

July 16, 2001 6:59 PM

TO: Secretary Paul O'Neill

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Safety

Attached is a memo that shows we are working the problem.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/13/01 Roche memo to SecDef re: USAF Safety Approaches

DHR:dh  
071601-69

929

16500

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July 7, 2001, 9:20am

TO: Jim Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

Jim,

Are you going to use Paul O'Neill's safety approach with respect to the F-16 crash?

*7/13*  
*RESPONSE ATTACHED.*

cam

11-L-0559/OSD/914

*7/16*  
*0620*

1.13  
1202

July 13, 2001

7/13

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: James Roche

SUBJECT: USAF Safety Approaches

---

Sir,

Re your query of July 7 on applying ALCOA's safety approach on the recent F-16 accident:

Our current flight safety procedures closely track with Paul O'Neill's program, and then some, particularly in regard to the emphasis on senior leadership involvement and visibility on flight safety issues. If anything, our reporting and remediation requirements on aviation fatalities and mishaps are even more stringent than ALCOA's industrial safety program. We would be happy to provide you with a detailed report on our actions following the recent F-16 incident, and our overall flight safety program (see attached chart 1 for relevant metric), at your convenience,

As you know, we've appreciated the productive reciprocal visits/ briefings we've had with the ALCOA team recently. And we do have some work to match ALCOA's record on injury-related lost workdays among our civilian workforce (see attached chart 2). We think we can apply more elements of the ALCOA approach in our 'non-flight' operations (ground operations, facilities and infrastructure maintenance, depots, etc.) We are currently formalizing the process for implementing these measures, and we would be happy to share the results of that effort as well.

V/R  


Attachments

1. Flight Safety
2. Lost Workday Injury Rates: USAF vs. ALCOA


Chart # 1



U.S. AIR FORCE

# Flight Safety

## A v i a t i o n F a t a l i t i e s / C l a s s A F l i g h t M i s h a p R a t e



*Integrity - Service- Excellence*

11-L-0559/OSD/916




Chart #2

# Lost Workday Injury Rates: USAF vs Alcoa

U.S. AIR FORCE

Lost wkday in. rate/200 K hrs



	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01
■ AF Civ rate	1.05	0.92	0.83	0.60	0.91	0.74	0.74	0.55	0.55	0.53	0.59	0.50
▲ AF rate (civ & mil)	0.47	0.41	0.35	0.31	0.35	0.29	0.30	0.24	0.23	0.21	0.26	0.24
◇ Alcoa rate	1.11	0.99	0.81	0.77	0.75	0.46	0.49	0.46	0.36	0.23	0.18	0.15
△ USAF rate (mil)	0.18	0.16	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.14	0.14	0.15

note: we need to do a lot better here.

USAF military injuries are on-duty. through 30 Apr 01; Alcoa rate us of 22 May 01.

31 May01

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/917

June 13, 2001 4:03 PM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUB SECT: Interim Brigade Combat Teams

Attached is a letter I received from the Chief of Staff some time back. I thought you might want to be aware of it.

Attach.  
4/16/01 CSA ltr to SecDef re: Interim Brigade Combat Teams

DHR:dh  
061301-33

*32*

*135000*

**U10945 /01**



UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

April 16, 2001

SECRET

2001 APR 26 11:11:07

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Now that the Interim Armored Vehicle protest has been decided, The Army is prepared to publicly announce the stationing locations for the next four of the six total programmed and funded Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Before The Army makes our public announcement, we will notify appropriate Members of Congress.

The Army has been carefully studying appropriate locations for the next four Interim Brigades. After a deliberate mobility study and analysis on potential regions for deployment, we decided that these brigade combat teams need to be located with an Asia orientation while maintaining a worldwide deployment capability. I have discussed this stationing with Admiral Denny Blair and have his strong support for locating Interim Brigade Combat Teams for rapid deployment within his Area of Operation.

The third Interim Brigade will be formed from the 172d Separate Infantry Brigade in Alaska, where it is best positioned to support operations in the Pacific Theater and other regions worldwide. The fourth Interim Brigade will be formed from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This brigade is currently the primary reconnaissance asset for the XVIII Airborne Corps, the Army's Rapid Reaction Corps, but today lacks the mobility and firepower necessary to accomplish its assigned missions. The fifth Interim Brigade will be converted from one of the two light infantry brigades of the 25<sup>th</sup> Division stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Stationing this force in Hawaii gives the Army a capability to deploy a division anywhere in the Pacific Ocean region. The sixth Interim Brigade will be converted from Army National Guard formations located in Pennsylvania.

The Army is announcing these Interim Brigade Combat Teams stationing now to include the requirements of these decisions in the 03-07 Program Objective Memorandum. As with all stationing decisions, we expect some resistance from a few Members of Congress; however, the Army has broad bipartisan support for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams.

Releasing this stationing decision helps The Army gain momentum to overcome the sixteen months of time lost due to the contract protest, bridges the operational gap that has existed since the end of the Cold War, and lays the foundation for the Army's Objective Force.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Eric Shinseki". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "E" and "S".

Eric K. Shinseki  
General, United States Army

December 13, 2001 7:45 AM

anon  
12/11/01

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Secretary of the Army

DDO Army

Please see me about this Tom White issue. I don't think he should have blanket authority at all, but I do think we need a policy. What should it be?

It is my personal opinion that they should not let both the Secretary and Under Secretary go out of town at the same time. They should have a policy like Paul and I do. If we can do it, why can't they?

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/05/01 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: MilAir [U19122-01]

DHR:dh  
121301-6

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Handwritten:*  
12/10  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
See me  
Larry see me  
He or Under Sec  
should always be  
in DC  
I am not persuaded  
by the argument.  
but felt he deserved  
your direct attention.  
I have denied previous  
requests from him  
for a blanket authority.  
D.Rita.

13 DEC 01

210  
210

005



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	12/12
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	12/5

ACTION MEMO

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

DEC 13 2001

December 5, 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action, \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

*Thomas E. White* DEC 5 2001

SUBJECT: Use of Military Aircraft by the Secretary of the Army for Unofficial Travel, December 22, 2001 through January 3, 2002

- Department of Defense Directive 4500.56, dated March 2, 1997, chapter 2.2, Authorized Uses of Air Travel, enables the Secretary of Defense to authorize, on a case-by-case basis, the use of military aircraft by his officials when on unofficial travel and deemed necessary to ensure safety, security and operational considerations.
- In accordance with the November 29, 2001 memorandum from the Office of the Executive Secretary, subject as above, I am requesting your authorization to utilize military aircraft for an upcoming personal trip to Aspen, Colorado on 22 December 2001 and pickup on January 3, 2002, to return to Washington, DC.
- The Under Secretary will be outside the continental United States visiting soldiers during the holiday season.
- The current political situation, as well as my duties as the Department of Defense's Executive Agent for Homeland Defense, requires that I have the added security that military aircraft can provide, i.e. limited time in or near commercial transportation terminals and the support of secure communications officer during my flight to and from Aspen.
- Should this request be approved, I will, of course, reimburse the government at full commercial coach fare for me and any dependents or personal guests traveling with me, in accordance with DOD 4500.56.

RECOMMENDATION: That the SecDef approve this request by initialing above.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Joel B. Hudson, 695-2442

SECDECISION: \_\_\_\_\_  
 APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_



019122-01

April 16, 2001 10:58 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Manpower

Please read this paper from Andy Marshall and the memo from Rudy de Leon on the Kagan paper, and let's have a meeting and discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach,  
4/1 O/O 1 Marshall memo to de Leon re: Kagan's Paper

DHR:dh  
041601-14

381

16 Apr 2001



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

ADVISOR  
FOR NET  
ASSESSMENT

*Get me a copy of Kagan's paper - 17 Sent*  
*PW*  
*52*

10 April, 01

MEMORANDUM FOR RUDY DE LEON

SUBJECT: Kagan's Paper

Thanks for the paper. I found it very interesting. In particular, and in addition to topics often addressed, he raises the need to prepare for mobilization in case a large-scale conflict threat emerges. DoD has largely dropped consideration of this possibility.

On the other hand he accepts that many Allies have substantially disarmed and count on us to protect them, which should be something we should try to change. In part of our broader national strategy should be to try to shift more of that burden back to the Allies. I sometimes say that we are an incompetent hegemon; very undemanding of Allies and friends. That makes our hegemony more acceptable and perhaps lasting. But in the mean while we have not succeeded in being paid for the services we provide, e.g. the relatively secure flow of oil from the Gulf.

Anyway, Kagan makes many good points. I probably agree a bit more than you do with the cautionary tales from history.

*Andy*  
A. W. Marshall

cc: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz



April 9, 2001

To: ✓ Andy Marshall  
cc: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
From: 'Rudy de Leon' R  
Subject: Strategy and Force Structure

Andy,

The attached paper is circulating around the Pentagon. While I don't agree with the historical analogies, it has a clear point of view and I wanted to make sure you had a copy.

It seems like the "ground forces" mafia is offering an alternative on strategy and force structure, largely that more ground forces are the hedge for the future.

As I said, I don't agree with the analogies but wanted to make sure you got a copy.

11-L-0559/OSD/925

## Strategy and Force Structure in an Interwar Period

Frederick W. Kagan  
Department of History  
U.S. Military Academy  
West Point, NY 10996-1793  
(845) 938-5591  
kf6328@usma.edu

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency or department of the United States government.

### Goal

America's primary national security goal in this interwar period must be to prolong the current epoch of peace and prosperity for as long as possible and to be ready to fight and win the conflict that will ultimately end it. The current era is not a "strategic pause," but an interwar period, and history suggests that the next major conflict will not be as far distant as many people imagine. Since 1648 there has been a full-scale conflict involving many of the world's major powers approximately every thirty years. Since 1783 the United States has deployed a significant military force into combat once every twenty years. To imagine that this cycle has ended with the end of the Cold War is wishful thinking not based on a careful analysis of the situation. It is not likely to be more accurate than the belief widely held just over a year ago that we had found a way to halt the economic cycle of booms and busts. Maintaining the current stability in today's international arena and preparing to face and deter or defeat a major adversary in the future are thus very urgent tasks. They cannot be put off, underresourced, or ignored except at grave peril to this nation.

The need to remain engaged and ready even in an era of relative peace is the most difficult challenge a liberal democracy can face. The track record of such states in such situations is extremely poor. After the end of the Crimean War and the end of the Wars of German Unification, Great Britain largely disengaged from the international situation and maintained a peacetime army so small that German leaders quipped that they would "have it arrested" if the British landed in Germany to support one of their allies. As a result, Britain conspicuously failed to prevent a series of wars in the 1860s and 1870s, and failed utterly to deter the Germans in 1914, with disastrous consequences despite the fact that England ultimately won the war. The tale of British weakness, appeasement, and consequent failure to deter Hitler in the 1930s is too well known to bear repetition here. America's refusal to remain engaged in Europe following World War I greatly facilitated the efforts of Hitler and Mussolini to destroy the peace, at a very high price in American lives when we were drawn into the war that followed. American failure to manage the international situation in the Pacific during those same years, although less frequently remarked upon, was, in fact, much more spectacular and led directly to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for which we were completely unprepared.

The only time in recent history when a liberal democracy has retained in peacetime the forces necessary to deter its enemies and ultimately win without fighting was the Cold War. For almost half a century, with conspicuous ups and downs, the U.S. maintained fighting forces strong enough to convince the Soviet Union that victory was unlikely, and our willingness to engage in significant conflict in Korea and Vietnam, whatever the regional results of those conflicts, helped show the Soviets that we were serious. That engagement was possible largely because the Soviets were so clearly and obviously an imminent threat to our security and way of life. We knew who our enemy was, we knew where the war would be fought, and we could work out what we had to do to win it. It was also relatively easier to persuade the American people of the need for large peacetime expenditures on defense because the threat was so clear and immediate. At the same time, America's leaders in the late 1940s and 1950s had learned the lessons of Munich and were determined to avoid them. The careful study and application of history at that time played a powerful role in guiding the nation through fifty years of near-conflict and constant tension.

The fact that there is no apparent threat makes our task much harder. It has returned us to a situation much like the 1920s, when our weakness and disengagement laid the groundwork for the disasters of the 1930s. Failure to behave responsibly then greatly foreshortened the peaceful era that was taken for granted, and it left both the British and the United States completely unprepared for the war that followed. The result in both cases was hundreds of thousands of casualties, many of which could have been avoided. In Britain's case, another consequence was the loss of her dominant world position and the permanent relegation to second-class status. Only by now recalling the clear lessons of history and recognizing that military preparedness and the maintenance of adequate military forces are as urgent in periods of apparent peace as they are in periods of obvious tension can we hope to avoid falling into the same trap.

### *Strategic Tasks*

Achieving this goal requires the accomplishment of three major tasks: 1) Shaping the international environment constantly so as to maintain stability in regions of vital interest to the U.S. and to deter aggression anywhere; 2) Maintaining the ability clearly to defeat at least two major regional aggressors simultaneously; 3) Preparing our armed forces for the possibility of larger-scale conflict in the future.

### *Shaping the International Environment*

The purpose of so-called "operations other than war" such as U.S. missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti is two-fold. We must, on the one hand, maintain peace and stability in regions of vital national interest, such as Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Failure to act to maintain stability in those regions will create power vacuums when traditional stability structures collapse. Those vacuums may spread, as instability crosses borders and infects or involves neighboring states. Or they may be filled by states antagonistic to the United States, and the instability used to harm our interests. The likelihood that power vacuums will be filled by our friends is very low, as most of the nations allied to the U.S. have disarmed even more thoroughly than we have, and have psychologically off-loaded the responsibility for maintaining peace onto our

shoulders. If we do not act to maintain stability and peace in a region, we must assume that instability and conflict there will continue and even worsen.

On the other hand, we must make it clear that we will not tolerate the use of force to change the international situation. This is an application of the "broken-window" theory of urban renewal to international relations. If it is apparent to would-be aggressors that their use of force against their neighbors or even against their own people will be opposed rapidly and forcefully, then most if not all are likely to be deterred even from trying. If, on the other hand, we permit the "broken windows" of the world, whether in Somalia, Haiti, or the Balkans to remain broken, we send the message to would-be aggressors that we will not oppose them. That message is likely to encourage the boldest of them to try to revise the international order by force to suit them better. In the best case, then, we will be drawn into a much more serious conflict against a more dangerous adversary through our failure to engage in a smaller scale conflict against a weaker one. In the worst case, if we fail that test as well either by agreeing to unacceptable conditions or by failing to engage the aggressor at all, we will be laying the groundwork for the extremely rapid destruction of a peaceful world order. Peacekeeping and stability operations always support a vital American national interest, wherever they may be. They support the interest of maintaining a peaceful and stable world, and there is no state that benefits more from such a world or would suffer more from its disappearance than the U.S.

#### *Major Theater War*

Although the U.S. armed forces are most likely to be engaged in small-scale contingencies on a day-to-day basis, they must above all be ready to meet the challenge of a major regional aggressor at all times at virtually no notice. In fact, they must be ready to meet two such challenges at once.

Failure to be prepared for a major theater conflict will have disastrous consequences. In the best scenario, we may find ourselves refighting the Korean War, taking unnecessary casualties, with partially-trained units breaking and confusion rampant. Although we ultimately recovered from our initial unpreparedness, the cost was extremely high. In the worst scenario, we may simply decide not to oppose the aggressor, which would have all of the negative consequences of failing in a smaller-scale challenge outlined above only at a much higher and more serious level. It is highly unlikely that we will lose a major theater conflict in the foreseeable future--that is not at issue. But the costs of unpreparedness, both in terms of unnecessary casualties and in the possibility of self-deterrence, are potentially very high.

It has become fashionable in recent years to claim that the "2-MRC" force sizing paradigm is unnecessary and simply an argument for the status quo. Since the Bottom-Up Review of 1993 more or less explicitly tied the concept to two specific enemies--Iraq and North Korea--and since those enemies now seem so weak, many argue that we can safely abandon this conception altogether. It is further argued that abandoning the 2-MRC requirement would allow us to reduce our standing armed forces and refocus resources either on domestic concerns or on transformation strategies for the armed forces. Both assumptions are wrong.

First, the United States has never maintained a true 2-MRC capability since the time of the Bottom-Up Review. Careful study of the origins and development of the

force structure adopted at that time reveals that even its originators did not believe that it was capable of dealing with two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. Nor was General Colin Powell confident that even the larger structure dubbed the Base Force in 1991 was capable of dealing with two such wars at the same time. In testimony in 1992, General Powell stated that dealing simultaneously with a DESERT STORM contingency at the same time as a Korean contingency would push U.S. forces to "the breaking point" and that the U.S. would then "no longer have the capability to deal with anything else that might happen elsewhere in the world."<sup>1</sup> That is not a true 2-MRC capability, and, of course, the armed forces have been cut significantly even since General Powell made that statement. Abandoning the 2-MRC force-sizing construct does not provide any honest or rational basis for reducing the armed forces.

Second, the 2-MRC requirement is not simply a randomly-generated force-sizing construct. It is a vital component of any rational strategy. Failure to maintain a force capable of dealing simultaneously with two major theater wars means that, in contemplating the response to one major act of aggression, the president must be prepared to be unable to respond to any others for the duration of the conflict. Such an inability will likely have two consequences. First, the national command authority is very likely to shirk from committing all or most of its disposable forces to a single contingency if doing so will leave U.S. interests and allies around the world utterly vulnerable. The likelihood is that WC will once again be self-deterred and fail to take action essential to protecting our interests and maintaining the peace and stability of the world.

This is precisely what happened to the British in the 1920s and 1930s. Faced with the need to contemplate major theater conflicts in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, Britain nevertheless did not support armed forces to meet even a 2-MRC standard, let alone the 3-MRC danger they faced. As a result during the Corfu crisis of 1923, the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-6 and Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the British military leaders repeatedly advised against taking action on the grounds that doing so would expose vital national interests in the Far East to Japanese aggression. In part as a result of that advice, Britain did not respond adequately to any of those crises and so paved the way for further aggression, especially on the part of a Hitler now encouraged in his boldness and England's paralysis. This threat is no less real for America today.

Second, the fact, known to the world, that a great power can meet only one major challenge at a time makes it infinitely more likely that a second aggressor will take advantage of that power's preoccupation with the first. There can be no doubt that Britain's exclusive focus on the European conflict in 1941 was a critical precondition to the Japanese attack on British--and American--possessions in December of that year. Britain looked to the U.S. to protect her interests in the Far East, but one cannot control the military policy of one's would-be allies. In that instance, British interests suffered because of America's unwisdom--all because Britain had not maintained the force necessary to deal with two major threats at the same time. As a result, although Britain ultimately won the war, her position in the Far East, and in the world, was seriously compromised, and thousands of English soldiers and sailors lost their lives needlessly to fight a war that could have been deterred. There is no reason now for, say, an Iraq to sign a treaty with a North Korea. But should the U.S. become involved in one region with no

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<sup>1</sup> See *While America Sleeps*, p. 296.

capability to respond in the second: we may well encourage an attack upon our interest: and allies by that very weakness by a state that, to that point, had not seriously contemplated attacking us. Abandoning the 2-MRC capability creates vulnerabilities that will be readily apparent to prospective foes, and will, in itself, be a destabilizing factor in the world today.

### *Preparing for Large-Scale Conflict*

Major theater wars are by no means the limit of the dangers the U.S. may face within the next few decades. Although there is no state now that can challenge us globally, it is not at all inconceivable that such a threat might arise, either in the form of a single state like Russia or China that devotes all its energies into obtaining such a capability, or in the form of a coalition of states that arises to challenge our current hegemony. In that regard, the steady improvement in relations between Russia and China that has gone largely unremarked upon over the last few years may be an ominous sign.

It has been commonplace in strategic discussions over the last decade to assert that the U.S. would have ample warning of the rise of such a state or coalition, and that we would have plenty of time in which to prepare our own forces to meet and deter or defeat that challenge. The truth is that that confidence is unwarranted. We probably will have considerable warning of the rise of a major challenger, but the warning that tells the strategist and the force planner that it is time to rearm is almost always insufficient to convince the democratic leader and legislature to do so. The rise of Hitler to power in 1933 should have been warning enough to Great Britain, and, indeed, her military leaders had already concluded in 1932 that the time to rearm had come. But it was only the crises of 1935-1936, coupled with the rapid expansion of the *Luftwaffe*, that convinced the politicians to support massive increases in defense spending, and by then it was too late.

There is absolutely no reason to imagine that the U.S. will behave more responsibly in a similar situation. Our desire to maintain peace, in fact, is likely to work against it, for as potential enemies arise, there is always a powerful desire to avoid provoking them with large arms build-ups. What is more, the event that triggered the rise of Hitler and Germany's turn toward aggression was the Great Depression--an event that also seriously hampered Britain's ability to respond. It is not at all unlikely that a major global economic slowdown will be the event that precipitates--quite without warning and unpredictably--the growth of our next major adversary. We, like the English in the 1930s, are likely to focus on the domestic consequences of that economic crisis for far too long at the expense of starting the prudent rearmament relied upon by those who think there will be time enough to respond when the danger is clear.

We must, rather, be considering even now what will be necessary to meet a major challenge in the future, and taking such steps as are possible to prepare for it. It is a matter of grave concern, in this regard, that America's military industrial base has been so dramatically contracted in tandem with the reduction of our armed forces over the past decade. The defense conversion efforts that have been made a priority since the end of the Cold War have succeeded too well. It is highly likely that when the next major crisis arises: we will find ourselves unable to spend the money that a nervous Congress appropriates because there will be no industrial firms to take the contracts. This is precisely what occurred in England in the mid-1930s. Her military industry had

atrophied and converted to civilian production during the lean years of peace, and when Parliament finally authorized dramatically increased expenditures on defense, the money literally could not be spent. This is the sort of problem that can only be addressed over the long term--when the crisis is upon us it will be far too late.

Cutting the armed forces excessively will also prove very harmful to long-term preparation for major war. To contemplate major conflict, we must be prepared to expand the armed forces dramatically. That expansion will require a significant cadre of experienced leaders at all levels of command who can train others even as they command their units. A force that is too small will not be able to meet that challenge, with the result that training will be rushed and haphazard, and units will be sent into combat in the hands of inexperienced and untried leaders--exactly the situation we faced during World War II, with painful consequences. We must remember at all times that, although the armed forces are sized primarily to deal with current and likely future contingencies, we cannot entirely ignore the need to be able to expand them rapidly should unforeseen circumstances require us to do so.

### *Conclusion*

These three tasks must all be achieved at the same time. We cannot afford to put one off in favor of the others, for they all accomplish different and essential parts of the same whole. We must be continually engaged in shaping the international environment by the use of force and its threat, and by stability and peacekeeping operations when appropriate. These operations signal to potential disturbers of the international peace our unwillingness to tolerate such disruptions, and are likely to have a profound dampening effect on the efforts of those who seek to alter the current international order that suits us so well. We must always be prepared to deter and defeat major theater adversaries, and real preparation in this area must mean the ability to defeat at least two such threats at the same time. Because of the danger of self-deterrence, the truth is that a "one-MRC" capability is really a "no-MRC" capability. Lastly we must never lose sight of the possibility that we will one day face a significant global challenge, and that preparations to meet that challenge will be too late when it is upon us. To "take advantage" of the current peaceful era in order to focus on other priorities, as many now urge, is to ignore our responsibility to act prudently to safeguard the nation's security. The best way to take advantage of the current era of peace is to prolong it as long as possible, but only aggressive involvement in the world and the maintenance of adequate armed forces to accomplish all three of the tasks outlined above will make that possible.

### *Technological Change*

In addition to the three main tasks that any leading state in an era of peace must perform, the U.S. faces the additional challenge today of transforming its armed forces to be able to fight and win as the nature of war itself rapidly changes. This challenge is particularly great precisely because our apparent technological lead is so large that many people do not seriously believe that an enemy will ever be able to challenge us technologically. As a result, technological transformation now presents two great dangers. First, we are likely to be too complacent, to put off transformation, avoid fielding systems, and defer costs on the grounds that we still have a comfortable lead. The likely result of that course of action will be to fail to prepare the armed forces to fight

the wars of the future. Second, we may be led into the comfortable belief that we have found a technological panacea that makes it unnecessary to maintain large armed forces at all, since small, highly-technical forces seem now to be so devastatingly effective. The danger there is that we will move toward having the best, most technically advanced brigade in the world, that will be over-whelmed by much larger, if far less technologically sophisticated, foes.

Such was the fate that the British Expeditionary Force suffered in 1914. At that time Britain was the only major power to retain a long-service volunteer force rather than one based on universal military service and a trained reserve. As a result, the BEF was by far the best combat force in the world in 1914, and it fought with incredible skill and tenacity against the German attack. But it had been far too small to deter that attack, it was too small to stop it, and it was wiped out almost to a man in the attempt. As a result, Britain was forced to sit the war out in 1915 and into 1916 as a new force was raised and trained from scratch. That force, in its turn, inadequately trained and inexpertly led, suffered horrendous casualties in the remaining years of the war and came very near to complete collapse before the U.S. was drawn into the conflict.

Worse still, since the emphasis on technology now is on long-range precision-guided munitions, we may come to imagine that our global presence is unnecessary, because we can respond decisively with forces based in CONUS. Action taken on such a conviction could be catastrophic. It makes sense only when military capabilities are divorced entirely from the strategic goals they are designed to accomplish, which occurs in academic discussions, but not in the real world. Our forward presence in the world signals our commitment to opposing aggression and maintaining peace. Withdrawing forces from their forward positions would automatically and immediately greatly increase global instability by making the statement that America is no longer as committed to the peace as she had been. We may tell ourselves and others that that is not true--that we are just as committed only now we seek to use new systems to accomplish the old aims, but we will not be believed. For over half a century the U.S. has taught the world to understand that our seriousness about our commitments in any given region can be measured by the presence or absence of our troops deployed in that region, and not by our global strike capabilities. Global strike capabilities did not deter North Korea in 1950, North Vietnam in the 1960s, Saddam Hussein in 1990, or Slobodan Milosevic thereafter. They are unlikely to deter potential aggressors in the future.

We must also not lose sight of the fact that a mixture of ground forces, theater air and missile forces, and global strike capabilities is far more powerful and effective than simply global strike capabilities alone. When an enemy knows that he faces only a missile attack, he can turn off his radars, bury his equipment, disperse his forces, and sit tight. If his will does not break under our attack--and there is considerable historical evidence to suggest that it will not--then we will have only two options. We will either have to abandon the conflict without achieving our objectives, or we will have to exterminate the enemy's armed forces to a man. Even then, we may well fail of achieving our objectives if we still fight shy of deploying ground forces to secure them. Air power can only provide an argument, however persuasive, that the enemy should change his way of doing business. Ground forces can force him to do so whether we persuade him or not.

For when ground forces or the threat of their deployment are added to the mix of precision-strike systems: then the enemy's task is greatly complicated. Now he must maintain his forces in combat formations, which provide better targets for our missile strikes, he must keep his radar on and his communications going, making it easier to hit those targets as well. In short, by eliminating the possibility that ground forces will be deployed, we will greatly complicate our efforts to use our precision-strike capabilities, and we may fail of our objectives entirely. The history of the military art is the history of the increasing integration of all types of forces into combined-arms and joint units that bring to bear an array of capabilities against the enemy. The forces that have performed that integration best have almost always won--those that have failed to integrate all of their capabilities have generally lost.

All of which is to say that technological transformation must be a fully joint endeavor. It must be tied to an agreed-upon vision of future warfare, but it must be a flexible enough vision to allow us to meet the unforeseen changes in war and the international environment that we are certain to encounter. Above all, it must be undertaken much more urgently than hitherto. Our apparent technological lead is illusory. It rests more upon the fact that no state has been working very hard recently to prepare to fight us. We depend on computerization very heavily for our advantages, and yet civilian computer technology is rapidly spreading across the globe. If an enemy concludes that war with us is imminent, we can be certain that he will find ways rapidly to convert that civilian technology for military purposes, and we will be shocked to discover our technological lead evaporating much more rapidly than we had ever thought possible.

We must never lose sight, in this regard, of the fact that the next war will almost certainly begin at a time and place of the enemy's choosing, not of our own. That means that when the enemy thinks that he has the best-chance of success, then is when he will attack. Our own delays and failure to maintain and deploy adequate armed forces may even encourage a pre-emptive enemy attack, as happened in 1939. Hitler was well aware that by 1942 the British were going to field large and modern armed forces equipped with excellent aircraft and decent tanks. His determination to attack Poland in 1939 resulted in part from the feeling that it was then or never. We must be careful to ensure that we are never presenting the enemy with a window of temptation during which he may hope to succeed before we are ready for him, but the current pace of our technological transformation suggests that we will be doing precisely that.

This consideration highlights the fact that transformation cannot come at the expense of readiness to accomplish the three main tasks described above. If we cut down our current capabilities to prepare for future transformation, we will signal to our enemies that now is their time to prepare and act before it is too late. In this way, the simple fact of our adopting such a military policy will be destabilizing internationally and will act to encourage, rather than deter, war in the middle distance. We must accomplish transformation while also maintaining the full spectrum of other necessary capabilities.

### *Force Structure Considerations*

Our current force structure is based upon a completely unfounded assumption: that the U.S. active armed forces in 1990 were prepared to fight and defeat a Soviet attack and that, since the Soviet threat was clearly so much greater than any threat or

combination of threats we now face, armed forces in this interwar period should necessarily be smaller and less costly. This assumption is not in accord with historical reality, and it prejudices the question of what force structure we need, coming to what is clearly a wrong answer.

America's strategy during the Cold War was supported by three separate military pillars: our nuclear forces, our conventional forces, and NATO's forces, both nuclear and conventional. By far the most important elements of that strategy from the standpoint of deterring the Soviets were America's nuclear forces within Europe and without, and the independent nuclear forces of France and England. The ground forces of Great Britain, France, and Germany, moreover, added 18 heavy and 6 light divisions to America's forces in the theater, bringing the total number of immediately available divisions to almost 43. Such a force might conceivably have been able to halt the advance of the more than 200 divisions in the Soviet order of battle and those of their Warsaw Pact allies as NATO hoped. It is certain that American forces alone could not have met that threat nor were they ever intended to.

But in the post-Cold War world, only America's active-duty conventional forces remain to be figured into the calculus of responding to major regional aggressors. It is universally believed that the United States would never use nuclear weapons against a regional foe, at least as long as that foe refrained from using weapons of mass destruction of its own (and probably not even then). Our nuclear capabilities, therefore, so important to deterring the Soviets, have become irrelevant with regard to regional aggressors today. Nor can we rely upon NATO's forces to take up the challenge with us. In the first place, NATO's forces are not ours to command. Their significant involvement in any campaign, particularly an out-of-area campaign as any MRC or smaller scale conflict is likely to be, will require time to convince them to join us and to work out the arrangements for their participation. In the second place, all of our NATO allies have their armed forces at least as dramatically as we have. The only forces the U.S. can rely upon to be in existence and ready to deter or oppose regional aggressors are its own.

Finally, the conventional armed forces maintained during the Cold War were always merely the leading edge of America's military power. War with the Soviet Union would certainly be a war of national mobilization. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of Americans would have had to be drawn into the war to see it through to the end. The provision of standing conventional forces, then, represented a calculation of what was necessary to halt or delay a Soviet advance for long enough to allow the nations to mobilize behind that shield, not an evaluation of what would be necessary to win the war. MRCs are *not* wars of national mobilization. Whatever conventional forces are maintained in peacetime will be the only forces available to pursue such conflicts. Mobilization could result only from real military catastrophe.

If we consider more carefully the likely flow of events of a major theater war, moreover, it becomes clear that our force posture is as wrong as our force structure. The MTW of the future is likely to begin when an enemy attacks a regional ally of the U.S. It will begin on the enemy's timetable when he feels that he is ready and we are not. Our likely foes have probably all learned the salient lesson of the Gulf War--don't let the Americans build up. Their plans, therefore, will likely be designed on the one hand to deny us access to the region in a timely manner and, on the other, to culminate in a situation acceptable to them before we can respond in a meaningful way. Our task,

therefore, will be to respond rapidly and decisively to a fast-paced no-notice attack in the face of considerable efforts at denying us access to the region. If we are able to accomplish that task, then the likelihood of rapid and relatively inexpensive success is high. If we are unable to do so, then the likelihood that the war will drag out, perhaps reaching stalemate, certainly imposing a great burden upon us, probably inflicting higher casualties upon us and our allies than we had expected or were prepared to bear, becomes very high. Speed and decisiveness of response will be the keys.

It is true that the equipment the Army currently fields militates against such a rapid deployment, and that issue must be carefully addressed, although it is essential not to compromise our forces' lethality and survivability once they arrive in theater. But transformation plans that focus only or even primarily on the technology miss the main point here. The real test will be how many forces we have ready to go at no notice at any given time. The short answer to that question is that one third of our force can be expected to be ready at any moment, while another third trains up to relieve it and the last third stands down from its ready-to-deploy status. The basic force-sizing metric, therefore, must be that our forces must be large enough that one-third of them will be able to deploy to and decisively halt or defeat a large-scale attack.

This metric must not be applied to our potential foes as they are now, however. For if it is true, as many believe, that Iraq for certain and North Korea in all likelihood could not attack with any reasonable hope of success now even in the face of a minimal U.S. commitment, then they will not attack now. Instead, if they (or other states) are determined to take actions that will bring them into conflict with us, they are almost certain to wait until they are better prepared for the struggle. Our forces must be sized, therefore: not against what our enemies can field today, but against what they could field in five or ten years if they now set their minds to creating forces that could defeat us. It should be immediately apparent that, for instance, our ten-division Army, yielding in principle (but not in practice due to budget-related training shortfalls) three ready divisions at any moment, could not face such a threat, nor will the three air expeditionary forces the Air Force might reasonably expect to keep on alert at all times be enough to handle the tasks that would fall to them in such a conflict. The precise size of the force cannot be calculated without reference to possible threats and possible theaters and possible missions: information to which we do not have access, but it seems unlikely that any force short of fifteen divisions and fifteen AEFs could be adequate to this task.

Forces needed to conduct smaller scale operations such as Bosnia and Haiti cannot be drawn from this pool for an extended period of time. To do so will be to cut into our ability to respond to no-notice attacks, and that fact will not be lost on potential adversaries--we may, once again, create windows of temptation for potential aggressors. The record of the past decade suggests that we will need another division-equivalent on call all the time, prepared to deploy to sustained operations in smaller scale contingencies around the world.

Finally, it is time to abandon the Cold War model of organization in the Army. The Air Force and Marines have already largely done so. The Army, however, still retains the division as the basic maneuver unit and the corps as the fundamental chess-piece in the operational theater. It still attempts to benefit from the economies of scale such an organization provides in the areas of combat support and combat service support units. Unfortunately, the Army has not, on the whole, deployed divisions this past

decade, but has sent brigade-sized units hither and yon as necessary, supported by CS and CSS units drawn from the division and corps support groups. As a result, when one brigade deploys, the ability of the entire division to train and/or deploy suffers. At the same time, divisions do not train to fight as a unit: rather the Army trains one brigade at a time. In order to send forces at no notice into a large-scale conflict, therefore, the Army would either have to send divisions that were a hodge-podge of ready and unready units or it would have to cobble together the ready brigades from all of the divisions in the force. It is time to break this pattern, and the concepts laid out by Douglas MacGregor *Breaking the Phalanx* point the way to one solution. MacGregor would create all-arms brigade-sized units with robust organic CS and CSS able to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves independently. Whether we choose the precise program he outlines or another similar one, it seems clear from a strategic perspective that such an organizational transformation is essential.

### *Conclusion*

America stands today at a crossroads. We can either address the serious underfunding from which our armed forces have suffered for the past decade, undertake the reorganization, re-equipping, and re-orientation of our forces so badly needed in this interwar period, and take seriously the tasks we must accomplish in order to maintain the peace, or we can withdraw from international involvements, cut our forces, reduce our preparedness, fail to transform, and reap the whirlwind that we will have sown. It lies largely in our hands today whether the world will continue to have peace over the long term or whether the present era of stability and prosperity will collapse quickly. Our hope of doing the right thing lies in learning the lessons of history and avoiding the mistakes that we and others have already made.

July 16, 2001 2:07 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: MTW Strategy

381

Here is Tom White's proposal on some ideas relating to pros and cons of the strategy.

**Thanks.**

Attach.  
6/21/01 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Strategy

DHR:dh  
071601-30

16374/01

U12629 /02



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

June 21, 2001, 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:  Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JUN 21 2001

SUBJECT: Strategy

Some comments on the strategy arguments:

. OLD (2MTW).

- FOR:

- If it's there, it isn't broken.
  - . 2MTW strategy is not executable at current force levels; everybody knows it; therefore, strategy is not credible to those who must execute it.
- We understand it; change is hard; must have something better.
  - Whether we have something better or not remains to be proven in the QDR exercise. If we make the analytical case, change will be welcomed and consequently not so hard.
- Attempts to change . . . reduced forces . . . never get back.
  - Force requirements must be strategy driven. Can't prejudge at this point whether more or less structure will be required. If new strategy requires less forces, we won't need to "get them back." However, at this point the new strategy may require more, not less force.

- AGAINST:

- It is 10 years old . . .
  - . The 10-year part is least important; we worried about the Soviets in Central Europe for longer than that. The key point is the new strategic environment; players, threats, etc.
- We currently lack . . .
  - . True, although "lie" is a bit strong, it's a matter of risk. The current strategy with current resources is extremely high risk. So change the strategy, change the resources, bring on new technology/capabilities; the sum total over the mid and long-

term should bring into alignment at reasonable risk levels strategy and resources.

- It causes **OPTEMPO** damage . . .
  - True. Critical constraint on force sizing in new construction is reasonable **OPTEMPO** level. Also, note that **OPTEMPO** currently is not driven by **2MTW**; rather, by smaller contingencies. Thus, our force sizing to include these contingencies in the new formulation is a better way to do it.
  
- Because we are so stressed . . .
  - Readiness has dropped because our predecessors failed to resource the **OPTEMPO** of the force. You could, theoretically, sustain readiness of the current structure at current **OPTEMPO** levels by spending a lot more money. They failed to do that.
  
- In striving . . .
  - True. Not only are we about 10 years late in beginning a transformation of the Army, but, we have not paid the bill to recapitalize/modernize the existing force. Crusader and Comanche, the only new major systems to hit the Army since the “big 5” of the early 1980s, are at least 5 years late because of under **resourcing**.
  
- It is so out-of-date . . .
  - You have two choices: Resource properly the current strategy or set in place a new strategy reflective of current and future conditions and resource against it. In either case, you most likely spend more money. It makes sense to spend it on the right stuff.

## NEW STRATEGY.

### - FOR:

- This is a more likely scenario . . .
  - Our considered judgment says it is; at the very least, it is more current thinking. It is, in fact (easy to prove) the way we currently use the force so it gives us a firm basis to build on.
  
- Using this as a sizing mechanism . . .

- . We are treating unique missions (chemical/homeland defense) as additional force requirements, depicts how we will actually use the force.
- It is less stressful to personnel and equipment.
  - If we stay true to the TOR and apply reasonable OPTEMPO constraints on force sizing, this will be the case.
- It should permit investment in people . . .
  - . It must permit investment in people and the infrastructure that supports them. I think this point receives considerable discussion in the TOR. The OPTEMPO constraint on force sizing is also a people/readiness related issue.
- It should permit a trade-off. . .
  - . The trade off is between investments in the threat-driven near-term force (recap/modernization) and the **capabilities-driven** mid/long-term force (transformation). Clearly, the TOR requires a balance between the two. In the past, transformation has been relatively underfunded compared to readiness.
- AGAINST:
  - It could lead to force reductions . . .
    - Forces are only useful if they support a strategy. To the extent the new strategy requires structure changes, up or down, we must resource the resulting force.
  - The world's only superpower . . .
    - The TOR requires forces in all critical areas capable of defeating an attack with little outside reinforcement while requiring resources to win decisively in one such area concurrently. Thus, we are capable of significant operations concurrently in all critical areas.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel, 703-695-1717

July 31, 2001 2:05 PM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Role of the Army

I ran across this memo. I believe Jim Haynes, our DoD General Counsel, may have written it when he was General Counsel of the Army.

After you read it, let me know what you think of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/15/93 GC Army memo to SecArmy, COS Army: "The Role of the Department of the Army in the Department of Defense"

DHR:dh  
073101-39

*020 Army*

*31 Jul 01*

U12670 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/941



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20310-0104



January 15, 1993

*Le*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: The Role of the Department of the Army in the  
Department of Defense

The proper role of the Department of the Army within the Department of Defense is an issue that we have discussed at length. The changes wrought by the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation have led to manifold increases in the power, authority, and discretion of the military-led components of the Department of Defense, sometimes at the expense of the civilian-led Military Departments. In particular, combatant commanders (also known as commanders-in-chief (CINCs))<sup>1</sup> have been assigned a number of functions previously performed by the Departments. The Joint Staff concurrently has become much more powerful. The functions and responsibilities left for the Departments to perform, while still substantial, are more and more diminished. The draft of the "Roles and Missions" report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only confirms this tendency.<sup>2</sup>

These trends are direct products of many forces, including duly enacted laws of the land. Nevertheless, some aspects of these trends are unfortunate, in that the Military Departments serve a vital function. As opposed to the combatant commands, the Departments

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<sup>1</sup>It may be more appropriate to refer to "combatant commanders" rather than to "CINCs," because the former phrase is used in title 10 and also emphasizes a somewhat more limited role for the commanders of unified and specified commands. Furthermore, in my opinion, there is only one Commander-in-Chief -- the President. (The term "war-fighting CINCs" has no apparent official founding in law or regulation.)

<sup>2</sup>Among other things, the report calls for a unified command to handle military assistance to civil authorities and for the consolidation of depot maintenance responsibilities.

reflect our society's historical ambivalence toward military authority. I believe that the key to maintaining the Departments' viability is the combination of strong and efficient civilian leadership together with an authoritative and powerful Chief of Staff.

What follows is a short history of the evolution of the allocation of authority between civilian and military leadership in the Department of the Army, an examination of some of the recent trends and changes in the area of Service roles and functions, and a discussion of possible responses to the recent developments.

### I. The Historical Department of the Army

On June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress created the predecessor of the United States Army by authorizing a mustering of troops.<sup>3</sup> George Washington was appointed the next day as commander of the Continental forces. To ensure against military overreaching, Congress required Washington to report to congressional committees set up to oversee the war effort.<sup>4</sup> These committees, embodying the concept of civilian control over the military, are the precursors of the modern Department of the Army.

The original congressional committees were formed on an ad hoc basis, however and this ephemeral management structure therefore impeded effective administration of the revolutionary forces. In response to a plea from General Washington, Congress created the Board of War and Ordnance on June 12, 1776. The Board was charged with "the raising, fitting out, and dispatching [of] all such land forces as may be ordered for the service of the United Colonies." The duties of the seven members of the Board became onerous, and Congress soon created a new Board, composed of persons who were not members of Congress. The Board had continuing difficulties in retaining its full complement of members. Simultaneously, sentiment for a stronger central government was growing. These factors led

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<sup>3</sup>2 Worthington C. Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, at 89-90; see also 3 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington.

<sup>4</sup>2 Ford, supra note 3, at 100-01.

Congress on February 7, 1781 to create a War Department, patterned after the British model. The head of the War Department was the Secretary at War [sic], who was responsible for the former Board of War's duties, oversight of the military, and also for transmitting and executing Congress' orders. Congress appointed a military officer, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, as the first Secretary at War. According to one military historian,

Congress did not trouble itself to define clearly the respective functions of the Secretary and the commander in chief [i.e., General Washington], but Lincoln and Washington were able to work out a satisfactory arrangement. On matters of reorganization and demobilization of the Army they conferred together, both in writing and through visits. Though the Secretary theoretically headed the military establishment, he left actual control of the armies in the field to Washington and, in the South, Nathanael Greene. At the same time, he relieved Washington of various routine administrative duties that had thitherto burdened him, such as matters involving prisoners of war, courts-martial, and the issuing of discharge papers.<sup>5</sup>

After George Washington, no officer was formally designated to command the entire Army in the early Federal period. Instead, commanders of Army components reported directly to the retitled Secretary of War.<sup>6</sup>

Despite this auspicious beginning, the division of authority between the civilian and the military leadership of the Army has since been a contentious one. Congress created the position of Commanding General of the Army in 1821 but failed to resolve the constitutionally and practically important issue of ultimate control of the Army. The Secretary of War and the Commanding General could not simultaneously control the Army, and one position would lose stature if the other position was granted primacy.

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<sup>5</sup>Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army 48 (1984).

<sup>6</sup>See id. at 594-95.

Depending on personalities, the debate flared occasionally during the nineteenth century, as when Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and Commanding General Winfield Scott sparred over the question of whether Scott could authorize his own travel reimbursements.<sup>7</sup>

The unstable relationship between the Secretary and the Commanding General continued until the Chief of Staff position was created as a result of reforms instituted by Secretary of War Elihu Root around the turn of the century. Root, a former corporate lawyer, took office in 1899 and was immediately confronted with the task of resolving organizational problems within the Army leadership exposed by the Spanish-American War.

In that conflict, the Army experienced difficulties in coordinating the actions of the independent-minded military bureaus (Washington-based organizations responsible for support activities such as supply, transport, and accounting) with the needs of the units in the field. These difficulties stemmed in part from the division of authority between the Secretary of War, who nominally controlled the bureaus, and the Commanding General of the Army, who controlled the units. One notorious incident arose when tons of supplies for Army units in Cuba were left rotting at railheads in Tampa, Florida.

Another organizational problem brought to light by the Spanish-American War was the absence of long-term strategic or logistical planning. Prior to the war, no plans had been drafted for the mobilization of large numbers of soldiers or for the procurement of large quantities of supplies. Previous Secretaries and Commanding Generals had not viewed such planning as within their purview. To put it mildly, this neglect led to a certain degree of disarray when hostilities commenced.

Root proposed to resolve these problems within the Army leadership by creating a General Staff, under the control of a Chief of Staff, who in turn reported to the Secretary. In addition to consulting military authors and critics, Root drew on his experience with corporate forms of organization in suggesting a consolidation of the

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<sup>7</sup>See *id.* at 193-94.

Army's structure through a General Staff.<sup>8</sup>

In his 1902 Report of the Secretary of War, Root advised that the title of the Commanding General of the Army should be changed to "Chief of Staff":

When an officer is appointed to the position of "Commanding General of the Army" he naturally expects to command, himself, with a high degree of independence, following his own ideas rather than the ideas of others. . . . The title of Chief of Staff, on the other hand, denotes a duty to advise, inform, and assist a superior officer who has command, and to represent him, acting in his name and by his authority in carrying out his policies and securing the execution of his commands.<sup>9</sup>

Root supported his conclusions by noting that the Constitution requires civilian control over the military (through its provision making the President commander-in-chief of the armed forces) and that numerous statutes required the Secretary of War to expend the monies appropriated for the support of the Army. Therefore, particularly in times of peace, the Commanding General possessed little or no independent authority and was required to act in conformity with the views of the Secretary of War and the President.<sup>10</sup>

Root's reforms were enacted into law in 1903. The statute created a General Staff, whose duties were to prepare plans for the national defense and mobilization, to investigate matters relating to the efficiency of the Army, to assist the Secretary of War and general

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<sup>8</sup>See 1 Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 1845-1909 254 (1938) ("The army seemed to [Root] very much like a corporation run without a general manager or board of directors by the superintendents of the various departments of the business."); see also American Military History 347 (M. Matloff, ed. 1969).

<sup>9</sup>Report of the Secretary of War 46-47 (1902).

<sup>10</sup>Id. at 47-48.

officers, and to coordinate the actions of subordinate officers. The statute placed the Chief of Staff under the direct supervision of the President and the Secretary of War. And it placed the bureaus under the direction of the Chief of Staff.<sup>11</sup>

The revised leadership structure would serve to consolidate lines of authority by making the Chief of Staff responsible for both military operations and for maintaining and administering the Army, the former province of the bureaus. The new structure would also create in the General Staff a "brain" for the Army, a brain capable of providing forethought and planning for contingencies.<sup>12</sup> Just as importantly, Root's reforms placed both broad policy formulation and ultimate direction of the military firmly in the civilian Secretary of War.

## II. Recent Changes

Since Root's time, a number of changes have been made in the respective responsibilities and duties of the civilian leadership of the Army and the military leadership of the armed forces. Most obviously, the position of Secretary of War was changed from being that of the head of a Cabinet-level executive department to a subordinate department of the Department of Defense. Although the relationship between the Secretary of War (now, of course, the Secretary of the Army) and the Chief of Staff of the Army that Root implemented has remained stable, a number of recent changes have significantly altered the command structure and management of Defense establishment personnel and resources by increasing the authority of military commands who are not subject to the direct authority of the Chief of Staff as the agent of the Service Secretary. Particularly since the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols), Congress has given joint "combatant commanders" control in some

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<sup>11</sup>"An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army," (Feb. 14, 1903).

<sup>12</sup>Root's reforms also included the creation of a permanent system for doctrinal education, resulting in the establishment of the War College. In addition to the War College, the spirit of these reforms is still felt today in such institutions as the National Defense University and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

respects over forces assigned to them from the Military Departments. Combatant commanders and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have in effect assumed some of the significant roles that historically were played by the Chief of Staff.

Raw numbers illustrate that the Military Departments' responsibilities are dwindling. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation required the Service Secretaries to assign to combatant commanders all forces not required to carry out Secretarial functions. Prior to the legislation, the Secretary of the Army had direct authority over approximately two-thirds of active-duty Army personnel. By the spring of this year, that figure had dropped to less than one-third of active-duty Army personnel.<sup>13</sup> These percentages do not take into account reserve and national guard personnel, who are assigned in large part to FORSCOM; if these personnel were taken into account, the percentage under the direct authority of the Department of the Army would be dramatically smaller.<sup>14</sup> See attachment.

More importantly, a number of functions have been removed from the Department of the Army and transferred to combatant commanders. These functions include those relating to transportation

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<sup>13</sup>This change is largely due to the fact that Forces Command (FORSCOM) personnel were assigned from the Secretary of the Army to CINCFOR in the aftermath of Goldwater-Nichols. The commander of FORSCOM is "dual hatted" as CINCFOR (a specified command commander reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, but under the de facto control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and as Commander, Forces Command (an Army commander reporting directly to the Secretary of the Army, but under the de facto command of the Army Chief of Staff). This arrangement provides the perhaps irresistible opportunity for the commander to shift roles as a natural consequence of having two masters, albeit one of those -- the Secretary of Defense -- is ultimately master in either role.

<sup>14</sup>Reserve and national guard forces are peculiarly suited for supervision by the Service Secretaries. Such forces are tied closely to their surrounding civilian communities, they are most frequently employed to perform non-combat missions, and their proper utilization often requires attention to civilian sensitivities.

management and to support to federal, state, and local agencies in the drug war. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in the past has proposed removing the Military Departments from human intelligence activities. The combatant commands, including SOCOM and SOUTHCOM, would also like to remove the Departments from intelligence oversight. Other proposals -- including the consolidation of religious, medical, and legal services -- may lie in the wings.<sup>15</sup>

### III. Problems Caused by the Recent Changes

The transfer of functions from the Military Departments to the combatant commands or defense agencies under military command has at least two drawbacks. One is that civilian control will be greatly lessened.<sup>16</sup> The other is that the creation of command-specific administration and support agencies will only further complicate the nation's efforts to supply and administer its armed forces.

The civilian leadership<sup>17</sup> in the Office of the Secretary of

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<sup>15</sup>See, e.g., Sen. Nunn Questions Military Duplication; Democrat Wants Debate on Services' Roles, Washington Post, July 3, 1992, at A21 ("Each of the military departments has its own huge infrastructure of schools, laboratories, industrial facilities, testing organizations and training ranges. We have at least three, and in some instances four separate chaplain corps, medical corps, dental corps, nursing corps and legal corps. ").

<sup>16</sup>The Secretary of Defense and his assistants are clearly capable of providing civilian control and oversight of the military, but the span of control of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is much greater than that of the Service Secretaries. Moreover, within OSD, executive authority is vested exclusively with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Decisions are accordingly pushed to the top of the power structure, whereas the Service Secretaries are capable of exercising a more diffused executive authority.

<sup>17</sup>"Civilian" oversight does not mean simply oversight by federal employees who do not happen to wear uniforms. True civilian oversight requires the full and constant participation of political

Defense (OSD) and in the Military Departments may not be as effective in overseeing military forces as it might be. OSD has too great a span of control to monitor closely the activities of the combatant commanders and the Joint Staff.

The Military Departments are even more limited in their oversight of combatant command and JCS activities in areas which might more appropriately be under the Departments' supervision, in order to enable the combatant commanders to focus on war-fighting responsibilities.<sup>18</sup> There are limited connections between the Military Departments and JCS, and information received by the Departments is oftentimes at the sufferance of the Joint Staff. While the Chief of Staff has access to information necessary to the conduct of his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff works "under" the Chairman and only assists the other members of the JCS "subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman."<sup>19</sup> And although the Departments ostensibly have access to information concerning activities conducted by Service components of unified and specified commands, as a practical matter little information is passed on to the Military Departments' civilian leadership -- the Service components are primarily answerable to the combatant commanders.

The Army Staff has been weakened by the recent trends. Although the Chief of Staff has a certain degree of independent authority in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,<sup>20</sup> most

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appointees: representatives of the domestically elected President and, by extension, of the citizens of the United States. Bureaucracy should not substitute for democracy.

<sup>18</sup>For example, combatant commanders have recently sought or received authority over military housing and status of forces agreements within their geographical areas of responsibility.

<sup>19</sup>10 U.S.C. § 155(a).

<sup>20</sup>In the 1986 revision of title 10, the Congress recognized a practice regularized during World War II under President Roosevelt of the conference of military chiefs (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff) directly with the Commander-in Chief, often bypassing the Secretaries of War and Navy. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the*

Army war-fighting units are not in the Chief's chain of command.<sup>21</sup> This fact may over time hamper his ability to receive information and to exercise discretion and accordingly diminish his prestige. Because the Chief is a key source of the Department's legitimacy, this diminution in his status also diminishes the legitimacy of the Department and of the Secretary of the Army.

An additional consequence of the legislation is that the combatant commanders are using the legislation to justify duplication of administrative and supply functions performed by the Military Departments. This summer's effort to take control of housing services in SOUTHCOM is an excellent example of this tendency.

The recent trends thus have created a situation in which civilian oversight of military activities is tenuous. Moreover, the multiplication of combatant commands and their authorities threatens to create rather than to eliminate inefficiencies.

State 319 (1957). With the 1986 revisions, the military chiefs now have two statutory roles independent of the Service Secretaries: membership in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an advisory role of individual senior military officers) and membership on the Armed Forces Policy Council (an organization designed to set broad policy goals for the Department of Defense). The chiefs of staff may also be directed to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense and to perform such other duties as they may direct. 10 U.S.C. §§ 151, 3033(d)(6).

<sup>21</sup>In fact, the Chief of Staff is not truly in the chain of command even of exclusively Departmental personnel, such as those in Major Army Commands (MACOMs). The current version of AR 10-5 and the regulations authorizing these MACOMs, for example, do not say anything other than that the MACOMs report to "HQDA." Neither does the Chief of Staff have any UCMJ authority, which is normally vested with commanders. Accordingly, the Chief is not in the chain of command between the Secretary of the Army and the MACOMs. (This can be changed at your direction.)

#### IV. Responses to the Trend Toward Jointness

The Department of the Army's historical missions, affirmed by statute, are steadily being eroded by the recent impetus toward consolidation of military command authority and, even more recently, the impetus toward downsizing the armed forces. What is needed in response to these trends is an integrated and realistic conception of the Department of the Army's role in the Department of Defense.

In shaping such a plan, it is important to keep in mind that the trend toward the Joint Staff and Combatant Command structure (the "joint channel," sometimes described by former Secretary John O. Marsh as the "hot water line") has arisen at least in part because of the perceived inefficiencies and admittedly parochial attitudes of the Military Departments. The hot water line available to the joint channel is difficult for the Departments to duplicate, in large part because of the Departments' somewhat byzantine jurisdictional configuration and overlapping, duplicative headquarters structure. For example, some have recently questioned whether the Army's function of overseeing aid to civil authorities would be better located in the Joint Staff.<sup>22</sup> Similar views may have influenced the decisions to allocate the counterdrug and transportation functions to the joint structure.

To combat these trends, I believe that it is time to take a close look at the Department of the Army's headquarters organizational scheme, much as Secretary of War Root did at the turn of this century. The division of responsibilities between the civilian Secretariat and the Army Staff is clearly one reason that the Department of the Army may be perceived as being less responsive than joint channels, and I believe a restructuring of relationships greatly would improve the Army's viability and usefulness.

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<sup>22</sup>See, e.g., George C. Wilson, Disaster Plan: Give Military the Relief Role, Army Times, Sept. 21, 1992, at 33, col. 1 ("The best place to locate the central authority [for disaster relief] is within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The chiefs have the authority, expertise, staffs and direct line to the White House needed to be effective in the confusing aftermath of a disaster. A disaster task force made up of chiefs should be run by a general and have officers from all the services represented.").

Several options present themselves. One possibility would be to merge the Army staff with the Secretariat and to make Assistant Secretaries absolutely responsible for all issues falling within their areas of the Department's purview. Obviously, the expertise and assistance of professional military personnel would continue to be required, although in advisory in addition to decisionmaking roles as delegated by the Assistant Secretaries. Such a restructuring clearly would streamline the Department's operations. The disadvantages are obvious, as well: deprived of much of their prestige as relatively independent decisionmakers, the senior military advisors to the Secretariat, for example, might have difficulty obtaining information from the field, communicating HQDA decisions to the field, and ensuring implementation. The Department might also have trouble attracting the highest quality officers to serve in what may be perceived as secondary roles.

Another option would be to dispense with the Assistant Secretaries and rely solely on the Army Staff to guide the functional policy areas of the Army. Although this plan would most effectively streamline the Army (and in effect replicate the joint structure), it would greatly increase the necessary span of control of the senior (and numerically diminished) Army civilian leadership. Indeed, the Army might be seen as not insuring sufficient civilian oversight.<sup>23</sup>

A middle way would follow a corporate model of organization. The Secretary of the Army would act as chairman of the board. The Chief of Staff would act as the chief executive officer. The Assistant Secretaries would act as corporate vice presidents for the various functional areas. And the present Deputy Chiefs of Staff would become instead Deputy Assistant Secretaries. This plan would have the virtue of making a single person in the Department comprehensively responsible for each functional area of responsibility. It simultaneously would allow civilian oversight at a level of detail

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<sup>23</sup>This plan of organization is essentially that adopted during Secretary Root's administration of the War Department. Root's reforms gave the Chief of Staff authority over all of the administrative bureaus of the Department. See Huntington, *supra* note 20, at 252. Huntington criticized this arrangement as requiring too little civilian control. See *id.* at 253.

sufficient to maintain effective control of the Department's activities.

An obvious drawback is that such interweaving of senior civilian and military officials could result in conflicts. It might be improvident to make the Assistant Secretaries directly subject to the control of the military Chief of Staff; such a view would dictate that the Assistant Secretaries should remain within the civilian "chain of command." The Assistant Secretaries could be made responsible to the Secretary and the Under Secretary and responsive to the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff. Similarly, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries would need to be responsible to their respective Assistant Secretaries, the Under Secretary, and the Secretary of the Army. The relationship between the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the Chief of Staff could be similar to that prescribed in 10 U.S.C. § 3014(d)(4), which states that the Secretariat office responsible for research and development (viz. ASA(RDA)) will provide "the Chief of Staff such staff support as the Chief of Staff considers necessary to perform his duties and responsibilities."

Indeed, it would be important for any restructuring proposal to preserve the authority and prestige of the Chief of Staff. The Chief in his Departmental role serves as a counterweight to the potentially overbearing joint channel; because of his leadership role in the Department, he helps to prevent the development of concentrated power in the Joint Staff, a la a Prussian general staff system.

Obviously, the many details of a restructuring could be complicated. But implementation of a restructuring along the lines of the options mentioned above could well revitalize the Department of the Army. The pitfalls of excessive span of control and lack of civilian oversight exhibited at the OSD/joint level could be avoided. The present duplication of functions by the Army Secretariat and the Army staff could be greatly reduced, resulting in at least symbolic dollar savings. If the reforms succeed in increasing the Department's responsiveness, the Department will be much better situated to maintain the executive agency responsibilities it currently possesses (such as aid to civil authorities) and to search out other responsibilities.

## V. Conclusion

Changes in the organization and operation of the Department of Defense in recent years have produced the most effective fighting force the world has ever seen. Those changes also have ensured the continued vitality of the very longstanding multiple capabilities of the military establishment as the nation's versatile servant. Throughout this recent period of change, as throughout the history of this Country, the Military Departments have performed critical functions.

During this same period, however, civilian oversight at the level of the Military Departments has to some degree diminished, while military control -- particularly at the combatant command level -- has grown tremendously. The Departments are well-positioned to oversee the military but have insufficient influence (though ample resources) to perform this task effectively. OSD has the authority to perform such oversight, but oversight at such a centralized level of such a tremendous organization is bound to be somewhat ineffective.

Of course, consolidation of Defense activities can be carried out in a beneficial manner with no cost to civilian control. For example, the Defense Management Review process has produced substantial savings and organizational efficiencies while preserving civilian oversight. My concern is that the joint channel will assume a large measure of control over the Defense establishment in the name of consolidation but at the price of true civilian oversight.

A collateral effect of the increase in combatant command authority has been the multiplication of support services within each combatant command (e.g., housing, intelligence oversight). Ironically, as the combatant commanders are increasingly empowered in the name of efficiency or consolidation, the combatant commanders are increasingly creating duplicative administrative overhead, thereby defeating the efficiency impetus behind the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.


One way to counter these trends would be to combine the Department of the Army's headquarters civilian and military staff structure to make it more responsive. HQDA would retain its civilian cast but would be able to act decisively and efficiently in accomplishing its variety of missions. By reducing staff layers, HQDA would become more "flat," increasing accountability and responsibility while saving resources. The Department of the Army would become an effective alternative to the Joint Staff or other potential alternative organizations for assignment of DoD missions and thus would be assured of playing a continuing, important role in meeting the nation's needs.



William J. Haynes II


Attachment

# Assignment of Active Duty Army Personnel as of September 1986



DA = Controlled exclusively by the Secretary of the Army; OTDA = Controlled in part by other than the Secretary of the Army; JOINT = Joint duty (e.g., JCS or CINC staff); MISC = Miscellaneous

# Assignment of Active Duty Army Personnel as of April 1992



DA = Controlled exclusively by the Secretary of the Army; OTDA = Controlled in part by other than the Secretary of the Army; JOINT = Joint duty (e.g., JCS or CINC staff); MISC = Miscellaneous

1/2  
0900

Return to  
USD (AT&L)  
Larry Di Rita '14



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECDEF HAS S...

JAN 13 2007

INFO MEMO

December 27, 2006 1,954 AM

Larry Di Rita '14  
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: E.C. Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) 12/27/06

SUBJECT: Leasing Boeing 767 Aircraft to Replace KC-135Es

- You asked for comments on a note from Newt Gingrich concerning Air Force lease of Boeing 767 aircraft and his perception that this approach represents a joint "power grab" by the Air Force and the Senate.
- We did not request funds for the Air Force to lease Boeing 767 aircraft in the FY02 President's Budget. However, recent congressional interest in economic stimulus programs, particularly for Boeing, has aligned with the Air Force's desire to upgrade their aging tanker fleet. The result is the enabling language (crafted by the Senate) in the Appropriations Act (not yet signed by the President) that would allow the Air Force to lease Boeing 767s.
- Up-front costs for lease are less than for purchase, which makes the concept appealing to the Air Force. However, the 10-year lease would cost more in the long run, although exact costs are unknown since no proposal has been submitted; notional comparison indicates lease costs \$9.7 billion more than purchase (about \$21 billion) over lease period.
- Recent Congressional actions: Leasing Boeing 767s was not addressed in the Authorization Conference. The Appropriations Conference provided lease language, including some specific terms for the lease, **but no funds**. Some of these provisions are not appealing to the Air Force—such as lease of commercial configuration aircraft to be modified by Air Force (note: separate authority required to modify aircraft), but returned to Boeing after 10-year lease in commercial configuration (no lease-to-buy).
- Given their concerns about the lease terms, and the fact that no funding was provided, I think it unlikely the Air Force will take any action to lease the 767s. The Air Force FY03 POM position includes funding for a comprehensive study of alternatives (leasing Boeing 767s could be one) for meeting future tanker needs.

4522C

07 Dec 01

Conrad Di Rita

Prepared by: Col Kathy Johnson, OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS/AW, 703-695-1600

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/4
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/3
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	12/28

U00333 / 02 L-05 OSD/959

December 21, 2001 12:58 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Roche  
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Boeing 767

Attached is a note I got from Newt Gingrich. What is happening? He is a pretty smart fellow.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/18/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
122101-26

.....

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*1/2*  
*Response attached*

**Larry Di Rita**

*1/2*

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 7:57  
To: (b)(6) osd.pentagon.mil  
cc: Torie.Clarke@osd.mil  
Subject: vetoing the Boeing-767 power grab  
could you give this to the Secretary, Paul, Ed and Larry, thanks newt

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 21 2001

Vetoing the Boeing 767 power grab

From the outside the Boeing 767 gimmick looks like a joint Air Force-Senate power grab. My impression is that the Air Force did not have your approval to push this rube goldberg contraption. The Senate clearly is trying to ram it down your throat on their terms with a ten year gimmick that is totally to Boeing's advantage and to the disadvantage of the taxpayer and of our men and women in uniform.

If you decide you need more tanker capacity you should first explore airlines in financial difficulty and see if you could not buy a bunch cheap. Second, you might go to Boeing to have a longer term lease purchase or purchase. I know of no planning which suggests that you will need fewer tankers in ten years and ought to retrofit the planes and turn them back to Boeing.

You ought to get the President to issue a veto threat that is quite simple. If the Congress wants to give you the authorization to buy tankers you deem necessary on terms you deem best for the taxpayer and the men and women in uniform you would be glad to accept it as a possible but not required use of money. If the Congress wants to micromanage your authority and dictate the terms and conditions you will insist on a veto and go to the country over who should run the Pentagon and why pork barrel masquerading as defense is indefensible and despicable. As you know McCain and Gramm are already hot on this and they represent the public's mood.

Properly framed this is a 90-10 issue which will help teach the Air Force and other services not to try to end run you and will teach the Congress that they have to negotiate with you and cannot run over you.

Welcome back.  
Newt

12/19/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/961



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000

701 07 16 JAN 0 33

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *Dr/k*  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

FROM: DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT *Steve Slavsky*  
Prepared by: Steve Slavsky/CPA/697-8335/021401

FEB 15 2001

SUBJECT: Federal Prison Industries--INFORMATION

PURPOSE: Respond to your question.

DISCUSSION:

- You requested information on the Federal Prison Industries mandatory source requirement. (TAB B)
- A fact paper (TAB A) is attached that describes the program.

COORDINATION: None

RECOMMENDATION: None

U03211/01

## FACT PAPER ON FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES

- Federal Prison Industries (FPI) was established in 1934 as a training program for federal inmates to keep them occupied and provide them with job skills for use after release.
- By law (18 U.S.C. 4121-4128), FPI is a mandatory source of supply for many items purchased by the federal government. This means that federal government buyers must purchase designated supplies from FPI unless a waiver is granted by FPI.
- The Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 8.6, implements the law and describes government procurement priorities and FPI's place in them.
- In FY 2000, FPI employed over 21,000 inmates and had sales of \$546.3 million. DoD purchased \$188.7 million of that amount.
- The single largest category of items sold to DoD is office and dormitory furniture, with electronic items next.
- DoD agencies can and do receive waivers from the mandatory source requirement (based on price or availability). FPI granted approximately 94% of such waivers in FY 2000; however, the process discourages waivers.
- In FY 2000, DoD negotiated an increase to the minimum amount subject to the mandatory source requirement from \$50 to \$250.
- DoD is currently engaged in a three year limited pilot that waives the mandatory source requirement below \$2,500 at 8 military locations.
- There is significant industry unhappiness (especially the furniture industry) with FPI's mandatory source requirement. There have been Congressional attempts to limit or end the requirement, but none have been successful.
- The Department of Justice has strongly supported the status quo and has determined previous administration policy.
- There are quality and delivery issues with FPI products.

**Bagley, Dianne, Ms, OSD/ATL**

**From:** Lee, Deidre, Ms, OSD/ATL  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 13, 2001 11:21 PM  
**To:** Zuckerman, Charles, Mr, OSD/ATL; Kerrins, Dave, COL, OSD/ATL; Slavsky, Stephen, Mr, OSD/ATL; Bagley, Dianne, Ms, OSD/ATL; Neilson, Linda, Ms, OSD/ATL  
**Subject:** FW: Prison Made Materials

Steve S:

Could you put together a one-pager? Thanks. D. Lee

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Oliver, David, Mr, OSD/ATL  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 13, 2001 1:08 PM  
**To:** Cribbs, Maria, COL, OSD; Lee, Deidre, Ms, OSD/ATL  
**cc:** Washburn, Grace, Col, OSD/ATL; Byrd, Roy, Col, OSD; Quinn, JJ, Rear Adm, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Prison Made Materials

Will do. Dee pls provide by noon on 15th..

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Cribbs, Maria, COL, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 13, 2001 12:26 PM  
**To:** Oliver, David, Mr, OSD/ATL  
**cc:** Washburn, Grace, Col, OSD/ATL; Byrd, Roy, Col, OSD; Quinn, JJ, Rear Adm, OSD  
**Subject:** Prison Made Materials

Sir

The Secretary sent the following note to Dr Cambone:

"Have someone find out something about prison-made materials. One of the congressman on the trip raised the issue with me, and it is called something like "mandated source," things made by prisoners. Congressman **McCullough** (sp?) was very much for it, and this congressman was against it.

Please provide the Secretary a fact paper or appropriate information on this subject.

Please provide NLT COB Friday, 16 Feb.

If getting this info together will take longer than the 16th, please let me know what is a reasonable target date and I'll run it up the flagpole.

Very Respectfully

Maria



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000

SECRET  
2001 FEB 22 10 5:07

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *12/23*  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

FROM: DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT *[Signature]* FEB 22 2001  
Prepared by: Steve Slavsky/CPA/697-8335/022201

SUBJECT: Federal Prison Industries--INFORMATION

PURPOSE: Respond to your request for additional information.

DISCUSSION:

- You requested information on the Federal Prison Industries mandatory source requirement. (TAB D)
- We responded with a fact paper on February 15. (TAB C)
- On February 21, your office requested additional information on two bullets concerning FPI waivers and customer satisfaction with quality and delivery. (TAB B)
- A fact paper (TAB A) is attached providing more information on those subjects.

COORDINATION: None

RECOMMENDATION: None

## FACT PAPER ADDENDUM ON FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES

Original statement: **DoD** agencies can and do receive waivers from the mandatory source requirement (based on price or availability). **FPI** granted approximately 94% of such waivers in FY 2000.

- **FPI** waivers are normally general or blanket clearances issued when classes of articles or services are not available from **FPI** within required timeframes or when the **FPI** product cannot technically satisfy the requirement.
- **FPI** is a mandatory source for approximately **\$400M** of supplies for **DoD** annually. **FPI** generally issue waivers for roughly 50% of that amount.

Original statement: There are quality and delivery issues with **FPI** products.

- The most recent review of **DoD** customer satisfaction with **FPI** products was conducted in 1999 as part of the Joint Study of **FPI** required by the National Defense Authorization Act for **FY** 1998.
- Generally, the **DoD** respondents seemed to be more satisfied with quality and price than they were with delivery.
- When compared to outside sources, 17% who had purchased items similar to those furnished by **FPI** rated **FPI** worse in quality, 36% rated **FPI** worse for price, and 59% rated **FPI** worse for delivery.
- Overall, 63% of **DoD** respondents believed **FPI** had shown improvement as a supplier in the past 12 months. The increased emphasis by **DoD** customers on both quality and timeliness of delivery has prompted **FPI** to pay more attention to these areas. As long as **FPI** remains a mandatory source of supply for certain items, **DoD** will continue to work with **FPI** to improve service to us.

Mr. Secretary,

Attached is information you requested on DoD purchase of prison-made materials.

I have asked for clarification on the reason for + effect of the waivers discussed in the point paper, as well as the "quality" and "delivery" issues raised in the last bullet.

SC  
2/21



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 FEB 16 AM 9:33

MIC  
2/16/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *-cy*

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *Dr/ks*  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)

FROM: DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT *[Signature]*  
Prepared by: Steve Slavsky/CPA/697-8335/021401

FEB 15 2001

SUBJECT: Federal Prison Industries--INFORMATION

PURPOSE: Respond to your question.

DISCUSSION:

- You requested information on the Federal Prison Industries mandatory source requirement. (TAB B)
- A fact paper (TAB A) is attached that describes the program.

COORDINATION: None

RECOMMENDATION: None

U03211 / 01

## FACT PAPER ON FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES

- Federal Prison Industries (FPI) was established in 1934 as a training program for federal inmates to keep them occupied and provide them with job skills for use after release..
- By law (18 U.S.C. 4121-4128), FPI is a mandatory source of supply for many items purchased by the federal government. This means that federal government buyers must purchase designated supplies from FPI unless a waiver is granted by FPI.
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- In FY 2000, DoD negotiated an increase to the minimum amount subject to the mandatory source requirement from \$50 to \$250.
- DoD is currently engaged in a three year limited pilot that waives the mandatory source requirement below \$2,500 at 8 military locations.
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- The Department of Justice has strongly supported the status quo and has determined previous administration policy.
- There are quality and delivery issues with FPI products.



# Office of the Secretary of Defense Routing Slip

Secretary of Defense \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Senior Military Assistant 2/19/01

*SIR*  
*you asked for this last week*  
*va*

The Special Assistant *J.S.*

Military Assistant *B 2/18/01*

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Executive Secretary *MR SECRETARY*

*ATTACHED IS A PAPER EXPLAINING  
THE PRISON MADE MATERIALS PROGRAM*  
*Respectfully*  
*Mancini*



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 13, 2001 7:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Prison-made Materials

*Maria* *MLC* *2/13/01*

*Action:*

*[Signature]*  
*SMA*

*2/14*

Have someone find out something about prison-made materials. One of the congressman on the trip raised the issue with me, and it is called something like "mandated source," things made by prisoners, Congressman McCullough (sp.?) was very much for it, and this congressman was against it.

*Adm Quinn:*  
*You might ask Stru*  
*Col. Cribbs.*  
*SC*

DR:dh  
021301-8

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME: 2

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF- DEFENSE:

February 24, 2001 9:14 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Armor-Killing Systems

LF  
070

Why don't you try to find out how many armor-killing systems we have in the Defense Department and how many are on the drawing boards?

DHR: dh  
022401-5

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

24  
29  
6  
01

3/1



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

301 SDEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3015



3/1

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - HAS COPY

FROM: DAVID R. OLIVER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *David O 3/1*

470

SUBJECT: Armor-Killing Systems

PURPOSE: The attached is information you requested on armor-killing systems. The information paper (attachment 1) is a general answer to your question. The table (attachment 2) provides more specific information on the Department's armor-killing systems.

1 MAR 01



PRINCIPAL ARMOR-KILLING SYSTEMS:

• Air-Launched	Quantity (Requirement)	Delivered to Date	Unit Cost	Key Feature
- Inventory				
Various Hellfire configurations	43,300	<i>52mm</i>	60K	Laser designation
Maverick	2,700	<i>52mm</i>	32K	TV/IR/Laser
- In-Production				
<b>Longbow</b> Hellfire	13,300	2200	96K	Helicopter, radar guided
Sensor Fuzed Weapon	7,500	1600	333K	Gravity, smart submunition
Joint Standoff Weapon-B	4,200	26	381K	Glide, smart submunition
- Concept Development				
New/Common Missile		Production: FY08		Precision guided, air/ground launch
• Ground-Launched	Quantity (Requirement)	Delivered to Date	Unit Cost	Key Feature
- Inventory				
Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided	112,700	<i>32mm</i>	35K	Air/Ground launched
120mm Kinetic Energy Penetrators	420,000	<i>32mm</i>	2.5K	Tank main gun
Dragon	19,000	<i>32mm</i>	5.5K	Old/man portable
- In-Production				
<b>Javelin</b>	32,000	3777	68K	Man portable
120mm Kinetic Energy Penetrator	128,000	0	6.2K	Tank main gun
Sense and Destroy Armor	375	127	50K	Artillery delivered
Army Tactical Missile System/ Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition	1,200/15,600	0	3.5M	Smart submunition
Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition	576,000	0	450	Artillery delivered mines
Wide Area Mine	53,300	221	118K	Smart mine, hand emplaced
- Development				
Predator		Production: FY01		Man portable
<b>Tube-Launched</b> Optically Tracked Wire Guided -- Fire and Forget		Production: FY04		Focal plane array
Light-of-Sight Anti Tank		Production: FY04		Kinetic energy missile
120mm Kinetic Energy Penetrator		Decision Milestone FY05		Anti-active protection
Excalibur		Decision Milestone FY05		Artillery delivered, guided

## INFORMATION PAPER

**YOUR QUESTION:** "Why don't you try to find out how many armor-killing (antiarmor) systems we have in the Defense Department and how many are on the drawing boards?"

**SUMMARY:** The Department of Defense has 5 types of armor-killing systems that are no longer in production and are part of our inventory, 9 types of armor-killing systems that are in production, and 6 types of armor-killing systems that are in development.

**DIFFERENCES:** The armor-killing systems differ in: launch platform (man portable through fixed-wing); engagement range (close combat through the range of fixed wing aircraft enabling stand-off outside of point defenses); guidance mechanism and accuracy; lethal mechanisms (kinetic energy penetrators, shaped: charge with precursor, explosively formed penetrator); and sensor suites (infrared, millimeter wave radar, electro-optical, acoustic).

**REPLACEMENTS AND UPGRADES:** The summary includes the following: some configurations of Hellfire are being replaced by the Longbow Hellfire; some of the Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missiles are being upgraded to the Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided -- Fire and Forget; and the 120mm kinetic energy penetrators are being replaced by the next generation kinetic energy penetrators. Dragon is being replaced by Javelin. Maverick will be replaced by Joint Standoff Weapon-B.

Attach 1

3/1



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3015 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3017



321

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE -HAS COPY

FROM: DAVID R. OLIVER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE (AT&L) *David O 3/1*

470

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Attach 1

February 24, 2001 9:14 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Armor-Killing Systems

470

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DHR: dh  
0224014

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

24 Feb 01

U03861 /01

2001 03 18 05:57

March 18, 2001 5:53 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Insight* Article on DTRA

Here is some material on an *Insight* article concerning the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Take a look at it and tell me what you think we ought to do with it.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031X01-29

*020 DTR*

*18 Mar 01*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

SECDEF HASSEIN

MAR 16 2001

Sir,

You asked me to look into this  
article - Whether it was ~~factually~~

FACTUAL OR NOT. DAVE OLIVER

"PDUSD FOR ATCL" PUT TOGETHER

THE ATTACHED RESPONSE.

VR

J.J.

3/15/01

SMA

6:28 pm.

## *Insight*

March 12, 2001

### Bill's Holdovers Grab DOD Agency

By Kenneth R. Timmennan

Clinton Democrats tried to shut down the Pentagon's export-control agency, but as Bush comes in they have turned it into a Disney World of fat salaries for their own

Clinton holdovers rapidly are expanding a Pentagon agency they twice tried to eliminate and are rewarding their friends with a taxpayer-paid trip to Walt Disney World. On the agenda: cozying up to U.S. exporters seeking Department of Defense (DOD) favors, and photo-ops with Mickey and his pals.

The Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) was created by resident Reagan to thwart Soviet attempts to acquire Western military technology. DTSA was widely criticized by U.S. industry groups for impeding the sale of American high-tech products to governments hostile to the United States.

President Clinton did his best to get rid of DTSA, and twice it was brought back from the dead by congressional supporters led by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. Now called the Technology Security Directorate (TSD), it has been rolled into a larger Pentagon entity known as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

So why did technology-security chief Dave Tarbell, a Clinton appointee, go on a hiring spree just as a new administration was coming to town? And why is he sending more than a dozen new export-licensing officers on a government-paid junket to Walt Disney World to cozy up to representatives of the very export industries DTRA regulates?

Insight spoke with a number of the 35 new DTRA hires: most of whom were Clinton appointees from Commerce, State or DOD weapons labs. All acknowledged that they were being sent down to Orlando to learn about export licensing – from industry representatives, not DTRA professionals.

Organized by SIA, the Society for International Affairs ([www.siaed.org](http://www.siaed.org)), the Feb. 15-16 Orlando meeting was billed as a basics conference. This time, according to DTRA spokesman David Rigby, DTRA would send its trainees to learn from industry and to become acquainted with members of the exporting community with whom they would deal daily.

Conveniently, most of the DTRA people would arrive a day early and stay a day late, according to hotel records obtained by Insight. SIA members include satellite makers and operators such as Orbital Sciences and INTELSAT, as well as the nation's largest defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin Corp., TRW Inc. and ITT Defense. "SIA is a private association of all the big exporters who license into DTRA," a senior DTRA

official told *Insight*. "They want to make sure that the new people get the industry gospel so they're taking them down to get indoctrinated."

The U.S. taxpayers will foot the bill for hotel and per-diem costs, conference-registration fees and round-trip travel (at government rates, which mandate high-cost, refundable tickets) in addition to salaries. Most of the engineers attending the conference have reached the highest General Service rank, GS-15, and are paid \$84,648 to \$110,028 annually.

This is not the first instance of alleged waste, fraud and abuse at DTRA. *Insight* has obtained a copy of a whistle-blower memorandum, dated April 24, 2000, sent to the Pentagon Inspector General's (IG) office by a senior DTRA engineer. The memorandum alleges that the agency's political bosses "have systematically been misleading the public, Congress and internal oversight authorities by deliberately overstaffing, as the volume and seriousness of export licenses have declined over these past seven years."

The complaint, which the IG never pursued, alleges that DTKA added personnel as justification to isolate this organization physically from the interagency community. Plans twice were approved by the Pentagon to move DTRA from prime office space just across the street from the Pentagon to more spacious digs at Washington Dulles International Airport, far from the day-to-day policy tug-of-war. The move was significant because DTRA officials continue to share hard copy files on sensitive export licenses with other agencies and must physically transport them from agency to agency in downtown Washington. Moving out to Dulles also isolated DTRA licensing officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their intelligence wings, which all maintain Pentagon offices, effectively taking them out of the policy loop.

One DTRA licensing engineer contacted by *Insight* acknowledges the agency's rationale: "Sure, it's unusual for DTRA to hire so many new people at any one time. But we need these new people to expedite export-licensing cases that are getting bogged down. We need to get these cases out the door so commerce can take place." What kind of commerce? DTRA engineers review proposed exports of U.S. weapons systems, military subsystems and so-called dual-use technology that has direct military applications. The bulk of the cases involve sales to Communist China and India.

Getting such cases out the door is precisely what worries critics of the Clinton administration's export policies. "Dave Tarbell bears personal responsibility for giving the Chinese military everything they need to fight the next war." Stephen D. Bryen, a DOD official under Reagan/Bush, tells *Insight*. "He has been highly successful - in giving away our military technology."

Bryen created DTSA in 1985 as part of President Reagan's effort to deny the Soviet union access to advanced Western military technology. He has been a vocal critic of the Clinton administration's decontrol of sensitive technology, testifying before Congress repeatedly on the importance of maintaining controls on U.S. military exports to slow China's military modernization.

"Tarbell was the point man, and he has to take responsibility," Bryen says. "He endorsed the Clinton administration plans to decontrol supercomputers, which have all gone into the Chinese nuclear-weapons and missile programs. He backed the release of hot-section technology, which has enabled the Chinese military to build new combat jet engines. He promoted the decontrol of military-grade Global Positioning System technologies, which the Chinese are now using to guide their nuclear missiles. He ought to be fired and find another job."

DTRA insiders say Tarbell is hoping to impress his new bosses by expanding his agency's size and by setting up a new policy shop. "This is precisely the type of thing he has tried to cut us out of for the past eight years," a senior DTRA engineer tells *Insight*. "He's running around these days like the Energizer Bunny because he wants to save his job and continue to implement the policies of the Clinton administration."

Tarbell refused repeated requests for comment on this story and referred *Insight's* questions to a public-affairs officer. On June 25, 1998, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from Peter Leitner, a senior trade analyst working under Tarbell, who cited instances where Tarbell leaned on him to change his license recommendations from denials to approvals. Leitner cited one instance where his superiors tampered with official government records on his computer while he was on vacation. Virtually all his cases involved the sale of sensitive technology to Russia and Communist China.

Leitner gave examples of critical technologies, including precision-machine tools and high-performance computers, which were transferred to both Chinese and Russian military establishments despite strong opposition by DTRA licensing analysts. The U.S. equipment ended up in facilities that design cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

Commenting on Leitner's revelations, Sen. Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., noted: "The process is rigged in favor of commercial interests rather than our national-security interests. It is time to address this issue. We should not be selling critical technologies at the expense of our nation's security."

Also testifying at the hearing was Franklin C. Miller, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction. Miller debunked Leitner's claims that the export-control process was broken. Recently, Miller was appointed the top National Security Council official for military affairs. Bush White House officials credit him with having added China to the nuclear targeting list while he was a Clinton appointee.

Rut. before a DOD restructuring in 1998. Tarbell and DTRA's export-licensing office reported to Miller at the Pentagon, making him ultimately responsible for some of the most sensitive and controversial sales of military technology the Pentagon approved to Communist China during the Clinton years,

Welcome to Disney World technology security, Dave Tarbell, a Clinton political appointee. Tarbell and his deputy, Ken Shelly, arranged for more than a dozen DTRA employees to stay at the Disney Coronado Springs Resort, conveniently located inside Disney World itself.

When the harried government workers get tired of meetings, they can head over to Disney-MGM Studios and watch a live performance of the Indiana Jones Epic Stunt Spectacular or board their own Star Wars "Star-Speeder" for a ride through hyperspace. Why not? It's all on the taxpayers' nickel. Among the government employees scheduled to join the fun were: Paul Chung, Walter Cybrowski, Jerry Frontiero, Robert Guckian, Ricky Jones, Gray Kwitkoski, Donald Maziarz, Jim Miles, Joe Omaggio, Soo Young Shin, Darrel Vidrine, George Woodford



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3015 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3015




MAR 15 2001

ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: *Insight* Article on Dave Tarbell of Defense Threat Reduction Agency

- **“Clinton Holdovers.”** Tarbell is a career employee in OSD since 1989.
- **Excessive New Hires.**
  - Directed by DEPSECDEF (Hamre) to improve technology security. Partially in response to Cox Commission – essentially doubled professionals evaluating export controls.
  - Plan personally briefed by me to Scowcroft, Perle and Armitage last year – all concurred.
- **Conference at Disney World.** Regular training conference run by professionals for State, DoD and Industry.
- **Move.** We will move Tarbell’s people to new facility (inside Beltway) in order to consolidate all who work for him so he can better supervise.
- **Technology Release to Chinese.**
  - Commerce released hot section in technology.
  - GPS technology released by C3I before Tarbell was in his job.
- **Whistle Blowers.** People quoted are whistle blowers in DTRA.
- **Summary.** Article is untrue and hatchet job.

  
Dave Oliver

Enclosures:

- TAB 1 →
1. Detailed explanation of errors in Timmerman Article
  2. *Insight* Article by Timmerman
  3. Export Licenses (Cycle Times/Backlog)

cc:

DEPSECDEF  
Public Affairs  
Legislative Affairs



11-L-0559/OSD/986

JJ  
Do we want to do anything w/ Timmerman? I was planning to ignore, but would be willing to talk to him about jets?  
Dave

3/14 Timmerman Article -- "Bill's Holdovers Grab DoD Agency

Below is an explanation of the significant errors in this article.

- "Clinton holdovers are rapidly expanding a Pentagon agency they twice tried to eliminate... Why did technology-security chief Dave Tarbell, a Clinton appointee, go on a hiring spree just as the new administration is coming to town?"

Response:

- Dave Tarbell, who is dual-hatted as DUSD/Technology Security Policy under USD/P and Director of the Technology Security Directorate, DTRA (required by law), is not a Clinton appointee, but is a career official who was hired under a year-long competitive hiring process in 1994. He is not a political appointee and has served in various career positions in OSD since 1979,
- The Technology Security Directorate in DTRA hired 15 new engineers in the Nov-Dec 2000 time frame. These engineers were authorized by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre in December 1999 to support a strengthened and reengineered export license review process within the Department of Defense. The process for hiring the new employees was begun in January 1999. The new hires did not come on board until late last year because of the lengthy government process for competitively hiring new employees. There was no relationship to the new administration one way or another.
- "Why is he sending more than a dozen new export licensing officers on a government-paid junket to Walt Disney World to cozy up to representatives of the very export industries DTRA regulates?"

more security

Response:

- The "junket" in question was a regular training conference run under the auspices of the Society for International Affairs (SIA) which is a government-industry/non-profit group founded in 1967 by munitions export control practitioners from government regulatory agencies and industry to provide a forum for training new export control professionals (both industry and government) and sharing common problems and solutions regarding the practical features of the export control system,
- SIA conducts several conferences around the country on an annual basis. **DoD** participates in most of them. These conferences are held at two levels: (1) so-called "basics" level to provide a training opportunity for new government and

industry entrants to the export control system, and (2) twice-yearly conferences, one in Washington and one in a non-Washington location to provide for an exchange of ideas and problems for individuals with more experience in the system. SIA provides a useful forum for the government to communicate new regulations and procedures to the industry people most directly involved in order to improve compliance with US export control laws and regulations.

- The Orlando conference was a “basics” conference. The conference panels are typically taught by a combination of senior experienced export control professionals from State’s Office of Defense Trade Controls (the regulatory agency for munitions exports) and DoD’s Technology Security organization. Occasionally, experienced industry professionals participate in the panels to provide a particular industry practitioner perspective. This is a common practice in a variety of regulatory activities throughout government including environmental and safety regulatory processes.
- The large number of DTRA attendees at the training session in Orlando was because of the recent large new hiring of engineers. It is categorically not a forum whereby “they want to make sure that the new people get the industry gospel, so they’re taking them down to get indoctrinated” as stated in one quote in the article.
- DoD pays the full freight for these conferences: all travel, per diem, and conference fees in order to avoid any perception of conflict of interest. Travel and per diem is paid in accordance with USG rules and regulations. Any time taken by employees outside the training conference is charged to annual leave and any costs associated with that leave are paid by the employees.
- “DTRA added personnel as justification to isolate this organization physically from the interagency community,”

Response:

- The decision to add personnel to the DTRA Technology Security Directorate was made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense after a major review of export control processes in DoD. This review concluded that the DoD export control process would be strengthened by reengineering the process with additional personnel in the organization responsible for determining DoD positions on important export license cases.
- The allegation that DoD is using generally scarce personnel resources to add personnel to this organization merely as a pretext to move the organization from its current location to another location (only 15 minutes farther away from it

current location in Pentagon City) as a device to isolate this organization is absurd on the face of it.

- There is a clear justification for the additional resources, and the move to the new location will have no impact on their ability to interact with their interagency: colleagues or with the Pentagon.
- Steve Bryen quote (which, given what else is wrong with this article, may also be a misquote or out of context) -- "Tarbell was the point man...endorsing Clinton administration plans to decontrol supercomputers which have all gone to Chinese nuclear weapons and missile programs. He backed the release of hot section technology which has enabled the Chinese military to build new combat jet engines. He promoted the decontrol of military-grade global positioning system technologies, which the Chinese are now using to guide their nuclear missiles."

Response:

- This is nonsense,
- Computer controls have been adjusted after significant DoD and interagency review including outside experts in order to keep pace with the widespread availability of large numbers of commodity computers. The controls are ineffective in these circumstances and keeping them in place only diverts scarce export control resources with no security gain,
- President Clinton decided to move jet engine hot section technology from the US munitions list to the Commerce control list after a thorough interagency review up to and including Cabinet officials. DoD expressed serious reservations about this approach and only agreed to go along after a new set of control mechanisms were established under the Commerce system (e.g., license required to all destinations with review by DoD). DoD has not approved any licenses for transfers of hot section technology to China that would help them build combat jet engines and is not aware of any that were approved by Commerce over any DoD objection.
- Dave Tarbell was not in his current position overseeing DoD technology security when the decision was made to decontrol certain GPS equipment (e.g., receivers) because of their widespread availability and lack of controllability. The principal organization responsible for GPS technology controls is not DTRA, but OSD/C3I.

**Insight**  
**March 12, 2001**

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Leitner gave examples of critical technologies, including precision-machine tools and high-performance computers, which were transferred to both Chinese and Russian military establishments despite strong opposition by DTRA licensing analysts. The U.S. equipment ended up in facilities that design cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

Commenting on Leitner's revelations, Sen. Fred Thompson, R-Term., noted: "The process is rigged in favor of commercial interests rather than our national-security interests. It is time to address this issue. We should not be selling critical technologies at the expense of our nation's security."



Also testifying at the hearing was Franklin C. Miller, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction. Miller debunked Leitner's claims that the export-control process was broken. Recently, Miller was appointed the top National Security Council official for military affairs. Bush White House officials credit him with having added China to the nuclear targeting list while he was a Clinton appointee.

But, before a DOD restructuring in 1998, Tarbell and DTRA's export-licensing office reported to Miller at the Pentagon, making him ultimately responsible for some of the most sensitive and controversial sales of military technology the Pentagon approved to Communist China during the Clinton years.

Welcome to Disney World technology security, Dave **Tarbell**, a Clinton political appointee. **Tarbell** and his deputy, Ken Shelly, arranged for more than a dozen DTRA employees to stay at the Disney Coronado Springs Resort, conveniently located inside Disney World itself.

When the harried government workers get tired of meetings, they can head over to Disney-MGM Studios and watch a live performance of the Indiana Jones Epic Stunt Spectacular or board their own Star Wars "Star-Speeder" for a ride through hyperspace. Why not? It's all on the taxpayers' nickel. Among the government employees scheduled to join the fun were: Paul Chung, Walter Cybrowski, Jerry Frontiero, Robert Guckian, Ricky Jones, Gray Kwitkoski, Donald **Maziarz**, Jim Miles, Joe Omaggio, Soo Young Shin, Darrel Vidrine, George Woodford

✓ **BUSINESS PROCESS GOAL**  
 - Time to develop product line



TO: Rudy de Leon  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Global Hawk**

Take a look at this Global Hawk material.

After reading Andy Marshall's paper, it strikes me we may want to move the IOC on Global Hawk up. Would you take a look at it and give us some advice?

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
032601.45  
Attach.

*152R*

*26 Mar 01*

3/20/01

TO: SecDef

FROM: RDML Quinn 3/20/01 J

SUBJECT: Global Hawk

Per your request (**TAB A**):

**TAB B** Background

**TAB C** Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

**TAB D** Air Vehicle (Platform) Upgrade Option

**TAB E** Sensor Capability Upgrade/Acceleration Option

**TAB F** Production Rate Acceleration Option

(Options D – F can be done individually or in combination)

**TAB G** Transmittal

March 13, 2001 11:14AM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Global Hawk

I need information on Global Hawk's purpose, capabilities and costs.

DHR:dh  
031301-I 1

## RQ-4A GLOBAL HAWK

### PURPOSE:

- Global Hawk is a High-Altitude (60K) Endurance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) that provides long-endurance reconuaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for theater commanders (24 hrs at 1200 mile radius, 8 hrs at 4080 mile radius, with a 2000 lb. Payload)
  - Has made long range/endurance flights collecting imagery which is relayed by satellite (or direct line-of-sight to ground station) anywhere in the world. Crossed Atlantic in June 2000, collected imagery at Portugal. Deploys to Australia in April 2001.

### CAPABILITY - BASELINE PROGRAM (approved March 2001)

- Delivers initial version (called Block 5) at 2/year starting FY03
  - Payload capability of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) (1 foot resolution); Electra-Optical (EO), and Infra-red (IR) sensors (no signal intelligence capability)
  - Designed for spiral development (eg. adds sensors as available).
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- AESA radar also adds improved ground moving target track capability

### COSTS

- Program was developed to fit within FYDP funding below:

TY\$ in Millions	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	Subtotal
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Procure	97.7	106.7	99.3	112.2	105.8	158.7	680.4
Total	194.2	209.8	276.8	289.5	237.3	237.9	1445.5

- Baseline funding does not address early system availability for CINCs

**Information Paper**  
**Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Global Hawk**

**Definition for Global Hawk IOC**

- **The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) states** – “system will be declared IOC when there are assets in place, tech data available, and a training system established to make the system and infrastructure robust enough to support one 24 hour orbit with all image intelligence payloads for 30 days”
- 4 Air Vehicles (A/Vs) and 1 Ground Station (GS) are needed to meet the 30-day, 24 hour continuous orbit requirement defined in the ORD.
  - Up to three aircraft airborne at a given time – 4<sup>th</sup> utilized for a spare

**Current Program Schedule**

- Because of budget decisions which limited funding, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) reflects an IOC date of Sept 2005
- The 4<sup>th</sup> A/V and 1 complete ground station that consists of 1 Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and 1 Mission Control Element will be delivered by Sept 2004
- **IOC Acceleration Option** – the logistics infrastructure (tech orders, training, spares, etc.) could be accelerated one year to support an earlier IOC in 2004
  - A 12 month acceleration requires a total of \$38M including \$2M by July 01

	<b>FY01</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>
<b>Tech Orders</b>	<b>\$2M by July</b>	<b>\$13M</b>	<b>\$8M</b>
<b>Spares</b>		<b>\$8M</b>	
<b>*LRE retrofit</b>		<b>\$7M</b>	

\* Would also need one extra properly configured LRE available to support other on-going training, testing, and EMD activities

- Of course, even a more costly (approximately \$113) total program acceleration option could be implemented that would field more final configuration Global Hawk systems sooner, but it would still be 2004 before the 4<sup>th</sup> A/V will be delivered and the IOC requirement is achieved

## Air Vehicle (Platform) Upgrade Option

- **Capability Improvements**

- Increased power for sensor packages (from 10 to 25 KVA)
- Upgraded engine (5% thrust increase plus additional cooling air)
- Open electronics architecture to ease future upgrades (commercial standards employed)
- Communications upgrades to meet CINC in theater requirements
- Improved wing aerodynamics for increased altitude, range, and endurance performance
- Multiple-Simultaneous payloads (signals intelligence and radar or EO/IR)
  - Payload growth to 3000# (from 2000#)
  - Endurance at 2400 Nautical Miles reduced from 24 to 20 hours when carrying a 3000# payload

- **Schedule**

- Develop: FY02-03
- Buy: FY03
- Deliver FY04

- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	FY03	Total
RDT&E	44.2	18.6	62.8

## Sensor Upgrade/Acceleration Options

- **Capability Improvements** (versus U-2 legacy sensors)
  - Improved EO/IR (need capability comparison to legacy)
  - Upgraded Legacy Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
  - Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar (2 to 4 times range and area coverage, improved ground moving target tracking and area coverage)
    - Radar being developed as part of the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) which also applies to the Joint STARS Program and NATO Ground Surveillance
  - Improved Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
  
- **Schedule**
  - Integrate Improved EO/IR: FY02-04
  - Upgrade SAR: FY02-03
  - Integrate AESA: FY04-07
  - Integrate Improved SIGINT: FY02-04
  
- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FY03</u>	<u>FY04</u>	<u>FY05</u>	<u>FY06</u>	<u>FY07</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EO/IR	5.9	30.3	24.7				60.9
SAR	3.1	28.7					31.8
AESA		17.0	79.8	67.5	15.1	11.2	190.6
SIGINT	1.4	34.5	35.2				71.1

## Production Rate Acceleration Options

### Acceleration Provides:

- Enables more efficient productions rates and provides increased force structure and improved capability sooner to theater CINCs

### Two production options:

#### Acceleration to 6 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

<b>(TY\$M)</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>Total</b>
Production	85.6	246.5	179.4	232.5	269.2	270.8	1,284
Units	0	0	2	4	4	4	14

#### Acceleration to 10 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

<b>(TY\$M)</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>Total</b>
Production	85.6	246.5	216.4	524.5	490.2	494.8	2,051.8
Units	0	0	2	4	8	8	22

- Cost includes price of advanced sensors, electronic intelligence sensor for each aircraft and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor for every two aircraft
- Cost includes four ground stations for the 6 aircraft per year option and five for the 10 aircraft per year option
- Parity reached with U-2 imagery intelligence sensors in FY04
- Partial parity reached with U-2 signals intelligence sensors (electronic intelligence only) in FY05



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

*Mr. [unclear] / 16  
Dave Oliver*

FROM: DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC & TACTICAL SYSTEMS

*Dr. George Schneider*

Approved by: Mr. Mutzelburg/ OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-0525 *Has Copy White 3/14/01*  
Prepared by: Col Vic Saltsman/ OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-3 165 March 14, 2001

SUBJECT: Global Hawk Program Options - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Provide SecDef information on Global Hawk system and program acceleration options

DISCUSSION:

- The attached papers (Tab A – D) provide information on the Global Hawk system and options for accelerating the currently approved program.
- Tab A - Global Hawk background information
- Tab B – Air Vehicle (platform) upgrade option
- Tab C – Sensor capability upgrade/acceleration option
- Tab D – Production rate acceleration options
- Options at Tabs B-D can be done individually or in combination
- Potential payoffs include accelerated air vehicle improvements and earlier fielding of improved sensor capability. Higher production rate provides more capability sooner (fully fielded FY08 vs FY 15) at lower cost (20% lower unit cost) with 40% less force structure required to cover orbit requirements

RECOMMENDATION: None – For Information Only.



11-L-0559/OSD/1003

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Subject: Global Hawk

The Acquisition folks gave you a baseline paper on the Global Hawk program. The paper provides the basics, specifically that the vehicle is a High-Altitude Endurance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that provides long-endurance reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for theater commanders.

General Dick Myers and I both agree that this is an exceptionally important technology for the future. In the Air Force, the principal advocate for the system is General John Jumper head of the Air Combat Command. I spoke with him and agree with these key points.

- In the near term, Global Hawk can begin to replace the U-2 as our primary platform for reconnaissance. The U-2 currently has one of the highest op-tempo rates, and as a consequence, the Air Force has great difficulty in developing pilots for this mission (it takes years in training to develop a U-2 pilot).
- The Global Hawk, when deployed, will have real time data links to other space and aerial platforms, and manned aircraft.
- While Global Hawk has great potential as a platform with a series of capabilities, there will need to be trade-offs between the engineers, scientists, operators, and program managers. The Air Force understands that program managers will have to assume some risk if the system is to be fielded without lengthy development and increased costs

452 R

4Apc 01

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon **R**  
cc: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Subject: Endangered Wildlife

618.2

Mr. Secretary,

You raised a question that comes from an article in the San Diego Tribune. In the article, a Navy Admiral is quoted as saying "the US military spends \$900 million a year in efforts to protect, nurture and enhance endangered wildlife."

The proposed Navy Environmental Programs for Fiscal Year 2002 totals \$924 million. A portion of that figure (\$4 to \$5 million) protects endangered species. The Departmental total for protecting endangered species is \$27 million.

The \$924 million total for the Navy breaks down as follows:

Cleanup (groundwater, soil)	256m
Compliance (landfills, air standards, etc)	405m
Pollution Prevention	53m
Conservation	13m
Technology	66m
BRAC Environmental	<u>131m</u>
Total	924M

There are similar accounts in the Army and Air Force.

3 Apr 01

**NAVY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (excludes Marine Corps)**

FY 2002 Budget Estimate Submission

Current \$ in Millions

	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	
CLEANUP	283	294	256	groundwater, soil
COMPLIANCE	506	432	405	- air, water, health safety, landfill
POLLUTION PREVENTION	65	61	53	contaminated
CONSERVATION	15	13	13	scrubbers -
TECHNOLOGY	102	87	66	
BRAC ENVIRONMENTAL	120	<u>406</u>	<u>131</u>	- clean-up legacy
TOTAL	1,091	1,293	924	bases -

\$4-\$5 m  
for endangered species

**Yim, Randall, Mr., OSD-ATL**

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**From:** Meehan, Patrick, Mr, OSD-ATL  
**Sent:** Friday, March 30, 2001 11:37 AM  
**To:** Yim, Randall, Mr., OSD-ATL  
**cc:** Oliver, David, Mr, OSD-ATL; Washburn, Grace, Col, OSD-ATL; Heinze, April, CDR, OSD-ATL; Doxey, Kevin, Mr, OSD-ATL; Sullivan, Maureen, Ms, OSD-ATL; Stafford, Arthur, COL, OSD-ATL; Leonard, Don, Mr, OSD-ATL; Spruill, Nancy, Dr., OSD-ATL  
**Subject:** SecDef Question re: \$ spent on endangered species

Randall - You passed on a SecDef question "Is it true that the Navy spends \$900M/year on endangered species ?"

Answer: No. Not true. Navy (ecluding USMC) spends \$27M on endandgered species.

- The \$900 M figure probably came from ADM Amerault's testimony on encroachment where he said that Navy (excluding USMC) spends \$900M on environmental programs. That figure includes costs associated with Cleanup, BRAC, Compliance, Conservation, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental Technology.

- An article in the San Diego Tribune misinterpreted the Admiral's testimony, and associated the \$900M only with endangered species. See earlier E-mail to you for the article.

We're working on a cleaner, more formal info paper for you to send forward.

PJM

San Diego Union-Tribune  
March 21, 2001

## Bases Caught In Environmental Squeeze, Top Officers Say

### *Wildlife regulations can hinder training*

By Otto Kreisher, Copley News Service

WASHINGTON -- Camp Pendleton, Miramar and military bases across the country are battling an environmental Catch-22 that is hampering training, senior officers from the four services told Congress yesterday.

Because bases frequently contain the largest undeveloped space in increasingly urban areas, the installations become havens for endangered species. But the presence of those protected animals or plants subjects the bases to environmental restrictions that can sharply limit training, the officers told a Senate Armed Services Committee panel.

Air quality rules, noise complaints from housing areas that are encroaching on previously remote bases and competition with civilian air traffic for limited air space also are affecting military training and, therefore, combat readiness, they testified.

Those factors are particularly at play in Southern California, where accelerating urban congestion and environmental sensitivities are affecting the primary training areas for the Navy and Marine Corps in the Pacific.

"We must, as best we can, duplicate the environment we will face on the battlefield," said Maj. Gen. Edward Hanlon, commanding general at Camp Pendleton.

But because of urban encroachment and "unintended consequences of well-intended laws," Hanlon continued, "it becomes more and more difficult to duplicate the realistic training environment,"

Although the subcommittee chairman, Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., and other GOP members supported the military off&Is' complaints, Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., gave them contrary advice.

"The military needs to recognize that the nation's environmental laws are not just another enemy," Kennedy said, after discussing groundwater pollution caused by an Army training area on Cape Cod.

Hanlon noted that 70,000 acres of Pendleton's total 125,000 acres were threatened with being shut down as critical habitat for three endangered species found there.

At Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposed to designate 65 percent of the base, "including the runways and supporting aviation facilities," as critical habitat for two endangered species, he said.

Hanlon and the other senior officers urged Congress to consider the impact on military readiness when it enacts environmental laws.

"To restore the right balance, we need your support," Vice Adm. James Amerault, deputy chief of naval operations for fleet readiness and logistics, told the readiness subcommittee.

The officers said the U.S. military spends \$900 million a year in efforts to protect, nurture and enhance endangered wildlife.

For example, the Marines remove eggs of endangered sea turtles from the training beaches at Camp

Lejeune, N.C., hatch them in an incubator and release the baby turtles when they're mature enough. The Navy runs a similar program on Vieques, Puerto Rico.

Camp Pendleton pays wildlife specialists to watch out for its extensive population of protected animals, birds and plants. Camp Lejeune, Fort Bragg, N.C., and other bases in the Southeast protect the red-cockaded woodpecker.

Thank you very much for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.

INHOFE:

Thank you, Senator **Akaka**.

Senator Bum-ring?

BUNNING:

Thank you, **Senator Inhofe**. I'm excited to be serving on this subcommittee. I know it is a critical **subcommittee**, as far as the readiness of all of our armed services. I am anxious to hear our witnesses today, particularly on training sites that have had problems, ranges that **have** had problems. As we **all** know, they **are** numerous, but **some** are more public than others.

I know that both Senator **Akaka** and Senator Inhofe are deeply dedicated to seeing to it that all of our services have the readiness that they need when we need it. And I'm anxiously looking forward to your testimony.

I have an additional statement for the record that I will submit. **Thank** you very much.

INHOFE:

Yes. I think, Senator Bunning, that this is the committee that deals with (inaudible) **one** area **that** we have never had and I don't believe anyone's ever had a hearing on. But we're going to have to consider some of the problems that are out there.

Now, for the purposes of your opening statements, your entire statement will be made a part of the record. But I want to give you adequate time, so if you really need the time, **go** ahead and take it, but try to keep it between, oh, about **five** to seven minutes if you **could**.

And we'll start with you, Admiral **Amerault**.

AMERAULT:

Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And distinguished members of the committee, **thank** you for this opportunity to speak on some of the most difficult challenges that we face **in** maintaining the readiness of our fleet and Marine forces.

AMERAULT:

I know that this committee has been a supporter consistently of the soldier, sailor, **Marine** and airman, and it's very greatly appreciated.

Forward-deployed naval forces are the **front** line that protects our nation's economic, political and security interests around the globe. Our naval forces, in particular, are expected to provide immediate response in times of crisis. Therefore, they must be credible, combat-ready forces that can sail anywhere at any time to demonstrate America's resolve and, if necessary, prevail in combat with minimum collateral damage.

Readiness is the foundation of our fleet's war-fighting capabilities. And there's a direct link between fleet readiness and training. Having experienced combat firsthand, I can assure you that there is no substitute for training.

Let me also stress that in a world where advanced weapons systems are available to anyone for the right price, no amount of technology, hardware, personnel or leadership can substitute for training. And that means training the way we fight. When a Marine or soldier calls for gunfire or close air support in future combat, we cannot **afford** to have the ship or aircraft crew learning on the job. That could be a lesson written in blood.

The foundation of military **readiness** training and the building blocks of training are molded on our ranges. Ranges are where we train in an environment that most closely mimics real combat. I think this is essential, because nothing **takes** the place of doing it for real. That's why full access to our ranges is vital **to fleet** readiness.

Use of our ranges, however, is being **constrained increasingly** by sometimes **broad and** ambiguous regulation and expanding encroachment. These challenges confront us **despite** our continuing commitment to environmental stewardship. That commitment is underwritten by an investment of \$900 million a year, approximately, **in support of** environmental programs.

Since 1970, however, **environmental** legislation and implementing regulations have expanded considerably. When these laws were adopted, they focused primarily on civilian commercial activity. Their application to military training and their potential impacts on military readiness were not fully discussed or anticipated.

Now I think we know better. Broad interpretations of ambiguities or failure to accommodate or consider unique **military** activities has **imposed significant burdens** on military training, **often** with very little actual benefit to the environment. Even worse, it has provided a powerful weapon to those who oppose military activities for whatever **reason.**

Further complicating the issue is the application of the precautionary approach for managing protected resources. This approach says that in **the** absence of scientific information to the contrary, our proposed training is assumed to harm the environment.

The burden of legal compliance is exacerbated by the shrinking real estate available for natural resource conservation. Residential and commercial development surround our once isolated ranges, reducing available conservation areas outside of our facilities.

Our installations and ranges, on the other hand, have proven to be more and more safe havens for our country's natural resources. Consequently, our property is becoming a

March 27, 2001 6:46 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Rudy de Leon  
Dov **Zakheim**

FROM: Donald Rums **DR**

SUBJECT: Endangered Wildlife

When we start racking up the DoD, we ought to include the fact that we spend \$900 **million** a year to protect, nurture and enhance endangered wildlife, **because** military bases are one of the few places where wildlife can still go, and that is **not** a **DoD** function.

T h a n k s .

DHR:dh  
032701-17

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
cc: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Subject: Global Hawk

452 R

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49pc 01

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CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Global Hawk**

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DHR/azm  
032601.45  
Attach.

3/20/01

TO: SecDef

FROM: RDML Quinn 3/20/01 J

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**TAB C** Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

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March 13, 2001 11:14 AM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Global Hawk

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DHR:dh  
031301-1 1

11-L-0559/OSD/1016

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	<b>FY01</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>
<b>Tech Orders</b>	<b>\$2M by July</b>	<b>\$13M</b>	<b>\$8M</b>
<b>Spares</b>		<b>\$8M</b>	
<b>*LRE retrofit</b>		<b>\$7M</b>	

\* Would also need one extra properly configured LRE available to support other on-going training, testing, and EMD activities

- Of course, even a more costly (approximately \$1B) *total program* acceleration option could be implemented that would field more final configuration Global Hawk systems sooner, but it would still be 2004 before the 4<sup>th</sup> A/V will be delivered and the IOC requirement is achieved

## Air Vehicle (Platform) Upgrade Option

- **Capability Improvements**

- Increased power for sensor packages (from 10 to 25 KVA)
- Upgraded engine (5% thrust increase plus additional cooling air)
- Open electronics architecture to ease future upgrades (commercial standards employed)
- Communications upgrades to meet CINC in theater requirements
- Improved wing aerodynamics for increased altitude, range, and endurance performance
- Multiple-Simultaneous payloads (signals intelligence and radar or EO/IR)
  - Payload growth to 3000# (from 2000#)
  - Endurance at 2400 Nautical Miles reduced from 24 to 20 hours when carrying a 3000# payload

- **Schedule**

- Develop:     FY02-03
- Buy:         FY03
- Deliver     NO4

- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FY03</u>	<u>Total</u>
RDT&E	44.2	18.6	62.8

## Sensor Upgrade/Acceleration Options

- **Capability Improvements** (versus U-2 legacy sensors)
  - Improved EO/IR (need capability comparison to legacy)
  - Upgraded Legacy Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
  - Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar (2 to 4 times range and area coverage, improved ground moving target tracking and area coverage)
    - Radar being developed as part of the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) which also applies to the Joint STARS Program and NATO Ground Surveillance
  - Improved Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
  
- **Schedule**
  - Integrate Improved EO/IR: FY02-04
  - Upgrade SAR: FY02-03
  - Integrate AESA: FY04-07
  - Integrate Improved SIGINT: FY02-04
  
- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FY03</u>	<u>FY04</u>	<u>FY05</u>	<u>FY06</u>	<u>FY07</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EO/IR	5.9	30.3	24.7				60.9
SAR	3.1	28.7					31.8
AESA		17.0	79.8	67.5	15.1	11.2	190.6
SIGINT	1.4	34.5	35.2				71.1

## Production Rate Acceleration Options

### Acceleration Provides:

- Enables more efficient production rates and provides increased force structure and improved capability sooner to theater CINCs

### Two production options:

#### Acceleration to 6 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

(TY\$M)	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	Total
Production	85.6	246.5	179.4	232.5	269.2	270.8	1.284
Units	0	0	2	4	4	4	14

#### Acceleration to 10 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

(TY\$M)	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	Total
Production	85.6	246.5	216.4	524.5	490.2	494.8	2.058
Units	0	0	2	4	8	8	22

- Cost includes price of advanced sensors, electronic intelligence sensor for each aircraft and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor for every two aircraft
- Cost includes four ground stations for the 6 aircraft per year option and five for the 10 aircraft per year option
- Parity reached with U-2 imagery intelligence sensors in FY04
- Partial parity reached with U-2 signals intelligence sensors (electronic intelligence only) in NO5



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

*Mr. [unclear] 2/16  
Dave Oliver*

FROM: DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC & TACTICAL SYSTEMS

*Dr. George Schneider*

Approved by: Mr. Mutzelburg/OUUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-0525 *Has Copy*  
Prepared by: Col Vic Salts & OUUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-3 165 March 14, 2001 *W/ [unclear] 3/14/01*

SUBJECT: Global Hawk Program Options - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Provide SecDef information on Global Hawk system and program acceleration options

DISCUSSION:

- The attached papers (Tab A – D) provide information on the Global Hawk system and options for accelerating the currently approved program.
- Tab A - Global Hawk background information
- Tab B – Air Vehicle ('platform) upgrade option
- Tab C – Sensor capability upgrade/acceleration option
- Tab D – Production rate acceleration options
- Options at Tabs B-D can be done individually or in combination
- Potential payoffs include accelerated air vehicle improvements and earlier fielding of improved sensor capability. Higher production rate provides more capability sooner (fully fielded FY08 vs FY 15) at lower cost (20% lower unit cost) with 40% less force structure required to cover orbit requirements

RECOMMENDATION: None – For Information Only.





ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

SECRET

JUL 10 PM 2:18



INFORMATION MEMO

July 9, 2001 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS) *E. C. [Signature]* 7/10/01

SUBJECT: ABC News Report on "New Radar Systems"

- A recent ABC News Report claimed several countries are working on "new radar system" to render the B-2 obsolete.
- These systems are a well understood class of radar known as passive coherent location systems (PCLS). PCLS demonstrate less of a threat to US aircraft than commercially available and widely deployed early warning radars.
- The Air Force has done flight testing with the Lockheed "Silent Sentry" PCLS. Testing has shown this system has significantly less detection range and comparable tracking accuracy to widely available early warning radars.

(U) COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Devin Cate, OUSD (A&T)/DSP, 697-1282



June 15, 2001 10:12 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Stealth

Do you have anything on this article I have circled on stealth?

Attach.  
6/15/01 SIRO Press Review

DHR:dh  
061501-2

11-L-0559/OSD/1024

FRIDAY, 15 JUNE 2001

UNCLASSIFIED

## HIGHLIGHTS

1. (MIDDLE EAST) A Palestinian fired from close range at an Israeli van in the West Bank on Thursday, killing an Israeli army intelligence officer, jeopardizing a new, U.S.-mediated cease-fire agreement. The shooting, along a major thoroughfare, took place during a schedule meeting between the Palestinian and the Israeli officer, a Palestinian security official in the Gaza Strip said on condition of anonymity. A soldier in the car then shot and killed the Palestinian, the Israeli military said. A soldier was wounded in the attack. Later that day, Palestinians fired several mortar shells at the Jewish settlement of Morag in the Gaza Strip, the military said, but no one was hurt. Israel ordered its army to start easing restrictions on the Palestinians following a security meeting on 13 June in Tel Aviv. At the Netzarim junction, a major flash point in the Gaza Strip, Israeli tanks pulled back about a 100 yards on Thursday, then approached again part-way. Stone-throwing Palestinian youths pelted Israeli military jeeps. Soldiers responded with stun grenades and tear gas. No injuries were reported. Major General Giora Eiland, Israeli Chief of Military Operations, said soldiers would begin to lift restrictions by mid-afternoon Friday, and Israeli forces would redeploy. The plan calls for Israel to pull its forces and heavy weapons back to points they held before the hostilities erupted. Eiland said the timetable could be accelerated if the Palestinians work to prevent attacks., -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (BALKANS) Macedonia asked NATO on Thursday to be ready to help it disarm ethnic Albanian rebels, if the guerrillas eventually agree to peace terms now on offer. Macedonian authorities have also extended a four-day cease-fire. Although ruling out Western intervention, NATO Chief George Robertson told a news conference, that he will be taking the request back to NATO headquarters "to see what we can do." Robertson supports Macedonian President Trajkovski's peace plan that provides for a system of disarmament and decommissioning. The guerrillas, meanwhile, outlined for the first time their demands for ending the insurgency. Wary of the Macedonian government, the guerrillas also want the Western alliance to get involved, asking that NATO troops be deployed throughout the country and demanding an amnesty for their fighters and wide-ranging reforms to improve the status of Albanians. Meanwhile, Britain said on Thursday it had offered to send training teams to help the Macedonian army but according to the Ministry of Defense, the Macedonians had yet to make a direct request for help. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

## CAPSULES

1. (U.S./CHINA) A six-person team from the contractor Lockheed Martin is en route to Hainan Island to begin dismantling and shipping home the damaged EP-3 Navy spy plane, U.S. and Chinese officials said Thursday. -AP, 14 JUN 01-

2. (U.S./STEALTH) China, Russia, and several European and U.S. companies are working on a new radar system that threatens to render the stealth B-2 bomber fleet obsolete by making the radar-evading planes more detectable, ABC's World News Tonight reported on Thursday. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

3. (RUSSIA/OSCE) According to Reuters, the 55-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has agreed to pay the Russian Ministry of Justice for a 25-man protection squad for its two-or-three-man monitoring team that is returning to Chechnya after withdrawing in December 1998. -REUTERS, 14 JUN 01-

August 8, 2001 10:55 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
CC: Torie Clarke  
Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3<sup>Λ</sup>  
SUBJECT: Savings

Please give Larry Di Rita a specific list of things you have stopped or cut out and where you have saved money. We need to keep a running log.

I just read your memo of August 6, and you are obviously doing some things-but we need to capture them. You can't just do it and let it sink. We have to know it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/6/01 Aldridge memo to SecDef re: "Detailees to AT&L"

DHR:dh  
080801-9

040

8 Aug 01

U12699 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1026

August 6, 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN

Aug 10 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Detailees to AT&L

You asked for my response to Arnold Punaro's 1997 report, which claimed that 156 people working in AT&L are not OSD personnel. I cannot verify the number that the report claims, but here are the facts:

--There are 446 Consultants assigned to AT&L. These are for boards and advisory committees, such as the Defense Science Board. I have, or did have 72 various advisory boards under the authority of AT&L. We just eliminated 31 of these Boards and will continue to scrub the number for value and contribution. The number of consultants will change according to the activity level of these boards.

--We have 310 people who are described as "Other Assignments" and are funded by their agencies or other DoD organizations. These are people assigned on temporary duty to AT&L for special and short term projects, DoD-wide Rotational Training Programs, Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) temporary assignments, assignment through Memorandum of Agreement with DOE, CIA and DIA, Summer hires and Interns, Career Development Programs, and course instruction by Faculty personnel. These assignments are tracked and monitored to ensure compliance with OSD and AT&L policies. However, I am sure these "temporary assignments" tend to become more permanent over time. We will take an action to scrub our use of these "other assignments".

--We also have about 300 Contractor personnel assigned to AT&L to provide administrative, information and computer support. I think this is too much and will cut it back.

11-L-0559/OSD/1027

August 17, 2001 10:33 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: F-22 Decision Paper

This paper on the F-22 doesn't do it. I need a shorter, simpler set of statements that are accurate. This is not persuasive. If this is the best case we've got, it won't sell.

If you don't know what I am looking for, or you can't understand what this memo means, come and see me and we'll figure it out.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/16/01F-22 DAB Decision Background

DHR:dh  
081701-13

452-F

1) Aug 17

U12714 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1028

## F-22 DAB DECISION BACKGROUND – AUGUST 16, 2001

AS  
SECDEF HAS SEEN  
AUG 17 2001  
person

### Executive Summary

- Re-organized DAB: the three Service Secretaries; USD(C); USD(P&R); USD(P); DOT&E; and PA&E. DAB Chair: USD(AT&L); DAB Vice-Chair: Vice Chairman
- DAB's August 14 review of Air Force's F-22 Program resulted in unanimous recommendation to proceed with Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), with a revised program based on new cost estimates for the program.
- An Acquisition Decision Memorandum and SecDef letter to Congress being prepared. Letter legally required to notify Congress of decision and the revised program plan.

### F-22 Milestone

- The program met all of its "exit criteria" for LRIP and meets or exceeds its design goals.
- We have extended the test program by 3 months to further reduce risks.
- Air Force analyses of alternatives and an independent study by IDA validated that the F-22 is the most effective air-to-air lighter for executing the QDR scenarios-guaranteed air dominance, minimizing air and ground force losses. Worth buying in any number. ✓

### Program Cost and Quantity

- Differences in cost estimates between Air Force and Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) have diminished. Both agree on cost within FYDP for EMD, LRIP Lots 2-5.
- Only remaining issue; total production costs for the high rate production after FY06. To resolve the DAB has agreed to the following plan:
  - 1) Accept the revised Air Force estimate of cost for the program
  - 2) Produce the number of aircraft the CAIG estimates can be procured at the total program cost level set by the Air Force (295 aircraft versus 331)
  - 3) The number actually produced through 2011 will depend on the QDR, future QDR's, future budgets. Furthermore, additional savings (or overruns) could result in purchase of more (or fewer) planes. Provides cost control incentives

### Questions

Is this program-with fewer planes and higher costs-out of control?

- No. We ~~have added additional funding to ensure sufficient management~~ flexibility to foster innovation and ~~make~~ smart investment decisions. We have incentivized the Air Force and the contractor to achieve additional savings.

Why are you proceeding despite this large cost growth? Isn't the F-22 a Cold War Relic?

- F-22 is a key part of Defense Transformation and Modernization. Current aircraft are at rough parity with foreign threats and are becoming increasingly difficult to support. The F-22 will be key to enabling Joint Operations in the 21st Century.

Why are you proceeding with the F-22 when it has technical problems like the tail cracks?

- The F-22 is meeting or exceeding all of its key requirements. The issue with debonding in the tails is minor. It is a known problem with a known solution.

Are the Congressional Cost Caps still an effective tool for controlling costs?

- I don't believe caps are wise. F-22 development is essentially complete and we have placed cost reduction incentives on the production of the aircraft.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

SIA

8/6

USD/ATIL -

This does not answer  
SecDef's question.  
Since we both need an  
extension, do we  
want to work with  
Russia to secure one?

D. K. H. T.

6 AUG 01

816  
1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

INFO MEMO

SPL ASSISTANT DIRITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1-13
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	10/8/3

July 26, 2001, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons

- With regard to your note (Tab A), the Russian initiative to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile is beset by a failed economy and poor management. U.S. assistance for these efforts is being managed through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. DoD has been working with Russian officials to develop a chemical weapons destruction process and munitions processing equipment, upgrade a central analytical laboratory, and, most significantly, construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch'ye (Tab B). This facility will use the Russian developed and demonstrated two-stage destruction process.
- The U.S. Congress has criticized Russia for delays with construction-related requirements and curtailed funding for this program beginning in FY00.
- To address the problem and demonstrate its commitment, the Russian government centralized all chemical demilitarization activities under one office to advance the program and seek foreign assistance. This has been perceived as a positive step,
- The U.S. program has nine sites, one in the closure phase, one operational, five under various stages of construction, and two locations where we will make a technology decision in FY02. In contrast, the Russian program has only one facility under construction. The Chemical Weapons Convention has a 2007 destruction deadline and the Russian program will require a full five-year extension. U.S. program data strongly suggests that we also need an extension. This will be determined in an upcoming Defense Acquisition Executive review,

Coordination: OUSD(P)

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Mr. Pat Wakefield, ODATSD(CBD), 695-9488

*Don - I met with Mr. Rak, the Russian in charge of this project. They are beginning to move out on the process, and told me they still have a goal to meet the 2007 date (not likely). They will do all of the destruction at the single site.*

May 25, 2001 9:09 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Chemicals

I notice the Russians are having the same problem getting rid of their chemicals. I wonder if we ought to delay the timing and try to cooperate with the Russians to figure out how we can each do it.

Any thoughts?

DHR:dh  
052501-4

11-L-0559/OSD/1032

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITY

**Project Objective:** Assist the Russian Federation in eliminating chemical weapons through the creation of a Russian destruction facility at Shchuch'ye for nerve agent-filled artillery munitions.

**Shchuch'ye:** A 5,460 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) is stored at the Shchuch'ye CW storage depot, Kurgan Oblast, Russia. These include modern, nerve agent-filled munitions which are: in excellent, ready-to-use condition; for the most part, small and easily transportable; easily mated to delivery systems found throughout the world-both short-range missiles and artillery. The agents stored at Shchuch'ye comprise 14 percent of the total declared Russian CW stockpile and roughly 50 percent of the modern artillery- and rocket-launched nerve agent. Included in the munitions stored at Shchuch'ye are nearly one million 122-mm nerve agent-filled artillery munitions,

**Project Overview:** The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program provides, among other things, assistance for the design and construction of a CW destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye to destroy approximately 800 metric-agent-tons per year. This facility will use the Russian developed and demonstrated two-stage destruction process. The Shchuch'ye CWDF, as planned, will be readily expandable to allow the Russians to scale-up destruction rates (to 1,600 metric agent-tons per year).

**US Project Cost:** CTR support to the Russian CW destruction facility effort has committed U.S. funding in the amount of \$229.5 M (FY94-FY99) for the following:

- Evaluation, optimization and scale-up of the Russian nerve agent destruction process;
- Development, design, fabrication and testing of the munitions processing equipment;
- Preparation of the Justification of Investment and design (working construction documents) of the integrated CWDF processes and facility.
- CWDF site clearing, water drainage and preparation of the land for construction.

Additional funding (FY02-08) for construction, equipment acquisition/installation, systemization, training, and start-up of the Shchuch'ye CWDF is estimated at \$657.5 M. Total U.S. project cost is projected to be \$888 M.

**US Congressional Action in FY 2000:** Section 1305 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of FY 2000 appropriations, or any appropriations thereafter, for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. DoD understands the Congressional action was taken largely as a result of concern about the slow progress by the Russian Federation in meeting construction-related requirements at the Shchuch'ye CWDF site and the lack of international assistance for the project. Substantial progress has been registered recently in both areas.

**US Congressional Action in FY 2001:** Although Congress noted recent progress, they declined to lift the post-FY 1999 construction ban and restore funding for the project in FY 2001. However, in the FY 2001 authorization language, Congress did note the availability of prior-year funding that may be used to secure and eliminate Russia's CW stockpiles. Accordingly, on 21 Dec 2000, DoD began site preparation activities for the CWDF using FY 1999 funding and will seek the lifting of the construction ban and \$35 M in additional funding for CWDF construction in its FY2002 budget request.

COORDINATION

OUSD(P)

COL Baldwin

July 25, 2001



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

INFO MEMO

August 9, 2001, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

*Pete Aldridge*  
8/9/01

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons

- DoD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (PL 99-145) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), ratified in 1997, require the United States to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and related chemical warfare materiel by April, 2007.
- The CWC is a multi-lateral treaty: 174 countries have signed the treaty and 143 have ratified it. South Korea, India, and Russia also have declared stockpiles. South Korea, India and the U.S. successfully met the first interim destruction requirement for declared nations to destroy 1% of their stockpile by April, 2000. Russia did not.
- The Army began destruction of the existing stockpile of chemical weapons in 1990 at a facility in Johnston Atoll – one of nine planned demilitarization facilities. This facility has successfully completed operations and is closed. To date, 22.8% of the original US stockpile has been destroyed. A chemical destruction facility in Tooele, UT is operational, the Anniston, AL facility is in systemization, four facilities are under various stages of construction (Pine Bluff, AR, Umatilla, OR, Aberdeen, MD and Newport, IN), and a technology decision will be made in FY02 for Pueblo, CO and Blue-Grass, KY.
- If a State Party requires an extension, they must request it from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) no later than one year prior to the April, 2007 destruction deadline, (i.e., April, 2006). U.S. program data strongly suggest we will need an extension. This will be determined at the Defense Acquisition Board Program Review (August 30, 2001).
- Russia is initiating construction of its first chemical demilitarization facility. The reason for the delay is mainly due to lack of funding. Because the CWC is a multi-lateral agreement, it is not necessary, nor beneficial, to link the programs for the purpose of requesting an extension.

RUSSIA

9A06-01

Coordination: None

Prepared by: Mr. Pat Wakefield, ODATSD(CBD), 695-9488 *aw 10/01*





ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

20010809 15:00:00

INFO MEMO

August 9, 2001, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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*Pete*  
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Coordination: None

Prepared by: Mr. Pat Wakefield, ODATSD(CBD), 695-9488 *aw 10/01*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

8/6

USD/ATIL -

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SecDef's question.  
Since we both need an  
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D. Rita

86  
1100



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 2030 1-30 10

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SPL ASSISTANT DI BITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1-13
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	FB 8/3

INFO MEMO

July 26, 2001, 10:00 AM

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Coordination: OUSD(P)

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Mr. Pat Wakefield, ODATSD(CBD), 6959488

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DHR:dh  
052501-4

11-L-0559/OSD/1039

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**Project Objective:** Assist the Russian Federation in eliminating chemical weapons through the creation of a Russian destruction facility at Shchuch'ye for nerve agent-filled artillery munitions.

**Shchuch'ye:** A 5,460 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) is stored at the Shchuch'ye CW storage depot, Kurgan Oblast, Russia. These include modem, nerve agent-filled munitions which are: in excellent, ready-to-use condition; for the most part, small and easily transportable; easily mated to delivery systems found throughout the world-both short-range missiles and artillery. The agents stored at Shchuch'ye comprise 14 percent of the total declared Russian CW stockpile and roughly 50 percent of the modem artillery- and rocket-launched nerve agent. Included in the munitions stored at Shchuch'ye are nearly one million 122-mm nerve agent-filled artillery munitions.

**Project Overview:** The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program provides, among other things, assistance for the design and construction of a CW destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye to destroy approximately 800 metric-agent-tons per year. This facility will use the Russian developed and demonstrated two-stage destruction process. The Shchuch'ye CWDF, as planned, will be readily expandable to allow the Russians to scale-up destruction rates (to 1,600 metric agent-tons per year).

**US Project Cost:** CTR support to the Russian CW destruction facility effort has committed U.S. funding in the amount of \$229.5 M (FY94-FY99) for the following:

- Evaluation, optimization and scale-up of the Russian nerve agent destruction process;
- Development, design, fabrication and testing of the munitions processing equipment;
- Preparation of the Justification of Investment and design (working construction documents) of the integrated CWDF processes and facility.
- CWDF site clearing, water drainage and preparation of the land for construction.

Additional funding (FY02-08) for construction, equipment acquisition/installation, systemization, training, and start-up of the Shchuch'ye CWDF is estimated at \$657.5 M. Total U.S. project cost is projected to be \$888 M.

**US Congressional Action in FY 2000:** Section 1305 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of FY 2000 appropriations, or any appropriations thereafter, for the planning, design, or construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. DoD understands the Congressional action was taken largely as a result of concern about the slow progress by the Russian Federation in meeting construction-related requirements at the Shchuch'ye CWDF site and the lack of international assistance for the project. Substantial progress has been registered recently in both areas.

**US Congressional Action in FY 2001:** Although Congress noted recent progress, they declined to lift the post-FY 1999 construction ban and restore funding for the project in FY 2001. However, in the FY 2001 authorization language, Congress did note the availability of prior-year funding that may be used to secure and eliminate Russia's CW stockpiles. Accordingly, on 21 Dec 2000, DoD began site preparation activities for the CWDF using FY 1999 funding and will seek the lifting of the construction ban and \$35 M in additional funding for CWDF construction in its FY2002 budget request.

COORDINATION

OUSD(P)

COL Baldwin

July 25, 2001



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

2001 AUG 22 PM 4:43



INFO MEMO

August 21, 2001 3:36 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

*M. J. Aldridge*  
*PA/EIA 8/20*

SUBJECT: U.S. Sponsored Television Broadcasts Over Foreign Territory ("Face of America")

- The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has investigated the feasibility of US-sponsored television broadcasts over foreign territory ("Face of America"). The task was to leverage *hand-held* commercial television (e.g., Sony Watchman).
- Broadcasting analog UHF/VHF signals from space to a *hand-held* commercial television is likely to be expensive and require significant satellite development.
- "Face of America" broadcasts are technically feasible today with *hand-held* commercial television utilizing airborne transmitters such as the Commando Solo (EC-130E) aircraft.
- Instead of analog broadcasts, leveraging the commercial digital broadcast technology from geostationary orbit (e.g., DirecTV) appears promising. Development required includes modification to the satellite to allow all the power to be combined into one broadcast channel, development of a patch antenna, and miniaturizing the digital receiver.
- Background at TAB A; White Paper on concept at TAB B.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: William Jeffrey, 703-696-23 15



11-L-0559/OSD/1042

U14261 /01

000.77

21Aug01

## BACKGROUND

**Scope:** DARPA investigated four scenarios including a COTS baseline and three excursions with increasing technical complexity. Each scenario assessed performance with the transmitting antenna placed in a geostationary orbit (GEO), medium earth orbit (MEO), low earth orbit (LEO), and on-board an aircraft. The enclosed briefings and white paper provide details on the analysis and results.

### **Analysis:**

- 1) COTS Broadcast: Standard UHF/VHF broadcast from MEO or GEO to a COTS *hand-held* TV is theoretically possible but likely to be expensive. It would require very large power and/or aperture on the satellite to provide adequate signal on the ground. The power/aperture required would exceed current satellite systems and require development. A LEO satellite is more feasible, but a single satellite would only provide a few minutes of broadcast per day over a specific target region. Thus a dense constellation may be required to provide greater coverage. Utilizing an airborne transmitter (e.g., the existing Commando Solo, EC-130E) provides sufficient signal and is capable of several hours of broadcast per aircraft. The airborne transmitter may have limited coverage, however, due to restricted airspace.
- 2) Non-COTS Excursion: The most promising excursion investigated was developing a digital broadcast system operating at higher frequency and broadcasting from GEO (similar to the commercial **DirectTV**). The commercial systems utilize a terrestrial 18" dish antenna with a very narrow angle of acceptance. A small sector antenna (~2") with a 45° acceptance angle can be used if the current power used to broadcast hundreds of channels were combined and used to broadcast a single channel. The larger acceptance angle eliminates the need for fine pointing of the antenna and allows relatively unsophisticated users to pick up the transmissions. In addition, the digital receiver (currently the size of a VCR) would need to be miniaturized. The technical risk to this development is considered low.


## Options for COTS TV Broadcast from Space

**Thesis:** With the proliferation of ubiquitous low-cost consumer televisions (e.g., Sony Watchman), does it make sense to use them as an economical receiver for a “Voice of America” broadcast from space?

**Background & Assumptions:** The baseline for the analysis used the familiar consumer VHF/UHF television receiver designed for analog broadcast [ch 2 (54 MHz) to ch 83 (884 MHz)]. The receiver sensitivity used in the link budget calculations was that of a standard commercial television set. To account for atmospheric, pointing, and other losses, 10 dB was added to the required power. Transmitters were placed at Geostationary (GEO), Medium (MEO), and Low Earth Orbits (LEO) as well as from airborne. Regulatory, frequency allocation, jamming (whether intentional or unintentional) and orbital slot availability issues were not considered.

**Discussion.** Commercial television receivers are designed assuming fixed, high power terrestrial broadcast transmitters. The wavelengths can range from 5.6m to 0.34 m (ch 2 to ch 83). Wavelengths of this order have the advantage of being able to penetrate non-metallic structures but also have the disadvantage of requiring large antennas to obtain gain (recall the size of the Yagi antenna on roofs). Additionally, while not a problem for terrestrial systems, transmission at these frequencies from space will be severely affected by the ionosphere which will twist, bend, attenuate, and even reflect the signal causing disruption of the transmission.

Fundamentally, enough signal must reach the receiver to be detected. That means high power must be achieved by some combination of transmitter power and size of aperture to focus the energy. The graph on the right illustrates the combinations of power and aperture needed by a transmitter at various notional altitudes.



Power-Aperture for VHF/UHF Transmission

A GEO satellite has the advantage of being able to remain “fixed” over a point on the earth and therefore is in continuous view of the receiver. Its high altitude, however, results in significant free space loss.<sup>1</sup> This loss results in a power-aperture that is quite large and would require significant expense. MEO and LEO satellites have an orbital period defined by their altitude and therefore a constellation of satellites is required to maintain continuous view relative to a receiver on the surface. Their shorter range (as compared to GEO) translates into lower free space loss. For MEO, however, the power-aperture is still quite large. A LEO system’s power-aperture appears better but the coverage over a spot on the earth per satellite would be rather limited. This limited

<sup>1</sup> Free space loss is a function of the distance squared and the frequency,  $(4\pi R/\lambda)^2$

cover will necessitate either a large constellation or some type of "TV Guide" to alert the intended listeners of when the satellite overpass will occur. An airborne transmitter has the greatest advantage in power-aperture, but may have limited coverage due to overflight restrictions.<sup>2</sup> Country demographics may, however, show that much of the intended population lives within an area that can be serviced by an airborne transmitter.

**Other Considerations.** Frequency allocation will be an issue. The International Telecommunications Union allocates spectrum (VHF/UHF) to be used from space. Since the spot size on the ground from a LEO or MEO transmitter is large, allies and neutral TV broadcasts in neighboring regions would likely be corrupted.

**Excursions.** If the assumption of a COTS television receiver is relaxed, then several improvements can be made:

1) Connecting the COTS television to a directional antenna provides about 10 dB improvement, and therefore decreases the power-aperture needed by the transmitter. The LEO and airborne link budgets become more favorable but pointing towards and tracking the satellite or aircraft becomes necessary.

2) Changing the format from analog to digital transmission would mean a completely new receiver but the added processing gain available would allow reception without a directional antenna from LEO and airborne transmitters. The 10 dB improvement, however, is probably not worth the receiver development cost.

3) Shifting from VHF to a higher frequency will improve the link budget if directivity is introduced. This would require a new receiver design. Additionally, the higher frequencies will not penetrate buildings - requiring the antenna to be outdoors. Coupling the higher frequency with digital broadcast may provide sufficient signal to leverage a GEO transmitter. Leveraging the work of direct broadcast systems (e.g., DirectTV) appears to be a viable option. If one replaced the 18" terrestrial antenna with a small sector antenna (-4 cm) providing a 45" acceptance angle, then one could receive a GEO broadcast if the power per TV channel were increased from a few W/channel to about 300 W/channel. The 45" acceptance angle eliminates the need for fine pointing of the antenna and allows relatively unsophisticated users to pick up the transmissions.

**Recommendations.** The Direct Broadcast set top box is becoming as ubiquitous and as inexpensive as the commercial television receiver, Leveraging Direct Broadcast technology may allow for a GEO transmission into a COTS handheld TV. Required development includes miniaturizing the Direct Broadcast receiver (frequency downconvert and digital-to-analog format) from the size of a VCR to palm-top. In addition, an inexpensive patch antenna is needed to integrate into the unit. On the satellite, the available power would need to be broadcast into a single (or a few) channels as opposed to spread over hundreds.

---

<sup>2</sup> Commando Solo, EC-130E conducts psychological operations and can broadcast AM, FM, HF, and TV bands.



Honorable E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.  
Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

JD  
6/22

June 21, 2001

To: Tony Tether

Per attached, please give me a response and any suggestions you may have.

Pete

/gh  
cca 062001-E

June 20, 2001 9:17 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: DARPA Project

One of the things that could really change the face of the earth is if people like the Iranians and Iraqis could have a single, small instrument they could use inside their own homes to pull down **satellite** signals.

The transistor radio did a great deal towards this, but if people who are repressed by **dictators** had the ability to pull in video signals of things like the news and music, it would make a **big** difference.

Do you think that is something DARPA ought to look into?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062001-S

11-L-0559/OSD/1047

Ron K took  
to suspense



Honorable Michael W. Wynne  
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)  
August 6, 2001

TO: Pete Aldridge

SUBJECT: U.S.-sponsored TV Broadcast Feasibility

Better off with large antenna to be compatible with what's out there as receivers. I'm not sure small receivers are in places we would transmit to?

I read the Dampa report on 'Face of America', and  
Question - not the transmitters but the receivers.

*Michael Wynne*

We need to  
provide a short  
summary for Sec Def.  
I read in Early Bird we  
we going to provide TV  
broadcast into IAAQ.  
AA

*Acted  
D 11/28  
1746*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

Here is a memo from Geoffrey Hoon which you should take a look at, and get the right people working on it. I have no idea what it's all about and I haven't got time to read it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.22

Attach: November 16<sup>th</sup> Letter from Geoffrey Hoon

Respond by: 11/29

*NATO 400.1.2*

*93 Nov 01*

U14996 02

*01/21  
16R*

CLASSIFICATION

[Redacted]

**THE RT HON GEOFFREY HOON MP**  
Secretary of State for Defence

Ministry of Defence  
Room 205  
Old War **Office**  
White hall  
London **SW1A** 2EU

*01/21*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S OFFICE** Fax:  
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

From:

Tel:

Date: 20 NOV 01

No of pages: 5 [including header]

Remarks:

THIS VERSION REPLACES THE LETTER THAT WAS FAXED TO YOU VIA THE BRITISH EMBASSY YESTERDAY (19 NOV 01). THIS OFFICE APOLOGISES FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED THROUGH OUR ERROR. THE ONLY CHANGE IS TO PAGE TWO OF THE LETTER WHERE ADDITIONAL TEXT HAS BEEN ADDED.

UMT

[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/1050

*01/21/01*

TO (b)(6)



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON. SW1A 2EU

Telephone 020 MI 82111/2/3  
Fax 020 721 87140  
E-mail: [sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk)

MO 13/8/1C

16 November 2001

Dear Donald,


I am writing to tell you about a European programme to develop advanced technologies for combat air system's capabilities that will be announced in Brussels on Monday. I and my colleagues from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden will sign a declaration to launch a joint technology programme with European industry which will sustain and develop European capabilities for combat air systems over the next two decades. I attach the text of the declaration.

The European Technology Acquisition Programme, or ETAP, is a broadly-based programme to examine and develop technologies that are likely to have application in airborne strike systems in the next decade and beyond. It is a framework for collaboration within which a series of technology demonstration programmes will be launched. Each nation is able to decide which technology demonstrator programmes to join, guided by its national requirements. Applications of ETAP generated technology are likely to be diverse and could include unmanned air vehicles, cruise missiles and command and control systems, as well as developments to existing or planned manned aircraft.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/1051

613536 01



I particularly wanted to keep you informed about this in order to reassure you about the nature of the ETAP programme and its relationship with the important work we are doing together on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). UK officials have discussed this with yours in recent weeks, in particular to address any concerns regarding the control of sensitive technology. I would like to reiterate that our ETAP work will be based on indigenous UK technology and know-how it will be kept entirely separate, both in Government and in industry, from our vital transatlantic co-operation on JSF. Under the arrangements that have been put in place to control access to technological information, JSF information will be safeguarded within that programme and will not be shared with others. I remain wholly committed to taking the Joint Strike Fighter programme forward.

The Defence Materiel staff in our Washington Embassy stand ready to discuss these matters further with your officials should this be necessary.

Your sincerely,  
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

## MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

**THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

**Acting in the spirit of the statement by the Heads of State and Government on 9 December 1997, which stated that they shared a vital political and economic interest in an efficient and globally competitive European aerospace and defence electronics industry,**

**Acting in the spirit of the framework agreement on measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European Defence Industry signed on 27 July 2000, and in particular the chapters concerning defence-related research and technology and the harmonisation of military requirements,**

**Recognising the need for their countries and for Europe to retain a strong and competitive industrial and technology base and a long-term capability to design, manufacture and integrate combat air systems,**

**Considering possible needs for such systems towards the end of the next decade (2020),**

**Promoting the harmonisation of military requirements in this sector,**

**Have decided in particular to carry out a joint study between now and summer 2002 aimed at delivering an initial assessment of their respective capability requirements in a 2020 timeframe and identifying the types of systems and their related technology base that might appropriately be developed jointly,**

**Have decided to launch, in co-operation with industry, a focused research and technology programme (the so called European Technology Acquisition Programme, ETAP) to lay the foundations for future combat air systems covering key fields within this sector.**

**Are asking their National Armament Directors to give priority to continued support for technology programmes already underway in order to ensure the achievement of their objectives and ensure the rapid signature of the necessary inter-governmental arrangements for ETAP whose management could be assigned in whole or part to OCCAR in due time,**

**Intend to allocate appropriate government funding for these activities,**

**Encourage European industry**

**- to make a substantial financial contribution to this effort**

(b)(6)

- to propose innovative solutions and initiatives to support this *activity*, including suggestions for possible regrouping~~s~~ and/or co-operation to make the most of existing ~~capabilites~~ in the industries of each country.

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:49 PM

Afghanistan

TO: CJCS  
VCJCS  
Gen. Holland  
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

27sep01

11-L-0559/OSD/1055

U16394 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Paul - this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

**Memorandum**

urgent

Subject: on possible operations in **Afghanistan**

From: (b)(6)

For: Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS

Date: 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A land invasion of Afghanistan would be **an** error of catastrophic proportions. The Taliban regime is weak militarily and economically. Most ordinary Afghans hate it **for** the poverty and abuses it has endangered. Foreigners among **the** Taliban are **particularly** resented. Having said that, an assault on Kabul and **Kandahar** can initially be **successful**. But in the medium **term** it would cause **an** Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. **The Talibanization of a nuclear country does** not bear thinking about. In addition, Hindu **Kush** passes will be **covered in** snow before the US can **mobilise** a **sufficient** invasion force, making operations even **harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states; surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets **selected** on the basis of electronic **and** satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The **country** has no infrastructure to speak **of**: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone **links**. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt they will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards** may have dispersed already. **In 1987** I spent **three** months under **constant** Soviet bombing and **rocketing**. In a terrain in **which** every rock and **every** irrigation canal provides **cover**, **high** altitude bombing is ineffective.
3. To track down **and** capture or kill **terrorists** I would advise using **commandos**. The biggest threat to a **guerrilla** is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist insurgency in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in disrupting **mujaheddin** supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using **Spetsnaz**, **which** lost effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in **1986** thus depriving them **of** air liberty. Using **commandos** means, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable **casualties**. The **groups** should be accompanied anti-Taliban Afghans **loyal** to **the** Northern Alliance government of President **Rabbani**.
4. It is **the** Afghans themselves who know their **country** best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The **non-Taliban** Afghans should be drawn **into** the **anti-terrorist** alliance. They had been warning against the **Taliban** for years. On the **other hand**, **you** cannot fully trust **the** Pakistanis. The **CIA's** proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's** Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, **most of the** US money and weapons **channelled** to the ISI went to support **Gulbuddin Hekmatyar**, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who **refused** to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a **Pashtun-based** (many officers **in** the Pakistani **army** and ISI are **Pashtuns**), pliable **government** in Kabul, to **give** themselves strategic depth against India. When **Hekmatyar** failed to capture Kabul, they created **another** puppet, **the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of **business** circle (**Unocal**, an oil company which struck a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. **Pakistani society and army are riven with** fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and **gen. Musharraf will find it difficult to control** them.

5. **Rabbani's** Northern Alliance has been **weakened** by the loss of **Ahmed Shah Masud**, his minister of **defence**, in a suicide attack by two apparently **Westernised** Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy **theory** but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of **Massud** was a quid pro quo to the Taliban for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a **valuable ally**. Nevertheless, the **Northern Alliance** proved capable of instant retaliation **against** a Taliban **arms** dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via **Dushanbe**. They have a representative at the **U.N.**; the Ambassador in London. **Wali Massud** (brother of **Ahmad Shah Massud**) is an **important figure**; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in **Northern** and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and **airfields** could be effected. The alliance **consists** of important commanders all over **the** country:

The new political head of the Alliance, **Dr Abdullah**, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a **satellite** phone. **Ismael Khan**, former **army** officer, governor of **Herat**, who **spent** two years in a Taliban prison in **Kandahar** but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite **phone**.

**Haji Kadir**, former governor of Jellalabad, a **Pashun**, which is important **because** his role **neutralises** the Taliban ethnic card. I spent a month with him in **Nangrahar** in 1986.

The former Communist general **Dostum** seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. **The Hazara** minority, **Shias**, also resent the Taliban for **the** murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines **and** weapons it **can** build an anti-Taliban **coalition** which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world onto **itself**. Most **local** commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion **and** bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the **Northern Alliance** can **be** delivered through **countries** which have their own **reasons** to want the downfall of the Taliban: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air **bridge** from **ships** in **international** waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to Alliance-controlled **enclaves inside** Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in **1980s** in support of the **mujahedin**.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An effective **strike** against the **Taliban** can best be dealt in co-operation **with** the military structures of **the** Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan who already suffer under the **Taliban** yoke
3. The best form of pressure and revenge on the **Taliban** is to support the moderate forces of the **Northern** Alliance
4. After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the **Taliban**, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid. Normal **state** structures can only be rebuilt by a **government** in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines **are** cleared, agriculture *functions again*, will **the** **refugees** **return** from Iran and Pakistan and does **the** region have any chance of **permanent** stabilisation.

(b)(6)

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:55 PM

Afghan Stan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

27 Sep 01

11-L-0559/OSD/1059

U16395 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

and this is a tough-minded guy I know well. *Dir.*

urgent

Memorandum

Subject: **possible operations in Afghanistan**

From: (b)(6)

For: Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS

Date: 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001

spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.

1. A land invasion of Afghanistan would be an error of catastrophic proportions. The Taliban regime is weak militarily and economically. Most ordinary Afghans hate it for the poverty and abuses it has endangered. Foreigners among the Taliban are particularly resented. Having said that, an assault on Kabul and Kandahar *can* initially be successful. But in the medium term it would cause an Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. The Talibanization of a nuclear country does not bear thinking about. In addition, Hindu Kush passes will be covered in snow before the US can mobilise a sufficient invasion force, making operations even harder.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states: surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets selected on the basis of electronic and satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The country has no infrastructure to speak of: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone links. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt they will now limit their radio communications. Bin Laden and his bodyguards may have dispersed already. In 1987 I spent three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing. In a terrain in which every rock and every irrigation canal provides cover, high altitude bombing is ineffective.
3. To track down and capture or kill terrorists I would advise using commandos. The biggest threat to a guerrilla is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist insurgency in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in disrupting mujaheddin supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using Spetsnaz, which lost effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in 1986 thus depriving them of air liberty. Using commandos means, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable casualties. The groups should be accompanied anti-Taliban Afghans loyal to the Northern Alliance government of President Rabbani.
4. It is the Afghans themselves who know their country best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The non-Taliban Afghans should be drawn into the anti-terrorist alliance. They had been warning against the Taliban for years. On the other hand, you cannot fully trust the Pakistanis. The CIA's proxy war against the Soviets was run via Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, most of the US money and weapons channelled to the ISI went to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who refused to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a Pashtun-based (many officers in the Pakistani army and ISI are Pashtuns), pliable government in Kabul, to give themselves strategic depth against India. When Hekmatyar failed to capture Kabul, they created another poppet, the Taliban. The U.S., under

influence of business circle (Unocal, an oil company which struck a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. Pakistan; society and army are riven with fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and gen. Musharraf will find it difficult to control them.

5. Rabbani's Northern Alliance has been weakened by the loss of Ahmed Shah Masud, his minister of defence, in a suicide attack by two apparently Westernised Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy theory but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of Massud was a quid pro quo to the Taliban for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a valuable ally. Nevertheless, the Northern Alliance proved capable of instant retaliation against a Taliban arms dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via Dushanbe. They have a representative at the U.N.; the Ambassador in London, Wali Massud (brother of Ahmad Shah Massud) is an important figure; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in Northern and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and airfields could be effected. The alliance consists of important commanders all over the country:

The new political head of the Alliance, Dr Abdullah, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a satellite phone. Ismael Khan, former army officer, governor of Herat, who spent two years in a Taliban prison in Kandahar but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite phone.

Haji Kadir, former governor of Jellalabad, a Pashtun, which is important because his role neutralises the Taliban ethnic card, I spent a month with him in Nangrahar in 1986.

The former Communist general Dostum seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. The Hazara minority, Shias, also resent the Taliban for the murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines and weapons it can build an anti-Taliban coalition which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world unto itself. Most local commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion and bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the Northern Alliance can be delivered through countries which have their own reasons to want the downfall of the Taliban: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air bridge from ships in international waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to Alliance-controlled enclaves inside Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in 1980s in support of the mujahedin.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An **effective strike against the Taliban can best be dealt** in co-operation with the military structures of the Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk **losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan** who **already suffer under the Taliban yoke**
3. The best form of pressure and revenge **on the Taliban** is to support the moderate **forces of the Northern Alliance**
4. **After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the Taliban, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid.** Normal state **structures can only** be rebuilt by a government in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic **infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines are cleared, agriculture functions again, will the refugees return from Iran and Pakistan** and does the region have any **chance of permanent stabilisation.**

(b)(6)

October 12, 2001 8:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: UAVs

452 R

Please have someone find out for me how many people have private UAVs, how much they cost and what they do with them.

I am told that some modelers actually made one and flew it across the Atlantic-it must be pretty easy.

**Thanks.**

DHR:dh  
1012014

12 OCT 01



ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ - 11/2/01

INFO MEMO

Oct. 15, 2001, 2:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & Logistics)

*P. Aldridge*  
11/2/01

4528

SUBJECT: Private Ownership of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

- You wanted to know how many people have private UAVs, what they do with them and their cost. Some quick research produced the following information.
- Large Radio-Controlled Aircraft Used for Recreation. Payload >10 lbs. (sufficient for bio weapon); wingspan - 80 to 200"; range - 2 miles (radio control link limited); flight times - hours. Thousands in the U.S. Cost - \$1,000 to \$10,000. Can be upgraded with COTS navigation tools and an autopilot to permit long-range autonomous flight; upgrade system sales are not monitored within the U.S. or controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Approximately 100 may have been upgraded; these could have ranges > 200 miles. With the upgrade, price is \$5,000 to \$20,000.
- UAVs. Non-military: Used for meteorology, forestry, agriculture, border patrol, law enforcement, media support; number: ~150; cost: \$50,000 to over \$300,000. Military: Thousand worldwide, no estimate of number privately owned.
- Manned Recreational Aircraft (Kit Planes, Ultralights). 700 models, numbers in the thousands. Range - over 1,000 miles. Payload - hundreds of pounds. Cost - \$20,000 to \$100,000. Significant threat as piloted vehicles and can be converted to UAVs (takes up to a year).
- Additional details are provided at Tab A – Radio-Controlled Model Airplanes, Tab B – Flight Control System Providers, Tab C – Controls of Flight Management Systems, Tab D – Manned Recreational Aircraft, and Tab E – Commercial UAV Market.
- The existence of uncontrolled navigation system providers is disturbing. These systems can turn a recreational vehicle into a very destructive weapon. The government should immediately backtrack recent sales of recreational air vehicles and flight control systems, close the MTCR loophole on flight control system exports, and develop defensive measures specifically aimed at converted recreational vehicles.

15 Oct 01

Prepared By: J. Carlini, 703-248- 1503



~~11L 0559/OSD/1064~~  
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U18293 /01

## Tab A: Large Radio-Controlled Model Aircraft

Radio controlled (RC) model aircraft in the *Giant* (up to 55 lbs) and *Experimental RC Aircraft* (55 to 100 lbs) classes are capable of carrying in excess of 10 lbs of payload and are capable of being modified to deliver biological weapons. It is estimated that there are in excess of 1000 aircraft in this category in the United States. (Over 200 pilots have demonstrated more than 400 aircraft at annual national rallies in the last several years.) This memorandum briefly describes the capabilities of these aircraft.



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RC model aircraft in these categories typically have wingspans of from 80 to > 200 inches. Two-cycle engines are quite powerful, with 155 cc engines providing 18.5 hp, and 240 cc engines providing 30 hp. Aircraft speeds can exceed 100 mph (jets have been developed that fly at about 300 mph), and ranges are estimated to exceed 200 miles, based on a 100 mph speed and over two-hours of flight time when 30 – 60 oz fuel containers are placed in the aircraft.

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~~For Official Use Only~~

Smoke is often used for dramatic effect at air shows. About 32 oz of chemical is carried for this purpose. Smoke systems appear to be common hardware. It is not known how easily these smoke dispensers could be modified to disperse a chemical or biological agent.

The aircraft typically cost \$1000 to \$2500, however deluxe systems are available that range from \$5000 to \$10,000. Aircraft can be purchased as kits, fully assembled from the manufacturers or as resale items. At least 20 aircraft of this type were identified by conducting a brief internet search.

The latest advance in the technology is autonomous flight. Companies such as Micropilot, U-NAV and Vector will sell or custom install GPS-based systems that allow cross-country flight. The systems cost \$4000 - \$8000, with custom modification of the design and installation into the aircraft being available for ~ \$50 / hour. With these systems, the pilot would launch the aircraft by remote control, and then engage the autopilot. Upon reaching its destination, the plane is commanded to return to remote control for landing. GPS way-points are used for the flight.

**Web Sites**

Several web sites have been identified that are valuable sources of information on RC aircraft. The following are of particular interest.

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**Autopilots**

MicroPilot

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U-NAV

<http://u-nav.com/>

**Vehicle with Autopilot**

Vector

<http://www.ase.w1.com/>

**Purchase RC Aircraft**

RadioCraft

<https://ntp1.kookiejar.net/dvhi/cgi/radiocraft/index.html>

**Pictures**

B-29

<http://rcwarbirds.com/macsb29page.htm>

B-25

<http://rcwarbirds.com/jacksb25page.htm>

S teerman

<http://rcwarbirds.com/mikesstearmanpage.htm>

P-40 / B-17


<http://rcwarbirds.com/owatonnapage.htm>

List of Web Sites  
RC Web Directory

<http://www.towerhobbies.com/rcwair.html>

### Examples

#### B-36



#### B-36 Stats

Wingspan	192"
Fuse length	135"
Stah width	62"
Stab height	39"
Radio	Futaba 7AUFS
Servos	World Engines ball bearing (164 inch ozs)
Finish	Epoxy fiberglass 3/4 oz cloth
Landing gear	Homemade oleo chrome moly steel
Engines	( 6 ) OS Max .61 two cycle
Wheels	( 8 ) 3 1/2" Dubro mains, ( 2 ) 3 1/4" Dubro nose
Flights	20 +

Roger scratch built this magnificent bomber using a 1/75 scale Monogram plastic model as a guide.

#### B25

The fuse is simply a box with foam blocks glued to the sides with yellow Elmers, and shaped to plan specification. Retracts are of the custom variety, myself being the customizer. The concept for the gear being proven earlier with a 136" span A-26 featured elsewhere in the RC war-birds site. Engines are also home brew with one of them an Ebay purchase in the form of a

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**P-40**

Jeff Quesenberry from Apple Valley Minn. and his magnificent enlarged Ziroli P-40. Jeff scratch built using wood and glass in the **P-40's** construction and painted her with Krylon paints. This big boy **weighs 52lbs and has a 120"** wingspan. A Husky 7.3 spins the prop. Other features are flaps and custom made retracts Great job Jeff!

**B-17**

Gene Hallaway from Claremont, Minn. shows off his great looking B-17 G. Gene used Don Smith plans and a Madden Model Products kit to craft this beauty. Wood construction with fiberglass overlay bring this **138.5" wingspan bomber up to 55lbs**. Four Saito 91's has carried her safely through 78 missions. This masters quality plane looks great in person and has amazing detail.

# Tab B: Flight Control System Providers

Some companies that make remote flight control systems:

AAI Corporation  
PO Box 126  
Hunt Valley, MD 21030-0126  
I-800-655-261 6  
AAIReg@aaicorp.com  
Applications: Shadow  
200, Shadow 600,  
Pioneer

CDL Systems  
3553 31 Street NW Suite  
200  
Calgary, Alberta, Canada  
T2L 2K7  
(403) 289-1 733  
info@cdlsystems.com  
Applications: Outrider  
Tactical UAV

Meggitt Defense Systems (S-TEC)  
One S-TEC Way, Municipal Airport  
Mineral Wells, TX 76067  
(940) 328-1 197  
info@sentryuav.com  
Applications: Sentry, Sentry HP, Banshee

Geneva Aerospace  
PO Box 613018  
Dallas, TX 75261-3018  
(940) 440-9099  
www.geneaero.com  
Applications: Dakota

## Tab C: Controls of Flight Management Systems

### Export Control

The 1987 MTCR, which now includes 33 member states, seeks to limit the proliferation of rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg for at least 300 km. In 1995 the guidelines were extended to include missile-delivery systems capable of carrying biological and chemical payloads regardless of weight.

The MTCR includes a long list of dual-use components that are subjected by member states to case-by-case review before they are exported. The MTCR's original formulation for coverage of flight control systems is provided under Item 10 of Category II dual-use items. Item 10 originally specified that such flight control systems would be subject to case-by-case review if they were "usable in the systems in Item 1," namely UAVs or cruise missiles meeting the MTCR's range and payload thresholds. The original formulation for UAV flight controls was subsequently liberalized so as only to capture flight control systems specifically "designed or modified" for UAVs and cruise missiles.

This loophole means that the current handful of manufacturers of UAV flight control system are not subject to any export review. Such flight control systems could help turn kit airplanes and radio-controlled model airplanes into very potent means of chemical or biological weapons delivery.

We recommend that Item 10 be returned to its original "usable in" formulation for flight control systems to eliminate this loophole.

### Internal U.S. Sales

We recommend that all internal sales be monitored and background checks be completed for all buyers.

## Tab D: Manned Recreational Aircraft

Manned recreational aircraft include kit planes and ultralight vehicles. We estimate the number of such vehicles in the United States to be in the thousands. The major advantage of these aircraft over model aircraft is their ability to carry large payloads. These aircraft can carry payloads up to 500 lbs to a distance of over 1000 miles.

The major challenge in converting a recreational vehicle to a UAV is the integration of the actuators and flight management system. We believe this task can be accomplished by a few people but requires significant time (up to a year) and some advanced mechanical and engineering skills. The total material cost for building a recreational aircraft based UAV is less than \$100K. The companies that build flight management systems do offer services to assist in this integration. However, it is important to note that the actuator and flight management integration challenge can be entirely eliminated by employing a pilot.

### Kit Plane Conversion to Cruise Missile Case Study

As a case study, DARPA and the Army are jointly funding the Air Force Hardware Facility (Hard Fac) to demonstrate the capability of a rogue nation to build a cruise missile. The Hard Fac uses a mix of engineers and technicians to emulate the capabilities of countries such as Iran or Iraq. These efforts are overseen by a team of "referees" from the intelligence community to ensure that only resources available to a rogue nation are used in the course of the program.

The planned effort is to procure a kit plane, integrate a guidance system, and demonstrate that the resulting "cruise missile" can autonomously fly a 350 lb payload up to 500 miles to within 100 feet of a selected target. After 9 months, Hard Fac has procured on the open market all equipment necessary for the vehicle using the Internet as the primary source of information. The Hard Fac is currently in the process of integrating the guidance system with flight-testing planned in 4 months.

The DARPA and Army have paid HardFac \$600K to build and ground test the "cruise missile". The majority of this cost is the labor required to integrate the flight management system and test the aircraft. The material cost is under \$100K and is broken out as follows:

Airframe Kit:	\$13K
8 1 HP Engine/Propeller:	\$10K
Aircraft Manufacturer Fee to Assemble Aircraft:	\$ 8K
Flight Management System with Software Configured for Aircraft:	\$40K
Radio Control System for Operator Assisted Take-off and Landing:	\$ 5K
<u>Actuators and Miscellaneous Equipment:</u>	<u>\$ 5K</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$81K</b>

The **HardFac** has also purchased approximately \$15K of spare equipment for use during an extended test period.



Titan Tornado II-912 Kit Plane Used in Case Study

<b><u>Performance</u></b>	
Cruise @ 75%	120 mph
Stall (solo)	35 mph
Range @ 75% (15 gal.)	500 miles
Climb (solo)	1800 fpm
Take off (solo)	300 ft
Landing (solo)	250 ft
Ceiling (solo)	14,500 ft

<b><u>Specifications</u></b>	
Empty weight	540 lbs.
Gross weight	1000 lbs.
Length	19 ft. 0in.
Height	6 ft. 6 in.
Wing Span	23 ft. 6 in.

Titan Tornado II-91 2 Kit Plane Performance/Specifications

## Tab E: Commercial UAV Market

**Introduction.** The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) community has tried for some time to create a commercial UAV market to expand sales. For completeness, we estimated the number of UAVs in the United States that were explicitly marketed and used for non-military applications, since these might be purchased through third parties or stolen and used for weapons. Non-military UAVs are marketed for applications such as meteorology, forestry, agriculture, border patrol, law enforcement operations, and media support. We estimate the number of platforms supporting these applications in the United States to be approximately 150. This is based largely on discussions with UAV manufacturers on the forefront of trying to create a commercial UAV market. The reasons for the small market and hence the small estimate is a point of argument. The positions include the lack of cost competitiveness with **manned** systems and the lack of action by the FAA to incorporate unmanned flight routinely into the nation's air infrastructure.

### ***Meteorology***

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Aircraft are used to fly through and around cloud formations measuring the general make-up of the cloud (water and ice content, etc.). This information is useful for future weather prediction. UAVs are able to fly with heavy payloads over great distances or during a prolonged amount of time. UAVs can also fly into conditions that might be considered life threatening to pilots in traditional aircraft.

#### **Example:**

In Hawaii, a study was conducted in 1999 that probed how clouds affect global warming.

<http://www.ca.sandia.gov/news/altuskauai.nr2.html>

NASA will use UAVs to study lightening and thunderstorms.

<ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/2001/01-089.txt> and

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/05/010511072551.htm>

### ***Forestry***

---

UAVs are able to loiter over an area and use remote sensing devices to detect activity. They may also be used as a kind of satellite – able to act as a relay for communications and other devices. UAVS are cheaper and easier to transport than their manned relatives. Some are also reconfigurable, meaning they may be outfitted with a variety of **mission-specific** devices.

## ***Agriculture***

---

UAVs can be used to provide photographs of crop growth or crop disease and insect infestation. UAVs are able to fly at higher altitudes and for longer durations than their manned counterparts. They can also loiter over fields for continuous data collection, and do so automatically.

### **Example:**

NASA plans on using UAVs to provide Hawaiian Coffee growers with spectral images of their fields. This will help coffee growers know when to harvest.

<ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/2001/01-090.txt> and  
<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/05/010511072637.htm> ,

## ***Border Patrol & Law Enforcement***

---

A UAV can be set to fly a preprogrammed route to detect border crossings or other activity. UAVs could operate in areas difficult or hazardous for patrols on the ground. They can also be made very small. This allows them to move easily in an urban environment. UAVs are also able to operate in potentially life-threatening conditions. This combined with a UAV's ability to carry a variety of sensors and to loiter over an area for an extended period of time makes UAVs uniquely suited to perform reconnaissance and surveillance roles.

### **Example:**

The CYPHER UAV took part in a drug interdiction program at Ft. McLellan's Military Police school.

[http://www.edwards.af.mil/articles98/docs\\_html/splash/may98/cover/cypher.htm](http://www.edwards.af.mil/articles98/docs_html/splash/may98/cover/cypher.htm)

## ***Media Support***

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A UAV can be outfitted with cameras to loiter over an area of activity around potentially dangerous areas (i.e., war zones, or hard to reach locations).



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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON,  
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INFO MEMO

Oct. 15, 2001, 2:45 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology & Logistics)

*P. Aldridge*  
11/2/01

4528

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15 Oct 01

Prepared By: J. Carlini, 703-248- 1503



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U18293 /01

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U-NAV

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Vector

<http://www.ase.w1.com/>

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RadioCraft

<https://ntp1.kookiejar.net/dvhi/cgi/radiocraft/index.html>

### **Pictures**

B-29

<http://rcwarbirds.com/macsb29page.htm>

B-25

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S teerman

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P-40 / B-17


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Mike's plane is made from a kit by Balsa USA. The plane is constructed from balsa, plywood, fiberglass and metal. Mike chose Stits for the covering. The Stearman **weighs 521bs and has 118" wingspan**. The kit features functional flying and landing wires, scale gear with suspension, cockpit gauges and leaf sprung tail wheel. One striking feature of Mike's Stearman is the **215cc gas four cycle, five cylinder radial!** You have to hear this engine. The one I have heard flying was amazing and sounded very much like a real radial going overhead. The radial will swing a **32/10** at 5000 rpm and idle at 700.

### **P-40**

Jeff Quesenberry from Apple Valley Minn. and his magnificent enlarged Ziroli P-40. Jeff scratch built using wood and glass in the **P-40's** construction and painted her with Krylon paints. This big boy **weighs 521bs and has a 120"** wingspan. A Husky 7.3 spins the prop. Other features are flaps and custom made retracts Great job Jeff!

### **B-17**

Gene Hallaway from Claremont, Minn. shows off his great looking B-17 G. Gene used Don Smith plans and a Madden Model Products kit to craft this beauty. Wood construction with fiberglass overlay bring this **138.5" wingspan bomber up to 551bs**. Four Saito 91's has carried her safely through 78 missions. This masters quality plane looks great in person and has amazing detail.

# Tab B: Flight Control System Providers

Some companies that make remote flight control systems:

AAI Corporation  
PO Box 126  
Hunt Valley, MD 21030-0126  
I-800-655-261 6  
AAIReg@aaicorp.com  
Applications: Shadow  
200, Shadow 600,  
Pioneer

CDL Systems  
3553 31 Street NW Suite  
200  
Calgary, Alberta, Canada  
T2L 2K7  
(403) 289-1 733  
info@cdlsystems.com  
Applications: Outrider  
Tactical UAV

Meggitt Defense Systems (S-TEC)  
One S-TEC Way, Municipal Airport  
Mineral Wells, TX 76067  
(940) 328-1 197  
info@sentryuav.com  
Applications: Sentry, Sentry HP, Banshee

Geneva Aerospace  
PO Box 613018  
Dallas, TX 75261-3018  
(940) 440-9099  
www.geneaero.com  
Applications: Dakota

## Tab C: Controls of Flight Management Systems

### Export Control

The 1987 MTCR, which now includes 33 member states, seeks to limit the proliferation of rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg for at least 300 km. In 1995 the guidelines were extended to include missile-delivery systems capable of carrying biological and chemical payloads regardless of weight.

The MTCR includes a long list of dual-use components that are subjected by member states to case-by-case review before they are exported. The MTCR's original formulation for coverage of flight control systems is provided under Item 10 of Category II dual-use items. Item 10 originally specified that such flight control systems would be subject to case-by-case review if they were "usable in the systems in Item 1," namely UAVs or cruise missiles meeting the MTCR's range and payload thresholds. The original formulation for UAV flight controls was subsequently liberalized so as only to capture flight control systems specifically "designed or modified" for UAVs and cruise missiles.

This loophole means that the current handful of manufacturers of UAV flight control system are not subject to any export review. Such flight control systems could help turn kit airplanes and radio-controlled model airplanes into very potent means of chemical or biological weapons delivery.

We recommend that Item 10 be returned to its original "usable in" formulation for flight control systems to eliminate this loophole.

### Internal U.S. Sales

We recommend that all internal sales be monitored and background checks be completed for all buyers.

## Tab D: Manned Recreational Aircraft

Manned recreational aircraft include kit planes and ultralight vehicles. We estimate the number of such vehicles in the United States to be in the thousands. The major advantage of these aircraft over model aircraft is their ability to carry large payloads. These aircraft can carry payloads up to 500 lbs to a distance of over 1000 miles.

The major challenge in converting a recreational vehicle to a UAV is the integration of the actuators and flight management system. We believe this task can be accomplished by a few people but requires significant time (up to a year) and some advanced mechanical and engineering skills. The total material cost for building a recreational aircraft based UAV is less than \$100K. The companies that build flight management systems do offer services to assist in this integration. However, it is important to note that the actuator and flight management integration challenge can be entirely eliminated by employing a pilot.

### Kit Plane Conversion to Cruise Missile Case Study

As a case study, DARPA and the Army are jointly funding the Air Force Hardware Facility (Hard Fac) to demonstrate the capability of a rogue nation to build a cruise missile. The Hard Fac uses a mix of engineers and technicians to emulate the capabilities of countries such as Iran or Iraq. These efforts are overseen by a team of "referees" from the intelligence community to ensure that only resources available to a rogue nation are used in the course of the program.

The planned effort is to procure a kit plane, integrate a guidance system, and demonstrate that the resulting "cruise missile" can autonomously fly a 350 lb payload up to 500 miles to within 100 feet of a selected target. After 9 months, Hard Fac has procured on the open market all equipment necessary for the vehicle using the Internet as the primary source of information. The Hard Fac is currently in the process of integrating the guidance system with flight-testing planned in 4 months.

The DARPA and Army have paid HardFac \$600K to build and ground test the "cruise missile". The majority of this cost is the labor required to integrate the flight management system and test the aircraft. The material cost is under \$100K and is broken out as follows:

Airframe Kit:	\$13K
8 1 HP Engine/Propeller:	\$10K
Aircraft Manufacturer Fee to Assemble Aircraft:	\$ 8K
Flight Management System with Software Configured for Aircraft:	\$40K
Radio Control System for Operator Assisted Take-off and Landing:	\$ 5K
<u>Actuators and Miscellaneous Equipment:</u>	<u>\$ 5K</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$81K</b>

The **HardFac** has also purchased approximately \$15K of spare equipment for use during an extended test period.



Titan Tornado II-912 Kit Plane Used in Case Study

<u>Performance</u>	
Cruise @ 75%	120 mph
Stall (solo)	35 mph
Range @ 75% (15 gal.)	500 miles
Climb (solo)	1800 fpm
Take off (solo)	300 ft
Landing (solo)	250 ft
Ceiling (solo)	14,500 ft

<u>Specifications</u>	
Empty weight	540 lbs.
Gross weight	1000 lbs.
Length	19 ft. 0in.
Height	6 ft. 6 in.
Wing Span	23 ft. 6 in.

Titan Tornado II-91 2 Kit Plane Performance/Specifications

## Tab E: Commercial UAV Market

**Introduction.** The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) community has tried for some time to create a commercial UAV market to expand sales. For completeness, we estimated the number of UAVs in the United States that were explicitly marketed and used for non-military applications, since these might be purchased through third parties or stolen and used for weapons. Non-military UAVs are marketed for applications such as meteorology, forestry, agriculture, border patrol, law enforcement operations, and media support. We estimate the number of platforms supporting these applications in the United States to be approximately 150. This is based largely on discussions with UAV manufacturers on the forefront of trying to create a commercial UAV market. The reasons for the small market and hence the small estimate is a point of argument. The positions include the lack of cost competitiveness with **manned** systems and the lack of action by the FAA to incorporate unmanned flight routinely into the nation's air infrastructure.

### ***Meteorology***

---

Aircraft are used to fly through and around cloud formations measuring the general make-up of the cloud (water and ice content, etc.). This information is useful for future weather prediction. UAVs are able to fly with heavy payloads over great distances or during a prolonged amount of time. UAVs can also fly into conditions that might be considered life threatening to pilots in traditional aircraft.

#### **Example:**

In Hawaii, a study was conducted in 1999 that probed how clouds affect global warming.

<http://www.ca.sandia.gov/news/altuskauai.nr2.html>

NASA will use UAVs to study lightening and thunderstorms.

<ftp://ftp.bq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/2001/01-089.txt> and

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/05/010511072551.htm>

### ***Forestry***

---

UAVs are able to loiter over an area and use remote sensing devices to detect activity. They may also be used as a kind of satellite – able to act as a relay for communications and other devices. UAVS are cheaper and easier to transport than their manned relatives. Some are also reconfigurable, meaning they may be outfitted with a variety of **mission-specific** devices.

## ***Agriculture***

---

UAVs can be used to provide photographs of crop growth or crop disease and insect infestation. UAVs are able to fly at higher altitudes and for longer durations than their manned counterparts. They can also loiter over fields for continuous data collection, and do so automatically.

### **Example:**

NASA plans on using UAVs to provide Hawaiian Coffee growers with spectral images of their fields. This will help coffee growers know when to harvest.

<ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/pressrel/2001/01-090.txt> and  
<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/05/010511072637.htm> ,

## ***Border Patrol & Law Enforcement***

---

A UAV can be set to fly a preprogrammed route to detect border crossings or other activity. UAVs could operate in areas difficult or hazardous for patrols on the ground. They can also be made very small. This allows them to move easily in an urban environment. UAVs are also able to operate in potentially life-threatening conditions. This combined with a UAV's ability to carry a variety of sensors and to loiter over an area for an extended period of time makes UAVs uniquely suited to perform reconnaissance and surveillance roles.

### **Example:**

The CYPHER UAV took part in a drug interdiction program at Ft. McLellan's Military Police school.

[http://www.edwards.af.mil/articles98/docs\\_html/splash/may98/cover/cypher.htm](http://www.edwards.af.mil/articles98/docs_html/splash/may98/cover/cypher.htm)

## ***Media Support***

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A UAV can be outfitted with cameras to loiter over an area of activity around potentially dangerous areas (i.e., war zones, or hard to reach locations).



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

2001 MAR 15 PM 4:52



March 15, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ROBERT R. SOULE   
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
Prepared by: David L. McNicol, DD(RA), PA&E, (703) 695-0721

SUBJECT: DoD Tooth-to-Tail Comparisons — INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To respond to your request for information on metrics for judging DoD tooth-to-tail (see Tab "Incoming")

DISCUSSION:

- ◆ OSD has used the forces-to-infrastructure ratio since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review
  - Developed by PA&E and the Institute for Defense Analyses
- ◆ PA&E metric based on rigorous definitions of "forces" and "infrastructure"
- ◆ Infrastructure is being downsized in proportion to the DoD topline
  - There is no indication that infrastructure resources are taking a significantly increased share of DoD resources
  - See point paper attached at Tab A, which includes a chart on the trend in the forces/infrastructure shares since 1980
- ◆ The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Tail-to-Tooth Commission has estimated the share of DoD funding devoted to "tail" to be roughly 70 percent
  - BENS estimate of tail includes logistics resources (such as fuel and spare parts) and operational intelligence, space, and communications programs that PA&E definitions attribute to forces

Attachments



11-L-0559/OSD/1086

U05426 /01

## DoD Tooth-to-Tail

### BACKGROUND

- ◆ This paper responds to your request for information on metrics for judging DoD tooth-to-tail

### DISCUSSION


- ◆ OSD has used the forces-to-infrastructure ratio since 1993 Bottom-Up Review
  - Developed by PA&E and the Institute for Defense Analyses
  - Used extensively within DOD-included as metric in response to Government Performance and Results Act
  - Used outside DOD-reviewed and tracked by General Accounting Office
- ◆ PA&E metric based on rigorous definitions of “forces” and “infrastructure”
  - Forces are operational units, assigned to combatant commands, that deploy and/or employ weapons
  - Infrastructure is all other activities-includes training above the unit level, installations, the DoD medical program, central logistics activities, and other categories of support activities
- ◆ Infrastructure is being downsized in proportion to the DoD topline
  - Infrastructure in FY 80 accounted for 42 percent of the DoD topline, while in FY 00 it accounted for 45 percent; by FY 05, it is expected to account for 43 percent (see attached chart)
  - There is no indication that infrastructure resources are taking a significantly increased share of DoD resources, although adjustments lagged forces
- ◆ The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Tail-to-Tooth Commission has estimated the share of DoD funding devoted to “tail” to be roughly 70 percent
  - BENS estimate of tail based on PA&E definitions but includes additional logistics resources-such as fuel and spare parts-that PA&E attributes to forces
  - BENS estimate also includes operational intelligence, space, and communications programs; Joint Staff guidelines attribute these programs to forces, since they are integral to combatant commands

Attachment: “Trends in DoD TOA: Forces and Infrastructure Shares”

Prepared by: David L. McNicol, DD(RA), PA&E, (703) 6950721

# Trends in DOD TOB

## Forces and Infrastructure Shares



SOURCE: FY 2001 President's Budget FYDP.  
IDA normalized data

OSD/PA&E

3-14  
0.559

March 12, 2001 3:21 PM

TO: Robert Soule, PA&E

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Teeth to Tail Ratios

I would like a good way to judge teeth to tail ratios and I would like to know what it has been over the last period of years.

DHR:dh  
031201-23

TO: Paul Gebhard  
CC: Steve Herbits  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: April 2, 2001  
SUBJECT: **BINS Tail-to-Tooth Commission Report**

Have we looked at the BINS Tail-to-Tooth Commission report?

If not, why don't we have the staff director and Perry and Carlucci come in and brief, say next Saturday, a key group of our people, including the service secretaries, Dov Zakheim, and a number of the people that are currently here.

Why don't you pull together a list and let me know what you think?

DHR/azn  
040201.17

110.01

2 Apr 01




PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1 800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



March 21, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ROBERT R. SOULE   
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
Prepared by: David L. McNicol, DD(RA), PA&E, 695-0721

SUBJECT: DoD Tooth-t&Tail Comparisons—INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To respond to your request for information on metrics for judging  
DoD tooth-to-tail



11-L-0559/OSD/1091

March 21, 2001

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPTJTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ROBERT R. SOULE, PA&E



SUBJECT: **DoD** 'Tooth-to-Tail Comparisons

TAB A: **Incoming** request

TAB B: PA&E estimate of tooth-t&tail

TAB C: Comparison of PA&E estimate with that of Business Executives **for**  
National Security (BENS)

TAB D: Transmittal letter

-March 12, 2001 3:21 PM

TO: Robert Soule, PA&E

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

-SUBJECT: **Teeth to Tail** Ratios

I would like a good **way** to judge teeth to tail ratios and I would like to know what **it** has been over the last period of **years**.

DHR:dh  
031201-23

## PA&E Tooth-to-Tail Calculation

- ◆ A metric we commonly use to measure **“tooth-to-tail”** is the percentage of the budget devoted to “forces” (tooth) compared to that for **“infrastructure”** (tail)
  - Forces are operational units, assigned to combatant **commands, that deploy and/or** employ weapons
  - **Infrastructure** is all other activities-includes **training above the unit level, installations, the DoD medical program, central logistics** activities, and **other** categories of support activities
- ◆ Based on those **definitions**, the **trend in** infrastructure percentages of the **budget is:**

	<b>1980</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1992</b>	2000	2005
Infrastructure %	4 2 %	3 7 %	4 5 %	4 5 %	4 3 %


- ◆ The attached graph shows this in more detail
- ◆ **There** is no indication that infrastructure resources are **taking** a significantly increased share of **DoD** resources; it is being downsized in proportion to **the DoD topline**

**Attachment: “Trends in DoD Total Obligation Authority (TOA): Forces and Infrastructure Shares”**

Prepared by: Robert R. **Soule**, Director, PA&E, 697-0971

# Trends in DoD Total Obligation Authority (TOA)

## Forces and Infrastructure Shares



SOURCE: FY 2001 President's Budget FYDP.

IDA normalized data

OSD/PA&E

## Assessment of BENS Calculations

- ◆ The Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Tail-to-Tooth Commission has estimated the share of **DoD** funding devoted to “tail” to be roughly 70 percent
- ◆ BENS estimate of tail includes additional **logistics** resources, such as fuel **and** spare parts, that PA&E believes should be attributed to forces, because the forces can not operate without them
- ◆ **BENS** estimate also includes programs such as operational intelligence, **space**, and **communications** programs that the Joint **Staff attributes** to **forces, because** they are integral to combatant commands
- ◆ Because of these differences, PA&E believes the **BENS** calculations severely -overestimate the extent of the force that should be characterized as “**tail**”
- ◆ The attached table compares the PA&E **and BENS** definitions
- ◆ PA&E is preparing a review of the BENS recommendations; it should be available **later** this month

## Comparison of "Tooth-to-Tail" Methods

	<u>PA&amp;E</u>	<u>BENS</u>
<b>FORCES ("Tooth")</b>	Operational units Fuel Spare parts Intelligence programs Space programs Tactical communications	Operational units
	<b>55%</b>	<b>30%</b>
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE ("Tail")</b>	Training above unit level Installations Medical Central logistics Central personnel	Training above unit level Installations Medical Central logistics Central personnel Fuel Spare parts Intelligence programs Space programs Tactical communications
	<b>45%</b>	<b>70%</b>

2001 MAY -2 AM 9:22

May 1, 2001

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: BARRY D. WATTS, PA&E *Barry Watts 1 May 01*

SUBJECT: Personnel in the Office of Net Assessment

**TAB A:** Office of Net Assessment Personnel Numbers – INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

May 1, 2001

### Net Assessment Personnel Numbers

- ◆ You asked us to provide the recent staff sizes and budgets for the Office of Net Assessment
  - ◆ The staff currently has 13 people
    - 8 civilian (3 SES, 2 GS-15, 1 GS-14, 1 GS-11, 1 GS-8)
    - 5 military (3 O-6, 1 O-4, 1 E-8)
  - ◆ The current budget is **\$8.9M**, including **\$6.9M** for studies and **\$2M** for staff
  - ◆ The most recent estimate we have on changes in the funding and staff size comes from the PBD in September 1997 that transferred the office from USD(Policy) to National Defense University
    - Staff size was 13 at that time and was estimated to remain the same; as it is still 13, we believe that has been the case
    - Total funding is shown in the table below
    - Because the staff size has remained constant, we estimate funding for staff at approximately **\$2M**, less the effects of inflation
    - The balance of the funding is for studies

[\$Millions]	Total Funding	Personnel Funding (estimate)	Study Funding (estimate)
1998	5.1	1.7	3.4
1999	6.2	1.8	4.4
2000	8.8	1.9	6.9
2001	8.8	1.9	6.9
2002	8.9	2.0	6.9

Prepared by: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant, PA&E, 695-0749



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1 800



INFO MEMO

May 9, 2001 3:53 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D Watts 9 May 01*

SUBJECT: Facilities Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ You requested information regarding standard recapitalization rates for various types of infrastructure in order to determine costs for each of the services to meet standards over 6 to 12 years (TAB A)
- ◆ The overall DoD recapitalization rate is about 67 years
  - PA&E calculated this value independently
  - Agrees with the value provided by USD(AT&L) in the April 2001 Report to Congress on reducing the backlog of maintenance and repair facilities
  - Recapitalization rates for the Services range from 65 years for the Army to 68 years for the Marine Corps
- ◆ The current backlog is approximately \$82B
  - The cost to work off that backlog in 6 to 12 years (while maintaining the rest of the facilities at the 67-year rate) is \$10-\$20B per year above the current funding level of \$2.5B
- ◆ Privatization efforts (such as utilities), BRAC rounds, or demolition of facilities could reduce the costs substantially, but without details we can not estimate those savings
- ◆ TAB B provides details on these calculations, as well as tables of recapitalization rates and funding requirements

600

9 May 01

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 695-0749



April 30, 2001 7:21 PM

TO: PA&E  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Recapitalization Rates

Would someone please give me the correct information as to what the proper recapitalization rates are for the various types of infrastructure the Pentagon invests in. I understand it could vary from Service to Service and from housing to other types of facilities. Let me know how you can most easily present it.

My goal is to end up being able to figure out a number for each of the Services as to what it would cost if we decided to get them to the proper recapitalization schedule in 6, 8, 10 or 12 years for, say, 75% of their infrastructure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
043001-63

11-L-0559/OSD/1101

## Facilities Recapitalization

### Background

- ◆ You requested information regarding standard recapitalization rates for various types of infrastructure in order to determine costs for each of the services to meet standards over 6 to 12 years (TAB A)

### Recapitalization Rates

- ◆ Facilities Recapitalization includes:
  - Replacement Projects
  - Revitalization Projects
  - Associated Planning and Design
  - Minor Construction
  - Restoration and Modernization
- ◆ Recapitalization rates were computed by PA&E from more detailed rates established by a panel of DoD experts in 1997 in connection with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These rates:
  - Provide the only comprehensive DoD rates
  - Reflect judgement of panel members-not explicitly sounded on benchmarks
- ◆ Table 1 (attached) provides detailed listings of recapitalization rates by service and by type of facility
  - The breakout by Service is:
    - Army – 65 years
    - Navy – 67 years
    - Air Force – 67 years
    - Marine Corps – 68 years
- ◆ Aggregating over all the services and facility types, the standard recapitalization rate for facilities funded through the military construction and family housing accounts is about 67 years
  - This figure agrees with the value computed by USD(AT&L) in the *Report to Congress on Identification of the Requirements to Reduce the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair of Defense Facilities* (April 2001)

## Comparison versus Commercial Standards

- ◆ Table 2 (attached) provides benchmark data for comparing DoD recapitalization rates to commercial standards
  - The data represents the best that is readily available to us
- ◆ Compared to these benchmarks:
  - DoD lines up well for:
    - Medical (DoD ~ 50 years; benchmarks ~ 50 years)
    - Office buildings (DoD ~ 56 years; benchmarks ~ 36-50 years)
    - Housing (DoD ~ 42 years; benchmarks ~ 30-65 years)
  - DoD seems high for:
    - Supply facilities (DoD ~ 77 years; benchmarks ~ 32-40 years)
    - Utilities and ground improvements (DoD ~ 68 years; Army, Air Force, USMC ~ 70-75 years; benchmarks ~ 60 years)
  - Because we do not have the underlying data behind these benchmarks, we can not evaluate the reasons for these differences

## Recapitalization Funding

- ◆ The steady-state cost of sustaining the department-wide recapitalization rate of 67 years is roughly **\$8B** per year (ignoring the backlog)
  - The services currently program about **\$2.5B** per year
  - The shortfall is thus about **\$5.5B** per year for the facilities in Table 1
- ◆ Because past funding has been well below the steady-state need, the recapitalization backlog is about **\$82B**
- ◆ Table 3 (attached) displays the annual additional resources needed to:
  - Either eliminate this backlog and fully fund the steady-state needs (100%)
  - Or, eliminate 75% of the backlog and fund 75% of steady-state needs
    - In the second case, the backlog would continue to grow absent measures such as a round of base closures
  - After working off the backlog, the steady-state funding would need be the **\$8B** per year discussed above (**\$5.5B** above current levels) to prevent the backlog from growing again
- ◆ Data in Table 3 suggest at least **\$10-20B** per year more would be needed to work off the backlog in the next 6 to 12 years (see caveats below)

## Caveats

- ◆ In computing these funding requirements, two points must be considered:
  - Some categories of facilities should be outsourced (such as utilities), which account for over 25 percent of the replacement value of DoD facilities
  - Many facilities should be declared excess and torn down rather than replaced, which is particularly important if no additional BRAC rounds are authorized
  
- ◆ We can not estimate the effects of these changes without details on which facilities are affected, but the changes could be substantial

**Table 1. Facility Recapitalization Rates (Years)**

Infrastructure Type	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	DoD
Operations and Training	61	73	75	75	71
Maintenance and Production	50	74	50	51	59
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation	46	48	45	48	46
Supply Facilities <sup>2</sup>	78	76	75	77	77
Medical (excluding Defense Health Program)	50	50	50	50	50
Administrative	38	50	65	61	56
Housing	65	64	62	76	68
Utilities and Ground Improvements	70	58	75	73	68
<b>Overall</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>67</b>

Notes:

1. The recapitalization rates shown are target rates and are equal to the service life of the respective facility infrastructure type.
2. Supply facilities include warehouses, hazardous material storage facilities, and ammunition storage facilities.

### **Variance in Infrastructure Recapitalization Rates**

- A 1997 DoD panel established service life estimates for approximating 130 groupings of like facilities.
- The differences in the proportion of these facilities owned by each service produced the variance shown in the infrastructure type recapitalization rates
- For example:
  - Shipyard maintenance facilities had an estimated service life of 100 years, far greater than other maintenance facilities. The Navy has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall maintenance and production recapitalization rate is noticeably higher than the other services.
  - One group of Morale, Welfare, and Recreational facilities in the administrative infrastructure type had an estimated service life of 25 years, far lower than other administrative facilities. The Army has the majority of these types of facilities and therefore its overall administrative recapitalization rate is noticeably lower than the other services.

Table 2. Comparison of Service Life Estimates'

	<b>BEA<sup>2</sup></b> <b>(private)</b>	<b>BEA</b> <b>(government)</b>	<b>Marshall</b> <b>&amp; Swift<sup>3</sup></b>
Office Building	36	50	45-55 35-50
Warehouse	40	50	35-60
Hospital	48	50	35-50
Single Residence	80	na	30-65

Notes:

1. Extracted from Implementation of the Department of Defense Sustainment Model, Whitestone Research, January 2001.
2. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
3. Marshall and Swift is a commercial firm that specializes in collecting, processing, and distributing building cost data.

**Table 3. Additional Annual Resource Needs to Recapitalize Facilities**

		<u>6 Years</u>	<u>8 Years</u>	<u>10 Years</u>	<u>12 Years</u>
100%	Army	\$6B	\$5B	\$5B	\$4B
	Navy	\$7B	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B
	Air Force	\$6B	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B
	<i>Total</i>	<i>\$19B</i>	<i>\$16B</i>	<i>\$14B</i>	<i>\$12B</i>
75%	Army	\$5B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	Navy	\$5B	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B
	Air Force	\$4B	\$4B	\$3B	\$3B
	<i>Total</i>	<i>\$14B</i>	<i>\$12B</i>	<i>\$10B</i>	<i>\$9B</i>

Note: These resources are above the \$2.5B the Services are currently investing and include eliminating the backlog within the prescribed times



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



2001 MAY 18 PM 1:52

INFO MEMO

May 18, 2001 9:20 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts / 18 May 01*

SUBJECT: Funding for Combating Terrorism

- In response to our package outlining funding for the Department's Combating Terrorism efforts, you asked why there was a discrepancy between the \$5B per year we reported and the \$15B reported elsewhere (TAB A).
- We have not been able to find any reference to a \$15B figure, nor are we aware of any way of aggregating the Department's combating-terrorism accounts that would suggest such a figure.
- The figure we developed (\$4.6B in FY 2001) was reported in our reports to OMB and the Congress and, as such, represents the official Department position.
  - ASD(SOLIC) reported the same figure to you separately.
- A similar report from OMB to Congress summarizing spending for the entire Federal Government reports a figure of \$9.3B in FY 2001.
  - An additional \$2.0B is spent on Critical Infrastructure Protection across the Federal Government for efforts that assure the security of infrastructures in both the government and private sector that are needed to ensure our national security, national economic security, and public health and safety.
  - The total expenditure government-wide is thus about \$11B.

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 6950749



11-L-0559/OSD/1108

U09504 / 01

May 10, 2001 9:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Costs for Combating Terrorism

I don't know why people are using the \$15 billion number if this piece of paper says it is closer to \$5 billion.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/9/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Combating Terrorism Funding Information

DHR:dh  
051001-13

*Barry - Full. Do you know where Sec Def is getting the \$15 billion figure?*

*Larry Di Rita*

5/9/01  
PA&E

## Combating Terrorism

- **Background**

- Combating Terrorism encompasses all actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the threat spectrum, including terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/or high explosives.

- **Funding**

- The DoD budget for Combating Terrorism is currently about \$5 billion per year. Manpower accounts for about 80 percent of the total and includes such elements as security forces/technicians, law enforcement, and investigations.

	TOA (\$ in Millions)	
	FY 2000	FY 2001
Antiterrorism	3,380.6	3,537.7
Counterterrorism	689.4	545.8
Terrorism Consequence Management	337.1	352.9
Intelligence	141.7	131.5
Total	4,548.8	4,567.9

- **Definition of Combating Terrorism Categories**

- **Antiterrorism:** Defensive measures (including force protection) used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited responses and containment by local military forces.

-- Includes physical security equipment, site improvements, management and planning, security forces and technicians, law enforcement, security and investigative matters, and research and development.

- **Counterterrorism:** Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

- **Terrorism Consequence Management:** DoD preparedness and activities to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. DoD domestic consequence management activities are designed to support the designated lead federal agency.

-- Includes emergency response preparedness, chemical/biological response, WMD civil support teams, medical elements, the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit, and the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force.

- **Intelligence Support for Combating Terrorism:** Collection, analysis, and dissemination of all-source intelligence on terrorist groups and activities intended to protect, deter, preempt, or counter terrorist threats to U.S. personnel, forces, critical **infrastructures**, and interests.



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 800

May 9, 2001



**MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)**

**SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Funding Information**

In response to a request from a member of your staff, we have prepared a point paper providing information on DoD funding for Combating Terrorism activities. The Comptroller has provided cost data for FY 2000-2001 derived from budget displays submitted to Congress. Once the FY 2002 budget is complete, we can provide similar figures for that year.

If you require further information, please feel to contact Jim Johnson of my staff at 695-7341.

**Barry D. Watts**  
Director

Attachment



11-L-0559/OSD/1111

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

6/12

PA+E

MR WATTS,

SEE SECRET'S COMMENT.

VR,

WAT

U09504A/01

000,5

1290001

QW -  
How do you  
explain this -  
What use should we  
DR



PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

2001 MAY 18 PM 1:59



INFO MEMO

May 18, 2001 9:20 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 16 May 01*

SUBJECT: Funding for Combating Terrorism

- In response to our package outlining funding for the Department's Combating Terrorism efforts, you asked why there was a discrepancy between the \$5B per year we reported and the \$15B reported elsewhere (TAB A).
- ~~We have not been able to find any reference to a \$15B figure, nor are we~~ *are not* aware of any way of aggregating the Department's combating-terrorism accounts that would suggest such a figure.
- The figure we developed (\$4.6B in FY 2001) was reported in our reports to OMB and the Congress and, as such, represents the official Department position.
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  - The total expenditure government-wide is thus about \$11B.

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 695-0749



U09504 /01

*SecDef. In sec  
No reference to  
TAB A*



May 10, 2001 9:41 AM

TO: L a r r y Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Costs for Combating Terrorism

I don't know why people are using **the** \$15 billion number if this piece of paper says **it** is closer to \$5 billion.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/9/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Combating Terrorism Funding Information

DHR:dh  
051001-13

*Barry - Full. Do you know where Sec Def is getting the \$15 billion figure?*

*Larry Di Rita*

11-L-0559/OSD/1115

5/9/01  
PALE

## Combating Terrorism

- **Background**

- Combating Terrorism encompasses all actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the threat spectrum, including terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/or high explosives.

- **Funding**

- The **DoD** budget for Combating Terrorism is currently about \$5 billion per year. Manpower accounts for about **80** percent of the total and includes such elements as security forces/technicians, law enforcement, and investigations.

	TOA (\$ in Millions)	
	FY 2000	FY 2001
Antiterrorism	3,380.6	3,537.7
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Terrorism Consequence Management	337.1	352.9
I n t e l l i g e n c e	141.7	131.5
Total	4,548.8	4,567.9

- **Definition of Combating Terrorism Categories**

- **Autiterrorism:** Defensive measures (including force protection) used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, including limited responses and containment by local military forces.

-- Includes physical security equipment, site improvements, management and planning, security forces and technicians, law enforcement, security and investigative matters, and research and development.

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-- Includes emergency response preparedness, chemical/biological response, WMD civil support teams, medical elements, the US. Army Technical Escort Unit, and the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force.

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PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 800

May 9, 2001



MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Funding Information

In response to a request from a member of your staff, we have prepared a point paper providing information on **DoD** funding for Combating Terrorism activities. The Comptroller has provided cost data for FY 2000-2001 derived from budget displays submitted to Congress. Once the FY 2002 budget is complete, we can provide similar figures for that year.

If you require further information, please feel to contact Jim Johnson of my staff at 695-7341.

  
Barry D. Watts  
Director

Attachment



11-L-0559/OSD/1117



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800



001179-6 01 9:13

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2001, 4:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation-*Barry D Watts 07/05/01*

SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Funding

- This memo responds to your question (Tab A) regarding DoD funding for combating terrorism.
- OMB prepares a report for Congress each year outlining combating terrorism spending government-wide. In its report, OMB gives a composite figure for national security funding, reflecting both DoD and Intelligence Community resources. Funds for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) are combined with combating terrorism resources in some of the report's displays in order to depict the total level of funding devoted to countering unconventional threats.
- The latest OMB report puts FY01 national security funding for combating terrorism at \$5.5B, against a federal total of \$9.7B. These figures rise to \$7.3B and \$12B, respectively, if CIP is included. The DoD share of the total (not reported separately by OMB) is \$4.6B.
- Bottom line: When responding to questions about current funding for combating terrorism activities, I suggest saying that DoD spends "around \$5B." When discussing how much the government as a whole spends on combating terrorism, an appropriate response would be \$1 OB to \$12B.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared By: Milton L. Tulkoff, 703-697-0373





PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



2001 MAY 21 PM 5:15

INFO MEMO

May 18, 2001 11:33 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry Watts 5/21/01*

SUBJECT: Standards-Based Review

- You requested information on the costs associated with funding the Department consistent with known, quantifiable standards, achieving those standards by FY 2007.
- We have estimated these costs using the following categories: Facilities, Equipment, Development, Personnel, and Readiness.
  - In some cases, such as housing and facilities, agreed standards exist.
  - In others, such as research and development, no standards exist.
  - Therefore, where necessary, we postulated standards based on several considerations, including historical experience and recent Congressional direction.
  - A description of each standard we used can be found at Tab A.
- The additional resources needed to achieve department-wide standards by FY 2007 are more than \$500 billion (Tab B). The implied program, particularly with respect to equipment modernization, could not be executed, due to the very large quantities of equipment (e.g., over 700 tactical aircraft per year) that would have to be bought.
- As an alternative, we estimated the costs to achieve these standards by FY 2015. The additional resources required through FY 2007 are roughly \$375 billion (Tab C). In this case the program would probably be executable, but still would be very costly.
- The FY 20 15 alternative generates fiscal increases that closely match the proposed FYDP funding profile the Comptroller provided you last week. As a percent of GDP, that profile is: 3.07% FY02-04, 3.05% FY05-06, and 3.02% FY07 (see Tab C).

110.01

18 May 01

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 695-0749



11-L-0559/OSD/1119

U09612 /01

## **Standards**

### **Facilities**

- Family Housing
  - Eliminate sub-standard housing by FY 2007.
  - Current Service programs meet standard by FY 2012.
- Recapitalization of other Facilities
  - Fund at steady state requirement (67-year replacement cycle).
  - Eliminate half of existing backlog (~\$40 billion).
  - Meet standard by either FY 2007 or 20 15.

### **Equipment**

- Major Platforms
  - Modernize at steady state rates, thereby achieving acceptable average age.
  - Eliminate accumulated shortfalls associated with less-than steady state procurement of the past decade.
  - Meet steady state standard by either FY 2007 or 2015.
- Minor Items
  - Fund at historical rates.

### **Research and Development**

- Science and Technology
  - Fund at 2% real growth per year, a rate consistent with past Congressional guidance.
  - This approach would yield results roughly consistent with the recommendation by Undersecretary Aldridge to fund S&T at 3% of DoD TOA.
- Other R&D
  - Fund other R&D at 2% real growth per year to accommodate unforeseen events – program cost growth, new initiatives, etc.
- Missile Defense
  - Increase to reflect renewed emphasis.

## Personnel

- Military
  - Set pay raise at ECI + 0.5% each year.
  - Provide bonuses consistent with Presidential Initiative for FY 2002 (~\$1 billion).
  - Add additional 60,000 in active duty endstrength to offset Service-identified shortfalls.
  
- Civilian
  - Set pay raise at ECI + 0.5% each year.

## Readiness

- Core accounts
  - Fund at historical rate of 3% annual real growth.
  - Service inputs required to further refine estimates.

**Summary – FY 2007 Option  
(TY \$ Billions)**

	<b>FY 02</b>	<b>FY 03</b>	<b>FY 04</b>	<b>FY 05</b>	<b>FY 06</b>	<b>FY 07</b>	<b>Sum</b>
<b>Facilities</b>							
Housing	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	3.4
MilCon	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	60.0
<i>Total</i>	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.6	63.4
<b>Equipment</b>							
Platforms	8.4	21.4	46.4	65.1	16.2	13.3	170.7
Minor Items	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.7	2.7	4.5	13.3
<i>Total</i>	10.1	22.8	47.8	66.7	18.9	17.7	184.1
<b>Research &amp; Development</b>							
S&T	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.8	13.2
Other	1.1	2.7	4.6	7.2	8.9	13.2	37.7
Missile Defense	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	27.0
<i>Total</i>	5.6	7.5	9.6	14.6	17.6	23.0	77.9
<b>Personnel</b>							
Military Raise	0.4	1.1	1.8	2.7	3.6	4.5	14.1
Bonuses	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	8.3
+70k	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	18.0
Civilian Raise	0.3	0.8	1.3	1.8	2.5	3.1	9.7
<i>Total</i>	4.7	6.2	7.5	9.0	10.5	12.2	50.1
<b>Readiness</b>							
Real Growth	10.5	17.2	21.7	26.4	30.9	36.5	143.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>97.2</b>	<b>127.3</b>	<b>88.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>518.6</b>

**Comptroller Profile**

Percent of GDP	3.07%	3.07%	3.07%	3.05%	3.05%	3.02%
Increase vs. Clinton Legacy Budget	23.4	41.5	53.3	62.9	74.8	83.5

**Examples of Additional Procurement  
FY 2007 Option**

	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>	<u>FY 2004</u>	<u>FY 2005</u>	<u>FY 2006</u>	<u>FY 2007</u>	<u>Total</u>
<b><i>Army Helos</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.9	14.2
Quantities	21	35	57	79	123	147	462
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.5	0.0	0.6	5.3
Quantities	45	90	143	197	0	12	487
<b><i>AF TacAir</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	3.3	4.7	4.6	4.1	4.6	5.4	26.8
Quantities	16	24	44	44	42	50	220
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	2.6	6.3	14.1	20.8	1.7	2.1	47.6
Quantities	50	150	316	496	42	50	1,104
<b><i>Attack Subs</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.7	4.2	15.3
Quantities	1	1	1	1	1	2	7
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.0	0.0	4.3	4.4	4.5	2.3	15.4
Quantities	0	0	2	2	2	1	7
<b><i>USMC Vehicles</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.9	2.0
Quantities	0	1	23	24	54	120	222
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.7	0.2	0.0	4.3
Quantities	250	250	337	418	34	0	1,289

**Summary – FY 2015 Option  
(TY \$ Billions)**

	<b>FY 02</b>	<b>FY 03</b>	<b>FY 04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY 06</b>	<b>FY 07</b>	<b>Sum</b>
<b>Facilities</b>							
Housing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MilCon	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	36.0
<i>Total</i>	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	36.0
<b>Equipment</b>							
Platforms	0.9	2.3	7.8	11.0	15.4	18.5	56.0
Minor Items	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.7	2.7	4.5	13.3
<i>Total</i>	2.6	3.8	9.2	12.7	18.1	23.0	69.4
<b>Research &amp; Development</b>							
S&T	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.8	13.2
Other	1.1	2.7	4.6	7.2	8.9	13.2	37.7
Missile Defense	3.0	3.0	3.0	5.0	6.0	7.0	27.0
<i>Total</i>	5.6	7.5	9.6	14.6	17.6	23.0	77.9
<b>Personnel</b>							
Military Raise	0.4	1.1	1.8	2.7	3.6	4.5	14.1
Bonuses	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	8.3
+70k	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	18.0
Civilian Raise	0.3	0.8	1.3	1.8	2.5	3.1	9.7
<i>T o t a l</i>	4.7	6.2	7.5	9.0	10.5	12.2	50.1
<b>Readiness</b>							
Real Growth	10.5	17.2	21.7	26.4	30.9	36.5	143.2
<b>Grand Total</b>	29.3	40.7	54.1	68.7	83.1	100.7	376.5

**Comptroller Profile**

Percent of GDP	3.07%	3.07%	3.07%	3.05%	3.05%	3.02%
Increase vs. Clinton Legacy Budget	23.4	41.5	53.3	62.9	<b>74.8</b>	83.5

**Examples of Additional Procurement  
FY 2015 Option**

	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>	<u>FY 2004</u>	<u>FY 2005</u>	<u>FY 2006</u>	<u>FY 2007</u>	<u>Total</u>
<b><i>Army Helos</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.9	14.2
Quantities	21	35	57	79	123	147	462
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6
Quantities	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
<b><i>AF TacAir</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	3.3	4.7	4.6	4.1	4.6	5.4	26.8
Quantities	16	24	44	44	42	50	220
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.4	0.3	0.4	1.5	2.9	5.0	10.5
Quantities	10	15	12	34	64	82	217
<b><i>Attack Subs</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.7	4.2	15.3
Quantities	1	1	1	1	1	2	7
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	8.8
Quantities	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
<b><i>USMC Vehicles</i></b>							
Current Plan							
Dollars (\$B)	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.9	2.0
Quantities	0	1	23	24	54	120	222
Adds							
Dollars (\$B)	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.4	2.6
Quantities	50	150	150	175	196	150	871



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



2001 MAY 18 9:29

INFO MEMO

May 18, 2001 3:43 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D Watts 25 May 01*

SUBJECT: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios

- You requested information on various tooth-to-tail metrics (TAB A)
- We have calculated numbers of headquarters personnel, general and flag officer, band members, and operational support aircraft per 100,000 "warriors" (TAB B)
- Because of the way the data is gathered, the "warriors" number is imperfect. It includes some military personnel who might not directly engage in combat, but excludes some personnel in the training base who would deploy to fight
- The data illuminate a few basic points:
  - The various categories of "headquarters" personnel and "support/executive" aircraft you asked about are small relative to the numbers of "warriors".
  - The numbers of warriors ("tooth") are more sensitive to changes in mission and strategy than are the numbers of other personnel or airplanes ("tail").
  - Headquarters staff and operational support aircraft per warrior rose in the early 1990s but have fallen since 1995.
  - General and flag officers and band members per warrior have risen over the 1990s.

COORDINATION: USD(Comptroller) *JY 6/22*

Attachments:

As **stated**

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 695-0749



U09942 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/1126

320.7

18MAY01

**TAB**

**A**

Paul & Rudy  
More Advice - DR

EMO

SC

SECDEF-IASSEEN

February 19, 2001 5:56 PM

MAR 10 2001

*we should give this to PA&E as part of their tooth to tail review.*

- I Want to figure out some indices to measure DoD teeth to tail ratio. Everything could be as a percentage to warriors—fighting troops.

For. example:

- OSD personnel as a percentage of troops DoD-wide
- Generals and admirals as a percentage of warriors DoD-wide
- Air Force/Army/Navy secretariats as a percentage of warriors in each of the Services
- Generals and admirals as a percentage of warriors in each Service
- Executive aircraft or private cars as a percentage of warriors in each Service
- Washington representational and bands and that type of thing as a percentage of warriors

There must be a number of these things that are better than these, but if we get them listed, without even saying anything, things will begin to get better. The old adage is "what you measure, improves." It is true.

DHR:dh  
021901-17

**TAB**

**B**

**Headquarters Staffs (100,000+)**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY99
OSD	208	60	137	183	265	249
Joint Staff	105	92	108	113	148	176
Army	1129	832	869	712	1132	895
Navy Dept	2409	1545	1270	976	1036	889
Air Force	1853	1564	1367	1267	1850	1736

**Generals and Colonels (100,000+)**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	101	100	88	86	104	111
Army	92	87	80	76	91	96
Navy	108	109	88	87	101	115
Marine Corps	61	62	53	57	73	73
Air Force	129	133	116	119	146	154

**Brigade and Battalion Staffs (100,000+)**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	522	418	422	412	505	538
Army	554	448	471	485	603	623
Navy	420	295	272	248	337	353
Marine Corps	751	549	672	529	699	788
Air Force	468	426	379	397	410	433

**Operational Support Staffs (100,000+)**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	69	51	43	53	66	48
Army	63	48	51	55	73	52
Navy	75	50	36	41	52	45
Marine Corps	146	88	17	20	22	23
Air Force	43	43	47	75	95	60

\*Military Department comparisons are to Military Department populations. OSD and Joint Staff are to DoD.



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 JUN -1 PM 5: 22



INFO MEMO

June 1, 2001 1:31 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts cc/ci/ci*

SUBJECT: Setting a Deadline for Making Command and Control (C2) of Legacy Systems Interoperable

- You asked Dr. Zakheim whether there is “any way to set a deadline for all legacy systems to be interoperable” with regard to C2 (TAB A).
- A realistic deadline of 2007 or 2008 can be set if two conditions are met:
  - (1) interoperability is limited to technically achievable goals (e.g., fielding common data links and tactical radios)
  - (2) the acquisition system can enforce migration by the services to interoperable C2.
- Enforcement is the pivotal issue in achieving such a deadline.
  - Heretofore, our acquisition oversight system has not been able to enforce interoperability across the military services.
  - C3I and AT&L have developed new directives that, when signed, should enable OSD to insist on interoperability certification at acquisition boards.
  - Unless these changes are implemented and interoperability enforced, success within any reasonable number of years is doubtful.
- What might be a realistic deadline for doing such things as fielding common data links and tactical radios, and how much might that cost?
  - ASD(C3I) currently estimates that acquisition oversight changes would require some \$570M during FY02-07, of which less than 40% is in the current program.
  - Accelerated acquisition of initiatives, such as interoperable tactical radios, data links, and the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) would require another \$8.4B over FY02-07, of which less than 40% is programmed.
  - If we completed investment in these programs, 2008 might be a reasonable deadline for achieving force-wide C2 interoperability.

- Investments in other interoperability programs, such as a Future Command Center and Battlefield Situational Awareness, are much more speculative, but could result in additional costs of **\$2.5B** over the FYDP.
- A more ambitious interoperability program than that described above could, of course, be attempted.
  - For additional detail, see the **C3I** paper (TAB B), which defines C3 interoperability, outlines the obstacles to achieving it, and provides current and plus-up funding data for a more comprehensive menu of interoperability programs.
  - Note that the “future command post” program in TAB B is the closest current program to the joint command-and-control system proposed by General McCarthy’s transformation panel.
  - Achieving more ambitious goals, such as a “common operational picture” that can be automatically shared at every level of command, are far less certain than fielding joint tactical radios or interoperable data links.
- The cost estimates in TAB B are very uncertain and should not be used for programmatic decisions until they are developed further.

COORDINATIONS: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Barry D. Watts, Director PA&E, 695-0971

May 21, 2001 2:48 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Interoperability of Legacy Systems

Is there any way to set a deadline for all legacy systems to be interoperable with respect to command and control?

DHR:dh  
052101-44

*DUSD (FM) 5/24 1500 11-L-0559/OSD/1133*

*01 May 18*

## C3 SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY

### **I. DEFINITIONS**

- Command, Control and Communications (C3) is the set of systems and processes that collect, distribute, process, store, present, disseminate, and manage information for decision makers and organizations throughout the Department of Defense, and related national security organizations.
  - C3 is a subset of Information Technology as defined by the Clinger-Cohen Act.
  - C3 is a dynamic set of capabilities that continually evolve and change as technology improves.
  
- Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide data, information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units, or forces and to use the data, information, materiel and services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
  
- Interoperability allows the full exploitation of information to:
  - decrease chance for error (e.g., fratricide),
  - make decision-making and control more effective and efficient,
  - reduce time to exchange information,
  - reduce training requirements,
  - optimize combat effectiveness.
  
- Interoperability is achieved by:
  - Compatible hardware and software (common warfighting tools).
  - Commonality and uniformity of data and format for information exchange (a common war-fighting language).
  - Commonality of operating procedures and rules for information exchange (a common warfighting method).

### **II. CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY**

Achieving interoperability has been a difficult problem because of technical issues involving information exchange among a diverse and large set of C3 systems including both fielded systems and those under development. These technical challenges are made more difficult to overcome because our acquisition process is geared toward the development of individual C3 systems vice "a system of systems" approach.

Furthermore:

- No one is perceived as being in charge of interoperability.
- Policies and instructions are almost a decade old.
- Metrics are hard to define and difficult to measure.
- The Department has not made interoperability a real priority.

### III. POLICY AND PROCESS

- A revised DoD interoperability directive has been prepared for Deputy Secretary of Defense approval that will implement a new process for achieving interoperability.
- It is mission-focused and outcome-based.
  - Characterizes interoperability requirements in a family-of-systems or system-of-systems joint mission area context.
  - Precisely defines operational user requirements.
  - Involves the test community throughout a system's life to ensure interoperability objectives have been met.
  - Includes experts from the operational war-fighter community to identify, consolidate, prioritize, and synchronize non-materiel solutions with materiel solutions, for both new and legacy capabilities.
  - Provides incentives to program managers to address high priority interoperability issues.
- To implement and institutionalize the process called for in the new directive would require the following resources. (**BOLD** entries show current funding levels.)

Program/Activity	Function	FY 02 Resources	FY 03-07 Resources
DoD CIO	Interoperability assessments and support	\$4 M	\$29 M
		<b>\$2 M</b>	<b>\$0 M</b>
Joint Interoperability and Integration Organization	Warfighter interoperability support	\$10 M	\$46 M
		<b>\$3 M</b>	<b>\$8 M</b>
Interoperability Stabilization Fund	Fund to address near term, high priority interoperability issues	\$10 M <b>\$5 M</b>	\$100 M <b>\$25 M</b>
Joint Distributed Engineering Plant	Distributed engineering and test capability for verifying interoperability	\$10 M <b>\$26 M</b>	\$145 M <b>\$150 M</b>
Total Oversight Plus-up		34M	320 M
<b>Total Oversight Baseline</b>		<b>36M</b>	<b>183 M</b>

#### IV. PROGRAMATIC AND RESOURCE ISSUES

- The following is a set of high priority initiatives that will move us closer to achieving C3 systems interoperability. (**BOLD** entries show current funding levels.)

<b>Program/ Initiative</b>	<b>Actions/ Fielding Plan</b>	<b>Improvement to Interoperability</b>	<b>Additional FY 02 Funding</b>	<b>Additional FY 03-07 Funding</b>
Accelerate Tactical Data Links	Accelerate the fielding of Link 16 and gateways to other data links	Link 16 enables a shared integrated operational picture	\$50 M \$69 M	\$1,300 M \$425 M
Accelerate Joint Tactical Radio System	Accelerate waveform and <b>crypto</b> software. Develop maritime, airborne, and handheld capabilities. Buy and install radios on <b>objective</b> platforms	Enables exchange of information between dissimilar radios	\$100 M \$160 M	\$3,500 M \$667 M
Accelerate Teleport Program	Accelerate interface between satellite and terrestrial communications systems	Enables war-fighter reach back to <b>CONUS</b>	\$0 M \$219 M	\$356 M \$409 M
Accelerate Global Command and Control Systems	Accelerate Command and Control information exchange between the JTF and the Services	Increases speed and capability for joint planning and execution	\$15 M \$268M	\$150 M \$1664 M
Future Command Center	Develop and field wireless command centers for the <b>CINCs</b> to maximize mobility and minimize footprint	Supports all scenarios (war-fighting to disaster relief). Hosted on variety of platforms, uses local <b>comms</b> can operate autonomously	\$50 M \$25 M (est.)	\$1,650 M \$125 M (est.)
Standardize Collaboration Planning Tools	Direct and field a standard collaboration planning toolkit	Allows shared planning information	\$7 M \$0 M	\$19 M \$0 M

Accelerate Integrated Broadcast Service	Accelerate system to integrate intelligence and warning information into a single broadcast	Ensures warfighters will have complete, shared intelligence information	\$18 M \$37 M	\$73 M \$188 M
Accelerate Battlefield Situational Awareness	Accelerate the development and fielding of "Common Operational Picture"	Enables the Service Components and Joint Force Commander to share a near real-time integrated view of the battlespace	\$10 M \$68 M	\$75 M \$371 M
Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP)	Increases the funding for organizations developing the enhanced capabilities for exchanging operational picture data and accelerates the fielding of these capabilities by the Services and Agency Systems	Improves the coherence and consistency of operational pictures across all systems that support joint and coalition operations	\$21 M \$9 M	\$183 M \$75 M
Total Initiative Plus-up			\$271 M	\$7,306 M
<b>Total Initiative Baseline</b>			<b>\$855 M</b>	<b>\$3924 M</b>

## V. CONCLUSIONS

- We are making progress toward interoperability.
- We have identified the management process (Section III). It requires sustained leadership commitment.
- Additional funding is needed to implement and sustain this new management process.
- Additional resources for high priority programmatic initiatives will accelerate the pace at which we achieve interoperability among our C3 systems.

**COORDINATIONS**

	<u><b>Name</b></u>	<u><b>Date</b></u>
Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller)	Dov Zakheim	6/1/01
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)	Cheryl Roby	6/1/01



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
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INFO MEMO

2001 JUN -5 PM 5:33

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 5, 2001, 4:30PM

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

*Barry D. Watts*  
6/05/01

SUBJECT: The Extent to Which DoD Has Outsourced

- You asked me to look at the extent to which DoD has outsourced. (TAB A: your Memo). The attached chart (TAB B) shows private sector participation in DoD's commercial-type functions as of FY99.
- Private contractors provide about 37 percent (734,000 work-year equivalents) of the nearly two million DoD positions engaged in "commercial" activities. Sixty three percent of these positions remain with the government.
- Three-in-four of the in-house positions are considered either inherently governmental (e.g. policy making positions) or exempt. Positions are exempt due to law (e.g. guards, firefighters, and many depot maintenance workers) or as otherwise determined by local DoD component managers. About 25 percent (316,000) of the in-house positions are eligible for outsourcing under OMB Circular A-76. DoD plans to review 40,000 of these positions in FY01-05.
- OMB Circular A-76 requires public-private competitions. Public bidders win about half of all competitions; thus substantial numbers of public providers would remain if all possible positions were competed.
- Most outsourcing has been in installation services. TAB C provides functions where additional opportunities remain (about 635,000 positions). As discussed above, only half of these are eligible for outsourcing, according to current regulations.
- Substantially increasing outsourcing requires addressing military-intensive and/or politically challenging functions. Achieving real savings from outsourcing military functions requires cutting endstrength.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: David L. McNicol, 703-695-0721



11-L-0559/OSD/1140

U10436 /01

# TAB A



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 1:01 PM

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

We ought to get a set of indices that look at the extent to which outsourcing has taken place—things such as guards, mess cooks, and dozens of other activities.

DHR:dh  
021901-18

A-76-

Need new energy - in it -

3 Series (AW 100) ~~needed~~ filtered. L A-76


what takes too long -

Declare more functions -

# TAB B



TAB B: Positions (or work-year equivalents) performing commercial activities in the Department of Defense (civilians, active military, national guard, and reserves)



\*includes civilian inherently governmental and military commercial positions

C

TAB C: Number of DoD employees performing commercial activities, by function area (in thousands)

	Civilians	Military*
Installation services	37.2	52.7
Depot repair and maintenance	62.1	3.5
Organizational and intermediate repair and maintenance	46.6	109.7
Health services	28.5	100.5
Education and training	34.4	85.6
Real property management, maintenance, and construction	50.1	23.1
Total	258.9	375.1

Source: 200 1 DoD Commercial Activities Inventory Data.

\* - includes guard and reserves



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
-WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



INFO MEMO

June 8, 2001, 5:20 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D Watts 06/08/01 1720*

SUBJECT: Budget Comparison

- You requested information to update DoD budget trends to 2000, to include service requests and SecDef recommendations (TAB A).
- Tables are attached, showing:
  - Budget trends (Then-year and FY 2000 dollars) from 1975-2000 (TAB B).
  - Budget detail for 1997-2000 (TAB C).
  - A manpower table for FY 1975-2001 (TAB D).
- Since at least the late 1980s, OMB has been involved at an early stage with DoD's budget formulation.
  - Potential differences between the position of the Secretary and that of the Executive Office of the President have typically been settled informally.
  - No "SecDef recommended" budget level, as distinct from the eventual President's Budget, has been promulgated.
  - Thus, the data in TAB B is equivalent to the "President's Decision" column of the tables in TAB A.
- You will notice that DoD-wide programs have grown as a share of the DoD budget.
  - The principal reason is the functional transfer of certain activities (such as BMDO, SOCOM, and the Defense Health Program) from the services to DoD-wide.
  - The increases in DoD-wide programs were partially offset by the 1985 transfer of funding responsibility for military retirement from a DoD-Wide account, to the Services.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Bryan C. Jack, Director, Programming and Fiscal Economics, PA&E, 693-7827

524  
4/4

May 21, 2001 8:37 AM

TO: Barry Watts  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Budget Comparison

Here is some old material I found in a **file**. I wonder if you could just give me a piece of paper **that** continues this and shows **the** year 2000 numbers, where **they** are appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/22/76 DoD FY 1978 Budget Status

DHR:dh  
052101-10

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Department of Defense

FY 1978 Budget Status  
(\$ Billions)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Current \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 Budget</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>EY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>EY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Service Request</u>	<u>Sec Def Recommended</u>	<u>President's Decision</u>
<b>Military Personnel</b>	24.9	25.4	26.2	<b>29.4</b>	28.5	27.7	28.2	27.9	27.7
Retired Pay	6.2	7.3	8.3	7.8	<b>8.3</b>	0.9	9.1	9.0	9.0
<b>Operation &amp; Maintenance</b>	<b>26.2</b>	28.9	32.2	32.5	33.5	34.3	<b>38.9</b>	35.5	34.7
Procurement	<b>17.4</b>	21.4	28.5	20.9	24.1	30.2	38.3	36.3	35.3
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	8.6	9.5	10.6	10.5	<b>10.8</b>	17.2	13.4	12.3	12.1
<b>Military Construction</b>	<b>1.8</b>	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.7	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.5</b>
Family Rousing	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.4
Other Military Functions	.1	.2	.3	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
<b>Military Assistance</b>	<u>1.5</u>	1.4	1.1	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>
<b>TOA Total</b>	87.9	97.7	110.9	<b>106.7</b>	111.0	117.7	133.6	126.3	<b>123.1</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	86.0	<b>88.5</b>	<b>99.0</b>	105.4	101.1	105.5	116.5	113.1	111.1

Detail may not add due to rounding

12/22/76

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Department of Defense

FY 1978 Budget Status  
(\$ Billions)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Current \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 Budget</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>h-vice Request</u>	<u>Sec Def Recommended</u>	<u>President's Decision</u>
<b>Army</b>	21.7	24.0	26.9	26.2	27.3	28.5	33.2	<b>31.2</b>	30.1
Navy	27.9	31.5	37.1	33.9	35.9	39.4	44.5	42.4	<b>41.2</b>
<b>Air Force</b>	26.1	28.5	32.1	31.5	32.3	34.1	<b>39.2</b>	36.6	35.9
Defense Agencies/ Defense-wide/MAP	<u>11.2</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>75.1</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>15.8</u>	<u>16.6</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>15.9</u>
<b>Total TOA</b>	87.9	97.7	110.9	106.7	111.0	117.7	133.6	126.3	<b>123.1</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	86.0	80.5	99.6	105.4	101.1	105.5	<b>116.5</b>	113.1	111.1

Detail may not add due to rounding

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Army

FY 1978 Budget Status  
(\$ Billions)

Title	<u>Current \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 Budget</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Service Request</u>	<u>Sec Def Recommended</u>	<u>President's Decision</u>
Military Personnel	9.2*	9.6	10.1	10.9	10.8	10.7	11.0	10.8	10.7
Operation & Maintenance*	7.4	8.3	9.2	9.2	9.7	9.9	10.9	9.9	9.7
Procurement	2.6	3.2	4.4	3.1	3.6	4.7	7.2	6.7	6.3
RDT&E	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.9	2.7	2.7
Military Construction	.8	.9	.7	.9	1.0	.8	1.1	.9	.6
Other Military Functions	*	*	.1	.1	*	.1	.1	.1	.1
TOA Total	21.7	24.0	26.9*	26.2	27.3	28.5	33.2	31.2	30.1
Outlays	21.9	21.4	25.2	26.6	24.4	26.8	28.5	28.3	

\* Less than \$50 million

Detail may not add due to rounding

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Navy

FY 1978 Budget Status.  
(\$ Billions)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Current \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 Budget</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>EY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>EY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Service Recommended</u>	<u>Sec Def</u>	<u>President's decision</u>
<b>Military Personnel</b>	7.8	8.0	8.4	9.3	<b>9.0</b>	<b>8.8</b>	9.0	9.0	8.9
Operation & Maintenance	a.0	9.2	10.6	10.0	10.7	11.3	13.1	12.3	12.0
<b>Procurement</b>	8.4	<b>10.2</b>	<b>13.6</b>	10.2	11.6	14.4	16.9	16.1	15.5
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	<b>3.7</b>	3.2	3.8	3.7	<b>3.8</b>	4.0	4.6	4.3	4.3
Military Constructsn	.6	.7	.7	.7	.8	.7	.7	.7	.5
Other Military Functions	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
<b>TOA Total</b>	27.9	31.5	37.1	33.9	<b>35.9</b>	39.4	44.5	42.4	41.2
Outlays	27.4	<b>28.5</b>	31.6	33.7	32.7	33.8	37.5	37.6	

\* Less than \$50 million

Detail may not add due to rounding

12/22/76

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Afr Force

FY 1978 Budget Status  
(\$ Billions)

Title	Current \$			FY 1978 \$			FY 1978 Budget		
	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	Service Decision	Sec Def Recommended	President's
Military Personnel	7.8	7.8	7.7	9.3	a.7	a.2	a.2	8.1	8.1
Operation & Maintenance	8.2	8.7	9.4	10.2	10.1	10.1	11.5	10.2	9.9
Procurement	6.3	7.8	10.2	7.5	8.7	10.8	13.8	13.1	13.1
RDT&E	3.3	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.0	5.0	4.5	4.4
Military Construction*	.4	.6	.9	.5	.7	.9	.7	.7	.4
Other Military Functions	.1	*	.1	*	*	.1	*	*	*
- TOA Total	26.1	28.5	32.1	31.5	32.3	34.1	39.2	36.6	35.9
Outlays	25.0	26.4	28.3	30.5	30.1	30.9	33.1	32.0	

\* Less than \$50 million

Detail may not add due to rounding

12/22/76

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Defense Agencies/Defensewide/MAP

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FY 1978 Budget Status  
(\$ Billions)

<u>Title</u>	<u>Current \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 \$</u>			<u>FY 1978 Budget</u>		
	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Agency Recommended</u>	<u>Sec Def</u>	<u>President's Decision</u>
Retired Pay	6.2	7.3	8.2	7.8	8.3	8.9	9.1	9.0	9.0
Operation & Maintenance	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.1
Procurement	.1	.2	.3	.1	.2	.3	.4	.4	.4
RD&E	.5	.6	.7	.6	.7	.7	.9	.8	.8
Military Construction	*	*	.1	*	*	.1	.2	.2	*
Family Housing	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.4
Other Military Functions	.1	.2	.3	.1	.3	.3	.1	.1	.1
<b>Military Assistance</b>	<u>1.5</u>	1.4	1.1	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>
TOA Total	12.2	13.6	14.6	15.1	15.6	15.8	16.6	16.1	15.9
Outlays	11.7	12.2	13.8	14.6	13.8	14.0	17.4	15.3	

\* Less than \$50 million

Detail may not add due to rounding

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FY 1978 Budget Strength Status

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>Transition</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>		<u>FY 1978.</u>		
				<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Sec Def Recommended</u>	<u>Service Request</u>	<u>Sec Def Recommended</u>	<u>President's Decision</u>
<b><u>Military Strengths:</u></b>								
Army	783,907	778,978	782,235	789,000	789,000	790,022	791,964	790,000
Navy	534,884	524,476	527,595	540,600	536,000*	543,545	536,736	536,000
Marine Corps	195,951	192,336	189,785	192,000	192,000	192,000	192,000	192,000
Air Force	612,551	585,207	583,078	571,000	571,000	572,819	572,994	572,000
Total	2,127,293	2,080,997	2,082,693	2,092,600	2,088,000	2,098,386	2,093,694	2,090,000
<u>Total Employment</u>								
<b><u>Civilian Strengths:</u></b>								
Army	401,116	389,920	384,700	376,624	378,539	384,453	382,247	378,000
Navy	325,859	321,416	318,621	318,439	320,172	330,724	318,984	317,500
Air Force	277,978	262,573	259,762	256,056	257,233	262,501	260,155	256,200
Defense Agencies	73,417	72,439	77,853	79,881	80,156	81,293	79,300	79,300
Total	1,078,370	1,046,348	1,040,936	1,031,000	1,036,100	1,058,971	1,040,686	1,031,000
<u>Direct Hire</u>								
Army	338,039	328,785	325,110	313,895	319,119	324,407	322,784	318,537
Navy	314,938	310,912	308,108	309,222	308,613	319,736	307,949	306,465
Air Force	263,718	249,064	246,203	240,932	242,018	247,557	245,206	241,251
Defense Agencies	72,787	70,604	76,457	77,951	78,317	79,462	77,485	77,505
Total	989,482	959,365	955,878	942,000	948,067	971,162	953,424	943,758

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TOTAL P.08

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P.08/08

## DoD Budget Track: FY 1975--FY 2000

<u>Title</u>	FY 1,975	FY 1976	FY 1977	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984
<b>Current \$ (Billion)</b>										
Military Personnel *	24.9	25.4	25.9	27.2	28.7	31.1	36.7	42.8	45.6	48.2
Retired Pay	6.2	7.3	8.2	9.2	10.3	11.9	13.7	14.9	18.0	16.5
Operation & Maintenance	26.2	28.8	32.0	34.9	37.9	46.8	55.2	62.0	66.8	70.4
Procurement	17.3	21.0	27.1	23.9	31.3	35.1	47.2	63.3	76.6	83.4
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>22.8</b>	<b>26.9</b>
Military Construction	1.8	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.4	2.3	3.4	4.8	4.2	4.7
Family Housing	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.8
Revolving & Mgt Funds	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.9	2.5
Special Foreign Currency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DOD-Wide Contingency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>86.1</b>	<b>95.7</b>	<b>107.6</b>	<b>116.1</b>	<b>124.7</b>	<b>142.0</b>	<b>175.5</b>	<b>210.7</b>	<b>235.5</b>	<b>255.3</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	<b>84.9</b>	<b>87.9</b>	<b>95.6</b>	<b>103.0</b>	<b>115.0</b>	<b>132.8</b>	<b>156.2</b>	<b>184.5</b>	<b>205.0</b>	<b>220.8</b>
Army Total	22.1	24.3	27.3	29.5	32.1	35.2	44.0	53.0	57.4	61.6
DoN Total	28.3	31.7	36.7	39.9	42.2	47.4	57.6	68.6	79.0	80.6
Air Force Total	26.3	28.8	31.5	33.3	35.4	42.1	53.0	65.8	73.4	85.3
DoD-Wide Total **	9.4	10.9	12.1	13.4	15.1	17.3	20.9	23.3	25.7	27.9
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>86.1</b>	<b>95.7</b>	<b>107.6</b>	<b>116.1</b>	<b>124.7</b>	<b>142.0</b>	<b>175.5</b>	<b>210.7</b>	<b>235.5</b>	<b>255.3</b>
<b>FY 2000 \$ (Billion)</b>										
Military Personnel .	85.6	83.0	80.4	78.9	78.3	78.8	80.9	82.4	63.9	84.7
Retired Pay	20.6	21.8	23.1	24.0	24.9	25.7	26.6	27.2	27.4	27.5
Operation & Maintenance	75.2	77.6	79.0	79.9	80.4	85.4	91.7	98.1	103.5	107.5
Procurement	50.7	57.2	66.4	67.2	63.7	64.6	79.9	100.2	115.4	121.4
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>25.9</b>	<b>25.9</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>35.3</b>	<b>40.1</b>
Military Construction	4.8	5.3	5.0	3.9	4.8	4.0	5.6	7.7	6.5	7.1
Family Housing	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	2.8	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.8
Revolving & Mgt Funds	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.9	0.6	1.4	4.0
Special Foreign Currency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DOD-Wide Contingency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>265.1</b>	<b>273.9</b>	<b>283.6</b>	<b>283.5</b>	<b>281.0</b>	<b>286.3</b>	<b>317.4</b>	<b>352.0</b>	<b>377.4</b>	<b>396.1</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	<b>288.3</b>	<b>259.8</b>	<b>262.8</b>	<b>264.2</b>	<b>273.3</b>	<b>281.5</b>	<b>294.9</b>	<b>317.2</b>	<b>336.7</b>	<b>348.6</b>
Army Total	70.0	72.0	74.6	74.6	75.4	75.6	84.1	92.8	95.8	98.9
DoN Total	85.4	89.0	94.1	94.6	92.3	92.9	101.9	112.7	124.6	123.6
Air Force Total	79.7	81.3	82.1	80.3	78.1	81.3	91.8	104.9	113.5	128.1
DoD-Wide Total **	30.0	31.6	32.7	33.9	35.2	36.5	39.6	41.6	43.5	45.5
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>265.1</b>	<b>273.9</b>	<b>283.6</b>	<b>283.5</b>	<b>281.0</b>	<b>286.3</b>	<b>317.4</b>	<b>352.0</b>	<b>377.4</b>	<b>396.1</b>

\* Includes retired pay accrual after FY 1984

\*\* Includes retired pay accrual prior to FY 1985

## DoD Budget Track: FY 1975--FY 2000

<u>Title</u> <u>Current \$ (Billion)</u>	FY 1985	FY 1988	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994
Military Personnel *	68.1	71.7	74.5	76.6	78.4	78.9	84.0	81.1	76.0	71.3
Retired Pay										
Operation & Maintenance	77.6	76.3	80.3	82.7	86.6	88.4	109.8	92.1	90.8	89.0
Procurement	90.0	87.3	83.2	82.1	79.4	79.7	71.4	61.9	53.6	43.8
RDT&E	30.8	33.5	35.7	36.9	37.3	35.8	34.7	37.9	37.7	34.5
Military Construction	5.5	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.7	5.2	5.5	5.0	3.9	6.5
Family Housing	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.6
Revolving & Mgt Funds	1.6	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.2	1.9	3.5	3.9	2.7
Special Foreign Currency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DoD-Wide Contingency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>276.2</b>	<b>278.1</b>	<b>282.7</b>	<b>287.8</b>	<b>291.5</b>	<b>291.4</b>	<b>310.6</b>	<b>285.1</b>	<b>269.7</b>	<b>251.3</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	<b>245.4</b>	<b>265.6</b>	<b>274.0</b>	<b>281.9</b>	<b>294.9</b>	<b>289.8</b>	<b>262.4</b>	<b>286.6</b>	<b>278.6</b>	<b>268.6</b>
Army Total	72.9	73.8	75.2	76.3	78.6	79.1	92.5	75.5	68.7	63.1
DoN Total	93.1	93.3	95.1	102.4	98.2	98.6	101.5	89.8	85.0	78.0
Air Force Total	96.5	93.9	93.6	90.3	94.7	93.2	91.2	84.7	79.6	74.9
DoD-Wide Total **	13.7	17.2	18.7	18.8	20.1	20.4	25.5	35.1	38.3	35.3
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>276.2</b>	<b>278.1</b>	<b>282.7</b>	<b>287.8</b>	<b>291.5</b>	<b>291.4</b>	<b>310.6</b>	<b>285.1</b>	<b>269.7</b>	<b>251.3</b>
<b><u>FY 2000 \$ (Billion)</u></b>										
Military Personnel .	107.9	109.7	111.0	109.8	108.9	107.8	109.5	102.9	92.4	84.6
Retired Pay										
Operation & Maintenance	115.9	112.9	114.9	114.7	114.4	112.9	130.0	109.1	104.7	100.0
Procurement	127.2	119.7	110.3	104.6	97.6	94.7	82.5	69.9	59.4	47.8
RDT&E	44.3	47.2	48.9	48.6	47.1	43.5	40.7	43.2	42.2	37.9
Military Construction	7.9	7.2	7.0	7.1	7.1	6.2	6.4	5.7	4.4	7.1
Family Housing	4.0	3.8	4.2	4.2	4.2	3.8	3.9	4.1	4.2	3.9
Revolving & Mgt Funds	2.2	2.1	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.3	2.2	4.1	4.4	3.1
Special Foreign Currency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DoD-Wide Contingency	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>409.4</b>	<b>402.5</b>	<b>397.1</b>	<b>390.0</b>	<b>380.3</b>	<b>369.3</b>	<b>375.2</b>	<b>339.0</b>	<b>311.7</b>	<b>284.1</b>
<b>Outlays</b>	<b>368.7</b>	<b>388.9</b>	<b>390.0</b>	<b>388.6</b>	<b>389.9</b>	<b>371.8</b>	<b>321.0</b>	<b>341.8</b>	<b>322.1</b>	<b>303.3</b>
Army Total	110.8	109.3	108.3	105.7	104.5	102.4	114.0	92.0	78.6	72.7
DoN Total	137.6	134.6	133.0	137.7	127.7	124.7	122.5	106.8	98.5	88.0
Air Force Total	140.0	133.5	129.5	121.2	122.1	116.9	108.3	99.8	91.1	84.1
DoD-Wide Total **	20.8	25.1	26.4	25.5	26.0	25.4	30.5	40.4	43.4	39.3
<b>TOA Total</b>	<b>409.4</b>	<b>402.5</b>	<b>397.1</b>	<b>390.0</b>	<b>380.3</b>	<b>369.3</b>	<b>375.2</b>	<b>339.0</b>	<b>311.7</b>	<b>284.1</b>

. Includes retired pay **accrual** after FY 1984

\*\* Includes retired pay accrual prior to FY 1985

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DoD Budget Track: FY 1997-2000

Department of Defense

Title	FY 2000 Budget Status (\$ Billions)								
	Current \$			FY 2000 \$			FY 2000 Budget		
	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	Budget Estimate Submission	SecDef Recommended *	President's Budget
Military Personnel **	70.2	69.7	70.9	77.3	74.5	73.6	71.4	73.7	73.7
Operation & Maintenance	91.8	95.9	98.0	97.3	99.3	99.8	98.1	103.3	103.3
Procurement	43.1	44.9	49.2	45.0	46.3	50.0	51.8	53.0	53.0
RDT&E	36.5	37.2	37.4	38.0	38.3	38.1	33.6	34.4	34.4
Military Construction	6.0	5.5	5.1	6.3	5.7	5.2	4.8	2.3	2.3
Family Housing	4.1	3.9	3.7	4.3	4.0	3.7	3.6	3.2	3.2
Revolving & Mgt Funds	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.6	2.2	1.8	0.8	0.4	0.4
DoD-Wide Contingency	0.0	0.0	-1.7	0.0	0.0	-1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOA Total	254.2	259.1	264.5	270.7	270.3	270.5	264.1	270.3	270.3
Outlays	258.3	256.1	263.6	273.9	266.6	269.5	***	260.8	260.8
Army Total	64.7	64.0	65.5	69.7	67.5	67.4	65.9	67.4	67.4
DoN Total	79.2	82.0	82.3	84.3	85.4	84.2	82.7	83.6	83.6
Air Force Total	73.2	76.5	77.4	77.6	79.5	78.9	79.1	79.6	79.6
DoD-Wide Total	37.2	36.6	39.2	39.1	38.0	40.0	36.4	39.9	39.9
TOA Total	254.2	259.1	264.5	270.7	270.3	270.5	264.1	270.3	270.3

• In recent years, no SecDef budget recommendation, as distinguished from the eventual President's Budget, has been promulgated

\*\* Includes retired pay accrual

\*\*\* Nat expressed in outlays

Table 7-5 [Continued]  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER**  
 (End Strength in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY						CIVILIAN WORKFORCE					Total DoD Manpower	Defense Related Employment In Industry	Total Defense Related Manpower
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Full Time Gd & Res	Total Military	Army	Navy, including Marines	NR Force	Defense Agencies & Other	Total Civilians			
1975	784	535	196	613	1	2,128	401	326	278	73	1,078	3,206	1,800	5,006
1976	779	524	192	585	1	2,082	390	321	262	72	1,945	3,127	1,690	4,817
1977	782	530	192	570	1	2,074	372	318	255	77	1,022	3,096	1,730	4,826
1978	771	530	191	569	1	2,062	371	317	251	77	1,016	3,078	1,765	4,843
1979	758	522	185	559	7	2,031	359	310	245	77	991	3,022	1,860	4,882
1980	777	527	188	558	13	2,063	361	309	244	77	990	3,053	1,990	5,043
1981	781	540	191	570	19	2,101	372	321	246	80	1,019	3,121	2,085	5,206
1982	780	553	192	583	22	2,130	378	319	248	82	1,028	3,158	2,290	5,448
1983	780	558	194	592	39	2,162	391	339	251	83	1,064	3,226	2,415	5,641
1984	780	565	196	597	46	2,184	403	342	253	87	1,085	3,270	2,735	6,005
1985	781	571	198	602	55	2,206	420	353	264	92	1,129	3,335	2,980	6,315
1986	781	581	199	608	64	2,233	413	342	263	94	1,112	3,345	3,315	6,660
1987	781	587	200	607	69	2,243	418	353	264	98	1,133	3,376	3,625	7,002
1988	772	593	197	576	71	2,209	393	348	253	96	1,090	3,299	3,430	6,729
1989	770	593	197	571	72	2,202	403	354	261	99	1,117	3,319	3,275	6,595
1990	751	583	197	539	74	2,143	380	341	249	103	1,073	3,216	3,115	6,332
1991	725	571	195	511	75	2,077	365	329	233	117	1,045	3,122	3,045	6,166
1992	611	542	185	470	72	1,880	334	309	214	149	1,006	2,886	2,840	5,726
1993	572	510	178	444	71	1,776	294	285	202	156	937	2,713	2,620	5,332
1994	541	469	174	426	68	1,678	280	269	196	156	901	2,579	2,460	5,039
1995	509	435	174	400	65	1,583	267	249	186	147	849	2,432	2,315	4,747
1996	491	417	175	389	66	1,538	259	240	183	138	819	2,356	2,210	4,566
1997	492	396	174	370	64	1,504	247	223	180	136	786	2,290	2,215	4,505
1998	484	382	173	367	64	1,470	237	210	174	126	747	2,217	2,190	4,407
1999	480	372	172	366	64	1,454	226	207	169	123	725	2,179	2,210	4,389
2000	480	372	172	361	64	1,449	220	199	163	118	700	2,149	2,185	4,334
2001	480	371	172	354	64	1,441	216	192	162	114	684	2,125	2,200	4,325

Air Force civil service employment is included in the Army prior to 1948 and identified separately thereafter. Beginning in 1953, the civilian work force figures include both U.S. and foreign national direct hires and the foreign national indirect hire employees that support U.S. forces overseas. Beginning with FY 1996, all the Federal civilian work force are measured in Full-time Equivalents (FTE) on this table.

Navy reserve personnel on active duty for Training and Administration of Reserves (TARS) are included in the active Navy prior to FY 1980 and in the Full-Time Guard and Reserve thereafter. Active Duty Military includes the activation of 25,652 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1990 pursuant to sections 673b, Title 10 U.S.C., 17,059 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1991 and 954 National Guard and Reservists in FY 1992 pursuant to sections 672 and 673, Title 10 U.S.C., to support Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

June 12, 2001 9:22 AM

TO: Service Chiefs  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Barry Watts

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios

Attached is a paper prepared by PA&E in answer to a question I posed.

I don't think the actual numbers are terribly important. I think, if we use the same yardsticks, what is important is the year-to-year progression.

What do think about setting five goals for 2002?

Also, on this page, why don't we have Barry Watts put in the totals for each'?

Let's visit about this.

Attach.

5/18/01 Watts memo to SecDef re: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios [U09942/0 1]

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① C-  
 ② For total  
 ③ Retired total

Headquarters Staff Personnel Per 100,000 Warriors	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY99
OSD	208	60	137	183	265	249
Joint Staff	105	92	108	113	148	176
Army	1129	832	869	712	1132	895
Navy Dept	2409	1545	1270	976	1036	889
Air Force	1853	1564	1367	1267	1850	1736

General and Flag Officers Per 100,000 Warriors	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	101	100	88	86	104	111
Army	92	87	80	76	91	96
Navy	108	109	88	87	101	115
Marine Corps	61	62	53	57	73	73
Air Force	129	133	116	119	146	154

\*

Band Members Per 100,000 Warriors	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	522	418	422	412	505	538
Army	554	448	471	485	603	623
Navy	420	295	272	248	337	353
Marine Corps	751	549	672	529	699	788
Air Force	468	426	379	397	410	433

Operational Support Personnel Per 100,000 Warriors	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	69	51	43	53	66	48
Army	63	48	51	55	73	52
Navy	75	50	36	41	52	45
Marine Corps	146	88	17	20	22	23
Air Force	43	43	47	75	95	60

\* Military Department comparisons are to Military Department populations. OSD and Joint Staff are to DoD.

\* NAVY NUMBERS INCLUDE DOCTORS, DENTISTS, CHAPLAINS, NURSES AND ACQUISITION FLAGS THAT SERVICE THE MARINE CORPS.



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-11800

6/11  
06/30



2001 MAY 18 11 34 AM

INFO MEMO

May 18, 2001 3:43 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D Watts 25 May 01*

SUBJECT: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios

- You requested information on various tooth-to-tail metrics (TAB A)
- We have calculated numbers of headquarters personnel, general and flag officer, band members, and operational support aircraft per 100,000 "warriors" (TAB B)
- Because of the way the data is gathered, the "warriors" number is imperfect. It includes some military personnel who might not directly engage in combat, but excludes some personnel in the training base who would deploy to tight
- The data illuminate a few basic points:
  - The various categories of "headquarters" personnel and "support/executive" aircraft you asked about are small relative to the numbers of "warriors".
  - The numbers of warriors ("tooth") are more sensitive to changes in mission and strategy than are the numbers of other personnel or airplanes ("tail").
  - Headquarters staff and operational support aircraft per warrior rose in the early 1990s but have fallen since 1995.
  - General and flag officers and band members per warrior have risen over the 1990s.

?

COORDINATION: USD(Comptroller) *JK/5/22*

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 6950749



U09942 /01

Paul & Rudy  
Need Advice - DR

EMO SC

SECDEF HASSEEN

February 19, 2001 5:56 PM

MAR 10 2001

we should give this to PA&E as part of their tooth to tail review.

I want to figure out some indices to measure DoD teeth to tail ratio. Everything could be as a percentage to warriors—fighting troops.

For example:

- OSD personnel as a percentage of troops DoD-wide
- Generals and admirals as a percentage of warriors DoD-wide
- Air Force/Army/Navy secretariats as a percentage of warriors in each of the Services
- Generals and admirals as a percentage of warriors in each Service .
- Executive aircraft or private cars as a percentage of warriors in each Service
- Washington representational and bands and that type of thing as a percentage of warriors

There must be a number of these things that are better than these, but if we get them listed, without even saying anything, things will begin to get better. The old adage is "what you measure, improves." It is true.

DHR:dh  
021901-17

UNCLASSIFIED



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



2001 JUN 13 PM 5: 28

INFO MEMO

June 13, 2001, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation *Barry D. Watts*

SUBJECT: Force Costs by CINC Area of Responsibility (AOR)

- In response to your question (TAB A), the total FY 2000 U.S. cost for forces by CINC AOR is \$22.4B, as shown in the table below.

**Force Costs by AOR, FY 2000**

\$ In Billions	Permanently Stationed Forces	Costs for Contingencies	Total U.S. Costs	Host Nation Support	AOR Costs With HNS
EUCOM	\$11.0	\$3.3	\$14.3	<\$0.1	\$14.3
PACOM	\$ 6.3	<\$0.1	\$6.3	\$4.3	\$10.6
CENTCOM	\$0.3	\$1.1	\$1.4	\$0.2	\$1.6
SOUTHCOM	\$0.1	N/A	\$0.1	N/A	\$0.1
JFCOM	\$0.3	N/A	\$0.3	N/A	\$0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$18.0</b>	<b>\$4.4</b>	<b>\$22.4</b>	<b>\$4.5</b>	<b>\$26.9</b>

- “Permanently Stationed Forces” include: military personnel, operations and maintenance, family housing, and military construction.
- “Costs for Contingencies” includes: the incremental costs of forces on temporary duty in support of contingency operations (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo).
- “Host Nation Support” includes: funding provided by foreign **nationas** within their borders.
  - Taking direct HNS funding into account, cost estimates for PACOM and EUCOM AOR are more closely aligned. This would be expected, since approximately equal numbers of U.S. military personnel are permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Milton L. Tulkoff, 703-697-0

U10856# / 01

May 29, 2001 6:31 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Dollar Cost

Will **someone please** get me the dollar cost by area where our farces are deployed using **the AORs?**

**Thanks.**

DHR:dh  
052901-76

June 13, 2001 4:27 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
Tom White

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

The attached on outsourcing might be of interest.

We need to press ahead.

Attach.

5/24/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Indices for Outsourcing

DHR:dh  
061301-36

160

135000 01

U10947 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/1166

5/17/01  
SECDEFHAS SEEN

JUN 13 2001

INFO MEMO

May 24, 2001, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

*for J1 5125*

SUBJECT: Indices for Outsourcing

- PA&E advises us that the Department annually reports to Congress on outsourcing of commercial activities in compliance with Title 10 U.S.C. 2461. (A draft copy of the most recent report is provided at Tab A.)
- This report may provide some frame of reference for the total amount and general type of DoD work that is contracted out. Nonetheless, it is not comprehensive and does not distinguish between core and non-core DoD missions.
- Further work needs to be done and we will work to develop some meaningful metrics.

Coordination: OSD, PA&E

Prepared By: Tina Jonas, 703/695-3078

*6/11  
1640*

11-L-0559/OSD/1167



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 1:01 PM

SUBJECT: Outsourcing

We ought to get a set of indices that look at the extent to which outsourcing has taken place—things such as guards, mess cooks, and dozens of other activities.

DHR:dh  
021901-18

A-76-

Need new energy - in it -

3 Series (AW 10 engine ~~and~~ filtered) A-76

what takes too long -

Declare more functions -

# **Department of Defense Report: Performance of Commercial Activities**

**Fiscal Year 2001 Submission**



**Working Draft**

May 16, 2001

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT  
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001  
10 USC SECTION 2461(g)

This report provides information describing the extent of commercial and industrial type work performed by Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employees and DoD private sector contractors during Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 with corresponding estimates for FY 2001.

### REPORTING REQUIREMENT

Title 10, United States Code, Section 2461(g) requires that:

“Not later than February 1 of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a written report describing the extent to which commercial and industrial type functions were performed by Department of Defense contractors during the preceding fiscal year. The Secretary shall include in each such report an estimate of the percentage of commercial and industrial type functions of the Department of Defense that will be performed by Department of Defense civilian employees, and the percentage of such functions that will be performed by private contractors, during the fiscal year during which the report is submitted.”

### METHODOLOGY

The commercial activities report is based on Fiscal Year 2000 in-house civilian authorizations and estimated contractor work-year equivalent (WYE) data. For FY 2000, the report displays federal civilian authorizations in total and by function group, and for private sector contractors, estimates contractor WYEs by federal service code (FSC). For FY 2001, the report provides estimates of civilian authorizations and WYE data in total. The function groups and codes are listed in Attachment 1. The FSCs are listed in Attachment 2.

**In-house Civilian Manpower:** The data submitted by the DoD Components for commercial activities performed by in-house labor is based on federal civilian authorizations.<sup>1,2</sup> The definition of DoD commercial activities is derived from OMB

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<sup>1</sup> Civilian authorizations account for the total number of civilian full-time equivalents (FTEs) authorized for the activity for FY 2000. An FTE accounts for the planned use of 2,087 straight-time paid hours in a Fiscal Year (to include authorized leave and paid time off for training), as defined in DoD Instruction 4100.33.

Circular A-76, and then more specifically defined by internal DoD policy.<sup>3</sup> Civilian authorizations engaged in commercial activities:

- include in-house civilian manpower authorizations for commercial activities that are classified as reviewable for competition;
- include in-house civilian manpower authorizations for commercial activities that are exempt from competition;
- include civilian manpower authorizations for depot maintenance (in contrast to the Department's Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR Act) submissions which exclude such commercial activities because they are not subject to OMB Circular A-76);
- do not include foreign nationals on DoD's direct payroll or foreign nationals hired indirectly through contractual arrangements with overseas host nations (foreign nationals are not appointed to the civil service and are not included in the definition of Federal "employee" under 5 U.S.C. 2105);
- do not include inherently governmental manpower authorizations; and,
- do not include military authorizations.

In early 2001, the Department collected Component data on civilian manpower authorizations performing commercial activities as part of a comprehensive total inventory of commercial and inherently governmental activities. The Department developed this inventory to address a multitude of management issues and congressional requirements, including the FAIR Act and the Section 2461 requirements. As a result, the Department has confidence in the in-house manpower data detailed in this report.

**Estimated Contractor Work-Year Equivalents (WYEs):** In contrast to the Department's comprehensive inventory data on civilian authorizations performing commercial activities, the Department does not have an equivalent level of detailed information for determining the size of the contractor workforce. With this report, the Department is taking a significantly different approach to estimating WYEs. Past Commercial Activities Reports provided estimates of WYEs based on input from the Components. However, this data suffered inherent quality control problems due to a lack of standardization in estimating techniques used and specific functions included by the Components.

To standardize the contractor WYE estimating methodology, the Department, for the first time, used a centralized approach in developing the information for the *Report on Use of Employees of Non-Federal Entities to Provide Services to Department of Defense* required by Section 343 of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2000,

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<sup>2</sup> Civilian authorizations account for work performed by all civilian U.S. citizens on DoD's direct payroll. This report does not include authorizations for civilians paid through Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF).

<sup>3</sup> These policies include DoD Directive 4100.15, "Commercial Activities Program," and DoD Instruction 4100.33, "Commercial Activities Program Procedures."

Public Law No. 106-65.<sup>4</sup> This standardized methodology represents an improved way of estimating contractor WYEs because the contracts come from a common data source that provides a more complete accounting of contract dollars and creates a clear audit trail. In addition, using a single estimating methodology for all Defense Components eliminates inconsistencies in reporting from one to another and represents a practical and efficient approach to addressing such requirements.

As with all estimating methods, our WYE methodology is subject to some limitations. For example, although the FPDS/DIOR database represents a high quality source of contract data, contracts with a value less than \$25,000 are not included. These contracts represent approximately 7 percent of the total dollars awarded by DoD, but they cannot be classified by FSC because the data is not captured by DIOR.

Notwithstanding limitations, the new estimating method represents an overall improvement compared to our previous approach. The WYE estimates provided herein are practical, cost-effective, and consistent and are the most reliable to date.

## DOD COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ESTIMATES

As illustrated in Table 1, the DoD estimates a total combined workforce for Fiscal Year 2000 of 1,203,000 civilian manpower authorizations and contractor work-year equivalents. The composition of the combined workforce is 39 percent in-house civilians and 61 percent contractor. Fiscal Year 2001 projections are very similar to Fiscal Year 2000 both in total size (1,194,000) and the percentage breakout of the in-house and private sector workforce. We expect a slight decline in the federal civilian workforce primarily because of projected civilian manpower reductions in the Department and no significant change in contractor WYEs.

Table 1  
Department of Defense  
Fiscal Year 2000 and Estimated Fiscal Year 2001  
Full-Time and Contractor Work-Year Equivalents\*

Fiscal Year	Federal Civilians		Contractor		Total	
	Civilian Manpower Auth	Percent of Total	Estimated Work-Year Equivalents	Percent of Total	Combined Workforce**	Percent of Total
2000	471,000	39%	732,000	61%	1,203,000	100%
2001	462,000	39%	732,000	61%	1,194,000	100%

\*Rounded to the nearest 1,000

\*\*Manpower Authorizations and Contractor Work-Year Equivalents

<sup>4</sup> When the Section 343 report was submitted on March 12, 2001, FY 2000 contracts data was not available and the report was based on FY 1999 contracts data. The FY 2000 data is now available is used in this report to generate contractor WYE estimates.

The estimated contractor WYEs are 54% higher than reported last year due to an improved methodology that more accurately and consistently includes the appropriate types of contract work. It is important to note that this significant increase represents a correction in our estimates rather than a trend in future year behavior.

With the new methodology for estimating contractor WYEs, we can no longer make a direct comparison between DoD's federal civilian authorizations arrayed by functional group with contractor WYEs arrayed by FSC. Table 2 on the next page presents the two arrays for FY 2000.

The data indicates that the Department relies heavily on the private sector to provide services in research, development, test, and evaluation, in professional administrative and management support, in automatic data processing and telecommunications, and in the construction, maintenance, and repair of real property. In contrast, federal civilian workers provide relatively more support services in logistics, in force management and general support, in personnel and social services, in education and training, and in health/medical services.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Department of Defense relies heavily on contracted labor for the performance of commercial activities. This year's report takes a significant step forward in improving the estimate of contractor WYEs providing the Department with better data quality assurance and control without unnecessarily burdening the Components or violating the proprietary rules of the FAR. We believe the new estimates more accurately reflect the extent to which commercial and industrial type functions are performed by DoD contractors. Due to continued focus on achieving management efficiencies, the composition of the Department's workforce will likely continue to follow the current trend of marginally decreasing civilian manpower authorizations relative to contractor WYEs.

**Table 2  
DoD Commercial and Industrial Workforce for FY 2000**

DoD Federal Workforce		DoD Civilian Workforce	
Commercial Activity Function Group	Manpower Auth	Federal Service Code Group	WYE
Communications, Computing and Other Information Services	25,833	Automatic Data Processing & Telecommunications Services	52,020
Science and Technology (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D)	13,230	Research, Development, & Evaluation	17,000
Systems Acquisition, Test and Evaluation, Engineering, and Contracting	13,919	Maintenance, Repair, & Rebuilding of Equipment	49,085
Logistics	48,830	Modification of Equipment	1,000
Products Manufactured or Fabricated	1,758	Transportation, Travel & Relocation Services	23,406
Installation, Facility Management, and Physical Security	24,921	Installation of Equipment	1,000
Environmental Security and Natural Resource Services	15,022	Natural Resources and Conservation Services	14,912
Real Property, Base Management, Maintenance and Construction	6,807	Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real Property	1,000
Civil Works	6,807	Construction of Structures & Facilities	52,099
Personnel and Support Services	45,042	Social Services	1,290
Education and Training	24,436	Education & Training Services	13,355
Health Services	24,406	Medical Services	1,000
Command and Intelligence	6,464	Architect & Engineering Services	25,222
Additional Force Defense	1,000	Purchase of Supplies	1,192
Homeland Defense	99	Quality Control, Testing & Inspection Services	2,105
			8,894
		Operation of Government-Owned Facilities	18,984
		Salvages	1,000
		Professional, Admin & Management Support Services	144,828
		Printing & Housekeeping Services	18,527
		Photographic, Mapping, Printing & Publication	2,063
<b>DoD Total</b>	<b>170,596</b>		<b>732,250</b>
			<b>61%</b>

# ATTACHMENT 1

## Function Codes

### GROUP I-FORCE MANAGEMENT AND GENERAL SUPPORT

#### *MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF THE DOD*

- Y105 Management Headquarters - Defense Direction and Policy Integration
- Y115 Management Headquarters - Joint Staff Direction of the Armed Forces
- Y199 Other Force Management and General Support Activities

#### *OPERATION PLANNING AND CONTROL*

- Y210 Management Headquarters - Operation Planning and Control
- Y215 Operation Planning and Control
- Y217 Combat Development Evaluations and Experimentation
- Y220 National Mobilization and Emergency Preparedness Management

#### *MANPOWER MANAGEMENT*

- Y240 Management Headquarters - Manpower Management
- Y245 Manpower Management Operations

#### *SUPPORT EXTERNAL TO DOD*

- Y310 Management Headquarters-Foreign Military Sales and Security Assistance
- Y315 Foreign Military Sales and Security Assistance Program Management
- Y320 Support External to DoD - Not Identified

#### *LEGAL SERVICES*

- Y405 Management Headquarters-Legal Services
- Y415 Legal Services and Support

#### *PUBLIC AFFAIRS*

- Y501 Management Headquarters-Public Affairs
- Y515 Public Affairs Program Activities and Operations

#### *PROTOCOL OPERATIONS*

- Y525 Protocol Operations
- Y527 Other Protocol Activities

#### *VISUAL INFORMATION*

- Y560 Management Headquarters-Visual Information
- Y570 Visual Information Program Activities and Operations

**LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS**

- Y610 Management Headquarters-Legislative Affairs
- Y620 Legislative Affairs

**HISTORICAL AFFAIRS**

- Y710 Management Headquarters-Historical Affairs
- Y720 Historical or Heraldry Services
- Y730 Museum Operations

**ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT**

- Y810 Management Headquarters - Administrative Support
- Y815 Administrative Support Program Management
- Y820 Administrative Management and Correspondence Services
- Y830 Documentation Services
- Y840 Directives and Records Management Services
- Y850 Microfilming and Library Services
- Y860 Printing and Reproduction Services
- Y880 Document Automation and Production Services
- Y899 Other Administrative Support Activities

**AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS**

**Audits**

- I110 Management Headquarters-Audit
- I120 Audit Operations

**Investigations**

- I510 Personnel Security Clearances and Background Investigations
- I520 Criminal, Counter Intelligence, and Administrative Investigative Services
- I530 Industrial Security Assessments
- I999 Other Audit and Investigative Activities

**FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

- C110 Management Headquarters - Financial Management
- C400 Budget Support
- C700 Finance/Accounting Services
- C999 Other Financial Management Activities

**GROUP 2-COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTING AND OTHER INFORMATION SERVICES**

- W100 Management Headquarters - Communications, Computing & Information Sservices

**COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES**

- W210 Telephone Systems
- W220 Telecommunication Centers

W299 Other Communications Systems

***COMPUTING SERVICES***

W310 Computing Services and Data Base Management

W399 Other Computing Services

***INFORMATION OPERATION SERVICES***

W410 Information Operations and Information Assurance/Security

W430 Mapping and Charting

W440 Meteorological & Geophysical Services

W499 Other Information Operation Services

**GROUP 3-SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) AND RESEARCH  
AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) MANAGEMENT AND  
SUPPORT**

R110 Management Headquarters - Research and Development

R120 Science and Technology

R140 Management and Support to Research and Development

R999 Other S&T and R&D Management and Support Activities

**GROUP 4-SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, TEST AND EVALUATION,  
ENGINEERING, AND CONTRACTING**

***SYSTEMS ACQUISITION***

D110 Management Headquarters - Systems Acquisition

D120 Systems Acquisition - Program Management

D210 Technology Transfer & International Cooperative Program  
Management

D510 Systems Acquisition - Research and Development Support

D520 Systems Acquisition - Other Program Support

D599 Other Systems Acquisition Activities

***TEST AND EVALUATION***

D610 Management Headquarters - Test and Evaluation

D620 Test and Evaluation Operations

D630 Management and Support to Test and Evaluation

D699 Other Test and Evaluation Activities

***ENGINEERING***

D730 Engineering Support at Maintenance Depots

D740 All Other Engineering Support

***PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTING***

F110 Management Headquarters - Procurement and Contracting

- F210 Contract Administration and Operations
- F999 Other Procurement and Contracting Activities

## **GROUP 5-LOGISTICS**

- L110 Management Headquarters - Logistics

### **MAINTENANCE**

- L120 Management Headquarters - Maintenance

#### **Organizational and Intermediate Repair and Maintenance of Military Equipment**

- J410 Organizational & Intermediate Repair & Maintenance Management
- J501 Aircraft
- J502 Aircraft Engines
- J503 Missiles
- J504 Vessels
- J505 Combat Vehicles
- J506 Non-Combat Vehicles and Equipment
- J507 Electronic and Communications Equipment
- J511 Special Equipment
- J518 Support Equipment
- J519 Industrial Plant Equipment
- J520 Test, Measurement & Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE)
- J550 Software Support for Embedded and Mission Systems
- J555 Tactical Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE)
- J570 Armament and Ordnance
- J575 Munitions
- J600 Metal and Other Containers, Textiles, Tents and Tarpaulins
- J700 Portable Troop Support Equipment
- J750 Portable Field Medical and Dental Equipment
- J999 Organizational and Intermediate Repair & Maintenance of Other Equipment

#### **Depot Repair and Maintenance of Military Equipment**

- K410 Depot Management
- K531 Aircraft
- K532 Aircraft Engines
- K533 Missiles
- K534 Vessels
- K535 Combat Vehicles
- K536 Non-Combat Vehicles and Equipment
- K537 Electronic and Communications Equipment
- K539 Special Equipment
- K541 Industrial Plant Equipment
- K546 Test, Measurement & Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE)
- K549 Support Equipment

K550 Software Support for Embedded and Mission Systems  
K555 Tactical Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE)  
K570 Armament and Ordnance  
K575 Munitions  
K600 Metal and Other Containers, Textiles, Tents, and Tarpaulins  
K700 Portable Troop Support Equipment  
K750 Portable Field Medical & Dental Equipment  
K999 Depot Repair and Maintenance of Other Equipment

**SUPPLY OPERATIONS**

T101 Management Headquarters - Supply  
T110 Retail Supply Operations  
T120 Wholesale/Depot Supply Operations  
T130 Storage and Warehousing  
T140 Supply Cataloging  
T150 Warehousing and Distribution of Publications  
T160 Bulk Liquid Storage  
T165 Distribution of Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant Products  
T167 Distribution of Liquid, Gaseous and Chemical Products  
T175 Troop Subsistence  
T177 Food Supply  
T180 Military Clothing  
T190 Preparation, Demilitarization and Disposal of Excess and Surplus  
Inventory  
T199 Other Supply Activities

**TRANSPORTATION**

T701 Management Headquarters - Transportation  
T710 Traffic/Transportation Management Services  
T800 Ocean Terminal Operations  
**Administrative Transportation Services**  
T810 Air Transportation Services  
T811 Water Transportation Services  
T812 Rail Transportation Services  
T824 Motor Vehicle Transportation Services  
T826 Air Traffic Control  
T899 Other Transportation Services

**GROUP 6-PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED OR FABRICATED**

X931 Ordnance  
X932 Products Made from Fabric or Similar Materials  
X933 Container Products and Related Items  
X938 Communications and Electronic Products  
X939 Construction Products  
X944 Machined Parts

X999 Other Products Manufactured and Fabricated

## **GROUP 7-INSTALLATION/FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND PHYSICAL SECURITY**

### ***INSTALLATION/FACILITY MANAGEMENT***

- S100 Management Headquarters - Installations
- S200 Installation, Base or Facility Management
- S210 Building Management
- S310 Housing Management
- Building and Housing Management Services**
- S410 Custodial Services
- S420 Collection and Disposal of Trash and Other Refuse
- S430 Collection and Disposal of Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)
- S440 Laundry and Dry Cleaning Operations
- S499 Other Building and Housing Management Services

### ***LA W ENFORCEMENT, PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SECURITY GUARD OPERATIONS***

- S500 Management of Law Enforcement, Physical Security and Security Guard Operations
- S510 Law Enforcement, Physical Security and Security Guard Operations
- S520 Support Services to Law Enforcement, Physical Security and Security Guard Operations
- S540 Security of Classified Material
- S560 Special Guard Duties
- Prison and Other Confinement Facility Operations**
- S570 Prison Operations
- S575 Confinement Facility Operations
- S599 Other Law Enforcement, Physical Security and Security Guard Operations

### ***UTILITY PLANT OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE***

- S722 Incinerator Plant and Sanitary Fill Operations
- S725 Electrical Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance
- S726 Heating Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance
- S727 Water Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance
- S728 Sewage and Waste Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance
- S729 Air-Conditioning and Refrigerator Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance
- S730 Other Utility Plant and Distribution Systems Operation and Maintenance

**GROUP & ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND NATURAL  
RESOURCE SERVICES**

- E110 Management Headquarters – Environmental Security
- E120 Environmental and Natural Resources Services
- E220 Safety
- E225 Occupational Health Services
- E230 Explosives Safety
- E240 Fire Prevention and Protection
- E250 Response to Hazardous Material Mishaps
- E260 Pest Management
- E999 Other Environmental Security Activities

**GROUP 9-REAL PROPERTY PROJECT MANAGEMENT,  
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION**

***REAL PROPERTY PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT***

- Z101 Corps of Engineers Program and Project Management
- Z110 Management of Major Construction of Real Property
- Z120 Real Estate/Real Property Acquisition
- Title, Outgranting, and Disposal of Real Estate/Real Property**
- Z135 Title, Outgranting and Disposal of Real Estate/Real Property-  
National Projects
- Z138 Title, Outgranting and Disposal of Real Estate/Real Property-Local  
Projects
- Architect-Engineering Services**
- Z145 Architect-Engineering-National Projects
- Z148 Architect-Engineering-Local Projects
- Z199 Other Real Property Program and Project Management Activities

***REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND CONSTRUCTION***

- Z991 Minor Construction, Maintenance & Repair of Family Housing  
and Structures
- Z992 Minor Construction, Maintenance & Repair of Buildings and  
Structures Other Than Family Housing
- Z993 Maintenance and Repair of Grounds and Surfaced Areas
- Z997 Maintenance and Repair of Railroad Facilities
- Z998 Maintenance and Repair of Waterways and Waterfront Facilities
- Z999 Maintenance, Repair and Minor Construction of Other Real  
Property

**GROUP 10-CIVIL WORKS**

- Q120 Management Headquarters-Civil Works
- Q220 Water Regulatory Oversight and Management

**Q240** Natural Resources Oversight and Management  
**Q260** Civil Works Planning Production and Management  
**Q420** Bank Stabilization  
**Q440** Maintenance of Open Waterways for Navigation  
**Q460** Maintenance of Jetties and Breakwaters  
**Q520** Operation and Maintenance of Locks and Bridges  
**4540** Operation and Maintenance of Dams  
**Q560** Operation and Maintenance of Hydropower Facilities  
**Q580** Operation and Maintenance of the Washington Aqueduct  
**Q620** Operation and Maintenance of Recreation Areas  
**4999** Other Civil Works Activities

## **GROUP II-PERSONNEL AND SOCIAL SERVICES**

### ***MILITARY PERSONNEL SERVICES***

**B110** Management Headquarters - Military Personnel  
**B120** Military Recruiting and Examining Operations  
**B130** Military Personnel Operations

### ***CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SERVICES***

**B210** Management Headquarters - Civilian Personnel  
**B220** Civilian Personnel Operations

### ***PERSONNEL SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAMS***

**B310** Management Headquarters - Personnel Social Action Programs  
**B320** Personnel Social Action Program Operations  
**B999** Other Personnel Activities

### ***SOCIAL SERVICES***

#### **Community and Family Services**

**G210** Management Headquarters - Community and Family Services  
**G220** Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Services  
**G240** Family Center Services  
**G260** Child Care and Youth Programs

#### **Commissary and Military Exchange Operations**

**G310** Commissary Management  
**G320** Commissary Operations  
**G380** Military Exchange Operations

#### **Other Social Services**

**G410** Homeowners' Assistance Program  
**G420** Employee Relocation Assistance Program  
**G520** Temporary Lodging Services  
**G620** Recreational Library Operations  
**G630** Postal Services  
**G660** Military Bands  
**G900** Chaplain Activities and Support Services

- G940 Casualty and Mortuary Affairs
- G999 Other Social Services

## **GROUP 12-EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

### ***MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING***

- U001 Management Headquarters-Education and Training
- U050 Military Institutional Education and Training Management
- U100 Recruit Training
- U150 Multiple Category Training
- U200 Officer-Acquisition (Pre-Commissioning) Training
- U300 Specialized Skill Training
- U400 Flight Training
- Professional Development Education**
- U510 Professional Military Education
- U520 Graduate Education (Fully Funded, Full Time)
- U530 Other Full-Time Education Programs
- U540 Off-Duty and Voluntary Education Programs
- U550 Training Development and Support for Military Education & Training
- U599 Other Military Education and Training Activities

### ***CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING***

- U605 Management Headquarters-Civilian Education and Training
- U620 Management of Civilian Institutional Training Education & Development
- U630 Acquisition Training, Education, and Development
- U640 Civil Works Training, Education, and Development
- U650 Intelligence Training, Education, and Development
- U660 Medical Training, Education, and Development
- U699 Other Civilian Training, Education, and Development

### ***DEPENDENT EDUCATION***

- U710 Management Headquarters-Dependent Education
- U720 Dependent Education Field Management
- U760 Dependent Education – Teacher Instruction
- U770 Dependent Education – Substitute Instruction
- U780 Dependent Education – Aides for Instruction
- U799 Other Dependent Education Activities

## **GROUP 13-HEALTH SERVICES**

- H010 Management Headquarters-Health Services
- H050 Hospital/Clinic Management
- H100 Medical Care

H102	Surgical Care
H106	Pathology Services
H107	Radiology Services
H108	Pharmacy Services
H113	Dental Care
H116	Veterinary Services
H119	Preventive Medicine
H125	Rehabilitation Services
H127	Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation
H203	Ambulatory Care Services
H250	Medical and Dental Devices Development
H350	Hospital Food Services and Nutritional Care
H450	Medical Records and Medical Transcription
H650	Hospital Supplies and Equipment
H710	Medical Transportation Services
H999	Other Health Services

## **CATEGORY II – FORCES AND DIRECT SUPPORT**

### **GROUP 14-COMMAND AND INTELLIGENCE**

#### ***OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL***

M120	Combatant Headquarters-CINC Command Authority
M145	Combatant Headquarters-Military Department Command Authority
M150	Support to the CINCS – Information
M199	Other Operational Command and Control Activities

#### ***INTELLIGENCE***

M301	Management Headquarters - Intelligence
M302	Intelligence Policy and Coordination
M306	Classification Management
M3 10	Counterintelligence
M312	Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
M314	Imagery Acquisition
M316	Geospatial Information Production
M318	Geospatial Information Acquisition and Processing
M320	Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Collection/Processing
M322	Language Exploitation
M324	Multidisciplinary Collection and Processing
M326	Intelligence Communications and Filtering
M328	All Source Analysis
M330	Intelligence Production Integration and Analytic Tools
M334	Intelligence Requirements Management and Tasking

M399 Other Intelligence Activities

**GROUP 15-EXPEDITIONARY FORCE DEFENSE**

M410 Expeditionary Force Operations

**GROUP 16-HOMELAND DEFENSE**

M610 Homeland Defense Operations

**GROUP 17-SPACE DEFENSE**

M810 Military Space Operations

# ATTACHMENT 2

## FEDERAL SERVICE CODES

### **A - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

A\*\*\* Research and Development Codes

### **B - SPECIAL STUDIES AND ANALYSES - NOT R&D**

B502 Air Quality Analyses  
B503 Archeological/Paleontological Studies  
B504 Chemical/Biological Studies and Analyses  
I3505 Cost Benefit Analyses  
B506 Data Analyses (other than scientific)  
B507 Economic Studies  
B509 Endangered Species Studies - Plant and Animal  
B5 10 Environmental Studies and Assessments  
B5 13 Feasibility Studies (non-construction)  
B5 16 Animal and Fisheries Studies  
B5 17 Geological Studies  
B5 18 Geophysical Studies  
B5 19 Geotechnical Studies  
B520 Grazing/Range Studies  
B521 Historical Studies  
B522 Legal Studies  
B524 Mathematical/Statistical Analyses  
B525 Natural Resource Studies  
B526 Oceanological Studies  
B527 Recreation Studies  
B528 Regulatory Studies  
B529 Scientific Data Studies  
B530 Seismological Studies  
B532 Soil Studies  
B533 Water Quality Studies  
I3534 Wildlife Studies  
B537 Medical and Health Studies  
B538 Intelligence Studies  
B539 Aeronautic/Space Studies  
B540 Building Technology Studies  
B541 Defense Studies  
B542 Educational Studies and Analyses  
B543 Energy Studies  
B544 Technology Studies  
B545 Housing and Community Development Studies  
B546 Security Studies (Physical and Personal)  
B547 Accounting/Financial Management Studies  
B548 Trade Issue Studies  
B549 Foreign Policy/National Security Policy Studies  
B550 Organization/Administrative/Personnel Studies  
B55 1 Mobilization/Preparedness Studies  
B552 Manpower Studies  
B553 Communications Studies  
B554 Acquisition Policy/Procedures Studies  
B555 Elderly/Handicapped Studies

B599 Other Special Studies and Analyses

**C - ARCHITECT AND ENGINEERING SERVICES**

**CI - ARCHITECT AND ENGINEERING SERVICES - CONSTRUCTION**

**C11 - BUILDING AND FACILITY STRUCTURES**

CI 11 Administrative and Service Buildings  
CI 12 Airfield, Communication and Missile Facilities  
C 113 Educational Buildings  
CI 14 Hospital Buildings  
C 115 Industrial Buildings  
C 116 Residential Buildings  
CI 17 Warehouse Buildings  
CI 18 Research and Development Facilities  
C 119 Other Buildings

**C12 - NON-BUILDING STRUCTURES**

C 12 1 Conservation and Development  
**CI 22** Highways, Roads, Streets, Bridges, and Railways  
CI23 Electric Power Generation (EPG)  
C 124 Utilities  
C 129 Other Non-Building Structures  
CI30 Restoration

**C2 - ARCHITECT AND ENGINEERING SERVICES - GENERAL**

C211 Architect - Engineer Services (including landscaping, interior layout, and designing)+B101  
C2 12 Engineering Drafting Services  
C2 13 A&E Inspection Services (non-construction)  
C214 A&E Management Engineering Services  
C2 15 A&E Production Engineering Services (including Design and Control, and Building Programming)  
C2 16 Marine Architect and Engineering Services  
C2 19 Other Architect and Engineering Services

**D3 - AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES**

D30 1 ADP Facility Operation and Maintenance Services  
D302 ADP Systems Development Services  
D303 ADP Data Entry Services  
D304 ADP Telecommunications and Transmission Services  
D305 ADP Teleprocessing and Timesharing Services  
D306 ADP Systems Analysis Services  
D307 Automated Information System Design and Integration Services  
D308 Programming Services  
D309 Information and Data Broadcasting or Data Distribution Services  
D3 10 ADP Backup and Security Services  
D3 11 ADP Data Conversion Services  
D3 12 ADP Optical Scanning Services  
D3 13 Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) Services  
D3 14 ADP System Acquisition Support Services. Includes preparation of statement of work, benchmarks, specifications, etc.  
D3 15 Digitizing Services. Includes cartographic and geographic information.  
D3 16 Telecommunications Network Management Services  
D3 17 Automated News Set-vices, Data Services, or Other Information Services. Buying data, the electronic equivalent of books, periodicals, newspapers, etc.  
D399 Other ADP and Telecommunications Services (includes data storage on tapes, compact disks, etc.)

**E - PURCHASE OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES**

E\*\*\* Purchase of Structures and Facilities

**F - NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION SERVICES**

- F001 Aerial Fertilization/Spraying Services
- F002 Aerial Seeding Services
- F003 Forest/Range Fire Suppression/Presuppression Services
- F004 Forest/Range Fire Rehabilitation Services (non-construction)
- F005 Forest Tree Planting Services
- F006 Land Treatment Practices Services (plowing/clearing, etc.)
- F007 Range Seeding Services (ground equipment)
- F008 Recreation Site Maintenance Services (non-construction)
- F009 Seed Collection/Production Services
- F010 Seedling Production/Transplanting Services
- F011 Surface Mining Reclamation Services (non-construction)
- F012 Survey Line Clearing Services
- F013 Tree Breeding Services
- F014 Tree Thinning Services
- F015 Well Drilling/Exploratory Services
- F016 Wildhorse/Burro Control Services
- F018 Other Range/Forest Improvements Services (non-construction)
- F019 Other Wildlife Management Services
- F020 Fisheries Resources Management Services
- F021 Site Preparation
- F022 Fish Hatchery Services
- F099 Other Natural Resources and Conservation Services

**F1 - ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS PROTECTION**

- F101 Air Quality Support Services
- F102 Industrial Investigation Surveys and Technical Support Related to Air Pollution
- F103 Water Quality Support Services
- F104 Industrial Investigation Surveys and Technical Support Related to Water Pollution
- F105 Pesticides Support Services
- F106 Toxic Substances Support Services
- F107 Hazardous Substance Analysis
- F108 Hazardous Substance Removal, Cleanup, and Disposal Services and Operational Support
- F109 Leaking Underground Storage Tank Support Services
- F110 Development of Environmental Impact Statements and Assessments
- F111 Industrial Investigations, Surveys and Technical Support for Multiple Pollutants
- F112 Oil Spill Response including Cleanup, Removal, Disposal and Operational Support
- F999 Other Environmental Services, Studies, and Analytical Support

**G - SOCIAL SERVICES**

- G001 Care of Remains and/or Funeral Services
- G002 Chaplain Services
- G003 Recreational Services
- G004 Social Rehabilitation Services
- G005 Geriatric Services
- G006 Government Life Insurance Programs
- G007 Government Health Insurance Programs
- G008 Other Government Insurance Programs
- G009 Non-Government Insurance Programs

G010 Direct aid to tribal Governments and organizations provided by contract pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 93-638  
GO99 Other Social Services

## **H - QUALITY CONTROL, TESTING, AND INSPECTION SERVICES**

H1\*\* Quality Control Services (\*\*In these two positions, enter first 2 digits of FSC Code from Part C, or 99 for miscellaneous)  
H2\*\* Equipment and Materials Testing (\*\*In these two positions, enter first 2 digits of FSC Code from Part C, or 99 for miscellaneous)  
H3\*\* Inspection Services (including commercial testing and laboratory services, except medical/dental)  
H9\*\* Other Quality Control, Testing and Inspection Services

## **J - MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND REBUILDING OF EQUIPMENT**

JO\*\* Maintenance, Repair and Rebuilding of Equipment  
J998 Non-nuclear Ship Repair (East) Ship repair (including overhauls and conversions) performed on non-nuclear propelled and nonpropelled ships east of the 108th meridian  
5999 Non-nuclear Ship Repair (West) Ship repair (including overhauls and conversions) performed on non-nuclear propelled and nonpropelled ships west of the 108th meridian

## **K - MODIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT**

K0\*\* Modification of Equipment

## **L - TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE SERVICES**

LO\*\* Technical Representation Services

## **M - OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED FACILITIES**

M\*\*\* Operation of Government-Owned Facilities

## **N - INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT**

NO\*\* Installation of Equipment

## **P - SALVAGE SERVICE**

P 100 Preparation and Disposal of Excess and Surplus Property  
P200 Salvage of Aircraft  
P300 Salvage of Marine Vessels  
P400 Demolition of Buildings  
P500 Demolition of Structures or Facilities (Other than Buildings)  
P999 Other Salvage Services

## **Q - MEDICAL SERVICES**

Q 10 1 Dependent Medicare Services  
Q201 General Health Care Services  
Q301 Laboratory Testing Services  
Q401 Nursing Services  
Q402 Nursing Home Care Contracts  
4403 Evaluation and Screening  
Q501 Anesthesiology Services  
Q502 Cardio-Vascular Services  
4503 Dentistry Services  
Q504 Dermatology Services  
Q505 Gastroenterology Services  
Q506 Geriatric Services  
Q507 Gynecology Services

Q508 Hematology Services  
Q509 Internal Medicine Services  
Q5 10 Neurology Services  
Q5 11 Ophthalmology Services  
Q5 12 Optometry Services  
Q5 13 Orthopedic Services  
Q5 14 Otolaryngology Services  
Q5 15 Pathology Services  
Q5 16 Pediatric Services  
Q5 17 Pharmacology Services  
Q518 Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Services  
Q5 19 Psychiatry Services  
Q520 Podiatry Services  
Q52 1 Pulmonary Services  
Q522 Radiology Services  
Q523 Surgery Services  
Q524 Thoracic Services  
Q525 Urology Services  
Q526 Medical/Psychiatric Consultation Services  
Q527 Nuclear Medicine  
Q999 Other Medical Services

## **R - PROFESSIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT**

### **R4 - PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

R401 Personal Care Services (includes such services as barber and beauty shop, shoe repairs, tailoring, etc.)  
R402 Real Estate Brokerage Services  
R404 Land Surveys, Cadastral Services (non-construction)  
R405 Operations Research and Quantitative Analysis Services  
R406 Policy Review/Development Services  
R407 Program Evaluation Services  
R408 Program Management/Support Services  
R409 Program Review/Development Services  
R411 Real Property Appraisals Services (SIC 653 1)  
R4 12 Simulation  
R4 13 Specifications Development Services  
R4 14 Systems Engineering Services  
R4 15 Technology Sharing/Utilization Services  
R4 16 Veterinary/Animal Care Services  
R4 18 Legal Services  
R4 19 Educational Services  
R420 Certifications and Accreditations for products and institutions other than educational institutions  
R42 1 Technical Assistance  
R422 Market Research and Public Opinion Services (includes telephone and field interviews, focus testing, and surveys)  
R423 Intelligence Services  
R424 Expert Witness  
R425 Engineering and Technical Services  
R426 Communications Services  
R427 Weather Reporting/Observation Services  
R428 Industrial Hygienics  
R497 Personal Services Contracts  
R498 Patent and Trademark Services  
R499 Other Professional Services

### **R6 - ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES**

R602 Courier and Messenger Services  
R603 Transcription Services  
R604 Mailing and Distribution Services  
R605 Library Services  
R606 Court Reporting Services  
R607 Word Processing/Typing Services  
R608 Translation and Interpreting Services(Including Sign Language)  
R609 Stenographic Services  
R610 Personal Property Management Services  
R611 Credit Reporting Services  
R6 12 Information Retrieval  
R6 13 Post Office Services  
R6 14 Paper Shredding Services  
R699 Other Administrative Support Services

#### **R7 - MANAGEMENT SUPPORT SERVICES**

R70 1 Advertising Services  
R702 Data Collection Services  
R703 Accounting Services  
R704 Auditing Services  
R705 Debt Collection Services  
R706 Logistics Support Services  
R707 Contract, Procurement, and Acquisition Support Services  
R708 Public Relations Services(includes writing services, event planning and management, media relations, radio and television analysis, and press services)  
R709 Ongoing Audit Operations Support  
R7 10 Financial Services (includes credit card services and any other financial services)  
R711 Banking Services(includes accepting and cashing government checks and other payment instruments, accepting direct deposits, accepting payments to the government from the public such as excise taxes and duties, maintaining bank accounts)  
R7 12 Coin Minting  
R7 13 Banknote Printing  
R799 Other Management Support Services

#### **S - UTILITIES AND HOUSEKEEPING SERVICES**

##### **S1 - UTILITIES**

S111 Gas Services  
S 112 Electric Services  
S113 Telephone and/or Communications Services (includes Telegraph, Telex, and Cablevision Services)  
S114 Water Services  
S 119 Other Utilities

##### **S2 - HOUSEKEEPING SERVICES**

S201 Custodial Janitorial Services  
S202 Fire Protection Services  
S203 Food Services  
S204 Fueling and Other Petroleum Services - Excluding Storage  
S205 Trash/Garbage Collection Services - Including Portable Sanitation Services  
S206 Guard Services  
S207 Insect and Rodent Control Services  
S208 Landscaping/Groundskeeping Services  
S209 Laundry and DryCleaning Services  
S211 Surveillance Services  
S2 12 Solid Fuel Handling Services  
S2 14 Carpet Laying and Cleaning

S2 15 Warehousing and Storage Services  
S2 16 Facilities Operations Support Services  
S2 17 Interior Landscaping  
S2 18 Snow Removal/Salt Service (also spreading aggregate or other snow melting material)  
S222 Waste Treatment and Storage  
S299 Other Housekeeping Services

## **T - PHOTOGRAPHIC, MAPPING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION SERVICES**

T00 1 Arts/Graphics Services  
T002 Cartography Services  
T003 Cataloging Services  
T004 Charting Services  
T005 Film Processing Services  
T006 Film/Video Tape Production Services  
T007 Microform Services  
T008 Photogrammetry Services  
T009 Aerial Photographic Services  
T0 10 General Photographic Services - Still  
T0 11 Print/Binding Services  
T012 Reproduction Services  
T013 Technical Writing Services  
T0 14 Topography Services  
T0 15 General Photographic Services - Motion  
T0 16 Audio/Visual Services  
T099 Other Photographic, Mapping, Printing, and Publication Services

## **U - EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES**

U001 Lectures For Training  
U002 Personnel Testing  
U003 Reserve Training (Military)  
U004 Scientific and Management Education  
U005 Tuition, Registration, and Membership Fees  
U006 Vocational/Technical  
U007 Faculty Salaries for Dependent Schools  
U008 Training/Curriculum Development  
U009 Education Services  
U010 Certifications and Accreditations for Educational Institutions  
U0 11 AIDS Training  
U012 ADP Software, Equipment, and Telecommunications Training  
U099 Other Education and Training Services

## **V - TRANSPORTATION, TRAVEL AND RELOCATION SERVICES**

VO02 Motor Pool Operations  
VO03 Packing/Crating Services

### **V1 - TRANSPORTATION OF THINGS**

#### **V11 - CARGO AND FREIGHT SERVICES**

V1 11 Air Freight  
V 112 Motor Freight  
V113 Rail Freight  
V 114 Stevedoring  
V115 Vessel Freight  
V 119 Other Cargo and Freight Services

**V12 - VEHICLE CHARTER FOR TRANSPORTATION OF THINGS**

- V12 1 Air Charter for Things
- V 122 Motor Charter for Things
- V123 Rail Charter for Things
- V124 Marine Charter for Things
- V125 Vessel Towing Service
- V126 Space Transportation and Launch Services
- V127 Security Vehicle Services
- V129 Other Vehicle Charter for Transportation of Things

**V2 - TRAVEL OF PERSONS**

**V21 - PASSENGER SERVICES**

- V2 11 Air Passenger Service
- V2 12 Motor Passenger Services
- V2 13 Rail Passenger Service
- V2 14 Marine Passenger Service

**V22 - VEHICLE CHARTER FOR PASSENGERS (WITH OPERATORS)**

- V22 1 Passenger Air Charter Service
- V222 Passenger Motor Charter Service
- V223 Passenger Rail Charter Service
- V224 Passenger Marine Charter Service
- V225 Ambulance Service
- V226 Taxicab Services
- V227 Navigational Aid and Pilotage Services

**V23 - LODGING - HOTEL/MOTEL**

- V23 1 Lodging - Hotel/Motel

**V24 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT (INCLUDING SUBSISTENCE AND/OR LODGING)**

- V241 Military Personnel Recruitment

**V25 - CIVILIAN PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT**

- V25 1 Civilian Personnel Recruitment

**V3 - OTHER TRANSPORTATION TRAVEL AND RELOCATION SERVICES**

- V301 Relocation Services
- V302 Travel Agent Services
- V999 Other Transportation Travel and Relocation Services

**W - LEASE OR RENTAL OF EQUIPMENT**

- WO\*\* Lease or Rental of Equipment

**X - LEASE OR RENTAL OF FACILITIES**

- X\*\*\* Lease or Rental of Facilities

**Y - CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES**

- Y\*\*\* Construction of Structures and Facilities

**Z - MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, OR ALTERATION OF REAL PROPERTY**

- Z\*\*\* Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real Property



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



INFO MEMO

June 19, 2001 5:05 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, PA&E *Barry D. Watts 20 Jun 01*

SUBJECT: Tooth-To-Tail Ratios

- You requested the totals behind tooth-to-tail ratios we provided to you earlier (TAB A)
- These are attached (TAB B), along with the original metrics (TAB C)

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant PA&E, 695-0749

**TAB**

**A**

6-14  
082

June 12, 2001 9:22 AM

TO: Service Chiefs

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Barry Watts

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios

Attached is a paper prepared by PA&E in answer to a question I posed.

**I don't think the actual numbers are terribly important. I think, if we use the same yardsticks, what is important is the year-to-year progression.**

**What do think about setting five goals for 20021**

Also, on **this** page, why don't we have **Barry** Watts put, in the totals for each?

**Let's visit about this.**

Attach.

5/18/01 Watts memo to SecDef re: ~~Tooth-to-Tail Ratios~~[U09942/01]

DHR:dh  
061101-26

**TAB**

**B**

**Active Duty Warriors**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY99	FY01
<b>DoD</b>	1,121,308	1,102,341	1,195,062	1,219,533	855,975	771,968	804,069
Army	474,811	483,198	498,027	520,893	335,969	304,775	320,828
Navy	257,385	250,925	282,505	295,851	216,757	180,949	191,299
Marines	112,325	108,205	123,740	123,630	110,251	106,259	108,984
Air Force	276,787	260,013	290,790	279,159	192,979	179,985	182,939
DA/DW	0	0	0	0	19	0	19

**Headquarters Staffs**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY99
OSD	2,337	665	1,642	2,230	2,180	1,919
Joint Staff	1,174	1,010	1,295	1,380	1,137	1,356
Army	5,361	4,018	4,330	3,707	3,143	2,729
Navy Dept	8,905	5,549	5,161	4,096	2,792	2,553
Air Force	5,128	4,067	3,976	3,537	3,567	3,124

**General/Flag Officers**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	1,138	1,105	1,050	1,054	889	889
Army	436	420	398	395	307	307
Navy	277	273	249	256	220	220
Marines	68	67	65	70	80	80
Air Force	357	345	338	333	282	282

**Band Members**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
<b>DoD</b>	5,853	4,609	5,049	5,022	4,319	4,327
Army	2,632	2,166	2,346	2,528	2,026	2,000
Navy	1,081	741	769	733	730	675
Marines	844	594	831	654	771	859
Air Force	1,296	1,108	1,103	1,107	792	793

**Operational Support Aircraft**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
<b>DoD</b>	776	566	511	641	565	388
Army	299	234	253	287	245	167
Navy	193	125	101	120	112	87
Marines	164	95	21	25	24	25
Air Force	120	112	136	209	184	109

\* Warriors include active duty manpower coded "Forces" in the FYDP

\*\* Data drawn from PB-22 budget exhibits

\*\*\* Data from OASD(FMP)/GOMO

\*\*\*\* Data drawn from service inventories, Occupational Code 450

\*\*\*\*\* Navy, Marine, and AF data from FYDP, Army from Army program manager

**TAB**

**C**

**Headquarters Staffs Per 100,000 Warriors**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY99
OSD	208	60	137	183	255	249
Joint Staff	105	92	108	113	133	176
Army	1129	832	869	712	936	895
Navy Dept	2409	1545	1270	976	894	889
Air Force	1853	1564	1367	1267	1848	1736

**Generals and Flag Officers Per 100,000 Warriors**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	101	100	88	86	104	111
Army	92	87	80	76	91	96
Navy	108	109	88	87	101	115
Marine Corps	61	62	53	57	73	73
Air Force	129	133	116	119	146	154

**Band Members Per 100,000 Warriors**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	522	418	422	412	505	538
Army	554	448	471	485	603	623
Navy	420	295	272	248	337	353
Marine Corps	751	549	672	529	699	788
Air Force	468	426	379	397	410	433

**Operational Support Aircraft Per 100,000 Warriors**

	FY75	FY80	FY85	FY90	FY95	FY01
DoD	69	51	43	53	66	48
Army	63	48	51	55	73	52
Navy	75	50	36	41	52	45
Marine Corps	146	88	17	20	22	23
Air Force	43	43	47	75	95	60

\* Military Department comparisons are to MilDep populations. OSD and Joint Staff are to DoD.

May 7, 2001 1: 12 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: J-8 Personnel

Here is some data on the relative size of J-8, PA&E, Comptroller, CBO and NSC.  
I thought you might find it interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/19/01 PA&E Info paper re: "J-8 Personnel Numbers"

DHR:dh  
05070 1-20

*0205CS*

*7 May 01*

U12602 /02

*Chalco*

April 19, 2001

**J-8 Personnel Numbers**

- ◆ As a result of our meeting with you on tooth-to-tail on April 16, you asked us to compare the personnel levels in J-8 with several other offices
- ◆ The question was whether J-8 had more people than any of these other offices
  - That is not the case
  - The table below shows that J-8 is slightly smaller than PA&E and Comptroller and is noticeably smaller than CBO; NSC has very few people by comparison

<b><u>Office</u></b>	<b><u>Civilian</u></b>	<b><u>Military</u></b>	<b><u>Total</u></b>
J-8	19	125	144
OSD(PA&E)	120	37	157
USD(Comptroller)	161	5	166
Congressional Budget Office	230		230 (15 in National Security Division)
National Security Council	37		37

- ◆ J-S's size is driven by its responsibilities:
  - Program and budgeting in support of the program and budget review processes and liaison with the CINC's on fiscal issues
  - Support for activities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), including preparation of the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and development of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments
  - Support for the Defense Acquisition Board, including close coordination with USD(AT&L) on system requirements
  - Modeling and data analysis in support of major analytical efforts such as the Mobility Requirements Study and Dynamic Commitment
- ◆ J-8's responsibilities are similar to those for PA&E and we work closely with them on numerous projects
  - Typically we divide the modeling work on major joint analytical efforts, such as the Mobility Requirements Study
- ◆ Both PA&E and J-8 rely on contractors in addition to the government staff, especially for modeling and data analysis

Prepared by: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant, PA&E, 695-0749

May 11, 2001 8:53 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim, Comptroller  
Barry Watts, PA&E  
Pete Aldridge, AT&L

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Manpower Levels Over Time

Attached is some information on OSD personnel you might find of interest.

We certainly are going to want to reduce the size of OSD. As soon as you are confirmed, please respond to this memo with some suggestions for your area of responsibility.

The same principle, I think, goes for the Service secretaries.

Attach.

2/14/01 PA&E memo to SecDef re: Defense Manpower Levels Over Time  
[U03088/01]

DHR:dh  
051101-6

*BCC:*

*GORDON ENGLAND  
JAMES ROUTE  
THOMAS WHITE  
DAVID GUN  
DOUG FEITH*

*020 050*

*11 May 01*

U12606 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1203



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



2001 FEB 14 PM 3: 43

February 14, 2001

MIC  
2/14/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE — *has cy*

FROM: ROBERT R. SOULE *RRS*  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
Prepared by: Scott A. Comes, Special Assistant, PA&E, 6950749

SUBJECT: Office of Secretary of Defense Manpower Levels Over Time —  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

BACKGROUND:

- ◆ You requested information on OSD manpower levels over time and sought metrics to compare those levels to the Defense budget (Tab A)
- ◆ Our summary conclusions are given below; detailed discussion is at Tab B

DISCUSSION:

- ◆ OSD manpower levels have fluctuated substantially over the past 25 years in response to changes in the national security environment, political circumstances, and the objectives and interests of the Presidents and Secretaries of Defense
- ◆ OSD manpower levels also have been affected by changes to OSD missions, functions, responsibilities, and Congressional direction
- ◆ Attempts to establish metrics to quantify the appropriate size of the OSD staff have not been illustrative (see graphs in the detailed discussion)
- ◆ The appropriate size of the OSD staff is better understood by identifying how the staff best serves the management style and direction of the Secretary. Issues to consider:
  - The degree of OSD oversight of programs and resources
  - The number of acquisition programs, extent of international involvement, and the numbers and types of fiscal reviews
  - The extent to which functions are kept in-house or devolved to other components or contractors

Coordination: Director, Administration and Management

Attachments



U03088 /01

MEMORANDUM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *7*  
DATE: January 29, 2001  
SUBJECT:

I want to find ways to use percentages to measure OSD as a percentage of ~~the~~ Defense budget; or OSD as a percentage of something and track year to year. I think that is the only way you're going to know what's going on. Let's talk about this and see if we can't come up with some good indices.

*Col Byrd -  
Please assemble  
the data.*

*SL  
1/31  
8:45a*

## OSD Manpower Levels Over Time

### Current staffing

- ◆ As of January 31, 2001, OSD staff on-board strength was 1,875, including 1,322 civilians, 476 military, and 77 Active Guard and Reserves (by law, the Reserve Component positions do not count against the OSD ceiling) — ?
  - The current authorized level reflects reductions implemented in the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (412 positions eliminated, 577 positions transferred out of OSD)
- ◆ The OSD authorized staffing level for FY 2001 and out is 2,109 (1,545 civilian, 471 active duty military, and 83 Active Guard and Reserve) w+
- ◆ The graph at Tab 1 shows trends in OSD personnel on-board levels from 1975 to the present

### Changes in manpower levels over time

- ◆ Manpower levels have risen and fallen over the years because of changes in the national security environment, political circumstances, and objectives/interests of Presidents and Secretaries of Defense
- ◆ In some cases, old functions have been eliminated, reduced, or transferred — ?
  - For example, administrative support services, review of export license cases, inspector general reviews and oversight, POW/MIA affairs, military health care program management
- ◆ In other cases, new functions were added or increased emphasis was placed on existing functions
  - For example, special operations and low-intensity conflict, counter-terrorism, drug enforcement, humanitarian assistance, Gulf War illnesses, anthrax matters, acquisition reform, information technology, cyber security
- ◆ The OSD workforce showed a decline of 30% from 1976 to 1978 when Secretary Brown reduced the staff by 561 positions through transfers and eliminations
  - Includes transfer of operational administrative support functions to the newly established Washington Headquarters Staff (see graph at Tab 1)

- ◆ Other reductions took place from 1983 to 1985
  - Review and oversight functions transferred to newly established DoD Inspector General organization
  - The 1984 Authorization Act reduced OSD by an additional five percent
  - Technology export review functions were transferred to the newly established Defense Technology Security Administration

### Metrics

- ◆ Metrics that attempt to relate the size of the OSD workforce to other DoD baselines show little relationship
  - The graph at Tab 2 shows that comparing the relative changes in the OSD workforce and the DoD budget topline over the last 25 years does not provide a useful correlation
  - Tab 3 suggests that the OSD workforce as a percent of the total DoD workforce increased substantially in the early 1990's, but that obscures the changes in missions and responsibilities discussed above
  - Focusing on recent changes, Tab 4 shows how the Defense Reform Initiative in 1997 arrested the growth of the OSD staff compared to overall management headquarters personnel (Note: the abrupt drop in FY 2000 results from Congressionally-mandated expansion of the definition of management headquarters staff)


### Sizing the OSD workforce

- ◆ When considering the appropriate size of the OSD staff, it is important to consider:
  - How the workforce is to be used
    - For example, the number of acquisition programs, extent of international involvement, and the number and types of fiscal reviews
  - The management style of the Secretary of Defense and his view on the scope and degree of OSD oversight of DoD programs and resources
  - The number and nature of congressionally mandated requirements
    - For example, statutorily required officials and functions, mandated manpower reductions and ceiling controls
  - The extent to which functions are maintained in house or devolved to other DoD components
  - The extent to which contractor support is used to supplement the workforce


## Conclusions

- ◆ Comparing manpower changes must be done with careful consideration of the underlying changes to definitions, missions, and responsibilities
- ◆ There are no close relationships between OSD manpower levels and other DoD macro-level baselines; rather, OSD staff levels are driven by the assigned roles and missions and changes in those over time

# OSD Manpower vs Time




# Comparison of OSD Manpower and DoD Budget Topline




16

### OSD Manpower as a Percent of Total DoD Personnel



3

## Comparison of OSD Manpower and Total Management Headquarters



h



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800



001379-6 01 9:13

INFO MEMO

August 30, 2001, 4:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Barry D. Watts, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation-*Barry D Watts 08/30/01*

SUBJECT: Combating Terrorism Funding

- This memo responds to your question (Tab A) regarding DoD funding for combating terrorism.
- OMB prepares a report for Congress each year outlining combating terrorism spending government-wide. In its report, OMB gives a composite figure for national security funding, reflecting both DoD and Intelligence Community resources. Funds for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) are combined with combating terrorism resources in some of the report's displays in order to depict the total level of funding devoted to countering unconventional threats.
- The latest OMB report puts FY01 national security funding for combating terrorism at \$5.5B, against a federal total of \$9.7B. These figures rise to \$7.3B and \$12B, respectively, if CIP is included. The DoD share of the total (not reported separately by OMB) is \$4.6B.
- Bottom line: When responding to questions about current funding for combating terrorism activities, I suggest saying that DoD spends "around \$5B." When discussing how much the government as a whole spends on combating terrorism, an appropriate response would be \$1 OB to \$12B.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment  
As stated

Prepared By: Milton L. Tulkoff, 703-697-0373



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

6/12

PA+E

MR WATTS,

SEE SECRET'S COMMENT.

VR,  
WAM

U09504A/01

000,5

1290001

U09504A-01

QW -  
How do you  
explain this -  
What use should we  
DR





COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SECRET

FEB 21 2001 11:04

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Bruce A. Dauer, Deputy Comptroller *Bruce A. Dauer* FEB 21 2001  
Prepared by: Warren Hall, Assistant Deputy Comptroller, 695-9252

SUBJECT: Timelines – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Respond to your question.

DISCUSSION:

- At the Tank session, you asked for budget timelines particularly as they relate to flying hours.
- Tab A tracks FY 2001 Air Force flying hour cost estimates through the budget process.
- Tab B tracks FY 2001 Navy flying hour estimates.
- Tab C is a more general budget timeline.
- This took too long to get to you because we bogged down working a more elaborate critique of the budget timeline.

Attachments

## **Air Force FY 2001 Flying Hour Cost Estimate Timeline**

### **May 1999: Air Force FY 2001 POM Submission**

- Flying hour cost estimate for FY 2001 and subsequent years is based on FY 1997 execution data and analysis by Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group (AFCAIG).

### **June 1999: Air Force Flying Hour Cost Update**

- Flying hour cost estimate updated by the AFCAIG to reflect FY 1998 execution data.

### **September 1999: Air Force FY 2001 Budget Estimates Submission**

- Air Force reduced the FY 2001 Operation and Maintenance appropriation budget request by \$200 million based on June update.

### **September – December 1999: OSD/OMB Budget Review**

- Air Force estimate is approved.

### **February – August 2000: Congress Reviews FY 2001 President's Budget**

- Congress approves the funding request, which was based on FY 1998 cost experience.

### **June 2000: Air Force Flying Hour Cost Update**

- Flying hour cost estimate updated by the AFCAIG to reflect FY 1999 execution data, which show a significant increase in spare parts consumption.

### **September 2000: Air Force FY 2002 Budget Estimates Submission**

- Air Force increased FY 2001 flying hour cost estimate by \$303 million based on June update.

### **September – December 2000: OSD/OMB Budget Review**

- Air Force estimate is questioned based on Navy experience, but no revisions are recommended.

### **January 2001: Air Force Flying Hour Cost Update**

- FY.2001 flying hour cost estimate increased by \$222 million based on AFCAIG assessment of preliminary FY 2000 data, which show a further increase in spare parts consumption.

## **Navy FY 2001 Flying Hour Cost Estimate Timeline**

### **December 1998 – February 1999: Flying Hour Cost Estimate Update**

- Flying hour cost estimate updated by Navy based on FY 1998 execution data.

### **May 1999: Navy FY 2001 POM Submission**

- Navy flying hour estimate based on updated cost factors.

### **September 1999: Navy FY 2001 Budget Estimates Submission**

- No revision to the flying hour estimate is required.

### **September – December 1999: OSD/OMB Budget Review**

- Navy estimate is approved.

### **February – August 2000: Congress Reviews FY 2001 President's Budget**

- Congress approves the funding request, which was based on FY 1998 cost experience.

### **March 2000: Flying Hour Cost Update**

- Flying hour cost estimate updated by Navy based on FY 1999 execution data, which show a significant increase in spare parts consumption.

### **September 2000: Navy FY 2002 Budget Estimates Submission**

- Navy increased FY 2001 flying hour estimate by \$202 million based on March update.

### **September – December 2000: OSD/OMB Budget Review**

- Navy revised estimate approved.

### **January 2001: Navy Flying Hour Cost Update**

- FY 2001 flying hour cost estimate increased by \$373 million based on preliminary FY 2000 data, which show a further increase in spare parts consumption.

## **Program and Budget Timeline**

### **March: Fiscal Guidance**

- Provides funding levels to the Military Departments and Agencies

### **April: Defense Planning Guidance**

- Guidance to the Military Departments and Agencies for preparation of Program Objectives Memoranda

### **May: POM Submission**

- Services balance program requirements against fiscal guidance

### **May – September: OSD Program Review**

- Review of Military Department and Agency Programs to ensure conformity to the Secretary's priorities

### **September: Budget Submission**

- Military Departments and Agencies refine programs and submit budget data

### **September – December: OSD/OMB Budget Review**

- Review of Military Department and Agency budgets

### **December: Final Presidential Decisions**

- Final funding and program levels adjusted

### **February – September 1 year later: Congressional Budget Review**

- Review by Congress of President's budget

### **Continuously: Execution Changes**

- Reprogramming and transfers

### **March – July 2 years later: Supplemental**

- Address emergent operating/readiness needs

February 22, 2001 8:01 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
William Schneider  
  
cc: Steve Cambone  
Admiral Quigley  
Honorable Rudy de Leon  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
STBJJECT: Report on Financial Management

100.5

Attached is a report I received on financial management. Please see that Steve Friedman gets a copy of this and is aware of it.

It might be desirable to have Public Affairs make sure that the existence of the Steve Friedman task force is a part of the program. Use your own judgment.  
Thanks.

Attachment

DHR:dh  
022201-14

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

22 Feb 01



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

FEB 21 2004

*MIC*  
SECRET HAS BEEN

FEB 21 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Bruce Dauer, Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary  
of Defense (Comptroller) *Bruce Dauer*  
Prepared by: Nelson Toye, Deputy Chief Financial Officer,  
697-0503

SUBJECT: Fleecing of America Broadcast - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: For information only.

DISCUSSION:

- There is a possibility that the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) will broadcast in its "Fleecing of America" segment sometime within the next week to 10 days (maybe as early as Thursday), a report on poor accounting in the Department. Sources indicate that the report is likely to be critical of the amount of disbursements that have not yet been matched to specific obligations, contract overpayments, and debt collection relating to erroneous contract payments.
- The Department has numerous initiatives underway such as the development of a modern integrated end-to-end procurement suite of systems to share data between contracting, disbursing and accounting systems that will eliminate the root cause of these problems. However, it is expected to be a few years before these initiatives will be fully implemented. In the interim we are working hard to eliminate these types of problems, but issues remain.
- Attached is a brief summary of each of the issues

Attachment  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/1222

# **ATTACHMENT**

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## “FLEECING OF AMERICA” STORY

- **Disbursements That Have Not Yet Been Matched to an Obligation**

Obligations are recorded in the official accounting records when a **contract** is awarded or an order is placed. Payment is made upon proof of receipt of the required goods or services, submission of an invoice by the contractor, and identification that a valid contract exists.

While obligations are recorded in the official accounting system at the time a contract is let or order made, the vast majority of payments are made from systems other than the accounting systems. Consequently, payment information must be **communicated** to the accounting system where the payment is matched to the obligation in the accounting system. Many of the payment and accounting systems are not linked electronically. As a result, payment data often cannot be matched to an obligation without manual intervention. Sometimes manual research is difficult, and the disbursement is not immediately matched to an existing obligation.

The vast preponderance of payments made by the Department are matched to a corresponding obligation in the official accounting records within a relatively short period of time after the payment. Nonetheless, at any given time, the Department has a number of disbursements that have not yet been matched to the applicable obligation. Given the amount of payments made by the Department, a small percentage of payments can equate to large dollar amounts. The audit community and the Congress have repeatedly criticized the Department for not matching obligations to disbursements in the accounting records in a more timely manner.

Through a serious commitment to financial management reform, the Department achieved dramatic reductions in the amount of disbursements not matched to their applicable obligation. For example, from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2000, the Department reduced the amount of such disbursements from approximately \$35 billion to around \$1.5 billion. Additionally, the Department now requires all payments, except payments of less than \$100,000 to be identified to an obligation before a payment is made.

As a long-term solution, the Department is developing a modern integrated end-to-end procurement suite of systems to share data among contracting, disbursing and accounting systems. This is expected to eliminate the root causes of disbursements not matched to obligations--reliance on manual efforts.

- **Overpayments**

Overpayments to contractors are not simply a case of payment processing errors. The vast majority of such payments result from causes outside the control of the paying office. A recent review by the General Accounting Office indicated that overpayments were principally related to contract administration actions and that only a small percentage of such payments were related to billing or payment errors on the part of the contractor or the paying office. For example, federal acquisition regulations permit contractors to bill estimated overhead rates, which are finalized, at a later date. To the extent that the final overhead rates are different from the estimated overhead rates, an overpayment or underpayment will have occurred. Periodically, the Defense Contract Audit Agency reviews contractors' overhead costs and may disallow costs previously billed by the contractor and paid by the government. Thus, a payment that was not improper at the time it was made subsequently can become an overpayment.

The acquisition and finance communities are working together to minimize those circumstances that might result in avoidable overpayments and aggressively pursuing collection of overpayments that occur regardless of the reason.

- **Debt Collections**

The amount of contractor debt that has been identified as potentially being owed to the Department is approximately \$3.7 billion. Of this \$3.7 billion, nearly \$3 billion is in dispute and is awaiting a formal decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims as to whether a debt in fact does exist. About \$100 million has been found to be a bona fide debt owed to the U.S. Government and is in the process of being collected by the DoD. The remaining \$600 million is being handled by the Department of Justice for collection action, is still under investigation by the DoD or is uncollectible (e.g., due to bankruptcy).



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

2001 MAR 21 PM 2:06

MAR 20 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Schneider   
Prepared by: Bruce Dauer, Deputy Comptroller, 695-3950

SUBJECT: Maintenance - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To respond to your question concerning whether it takes 40 hours of maintenance to keep an F-16 in the air after a flight.

DISCUSSION:

- The recent newspaper articles reporting increases in the amount of man-hours required to maintain fighter aircraft cite erroneous statistics, but their message is generally correct. The Air Force reports that the F-16 now requires 19.9 man-hours of maintenance for every flying hour, which is almost 9 hours higher than reported in FY 1995. The Navy reports that its inventory of F14s has averaged between 40 to 50 man-hours of maintenance per flying hour, which is more than double the maintenance required on the Navy's newer FA- 18 aircraft.
- The attached Air Force and Navy papers confirm the basic thrust of the article. The increased maintenance requirement is due to aircraft reaching an age where increasing component failure rates and other unforeseen maintenance problems occur with greater frequency and severity.

Attachments

- (1) Air Force paper
- (2) Navy paper

March 13, 2001 8:39 AM

TO: William Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Maintenance

I read in the paper this week that it takes 40 hours of maintenance to keep an F- 16 in the air after a flight.

Would you have someone take a look at that?

DHR:dh  
031301-4


11-L-0559/OSD/1227

AIR FORCE  
TALKING PAPER  
ON  
MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS

**PURPOSE:** Response to SECDEF question "I read.. it takes 40 hours of maintenance to keep an F-16 in the air after a flight."

**DISCUSSION:**

- Maintenance Manhours per Flying Hour for F-16 (all models) in FY00 was 19.9 hours
  - 78% increase from FY95



- FY00 average age for F-16A/B was 17.6 years; F-16C/D was 10.9 years

**MMH/FH includes the following maintenance operations:**

Launch and Recovery

- Pre/Thru/Post flight inspections
- Sortie launch and recovery
- Ground handling and servicing

Scheduled Maintenance Activities

- Hourly phase inspections (e.g., structural insp., component time changes, and delayed maintenance)
- Systems Program Office (SPO) or MA directed inspections or maintenance actions
  - Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) and special inspections
- Periodic washing, painting, and lubricating program

Unscheduled maintenance actions

- On-aircraft engine and maintenance (e.g., boroscope, component changes, engine removals, and engine runs/ops check)
- Component failure repairs - Not Mission Capable (NMC) on landing

Lateral support actions

- Cannibalization (removing and installing)
- Recovery (rebuild) of cannibalized aircraft

## NAVY

CAPT John Woodburn  
CNO (N432)  
14 March 2001

### **Subject: F-14 DIRECT MAINTENANCE MAN-HOUR PER FLIGHT HOUR**

**BACKGROUND:** An article titled Military Overhaul Hindered By Rising Cost, published in New Orleans Times-Picayune March 11, 2001, stated "For every hour a Navy F-14 fighter spends in the air, mechanics at the Oceana Naval Air Station labor for 40 hours to patch it back up enough to fly again"..

#### **DISCUSSION:**

- Author states "for every hour a Navy F- 14 tighter spends in the air, mechanics at NAS **Oceana** labor for 40 hours to patch it back up enough to fly again." Three factors that impact Direct Maintenance Man-hours per Flight Hour (DMMH/FH) on the F- 14 are aircraft age, scheduled maintenance and the five-year rule.
  - **Aircraft age:** The average age of today's F-14A fleet is 17.1 years. Many of the F- 14B and F- 14D fleet are remanufactured F- 14A's. The new manufactured F- 14B and F-14D aircraft have an average age of 12.2 and 11.7 years respectively. As the age of the fleet increases, the man-hours required to maintain the aircraft increases. By way of comparison, the F- 14 DMMH/FH has varied between 40 to 50 hours for the period of 199 I-2000 while the newer FA- 18 has experienced 18 to 20 hours over the same period. Additionally, the age of the aircraft adversely impacts the ability to procure replacement parts due to diminishing manufacturing sources and obsolescence. Many initiatives directed at sustaining an aging fleet and reducing high readiness and cost degraders are ongoing and beginning to show results. Also, safety-engineering processes are being streamlined to get **fixes** into the fleet quickly.
  - **Scheduled Maintenance:** The man-hours required to **perform** scheduled maintenance inspections have increased over time. As the aircraft approach their maximum fatigue life, unforeseen as well as predicted structural failures occur. The anticipation of these failures imposes new maintenance inspections. Recurring maintenance inspections are often implemented in lieu of more expensive redesign/modification solutions.
  - **Five-year Rule:** Public Law 103- 139-Nov 11, 1993 prohibits the installation of modifications to aircraft, other than safety, that will be removed from service before five years. The current retirement plan for the F- 14 makes it ineligible for many reliability and maintainability improvements that could both improve readiness and decrease maintenance man-hours.
- Author states that when aircraft mechanics see that there are no spares in the system to replace a broken part on his aircraft, the mechanic "walks down the line and steals a good one off another F-14 and installs it on his plane."
  - While "go steal one off of an aircraft" is common phraseology for authorized cannibalization actions in the fleet, the author conveys an incorrect image. Naval Aviation's cannibalization rate for F- 14 aircraft per 100 flight hours has remained essentially unchanged since 199 I. These cannibalization actions are performed only when necessary and with the strictest documentation to maintain safety and justify **material** requirements.

#### **RECOMMENDATION:**

- None. Submitted for information purposes only.

April 9, 2001 3:25 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Nontraditional DoD Funding

If you think it is a good idea, do you want to see if someone could draft up something so that we could propose to Congress that they move these \$7 billion out of the Defense Department?

There are some who say it is a good idea to keep some of it in because it causes people who might not support the Defense Department, unless it was doing breast cancer or prostate cancer research or some education program at their local college, to support it.

In any event, please take a look and tell me what you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/13/01 Info Memo: "Nontraditional Defense Programs Report" U05244/01

DHR: dh  
04090 1-43

0.0

9 Apr 0

U07294#01



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 MAR 13 PM 3:33

3/16

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - HAS COPY

FROM: Bruce A. Dauer, Deputy Comptroller *Bruce Dauer* MAR 13 2001  
Prepared by: Warren Hall, Assistant Deputy Comptroller (P/B), 695-3950

*3/16*  
*3/15/01*  
*3/15/01*  
*WH*

SUBJECT: Nontraditional Defense Programs Report - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Information on DoD funding for nontraditional programs.

DISCUSSION:

- The current DoD budget supports many activities that are only indirectly related to the core Defense mission of manning, training, and equipping military forces to maintain the security of the United States.
- Although these activities may generally serve the nation as a whole and enjoy a broad level of support, it is questionable whether their inclusion in the Defense program is appropriate.
- The attached report attempts to quantify these "nontraditional" Defense programs in FY 2001 and as proposed in the Legacy budget for FY 2002. However, many would argue that each program identified in the report as nontraditional provides some value to DoD.
- The report indicates that these programs in FY 2001 are funded at \$7.0 billion (2.4 percent of the FY 2001 budget authority). In comparison, the amount identified in a similar report in FY 1994, which was also the enacted level, was \$1.7 billion (0.7 percent of the FY 1994 budget authority). However, it should be noted that the FY 1994 report did not include environmental programs as "nontraditional" Defense programs. (If environmental programs are excluded, the FY 2001 funding for these programs is \$2.8 billion (0.9 percent).)
- The Legacy budget includes \$5.4 billion, significantly lower than the funding level in FY 2001, primarily because many congressional adds in FY 2001 are not continued. The FY 2002 amount accounts for about 1.7 percent of the \$310.5 billion of discretionary topline.

COORDINATION: None required.

U05244 /01

Department of Defense  
Report to the Secretary of Defense<sup>se</sup>  
on  
Nontraditional Programs



February 2001

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description  
FY 2001 – FY 2002**

**Executive Summary**

**Report Structure**

Part I of this report provides a funding summary of Nontraditional Programs by major grouping. Part II provides a narrative description of these programs.

**Description**

The basic mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to maintain and provide for the security of the United States as a free and independent nation. Meeting this responsibility is the fundamental, traditional mission of DoD and requires that the U.S. military forces be composed of quality personnel who are well trained and equipped with modern equipment. Acquiring, training, and equipping such forces requires a host of activities such as recruiting and training of new personnel, conducting operational training, logistically supporting operations around the world, operating and maintaining bases, providing health care and personnel support, and developing and acquiring sophisticated weapon systems. Such activities dictate the vast majority of Defense resource requirements.


Changes here and abroad, however, have led to new Defense missions that support national objectives. Such missions, which are referred to as nontraditional Defense missions, include activities to support the President's multi-agency National Drug Control strategy and weapons destruction and nonproliferation activities in the Former Soviet Union. Other nontraditional missions range from providing international disaster and humanitarian assistance to conducting domestic youth citizenship/educational programs.

**Appropriated Amounts**


- In the FY 2001 DoD Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-259), \$7,005.4 million can be identified as supporting nontraditional Defense programs. In the FY 2002 Legacy budget, the amount decreases to \$5,417.6 million, a reduction of \$1,587.8 million. For the most part, the amount is lower in FY 2002 because it excludes the congressional adds in FY 2001, many of which will be repeated in FY 2002, and the amount in the Legacy budget for the environmental-related programs is over \$0.5 billion less mostly due to the discontinuance of the advance appropriation financing concept.
- The FY 2002 funding levels are those proposed in the Legacy budget. The largest programs included in this estimate are the environmental-related programs (\$3.7 billion), the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (\$0.4 billion), and the Counterdrug Activities (\$0.8 billion), which account for about 90 percent of the total funding.
- The funding for nontraditional Defense programs in FY 2001 and FY 2002 is displayed in the following groupings :

- International Activities. This grouping includes funding for programs being executed in support of foreign activities. These activities include diplomatic relations, humanitarian assistance, international centers, and other similar activities. (FY 2001, \$614.9 million; FY 2002, \$570.7 million)
- Law Enforcement. This grouping includes funding for programs that directly or indirectly support U.S. law enforcement. These programs include various counterdrug missions and civil emergency support, (FY 2001, \$999.9 million; FY 2002, \$804.2 million)
- Educational Support. This grouping includes support for educational institutions and payments to local school districts to compensate for the increased costs for educating military dependents. (FY 2001, \$170.5 million; FY 2002, \$54.3 million)
- Support to Non-governmental Activities. The funding in this grouping provides for various organizations, foundations, centers, and activities. The funding finances organizations as diverse as the National Flag Foundation and the South Florida Ocean Measurement Center. (FY 2001, \$148.5 million; FY 2002, \$49.3 million)
- Social Support. This funding provides for support to various domestic social programs. (FY 2001, \$146.6 million; FY 2002, \$122.3 million)
- Medical Research Support. The funding in this grouping finances medical research not related to military readiness. The National Institute of Health is the agency responsible for most such medical research. (FY 2001, \$17.5 million; FY 2002, \$11.0 million)
- Environmental Programs. The funding in this grouping finances DoD's environmental security program which includes restoration, compliance, conservation, pollution prevention, technology, safety, occupational health, fire and emergency services, and Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC) efforts. (FY 2001, \$4,255.1 million; FY 2002, \$3,728.8 million)
- Other Nontraditional Defense Programs. The remaining nontraditional Defense programs are displayed in this grouping. (FY 2001, \$152.4 million; FY 2002, \$77.0 million).
- A summary of nontraditional Defense funding by grouping for FY 2001 and the FY 2002 Legacy budget is displayed in the following charts.

**Nontraditional Programs  
FY 2001 By Grouping  
(Percent & Funding - \$ Millions)**



**Nontraditional Programs  
FY 2002 By Grouping  
(Percent & Funding - \$ Millions)**



**NONTRADITIONAL PROGRAMS SUMMARY**  
**SUMMARY BY GROUPING (Part I)**  
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>PROGRAM NAME</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>International Activities</u></b>		
Cooperative Threat Reduction	442.4	403.0
Middle East Regional Security Studies	1.0	
Regional Centers	<b>57.0</b>	61.3
China Center	0.5	0.5
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid	55.8	49.9
Humanitarian Assistance Conducted in African Nations	10.0	
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance	5.0	-
Humanitarian Civic Assistance	4.8	5.7
Warsaw Initiative/Partnership for Peace	38.4	50.3
Total	614.9	570.7
<b><u>Law Enforcement</u></b>		
Gulf States Initiative	15.9	1.2
Counterdrug Activities	915.6	750.3
National Emergency & Disaster Information Center	1.0	
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	67.4	52.7
Total	999.9	804.2
<b><u>Educational Support</u></b>		
National Security Education Program	7.9	<b>8.0</b>
Software Executive Institute	17.8	18.6
Local Education Agency School (Real Property Maintenance)	10.5	
Impact Aid to Public Schools	35.0	
Special Education Support	5.0	
Oakland Military Institute	2.0	
National Center for the Preservation of Democracy	20.0	
National Security Training	0.7	-
American Indian Higher Education Consortium (AIHEC) - Tribal College & University Computer Equipment & Science Lab	3.0	
Historically Black Colleges & Universities	19.1	<b>14.4</b>
William Lehman Aviation Center	0.5	-
Government/Industry Cooperative Research	6.7	<b>3.4</b>
Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research	21.7	<b>9.9</b>
Pacific Island Health Referral Program	8.0	-
Monterey Regional Educational Initiative	1.8	-
South Florida Ocean Measurement Center	1.8	-
University Partnering for Operational Support	4.0	
Chicago Public Schools Grant	5.0	-
Total	170.5	54.3
<b><u>Support to Non-Government Activities</u></b>		
United Service Organization Incorporated	7.5	-
San Bernardino County Airport	1.9	-
Support for International Sporting Competitions	22.4	15.8
National Flag Foundation	1.0	-

**NONTRADITIONAL PROGRAMS SUMMARY**  
**SUMMARY BY GROUPING (Part I)**  
(Dollars in Millions)

<b><u>PROGRAM NAME</u></b>	<b><u>FY 2001</u></b>	<b><u>FY 2002</u></b>
National D-Day Museum	2.1	
American Red Cross	5.0	
Clara Barton Center	1.5	
Bosque Redondo Memorial	2.0	-
Civil Air Patrol	19.4	8.7
Elmendorf Transportation Infrastructure	10.0	-
Grant to City of San Bernardino	10.0	-
Restoration of USS Turner Joy Historical Ship	0.8	-
Global Positioning System (GPS) Civil Signal	16.4	24.8
Information Technology Center Initiative	20.0	-
Electronic Commerce Resource Center	28.5	-
Total	148.5	49.3
 <b><u>Social Support</u></b>		
Homeless Blankets	3.1	3.1
National Guard Challenge Program	63.0	62.5
<b>STARBASE</b> Youth Program	10.1	11.1
Youth Development and Leadership Program (Outdoor Odyssey)	0.5	0.5
Innovative Readiness Training Program	30.0	20.0
Mentor Protege	27.7	25.1
Angel Gate Academy	4.2	
Indian Financing	8.0	
Total	146.6	122.3
 <b><u>Medical Research Support</u></b>		
Oxford House Pilot Project	0.8	-
Alaska Federal Health Care Network	1.0	-
Biomedical Research Center	1.0	-
Breast Cancer Research Program	174.6	-
Prostate Cancer Research Program	99.8	-
Ovarian Cancer Research	12.0	-
Cancer Research	5.5	
Advanced Cancer Detection	3.5	
Prostate Cancer/Disease Research	11.5	
Lung Cancer Research	7.5	-
Coastal Cancer Control	5.0	-
Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program	39.9	-
Norwegian Telemedicine	2.0	-
Post-Polio Syndrome	7.0	-
Iodine 131 Experimentation	5.0	-
Iodine Medical Monitoring	2.0	-
Osteoporosis and Bone Disease Research	6.0	-
Artificial Hip Medical Advanced Technology	3.5	-
Diabetes Project	14.0	
Alcoholism Research	8.5	
HIV Research	21.5	11.0

**NONTRADITIONAL PROGRAMS SUMMARY**  
**SUMMARY BY GROUPING (Part I)**  
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>PROGRAM NAME</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
Laser Vision Correction	5.5	
Center for Research on the Aging Eye	2.0	-
Chronic Fatigue	1.5	
Chronic Disease Management Advanced Technology	4.5	
Bone Marrow Transplant Technology	3.0	
Dental Research	4.0	
High Resolution Digital Mammography	2.0	
National Bone Marrow Program	34.0	-
Ranch Hand II Epidemiology Study	4.4	
Optical Imaging of the Brain	2.0	
Teleradiology and Mammography Imaging	3.0	-
Medical Free Electron Laser	20.0	
Total	517.5	11.0
 <b><u>Environmental Programs</u></b>		
Environmental Restoration	1,310.4	1,246.5
Environmental Quality	2,033.4	1,931-g
Environmental Technology	163.6	129.4
Base Realignment & Closure	747.7	421.0
Total	4,255.1	3,728.8
 <b><u>Other Nontraditional Programs</u></b>		
Pacific Disaster Center	10.0	
Thermionics	2.5	-
Fossil Energy Research and Development	2.0	-
Brown Tree Snakes	1.0	-
Emergency Spill Response	1.0	-
Technology Insertion Demonstration	2.0	-
Next Generation Internet	14.8	-
Public Service Initiative	1.0	
Chabot Observatory	1.0	
Dual Use Science and Technology Program	32.4	30.4
Advanced Electronics Technology - DARPA	55.7	25.0
Development of America in the 19th Century Exhibit	1.1	
Fouth of July/Memorial Day Celebration	1.9	1.2
Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies	1.0	
Repair Improvements at Fort Baker	5.0	-
Disadvantaged Businesses/Black Colleges	0.2	2.0
Procurement Technical Assistance Program	18.0	18.4
National Center for Industrial Competitiveness	1.8	
Total	152.4	77.0
Total	7,005.4	5,417.6

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

**FY 2001**      **FY 2002**

**INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES**

<b><u>Cooperative Threat Reduction Program</u></b>	<b><u>442.4</u></b>	<b><u>403.0</u></b>
Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction	442.4	403.0

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program provides for the destruction and nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Major activities include the dismantlement of strategic nuclear systems, storage of nuclear materials, export control assistance, chemical weapons destruction, and industry/enterprise cooperation.

<b><u>Middle East Regional Security Studies</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	1.0	

Congress directed that these funds be used for the continuation of the Middle East Regional Security Studies program.

<b><u>Regional Centers</u></b>	<b><u>57.0</u></b>	<b><u>61.3</u></b>
O&M, Army	46.5	51.2
O&M, Navy	9.9	10.1
Procurement, Defense-Wide	.6	

The Department operates five regional centers. These include the Marshall Center in Europe; the Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii; and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Near-East South Asia Center, and the Africa Center for Security Studies -- all of which are located at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. The Centers are primarily academic institutions that offer a number of classes and seminars to senior military and civilian decisionmakers from the countries in their areas of responsibility. These Centers are designed to promote regional stability by fostering an appreciation of U.S. national objectives in the minds of military and civilian leaders in foreign countries. The Centers also seek to create a safe haven where leaders from countries, some of whom are adversaries in active conflicts, can engage in person-to-person dialog that hopefully will lead to greater understanding and harmony,

<b><u>China Center</u></b>	<b><u>.5</u></b>	<b><u>.5</u></b>
O&M, Army	.5	.5

In the FY 2000 DoD Appropriations Act, the Congress added an unfunded mandate for the creation of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. In March 2000, the Deputy Secretary formally established the Center under the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The China Center is to serve as a source of knowledge about Chinese strategic capabilities and objectives.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)</u></b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b><u>49.9</u></b>
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid	55.8	49.1
Procurement, Defense-Wide		.2

The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation is available for 2 years and is composed of two major programs: the general Humanitarian Assistance/Foreign Disaster Relief Program, and the Humanitarian Demining Program. The Congress first authorized DoD Humanitarian Assistance activities in FY 1996. In broad terms, OHDACA programs support U.S. military forces in meeting two key requirements. The first requirement is for U.S. forces to respond effectively when called upon to assist the victims of storms, earthquakes, and other disasters. The second requirement is to help maintain an auspicious operating environment for U.S. presence overseas -- one that strengthens U.S. relationships with friends and allies and one that promotes peace and stability in regions of tension, including assisting countries that are experiencing the adverse effects of uncleared landmines.

<b><u>Humanitarian Assistance Conducted in African Nations</u></b>	<b><u>10.0</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	10.0

Congress directed the Department to manage this program to provide Human Immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevention educational activities undertaken in connection with U.S. military training exercises and humanitarian assistance activities conducted in African nations.

<b><u>Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance</u></b>	<b><u>5.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	5.0	

Congress added funds for the Casualty Care Research Center at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and the Disaster Management Center of Excellence at USCINCPAC. The Congress established this program in FY 1994 to provide expertise and training within DoD and to other Federal agencies.

<b><u>Humanitarian Civic Assistance</u></b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b><u>5.7</u></b>
O&M, Army	4.8	5.7

Humanitarian civic assistance projects are conducted in conjunction with authorized military operations or exercises and are in support of the Commander in Chiefs regional engagement strategy. These activities are intended to enhance operational readiness skills and require the approval of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

<b><u>Warsaw Initiative/Partnership for Peace (WI/PP)</u></b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b><u>50.3</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	38.4	50.3

The WI/PP was established to improve interoperability between former Warsaw Pact countries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. These funds are used primarily to

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

FY 2001      FY 2002

pay for: the participation of partner-nation forces in joint exercises with U.S. forces; partner attendance at PfP or interoperability-related conferences, seminars, or similar type activities hosted by NATO or DoD; DoD studies of partner force structure to help DoD better focus U.S. bilateral assistance to address partner interoperability and military reform problems; and the PfP Information Management System (PIMS) that links partner capitals with U.S. and NATO facilities to plan exercises, share information, and deepen day-to-day cooperation.

**LAW ENFORCEMENT**

<b><u>Gulf States Initiative</u></b>	<b><u>15.9</u></b>	<b><u>1.2</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	1.1	1.2
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	14.8	

This program supports law enforcement activities in the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The program provides for the operation of an integrated command and control network, which permits cooperative intelligence sharing among the states. The RDT&E funds were added by the Congress. The O&M, Defense-Wide funds budgeted for National Guard training activities with local law enforcement agencies.

<b><u>Counterdrug Activities</u></b>	<b><u>915.6</u></b>	<b><u>750.3</u></b>
Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, Defense Central Transfer Account (CTA)	907.1	739.7
Military Construction, Defense-Wide		10.6
O&M, Air Force	8.5	

The funding in this program finances the DoD Components' support to law enforcement agencies, which are leading the effort to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The primary objectives are to assist source zone countries in combating the cultivation of illicit drugs and to sustain an interdiction capability to intercept and destroy illegal drugs while in transit. Furthermore, the funding finances the education of the nation's youth through outreach programs. The funding identified for the Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, Defense Central Transfer Account (CTA) excludes the cost for drug testing and the treatment of military personnel for drug addiction. The Military Construction funding in FY 2002 provides for the construction of the Counterdrug Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) at: Curacao; Aruba; Manta, Ecuador; and San Salvador, El Salvador, (The Military Departments OPTEMPO costs are not included in the CTA funding.) The O&M, Air Force funds finance the operation and maintenance of three Tethered Aerostat Radar System used to detect low flying aircraft along portions of the Gulf coast of the United States.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)  
 FY 2001 – FY 2002  
 (Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>National Emergency &amp; Disaster Information Center</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	
O&M, Army National Guard	1.0	

Congress added these funds to provide support to the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program to include consequence management for WMD incidents, continuity of operations! critical asset and infrastructure assurance, and disaster response.

<b><u>Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams</u></b>	<b><u>67.4</u></b>	<b><u>52.7</u></b>
O&M, Army	5.9	
O&M, Army National Guard	13.2	13.4
Other Procurement, Army	5.7	
National Guard Personnel, Army	32.7	31.4
National Guard Personnel, Air Force	8.3	7.9
Procurement, Defense-Wide	1.6	

On January 26, 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the Defense Reform Initiative to integrate the National Guard and Reserve Components into the Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Response teams. The DoD's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) are comprised of 22 National Guard members who would support civil authorities in response to domestic attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The Congress has legislated the establishment of additional teams. (Five additional were mandated in the FY 2001 legislation to provide for a total of 32 teams). The FY 2002 Legacy budget does not contain funds to sustain the five teams added in FY 2001; funding sustains 27 teams.

**EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT**

<b><u>National Security Education Program (NSEP)</u></b>	<b><u>7.9</u></b>	<b><u>8.0</u></b>
National Security Education Trust Fund (NSETF)	7.9	8.0

The National Security Education Act of 1991 directs the Department to carry out a program to award undergraduate scholarships; graduate fellowships, and grants to institutions of higher education to support foreign languages and international studies. The purpose of the NSEP is to enhance U.S. educational programs in these areas and to make it possible for students to study abroad, thereby creating a pool of potential government employees with knowledge of foreign cultures, languages, and governments.

<b><u>Software Executive Institute (SEI)</u></b>	<b><u>17.8</u></b>	<b><u>18.6</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	17.8	18.6

These funds support the technology transition activities of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<p>The SEI enables the exploitation of emerging software technology by bringing the engineering discipline to software acquisition, development, and evolution.</p>		
<p><b><u>Local Education Agency School</u></b>                      Quality-of-Life Enhancements, Defense</p>	<p><b><u>10.5</u></b> 10.5</p>	<p>- -</p>
<p>Congress added these funds and directed the DoD to use them for real property maintenance of the Department of Education's educational facilities located on Department of Defense property. These schools are administered by the local education agencies (LEAs) and provide elementary and secondary education for military dependents.</p>		
<p><b><u>Impact Aid to Public Schools</u></b>                      O&amp;M, Defense-Wide</p>	<p><b><u>35.0</u></b> 35.0</p>	<p>- -</p>
<p>This program is traditionally funded in the Department of Education (DoE) budget. However, the Congress augmented the DoE program with an add to the DoD budget. The DoD funding is intended to reduce the impact on local education districts when the number of military children in attendance in local schools dramatically fluctuates due to the relocation of armed forces personnel or DoD civilian employees.</p>		
<p><b><u>Special Education Support</u></b>                      O&amp;M, Defense-Wide</p>	<p><b><u>5.0</u></b> 5.0</p>	<p>- -</p>
<p>This program is traditionally funded in the Department of Education budget. However, the Congress provided funds to DoD to assist Hawaiian public school systems that have unusually high concentrations of enrolled military dependents who have special needs.</p>		
<p><b><u>Oakland Military Institute</u></b>                      O&amp;M, Defense-Wide</p>	<p><b><u>2.0</u></b> 2.0</p>	<p>- -</p>
<p>Congress added these funds for a grant to the Oakland Military Institute in Oakland, California. The Institute is an initiative of the mayor of the city of Oakland to open a military charter school with 162 seventh-graders at the former Oakland Army Base. The proposal plans call for students to wear uniforms and participate in inspections and Outward Bound-style physical and mental challenges as part of a rigorous, 6-day-a-week college preparatory preparation program. California National Guard personnel and civilian teachers will provide the instruction.</p>		
<p><b><u>National Center for the Preservation of Democracy</u></b>                      O&amp;M, Defense-Wide</p>	<p><b><u>20.0</u></b> 20.0</p>	<p>- -</p>
<p>Congress added these funds for the renovation of the Aleutian and Pribilof Island Center buildings and for other purposes to assist in carrying out the intent of U.S. public law</p>		

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**N 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

N 2001    N 2002

establishing the National Center for the Preservation of Democracy. The Center conducts educational programs related to the internment of Japanese American during World War II.

<b><u>National Security Training</u></b>	<b><u>.7</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	.7	

Congress added these funds to encourage nontraditional and minority students to enter national security and foreign policy careers through a training partnership between DoD, a Hispanic Serving Institution that is located in an empowerment zone, and Hostos Community College of The City University of New York, which is an institution of higher education that is experienced in international affairs.

<b><u>American Indian Higher Education Consortium (AIHEC) - Tribal Colleges &amp; Universities Computer Equipment &amp; Science Lab</u></b>	<b><u>3.0</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	3.0	

Congress added these funds to teach technical computer skills to Native Americans. The AIHEC is a partnership of 31 tribal colleges throughout the United States and Canada. The consortium promotes, fosters, encourages, and implements programs for the improvement of Native and/or tribally controlled post-secondary and higher education for American Indian, Eskimo, and Alaskan Natives.

<b><u>Historically Black Colleges and Universities</u></b>	<b><u>19.1</u></b>	<b><u>14.4</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	19.1	14.4

This program provides infrastructure support to minority institutions to strengthen their science and engineering programs. This support is provided through grants or contracts for research, collaborative research, education assistance, instrumentation purchases, and technical assistance.

<b><u>William Lehman Aviation Center</u></b>	<b><u>.5</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Air Force	.5	

Congress earmarked funding for minority aviation training at Florida Memorial College of Miami under the Minority Aviation Project.

<b><u>Government/Industry Cooperative Research</u></b>	<b><u>6.7</u></b>	<b><u>3.4</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	6.7	3.4

The Government/Industry Cooperative Research project is a research, education, and training program with the University of California and Georgia Tech to conduct research in support of semi-conductor technologies.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**

**N 2001 – FY 2002**

**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>N 2002</u>
<b><u>Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate</u></b>		
<b><u>Competitive Research (DEPSCoR)</u></b>	<b><u>21.7</u></b>	<b><u>9.9</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	21.7	9.9

The DEPSCoR program is intended to build a national infrastructure for science and technology by funding research activities in states that meet eligibility criteria as set forth in authorizing language. The program is designed to improve the capabilities of institutions of higher education to develop, plan, and execute science and engineering research that is competitive under the peer-review system.

<b><u>Pacific Island Health Care Referral Program</u></b>	<b><u>8.0</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Defense Health Program	8.0	-

Congress added these funds for graduate medical education to enhance the provision of specialty care to native Hawaiians in military medical treatment facilities in Hawaii.

<b><u>Monterey Regional Educational Initiative</u></b>	<b><u>1.8</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Army	1.8	-

Congress provided funding for a California University, Monterey Bay public-private initiative to establish a consortium to further foreign language education.

<b><u>South Florida Ocean Measurement Center</u></b>	<b><u>1.8</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
RDT&E, Navy	1.8	-

Congress added funds for the South Florida Ocean Measurement Center to support efforts in ocean technology with emphasis on mine countermeasures and autonomous ocean vehicle testing.

<b><u>University Partnering for Operational Support</u></b>	<b><u>4.0</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Air Force	4.0	-

This is a path-finding initiative to link university-based applied research to DoD operational support requirements focused in environmental areas and provide a framework for increasing the scope of technology and expertise transfer from universities to government and industry.

<b><u>Chicago Public Schools Grant</u></b>	<b><u>5.0</u></b>	<b><u>-</u></b>
O&M, Army National Guard	5.0	-

Congress added these funds for a grant to the Chicago Public School system for the conversion and expansion of the former Eighth Regiment National Guard Armory (Bronzeville).

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

N 2001                      N 2002

**SUPPORT TO NON-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES**

<b><u>United Services Organization (USO) Incorporated</u></b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>-</b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	7.5	

Congress added these funds for a grant to the USO to provide morale, welfare, and recreation-type services to the members of the armed forces.

<b><u>San Bernardino County Airport</u></b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>-</b>
O&M, Army	1.9	

Congress added these funds for the installation of a perimeter security fence for that portion of the **Barstow-Daggett** Airport, California, which is used as a heliport for the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and for installation of other security improvements at that airport.

<b><u>Support For International Sporting Competitions CSISC)</u></b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>15.8</b>
Support For International Sporting Competitions (SISC)	22.4	15.8

The SISC account provides funding for DoD support to international sporting events. Congress has provided specific authorities allowing the Department to assist at these events (Title 10 U.S.C., section 2554). The FY 2001 and FY 2002 funds will support several International Sporting Events including the 2001 Special Olympics, the 2002 Winter Olympics, and the 2002 Paralympics. The DoD may provide the following: physical security, transportation, communications, explosive ordnance disposal, temporary facilities, ceremonial support, logistics planning and support, and medical support.

<b><u>National Flag Foundation</u></b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>-</b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	1.0	

Congress added these funds for a grant to the National Flag Foundation, which is a non-profit organization devoted to promoting the flag of the United States by distributing educational material to schools and other institutions.

<b><u>National D-Day Museum</u></b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>-</b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	2.1	

Congress added these funds for a grant to the National D-Day Museum, which is located in downtown New Orleans, Louisiana. The National D-Day Museum celebrates the American war effort during World War II.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>American Red Cross</u></b>	<b><u>5.0</u></b>	
O&M, Defense-Wide	5.0	

Congress added these funds for a grant to the American Red Cross for the Armed Forces Emergency Services Center, which delivers around-the-clock emergency communication services to active duty military personnel and to their families.”

<b><u>Clara Barton Center</u></b>	<b>1.5</b>	
O&M, Defense-Wide	1.5	

Congress added these funds to train American Red Cross volunteers to respond to incidents related to weapons of mass destruction.

<b><u>Bosque Redondo Memorial</u></b>	<b>2.0</b>	
O&M, Defense-Wide	2.0	

Congress directed that these funds to be made available, subject to authorizing legislation, for the Bosque Redondo Memorial. These funds provide partial funding for the construction of a memorial to Navajo and Apache Indians in the state of New Mexico.

<b><u>Civil Air Patrol</u></b>	<b><u>19.4</u></b>	<b><u>8.7</u></b>
O&M, Air Force	19.4	8.7

These funds support the youth-oriented program that serves as a civilian auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force. There are 52 CAP Wings operating 530 aircraft used for inland search and rescue, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, live organ transport, and Reserve Officer Training Corps orientation flights.

<b><u>Elmendorf Transportation Infrastructure</u></b>	<b><u>10.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Air Force	10.0	

Congress added \$10.0 million for Elmendorf Transportation Infrastructure and directed the Air Force to transfer the funds to Department of Transportation for the realignment of railroad tracks on Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson in Alaska.

<b><u>Grant to City of San Bernardino</u></b>	<b><u>10.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Army	10.0	

Congress added these funds to provide a grant to the City of San Bernardino, California, contingent on the resolution of the case against the Army for water contamination at Camp Ono.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u><b>FY 2001</b></u>	<u><b>FY 2002</b></u>
<u><b>Restoration of USS Turner Joy Historical Ship</b></u>	<u><b>.8</b></u>	
O&M, Navy	.8	

Congress provided \$750 thousand for repairs to the decommissioned destroyer, the USS Turner Joy, which has been converted to a museum and Naval Memorial in Bremerton, Washington.

<u><b>Global Positioning System (GPS) Civil Signal</b></u>	<u><b>16.4</b></u>	<u><b>24.8</b></u>
RDT&E, Air Force	7.5	2.8
Missile Procurement, Air Force	8.9	22.0

As part of the Global Positioning System (GPS), a positioning signal is generated that is used primarily for civil aviation navigation. Funds provide for the development and integration of the newest civil signal onto the next series of GPS satellites and the procurement of the hardware for installation on the satellites.

<u><b>Information Technology Center Initiative</b></u>	<u><b>20.0</b></u>	-
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	20.0	

Congress added funds for the Information Technology Center Initiative to establish two Pacific-based Information Technology Centers (ITCs). One center will be located in Alaska, and the other will be in Hawaii. The focus will be to integrate and implement logistics and personnel initiatives and to upgrade to more capable and more flexible information technology tools.

<u><b>Electronic Commerce Resource Center</b></u>	<u><b>28.5</b></u>	-
Procurement, Defense-Wide	28.5	

Congress added funds for the Electronic Commerce Resource Center (ECRC) in Bremerton, Washington, which offers comprehensive eCommerce and Internet resources. The eCommerce information from the ECRC covers the Pacific Northwest, U.S. national resources, and global Web links. The funds provide for a national network of assistance/support for DoD supply chain entities in understanding and implementing eCommerce.

**SOCIAL SUPPORT**

<u><b>Homeless Blankets</b></u>	<u><b>3.1</b></u>	<u><b>3.1</b></u>
O&M, Defense-Wide	3.1	3.1

The DoD budget includes an annual request to procure blankets that can be provided to the homeless each winter. The Defense Logistics Agency manages this program.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>National Guard Youth Challenge Program</u></b>	<b><u>63.0</u></b>	<b><u>62.5</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	62.0	62.5
O&M, Army National Guard	1.0	

The Challenge program (32 U.S.C. 509) is a youth development program for drug free 16 to 18 year old high school dropouts who are unemployed and not currently involved with the legal system. The goal of this program is to improve the life skills and employment potential of participants. The program's core components are to assist participants in receiving a high school diploma or its equivalent and to provide supervised work experience along with providing military based training. The program fosters leadership development by promoting fellowship and community service; developing life coping skills and job skills; and improving physical fitness, health, and hygiene.

<b><u>STARBASE Youth Program</u></b>	<b><u>10.1</u></b>	<b><u>11.1</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	10.1	11.1

The STARBASE Program (10 U.S.C. 2193) targets "at risk" (minority, female, and low socio-economic) students (grades K-12) and uses instruction modules specifically designed to meet the state's math and science objectives, A motivation module is included to teach children how to set and achieve goals, take positive action in their lives, and build strong self-esteem.

<b><u>Youth Development &amp; Leadership Program (Outdoor Odyssey)</u></b>	<b><u>.5</u></b>	<b><u>.5</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	.5	.5

The Outdoor Odyssey Youth Development and Leadership Academy Program is a program designed to target "at risk" youths and provide them with the opportunity to participate in exercises and activities that develop self-esteem, confidence, respect, and trust in others. The program operates at Roaring Run Camp, Somerset County, Pennsylvania.

<b><u>Innovative Readiness Training Program</u></b>	30.0	<b><u>20.0</u></b>
O&M, Defense-Wide	30.0	20.0

The Innovative Readiness Training Program (IRT) (10 U.S.C. 2012) provides improvements to local communities by means of selected infrastructure, health care, and environmental projects. Units and individuals benefit by training in a more realistic hands-on setting that enhances morale and contributes to recruiting and retention. The community benefits by receiving needed health care, engineering, and infrastructure support, thus providing the taxpayer added value for tax dollars spent.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<b>FY 2001</b>	<b>FY 2002</b>
<b><u>Mentor Protege</u></b>	<b><u>27.7</u></b>	<b><u>25.1</u></b>
Procurement, Defense-Wide	27.7	25.1

The funding provides for incentives to major contractors to develop the technical capabilities of small/disadvantaged businesses to perform as subcontractors.

<b><u>Angel Gate Academy</u></b>	4.2	-
O&M, Army National Guard	4.2	-

Congress added funds for the Angel Gate Academy, which is a pro-active intervention program that is conducted in conjunction with the Los Angeles school districts. The program addresses the unique needs of middle school students who are seriously "at risk" with the legal system.

<b><u>Indian Financing</u></b>	<b><u>8.0</u></b>	-
Procurement, Defense-Wide	8.0	-

Congress added these funds to provide incentives for purchasing from companies partially or solely owned by Native Americans.

**MEDICAL RESEARCH SUPPORT**

<b><u>Oxford House Pilot Project</u></b>	<b><u>.8</u></b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	.8	-

Congress added these funds to conduct a pilot project to improve treatment outcomes for alcoholism and drug addiction. The pilot project's goal is to evaluate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of Oxford House Recovery homes in improving the recovery of retired military personnel and their dependents from alcoholic abuse and drug addiction.

<b><u>Alaska Federal Health Care Network</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	1.0	-

Congress added these funds to develop a statewide telecommunications network to link health care providers at rural clinics, regional hospitals, and medical centers to referring health care providers. The program includes the Army, the Air Force, the Indian Health Service, the Coast Guard, and the Veteran's Administration agencies.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>Biomedical Research Center</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	1.0	

Congress added these funds for feasibility studies to determine better methods of coordinating and consolidating various biomedical research efforts being conducted by two teams. One team includes the University of Hawaii Medical School and the Tripler Army Medical Center and the other team is composed of the Veterans Health Administration at the Little Rock Medical Facility and the School of Medicine at the University of Arkansas.

<b><u>Breast Cancer Research Program</u></b>	<b><u>174.6</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	174.6	

Congress added these funds to conduct breast cancer research and provide preventive care.

<b><u>Prostate Cancer Research Program</u></b>	<b><u>99.8</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	99.8	

Congress added these funds to conduct prostate cancer research and provide preventative care.

<b><u>Ovarian Cancer Research Program</u></b>	<b><u>12.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	12.0	

Congress added these funds to conduct ovarian cancer research and provide preventative care.

<b><u>Cancer Research</u></b>	<b><u>5.5</u></b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	5.5	

Congress added these funds to conduct cancer research.

<b><u>Advanced Cancer Detection</u></b>	<b><u>3.5</u></b>	
RDT&E, Army	3.5	

Congress added these funds to coordinate screening for cancer detection and treatment, to train military cancer specialists, and to develop improved cancer detection equipment and technology.

<b><u>Prostate Cancer/Disease Research</u></b>	<b><u>11.5</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Army	11.5	

Congress added these funds for multidisciplinary basic and clinical research studies aimed at combating prostate cancer and disease.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**

**FY 2001 – FY 2002**

**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u><b>FY 2001</b></u>	<u><b>FY 2002</b></u>
<b><u>Lung Cancer Research</u></b>	<b>7.5</b>	-
RDT&E, Army	7.5	

Congress added these funds for research to improve the detection of lung cancer by using portable X-ray machines, studying the biology of lung cancer, and exploring chemoprevent therapeutics.

<b><u>Coastal Cancer Control</u></b>	<b><u>5.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	5.0	

Congress added these funds for epidemiological studies into cancer prevention in coastal regions.

<b><u>Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program</u></b>	<b><u>39.9</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	39.9	

Congress added these funds for medical research projects of clear scientific merit and direct relevance to military health.

<b><u>Norwegian Telemedicine</u></b>	<b>2.0</b>	-
RDT&E, Defense Health Program	2.0	

Congress added these funds for the development and delivery of medical services using telecommunications systems.

<b><u>Post Polio Syndrome</u></b>	<b>7.0</b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	3.0	
RDT&E, Navy	4.0	

Congress added these funds to commence a program on Polio Syndrome research at Windfall Medical Center in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.

<b><u>Iodine 131 Experimentation</u></b>	<b><u>5.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Air Force	5.0	

Congress added these funds to pay compensation to the citizens of the North Slope Borough in Alaska who participated in research conducted from 1955 to 1957 by the former Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory on the role of the thyroid gland in the acclimatization of humans to cold weather by using Iodine 131.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**

**FY 2001 – FY 2002**

**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u><b>FY 2001</b></u>	<u><b>FY 2002</b></u>
<b><u>Iodine Medical Monitoring</u></b>	<b>2.0</b>	-
O&M, Air Force	2.0	

Congress added these funds for the North Slope Borough in Alaska in order to provide assistance for health care, monitoring, and related issues associated with research conducted from 1955 to 1957 by the former Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory on the role of the thyroid gland in the acclimatization of humans to cold weather by using Iodine 131.

<b><u>Osteoporosis and Bone Disease Research</u></b>	<b>6.0</b>	-
RDT&E, Army	6.0	

Congress added these funds to study biomechanical influences on bones and methods to optimize bone health.

<b><u>Artificial Hip Medical Advanced Technology</u></b>	<b>3.5</b>	-
RDT&E, Army	3.5	

Congress added these funds to support new manufacturing techniques (Volumetrically Controlled Manufacturing) for artificial hip stems.

<b><u>Diabetes Project</u></b>	<b>14.0</b>	-
RDT&E, Army	14.0	

Congress added these funds to support the teleophthalmology diagnostic system and to study the link between Coxsackie virus B and juvenile diabetes.

<b><u>Alcoholism Research</u></b>	<b>8.5</b>	-
RDT&E, Army	8.5	

Congress added these funds to support efforts to identify genes that control brain responses to alcohol and other addicting agents and to develop new drugs to treat such addictions.

<b><u>HIV Research</u></b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>11.0</b>
RDT&E, Army	21.5	11.0

These funds are for studies into the protection and preservation of the fighting force from HIV infection, ultimately by the administration of an effective vaccine. The FY 2001 amount includes a congressional add of \$10 million.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**N 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>N 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>Laser Vision Correction</u></b>	<b><u>5.5</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Army	5.5	
Congress added these funds to establish laser eye surgery treatment centers at two Army hospitals.		
<b><u>Center, for Research on the Aging Eye</u></b>	<b><u>2.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Army	2.0	
Congress added these funds for collaborative, multidisciplinary research on the diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of ocular diseases that lead to low vision.		
<b><u>Chronic Fatigue</u></b>	<b><u>1.5</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Army	1.5	
Congress added these funds to study the neurobiology of chronic fatigue syndrome and other Gulf War illness-related conditions.		
<b><u>Chronic Disease Management Advanced Technology</u></b>	<b><u>4.5</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Army	4.5	
Congress added these funds for researching and testing a proprietary system of home care for patients with congestive heart failure.		
<b><u>Bone Marrow Transplant Technology</u></b>	<b><u>3.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	3.0	
Congress added these funds for research into graft engineering of bone marrow to improve unrelated donor bone marrow transplantation.		
<b><u>Dental Research</u></b>	<b><u>4.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	4.0	
Congress added these funds for research on improving dental care and treatment of dental emergencies.		
<b><u>High Resolution Digital Mammography</u></b>	<b><u>2.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	2.0	-
Congress added these funds for studies of digital mammography sensors based on a new breakthrough photo-conductors-technology and development of clinical workstations.		

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**N 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>N 2002</u>
<b><u>National Bone Marrow Program</u></b>	<b><u>34.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	34.0	

Congress added these funds to finance a bone marrow donor center that recruits donor volunteers for use in military contingencies and for civilian patients.

<b><u>Ranch Hand II Epidemiology Study</u></b>	<b><u>4.4</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Air Force	4.4	

Congress added these funds to continue financing a 20-year ongoing study to identify the long-term health effect of occupational exposure to dioxin on U.S. Air Force veterans.

<b><u>Optical Imaging of the Brain</u></b>	<b><u>2.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	2.0	

Congress added these funds to study the basic theory of photon migration through tissues for analysis of pre-frontal cortex activation in cognitive activity.

<b><u>Teleradiology and Mammography Imaging;</u></b>	<b><u>3.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Navy	3.0	

Congress added these funds to finance collaborative research efforts in computer-aided diagnosis and digital x-ray imagery to develop digital mammography and tele-mammography applications.

<b><u>Medical Free Electron Laser</u></b>	<b><u>20.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	20.0	

Congress added these funds to develop advanced, laser-based applications for medicine and electronic materials research.

**ENVIRON-MENTAL PROGRAMS**

<b><u>Environmental Program</u></b>	<b><u>4,255.1</u></b>	<b><u>3,728.8</u></b>
O&M, Army	421.0	431.5
O&M, Army Reserve	26.1	26.2
O&M, Army National Guard	118.8	145.1
O&M, Navy	298.7	261.6
O&M, Navy Reserve	6.0	6.2
O&M, Marine Corps	124.7	117.0
O&M, Marine Corps Reserve	4.3	3.4
O&M, Air Force	416.2	414.6
O&M, Air Force Reserve	16.0	16.4

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**

**FY 2001 – FY 2002**

**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>N 2002</u>
O&M, Air National Guard	17.9	19.0
O&M, Defense-Wide	78.9	58.3
Procurement of Ammunition, Army	15.1	27.1
Other Procurement, Army	1.8	
Other Procurement, Navy	71.1	86.8
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force	16.0	15.3
Missile Procurement, Air Force	2.4	2.3
Other Procurement, Air Force	.9	.9
RDT&E, Army	33.9	34.2
RDT&E, Navy	91.3	50.9
RDT&E, Air Force	2.5	2.7
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	63.5	58.9
Family Housing, Army	.1	.1
Military Construction, Army	22.0	
Military Construction, Navy	6.6	2.7
Military Construction, Air Force	17.3	10.2
Military Construction, Air National Guard	3.8	
Military Construction, Defense-Wide	45.4	
Military Personnel, Air Force	14.6	13.5
National Guard Personnel, Air Force	1.1	2.3
Defense Working Capital Fund, Army	26.6	25.4
Defense Working Capital Fund, Navy	118.7	109.3
Defense Working Capital Fund, Air Force	153.4	15.5
Defense Working Capital Fund, Defense-Wide	98.3	103.9
Environmental Restoration Fund, Army	389.1	389.8
Environmental Restoration Fund, Navy	293.4	257.5
Environmental Restoration Fund, Air Force	375.5	385.4
Environmental Restoration Fund, Defense-Wide	21.4	23.5
Environmental Restoration, Formerly Used Defense Sites	231.0	190.3
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)	747.7	421.0

These funds provide for DoD's environmental security program, which includes environmental restoration (cleanup resulting from past contamination), environmental compliance, environmental conservation, pollution prevention, environmental technology, and environmental cleanup of bases scheduled for closure under BRAC. The FY 2001 amount for Environmental Restoration, Formerly Used Defense Sites includes a congressional add of \$45.0 million. The decrease between FY 2001 and FY 2002 is primarily due to completion of all BRAC cleanup investigations by the Navy, deferral of some lower priority projects, and discontinuance of the advance appropriation financing concepts.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

N 2001      N 2002

**OTHER NONTRADITIONAL PROGRAMS**

<b><u>Pacific Disaster Center</u></b>	<b><u>10.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	10.0	

Congress added these funds for the Hawaiian Pacific Disaster Center to support and maintain capability to provide early warning notice of an impending natural disaster in the Pacific Basin.

<b><u>Thermionics</u></b>	<b><u>2.5</u></b>	
PDT&E, Defense-Wide	2.5	

Congress added these funds to study thermionics technology for the potential application for large capacity nuclear space power systems.

<b><u>Fossil Energy Research and Development</u></b>	<b><u>2.0</u></b>	-
PDT&E, Defense-Wide	2.0	

Congress added these funds for transfer to the Department of Energy to examine the feasibility of a zero emissions, steam injection process with possible applications for increased power generation efficiency, enhanced oil recovery, and carbon sequestration.

<b><u>Brown Tree Snakes</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Defense Health Program	1.0	

Congress added these funds to be used by the U.S. Customs Service to inspect all aircraft and ships departing Guam to prevent the dispersal of brown tree snakes to the Pacific Islands and the U.S. mainland.

<b><u>Emergency Spill Response</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Army National Guard	1.0	

Congress added these funds to provide assistance with an oil spill cleanup in Alaska.

<b><u>Technology Insertion Demonstration</u></b>	<b><u>2.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	2.0	

Congress added these funds to demonstrate the cost savings and other efficiency benefits of applying commercially available software and information technology to the manufacturing lines of industrial companies that may do business with the DoD.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>Next Generation Internet</u></b>	<b><u>14.8</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	14.8	

Congress added these funds to promote experimentation with the next generation of networking technologies to connect universities and national laboratories with high speed networks and to demonstrate revolutionary applications that meet important national goals and missions.

<b><u>Public Service Initiative</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
O&M, Navy	1.0	

Congress added these funds for the Stennis Center for Public Service Initiative on Civil-Military Leadership. This program, which focuses on the relationship between military and civil leaders, enhances the understanding of Members of Congress and congressional staff regarding military life, values, culture, and institutions.

<b><u>Chabot Observatory</u></b>	<b><u>1.0</u></b>	-
RDT&E, Air Force	1.0	

Congress added these funds to permit the Chabot Observatory in Oakland, California, to support the completion and testing of a 36-inch reflector telescope. The telescope will support astronomical research and observations of stellar-planetary interactions in general and physical processes occurring in the sun.

<b><u>Dual Use Science and Technology Program</u></b>	<b><u>32.4</u></b>	<b><u>30.4</u></b>
RDT&E, Army	9.8	10.0
RDT&E, Navy	12.5	10.0
RDT&E, Air Force	10.1	10.4

The goal of the program is to establish a new way of doing business with the private sector in the development of technologies having both military and commercial applications. A cost-sharing investment of 25 percent from these Service programs, 25 percent from the sponsoring organizations within the Military Departments, and 50 percent from private sector partners is intended to demonstrate the willingness of the private sector to invest in the development of products for items that have substantive commercial applications.

<b><u>Advanced Electronics Technology – DARPA</u></b>	<b><u>55.7</u></b>	<b><u>25.0</u></b>
RDT&E, Defense Wide	55.7	25.0

Current microelectronics fabrication uses feature sizes of 0.35 microns. The Advanced Lithography program emphasizes longer-term research with expected high payoff in the fabrication of semiconductor devices with 0.1 or less micron feature sizes.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>Development of America in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century Exhibit</u></b>	1.1	-
O&M, Army	1.1	

This funding finances a major exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution depicting the Army's contributions to the development of America in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<b><u>Fourth of July/Memorial Day Celebration</u></b>	1.9	1.2
O&M, Army	1.9	1.2

This funding supports live-televised broadcast services for concerts at the United States Capitol on National Memorial Day and Fourth of July.

<b><u>Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies</u></b>	1 . 0	
O&M, Army	1.0	

The DoD budgets every 4 years funds to support the Presidential Inaugural Committee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies for all official events during the inaugural period. Official events include the swearing-in ceremony, the parade, the opening ceremony, the inaugural balls, and the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee rehearsals.

<b><u>Repair Improvements at Fort Baker</u></b>	5.0	-
O&M, Army	5.0	

Congress added these funds to be transferred to the National Park Service for infrastructure repair improvements at Fort Baker, a former Army installation.

<b><u>Disadvantaged Businesses/Black Colleges</u></b>	0.2	2.0
O&M, Army	0.2	2.0

This funding provides technical assistance to minority private sector businesses and traditional African-American colleges to enhance their participation in Defense contracting programs.

<b><u>Procurement Technical Assistance Program (PTAP)</u></b>	18.0	18.4
O&M, Army	18.0	18.4

The Procurement Technical Assistance Cooperative Agreement Program (PTACAP) was established by Congress in the FY 1985 National Defense Authorization Act. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter into cost-sharing cooperative agreements with state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, Indian tribal organization, and Indian economic enterprises to establish and conduct procurement technical assistance programs. Activities include helping business firms market their goods and/or services to DoD, other Federal agencies, and state and local governments.

**Nontraditional Programs Narrative Description (Part II)**  
**FY 2001 – FY 2002**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>
<b><u>National Center for Industrial Competitiveness</u></b>	<u>1.8</u>	-
RDT&E, Air Force	1.8	

Congress added these funds for the National Center for Industrial Competitiveness (NCIC) to work to enhance industrial competitiveness of existing commercial enterprises, to assist Defense dependent companies commercialize, and to help launch new technology based companies. Among its services are financial, technical, and management support which are provided to companies working in advanced materials, structures and processes; manufacturing technologies, machinery and equipment; and information networks, software and data systems.



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Bruce A. Dauer, Deputy Comptroller  
Prepared by: Warren Hall, Assistant Deputy Comptroller (P/B), 695-3950

SUBJECT: Nontraditional Defense Programs Report - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Information on DoD funding for nontraditional programs.

DISCUSSION:

- The current DoD budget supports many activities that are only indirectly related to the core Defense mission of manning, training, and equipping military forces to maintain the security of the United States.
- Although these activities may generally serve the nation as a whole and enjoy a broad level of support, it is questionable whether their inclusion in the Defense program is appropriate.
- The attached report attempts to quantify these "nontraditional" Defense programs in FY 2001 and as proposed in the Legacy budget for FY 2002. However, many would argue that each program identified in the report as nontraditional provides some value to DoD.
- The report indicates that these programs in FY 2001 are funded at \$7.0 billion (2.4 percent of the FY 2001 budget authority). In comparison, the amount identified in a similar report in FY 1994, which was also the enacted level, was \$1.7 billion (0.7 percent of the FY 1994 budget authority). However, it should be noted that the FY 1994 report did not include environmental programs as "nontraditional" Defense programs. (If environmental programs are excluded, the FY 2001 funding for these programs is \$2.8 billion (0.9 percent).)
- The Legacy budget includes \$5.4 billion, significantly lower than the funding level in FY 2001, primarily because many congressional adds in FY 2001 are not continued. The FY 2002 amount accounts for about 1.7 percent of the \$310.5 billion of discretionary topline.

COORDINATION: None required.

May 29, 2001 1:03 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Budget

Before we make any proposals to OMB about transferring items out of the DoD budget, we better carefully think through the Congressional relations implications and talk to Powell Moore about it.

A number of those items are in the Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills because people on those committees have a personal interest in them. They also make the case that, in some instances, they help to generate support for the bill.

Don't move precipitously.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/21/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Defense Budget

DHR:dh  
052901-21

*110.01*

*29 May 01*

INFO MEMO

May 21, 2001, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

SUBJECT: Defense Budget *DJ 5/21*

- We are looking at a number of programs that should be moved out of the defense budget to other agencies. The number of programs is dependent on the definition of what is considered ~~non~~ nondefense related, but I believe there is clearly \$1.5 billion (see tab) in programs that would fit into this category and could be reasonably transferred.
- I am looking to conduct the transfer of nondefense related programs in the FY03 budget request. The transfers of these items for the FY02 budget would be difficult, since the budget, other than defense, has been submitted to Congress.

*D  
M  
LH  
5/21/01*

COORDINATION: None required

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Larry Lanzillotta, 697-6 142

*5/22  
08:30*

**POTENTIAL FY 2003 TRANSFERS**  
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>PROGRAM NAME</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>TRANSFER TO</u>
<b><u>International Activities</u></b>		
Cooperative Threat Reduction	403.0	STATE
Regional Centers	61.3	STATE
China Center	0.5	STATE
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid	49.9	STATE
<b><u>Law Enforcement</u></b>		
Counterdrug Activities	750.3	STATE / JUSTICE / COMMERCE
Gulf States Initiative	1.2	JUSTICE
<b><u>Educational Support</u></b>		
Government/Industry Cooperative Research	3.4	COMMERCE
Software Executive Institute	18.6	EDUCATION
National Security Education Program	8.0	STATE
Historically Black Colleges & Universities	14.4	COMMERCE
Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research	9.9	COMMERCE
<b><u>Support to Non-Government Activities</u></b>		
Global Positioning System (GPS) Civil Signal	24.8	TRANSPORTATION
Support for International Sporting Competitions	15.8	U.S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
<b><u>Social Support</u></b>		
Mentor Protégé	25.1	COMMERCE
National Guard Challenge Program	62.5	EDUCATION
STARBASE Youth Program	11.1	EDUCATION
Youth Development and Leadership Program (Outdoor Odyssey)	0.5	EDUCATION
<b><u>Medical Research Support</u></b>		
HIV Research	11.0	NIH
<b><u>Other Nontraditional Programs</u></b>		
Disadvantaged Businesses/Black Colleges	2.0	COMMERCE
Procurement Technical Assistance Program	18.4	COMMERCE
 Total	 <u>1,491.7</u>	

TO: Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard

*Paul*

CC: Dov Zakheim

**FAXED**

*to Dr Zakheim*

*3/21*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 20, 2001

SUBJECT: Defense Budget

Do we have a group working on the number of things we would like to try to move out of the defense budget, such as research on things that don't have anything to do with the Pentagon, and the maritime item that was passed over to DOD by OMB?

\_\_\_\_\_

DHR/azn  
03200 1.07

*To Dov - let's do this - DR*

May 29, 2001 9:28 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financial Management

I have read your memo on financial management. I agree. Let's charge ahead.

To what extent should we release the **financial** management report? Please visit with Steve **Cambone** about that.

With respect to the Business Board, I think we certainly ought to have one. I don't think it ought to be to the Comptroller's office-I think it probably ought to be to the Department and OSD and we ought to get some good people on it. Why don't you come up with a proposal. I like the ideal of Friedland and Punaro. I don't know Bayer, but I hear he is excellent.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/16/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: Financial Management Reforms

DHR:dh  
052901-10

100.5

*Dov -  
I'm coordinating  
the studies to take  
it off Steve's plate  
Let's discuss.  
Larry*

29 May 01

②

INFO MEMO

May 16, 2001, 7:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

MAY 18 2001

SUBJECT: Financial Management Reforms

- We are moving forward on implementation of the Friedman study recommendations. I believe that our objective needs to be to modernize the Department's financial management system within five to six years. Within that framework, there are several areas that I intend to address immediately: (1) the budget; (2) organization; (3) private expertise; and, (4) policy guidance.
- The Budget. First, I plan to demonstrate our commitment to financial management using the budget. Aside from the obvious requirement for funds, the budget will be our most effective tool for enforcing financial management policy. For the short term, we have identified a few projects for inclusion in the FY 2002 budget. This modest package (\$100 million) of initiatives in **the** budget will send a strong signal to the Department and to the Congress that **this** is a top priority. Concurrently, we are assessing future year requirements. At this point, the numbers are not highly reliable -- in part due to the absence of credible budget data.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, we anticipate an investment of over \$1 billion annually to meet our goal within five to six years. This number will be refined during the FY 2003 budget review. (Tab A)
- Organization. Second, I plan to modify the current working level organization so that we are able to bring about change. The most critical element of the entire effort will be the modernization of the Department's financial management systems. Closely related to this issue is the underlying accuracy of the information that is fed into those

---

<sup>1</sup>/ Because the budget does not formally identify or aggregate financial management modernization initiatives through a separate program element line, estimates are generally constructed via a data call or a request for information. This process is rife with inaccuracy and lacks the integrity of budget quality data.

5/18  
4:05 pm

financial systems from the Service operational entities, Financial systems cannot be viewed in isolation from these functional military "feeder" systems. This is a huge undertaking and it must be managed as a Defense program – much like a weapons system program. Therefore, I am looking at the concept of a systems program office to centrally plan and manage the development of this integrated **financial** management system.

- Private Expertise. Third, I intend to enlist outside expertise. One means of doing so will be to establish a Business Board. I hope to assemble a group of experts who will provide sound guidance on management reform and financial management. Included in this group will be Richard Friedland, Michael Bayer and Arnold Punaro. Richard's private sector experience and work on the Friedman Study will be extremely useful in driving this effort forward. The extensive work done by Michael Bayer and Arnold Punaro on the Defense Reform Task Force will also be invaluable in the broader attempt to change the way the Department does business. Related to the Business Board concept, I would like to see that a subgroup on financial management is formed as part of your Management Committee. This will assure top level attention to the issue and will allow routine evaluation of our progress. In addition, we will likely proceed with hiring an independent outside consulting firm to advise us on the technical aspects of the program. Steve Friedman believes that independent counsel is very important for our success. We are drafting the charter for the Business Board. I will be forwarding it to you in a subsequent memorandum.
- Policy Guidance. Finally, I think that it is critical to get on the record as soon as possible with regard to the aforementioned issues. I will be forwarding a series of memoranda for your signature to formalize new policies and get this process moving.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Tina Jonas, 703/685-3078

**Proposed FY 2002 Budget Amounts**

**Amount**

**Financial Management Systems Enterprise Architecture**

Develop a **DoD-wide** blueprint--an enterprise architecture--to guide financial management modernization and reform efforts.

15

**Financial Data Standardization**

Analyze and define **DoD-wide** standard financial management data requirements and develop a plan to implement standard data requirements throughout the Department

20

**Financial Management Transactional Data Mapping**

Document (map) the flow of financial transaction data **from** original systems/"points of entry" to inclusion in financial and other management reports. Also, conduct "forward looking" data flows for **future** systems.

20

**Systems Compliance Oversight**

Obtain assistance and analysis relative to the oversight of the systems compliance process.

5

**Environmental Liabilities**

Determine existing environmental liabilities--estimated to be as much as \$100-\$300 billion--and develop a methodology to determine future estimates. Reliable information is needed to budget for **future** environmental remediation efforts. Currently, the Department does not have an effective way to compute these liabilities and report the estimates.

10

**Postretirement Benefit Liabilities**

Accelerate the development of a methodology to determine postretirement benefit liabilities--estimated to be approximately \$200 billion. The resulting methodology could be anticipated to yield more accurate cost data that would provide information to enable more informed decisions and enhance near-term budget estimates.

5

<b>Proposed FY 2002 Budget Amounts</b>	<b>Amount</b>
<b>Defense Travel System</b>	
Facilitate implementation throughout the Department of Defense.	27
<b>Fund Balance with Treasury/Suspense Accounts</b>	
Research and reconcile long outstanding differences between Treasury and DoD cash balances and develop a methodology to resolve future imbalances.	10
<b>Contract Reconciliation</b>	
The official accounting records for major contracts are maintained in separate information systems from those used to calculate and issue payments for most of those contracts. The accounting and payment records for over 300,000 of these major contracts may need to be reconciled and any out of balance conditions corrected before the Department can move them to modern financial management systems.	15
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>127</b>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 COST ESTIMATE - FINANCIAL AND FEEDER SYSTEMS  
 (\$ MILLION)

COMPONENT	FY02	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	TOTAL
<b>DFAS</b>							
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT REDESIGN	5	5	5	5	5	5	30
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING (15 OLD/1 2 NEW)	145	135	110	90	85	85	650
FEEDER (0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ARMY</b>							
ERP (0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING (2 OLD)	40	40	40	35	30	25	210
FEEDER (5 OLD)	50	125	125	90	80	70	540
<b>NAVY</b>							
ERP (4)	80	80	80	75	60	55	430
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING (3 OLD)	60	60	60	55	50	45	330
FEEDER (8 OLD/7 NEW)	150	400	400	300	250	200	1700
<b>AIR FORCE</b>							
ERP (0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING (0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FEEDER (25 OLD)	250	500	625	450	400	350	2575
<b>DEFENSE AGENCIES</b>							
ERP (5)	100	100	100	90	80	70	540
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING (4 OLD)	80	80	80	75	70	65	450
FEEDER (5 OLD/1 NEW)	50	150	150	110	100	90	650
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1010</b>	<b>1675</b>	<b>1775</b>	<b>1375</b>	<b>1210</b>	<b>1060</b>	<b>8105</b>

**INCOMING**

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**TASKER**

April 30, 2001 4:42 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financial Management Paper

Please take a look at this paper, I think you ought to think about moving on it as soon as you are confirmed.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/13/01 IDA paper, "A Strategy for Change"

DHR:dh  
043001-40



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

① 14 b1  
② Spill  
③ Director  
inform 4/23  
be what  
That  
Buck Hill  
to be

Mr. Secretary,

Per your request, attached  
is the final report from  
Steve Friedman et al on  
Financial Management.

<sup>4/r</sup>  
Paul Gebhard

11-L-0559/1274

4/23  
6:20 pm  
D.H.



STRATEGY, FORCES,  
AND RESOURCES DIVISION

# INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772 • Telephone (703) 845-2255

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

April 13, 2001

*OTM  
of GIC  
with DOD  
Reference - ?  
to GIC*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

At your request, the Department of Defense contracted with the Institute for Defense Analysis to conduct a study:

To design a transformation plan which, when implemented, will systematically deliver relevant, reliable and timely financial information on a routine basis in support of the Department's decision-making.

Relevant financial information will tell managers the costs of the forces or activities they manage and the relationship of funding levels to the output, capability, and performance of those forces or activities. Reliable financial information will provide an accurate basis for decisions and be **affirmed** by a clean audit opinion.

Suffice it to say that, in most cases, the current DoD financial and feeder systems cannot meet a **financial** information test of relevancy, reliability and timeliness. Nor is "support for management decision-making" an objective of many of the financial information systems currently in existence or planned.

The attached report presents a plan in two tracks: Track 1 deals with longer term structural change requiring a multi-year strategy for implementation; and Track 2 provides a plan for close-in actions to improve accountability and cost efficiencies in the interim.

On the structural level, the key take-aways are:

1. **SecDef** leadership, as implemented through an empowered Comptroller's office, is required to establish momentum for change,
2. Standardizing core accounting and data classification elements on a **DoD-wide** basis is the critical underpinning of an integrated information network,
3. Implementing a **DoD-wide** system architecture including financial, accounting and feeder systems is **key** to achieving reliable and timely financial and management information,

4. Providing **DoD** management, including **CINC's**, with financial information, analysis capabilities and result oriented metrics and incentives is fundamental to altering the relationship among mission-related priorities, and supply and support component budgets (the underlying premise is that better informed managers will seek to improve productivity), and
5. Congress and OMB must be engaged as partners to a) simplify reporting and **record-keeping** requirements, b) remove impediments to a more efficient **infrastructure** management and c) encourage adoption of private industry partnering and practices.

The path to achieving our objective is an extended one, but interim success enabled by steadily improving quality of **financial** information will be measurable.

In the meantime, close-m actions driven by the Comptroller can produce meaningful efficiencies over the next twenty-four months using financial tools that can **be** applied to currently available data:

1. Cost measurement techniques (i.e., activity based costing) can be used to identify targets of opportunity for increased financial efficiency and plans can be implemented and tracked to achieve increased productivity; and
2. Management metrics supporting the Secretary's critical success factors, with appropriate short and long term goals, can be integrated into **DoD** management processes to focus on execution of key initiatives. As an outside group, it was not feasible to develop these metrics; however, we have recommended a practical process using the Secretary's critical success factors to develop these management tools.

An important challenge to all of these initiatives is making **financial** inputs more relevant to the way **DoD** is managed. Setting Secretarial targets for **DOD**-wide cost and performance improvements will be an important tool whose efficacy will increase as the standardization and systemization of data come on stream.

The **DoD's** relationship with Congress represents the most significant challenge to structural change in the Department. Complex oversight rules, impediments to private sector partnering and reporting requirements in support of the budget/appropriation processes impede progress toward improved financial management at **DoD**. This relationship should become more of a partnership for structural change.

Many of the issues uncovered in our interviews and research have been dealt with effectively in private industry due largely to the competitive forces of the marketplace and the focus on shareholder value. No similar external push exists with **DoD**. It is important to note that a recurring theme of our interviews is the critical importance of leadership **from** the Secretary and his deputies. We trust that the attached plan provides an appropriate framework for your initiatives in this area.

We wish to acknowledge the support we received **from DoD** personnel, particularly Nelson **Toye**, Carmen Covey, Ed Harris and Ron Brooks. Our group was impressed by the dedication, experience, intelligence and commitment of **DoD** personnel as exemplified by these individuals.

Respectfully submitted,

Stephen Friedman, Chmn  
James M. Denny  
Donald H. Haider  
William E Kelvie

Richard S. Friedland  
Robert J. Hermann

Encl. Report

# **Transforming Department of Defense Financial Management**



## **A Strategy for Change**

**Final Report**

**April 13, 2001**

11-L-0559/OSD/1278

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## Executive Summary

At the request of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Department of Defense (DoD) contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses to conduct a study to recommend a strategy for financial management improvements within the Department. **The Study Group envisions a future in which relevant, reliable and timely financial information<sup>1</sup>, affirmed by a clean audit opinion, is available on a routine basis to support management decision-making at all levels throughout DoD.** Relevant financial information will tell managers the costs of forces or activities that they manage and the relationship of funding levels to output, capability or performance of those forces or activities. Reliable financial information will provide a more accurate basis for decision-making and be affirmed by a clean audit opinion. Such financial information will be available to managers at all pertinent levels, from those charged with carrying out DoD's missions at the theater and national levels down to the managers of supporting activities.

Current DoD financial, accounting and feeder/operational management systems do not provide information that could be characterized as relevant, reliable and timely. Nor is the "support of management decision-making" generally an objective of the financially based information currently developed or planned for future development. Front-end investment and much work need to be done to accomplish a necessary transformation. Many positive projects are currently underway in DoD; however, they are narrowly focused, do not have sufficient senior leadership and urgency behind them, and are not part of an integrated DoD-wide strategy.

### Vision

Financial management in DoD should be focused on a single objective: Delivering relevant, reliable and timely financial information on a routine basis to support management decisions. Appropriate focus on improved financial information will markedly improve the opportunities to:

- **Provide visibility to cost incurred** which is a critical underpinning of efficiency improvement;
- **Institutionalize the use of performance metrics that are tied to cost** and relevant to the mission of DoD in the management process of the Department. This is a process that is key to establishing benchmarking standards and raising the level of performance;
- **Identify and take action, on an on-going basis, on performance improvement** (cost and effectiveness), **including private sector partnering** as appropriate;

---

<sup>1</sup>For purposes of this report, financial information includes: accounting records and reports; financial records and reports; cost-based performance metrics related to mission; and budget and appropriation data.

- **Ensure clean audits and routine compliance with Federal financial standards** and related accounting and financial regulations; and
- **Increase the credibility of DoD's financially based information** with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other oversight agencies that have critical input into DoD operations.

## **Current Situation**

Many studies and interviews with current and former leaders in DoD point to the same problems and frustrations. Repetitive audit reports verify the systemic problems; while they indicate some improvement, they illustrate the need for radical transformation in order to achieve real progress. As a result, DoD has developed a credibility problem with Congress, OMB, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and itself, when it comes to financial information. **Situations and problems associated with the current DoD environment include:**

- Inability to consistently provide reliable financial and managerial data for effective decision-making;
- Lack of an overarching approach to financial management – disparate systems (accounting, financial and feeder) hampered by lack of integration and standardization;
- Overly complex data requirements driven by appropriation funding rules, elaborate policies and procedures, and outdated guidelines for excessively detailed tracking of expenditures;
- “Convoluting” business processes which fail to streamline excessive process steps – sometimes driven by accounting, operational, and organizational structures, further complicated by aged and disparate systems;
- Changing federal financial management standards that have provided a moving target for compliance;
- Difficulty in obtaining financially based, outcome-oriented management metrics. Many metrics reflect yearly goals and outputs with little link between financial management and DoD Goals;
- Inability to produce Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act compliant annual financial statements;
- Disproportionate budget dollars appear to support non-value added activities – since useful information is hard to extract, useful corrective action is difficult to implement – with a lack of wide-spread understanding of how financial information can help;
- Cultural bias toward status quo – driven by disincentives for change, and short timeframes of political appointees who otherwise might serve as agents of change; and
- Requires an infusion of personnel with technical and financial skill sets necessary to achieve integrated financial management systems.

To date, DoD's efforts to improve financial information have focused primarily on obtaining reliable information, and a protracted effort involving people, systems and data

still is required to reach the goal. But it is possible to reach the goal of reliable financial information and a clean audit opinion and still not have information that is relevant to managers. A complementary effort is needed to ensure that DoD's management information systems also provide relevant information. This includes selecting performance metrics, linking them to costs and institutionalizing their use in management and decision-making.

## Elements of Transformation

Past studies have given significant attention to such matters as: achievable cost savings, productivity improvements, private sector partnering and other operating efficiencies. While useful projects are being carried out, few of the recommendations contained in these reports (reference *Appendix A, Current Situation Examples, Figure A-1*, for selected recent studies) have been implemented on a wide-scale basis. **We believe that the absence of relevant, reliable and timely financial information (“financial intelligence”) and the need for an accelerated pace and a more assured outcome in improving DoD efficiency are related.** Each can be traced to similar origins within DoD's operating fabric.

**Accordingly, we recommend an integrated twin-track program to implement a financial transformation.** It includes six broad elements that we believe are central to substantially improving the financial management within DoD and providing a foundation for change. These **Elements of Transformation are:**

1. **Leadership** – establishing a SECDEF and senior leadership high priority for financial information transformation;
2. **Incentives** – addressing the current disincentives within DoD for engaging in financial reform;
3. **Accountability** – establishing a transformation framework with clear measurements, timeframes and assigned personal responsibilities and authority;
4. **Organizational Alignment** – SECDEF empowerment of the DoD Comptroller to act as the focal point for implementing an integrated DoD-wide program for financial management transformation;
5. **Changing Certain Rules** – directly addressing with Congress and OMB regulations and legal issues that hinder innovation and private sector partnering; and
6. **Changing Enterprise Practices** – modifying current overemphasis on Component process “uniqueness” that hinders forward progress, by standardization of core accounting requirements<sup>2</sup> and establishing a bias towards commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS) systems.

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<sup>2</sup> Standardization of “core accounting” is intended to include only a subset of data (standard general ledger transaction level accounting events and data elements for reporting) required for DoD financial information management and does not include genuinely unique military data requirements.

## Financial Transformation Framework

A program is needed that will incorporate the elements described above and provide for a functional and technical architecture for achieving integrated financial and accounting systems in order to generate relevant, reliable and timely information on a routine basis and, ultimately for obtaining a clean opinion. **The Study Group recommends a framework for a twin-track program for financial information transformation.** The recommended framework would not only take advantage of certain on-going improvement actions within the DoD but also provide **specific** direction for a more coordinated, managed and results-oriented approach. The recommended framework includes:

### Track 1 -Structural Change

**Employ a coordinated DoD-wide management approach to developing standard integrated systems**, obtaining relevant, reliable and timely financial intelligence (and ultimately a clean audit opinion) and aligning, incentivizing and authorizing the Department to utilize financial intelligence in an efficient and effective way.

Structural Change (Track 1) will require a longer timeframe and will include establishing a centralized oversight process under the Comptroller for implementing the recommended structural changes and developing standard, integrated financial intelligence systems. A phased approach should be taken which will allow for important incremental success yearly (e.g., with defined systems architecture and incremental improvements).

### Track 2 – Close-in Success

**Target, select and oversee implementation of a limited number of intra-Service/cross-Service projects for major cost savings or other high-value benefit under a process led by the Comptroller; assist the SECDEF in establishing and managing with a set of “Dashboard Metrics”.** Dashboard metrics should be derived from the SECDEF’s Critical Success Factors. **Track 2 should be used as a learning experience on using financial information to drive decision-making.**

Prime tools of such improvements would include activity based costing (ABC) and benchmarking/best practices analysis to identify cost savings opportunities. A series of key management metrics will be identified, tracked and reported to those with senior managerial responsibility, including mission related-departments.

(During our interview process, logistics throughout DoD was mentioned numerous times as an area where progress has been made in recent years, but opportunities still exist for high-value improvements. While our timeframe did not allow us the opportunity to analyze the costs and benefits of this particular reengineering prospect, it deserves active consideration by the proposed Management Initiatives Office described below.)

**Critical to the success of both tracks of the recommended program is the establishment within the OUSD(C) of two new functions represented by distinct offices.** Through these two offices – the Financial and Management Information Integration Office and the Management Initiatives Office – the Comptroller would provide executive control over processes, policies and resources for financial management and related systems transformation. Current structure does not provide for an authoritative focal point for DoD-wide financial management transformation. Lean but full-time staffing is essential to the success of both offices. At the Comptroller's discretion, these two organizations could be created with some newly recruited talents as well as existing DoD staff; they are intended to fill a void as discussed above, not to duplicate or create additional layers. These two offices would (working with the Components) develop options for approval, monitor progress and regularly report to the SECDEF on progress, problems, and possible solutions. They would control resources for financial management, systems transformation (although the Components would manage such programs), and take a leadership role in developing incentives. Each function must be headed by an individual who has sufficient stature and empowerment to act as an effective change agent. Led by the Comptroller, the heads of these two offices should reach out to the Services and DFAS, as well as Congress, to coordinate the development of a strategy and effective implementation. Each office is described below:

**Financial & Management Information Integration Office** – accountable for effective implementation and coordination of overall financial and related systems architecture [in consultation with the Services, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) and others], systems integration, core accounting standardization and CFO compliance issues on an intra- and cross-Service basis; develop a phased plan for progressively increasing the number of individual statements on which a clean audit opinion can be obtained; and over time, institutionalize in DoD's financial management information systems the ability to routinely generate the Dashboard Metrics established by the Management Initiatives Offices and DoD senior leadership.

**Management Initiatives Office** – responsible for the process of establishing and initially reporting on Dashboard Metrics; and on an intra- and cross-Service basis, work with the DoD Components to select projects for major cost and operational improvements, providing initial funding for a limited number of projects per year and overseeing implementation with use of consultants and private sector partnering, as appropriate.

**The path to full transformation is a long one. We recognize that the complete solution is key to ensuring that the transformation has a permanent impact on DoD operating policies; however, important nearer term improvements in operating efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved.** The recommended twin track approach allows for near-term successes while working towards the longer-term objective of delivering relevant, reliable and timely financial information.

## Significant Challenges

We believe the most difficult challenges to be addressed in implementing our recommended program are:

- Developing an integrated system architecture including financial, accounting and feeder systems;
- Standardizing a DoD-wide “core” accounting and data classification;
- Engaging Congress and OMB to ameliorate certain rules: simplify record keeping and accounting requirements, remove impediments to a more efficient infrastructure management, and reduce hurdles to private sector partnering;
- Providing DoD management, including the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), with enhanced financial intelligence, incentives and tools; and encouraging them to maximize the efficiencies and effectiveness of their operations and suppliers; and
- Imbuing the culture with a sense of urgency for a DoD-wide financial management information transformation, similar to Y2K.

## Catalyst for Change

The catalyst for effectively implementing these recommendations will be the leadership provided by the SECDEF and his senior management team. A vision for financial information, such as that described herein, has been accomplished in the private sector on a widespread basis, through the development of financial intelligence and the reporting, analysis and measurement of business process reengineering results, using such intelligence. Our interviews and discussions with senior representatives of DoD, both current and past, lead us to believe that the organization is ripe for this financial management leadership change. The DoD needs better financial information if it is to follow Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz’s admonition “to engage our brains before we open the taxpayer’s wallet”. This proposed transformation program will provide the needed leadership, accountability and structure to re-engineer financial management within DoD.

*“That which you require he reported on to you will improve, if you are selective. How you fashion your reporting system announces your priorities and sets the institution’s priorities.”*

Rumsfeld’s Rules

	<b>Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Leadership</b>	<p>SECDEF Leadership – one of SECDEF's and senior leaderships' highest priorities</p> <p>Establish, empower and fund the Financial and Management Information Integration Office – reporting to USD(C)</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF/OUUSD(C)</p>
<b>Incentives</b>	<p>Create DoD-wide awareness and reward system in support of increased efficiency and improved productivity – money saver keeps a portion of savings within his/her organization for high value added purposes</p> <p>Work (with Congress as required) to change the Personnel recognition and reward system to reinforce achievement in this financial information transformation initiative</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF</p>
<b>Accountability</b>	<p>Institutionalizing in DoD's financial management information systems the ability to routinely generate the Dashboard metrics established by the Management Initiatives Office and DoD senior leadership</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership; OUUSD(C)</p>



	<b>Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Changing Certain Rules</b>	<p>Seek increased flexibility from Congress, OMB, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and others to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reallocate and reinvest saved dollars</li> <li>▪ Remove outmoded impediments to a more efficient infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Simplify appropriations accounting requirements</li> <li>– Establish a cost-benefit analysis process for dealing with low value write-offs (e.g., unmatched disbursements below a minimum threshold, including elimination of accounting for cancelled accounts)</li> <li>– Consider “sunsetting” burdensome past mandates of reporting requirements</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Utilize more commercial practices in the process for private sector partnering</li> <li>▪ Negotiate a phased approach to achieving a clean audit opinion (e.g., can start with Statement of Budgetary Resources)</li> <li>▪ Seek authorization to break pay grades to hire and retain financial and technology talent (use IRS as example)</li> <li>▪ Personnel initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Capitalize on looming large scale retirements as an opportunity to upgrade necessary skill sets</li> <li>– Enable DoD to match capabilities to needs rather than retention of staff by longevity (i.e., achieve rightsizing with the needed skill sets)</li> <li>– Establish personnel incentives related to achieving increased organization efficiency</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p>

	Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions	Responsibility
Changing Enterprise Practices	<p>Develop and implement DoD-wide integrated systems architecture strategy – implement a streamlined "life cycle management process" to expedite the development of financial and related feeder systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a bias toward commercial off-the-shelf software systems</li> <li>▪ Avoid excessive customization of software – measure against private sector practices</li> </ul> <p>Mandate standardization of “core” financial information in feeder, accounting and financial systems</p> <p>Provide DoD management, including the CINCs and other customers, with enhanced financial intelligence, analysis tools <b>and</b> incentives to better enable them to monitor and encourage the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations and suppliers (Institutional “wisdom” will question the feasibility of this proposal but the potential long term payback is significant and the attempt, therefore, is worthwhile.)</p>	<p>OUSD(C); ASD(C3I)</p> <p>OUSD(C)</p> <p>OUSD(C)</p>

	<b>Track 2 – Close-in Successes Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Leadership</b>	<p>SECDEF Leadership – one of SECDEF's and senior leaderships' highest priorities</p> <p>Establish, empower and fund the Management Initiatives Office – reporting to USD(C)</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF/OUUSD(C)</p>
<b>Incentives</b>	<p>Create DoD-wide awareness and reward system in support of increased efficiency and improved productivity – money saver keeps a portion of savings within his/her organization for high value added purposes</p> <p>Work (with Congress as required) to change the personnel recognition and reward system to reinforce importance of close-in actions</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p>
<b>Accountability</b>	<p>Identify and institutionalize SECDEF Critical Success Factors and Dashboard Metrics</p> <p>SECDEF's senior subordinates establish more granular Critical Success Factors and related metrics to achieve SECEF priorities</p> <p>Integrate metrics into the management of DoD, monitor and regularly report on performance to SECDEF and senior leadership</p> <p>Benchmark to similar private industry operations</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership;</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>OUUSD(C)</p>

	<b>Track 2 – Close-in Successes Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Organizational Alignment</b>	<p>Emphasize Comptroller (CFO) leadership role in transformation program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use outside consultants as necessary</li> <li>▪ Provide regular briefings to SECDEF on progress, at least every 30 days</li> <li>▪ Provide initial funding for a limited number of projects each year</li> </ul>	SECDEF/OUUSD(C)
<b>Changing Certain Rules</b>	<p>Work with Congress and OMB to facilitate close-in cost and effectiveness improvement programs (e.g., enable more private sector partnering in processes that are inherently commercial)</p>	SECDEF – Sr Leadership
<b>Changing Enterprise Practices</b>	<p>Develop and implement close-in major cost and efficiency improvement programs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Utilize cost management tools (e.g., Activity Based Costing and Management)</li> <li>• Select a limited set of intra-Service and cross-Service cost and/or process improvement targets of opportunity (e.g., consider DoD-wide logistics)</li> <li>• Benchmarking/best practices</li> <li>▪ Expand and continue successful efforts</li> </ul>	OUUSD(C)

# 1 .0 Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) is challenged by an inferior financial management information systems infrastructure. **Large, complex U.S. companies are able to leverage technology to streamline processes and integrate sophisticated personnel and logistics systems with their financial systems. However, the DoD finds itself hampered with a financial management structure that is in large part aged.** Beyond the multiplicity of disparate financial management systems throughout each of the Components, the information systems infrastructure is further hampered by the lack of functional and technical integration<sup>3</sup>.

Many studies and interviews with current and former leaders in DoD point to the same problems and frustrations. **Repetitive audit reports verify the systemic problems; while they indicate some improvement, they illustrate the need for radical transformation in order to achieve real progress.** As a result, DoD has developed a credibility problem with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the General Accounting Office (GAO) and itself, when it comes to financial information.

Further, past studies have given significant attention to such matters as: achievable cost savings, productivity improvements, private sector partnering and other operating efficiencies. While useful projects are being carried out, few of the recommendations contained in these reports (reference *Appendix A, Current Situation Examples, Figure A-1* for selected recent studies) have been implemented on a wide-scale basis. **We believe that the absence of relevant, reliable and timely financial information (“financial intelligence”) and the need for an accelerated pace and a more assured outcome in improving DoD efficiency are related.** Each can be traced to similar origins within DoD’s operating fabric.

**The systemic problems addressed in this report are not strictly “financial management” problems and cannot be solved by the financial community alone. The solution will require the concerted effort and cooperation of cross-functional communities throughout the Department.**

At Secretary Rumsfeld’s request, DoD contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to address financial management transformation. Specifically, the IDA Study Group, comprised of experienced business people, supported by a private sector professional services firm under separate contract, was **tasked to develop the framework for an effective transformation of financial management throughout the DoD.**

This report was developed based on multiple sources of information – relevant reports and studies on the DoD and an interview process that generated past and present senior leader perspectives throughout DoD and other key governmental agencies.

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<sup>3</sup> Integration throughout this document is intended to imply both functional (definitional) standardization and technical compatibility in order that systems are interoperable. It is not intended to imply standardized business processes.

## 2.0 Vision

**The Study Group envisions a future in which relevant, reliable and timely financial information<sup>4</sup>, affirmed by a clean audit opinion, is available on a routine basis to support management decision-making at all levels throughout DoD.** Relevant financial information will tell managers the costs of forces or activities that they manage and the relationship of funding levels to output, capability, or performance of those forces or activities. Reliable financial information will provide a more accurate basis for decision-making and be affirmed by a clean audit opinion. Such financial information will be available to managers at all pertinent levels, from those charged with carrying out DoD's missions at the theater and national levels down to the managers of supporting activities.

Current DoD financial, accounting and feeder/operational management systems do not provide information that could be characterized as relevant, reliable and timely. Nor is the "support of management decision-making" generally an objective of the financially based information currently developed or planned for future development. Front-end investment and much work need to be done to accomplish a necessary transformation. **Many positive projects are currently underway in DoD; however, they are narrowly focused, do not have sufficient senior leadership and urgency behind them, and are not part of an integrated DoD-wide strategy.**

Financial management in DoD should be focused on a single objective: Delivering relevant, reliable and timely financial information on a routine basis to support management decisions. **Appropriate focus on improved financial information will markedly improve the opportunities to:**

- **Provide visibility to cost incurred** which is a critical underpinning of efficiency improvement;
- **Institutionalize the use of performance metrics that are tied to cost** and relevant to the mission of DoD in the management process of the Department. This is a process that is key to establishing benchmarking standards and raising the level of performance;
- **Identify and take action, on an on-going basis, on performance improvement** (cost and effectiveness), **including private sector partnering** as appropriate;
- **Ensure clean audits and routine compliance with Federal financial standards** and related accounting and financial regulations; and
- **Increase the credibility of DoD's financially based information** with Congress, OMB, and other oversight agencies that have critical input into DoD operations.

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<sup>4</sup> For purposes of this report, financial information includes: accounting records and reports; financial records and reports; cost-based performance metrics related to mission; and budget and appropriation data.

### 3.0 Current Situation

More than ten years ago, the U.S. Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, mandating that the Federal agencies prepare annually a set of auditable financial statements detailing assets and liabilities and the results of their annual operations. Selected agencies, including parts of DoD, were included as pilots for this program. In 1994, Congress passed the Government Management and Results Act, mandating that the CFO Act applies to all agencies. For FY 2000, DoD, once again, was unable to meet the requirements of the CFO Act. Even more troublesome is the awareness that compliance with the CFO Act remains out of reach, far over the horizon.

In the current environment, DoD has a serious credibility problem in financial management. On January 11, 2001, in the confirmation hearing of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Senator Byrd questioned the Defense Department's inability "to receive a clean audit opinion in its financial statements". He went on to say, "I seriously question an increase in the Pentagon's budget in the face of the department's recent (inspector general) report. How can we seriously consider a \$50 billion increase in the Defense Department's budget when the (Department of Defense's) own auditors--when DoD's own auditors--say the department cannot account for \$2.3 trillion in transactions. . . "

In subsequent Senate testimony of February 13, 2001, Senator Grassley referenced these questions and continued, "...these reports show that DoD has lost control of the money at the transaction level. With no control at the transaction level, it is physically impossible to roll up the numbers into a top-line financial statement that can stand up to scrutiny and, most importantly, audit."

While DoD may debate some of the criticisms of its financial statements and the size and components of the \$2.3 trillion issue, we think that corrective action requires radical financial management transformation. For the FY 1999 financial statements, the auditors concluded that \$2.3 trillion transactions of the \$7.6 trillion entries to the financial statements were "unsupported". DoD notes that many of these entries included end-of-period estimates for such items as military pension actuarial liabilities and contingent liabilities, and manual entries for such items as contract accounts payable and property and equipment values, DoD would further note that the "unsupported" entries are "not necessarily improper" and that documentation does exist in many cases, albeit, not adequate for the auditing standards imposed.

To date, DoD's efforts to improve financial information have focused primarily on obtaining reliable information, and a protracted effort involving people, systems and data still is required to reach the goal. But it is possible to reach the goal of reliable financial information and a clean audit opinion and still not have information that is relevant to managers. A complementary effort is needed to ensure that DoD's management information systems also provide relevant information. This includes selecting performance metrics, linking them to costs, and institutionalizing their use in financial management information systems and management decision-making.

**Situations and problems associated with the current DoD environment include:**

**Issue 1 – Inability to consistently provide reliable financial and managerial data for effective decision-making**

DoD cannot produce, on a consistent basis, reliable financial and managerial information to guide effective decision-making. This is reflected in the inability to produce clean financial reports automatically and to generate succinct management cost information consistently on demand. Management must be capable of acting with agility and responding rapidly to opportunities and challenges. When relevant financial information is needed, management cannot always afford to wait days or even weeks for data calls. Further, management cannot operate effectively with frequently unreliable information. Interviewees cited multiple examples of the manual calls for key managerial data and the need for tracking off-line their expenditures on program areas (due to the unreliability and lag time in obtaining data required to manage day-to-day operations).

Much of the financial data used to develop financial statements and provide the basis for management decisions is unreliable. Currently, about 91 critical operating systems feed information to approximately 61 critical accounting systems.<sup>5</sup> Few of these systems speak the same language (charts of account, data elements) and fewer still provide automatic data feeds upstream. Many work-arounds and off-line records are maintained to translate data from one system to another and to feed data up the financial chain. Currently, balance sheet information is not maintained on a widespread scale, resulting in significant manual adjustments in many areas, including property accounts.

**Issue 2 – Lack of an overarching approach to financial management – disparate systems (accounting, financial and feeder) hampered by lack of integration and standardization**

The current environment is supported by a systems infrastructure that DoD categorizes by primary function – respectively, accounting<sup>6</sup>, finance<sup>7</sup>, and feeder<sup>8</sup> systems. No single authoritative source is currently addressing, from a strategic and programmatic level, the key issues from *an end-to-end approach*. This includes addressing incompatible and technologically-dated systems, and defining and standardizing the financial requirements and managerial data needed for reporting and decision-making.

A void exists in the organizational structure with respect to developing and implementing an overall financial management strategy. Two chains of command within DoD perform

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<sup>5</sup> Source: DoD Financial Management Improvement Plan (FMIP), January 2001

<sup>6</sup> According to the DoDFMIP, 61 critical accounting systems process event transactions for Defense Working Capital Funds, General Funds, Security Assistance, Departmental Reporting, Cash Accountability, and others.

<sup>7</sup> According to the FMIP, 15 critical finance systems process payment transactions for Civilian Pay, Debt Management, Military Pay, Contract/Vendor Pay, Disbursing, Transportation, and Travel.

<sup>8</sup> According to the FMIP, 91 critical feeder systems capture financial management events related to functions such as Acquisition, Personnel, Cost Management, Property Management, and Inventory Management at DoD Component levels.

finance and accounting functions'. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), reporting to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [OUSDC], is responsible for improving compliance of the General Fund and Working Capital Fund accounting and finance systems and the production of the Service financial statements. The Services, reporting directly up the chain to their respective Secretaries, are responsible for all data in their systems and for improving their feeder systems.

The development of systems is reflective of both the functional and budgetary structure of the Services. Historically, systems were developed within functional areas at the Service level, or even lower levels, as a means to automate existing processes, with little thought given to end-to-end processing. Consolidation and interface development to integrate systems has been a focus of the 1990s. But to a large extent, the relationships among feeder, accounting and financial systems are still "detached" from the perspective of data standardization, transactional standardization, and system compatibility. This detachment causes much re-entry of data, "crosswalking" or matching of data through elaborate edit processes and conversion tables, creating timing delays – all of which contribute to an inability to determine the status of financial information on a routine basis.

Much work has been done with the development of the annual Financial Management Improvement Plan (FMIP), but it is a work in process and, has been cited as being "perpetually out of date". The FMIP only identifies critical systems for financial reporting and is not intended to include the complete inventory of systems. There appears to be no overarching plan or coordinated planned strategy against which each DFAS and Component initiative is evaluated. Under the guidance of a future-focused plan and strategy, the investments already made under the FMIP would have longer-term benefit.

In January 2001, a Senior Financial Management Oversight Council was established to address CFO compliance. The announcement of this council notes that it was modeled on a similar approach within DoD that successfully addressed the Y2K issue by engaging senior leaders across the organization in a coordinated effort. The Comptroller should review the charter of this new council, its make-up and approach to determine if they are consistent with the financial management transformation framework described later.

### **Issue 3 – Overly complex data requirements driven by appropriation funding rules, elaborate policies and procedures, and outdated guidelines for excessively detailed tracking of expenditures**

Financial, accounting and feeder systems and processes are rife with incredible complexities caused by inconsistent data elements". Due to its complexity,

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<sup>9</sup> Source: DoD FMIP, January 2001

<sup>10</sup> Systems often carry with each transaction upwards of 60 to 100+ populated data fields to identify a transaction according to the internal and external reporting requirements. In general, this is substantially more than the private sector model. Efforts to standardize using the DFAS Budget Accounting Classification Code or Standard Fiscal Code have projected the total number of standardized data elements to exceed 250+. A Substantial number of excessive fields severely hamper interoperability.

appropriation funding rules, and a number of disparate systems, DoD has a more complex problem than civilian agencies. Attempts to streamline data requirements often get bogged down by definitional issues and difficulties associated with modifying aged systems. **Elaborate policies and procedures, many of which are outdated but remain “on the books,” complicate the elimination and/or changing of requirements or processes. Attempts at standardization of data elements and standard general ledger postings often are met with differing accounting interpretations.**

**Issue 4 – “Convoluting” business processes which fail to streamline excessive process steps – sometimes driven by accounting, operational, and organizational structures, further complicated by aged and disparate systems**

The DoD is currently supported by a financial infrastructure that is not fully integrated in its end-to-end processing either from a technology perspective or from a functional process perspective. (*See Appendix A, Current Situation Examples, for an example of a DoD Service travel process, which is one example of the complexities of processes.*) Current processes are supported by multiple systems at various stages of technological innovation. **Many processes are duplicated due to non-interfaced systems along the business process chain, often requiring new input of data by hand, thereby increasing the probability for input errors and errors created by a lack of overall process knowledge.** Coordination of process hand-offs and shared process steps are specific targets for process congruence and functional and technological improvement. **Budget and appropriation systems are the primary driver for the vast majority of DoD’s present financial system users. These systems add complexity but, more importantly, preclude, in many cases, the use of commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS) systems, without a reworking of the process.** In contrast, modern enterprise systems are developed to facilitate end-to-end seamless processing.

Attempts to charge the Services for overhead expenses (i.e., Working Capital Fund and reimbursables), while directionally correct, suffer from bad data and, as a result, add complexity that exceeds benefit. Differing practices by the Military Services (and difficulty in streamlining because of stovepipes, cultural issues, and funding streams) represent roadblocks to standardization. Much of the DoD information technology manpower is dedicated to “crosswalking” different inputs. **When reporting requirements change, new data fields must be developed at the various relevant sources, and new interface crosswalks laboriously developed among systems.**

Many requirements have accumulated over the years from congressional mandates without sunset. **One of the first priorities in the transformation process should be to identify requirements that could be streamlined or eliminated.**

**Issue 5 – Changing federal financial management standards that have provided a moving target for compliance**

Since the CFO Act of 1990, financial standards (new guiding principles) have been in a state of flux [Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) Statements of

Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS), OMB Form and Content, etc.] as the Federal government moved to the development of private sector-like financial statements. Implementation of a policy frequently has been dependent on the interpretation of the system owner at the DFAS and Service level. Often, system structure and processing constrain or limit correct implementation. Compounding the effect of a change is the multiple number of systems that need to be modified each time a standard is modified. Many of the changes to date have centered on the 'issues of Real Property and Property, Plant and Equipment -high priority areas for CFO compliance and a source of much resource investment by DoD within the past two years to solve this problem. However, some senior financial leaders note that the time and effort devoted to property values for financial statement purposes could be better spent elsewhere and that the CFO auditing policy should be made more relevant to the realities of the DoD environment,

All Federal agencies have faced this evolution of requirements. However, its impact across DoD where systems are disparate and cross-Service has made the moving target for compliance more problematic. (In *Appendix A, Current Situation Examples, Figure A-4* arrays these requirements of various legislation and pronouncements on a **timeline** as they have evolved from the enactment of CFO legislation to today.) Consideration should be given to working with the appropriate parties to enable a moratorium for DoD's attempting to meet certain selected standards, to better focus its efforts on actual forward progress.

**Issue 6 – Difficulty in obtaining financially based, outcome-oriented management metrics. Many metrics reflect yearly goals and outputs with little link between financial management and DoD goals.**

In 1999, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) [USD(C)] conducted a study of cost accounting capabilities. Certain challenges identified were: (1) DoD must decide what data element and program information it must collect in support of its Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) performance measures; (2) DoD must decide how much autonomy the Services will have in implementing the strategy and how much will be directed; (3) DoD must decide on a scope and framework for the solution beyond regulatory reporting requirements; and (4) DoD must recognize that new data collection requirements may be necessary and that business process changes may result (within the cost benefit framework). These issues are yet unaddressed.

DoD uses a wide variety of metrics throughout the organization. The Department's current financial performance measurements generally reflect high-level yearly goals and outputs, not operational day-to-day financial managerial metrics. Amid a wide variety of published measurements throughout the Department, there is typically an inability to routinely generate cost-based metrics related to performance.

**Issue 7 – Inability to produce CFO compliant annual financial statements**

Audit reports issued by the Inspector General's staff highlight weaknesses in accounting records and processes required to achieve audited financial statements. There **is a need to review priorities for bridging the gaps in CFO Act audit compliance. Several**

interviewees even suggested a three or so year moratorium on attempting to obtain a clean opinion – using the associated dollars to address needed corrective actions rather than just generating numbers for the financial statements purposes alone.

An analysis of the FY 2000 audit reports, identifying the critical issues affecting the achievement of a clean audit opinion, is provided in *Appendix B, Recent Financial Management Audit Issues*. Most problems have been noted in prior year audit reports and are so overwhelming and the costs to fix them so large that the DoD, absent a financial management strategy, year after year finds itself moving from one priority to another – usually, to the one that received the most recent visibility.

**Issue 8 – Disproportionate budget dollars appear to support non-value added activities – since useful information is hard to extract, useful corrective action is hard to implement -with a lack of widespread understanding of how financial information can help**

Much debate has been generated around what percentages and dollar amounts should be concentrated in the operations and mission areas (sometimes referenced as “tooth”) versus the support areas (referenced as “tail”), **But, proceeding down this “tooth-to-tail” semantic path has typically resulted in getting stuck in the quagmire of definitions. A better approach may be to target those functions where more efficient resource use could provide reallocations to operations and mission areas. For example, target functions that are “inherently commercial”, identify their costs, and compare and benchmark them against private sector data to determine what performance improvements need to be made.** Even in functions considered to be “tooth”, there may be low value added or redundant processes identified by more useful financial information, which would be candidates for reengineering.

**Issue 9 – Cultural bias toward status quo – driven by disincentives for change, and short timeframes of political appointees who otherwise might serve as agents of change**

The effect of the current budget rules – “use or lose” – creates an environment of disincentives for finding cheaper, faster ways of doing things. Reallocation of funds (money, people, programs and projects) under the control of the current users for investing in improvements is quite limited. Requirements to manage to the budget (established two years in advance) and the budget process cause managers to continuously be “out of sync” with current needs.

Many of the issues uncovered in our interviews and research have been dealt with effectively in private industry, largely because of the competitive forces of the marketplace and the focus on shareholder value. No similar external push exists within DoD. The Department needs change agents and drivers analogous to those agents and forces that have made the private sector competitive and efficient.

**Issue 10 – Requires an infusion of personnel with technical and financial skill sets necessary to achieve integrated financial management systems**

In the course of DoD's downsizing in recent years, longevity was often a major criterion for retention and not typically the private sector model of functional and performance value. As a result, new ideas, skill sets, and modernized ways of thinking are not sufficiently available to enhance DoD performance. Pay scales and reward packages available to technology workers, certified public accountants, and financial professionals in private industry have far outstripped the government's, thereby limiting the ability to attract and retain the required skills. As a result, many note that DoD has "lost a generation" of workers. This turnover is expected to continue over the next five years as nearly half of senior government executives are expected to retire in this timeframe. The choices are few, including raising pay scales to be competitive **and/or** engaging in substantial private sector partnering to deal with obvious skill set deficiencies.

## 4.0 Elements of Transformation

We believe that the absence of relevant, reliable and timely financial information (“financial intelligence”) and the need for an accelerated and a more assured pace in improving DoD efficiency can each be traced to similar origins within DoD’s operating fabric. **Accordingly, we recommend an integrated twin-track program to implement a financial transformation. It includes six broad elements that we believe are central to substantially improving the financial management within DoD and providing a foundation for change.** A lack of, or insufficient emphasis on, many of these elements perpetuates the current environment.

These Elements of Transformation are:

1. **Leadership** – establishing a SECDEF and senior leadership high priority for financial information transformation;
2. **Incentives** – addressing the current disincentives within DoD for engaging in financial reform;
3. **Accountability** – establishing a transformation framework with clear measurements, timeframes and assigned personal responsibilities and authority;
4. **Organizational Alignment** – SECDEF empowerment of the DoD Comptroller to act as the focal point for implementing an integrated DoD-wide program for financial management transformation;
5. **Changing Certain Rules** – directly addressing with Congress and OMB regulations and legal issues that hinder innovation and private sector partnering; and
6. **Changing Enterprise Practices** – modifying current overemphasis on Component process “uniqueness” that hinders forward progress, by standardization of core accounting requirements<sup>11</sup> and establishing a bias towards COTS systems,

### Leadership

*Working with Congress, OMB, GAO, and Others.* We believe that the Secretary and the DoD Comptroller should begin now by presenting the financial management transformation framework, as a work in progress, to the appropriate congressional committees, GAO, OMB, and other key influencers. Much of what is needed cannot be accomplished without congressional understanding and assistance in implementing change. For example, elements of the human capital strategy, the CFO Act implementation plan, private sector partnering, budget reallocation transactions and related incentives, may require congressional approval or at least concurrence. If there are limits on their support in various areas, these should be addressed early in the program lifecycle.

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<sup>11</sup> Standardization of “core accounting” is intended to include only a subset of data required for DoD financial information management and does not include genuinely unique military data requirements. Typically, core requirements would include standard general ledger and related attributes and other data elements for recording accounting events at the transaction level and summarizing at correspondingly higher levels for Financial management reporting.

*Generating the Change Management Strategy.* The DoD must recognize that the initiatives outlined here require doing business in a way different from before. **This effort requires that the Department adopt change management strategies and a strategic communication approach that convey to the Department why this is important to the Secretary and DoD, how it will be implemented and measured, and the incentives to be utilized.** Many well-intended initiatives fail because of insufficient processes and communications to share objectives and purpose with the larger organization. The emphasis of messages may be different for different audiences but the themes must be consistent. SECDEF priorities must be clearly defined in these messages.

## **Incentives**

*Building Incentives for Information and Financial Management Transformation.* In the current environment, position, prestige, influence, etc. are measured by traditional elements such as number of people managed, the size of the budget or the information controlled. In this scenario, there is little focus on major operational improvement and cost savings. **A new incentive system must be developed that encourages performance improvement and information management transformation, while rewarding efficiencies and cost savings.** This incentive system must address personnel issues in addition to allowing organizations to take advantage of cost savings by retaining some portion of the money saved for matters accorded a high priority by the SECDEF or the respective Service Secretary. The incentive system should also recognize top individual performance/promotions by the accomplishments or results achieved – not by the traditional view of managing to budget.

## **Accountability**

*Critical Success Factors, Providing a framework to establish accountability begins with communicating SECDEF strategic goals and Critical Success Factors.* Critical Success Factors are “the 5-6 things that must go right” in the Secretary’s view if DoD is to achieve its mission. In support of his Critical Success Factors, senior leadership under the SECDEF would then organize their own objectives. Establishing the SECDEF Critical Success Factors is key to initiating the “cascading effect” whereby his subordinates establish supporting objectives and related measurements.

*Developing Metrics.* A set of financially based metrics needs to be developed to correspond with the SECDEF Critical Success Factors, goals and outcomes and the supporting objectives of his subordinates. Monitoring performance should happen through a forum of regular briefings given directly to the SECDEF leadership, utilizing a set of well-developed metrics to measure progress.

## **Organizational Alignment**

*Organizational Roles and Responsibilities.* Information and financial management transformation require some changes in the organizational roles and responsibilities

**within DoD. To achieve this transformation, the responsible individual must exercise authority and be accountable.** The individual should have greater authority over budgets and requirements related to information and financial management in DoD. **Taking into account the OUSD(C) broadly-defined responsibilities in the Department, we believe that the Comptroller should be the responsible party with corresponding control of budgetary decisions and dollars affecting the improvement of financial management information.** The Comptroller should develop a strong relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) [ASD(C3I)]. It is important to strengthen DoD's Chief Information Officer (CIO) capacities in systems planning, architecture and oversight.

Our interviews with senior leadership across the organization confirm a widespread desire for a clear vision and for someone to be in charge, to make the decisions necessary to achieve relevant and reliable data. Repeatedly, senior leadership across the organization notes that priorities must be established and then enforced-and the number of priorities must be manageable and funded (past history has shown that having 50+ priorities, which are not integrated, is not workable). These interviews also noted repeatedly that the current structure simply does not promote or support integration.

***Create a Human Capital Strategy.*** People with the necessary skill sets are absolutely critical to DoD's ability to achieve financial management transformation, and currently DoD does not have an adequate supply of such skill sets. Additionally, there is no comprehensive human resource strategy in place today to address this issue. In fact, most discussions of human capital or human resources focus on the attraction, development, and retention of internal staff. However, in the private sector as well as in more entrepreneurial government practices, leaders have recognized that effective human capital strategies include alternative sources of skills, including the use of private sector partnering, contracting, and shared service arrangements. They look at human capital strategy as including the full range of available people because they cannot afford to limit themselves to who they can hire and retain. **DoD must build a financial management human capital strategy that includes both internal and external elements.**

## **Changing Certain Rules**

***Streamline and Simplify.*** Current requirements for tracking funding and providing reports to various Federal entities (Congress, OMB, Treasury, etc.) place an inordinate amount of complex information requirements on the DoD that do not contribute to the performance of its mission. These complex requirements often drive impractical business processes and make it harder to align processes to private sector-like practices. Further complicating this requirement is the number of disparate systems operating in DoD that must be modified or maintained to track this information. Additionally, **many such requirements are self-imposed by DoD.** A focused effort aimed at eliminating self-imposed, non-value added requirements and working with regulatory agencies and Congress to simplify their requirements will ease the burden and shift the focus to more mission related information.

*Reallocating Dollars.* We believe that proper categorization and costing can provide DoD managers across the Department with the financial information to manage resources more efficiently and, therefore, reallocate dollars where appropriate. Budgets that are developed two years in advance of activity allow only a limited amount of flexibility to adjust to changing requirements. Moreover, unreliable data often inhibits the justification of such reallocations. We are proposing a greater emphasis on having the management information necessary to make informed decisions regarding the reallocation of dollars and working with Congress and within DoD to change policies and procedures which inhibit such reallocations.

*Auditable Financial Statements – Getting the “Clean” Opinion for DoD.* Given the current state of financial management operations, this is a long-term process. Full CFO Act compliance may take eight to ten years. A plan must be built based on a gap analysis – what has to be fixed to get a clean opinion. Working with the GAO, the DoD Inspector General and the Service audit agencies is critical. **The DoD should adopt the private sector model of teaming with the audit teams “year round” to resolve issues and not simply wait for the annual audit “test”.** The recent efforts in the area of Real Property valuation are a useful attempt that may serve as a model for coordination across DoD.

**A plan should be negotiated to provide for interim successes.** For example, we believe that the Statement of Budgetary Resources, with focus, could receive a clean audit opinion in a much shorter timeframe. It may also be possible for other Department Components to receive a clean opinion long before the whole agency. **Building intermediate success stories demonstrates progress and the Department’s willingness to meet the spirit of the CFO Act.**

## **Changing Enterprise Practices**

*Building Standards in Core Accounting and Attribute Data Elements.* Standardization is the key to the interoperability of financial management and feeder systems. Standard data for “core accounting” elements enable systems to communicate with each other; also, they facilitate the auditing process when transactions must be traced from the general ledger to the originating accounting event and vice-versa. **The current systems plan, as articulated in the FMIP, often takes the path of least resistance by allowing the Services and Defense Agencies to keep their own “traditional” standards and, through the use of translation tools and systems interface programs, turn them into DoD standards.** Unfortunately, this approach encourages the continuation of old and potentially inefficient business practices and creates a very expensive systems maintenance problem down the road. **DoD must stop that practice and drive core accounting transaction standards from the new DoD Comptroller organization, described later, through the DFAS and the Services into all financial management and feeder systems.** According to the January 2001 FMIP, DoD is intending to invest at least \$4-6 billion in various financial management and feeder system initiatives. With occasional exception, DoD should stop the practice of investing in systems that do not incorporate standardization.

***Building a Bias toward Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Software Solutions.*** The Department generally cannot afford to custom build and maintain new financial management systems. We agree that the DoD has many unique elements and process issues. However, we also believe that the reluctance to accept COTS is as much a reluctance to accept the inevitable business process changes that are mandated by this approach. **We see a double benefit here for the Department: first, cost savings through the implementation of best business practices imbedded in COTS products; and second, cost savings through less expensive and faster systems implementations.** The application of return on investment (ROI) analysis should also be adopted in all software implementation decisions.

***Driving Near-Term Improvements and Savings.*** While many components of the financial management transformation initiative will take years to accomplish, the Department cannot afford to wait that long to see tangible and dramatic cost improvements. **We believe that there are many opportunities to demonstrate the power of financial transformation without having to wait for auditable financial statements. There are tools and methods that will enable the DoD to implement process improvements and, possibly, reallocate dollars.**

Activity based costing (ABC) is one of the most widely accepted methods in use by both the private and public sector today. It provides the ability for an organization to understand what it costs to do what it does (e.g., repair F15 engines, provide accounting services to the Services, manage the logistics supply chain) and then make informed decisions of how and where to reduce costs. ABC is the front-end of a thoughtful, and relatively quick, assessment of an organization's operations. For example, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) conducted a comprehensive ABC assessment that rolled directly into a business process reengineering solution, ultimately driving millions of dollars out of the organization cost structure over a relatively short period. ABC does have limits. For example, if organizational leadership is not supportive of the process and committed to delivering a streamlined operation as a result of the analysis, nothing will change.

Another target for potential savings and cost avoidance is in problem disbursements and the related areas of contract close-out. They have high visibility and may have prospects for near-term cost avoidance and savings, depending on the appropriate write-down or closure decisions driven by cost/benefit analysis. With leadership, much can change and DoD can use methodologies such as ABC and cost/benefit analysis comparisons to review more carefully its overhead structure and introduce process improvements.

It would also be useful to provide the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and other "customers" with enhanced financial intelligence, analysis tools and incentives to better enable them to monitor and encourage the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations and suppliers.

## 5.0 Financial Transformation Framework

A program is needed that will incorporate the elements described above and provide for a functional and technical architecture for achieving integrated financial and accounting systems in order to generate relevant, reliable and timely financial information on a routine basis and, ultimately for obtaining a clean opinion. **The Study Group recommends a framework for a twin-track program for financial information transformation.** The recommended framework would not only take advantage of certain on-going improvement actions within the DoD but also provide specific direction for a more coordinated, managed, and results-oriented approach. The recommended framework includes:

### Twin Track Approach – High Level Overview

#### Track 1 – Structural Change

**Employ a coordinated DoD-wide management approach to developing standard integrated systems,** obtaining relevant, reliable and timely financial information (and ultimately a clean audit opinion) and aligning, incentivizing and authorizing the Department to utilize financial intelligence in an efficient and effective way,

**Structural Change (Track 1) will require a longer timeframe and will include establishing a centralized oversight process under the Comptroller for implementing the recommended structural changes and developing standard, integrated financial intelligence systems.** A phased approach should be taken which will allow for important yearly incremental success (e.g., with defined systems architecture and yearly incremental improvements).

#### Track 2 – Close-in Success

**Target, select and oversee implementation of a limited number of intra-Service/cross-Service projects for major cost savings or other high-value benefit under a process led by the Comptroller; assist the SECDEF in establishing and managing with a set of “Dashboard Metrics”.** Dashboard metrics should be derived from the SECDEF’s Critical Success Factors. **Track 2 should be used as a learning experience on using financial information to drive decision-making.**

Prime tools of such improvements would include ABC and benchmarking/best practices analysis to identify cost savings opportunities. A series of key management metrics will be identified, tracked and reported to those with senior managerial responsibility, including mission related-departments.

(During our interview process, logistics throughout DoD was mentioned numerous times as an area where progress has been made in recent years, but opportunities still exist for high-value improvements. While our timeframe did not allow us the opportunity to

analyze the costs and benefits of this particular reengineering prospect, it deserves active consideration by the proposed Management Initiatives Office described below.)

## **Twin Track Program Implementation**

**Critical to the success of both tracks of the recommended program is the establishment within the OUSD(C) of two new functions represented by distinct offices. Through these two offices – the Financial and Management Information Integration Office and the Management Initiatives Office – the Comptroller would provide executive control over processes, policies and resources for financial management and related systems transformation, Current structure does not provide for an authoritative focal point for DoD-wide financial management transformation.** Lean but full-time staffing is essential to the success of both offices. At the Comptroller's discretion, these two organizations could be staffed with newly recruited talent as well as existing DoD staff; they are intended to fill a void as discussed above, not to duplicate or create additional layers. These two offices would (working with the Components) develop options for approval, monitor progress and regularly report to the SECDEF on progress, problems, and possible solutions. They would control resources for financial management, systems transformation (although the Components would manage such programs), and take a leadership role in developing incentives. Each function must be headed by an individual who has sufficient stature and empowerment to act as an effective change agent. Led by the Comptroller, the heads of these two offices should reach out to the Services and DFAS, as well as Congress, to coordinate the development of a strategy and effective implementation. Each office is described below:

**Financial & Management Information Integration Office** – accountable for effective implementation and coordination of overall financial and related systems architecture [in consultation with the Services, the ASD(C3I) and others], systems integration, core accounting standardization and CFO compliance issues on an **intra-** and **cross-Service** basis; develop a phased plan for progressively increasing the number of individual statements on which a clean audit opinion can be obtained; and over time, institutionalize in DoD's financial management information systems the ability to routinely generate the Dashboard Metrics established by the Management Initiatives Offices and DoD senior leadership.

The major program components envisioned for this office are:

- Develop and “dictate” core accounting requirements (accounting transactions, Standard General Ledgers, attributes, and data elements) and manage a comparison (“gap analysis”) to this core for each system slated to be part of the integrated network of CFO systems to determine funding priorities. Have the final **decision-making** authority for trade-offs and cost benefit decisions based on the gap analysis.
- **Develop a systems integration strategy and monitor on a regular basis in coordination with DFAS and the Services.** The strategy should consider both the needed integration for the development of core accounting and accurate financial statements as well as the requirements for managerial cost accounting.

- **Initiate a review to determine which burdensome rules/regulations should be eliminated or streamlined**, and a strategy to obtain necessary approval, identifying: (1) existing data elements that are no longer needed; and (2) reports that should be discontinued.

**Management Initiatives Office** – responsible for the process of establishing and initially reporting on Dashboard Metrics; and on an intra- and cross-Service basis, work with the DoD Components to select projects for major cost and operational improvements, providing initial funding for a limited number of projects per year and overseeing implementation with use of consultants and private sector partnering, as appropriate.

The major program components envisioned for this office are:

- Integrate Dashboard Metrics based on the SECDEF's Critical Success Factors into the management of DoD, monitor and regularly report on performance to SECDEF and senior leadership. Benchmark to similar private industry operations.
- Work with DoD Components to identify target areas for high-value cost savings and efficiency improvements, and entertain proposals from Components throughout DoD. A limited number of projects would be selected each year. Initial high target areas of opportunities should be projects for applying ABC or other process improvement initiatives.

The costs to initiate these two functions will include necessary funding for the salaries and related costs of the respective heads of the Financial & Management Information Integration Office and the Management Initiatives Office with full-time staff for each, as well as seed money to: (1) implement priorities for the Financial and Management Integration Office; (2) provide for selected cost savings projects within the Management Initiatives Office; and (3) hire consultants as necessary to perform specific tasks in support of the offices. Beyond the funding to initiate the two offices, we think that the transformation framework described herein will allow DoD to use the existing quantum of dollars spent on finance and accounting more efficiently.

**The path to full transformation is a long one. We recognize that the complete solution is key to ensuring that the transformation has a permanent impact on DoD operating policies; however, important nearer term improvements in operating efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved.**

**Contained in the tables on pages 19-24 is a high-level end-to-end financial management transformation strategy mapped to the elements of transformation described previously. Many of the elements require more granularity, which can only be developed at the discretion of the SECDEF, Comptroller, and other senior leadership.**

## Significant Challenges

We believe the most difficult challenges to be addressed in implementing our recommended program are:

- Developing an integrated system architecture including financial, accounting and feeder systems;
- Standardizing a DoD-wide “core” accounting and data classification;
- Engaging Congress and OMB to ameliorate certain rules: simplify record keeping and accounting requirements, remove impediments to a more efficient infrastructure management, and reduce hurdles to private sector partnering;
- Providing DoD management, including the CINCs, with enhanced financial intelligence, incentives and tools; and encouraging them to maximize the efficiencies and effectiveness of their operations and suppliers; and
- Imbuing the culture with a sense of urgency for a DoD-wide financial management information transformation, similar to Y2K.

## Catalyst for Change

The catalyst for effectively implementing these recommendations will be the leadership provided by Secretary Rumsfeld and his senior management team. A vision for financial information, such as that described herein, has been accomplished in the private sector on a widespread basis, through the development of financial intelligence and the reporting, analysis and measurement of business process reengineering results, using such intelligence. Our interviews and discussions with senior representatives of DoD, both current and past, lead us to believe that the organization is ripe for this financial management leadership change. The DoD needs good financial information if it is to follow Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz’s admonition “to engage our brains before we open the taxpayer’s wallet”. This proposed transformation program will provide the needed leadership, accountability and structure to re-engineer financial management within DoD.

*“That which you require be reported on to you will improve, if you are selective. How you fashion your reporting system announces your priorities and sets the institution’s priorities.”*

Rumsfeld’s Rules

\*\*\*\*\*

	<b>Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Leadership</b>	<p>SECDEF Leadership – one of SECDEF's and senior leaderships' highest priorities</p> <p>Establish, empower and fund the Financial and Management Information Integration Office – reporting to USD(C)</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF/OUUSD(C)</p>
<b>Incentives</b>	<p>Create DoD-wide awareness and reward system in support of increased efficiency and improved productivity – money saver keeps a portion of savings within his/her organization for high value added purposes</p> <p>Work (with Congress as required) to change the Personnel recognition and reward system to reinforce achievement in this financial information transformation initiative</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF</p>
<b>Accountability</b>	<p>Institutionalizing in DoD's financial management information systems the ability to routinely generate the Dashboard metrics established by the Management Initiatives Office and DoD senior leadership</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership; OUUSD(C)</p>



	<b>Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Changing Certain Rules</b>	<p>Seek increased flexibility from Congress, OMB, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and others to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reallocate and reinvest saved dollars</li> <li>• Remove outmoded impediments to a more efficient infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Simplify appropriations accounting requirements</li> <li>– Establish a cost-benefit analysis process for dealing with low value write-offs (e.g., unmatched disbursements below a minimum threshold, including elimination of accounting for cancelled accounts)</li> <li>– Consider “sunsetting” burdensome past mandates of reporting requirements</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Utilize more commercial practices in the process for private sector partnering</li> <li>▪ Negotiate a phased approach to achieving a clean audit opinion (e.g., can start with Statement of Budgetary Resources)</li> <li>▪ Seek authorization to break pay grades to hire and retain financial and technology talent (use IRS as example)</li> <li>▪ Personnel initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Capitalize on looming large scale retirements as an opportunity to upgrade necessary skill sets</li> <li>– Enable DoD to match capabilities to needs rather than retention of staff by longevity (i.e., achieve rightsizing with the needed skill sets)</li> <li>– Establish personnel incentives related to achieving increased organization efficiency</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p>

	Track 1 – Structural Change Recommended Implementation Actions	Responsibility
Changing Enterprise Practices	<p>Develop and implement DoD-wide integrated systems architecture strategy – implement a streamlined “life cycle management process” to expedite the development of financial and related feeder systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Build a bias <b>toward</b> commercial off-the-shell software systems</li> <li>▪ Avoid excessive customization of software – measure against private sector practices</li> </ul> <p>Mandate standardization of “core” financial information in feeder, accounting and financial systems</p> <p>Provide DoD management, including the CINC’s and other customers, with enhanced financial intelligence, analysis tools and incentives to better enable them to monitor and encourage the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations and suppliers (Institutional “wisdom” will question the feasibility of this proposal but the potential long term payback is significant and the attempt, therefore, is worthwhile.)</p>	<p>OUUSD(C); ASD(C3I)</p> <p>OUUSD(C)</p> <p>OUUSD(C)</p>

Track 2 – Close-in Successes		
Recommended Implementation Actions		Responsibility
<b>Leadership</b>	<p>SECDEF Leadership – one of SECDEF's and senior leaderships' highest priorities</p> <p>Establish, empower and fund the Management Initiatives Office – reporting to USD(C)</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF/OUUSD(C)</p>
<b>Incentives</b>	<p>Create DoD-wide awareness and reward system in support of increased efficiency and improved productivity – money saver keeps a portion of savings within his/her organization for high value added purposes</p> <p>Work (with Congress as required) to change the personnel recognition and reward system to reinforce importance of close-in actions</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p>
<b>Accountability</b>	<p>Identify and institutionalize SECDEF Critical Success Factors and Dashboard Metrics</p> <p>SECDEF's senior subordinates establish more granular Critical Success Factors and related metrics to achieve SECEF priorities</p> <p>Integrate metrics into the management of DoD, monitor and regularly report on performance to SECDEF and senior leadership</p> <p>Benchmark to similar private industry operations</p>	<p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership;</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>SECDEF – Sr Leadership</p> <p>OUUSD(C)</p>

	<b>Track 2 – Close-in Successes Recommended Implementation Actions</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<b>Organizational Alignment</b>	<p>Emphasize Comptroller (CFO) leadership role in transformation program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use outside consultants as necessary</li> <li>▪ Provide regular briefings to SECDEF on progress, at least every 30 days</li> <li>• Provide initial funding for a limited number of projects each year</li> </ul>	SECDEF/OUUSD(C)
<b>Changing Certain Roles</b>	<p>Work with Congress and OMB to facilitate close-in cost and effectiveness improvement programs (e.g., enable more private sector partnering in processes that are inherently commercial)</p>	SECDEF – Sr Leadership
<b>Changing Enterprise Practices</b>	<p>Develop and implement close-in major cost and <b>efficiency</b> improvement programs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Utilize cost management tools (e.g., Activity Based Costing and Management)</li> <li>• Select a limited set of intra-Service and cross-Service cost and/or process improvement targets of opportunity (e.g., consider DoD-wide logistics)</li> <li>• Benchmarking/best practices</li> <li>▪ Expand and continue successful efforts</li> </ul>	OUUSD(C)

# Appendices

## Appendix A. Current Situation Examples

Appendix A includes:

- Figure A-1 : Recent Studies and Reports on DoD Financial Management
- Figure A-2: DoD Service Travel Disbursement Process – Before Revision
- Figure A-3: DoD Service Travel Disbursement Process – After Revision
- Figure A-4: Timeline of Federal Accounting Legislation and Pronouncements

### Figure A-1: Recent Studies and Reports on DoD Financial Management

In defining the current situation, we have drawn heavily on information gathered from prior reports and studies (see *Figure A-1* below). This information was supplemented through interviews of current and former DoD leaders.

Organization	Title	Date
Business Executives for National Security	Tail-to-Tooth Commission A Call to Action	(Not Dated)
Defense Science Board	More Capable Warfighting through Reduced Fuel Burden	January 2001
Defense Science Board	Achieving an Innovative Support Structure to Enhance Early 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Military Operations	November 1996
Defense Science Board	Outsourcing and Privatization	August 1996
General Accounting Office	DoD Financial Management: More Reliable Information Key to Assuring Accountability and Managing Defense Operations More Efficiently	April 14, 1999
General Accounting Office	Various Financial Management audit reports	1999-2000
Office of the Inspector General, DoD	Various Financial Management audit reports	1999-2001
Department of Defense	Financial Management Improvement Plan	January 2001

*Figure A-1: Recent Studies and Reports on DoD Financial Management*

**Figures A-2 and A-3: Examples of “Convolutd” Business Processes**

These two charts depict a DoD Service travel process illustrated in before and after pictograms. As representative of convoluted and complex processes please note in the “Before” example, *Figure A-2*, the following: number of process steps; number of organizations involved; number of systems involved; and number of times the data must be re-keyed into a new system. As representative of how DoD does make positive strides toward streamlining (while further streamlining could occur), please note in the “Revised Process” pictogram, *Figure A-3*, the reduced number of process steps and the number of increased data that are edited - thereby reducing errors.

# Travel Disbursement Process Map




Figure A-2: DoD Service Travel Disbursement Process – Before Revision





Figure A-3: DoD Service Travel Disbursement Process – After Revision

**Figure A-4: Timeline of Federal Accounting Legislation and Pronouncements**

Since the CFO Act of 1990, financial standards (new guiding principles) have been in a state of flux [Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS), OMB Form and Content, etc.] as the Federal government moved to the development of private sector-like financial statements. Below is a timeline of the legislation and pronouncements by issue date. The implementation date for many of the SFFASs follows the issue date by several years. Of the 18 SFFASs, ten had implementation dates of FY 1999 through FY 2001.



*Figure A-4: Timeline of Federal Accounting Legislation and Pronouncements*

CFO Act – Chief Financial Officers Act  
 GPRR – Government Performance and Results Act  
 GMRA – Government Management and Results Act  
 FFMIA – Federal Financial Managers Integrity Act

OMB 97-01 – Office of Management and Budget Form and Content  
 SFFAC – Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concept  
 SFFAS – Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard

## Appendix B. Recent Financial Management Audit Issues

This appendix presents the findings noted in the audit reports without further clarification by DoD. Often, upon more careful review, one will find that confusion exists regarding the finding or that an issue has subsequently been addressed. A part of the financial management transformation strategy proposed in *Section 5.0, Financial Transformation Framework*, should be to establish priorities, based on defined criteria and an agreed-upon understanding of each issue.

Issue	Dollar Amount	Significance
<b>Plans to Improve Financial Management</b>		
<i>DoD lacks adequate financial management and feeder systems for compiling accurate and reliable financial data</i>		Three major efforts to improve financial management: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DoD Financial Management Improvement Plan (FMIP)</li> <li>▪ DoD Critical Financial and Feeder Systems Compliance Process</li> <li>▪ DoD Implementation Strategies</li> </ul>
<i>DoD Guidance – Intragovernmental Eliminations</i>	\$89.5 billion revenue/expense eliminations  \$5.9 billion A/P and A/R eliminations	The inability of DoD to properly account for and disclose intragovernmental transactions and report trading partner eliminations is a major impediment to obtaining a favorable audit opinion on its financial statements. Since FY 1996, the Department has been slow to initiate improvements needed to ensure that all of the intragovernmental transactions were captured and the amounts were accurate.
<i>Guidance Issued by DFAS</i>	\$1,200 billion	Journal Voucher Guidance issued by DFAS was not in agreement with generally accepted accounting principles. DFAS Centers processed 5,654 unsupported or improper department-level accounting entries, valued at \$1.2 trillion. One of the reasons that the department-level accounting entries were unsupported is that they were made to force general ledger data to agree with data from other sources without adequate research and reconciliation.

Issue	Dollar Amount	Significance
<b>Overarching Financial Management Problems</b>		
<i>Changes to Financial Statements</i>		The published DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000 differed materially from the financial statements presented for audit.
<i>Problem Disbursements</i>	\$4.4 billion	As of September 30, 2000, DoD reported \$1.7 billion of unmatched disbursements, \$1.2 billion of negative unliquidated obligations and \$1.5 billion (absolute value) of in-transit disbursements. The lack of integrated finance and accounting systems causes disbursing stations to make disbursements that were accounted for by stations that were not collocated with the disbursing stations.
<i>Basis for Accounting</i>		DoD generally records transactions on a budgetary basis and not on an accrual basis as required by accounting standards. This is particularly true of the accounting for the general funds, which generally record transactions on a cash basis.
<i>Inadequate Audit Trail</i>	<i>Supported entries</i> \$2.808 billion	The departmental-level accounting entries were processed to force financial data to agree with various data sources, to correct errors, and to add new data. Of the \$4.5 trillion, proper research, reconciliations, and adequate audit trails supported \$2.8 trillion of the department level accounting entries for FY 2000. DoD could improve the accuracy of its financial data by following accounting principles and including the proper support for any accounting entries made to the accounting records.
	<i>Unsupported entries</i> \$1,114 billion	
	<i>Improper entries</i> \$107 billion	
	<i>Entries not reviewed</i> \$477 billion	

Issue	Dollar Amount	Significance
<b>Balance Sheet</b>		
<i>Fund Balance With Treasury (FBWT)</i>	\$28.4 billion	The DoD Components and DFAS did not resolve financial and accounting disparities of \$28.4 billion, and the disparities continue to affect the accuracy of the FBWT account. Auditors were unable to assess the reliability of the \$177.5 billion reported for FB WT on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000 (\$1.2 billion).
<i>Inventory and Related Property, including Operating Materials and Supplies</i>		DoD financial management systems were unable to accurately report amounts for inventory and related property on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000. Internal controls over inventory were inadequate.
<i>General Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&amp;E)</i>	\$112.5 billion	Auditors were unable to verify the \$112.5 billion reported for DoD General PP&E because of a lack of supporting documentation. Previously identified problems still exist that affect the accuracy of amounts reported for real property.
<i>Military Retirement Health Benefits Liability</i>	\$192.4 billion	DoD continued to have problems with accurately reporting its Military Retirement Health Benefits Liability. The FY 2000 estimate of \$192.4 billion was based on unreliable data.
<i>Environmental Liabilities</i>	\$63.2 billion	For FY 2000, \$63.2 billion reported for DoD Environmental Liabilities could not be verified because of insufficient controls and inadequate audit trails. As a result, the Environmental Liabilities reported on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000 were unreliable.

Issue	Dollar Amount	Significance
<b>Statement of Net Cost</b>		
<i>Program Cost Categories</i>		The program categories used for the DoD Agency-wide and DoD Components' Statements of Net Cost were not consistent with the DoD performance goals and measures outlined in the DoD Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) strategic and annual performance plans. DoD guidance incorrectly specified the use of appropriation categories, such as military personnel and operations and maintenance.
<b>Statement of Financing</b>		
<i>Agency- Wide</i>		DoD does not have the processes and financial systems in place to prepare a reliable Statement of Financing. The Statement of Financing reconciled \$454.1 billion of obligations reported on the Statement of Budgetary Resources with the \$347.5 billion net cost of operations reported on the Statement of Net Cost of the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements. However, this information was unreliable because DoD made adjustments to force budgetary and proprietary information to agree and did not disclose eliminating entries.
<b>Statement of Budgetary Resources</b>		
<i>Agency-Wide</i>		<del>Auditors were unable to express an opinion on the Statement of Budgetary Resources because of</del> deficiencies in internal controls and accounting systems related to the Statement of Budgetary Resources.

Issue	Dollar Amount	Significance
<b>Information Security/Internal Controls</b>		
<i>Agency- Wide</i>		Security and application controls over financial management systems <b>are</b> critical to ensuring the integrity of data reported on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000. DoD has become increasingly dependent on automated information systems to carry out its operations <b>and</b> to process, maintain, and report information in the annual financial statements. Auditors issued three reports and the General Accounting Office issued one report that identified security and application control weaknesses over systems that affected the amounts reported on the DoD Agency-Wide financial statements for FY 2000.

## **Appendix C. Related Audit Reports and Testimony**

### **General Accounting Office**

GAO/T-AMID/NSIAD-00-264, Statement of Jeffrey C. Steinhoff, Assistant Comptroller General, before the Task Force on Defense and International Relations, House Committee on the Budget, "DoD: Implications of Financial Management Issues," July 20, 2000.

GAO/T-AMID/NSIAD-00-163, Statement of Jeffrey C. Steinhoff, Assistant Comptroller General, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform, "DoD: Progress in Financial Management Reform," May 9, 2000.

GAO/T-AIMD-00-137, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform, "Auditing the Nations Finances: Fiscal Year 1999 Results Continue to Highlight Major Issues Needing Resolution," March 31, 2000.

GAO/T-AIMD-99-131, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform, "Auditing the Nations Finances: Fiscal Year 1998 Results Highlight Major Issues Needing Resolution," March 31, 1999.

### **Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense**

OIG, DoD, Report No. D-2001-070, "Internal Controls and Compliance with Laws and Regulations for the DoD Agency-wide Financial Statements for FY 2000," February 28, 2001.

Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD, before the Task Force on Defense and International Relations, House Committee on the Budget, "Department of Defense Financial Management", July 20, 2000.

OIG, DoD, Report No. D-2000-123, "Disclosure of Differences in Deposits, Interagency Transfers, and Checks Issued in the FY 1999 DoD Agency-wide Financial Statements," May 18, 2000.

Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD, before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform, "DoD Financial Management," May 9, 2000.

OIG, DoD, Report No. D-2000-091, "Internal Controls and Compliance with Laws and Regulations for the DoD Agency-wide Financial Statements for FY 1999," February 25, 2000.

## **Appendix D. Individuals Interviewed During the Study**

### **Office of the Secretary of Defense**

Allen Beckett, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)  
Karen Grosso, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel  
Dr. John Hamre, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
Doug Larsen, Deputy General Counsel  
Alice Maroni, Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
Dr. David McNichol, Deputy Director, Resource Analysis, Program, Analysis and Evaluation  
Philip Odeen, Vice Chairman, Defense Science Board  
Roger Pitkin, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel  
Robert Soule, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Karen Yanello, Deputy General Counsel

### **Department of the Army**

Dave Borland, Vice Director, Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers/Deputy Chief Information Officer  
Ernie Gregory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations)  
GEN John Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army  
Jan Menig, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management

### **Department of the Navy**

Deborah Christie, Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Wes McNair, Director, Program/Budget Coordination Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Dr. Bob Roarke, Comptroller, Naval Facilities Engineering Command  
Charlie Nemfakos, Senior Civilian Official, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)

### **Department of the Air Force**

Gen John Handy, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force  
Terry Keithley, Chief Financial Officer, Air Force Materiel Command  
Ron Orr, Assistant Deputy Chief-of Staff for Installations and Logistics  
Earl Scott, Deputy Auditor General of the Air Force  
James Short, Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary (Financial Operations)

Ron Speer, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)

**Defense Finance and Accounting Service**

Tom Bloom, Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Audrey Davis, Director, Information and Technology

Joanne Kelley, Chief Field Assistant and Support Division, Accounting Directorate

Kathy Noe, Director for Systems Integration

Jack Nutter, Branch Chief, External Applications and DoD Initiatives Branch

**Other Defense Agencies/DoD Field Activities**

Jay Lane, Director, Finance and Accounting, Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Robert Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, DoD

David Steensma, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD

**Congressional Committees**

Dionel Aviles, Professional Staff Member, House Committee on Armed Services

Larry Lanzillotta, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

Peter Levine, Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services

**Other Federal Departments/Agencies**

Sean O'Keefe, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Nominee

**Private Sector**

Gen (Retired) Richard Hearney, President, Chief Executive Officer, Business Executives  
for National Security

Arnold Punaro, SR VP Corporate Development, SAIC

From P 10/25  
1710

October 24, 2001 10:50 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Reimbursable Rates

Capleton  
10/24

240

I just read your September 28 memo. I cannot understand it. Does that mean it includes healthcare for life or not?

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/29/01 and 10/17/01 USD(C) memos to SecDef [U16278A/01, U17525/01]

DHR:dh  
102401-16

10/24

SECDEF -

The answer is that the reimbursable rates will include health care for life starting in 2003. In 2002, "health care for life" does not apply to active duty military, only current retirees. When the benefit is extended to future retirees in (2003), our reimbursement rate will reflect it. D/Rite

U12938 /02

11-L-0559/QSD/1331

21 OCT 01



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 SEP 20 AM 3: 53

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

OCT 23 2001

INFO MEMO

September 28, 2001 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D*

SUBJECT: Reimbursable Rates for Military Members Detailed outside the Department

- Under applicable Federal law, reimbursable rates for military personnel detailed to other Federal agencies include indirect costs that bear a significant relationship to the cost of the detail. Allowable costs that may be billed include health care costs for active duty members and their dependents.
- Updated cost factors, including health care related costs for active duty members and their dependents, were calculated for military members detailed to other federal agencies. These factors, which are charged in addition to pay and allowances, were calculated using applicable data from the fiscal year 2002 President's Budget. The result is that approximately an additional \$6,500 per member for such costs will be charged as part of the reimbursable rates to be used when military personnel are assigned to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis.

Prepared by: Ms. Tina Jonas, 614-1529

*To USA(c)*

*SecDef - The answer is "Yes but..." (Next under) Difficult 10/27*

*Simple question:  
Does this account for TRICARE PLUS ("health care for life")?*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>12/10/22</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/25/02</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>10/11</i>

*11-12-0559/OSD/1332*

**U16278A/01**

018  
1600

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 2001 OCT 18 PM 4: 08  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

OCT 23 2001

INFO MEMO

October 17, 2001 11:00 PM

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ* OCT 18 2001

SUBJECT: Reimbursable Rates for Military Members Detailed outside the Department

- On the Information Memo for the Secretary of Defense dated September 28, 2001, you asked: "Does this account for TRICARE PLUS ("health care for life")?"
- Beginning in fiscal year 2003, the "Department of Defense Medicare-eligible Retiree Health Care Fund" will be established. Annual payments to the Fund will be made from the Military Personnel appropriation for each active duty member to fund future benefits accrued for TRICARE for Life for current active duty members. These amounts will be included in the fiscal year 2003, and subsequent year, reimbursable rates for military personnel.
- In fiscal year 2002, the Department's TRICARE for Life costs cover only current retirees, retiree family members and survivors who are Medicare-eligible. Accordingly, under applicable Federal law, TRICARE for Life costs for current retirees, retiree family members and survivors who are Medicare-eligible cannot be included in the fiscal year 2002 reimbursable rates for active duty members detailed to other Federal Agencies.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Ms. Tina Jonas, 614-1529

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>DS</i> 10/19

11-L-0559/OSD/1333

U17525 /01



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



2001 DEC -6 PM 1: 50

INFO MEMO

December 5, 2001, 9:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Gunship-Like Weapons

- In a memo on November 8, Under Secretary Aldridge suggested four initiatives to meet the Department's need for "more weapon systems like the AC- 130 [gunship], where the ordnance can be delivered in a more precise way..." in that memo, Secretary Aldridge also noted that Air Force A-1 0 attack aircraft "possess similar capabilities" to gunships.
- The A-1 0 deserves further consideration in selected operations.
- The annual operating cost of the A-1 0 is about one-third that of an AC-130 (\$2.6 M vs. \$7.4 M). New **gunships** also are costly (\$190 M each).
- The AC- 130 achieves greater precision than the A- 10 when overflying targets and employing its unique downward firing guns. The A- 10 has greater survivability, with armor against ground fire (through 23-mm).
- While considering gunship improvements, I suggest the following:
  - Consider deploying some of the 246 A- 10 type aircraft currently in combat units where its capabilities are appropriate.
  - Evaluate upgrading some A-10s with podded radars if an "in weather" capability is needed (A- 10 has infrared sensors only).
  - Conduct an Analysis of Alternatives prior to any decision to retire the A-10s earlier than their projected service life,
- The Air Force and Navy have ongoing UCAV demonstrations, but these projects have **very** limited funding. PA&E is preparing an issue paper for the FY03 program review that will provide acceleration options,

470

5 Dec 01

*used*  
*Dov*  
*discusses during budget meeting as appropriate*  
*DZ*

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*12/10/01*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXEC SEC WHITMORE	12/7

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: USD (AT&L)

Prepared By: Barry D. Watts, 695-0971

5333  
SECDEF HAS SEEN 11/8

NOV - 9 2001

November 8, 2001

9/1/8

To: Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge 

Subject: **Gunship-Like** Weapons

You sent me a note stating "we need *more* weapon **systems** like the AC- 130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way . . . . . ." I agree, and this memo will describe what we are doing.

Two general points. First, the use of the **gunship** requires air superiority, and some self defense capability from ground fire. The **gunships** have been used infrequently, and one could suspect that their proficiency has eroded over time. Second, the gunship's advantage is that it couples target identification, man-in-the-loop decision making and organic firepower in a single platform. The older Air Force A-10s possess similar capabilities. This leads me to suggest the following:

--maximum the use of **gunship** crew training to enhance current effectiveness;

--upgrade the current **gunship** fleet with additional capabilities, such as small **UAVs** and air-to-surface missiles, to augment their guns and **cannons** (we have been in contact with the SOF at **Hulbert** AFB to start such a program);

--augment the **gunships** with UCAVs, but this will take some time to get the UCAVs of **sufficient** size even to achieve a fraction of the kill capability of the AC-130 (we **are currently** working on 3000 pound payload UCAVs);

--refine the target kill **chain—target ID**, decision and rapid target destruction-to "mimic" the **gunship** in its operation, requiring an integrated approach sensors, decision making and lethality (we have a Time Sensitive Target Study underway to do this).

For Information Only.

October 30, 2001 3:09 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Weapon Systems

We need more weapon systems that are like the AC-130, where the ordnance can be directed in a more precise way than can some of our other platforms and weapons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
103001-56

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

11-L-0559/OSD/1337

February 27, 2001 5:07 PM

TO: Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Threat Analysis

I asked the DCI to give me an unclassified version of his threat analysis that he presented to the Congress earlier this month. Here it is. I don't know but what possibly a few of these thoughts might fit into the front piece of your paper.  
Regards.

*000.5*

Attach.

DHR:dh  
022701-30

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

*27 Feb 01*

## **DCI'S WORLDWIDE THREAT BRIEFING: NATIONAL SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD**

### *KEY POINTS:*

We are facing a world in which the US, as the sole military and economic superpower, must stand vigilant against both traditional threats—such as ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism—as well as the new uncertainties that stem from the effects of globalization.

- The threat of terrorist attacks on US facilities and interests has come to the fore. We are seeing increased networking and cooperation among terrorist groups which makes the threat more pervasive and harder to track, raising the likelihood of surprise and making it more difficult to assign responsibility and to take action. All the same, we **believe that Usama bin Ladin and his associates remain the most immediate and serious threat.**
- We see a worsening trend in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. We continue to face ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors beyond Russia and China—specifically, North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq. The threat from new or nontraditional suppliers is growing as successful WMD programs—notably Russia's, China's, and North Korea's—pass on their technology to other would-be **proliferants**. There is also great potential of

“secondary proliferation” from maturing state-sponsored programs such as those in Pakistan, Iran, and India.

- No country in the world rivals the US in its reliance, dependence, and dominance of information systems. Computer-based information operations could provide our adversaries with an asymmetric response to US military superiority by giving them the potential to degrade or circumvent our advantage in conventional military power. Moreover, **cyber** attacks can be launched from anywhere in the world.
- International organized crime and drug trafficking syndicates are becoming more capable as they take advantage of technology and the **globalizing** economy. In particular, **we are focused on the progress of Plan Colombia**; Mexican President Fox’s efforts to rein in the Mexican drug-trafficking organizations; and Afghanistan’s surging opium poppy crop.
- Looking regionally, **developments in the Middle East are key. The violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians has cast uncertainty on the prospects for a near-term peace agreement.** Other trends, such as limited prospects for economic development, population pressures, and exploding popular access to information will also be at work and are likely to have profound long-term effects on the region.

- **Iraq, Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia remain key strategic challenges:**  
Saddam Hussein has grown more confident in his ability to hold on to his power. In Iran, prospects for near-term political reform are receding, China continues its pursuit of great power status. P'yongyang's bold diplomatic outreach to the international community and engagement with South Korea reflect a significant change in strategy. Finally, Russian President **Putin** wants to restore some aspects of the Soviet **past**—status as a great power, strong central authority, and a stable and predictable society—sometimes at the expense of neighboring states or the civil rights of individual Russians.
- The **Balkan countries continue to be fraught with turmoil** and it remains an open question when-or whether-they will be able to stand on their own. And in South Asia, **relations between India and Pakistan remain volatile, making the risk of war between these two nuclear-armed adversaries unacceptably high.**

August 1, 2001 8:28 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meetings with the Russians

It seems to me that one of the first things we need to do is establish a public relations/public affairs policy, or at least discuss it and see if they want to.

I have been noting that both sides get beaten up in the press and then feel a need to respond. My instinct is to play it down the center. When it is all over, either we will have a good arrangement that we both like, or we won't. If we do, if we play it down the center heading that way, we will not bias it either way-that it looks like it is going one way or another, or this thing is being discussed, or something else is being discussed. At the end, the truth will prevail.

From our standpoint, we have no intention of trying to manipulate our press, the Russian press or the world press to our advantage during this period. My instinct is to just demonstrate a seriousness of purpose to try to sort through this. To the extent statements are made, my instinct would be that we should talk to each other before they are made, to the extent possible, and stick fairly close to the center of the lane.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080101-2

Russia

1 Aug 01

U12672 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1342



Let's get press photos at 5

## Foreign Media Item

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service*

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RUSSIA: AFP: No Compromise With US on ABM Treaty: Russian Defense Minister  
WAX20010731000038 Paris AFP in English 0254 GMT 31 Jul 01

{FBIS Transcribed Text} MOSCOW, July 31 (AFP) - Moscow is not prepared to make any concessions on the Anti-Ballistic Missile accord which bars Washington from building a missile defense shield, Russian Defense minister **Sergey Ivanov** said Tuesday.

Reports in the Russian press last week that Russia was ready to strike a deal with the United States to amend the cornerstone 1972 ABM agreement which both countries signed in 1972 "are not in the least justified," **Ivanov** told the **Interfax** news agency.

"There exists no agreement between Russia and the United States on anti-missile defense or strategic offensive weapons, since there haven't been any negotiations to speak of so far," **Ivanov** said.

"We are waiting for the United States to tell us what it is they have in mind when they talk about this limited missile defense shield they plan to build," he added.

The United States intends to build a national missile defense system (NMD), at odds with the ABM Treaty, which it says would protect it from attacks from so-called "rogue states" like North Korea or Iran, but would not be able to stop Russian missiles.

US National Security Adviser **Condoleezza Rice** was in Moscow last week in a bid to impress on Russia the need to move beyond the ABM agreement.

Moscow declared on Friday that **Rice** had offered no new or convincing arguments in favor of missile defense and that Russia remained strictly opposed to the idea.

September 13, 2001 1:27 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Mubarak

Please look at the statement from Mubarak. It is inexcusable.  
And we give him hundreds of millions in aid? Even Syria was better.  
Don't forget.

Attach.  
FBJS-FMN 01-377

DHR:dh  
091301-3

*000,5*

*13 Sep 01*

U12730 /02



FBIS

## Foreign Media Note

[Note: This FMN is based on information available as of 1800 Tuesday]

### International Media Reaction to Bombings in New York, Washington, DC (#2)

**Palestinians** Following the attacks, hundreds of Palestinians rejoiced in the streets of East Jerusalem, Ram'allah, and other parts of the West Bank, dancing and distributing candy to passers by. Similar celebrations were also observed in Lebanon in the Ayn al-Hilwah and Shatila refugee camps with Palestinians in the streets saying, "this is a blow to the Great Satan for supporting Israel" (Tel Aviv Ynet; BBC; CNN).

- **HAMAS** spiritual leader Shaykh Ahmad Yasin declared "there is no doubt that this is the outcome of the injustice that the US exercises against the oppressed people in the world . . . we are against harming civilians and we do not support attacks against defenseless people, but we say that the US must review its calculations" (Al-Jazirah).
- **Palestinian Liberation Front** official Dr. Wasil Abu-Yusuf said, "what takes place today is a reaction to the US policies that are hostile to the rights of people under occupation in the Third World, particularly in Palestine. We can say that today's incidents are the result of the policy that is completely biased toward the Jewish State" (Quds Press).

**Israel** In a televised address this evening, Prime Minister Sharon declared that Israel will observe tomorrow a "national day of mourning and solidarity" with the American people.

- Defense Minister Ben-Eli'ezer said "radical Islamic terrorism is the central international threat today to the countries of the free world, because its goal is to smash and destroy all values of democratic governments and western societies" (*Ha'aretz*).

**Saudi Arabia** Although the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) cited a "responsible source" as condemning the attacks, as of 2120 GMT, no Saudi official has been observed to comment on them. According to SPA, Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz met in Jedda today with Sudanese President Umar Hasan Al Bashir, but the news agency did not report any comment by the Crown Prince on the attacks.

**Egypt** Egyptian President Mubarak, asked in an interview if today's bombings would have any consequences on the Mideast situation, replied: "I cannot say anything now. They [the US] have a problem. They have a disaster and we cannot talk about this issue at all. When they collect themselves and assert their position we will talk" (Arab Republic of Egypt Radio).

This foreign media note is based exclusively on the content and behavior of selected foreign public media. It is issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

11-L-0559/OSD/1345

April 30, 2001 6:09 PM

TO: Steve Herbits *Cam Lrs*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Global Threat

Here are the global threat papers by Admiral Wilson and George Tenet, Please take a look at both of them and tell me whether or not you think they fit with the threat assessment that is being prepared for the ballistic missile defense threat assessment.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/1/01 Wilson memo to SecDef w/ 3/6/01 Testimony and 2/26/01 Tenet Testimony

DHR:dh  
043001-53

381

30 Apr 01

U08420 / 01



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D.C 20340-0001

*B3/1/01*

U-029/DR

1 March 2001

To: SECDEF DEPSECDEF

Subject: Global Threat Testimony

1. Attached is my unclassified Statement for the Record (SFR) for the 6 March Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on the worldwide threat through 2015. The product is to be delivered to the Hill on 2 March. The Director of Central Intelligence is the lead witness for this closed hearing. I will testify as a supporting witness. We have also submitted this statement to the OSD/Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review.

2. A summary of my statement is as follows: The United States continues to face an array of security challenges. Transnational issues -- terrorism, proliferation, and crime -- may become more difficult to address due to globalization. Continuing global turmoil will foster complex operating environments and spur adversary use of asymmetric approaches, including those designed to attack our homeland and critical infrastructure. Russia and China will retain strategic threat capabilities. North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq will field intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, potential regional foes will maintain large conventional forces augmented by weapons of mass destruction, longer-range missiles, and selected 21<sup>st</sup> Century technologies. This is an updated statement from the one prepared for an earlier SASC hearing that was cancelled. The updated statement responds to the Committee's desire for the SFR to include the defense intelligence community's readiness "to evaluate these emerging, evolving threats".

It also includes an introduction to the community's "Four Thrusts" initiative.

3. I anticipate questions covering the full range of threats, with emphasis placed on the asymmetric threat. Chairman Warner created the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee specifically because of his interest in new, unconventional threats. His high interest in the USS Cole attack reinforces this expectation. Also, I anticipate significant questioning related to the relative probabilities of attack on the U.S. by ballistic missiles versus various forms of terrorist attack or cyber warfare.

*WR*  
  
THOMAS R. WILSON  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director

cc:  
USD(A&T)  
USD(P)  
ASD(C3I)  
ASD(LA)  
ASD(PA)  
DASD(I)

# **Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015**

**Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency**



**Statement for the Record  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
6 March 2001**

## The Emerging Global Security Environment

"What's past is prologue" Shakespeare wrote. Those words have relevance today with respect to the recent and future global security environment. The 1990s were a time of transition and turmoil as familiar Cold War issues, precepts, structures, and strategies gave way to new security paradigms and problems. That transition continues, with the end nowhere in sight. In fact, I expect the next 10 to 15 years to be at least as turbulent, if not more so. The basic forces bringing stress and change to the international order – some of them outlined below – will remain largely at work, and no power, circumstance, or condition is likely to emerge capable of overcoming these and creating a more stable global environment.

**Globalization** – defined here as the increasing (and increasingly less restricted) flow of money, people, information, technology, ideas, etc. throughout the world – remains an important, and perhaps even the dominant, influence. Globalization is generally a positive force that will leave most of the world's people better off. But in some ways, globalization will exacerbate local and regional tensions, increase the prospects and capabilities for conflict, and empower those who would do us harm. For instance, the globalization of technology and information – especially regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons – will increasingly accord smaller states, groups, and individuals destructive capabilities previously limited to major world powers. Encouraging and consolidating the positive aspects of globalization, while managing and containing its 'downsides,' will be a continuing challenge.

Globalization is independent of any national policy and can weaken the power of governments to control events within and beyond their borders. Nevertheless, many individuals, groups, and states equate globalization to 'Americanization' ... that is, the expansion, consolidation, and perceived dominance of US power, values, ideals, culture, and institutions. This dynamic –

in which the US is seen as both a principal proponent for and key benefactor of globalization – and the global reaction to it, will underpin many of the security challenges we face during the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Not everyone shares our particular view of the future and *disaffected states, groups, and individuals* will remain an important factor and a key challenge for US policy.

- Some (e.g. Iran, various terrorists, and other criminal groups) simply reject or fear our values and goals. They will continue to exploit certain aspects of globalization, even as they try to fend off some of its consequences (like openness and increased global connectivity). They will frequently engage in violence – targeting our policies, facilities, interests, and personnel – to advance their interests and undermine ours.
- Others, either unable or unwilling to share in the benefits of globalization, will face deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation. These conditions will create fertile ground for political, ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism. For many of those 'left behind,' the US will be viewed as a primary source of their troubles and a primary target of their frustration.
- Still others will, at times, simply resent (or be envious of) US power and perceived hegemony, and will engage in 'milder' forms of anti-US rhetoric and behavior. As a consequence, we are likely to confront temporary anti-US 'coalitions' organized or spontaneously forming to combat or rally against a specific US policy initiative or action.

*Global demographic trends* remain a factor. World population will increase by more than a billion by 2015, with 95 percent of that growth occurring in the developing world. Meanwhile developing-world urbanization will continue, with some 20-30 million of the world's poorest people migrating to urban areas each year. These trends will have profound implications that will vary by country and region. Poorer states, or those with weak governance, will experience

additional strains on their resources, infrastructures, and leadership. Many will struggle to cope, some will undoubtedly fail. At the same time, some advanced and emerging market states – including key European and Asian allies – will be forced to reexamine longstanding political, social, and cultural precepts as they attempt to overcome the challenges of rapidly aging populations and declining workforce cohorts. In these and other cases, demographic pressures will remain a potential source of stress and instability.

***Rapid technology development and proliferation*** – particularly with respect to information, processing, and communications technologies, biotechnology, advanced materials and manufacturing, and weapons (especially weapons of mass destruction) – will continue to have a profound impact on the way people live, think, work, organize, and fight. The globalization of technology, the integration and fusion of various technological advancements, and unanticipated applications of emerging technologies, make it difficult to predict the technological future. Regarding military technology, two other trends – constrained global defense spending, and the changing global armaments industry – will affect the nature of future conflict.

- Global defense spending dropped some 50% during the past decade and, with the exception of Asia, is likely to remain limited for some time to come. This trend will continue to have multiple impacts. First, both adversaries and allies are not likely to keep pace with the US military (despite our own spending limitations). This will continue to spur foes toward asymmetric options, widen the capability gap between US and allied forces, reduce the number of allied redundant systems, and increase the demand on unique US force capabilities. Additional, longer-term impacts – on global defense technology development and proliferation, and on US-allied defense industrial consolidation, cooperation, and technological competitiveness – are likely, though difficult to foresee.
- Limited defense budgets, declining arms markets, and the globalization of technology are leading to a more competitive global armaments industry. In

this environment, with many states attempting to diversify either export markets or sources of arms, technology transfer restrictions and arms embargoes will be more difficult to maintain. Military technology diffusion is a certainty. Advantages will accrue to states with strong commercial technology sectors, the 'adaptiveness' to successfully link civilian technologies to defense programs, and the foresight to accurately anticipate future warfare requirements. China is one state that meets these criteria, and pursues an aggressive, systematic, comprehensive, and well-integrated technology acquisition strategy.

- While the US will remain in the vanguard of technological prowess, some aspects of our general military-technological advantage are likely to erode, and some technological surprises will undoubtedly occur. But we cannot be very specific about which technologies will 'show up' ... in what quantities ... in the hands of which adversaries ... or how those technologies may be applied in innovative ways.

The complex integration of these factors with other 'second and third order' trends and consequences – including the frequency, intensity, and brutality of ethnic conflict, local resource shortages, natural disasters, epidemics, mass migrations, and limited global response capabilities – portend an extremely dynamic, complex, and uncertain global future. Consider for instance the significant doubts we face today concerning the likely directions of Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula. Developments in each of these key states and regions will go a long way toward defining the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment, but outcomes are simply too tough to call. This complexity humbles those of us charged with making judgments about the future and makes specific 'point-projections' of the future threat less meaningful. It is perhaps more useful for us to identify some of the more troubling potential circumstances, and broadly define the kinds of challenges we are most likely to encounter.

## Key Near Term Concerns

While specific threats are impossible to predict, and new threats and challenges can arise almost without warning in today's environment, over the next 12-24 months, I am most concerned about the following potential situations.

- ***A major terrorist*** attack against United States interests, either here or abroad, perhaps with a weapon designed to produce mass casualties. Terrorism remains the 'asymmetric approach of choice' and many terrorist groups have both the capability and desire to harm us. Terrorism is the most likely direct threat to US interests worldwide. I will discuss the terrorist threat in more detail a little later on.
- ***Worsening conditions in the Middle East.*** An expansion of Israeli-Palestinian violence and the complete collapse of the Middle East peace process would have numerous troubling implications:
  - An increased risk of anti-American violence – particularly terrorism.
  - An increased risk of a wider regional conflict.
  - Intensified Iraqi efforts to exploit the conflict to gain relief from sanctions.
  - An increased chance that Iraq will be successful in gaining widespread support for lifting UN sanctions . . . a development that would likely strain our relations with regional and European allies, allow Iraq to rearm more rapidly, and ultimately, threaten the foundation of our Middle Eastern policy.
- ***Dramatic changes on the Korean peninsula*** . . . either a breakdown in rapprochement and a return to an increased threat of war, or, less likely, an accelerated move toward reunification whose impact catches regional powers unprepared.
- ***An expanded military conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir*** . . . with the potential for a nuclear exchange. Both sides operate from 'zero-sum perspectives,' retain large forces, in close proximity, across a tense line of control. The potential for mistake and miscalculation remains relatively

high. Meanwhile, both continue to pursue a wide range of WMD and missile programs.

- ***Intensifying disagreements with Russia*** (over National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty, European security issues, etc.) spurred by President Putin's more assertive and potentially confrontational foreign policy.
- ***Increased anti-American violence and regional instability*** as Colombian insurgents and drug traffickers react to the implementation of Plan Colombia.
- ***Another outbreak of violence in the Balkans*** . . . between Belgrade and Montenegro and/or Belgrade and Kosovo . . . as these smaller territories continue their demands for increased autonomy or independence.
- ***Conflict between China and Taiwan*** . . . resulting from increased pressure by Beijing for reunification or a more assertive stance from Taiwan on independence.

### **Longer-Term Threats and Challenges**

Beyond these immediate concerns, I have a long list of more enduring potential threats and challenges. Some of these are in the category of 'the cost of doing business' in that they are generally a consequence of our unique power and position and will exist so long as we remain globally engaged. Others are more a reflection of the complex mix of political, social, economic, technological, and military conditions that characterize today's world. Still others reflect more direct anti-American sentiments held by various nations, groups, and individuals. While none of these individual challenges is as directly threatening to the US as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War, collectively they form a significant barrier to our goals for the future.

### **Engagement challenges**

So long as the global security environment remains turbulent and the US retains (and remains willing to exercise) unique leadership and response capabilities, we will likely experience a high demand for military, diplomatic, and intelligence engagement. Global turbulence could spawn a spectrum of potential

conflict ranging from larger-scale combat contingencies, through containment deployments, peace operations, and humanitarian relief operations. Such wide-ranging contingencies would pose diverse challenges for our defense and intelligence services.

First, 'engagement contingencies' will generally occur toward the lower end of the conflict spectrum, in less-developed nations. As a consequence, they will frequently require our forces to operate in challenging 'asymmetric environments' (urban centers, or remote, austere, or otherwise underdeveloped areas with limited infrastructures, inadequate health and sanitation facilities, high levels of industrial or other toxic contamination, etc.). These environments will present unique deployment, operational, intelligence, and logistical problems that may limit many of our 'information age' force advantages. Similarly, such contingencies will, more often than not, pit us against adversaries who are likely to employ a variety of asymmetric approaches to offset our general military superiority. (I will address some of these in the following section).

Another consequence of high levels of peacetime engagement is increased operations (and personnel) tempo (OPTEMPO) for both our military and intelligence services. High OPTEMPO strains equipment, resources, and personnel, reduces time for 'normal' activities such as training, education & maintenance, disrupts personnel and unit rotation cycles, and stresses personnel. These impacts are cumulative, worsening over time. Speaking strictly from the intelligence perspective, I was very concerned during the recent Kosovo campaign that we would have had a tough time supporting another major crisis, should one have arisen. Additionally, as a manager of intelligence resources, I remain concerned that our intelligence capability is being stretched 'a mile wide and an inch deep.' Prioritizing our efforts against the most important threats ... maintaining focus on those ... doing the research, data base maintenance, and long term analytic projects required to maintain our analytic

depth . . . and generally being proactive instead of reactive . . . are all more difficult to do in a high tempo security environment.

Finally, high levels of peacetime engagement can limit our flexibility and extend our response times because committed forces, personnel, and resources are not easily extracted and readily available for new contingencies. In fact, it may be that on a daily basis, our simultaneous involvement in 'many lesser crises' equates to a 'major theater war' contingency . . . in terms of our available resources and capabilities.

### **Asymmetric challenges**

Our future opponents – from states to drug lords – are likely to be smart and adaptive. Recognizing our general military superiority, they will avoid engaging 'on our terms,' opting instead to pursue strategies designed to render our military power indecisive or irrelevant to their operations and objectives. They will make the effort (intelligence work) to understand how we think, organize, command, and operate . . . will attempt to identify our strengths, weaknesses, and potential vulnerabilities . . . and will pursue a variety of generally lower-cost operational and technological initiatives which they hope will achieve disproportionate (especially psychological) results. They seek capabilities that we are either unwilling or unable to counter, thereby either denying our leadership the 'military option,' or forcing us to 'disengage' before they are defeated. At the worst, asymmetric approaches threaten to undermine the 'full spectrum dominance' envisioned in our Joint Vision 2020 concept.

While specific adversaries, objectives, targets, and means of attack will vary widely from situation to situation, I think most asymmetric approaches will fit generally into five broad, overlapping categories:

- **Counter will** . . . designed to make us 'not come, or go home early' . . . by severing the 'continuity of will' between the US national leadership, the military, the people, our allied and coalition partners, and world public opinion.

- **Counter access** . . . designed to deny US (allied) forces easy access to key theaters, ports, bases, facilities, air, land, and sea approaches, etc.
- **Counter precision engagement** . . . designed to defeat or degrade US precision intelligence and attack capabilities.
- **Counter protection** . . . designed to increase US (allied) casualties and, in some cases, directly threaten the US homeland.
- **Counter information** . . . designed to prevent us from attaining information and decision superiority.

Beyond these broader generalizations, I have highlighted below several types of asymmetric approaches we are most likely to encounter during the next 10-15 years.

**Terrorism,** Terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric threat to our interests at home and abroad. This threat will grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as the source of their troubles. Most anti-US terrorism will be regional and based on perceived racial, ethnic or religious grievances. Terrorism will tend to occur in urban centers, often capitals. Our overseas military presence and our military's status as a symbol of US power, interests, and influence can make it a target. However, in many cases, increased security at US military and diplomatic facilities will drive terrorists to attack 'softer' targets such as private citizens or commercial interests. The characteristics of the most effective terrorist organizations – highly compartmented operations planning, good cover and security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness – make them very difficult intelligence targets. Middle East-based terrorist groups will remain the most important threat, but our citizens, facilities, and interests will be targeted worldwide. State sponsors (primarily Iran) and individuals with the financial means (such as Usama bin Ladin) will continue to provide much of the economic and technological support needed by terrorists. A move toward 'higher-casualty attacks' is predictable as globalization provides

terrorists access to more destructive conventional weapons technologies and WMD.

**Information Operations.** Information operations can involve many components including electronic warfare, psychological operations, physical attack, denial and deception, computer network attack, and the use of more exotic technologies such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons. Adversaries recognize our civilian and military reliance on advanced information technologies and systems, and understand that information superiority provides the US unique capability advantages. Many also assess that the real center of gravity for US military actions is US public opinion. Accordingly, numerous potential foes are pursuing information operations capabilities as relatively low cost means to undermine domestic and international support for US actions, to attack key parts of the US national infrastructure, or to preclude (or make more difficult) our attainment of information superiority. The threat from information operations will grow significantly during the next decade or so.

- Computer network operations, for instance, offer new options for attacking the United States . . . potentially anonymously and with selective (including non-lethal) effects. Attacks can be focused against our traditional continental sanctuary, or designed to slow or disrupt the mobilization, deployment, combat operations, and resupply of US military forces. Software tools for network intrusion and disruption are becoming globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested US adversary a basic computer network (cyber) exploitation or attack capability. To date, however, the skills and effort needed for adversaries to use tools and technology effectively – such as intensive reconnaissance of US target networks, for example – remain important limits on foreign cyber attack capabilities.

**WMD and Missile Proliferation.** Many potential adversaries believe they can preclude US force options and offset US conventional military superiority by

developing WMD and missiles. Others are motivated more by regional threat perceptions. In either case, the pressure to acquire WMD and missiles is high, and, unfortunately, globalization creates an environment more amenable to proliferation activities. Some 25 countries now possess – or are in the process of acquiring and developing – WMD or missiles. Meanwhile, a variety of non-state actors are showing increasing interest. New alliances have formed, providing pooled resources for developing these capabilities, while technological advances and global economic conditions have made it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. The basic sciences necessary to produce these weapons are widely understood. Most of the technology is readily available, and the raw materials are common. All told, the global WMD/missile threat to US and allied territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase significantly.

- Russia, China, and North Korea remain the ‘WMD and missile’ suppliers of primary concern. Russia, for instance, has exported ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Iran . . . China has provided missile and other assistance to Iran and Pakistan . . . and North Korea remains a key source for ballistic missiles and related components and materials. Over time, as other nations (such as Iran) acquire more advanced capabilities, they too are likely to become important proliferators.
- Several states of concern – particularly Iran and Iraq – could acquire nuclear weapons during the next decade or so, and some existing nuclear states – India and Pakistan, for instance – will undoubtedly increase their inventories.
- Chemical and biological weapons are generally easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and will be readily available to those with the will and resources to attain them. More than two dozen states or non-state groups either have, or have an interest in acquiring, chemical weapons, and there are a dozen countries believed to have biological warfare programs. I expect chemical and biological weapons to be widely proliferated, and they could well be used in a regional conflict or terrorist attack over the next 15 years.

- The potential development/acquisition of intercontinental missiles by several states of concern – especially North Korea, Iran, and Iraq – could fundamentally alter the strategic threat. Meanwhile, longer-range theater (up to 3,000 km) ballistic and cruise missile technology proliferation is a growing challenge. The numbers of these systems will increase significantly during the next 15 years. So too will their accuracy and destructive impact.

***The Foreign Intelligence Threat.*** Adversaries hoping to employ asymmetric approaches against the United States need detailed intelligence on US decision-making, operational concepts, capabilities, shortcomings, and vulnerabilities. Consequently, we continue to face extensive intelligence threats from a large number of foreign nations and sub-national entities including terrorists, international criminal organizations, foreign commercial enterprises, and other disgruntled groups and individuals. These intelligence efforts are generally targeted against our national security policy-making apparatus, national infrastructure, military plans, personnel, and capabilities, and our critical technologies. While foreign states – particularly Russia and China – present the biggest intelligence threat, all our adversaries are likely to exploit technological advances to expand their collection activities. Moreover, the open nature of our society, and increasing ease with which money, technology, information, and people move around the globe in the modern era, make effective counterintelligence and security that much more complex and difficult to achieve.

***Cover, Concealment, Camouflage, Denial and Deception (C3D2).*** Many potential adversaries – nations, groups, and individuals – are undertaking more and increasingly sophisticated C3D2 operations against the United States. These efforts are generally designed to hide key activities, facilities, and capabilities (e.g. mobilization or attack preparations, WMD programs, advanced weapons systems developments, treaty noncompliance, etc.) from US intelligence, to manipulate US perceptions and assessments of those programs, and to protect key capabilities from US precision strike platforms. Foreign

knowledge of US intelligence and military operations capabilities is essential to effective C3D2. Advances in satellite warning capabilities, the growing availability of camouflage, concealment, deception, and obscurant materials, advanced technology for and experience with building underground facilities, and the growing use of fiber optics and encryption, will increase the C3D2 challenge.

***Counter-Space Capabilities.*** The US reliance on (and advantages in) the use of space platforms is well known by our potential adversaries. Many are attempting to reduce this advantage by developing capabilities to threaten US space assets, in particular through denial and deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack. A number of countries are interested in or experimenting with a variety of technologies that could be used to develop counter-space capabilities. These efforts could result in improved systems for space object tracking, electronic warfare or jamming, and directed energy weapons. China and Russia have across-the board programs underway, and other smaller states and non-state entities are pursuing more limited – though potentially effective – approaches. By 2015, future adversaries will be able to employ a wide variety of means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat portions of the US space support system.

***Threats to Critical Infrastructure.*** Many adversaries believe the best way to avoid, deter, or offset US military superiority is to develop a capability to threaten the US homeland. In addition to more traditional strategic nuclear threats (discussed below), our national infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions by other forms of physical and computer attack. The interdependent nature of the infrastructure creates even more of a vulnerability. Foreign states have the greatest attack potential (in terms of resources and capabilities), but the most immediate and serious threat today is from insiders, terrorists, criminals, and other small groups or individuals carrying out well-coordinated strikes against selected critical nodes.

## **Criminal Challenges**

International criminal activity of all kinds will continue to plague US interests. I am very concerned about the growing sophistication of criminal groups and individuals and their increasing potential to exploit certain aspects of globalization for their own gain. The potential for such groups to usurp power, or undermine social and economic stability is likely to increase.

- International drug cultivation, production, transport, and use will remain a major problem. The connection between drug cartels, corruption, and outright insurgency will likely increase (witness Colombia) as drug money provides an important funding source for all types of criminal and anti-government activity. Emerging democracies and economically strapped states will be particularly susceptible. The drug trade will continue to produce tensions between and among drug producing, transport, and user nations.
- I am also increasingly concerned about other forms of international criminal activity – for instance, ‘cyber-criminals’ who attempt to exploit the electronic underpinnings of the global financial, commercial, and capital market systems, and nationally based ‘mafia’ groups who seek to undermine legitimate governments in states like Russia and Nigeria. Globally, criminal cartels are becoming more sophisticated at exploiting technology, developing or taking control of legitimate commercial activities, and seeking to directly influence – through infiltration, manipulation, and bribery – local, state, and national governments, legitimate transnational organizations, and businesses. Increased cooperation between independent criminal elements, including terrorist organizations, is likely. Greater interaction among the US military, the Intelligence Community, and other federal agencies will be required to counter this growing threat.

## **Strategic challenges**

Beyond the asymmetric and infrastructure threats to our homeland outlined above, we will continue to face an array of more traditional, albeit evolving,

strategic threats. Under virtually any circumstance short of state failure, Russia will maintain a viable strategic nuclear force. Moscow has begun deployment of the new SS-27 ICBM and has upgrades to this missile and several other systems under development. While strategic forces retain their priority, they have not been immune to the problems affecting the rest of the Russian military. System aging, chronic underfunding, and arms control agreements ensure that Russian strategic warhead totals will continue to decline – from some 5,000 today to a future force perhaps under 1,500 warheads (depending on arms control treaties, decisions we make about missile defense, the state of the Russian economy, Russian perceptions of other strategic threats, etc).

At the same time, for at least the next decade or so, Moscow will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons to compensate for its diminished conventional capability. This policy – published in the October 1999 Russian Military Doctrine statement and reiterated in January and April 2000 – lowers the theoretical threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons. One additional concern, which will remain with us so long as Russia remains in some turmoil, is the potential for a Russian nuclear weapon (or more likely, nuclear material) to be stolen by or otherwise diverted to a state of concern, a terrorist group, or other criminal organization.

One of Beijing's top military priorities is to strengthen and modernize its small, dated strategic nuclear deterrent. While the ultimate extent of China's strategic modernization is difficult to forecast, the number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the US will increase during the next 20 years. We know little about China's concepts for nuclear weapons use, especially with respect to Beijing's views on the role and utility of strategic weapons in an international crisis involving important Chinese interests (e.g. Taiwan or the Korean peninsula).

- China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000 km. Several new strategic missile systems are under development, including two

new road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. One of these, the 8,000 km DF-31, was successfully flight-tested in 1999 and 2000. Another, longer-range mobile ICBM will likely be tested within the next several years.

- China currently has a single *X/A* class SSBN, which is not operational. It is intended to carry 12 CSS-NX-3 missiles (with ranges exceeding 1,000 km). China is developing a new SSBN and an associated SLBM (the 8,000+ km JL-2). These systems will likely be developed and tested later this decade.
- China also has upgrade programs for associated command, control, communications and other related strategic force capabilities.

Beyond China and Russia, several states – especially North Korea and, later on, Iran and possibly Iraq – could field small numbers of long-range, WMD-equipped missiles capable of striking the United States. Again, we know very little about how these states think about strategic weapons, deterrence, and escalation.

- North Korea has made substantial missile progress during the last several years. The August 1998 launch of the Taepo Dong (TD) 1 system demonstrated several of the key technologies required to develop an ICBM, including stage separation. A three-stage TD 1 could potentially deliver a light payload to the US, albeit with very poor accuracy. North Korea is also developing a TD 2 ICBM, which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska or Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the US. A three-stage TD 2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the US. In September 1999, and again in June and October 2000, North Korea agreed to refrain from testing long-range missiles . . . a pledge it has lived up to so far.
- Iran's Defense Minister has publicly talked of plans for developing a platform more capable than the Shahab 3 (a 1,300 km MRBM based on North Korea's No Dong). While this could refer to a space launch vehicle, Iran may also have ICBM plans. Sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities is furthering Tehran's expertise and it could test a space

launch vehicle (with ICBM applications) within 15 years. However, if Iran purchased an ICBM from North Korea or elsewhere, further development might not be necessary.

- Despite the damage done to Iraq's missile infrastructure during the Gulf War, Operation Desert Fox, and subsequent UNSCOM activities, Iraq may have ambitions for longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Depending on the success of acquisition efforts and the degree of foreign support, it is possible that Iraq could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the US by 2015.

As these trends unfold, the strategic threat picture will become more complex, diverse, and complicated, leaving our homeland potentially more vulnerable to a wider array of strategic challenges.

### **Regional Military Challenges**

Joint Vision 2020 is the conceptual template for US force development. It envisions a 21<sup>st</sup> Century 'information age' US military that leverages high quality, highly-trained personnel, advanced technology, and the development of several key operational concepts – including dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics – to achieve dominance across the range of military operations. The United States is moving steadily toward the capabilities embodied in this vision.

In contrast, other large militaries are generally making much slower progress, and will continue to field primarily 'industrial age' forces – mostly mass and firepower oriented, equipped predominantly with late-generation Cold War (vice 21<sup>st</sup> Century) technologies, and retaining centralized, hierarchical command-and-control structures. While less advanced than the US military, these large regional forces will still be potent by regional standards, and, in many cases, be fully capable of accomplishing significant regional objectives. Moreover, during the next 15 years, many regional states will seek to augment

these 'traditional' forces with selected high-end capabilities, including: WMD and missiles, advanced C4I systems, satellite reconnaissance, precision strike systems, global positioning, advanced air defense systems, and advanced anti-surface ship capabilities. To some extent, these 'niche' capabilities will be designed to counter key US concepts (precision strike, global access, information superiority, etc.), in an attempt to deter the US from becoming involved in regional contingencies, or to raise the cost of US engagement.

- Volumetric weapons (VW) are an example of the types of 'counter US' technologies potential adversaries may pursue. Unlike 'traditional' military weapons, which rely on high explosive technologies, VW depend primarily on simple air blast or overpressure to damage or destroy their targets. They actually form clouds, or volumes, of fuel rich materials that detonate relatively slowly. The result is a much larger area of high pressure that causes more damage to personnel (even dug in) and structures. VW technology is becoming more widely known, with several countries openly advertising it for sale. We should anticipate facing VW in either a terrorist or combat environment during the next 15 years.

For the most part, however, even large regional forces will be hard pressed to match our dominant maneuver, power projection, and precision engagement capabilities. But in a specific combat situation, the precise threat these forces pose will depend on a number of factors, including: the degree to which they have absorbed and can apply key '21<sup>st</sup> Century' technologies, have overcome deficiencies in training, leadership, doctrine, and logistics, and on the specific operational-tactical environment. Under the right conditions, their large numbers, combined with other 'situational advantages' – such as initiative, limited objectives, short lines of communication, familiar terrain, time to deploy and prepare combat positions, and the skillful use of 'asymmetric' approaches – could present significant challenges to US mission success. China and perhaps Russia at the high end, followed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are all examples

of militaries that could field large forces with a mix of current and advanced capabilities.

*China.* Beijing recognizes that its long term prospects to achieve great power status depend on its success at modernizing China's economy, infrastructure, and human capital, and it will continue to emphasize those priorities ahead of military modernization. In addition to the limitations posed by these other priorities, China's military is moving from 1960s to 1990s technology, and can probably not efficiently absorb technology upgrades at a much faster rate. Accordingly, I expect China to continue to allow total military spending to grow at about the same rate as the economy, by maintaining a defense burden of roughly 5% of GDP (or about \$40-50 billion in defense spending last year). Part of this steady defense spending increase will be absorbed by rapidly rising personnel costs, a consequence of the overall transformation toward a market economy.

As I mentioned earlier, a top Chinese military priority is to upgrade its small, aging strategic deterrent force (although we have no indications that China intends to develop a 'first strike' strategic capability). In terms of conventional forces, Beijing is pursuing the capability to defend its eastern seaboard – the economic heartland – from attacks by a 'high-technology' opponent employing long-range precision strike capabilities. This means China is expanding its air, anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, reconnaissance, and battle management capabilities, to enable the PLA to project 'defensive' power out to the first island chain. China is also rapidly expanding its conventionally-armed theater missile force (particularly the road-mobile, solid-propellant, 300 km CSS-7), in large measure to give it leverage against Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, other US Asian allies.

As a result of these and other developments, China's capability for regional military operations will improve significantly. By 2010 or so, some of

China's best units will have achieved a reasonably high level of proficiency at maneuver warfare (though they will probably not fully master large, complex joint service operations until closer to 2020). Moreover, by 2015 Chinese forces will be much better equipped, possessing more than a thousand theater-range missiles, hundreds of fourth-generation (roughly F-16 equivalent) aircraft, thousands of 'late Cold War equivalent' tanks and artillery, a handful of advanced diesel and third generation nuclear submarines, and some 20 or so new surface combatants. China is also likely to field an integrated air defense system and modern command-and-control systems at the strategic and operational levels. Selective acquisitions of advanced systems from Russia – such as *Sowremenny* destroyers and *SU-30/Flanker* aircraft – will remain an important adjunct to the PLA's modernization efforts during this period

The Taiwan issue will remain a major potential flashpoint, particularly over the near term. It is doubtful, however, unless Taipei moved more directly toward independence, that China would attempt a larger scale military operation to attack Taiwan outright. Beijing recognizes the risk inherent in such a move and, at least for the near term, probably has questions about its military ability to succeed. Nevertheless, by 2015, China's conventional force modernization will provide an increasingly credible military threat against Taiwan (though probably not the large amphibious capability necessary for invasion).

*Russia.* I remain relatively pessimistic about Russia's prospects, primarily because there are no easy, simple, or near term solutions to the tremendous political, economic, social, and military problems confronting Moscow. Consequently, I expect that many of the issues that concern us today – Russia's role as a proliferator of advanced military and WMD technologies and brainpower, the uncertain security of Russia's nuclear materials and weapons, the expanding local, regional, and global impact of Russian criminal syndicates, and Moscow's questionable reliability as a global security partner – will be with us for some time to come.

In the meantime, Russia's Armed Forces continue in crisis, with even priority strategic force elements receiving only a portion of their authorized funding. Compensation, housing, and other shortfalls continue to undermine morale. Under these conditions – chronic underfunding and neglect – there is little chance that Moscow's conventional forces will improve significantly during the next decade.

- Russia's defense resources remain especially limited, given the still relatively large Russian force structure. Moscow spent some \$40 billion on defense last year – about 3-5% of GDP – and the process of allocating monies remained extremely erratic and inefficient. This level of spending is not enough to fix the Russian military.

Beyond the near term, the size, characteristics, and capabilities of Russia's conventional forces could vary widely, depending on the outcome of numerous unsettled issues. Among the most important of these are the level of Russian defense spending, Russian threat perceptions, the achievement of national consensus on a blueprint for military reform, and Moscow's success at restoring the 'intangible' components of military effectiveness (leadership, readiness, morale, sustainment, etc.).

I still see two principal alternatives for the Russian military beyond 2010. The first (more likely scenario) is that Russia will remain chronically weak (probably posing less of a military threat to the US than it does today). This future would result from continuing neglect of the Russian military by the political leadership – characterized by continued underfunding, lack of prioritization, and minimal success at military reform. If, on the other hand, economic recovery and leadership support come sooner rather than later, Russia could begin rebuilding an effective military toward the end of this decade, and field a smaller, but more modern and capable force in the 2015 timeframe. This improved force would be large and potent by regional standards, equipped with thousands of late-

generation Cold War-era systems, and hundreds of more advanced systems built after 2005.

*Iran.* The election of President Khatemi in August 1997 marked a turning point in Iran's domestic situation. Khatemi received the bulk of his support from minorities, youths, and women (all growing segments of Iran's population), and I am hopeful that Tehran will change for the better over time. For now, however, the religious conservatives who have held power since 1979 remain in control of the security, foreign policy, intelligence, and defense institutions, and generally continue to view the US with hostility. For these reasons, I remain concerned with Tehran's deliberate (though uneven) military buildup. That effort is designed to ensure the security of the cleric-led regime, increase Iran's influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, deter Iraq or any other regional aggressor, and limit US regional influence. While Iran's forces retain significant limitations with regard to mobility, logistics infrastructure, and modern weapons systems, Tehran is attempting to compensate for these by developing (or pursuing) numerous asymmetric capabilities, to include subversion and terrorism, the deployment of air, air defense, missile, mine warfare, and naval capabilities to interdict maritime access in and around the Strait of Hormuz, and the acquisition of WMD and longer range missiles to deter the US and to intimidate Iran's neighbors.

- Iran has a relatively large ballistic missile force – hundreds of Chinese CSS-8s, SCUD Bs and SCUD Cs – and is likely assembling SCUDs in country. Tehran, with foreign assistance, is buying and developing longer-range missiles, already has chemical weapons, and is pursuing nuclear and biological weapons capabilities.
- Iran's navy is the most capable in the region and, even with the presence of Western forces, can probably stem the flow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods employing *KILO* submarines, missile patrol boats, and numerous naval mines, some of which may be modern and sophisticated. Aided by

China, Iran has developed a potent anti-ship cruise missile capability to threaten sea traffic from shore, ship, and aircraft platforms.

Although Iran's force modernization efforts will proceed gradually, during the next 15 years it will likely acquire a full range of WMD capabilities, field substantial numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles – including, perhaps, an ICBM – increase its inventory of modern aircraft, expand its armored forces, and continue to improve its anti-surface ship capability. Iran's effectiveness in generating and employing this increased military potential against an advanced adversary will depend in large part on 'intangibles' – command and control, training, maintenance, reconnaissance and intelligence, leadership, and situational conditions and circumstances.

*Iraq.* So long as Saddam or someone of his ilk remains in power, Iraq will remain challenging and contentious. Saddam's goals remain to reassert sovereignty over all of Iraq, end Baghdad's international isolation, and, eventually, have Iraq reemerge as the dominant regional power. For the time being, however, his options are constrained. Years of UN sanctions, embargoes, and inspections, combined with US and Coalition military actions, have significantly degraded Iraq's military capabilities. Manpower and materiel resource shortages, a problematic logistics system, and a relative inability to execute combined arms operations, remain major shortcomings. These are aggravated by intensive regime security requirements.

Nevertheless, Iraq's ground forces continue to be one of the most formidable within the region. They are able to protect the regime effectively, deploy rapidly, and threaten Iraq's neighbors absent any external constraints. Iraq's air and air defense forces retain only a marginal capability to protect Iraqi air space and project air power outside Iraq's borders. Although the threat to Coalition Forces is limited, continued Iraqi confrontational actions underscore the regime's determination to stay the course. Iraq has probably been able to retain

a residual level of WMD and missile capabilities. The lack of intrusive inspection and disarmament mechanisms permits Baghdad to enhance these capabilities.

- Iraq probably retains limited numbers of SCUD-variant missiles, launchers, and warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents. Baghdad continues work on short-range (150 km) liquid and solid propellant missiles allowed by UNSCR 687 and can use this expertise for future long range missile development. Iraq may also have begun to reconstitute chemical and biological weapons programs.

Absent decisive regime change, Iraq will continue to pose complex political and military challenges to Coalition interests well into the future. Saddam has been increasingly effective during the past year at circumventing sanctions and exploiting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to garner sympathy for Iraq's plight by linking the Iraqi and Palestinian causes. Should sanctions be formally removed, or become de facto ineffective, Iraq will move quickly to expand its WMD and missile capabilities, develop a more capable strategic air defense system, and improve other conventional force capabilities. Under this scenario, Baghdad could, by 2015, acquire a large inventory of WMD – including hundreds of theater ballistic and cruise missiles – expand its inventory of modern aircraft, and double its fleet of armored vehicles. While this force would be large and potent by regional standards, its prospects for success against a western opponent would depend ultimately on how successful Baghdad was in overcoming chronic weaknesses in military leadership, reconnaissance and intelligence, morale, readiness, logistics, and training.

**North Korea.** Despite the unexpected relaxation of tensions on the peninsula during the past year, and the real potential for further improvements, North Korea retains a large, forward deployed military force, capable of inflicting significant damage on the South. War on the peninsula would still be very violent and destructive, and could occur with little warning. Moreover, even if the North-South rapprochement continues, Pyongyang is unlikely to significantly reduce its

military posture and capability in the near term, because the North needs its military forces to ensure regime security, retain its regional position, and provide bargaining leverage. In the meantime, the Korean People's Army continues to demonstrate resiliency, managing during the past several years to stop the general capability decline experienced during most of the 1990s and, in some ways, marginally improve its readiness and capability for war.

For the near future, I expect North Korea will continue to proliferate WMD and especially missile technology – one of the few areas where North Korea has something to offer for hard currency on the international market. Pyongyang's proliferation of No Dong missile technology is particularly important for those states seeking to extend the range of their missile fleet. I also expect North Korea to continue to develop and expand its own 'asymmetric' capabilities – WMD, missiles, Special Operations Forces, small submarine insertion platforms, etc. – in part to offset its conventional force shortcomings. And, as I said earlier, I think North Korea has the potential to field an ICBM sometime within the next several years. In short, as long as North Korea remains around in its present form, it will represent one of the major threats to our regional and global interests.

### **The Bottom Lines**

The complex mix of global political, economic, social, technological, and military conditions at work during the next 15 years will spawn wide ranging challenges for our defense and intelligence establishments. Transnational issues – such as terrorism, weapons and technology proliferation, and global criminal activities – will likely be more difficult to address as a result of globalization. Meanwhile, continuing global turmoil will create the conditions for our involvement in a variety of complex operating environments, against adversaries employing a wide range of asymmetric approaches. These 'contingencies' will pose unique challenges for our military and intelligence services. At the same time, we will continue to face an array of strategic threats – from Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces, from potential new ICBM states like North

Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq, and from emerging 'non-traditional' threats to our homeland and critical infrastructure. Collectively this mix will compound the strategic threat picture. Finally, we must remain capable of dealing with large, mostly 'industrial-age' regional military forces, augmented by WMD and longer-range missiles and selected '21st Century' technologies & capabilities. Under the right conditions, these regional militaries could pose a significant challenge, despite our enduring overall military superiority.

The defense intelligence community is working hard to develop the processes, techniques, and capabilities necessary to handle these new and emerging security challenges . . . even as we preserve our capability to understand more traditional military threats and enhance our ability to support military operations on the conventional battlefield. I am very proud of our accomplishments to date and have confidence that, with your continued support, we can provide military operators, policymakers, and acquisition professionals the intelligence they need.

But as I think about our long-term readiness to meet the challenges of this new century, I am concerned about several issues. For instance, some of our unique technical collection systems that have served the nation well for the past 20 years are aging and badly need capital reinvestment. The Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) systems-of-systems is crucial to maintaining coverage against global WMD and missile developments. I also believe we need to expand and revitalize our Defense HUMINT Service, as a key part of the overall push to enhance our collection against difficult worldwide targets. We also need to increase analytic depth and breadth, and improve the content and responsiveness of our data bases. These efforts are absolutely essential if we are to maintain the capability to provide vital intelligence on adversary plans, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities . . . before those adversaries are able to do us harm.

Another area of concern, highlighted earlier in this statement, is mitigating the analytic and other 'opportunity costs' of a high peacetime engagement posture. We need to understand 'up-front' that as we surge to support a given military operation, we pay a very real price in terms of our capability to address longer-term challenges. I am also worried about the long-term trend of decreasing fill rates for military billets within our overall intelligence personnel structure. As a combat support agency, we need the unique insights and expertise these military professionals provide. We also need to ensure that our people – the life-blood of the intelligence enterprise – have the right skill mix, and the secure facilities, bandwidth, connectivity, and collaborative tools to do the job. And finally, some of the information systems that have served us so well in post-Desert Storm military engagements need to be replaced and, as 'Defense of the Homeland' initiatives are considered, reducing intelligence system vulnerabilities should be a priority.

In this regard, I would like to close on a positive note, by highlighting our 'Four Thrust' initiative . . . a collective effort that is critical to our success in confronting the wide ranging defense and intelligence challenges addressed throughout this testimony. Some 18 months ago, the defense intelligence leadership (including the service intelligence chiefs and command J-2s) identified four priority areas where we must make significant progress in order to be ready for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Those were: improving the quality of our military intelligence data bases, ensuring our intelligence systems 'plug and play' in the computer and decision networks of our military customers, shaping to meet the asymmetric threat, and revitalizing/reshaping the work force. Under the leadership of small senior steering groups drawn from throughout the defense intelligence community, we have formulated plans of action to meet the overarching goals of the four thrusts, gaining endorsement by the Military Intelligence Board before moving forward. The thrust areas are all interconnected, and goals, plans, and actions are synchronized to build on the progress of each. Collectively, they are

critical to our building a defense intelligence community well-positioned to support the military today and tomorrow.

## **Oral Statement (Asymmetric Theme)**

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide my views on the intelligence challenges facing our military' and our nation today and in the future. In my more detailed statement for the record, I describe a range of issues, including our traditional update on enduring strategic threats to our homeland, and potential conventional threats posed by large regional militaries. Those issues are important, and I look forward to discussing them with you in the question and answer sessions to follow.

But what I would like to do with these brief opening remarks is focus on one aspect of the future security environment that is particularly troubling to me . . . namely the growing potential and capability for adversaries to use asymmetric approaches to counter US conventional military superiority.

The concept of asymmetric threat stems directly from adversary recognition of US strength, both present and future. Generally, the rest of the world believes the United States is the dominant global power and will remain so for some time to come. This is especially true in the military arena. The superiority of US military concepts, technology, and

capabilities has been a key theme in foreign military assessments since the Gulf War. Many express an expectation, and concern, that our military advantage will only grow in the future as we move steadily toward the operational capabilities expressed in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020 . . . known as JV 2020.

These realizations are driving potential foes to the conclusion that there is little to be gained by engaging the US military on our terms. In fact, most believe that they cannot prevail, force-on-force, against a US military that has the full support of our leadership, citizens, and key allies, and embodies the

Joint Vision 2020 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, focused logistics, precision engagement, and full dimensional protection . . . all enabled by information superiority and innovation.

Accordingly, adversaries increasingly are seeking technological and operational counters to Joint Vision 2020. While coming up with effective ways to defeat the JV 2020 concept is no easy task, I expect these efforts to continue. In fact, I have been struck, during the past year, by the realization that JV 2020 may be the conceptual model driving many adversary force developments and asymmetric approaches. I am increasingly of the opinion that

regardless of the means used – whether terrorism, or information operations, or the threat or use of mass casualty weapons, or a more specific military technology or concept – adversaries who engage the US military will be seeking to counter one or more of the key concepts of our Joint Vision.

For instance, JV 2020 emphasizes the importance of dominant maneuver and focused logistics . . . that is, the need to assemble and move the right force package, in time, to any point on the globe, and to sustain that force once it is there. While we think dominant maneuver, adversaries think counter-access . . . or denying US and allied forces

easy access to key theaters, ports, bases, and facilities, and important air, land, and maritime approaches and lines of communication.

There are any number of counter-access means, either available or under development, which, if successful, could disrupt our dominant maneuver planning concepts and timelines. Examples range from more traditional stand-off military systems, such as anti-ship cruise missiles or other strike assets that can attack forces approaching a given theater, through more subversive approaches such as fomenting instability in foreign states to overturn US-

friendly leaders, or pressuring key in-theater allies to deny US access.

Another key JV 2020 tenant is precision engagement, and again, adversaries have, or want, a host of counter-precision engagement capabilities. For example, we increasingly see the use of various cover, concealment, and deception technologies and methods, including deep underground facilities and multispectral obscurants , to hide key activities and assets from US precision intelligence and strike platforms. At the same time, many are pursuing high technology approaches such as counter-stealth, radio frequency weapons, and ground based lasers, to

enhance their future capability to engage, degrade, or defeat key precision engagement sensors and platforms.

JV 2020 also emphasizes the importance of full dimensional protection for US and allied forces.

Adversaries are emphasizing any number of counter protection capabilities, to include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, and volumetric and other conventional weapons that are designed to inflict mass casualties, even against well-protected, or dug-in military forces.

Beyond these operational concepts, JV 2020 underscores the importance of information superiority as a critical force enabler. In this regard, potential adversaries have, and are developing, extensive capabilities for information operations, to include the denial and deception methods noted above, plus psychological operations, and various means for electronic, physical, or cyber attack against our key information systems.

Finally, implied throughout our discussions of future warfare, is the recognition that our forces are not likely to become involved, or stay engaged, without a collective national willingness to commit

them and stay the course. Adversaries seem to understand this concept too, and either have, or desire, a variety of what I term counter-will capabilities. Generally, these would be designed to deter or preclude the United States from choosing the military option, or to make us disengage short of our objectives if we do pursue a military solution. These capabilities will focus on severing the ‘continuity of will’ between the US national leadership, the military, the people, our allied and coalition partners, and world public opinion.

Examples of counter-will capabilities, both present and future, include information operations that enable

an adversary to shape or persuade domestic and foreign public opinion . . . the use, or threat, of mass casualty weapons, either in theater or against US or allied homelands . . . or adversaries choosing to inflict, cause, or allow extensive collateral damage and casualties as a means to pressure the US to end hostilities.

Mister Chairman, JV 2020 is the right strategy, at the right time, to guide our force development through the first decades of this Century. Its goal, full spectrum dominance, is essential if our military is to be successful against the wide range of threats and challenges we are likely to confront in the coming

years. While it is my duty to point out how potential adversaries may attempt to counter key JV 2020 concepts and enablers, I in no way want to imply that doing so will be easy, or automatic.

That said, what worries me most about these various asymmetric approaches, is that they offer potentially low cost opportunities to achieve disproportionate results against key JV 2020 concepts. What adversaries are seeking is a set of capabilities that we are either unwilling or unable to counter, at least in the timeframe that matters, so that they can accomplish their objective, even in the face of overall US military superiority.

For the US military, the real threat is that we would be unable to deploy or employ our forces as designed, and that the tremendous potential capability imbedded in the JV 2020 concept would be rendered less relevant, or even indecisive. In other words, if asymmetric threat approaches are successful, we will find it hard to fight the way we want to, and may not be able to fight at all.

As we collectively shape our intelligence and response capabilities to meet the asymmetric threat, we must keep in mind the notion of what adversaries are trying to accomplish by using asymmetric

approaches, and what they must accomplish in order for their approach to be decisive. In this regard, I see three prerequisites.

First, our adversaries must enjoy an asymmetry in objectives, meaning that their objective must mean more to them, in terms of the price they are willing to pay, than denying the objective means to us. Second, asymmetric adversaries need good intelligence, to accurately assess our strengths, weaknesses, and potential vulnerabilities. Only then can they design specific technological or operational plans that attack the right US capability, at the right time, to be

decisive. And finally, they must have the capability to act.

The intelligence community has, to date, focused mostly on this third ingredient – capability – in attempting to combat the asymmetric threat.

Terrorism, the proliferation of mass casualty weapons, foreign information operations, and cyber attack capabilities, for instance, are all priority intelligence concerns. And this is only natural, because it is at the capability end of the asymmetric paradigm where the physical damage to American interests, property, and lives, actually occurs. Those efforts are critical, and need to be sustained.

But my concern is that if we 'over focus' only on the means or target of attack we will miss the true implications asymmetric approaches represent. A singular concentration on the deadly consequences of an opponent's catastrophic asymmetric attack may blind us to the more insidious, albeit less deadly threat of slow mission failure or force ineffectiveness. We must build a broader and deeper insight into the motivations, perceptions, objectives, and vulnerabilities of those who would attack us using asymmetric means. It is this understanding, as a necessary precursor to effective response, that may ultimately allow us to defeat the asymmetric threat.

That concludes my opening remarks Mister  
Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

02/26/01

## **Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World**

As I reflect this year, Mr. Chairman, on the threats to American security, what strikes me most forcefully is the **accelerating pace of change** in so many arenas that affect our nation's interests.

Numerous examples come to mind: new communications technology that enables the efforts of terrorists and narcotraffickers as surely as it aids law enforcement and intelligence, rapid global population growth that will create new strains in parts of the world least able to cope, the weakening internal bonds in a number of states whose cohesion can no longer be taken for granted, the breaking down of old barriers to change in places like the Koreas and Iran, the accelerating growth in missile capabilities in so many parts of the world-to name just a few.

Never in my experience, Mr. Chairman, has American intelligence had to deal with such a dynamic set of concerns affecting such a broad range of US interests. Never have we had to deal with such a high quotient of uncertainty. With so many things on our plate, it is important always to establish priorities. For me, the

highest priority must invariably be on those things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security of the United States. With that in mind, let me turn first to the challenges posed by international terrorism.

## **TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES**

We have made considerable progress on terrorism against US interests and facilities, Mr. Chairman, but it persists. The most dramatic and recent evidence, of course, is the loss of **17** of our men and women on the USS Cole at the hands of terrorists.

The threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State sponsored terrorism appears to have declined over the past five years, but transnational groups-with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt-are emerging. We are seeing fewer centrally controlled operations, and more acts initiated and executed at lower levels.

Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and more technically sophisticated in order to defeat counterterrorism measures. For example, as we have increased security around government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out “softer” targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties. Employing increasingly advanced devices and using strategies such as simultaneous attacks, the number of people killed or injured in international terrorist attacks rose dramatically in the 1990s, despite a general decline in the number of incidents. Approximately one-third of these incidents involved US interests.

Usama bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat. Since 1998, Bin Ladin has declared all US citizens legitimate targets of attack. As shown by the bombing of our Embassies in Africa in 1998 and his Millennium plots last year, he is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning.

His organization is continuing to place emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection, blame,

and retaliation. As a result it is often difficult to attribute terrorist incidents to his group, Al Qa'ida.

Beyond Bin Ladin, the terrorist threat to Israel and to participants in the Middle East peace negotiations has increased in the midst of continuing Palestinian-Israeli violence. Palestinian rejectionists—including HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)-have stepped up violent attacks against Israeli interests since October. The terrorist threat to US interests, because of our friendship with Israel has also increased.

At the same time, Islamic militancy is expanding, and the worldwide pool of potential recruits for terrorist networks is growing. In central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, Islamic terrorist organizations are trying to attract new recruits, including under the banner of anti-Americanism.

International terrorist networks have used the explosion in information technology to advance their capabilities. The same technologies that allow individual consumers in the United States to search out and buy books in Australia or India also enable terrorists to raise money, spread their dogma, find recruits, and plan

operations far afield. Some groups are acquiring rudimentary cyberattack tools. Terrorist groups are actively searching the internet to acquire information and capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear attacks. Many of the 29 officially designated terrorist organizations have an interest in unconventional weapons, and Usama bin Ladin in 1998 even declared their acquisition a "religious duty."

Nevertheless, we and our Allies have scored some important successes against terrorist groups and their plans, which I would like to discuss with you in closed session later today. Here, in an open session, let me assure you that the Intelligence Community has designed a robust counterterrorism program that has preempted, disrupted, and defeated international terrorists and their activities. In most instances, we have kept terrorists off-balance, forcing them to worry about their own security and degrading their ability to plan and conduct operations.

## *PROLIFERATION*

I would like to turn now to **proliferation**. A variety of states and groups continue to seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

First, let me discuss the continuing and growing threat posed to us by ICBMs.

We continue to face ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors beyond Russia and China--specifically, North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly in other cases, their programs are the result of indigenous technological development, and in other cases, they are the beneficiaries of direct foreign assistance. And while these emerging programs involve far fewer missiles with less accuracy, yield, survivability, and reliability than those we faced during the Cold War, they still pose a threat to US interests.

For example, more than two years ago **North Korea** tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo Dong-I, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM. This missile would be capable of delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to the United States, although

with significant targeting inaccuracies. Moreover, North Korea has retained the ability to test its follow-on Taepo Dong-2 missile, which could deliver a nuclear-sized payload to the United States.

- **Iran** has one of the largest and most capable ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Its public statements suggest that it plans to develop longer-range rockets for use in a space-launch program, but Tehran could follow the North Korean pattern and test an **ICBM** capable of delivering a light payload to the United States in the next few years.
- And given the likelihood that **Iraq** continues its missile development work, we think that it too could develop an **ICBM** capability sometime in the next decade assuming it received foreign assistance.

As worrying as the **ICBM** threat will be, Mr. Chairman, the threat to US interests and forces from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is here and now. The proliferation of **MRBMs**—driven largely though not exclusively by North Korean No Dong sales—is altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.

These missiles include Iran's Shahab-3, Pakistan's Ghauri and the Indian Agni II.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot underestimate the catalytic role that foreign assistance has played in advancing these missile and WMD programs, shortening their development times and aiding production. The three major suppliers of missile or WMD-related technologies continue to be **Russia, China, and North Korea**. Again, many details of their activities need to remain classified, but let me quickly summarize the areas of our greatest concern.

**Russian** state-run defense and nuclear industries are still strapped for funds, and Moscow looks to them to acquire badly needed foreign exchange through exports. We remain concerned about the proliferation implications of such sales in several areas.

- Russian entities last year continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Indeed, the transfer of ballistic missile technology from Russia to Iran was substantial last year, and in our judgment will

continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and to become self-sufficient in production.

- Russia also remained a key supplier for a variety of civilian Iranian **nuclear** programs, which could be used to advance its weapons programs as well.
- Russian entities are a significant source of dual-use **biotechnology, chemicals**, production technology, and equipment for Iran. Russian biological and chemical expertise is sought by Iranians and others seeking information and training on BW and CW-agent production processes.

**Chinese** missile-related technical assistance to foreign countries also has been significant over the years. Chinese help has enabled Pakistan to move rapidly toward serial production of solid-propellant missiles. In addition to Pakistan, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, or other help to several countries of proliferation concern, including Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

Last November, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that committed China not to assist other countries in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Based on what we know about China's past proliferation behavior, Mr. Chairman, we are watching and analyzing carefully for any sign that Chinese entities may be acting against that commitment. We are worried, for example, that Pakistan's continued development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM will require additional Chinese assistance.

On the **nuclear** front, Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear programs. In May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan; we cannot yet be certain, however, that contacts have ended. With regard to Iran, China confirmed that work associated with two nuclear projects would continue until the projects were completed. Again, as with Russian help, our concern is that Iran could use the expertise and technology it gets-even if the cooperation appears civilian-for its weapons program.

With regard to **North Korea**, our main concern is P'yongyang's continued exports of ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components, materials, and technical expertise. North Korean customers are countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P'yongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology because these sales are a major source of hard currency.

Mr. Chairman, the missile and WMD proliferation problem continues to change in ways that make it harder to monitor and control, increasing the risk of substantial surprise. Among these developments are greater proficiency in the use of denial and deception and the growing availability of dual-use technologies-not just for missiles, but for chemical and biological agents as well. There is also great potential of "secondary proliferation" from maturing state-sponsored programs such as those in Pakistan, Iran, and India. Add to this group the private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia, China, and India who may be increasing their involvement in these activities, taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of

technologies, These trends have continued and, in some cases, have accelerated over the past year.

### *INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND SPACE*

Mr. Chairman, I want to reemphasize the concerns I raised last year about our nation's vulnerability to attacks on our critical information infrastructure. No country in the world rivals the US in its reliance, dependence, and dominance of information systems. The great advantage we derive from this also presents us with unique vulnerabilities.

- Indeed, computer-based information operations could provide our adversaries with an asymmetric response to US military superiority by giving them the potential to degrade or circumvent our advantage in conventional military power.
- Attacks on our military, economic, or telecommunications infrastructure can be launched from anywhere in the world, and they can be used to transport the problems of a distant conflict directly to America's heartland.

- Likewise, our adversaries well understand US strategic dependence on access to space. Operations to disrupt, degrade, or defeat US space assets will be attractive options for those seeking to counter US strategic military superiority. Moreover, we know that foreign countries are interested in or experimenting with a variety of technologies that could be used to develop counterspace capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, we are in a race with technology itself. We are creating relations with the private sector and academia to help us keep pace with ever-changing technology. Last year I established the Information Operations Center within CIA to bring together our best and brightest to ensure that we had a strategy for dealing with the cyber threat.

Along with partners in the Departments of Justice, Energy, and Defense we will work diligently to protect critical US information assets. Let me also say that we must view our space systems and capabilities as part of the same critical infrastructure that needs protection.

## *NARCOTICS*

Mr. Chairman, drug traffickers are also making themselves more capable and efficient. The growing diversification of trafficking organizations-with smaller groups interacting with one another to transfer cocaine from source to market-and the diversification of routes and methods pose major challenges for our counterdrug programs. Changing production patterns and the development of new markets will make further headway against the drug trade difficult.

Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru continue to supply all of the cocaine consumed worldwide including in the United States. Colombia is the linchpin of the global cocaine industry as it is home to the largest coca-growing, coca-processing, and trafficking operations in the world. With regard to heroin, nearly all of the world's opium production is concentrated in **Afghanistan** and Burma. Production in Afghanistan has been exploding, accounting for 72 percent of illicit global opium production in 2000.

The drug threat is increasingly intertwined with other threats. For example, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which allows Bin

Ladin and other terrorists to operate on its territory, encourages and profits from the drug trade. Some Islamic extremists view drug trafficking as a weapon against the West and a source of revenue to fund their operations.

No country has been more vulnerable to the ramifications of the drug trade than Colombia. President Pastrana is using the additional resources available to him under Plan Colombia to launch a major antidrug effort that features measures to curb expanding coca cultivation. He is also cooperating with the US on other important bilateral counternarcotics initiatives, such as extradition.

A key impediment to President Pastrana's progress on drugs is the challenge from Colombia's largest insurgent group-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC-which earns millions of dollars from taxation and other involvement in the drug trade. Founded more than 35 years ago as a ragtag movement committed to land reform, the FARC has developed into a well-funded, capable fighting force known more for its brutal tactics than its Marxist-Leninist-influenced political program.

The FARC vehemently opposes Plan Colombia for obvious reasons. It has gone so far as to threaten to walk away from the peace process with Bogota to protest the Plan. It appears prepared to oppose Plan activities with force. The FARC could, for example, push back on Pastrana by stepping up attacks against spray and interdiction operations. US involvement is also a key FARC worry. Indeed, in early October FARC leaders declared that US soldiers located in combat areas are legitimate "military targets."

The country's other major insurgent group, the National Liberation Army or ELN, is also contributing to mounting instability. Together with the FARC, the ELN has stepped up its attacks on Colombia's economic infrastructure. This has soured the country's investment climate and complicated government efforts to promote economic recovery, following a major recession in 1999. Moreover, the insurgent violence has fueled the rapid growth of illegal paramilitary groups, which are increasingly vying with the FARC and ELN for control over drug-growing zones and other strategic areas of rural Colombia. Like the FARC, the paramilitaries rely heavily on narcotics revenue and have intensified their attacks against

noncombatants in recent months. Paramilitary massacres and insurgent kidnappings are likely to increase this year, as both groups move to strengthen their financial positions and expand their areas of influence.

As for Mexico, Mr. Chairman, President Fox is also trying to attack the power of Mexican drug traffickers, whose activities had made Mexico a transit point for cocaine shipments into the US and a source of heroin and methamphetamine for the US drug market. He faces great challenges in doing so and has simultaneously launched high-profile initiatives to strengthen rule of law and reduce government corruption, including among Mexican law enforcement officials.

## **REGIONAL ISSUES**

### *THE MIDDLE EAST*

Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the Middle East. We are all aware of the violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the uncertainty it has cast on the prospects for a near-term peace agreement. So let me take this time to look at the less obvious trends in the region-such as population pressures,

growing public access to information, and the limited prospects for economic development-that will have a profound effect on the future of the Middle East.

The recent popular demonstrations in several Arab countries—including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Jordan-in support of the Palestinian *intifada* demonstrate the **changing nature of activism of the Arab street**. In many places in the Arab world, Mr. Chairman, average citizens are becoming increasingly restive and getting louder. Recent events show that the right catalyst-such as the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence-can move people to act. Through access to the Internet and other means of communication, a restive public is increasingly capable of taking action without any identifiable leadership or organizational structure.

Mr. Chairman, balanced against an energized street is a **new generation of leaders**, such as Bashar al Asad in Syria. These new leaders will have their mettle tested both by populations demanding change and by entrenched bureaucracies willing to fight hard to maintain the status quo.

Compounding the challenge for these leaders are the persistent economic problems throughout the region that prevent them from providing adequately for the economic welfare of many of their citizens. The region's legacy of statist economic policies and an inadequate investment climate in most countries present big obstacles. Over the past 25 years, Middle Eastern economies have averaged only 2.8 percent GDP growth-far less than Asia and only slightly more than sub-Saharan Africa. The region has accounted for a steadily shrinking share of world GDP, trade, and foreign direct investment since the mid-1970s, and real wages and labor productivity today are about the same as 30 years ago. As the region falls behind in competitive terms, governments will find it hard over the next 5 to 10 years to maintain levels of state sector employment and government services that have been key elements of their strategy for domestic stability.

Adding to this is the challenge of **demographics**. Many of the countries of the Middle East still have population growth rates among the highest in the world, significantly exceeding 3 percent-compare that with 0.85 percent in the United States and 0.2 percent in Japan.

Job markets will be severely challenged to create openings for the large mass of young people entering the labor force each year.

- One-fourth of Jordanians, for example, are unemployed, and annual economic growth is well below the level needed to absorb some 60,000 new labor market entrants each year.
- In Egypt the disproportionately young population adds 600,000 new job applicants a year in a country where unemployment is already near 20 percent.

Mr. Chairman, the inability of traditional sources of income such as oil, foreign aid, and worker remittances to fund an increasingly costly system of subsidies, education, health care, and housing for rapidly growing populations has motivated governments to implement economic reforms. The question is whether these reforms will go far enough for the long term. Reform thus far has been deliberately gradual and slow, to avoid making harsh economic choices that could lead to short term spikes in high unemployment.

Arab governments will soon face the dilemma of choosing between a path of gradual reform that is unlikely to close the region's widening gap with the rest of the world, and the path of comprehensive change that risks fueling independent political activity. Choosing the former risks building tension among a younger, poorer, and more politically assertive population.

### *IRAQ*

Mr. Chairman, in **Iraq** Saddam Hussein has grown more confident in his ability to hold on to his power. He maintains a tight handle on internal unrest, despite the erosion of his overall military capabilities. Saddam's confidence has been buoyed by his success in quieting the Shia insurgency in the south, which last year had reached a level unprecedented since the domestic uprising in 1991. Through brutal suppression, Saddam's multilayered security apparatus has continued to enforce his authority and cultivate a domestic image of invincibility.

High oil prices and Saddam's use of the oil-for-food program have helped him manage domestic pressure. The program has helped meet the basic food and medicine needs of the population.

High oil prices buttressed by substantial illicit oil revenues have helped Saddam ensure the loyalty of the regime's security apparatus operating and the few thousand politically important tribal and family groups loyal.

There are still constraints on Saddam's power. His economic infrastructure is in long-term decline, and his ability to project power outside Iraq's borders is severely limited, largely because of the effectiveness and enforcement of the No-Fly Zones. His military is roughly half the size it was during the Gulf War and remains under a tight arms embargo. He has trouble efficiently moving forces and supplies-a direct result of sanctions. These difficulties were demonstrated most recently by his deployment of troops to western Iraq last fall, which were hindered by a shortage of spare parts and transport capability.

Despite these problems, we are likely to see greater assertiveness-largely on the diplomatic front-over the next year. Saddam already senses improved prospects for better relations with other Arab states. One of his key goals is to sidestep the 10-year-old

economic sanctions regime by making violations a routine occurrence for which he pays no penalty.

Saddam has had some success in ending Iraq's international isolation. Since August, nearly 40 aircraft have flown to Baghdad without obtaining UN approval, further widening fissures in the UN air embargo. Moreover, several countries have begun to upgrade their diplomatic relations with Iraq. The number of Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad are approaching pre-Gulf War levels, and among the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have not reestablished ties.

Our most serious concern with Saddam Hussein must be the likelihood that he will seek a renewed WMD capability both for credibility and because every other strong regime in the region either has it or is pursuing it. For example, the Iraqis have rebuilt key portions of their chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use. The plants he is rebuilding were used to make chemical weapons precursors before the Gulf War and their capacity exceeds Iraq's needs to satisfy its civilian requirements.

- We have similar concerns about other dual-use research, development, and production in the biological weapons and ballistic missile fields; indeed, Saddam has rebuilt several critical missile production complexes.

## *IRAN*

Turning now to Iraq's neighbor: **events of the past year have been discouraging for positive change in Iran.** Several years of reformist gains in national elections and a strong populist current for political change all threaten the political and economic privileges that authoritarian interests have enjoyed for years under the Islamic Republic-and they have begun to push back hard against the reformers.

Prospects for near-term political reform are now fading. Opponents of reform have not only muzzled the open press, they have also arrested prominent activists and blunted the legislature's powers. Over the Summer, Supreme Leader Khamenei ordered the new legislature not to ease press restrictions, a key reformist pursuit. This signaled the narrow borders within which he would allow the legislature to operate.

The reformist movement is still young, however, and it reflects on the deep sentiments of the Iranian people. Although frustrated and in part muzzled, the reformers have persisted in their demands for change. And the Iranian people will have another opportunity to demonstrate their support for reform in the presidential election scheduled for June. Although Khatami has not announced his candidacy, and has voiced frustration with the limitations placed on his office, opinion polls published in Iran show him to remain by far the most popular potential candidate for president.

The short -term gains made by shutting down the proreform press and prosecuting some of its most outspoken members is not a formula for long-term success. A strategy of suppressing the demands of the new generation coming of age risks a political explosion down the road. Some advocates of the status quo are beginning to recognize this danger as more conservatives-to include Khamenei-have endorsed the principle, if not the substance, of reform.

Despite Iran's uncertain domestic prospects, Mr. Chairman, it is clear that Khatami's appeal and promise of reform thus far, as well as

the changing world economy, have contributed to a run of successes for Iran in the foreign arena over the past year. Some Western ambassadors have returned to Tehran, and Iranian relations with EU countries and Saudi Arabia are at their highest point since the revolution in 1979. Higher oil prices, meanwhile, have temporarily eased the government's need to address difficult and politically controversial economic problems. They have also taken more of the sting out of US sanctions. Iran's desire to end its isolation has not resulted in a decline in its willingness to use terrorism to pursue strategic foreign policy agendas-Tehran, in fact, has increased its support to terrorist groups opposed to the peace process over the past two years.

#### *NORTH KOREA*

I would like to shift gears to **North Korea**. P'yongyang's bold diplomatic outreach to the international community and engagement with South Korea reflect a significant change in strategy. This strategy is designed to assure the continued survival of Kim Chong-il's regime by ending P'yongyang's political isolation and fixing the North's failing economy by attracting more aid. We do not know how

far Kim will go in opening the North, but I can report to you that we have not yet seen a significant diminution of the threat from the North to American and South Korean interests.

P'yongyang still believes that a strong military, capable of projecting power in the region, is an essential element of national power. P'yongyang's declared "military first" policy requires massive investment in the armed forces, even at the expense of other national objectives. North Korea maintains the world's fifth largest armed forces consisting of over one million active-duty personnel, with another five million reserves. While Allied forces still have the qualitative edge, the North Korean military appears for now to have halted its near-decade-long slide in military capabilities. In addition to the North's longer-range missile threat to us, P'yongyang is also expanding its short and medium range missile inventory, putting our Allies at greater risk.

On the economic front, there are few signs of real systemic domestic reform. Kim has recently shown interest in practical measures to redress economic problems, most notably with his trip to

Shanghai. To date, however, Kim has only tinkered with the economic system.

External assistance is essential to the recovery of North Korea's domestic economy. Only massive food aid deliveries since 1997 have enabled the country to escape a recurrence of the famine from the middle of the last decade. Industrial operations remain low. The economy is hampered by an industrial base that is falling to pieces, as well as shortages of materials and a lack of new investment. Chronic energy shortages pose the most significant challenge.

Aid and investment from the South bring with them increased foreign influences and outside information that will contradict propaganda from the regime. Economic engagement also can spawn expectations for improvement that will outrace the rebuilding process. The risk for Kim is that if he overestimates his control of the security services and loses elite support, or if societal stresses reach a critical point, his regime and personal grip on power could be weakened. As with other authoritarian regimes, sudden, radical change remains a real possibility in North Korea.

## *CHINA*

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to China, whose drive for recognition as a Great Power is one of the toughest challenges we face. Beijing's goal of becoming a key world player and especially more powerful in East Asia has come sharply into focus. It is pursuing these goals through an ambitious economic reform agenda, military modernization, and a complex web of initiatives aimed at expanding China's international influence-especially relative to the United States.

Chinese leaders view solid relations with Washington as vital to achieving their ambitions. It is a two-edged sword for them, Mr. Chairman. China's development remains heavily reliant on access to Western markets and technology. But they also view Washington as their primary obstacle because they perceive the US as bent on keeping China from becoming a great power.

Perhaps the toughest issue between Beijing and Washington remains Taiwan. While Beijing has stopped its saber rattling—reducing the immediate tensions—the unprecedented developments on Taiwan have complicated cross-strait relations. The election last

March of President Chen ushered in a divided government with highly polarized views on relations with Beijing. Profound mutual distrust makes it difficult to restart the on-again off-again bilateral political dialogue. In the longer term, Mr. Chairman, cross-strait relations can be even more volatile because of Beijing's military modernization program. China's military buildup is also aimed at deterring US intervention in support of Taiwan.

Russian arms are a key component of this buildup. Arms sales are only one element of a burgeoning Sino-Russian relationship. Moscow and Beijing plan to sign a "friendship treaty" later this year, highlighting common interests and willingness to cooperate diplomatically against US policies that they see as unfriendly to their interests-especially NMD.

On China's domestic scene, the Chinese Communist leadership wants to protect its legitimacy and authority against any and all domestic challenges. Over the next few years, however, Chinese leaders will have to manage a difficult balancing act between the requirements of reform and the requirements of staying in power.

China's leaders regard their ability to sustain economic prosperity as the key to remaining in power; for that reason, they are eager to join the WTO. Beijing views WTO accession as a lever to accelerate domestic economic reform, a catalyst for greater foreign investment, and a way to force Chinese state-owned enterprises to compete more effectively with foreign companies.

But Beijing may slow the pace of WTO-related reforms if the leadership perceives a rise in social unrest that could threaten regime stability. Chinese leaders already see disturbing trends in this regard. Their crackdown on Falungong, underground Christians, and other spiritual and religious groups reflects growing alarm about challenges to the Party's legitimacy.

All of these challenges will test the unity of the leadership in Beijing during a critical period in the succession process. The 16<sup>th</sup> Communist Party Congress next year will be an extremely important event, as it will portend a large-scale transfer of authority to the next generation of Communist Chinese leaders. The political jockeying has already begun, and Chinese leaders will view every domestic

and foreign policy decision they face through the prism of the succession contest.

## *RUSSIA*

Mr. Chairman, yet another state driving for recognition as a Great Power is Russia. Let me be perfectly candid. There can be little doubt that President Putin wants to restore some aspects of the Soviet past-status as a great power, strong central authority, and a stable and predictable society-sometimes at the expense of neighboring states or the civil rights of individual Russians. For example,

- Putin has begun to reconstitute the upper house of the parliament, with an eye to depriving regional governors of their ex officio membership by 2002. He also created a system of seven “super districts” where Presidential “plenipotentiaries” now oversee the governors within their districts.
- He has moved forcefully against Russian independent media including one of Russia’s most prominent oligarchs,

Vladimir Gusinskiy, pressing him to give up his independent television station and thereby minimize critical media.

Moscow also may be resurrecting the Soviet-era zero-sum approach to foreign policy. As I noted earlier, Moscow continues to value arms and technology sales as a major source of funds. It increasingly is using them as a tool to improve ties to its regional partners China, India, and Iran. Moscow also sees these relationships as a way to limit US influence globally. At the same time Putin is making efforts to check US influence in the other former Soviet states and reestablish Russia as the premier power in the region. He has increased pressure on his neighbors to pay their energy debts, is dragging his feet on treaty-mandated withdrawals of forces from Moldova, and is using a range of pressure tactics against Georgia.

Putin has also increased funding for the military, although years of increases would be needed to deal with the backlog of problems that built up in the armed forces under Yeltsin. The war in Chechnya is eroding morale and thus the effectiveness of the military. Despite

its overwhelming force, Moscow is in a military stalemate with the rebels, facing constant guerrilla attacks. An end does not appear close. There are thousands of Russian casualties in Chechnya, and Russian forces have been cited for their brutality to the civilian population. Increasingly, the Russian public disapproves of the war. Because Putin rode into office on a wave of popular support, resolution of the conflict is an issue of personal prestige for him. Recently, Putin transferred command in Chechnya to the Federal Security Service, demonstrating his affinity for the intelligence services from which he came.

Despite Putin's Soviet nostalgia, he knows Russia must embrace markets and integrate into the global economy and that he needs foreigners to invest. Plus, public expectations are rising. Putin is avoiding hard policy decisions because Russia enjoyed an economic upturn last year, buoyed by high oil prices and a cheap ruble. But Putin cannot count on these trends to last permanently. He must take on several key challenges if Russia is to sustain economic growth and political stability over the longer term.

- Without debt restructuring, for example, he will face harsh choices through 2003. Russia will owe nearly \$48 billion spread over the next three years.
- Domestic and foreign investment is crucial to sustained growth. Moscow recently announced that capital flight last year increased to \$25 billion. Putin will need to demonstrate his seriousness about reducing corruption and pushing ahead with corporate tax reform and measures to protect investor's rights.

### *CENTRAL ASIA*

Mr. Chairman, the Caucasus and Central Asia are parts of the world that have the potential to become more volatile as they become more important to the United States. The strategic location of the Caucasus and Central Asia-squeezed between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China-make the stability of these countries critical to the future of Eurasia. Here corruption, poverty, and other social ills are providing fertile ground for Islamic extremism, terrorist networking, and drug and weapons trafficking that will have impact in Russia, Europe, and beyond. Central Asian leaders, seeking to fend

off threats to their security from terrorists and drug traffickers, are looking increasingly to the West for support.

- We are becoming increasingly concerned about the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist insurgent and terrorist group whose annual incursions into Uzbekistan have become bloodier and more significant every year.

In addition, US companies have a significant stake in Caspian energy development. As you know, the United States supports the construction of pipelines that will bring the Caspian's energy resources to Western markets. One oil pipeline is expected to pass through both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Western companies are pursuing the construction of a gas pipeline under the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Georgia en route to Turkey. Although many of the leaders in the region through which the pipelines will flow view the United States as a friend, regime stability there remains fragile.

### *The Balkans*

Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to another important region: the Balkans. It is an open question when Balkan states will be able to stand on their own. The Balkans continue to be fraught with turmoil, and the coming year promises more challenges.

Milosevic's departure was a victory for the Serbian people and the United States. America was a strong force in helping to depose this indicted war criminal who was a major obstacle to progress. Milosevic's fall through election and popular rebellion gives Serbia and what is left of Yugoslavia a chance to remake its politics and to begin to recover. It also means that Serbia can be reintegrated into Europe.

Milosevic's successors will have a hard time cleaning up the mess he left. Milosevic, his family, and cronies stole much of what had value, ran down industries, and wasted whatever resources were left. From the ashes, newly elected President Vojislav Kostunica is trying to create a legal, transparent, and effective government. Meanwhile, the Serbian economy has contracted 50 percent since 1990.

Mr. Chairman, Kostunica will also face problems holding his country together. Montenegro's drive for independence presents a simmering crisis. Montenegrin President Djukanovic remains committed to negotiating a new, decentralized relationship with Belgrade. Events in the rest of Yugoslavia will have impact on Kosovo as well. Ethnic Albanians from across the political spectrum in Kosovo still insist on independence.

There are signs that Kosovo's troubles are spilling over into southern Serbia where both ethnic Albanians and Serbs live in close proximity. Most ethnic Albanians in this region seek only greater civil rights within Serbia, but militants are fighting to join the region to an independent Kosovo. This is a dangerous flashpoint, Mr. Chairman, with the potential for escalation. In short, Mr. Chairman, we are still not at the point where we look confidently ahead to a Balkans without violence.

With regard to Bosnia, none of the three formerly warring factions-Muslims, Serbs, or Croats-wants to begin fighting again. Refugee returns continued at a brisk pace last year as in 1999, the most encouraging development since the end of the war.

Disarmament of the warring factions has been generally successful, and positive developments in Croatia and Serbia have removed some sources of earlier nationalist sentiment. But there has been little progress in achieving a common vision of a unified, multiethnic Bosnia capable of standing on its own.

### *SOUTH ASIA*

At this point, Mr. Chairman, let me draw your attention to the potentially destabilizing competition in **South Asia**. I must report that relations between India and Pakistan remain volatile, making the risk of war between the two nuclear-armed adversaries unacceptably high. The military balance in which India enjoys advantages over Pakistan in most areas of conventional defense preparedness remains the same. This includes a decisive advantage in fighter aircraft, almost twice as many men under arms, and a much larger economy to support defense expenditures. As a result, Pakistan relies heavily on its nuclear weapons for deterrence. Their deep-seated rivalry, frequent artillery exchanges in Kashmir, and short flight times for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and aircraft all contribute to an unstable nuclear deterrence.

If any issue has the potential to bring both sides to full-scale war, it is Kashmir. Kashmir is at the center of the dispute between the two countries. Nuclear deterrence and the likelihood that a conventional war would bog down both sides argue against a decision to go to war. But both sides seem quite willing to take risks over Kashmir in particular, and this-along with their deep animosity and distrust-could lead to decisions that escalate tensions.

The two states narrowly averted a full-scale war in Kashmir in 1999. The conflict that did occur undermined a fledgling peace process begun by the two prime ministers. Now, for the first time since then, the two sides are finally taking tentative steps to reduce tension. Recent statements by Indian and Pakistani leaders have left the door open for high-level talks. And just last week [2 Feb 2001], Vajpayee and Musharraf conversed by phone perhaps for the first time ever, to discuss the earthquake disaster.

The process is fragile, however. Neither side has yet agreed to direct, unconditional talks. Tension can easily flare once winter ends or by New Delhi or Islamabad maneuvering for an edge in the

negotiations. Leadership changes in either country also could add to tensions.

Kashmiri separatist groups opposed to peace could also stoke problems. India has been trying to engage selected militants and separatists, but militant groups have kept up their attacks through India's most recent cease-fire. In addition, the Kashmir state government's decision to conduct local elections-the first in more than 20 years-will provoke violence from militants who see the move as designed to cement the status quo.

Pakistan's internal problems-especially the economy—complicate the situation and further threaten what maneuvering room Musharraf may have. Musharraf's domestic popularity has been threatened by a series of unpopular policies that he promulgated last year. At the same time, he is being forced to contend with increasingly active Islamic extremists.

Mr. Chairman, a word on proliferation. Last year I told you I worried about the proliferation and development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia. The competition, predictably, extends here as well and there is no sign that the

situation has improved. We still believe there is a good prospect of another round of nuclear tests. On the missile front, India decided to test another Agni MRBM last month, reflecting its determination to improve its nuclear weapons delivery capability. Pakistan may respond in kind.

### *FRAGMENTATION AND FAILURE*

The final point that I would like to discuss today is the growing in potential for state fragmentation and failure that we have observed this past year.

Mr. Chairman, **Afghanistan** obviously falls into this category. The Afghan civil war will continue into the foreseeable future, leaving the country fragmented and unstable. The Taliban remains determined to impose its radical form of Islam on all of Afghanistan, even in the face of resistance from other ethnic groups and the Shia minority.

Mr. Chairman, what we have in Afghanistan is a stark example of the potential dangers of allowing states-even those far from the US-to fail. The chaos here is providing an incubator for narcotics traffickers and militant Islamic groups operating in such places as

Kashmir, Chechnya, and Central Asia. Meanwhile the Taliban shows no sign of relinquishing terrorist Usama Bin Ladin, despite strengthened UN sanctions and prospects that Bin Ladin's terrorist operations could lead to retaliatory strikes against Afghanistan" The Taliban and Bin Ladin have a symbiotic relationship-Bin Ladin gets safe haven and in return, he gives the Taliban help in fighting its civil war.

Mr. Chairman, events of the last few years in **Indonesia** paint a vivid picture of a state struggling to regain stability. Last year I described the difficult political transition that Indonesian President Wahid was trying to manage. He has managed to stay one step ahead of his opponents, mostly because they are unable to work together. He has survived several confrontations with the legislature, but efforts to impeach him on corruption charges will continue.

Separatist violence is rampant in Aceh and rising in two other key provinces. Muslim-Christian violence continues, and resulted in several thousand deaths last year. The country's security forces are poorly equipped, and either back away from challenges or respond too forcefully.

Mr. Chairman, Indonesia's problems are worrying neighboring countries that have long considered it as the pillar of regional stability. Some Southeast Asian leaders fear a power vacuum in Indonesia would create fertile ground for international terrorist groups and Islamic activists, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

My final case study, Mr. Chairman, is **Africa**, a land of chronic turbulence and crises that are among the most brutal and intractable in the world. Left behind by globalization and plagued by ethnic conflicts, several African states appear to be the first of the wave of failed nations predicted by the Global Trends 2015 Report.

We are especially concerned because hotspots often set off chain reactions across the region. The brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, for example, started as an offshoot of fighting in Liberia and has now spread into Guinea. These waves of violent instability bring even worse woes in their wake, including the ethnically-based killings that are now routine in the wars in Sudan, Congo (Kinshasa), and Burundi. Coping with this unrest depletes the scant resources available to the region's governments for fighting HIV/AIDS and other epidemics.

One immediate challenge in Africa, Mr. Chairman, is the protection of US diplomats, military personnel, citizens, and other interests in the region. Violent unrest has necessitated a half-dozen evacuations of Embassy employees, other citizens, and Allied nationals in recent years.

## **CONCLUSION**

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken at some length about the threats we face to our national security. It is inevitable given our position as the world's sole superpower that we would attract the opposition of those who do not share our vision or our goals, and those who feel intimidated by our strength. Many of the threats I've outlined are familiar to you. Many of the trends I've described are not new. The complexity, intricacy, and confluence of these threats, however, is necessitating a fundamental change in the way we, in the Intelligence Community, do our business. To keep pace with these challenges:

- We must aggressively challenge our analytic assumptions, avoid old-think, and embrace alternate analysis and viewpoints.

- . We must constantly push the envelope on collection beyond the traditional to exploit new systems and operational opportunities to gain the intelligence needed by our senior policymakers.
- And we must continue to stay ahead on the technology and information fronts by seeking new partnerships with private industry as demonstrated by our IN-Q-TEL initiative.

Our goal is simple. It is to ensure that our nation has the intelligence it needs to anticipate and counter threats I have discussed here today.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would welcome any questions you and your fellow Senators may have for me.

September 26, 2001 6:16 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: JITF - CT

Thanks for coming over here today. It was helpful.

I have these additional thoughts:

1. From everything I hear, CTC is too small to do a 24-7 job.
2. Admiral Wilson came to see me and has a proposal, which Joan Dempsey is familiar with. Here are the charts. I have asked Rich Haver, and possibly Steve **Cambone**, to come over with Wilson and brief you on it. I don't want him to go ahead until I know what you think about it and that it is going to fit. I don't know what I will ultimately decide ought to be done, but I sure don't want to go forward with this until I know what you think about it and we have a good sense of where we are going together.

Thanks.

Attach.

Briefing slides: JITF -- CT: Supporting a Unified National CT Campaign

DHR:dh  
092601-11

0005

30 Sep 01

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
SEP 27 2001

# JITF - CT

(Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating Terrorism)


Supporting a Unified  
National CT Campaign

# Purpose


- Support Aggressive Campaign to Defeat Terrorism (Offense)
- Provide Warning for Force Protection and Homeland Security (Defense)
- Establish Single Focused Effort (Responsibility and Accountability)


# Mission

Generate actionable intelligence to drive planning and operations by exposing and exploiting terrorist vulnerabilities.



Deter, Disrupt, Defeat Terrorists;  
Prevent WMD Acquisition





# Envisioned Organization

- Site: DIA (Boiling AFB)
  - Reconfigured Now
  - Designed into New Building
- Size: Projected 700 (Present 150)
- Participation
  - Embedded Capability from NSA, NIMA, CTC, FBI, FAA, Services
  - Deployed Capability to Commands, CTC, FBI
- State of the Art Technology

# So What Do You Get?

- Fundamental Shift in DoD Intelligence Focus and Priorities
- DoD Leadership Role
- Aggressive Campaign Focus
- Access to All information

Changed Approach for a Changed World

# Immediate Actions'

- Accelerate/Enlarge On-going Terrorism Upgrades
- Ensure Access to **ALL** Data Flow
  - CIA, NSA, FBI, DOS, DOT
- Commit Resources Now

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: Patriot Missiles

I just read this note on Patriot missile part fraud.

My instinct is that you ought to see if we can't stop doing business with that outfit completely. That's just terrible and the penalty is not anywhere near enough to match the crime. If we can't stop doing business with them completely legally, then we ought to go to Congress and get legislation that let's us do it.

Thank you.

Please respond by: 11 | 11 | 11

DHR/azn  
110501.01  
Attach. Lieberman Memo 11/1/01 U18096

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**DEC 20 2001**

**Larry Di Rita**

*12/19*

*12/17*  
*Response Attached*

*5 Nov 01*

*471.42*

037 100-1 0112:34



To Jim H-  
DoD should see if  
he can stop doing  
business with them completely.

INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

DA - If not, let's get legislation  
so we can

November 1, 2001, 11:00 a.m.

Larry Di Rita  
11/2

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, DoD *Robert J. Lieberman*

SUBJECT: Patriot missile parts fraud

- On October 25, 2001 ANGHEL Laboratories, Rockaway, New Jersey, pled guilty to a criminal information charging the company with submitting false testing data. Company officials admitted falsifying testing data and concealing defective components, including switches for the fuse assemblies of the Patriot missile. None of the identified faulty parts were actually installed in the Patriot missile systems.
- ANGHEL is a production and testing facility owned by COMSAT Radiation Systems, Inc. which is owned by COMSAT Corporation, Bethesda, MD. ANGHEL is a subcontractor on multiple DoD contracts with the Army and Air Force to provide electronic parts for use in various military systems, including aircraft, satellites, and the Patriot.
- Because of the limited scope of the plea, ANGHEL faces a maximum of only 5 years probation and a fine of only \$500,000. Final sentencing has been set for February 5, 2002.
- DoD suspension and debarment action is under consideration by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency.
- This was a joint investigation with this office and the Military Departments.
- This matter was reported in New Jersey newspapers and could have national interest because of public familiarity with the Patriot.

Action

COORDINATION: NONE

cc: Secretary of the Army  
Secretary of the Air Force  
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
General Counsel, DoD

Prepared By: Robert J. Lieberman, (703) 604-8300

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>11/1</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>RJL</i>
MA BUCCO	<i>11/2</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

March 29, 2001 11:27 AM

TO: General Shelton, Chairman, JCS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Incident in Nigeria

I just read this cable on the altercation in Nigeria. There are a lot of questions.  
Why did they leave the convoy? Why weren't they carrying their identification  
Why are the crowds so hostile to Americans?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
032901-12

*Nigeria*

*29 Mar 01*

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DEPT FOR: AF/EX, AF/RA, AF/W, DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS : ASEC, MASS, NI  
SUBJECT: INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

1. (U) SUMMARY: ON 12/2/2000 THERE WAS AN INCIDENT IN ABUJA, NIGERIA INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AND NUMEROUS UNKNOWN NIGERIAN CIVILIANS. THE U.S. MILITARY CURRENTLY HAS A LARGE PRESENCE IN NIGERIA TO TRAIN THE NIGERIAN MILITARY FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN SIERRA LEONE (OPERATION Focus RELIEF OR OFR). THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE ENROUTE TO ABUJA IN AN UNMARKED CIVILIAN VEHICLE WITHOUT LICENSE PLATES AFTER COMPLETING TRAINING WITH THE NIGERIAN MILITARY. THE THREE U.S. MILITARY AND THEIR NIGERIAN DRIVER SEPARATED FROM THEIR CONVOY AND WERE STOPPED BY NIGERIAN AUTHORITIES OPERATING A CHECKPOINT NEAR THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN NASSARAWA STATE AND THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

2. (U) DURING THE COURSE OF THE CHECKPOINT STOP, CONFUSION AROSE BETWEEN THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIALS CARRIED BY THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. DURING THE COURSE OF THE CHECKPOINT STOP A LARGE, HOSTILE CROWD FORMED. FEARING FOR THEIR SAFETY, THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FLED THE SCENE. BOTH NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND NUMEROUS NIGERIAN CIVILIANS PURSUED THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. AT ONE POINT THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE ENGAGED IN A PHYSICAL ALTERCATION WITH BOTH NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AND NIGERIAN CIVILIANS. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FIRED TWO WARNING SHOTS INTO THE AIR TO DISPERSE THE CROWD AFTER INDIVIDUALS ATTEMPTED TO DISARM THEM. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBSEQUENTLY WERE ABLE TO FLEE THE SCENE IN A LOCAL TAXI BUT WERE ULTIMATELY FORCED TO EXIT BY THOSE IN PURSUIT. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL THEN FORCED ENTRY INTO A NEARBY UNOCCUPIED RESIDENCE TO SEEK REFUGE FROM THE PURSUING CROWD. THE INCIDENT WAS REPORTED TO POST BY AN EMBASSY MOTOR POOL DRIVER WHO HAPPENED TO BE AT A NEARBY FILLING STATION AS THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ENTERED THE RESIDENCE. HE CALLED FOR ASSISTANCE, AND THE RSO RESPONDED, PROCEEDING TO THE UNOCCUPIED RESIDENCE WHERE HE OBSERVED A LARGE HOSTILE

S

Why?

~~STOPPED~~  
- STOPPED  
- Hostile crowd  
- Military Flee  
- Pursued  
- Fighting two  
- two firing two  
- warning shots  
- when approached  
- attempted to disarm.  
- Flee in  
- Taxi

CROWD SURROUNDING THE OUTSIDE OF THE RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND.

3. (U) NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES WERE SURROUNDING THE PERIMETER OF THE RESIDENCE, DISCUSSING PLANS TO STORM THE-HOUSE. RSO DETERMINED THE INDIVIDUALS INSIDE THE RESIDENCE WERE IN FACT U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND SO INFORMED THE NIGERIAN AUTHORITIES PRESENT ON THE SCENE. THE NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES DISPERSED THE CROWD AND SECURED THE AREA. A DAO OFFICER LATER ESCORTED THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE RESIDENCE TO THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS, WHERE THE NIGERIAN POLICE TOOK STATEMENTS. RSO AND RAO PROCEEDED TO THE VEHICLE ABANDONED BY THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO RETRIEVE PERSONAL EFFECTS AND EQUIPMENT, TO INCLUDE CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. ALL EFFECTS AND EQUIPMENT WERE SUCCESSFULLY RECOVERED. END SUMMARY.

4. (U) ON SATURDAY, 2 DECEMBER 2000 AT APPROXIMATELY 1030 HOURS THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WEARING FATIGUE UNIFORMS WERE TRAVELLING IN AN UNMARKED CIVILIAN VEHICLE (NO LICENSE PLATES OR OTHER MARKINGS) RETURNING TO ABUJA FROM TRAINING THE NIGERIAN MILITARY. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR NIGERIAN DRIVER HAD SEPARATED FROM A LARGER CONVOY UNDER ESCORT BY NIGERIAN MILITARY FROM THE MORTAR-FIRING RANGE AT KACHIA (SOUTHERN KADUNA STATE) AT SOME POINT ALONG THE KACHIA-KEFFI-ABUJA ROUTE. AS THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROACHED THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, THEY ENCOUNTERED A ROADSIDE CHECKPOINT OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES. THEY FREQUENTLY OPERATE ROADSIDE CHECKPOINTS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS: TO APPREHEND CRIMINALS, TO RECOVER STOLEN PROPERTY AND VEHICLES AND TO CONDUCT VEHICLE SAFETY INSPECTIONS. LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL WORKING THE CHECKPOINT ORDERED THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO PRODUCE IDENTIFICATION. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL PRODUCED THEIR IDENTIFICATION. THE NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE IDENTIFICATION PRESENTED BY THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND ADVISED THEM THEY INTENDED TO SEIZE THE VEHICLE AND ARREST THE LOCALLY CONTRACTED DRIVER. THE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 ABUJA 1936

DEPT FOR: AF/EX, AF/RA, AF/W, DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, MASS, NI

SUBJECT: INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ATTEMPTED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE AREA. MEANWHILE, A LARGE CROWD OF NIGERIAN CIVILIANS FORMED AND BECAME INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TOWARDS THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. FEARING FOR THEIR SAFETY, THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL GOT BACK INTO THEIR VEHICLE AND LOCKED THE DOORS. THE CROWD SURROUNDED THE VEHICLE AND PROCEEDED TO BEAT AND KICK IT. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ORDERED THEIR DRIVER TO EXIT THE SCENE. AT LEAST TWO UNIFORMED NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

AND TWO UNKNOWN CIVILIANS MANAGED TO CLIMB IN TO BACK OF THE VEHICLE (AN OPEN BED PICK-UP TRUCK) BEFORE THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LEFT THE SCENE OF THE CHECKPOINT.

5. (U) A SHORT DISTANCE LATER, THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL STOPPED THE VEHICLE IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE NIGERIAN POLICE OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS FROM THE BED OF THE VEHICLE. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS INCIDENT, A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE/ALTERCATION ENSUED INVOLVING THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS WHO WERE IN THE BED OF THE VEHICLE. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS STRUGGLE ONE NIGERIAN (NFL) ATTEMPTED TO TAKE A U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL'S HOLSTERED SIDEARM. ANOTHER U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DREW HIS SIDEARM AND FIRED TWO WARNING SHOTS INTO THE AIR TO DISPERSE THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY HOSTILE CROWD. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL GOT BACK INTO THEIR VEHICLE AND LEFT THE AREA BUT WERE STILL PURSUED BY NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AND A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS IN CARS, MOTORCYCLES AND FOOT.

*Tagged*  
6. (U) THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE PURSUED INTO A RESIDENTIAL AREA. EVENTUALLY, THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL COULD NEITHER PROCEED (BECAUSE THE NEIGHBORHOOD IS A LARGE CUL-DE-SAC, WITH ONE WAY IN AND OUT) NOR REVERSE COURSE (BECAUSE OF THE PURSUERS BEHIND THEM). THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DROVE THEIR VEHICLE OFF THE ROAD, AND TRIED TO TRAVEL CROSS-COUNTRY UNTIL BECOMING STUCK IN A LOW-LYING, SWAMPY AREA. THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR CONTRACT DRIVER EXITED THE VEHICLE AND PROCEEDED TO RUN CROSS-COUNTRY TO A NEARBY HIGHWAY. UPON REACHING THE HIGHWAY, THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL HAILED A PRIVATE TAXICAB AND TOLD THE DRIVER TO TAKE THEM TO EITHER THE U.S. EMBASSY OR THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS AT THE SHERATON HOTEL. NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AND A LARGE CROWD OF CIVILIANS WERE STILL PURSUING THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONAL.

7. (U) THE PRIVATE TAXICAB TRANSPORTED THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR LOCALLY HIRED CONTRACT DRIVER AWAY FROM THE AREA INTO ABUJA CITY LIMITS. NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE TAXI. THE TAXI WAS FORCED TO STOP BY A CIVILIAN VEHICLE (NFI). A NIGERIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER THEN POINTED A GUN AT THE TAXI DRIVER, ORDERING HIM TO STAY IN PLACE. THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL EXITED THE VEHICLE WITH THEIR LOCALLY HIRED CONTRACT DRIVER AND RAN TO A NEARBY RESIDENCE. THEY FORCED ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE AND SECURED THE DOORS BY BLOCKING THEM WITH INTERIOR FURNISHINGS AND APPLIANCES.

8. (U) AN EMBASSY MOTOR POOL DRIVER WHO HAPPENED TO BE AT A NEARBY FILLING STATION OBSERVED THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL RUNNING FROM THEIR PURSUERS. THE DRIVER CONTACTED THE EMBASSY GUARDS VIA TWO-WAY RADIO, AND RSO WAS NOTIFIED. RSO WENT TO THE LOCATION OF THE RESIDENCE AND OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY A HALF DOZEN UNIFORMED NIGERIAN

POLICE OFFICERS AND A LARGE CROWD OF HOSTILE CIVILIANS. ONE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS ADVISED THE RSO THAT ARMED ROBBERS HAD INVADED THE HOUSE. THE RSO OVERHEARD THE NIGERIAN POLICE REPORTING BY RADIO THAT ARMED ROBBERS HAD INVADED A HOUSE AND CALLING FOR ASSISTANCE. THE EMBASSY MOTOR POOL DRIVER DESCRIBED THE THREE PERSONS HE OBSERVED RUNNING INTO THE HOUSE AS U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL (CAUCASIAN, MALE, FATIGUE UNIFORMS, RIFLES). THE RSO REQUESTED THE POLICE NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE HOUSE UNTIL IDENTITY OF THE PERSONS INSIDE THE HOUSE COULD BE CONFIRMED. THE RSO WENT TO THE HOUSE AND CONFIRMED THE PERSONS INSIDE THE HOUSE AS U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL GRANTED THE RSO ACCESS TO THE HOUSE. THE RSO OBSERVED THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FATIGUE UNIFORMS AND RIFLES INSIDE THE HOUSE. ONE OF THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WAS IN THE PROCESS OF PLACING A TELEPHONE CALL TO THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS VIA SATELLITE TELEPHONE. RSO ADVISED THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO STAND DOWN, AND THAT THE EMBASSY WAS AT THE LOCATION AND

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 ABUJA 1936

DEPT FOR: AF/EX, AF/RA, AF/W, DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, MASS, NI

SUBJECT: INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

HANDLING THE SITUATION.

9. (U) UPON EXITING THE HOUSE, THE RSO MET THREE NIGERIAN INDIVIDUALS WHO INTRODUCED THEMSELVES AS NIGERIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA) OFFICERS. THEY ADVISED THAT THE RESIDENCE BELONGED TO NIA. THE NIA OFFICIALS AGREED WITH THE RSO'S REQUEST TO ALLOW ~~THE U.S. MILITARY TO REMAIN IN THE HOUSE, SAFE FROM AN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE CROWD.~~ DAO WAS CONTACTED AND ADVISED TO COME TO THE SCENE WITH NIGERIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE COUNTERPARTS. ADDITIONAL NIGERIAN POLICE UNITS ARRIVED AT THE SCENE AND SUCCESSFULLY DISPERSED THE CROWD AND SECURED THE AREA SURROUNDING THE HOUSE. THE RSO NOTIFIED THE EMBASSY TO CONTACT THE OFR OPERATIONS CENTER AND ADVISE THEM NOT TO SEND ANY ADDITIONAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL INTO THE AREA, FURTHER ADVISING THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL. MEANWHILE, PRINCIPAL OFFICER HAD ALREADY CONTACTED THE OFR OPERATIONS CENTER AND LEARNED THAT OFR HAD DISPATCHED FIVE SOLDIERS TO THE AREA. PO REQUESTED THAT UNIFORMED U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AVOID THE INCIDENT SCENE. THE OFFICER RESPONDING AT THE OFR OPERATIONS CENTER SAID OFR WOULD COMPLY. WHEN RSO URGENTLY MADE THE SAME REQUEST, PO CONVEYED RSO'S REQUEST AND SOUGHT STATUS. THE OFR OFFICER SAID THE FIVE SOLDIERS HAD BEEN RECALLED.

10. (U) THE RSO RETURNED TO THE HOUSE TO BRIEF THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL REGARDING THE SITUATION. ONE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ADVISED THE RSO THERE WAS CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT ("CRYPTO") LEFT IN THE

VEHICLE THEY HAD ABANDONED IN THE SWAMP. AS THE RSO LEFT THE HOUSE AND RETURNED TO THE STREET HE ENCOUNTERED FOUR U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FATIGUE UNIFORMS WITH RIFLES COMING UP THE STREET. THE RSO INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, ADVISED THEM THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL AND REQUESTED THEY LEAVE THE SCENE BEFORE THE INCITED THE NOW PEACEFUL CROWD. THE US MILITARY PERSONNEL LEFT THE AREA IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE HOUSE, WENT AROUND A STREET CORNER AWAY FROM VIEW OF THE RSO.

11. (U) THE RSO BRIEFED RAO REGARDING STATUS OF CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT LEFT UNSECURED IN THE ABANDONED VEHICLE. RSO AND RAO LEFT THE AREA TO GO TO THE AREA WHERE THE VEHICLE WAS ABANDONED TO RECOVER THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. AT APPROXIMATELY 1320 HOURS, RSO AND RAO LOCATED THE VEHICLE AND RECOVERED ALL PERSONAL ITEMS, EFFECTS AND EQUIPMENT. THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WAS CONTAINED IN TWO UNLOCKED/UNSEALED HARD-SIDED PADDED CASES LOCATED IN THE BED OF THE VEHICLE. ALTHOUGH ALL EQUIPMENT APPARENTLY WAS RECOVERED, IT WAS LEFT IN AN UNSECURED ENVIRONMENT OUTSIDE OF CLEARED U.S. CITIZEN CONTROL FOR SEVERAL HOURS. RSO AND RAO RETRIEVED THE ABANDONED VEHICLE FROM THE SWAMP WITH A WINCH AND THE ASSISTANCE OF LOCAL HIRED LABOR.

12. (U) AFTER LOCATING AND SECURING THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, THE RSO RETURNED TO THE NIA RESIDENCE. THERE WAS BRIEF ADDITIONAL CONFUSION AS THE ~~OFF~~ COMMANDER (FROM HIS OPERATIONS ROOM AT THE SHERATON) ENERGETICALLY REJECTED THE NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE'S REQUESTED THAT ONE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL PROCEED TO THE POLICE STATION TO GIVE A STATEMENT. THE NIGERIAN POLICE WERE UNWILLING TO TAKE THE STATEMENT AT THE EMBASSY BECAUSE OF ITS DIPLOMATIC STATUS. PO PROPOSED, AND THE NIGERIAN POLICE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED, THAT STATEMENTS BE TAKEN AT THE SHERATON. THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE ESCORTED FROM THE RESIDENCE, AND TAKEN BY EMBASSY VEHICLE TO THEIR BASE OF OPERATIONS AT THE ABUJA SHERATON HOTEL WHERE THEY GAVE STATEMENTS TO NIGERIAN POLICE, NIGERIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND RSO.

13. (U) COMMENT: AFTER INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT AND TALKING TO PARTIES INVOLVED, RSO DOES NOT/NOT FEEL THIS INCIDENT WAS A HOSTILE ATTACK AGAINST U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN NIGERIA. THE ENTIRE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED FOLLOWED PROPER PROCEDURE FOR INTERCITY ROAD TRAVEL AND REMAINED IN THEIR CONVOY. THE NIGERIAN POLICE STOP ALL NON-DIPLOMATIC AND NON-OFFICIAL VEHICLES AT ROAD CHECKPOINTS TO CHECK IDENTIFICATION. THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE WEARING FATIGUE UNIFORMS, CARRIED RIFLES AND WERE NOT TRAVELLING WITH A NIGERIAN MILITARY LIAISON COUNTERPART OR AS PART OF A MILITARY CONVOY, NOR----- DID THEY HAVE NORMAL NIGERIAN MILITARY IDENTIFICATION. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND GIVEN THE RECENT SHARP INCREASE IN ARMED CARJACKINGS WITHIN ABUJA, THE NIGERIAN POLICE UNDERSTANDABLY MIGHT WANT TO DETAIN AND QUESTION THE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 ABUJA 1936

DEPT FOR: AF/EX, AF/RA, AF/W, DS/DSS, DS/OP/AF

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, MASS, NI

SUBJECT: INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

UNIFORMED OCCUPANTS OF AN UNMARKED, UNLICENSED, RELATIVELY NEW TOYOTA CREW CAB PICKUP TRUCK ENTERING THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY. THE VEHICLE TRANSPORTING THE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WAS A CIVILIAN MODEL PICK-UP TRUCK WITHOUT LICENSE PLATES OR EXTERNAL IDENTIFYING MARKINGS. IF THIS VEHICLE HAD REMAINED IN ITS ESCORTED CONVOY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE CHECKPOINT. THE POLICE OFFICER AT THE SCENE WAS PROBABLY NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE IDENTIFICATION PRESENTED BY THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND WAS CONFUSED AT SEEING THREE NON-AFRICAN MALES IN COMBAT FATIGUES CARRYING WEAPONS.

14. (U) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, POST DOES NOT DOUBT THAT THE THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LEGITIMATELY FEARED FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY WHEN CONFRONTED BY A LARGE CROWD OF HOSTILE NIGERIAN CITIZENS. NIGERIAN CROWDS GROW QUICKLY IN BOTH SIZE AND ENERGY AND CAN BE EASILY INCITED TO RIOT. JUST AS A NIGERIAN FROM ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY CAN FALL VICTIM TO A LOCAL CROWD, NON-NIGERIANS ARE AT AN EXTREME DISADVANTAGE IN ANY CONFRONTATION INVOLVING NIGERIAN NATIONALS. NIGERIAN CROWDS DO NOT LISTEN TO REASON WHEN IT FAVORS THE "OUTSIDERS" AND HAVE IN THE PAST CARRIED OUT DEADLY ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN TRAFFIC INCIDENTS. THE RSO ADVISES ALL U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO FLEE THE AREA AFTER BEING INVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT OR IF A LARGE HOSTILE CROWD FORMS.

15. (U) DIRECT ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS MATTER TO MICHAEL E. BISHOP, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, U.S. EMBASSY ABUJA AT EITHER OFFICE: 234-g-523-0960 OR HOME: 234-9-413-5426.

SERPA

BT

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION

INFO NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*) CMAS(\*) JSAMS(1)  
JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(\*) AF-CC-POLAD(\*) BOARDMAN(\*)  
+US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE

(U)

1

SECDEF V2

ACTION

INFO CHAIRS(\*) SECDEF-C(\*) SECDEF-C(\*)  
DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) LA(\*)

(U)

0

DIA V3

ACTION

INFO DOTE(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)

(U, 6, 7)

0

+SAFE

CINC/SVC CHF V5

ACTION

INFO +OCSA WASHINGTON DC

(U)

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TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

1

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Received from AUTODIN 0416072 DEC 00

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*Acton*  
*11/28*  
*1746*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DH*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

Here is a memo from Geoffrey Hoon which you should take a look at, and get the right people working on it. I have no idea what it's all about and I haven't got time to read it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.22

Attach: November 16<sup>th</sup> Letter from Geoffrey Hoon

Respond by: 11/29

*NATO 400.1.2*

*93 Nov 01*

U14996 02

*01/21  
16R*

CLASSIFICATION

[Redacted]

**THE RT HON GEOFFREY HOON MP**  
Secretary of State for Defence

Ministry of Defence  
Room 205  
Old War Office  
White hall  
London **SW1A** 2EU

*01/21*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S OFFICE** Fax: 0  
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

From:

Tel:

Date: 20 NOV 01

No of pages: 5 [including header]

Remarks:

THIS VERSION REPLACES THE LETTER THAT WAS FAXED TO YOU VIA THE BRITISH EMBASSY YESTERDAY (19 NOV 01). THIS OFFICE APOLOGISES FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED THROUGH OUR ERROR. THE ONLY CHANGE IS TO PAGE TWO OF THE LETTER WHERE ADDITIONAL TEXT HAS BEEN ADDED.  
  
UMT

[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/1464

*01/21/01*

TO (b)(6)

P. 02/05



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON. SW1A 2EU

Telephone 020 MI 82111/2/3  
Fax 020 721 87140  
E-mail: [sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk)

MO 13/8/1C

16 November 2001

Dear Donald,

I am writing to tell you about a European programme to develop advanced technologies for combat air system's capabilities that will be announced in Brussels on Monday. I and my colleagues from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden will sign a declaration to launch a joint technology programme with European industry which will sustain and develop European capabilities for combat air systems over the next two decades. I attach the text of the declaration.

The European Technology Acquisition Programme, or ETAP, is a broadly-based programme to examine and develop technologies that are likely to have application in airborne strike systems in the next decade and beyond. It is a framework for collaboration within which a series of technology demonstration programmes will be launched. Each nation is able to decide which technology demonstrator programmes to join, guided by its national requirements. Applications of ETAP generated technology are likely to be diverse and could include unmanned air vehicles, cruise missiles and command and control systems, as well as developments to existing or planned manned aircraft.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/1465

U13536 01



I particularly wanted to keep you informed about this in order to reassure you about the nature of the ETAP programme and its relationship with the important work we are doing together on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). UK officials have discussed this with yours in recent weeks, in particular to address any concerns regarding the control of sensitive technology. I would like to reiterate that our ETAP work will be based on indigenous UK technology and know-how it will be kept entirely separate, both in Government and in industry, from our vital transatlantic co-operation on JSF. Under the arrangements that have been put in place to control access to technological information, JSF information will be safeguarded within that programme and will not be shared with others. I remain wholly committed to taking the Joint Strike Fighter programme forward.

The Defence Materiel staff in our Washington Embassy stand ready to discuss these matters further with your officials should this be necessary.

Your sincerely,  
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

## MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

**THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

**Acting in the spirit of the statement by the Heads of State and Government on 9 December 1997, which stated that they shared a vital political and economic interest in an efficient and globally competitive European aerospace and defence electronics industry,**

**Acting in the spirit of the framework agreement on measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European Defence Industry signed on 27 July 2000, and in particular the chapters concerning defence-related research and technology and the harmonisation of military requirements,**

**Recognising the need for their countries and for Europe to retain a strong and competitive industrial and technology base and a long-term capability to design, manufacture and integrate combat air systems,**

**Considering possible needs for such systems towards the end of the next decade (2020),**

**Promoting the harmonisation of military requirements in this sector,**

**Have decided in particular to carry out a joint study between now and summer 2002 aimed at delivering an initial assessment of their respective capability requirements in a 2020 timeframe and identifying the types of systems and their related technology base that might appropriately be developed jointly,**

**Have decided to launch, in co-operation with industry, a focused research and technology programme (the so called European Technology Acquisition Programme, ETAP) to lay the foundations for future combat air systems covering key fields within this sector.**

**Are asking their National Armament Directors to give priority to continued support for technology programmes already underway in order to ensure the achievement of their objectives and ensure the rapid signature of the necessary inter-governmental arrangements for ETAP whose management could be assigned in whole or part to OCCAR in due time,**

**Intend to allocate appropriate government funding for these activities,**

**Encourage European industry**

**- to make a substantial financial contribution to this effort**

- to propose innovative solutions and initiatives to support this *activity*, including suggestions for possible regrouping~~s~~ and/or co-operation to make the most of existing ~~capabilites~~ in the industries of each country.

September 27, 2001 1:49 PM

Afghanistan

TO: CJCS  
VCJCS  
Gen. Holland  
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

29sep01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Paul - this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

**Memorandum**

urgent

**Subject: on possible operations in Afghanistan**

**From:** (b)(6)

**For:** Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS

**Date:** 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A land invasion of Afghanistan would be **an** error of catastrophic proportions. The Taliban regime is weak militarily and economically. Most ordinary Afghans hate it **for** the poverty and abuses it has endangered. Foreigners among **the** Taliban are **particularly** resented. Having said that, an assault on Kabul and **Kandahar** can initially be **successful**. But in the medium **term** it would cause **an** Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. **The Talibanization of a nuclear country does** not bear thinking about. In addition, Hindu **Kush** passes will be **covered in** snow before the US can **mobilise** a **sufficient** invasion force, making operations even **harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states; surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets **selected** on the basis of electronic **and** satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The **country** has no infrastructure to speak **of**: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone **links**. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt **they** will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards** may have dispersed already. **In 1987 I spent three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing.** In a terrain in **which** every rock and **every** irrigation canal provides **cover**, **high** altitude bombing is ineffective.
3. To track down **and** capture or kill **terrorists** I would advise using **commandos**. The biggest threat to a **guerrilla** is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist insurgency in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in disrupting **mujaheddin** supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using **Spetsnaz**, **which** lost effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in **1986** thus depriving them **of** air liberty. Using **commandos means**, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable **casualties**. The **groups** should be accompanied anti-Taliban Afghans loyal to **the** Northern Alliance government of President **Rabbani**.
4. It is **the** Afghans themselves who know their **country** best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The **non-Taliban** Afghans should be drawn **into** the **anti-terrorist** alliance. They had been warning against the **Taliban** for years. **On the other hand, you cannot** fully trust **the** Pakistanis. The **CIA's** proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's** Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, **most of the** US money and weapons **channelled** to the ISI went to support **Gulbuddin Hekmatyar**, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who **refused** to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a **Pashtun-based** (many officers **in** the Pakistani **army** and ISI are **Pashtuns**), pliable **government** in Kabul, to **give** themselves strategic depth against India. When **Hekmatyar** failed to capture Kabul, they created **another** puppet, **the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of **business** circle (**Unocal**, an oil company which struck a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. **Pakistani society and army are riven with** fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and **gen. Mushsharaf will find it difficult to control** them.

5. **Rabbani's** Northern Alliance has been **weakened** by the loss of **Ahmed Shah Masud**, his minister of **defence**, in a suicide attack by two apparently **Westernised** Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy **theory** but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of **Massud** was a quid pro quo to the Taliban for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a **valuable ally**. Nevertheless, the **Northern Alliance** proved capable of instant retaliation **against** a Taliban **arms** dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via **Dushanbe**. They have a representative at the **U.N.**; the Ambassador in London. **Wali Massud** (brother of **Ahmad Shah Massud**) is an **important figure**; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in **Northern** and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and **airfields** could be effected. The alliance **consists** of important commanders all over the country:

The new political head of the Alliance, **Dr Abdullah**, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a **satellite** phone. **Ismael Khan**, former **army** officer, governor of **Herat**, who spent two years in a Taliban prison in **Kandahar** but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite **phone**.

**Haji Kadir**, former governor of **Jellalabad**, a **Pashun**, which is important because his role **neutralises** the Taliban ethnic card. I spent a month with him in **Nangrahar** in 1986.

The former Communist general **Dostum** seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. The **Hazara** minority, **Shias**, also resent the Taliban for the murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines and weapons it can build an anti-Taliban **coalition** which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world onto itself. Most **local** commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion and bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the **Northern Alliance** can be delivered through **countries** which have their own **reasons** to want the downfall of the Taliban: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air **bridge** from **ships** in **international** waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to Alliance-controlled **enclaves** inside Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in 1980s in support of the **mujahedin**.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An effective **strike** against the **Taliban** can best be dealt in co-operation **with** the military structures of **the** Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan who already suffer under the **Taliban** yoke
3. The best form of pressure and revenge on the **Taliban** is to support the moderate forces of the **Northern** Alliance
4. After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the **Taliban**, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid. Normal **state** structures can only be rebuilt by a **government** in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines **are** cleared, agriculture *functions again*, **will the refugees return** from Iran and Pakistan and does **the** region have any chance of **permanent** stabilisation.

(b)(6)

September 27, 2001 1:55 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

27 SEP 01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

and this is a tough-minded guy I know well. *Dir.*

urgent

Memorandum

Subject: **possible operations in Afghanistan**

From: (b)(6)

For: Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS

Date: 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001

spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.

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2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states: surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets selected on the basis of electronic and satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The country has no infrastructure to speak of: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone links. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt they will now limit their radio communications. Bin Laden and his bodyguards may have dispersed already. In 1987 I spent three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing. In a terrain in which every rock and every irrigation canal provides cover, high altitude bombing is ineffective.
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4. It is the Afghans themselves who know their country best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The non-Taliban Afghans should be drawn into the anti-terrorist alliance. They had been warning against the Taliban for years. On the other hand, you cannot fully trust the Pakistanis. The CIA's proxy war against the Soviets was run via Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, most of the US money and weapons channelled to the ISI went to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who refused to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a Pashtun-based (many officers in the Pakistani army and ISI are Pashtuns), pliable government in Kabul, to give themselves strategic depth against India. When Hekmatyar failed to capture Kabul, they created another puppet, the Taliban. The U.S., under

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

December 19, 2001 7:40 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Freedom Support Act

*Azerbaijan*

Please look at paragraph five of this cable. What do we do to make that happen?  
Has the Congress done it?

Thanks.

Attach:  
AMEMBASSY BAKU CABLE R 1806012 DEC 01

DHR:dh  
121901-31

*Mira,*

*Please have a short memo drafted from JOC to secretary on status of 901.*

*19 Dec 01*

*5: COB 12/21*

*v/r [Signature]*

11-L-0559/OSD/1477

U19865 /01



THEIR HEADS OF STATE." "SPACE' TV QUOTED PRESIDENT ALIYEV AS SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES AND AZERBAIJAN ARE "MEMBERS OF THE SAME COALITION IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATION," AND THAT "ALL FORMS OF ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST CAPAIGN IN THE FUTURE."

3. OTHERS SPECULATED UPON THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES. "LIDER' TV RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SPONSORING AZERBAIJANI AIRBASE UPGRADES. RUMSFELD IS NOTED AS RESPONDING THAT "A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE MADE BY OFFICIALS IN BAKU." IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT RUMSFELD HOPED THAT THE REPEAL OF SECTION 907 WOULD "OPEN UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR RENDERING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AZERBAIJAN." ANS REPORTED THAT "THE CURRENT MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND AZERBAIJAN IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATION CONSISTS OF PROVIDING THE US AIR FORCE WITH AN AIR CORRIDOR ONLY." ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BEGIN USING THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN AZERBAIJAN, ABIYEV STATED THAT 'SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO TALE OF THIS."

-----  
RUMSFELD SAYS THANK YOU; ALIYEV IMPATIENT OVER 907  
-----

4. STATE-RUN AZTV, WHICH BROADCASTS NATIONWIDE, AIRED THE COMPLETE PUBLIC PORTION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT ALIYEV AND DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD. IT WAS REPORTED THAT "THE PENTAGON CHIEF SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE JOINT STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM WITH PRESIDENT HEYDARALIYEV AND HAD CONVEYED PRESIDENT BUSH'S AND THE US PEOPLE'S GRATITUDE FOR AZERBAIJAN'S SUPPORT DURING THE ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION.'

5. SEVERAL MEDIA OUTLETS MENTIONED PRESIDENT ALIYEV'S PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF DISMAY THAT SECTION 907 OF THE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT HAS NOT YET BEEN WAIVED. INDEPENDENT SPACE TV QUOTED ALIYEV AS SAYING: "I BELIEVED THAT UPON ARRIVING HERE, YOU WOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT SECTION 907 NO LONGER EXISTED. BUT, YOU ARE SAYING AGAIN THAT IT WILL BE EXAMINED SOON. WE HAVE WAITED FOR A LONG TIME AND WE'LL WAIT MORE. BUT, NOW THE TIME HAS COME, FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 907 IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO US, BUT ALSO TO YOU. THE SOONER YOU REPEAL IT, THE BETTER. IN ANY CASE, EVERYTHING IS IN YOUR HANDS. WE WILL SIT QUIETLY AND WAIT. I SUPPOSE THAT THE WORDS YOU SAID HERE WILL BE FULFILLED. IN ANY CASE, THE DEFENSE SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS SAID THESE WORDS IN A MEETING WITH THE AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT IN THE AZERBAIJANI CAPITAL OF BAKU."

-----  
VAFA SPEAKS  
-----

6. ANS TV RAN A TALK SHOW CONSISTING OF 'INTERVIEWS WITH THE FORMER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT ALIYEV VAFA GULUZHADA IN BAKU, AN ANS CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON, AND A WELL-KNOWN JOURNALIST FROM ● RUSSIAN "KOMMERSANT" WEEKLY IN MOSCOW. COMMENTATORS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AZERBAIJAN STRENGTHENING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE US. GULUZHADA ASSERTED THAT RUMSFELD'S DECISION TO VISIT BAKU FIRST WAS NOT INCIDENTAL, AND THAT HIS VISIT TO YEREVAN WAS A FORMALITY. GUESTS ALSO TALKED ABOUT THE LIGHT COVERAGE OF THE VISIT BY RUSSIAN MEDIA. GULUZHADA SAID THIS REFLECTED MOSCOW'S NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND COUNTRIES OF CIS.

WILSON

JOINT STAFF V1		1
ACTION	(U)	
INFO CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JSAMS(*) JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(*)		
AF-CC-POLAD(*) BOARDMAN(*) N00H(*)		
SECDEF V2		1
ACTION	(U,6)	
INFO CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1)		
SECDEF-C(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) C2DIR(*)		
DIA V3		0
ACTION	(U,6,7)	
INFO +US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE		
+SAFE		
CINC/SVC CHF V5		0
ACTION	(U)	
INFO NMCC:CWO(*)		
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC		
	TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED	2

#3219

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\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*



DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

APR 11 2001

10 APR 2001

In reply refer to:  
I-01/004298-PMD

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
POLICY MATTERS (Chris Williams, 695-5136)  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY SUPPORT)  
(Pete Verga, 697-0285)  
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Bear McConnell, 693-0471)

MAY - 2 2001

FROM: Director, DSCA, Lt Gen Tome H. Walters, Jr., USAF, 604-6004  
(Prepared by: Rita Verry, DSCA/PPP, 601-3672)

*Tome H. Walters, Jr.*

*BM*  
11 APR 2001

SUBJECT: SECDEF Inquiry on Training for Foreign Officers

PURPOSE: Via e-mail, your office requested information regarding foreign military training programs. The enclosed point paper and attachments provide the requested information.

Attachments  
As stated

## RESPONSE TO SECDEF INQUIRY ON FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

Secretary Rumsfeld indicated he may be interested in amending existing laws to allow the US to pay 100% of costs for foreign military students to come to the US (or US facilities) for training without regard to funding need. The e-mail tasker from the SECDEF's office is at TAB 1. It specifically requests: (1) information on current training programs; (2) what legislative changes might be required to allow the US to pay the full cost of US-provided training for all foreign students; and (3) a rough estimate of the cost of this proposal.

### SUMMARY

- **Question #1:** The principal components of foreign military assistance training are a combination of grant aid programs and government-to-government sales. The point paper at TAB 2 describes these programs and provides the approximate costs for FY00.
- **Question #2:** The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) provides authority to provide International Military Education and Training (IMET) on a grant basis. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides authority to sell USG training at cost. Since the Department of Defense implements these military training programs on behalf of the State Department, any legislative changes would require State Department support.
  - Under current legislative authority, IMET recipients may purchase training at a reduced rate (only those additional costs that are incurred by the USG in furnishing such assistance are charged). This results in a savings of 30%-40% to the foreign customer.
  - Section, 546 of the FAA prohibits IMET for Austria, Finland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Spain. However, these countries are entitled to purchase training at the reduced rate described above. Draft legislative proposals that would allow all countries to receive IMET are provided at TAB 3.
  - There are separate authorities in title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), under which training of foreign military students may be accomplished. TAB 3 acknowledges that while these authorities exist, they lack appropriated dollars to allow execution.
  - To provide DoD training at no cost to the foreign customer under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the AECA would need revision. TAB 3 includes information regarding this change.

- Question #3:
  - While US-funded programs typically pay tuition costs and the cost of travel, none of the programs cover 100% of foreign countries' costs when their students are in training. Many programs do provide a supplemental living allowance (vice actual expenses or Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) per diem for foreign students) to help defray living expenses.
  - In FY00, foreign customers used approximately \$345 million of their own national funds to pay for training. These costs would be borne by the US in a 100% US-funded scenario. This would be in addition to the approximately \$170 million of foreign military training already paid for by the USG.
  - These figures represent training figures that are constrained by the budget of each country. We can assume that if the training were free, more would be requested.
  - Current schoolhouse capacity is not available to absorb a significant increase in demand beyond today's \$516 million worth of training. Military Departments must be directed and given time to budget and accommodate this level of capacity, and they must know exactly which courses of instruction must be expanded to support the increase in international students.
    - We are studying the number of student quotas available and schoolhouse maximum capacity required to increase the existing IMET program to \$100M by FY2004.
    - We are also developing a Strategic Security Assistance Training Plan for each country to ensure the courses meet U.S. foreign policy objectives and will project the requirements to the Military Departments.

**Attachments:**

TAB (1) – E-mail forwarding Secretary Rumsfeld's Inquiry of April 2, 2001

TAB (2) – Existing International Training Programs

TAB (3) – Foreign Military Training DRAFT Legislative Proposal

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**This Message: UNCLASSIFIED**

**Arthur Keltz**

04/02/01 01:14 PM

To: Keith Webster/PS/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, Vanessa Murray/LPA/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP

cc: Tome Walters/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, Kay Cannon/GC/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, (bcc: archive/USDP/OUSDP@OUSDP)

Subject: SecDef inquiry on training for foreign officers (U)

Keith and Vanessa, please team on this and draft a reply for the boss to send. Coordinate with Kay regarding the leg proposal. Thanks, **ARK----- Forwarded by Arthur Keltz/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP on 04/02/01 01:12 PM ----**

**This Message: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**Christine Wormuth**

04/02/01 12:25 PM

To: ArthurKeltz/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP

cc: LawrenceGarrison/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, John Fulton/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, Vanessa Murray/LPA/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, Kay Cannon/GC/DSCA/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, DanP O'Brien/ISA/OUSDP@OUSDP, Dwight Brown/USDP/OUSDP@OUSDP, Kevin McDonnell/USDP/OUSDP@OUSDP, (bcc: archive/USDP/OUSDP@OUSDP)

Subject: SecDef inquiry on training for foreign officers (U)

Mr. Keltz: The Secretary has indicated (via Chris Williams) he may be interested in amending existing laws to allow the US to pay 100% of costs for foreign military officers to come to the US (or US facilities) for training, schooling etc. I believe he is aware that currently we pay 100% for some countries but not for others due to provisions in law, the **IMET** program etc.

Can DSCA prepare:

- a) a point paper on how the current **training/schooling/IMET** program works (how much we spend, how rules are applied, what laws govern the program)
- b) a draft legislative proposal that would amend whatever laws apply to allow the US to pay for everyone (regardless of need) and
- c) a rough estimate of the kind of bill such a proposal would likely entail? (i.e. how much do we currently think countries are paying from their own pockets that we would pick up if such a leg proposal were passed by Congress?)

It would be most helpful if these materials could be done by Wednesday COB, but please let me know if this seems unreasonable.

Many thanks -- CEW, 6976362.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

11-L-0559/OSD/1484

## EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS

<b>Total Foreign Military Training</b>	<b><u>\$516.227111</u></b>
• <b>Foreign Government Funded</b>	
➤ <b>FMS</b>	<b>\$345.7M</b>
<p>Government to government sales that strengthen bilateral defense relations, support bilateral defense relations, support coalition building, and enhance interoperability between U.S. forces and militaries of friends and allies. Authorized under Chapter 2, Section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2761), the United States is directed to recoup the full cost of providing training to FMS customer, to include direct and indirect personnel and material costs. The FMS customer also pays all travel and living allowances (TLA).</p>	
• <b>DoS Funded (International Affairs Budget Function 150)</b>	<b>\$95.0M</b>
➤ <b>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</b>	<b>(\$42.0M)</b>
<p>U.S. appropriations for financing the acquisition of U.S. training through grants and loans that supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables allies and friendly foreign countries to improve their defense capabilities. Section 21 of the AECA calls for reimbursement to DoD of the “additional costs” incurred by the United States. Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 23 11) allows for further reduction of military salary charges. FMF funds may be used to pay travel and supplemental living allowance (LA) for foreign students. FMF funds also are used to support:</p>	
✓ <b>African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)</b>	<b>(\$6.3M)</b>
<p>Provides training of African troops in peacekeeping and humanitarian crisis response.</p>	
✓ <b>Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)</b>	<b>(\$0.4M)</b>
<p>EIPC seeks to promote burdensharing, to enhance national and regional capability to support peacekeeping operations (PKO) by developing core curriculum for PKO education and training and procures non-lethal defense-related training equipment.</p>	
➤ <b>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</b>	<b>* (\$45.8M)</b>
<p>Provides grants for training foreign militaries in U.S. DoD education programs that assist U.S. friends and allies in the professionalization of their militaries. IMET is authorized under Section 541 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2347) and calls for reimbursement of the “additional costs” incurred by the United States in providing training. Section 503 of the FAA allows for further reductions of military salary charges. Most countries use their IMET allocated funds to pay for travel and supplemental LA.</p>	
➤ <b>International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)</b>	<b>(\$0.5M)</b>
<p>Supports foreign criminal justice sectors in international crime and drug control.</p>	

\* The IMET program was funded at \$55M for FY2000. These funds were also used to purchase English Language Labs and language materials, and are not reported in the individual training figures reported above.

Training provided through the FMS system using **INL** funds is governed by the same laws and policies as those outlined for **FMF**.

- **DoD Funded (National Defense Budget Function 050)** **\$75.0M**
  - **Regional Centers for Security Studies**

Established by the Secretary of Defense. Essential institutions for bilateral and multilateral communication, military and civilian exchanges that provide the Secretary and **CINCs** a vehicle to engage militaries and defense establishments worldwide with a goal of lowering regional tensions, strengthening **civil-military** relations and addressing regional challenges. Each Center has a different set of legal authorities based on when and how they were established; some Centers have authorities that allow cost waivers with no limits on course length; other Centers' authorities are more limited. Some Centers can accept foreign gifts to defray operating costs; other Centers can not accept such gifts. The payment of foreign student travel and supplemental LA varies by Center and circumstance. In general, students from developing countries may have these expenses funded whereas developed countries may be expected to pay these expenses. Each Center determines the exceptions.

    - ✓ Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (\$0.7M)
    - ✓ Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (\$1.3M)
    - ✓ Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) (\$1.6M)
    - ✓ Marshall Center (\$12.3M)
    - ✓ Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (**NESA**) \*\*(- )
  - **Section 1004 – Counter-Drug Training Support (CDTS)** (\$22.3111)

CDTS includes deployments for training of foreign forces at the request of an appropriate law enforcement agency official as defined in Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for **FY** 1991 (Public Law 101-510). The purpose of the CDTS is to conduct counternarcotics related training of foreign military and law enforcement personnel. **DoD** schools are reimbursed for the “additional costs” incurred in providing training. CDTS funds may be used to pay travel and supplemental LA to foreign students.
  - **Non Security Assistance - Unified Command** (\$27.09M)
    - ✓ **Humanitarian Demining (HD)**

Provides training to foreign nations in mine clearance operations, mine awareness education and information campaigns, assistance in the establishment of mine action centers, emergency medical care, and leadership and management skills needed to successfully conduct a national level mine action program (10 U.S.C. 401). The **CINCs** execute the HD Programs. The training is conducted in the foreign country at no charge and any student TLA expenses are paid by the foreign 'country.

\*\* Note: At the time the Foreign Military Training Report data was collected, the **NESA** Center had not reported operational/programmatic costs, only planned events.

✓ **Disaster Response (Humanitarian Assistance (HA))**

HA, including training in disaster response and/or disaster preparedness, is authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2561. Normally, HA and training conducted under 10 U.S.C. 2561 is not provided to foreign militaries. However, selected military members of the host nation are occasionally included in the training so that the military understands the role in supporting the civilian government during emergencies. The ultimate goal of disaster response training is an improved host nation capability to effectively respond to disasters, thereby reducing or eliminating the need for a U.S. military response. The training is conducted in the foreign country at no charge and any student TLA expenses are paid by the foreign country.

✓ **Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)**

Permits U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train in a foreign country through interaction with foreign military forces and is authorized under 10 U.S.C. 2011. It enhances SOF skills, such as instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion, critical to required missions generated by either existing plans or unforeseen contingencies. The primary purpose of JCET activities is always the training of U.S. SOF personnel, although incidental-training benefits may accrue to the foreign friendly forces at no cost. TLA funds are not provided to the foreign students by DoD.

✓ **Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs**

Under 10 U.S.C. 1051, the Secretary of Defense may pay travel, subsistence, and similar personal expenses of defense personnel of developing countries in connection with attendance at bilateral or regional conferences, seminars or similar meetings if the Secretary deems attendance in the U.S. national security interest. See also 10 U.S.C. 1050 for payment of personnel expenses in connection with Latin American cooperation.

✓ **CINC Initiative**

Under 10 U.S.C. 166a, CINC's may fund military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries.

➤ **Service-Sponsored Activities**

✓ **Service Academy Exchanges**

**(\$8.1M)**

DoD's three Service Academies have conducted traditional academic exchange programs of varying length and content. Up to 40 foreign students may attend each Service Academy at any one time as actual members of an Academy class. Some countries reimburse all or a portion of the program cost (to include the living allowance) to the Service Academy.

For the Cadet Exchange Program (CEP), the parent (sending) Service is responsible for the basic pay and LA for their cadets and all travel costs associated with transporting their cadets to/from the host (receiving) Air Force Academy. The host Air Force Academy provides the exchange cadets with billeting and subsistence and the cost of travel during training.

Under the Military Services Academies International Student Program, the international cadets come to the U.S. Service academies but there are no U.S. cadets going abroad. Foreign cadets are provided transportation from/to country. Also, the international cadets receive the same pay/allowances as U.S. cadets. Countries are required to reimburse the USG the cost of providing instruction, including pay, allowances, and emoluments, unless a "full" or "partial (50%)" waiver of costs is granted by OUSDP/ISA/INRA.

✓ **Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)** (\$0.01M)

ALP provides Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) to a small number of selected international students from friendly, less-developed countries. ALP is a USAF-funded program authorized under 10 U.S.C. 9381-9383. ALP consists of English language training, UPT and necessary related training as well as programs to promote better awareness and understanding of the democratic institutions and social framework of the United States. The cost of the ALP program is approximately \$470K per student. ALP was suspended in **FY1999**, but the USAF plans to restart the program in **FY2002**. ALP funds may be used to pay TLA to foreign students on the same basis as **IMET**.

✓ **Exchanges** (\$0.4M)

Reciprocal professional military education (PME) exchanges are authorized by Section 544 (Exchange Training) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2347c). This section authorizes the President to provide for the attendance of foreign military personnel at **PME** institutions in the United States (other than Service Academies) without charge, if such attendance is part of an international agreement. These international agreements provide for the exchange of students on a one-for-one reciprocal basis each fiscal year between the two military Services participating in the exchange. Each country is responsible for paying their own students' TLA.

Section 30A (Exchange of Training and Related Support) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2770a). authorizes the President to provide training and related support to military and civilian defense personnel of a friendly foreign country or international organization. Such training and related support are provided through the Military Services (as opposed to the Unified Commands). Unit exchanges conducted under this authority are arranged under international agreements negotiated for such purposes, and are integrated into the theater engagement strategies. of the relevant Unified Commander. Recipient countries provide, on a reciprocal basis, comparable training and related support; however, each country is responsible for paying their own students' TLA.

➤ **Drawdowns (Section 506) (22 U.S.C. 2318)** (\$1.2M)

Under Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA, the President may direct the **drawdown** of defense services education and training from the **DoD** if he determines and reports to the Congress that an unforeseen emergency exist which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international organization; and that

such emergency requirement cannot be met under the AECA or any other law except this section.

Under Section 506(a)(2) of the FAA, the President need only determine and report to the Congress in accordance with Section 652 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2411), that it is in the national interest of the United States to **drawdown** articles and services from the inventory of any USG agency and military education and training from the DoD. If he so determines, the President may direct the **drawdown** of such articles, services and military education and training for the purposes and under the authorities of Chapter 8 of Part I [of the FAA] relating to international narcotics control assistance; Chapter 9 of part I [of the FAA] relating to international disaster assistance; or the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962; or for the purpose of providing such articles, services and military education and training to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as the President determines are necessary to (1) support cooperative efforts to locate and repatriate members of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilians employed directly or indirectly by the USG who remain unaccounted for from the Vietnam War; and (2) to ensure the safety of USG personnel engaged in such cooperative efforts and to support DOD-sponsored humanitarian projects associated with such efforts.

If the President determines that, as the result of an unforeseen emergency, the immediate provision of assistance for PKO under Chapter 6 of the FAA in amounts in excess of funds otherwise available for such assistance is important to the national interest of the United States, then Section 552 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2348a), provides for **drawdown** of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the USG of an aggregate value not to exceed **\$25M** in any fiscal year.

Under Sections 506(a)(1) and (2) of the FAA, tuition for education and training is provided at no cost to the foreign government. Student travel is funded from the Military Departments' Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. Students may stay in a Bachelor Officers' Quarters (BOQ) or a Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) if operated by DoD funds, and LA is not provided to the student.

- **DoT/USCG Funded**

\$0.527111

Provides training by the USCG in maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and marine environmental protection.

- 9 **USCG Academy Foreign Cadet Program**

14 U.S.C. 195 authorizes a limited number of foreign national appointments (maximum of 36) to the USCG Academy. Cadets can earn a Bachelor of Science degree. The foreign government must agree in advance to reimburse the USCG for all costs incurred for a cadet's training at the Coast Guard Academy, except where a waiver has been granted by the Commandant, USCG.

- 9 **Caribbean Support Tender (CST)**

Provides a 180' ex-buoy tender that operates in the Caribbean, with **onboard** training capability in maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, marine safety, environmental protection and disaster relief. The concept for the CST was

developed in response to Presidential commitments in Bridgetown, Barbados in 1997, and was authorized under Public Law 105-277, Chapter 4, and subsequently commissioned in September 1999. Quotas are made available to all eligible countries and tuition may be paid from **IMET**, **FMF**, or **FMS**. Travel and supplemental LA is provided from the respective grant aid programs or the foreign government provides all TLA under **FMS**.

Note: While U.S. funded programs typically pay tuition costs (and travel cost in many instances), none of the programs cover 100% of the foreign country's living/subsistence costs when their students are in training. However, many programs do provide a supplemental living allowance (vice actual expenses or Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) per diem for foreign students).

**DRAFT Legislative Proposals to Allow  
USG to Pay 100% Costs to Train Foreign Students**

- **PROPOSAL ONE: If decided to provide all training under IMET authority.**

Sec. \_\_\_\_\_. Prohibition on Grant Assistance for Certain High Income Foreign Countries

Strike Section 546 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 USC 2347c) in its entirety:

- ~~(a) IN GENERAL. None of the funds made available for a fiscal year for assistance under this chapter may be made available for assistance on a grant basis for any of the high income foreign countries described in subsection (b) for military education and training of military and related civilian personnel of such country.~~
- ~~(b) HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES DESCRIBED. The high income foreign countries described in this subsection are Austria, Finland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Spain.~~

Sectional Analysis

Section 546 prohibits the provision of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to Austria, Finland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Spain. However, Chapter 2, Section 21(a)(1)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2761(a)(1)(c)) entitles these countries to purchase training at a reduced rate (only those additional costs that are incurred by the USG in furnishing the assistance). Under current legislative authority, a significant benefit to receiving an annual IMET allocation, is the legal provision that enables IMET recipients to then purchase training at a reduced rate. Striking out Section 546 would allow all countries to receive IMET and consequently would give authority to the Secretary of State to use IMET/EIMET funding in a way that would more fully encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

- **PROPOSAL TWO: If decided to provide all training under IMET authority--but an alternative approach that would not repeal the statute.**

A provision to be included in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2002, to wit:

## GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR IMET

Sec. \_\_\_\_\_. Funds made available for grant assistance for international military education and training (IMET) or expanded international military education and training (EIMET) may be made available for high-income foreign countries notwithstanding the provisions of section 546 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347c), as amended, if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that such assistance will promote the objectives of the United States as set out by the Congress in section 541 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2347).

### ANALYSIS

This provision would give authority to the Secretary of State to use IMET/EIMET funding in a way that would more fully encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.

- **PROPOSAL THREE: If decided to provide training through DoD appropriations.**

Section 21(a)(1)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2761(a)(1)(c)) permits the sale of training to foreign allies provided the foreign customer pays the full cost USG incurs in providing such service. This Section would need to be revised to allow the SECDEF, in coordination with SECSTATE, to provide DoD training to foreign allies at no cost to foreign governments on a case-by-case basis. The cost for this training would have to be included in a DoD appropriation.

- **PROPOSAL FOUR: Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) Authorities**

There are many separate statutory authorities in title 10, United States Code (U.S.C), under which training is accomplished. None of these are security assistance authorities, although DSCA is responsible for funding determinations for the use of Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF), part of the annual DoD O&M appropriation, and for funding for demining training under 10 U.S.C. 401.

Some title 10 authorities, like 10 U.S.C. 1050. for payment of personnel expenses for Latin American cooperation authorize a broad scope of support, but there are no current appropriations budgeted or earmarked to pay for this support. Some, like 10 U.S.C. 2011. Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces do have associated appropriations to pay for the expenses authorized in the statute.

Although its a matter for OSD GC evaluation, we think that all title 10 training authorities should not be individually changed to authorize more funding when appropriations have not been sought or provided to allow funding under all the current authorities. However, a proviso in the annual National Defense Appropriation Act might be crafted to allow the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law in title 10, U.S.C., to pay for the costs of all training to friendly foreign countries under authorities in title 10, to the extent supported by available appropriations

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DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

JUN 11 2001



WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

~~SECRET~~

**INFO MEMO**

2001 JUN 12 PM 5: 21

I-01/006145

June 6, 2001, 4:40 PM

FOR : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lt Gen *Tom H. Walters* 8 JUN 2001  
Tom H. Walters, Jr., USAF, Director, DSCA

SUBJECT: SECDEF Inquiry on Training for Foreign Officers

Via e-mail, your office requested information regarding training for foreign officers. The enclosed point paper and attachments provide the requested information.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

TAB A: Response to Inquiry

TAB B: Country Listing

TAB C: Coordination

Prepared by: Kay Judkins, DSCA/P3, 601-3719

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11-L-0559/OSD/1494

U10799 /01

RESPONSE TO SECDEF INQUIRY ON FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated he may be interested in waiving the cost of DoD training for foreign military students from select countries. Below is a response to the e-mail tasker (TAB A) requesting further information.

- Question #1. "Can we (the SD or someone he designates) waive the cost associated with this training for selected countries or do we have to change the law?"  
Answer: We have to change the law. A proviso in the annual National Defense Appropriation Act could be crafted to allow the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law in title 10, U.S.C., to pay for the costs of all training to friendly foreign countries under authorities in title 10, to the extent supported by available appropriations. Furthermore, we recommend that DoD seek authority and appropriations to pay training associated travel costs and provide living allowances to students from poorer countries that cannot afford to cover these expenses. Unless these expenses are paid, poorer countries **will** not send students to participate in training, even if the training is otherwise free.
- Question #2. "If we are authorized to waive it, for which countries should we waive it and what should the standards be for waiving costs?"  
Answer: DoD is not currently authorized to waive the costs. Should DoD be authorized to fund training costs, full staffing with OSD, JCS, and others would be required to develop standards for waiving and funding such costs. These standards might include a country's ability to pay, training needs, and the ability of DoD schools to absorb increased capacity (as we recognize demand may increase if training is offered at no cost). We have included a list of countries, developed with the support of the CINCs, that might be considered for waiver (TAB B). This list is not in priority order nor does it necessarily reflect standards that would be developed during formal staffing.
- One item of note: In pursuing such an initiative, pre-consultation with Congress is essential. In FY94, the IMET appropriation was cut by 50% in response to DoD's proposed Democracy Fund initiative. The Democracy Fund initiative was proposed as a DoD funded program of \$50M to provide IMET-like training and education. Though authorized by Congress, funds were never appropriated because some in Congress viewed this initiative as duplicative to the IMET Program. It took several years to restore IMET funding to an FY01 value of \$55M, an FY02 request of \$65M, and an FY04 target of \$100M.

TAB A

General Walters,

Your office answered several SECDEF "Snowflakes" in March and April regarding Training of Foreign Officers and subsequently provided a matrix of Foreign Military Training Information broken down by country, students, and total cost. The follow-on requirement to this effort is a short (no more than one page information memorandum that answers the following questions:

1. Can we (the SD or someone he designates) waive the cost associated with this training for selected countries or do we have to change the law.
2. If we are authorized to waive it, for which countries should we waive it and what should the standards be for waiving training costs.

The questions generated over poor countries inability to fund the training costs and the SD's willingness to assist in selected cases.

The SD a requests short concise response based on facts and actionable recommendations.

I have returned copies of the complete packets of work your office has done to address this issue to date for your use. Thank-you in advance for your efforts.

V/R

Kevin

Kevin M. McDonnell  
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Albania	Guinea-Bissau	Rwanda
Angola	Guyana	Saint Lucia
Bangladesh	Haiti	Samoa
Belize	Honduras	Sao Tome
Benin	Hungary	S e n e g a l
Bolivia	India	Seychelles
Bosnia	Indonesia	Sierra Leone
Botswana	Jamaica	Slovakia
Bulgaria	Kazakhstan	Slovenia
Burkina Faso	Kenya	Solomon Islands
Burundi	Kyrgyzstan	South Africa
Cambodia	Laos	Sri Lanka
Cameroon	Latvia	St Kitts
Cape Verde	Lesotho	St Vincent
Central African Republic	Liberia	Suriname
Chad	Lithuania	Swaziland
Colombia	M a c e d o n i a	Tajikistan
Comoros	Madagascar	Tanzania
Congo Brazzaville	Malawi	Thailand
Congo Kinshasa	Malaysia	Togo
Costa Rica	Maldives	Tonga
Cote d'Ivoire	Mali	Turkmenistan
Croatia	Malta	Turkey
Czech Rep	Mauritania	Uganda
Djibouti	Mauritius	Ukraine
Dominica	Moldova	Uzbekistan
Dominican Republic	Mongolia	Vanuatu
Ecuador	Mozambique	Venezuela
El Salvador	Namibia	Vietnam
Equatorial Guinea	Nepal	Zambia
<b>Eritrea</b>	Nicaragua	Zimbabwe
Estonia	Niger	
Ethiopia	Nigeria	
Fiji	Panama	
Gabon	Papua New Guinea	
Gambia	Paraguay	
Georgia	Peru	
Ghana	Philippines	
Grenada	Poland	
Guatemala	Portugal	
Guinea	Romania	

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TAB C: COORDINATION

Special Assistant to the SecDef for Policy Matters (Daniel J. Gallington)

*DJG* 11 JUN 2001

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PS)(Peter Verga)

TDY --  
COPY PROVIDED

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)(Bernd McConnell)

*FCSmitz*  
11 JUN 2001

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11-L-0559/OSD/1498



DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800  
INFO MEMO

SECRET  
JUL -5 2001  
2001 JUL 1 0 PM 5: 07  
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I-01/007681-LPA  
July 3, 2001, 9:50 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

05 JUL 2001

FROM: Lt Gen Tome H. Walters, Jr., USAF, Director, DSCA *Tome Walters*

SUBJECT: Results of House Appropriations Mark-up – Foreign Operations Bill

- On 27 June, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (HACFO) marked the FY02 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account at \$3.627B against the PB of \$3.674B—a \$47M cut.
- The HACFO mark-up is the first mark. Full committee marks should start after 10 Jul. The Senate has not begun markups.
- If this figure holds, discretionary FMF (non-Israel, Egypt, Jordan) would be cut from \$259M to \$212M. This cut would prevent us from initiating new FMF starts (El Salvador, South Africa) and providing more FMF to others (the Philippines, new NATO countries, etc.).
- We will work to restore full funding during full committee marks.
- HACFO mark highlights:
  - IMET was funded at \$65M (the President's request).
  - Israel got \$2.04B in FMF; Egypt got \$1.3B; and Jordan received \$75M (all of these amounts were at the President's requested levels).
  - The Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Activities (NADR) account got \$311M (\$21M less than the President's request). This account pays for such programs as the CTBT Preparatory Commission and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.
  - The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (\$676M) received pointed criticism by Democratic members of the HACFO, but funding was not reduced. We expect attempts will be made to cut this during full committee markups.
- The House Appropriations Committee plans to take action on 10 July. The Senate will start its work later in July.

Prepared by: Brian Knapp, 604-66 18



April 10, 2001 8:00 AM

TO: Rich Haver  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board

Here is some material from the Defense Science Board you should take into account concerning your intelligence work.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/1/01 Williams Memo: "Defense Science Board Task Force Briefing" and 2/28/01 Briefing Slides

DHR:dh  
041001-25

334 DSB

18 GJM 01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

SIR-

ATTACHED IS THE BRIEF  
BY PHIL ODAEN OF THE DEFENSE  
SCIENCE BOARD.

I AGREE WITH CHRIS WILLIAMS'  
RECOMMENDATION THAT YOU NOT  
TAKE THIS BRIEF IN PERSON.

HOWEVER, THE DISCUSSION  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON  
INTELLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS ARE WORTH READING.  
THE FORMER MIGHT BE REFLECTED  
IN THE NSPD THE DCI WANTS  
FOR AN INTELLIGENCE REVIEW.  
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECTION  
SUGGESTS ORGANIZATION.

SK  
3/8



March 1, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *OW*  
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Task Force Briefing

*Sir:*  
Former SecDef Frank Carlucci recommended that you receive a briefing by Phil Odeen, who heads the Defense Science Board (see your previous note/attached). You asked that I get a copy of and pre-screen the briefing for you.

Attached is a copy of the briefing, for your review. It is highly prescriptive, but without a lot of justification for the specific recommendations made therein. I do not recommend you receive a sit-down<sup>OW</sup> briefing by Dr. Odeen at this time.

Please do not hesitate to let me know if you require additional information or action on this matter.

Attachments

Cc: DepSecDef Wolfowitz  
Cambone  
Schneider  
Zakheim  
Aldridge

11-L-0559/OSD/1503



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 9, 2001 4:03 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: -Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Briefing

Phil O'Deen apparently has a briefing from the Defense Science Board that's worth hearing, according to Carlucci. Why don't you get someone to receive it and see if it's worth my time? Thanks.

*pre-screen*

*Chris Williams*

DR:dh  
020901-16

**DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD  
TASK FORCE**

*Sustaining U.S.  
Military Dominance  
Findings and  
Recommendations*

# Background

- Since the **mid-1990s**, the Defense Science Board has conducted over 60 studies on topics ranging from narrow technical issues, to new or emerging threats, to defense business practices.
- These studies provide a solid, **well-documented roadmap** for sustaining, and indeed enhancing, the dominant U.S. military capabilities.
- While these capabilities are not challenged today by a peer competitor, many asymmetrical threats are emerging and require special attention.
- Based on its recent work, the DSB sees eight critical **challenges** the Department must address.

# Project Rapidly Deployable, Potent Joint Forces

## *Findings*

- Today's **forces vary widely in their ability to respond to crises.**
  - Strategic and tactical airpower can respond virtually anywhere in the world with potent forces in hours or days depending on location
  - Light ground forces can respond in days but have limited combat power
  - Follow-on heavy and potent ground forces may require weeks or months to respond; they also require extensive sea port capabilities
  - Sustainment is not responsive nor sufficiently agile to support rapidly deployable forces
- **Rapidly deployable and potent joint forces could prevent a conflict or prevail quickly, minimizing the people and dollar costs.**
- **DoD lacks a capable, responsive, and deployable joint command and control structure.**
  - Essential element for effective joint operations with coalition partners
  - A pick-up game for each contingency today--a limiting factor, not an advantage

## *Conclusion*

- **Rapidly deployable, agile, potent, full capability-air, land and sea-joint**

**control ou**

# Project Rapidly Deployable, Potent Joint Forces

## *Recommendations*

- **Under the direction of the CJCS, the Services must develop and field a rapid, decisive, joint force.**
  - Deployable within hours, sustainable within days, and capable of continuous operations
  - Provide a valid, reliable common operating picture-key to dominant battlespace awareness
  - Interdependent, exploiting remote fires capabilities with high confidence
  - Maximum operational, minimum support forces ashore
  - Agile logistics based on integrated supply chain management concepts
  - Particular focus on improving deployability of Army forces, per Army Science Board Studies
- **Establish a standing joint force headquarters at U.S. Joint Forces Command.**
  - Define force packages of joint combat forces
  - Conduct experiments to develop and refine concepts, doctrine, processes and establish confidence
  - Exercise regularly using real forces and full-time personnel
- **Create standing, joint task force command and control systems that meet performance and readiness standards – equal to that for combat and combat support units – for employment- by theater CINCs.**

# Combat Transnational Threats

## *Findings*

- DoD is not organized or structured to deter or effectively respond to transnational threats, especially attacks employing nuclear devices or biological agents.
- There is inadequate intelligence focus, capabilities and activities against transnational threats, especially on those groups willing to use weapons of mass destruction.
- DoD is increasingly dependent on civil networks and infrastructure and yet little has been done to protect those assets or dedicated DoD networks against electronic (cyber) attacks.
- An effective U.S. response requires complex integration of federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies; the national security community; and the international community.

## *Conclusion*

- Transnational threats-including biological, chemical, and unconventional nuclear weapons-present fundamental dangers to the security of the United States. ~~We need the capability to deal with these threats.~~

# Combat Transnational Threats

## *Recommendations*

- **The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman should charter and resource a joint program office to establish policy and to support the CINCs with programs to counter transnational threats.**
- **The Secretary of Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence should establish intelligence capabilities, processes and activities against transnational threats.**
  - Develop a new spectrum of “observables” for bioagent and nuclear device development, production, and delivery
  - Develop a data base and increasingly sophisticated forensic analysis capabilities to rapidly and accurately determine attribution and options for retribution against the range of threats
  - Address deficiencies – technical expertise and operational capabilities
- **The Secretary of Defense should institute programs that improve our ability to respond to the transnational threat.**
  - A broad program of defensive information operations for the entire DoD information infrastructure
  - Capabilities for improved speed, breadth, and accuracy of diagnosis of a bioterrorism and biowarfare attack
  - **With the Secretary of Energy, develop capabilities to detect and render safe nuclear devices and materials and accelerate efforts for securing nuclear weapons in Russia and fissile material against loss**

# Transform Intelligence

## *Findings*

- **The structure of U.S. intelligence was established 40-50 years ago in the shadow of WWII and the early stages of the cold war.**
  - It is stovepiped around technical disciplines and functions
  - A different set of technologies existed
  - A different set of classification and security imperatives
  - A different set of threats and possible uses of military force
  - Different forces employing different technologies with different operational concepts
- **The 21<sup>st</sup> century national security posture requires a more effective/efficient intelligence apparatus. The current structure has a:**
  - Lack of focus on CINC missions, problems and regional crises
  - Unnecessary duplication of effort and infrastructure
  - uneven roles, capabilities, and performance across the technical/functional stovepipes, which create difficult integration issues
  - Imbalance between collection volume and ability to task, process, exploit and disseminate
  - Inadequate intelligence integration with military operations

# Transform Intelligence

## *Conclusion*

- **The nation's intelligence organization and infrastructure were created to deal with world wars and the cold war and are poorly structured for regional conflicts, asymmetric threats, or homeland defense.**

## *Recommendations*

- **The Secretary of Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence should restructure intelligence activities with “missions/problems” as primary focus (vice technical function).**
- **For regional areas of responsibility, the Secretary and Chairman should charge the CINCs with the responsibility for “Intelligence Preparedness” within their theater or function.**
  - CINCs should ensure that Joint Intelligence Centers are focused on broad regional intelligence assessments in support of the CINC mission
  - CINCs should ensure that the system architecture and technical architecture supports their regional/functional operational architecture
- **The Secretary and the Chairman should charge the Joint Forces Command with support for CINC “Intelligence Preparedness”.**
  - To support the CINCs, JFCCM will need additional engineering capability to develop joint operational architectures and perform joint systems engineering analysis

# Ensure Information and Decision Superiority

## *Findings*

- **The United States had information superiority in the Desert Storm conflict.**
- **The enablers of our information superiority are likely to be transitory (e.g. increasing access by adversaries to commercial surveillance and communications).**
- **In the Kosovo operation, NATO lost decision superiority to the Serbs who exploited wireless and internet technology and allied signal intelligence vulnerabilities.**
- **An integrated information infrastructure, based on private-sector standards, is an essential enabler of decision superiority.**
  - The military Services are exploiting today's information revolution but each has an independent solution; they have not signed up to the Global Information Grid concept and its architecture.
  - DoD increasingly depends on commercial communications infrastructure with inadequate knowledge of its future direction, capabilities and vulnerabilities.
  - OSD has failed to mandate an integrated information architecture.

# Ensure Information and Decision Superiority

## *Conclusion*

- **The key to success in future contingencies will be decision superiority enabled by information superiority. Our information superiority is eroding and will be difficult to sustain.**

## *Recommendation*

- **DoD must implement a Global information Grid (GIG) to provide information services for battlespace decision superiority.**
- **SecDef establish a GIG Executive Director with the-resources and authority to:**
  - Move all public DoD web sites off NIPRNET
  - Continue to aggressively deploy public key infrastructure/public key encryption; address scalability
  - Develop & deploy high-speed Type 1 inline IP crypto
  - Deploy diverse intrusion detection systems at wide area network & enclave boundaries and in hosts
  - Establish a GIG information assurance R&D test bed
- **The GIG Executive Director should create a vigorous and sustained, balanced information assurance R&D program to maintain GIG security and dynamic consequence management.**

# Achieving Joint Vision 2020

## *Findings*

- **Recent studies by the Defense Science Board, the military Services and outside panels describe new force capabilities needed to achieve Joint Vision 2010 and 2020. For example,**
  - An integrated information infrastructure
  - Rapid response, potent ground forces
  - Long-range aircraft precision attack systems
  - Responsive global targeting systems
  - New inter- and intra-theater mobility systems
  - A family of advanced munitions which enable precision remote fires
  - Day/night, any weather, any terrain intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
  - Systems focused on finding and targeting hidden/mobile targets
- **The military departments are not planning to produce these capabilities on a timeline consistent with the vision. Technologies are available or can be developed in the near term to provide the needed capabilities; and there are adequate funds if properly allocated. The hindrances are leadership, incentives and focused management.**

# Achieving Joint Vision 2020

## *Conclusions*

- **DoD will not achieve Joint Vision 2020 unless the Secretary of Defense takes aggressive action to put in place new innovative approaches and systems to provide the force capabilities it requires.**

## *Recommendations*

- **The Secretary should direct key subordinates to give priority to ensuring that the necessary innovations occur on a timely basis.**
  - Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of staff to develop a Joint Chiefs' investment strategy to provide the needed force capabilities-with emphasis on harmonization of technology, tactics, and doctrine.
  - Direct the USD(AT&L) to develop specific acquisition plans and programs to provide the needed -capabilities
  - Direct the military Services to reallocate funds to provide the procurement, logistics, and training that will be required.

# Transform Human Resources Strategy and Management

## *Findings*

- **DoD is facing serious human resource challenges.**
  - The Department is increasingly competing with the private sector for the same skills, particularly in high technology areas
  - The Services are having difficulty meeting recruiting goals, especially for certain skill needs, and are losing many talented individuals to private sector jobs
  - The civilian workforce is aging (50 percent eligible for retirement in 5 years) and there is a shortage of people in the pipeline
  - Senior political appointee positions are staying vacant longer and the appointment process far too long and uncertain
  - The American public is increasingly less involved and less inclined to serve in the Department of Defense
- **DoD's needs for a high quality workforce are increasing in light of complex technologies, new missions and concepts, and new business practices.**
- **The Department needs more effective planning, new authorities, and better tools to integrate effectively the management of its human resources.**

## *Conclusion*

- **DoD has critical deficiencies in its ability to attract and retain the quantity and quality of military and civilian personnel. The same is true in important segments of defense industry.**

# Transform Human Resources Strategy and Management

## *Recommendations*

- **Streamline and expedite the political appointee process to ensure the Department is able to recruit highly qualified individuals to fill its leadership positions.**
  - Begin by rescinding Executive Order 12834
  - Reduce the number of political appointees requiring senate confirmation and the number of political appointees below the Assistant Secretary level
- **Develop, execute, and fund an outreach program to educate the public on the value of service in military and civilian positions.**
- **Establish a strategic human resources plan encompassing all elements of the work force – civilian, military, private sector – linking the Department's force concepts (*Joint Vision 2020*) to manpower requirements.**
- **Amend Title 10 and Title 5 of the United States Code to transfer authority for the DoD civilian workforce to the Secretary of Defense.**
- **Develop flexible, human resource tools and programs that will enable the Department to size and shape its workforce for the 21st century. A one-size-fits-all approach is not suited to today's environment.**
  - Fund recruiting and retention at appropriate levels, foster a second revolution in training, restructure military pay and retirement, improve quality of life, and better integrate the force components
  - Develop a comprehensive civilian professional development and career management program and recruit a more age-balanced workforce

# Transform DoD's Business Practices

## *Findings*

- **Despite fundamental changes in the threat, technology and economic and industrial conditions, DoD continues to do business largely as it did during the Cold War.**
- **Current DoD business processes are too costly and do not adequately support resource allocation, weapons development, procurement and logistics.**
  - The transformation and the resulting dramatic increase in the productivity of U.S. commercial manufacturing and logistics practices has not been matched by DoD or defense industry
  - Logistics consumes over \$80 billion yet does not provide the agile response support needed by our forces
  - Many functions could be outsourced or privatized which would enhance quality and responsiveness while reducing costs and DoD personnel needs
  - Despite progress, reform of the acquisition processes is only partially implemented and has much left to achieve. Costs are too high, time lines too long, and DoD often cannot access the best commercial techniques/technology. It is still cost based and “requirements” driven

## *Conclusion*

- **Current DoD business practices — with 60 percent of the budget spent on overhead, logistics, and infrastructure and an acquisition cycle time approaching two decades — consume so many resources that the Department is unable to modernize and transform the force.**

# Transform DoD's Business Practices

## *Recommendations*

- **Rationalize the DoD support structure to enhance force capabilities and reduce costs.**
  - Aggressively pursue outsourcing (revise or waive A-76) with priority to logistics
  - Consolidate the base structure via the creation of a new Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC)
  - Pursue non-traditional approaches in carrying out overhead functions
- **Adopt commercial business practices as a basis for acquiring military capabilities.**
  - Establish a management information system that identifies resources used and needed for major objectives, as assigned to warfighter commands.
  - Create and apply metrics for measuring mission performance.
  - Buy value and use price based contracts rather than fulfill “requirements” with cost based contracts
  - Use commercial specifications and standards.
  - Depend on value competition between un-like capabilities as well as similar alternatives.

# Maintain the Nuclear Deterrent

## *Findings*

- **The current DoD/DOE process for deciding what needs to be done is fragile and not institutionalized.**
- **More focused senior government level attention on nuclear policy is needed (NGOs teamed with the media tend to drive critical issues).**
- **Sustaining the nuclear deterrent requires comprehensive, long-range planning to ensure every component of the system can be modernized over time – delivery platforms, warheads, command, control, and communications.**
- **Nuclear expertise, both technical and operational, is declining while the need continues at a high level. Business as usual personnel practices will not meet the need**
- **Progress is being made in enhancing stockpile stewardship -the key to maintaining reliable and safe warheads – but needs:**
  - Long term capability to deal with aging warheads and component failures
  - Funding for key facilities

# Maintain the Nuclear Deterrent

## *Conclusion*

- **Given the deficiencies in the DOE weapons complex and the aging of the strategic forces and infrastructure, our long-term nuclear deterrent is seriously at risk.**

## **Recommendations**

- **In light of changing threats and new technologies, establish a commission or panel to determine how the nuclear deterrent that has served the United States for the past 50 years needs to change for the future. The assessment should include warheads, delivery systems, and command and control.**
- **Conduct an annual review to ensure there is a comprehensive and authoritative program for sustaining DoD's nuclear forces.**
- **With the Secretary of Energy, establish the Nuclear Weapons Council as the approval authority for planned changes to weapons in the existing stockpile.**
- **Re-establish and adequately fund the capability to produce key warhead components (physics package/nuclear components).**
- **Senior leadership must establish personnel procedures to reverse the decline in nuclear expertise.**

# Summary

- **The challenges described are difficult and enduring issues with intellectual, organizational and cultural obstacles.**
- **While many of these challenges have been recognized by the Joint and Service leadership, the response has been disappointing for reasons ranging from funding priorities, to political constraints, to bureaucratic inertia.**
- **Thus, progress will require bold action and personal attention by the Secretary of Defense and, in most cases, close and perhaps unprecedented collaboration with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.**
- **Failing such action, U.S. military dominance will not be sustained for the next decades.**

April 16, 2001 1:04 PM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Meeting on Defense Policy

Please set a meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Steve Herbits and me to discuss this defense policy memo.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/11/01 S. Herbits memo to SecDef re: Defense Policy Board

DHR:dh  
041601-27

334

16 Apr 01

April 11, 2001 7:30 AM

TO: SECDEF

FR: S. HERBITS

*for me*  
*Dr. Galt*  
*my site*

DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

Attached are:

- A. A memo from Richard Perle on the Defense Policy Board.
- B. A list of Richard's suggested changes to the make-up of the Board, with a **few suggestions from me.**

Do you:

Wish to see Richard to discuss?

Wish to talk to Richard on the phone about this?

Proceed with the list including any amendments you wish to make?

Do nothing for a while?

*L*

**DRAFT MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE DEFENSE POLICY BOARD**

The Defense Policy Board was founded during the Reagan administration: (1) to bring new thinking to the Department of Defense; (2) to analyze and assess policies and programs with the detachment that distance from day-to-operations allows; (3) to provide the Secretary with early warning of potential problems and early advice concerning emerging opportunities; and (4) to help develop support for the Secretary and his program among members of Congress, other executive branch officials, the press and intellectual communities.

The Board's products are ideas, assessments and advice. These can only be produced by a group of intelligent, experienced and innovative individuals brought together with a sense of purpose and a close relationship to the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary takes the Board seriously, so will the officials who come before it to discuss their policies and programs. If it is known that the Secretary counts on the Board to keep him informed, to develop ideas, to evaluate current programs and propose new ones, the Board will be able to recruit talented members and enlist the help of a wider community.

To make the Board effective, I believe that: (1) you should be available to meet with the Board at least quarterly for 1-2 hours; and (2) the Board should be described as reporting to you (even though, for administrative purposes, it should continue to be managed by the Under Secretary for Policy.)

I would like to reinvigorate the Board by a combination of new members, the establishment of working groups assembled as necessary to look at and report on specific matters of interest to you, and by allocating a small budget for outside consulting/research services. (Board members serve without compensation).

The priorities of the Board will, of course, be your priorities. I would imagine that you would want us to work on missile defense, on a strategy for Iraq, on the transformation of our current force posture to one less oriented to cold war contingencies, on the realignment of NATO/EU "arrangements," and the like. We should be broad and deep enough to take on any assignment you choose to give us and you may well have others in mind.

As I see the Board it is not a substitute for the staff work that will be coming to you from a vast department. But as you know it is often difficult

401  
401  
with my 612  
P.W.  
[Handwritten notes and scribbles]

11-L-0559/OSD/1526  
[Handwritten notes: add on title, etc.]

to look much beyond the next inter-agency meeting, the next Presidential speech, the next NATO ministerial meeting, the next budget decision. The Board can make its most important contribution, not by looking into the distant future or at today's immediate concerns, but at new policies that can be initiated during your tenure as Secretary.

In a separate memo I have indicated the current membership and some preliminary ideas about new members. If we were to go forward I would propose to conduct an immediate review of the current membership with a view to recommending a reconstituted Board.

Policy Board

RP thoughts

Suggested modifications

2000: 29 members

2001: 23 members

Resigned:

Paul Wolfowitz  
Bill Crowe

Will resign:

*scull*

Rich Armitage  
Richard **Haas**  
Bob Zoellick  
Steve **Hadley**

Should resign:

2

Gordon Adams  
**Ashton Carter**  
**Gary Hart**  
Robert Hunter  
Janne Nolan  
Joseph Nye  
Lynn Davis  
Ted Warner

Possibly should Resign:

Pete Dawkins  
**Michele Flournoy**  
Hank Greenberg  
Harry Harding

+ Adm. Joseph Lopez → Retain  
+ Gen. Tom **Moorman** → Retain  
Prof. Thomas **Bruncau**

Remaining:

Brent Scowcroft  
Norm Augustine  
Harold Brown  
Richard Burt  
Charles Curtis  
+ Adm. Dave Jeremiah  
+ Adm Bill Owens  
+ Richard Perle

Additions:

+ Rudy **DeLeon**  
Pete Wilson  
+ Ed Meese  
+ Dick Allen  
+ Dan Quayle  
+ Van Galbraith  
+ Chris Williams

+ James **Welbb**

Stephen **Herbits**

Decline |

Retired Officer  
Additions:

**NO** Shy Meyer (Army)  
Jack Sheehan (Marine Corps)  
Mike Loh (Air Force)  
**+** Chuck Homer (Air Force)

Business  
Additions:

Gerald Hillman

**NO** John Robson

*Acted  
D 11/28  
1746*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

Here is a memo from Geoffrey Hoon which you should take a look at, and get the right people working on it. I have no idea what it's all about and I haven't got time to read it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.22

Attach: November 16<sup>th</sup> Letter from Geoffrey Hoon

Respond by: 11/29

*NATO 400.1.2*

*93 Nov 01*

U14996 02

*01/21  
16R*

CLASSIFICATION

[Redacted]

**THE RT HON GEOFFREY HOON MP**  
Secretary of State for Defence

Ministry of Defence  
Room 205  
Old War Office  
White hall  
London **SW1A** 2EU

*01/21*

(b)(6)  
[Redacted]

(b)(6)  
[Redacted]

**To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S OFFICE** Fax:  
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

From:

Tel:

Date: **20 NOV 01**

No of pages: **5** [including header]

Remarks:

*THIS VERSION REPLACES THE LETTER THAT  
WAS FAXED TO YOU VIA THE BRITISH EMBASSY  
YESTERDAY (19 NOV 01). THIS OFFICE APOLOGISES  
FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED THROUGH  
OUR ERROR. THE ONLY CHANGE IS TO PAGE  
TWO OF THE LETTER WHERE ADDITIONAL  
TEXT HAS BEEN ADDED.  
UMT*

[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/1531

*01/21/01*

TO (b)(6)

P. 02/05



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON. SW1A 2EU

Telephone 020 MI 82111/2/3  
Fax 020 721 87140  
E-mail: [sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk)

MO 13/8/1C

16 November 2001

Dear Donald,

I am writing to tell you about a European programme to develop advanced technologies for combat air system's capabilities that will be announced in Brussels on Monday. I and my colleagues from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden will sign a declaration to launch a joint technology programme with European industry which will sustain and develop European capabilities for combat air systems over the next two decades. I attach the text of the declaration.

The European Technology Acquisition Programme, or ETAP, is a broadly-based programme to examine and develop technologies that are likely to have application in airborne strike systems in the next decade and beyond. It is a framework for collaboration within which a series of technology demonstration programmes will be launched. Each nation is able to decide which technology demonstrator programmes to join, guided by its national requirements. Applications of ETAP generated technology are likely to be diverse and could include unmanned air vehicles, cruise missiles and command and control systems, as well as developments to existing or planned manned aircraft.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/1532

U13536 01



I particularly wanted to keep you informed about this in order to reassure you about the nature of the ETAP programme and its relationship with the important work we are doing together on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). UK officials have discussed this with yours in recent weeks, in particular to address any concerns regarding the control of sensitive technology. I would like to reiterate that our ETAP work will be based on indigenous UK technology and know-how it will be kept entirely separate, both in Government and in industry, from our vital transatlantic co-operation on JSF. Under the arrangements that have been put in place to control access to technological information, JSF information will be safeguarded within that programme and will not be shared with others. I remain wholly committed to taking the Joint Strike Fighter programme forward.

The Defence Materiel staff in our Washington Embassy stand ready to discuss these matters further with your officials should this be necessary.

Your sincerely,  
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

## MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

**THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

**Acting in the spirit of the statement by the Heads of State and Government on 9 December 1997, which stated that they shared a vital political and economic interest in an efficient and globally competitive European aerospace and defence electronics industry,**

**Acting in the spirit of the framework agreement on measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European Defence Industry signed on 27 July 2000, and in particular the chapters concerning defence-related research and technology and the harmonisation of military requirements,**

**Recognising the need for their countries and for Europe to retain a strong and competitive industrial and technology base and a long-term capability to design, manufacture and integrate combat air systems,**

**Considering possible needs for such systems towards the end of the next decade (2020),**

**Promoting the harmonisation of military requirements in this sector,**

**Have decided in particular to carry out a joint study between now and summer 2002 aimed at delivering an initial assessment of their respective capability requirements in a 2020 timeframe and identifying the types of systems and their related technology base that might appropriately be developed jointly,**

**Have decided to launch, in co-operation with industry, a focused research and technology programme (the so called European Technology Acquisition Programme, ETAP) to lay the foundations for future combat air systems covering key fields within this sector.**

**Are asking their National Armament Directors to give priority to continued support for technology programmes already underway in order to ensure the achievement of their objectives and ensure the rapid signature of the necessary inter-governmental arrangements for ETAP whose management could be assigned in whole or part to OCCAR in due time,**

**Intend to allocate appropriate government funding for these activities,**

**Encourage European industry**

**- to make a substantial financial contribution to this effort**

- to propose innovative solutions and initiatives to support this *activity*, including suggestions for possible regrouping~~s~~ and/or co-operation to make the most of existing ~~capabilites~~ in the industries of each country.

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: CJCS  
VCJCS  
Gen. Holland  
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

Afghanistan

27sep01

11-L-0559/OSD/1536

U16394 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Paul - this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

**Memorandum**

urgent

**Subject: on possible operations in Afghanistan**

**From:** (b)(6)

**For: Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS**

**Date: 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001**

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A land invasion of Afghanistan would be **an** error of catastrophic proportions. The Taliban regime is weak militarily and economically. Most ordinary Afghans hate it **for** the poverty and abuses it has endangered. Foreigners among **the** Taliban are **particularly** resented. Having said that, an assault on Kabul and **Kandahar** can initially be **successful**. But in the medium **term** it would cause **an** Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. **The Talibanization of a nuclear country does** not bear thinking about. In addition, Hindu **Kush** passes will be **covered in** snow before the US can **mobilise** a **sufficient** invasion force, making operations even **harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states; surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets **selected** on the basis of electronic **and** satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The **country** has no infrastructure to speak **of**: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone **links**. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt **they** will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards** may have dispersed already. **In 1987 I spent three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing.** In a terrain in **which** every rock and **every** irrigation canal provides **cover**, **high** altitude bombing is ineffective.
3. To track down **and** capture or kill **terrorists** I would advise using **commandos**. The biggest threat to a **guerrilla** is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist insurgency in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in disrupting **mujaheddin** supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using **Spetsnaz**, **which** lost effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in **1986** thus depriving them **of** air liberty. Using **commandos means**, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable **casualties**. The **groups** should be accompanied anti-Taliban Afghans loyal to **the** Northern Alliance government of President **Rabbani**.
4. It is **the** Afghans themselves who know their **country** best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The **non-Taliban** Afghans should be drawn **into** the **anti-terrorist** alliance. They had been warning against the **Taliban** for years. **On the other hand, you cannot** fully trust **the** Pakistanis. The **CIA's** proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's** Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, **most of the** US money and weapons **channelled** to the ISI went to support **Gulbuddin Hekmatar**, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who **refused** to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a **Pashtun-based** (many officers **in** the Pakistani **army** and ISI are **Pashtuns**), pliable **government** in Kabul, to **give** themselves strategic depth against India. When **Hekmatar** failed to capture Kabul, they created **another** puppet. **the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of **business** circle (**Unocal**, an oil company which struck a deal with the **Taliban** to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. **Pakistani society and army are riven with** fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and **gen. Mushsharaf will find it difficult to control** them.

5. **Rabbani's** Northern Alliance has been **weakened** by the loss of **Ahmed Shah Masud**, his minister of **defence**, in a suicide attack by two apparently **Westernised** Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy **theory** but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of **Massud** was a quid pro quo to the **Taliban** for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a **valuable ally**. Nevertheless, the **Northern Alliance** proved capable of instant retaliation **against** a Taliban **arms** dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via **Dushanbe**. They have a representative at the **U.N.**; the Ambassador in London. **Wali Massud** (brother of **Ahmad Shah Massud**) is an **important figure**; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in **Northern** and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and **airfields** could be effected. The alliance **consists** of important commanders all over **the** country:

The new political head of the Alliance, **Dr Abdullah**, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a **satellite** phone. **Ismael Khan**, former **army** officer, governor of **Herat**, who **spent** two years in a Taliban prison in **Kandahar** but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite **phone**.

**Haji Kadir**, former governor of Jellalabad, a **Pashun**, which is important **because** his role **neutralises** the Taliban ethnic card. I spent a month with him in **Nangrahar** in 1986.

The former Communist general **Dostum** seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. **The Hazara** minority, **Shias**, also resent the **Taliban** for **the** murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines **and** weapons it **can** build an anti-Taliban **coalition** which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world onto **itself**. Most **local** commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion **and** bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the **Northern Alliance** can **be** delivered through **countries** which have their own **reasons** to want the downfall of the **Taliban**: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air **bridge** from **ships** in **international** waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to **Alliance**-controlled **enclaves inside** Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in **1980s** in support of the **mujahedin**.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An effective **strike** against the **Taliban can** best be dealt in co-operation **with** the military structures of **the** Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan who already suffer under the **Taliban** yoke
3. The best form of pressure and revenge on the **Taliban** is to support the moderate forces of the **Northern** Alliance
4. After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the **Taliban**, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid. Normal **state** structures can only be rebuilt by a **government** in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines **are** cleared, agriculture *functions again*, **will the refugees return** from Iran and Pakistan and does **the** region have any chance of **permanent** stabilisation.

(b)(6)

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:55 PM

Afghan Stan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

27 Sep 01

11-L-0559/OSD/1540

U16395 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*and this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

urgent

**Memorandum**

Subject: **possible operations in Afghanistan**

From: (b)(6)

For: **Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS**

Date: **19<sup>th</sup> September 2001**

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A **land invasion of Afghanistan** would be **an error of catastrophic proportions**. The Taliban regime is **weak militarily** and economically. **Most ordinary Afghans hate it for the poverty and abuses it has endangered**. **Foreigners among the Taliban are particularly resented**. Having said that, an assault on **Kabul and Kandahar** *could* initially be successful. But in the medium term it would **cause an Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan**. The Talibanization of a nuclear country **does not bear thinking about**. In addition, **Hindu Kush passes will be covered in snow before the US can mobilise a sufficient invasion force, making operations even harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states: **surgical strikes** by bombers and **guided missiles at targets selected on the basis of electronic and satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan**. The country has no infrastructure to speak of: **no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone links**. **The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs**. No doubt they will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards may have dispersed already**. In 1987 I spent **three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing**. In a terrain in **which every rock and every irrigation canal provides cover, high altitude bombing is ineffective**.
3. To **track down and capture or kill terrorists** I would advise using **commandos**. The biggest threat to a **guerrilla** is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist **insurgency** in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in **disrupting mujaheddin supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using Spetsnaz**, which lost **effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in 1986 thus depriving them of air liberty**. Using **commandos means, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable casualties**. The groups should be accompanied **anti-Taliban Afghans loyal to the Northern Alliance government of President Rabbani**.
4. It is the **Afghans themselves** who know their country best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. **The non-Taliban Afghans should be drawn into the anti-terrorist alliance**. They had been **warning against the Taliban for years**. On the other hand, you cannot fully trust the **Pakistanis**. The CIA's proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan**. For example, most of the **US money and weapons channelled to the ISI went to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who refused to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan**. **Pakistan thinks it can establish a Pashtun-based (many officers in the Pakistani army and ISI are Pashtuns), pliable government in Kabul, to give themselves strategic depth against India**. When **Hekmatyar failed to capture Kabul, they created another poppet, the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of business circle (Unocal, an oil company which struck a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. Pakistan; society and army are riven with fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and gen. Musharaf will find it difficult to control them.

5. Rabbani's Northern Alliance has been weakened by the loss of Ahmed Shah Masud, his minister of defence, in a suicide attack by two apparently Westernised Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy theory but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of Massud was a quid pro quo to the Taliban for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a valuable ally. Nevertheless, the Northern Alliance proved capable of instant retaliation against a Taliban arms dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via Dushanbe. They have a representative at the U.N.; the Ambassador in London, Wali Massud (brother of Ahmad Shah Massud) is an important figure; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in Northern and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and airfields could be effected. The alliance consists of important commanders all over the country:

The new political head of the Alliance, Dr Abdullah, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a satellite phone. Ismael Khan, former army officer, governor of Herat, who spent two years in a Taliban prison in Kandahar but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite phone.

Haji Kadir, former governor of Jellalabad, a Pashtun, which is important because his role neutralises the Taliban ethnic card, I spent a month with him in Nangrahar in 1986.

The former Communist general Dostum seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. The Hazara minority, Shias, also resent the Taliban for the murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines and weapons it can build an anti-Taliban coalition which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world unto itself. Most local commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion and bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the Northern Alliance can be delivered through countries which have their own reasons to want the downfall of the Taliban: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air bridge from ships in international waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to Alliance-controlled enclaves inside Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in 1980s in support of the mujahedin.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An **effective strike against the Taliban can best be dealt** in co-operation with the military structures of the Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk **losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan** who **already suffer under the Taliban yoke**
3. The best form of pressure and revenge **on the Taliban** is to support the moderate **forces of the Northern Alliance**
4. **After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the Taliban, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid.** Normal state **structures can only** be rebuilt by a government in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic **infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines are cleared, agriculture functions again, will the refugees return from Iran and Pakistan** and does the region have any **chance of permanent stabilisation.**

(b)(6)

December 19, 2001 2:20 PM

Alexander  
01/03  
2010 (13)

TO: Ian Brzezinski  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

*01/03*

*Russia*

Here is a formal letter Ivanov gave me. I don't have any idea what it says.

Please get it into the process, and see that it is handled properly. If it requires a response, let's take care of it.

Thanks.

Attach  
12/17/01 Ivanov ltr to SecDef (in Russian)

DHR:dh  
121901-6

*19 Dec 01*

U15119 02

Москва, 17 декабря 2001 г.



Уважаемый господин Министр!

Весьма признателен за Вашу высокую оценку вклада Министерства обороны Российской Федерации в дело сотрудничества в борьбе против международного терроризма.

Поддерживаю Ваше мнение о том, что сегодня необходимо повышать уровень взаимодействия наших стран в этой области, так как опасность угроз, связанная с деятельностью террористических организаций, в ближайшее время не только сохранится, но и имеет все посылки к возрастанию.

В целом мы согласны с Вашим предложением по "Инициативе Евро-Атлантической безопасности". Вместе с тем, ограниченный объем полученной информации не позволяет провести углубленный анализ Ваших предложений. В этой связи хотелось бы получить от Вас более детальное разъяснение предлагаемых мер с американским видением путей и механизмов реализации "Инициативы".

На мой взгляд, идеи, изложенные в "Инициативе", в целом или в ряде пунктов могут стать одним из вопросов для обсуждения в рамках планируемого нового формата отношений между Россией и НАТО.

Надеюсь, что сотрудничество между министерствами обороны Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки станет весомым вкладом в дело развития конструктивных партнерских отношений между нашими государствами и обеспечения евро-атлантической безопасности.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

С.Иванов

Его Превосходительству  
Господину Дональду Рамсфелду  
119L-0559/OSD/1545  
Министру обороны Соединенных Штатов Америки

December 28, 2001 3:04 PM

ACTION  
15 01/02  
10/16

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

NATO 380.01

Let's get that Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative fed in through NATO. Here is a copy of the letter Ivanov gave us.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/01 MoD Ivanov ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
#22801-14

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

38 Dec 01

U 151 40 02

①

Moscow 17 December 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary!

I am most grateful for your positive evaluation of the contribution of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

I support your assessment that today we must increase the level of cooperation between our countries in this area since the danger of threats associated with activities of terrorist organizations not only will remain in the near term but will in all likelihood increase.

Overall, we agree with your proposal on the "Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative." At the same time, the limited volume of information we have received does not permit us to conduct a thorough analysis of your proposal. In this regard, we would like to receive from you a more detailed explanation of the proposed measures with the American vision of the ways and means for achieving this 'Initiative.'

In my view, the ideas laid out in the 'Initiative,' either in toto or as separate points, could be one of the topics discussed in the framework of the planned new format for relations between Russia and NATO.

I hope that 'cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the United States Department of Defense becomes a significant contribution in the development of a constructive partnership between our governments and in guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security.

Respectfully,

Minister of Defense, Russian Federation

(signed) S. Ivanov

(Addressed to)

His Excellency  
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

②

11-L-0559/OSD/1547



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 9, 2001 3:35 PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleeza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Communications

312

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from you to General Shelton.

I think any communication from the National Security Council to the Pentagon should come through my office, and not directly to the Chairman. This has historically been the practice. It is exceedingly difficult to manage the Pentagon without that clear understanding and procedure.

I have not researched this, so I'm not in a position to propose a document that would establish the relationship between DoD and the NSC in detail, and I will try to do that so we can see what models have been used. If you have any suggestions, let me know. In the meantime, I'd appreciate it if things came through my office rather than locations elsewhere in the Department, so I can keep track of what's taking place.

Attachment

DR:dh

9 Feb 0

U02820 /01

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HENRY H. SHELTON, USA  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Request Nomination for NSC Vacancy -- Defense  
Policy and Arms Control

The National Security Council staff has a Director-level vacancy in our office of Defense Policy and Arms Control.

We are seeking a Brigadier General (O-7) who will lead the interagency effort to refine U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy and support interagency efforts to define the nuclear force structure supporting that strategy. The selected officer will lead the interagency effort to define and revise, as necessary, the nuclear stockpile stewardship program, lead interagency efforts to define the Administration's nuclear arms control policy and coordinate the interagency implementation process. Additionally, the officer will coordinate interagency efforts on other critical arms control efforts such as the CFE treaty, CTBT, INF and lead the interagency effort on NATO nuclear **policy** issues.

Given the nature of this portfolio, we are particularly interested in filling this position in a timely manner and anticipate your support. This nonreimbursable Outside DoD Detail will be for two years with the option to extend an additional year. Points of contact for this request are Dean Haas (202) 456-9302 or Marsha Dimel (202) 456-9306.



Condoleezza Rice  
Assistant-to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Chairman  
of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff



9 February 2000

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

Mr. Secretary –

For your information, I received the attached  
from Condoleezza Rice today and we are working it.

*V/R  
Hugh*

2001 MAR 18 PM 5:53

March 18, 2001 5:53 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "CJCS Progress and Challenges" Report

Take a look at this "CJCS Progress and Challenges" report from the Chairman, and let's discuss it.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031801-30

*690 JCS*

*18 Mar 01*

U05675 /01



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 16 2001

CM-1132-01  
16 March 2001

①

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: CJCS Progress and Challenges

As you requested on 13 March, enclosed is a summary of progress and challenges.

  
HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

## CJCS PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

(As of: 16 March 2001)

### 1. PROGRESS

#### a. Maintain a Quality Force

##### ACCOMPLISHED

##### METRIC

Narrowed the pay gap	NDAAs 00 (across the board raise)
Reformed pay tables	NDAAs 00 (targeted by pay grade)
Restored retirement benefit	NDAAs 00 (50% at 20 years)
Improved Military Health Care	NDAAs 01 (active and retired)
Met quantity and quality manning goals	Exceeded goals in each category (-USAF)

#### b. Improve the Readiness of the force

##### ACCOMPLISHED

##### METRIC

Missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, West Africa, East Timor, CONUS	Mission accomplished; no casualties
Identified readiness funding shortfall	NDAAs 00 (\$112B increase)
Improved Alliance Cohesion	Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
Improved AC / RC Integration	"Chairman's 10" RC Flag Officers to CINCs
Improved Joint Readiness Reporting	Revised Joint Monthly Readiness Review
Improved allocation of LD / HD resources	Revised Global Military Force Policy (GMFP)
Established Deployment Standard	Joint Deployment Process Improvement

#### c. Recapitalize and Modernize the Force

##### ACCOMPLISHED

##### METRIC

Increased Modernization/Procurement Budget to \$60B	Achieved in NDAA 01
--	---------------------

#### d. Transition the Force to Deal with Future Threats:

##### ACCOMPLISHED

##### M E T R I C

Assessed potential Asymmetric Threats	Joint Strategy Review 99
Published Joint Vision	JV 2020 and "Next Step" Aim Points
Published Unified Command Plan	Annex A of UCP-99
-Established JFCOM	
-Established JTF-CND	
-Established JTF-CNA	
Improved JROC Process	Integration of JFCOM and Joint Experimentation

## 2. CHALLENGES

### a. For the Quality Force

- (1) Improve Work and Family Housing Infrastructure
- (2) Establish a Predictable Deployment Pace
- (3) Ensure Technologically Superior Equipment
- (4) Sustain pay, retirement, and health care improvements

### b. For Readiness

- (1) Address the strategy to forces imbalance
- (2) Address the Low Demand/High Density resources issue
- (3) Improve the inventory of preferred munitions
- (4) Continue to improve force protection measures
- (5) Address the widening US-Allies technology gap

### c. For Modernization

Increase the pace of recapitalization and modernization

### d. For Future Transition

- (1) Continue to improve joint capabilities (The Future Joint Force)
- (2) Improve Joint Operational Architectures
- (3) Implement Joint Operational Concepts
- (4) Evolve the Unified Command Plan to account for Homeland Security, Space, and Information Dominance
- (5) Revise the Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve joint structures, joint officer management, and joint professional military education

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

April 16, 2001 2:51 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Forces

Would you please take a look at this April 13 memo from the Chairman and have Andy Marshall and Steve Cambone look at. Let me know what you think we ought to do with it, how you think it ought to fit in.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/13/01 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Strategic Objectives, Comparative Military Advantages and Risk

DHR:dh  
041601-43

*USJFEDM*

*16 Apr 01*

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/1555

U07623-1/01



~~CLOSE HOLD~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 203194999

13 April 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Again, thanks for the opportunity to share my views on defense strategy with you. You asked me to elaborate on three specific areas: Strategic Objectives, Comparative Military Advantages, and Risk.

1. Strategic Objectives. Andy Marshall's paper identifies four goals of defense strategy -- Deter, Reassure, Dissuade, and Win War. As the outline of a defense strategy, these goals are well stated. However, absent a National Security Strategy (usually an interagency effort led by NSC) that lays out national interests, it is not possible to derive military objectives and in turn military capabilities necessary to achieve these goals. Moreover, even if the strategy review determines which capabilities are necessary, we need something to help us measure how much of each capability should be developed and how it should be applied. Attached at the enclosure is a document provided for Mr. Marshall that represents some thoughts on prioritizing national security interests and related military objectives. It may be useful as a template for establishing a linkage between ends and means.

2. Comparative Military Advantages. The Marshall paper summarizes its defense strategy as "select, develop, and sustain a portfolio of key military advantages to hedge against and dissuade future threats." I am enthusiastic about any proposal that seeks to leverage technological advantages to improve our ability to fight. However, the paper seems to suggest that the United States will specialize in types of conflict where we enjoy the greatest advantage. That is a flawed concept. It is the American "Way of War" to remain on the strategic defensive. Therefore, it is unlikely that we will have the luxury of selecting-to the extent suggested in the paper--the precise terms of future conflict. In fact, how we prepare for future conflict will shape the way others challenge us. The strategy should require warfighting dominance from low to high end. There are many historical examples why this is necessary:

- Demobilization after World War II led to complacency about readiness requirements for which the US military paid the price in Korea
- Reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation and escalation control during the 1950s deprived the US of options below that threshold

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/1556

U07735 /01

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

- US firepower and technology superiority in Vietnam were uncontested, but the NVA adopted tactics to effectively neutralize that superiority.
- US high technology systems were integrated in the invasion of Panama, but firepower was insufficient to accomplish the mission of capturing Noriega and establishing a new government.

Conflict in urban and close terrain will always limit firepower solutions, and any technology has the potential to be defeated, I will continue to press for a strategy that provides you and the President the greatest possible number of options for dealing with challenges to national security now and into the future.


3. Risk. In looking to the future, the Marshall Paper presents a very valid assessment of long-term risk. However, I am concerned about some of the potential risks that may arise during transformation. These include:

- Precipitous force reductions could undermine deterrence
- Disengagement from overseas commitments could undermine alliance cohesion or support for U.S. interests in the region
- The perception of US. emphasis on high-end capabilities could create alliance tensions related to burden sharing and shared risk, while, in reality, exacerbating alliance interoperability challenges
- A perception of changing roles and missions could undermine the morale of the current force

Each of these risks is manageable provided that they are addressed before the strategy is implemented. Today's military became stretched-thin over time, and it will take time to recover and refocus. In its final form, the strategy must account for our potential vulnerabilities during this transition.

I hope this answers your questions. It's clear that the deeper we all dig into strategy, the more we rediscover the old truth that "the devil is in the details." Let us know how we can continue to help.

Sincerely,



HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure (a/s)

CF: Mr. Marshall

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/1557

## **PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES**

The following paragraphs provide a listing of U.S. national security interests and related military objectives in priority. Interests are in plain type within each category while related objectives are in italics. Each objective also has been assigned a priority indicated in the parentheses at the end of the objective.

### **SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES**

**Survival Interests (S)**. This category of security interest relates directly to physical protection of the U.S. population within the borders of the United States and its territories: protection of U.S. territory from foreign attack by whatever means; and protection of the institutions and values of the United States. Failure would fundamentally, and perhaps irreparably, change the U.S. way of life, e.g., form of government, political stability, legal structures, civil liberties, economic structure, and social cohesion. Essentially, survival interests are those for which only very limited discretion exists about their priority and implementation.

- Protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the United States from external threats. *(This interest relates directly to the protection of the U.S. population within the United States and its territories and affects both the physical security of the population and its perceptions of being secure. Further, defense of the territory, waters and borders remains the foundation of sovereignty now and for the foreseeable future. Failure to secure this interest would undermine the trust and confidence of the U.S. population in its Government, as well as that of allies and friends worldwide.)*
  - *Inviolate U.S. borders from hostile foreign intrusion(S)*
  - *Protection and control of the territorial waters of the United States against foreign threats(S)*
  - *Protection of the United States from the full spectrum of potential air and missile attack, including nuclear(S)*
  - *Secure public and private critical infrastructure, including information, from foreign attack(S)*
- Protection of U.S. citizens at home. *(This interest relates directly to the protection of the U.S. population within the United States and its territories and affects both the physical security of the population and its perceptions of being secure. It goes to the heart of sovereignty of a nation. Failure to secure this interest would undermine the trust and confidence of the population in Government.)*
  - *Reduction or elimination of foreign sponsored or supported terrorism directed against the United States and its citizens and property (S)*
  - *Prevention, defense, response and recovery in cooperation with lead civil agencies from attacks on U.S. population and facilities, including with weapons of mass destruction/effect(S)*

**Vital Interests (V).** This category of interest relates directly to maintaining U.S. independence from external political and military forces and influence; continued economic growth and prosperity; and social and religious freedom. Failure would significantly raise the costs and risks of maintaining U.S. security; weaken U.S. ability to make and fulfill security commitments to others; and create undue economic dependencies. Prolonged failure to protect vital interests could have direct and indirect impacts on the U.S. way of life, as we know it today. As opposed to survival interests, national leaders have considerable discretion in allocation of resources to protect these interests.

- Protection of U.S. citizens abroad from hostile attack. *(This interest relates to maintaining U.S. independence from external political and military threats and sustaining U.S. economic growth, of which significant portions are being created overseas. Failure to secure U.S. citizens overseas would undermine confidence of the U.S. people in their government, compromise U.S. commitment to allies and friends, and weaken the ability of the United States to influence international matters to its advantage.)*
  - *Suppression or defeat of campaigns of terrorism and violence directed against U.S. citizens overseas (V)*
  - *Suppression or defeat of terrorism directed against U.S. citizens and property overseas (I)*
- A science and technology and industrial base capable of developing, producing, and integrating leading edge technologies essential to military innovation. *(This interest relates to maintaining an independence from external political and military forces and influence and continued economic growth and prosperity. It affects military supremacy in the hemisphere, military superiority elsewhere, and the ability to sustain U.S. commitment to allies and friends. It affects the ability to develop and produce advanced military systems and sustain them during operations.)*
  - *Robust military research and development programs to enhance existing capabilities, maintain technological superiority, and hedge against technological breakthroughs by opponents (V)*
  - *Independence from undue reliance on foreign sources of critical technology and components, including those supporting military systems (e.g., munitions) (V)*
  - *A capability to respond to surge requirements for advanced military systems and components (V)*
  - *Preventing adversaries or potential adversaries from acquiring militarily-relevant technologies and related innovations, and the means to exploit them for operational advantage (V (nuclear/biological) / I)*

**Important Interests (I).** This category relates to maintaining an international security environment in which U.S. political, military and economic values can survive and prosper. Failure would have direct and indirect impacts on U.S. ability to operate and function to advantage in international milieu, but would not affect U.S. survival.

- Protection of the United States from international criminal activity. *(This interest focuses on the connectivity of criminal activities with U.S. supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, stability of our neighbors, and the potential for massive illegal*

immigration into the United States if instability occurs. Further, it relates to continued U.S. access to oil and gas resources in the hemisphere. Prevention of illegal technology and weapons exports affects the U.S. ability to maintain military superiority worldwide against the possible array of potential enemies.)

- Reduction in the illegal flow of drugs into the United States (I)
- Prevention of illegal immigration into the United States (I)
- Prevention of the theft and/or illegal exportation of weapons and technology to adversaries (V (nuclear/biological)/I (other))

## **GLOBAL INTERESTS**

### **Vital Interests**

- U.S. status as the world's dominant military power. (This interest focuses on maintaining a global security environment in which U.S. policy is predominant. Decisions within this U.S. dominated environment are consequently generally conducive to advancing U.S. political, military and economic interests by the sheer weight of U.S. influence and impact. Achieving this interest may reduce or eliminate the need for direct application of U.S. power, because indirect power and influence achieve U.S. ends. Failure may result in frequent challenges and the need to establish de facto U.S. power at high cost and risk)
  - Superiority in military power, especially as it relates to global reach, power projection, and technology innovation (V)
  - Leadership of key regional alliance systems in which the United States is a member. Remain the preferred security partner, especially for new market democracies. (V)
  - Sustained U.S. power and influence vis a vis emergent rival ideologies or power blocs (I)
  - Encouragement of allies to assume, in cooperation with the United States, greater responsibilities and capabilities for resolution of potential or actual regional conflict situations (I)
- Prevention of conflicts worldwide that may involve the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. (This interest focuses on the uncertainty regarding the short and long-term effects of use of WMD on the physical and psychological security environment. U.S. security in a highly proliferated security environment would become tenuous over the long term. Prevention, at a minimum containment is critical to international activities and operations in the global environment.)
  - Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to include nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, including among friendly nations. Specifically, cooperation with Russia and China to stop the flow of WMD technology to other nations. (V)
  - Sustained confidence in the effectiveness of arms control agreements (V)
  - Increased warning of impending conflict between WMD armed powers (V)
- Avoidance of cataclysmic confrontations between major regional powers and other states in the region, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, NATO Europe, Korea, and Japan. (This interest could also be merely

Important, depending on the states involved, relationships with the United States and its allies, and degree of sophistication of military capability. It is vital where such conflicts may require exercise of treaty obligations to protect allies. Total war between major regional powers could fundamentally change the balance of power in many regions, often to the detriment of U.S. political, military and economic interests. This interest is preventive at its heart.)

- Prevention of hostilities between major powers and potential adversaries (V)
- If conflict occurs, limited escalation within the immediate nations or region (V)
- Freedom of navigation on the high seas. (The preponderance of U.S. commodities transits to and from overseas markets via sea. Loss of freedom of navigation would have significant implications for the economy, driving costs higher. As the United States transitions to a services-based economy, such effects may have lesser consequences. Further, U.S. military responses often require sea movement to accommodate the tonnages of U.S. forces. It would also affect other nations' perceptions of the U.S. ability to protect its own, and by implication their, interests in the inviolability of accepted international norms and standards for transit of non-sovereign portions of the earth)
- Free access to space for national and international, peaceful purposes. (Space has become critical to the U.S. economy and military capabilities. Our services-based economy relies on space communications, data transfer, positioning, and sensing for immediate responsiveness to changing markets and demands. Military capabilities have become highly dependent on military and civilian space systems for command and control. Current and proposed future doctrine relies heavily on assured access to space. It would also affect other nations' perceptions of the U.S. ability to protect its own, and by implication their, interests in the inviolability of accepted international norms and standards for transit of non-sovereign portions of the earth.)
- Freedom of international air space. (Loss of access to international air space would have implications for U.S. economic and military capabilities, but would primarily affect other nations' perceptions of the U.S. ability to protect its own, and by implication their, interests in the inviolability of accepted international norms and standards for transit of non-sovereign portions of the earth.)

#### Important Interests

- Protection of U.S. investments overseas. (This interest relates to protection of U.S. citizens and facilities overseas, but also acknowledges the growing multinational nature of the U.S. and global economies. Given the interconnectivity of international economics and U.S. well being, this interest has a high priority.)
- Sustained U.S. position of global influence. (This interest seeks to shape the global political, military and economic environments in order to create conditions conducive to U.S. and global security. It promotes other nations adhere to peaceful resolution of conflicts in all domains.)
  - Global leadership and moral suasion to influence the behavior and adaptation of militaries of other nations to democratic rule (I)
  - Advancing the rule of law and agreed norms of international behavior related to the use of force and human rights (I)

- Advancing the spread of democracy and free market economies as the basis for international stability and prosperity, to include to second and third tier nations. *(Based on the assumption that free market democracies are less prone to war on each other, this interest seeks to establish some form of democratic government in most states and encourage free market economies as the surest way to sustain growth. By doing so, these nations create the conditions for internal stability and security and confidence in external relations with competitors who abide by similar rules and norms. This does not eliminate competition and conflict, but develops a system within which it can be managed)*
  - *Reform of militaries to conform with democratic principles (I)*
- Prevention of intra-state conflict with the potential for spillover that would affect major regional powers. *(This interest relates to maintaining a global security environment based on the rule of law, but, where intra-state conflict erupts, contains it within the borders of that nation. In some regions, intra-state conflict will affect several nations because of the natural dispersion of ethnic, tribal and religious groups across borders created over the past two centuries. The U.S. concern is limited primarily to circumstances where such conflict could entangle major powers and produce tension or conflict among these competing powers. Because of the flagrant disregard for human rights and U.S. values inherent in genocide, defusing or limiting these conflicts is in our security interest.)*
  - *Resolution of intrastate conflict before it erupts into overt warfare (I)*
  - *Containment of intrastate conflict within borders of the originating state (I)*
  - *Prevention of ethnic, political, religious, or cultural based conflict that could result in policies of genocide/mass murder being enacted (I)*

**Other Interests (O).** This category relates to maintaining an international security environment in which other U.S. values, to include social, religious, cultural, environmental and humanitarian values, are promoted and accepted. Failure will have little direct short or long-term effect on other U.S. goals and objectives, but could affect a cooperative political and economic environment important to US. prosperity and security.

- Protection of the global environment and natural (non-commodity) resources, particularly those that effect the well being of the United States and other nations on a regional or global scale. *(This interest focuses primarily on the impact of environmental degradation on access of nations to critical resources, like fresh water. While wars over natural resources have not been fought recently, since World War II, and despite dire, but unfulfilled, predictions over the past 40 years, the potential for conflict exists in several regions, especially the Middle East)*
  - *Prevention of conflict over environmental or resource issues (I)*
- Avoidance of costs and disruptive potential from crises associated with failed or troubled states. *(This interest focuses on preventing conditions that could require even limited U.S. military or economic assistance to failed states and their populations. Addressing the root causes is more likely to provide long term solutions and limit the need for use of military forces.)*
  - *Military assistance in resolving the conditions that lead states to fail (O)*

- *Support for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts related to failed or troubled states, where such support will help resolve the issues that led to instability (O)*
- *Support for humanitarian relief efforts in response to natural and man-made disasters. (This interest addresses relieving human suffering and is related to U.S. values, rather than directly to security interests. The security aspect resides in promoting greater international acceptance of standards of behavior within and between nations.)*

## **REGIONAL.**

This section has prioritized regional interests: however, the aggregation by region and the range of objectives makes the prioritization imperfect. In many cases, the region has the higher category as a result of one or two issues, rather than the entire region possessing the priority.

## **Vital Interests**

- *Protection of the Western Hemisphere from external threats. (The United States has not had an external threat to its territorial integrity for over a hundred years. The Monroe Doctrine has remained the consistent governing policy and strategy toward the hemisphere. The United States has established coordinative mechanisms for regional security and worked within those mechanisms to guarantee an Americas free of foreign intervention. For the foreseeable future, (his interest will remain unabridged)*
  - *No undue military presence of external powers in the hemisphere (V)*
  - *No hostile military presence of external powers in the hemisphere (V)*
  - *Assured access to the energy resources of the hemisphere (V)*
  - *Regional security environment such that the presence of external powers is seen as unwelcome (O)*
  - *Assured access to and use of the Panama Canal (O)*
- *Stable, peaceful neighboring states in Canada and Mexico. (Like the Western Hemisphere, but more acutely, security of Mexico and Canada is inextricably linked to U.S. security. Instability or conflict could have multiple consequences for U.S. military interests. Illegal immigration, uncontrolled migration, refugee challenges, terrorism criminal activities, cross border conflict or sanctuary, or divisions among ethnic groups within the United States could all result from tensions with our neighbors. In each case, U.S. short and long term security could be jeopardized.)*
  - *Special military relationships with Canada and Mexico (V)*
  - *Enhanced mechanisms for hemispheric military cooperation (V)*
  - *Resolution of internal conflicts in Mexico (V)*
- *A peaceful, prosperous, internally stable Russia, governed by the rule of law, that accepts international norms and standards of behavior. (Russia has the size, power, tradition, nationalistic tendencies and legitimate concerns for its future role in the global community of nations that could develop into serious opposition to the*

United States. It is the only nation that has the means to threaten U.S. survival. It is contiguous with other vital U.S. interests in Europe and East Asia. It shares a long difficult border with China, the only other potential global challenger to U.S. interests. It is beset with long term security challenges to its territorial integrity throughout its periphery. Its paranoia and intense nationalism could become focused on the United States and its allies as the cause of its demise and the catalyst for its resurgence.)

- Russia as a recognized military power, but without expansionist global or imperial aspirations, especially as Russia emerges from its present weakened state (V)
- Peaceful resolution of border conflicts and territorial disputes (V)
- Peaceful resolution of potential conflicts in the near abroad e.g., ethnic, religious and economic strains (V)
- Russia as a reliable partner in strategic and regional arms control (V)
- A peaceful, prosperous, internally stable China, governed by the rule of law, that accepts international norms and standards of behavior. (This interest relates to the nexus of major power interests in northeast Asia (China, Russia, United States, Japan, Koreans) and the potential for competition and conflict in east and south Asia. China's emergence and desire to become a recognized global power will certainly spawn the potential for conflicting views of security in the region. China has the potential to threaten U.S. security directly with its nuclear capability, but it remains limited. Latent regional animosities and fears continue, particularly between Japan and other nations of the region. Taiwan remains a significant security issue for China and for the U.S. commitment to Taiwanese security.)
  - China as a recognized military power, but without hegemonic or global aspirations and constrained to military activities within its borders and territorial waters (V)
  - Cooperative Chinese-U.S. approaches to regional security and stability (V)
  - Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan (V) and maritime territories issues (I)
- Regional stability and cooperation in Europe. (This interest relates to maintaining a secure, stable region, which has been the locus of two world wars over the past one hundred years and of potential conflict for 44 of the past 55 years (since 1945). NATO has been the central alliance of the West for over 50 years and, given the Euro-centric nature of the U.S. populace, it will remain a pillar of U.S. security interest. Uncertainty regarding the future course of Russia and the evolution of former nations of the Warsaw Pact from Soviet domination to free market democracies or some alternative could generate instability and the potential for conflict, either directly or indirectly over the next 20 years.)
  - Absence of a single dominant power in the Eurasian landmass, especially Russia or Germany (V)
  - Peaceful resolution and prevention of potential interstate conflict (V)
  - NATO as the principal security organization in Europe (V)
  - Greater European military integration and cooperation (I)
  - Enhanced European capability and willingness to respond to common military missions (I)

- Containment of intrastate conflict on the periphery of NATO Europe, prevention wherever possible (I)*

### Important Interests

- Protection of the Western Hemisphere from internal destabilizing events. *(This interest focuses on maintaining a state of non-hostilities between nations of the hemisphere in order to sustain political and social progress and economic growth. Advocacy for this interest supports a cooperative region of like-minded nations, who generally support U.S. policies. As well, the roll back of nuclear programs in South America established a non-nuclear region, which supports U.S. non- and counterproliferation policies important to global stability. Instability would promote illegal immigration into the United States, support for narco-trafficking and insurgency, and tendencies toward authoritarian rule.)*
  - O Sustainment of the non-nuclear posture of the region (V)*
  - O Peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts (I)*
  - Peaceful resolution of internal conflict (I)*
  - Decreased narco-trafficking and non-state threats to legitimate government (I)*
- Regional stability and balance of power in East and Southeast Asia. Preventing the emergence of China, Japan, or a united Korea as regional hegemony. *(This interest is vital in many respects and could be placed in either category, however, not all aspects of the region are vital. Those that are vital are related primarily to China and Japan. China has been addressed in the vital category. The number of existing long term and potential conflicts in the region is significant, including Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the maritime territories. As well, trade with East Asia exceeds that with Europe. It is a region of change, as China tries to transform to a free market economy, the Korean situation evolves, although unpredictably, Japan reasserts its power in the region, Indonesia adapts to democratic government and the "tigers" re-assess and re-build from the financial turmoil of the mid-1990s. Russia remains an unknown in the situation, now unable to control its distant republics and assert its former power, it could change dramatically over the next 15-20 years. Both changing Russian military approaches to use of nuclear weapons in lieu of conventional force and China's view of their utility, given a decided even unrecoverable, inferiority in conventional capability, could affect the potential for nuclear conflict in the region should interstate war occur. The web of bilateral alliances in the region ties the United States to potential flashpoints, but is also a source of U.S. power and influence. However, the region lacks the strength of cooperative regional security approaches.)*
  - Peaceful resolution and prevention of interstate conflict (V)*
  - O A stable balance of power in which the United States plays a critical role (V)*
  - Sustained bilateral security relationships with Japan and Korea (V)*
  - Peaceful resolution of the two Korea issue (V)*
  - O Avoidance of conflict with China, especially over Taiwan and maritime territorial disputes (V)*
  - Sustained bi- and multilateral security relationships with regional partners, especially Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, and Thailand (I)*

- 0 Peaceful resolution of internal conflict, especially with regard to Indonesia (I)
- Regional stability and prevention of war in South and Central Asia. (This interest has a vital aspect related to the potential for nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, but is otherwise primarily important. Nuclear conflict would change many nations' perceptions of the need to own their own nuclear weapons and challenge U.S. non- and counterproliferation policies. The current and projected volatility of this region stems from unresolved territorial disputes, fragmented ethnic and religious groups among the populations and the potential that several countries have large natural resources that could generate hard cash in an economically challenged region. Again Russia remains a difficult unknown. Its reassertion of influence and power in the near abroad of Central Asia and/or the Caucasus, spill-over of continued intra-state conflict into Russia or repression of large Russian ethnic populations could ignite conflict)
  - Recognition of India as a regional power and establishment of cooperative regional security relationships (V)
  - 0 Peaceful resolution and prevention of interstate conflict, especially resolution of the territorial dispute over Kashmir and any conflicts with China (V)
  - Safe, secure control of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan (V)
  - 0 Non-proliferation of WMD technologies and systems beyond current powers (V)
  - Containment of radical Islamic movements within and outside of the region (I)
  - Assured access to oil and gas resources (I)
  - 0 Peaceful resolution of internal conflict, especially in the Caucasus/Trans-Caucasus region (I)
  - Suppression and elimination of state sponsored or abetted terrorism originating from within the region (V(nuclear/biological)/I)
- Regional stability and prevention of war in Southwest Asia. (This interest has vital aspects, particularly in the security of Israel, a long time partner of the United States. The oil and gas resources of the region make it very important to the United States, which is not dependent on oil and gas from this region, but whose allies and friends are. An ideological conflict centered on radical Muslim fundamentalism could result in denial of access to resources and provide the impetus for war in the region. This potential exists in the difficult transitions facing many authoritarian and/or theocratic regimes.)
  - Assured U.S. and allied access to oil and gas resources (V)
  - Israel as a secure, stable nation (V)
  - 0 A stable Middle East peace (V)
  - Suppression and elimination of state sponsored or abetted terrorism originating from within the region (V(nuclear/biological)/I)
  - Containment of radical Islamic movements within and outside of the region (I)
  - 0 Preventing the emergence of a dominant regional power, especially Iraq and Iran (I)
  - 0 United States as the dominant external power in the region (I)
  - Assured access to and use of the Suez canal (I)

Other Interests

- Peace and regional stability in sub-Saharan Africa. *(This interest has little priority, given the lack of political or economic influence of African nations within the developed world. While evidence exists that an economic renaissance in Africa could emerge over the next 20 years, it will still have minor implications for the United States. The greatest challenge resides in handling conflict, which transgresses U.S. values and offends moral sensibilities.)*
  - Containment of inter and intrastate conflict (0)

April 9, 2001 12:50 PM

REC'D APR 10 PM 5: 24

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**

SUBJECT: March 30 Memo

I was looking over your March 30 memo commenting on Andy Marshall's work.

Could you please have your staff try to address the areas that you think need additional emphasis? For example, under "b" at the bottom of your first page, it says that the strategic objectives, the ends, are not sufficiently defined to allow us to derive ways and means. Could you come up with some specific examples of that and your own suggestions?

The same thing with respect to item "c."

With respect to "e," I think it would be helpful if you listed some examples.

With respect to "f," I quite agree with you that the likelihood of surprise is understated.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
04090 1-20

~~SECRET~~

*(Unclassified when separated from enclosure.)*

X00412 /01

SECDEF CONTROL

11-L-0559/OSD/1568

April 16, 2001 2:40 PIM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Forces

I want to set up a meeting with General Shelton, General Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Steve Cambone, and Andy Marshall to discuss this memo from General Shelton on standing joint forces.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/13/01 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Future Joint Force

DHR:dh  
041601-42

USJFCOM

16 April



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

13 April 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Really enjoyed our brief discussion on the Future Joint Force earlier this week. I'd like to follow up with a few thoughts on implementation.

Goldwater-Nichols drove jointness to the 4-star headquarters level. As you know, today, the 4-star CINC Headquarters are Joint Headquarters, but the Component Headquarters beneath them—some 4-star and some 3-star—are Service pure. Essentially, the next logical step would be to drive jointness to the 3-star headquarters level. As we discussed, there are some very good reasons to do so:

- Enhance ability to train as we will fight
- Harvest manpower "savings" from redundant headquarters
- Provide platform for Joint Experimentation
- Adapt organizations in support of transformation

For many practical reasons, implementation should occur in phases. The goals of each phase of implementation would look like this:

Phase I. Establish Joint War-fighting as the core competency of the US Armed Forces in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). This provides the mark on the wall for the development of future capabilities and sets the stage for structural changes.

Phase II. Define and adopt a Joint Operational Concept for the Future Joint Force (CINCJFCOM through CJCS to SECDEF for approval). This establishes the parameters of joint war-fighting requirements, organizational constructs, training, and education.

Phase III. Revise Title 10 to provide budgetary authority to the Chairman for implementation of these initiatives.

Phase IV. Activate a single standing Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters as a test bed for the standing JTF concept. Use an existing 3-star Service headquarters augmented by other Services. Mandate zero growth. Assign research, development, acquisition and fielding responsibilities for the standing JTF headquarters to JFCOM. Modify Joint Doctrine to incorporate the standing JTF as an operational concept. Establish DOD policies that drive Service acquisition programs through directed compatibility with JTF capabilities,

Phase V. After period of time and upon review of lessons learned, establish three additional standing JTFs. At end state, four standing JTFs would be organized as follows:

- JTF East (CONUS Based)
- JTF West (CONUS Based)
- JTF Atlantic (Forward Deployed)
- JTF Pacific (Forward Deployed)

Each Service could have proponency for one standing JTF.

What I have described above are the major muscle movements of an implementation plan. However, this is a very complex issue. Achieving a goal of improving readiness through standing JTFs will be relatively simple. Achieving a goal of adapting and flattening organizational structures through standing JTFs will be more difficult and contentious. In order to ensure that at the end of this process the Armed Forces are both more ready and more efficient, I recommend that you direct a study-on a very aggressive timeline-to examine the issue and produce a detailed implementation plan.

There is a lot of potential here. Look forward to working with you to realize it.

*Recommend "Close Hold"  
on this in the near term.  
It will be very controversial  
with the CMC's and services.  
When properly fleshed out  
it will be much easier to  
sell.*

Sincerely,

*V/R  
Hugh*

HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

April 16, 2001 3:00 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Transformation

Please take a look at these two memos for me on Joint Transformation.

Then tell me what you think I ought to do to push forward on a standing joint task force.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/27/01 CJCS memo to SecDef re: JFCOM Joint Transformation and undated paper, "Is JFCOM doing anything?"

DHR:dh  
041601-45

USSF Com

16 APR 01



## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: JFCOM Joint Transformation

1. Summary. While it is easy to be critical of what Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has done to date, it is important to acknowledge how far they have come in a short period. In 1999, JFCOM was activated and given its charter for joint experimentation. Although we have made significant progress, a great deal of work remains. Recent efforts laid a solid foundation for joint transformation, but we have moved about as fast and as far as we can. Authority and capacity for requirements and forces, including joint forces, remain primarily vested in the Services. Further and faster progress may require greater exercise of SecDef authority and could require additional legislation.

2. Background. Atlantic Command (ACOM) was selected to convert to JFCOM because it was best positioned to accept the mission. ACOM already had responsibility for joint training and exercise of joint forces. It had access to forces through existing Service components. JFCOM was established as the centerpiece of joint experimentation and, consequently, joint transformation. While the situation is not ideal, JFCOM remains our best available vehicle for joint experimentation and transformation. ACOM had a multitude of missions when it was converted to JFCOM. Through the Unified Command Plan (UCP) process we have shed some missions and continue efforts, though with limited success as the easy fixes are done.

3. Current Status. We currently guide Service efforts to achieve joint capability, judiciously using SecDef authority where necessary. It is slower and more arduous than anticipated. Most success is achieved through formal processes to force Service decisions into joint fora. While Services retain decision authority, the risk of taking suboptimal decisions to the SecDef level is always there. The current process is:

- a. Establish broad guidance in JV 2020. (CJCS)
- b. Narrow Service focus with Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept. (JFCOM)

c. Focus Service Title 10 decisions on support of "Aim Points" as spelled out in "Next Step." (JFCOM, Joint Staff) (Need to brief you on this!)

d. Test Service contributions to Joint Task Force (JTF) Capabilities in Millennium Challenge Exercises. (JFCOM)

e. Provide joint input to Service priorities through enhanced Joint Requirements Oversight Committee. (VCJCS)

f. Gain independent funding for joint requirements through "Next Step." (CJCS proposal to SecDef)

#### 4. Challenges Remain in the Areas of Focus, Authority and Resources

a. Focus. JFCOM should be more focused as our force provider, integrator and experimenter, but there are a number of parochial and bureaucratic obstacles to overcome. We should divest CINCJFCOM of his Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) role to allow the command to focus on its primary roles without distraction. I remain committed to relieving JFCOM of functions collateral to joint readiness through the UCP process. There are multiple 4-star headquarters in the continental United States, and any number of ways to realign their functions. I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you about this issue as your reviews proceed.

b. Authority. Title 10 authority of the Services to organize, train and equip is contrary to the requirement for a single decision authority on issues of organization, training and equipping the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Service programs (by law) move to optimal solutions for Service roles and missions. Desert 1 (Iran Rescue attempt) illustrated how this can be to the detriment of requirements for joint integration and C4I. Service authority currently trumps that of JFCOM, necessitating an indirect approach. Unfortunately, the Goldwater-Nichols solution only addressed the operational failure of Special Operations forces. Similarly, JFCOM relies heavily on Service cooperation for both experimentation and training. Service participation and contribution currently require Service consent or SecDef directive. Establishment of a Joint Training Center is a great idea; however, the two possibilities for implementation are both difficult. Establishment of a separate facility would require a great deal of funding and would impose additional training requirements on heavily tasked tactical forces. Joint control and integration of current Service facilities would be extremely contentious.

c. Resources. Determining priorities for joint requirements and funding is an appropriate role for JFCOM. Funds for training, organizing and equipping are currently part of individual Service budgets. Joint requirements require validation and assignment of proponent responsibility to the appropriate Service. Services

understandably prioritize funding based on contribution to the Service mission. There are no "independent" funds available to pursue systems for Joint Operational Architecture. I am proposing the establishment of separate funding authority for exclusively joint systems. This proposal (Next Step), recently briefed to your transformation panel, is one I hope will be included in your ongoing review.

5. JFCOM is our best hope for leveraging jointness to US advantage in future military operations. Progress has been slow but steady; we have gone about as far as we can without addressing issues of focus, authority and resources. We need to press on with joint experimentation, transformation and identification of issues. The easy steps have been taken. Fundamental questions of responsibility, authority and resources for joint transformation remain. I look forward to discussing this challenge further with you.



HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Your 13 March 2001 Paper on Joint Forces Command



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

CH-1170-01  
24 Apr 11 2001 11:52

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Force Sizing

1. I've read Pete Aldridge's "Thoughts on Force Sizing" and appreciate the opportunity to respond. Overall, I find that the paper has both disappointing and encouraging aspects.
2. I find the paper's opening premise disappointing. Pete says:

. . .we would all *like* to see the forces sized for two, nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. However, a fully-funded Defense budget to accomplish this task is probably not *affordable* [emphasis mine].
3. This suggests that the search is for a force based more on what's affordable than on what's needed. There must be a balance, but the force-sizing criterion selected should articulate first and foremost how it will unfailingly meet the nation's security needs.
4. On the other hand, Pete's proposal is encouraging in that it acknowledges the need for trained and ready forces to respond to contingencies in more than one place at a time. Essentially, it proposes that the U.S. military should maintain standing forces sufficient to finish one fight on our terms-rapidly and decisively-and to deter or "establish control" of another fight. The decisive phase of the second fight would be accomplished by coalition, reserve, or swing forces. Pete characterizes this as "acceptable" risk. I'm not so sure.
5. I am uncomfortable with a strategy that purports to "establish control" (hold for some unspecified period of time) as the objective of a major conflict. If there is anything we know about warfare, we know that it is unpredictable, often chaotic, and always costs more lives the longer it is protracted. To knowingly adopt a strategy that will intentionally protract conflict seems beyond "acceptable" risk. If the nation anticipates having to fight in more than one place at a time, it should have the forces required to finish each fight rapidly, decisively, and overwhelmingly.

U08112./01


11-L-0559/OSD/1576

6. Pete's proposal has implications for daily, peacetime operations as well. The CINCs and Services have made a pretty compelling case to you that they are stretched thin. From their perspective, the choice is either "less strategy" or "more forces." Pete's proposal for a "minimum level force" casts the choice in a slightly different light. If commitments are reduced and the active force is sized to a "minimum level," the nation will lose some degree of flexibility. Militarily, at least, it will have fewer options. On the other hand, if commitments remain the same and the force is sized to a "minimum level," military readiness will rapidly erode.

7. Finally, there is a human dimension to consider in this and other force sizing discussions. "Tiered Readiness" proposals of the sort embedded in the Transitional Task Force Model often ignore the way the military grows leaders. Like a football team, the armed forces must be more than one-deep at the skilled positions, and its bench must be robust. The next war will not be Operation Desert Storm. It will not be Operation Allied Force. Leaders will be lost in every phase of operations. Proposals on unit readiness and force sizing that are too proscriptive, too narrow, and truly minimal may limit our ability to build a "bench" of leaders with the necessary war-fighting skills to replace them.

8. I appreciate the difficulty of identifying a force-sizing criterion, but simply diluting the current two MTW paradigm may not be the best answer. The concept of Joint Response Forces is on the right track, but each fielded force should be organized, trained, and equipped to finish its fight rapidly and decisively. I still think there are efficiencies and opportunities available in a Joint solution to this problem. Some of the ideas outlined in my letter to you on Standing Joint Task Forces may apply,

9. I suppose we should know we're getting closer to a solution because the questions are getting harder. Look forward to continuing to work it.



HENRY H. SHELTON

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

Your 16 April note, "Force Sizing"

April 16, 2001 1:42 PM

TO: Gen. Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Force Sizing

Attached is a note that Pete Aldridge wrote on force sizing. Do you have any thoughts on it?

Thanks.

Attach.

04/10/01 Aldridge memo to SecDef, re: "Thoughts on Force Sizing"

DHR:dh  
041601-37

11-L-0559/OSD/1578

04/16/01



# THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION

*E. C. Aldridge, Jr.*  
*Chief Executive Officer*

## TELEFAXCOVERSHEET

**Date:** 4/1 0/01

**TO:** **The Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
Secretary Of Defense  
U.S. Department Of Defense  
**Fax:** (703) 697-8339  
**Phone:** (703) 692-7 100



**FROM:** Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr.  
Chief Executive Officer  
The Aerospace Corporation  
**Fax:** (703) 812-9332  
**Phone:** (703) 812-0606 **CC:**

No. of Pages: 3 \_\_\_\_\_ each (including Cover Sheet)

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April 10, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense

Cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Thoughts on Force Sizing

As you well know, we are struggling to find the logic and rationale for how we size the conventional (non-nuclear) force structure. The strategy development exercise and the Transformation Task Force have given us some foundation for a methodology to do this.

As a minimum risk force I think we would all like to see the forces sized for two, nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. However, a fully funded Defense budget to accomplish this task is probably not affordable. So, how should the force be sized for "acceptable" risk?

The minimum level force should be sized to be able to defeat an adversary decisively and quickly in at least one major regional conflict. We need to decide the size and technology characteristics of the adversary (land forces, air forces, sea forces and terrain) that we must plan against in the region. We can then, using the three-phase Transformation Task Force approach, design the rapid response force, the follow-on 4-day response force, and the size of the remaining forces arriving in 30 days, to achieve the desired outcome.

This force should be able to contribute to deterrence of one potential adversary. But, how do we deter others?

My suggestion is that we build additional forces using the first two phases of combat in the Transitional Task Force model (Setting Conditions, deployed within 24 hours, and Establish Control, within 4 days) to deter a second potential adversary simultaneously. Additional forces beyond these would be added to the second region later, on an "as available" basis--pulling forces out of training, mobilization of guard and reserves, addition of allied and coalition forces, or "swinging" forces from the first regional conflict. While this would be a higher risk region than the first, the second adversary could never be sure that some portion, if not all, of the forces would not be diverted to the second region.

Therefore the size of the conventional forces would be based on the following criteria:

- Two fully ready "Setting Conditions" force packages for **24-hour** deployment
- Two "Establish Control" force packages for **4-day** deployment
- One "Decisive Resolution" force package for **30-day** deployment
- Additional forces for training, post-alert recovery, and pre-alert preparation, to support the force packages above.

The Air Force Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) concept employs a similar approach. From a total of 10 AEF units, they have 2 AEF units on alert and ready to deploy, 2 more preparing to go on alert, 4 in training, and 2 recovering from alert. This really helps their personnel tempo problems in peacetime since people know when they will be on alert and deployable and when they will be at home,

I am sure there will be more debate on this topic, but this may help focus the discussion.

April 28, 2001 4:41 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman

I am ready to sign these papers from General Shelton if you are comfortable with them,

Thanks.

Attach.

CJCS memo to SecDef re: "Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences"

DHR:dh  
042801-21

0207CS

28APR01

U08397 /01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 4/16

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

TO: SECDEF

SUBJ: ① DESIGNATION OF ACTING CHAIRMAN  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
② DUAL ABSENCES

SIR.

— GEN SHELTON SENT THESE WORKING  
DRAFTS FOR YOUR REVIEW.

— REGARDING YOUR QUESTIONS ON  
ORDER OF SUCCESSION IN THE PENTAGON  
TO DAN DELL'ORTO, — DAN STILL  
IS WORKING WITH OFFICE OF LEGAL  
COUNSEL AT JUSTICE DEPT. TO RECEIVE  
AN OFFICIAL REPLY.

VR

J/SMA 4/16

Working Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e (Enclosure A), state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices.

a. To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, recommend the President appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

b. These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

2. Guidance with regard to dual absences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Service Chiefs and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is also enclosed.

3. Request your signature at Enclosure B forwarding the proposed memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman and at Enclosure C promulgating guidance on dual absences.

HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.

(2) The Chairman shall include in each such report recommendations for such changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation as may be necessary to achieve the changes in the assignment of functions recommended by the Chairman

(Added P.L. 93-453, § 201, Oct. 1, 1988, 100 Stat. 1007.)

#### § 164. Vice Chairman

(a) APPOINTMENT.—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR APPOINTMENT.—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) as a general or flag officer.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) DUTIES.—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(d) FUNCTION AS ACTING CHAIRMAN.—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

(e) SUCCESSION AFTER CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman or in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or vice Chairman ceases.

(f) GRADE AND RANK.—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e, state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both **offices**.

To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, I recommend you appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

I recommend you approve these procedures by signing the attached memorandum.

Attachment:  
As stated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby designate the following officers to act as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the circumstances described in section 154 (e) of title 10, United States Code, during the period indicated in CY 2001 and in succeeding calendar years:

Period of Designation:

1 January to 31 March

1 April to 30 June

1 July to 30 September

1 October to 31 December

Designated Officer:

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, US Army

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

If the member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next member in the rotation. In the event no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities will be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE  
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subject: Dual Absence

If you intend to be absent from the Washington area, your Vice/Assistant should remain. If both you and your Vice/Assistant intend to be absent, please notify the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the OSD Executive Secretary.

In the event of a dual absence, the Chairman and Vice Chairman should limit their travel so at least one remains in CONUS, could return within 4 hours, and has access to secure communications. The Service Chiefs/Commandant and their Vice Chiefs/Assistant Commandant should coordinate their travel so that at least one remains in CONUS and has access to secure communications.

copy to:  
Secretaries of the Military Departments

March 15, 2001 3:46 PM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Order of Succession

Have Dell'Orto take a look at that order of succession in the Pentagon for me.

DHR:db  
031501-26

11-L-0559/OSD/1589

March 15, 2001 12:13 PM

SUBJECT: Order of Succession

I want to review **the** order of succession for the Pentagon and be told to what extent it is statutory and to what extent we can propose changes to it.

DHR:dh  
031501-12

11-L-0559/OSD/1590

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: May 21, 2001

SUBJECT: **Summary of US-Russia Military Cooperation Contact Plans**

This came directly from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to me. It should be staffed out in Policy. Please see that that is done and then someone get back to me with their thoughts.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
052101.45  
Attach,

*Staff eed*

**RUSSIA**

**21MAY01**



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

SECRET  
*Rec'd & Comment*  
2001 MAY 23 AM 9:28

May 15 2001, 1830

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of US-Russia Military Cooperation Contact Plans

- The United States and the Russian Federation conduct a variety of military-military activities. CJCS and his counterpart annually sign a Program of Contacts. A number of lower level contacts not contained in the signed plan are also executed.
  - The majority of military contacts focus on interoperability in Peacekeeping Operations; Search and Rescue, and Disaster Relief. They also include contacts between medical and military legal personnel. 2001 summary attached (TAB A).
- Development of the 2002 Plan is one of the topics of this weeks US-Russia Joint Staff-General Staff Talks. A first draft was developed in a colonel level meeting in February. There is agreement that contacts will continue to focus on peacekeeping, search and rescue, strategic force exchanges and other exercises. It will continue airborne officer exchanges, academic cooperation, and multinational conferences and working groups hosted by the US Pacific Command. New proposals include a combating terrorism exercise and more unit to unit operational exchanges.
- Attached (TAB B) is the current list of possible events that are being considered for the 2002 plan. At the Joint Staff Talks, we will adjust based on mutual agreement, and continue to refine the draft over the next 6 months. The objective is to sign the plan by December, 2001.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: LTC Harris-Smith and LCDR Haynes, J-5/RUE (b)(6)

## 2001 Military-to-Military Cooperation with Russia

The summary below lists 70 military-military cooperation events, 34 on the Annual Plan of Contacts, and 36 not on the plan but proposed by either the US or Russia. Events not on the CJCS-Russian CHOD-signed Contact Plan are called "out-of-cycles."

### 2001 Summary of Execution:

- 34 events on the Contact Plan
  - To date, Russians have participated in 3 of 7 events on the Contact Plan.
- 36 Out-of-Cycle events (marked with \*)
  - To date, Russians have participated in 6 of 11 Out-of-Cycle events.

### JANUARY

- 31-11 US-Russian Theater Missile Defense Exercise**
- 0-6-level exercise to develop interoperable theater missile defense procedures. **Russians participated.**

### FEBRUARY

- 6-8 Pacific Rim Air Force Director of Operations Conference\***
- 0-6-level conference of Pacific rim countries' military air operations officers. **Russians did not participate.**
- 12-16 Pacific Area Special Operations Conference\***
- 0-6-level conference of Pacific Rim countries' special operations officers. **Russians participated.**
- 25-2 Pacific Multilateral Planning Augmentation Staff Planning Workshop\***
- Workshop for 20 nations' military planners to plan and execute coalition operations in response to Small-Scale Contingencies such as disaster relief ops. **Russians did not participate.**
- 27-1 Multilateral Pacific Submariners' Conference\***
- Participants develop submarine safety procedures such as **Search-and-Rescue** for missing submarines. **Russians did not participate.**

## **MARCH**

- 5-9 US Pacific Command International Military Operations and Law Conference\***
- Annual symposium for operators, planners, and lawyers to discuss legal issues. **Russians participated.**
- 8-10 US European Command Chaplain meeting with other European Nation's' military chaplains\***
- First counterpart meeting. **Russians participated.**
- 15-17 Exercises at sea between two Russians destroyers and US Seventh Fleet ships\***
- Requested by Russia. Two Russian destroyers were returning from a naval show in India. **Russians did not participate.**
- 20-22 9th Annual Conference of European Armies**
- 4-star level European CHOD conference. **Russians did not participate.**
- 25-30 Russian officers to observe Exercise NORTHERN EDGE**
- Annual large-scale US exercise in Northern Pacific using US Pacific Command and Coast Guard ships and other US forces. **Russians did not participate.**
- 26-28 Asia Pacific Conference: 2001 Pacific Symposium on Regional Cooperation\***
- Symposium for 0-6/7-level commanders from Pacific area countries. **Russians did participate.**

## **APRIL**

- 1-5 Visit of Russian Naval Infantry Commander to Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic**
- Counterpart visit. **Russians did not participate.**
- 2-6 Pacific Rim Air Doctrine Symposium\***

- 0-6-level conference on air doctrine. **Russians did not participate.**

- 2-6            **Visit by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff to speak at the Joint Staff Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Division Policy and Strategy Conference**
- Invitation to address conference. **Russians did not participate. (Joint Staff withdrew invitation.)**
- 21-28        **Pacific Advanced Injury Management, Diagnosis and Treatment Medical Symposiums\***
- Medical symposium for Pacific nations' military doctors. **Russians participated.**
- 23-27        **Visit by US Pacific Command military lawyers to Moscow**
- 0-6/7-level. Annual symposium for operators, planners, and lawyers to discuss legal issues. **Russians participated.**

**MAY**

- 6-11         **Asia-Pacific Military Medical Conference\***
- Conference on military aspects of humanitarian deployments and military medicine. **Russians participated.**
- 15-18        **Annual Joint Staff Talks between Russian General Staff and US Joint Staff**
- Annual 3-star-lead delegation to discuss US-Russian military issues. **Russians participated.**

**Planned Events Remaining in 2001**

- 21-26        **Visit by US European Command Chaplain to Russian Counterpart\***
- First counterpart visit.
- 22-24        **O-6 level US Pacific Command Working Group**
- Visit by a Russian Army general officer-led delegation of the Russian Far East Military District.

## **JUNE**

- 1-18**      **Russians to participate in Exercise BALTOPS**
- NATO Partnership for Peace U.S. invitational maritime ship exercise with Baltic nations in the Baltic Sea.
- 12-18**      **Visit by Commander, US Pacific Command to Moscow and Vladivostok to see Commander, Russian Far East Military District**
- 17-28**      **Russians to participate in US Central Command's REGIONAL COOPERATION 2001\***
- A multi-national, In-the-Spirit of Partnership for Peace, computer assisted command post exercise.
- 18-29**      **Russia to participate in DESERT RESCUE IX**
- US Navy Rotary Wing Combat Search and Rescue Exercise which includes personnel from UK and Italy.
- TBD**        **Visit by Russian Commander, Pacific Fleet to Commander, US Submarine Forces Pacific**
- TBD**        **European Multinational Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Conference**
- US European Command-sponsored event for European nations.
- TBD**        **Visit by Commander, 8th Air Force to Commander, Strategic Air Army of Supreme High Command**
- TBD**        **Visit by Commander, US Atlantic Fleet and Commander, US Submarine Forces Atlantic to Commander, Northern Fleet**

## **JULY**

- 2-5**        **USN ship visit to Vladivostok\***
- 9-13**      **Visit by Chief of Staff, US Army to Commander, Russian Ground Forces**

- XI-14 Pacific Air Power Week Symposium\***
  - Series of four multinational symposiums for mid-level officers from air forces in US Pacific Command's area.
- 11-14 Russians to Observe US Pacific Command's COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER Exercise\***
  - Large scale multilateral exercise.
- 16-9 Symposium on East Asia Security?**
  - Annual multinational symposium on regional security issues for foreign security experts.
- 24-27 USN ship visit to Petropavlosk\***
- TBD US Naval Criminal Investigation Service-Russian Federal Security Service Exchange\* ?**
  - Emphasizes cooperative actions and exchange on law enforcement and force protection matters needed for ship visits.

**AUGUST**

- 7-9 USN ship visit to Vladivostok\***
- 17 Multinational Pacific Conference: Roles of Non-Government Organizations in Asia-Pacific Security\***

**SEPTEMBER**

- 1 Russians observe Mission Readiness Exercise required by US forces before Kosovo Force rotation\***
  - First one-placed on 2002 Contact Plan.
- 9-13 Pacific Armies Chiefs' Conference\***
  - 3-star-level conference of Pacific countries' army chiefs.
- 10-14 Trilateral Arctic Search and Rescue Exercise**
  - Maritime search and rescue exercise involving US-Canada-Russia.
- 10-14 Pacific Armies Management Seminar\***

- Provides a non-political forum for discussion of common military management problems with Asia-Pacific counterparts.

- 10-14 Pacific Airlift Rally\***
- Exercise between air forces in Pacific.
- 16-21 Visit by President, National Defense University-led delegation to Military -Academy of the General Staff**
- 17-21 Annual Incidents at Sea Review and Navy staff talks between US Navy and Russian Main Navy Staff**
- 24-13-Dec Mnltnational Pacific Conference: Senior Executive Course\***
- TBD Visit by Russian Main Military Laywers to US Army Judge Advocate General Staff**
- TBD 0-6-level US European Command Working Group\***
- 0-6-level working group with counterparts in Moscow and Lenigrad Military Districts.
- TBD Visit by Commander, US Pacific Fleet to Commander, Pacific Fleet**
- TBD Russians to participate in COOPERATION FROM THE SEA.**
- Cornerstone of USN-Russian fleet interaction in the Pacific. Naval and amphibious Force Exercise based on Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Scenario.
- TBD Airborne Infantry Squad Exchange\***
- Weeklong exchange of mid-grade officers.
- TBD US-Russian airborne training jump near Volgograd followed by a Russian-led Battle Staff Ride around the site of the Battle of Stalingrad\***
- TBD Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar\***
- Annual seminar attended by senior logisticians from 23 member nations and up to 11 observer nations.
- TBD Visit by Commander, Russian Navy to US Chief of Naval Operations**

- TBD Visit by Russian naval officers to Submarine Base, Groton, CT**
- TBD Visit by Commanding, US Army Command and General Staff College to Russian Combined Infantry Academy**
- TBD Visit by 0-6-led Russian delegation to Navy Diving and Salvage Training Center, Panama City, Florida for Navy dive briefings**
  - Requested by Russians in aftermath of Kursk mishap.
- TBD US/Russian Submarine Rescue Program Discussions**
- TBD Visit by Commander, US Strategic Command to Strategic Rocket Forces, Strategic Navy Forces and Long Range Aviation**
- TBD Visit by a test-pilot delegation from Edwards AFB to Russian Government Combat Training Center of the Ministry of Defense\***
- TBD Visit by Commander, XVIII AB Corps to Russian Airborne Forces Commander**

## **OCTOBER**

- 5-9 Russian Medical Presentation at American Surgeons of the US Meeting\***
  - Allows Russian military personnel to present their perspectives and treatment philosophies with US military medical personnel.
- 6-8 2001 US Pacific Command AOR Chiefs of Defense Conference\***
  - Increases high-level dialogue and foster regional military-military cooperation.
- 7-12 Visit by the Commander, US Joint Forces Command to Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts**

## **DECEMBER**

- 2-9 Pacific Medical Planning Team Conference\***
  - Planning conference for 2002 medical events.

- 5-7 Pacific Senior Communicators Meeting\***
- High-level conference attended by 25 nations. Topics include setting up an Asia-Pacific LAN for militaries particularly for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
- TBD Marine Forces Pacific Officer Exchange\***
- Mid-level staff officer contact between Marine Forces Pacific Command and Russian Far East Military District Naval Infantry.
- TBD Visit by Commander, Strategic 37th Air Army of Supreme High Command to Commander, 8th Air Force**
- TBD Visit of Chief of Military Academy of the General Staff to National Defense University**
- TBD Army Forces Service School Exchange**
- Meeting of experts to explore potential Armor, Infantry and Artillery Service School exchanges.
- TBD Officer Exchange Program including Army, Navy, Air Force and airborne officers**

**DRAFT**  
**PROGRAM OF CONTACTS**  
**BETWEEN**  
**THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND**  
**THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**  
**FOR 2002**

Based on the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation signed on September 8, 1993, and the Joint Declaration of the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on military cooperation in areas of mutual interest of May 13 1997, the participants undertake to make their best efforts to conduct the following military contacts, which are under the auspices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United States of America and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in 2002.

Reciprocal visits by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be conducted by mutual agreement.

**VISITS BY RUSSIAN MILITARY DELEGATIONS TO THE US**

1. Visit by RF Chief of Defense to US Pacific Command's Chiefs of Defense Conference.
2. Annual visit between Commander, RF Strategic Rocket Forces and Commander, US Strategic Command.
3. Annual visit between Commanders of Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts and Commander, RF Northern Fleet and Commander, US Joint Forces Command.
4. Annual visit between Commander, RF Far East Military District and Commander, US Pacific Command.
5. Annual visit between Commander, RF Ground Forces and Chief of Staff, US Army.
6. Annual visit between Commander, RF Pacific Fleet and Commander, US Pacific Fleet.
7. Annual visit between Commander, RF Northern Fleet and Commander, US Atlantic Fleet.
8. Annual visit between Commander, RF Airborne Forces and Commander, US XVIII Airborne Corps.

9. Annual US Strategic Command-sponsored visit between Commander, RF Pacific Fleet and US Submarine Forces Group Commander, Bangor.
10. Biannual visit between Military Academy of the General Staff and US National Defense University.
11. Visit by Chief of RF Ground Forces Engineers to US Chief of Engineers.
12. Annual visit between Commander, RF Combined Infantry Academy and Commander, US Army Command and General Staff College.
13. Multinational Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Conference, conducted under the auspices of US European Command.
14. Annual Conference of European Armies hosted by US Army Europe
15. Annual visit between representatives of Russian Federation Government Flight Test Center of the Ministry of Defense and representatives of the US Air Force Test Facility.
16. Annual Navy Staff Talks between RF Navy and US Navy.
17. Annual Incidents at Sea Review between the RF Navy and the US Navy.
18. Port visit by RF Pacific Fleet ship to non-CONUS US Navy Pacific port.
19. US Joint Forces Command-sponsored visit by Russian naval officers to Submarine Base, Groton, CT to discuss establishment of expert group on mutual submarine operations issues.
20. Visit by a delegation of RF Combating Terrorism experts to US Joint Forces Command.
21. US Atlantic Fleet-sponsored visit by RF Navy representatives to US Mine Warfare Command to observe training on sea-based mining/demining ops.
22. Visit by RF Far East Military District Infantry Squad to US Army Alaska.
23. Visit by RF representatives to US Army Forces Pacific-hosted Conference of Pacific Armies.
24. Visit by RF representatives to US Air Forces Pacific-hosted Conference of Pacific Air Chiefs.

## **VISITS BY US MILITARY DELEGATIONS TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

1. Visit by RF representatives to US Air Forces Pacific-hosted Conference of Pacific Air Chiefs.
2. Annual Joint Staff Talks between RF General Staff and US Joint Staff.
3. Annual visit between Commander, RF Strategic Air Army and Commander, US Strategic Command and Commander, US 8th Air Force.
4. Visit of Commander, US Space Command to Commander, RF Space Forces.
5. Annual visit between Commander, RF Pacific Fleet and Commander, US Strategic Command and Commander, US Submarine Forces Group Commander, Bangor.
6. Annual visit between Commander, RF Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy.
7. Annual visit between Commander, RF Naval Infantry and Commander, US Marine Forces Atlantic.
8. Visit of Commander, US Second Fleet with corresponding Commander, RF Northern Fleet ICW US Atlantic Fleet ship visit.
9. Visit of Commander, RF Naval Infantry to Commander, US Marine Forces Atlantic.
10. Bi-annual visit between Military Academy of the General Staff and US National Defense University.
11. Visit by US Naval Academy to RF Naval Academy Senior Staff.
12. Visit by US Pacific Command delegation to RF Far East Military District for Small Group Meeting.
13. Visit by US European Command delegation to Moscow or Leningrad Military District Commands for Small Group Meeting.
14. Visit by US Southern European Task Force to Volgograd for Battle Staff Ride of the Battle of Stalingrad. (Possibly combined with a US-RF airborne operation.)
15. Annual visit of US Pacific Command-led multi-CINC and Services' lawyers to the RF Legal Service Department of the Armed Forces.
16. Annual visit between RF Main Military Procuracy and US Army Judge Advocate General Staff.

17. Port visits by US Pacific Fleet ships to RF Pacific Fleet ports Vladivostok and Petropavlosk.

\*

## MAJOR COMBINED EXERCISES AND EXCHANGES\*

1. Port visit by US Atlantic Fleet ship to RF Atlantic port.
2. Combined US-RF operations and training programs within KFOR/SFOR context.
3. RF Participation in KFOR Mission Readiness Exercise.
4. Annual Theater Missile Defense Exercise (TMDX).
5. RF to participate in US Pacific Command's COOPERATION FROM THE S E A .
6. RF to participate in US Central Command's REGIONAL COOPERATION 02.
7. RF officers to observe US Pacific Command's NORTHERN EDGE.
8. RF officers to observe the US Pacific Command-sponsored annual multilateral COOPERATIVE COPE THUNDER exercise.
9. RF officers to observe appropriate annual TEAM CHALLENGE Exercises.
10. US Navy-RF Navy arranged program of PASSEXs to be held in the Pacific Ocean.
11. Annual Trilateral Russia-United Kingdom-United States (RUKUS) Exercise.
12. Trilateral US-Canada-RF Arctic Search and Rescue Exercise (ARCTIC SAREX).
13. US to participate in multinational Russia-South Korea-Japan Maritime Pacific Search and Rescue Exercise.
14. Caspian Sea Search and Rescue Exercise.
15. RF Navy to participate in or observe US submarine rescue exercises.
16. Special Operations forces Combating Terrorism exercise.
17. Physical Security Assessment of a RF Ministry of Defense facility.
18. Joint Combined Exchange Training. US Pacific Command (Special Operations division) and US European Command (Special Operations division). Training program by mutual agreement.

19. Strategic bomber exchanges at respective national air shows.
20. Army Forces Service School Exchange.
21. Exchange between RF Military Educational Physical Fitness and US Army Physical Fitness Command.
22. Exchange between RF Military Educational Physical Fitness and US Army Physical Fitness Command.
23. RF Navy officers onboard US Joint Forces 'Command ships to observe naval exercises.

- \* Each exercise will occur in stages and in accordance with its specific planning process, as agreed upon by the participants or as developed by exercise organizers. Each exercise also includes planning conferences, which are regarded as **integral elements** of the exercise, the particulars of which will be specified in the exercise program and are conditional on availability of funding.

## NOTES

1. Changes and additions to this Program of Contacts may be made as required, following agreement by the two sides.
2. Working and protocol ship visits and exchanges between the US Navy and the Navy of the Russian Federation during 2001 will be conducted by separate agreements.
3. In keeping with the provisions of the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the Joint Declaration of the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation about military cooperation in areas of mutual interest, both sides will strive to search for new areas of cooperation and to broaden and deepen their mutual relations.
4. This program of military contacts will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation for inclusion in an overall annual plan of defense and military contacts between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Signed in two originals, in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic.

---

Henry H. Shelton  
General

Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
of the Armed Forces of the  
United States of America-

---

Anatoliy V. Kvashnin  
General of the Army

Chief of the General Staff  
of the Armed Forces of the  
Russian Federation

May 29, 2001 1:32 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Prioritization

This is the project that General Shelton and the Policy shop are working together. It certainly is going to end up being part of the QDR, and we are going to have to know what guidance we want to give it-for example, reducing counter drug activities by X percent.

Attach.

5/21/01 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Strategic Prioritization w/attachments

DHR:dh  
052901-23

381

29 May 01

INFO MEMO

52

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Shelton, CJCS



SUBJECT: Strategic Prioritization

- On 4 May 01, I briefed you and DepSecDef on a methodology for strategic prioritization of peacetime military activities worldwide, based on a criteria of military value.
- You concurred with the preliminary proposal and directed me to finish methodology review and development which will be completed by 30 May. I will be prepared to brief you at that time on any changes to the methodology if you desire.
- Using this methodology, CINCs will conduct assessments of their areas of responsibility (AORs) and will brief these results at the J-5 Joint Worldwide Planners Conference (JWPC) on 27 Jun 01.
- Following review by the Joint Staff and my approval, I will brief you on the results by about 13 July 01. This briefing will provide an assessment of peacetime military activities in each country based on the military value criteria.
- The attached calendar outlines the key events in this project.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

copy to:

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Prepared By: General Henry H. Shelton, 697-9121

11-L-0559/OSD/1609

# Assessment Methodology



- Identify Priority Countries in Each Region
- Assessment of Military Value, by country

Military Value:

Warfighting effectiveness  
 Operational access  
 Coalition capability

COUNTRY	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES	COMBINED EXERCISES	SECURITY ASSISTANCE	COMBINED TRAINING	COMBINED EDUCATION	MILITARY CONTACTS	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	OTHER
XXXX			A,D,E		D,E			E
NOTES: CRITERIA				EXECUTION RATIONALE				
WARFIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS				A-TREATIES(BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL)				
OPERATIONAL ACCESS				B - PDDs/NSDDs				
COALITION CAPABILITY				C-CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION				
GREEN - ALL THREE OF ABOVE				D-NATIONAL GUIDANCE (NSS, CPG, DPG, etc.)				
YELLOW - SOME OF ABOVE				E - CINC's PROGRAM				
RED - NONE OF ABOVE								

May 2001						
Strategic Prioritization Milestones						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1	2	3	4	5	
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	Consolidate Inputs					
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
		JB/CJMC/ Service WG Meeting				
27	28	29	30	31		
		Stop Brief to CJCB	CJCB PJ			

Printed by Calendar Creator for Windows on 5/21/2001

June 2001						
Strategic Prioritization Milestones						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	Assess- ment Inputs Due					
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
			Assess- ment Briefs to JWPC			

Printed by Calendar Creator for Windows on 5/21/2001

July 2001						
Strategic Prioritization Milestones						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
			HOLIDAY		Briefing CJCB	
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Printed by Calendar Creator for Windows on 5/21/2001

August 2001						
Strategic Prioritization Milestones						
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
			1	2	3	4
			Begin Review of CJCBM			
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

Printed by Calendar Creator for Windows on 5/21/2001



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CH-1208-01 2001 JUN -5 10:44  
4 June 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Henry H. Shelton, CJCS

SUBJECT: Reply to 17 May SecDef questions on what we are training the Nigerians to do

- Operation FOCUS RELIEF (OFR) was undertaken as the US response to the crisis experienced by the UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in May 2000. The primary purpose of OFR is to provide trained and equipped West African battalions to UNAMSIL. Additionally, OFR contributes to the long-term goal of assisting African nations in developing the capacity to provide trained and equipped forces for African peacekeeping missions.
- Specifically, OFR is designed to train and equip 7 battalions (5 x Nigerian 1 x Ghanaian and 1 x Senegalese) from Economic Community of West African States to conduct day offensive and defensive operations and night defensive operations up to the company level. The training is focused on military tasks and does not include specific training on democracy, but does provide a 3-hour class to soldiers (4 hours for leaders) on Human Rights and the Law of Land Warfare. The Human Rights and Law of Land Warfare classroom training is reinforced during situational field training exercises. Training on the use and maintenance of provided equipment is included.
- The training is a 10-week program commencing with individual soldier skills and building through squad and platoon skills to achieve company level proficiency by the end of week 8. Week 9 is designed as a capstone exercise, with the remaining week set aside for remedial training in areas identified during the capstone exercise.
- The training is divided into five general subject groupings and broken out in the Tab. They are: General Tasks (15 days), Leader Tasks (25 days), Individual Tasks (5 days), Special Tasks (10 – 15 days depending on task),

11-L-0559/OSD/1612

U10391 / 01

and Collective Tasks (30 days). Each area represents several military tasks that have to be mastered to meet the training objective for the specific area.

- The program also includes specific instruction on the use and maintenance of provided equipment. This includes training on individual weapons, machine guns, mortars, light anti-tank weapons, US 2-½ ton trucks, Toyota 4 x 4s and Motorola radios.
- Phase I of OFR (2 x Nigerian battalions) began in October 2000 and ended in December 2000. Phase II began on 29 May 2001 (1 x **Ghanaian** and 1 x Senegalese battalions). Phase III (3 x Nigerian battalions) is tentatively scheduled to begin on or about 8 October 2001.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: General Henry H. Shelton, (b)(6)

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION FOR OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF

The following subjects are covered during the Program of Instruction.

1. General Task Training:
  - a. Human Rights and Law of Land Warfare
  - b. Basic Rifle Marksmanship
  - c. Voice Communications
  - d. Use Challenge and Password
  - e. Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline
  - f. Select and Construct Fighting Positions
  - g. Clear a Field of Fire
  - h. Camouflage Self and Equipment
  - i. Camouflage Fighting Position
  - j. Hand and Arm Signals
  - k. Individual Movement Techniques
    - l. React to Flares
  - m. React to Direct Fire
  - n. React to Indirect Fire
  - o. Individual Movement Techniques as a Buddy Team
  - p. Move Tactically as a Fire Team Member
  - q. Cross Danger Areas
  - r. Report **Information** using the Key Word "SALUTE"
  - s. Process Enemy Prisoner of War and Captured Equipment
  - t. Perform Tactical Road March
2. Leaders Task Training (Platoon through Battalion):
  - a. Human Rights and Law of Land Warfare
  - b. Troop Leading Procedures
  - c. Combat Orders
  - d. Mortars Employment
  - e. Map Reading/Land Navigation
  - f. General Purpose Machine Gun
  - g. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Focusing on Counter-insurgency Operations)
  - h. Perform Combat Service Support Operations (Company/Battalion Staff level)
3. Individual Skill Training:
  - a. Basic First Aid
  - b. Employ Hand Grenades
  - c. Employ General Purpose Machine Gun
  - d. Employ the M72A2 Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW)
  - e. Employ the M1 8A1 Anti-Personnel (AP) Claymore Mine

4. Special Skills Training:
  - a. Mortar Training
  - b. General Purpose Machine Gun Use and Employment
  - c. Combat Lifesaver
  - d. Engineer (Basic Demolitions/Barriers and Obstacles)
  
5. Collective Skill Training (Situational Training Lanes and Field Training Exercise):
  - a. Occupy Assembly Area
  - b. Defend Sector
  - c. Prepare for Combat
  - d. Employ Fire Support
  - e. Cross Danger Area
  - f. Perform Link-up Operations
  - g. React to Contact
  - h. Attack
  - i. Perform Ambush
  - j. Overwatch and Support by Fire
  - k. Disengage
    - l. Defend
  - m. Move Tactically
  - n. Clear Wood Line
  - o. Reconnoiter Area
  - p. Sustain Operations
  - q. Consolidate and Reorganize
  - r. Move in an Urban Environment

JCS

May 17, 2001 6:56 AM

TO: General Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 3  
SUBJECT: Nigeria

Please have someone tell me what we are training the Nigerians to do-what kind of lesson programs are there? Are we teaching them how to use equipment, or are we teaching them democracy and things like that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051701-5

2001 MAY 2 PM 3: 00

11-L-0559/OSD/1616

U09400 /01



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 203194999

INFO MEMO

2001 JUN 20 10 10 50

CM-1226-01  
19 June 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, Acting *ASAM 6/18*

SUBJECT: Classified Material Destruction Capability of Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations Platforms (U)

- ~~(FOUO)~~ Background. Commander Naval Security Group is conducting the Damage Assessment for the 01 Apr EP-3E emergency landing in PRC. Informal feedback from this group indicates that the scope of the classified material compromise might have been mitigated by more detailed guidance, improved system design and provision of "easy to destroy" material. Naval Security Group's report and recommendations will be completed by 12 July.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Using the Naval Security Group's report and recommendations, the Joint Staff will coordinate with the CINCs and Services to develop recommendations for modification/enhancement of emergency destruction procedures on sensitive reconnaissance platforms. These modifications will be forwarded to you on 1 August with my recommendation for implementation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Reference:

1 SecDef memorandum, 11 June 2001, "SRO"

Prepared By: Lieutenant General G.S. Newbold, Director for Operations,

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/1617

U11172 /01

June 11, 2001 1:09 PM

TO: General Hugh Shelton

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: SRO

I would like to have the appropriate person take a look at the capability we have to destroy anything that is classified on all SRO subs, ships and aircraft.

My impression was that what we had on the EP-3 wasn't good enough.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061101-20

2001 JUN 13 AM 9:22

11-L-0559/OSD/1618

Q #95 11/9  
0645

November 8, 2001 9:26 AM

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Metrics

We need to develop some metrics as to how we are going to measure our progress.

Why don't you get that Joint Staff thinking about that and get back to me in 48 hours?

Thanks.

Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
110801-13

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

8.1.02

U12014 /02



3. We will continue to refine the Strategic Measures of Effectiveness for inclusion in the National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism.

*✓*  
*Chris Baggott*  
CHRIS BAGGOTT  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, J-5 Strategy Division

Attachments:

1. ~~(S)~~ Strategic Measures of Effectiveness
2. ~~(S)~~ CENTCOM Campaign Assessment

#68

October 26, 2001 7:35 AM

RECEIVED 26 OCT 2001

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ~~Executive Order~~  
*Execute*

Please give me a copy of the Executive Order of the rules of engagement for Taliban military and C3, and what targets are included.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102601-3

*Complete  
10/27/01*

*Afghanistan*

Please respond by 10/27

*26 OCT 01*

U12024 /02



THE VICE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

27 OCT 2001

FOR SECDEF \_\_\_\_\_

18/10/27

SIR,

HERE ARE ALL THE EXECUTE ORDERS ON  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT; MOST RECENT ON TOP.

AT THE TAB MARKED "NOTE #1" YOU'LL  
FIND YOUR MOST RECENT GUIDANCE ON ATTACKING  
SENSITIVE TARGETS.

AT THE TAB MARKED "NOTE #2" YOU'LL  
FIND DEFINITIONS OF THE TARGETS.

VR/

snowflake

July 31, 2001 7:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: National Defense University

352 NDU

Please have somebody take a good, hard look at National Defense University.

I am told there are a lot of people seconded over there who shouldn't be. Indeed, I am told there is a person named (b)(6) who is a really serious problem for (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) apparently has something to do with (b)(6) and I think we want to try to disconnect from him.

However, I am equally interested in the whole situation. Please get me a briefing on what NDU is doing, how people get there, who is paying for it and how that whole thing works so we can get our arms around it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073101-9

3152101

U12659 /02



**THE JOINT STAFF**  
WASHINGTON, DC  
**INFO MEMO**

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 AUG 20 AM 10: 24

DJSM-0612-01  
17 August 2001

FOR: SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Vice Admiral S. A. Fry, USN, DJS

*S. A. Fry 8/17*

SUBJECT: OSD Question Regarding VTC

- To respond to the **SecDef's** question regarding the cause and remedy of technical difficulty discovered during a VTC 11 August 2001.
- NMCC communication technician inspected the NMCC Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS) equipment and determined that it is in proper working order. The White House System Manger determined the "static or rush" noise was from the power source, air conditioner and SVTS equipment in the remote van at **POTUS's** ranch in Crawford, Texas. The System Manager reported that new equipment is being sent to that location.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: LtGen G. S. Newbold, USMC, Director, J-3

(b)(6)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 203184999

SECRET  
2001 OCT 29 10 01 01

INFO MEMO

m-47-01  
29 October 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBM 10/29*

SUBJECT: Circumstances of Arrival of Lt Gen Wald Into Saudi Arabia

- In response to your question (TAB), the following information is provided. After the 11 September attacks, Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), determined that Commander, US Air Force Central Command (COMUSCENTAF), needed to relocate to the area of responsibility. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) requested approval to deploy General Wald and his staff on 12 September. General Wald deployed on 17 September with a **50-man team** to Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB). They deployed with a verbal authorization from USCINCCENT with the understanding that appropriate clearances would precede his landing in country. Unfortunately, proper and complete coordination with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not accomplished. The Saudi Arabian Government approved the aircraft clearance into Saudi Arabia, however, they were unaware of duty passengers arriving on the plane.
- The Saudi military found out about USCENTAF personnel upon their arrival. During an office call between the Deputy Minister of Defense (DEPMINDEF) Khalid bin Sultan and General Wald, the USCENTAF contingent's arrival was tacitly allowed. In another office call between the DEPMINDEF and the United States Defense Representative (USDR), MG Johnson, DEPMINDEF expressed strong displeasure that the USCENTAF component had arrived at PSAB without consultation, and reminded the USDR that PSAB is a Saudi base and that Saudi Arabia must be consulted before any new deployments.
- General Wald apologized to his counterpart, Khalid bin Sultan, on the same day he arrived in country.
- USCENTCOM has procedures in place to ensure this does not reoccur.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Maj Gen Michael Dunn, ADJ-5

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/1626

U18033 /01

October 15, 2001 11:16 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia

Did you ever figure out why Wald apparently arrived without getting Sultan's clearance to go in and add capability? It may not be true, but that is what Sultan told me.

We want to make sure we do things in a gracious way with everybody, but particularly with the Saudis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101501-27

11-L-0559/OSD/1627

01 OCT 16 9:09 AM

March 30, 2001 5:38 PM

TO: Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo from General Jones, CMC

I just finished reading General Jones's memo, which I understand he gave a copy of to you.

I thought he had some very good comments. The weaknesses he cited have some validity. I am particularly concerned about the adverse signal to the other continents of the world and how we phrase that.

Why don't you go through that and see if we can fix the paper to take into account General Jones's suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
033001-38

381

30 Mar 01



27 March 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I look forward to participating in the development of a strategy that will help to sustain the global influence of our nation for the next generation of Americans. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the current effort.

As I mentioned in our conversation last Friday, I believe that we are at a point in time where the development of our strategy must be accompanied by a vigorous educational campaign designed to illustrate the vital relationship of such a strategy to the principal pillars which anchor our modern day society. These pillars, in addition to our investment in national security, include economic power, political and diplomatic influence, cultural impact, and technological dominance. Each will be interdependent in formulating the overall national strategy for the new century.

I am concerned that, increasingly, "defense" is seen as an independent entity, and that the relationship between this particular pillar and the others is not well understood in the mainstream of contemporary America. By contrast, the majority of our 20<sup>th</sup>-century leaders, as a result of their personal experiences through incredibly difficult times, retained for the rest of their lives an intuitive understanding of the strong link between our nation's foundational pillars. It is not clear to me that the importance of these interdependencies is intuitively, or even intellectually, widely accepted or recognized today. If this is true, the implications should concern us all.

A fundamental question we, as Americans, should ask concerns our national expectations for the next century. Simply put, do we want to continue to be the most influential nation on Earth, and are we willing to do what is required to maintain our current status? The answers to these questions lie, in part, in our collective ability as a nation to extrapolate the vital lessons of the past century. Such lessons will be of great use to us as we develop our national security strategy for the 21st century. This will be essential if we are to achieve the objectives set for us by our fellow citizens, not the least of which is for the nation to forever remain as influential as it was at the close of the last century.

Perhaps a good point of departure is to answer the basic question before us: "What must our strategy achieve?" If it is intended to maintain our position of global influence, then it must be broad in scope and must address the need to synchronize all of the elements of our national power. In such a strategy, the ability to fight and win the nation's future conflicts will be vital, though perhaps not a singular capability, as "power" in the new century will not be defined by military force alone. In the past 50 years, we have employed our military power in a major theater context only three times. It follows, therefore, that while we must always be prepared for the worst (albeit least likely) scenario, we must also acknowledge the hundreds of other ways our military forces have been employed to further the nation's peacetime objectives of influencing events around the globe through power projection. Our ability to exert such influence continues to shape the world as we know it and will likely continue to do so in the years ahead.

With this discussion as a preface, please allow me to briefly summarize my earlier comments relative to the draft "Strategic Review" I was provided last Thursday:

11-L-0559/OSD/1629

### Major Strengths


- Good assessment of the future security environment.
- Recognition of the importance of technology as an essential future core competency of America's armed forces.
- Recognition of the "superpower" status we enjoy. . . and want to preserve.
- Strong treatment of "anti-access" issues.
- Emphasizes the importance of Asia to our future.
- Develops good foundation for the articulation of the importance of both air and sea power to our future.
- Develops interesting new terms that will be important as we go along.
- Raises valid implications for force sizing issues which, though challenging, must be addressed.
- Removes the Two MTW label.

### Major Weaknesses

- Unclear purpose: Is this a national security strategy, a national military strategy, a DoD transformation strategy, or a combination of each?
- Dismissive of other hemispheres; big signal to the rest of the world not included under our "superpower" umbrella.
- No direct mention of ground forces.
- Competency or capability based without emphasizing "sufficiency" or the need for a superpower to be able to retain the ability to do several "big things" simultaneously.
- Undervalues the importance of engagement and forward presence (including Operations Other Than War) as an important component of our national strategy (particularly important if we want to deter/prevent future conflicts). "Virtual presence" equates to actual absence. Absence creates vacuums, and what fills them may not be in our interest.
- Risk assessment not addressed in depth.
- Recommend no mention of specific platforms in the strategy itself.
- "Just enough force," as a concept, will be difficult to explain.
- Insufficiently highlights the requirement to increase strategic sea and airlift capabilities.
- Insufficient treatment of information warfare, cyber attack, non-state actors, etc.

Mr. Secretary, this represents a quick look assessment only. I look forward to providing more detailed observations and suggested inputs in the near future for your consideration. I am sending a courtesy copy of this letter to Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Marshall for their information.

Very respectfully,



JAMES L. JONES  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

May 14, 2001 8:51 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
cc: Steve Herbits *(cover note only)*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Marine Corps Input

Here is some material from General Jones that lists all of the actions the United States has been involved in over the years. It is interesting because there is a way to aggregate those numbers that could show the number of types of things we have been doing as opposed to two major regional conflict, as an argument to support some sort of a different way to size forces.

Please take a look at this material

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/13/01 CMC ltr to SecDef w/attachments

DHR:dh  
051401-16

381

14 May 01



13 April 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I greatly appreciated yesterday's opportunity to further discuss with you the Marine Corps' contributions to the Department of Defense and national security. Following our dialogue, I noted **three** questions you had regarding the brief that merit amplification. In response to these questions, which pertained to numbers of Marine Corps pilots, numbers of personnel underpinning our Global Posture, and the numbers of crises involving naval forces since World War II, the following information is provided.

a. Numbers of Pilots. Based on 31 March 2001 manpower data, the total number of on-hand Marine Aviation Officers, which includes all fixed- and rotary-wing pilots and naval flight officers, is 3,486 with the following breakdown: 1,066 fixed-wing pilots, 2,058 rotary-wing pilots, and 362 naval flight officers. We are currently meeting our aviation squadron and joint staffing manning requirements. From a manpower perspective, our Aviation Combat Element is and will remain combat-ready for the foreseeable future.


b. Global Posture. As of 9 April 2001, a total of 32,381 Marines from our active and reserve components were forward postured. This total includes 8,831 personnel forward deployed; 9,165 personnel deployed away from home station for training; 10,786 forward based with III Marine Expeditionary Force; and 3,599 Marines forward stationed with our Marine Corps Security Force Companies, Marine Support Battalion Companies, Marine Forces Europe and Marine Forces Korea headquarters, and our overseas bases and stations (Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, and Marine Corps Base Camp Butler). Of note, the Global Posture slide from the brief (Tab A) depicts a representative sampling of units and basing locations that fall within these categories to give a flavor for where Marines are located around the globe today. To further clarify this data, I have enclosed a set of tables that accurately reflects our total force posture-to include units and detachments by category and location as of 9 April.

c. Number of Crisis Responses by Naval Forces. Our data on crisis response was drawn primarily from a 1998 RAND Corporation Study entitled "The Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base." Appendix B of this study, "Crisis Response Data, 1950-1996," provides a comprehensive table that identifies 268 US, crisis responses during the subject period. Of these, 224 represented some form of naval response. Of note, this fairly comprehensive list **excludes** major conflicts, events within the United States, humanitarian operations, purely disaster-relief operations, environmental operations, alerts, intelligence operations, law enforcement operations, routine training, and continued presence after an initial response. A copy of this Appendix has been provided as Tab B. By comparing this data with an internal document entitled "Marine Corps Operations Since 1776," we have determined that the number of Department of Defense crisis responses from 1946-2001 is approximately 300, based on the above criteria. A copy of this internal document is provided as Tab C. I believe that our brief conveyed a very conservative

estimate of post-World War II naval crisis responses. The true number is greater than the approximately 160 cited, and is probably much closer to the 240-260 range.

I hope that the information provided herein provides the added level of detail and clarification you are seeking, I appreciate the opportunity to engage with you on these issues and look forward to continuing this dialogue.

Very Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J.L. Jones", written over the typed name and title.

J.L. JONES  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps


The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000



# Global Posture USMC Engaged


**32,381 Marines**  
Forward deployed/  
stationed/based

**9 April 2001**




**DEPLOYED FORCES**

<u>EXERCISE/OPERATION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
FORWARD PRESENCE	22D MEU(SOC) (NOV 00 - MAY 01)	2,071	USS NASSAU ARG
FORWARD PRESENCE	11TH MEU (SOC) (MAR 01 - SEP 01)	2,109	USS BOXER ARG
CARRIER INTEGRATION	VMFA-312 (NOW 00 - MAY 01)	388	USS HARRY S. TRUMAN
CARRIER INTEGRATION	VMFA-323 (MAR 01 - AUG 01)	196	USS CONSTELLATION
UDP	1/5 (31 ST MEU GCE) (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	963	OKINAWA
UDP	2/3 (DEC 00 - JUN 01)	316	443 FUJI 01-3
UDP	3/8 (DEC 00 - JUN 01)	10	824 KITP 01-2/GAIT/15 MIA RECOVERY OP
UDP	3/7 (FEB 01 - JUL 01)	156	702 JWC 01-3
UDP	BTRY C, 1/12 (DEC 00 - JUN 01)		
UDP	BTRY S, 5/10 (DEC 00 - JUN 01)	33	98FUJW01-3
UDP	BTRY F 2/11 (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	132	OKINAWA
UDP	BTRY I 3/11 (FEB 00 - AUG 01)	144	OKINAWA
UDP	VMFA(AW)-533 (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	249	IWAKUNI
UDP	VMFA(AW)-242 (MAR 01 - SEP 01)	152	IWAKUNI
UDP	HMH-361 (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	153	68 KITP 01-2/GAIT/48 BALIKATAI
UDP	HMLA-267 (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	128	62 KITP 01-2/GAIT/46 BALIKATAI
UDP	CO C, 3D AAV BN (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	185	OKINAWA
UDP	CO A, 3D I-AR BN (JAN 01 - JUN 01)	162	OKINAWA
FAST	3D PLT, 1 ST FAST (OCT 00 - APR 01)	47	NAPLES, ITALY
FAST	4TH PLT, 1 ST FAST (DEC 00 - MAY 01)	47	MANAMA, BAHRAI
FAST	6TH PLT, 2D FAST (MAR 01 - APR 01)	48	MANAMA, BAHRAI
FAST	3D PLT, 2D FAST (JAN 01 - JUL 01)	48	YOKOSUKA, JAPAN
FAST	2D PLT, 1 ST FAST (DEC 00 - APR 01)	48	GUANTANAMO BAY, CUB
FAST	CMFR, PROV RFL PLT (FEB 01 - JUN 01)	51	GUANTANAMO BAY, CUB
FAST	2D PLT, 2D FAST (MAR 01 - APR 01)	45	PUGET SOUND, WA



JTF SWA	DET, 1 MEF (ONGOING)	1	CENTCOM
CJTF, KUWAIT	DET, 1 MEF (ONGOING)	6	
JSD	DET, 1 MEF (1 JAN 01 - 15 JUN 01)	1	
SOUTHERN WATCH	VMAQ-3 (27 DEC 00 - 3 APR 01)	190	
USMTM	1 MEF (7 OCT 00 - 7 MAR 01)	1	
HDO DJIBHOUTI	1ST FSSG (22 JAN - 15 MAY 01)	17	
CI SUPPORT	1 MEF (1 JAN - 1 JUN 01)	2	
F/A-18 DEP OSW	VMFA-225 (7 MAR - 7 JUN 01)	250	
ACRI (ADVON)	MARCENT(FWD) DET KENYA	16	
ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY	CBIRF (1 - 10 APR 01)	3	
USGET	AUGMENTS MFP (23 FEB 00 - TBD)	8	PACOM
SUPPORT TO OPLAN 5027	VMAQ-2 (22 MAR - 1 JUL 01)	227	
MIA RECOVERY OPS	DET, 3/8 (4 APR - 5 MAY 01)	15	



9 ACTIVE/ RESERVE  
2 ACTIVE  
3 ACTIVE  
3 ACTIVE/ RESERVE

# DEPLOYMENT FOR TRAINING

4/11/01

EXERCISE	MEF	PERS
ATC TOWER DET	DET MAGS-2 (26 JUN - 11 MAY 01)	5
DARKWIND	2D RADBN (16 JAN - 30 MAY 01)	4
ASAB SUPPORT	DET VMOP-262 (1 MAR - 31 MAY 01)	0
NH ST VINCENT	MWSS-274 (2 JAN - 16 MAY 01)	25
NH ST LUCIA	DETS C-2C 8TH ESB (16 JAN - 31 APR 01)	4
WOTIS-01	DETS MAG-14, MAG-26 (4 MAR - 15 APR 01)	500
EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELD SPT	MWSS-273 (16 FEB - 14 MAY 01)	19
RADEX LATAM	DET 2D RADBN (26 FEB - 26 APR 01)	20
ROLLING THUNDER	10TH MAR, DETS MAGS-7 (26 JUN - 10 APR 01)	50
RED FLAG	MAG-2 & 2D LAB BN (14 MAR - 25 APR 01)	5
BRIDE OPS	2D FLT 2D FAST (13 MAR - 31 APR 01)	4
MMCS	VMFA-21 (20 MAR - 20 APR 01)	103
MMC-6	DET, III MEF CE, III MHG (23 AUG - 30 JUN 01)	18
FUJ 01-3	2/3, BTRY S 5/10, DET CAB (10 MAR - 25 APR 01)	1040
JWC 01-3	3/7, DET CAB (15 MAR - 12 APR 01)	766
KITP 01-2/GAIT	3/8, DET CAB, MAG-36 (25 MAR - 15 APR 01)	1282
BALIKATAN	3D MARDIV, 3/7, AAV, CAB (27 MAR - 3 MAY 01)	673
AST 01-1	3D RECON, 3D FSSG (2 -14 APR 01)	59

# FORWARD BASED


4/11/01

DEPLOYED FROM  
FORWARD BASED

NET TOTAL




TOTAL FORWARD  
BASED



# FORWARD STATIONED

UNIT

PERS



TOTALS



8,831  
9,165  
3,599  
10,788  
**32,381**

MISAWA, JAPAN  
ROTA, SPAIN  
MENWITH HILL, UK  
GTMO, CUBA  
DET, MFP HQ ELEMENT

In Chapter Two, we offered some information on crisis response by aircraft carriers. Here, we elaborate on that information and place it in the context of U.S. military crisis response in general. Any such compilation is necessarily subjective. Thus, for the data to be meaningful, the criteria for inclusion of events as "crises" and sources from which the data were drawn must be fully understood. Much work on military operations in other than major conflicts has already been done and is ongoing, so we considered it prudent to use data from such studies. They are

- *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post- War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990*, Adam B. Siegel, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, CRM-90-246, February 1991.
- *Answering the 9-1 -1 Call: U.S. Military and Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1977-91*. Thomas P.M. Barnett. Linda D. Lancaster, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, ADB173802. August 1992.
- *Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War*, Alan Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, John Stillion, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-842-AF, 1997.

Additional data on U.S. Army (USA) operations were obtained from the Army Center for Military History.

The four separate databases from these sources were combined into the single database in Table B. 1. We excluded the following operations:

- The three major military conflicts during the period June 1950–September 1996 (Korean War, Vietnam War, 1991 Gulf War). However, pre- and post-war events related to the conflicts were included.
- Events that took place within the United States.

- Purely humanitarian or disaster-relief operations. However, some operations considered to be primarily humanitarian but that also had a broader geopolitical rationale were included (e.g., Operation Provide Comfort).
- Alerts or other actions not involving force movements.
- Intelligence operations.
  - Routine operations in support of U.S. diplomacy.
- Law enforcement and counternarcotics operations.
- Routine training and assistance to allies, airlift operations, and exercises.

A few other points will be of help in interpreting the results:

- Only the starting date of the crises in the table has been noted, not the duration. In some cases, the duration is clear and easily defined; in others, it is difficult to determine.
- Some actions that begin as a response to a crisis eventually become long-standing, routine operations. For example, deployments to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf were initially in response to the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; since then, this area has remained a regular theater of U.S. operations. NATO combat air patrols over **Bosnia-Herzegovina** (Operation Deny Flight) are another example. In such cases, the initial response to the original crisis is counted in the database; the continuing presence of U.S. forces is not reflected. Conversely, some short and easily identified missions relating to the same situation could be combined into one larger operation—a selectivity that obviously affects both the final total of crisis responses and individual-service participation. However, every meaningful instance of service participation has been included in order to present as unbiased a picture as possible.
- Finally, it must be noted that U.S. Marine Corps forces and actions are counted and included in Navy forces and actions. This is not intended to diminish Marine Corps participation in such actions, which is **continually**—and sometimes inordinately-high. Rather, it is merely a reflection of the fact that Marine Corps activity is not relevant to this study, but that of naval forces as a whole and aircraft carriers in particular is.

Table B.I  
Chronological List of U.S. Military Crisis Responses, 1950-1996

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date Began	USN Involved?	If So, No. of cvs Used	USAF Involved?	U.S. Army Involved?
1.	Korean War: Formosa Straits	Jun 50	Y✓	1	N	N
2.	Korean War: Security in Europe	Jul 50	Y✓	2	Y	Y
3.	Lebanon	Aug 50	Y✓	2	N	N
4.	Security of Yugoslavia	Mar 51	Y✓	2	N	N
5.	China-Taiwan Conflict	Feb 53	Y✓	1	N	N
6.	Dien Bien Phu	Mar 54	Y✓	2	Y	N
7.	Honduras-Guatemala	May 54	Y✓	1	N	N
8.	People's Republic of China (PRC) Shootdown	Jul 54	Y✓	2	N	N
9.	Vietnam Evacuations	Aug 54	Y✓	0	N	N
10.	Honduran Elections	Oct 54	Y✓	0	N	N
11.	Accord on Trieste	Oct 54	Y✓	0	N	Y
12.	Tachen Islands	Feb 55	Y✓	6	Y	N
13.	Red Sea Patrols	Feb 56	Y✓	0	N	N
14.	Jordan	Mar 56	Y✓	2	N	N
15.	Pre-Suez	Aug 56	Y✓	2	N	N
16.	Suez War	Oct 56	Y✓	3	Y	N
17.	Port Lyautey	Nov 56	Y✓	0	N	N
18.	Post-Suez	Nov 56	Y✓	a	N	N
19.	Cuban Civil War	Dec 56	Y✓	1	N	N
20.	Red Sea Patrols	Feb 57	Y✓	0	N	N
21.	Jordan Unrest	Apr 57	Y✓	2	N	N
22.	Haiti	Jun 57	Y✓	0	N	N
23.	PRC-Republic of China(ROC) Tenslon	Jul 57	Y✓	3	N	N
24.	Syria	Aug 57	Y✓	4	Y	N
25.	Indonesia	Dec 57	Y✓	2	N	N
26.	Venezuelan Revolution	Jan 58	Y✓	0	N	N
27.	Laos	Mar 58	N	0	Y	N
28.	Venezuela	May 58	Y✓	0	N	Y
29.	Lebanon	May 58	Y✓	3	Y	N
30.	Lebanon	Jul 58	Y✓	3	Y	Y
31.	Jordan-Iraq	Jul 58	Y✓	0	N	N
32.	Q u e m o y	Aug 58	Y✓	6	Y	Y
33.	Panama	Apr 59	Y✓	0	N	N
34.	BerlinCrisis	May 59	Y✓	2	Y	Y
35.	Laos	Jul 59	Y✓	1	Y	Y
36.	PRC-ROC	Jul 59	Y✓	2	N	N
37.	Panama	Aug 59	Y✓	0	N	N
38.	Congo	Jul 60	Y✓	1	Y	Y
39.	Guatemala	Nov 60	Y✓	2	N	N
40.	Laos	Jan 61	Y✓	3	Y	Y
41.	SS Santa Maria	Jan 61	Y✓	0	N	N
42.	Gulf of Guinea-Congo	Feb 61	Y✓	0	N	N
43.	Laos	Mar 61	Y✓	3	Y	N
44.	SS Western Union	Mar 61	Y✓	0	N	N
45.	Bay of Pigs	Apr 61	Y✓	2	Y	N
46.	Dominican Republic	May 61	Y✓	3	Y	Y

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Table B.1—continued

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date Begun	USN Involved?	If so, No. of cvs Used	USAF Involved?	U.S. Army Involved?
47.	Zanzibar	Jun 61	Y	0	N	N
48.	Kuwait	Jul 61	Y	0	N	N
49.	Berlin Crisis	Jul 61	Y	3	Y	Y
50.	Taiwan	Aug 61	N	0	Y	N
51.	Dominican Republic	Nov 61	Y	1	N	N
52.	Thailand	Nov 61	N	0	Y	N
53.	South Vietnam	Dec 61	Y	0	Y	Y
54.	Dominican Republic	Jan 62	Y	0	N	N
55.	Guatemala Riots	Mar 62	Y	1	Y	N
56.	South Vietnam	Apr 62	Y	0	N	N
57.	Laos/Thailand	May 62	Y	2	Y	Y
58.	Guantanamo	Jul 62	Y	0	N	N
59.	Haiti Civil Disorder	Aug 62	Y	1	N	N
60.	Yemen	Sep 62	Y	0	N	N
61.	Cuban Missile Crisis	Sep 62	Y	8	Y	Y
62.	Sino-Indian War	Nov 62	Y	1	Y	N
63.	SS Anzoatequi	Feb 63	Y	0	N	N
64.	Laos	Apr 63	Y	2	N	N
65.	Haitian Unrest	Apr 63	Y	1	N	N
66.	Haiti Civil War	Aug 63	Y	1	N	N
67.	Vietnam Civil Disorder	Aug 63	Y	2	N	N
68.	PRC-ROC	Sep 63	Y	1	N	N
69.	Dominican Republic	Sep 63	Y	0	N	N
70.	Indonesia-Malaysia	Oct 63	Y	1	N	N
71.	Zanzibar	Jan 64	Y	0	N	N
72.	Tanganyika	Jan 64	Y	0	N	N
73.	Caribbean Surveillance	Jan 64	Y	0	N	N
74.	Panama	Jan 64	Y	0	Y	Y
75.	Venezuela	Jan 64	Y	0	N	N
76.	Cyprus	Jan 64	Y	1	Y	N
77.	Peru	Mar 64	N	0	Y	N
78.	Brazil	Mar 64	Y	1	N	N
79.	Laos	Apr 64	Y	2	Y	N
80.	Guantanamo	May 64	Y	0	N	N
81.	Panama	May 64	Y	0	N	N
82.	Dominican Republic	Jul 64	Y	0	N	N
83.	Gulf of Tonkin	Aug 64	Y	2	N	N
84.	Haiti	Aug 64	Y	0	N	N
85.	Congo Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO)	Aug 64	N	0	Y	N
86.	Congo NEO	Nov 64	N	0	Y	N
87.	Panama	Jan 65	Y	0	N	N
88.	Tanzania	Jan 65	Y	0	N	N
89.	Venezuela-Colombia	Jan 65	Y	0	N	N
90.	British Guiana	Apr 65	Y	0	N	N
91.	Dominican Republic	Apr 65	Y	2	Y	Y
92.	Yemen	Jul 65	Y	0	N	N
93.	Ethiopia Hostage Rescue	Jul 65	N	0	Y	N
94.	Cyprus	Aug 65	Y	1	Y	N
95.	Indo-Pakistani War	Sep 65	Y	0	Y	N

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Table B.I-continued

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date B e g u n	USN Involved?	If So. No. of cvs Used	USAF Involved?	US Army Involved?
96.	Indonesia	Oct 65	Y✓	0	N	N
97.	Greek Coup	Apr 67	Y-	1	N	N
98.	Six-Day War	Jun 67	Y✓	2	Y	Y
99.	Congo	Jul 67	N	0	Y	N
100.	Destroyer <i>Eilat</i> Sinking	Oct 67	Y-	2	N	N
101.	Cyprus	Nov 67	Y-	1	N	N
102.	USS <i>Pueblo</i>	Jan 68	Y-	3	Y	N
103.	EC-121 Shootdown	Apr 69	Y✓	4	Y	Y
104.	Curaçao Civil Unrest	May 69	Y✓	0	N	N
105.	Lebanon-Libya Operations (Ops)	Oct 69	Y-	2	N	N
106.	Trinidad	Apr 70	Y-	0	Y	N
107.	Jordan	Jun 70	Y-	1	Y	N
108.	Jordan	Sep 70	Y✓	3	Y	Y
109.	Haiti Succession	Apr 71	Y✓	0	N	N
110.	Indo-Pakistani War	Dec 71	Y-	1	N	N
111.	Bahama Lines	Dec 71	Y✓	0	N	N
112.	Taiwan Air Defense	Nov 72	N	0	Y	N
113.	Lebanon	May 73	Y✓	2	N	N
114.	Middle East War	Oct 73	Y✓	3	Y	Y
115.	Middle East Force	Oct 73	Y✓	0	N	N
116.	Oil Embargo—Indian Ocean Ops	Oct 73	Y✓	1	N	N
117.	Cyprus	Jul 74	Y-	2	Y	Y
118.	Cyprus Unrest	Jan 75	Y-	1	N	N
119.	Ethiopia	Feb 75	Y	0	N	N
120.	Eagle Pull, Cambodia	Feb 75	Y-	1	Y	Y
121.	Vietnam Nuclear Transport	Mar 75	N	0	Y	N
122.	Frequent Wind, Vietnam	Apr 75	Y✓	4	Y	N
123.	SS <i>Mayaguez</i>	May 75	Y-	2	Y	N
124.	Lebanon	Aug 75	Y	1	N	N
125.	Polisario Rebels	Jan 76	Y-	0	N	N
126.	Lebanon NEO	Jun 76	N	0	Y	N
127.	Tunisia	Jul 76	Y-	0	N	N
128.	Kenya-Uganda	Jul 76	Y-	1	N	N
129.	Korean Tree Incident	Aug 76	Y✓	1	Y	Y
130.	Uganda	Feb 77	Y✓	1	N	N
131.	Ogaden War	Feb 78	Y✓	1	Y	N
132.	Zaire	May 78	N	0	Y	N
133.	Sea of Okhotsk	Jun 78	Y✓	0	N	N
134.	Afghanistan	Jul 78	Y-	1	N	N
135.	Nicaragua	Sep 78	Y✓	0	Y	N
136.	Israel-Lebanon	Sep 78	N	0	Y	N
137.	Iranian Revolution	Dec 78	Y✓	1	Y	N
138.	Saudi Arabia	Mar 79	N	0	Y	N
139.	China-Vietnam	Feb 79	Y✓	1	N	N
140.	Yemen	Mar 79	Y✓	1	Y	N
141.	Nicaraguan Revolution	Jul 79	Y-	0	Y	N
142.	Soviet Troops in Cuba	Oct 79	Y✓	1	Y	N
143.	Afghan/Iran Hostages	Oct 79	Y✓	2	Y	Y

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Table B. I-continued

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date Begun	USN Involved?	If So, No. of cvs Used	USAF Involved?	U.S. Army Involved?
144.	Park-Chung Hee	Oct 79	Y	1	Y	Y
145.	Bolivia	Nov 79	N	0	Y	N
146.	Zimbabwe	Dec 79	N	0	Y	N
147.	Iran Hostage Rescue	Apr 80	Y	1	Y	Y
148.	Korea	May 80	Y	1	Y	Y
149.	Thailand	Jun 80	N	0	Y	N
150.	Iran-Iraq War	Sep 80	Y	2	Y	N
151.	Poland	Dec 80	Y	0	Y	N
152.	Saudi Arabia	Jan 81	N	0	Y	N
153.	El Salvador	Jan 81	N	0	Y	N
154.	Morocco	Jan 81	Y	0	N	N
155.	Liberia	Apr 81	Y	0	N	Y
156.	Syria	May 81	Y	2	N	N
157.	Sadat visits Sudan	May 81	N	0	Y	N
158.	Gambia NEO	Jul 81	N	0	Y	N
159.	Libya	Aug 81	Y	2	N	N
160.	Sadat-Sudan	Oct 81	Y	1	Y	N
161.	Central America	Oct 81	Y	2	N	N
162.	Korea	Dec 81	N	0	Y	N
163.	El Salvador	Mar 82	N	0	Y	N
164.	Falklands	May 82	N	0	Y	N
165.	Israeli Invasion	Jun 82	Y	1	Y	N
166.	Somalia	Jul 82	N	0	Y	N
167.	Lebanon Peacekeeping Force	Aug 82	Y	2	N	N
168.	Palestinian Massacre	Sep 82	Y	2	N	N
169.	Libya-Sudan	Feb 83	Y	1	Y	N
170.	Thailand-Burma	Apr 83	N	0	Y	N
171.	Honduras	Jun 83	Y	1	Y	Y
172.	Libya-Chad	Aug 83	Y	1	Y	N
173.	Marine Barracks Bomb	Aug 83	Y	2	Y	Y
174.	Korea Airlines 007	Sep 83	Y	0	Y	N
175.	Iran-Iraq	Oct 83	Y	1	N	N
176.	Korea-Burma	Oct 83	Y	1	Y	N
177.	Grenada	Oct 83	Y	1	Y	Y
178.	Syria	Dec 83	Y	1	Y	N
179.	El Salvador	Jan 84	N	0	Y	N
180.	Central America	Mar 84	Y	1	Y	Y
181.	Egypt/Libya/Sudan	Mar 84	Y	0	Y	N
182.	El Salvador	Mar 84	N	0	Y	N
183.	Persian Gulf	Apr 84	Y	1	Y	N
184.	Saudi Arabia	Jun 84	N	0	Y	N
185.	Red Sea Mines	Aug 84	Y	0	Y	N
186.	Sudan-Chad	Aug 84	N	0	Y	N
187.	Beirut Embassy	Sep 84	Y	0	N	N
188.	El Salvador	Oct 84	N	0	Y	N
189.	Colombian Embassy	Nov 84	N	0	Y	N
190.	Saudi Hijacking	Nov 84	Y	1	N	N
191.	Cuba	Nov 84	Y	1	Y	N
192.	U.S. Personnel in Lebanon	Mar 85	Y	1	N	N
193.	TWA 847 Hijacking	Jun 85	Y	1	N	N

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Table B. I-continued

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date Begun	USN Involved?	If So, No. of evs Used	USAF Involved?	U.S. Army Involved?
194.	Persian Gulf	Sep 85	Y✓	0	N	N
195.	<b>SS Achille Lauro</b>	Oct 85	Y✓	1	N	N
196.	Egypt Air Hijacking	Nov 85	Y✓	1	N	N
197.	Persian Gulf Escort	Jan 86	Y✓	0	N	N
198.	Yemen Civil War	Jan 86	Y✓	0	N	N
199.	OVL-FON Ops	Feb 86	Y✓	3	N	N
200.	Lebanon Hostages	Mar 86	Y✓	0	N	N
201.	Libya Strike	Apr 86	Y✓	2	Y	N
202.	Pakistan Hijacking	Sep 86	Y✓	1	N	N
203.	Korea	Sep 86	N	0	Y	N
204.	Persian Gulf Ops	Jan 87	Y✓	2	Y	Y
205.	Hostages in Lebanon	Feb 87	Y✓	1	N	N
206.	Haiti	Jan 88	Y✓	0	N	N
207.	Honduras	Mar 88	N	0	Y	Y
208.	Panama	Apr 88	Y✓	0	Y	Y
209.	Pakistan	Apr 88	N	0	Y	N
210.	Summer Olympics	Sep 88	Y✓	2	Y	Y
211.	Burma Unrest	Sep 88	Y✓	0	N	N
212.	Maldives Coup	Nov 88	Y✓	1	N	N
213.	Lebanon Civil War	Feb 89	Y✓	1	N	Y
214.	Panama Election 5	May 89	Y✓	1	Y	Y
215.	Pakistan-Afghan	May 89	N	0	Y	N
216.	<b>China</b> Civil Unrest	Jun 89	Y✓	1	N	N
217.	Hostages in Lebanon	Aug 89	Y✓	2	N	N
218.	Philippines	Nov 89	Y✓	2	Y	N
219.	Panama	Dec 89	Y✓	0	Y	Y
220.	Liberia NEO	May 90	Y	0	N	N
221.	Iraqi Pressure on Kuwait	Jul 90	Y✓	0	Y	N
222.	Operation Desert Shield	Aug 90	Y✓	6	Y	Y
223.	Trinidad Coup	Aug 90	Y✓	0	N	N
224.	Somalia Evacuation	Jan 91	Y✓	0	Y	N
225.	Israel	Jan 91	N	0	N	Y
226.	Sudan NEO	Jan 91	N	0	Y	N
227.	Postwar Iraq Sanctions	Feb 91	Y✓	1	N	N
228.	Provide Comfort	Apr 91	Y✓	1	Y	Y
229.	Haiti	Sep 91	Y✓	1	Y	Y
230.	<b>Zaire</b>	Sep 91	N	0	Y	N
231.	Sierra Leone	May 92	N	0	Y	N
232.	Iraq-Kuwait	Aug 92	Y✓	1	Y	Y
233.	Southern Watch	Aug 92	Y	1	Y	Y
234.	Combat, Search and Rescue (CSAR) in <b>Bosnia—Italian Pilot</b>	Sep 92	Y✓	0	N	N
235.	Liberia Evacuation	Oct 92	Y✓	1	Y	N
236.	<b>Tajikistan</b> NEO	Oct 92	N	0	Y	N
237.	Sharp Guard	Jul 92	Y✓	0	N	N
238.	<b>Somalia—UN Support</b>	Sep 92	Y✓	0	Y	N
239.	<b>Restore Hope—Somalia</b>	Nov 92	Y✓	1	Y	Y
240.	<b>Iraq Strikes</b>	Jan 93	Y✓	0	Y	N
241.	Haitian Maritime Intercept	Jan 93	Y✓	0	N	N
242.	Deny Flight	Apr 93	Y✓	1	Y	N

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Table B.I-continued

No.	Operation/Event/Location	Date Begun	USN Involved?	If So, No. of cvs Used	USAF Involved?	U.S. Army Involved?
243.	Iraq Strikes	Jun 93	Y ✓	1	Y	N
244.	Macedonia	Jul 93	N	0	N	Y
245.	Somalia-Withdrawal	Feb 94	Y ✓	0	N	N
246.	Rwanda-U.S. Citizen Evacuation	Apr 94	Y ✓	0	Y	N
247.	Haiti Embargo	May 94	Y ✓	0	N	N
248.	Yemen NEO	May 94	Y ✓	0	Y	N
249.	Iraq-Kuwait	Jun 94	Y ✓	1	Y	Y
250.	Rwanda Intervention	Jun 94	N	0	Y	Y
251.	North Korea Tensions	Jun 94	Y ✓	1	Y	Y
252.	Haitian Intervention	Sep 94	Y ✓	2	Y	Y
253.	Bosnia Strikes	Sep 94	Y ✓	1	Y	N
254.	Somalia-U.S. Liaison Office Evacuation	Sep 94	Y ✓	0	Y	N
255.	Somalia-Final Evacuation	Jan 95	Y ✓	0	Y	N
256.	Cuban Shootdown	Feb 95	Y ✓	1	N	N
257.	Bosnia-NATO Support	May 95	Y ✓	1	Y	N
258.	CSAR in Bosnia	Jun 95	Y ✓	0	Y	N
259.	Bosnia Strikes	Aug 95	Y ✓	1	Y	N
260.	Iraqi Defectors to Jordan	Aug 95	Y ✓	1	N	N
261.	<del>Bosnia—NATO Intervention</del>	Dec 95	Y ✓	1	Y	Y
262.	Bosnia—Headquarters Security	Dec 95	Y ✓	0	N	N
263.	China-Taiwan	Feb 96	Y ✓	2	N	N
264.	Liberia NEO	Apr 96	Y ✓	0	Y	N
265.	Central African Republic	May 96	Y ✓	0	Y	N
266.	Haiti—UN Security	Jul 96	Y ✓	0	N	Y
267.	Iraq-Kurdish Conflict	Sep 96	Y ✓	2	Y	N
268.	Burundi NEO	Sep 96	N	0	Y	N

CSAR = Combat Search and Rescue; NEO = Noncombatant Evacuation Order; Ops = Operations; PRC = People's Republic of China; ROC = Republic of China.

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**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
3 Mar 1776/OT	New Providence, Bahama Islands (now Nassau)	Raid	Expedition	<b>BRITISH FORT CAPTURED</b> An expedition captured British fort and seized a number of <b>cannon</b> and other <b>military</b> stores for the Continental Army.
22 Sep 76/MA	Canso Harbor, Nova Scotia	Raid	Marines from the Providence	<b>BRITISH FISHING VESSELS BURNED</b> Marines from the Providence commanded by John Paul Jones, burned British fishing vessels at Canso and Madame Island.
22 Nov 76/MA	Canso Harbor, Nova Scotia	Raid	Marines from the Providence	<b>BRITISH FISHING VESSEL BURNED</b> British vessel aground in the harbor was burned.
27 in 78/OT	New Providence, Bahama Islands (now Nassau)	Raid	Continental Marines	<b>SECOND RAID OF BRITISH TERRITORY</b> Continental Marines conducted a <b>second</b> raid of British held territory.
22 Apr 1778/OT	Whitehaven, England	Raid		<b>RAID AND ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING</b> Marines participated in a raid led by John Paul Jones. Next the Americans landed at the nearby St. Mary's Isle in an attempt to capture an English nobleman. The intended victim was not at home.
12 May 1800/OT	Puerta Plata, Santo Domingo	Raid	Captain Daniel Carmick's Marines	<b>SHORE BATTERY CAPTURED</b> Captured a shore battery which was protecting a French privateer, The vessel also was captured.
16 Feb 04/OT	Tripoli	Deny Access to American Property	Eight Marines led by Navy Lieutenant Stephen Decatur	<b>AMERICAN VESSEL PHILADELPHIA BURNED</b> Eight Marines were among the 70 volunteers led by Navy Lt. Decatur into Tripoli harbor to burn the grounded American vessel Philadelphia.
26 Apr 05/OT	Derna, Tripoli	Raid	Lieutenant Presley Bannon's Marines	<b>FORTRESS OF DERNA CAPTURED</b> Supported by American war vessels, stormed and captured the fortress of Derna. This was the climax of a <b>600-mile</b> march from the banks of the Nile.
Jan 1811/PK	New Orleans, Louisiana	Police Support	A detachment of Marines from New Orleans	<b>NEGRO INSURGENTS IN NEW ORLEANS</b> yebagainst "Negro insurgents."
12 Dec 13/OT	Nukuhiva, Marquesas Island	Guard Captured Property	Lieutenant John M. Gamble	<b>GUARDING CAPTURED PROPERTY</b> Lt. Gambles was left in charge of three prizes and a temporary base. In spite of mutiny and the hostility of the natives, he was able to hold out for almost six months before he sailed from the island in one of the vessels entrusted to his care.
12 Mar 24/PK	Boston, MA	Police Support	Marines from Boston Navy Yard	<b>RIOT AT MASSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON</b> Subdued a riot at the Massachusetts State Prison.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
2 Nov 24/OT	Pajardo, Puerto Rico	Diplomacy		<b>APOLOGY DEMANDED</b> Sailors and Marines landed to demand an apology for insults to an American Naval officer.
12 Feb 25/HU	St. Thomas, Virgin Islands	Fire-fighting	Marines and seamen from USS Grampus	<b>FIRE ON ST. THOMAS</b> Helped fight a fire on St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.
1831/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	Headquarters Battalion	<b>MOB IN WASHINGTON DC</b> Performed riot duty when it was feared that a mob might attack some public buildings.
1831 (SUMMER)/PK	Virginia	Police Support	Marines from USS Warren and USS Natchez	<b>REVOLT IN VIRGINIA</b> Following Nat Turner's revolt in which 55 whites were killed, put down the revolt.
Fall 1831/ Jan 1832/OT	Falkland Islands	NEO	Marines from the sloop-of-war Lexington	<b>RELEASE OF AMERICAN WHALERS AND CREWS</b> Secured the release of three American whalers and their crews.
1 Jan 32/OT	Port Louis, East Falkland, Falkland Islands	NEO	Marine Guard of the Lexington	<b>AMERICANS EVACUATED AND PROPERTY RESTORED</b> Assisted in evacuating American nationals and restoring their property which had been seized by the governor of the islands.
5 Feb 32/OT	Quallah Battoo, Sumatra	Raid	Marines under Lieutenant Alvin Edson	<b>PIRATE VILLAGE DESTROYED</b> Assisted in the destruction of a fortified pirate village.
1 Mar 33/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	Marines from the Eighth and Eye Barracks	<b>ARSON IN WASHINGTON DC</b> Helped to quell the flames and guard the funds when the U.S. Treasury was set afire.
31 Oct 33/PK	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Property Protection		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED DURING RIOTS</b> Marines and sailors landed to protect American interests during riots.
19 Jul 35/HU	New York City	Fire-fighting	Marines from the Brooklyn barracks	<b>FIRE IN NEW YORK</b> Aided fire fighting and protected property during a major fire in New York City.
17 Dec 35/PK	Lima, Peru	Property Protection	Brandywine's Marine Guard	<b>AMERICAN CONSULATE PROTECTED DURING REVOLUTION</b> Went ashore to protect American Consulate during a revolution.
2 Jan 39/OT	Muckie, Sumatra	Property Destruction	Landing Party from warships John Adams and Colombia	<b>DESTRUCTION OF MUCKIE</b> After the bombardment of both Quallah Battoo and Muckie, a landing party was sent ashore to level the town.
12 Jul 40/OT	Fiji Islands	Retaliation	Party of Marines	<b>NATIVE VILLAGE BURNED</b> Natives attacked a survey party sent ashore by the Wilkes' Exploring Expedition. A party of Marines and sailors burned a native village in retaliation,

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
26 Jul 40/OT	Fiji Islands	Retaliation		<b>TWO NATIVE VILLAGES DESTROYED</b> To avenge the murder of a member of the Wilkes Expedition, two native villages were destroyed.
25 Feb 41/OT	Upolu Island, Samoa	Retaliation		<b>THREE NATIVE VILLAGES DESTROYED</b> Three villages on the island were destroyed to avenge the murder of an American scaman.
6 Apr 41/OT	Drummond Island, (Tabiteuea, Gilbert Islands)	Retaliation		<b>TWO VILLAGES BURNED</b> A member of the Wilkes Expedition failed to return from the Island. Two days later a second group of sailors and Marines drove off a band of natives, burned two villages, but found no trace of the missing American.
29 Nov 43/PK	Sinoe, West Africa (now Greenville, Liberia)	Diplomacy		<b>MARINES STAND GUARD DURING SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE</b> Stood guard while Commodore Matthew C. Perry settled a dispute between a white man and a native.
1 Dec 43/PK	Blue Barra, West Africa	Diplomacy		<b>MEETING BETWEEN NATIVE LEADERS AND NAVAL OFFICERS</b> Assisted at a meeting between native leaders and naval officers.
5 Dec 43/PK	Setra Kroo, West Africa	Diplomacy		<b>MARINES STAND GUARD DURING CONFERENCE</b> Guarded Perry during a conference with native dignitaries.
8 Dec 43/PK	Caval, West Africa	Diplomacy		<b>MARINES STAND GUARD DURING CONFERENCE</b> Guarded Perry throughout a conference with the native "King" Ben Crack-O.
14 Dec 43/PK	Little Berribee	Retaliation		<b>NATIVE RULER CAPTURED AND VILLAGE BURNED</b> Ben Crack-O attacked Perry, was thrown to the ground, and shot by a Marine sergeant when he tried to escape. The native ruler was carried from the meeting place a prisoner, and the village was burned.
8 May 46/OT	Point Isabel	Property Protection	Marines from the Gulf Squadron	<b>SUPPLY BASE PROTECTED</b> Landed to protect General Zachary Taylor's supply base.
18 May 46/OT	Barita, Mexico	Expedition		<b>EXPEDITION ON THE RIO GRANDE</b> Sailed up the Rio Grande to find that the place had already been occupied by U.S. Army.
7 Aug 46/OT	Alvarado, Mexico	Landing		<b>ATTEMPTED LANDING</b> Attempted to land but failed when boats were unable to make headway against the current.

## MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
15 Oct 46/OT	Alvarado, Mexico	& ding		<b>ATTEMPTED LANDING</b> Again the landing party was halted by the strong tide.
13 Oct 46/HU	Tabasco River, Mexico	River Clearing		<b>RIVER CLEARED FROM FRONTERA TO SAN JUAN BAUTISTA</b> Assisted in clearing the river from Frontera some 70 miles upstream. The squadron then withdrew.
15 Nov 46/OT	Tampico, Mexico	Combat		<b>CITY SEIZED</b> Marines participated in the seizure of the city.
21 Dec 46/OT	Carmen, Yucatan, Mexico	Combat		<b>TOWN CAPTURED</b> Took part in capture of town. From May 1847 until the end of the war, a Marine garrison was posted here.
9 Mar 47/OT	Vera Cruz, Mexico	Combat		<b>CITY SIEGED</b> Manned artillery pieces during the siege. The city <b>surrendered</b> on 25 Mar.
29 Mar 47/OT	San Jose del Cabo, Lower California	Occupation		<b>TOWN OCCUPIED</b> Town was occupied by Marines, but no <b>permanent</b> garrison was established.
2 Apr 47/OT	San Lucas, Lower California	Occupation		<b>TOWN OCCUPIED</b> (Town was occupied but no permanent garrison was established.
7 Apr 47/OT	La Paz, Lower California	Occupation		<b>TOWN OCCUPIED</b> Town was occupied but no permanent garrison was established.
18 Apr 47/OT	Tuxpan, Mexico	Combat	Marine Battalion under Captain Alvin Edson	<b>CITY CAPTURED</b> Played an important role in the capture of the city.
14 Jun 47/OT	Tabasco River, Mexico	Expedition		<b>SECOND TABASCO RIVER EXPEDITION</b> A Marine garrison remained at San Juan Bautista until 22 July when it was withdrawn to Frontera.
16 Jul 47/OT	Eastern Mexico	Combat	Watson's Marine Battalion	<b>MEXICO CITY CAPTURED</b> <b>Marched from Vera Cruz to join Scott's army. This unit served in the capture of Mexico City.</b>
30 Sep 47/OT	Mulejo, Lower California	Combat	Landing Party	<b>ENEMY DRIVEN FROM CITY</b> Drove the enemy from the city and then withdrew.
17 Oct 47/OT	Guaymas, Mexico	Combat		<b>TOWN CAPTURED</b> Town captured by Marines.
10 Nov 47/OT	Mazatlan, Mexico	Combat		<b>CITY CAPTURED</b> Marines assisted in the capture of the city.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
19 Nov 47/OT	San Jose del Cabo, Lower California	Combat		<b>AMERICAN GARRISON DEFENDED AGAINST SIEGE</b> Twice the American garrison, which included Marines, was subjected to a siege. Each time it held out until reinforcements arrived. On 15 Feb of the following year, the last siege was broken.
8 Dec 47/OT	La Paz, Lower California	Combat	Marines from the Dale	<b>SIEGE LIFTED</b> Lifted the siege of the town.
28 Dec 47/OT	Cochari, Mexico	Raid		<b>RAID OF MEXICAN BARRACKS</b> Participated in a raid on the Mexican barracks.
13 Feb 48/OT	Bocachicampo, Mexico	Raid		<b>RAID OF ENEMY BARRACKS</b> Marines and sailors raided an enemy barracks in the town.
15 Mar 48/OPK	Cochari, Mexico	Occupation	Small garrison commanded by a Marine officer	<b>GARRISON REMAINS BEHIND</b> After an attack on the enemy barracks, a small garrison was left behind.
6 Jun 51/OT	Johanna Island	Police Support	Marines from the U.S. sloop-of-war Dale	<b>MUTINY IN JOHANNA ISLAND HARBOR</b> Put down a mutiny on the Paulina in Johanna Island Harbor.
Sep 51	PA	Police Support	Marines from Philadelphia Navy Yard	<b>CAPTURE OF MURDERERS IN PA</b> Assisted authorities in apprehending people who committed murders during a riot in Christiana, PA.
3 Feb 52/PK	Buenos Aires, Argentina	Patrol		<b>STREETS PATROLLED DURING REVOLUTION</b> Marines helped patrol the streets during a revolution.
5 Feb 52/HU	Nicaragua	Fire-fighting	Marines from the U.S. sloop Albany	<b>FIRE IN NICARAGUA</b> Assisted in fighting a fire in San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua.
11 Mar 53/PK	San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua	Protection of American	Marines from the Cyano	<b>AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY PROTECTED</b> Landed to protect American lives and property during a period of political turmoil.
6 Jun 53/PK	Napha, Grand Lew Chow Island (Naha Okinawa)	Show of Force	Marine Guards of the Mississippi and Susquehanna	<b>ATTEMPT TO IMPRESS LOCAL SHOGUN</b> Landed in full dress uniform to impress th local shogun with American might.
13 Jul 53/PK	Uraga, Japan	Diplomacy		<b>PERRY ACCOMPANJED AT FIRST MEETING</b> Commodore Perry had his first meeting with Japanese officials, He was accompanied by some 300 sailors and Marines including Major Zeilin (future CMC).

## MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
11 Sep 53/OT	China	Police Support	Marines from the USS steamer Mississippi	<b>MUTINY ON A SIAMESE VESSEL IN CHINA</b> put down a mutiny on a Siamese vessel in the Canton River, 60 miles above Hong Kong.
8 Mar 54/PK	Yedo Bay, Japan	Diplomacy	Marine Guards	<b>PERRY ACCOMPANIED AT SECOND MEETING</b> Marine guards were present at Perry's second meeting with the Japanese.
4 Apr 54/OT	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Mission	Marines from the sloop Plymouth	<b>CHINESE TROOPS DRIVEN AWAY</b> Landed to protect the American mission during Taeping Rebellion. On the following day, American Marines joined with the British in driving Chinese troops from a position near the International Settlement.
6 Jul 54/OT	Tumai, Grand Lew Chow Island	Retaliation		<b>RELIGIOUS SHRINE SEIZED</b> Helped seize shrine to obtain redress for murder of an American Seaman.
12 Jul 54/OT	San Juan del Sur Nicaragua	Reparations		<b>ARMS AND AMMO SIEZED</b> Arms and ammo siezed and destroyed in the city to avenge insults to Americans. A treat to destroy the town finally wrung an apology from its officials.
5 Nov 54/OT	Napha Grand Let Chow Island	Logistics	Marines from USS Vicennes	<b>LOGISTICS RESUPPLY</b> Destruction of the city is threatened unless natives agree to sell firewood to ships captain. Natives agree.
19 May 55/PK	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Intrests		<b>MARINES ASHORE</b> American property is protected during local disturbances.†
12 Sep 55/OT	Nukulau, Fiji Islands	Reparations	Marines from the USS John Adams	<b>REPARATIONS COLLECTED</b> Lt. John L. Broome and his Marines help extract reparations for cruelties inflicted on shipwrecked American seamen.
22 Sep 55/OT	Viti Levu, Fiji Islands	Reparations		<b>REPARATION COLLECTED</b> Landing party goes ashore to force Island Ruler to agree to make reparations for the destruction of American property.
25 Nov 55/PK	Montovideo, Uruguay	NEO	Marines from the Germantown	<b>GUARDING THE CONSULATE</b> Americans join Brazilian, Spanish and French Marines in guarding the consulates during a revolution. Americans remain ashore for five days.
4 Aug 55/OT	Tyho Bay, Hong Kong, China	Combat Operations		<b>DESTRUCTION OF PIRATE FLEET</b> American and British Marines destroy a pirate fleet.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
6 Nov 56/OT	Caton, China	Combat Operations		<b>DESTRUCTION OF FORTS</b> Participated in the bombardment, storming and destruction of forts guarding the approaches to <b>Caton</b> . This expedition was undertaken to punish the Chinese for firing on a n unarmed American Boat.
1 Jan 58/PK	Montevideo, Uruguay	NEO	Marines from the St. Lawrence	<b>GUARDING THE CONSULATE</b> American consulate is <b>protected from</b> outside forces during a revolt.
1 Oct 58/OT	Waia, Fiji Islands	Police Support		<b>ARMED BANED OF NATIVES ROUTED</b> An expedition landed to punish a native guilty of murdering two American citizens. When the inhabitants refused, the Americans routed a large band of armed natives.
16 Jun 58/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	20 Marines	<b>DISTURBANCE AT DC JAIL</b> <b>Helped restore order at DC jail.</b>
Sep 58/PK	New York City	Police Support	Marines from the New York Navy Yard Marine Barracks and from the steamer Sabine	<b>RIOTING IN NEW YORK</b> Protected government buildings against mobs <b>seeking</b> to burn them.
17-20 Oct 59/OT	Harper's Ferry, VA	Police Support	First Lieutenant Israel Greene and 56 Marines from Washington DC	<b>FEDERAL ARSENAL SEIZED IN HARPER'S FERRY, VA</b> Recaptured the arsenal.
Mar 60/OT	Kisembo, Angola, Portuguese West Africa	Police support		<b>PREPERATIONS FOR UPRISING</b> When the danger of a native uprising seemed <b>great</b> , <b>Maines</b> from Marion landed.
27 Jul 60/PK	Isthmus of Panama, Colombia	Protection of American Intrests		<b>AMERICAN INTRESTS PROTECTED</b> During the revolution that year, Marines landed to protest the railroad and other American <b>intrests</b> .
30 Apr 66/PK	Caribbean	Police Support	The Marine guard from the sloop USS St. Marys	<b>RIOT IN THE CARIBBEAN</b> Boarded the Panama mail steamer USS Golden City to quell a riot.
20 Jun 66/OT	Newchwang, China	Police Support		<b>THUG LEADER ARRESTED</b> Upon landing arrangements are made for the arrest of a leader of local thugs who had attacked the American <b>Consulate.</b>
25 Jun 66/OT1	Newchwang, China	Police Support		<b>MARINES ARREST LOCAL NATIVE</b> Local police were <b>afraid</b> to act, Marines went ashore to arrest the native charged with leading the attack on the American Consul.
7 Jul 66/PK	Maine	Police Support	Two companies of Marines from the Portsmouth Navy Yard, New Hampshire	<b>FIRE IN MAINE</b> Aided in restoring order after a fire.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
Aug 66/HU	China	Fire-fighting	One officer and 46 enlisted Marines and seamen from the steamer USS Wachusett	<b>FIRE IN CHINA</b> Assisted in fighting a fire at Shanghai, China.
Apr 67/OT	New York	Police Support	Four companies of Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>RAIDS ON ILLEGAL DISTILLERIES IN BROOKLYN</b> Assisted revenue officers in raids on illegal Irishtown distilleries in Brooklyn .1
3 Jun 67/OT	Formosa	Combat Operations		<b>MURDERING NATIVES DEFEATED</b> The island government refused to cooperate in investigating the rumor that an American Ship had run aground and its crew had been murdered. A punitive expedition defeated the natives and burned several villages.
Feb 68/PK	Yokohama, Japan	Diplomat Support		<b>SECURITY FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS</b> Remained ashore for several days to protect American diplomats during the Japanese civil war.
7 Feb 68/PK	Montevideo, Uruguay	NEO		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES</b> Landed to protect American lives during an uprising.
Mar 68/OT	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard, New York	<b>SEIZING ILLICIT DISTILLERIES IN BROOKLYN</b> Seized and destroyed several illicit distilleries in Irishtown, Brooklyn adjoining the Navy Yard.
Feb 68/PK	Nagasaki, Japan	Diplomat Support		<b>SECURITY FOR AMERICAN CONSUL</b> The American Consul asked for and received a detachment to protect the consulate during the Japanese civil war.
9 Feb 68/OT	Montevideo, Uruguay	Diplomat Support		<b>SECURITY OF AMERICAN PROPERTY</b> Because of savage rioting in the city, Marines and Sailors were landed to guard the custom house and American consul,
1 Apr 68/PK	Yokohama, Japan	Police Support		<b>MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER</b> Acting as part of an international force, they help keep order in the city and were withdrawn on May 12.
18 Mar 70/OT	New York	Police Support	129 Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard, New York, and the USS Vermont	<b>SEIZING ILLICIT DISTILLERIES IN BROOKLYN</b> Assisted revenue authorities in seizing and destroying several illicit distilleries in Irishtown, Brooklyn.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
17 Jun 70/OT	Teacapan, Mexico	Combat Operations		<b>PIRATE STRONG HOLD ATTACKED</b> Participated in an attack on a pirate stronghold and helped scuttled a grounded vessel seized by the pirates only a short time before.
1 Oct 70/PK	Philadelphia, PA	Police Support	Marines from Philadelphia Navy Yard	<b>DISTURBANCES IN PHILADELPHIA</b> Helped quell disturbances in Philadelphia when "Negroes" cast their first votes under the 15th Amendment.
1 Nov 70/OT	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>RAIDS ON ILLEGAL DISTILLERIES</b> Assisted revenue agents in raids on illegal distilleries in Irishtown, Brooklyn.
4 Jan 71/OT	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>WORKERS ATTACK IN BROOKLYN</b> Occupied 14 legitimate distilleries to protect workmen from attack by workers from illegal distilleries.
10 Jun 71/OT	Han River, China	Combat Operations	Battalion from Asiatic Fleet	<b>FORTS ATTACKED ON THE HAN RIVER</b> A battalion from the Asiatic Fleet helped storm the forts guarding the mouth of the Han River. Most impressive of these works was the "Citadel" captured on 11 June. The expedition was undertaken to avenge the attack on the American sailing vessel, General Sherman, and murder of her crew.
14 Jul 71/PK	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>STREET FIGHTING IN BROOKLYN</b> Broke up street fighting during raids on illegal distilleries in Irishtown Brooklyn.
1 Sep 71/OT	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>SEIZURE OF VESSELS CARRYING CONTRABAND WHISKEY</b> Boarded the tugboat USS Catalpa to assist revenue agents in the seizure of vessels carrying contraband whiskey in New York harbor.
17 Oct 71/OT	New York	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn Navy Yard	<b>ILLEGAL DISTILLERIES IN BROOKLYN</b> Established a guard over seized illegal distilleries in Irishtown, Brooklyn.
10 Nov 72/PK	Boston, MA	Police Support	Marines from the Boston Navy Yard	<b>FIRE IN BOSTON</b> Aided in restoring order after a fire in Boston.
1 May 73/PK	Panama City, Isthmus of Panama, Columbia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF U.S. PROPERTY</b> Went ashore to protect American property during disturbances.
10 May 73/PK	Boston, MA	Police Support	68 Marines from the Boston Navy Yard and 15 Marines from USS Ohio	<b>FIRE IN BOSTON</b> Aided in restoring order after a fire in Boston.

## MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

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25 Jun 73/HU	Peru	Fire-fighting	22 Marines from USS St. Mary	<b>FIRE IN ITALIAN MERCHANT SHIP</b> Assisted in putting out a fire aboard the Italian merchant ship <b>Delaide</b> in the harbor of <b>Callao</b> , Peru.
23 Sep 73/PK	Panama City, Isthmus of Panama, Columbia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF U.S. LIVES AND PROPERTY</b> Civil strife again <b>required</b> the Presence of Marines ashore.
12 Feb 74/PK	Honolulu, Hawaii	Police Support	Marines from the Portsmouth and <b>Tuscarora</b>	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY</b> The election of a new King brought <b>riotous</b> celebrations which endangered <b>American property</b> .
21 Jul 77/PK	MD, PA	Police Support	Marine battalion from the Washington Navy Yard	<b>LABOR RIOTING IN MD AND PA</b> Protected railroad property during labor rioting.
26 Jul 77/PK	DC, MD, VA	Police support	Battalion of Marines organized from Marines at Norfolk, VA, and from several Atlantic Squadron ships	<b>DC ARSENAL AND RAILROAD PROPERTY PROTECTION</b> Assumed guard of the DC arsenal and <b>later</b> guarded railroad property in Baltimore.
11 Jul 82/PK	Alexandria, Egypt	Police Support		<b>RESTORATION OF ORDER</b> After the British bombardment of 11 July, terror stalked the <b>streets</b> . Marines landed to restore order.
19 Jul 84/HU	Arctic	Rescue	Marine detachment from USS <b>Alert</b>	<b>RELIEF EXPEDITION</b> Took part in relief expedition searching for members of the <b>Greeley</b> Expedition west of Greenland.
11 Jan 85/PK	Aspinwall, Isthmus of Panama, Colombia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF THE RAILROAD</b> Another revolt broke out, and Marines landed to keep the panama railroad open.
16 Mar 85/HU	Aspinwall Isthmus of Panama, Columbia	Humanitarian Support		<b>PEACE KEEPING/ SECURITY</b> The isthmus became the scene of heavy fighting between Colombian troops and <b>local</b> insurgents. Marines were active in halting arms shipments, caring for refugees, and guarding American property.
19 Jun 88/PK	Seoul, Korea	Diplomat Security	Marines from the Essex	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LEGATION</b> Marched from <b>Inchon</b> to Seoul to protect the American Legation during local <b>unrest</b> .
14 Nov 88/PK	Apia, Samoa	Dipmolat Security		<b>PROTECTION OF THE AMERICAN CONSULATE</b> The American Consulate was endangered by a revolution.
30 Jul 89/PK	Honolulu, Hawaii	Police Support	Marines from the Adams	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTRESTS</b> During a <b>brief</b> revolution, Marines from the Adams protected American intrests.

## MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
5 Feb 90/HU	Japan	Fire-fighting	Marines from the steam bark USS Omaha	<b>FIRE IN JAPAN</b> Assisted local authorities in fighting a fire near Kanagawa.
2 Jun 91/PK	Navassa Island near Jamaica	Police Support	Maines from the Kearsarge	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY</b> Protection of American property when labor disputes threatened the Navassa Phosphate Company.
2 Jul 91/MA	Bering Sea	Environmental Law Enforcement	5 officers and 113 enlisted Marines aboard ships	<b>SEAL POACHING IN THE BERING SEA</b> Prevented seal poaching by various nationalities.
28 Aug 91/PK	Valparaiso, Chile	Diplomat Security		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CONSULATE</b> American Consulate is protected from ongoing revolution.
14 Sep 92/PK	NEW YORK	Police Support	A Marine battalion from various east coast Marine barracks	<b>OUTBREAK OF CHOLERA IN NY</b> Guarded the Sandy Hook, NY. immigrant camp during an outbreak of cholera among the immigrants,
16 Jan 93/PK	Honolulu, Hawaii	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICANS</b> Protection was need for foreign Americans who disposed the Queen and se up a provisional government.
7 Aug 93/HU	South Carolina	Disaster Relief	Marine detachment from Marine Barracks, Port Royal, South Carolina	<b>TIDAL WAVE IN SOUTH CAROLINA</b> (Assisted in preserving life and property after a tidal wave,
6 Jul 94/PK	Bluefields, Nicaragua	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY</b> American interests are guarded during a revolution.
24 Jul 94/PK	Seoul, Korea	Diplomat Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LEGATION</b> During the Sino- Japanese war the American Legation is <b>guarded</b> until 19 June 1895
Jul 94/OT	CALIFORNIA	Police Support	Marine detachments from Marine Island Navy Yard, USS Independence, USS Charleston, USS Monterey, and USS Thetis	<b>MAIL PROTECTION DURING RAILROAD STRIKES</b> Assisted Army <b>troops</b> in guarding the mail during railroad strikes in California.
6 Dec 94/PK	Tientsin, China	Police Support		<b>MAINTAINING ORDER</b> A landing party maintained order during the Sino-Japanese War. Marines left Tientsin on 16 May 1895,
4 Mar 95/HU	Trinidad	Fire-fighting	Marines and seamen from USS Cincinnati, USS New York, USS <b>Columbia</b> , USS Raleigh, USS Minneapolis, and USS <b>Montgomery</b>	<b>FIRE IN TRINIDAD</b> Assisted local authorities in fighting a fire

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
Mar 95/PK	Locas Del Toro, isthmus of Panama, Columbia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF FOREIGNERS</b> A detachment was sent ashore to protect foreigners during a revolution.
1 Oct 95/PK	Seoul, Korea	Diplomat Security	Marines from the Asiatic Fleet	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LEGATION</b> Guarding of the American Legation until 3 April 1896.
May 96/PK	Corinto, Nicaragua	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF FOREIGNERS</b> At the request of <b>Nicaraguan Officials</b> foreigners are protected during a revolution.
Feb 98/OT	San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua	Police Support	Marines from Alert Island	<b>CRISIS RESORNSE</b> Landing takes place in response to a distress signal from the American <b>Consulate</b> .
May 98/OT	Manila, Philippine islands	Combat Operations	Marines from the Baltimore	<b>NAVAL BASE OCCUPIED</b> A detachment from the Baltimore lands at Cavite Naval Base after the destruction of the Spanish Fleet.
Jun 98/OT	Playa del Este, Cuba	Combat Operations		<b>VILLAGE DESTROYED</b> Assist in the burning of a village and its cable station.
0 Jun 98/OT	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	Combat Operations	Lt Col Huntington and Marine battalion	<b>ADVANCED NAVAL BASE</b> Amphibious landing to seize beachhead for development of advanced Naval Base.
0 Jun 98/OT	Agana, Guam	Combat Operations		<b>SURRENDER ACCEPTED</b> Marines landed, inter alia, to accept surrender of the island by the Spanish.
8 Jul 98/PK	Ponce, Puerto Rico	Police Support		<b>OCCUPATION OF A TOWN</b> A detachment helps occupy a town.
Aug 98/OT	Zap San Juan, Puerto Rico	NEO	Marines from the Cincinnati	<b>WITHDRAWAL OF LIGHTHOUSE UNIT</b> A detachment from the Cincinnati covered the withdrawal of an American lighthouse unit.
Oct 98/HU	South Carolina	Disaster Relief		<b>TROPICAL STORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA</b> Assisted in saving and protecting government property at Port Royal, SC, during a severe tropical storm.
3 Mar 99/OT	Apia and vicinity, Samoa	Combat Operations		<b>HOSTILE NATIVES DEFEATED</b> Join British and friendly <b>Samoans</b> in defeating a band of hostile natives.
3 Sep 99/OT	Dlongapo, Philippine Islands	Combat Operations		<b>ARMS CAPTURED</b> Joint naval /Marine force lands and captures large rifled gun in hands of insurgents,
8 Oct 99/OT	Novaleta, Philippine Island	Combat Operations	Marines from the Baltimore	<b>INSURRECTION</b> Marines from Baltimore engaged "insurrectos".

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
Feb - Mar 1900/OT	Subic Bay area, Philippine Islands	Combat Operations		<b>COMBAT OPERATIONS</b> Marines engage dissident forces,
31 May 1900/PK	Peking, China	Police Support	Capt. Myers and 48 marines from The Oregon and Newark	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LEGATIONS</b> Protect diplomatic Quater during Boxer Rebellion. Legations <b>unders</b> siege until arrival of relief column 13 August 1900,
20 Jun 1900/OT	Tientsin, China	Combat Operations		<b>BOXERS DRIVEN FROM TIENTSIN</b> Landing at <b>taku</b> and joined in attack which drove the Boxers from Tientsin, City Captured on 15 July,
4 Aug 1900/OT	Peking, China	Combat Operations		<b>EXPEDITION TO PEKING</b> An international expedition set out from Tientsin to break the Boxer siege of legations in Peking. Arrived Peking 13 Aug. 1900.
Nov 1900 - Jan 1901/OT	Samar, Philippine islands	Combat Operations	Marines lead by Major Waller	<b>FIGHTING IN SAMAR</b> Major Waller marches across <b>Samar</b> fighting "insurrectos" en route.
21 Jan 1901/HU	Alaska	Fire-fighting	Marines at Sitka, Alaska	<b>FIRE IN ALASKA</b> Helped fight a <b>fire</b> that threatened Sitka, Alaska.
24 Nov 1901/PK	Aspinwall, Isthmus of Panama, Columbia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTING AMERICANS</b> Another <b>reolt</b> broke out on the Isthmus, and Marines were landed.
16 Apr - 22 Sep 1902/PK	Columbia	Police Support		<b>PROTECTING AMERICAN INTRESTS</b> Landed to assist in the surrender of rebel forces. Landed again when surrender negotiations seemed to breakdown. Stood guard in the Aspinwall-Bocas <b>del</b> Toro region until 18 Nov 1902.
23-24 Mar 1903/PK	Port Cortez, Honduras	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTRESTS</b> A <b>small</b> detachment lands to protect American lives and property.
1 Apr 1903/OT	Santo Domingo City, Santo Domingo	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTRESTS</b> American citizens are protected during periods of political unrest.
7 Sep 03/PK	Beirut, Syria (now Lebanon)	Police Support	Marines from the Brooklyn	<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CONSULATE</b> A detachment from Brooklyn guarded the American Consulate until the threat of a Moslem-Christian riot passed,

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
16 Nov 03/PK	Colon, Panama	Police Support		<b>PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES</b> During the final successful revolt of the Panamanians against the Colombian rule, Marines were sent ashore to protect lives and property. <b>from</b> 16 Nov 1903 until 23 Jan 1914 unit as large as a regiment were station in the Isthmus to maintain law and order.
18 Nov 03/PK	Abyssinia	Guard Duty		<b>DIPLOMATIC MISSION GUARDED</b> Guarded a diplomatic mission to Addis Ababa to sign a treaty with the Emperor of Abyssinia.
11 Jan 04/PK	Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo	Protection of American Interests	Landing Party of Marines	<b>AMERICAN CITIZENS PROTECTED</b> Landed to protect American citizens during a revolution.
11 Jan 04/PK	Seoul, Korea	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN LEGATION GUARDED</b> Guarded the American Legation during Russo-Japanese War.
17 Jan 04/PK	Sousa, Santo Domingo	Protection of American Interests		<b>CITIZENS PROTECTED</b> Landed to protect citizens.
17 Jan 04/PK	Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> After serious fighting erupted near the city, Marines were called upon to protect American lives and property.
1 Feb 04/OT	Santo Domingo City, Santo Domingo	Protection of American Interests	Landing Party of Marines	<b>AMERICAN LAUNCH FIRED UPON</b> <b>Sent ashore</b> after insurgents fired upon an American launch, killing a sailor.
12 Mar 04/OT	Korea	Non-combatant Evacuation	JSS Cincinnati's Marine Detachment	<b>RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR</b> Aided the evacuation of Americans from Chemulpo and Seoul, Korea, with the start of the Russo-Japanese War.
30 May 04/PK	Tangier, Morocco	Protection of American Interests	Marine guard	<b>AMERICAN CONSULATE GUARDED</b> Guard posted during a period of tension between the local sultan and a bandit leader.
18 Apr 06/HU	California	Disaster Relief	Marine detachment from Yerba Buena Island and a detachment from Mare Island	<b>EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE IN SAN FRANCISCO</b> Aided civilian authorities after an earthquake and fire in San Francisco.
13 Sep 06 - 23 Jan 09/PK	Cuba	Police Support	Marines from the Denver, a Marine brigade, and a provisional regiment	<b>MARINES IN CUBA</b> Served on the island as part of the Army of Cuban Pacification.
17 Jan 07/HU	Jamaica	Disaster Relief	Marines and seamen from U.S. ships	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN JAMAICA</b> Assisted local authorities in rescue work following a severe earthquake.
28 Apr 07/PK	Laguna, Honduras	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> Landed to protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
19 May 10/PK	Bluefields, Nicaragua	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> Throughout the summer, a guard remained in the city to protect American interests threatened by a revolution.
4 Nov 11/OT	Shanghai, China	Guard Duty	Marines from the Rainbow	<b>OFFICES GUARDED</b> Guarded the offices of the Great Northern and Commercial Cable Companies.
28 May - 5 Aug 12/OT	Cuba	Police Support	Marine Brigade	<b>ORDER MAINTAINED</b> Assigned to maintain order upon the outbreak of civil war.
6 Aug - 12 Oct 12/PK	Bluefields, Nicaragua	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> Another revolution imperilled American interests.
14 Aug 12/PK	Corinto, Managua, and San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua	Occupation	Detachment from the Denver and various units and ships' detachments	<b>MARINE PRESENCE DURING REVOLUTION</b> Landed at Corinto and moved to Managua Detachment posted at San Juan del Sur.
24 Aug 12/PK	Shanghai and vicinity, China	Police Support		<b>MARINE PRESENCE DURING CIVIL STRIFE</b> On two occasions, Marines went ashore to remain for a few days during a period of civil strife.
1 Oct 12 - 9 Jan 13/PK	Managua, Nicaragua	Police Support	Battalion of Marines	<b>CITY OCCUPIED</b> Remained until relieved by a small legatio guard.
7 and 28 Jul, and 17 Aug 13/PK	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> Marines landed to protect American interests.
5 - 14 Sep 13/OT	Mexico	Non-Combatant Evacuation	USS Buffalo Marines	<b>UNREST IN MEXICO</b> Aided the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Cuernavaca, Mexico, during local unrest.
29 Jan 14/PK	Port au Prince, Haiti	Show of Force	Marines from the South Carolina	<b>SHOW OF FORCE IN HAITI</b> Marines as well as German, British, and French detachments landed in a show of force to impress Haitians,
21 Apr 14/OT	Vera Cruz, Mexico	Seizure	Marine Regiment	<b>PARTICIPATED IN SEIZURE</b> Participated in seizure of Vera Cruz.
9 Jul 15 - 15 Aug 34/PK	Haiti	Occupation	Marine Detachment from the Washington	<b>STABILITY MAINTAINED AFTER PRESIDENT ASSASSINATED</b> Landed at Port au Prince after Haitian president assassinated.
5 May 16 - 17 Sep 24/PK	Santo Domingo	Occupation	Two companies of Marines	<b>ORDER MAINTAINED AND NATION OCCUPIED</b> Landed at Santo Domingo City to bring order and formally occupy.

## MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

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1 Mar 17/PK	Cuba	Police Support	Marine units at times as large as a regiment	<b>REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SUPPRESSED</b> Combed the interior of the island to suppress revolutionary activities.
27 Jun - 8 Sep 19/OT	France	Combat	Fourth and Fifth Brigades	<b>WORLD WAR I</b> The Fourth Brigade and aviation units saw heavy fighting on the Western Front, participating in 7 major engagements. The Fifth Brigade did not reach France until shortly before the armistice.
22 Jul 19/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	Two companies of Marines from Quantico, VA	<b>RACE RIOTS IN WASHINGTON DC</b> Assisted civil authorities and other military organizations in restoring and maintaining order in Washington DC after severe race riots.
12 Oct 20/HU	Dominican Republic	Fire-fighting	4th Marine Regiment	<b>FIRE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Helped fight a severe fire in the center of the Santiago, Dominican Republic, business district.
7 Nov 21 - 7 Mar 22/PK	Continental United States	Police Support	2300 Marines	<b>PROTECTION OF REGISTERED MAILS</b> Following a series of postal robberies, Marines provided protection of registered mail deliveries.
23 Jan 1922/HU	Washington DC	Disaster Relief		<b>COLLAPSED ROOF IN WASHINGTON DC</b> Assisted in rescue work after the roof of the Knickerbocker Theater in Washington DC collapsed following a major snowfall.
5 May 22/PK	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Interests	Marine battalion from the Huron	<b>MARINES STAND GUARD</b>
27 Feb 24/PK	La Ceiba, Honduras	Protection of American Interests	Marines from the Denver	<b>AMERICAN PROPERTY GUARDED</b> Landed to guard American property during a battle between government and insurgent forces.
3 Mar 24/PK	Tela, Honduras	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS GUARDED</b>
4 Mar 24/PK	Puerto Cortez, Honduras	Protection of American Interests	Landing Party from the Denver	<b>NEUTRAL ZONE ESTABLISHED AROUND AMERICAN PROPERTY</b>
8 Mar - 10 Sep 24/PK	La Ceiba, Honduras	Protection of American Interests	Marines from the Rochester	<b>AMERICAN CONSUL REQUESTS PROTECTION</b>
6 Oct 24/PK	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN HOLDINGS THREATENED</b> Continuing revolutionary activity threatened American holdings, and Marines were landed.
4 Nov 24 - 8 Feb 25/PK	Tientsin, China	Protection of American Interests	Marines stationed in the city	<b>AMERICAN PROPERTY PROTECTED</b>
15 Jan 25 - 12 Mar 26/PK	Shanghai, China	Protection of American Interests	Ships' detachments and a provisional company	<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b> Guarded American interests.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
Nov 25 - 9 Jun 26/PK	Tientsin, China	Protection of American Interests		<b>AMERICAN INTERESTS PROTECTED</b>
May 26 - 27 May 27/PK	Bluefields, Nicaragua	Protection of American Interests	Marines from the leveland, the Galveston, the Rochester, and the Denver	<b>AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY PROTECTED</b> After the withdrawal of the Managua legation guard, rebellion flared. Marines were called upon to protect American lives and property.
10 Oct - 13 Nov 26/MA	Corinto, Nicaragua	Patrol	Marines from the Denver	<b>FORT PATROLLED</b> Patrolled the port.
26 Oct 1926/OT	Continental United States	Police Support	500 Marines	<b>U.S. MAIL PROTECTION</b> Guarded the U.S. mails.
12 Nov 26 - Jan 29/OT	China	Defense Force	Detachments of the 6th Marines and the 4th Marines	<b>FOREIGN CONCESSIONS DEFENDED</b> Defended foreign concessions from attack during the Chinese civil war.
23 Dec 26/PK	Bragman's Bluff	Police Support	Marines from the leveland	<b>ORDER MAINTAINED</b> Landed to maintain order.
6 Jan 27/PK	Managua, Nicaragua	Guard Duty	Marines from the Galveston	<b>AMERICAN CONSULATE GUARDED</b> Guarded the American Consulate.
10 Jan 27 - Jan 33/PK	Nicaragua	Police Support	Elements of 5th Marines and 1 1th Marine Regiment	<b>REVOLUTIONARY TROOPS DISARMED</b> Elements of 5th Marines began landing on 10 Jan 27. The problem of disarming revolutionary troops proved so difficult that another regiment, the 1 1th, was rushed to the scene.
11 Jun 27/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	Marines from the Washington Navy Yard	<b>WELCOME CEREMONY FOR CHARLES LINDBERGH</b> Assisted crowd control in the welcome of Charles A. Lindbergh after his transatlantic flight.
Sep 30/HU	Dominican Republic	Disaster Relief		<b>HURRICANE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Flew in emergency relief.
31 Mar 31/HU	Nicaragua	Disaster Relief		<b>EARTHQUAKE IN NICARAGUA</b> Conducted search and rescue operations. Furnished guards to prevent looting in the city, and set up first aid stations, food centers, and tents for the homeless.
3 Feb - 13 Jun 32/PK	Shanghai, China	Defense Force	Marines from the Houston and 4th Marines	<b>INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT DEFENDED</b> Marines from the Houston arrived in Shanghai to reinforce 4th Marines who had been called out to help defend International Settlement during Sino-Japanese incident of 1932.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
9 Sep 37 - 18 Feb 38/PK	Shanghai, China	Defense Force	4th and 6th Marines	<b>INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT DEFENDED</b> 6th Marines arrived in Shanghai to reinforce 4th Marines who had been called out to help defend International Settlement during fighting between Japanese and Chinese.
10 - 29 Aug 39/HU	Tientsin, China	Disaster Relief	170 Marines	<b>FLOOD IN TIENSIN</b> Helped protect U.S. facilities, and provided assistance to endangered Americans and other foreigners.
Jul 41 - 25 Mar 41/PK	Island	Defense Force	Marine Brigade	<b>DEFENSE FORCE DISPATCHED</b> Served as a defense force.
Dec 41 - 13 Oct 45/OT	Pacific Ocean (Wake, Midway, Solomon, Aleutian Islands, etc.)	Combat/Combat Landing	5 Divisions of the USMC	<b>WORLD WAR II</b> Conducted Marine air and ground operations in support of World War II.
Oct 45 - Apr 49/OT	North China	Accept surrender of Japanese and repatriation of Japanese and occupation duties	3d Amph Corps of 2 divisions and 1 wing	<b>SURRENDER OF JAPANESE TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA</b> 326,000 regulars, 120,000 organized troops, 320,000 militia, 140,000 CCF troops, 300,000 guerrillas
May 46/PK	California	Police Support	Marine Volunteers	<b>RIOTING ON ALCATRAZ ISLAND</b> Assisted civilian police in combating rioting prisoners on Alcatraz Island, California,
Nov 46 - 47/HU	China	Relief Aid	Marine Corps forces in Tsingtao	<b>SUPPORT OF UN REFUGEE AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION</b> Supported relief supply distribution in Communist controlled areas in hopes that it would reduce attacks on Marine Corps forces. This did not occur.
Mar 48/HU	China	FIRE-FIGHTING		<b>FIRES IN CHINA</b> Aided Chinese authorities to fight a fire and treat more than 700 injured after a warehouse exploded in Tsingtao.
8 Jul - 21 Oct 48/PK	Jerusalem, Palestine	Protection of Consul General	Prov Mar Consular Guard from 21st Mar	<b>WAR IN PALESTINE</b> Guard was detached to protect Consul General
7 Nov 48 - 31 Mar 49/OT	North China	Evacuation Operations	BLT-9	<b>COMMUNIST THREAT</b> Evacuate U.S. nationals from Communist threatened Yangtze Valley.
8 Mar - 28 Apr 49/OT	North China	Evacuation Operations	BLT-3	<b>CHINESE CIVIL WAR</b> Remained aboard ship near Shanghai, prepared to land and evacuate U.S. citizen: at climax of Chinese Civil War.
1 Aug 50 - 3 Apr 53/OT	Korea	Combat/Combat Landing	1st Mar Div and 1st MAW	<b>KOREAN WAR</b> Conducted Marine air and ground operations in support of Korean War.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
14 - 19 Aug 53/HU	Greek Isles, Greece	Disaster Relief Operations	LT-2/6 (Rein)	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN GREECE</b> Provided rescue and relief missions after earthquake.
19 Jun - 1 Jul 54/OT	Guatemala	Evacuation Operations	LT-3/8	<b>CRISIS IN GUATEMALA</b> Response to CINCLANTFLT warning order for evacuation of U.S. nationals. BLT remained afloat offshore for 20 days. No landing necessary as crisis subsided.
12-19 Jul 54/OT	Indo-China	Crisis Alert	3rd MarDiv	<b>FALL OF DIN BIEN PHU</b> Fall of Din Bien Phu on 7 May 54 and stalled Geneva Conference caused, CG, AFCE to alert 3rd MarDiv to prepare to move to Indo-China on 48 hours notice. Alert canceled by unexpected signing of armistice.
Aug 54 - Jul 55/OT	South Vietnam	Evacuation Operations	Primarily USN	<b>OPERATION PASSAGE TO FREEDOM</b> - Relocation refugees from N VN to S VN Amphib forces provide 59 of 109 ships/craft to move 3 10,000 people, 81,000 tons, 8,100 vehicles
Sep - Oct 54/HU	Honduras	Disaster Relief/Crisis Alert	Primarily U.S. Navy	<b>FLOODS AND POLITICAL UNREST IN THE HONDURAS</b> Combination of floods and political unrest caused by impending elections. U.S. forces provided disaster relief and stood by to protect U.S. interests until political situation stabilized.
13 - 19 Oct 54/HU	Haiti	Disaster Relief	IMR-261	<b>OPERATION SANTE</b> Delivered food, medicine, clothing, and other supplies.
3 Jan - 12 Feb 55/OT	Tachen Islands	Evacuation Operations	TF-76 (3d Shore Party Bn)	<b>EVACUATION AT TACHEN ISLANDS</b> Evacuation of civilians at request of Nationalist Chinese. Totals: 15,627 civilians; 11,120 military; 8,530 short tons of cargo.
7 - 27 Mar 55/HU	Philippines	Search and Rescue	Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron (Light)-16	<b>C-47 CRASH IN PHILIPPINES</b> Supported search operations and provided support to Philippine authorities in removing the bodies after discovery of the plane.
1 - 9 Apr 55/HU	North Carolina	Fire-fighting	Co. B, 2d Shore Party Battalion, Camp Lejeune	<b>FIRE IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Aided fire fighting efforts in North Carolina.
13 - 30 Apr 55/HU	North Carolina	Fire-fighting	1st and 2nd Battalions, 6th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 2d Marines	<b>FIRE IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Helped fight North Carolina forest fires.
7 Aug 55/HU	North Carolina	Disaster Relief	1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion	<b>FLOOD IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Assisted evacuations amidst flooding of the Pamlico River.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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20 Sep 55/HU	California	Fire-fighting	1st Infantry Training Regiment at Camp Pendleton (600 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Helped battle fires in the Los Padres National Forest near Santa Barbara, California.
2 - 13 Oct 55/HU	Mexico	Disaster Relief	Helicopters of MAG-26, Marine Transport squadrons 153 and 252 of MAG 35, and certain specialists of the 2d MAW	<b>FLOOD IN MEXICO</b> Aided in rescue work at Tampico, Mexico when flood waters inundated the city. The helicopters rescued 5439 persons and delivered 183,017 pounds of food and medical supplies.
25 - 27 Dec 55/HU	California	Disaster Relief	VMRs 152 and 352 from 31 Toro	<b>FLOOD IN CALIFORNIA</b> Flew in food, clothing and medical supplies to flood-stricken areas of northern California.
29 Oct 56 - 7 Feb 57/OT	Port Lyautey, Moroccans	Crisis Alert	1 Co from 2d MAR	<b>MARINE BARRACKS, MOROCCO</b> -security endangered by tensions between French-Moroccan, airlifted force.
30 Oct - 1 Nov 56/OT	Egypt and Israel	Evacuation Operations/Alert	3LT 3/2, RLT 2(-), 3LT 3/3	<b>ISRAELI SUEZ CAMPAIGN</b> BLT 3/2 (from Suda Bay) evacuated 1,528 people, mostly U.S. nationals, from Alexandria, and U.S. observers from Gaza, threatened by Anglo-French attack on Egypt. RLT 2(-) embarked at Norfolk on 48 hour alert. BLT 3/3 departed Yokosuka for Persian Gulf, but diverted en route.
1957/CPK	Port Lyautey, Morocco	Protection of U.S. Property	Marine Company from CLNC	<b>TENSION IN MOROCCO</b> Company deployed to Port Lyautey by airlift from CLNC, NC., to reinforce MarBks in Morocco due to tension.
16 Oct 57/HU	Valencia	Disaster Relief Operations	Units of 6th Fleet	<b>FLOOD IN VALENCIA</b> 1 CVS, 1 AKA, 1 LST assisted in locating, rescuing, supporting flood victims.
8 Dec 57 - May 58/OT	Indonesia	Crisis Alert	MEB (3rd Mar & HMR-162, BLT 3/3)	<b>ARMY REVOLT ON SUMATRA</b> Local Army revolt on Sumatra endangered U.S. lives/property. MEB (part of TF-71) left Subic Bay and took station in South China Sea, 500+ miles from Sumatra. Force later downgraded to BLT/Prov MAG on standby at Subic Bay.
26 Dec 57 - Jan 58/HU	Ceylon	Disaster Relief Operations	HMR-162	<b>FLOOD IN CEYLON</b> Twenty helos of HMR-162 rushed to Ceylon aboard USS Princeton to engage in rescue work incident to floods.
21-22 Jan 58/OT	Venezuela	Evacuation Alert	Prov Co. from Gitmo	<b>MOB VIOLENCE THREATENS AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY</b> - Alert cancelled
28 Apr 58/HU	Morocco	Disaster Relief	VMR-252	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN MOROCCO</b> Aided earthquake victims.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
3-15 May 58/OT	Venezuela	Crisis Alert	1/6 (Co's A,B & C) MAG-26	<b>MOB ATTACKS OF VP NIXON</b> Alert/staging in <b>Guantanamo</b> in wake of mob attacks on Vice President Nixon in Caracas.
5 May 58/PK	Lebanon	Power Projection/Interposition	2dProvMar (1/8) RLT-2 alerted	<b>VIOLENCE IN LEBANON</b> Mob violence threatened USIA offices in Beirut. 2dProvMar Force took position 50 miles offshore. RLT-2 (less 2 <b>BLT's</b> ) on alert at CLNC, NC., on 20 May 58. No landing required.
2 Jul 58/HU	California	Fire-fighting	1st Marine Division and Marine Corps Base Marines from Camp Pendleton	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted Forest Service personnel in fighting brush fires in the Cleveland National Forest of California.
Jul 58/OT	Cuba	Deployment to Crisis Area	11 Tactical A/C Sqn.	<b>CRISIS IN CUBA</b> Deployed to Puerto Rico on standby in response to Cuban situation.
14 Jul - 30 Sep 58/PK	Lebanon	Power Projection Interposition/Alert	2nd Provisional Marine Force (BLT's, 3/6, 1/8, 2/2, 2/8; RLT-6) MAG-26	<b>COUP THREAT IN LEBANON</b> President <b>Chamoun</b> requested US/UK assistance in face of coup threat. Marine landings commenced within 16 hours. USMC forces withdrawn by end of Sep., with RLT-6 remaining as floating reserve for USA forces, in Beirut Harbor.
1 Aug 58 - 20 Feb 59/OT	Quemoy-Matsu Taiwan	Crisis Alert	1 MAG-11 and 1 BLT	<b>CRISIS IN QUEMOY-MATSU</b> 1 BLT deployed to Taiwan in face of crisis. (MAG-11 and two rifle companies {reinforced}).
Oct 58/OT	Cuba	Evacuation Operations	USS Kleinsmith (APD)	<b>FIGHTING IN CUBA</b> At request of State Department, evacuated 59 U.S. citizens from Nicaro Nickel Mine in wake of <b>fighting</b> between Cuban Army units/Castro rebels in vicinity.
2 Dec 58/HU	California	Fire-fighting	2d Infantry Training Regiment (650 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted fire department and forestry service personnel in fighting a forest fire in the Malibu area of California.
5 Dec 58/HU	North Carolina	Fire-fighting	3d Battalion, 8th Marines (64 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Assisted state forestry service personnel and civilian volunteers in <b>fighting</b> a 3000 acre forest fire near <b>Pungo</b> Lake, NC.
29 Dec 58 - 1 Jan 59/HU	South China Seas	Disaster Relief	HMR(L)-162 and VMA-332	<b>FLOOD IN CEYLON</b> Assisted flood victims
1 Jan 59/HU	California	Fire-fighting	1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 1st Force Service Regiment at Camp Pendleton	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted civilian fire fighters in putting out forest fires in the Topanga Canyon area.
5 Jan - 9 Mar 59/OT	Cuba	Crisis Alert	8th Prov Bde (BLT 3/8 and HMR-262)	<b>CASTRO TAKES OVER CUBA</b>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
19 Mar -6 Jun 59/OT	Berlin	Crisis Alert	3LT 1/2 and HMR-262, elements of 1st MARDIV and 3rd MAW	<b>BERLIN CRISIS</b> Forces embarked for training and Exercise TWIN PEARLS
14 Jun 59/HU	North Carolina	Fire-fighting	1st and 6th Marines (100 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Battled a fire which burned over 700 acres of Camp Lejeune's forests,
12 Jul - 26 Nov 59/OT	Haiti	Crisis Alert	14th Prov Bde ( BLT 1/2, HMR-162, VMA-533)	<b>THREAT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST HAITI BY CUBA OR DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Alert status only
14 - 20 Aug 59/HU	Taiwan	Disaster Relief Operations	USS Thetis Bay (LPH) HMR-261	<b>FLOOD IN TAIWAN</b> 897 helo missions for flood relief of Central Taiwan. 855 refugees/1.6 million pounds of supplies lifted.
1 - 25 Aug 59/OT	Trinidad	Crisis Alert	1st Recon BN	<b>POSSIBLE RIOTING</b> Alert status only
5 Sep - 6 Oct 59/OT	Laos	Crisis Alert	3rd MEF ( 1UT-9 and MAG-16)	<b>COMMUNIST IRREGULARS DRIVE IN LAOS</b> Alert status to prepare to free-up Laotians troops so they can fight
5 Nov 59/HU	California	Fire-fighting	5th Marines (200 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted forest service personnel and civilian fire fighters in combating a forest fire in the Roblan Canyon of the Cleveland National Forest in California.
Nov 59/HU	California	Fire-fighting	1st Infantry Regiment and the 7th and 5th Marines at Camp Pendleton, CA	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted fire department and forestry service personnel in fighting forest fires in the Las Pulgas and Aliso Canyon areas of California.
29 Feb 60/HU	Morocco	Disaster Relief	Marine Barracks, U.S. Naval Activities, Port Lyautey, Morocco	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN MOROCCO</b> Aided in rescue and relief operations.
26 Jun - 15 Jul 60/HU	Chile	Disaster Relief	USS Catamount (LSD) and embarked boat group	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN CHILE</b> Conducted flood relief operations.
23 Sep 60/HU	Connecticut	Disaster Relief	3d Truck Co (USMCR)	<b>HURRICANE IN CONNECTICUT</b> Aided hurricane recovery operations.
Nov - Dec 60/HU	Haiti	Disaster Relief Operations	Asslt. Constr. Bn. #2	<b>FLOODING IN HAITI</b> Flooding of Lake Miragoane, washed out bridge linking SW Haiti with rest of country. New bridge and 6.5 miles of improved road constructed in 29 days.
Nov 60 - Dec 61/HU	Africa/Indian Ocean	Evacuation Operation	TF-88	<b>EVACUATION IN AFRICA/INDIAN OCEAN</b> Evacuation/property protection/humanitarian assistance.
20 Jan 61/HU	Congo	Relief Aid	HMR(L)-264	<b>FAMINE IN CONGO</b> Assisted in famine relief work.
20 Jan 61/HU	California	Fire-fighting	1st MARDIV (400 Marines)	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted civilian fire fighters in battling brush fires in southern Orange County, CA.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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Apr 61/OT	Bay of Pigs	Alert	1 BLT	Precautionary security measures.
20 May 61/HU	Turkey	Disaster Relief	1MR-262 and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN TURKEY</b> Assisted in relief work.
12 Sep 61/HU	Texas and Louisiana	Disaster Relief	2d MARDIV and MAG-26 (400 Marines)	<b>HURRICANE IN TEXAS AND LOUISIANA</b> Assisted in rescue operations.
1- 17 Nov 61/HU	British Honduras	Disaster Relief	1MR-264 (MAG-26)	<b>HURRICANE IN BRITISH HONDURAS</b> Provided supplies and transported personnel.
Nov 61/PK	Dominican Republic	Show of Force	1 Amphibron-8, BLT+VMA-224	<b>SHOW OF FORCE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Show of force stemming from Dominican Republic president's request for U.S. assistance in stabilizing internal political situation. <b>Amphibs</b> afloat offshore.
8 Mar 62/HU	North Carolina	Disaster Relief	HMM-263	<b>HURRICANE IN NORTH CAROLINA</b> Assisted in rescue and relief operations.
9 Apr 62 - 30 Jun 71/OT	Vietnam	Combat/Combat Landing	111 MAF: 3rd Mar Div 1st Mar Div 1st MAW (Rein)	<b>VIETNAM WAR</b> Conducted Marine air and ground operations in support of the Vietnam War.
17 May - 7 Aug 62/OT	Thailand	Show of Force	3rd MEU (BLT-3/9, HMM-261, VMA-332, HMM-211, ProvMAG-3, 1 TacAir & 2 Helo Sqdn	<b>LAOS CRISIS</b> Provided show of force in response to Laos crisis- military forces near Thai's border
4 Apr 6UHU	North Carolina	Fire-fighting	2d MARDIV (400 Marines)	<b>FIRE NEAR JACKSONVILLE</b> Assisted firefighters in combating forest fires.
1 Oct 62/PK	Tennessee	Police Support	MAG-26	<b>DISTURBANCES IN TENNESSEE</b> Supported federal efforts to enforce civil rights.
21 Oct - 18 Dec 62/MA	Cuba	Alert/ Naval Quarantine	2d Mar Div (Rein) 2d MAW, 1st Mar, 5th MEB, BLT 2/1, Landing Group West, 3 MAGs, 9 TACAIR	<b>CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS</b> <del>Response to Cuban missile crisis.</del> 2d Mar Div from East Coast; 5th MEB sailed from West Coast to Caribbean in response to alert.
20 Nov 62/HU	Guam	Disaster Relief	3d Battalion, 4th Marines (400 Marines)	<b>TYPHOON IN GUAM</b> Provided security and salvage assistance.
Apr 63/OT	Laos	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>LAOS CRISIS</b> Response to Laos crisis.
Nov 63/OT	Vietnam	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>VIETNAM CRISIS</b> Response to Vietnam crisis,
Apr - 23 May 63/OT	Haiti	Crisis Alert	Caribbean ARG (6th MEU- BLT 2/6, ProvMAG 40, and HMM-264), VMA-533, and 4th MEB ( 6 MAR, HMM-265, A/1/8, and 2/2)	<b>WORSENING DOMESTIC SITUATION IN HAITI</b> Positioned off coast for 5 days when trouble developed in Haiti.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
6-16 Aug 63/OT	Haiti	Crisis Alert	Mar ARG (MEU)	<b>CIVIL DISORDER IN HAITI</b> Precautionary positioning of forces
Sep 63/OT	Dominican Republic	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>COUP IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Caribbean Ready Force alert in response to coup d'etat.
20 Ckt 63/HU	Haiti/ Dominican Republic	Disaster Relief	HMM-162	<b>HURRICANE IN HAITI</b> Delivered food supplies and conducted relief operations.
9-12 Jan 64/OT	Canal Zone	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>RIOTS IN PANAMA</b> Already ashore for training. BLT placed in alert status in response to riots.
Mar 64/HU	Alaska	Disaster Relief	Marines from the Naval Station	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN ALASKA</b> Aided police in maintaining order.
27 Apr - 7 May 64/OT	Cuba	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>DEMONSTRATION IN CUBA</b> Caribbean Ready Force alert in response to threat of demonstration on <b>Guantanamo</b> perimeter.
7-20 May 64/OT	Panama	Crisis Alert	1 BLT	<b>ELECTION VIOLENCE IN PANAMA</b> Caribbean Ready Force alert in response to election violence.
Summer 64/HU	Peru	Medical Aid	VMO-1	<b>SICK, INJURED AND WOUNDED IN PERU</b> Provided medical aid and evacuation.
Aug - Sep 64/HU	Haiti, Dominican Republic	Disaster Relief	Marines embarked on LPH-4 Boxer and two LSDs	<b>HURRICANE IN HAITI</b> Provided medical aid and evacuation services.
14-30 Sep 64/HU	Vietnam	Disaster Relief Operations	TF-76	<b>TYPHOONS IN VIETNAM</b> Provided flood relief.
17 -23 Nov 64/HU	Vietnam	Disaster Relief Operations	TF-76 (HMM-365 and 162)	<b>TYPHOONS IN VIETNAM</b> Provided flood relief and evacuated 1,700 Vietnamese victims and delivered 900 tons of supply
8 Mar 65/OT	Da Nang, Vietnam	Continuous Ops	9th MEB = III MEF	<b>LANDING OF FORCES IN DA NANG, RVN</b> - Operations Blue Marlin, White Wing, Masher, Double Eagle
27 - 30 Apr 65/OT	Dominican Republic	Combat employment from land bases	Marines from BLT 3/6	<b>CONFLICT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Provide U.S. presence.
28 Apr - 6 Jun 55/PK	Dominican Republic	Landing to protect lives and evacuate civilians/Peace-keeping force/ Power projection/ Interposition	5th MEU (BLT 3/6 and HMM-263) and 4th MEB (4 BLT's, ProMag-60)	<b>CONFLICT IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b> Protect property, evacuate civilians; peace-keeping force.
21 Jan 66/HU	Southeast of Chu Lai, RVN	Rescue	VMO-6, HMM -261 and 364	<b>FREIGHTER BRIGHT STAR FLOUNDERING</b> Helos rescued 30 passengers and crew
14 - 16 Oct 66/HU	Mexico	Disaster Relief	JTF	<b>HURRICANE IN MEXICO</b> Airlifted food and supplies to Tampico, Mexico.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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1 Nov 66/HU	California	Fire-fighting	Marines from Camp Pendleton	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Four Marines died while fighting a brush fire in the <b>Piedro de Lumbr</b> Canyon area.
1-15 Jun 67/OT	Middle East	Evacuation Operations	1 BLT (1/6)	<b>7-DAY WAR IN MIDDLE EAST</b> Alert for civilian evacuation during 7-Day War.
Apr 68/PK	Washington, DC	Police Support	Marine Barracks company and 2 companies of Schools Demonstration Troops from Quantico, VA (1500 Marines)	<b>RIOTS IN WASHINGTON</b> Assisted in riot control.
15 - 27 Feb 69/HU	Southern CA	Disaster Relief	3d MAW (1500 Marines)	<b>LOODING IN SOUTHERN CA</b> Conducted evacuation and erosion control operations.
1-28 Apr 70/PK	Trinidad	Evacuation Operations	LANFORCARIB 1-70 (BLT 3/2 and HMM-261)	<b>MUTINY IN TRINIDAD</b> Alert for civilian evacuation in wake of mutiny by Trinidad regiment.
3 - 28 Jun 70/HU	Peru	Disaster Relief Operations	32 MEU (Co A 1/2 and HMM-3651)	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN PERU</b> Transported medical teams to remote areas, brought back victims for medical care, and delivered more than 55 tons of relief supplies.
6 Sep - 30 Oct 70/OT	Middle East	Crisis Alert / Contingency Ops	3th MEB (BLT 1/2 and HMM-365; BLT 2/2 and VMA-331)	<b>CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN</b> Alert in response to Jordanian crisis- Syrians crossed border to support PLO
1 Sep 70/HU	California	Fire-fighting	Marine Corps personnel	<b>FIRE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted local fire fighters amidst a series of brush fires in San Diego County.
14 - 23 Sep 70/HU	Philippines	Disaster Relief	3d MARDIV	<b>TYPHOON IN PHILIPPINES</b> Set up water purification units to aid victims of Typhoon Georgia in Quezon City, PI.
21 - 25 Oct 70/HU	Philippines	Disaster Relief	HMM-164 and a Det from BLT 2/9	<b>HURRICANE IN PHILIPPINES</b> Conducted relief operations and delivered over 65 tons of supplies- Typhoon Joan
Oct 70/HU	South Vietnam	Disaster Relief	USMC helicopters from 1st MAW	<b>TYPHOON IN SOUTH VIETNAM</b> Performed rescue and relief operations for over 9000 South Vietnamese.
5-29 Jan 71/OT	southern Cambodia	Logistical and comm support	3 1st MEU (BLT 3/9 and HMM-165)	<b>OPERATION CUU LONG 2/44</b> Marine force from Subic Bay provides support for joint Cambodian/South Vietnam operation along Route 4
1 Feb - 9 Mar 71/OT	Vinh area of North Vietnam	Raid / Diversionary Force	31st MEU (BLT 319 and HMM-165)	<b>VIETNAM-LAOS INCURSION</b> Marine forces from Subic Bay to prepare for a raid into Vinh area of N Vn as a diversion in support of S Vn invasion of Laos
9 Feb 71/HU	Newhall, CA	Disaster Relief	Det from 3d MAW	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN CALIFORNIA</b> Assisted earthquake victims by delivering food and supplies.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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21-23 Apr 71/OT	Moorehead City, N.C.	Contingency Reaction Force	3LT 213	<b>HAITI CRISIS</b> Resident Duvalier dies and fears of revolution or invasion - orders cancelled
1-9 Dec 71/OT	South China Sea	Contingency Evacuation	31st MEU (BLT 2/4 and HMM-165)	<b>INDO-PAK WAR</b> Forces stand-by for evacuation
Mar - May 72/PK	Vietnam	Show of Force/ Reinforcement	4 BLT TacAir and Air Spt	<b>NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE</b> Multiplicity of land based tactical air and air support missions by Marine recon, fighter/attk, refueler and air control units
Jul 72/HU	Philippines	Disaster Relief	HMM-165	<b>TYPHOON IN PHILIPPINES</b> Evacuated 2000 Filipinos and flew in 350 tons of relief supplies,
Mar 73/HU	Tunisia	Disaster Relief	USMC helicopters from Forrestal	<b>FLOOD IN TUNISIA</b> Rescued or relocated 729 persons and moved 27 tons of cargo.
April 73/OT	Lebanon	Contingency Evacuation	34th MEU (BLT 2/6 and HMM 264)	<b>LEBANON CRISIS</b> PLC forces entered into Lebanon
24-27 Oct 73/OT	Eastern Med	DEFCON III alert	4th MEB (BLT 3/4, 2/6, 3/6, and HMM 261 and 264)	<b>MIDDLE EAST WAR</b> Forces placed on alert and deployed for possible operations to support Israel
Dec 73/HU	Tunisia	Disaster Relief	USMC helicopters from USS Iwo Jima	<b>FLOOD IN TUNISIA</b> Conducted refugee rescue, equipment deliveries, and other flood-associated missions in Tunisia.
25 Jul 74/OT	Cyprus	Evacuation Operations and Show of Force	34th MAU (BLT 1/8 and HMM 162)	<b>COUP IN CYPRUS</b> Evacuated 752 personnel of which 498 were U.S. nationals.
Aug 74/HU	Philippines	Disaster Relief Operations	31st MAU	<b>FLOODING IN PHILIPPINES</b> Helicopter elements of MAU assisted in flood relief effort.
Jan 75/OT	Cyprus	Evacuation Operation	32nd MEU (BLT 2/8 and HMM263)	<b>CYPRUS CRISIS</b> Violent demonstrations caused alert for possible NEO
12 Apr 75/OT	Phnom Penh	Evacuation Operations	31st MAU/ARG	<b>OPERATION EAGLE PULL</b> Evacuated 276 personnel of which 82 were U.S. nationals.
29 - 30 Apr 75/OT	Saigon	Evacuation Operations	9th MAB	<b>OPERATION FREQUENT WIND</b> Evacuated 6,968 personnel of which 2,373 were U.S. nationals.
May 75/OT	Cambodia	Combat Landing/Ship Capture/Recovery	BLT(R2/9 and Co D 1/4)	<b>MAYAGUEZ RESCUE</b> BLT(-) landed on Ko Tang Island near Cambodia, while other elements seized USS Mayaguez. Both actions supported by USAF helos and Marine forces launched from Thailand.
Aug 75/OT	Lebanon	Evacuation Operation	32nd MEU (BLT 1/2 and HMM 261)	<b>LEBANON CIVIL WAR</b> Forces were prepared to conduct NEO
Jun/Jul 76/OT	Lebanon	Evacuation Operations	32d MAU	<b>NEO EVACUATION</b> Evacuated 160 American citizens and 148 other foreign .

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
11 Aug - 2 Sep 77/OT	Juanatamo Bay	Police Support	20 Marines	RETURN OF HAITIAN REFUGEES <b>Accompanied</b> return of refugees.
26 - 27 Mar 79/HU	Peoria, IL	Disaster Relief	I&I Staff of Company C, 5th Engineer Support Battalion (15 Marines)	FLOOD IN PEORIA <b>Aided</b> damage estimates.
Sep 79/HU	Caribbean and Florida	Disaster Relief	KC- 130 and helicopters from MCAS, Cherry Point, NC A communications detachment and refueling equipment Truck Company (-) Reinforced from the 6th Motor Transport Battalion, 4th FSSG and I&I staff assistance	<b>HURRICANE DAVID</b> Provided reconnaissance and logistical support, and assistance in running the <b>disaster</b> control center and evacuation of at least 60 civilians.
Apr 80/OT	Iran	Rescue Mission	8 helos from USS Niiitz (MAG-26)	OPERATION DESERT ONE Aborted rescue mission attempting to release American hostages held in Tehran.
May 80/PK	Key West, FL	Police Support	434 Marines from Camp Lejeune	OPERATION ALIEN ASSIST Relieved National Guard troops providing aid to Cuban refugees.
12 Oct 80/HU	Algeria	Disaster Relief	USMC helicopters	EARTHQUAKE IN ALGERIA Provided assistance following earthquake in Al Asnam, Algeria.
Jun - 25 Jun 82/OT	Lebanon	Evacuation Operations	32d MAU	EVACUATION IN LEBANON Evacuated nearly 600 American citizens and designated foreign nationals.
Aug 82/OT	Lebanon	Evacuation Operations	32d MAU	EVACUATION OF PLO FIGHTERS AND SUPPORTERS Aided the evacuation of 12,000 PLO fighters and supporters.
29 Sep 82 - 26 Feb 84/PK	Lebanon	Peace support	24 MAU, 22d MAU, 24 MAU, 22d MAU	<b>MULTI-NAT'L PEACEKEEPING FORCE</b> Peace-keeping force. (1 BLT at a time in rotation)
21 - 24Feb 1983/HU	Lebanon	Disaster Relief	Marines in Lebanon	SNOW STORM IN LEBANON Performed snow removal, distributed food and heating <b>fuel</b> , gave medical assistance and rescued four <b>Lebanese</b> men suffering from frostbite and exposure.
29 May 83/HU	Angola, La	Disaster Relief	N/A	<b>Disaster Relief</b> Provided <b>AAVs</b> to assist in flood control.
Oct - Dec 83/OT	Grenada	Protection of US civilians/ NEO	22d MEU, designated TF 125 ashore.	<b>OPERATION URGENT FURY</b> In conjunction with other U.S. and Caribbean forces, intervened to protect and evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals, neutralize <b>Grenadan</b> and <b>Cuban</b> forces, maintain order, and assist in restoring democratic govt.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
Feb - Apr 84/OT	Lebanon	Force Protection/ Withdrawal	22d MEU	<b>JTF LEBANON</b> Complete withdrawal of US forces from Beirut, <b>Provide security for US Embassy.</b>
Oct 85/OT	Mediterranean	Counter Terrorism	USN/USMC Aviation	<b>ACHILLE LAURO hijackers captured</b>
Apr 86/OT	Libya	Retaliatory Strikes	VMFA-3 14 VMFA-323	<b>LIBYAN RETALIATION (EL DORADO CANYON)</b> Marine fighter attack squadrons on board the USS Coral Sea joined Air Force and Navy war planes in the bombing <b>strike</b> of the Libyan port cities of Tripoli and Benghazi in retaliation for Libyan terrorist activities.
Sep 87 - Apr 89/OT	Persian Gulf	Force Protection	4 X CMAGTF 3 X MCFME / 2420	<b>JTFME/OPERATION EARNEST WILL</b> Protected US-flagged and other vessels in Persian Gulf during Iran-Iraq War.
Apr 88/PK	Panama	Reinforcement	AF/ARMY/MC	<b>SAFEGUARD CANAL AND US CITIZENS/</b> interest during instability
Apr 88/OT	Persian Gulf	Retaliatory Strikes	Contingency MAGTF 2-88	<b>OPERATION PREYING MANTIS</b> Units of the Joint Task Force Middle East conducted retaliatory strikes against Iranian Gas/Oil separation platforms and Iranian naval units in the Persian Gulf as a <b>direct</b> response to the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58).
Apr 88/PK	Korea	Deterrent Ops	AF/ARMY/USN/MC	<b>SUMMER OLYMPICS</b> deterrence of DPRK aggression
8 Sep - 1 Oct 88/HU	Wyoming	Fire-fighting	MAGTF 5: 2 bns/5th Marines (1200 Marines)	<b>JTF YELLOWSTONE</b> Provided aid to fuefighters.
89/OT	SW Conus	Counter-drug	IMEF II MEF MarForRes	<b>JTF-6</b> Marine units provide support for <b>Counter-drug Operations in SW Conus</b>
Apr - Sep 89/HU	Pr. Wm. Sound, Alaska	Disaster Relief	I MEF units 3 x SPMAGTF / 300 Det, HMM	<b>ALASKAN OIL SPILL TF</b> Environmental cleanup of oil spill from Exxon <b>Valdez</b> mishap. <b>CH-46s</b> flew <b>MedEvacs</b> and other support sorties.
May 1989	Panama	Security	LAV Co, II MEF	<b>NIMROD DANCER</b> Security of US Installations / Facilities during National <b>Elections</b>
Sep - Oct 89/HU	Charleston, SC	Disaster Relief	8th ESB Det HMH / 1000	<b>HURRICANE HUGO</b> Provided medical <b>assistance</b> , road clearing, power supply and transmission line hook-up, and water purification.
Oct 89/HU	San Francisco, Ca	Disaster Relief	Det, 15th MEU Det, MAG-42 / 500	<b>SAN FRANCISCO EARTH QUAKE</b> Provided disaster relief ranging from crowd control in the port area, <b>rescue</b> efforts at the collapsed overpass, flying damage inspection tours, and general clear <b>u .</b>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
8 Nov 89/HU	Wisconsin	ACSCA: Environmental Assistance	Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452	<b>WHOOPIING CRANE TRANSPORT</b> Airlifted 8 whooping cranes from Andrews AFB to <b>Baraboo</b> , Wisconsin. home of the International Crane Foundation.
kc 89/	Luzon, Philippines	HOW OF FORCE: Security	CO, 9th MEB; Elems of CTF 79 SPMAGTF; MarBks / 3050	<b>JTF PHILIPPINES</b> Coordinated assistance to PI govt during coup attempt, protect US bases and Emb, prepare for <b>NEO</b> (not executed).
kc 89 - Jan 90	Panama	Peacekeeping	6th MEB/II MEF, MarFor Lant, Marine Security Dets already in Panama/ 717	<b>OPERATION JUST CAUSE</b> Protected US lives, secured key mil & canal sites, neutralized Panama Def Forces established law & order, <b>sptd</b> new US-recognized democratic govt.
1-16 Feb	Colombia	ASCA: Presidential Support	MAGTF 1-90: 728 pers * CE: 2d MAW * GCE: CoL (REIN), 3/6 * ACE: HMM-268, HMH-461, HMLA-269, HMLA-167, DET, LAAD * CSSE: 2d FSSG	<b>OPERATION TOP KICK</b> Sea based <b>scy</b> for Presidential visit to <b>Cartegena</b> .
15 May 90 - 9 Jan 91	Liberia	NEO	TF 62 (22d MEU), MARG 3-90 (elems of 26th MEU) FAST / 4,000	<b>OPERATION SHARP EDGE</b> Protected US Embassy and <b>evacuated</b> over 2400 civilians.
7-31 Jul 90	Philippines	Disaster Relief	MAGTF 4-90 (200 Marines) deployed for training 13th MEU(SOC)  1	<b>EARTHQUAKE IN PHILIPPINES</b> Assisted in search missions <b>and emergency</b> relief, (Baguio City, Cabauatuan) * 313 sorties * 627000 lbs of cargo lifted * <b>1804 pers flown</b> * Radio relay site est. * Triage <b>med</b> teams * 40 man Control Center Tm * Aircraft <b>supply</b> delivery
3-5 Sep 90 12-18 Sep 90	Philippines	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: Disaster Relief	MAGTF 4-90: MUD PACK I; (67 Marines) MUD PACK II (94 Marines)	<b>MUD PACK I / MUD PACK II:</b> * I: IRT torrential downpours burying towns and blocking roads, unit transported supplies from <b>Villamor/Manila</b> to Baguio City * II: Continued heavy rains required unit to > lift 98,600 lbs of <b>food</b> and clothing from Baguio to <b>24</b> isolated villages > 447 villagers evacuated > 6 MEDEVAC extractions
Aug 90 - Jan 91	Saudi Arabia	Defense of Saudi Arabia	I, II, III, MEF UNITS	<b>OPERATION DESERT SHIELD</b>
Jan-15 Dec 91	Kuwait	Evacuation of Kuwait	I, II, III, MEF UNITS / 92,690	<b>OPERATION DESERT STORM</b>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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2 - 11 Jan 91	Somalia	NEO	4th MEB (BLT 1/2) HMM-263 KMM-365 Det HMM-461 / 1,800	<b>OPERATION Eastern Exit</b> Evacuated 260 U.S. and Foreign Citizens from the American Embassy in Mogadishu.
Apr - Jul 91	Turkey / N. Iraq	Humanitarian Assistance	24th MEU(SOC), CMAGTF 1-91, Elems of II MEF & III MEF / 2,000	<b>CTF Provide Comfort</b> Coordinated <b>multinational</b> relief effort to establish refugee camps, and provided food and security to thousands of Kurds.
1 May-15 Jun 91	Bangladesh	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	III MEF staff, 5th MEB, CMAGTF 2-91 / 4294	<b>JTF Sea Angel</b> Provided tons of relief supplies using helicopters, C-130s, and landing craft following Cyclone <b>Marian</b> .
2-28 Jun 91	Philippines	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	MAGTF 4-90; 15th MEU; 1124 (USMCR) MPS M/V LUMMUS / 2,700	<b>JTF Fiery Vigil</b> Provided <b>security</b> augmentation, heavy equipment support, cleanup, medical, resupplying food and potable water, generator support, and evacuated over 21,000 US troops and dependents, after the eruption of Mt. <b>Pinatubo</b> .
3 Oct 91	Haiti	Reps for NEO	JTF 129	<b>OPERATION VICTOR SQUARED</b> Prepare for NEO (not executed). JTF 129 deployed from CLNC to GTMO.
22 Nov 91- Jun 93	GTMO Cuba	Humanitarian Assistance	JTF GTMO / 800: Dets of 2dFSSG, 2dMAW, 2dMarDiv, 1/2(-) 3/10, 2/8.	<b>OPERATION SAFE HARBOR/ JTF GTMO/HAITIAN MIGRANT</b> Provide humanitarian aid, help INS screen migrants, construct tent city as a result of the flood of <b>haitian &amp;</b> Cuban migrant seeking to reach US..
Feb 92	Panama	Peace Keeping	MARINE SECURITY FORCE COMPANY	<b>PROMOTE LIBERTY</b> Panama reconstruction
3 Apr 92	Italy	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	HMM-266, 24th MEU	<b>HOT ROCK:</b> VOLCANO IN SICILY Two CH-53Es carried over 200,000 pounds of concrete slabs to alter the course of the volcano's lava flow,
May 92	Los Angeles	Civil Assistance	SPMAGTF (LA) / 1,500: 3dBn/1stMarDiv, engr, MP, & air elems	<b>Operation Garden Plot</b> Reduce civil unrest and help restore order following rioting.
May - Jun 92	Chuuk Island	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	III MEF units Det, 3d FSSG: MPS LUMMUS	<b>Operation Water Pitcher (drought)</b> Supplied water to drought stricken island of Chuuk. (73 Marines)

**MAFUNE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
Jan 92 - TBD	Adriatic Sea	UN Sanction enforcement	22 MEU 24 MEU 26 MEU	<b>OPERATION SHARP GUARD</b> Maritime interception operations enforcing UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Marine forces provided TRAP and CSAR.  Transitioned to operation <b>DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT 16 DEC 95</b>  Transitioned to <b>OPERATION DETERMINED GUARD ON 20 DEC 96</b>
Jul 92 - 15 Mar 96	Bosnia	Humanitarian Assistance	SPMAGTF TR various MEUs Det, MP Co H&S Bn, 2d FSSG (33) MAR -AUG 94 DET MWSG-27 (32) AUG 94 -FEB 95 INDV AUGMENTEES	<b>PROVIDE PROMISE</b> Marine involvement has been <b>almost</b> continuous. The MEUs provided TRAP/CSAR and contingency Ops capability. Also provide security in support of <b>60-bed</b> naval hospital in Zagreb, Croatia
Aug 92 - TBD	S. Iraq	NFZ Enforcement	-VMFA 323 (TR) -VMFA 314 (LINCLN) -VMFA-252 (USSA) 18 NOV-8 DEC 95 -VMAQ-3 2A/C (USSA) 18 NOV-8 DEC 95 -11th MEU(SOC) AV-8B DEC 96-FEB 97 -VMFA-314 (USS NIMITZ) OCT 97-FEB 98 -13 <sup>TH</sup> MEU(SOC) AV-8B'S & KC-130'S Oct-Dec 97 -VMFA-25 1 (USS GW) DEC 97- FEB 98	<b>SOUTHERN WATCH</b> Primarily Marine squadrons provide support <b>embarked</b> on Aircraft carriers as part of the TACAIR integration program; additional air assets from MEU's in theater
Aug - Oct 92	S. Florida	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	HQ, II MEF, 2d MarDiv(-), 2dFSSG(-), 2dMAW(-), 2dSRIG(-), CA Gp, 4thMarDiv(-) USMCR, SPMAGTF (DADE COUNTY) / 850	<b>JTF ANDREW</b> Provided two tent cities, a field kitchen facilities, water purification units and storage tanks, after Hurricane Andrew.
8 Aug - 19 Sep 92	Guam, Marianas	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	Elms of 1st MEB, Det, BSSG-1 M/V Lummus / 175	<b>JTF MARIANAS</b> Provided potable water, restored power, re established communication, transportation and general Island cleanup after Typhoon Omar.
Aug 92 - Feb 93	Somalia	Humanitarian Assistance	Det, I MEF / 20	<b>JTF PROVIDE RELIEF</b> Airlift food relief supplies to the famine and drought stricken areas of Somalia.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
12 Sep - Oct 92	Kauai, Hawaii	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	Engr Det, 1st MEB/466 HMH (D),HMM VMGR Sqdn; total: about 1,000 Marines	<b>JTF HAWAII/ OPERATION GARDEN SWEEP</b> Assisted in massive cleanup and reconstruction effort conducted by JTF Garden Isle after Hurricane Iniki.
Dec 92 - May 93	Somalia	Peacekeeping / Presence Ops	1 MEF units: 1st Mar Div, elems of 3dMAW, elems of 1stFSSG, MEU's Off the coast 24 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / Wasp ARG (Mar - Apr 93); /	<b>OPERATION RESTORE HOPE</b> Assisted in humanitarian relief and peacekeeping by creating a <b>secure environment</b> for UN and NGO agencies,  Approx 11,000 marines & sailors participated.
Jan93 - Sep94	Haiti	Migrant Interdiction	DET FAST CO/ CMFL	<b>OPERATION ABLE MANNER</b> Migrant interdiction in Windward Passage
16-18 Jan 93	California	MSCA; Search and Rescue	1st Force Recon Company and Camp Pendleton Fire Dept personnel	<b>CALIFORNIA FLOODING</b> Assisted local authorities in rescuing flood victims.



**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

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Aug 93	Tunisia	Humanitarian Assistance: Fire-fighting	3LT 3/8 and MSSG 26	FIRE IN TUNISIA
1-3 Aug 93	Nebraska	USCA: Disaster Relief	&I Staff of the Engineering Maintenance Company from Omaha and SMCR Marines	<b>NEBRASKA TORNADO</b> Assist evacuation of 20 civilians and clear roads of debris.
1-19 Aug 93	Territory of Guam	Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief	WA	<b>GUAM EARTHQUAKE</b> ASSIST IN DAMAGE CLEANUP.
12-24 September 1993	Alabama	USCA: Search and Rescue	1st Force Reconnaissance Company, MARRESFOR, AL (12 Marines)	<b>AMTRAK TRAIN DERAILMENT</b> Conduct search operations.
1 Sep 93 - 18 SEP 94	Haiti	ENFORCEMENT OF UN SANCTIONS	Marfor Carib / 65 14th MEU 11,800) (7 July - 16 Aug) JPMATF CARIB 16 Aug - Oct	<b>SUPPORT DEMOCRACY</b> Provided Show of Force/ contingency / NEO ops
Oct 93 - Mar94	Somalia	Withdraw US forces		<b>JTF SOMALIA</b>
Jan 94	Los Angeles	Humanitarian Assistance	1 MEF Units: CSSD (LA) (93 Marines)	<b>LA EARTHQUAKE</b> Provide water support distribution at ten locations throughout the disaster area.
9-29 Jan 94	California	BCA: Disaster Relief	1 MEF Forces CSSD-LA (FORCE 93 MARINES)	<b>OPERATION NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE</b> CSSD-LA provided ten detachments and linguists throughout the AO. Provided 10 storage distribution SITES.
Mar 94	New Jersey	USMSCA: Disaster Relief	5th Motor Transport Battalion's Emergency Action Platoon (36 Marines)	<b>PIPE EXPLOSION IN NEW JERSEY</b> Assisted local authorities following an underground pipeline explosion.
Apr 94	Rwanda	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	11TH MEU / 330	<b>OPERATION DISTANT RUNNER</b> Provided force to perform NEO. 241 citizens evacuated from Bujumbura, burundi on US C-141's, KC-130's and CH-53's.
May 94 - 18 Feb 96	GTMO, Cuba	Migrant Processing/ Humanitarian Asst.	11 MEF units / 1,400 2/6; 1/2	<b>OPERATION SEA SIGNAL</b> Provide security/ Safehaven for Cuban and Haitian migrants. Provided security on board USCG Cutters for haitian being returned to Haiti. Transitioned to joint logistic support group On 18 Feb to breakdown camps to redeploy/store equipment. JLSG terminated on 12 April
13-30 Jun 94	Atlantic	JSCG Interdiction of PRC Migrants	11 MEF units MP Plt, H&S BN MARFORLANT (17 Marines)	<b>OPERATION AMBER VALUE</b> Provided security Det to escort Peoples Republic of China migrants interdicted at sea by the USCG .
Jun - Jul 94	Conus	USCA: security support	I/II MEF (12 K-9 Security Teams)	<b>WORLD CUP SOCCER</b> Provide security support

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
2 - 17 Jul 94	Georgia, Florida, Alabama	MSCA: Disaster relief	MCLB Albany (125)	<b>SOUTHEAST FLOODS</b> MCLB Albany, provided support in the form of equipment and personnel.
1 Aug - Oct 94	Rwanda/ Uganda	Humanitarian Assistance	15th MEU(SOC) Tripoli 4RG HMH-466 4xCH-53E's 2 KC-130's 203 Marines	<b>OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE</b> TF Super Stallion provided heavy lift support for the Rwandan relief effort.
Aug 94	CUBA	MIGRANT INTERDICTION	FAST CO CMFL 2D MARDIV	<b>OPERATION ABLE VIGIL</b> During the interdiction by the USCG of Cuban migrants in the Florida straits MARFORLANT provided security Dets aboard USCG cutters.
Aug 94	Wenatchee, Washington/ Libby, Montana	MSCA: Disaster relief	I MEF units: (1000 Marines) 11th Mar CE 1/5 5/11	<b>OPERATION WILDFIRE</b> (Forest fires) TF WILDFIRE conducted Fire Containment lines, coldline mop-ups training.
20 Sep - 31 Oct 94  31 Jan 00	Haiti	Show of Force:	II MEF units: SPMAGTF CARIB (GCE 2/2)	<b>OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY</b> Marine forces provided ISO of the restoration of democracy. Redeployment of forces continued by both the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army on alternating basis through January 2000 when U.S. Support Group Haiti disestablished.
Oct - Nov 94	SWA	Show of Force: Enforcement of UN Resolutions Deter Iraqi aggression	I MEF UNITS CE CMFP Det, BSSG I MPS-2	<b>OPERATION VIGILANT WARRIOR</b> Provided show of force to enforce UN resolutions.
1 Nov 94- 30 MAR 95	Haiti	Nation Assistance: Police Support	II MEF (Units) and Wing units across USMC	<b>OPERATION MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY</b> Assisted Government of Haiti in maintaining a secure and stable environment, Transitioned into UNMIH
Jan - 20 Feb 95	Panama - GTMO	Migrant Transfer	MARFORLANT 4 X FAST PLTS II MEF Units (3/6, 1x Co 2D CEB)	<b>OPERATION SAFE PASSAGE</b> Provide safe passage for Cuban migrants from Panama to GTMO via air.
Jan 95	Kobe, Japan	Humanitarian Assistance	II MEF C-130 support & engineer det	Delivery of relief supplies and engineer support
Jan - 2 Mar 95	Somalia	UNOSOM II W/D	I MEF(CE) SPMAGTF SOMALIA 13TH MEU(SOC) 3,017 marines	<b>OPERATION UNITED SHIELD</b> Supported the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces and equipment from Somalia.
31 Mar 95- 15 Apr 96	Haiti	Nation Assistance: Support UN mission	20 linguist/staff pers (globally sourced)	UNMM (UN Mission in Haiti) Assisted Government of Haiti in maintaining a secure and stable environment. US FORCES terminated force contribution on 15 April 96

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
17 Aug 95- Feb 96	SWA	Show of Force: Enforcement of UN Resolutions Deter Iraqi aggression	MEF OPP MPS-2 342 marines	<b>OPERATION VIGILANT SENTINEL</b> Provided show of force to enforce UN resolutions
3 DEC 96- FEB 97	Kuwait	'Terminal guidance 'Coalition connectivity 'Coalition Support <b>Team</b> coverage	11th MEU(SOC) 4NGLIC0 Det	<b>EXERCISE IRIS GOLD</b> Covers shortfall in continuous CENTCOM SOF presence requirement 1
Aug-Sep 95	Bosnia/ Herzegovina	Strike: enforcing the 12.5 mile heavy weapons exclusion zone around the UN declared safe areas in Bosnia.	Marine F/A-18D aircraft operating from Aviano, Italy and F/A-18C aircraft operating from the USS Roosevelt in the Adriatic flew over 430 sorties in support of NATO strike operations (sqdns that participated.) vmfa(AW)-533 vmfa(AW)-224 VMFA-312 VMFA-25 1 VMAQ3 VMAQ- 1	<b>OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE</b> This joint/combined NATO effort successfully forced the Bosnian-Serb heavy weapons from around the safe areas and made a major contribution to the U.S. diplomatic efforts for peace in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. 1

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
5 DEC 95 -20 EC 96	Bosnoia/ Herzegovinia	Peacekeeping Operation: Implementation of the Peace Accords	26 MEU (IFOR RES) 22 MEU (IFORRES) 24TH MEU (IFOR RES.) VMFA(AW)-224* VMFA(AW)-332* VMFA(AW)-533* VMAQ-1 * VMAQ-2* VMAQ-4* VMFA-25 1 **(USS A) VMAQ-3**(USS A) VMU-1(178 pers.) DET VMU-2 (6 pers.)  109 IND. AUGMENTS	<b>OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR</b> NATO Operation for the implementation of the PEACE ACCORD sign in Dayton, Ohio, *A/C ASSIGNED DENY FLIGHT transitioned to AIRSOUTH OP DECISIVE EDGE IS0 JT ENDEAVOR <b>** SQDNs embark carrier</b>  VMU-1 providing UAV support to TF EAGLE (MND(N)).  DET VMU-2 providing P-3 connectivity for MND's with remote receiver stations (RRS).
0 Dec 96 - 20 Jan 98			58 IND AUGMENTS 24 <sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC) 26 <sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC)   Det, VMU-2  Det, 4 <sup>th</sup> CAG	<b>OPERATION JOINT GUARD</b> SACEUR MSN: military presence to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace in B-H, transition to deterrent only to allow self sustaining nation building.  DET VMU-2 providing P-3 connectivity for MND's with remote receiver stations (RRS).  CAG augmenting Army Civil Affairs Brigade
Mar - 20 Jun 98			Det, 2d LSB (22 pax)	2d LSB providing Movement Control Teams in Tazar, Hungary & Tuzla, Bosnia  <b>DEPLOYED ARG/MEU(SOC) IS PART OF SFOR U. S. FORCE CONTRIBUTION. UPON NCA APPROVAL, BECOME OPCON SACEUR AND REMAINS OPCON COMSTRIKEFOR SOUTH AS STRATEGIC RESERVE FORCE. TACON MAY BE DELEGATED. MPF/MEU MODULE ALSO PART OF PROMISED STRATEGIC RESERVE.</b>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
Apr-3 Aug 96	Liberia	NEO	22D MEU(SOC) DET VMGR-252 (2 x KC-1301 SPMAGTF-LIBERIA - CE: 8TH MAR - 3/8(-)REIN - ACE: (4 X CH-46 & 2 x UH-IN) -9 x AAV -5 X LAV -727 PERS. ABOARD USS PONCE(LPD)	<b>OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE</b> CINCEUR OP for the evacuation of AMCITS/Third Country Nationals from Monrovia, Liberia, CJTF composed of SOF, CMD by BGen Canavan. SOCEUR Inducted initial ops. Guam ARG/22 MEU(SOC) assumed operational control on 20 April for follow- on missions(NEO/EMB Security)
10 May-1 Aug 1996	Central African Republic (CAR)	NEO: AMEMB Security	22D MEU(SOC) DET VMGR-252 560 PERSONNEL)	<b>OPERATION QUICK RESPONSE</b> CINCEUR OP to secure the AMEMB in Bangui, Central African Republic C.A.R.
5 APR- Pres 9 Sep-15 Apr 9 Nov- 15 Apr 1 Dec-15 May 1 Jan-9 Jul97 Nov-15 Dec	Haiti	Nation Assistance	DET, 2D MED BN CO D, 2D TANK BN COC (REIN) 8TH ESB DET 2D MAW F Co 2/8(REIN) & 4th CAG	<b>ASSISTANCE PHAITI</b> Security Ops & 3 CIMSS ISO of nation building
UN96	Atlanta, GA	MSCA: Consequence management capability	MARFORLANT, CBIRF (approx 350 pers)	1st Olympiad
1 Jul - 15 Dec 96	Manama, Bahrain	security ops: Enhance NAVCENT Scty as a result of the Khobar Towers Bombing	FAST Co.(-) REIN, (132 pers.) 7 Oct: MCSF Co Diego Garcia redesign as Interim MCSF Co Bahrain with 1 FAST Plt augmenting scty (148 pers)	Perimeter Security to NAVCENT HQ and Reaction Force for port.
4 Jul - Pres	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Security Ops: CIT support for JTF- SWA	DET I MEF CIT, 18 pers.	<b>OPERATION DESERT FOCUS</b> providing enhanced counter-intel and route econ. support to JTF-SWA during relocation from Riyadh to Eskan village.
Sept 96	Matilla National Forest, Oregon	MSCA: firefighting	I MEF, 2/5, Med Det, CE (approx 550 pers)	JIFC firefighting support
15 SEP-PRES  III MEF participation: 4 Dec - 8 Mar 97	Guam	Humanitarian Assistance: Relocation of Kurdish Foreign Service Nationals	Det, MARFORPAC (13 pers.)  III MEF Scty: x CE: III MEF x GCE: CoC, 1/3(REIN) x 31 Dec, Co B, 1/6 x CSSE: CSSD-37 x ACE: III MEF LNO	<b>OPERATION PACIFIC HAVEN</b> humanitarian assistance operation to receive, shelter, process, and provide care and security for Kurdish Foreign Service Nationals and their families at Guam Ending their disposition.  Cared for nearly 1355 Kurdish nationals
SEP 96- Jan 97	SOUTHCOM	CD: Radar & Comm support	DET, MACG-28 (70 PERS)	LASER STRIKE

MARJNE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
19 SEP-20 Nov 96	OFFSHORE BERMUDA 200 NM (NORTH) Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	Chinese Migrant interdiction	1 Officer/16 FAST Marines 3/8 (-) (REIN) HQ, 3/8 K, 3/8 WPNS, 3/8 216 pers)	<b>OPERATION MARATHON</b> x Security assistance to USCG Chinese migrant interdiction operation x Interim Security of Chinese migrants at <b>Guantanamo Bay</b> until relocated to Wake Island x Mission handed off to <b>Army</b> , concluded on 20 Nov <b>with repat to PRC</b>
Jan-?Jan 97	athrop, CA	Sandbag filling for evy reinforcement	20 B, 4" LSB 20 active and 60 volunteer and Red Cross workers.)	<b>SAN JOACHINE RIVER flooding:1</b>
Feb- 16 Feb 97	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	Guyanese Migrant Scty	20 E (-)(REIN), 2/2 Det, CI, 2D SRIG let, ITT, 2D SRIG Det, TRK Co, HQBN let, MP Co, HQBN	<b>OPERATION PRESENT HAVEN</b> x Scty for 43 Guyanese migrants interdicted at sea by naval vessel and escorted to <b>Gitmo</b> by USCG x Repatriated to Guyana
3 Mar- 14 Jul 97	irana, Albania	Conduct <b>NEO</b> in Albania IOT <b>Evac</b> AMCITS and TCN to safehaven (Brindisi)	16 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) 16 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)FWD MCSF Co Created from DETS, Naples/Souda Bay, and individ aug from London and Navy 22 <sup>d</sup> MEU(SOC)FWD (Ponce) provided 4 hr response coverage during Redep of MCSF to Brindisi, currently on 96 hr response string	<b>OPERATION SILVER WAKE</b> x 13 Mar - Commence <b>NEO</b> x 877 <b>AMCITS/TCN's evacuated</b> x 26 Mar - <b>NEO</b> ends, continue 30 <b>day</b> <b>Embassy / housing / HLZ scty</b> role x 27 Apr MCSF Co assumes mission x 9 Jun MCSF redeploys to Brindisi, assumes 4 hr alert status from 9 Jun to 13 Jul
2 Mar - 5 Jun 97	Kinshasa, Zaire	Conduct <b>NEO</b> in Zaire IOT <b>evac</b> AMCITS and TCN to safehaven (Brazzaville)	26 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)/ Nassau ARG 22 <sup>d</sup> MEU(SOC)/ Kearsarge ARG	<b>OPERATION GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL</b> x 22 Mar depart Adriatic (JTF-SW) x 2 April <b>arr Simba</b> Station (off coast <b>Zaire</b> ) x 6 April assume JSOTF mission x 15 April assume CJTF role: 13Gen Vanderlinden x 2 May <b>ARG/MEU</b> turnover x 6 May pre-stage <b>Brazzaville</b>
9 May - 5 Jun 97	Freetown, Sierra Leone	Conduct <b>NEO</b> in Freetown, Sierra Leone.	22 <sup>d</sup> MEU(SOC)/ Kearsarge ARG	<b>OPERATION NOBLE OBELISK</b> x 29 May 22d MEU arrives <b>modloc</b> off <b>Sierra Leone</b> inserts FCE x 30 May-2 Jun <b>evacuated</b> 451 AMCITS <b>and</b> 2058 TCN'S. All evacuees <b>transferred</b> to <b>Conakry</b> , Guinea for DOS processing to safehaven
21 Jun-14 Dec 97	incirlik, Turkey	NFZ enforcement over Northern Iraq	VMAQ-1(-) (4 acft)	<b>OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH</b> -VMAQ-1(-) replaced USAF EF-111 det, EF-111's being retired. VAQ-134 (USN) replaced VMAQ- 1 during <b>Dec 97</b> .

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
8 - 21 Jul 97	Utapao, Thailand	reparations and planning for possible NEO in Cambodia	Det from III MEF & ROTG (88 Pax), USMC IC: LtCol M. Ralph. 1 <sup>ST</sup> MEU also placed on alert.	<b>TF-BEVEL EDGE</b> TF was activated and lead elements deployed to Thailand IOT monitor Cambodian NEO situation and conduct advance party activities.
10-19 Nov 97	Doha, Qatar	Military ops to enhance security for US citizens/facilities during the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) Economic Conference	3 <sup>TH</sup> MEU(SOC)/ Peleliu ARG	<b>OPERATION SILENT ASSURANCE</b> MEU inserted FCE and security element in Doha (Camp Snoopy) to provide security & improved comm connectivity, remainder of MEU staged to provide counterterrorist/medevac response and afloat med facility,
13 Feb-30 Jun 98	Kuwait, Arabian Gulf	Support UN resolution enforcement & potential strikes against Iraq	24 <sup>TH</sup> MEU/Guam ARG 11 <sup>TH</sup> MEU/Tarawa ARG I MEF ADVON (17 pers/ MajGen Bolden) I MEF FWD CE (-) - OPP/SLRP - 529 pers	<b>OPERATION DESERT THUNDER</b> Force deployments ISO potential operations to enforce UN resolutions in Iraq
16 Feb - 3 Apr 98	Mombasa and Narissa, Kenya	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief	JTF BGen Whitlow TFHQ (27 pax) HQ Det. I MEF (21 Pax) Det, JPAO, I MEF (3 Pax) Det, JCSE, (3 pax) (USCENTCOM) Det, 3d MAW, I MEF (31 Pax) Det VMGR-352 (2 KC-130-S) Det, MWSS, 3d MAW Det, 96 <sup>th</sup> CA Bn , Tac Spt Tm (2 Pax)	<b>OPERATION NOBLE RESPONSE</b> TF-Kenya provided air land/air delivery support for approximately 30 days IOT sustain WFP efforts to build up distribution sites w/sufficient food & supplies & demonstrate US support to the government & people of Kenya. Total sorties flown 51 / 802 metric tons of Food stuffs delivered. 3 Apr JTF deactivated.
15 Apr - 1 Aug 98	Incirlik, Turkey	EFZ enforcement over Northern Iraq	Det, VMGR-252	<b>OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH</b> VMGR-252 providing aerial refueling spt to CSAR helicopters.
11 - 27 Apr 98	Tbilisi, Georgia and Scotland, UK	Movement of HEU from Tbilisi, Georgia to the United Kingdom	CJIA TF AE: 201 (BGen Sel) Nash IIATF (76 pax) Manning List comprised of personnel from - MARFOR (37 pax) - NAVEUR (7 pax) - AREUR (1 pax) - AFEUR (3 pax) - EUCOM (3 pax) - TRANSCOM (2 pax) - DOE (21 pax) - DOS (1 pax) - NCIS (1 pax)	<b>OPERATION AUBURN ENDEAVOR.</b> To conduct military operations to recover and package fresh and spend HEU at reactor site in Tbilisi, Georgia; Conducts deliberate evacuation of HEU material to designated United Kingdom authorities in Scotland.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>FORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
0 - 30 May 98	Indonesia	Ordered MODLOC to w/in 12 hrs of Jakarta, Indonesia	31 <sup>st</sup> MEU / BW ARG - CE - Blt 3/5 - HMM - 262 - MSSG - 31 - MAG - 36 (Helio Det attached <b>opcon</b> for mvmt to CG98)	<b>OPERATION BEVEL INCLINE.</b> Staged IOT support DOS in the protection & <b>evac</b> of US Non combatant citizens in Indonesia. (Not executed)
Jun 98	Asmara, Eritrea	Conduct <b>NEO</b> in Asmara, Eritrea	11 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)/Tarawa ARG - 30 Marines and Sailors - 2 C-130's from Jordan	<b>OPERATION SAFE DEPARTURE:</b> (Air-only NEO) The following individuals: - 105 <b>AMCITS</b> - 24 Norwegians - 20 British - 8 Canadians - 6 Eritreans - 3 Ethiopians - 3 Japanese - 1 Korean - 1 Mexican, and - 1 <b>Swede</b> were evacuated and taken to Amman, Jordan for processing to safehaven. This <b>came</b> as a result of escalated border disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia which culminated in air attacks between the two nations.
10 Jun 98 -	Bosnia - Herzegovina	Peace Enforcement / Keeping Operations	26 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)/Wasp ARG Det VMU - 2 (6 pax) Det 4 <sup>th</sup> CAG 2 <sup>d</sup> LSB	<b>OPERATION JOINT FORGE</b> (follow on Op <b>frm</b> Joint Guard) military presence <b>IOI</b> stabilize & consolidate the <b>peace</b> and thus contribute to provide & maintain broad support for the implementation of the civil <b>aspects</b> of the General Framework Agreement for Peace .
0 Jun 98 -	Adriatic Sea	Maritime Support Interdiction ISO Peace Enforcement / Keeping Operations		<b>OPERATION DETERMINE FORGE</b> (follow on Op to Determined Guard)
0 Jun 98 - 8 Jul 98	Bosnia - Herzegovina	No Fly Zone enforcement ISO Peace Enforcement / Keeping Operations	VMAQ-4(-)	<b>OPERATION DELIBERATE FORGE</b> (follow on to op Deliberate Guard)  Began redeployment 18 Jul completed 23 Jul
4 Jun 98	MODLOC of Coast of Albania	Show-of-Force Exercise	26 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)	<b>OPERATION DETERMINED FALCON</b> To demonstrate NATO's <b>ability</b> to rapidly project power, and NATO's will to conduct Operations in Kosovo, if necessary.

MARJNE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
Jul 98 - 10 Aug 98	Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic	Kosovo Observer Mission	Maj Black firm <b>1ARFOREUR</b> 3 Jul - 15 Sep 98) Lt Col Dean & Maj Slavik [MEF Augments 15 Sep - 15 Nov) Marine Maj Paschal EUCOM Staff also in country)	<b>OPERATION BALKAN CALM</b> To provide overt mission US presence with non-obtrusive observer teams throughout Kosovo. <b>CINCUSNAVEUR (MED MEU(SOC))</b> tasked to be prepared to execute: 1. Med <b>evac</b> 2. TRAP permissive (4 hrs)/ non (2 hrs)
10 Aug 98 - 30 Aug 98	Nairobi, Kenya/Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania	Security Augmentation (Aug-18 Oct 8 Oct - 30 Nov Tent.)	Nairobi, Kenya) <b>JTF - Bgen Johnson</b> JSMC (Centcom IG) 5 <sup>ST</sup> Plt, 2d FAST Co; 4d Plt, 1 <sup>ST</sup> FAST Co  MSG Augments - Sgt <b>E.L. Smith</b> Cpl J.D. Cornell Sgt T.J. Lawler Sgt J.B. Wolfe Cpl S.A. <b>Grafe</b> Cpl R.R. Outt  Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) 4d Plt, 2d FAST Co 6 <sup>TH</sup> Flt FAST Plt) 5 MSG Augments - Cpl <b>E.G. Boudah</b> Sgt AS. <b>Salazar</b> Sgt G.A. Albero Cpl <b>A.E. Durdeu</b> Sgt <b>S.M. Jackson</b> Sgt AC. Reynolds	<b>OPERATION RESOLUTE RESPONSE</b> Joint Task force ( <b>JTF</b> ) deployed to Nairobi & assumed command and control of all US Military forces (concerning recovery, security force and humanitarian assistance support to Amembassy following the 7 Aug Bomb attack. Although the operation ended on 30 Aug, 1 <sup>ST</sup> Plt, 2 <sup>ND</sup> FAST Co <b>remained</b> in Kenya thru 18 Oct 98. 2d Plt 1 <sup>ST</sup> FAST initially <b>backfilled</b> the 5 <sup>TH</sup> Flt <b>FP/AT</b> plt mission in NAVCENT
10 - 16 Aug 98	Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation	22d MEU(SOC) USS Saipan USS Tortuga	<b>OPERATION AUTUMN SHELTER.</b> - O/A 10 Aug 22D MEU(SOC) was <b>directed</b> to conduct Split ARG ops IS0 Autumn Shelter off the coast of Western Africa. - 16 Aug, the requirement for the MEU to conduct <b>NEO</b> was removed.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
17 Aug-15 Nov 98	Albania	Embassy/Housing 2 Security Mission	22d MEU(SOC) USS Saipan USS Tortuga USS Austin	<b>OPERATION RESOLVE RESOLUTE</b> - From 17 Aug – 15 Nov 98 two Rifle Companies (CO F(Maj <b>LeBlanc</b> )/CO G) conducted a two time relief in place ISO a security mission to the Embassy Ralindja Ridge Housing Complex and the U.S. Embassy. Security was present against a known terrorist threat and civil unrest (20,000 riotors) against the Gouvernement and Prime Minister. - 22 MEU(SOC) completed turn over with 24 MEU(SOC) in Nov 98- 24 MEU(SOC) completed mission and backloaded ARG NLT 30 DEC 98.
5 Sep - 5 Oct 98	Kuwait	southern NFZ enforcement	15 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) Harrier's, Det, VMA-5 13	<b>OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH</b> Provide sorties ISO of JTF-SWA ISO Southern Watch (38 sorties in 11 days)
8 Sep -- 27 Oct 98	Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, PR	Hurricane Georges Disaster Relief Operations JTF departed PR 25 Oct 29 Oct Rear Party departs	CJTF - BGen Lee (2 <sup>d</sup> FSSG) CE, SPMAGTF (LtCol Whitfield) GCE: L 3/6 ACE: HMM-461 CSSE: CSSD-61	<b>OPERATION FUNDAMENTAL RELIEF</b> JTF (FULL PROVIDER) deploys to provide Disaster Relief (DR)/Humanitarian Assistance (HA) ISO FEMA. SPMAGTF (Puerto Rico) deploys to provide sea based support for CJTF PR disaster relief operations in the vicinity of Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. It is configured to provide helicopter transport, engineer support for construction of up to ten medium girder bridges and water purification at four separate sites. - Disaster Relief efforts conducted at (temp roofing at 171 sites) San Sebastian, Marcio, Lares, Cabo Rojo, Las Marias. - Water production (ROWPU) at Comerio 103,800 gals produced / 95,495 distributed - MGB sites Villalba, Utuado, Lares, Penuelas - 22,600 man hours - 42,149 gals fuel consumed - 11, 813 miles driven - 500 hrs hvy equip operation - <b>1,790,533 lbs transported</b> - 1498 pax transported - 3,551 generator hrs

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
Nov - 15 Nov 8	Okinawa / Camp Pendleton I Kuwait	<p>IRI Iraqi refusal to comply w/ UNSCOM Wpn's Inspectors SECDEF - order the alerting &amp; preparing to deploy of certain</p> <p><b>MARFORPAC</b> assest &amp; extedned 15<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) /Essex ARG in CENTCOM, diverted 31<sup>st</sup> MEU/Belleau Wood ARG to deploy to the CENTCOM AOR</p>	<p>15<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) extended in theater until O/A 20 Nov</p> <p>31<sup>st</sup> MEU in chop</p> <p>CENTCOM AOR NLT 26 Nov</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MARCENT(FWD)</li> <li>- MEF (FWD)</li> <li>- MAGTF Enhancement Package (MEP)</li> <li>- MPSRON2</li> <li>- A A O G</li> <li>- SLRP</li> <li>- OPP</li> </ul>	<p><b>OPERATION DESERT THUNDER.</b></p> <p>11 Nov- 3 1<sup>st</sup> MEU sailed</p> <p>13 Nov - 15<sup>th</sup> MEU inserted <b>MSALT</b> into <b>AmEmbassy</b> Ku</p> <p>15 Nov - all deploymnts placed on hold w/ the exception of 31<sup>st</sup> MEU remained in AOR through 24 Mar</p>
Nov 98 - 12 far 99	Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala		<p>JTF - BRAVO:</p> <p>CSSD-68</p> <p>3 x medium girder bridges (MGB) &amp; 2 marines via sea lift departed 14 Nov / ETA 21 Nov</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advon 9 marines &amp; 2 HMMWV via airlift departed 14 Nov</li> <li>- personnel LtCol Ray, CO 2d LSB, COMMARFOR</li> </ul> <p>2d LSB &amp; 2d FSSG approx 196 Marines &amp; sailors</p> <p><b>DRJTF-</b> CSSD-69</p> <p><b>water purification units</b> for 11 sites</p> <p>1 x Med Co(-)</p> <p>10 x Hvy lift &amp; 6 x medium lift Helo's</p> <p>Alert &amp; be prepared to &amp;ploy (w/in 72 hrs):</p> <p>1 x Preventative Med Det</p> <p>1 x MP Co</p> <p>Requirement for Helo Assets removed and given to FORSCOM.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- personnel LtCol Daly, CO, 8<sup>th</sup> MTBn, COMMARFOR</li> </ul>	<p><b>OPERATION STRONG SUPPORT - HURRICANE MITCH DISASTER RELIEF OPS-mission statement</b></p> <p>&gt; USCINCSO employs multiple JTFS to conduct disaster relief operations. <b>ISO</b> United States relief efforts in the <b>CENTAM</b> region IOT mitigate <b>near-term human</b> suffering &amp; accelerate long-term regional recovery</p> <p><b>CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS</b></p> <p>&gt; JTF - Bravo (<b>Soto</b> Cano Air Base, Ho) Joint Operating Area (<b>JOA</b>) Honduras &amp; adjacent waters (50 nm)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- O/O DISASTER RELIEF JTF (<b>DRJTF</b>) (El Salvador International Airport, Compala) <b>JOA</b> Guatemala, El Salvador &amp; Nicaragua &amp; adjacent waters (50 nm)</li> <li>- <b>RENAMED OPERATION FUERTE APOYO (STRONG SUPPORT) ON 3 DEC 98.</b></li> <li>- <b>DRJTF</b> renamed JTF-Aguila on</li> <li>- <b>ADVON</b> CI Teams (7 pax) arr 7 Dec</li> </ul>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

<b>DATE / TYPE</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>MISSION</b>	<b>ORCE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION OF ACTION</b>
3 Nov - 1 Dec 98	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Mission was to oversee military operations ISO of the NATO Kosovo Air Verification Mission.	Gen Amos JEP COMSTRIKEFOR (UTH)	<b>OPERATION EAGLE EYE - BGen</b> Amos only Marine participating in this operation. <b>Headed</b> the mission from 3 Nov - 1 Dec. Was replaced by <b>BGen</b> Montgomery (UK),
16 - 20 Dec 98	Arabian Gulf / Kuwait	IRI Iraqi refusal to comply w/ UNSCOM Wpn's Inspectors SECDEF order the alerting & preparing to deploy of certain MARFORPAC assets	'MFA-312 embarked board the USS Enterprise 1 <sup>st</sup> MEU / USS BWD ARG Elements from MARFORPAC & I MEF	<b>OPERATION DESERT FOX - TLAM &amp;</b> Air Strikes against Iraqi installations in response to Iraq's <b>non-compliance</b> with UN directed UNSCOM weapons inspections.
Jan 99 2 - 17 Feb 99	Arabian Gulf	Maritime Interdiction Operations	Elements 31 <sup>st</sup> MEU embarked aboard the USS Dubuque & USS Serranow	<b>MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO) -</b> Ships of the ARG & embarked Marines conducted boarding & subsequent searches / inspections of various ships in Gulf.
O/A 23 Mar 99	MODLOC Aegean Sea (MEU/ARG), MEU to deploy to FSB at Brazda, FYROM & subsequently into Kosovo	MEU tasked as KFOR Enabling Force	24 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / USS Jassau ARG	<b>OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN - Planned not executed.</b> Conduct Initial Entry Force tasks & support for 3BCT/1ID (U.S. element of KFOR main force). Task! include: providing initial command & control, conducting initial reconnaissance operations, provide security for follow-on forces until relieved, Mission duration not expected to be more than 30-45 days from initial entry.

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
<p>17 Feb 99 5 Mar 99 Commenced Combat ops)</p> <p>8 Mar – 30 Jun VMAQ-4)</p>	<p>Former Republic of Yugoslavia Viano AB, Italy (MAQ Sqdns) MODLOC Mediterranean Sea (MEU)</p>	<p>Tagging &amp; Subsequent Combat Operations ISO ACEUR Phased Air Operations</p>	<p>MAQ-2 { 5 x EA-6B a/c were deployed 21 Feb 99) MAQ-2 redeployed to ONUS on 14 Jul 99 MAQ-1(-) { 3 x EA-6B a/c &amp; crew, were deployed to Op Northern Watch Subsequently chopped to JTF-NA 20 Mar - 11 (pr)} MAQ-4(-) (3 x EA-6B a/c deployed 29 Mar arrived 30 Mar}. MAQ-4(-) returned to NAS Cherry Point 30 Jun.  24<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / USS Massau ARG TRAP Package &amp; Det, VMA  26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / Learsarge ARG &amp; Det MGR-252</p>	<p><b>OPERATION NOBLE ANVIL</b> (US Combat Ops ISO of NATO efforts) / <b>OPERATION ALLIED FORCE</b> (NATO Name). IRT failing negotiations between Serbian &amp; Kosovar Rebel leaders at Rambouillet forces deployed and/or prepared to support US / NATO military actions if so required by NCA &amp; NAC. MAQ Sqdns providing airborne E/W ops ISO of strike packages.  14<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) stand by TRAP. Det, VMA flew 28 Combat sorties (BAI / CAS) ISO CJTF-NA (departed AOR o/a 26 Apr) relieved on station by 26<sup>th</sup> MEU who assumed BAI &amp; TRAP responsibilities</p>
<p>May-4 Jun</p> <p>2 May – 2 Jul</p>	<p>Naples, Italy</p> <p>Saszar, Hu</p>	<p>Force Protection</p> <p>Combat Air ops</p>	<p>MCSF Co Naples, Italy</p> <p>MAG-31 FWD VMFA(AW) 332 &amp; 533) 28 May – o/a 2 Jul)</p>	<p>Provided fixed site security (3 Grd posts)</p> <p>MAG reported initial operational capability 28 May &amp; began flying combat sorties providing strike mission support..</p>
<p>10 May -</p>	<p>Naples, Italy</p>	<p>Planning</p>	<p>Dpty COMMARFOR-NA</p>	<p>BGen Davis reported to JTF-NA as the Dpty MARFOR Component Cmr for naval forces employment planning (ONLY) co-located w/ COMNAVFOR abd USS Mt Whitney</p>
<p>16 Mar – 26 Jun '99. Mission extended to 5 Jul 99</p>	<p>Skopje, FYROM</p>	<p>AT / FP Security Support to US Embassy</p>	<p>1<sup>st</sup> Plt, 1<sup>st</sup> FAST Co (26 Mar – 26 May) 2<sup>nd</sup> Flt LNO (Maj Shoup relieved by Maj Skuta) 1<sup>st</sup> Plt, 2d FAST Co (26 May – 25 Jul 99)</p>	<p>IRT violent demonstrations in / around US Embassy Skopje (no MSG Det assigned) C6F deployed FAST from Naples to Skopje. 3<sup>rd</sup> PLT, 1<sup>st</sup> FAST CO deployed until relieved in place by 3<sup>rd</sup> PLT, 2<sup>d</sup> FAST CO, as a result of mission extension by 30 days to 25 Jul 99. Security force drawn down to 17 Marines as of 2 Jul. 31 Marines redeployed to Naples, Italy due to reduced site requirement.</p>

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
7 Apr - 8 Jul 99	Tirana, Albania / Fier, Albania / (Camp Hope), 15 km east of Fier (Camp Eagle)	Refugee Assistance & Security Operations	<p>Individual Augments from:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 MEF (21 JTF-HQ / 3 JTF(Fwd))</li> <li>24<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / Nassau ARG</li> <li>26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / Kearsarge ARG (On station 28 Apr)</li> </ul> <p>All JTF functions in Germany cease on 30 Jun 99. Functions shifted to Tirana, Albania.</p> <p>JTF stood down by USCINCEUR</p>	<p><b>OPERATION SHINING HOPE</b> (US Refugee Relief Operation in support of NATO <b>OPERATION ALLIED HARBOUR</b>.</p> <p><b>BGen Sam Helland</b> Deputy CJTF SH 24<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) conducted HA relief planning no formal <b>taskings</b> of direct support.</p> <p>26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) HA relief support planning subsequently deployed forces ashore to provide Security for Camp <b>Hope</b> beginning 2 May - 4 Jun; Security support for Camp Eagle initiated 30 May - 4 Jun; Elements of BLT 3/8 providing security for CTF 64 <b>helo's</b> embarked aboard USS <b>Inchon</b> initiated 2 May - 4 Jun 99. On 28 Jun, <b>BGen Helland</b> assumed command of the JTF.</p> <p><b>BGEN Helland</b> returned to CONUS on 12 Jul 99.</p>

**MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776**

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
<p>1 Jun –</p> <p>1 Jun – FCE asserted</p> <p>10 Jun Initiated Offload Ops at Dushorun Beach</p> <p>4 Jun Lead elements cross into Kosovo en route MND SE Sector</p> <p>10 Jul – Relief in place with U.S. Army TF 1-26</p> <p>10-11 Jul – Tactical Withdrawal to Camp Able Sebry &amp; FSB in Petrovec</p> <p>12-15 Jul – Consolidation &amp; maintenance stand down. ACE backloaded to Kearsarge.</p> <p>15-16 Jul – Surface mvmt to Thessaloniki, GR</p> <p>17-20 Jul – Backload amphibious shipping at Thessaloniki port.</p>	<p>Kosovo – General vicinity of Prizren</p>	<p>Peacekeeping enabling Force operations</p>	<p>5<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) / USS Kearsarge ARG</p>	<p><b>OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN -</b></p> <p>Conduct Initial Entry Force tasks &amp; support KFOR Main Force (U.S. element of KFOR main force). Tasks included: providing initial command &amp; control, conducting initial reconnaissance operations, provide security for follow-on forces until relieved. Mission duration not projected to be greater than 45 days from initial entry.</p> <p>34 hours elapsed from initiating of off load operations – movement to FSB (Petrovec, FYROM) 375 Km.</p> <p>26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) Marines involved in shooting incidents at various Marine checkpoints and operating areas, No Marine casualties were suffered.</p>

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
May - 3 Jul 99	Izmirlik, Turkey	IFZ enforcement over Northern Iraq	-Det, VMGR-234 / 452	<b>OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH</b> VMGR detachment providing aerial fueling support for CTF ONW CSAR helicopters.
5 Jul - 30 Sep 99			-Det, VMGR-352	
1 Jun-31 Jul 00			-Det, VMGR-352	
26 Jul - 3 Sep 00			-Det, VMGR-252	
1 - 30 sep 00			-Det, VMGR-234	
22 Aug - 10 Sep 99	Izmit, Turkey	humanitarian assistance	26 <sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC)/ Keearsarge ARG - BLT 3/8 - HMM-365 - MSSG-26  12 x CH-46 6 x CH-53 2 x UH-1N	<b>OPERATION AVID RESPONSE MISSION</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ In coordination with Office of Defense Coordination (ODC), Task Force Avid Response (TF-AR) provides disaster relief as required vicinity of <b>Izmit/Golcuk</b> Turkey IOT support the Government of turkey (GOT).</li> <li><b>CONOPS</b> - Op conducted in 5 phases</li> <li>▶ <b>Phase I</b> - Assessment and Preparation. FCE inserted in Istanbul conducting liaison and <b>coord w/ODC, GOT, crisis response teams &amp; other relief agencies,</b></li> <li>▶ <b>Phase II</b> - Movement to Objective. <b>ARG/MEU</b> positioned near beach landing site (BLS) and includes <b>ship-to-shore</b> movement and initial establishment of the forward support base (FSB).</li> <li>▶ <b>Phase III</b> - Disaster Relief Operations. <b>ARG/MEU</b> arrives in Turkish <b>AOR.</b> A shore-based Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is established. Distribution of <b>food, water &amp; medical supplies</b> initiated.</li> <li>▶ <b>Phase IV</b> - Transition to Host Nation Support (HNS). Host nation relief effort has stabilized and COMTF-AR is no longer needed to provide relief.</li> <li>▶ <b>Phase V</b> - Retrograde. Enabling <b>force elements</b> arrive respective <b>LZ's</b> and <b>BLS.</b> Enabling <b>elements</b> conduct retrograde via surface and air to ARG shipping.</li> </ul>

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
10 Sep - Ongoing	Darwin East Timor	Peacekeeping	Elements from III MEF & MARFORPAC	OPERATION STABILISE. UN directed, Australian led, U.S. supported PEACEKEEPING mission in East Timor, Indonesia. US contingent is led by BGen Castellaw (COMUSF INTERFET) and is currently operating from Dili, ET.
Oct 99 - 7 Oct 99	Dili, East Timor		31 <sup>ST</sup> MEU(SOC) USS BWD ARG	USS BELLEAU WOOD and SPMAGTF-31 (31 <sup>ST</sup> MEU(SOC)(-)) is MODLOC Timor Sea. USS PELELIU scheduled to arrive IOT relieve BWD O/A 26 Oct thru O/A 28 Nov 99.
9 Oct 99 - 7 Nov 99	Dili, East Timor		11 <sup>TH</sup> MEU(SOC) USS PELELIU ARG	
9 Jan 00 -	Dili, East Timor	Peacekeeping	USS JUNEAU/SPMAGTF East Timor G Co (-) BLT 2/5 Det, HMM-265 Det, MSSG-3 1 4 x CH-46E	To provide security forces and medium helo lift support with appropriate HST capability for ship to shore operations as directed by USFI. The SPMAGTF will operate in direct support of USF INTERFET missions to transport equipment/personnel to retrograde from East Timor. The SPMAGTF will deploy with the ability to support additional missions which are inherent to the East Timor situation such as TRAP, PCM Flights, and security to U.S. personnel as required.
1 Feb 00				Col M. E. Williams relieved BGen J. Castellaw as Commander, U.S. International Forces, East Timor (USINTERFET)
3 Feb 00 - 1 Mar 00	Darwin, East Timor		5 <sup>TH</sup> MEU(SOC) USS BHR ARG	5 <sup>TH</sup> MEU TACON to USGET
23 Feb 00				International Forces, East Timor (INTERFET) transitions to United States Group, East Timor (USGET)

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776

DATE / TYPE	LOCATION	MISSION	FORCE	DESCRIPTION OF ACTION
12 Jan 00 - 12 Mar 00	Coastal Venezuela	Humanitarian Assistance & Search and Rescue	Det, II MEF	<b>OPERATION FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSE.</b> An emergency <b>Humanitarian Assistance and Search and Rescue</b> Operation utilized in <b>assisting</b> the <b>Venezuelan Government</b> as a result of intense <b>rains</b> and subsequent <b>flooding</b> in the <b>Federal District</b> of Caracas and eight northern <b>states</b> .
Mar 00 - O/A 30 Mar 00	Mozambique, Africa	Humanitarian Assistance & Search and Rescue	Det, MARFOREUR	<b>OPERATION ATLAS RESPONSE</b> An emergency <b>Humanitarian Assistance</b> operation in Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and <b>Zimbabwe</b> to relieve suffering and prevent <b>further</b> loss of life. Due to <b>higher</b> than average seasonal <b>rainfall</b> , <b>exacerbated</b> by <b>tropical</b> cyclones <b>Connie</b> and <b>Eline</b> .
1 Apr - 7 May 00	Vieques Island Puerto Rico	Support Operations on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico	PMAGTF, II MEF	<b>OPERATION EASTERN ACCESS</b> The presence of trespassers in front of the Camp <b>Garcia</b> Gate and on the Vieques Island <b>Lia</b> Range complex prevents its use by Navy and Marine <b>Forces</b> for important <b>predeployment</b> training.
2 Oct 00 - 5 Oct 00	Yemen/Aden	Force Protection	3 <sup>TH</sup> MEU(SOC) ISS TARAWA ARG 1 <sup>TH</sup> Plt 2 <sup>D</sup> FAST 1 <sup>TH</sup> Plt 1 <sup>ST</sup> FAST	<b>JTF DETERMINED RESPONSE</b> As a result of the 12 Oct 00 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67), CINCCENT has formed JTF DETERMINED RESPONSE. 4th Plt, 2d FAST Co (50 PAX) deployed to <b>Aden</b> on 13 Oct. Or 15 Oct 00, 6th Plt, 1st FAST Co (45 PAX) arrived at <b>Aden</b> from Norfolk via Bahrain. Both FAST Platoons and the 13th MEU(SOC) are OPCON to <b>CJTF DETERMINED RESPONSE</b> .
15 Oct 00 - 15 Dec 00			1 <sup>ST</sup> RADBN 2 <sup>D</sup> RADBN	<b>OPERATION BOLD VENTURE</b>

MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS SINCE 1776



13 April 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is a response to your question concerning what issues I think are of importance to the Marine Corps. It is divided into two sections, one discussing matters internal to the Corps, the other addressing subjects external to the Corps. With each concern, I comment on why the topic is important, what we are doing about it, and how we track our performance vis-a-vis that issue. As well, I have attached a series of charts that are illustrative of the metrics we use in relation to these matters,

The issues internal to the Marine Corps of special importance to me are: safety; readiness and modernization; returning Marines to our operating forces; recruiting and retention; maintaining a warrior culture; education; and, innovation.

**Safety** (See Tab A) Operational and personal, is of fundamental importance to the Corps. Unsafe acts and conditions rob the Corps of its most precious asset: our Marines. Too frequently, mishap investigations reveal deviation from regulations. Too often, the aggressiveness of our Marines translates into off-duty accidents. To counter this, the subject of the update to my "Commandant's Guidance" was safety, underscoring to the Corps that safety is vital to mission accomplishment and taking care of our Marines. The Assistant Commandant and I repeatedly emphasize that each Marine must assess the degree of risk in given situations and be mindful of exercising their responsibility to live up to the safety standards that we set for them – we will continue to hammer home this message.

**Readiness and modernization** (See Tab B). Inasmuch as the Marine Corps exists to answer our nation's call, the readiness of our operating forces is of critical interest to me. The Corps' readiness has four pillars: Marines and their families; infrastructure; modernization; and "legacy" systems. To maintain the strength of each pillar while achieving an effective balance of resources among the four requires a variety of separate assessments. We measure operational tempo and personnel tempo. We use individual combat skills and unit operational readiness evaluations. We have no-notice Inspector General and maintenance inspections – and with our IG webpage, commanders can compare their unit's quantitative indicators to those of similar battalions or squadrons around the Corps. Additionally, we emphasize Quality of Life issues across the board from unit initiatives by field commands to our service's budgetary requests. Our base and station commanders report annually their progress in achieving cost reduction goals in relation to our infrastructure. Analysis of the pace of our modernization considers both the progress of our new equipment items through acquisition and development processes as well as the increased costs produced by programmatic changes and budgetary deferments – including the price of continuing the operation of legacy systems, including increasingly higher maintenance costs and the attenuation of readiness.

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**Returning Marines to our operating forces** (See Tab C). Because our operating forces are the main component of the Corps' contribution to the security of our nation, it is important to us that as many of our Marines as possible are assigned to them. Some of the ways in which we are improving our tooth-to-tail ratio are privatizing food service, reducing the Fleet Assistance Program, reducing the time spent in training and transition, consolidating both our base and station motor transport as well as our supply issue facilities, changing our National Foreign Intelligence Program, and expanding outsourcing initiatives through the A-76 program. In measuring our success in this endeavor, we have identified nearly 3,000 positions in the supporting establishment from which we are removing Marines and sending those men and women to the operating forces.

**Recruiting and retention** (See Tab D). Inasmuch as our strength as the nation's force-in-readiness is rooted in our people, we are very concerned with the men and women we recruit and retain. We have met our recruiting and retention goals in quality and quantity for nearly six years. Nonetheless, to increase our success in attracting and keeping the men and women we want, we analyze a number of manpower statistics. We assess the performance of our recruiters with regard to their recruits' education level, mental-test scores, waivers, and recruit training completion rates. We look at how education level, mental-test scores, waivers, and training-class standing relate to whether or not Marines complete their initial enlistment, re-enlist, and continue on to retirement. We are adding emphasis to the role of the career planners and are more closely aligning them with our recruiters. We are also examining the factors that contribute to the retention of our senior leaders – enlisted and officer – beyond the twenty-year retirement mark.

**Maintaining a warrior culture.** To cultivate our capacity to deter and resolve crises and conflicts we also pay special attention to the intangible goal of maintaining our Corps' warrior culture. We seek to make our Marines warriors by inculcating them with mental discipline and physical confidence as well as their particular warfighting skills. We do this to enable them to succeed in whatever circumstances, no matter how trying, they find themselves. Moreover, we do this to influence our opponents, to intimidate them, so that we can be more economical and effective when we actually do employ force. Two examples of this warrior focus are the institutional primacy of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) and our recently begun initiative of sustained martial arts training for all our Marines. Ultimately, our success in this concern is reflected in the Corps' performance in crises and conflict.

**Education.** The education of Marines is also important to me as it works in tandem with training to provide perspective and context for our Marines in addition to augmenting their operational and administrative skills. With the help of our operating forces, our Marine Corps schools are constantly re-tooling their programs of instruction to ensure they are relevant to our Marines' tasks and missions. Moreover, we have created a distance-learning program at all our major installations to support non-resident courses. As we have improved our non-resident courses so that they mirror resident programs, we have ensured that graduating from non-resident courses is considered equal to completing resident courses in the eyes of promotion boards and other selection boards. To assess

our success we note rates of non-resident and distance-learning course enrollment as well as course completion, and their relationship to selection board results.

**Innovation.** Continuing the Marine heritage of innovation is additionally important to the Corps. International circumstances are ever-changing and actors hostile to the United States are continually evolving and adjusting their methodologies and capabilities. In turn, it is imperative that we modernize our doctrine, organizational structure, training, and equipment. The Marine Corps **Warfighting** Lab and the Corps' role as the Joint Service executive agent for Non-Lethal Weapon development **both** reflect our aim to experiment and step ahead in operational concepts. That we have brought back the Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters as well as continued to evolve our existing Chemical Biological Incident Reaction Force and Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Teams are illustrative of our efforts to revamp our organizational structure. Likewise, we are adapting our live-fire, force-on-force, and command post exercises to benefit from experience and technological advances and to match the changing operational arena. Our equipment procurement is managed by our Marine Requirements Oversight Council with a cost-benefit approach and our Material Command has instituted better business practices to improve our maintenance efforts. Likewise, we are outsourcing some of our infrastructure activities in order to harness the private sector to lower our costs – the Navy Marine Corps Intranet is an example of such ventures. With regard to individual modernization programs, we are moving forward in **myriad** projects germane to all components of our MAGTFs: Command, Ground, Aviation, and Combat Support. In the short-term, we assess our success in these diverse endeavors by the degree to which we are cost-effective in our innovations. In the long-term, our success will be judged by the outcome of our future operations.

In addition to these internal issues, there are also external matters that are of special concern to me; namely, supporting the Regional Combatant **Commanders-in-Chief (CinC)**, the need for addressing **21<sup>st</sup>** century overseas force-basing concepts, articulating the salient role national security plays in the well-being of our citizens, and the need for defense acquisition reform.

**Supporting the CinCs** (See Tab E). First and foremost, I am focused on ensuring **MAGTFs** provide the CinCs with whatever the Marine Corps is asked to contribute to operations. We are committed to serving as a Joint force enabler. We are complementary, not competitive, in our relationship to the other services, and give Joint Commanders a diversified set of **competencies**. Part of this is also ensuring that Marine capabilities, such as those of our Expeditionary Brigades, are understood by Joint Commanders. The benchmark for success in the objective of supporting the CinCs is whether or not we deliver the resources that accomplish whatever mission Marines are tasked with around the world and across the spectrum **of** operations.

**21<sup>st</sup> century overseas force-basing concepts.** It is also important to me that we do not slip into the myopic conception that we can deter aggression and **confront** crises overseas solely with capabilities based here in **our** homeland. In many situations, projecting our power from the Continental United States will not be effective or efficient. For our


nation to influence international relations, reassure our allies, preclude instability, and answer crises requires our presence and leadership on the global playing field. However, our forward-basing is becoming increasingly constrained by local political pressures, civilian encroachment, and environmental constraints. As a result, our future combat and peace operations are less likely to use large overseas fixed bases for deployment or sustainment. I believe this means the solution is a sea-based presence in areas of operation, using the sea as a force protection device and barrier to enemy action as well as a means to facilitating our own operational agility and tactical flexibility. By sea-based, I do not mean reliant upon a single platform, but rather a mobile, dispersed Joint force, with the capacity to strike an enemy from over-the-horizon as well as logistically sustain forces ashore. Of course, such a presence requires a panoply of technological, organizational, and doctrinal creations. Such innovations, however, will require our nation to allocate increased resources to national security. Which leads to my concern about the articulation of the importance of investing in our national security. ✓

**Articulating the salient role national security** (See Tab F). I think it is of vital importance that our citizens understand that our national security is comprised of several interrelated elements whose collective power is reflected, ultimately, in our nation's prosperity and security. However, without being critical, it seems that a growing number of Americans are unconcerned with the issue of national security because they do not perceive a threat to our nation. For me, it is critical for our citizens to comprehend that if any of these pillars is weakened, then all are weakened, and will, in the long term, negatively impact our global relationship!, our economy, the spread of our democratic and free-market practices, our technological leadership, and our way of life. Our success in articulating the need for our nation to invest appropriately in our national security will ultimately be evaluated by historians.

**The need for defense acquisition reform.** Finally, reforming our Department of Defense acquisition system is also very important to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is engaged in an evolutionary transformation. As I have said before, the Corps has long viewed transformation as a process and not an event. To ensure this evolution is timely and potent we need to re-engineer the way in which we procure, develop, and test our equipment. The current three-year cycle inherent to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System instituted in 1962, interferes with both cost-efficiency and programmatic adaptation. We suffer a technology lag that results in our war-fighters being given equipment that is typically four to six years behind that which is available in the commercial marketplace. I would like us to engage industry to help us move ahead in this arena, while maintaining strict accountability and oversight in how we determine and fulfill our operational requirements. If we succeed in this effort, we will have moved beyond the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, and the 5000-Series Reforms to a new degree of teamwork between the Department of Defense, the Congress, and our Defense industry base.

These internal and external areas of focus are not an all-inclusive list of the items my headquarters tracks, or the span of concern that we manage on a day-to-day basis, or even all the factors that may have serious impact on the capabilities that our Corps brings to our nation. However, they are things that I believe have special importance to our nation's Marine Corps. Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you.

Very respectfully and Semper **Fidelis**,


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Jones", written over the typed name and title.

**JAMES L. JONES**  
General/U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000



## Class A Flight Mishap Rates (Per 100,000 Flight Hours)




**FY01 data as of 2 Apr 01 (3 Mishaps)**  
**FY01 Goal: 25% decrease from FY99**

Tab A - 1



# Ground/Afloat Operational Class A Mishap Rates (Per 100,000 Military Personnel Per Year)




FY01 data as of 2 Apr 01 (13 Deaths)  
FY01 Goal: 25% decrease from FY99

Tab A - 2




# Traffic Death Rates (Per 100,000 Personnel)



**FY01 data as of 2 Apr 01 (13 Deaths)**  
**FY01 Goal: 25% decrease from FY99**




# 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division Equipment Readiness



Tab B - 1





# Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR)






# Ground and Aviation Procurement Funding





# Convergence of Expeditionary Capabilities




Tab B -



# Returning Marines to Operating Forces

## Percent of Operating Force Structure Manning



Tab C - 1




# 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr FY01 Recruiting Quality

(Percent of Total Shipped and Contracted)

**USMC  
Goals**


**DoD  
Goals**

**Total Quarterly Recruiting Numbers Met**  
 103.3% -- Shipped  
 101.9% -- Under Contract





# First Term Reenlistment (Percent of Goal Filled)






Tab D - 2



# Requirements for Naval Overseas Presence Forces

**Carrier & ARG/MEU(SOC) Presence Requirements vs. Capability**  
 % = Ship Days in Theater/365

	CINCs Req't	CV Actual	ARG MEU(SOC) Actual
PACOM	100%	94%	100%
EUCOM	100%	100%	53%
CENTCOM	100%	54%	95%




**Current Force Level**  
 12 Carriers      11 ARGs

Tab E - 1



# Strategic Funding



May 17, 2001 10:51 AM

TO: General J. L. Jones  
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transformation

Thanks so much for your note on transformation. I appreciate the support and the efforts being made in the Marine Corps.

I saw Pete Dawkins the other night at a dinner. I hadn't seen him for a while, and I am delighted to know he is involved. He certainly is a good man.

Pete Aldridge visited the DLA the other day and is in the process of raising some of the issues you have raised with me. He feels they have a pretty good process in shape and will be improving in the period ahead. You may want to visit with him about your thoughts on it.

Thanks again.

Regards.

DHR:dh  
051701-15

*310.1*

*17 May 01*

**U09515 /01**



DEPARTMENT OF THE **NAVY**  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAW ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

**Dear Mr. Secretary:**

I wanted to communicate to you my strongest support for the ongoing efforts of the panels looking at Department of Defense transformation. Our interaction to date with these panels has been extremely positive, and reinforces many of the efforts underway inside the Marine Corps to seek process reform, as well as a re-engineering of our business practices. Clearly these panels have helped to demonstrate the need to look hard at how we execute every aspect of our mission to defend this nation.

For the last two years, the centerpiece of our transformation effort has been the Integrated Logistics Capability initiative. This effort to transform our logistics functions from the ground up, building on proven better business practices, has demonstrated the viability of not being afraid to break the long standing paradigms of how we support the warfighter. The benefits to the Marine Corps, in terms of reinvestments of our resources, continue to show tremendous promise. It is rapidly expanding in scope to influence every facet of our decision-making process. This program was highlighted in the 1999 report by the panel on Globalization and Commercialism, chaired by Pete Dawkins, as a pacesetter for the Department of Defense. We continue to not only take pride in this distinction, but to seek **ways** to implement and incorporate **many** of the other recommendations of that report into our concept for the future.

I promise you that our nation's Corps of Marines will continue to support the efforts now underway to transform our **military services**. I look forward to working with you to build a future for the Department of Defense that fully meets the expectations as well as the aspirations of the American people.

Very respectfully,

J. L. JONES  
General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

slr  
1999

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: May 21, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Preliminary Findings**

Here's a survey you might want to think about sending out to some of the people in our group. It is interesting. I think Torie and Powell Moore ought to see it for sure. Why don't you pump it out.

*cc. Torie Clark*  
*cc. Powell Moore*

DHR/azn  
052101.54

Attach. (U.S. Armed forces/Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs by T.G. Mahnken)

381

21 May 01



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
888 CUSHING RD  
NEWPORT RHODE ISLAND 02844207

May 9, 2001

Andrew W. Marshall  
Director of Net Assessment  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
2950 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-2950

Dear Mr. Marshall,

As requested, I am enclosing a short summary of the initial findings of the survey project that Jim FitzSimonds and I have been running, together with the PowerPoint slides that I used in my briefing to you last week.

We are prepared to brief anyone who is interested in our findings.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas G. Mahnken", written over the printed name.

Thomas G. Mahnken

## **The U.S. Armed Forces and the Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs Preliminary Findings**

By

Prof. Thomas G. Mahnken  
CAPT James R. FitzSimonds

Recent years have witnessed a burgeoning debate over the proposition that we are today in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). To date, however, it has not included a discussion of how the U.S. officer corps views emerging warfare areas. This project attempts to fill this void by exploring systematically the attitudes of the U.S. armed forces toward the emerging RMA.

The Principal Investigators, assisted by CAPT Frank Petho of the Naval Postgraduate School, administered a survey to over 1,900 officers attending eight joint professional military education institutions: the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff and College of Naval Warfare), Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, Army Command and Staff College, Army War College, National War College, and the Capstone Course. The survey focused upon their attitude toward the emerging RMA as well as their beliefs about its impact upon the character and conduct of war, the perceived need for the services to change to exploit the information revolution, and the character and depth of change needed. We hope to use demographic variables such as rank, service and branch affiliation and combat experience to explain differences in officer attitudes.

The results of the survey reveal an officer corps that is confident in U.S. technological superiority. The officers that we surveyed believe that new ways of war will give the United States leverage over the full spectrum of adversaries. They feel that space and cyberspace will emerge as new theaters of war over the next two decades. They also feel that future wars may be more decisive and less bloody than past conflicts.

While reasonably confident that information technology will influence the course and outcome of future wars, the officers we surveyed are hardly advocates of radical change. They are split evenly over the need to transform the U.S. armed forces. Most believe that today's dominant military systems – the tank, aircraft, and aircraft carrier – will be as important in twenty years as they are today. They also feel that potential adversaries will be unable to blunt U.S. power projection capabilities or deny us use of information networks. As a result, they see no compelling need to undertake drastic changes in U.S. force structure or readiness to finance transformation. They are similarly opposed to the creation of new services devoted to space and information operations.

The U.S. officer corps is divided over the implications of the information revolution for the conduct of war. The officers we surveyed are uncertain as to how the information revolution will affect the character and conduct of future conflicts. They are also unsure

of how the growth and diffusion of information technology will affect the roles and missions of the services as well as the relative importance of their branch and service.

We intend to conduct additional surveys of U.S. officers in coming years to measure trends in attitudes toward innovation. We are also considering a transnational comparison of American officers with their counterparts in other "innovative" militaries (i.e., Australia, Sweden, Israel).



# The U.S. Armed Forces and the Emerging RMA

Prof. Thomas G. Mahnken  
CAPT James R. FitzSimonds



## Outline

- Project Overview
- Methodology
- Results
- Implications

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- Project Overview
- Methodology
- Results
- Implications

## Project Overview

- Task 1: Survey of U.S. Officers Attending JPME Institutions
  - 2000
- Task 2: Analysis of RMA / Innovation Articles in Professional Military Journals
  - 1990-2001



## Participating Institutions

- Naval Postgraduate School
- Naval War College
  - College of Naval Command and Staff
  - College of Naval Warfare
- Air Command and Staff College
- Air War College
- Army Command and Staff College
- Army War College
- National War College
- Capstone Course



## Outline

- Project Overview
- Methodology
- Results
- Implications



## Research Questions


- Is the officer corps enthusiastic, ambivalent, or skeptical about the proposition that we are today in an RMA?
- How compelling is the need to transform the U.S. armed forces?
- What is the depth and character of change that is required?
- How confident are they in the U.S. military's ability to innovate?




## Master Hypothesis

- Demographic Variables Explain Attitudes Toward:
  - The Emerging RMA
  - The impact of the RMA
  - The Need for Change
  - The Character and Depth of Change Needed


## Survey Population by Service




## Survey Population by Rank



## Survey Population by Years of Service



## Maximum Retirement Age of Survey Population



## Outline

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- Implications


## Attitudes Toward the RMA Questions

- a Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not (Q1).
- The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will favor the United States over the full spectrum of potential adversaries (Q2).
- Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts (Q3).
- Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts before the U.S. can field similar capabilities (Q4).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an advantage over the United States in future conflicts (Q5).
- Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures (Q6).
- Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct of war are unrealistic (Q10).

## Attitudes Toward the RMA Findings

- Information-Age Ways of War Will Give the United States Considerable Leverage
  - Favor U.S. Over Full Spectrum of Adversaries
  - U.S. Will Maintain its Lead
- BUT Information Systems, Networks Highly Vulnerable


**“ Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.”**




## Impact of the RMA Questions

- Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today (Q7).
- Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today (Q8).
- Carrier battle groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today (Q9).


**“Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.”**




**"Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today."**




**"Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today."**



**“Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today?”**



**“Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.”**




## Impact of the RMA Findings

- Currently Dominant Weapon Systems Will Be As Important in 2020 As Today
  - Split
  - But Majority Believes in the Enduring Utility of Dominant Systems
- While Technology Will Have a Dramatic Effect, it Will Not-Reduce the Utility of Dominant Platforms


## Impact on the Conduct of War Questions

- The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the need for the US to field ground forces (Q11).
- Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures (Q16).
- Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space (Q17).
- Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central feature of military operations (Q18).
- Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precision-guided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile (Q19).
- Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the Predominant means of conducting strike warfare (Q20).


**“Within the next 20 years, Conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.”**



**“Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central feature of military operations.”**



**“Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precision-guided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.”**



## Impact on the Conduct of War Findings

- Consensus that Space, Cyberspace Increasingly Important

- But We Will Still Need Ground Forces

### #Areas of Uncertainty

- “Dominant Battlespace Knowledge”

- UCAVs for Strike Missions

- Nuclear Reductions

## Impact of Demographic Factors

- Demographic Factors did NOT Affect Attitudes Toward Impact of RMA:
  - Rank
  - Duration of Commissioned Service
  - Service Affiliation
  - Branch Affiliation
  - Combat Experience

## Impact on the Character of War Questions

- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S. casualties (Q24a).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts (Q24b).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the US to use force (Q24c).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the US to achieve decisive battlefield victories (Q24d).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my service relative to the other services (Q24e).
- New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my branch relative to others in my service (Q24f).


## Impact on the Character of War Findings

- Officers Believe that New Ways of War Will:
  - Make it Easier to Use Force
  - Reduce Risk of U.S. Casualties
  - Make it Easier To Achieve Decisive Battlefield Results


## Need for Change Questions

- The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete effectively with future adversaries (Q14).
- Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations (Q22a).
- Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack U.S. carrier battle groups (Q22b).
- Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites (Q22c).
- Future adversaries will be able to deny the US the use of information networks (Q22d).


**“The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete effectively with future adversaries.”**




**“Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, logistical sites.”**



**“Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.”**



**“Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.”**



## Need for Change Findings

- Split Evenly Over Need for Radical Change
- Confident in the Continued Viability of Dominant Systems
  - Skeptical About Area-Denial Threats
  - Skeptical About Information Warfare Threats

## Character and Depth of Change Questions

- It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint. (Q12).
- The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time (Q13).
- The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to radical change in military technology, doctrine, and organization (Q15).
- My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare (Q25a).
- My service should increase its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare (Q25b).
- Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions (Q25c).
- The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations (Q25d).
- The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information operations (Q25e).
- The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010 by 2010 (Q25f).
- My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare (Q25g).
- Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare (Q25h).



## Character and Depth of Change Findings

- Unwilling to Support Reductions in Force Structure, Readiness to Fund Transformation
- Believe Their Services are Serious
- Uncertain Whether Changes in Roles, Missions Needed
- Oppose Space, Information Corps



## Outline

- Project Overview
- Methodology
- Results
- Implications

## Implications

- U.S. Officer Corps Divided Over Implications of Information Revolution
- In Many Respects Quite Conservative
  - Faith in Dominant Systems
  - Unconcerned About Threats
- Split Over Character and Conduct of War, Need for Change

## Next Steps

- Complete Literature Review
- \*Administer Same Survey in Several Years
- Transnational Comparison

*Handwritten initials and numbers: "TUP" and "a/b 0957"*

September 20, 2001 2:08 PM

TO: General Jim Jones, CMC  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DPG

*Handwritten vertical text: "100.54"*

I agree completely, and I have Steve Cambone working on the project. Please feed in any ideas you have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
092001-6

*Handwritten vertical text: "205001"*

U13094 /02



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-0001

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3000  
CMC  
17 Sep 01

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

*JS 9/20*

Subj: DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. In light of the terrorist attacks last Tuesday, I recommend that the recently published Defense Planning Guidance be reviewed. The purpose of this review would be to determine if additional guidance is needed, insofar as the threat to "Homeland Defense" is concerned.

*J. L. Jones*  
J. L. JONES

Commandant of the Marine Corps

01 SEP 18 10:53

11-L-0559/OSD/1743

*FVF Q920  
100A*

September 20, 2001 2:12 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: QDR Comments from CNO

*310.1*

Here is a note from Vern Clark that needs to be taken into consideration in the defense strategy.

You are going to have to do a brilliant job of either incorporating these kinds of suggestions or making sure that they are discussed openly so people feel they were given a fair hearing if it looks like they may not be included.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/18/01CNO ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092001-8

*20 Sept*

U13096 /02



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

18 SEP 2001


*9/20*

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have read the Draft Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report. It is, overall, a good product. There are a few minor points that I believe need to be clarified, and I have asked my staff to work with yours on those issues. But, again, these points are minor; overall, I am very pleased.

At the heart of the new defense strategy is the idea of "forward deterrence" which is completely in line with the capabilities-based approach to defense we have all worked so hard to develop in this QDR. The current report language states that forward deterrence may be able to be accomplished in the future with fewer troops, ships and aircraft. In my view, we may be best served by saying in the report that our military transformation will likely change the size and shape of forward deterrence, and not address specific platforms. In the end, we will send the platforms that we believe will best provide the capabilities needed to deter forward.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input.

Sincerely *and V/R,*  


VERN CLARK  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

11-L-0559/OSD/1745

September 10, 2001 9:12 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Powell Moore  
General Jones, USMC, CMC  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Indonesia >

Attached is a memo from the Commandant of the Marine Corps concerning mil-to-mil contacts with Indonesia.

I would appreciate it if you folks would press ahead along this line. I think we ought to work the problem and see if we can't improve our situation.

I very much favor the contacts.

**Thanks.**

Attach.

8/29/01 CMC Memo to **SecDef** re: Military to Military contact with Indonesia

DHR:dh  
091001-11

INDONESIA

05090



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1000  
CMC  
29 Aug 01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACT WITH INDONESIA

1. As per our discussion of 1 August 2001, I have had a follow on meeting with Senators Leahy, Cochran, and Hutchinson on the subject of resuming "mil to mil" contacts with the Armed Forces of Indonesia.
2. During these meetings I made the following points to each Senator:
  - a. That our traditional response of severing "mil to mil" contacts as an expression of national displeasure can have unintended consequences that are not always in our best interests.
  - b. Indonesia has a newly elected President whose position could be reinforced by restarting such contacts.
  - c. We are in a position of needing future access to basing options in the Pacific rim given the high probability of an eventual restructuring of the bases we currently have.
  - d. Indonesia has previously expressed willingness to accept "expeditionary" basing on one of its many islands, specifically the Island of Netuna.
3. All three Senators expressed a willingness to discuss the possibility of a resumption of the subject contacts and were interested in learning more about the future basing alternatives in the region.

  
J. L. JONES  
General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

copy to:  
DepSecDef  
UnSecDef (Policy)  
SecNav  
CJCS

SPD 9/4  
29/4

11-L-0559/OSD/1747

December 21, 2001 1:01 PM

Action  
01/02  
13/15

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Medical Department Officers

056

Please take a look at this memo. My impression is that it is unwise to have that high a percentage of each of our services from the medical service. There ought to be a way to shift that to the private sector in some proportion.

Why don't you take a look at it, tell me if you think I am right and come up with some suggestions. Please then feed it into the Service Secretaries and the Senior Executive Group.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/13/01 SecNav response on Naval officers in health care

DHR:dh  
122101-27

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

21 Dec 01

U15126 02

SECDEF

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

December 13, 2001

PN/A 12/19

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
DEC 21 2001

Secretary Rumsfeld,


In response to your question regarding the number of naval officers in health care, the answer is contained in the following graphics:

- (1) Chart 1 illustrates that the rationale for the size of the total medical corps is based on CINC data. The CINC's predict the expected casualty rates in wartime, and that planning factor is fed into a model for the total of the U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps health care structure.
- (2) The total number of Navy/Marine Corps personnel in health care is 6% of the total force, and medical officer departments comprise 16% of the total officer corps. This compares with 18% in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army. This data is depicted in chart 2.
- (3) Also, breakout of the officers by medical specialty is identified on chart 3.

The larger question to be addressed is: are these reasonable numbers? To arrive at some basis, I have asked the Surgeon General of the Navy to give me corresponding data for World War II, Korea and Vietnam so we can look at the trends. More later on this subject.




# Percent of Medical Department Officers\* to Total Officers by Service



*\* Medical Department Officers include Doctors, Dentists, Nurses, Medical Service, Warrant Officers*

Source: HMPDS and Defense Link


# Percent of Medical Department Officers to Total Officers for Navy / Marine Corps



**\*\* Navy/USMC included together since Navy provides all medical support to the Marine Corps**

Source: HMPDS and Defense Link

# Wartime Medical Requirements



April 16, 2001 1:19 PM

TO: Pefe Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on NRO

Please take a look at this memo on NRO and tell me what you think.  
Thanks.

Attach.  
04/04/01 Memo from Robert Kohler to DCI, "State of the NRO"

DHR:dh  
041601-34

*020 NRO*

*6 Apr 01*

\* mentalization of SET  
close to SET/Roy Bunty.

04 April 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Robert J. Kohler  
SUBJECT: State of the NRO

I write this as one who toiled in and around the trenches of the NRO for 40 years, who continues to have a deep respect for the mission of the NRO, and who is convinced of the importance of a healthy, innovative and technically astute NRO to the Intelligence Community and the DCI. But, things **are** not well and somebody needs to tell you so.

I am fully cognizant of the various "Commission" reports that have, to varying degrees, tried to address issues they saw surrounding the NRO. In fact, many of the observations of those Commissions are, in their own context, good. But all the Commissions missed many of the key issues that surround the effectiveness and future functioning of the NRO.

For the last three months, I have been leading a task force (chartered by the D/NRO), the purpose of which is to evaluate the state of system engineering in the NRO. The perception was that this NRO "core competency" had eroded and that actions were needed to enable its reestablishment. In this process I talked to a wide array of people about the NRO and discussed their perceptions as to how it was functioning. These people included senior and middle NRO management, military and civilian personnel, the prime contractors who serve the NRO and many individuals that I know from my previous time in the NRO, both active and retired.

#### Dwindling Technical capability

The hallmark of the NRO has been its technical core. It was staffed by, and managed by, solid technical people with solid technical credentials. In the unmanned space business the NRO was the premier organization in the country, certainly "best in

11-L-0559/OSD/1754

SUBJECT: State of the NRO

class." But this is no longer the case. The depth of technical talent has eroded and plans to replace this talent are non-existent. Military personnel serve one tour and are "out." Only recently has the CIA tried to reinvigorate their relationships with the NRO and recognize their NRO staffing issues as a priority. The result is increasing influence of support contractors who not only have different motivations than the government staff but cannot provide the technical leadership that can only come from the government workforce.

#### Imbalance Between Staff and Programs

The NRO of old was primarily a technical organization. Our job was to manage the development, acquisition and operation of highly sophisticated space collection systems. As a result, most of our human resources were devoted to these tasks. Today, the majority of the NRO's human resources are devoted to staff functions rather than to the NRO's primary job--acquiring and operating space reconnaissance systems. No commercial business would succeed with this model.

The problem is not completely of the NRO's making. Congress, DCI/CMS and DOD have all conspired (unfortunately in an uncoordinated way) in making this happen. It is appalling that today's NRO includes over 50+ IGS, 100+ budget people (ROM), numerous policy staffs, resident HAC S&I staffs, unrelenting "questions" for which the NRO maintains staffs to answer, all to the detriment of their only real job: develop, acquire, launch and operate the Nation's Reconnaissance Program. There was a time in the history of the NRO when the Program Manager(s) was "king," now he/she is simply a pawn to the various staffs.

#### The Lack of a Culture

In the days of Programs A/B/C each component had its own culture and reason for being. Each of the parent organizations understood the reason for these components and supported their mission with people and resources. The elimination of A/B/C did away with not only these unique cultures but did away with the reason why the parent organizations supported the NRO. Neither the Air Force, Navy nor CIA any longer has an "institutional interest" in the NRO. Military officers can no longer spend their careers in the NRO (as in the Program A and C days) and CIA

SUBJECT: State of the NRO

officers no longer have confidence that, even if they do exceedingly well in the NRO, it will be helpful to their CIA careers. Many senior military officers now assigned to the NRO have absolutely no understanding of the business nor an ability to contribute to its mission in any significant way. The NRO is no longer an organization where the "best and brightest" are assigned to the job, but one where politics almost entirely determines important position assignments.

What were three distinct, powerful and enabling cultures (in the A/B/D days) has been replaced by nothing. Two interesting quotes from senior contractors about the NRO:

1. "The NRO is becoming an organization of transients; this may be an unintended consequence of the NRO reorganization."

2. "The NRO is becoming more like a contracting organization rather than a technical organization."

#### The Dichotomy of the Organization

Programs A/B/C were abolished for (at least) two reasons:

1. To eliminate what some saw as the growing counterproductive competition between Programs A/B/C

2. To consolidate the staffs, such that redundancies could be eliminated.

As mentioned above, not only did two not happen, but the staffs are significantly bigger today than before the reorganization.


Certainly the competition between A/B/C was eliminated. But it was replaced by a competition between the IMINT/SIGINT/COMM and AS&T Directorates. The new competition in the NRO, between the "stovepipe INTS," is, one for dollars. At least in the old days the competition was between *ideas*. The new competition is debilitating. a

SUBJECT: State of the NRO

**Congressional Micromanagement**

The impact of Congressional micromanagement, on the NRO cannot be overstated. When the NRO "collapses," which is most likely on its current trajectory, the Congress will have contributed significantly to this, but will never accept responsibility for it. In fact, from their perspective it will be the fault of you and the SECDEF. The Congress through their manipulation of the budget and their mindless adherence to budgetary constraints, e.g. no forward funding, is putting the NRO in the position of simply not being able to execute their programs in a logical fashion. Apparently nobody has the guts to tell Congress that this is the case. And so you get Congressional Commission reports that simply miss the mark.

The situation is dire and needs senior level attention. As I said, the "commissions" missed the real issues and, even if every one of their recommendations were adopted, the fundamental NRO problems will remain unresolved. Give the NRO two to three years before it becomes so bad that it cannot be fixed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. J. Kohler', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Robert J. Kohler

July 16, 2001 6:39 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: External Panel of Pres. Review of Intel

Please see me on this Schneider memo, and tell me what you think we ought to do.  
Thanks.

Attach.  
7/6/01 Schneider memo to SecDef re: Developments at First Meeting

DHR:dh  
071601-65

350.09

1634101

U12624 /02

*William Schneider, Jr.*

*Steve [unclear]*

**MEMORANDUM**

July 6, 2001

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
cc: Mr. Richard Haver

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Developments at the first meeting of the External Panel of the Presidential Review of Intelligence in response to NSPD-5 (2 July 2001).

---

The External Panel of the Presidential Review of **Intelligence** held its first meeting on 2 July at the K Street office usually reserved for external reviewers. Chairman **LTG Brent Scowcroft** and Vice Chair, **ADM Dave Jeremiah** led the meeting. Other members of the panel attending were **Johnnie Foster** and **Dick Kerr**. Ambassador **Stapelton Roy** (former US Ambassador to the **PRC** now with Kissinger Associates) and **Jamie Gorelick** (former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton administration) were absent. A list of the Members of the External Panel as well as the Panel staff is attached. Joan Dempsey of the Community Management Staff who is involved in the Inside Panel was present as well.

The panel faces a very demanding timeline; the results are due by 30 September. The **DCI** participated in the discussion as well. The inside panel, led by Joan Dempsey will be meeting concurrently with the External Panel, and will participate in the work of the External Panel as well to assure congruence between the two efforts.

Chairman **Scowcroft** proposed (based on earlier discussions with Dempsey and the **DCI**) agreed that there would be a division of labor between the two groups on the four tasks enumerated in **NSPD-5**. A copy of **NSPD-5** is attached. The external panel will concentrate **on** Tasks 1 and 3, while the Internal Panel will focus on Tasks 2 and 4:

Task 1: The challenges and opportunities our Nation is likely to face in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century that require intelligence support. This review will be the basis for my Administration to articulate its intelligence priorities.'

---

<sup>1</sup> This aspiration aims at a replacement of the Clinton administration's **NSDD-35**. This approach had little impact on resource allocation or **IC** planning, so **doubts** have emerged about whether the subject of priorities should be approached in the same manner as **NSDD-35**.

11/1/01  
1220

Task 3: New and highly advanced **intelligence** collection, analysis and distribution capabilities. The **DCI** will make recommendations to me on whether such capabilities **warrant** new investment.

A dimension of the time pressure to complete the review is to converge on the **FY 03-08**-budget process and program review. As a consequence, I believe it will be most useful for the panel to concentrate on providing **recommendations** to some **of the most** pressing policy, program, and resource allocation issues. The **DCI** testified to his view on the mismatch between key elements of the Community's pattern of resource allocation for specific intelligence disciplines and the utility of their product. As a result, the External Panel is beginning to converge on an effort that would produce the following "output."

1. The major programmatic initiatives now underway that may reflect a mismatch between cost and utility will be examined with a view toward identifying opportunities for restructuring the programs if appropriate.
2. The underutilization of commercial imagery by the **IC** is widely understood, and its failure to do so exacerbates the program/resource mismatch. I have agreed to present alternative acquisition models for the **IC** to procure commercial imagery. These models will derive from work previously done on the **NRO** Commission on which I served last year.
3. Similarly, open source intelligence is believed to be an underutilized **source of information** as well. I have requested that **FBIS** (reported to be working on new open source **products**) brief the panel on its view(s) of how better utilization can be made by the **IC**, effectively programmed and budgeted.
4. I have proposed to Chairman **Scowcroft** that the panel receive an element of the unimplemented Defense Reform briefing prepared by **Arnold Punaro** for Secretary Cohen (you have heard the more comprehensive **form** of the briefing) in **1997**. There is a module that proposes radical reorganization in the **IC** to capture what **Punaro's** committee believes to be vast unproductive overhead in the **IC**, especially in **DoD**-related agencies.

The External Panel will meet again later in the month. I would like to get your insights into how the External Panel's report can best serve your needs.

President's Review of Intelligence  
NSPD #5  
External Panel

General Brent Scowcroft, Chair  
900 17th Street, NW  
Suite 500  
Washington, DC 20006  
202-296-9312

Admiral David Jeremiah, Co-Chair

(b)(6)

Dr. John S. Foster  
TRW, Incorporated  
1 Space Park, E1-5010  
Redondo Beach, CA 90278  
310-812-1846

The Honorable Jamie Gorelick

(b)(6)

The Honorable Richard J. Kerr

(b)(6)

Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy  
Kissinger Associates, Incorporated  
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor  
New York City, NY 10022  
212-759-7919

- or -

1800 K Street, NW  
Suite 1021  
Washington, DC 20006  
202-872-0300

Dr. William Schneider, Jr.  
President, International Planning Services  
1925 N. Lynn Street  
Arlington, VA 22209  
703-524-5522

# President's Review of Intelligence: Staff

2100 K Street, NW Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20427  
(202) 331-4060

## Management Team

(b)(6)

## Review Team

(b)(6)

## Business Team

(b)(6)

Schneider

2868

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 2001

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY BOARD

SUBJECT: Intelligence


Current and accurate foreign intelligence is essential to the success of our foreign policy, law enforcement, and defense strategies and is critical to protecting and advancing America's vital interests. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), working with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State as appropriate, is directed to: conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence. The DCI is given a broad mandate to challenge the status quo and explore new and innovative techniques, systems, practices and processes for foreign intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution.

This review will be undertaken by two separate panels that will be established by and report to, the DCI. One panel will consist of members of the Intelligence Community and other senior United States Government officials to be named by the DCI. The other panel will consist of knowledgeable and experienced individuals from outside the United States Government to be named by the DCI in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The

11-L-0559/OSD/1763

panels will conduct independent, but parallel reviews of the following:

1. The challenges and **opportunities** our Nation is likely to face in the **21<sup>st</sup> Century** that require intelligence support. This review will be the basis for my **Administration** to articulate **its** intelligence **priorities**.
2. The current state of our intelligence and **counter-intelligence capabilities** to ensure that they **meet** the challenges of the new century. The **DCI** is to **affirm** to me that our current and planned programs and **acquisitions** will **adequately** meet our Nation's future intelligence needs.
3. New and highly advanced intelligence collection, analysis and distribution capabilities. The **DCI** will make recommendations to me on whether such **capabilities** warrant new investment.
4. **Reorganizing** and/or **restructuring** the Intelligence Community to improve its management, **consolidate** its **activities** or agencies, and to streamline and strengthen its management **practices**.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be "George W. Bush". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a long horizontal tail stroke.

April 9, 2001 1:12 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: Steve Cambone  
Pete Aldridge  
Dov Zakheim  
Barry Watt  
Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Memo from Andy Marshall

Attached is a note from Andy Marshall. The last paragraph is what we simply must focus on. Please help.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-26

381

9 Apr 01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, 20301-2950

3/23/01

DIRECTOR OF  
NET  
ASSESSMENT


FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Latest Draft of Strategic Review

This draft reverts to use of the word “**advantage**” to describe the strategy. I did this because at this stage getting the military to understand and buy in is important. My \*officers told me the earlier drafts were confusing with the switching between “competence”, “**advantage**”, and “capability”. Also JV 2010 and JV 2020 already are a switch to a capabilities based approach. In any case we can switch back later to better public language.

I will get responses from the Chiefs and make appropriate **changes**. I have your list of edits from the prior draft. Also I have started on the drafting the Annexes with finish date of mid-April.

Your discussion of the sizing issue and the requirement of risk assessment are just right. To do it right is complex, but as you say we all do it all the time. Two **MRC**'s are a simplification; assessment should really be done over the whole set of plausible (possible?) contingencies, including current and future. At any level of budget the task is to get the least risk measured over the whole set of contingencies.

  
A.W. Marshall

cc: DepSecDef



11-L-0559/OSD/1766

April 16, 2001 3:29 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
William Schneider, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategy and Force Structure

Please take a look at this paper on strategy and force structure and come and see me about it. We need to make a conscious decision about Andy's paper in this regard.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/09/01 de Leon memo to SecDef re: Strategy and Force Structure

DHR:dh  
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381

16 Apr 01

April 9, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz

From: Rudy de Leon *R*

Subject: Strategy and Force Structure

Attached is an exchange of memos with Andy Marshall regarding a paper that is circulating around the Pentagon.

While I don't agree completely with the historical analogies, the paper written by Frederick Kagan of the West Point history department has a clear point of view and I wanted to make sure you had a copy.

The paper makes the point that "ground forces" are a key hedge for the future. The Frederick Kagan paper offers a much different perspective than the views offered by General Fogleman, and I thought you might find it of interest.

11-L-0559/OSD/1768



ADVISOR  
FOR NET  
ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

10 April, 01

MEMORANDUM FOR RUDY DE LEON

SUBJECT: Kagan's Paper

Thanks for the paper. I found it very interesting. In particular, and in addition to topics often addressed, he raises the need to prepare for mobilization in case a large-scale conflict threat emerges. DoD has largely dropped consideration of this possibility.

On the other hand he accepts that many Allies have substantially disarmed and count on us to protect them, which should be something we should try to change. Indeed, part of our broader national strategy should be to try to shift more of that burden back to the Allies. I sometimes say that we are an incompetent hegemon; very undemanding of Allies and friends. That makes our hegemony more acceptable and perhaps lasting. But, in the mean while we have not succeeded in being paid for the services we provide, e. g. the relatively secure flow of oil from the Gulf.

Anyway, Kagan makes many good points. I probably agree a bit more than you do with the cautionary tales from history.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Andy".

A.W. Marshall

cc: Secretary Rumsfeld  
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz



11-L-0559/OSD/1769

## Strategy and Force Structure in an Interwar Period

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**The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency or department of the United States government.**

### Goal

America's primary national security goal in this interwar period must be to prolong the current epoch of peace and prosperity for as long as possible and to be ready to fight and win the conflict that will ultimately end it. The current era is not a "strategic pause," but an interwar period, and history suggests that the next major conflict will not be as far distant as many people imagine. Since 3648 there has been a full-scale conflict involving many of the world's major powers approximately every thirty years. Since 1783 the United States has deployed a significant military force into combat once every twenty years. To imagine that this cycle has ended with the end of the Cold War is wishful thinking not based on a careful analysis of the situation. It is not likely to be more accurate than the belief widely held just over a year ago that we had found a way to halt the economic cycle of booms and busts. Maintaining the current stability in today's international arena and preparing to face and deter or defeat a major adversary in the future are thus very urgent tasks. They cannot be put off, underresourced, or ignored except at grave peril to this nation.

The need to remain engaged and ready even in an era of relative peace is the most difficult challenge a liberal democracy can face. The track record of such states in such situations is extremely poor. After the end of the Crimean War and the end of the Wars of German Unification, Great Britain largely disengaged from the international situation and maintained a peacetime army so small that German leaders quipped that they would "have it arrested" if the British landed in Germany to support one of their allies. As a result, Britain conspicuously failed to prevent a series of wars in the 1860s and 1870s, and failed utterly to deter the Germans in 1914, with disastrous consequences despite the fact that England ultimately won the war. The tale of British weakness, appeasement, and consequent failure to deter Hitler in the 1930s is too well known to bear repetition here. America's refusal to remain engaged in Europe following World War I greatly facilitated the efforts of Hitler and Mussolini to destroy the peace, at a very high price in American lives when we were drawn into the war that followed. American failure to manage the international situation in the Pacific during those same years, although less frequently remarked upon, was, in fact, much more spectacular and led directly to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for which we were completely unprepared.

The only time in recent history when a liberal democracy has retained in peacetime the forces necessary to deter its enemies and ultimately win without fighting was the Cold War. For almost half a century, with conspicuous ups and downs, the U.S. maintained fighting forces strong enough to convince the Soviet Union that victory was unlikely, and our willingness to engage in significant conflict in Korea and Vietnam. Whatever the regional results of those conflicts, helped show the Soviets that we were serious. That engagement was possible largely because the Soviets were so clearly and obviously an imminent threat to our security and way of life. We knew who our enemy was, we knew where the war would be fought, and we could work out what we had to do to win it. It was also relatively easier to persuade the American people of the need for large peacetime expenditures on defense because the threat was so clear and immediate. At the same time, America's leaders in the late 1940s and 1950s had learned the lessons of Munich and were determined to avoid them. The careful study and application of history at that time played a powerful role in guiding the nation through fifty years of near-conflict and constant tension.

The fact that there is no apparent threat makes our task much harder. It has returned us to a situation much like the 1920s, when our weakness and disengagement laid the groundwork for the disasters of the 1930s. Failure to behave responsibly then greatly foreshortened the peaceful era that was taken for granted, and it left both the British and the United States completely unprepared for the war that followed. The result in both cases was hundreds of thousands of casualties, many of which could have been avoided. In Britain's case, another consequence was the loss of her dominant world position and the permanent relegation to second-class status. Only by now recalling the clear lessons of history and recognizing that military preparedness and the maintenance of adequate military forces are as urgent in periods of apparent peace as they are in periods of obvious tension can we hope to avoid falling into the same trap.

### *Strategic Tasks*

Achieving this goal requires the accomplishment of three major tasks: 1) Shaping the international environment constantly so as to maintain stability in regions of vital interest to the U.S. and to deter aggression anywhere; 2) Maintaining the ability to clearly to defeat at least two major regional aggressors simultaneously; 3) Preparing our armed forces for the possibility of larger-scale conflict in the future.

### *Shaping the International Environment*

The purpose of so-called "operations other than war" such as U.S. missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti is two-fold. We must, on the one hand, maintain peace and stability in regions of vital national interest, such as Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Failure to act to maintain stability in those regions will create power vacuums when traditional stability structures collapse. Those vacuums may spread, as instability crosses borders and infects or involves neighboring states. Or they may be filled by states antagonistic to the United States, and the instability used to harm our interests. The likelihood that power vacuums will be filled by our friends is very low, as most of the nations allied to the U.S. have disarmed even more thoroughly than we have, and have psychologically off-loaded the responsibility for maintaining peace onto our

shoulders. If we do not act to maintain stability and peace in a region, we must assume that instability and conflict there will continue and even worsen.

On the other hand, WC must make it clear that WC will not tolerate the use of force to change the international situation. This is an application of the "broken-window" theory of urban renewal to international relations. If it is apparent to would-be aggressors that their use of force against their neighbors or even against their own people will be opposed rapidly and forcefully, then most if not all are likely to be deterred even from trying. If, on the other hand, we permit the "broken windows" of the world, whether in Somalia, Haiti, or the Balkans to remain broken, we send the message to would-be aggressors that we will not oppose them. That message is likely to encourage the boldest of them to try to revise the international order by force to suit them better. In the best case, then, we will be drawn into a much more serious conflict against a more dangerous adversary through our failure to engage in a smaller scale conflict against a weaker one. In the worst case, if we fail that test as well either by agreeing to unacceptable conditions or by failing to engage the aggressor at all, WC will be laying the groundwork for the extremely rapid destruction of a peaceful world order. Peacekeeping and stability operations always support a vital American national interest, wherever they may be: They support the interest of maintaining a peaceful and stable world, and there is no state that benefits more from such a world or would suffer more from its disappearance than the U.S.

### *Major Theater War*

Although the U.S. armed forces are most likely to be engaged in small-scale contingencies on a day-to-day basis, they must above all be ready to meet the challenges of a major regional aggressor at all times at virtually no notice. In fact, they must be ready to meet two **such** challenges at once.

Failure to be prepared for a major theater conflict will have disastrous consequences. In the best scenario, we may find ourselves refighting the Korean War, taking unnecessary casualties, with partially-trained units breaking and confusion rampant. Although we ultimately recovered from our initial unpreparedness, the cost was extremely high. In the worst scenario, we may simply decide **not to** oppose the aggressor: which would have all of the negative consequences of failing in a smaller-scale challenge outlined above only at a much higher and more serious level. It is highly unlikely that we will lose a major theater conflict in the foreseeable future--that is not at issue. But the costs of unpreparedness, both in terms of unnecessary casualties and in the possibility of self-deterrence, are potentially very high.

It has become fashionable in recent years to claim that the "2-MRC" force sizing paradigm is unnecessary and simply an argument for the status quo. Since the Bottom-Up Review of 1993 more or less explicitly tied the concept to two specific enemies--Iraq and North Korea--and since those enemies now seem so weak, many argue that we can safely abandon this conception altogether. It is further argued that abandoning the 2-MRC requirement would allow us to reduce our standing armed forces and refocus resources either on domestic concerns or on transformation strategies for the armed forces. Both assumptions are wrong.

First, the United States has never maintained a true 2-MRC capability since the time of the Bottom-Up Review. Careful study of the origins and development of the

force structure adopted at that time reveals that even its originators did not believe that it was capable of dealing with two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. Nor was General Colin Powell confident that even the larger structure dubbed the Base Force in 1991 was capable of dealing with two such wars at the same time. In testimony in 1992, General Powell stated that dealing simultaneously with a DESERT STORM contingency at the same time as a Korean contingency would push U.S. forces to "the breaking point" and that the U.S. would then "no longer have the capability to deal with anything else that might happen elsewhere in the world."<sup>1</sup> That is not a true 2-MRC capability, and, of course, the armed forces have been cut significantly even since General Powell made that statement. Abandoning the 2-MRC force-sizing construct does not provide any honest or rational basis for reducing the armed forces.

Second, the 2-MRC requirement is not simply a randomly-generated force-sizing construct. It is a vital component of any rational strategy. Failure to maintain a force capable of dealing simultaneously with two major theater wars means that, in contemplating the response to one major act of aggression, the president must be prepared to be unable to respond to any others for the duration of the conflict. Such an inability will likely have two consequences. First, the national command authority is very likely to shirk from committing all or most of its disposable forces to a single contingency if doing so will leave U.S. interests and allies around the world utterly vulnerable. The likelihood is that we will once again be self-deterred and fail to take action essential to protecting our interests and maintaining the peace and stability of the world.

This is precisely what happened to the British in the 1920s and 1930s. Faced with the need to contemplate major theater conflicts in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East, Britain nevertheless did not support armed forces to meet even a 2-MRC standard, let alone the 3-MRC danger they faced. As a result during the Corfu crisis of 1923, the Ethiopian crisis of 1935-6 and Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the British military leaders repeatedly advised against taking action on the grounds that doing so would expose vital national interests in the Far East to Japanese aggression. In part as a result of that advice, Britain did not respond adequately to any of those crises and so paved the way for further aggression, especially on the part of a Hitler now encouraged in his boldness and England's paralysis. This threat is no less real for America today.

Second, the fact, known to the world, that a great power can meet only one major challenge at a time makes it infinitely more likely that a second aggressor will take advantage of that power's preoccupation with the first. There can be no doubt that Britain's exclusive focus on the European conflict in 1941 was a critical precondition to the Japanese attack on British--and American--possessions in December of that year. Britain looked to the U.S. to protect her interests in the Far East, but one cannot control the military policy of one's would-be allies. In that instance, British interests suffered because of America's unwisdom--all because Britain had not maintained the force necessary to deal with two major threats at the same time. As a result, although Britain ultimately won the war, her position in the Far East, and in the world, was seriously compromised, and thousands of English soldiers and sailors lost their lives needlessly to fight a war that could have been deterred. There is no reason now for, say, an Iraq to sign a treaty with a North Korea. But should the U.S. become involved in one region with no

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<sup>1</sup> See *While America Sleeps*, p. 296

capability to respond in the second, WC may well encourage an attack upon our interests and allies by that very weakness by a state that, to that point, had not seriously contemplated attacking us. Abandoning the 2-MRC capability creates vulnerabilities that will be readily apparent to prospective foes, and will, in itself, be a destabilizing factor in the world today.

### *Preparing for Large-Scale Conflict*

Major theater wars are by no means the limit of the dangers the U.S. may face within the next few decades. Although there is no state now that can challenge us globally, it is not at all inconceivable that such a threat might arise, either in the form of a single state like Russia or China that devotes all its energies into obtaining such a capability, or in the form of a coalition of states that arises to challenge our current hegemony. In that regard, the steady improvement in relations between Russia and China that has gone largely unremarked upon over the last few years may be an ominous sign.

It has been commonplace in strategic discussions over the last decade to assert that the U.S. would have ample warning of the rise of such a state or coalition, and that we would have plenty of time in which to prepare our own forces to meet and deter or defeat that challenge. The truth is that that confidence is unwarranted. We probably will have considerable warning of the rise of a major challenger, but the warning that tells the strategist and the force planner that it is time to rearm is almost always insufficient to convince the democratic leader and legislature to do so. The rise of Hitler to power in 1933 should have been warning enough to Great Britain, and, indeed, her military leaders had already concluded in 1932 that the time to rearm had come. But it was only the crises of 1935-1936, coupled with the rapid expansion of the *Luftwaffe*, that convinced the politicians to support massive increases in defense spending, and by then it was too late.

There is absolutely no reason to imagine that the U.S. will behave more responsibly in a similar situation. Our desire to maintain peace, in fact, is likely to work against it, for as potential enemies arise, there is always a powerful desire to avoid provoking them with large arms build-ups. What is more, the event that triggered the rise of Hitler and Germany's turn toward aggression was the Great Depression--an event that also seriously hampered Britain's ability to respond. It is not at all unlikely that a major global economic slowdown will be the event that precipitates--quite without warning and unpredictably--the growth of our next major adversary. We, like the English in the 1930s, are likely to focus on the domestic consequences of that economic crisis for far too long at the expense of starting the prudent rearmament relied upon by those who think there will be time enough to respond when the danger is clear.

We must, rather, be considering even now what will be necessary to meet a major challenge in the future, and taking such steps as are possible to prepare for it. It is a matter of grave concern, in this regard, that America's military industrial base has been so dramatically contracted in tandem with the reduction of our armed forces over the past decade. The defense conversion efforts that have been made a priority since the end of the Cold War have succeeded too well. It is highly likely that when the next major crisis arises, we will find ourselves unable to spend the money that a nervous Congress appropriates because there will be no industrial firms to take the contracts. This is precisely what occurred in England in the mid-1930s. Her military industry had

atrophied and converted to civilian production during the lean years of peace, and when Parliament finally authorized dramatically increased expenditures on defense, the money literally could not be spent. This is the sort of problem that can only be addressed over the long term--when the crisis is upon us it will be far too late.

Cutting the armed forces excessively will also prove very harmful to long-term preparation for major war. To contemplate major conflict, we must be prepared to expand the armed forces dramatically. That expansion will require a significant cadre of experienced leaders at all levels of command who can train others even as they command their units. A force that is too small will not be able to meet that challenge, with the result that training will be rushed and haphazard, and units will be sent into combat in the hands of inexperienced and untried leaders--exactly the situation we faced during World War II, with painful consequences. We must remember at all times that, although the armed forces are sized primarily to deal with current and likely future contingencies, we cannot entirely ignore the need to be able to expand them rapidly should unforeseen circumstances require us to do so.

### *Conclusion*

These three tasks must all be achieved at the same time. We cannot afford to put one off in favor of the others, for they all accomplish different and essential parts of the same whole. We must be continually engaged in shaping the international environment by the use of force and its threat, and by stability and peacekeeping operations when appropriate. These operations signal to potential disturbers of the international peace our unwillingness to tolerate such disruptions, and are likely to have a profound dampening effect on the efforts of those who seek to alter the current international order that suits us so well. We must always be prepared to deter and defeat major theater adversaries, and real preparation in this area must mean the ability to defeat at least two such threats at the same time. Because of the danger of self-deterrence, the truth is that a "one-MRC" capability is really a "no-MRC" capability. Lastly we must never lose sight of the possibility that we will one day face a significant global challenge, and that preparation to meet that challenge will be too late when it is upon us. To "take advantage" of the current peaceful era in order to focus on other priorities? as many now urge, is to ignore our responsibility to act prudently to safeguard the nation's security. The best way to take advantage of the current era of peace is to prolong it as long as possible, but only aggressive involvement in the world and the maintenance of adequate armed forces to accomplish all three of the tasks outlined above will make that possible.

### *Technological Change*

In addition to the three main tasks that any leading state in an era of peace must perform, the U.S. faces the additional challenge today of transforming its armed forces to be able to fight and win as the nature of war itself rapidly changes. This challenge is particularly great precisely because our apparent technological lead is so large that many people do not seriously believe that an enemy will ever be able to challenge us technologically. As a result, technological transformation now presents two great dangers. First, we are likely to be too complacent, to put off transformation, avoid fielding systems, and defer costs on the grounds that we still have a comfortable lead. The likely result of that course of action will be to fail to prepare the armed forces to fight

the wars of the future. Second, we may be led into the comfortable belief that we have found a technological panacea that makes it unnecessary to maintain large armed forces at all, since small, highly-technical forces seem now to be so devastatingly effective. The danger there is that we will move toward having the best, most technically advanced brigade in the world, that will be overwhelmed by much larger, if far less technologically sophisticated, foes.

Such was the fate that the British Expeditionary Force suffered in 1940. At that time Britain was the only major power to retain a long-service volunteer force rather than one based on universal military service and a trained reserve. As a result, the BEF was by far the best combat force in the world in 1940, and it fought with incredible skill and tenacity against the German attack. But it had been far too small to deter that attack, it was too small to stop it, and it was wiped out almost to a man in the attempt. As a result, Britain was forced to sit the war out in 1940 and into 1941 as a new force was raised and trained from scratch. That force, in its turn, inadequately trained and inexpertly led, suffered horrendous casualties in the remaining years of the war and came very near to complete collapse before the U.S. was drawn into the conflict.

Worse still, since the emphasis on technology now is on long-range precision-guided munitions, we may come to imagine that our global presence is unnecessary, because we can respond decisively with forces based in CONUS. Action taken on such a conviction could be catastrophic. It makes sense only when military capabilities are divorced entirely from the strategic goals they are designed to accomplish, which occurs in academic discussions, but not in the real world. Our forward presence in the world signals our commitment to opposing aggression and maintaining peace. Withdrawing forces from their forward positions would automatically and immediately greatly increase global instability by making the statement that America is no longer as committed to the peace as she had been. We may tell ourselves and others that that is not true--that we are just as committed only now we seek to use new systems to accomplish the old aims, but we will not be believed. For over half a century the U.S. has taught the world to understand that our seriousness about our commitments in any given region can be measured by the presence or absence of our troops deployed in that region, and not by our global strike capabilities. Global strike capabilities did not deter North Korea in 1950, North Vietnam in the 1960s, Saddam Hussein in 1990, or Slobodan Milosevic thereafter. They are unlikely to deter potential aggressors in the future.

We must also not lose sight of the fact that a mixture of ground forces, theater air and missile forces, and global strike capabilities is far more powerful and effective than simply global strike capabilities alone. When an enemy knows that he faces only a missile attack: he can turn off his radars, bury his equipment, disperse his forces, and sit tight. If his will does not break under our attack--and there is considerable historical evidence to suggest that it will not--then we will have only two options. We will either have to abandon the conflict without achieving our objectives, or we will have to exterminate the enemy's armed forces to a man. Even then, we may well fail of achieving our objectives if we still fight shy of deploying ground forces to secure them. Air power can only provide an argument, however persuasive, that the enemy should change his way of doing business. Ground forces can force him to do so whether we persuade him or not.

For when ground forces or the threat of their deployment are added to the mix of precision-strike systems, then the enemy's task is greatly complicated. Now he must maintain his forces in combat formations, which provide better targets for our missile strikes. He must keep his radar on and his communications going, making it easier to hit those targets as well. In short, by eliminating the possibility that ground forces will be deployed, we will greatly complicate our efforts to use our precision-strike capabilities, and we may fail of our objectives entirely. The history of the military art is the history of the increasing integration of all types of forces into combined-arms and joint units that bring to bear an array of capabilities against the enemy. The forces that have performed that integration best have almost always won--those that have failed to integrate all of their capabilities have generally lost.

All of which is to say that technological transformation must be a fully joint endeavor. It must be tied to an agreed-upon vision of future warfare, but it must be a flexible enough vision to allow us to meet the unforeseen changes in war and the international environment that we are certain to encounter. Above all, it must be undertaken much more urgently than hitherto. Our apparent technological lead is illusory. It rests more upon the fact that no state has been working very hard recently to prepare to fight us. We depend on computerization very heavily for our advantages, and yet civilian computer technology is rapidly spreading across the globe. If an enemy concludes that war with us is imminent, we can be certain that he will find ways rapidly to convert that civilian technology for military purposes, and we will be shocked to discover our technological lead evaporating much more rapidly than we had ever thought possible.

We must never lose sight, in this regard, of the fact that the next war will almost certainly begin at a time and place of the enemy's choosing not of our own. That means that when the enemy thinks that he has the best chance of success: then is when he will attack. Our own delays and failure to maintain and deploy adequate armed forces may even encourage a pre-emptive enemy attack, as happened in 1939. Hitler was well aware that by 1942 the British were going to field large and modern armed forces equipped with excellent aircraft and decent tanks. His determination to attack Poland in 1939 resulted in part from the feeling that it was then or never. We must be careful to ensure that we are never presenting the enemy with a window of temptation during which he may hope to succeed before we are ready for him, but the current pace of our technological transformation **suggests** that we will be doing precisely that.

This consideration highlights the fact that transformation cannot come at the expense of readiness to accomplish the three main tasks described above. If we cut down our current capabilities to prepare for future transformation, we will signal to our enemies that now is their time to prepare and act before it is too late. In this way, the simple fact of our adopting such a military policy will be destabilizing internationally and will act to encourage, rather than deter, war in the middle distance. We must accomplish transformation while also maintaining the full spectrum of other necessary capabilities.

### *Force Structure Considerations*

Our current force structure is based upon a completely unfounded assumption: that the U.S. active armed forces in 1990 were prepared to fight and defeat a Soviet attack and that, since the Soviet threat was clearly so much greater than any threat or

combination of threats we now face, armed forces in this interwar period should necessarily be smaller and less costly. This assumption is not in accord with historical reality, and it prejudices the question of what force structure we need, coming to what is clearly a wrong answer.

America's strategy during the Cold War was supported by three separate military pillars: our nuclear forces, our conventional forces, and NATO's forces, both nuclear and conventional. By far the most important elements of that strategy from the standpoint of deterring the Soviets were America's nuclear forces within Europe and without, and the independent nuclear forces of France and England. The ground forces of Great Britain, France, and Germany, moreover, added 18 heavy and 6 light divisions to America's forces in the theater, bringing the total number of immediately available divisions to almost 43. Such a force might conceivably have been able to halt the advance of the more than 200 divisions in the Soviet order of battle and those of their Warsaw Pact allies as NATO hoped. It is certain that American forces alone could not have met that threat, nor were they ever intended to.

But in the post-Cold War world, only America's active-duty conventional forces remain to be figured into the calculus of responding to major regional aggressors. It is universally believed that the United States would never use nuclear weapons against a regional foe, at least as long as that foe refrained from using weapons of mass destruction of its own (and probably not even then). Our nuclear capabilities, therefore, so important to deterring the Soviets, have become irrelevant with regard to regional aggressors today. Nor can we rely upon NATO's forces to take up the challenge with us. In the first place, NATO's forces are not ours to command. Their significant involvement in any campaign, particularly an out-of-area campaign as any MRC or smaller scale conflict is likely to be, will require time to convince them to join us and to work out the arrangements for their participation. In the second place, all of our NATO allies have cut their armed forces at least as dramatically as we have. The only forces the U.S. can rely upon to be in existence and ready to deter or oppose regional aggressors are its own.

Finally, the conventional armed force maintained during the Cold War were always merely the leading edge of America's military power. War with the Soviet Union would certainly be a war of national mobilization. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of Americans would have had to be drawn into the war to see it through to the end. The provision of standing conventional forces, then, represented a calculation of what was necessary to halt or delay a Soviet advance for long enough to allow the nations to mobilize behind that shield, not an evaluation of what would be necessary to win the war. MRCs are *not* wars of national mobilization. Whatever conventional forces are maintained in peacetime will be the only forces available to pursue such conflicts. Mobilization could result only from real military catastrophe.

If we consider more carefully the likely flow of events of a major theater war, moreover, it becomes clear that our force posture is as wrong as our force structure. The MTW of the future is likely to begin when an enemy attacks a regional ally of the U.S. It will begin on the enemy's timetable when he feels that he is ready and we are not. Our likely foes have probably all learned the salient lesson of the Gulf War--don't let the Americans build up. Their plans, therefore, will likely be designed on the one hand to deny us access to the region in a timely manner and, on the other, to culminate in a situation acceptable to them before we can respond in a meaningful way. Our task.

therefore, will be to respond rapidly and decisively to a fast-paced no-notice attack in the face of considerable efforts at denying us access to the region. If we are able to accomplish that task, then the likelihood of rapid and relatively inexpensive success is high. If we are unable to do so, then the likelihood **that** the war will drag out, perhaps reaching stalemate, certainly imposing a great burden upon us, probably inflicting higher casualties upon us and our allies than we had expected or were prepared to bear, becomes very high. Speed and decisiveness of response will be the keys.

It is true that the equipment the Army currently fields militates against such a rapid deployment, and that issue must be carefully addressed, although it is essential not to compromise our forces' lethality and survivability once they arrive in theater. But transformation plans that focus only or even primarily on the technology miss the main point here. The real test will be how many forces we have ready to go at no notice at any given time. The short answer to that question is that one third of our force can be expected to be ready at any moment, while another third trains up to relieve it and the last third stands down from its ready-to-deploy status. The basic force-sizing metric, therefore, must be that our forces must be large enough that one-third of them will be able to deploy to and decisively halt or defeat a large-scale attack.

This metric must not be applied to our potential foes as they are now, however. For if it is true: as many believe, that Iraq for certain and North Korea in all likelihood could not attack with any reasonable hope of success now even in the face of a minimal U.S. commitment, then they will not attack now. Instead, if they (or other states) are determined to take actions that will bring them into conflict with us, they are almost certain to wait until they are better prepared for the struggle. Our forces must be sized, therefore, not against what our enemies can field today, but against what they could field in five or ten years if they now set their minds to creating forces that could defeat us. It should be immediately apparent that, for instance, our ten-division Army, yielding in principle (but not in practice due to budget-related training shortfalls) three ready divisions at any moment: could not face such a threat, nor will the three air expeditionary forces the Air Force might reasonably expect to keep on alert at all times be enough to handle the tasks that would fall to them in such a conflict. The precise size of the force cannot be calculated without reference to possible threats and possible theaters and possible missions, information to which I do not have access, but it seems unlikely that any force short of fifteen divisions and fifteen AEFs could be adequate to this task.

Forces needed to conduct smaller scale operations such as Bosnia and Haiti cannot be drawn from this pool for an extended period of time. To do so will be to cut into our ability to respond to no-notice attacks, and that fact will not be lost on potential adversaries--we may, once again, create windows of temptation for potential aggressors. The record of the past decade suggests that we will need another division-equivalent on call all the time, prepared to deploy to sustained operations in smaller scale contingencies around the world.

Finally, it is time to abandon the Cold War model of organization in the Army. The Air Force and Marines have already largely done so. The Army, however, still retains the division as the basic maneuver unit and the corps as the fundamental chess-piece in the operational theater. It still attempts to benefit from the economies of scale such an organization provides in the areas of combat support and combat service support units. Unfortunately: the Army has not, on the whole, deployed divisions this past

decade, but has sent brigade-sized units hither and yon as necessary, supported by CS and CSS units drawn from the division and corps support groups. As a result, when one brigade deploys, the ability of the entire division to train and/or deploy suffers. At the same time, divisions do not train to fight as a unit; rather the Army trains one brigade at a time. In order to send forces at no notice into a large-scale conflict, therefore, the Army would either have to send divisions that were a hodge-podge of ready and unready units, or it would have to cobble together the ready brigades from all of the divisions in the force. It is time to break this pattern, and the concepts laid out by Douglas MacGregor in *Breaking the Phalanx* point the way to one solution. MacGregor would create all-arms brigade-sized units with robust organic CS and CSS able to deploy, fight, and sustain themselves independently. Whether we choose the precise program he outlines or another similar one, it seems clear from a strategic perspective that such an organizational transformation is essential.

### ***Conclusion***

America stands today at a crossroads. We can either address the serious underfunding from which our armed forces have suffered for the past decade, undertake the reorganization, re-equipping, and re-orientation of our forces so badly needed in this interwar period, and take seriously the tasks we must accomplish in order to maintain the peace, or we can withdraw from international involvements, cut our forces, reduce our preparedness, fail to transform, and reap the whirlwind that we will have sown. It lies largely in our hands today whether the world will continue to have peace over the long term or whether the present era of stability and prosperity will collapse quickly. Our only hope of doing the right thing lies in learning the lessons of history and avoiding the mistakes that we and others have already made.

May 4, 2001 2:38 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
General Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper from Estes

381

Attached is a note from Andy commenting on Howell Estes' paper. It is useful in helping us think this through.

Thanks.

Attach.  
5/4/01 Marshall memo to SecDef re: Threat v. Capabilities

DHR:dh  
050401-30

4 May 01

U12599 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/1781

May 4, 2001 08:30 AM

TO: SecDef

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Threat v. Capabilities

Read the paper you forwarded by Howell **Estes** and agree that there is merit there. I believe it is very similar in intent to what we had provided earlier responding to Pete **Aldridge's** force sizing paper where we proposed ideas about linking the force sizing method and written strategy more closely. Key points we agree on:

- Moving away from an **MTW** construct
- Considering a broad range of likely threats or scenarios in designing your forces
- Using a system of establishing and then managing advantages as the mechanism for implementing strategy
- And, although not explicitly stated, the benefits of having the strategy itself and force sizing method consistent with one another.

Our idea differs somewhat **from Estes** approach in that we would recommend more specific task-organizing for four, rather than two, "tiers"

- Day to day (forward presence, "engagement" and small crises)
- Experimentation/transformation
- U.S. territorial defense (including **NMD**)
- Global power projection (expeditionary and decisive)

Second, although this is a little rhetorical, the strategy review more accurately defines this idea as an "advantage-based" approach. Establishing and

maintaining the portfolio of advantages will require study of both threats and capabilities, but wouldn't necessarily be **framed** by either of those factors.

Regardless of these minor differences, the main ideas seem to be gaining some recognition and support **from** a number of people, and there are likely a variety of techniques of approach that would be workable.

To: Doug  
FATH

July 11, 2001 9:05 AM

TO: [Redacted]  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: China Fellows Program

Please take a look at this memo from Chris Williams and see what we ought to do about the China Fellows program.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/10/01 Williams ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
071101-3

China

115101

U12618 /02

Copy to: LD  
Adm. G  
7/10/01

July 10, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM:

Chris Williams

*AW Great help*

SUBJECT:

Several Matters

Sir, I wanted to bring you up to speed on several matters regarding my activities as a DOD consultant.

As you may know, I meet with Dan Gallington regularly in an effort to assist him with on-going policy issues. Topics I've worked on with Dan comprise the gamut of issues that the Policy routinely deals with, as well as "crisis" actions that have cropped up from time to time. In addition, I have consulted with Steve Cambone on various matters, including intelligence policy and funding, the QDR, missile defense strategy, budget issues. Dov Zakheim asked me to assist in one project related to up-coming U.S.- Republic of Korea burdensharing negotiations. Steve Cambone and Rich Haver contacted me recently to ask whether I would be willing to represent Defense in the Presidentially mandated inter-agency review of U.S. intelligence capabilities. I informed them that I'd be pleased to assist, if you believe my participation would be appropriate.

I am looking forward to the first meeting of the Defense Policy Board. I provided a list of possible study topics for Richard Perle's consideration. Obviously, Richard's and my shared objective is to use the Board to support your efforts to transform Defense policy, organizations, and processes in ways beneficial to U.S. national security.

John Gordon of the National Nuclear Security Administration recently asked me to serve on his Advisory Board that is reviewing various issues associated with the Department of Energy's capabilities to maintain a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile. In addition to providing John with advice and recommendations on this important subject, I intend to provide you with regular updates on this topic.

I've met with Andy Marshall on several occasions, at his request, to review a number of his on-going projects, especially his proposals for

7/10/01  
6:28 pm

enhancing Defense's analytical understanding of China. He will soon forward to you a memorandum laying out his proposals for (1) standing up a so-called "Secretary of Defense China Fellows Program" and (2) an expanded set of China-related research projects. *I strongly endorse Andy's recommendations.* The "China Fellows Program" is, in my view, a highly innovative way of focussing much-needed attention on China's security policies, plans, and capabilities. I'm convinced that Andy's suggested approach is a cost-effective and means of enhancing Defense's understanding of the security challenge posed by a "rising China." (Andy's approach is certainly a better than the poorly conceived, expensive and unmanageable "China Center at NDU" that the Congress established years ago in response to Clinton Administration foibles on China.) I would be happy to discuss Andy's proposals with you at your convenience.

If there are other means by which I might contribute, please do not hesitate to contact me. I hope my efforts have aided "the cause."

Once again, thank you for allowing me to serve. Warmest regards.

*Thanks again, Sir, for the courtesies  
you showed to my family. It was  
greatly appreciated. Q.*

Rec'd 1/2 02  
A

December 28, 2001 7:22 AM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Guard

Should we make some **changes** in the National Guard? Please take a look at this file.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1212 I/O 1 GC memo to **SecDef** re: National Guard

DHR:dh  
122801-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

325

28 Dec 01

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

December 21, 2001

SECDEF HAS SELIV

DEC 28 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 12/22/01*

SUBJECT: *USA Today* Articles About the National Guard: "Tarnished Guardians"

You asked for my views about the series "Tarnished Guardians," which was printed in *USA Today* beginning with the December 17 edition.

- I understand that the articles have David Chu's personal attention and that he has asked the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to evaluate the assertions in them. I also understand that Dr. Chu is providing an Information Paper to you on this matter.
- My office has offered to work closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
- I recommend that Legislative Affairs and Public Affairs work with Personnel and Readiness and my office to develop a comprehensive approach for responding to the *USA Today series*.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, (b)(6)

*12/26 -*

*12/26*

*SecDef -*

*I sent your note to David Chu to ask what he intends to do. You're right; it's an opportunity we should jump on.*

*D. Rita*



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 5:48 PM

TO: Daniel Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Reimbursement for Air Travel

580

When I take a private trip, I am required to be on a government aircraft so I have secure communication available at all times. When I make a trip that I would have normally used a charter flight, my inclination is to not pay the first-class fare as the regulations suggest, but to pay the charter fare that I would have paid were I doing it myself, which of course would be considerably more.

I have taken two personal flights thus far. The first was to New York for a funeral. I would have taken the shuttle, so a first-class ticket is fine. It is a bit more than I would have paid on the shuttle, but that is fine.

My second personal flight was to Taos, New Mexico. In that case, I would normally have flown to Denver first class (on coach tickets with upgrades) and then chartered to Taos and the same thing coming back. Therefore, I plan to pay the government for a coach-class round-trip ticket plus upgrades from Washington, D.C., to Denver, and, in addition, pay the cost of a charter round trip from Denver to Taos.

DHR:dh
021901-9

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

19 FEB 20 1

2001 FEB 22 PM 12:46

**OFFICE of DoD GENERAL COUNSEL**  
**The Pentagon, Room 3E980**  
**Washington, D.C. 20301-1600**

February 21, 2001


**NOTE FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD**

**SUBJECT: Reimbursement for Air Travel**

There is no objection to your paying the amounts you suggested in your memo. However, based upon the facts that you have provided, the actual reimbursement required is less. The rate of reimbursement required under Office of Management and Budget Circular A-126 for personal use of the military aircraft is the equivalent commercial full coach fare for the actual flights taken, regardless of how you otherwise would have traveled. The Circular defines "full coach fare" as "a coach fare available to the general public between the day that the travel was planned and the day the travel occurred."

The Circular does not address the rate of reimbursement where no regularly scheduled airline service exists. Based upon informal consultation with OMB staff, we conclude that the appropriate reimbursement is the full coach round-trip fare available to the general public between the day that the travel was planned and the day the travel occurred to the nearest regularly scheduled location. With respect to Taos, this appears to be Santa Fe. Therefore, reimbursement to the government of the cost of the full coach fare of a round-trip ticket from Washington, D.C. to Santa Fe is the appropriate rate.

I note also that the same rate of reimbursement would be required with respect to any other individual who was aboard the aircraft in an unofficial capacity.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel

2001 FEB 22 PM 12:46

**OFFICE of DoD GENERAL COUNSEL**  
**The Pentagon, Room 3E980**  
**Washington, D.C. 20301-1600**

February 21, 2001


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Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 19, 2001 5:48 PM

TO: Daniel Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

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DHR:dh  
021901-9

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

December 17, 2001 1:00 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *JH*  
SUBJECT: Memberships

334

Is it possible for me to indicate a representative to attend some of these various memberships that I don't have time for, such as numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

Also, I would like to know who represents me on numbers 2, 3 and 4.

Thanks.

Attach  
11/07/01 GC memo to SecDef: Automatic Memberships

DHR:dh  
121701-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Mr. D. R. suggested determining what the groups do, and for those that do not provide value to DoD, have SecDef recommend that DoD/SecDef be deleted from memberships. For those that are of some value but do not need SecDef's personal attention, advise that a specific lower level person will perform DoD memberships functions. He noted that it may be necessary to contact the proponent/DoD attache to do this. V/R Carl Wagner*

7 Dec 17

. November 12, 2001 4:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memberships

We ought to **review** this list of **memberships** and find out who my representative **is** on each **one**. Then we **ought** to **change** the representatives to make sure we have the people we want.

. Please **come up with** a current list and a proposed **list** of changes.

**Thanks.**

Attach,  
11/07/01 GC memo to SecDef re: Automatic Membership

DHR:dh  
111201-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 12 2001

INFO MEMO

November 7, 2001, 11:11a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE .

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense

*WJ Haynes 11/9/01*

SUBJECT: Response to Your Query Concerning Automatic Membership

- You-requested (tab B) a list of groups of which **you** are a member by **virtue** of your position as Secretary & Defense.
- The list at tab A is the result of our **search** of **statutes** and Executive **Orders** establishing Secretary of **Defense membership** on councils, **committees**, and other groups.
- We **have not undertaken** an **exhaustive effort** to **determine** the exact status of many of these committees, For **most**, **representation has** been delegated or **has** devolved to **subordinate** DoD officials. Some of **these committees**, although still "on the books," are moribund.
- **Your note mentioned** the Red Cross. The **President appoints eight members** of the Red Cross **Board** of Governors, traditionally **including** the Secretary of Defense, President Bush has not yet **made his appointments**.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: John A. Casciotti, (b)(6)

*SPD  
11/10*

UNCLASSIFIED

## Secretary of Defense Memberships

### MOST SIGNIFICANT MEMBERSHIPS

1. **National Security Council, member**  
**Committee on Foreign Intelligence, member**  
**Committee on Transnational Threats, member**  
-50 U.S.C. §402
2. **President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board**  
-Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202 (Oct. 16, 2001)  
-SecDef or designee
3. **Homeland Security Council, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 8, 2001)
4. **Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman**  
-22 U.S.C. §2751  
-SecDef may designate a DASD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties  
-DepSecDef designated Committee Chairman  
-USD(AT&L) Chairs interagency group supporting committee

### OTHER MEMBERSHIPS

5. **Invasive Species Council, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 1311364 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)  
-Primary Representative is ADUSD (E), Mr. John P. Woodley
6. **U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701 (Jun. 11, 1998), 16 U.S.C. §6401, note
7. **American Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48445 (Sep. 11, 1997)  
-SecDef or ASD-level designee
8. **Export Administrative Review Board, member**  
-Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), *continues the* Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533, (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

DEC. 17.2801 7:28AM

- No alternate Board member **shall** be designated, but the acting **SecDef** or Deputy Secretary may **serve in lieu** of SecDef
- Board responsible for interagency dispute resolution **concerning** export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve dispute

**9. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation; nonvoting ex officio member**

- 15 U.S.C. §657c

**10. National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, member**

- 15 U.S.C. §4632
- SecDef** or designee
- DDR&E** advised that the Committee ceased **activities** in 1992

**11. Trade Policy Committee, member**

- Excc. Order No. 12188**, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. §2171 note
- SecDef** may designate a subordinate officer at the ASD-level to go **in** his stead to meetings when he is unable to attend

**12. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member**

- 20 U.S.C. §80
- DoD** Historian advised that Board met **once** in 1980

**13. DoD Advisory Council on Dependent's Education, cochairman**

- 20 USC. §929
- SecDef** or SecDef designee

**14. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member**

- 22 U.S.C. §4605
- SecDef** may designate an **DoD** PAS official

**15. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance; member**

- Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. § 116 note)
- SecDef** or designee

**16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member**

- 38 U.S.C. §542
- SecDef** or **SecDef** designee (after **consultation** with DACOWITS)
- DACOWITS** Military Director is **SecDef** designee

**17. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member**

- 38 U.S.C. §1974
- DoDD** 1341.3, "**Servicemen's Group Life Insurance**," assigns the **DoD** Comptroller

DEC. 17. 2001 7:21AM

responsibility for **financial** policy and **ASD(FMP)** responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program

-Council meets once a year

**18. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member**

-38 U.S.C. §3689

**19. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member**

-38 U.S.C. 54110

-Committee meets quarterly

**20. National Capital Planning Commission, es officio member**

-40 U.S.C. §71a

-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to **serve** in his stead

-SecDef designee is **Jetry** Shiplett, Special Assistant to the Director, Real Estate and Facilities

**21. Interagency Council on the Homeless**

-42 U.S.C. §11312

-SecDef or designee

**22. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member**

-42 U.S.C. §12623

**23. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member**

-42 U.S.C. §12651a

**24. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member**

-Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

-Task Force **terminates** May 15, 2002 unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending **continuation** of activities

**25. Economic Adjustment Committee, Chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member**

-Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)

-SecDef or designated principal **deputy**

-Director Office of Economic Adjustment (DUSD(LA&I)), serves as **Committee** Chair

October 17, 2001 7:04 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Automatic Membership

Please pull together a list of **all the** things I am automatically a member of because of my role as **Secretary** of Defense. For **example, I** understand I am **now a** member of the **Homeland Security** Council. Of course, I am **also** a member of the Cabinet and the National **Security** Council.

Are **there** other things like that? As **I** recall, the last time I was here I was a **member** of **the** board of the Red Cross.

Please **let** me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101701-3

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
NOV 12 2001

*11/9*  
*Sec Def -*  
*Response attached. If you have questions about any particular membership, I have a binder with an explanation of ~~each~~ each.*

*D. White*

2001 MAR -9 AM 11: 06



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

MAR 08 2001

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL *DJD 3/6/01*  
(Prepared by: Paul Koffsky, Deputy General Counsel, P&HP,

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Studies and Analyses by Federally Funded Research and  
Development Centers (FFRDCs) - INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

You have asked for a legal opinion on the ordering of studies and analyses from FFRDCs in support of four specific areas of the Department's business. These studies would focus on: 1) Financial Management, 2) Acquisition Reform, 3) Transformation, and 4) Quality of Life.

The specific legal concerns are whether these efforts violate either the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) or the rules concerning personal services contracting. The following guidelines govern proper use of the FFRDC contractors.

Studies and analyses conducted by an FFRDC, functioning as an independent contractor, do not fall under the FACA or implicate the rules against personal services contracting. DoD lawfully may issue task orders to an FFRDC for studies and analyses if they are within the purpose, mission, general scope of effort, and special competency for which the FFRDC has been established and maintained. Such orders must set forth a specific statement of work and defined deliverables, such as reports or briefing slides, to DoD as the product of the study effort. DoD personnel may not perform the task order in whole or in part, direct the day-to-day performance of the task order, or direct the specific personnel or resources to be used by the FFRDC to accomplish its work under the task order. It is permissible for the FFRDC to obtain information it needs to conduct the study from DoD personnel and DoD personnel may facilitate locating and providing that information.

The statements of work for each of the four studies are now under development by the respective OSD proponent activities, in coordination with the OSD Studies Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). My staff and I are providing legal advice to each of



11-L-0559/OSD/1800

U04875 / 01

the proponent activities within OSD for these efforts. The OSD Studies and FFRDC Policy Offices are also assisting in the development of the task orders. Once the statements of work for these task orders are completed, they will be reviewed by the General Counsel, Washington Headquarters Services, and by legal counsel for the contracting activity before any orders are placed. A written legal opinion will be prepared for each order. The FFRDCs should not begin work until the contracting formalities are concluded

I am providing copies of this memorandum to the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Director, Administration and Management for their guidance.

cc: OUSD (Policy)  
Acting USD (A, T&L)  
OUSD (Comptroller)  
Acting USD (P&R)  
Director, A&M  
General Counsel, WHS

March 29, 2001 7:48 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment

Do we have a process of getting rid of excess equipment, selling it, stopping the cost of managing it, housing it, auditing it, inventorying it, etc.?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032901-S

*Y00.703*

*29 Mar 01*

U06506 /01

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Subject: Excess Equipment

Mr. Secretary,

The Acting General Counsel has prepared the attached paper on the property disposal process. The law is fairly straightforward in this area.

I would note, however, that the Army & Air Force have a different philosophy in using these authorities than does the Navy. This is especially true in the BRAC process.

The Army and Air Force prefer to liquidate the excess property quickly, and by doing so, find their savings in the prompt reduction of their overhead.

The Navy, on the other hand, prefers to hold the property for a longer period and attempt to obtain maximum value.

400.703

4 Apr 01

**OFFICE OF DoD GENERAL COUNSEL**  
**The Pentagon, Room 33980**  
**Washington, DC 20301-1600**

April 3, 2001

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DE LEON

SUBJECT: Property Disposal Process

The following information is provided in response to Secretary Rumsfeld's question concerning the Department's process for managing and disposing of excess equipment:

- The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. Chapter 10) governs the process for disposal.
- The General Services Administration (GSA) has issued regulations on the utilization and disposal of property by Federal agencies (41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter H).
- Under the authority of DoD Directive 4140.1 and DoD 4140.1-R, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has issued the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual (DoD 4160.21-M) which contains the DoD procedures and policies for the reutilization, transfer and disposal of government property.
- Numerous DoD directives, instructions, regulations and manuals in the 4100 series of the Directives System govern the process for property storage, audit and inventory.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel

April 4, 2001

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From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Subject: Excess Equipment

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The Navy, on the other hand, prefers to hold the property for a longer period and attempt to obtain maximum value.

*400.903*

*4 Apr 01*

**OFFICE OF DoD GENERAL COUNSEL**  
**The Pentagon, Room 33980**  
**Washington, DC 20301-1600**

April 3, 2001

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DE LEON

SUBJECT: Property Disposal Process

The following information is provided in response to Secretary Rumsfeld's question concerning the Department's process for managing and disposing of excess equipment:

- The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. Chapter 10) governs the process for disposal.
- The General Services Administration (GSA) has issued regulations on the utilization and disposal of property by Federal agencies (41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter H).
- Under the authority of DoD Directive 4140.1 and DoD 4140.1-R, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has issued the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual (DoD 4160.21-M) which contains the DoD procedures and policies for the reutilization, transfer and disposal of government property.
- Numerous DoD directives, instructions, regulations and manuals in the 4100 series of the Directives System govern the process for property storage, audit and inventory.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel

March 29, 2001 7:48 AM

T O : Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment

Do we have a process of getting rid of excess equipment, selling it, stopping the cost of managing it, housing it, auditing it, inventorying it, etc.?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032901-5

*MAS MARTINEZ  
DEP SEC DEF MA  
692-7150*

U06506 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/1807

April 10, 2001 6:03 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
RADM Quigley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EP-3 Legal Issues

Attached is some material from Dan Dell'Orto on the legal situation with respect to the EP-3. Let's make sure we feed this into any final statement after the crew is out.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/6/01 GC Memo: "EP-3 Incident-Guidance on Legal Issues"

DHR:dh  
041001-4

*CHINA*

*10 APR 01*

**U07407 /01**

11-L-0559/OSD/1808

April 16, 2001 2:21 PM

TO: Undersecretary-designates  
Service Secretary-designates

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislative and Statutory Provisions

Attached is a compendium of major legislative and statutory provisions that affect the Department.

I would appreciate it if you would take a look at this compendium, review the legislative provisions, and then recommend any modifications and/or eliminations you feel would be appropriate for us to propose to the Congress this year.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/09/01 de Leon memo to SecDef re: "Significant Statutory, Regulatory and Judicial Changes 1974-2000"

DHR:dh  
041601-41

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April 9, 2001

To: ✓ Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Acting General Counsel Dan Dell'Orto  
From: Rudy de Leon R  
Subject: Significant Statutory, Regulatory and Judicial  
Changes 1974 – 2000

Mr. Secretary,

Attached is a compendium of major legislative / statutory provisions that affect the Department of Defense. I asked the General Counsel's office to put these materials together because they help explain the rather complex regulatory environment that impacts the DOD.

The survey tracks the period 1974 to 2000, but we also included the Buy American provisions.

Other provisions include the 60/40 Depot Rule, Revolving Door/Conflict of Interest, Procurement Reform/Acquisition Workforce Requirements, Goldwater-Nichols, etc. It is a long list.

While the list is interesting, my suggestion is to farm this list out to the senior members of your team – the three service secretaries and the four OSD under secretaries – and ask them to review these legislative provisions and recommend modifications and eliminations.

11-L-0559/OSD/1831

**Significant Statutory, Regulatory, and Judicial Changes Since 1974 Affecting DoD**

1933--**Buy American Act**, ch. 268, Title III, §§ 1 to 3, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), amended by 1988 Pub. L. No. 86-70, §43, 73 Stat. 151 (1959), as further amended by Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title VII, 102 Stat. 1545 (1988).

The "Buy American Act" (41 USC 10a--41 USC 10d) requires the procurement only of articles, materials, and supplies that have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from components that have been manufactured in the United States. The Act does not apply if a domestic product is inconsistent with the public interest, if domestic products are not available in reasonable quality and quantity, or if the price is unreasonable. Basically, in DoD procurements, offers of foreign products are adjusted for evaluation purposes by adding a 50% differential. If the adjusted foreign product price is lower than the domestic product price, the foreign product may be acquired.

The Buy American Act has been waived by the United States Trade Representative for purchases of eligible products from designated countries under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, It has also been waived by the Secretary of Defense for purchases of defense products from NATO and other friendly countries.

**1974 Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974**, Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796 (1974).

Created the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to provide overall direction of government-wide procurement policies, regulations, and procedures.

**Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974**, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. (1974).

Authorizes the federal government to provide supplemental assistance to State and local governments in actions to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from catastrophic or major disasters or emergencies.

**1975 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976**, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).

Permanently codified emergency and extraordinary expense authority

**1976 Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC)**, 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (1976).

When the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission he may authorize the Secretary of

Defense to order to active duty involuntarily up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (limited to 30,000 of the 200,000) for not more than 270 days. This authority may be used to order members and units to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a WMD but not to provide assistance for other domestic disasters or emergencies. When this authority is used a report must be forwarded to Congress within 24 hours.

**Arms Export Control Act (AECA)**, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq.).

Renamed the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 to be the Arms Export Control Act and authorized the President to control the export of all defense articles and services. The AECA is the statutory foundation for current controls on the export of weapons and weapons technology. Many of the President's AECA authorities have been delegated by Executive Order to either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. In DoD, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for FMS under the Act.

**International Military Education and Training (IMET)**, International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act § 106(a), Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2347); amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Authorizes international military education and training to be provided (on a reimbursable basis whenever feasible) to military and related civilian personnel (to include foreign governmental personnel of ministries other than ministries of defense) of foreign countries.

1977 **International Emergency Economic Powers Act**, 50 U.S.C. Chapter 35 (1977).

Authorizes the President to impose economic sanctions in response to certain international threats.

1978 **Civil Service Reform Act of 1978**, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified and amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).

Reformed the civil service system; established federal labor unions.

**Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act**, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 *et seq.* (1978) and (1994).

Establishes a warrant procedure for the conduct of electronic surveillance and physical searches conducted within the United States against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers.

**Contract Disputes Act of 1978**, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

Established uniform procedures for the submission of claims by contractors, decisions concerning such claims by contracting officers, and appeals of contracting officers' decisions.

**Ethics in Government Act of 1978**, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, as amended.

Established public disclosure and reporting of financial information by senior officials.

**1979 Federal Emergency Management**, Executive Order 12148 (1979).

Delegated to the Director, FEMA the authority to establish policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and the civil emergency planning, management, mitigation and assistance functions of Federal executive agencies.

**1980 Classified Information Procedures Act**, 18 U.S.C. Appendix 3 (1980).

Established procedures for the handling and treatment of classified information to be used in a federal criminal trial.

**Burdensharing**, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981, Pub. L. 96-342, 94 Stat. 1077, amended by Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98 Stat. 2516 (set March 1 as annual reporting date) and Pub. L. No. 106-246 (broadened reporting requirement to include U.S. allies bordering Arabian Gulf).

Entreats President to seek increases in Allied Contributions to the Common Defense.

**Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)**, Public Law 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835 (codified and amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) (1980).

Revised and made uniform the laws relating to appointment, promotion, separation and retirement of Regular commissioned officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force.

**1981 Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies**, 10 U.S.C. Chapter 18 (provisions added 1981-1996).

Provides authority for DoD support and assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. Cost of most support is reimbursable to DoD.

**Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities**, 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1981).

Establishes procedures for oversight of intelligence activities.

1982 **Military Assistance in Response to Nuclear Events**, 18 U.S.C. §§ 831(d)(e) (1982).

Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in response to requests from the Attorney General, to provide assistance in responding to emergencies involving nuclear weapons.

**Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982**, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).

Eliminated the "M-account" (the "M-account" was where all unobligated balances of expired appropriations merged and lost their fiscal year identity) and required that all appropriations close five years after they expire.

**Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983**, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982).

Imposed significant new oversight and reporting requirements in connection with the procurement of major weapons systems.

**Other Domestic Source or Content Restrictions**, 10 U.S.C. § 2534 (1982), amended in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, and 1999.

Additional miscellaneous restrictions on DoD procurements are at 10 U.S.C. § 2534 which requires that specified defense items be manufactured by companies that are part of the national technology and industrial base. These restrictions may be waived by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and in some cases lower level officials, on a case-by-case basis if they would cause unreasonable delay or costs or if U.S. producers would not be jeopardized by foreign competition. Further Bounds for waiver include national security and the unavailability of satisfactory domestic items.

1983 **Revision of Title 31, U.S.C.A.**, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (1983).

Enacted "Prompt Payment" provisions requiring interest payments on overdue accounts.

**Nonappropriated Fund Whistleblower Protection**, 10 U.S.C. § 1587 (1983).

Prohibits reprisal against Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality civilian employees for making protected disclosures regarding: a violation of any law, rule or regulation; waste, fraud or abuse; or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

1984 **Aircraft Sabotage Act**, 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1984).

Implements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the

Safety of Civil Aviation and expands the protection for aircraft and related facilities.

**Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984).**

Criminalizes specific conduct resulting from obtaining unauthorized access to computers.

**Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Div. B., title VII, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).**

Substantially revised procedures for government contracting with full and open competition the requirement unless one of a limited number of exceptions is satisfied.

**Single Audit Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507 (1984).**

Provides for a single audit of nonprofit entities and state and local governments receiving Federal awards.

1985 **Cooperative Projects with Friendly Foreign Countries, Arms Export Control Act §27, 22 U.S.C. § 2767 (1985).**

Authorizes SecDef, on behalf of the President; to enter into agreements with NATO nations, specifically designated friendly foreign countries, or NATO organizations, for cooperative research on and development, testing, evaluation, or joint production of defense articles.

**Montgomery GI Bill - Active Duty, 38 U.S.C. Chapter 30 (1985) and Montgomery GI Bill - Selected Reserve, 10 U.S.C. Chapter 1606 (1985).**

Provides education assistance to active duty personnel and reservists.

1986 **Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (codified and amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).**

Restructured and strengthened the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

**Establishment of Special Operations Command, 10 U.S.C. § 167 (1986).**

Creates the Unified Command for special operations forces.

**Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 119 (1986).**

Updates the federal wiretap statute to encompass computer surveillance.

**Stored Wire and Electronic Communications**, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 121 (1985).  
Updates the federal law governing how federal law enforcement agencies obtain access to stored communications.

**Assignment of Coast Guard Personnel**, 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1986).  
Assigns USCG legal detachments on USN vessels in drug interdiction areas.

**Partnership for Peace Exercises**, DoD Authorization Act, FY 1987 § 1321, Pub. L. No. 99-661, Div. A, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986).  
Authorities for DoD to pay incremental expenses of developing countries as a result of the participation in bilateral or multilateral exercises.

**Bilateral and Regional Cooperation**, DoD Authorization Act, FY 1987 § 1322(a), Pub. L. No. 99-661, Div. A, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986).  
Authorizes SecDef to pay the expenses of defense personnel from developing countries for attendance at bilateral and regional conferences, seminars and meetings.

**False Claims Amendments Act of 1986**, Public Law 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).  
Significantly revised and strengthened the False Claims Act of 1863.

**NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979**, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2331 (1979).  
1986 Amendments to the Act create Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs); NATO countries eligible for ACSAs under 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2350.

**Humanitarian and Other Assistance**, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 § 333(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3857-3859 (codified as further amended at 10 U.S.C. § 401).  
Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to carry out humanitarian and civil assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations in foreign countries.

1987 **Enhance Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials**, 10 U.S.C § 380 (1987).  
The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Attorney General, conduct annual briefings with civilian law enforcement to facilitate DoD support.

**Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1987).**

Prohibits reprisal against members of the Armed Forces for making protected communications to a member of congress, an Inspector General, or other designated officials, regarding: mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

**Obstruction of a Federal Audit, 18 U.S.C. § 15 16 (1987).**

Makes it a crime to obstruct the work of a Federal auditor or quality assurance inspector working on behalf of the United States.

**Special Access Programs, 10 U.S.C. § 119 (1987).**

Establishes requirements to facilitate congressional oversight over all special access programs.

1988 **Office of National Drug Control Policy, 21 U.S.C. Chapter 22 (1988).**

Establishes the Office and assigns it responsibility for developing national drug control policy and overseeing its implementation. including authority over "Drug Control Program Agencies", including DoD.

**Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of 1988,**

Pub. L. No. 100-679, 102 Stat. 4055 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).

Prohibits contractors and procurement officials from offering, accepting, or soliciting employment, gratuities, or et al. during the conduct of a procurement and imposed a 2 year ban on employment with the winning contractor.

**Exon-Florio Amendment of 1988 §5021, Pub. L. No. 100-418, title V, 102 Stat. 1425 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170).**

President may review the effects on national security of certain merge acquisitions, and takeovers by or with foreign persons.

**Executive Order No. 12674, (1989), as amended,**

Established principles of ethical conduct for the Executive Branch.

**Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, Executive Order No. 12656 (1988).**

Establishes the policy of the Federal government to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any National security emergency.

**TRICARE Managed Care Program.**

Congress has enacted a series of authorities implementing managed care for DoD, including large TRICARE regional managed care contracts under which health care enterprises administer HMO-like programs (late 1980s-present). DoD also implemented major cost saving payment methods for reimbursing hospitals and physicians and is in the process of reforming pharmaceutical purchasing and management. Today, the Military Health System, following civilian sector practices, has fully integrated managed health care into its civilian provider program.

**National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, § 326, Pub, L. No. 100-456, 102 Stat. 1956 (1988).**

Enacted 10 U.S.C. § 2466 to prohibit the Secretary of Defense from requiring the Secretary of the Army or the Air Force, in selecting an entity to perform depot maintenance workload, to carry out a competition for such selection either among in-house activities (Air Force or Army) or between an in-house activity and a contractor.

1989 **Detection and Monitoring of Illegal Drugs, 10 U.S.C. § 124 (1989).**

DoD designated lead Federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime traffic of illegal drugs into the United States in support of law enforcement agencies.

**National Guard Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, 32 U.S.C. § 112 (1989).**

Authorizes DoD to pay the costs of National Guard support to drug law enforcement agencies pursuant to plans submitted by state governors.

**Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1989).**

Strengthens protections of federal employee whistleblowers when a personnel action is allegedly taken because of a protected disclosure.

1990 **Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub, L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).**

Designates a Chief Financial Officer in each executive department and in each major executive agency in the Federal Government.

**Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XII, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et. al.**

Established the Defense Acquisition Workforce under the authority of the SecDef, to professionalize the workforce to education, training and career development programs.

**DoS Foreign Military Financing (FMF) on the Decline.**

In 1990, DoS FMF budget was \$5.02713; in 1994, \$3.23 1B; and in 1999, \$3.276B. Costs of financing foreign assistance are migrating to DoD by direct and indirect means.

**Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1990).**

Authority to recommend the closure or realignment of bases expired in 1995; the remaining authority to close or realign an installation is very limited.

**Authority to Accept Contributions of Money, Property, and Services, 10 U.S.C. § 2608 (1990).**

Authorizes DoD to accept contributions of money and property from any person, foreign government, or international organization and contributions of services from any foreign government or international organization. Money contributions must be deposited into the Treasury and may be used only if appropriate & DoD may accept, retain, and use contributions of property and services.

**Defense Acquisition Workforce Established, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et. seq. (1990).**

Established the Defense Acquisition Workforce under the authority of the SecDef to professionalize the workforce through education, training and career development programs.

**DOD Support to Counterdrug Activities, National Defense**

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 § 1004, Pub. L. No. 101-510, as amended.

Authorizes DoD to provide 10 categories of counterdrug support to any federal, state, local, and foreign agencies with counter drug responsibilities. Provision has been renewed continuously.

1991 **Accountability for Intelligence Activities, 50 U.S.C. Chapter 15, Subchapter III (1991).**

Amends oversight procedures, defines covert action, and prescribes requirements for Presidential findings.

**Intelligence Commercial Activities, 10 U.S.C. § 431 et seq (1991).**

Codifies the Secretary's authority to approve the conduct of commercial activity in support of intelligence activities conducted abroad.

**Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 105 Stat. 1693 (22 U.S.C. § 2551 note), renamed in subsequent legislation as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act.**

Authorizes DoD to assist States of the Former Soviet Union in the dismantlement and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of weapons proliferation.

**GARDEN PLOT, DoD Civil Disturbance Plan (1991).**

DoD's plan for military assistance to Federal, State and local government agencies for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations. Such operations are referred to within DoD as Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).

**CINC Initiative Funds, 10 U.S.C. § 166a (1991).**

Authority established in 1991 to be available to cover CINC contingencies; \$25M a year has been appropriated.

**Amendments to Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-16 (1991).**

Forbids discrimination in Federal employment based on race, color, creed, national origin, and retaliation for protesting discrimination; compensatory and punitive damages up to \$300,000 available.

**Armed Forces Retirement Home (AFRH), 24 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1991).**

Congress incorporated the U.S. Naval Home (Gulfport, Mississippi) and the U.S. Soldiers' and Airmen's Home (Washington, D.C.) into a new independent establishment in the Executive Branch, the AFRH. DoD will provide nonreimbursable administrative, legal, policy and investigative support; Navy officers run the Naval Home; and SecDef appoints the members of the Board that runs AFRH. If SecDef decides to increase the mandatory contribution that all enlisted and warrant officers make to the AFRH from \$.50/month to \$1/month (Congress authorized SecDef to do so in 1991), SecDef will gain authority, direction and control over the AFRH.

**Compensatory Damages in EEO Cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991).**

Provides SecDef authority to pay compensatory damages in complaints of discrimination filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, § 2466, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1336 (1991).**

Revised 10 U.S.C. § 2466 to provide that not less than 60 percent of the funds available for depot-level maintenance for the Department of the Army and Air Force shall be used for the performance of such maintenance by military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense. It also prohibited management by end-strength of depot-level maintenance civilian employees. The Secretary of the Army or Air Force could waive the limitation when determined necessary for

reasons of national security, and after notification of congress of the reasons.  
Annual reports to Congress required on January 15, 1992 and 1993.

**Expanded IMET (EIMET)**, Congress earmarked \$1M of IMET appropriations in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1997 (1990).

Requires certain funds to be used for foreign training programs to emphasize (1) responsible defense resource management, (2) respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, (3) cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, and (4) military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

**1992 National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act of 1992**, Pub. L. No. 102-538, title I, 106 Stat. 3533 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

Codifies certain authorities for government use of the radio spectrum (e.g., Joint Warfighter requirements) in the Department of Commerce. Ultimate authority on issues of most concern to DoD remain vested in the President and the Director, OMB, pursuant to Executive Order 12046.

**Land Remote Sensing Policy, 15 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq.** (1992).

Grants the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State authority to deny imagery from U.S.- licensed remote sensing satellites in the interests of national security and foreign policy.

**5 C.F.R. § 2635** (1992).

Established the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.

**Federal Response Plan**, April 1992.

An umbrella plan that guides Federal government support to State and local governments during disasters and emergencies. Includes outlining Federal, including DoD, responsibilities providing framework for coordinating civil-military requirements between DoD and other Federal agencies.

**Humanitarian Assistance (HA)**, 10 U.S.C. § 2551 (1992).

Broad authority to provide limited HA funds in conjunction with creation of new appropriation account (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)).

**Fines and Penalties under Environmental Statutes, Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, title I, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660; Clean Air Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322.**

Subjects Federal facilities, including military installations, to the substantive and procedural requirements of various environmental laws, including fine and penalty provisions, and in several important environmental areas federal facilities are fully subject to State, Interstate, and local laws.

**Obligation to Consult with American Indian and Alaska Native Entities, 1992 Amendments to National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6), Executive Order No. 13007: "Indian Sacred Sites" (1996); Executive Memorandum: "Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments" (April 29, 1994); and DoD American Indian and Alaska Native Policy (October 20, 1998).**

Obligate DoD to consult with potentially affected Indian tribes before taking any action that may adversely affect traditional cultural properties or reserved treaty rights to hunt, fish, or gather plants, or may restrict access to sacred sites. Although this obligation is not a "veto" authority, consultation can be time-consuming and resource-intensive.

**Improving the Management and Use of Government Aircraft, OMB Circular A-126 (1992).**

Establishes a preference for the use of commercial airline service, prescribes criteria that must be satisfied before government aircraft may be used, and identifies certain categories of travel, such as "required use;" which permits use of a government aircraft due to bona fide communications or security needs or exceptional scheduling requirements. SecDef is authorized to make such determinations for DoD personnel.

**Defense Health Program Funding Account (1992).**

Health program funding (but not management authority) was consolidated under a unified Defense Health Program account, under the authority, direction, and control of the ASD(HA), as opposed to the budgets and appropriations of the Military Departments.

**Increased DCI Involvement in DoD, 50 U.S.C. § 403-6 (1992, amended 1996).**

Requires DCI concurrence with appointments for the Directors of NSA, NRO, and NIMA, and mandates consultation with the DCI for the appointment of the Director, DIA. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5(d) (1992, amended 1996) requires the DCI, in consultation with the SecDef and the Chairman, to evaluate and report to congressional intelligence committees on the

performance of their national missions. 50 U.S.C. 403-4 (1992, amended 1996) requires DCI, in coordination with Intelligence Community (IC) department heads, to consolidate personnel, administration, and security programs within the IC whenever possible. 1999-2000 DCI initiative updated DCI regulations to support DCI oversight (and management) over National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) programs (including DoD programs) by functional (not organizational) lines across the IC, with a stated goal of increased direct DCI management of IC programs.

**Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**, 10 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1992).  
Position of Vice Chairman established.

**DoD Education Activity (DoDEA)**, DoDD 1342.20, "Department of Defense Education Activity," Oct. 13, 1992.

The SecDef has clarified his authority over DoD domestic and overseas schools through the establishment of DoDEA. The SecDef has authority over DoD domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2164.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, § 352**, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2378 (1992).

Amended 10 U.S.C. § 2466 to expand the requirement that not less than 60 percent of the funds available for depot-level maintenance be used for the performance of such maintenance by employees of the Department of Defense to the military departments and the defense agencies, in lieu of the former limitation applicable only to the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

**Humanitarian Assistance**, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 § 304, Pub. L. No. 102-494, 106 Stat. 2361, as later amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 1312, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186 (codified and amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2561).

Authorizes DoD to provide transportation of humanitarian relief and other humanitarian activities worldwide, to the extent provided in DoD authorization and appropriations acts.

**Berry Amendment**, Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1993, § 8005, 10 U.S.C. § 2241 note (1992), further amended by Department of Defense Appropriations Act of FY 1994, § 8005, 10 U.S.C. § 2241 note (1993).

The Berry Amendment prohibits the purchase of foreign source articles, such as food; clothing; tents, tarpaulins, and covers; cotton; wool; woven silk and woven silk blends; spun silk yam for cartridge cloth; synthetic fabric or coated synthetic fabric; canvas products; specialty metals; and hand or measuring tools, as well as individual items of equipment

manufactured from or containing any of the listed fibers, fabrics, or materials. Exceptions may be granted by Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designees, for emergencies, combat support or for acquiring perishable food items. Also excepted are procurements below the simplified acquisition threshold, which is currently \$100,000.

1993 **Provide Procurement Support for State and Local Civilian Law Enforcement Officials**, 10 U.S.C § 381 (1993).

Enables State and Local law enforcement authorities to enjoy some of the benefits of the "Economy Act" 31 U.S.C. § 1535.

**DoD Support to Civil Authorities**, DoD Directive 3025.1, January 15, 1993.

Establishes SECARMY as SECDEF's Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities and establishes the processes by which DoD provides support to FEMA.

**Government Performance and Results Act of 1993**, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).

Requires each federal agency to annually submit a performance plan and a performance report to OMB and the Congress.

**Family and Medical Leave Act**, 5 U.S.C. § 63x1-6387 (1993).

Entitles a civilian employee to a total of 12 administrative workweeks of leave, during any 12-month period, due to (1) the birth of a child, (2) the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care, (3) the care of a close family member with a serious health condition, or (4) the employee has a serious health condition.

**Restrictions on Basing Aircraft and Carriers**, The General Conformity Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 51.850 (1993), implementing the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1955, Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322).

Provides that federal agencies are prohibited from taking actions not in conformity with state plans to bring their states into compliance with ambient air quality standards. Since basing actions can significantly increase the emissions of air pollutants controlled under the CAA, the rule prevents the DoD from taking the action unless the State has accounted for the federal action in the state's plan to reach attainment with the ambient air quality standard, or unless the federal government can obtain an "offset" of the increase in emissions. In particular this has presented major obstacles to the basing of the Joint Strike Fighter, V-22 Osprey, and re-basing Navy carriers.

**Joint Duty Assignments**, 10 U.S.C. § 663 (1993).

Congress provided SecDef with more flexibility in the timing of placement of graduates from a joint professional military education school in their post-education joint duty assignments.

**Military Aid Debt Forgiveness**, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-87, Title II, 108 Stat. 931,937 (1993).

Provides general authority for the President to forgive market-rate foreign aid debt, military aid loans, and Ex-Im Bank loans in conjunction with debt relief plans organized by the Paris Club, to the extent it was supported by appropriations.

**Continued Military Aid Debt Forgiveness**, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-306, title II, 108 Stat. 1608, 1613 (1994).

Provides general authority for the President to forgive covered debt for countries that do not have excessive military spending levels, do not repeatedly support terrorism, do not fail to cooperate in international control of narcotics, and have not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

**Defense Export Loan Guarantee Program (DELG Program)**, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Div. A., Title XIII, Subtitle C, § 1321(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 2540 (1995).

Authorizes DoD to issue guarantees assuring lenders against losses of principal or interest, or both, arising out of the financing of FMS sales or long-term leases for NATO member nations, major non-NATO allies pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2350(a)(3) and countries in Central Europe pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of State, to the extent or in such amounts as provided in advance in appropriations Acts. (See 61 Fed. 1Reg. 57,853 (1996) for DoD's DELG Program announcement. DELG is not currently funded.)

**Demining**, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Div. A Title XIII, Subtitle B, § 1313, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 474 (1995).

Amended 10 U.S.C. § 401(a) to ensure that, while providing assistance no military member engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines, unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a U.S. military operation, or provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the Armed Forces.

**Waiver of Recoupment for Nonrecurring Costs (NRC) of Research, Development and Production of Major Defense Equipment (MDE).** National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, § 4303(a), Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 658 (1995).

Authorized the President to waive recoupment of NRC on a determination that (1) imposing NRC likely would result in the loss of the FMS sale, or (2) that waiver would result in U.S. savings on equipment procured by DoD. Section 3303(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. No. 104-201) provided DoD authority to sell up to \$693 million of items from the National Defense stockpile to offset any lost revenue and brought the waiver authority into effect.

**1994 War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies,** Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1994 and 1995 §509, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 382 (1994).

Authorizes the transfer of obsolete or surplus defense articles to Korea from the war reserve stockpile.

**Reciprocal Status of Forces Legislation,** Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1994 and 1995 §514, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 108 Stat. 382 (1994).

Authorizes the negotiation and conclusion of agreements providing for reciprocal status of forces rights.

**National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 § 845,** Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993).

Authorizes the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other officials designated by the Secretary of Defense to enter into "other" transactions to carry out prototype projects by DoD.

**Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994,** Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (1993).

Fundamentally reformed required procurement procedures and established a preference for the acquisition of commercial items.

**Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS),** DoD Directive 3025.12, February 4, 1994.

Establishes SECARMY as SECDEF's Executive Agent for MACDIS and set out procedures for engaging DoD assets in a MACDIS situation.

**Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA),** Pub. L. No. 103-337, Div. A, Title XVI, 108 Stat. 2921 (1994).

Does basically the same thing for commissioned officers of the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force that DOPMA did for the Regular components. (See p. 3, above, for DOPMA.)

**10 U.S.C. § 2409 (1994).**

Prohibits reprisal against contractor employees who disclose substantial violations of law related to contracts to Justice, authorized agency officials, or Members of Congress.

**Migrant Operations.**

Historical precedent for use of military resources during migrant operations has not been resolved. 1994 Cuban migration emergency required use of US military facilities and employed 18,000 US military personnel over a period of two years at a cost of \$400M. Housing and processing illegal immigrants is not a DoD mission; fiscal legal authority for these expenditures is limited. Interagency did not agree to 1998 NSC burden-sharing plan. There has been continuous interagency pressure to migrate costs inappropriately to DoD in planning for future emergencies.(IA)

**Foreign Disaster Assistance, § 10 U.S.C. 404 (1984).**

Authorizes the President to direct DoD to provide disaster assistance outside the U.S. to include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment to prevent loss of lives.

1995 **Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-201, Title XIV, 110 Stat. 2714 (1996).**

Established requirements for DoD to assist in preparing State and local first responders to respond to a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction and authorized DoD assistance to DOJ in responding to a chemical or biological terrorist incident. Section 382 is part of Chapter 18, title 10, US Code.

**Administration of Export Controls, Executive Order No. 12984 (1995).**

Establishes a structured inter-agency process and deadlines for review of dual-use export license applications with cabinet-level appeal to the President on controversial issues.

**Classification and Declassification of Information, Executive Order No. 12958 (1995).**

Established new rules for the classification and declassification of information. Doubts about the need to classify information are resolved in favor of not classifying or classifying at a lower level. There is a mandatory declassification program, which requires automatic declassification of information based on time limits, with some exceptions, and systematic reviews of classified records to determine whether they still need to be

classified. The Order also instituted an automatic **declassification** of records 25 years old and pre-1975 records on 17 Apr 00 (extended to 17 Oct 01), unless agencies can justify continued classification.

**Personnel Security Clearances**, Executive Order No. 12968 (1995), issued in part to implement 50 U.S.C. §§ 435,436.

Established a uniform program for background investigations and standards for adjudications of security clearances and access to classified information, and provided authority for investigative access to financial and travel records of applicants and holders of clearances. 10 U.S.C. § 986 (2000) prohibits granting or renewing security clearances for persons with felony convictions, who are unlawful drug users (not waivable), who are mentally incompetent (not waivable), or who have been discharged/dismissed from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions.

**Limitations on Affirmative Action**, Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).

The Supreme Court found that federal affirmative action programs that use racial and ethnic criteria as a basis for decisionmaking are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, SecDef must ensure that any such programs serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Applies primarily to personnel matters, including military officer promotion boards; education and training; and acquisitions.

**Exchange of Defense Personnel**, DoD Authorization Act, FY 1996 §1082, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2672 (1995).

Authorizes the exchange of military personnel between the United States and Allied countries.

**1996 Military Assistance in Response to Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction**, 18 U.S.C. §175a (1996).

Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in response to requests from the Attorney General, to provide assistance in responding to emergencies involving biological weapons of mass destruction.

**National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)**, 10 U.S.C. § 441 et seq. (1996).

Establishes NIMA as a combat support agency of DOD.

**War Crimes Act**, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).

Establishes the conduct of war crimes as a crime under U.S. domestic law.

**Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996**, Division D, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106, 110 Stat. 642 (1996).

Established additional streamlining for procurement and acquisition of information technology.

**Chief Information Officer (CIO) Established**, Division D, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106, 110 Stat. 642 (1996).

Required the establishment of the position of Chief Information Officer (CIO) with clear authority, responsibility, and accountability for the Department's information resources management activities. Clinger-Cohen also repealed the Brooks Automatic Data Processing Act under which the General Services Administration had exclusive authority over the acquisition of automatic data processing equipment.

**Antipersonnel Landmines, PDD.**

Limits U.S. uses of all non-self-destructing antipersonnel landmines (APL) not needed to train personnel or defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression.

**Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Authority**, 10 U.S.C. § 127 (1996).

Amended the Secretary's emergency and extraordinary expenses authority ("E&E" or "EEE") (10 U.S.C. § 127, in conjunction with the annual DoD Appropriations Act) to prohibit the use of E&E for an expenditure in excess of \$500,000 unless Congress is notified in advance (5 days in advance for expenditures in excess of \$500,000, and 15 days in advance for expenditures in excess of \$1,000,000). The primary purpose of E&E is to permit the use of DoD funds for activities or purposes for which there is no statutory authority and for which DoD funds could not otherwise be spent.

**Military Housing Privatization Initiative**, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2871-2885 (1996).

Allows DoD to tap private sector capital and expertise and to leverage scarce military construction dollars to design, build, and manage housing for military members and their families.

**Electronic Freedom of Information Act**, 5 U.S.C. §552 (1996).

Amended the FOIA to add requirements that documents requested be provided in electronic format if that format is readily available and that increase the electronic availability of information in the reading rooms FOIA mandates.

**Increased DCI Involvement in DoD Budget**, 50 U.S.C. § 403-3 (amended 1996).

Mandates DCI participation in development of Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)

annual budgets, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4 (1992, amended 2000) prohibits National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) reprogramming without DCI approval, or under DCI procedures, and authorizes the DCI to transfer funds or personnel from lower to higher priority NFIP programs unless the affected Department Head [SecDef or DepSecDef only, may not be delegated] objects in writing.

**Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Agencies, 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a (1996).**

Establishes authority for intelligence agencies, including Defense intelligence agencies, to collect information on behalf of law enforcement agencies.

**Military Assistance in Response to Biological Weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 175a (1996).**

Authorizes military assistance in response to emergencies involving biological weapons of mass destruction.

**Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) Program, 10 U.S.C. § 2540-2540d (1996).**

Directs the SecDef to establish a program of loan guarantees of the sale or long-term lease of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services to "eligible countries." Terms and conditions may not be more favorable than those of the Export-Import Bank, and DoD must charge a country, receiving a guaranteed loan, an exposure fee in an amount that is sufficient to meet potential liabilities of the United States under the loan guarantee.

**Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Established, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et. seq. (1996).**

The Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996, in the NDAA FY97, consolidated the intelligence personnel authorities for NSA, DIA, NIMA, NRO, and the Military Departments into a single personnel system under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef.

**Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 10 U.S.C. § 181 (1996).**  
JROC established.

**IC Resource Consolidation, 50 U.S.C. § 403-4 (1996).**

DCI's authority to consolidate personnel, administration and security programs with the Intelligence community.

**Expanded IMET (EIMET) changes**, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, § 112(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2347 (1997).

Further expanded EIMET to include foreign government non-military personnel and legislators and those who are not members of the government if the training would (1) contribute to responsible defense resource management, (2) foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, (3) contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts or (4) improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

1997 **Dismantlement of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998 §1302, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1948 (1997).

Limits retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems below certain specified levels.

**Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Peru and Colombia**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998 §1033, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1948 (1997), as amended.

Authorizes DoD to provide counterdrug support and transfer nonlethal equipment to Colombia and Peru.

**Military Assistance to Civil Authorities**, DoD Directive 3025.15, February 1997.

Establishes the procedures by which DoD will provide support to civil authorities.

**CONPLAN/OPLAN Interagency Coordination Annex**, PDD 56.

CONPLANs/ OPLANs now contain a new Interagency Coordination Annex --Annex V. The goal, ultimately, is to staff Annex V with the Interagency to get approval -- before the CONPLAN/OPLAN is approved by the Chairman and SecDef.

**Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection**, DoD-DoS MOU (Dec 97), Title 22, U.S.C.

Delegates DoS's security functions to SecDef for designated DoD elements and personnel present outside the United States in a CINC's geographic area of responsibility, but not under the CINC's command.

**Force Protection in Peacekeeping Operations**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998 § 1052, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1948 (1997).

Requires SecDef to “take appropriate actions to ensure that units of the Armed Forces engaged in a peacekeeping operation are provided adequate troop protection for that operation.”

**Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC)**, CWC ratified by US on 24 Apr 97; CWC Implementation Act of 1997, 19 Oct 98. Article I of CWC.

Requires US. destroy all chemical weapons it owns or possesses or abandoned on territory of another state, and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities; and authorize on-site challenge inspections.

**Utility Privatization**, 10 U.S.C. § 2688 (1997).

Authorizes DoD to privatize utility systems owned by the Department, such as power plants, electric distribution lines.

**Integrated Natural Resources Management Plans (INRMPs)**, Sikes Act Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. § 670a (1997).

Requires preparation of an INRMP that integrates military mission requirements with the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources for more than 400 military installations nationwide by November 2001. INRMPs must be prepared in cooperation with the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the heads of appropriate State fish and wildlife agencies; reflect the mutual agreement of the parties concerning the conservation and protection of fish and wildlife resources; and undergo a public comment period before the plans go into effect.

**FDA Regulation of Force Health Protection Activities.**

Massive attention on Gulf War Illnesses has focused criticism on DoD procedures employed during the war and resulted in a new law requiring that only the President can waive informed consent for the military to use investigational new drugs as if they were FDA approved. FDA regulation is now a major factor in force health protection, particularly regarding medical defense against chemical and biological weapons. This extends well beyond the use of investigational new drugs. The FDA has had a major impact on the anthrax vaccine immunization program, resulting in acquisition and supply challenges much greater than were anticipated.

**National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, § 357**, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1695 (1997).

Amended 10 U.S.C. § 2466 to change the previous 60/40 limitation to a limitation that not more than 50% of the funds available to a military department or a

defense agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload may be used to contract for the performance of such workload by non-federal government personnel. The Secretary of Defense (for a defense agency), and the Secretary of a military department may waive the limitation when necessary for reasons of national security, and Congress must be notified of reasons. The Secretary of Defense must report annually to Congress. Reports are audited by the Comptroller General.

**1998 Military Assistance in Response to Chemical Weapons Events,**  
18 U.S.C. § 229E (1998).

Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in response to requests from the Attorney General, to provide assistance in responding to emergencies involving chemical weapons.

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),** Executive Order No. 12655  
(amended 1998).

Gives SecDef lead responsibility for the deployment and use of military forces to protect US citizens and nationals in support of their evacuation from threatened areas overseas. In conjunction with a Jul98 DoD-DoS MOU, this gives SecDef greater voice in NEO planning, but also greater responsibility for funding NEO around the world.

**Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET),** 10 U.S.C. § 2011 (1998).

Authorizes DoD special operations forces to train and train with armed and other security forces of foreign countries, requires training activities to occur only with the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense.

**Monitoring of Foreign Launches of Commercial Communications Satellites,**  
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY99 § 15 14, Pub. L.  
No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 1920 (1998).

Requires SecDef "in any case in which a license is approved for the export of a satellite or related items for launch in a foreign country" to monitor all aspects of the launch (including failure/crash investigations); to be reimbursed for the costs of monitoring; and to establish a program for recruiting, training, and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in foreign countries of US-origin satellites.

**Policy Oversight of Export Controls,** 10 U.S.C. § 134b (1998).

Establishes the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy (DUSD(TSP)), in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)). The DUSD(TSP) serves as the Director of the former Defense Technology Security Administration (now

under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency). 10 U.S.C. § 134 also makes the USD(P) the primary advisor to the Secretary on export controls.

**Rehabilitation Act of 1973**, §508, as amended by section 408(b) of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 794d (1998).

Requires agencies to ensure that persons with disabilities have access to government electronic or information technology that is comparable to that of persons who are not disabled.

**Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998**, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349 (1998).

Establishes requirements for filling PAS positions in an "Acting" capacity.

**Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998**, Pub. L. No. 105-272, Title VII, 112 Stat. 2413 (1998).

Protects Intelligence Community employees who report urgent concerns to Congress.

**Foreign Government Claims for Cleanup of Overseas Sites**, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY99 § 321, Pub. L. No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 1920 (1998).

Prohibits use of funds--without prior Congressional approval--for settlement of claims of foreign governments for environmental cleanup of overseas sites formerly used by DoD.

**Coral Reef Protection**, Executive Order No. 13089 (1998).

Imposes requirements concerning actions by all Federal agencies that might affect coral reef ecosystems. This includes national security activities in coral reef areas.

**Government Paperwork Elimination Act**, 44 U.S.C. 3504 (1998).

Requires agencies to provide for the option of electronic maintenance, submission, or disclosure of information as a substitute for paper and for the use and acceptance of electronic signatures whenever practicable by October 2003. OMB M-10-00 required agencies to submit plans for implementation by October 2000.

**Information Technology Access for the Disabled**, Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §408(b), Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (1998), revising Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Requires SecDef to ensure that electronic and information technologies developed, maintained, procured, or used by DoD programs are accessible to the disabled.

**Commissary Operations**, 10 U.S.C. § 192(d) (1998).

The SecDef may not transfer responsibility to manage and fund the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) to a Military Department unless the transfer is specifically authorized by a law enacted after October 17, 1998. 10 U.S.C. § 2482 (1998) requires the SecDef to establish a governing board for the commissary system to provide advice to the Secretary regarding the prudent operation of the commissary system and to assist in the overall supervision of DeCA. The Board is accountable only to the SecDef and to the civilian officer assigned the responsibility for the overall supervision of DeCA.

1999 **National Missile Defense Act of 1999**, Pub. L. No. 106-38, 113 Stat, 205 (1999).

Declares national policy (1) to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective NMD system against a limited ballistic missile attack, and (2) to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

**Military Assistance to Civil Authorities to Respond to Act or Threat of Terrorism**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 § 1023, Public Law 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).

Provides limited authority for DoD to provide assistance to DOJ in preparing for, or actually responding to, a terrorist incident. Except in extraordinary circumstances, DOJ must reimburse DoD.

**Helms-Biden Amendment**, 22 U.S.C. § 287e-2 (1999).

Establishes requirement to seek and obtain reimbursement from UN when providing assistance to UN, as well as the requirement to notify Congress before the President waives the reimbursement requirement.

**Allocation of Radio Spectrum**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 § 1062(b), Public Law 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).

Essentially gives SecDef &/or CJCS veto power over any effort to require DoD to move out of spectrum to make it available to the private sector unless, alternative comparable spectrum is provided.

**Cooperative Threat Reduction Program**, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1999).

Creates a complicated legal and fiscal framework to DoD resources to provide assistance to former Soviet states to facilitate elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the demilitarization of related military facilities, technologies and capabilities.

**Restrictions on Military-to-Military Contacts with the Peoples Republic of China**, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 § 1201, Public Law 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).

Precludes the SecDef from authorizing certain military-to-military exchanges or contacts between US Armed Forces and representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China.

**Invasive -Species**, Executive Order No. 13 112 (1999).

Directs all agencies to take steps to prevent the introduction of invasive species (those that are not native to the region). This may restrict or delay movement of military units both within and outside US.

**Computer Network Operations (CNO)**, UCP 99.

Directed USSPACECOM to be the military lead for computer network defense and computer network attack.

**Operational Reports**, 10 U.S.C. §§ 486,487 (1999).

Congress required SecDef to submit a new quadrennial report and an optempo/perstempo report.

**Military Funeral Honors**, 10 U.S.C. § 1491 (1999).

Congress made military funeral honors (defined as a ceremony performed by at least two military members, and consisting of the folding and presentation of a flag and the playing of taps, by recording if necessary) an entitlement for all eligible veterans and authorized veterans' groups to be part of the funeral detail.

**Military Child Care Act of 1989**, Pub. L. No. 101-189, Div. A. title XV, 103 Stat. 1589, amended by Child Care Services, 10 U.S.C. §1791-1800 (1999).

The SecDef is authorized to establish and provide financial assistance to military child care centers on military installations; he may also provide funds for home-based child care services and to civilian providers of child care services who are not home-based who meet specified criteria.

**Cap on OSD and WHS Staffs**, 10 U.S.C. § 143 (1999).

The number of military and civilian personnel assigned to, or employed in OSD, OSD Direct Support Activities, and WHS is capped at 3767.

**Cap on Major Headquarters Staffs**, 10 U.S.C. § 130a (1999).

Congress has limited the number of military and civilian personnel in major or headquarters activities across DoD to 85% of the total as of October 1 1999. Affected headquarters elements are specified in DoD Directive

5 100.73, "Major DoD Headquarters Activities," and may not be changed "except as provided by law."

**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materials Readiness), 10 U.S.C. § 133b (1999).**

Established the **DUSD(L&MR)**, a PAS position, as one of two DUSDs under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Material Readiness, and as the principal logistics official within the senior management of the Department of Defense. Statutory position of PDUSD(AT&L) abolished.

**2000 War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies, DoD Appropriations Act, FY 2000 §1232, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1212 (1999).**

Authorizes the transfer of obsolete or surplus defense articles to Korea and Thailand from war reserve stockpiles.

**Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 §220, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000).**

Establishes goals of the Armed Services to achieve the fielding of **unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that (1) by 2010, one-third of the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet is unmanned and (2) by 2015, one-third of the operational ground combat vehicles is unmanned.**

**Emergency Supplemental Act for Fiscal Year 2000 § 3 101, Public Law 106-246, Div. B (1999).**

Authorizes DoD to provide additional counterdrug support and transfer nonlethal equipment to Colombia.

**Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, DoD Appropriations Act for FY01 § 8070, Pub. L. No. 106-259 (2000).**

Prohibits any use of DoD funds for transfer of defense articles or defense services to a foreign country or international organization for use in an international peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operation without 15 days advance notice to Congress.

**Leahy Amendment--Human Rights Vetting, DoD Appropriations Act for FY01 §8092, Pub. L. No. 106-259 (2000).**

Mandates human rights vetting before expending funds to train foreign military personnel.

**Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid [OHDACA], FY01 DoD Appropriations Act (2000).**

Provides DoD a specific amount of funds (\$55.6 million in two-year

money in the FY01 DoD Appropriations Act) to support DoD OHDACA program,

**Establishment of Regional Centers**, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 § 912, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000).

Establishes a requirement for 90-day advanced notice before the SecDef may establish a new regional center for national security studies, and requires an annual report on the operation of existing regional centers (10 U.S.C. § 184).

**Former U.S. Army School of the Americas**, 10 U.S.C. § 2166 (2000).

Authorizes the SecDef to operate a "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation" to provide professional education and training to military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel of Western Hemisphere nations.

The NDAA FY01 also repealed the Secretary of the Army's authority to operate the U.S. Army School of the Americas (former 10 U.S.C. § 445).

**Vieques Range Complex**, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, Title XV, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000).

Two PDDs issued in Jan 2000 restrict use of range. These PDDs are largely incorporated in NDAA FY01, Title XV.

**Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)**, Executive Order No. 13158 (2000).

Developed national system of MPAs. Establishment of MPAs could restrict operations, training, and testing in designated MPAs.

**Northwest Hawaii Island (NWHI) Reserve**, Executive Order No. 13178 (2000).

Temporarily designated the NWHI as a Marine Protected Area, potentially restricting operations, training, and testing in the area.

**Expanded Outleasing Authority**, 10 USC § 2667 (2000).

Authorizes DoD to obtain "in-kind" consideration for the lease of property or facilities owned by the Department; such in-kind consideration includes services, maintenance, repair, environmental remediation, and new construction.

**Environmental Compliance at Overseas DoD Installations, Overseas**  
Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEGBD), DoD 4715.5 G,  
March 15, 2000.

Sets criteria and management practices for environmental compliance at  
DoD installations overseas as required by Public Law 101-510, section  
342(b).

**KOSOVO, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001**  
§1211, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000).

Requires the President to establish "militarily significant benchmarks for  
conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately  
allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo."  
A semiannual report on progress in achieving these benchmarks is required,  
and is prepared by DoD. A Bosnia report is also required as is a more  
general report on peacekeeping forces and funds expended for  
peacekeeping.

**Contracting for Performance of Commercial or Industrial Type Functions,**  
Changes to 10 U.S.C. chapter 146 (amended most by the NDAA FY01).

Require studies and reports to Congress before a DoD commercial or  
industrial type function may be converted to contract; requires an annual  
report to Congress on the results of monitoring the performance of each  
DoD function that is the subject of a workforce review under OMB Circular  
A-76; require that "core logistics capabilities," identified by the SecDef, be  
performed in government-owned and operated facilities and not be placed  
under contract; limit funds available in a fiscal year to a military  
department or defense agency for depot-level maintenance and repair  
workload performed by non-Federal government personnel to no more than  
50 percent; require SecDef to submit an annual Strategic Sourcing Plan  
Action, concurrent with the President's annual budget request, for the  
Department of Defense for the following year.

**New Retiree Health Care Benefit, Floyd D. Spence National Defense**  
Authorization Act for FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398 (2000).

Enacted a senior pharmacy benefit, effective April 1, 2001, and  
reinstatement of CHAMPUS/TRICARE eligibility at age 65, effective  
October 1, 2001, which becomes second payer to Medicare. Congress also  
established an accrual funding mechanism to help fund the new benefit  
estimated to require an additional approximately \$4 billion per year.

**Appropriations Act Domestic Source and Content Restrictions**, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2001, Pub. Law. No. 106-259 (2000).

The DoD appropriations acts annually contain other restrictions on the purchase of foreign products. Current restrictions cover: welded shipboard anchor and mooring chains (sec. 8016); carbon, alloy or armor steel plate (sec. 8033); vessel propellers and ball and roller bearings (sec. 8064); supercomputers (sec. 8066); main propulsion diesel engines and propulsors for the ADC(X) class of ships.

### **GRATUITIES REGULATION IN DOD**

The initial prohibition on acceptance of gratuities in DoD was in DoD Directive 1000.8, "Acceptance of Gifts, Use of Government facilities, and Use of Official Representation Funds", dated April 14, 1961. It prohibited Defense personnel from accepting gifts "which might reasonably be interpreted by others as being of such nature that it could affect their impartiality."

This language was generally incorporated in successive directives on Standards of Conduct until DoD Directive 5500.7, dated January 15, 1977, which allowed gifts up to \$5. This exception was raised to \$10 in DoD Directive 5500.7 dated May 6, 1987, and again to \$20 in DoD 5500.7-R, dated August 30, 1993.

## **Title 10, United States Code**

### **1958 Edition**

- 725 pages

### **1970 Edition**

- 817 pages

### **1976 Edition**

- 984 pages

### **1988 Edition**

- 1268 pages

### **1994 Edition**

- 1694 pages

April 16, 2001 3:10 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: SecDef Authorities

Please take a look at this packet on the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and see me about it. I would like to get a sense from you as to how it could be presented in an orderly way and what you think I ought to do with it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/29/01 memo attached to 03/01/01 Info Memo from GC re: Changes in SecDef Authorities/Prerogatives

DHR:dh  
041601-48

OSD SD

16 Apr 01

- 1) *MAC DELBITS\**
- 2) *SECRETARY FUNDS*

*Hope this helps  
Respect fully  
Maia*

3/29/01

Mr. Secretary, this responds to your note of "What's this about"

You asked General Counsel **what has changed over the last ten years in terms of his authority to execute missions, structure forces, and spend money.**

**In general, SecDef's powers have sharply declined in those areas noted above. This is due to legislative and cultural/societal changes since the end of the Cold War;**

- The shift to Operations Other Than War has put a significant fiscal burden on DoD, impacting O&M and procurement funds.
- Societal expectations concerning the environment including BRAC and encroachment issues has greatly restricted training and operations.
- Required interagency involvement (e.g. the drug war) is a drain on the full spectrum of DoD resources.
- Congress has restricted SecDef's authority to structure and reorganize DoD/OSD components.
- **The attached package from the Office of the General Counsel addresses the question you brought up and presents detailed analysis at the Tabs.**

Prepared by LtCol K.A. Seiwell



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

MAR 01 2001

3/6  
SECRET 148 6201  
MAR 12 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *HAS Copy*

FROM: ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL *DID 3/1/01*  
(Prepared by: Paul S. Koffsky and Helena Sullivan (b)(6))

*224  
3/6/01  
JTC  
Loren*

SUBJECT: Changes in SecDef Authorities/Prerogatives – INFORMATION  
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE:

- Respond to SecDef request for list of changes in his authorities and prerogatives over the last ten years.

DISCUSSION:

- Significant changes are summarized by subject area (fiscal, environment/installations, operations, information, international, intelligence, acquisition/logistics, personnel, organizational and other issues), at Tabs A through I.
- The most significant, overall, are:
  - o Fiscal: There is an increasing reliance on DoD to fund Humanitarian Assistance, Military Operations, and Peacekeeping Operations (Tab A).
  - o Environment/Installations: Laws and regulation place increased restrictions on training and operations (Tab B).
  - o Operations:
    - There are increased statutory requirements and restrictions for deployments of US Armed Forces; plus an expansion of DoD mission requirements (Tab C).
    - Interagency role: Interagency involvement in CONPLAN/OPLAN development exemplifies growing/changing interagency role (Tab C).
  - o Organization: Congress has restricted SecDef's authority to structure, reorganize and staff OSD and the DoD Components (Tab I).

Attachments:

As stated



## FISCAL ISSUES

- **Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Authority.**<sup>1</sup> In 1996 Congress amended the Secretary's emergency and extraordinary expenses authority ("E&E" or "EEE") (10 U.S.C. § 127, in conjunction with the annual DoI Appropriations Act) to prohibit the use of E&E for an expenditure in excess of \$500,000 unless Congress is notified in advance (5 days in advance for expenditures in excess of \$500,000, and 15 days in advance for expenditures in excess of \$1,000,000). The primary purpose of E&E is to permit the use of DoD funds for activities or purposes for which there is no statutory authority and for which DoD funds could not otherwise be spent.
- **DoS Foreign Military Financing (FMF) on the Decline.** In 1990, DoS FMF budget was \$5.027B; in 1994, \$3.23 1B; and in 1999, \$3.276B. Costs of financing foreign assistance are migrating to DoD by direct and indirect means.
- **Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** Broad authority to provide limited HA funds (10 USC § 2551) in conjunction with creation of new appropriation account (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) (1992).
- **Helms-Biden Amendment.** This law establishes requirement to seek and obtain reimbursement from UN when providing assistance to UN, as well as the requirement to notify Congress before the President waives the reimbursement requirement. (22 USC § 287e-2, amended 1999)
- **CINC Initiative Funds.** Authority established in 1991 to be available to cover CINC contingencies; \$25M a year has been appropriated. (10 USC § 166a)
- **Migrant Operations.** Historical precedent for use of military resources during migrant operations has not been resolved, 1994 Cuban migration emergency required use of US military facilities and employed 18,000 US military personnel over a period of two years at a cost of \$400M. Housing and processing illegal immigrants is not a DoD mission; fiscal legal authority for these expenditures is limited. Interagency did not agree to 1998 NSC burden-sharing plan. There has been continuous interagency pressure to migrate costs inappropriately to DoD in planning for future emergencies.

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<sup>1</sup> • **Bolding denotes key item.**

- Funding for CJNC Theater Engagement. Several purpose-specific **funding** authorities have been created and are now used to support CINC theater engagement plans (e.g., Warsaw Initiative Fund, Cooperative Threat Reduction).
- Chief Financial Officers Act. The Act (1990) established a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) with certain statutory duties in each agency. In DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is by law DoD's CFO (10 U.S.C. § 135). The CFO's statutory duties include overseeing DoD's financial management activities and evaluating the cost goals proposed for each agency major acquisition program.
- Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs). 1986 Amendments to NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979 create ACSAs; non-NATO countries eligible for ACSAs under 10 USC. §§ 2341-2350.

## ENVIRONMENT AND INSTALLATION ISSUES

- **Vieques Range Complex.** Two PDDs issued in Jan 00, both of which were codified in sections 1501 and following of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (NDAA FY01), restrict use of range.
- **Restrictions on basing aircraft and carriers.** The General Conformity Rule (40 C.F.R. 5 1.850) (1993), implementing the Clean Air Act (CAA), provides that federal agencies are prohibited from taking actions not in conformity with state plans to bring their states into compliance with ambient air quality standards. Since basing actions can significantly increase the emissions of air pollutants controlled under the CAA, the rule prevents the DoD from taking the action unless the State has accounted for the federal action in the state's plan to reach attainment with the ambient air quality standard, or unless the federal government can obtain an "offset" of the increase in emissions. In particular this has presented major obstacles to the basing of the Joint Strike Fighter, V-22 Osprey, and re-basing Navy carriers,
- **Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).** EO 13 158 (26 May 00) developed national system of MPAs. Establishment of MPAs could restrict operations, training, and testing in designated MPAs.
- **Northwest Hawaii Island (NWHI) Reserve.** EO 13178 (4 Dec 00) temporarily designated the NWI-JI as a Marine Protected Area, potentially restricting operations, training, and testing in the area.
- **Military Housing Privatization Initiative.** 10 U.S.C. §§ 2871-2885 (1996) allows DoD to tap private sector capital and expertise and to leverage scarce military construction dollars to design, build, and manage housing for military members and their families.
- **Utility Privatization.** 10 U.S.C. § 2688 (1997) authorizes DoD to privatize utility systems owned by the Department, such as power plants, electric distribution lines.
- **Expiration of Base Closure Authority.** Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 authority to recommend the closure or realignment of bases expired in 1995; the remaining authority to close or realign an installation (10 USC § 2687) is very limited.

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<sup>1</sup> **Bolding denotes key item.**

- Expanded Outleasing Authority. 10 USC § 2667 (as amended in 2000) authorizes DoD to obtain “in-kind” consideration for the lease of property or facilities owned by the Department; such in-kind consideration includes services, **maintenance**, repair, environmental remediation, and new construction.
- Fines and Penalties under Environmental Statutes. Current law (e.g., Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992; Safe Drinking Water Act; Clean Air Act) subjects Federal facilities, including military installations, to the substantive **and** procedural requirements of various environmental laws, including **fine** and **penalty** provisions, and in several important environmental areas federal facilities are **fully** subject to State, Interstate, and local laws.
- Foreign Government Claims for Cleanup of Overseas Sites. FY99 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 321, prohibits use of funds--without prior Congressional approval--for settlement of claims of foreign governments for environmental cleanup of overseas sites formerly used by DoD.
- Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste. Although the US is not a party to the Basel Convention on the **transboundary** movement of hazardous waste:s, almost every other nation in the world is a party; there are significant **constraints** on DoD’s ability to move hazardous wastes from an area of operation **outside the** United States to a third country, or even back to the United States. Under U.S. law, there are special constraints on our ability to move **PCBs** (polychlorinated **biphenyls**).
- Integrated Natural Resources Management Plans (INRMPs). Sikes Act Improvement Act of 1997 (16 U.S.C. § 670a) requires preparation of an INRMP that integrates military mission requirements with the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources for more than 400 military installations nationwide by November 2001. INRMPs must be prepared in cooperation with t b e Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the heads of appropriate State **fish** and wildlife agencies; reflect the **mutual** agreement of the parties concerning he conservation and protection of fish and wildlife resources; and undergo a **publ ic** comment period before the plans go into effect.
- Obligation to Consult with American Indian and Alaska Native Entities. 1992 Amendments to National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6), Executive Order 13007: “Indian Sacred Sites” (May 24, 1996); Executive Memorandum: “Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments” (April 29, 1994); and DoD American Indian and **Alask** Native Policy (October 20, 1998) obligate DoD to consult with potentially **affected** Indian tribes before taking any action that may adversely affect traditional **cu tural** properties or reserved treaty rights to hunt, fish, or gather plants, or may restrict

access to sacred sites. Although this obligation is not a ‘veto’ authority, consultation can be time-consuming and resource-intensive.

- Invasive Species. EO 13 112 (3 Feb 99) directs all agencies to take steps to prevent the introduction of invasive species. This may restrict or delay movement of military units both within and outside US.
- Coral Reef Protection. EO 13089 (11 Jun 98) imposes requirements concerning actions by all Federal agencies that might affect coral reef ecosystems. This includes national security activities in coral reef areas.
- Environmental Compliance at Overseas DoD Installations. Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document (OEGBD), DoD 4715.5-G, 15 Mar 00, sets criteria and management practices for environmental compliance at DoD installations overseas as required by Public Law 10 I-5 10, section 342(b).

## OPERATIONS ISSUES

- **Counterdrug (CD) Activities.** Section 1004 of NDAA FY01 allows SecDef to provide equipment, transportation, construction, training, and C3 I support for CD activities of federal, state, and local governments; 10 U.S.C. § 124 (amended 1991) establishes DoD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs; PDD-73 (U.S. Colombia Initiative) establishes the scope of the support DoD can provide to state and federal law enforcement agencies and foreign governments in furtherance of their CD missions.
- **CONPLAN/OPLAN Interagency Coordination Annex.** CONPLANS/OPLANs now contain a new Interagency Coordination Annex -- Annex V. This requirement grows out of PDD 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations (May 97). The goal, ultimately, is to staff Annex V with the Interagency to get approval -- before the CONPLAN/OPLAN is approved by the Chairman and SecDef.
- **Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.** A recurring general appropriations provision (Section 8070, FYO 1 DoD Appropriations Act), prohibits any use of DoD funds for transfer of defense articles or defense services to a foreign country or international organization (on a reimbursable basis or otherwise) for use in an international peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operation without 15 days advance notice to Congress. DoD provides advance notification at the beginning of each fiscal year and as necessary to give the Congress notice of operations where such support may be provided.
- **Support to Civil Authorities.** Section 1023 of NDAA FY00 gives SecDef authority to provide personnel and other DoD resources to assistance civil authorities in responding to an act or threat of terrorism. Unified Command Plan (UCP) 99 assigned USJFCOM mission to provide military assistance to civil authorities for consequence management (CM) of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents in CONUS and to support WMD CM efforts of other CINCs. Related authorities are: DoDD 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," Feb 18, 1997; DoDD 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities," Jan 15, 1993; Public Law 106-65, sec. 1023, Oct 5, 1999; 18 U.S.C. § 831; 10 U.S.C. § 382; Interagency "Domestic Guidelines," signed late last year; and "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996," Public Law 104-201, Title XIV, Sept 23, 1996; 10 U.S.C. § 2554 (support to special events such as the Olympics).

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<sup>1</sup> **Bolding denotes key item.**

- **Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection**, DoD-DoS MOU (Dec 97) delegates DoS's security functions under Title 22, U.S.C., to SecDef for designated DoD elements and personnel present outside the United States in a CINC's geographic area of responsibility, but not under the command of the geographic CINC.
- **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)**. EO 12656 (amended 1998), Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, gives SecDef lead responsibility for the deployment and use of military forces for protection of US citizens and nationals in support of their evacuation from threatened areas overseas. In conjunction with a Jul 98 DoD-DoS MOU, this gives SecDef greater voice in NEO planning, but also greater responsibility for funding NEO around the world.
- **Force Protection in Peacekeeping Operations**. Section 1052 NDAA FY98 requires SecDef to "take appropriate actions to ensure that units of the Armed Forces engaged in a peacekeeping operation are provided adequate troop protection for that operation." It also provides for a report on DoD's antiterrorism activities, specifically on how the roles of the SecDef, Chairman, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments have changed since the Khobar Towers incident.
- **Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)**. DoD authority for special operations forces to train and train with armed and other security forces of foreign countries was amended in the NDAA FY99 to require training activities to occur only with the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense. This requirement is in addition to the "Leahy" human rights verification requirements for DoD-funded training (10 U.S.C. § 2011).
- **Leahy Amendment -- Human Right Vetting**. This law mandates human rights vetting before expending funds to train foreign military, and prohibits any use of DoD funds to support any training program involving units of foreign security forces, if the Secretary of Defense has received from the Department of State credible information of gross violations of human rights by that unit, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken. (Section 8092, NDAA, FY01)
- **Computer Network Operations (CNO)**. UCP 99 assigned computer network defense and computer network attack (CNA) missions to USSPACECOM. PDD 56 requires interagency coordination on CNO; new policy risks dilution of SecDef authority/autonomy, especially in area of CNA.

- Kosovo. Section 1211 NDAA FY01 requires the President to establish “militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo.” A semiannual report on progress in achieving these benchmarks is required, and is prepared by DoD. A Bosnia report is also required as is a more general report on peacekeeping forces and funds expended for peacekeeping.
- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid [OHDACA]. A recurring DoD appropriation provides the Department a specific amount of funds (\$55.6 million in two-year money in the FY01 DoD Appropriations Act) to support DoD OHDACA program, which include disaster relief, humanitarian demining training, excess property donation, space available airlift (Denton) and other humanitarian assistance programs. Although relatively small, the OHDACA appropriation and its programs are a significant part of the regional CINCs’ theater engagement strategies,
- Operational Reports. Congress required SecDef to submit a new quadrennial report and an optempo/perstempo report (10 USC §§ 486,487) (1999).

## INFORMATION ISSUES

- **Classification and Declassification of Information**, EO 12958 (April 20, 1995) established new rules for the classification and declassification of information. Doubts about the need to classify information are resolved in favor of not classifying or classifying at a lower level. There is a mandatory **declassification** program, which requires automatic declassification of information based on **time** limits, with some exceptions, and systematic reviews of classified records to determine whether they still need to be classified. The Order also instituted an automatic declassification of records 25 years old and pre-1975 records on 17 Apr 00 (extended to 17 Oct 01), unless agencies can justify continued **classification**.
- **Electronic Freedom of Information Act**, Public Law 104-231 amended the FOIA to add requirements that documents requested be provided in electronic **format** if that format is readily available and that increase the electronic availability of information in the reading rooms FOIA mandates.
- **Chief Information Officer (CIO) Established**. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 required the establishment of the position of Chief Information Officer (CIO) with clear authority, responsibility, and accountability for the Department's **information** resources management activities. Clinger-Cohen also repealed the Brooks Automatic Data Processing Act under which the General Services **Administration** had exclusive authority over the acquisition of automatic data processing equipment.
- **Government Paperwork Elimination Act**, Ch 5, Title XVII, Pub, L. 105-277 (1998). Act requires agencies to provide for the option of electronic **maintenance**, submission, or disclosure of information as a substitute for paper and for the use and acceptance of electronic signatures whenever practicable by October 2003. OMB M-10-00 required agencies to submit plans for implementation by **October** 2000.

## INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

- Allocation of Radio Spectrum.<sup>1</sup> Sec. 1062(b) NDAA FY00 essentially gives SecDef &/or CJCS veto power over any effort to require DoD to move out of spectrum to make it available to the private sector unless, in their judgment, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, in consultation with the FCC, has made available to DoD alternative spectrum that “provides comparable technical characteristics to restore essential military capability that will be lost as a result of the band of frequencies to be surrendered”; 47 U.S.C. § 923(g) (codifying provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, as amended by NDAA FY99) essentially requires the private sector to pay agencies, including DoD, for costs of “relocating” to different spectrum before agencies can be required to vacate spectrum to make it available to the private sector.
- Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC). CWC ratified by US on 24 Apr 97; CWC Implementation Act of 1997, 19 Oct 98. Article I of CWC: To destroy all chemical weapons it owns or possesses or abandoned on territory of another state, and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities. Article IX of CWC: Each state party can demand an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or chemical weapon located in the territory of another state party or in any other place under jurisdiction or control of another state party. CWC Implementation Act, section 304 (22 U.S.C. § 6701 and following) specifies inspection procedures.
- Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The Nunn-Lugar Act (22 U.S.C. § 2551) creates a complicated legal and fiscal framework to DoD resources to provide assistance to former Soviet states in order to facilitate the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the demilitarization of related military facilities, technologies and capabilities, and to help prevent the proliferation of weapons and weapons technologies from those states (1991). Since the enactment of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (22 U.S.C. §§ 5951-5958), DoD frequently refers to the program as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
- Monitoring of Foreign Launches of Commercial Communications Satellites. Sec. 1514 NDAA FY99 requires SecDef “in any case in which a license is approved for the export of a satellite or related items for launch in a foreign country” to monitor all aspects of the launch (including failure/crash investigations) to ensure that no unauthorized transfer of technology occurs, including technical assistance and technical data; to be reimbursed for the costs of monitoring; and to establish a program for recruiting, training, and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in foreign countries of US-origin satellites.

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<sup>1</sup> **Bolding denotes key item.**

- Administration of Export Controls. EO 12984 (1995) establishes a structured inter-agency process and deadlines for review of dual-use export license applications (chaired by the Secretary of Commerce) that ensures full DoD participation in the process (as well as State, Energy, and Justice) and provides for cabinet-level appeal to the President on controversial issues.
- Antipersonnel Landmines. In 1996, the President directed that the United States will unilaterally undertake not to use, and will place in inactive stockpile status with intent to demilitarize by the end of 1999, all non-self-destructing antipersonnel landmines (APL) not needed to (a) train personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations, or (b) to defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression. This PDD directed SecDef to undertake a program of research, procurement, and other measures to eliminate the requirement for, and reliance on, APL as soon as possible. In 1998 the President established a goal of ending the use of APL outside Korea by 2003, and to sign the Ottawa convention by 2006 (thus also eliminating APL in Korea) if suitable options can be found to maintain war fighting capability and safety of our military personnel,
- Restrictions on Military-to-Military Contacts with the Peoples Republic of China. Section 1201 NDAA FY00 precludes the SecDef from authorizing certain military-to-military exchanges or contacts between US Armed Forces and representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China if that exchange or contact would create a national security risk due to inappropriate exposure" to 12 specified activities (including force projection operations; nuclear operations, military space operations, and access to DoD laboratories).
- Establishment of Regional Centers. Section 912 NDAA FY01 establishes a requirement for 90-day advanced notice before the SecDef may establish a new regional center for national security studies, and requires an annual report on the operation of existing regional centers (10 U.S.C. § 184).
- Former U.S. Army School of the Americas. 10 U.S.C. § 2166 (NDAA FY01) authorizes the SecDef to operate a "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation" to provide professional education and training to military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel of Western Hemisphere nations, and to designate the Secretary of a Military Department as the executive agent. The NDAA FY01 also repealed the Secretary of the Army's authority to operate the US Army School of the Americas (former 10 U.S.C. § 4415).

## INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

- Increased DCI Involvement in DoD Budget. 50 U.S.C. § 403-3 (amended 1996) mandates DCI participation in development of Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) annual budgets. 50 U.S.C. § 403-4 (1992, amended 2000) prohibits National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) reprogramming without DCI approval, or under DCI procedures, and authorizes the DCI to transfer funds or personnel from lower to higher priority NFIP programs unless the affected Department Head [SecDef or DepSecDef only, may not be delegated] objects in writing.
- National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). 10 U.S.C. § 441 and following (1996) established NIMA as a new combat support agency of DoD, with national missions.
- Special Access Programs. 10 U.S.C. § 119 (1987) establishes requirements to facilitate congressional oversight over all special access programs. 7
- Land Remote Sensing Policy. 15 U.S.C. § 5601 and following. (1992) Grants SecDef and the Secretary of State authority to deny imagery from U.S.-licensed remote sensing satellites in the interests of national security and foreign policy.
- Covert Action. 50 U.S.C. § 413b (1991) defines covert action and prescribes requirements for Presidential findings.
- Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Agencies. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a (1991) establishes authority for intelligence agencies, including Defense intelligence agencies, to collect information on behalf of law enforcement agencies.
- Intelligence Commercial Activities. 10 U.S.C. § 431 and following (1991) codifies the SecDef's authority to approve the conduct of commercial activity in support of intelligence activities conducted abroad.
- Military Assistance in response to Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Events. 18 U.S.C. § 175a (1996) authorizes military assistance in response to emergencies involving biological weapons of mass destruction 18 U.S.C. § 229E (1998) authorizes military assistance in response to emergencies involving chemical weapons.

## ACQUISITION & LOGISTICS ISSUES

- Authority to Accept Contributions of Money, Property, and Services.<sup>1</sup> 10 U.S.C. § 2608 (1990) authorizes DoD to accept contributions of money and property from any person, foreign government, or international organization and contributions of services from any foreign government or international organization. Money contributions must be deposited into the Treasury and may be used only if appropriated. DoD may accept, retain and use contributions of property and services.
- Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) Program. 10 U.S.C. § 2540-2540d (1996) directs the SecDef to establish a program of loan guarantees of the sale or long-term lease of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services to “eligible countries.” **Terms and conditions** may not be more favorable than those of the Export-Import Bank, and DoD must charge a country, receiving a guaranteed loan, an exposure fee in an amount that is sufficient to meet **potential** liabilities of the United States under the loan guarantee.
- Contracting for Performance of Commercial or Industrial Type Functions. Changes to 10 U.S.C. chapter 146 (amended most by the NDAA FY01) **require** studies and reports to Congress before a DoD commercial or industrial type function may be **converted to contract**; **requires an annual report to Congress** on the results of monitoring the performance of each DoD function that is the subject of a workforce review under OMB Circular A-76; requires that “**core logistics capabilities**,” identified by the SecDef, be performed in government-owned and operated facilities and not be placed under contract; limits funds available in a fiscal year to a military department or defense agency for **depot-level maintenance** and repair workload **performed by non-Federal government personnel to no more than 50 percent**; **requires SecDef to submit an annual Strategic Sourcing Plan of Action**, concurrent with the President’s annual budget request, for the Department of Defense for the following year.
- Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act 1998. Requires agencies to develop and submit to OMB an annual list of activities performed by Federal Government sources for that, in the judgment of the agency head, are not inherently governmental functions. The list is published and subject to challenge by interested parties.
- OMB Circular A-126. “Improving the Management and Use of Government Aircraft.” This rule (1992) establishes a preference for the use of commercial airline service, prescribes criteria that must be satisfied before government aircraft

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<sup>1</sup> **Bolding denotes key item.**

may be used, and identifies certain categories of travel, such as “required use,” which permits use of a government aircraft due to bona fide communications or security needs or exceptional scheduling requirements. SecDef is authorized to make such determinations for DoD personnel.

## MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ISSUES

- Personnel Security Clearances. EO 12968 (1995), issued in part to implement 50 U.S.C. §§ 435 and 436, established a uniform program for background investigations and standards for adjudications of security clearances and access to classified information, and provided authority for investigative access to financial and travel records of applicants and holders of clearances. 10 U.S.C. § 986 (2000) prohibits granting or renewing security clearances for persons with felony convictions, who are unlawful drug users (not waivable), who are mentally incompetent (not waivable), or who have been discharged/dismissed from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions.
- Joint Duty Assignments. Congress provided SecDef with more flexibility in the timing of placement of graduates from a joint professional military education school in their post-education joint duty assignments (10 U.S.C. § 663) (1993).
- Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). Under 10 U.S.C. § 12304, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission he may authorize the Secretary of Defense to order to active duty involuntarily up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (limited to 30,000 of the 200,000) for not more than 270 days. This authority may be used to order members and units to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a WMD but not to provide assistance for other domestic disasters or emergencies. When this authority is used a report must be forwarded to Congress within 24 hours.
- Armed Forces Retirement Home (AFRH). In 1991, Congress incorporated the U.S. Naval Home (Gulfport, Miss.) and the U.S. Soldiers' and Airmen's Home (Washington, D.C.) into a new independent establishment in the Executive Branch, the AFRH (24 U.S.C. §~ 401 and following). DoD may provide nonreimbursable administrative, legal, policy and investigative support; Navy officers run the Naval Home; and SecDef appoints the members of the Board that runs AFRH. If SecDef decides to increase the mandatory contribution that all enlisted and warrant officers make to the AFRH from \$.50/month to \$1/month (Congress authorized SecDef to do so in 1997), SecDef will gain authority, direction and control over the AFRH.
- Military Funeral Honors. Congress made military funeral honors (defined as a ceremony performed by at least two military members, and consisting of the folding and presentation of a flag and the playing of taps, by recording if necessary) an entitlement for all eligible veterans and authorized veterans' groups to be part of the funeral detail. (10 U.S.C. § 1491) (1999).

- Limitations on Affirmation Action. Under Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,224 (1995), the Supreme Court found that federal affirmative action programs that use racial and ethnic criteria as a basis for decisionmaking are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, SecDef must ensure that any such programs serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Applies primarily to employment, education and training, and acquisitions, including military officer promotion boards.
- Defense Health Program Funding Account. Health program funding (but not management authority) was consolidated under a unified Defense Health Program account, under the authority, direction, and control of the ASD(HA), as opposed to the budgets and appropriations of the Military Departments (1992).
- TRICARE Managed Care Program. Congress has enacted a series of authorities implementing managed care for DoD, including large TRICARE regional managed care contracts under which health care enterprises administer HMO-like programs (late 1980s-present). DoD also implemented major cost saving payment methods for reimbursing hospitals and physicians and is in the process of reforming pharmaceutical purchasing and management. Today, the Military Health System, following civilian sector practices, has fully integrated managed health care into its civilian provider program.
- New Retiree Health Care Benefit. NDAA FY01 enacted a senior pharmacy benefit, effective April 1,200 1, and reinstatement of CHAMPUS/TRICARE eligibility at age 65, effective October 1, 2001, which becomes second payer to Medicare. Congress also established an accrual funding mechanism to help fund the new benefit, estimated to require an additional approximately \$4 billion per year.
- FDA Regulation of Force Health Protection Activities. Massive attention on Gulf War Illnesses has focused criticism on DoD procedures employed during the War and resulted in a new law requiring that only the President can waive informed consent for the military to use investigational new drugs as if they were FDA approved. FDA regulation is now a major factor in force health protection, particularly regarding medical defense against chemical and biological weapons. This extends well beyond the use of investigational new drugs. The FDA has had a major impact on the anthrax vaccine immunization program, resulting in acquisition and supply challenges much greater than were anticipated.
- Child Care Services. The SecDef is authorized to establish and provide financial assistance to military child care centers on military installations; he may also provide funds for home-based child care services and to civilian providers of child care services who are not home-based who meet specified criteria, of 10 U.S.C.

§1791-1800 (1999).

- Compensatory Damages in EEO Cases. The SecDef has authority to pay compensatory damages in complaints of discrimination filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Rehabilitation Act. 42 USC. § 1981a (1991).
- Defense Acquisition Workforce Established. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), Title XII, NDAA FY91, established the Defense Acquisition Workforce under the authority of the SecDef to professionalize the workforce to education, training and career development programs. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1701 and following.
- Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) Established, The Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996, in the NDAA FY97, consolidated the intelligence personnel authorities for NSA, DIA, NIMA, NRO, and the Military Departments into a single personnel system under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1601 and following.
- Information Technology Access for the Disabled, SecDef must ensure that electronic and information technologies developed, maintained, procured, or used by DoD programs are accessible to the disabled. Section 408(b) of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (1998), revising Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

## ORGANIZATIONAL AND OTHER ISSUES

- **Cap on OSD and WHS staff.**<sup>1</sup> The number of military and civilian personnel assigned to, or employed in OSD, OSD Direct Support Activities, and WHS is capped at 3767 (10 U.S.C. § 143) (1999).
- **Overall Supervision of DoD Activities for Combating Terrorism.** Section 901 NDAA FY01 requires that one the Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for combating terrorism have as among his/her duties, the **duty** to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism, including antiterrorism activities, **counterterrorism** activities, terrorism consequences management activities, and terrorism-related intelligence support activities. If the selected ASD is not the ASD(SO/LIC), then the ASD(SO/LIC) 's responsibilities for combating terrorism must be exercised by the selected ASD. [This may conflict with DoDD 5 107.1, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD(CS))," January 5, 2001.1
- **Increased DCI Involvement in DoD.** 50 U.S.C. § 403-6 (1992, amended 1996) requires DCI concurrence with appointments for the Directors of NSA, NRO, and NIMA, and consultation with the DCI for the appointment of the Director, DIA. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5(d) (1992, amended 1996) requires the DCI, in consultation with the SecDef and the Chairman, to evaluate and report to congressional intelligence committees on the performance of their national missions. 50 U.S.C. 403-4 (1992, amended 1996) requires DCI, in coordination with Intelligence Community (IC) department heads, to consolidate personnel, administration, and security programs within the IC whenever possible. 1999-2000 DCI initiative updated DCI regulations to support DCI oversight (and management) over National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) programs (including DoD programs) by **functional** (not organizational) lines across the IC, with a stated goal of **increased direct** DCI management of IC programs.
- **Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** Congress added the Vice Chairman as a member of the JCS (10 U.S.C. § 151(a)) (1992).
- **Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).** Congress directed SecDef to establish the JROC (10 U.S.C. § 18 1) (1996).
- **Cap on Major Headquarters Staff.** Congress has limited the number of military and civilian personnel in major headquarters activities across DoD to 85% of the

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<sup>1</sup> **Bolding denotes key item.**

total as of October 1, 1999. Affected headquarters elements are specified in DoD Directive 5 100.73, "Major DoD Headquarters Activities," and may not be changed "except as provided by law," (10 U.S.C. § 130a) (1999).

- **DoD Education Activity (DoDEA)**. The SecDef has clarified his authority over DoD domestic and overseas schools through the establishment of DoDEA. DoDD 1342.20, "Department of Defense Education Activity," Oct. 13, 1992. The SecDef's authority over DoD domestic dependent elementary and secondary schools was clarified and revised pursuant to 10 USC. § 2 164,
- **Defense Reorganization**. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, October 6, 1986.
- **Policy Oversight of Export Controls**. 10 U.S.C. § 134b (1998) establishes the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy (DUSD(TSP)), in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), who serves as the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration (now renamed, it has been consolidated as a division in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency). 10 U.S.C. § 134 also makes the USD(P) the primary advisor to the Secretary on export controls.
- **New Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materials Readiness)**. 10 U.S.C. § 133b (1999) established the DUSD(L&MR), a PAS position, as one of two DUSDs under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Material Readiness, and as the principal logistics official within the senior management of the Department of Defense.
- **Commissary Operations**. 10 U.S.C. § 192(d) (1998). The SecDef may not transfer responsibility to manage and fund the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) to a Military Department unless the transfer is specifically authorized by a law enacted after October 17, 1998. 10 U.S.C. § 2482 (1998) requires the SecDef to establish a governing board for the commissary system to provide advice to the Secretary regarding the prudent operation of the commissary system and to assist in the overall supervision of DeCA. The Board is accountable only to the SecDef and to the civilian officer assigned the responsibility for the overall supervision of DeCA.

April 26, 2001 7:02 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment 

400.103

Attached are some thoughts from Rudy de Leon on your memo on excess equipment, which I thought were helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/10/01 Zakheim memo to SecDef re: "Excess Equipment" and attachments

DHR:db  
04260 1-3

U08303 /01

26 APR 01

April 10, 2001/1515

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Excess Equipment

On its face it would make sense that the Navy follow the policy of the other services. Prompt disposal and prompt savings would provide at least some modicum of relief to DoD's budget strains. We need to know how quickly the Army and Air Force actually dispose of their property, however.

In addition, and as a courtesy, I think it would be worthwhile to have the Navy explain—succinctly—why it does not dispose of its equipment in the same manner as the other Services. Unless you are swayed by the Navy's arguments, you might then issue a DoD-wide Directive that all DoD components liquidate their excess property within a given number of days—that number being determined by your findings regarding Air Force and Army disposal policy.

4/16/01

Mr. Secretary, Dov outlines a good approach. This issue has some history. The Bush Administration (41) took some heat for the slow pace of turning over closed bases from the first two rounds of BRAC. The local ~~com~~ community would lose jobs when the base was closed, and then be frustrated when it tried to come in with an economic development policy/program. For rounds 3 & 4, there was an effort to turn the bases back to the ~~com~~ community in a much shorter time period. Lengthy delays cost the ~~com~~ locals money + jobs. The Air Force and Army developed track records of turning over the base to the local community in a timely way. The re-development success stories come from bases that closed quickly. There is a lesson to be learned, specifically as the DoD ~~to~~ closes bases, it needs a dedicated team to work with the local community to help pick up the post-DoD pieces.

April 9, 2001 6:00 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment

Please take a look at this memo from Rudy de Leon on excess equipment. What do you think we ought to do? Shouldn't we have a Department-wide policy, a single policy? If so, what should it be?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/4 Memo from Mr. de Leon re: Excess Equipment

DHR:dh  
040901-51

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Subject: Excess Equipment

Mr. Secretary,

The Acting General Counsel has prepared the attached paper on the property disposal process. The law is fairly straightforward in this area.

I would note, however, that the Army & Air Force have a different philosophy in using these authorities than does the Navy. This is especially true in the BRAC process.

The Army and Air Force prefer to liquidate the excess property quickly, and by doing so, find their savings in the prompt reduction of their overhead.

The Navy, on the other hand, prefers to hold the property for a longer period and attempt to obtain maximum value.

OFFICE OF **DoD** GENERAL COUNSEL  
The Pentagon, Room **3E980**  
Washington, DC 20301-1600

April 3, 2001

NOTE FOR SECRETARY DE LEON

SUBJECT: Property Disposal Process

The following information is provided in response to Secretary Rumsfeld's question concerning the Department's process for managing and disposing of excess equipment:

- The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. Chapter 10) governs the process for disposal.
- The General Services Administration (GSA) has issued regulations on the utilization and disposal of property by Federal agencies (41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter H).
- Under the authority of DoD Directive 4140.1 and DoD 4140.1-R, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has issued the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual (DoD 4160.2 I-M) which contains the DoD procedures and policies for the reutilization, transfer and disposal of government property,
- Numerous DoD directives, instructions, regulations and manuals in the 4 100 series of the Directives System govern the process for property storage, audit and inventory.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel

March 29, 2001 7:48 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment

Do we have a process of getting rid of excess equipment, selling it, stopping the cost of managing it, housing it, auditing it, inventorying it, etc.?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032901-5

*MFS MARTINEZ  
DEP SEC DEF MA  
692-7150*

**U06506 /01**

April 9, 2001 6:00 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Excess Equipment



Please take a look at this memo from Rudy de Leon on excess equipment. What do **you** think we ought to do? Shouldn't we have a **Department-wide** policy, a single policy? If so, what should it be?

Thanks.

Attach.

414 Memo from Mr. de Leon re: Excess Equipment

DHR:dh  
040901-51

409.703

9 Apr-01

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon   
Subject: Excess Equipment

Mr. Secretary,

The Acting General Counsel has prepared the attached paper on the property disposal process, The law is fairly straightforward in this area.

I would note, however, that the Army & Air Force have a different philosophy in using these authorities than does the Navy. This is especially true in the BRAC process

The Army and Air force prefer to liquidate the excess property quickly, and by doing so, find their savings in the prompt reduction of their overhead.

The Navy, on the other hand, prefers to hold the property for a longer period and attempt to obtain maximum value,

OFFICE OF **DoD GENERAL COUNSEL**  
The Pentagon, Room **3E980**  
Washington, DC 20301-1600

April 3, 2001

NOTE FOR **SECRETARY DE LEON**

SUBJECT: Property Disposal Process

The following information is provided in response to Secretary Rumsfeld's question concerning the Department's process for managing and disposing of excess equipment:

- The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (**40 U.S.C. Chapter 10**) governs the process for disposal.
- The General Services Administration (GSA) has issued regulations on the utilization and disposal of property by Federal agencies (**41 CFR Chapter 101, Subchapter H**).
- Under the authority of **DoD Directive 4140.1** and **DoD 4140.1-R**, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has issued the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual (**DoD 4160.21-M**) which contains the **DoD** procedures and policies for the reutilization, transfer and disposal of government property.
- Numerous **DoD** directives, instructions, regulations and manuals in the 4 100 series of the Directives System govern the process for property storage, audit and inventory.



Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting General Counsel

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: May 7, 2001

**SUBJECT: Secretary's Management Committee**

I think we need to set up a meeting with Wolfowitz, Herbits, Cambone, Rumsfeld and Aldridge and go over this directive.

I can't understand why we wouldn't have two other Under Secretaries, Personnel and Readiness and Controller, as part of the group.

Second, I don't understand why we would mention some possible other people who could attend and not all.

Third, I am concerned about the idea of making it effective immediately since we don't have our people on board.

Also, we will want to discuss the directive that is being replaced and see if there are any good ideas there that we left out. The most notable omission is there is not a uniformed person on this and in the prior one dated 1989, they have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That could be considered a significant difference.

Thanks.

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Herbits  
Steve Cambone  
Peter Aldridge

DHR/azn  
030701.02

U08847 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/1893

334

10 May 01

May 6, 2001 1:00 PM

MEMO TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD  
FROM: S. Herbits  
Re: Secretary's Management Committee

Attached is the directive setting up the Secretary's Management Committee(SMC).

It is ready to go.

Would you like to hold its announcement to coincide with the swearing in of the three Service Secretaries?

A handwritten mark, possibly a signature or initials, consisting of a stylized 'A' with a horizontal line through it.



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

20 APR 2001

VIA LC  
4/23/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *JK* D. O. Cooke, Director, Administration and Management, 695-4436  
(Prepared by: J. S. Spaeth, OMP-ODA&M, 695-4281) *J.S. Spaeth*

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Secretary's Management Committee  
(SMC) and SMC Charter Directive--ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Secure **SecDef** signature on documents establishing the SMC.

DISCUSSION:

- A Department of Defense Directive establishing the SMC is attached at Tab A.
- A memorandum announcing this action is attached at Tab B.
- We have worked with your transition staff to refine these documents. They are now ready for publication.
- The **DoD** General Counsel has reviewed and concurs with comment (Tab C).
- Once you have signed, we will cancel **DoD** Directive 5 160.69, "The Defense Management Council," December 22, 1997 (Tab D) and **DoD** Directive 5 105.54, "Executive Committee of the Department of Defense," June 26, 1989 (Tab E).

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend signature on documents at Tab A and Tab B.

Attachments:

1. DoDD 5105.66
2. Memo Establishing SMC
3. DoD General Counsel Memorandum
4. DoDD 5 160.69
5. DoDD 5105.54

SECDEF DECISION

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER \_\_\_\_\_



# Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5105.66

DA&M

SUBJECT: Secretary's Management Committee (SMC)

Reference: Title 10, United States Code

## 1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., this Directive establishes the Secretary's Management Committee (SMC), and assigns associated membership, functions, and administrative support responsibilities.

## 2. MISSION

The SMC is the <sup>senior</sup> ~~primary~~ mechanism for recommending to the Secretary of Defense major changes needed to effect his transformation goals, and ensuring that management priorities for Defense transformation directed by the Secretary of Defense are carried out **within** the Department of Defense.

## 3. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

3.1 The SMC shall be composed of the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as its Chair; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

*Why not Sec of R & Controller?*

3.2 Other officials of the Department of Defense and other officials of Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch (~~including the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council~~) may be invited, as appropriate, to attend meetings of the SMC.

## 4. FUNCTIONS

*Why mention some & not others?*

The SMC shall:

4.1. Assist the Secretary of Defense in determining broad policy and implementing initiatives relating to Defense transformation, the efficient organization and management of the Department of Defense, and other matters as the Secretary deems appropriate.

4.2. Identify opportunities to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness in DoD operations through:

4.2.1. Initiatives to improve DoD business practices.

4.2.2. Competition of in-house products and services with private sector sources.

4.2.3. Consolidation of managerial functions and activities of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and other organizational entities within the Department of Defense.

4.3. Monitor progress of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and other DoD Components in implementing management improvements and other transformation initiatives.

4.4. Consult with members of the business and the academic communities to seek innovative methods to resolve management problems, - business practices, and streamline operations.

*improve*

## 5. ADMINISTRATION

5.1. The SMC shall meet on the third Thursday of every month, or at the call of the Chair.

5.2. The Executive Secretary of the SMC shall be selected by, and report to, the Chair of the SMC, or his designee.

5.3. The Executive Secretary of the SMC shall:

5.3.1. Assemble and prepare material on matters under consideration for use by the Chair and members of the SMC and distribute them in a timely manner.

5.3.2. Disseminate, to the members of the SMC, requirements for information and actions needed to support SMC deliberations.

5.3.3. Disseminate, to appropriate DoD officials, results of SMC meetings, to include Secretary of Defense decisions.

5.3.4. Monitor the progress of follow-on actions, provide status reports, and prepare DoD issuances or other appropriate administrative materials for consideration by the SMC.

5.3.5. Prepare minutes of each meeting of the SMC.

5.3.6. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required.

5.4. The General Counsel, DoD, shall provide legal counsel to the SMC, as required.

5.5. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services, shall provide personnel resources and such other technical, administrative, and logistical support, as required by the SMC.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

6.1. This Directive is effective ~~immediately~~

*July 1 or on the Conference of the depts I mentioned*

6.2. Nothing in this Directive limits or otherwise affects the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, or the Defense Agency and DoD Field Activity oversight responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense officials required by Section 192 of 10 U.S.C.

6.3. This Directive will be reviewed every 3 years for continued need and/or applicability.

Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Establishment of Secretary's Management Committee

The Department's transformation will require a new set of management structures, processes, and tools. To that end, I am establishing the Secretary's Management Committee (SMC). The SMC will be my team to carry out needed management initiatives.

The membership for the SMC is myself; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The full cooperation of all concerned is expected as the SMC moves ahead.

Accordingly, I have signed DoD Directive 5 105.66 formally chartering the SMC. A copy of the Charter is attached for your information.

Attachment:  
As stated





GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1 600

APR 20 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Secretary's Management Committee Chartering DoD  
Directive

I concur with the proposed Directive, subject to incorporation of the revisions in the attached draft and with one caveat.

While there is no legal objection to paragraph 4.4 as written, there are potential legal pitfalls in such consultations. Therefore, I recommend that my office brief the SMC members regarding such matters, including the Federal Advisory Committee Act and defense acquisition issues.

  
Daniel J. Dell'Orto  
Acting

Attachment: a/s



11-L-0559/OSD/1900



# Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 5 105.66

DA&M

SUBJECT: Secretary's Management Committee (SMC)

Reference: Title 10, United States Code

## 1. PURPOSE

✓ Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by <sup>title</sup> ~~Section~~ 113 of 10 U.S.C., this Directive establishes the Secretary's Management Committee (SMC), and ~~assigns~~ associated membership, functions, and administrative support responsibilities.

## 2. MISSION

The SMC is **the** primary mechanism for recommending to the Secretary of Defense major changes needed to effect his transformation goals, and ensuring that management priorities for Defense transformation directed by the Secretary of Defense are carried out within the Department of Defense.

## 3. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

3.1 The SMC shall be composed of the Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as its Chair; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

3.2. Other officials of the Department of Defense and other officials of Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch (including the **Office** of Management and Budget and the National Security Council) may be invited, as appropriate, to attend meetings of the SMC.

## 4. FUNCTIONS

The SMC shall:

✓ 4.1. Assist the Secretary of Defense in determining broad policy and implementing initiatives relating to Defense transformation, the efficient organization and management of the Department of Defense, ~~and such~~ other matters as the Secretary deems appropriate.

4.2. Identify opportunities to achieve improved efficiency and effectiveness in DoD operations through:

4.2.1. Initiatives to improve DoD business practices.

4.2.2. Competition of in-house products and services with private sector sources.

4.2.3. Consolidation of managerial functions and activities of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, **DoD** Field Activities, and other organizational entities within the Department of Defense.

4.3. Monitor progress of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, **DoD** Field Activities, and other **DoD** Components in implementing management improvements and other transformation initiatives.

4.4. Consult with members of the business and the academic communities to seek innovative methods to resolve management problems, reengineer business practices, and streamline operations.

## 5. ADMINISTRATION

5.1. The SMC shall meet on the third Wednesday of every month, or at the call of the Chair.

5.2. The Executive Secretary of the SMC shall:

5.2.1. Assemble and prepare material on matters under consideration for use by the Chair and members of the SMC and distribute them in a timely manner.

5.2.2. Disseminate, to the members of the SMC, requirements for information and actions needed to support SMC deliberations.

✓ 5.2.3. Disseminate, to appropriate **DoD** officials, results of SMC meetings, to include Secretary of Defense ~~approved decisions of the SMC.~~

^

5.2.4. Monitor the progress of follow-on actions, provide status reports, and prepare **DoD** issuances or other appropriate administrative materials for consideration by the SMC.

5.2.5. Prepare minutes of each meeting of the SMC.

5.2.6. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required.

5.3. The General Counsel, **DoD**, shall provide legal counsel to the SMC, as required.

## 6. EFFECTIVE DATE

6.1. This Directive is effective immediately.

6.2. Nothing in this Directive limits or otherwise affects the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, or the Defense Agency and **DoD**

Field Activity oversight responsibilities of the **Office** of the Secretary of Defense officials required by Section 192 of 10 U.S.C.

6.3. This Directive will be reviewed every 3 years for continued need and/or applicability.

Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense



# Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

December 22, 1997  
NUMBER 5160.69

DA&M

SUBJECT: Defense Management Council @MC)

References: (a) Title 10, United States Code  
(b) **Office** of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 (Revised),  
"Performance of Commercial Activities," August 4, 1983

## 1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive establishes the DMC, and assigns associated membership, functions, and administrative support responsibilities.

## 2. MISSION

The DMC is the primary mechanism for ensuring that reform initiatives directed by the Secretary of Defense are carried out within the Department of Defense, recommending to the Secretary of Defense major reforms still needed, and serving as a **DoD** Board of Directors for oversight of the Defense Agencies.

## 3. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

3.1 The **DMC shall** be composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as its Chair; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (**USD(A&T)**); the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (**USD(P)**); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (**USD(C)**); the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (**USD(P&R)**); the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD); the Director, Administration and Management; the Under Secretary of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army; the Vice Chief of Naval **Operations**; the Vice **Chief** of Staff, Air Force; and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

3.2. The **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)) shall** attend meetings of the DMC when matters under the cognizance of the **ASD(I)** are addressed.

3.3. **Other officials** of the Department of Defense and other Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch (including the **Office** of Management and Budget and the National

Security Council), as may be designated by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, **shall** be invited to attend appropriate meetings of the DMC.

#### 4. FUNCTIONS

The DMC shall:

4.1. Advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to Defense reform, the efficient organization and management of the Department **of** Defense, and such other matters **as** the Secretary of Defense may direct,

4.2. Negotiate performance goals and measurements with the heads of the Defense Agencies and monitor their performance against agreed **upon** goals, consistent with Section 192 of Title 10, U.S.C. (reference (a)).

4.3. Identify initiatives to improve **DoD** business practices and monitor progress of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other **DoD** organizations toward their accomplishment.

4.4. Identify opportunities to achieve improved **efficiency** and effectiveness in **DoD** operations by opening them to competition with the private sector, consistent with OMB Circular No. A-76 (reference **(b)**), and monitor the progress of the competitive evaluation process for these initiatives.

4.5. Identify **opportunities** for the consolidation of management activities of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other **DoD** organizations.

4.6. Consult with business leaders and the academic community to seek innovative methods to resolve management problems, reengineer business practices, and streamline operations.

#### 5. ADMINISTRATION

5.1. The DMC shall meet at the call of the Chair.

5.2. The **USD(C)** shall serve **as** the Executive Secretary to the DMC and shall arrange for such other staff assistance as may be **required**.

5.3. The Executive Secretary of the DMC shall:

5.3.1. Assemble and prepare **material on matters** under consideration for use by the Chair and members **of the** DMC and distribute them in a timely manner.

5.3.2. Disseminate; to the **members** of the DMC, **specific** requirements for data and other actions that **arise** in each of the **sessions** of the DMC.

5.3.3. Disseminate, to appropriate **DoD officials**, decisions reached by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, after receiving the advice of the DMC.

5.3.4. Monitor follow-on actions taken to ensure that decisions reached by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense are implemented properly, including preparation of **DoD** issuances, when necessary.

5.3.5. Prepare minutes of each meeting of the DMC, which shall be retained in the office of the Executive Secretary of the DMC.

5.3.6. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required.

5.4. The General Counsel, **DoD**, shall, in addition to serving as a member of the DMC, provide legal counsel to the DMC.

## 6. EFFECTIVE DATE

6.1. This Directive is effective immediately.

6.2. Nothing in this Directive limits or otherwise affects the authority, direction, **and** control of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, or the Defense Agency and **DoD** Field Activity oversight responsibilities of the **Office** of the Secretary of Defense **officials** required by Section 192 of 10 U.S.C. (reference (a)),

6.3. This directive will be reviewed every three years for continued need and/or applicability.

  
John J. Hamre  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Department of 'Defense .  
**DIRECTIVE**

June 26, 1989  
NUMBER 5105.54

SA, OSD

**SUBJECT:** Executive Committee of **the Department** of Defense

A. PURPOSE

This Directive establishes the Executive Committee (**EXCOM**) of the Department of Defense (DoD).

B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of **the Secretary** of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components").

C. MISSION

The EXCOM exists to provide the Secretary of Defense the opportunity to receive in confidence and with candor the advice, opinions, and judgments of the Secretary's senior advisors.

D. MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership shall consist of the following officials
  - a. The Secretary of Defense (Chair);
  - b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
  - c. The Secretary of the Army;
  - d. The Secretary of the Navy;
  - e. The Secretary of the Air Force;
  - f. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
  - g. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; and
  - h. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
2. The DoD General Counsel shall serve as the Legal Advisor to the EXCOM.

3. The Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the **EXCOM**.

4. In the case of absence or disability of the Secretary of Defense, or when directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall serve as Chair of the **EXCOM**.

5. In the case of absence or disability of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the **individual acting as** the Secretary of Defense shall serve as the Chair of the EXCOM.

#### E. OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. The **EXCOM** shall meet at the call of the Chair.

2. Attendance at **EXCOM** meetings is limited to:

a. Members of the EXCOM;

b. The Legal Advisor to the **EXCOM**;

c. The Executive Secretary, of the EXCOM; and

d. Other persons specifically invited by the Chair to attend a particular meeting.

3. For the purposes of ensuring candor at meetings of the EXCOM, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, attendees at the EXCOM meetings shall not disclose any of the contents of the deliberations of the EXCOM.

#### F. EFFECTIVE DATE

1. This Directive is effective immediately.

2. Nothing in this Directive limits or otherwise affects the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense over the DoD.



RICHARD B. CHENEY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 13, 2001 8:03 AM

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Budget

Here is a memo I received that says it is going to take four to six weeks for OMB to review this package we sent over,

It is hard to believe it ought to take that long, Why don't you ask around about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/7/01 GC memo to SecDef re: Routine Legislation Package

DHR:dh  
061301-5

*110.01*

*13 Jun 01*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

6/11  
1640

INFO MEMO

June 7, 2001, 12:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *William J. Haynes II 6/7/01*

SUBJECT: Routine Legislation Package

- The annual vehicle for proposing generally routine, non-controversial legislative proposals -- internally styled "omnibus legislation package" -- was briefed to DEPSEC on June 5, 2001.
- These proposals generally seek incremental increases in legislative authority that the sponsoring entity needs to perform its mission more effectively. This exercise is not inconsistent with, nor a substitute for, the planned initiative to reduce legislative constraints on management of the Department. Nor does it include issues to be addressed in the nascent FY 2002 Budget Amendment.
- Although most of the proposals were drafted before appointment of the Secretary or Under Secretary concerned, each reviewed and approved all proposals from his organization on June 5. All proposals were fully coordinated within the Department.
- After DEPSEC review, the package was transmitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on June 6. OMB review is likely to take four to six weeks.
- OMB typically clears about 70% of DoD proposals and returns the package to DoD for transmission to Congress by DoD General Counsel.
- In a separate effort, DoD General Counsel will be working with OMB General Counsel, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Under Secretaries of Defense to prepare a comprehensive legislative proposal to reduce legislative constraints on management.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, 697-7248



11-L-0559/OSD/1910

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE June 13, 2001 8:03 AM

2001 JUN 13 PM 5: 51

TO: Honorable Mitch Daniels

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Budget

Here is a memo I received that says it is going to take four to six weeks for OMB to review **this** package we sent over.

It is hard to believe it ought to take that long. Why don't you ask around about it?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/7/01 GC memo to SecDef re: Routine Legislation Package

DHR:dh  
0613014

6/25

→ Sec. Rumsfeld

12 days. I've been promised completion by 6/25. Don't please know I want tolerate unnecessary loss of time. I know you were unhappy about the timing of the budget submission, but we did get it to the Hill on the 3rd day (Thurs) after receiving the new material from your guys, the Monday after the ~~Friday~~ <sup>Saturday</sup> passage of the tax bill.

Walter D. 6/13



GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600**

6/11  
1640

## INFO MEMO

June 7, 2001, 12:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 6/7/01*

SUBJECT: Routine Legislation Package

- The annual vehicle for proposing generally routine, non-controversial legislative proposals -- internally styled "omnibus legislation package" -- **was** briefed to DEPSEC on June 5, 2001.
- These proposals generally seek incremental increases in legislative authority that the sponsoring entity needs to perform its mission more effectively. This exercise is not inconsistent with, nor a substitute for, the planned initiative to reduce legislative constraints on management of the Department. Nor does it include issues to be addressed in the nascent FY 2002 Budget Amendment.
- Although most of the proposals were drafted before appointment of the Secretary or Under Secretary concerned, each reviewed and approved all proposals **from** his organization on June 5. All proposals were **fully** coordinated **within the Department**.
- **After DEPSEC review, the package was transmitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on June 6. OMB review is likely to take four to six weeks.**
- **OMB typically clears about 70% of DoD proposals and returns the package to DoD for transmission to Congress by DoD General Counsel.** 3 
- In a separate effort, **DoD** General Counsel will be working with OMB **General** Counsel, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Under Secretaries of Defense to prepare a comprehensive legislative proposal to reduce legislative constraints on management,

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, (b)(6)

2001 JUL -9 PM 3:17

July 5, 2001 2:00 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Military Construction

Tell me what the law is on military construction. Is it true that the base commander can't build a building that cost over \$500,000 without getting approval from the Congress -- but he can renovate for a million dollars. We may want to ask for some changes in the rules.

DHR:cd  
070501-16

600,1

59201



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

July 23, 2001, 11:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 7/23/01*

SUBJECT: Military Construction

- You asked “Is it true that the base commander can’t build a building that cost[s] over \$500,000 without getting approval from the Congress – but he can renovate for a million dollars. We may want to ask for some changes in the rules.” (Tab A).
- There is some truth to this. I’ve referred this to the Senior Executive Committee, which is collecting and evaluating the growing list of “Freedom to Manage” initiatives. They may decide to seek changes.
- “Minor” Military Construction (MMC) refers to low-dollar construction projects that can proceed without specific prior legislative approval. The statute governing use of MMC funds allows a Secretary (or his authorized subordinate) to spend up to \$1.5 million on any construction project not specifically authorized by Congress, and up to \$3 million on projects to ameliorate life-, health-, or safety-threatening conditions.
- The \$500,000 figure comes from two subcategories of that authority:
  - construction projects costing up to that amount can draw on Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account funds rather than Military Construction funds;
  - amounts exceeding that figure require prior approval of the Secretary.
- Since a base commander’s funds typically are Operation and Maintenance account funds, he can’t use his funds for a larger construction project without going to Congress. (He can, however, seek MMC funds from within his department without going to Congress.)
- If, however, the project is deemed “repair” rather than “construction”, then the commander can use his O&M funds with substantially more freedom. He needs Secretarial approval only when he exceeds \$5 million per project, and he needs to notify Congress (not seek approval, prior or otherwise) when he exceeds \$10 million.

600 /

239010

COORDINATION: None



**SEC. xx. UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION**

Section 2805 of title 10, United States Code is amended as follows:

(a) in subsection (a)( 1)

(1) by striking "\$1,500,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,500,000"; and

(2) by striking "\$3,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$5,000,000".

(b) in subsection (c) as follows:

(1) in paragraph (1) by striking "\$1 ,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,000,000"; and

(2) in paragraph (2) by striking "\$500,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$1,000,000".

## Detailed Analysis of Info Memo on Military Construction

The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments are authorized to carry out such MILCON projects "as are authorized by law." 10 U.S.C. 2802. MILCON is "any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation" 10 U.S.C. 2801(a).

In Sections 2803, 2804, 2805, 2808, 2811, and 2854 of title 10, United States Code, Congress has authorized the Department by law to carry out certain types of construction projects. If a construction project does not fit within one of these authorities, described below, then the Department can carry out the project only if the specific project is authorized in a law enacted by the Congress. That specific authorization, generally in the Military Construction Authorization Act, takes place only after the specific project is justified to the Congress. The general authorities are:

- **Section 2803, Emergency Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the project is vital to national security or the protection of health, safety, or the environment and the delay of the project for inclusion in the next authorization act would be inconsistent with those vital interests. Requires a 21 day congressional notification before the Secretary concerned is authorized to Act. (Enclosure 1).
- **Section 2804, Contingency Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the Secretary determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next authorization act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest. Requires a 21 day congressional notification before the Secretary concerned is authorized to Act. (Enclosure 2).
- **Section 2805, Unspecified Minor Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law as long as the project has an approved cost of less than \$1.5 Million or \$3 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. The Secretary concerned must approve in advance any project costing more than \$500,000. We currently have a legislative proposal to increase this amount to \$750,000 for overseas projects. This section also authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funding for such projects as long as the cost is not more than \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening, or \$500,000 for other projects. We currently have a legislative proposal to increase these amounts for overseas projects to \$1.5 Million and \$750,000 respectively. (Enclosure 3).

- **Section 2808, Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency.** Authorizes the secretary of Defense to undertake MILCON projects not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support use of the armed forces in the event of a declaration of war or declaration of national emergency. The Secretary is required to notify the appropriate congressional committees of any decision to undertake such a project and the estimated cost of the project, but there is not waiting period. (Enclosure 4).
- **Section 2811, Repair of Facilities.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funds to carry out repair projects. A repair project is “a project to restore a real property facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its designated functional purpose.” Construction of new facilities, additions to existing facilities, or functional conversions cannot be carried out under this section. A repair project costing more than \$5 Million must be approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. If the repair project costs more than \$10 Million the Secretary concerned must send Congress a report containing the justification of the project, the current estimate of the cost of the project, and the reasons for using this section for the project, but there is not waiting period. (Enclosure 5).
- **Section 2854, Restoration or Replacement of Damaged or Destroyed Facilities.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to repair, restore, or replace a facility that has been damaged or destroyed. If the cost of the project exceeds the unspecified minor construction threshold (\$1.5 Million), the section requires a 2 1 day congressional notification before the Secretary is authorized to act. (Enclosure 6)

Because a base commander’s only source of funding over which he has any direct control is O&M, he is subject to some of the more restrictive limitations discussed above. He can carry out a MILCON project not otherwise authorized by law, using O&M funding, as long as the cost does not exceed \$500,000, or \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. For all projects in excess of \$500,000, he must obtain Secretarial approval.

As discussed above, the most general of the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments is section 2805, unspecified minor construction. Subsection (c) authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funds to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, as long as the cost does not exceed \$500,000, or \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. The authority to use O&M funds makes this authority especially important, but the limitation to \$500,000/\$1 Million has not been increased since 1996. Substantially increasing the limitations in section 2805(c) and in section 2805(a) (the overall limit on what is considered minor construction) would substantially expand the Secretary’s freedom to manage.

### **Sec. 2803. Emergency construction**

(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary concerned may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the Secretary determines (1) that the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment, and (2) that the requirement for the project is so urgent that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality, as the case may be.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary concerned shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project,

(2) the **justification** for carrying out the project under this section, and (3) a statement of the source of the funds to be used to carry out the project. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21 -day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.

(c)(1) The maximum amount that the Secretary concerned may obligate in any fiscal year under this section is **\$30,000,000**.

(2) A project carried out under this section shall be carried out within the total amount of funds appropriated for military construction that have not been obligated.

#### **Sec. 2804. Contingency construction**

(a) Within the amount appropriated for such purpose, **the Secretary** of Defense may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, or may authorize the Secretary of a military department to carry out such a project, if the Secretary of Defense determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project, and (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.

## **Sec. 2805. Unspecified minor construction**

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), within an amount equal to 125 percent of the amount authorized by law for such purpose, the Secretary concerned may carry out unspecified minor military construction projects not otherwise authorized by law. An unspecified minor military construction project is a military construction project that has an approved cost equal to or less than \$1,500,000. However, if the military construction project is intended solely to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening, an unspecified minor military construction project may have an approved cost equal to or less than \$3,000,000.

(2) A Secretary may not use more than \$5,000,000 for exercise-related unspecified minor military construction projects coordinated or directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the United States during any fiscal year.

(b)(1) An unspecified minor military construction project costing more than \$500,000 may not be carried out under this section unless approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. This paragraph shall apply even though the project is to be carried out using funds made available to enhance the deployment and mobility of military forces and supplies.

(2) When a decision is made to carry out an unspecified minor military construction project to which paragraph (1) is applicable, the Secretary concerned shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of that decision, of the justification for the project, and of the estimated cost of the project. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by the committees.

(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), the Secretary concerned may spend from appropriations available for operation and maintenance amounts necessary to carry out an unspecified minor military construction project costing not more than -

(A) \$1,000,000, in the case of an unspecified minor military construction project intended solely to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening; or

(B) \$500,000, in the case of any other unspecified minor military construction project.

(2) The authority provided in paragraph (1) may not be used with respect to any exercise-related unspecified minor military construction project coordinated or directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the United States.

(3) The limitations specified in paragraph (1) shall not apply to an unspecified minor military construction project if the project is to be carried out using funds made available to enhance the deployment and mobility of military forces and supplies.

(d) Military family housing projects for construction of new housing units may not be carried out under the authority of this section.

**Sec. 2808. Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency**

(a) In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects, and may authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces. Such projects may be undertaken only **within the** total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.

(b) When a decision is made to undertake military construction projects authorized by this section, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of the decision and of the estimated cost of the construction projects, including the cost of any real estate action pertaining to those construction projects.

(c) The authority described in subsection (a) shall terminate with respect to any war or national emergency at the end of the war or national emergency.

## **Sec. 2811. Repair of facilities**

(a) **Repairs Using Operations and Maintenance Funds.** - Using funds available to the Secretary concerned for operation and maintenance, the Secretary concerned may carry out repair projects for an entire single-purpose facility or one or more functional areas of a multipurpose facility.

(b) **Approval Required for Major Repairs.** - A repair project costing more than **\$5,000,000** may not be carried out under this section unless approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. In determining the total cost of a repair project, the Secretary shall include all phases of a multi-year repair project to a single facility. In considering a repair project for approval, the Secretary shall ensure that the project is consistent with force structure plans, that repair of the facility is more cost effective than replacement, and that the project is an appropriate use of operation and maintenance funds.

(c) **Prohibition on New Construction or Additions.** - Construction of new facilities or additions to existing facilities may not be carried out under the authority of this section.

(d) **Congressional Notification.** - When a decision is made to carry out a repair project under this section with an estimated cost in excess of \$10,000,000, the Secretary concerned shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing -

- (1) the justification for the repair project and the current estimate of the cost of the project; and
- (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section.

(e) **Repair Project Defined.** - In this section, the term "repair project" means a project to restore a real property facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its designated functional purpose.

**Sec. 2854. Restoration or replacement of damaged or destroyed facilities**

(a) Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary concerned may repair, restore, or replace a facility under his jurisdiction, including a family housing facility, that has been damaged or destroyed.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out construction under this section and the cost of the repair, restoration, or replacement is greater than the maximum amount for a minor construction project, the Secretary concerned shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of that decision, of the justification for the project, of the current estimate of the cost of the project, of the source of funds for the project, and of the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

5 JUL 24 11 09:25  
July 23, 2001, 11:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 7/23/01*

SUBJECT: Military Construction

- You asked “Is it true that the base commander can’t build a building that cost[s] over \$500,000 without getting approval from the Congress – but he can renovate for a million dollars. We may want to ask for some changes in the rules.” (Tab A).
- There is some truth to this. I’ve referred this to the Senior Executive Committee, which is collecting and evaluating the growing list of “Freedom to Manage” initiatives. They may decide to seek changes.
- “Minor” Military Construction (MMC) refers to low-dollar construction projects that can proceed without specific prior legislative approval. The statute governing use of MMC funds allows a Secretary (or his authorized subordinate) to spend up to \$1.5 million on any construction project not specifically authorized by Congress, and up to \$3 million on projects to ameliorate life-, health-, or safety-threatening conditions.
- The \$500,000 figure comes from two subcategories of that authority:
  - construction projects costing up to that amount can draw on Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account funds rather than Military Construction funds;
  - amounts exceeding that figure require prior approval of the Secretary.
- Since a base commander’s funds typically are Operation and Maintenance account funds, he can’t use his funds for a larger construction project without going to Congress. (He can, however, seek MMC funds from within his department without going to Congress.)
- If, however, the project is deemed “repair” rather than “construction”, then the commander can use his O&M funds with substantially more freedom. He needs Secretarial approval only when he exceeds \$5 million per project, and he needs to notify Congress (not seek approval, prior or otherwise) when he exceeds \$10 million.

COORDINATION: None



600.1

23 Jul 01

2001 JUL -9 PM 3: 17

**July 5, 2001 2:00 PM**

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Military Construction

Tell me what the law is on military construction. Is it true that the base commander can't build a building that cost over \$500,000 without getting approval from the Congress -- but he can renovate for a million dollars. We may want to ask for some changes in the rules.

DHR:cd  
070501-16

11-L-0559/OSD/1925

U12043 /01

**SEC. xx. UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION**

Section 2805 of title 10, United States Code is amended as follows:

(a) in subsection (a)( 1)

- (1) by striking "\$1,500,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,500,000"; and
- (2) by striking "\$3,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$5,000,000".

(b) in subsection (c) as follows:

- (1) in paragraph (1) by striking "\$1 ,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$2,000,000"; and
- (2) in paragraph (2) by striking "\$500,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$1,000,000".

## Detailed Analysis of Info Memo on Military Construction

The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments are authorized to carry out such MILCON projects “as are authorized by law.” 10 U.S.C. 2802. MILCON is “any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation.” 10 U.S.C. 2801(a).

In Sections 2803, 2804, 2805, 2808, 2811, and 2854 of title 10, United States Code, Congress has authorized the Department by law to carry out certain types of construction projects. If a construction project does not fit within one of these authorities, described below, then the Department can carry out the project only if the specific project is authorized in a law enacted by the Congress. That specific authorization, generally in the Military Construction Authorization Act, takes place only after the specific project is justified to the Congress. The general authorities are:

- **Section 2803, Emergency Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the project is vital to national security or the protection of health, safety, or the environment and the delay of the project for inclusion in the next authorization act would be inconsistent with those vital interests. Requires a 21 day congressional notification before the Secretary concerned is authorized to Act. (Enclosure 1).
  
- **Section 2804, Contingency Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the Secretary determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next authorization act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest. Requires a 21 day congressional notification before the Secretary concerned is authorized to Act. (Enclosure 2).
  
- **Section 2805, Unspecified Minor Construction.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law as long as the project has an approved cost of less than \$1.5 Million or \$3 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. The Secretary concerned must approve in advance any project costing more than \$500,000. We currently have a legislative proposal to increase this amount to \$750,000 for overseas projects. This section also authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funding for such projects as long as the cost is not more than \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening, or \$500,000 for other projects. We currently have a legislative proposal to increase these amounts for overseas projects to \$1.5 Million and \$750,000 respectively. (Enclosure 3).

- **Section 2808, Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency.** Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to undertake MILCON projects not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support use of the armed forces in the event of a declaration of war or declaration of national emergency. The Secretary is required to notify the appropriate congressional committees of any decision to undertake such a project and the estimated cost of the project, but there is not waiting period. (Enclosure 4).
- **Section 2811, Repair of Facilities.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funds to carry out repair projects. A repair project is “a project to restore a real property facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its designated functional purpose.” Construction of new facilities, additions to existing facilities, or functional conversions cannot be carried out under this section. A repair project costing more than \$5 Million must be approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. If the repair project costs more than \$10 Million the Secretary concerned must send Congress a report containing the justification of the project, the current estimate of the cost of the project, and the reasons for using this section for the project, but there is not waiting period. (Enclosure 5).
- **Section 2854, Restoration or Replacement of Damaged or Destroyed Facilities.** Authorizes the Secretary concerned to repair, restore, or replace a facility that has been damaged or destroyed. If the cost of the project exceeds the unspecified minor construction threshold (\$1.5 Million), the section requires a 21 day congressional notification before the Secretary is authorized to act. (Enclosure 6)

Because a base commander’s only source of funding over which he has any direct control is O&M, he is subject to some of the more restrictive limitations discussed above. He can carry out a MILCON project not otherwise authorized by law, using O&M funding, as long as the cost does not exceed \$500,000, or \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. For all projects in excess of \$500,000, he must obtain Secretarial approval.

As discussed above, the most general of the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments is section 2805, unspecified minor construction. Subsection (c) authorizes the Secretary concerned to use O&M funds to carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, as long as the cost does not exceed \$500,000, or \$1 Million if the project is to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening. The authority to use O&M funds makes this authority especially important, but the limitation to \$500,000/\$1 Million has not been increased since 1996. Substantially increasing the limitations in section 2805(c) and in section 2805(a) (the overall limit on what is considered minor construction) would substantially expand the Secretary’s freedom to manage.

### **Sec. 2803. Emergency construction**

(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary concerned may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law if the Secretary determines (1) that the project is vital to the national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment, and (2) that the requirement for the project is so urgent that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or the protection of health, safety, or environmental quality, as the case may be.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary concerned shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project,

(2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section, and (3) a statement of the source of the funds to be used to carry out the project. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the **21-day** period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.

(c)(1) The maximum amount that the Secretary concerned may obligate in any fiscal year under this section is **\$30,000,000**.

(2) A project carried out under this section shall be carried out within the total amount of funds appropriated for military construction that have not been obligated.

## **Sec. 2804. Contingency construction**

(a) Within the amount appropriated for such purpose, **the Secretary** of Defense may carry out a military construction project not otherwise authorized by law, or may authorize the Secretary of a military department to carry out such a project, if the Secretary of Defense determines that deferral of the project for inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act would be inconsistent with national security or national interest.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out a military construction project under this section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each such report shall include (1) the justification for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the project, and (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the **21-day** period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.

## **Sec. 2805. Unspecified minor construction**

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), within an amount equal to 125 percent of the amount authorized by law for such purpose, the Secretary concerned may carry out unspecified minor military construction projects not otherwise authorized by law. An unspecified minor military construction project is a military construction project that has an approved cost equal to or less than **\$1,500,000**. However, if the military construction project is intended solely to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening, an unspecified minor military construction project may have an approved cost equal to or less than **\$3,000,000**.

(2) A Secretary may not use more than **\$5,000,000** for exercise-related unspecified minor military construction projects coordinated or directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the United States during any fiscal year.

(b)(1) An unspecified minor military construction project costing more than **\$500,000** may not be carried out under this section unless approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. This paragraph shall apply even though the project is to be carried out using funds made available to enhance the deployment and mobility of military forces and supplies.

(2) When a decision is made to carry out an unspecified minor military construction project to which paragraph (1) is applicable, the Secretary concerned shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of that decision, of the justification for the project, and of the estimated cost of the project. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by the committees.

(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), the Secretary concerned may spend from appropriations available for operation and maintenance amounts necessary to carry out an unspecified minor military construction project costing not more than -

(A) **\$1,000,000**, in the case of an unspecified minor military construction project intended solely to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening, or safety-threatening; or

(B) **\$500,000**, in the case of any other unspecified minor military construction project.

(2) The authority provided in paragraph (1) may not be used with respect to any exercise-related unspecified minor military construction project coordinated or directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the United States.

(3) The limitations specified in paragraph (1) shall not apply to an unspecified minor military construction project if the project is to be carried out using funds made available to enhance the deployment and mobility of military forces and supplies.

(d) Military family housing projects for construction of new housing units may not be carried out under the authority of this section.

**Sec. 2808. Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency**

(a) In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects, and may authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to undertake military construction projects, not otherwise authorized by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces. Such projects may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.

(b) When a decision is made to undertake military construction projects authorized by this section, the Secretary of Defense shall **notify** the appropriate committees of Congress of the decision and of the estimated cost of the construction projects, including the cost of any real estate action pertaining to those construction projects.

(c) The authority described in subsection (a) shall terminate with respect to any war or national emergency at the end of the war or national emergency.

## **Sec. 2811. Repair of facilities**

(a) Repairs Using Operations and Maintenance Funds. - Using funds available to the Secretary concerned for operation and maintenance, the Secretary concerned may carry out repair projects for an entire single-purpose facility or one or more functional areas of a multipurpose facility.

(b) Approval Required for Major Repairs. - A repair project costing more than **\$5,000,000** may not be carried out under this section unless approved in advance by the Secretary concerned. In determining the total cost of a repair project, the Secretary shall include all phases of a multi-year repair project to a single facility. In considering a repair project for approval, the Secretary shall ensure that the project is consistent with force structure plans, that repair of the facility is more cost effective than replacement, and that the project is an appropriate use of operation and maintenance funds.

(c) Prohibition on New Construction or Additions. - Construction of new facilities or additions to existing facilities may not be carried out under the authority of this section.

(d) Congressional Notification. - When a decision is made to carry out a repair project under this section with an estimated cost in excess of \$10,000,000, the Secretary concerned shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing -

- (1) the justification for the repair project and the current estimate of the cost of the project; and
- (2) the justification for carrying out the project under this section.

(e) Repair Project Defined. - In this section, the term "repair project" means a project to restore a real property facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its designated functional purpose.

## **Sec. 2854. Restoration or replacement of damaged or destroyed facilities**

(a) Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary concerned may repair, restore, or replace a facility under his jurisdiction, including a family housing facility, that has been damaged or destroyed.

(b) When a decision is made to carry out construction under this section and the cost of the repair, restoration, or replacement is greater than the maximum amount for a minor construction project, the Secretary concerned shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of that decision, of the justification for the project, of the current estimate of the cost of the project, of the source of funds for the project, and of the justification for carrying out the project under this section. The project may then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period beginning on the date the notification is received by such committees.

SMA copy

-Tracker updated

October 17, 2001 7:04 AM

- Original to SecDef

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Automatic Membership

Please pull together a list of all the things I am automatically a member of because of my role as Secretary of Defense. For example, I understand I am now a member of the Homeland Security Council. Of course, I am also a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

334

Are there other things like that? As I recall, the last time I was here I was a member of the board of the Red Cross.

Please let me know.

Thanks.

11/9  
Sec Def -

DHR:dh  
101701-3

Response attached. If you have questions about any particular membership, I have a binder with an explanation of ~~each~~ each.

17 OCT 01

Dilite



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

November 7, 2001, 11:11a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense

*WJ Haynes II 11/9/01*

SUBJECT: Response to Your Query Concerning Automatic Membership

- You requested (tab B) a list of groups of which you are a member by virtue of your position as Secretary of Defense.
- The list at tab A is the result of our search of statutes and Executive Orders establishing Secretary of Defense membership on councils, committees, and other groups.
- We have not undertaken an exhaustive effort to determine the exact status of many of these committees. For most, representation has been delegated or has devolved to subordinate DoD officials. Some of these committees, although still "on the books," are moribund.
- Your note mentioned the Red Cross. The President appoints eight members of the Red Cross Board of Governors, traditionally including the Secretary of Defense. President Bush has not yet made his appointments.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: John A. Casciotti (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED



11-L-0559/OSD/1936

## Secretary of Defense Memberships

### MOST SIGNIFICANT MEMBERSHIPS

1. **National Security Council, member**
  - Committee on Foreign Intelligence, member
  - Committee on Transnational Threats, member
  - 50 U.S.C. §402
  
2. **President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board**
  - Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 202 (Oct. 16, 2001)
  - SecDef or designee
  
3. **Homeland Security Council, member**
  - Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 8, 2001)
  
4. **Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Chairman**
  - 22 U.S.C. §2751
  - SecDef may designate a DAsD-level or above representative to perform his routine duties
  - DepSecDef designated Committee Chairman
  - USD(AT&L) Chairs interagency group supporting committee

### OTHER MEMBERSHIPS

5. **Invasive Species Council, member**
  - Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999)
  - Primary Representative is ADUSD (E), Mr. John P. Woodley
  
6. **U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, member**
  - Exec. Order No. 13089, 63 Fed. Reg. 32701 (Jun. 11, 1998), 16 U.S.C. §6401, note
  
7. **American Heritage Rivers Interagency Committee, member**
  - Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48445 (Sep. 11, 1997)
  - SecDef or ASD-level designee
  
8. **Export Administrative Review Board, member**
  - Exec. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981 (Dec. 5, 1995), continues the Board established by Exec. Order No. 11533 (Jun. 4, 1970) and Exec. Order No. 12002 (Jul. 7, 1977), amended by Exec. Order No. 13020 (Oct. 12, 1996), Exec. Order No. 13026 (Nov. 15, 1996) and Exec. Order No. 13118 (Mar. 31, 1999)

-No alternate Board member shall be designated, but the acting **SecDef** or Deputy Secretary may serve in lieu of **SecDef**  
-Board responsible for interagency dispute resolution concerning export license applications; Board meets only when necessary to resolve dispute

**9. Board of Directors, National Veterans Business Development Corporation, nonvoting ex officio member**

-15 U.S.C. §657c

**10. National Advisory Committee on Semiconductors, member**

-15 U.S.C. §4632

-**SecDef** or designee

-DDR&E advised that the Committee ceased activities in 1992

**11. Trade Policy Committee, member**

-Exec. Order No. 12188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (Jan 2, 1980), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. §2171 note

-**SecDef** may designate a subordinate officer at the **ASD-level** to go in his stead to meetings when he is unable to attend

**12. National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, ex officio member**

-20 U.S.C. §80

-DoD Historian advised that Board met once in 1980

**13. DoD Advisory Council on Dependent's Education, cochairman**

-20 U.S.C. §929

-**SecDef** or **SecDef** designee

**14. Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace, member**

-22 U.S.C. §4605

-**SecDef** may designate an DoD PAS official

**15. White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, member**

-Pub. L. No. 106-579 (36 U.S.C. §116 note)

-**SecDef** or designee

**16. Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, ex officio member**

-38 U.S.C. §542

-**SecDef** or **SecDef** designee (after consultation with DACOWITS)

-DACOWITS Military Director is **SecDef** designee

**17. Advisory Council on Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance, member**

-38 U.S.C. §1974

-DoDD1341.3, "Servicemen's Group Life Insurance," assigns the DoD Comptroller

responsibility for financial policy and ASD(FMP) responsibility for administrative policy of the SGLI Program  
-Council meets once a year

**18. Professional Certification and Licensure Advisory Committee, ex officio member**

-38 U.S.C. §3689

**19. Advisory Committee on Veterans Employment and Training, ex officio non-voting member**

-38 U.S.C. §4110

-Committee meets quarterly

**20. National Capital Planning Commission, ex officio member**

-40 U.S.C. §71a

-SecDef from time-to-time may designate an alternate to serve in his stead

-SecDef designee is Jerry Shiplett, Special Assistant to the Director, Real Estate and Facilities

**21. Interagency Council on the Homeless**

-42 U.S.C. §11312

-SecDef or designee

**22. Civilian Community Corps Advisory Board, member**

-42 U.S.C. §12623

**23. Corporation for National and Community Service, ex officio non-voting member**

-42 U.S.C. §12651a

**24. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, member**

-Exec. Order No. 13,122, 64 Fed. Reg. 29201 (May 25, 1999)

-Task Force terminates May 15, 2002 unless the Task Force reaches a consensus recommending continuation of activities

**25. Economic Adjustment Committee, Chairman (yearly rotating basis w/ Secretaries of Commerce and Labor) or member**

-Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 21, 1992)

-SecDef or designated principal deputy

-Director Office of Economic Adjustment (DUSD(IA&I)), serves as Committee Chair



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

11 AUG 01 PM 1:13

## INFO MEMO

August 1, 2001, 9:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *William J. Haynes II 8/1/01*

SUBJECT: Your July 16, 2001 memorandum styled "Categories"

- You forwarded to me Dov Zacheim's memo describing fiscal management constraints resulting from rules associated with appropriation accounts, and suggested we add to our Freedom to Manage package some requests for fiscal flexibility. (See Tabs A and B, respectively.)
- At Tab C is my memo giving Dov some suggestions for addressing these concerns in the short term. I am forwarding this to Ken Krieg (who is preparing for incorporation into our legislative package).

COORDINATION: None



11-L-0559/OSD/1940

U13304 / 01

July 16, 2001 5:21 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: **Dov ZAKHEIM**  
FROM: Donald **Rumsfeld** 

SUBJECT: Categories

Here is a memo **from** Dov Zakheim. I would think we ought to ask for a reduction in the number of appropriation accounts, an increase in the reprogramming and a provision for fiscal flexibility in the package. Let's add this to it.

Thanks.

Attach.

**7/9/01** Zakheim memo to **SecDef** re: Categories

**DHR:dh**  
**07160141**

11-L-0559/OSD/1941

INFO MEMO

Add.  
Ar 6 ch

-- July 9, 2001, 7:41 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Categories

- The number of Department of Defense (DOD) appropriation accounts has increased from 71 in fiscal year (FY) 1975 to 114 for fiscal year 2001.<sup>i</sup> Between fiscal years 1985 and 1995 the total number of accounts rose from 85 to 110, an increase of 29 percent. A smaller increase in appropriations occurred in the time period between FY 1975 and FY 1985, with an increase of 14 appropriations, or about a 20 percent increase. After FY 1995, there have been only 4 new appropriations added.”
- Statute (31 U.S.C 1532) prohibits transferring funds between appropriation accounts without explicit authority. In fiscal year 2001 the Congress provided general transfer authority of about \$2 billion. Historically, this amount has varied – from \$1.5 Billion to \$3.1 Billion. On average DOD has used approximately 62 percent of that authority.
- Reprogramming **rules** (i.e., rules that govern the transfer of funds within an appropriation) also limit the Department. These rules are longstanding agreements between the Department and the authorization and appropriation committees. It is common that before funds can be shifted from one project to another, all four committees must act to approve the reprogramming.
- Past DOD efforts to seek agreement from Congress to adjust reprogramming thresholds were largely unsuccessful, probably because Congress feared a loss of control or visibility with respect to **the** use of appropriated funds. It may be possible

to convince Congress to provide greater fiscal latitude if the Department can demonstrate **that** such flexibility would result in better management, greater efficiency and thus true reform..

- We may want to consider including a provision on fiscal flexibilities in the legislative package that Jim Haynes is developing for fast track. In addition, the FY 2003 program and budget cycle provides an excellent opportunity to examine our account structure. In the interim, we can certainly broach the topic of reprogramming thresholds with the committees. They may be more receptive to an appeal for relief once you have outlined your management goals in testimony.

Prepared By: **Tina Jonas, 703/614- 1529**

COORDINATION: None

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'Appropriations represent legal authority granted by Congress to incur obligations and to make disbursements for the purposes, during the time periods, and up to the amount limitations, specified in appropriations acts. The Treasury Department uses account symbols to identify the agency responsible for the appropriation account, the period of **availability** of the appropriation, and the specific fund classification.

<sup>ii</sup> The most significant increase was in the Operation and Maintenance Title, which increased from- 16 to 29 appropriations. The increase in the number of appropriations in the Procurement Title was from 14 to 17, the Military Construction Title, from 9 to 14, and the Family Housing Title from 4 to **8**. Significant increases in the number of appropriations were also seen in the Receipt Account and Trust Funds areas, from 8 to 28.

TO: Rudy de Leon

CC: Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: April 9, 2001

SUBJECT: Categories

*Cater / Chron*

*DL*

Is it possible you could get me the numbers of categories of spending that we have to track for the Congress and how that number has changed since 1975 or some other benchmark?

I think that would indicate some of the lack of flexibility that exists where we've got to get approval to shift between categories. If we know the number of categories now, and the number of categories during some prior periods, it ought to help make the point.

DHR/azn  
040901.13

<i>O&amp;M / Pay</i>	<i>1 year</i>
<i>R&amp;D</i>	<i>2 year</i>
<i>Procurement</i>	<i>3 year</i>
<i>Shipbuilding</i>	<i>5 year</i>



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

AUG 01 2001

GENERAL COUNSEL

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Categories

Regarding Dov's memo to the Secretary on spending categories, and the Secretary's forwarding memo to me suggesting we seek a reduction in the number of appropriation accounts, an increase in "the reprogramming," and a provision for "fiscal flexibility," I would recommend the following course of action:

- In preparing the FY 03 budget request, Comptroller should work with OMB to identify accounts, or formal subdivisions of accounts, that can be eliminated, either by subsuming appropriations within other existing appropriations, or by combining related appropriations into new, broader appropriations.
- Since the existing reprogramming process is basically a matter of accommodation based on understandings previously reached between the Department and our oversight committees, and our willingness to observe reprogramming "requirements" established from time to time by one or more of the committees, Comptroller and LA should initiate a dialogue with our oversight committees with a view to making the reprogramming process more responsive to our needs.
- Comptroller should identify the kinds of fiscal flexibility the Department needs to accomplish its mission in a more timely and efficient manner. Some initiatives would probably best be advanced in conjunction with the preparation and submission of the 03 budget (for example, a proposal to extend the life of various appropriations; e.g., from 1-year to 2-years for O&M, or from multi-year to no-year for investment accounts). Other proposals may be better suited for authorizing legislation. Once you have identified your requirements, my staff is prepared to work with your offices to assist with the crafting of any legislation that may be required.

  
William J. Haynes II



11-L-0559/OSD/1945



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2001 AUG 25 11:11:07

INFO MEMO

August 14, 2001, 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 8/15/01*  
SUBJECT: Frequent Flier Legislation

248.7

- This replies to your request for information regarding the InsideDefense.com article "Bush Administration Proposal Would Let Service Members Keep Frequent Flier Miles" at Tab A.
- The article accurately summarizes the proposed legislation (Tab B). If enacted, the federal government would adopt the commercial business practice of allowing travelers to retain for their personal use frequent flier programs, seat upgrades, travel club access and similar promotional benefits accrued during official travel.
- If enacted, the proposal would affect all military personnel, civilian employees and members of the Foreign Service. It has wide support throughout the Executive Branch.
- The U.S. Transportation Command proposed this legislative item. OMB has the legislation on hold for possible inclusion in an Executive Branch-wide Freedom to Manage legislative proposal. The proposal has not been submitted to Congress.
- The House of Representatives has passed a similar bill (H.R. 2456). However, the House bill includes only civilian employees; it does not include either military personnel or members of the foreign service. H.R. 2456 is pending before the Senate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk; (b)(6)

144060



July 5, 2001 11:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Frequent Flier Miles

What's this about frequent flier miles? Please let me know.

DHR:cd  
070501-10

**AIDS in African armed forces, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which brings regional military and civilian leaders together.**

In Guinea, the United States has supplied more than \$1 million of communications equipment, spare parts and meals to its army. A multimillion-dollar aid package is under consideration, Pentagon officials said.

Many African armed forces, faced with sharp budget cutbacks and the end of Cold War largess, welcome the U.S. training and the equipment that often goes with it.

Ghana, participating in both Focus Relief and ACRI, is one of the most enthusiastic countries about the new military ties. In an interview, Defense Minister Kwame Addo-Kufuor said his troops received advanced equipment and "orientation toward democratic traditions and a better appreciation of the democratic way of life."

About 300 of the 800 soldiers being trained here come from the 64th Battalion, known for its loyalty to former president Jerry Rawlings, who led two coups, governed the country for 20 years and is widely accused of using the unit to suppress dissent and violate human rights. Rawlings left office in January.

None of the units trained in either Focus Relief or ACRI has been accused of human rights abuses. But human rights groups argue that training armies that have histories of brutality must include effective vetting of participants and have a strong focus on human rights and humanitarian law.

Janet Fleischman, Africa director of Human Rights Watch, said human rights training and vetting are the "weakest link" in the Focus Relief program. "If done right, with strong human rights vetting, humanitarian law instruction and a clear mechanism for monitoring and accountability, this could be a new model," she said. "But we haven't seen if they are going to give sufficient emphasis to these fields to make it work."

Lt. Col. Glover said troops he trains receive seven hours of human rights instruction,

with additional training incorporated into other exercises.

A senior Pentagon official said "all participating individuals are vetted for human rights violations." But in the cases of Nigeria and Ghana, where until recently the United States has had scant military contact, vetting is limited to checking the names of training candidates against lists of suspected rights abusers kept by the State Department, Defense Department or intelligence agencies.

"We don't really know who these guys are or where they come from," acknowledged a U.S. official in the region. "We have very little to match the names against because we haven't worked with this army for decades."

InsideDefense.com  
JUL 2, 2001

**6. Bush Administration Proposal Would Let Service Members Keep Frequent Flier Miles**

The Bush administration will send to Congress this week proposed legislation that allows service members to keep certain promotional items they receive from private companies when traveling on official business, such as airline frequent flier miles.

The proposed legislation would lift existing restrictions on the use of items such as "frequent travel programs, upgrades, and access to carrier clubs or facilities" offered by major airlines. "Such items must be obtained under the same terms as provided the general public and must be at no additional cost," according to the legislation, a copy of which was obtained by Inside the Pentagon.

"Normally, items of value received by military members pursuant to official duty belong to the government," states a "sectional analysis" of the bill approved by the administration. "Where transportation has been obtained for the military member by the government, the ability to obtain private gain through the use of one's official position is extremely limited. Normally, promotional items are of little intrinsic value and the overall

costs to the government from tracking, accounting for, and processing such items exceeds all benefits received."

In addition to those affecting military personnel, the proposed legislation would lift restrictions on the use of such promotional items by civilian federal government employees and Foreign Service members.

The bill repeals a section of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 dealing with General Services Administration guidelines that encourage "the use of frequent traveler programs to realize cost savings for Official travel," the analysis states.

The administration views its proposal as a way to ease restrictions on official government travel and make federal employment more attractive by letting officials keep for their own use frequent flier miles and other promotional benefits they accrue while on government-paid travel. The measure allows government entities to adopt a practice often employed by private industry to reward those whose jobs that require extensive travel, some proponents of the legislation say.

"The administrative expense and labor-intensive burden of accounting for unsolicited items of little intrinsic value is inconsistent with efforts by the federal government to adapt to commercial practices where possible," according to the sectional analysis.

Contracts negotiated by the General Services Administration and travel arranged by U.S. Transportation Command "represent the lowest cost fares for the government . . . [and] despite repeated requests, transportation providers will not make the nominal costs of promotional items directly transferable to the government nor will they reduce the cost of transportation by such amounts," it adds. Moreover, the federal government to date has been unable to find a way "to effectively utilize" frequent flier miles benefits.

The legislative proposal would have no impact on the use of the Government Travel Card and would not increase the government's budgetary

requirements, the analysis states.

— Keith J. Costa

European Stars and Sniper  
July 3, 2001

Pg. 3

**7. Military Wants Funds To Beef Up Security Stateside**

By Pauline Jelinek, The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — In April, someone stole machines used to make military identification cards from an Army building in Washington. In May, it was plastic explosives and land mines from a Navy base in California.

While American military posts overseas get the lion's share of the attention and money in fight off possible terrorist attacks, officials are taking a closer look at how secure stateside bases are as well. Commanders from coast to coast say they need more people and money to protect troops and their families from what some believe is an inevitable attack on U.S. soil.

"In the battle for anti-terrorism dollars, it is difficult for stateside bases to compete," said Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Kane of the 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base in California.

"We can't afford to sit on our hands and wait to see if one of our domestic bases is attacked, and then face the issue," said Rep. Jim Turner, D-Texas, a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

"Numerous potential vulnerabilities" at U.S. bases have been found in a General Accounting Office study commissioned by the committee's Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism and due to be completed this summer, lawmakers said. At a recent closed-door session, GAO researchers reportedly told panel members preliminarily that most of the problems could be fixed without more money, but rather with changes in how troops operate.

The study was requested after October's bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, an attack that killed 17 sailors and nearly sunk the warship. The GAO,

**SEC. \_\_\_\_ . PROMOTIONAL ITEMS RECEIVED PURSUANT TO OFFICIAL TRAVEL.**

(a) **AMENDMENT TO TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCES.**—Section 404 of title 37, United States Code, is amended-

(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and

(2) by inserting **after** subsection (i) the following new subsection:

**"(j)** Promotional items a member receives as a consequence of travel paid by the United States, or accepted under the provisions of section 1353 of title 31, United States Code, may be retained by the member. Promotional items include but are not limited to frequent travel programs, upgrades, and access to carrier clubs or facilities. Such items must be obtained under the same terms as provided the general public and must be at no additional cost."

(b) **AMENDMENT TO PER DIEM ALLOWANCES.**—Section 5702 of title 5, United States Code, is amended-

(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c):

**"(c)** Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (d), promotional items an employee (including justices and judges) receives as a consequence of travel paid by the United States, or accepted pursuant to the provisions of section 1353 of title 31, United States Code, may be retained by the employee. Promotional items include but are not limited to frequent travel programs, upgrades, and access to carrier clubs or facilities. Such items must be obtained under the same terms as provided the general public and must be at no additional cost."

(c) **AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN SERVICE &T.**-Section 901 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4081) is amended-

1 (1) by inserting "(a)," before "The Secretary";

2 (2) by inserting a new subsection (b) as follows:

3 "(b) Promotional items a member of the Service receives as a consequence of travel paid  
4 by the United States, or accepted pursuant to the provisions of section 1353 of title 31, United  
5 States Code, may be retained by the member. Promotional items include but are not limited to  
6 frequent travel programs, upgrades, and access to carrier clubs or facilities. Such items must be  
7 obtained under the same terms as provided the general public and must be at no additional cost."

8 (d) REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON THE USE OF TRAVEL AWARDS.-Section 6008 of the  
9 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355; 108 Stat. 3367) is repealed.

#### Sectional Analysis

Section (a) of this proposal would amend section 404 of title 37, United States Code. This section authorizes military members receiving promotional items while traveling pursuant to government procured travel to retain such items. Normally items of value received by military members pursuant to official duty belong to the government. However, where the transportation has been obtained for the military member by the government, the ability to obtain private gain through the use of one's official position is extremely limited. Normally, promotional items are of little intrinsic value and the overall costs to the government from tracking, accounting for, and processing such items exceeds all benefits received. Guidance would be provided to the members through implementing regulations.

Section (b) would amend title 5, United States Code, section 5702 to provide the same treatment for civilian employees of the U.S. Government.

Section (c) amends section 901 of the Foreign Service Act to provide similar treatment of members of the Foreign Service.

Section (d) would repeal section 6008 of Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. That provision required the Administrator of General Services Administration to issue guidelines to ensure that agencies promoted and encouraged the use of frequent traveler programs to realize cost savings for official travel,

The administrative expense and labor intensive burden of accounting for unsolicited items of little intrinsic value is inconsistent with the efforts by the Federal Government to adapt

**to commercial practices where possible. Federal supply** schedule contracts negotiated by GSA and transportation arranged by the United States Transportation Command represent the lowest cost fares for the Government that can be obtained through the acquisition process. Despite repeated requests, transportation providers will not make the nominal costs of promotional items directly transferable to the government nor will they reduce the cost of transportation by such amounts. Although the government has expended significant effort on programs to use frequent flyer miles, the government has not been able to effectively utilize these benefits. The proposal would have no impact on the use of the Government Travel Card,

If enacted, this proposal will not increase the budgetary requirements of the Federal government.

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: Patriot Missiles

I just read this note on Patriot missile part fraud.

My instinct is that you ought to see if we can't stop doing business with that outfit completely. That's just terrible and the penalty is not anywhere near enough to match the crime. If we can't stop doing business with them completely legally, then we ought to go to Congress and get legislation that let's us do it.

Thank you.

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*11/15*

DHR/azn  
110501.01  
Attach. Lieberman Memo 11/1/01 U18096

*Response Attached*

Larry Di Rita

U14662 0 2

11-L-0559/OSD/1952

*COMPLETE 12/24/01*

*471.94*

*12/17*

*5 Nov 01*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1 600  
**ACTION MEMO**

SECRET

2001 DEC 14 PM 12:47

December 5, 2001, 10:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, GENERAL COUNSEL  
SUBJECT: ANGHEL Laboratories, Incorporated

*William J. Haynes II* 12/5/01

- You asked whether DoD could stop doing business with ANGHEL Laboratories, Inc. (ALI). ALI pled guilty to making a false statement in 1995 regarding its failure to comply with quality control testing procedures for Patriot missile parts (Tab A).
- The courts have held that suspension and debarment must be designed to protect the government's *present interests* in contracting with responsible parties and that a company must be afforded specific procedural safeguards.
- The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that debarments should "generally" not exceed three years, but there is no limit on the amount of time a debarment may last. The government may impose longer periods in "egregious circumstances that present an unusual threat to the government's business interests."
- Because the indictment concerns the Patriot, the Army has taken the lead in investigating the matter. At this time, the Army does not believe that it has sufficient facts upon which to determine whether ALI should be suspended or debarred.
- You could assume decisionmaking responsibility for the ALI case and determine whether it should be suspended or debarred, and for how long. I do not recommend this course of action, as it could require a significant amount of your time and could create the impression that YOU singled ALI out for special adverse treatment.
- You also asked whether DoD should request additional statutory authority to permit us to stop doing business with companies like ALI permanently. A significant risk of asking for additional statutory authority is that Congress could be tempted to limit DoD's discretion. I believe that our authority is fully adequate and recommend against pursuing legislation.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef initial below to permit the Army to decide concerning suspension and debarment of ALI.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>



U19442 / 01

*Rumsfeld*  
1346

November 6, 2001 4:13 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,  
SUBJECT: Personal Security Detail

38001

I just read your memo of November 2 to the Deputy Secretary. I appreciate your prompt assistance in that matter, given the threat report that the President provided me.

My recommendation is that the personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld be discontinued promptly, if that particular threat has been investigated and deemed not to be a serious problem.

Second, I would appreciate it if I could be advised as to what I should reimburse the government for this service in the future if I decide to use it at a time when the government deems that there is not sufficient threat.

Alternatively, you could provide me with some information as to how I could hire the appropriate security myself for Mrs. Rumsfeld in the event I feel it is necessary.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/02/01 GC memo to DepSecDef

DHR:dh  
110601-10

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

6 Nov 01

U14672 02



SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV - 5 2001

ACTION MEMO

November 2, 2001, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 11/2/01*

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detail

(b)(6)  
*SECURE A  
PROF. THREAT  
ASSESSMENT  
PER PAR. D.  
RECOMMENDATION*

*11/4*

- Earlier today just as the Secretary departed, I learned of very recent suspicious and troubling activity in the immediate vicinity of the Secretary's home, punctuating the already significant risk to him and Mrs. Rumsfeld, reflected in various reports of which I believe you are at least partially aware.
- Knowing that his personal security detail would travel with him, the Secretary was appropriately concerned about the safety of Mrs. Rumsfeld. The Secretary was unsure of the means of protecting her, and wondered whether he should send her elsewhere, or contract for private security services.
- I advised the Secretary then that under these circumstances personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld is appropriate and lawful, and should be provided by the Department in his absence. I advised him that I would analyze the matter further, and ensure that Mrs. Rumsfeld's safety was assured in complete accord with applicable procedures. In particular, I assured him that if Departmental resources are not appropriate, then I would advise him on the method for reimbursing the Department from his personal funds. I so informed the Secretary's senior military assistant.
- As you know, the Department provides the Secretary personal security, including a driver and transportation, as a critical component of the effective functioning of the Department in support of the President's responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and of the Secretary's responsibilities provided in part by the laws of the United States.
- Although there is no express statutory authority for the Department of Defense to provide personal security details, the Secretary's inherent authority as the head of the Department provides sufficient legal basis to authorize such details in response to credible threats as determined by appropriate officials.



- Personal security details provided by the Department should be authorized only for personnel connected with the Department and only for threats associated with the missions and functions of the Department. I am aware of at least one instance during the last administration in which personal security protection was authorized for the spouse of the Secretary.
- Upon further consideration, it remains my opinion as chief legal officer of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. section 140 that personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld is appropriate and lawful under these circumstances. It is my opinion that under these circumstances Mrs. Rumsfeld may be considered to be connected to the Department and a threat to her safety may reasonably be assumed to be associated with Secretary Rumsfeld's official duties.
- As this particular instance involves the Secretary's immediate family, I recommend that you confirm that the detail should continue, provided you agree with me in your independent judgment that it is appropriate. I also recommend that you order a professional threat analysis, and modify the protective services supplied in accordance with the results of that analysis.

RECOMMENDATION: That you confirm the continuance of the personal security detail for Mrs. Rumsfeld with appropriate modification following a professional threat analysis; and that you order the professional threat analysis, by initialing below. (If you confirm, the Secretary's senior military assistant will secure the professional threat analysis.)

PW 11/03/01  
Confirmed

\_\_\_\_\_ Not Confirmed

\_\_\_\_\_ See Me

COORDINATION: NONE

Acad 01/14  
0920

November 10, 2001 12:07 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joyce on WETA Board

*Responde 13 Nov  
a Howard*

*020 SD*

Jim, as quickly as you can, please check and see if there is any legal reason or even perception reason why Joyce should not go on the board of WETA, the public television station in Washington, DC?

Torie, do you have any sense of this? Is this a good idea or a bad idea? I think you talked to Joyce about it, and Joyce would be replacing you. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111001-1

Please respond by

*9 11/14*

*16 Nov 01*

U14690 02



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1 600

INFO MEMO

November 13, 2001 (5:26PM)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 11/13/01*

SUBJECT: Joyce Rumsfeld Serving On WETA Board of Directors

- You asked if I had any concerns about your wife accepting a position on the board of directors of **WETA**, a local public television station. I understand she will not be compensated.
- **WETA** is not a DoD contractor. However, it may request interviews and information from you or this Department.
- Although there is no <sup>apparent</sup> potential for a conflict of interest, a Government-wide regulation prohibits you from taking action in matters affecting the financial interests of **WETA** in which a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts would question your impartiality.
- I doubt that matters such as requests for interviews or information would meet this test, and, therefore, offer no objection to your wife accepting this position. If such official matters should arise affecting **WETA**, we can disqualify you from involvement or seek a waiver.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by Steve Epstein,

(b)(6)

*Col Newbourn -  
Original to  
Sec Def  
cc to you.*

*Sharon  
11/14*



TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: September 6, 2001

11-0559/OSD/1959  
U15130 / 01

SUBJECT:

Ted Stevens says there have been many bases closed in Alaska, and none of them under a base closing act, or a BRAC. He wonders why we just don't close some.

What's the answer?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
090601.06

9/11

To: GC

Please prep response for SecDef  
Thanks.

D. Rita

Copy Back to me.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2001 OCT 30 10 02 32

112  
PENNS

The Honorable Ted Stevens  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 205 10

Dear Senator Stevens,

I write to respond to your recent suggestion to the Secretary that the Department should close military bases, as it did in the past in Alaska, outside of any Base Closure and Realignment Act (BRAC).

The Department has not effectuated any substantial base closings in Alaska outside of an authorized BRAC since 1977, when Congress enacted Section 2687 of title 10, United States Code. Through Section 2687, Congress restricted the Secretary's authority to close and realign any military installation at which 300 or more civilians are employed. Prior to 1977, the Department did close a number of installations in Alaska.

523.3

I trust this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

  
William J. Haynes II

(659 01)





GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1 600

RECEIVED  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 OCT 16 PM 1:41

## INFO MEMO

October 15, 2001, 2:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH 10/15/01*

SUBJECT: Declaration of War

- On October 1, you asked Steve Cambone and me to look at a September 12 e-mail from Newt Gingrich to you, the White House and OMB and advise you on what we should do about it (Tab A).

- Mr. Gingrich argued that anything less than a declaration of war would cripple the administration. The administration considered all arguments pro and con regarding a declaration of war during the first week after the terrorist attacks. I'm sure Mr. Gingrich's views were among those considered.

- The President has broad authority, without a declaration of war, to use force in the exercise of the right of self-defense, including whatever measures may be necessary to defeat terrorists and states that support them.

- At present, the absence of a declaration of war is not adversely affecting our efforts to fight terrorism.

- We have looked for laws that are triggered only by a declaration of war. None provided authority beyond that already available to the President.

- I see no advantage in the President's requesting a declaration of war at this time.

RECOMMENDATION. That you take no action regarding Mr. Gingrich's e-mail.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Jim Schwenk (b)(6)

*cc: Steve Cambone*



11-L-0559/OSD/1961

U17365 /01

October 1, 2001 8:37 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Declaration of War

Please look at this note **from** Newt **Gingrich**. What do you think we ought to do about it?

**Thanks.**

Attach.  
9/12/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
100101-7

11-L-0559/OSD/1962

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, September 12, 2001 7:44 AM

To: (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) @omb.eop.gov

cc: (b)(6)

Subject: declare war

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
OCT -1 2001

the current anger as exhibited in the Post op ed pages will last for about a week, then the forces of bureaucracy and legality will begin to equivocate and avoid the directed passions of changing history  
this week is an historic but very brief moment  
we MUST declare war and turn the current situatuion into a military national security problem before it becomes a criminal justice problem  
the American people want retribution and victory (something Jim Baker said on tv last night), the President said last night we were at war and must get retribution (something George Schultz reinforced on tv last night)  
this MUST be captured in a declaration of war and the passage of a series of very decisive bills liberating the CIA, funding intelligence and defense and **establishing** a legal framework to go to the **UNited** Nations and the World  
read Wes Clark's Waging Modern War and you will see how the lawyers crippled the campaign

THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS MOMENT, ANYTHING LESS THAN A **DECLARATION** OF WAR WILL CRIPPLE THIS **ADMINSITRATION** AS WE PROCEED  
newt

(D)

cc LD  
Adm. Grant-stani



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

October 29, 2001, 7:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH 10/29/01*

SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

- Responding to my memo of October 22, 2001 (Tab A), you asked (Tab B) for a revised definition of terrorism. In particular, you asked me to include “the idea of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants and innocents.”
- Here’s another try:

Terrorism – The use or threatened use of unlawful violence against civilians, noncombatants, or other innocents, calculated to cause fear or to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies, and motivated by political, religious, or ideological goals.

- Three notes:

- (1) Notwithstanding that you used “premeditated” in your note, I prefer “calculated.”
- (2) We need to be mindful of Marine Barracks Beirut, Khobar Towers, USS COLE, and Pentagon-like attacks. Therefore, the above definition includes “or other innocents” to cover the fact that terrorism includes an attack on an otherwise “military” objective when it is for the purpose of striking fear into society rather than engaging in lawful armed conflict.
- (3) I’m not sure I like including the motivation in the definition. I have the same concern about “hate” crimes.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Chuck Allen,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/1964

U17970 /01



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 23 2001

INFO MEMO

October 22, 2001, 8:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 10/22/01*



SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

- You asked for a good definition of terrorism and some elaboration as to what it is and what it isn't.
- One definition is found both in DoD Directive 2000.12 (DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program) and Joint Publication 1-02:
  - Terrorism – The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
- The definitions of terrorism found in the U.S. Code emphasize the innocent, noncombatant objects of terrorism. Examples:
  - “Annual Country Reports on Terrorism” (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)): “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”
  - The U.S. Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. 3077) defines “act of terrorism” as “an activity that -- (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.”
- “Terrorism” is not usually understood to mean:
  - Random acts of violence without deliberate political objectives.



11-L-0559/OSD/1965

-- Actions by states using conventional governmental organs, even if the state targets innocents or uses violence with the intent of causing fear in target groups. Conventional wisdom would treat such acts as state aggression rather than terrorism.

- “Terrorism” would be a fair name for:

-- Acts by non-state actors against otherwise “military” objectives such as **Khobar Towers** or the Pentagon. Terrorists primarily attack targets that would be forbidden to states in armed conflict. But when terrorists attack a military or police target, their acts are still terrorist with the purpose of striking fear into society rather than defeating military forces.

-- Politically motivated violence by non-state actors wrongly claiming to be legitimately waging war for religious purposes or as “freedom fighters.” Senator Scoop Jackson’s 1981 statement in the latter context remains a valid response to Al-Qaeda or others who would claim their actions are not terrorism:

The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with the acts of terrorists.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Chuck Allen,

(b)(6)

October 15, 2001 1:41 PM

TO: Jim Haynes


FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Definition

Please give me a good definition for terrorism and some elaboration as to what it is and what it isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101501-40

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Larry Di Rita". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Larry Di Rita

10/22

October 23, 2001 10:56 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

Please give me a specific definition of terrorism that includes the first definition you have in the second bullet, but also includes the idea of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants and innocents.

Please fashion it in a single paragraph so I can use it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/22/01 GC info memo to **SecDef** re: Definition of Terrorism

DHR:dh  
102301-18

11-L-0559/OSD/1968



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1 600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

OCT 23 2001

October 22, 2001, 8:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

*William J. Haynes II*  
*10/22/01*



SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

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COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Chuck Allen, (b)(6)

October 15, 2001 1:41 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Definition

Please give me a good definition for terrorism and some elaboration as to what it is and what it isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101501-40



Larry Di Rita

10/22

October 23, 2001 10:56 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

Please give me a specific definition of terrorism that includes the **first** definition you have in the second bullet, but also includes the idea of premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants and innocents.

Please fashion it in a single paragraph so I can use it.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/22/01 GC info memo to **SecDef** re: Definition of Terrorism

DHR:dh  
102301-18

000.5

23 OCT 01

017-1352



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

OCT 23 2001

October 22, 2001, 8:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

*W. Haynes II*  
*10/22/01*



SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

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- The definitions of terrorism found in the U.S. Code emphasize the innocent, noncombatant objects of terrorism. Examples:

-- “Annual Country Reports on Terrorism” (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)): “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”

-- The U.S. Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. 3077) defines “act of terrorism” as “an activity that -- (A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.”

- “Terrorism” is not usually understood to mean:

-- Random acts of violence without deliberate political objectives.



-- Actions by states using conventional governmental organs, even if the state targets innocents or uses violence with the intent of causing fear in target groups. Conventional wisdom would treat such acts as state aggression rather than terrorism.

- "Terrorism" would be a fair name for:

-- Acts by non-state actors against otherwise "military" objectives such as Khobar Towers or the Pentagon. Terrorists primarily attack targets that would be forbidden to states in armed conflict. But when terrorists attack a military or police target, their acts are still terrorist with the purpose of striking fear into society rather than defeating military forces.

-- Politically motivated violence by non-state actors wrongly claiming to be legitimately waging war for religious purposes or as "freedom fighters." Senator Scoop Jackson's 1981 statement in the latter context remains a valid response to Al-Qaeda or others who would claim their actions are not terrorism:

The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with the acts of terrorists.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Chuck Allen,

(b)(6)

October 15, 2001 1:41 PM

TO: Jim Haynes


FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Definition

Please give me a good definition for terrorism and some elaboration as to what it is and what it isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101501-40



Larry Di Rita

10/22



GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

**INFO MEMO**

October 26, 2001 (9:51AM)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

*WJ Haynes 10/27/01*

SUBJECT: Sports Tickets

- You asked if you could give away to people inside the Pentagon tickets to Wizards and Redskins games that you have purchased with your personal funds.
- There are no legal prohibitions for such gifts since they would be to DoD employees who are not superior to you.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by Steve Epstein

(b)(6)

October 25, 2001 8:39 AM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>D</sup>

SUBJECT: \* Sports Tickets

I have Redskins and Wizard tickets. There is no problem if I give them away to people inside the Pentagon, is there?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102501-10

.....  
Please respond by

10/30

October 25, 2001 8:39 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>17</sup>  
SUBJECT: \* Sports Tickets

005

I have Redskins and Wizard tickets. There is no problem if I give them away to people inside the Pentagon, is there?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102501-10



Please respond by 10/30

25 OCT 01



GENERAL COUNSEL

**GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

**INFO MEMO**

October 26, 2001 (9:51AM)

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COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by Steve Epstein

(b)(6)



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

CONFIDENTIAL  
NOV 13 2001 11:30 AM

INFO MEMO

November 13, 2001, 11:30 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 11/17/01*

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detail

- In my memorandum of November 2, 2001, I advised the Deputy Secretary that the Department could lawfully provide personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld given the current threat reports. Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary has directed, and your security team has initiated, an assessment of the current threats and security requirements for protection of Mrs. Rumsfeld. Under the current circumstances of National Emergency, until our threat analysis indicates otherwise, it is lawful for the Department to provide appropriate protection for Mrs. Rumsfeld in her capacity as the spouse of the Secretary of Defense. It is my understanding that such personal protection is currently being provided for some immediate family members of your counterparts on the National Security team.
- (b)(6) your assistant for personal security, has prepared the attached Interim Personal Security Assessment recommending continued protection for Mrs. Rumsfeld at this time. Should the Department determine through ongoing threat analyses that the threat conditions have subsided, such that Mrs. Rumsfeld no longer requires Departmental protection, the Department would not be authorized to provide such services to your family on a reimbursable basis. Should you wish to consider private security firms, we have discussed this matter with (b)(6) and he is prepared to assist you with information on private security arrangements for Mrs. Rumsfeld. Currently, however, it remains lawful and in the best interests of the Department to provide such protection until the threat environment changes favorably.

Attachment

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by Bill Brazis, WHS/OGC, (b)(6)

*I will stay in touch with your security officers on this, and will look into reimbursement.  
WJ Haynes 11/17/01*



U18855 /01

13 Nov 2001

FOR: OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

FROM: (b)(6) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Personal Security

SUBJECT: Interim Personal Security Assessment Overview

**Purpose:**

To assess the current personal security threat to family members of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld.

**Assessment:**

Few positions in the U.S. Government are as central to the execution of U.S. foreign policy and as identifiable with specific strategic policy objectives as is the Secretary of Defense. Our current environment poses distinct potential security concerns for high-profile figures who may become the focus of terrorist, factional, or delusional targeting by subjects who aspire to attack a symbol of U.S. policy. In our response to the recent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the number of terrorist threats to U.S. interests has increased significantly. Secretary Rumsfeld has emerged as a key administration spokesman and symbol for the execution of actions in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. He has received extensive worldwide news coverage and is evolving into a highly prolific and recognizable figure. The consensus of intelligence and law enforcement agencies is that the current global threat environment requires robust security precautions.

One specific incident which occurred on 31 Oct 2001 in the vicinity of Secretary Rumsfeld's residence is still under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and has not been completed. The nature of this incident and its' implications causes concern which could directly impact on the safety of Mrs. Rumsfeld.

There have been no other recent specific, credible threats that we are aware of directed against the current Secretary of Defense, his office, nor any of his immediate family members. Past, credible threats have been documented against his predecessor, Former Secretary Cohen, and the position of the Secretary of Defense.

However, in light of the events of 11 Sep 2001 and the emergence of Secretary Rumsfeld as a focus and leading spokesman for the ongoing U.S. response to terrorism, a heightened, general threat environment exists which warrants elevated security concerns for the Secretary. As evidenced in the attacks of 11 Sep 2001 and other intelligence, international extremist groups have an

11-L-0559/OSD/1981

established presence in the United States that could be used to carry out a terrorist operation. It is generally recognized that the key Cabinet secretaries are afforded protection and this in itself, could provide a certain level of deterrence against potential attackers. Conversely, family members of these principals could potentially be identified and developed as "softer" targets and threats to their safety may reasonably be assumed to be associated with the principal's official duties. Previously, during periods of heightened threat conditions, security was provided to the spouses of the Former Secretary Cheney and Secretary Cohen.

**Coordination:**

In the development of this assessment, coordination was affected with the following agencies: the United States Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Capitol Police, Joint Terrorism Operation's Center, and the Army Terrorist Operation's Intelligence Center.


No specific information was developed involving threats against the Secretary of Defense or his family members. However, all agencies and appropriate security details noted the general heightened threat conditions and the requirement for more robust security safeguards. It was confirmed that security is currently being provided to two other spouses of cabinet level officials (Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence) similar to the posture we're currently providing Mrs. Rumsfeld. The coverage was initiated in wake of the 11 Sep attacks, based on heightened security concerns, not on any specific threat to the spouse.

**Recommendation:**

That appropriate security coverage continue for Mrs. Rumsfeld until the satisfactory conclusion of the 31 Oct investigation by the FBI, and until the current heightened threat condition subsides. Following the results of the FBI investigation, recommend that a continuous, ongoing, intelligence assessment be sustained and that the level of security afforded Mrs Rumsfeld be adjusted commensurate with the threat environment.

November 6, 2001 4:13 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detail

I just read your memo of November 2 to the Deputy Secretary. I appreciate your prompt assistance in that matter, given the threat report that the President provided me.

My recommendation is that the personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld be discontinued promptly, if that particular threat has been investigated and deemed not to be a serious problem.

Second, I would appreciate it if I could be advised as to what I should reimburse the government for this service in the future if I decide to use it at a time when the government deems that there is not sufficient threat.

Alternatively, you could provide me with some information as to how I could hire the appropriate security myself for Mrs. Rumsfeld in the event I feel it is necessary.

**Thanks.**

Attach.

11/02/01 GC memo to DepSecDef

DHR:dh  
110601-10

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/1983



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

NOV - 6 2001

**ACTION MEMO**

November 2, 2001, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 11/2/01*

SUBJECT: Personal Security Detail

(b)(6)

*SECURE  
PROF. THQ  
ASSESSMENT  
PER PAR.  
RECOMMENDATION*

- Earlier today just as the Secretary departed, I learned of very recent **suspicious** and troubling activity in the immediate vicinity of the Secretary's home, punctuating the already significant risk to him and Mrs. **Rumsfeld**, reflected in various reports of which I believe you are at least partially aware.
- Knowing that his personal security detail would travel with him, the Secretary was appropriately concerned about the safety of Mrs. **Rumsfeld**. The Secretary was unsure of the means of protecting her, and wondered whether he should send her elsewhere, or contract for private security services.
- I advised the Secretary then that under these circumstances **personal** security for Mrs. Rumsfeld is appropriate and lawful, and should be provided by the Department in his absence. I advised him that I would analyze the matter **further**, and ensure that Mrs. Rumsfeld's safety was assured in complete accord with applicable procedures. In particular, I assured him **that** if **Departmental** resources are not appropriate, then I would advise him on the method for reimbursing the Department **from** his personal **funds**. I so informed the Secretary's senior military assistant.
- As you know, the Department provides the Secretary personal security, including a driver and transportation, as a critical component of the effective functioning of the Department in support of the President's responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and **of** the Secretary's responsibilities provided in part by the laws of the United States.
- Although there is no express statutory authority for the Department of Defense to provide personal security details, the Secretary's **inherent** authority as the head of the Department provides sufficient legal basis to authorize such details in response to credible threats as determined by appropriate officials.

- Personal security details provided by the Department should be authorized only for personnel **connected with the Department and only for threats associated** with the missions and functions of the Department. I am aware of at least one instance during the last administration in which personal security protection was authorized for the spouse of the Secretary.
- Upon further consideration, it remains my opinion as chief legal officer of the Department of Defense under 10 U.S.C. section 140 that personal security for Mrs. Rumsfeld is appropriate and lawful under these circumstances. It is my opinion that **under these circumstances Mrs. Rumsfeld may be considered to be** connected to the Department and a threat to her safety may reasonably be assumed to be associated with Secretary Rumsfeld's official duties.
- As this particular instance involves the Secretary's immediate family, I recommend that you confirm that the detail should continue, provided you agree with me in your independent judgment that it is appropriate. I also recommend that you order a professional threat analysis, and modify the protective services supplied in accordance with the results of that analysis.

RECOMMENDATION: That you confirm the continuance of the personal security detail for Mrs. Rumsfeld with appropriate modification following a professional threat analysis; and that you order the professional threat analysis, by initialing below. (If you confirm, the Secretary's senior military assistant will secure the professional threat analysis.)

PW 11/03/01  
Confirmed

\_\_\_\_\_ Not Confirmed

\_\_\_\_\_ See Me

COORDINATION: NONE



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRET

ACTION MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

2001 DEC 19 11 13:47

December 5, 2001, 10:00 A.M.  
DEC 20 2001

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, GENERAL COUNSEL  
SUBJECT: ANGHEL Laboratories, Incorporated

*William J. Haynes II* 12/5/01

471.99

- You asked whether DoD could stop doing business with ANGHEL Laboratories, Inc. (ALI). ALI pled guilty to making a false statement in 1995 regarding its failure to comply with quality control testing procedures for Patriot missile parts (Tab A).
- The courts have held that suspension and debarment must be designed to protect the government's *present interests* in contracting with responsible parties and that a company must be afforded specific procedural safeguards.
- The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that debarments should "generally not exceed three years, but there is no limit on the amount of time a debarment may last. The government may impose longer periods in "egregious circumstances that present an unusual threat to the government's business interests."
- Because the indictment concerns the Patriot, the Army has taken the lead in investigating the matter. At this time, the Army does not believe that it has sufficient facts upon which to determine whether ALI should be suspended or debarred.
- You could assume decisionmaking responsibility for the ALI case and determine whether it should be suspended or debarred, and for how long. I do not recommend this course of action, as it could require a significant amount of your time and could create the impression that you singled ALI out for special adverse treatment.
- You also asked whether DoD should request additional statutory authority to permit us to stop doing business with companies like ALI permanently. A significant risk of asking for additional statutory authority is that Congress could be tempted to limit DoD's discretion. I believe that our authority is fully adequate and recommend against pursuing legislation.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef initial below to permit the Army to decide concerning suspension and debarment of ALI.

Approved WJH Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_  
DEC 20 2001

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

5 Dec 01



TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Patriot Missiles**

I just read this note on Patriot missile part fraud.

My instinct is that you ought to see if we can't stop doing business with that outfit completely. That's just terrible and the penalty is not anywhere near enough to match the crime. If we can't stop doing business with them completely legally, then we ought to go to Congress and get legislation that let's us do it.

Thank you.

*Please respond by:* 11/15

DHR/azn  
110501.01  
Attach. Lieberman Memo 11/1/01 U 18096

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**DEC 20 2001**

*12/17*  
*Response Attached*  
**Larry Di Rita**

*12/19*



To Jim H-  
DoD should see if  
he can help doing  
business with them completely.

INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

01 01 2001 11:34

INFO MEMO

DA - If not, let's get legislation  
so we can

November 1, 2001, 11:00 a.m.

Larry Di Rita  
1/2

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, DoD

*Robert Lieberman*

SUBJECT: Patriot missile parts fraud

- On October 25, 2001 ANGHEL Laboratories, Rockaway, New Jersey, pled guilty to a criminal information charging the company with submitting false testing data. Company officials admitted falsifying testing data and concealing defective components, including switches for the fuse assemblies of the Patriot missile. None of the identified faulty parts were actually installed in the Patriot missile systems.
- ANGHEL is a production and testing facility owned by COMSAT Radiation Systems, Inc. which is owned by COMSAT Corporation, Bethesda, MD. ANGHEL is a subcontractor on multiple DoD contracts with the Army and Air Force to provide electronic parts for use in various military systems, including aircraft, satellites, and the Patriot.
- Because of the limited scope of the plea, ANGHEL faces a maximum of only 5 years probation and a fine of only \$500,000. Final sentencing has been set for February 5, 2002.
- DoD suspension and debarment action is under consideration by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency.
- This was a joint investigation with this office and the Military Departments.
- This matter was reported in New Jersey newspapers and could have national interest because of public familiarity with the Patriot.

Action

COORDINATION: NONE

cc: Secretary of the Army  
Secretary of the Air Force  
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) --  
General Counsel, DoD

Prepared By: Robert J. Lieberman, (703) 604-8300

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>11/1</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>RJL</i>
MA BUEGG	<i>JJ</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY - 3 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

020 JCS

Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e, state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices.

To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, I recommend you appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

I recommend you approve these procedures by signing the attached memorandum.

Attachment:  
As stated

3 MAY 01



W00546 01

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby designate the following officers to act as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the circumstances described in section 154 (e) of title 10, United States Code, during the period indicated in CY 2001 and in succeeding calendar years:

Period of Designation:

1 January to 31 March

1 April to 30 June

1 July to 30 September

1 October to 31 December

Designated Officer:

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, US Army

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

If the member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next member in the rotation. In the event no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities will be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

4130  
SECDEF HASSEEN

MAY - 3 2001

5/3  
0/120

MAY 27 11:05

GENERAL COUNSEL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD  
MAY 2001

FROM: ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL *DD 4/26/01*  
(Prepared by Mr. James Smyser, OGC(P&HP), (b)(6))

*MF*  
*4/20/01*

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)  
and Dual Absences of Senior Military Officers – ACTION  
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To Obtain the President's Designation of Acting Chairman Pursuant  
to title 10, United States Code, section 154(e), and to Establish  
Departmental Policy with Regard to Dual Absences of Senior  
Military Officers.

DISCUSSION:

- CJCS requests that the President designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to become Acting Chairman in the Absence of the CJCS and Vice Chairman (VCJCS) on a rotating calendar basis (Tab A).
- In absence of JCS member, a Service Vice Chief (Assistant Commandant for Marine Corps (CMC)) would assume Acting Chairman duties.
- CJCS also requests that SECDEF establish policy that requires VCJCS and the Vice Service Chiefs/Assistant CMC to remain in the Washington area when the principal is absent and establishes restrictions on dual absences of both senior officers for a Service.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman at Tab B and sign the memorandum at Tab C that promulgates guidance on dual absences.

Attachments:  
As stated

SECDEF DECISION:  
APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

U08239 /01

W00546 01



April 28, 2001 4:41 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman

I am ready to sign these papers from General Shelton if you are comfortable with them.

Thanks.

Attach.

CJCS memo to SecDef re: "Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences"

DHR:dh  
042801-21



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 4/16

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

TO: SECDEF \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJ: ① DESIGNATION OF ACTING CHAIRMAN  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
② DUAL ABSENCES

SIR.

— GEN SHELTON SENT THESE WORKING  
DRAFTS FOR YOUR REVIEW.

— REGARDING YOUR QUESTIONS ON  
ORDER OF SUCCESSION IN THE PENTAGON  
TO DAN DELL'ORTO, — DAN STILL  
IS WORKING WITH OFFICE OF LEGAL  
COUNSEL AT JUSTICE DEPT. TO RECEIVE  
AN OFFICIAL REPLY.

VR

J/SMA 4/16

Working Draft

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e (Enclosure A), state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices.

a. To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, recommend the President appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

b. These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

2. Guidance with regard to dual absences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Service Chiefs and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is also enclosed,

3. Request your signature at Enclosure B forwarding the proposed memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman and at Enclosure C promulgating guidance on dual absences,

HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.

(2) The Chairman shall include in each such report recommendations for such changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation as may be necessary to achieve the changes in the assignment of functions recommended by the Chairman.

(Added P.L. 99-433, § 201, Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1007.)

#### § 154. Vice Chairman

(a) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR APPOINTMENT.**—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) as a general or flag officer.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) **DUTIES.**—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(d) **FUNCTION AS ACTING CHAIRMAN.**—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

(e) **SUCCESSION AFTER CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.**—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman or in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or vice Chairman ceases.

(f) **GRADE AND RANK.**—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e, state the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both **offices**.

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These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

I recommend you approve these procedures by signing the attached memorandum.

Attachment:  
As stated

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Period of Designation:

1 January to 31 March

1 April to 30 June

1 July to 30 September

1 October to 31 December

Designated Officer:

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, US Army

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

If the member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff specified in this schedule were absent or disabled, responsibilities would fall to the next member in the rotation. In the event no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities will be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE  
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Subject: Dual Absence

If you intend to be absent from the Washington area, your Vice/Assistant should remain. If both you and your Vice/Assistant intend to be absent, please notify the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the OSD Executive Secretary.

In the event of a dual absence, the Chairman and Vice Chairman should limit their travel so at least one remains in **CONUS**, could return within 4 hours, and has access to secure communications, The Service Chiefs/Commandant and their Vice Chiefs/Assistant Commandant should coordinate their travel so that at least one remains in **CONUS** and has access to secure communications.

copy to:  
Secretaries of the Military Departments

**March 15, 2001 3:46 PM**

**TO:** RDML Quinn  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld  
**SUBJECT:** Order of Succession

Have Dell'Orto take a look at that order of succession in the Pentagon for me.

DHR:dh  
031501-26

March 15, 2001 12:13 PM

SUBJECT: Order of Succession

I want to review the order of succession for the Pentagon and be told to what extent it is statutory and to what extent we can propose changes to it.

DHR:dh  
031501-12



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

APR 19 2001 14:07

CM-1162-01

19 April 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Designation of Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dual Absences

1. Title 10, United States Code, section 154, paragraphs d and e (Enclosure A), state that the Vice Chairman will function as Acting Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office. Paragraph e further states the President will designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become Acting Chairman if both the Chairman and Vice Chairman are absent or disabled or there is a vacancy in both offices,

a. To ensure designation of an Acting Chairman in a timely manner, recommend the President appoint the JCS member to become Acting Chairman in advance on a rotating quarterly basis. If the Service Chief specified in this schedule is absent or disabled, responsibilities fall to the next JCS member in the rotation. Finally, if no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is available, Acting Chairman responsibilities would be assumed by one of the Vice Chiefs or the Assistant Commandant of the Services in order of their seniority by date of appointment to the position.

b. These procedures have been in place for many years and serve to ensure continued military leadership and advice in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances.

2. Guidance with regard to dual absences of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Service Chiefs and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps is also enclosed.

3. Request your signature at Enclosure B forwarding the proposed memorandum to the President on designating the Acting Chairman and at Enclosure C promulgating guidance on dual absences.

*Henry H. Shelton*  
HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

(A)GC \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/2012

U07864 /01

020 JCS

19 APR 01

(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.

(2) The Chairman shall include in each such report recommendations for such changes in policies, directives, regulations, and legislation as may be necessary to achieve the changes in the assignment of functions recommended by the Chairman.

(Added P.L. 89-433, § 201, Oct. 1, 1966, 100 Stat. 1007.)

#### § 154. Vi& Chairman

(a) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR APPOINTMENT.**—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title) as a general or flag officer.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) **DUTIES.**—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(d) **FUNCTION AS ACTING CHAIRMAN.**—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

(e) **SUCCESSION AFTER CHAIRMAN AND VICE CHAIRMAN.**—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman or in the absence or disability of both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

(f) **GRADE AND RANK.**—The Vice Chairman, while so serving holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy: admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except

Enclosure A

August 9, 2001 7:56 AM

TO: Dick McGraw  
cc: Torie Clarke  
Larry Di Rita  
Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Efficiency and Cost Cutting

Thanks so much for the excellent report dated August 3.

I have these thoughts:

1. In the first paragraph on page 1, the second line, please get the estimate of the Services' Public Affairs, and let's get a total figure.
2. In the bottom of the first paragraph, let's come up with an average cost for military personnel and throw that cost in.
3. I would get going on exercising some control over AFIS.
4. You ought to get with Washington Headquarters Services and USD(C) and see if we can get a presentation that pulls these things together so we can track it properly. I don't know whether or not we ought to actually move the accounts.
5. Why is OASD(PA) never charged for the computer printers?
6. You might want to get with a pro on the subject of office budgets and management and if you need any outside assistance, there are folks around who would be happy to help.

Thanks so much.

Attach.

8/3/01 McGraw memo to SecDef re: OASD/PA Efficiency and Cost Cutting

DHR:dh  
080901-5

U12701 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/2014

110.01

9 Aug 01



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1400

3 August 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DICK MCGRAW *Dick*  
THROUGH: TORIE CLARKE *Torie*  
cc: LARRY DIRITA AND VADM GIAMBASTIANI  
SUBJECT: OASD/PA Efficiency and Cost Cutting

Where We Are

Your public affairs operation has about 1,276 people assigned to it ~~and has budgets~~ totaling \$154.3 million for FY 2001. The Services' public affairs operations are not included in these numbers. These figures include 76 people and a budget of \$4.3 million for the office of the OASD(PA) and 1,200 people and a budget of \$150 million for American Forces Information Service (AFIS). I can't tell you the true cost because military personnel assigned to the public affairs function are paid by their military departments and are not carried on the budget of OASD(PA) or AFIS—that's about 387 of the 1,276 people.

*Add in*

*Ernie*

*D-12*

While we have supervisory responsibility for AFIS, our office apparently has rarely exercised any budgetary control over AFIS. They are an OSD Field Activity and are budgeted by the USD/Comptroller, while the rest of OASD(PA) is budgeted by WHS.

What We're Doing Now

*pull from*

We are taking some immediate steps to cut costs and improve the organization of our immediate office. Some are minor in the great scheme of things but they are symbolic. Some of these savings will not show up on our budget because we never budgeted for them in the first place—they're in the WHS budget but we never see it. For example, for 76 people in our operation, we have 62 desktop computer printers. We will cut those by at least 50%, saving an estimated \$6000 to \$7000 in capital replacement costs and another \$6,600 per year in operating expenses for toner, etc. But those figures will never show up on any OASD(PA) budget as a savings because OASD(PA) was never charged for them. I point that out only to highlight the difficulty in finding reportable savings. Moreover, I am concerned that if we, in effect, turn the money back to WHS, the funds simply will be recycled to someone who overruns their budget so no savings are realized. I submit people are less likely to hunt for cost savings and expense reduction if it isn't reflected on their budgets.

*why*



Some other things we are doing to reduce costs and improve efficiency in our shop are: reducing the number of voice mail boxes, reducing overtime and compensatory time by using more flex time, reducing newspaper and magazine subscriptions and eliminating providing Boy Scout and Girl Scout certificates upon their achieving Eagle Scout or equivalent status. These savings will amount to approximately \$167,000 in FY 02.

AFIS has identified another \$1.4 million in potential cost savings in FY 02 and beyond but those savings need to be examined closely. In the administrative area of AFIS (travel, subscriptions, training, overtime, office supplies, etc.) we know we can save about \$155,000 in FY 02 and we will proceed to do that.

Also in the short run, we are thoroughly analyzing our immediate office structure and manning-both quantity and quality. We already know we are doing some things very well we probably should not be doing, while some things we should be doing, like setting communications goals and strategic planning to accomplish those goals, are not being done. We already are making some changes and bringing in some new people. So far we have been able to accomplish this within our existing headcount allocation, but I expect we will seek some relief there from WHS before this is over.

Measurable results of our immediate steps should be greater efficiency (even if the dollars don't show up in our budget) and the ability to deliver the DoD message or messages to a variety of audiences, in any geographic location, through a multitude of communications media and mechanisms and provide reasonably quick feedback as to whether we are successful in getting our message across to the target audience. We do not now have the ability to do those things.

### Where We're Headed

We are in the process of preparing a DOD-wide audit and evaluation of all internal and external public affairs activities and organizations with an eye toward reviewing the public affairs mission across all the services, achieving some cost savings through greater efficiencies of operation, making sure the proper assets are in place to execute the mission, and to better manage message coordination and delivery. This will include a review of all the legislation and DoD directives under which we, AFIS and the Service PAO's operate. It probably will take from six months to a year to complete the work. This will be a massive undertaking for the Public Affairs shop. It likely will run into resistance-change is hard and this kind of undertaking will be seen as a precursor to change. We are also mindful that the Congress is quite sensitive to and has a history of looking very carefully at what the DoD spends on its public communications activities. At the end of the day, we will have completely reevaluated what the Public Affairs mission is and should be in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and realigned ourselves, both in OSD and throughout the services, accordingly.

October 22, 2001 11:12 AM

*Arnold 10/25 0841*

*Relates to 10300138*

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Link w/CENTCOM

*OPEN STATE  
Headquarters*

I have read your memo of October 19. My recommendation is that you develop a quick response center here in the Pentagon, with a direct link to Craig Quigley.

Then have someone redraft this as a memo from me to Gen. Franks to tell him we are setting up this quick response cell. Let him know we need to do it as part of our information and influence campaign and that we would appreciate his cooperation in allowing us to work closely with Craig Quigley on it.

Then you should work with the influence group and be sure there is a direct connection between what you are doing and what they are doing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/19/01 ASD(PA) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102201-16

*CENTCOM*

*22 Oct 01*

U12924 /02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 22 2001

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

19 October 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Credibility

The news cycles for the war against terrorism are minutes and hours, not days or weeks. Improved technologies have greatly expanded news capabilities from remote areas. Bad information can and does travel fast and has a debilitating impact on our credibility if not addressed quickly. Thus, we need to be organized to rapidly counter disinformation and quickly admit our mistakes. X

Initial reports often come through the press. The media report what the **Taliban** and their supporters say, even when what they say is flatly not true. Our spokesmen and public affairs people get press inquiries about operational mistakes before we hear about them from our own commanders. Network footage airs without explanation.


Our responses have been delayed or incomplete or inadequate. We have missed opportunities to set the record straight and to explain our own actions.

We can and should do better. Our experience in the past few days has convinced me that we need to work this from the top down.

Specifically, I recommend you direct your supported unified commander(s) to report to you and the Chairman as follows:

- Make an initial report within one hour of receiving a report of significant disinformation or a mistake by U.S. forces.
  - Follow up that initial report within three hours with a written operational and intelligence assessment and a recommended public affairs approach, including a proposed news release if warranted.
  - Submit imagery and other "proof" in time for the next Pentagon news briefing.
- {

In PA we can and will support this effort, but the guidance and direction should come from you, and the supporting information must come from the CINC.

  
Victoria Clarke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/2018

12/11  
1800

DeTrow  
12/10  
1425

November 20, 2001 8:12 AM

Afghanistan

AMY DI RITTA  
12/16

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Claims by Al-Jazeera

12/7/01  
Please see attached letter

I think we ought to get somebody to go after Al-Jazeera very hard for making the irresponsible charge that we purposely targeted them. It is a flat lie. We did not.

to  
Al-Jazeera  
TO

It is irresponsible for an organization like that to make that charge without any justification at all.

Thanks.

Complete

DHR:dh  
112001-2

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

adNovoi

U14726 02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

December 6, 2001

Hafez Al-Mirazi-Osman  
Bureau Chief  
Al-Jazeera  
National Press Building  
Suite 924, 529 14<sup>th</sup> Street NW  
Washington, DC 20045


Dear Mr. Al-Mirazi-Osman,

On November 18, Al-Jazeera claimed U.S. bombers targeted its Kabul office. Chief Editor Ibrahim Hilal was quoted as saying he believed the attack was deliberate and planned.

The Secretary of Defense has been clear from the start of the campaign in Afghanistan that we would only consider militarily significant targets and that we would not target civilians. As our spokesmen from the U.S. Central Command said in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, the building we struck was a known al-Qaida facility in central Kabul. There were no indications this or any nearby facility was used by Al-Jazeera.

We will continue to target those facilities and locations that have military significance. We regret any loss of life or damage to property that occurs during bombing, but will continue to aggressively pursue those individuals and organizations that support or underwrite terrorism or terrorist organizations.

Sincerely,



Victoria Clarke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/2020

UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF HAS SEEN 4/19

NOV 20 2001



## COALITION WORKING GROUP PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MORNING REPORT

Sunday November 18, 2001

7:42

### MEDIA/OPINION CLIMATE

Reuters carried an item stating U.S. urges that any future Afghan government include both genders. The item also mentions the First Lady's address and the Department report on "Taleban's War Against Women." (Reuters)

Northern Alliance senior officials said 100 recently arrived British commandos must leave since the Alliance was not consulted about their arrival. UK insist? the issue had been discussed. (Reuters)

The Taleban confirmed the death of bin Laden's military chief Mohammed Atef in a U.S. bombing raid three days ago. (AP)

Al-Jazeera claimed its Kabul office was targeted by U.S. bombers. Chief editor Ibrahim Hilal said he believed the attack was deliberate and planned. The recently reopened BBC office on the same street was not damaged. (The Guardian)

### SUMMARY OF AL JAZEERA PROGRAMMING

Pakistan correspondent quoted Taleban ambassador to Pakistan as stating that while he was unaware of the exact location of Usama bin Laden, he did know that bin Laden was still in Afghanistan,

Station:

- reported arrival of 25 UN workers in Kabul;
- speculated that a Russian delegation will soon travel to Kabul to meet with former president Rabbani;
- claimed that since Pakistan has tightened its borders it is unlikely that bin Laden will attempt to escape to Pakistan.

### PUBLIC APPEARANCES BY STATE AND OTHER OFFICIALS

November 18: Secretary Powell to appear on ABC and Fox Sunday news shows to discuss the global coalition. Senior Advisor Ross to appear on a Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation interview program.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/2021

**UNCLASSIFIED**

November 19: Secretary Powell to appear at the University of Louisville; EAP Assistant Secretary James Kelly to appear at the Foreign Press Center. Ambassador Kenton Keith will open the Coalition Information Center in Islamabad with a press conference.

November 20: Senior Advisor Ross on VOA Arabic radio/TV interview call-in show "Hello America;" AID Administrator Natsios to appear at the Foreign Press Center reporting on visit to Afghanistan. Natsios to appear on the morning TV news shows to discuss Humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan.

November 21: Senior Advisor Ross DVC with Tunisian media.

November 29: Attorney General Ashcroft on *al Jazeera*, BBC, VOA; AF Assistant Secretary Kansteiner on VOA.

**COALITION MESSAGE OF THE DAY**

The Taleban's war against females has cruelly reduced women and girls to poverty, poor health, and illiteracy, conditions that do not conform to the treatment of women in the Muslim world nor the tenets of Islam. These brutal discriminatory policies violate basic principles of human rights and they deny Afghan society a large pool of professional knowledge. In the early 1990s, women were well-represented in government, education, medicine, and other occupations. Women will be able to provide invaluable expertise necessary for the reconstruction of post-Taleban Afghanistan. (*Washington File*)

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIONS**

IIP translated and posted the First Lady's address on the brutal oppression of Afghan women and children by al-Qaida in five languages (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish) and did the same with the State Department report "Taleban's War Against Women." (IIP)

Drafted: **MMuller**, Coordinator

Approved: **JJohnson**, Director

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/2022

April 10, 2001 9:55 AM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Military Health System

Please take a look at these health papers that we received from the National Academy of Sciences group. We ought to think carefully about some of their recommendations.

**Attach.**

“Military Health System” and “Alt 1: Defense Health Command”

DHR:dh  
041001-50

701

10 April



# Military Health System



11-L-0559/OSD/2024

## **Military Health Services System Mission**


- **Military Readiness** - to provide medical and preventive health services and support to the United States Armed Forces during military operations
- **Peacetime Health Care** - to provide continuous medical and preventive services and support to members of the Uniformed Services, their family members, and survivors, retired members and their families and all others entitled to Department of Defense health care

Source: ASD(HA)

# Military Health Services System





- **6 million customers (8.2 million eligible)**
  - **12,000 physicians**
- **Total medical workforce 147,800**
- **\$15.7 Billion - 6.4% of DoD budget**
  - **115 hospitals, 471 clinics**
  - **30,000 deployable beds**





# Task Force on Defense Reform Medical Issues

- ➔ **Health Care During Military Operations**
- ➔ **Delivery of the Peacetime Benefit**
- ➔ **Health Promotion/Preventive Medicine**


# Healthcare During Military Operations



# Current Wartime Care Organization- Patient Flow




# Current Wartime Care Organization- Resources



~ 4,000 active duty physicians are required in the sustainment and training base (primarily in CONUS) to support this wartime care establishment.



(Pentagon HQ staffs R&D, epidemiology, etc)  
 Physicians: 500 active, 800 reserve




**Delivery of the Peacetime Benefit**




**T R I C A R E**



# Health Affairs Management Structure




# Army Management Structure




- Office of the Surgeon General 95
- Medical Command 374
- 7 Regional Medical Command's 114
- Dental Command 17
- Vet Command 27
- Medical RDT&E 116
- Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 758
- AMMED Center and School 1886
- Assigned to Health Affairs Lead Agents 143

# Navy Management Structure




# Air Force Management Structure


2 Forward Operating Activities 158  
AF Medical RDT&E 70  
AF Material Command - Medical 161  
Schoolhouse 597




# TRICARE




ARMY




Navy






**Each circle represents a Medical Facility. They are color coded to represent the Major Command they report to.**

# Proposed TRICARE Health Service Regions



**Not Shown**  
**TRICARE Europe**  
**TRICARE Pacific**  
**TRICARE Latin America**  
**TRICARE Alaska**


# Proposed TRICARE Structure



TRICARE System Headquarters responsible for Defensewide Resourcing, Graduate Medical Education, IM/IT, Mgmt of TRICARE Regions, Medical RDT&E, Adv. Medical Technical Training

# New TRICARE Staffing Level

*Appropriate level of staffing is between current  
Health Affairs level and the total of all Military Departments*



# Proposed Health Affairs/Service Structure

**Under Secretary  
Of Defense For  
Personnel & Readiness**

**Health Affairs**

**Health and Benefit Policy**

**Quality Assurance,  
Patient Satisfaction**

**Prevention/  
Promotion**

**Assistant Secretary  
for Military and Personnel  
Affairs**

**Strategic Council**

**Employer Medical Care**

**Quality Assurance,  
Patient Satisfaction**

**Prevention/  
Promotion**

**Research**

# Health Promotion/Preventive Medicine

Health Promotion  
Preventive Medicine




re recuperative care

The scales are not balanced!



**About one half of all early deaths in the United States are attributable to external factors such as alcohol, dietary habits, illegal drugs, and tobacco. Tobacco use alone accounts for over \$50 billion in health care costs nationally.**



# Harmful Behaviors Among Military Beneficiaries

<u>Heavy Drinking</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian*</u>	<u>DoD Goal</u>
18-25	26%	17%	none
26-55	10%	8%	none
<u>Tobacco Use</u>			
Cigarettes 18-25	40%	36%	20%
26-55	28%	28%	20%
Smokeless 18-25	22%	unk	4%
26-55	6%	unk	4%
<u>Illegal Drugs</u>			
18-25	4.9%	13.5%	0
26-55	1.7%	7.3%	0

\*Adjusted for age, race, gender


## **Proposed Mission of the Military Health System**

- To to provide medical and. preventive health services and support to the United States Armed Forces during military operations**
- To provide for a healthy and productive military force during peacetime**
- To provide for healthy and productive military beneficiaries**

## **Proposed Mission of the Military Health System**


- To provide medical and preventive health services and support to the United States Armed Forces during military operations**
- To provide for a healthy and productive military force during peacetime**
- To provide for healthy and productive military beneficiaries**

# Alt 1: Defense Health Command



\* USUHS forms the core of the command

# Alt 2: Defense Health Command, Joint Medical Research & Training Command, & Deployed Medicine and Health Promotion Command




\* USUHS forms the core of the command  
 11-L-0559/OSD/2050

## Oversight Board(s) Structure

**Oversight boards will consist of:**


- ➔ **Permanent membership from all three Military Departments - including both line and medical**
- ➔ **Representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
- ➔ **Representation from USD(A), USD(C), USD(P&R), and ASD(HA) (as appropriate)**
- ➔ **Representation from customers to include active duty representation (and retiree representation - if possible)**

# Alts 1 & 2: Health Affairs/ Surgeons General Structure



# Defense Health Command Staffing Level

*Appropriate level of staffing is between current Health Affairs level and the total of all Military Departments*



# Army Medical Staffing for Common Support and Administrative Functions (3530)

## **Deployed Medicine & Health Promotion:**

17 from DENTCOM

758 from CHPPM

21 from AMEDD Center & School (logistics)

134 from AMEDD Center & School (force integration)

## **Research & Training:**

116 from RDT&E

1643 from AMEDD Center & School

## **Defense Health Command:**

114 from Regional Medical Commands

269 from MEDCOM

\$8 from AMEDD Center & School(IM/IT)

143 already allocated to Lead Agents

## **Surgeon General:**

200 plus 27 (VETCOM) for a total of 227

# Navy Medical Staffing for Common Support and Administrative Functions (2445)

## **Deployed Medicine & Health Promotion:**

**185** from Environmental Health

**195** from Ophthalmic

**40** from Medical & Dental

**115** from Logistics

**187** from Navy Operational Medicine

## **Research & Training:**

**780** from Naval Schools of Health Sciences

## **Defense Health Command:**

**173** from Health Service Organizations (regional structure)

**189** from Navy Medical Information Management Command

**267** from BUMED

**114** already allocated to Lead Agents

## **Surgeon General:**

**200**

# Air Force Medical Staffing for Common Support and Administrative Functions (1532)

## **Deployed Medicine & Health Promotion:**

**161** from AF Materiel Command

**80** from AF Medical operations

## **Research & Training:**

**597** from Air Training Command

**70** from Medical RDT&E Brooks, AFB

## **Defense Health Command:**

**186** from MAJCOM's

**78** From AF Medical Systems Activity

**160** already allocated to Lead Agents

## **Surgeon General:**

**200**



## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 12:12 PM

TO: Mr. John Veroneau, Legislative Affairs

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Attached is a report that indicates the Congressional reporting requirements for 2001.

I am absolutely amazed. I have not seen anything like this.

I have these thoughts:

1. What does all this cost?
2. Which committees are requiring these reports?
3. Which individuals are requesting the reports?
4. Are there some that can be reasonably eliminated completely?
5. Are there some that can be combined?
6. Is it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunsets on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?
7. Does someone have the due dates?
8. Is this something we should be talking to the key members of Congress about and see if we can't calm it down?
9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be? For example, the ones for the President being reduced to me and the ones for me being reduced down to lower levels.
10. Any thoughts from anyone?

cc:

Dr. William Schneider

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz

Dr. Dov Zakheim

Attachment

DR:dh

020501-7

11-L-0559/OSD/2057

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3-Feb-01

MEMORANDUM FOR Dr Cambone

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Sir

Attached for your information is a paper explaining the subject reports

Also attached is a listing of all Congressionally mandated reports

Package prepared by Bruce Dauer and Warren Hall

They indicated in red which reports they believe the Secretary should personally sign (i.e. not delegate to Component leadership for signature)

*Very respect fully  
Mauo*

MARIA I. CRIBBS  
Colonel, USAF  
Executive Secretary for the  
Department of Defense

*Alb Plan* *South* *MTG* *DoD date* *Releas* *man Dan* *2/11/01*  
*colt* *which Gm figure* *elms* *which indell* *from put* *date!*

## N 2001 CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The attached listing identifies the congressional reporting requirements included in the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act, the FY 2001 DoD Appropriation Act, FY 2001 Military Construction Appropriation Act and the accompanying conference, House, and Senate reports.

- Reports noted in language to be submitted by the President or the Secretary of Defense are highlighted in the attached listing.

There are 520 individual requirements for the Department to prepare reports, plans, studies, notifications, and certifications.

- 21 state that the President should report to the Congress.
- 245 state that the Secretary of Defense should report to the Congress
- The remainder identify the Department, a Military Service, or an individual other than the Secretary of Defense

### General procedures for submission of reports to the Congress:

- Reports required to be submitted "to the Congress" are addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representative and the President of the Senate. These offices then distribute the reports to the relevant offices. (Sometimes copies are sent directly to the defense oversight committees as well as a courtesy. The office preparing the report makes this recommendation on a case by case basis.)
- Reports required to be submitted "to the defense committees" are addressed to the Chair and Ranking member of the House and Senate Defense Authorization Committees and the Chair and Ranking member of the House and Senate Appropriation Committees. Copies are usually sent directly to the relevant DoD Appropriation Subcommittee.
- Reports required to be submitted to a specific committee are addressed to that committee. Copies are usually sent to the other committees as a courtesy.

### General procedures for Secretary of Defense signature on reports:

- Secretary of Defense should sign all correspondence relating reports required to be submitted by the "President"
  - As a matter of practice, the Secretary of Defense would forward all designated "President" reports to the President for submission to the Congress.
  - The Secretary of Defense would sign a "President" report that is to be jointly signed with the Secretary of another agency or directly coordinate on a report signed by the Secretary of another agency that is to be coordinated on by the Secretary of Defense

- “Secretary of Defense” reports allow for discretion by the Secretary of Defense to either accept or delegate signing authority
  - The Congress designates a “Secretary of Defense” report because it wants the Secretary to sign it or wants a senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to sign rather than someone from the Military Services
  - The Secretary of Defense signs those reports considered to be of special interest by the Secretary or the senior OSD staff, and delegates signature authority to other senior officials for all others
    - As a general rule, the Secretary of Defense signs certifications and elected waiver authorities required in statute
    - Secretary of Defense special interest reports could be determined from issues known to be of interest to the Secretary, international policy issues, highly controversial issues, or other issues recommended by the senior OSD staff.

The attached listing annotates those “Presidential” and “Secretary of Defense” reports that might be considered for signature by the Secretary. Final determination should be made by the OSD senior staff.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
<b>106-290</b>	<b>SAC-MILCON Subcommittee Rpt (on S 2521, Rpt'd 9 May 00)</b>					
106-290	020	Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Facility	Report	"Without further delay"	OASD/HA	Evaluate alternatives for improving the AFIO facilities. SECDEF report.
106-290	012	Transfer Authority	Notify	"After the fact"	OUSD/C	Transfers between any accounts in the bill could be accomplished at the determination of the SECDEF. SECDEF report.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Report	Within 45 days of enactment	OUSD/P	Outline specific uses for all funds appropriated in account. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-290	020	Weapons Storage and Maintenance Facility, Ft Bragg, NC	Report	06/15/01	JCS	Needed improvements in the overall infrastructure required to ensure the safety certification and efficiency of those foreign weapons.
106-290	022	Weapons of Mass Destruction -- Civil Support Teams (WMD CST)	Report	2/15/01	NGB	Distribution of funds for unspecified minor construction funding to directly support WMD CST requirements.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Notify (if necessary)	15 session days prior to obligation of funds	OUSD/C	Limit on funds made available.
106-290	025	NATO Security Investment Program Funds	Notify	21 days prior to obligation	OUSD/P	Before using NSIP funds for NATO enlargement or Partnership for Peace (PFP) purposes.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Report	Monthly	OUSD/P	Identify private sector firms providing support, the number of Americans overseas in execution of supporting contracts, the number of military personnel and U.S. Government employees operating in Colombia and surrounding region.
106-290	021	Antilles Consolidated School System	Report	08/01/00	OUSD/P&R	Deficiencies of the school system, corrective measures to be implemented, and an associated line line for resolving the issues.
106-290	059	Defense Health Programs	Report	Within 30 days of enactment	OUSD/P&R	Report on the application and use of funds provided.
<b>106-614</b>	<b>HAC-MILCON Subcommittee Rpt (on HR 4425, Rpt 9 May 00)</b>					
106-614	026	New housing construction	Notify	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Funds appropriated for a new construction project may be transferred for purpose of a private sector pilot project at the same location. SECDEF report.
106-614	026	Construction improvements	Notify	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Funds appropriated for a construction improvement project may be transferred for purpose of a private sector pilot project at the same location. SECDEF report.
106-614	038	Environmental Restoration	Notify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	A ceiling is established on the level of funding unless it is determined that additional obligations are necessary, and the necessary reasons for the increase are given. SECDEF report.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-614	007	Transfer Authority	Notify	"After the fact"	OUSD/C	The budget request proposed a <b>general provision</b> allowing the transfer of up to <b>\$67,000,000 between</b> any accounts in the bill. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-614	014	Ft Belvoir: Army Museum	Report	Within 90 days of enactment	Army	<b>Determine</b> whether Fort Belvoir is an appropriate site for the <b>National Museum of the U.S. Army.</b>
106-614	030	Fire Suppression	Report	Within 30 days after enactment	Army	To ensure smoke detectors, <b>alarms</b> and <b>fire</b> extinguishers are <b>installed</b> in all <b>stairwell apartments</b> in Germany.
106-614	039	Rio Vista Reserve <b>Center</b> : Cleanup efforts and asbestos <b>remediation</b>	Report	09/15/00	Army	Concerning <b>plans</b> for <b>building</b> demolition, including the required <b>funding, funding</b> source, and estimated <b>dates</b> for completion of such activities.
106-614	008	<b>Recycled</b> foundry sand	Report	03/30/01	Army / Navy	Prior and potential use of foundry sand in military construction.
106-614	007	Joint Use Facilities	Certify	With use of Form 139011391	Army/Navy / Air Force	<i>When the</i> Department assesses facilities needs, and Form 1390/1391 which is presented as <b>justification</b> for either joint use or unilateral construction.
106-614	020	Facilities Backlog	Report	With the budget	Army / NGB	Current backlog of facilities requirements of the Army National Guard.
106-614	020	Armory Infrastructure	Report	01101101	Army / NGB	Status of armory <b>infrastructure.</b>
106-614	008	BMDG Construction Projects	Notify	30 days prior to obligation	BMDO	The Committee is <b>concerned</b> about this request and wants prior notification of <b>specific</b> projects with <b>detailed</b> justification.
106-614	015	Lemoore NAS Quality of Life and Work Space Conditions	Report	03/15/00	Navy	Explain the execution of the Infrastructure Improvement Plan, <b>including any changes or modifications</b> that have been made to <b>the plan and the reasons therefor.</b>
106-614	015	Puerto Rico-Roosevelt Roads Naval Station	Report	Within 90 days of enactment	Navy	<b>Outline options available</b> for development of the land, a timetable, the Navy should develop with the <b>Municipality of Ceiba, and actions to be taken by the Department.</b>
106-614	032	Marine Corps Barracks.	Notify	30 days in advance of intended fund use	Navy	<b>Authorizes the use of private funds for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of the historic residences.</b>
106-614	038	Hunters Point Naval Shipyard	Report	01/15/01	Navy	Status of the transfer and remediation of the shipyard.
106-614	006	Historic Preservation	Report	3/30/01	OUSD/AT&L	Develop innovative initiatives and future plans that can help <b>reduce costs and improve maintenance</b> of historic properties.
106-614	007	Paint	Report	03/30/01	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Review current military specifications and costs for paint.</b>
106-614	035	Contractor Support for Family Housing Privatization	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Review and report the expenses of each Service to ensure excessive amounts are not being spent</b> on contractor support
106-614	024	NATO Security Investment Program	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/C	NATO nations share of cost and NSIP project costs and cost shares.
106-614	027	Foreign Currency Savings, O&M	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/C	Allowcation of <b>savings</b> from foreign currency <b>re-estimations.</b>

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-614	027	Operation and Maintenance, Reprogrammings	Notify	Within 30 days of transfer of funds	OUUSD/C	Proposed transfers of funds in excess of ten percent to all primary accounts and subaccounts.
106-614	028	Domestic Leases	Report	Quarterly	OUUSD/C	Details of certain new or renewed leasing agreements.
106-614	028	Foreign Leases	Report	21 days prior to entering into an agreement	OUUSD/C	Perform an economic analysis on all new leases or lease/contract agreements; report details of any new or renewal lease exceeding \$20,000 per year (as adjusted for foreign currency fluctuation, but not adjusted for inflation).
106-614	024	NATO Expansion	Notify	21 days prior to obligation	OUUSD/P	Before using NSIP funds for NATO enlargement or Partnership for Peace (PFP) purposes.
106-614	011	Child Development Centers	Plan	02/15/01	OUUSD/P&R	Creation of 25,000 additional child care spaces through constructing child development centers over the next five years.
106-614	029	Asbestos and Lead-based paint removal	Notify	As required	Services	When asbestos and/or lead-based paint removal costs cause maintenance and repair thresholds to be exceeded.
106-292	SASC Rpt (S 2549, Rpt'd 12 May 00)					
106-292	329	Appropriate use of the government purchase card	Report	02/01/01	Army (Bruce Sullivan, 681-7564)	Report on processing costs at the DFAS. SECDEF report.
106-292	264	Manufacturing Technical Assistance Pilot Program	Report	When necessary	Navy	Outline results of this pilot program SECDEF report.
106-292	142	Army Future Combat Systems (FCS)	Report	01/31/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Include the schedule for this initiative; funding required for FY-02 and future years; and a description and assessment of the acquisition strategy. SECDEF report.
106-292	224	Maritime patrol aircraft	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Outline the current status of the MMA concept exploration, including the impact of funding requested in the FY-02 budget request to prevent near-term shortfalls. SECDEF report.
106-292	226	Radiation Harden& Electronics Investment Strategy	Report	4/1/2001 and Annually thereafter	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on implementation of the Strategy, including the degree to which directed investment goals are being fulfilled. SECDEF report.
106-292	329	Availability of contractor past performance information	Report	NLT 03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Examine the issue of award fee determination information disclosure under FOIA, to determine whether a clarification in regulation would be in the public interest. SECDEF report.
106-292	331	Performance goals and measures for quality of equipment and other products	Report	02/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report how the Department plans to improve its quality assurance program. SECDEF report.
106-292	332	Polyacrylonitrile (PAN) carbon fibers	Report	02/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on the domestic and international industrial structure that produces PAN carbon fibers, current and anticipated market trends, and on any decision made in regard to the DFAR restriction. SECDEF report.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-292	286	Inventory of financial <b>management</b> and feeder <b>systems</b>	Plan	Addition to <b>current requirement</b>	OUUSD/C	Additional matters to be covered under the <b>original</b> report, e.g., <b>identify</b> each system <b>listed in</b> the inventory as critical or <b>non-critical</b> and major or non-major. SECDEF report.
106-292	302	Funeral honors for members of the uniformed services	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/P&R	<b>Following</b> a conference with VA, HHS and Commerce, report its findings <b>and</b> recommendations. SECDEF report
106-292	302	Information related to alternatives to the Survivor Benefit <b>Plan (SBP)</b>	Report	NLT 01/30/01	OUUSD/P&R	<b>Describe the</b> TAP program <b>and</b> its content by service, include a description of the methods of exposure; various numbers on <b>participates</b> , and those who declined SBP. SECDEF report.
106-292	303	Study on the use of peyote by military personnel	Report	Upon completion of study	OUUSD/P&R	Report the <b>findings</b> of a <b>study</b> and any recommendations prior to <b>finalizing a Department directive</b> . SECDEF report.
106-292	319	Health care benefits for retirees living overseas	Report	NLT 03/12/01	OUUSD/P&R	Report on the <b>desirability and feasibility</b> of providing health care benefits to these <b>military retirees</b> . SECDEF report.
106-292	319	Implementation of DoD and VA sharing initiatives	Report	NLT 01/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	With the VA, develop a plan and report on the <b>formation of problem solution groups and regional liaisons</b> to facilitate sharing opportunities. SECDEF report.
106-292	320	Notification of persons affected by unanticipated <b>adverse outcomes of medical care</b>	Report	NLT 03/01/01	OUUSD/P&R	Review the current notification process and any <b>additional requirements</b> the Secretary deems necessary. SECDEF report.
106-292	320	Special pays for military health care professionals	Report	NLT 03/01/01	OUUSD/P&R	Conduct a review and report on the <b>adequacy of special pays and bonuses</b> . SECDEF report.
106-292	049	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat Vehicles	Certify	When necessary	PA&E	Certify that the conclusions of the operational analysis contained in the Army's 2nd report support the proposed acquisitions for additional IBCT equipment. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-292	127	C-5 aircraft upgrades	Report	02/15/01	Air Force	Contain analysis to support the recommendation on sequence of aircraft upgrades and project lift capabilities for ten years.
106-292	048	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat Vehicles	Report & Plan	02/01/01	Army	Description of the Army's plans for conducting a side-by-side comparison of <b>existing</b> versus new hardware implementations.
106-292	049	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat <b>Vehicles</b>	Report	03/01/02	Army	Provide analysis of <b>the results</b> of the side-by-side comparative <b>operational</b> analysis.
106-292	127	Electronic <b>digital</b> compass system	Report	None specified	Army	Assess the <b>utility</b> and costs involved in <b>integrating</b> and <b>procurin</b> systems for combat and tactical <b>vehicles</b> of the <b>first digitized</b> division and the digitized corps.
106-292	128	<b>Soldier's</b> portable on-system repair tool (SPORT)	Report	None specified A r m y	Army	<b>Following</b> a review of outstanding <b>requirements</b> , report on an <b>acquisition strategy designed to meet those requirements</b> .
106-292	2.2.5	Prophylactic pharmaceuticals	Report	When completed	Army	Report results of a <b>cost-benefit analysis</b> of a <b>development</b> program based on current <b>medical</b> research, and Include the <b>funding</b> requirement to <b>fully</b> develop this <b>research</b> .

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Office	Brief
106-292	286	Charlestown Naval Auxiliary Landing Field, Charlestown, RI.	Report	01/01/02, if necessary	Army	If the site demolition <b>workplan cannot</b> be executed <b>in FY-01</b> , then <b>the</b> Army needs to explain their inaction.
106-292	405	Support for Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	Report	NLT 10/01/01	Army	Provide a report on the expenditure of these funds.
106-292	222	Crusader	Report	03/01/01	Army [AT&L]	<b>Describe</b> how the current development and acquisition strategy <b>will</b> fit with efforts designed to field <b>the</b> objective force described in the Army transformation initiative.
106-292	212	National Missile Defense (NMD)	Report	04/01/01	BMDO	Report the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of a <b>competitive</b> approach to follow-on GBR development and deployment.
106-292	330	Online auctioning	Report	03/01/01	DFAS or OASD/AT&L	Provide a progress report on <b>identifying specific</b> markets for which online auctioning may be appropriate and the development of a pilot <b>program</b> .
106-292	125	Special Operations Forces small arms and support equipment	Report	Prior to any additional authorizations	JCS	Assess <b>the</b> suitability of the equipment enhancements for <b>all</b> SOF <b>operational</b> elements and any <b>recommendations</b> for improvements to meet the needs of SOCOM.
106-292	224	Joint Training and Experimentation	Report	03/01/01	JCS	Assess the advisability and feasibility of establishing a joint national training center; include a summary of actions taken, <b>planned</b> or under consideration.
106-292	094	LHD-8 Advance Procurement	Report	None Specified	Navy	Continued concerns over the FYDP and the Navy's structure of a contract for LHD-8 <b>that maximizes potential</b> costs savings.
106-292	176	Refuel Los Angeles-class SSNs or convert Ohio class SSBNs	Report	W/FY-02 Budget	Navy	Report the attributes used to analyze the options and the distinctions among these attributes in the near- and long-term.
106-292	177	Shipboard simulators for Marine Corps operations	Report	03/01/01	Navy	Assess <b>Marine</b> Corps training for Marines afloat; a program to develop <b>and</b> field <b>additional simulation capabilities</b> ; and plans to support the fielding of new training <b>simulation</b> systems.
106-292	283	Cultural and Historic Activities	Report	04/01/01	Navy	Describe all the uses of Legacy funds and relevant state <b>funds</b> , <b>status</b> of recovery and preservation activities related to three civil war era vessels, and <b>the</b> projected <b>funding</b> and date for completion of <b>all</b> recovery and preservation activities.
106-292	289	Revised requirements for report on use of smart card as PKI authentication device carrier	Report	12/01/00	OASD/C3I	Report on the cost and feasibility of existing hard disk storage technology or other <b>technologies</b> it <b>could</b> be used, include a <b>comparison</b> of the <b>technologies</b> on a cost and performance basis
106-292	216	Complex systems design	Report	When completed	OASD/C3I or Army	Conduct a review of the project.
106-292	221	Management reform for DoD test and evaluation centers	Report	When funds are awarded	OT&E	Report on the allocation of PE 64940D funds and the Criteria used to determine the recipients.
106-292	124	Advanced SEAL Delivery System	Report	None Specified	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Explain</b> why this program was not to elevate to a higher level of review, as was required.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-292	226	Transition of successful research projects into the acquisition system	Report	NLT 6 months after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Review the transition pace problem and report alternative approaches to ensuring that successful research initiatives are fielded in a timely manner, and the review should consider possible changes to the acquisition and budgeting systems.
106-292	287	Joint Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (JCALS) program	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report progress made to restructure the program to expand the functionality and use of the JCALS program beyond the technical manual capability.
106-292	319	Financial assistance for those beneficiaries requiring animal assistance	Report	None specified	OUSD/P&R	Study requirements for dependents of military personnel whose medical conditions may require such assistance, include an assessment of the economic impact of obtaining such animals.
106-292	329	Appropriate use of the government purchase card	Report	02/01/01	Services	Report the findings of sampled purchase card transactions from selected commands to determine whether the prices paid were fair and reasonable.
<b>106-616</b>	<b>HASC Rpt (HR 4205, Rpt'd 12 May 00)</b>					
106-616	455	Condition of Barracks to Support Basic Training	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Report findings, including recommendations, coincident with Army's review of current plans and program. SECDEF report.
106-616	465	Military Housing Privatization Initiative	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Report findings, including recommendations on the impact of military housing developed under the authority of subchapter IV ch. 169 of title 10, U.S.C., at Fort Carson. SECDEF report.
106-616	408	DoD Personnel Security Investigation Requirements Priorities	Report	NLT 03/01/00	DA&M	Describe efforts to establish a prioritization scheme and to provide more timely and complete personnel security investigations. SECDEF report.
106-616	286	Thermionics for space power systems	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	DTRA	Report the results of the assessment of progress being made in the program and plans for its continuation. SECDEF report.
106-616	334	Container Freight Station (CFS) Operations	Report	180 days prior to any action on any function transfer	JCS	Report results of the MTMC business case analysis and assess the effects of the proposed transfer on military readiness. SECDEF report.
106-616	342	Urban Warfare Training	Report	02/01/01	JCS	Report on master plan for a DOD-wide strategy, with milestones, for improving service and joint capabilities to conduct these military operations. SECDEF report.
106-616	224	SSGN Conversion	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide an approved acquisition strategy and program plan, and a decision as to whether the SSGN shall be START-accountable or START compliant. SECDEF report.
106-616	282	Information technology, superiority and assurance	Report	11/01/00	OASD/C3I	Report findings and recommendations of assessed shortfalls in the information technology program. SECDEF report.
106-616	290	Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP)	Report	Prior to including in any budget request	OT&E	Report any recommended change to current funding procedures for T&E facilities. SECDEF report.

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Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-616	284	Requirement for "designated laboratory"	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OUUSD/AT&L	The Department's position, <b>actions</b> , and funding requirements relative to establishment of a second designated laboratory. SECDEF report.
106-616	285	Science and <b>technology</b> affordability initiative	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on the manner <b>in</b> which the S&T program addresses <b>total</b> life cycle costs of weapons systems, include a description and assessment, associated funding requirements, and related policy initiatives. SECDEF report.
106-616	285	<b>Tactical</b> and support <b>aircraft</b> noise reduction	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Provide status of funding and <b>plans</b> for <b>noise</b> reduction in tactical <b>and</b> support <b>aircraft</b> and for <b>the</b> reduction of sound pressure levels. SECDEF report.
106-616	337	Department of <b>Defense Civilian Personnel</b> (Recruiting and Retention)	Report	01/31/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Develop a comprehensive plan to attract high quality scientists and engineers, and <b>report</b> the findings and recommendations. SECDEF report.
106-616	394	Compliance with Applicable Labor Laws <b>in</b> Procurement of Military Clothing	Report	NLT 04/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report any information indicating non-compliance by <b>contractors</b> , with emphasis <b>shall</b> be placed on <b>proper</b> wage <b>payments</b> and scales. SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Armed Forces Recreation Centers	Report	01/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	<b>Review</b> the categories of personnel with <b>AFRC</b> privileges to determine whether those categories should be broadened to include honorably discharged veterans. SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Lodging Programs	Report & Plan	01/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Review change in policy, detailing the reasons for the change, and <b>submit a plan to hold harmless Army and Marine Corps MWR</b> . SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Nonappropriated Fund Support of Official Activities	Report	03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Review the support that category C activities provide to official activities without reimbursement. SECDEF report.
106-616	333	Civilian Air Traffic Controllers	Report	01/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Determine the best method to solve the recruiting and retention problem and report any recommendations. SECDEF report.
106-616	347	Additional Capabilities of, and Reporting Requirements for, the RRS	Report	Annual report	OUUSD/P&R	Detail the funding programmed for deficiencies identified in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review process. SECDEF report.
106-616	361	Incentives for Overseas Assignments	Report	12/31/00	OUUSD/P&R	Study incentives for overseas assignments and report on <b>attainable</b> and <b>affordable</b> recommendations to resolve the <b>problem of filling overseas duty positions</b> . SECDEF report.
106-616	361	National Guard Military Technician Overtime Pay	Report	03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Report findings and recommendations to a review of the "time off in lieu of overtime" policy and cost considerations. SECDEF report.
106-616	372	Benefits of Military Service	Report	03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Review the programs employed to provide service members information on the benefits available to them, and include an assessment of the programs effectiveness. SECDEF report.
106-616	373	Extension of Time Limitation on Use of Reserve Education Benefits	Report	03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Study time limitations on use of education benefits and determine if an extension of the time limitations is useful and cost effective. SECDEF report.

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106-616	373	Improved Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)	Report	Annually 03/31/01-06	OUSD/P&R	Study the growth of housing costs in areas where the local costs of housing are believed to be directly influenced by increases in BAH rates. SECDEF report
106-616	373	Military Pay Day Every 14 Days	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Study whether the change to a 14-day pay period for military personnel is both necessary and desirable. SECDEF report.
106-616	374	Pay Table Reform for Mid-Grade Enlisted Members	Report or Legislative Proposal	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/P&R	Study the issue and submit either a legislative proposal or an explanation as to why the concerns are not valid. SECDEF report.
106616	374	Reimbursement for Reservists' Travel Expenses	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review current travel practices, potential advantages for Reservist and Reserve components of providing reimbursements, and report SECDEF report.
106-616	374	Reimbursement of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Expenses	Legislative Proposal	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/P&R	Based on a DoD study, develop a legislative proposal designed to enhance PCS reimbursement levels. SECDEF report.
106-616	383	Preventive Health Care Services	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on the steps taken to improve the implementation of the PPIP initiative. SECDEF report
106616	383	Computer-Based Patient Record and Medical Records Tracking System	Report	Annually beginning 03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on the progress and the remaining timelines and tasks associated with integrating the medical information systems. SECDEF report.
106-616	383	Computer-Based Patient Record and Medical Records Tracking System	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report the progress of the MRTS and any interim measures to assure that all hospital and medical records of service members can be easily identified. SECDEF report.
106-616	384	Mandatory Enrollment Program for TRICARE Beneficiaries	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Conduct a study of the benefits to be gained by requiring TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in any of the Department's TRICARE programs. SECDEF report.
106-616	384	Two-Year Extension of Authority for Use of Contract Physicians at Military Entrance Processing Stations and Elsewhere	Report	12/31/00	OUSD/P&R	Extend authority for two years to complete tests of alternative methods for streamlining the new-recruit medical screening and make recommendations for changes. SECDEF report.
106-616	125	F-15 modifications	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Provide plan to implement a block upgrade program.
106-616	129	Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Assess the utility of a Predator-B aircraft, including the benefits or problems operating a mixed Predator fleet.
106-616	249	Extended range cruise missile (ERCM)	Notify	If necessary, but 30 days prior to obligating any funds	Air Force	If the Air Force proposes to pursue an acquisition strategy using other than full and open competition, inform the committees of the rationale and justification.
106-616	256	Small smart munitions (Miniaturized Munitions Capability (MMC))	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force/Navy	Final results of analysis of alternatives, include a review of all 26 government and industry MMC concepts.
106-616	062 / 341	Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS)	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Army	Detail programmed funds for RCAS for FYs 2002 through 2007.

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106-616	172	Chinook helicopter modification and improvement	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Assess the need to establish a funded product improvement program; report the results including levels of funding required.
106-616	176	Future Combat System (Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) program)	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Army	Report how the Army will sustain the joint FSCS program to develop and demonstrate key technologies applicable to the future family of combat systems.
106-616	332	Army Apprenticeship Program	Report	01/31/01	Army	Report on plans to implement an apprenticeship program for Army maintenance depots.
106-616	332	Army Workload and Performance System	Report	02/01/01	Army	Update the AWPS master plan to incorporate GAO's recommendations and submit a revised master plan.
106-616	340	National Maintenance Program (NMP)	Report	02/01/01	Army	Identify the proliferation of depot-level maintenance that is performed outside of the public depots.
106-616	270	National missile defense (NMD)	Report	If determined NMD radars shouldn't be competed	BMDO	Detail justification for noncompete determination not later than 30 days prior to the proposed initiation of any noncompetitive effort.
106-616	271	Navy theater wide (NTW)	Report	02/15/01	BMDO	Assess NTW radar requirements and technologies and architectures, include consideration of expected threats.
106-616	272	Russian-American cooperative national missile defense	Report	01/15/01	BMDO	Examine concept report on possible architectures, technical merits and challenges, cost, effectiveness, technology transfer risks, and areas of technical cooperation.
106-616	193	Advanced anti-radiation guided missile (AARGM)	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide results of the developmental testing of the AARGM seeker and the Navy's plans for further development.
106-616	199	Common Command and Decision (CC&D) System	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the Navy's program plan and funding for the CC&D P3I program and for insertion of advanced technology in the CEC/SSD integrated combat system.
106-616	200	Composite advanced sail development	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide the Navy's plan for further development of a composite advanced sail for the Virginia class submarine.
106-616	200	CVNX aircraft carrier design product modeling	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	After conducting an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of developing a product model for the CVNX report the results, together with plans and funding requirements for development.
106-616	203	Extended range guided munition (ERGM)	Report	11/01/00	Navy	Provide a revised program baseline, risk reduction measures, and measures to foster competition in the program.
106-616	204	Fielded system obsolescence, technology insertion and technology refreshment	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on plan for an Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) program that would address the issues of technology refresh and technology insertion in legacy and developmental programs.
106-616	205	Fleet health technology and occupational lung disease	Report	NLT 03/21/01	Navy	Report on the plan for the occupational lung disease study and any initial study results
106-616	207	Hybrid fiberoptic/wireless communication technology	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Assess the progress in the program and the potential for incorporation into the Navy's core science and technology program.

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106-616	219	P-3 modernization program	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide plans for sustaining the operational capabilities of the P-3 and for development of a replacement aircraft.
106-616	220	Parametric Airborne Dipping Sonar (PADS)	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Pending successful completion of tests, report on the Navy's plan for further development.
106-616	220	Project M	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the Navy's plan for transition of the technology
106-616	226	Vacuum electronics	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide final results and recommendations on the assessment of vacuum electronics and solid state technologies and applications.
106-616	336	Defense Personnel Records Imaging System-Electronics Military Personnel Records System	Report	09/01/00	Navy	Identify the strategy for sustainment of this system.
106-616	341	Naval Audit Service	Notify	Within 10 days of decision being made	Navy	Submit documentation to support any decision to close audit sites in major fleet concentration areas.
106-616	249	Extended range cruise missile (ERCM)	Report	If necessary, but 30 days prior to obligating any funds	OUSD/AT&L	If Air Force opts to include a penetration warhead, DDR&E provide an assessment of penetration warhead improvements necessary to defeat the full spectrum of targets identified.
106-616	279	High definition displays for military applications	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Develop a strategy for meeting the requirements for advanced high definition displays.
106-616	120	Aircraft navigational and passenger safety equipment	Report	02/01/01	Services	Report on passenger and navigation safety upgrade status and plans for each of its passenger-carrying aircraft.
<b>106-298</b>	<b>SAC-Defense Subcommittee Rpt (on S 2593, Rpt'd 18 May 00)</b>					
106-298	136	Defense Working Capital Funding Adjustments	Report	NLT 10/30/00	OUSD/P&R	Report on the usage policies, categories, reimbursement, etc. of the commissaries. SECDEF report.
106-298	028	Civil Air Patrol (CAP)	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Report on the status of the relationship between the organizations and the governance and management of CAP, e.g., the cost of Air Force oversight of CAP.
106-298	035	819th Red Horse Squadron	Report	10/15/00	Air Force	Report on the plan and time line to provide this standard vehicle allowance to the 819th Squadron.
106-298	036	C <sup>4</sup> Infrastructure Requirements for C-17 Beddown	Plan	11/15/00	Air Force	Provide a plan and time line for satisfying these funding commitments.
106-298	083	C-130 modifications	Report	Not specified	Air Force	Report on the potential acquisition of existing simulators to support this effort, and the location of the simulator training site to support the Pacific Air Forces.
106-298	083	Commando Solo	Report	NLT 02/15/01	Air Force	Conduct an analysis of options for effective airframe alternatives, to include the investigation of cost effective, commercial aircraft replacement options.
106-298	118	Combat Training Ranges	Report	11/01/00	Air Force	Inform the Committees of the earliest expected implementation of ADOSM to achieve initial operational capability.

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106-298	018	Unutilized plant capacity	Report	NLT 09/15/00	Army	Study the scale <b>and</b> capacity of <b>arsenals</b> and ammunition plants, in an effort to mitigate the need for <b>further</b> cash subsidies.
106298	059	STAR-T	certify	When necessary	Army	Certify, when appropriate, that <b>the</b> program no longer has any <b>software</b> integration problems.
106-298	098	Objective Crew-Served Weapon (OCSW)	Report	Within 60 days of passage	Army	Provide a status of the program.
106-298	139	Deseret Chemical Depot	Report	Within 30 days of investigation	Army	Report the findings <b>from</b> safety <b>investigations</b> conducted at <b>Tooele Chemical Agent Facility (TOCDF)</b> .
106298	144	Office of the Inspector General	Report	Semi-annually	IG	Submit a semi-annual <b>expenditures</b> report in <b>compliance with</b> the requirements contained in sec. 127 of title 10, U.S.C.
106-298	014	Container use maximization	Report	Within 1 year from enactment	JCS	Outline in detail the inventory of DOD-owned container equipment and its readiness condition, the percentage <b>being containerized</b> , and provide an analysis of steps taken.
106-298	023	Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard	Report	NLT 01/15/01	Navy	<b>Report</b> on the <b>status</b> of the conveyance and <b>remediation</b> of this <b>property</b> .
106298	033	Real property maintenance, Army National Guard	Report	04/15/01	NGB	<b>Detail</b> how all funds appropriated for real property <b>maintenance to the ANG will be allocated</b> .
106-298	034	Distributive Training Technology program	Report	02/15/01	NGB	Report on how the <b>Department</b> intends to allocate funding for this program in <b>FY-01</b> .
106-298	034	Homeland Defense Initiative, Camp Gruber, OK and Camp Dawson, WV	Report	03/05/01	NGB	Report on a feasibility study to assess the establishment of combat training centers for <b>local</b> , State and Federal entities in response to weapons of <b>mass</b> destruction ( <b>WMD</b> ) threats.
106-298	037	Museum of the Rockies	Report	10/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a report on <b>plans</b> to fund and build this facility, and the <b>overall construction</b> schedule, to include the DD form <b>1391</b> .
106298	097	Electronic Warfare Plan	Assessment	04/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a analysis of each system's capability and potential for <b>enhancement</b> , including a specific assessment of each system's capability against the current and projected <b>threats</b> .
106-298	127	PAC-3/Navy Area Defense	Report	04/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	Conduct a study of the potential for <b>the</b> missile to be used as <b>the</b> interceptor in <b>the</b> Navy Area program.
106-298	035	Angel Gate Academies	Report	NLT 02/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Should this program <b>be</b> included in <b>the</b> civil-military program <b>and</b> should it be expanded to additional locations.
106298	140	Clinical Coupler Demonstration Project	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	<b>Report</b> the results of the clinical couplers demonstration, including a <b>recommendation</b> on <b>whether</b> they <b>should</b> be <b>fully</b> incorporated into the CHCS II system.
106-298	036	Notification of environmental contract awards	Notify	Upon release of draft solicitations	Services	Notify interested State and local authorities and <b>interested</b> Members of <b>Congress</b> upon release of <b>draft solicitations</b> for <b>contracts anticipated</b> to exceed \$5,000,000.

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<b>06-644</b>	<b>HAC-Defense Subcommittee Rpt (on HR 4576, Rpt'd 25 May 00)</b>					
106-644	050	War Reserve and Prepositioned Materials	Report	01/31/01	JCS	Detail specific <b>shortfalls</b> and other stocks needed as described in the QRR, include estimates for both quantities and types of <b>material shortfalls</b> , measures to eliminate shortfalls, and <b>estimates</b> of the cost to remedy. SECDEF report
106-644	006	Information Assurance and Computer Network Security	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I	Provide details on planned obligation of funds, as well as funding <b>proposed</b> in the FY-02 budget. SECDEF report.
106-644	176	Radiation hardened electronics	Report	NLT 04/01/01, then <b>Annually</b>	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the implementation of the Radiation Hardened Electronics Investment Strategy, and describe the degree of participation by <b>the</b> Services and Agencies. SECDEF report.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT)	Certify	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/C	Certify the budget submission fully funds an additional two <b>IBCTs</b> , as well as <b>in</b> each of the succeeding years of <b>the</b> FYDP <b>until</b> eight brigades are financed. SECDEF report- SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106644	041	Guard and Reserve <b>Workyear</b> Requirements	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Report on efforts to <b>ensure</b> that accurate accounting information is used <b>in preparing the</b> Reserve components budget submissions. SECDEF report.
106-644	053	Public transit vouchers	Report	NLT 7/23/00	OUSD/P&R	Delineate measures that the <b>DoD</b> has taken to implement E.O. 13150, and estimate the funding required to support the Executive Order. SECDEF report.
106-644	071	DoD Schools	Report	01/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on school teacher <b>compensation/allowances</b> and fees for teacher/dependent medical <b>services</b> , include recommendations and legislative proposals, if appropriate. SECDEF report.
106-644	067	c-s spare Parts	Report	NLT 01/31/01 and 09/30/01	Air Force	Report the overall status of <b>the</b> spare <b>and</b> repair <b>parts program</b> , including <b>whether</b> necessary resources are <b>programmed</b> to address future <b>requirements</b> .
106644	067	AF cargo distribution hub	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Air Force	Assess the feasibility of <b>using Youngstown-Warren Aii</b> as a hub for the distribution of <b>DoD</b> cargo.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) (Army Management)	Report	04/30/01	Army	Commission an <b>independent</b> organization to review and make necessary recommendations to improve the Army's <b>managemen</b> structure, <b>procedures</b> , etc., and provide a <b>summary</b> of the Secretary's planned recommendations and actions.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) (Army Management)	Report	04/30/01	Army	<b>After</b> a review of ways to improve <b>the</b> Army's management structure and procedures, provide a <b>summary</b> of recommendations and actions to be taken.
106-644	085	Depleted Uranium Environmental Restoration	Report	11/23/00	Army	<b>Define responsibilities</b> for restoration of the site, if any, plans to meet them, <b>and</b> identify <b>funding</b> requirements, how the Army has financed them, and a detailed schedule for completion.

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106-644	093	Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Modernization	Plan	01/15/01	Army	Submit a plan for modernization of the force, and include an analysis of the threat against the current, mid-term and future threat forces, alternatives for meeting the threat and their cost, and the plan to fund modernization.
106-644	091	Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)	Report	04/01/01	Army	Report the viability of installing GPWS on Army transport helicopters, include a cost analysis of the latest generation on a single circuit card and an acquisition plan.
106-644	098	Ammunition Management	Report	Within 3 months of enactment	Army	Report the effectiveness of the Triad at managing ammunition, include readiness measurements; on-time delivery; reduction in backlog, and modernization of production base.
106-644	103	Up-armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)	Report	NLT 07/10/00	Army	Outline Army's acquisition objective, current inventory levels, and the funding required to alleviate the shortfall.
106-644	156	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	Report	06/15/01	Army	Identify UAV requirements not met by the Tactical UAV (TUAV) and plans for meeting those requirements.
106-644	157	Excalibur (XM-982)	Report	07/1/00	Army	Outline alternatives for meeting the 155mm requirement, including capabilities, estimated development cost, production cost, and the schedule for each alternative.
106-644	195	Anthrax Vaccine Program	Report	12/30/00	Army	Present plans to significantly accelerate the availability of new vaccine as well as any additional unfunded requirement associated with this goal.
106-644	128	Miscellaneous Production Charges	Report	NLT 02/15/01	AT&L	Report the findings of a review of plans to acquire next generation targeting pods, and steps taken to promote joint commonality.
106-644	062	Naval Sea Cadet Program	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Navy	Lists the benefits of the program to the Navy, and identifies financial, material and manpower resources the Navy should make available to the program in order to expand it.
106-644	108	F-3 Modernization	Report	01/15/01	Navy	Identify the outyear requirements for a SLEP, including any requirement to replace sensors.
106-644	118	Aviation requirement for Joint Tactical Terminals	Report	03/15/01	Navy	Review and report the requirement for aviation joint tactical terminals.
106-644	168	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS)	Report	12/15/00	Navy	Address all of the plans for unmanned aerial vehicles, including, at a minimum, all identified requirements.
106-644	145	Information security lessons learned	Report	11/15/00	OASD/C3I	Outline efforts in implementing lessons learned from April 10, 2000, report on Year 2000.
106-644	148	Tactical radios	certify	Prior to more than 25% of funds being obligated	OASD/C3I	Certify that the development program meets interoperability requirements, is not duplicative of other developmental efforts and is fully funded in the budget.
106-644	148	Networking of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)	Report	NLT 09/30/01	OASD/C3I	Provide a report on the strategy to network ISR platforms.

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IReport	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-644	151	Use of special access-like security measures to protect business sensitive information	Report	NLT 11/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the review of guidance for using security measures to protect business sensitive information, and development of additional guidance.
106-644	052	O&M Budget Execution Data	Notify	Semiannual	OUSD/C	Summarize O&M budget execution, including the effect of rebaselining procedures, other below threshold reprogrammings, and prior approval reprogrammings.
106-W	052	O&M Budget Execution Data	Notify	30 days prior	OUSD/C	Notify prior to executing procedures to rebaseline O&M accounts.
106-644	052	O&M Reprogrammings	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Notify of the cumulative value of any and all transfers in excess of \$15,000,000 from any of the O&M budget activities and subactivity group categories.
106-644	197	Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)	Report	Not specified	OUSD/P	Report on the status of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System.
106-644	197	Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)	Certify	Not specified	OUSD/P	Certify that the budget for FY-02 and the FYDP fully meet the operational and modernization requirements, and management responsibility and funding have been best allocated.
106-644	184	Arms control technology	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a detailed report on the plan for obligating these funds.
106-644	177	Air Traffic Control, Approach, and Landing System	Certify	Prior to funds being obligated	OUSD/P&R	Certify that the development program meets schedule and performance requirements of Air National Guard units.
106-710	<b>MILCON Conference Rpt (on HR 4425, Rpt'd 29 Jun 00)</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-246 on 13 Jul 00</b>
106-710	015	Sec. 139, Transfer of Funds (Forward Operating Locations)	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Report on construction, security and operation of Forward Operating Locations (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador, Aruba, Curacao, and El Salvador. SECDEF report.
106-710	020	Sec. 106, Defense Health Program	Notify	Before charging	OUSD/P&R	Notify the committees before charging an obligation or an adjustment to obligations under this section. SECDEF report.
106-710	020	Sec. 106, Defense Health Program	Report	NLT 30 days after the end of FY-00.	OUSD/P&R	Report on obligations made under this section. SECDEF report
106-710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Reporting Requirements)	Notify	45 days prior to transfer of any funds	OUSD/C	Submit notice and justification for the transfer of appropriated funds into the account. SECDEF report.
106-710	062.	Sec. 3101, Counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Certify	15 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUSD/P	Address the support provided under this section by the Government of Colombia. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	007	Sec. 119, Transfer of Funds (Burden sharing)	Report	02/15 Annually	OUSD/P & C	Provide details of the specific actions proposed to be taken to encourage nations of the NATO, Japan, Korea, and U.S. allies bordering the Arabian Gulf. SECDEF report.
106-710	064	Sec. 3201, Conditions on Assistance for Colombia -- waiver	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/P	Assistance may be furnished if to do so is in the national security interest. President report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.

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Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-710	065	Sec. 3202. Regional Strategy	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSD/P	Current policy and strategy regarding U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Colombia and neighbors. <i>President report</i> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	066	sec. 3204, Limitations on support for plan Colombia and on assignment of U.S. personnel in Colombia	Report	When necessary	OUSD/P	Request the availability of funds. <i>President report</i> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	067	Sec. 3204. Limitations on assignment of U.S. personnel in Colombia -- Exception	Report	If necessary	OUSD/P	Request the limitation not apply. <i>President report</i> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	067	Sec. 3204. Support for Plan Colombia	Report	Semiannually from 06/01/01	OUSD/P	Delineate any costs (including incremental costs) incurred by any entity of the Executive branch during the two previous fiscal quarters. <i>President report</i> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	067	Sec. 3204. Bimonthly report	Report	Within 90 days of enactment and every 60 days thereafter	OUSD/P	Includes the aggregate number, locations, activities, and lengths of assignment for all temporary and permanent U.S. military and U.S. individuals retains as contractors. <i>President report</i> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-710	011	Sec. 136. Brooks Air Force Base Development Demonstration Project	Plan	30 days prior to exercising any authority	Air Force	The Secretary may not exercise any authority under this section until after the submission of a master plan for development of the Base.
106-710	014	Sec. 136. Brooks Air Force Base Development Demonstration Project	Report	30 days prior	Air Force	Section 2662 of title 10, U.S.C., applies to transactions at the Base during the Project.
106-710	089	Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator	Report	NLT 02/28/01	Air Force	Conduct a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis and standard return on investment criteria in the relocation study now being performed and provide a report.
106-710	019	Sec. 104. Abrams M1A2 SEP Upgrades	Certify	Prior to funds being obligated	Army	Certify that these funds will be used to upgrade vehicles for an average unit cost (for 307 vehicles) that does not exceed \$5,900,000.
106-710	095	Base Realignment and Closure Account, Part IV	Notify	21 days prior to transfer of funds	Army	Any transfer of funds which exceeds reprogramming thresholds for any construction project financed by any BRAC Account and shall not be subject to reprogramming procedure.
106-710	097	Cadet Physical Development Center	Notify	30 days prior to use of private donations	Army	Any further requirements must be funded through private donations.
106-710	022	Sec. 113. Patriot missile program	Plan	NLT 30 days after enactment	BMDO	Submit a revised plan for \$125,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 2002, and be available only for this program.
106-710	023	Sec. 118. NMD Program	Notify	15 days prior	BMDO	Notify prior to issuing any type of information or proposal solicitation with a potential annual contract value greater than \$5,000,000 or a total contract value greater than \$30,000,000.
106-710	006	Sec. 113. Proposed military exercises	Notify	30 days prior	JCS	Provide plans and scope of proposed military exercise involving U.S. personnel if amounts expended for construction, either temporary or permanent, are anticipated to exceed \$100,000.

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106-710	010	Sec. 135, Marine Corps Barracks, 8th and I Streets	Notify	30 days prior to the use of funds	Navy	Authorization to use funds received for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of the historic residences
106-710	017	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide (including Transfer of Funds)	Certify	30 days prior to funds becoming available	Navy	Certify that the integrity and accessibility of the training range is uninterrupted, and trespassing and other intrusions on the range have ceased.
106-710	017	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide (including Transfer of Funds)	Recertify	90 days after initial certification	Navy	SECNAV shall recertify the status of the range 90 days after the initial certification, and each 90 days thereafter.
106-710	005	Sec. 110, New installation overseas	Notify	Prior to initiation	OUSD/AT&L	No funds MilCon Appropriations Acts may be used to initiate a new installation overseas without prior notification.
106-710	007	Sec. 123, DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund	Notify	30 days prior to transfer	OUSD/AT&L	Additional amounts as may be determined may be transferred to the DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund from amounts appropriated for construction in "Family Housing" accounts.
106-710	008	Sec. 125, Transfer of funds (military family housing)	Notify	NLT 60 days before issuing any solicitation	OUSD/AT&L	Provide notice of any guarantee (including making mortgage or rental payments) proposed to be made by the Secretary to the private party under the contract involved in the certain events.
106-710	088	Alkali Silica Reactivity	Report	NLT 05/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Assess the overall condition of facilities and infrastructure with respect to ASR, also address the long-term strategy and recommendations to manage this issue.
106-710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Contractor Support for Family Housing Privatization)	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	Review quarterly, and report the expenses of each component to ensure excessive amounts are not being spent on contractor support.
106-710	009	Sec. 127, O&M for family housing, including flag and general officer quarters	Report	Annually	OUSD/C	Report all O&M expenditures for each individual flag and general officer quarters for the prior fiscal year.
106-710	132	Military personnel, recruiting, advertising, and retention programs	Notify	30 days prior to obligation	OUSD/C	The remaining funds shall be withheld from obligation pending the proposed specific distribution of funds.
106-710	061	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense (including Transfer of Funds)	Report	15 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUSD/P	Report on the value, duration and purpose of contracts for training, logistics support, planning or assistance contracts for any overseas activity.
106-710	132	Anti-Deficiency Act and TRICARE	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSD/P&R	Delineate the extent and scope of any violations of fiscal law or departmental regulations found during an investigation into the execution and administration of Defense Health Program funds.
106-710	009	Sec. 128, Family Housing Master Plan	Plan	07/01/01	Services	Demonstrate how the plan will meet the year 2010 housing goals with traditional construction, operation and maintenance support, as well as privatization initiative proposals.
106-710	087	Real Property Maintenance: Reporting Requirement	Notify	21 days prior	Services	Submit prior to carrying out any repair project with an estimate cost in excess of \$7,500,000.
106-710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Reporting Requirements)	Notify	45 days prior to entering into any contract	Services	Submit notice of the nature and terms of the privatization contracts following a 45-day review period.

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<b>106-754</b>	<b>Appropriations Conference Rpt (on HR 4576, Rpt'd 18 Jul 00)</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-259 on 9 Aug 00</b>
106-754	234	Artillery Systems -- Demonstration/Validation	Report	30 days prior to 50% of funds	Army	Submit an Analysis of Alternatives on Crusader and analysis of Crusader and Future Combat System SECDEF report.
106-754	024	Sec. 8021. Relocations	Certify	When necessary	DA&M	If a <b>relocation</b> within the National Capital Region is required is it in the best <b>interest</b> of the Government. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	040	Sec. 8095, ADC(X) class main propulsion diesel engines and propulsors	Certify	On a case-by-case basis	Navy	When adequate domestic supplies are not available to <b>meet</b> requirements on a timely basis and such acquisitions must be made in order to acquire capability. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	281	Information Technology Center	Report	NLT 05/01/01	Navy	<b>Outline</b> plans for <b>proceeding</b> with establishment of the centers. SECDEF report.
106-754	024	Sec. 8019, Executive agreement with NATO member host nation	Report	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Each executive agreement with a NATO member host nation shall <b>be</b> reported. SECDEF <b>report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	027	Sec. 8032, Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Present specific</b> amounts of staff years of <b>technical effort</b> to be allocated for each defense FFRDC during that fiscal year. SECDEF report.
106-754	028	Sec. 8036, Buy American Act	Report	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Determine the</b> amount of DoD purchases from foreign entities in FY-01 and <b>indicate</b> the dollar value of items for <b>which</b> the BA Act was waived pursuant to any agreement. SECDEF report.
106-754	034	Sec. 8066, Purchase of supercomputer	certify-	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify that an <b>acquisition</b> must be made in order to <b>acquire capability</b> for national security purposes. SECDEF <b>report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	035	Sec. 807 1, Defense exports loan guarantees	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the implementation of these loan guarantees. SECDEF <b>report</b> .
106-754	038	Sec. 8084, RDT&E funds to procure end-items for delivery to military forces	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	May waive the <b>restriction</b> on a case-by-case basis by <b>certifying</b> that it is in the national security interest. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	041	Sec. 8099, Advanced concept technology demonstration projects	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Waive <b>the restriction</b> by <b>certifying</b> that it is in the national interest to do so. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN
106-754	046	Sec. 8120, Work-related illnesses resulting from exposure to beryllium or beryllium alloys	Report	05101101	OUSD/AT&L	Work-related illnesses in the <b>DoD</b> workforce, including the workforce of contractors and vendors. SECDEF <b>report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	048	Sec. 8124, LRIP for F-22 aircraft program	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify <b>that</b> all Defense Acquisition Board exit criteria for the award of low-rate initial production of <b>the aircraft</b> have been met. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.

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106-754	106	Enhanced Safety in DoD Industrial Facilities	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Evaluate the feasibility of establishing pilot programs to improve worker safety and include proposals for employing gain sharing incentives. SECDEF report.
106-754	220	Joint Strike Fighter	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a status of the program, technical development results, flight test program, and cost estimates. SECDEF report.
106-754	264	Joint Ejection Seat Program	Plan	30 days prior to contract award	OUSD/AT&L (N/AF)	Address all specific applications for the ejection seat or ejection seat technology developed. Specifically address the cost and commonality benefits. SECDEF report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8005, Military Functions	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the military functions account. SECDEF report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8006, Working Capital Funds	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the "Foreign Currency Fluctuation" and "Operation and Maintenance" appropriation accounts. SECDEF report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8006, Working Capital Funds	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the war reserve material inventory. SECDEF report.
106-754	028	Sec. 8041, DoD Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account	Report	30 days prior to transfer or obligation of funds	OUSD/C	Detail the balance available, projected income during FYs 2001 and 2002, and specific expenditures to be made using funds transferred from the account during FY-01. SECDEF report.
106-754	033	Sec. 8061, Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Revolving Fund	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/C	Certify that the total cost for the planning, design, construction and installation of equipment for the renovation will not exceed \$1,222,000,000. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	043	Sec. 8103, Reimbursement by another department or agency	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Certify a waiver if a department or agency is more than 90 days in arrears for goods or services. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	049 / 091	Sec. 8131, Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund	Report	NLT 30 days after the end of each quarter	OUSD/C	Explain transfers from the "Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund", and transfers for maintenance, pay of civilian personnel, and base operations support. SECDEF report.
106-754	040	Sec. 8092, Foreign security forces training program	Report	15 days after the exercise of any waiver	OUSD/P	Describe the circumstances, purpose and duration of training, U.S. and foreign forces involved, and human rights violations information necessitating the waiver. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	044	Sec. 8109, the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance	Report	04/01/01	OUSD/P	Regards training of foreign personnel in the previous year, specify countries in which the training was conducted, type of training, and the foreign personnel trained. SECDEF report.
106-754	031	Sec. 8052, Field Operating Agency	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Granting a waiver on limitations will reduce the personnel requirements or the financial requirements of the department. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-754	046	Sec. 8117, Health care contract costs	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Evaluate the scope and extent of health care contract claims, and on actions taken to implement the provision. SECDEF report.

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106-754	047	Sec. 8123, Interim Armored Vehicle program (Family of Medium Armored Vehicles)	Report	NLT 90 days after source selection	Army	Include the required R&D and production unit cost for each variant of the vehicle and the program cost and milestones.
106-754	098	Underutilized Plant Capacity	Report	09/15/00	Army	Study the scale and capacity of the plants.
106-754	098	Air Battle Captain	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	Army	Submit a detailed recruitment plan, specifically addressing this program.
106-754	099	Enhanced Skills Training Program	Report	10/01/00	Army	Define the long-term plans for the program's partnership with HBCU's.
106-754	099	Open Burn/Open Disposal Practices	Report	09/30/01	Army	Study potential alternative technologies and report on possible phase out; include a review of technologies currently in existence and under development and assess cost and feasibility of constructing facilities.
106-754	147	Forward Looking Infrared Devices (FLIR)	Report	Prior to obligation of funds	Army	Justify a requirement for a unique FLIR and demonstrate that it is affordable compared to a common system.
106-754	234	Enhanced Skills Training Program	Report	NLT 10/01/00	Army	Report on long term plans for Army's partnership with HBCU's in preparing students for the Army.
106-754	287	Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program	Report	03/01/01	Army	Report the status of the program, and include the corresponding funds provided in previous fiscal years.
106-754	048 / 293	Sec. 8127, NMD Program	Notify	15 days prior to issuing	BMDO	When issuing any type of information or proposal solicitation with a potential annual contract value greater than \$5,000,000 or a total contract value greater than \$30,000,000.
106-754	048	Sec. 8123, Joint warfighting requirements for new medium brigades for the Army	Report	With FY-02 budget request	JCS	Describe any adjustments made to operational plans of the unified combatant commands for use of those brigades.
106-754	49	Sec. 8133, Navy ship construction appropriation transfer of funds	Report	30 days prior to the proposed transfer	Navy	Navy may transfer funds for the purpose of liquidating necessary ship cost changes for previous ship construction programs appropriated in law.
106-754	189	SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System	Report	Within 120 days	Navy	Assess the operational readiness status of the system, including plans and funding requirements.
106-754	050	Sec. 8136, Navy Inactive Fleet and Maritime Administration National Defense Reserve Fleet ship disposal and scrapping	Report	06/01/01	Navy (and DoT)	Report the total number of vessels currently designated for scrapping, and the schedule and costs for scrapping these vessels.
106-754	264	Joint Ejection Seat Program	Certify	Prior to obligation of funds	Navy / Air Force	Certify that a joint program office is in place to manage to program.
106-754	042	Sec. 8102, Certifications as to Compliance with Clinger-Cohen Act	Notify	Prior to Milestone approval	OASD/C3I	Certify, with respect to each milestone, that the system is being developed in accordance with the Act.
106-754	264	Discoverer II	Report	Not specified	OASD/C3I	Submit a program plan for the development, testing and application of technologies funded under this revised initiative.
106-754	048	Sec. 8124, LRIP for F-22 aircraft program	Report	When necessary	OT&E	Assess the adequacy of testing to date to measure and predict performance of F-22 avionics system, stealth characteristics, and weapons delivery systems.

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106-754	022	Sec. 8014, Contractor performance	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	No funds shall <b>be</b> available to convert to contractor performance an activity or <b>function</b> that, until an efficient and cost-effective <b>organization analysis</b> is completed.
106-754	041	Sec. 8099, Advanced concept <b>technology</b> demonstration projects	Report	30 days prior to obligation of funds	OUSD/AT&L	Include a <b>description of the</b> demonstration project and its estimated annual and total cost.
106-754	020	Sec. 8007, Special Access <b>Program</b>	Notify	30 days prior to transfer	OUSDK	Funds may not <b>be</b> used to initiate a special access program.
106-754	020	Sec. 8008, <b>Multiyear Contracts</b>	Notify	30 days <b>prior</b> to contract award	OUSD/C	No funds shall <b>be available</b> for which <b>the</b> economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability.
106-754	021	Sec. 8008, <b>Multiyear</b> Contracts	Notify	10 days <b>prior</b> to <b>termination</b>	OUSD/C	No <b>multiyear procurement</b> contract can be terminated.
106-754	021	Sec. 8009, <b>Humanitarian</b> and Civic Assistance costs	Report	9/30 <b>Annually</b>	OUSD/C	O&M funds may be obligated for <b>humanitarian</b> and civic assistance costs incidental to authorized operations and <b>pursuant</b> to authority granted.
106-754	037	Sec. 8078, FY-02 Budget Request reductions	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Identify, by amount and by <b>separate</b> budget activity, activity group, subactivity group, line item, program element, program, project, subproject, and activity any reductions.
106-754	038	Sec. 8086, Funding reductions of <b>0.7%</b>	Report	60 days after enactment	OUSD/C	<b>Amounts provided</b> in all <b>appropriation</b> accounts in <b>titles II?</b> and IV of the Act are affected and reductions <b>shall</b> be applied on a pro-rata basis to each <b>appropriation</b> account.
106-754	039	Sec. 8091, New <b>Start Program</b>	Notify	Prior to payment	OUSD/C	No funds may be used to compensate an employee of <b>the DoD</b> who initiates a <b>program</b> without notification.
106-754	121	<b>Civil/Military</b> Programs	Report	04/15/01	OUSD/C	Report the status of <b>the</b> obligation of funds for these programs.
106-754	284	National Defense <b>Sealift</b> Fund (C-17)	Notify	When necessary	OUSD/C	<b>NDAF</b> should conform to <b>the</b> requirements for other <b>DoD</b> procurement accounts.
106-754	035	Sec. 8070, Limitation on Transfer of Defense <b>Articles</b> and Services	Notify	15 days in advance of my transfer.	OUSD/P	A description of the equipment, supplies, or services to be transferred, and a statement of the value in peacekeeping or <b>peace-enforcement operations</b> .
106-754	291	T-AGOS support	Report	NLT 03/30/01	OUSD/P	Analyze the operational effectiveness of the T-AGOS ships and provide a summary of suggested alternative platforms or assets and their associated <b>costs</b> .
106-754	015	National Guard and <b>Reserve</b> Equipment	Report	NLT 30 days after <b>enactment</b>	OUSD/P&R	Submit a <b>modernization</b> priority assessment for <b>each Reserve or National Guard component</b> .
106-754	023	Sec. 8016, Shipboard anchor and mooring chain	Certify	If necessary	Services	<b>When adequate domestic supplies are not available on a timely basis, the Secretary of the service responsible for the procurement may waive the restriction on a case-by-case basis.</b>
106-754	027	Sec. 8033, Procurement of carbon, alloy or armor steel plate	Certify	When necessary	Services	<b>Certify that adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet requirements and an acquisition must be made.</b>

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106-754 033	Sec. 8060, <b>Military</b> Treatment Facilities	<b>Certify</b>	<b>If necessary</b>	<b>Services</b>	Certify that the <b>beneficiary</b> population is declining and civilian <b>strength</b> reductions may be consistent with responsible resource stewardship and <b>capitation-</b> based budgeting.
106-754 034	<b>Sec. 8064, Vessel</b> propellers and ball and roller bearings	<b>Certify</b>	When necessary	Services	Certify that adequate domestic supplies are not available to <b>meet requirements</b> on a timely basis.
<b>106-945 Authorization Conference Rpt (H.R. 4205 (HR 5408), Rpt'd 6 Oct</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-398 on 30 Oct 00</b>
106945 036 / 646	Sec. 131, <b>B-2</b> Bomber	<b>Report</b>	0310   Annually	<b>Air Force</b>	Include capability to carry out missions; ongoing and planned technology efforts to improve <b>capabilities</b> and meet expanded threats; and a fiscally-phased program for each of three funding scenarios. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945 340	<b>Sec. 1203, Furnishing</b> of Nuclear Test Monitoring Equipment to Foreign Governments	<b>Report</b>	<b>Promptly</b> after entering into any <b>agreement</b>	<b>Air Force</b>	Identify <b>the</b> country with which <b>the agreement</b> was made, <b>the</b> anticipated costs to be incurred, and the national interest that is <b>furthered</b> by the agreement. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945 031	Sec. 113, Costs and Effectiveness of Medium Armored Combat Vehicles for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams	<b>Certify</b>	30 days after submission of <b>Army's</b> plan	<b>Army</b>	After completion of comparison of costs and operational effectiveness, certify obligation of funds, the force structure and <b>the</b> subsequent operational capability will not diminish <b>the</b> combat power. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945 038 / 647	Sec. 152, <b>Federal</b> economic <b>assistance</b> for communities impacted by Chemical Demilitarization activities	<b>Report</b>	04/01/01	<b>Army</b>	Report on impact of the <b>DoD</b> destruction program on communities in <b>the</b> vicinity of stockpile storage sites and associated activities at certain facilities. SECDEF report.
106-945 079	Sec. 344, <b>Codification</b> and improvement of armament retooling and <b>manufacturing</b> support programs	<b>Report</b>	NLT 07/01/01	<b>Army</b>	<b>Report</b> on the procedures and controls implemented to <b>carry out</b> this program. SECDEF report.
106-945 241 / 836	Sec. 911, Western <b>Hemisphere</b> Institute for Security Cooperation	<b>Report</b>	<b>NLT 03/15</b> Annually	<b>Army</b>	<b>Detail</b> activities of <b>the</b> institute for the previous <b>calendar year</b> , in consultation with the Secretary of State. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945 205 / 819	<b>Sec. 751, Management</b> of anthrax vaccine immunization program	<b>Report</b>	NLT 04/01 Annually	DEPSECDEF	Track and report separations resulting from refusal to <b>participate</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945 261	sec. 1006, <b>Requirement</b> for prompt payment of contract vouchers	<b>Report</b>	<b>If necessary</b>	DFAS	If for any <b>month</b> of <b>the</b> noncompliance reporting period the requirement is not met, a report on the magnitude of <b>the</b> unpaid contract <b>vouchers</b> shall be submitted. SECDEF report.
106-945 044 I718 S	Sec. 216, Limitation on Russian American Observation Satellites Program ( <b>RAMOS</b> )	<b>Report</b>	30 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	<b>BMDO</b>	Explain plans to protect U.S. advanced <b>military</b> technology <b>that</b> may be associated with the program SECDEF report.
106-945 275 / 849	Sec. 1034, <b>Status</b> of domestic <b>preparedness</b> against the threat of biological terrorism	<b>Report</b>	03/01/01	DIA	An intelligence estimate of the threat posed by a biological weapon and the consequences of a terrorist attack compared to using other <b>types</b> of weapons. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.

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106-945	346 / 871	Sec. 1233, Communist Chinese military companies operating in the U.S.	Report	NLT 03/01/01	DIA	Make a determination of those persons operating in the U.S. or any of its territories and possessions and submit a list in classified and unclassified form. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	346	Sec. 1233, Communist Chinese military companies operating in the U.S.	Report	02/01 Annually	DIA	To make additions or deletions to the list. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	094 / 770	Sec. 381, Public sale of certain military equipment identified on U.S. Munitions List	Report	NLT March 31 annually	DLA	Identify each public sale conducted by a military department or defense agency and cover various elements of the public sale. SECDEF report.
106-945	279 / 852	Sec. 1054, DOD process for decisionmaking in cases of false claims	Report	02/01/01	IG	Describe policies and procedures in cases of claims; include any changes in policies and procedures, and how such procedures are being implemented. SECDEF report.
106-945	792	Sec. 552, Defense Clearance and Investigative Index (DCII)	Report	04/01/01	IG	Submit findings and recommendations of a review of policies and procedures addressing the degree that must exist before titling and indexing occurs. SECDEF report.
106-945	030 / 643	Sec. 113, Objective Force Development Process	Report	03/01/01	JCS	Report on the process for developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army, including joint warfighting and lift requirements. SECDEF report.
106-945	041 / 717	Sec. 213, FY-02 Joint Field Experiment	Report	NLT 3/1/2001	JCS	Report on the concept plan, including the objectives; forces participating; schedule and location; and for each participate, identification of budget issues. SECDEF report.
106-945	116	Sec. 507, Grade of Chiefs of Reserve components and Directors of National Guard components	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on a study of changing the grade authorized for the Vice Chief of the NGB from major general to lieutenant general, and include recommendations/conclusions. SECDEF report.
106-945	150	Sec. 576, Test of ability of Reserve component intelligence units and personnel to meet current and emerging Defense intelligence needs	Report (Final)	NLT 12/1/2004	OUSD/P&R	Submit a final report with recommendations for changes. SECDEF report.
106-945	152	Sec. 578, Study of use of civilian contractor pilots for operational support missions	Report	NLT 6 months after enactment	JCS	Study the feasibility and cost of using civilian contractor personnel as pilots and other air crew members to fly nonmilitary Government aircraft. SECDEF report.
106-945	251 / 839	Sec. 934, Network Centric Warfare (Joint Experimentation)	Report	03/01/01	JCS	Study the present and future use of joint experimentation for developing network centric warfare concepts. SECDEF report.
106-945	042	Sec 214, Acquisition and Maintenance Plan	Report	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Report on the Navy's plan. SECDEF report.
106-945	124	Sec. 535, Authority for NPG School to enroll certain Defense industry civilians	Report	NLT 60 days after receipt of Navy report	Navy	Submit the Navy report on the program, together with any comments that are considered appropriate. SECDEF report.
106-945	147 / 795	Sec. 573, Congressional review period for assignment of women to duty on submarines	Notify	Prior to any change in Navy policy	Navy	No changes in the policy, as in effect on May 10, 2000, may take effect until notification is given and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has past. SECDEF report.

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106-945	147 / 795	Sec. 573, Congressional review period for assignment of women to duty on submarines	Notify	Prior to funds being available	Navy	Before funds may be expended to reconfigure any submarine, or to design any new submarine, and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress have past. SECDEF report.
106-945	756	Cultural and historic activities	Report	NLT 04/01/01	Navy	Completely describe all prior and current use of Legacy funds and relevant state funds and the status of recovery and preservation activities. SECDEF report.
106-945	224	Sec. 811, Acquisition and management of information technology	Report	NLT 04/01 of FYs 2001, 2002 & 2003	OASD/C3I	Report on implementation of the requirements of this section during the preceding fiscal year, including each major automated information system approved. SECDEF report.
106-945	226 / 828	Sec. 812, Tracking and Management of information technology purchases	Report	NLT 03/15 Annually	OASD/C3I	Summarize data collected for each purchase of information technology products and services in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold. SECDEF report.
106-945	246	Sec. 921, Institute for Defense Computer Security and Information Protection	Plan	NLT 04/01/01	OASD/C3I	Submit a plan for establishing and contracting to organize and operate the institute. SECDEF report.
106-945	251 / 839	Sec. 934, Network Centric Warfare (Implementation)	Report	03/01/01	OASD/C3I	Report on the development and implementation of network centric warfare concepts. SECDEF report.
106-945	263	Sec. 1008, Electronic submission and processing of claims for contract payments	Plan	NLT 03/30/01	OASD/C3I	Plan for the implementation of the requirements imposed under Sec. 2227 of title 10, U.S.C. (as added by subsection (a)). SECDEF report.
106-945	289	Sec. 1063, Relationship of Defense information assurance program to government-wide information security program	Report	Annual	OASD/C3I	An addition to the annual report requirement is made by amending Subsection (e) sec. 2224 of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945	289	Sec. 1071, Limitation on granting of security clearances	Report	02/01 Annually	OASD/C3I	Report each waiver issued authorizing an exception to prohibitions during the preceding year with an explanation for each case. SECDEF report.
106-945	298	Sec. 1078, Coordination of nuclear weapons secrecy policies and consideration of health of workers at former DoD nuclear facilities	Report	NLT 05/01/01	OASD/C3I	Report the results of the review, including any changes made or recommendations for legislation; and status of the notifications required. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	363	Sec. 1403, Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack	Report	NLT 1 year after the Commission's report	OASD/C3I ?	Report on the Commission's findings and conclusions; describe political-military scenarios; evaluate the likelihood of an EMP attack compared to other threats. SECDEF report.
106-945	383	Sec. 1705, Progress on Spectrum Sharing	Report	Within 1 year of enactment	OASD/C3I	An interim report on the progress of the engineering study. SECDEF report.
106-945	639	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I	Provide an analysis evaluating current capability and forces; identifying capabilities and forces; enumerate capabilities that need to be created or enhanced; and itemize how the budget and the FYDP supports these needs. SECDEF report.
106-945	712	Defense Space Reconnaissance Program	Report	05/01/01	OASD/C3I	Provide an assessment and recommendations regarding the overall role of the NRO in supporting tactical military forces. SECDEF report.

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106-945	715	National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) pre-acquisition activities	Report	02/01/01	OASD/C3I	Describe the implementation of numerous steps to ensure the TPED efforts begin efficiently and promptly. SECDEF report.
106-945	865	Sec. 1142, Increase in number of positions authorized for the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service	Report	03/15/01	OASD/C3I	How will the additional senior executive service positions be allocated within the defense intelligence community? SECDEF report.
106-945	824	Acquisition programs at the National Security Agency	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I & NSA	Outline an oversight plan, including the changes the plan will make in the acquisition process. SECDEF report.
106-945	250 / 839	Sec. 932, Number of personnel assigned to legislative liaison functions	Report	NLT 12/01/00	OASD/LA	Report the number of personnel, shown by organizational entity and by pay grade, performing legislative liaison functions as of April 1, 2000. SECDEF report.
106-945	033 / 644	Sec 123, Virginia class submarine program	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on a plan for maintaining at least 55 fast attack submarines; two production rate assessments of potential savings; and an analysis of various contracting strategies. SECDEF report.
106-945	037 / 647	Sec. 141, Study of Final Assembly and Check Alternatives for the Joint Strike Fighter program	Report	NLT 180 days after date of award of a contract	OUUSD/AT&L	After award of a contract for engineering and manufacturing development provide the results of a study of final assembly and checkout alternatives for that aircraft. SECDEF report.
106-945	040 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike Fighter program	Report	12/15/00	OUUSD/AT&L	Describe the criteria for exiting from the demonstration and validation phase, and entry into the engineering and manufacturing development phase. SECDEF report.
106-945	040 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike Fighter program	Certify	Upon completion of exit criteria accomplishment	OUUSD/AT&L	Certify accomplishment of exit criteria; technological maturity sufficient for entry into engineering and manufacturing development phase; and short take-off, vertical-landing aircraft variant. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	041 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike Fighter program	Notify	Prior to any transfer	OUUSD/AT&L	Transfers within the JSF Navy and AF accounts may occur, subject to established congressional notification and reprogramming procedures. SECDEF report.
106-945	043 / 718	Sec 215, DD-21 class destroyer program	Report	NLT 04/18/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on Navy's plan for the acquisition and maintenance of the destroyers. SECDEF report.
106-945	044 / 719	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Notify	Prior to funds being obligated	OUUSD/AT&L	Submit when the FDA has approved the current manufacturer for production of the anthrax vaccine. SECDEF report.
106-945	044	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Report	Prior to funds being obligated	OUUSD/AT&L	Report contingencies associated with continuing to rely on the current manufacturer. SECDEF report.
106-945	045 / 719	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Notify / Justify	NLT 7 days after funds obligated exceeds \$5M	OUUSD/AT&L	Notify that total obligations exceed \$5M, together with written justification for obligation of funds in excess of that amount. SECDEF report.
106-945	045	Sec. 218, Biological warfare defense vaccines research and development programs	Report	02/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on the acquisition of biological warfare defense vaccine for the Department SECDEF report.

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106-945	046 / 720	Sec. 220, Unmanned advanced capability combat aircraft and ground combat vehicles	Report	01/31/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the programs to demonstrate the aircraft and vehicles undertaken jointly between the DARPA and any of the services. SECDEF report.
106-945	048	Sec. 221, Global Hawk high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle	Report	NLT 45 days after demonstration	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the results of the demonstration, including an assessment of the technical feasibility and a discussion of the operational concept for the use of the vehicle. SECDEF report.
106-945	050	Sec. 233, Plan to modify ballistic missile defense systems and architecture	Report	NLT 02/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	After assessing the plan report on the results of the assessment. SECDEF report.
106-945	053	Sec. 248, High Energy Laser programs	Report	NLT 02/15/2001, 2002 & 2003	OUSD/AT&L	Assess the adequacy of the management structure, funding available, technical progress, and extent to which goals and objectives of the plan have been met. SECDEF report.
106-945	054	Sec. 250, Review of Defense-wide directed energy programs	Report	NLT 03/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report the findings of the evaluation of expansion of the management structure. SECDEF report.
106-945	054	Sec. 251, Merits of Mobile Offshore Base Concept	Report	NLT 03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the cost-benefit analysis, using operational concepts; recommendation regarding whether to proceed as a program and, if so state which service is to be designated to have the lead responsibility; and include a schedule. SECDEF report.
106-945	066 / 762	Sec. 319, Defense Environmental Security Corporate Information Management Program	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Include a mission statement and strategic objectives for the Program, recommendations of the Secretary for the Programs future mission and objectives. SECDEF report.
106-945	071 / 764	Sec. 341, Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence and public-private partnerships to increase utilization of such centers	Report	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Report the extent to which a loan guarantee program modeled after the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program would help to achieve the objectives. SECDEF report.
106-945	081 / 765	Sec. 351, Additional information required before conversion of commercial or industrial type functions to contractor performance	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify the factors considered in the examinations performed, and the decisions made, did not include any predetermined personnel constraint or limitation. SECDEF report.
106-945	081 / 766	Sec. 353, Consolidation, restructuring, or reengineering of organizations, functions, or activities	Plan	Annually with budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Submit each Strategic Sourcing Plan of Action for the Department (as identified in the DoD Interim Guidance), for the following year. SECDEF report.
106-945	082	Sec. 353, Consolidation, restructuring, or reengineering of organizations, functions, or activities: Decision to execute plan	Report	If a decision is made	OUSD/AT&L	Describe the decision, include a projection of savings compared with cost; describe missions, duties, or requirements affected; and various certifications and schedules. SECDEF report.
106-945	083 / 767	Sec. 354, Savings resulting from workforce reductions as part of conversion of functions	Report	NLT 02/01 annually	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the results of the monitoring performed under the system established. SECDEF report.
106-945	091 / 769	Sec. 374, ID of requirements to reduce backlog in maintenance and repair of Defense facilities	Report	NLT 03/15/01, with annual updates	OUSD/AT&L	Identify, develop and annually update a strategic plan for the reduction of the backlog. SECDEF report.
106-945	097 / 772	Sec. 386, Additions to plan for ensuring visibility over all in-transit end items and secondary items	Plan	NLT 180 days after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Submit any revisions made to the plan that are required by any law enacted after October 17, 1998. SECDEF report.

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106-945	215 / 824	Sec. 801, Acquisition pilot programs	Report	NLT 01/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Describe, for each acquisition program identified in Sec. 5064(a) of the FASA of 1994, quantitative measures, recommended revisions to statutes or the FAR, any new innovative business practices, etc. SECDEF report.
106-945	232	Sec. 824, Extension of waiver period for live-fire survivability testing for MH-47E and MH-60K helicopter modification programs	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	May waive the application of the survivability and lethality tests if live-fire testing of the programs would be unreasonably expensive and impracticable. SECDEF report.
106-945	233 / 831	Sec. 831, Impact of foreign sourcing of systems on long-term military readiness and related industrial infrastructure	Report	NLT one year after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Study whether parts, components, and materials of certain systems are obtained through domestic sources or from foreign sources, and the impact on military readiness. SECDEF report.
106-945	235 / 831	Sec. 834, Requirement to conduct study on contract bundling	Report	Before the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Report the results of a study on the practice of "contract bundling", and the effect on small businesses. SECDEF report.
106-945	329	Sec. 1112, Work Safety Demonstration Program	Report	NLT 12/1/2001	OUSD/AT&L	Submit an interim report on demonstration program containing at a minimum, for each site of the demonstration program certain baseline information and comparisons. SECDEF report.
106-945	329	Sec. 1112, Work Safety Demonstration Program	Report	NLT 12/1/2002	OUSD/AT&L	Final report containing, at a minimum, for each site a determination on safety practices; comparisons of lost workday injury rates, and direct/indirect costs. SECDEF report.
106-945	430	Sec. 2801, Joint use military construction projects (defined)	Certify	With FY-03 budget request, Annually	OUSD/AT&L	Each Secretary evaluated the feasibility of carrying out the projects as joint use MILCON projects. SECDEF report.
106-945	436	Sec. 2812, Enhancement of authority of military departments to lease non-excess property	Notify	NLT March 15 Annually	OUSD/AT&L	Changes reporting requirement of Subsection (d)(3), sec. 2667 of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945	692	Space-based radar	Report	05/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Prepare a roadmap to guide the development and deployment of an operational system. SECDEF report.
106-945	760	Sec. 314, Payment of fines and penalties for environmental compliance at Ft Wainwright, Alaska	Report	NLT 03/01/02	OUSD/AT&L	Report the analysis of all environmental compliance fines and penalties assessed and imposed at military facilities during fiscal years 1995-2001. SECDEF report.
106-945	772	Sec. 389, Alkali Silica Reactivity (ASR)	Report	09/30/06	OUSD/AT&L	Outline the damage caused to aviation facilities and the availability of technologies capable of preventing, treating, or mitigating the impact of ASR. SECDEF report.
106-945	063 / 759	Sec. 312, Certain environmental restoration activities	Notify	Before paying costs of permanently relocating	OUSD/AT&L and Services	Upon determination that such permanent relocation is part of a response action. SECDEF report.
106-945	099 / 773	Sec. 391, Additional conditions on implementation of Defense Joint Accounting System	Report	Prior to granting a Milestone III decision	OUSD/C	Report on analysis of the requirements for the DJAS and analysis of alternatives to the system to determine whether it warrants deployment. SECDEF report.
106-945	100 / 773	Sec. 391, Additional conditions on implementation of Defense Joint Accounting System	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Will the system meet required functionality for users; acquisition standards; applicable Milestone requirements; and requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. SECDEF report.

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106945	100 / 1773	Sec. 392, Defense Travel System	Report	11/30/00	OUSD/C	Provide a schedule and discussion of the development, testing, and fielding of the <b>system</b> ; and analysis of the costs and benefits of fielding <b>this</b> system. SECDEF report.
106-945	216	Sec. 802, Multiyear service contracts	Notify	If necessary, at least 30 days in advance of contract award	OUSDK'	Head of an agency may not initiate <b>under</b> this section a contract for services <b>that</b> includes an unfunded <b>contingent liability</b> in excess of <b>\$20,000,000</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	217	Sec. 802, <b>Multiyear</b> service contracts	Notify	If <b>necessary</b> , 10 days after <b>notification</b>	OUSD/C	Head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract for services until notice is provided. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	217	Sec. 802, <b>Multiyear</b> service contracts	Notify	If <b>necessary</b> , 30 days after notification	OUSDK	Before any contract <b>contains</b> a clause setting a cancellation ceiling in excess of <b>\$100,000,000</b> my be <b>awarded</b> . SECDEF <b>report</b> .
106-945	219 / 826	Sec. 806, Reporting requirements relating to <b>Multiyear</b> Services Contracts	Report	Annually, <b>NLT w/President's</b> budget request	OUSD/C	Contains information on each multiyear service <b>contract</b> or extension of an existing <b>contract</b> entered into, or planned, by the head of an agency during the current or preceding year'. SECDEF report.
106-945	219 / 826	Sec. 806, Reporting requirements relating to Multiyear Services Contracts	Report	Prior to <b>entering into</b> a multiyear contract	OUSD/C	Provide a <b>report</b> containing information described in paragraph (4) of this <b>amendment</b> with <b>respect</b> to the <b>contract</b> (or <b>contract extension</b> ). SECDEF report.
106-945	254	Sec. 941, <b>Flexibility</b> in implementation of limitation on major DoD <b>headquarters</b> personnel	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Certify that the limitation of headquarters personnel, would <b>adversely</b> affect national security. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	258	Sec. 1001, <b>Transfer Authority</b>	Notify	Upon <b>determination</b>	OUSD/C	Total amount of authorizations that <b>may</b> be transferred may not <b>exceed \$2,000,000,000</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	262	Sec. 1007, <b>Prompt recording</b> of obligations of funds for contractual transactions	Plan	<b>NLT 11/15/00</b>	OUSD/C	<b>Ensure that each obligation under a transaction be recorded not later than 10 days after the date on which the obligation is incurred</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	269	Sec. 1022, DoD expenditures to support foreign counter-drug activities	Report	<b>NLT 01/01/01</b>	OUSD/C	<b>Detail the expenditure of funds during FY-00 in direct or indirect support of the counter-drug activities of foreign governments</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	298 / 855	Sec. 1081, Funds for administrative expenses under Defense Export Loan Guarantee program	Report	Prior to providing funds for <b>admin expenses</b>	OUSD/C	<b>Report on operation of the DELG Program and determination as to which agency, office, or other activity should administer, manage, and oversee the program</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	343 / 869	Sec. 1221, NATO fair burdensharing (Costs)	Report	<b>30 days after a military</b> operation begins, or later, if ...	OUSD/C	<b>Report on costs of Operation Allied Force, including ordnance expended, fuel consumed, personnel; and estimated cost of reduced service</b> We of U.S. <b>aircraft</b> , etc. SECDEF report. SECDEF <b>SHOULD SIGN</b> .
106-945	343 / 869	Sec. 1221, NATO fair burdensharing (Future operations)	Report	<b>NLT 90 days</b> after completion of the <b>military</b> operation	OUSD/C	<b>Report on costs of Operation Allied Force, including ordnance expended, fuel consumed, personnel; and estimated cost of reduced service life of U.S. aircraft</b> , etc. SECDEF <b>report</b> . SECDEF <b>SHOULD SIGN</b> .

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106-945	356	Sec. 1302, Obligation or expenditure of funds for other purposes (Cooperative Threat Reduction)	Notify	15 days prior to obligation of funds	OUSD/C	Provide notification of the intent to obligate amounts appropriated for FY-01 in excess of the amount specifically authorized and the justification for doing so. SECDEF report.
106-945	356	Sec. 1304, Limitations on use of funds for funds for fissile material storage facility	Notify	15 days prior to CTR fund use	OUSD/C	For construction of a second wing for the storage facility. SECDEF report.
106-945	356	Sec. 1305, Limitation on use of funds to support warhead dismantlement processing	Notify	15 days prior to CTR fund use	OUSD/C	When the U.S. has reached an agreement with Russia, which shall provide for appropriate transparency measures, regarding assistance by the U.S. SECDEF report.
106-945	825	Sec. 802, Multiyear services contracts	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Contains information comparable to that required by Sec. 2306b(1)(4) for each multiyear service contract and each extension of an existing contract entered into, or planned, during the current or preceding year. SECDEF report.
106-945	241 / 836	Sec. 912, Regional centers for Security Studies	Notify	Upon intent to establish	OUSD/P	Upon intent to establish the center, including a description of the mission and functions, and justification, SECDEF report.
106-945	242 / 836	Sec. 912, Regional centers for Security Studies	Report	NLT 02/01/01, then Annually	OUSD/P	Report on operations during the preceding fiscal year, including budgetary and international participation information for each center. SECDEF report
106-945	269	Sec. 1023, Recommendations on expansion of support for counter-drug activities	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P	What, if any, additional counties should be covered or additional support provided to covered countries, together with the reasons; and a plan for providing support. SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1024, Review of riverine counter-drug program	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P	For each country receiving support, provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the program, and a recommendation regarding responsibility for managing the program. SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1025, Tethered Acrostat Radar System	Report	NLT 05/01/01	OUSD/P	Report on the status of the TARS used to conduct detection and monitoring and border security and air sovereignty operations. SECDEF report.
106-945	271	Sec. 1031, Preparedness of military installation first responders for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction	Report	NLT 90 days after enactment	OUSD/P	Describe the overall program, deficiencies of installations to respond to an incident; schedule and costs associated with implementation; and plans. SECDEF report.
106-945	274	Sec. 1033, Loan guarantees to improve domestic preparedness to combat cyber-terrorism	Report	NLT 03/01 annually	OUSD/P	Report on the loan guarantee program. SECDEF report.
1 M-945	276 / 850	Sec. 1041, Revised nuclear posture review	Report	Concurrently w/QDR rpt due in 12/01	OUSD/P	Report the results of a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. for the next 5-10 years. SECDEF report.
106-945	276 / 850	Sec. 1042, Plan for long-term sustainment and modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces	Plan	NLT 04/15/01	OUSD/P	Develop a long-range plan for sustainment and modernization of strategic nuclear forces to counter emerging threats and satisfy evolving requirements of deterrence. SECDEF report.

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106-945	278 / 851	Sec. 1044, Report on the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets	Report	NLT 07/01/01	OUUSD/P	After conduct a study relating to the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets report the results. SECDEF report.
106-945	341	Sec. 1211, Assessing effect of continued operations in the Balkans region on readiness to execute the national military strategy	Notify	When necessary, but NLT the latest date of next annual rpt	OUUSD/P	Notice that the annual report is no longer required after U.S. military operations in the Balkans region have ended. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	345 / 870	Sec. 1231, Joint Data Exchange Center with Russian Federation	Report	NLT 30 days after enactment	OUUSD/P	Report on plans for a center on early warning systems and notification of ballistic missile launches. SECDEF report SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	345 / 871	Sec. 1232, Sharing and exchange of ballistic missile launch early warning data	Report	03/15/01	OUUSD/P	Report current and planned activities with respect to sharing and exchanging early warning data; include an assessment of the benefits and risks of sharing such data. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	346 / 872	Sec. 1234, Adjustment of composite theoretical performance levels of high performance computers	Report	04/01/01	OUUSD/P	Report on national security implications of trends in the R & D, manufacture, use, and proliferation of information technology in the commercial sector. SECDEF report.
106-945	355	Sec. 1302, Obligation or expenditure of funds for other purposes (Cooperative Threat Reduction)	Report	30 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUUSD/P	Report the purpose and the amount for which funds will be obligated or expended CTR. SECDEF report.
106-945	360 / 876	Sec. 1308, Reports on activities and assistance under cooperative threat reduction programs	Report	NLT 30 days after enactment	OUUSD/P	Assess Russia's arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads, include a summary of U.S. efforts to work cooperatively with Russia. SECDEF report.
106-945	360 / 877	Sec. 1309, Russian chemical weapons elimination	Report	NLT 90 days after enactment	OUUSD/P	Identify the amount of money spent; assistance provided by the international community for the storage and elimination of nerve agents; countries providing assistance; and value of assistance. SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	361	Sec. 1310, Limitation on use of funds for elimination of weapons grade plutonium program	Report	30 days prior to 50% being obligated or expended	OUUSD/P	Report on agreement between the U.S. and Russian Federation regarding shut down or conversion of the reactors of the Russian Federation, SECDEF report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	069 / 764	Sec. 336, Effects of availability of slot machines on U.S. military installations overseas	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Evaluate the effects of the availability of slot machines as a MWR activity, the morale of military communities overseas, and members' personal financial stability. SECDEF report-
106-945	104 / 781	Sec. 415, Increase in numbers of members in certain grades authorized to be on active duty in support of the Reserves	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUUSD/P&R	Report on management of the grade structure for reserve-component officers enlisted members subject to sec. 12011 and sec. 12012 of title 10, U.S.C., respectively. SECDEF report.
106-945	122	Sec. 534, Review of allocation of Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) units among the services	Legislative proposal	If necessary, with FY 02 budget request	OUUSD/P&R	Based on the review of the allocations of units it is determined that an increase in the statutory maximum number of such units is warranted. SECDEF report.
106-945	143 / 794	Sec. 563, Access to secondary schools for military recruiting purposes	Notify	If necessary	OUUSD/P&R	If one year after notification is given a local educational agency continues to deny access to at least two of the armed forces. SECDEF report.

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106-945	144	sec. 564, Pilot program to <b>enhance</b> military recruiting by improving military <b>awareness</b> of school counselors and educators	Report	NLT 180 days after program period	OUSD/P&R	Provide the Secretary's <b>findings</b> and <b>conclusions</b> on the pilot program. SECDEF report.
106-945	149 / 795	Sec. 574, Management and <b>per diem</b> requirements	Report	03/31/02	OUSD/P&R	Report on the <b>administration</b> of this provision and make recommendations for revision. SECDEF report.
106-945	157	Sec. 604, Supplemental <b>subsistence</b> allowance for low-income members with dependents	Report	NLT 03/01 2001-2006	OUSD/P&R	<b>Postponement authority</b> of up to 180 days may be exercised, as determined by the <b>SECDEC after consultation</b> with the <b>FRTIB Executive Director</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	168 (805	Sec. 633, Authorization of <b>retention bonus</b> for members of <b>the armed forces qualified</b>	Notify	90 days before any bonus	OUSD/P&R	<b>In advance</b> , of each <b>military skill</b> to be designated as critical, <b>notice shall</b> be submitted. SECDEF report.
106-945	168	Sec. 633, <b>Authorization</b> of retention <b>bonus</b> for <b>members of the armed forces qualified</b>	Report	NLT 02/15 annually	OUSD/P&R	Analyze the <b>effect</b> of bonuses on retention of <b>members qualified</b> for which the bonuses were offered; and describe the <b>intentions regarding their</b> continued use, SECDEF report.
106-945	178 / 808	Sec. 661, <b>Participation in Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)</b>	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Postponement authority of up to <b>180</b> days may be exercised, as determined by the SECDEC after <b>consultation</b> with the <b>FRTIB Executive Director</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	184 / 812	Sec. 702, Chiropractic health care for <b>members</b> on active duty	Report	NLT 01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	<b>Plan</b> to phase <b>in</b> , over a period of five years, <b>services</b> for <b>all</b> active duty service personnel, also continue to provide services and <b>benefits</b> as provided <b>during W-00</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	188 / 814	Sec. 712, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and modification of Medicare subvention project	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Continuation of program would be <b>contingent upon</b> SECDEF and HHS <b>jointly</b> developing and implementing terms and conditions for both agencies. SECDEF report.
106-945	190	Sec. 712, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and <b>modification</b> of Medicare <b>subvention</b> project	Report	Annual Report	OUSD/P&R	Report on the program <b>and</b> its impact <b>on</b> costs and <b>the</b> provision of health services. SECDEF report.
106-945	190	Sec. 712, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and <b>modification</b> of Medicare subvention project	Report	60 days before changes	OUSD/P&R	Justify <b>changing the</b> designation of a site; applying comparable requirements; making significant changes <b>in</b> payment <b>amounts</b> or methodology, <b>and</b> operation of the program or <b>terminating</b> the agreement. SECDEF report.
106-945	190	Sec. 712, <b>Conditions</b> for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and modification of Medicare subvention project	Notify	Upon negotiating an agreement	OUSD/P&R	<b>Transmit</b> a copy of a proposed agreement with <b>HHS</b> and all <b>related</b> agreements and <b>supporting</b> documents. SECDEF report
106-945	198 / 816	Sec. 723, <b>Modernization</b> of <b>TRICARE</b> business practices and increase of use of <b>military</b> treatment <b>facilities</b>	Plan	NLT 03/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a <b>plan</b> to provide portability <b>and</b> reciprocity of benefits for <b>all enrollees under the program</b> throughout <b>all</b> regions. SECDEF report.
106-945	199 / 817	Sec. 725, <b>Protections</b> against health care providers seeking direct <b>reimbursement</b> from members of the uniformed services	Report	NLT 01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Recommend practices to discourage or prohibit providers under the TRICARE program, and individuals or entities working on their <b>behalf, from</b> seeking direct reimbursement. SECDEF report.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-945 201	Sec. 731, Demonstration project for expanded access to mental health counselors	Plan	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a plan to carry out the demonstration project. SECDEF report.
106-945 201	Se-c. 731. Demonstration project for expanded access to mental health counselors	Report	NLT 02/01/03	OUSD/P&R	Report on the demonstration project, including the extent to which expenditures for reimbursement changes. SECDEF report.
106-945 203	Sec. 733, Health care management demonstration program	Report	NLT 03/15/02	OUSD/P&R	Report on the demonstration program, include an assessment of the value of incorporating the use of the tested planning and management models. SECDEF report.
106-945 207 / 820	Sec. 753, Health Informatics	Report	Annual	OUSD/P&R	Adds two additional sections to the annual report as required by Sec. 723 of the NDAA for IT-00 (P.L. 106-65). SECDEF report.
106-945 210 / 820	Sec. 756, Privacy of DoD medical records	Plan	NLT 04/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a comprehensive plan to improve privacy protections. SECDEF report.
106-945 211	Sec. 757, Authority to establish special locality-based reimbursement rates	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on actions taken to carry out sec. 1079(h)(5) of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945 211	Sec. 757, Authority to establish special locality-based reimbursement rates	Report	NLT 180 days after enactment	OUSD/P&R	The extent to which physicians are choosing not to participate in contracts for the furnishing of health care in rural States, include reasons for withdrawals and refusals. SECDEF report.
106-945 212   821	Sec. 760, Training in health care management and administration	Report	NLT 18 months after enactment	OUSD/P&R	Include a survey of professional civilian certifications and credentials; descriptions of continuing education activities and of the prominence of such credentials or certifications among senior civilian executives. SECDEF report.
106-945 214	Sec. 762, Study on comparability of coverage for physical, speech, and occupational therapies	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on the findings of the study comparing coverage and reimbursement for covered beneficiaries to coverage and reimbursement for such therapies. SECDEF report.
106-945 327	Sec. 1105, Study on civilian personnel services	Report	NLT 01/01/02	OUSD/P&R	Assess the manner in which personnel services are provided for civilian personnel and report, and include, if appropriate, a proposal for a demonstration program. SECDEF report.
106-945 403	Sec. 1811, Construction	Report	NLT 01/01 Annually	OUSD/P&R	Justify each grant to enable local educational agencies to carry out modernization of school facilities for the prior fiscal year. SECDEF report.
106-945 455	Sec. 2871, Land conveyance, AAFES property, Farmers Branch, Texas	Report	Within 30 days after sale of property	OUSD/P&R	Report the particulars of the sale. SECDEF report.
106-945 811	Armed Forces Retirement Home fees	Report	03/30/01	OUSD/P&R	Following a review, report the results and any recommendations for changing the current fees or operations of the Armed Forces Retirement Home. SECDEF report.
106-945 815	Sec. 712, Medicare subvention project	Plan	03/30/01	OUSD/P&R	A plan for universal, continuous enrollment of all eligible beneficiaries beginning in fiscal year 2002. SECDEF report.
106-945 815	Sec. 713, Accrual funding for health care for Medicare-eligible retirees and dependents	Report	02/08/01	OUSD/P&R	Report results of an independent study, including any recommendations. SECDEF report.

## Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-945	776	Revision of <b>authority to waive limitation on performance</b> of depot-level maintenance	waiver	None specified	Air Force	Waive the 50 percent depot maintenance requirement for reason of <b>national security</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	049 / 722	Sec. 232, <b>Reports on Ballistic Missile Threat Posed By North Korea (Threat)</b>	Report	NLT 2 weeks after D next long-range test by N.K. or 60 days	IA	Assess <b>the missile</b> threat, whether <b>the U.S.</b> is capable of <b>defeating the N.</b> Korean missile threat, and <b>the</b> potential for proliferation of missile <b>technologies</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	049 / 722	Sec. 232, Reports <b>on Ballistic Missile Threat Posed By North Korea (Reducing Vulnerability)</b>	Report	NLT 2 weeks of next test	DIA	<b>Provide any steps intended to reduce the vulnerability</b> to the N. Korean long-range <b>ballistic</b> missile threat, <b>and</b> the technical <b>and</b> programmatic viability of testing any other missile defense <b>systems</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	034 / 644	Sec. 124, <b>Limitation</b> during fiscal year 2001 on <b>changes</b> in submarine force structure	Report	04/15/01	Navy	Required force structure to support <b>the national military strategy</b> and include <b>the acquisition</b> strategy and fleet <b>maintenance</b> requirements. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	279 / 852	Sec. 1053, Report on Federal Government progress <b>in</b> developing information assurance strategies	Report	NLT 01115101	OASD/C3I	Detail the specific steps taken by the Federal <b>Government</b> as of the date of the report to develop critical infrastructure assurance strategies as outlined by PDD-63. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	274 / 849	Sec. 1034, Status of domestic preparedness <b>against the threat</b> of biological terrorism	Report	03/31/01	OASD/CS	Report on the status of domestic <b>preparedness</b> against <b>the</b> threat of biological terrorism. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	341 / 867	Sec. 1204, <b>Additional</b> matters for annual report on <b>transfers</b> of militarily sensitive technology to countries and entities of <b>concern</b>	Report	Annual	OUSD/AT&L	Include in annual report a description of actions taken on <b>recommendations</b> of inspectors <b>general</b> contained <b>in</b> previous <b>annual</b> reports. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	342 / 869	Sec. 1213, Semiaannual report on Kosovo peacekeeping	Report	12/1/2000 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/C & P	Report on the contributions of European <b>nations</b> and organizations to the peacekeeping <b>operations</b> in Kosovo. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	260 / 842	Sec. 1005, Limitation on Funds for Bosnia <b>and</b> Kosovo <b>Peacekeeping Operations</b> for FY-01	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/P	If a waiver is necessary <b>and</b> will not adversely affect the readiness of U.S. military <b>forces</b> or national security <b>interests</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	260 / 842	Sec. 1005, <b>Limitation</b> on Funds for Bosnia and Kosovo Peacekeeping Operations for <b>FY-01</b>	Report	When necessary	OUSD/P	Reasons for waiver, including impact of military involvement <b>in</b> <b>Balkan</b> peacekeeping <b>operations</b> on military <b>readiness</b> , and specific reasons additional funding is required <b>President</b> report. SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	341 / 867	Sec. 1211, Assessing effect of continued operations in the Balkans region on readiness <b>to</b> execute <b>the national</b> military <b>strategy</b>	Report	NLT 04/01 Annually	OUSD/P	Making the report <b>on</b> the readiness impact of U.S. military <b>operations</b> in the Balkans an <b>annual report</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-945	342 / 868	Sec. 1212, Situation in <b>the Balkans</b> (Benchmarks)	Report	06/30/01 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/P	Report on progress in <b>achieving</b> benchmarks for conditions <b>that</b> would achieve a sustainable peace and ultimately withdrawal of U.S. military presence in Kosovo. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	342 / 868	Sec. 1212, Situation in <b>the Balkans</b> (Comprehensive Strategy)	Report	06/30/01 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/P	Report on progress in developing and implementing a comprehensive political-military strategy for <b>the Balkans</b> . <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	357 / 876	Sec. 1307, Limitation on use of funds for <b>construction</b> of fossil <b>fuel energy plants</b>	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSD/P	Detail options for assisting Russia in the <b>development</b> of <b>alternative</b> energy sources to the three plutonium production reactors <b>remaining in operation in</b> Russia. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	357 / 876	Sec. 1308, Reports <b>on</b> activities and assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs	Report	02/05/01 and each first Monday in February	OUSD/P	<b>Consolidate</b> reports on activities and assistance during the preceding fiscal year <b>under</b> CTR programs. <b>President report</b> . SECDEF SHOULD SIGN.
106-945	036 / 646	Sec. 132, Modernization of Air National Guard F-16A units	Plan	02/01/01	Air Force	A plan to <b>modernize and</b> upgrade the combat capabilities of those <b>units</b> that are assigned F-16A aircraft.
106-945	093 / 770	Sec. 377, Air Force spare <b>and repair parts</b> program for c-5	Report	NLT 01/01/01 and 09/30/01	Air Force	Report on the overall status of <b>the</b> spare and <b>repair parts program</b> .
106-945	213	Sec. 761, Studies on feasibility of <b>sharing</b> Biomedical Research Facility (Little Rock Medical Facility)	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Air Force	Report on a study on the feasibility of sharing a biomedical research facility <b>with</b> the Department of VA <b>and the</b> School of Medicine at the University of <b>Arkansas</b> .
106-945	253	Sec. 935, Air Force Institute of <b>Technology</b>	Report	NLT 09/30/01	Air Force	Report <b>the</b> roles and missions, organizational <b>structure, funding, and operations</b> as projected, along with any recommendations.
106-945	638	Air Mobility <b>Command</b>	Report	03/15/01	Air Force	Provide analysis for the C-141, C-5, <b>and</b> C-17 <b>fleets and determine</b> readiness levels, explore <b>alternatives</b> to existing <b>aircraft stationing plans</b> for <b>component airlift</b> forces.
106-945	692	Specialty aerospace metals	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Report on the plan for meeting <b>requirements</b> for advanced special aerospace metals <b>and</b> alloys.
106-945	693	Space <b>maneuver</b> vehicle	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Report <b>on</b> concepts, critical development paths, and application! for a low-cost reusable lower stage booster, <b>and</b> how it could fit into an overall Military <b>Spaceplane</b> system.
106-945	694	Satellite control network	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Conduct an evaluation of <b>commercial technologies</b> and services <b>relevant to modernization</b> of <b>the</b> satellite control <b>network</b> .
106-945	029 / 642	Sec. 111, Multiyear <b>procurement</b> authority (M2A3 Bradley)	Certify	Prior to executing a contract	Army	<b>Certify</b> that the vehicle has successfully completed <b>the</b> initial operational test and evaluation and milestone HI review.
106-945	029	Sec. 113, Objective Force Development Process	Report	30 days prior to obligation of 80% of the funds	Army	Include envisioned <b>operational environments</b> , threat <b>assumption</b> on which R <b>and</b> D efforts <b>are</b> based, and potential operational <b>and</b> organizational <b>concepts</b> .

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-945	758	Water quality issues at installations in Kaiserslautern, Germany	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Army / Air Force	Plan and submit findings and recommendations for completion of remediation and restoration, to include related costs.
106-945	050	Sec. 234, Management of Airborne Laser program	Report	NLT 02/15/01	BMDO	Report on the role of the airborne laser, including assessments of various aspects of the program.
106-945	708	National Missile Defense (NMD)	Report	04/01/01	BMDO	Report on plans for mitigating the ground-based interceptor (GBI) booster problems.
106-945	503	Sec. 3301, Authorized uses of Stockpile funds	Report	If necessary or 45 days prior to obligation	DMCA	May obligate amounts in excess of \$71,000,000 if extraordinary or emergency conditions necessitate additional obligations; or may make the additional obligations described in notification.
106-945	720	Sec. 219, Cost limitations applicable to F-22 aircraft program	Notify	If necessary	DOT&E	Consult with the USD(AT&L) to determine that the increase, not exceed 1 1/2 percent of the total amount, is necessary in order to ensure adequate testing.
106-945	090 / 769	Sec. 373, Effects of worldwide contingency operations on readiness of military aircraft and equipment	Report	NLT 180 days after date of enactment	JCS	Assess the effects of operations on the readiness of equipment, and the capability of the Armed Forces to maintain a high level of equipment readiness and to manage a high operating tempo.
106-945	150	Sec. 576, Test of ability of Reserve component intelligence units and personnel to meet current and emerging Defense intelligence needs	Report (Interim)	7/1/2002 & 2003	JCS	Submit interim reports on the status of the test program.
106-945	238 / 835	Sec. 905, Additional components of Chairman of the JCS annual report on combatant command requirements	Report	With the budget request	JCS	Identify the extent to which the FYDP includes funds to address the capability shortfalls identified during the Joint Readiness Review conducted during first quarter of fiscal year.
106-945	244 / 837	Sec. 916, The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reform initiative	Report	Semiannually from 03/01/01 - 03/01/03	JCS	Focus on the progress made on the initiative of the Chairman to reform and refocus the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
106-945	032	Sec 122, Arleigh Burke class destroyer program	Report	11/01/00	Navy	Update information provided in the report of the SECNAV entitled the 'Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Industrial Base Study of 1993'.
106-945	035 / 645	Sec. 127, Alternative funding mechanism for naval vessels and other naval capabilities	Report	With FY-02 budget request (NLT 02/05/01)	Navy	Include a detailed description of the funding mechanisms and effect of each funding mechanism on production stability of other shipbuilding programs funded within the Navy.
106-945	042 / 718	Sec 214, Nuclear Aircraft Carrier Design and Production Modeling	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report the results of the required assessment and plans and funding requirements for developing the model specified.
106-945	042 / 718	Sec 214, Use of Technology Insertion Approach for Construction of the DD-21 Ship	Plan	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Submit a plan for pursuing the Approach as authorized, and include estimates of resources necessary to carry out the plan.
106-945	043 / 718	Sec 215, DD-21 class destroyer program	Plan	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Pursue a technology insertion approach for construction as authorized; the plan shall include estimates of the resources necessary to carry out.
106-945	054	Sec. 251, Mobile Offshore Base potential use for certain purposes of associated technologies	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Navy	Report on the potential use of technologies associated with the concept, including an assessment of the potential application and feasibility of using existing technologies.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Office	Brief
106-945	065 / 762	Sec. 318, Ship disposal project	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Navy	Include a description of the competitive procedures used for the solicitation and award of task orders including a description; an assessment of the results; and a strategy for future procurement.
106-945	084 / 767	Sec. 356, Suspension of reorganization or relocation of Naval Audit Service	Report	180 days prior	Navy	Detail plans and justification for the reorganization or relocation of the performance of the auditing functions, as the case may be.
106945	123	Sec. 535, Authority for <b>NPG School</b> to enroll certain Defense industry civilians	Certify	Prior to the start of the academic year, annually	Navy	Providing instruction during that year will further the military mission of the school; enhance the design and development of defense systems; and will be on a space-available basis.
106-945	228 / 828	Sec. 814, Navy-Marine Corps <b>Intranet</b>	Certify	Prior to obligation or expenditure	Navy	Certify a review of the business case and comments provided by the <b>OSD(C)</b> and the Director of OMB and determine that implementation of the contract is in the Navy's <b>best</b> interest.
106-945	229 / 829	Sec. 814, Navy-Marine Corps <b>Intranet (phased implementation)</b>	Certify	Prior to exceeding threshold	Navy	After a review of the operational testing and cost review have determined that the implementation of the contract is in the best interest of the Navy.
106-945	279 / 851	Sec. 1052, <b>Report</b> on submarine rescue support vessels	Plan	With FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the plan of the Navy for providing for submarine rescue support vessels through <b>FY-07</b> .
106-945	365 / 879	Sec. 1501, Assistance for economic growth on Vieques	Notify	When necessary	Navy	The advance notice required by the <b>Vieques</b> supplemental appropriation of each proposed transfer shall also be submitted to the committees.
106945	368 / 879	Sec. 1503, Determination regarding continuation of Navy training	Certify	If necessary	Navy	If the CNO and the CMC jointly find that the range is no longer needed for training.
106-945	674	DP-2 <b>thrust vectoring</b> system proof-of-concept demonstration	Assessment	With <b>FY-02</b> budget request	Navy	Assess the program's progress, plans and funding requirements for completion of the flight-test demonstration.
106-945	677	Advanced land attack missile ( <b>ALAM</b> )	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Navy	<b>Report on</b> recommended <b>revisions</b> to the program plan and the funding required to deploy as soon as technically feasible.
106945	224	Sec. 811, Acquisition and management of information technology	Notify	NLT 30 days after the date of designation	OASD/C3I	Whenever during <b>FYs 2001, 2002, or 2003</b> a system previously designated as a major automated information system is changed to another category.
106945	224	Sec. 811, <b>Acquisition</b> and <b>management</b> of information technology	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OASD/C3I	Specify systems previously designated as a major automated information system currently in another designation category including as a "special interest major technology initiative".
106-945	250	Sec. 922, Information Security <b>Scholarship Program</b>	Plan	NLT 04/01/01	OASD/C3I	Submit a plan for implementing the <b>programs</b> under chapter 112 of title 10, U.S.C.
106-945	250	Sec. 933, Joint report on establishment of national collaborative information analysis capability	Report	NLT 03/01/00	OASD/C3I	Assess <b>alternatives</b> architectures for the establishment of a national capability.
106-945	711	common <b>Imagery Processor (CIP)</b>	Plan	03/15/01	OASD/C3I	Outline a <b>path</b> for migrating tactical imagery programs, including the <b>CIP</b> , <b>NAVE</b> , and <b>CIGSS</b> , to <b>integrated</b> solutions within the <b>CIGSS</b> architecture.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

IReport	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-945	030 / 643	Sec. 113, Costs and <b>Effectiveness</b> of Medium Armored Combat Vehicles for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams	Plan	30 days <b>prior</b> to obligation of <b>funds</b>	Army	Compare costs and operational effectiveness of infantry carrier variant and troop-carrying <b>medium</b> armored vehicles currently <b>in</b> the Army Inventory for the use of infantry battalions.
106-945	066 / 762	Sec. 320, Plasma Energy Pyrolysis System	<b>Report</b>	NLT 02/01/01	<b>Army</b>	Analysis of <b>information</b> and data on fixed-transportable unit and on mobile <b>unit</b> demonstration <b>phase</b> ; <b>recommendations</b> on <b>future</b> applications of system; and statement of projected funding.
106-945	075	Sec. 343, Arsenal Support Program Initiative	Report	NLT 07/01/01 & 2002	Army	<b>Specifying</b> the amount of loans guaranteed <b>during</b> the preceding calendar year.
106-945	075	Sec. 343, Arsenal Support Program <b>Initiative</b>	<b>Report</b>	NLT 07/01/01	<b>Army</b>	Report on <b>the</b> implementation of the demonstration program <b>and</b> include a review of contracting at the manufacturing arsenals <b>and</b> recommendations appropriate <b>regarding</b> any <b>changes</b> .
106-945	081 / 766	Sec. 352, Effects of <b>outsourcing</b> of overhead costs of Center of Industrial and Technical <b>Excellence</b> and Army ammunition <b>plants</b>	Report	<b>Changes</b> may not <b>begin</b> until at least <b>60 days after report</b>	Army	Include a <b>description</b> of the effect that the <b>performance</b> and administration of the resulting contract will have on the overhead costs to the <b>required</b> report.
106-945	084 / 767	Sec. 355, Performance of emergency response <b>functions</b> of <b>chemical</b> weapons storage installations	Certify	<b>Prior to any</b> conversion	<b>Army</b>	Certify the plan for conversion is consistent with recommendation <b>contained in</b> GAO Report NSIAIF00-88, and provides for a <b>transition</b> to contractor <b>performance</b> .
106-945	099 / 773	Sec. 390, <b>Demonstration</b> project for the National Guard to provide <b>internet</b> access	Report	02/01/05	<b>Army</b>	Describe <b>the</b> activities conducted under the <b>demonstration</b> project and include any recommendations <b>regarding the</b> expansion of this <b>demonstration</b> project to other offices.
106-945	141	Sec. 561, Army recruiting pilot programs	<b>Report</b>	NLT 02/01/06	<b>Army</b>	Provide a <b>separate</b> report on each pilot program carried out, <b>and</b> include an assessment of the value of the actions taken and any recommendations to <b>increase</b> the <b>effectiveness</b> and efficiency.
106-945	210	Sec. 755, Augmentation of Army medical department by detailing reserve <b>officers</b> of the Public <b>Health</b> Service	<b>Report</b>	NLT 03/01/01	<b>Army</b>	<b>Report</b> the results of a <b>review</b> and assessment of the adequacy <b>of</b> laws for authorizing the Secretary of HHS to <b>detail</b> reserve <b>officers</b> .
106-945	213	Sec. 761, Studies on feasibility of <b>sharing</b> Biomedical Research <b>Facility (Tripler Army Medical Center)</b>	<b>Report</b>	NLT 03/01/01	<b>Army</b>	Report on a study on the feasibility of sharing a biomedical research facility with the Department of VA and <b>the</b> School of <b>Medicine</b> at the University of Hawaii.
106-945	231	Sec. 822, Financial analysis of use of dual rates for quantifying overhead costs at Army ammunition <b>plants</b>	Report	NLT 02/15/01	<b>Army</b>	<b>Report</b> results of <b>the</b> analysis carried out on the costs incurred <b>and</b> the benefits <b>derived</b> from implementation of a <b>policy</b> of <b>using various</b> sets of rates for <b>quantifying</b> overhead costs.
106-945	480	Sec. 3138, Contingent limitation on use of certain funds. . . with <b>formerly</b> utilized sites <b>remedial</b> action program <b>funding prohibition</b>	Certify	NLT 11/01/01	<b>Army</b>	Certify that <b>the</b> Corps of Engineers is in compliance <b>with the</b> <b>requirements</b> of travel funds for the <b>Chief</b> of Engineers.
106-945	640	<b>Multipurpose</b> individual <b>munition (MPLM)</b>	Plan	NLT 01/30/01	<b>Army</b>	Following a final, thorough review of the status of <b>this</b> program and alternatives to the status quo, provide a plan to the on how these <b>requirements</b> will be met as soon as practicable.



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

2001 FEB 20 AM 10:22

February 15, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: John K. Veroneau, Assistant Secretary for Defense (Legislative Affairs) *JKV*

SUBJECT: Congressional Reporting Requirements (SecDef Memo dated February 5, 2001)

PURPOSE: To address questions and concerns about the number of congressionally mandated reports that are required by law or policy.

DISCUSSION: Historically, the Comptroller has tracked the Department's congressional reporting requirements that are mandated by law and emanate from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Appropriations-Defense Subcommittees. I asked Bruce Dauer in the Comptroller's office to provide the cost estimates and other data to address some of the questions you have posed. His response is at Tab A.

Reports fall into one of two categories: 1) periodic (e.g., annual; semi-annual; quadrennial, ect.); or 2) one-time requirements. This distinction is important because in 1995, as part of the Contract with America, the new Republican majority pushed through the Federal Report Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995. The bill arose from initiatives of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and was introduced in the Senate by Senator John McCain (R-NM). The bill was signed into law on December 21, 1995. The law eliminated some reports and created a sunset provision of four years for all previously enacted laws with re-occurring annual, semi-annual, or periodic reports. The deadline, however, was extended to May 15, 2000, to give congressional committees more time to scrub their requirements. In the meantime, the Armed Services Committees, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000, "preserved" most of their periodic reports by exempting them from the sunset provision after undergoing an extensive scrub of all existing periodic reports.

The majority of congressionally mandated reports fall into the "one-time requirement" category and, as such, are not subject to the 1995 law. Currently, the only check on the Congress' thirst for information through reporting requirements is the exercise of self-discipline. According to sources on the Hill, only Senator McCain is expressing concern about the number of reports required by law. Apparently, nobody else is taking a good hard look at the issue. There exists a certain mentality in some circles on the Hill that the Pentagon has vast resources of personnel and money and

032

15 FEB 01

should not complain about providing necessary information to Congress. Others know the requirements are onerous and burdensome, but see it as a necessary evil. At a minimum, the number of reporting requirements is something that is discussed by Members and professional staff as the bill is being put together. My assessment is that all are concerned about this issue, but none are motivated to act.

On the other side of the issue, some Members and professional staff will claim that they have exercised some self-discipline in reducing the number of reports. As you will note in the Comptroller's assessment, the number of congressionally mandated reports has actually declined from a historic high of 861 in 1990 to the current figure of 567 for 2 0 0 1 .

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** One approach you may want to explore that will highlight this issue is to seek a line item authorization/appropriation to fund the Department's reports that are congressionally mandated. Another approach is for you to use your office as a bully pulpit, much like then-Secretary Cheney did on this very issue during his tenure in DoD, to encourage greater self-discipline by our Committees to ensure that only the most critical reporting requirements are mandated by law.

Attachment:

As Stated

## CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

### 1. What does all of this cost?

**A:** Reports are prepared either entirely in-house or with contractor support. No recent cost estimates have been prepared

- The costs of preparing these reports could be calculated by requiring each office that prepares a report to make a formal cost estimate similar to that made for responses to Freedom of Information requests
- Alternatively, total costs could be estimated by extrapolating total costs based on samples of cost estimates

### 2. Which committees are requiring these reports?

**A:** The House and Senate Defense Authorization Committees and House and Senate DoD and Military Construction Subcommittees include reporting requirements in committee reports, conference reports, and the Authorization and Appropriations Bills. The following tables provide an historical distribution of these reports:

<u>FY</u>	<u>AUTH</u>			<u>APPN</u>			<u>Supps/</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>HASCSAS</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>	<u>SAC</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>MilCon</u>	<u>Other</u>		
80									231
81									223
82	No breakout available								221
83									325
84									422
85									458
86	51	43	179	126	77	122	69	9	676
87	52	32	184	77	55	181	88	11	680
88	49	35	185	101	57	165	105	22	719
89	77	44	219	92	53	96	80	0	661
90	133	76	308	72	70	115	87	0	861
91	74	78	232	80	56	91	46	19	676
92	52	67	180	90	86	166	46	47	734
93	60	66	233	67	95	86	36	11	654
94	92	66	248	86	80	86	18	0	676
95	108	57	216	68	93	138	27	2	709
96	65	45	254	47	32	64	48	0	555
97	76	50	189	47	40	81	51	0	534
98	126	86	220	36	15	62	49	27	621
99	60	74	287	38	20	69	41	8	597
00	62	50	184	35	36	88	52	0	so7
01	76	60	222	39	23	62	85	0	567

**3. Which individuals are requesting these reports?**

A: Both staffers and members request reports to:

- obtain information they may otherwise be unable to get
- punish the Department or a particular Service or Component because information has not been forthcoming, or
- force the Department to take a particular course of action (such as requiring DoD to report details on contingency costs and to submit supplemental appropriations requests before undertaking a contingency operation)

Sometimes DoD proposes a reporting requirement as a cheap alternative to a congressional budget cut or as a vehicle to resolve problem conference issues

**4. Are there some that can reasonably be eliminated completely?**

**5. Are there some that can be combined?**

A: Services and OSD components routinely try to work around, eliminate, or consolidate some reporting requirements by negotiating with the committees about report content or type of compliance for reports not required in statute

- For example, committees often will agree to briefings, consolidation of submissions (either for content or due dates), or accepting information informally in lieu of a formal report
- The Services and OSD Components are encouraged to seek such relief wherever possible

**6. Is it possible that we could encourage the Congress to put sunsets on these reports so that they only happen once and never again?**

A: In each year's budget and authorization request, the Department formally asks that statutory reports included in the previous year not be repeated. However, each year a new set of "one time only" reports are included on a new set of subjects

**7. Does someone have the due dates?**

A: The Plans & Systems Directorate in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for identifying, tasking, and monitoring compliance of all annual congressionally reporting requirements

- The Comptroller signs out an annual tasking memo to the Military Services, the Joint Staff, and the OSD Components
- This tasking is consistent with the DoD General Counsel's annual Delegation of Authorities memos that assign responsibility for actions required in Defense Authorization and DoD Appropriations Acts

**8. Is this something we should be talking about to the key members of Congress about and see if we can't calm it down?**

**A:** The Secretary and Deputy Secretary and senior military and civilian staff could address the excessive reporting burden placed on the Department in a number of venues:

- The burden could be underscored at meetings with Committee chairs and ranking members and at annual Authorization and Appropriation budget hearings
- Senior DoD officials could advise informally the senior congressional leadership and committee staff directors of the Department's willingness to work with the committees to provide alternatives to their reliance on annual reporting requirements

**9. Is there some way we could reduce the level at which these reports or responses have to be? For example, the ones for the President being reduced to me and the ones for me being reduced down to lower levels.**

**A:** It is very difficult to reduce the President's reports to a lower level after the fact. Generally they are in statute and are identified as a President's report because the Congress wants the President to sign or requires an action by the President. However, the Department has much discretion with Secretary of Defense reports.

- Generally, the Secretary of Defense signs certifications and elected waiver authorities required in statute
- Other Secretary of Defense reports can be delegated to a senior OSD official

**10. Any other thoughts?**

**A:** The Department should change its management approach to complying with reporting requirements

- Senior DoD managers should take an active interest in determining the most efficient way to respond to congressional reports assigned to their organizations
- Contractor support should be used only as necessary or appropriate to prepare reports
- DoD staff should reduce reliance on reports as a negotiating tool during congressional markups
- DoD components should be discouraged from promoting congressional reporting requirements to garner support for their programs



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 300

INFO MEMO **SECDEF HAS SEEN** *Asblz*  
JUN 10 2001 June 7, 2001, Noon

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Rep. Jo Ann Davis (VA-1<sup>st</sup> District)

- This memo is in response to your May 23<sup>rd</sup> memo to me about Rep. Jo Ann Davis, freshman Republican Member, who asked you during your May 23<sup>rd</sup> HASC meeting about the involvement of high-ranking military officers in the strategic review.
- The background for her question is that she had been in contact with several three-star and four-star generals who told her they had not been consulted about the review.
- As a follow up to the meeting, Rep. Davis sent you a hand-written note thanking you for the meeting "to discuss the future of our national defense, what I consider our # 1 priority" and you responded. (Attached)
- Last week, my House Deputy, Mary Beth Carozza, was in contact with Rep. Davis and her staff to pass on your message that you have been meeting with the service chiefs and other military officials as you work to develop the '02 amended budget. The Member and staff were appreciative of the update.
- Rep. Jo Ann Davis also attended a DepSec breakfast on June 6<sup>th</sup> that he hosted for new HASC members.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated.

Prepared By: Mary Beth Carozza, DASD-House Affairs, 697-2536

11-L-0559/OSD/2102

U10800 /01

*Powell Moore*  
381

7 Jun 01

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: May 23, 2001  
SUBJECT:

Let's get back to the congresswoman who asked about the four-star general and let her know that Gen. Shelton and I see that every four-star in any service has it. I am sure that 3/4ths of them already do, but undoubtedly there are some that don't.

We are going to try to fix that.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
052301.03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

LA

MAY 29 2001

The Honorable Jo Ann Davis  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 205 15

Dear Congresswoman Davis:

You were so nice to write. I appreciate it a great deal! I assure you that I look forward to working with you in the period ahead.

With my appreciation and best wishes.

Sincerely,

U09966 /01



U.S. GOVERNMENT  
PRINTING OFFICE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

077 MAY 23 AM 9:43

JO ANN DAVIS  
FIRST DISTRICT  
VIRGINIA

May 23, 2001

Secretary Amosfeld,

Thank you for taking the time today to discuss the future of our National Defense, what I consider our #1 priority.

Representing the 1<sup>st</sup> District of Virginia, I look forward to working with you in furthering our National security.

John Davis

U09944 /01

July 25, 2001 11:59 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Venezuela MoD



Venezuela

Congressman **Cass Ballenger**, a very friendly Republican from North Carolina, called me this morning. [His phone number is (202) 225-2576.]

He says he has a working relationship with President Chavez of Venezuela. Apparently **Ballenger** is a successful businessman from Hickory, North Carolina, and has done a lot of good things for Venezuela. He knows the U.S. Ambassador down there. Chavez has been to **Ballenger's** house.

He says that the Minister of Defense, **Rangel** (he used to be Foreign Minister and is probably an old, **left-winger**), would like to come to the Department of Defense and meet some people. He has been turned down. Apparently, he said he would like to go to **SOUTHCOM** also, but that has been turned off.

**Ballenger** thinks they have been pretty cooperative except for overflights. He said they are thinking of buying some helicopters from the U.S. or Russia. **Ballenger** made a point of telling me that he has stock in the U.S. helicopter company-I think it is Bell.

He said, "Does DoD have any reason for keeping him away?" I said I would look into it and that we would want to talk to State.

Please take a look at it and get back to me.


Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072501-35

25 Jul 01

U12644 /02

August 6, 2001 10:15 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Lin Wells  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Spectrum

311

I talked to Congressman Mark Kirk from Illinois yesterday. He said he would bring up his amendment in the mark-up meeting of the Armed Services Committee, discuss it, get everyone alerted to the problem that DoD needs to get the money-but then withdraw it at the last minute, if that is what we want. He thinks the spectrum auction could bring as much as plus or minus \$50 billion and that it is going to end up being traded off at the end of the year. He wants to have his oar in for us.

He also talked about the confliction problem-that this bandwidth has already been given away to civilians in the rest of the world, where we would be fighting a war.

He estimates the cost to migrate it as only between \$4 and \$14 billion, but he doesn't know how long it will take.

He recognizes we cannot migrate with respect to the satellites.

He wants to be helpful.

We have to get a single person in this building who is in charge of spectrum. When is Stenbit going to be confirmed?

He asked me if I have talked to Evans lately, because Evans is receiving enormous pressure.

6 Aug 01

DHR:dh  
080101-15

U12679 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/2107



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 300

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG - 1 2001

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

July 31, 2001 3:30 p.m.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)  
SUBJECT: Call to Congressman Mark Kirk (R-IL) (202) 225-4835

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell A. Moore", written over the "FROM:" line of the memo.

- Congressman Kirk called you regarding an amendment he may offer tomorrow in the mark-up of the Defense Authorization bill in the House Armed Services Committee.
- Attached are talking points for your return call.

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/2108

**TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO CONGRESSMAN KIRK ON DRAFT SPECTRUM AMENDMENT TO THE FY02 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL**

- Congressman Kirk is planning to add the "Defense Spectrum Comparison Act of 2001" at the **House Armed Services Committee mark-up on our authorization bill tomorrow, August 1st**, in order to "resolve" the IMT-2000 national debate in a way that enables the Department to be compensated for the costs of moving to different spectrum the 100+ DoD systems in the band. The band is used by 120+ DoD satellites (both classified and unclassified purposes), precision guided munitions, tactical radios, air combat training systems, and real-time delivery of voice, video, and data information to warfighters and their commanders.
- **The draft bill:** establishes a "spectrum trust fund" into which all of the proceeds of spectrum auctions would be deposited for the use of DoD, first to pay costs for relocation of existing systems and, if there are additional funds, to pay the costs of combat capability enhancement.

**Talking Points:**

- Appreciate your efforts to assist the Department of Defense to preserve and enhance our ability to carry out our national security responsibilities.
- Strongly believe that HASC inclusion of a "trust fund" mechanism in the authorization bill at this time would not be as helpful as you intend in advancing DoD's interests in the national debate over spectrum for 3G (third generation) wireless services, for the following reasons:
  - introducing the bill at this time presupposes that the Federal band (1755 MHz – 1850 MHz) will be selected for 3G implementation in the United States. No such decision has been made and alternatives are on the table;
  - the critical issue of comparable spectrum (that is, spectrum that has suitable technical characteristics and equivalent regulatory status) has not been addressed in a meaningful way and industry has not proposed realistic options for moving the 100+ DoD systems using the band. Commerce/NTIA and FCC have yet to identify such spectrum. Given that all of the prime spectrum is currently heavily used by industry or the government, doing so will be as complex and politically sensitive -- if not more so -- than finding spectrum for 3G;
  - we appreciate that you are trying, in effect, to earmark funds for DoD; we are concerned, however, that subsequent legislation could change such an earmark and that many have other plans for the funds generated from a spectrum auction (such as bridging the digital divide and using auction funds to balance the budget).
  - Finally, the bill does not provide protection in the event an auction does not generate sufficient revenue to pay for all of DoD's relocation costs.

*Time to do it*

August 8, 2001 8:16 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Senator Dayton

You ought to make sure that Senator Dayton of Minnesota knows you are aware of the letter we sent him denying him the chance to have another Pentagon fellow because we are so short of personnel. You ought to be aware of that and make sure you don't let him get angry about it because he is a good man.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080801-1

*632*

*P Aug 01*

U12700 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/2110



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

STON OFFICE  
ENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
TON, DC 20510  
224-3244

OTA OFFICE  
AL BUILDING  
RIVE, SUITE 298  
MINNESOTA 55111  
727-5220  
224-9043

Honorable Mark Dayton  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-2305

Dear Senator Dayton:

Thank you for your letter requesting an extension for Mr. Mark Centra's fellowship. I appreciate the value you place on his expertise and am pleased to learn he has made such a positive impression on you and your staff.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, though, you certainly understand the situation in which we find the Department of Defense. We are underfunded in virtually every category, from operations to procurement and research and development. We have excess headquarters staffs at the very time when some are proposing cuts to our force structure to reduce the impact of this chronic underfunding.

In such a circumstance, we have to take interest in the number of OSD and Service personnel assigned all across the U.S. Government and elsewhere, without reimbursement. By most estimates, the number is over 1,000. I know you can see the impact that has on the Department as we seek to reduce costs and convert excess headquarters operations into greater war fighting capability.

I therefore request your assistance and cooperation in this effort by allowing Mr. Centra to return to the Pentagon at the scheduled completion of his fellowship. I am grateful for your understanding in this matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

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December 10, 2001 3:49 PM

12/24  
New

020 DOD

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senate Confirmations

If you need help getting those last confirmations done, I will help, Wolfowitz will help, Michelle Laxalt called and is available to help, and Vin Webber called and is available to help. We have friends who may know someone who can bust something loose.

Let's get it going. I want them done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121001-27

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12/14 -

Response attached. The only guy who needs busting loose is Schmitz. He has a vote in Armed Services Tuesday. Powell recommends you call Senator Lieberman. I agree.

10 Dec 01

May we set that up?

U15080 02

✓ C2/1/1-11-0559/OSD/2/1/2  
Lieberman/yes

No



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

December 13, 2001 10:45 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Senate Confirmations response to memo # 121001-27

- This responds to your memorandum of December 10 concerning Senate confirmations (Tab A).
- With the probable confirmation today or tomorrow of Claude Bolton to be Assistant Secretary of Army for Acquisition, 42 of 43 Bush nominations for positions at the Department of Defense have been cleared by the Senate.
- Only Joe Schmitz, to be Inspector General, awaits confirmation. No nomination has been submitted for ASD (Reserve Affairs) and I am advised that the nomination of someone for ASD SO/LIC is on hold.
- The obstacle to Schmitz's confirmation continues to be Chairman Levin and you have personally engaged him on his concerns, as has the Deputy Secretary. You have also written to him recently on this subject (Tab B). Until recently, Chairman Levin declined to schedule a Committee vote on the issue. Last week he indicated the Committee would have a vote on the nomination before the Senate adjourns. If Senator Levin keeps his word, we hope the issue will be resolved at the Armed Services Committee level before the week ends. We have previously engaged outside assistance to persuade Senator Levin to act on this nomination, specifically Joe Schmitz's law partners and prominent Democrats, Tommy Boggs and Lanny Davis ( T a b C ) .
- As we have discussed, nominations for Inspectors General require sequential referral to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. I have discussed the need to act promptly on this nomination to complete consideration before adjournment with Senator Thompson, Ranking Republican on the Committee. He has assured me of his willingness to help. I may ask you to call Chairman Joe Lieberman when the issue is before him and the timing is right.
- Let me assure you that I firmly believe in using outside assistance when the timing and circumstances make it productive. Vin Weber and Michelle Laxalt are old friends and I know we can count on them to assist us. I touched base with both of them yesterday. Michelle is helping us assure that there are enough Democrat votes in the Armed Services Committee when Senator Levin brings up the Schmitz nomination.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 7:23 PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleeza Rice  
The Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Khobar Towers and USS Cole

Attached are some quotes on what the United States said it would do if and when we learn what happened with respect to Khobar Towers and/or the USS Cole.

I thought you might want to have these public pronouncements in mind.

Attachment

DR:dh  
020501-3

000.5

S Feb 01

30 JAN 2001

*DEFS*



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

2001 JAN 31 PM 6:00

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
(PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE UNDER  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY)

*Frank R. Kern*

FROM: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY  
CONFLICT *MM* JAN 30 2001  
(Prepared by: Mr. Carl Meyer, CTP&S, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Post-Terrorist Event Statements – Information Paper

PURPOSE: To answer SECDEF questions on post-terrorist event statements

DISCUSSION: Attached are background status summaries and representative quotations by the President and the Secretary of Defense following the terrorist actions against Khobar Towers, two U.S. Embassies in East Africa, and the USS Cole. Statements have been consistent and have emphasized that “we will investigate and bring those responsible for terrorist acts to justice.”

Attachment:  
As stated

U01834 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2115

*SD*

## **Khobar Towers – June 1996**

BACKGROUND: Still an open case. Saudi authorities are holding several suspects they believe to be perpetrators of the bombings. The FBI is working the action with Saudi authorities, but has not received access to suspects.

### QUOTATIONS:

POTUS – 6/25/96 – “The cowards who committed this murderous act must not go unpunished. . . . We are ready to work with them (the Saudi authorities) to make sure those responsible are brought to justice. . . . Let me say again: We will pursue this. America takes care of our own. Those who did it must not go unpunished,” 6/29/96 Radio Address following G7 summit – “I’ll do everything in my power to discover who’s responsible, to pursue them and to punish them. . . . We have adopted specific recommendations to combat crime and terrorism.”

SECDEF Perry – 6/29/96 news conference after touring the blast site and meeting with U.S. troops in Dhahran - “This attack will not drive us away. To give in would be to betray the brave airmen who died in Dhahran and their families.” “Our military presence is vital to the United States’ and Saudi security, so we are going to stay. . . . We will not be intimidated by terrorists or by rogue nations.”

## **Embassy Bombings in East Africa - 8/17/98 (U.S. strikes on Afghanistan / Sudan occurred on 8/20/98)**

BACKGROUND: Four suspects who were apprehended and extradited to the U.S. are being tried in the Southern District of New York. The trial began on January 3, 2001. Three others who have been indicted are still being held in London. A number of others, to include Bin Ladin, are still at large. There was no public statement prior to our “pre-emptive” strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. These strikes were not characterized as retaliatory, but as self-defense against imminent terrorist plots.

### QUOTATIONS:

POTUS – 8/20/98 - “Let our actions today send this message loud and clear -- there are no expendable American targets. . . . There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests and our values. . . . The United States does not take this action lightly. Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. The countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.” ✓

SECDEF Cohen – 8/20/98 – (The goal of the strikes was to disrupt and attempt to destroy the suspected training and support facilities used to train) “hundreds, if not thousands, of terrorists. . . . We recognize these strikes will not eliminate the problem, but our message is clear. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists and no limit to our resolve to defend American citizens and our interests -- our ideals of democracy and law -- against these cowardly attacks.” ✓

SECDEF Cohen - 8/21/98 - (Further military strikes against suspected terrorist targets in other countries are) "always a possibility. . . . We have contingency plans that we are developing, and there may be more in the future."

### USS Cole - October 2000

BACKGROUND: Yemeni and U.S. authorities are still investigating. The government of Yemen is holding a number of suspects pending trial in Yemeni court. The FBI is working with the government of Yemen regarding FBI access to the suspects and to maintain the integrity of any indictment the U.S. might bring against them in the future.

### QUOTATIONS:

Candidate Bush - 10/12/00 - the Clinton administration must "find out the facts" so that the U.S. can take appropriate steps. "There must be a consequence." || ✓

POTUS - 10/12/00 - "We will find out who is responsible and hold them accountable." || ✓

SECDEF Cohen - 10/12/00 - "No one should assume they can attack us with impunity." "If, as it appears, that this was the act of terrorists, then we will certainly do everything in our power to track them down and hold them accountable." || ✓

SECDEF Cohen - 10/31/00 - "We're going to hold them accountable, and we're going to track them down, and we're going to see that justice is done." ✓

SECDEF Cohen - 1/9/01 - "We have a full range of options available. I wouldn't specify military as being the first or the only. There are other options available as well, and in addition to criminal prosecution, diplomatic action, economic measures that can be taken as well as potentially military. But we first have to make sure that we have the right person or persons and organizations responsible for the attack before any action is taken. We also have the right, of course, to take preemptive action to prevent future actions from being - direct terrorist actions from being leveled at our people. But I wouldn't say that military is the only option. It is one of many options available." ✓

Coordination: Post-Terrorist Event Statements – Information Paper

ASD(PA) JW (31) / [Signature] 1/31

March 15, 2001 11:18AM'

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cam Ranh Bay

Please have someone take a look at this and see what we think.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031501-10

U1310

15 Mar

March 15, 2001 11:14 AM

SUBJECT: Meeting w/ (b)(6) on Cam Ranh Bay

(b)(6)

March 13, 2001, I had lunch with (b)(6), an old friend. He is working with (b)(6) who is Swedish.

1. Would we have an interest in Cam Ranh Bay? The Russians are going to be getting out in two years.
2. (b)(6) heads up a Swedish group that could buy the Russian's interest in it and then help Vietnam turn it into a moneymaker as a free port. It is one of the best ports in the region. His company has talked to the Russians about giving it up and to the Vietnamese.
3. The Russians have indicated they would like to keep a position in Cam Ranh Bay. They like the idea, and they have agreed to help persuade the Vietnamese. The Swedes said they could raise a billion dollars to do it.
4. A retired Air Force general named (b)(6) works with the Swedish group.
5. The Vietnamese are divided. The political people want it because of the money it could bring in; the Army is against it.
6. The Swedes have stopped pushing it because they have not sensed any interest by the U.S. and because of the economic slump in Asia.
7. Should we have any interest in this? If so, I should let (b)(6) know,

DHR:dh  
031401-17

CD  
Action complete  
20/3

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Senior Military Assistant  
16 March 2001

MEMO FOR: MR. CHRIS WILLIAMS, SATSD/POLICY

SUBJECT: Cam Ranh Bay

Sir:

Please review the attached **SecDef** meeting notes and provide **assessment** for **DepSec** review.

Very respectfully,



John Batiste  
BG, USA  
Senior Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

**Attachment:**  
as stated

**cc:** DepSecDef

**SUSPENSE:** Tuesday, 20 March 2001

VIET

( ISMAR 01 )

March 15, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cam Ranh Bay

Please have someone take a look at this and see what we think.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031501-10

*pull back  
from USD-P*

U05444 /01



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

APR - 4 01 3: 06

MAR 21 2001



I-01/003230

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

COPY PROVIDED

THROUGH SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY MATTERS (Mr. Chris Williams, 697-7200)  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
SUPPORT (Mr. Peter Verga, 697-0286)

FROM: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
(Mr. Bernd McConnell, 693-0482)

Prepared by: Dr. Lewis M. Stern, ISA/AP, 697-0556

*BMc 21*

21 MAR 2001

SUBJECT: VIETNAM AND CAM RANH BAY  
-- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TAB 1 contains notes from a meeting with Mr. Kimche on commercial development possibilities for Cam Ranh Bay, and a question from SECDEF on DoD views regarding Cam Ranh access/commercial development.

The Vietnamese government has contemplated the commercial development potential for Cam Ranh Bay since the mid-1980s, when it began economic reforms.

The government, however, has not made a decision on what to do with Cam Ranh. Commercialization of Cam Ranh Bay, as well as facility access for foreign countries, are sensitive issues for Hanoi because of three key variables:

- Beijing's fundamental opposition to anything that would change the regional balance of power, and put China at a disadvantage.
- The Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) allergy to establishing foreign military bases in the region.
- The complexity of the Cam Ranh Bay utilization agreement with Moscow that expires in 2004.

It is important to note that the recent "revival" of the Vietnamese-Russian "strategic" relationship provides Hanoi with an important comfort level, and might alter the meaning of the 2004 termination date for the existing agreement with Moscow.

VIET

21 MAR 01



Vietnamese businesses have concocted proposals for Cam Ranh development schemes, and engaged Western business interests with similar visions.

- These Vietnamese businesses do not appear to have the authority necessary to follow through on the proposed deals.
- Hanoi has probably not made a final decision on the disposition of Cam Ranh, and is likely to defer making a decision until the precise chemistry of the renewed Russian-Vietnamese relationship is given more precise definition.

Finally, Hanoi has been emphatically clear that the question of access to Cam Ranh Bay or other facilities should not figure in efforts to develop the US-Vietnamese defense relationship.

- Hanoi refused to discuss simple issues such as US Navy ship visits until SecDef's March 2000 visit, and at that point simply agreed to refer the issue of port calls to the US-Vietnamese defense working group that has managed the ground floor level activities in this relationship.
- The political body language suggests that a ship visit is not something that will take place in the near future.
- Hanoi will avoid discussing the harder questions concerning Cam Ranh with the US.

Bottom line: It is probably not in our interest to attempt to discuss access to or commercial development of Cam Ranh Bay at this point in the bilateral defense relationship.

- Our goal for the immediate future is to coax the Vietnamese Defense Ministry to continue to develop military-to-military relations in a gradual, cautious, deliberately slow-paced manner.
- We should continue to bring military specialists into contact, expand dialogue, and gradually elevate the level of official interaction between US and Vietnamese defense officials.
- Practical cooperation so far has been confined to entry level steps in humanitarian demining, search and rescue, and environmental security cooperation.

Reviewed by DASD/AP  20 MAR 2001



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

MAR 21 2001 *me*  
APR - 4 PM 3: 06



I-01/003230

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

COPY PROVIDED *JH*

THROUGH SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY MATTERS (Mr. Chris Williams, 697-7200) *copy from me 3/23*  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY SUPPORT (Mr. Peter Verga, 697-0286)

FROM: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Mr. Bernd McConnell, 693-0482) *BMc 21* 21 MAR 2001  
Prepared by: Dr. Lewis M. Stern, ISA/AP, 697-0556

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
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Reviewed by DASD/AP  0 1

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Senior Military Assistant  
16 March 2001

*YSL/10  
Forwarded to AA*

MEMO FOR: MR. CHRIS WILLIAMS, SATSD/POLICY

SUBJECT: Cam Ranh Bay

Sir:

Please review the attached SecDef meeting notes and provide assessment for DepSec review.

Very respectfully,



John Batiste  
BG, USA  
Senior Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
as stated

cc: DepSecDef

SUSPENSE: Tuesday, 20 March 2001

01-03-16 16:27 10

11-L-0559/OSD/2133

3/16

March 15, 2001 11:18 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Cam Ranh Bay

Please have someone take a look at this and see what we think.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031501-10

U05444 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2134

March 15, 2001 11:14 A M

SUBJECT: Meeting w/ (b)(6) on Cam Ranh Bay

(b)(6)

March 13, 2001, I had lunch with (b)(6) an old friend. He is working with (b)(6) who is Swedish.

1. Would we have an interest in Cam Ranh Bay? The Russians are going to be getting out in two years.
2. (b)(6) heads up a Swedish group that could buy the Russian's interest in it and then help Vietnam turn it into a moneymaker as a free port. It is one of the best ports in the region. His company has talked to the Russians about giving it up and to the Vietnamese.
3. The Russians have indicated they would like to keep a position in Cam Ranh Bay. They like the idea, and they have agreed to help persuade the Vietnamese. The Swedes said they could raise a billion dollars to do it.
4. A retired Air Force general named (b)(6) works with the Swedish group.
5. The Vietnamese are divided. The political people want it because of the money it could bring in; the Army is against it.
6. The Swedes have stopped pushing it because they have not sensed any interest by the U.S. and because of the economic slump in Asia.
7. Should we have any interest in this? If so, I should let (b)(6) know.

DHR:dh  
031401-17

11-L-0559/OSD/2135



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

UNCLASSIFIED  
M/C 2/24/01  
DSD  
23 APR 2001  
23/4  
APR 10 2001  
440

01/002921

D

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: PDASD FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (Robert J. Newberry, 693-2892)  
(Prepared by: LTC Tom Baltazar, SOLIC/PKHA, (b)(6))  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR POLICY MATTERS HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Former Secretary of State Haig's Remarks on Humanitarian Intervention – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Mr. Chris Williams has reviewed this and requested we provide the attached information responding to the Secretary's request to take a look at former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig's speech on humanitarian intervention

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY MATTERS  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
SUPPORT

350.001

10 Apr 01

## Secretary Haig's Views on Humanitarian Intervention

**Purpose:** Respond to the Secretary's request to "Take a look at these remarks and mark some sections you think we should be looking at and are not."

- OUSD(P) Comment: There is nothing in Secretary Haig's remarks that this administration is not already looking at. The following are the three main points of the speech:

**Point #1:**

- Primacy of strategic planning in U.S. foreign policy must be restored. USG must be able to predict disasters/crises and take action in advance. (pg. 5, para. 7)

**OUSD(P) Remark:**

- Agree. It is especially difficult to generate non-military preventive action. NSC intends to re-invigorate an interagency working group on **interagency** contingency planning. DoD should support.

**Point #2:**

- U.S. military intervention on humanitarian grounds should be rare. When the U.S. does intervene, we must select objectives carefully. (pg. 6, para. 2)

**OUSD(P) Remark:**

- Agree. The overarching goal should be to leverage others to accomplish these operations. Effective leverage usually has costs (e.g., political chits!, logistical support and training/equipping foreign forces). DoD should sustain the capability to leverage others when needed.

**Point #3:**

- The U.S. should not intervene alone, but as part of a coalition. The U.S. has an essential political and military role to play in forming such coalitions. (pg. 6, paras. 4&6)

**OUSD(P) Remark:**

- Agree. Selection of military objectives is crucial in humanitarian intervention. DoD must exert strong influence within the interagency to ensure appropriate objectives are selected.

P ee Ver;ga \_\_\_\_\_ Chris Williams *CAW*

Prepared by: LTC Tom Baltazar, SOLIC/PKHA, (b)(6)

March 12, 2001 8:30 AM

TO: Chris Williams  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Haig Remarks

Take a look at these remarks by Haig and mark some sections you think are things we ought to be thinking about that we are not.

Thank you.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031201-6

**The Question of Humanitarian Intervention**

Keynote Address as Prepared for Delivery

By

**Hon. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.**

**Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference**

**Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

12 February 2001

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you here to the Foreign Policy Research Institute's conference on the question of humanitarian intervention. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for turning out and also to thank all of those involved in putting the conference together. I was especially impressed by the unusual sight of my co-chairman Harvey Sicherman, actually working -- that's right -- working hard since early this morning during our panel discussions. It was worth the trip up here just to see that and, although Harvey did not know it, we photographed him in the act! He assures me, however, that this will not become a habit. And based on past experience, I believe him!

As you know, FPRI has long distinguished itself through its pioneering work in bringing the best of scholarship to bear on current policy problems. Today's conference is no exception. We have brought together a great cast of analysts, many of whom have experience not only in thinking about humanitarian interventions but in actually carrying out such missions. And what a job that is,

The most serious decision a President can make is to commit American troops to possible combat. Over the past eight years, Bill Clinton sent American forces into harm's way, more than any President before him, all on behalf of what has come to be labelled humanitarian intervention. The roll-call of the most significant is familiar: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo. Today, even as we meet, the United States and our NATO allies have committed some 100,000 troops, including reserves, to Bosnia and Kosovo. And NATO went to war over Kosovo for the very first time in the history of the Alliance.

As the new Bush Administration assesses the appropriateness of these interventions, the President and his team should avoid the old argument over burden-sharing. Washington should know, and every American should know, that some 80% of the forces in the Balkans are European. Our allies also bear 87% of the cost. So it is truly a profound commitment by the Western Alliance, not only by the United States, and this reminds us that NATO only works when the principle of shared risks and shared burdens is observed.

What does humanitarian intervention mean? When I was Secretary of State it meant that someone was coming to help me in my struggle with the White House staff. In those difficult times, let me assure you that such help was very, very rare!

Happily, I can say that the new Administration appears to have the kind of Cabinet that would not tolerate such staff meddling. These individuals are the President's own choices and so I am optimistic,

Today, humanitarian intervention has come to mean the use of military force to rescue people at risk from political causes, such-as the actions of dictators, even if the American national interest does not appear to be meaningful at stake. It thus appears to fall in that sensitive area where our humane values and our sense of geopolitics -- what we believe to be right and what we judge to be prudent -- rub uneasily together. And, as such, it often leaves us divided about the course of action and wary of the precedents that may be set.

Let me make the following observations:

- First, the American people will not support a policy that tends to intervene everywhere. Nor will they support its opposite, a policy that abstains altogether. A balance must be found that comports with both our ideals and our sense of reality.
- Second, humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. We must break with a policy that does not act until after a human catastrophe and then assigns to our troops objectives they cannot achieve. Both are the products of a dangerous populism amplified by the media and the related explosion in information sciences.
- Third, and finally, there is an alternative, We can work to prevent the problems that give rise to such interventions, and, if that fails, we can guide our interventions with common sense criteria and reasonable objectives.

Let me begin with the very basic issue of whether humanitarian intervention fits into American foreign policy.

Our debate today tends toward two extremes. One school puts American values at the top and argues that we should use military force in defense of human rights around the world. Some would even argue that we should go further, and use such occasions to impose our democratic values on societies that have no historic experience with democracy. The record suggests that this cannot be achieved, Haiti being a case in point, as we shall see in a moment.

Nonetheless, we should recognize that both types of intervention are sustained by powerful currents of American idealism. They are the lineal descendent of Woodrow Wilson's ringing declaration, and I quote: "All shall know that America puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity." End of quote. Some are even willing to subscribe to a variation of Wilson's mystical belief that, as he put it, America was created, quote, "to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty." [End quote]

It is amusing, of course, for this old General to see so many of the doves from the Cold War era suddenly reborn as hawks in advocating the use of American military power without applying the test of whether it is in our national interest. Perhaps we should follow the great Cold War historian Robert Coates who suggested that one must consider not only hawks and doves but also cuckoo birds and ostriches. Surely those who would use the bayonet to remake the world in America's image qualify as the cuckoos. I would agree with George Kennan who wrote back in 1993 that, quote "to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world... is unthought through, vainglorious, and undesirable."

The American people are much too sensible to support for long either version of humanitarian intervention because they rightly suspect the crusading arrogance of it, the moral overreach of it, and the inevitable rebellion against it. It will multiply adversaries and sour our friends. John Quincy Adams put it best as long ago as July 4, 1821, when he said: "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." He added that doing so would involve the U.S., and I quote, "beyond the power of extrication... she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit. "

The excesses of the Clinton era, in dialectical fashion, have called forth an opposite school, now gaining strength from the evident failure of perfectionist interventionists to produce perfection. These are the abstainers. They would have the United States stay aloof from humanitarian disasters in the name of the national interest. But their idea of the national interest is an imported one, drawn from the realpolitik of a vanished pre-1914 Europe. They ignore the fact that for Americans, the national interest is not simply a calculation of material interests but also a moral one. After all, we do stand for certain values: democracy, respect for individual rights, the settling of disputes through diplomacy rather than force, and the rule of law not the jungle. Who of us could stand idly by if we saw our neighbors, or even a stranger, assaulted by thugs? We resent such assaults upon our values and our innate decency as a nation demands action to prevent massacres. A policy of abstention is thus the policy of the ostrich. The American people will simply not support for long a policy so at odds with our fundamental values.

I know, of course, that I have set up a pair of straw men, or at least, a pair of straw birds. But we all know that each of us bears a little sympathy for these positions. Yes, we would like to right the wrongs of this world, especially on the cheap. Yes, we also resent the idea that we should straighten out the messes made by others. That is why the American national interest, properly conceived, encompasses not only ideals but also reality, not only the world as we would like it to be but the world as it is. On balance, humanitarian intervention can be just but it must be leavened by prudence. We should seek to prevent massacres and genocide through diplomacy, and other actions, including the use of the bayonet if necessary. But this should never be a crusade and should never be undertaken in the absence of careful calculations that include costs and benefits.

In 1981, concerned about this very debate following my experiences in NATO during President Carter's term, I observed that a foreign policy that pursued ideals while ignoring power would offend America's sense of reality and probably will fail. Equally, a foreign policy that pursued power while ignoring ideals would offend America's sense of right and in the long run will also fail. Only a balance between the two would merit consistent public support. Every generation of American statesman has to decide the balance to be struck. Ours is no exception.

With this in mind, let me turn now to my second observation, about the practice of humanitarian intervention as we have conducted it over the past decade. Have we struck that balance between ideals and reality to which I just referred? My answer is no. Our interventions have been neither just nor practical. A brief review of the facts will make the case.

In Somalia, the Bush Administration intervened in late December 1992 with 30,000 troops to prevent a widening of a famine well underway. That mission was expanded in the Spring of 1993 by the Clinton Administration to rebuild the

country as a nation under a mandate from the UN Security Council, against a backdrop of media clamor for a continued U.S. military presence. The mission ended, however, after a disastrous ambush cost eighteen American lives and the U.S. withdrew in failure. A notable part of this adventure was the role played by CNN. There can be no doubt that the television image of starving Somalis played a large part in getting us in. There can also be no doubt that the image of a Somali mob abusing the corpse of an American soldier played a large part in getting us out.

In true dialectical fashion, one mistake beget another. We recoiled from Somalia and therefore hesitated about Rwanda. There was no CNN effect to get us in. And a genocide took place while UN troops watched.

In Haiti the U.S. intervened with some 20,000 troops and two aircraft carrier groups to restore democracy in the unique form of President Aristide. The invasion had been produced by a wave of desperate refugees seeking asylum, many dying from either exposure or unseaworthy boats before they could reach Florida. The results of this effort were disheartening, to say the least. Just this last week, after six years of effort and several billions in aid, the UN and the U.S. gave up. Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote to the Security Council that, and I quote, "a combination of rampant crime, violent street protests, and incidents of violence targeted at the international community could severely limit the ability of the mission to fulfill its mandate," end of quote. It has now been shut down. All international observers agree that the May 2000 elections giving Aristide's party a huge majority and indeed, Aristide's own election in November were blatant frauds.

The result of all this effort has been not to rescue the country but rather to enthrone a leader who is certainly no democrat, I must note that Haiti is by now a familiar object of American humanitarian intervention. We stayed 19 years the first time from 1915 to 1934, and six years the second time. The results truly speak for themselves in this prolonged experiment to impose democracy through the bayonet. Enough said.

Finally, we have the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1990-91 the Bush Administration thought Bosnia was European business, not ours, and so did the Europeans. Both seemed more amenable to propping up Gorbachev's Soviet Union, already a political corpse, rather than dealing with the real trouble brewing in Yugoslavia. Without U.S. leadership, clashing European interests produced a predictable paralysis. Massacre followed upon massacre which we condemned, but did not intervene to prevent. Finally in the summer of 1995, a combination of international and domestic pressures, combined with the scenes of the awful Srebrenica slaughter, forced President Clinton to act.

A similar episode followed in Kosovo. Over a million Kosovars were set to flight by the Serbs before NATO went to war. This military action, despite all of the enthusiastic reviews of our air power, succeeded only when we threatened a ground invasion. It ended on a particularly sour note of strain within NATO's command structure,

Many very dangerous precedents were set. NATO had attacked a sovereign state to rearrange the politics of one of its provinces even though the situation did not pose a threat to the Alliance itself. Countries who feared that the promotion of NATO's use to intervene in their internal affairs.

There was another ugly mishap within the NATO command itself. A British subordinate to General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, refused his order to intercept the Russians in their dash to the Pristina airport. Oddly enough, the Pentagon sided with the British subordinate. Clearly, these are not **experiences** the Alliance would wish to repeat.

The result is that today the U.S. and NATO are committed to keep troops in Bosnia and Kosovo until those countries become multiethnic democracies or the end of time, whichever occurs first. Old Balkan hands, including FPRI's founder Robert Strausz-Hupe, who knows that area intimately, tell me that the end of time is a better bet.

This pattern of interventions illustrates the dangers of what I call "electronic populism." By waiting until a humanitarian disaster has occurred, replete with gory coverage by the media, a President may find it easier to rally public support for military action. But by doing so, we put our whole foreign policy at the risk of events that are shaped primarily by others.

We lose twice in this approach. First, we forfeit strategic direction, whereby we shape events. Second, we also disarm our diplomacy. As Henry Kissinger has often observed, the early stages of a problem, when positions are still fluid and ambiguous, present the best opportunity for creative diplomacy. Once positions are hardened and the massacres committed, there is little left to do except to summon the troops.

So we end up making much more effort for much less result. Even worse, we expose the very people we hope to save to even greater risk. In both strategic and humanitarian terms, these have been military interventions to rescue an utterly failed foreign policy.

This brings me to my final observation. There is an alternative to humanitarian intervention as we have seen it.

The beginning of wisdom is, first, to restore the primacy of strategic planning in our foreign policy and in doing so, to put humanitarian intervention in its place -- a lesser but honorable role. In recent years because of confusion about the real causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inchoate analysis of the so-called "New World Order" has left us vulnerable to passing crises and deprived us of any sensible judgment about their importance to our overall goals.

Above all, we must discard the idea that we need the disaster before we can do anything effective. Ladies and gentlemen, there is no room in a sound American foreign policy for today's electronic populism!

Once this is done we will be able to revive our diplomacy of prevention. I realize of course, that preventing a crisis sometimes requires an earlier threat to use force. But does anyone not believe that a united U.S.-European approach to the Bosnia crisis in 1991 or 1992 would have spared everyone great agony and saved thousands of lives?

Second, if diplomacy fails and we contemplate intervention, we should recall that our military forces operate in support of national objectives that include above all the deterrence of major wars, which is really the most important humanitarian role we can play. We and our allies must keep this in mind as we contemplate minor interventions.

The Marines, in their very plain-spoken way -- only an Army General could say that -- described it accurately when they called their manual on the subject "The Small Wars Manual." It was published in 1940 and if you can get beyond the fascinating chapters on the care and feeding of mules, you will find a fair description of what humanitarian missions are today. Mark that title. "Small wars," not "big wars." Small wars are compounded by ambiguity, different rules of engagement and many other snares and traps. It was Wellington who said that "a great country can have no such thing as a little war." So in the interest of our larger role in deterrence we must be wary of frittering away our strength.

Third, if no other alternative is available, when we do intervene militarily we ought to do so with military prudence, **These are not exercises that break new ground in military science. The key point is to determine whether and how the use of military force will make a difference for the better.** The definition of that difference will automatically allow us to measure whether our objectives are being achieved once we hit the ground. That, in turn, will make it much easier to determine the point of exit.

I would like to stress this last issue. Forget about the fetish for doing checklists and artificial exit deadlines. The key is to set reasonable goals and then to measure our progress toward them. It cannot be something vague like building a nation or something superficial like just holding an election. These are troops trained to fight, kill, and overcome. They are not police and not social workers. And I do not accept the argument by some that **peacekeeping** actually sharpens combat skills. Just the opposite is true.

Fourth and finally, we ought to use the coalition principle as often as we can. Others share our values, Some are better placed to intervene and have a more acute understanding of the situation.

I want to add a caveat here. NATO itself, as an alliance should not necessarily be pressed into this task. Those few in NATO who have the capacity to project military power should act if it is in their interest to do so. The rest of the Alliance should be supportive. This was the formula I used successfully while Supreme Allied Commander of NATO to deal with so-called out of area crises. I am convinced that it remains both workable and far preferable to the cumbersome and restrictive procedures we saw in the Kosovo war.

The U.S. has an essential role to play in forming such coalitions. We need not -- we should not -- provide the lion's share of forces. In fact, as I pointed out, we are not doing so today in the Balkans. But the essence of any coalition, shared burdens and shared risks, may require important U.S. participation. We should never forget that there is a price for leadership.

Let me conclude now by reviewing the main points. Humanitarian intervention has a minor but honorable role to play in American foreign policy. It must be gauged on the balance of values and interests, ideals and reality, what is right and what is prudent. The American people will not support humanitarian intervention as a formula to impose American values on the rest of the world but they will also not support a realpolitik that does nothing about genocide.

Thus far, we have failed to strike the proper balance. Humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. "Electronic populism" stays our hand until disaster strikes, depriving our foreign policy of strategic sense, and our diplomats of their most effective opportunities, before positions congeal in blood.

There is a better way. First, restore strategic balance to our foreign policy and focus on prevention at the earliest stage when creative diplomacy can work best. Second, **consider** engagement in these "small wars" with an eye to the larger more important mission of deterrence -- the prevention of big wars -- so that we do not fritter away our strength. We should know beforehand that any new commitment will not undercut this greater objective. Third, if we must **commit**, then do so to make a decisive difference with attainable objectives and a way to measure them so that we can leave. Fourth, use the coalition principle ~~that~~ shares burdens and responsibilities in the use of military force. Above ~~all~~, lead.

I want to close with this comment. Humanitarian intervention, like the **rest** of foreign policy, is ultimately a test of a nation's character. Are we **willing** to defend the right, and fight for it, if need be? Americans have answered this call throughout their history. But there is another part to character and that is humility. Robert Strausz-Hupe, wrote that "moral perfection, **especially when** it uses service to humanity as its vessel, puts me on my guard." We ought to be on guard too, that the promise of America's values does not become the excuse for an American crusade, one that repeats the folly of the European empire's who imagined that a lasting civilization could be imposed by bayonets. Yes, let us do our duty when our forces must be used to rescue humanity from man-made disasters. But we should do so understanding that foreign policy, and military forces, are very imperfect instruments in a very imperfect world.

May 14, 2001 11:39 AM

TO: Lisa Bronson  
cc: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9 June Helsinki

There are only so many hours in the day. I really can't imagine making two stops in Finland, I think I am going to pass.

Attach.  
5/10/01 Bronson memo to SecDef re: Helsinki 9 June

DHR:dh  
051401-37

*Finland*

*14 May 01*



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

**ACTION MEMO**

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-01/005682

May 10, 2001; 11:32 AM

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, EUROPEAN &  
NATO AFFAIRS

*John Ruble*  
10 MAY 2001

SUBJECT: Potential for **Bilateral Meetings in Helsinki on 9 June**

- There is an opportunity to meet Finnish President (Tarja Halonen) and Prime Minister (Paavo Lipponen) on June 9 as you travel to the Nordic-Baltic-U-S. ministerial in Turku, Finland later that day.
- The Finns, more transatlantic than many allies, invited you to the ministerial hoping that they could meet with you separately.
- Meetings in Helsinki provide chance to discuss Finnish views on NATO and EU enlargement; make case for Turkey's role in EU military decision-making
  - Finns have the (first) Chairmanship of the EU military committee (their previous CHOD, Hagglund)
- It **would be** awkward to visit Finland without meeting the President when the offer has been extended (President Halonen has agreed in principle to a meeting with you Saturday morning (unusual) in Helsinki).
- Opportunity to discuss missile defense and importance of NATO with Halonen and Lipponen (Halonen is skeptical); garner support of key non-NATO, influential nation
- Meeting would avoid the perception by Finland that it is (again) used as "conference location" without ability to contribute substantively
- Meetings would require an additional stop (Helsinki); short flight to Turku (35 min.)

**RECOMMENDATION:** SecDef agree to meetings in Helsinki with Finnish President and Prime Minister on the morning of 9 June.

Prepared by: John Ruble, 695-6538

*Copy back to me*

May 29, 2001 2:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Refugees at Guantanamo

In one of the meetings this week, someone said that the Department of State is not paying for the cost of the refugees at Guantanamo. Let's have someone look at that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052901-38



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

INFO MEMO

14 AUG 01 M  
SECRET  
#-01/006736

2001 AUG 17 AM 11: 22

August 13, 2001, 2:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Gallington, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Policy Matters  
(Performing the Duties of the ASD/SOLIC)

AUG 13 2001

SUBJECT: Update on migrant issues at Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station (GTMO)

- **SecDef** requested that someone look into why State Department is not paying costs for refugees at GTMO.
- An NSC-led interagency group has produced a draft paper (Tab A) that is approaching DoD's position on this issue.
  - Plan is to establish an Administration strategy to deal with migrant operations in the Caribbean, shifting responsibility to State and Justice for migrant operations for other than mass migrations. State/Justice would each obtain **\$1M/yr** to handle the normal, small numbers of migrants at GTMO, and **\$5M** each in a contingency fund for times when the numbers of migrants increase.
  - Final outcome will be a decision paper for review by Principals.
- Background: Currently State/Justice do not accept responsibility for housing, food, medical needs, utilities, etc., for the migrants (normally 20-50) at GTMO. Cost to DoD about **\$1.8M/yr**.
  - In 1994, **DoD** received a one-time emergency appropriation to support its response to a mass migration of Cubans/Haitians at GTMO (38,000 migrants).
  - Since then, **DoD** has been burdened with all migrant operations at GTMO. There is not clear authority or funding for this mission. In our view, State/Justice are the appropriate agencies for this mission.

COORDINATION: Tab B.

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: LCDR Tarantino, 614-0022

U14025 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2149

April 27, 2001

### Caribbean Mass Migrant Operations: Six Points In Principle

Understanding that consideration of and compliance to legal and funding authorities would need to be addressed, **this paper** provides a brief and general description of agency responsibilities in the event of a mass migration contingency in the Caribbean. It is intended to provide an agreed upon framework within which follow-on interagency discussions can flesh out more detailed descriptions of core responsibilities and the hand-offs between agencies, with consideration of legal and funding authorities.

1. A mass migration contingency, as determined by Principals, would present significant humanitarian, law enforcement, and national security implications.
2. In a mass migration contingency, the National Security Council would lead the interagency coordination of the responsibilities of Justice, State, Coast Guard, Defense, and other agencies, under the Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Policy Coordination Committee. (NSC may delegate this coordinating role under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)
3. In a mass migration contingency, Coast Guard is the primary agency responsible for interdiction activities. Coast Guard is to track, intercept, board migrant boats, maintain custody of migrants while on the boat, report observations, support shipboard screening by INS, and repatriate migrants who do not have **protection** concerns. (Coast Guard also has these responsibilities under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)
4. In a mass migration contingency, Justice is the primary agency responsible for migrant screening and determining which migrants have protection concerns. It is responsible for providing for the custody and care of migrants, **until** such a determination has been made. (Justice also has these responsibilities under steady state condition and in migrant surge events.)
5. In a mass migration contingency, State is the primary agency responsible for the care, maintenance, and support of those migrants determined to have protection concerns. State is also responsible for migrant resettlement and all diplomatic issues. (State also has these responsibilities under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)

*Note: **It still** needs to be determined whether Justice or **State** will **provide** for the **care of migrants** without protection concerns **still** in custody before their repatriation.*

6. In a mass migration contingency, Defense (as well as FEMA, HHS, Customs, and other agencies) will provide support to the efforts of Coast Guard, Justice, and State in their response to the emergency. Defense support, for example, may include maritime

## WORKING DRAFT

holding and transportation of migrants as **well as** holding, security, basic infrastructure, and support to migrants at military facilities at Guantanamo.

- Defense support in response to a mass migration that raises a national security threat, as determined by the President, ~~extremis-would~~ largely be on a **non-reimbursable** basis.
- The size and scope of the Defense role will be determined by the [President] SECDEF on a case by case basis, in consultation with other senior officials a product of interagency deliberation and/or a White House determination at a sufficiently senior level.
- The scope and level of support from Defense in a mass migration contingency **is** greater than its responsibilities under steady state conditions or in migrant surge events.

NOTE: The edits shown here were conveyed by ODGC/IA, DGC/F, and JS Legal Counsel to NSC Legal and to the NSC chair of the interagency working group. The edits are no (vet) included in the NSC text.

WORKING DRAFT

COORDINATION:

Under Secretary of Defense  
For Policy

Mr. Douglas Feith

*WJH*  
**AUG 16 20**

General Counsel

Mr. William J. Haynes

July 3, 2001

Comptroller

Mr. D. Zakheim

July 3, 2001

OUSD(P), Inter-American Affairs

Mr. John Merrill

June 8, 2001

CUBA

Task Policy  
with short suspense

Should we see training  
memo

6/6



Larry Di Rita


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TO: CID

SUBJ: REFUGEES AT GUANTANAMO

1) REQUEST TASK Policy  
WITH FAA WITH SUSPENSE  
OF 8 JUN.

2) NOTES SHOULD READ:  
PER MR. Di RITA -  
A PREPARE INFO MEMO FOR  
SECDEF ON SUBJECT REQUEST.



29 MAY 01



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

2001 JUL 11 AM 6:13

## INFO MEMO

I-O 11008063

JULY 9, 2001, 2:06 P.M

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: DAN GALLINGTON, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE (POLICY MATTERS) *DG 9 Jul 2001*

SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar)

You asked (TAB A) about the value of the Cooperative Threat Reduction ("CTR") program (known as "Nunn-Lugar"), which OUSD(P) administers. The program – funding destruction of nuclear, biological, chemical and missile capabilities in the former Soviet Union – is sensible in principle and has produced some valuable results. Pending a program review by the new Policy team that may take office in the coming weeks, I would evaluate CTR as an apparent net contribution to US interests. But some cautionary notes are warranted.

The paper at TAB B, prepared by the OSD office responsible for CTR lists program accomplishments. The list's impressive quality helps account for the overwhelming support for the program in Congress, including among key congressional leaders of both parties. In the confirmation process, the candidates for OSD's Policy jobs all were asked about CTR and all expressed strong support for the idea of the program.

DOD spends approximately \$400 million a year on CTR. The key questions for policymakers are:

Are we selecting the right projects to fund? Are there proper financial controls?

*Are we selecting the right projects?*

In the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, CTR has eliminated their nuclear capabilities. It is working still on eliminating their WMD capabilities,



11-L-0559/OSD/2154

U12168 /01

including infrastructure. This is desirable. Given the poor state of the economies there, it is unlikely that these capabilities would have been eliminated without.

The question is more difficult in the case of Russia. Here is where the fungibility issue arises: Did CTR bring about a destruction/elimination of WMD capabilities that would not otherwise have occurred? Or did US taxpayers, through CTR, simply pay for the destruction of items that the Russians would have eliminated anyway as part of their military modernization program.

We do not have definitive answers yet. Our new team will have to review this.

*Are the programs managed properly to prevent misappropriation or diversion of funds and to achieve and our threat reduction goals?*

There are known instances of funds being diverted and some individuals unjustly enriched at U.S. taxpayer expense. OSD's CTR office says that DOD has done a better job than State or Energy has in ensuring that assistance is used for its intended purposes. This requires careful examination.

For well run programs, a key benefit is our giving employment to their weapons scientists and technicians or our encouraging US companies to hire such people there or bring them to the United States.

Attachments:

a/s

Prepared by: Guy Roberts, OUSD(P), 695-5 136

11-L-0559/OSD/2155

K  
Pass to Sgt.

CTR

To  
Doug FEITH

May 21, 2001 2:51 PM

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar . .

J  
6/15

I think we ought to get somebody to get me a piece of paper that explains what we think about Nunn-Lugar.

Is it really working today? Has it worked in the past? Is it worth the money? Should it receive more money? Should it receive less money?

I get asked the question, and I am not current enough.

*[Handwritten signature]*

DHR:dh  
052101-45

Susan  
FUT  
George has for action  
✓/r  
Pete

## **NUNN-LUGAR/COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM**

- Objective to enhance U.S. national security by contracting with private sector to assist states of Former Soviet Union (FSU) in following major areas:
  - Strategic arms elimination-Russia/Ukraine; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure elimination-Kazakhstan
  - Nuclear weapons storage and transport security, fissile material storage facility, end to plutonium production in Russia;
  - Proliferation prevention of biological weapons (B W) technologies and expertise;
  - Chemical weapons (CW) destruction in Russia.
- Appropriated: \$3.6 billion since 1991. FY2002 Final Budget Request: \$403 million. Achievements as of 8 June 200 1:
  - Deactivated: 5560 warheads. Destroyed: 386 ICBM launchers, 352 SLBM launchers and 20 associated SSBNs, 87 heavy bombers, 423 ICBMs, 483 ALCMs, 2 12 SLBMs, and 194 nuclear test tunnels/bore holes.
  - All strategic arms eliminated in Belarus and Kazakhstan; Ukraine nearly complete.
  - Improving accountability, storage and transport security for nuclear warheads; building storage for 50 tons of plutonium from dismantled warheads; finalizing plan to stop 1.5 ton/year plutonium production.
  - Initiated collaborative BW force protection research (11 projects), destroying BW (anthrax) production facility, enhancing B W pathogen security (4 institutes).
  - Preparing to construct facility to destroy 800 tons a year of CW nerve agent.
  - 350 defense and military contacts per year to encourage defense reforms.
- Government-to-government (“Umbrella”) Agreements ensure tax and customs exemptions, liability protections for U.S. and its citizens and right to verify assistance used for intended purposes.
- 87% of CTR work awarded to U.S. contractors, who hire in-country subcontractors.
- Gives U.S. unparalleled access and insight into FSU military and WMD operations,
- Most CTR projects supported/properly funded by Congress -- except CW destruction and replacement of plutonium-producing reactors with fossil fuel plants. Both supported in Senate, opposed by House majority.

**COORDINATION**  
**Cooperative Threat Reduction Program**

Special Assist to the Secretary of Defense  
for Policy Matters

Mr. Gallington

*DG 28 Jun 2001*

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (PS)

Mr. Verga

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (S&TR)

Dr. Koch

*Dr. Koch 27 June*


Principal Director, Threat Reduction Policy

Dr. Look

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Mr. Kuenning

25 June 2001



- Program initially proposed by Senators Nunn and Lugar in December 1991
  - to assist former Soviet states to destroy weapons of mass destruction
  - to prevent proliferation to rogue nations or to terrorist organizations
  - Kazakhstan became nuclear weapons free in 1995; Ukraine in 1996; Belarus in 1996
- Funding
  - \$3.6 billion authorized from FY92 through FY01
  - FY02 final budget request: \$403 million
  - currently planned future activities extend through FY07
- ISSUE: Is this assistance facilitating Russian military modernization?
  - If so, it is not noticeable. Modernization has declined as assistance to Russia has increased from FY97-present.
  - Reject request for assistance that might indirectly contribute (example: SS-N-33 elimination, etc.)

## Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Objectives


1. Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reductions to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels.
2. Enhance safety, security, control, accounting, & centralization of nuclear weapons & fissile material in the former Soviet Union to prevent their proliferation & encourage their reduction.
3. Assist Ukraine & Kazakhstan to eliminate START limited systems & weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.
4. Assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate & prevent proliferation of biological & chemical weapons & associated capabilities.
5. Encourage military reductions & reform, while reducing proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union.

CTR Overview 3-12-01.ppt

02/26/2003 14:24

CTR

- Priority objectives today are: (See above)
- CTK assistance process:
  - Annual President's certification to Congress, previously delegated to SecState, of former Soviet states' commitment to (FY01 certifications signed January 19, 2001):
    - Forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    - Making substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying its WMD, if recipient has an obligation under a treaty/ agreement to destroy or dismantle WMD.
    - Forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear weapons.
    - Facilitating U.S. verification of WMD destruction under this legislation
    - Complying with all relevant arms control agreements
    - Observing internationally recognized human rights: including the protection of minorities
  - SecDef notification to Congress with activities! amount, and USG/private sector investment
  - Signed umbrella and implementing agreements with recipients ensure tax exemption, liability protection, privileges/immunities, right to verify use of assistance
  - Most work done by contract with US firms. Contracts with recipient nation firms are fixed price, paid after work completion
  - NC cash provided to recipient governments. Only exception was \$10 million to Ukraine in 1996 to assist denuclearization




- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$907.7 million
- FY02 Request \$133.4 million
- Accomplishments/systems eliminated (as of 8 June 01):
  - 352 SLBM launchers and 20 associated SSBNs
  - 61 ICBM silos (including 8 SS- 18 launchers))
  - 42 heavy bombers
  - 524 ICBMs and SLBMs
- ISSUES:
  - Will Russia be below all START I limits by December 5, 2001?
  - Number of SS- 18 silo launchers Russia may convert to SS-27s (START II would limit to 90)



- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - 5306.9 million
- FY02 Request: \$56.0 million
- Accomplishments
  - Provided perimeter security systems for weapons storage sites (Quick Fix)
  - Designing comprehensive security upgrades and inventory control systems
- ISSUE: Low rate of installation due to level of Russian funding or will Russian Federation authorize periodic nuclear weapon site access for DoD managers, thereby permitting DoD to contract for installation'?

## Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Projects (Russia)



Comprehensive Accident  
Response Capability  
Enhancements



150 Supercontainers



Railcar Maintenance,  
Certification & Procurement



Nuclear Weapons Transportation  
for Dismantlement

CTR Overview 1-12-01.ppt

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
CTR

- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$114.7 million
- FY02 Request: \$9.5 million
- Accomplishments
  - Provide surety enhancements; e.g., railcars & weapons supercontainers
  - Support warhead movements from operational site to enhanced storage and to dismantlement
- ISSUES: None




- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$475.6 million
- FY02 Request: none
- Accomplishments
  - Construction to be complete in February 2002
  - Facility designed to store fissile material from more than 6000 dismantled warheads (up to 50 metric tons (MT) plutonium and 200 MT highly enriched uranium)
  - Corps of Engineers and Bechtel personnel have daily access to site to oversee construction and subcontractors
  - Plan to start loading Aug 2002 after facility certification
  - US/CTR produced 32,000 storage containers for the fissile material
  - Draft transparency protocol has been developed so US can monitor filling and long-term storage
- ISSUE: One remaining transparency difference: US proposes monitoring 4 attributes to provide some confidence plutonium is weapons origin. Russia proposes 3 attributes to provide confidence plutonium is weapons grade and declaration of weapons origin.

## Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium (Russia)




- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$130.1 million
- FY02 Request: \$41.7 million
- Accomplishments
  - Began in 1997 to design cores of three remaining plutonium-producing reactors so they could continue to supply local energy needs without producing plutonium
  - Cancelled in spring 2000 - technical and safety difficulties.
  - Study initiated in spring 2000 found fossil fuel alternative for energy and shutdown of all three reactors most effective and efficient solution
- ISSUE: House Authorization Committee banned CTR funds for fossil fuel; Senate receded to House, but limited ban to FY01 funds and requested report


## Biological & Chemical Weapons Proliferation Prevention Program (Russia)



- Biological Weapons (B W) Proliferation Prevention
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$33 million; FY02 Request: \$11.8 million
  - Accomplishments: Securing dangerous pathogens, biodefense research, identified former BW research & development facilities for dismantlement
- ISSUES:
  - No access yet to military facilities
  - Some civilian institutes favor eliminating former BW capacity, but government has not yet approved
  - Collaborative biodefense research
- Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$286.5 million - FY02 Request: \$50.0 million
  - Accomplishments
    - Eliminating CW nerve agent production complexes: constructed analytical lab
    - Site preparation began Dec 2000 for nerve agent CW destruction facility at Shchuch'ye
- ISSUES:
  - Congress in FY00 prohibited funds for Shchuch'ye because of slow Russian progress, but Russian actions have improved
  - Senate would have lifted ban in FY01, but deferred to House in conference with note that prior-year funds available to begin CW destruction. Senate continues to support facility; House majority continues to oppose.


# U.S. – Russia Overview of Implementation






- Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$506 million
  - FY02 Request: \$5 1.5 million
  - Accomplishments/Systems eliminated (as of 8 June 01 j):
    - all 144 SS-19 silos and all but 32 SS-19 missiles
    - 38 heavy bombers
    - 483 ALCMs
    - 33 SS-24 silos (including 3 launch control silos)
  - Remaining 16 SS-24 silos will be eliminated by Dec 2001
  - SS-24 missile destruction to be complete in 2006
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$23.4 million: FY02 Request: \$6.0 million
  - Eliminating support infrastructure for strategic bases
- ISSUE: Stability and suitability of SS-34 propellant for safe removal from motor cases and conversion into mining explosives - Ukraine preferred solution for SS-24 missile elimination


# U.S. -- Ukraine Overview of Implementation





- Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$64.3 million
  - FY02 Request: none
  - Accomplishments/Systems eliminated - all 104 operational SS-18 silos and 14 control centers, heavy bombers and 17 SS-19/18 launchers used for tests at Leninsk
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$29.5 million
  - FY02 Request: \$6.0 million
  - Accomplishments:
    - Closed all 18 1 nuclear test tunnels and 13 unused boreholes
    - Eliminating support infrastructure at strategic bases
    - Securing proliferable fissile and radioactive materials
- Biological Weapon Proliferation Prevention
  - Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$5 million
  - Accomplishments: Dismantling world's largest former anthrax production facility at Stepnogorsk
- Issue: Prior-year renotification required to secure buried plutonium

# U.S. – Kazakhstan Overview of Implementation



CTE Derivace 1-12-01.gpr

15

6/26/2001 14:21



**Uzbekistan**  
**Biological & Chemical Weapons Proliferation Prevention**

**Biological Capabilities**



Vozrozhdeniye Island Biological Weapons Dismantlement



Bio Material Protection, Control & Accountability

**CW Facility Dismantlement**  
 Chemical Research Institute (NUKUS)





CTR


- Amount authorized FY92-FY01 - \$6 million
- FY02 Request: \$2.8 million
- BW threat reduction activity, including:
  - Elimination of the Vozrozhdeniye Island Soviet biological weapons test site in the Aral Sea
  - Elimination of anthrax burial pits associated with Vozrozhdeniye Island
  - Biological material protection control & accountability projects at bio-research institutes in Tashkent
- ISSUE: none

## Preemptive Acquisition



### Project Sapphire (Kazakhstan 1994)

Over 600 Kg Weapons Grade  
Uranium removed to U.S.



### Pivot Sail (Moldova 1997)

21 MIG-29  
507 Air-to-Air Missiles



### Auburn Endeavor (Georgia 1998)

Weapons Grade  
Uranium Removal

CTR Overview 1-12-01 ppt


15

STARTING 11-29

CTR

# CTR Scorecard

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, & Belarus are Nuclear Weapons Free



Current numbers as of 8 June 2001

**CLOSE HOLD**

May 11, 2001 11:56 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PRC

On the airplane, I have told Colin and Condi that if they have said "no" at the lower level that we ought to keep raising it up to the top.

Second, I have told them that I think the Chinese want the plane out and we should play a waiting game and keep telling them in a calm, cool manner that we need to fly it out.

Third, I have told them that the U.S. is helping with their commercial aviation air traffic control and that we fly U.S. planes in and out of China all the time.

The bottom line is, we ought to hang tough.

DHR:dh  
051101-14

*China*

*11 May 01*

**CLOSE HOLD**

U12605 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/2175



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

AUG 4 - 2001 M

270 111 14 11 01 24

INFO MEMO

I-01/008268  
August 2, 2001, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (MR. DOUGLAS J. FEITH)

SUBJECT: Info Memo: Question on Bruce Blair Article

AUG 11 2001

- You asked whether the Bruce Blair article (Tab A) of 11 July was accurate.
- Blair alleges that DOE provided a faulty computer system to the Russians for tracking nuclear materials. He further states that the Russians discovered the flaw and informed the U.S. and that this "critical deficiency" was inherent in U.S. codes for tracking nuclear materials.
- It is true that 1) a DOE laboratory provided assistance to the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow to develop a nuclear materials tracking system, and 2) the tracking system contained a flaw in the computer software.
- It is not true that 1) U.S. systems for tracking nuclear materials have any similar deficiency, and 2) that U.S. labs are to blame for the faulty computer code.
- An accurate characterization of events would be successful collaboration between U.S. and Russian scientists, and not Russian scientists discovering defective U.S. work.
- According to DOE:
  - The faulty computer software was unique to the system developed at the Kurchatov Institute. It was not the same as used by the US and at other Russian facilities.
  - The faulty software was not the result of DOE-designed computer codes. The defect was in the Russian-designed integration of Russian codes and commercial U.S. software (which did contain a flaw).
  - Once alerted, U.S. laboratory staff collaborated with Russian scientists to identify the problem and develop a solution.

- An official of the National Nuclear Security Administration has written a letter (Tab B) to the Washington Post to set the facts straight.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Thomas Scheber, OUSDP/ISP/FP, 695-5553

AUG 4 - 2001 MS



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FORCES POLICY

I-01/008268

DATE: 2 August 2001

**MEMO TO:** Douglas Feith, USDP  
**THROUGH:** J. D. Crouch, ASD/ISP *MS*  
**FROM:** Mark Schneider, PDFP (695-5553) *MS 2 Aug 2001*  
**SUBJECT:** SecDef Question on Bruce Blair Article

The SecDef asked whether the Bruce Blair article (Tab A) in the 11 July Washington Post was accurate. The article alleges that the DOE provided a faulty computer system to the Russians for tracking nuclear materials. The article further states that the defect is inherent in US codes for tracking inventories of nuclear materials and the Russians discovered the flaw and alerted US authorities.

DOE has identified several fundamental inaccuracies in the article:

The faulty nuclear material accounting system at the Kurchatov Institute was unique to that institute and is not used by the US or by the Russians at other sites.

The faulty software was created primarily with Russian resources at the Kurchatov Institute. The system integrated US commercial software with Russian-supplied software.

Once alerted, the Los Alamos Laboratory technical staff was able to determine the source of the problem. They recommended a simple way to fix the defect and they informed the US supplier (Microsoft) of the defect inherent in the commercial software.

This is old news. The corrected accounting system software was fully functional at Kurchatov in June 2000.

Ken Baker, acting NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has written a letter to the Post stating the facts (Tab B).

Recommend you sign the attached response to the SecDef (next under).

11-L-0559/OSD/2178

7/12 11:42  
July 12, 2001 8:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bruce Blair Article

Please find out if this article by Bruce Blair is accurate. If it is, it merits expressing appreciation to the Russians when we meet with them.

Thanks.

Attach.

*Washington Post* op-ed by Bruce Blair: "Nukes: A Lesson from Russia"

DHR:dh  
071201-l

7/12

Copy BTM  
Col W-  
Pls Task to AsD/~~AsD~~  
S&T  
to provide response for  
Sec Def.  
D. Rita

Bruce G. Blair

# Nukes: A Lesson From Russia

Although the United States spends nearly \$1 billion every year to help Russia protect its vast storehouse of nuclear weapons materials from theft or sale on the black market, few Americans know how this aid helps strengthen America's own nuclear safeguards.

Russian experts at the Kurchatov Institute, the renowned nuclear research center in Moscow, recently found what appears to be a critical deficiency in the internal U.S. system for keeping track of all bomb-grade nuclear materials held by the Energy Department—enough material for tens of thousands of nuclear bombs.

Kurchatov scientists discovered a fatal flaw in the Microsoft software donated to them by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This same software has been the backbone of America's nuclear materials control system for years. The Russians found that over time, as the computer program is used, some files become invisible and inaccessible to the nuclear accountants using the system, even though the data still exist in netherworld of the database. Any insider who understood the software could exploit this flaw by tracking the "disappeared" files and then physically diverting, for a profit, the materials themselves.

After investigating the problem for many months, the Russians came to believe that it posed a grave danger and suspended further use of the software in Russia's accounting system. By their calculations, an enormous amount of Russia's nuclear material—the

equivalent of many thousands of nuclear bombs—would disappear from their accounting records if Russia were to use the flawed U.S. software program for 10 years.

Then, in early 2000, they did something they didn't have to do. They warned the United States, believing that an analogous risk must exist in the U.S. system. Although neither Los Alamos nor the U.S. Department of Energy has publicly acknowledged the possibility that innumerable files on American nuclear materials might have disappeared, the Russian warning caused shock waves at the highest levels of the Energy Department.

Unlike the Russians, who did not throw away their manual records of their nuclear stockpile—the infamous shoe box and hand receipt system that U.S. assistance was intended to supersede—the United States has long since discarded its old written records. To reconstruct a reliably accurate accounting record, the Energy Department may need to inspect all of America's nuclear materials—a huge task that could cost more than \$1 billion and still might not detect the diversion of some material should it have occurred.

The importance of the goodwill and trust that had grown up between American and Russian nuclear experts over years of working together in this area is clear. When the Russian scientists first discovered this computer flaw, the initial reaction in some high-level Moscow circles was to suspect an American Trojan horse, a bug planted deliberately to im-

permeate Russian security. After complaints by their Russian counterparts, scientists at Los Alamos suggested that the Russian scientists instead use a later version of the same program. Kurchatov then discovered the upgraded program not only contained the same bug (though much less virulent) but also had a critical security flaw that would allow easy access to the sensitive nuclear database by hackers or unauthorized personnel.

But trust overrode suspicion. The Russians concluded that the glitches were innocent errors, not devious traps. Thus, they feared the U.S. database, unbeknown to Americans, was not only prone to lose track of nuclear materials but was also accessible to unauthorized users. Russia reported both problems to Los Alamos, which subsequently verified the defects, as did Microsoft. Though a fix remains elusive, Kurchatov scientists also have shared a partial repair they developed.

This Russian feedback may be causing American embarrassment—U.S. officials apparently have tried to muzzle the Russians and censor their scientific papers on the fiasco—but it surely represents a high return on the American investment in Russian nuclear security. The lesson is that nuclear cooperation is a two-way street, it paying off and deserves continuing support.

*The writer, a former Minuteman missile launch officer, is president of the Center for Defense Information.*

the same for the Medicare Part A trust. There's another \$28 billion gone. If eliminated \$184 billion of the \$200-billion surplus, the "on budget" surplus can't be trusted as more \$16 billion. If a slowing of any crises this margin, then we still have an on-budget deficit.

This almost Orwellian process (standable only by "accountants or other specialists") converts actual budget surplus to the appearance of deficits. Of course politics heavily motivates the arithmetic. With these numbers, Sen. Kent Conrad, North Dakota, the new chairman of the Budget Committee, accuses the Bush administration of driving the country into a ditch. Worse, he says, the White House is about to "raid" the Medicare and Social

*John Podesta and Beth*

## Federal Judges

The Senate is in the midst of examining the role that ideology should play in a senatorial selection to advise and consent to the presidential nominees. What must not be lost in that debate is the equally important question about what role ideology should play in a president's selection of judicial nominees.

As two people intimately involved in the judicial selection process in the Clinton White House, we were often criticized by our friends for not being ideological enough in selecting judges. Some of our friends believed the way to achieve balance on the federal courts was to appoint individuals who were far to the left as the conservative judges appointed by President Reagan were to the right.

President Clinton did not march down that path, he believed, and we concur, that federal judges should not be used as the point-

July 17, 2001

Letters to the Editor  
The Washington Post  
1150 15<sup>th</sup> Street NW  
Washington, DC 20071

Bruce Blair is correct to praise American cooperation with Russia to safeguard that country's nuclear weapons materials, but he's wrong to suggest that a software glitch could threaten our system for tracking nuclear materials in the United States. It is important that the American people feel confident in the government's ability to secure and account for all its nuclear material.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), within the DOE, is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. nuclear material associated with the nuclear weapons program. U.S. nuclear material accountability systems are rigorously tested and have demonstrated capability for tracking all accountable nuclear materials. All our nuclear material accountability systems are compliant with stringent requirements that ensure appropriate protection against unauthorized access and disclosure. On a periodic basis, physical inventories of nuclear materials are performed to provide assurance that no nuclear material has been diverted and that the accountability system accurately reflects the quantity, form, and location of nuclear material holdings.

The NNSA's Material Protection Control and Accounting program provided the Kurchatov Institute and other Russian institutes a simplified version of an accounting program operating system that would be adapted for individual site-specific applications. It was the combination of the U.S. provided operating system and the Kurchatov-designed software that created the error reported in the Blair Op-Ed. The accounting software designed by the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow was never intended for use in tracking weapons-grade nuclear materials in the United States. Therefore, at no time was the U.S. system compromised, nor was any other Russian institute's system at risk.

Once the error was identified, Los Alamos National Laboratory experts worked closely with their Russian colleagues to rectify the problem. As of June 2000, a senior Kurchatov Institute official stated that the Kurchatov system was now fully functional.

11-L-0559/OSD/2181

Page 2

Resolution of this issue is a tribute to the excellent working relationship between the NNSA, its national laboratories and their Russian counterparts in the nuclear threat reduction arena. These programs continue to make a valuable contribution to U.S. and international security by reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the materials used to create them.

Sincerely,

Kenneth E. Baker  
Acting Deputy Administrator for  
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation  
(202) 586-0645



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

INFO MEMO

14 AUG 01 MS  
I#-01/006736

2001 AUG 13 11:22

August 13, 2001, 2:00 p.m.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Gallington, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Policy Matters  
(Performing the Duties of the ASD/SOLIC)

*Robert Anderson* 13 Aug 01

AUG 13 2001

SUBJECT: Update on migrant issues at Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Station (GTMO)

- SecDef requested that someone look into why State Department is not paying costs for refugees at GTMO.
- An NSC-led interagency group has produced a draft paper (Tab A) that is approaching DoD's position on this issue.
  - Plan is to establish an Administration strategy to deal with migrant operations in the Caribbean, shifting responsibility to State and Justice for migrant operations for other than mass migrations. State/Justice would each obtain \$1M/yr to handle the normal, small numbers of migrants at GTMO, and \$5M each in a contingency fund for times when the numbers of migrants increase.
  - Final outcome will be a decision paper for review by Principals.
- Background: Currently State/Justice do not accept responsibility for housing, food, medical needs, utilities, etc., for the migrants (normally 20-50) at GTMO. Cost to DoD about \$1.8M/yr.
  - In 1994, DoD received a one-time emergency appropriation to support its response to a mass migration of Cubans/Haitians at GTMO (38,000 migrants).
  - Since then, DoD has been burdened with all migrant operations at GTMO. There is not clear authority or funding for this mission. In our view, State/Justice are the appropriate agencies for this mission.

COORDINATION: Tab B.

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: LCDR Tarantino, 614-0022

11-L-0559/OSD/2183

014025 / 01

April 27, 2001

### Caribbean Mass Migrant Operations: Six Points In Principle

Understanding that consideration of and compliance to legal and funding authorities would need to be addressed, **this paper** provides a brief and general description of agency responsibilities in the event of a mass migration contingency in the Caribbean. It is intended to provide an agreed upon framework within which follow-on interagency discussions can flesh out more detailed descriptions of core responsibilities and the hand-offs between agencies, with consideration of legal and funding authorities.

1. A mass migration contingency, as determined by Principals, would present significant humanitarian, law enforcement, and national security implications.
2. In a mass migration contingency, the National Security Council would lead the interagency coordination of the **responsibilities** of Justice, State, Coast Guard, Defense, and other agencies, under the Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations Policy Coordination Committee. (NSC may delegate this coordinating role under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)
3. In a mass migration contingency, Coast Guard is the primary agency responsible for interdiction activities. Coast Guard is to track, intercept, board migrant boats, maintain custody of migrants while on the boat, report observations, support shipboard screening by INS, and repatriate migrants who do not have protection concerns. (Coast Guard also has these responsibilities under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)
4. In a mass migration contingency, Justice is the primary agency responsible for migrant screening and determining which migrants have protection concerns. It is responsible for providing for the custody and care of migrants until such a determination has been made. (Justice also has these responsibilities under steady state condition and in migrant surge events.)
5. In a mass migration contingency, State is the primary agency responsible for the care, maintenance, and support of those migrants determined to have protection concerns. State is also responsible for migrant resettlement and all diplomatic issues. (State also has these responsibilities under steady state conditions and in migrant surge events.)

*Note: It still needs to be determined whether Justice or State will provide for the care of migrants without protection concerns still in custody before their repatriation.*

6. In a mass migration contingency, Defense (**as** well as FEMA, HHS, Customs, and other agencies) will provide support to the efforts of **Coast** Guard, Justice, and State in their response to the emergency. Defense support, for example, may include maritime

## WORKING DRAFT

holding and transportation of migrants as well as holding, security, basic infrastructure, and support to migrants at military facilities at Guantanamo.

- Defense support in response to a mass migration that raises a national security threat, as determined by the President, ~~extremis-would~~ largely be on a non-reimbursable basis.
- The size and scope of the Defense role will be determined by the [President] SECDEF on a case by case basis, in consultation with other senior officials ~~a product of interagency deliberation and/or a White House determination at a sufficiently senior level.~~
- The scope and level of support from Defense in a mass migration contingency **is** greater than its responsibilities under steady state conditions or in migrant surge events.

NOTE: The edits shown here were conveyed by ODGC/IA, DGC/F, and JS Legal Counsel to NSC Legal and to the NSC chair of the interagency working group. The edits are no (yet) included in the NSC text.

WORKING DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/2185

COORDINATION:

Under Secretary of Defense  
For Policy

Mr. Douglas Feith

 **AUG 16 20**

General Counsel

Mr. William J. Haynes

July 3, 2001

Comptroller

Mr. D. Zakheim

July 3, 2001

OUSD(P), Inter-American Affairs

Mr. John Merrill

June 8, 2001

CUBA

Task & Policy  
with short suspense

to see me see tracking  
memo.

6/6



Larry Di Rita

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TO: CID

SUBJ: REFUGEES AT GUANTANAMO

1) REQUEST TASK Policy  
WITH FAA WITH SUSPENSE  
OF 8 JUN.

2) NOTES SHOULD READ:  
PER MR. DI RITA -  
^ PREPARE INFO MEMO FOR  
SECDEF ON SUBJECT REQUEST.

VIA  
  
G

29 MAY 01

U10457-01

150  
D

*Copy back to me*

May 29, 2001 2:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Refugees at Guantanamo

In one of the meetings this week, someone said that the Department of State is not paying for the cost of the refugees at Guantanamo. Let's have someone look at that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052901-38

U10457 /01



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-O 1/0 10004  
August 23, 2001, 12:43 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS (Mr. Peter W. Rodman) *PWR* 22 AUG 2001

SUBJECT: Writing Assignments

You asked Douglas Feith a number of questions about writing assignments for me, past and future.

As I mentioned in your office, my involvement in the White House's *National Security Strategy Report* is to be a point of contact (along with Steve Cambone) for DoD input. I will be happy to suggest ideas and themes, though the writing is traditionally an NSC Staff responsibility.

When Secretary Powell was National Security Advisor, I was on the NSC Staff in a policy planning/strategic advisor role. I did help occasionally with speeches.

If there is anything I can do to assist you in this regard, I will be happy to do so. Marc Thiessen is first-class, and he and I talk frequently about ideas and themes. I will stay in close touch with him.

Cc:  
ASD PA

AUG 17 2001

C10004,01

August 17, 2001 9:01 AM

PLEASE SEE  
USDP NOTE

ASD-ISA

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Peter Rodman

Condi tells me that Peter Rodman is involved in writing the National Security Strategy for her. I am also told that Peter Rodman was Colin Powell's <sup>a</sup> <sub>1</sub> speechwriter.

I wonder if we ought to be using him to work on some speeches and things for me.

Thanks.

8/17/01  
→ PWR  
Huh?  
DJF

DHR:dh  
081701-6

**COORDINATION**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

2/8 8/23/01

Action  
12/4  
1737 JS

December 3, 2001 12:54 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA  
SUBJECT: Letter to Israel

ISRAEL

We should get a letter off to **Shimon** Peres and the **MoD** about this latest terrorist attack on Israel. Please draft it up and I will send it out today without fail.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120301-40

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

3 Dec 01

U14757 02

14  
1220

DEC 3



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



ACTION MEMO

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
I-01/014782-NESAR

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 6954351) *[Signature]* 03 DEC 2001

SUBJECT: (U) Condolence Letters to Israeli MOD ben Eliezer and FM Peres

- (U) Over the weekend, Palestinian suicide bombers in Jerusalem and Haifa killed 26 Israelis and wounded over 200. Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad have claimed responsibility.
- (U) Attached are condolence letters to Israeli MOD ben Eliezer and FM Peres

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letters next under. ISA will fax the letters to ben Eliezer and Peres via the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Attachments:

Next under: Condolence letters to MOD ben Eliezer and FM Peres

Prepared by: Larry Hanauer, Israel Country Director, ISA/NESA, 697-8088 ext. 117

DASD: *[Signature]* 1213

PDASD (ISA): *[Signature]*

① See my files.

② Make the letters somewhat different.

*[Signature]*

Larry Di Rita  
12/3

Larry Di Rita  
12/4



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

I-01/010000-PK

11-01-01  
11-01-01  
11-01-01

INFO MEMO

August 31, 2001, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6) [redacted] /s/ [signature])

SUBJECT: Reducing US Military Contribution in Western Sahara

- This answers your query on reducing the number of US military personnel in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), where we contribute 15 of the 204 military observers.
- In November 1999, DoD proposed a 50 percent cut in the US presence in the mission; State strongly opposed and defeated the proposal.
- We will again seek to reduce the number of US observers by approximately half – to seven military observers. We have obtained NSC agreement to convene a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) meeting on the subject. (PCC talking points at tab A.)
- Replacing the US observers with personnel from other countries will have no military impact on the mission, which monitors a cease-fire. Although one of the US observers typically serves as chief of operations and plans, the other 14 do not perform any specialized tasks.
- However, State may argue that reducing the US military presence now would signal waning US commitment to achieving a long-term settlement to the conflict between Morocco, which claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, and the Algerian-supported POLISARIO, which seeks independence.
- State may also argue that the reduction in US military presence will have a negative impact on the peace efforts of the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker.
- In 1997, Baker forged an agreement between the parties for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. The UN completed voter identification, but inadequate cooperation from the parties has prevented further progress.



- To break the impasse, Baker seeks acceptance of an alternate plan to devolve political authority to Western Sahara, with a referendum in five years. Baker hosted talks in Wyoming on 27-29 August, with the intent of making progress prior to the November mandate renewal.
- Timeline: The next rotation of US observers occurs in January. The UN Security Council will discuss renewal of the MINURSO mandate before it expires on November 30, 2001. We will press the interagency for a decision by November in order to give the UN enough time to find replacements.

Attachments:

As stated.

Prepared by: Laura K. Cooper, 695-23 13

11-L-0559/OSD/2195

## **Talking Points on Reducing US Military Contribution in Western Sahara**

### **Core Points:**

- For Optempo reasons, DoD needs to reduce US military commitments, including the US contribution to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
- Our current contribution of 15 military observers is disproportionately large, given our global priorities.
- We need to notify the UN as soon as possible that we intend to decrease our contribution by approximately half – to 7 military observers.
- This decision should be independent of our continuing support for the UN mission and James Baker's peace process.

### **Contingency Points:**

If State or NSC argue that the reduction of our military presence adversely affects the mission or on the peace efforts of James Baker:

- Replacing US observers with personnel from other countries will have no military impact on the mission.
- The presence of US military observers is not necessary for a robust diplomatic effort in the region.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

TO: USDP

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-01/010000-PK SEP -6 AM 11: 02

INFO MEMO

SECDEF HASSEEN

August 31, 2001, 4:30 p.m. SEP 11 2001

*Handwritten initials in a circle*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas J. Feith, 695-5 136) *X* 1/5/01

SUBJECT: Reducing US Military Contribution in Western Sahara

- This answers your query on reducing the number of US military personnel in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), where we contribute 15 of the 204 military observers.
- In November 1999, DoD proposed a 50 percent cut in the US presence in the mission; State strongly opposed and defeated the proposal.

- We have consulted (PC)
- Represent the do
- How sign con: the:

*Handwritten note:*  
 DoD - State could "defeat"  
 it. Kick it up stairs &  
 let's get the # cut at  
 least in 1/2.

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a, and

- State may also argue that the reduction in US military presence will have a negative impact on the peace efforts of the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker.
- In 1997, Baker forged an agreement between the parties for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. The UN completed voter identification, but inadequate cooperation from the parties has prevented further progress.

UN

(31 AUG 01)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/10
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	29/11
MA BUCCI	5/13/10
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/9/11



11-L-0559/OSD/2197

U14835 /01

1/11  
01/1

*Acted  
D 11/28  
1746*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 23, 2001  
RE:

Here is a memo from Geoffrey Hoon which you should take a look at, and get the right people working on it. I have no idea what it's all about and I haven't got time to read it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
112301.22

Attach: November 16<sup>th</sup> Letter from Geoffrey Hoon

Respond by: 11/29

*NATO 400.1.2*

*93 Nov 01*

U14996 02

*01/21  
16R*

CLASSIFICATION

[Redacted]

**THE RT HON GEOFFREY HOON MP**  
Secretary of State for Defence

Ministry of Defence  
Room 205  
Old War Office  
White hall  
London **SW1A** 2EU

*01/21*

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

To: **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S OFFICE** Fax:  
**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

From:

Tel:

Date: **20 NOV 01**

No of pages: **5** [including header]

Remarks:

*THIS VERSION REPLACES THE LETTER THAT  
WAS FAXED TO YOU VIA THE BRITISH EMBASSY  
YESTERDAY (19 NOV 01). THIS OFFICE APOLOGISES  
FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED THROUGH  
OUR ERROR. THE ONLY CHANGE IS TO PAGE  
TWO OF THE LETTER WHERE ADDITIONAL  
TEXT HAS BEEN ADDED.*

*UMT*

[Redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/2199

*01/21/01*



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING  
WHITEHALL LONDON. SW1A 2EU

Telephone 020 MI 82111/2/3  
Fax 020 721 87140  
E-mail: [sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:sole-registry1@mod.gsi.gov.uk)

MO 13/8/1C

16 November 2001

Dear Donald,

I am writing to tell you about a European programme to develop advanced technologies for combat air system's capabilities that will be announced in Brussels on Monday. I and my colleagues from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden will sign a declaration to launch a joint technology programme with European industry which will sustain and develop European capabilities for combat air systems over the next two decades. I attach the text of the declaration.

The European Technology Acquisition Programme, or ETAP, is a broadly-based programme to examine and develop technologies that are likely to have application in airborne strike systems in the next decade and beyond. It is a framework for collaboration within which a series of technology demonstration programmes will be launched. Each nation is able to decide which technology demonstrator programmes to join, guided by its national requirements. Applications of ETAP generated technology are likely to be diverse and could include unmanned air vehicles, cruise missiles and command and control systems, as well as developments to existing or planned manned aircraft.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/2200

U13536 01



I particularly wanted to keep you informed about this in order to reassure you about the nature of the ETAP programme and its relationship with the important work we are doing together on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). UK officials have discussed this with yours in recent weeks, in particular to address any concerns regarding the control of sensitive technology. I would like to reiterate that our ETAP work will be based on indigenous UK technology and know-how it will be kept entirely separate, both in Government and in industry, from our vital transatlantic co-operation on JSF. Under the arrangements that have been put in place to control access to technological information, JSF information will be safeguarded within that programme and will not be shared with others. I remain wholly committed to taking the Joint Strike Fighter programme forward.

The Defence Materiel staff in our Washington Embassy stand ready to discuss these matters further with your officials should this be necessary.

Your sincerely,  
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

## MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

**THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

**Acting in the spirit of the statement by the Heads of State and Government on 9 December 1997, which stated that they shared a vital political and economic interest in an efficient and globally competitive European aerospace and defence electronics industry,**

**Acting in the spirit of the framework agreement on measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European Defence Industry signed on 27 July 2000, and in particular the chapters concerning defence-related research and technology and the harmonisation of military requirements,**

**Recognising the need for their countries and for Europe to retain a strong and competitive industrial and technology base and a long-term capability to design, manufacture and integrate combat air systems,**

**Considering possible needs for such systems towards the end of the next decade (2020),**

**Promoting the harmonisation of military requirements in this sector,**

**Have decided in particular to carry out a joint study between now and summer 2002 aimed at delivering an initial assessment of their respective capability requirements in a 2020 timeframe and identifying the types of systems and their related technology base that might appropriately be developed jointly,**

**Have decided to launch, in co-operation with industry, a focused research and technology programme (the so called European Technology Acquisition Programme, ETAP) to lay the foundations for future combat air systems covering key fields within this sector.**

**Are asking their National Armament Directors to give priority to continued support for technology programmes already underway in order to ensure the achievement of their objectives and ensure the rapid signature of the necessary inter-governmental arrangements for ETAP whose management could be assigned in whole or part to OCCAR in due time,**

**Intend to allocate appropriate government funding for these activities,**

**Encourage European industry**

**- to make a substantial financial contribution to this effort**

TO (b)(6)

- to propose innovative solutions and initiatives to support this *activity*, including suggestions for possible regrouping<sup>8</sup> and/or co-operation to make the most of existing capabilities in the industries of each country.

December 12, 2001 12:16 PM

JS Action  
12/24  
1043

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Definitions

*Done 12/27  
1710*

*Afghanistan*

We ought to define the words "Taliban" and "al Qaeda."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121201-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*12 Dec 01*

**U15095 02**

File 1050



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



ACTION MEMO

DDP  
VCS-1-01A 55510N

December 20, 2001; 1:42 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *WJF* 12/20/01  
(Douglas J. Feith)

SUBJECT: Defining Taliban, Al-Qaida and Others

- You asked how we should describe the people we fought in Afghanistan.
- RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Vice President and others (next under) recommending that the U.S. government adopt a standard set of definitions.

SPR ASSISTANT DI RITA	12/26
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>WJF</i>

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: a/s

Prepared by M. D. Walsh, ISA/NESA, 6974088 X1 16

DASD \_\_\_\_\_



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Adopting a Common Terminology

It would be useful for Administration officials to standardize our terminology about the people against whom we are fighting (or have fought) in Afghanistan.

- Enemy forces in Afghanistan all fought under one of two banners, either Al-Qaida or Taliban.
- Al-Qaida is a specific terrorist organization; one is either a member or not.
- The non-Al-Qaida people who fought us are either Afghans or “others.”
- The term Taliban generally has been applied only to Afghans. But for simplicity’s sake it is useful to refer to the enemy forces who are not Al-Qaida and not Afghan as “non-Afghan Taliban.”

So, I suggest we use the following terms:

- **Afghan Taliban:** Afghan officials and fighters of the former regime.
- **Non-Afghan Taliban:** Foreign fighters for the former regime.
- **Al-Qaida:** Usama Bin Ladin supporters, mostly Arab but including many nationalities, fighting against the U.S. and coalition forces.

I suggest we send this memo to our respective Public Affairs offices, among others.



COORDINATION PAGE

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter W. Flory

PW Flory <sup>20</sup> *Ry*

December 19, 2001 2:20 PM

Acknow  
01/03  
2010 (13)

TO: Ian Brzezinski  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

*01/03*

*Russia*

Here is a formal letter Ivanov gave me. I don't have any idea what it says.

Please get it into the process, and see that it is handled properly. If it requires a response, let's take care of it.

Thanks.

Attach  
12/17/01 Ivanov ltr to SecDef (in Russian)

DHR:dh  
121901-6

*19 Dec 01*

U15119 02

Москва, 17 декабря 2001 г.



Уважаемый господин Министр!

Весьма признателен за Вашу высокую оценку вклада Министерства обороны Российской Федерации в дело сотрудничества в борьбе против международного терроризма.

Поддерживаю Ваше мнение о том, что сегодня необходимо повышать уровень взаимодействия наших стран в этой области, так как опасность угроз, связанная с деятельностью террористических организаций, в ближайшее время не только сохранится, но и имеет все посылки к возрастанию.

В целом мы согласны с Вашим предложением по "Инициативе Евро-Атлантической безопасности". Вместе с тем, ограниченный объем полученной информации не позволяет провести углубленный анализ Ваших предложений. В этой связи хотелось бы получить от Вас более детальное разъяснение предлагаемых мер с американским видением путей и механизмов реализации "Инициативы".

На мой взгляд, идеи, изложенные в "Инициативе", в целом или в ряде пунктов могут стать одним из вопросов для обсуждения в рамках планируемого нового формата отношений между Россией и НАТО.

Надеюсь, что сотрудничество между министерствами обороны Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки станет весомым вкладом в дело развития конструктивных партнерских отношений между нашими государствами и обеспечения евро-атлантической безопасности.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Ivanov', written over a white background.

С.Иванов

Его Превосходительству  
Господину Дональду Рамсфелду  
119L-0559/OSD/2209  
Министру обороны Соединенных Штатов Америки

Action  
JS 01/02  
2/20

December 28, 2001 7:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Definitions

Afghanistan

I don't like these definitions. I don't think they work, so let's not send that memo unless we can come up with something better than that.

Paul, why don't you get involved in this and see if you can figure it out.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/20/01 USD(P) memo to SecDef re: Defining Taliban, Al-Qaida and Others [WO1583/01]

DHR:dh  
122801-2

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

38 NOV 01

U15139 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000



ACTION MEMO

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

December 20, 2001; 1:42 PM

OSD  
 NAME CODE SECTION  
 I-01/4555

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 28 2001 DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas J. Feith) *12/20/01*

*REC'D FROM POLIC  
 12/27*

SUBJECT: Defining Taliban, Al-Qaida and Others

*DIRITA 12/26*

- You asked how we should describe the people we fought in Afghanistan.
- RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Vice President and others (next under) recommending that the U.S. government adopt a standard set of definitions.

SPR ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>12/26</i>
SS MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>12/24</i>

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments: a/s

Prepared by M. D. Walsh, ISA/NESA, 697-8088 XI 16

DASD \_\_\_\_\_



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Adopting a Common Terminology

It would be useful for Administration officials to standardize our terminology about the people against whom we are fighting (or have fought) in Afghanistan.

- Enemy forces in Afghanistan all fought under one of two banners, either Al-Qaida or Taliban.
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- The term Taliban generally has been applied only to Afghans. But for simplicity’s sake it is useful to refer to the enemy forces who are not Al-Qaida and not Afghan as “non-Afghan Taliban.”

So, I suggest we use the following terms:

- **Afghan Taliban:** Afghan officials and fighters of the former regime.
- **Non-Afghan Taliban:** Foreign fighters for the former regime.
- **Al-Qaida:** Usama Bin Ladin supporters, mostly Arab but including many nationalities, fighting against the U.S. and coalition forces.

I suggest we send this memo to our respective Public Affairs offices, among others.



COORDINATION PAGE

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter W. Flory

PW Flory <sup>20</sup> 

December 12, 2001 12:16 PM

AS ACTION  
12/24  
1043

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Definitions

We ought to define the words "Taliban" and "al Qaeda."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121201-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

December 28, 2001 3:04 PM

ACTION  
15 01/02  
10/16

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

NATO 380.01

Let's get that Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative fed in through NATO. Here is a copy of the letter Ivanov gave us.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/17/01 MoD Ivanov ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
#22801-14

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

38 Dec 01

U 151 40 02

①

Moscow 17 December 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary!

I am most grateful for your positive evaluation of the contribution of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

I support your assessment that today we must increase the level of cooperation between our countries in this area since the danger of threats associated with activities of terrorist organizations not only will remain in the near term but will in all likelihood increase.

Overall, we agree with your proposal on the "Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative." At the same time, the limited volume of information we have received does not permit us to conduct a thorough analysis of your proposal. In this regard, we would like to receive from you a more detailed explanation of the proposed measures with the American vision of the ways and means for achieving this 'Initiative.'

In my view, the ideas laid out in the 'Initiative,' either in toto or as separate points, could be one of the topics discussed in the framework of the planned new format for relations between Russia and NATO.

I hope that 'cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the United States Department of Defense becomes a significant contribution in the development of a constructive partnership between our governments and in guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security.

Respectfully,

Minister of Defense, Russian Federation

(signed) S. Ivanov

(Addressed to)

His Excellency  
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

②

11-L-0559/OSD/2216

INFO  
02/10  
29/11  
SP

December 30, 2001 9:30 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: U.S./UK Documents

Afghanistan

Here is the latest on **the** U.S./UK documents relating to Afghanistan.

Regards,

Attach  
12/29/01 ASD(ISA) memo to **SecDef** re: U.S./UK Documents on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
1230014

31 Dec 01

U15146 02



• ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL  
**SECURITY**  
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

MEMO FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
**W. Rodman**

*[Handwritten initials]*  
DEC 29 2001

SUBJECT: U.S.-UK Documents on Afghanistan

Last night, I informed you that the U.S./UK bilateral "Letter of Arrangement" had been signed.

The other document, the "Military Technical Agreement" negotiated between the UK and the **Afghans**, is virtually complete:

- CENTCOM is reviewing the text one last time (though it had earlier indicated its approval).
- We have just today received the map of the proposed **AOR**, showing Kabul, **Bagram**, and a wide corridor between. Joint Staff and CENTCOM are reviewing this.
- The **last missing** element is an annex listing barracks in Kabul to which Afghan forces will repair. This is still awaited **from** the Afghans.

The British expectation is still that a formal signature will take place in Kabul next week. We have promised a senior military officer to sign as a witness, once we have seen and approved the complete text, map, and annexes.

PDUSD (P) - *[Handwritten initials]*

DEC 29 2001



11-L-0559/OSD/2218

September 18, 2001 9:17 AM

TO: Scooter Libby  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld a c

SUBJECT: Coalition

0005

Attached is a note from Doug Feith, which is right on the mark.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/14/01 USD(P) Info memo to SecDef re: Telcon from Bibi Netanyahu [U15236/01]

DHR:dh  
091801-5

18 Sep 01

U15459 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2219



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

SECRET  
SEC. OF DEFENSE

2001 SEP 14 PM 5:06

**INFO MEMO**

**I-01/010923-USDP**  
September 14, 2001 1600

DepSec Action *info*

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)**

**SUBJECT: Telcon from Bibi Netanyahu**

Bibi, an old friend of mine, called to express condolences for the September 11 attack. He said you and he are long-time friends and asked to be remembered to you.

His main substantive points were:

The US should define its goals in the war based on principles and only then forge a coalition, Don't compromise principles to build a coalition. "Why bring the compromisers in?" It is principles that will win the day.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	9/17
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	9/17
MA BUCCI	9/17
EXECSEC WHITMORE	9/17

*9/17  
DJS  
1/18*

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:49 PM

TO: CJCS  
VCJCS  
Gen. Holland  
Gen. Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

Afghanistan

27sep01

11-L-0559/OSD/2221

U16394 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*Paul - this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

**Memorandum**

urgent

**Subject: on possible operations in Afghanistan**

**From:** (b)(6)

**For: Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS**

**Date: 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001**

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A land invasion of Afghanistan would be **an** error of catastrophic proportions. The Taliban regime is weak militarily and economically. Most ordinary Afghans hate it **for** the poverty and abuses it has endangered. Foreigners among **the** Taliban are **particularly** resented. Having said that, an assault on Kabul and **Kandahar** can initially be **successful**. But in the medium **term** it would cause **an** Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. **The Talibanization of a nuclear country does** not bear thinking about. In addition, Hindu **Kush** passes will be **covered in** snow before the US can **mobilise** a **sufficient** invasion force, making operations even **harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states; surgical strikes by bombers and guided missiles at targets **selected** on the basis of electronic **and** satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan. The **country** has no infrastructure to speak **of**: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone **links**. The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs. No doubt **they** will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards** may have dispersed already. **In 1987 I spent three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing.** In a terrain in **which** every rock and **every** irrigation canal provides **cover**, **high** altitude bombing is ineffective.
3. To track down **and** capture or kill **terrorists** I would advise using **commandos**. The biggest threat to a **guerrilla** is another guerrilla. The British liquidated a Communist insurgency in Malaya this way. Soviets were pretty successful in disrupting **mujaheddin** supply lines in Afghanistan in 1980s using **Spetsnaz**, **which** lost effectiveness only when the U.S. delivered Stingers in **1986** thus depriving them **of** air liberty. Using **commandos means**, however, the loss of some aspects of technical superiority over the enemy and inevitable **casualties**. The **groups** should be accompanied anti-Taliban Afghans loyal to **the** Northern Alliance government of President **Rabbani**.
4. It is **the** Afghans themselves who know their **country** best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. The **non-Taliban** Afghans should be drawn **into** the **anti-terrorist** alliance. They had been warning against the **Taliban** for years. **On the other hand, you cannot** fully trust **the** Pakistanis. The **CIA's** proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's** Inter Services Intelligence, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, **most of the** US money and weapons **channelled** to the ISI went to support **Gulbuddin Hekmattar**, the most fanatical and anti-American of Afghan leaders, who **refused** to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan. Pakistan thinks it can establish a **Pashtun-based** (many officers **in** the Pakistani **army** and ISI are **Pashtuns**), pliable **government** in Kabul, to **give** themselves strategic depth against India. When **Hekmattar** failed to capture Kabul, they created **another** puppet. **the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of **business** circle (**Unocal**, an oil company which struck a deal with the **Taliban** to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is Pulling its **own** strings. **Pakistani society and army are riven with** fundamentalist and pro-Taliban **organisations** and **gen. Mushsharaf** will find it **difficult** to **control** them.

5. **Rabbani's** Northern Alliance has been **weakened** by the loss of **Ahmed Shah Masud**, his minister of **defence**, in a suicide attack by two apparently **Westernised** Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy **theory** but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of **Massud** was a quid pro quo to the **Taliban** for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a **valuable ally**. Nevertheless, the **Northern Alliance** proved capable of instant retaliation **against** a Taliban **arms** dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via **Dushanbe**. They have a representative at the **U.N.**; the Ambassador in London. **Wali Massud** (brother of **Ahmad Shah Massud**) is an **important figure**; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in **Northern** and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and **airfields** could be effected. The alliance **consists** of important commanders all over **the** country:

The new political head of the Alliance, **Dr Abdullah**, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a **satellite** phone. **Ismael Khan**, former **army** officer, governor of **Herat**, who **spent** two years in a Taliban prison in **Kandahar** but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to **Herat** in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite **phone**.

**Haji Kadir**, former governor of **Jellalabad**, a **Pashun**, which is important **because** his role **neutralises** the Taliban ethnic card. I spent a month with him in **Nangrahar** in 1986.

The former Communist general **Dostum** seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. The **Hazara** minority, **Shias**, also resent the **Taliban** for **the** murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines **and** weapons it **can** build an anti-Taliban **coalition** which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world onto **itself**. Most **local** commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion **and** bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the **Northern Alliance** can **be** delivered through **countries** which have their own **reasons** to want the downfall of the **Taliban**: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air **bridge** from **ships** in **international** waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to **Alliance**-controlled **enclaves** inside Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in **1980s** in support of the **mujahedin**.

**Conclusions:**

1. An effective **strike** against the **Taliban can** best be dealt in co-operation **with** the military structures of **the** Northern Alliance
2. The U.S. should not risk losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan who already suffer under the **Taliban** yoke
3. The best form of pressure and revenge on the **Taliban** is to support the moderate forces of the **Northern** Alliance
4. After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the **Taliban**, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid. Normal **state** structures can only be rebuilt by a **government** in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines **are** cleared, agriculture *functions again*, *will the refugees return* from Iran and Pakistan and does **the** region have any chance of **permanent** stabilisation.

(b)(6)

snowflake

September 27, 2001 1:55 PM

Afghan Stan

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

FYI.

Attach.  
9/19/01 (b)(6) paper on Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
092701-18

27 Sep 01

11-L-0559/OSD/2225

U16395 /01

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

*and this is a tough-minded guy I know well. [Signature]*

urgent

**Memorandum**

Subject: **possible operations in Afghanistan**

From: (b)(6)

For: **Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS**

Date: **19<sup>th</sup> September 2001**

*spent 3 months fighting the Soviets in A.*

1. A **land invasion of Afghanistan** would be **an error of catastrophic proportions**. The Taliban regime is **weak militarily** and economically. **Most ordinary Afghans hate it for the poverty and abuses it has endangered**. **Foreigners among the Taliban are particularly resented**. Having said that, an assault on **Kabul and Kandahar** *could* initially be successful. But in the medium term it would **cause an Islamic backlash not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan**. **The Talibanization of a nuclear country does not bear thinking about**. In addition, **Hindu Kush passes will be covered in snow before the US can mobilise a sufficient invasion force, making operations even harder**.
2. Traditional methods of dealing with rogue states: **surgical strikes** by bombers and **guided missiles at targets selected on the basis of electronic and satellite intelligence will be insufficient in Afghanistan**. The country has no infrastructure to speak of: no railways, no electricity grid, no information or telephone links. **The Taliban issue orders on the back of cigarette packs**. No doubt they will now limit their **radio communications**. **Bin Laden and his bodyguards may have dispersed already**. In 1987 I spent **three months under constant Soviet bombing and rocketing**. In a terrain in which every rock and every irrigation canal provides cover, high altitude bombing is **ineffective**.
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4. It is the **Afghans themselves** who know their country best and are best-motivated against the Taliban. **The non-Taliban Afghans should be drawn into the anti-terrorist alliance**. They had been **warning against the Taliban for years**. On the other hand, you cannot fully trust the Pakistanis. The CIA's proxy war against the Soviets was run via **Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence**, which has always had its own agenda in Afghanistan. For example, most of the US money and **weapons channelled to the ISI** went to support **Gulbuddin Hekmatyar**, the most fanatical and **anti-American of Afghan leaders**, who **refused to meet with the 'Great Satan' - President Ronald Reagan**. **Pakistan thinks it can establish a Pashtun-based** (many officers in the Pakistani army and ISI are Pashtuns), pliable government in Kabul, to **give themselves strategic depth against India**. When Hekmatyar failed to capture Kabul, they created **another poppet, the Taliban**. The U.S., under

influence of business circle (Unocal, an oil company which struck a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean) initially turned a blind eye. Today, the puppet is pulling its own strings. Pakistan; society and army are riven with fundamentalist and pro-Taliban organisations and gen. Musharaf will find it difficult to control them.

5. Rabbani's Northern Alliance has been weakened by the loss of Ahmed Shah Masud, his minister of defence, in a suicide attack by two apparently Westernised Arabs two days before the attack on America. I don't believe in conspiracy theory but I believe in conspiracy practice. If so, the assassination of Massud was a quid pro quo to the Taliban for protection, as well as a pre-emptive strike to deprive America of a valuable ally. Nevertheless, the Northern Alliance proved capable of instant retaliation against a Taliban arms dump on the outskirts of Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls an enclave in North Eastern Afghanistan with landings and access to the Tajik border. Contacts with the outside world go via Dushanbe. They have a representative at the U.N.; the Ambassador in London, Wali Massud (brother of Ahmad Shah Massud) is an important figure; contacts are also possible in Warsaw. There are pockets in Northern and Central Afghanistan where airdrops and airfields could be effected. The alliance consists of important commanders all over the country:

The new political head of the Alliance, Dr Abdullah, is a moderate and highly sophisticated individual. I have hosted him in Warsaw twice during official consultations and can be in touch with him via a satellite phone. Ismael Khan, former army officer, governor of Herat, who spent two years in a Taliban prison in Kandahar but is now back inside the country rallying resistance against them. My book 'Dust of the Saints - a Journey to Herat in Time of War' describes his heroic deeds during resistance against the Soviets. He can also be reached inside Afghanistan by satellite phone.

Haji Kadir, former governor of Jellalabad, a Pashtun, which is important because his role neutralises the Taliban ethnic card, I spent a month with him in Nangrahar in 1986.

The former Communist general Dostum seems to maintain following among the northern Uzbeks. The Hazara minority, Shias, also resent the Taliban for the murder of their former leader.

6. If the Northern Alliance were backed with money, food, medicines and weapons it can build an anti-Taliban coalition which could establish control over Afghanistan in a matter of months. Afghan politics is volatile, each oasis, valley, clan, a world unto itself. Most local commanders had submitted to the Taliban through exhaustion and bribery. They will just as easily desert them if their luck is seen to have turned.
7. While assistance to the Northern Alliance can be delivered through countries which have their own reasons to want the downfall of the Taliban: India, Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran, the U.S. would do best to establish its own, direct links. An air bridge from ships in international waters off the Pakistani coast could ferry supplies directly to Alliance-controlled enclaves inside Afghanistan. I believe such a scenario was considered in 1980s in support of the mujahedin.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Conclusions:**

1. An **effective strike against the Taliban can best be dealt in co-operation with the military structures of the Northern Alliance**
2. The U.S. should not risk **losing the world's sympathy by punishing the people of Afghanistan who already suffer under the Taliban yoke**
3. The best form of pressure and revenge **on the Taliban** is to support the moderate **forces of the Northern Alliance**
4. **After tracking down the terrorists and toppling the Taliban, Afghanistan should be given massive humanitarian and development aid. Normal state structures can only be rebuilt by a government in Kabul that disposes aid and is rebuilding basic infrastructure. Only when control is re-established, Soviet mines are cleared, agriculture functions again, will the refugees return from Iran and Pakistan and does the region have any chance of permanent stabilisation.**

(b)(6)

OCT 30 2001  
OWN

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

Schmitt 10/30/01  
EF-0219  
I-01/013232 1500

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-435 1) *PRM* 30 OCT 2001

SUBJECT: The Taliban: A Well-Documented Legacy of Brutality

- You asked for a point paper on Taliban atrocities and human rights violations.
- Next under is the ISA paper on the topic.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Marybeth McDevitt, 697- 1336

DASD *M. Rodman 10/30*

PDASD COPY PROVIDED

CC : Plans and Resources  
: SOLIC /BG Warden

UNCLASSIFIED



11-L-0555/OSD/2229

U18032 /01

## The Taliban: A Well-Documented Legacy of Brutality

The Taliban's brutal disregard for human life, employment of scorched earth policies against its enemies, intolerance of other religious, ethnic or cultural differences, enforcement of an extreme version of Islam and potential war crimes, combine to create a "human rights catastrophe" in Afghanistan. Specific examples of these behaviors include:

### **Treatment of Woman and Girls**

Afghan woman and girls are subjected to rape, kidnapping and forced marriage. Taliban restrictions are widespread, institutionally sanctioned, and systemic. Taliban edicts enforce strict dress codes, prohibit women from working outside the home, or attending school, among other restrictions.

- Taliban reportedly abducted women from the Taloqan area during the fighting from June – October 2000. In August 1999, Taliban reportedly abducted women near Shomali plains and possibly trafficked them in Pakistan for prostitution. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*
- Taliban religious police beat individuals on the streets for infractions of rules on dress, or the prohibition of women being with unrelated men. According to one report, a woman struggling with her two small children and groceries was beaten with a car antenna because her face covering slipped. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001; US Department of State March 1998 Report on Women and Girls in Afghanistan*
- Prohibiting women from working outside their home is particularly hard on the 30,000 widows from the civil war. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*
- Taliban restrictions on woman's medical care have left Afghan women with little or no access to health care. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

### **Massacres Against Civilians**

The Taliban massacred hundreds of Afghan civilians, many of the victims were targeted because of their ethnic or religious identity.

- In January 2001, Taliban forces captured the town of Yakaolang and executed at least 170 civilians. On 19 January, 2001, UN SecGen Kofi Annan issued a statement expressing concern about "numerous credible reports" that civilians were deliberately killed in Yakaolang and demanded a "prompt investigation". *The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Feb 01; Human Rights Watch*

- In May 2000, the Taliban systematically executed as many as 100 ethnic Uzbek prisoners in Samagan province. *The U.N. Commission on Human Rights February, 01; Human Rights Watch*
- In the August 1998 fight for Mazar-I-Sharif, Taliban forces summarily executed ethnic Hazara, Jajik, and Uzbek civilians. There are also reports that women and girls were raped and abducted. *Human Rights Watch*

### **Massacre at a Muslim Mosque**

- In the January 2001 attack on Yakaolang, eyewitnesses reported rocket attacks on a mosque where women, children and elderly had taken shelter. Dozens were killed in the mosque. *Amnesty International*

### **Attacks on Humanitarian Aid**

- Taliban attacks on humanitarian relief agencies are increasing as they steal equipment, supplies, and vehicles. These assaults are directly contributing the starvation of Afghani people. *18 October, Human Rights Watch*
- 16 October, the Taliban seized control of two U.N. warehouses containing more than half the World Food Program's wheat supply for Afghanistan. *17 October U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet*

### **Scorched Earth Policy**

- In its fight with the Northern Alliance, the Taliban have indiscriminately shelled and bombed civilians. Taliban have burned homes, killed livestock, uprooted orchards and destroyed irrigation systems.
- In August 1999, the Taliban's scorched earth operation displaced up to 100,000 people north of Kabul. *30 August Iranian News Agency; 26 August Hindustan Times in India*
- In August-September 2000, Taliban's indiscriminate bombardment of the town of Taloqan forced tens of thousand of civilians to flee their homes. Reportedly, during the fighting the Taliban bombed a nearby village, burned all the houses and killed some of the villagers. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

### **Targeted Assassinations**

- From 1998-2000 alone, Amnesty International suspects the Taliban was responsible for making dozens of death threats against Afghans living in Pakistan, several of whom were subsequently killed. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001*

- Summary executions of opponents is common, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has received numerous reports of prisoners' executions in Taliban-held areas. *U.N. Press Release, 24 October 2001*

### **Torture**

- The U.N. Commission on Human Rights reported that former Taliban prisoners have provided "harrowing accounts of torture." *U.N. Press Release, 24 October 2001*

### **Religious Persecution and Intolerance**

- Taliban continue to hold Shelter Now International detainees for preaching Christianity. Under the Taliban, conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death. *US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, February 2001; Reuters*
- In May 2001, Taliban decreed (but have not yet enforced) Hindus wearing distinguishing identification on their clothing. In September 1999, the Taliban forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship. *Human Rights Watch May 2001*
- Supreme Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar issued an edict in August 2001 against un-Islamic graven images. The Taliban quickly began the destruction of all ancient sculptures to include the two centuries old colossal Buddhist statues in Bamiyan. *USA Today 13 August 2001*


### **Narcotics Trafficking**

- Afghanistan is one of the world's largest opium producers and accounted for more than 70% of the world's illicit opium supply in 2000. The Taliban control most of the country's poppy cultivation and use funds from opium sales to finance its military. *U.S. Department of State, Afghan Country Study 2000*

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

 10/31/01

2001 NOV 13 PM 2:45



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

INFO MEMO

*Selig* 11/08/01 1830

01/013683 - P&R/EF-0258  
November 8, 2001, 5:00 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict *Robert Andrews* NOV 8 2001

SUBJECT: Update of Special Operations Forces and Special Forces Activities

- As requested, attached slide is updated with personnel numbers (Tab A).

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments  
As Stated

Prepared by: Col. Dan Williams, 695-0485

**UNITED STATES SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS COMMAND  
(USSOCOM)**

**JOINT SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS COMMAND  
(JSOC)**

**PERSONNEL TOTAL:**

Combatant: 328  
Support: 0  
Reserve: 0

**• HEADQUARTERS PERS**

**UNITED STATES ARMY  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND  
(USASOC)**

**PERSONNEL TOTAL:**

Combatant: 10,760  
Support: 5,468  
Reserve: 11,544

- SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND
- JFK SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL
- CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOP COMMAND

SPECIAL FORCES  
RANGERS  
AVIATION  
PSYOP  
CIVIL AFFAIRS

**NAVY SPECIAL  
WARFARE COMMAND  
(NAVSPECWARCOM)**

**PERSONNEL TOTAL:**

Combatant: 3,345  
Support: 2,071  
Reserve: 1,213

- NAVSPECWARGRU
- SPECIAL BOAT SQUADRONS
- NAVSPECWARCEN

SEAL TEAMS  
SPECIAL BOAT UNITS  
PATROL COASTAL SHIPS

**AIR FORCE  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND  
(AFSOC)**

**PERSONNEL TOTAL:**

Combatant: 4,952  
Support: 5,075  
Reserve: 1,819


- WINGS/GROUPS
- 18TH FLIGHT TEST SQUADRON
- SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL

AVIATION  
- FIXED WING  
- ROTARY WING  
SPECIAL TACTICS GP  
COMBAT WEATHER SQ

COORDINATION:

Under Secretary of  
Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

Handwritten signature and date: DF 11/14/09

July 16, 2001 3:12 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Payment of EP-3 Bill

*Exec Sec*  
*USD (P) Chuck Turner*

*See Me*

*Fany*

I agree-let's tell State they can go ahead, that we can pay \$76,000. They should handle it diplomatically and suggest that that ends it.

I think we ought to do this as fast as possible.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/12/01 Di Rita memo to SecDef re: EP-3 Bill

DHR:dh  
071601-33

*CLINA*

*16 Jul 01*

U194671/02

11-L-0559/OSD/2237

July 12, 2001

10:15 a.m.

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

Subj: EP-3 Bill

The Chinese full assessment is for \$1,055,002. A detailed breakdown is attached.

Most of the PRC charges stem from the Chinese decision not to return the crew or the requirement that we disassemble the aircraft. For example:

\$282,000 for the crew's 11 day lodging/boarding/transportation

\$244,000 for 94 days of airplane security guards and standby fire engine

\$251,000 for 94 days of "ground occupation" by the airplane


CINCPAC offers the following logic in response:

Had the Chinese responded more reasonably, the crew would not have been in the PRC for more than 2 days.

Had the Chinese accepted the original U.S. recommendation to repair and fly away the EP-3, the aircraft could have been out of the PRC within 10 days of the incident.

Under these two assumptions, an estimate of fair and reasonable charges is \$76,000.

I recommend you concur with CINCPAC.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Di Rita", is enclosed within a large, hand-drawn oval. The signature is written in a cursive style.

7/12/01  
1705

11-L-0559/OSD/2238

7/9 11:30

(Translation)

- FROM U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Di Rita

**Relevant Expenses by Chinese side in the Arrangement for the EP-3  
Crew Members, the U.S. Inspection Team and in Assistance with the  
Disassembly and Removal of the U.S. EP-3 Aircraft**

(Total: \$1,055,002)

**I. Total Cost for arrangement for the 24 crew members of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft  
from April 1 to 12: \$282,681.**

**1. Boarding and lodging provided by the PLA Navy:**

Calculated by charter charge at the navy hostel (equivalent to a three star hotel)

\$24,096 per day × 11 days = \$265,056

**2. Security service provided by Hainan Public Security Authority: \$6,820**

Chinese security vehicles: \$100 × 2 vehicles × 11 days = \$2,200

Service charge for Chinese security guards: \$42 × 10 persons × 11 days = \$4,620

**3. Expenses paid by Hainan Foreign Affairs Office: \$10,805**

Transportation for the U.S. personnel: \$100 × 3 vehicles × 12 days = \$3,600

Conference rooms used by U.S. side: \$241 × 5 times = \$1,205

Cars used for Chinese personnel: \$100 × 5 cars × 12 days = \$6,000

**II. Total cost for inspection of the EP-3 Aircraft by U.S. team from May 1 to 6:**

**\$40,119.**

**1. Security service provided by Hainan Public Security Authority: \$3,100**

Chinese security vehicles:  $\$100 \times 2 \text{ vehicles} \times 5 \text{ days} = \$1,000$

Service charge for Chinese security guards:  $\$42 \times 10 \text{ persons} \times 5 \text{ days} = \$2,100$

**2. Expenses paid by Hainan Foreign Affairs Office: \$37,019**

a) VIP room at the airport used by U.S. side: **\$241**

b) Costs for the Chinese personnel providing assistance for inspection: **\$36,778**

Transportation:  $\$200 \times 6 \text{ vehicles} \times 6 \text{ days} = \$7,200$

Rooms:  $\$181 \times 26 \text{ rooms} \times 5 \text{ days} = \$23,530$

Meals:  $\$24 \times 42 \text{ persons} \times 6 \text{ days} = \$6,048$

**III Total expenses by the PLA Navy in assistance with the disassembly and removal of EP-3: \$646,470**

The charges are calculated by the charging standards as published by the CAAC. Given that Lingshui airport is a military airport, the charges are doubled, affecting Items 1, 2, 3, and 7.

**1. Landing and take-off charges of the An-124 aircraft: \$43,120**

According to the technical materials Chinese side has, the maximum take-off weight of AN-124 is 392 tons, and the charge for each flight is therefore \$4,312, and there are 5 flights.

$\$4,312 \times 5 \times 2 = \$43,120$

**2. Ground service: \$54,880**

The charges are calculated according to the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft, at \$14 per ton. The maximum takeoff weight of AN-124 is 392 tons, and the charge for each flight is therefore \$5,488, and there are 5 flights.

$\$5,488 \times 5 \times 2 = \$54,880$

**3. Parking charge: \$9,058**

The parking charge for 24 hours for each aircraft is 15% of its landing and take-off charge. The parking duration less than 24 hours but over 2 hours is counted as 24 hours.

AN-124: For the first two flights, the total parking time is 4 days with 2 days for each flight. For the last three flights, the total parking time is 3 days, 1 day for each flight.

The total parking time for the 5 flights is therefore 7 days, at \$647 per day.

$$\$647 \times 7 \text{ days} \times 2 = \$9,058$$

**4. Clearing obstacles on both sides of the taxiway: \$17,352**

Leveling the ground by 3,800 cubic meters of earth, at \$4 per cubic meter:  $\$4 \times 3,800 = \$15,200$

Removal of 100 trees (masson's pine), at \$13 per tree:  $\$13 \times 100 = \$1,300$

Demolishing of a 4-square meter pavilion, at \$63 per square meter:  $\$63 \times 4 = \$252$

Dismantling of 300-meter electric wire, at \$2 per meter:  $\$2 \times 300 = \$600$ .

**5. Charge for security service for the U.S. aircraft: \$181,800**

60 security persons, at \$30 per person per day. EP-3 is parked for 94 days from April 1 to July 3; AN-124 for 7 days.

$$\text{EP-3: } \$30 \times 60 \text{ persons} \times 94 \text{ days} = \$169,200$$

$$\text{AN-124: } \$30 \times 60 \text{ persons} \times 7 \text{ days} = \$12,600$$

**6. Fire control service: \$75,200**

One fire engine is leased by the airport to stand by for 94 days from April 1 to July 3, at \$800 per day.

$$\$800 \times 94 \text{ days} = \$75,200$$

**7. Ground occupation: \$250,960**

for ground occupied by EP-3 aircraft and used for disassembly and removal work.

a) ground occupied by EP-3 aircraft:

40 m × 50 m = 2000 square meters. The charge is \$12 per square meter per month, and the occupation lasts 3 months from April 1 to July 3.

$\$12/\text{sq. m}/\text{month} \times 2000\text{sq. m} \times 3\text{ months} \times 2 = \$144,000$

b) The work site for disassembly and removal is 80 meters × 76 meters = 6,080 square meters. The charge is \$12 per square meter per month. The disassembly and removal lasts 22 days from June 11 to July 3.

$\$12/\text{sq. m}/\text{month} \times 6,080\text{ sq. m} \times 0.733\text{ month} \times 2 = \$106,960$

*is this "CAAC" acceptable*

#### **8. Safeguard vehicles: \$14,100**

a) Safeguard vehicles for security inspection of the EP-3 aircraft parking area.

One safeguard vehicle is provided daily for 94 days, at \$100 per day.

$\$100/\text{day} \times 94\text{ days} = \$9,400$

b) Safeguard vehicles provided for the U.S. personnel entering and leaving the military airport: \$2,000

One vehicle was provided for two days, on June 11 and 14, when the US. personnel examined the runway.

From June 16 to July 3, one safeguard vehicle is provided each day for the U.S. disassembly personnel for 18 days altogether;

The total is 20 days.

$\$100/\text{vehicle}/\text{day} \times 20\text{ days} = \$2,000$

c) Safeguard vehicles for crews of An-124: \$700

The duration of An-124 being parked at the airport is 7 days, as calculated in Item 3).

One safeguard vehicle is provided each day.

$\$100/\text{vehicle}/\text{day} \times 7\text{ days} = \$ 700$

#### **IV. Service provided by CAAC for the disassembly and removal of EP-3: \$5,540**

The charges are made by the charging standards as published by the CAAC:

**a) AN-124:**

Air route charge:  $\$404$  (one-way)  $\times 2 \times 5 = \$4,040$

Air route application charge:  $\$200 \times 5 = \$1,000$

**b) Gulfstream-IV:**

Air route charge:  $\$150$  (one-way)  $\times 2 \times 1 = \$300$

Air route application charge:  $\$200 \times 1 = \$200$

**V. Security service provided by the Hainan Public Security Authority for the disassembly and removal of EP-3: \$11,780 (from June 15 to July 3)**

Allowances for security personnel:  $\$42 \times 10$  persons  $\times 19$  days =  $\$7,980$

Security vehicles:  $\$100 \times 2$  vehicles  $\times 19$  days =  $\$3,800$

**VI. Establishment of on-site port service facilities by Chinese Customs, Immigration/Emigration Inspection, Quarantine of Animals and Plants, Port Office and Entry/Exit Administration Office of the Public Security Bureau: \$6,024 (from June 14 to July 3)**

**VII. Expenses by Hainan Foreign Affairs Office in providing assistance for the disassembly and removal of EP-3 (from June 14 to July 4): \$62,388**

Transportation:  $\$100 \times 7$  cars  $\times 21$  days =  $\$14,700$


Rooms:  $\$120 \times 3$  rooms  $\times 20$  days =  $\$72,000$

$\$90 \times 7$  rooms  $\times 20$  days =  $\$126,000$

$\$70 \times 12$  rooms  $\times 20$  days =  $\$168,000$

Meals:  $\$24 \times 22$  people  $\times 21$  days =  $\$11,088$

July 10, 2001 4:56 PM



TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EP-3 Charges

Please give me a copy of the actual bill for the EP-3 from the Chinese. I have not seen it unless it is what is attached.

If it is, then someone take a good look at it and tell me what we think we ought to pay and what we shouldn't **and** give me some suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Msg from ADM Blair, Translation of China's Demands

DHR:dh  
071001-31

11-L-0559/OSD/2244

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*Resolved in separate  
response from Policy to SecDef*

Date: July 18, 2001

**Suspense: ASAP (WIN 24 HRS)**

SUBJECT: Payment of EP-3 Bill to China

Mr Di Rita, Special Assistant to SecDef, asked that USD(P) review the attached package on SecDef desire to pay China what CINCPAC thinks is fair and reasonable. Please indicate below concurrence/nonconcurrence, coordination official, date, telephone number, and include any written comments.

<u>COORDINATION</u>	<u>CONCUR/ NONCONCUR</u>	<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>EXT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USD(P)	<i>concur.</i>	<i>JUL 18 2001</i> USD(P) HAS SEEN		

Please call Lt Col Tim Grosz or LtCol Seiwel, telephone (b)(6) for pickup or deliver coordinated copy to room 3D853.

*→ Memo to USD(P)  
from ISA - Rodman  
on status  
pending coordination*

JUL 18 2001 17 JUL 18 2001



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-OI/008428-APR  
July 18, 2001, 1400hrs

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs *RWR*

SUBJECT: Difference between PACOM's initial estimate and proposed US response to PRC bill for EP-3 recovery.

- PACOM's initial estimate of \$76,000, for costs associated with the removal of the EP-3, was formulated while the Lockheed-Martin team was still on the ground in China.
- This estimate included some monies Lockheed-Martin paid as part of their agreement with the PRC for certain costs associated with removal. In addition, certain costs were found not to be "fair and reasonable" after further analysis by ISA China Desk working with PACOM.
- The new balance of \$34,576 is appropriate and in line with our consistent position to consider only those expenses related to the recovery of the EP-3, less any deliberate damage to the aircraft.
- A key factor in determining the appropriate cost, is the USG consideration that the contract aircraft used for this operation had "Official USG Status".
  - Aircraft under this status do not pay landing and take-off charges, ground service or parking charges under the Convention of Civil Aviation, Article 3. These charges were included in PACOM's original estimate.
- The costs associated with security for the EP-3 and its crew were not "fair and reasonable".
- The cable on the EP-3 Bill Response to the PRC was forwarded to ISA from ISA/AP. It has been coordinated with Pacific Command and Joint Staff and is in coordination with General Consul, Department of State, and NSC.

COORDINATION: None.

DASD/AP has seen: *[Signature]* 18 JUL 2001

Prepared by: MAJ Randy H. Lawrence, ISA/AP, 697-7757

*→ DSD  
F...  
Doug*

USDP HAS SEEN

JUL 18 2001



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEF 2001

EF-0401 *Sully* NOT  
December 14, 2001, 1600 FAX'D

*S32*  
*12/19*  
*12/22/01*  
*12/14/01*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*TO AIRCRAFT*  
*ETC. ON 104-19 DEC.*  
*JMP TRIP*

FROM PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

SUBJECT SINGLE POC FOR TRACKING TERRORISTS

*ANSWER*  
*TO*  
*SNOWFLAKE*  
*000.5*

(FOUO) In response to your memo of December 13, Keith Dunn, Coalition Management Team Coordinator for PDUSDP, will be your single point of contact in the Pentagon for tracking the people we are after in the campaign against terrorism. The results of the tracking effort will be put in a chart for you twice a month.

(U) Within Policy, Dunn will coordinate with Ken deGraffenreid of PI; Bill Luti of NESAs; and Bob Andrews of SO/LIC. He also will coordinate with Jim Haynes in GC as well as with CIA, DIA, and CENTCOM.

(FOUO) Each chart will include who we are after; who has been killed or captured; assessments of the whereabouts of people still at large; and the disposition of what we are doing with each of the detainees.

copy to:  
USDP  
DUSD/PI  
ASD/ISA  
PDASD/ISA  
DASD/ISA/NESA  
ASD/SO/LIC  
Dr. Dunn  
DIA/DPX

*14Dec01*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

U19767 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2247

**COORDINATION SHEET**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

 12/14/01

Review on Policy <sup>at</sup> 12/13/01  
at 1804

Feith Copy

December 13, 2001 9:27 AM

Tarkenton to PD

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking People

We need a single point of contact in the Pentagon for who is going to track who the people are we are after, who has been killed or captured and the best information we have as to the location of the remainder.

I need that done this week. We need to coordinate it with the CIA, we need to keep it up to date, and we need to know what it is we are trying to do with each one of them.

We need to start working with Tom Franks on it. That is part of his job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121301-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

DEC 21 2001

I-01/015646-RUE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY (J.D. Crouch, II) *JDC* DEC 21 2001

SUBJECT Waiver of Section 907 Restrictions on Azerbaijan

- You asked if Congress has yet lifted the restrictions on Azerbaijan imposed by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (TAB A).
- These restrictions will be lifted in the coming days via a Presidential waiver.
- The FY02 Foreign Operations Act, which was passed December 20, 2001, includes provisions which allow for the waiver of section 907 subject to Presidential certification that doing so is:
  - 1) necessary to US efforts to counter terrorism;
  - 2) is important to Azerbaijan's border security; and
  - 3) will not undermine efforts to secure peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.
- President Bush is expected to make this certification in the coming days once he signs the Foreign Operations Act into law.
- NOTE: Passage of the Foreign Operations Act was delayed because of a dispute over US funding for family planning programs overseas. The 907 provisions were not responsible for the delay.

*Y. J. C. Azerbaijan*

*2  
3  
EC 01*

Attachments:

TAB A: SecDef Question  
TAB B: Coordination

Prepared by: Katie Johnson, 6 14-53 85

11-L-05597-SD/2250

U19864 /01

December 19, 2001 7:40 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Freedom Support Act

Please look at paragraph five of this cable. What do we do to make that happen?  
Has the Congress done it?

Thanks.

Attach:  
AMEMBASSY BAKU CABLE R 18060 1Z DEC 01

DHR dh  
121901-31

*Mira,*

*Please have a short  
memo drafted from JOC  
& secdef on status  
of 907.*

*S: COB 12/21*

*v/r Peter*

11-L-0559/OSD/2251

SP3  
12/14

RAAUZYUW RUEHKBA3219 3520601-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUW ZOC STATE ZZH  
MS13068  
RR RUEHC  
DE RUEHKB #3219/01 3520601  
ZNR UUUW ZZH

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 19 2001

12/19

R 180601Z DEC 01  
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7889  
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3557

UNCLAS BAKU 003219

STATE FOR EUR/NIS/PD:KHARGAN, MTAPLIN, R/IIP/G/EUR,  
INR/R/MR, D/G, R/RUC, B/VOA/M/AZERI SERVICE,  
EUR/CACEN:KBILGE, S/NIS, EUR/PPD, PA, USMISSION USOSCE  
VIENNA FOR DMOXAY

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: PREL, OIIP, KPAO, AJ

SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: MEDIA REACTION. SECRETARY  
RUMSFELD'S LANDMARK VISIT TO BAKU.

1. SUMMARY: AZERBAIJANI MEDIA PROVIDED EXTENSIVE,  
POSITIVE COVERAGE TO U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S  
VISIT TO BAKU WITH MOST REITERATING THE THEME OF  
INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND  
GOAJ IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM. QUESTIONS  
FOCUSED ON THE EXTENT OF AZERBAIJANI COOPERATION AND  
THE STATUS OF SECTION 907. THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO  
REPORTS. END SUMMARY.

-----  
EXPANDING MILITARY TIES  
-----

2.. LEADING TELEVISION CHANNELS REPORTED THAT  
RUMSFELD'S VISIT WILL RESULT IN THE SIGNING OF A  
MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND AZERBAIJAN IN  
THE NEAR FUTURE. ANS QUOTED AZERI DEFENSE MINISTER  
SAFAR ABIYEV AS SAYING THAT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE  
REPEAL OF SECTION 907, COMMISSIONS FROM RESPECTIVE  
DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS WOULD MEET TO DETERMINE THE  
DIRECTION OF MILITARY COOPERATION AND SUBMIT THEM TO

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: E k SPE ASST: S E C 1 SR MA: \_\_\_\_\_  
C&D: C A B CCD: E C H : \_\_\_\_\_ FILE: \_\_\_\_\_

USDP: 1 DIA: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_  
MILPER: \_\_\_\_\_ PER SEC: \_\_\_\_\_ COMM: \_\_\_\_\_

THEIR HEADS OF STATE." "SPACE" TV QUOTED PRESIDENT ALIYEV AS SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES AND AZERBAIJAN ARE "MEMBERS OF THE SAME COALITION IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATION," AND THAT "ALL FORMS OF ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST CAPAIGN IN THE FUTURE:

3. OTHERS SPECULATED UPON THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE MILITARY PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES. "LIDER' TV RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. SPONSORING AZERBAIJANI AIRBASE UPGRADES. RUMSFELD IS NOTED AS RESPONDING THAT "A DECISION ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE MADE BY OFFICIALS IN BAKU." IT WAS ALSO REPORTED THAT RUMSFELD HOPED THAT THE REPEAL OF SECTION 907 WOULD "OPEN UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR RENDERING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AZERBAIJAN." ANS REPORTED THAT "THE CURRENT MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND AZERBAIJAN IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATION CONSISTS OF PROVIDING THE US AIR FORCE WITH AN AIR CORRIDOR ONLY." ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD BEGIN USING THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN AZERBAIJAN, ABIYEV STATED THAT 'SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO TALK OF THIS."

-----  
RUMSFELD SAYS THANK YOU; ALIYEV IMPATIENT OVER 907  
-----

4. STATE-RUN AZTV, WHICH BROADCASTS NATIONWIDE, AIRED THE COMPLETE PUBLIC PORTION OF THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT ALIYEV AND DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD. IT WAS REPORTED THAT "THE PENTAGON CHIEF SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE JOINT STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM WITH PRESIDENT HEYDAR ALIYEV AND HAD CONVEYED PRESIDENT BUSH'S AND THE US PEOPLE'S GRATITUDE FOR AZERBAIJAN'S SUPPORT DURING THE ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION."

5. SEVERAL MEDIA OUTLETS MENTIONED PRESIDENT ALIYEV'S PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF DISMAY THAT SECTION 907 OF THE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT HAS NOT YET BEEN WAIVED. INDEPENDENT SPACE TV QUOTED ALIYEV AS SAYING: "I BELIEVED THAT UPON ARRIVING HERE, YOU WOULD HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT SECTION 907 NO LONGER EXISTED. BUT, YOU ARE SAYING AGAIN THAT IT WILL BE EXAMINED SOON. WE HAVE WAITED FOR A LONG TIME AND WE'LL WAIT MORE. BUT, NOW THE TIME HAS COME, FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 907 IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO US, BUT ALSO TO YOU. THE SOONER YOU REPEAL IT, THE BETTER IN ANY CASE, EVERYTHING IS IN YOUR HANDS. WE WILL SIT QUIETLY AND WAIT. I SUPPOSE THAT THE WORDS YOU SAID HERE WILL BE FULFILLED. IN ANY CASE, THE DEFENSE SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS SAID THESE WORDS IN A MEETING WITH THE AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT IN THE AZERBAIJANI CAPITAL OF BAKU."

-----  
VAFA SPEAKS  
-----

6. ANS TV RAN A TALK SHOW CONSISTING OF INTERVIEWS WITH THE FORMER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT ALIYEV VAFA GULUZADE IN BAKU, AN ANS CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON, AND A WELL-KNOWN JOURNALIST FROM 'RUSSIAN COMMERSANT' WEEKLY IN MOSCOW. COMMENTATORS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AZERBAIJAN STRENGTHENING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE US. GULUZADE ASSERTED THAT RUMSFELD'S DECISION TO VISIT BAKU FIRST WAS NOT INCIDENTAL, AND THAT HIS VISIT TO YEREVAN WAS A FORMALITY. GUESTS ALSO TALKED ABOUT THE LIGHT COVERAGE OF THE VISIT BY RUSSIAN MEDIA. GULUZADE SAID THIS REFLECTED MOSCOW'S NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THE INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND COUNTRIES OF NIS.

WILSON

JOINT STAFFV1  
ACTION (U) 1  
INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1) JSAMS(\*) JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(\*)  
AP-CC-POLAD(\*) BOARDMAN(\*) NOOH(\*)

SECDEF V2  
ACTION (U,6) 1  
INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) C2DIR(\*)

DIA V3  
ACTION (U,6,7) 0  
INFO +US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE  
+SAFE

CINC/SVC CHF V5  
ACTION (U) 0  
INFO NMCC:CWO(\*)  
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 2

x3219

NNNN

**COORDINATION**

Under Secretary of Defense, Policy  
(Douglas J. Feith)

AJ 12/21/01  
- MS 12/21/01 01

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
Eurasia (Mira R. Baratta)



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 12:07 PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleeza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Disaster Response Procedures

Attached is an information paper on the disaster response procedures so your office will be aware of what takes place.

cc:

The Honorable Colin Powell

Mr. Stephen Hadley

Attachment

DR:dh  
020501-5

050-92

5  
26  
0

W00133 01

11-L-0559/OSD/2256

2001 JAN 31 PM 4:20



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

I-01/000921-HA&APL

MIC  
2/1/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - *hascy*

THROUGH: ASD/ISA PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE USD(P) *[Signature]* 31 JAN 2001

FROM: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT  
(Prepared by: Marc Cheek, ODASD/PKHA, 614-0054) *[Signature]* 30 JAN 30 2001

SUBJECT: Disaster Response Process – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Attached for your reference is an update on the policies and procedures for responding to foreign disasters.

COORDINATION: GC D. Dell-Orto (as modified) 29 Jan 01

Attachment  
As stated

U01830 / 01

*[Signature]*

## INFORMATION PAPER: DISASTER RESPONSE PROCEDURES

### GENERAL

- The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within the Agency for International Development, has primary responsibility for organizing US Government responses to international disasters.
- DoD does not take a lead role in providing disaster assistance but may be asked by OFDA to assist when the disaster exceeds OFDA's response capabilities and the US military has unique assets to contribute (e.g., transportation, medical supplies, engineering equipment).
- When DoD becomes involved, the military role must be clearly defined, the risks minimal, and the exit conditions clear.

### PROCESS

- When a disaster occurs, OFDA dispatches a field assessment team (Disaster Assistance Response Team, or DART) to identify emergency needs.
- Based on this first-hand report, OFDA confirms legitimate requests for assistance and usually meets those needs with its own resources.
- If OFDA identifies a need that it believes can most effectively be filled by DoD, OFDA recommends forwarding a memo from the State Department Executive Secretary (ExecSec) to DoD ExecSec specifying the type of assistance requested and the means of payment (reimbursable or nonreimbursable).
- OSD Policy then vets the request with relevant offices (e.g., General Counsel, Comptroller, regional desks) and determines through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) if sufficient resources are available for the mission,
- Upon appropriate OSD approval, then ExecSec passes the tasking to Joint Staff for execution. Large or sensitive DoD responses for assistance would be forwarded for SecDef approval.

### AUTHORITIES

- Several legal authorities are available to support DoD provision of disaster assistance outside the US, depending upon the scale and funding source of the proposed response. These authorities include (a) the Economy Act, (b) DoD's Title 10 humanitarian assistance authorities, and (c) Presidential drawdown under Section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

## **FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS**

Ordinarily, OFDA will reimburse DoD under the Economy Act for disaster expenditures. However, in the case of a large disaster, DoD may be called on to provide from its own resources on a non-reimbursable basis:

1) Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA), which is a specific account in the DoD budget that covers DoD humanitarian activities and totals approximately \$50 million annually (with \$10 million of this amount informally earmarked for disaster response); and

2) Presidential **drawdown** under the Foreign Assistance Act, which empowers the President to direct that DoD provide goods and services **from** existing resources totaling up to \$75 million (per fiscal year) in response to a disaster. With a limited exception for procurement of commercial transportation and related services, new contracts may not be used to provide goods or services under drawdown. Note also that **drawdown** requires prior written Congressional notification of the President's intent to exercise **drawdown** authority. The cost of providing or replacing DoD goods and services provided under Presidential **drawdown** is initially borne by the Military Departments (usually out of Operation and Maintenance funds), but these accounts can be replenished by supplemental appropriation.

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

May 24, 2001

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 MAY 25 PM 2:31

The Honorable Donald **Rumsfeld**  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon, Room **3E880**  
Washington, DC **20301**

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last week the House of Representatives passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for **FY 2002** and **2003**, which, among other things, includes amendments to the Helms-Biden legislation necessary to pay our arrears to the United Nations.

During the debate on this measure, we offered an amendment to insert into the bill the "American Servicemembers' Protection Act of **2001**," our legislation aimed at reducing **the** threat posed to the United **States** by the International Criminal Court (ICC). We first introduced our ICC legislation last year with the strong support of the Republican leadership and key committee chairmen in both the House and Senate. **In** addition, we received a letter endorsing the legislation from twelve prominent experts on national security matters, ranging from Henry Kissinger to **Zbigniew** Brzezinski. We were pleased that you were among the signers of this letter. This year, prominent Democrats like Jack **Murtha** in the House and **Zell** Miller in the Senate have joined as cosponsors of our legislation.

We were pleased that, after a spirited debate, the House of Representatives voted **282-137** in favor of the American Servicemembers Protection Act. We look forward to working with Jesse Helms, **Trent Lott**, and our other Senate cosponsors, as well as with you and Secretary Powell, to promptly send this legislation to the President.

We do not believe the Bush Administration should wait for the enactment of **this** legislation before implementing a comprehensive strategy to slow down the ill-considered rush of foreign countries-many of them friends of the United States-to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. At last count, **32** countries had ratified the Rome Statute, which is more than half the number required for the Court to come into existence. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act can be a **central** component of such a comprehensive strategy, both before it is enacted and after.

Several provisions of the American **Servicemembers'** Protection Act were written with an eye to slowing down the international rush to ratification of the Rome Statute. Most importantly, section 7 of the legislation requires the suspension of U.S. military assistance to most countries that ratify the Statute until such countries enter into an agreement with the United States pursuant to **Article 98** of the Statute preventing the Court from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in the country. This provision was designed to give countries that are considering ratifying the Rome Statute a reason for not doing so, and also to give the United States leverage in negotiating **Article 98** agreements with countries that have ratified.

11-L-0559/QSD/2267

U09893 / 01  
T-01/001211

The Honorable Donald **Rumsfeld**  
May 24, 2001  
Page Two

We suspect that many of the countries now considering ratifying the Rome Statute are not aware that this provision has been approved overwhelmingly by the House of Representatives and may soon become U.S. law. If they knew **that** ratification of the Rome Statute might jeopardize their ability to receive military assistance **from** the United States, they might decide not to ratify. We strongly encourage the **Departments** of State and **Dcfensc** to bring this matter to the attention of all current and potential recipients of U.S. military assistance that have signed but not yet ratified the Rome Statute.

In approaching those countries **that** appear inclined to ratify the Statute, it might be useful to propose the initiation of negotiations on an Article **98** agreement so as to impress upon them the implications of ratification. To further underscore those implications, it might be useful to begin discussions with such countries about the new procedures regarding the use of classified information provided to such countries by the U.S. Government that may have to be adopted in accordance with section **6** of our legislation.

Section 5 of our legislation encourages the U.S. Government to insist that United Nations Security Council resolutions establishing new **peacekcepping** operations contain provisions exempting any U.S. personnel participating in such operations from the jurisdiction of the ICC. We encourage the Administration to begin insisting on **the** inclusion of such **provisions** in all Security Council resolutions **that** either authorize or reauthorize a **U.N.** peacekeeping operation in which U.S. military personnel will participate.

In this regard, we note that **U.N.** Security Council resolution **1305 (2000)**, which authorizes the Stabilization Force (**SFOR**) peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, will expire on June **21, 2001**, and is likely to be renewed. We think it is especially important that the next Security Council resolution reauthorizing **SFOR** include a provision of the type called for in section 5 of our legislation. This is **because**, even in advance of the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the over **3,000** U.S. military personnel participating in **SFOR** are today at risk of **prosecution** by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (**ICTY**). This risk was highlighted by the **ICTY's** investigation of U.S. forces for allegedly committing war crimes in **Kosovo** in **1999**.

The **Bush** Administration should not allow this situation to persist any longer than absolutely necessary, both with regard to our forces in **Bosnia** and our forces in **Kosovo**. The reauthorization of the Bosnia operation-over which the United States has a veto-provides an opportunity to insist on immunity for our personnel in Bosnia from the jurisdiction of both **the** ICC and the **ICTY**. The fact that the **countries** that are most eager to maintain the U.S. military presence in Bosnia are also among the strongest promoters of the ICC makes this an especially fitting place to establish precedent.

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
May 24, 2001  
Page Three

Finally, we wish to comment on suggestions that the Bush Administration can cure America's problems with the ICC simply by renouncing President Clinton's signature of the Rome Statute last December. Such suggestions are based on a profound underestimation of the threat posed to the United States by the ICC.

We introduced the American  **Servicemembers'**  Protection Act on June 14<sup>th</sup> of last year, more than six months before President Clinton signed the Statute. The letter endorsing the legislation from Henry Kissinger and other foreign policy experts was sent on November 29<sup>th</sup> of last year, one  **month**  before President Clinton acted. Renouncing President Clinton's signature of the Statute, while laudable and, in our view, necessary, will only restore the status quo  **that**  existed prior to his action. For the reasons spelled out in our legislation and in the November 29<sup>th</sup> letter, that status quo was unacceptable and required a much more active U.S. policy to protect the interests of our nation.

We urge you to  **take**  the  **lead**  in implementing such a policy, and we pledge to you our full support as you go about this important task.

Sincerely,

  
TOM DELAY

  
HENRY J. HYDE



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

ACTION MEMO



MAR 19 2002

FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: COL James A. Whitmore, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Return of Pending Signature/Approval Items

- Attached is a list and a copy of action items submitted by your organization or a subordinate agency to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary for approval or signature.
- These actions are no longer active. They are being returned for review and appropriate action since they have been pending for more than 90 days.
- If action by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary is still required, please update the action, to include obtaining the necessary **coordinations**, and resubmit a new action to Communications and Directives for control and processing in the appropriate format and in compliance with current administrative instructions.

Attachments:  
As stated

DISTRIBUTION :

(ATTENTION: Military and Executive Assistants)

Secretary of the Army

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

General Counsel

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Director, Administration and Management

W00824-0



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1 000

JUN 18 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency Components to Joint Forces Command

Your request to transfer intelligence and operations components of the Air Intelligence Agency to Joint Forces Command is approved. Ensure that these assignments are reflected in the Forces For Unified Commands, FY 2002 document.

322

18 Jun 01



U05865 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

6/16  
1245

SECRET

2001 MAR 22 AM 8:47

01/002692

MIC  
3/25/01

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AW 4/5/01

JSL

THROUGH: SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
POLICY MATTERS (Chris Williams, 695-5136) (COPY PROVIDED) MAR 21 2001  
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY SUPPORT) *[Signature]*  
(Pete Verga, 697-0286)

AW 4/12/01

FROM: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat  
Reduction (Susan Koch, 695-4503)  
(Prepared by CAPT Scott Hebner, ODASD/R&P, 614-2759)

SUBJECT: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) Components to Joint Forces  
Command (JFCOM) – ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To obtain approval on the peacetime assignment of Air Intelligence Agency  
intelligence and operations components to Joint Forces Command

COORDINATION: Personnel & Readiness, General Counsel!,

SECAF RUCHE *[Signature]*  
MR HANER *[Signature]*  
DR CAMBERG *[Signature]*  
6/4

Attachments:

- Tab 1 – Chairman memorandum of 8 March 2001 w/enclosure
- Tab 2 – Fiscal Year 2000 Forces For Unified Commands, 2 August 2000 Secretary of Defense memorandum
- Tab 3 – Coordination sheets
- Tab 4 – Proposed Secretary of Defense memorandum

**SECDEF DECISION:**

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_



U05865 14 / 01

## Executive Summary

**DISCUSSION:** In accordance with Title 10, the Secretary is to direct the Service Secretaries to assign all combat forces to a Unified or Specified Command, or to the Commander, US Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command.

- Any changes to assignments, other than those caused by normal service rotation of forces or programmed force reductions, will be submitted by the Service Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense for approval. (Tab 2)
- The Air Force is requesting to assign intelligence and operations components of the Air Intelligence Agency to Joint Forces Command.
- These elements are not assigned in the FY 2000 (1 Oct 1999) or proposed FY 2001 Forces For Unified Commands (1 Oct 2000).
- The Air Force believes, and the Chairman agrees, that these assignments will more effectively posture USAF information superiority forces for support to the combatant commanders.
- CINCFCOM and CINCSPACECOM concur with the assignments.
- Assignment of these forces will not prejudice defense review discussions.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you approve the Air Force's request and sign the memorandum at Tab 4.

Pete Verga



Chris Williams



Prepared by: CAPT Scott Hebner,  
ODASD/R&P, 614-2759

11-L-0559/OSD/2273

### COORDINATION SHEET

Subject: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency Components to Joint Forces  
Command

USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)  \_\_\_\_\_

GENERAL COUNSEL \_\_\_\_\_

**COORDINATION SHEET**

Subject: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency Components to Joint Forces  
Command

USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS) \_\_\_\_\_

GENERAL COUNSEL           DJD 3/14/01



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0999

CLASSIFIED  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CM-1125-012501 1111 -3 01 3: 46  
8 March 2001

322

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency Components to Joint Forces Command

1. The enclosed memorandum from the acting Secretary of the Air Force requests approval to assign the Air Intelligence Agency's combatant forces to US Joint Forces Command. This request is consistent with the letter and intent of title 10, United States Code, section 162, regarding assignment of forces. The request is also directed by previous guidance<sup>1</sup> in the cover letter to the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum that instructs the Service Secretaries, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit requests for force assignment changes for your approval.

2. This transfer of forces is a positive step toward building a more responsive defense intelligence and information operations architecture. I concur in this request.

  
HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Reference:

<sup>1</sup> SecDef memorandum, 2 August 2000, "Forces for Unified Commands, FY 2000"

SECDEF DECISION

Approval

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapproval

\_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

( 8 MAR 01 )



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

FEB 8 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

*Lawrence J. Delaney*

FROM: ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, LAWRENCE J. DELANEY  
Prepared by: Ralph Larson, AF/XOIIIF, 695-7497

SUBJECT: Assignment of Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) Components to Joint Forces  
Command (JFCOM)

PURPOSE: Request SECDEF approve the assignment of AIA intelligence and information  
operations components to JFCOM.

DISCUSSION:

- The Air Force seeks to transfer AIA's 67th Information Operations Wing and 70th Intelligence Wing, along with their intelligence and information operations components, to 8th Air Force.
  - 8th Air Force is subordinate to Air Combat Command (ACC), the air component of JFCOM.
  - The headquarters element of AIA and AIA's subordinate centers (National Air Intelligence Center, Air Force Information Warfare Center) and its administratively controlled center (Air Force Technical Applications Center) would be collectively reassigned as a primary subordinate unit to ACC.
- We believe these moves will most effectively posture the Air Force information superiority forces for support to the combatant commanders.
- Title 10 US Code, section 162(a)(1) and (2) requires SECDEF approval prior to the transfer of these Service-assigned forces to JFCOM.
  - We briefed these actions to the current and previous USCINCFJCOM - both approved.
  - In addition, we briefed USCINCSpace - who also approved.

RECOMMENDATION SECDEF approve the transfer of forces to JFCOM described above.

SECDEF DECISION:

\_\_\_\_\_ Approved  
\_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
200 APR 16 11 08 25

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THROUGH DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM:** ACTING USD(P&R) *Charlie Casin* APR 16 2001  
Prepared by Barbara Dieker, MWRP, 693-5049

**SUBJECT:** Military Slot Machines – **INFORMATION MEMORANDUM**

**PURPOSE:** To respond to questions from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

- A 26 March Information Paper to the SecDef and **DepSecDef** on military slot machines was returned to determine how many military personnel have a gambling addiction and what actions should be taken (**TAB 4**)
- A 3 April Memorandum forwarded to address these questions was returned with additional questions and guidance (**TAB 3**):
- “What is the memo SecDef was asking about?” The memo in question was the 26 March Information Paper, which was not attached to the 3 April Memorandum
- “Memo should suggest things that could be done to reduce the military rate. Shouldn’t we be trying for a lower than normal rate?” Ongoing actions are discussed in the revised Information Paper at **TAB 1**.
- These actions which could be enhanced as required include design controls on playing, counseling and referrals, and addiction education and treatment.
- “How is this (**gambling rate**) measured?” The military gambling rate is based on a 1998 Survey of Health Related Behaviors. An information paper addressing **this survey** is at **TAB 2**.

**COORDINATION:** NA

**RECOMMENDATION:** None. Information only.

## INFORMATION PAPER

**SUBJECT:** Slot Machine Program

**PURPOSE:** To provide background information on slot machine programs operated by the Military Services, including uses of slot machine income.

### **BACKGROUND:**

- The Services installed slot machines in their stateside and overseas open messes in the 1930s and 40s. Slot machines were removed from CONUS clubs in the late 1960s. After fraud allegations, the Army and Air Force removed slot machines overseas in 1972.
- In 1980, the Army and Air Force informed congressional oversight committees of plans to reinstate slot machines overseas employing strict standards and control procedures. The machines were phased in during the 1980s.
- In 1987, the Services further expanded their slot machine programs to other Category C MWR activities, such as bowling centers, recreation lounges, and golf courses and added video poker and multiple coin play machines.

### **DISCUSSION:**

- Slot machines are offered at 90 overseas installations where the program does not conflict with the laws of the host nation or status of forces agreement, and the host nation has its own legal form of gambling.
- The program is owned and operated by the Military Services, using internal machine controls that are more stringent than the gaming industry standard.
- DoD establishes controls on the play of slot machines to limit potential abuse by that segment of the military population that may have a propensity for compulsive or addictive behaviors, including gambling:
  - The Military Services have limited play through program design, which features only nickel and quarter machines with frequent payouts and limited jackpots.
  - The Military Services do not permit advertising or promoting of slot machines. There are no tournaments, contests or other competitive events involving slot machine play. No incentives are offered to play slots.
  - Slot machines are located in a separate area within the parent activity, with activity staff periodically checking I.D. cards and observing play.

- Instances of misconduct or potential excessive and unaffordable participation are investigated and identified to the unit commander, supervisor or sponsor, depending on the individual involved.
- Installation commanders may bar any individual **from** playing slot machines if it is perceived to be in the best interest of the individual.
- Service members are restricted from play if they have written a bad check or owe a delinquent debt to the local MWR fund.
- **DoD** continues to inform overseas Service members of the consequences of abusing slot machines. The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service airs spot announcements that focus on the consequences of compulsive-gambling.
- Although there is little training in identifying and treating gambling as an addictive behavior, Chaplain services, mental health clinics, and financial management programs provide counseling and referrals on gambling issues.
  - Clinics also make referrals to civilian outpatient programs and direct individuals to Gamblers Anonymous.
  - Some installations host support groups for those suffering from problem gambling as part of their substance abuse programs.
- **DoD** has a specific treatment program for problem gambling at the Naval Hospital, Camp Pendleton, California, as a component of the inpatient addictive behavior program.
- An ongoing study of the effects of military slot machines on military members should provide additional insights on the nature and extent of problem gambling, enabling the Department to evaluate additional actions necessary in the prevention, detection and treatment.
- The income from slot machines represents the basis for nonappropriated fund construction funding for the Services and provides funding for low cost **recreational** and entertainment programs in overseas areas that could not be otherwise supported.
- In FY 2000, a total of 7,092 machines provided a net income of \$125 million.

## INFORMATION PAPER

**SUBJECT:** 1998 Department of Defense Survey of Health Related Behaviors  
Among Military Personnel

**PURPOSE:** To respond to the Deputy Secretary of Defense question regarding the method of measuring probable pathological gambling in the military population utilized in the 1998 survey.

### **BACKGROUND:**

- The study is the seventh in a series of active-duty military personnel under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs). The sample consisted of 17,264 military personnel worldwide.
- The survey asked eight questions on problems related to gambling to assess the lifetime prevalence of gambling problems. Respondents were asked if they had **ever** had any of the following eight gambling-related problems:
  - being increasingly preoccupied with gambling;
  - needing to gamble with increased amounts of money to achieve the desired level of excitement;
  - feeling restless or irritable when unable to gamble;
  - going back to try to win back earlier gambling losses;
  - lying to others about the extent of their gambling;
  - having jeopardized or lost important relationships, a job, or **career opportunities** because of gambling; and
  - borrowing money to relieve financial problems caused by gambling.
- An affirmative answer to **at least one** of the eight items was judged indicative of **problem gambling**. Affirmative response to **three or more** items was deemed to indicate **probable pathological gambling** at some point in the person's lifetime.

### **DISCUSSION:**

- The study report acknowledged limitations of the data on problem gambling in the military.
  - The data includes only a subset of gambling-related behavior, thus there is no baseline measure of the prevalence of all types of gambling behavior among military personnel regardless of whether the behavior was problematic.

- The data is lifetime prevalence **data**—the survey did not address whether the gambling-related problems occurred in the past year **or since** the individual joined the military.
- Therefore, it is not possible to know if these problems occurred before joining the military or whether the problems occurred concurrently or at different points in the individual's lifetime.
- The study report emphasized that, due to **limitations** in survey scope and depth, it is most accurate to consider the 1998 survey findings as representing only an initial exploration of the issue of problem gambling in the military.

9 APR 2001

USD (P+R)

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: Military Slot Machine Program

*Please reformat  
and address DSD  
question, below. Return  
11 April '01. JP 9/4*

Take a look at this gambling memo. I wonder if we've got any indication of how many people have a gambling addiction in the military.

What do you think we ought to do with this?

DHR/azn  
032601.48  
Attach.

- ① - What is the memo SDef was asking about?
- ② Does this mean as a memo from P+R through me.
- ③ Memo should suggest things that could be done to reduce the military rate. Shouldn't we be trying for a lower than normal rate?

~~thoughts from Jayman, Leeds, me~~

406795/01



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

10 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT:** Military Slot Machine Program

In response to your question of March 26, the following information is provided regarding the military slot machine program and the incidence of gambling addiction in the military:

- In response to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, the Department is conducting a study on the effects of slot machines on service members overseas. The study will be complete at the end of April.
- Congressman Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), the sponsor of the reporting provision, has been quite vocal in his opposition to the operation of slot machines on military installations and is likely to pursue this issue in the future.
- The military slot machine program generated approximately \$126 million in net income in FY 2000, with \$80 million retained for local MWR operations and \$46 million used for Service-wide MWR capital improvement programs.
- The 1998 Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel found that lifetime prevalence of probable pathological gambling in the military is 2.2 percent, slightly higher than civilian population (1.8 percent). *How is this measured?*
- The incidence of probable pathological gambling among OCONUS respondents was slightly higher (2.3 percent) than CONUS respondents (2.1 percent). With a standard deviation of .2 percent, the difference is negligible.
- The Departmental position on military slot machines should consider the results of the ongoing study of the impact on military members, and not necessarily focus solely on funds derived from the program.

I hope this information is useful as you continue to review the military slot machine program.

*This is more than 20% higher.*

TO: Paul Wolfowitz | Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUBJECT: ~~Military Slot Machine Program~~

Take a **look** at this gambling memo. I wonder if we've got any indication of how many people **have** a gambling addiction in **the military**.

What do you think we ought to do with this?.

DHR/azn

032601.48 .

Attach.

*thoughts from Gagnier, Leidy, me*

## INFORMATION PAPER

**SUBJECT:** Military Slot Machine Program

**PURPOSE:** To provide background information on slot machine programs operated by the Military Services, including uses of slot machine income.

### **B A C K G R O U N D :**

- The Services installed slot machines in their **stateside and** overseas open messes in the 1930s and 40s. Slot machines were removed from **CONUS** clubs in the late 1960s. After fraud allegations, the Army and Air Force removed slot **machines** overseas in 1972.
- In 1980, the Army and Air Force informed congressional oversight committees of plans to reinstate slot machines overseas employing strict **standards** and control procedures. **The** machines were phased in during the 1980s.
- In 1987, the Services further expanded their slot machine programs to other Category C **MWR** activities, such as bowling centers, recreation **lounges**, and golf **courses** and added video poker and multiple coin play machines.

### **D I S C U S S I O N =**

- Slot machines are offered at 900 overseas installations where the program does **not conflict with** the laws of the host nation or status of forces agreement (SOFA), and the host nation **has its** own legal form of gambling.
- The program is owned and operated by the **Military** Services, using internal machine controls that are more stringent than the gaming industry standard.
- The **DoD** establishes controls on the play of slot machines to limit potential abuse.
  - **The** Military Services have limited play through **program** design — **only** nickel and quarter machines with frequent payouts and limited jackpots. The rate of return to the customer is between 90 to 93 percent.
- The **income from** slot machines represents the basis for nonappropriated fund **construction** funding for the Services and provides **funding** for low cost recreational and entertainment programs in overseas areas that could not be, **otherwise** supported.
  - In **FY 2000**, a total of 7,092 machines provided a net income of **\$128** million.

Demographic and Revenue Data on Slot Machines

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine corps	Total
Total number of machines	3,492	1,305	1,649	646	7,092
Number of machines by denomination:					
Nickel	726	261	512	144	1,643
Quarter	2,766	989	1,110	502	5,367
Other <sup>1</sup>	0	55	27	0	82
Percentage of total that are video poker	42% <sup>2</sup>	13%	18%	See note <sup>2</sup>	31%
Number of machines by activity:					
NCO/enlisted clubs	856	276	1,121	487	2,740
Officers clubs	195	46	136	13	390
Community clubs	1,074	367	81	20	1,542
Bowling centers	945	131	285	116	1,477
AFRCs	161	57	0	0	218
Other	261	428	26	10	725
Maximum single play	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50
Maximum jackpot	\$1,199	\$500	\$1,000	\$1,199	\$1,199
Average payback to customer	93.9%	92.0%	90.9%	93.9%	92.5%
Revenue and income in \$ millions:					
Total machine revenue after payouts	99.0	18.3	30.5	14.6	162.4
Total activity expenses <sup>3</sup>	25.4	1.9	3.4	3.3	34.0
Net income	73.4	16.4	27.1	11.3	128.2
Total net income retained by command/installation <sup>4</sup>	43.5	16.4	11.9	8.4	80.2
Total net income assessed by headquarters <sup>4</sup>	31.3	0	15.2	2.9	49.4

NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Other category represents machines that take tokens or local currency

<sup>2</sup> Percentage of video poker machines for the Army includes those operated by the Army listed in the Marine Corps total. Army operates Marine Corps slot machines at Camp Butler and Iwakuni, Japan.

<sup>3</sup> Activity cost for the Army includes reimbursement of 10 percent of revenue to the installation for upkeep of the facility.

<sup>4</sup> Total amount distributed by the Army is based on a balance sheet transaction and varies slightly from the net income which factors in accruals for monthly expense.

April 9, 2001 9:29 AM

293

*TS* →

TO: RDML Quinn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *7*

SUBJECT: Acknowledgement and Tracking of Military Casualties

I have a feeling that when military people are killed, that either the Secretary of the Service or I or both ought to send a letter to the family. Apparently, nothing like that is going on because I have not been informed of it.

We also ought to keep a log of the number of military people that are killed in some sort of training or action-I don't mean people who die of natural death or who get killed robbing a bank or in a car accident. I do want to keep some sort of a record of all of these people who have died so I know what it is and can mention it from time to time.

Thank you.

DHR:dh  
04090 1-4

*SIR,*

*Please see attached and*

*approve / disapprove recommendations*

*listed under # 3*

*I agree w/ both*

*JH - agree w/ both recommendations*

*recommendations*

*[Signature]*

*VR*

*J/SMA 4/12*

*94PRO1*

April 12, 2001

**Mr. Secretary**

**SUBJECT:** Acknowledgement and Tracking of Military Casualties (~~TAB A~~)

1. Condolence letters:

- a. SecNav, SecArmy, and all Service Chiefs send letters, regardless of how military member died.
- b. SecAF sends letters on a case-by-case basis.
- c. Secretary Cohen sent letters on a case-by-case basis.

2. Tracking:

- a. There is no OSD focal point for collecting military casualty information.
- b. Action officer on USD(P&R) staff built **the** log at **TAB B** at Secretary Wolfowitz' request.

3. Recommendations:

- a. With SecDef approval the Executive Secretary will prepare letters for SecDef on a case-by-case basis.
- b. Task the Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) with identifying a single focal point and methodology for collecting military casualty information.

*Respectfully  
Maria*

**SECDEF JASSEN**  
Maria I. Cribbs  
Colonel, USAF  
APR 23 2001 Executive Secretary

*Agree*

Attachments:  
as stated



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000

FORCE MANAGEMENT  
POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)

*Gil M. G...* MAR 13 2001  
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (FMP)

(See signature next under)

FROM: Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MC&FP)  
Prepared by: CDR Rene' Campos, OFP, 697-9283

SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary of Defense Inquiry on DoD Military Death  
Statistics-INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To provide information to answer DEPSECDEF's Office inquiry.

- As a follow-on to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) inquiry on the number of total active duty deaths, broken down by month, Service component, and type of death that was forwarded on March 7, General Mattis asked if this data could be further broken out by duty status categories.
- WHS/DIOR conducted a preliminary audit of duty status by manually reviewing CY 2000 Report of Casualty, DD 1300 forms, as CY 2000 data is still being compiled (TAB A). Comparable specificity for preceding years is not available because the Defense Casualty Reporting Service did not require such specificity until Calendar Year 2000.

COORDINATION: Washington Headquarters Services/Director Information  
Operations and Reports Office (WHS/DIOR)

RECOMMENDATION: That TAB A be forwarded to respond to  
General Mattis' question.

TAB B,  
0092882



PRELIMINARY CY2009 UNUSUAL DEATH STATISTICS BY SERVICE/DUTY STATUS

Service/Duty Status,	On Duty	Off Duty	Leave	Patient/*TDRL	UA/Confined	PRELIM	TOTAL
<b>Army</b>							
Accident	27	90	23				140
Illness	27	23	4	4	1		59
Self-Inflicted	2	33	4		3		42
Homicide		8	2	1			11
Unknown/Pending	6	12	2	2	1		23
Temp Duty Retirement List-TDRL (as reported)				73			73
<b>Totals</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>348</b>
<b>Navy</b>							
Accident	23	66	6	2	1		98
Illness	10	14	3	5			32
Self-Inflicted	2	23	3	2	4		34
Homicide		3	2				5
Unknown/Pending	1	20	3		3		27
Temp Duty Retirement List-TDRL (as reported)				28			28
Hostile (Terrorist - Cole)	17						17
<b>Totals</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>8</b>		<b>241</b>
<b>Air Force</b>							
Accident	9	39	4				52
Illness	3	12	6	1			22
Self-Inflicted	1	21	1				23
Homicide		2	1				3
Unknown/Pending	4	18	4	1			27
Temp Duty Retirement List-TDRL (as reported)				8			8
<b>Totals</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>			<b>135</b>
<b>Marine Corps</b>							
Accident	38	45	10		1		94
Illness	4	5	1	2			12
Self-Inflicted	1	13	1		1		16
Homicide		8	2				10
Unknown/Pending	2	6	3				11
Temp Duty Retirement List-TDRL (as reported)				17			17
<b>Totals</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>160</b>
<b>Grand Totals</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>15</b>		<b>884</b>
*TDRL-Temporary Duty Retirement List							

11-L-0559/OSD/2291

TAB B2



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



July 13, 2001, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu 13 Jul 01*

SUBJECT: Status of Tracking "Lost Days" for DoD

- You asked us to ensure that we could track workdays lost to injury as Paul O'Neill had done with ALCOA (see Tab A). This is a quick status of our efforts.
- Working with Pete Aldridge's safety office, we have made quick progress toward capturing these data. Currently, our civilian personnel office has ready access to the amount of time lost to injury for our civilian workforce as these data are gathered from payroll records.
- We do not have as ready access to capture the time lost for our military as the payroll records do not directly record this information. Instead, we expect to use accident records from the Service safety centers and DoD hospitals to develop a good metric of the time lost.
- As to disseminating this information, the Air Force is developing a web based tool to capture many of these safety metrics. We have established an IPT to consider this system as well as others to implement quickly lost workdays tracking.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Joseph J. Angello, 693-0466



11-L-0559/OSD/2292

U12405 / 01

June 25, 2001 1:03 PM

TO: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Lost Day Rate

Let's require that every one of our units give us a "lost day" rate like Paul O'Neill suggested, and let's think of starting to put it on some sort of a web so everyone can see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062501-21

11-L-0559/OSD/2293

Have not forwarded. Wanted you to know that SecAf has forwarded to SecDef a chart that shows Af data, military & civilian, in the "ALCOA" format.

Seems to contradict the info you have that we do not have the the data on military in your 3<sup>rd</sup> Bullet. (I may be missing something, of course.)

v/r -

U12405A/01 Larry D. Rita



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

July 13, 2001, 5:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu 13 July 01*

SUBJECT: Status of Tracking "Lost Days" for DoD

- You asked us to ensure that we could track workdays lost to injury as Paul O'Neill had done with ALCOA ~~(see M4144)~~. This is a quick status of our efforts.
- Working with Pete Aldridge's safety office, we have made quick progress toward capturing these data. Currently, our civilian personnel office has ready access to the amount of time lost to injury for our civilian workforce as these data are gathered from payroll records.
- We do not have as ready access to capture the time lost for our military as the payroll records do not directly record this information. Instead, we expect to use accident records from the Service safety centers and DoD hospitals to develop a good metric of the time lost.
- As to disseminating this information, the Air Force is developing a web based tool to capture many of these safety metrics. We have established an IPT to consider this system as well as others to implement quickly lost workdays tracking.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L)

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Joseph J. Angello, 693-0466

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>7/19</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/16</i>



June 25, 2001 1:03 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Lost Day Rate

Let's require that every one of our units give us a "lost day" rate like Paul O'Neill suggested, and let's think of starting to put it on some sort of a web so everyone can see it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062501-21

2001 JUL 24 AM 10:34

July 17, 2001 10:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Law

Bob Soule of PA&E told us we weren't going to be able to comply with a law that requires us to reduce the size of our headquarters staffs. Please **find** out about that law.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071701-12

*7/20*

*Exec Sec -*

*Please task to USD P&R  
for brief response via me.*

*D.R.'s*

*Copy BTM*

*020 OSD*

*17 Jul 01*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

August 6, 2001, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu (aug 01)*

SUBJECT: Streamlining DoD Management and deducing Headquarters Staff

- On several recent occasions, you have inquired about streamlining DoD management and reducing headquarters staff (see attached). This memorandum outlines a set of options for your consideration and proposes a course of action for implementing them.
- At the end of FY 1999, DoD management headquarters staff totaled 63,817 (under a definition established by the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act). Most are in the Military Departments (46,276 or 73%); OSD accounts for 2,007 (3%) and the Joint Staff 1,330 (2%). Under current plans, the total will fall about 5,000 by the end of FY 2002. My recommendation is that further reductions be targeted on streamlining and strengthening DoD management (rather than assigning classic "fair share" targets). Such steps could include:
  - In the Military Departments (46,276 positions in baseline), eliminating or substantially reducing component commands (each CINC has a subordinate Service Command) and overlapping combat commands (e.g., U.S. Army Pacific and Eighth Army), and simplifying installation management (e.g., now the jurisdiction of five commands in the Air Force within the United States alone).
  - In the Defense Agencies (6,475 positions in baseline), reviewing potential consolidations (e.g., counterintelligence activities, Inspector General and audit functions).
  - In the Unified Commands (5,894 positions in baseline), merging those with overlapping responsibilities.

020 OSD

6 AUG 01

U14182 /01

~~U12805-01~~

~~009534~~



- In **OSD** (2,007 positions in baseline), eliminating principal deputies below the Presidential appointee level, and reducing military assistants. (**This** could be part of the **reduction plan** you have asked each principal to provide.)
- In the Joint Staff (1,330 positions in baseline), reducing overlap with OSD.
- Some steps could overlap these categories (e.g., merging Defense Logistics Agency with the Transportation Command to form a single supply chain manager). And all elements of the Department could benefit from reviewing the plethora of ad hoc groups and associated staff that have **grown** up over the years. (I am pleased to report, for example, that we have held the last meeting of the Defense Medical Oversight Committee.)
- Throughout, these changes should be guided by the conclusions you reach in the Quadrennial **Defense** Review.
- The Congress, as Bob **Soule** emphasized to you, has also taken a strong interest in slimming management headquarters, and the **FY 2000** National Defense Authorization Act directed a reduction of **7.5% to 15%** by the end of **FY 2002** from the 1999 baseline, with an intermediate reduction of 2.5% to 10% by the end of the current **fiscal** year. Current plans will yield a reduction of **3.5%**. While some further reduction is possible in the remaining two months, it is not feasible to reach **10%**, which will require you to exercise the waiver authority Congress granted you. (I will work with the General Counsel to prepare the waiver document for your signature.)
- If you approve the course of action outlined in this memorandum, I would be privileged to coordinate its implementation, providing you a quarterly report on our progress.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove : \_\_\_\_\_

See me for further discussion : \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

August 7, 2001 3:05 p.m.

**INFO MEMO**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: **Dov S. Zakheim**

CC: David Chu

SUBJECT: Streamlining **DoD** Management and Headquarters Staff

- Dave Chu kindly sent me a copy of his memo to **you** of 6 August (attached). Perhaps because we both served on Arnold **Punaro's** force; he has reached conclusions about consolidation **and removal** of layers that are **similar to those** I outlined in my **two** pages to you of July 27, which I am also attaching, beneath Dave's memo.
- I would only add to what Dave has written that we **need** to:
  - 1) give the Services targets for end-strength reductions, for which consolidation and headquarters reduction etc. should serve as guidelines; **These** reductions should be accomplished **in** coordination with the Unified Commands and the Joint Staff, and should incorporate reductions in the staff levels **of** both of the latter.
  - 2) provide two-year targets for the civilian agencies, including **OSD**, requiring aggregate reductions through consolidation, de-layering and attrition of **not less than 7.5%** in both OSD and the Defense Agencies over each of **the** next two years.
- My staff and Dave's are **prepared** to **work** together on this matter, and I believe that **Arnold Punaro** could provide invaluable assistance **as** well.

COORDINATION: NON-E

Attachments:  
As stated above

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

8/6

On Chu -

I've forwarded to SecDef, with note saying you'll be prepared to discuss in some detail, with some vision on how to proceed, at an already scheduled Management Initiatives meeting Friday.

He wants you to tell him how you intend to proceed, rather than ask him ~~for~~ <sup>how</sup> you should. I think he's at the point that better is the enemy of good enough. Your proposals are good enough.

D. L. T.



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

07/25/01 11:33

07/25/01 11:33

INFO MEMO

July 25, 2001, 3:30 pm

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu July 01*

SUBJECT: Should We Classify Readiness Information?

- You asked whether we should classify readiness information (TAB B) to preclude divulging known weaknesses to the world. In short, we should -- and do -- classify any information that directly divulges our vulnerabilities.
- By regulation, we currently classify unit (squadron, ship, and battalion) readiness information as reported in the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). This system provides unit readiness ratings ("C-ratings") in four resource areas: personnel, training, equipment, and supplies.
- A more difficult problem is safeguarding the unclassified data systems used as the basis for establishing these unit readiness ratings. Current computer and data security policies and procedures, properly applied, provide adequate protection of this information.
- Finally, Title X, Section 117 requires an unclassified Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). We craft this document to be general in nature but representative of our areas of strategic concern. A classified annex to the QRRC, highlighting specific readiness deficiencies, is also submitted.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared by: Col William Hughes, Room 3D819, 693-5584, fax 693-5588



11-L-0559/OSD/2302

U13091 /01



**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

27-Jun-01

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS**

**SUBJECT: Readiness**

The Secretary has asked whether the issue of readiness should be classified. Specifically, why should a known weakness be exposed to the world?

I would appreciate it if you would coordinate with the Joint Staff and General Counsel on a quick response to his question.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "E.P. Giambastiani", is positioned above the typed name.

E.P. Giambastiani  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Senior Military Assistant  
to the Secretary

*Copy to: DJS*



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

July 9, 2001, 2:10 pm

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Should We Classify Readiness Information?

- You asked whether we should classify readiness information to preclude divulging known weaknesses to the world. In short, we should -- and do -- classify any information that directly divulges our vulnerabilities.
- Per CJCS Manual 3150.02, we currently classify unit (squadron, ship, battalion) readiness information as reported in the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). This system provides unit readiness ratings ("C- ratings") in four resource areas: personnel, training, equipment, and supplies.
- While the data used in making the readiness rating decisions <sup>are</sup> housed on unclassified systems, the determination of readiness is the result of a planned and coordinated aggregation of specific data elements. Current computer and data security policies and procedures, properly applied, provide adequate protection of this information.
- Classifying these functional systems would be costly and inefficient. Instead, we would suggest the Department continue to implement and operate our unclassified management systems with appropriate security safeguards and control access to both the systems and information by implementing the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared by: Colonel William Hughes, Room 3D819, 693-5584, fax 693-5588



11-L-0559/OSD/2304

**Hughes, William D., COL, OSD-PF?**

**From:** Nowak, Doug, Col, OSD-C3I  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 12, 2001 3:57 PM  
**To:** Burton, Katharine, CAPT, OSD-C3I; Hughes, William D., COL, OSD-P&R  
**cc:** Smulian, Paul, Mr, OSD-C3I; Tyler, Gene, Col, OSD-C3I; Chassot, Charles, CAPT, OSD-C3I  
**Subject:** RE: Readiness Classification Memo for SecDef

William--final comments from C3I for your consideration v/r doug nowak

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Burton, Katharine, CAPT, OSD-C3I  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 11, 2001 13:42  
**To:** Nowak, Doug, Col, OSD-C3I  
**cc:** Smulian, Paul, Mr, OSD-C3I; Tyler, Gene, Col, OSD-C3I; Chassot, Charles, CAPT, OSD-C3I  
**Subject:** RE: Readiness Classification Memo for SecDef

Doug,

I think Chuck has provided some good comments. The only thing I would add is that in the last sentence of the memo where it talks about the alternative to classifying the functional systems, I would change the last sentence to read:

*computerized*

"...we would suggest the Department continue to implement and operate our unclassified management systems with appropriate security safeguards and control access to both the systems and information by implementing the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)..."

Kathy

J. Katharine Burton  
CAPT USN  
Staff Director, Defense-wide Information Assurance Program  
703-602-9988  
DSN 332-9988  
Unclas fax 703-602-7209

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Chassot, Charles, CAPT, OSD-C3I  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 11, 2001 11:31 AM  
**To:** Nowak, Doug, Col, OSD-C3I  
**cc:** Smulian, Paul, Mr, OSD-C3I; Burton, Katharine, CAPT, OSD-C3I; Tyler, Gene, Col, OSD-C3I  
**Subject:** Readiness Classification Memo for SecDef

Doug,

I have some problems with the memo as written. My comments are imbedded along with some alternate wording.

Chuck

<< File: readiness classification memo -v

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Smulian, Paul, Mr, OSD-C3I  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 11, 2001 6:52 AM  
**To:** Burton, Katharine, CAPT, OSD-C3I; Ty: Betsy, , OSD-C3I  
**Subject:** FW: MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETAR

*USD(C3I) simplified our addressing the issue of how we protect classified information and systems.*

Kathy;

After reading the memo there is somethin provide comments directly to COL Nowak.

Paul

*We did not include their desire to highlight Public Key Infrastructure.*

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Nowak, Doug, Col, OSD-C3I  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 10, 2001 5:47 PM

To: Greene, Toni, CIV, OSD-C31; Bozek, Tom, Mr., OSD-C31; Mellon, Christopher, Mr., OSD-C31; Ferguson, Thomas, SES, OSD-C31; Landon, John, Mr, OSD-C31; Ward, Michael J., Maj, OSD-C31 (Space Systems); Lentz, Robert, CTR, OSD-ATL; Smulian, Paul, Mr, OSD-C31; Semple, Bernadette, CDR, OSD-C31; Taylor, Brenda,, , OSD-C31  
Subject: FW: MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Chris/John/Tom/Tom B --

Attached **email** is from P&R asking for an informal chop on attached point paper answering SD question on whether Service Readiness should remain classified. Think their answer is a **common** sense approach....do you agree? Request (if possible, your answer by COB tomorrow)

v/r doug nowak

-----Original Message-----

From: Hughes, William D., COL, OSD-P&R  
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2001 07:49  
To: Nowak, Doug, Col, OSD-C31; Wagner, Carl, COL, DoD OGC  
Subject: FW: MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Gentlemen,  
Good morning. I am taking a stab to expedite the staffing of a proposed memo answering a simple question from the Secretary. Paper copy will follow.

The Secretary asked if we should classify readiness information. We were required to coordinate with CJCS, however, my boss asked to seek Counsel General and C3I coordination as well.

The first paper "readinessclass..." is the proposed answer; the second "memoClas..." is the memo to you.

I request that you forward this to the appropriate office and info me. Paper will be provided to you, or your designee this morning. Thank you for the assistance.

S/  
William D. Hughes III  
Colonel, USMC  
OSD P&R  
Readiness Programming & Assessment  
Pentagon Room 3D819  
Tel: 703.693.5584  
Fax: 703.693.5588

Chuck Chassot  
CAPT, USNR  
Operations Officer, Defense-wide Information Assurance Program  
703-602-9997  
DSN 332-9997  
Fax: 703-602-7209

July 9, 2001, 2:10 pm

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

SUBJECT: Should We Classify Readiness Information?

- You asked whether we should classify readiness information to preclude divulging known weaknesses to the world. In short, we should -- and do -- classify any information that directly divulges our vulnerabilities.
- By regulation, we currently classify unit (squadron, ship, battalion) readiness information as reported in the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). This system provides unit readiness ratings ("C- ratings") in four resource areas: personnel, training, equipment, and supplies.

---

To this point this document makes sense. Below this point is opening a can of very active worms. Virtually all of our readiness numbers are determined by compiling bits and pieces of unclassified data and applying a "readiness criteria" to determine a readiness value. The concern I see here is the need to protect readiness data from public release. Since an unclassified readiness report would be subject to FOIA release, we classify them. Since the data in the computer that is used to "generate" the report but is not a report in itself it is exempt from FOIA action.

The computer security issue is separate. If someone access the databases they can reach their own conclusions as to our readiness levels whether or not they get the easier task of seeing to precompiled data from the "middle-ware." Personnel computers must have strict application of security policies and procedures not only for the issue of readiness but the legal implications of Privacy Act, HIPAA, etc. Logistics computers must also have strict application of security policies and procedures since not only are there readiness determination issues but a determined adversary accessing these systems could totally disrupt the entire supply and support system.

The following two paragraphs seem to be trying to answer a question that does not appear to have been asked. They are addressing a small piece of a larger issue without a good context and are likely to generate questions that cannot be answered in a one-pager and will not lead to improvements in the overall situation. If we need to address these issues at this point something like: "While the data used in making the readiness rating decisions is housed on unclassified systems, the determination of readiness is the result of a planned and coordinated aggregation of specific data elements. Current computer and data security policies and procedures, properly applied, provide adequate protection of this information."

1-1E072212 HQ

- A more difficult problem is safeguarding the unclassified data systems used for personnel, supply, and equipment management. These systems serve as the basis for establishing unit readiness ratings. Modern information technology, such as middle-ware tools, allows these disparate databases to be readily integrated – essentially creating unit readiness data and highlighting shortfalls and vulnerabilities.
- Classifying these functional systems would be costly and inefficient. Instead, we would suggest the Department continue to implement strong security safeguards in our unclassified management systems such as security firewalls and password protected access controls.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Prepared by: Col William Hughes, Room 3D819, 693-5584, fax 693-5588



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM-0537-0 1  
24 July 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL  
AND READINESS)

Subject: Readiness Classification

1. We concur in the proposed response to SecDef's question regarding the classification of readiness data, subject to the inclusion of the changes outlined in the Enclosure. The proposed changes provide completeness and clarity to the proposed response.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Colonel Jerry Macken, 693-5976.

S. A. FRY  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

Reference

1 OUSD(P&R) memorandum, 9 July 2001  
"Readiness Classification"

COMMENTS REGARDING GRRR  
included.

Considered, but did not use,  
detailed descriptions of GSORFS,  
JUMP, and GRRR.

## ENCLOSURE

### PROPOSED JOINT STAFF REVISIONS TO DRAFT OSD MEMO ON READINESS CLASSIFICATION

1. General Comment. The proposed changes outlined below are intended to give a more complete summary of formal readiness documents required by title X and CJCS Instructions (CJCSIs) as well as the classification guidance associated with those formal readiness documents.

#### 2. Specific Recommended Changes

a. Add the following as new 2d bullet: "There are two formal readiness forums that process readiness data: the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) and the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)."

REASON: Provides complete, organized summary of formal readiness processes that produce readiness information that would be subject to classification.

b. Make the old 2d bullet the 1st subbullet to the new 2d bullet (subparagraph 2a above), and change as follows: "Per CJCS Manual 3 150.02, "GSORTS", we currently classify unit (squadron, ship, battalion) readiness information as reported in the ~~Global Status of Resources and Training~~ GSORTS. This system provides unit readiness ratings ("C-ratings") in four resource areas: personnel, training, equipment, and supplies."

REASON: Administrative change, as information is now supporting the added major bullet.

c. Add the following as 2d subbullet to the addition outlined in 2(a) above: "Per CJCSI 3401.01B, "Current Readiness System," Enclosure A, paragraph 4, JMRR reports are defined as 'military capability information' that must be referred to the Joint Staff J-3 for classification and release determination. As a general rule, a JMRR report with actual assessments relating to a specific functional area, CINC, or unit will be classified SECRET. Furthermore, references to JSCP or OPLAN timelines, planning guidance, assumptions, or host-nation strengths should also be classified SECRET."

REASON: Adds necessary data on JMRR process.

d. Change 3d bullet to read as follows: 'It must be noted, however, that some of ~~While~~ the data used in making the readiness rating decisions is housed on unclassified systems. ~~The~~ determination of overall readiness for a unit or CINC, therefore, may ~~is the~~ result from of a planned and coordinated aggregation of specific data elements, to include unclassified elements. However, the formal readiness assessment is CLASSIFIED. Current computer

and data security policies and procedures, properly applied, provide adequate protection of this information.”

REASON: Better articulates point that readiness reports can be based partially on unclassified data, but formal readiness reports are classified.

e. Change 4th bullet, 1st sentence as follows: “Classifying ~~these~~ functional systems that feed formal readiness assessments would be costly and inefficient.

REASON: More clearly states concern about unnecessarily classifying currently unclassified feeder systems.

f. Add the following as 5th bullet: ‘Lastly, title X, section 117 requires the Department to provide an UNCLASSIFIED Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (and allows a CLASSIFIED report as well). The UNCLASSIFIED report is very general in nature, though it does articulate areas of strategic concern (without detailing any specific topics) and makes reference to the risk associated with scenarios assessed in that particular JMRR cycle. As a result of answering this question, P&R will work with the Joint Staff and Services and reevaluate if this information is better addressed solely in the CLASSIFIED section of the QRRC.”

REASON: Provides information on key document that relays readiness information, and has an unclassified section, making it germane to the SecDef’s question. Also suggests a relook at what goes in that section.



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

July 9, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I)  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: Request for Coordination – Readiness Classification

Attached is a copy of our proposed response to the Secretary's question on the classification of readiness data. Request your coordination by 0900, July 12. My Point of Contact for this action is Col Bill Hughes, 693-5584 or e-mail: [William.Hughes@osd.mil](mailto:William.Hughes@osd.mil).

  
Joseph J. Angello, Jr.  
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of  
Defense (Readiness)

Attachments

1. Draft Response to the Secretary
2. Secretary's question on readiness

COORDINATION:

Director, Joint Staff \_\_\_\_\_

General Counsel 

ASD(C3I) \_\_\_\_\_

GC concerned about the word "regulation." We removed the specific reference for readability. G SORTS is classified per CJCSM 3150.02.

Otherwise, GEN COUNSEL RAISED NO ISSUES.





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

001

2001 08 22 14:01

## INFO MEMO

August 22, 2001, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Education Leaders

*David S. C. Chu 30 Sept 01*

- Following your recent meeting with educators, you offered ideas and questions (Tab B). Replies are at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Prepared by: William J. Carr, 703-697-8444 *John Van Alstyne, 27 Aug 01*

## Issues and Answers

**1. Someone mentioned the idea of a second career and how it might be fashioned so it still benefits the military, possibly in the Reserve Component. There might be a thought in there.**

- We encourage people finishing their active duty commitment to move to a Reserve unit; in fact, we recruit aggressively and pay handsomely when a skill is in short supply. In years past, we haven't pushed for ex-military to join the Federal civilian workforce but now are working that harder. For example, we have eliminated disincentives like the forfeiture of some military retirement pay when a veteran is employed as a Federal civilian, helping those cross-flows.

**2. I was unaware that 1 out of every 3 new people coming into the military drops out before their tour is complete. What is the story on that? Does that mean we are bringing the wrong people in?**

- First-term attrition rates (within the first 36-months of service) historically have been in the 30-percent range. We know that high school diploma graduates are about twice as likely as nongraduates to complete their initial service obligations, with three-year attrition rates of roughly 20 and 50 percent, respectively. As a result, the Services prefer to enlist high school graduates. In fact, about 90 percent of new recruits hold that traditional diploma. Yet, the 30-percent attrition rate has been persistent as a consequence of losses brought about by poor physical conditioning or inadequate motivation. Programs recently have been put in place to help recruits meet physical fitness standards and to adjust to military discipline. We are spending more effort in saving them – a habit we may have misplaced during the drawdown.

**3. Should we have someone look at high schools around military bases to see if they refuse to allow recruiters in?**

- We've looked at recruiter access to high schools in high-military-density states and cities. Frankly, the correlation is not strong. Many schools denying access are private schools (often with religious affiliations) or those with school board policies discouraging release of student names or phone numbers to third parties. A new law takes effect in July 2002, requiring that senior officers visit schools that deny access. Problems unresolved after 120 days would be reported to Governors, requesting their help. For denials unresolved within a year, DoD would notify congressional delegations and Defense oversight committees. Congressional intent is to get public officials to push for wider access for our military recruiters.

**4. What about getting Dr. Eliot Cohen to take a look at war colleges and see if they really are as pedestrian as he indicated?**

- Dr. Cohen appears to represent a minority view, but this is something I will want to explore in concert with the Joint Staff.

**5. I can't imagine there is a way to tie student aid to military service, but if there is, it is interesting.**

- Today, we offer several programs that tie money for college, or repayment of student loans, to military service. Three Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) offer a student loan repayment program, with Army offering up to \$65,000 while the Navy and Air Force offer up to \$10,000. New troops also may enroll in the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) program during their initial training. Members must agree to have their pay reduced by \$100 a month for 12 months, in return for a monthly stipend of up to \$650 for 36 months (\$23,000) in college assistance. The Services also may offer a college fund "kicker" in concert with the MGIB, paying up to a total of \$50,000. Finally, all Services currently offer tuition assistance of up to 75 percent (a maximum of \$3,500 per year) to those attending college courses while on active duty.

**6. What about GI Bill for Graduate School?**

- It's already in force. Currently, the Montgomery GI Bill pays a monthly stipend of up to \$650 for 36 months for full-time college attendance toward an undergraduate or graduate degree. The Montgomery GI Bill also may be applied to courses leading to a certificate or diploma from business, technical or vocational schools; cooperative training programs; apprenticeship or job training programs; flight training programs; or correspondence and accredited independent study courses. It's very flexible.

August 15, 2001 5:10 PM

TO: David Chu  
CC: Charlie Abell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Education Leaders

I thought that meeting with the educators was useful. You folks probably knew all that, but I found it informative.

Some random thoughts:

1. Someone mentioned the idea of a second career and how it might be fashioned so it still benefits the military, possibly in the reserve component. There might be a thought in there. *Mil to Civil Service already possible. CP may have insights*
2. I was unaware that 1 out of every 3 new people coming into the military drops out before their tour is complete. What is the story on that? Does that mean we are bringing the wrong people in? *AP: ~~that's~~ We need to lay out the facts.*
3. Should we have someone look at the high schools around military bases to see if they refuse to allow recruiters in? *AP: Need to lay out way ahead.*
4. ~~What about getting Dr. Eliot Conen to take a look at war colleges and see if they really are as pedestrian as he indicated? ----~~
5. I can't imagine there is a way to tie student aid to military service, but if there is, it is interesting. *Would appreciate your thoughts.*
6. What about GI Bill for grad school? *What are the facts, please?*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
08150140

11-L-0559/OSD/2316

COORDINATION

ASD (FMP)

Charles S. Abell

CSA AUG 26 2001

DASD (MPP)

LTG John A. Van Alstyne

John Van Alstyne 27 Aug 01



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

0 2507 7 1  
5  
000 075111 2 01

INFO MEMO

October 29, 2001, 2:00PM

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S.C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

OCT 31 2001

SUBJECT: Anthrax Disposal

- You asked the question "Please find out what the United States did with the anthrax we had before we discontinued work on it back in 1969." The following is conveyed from Mr. Bill Patrick, a former Ft. Detrick worker.
- An elaborate sterilization and decontamination protocol was established. Anthrax (volum 1B strain) at Ft. Detrick was transferred to Pine Bluff Arsenal and destroyed there along with their supply. Material at Dugway Proving Grounds was destroyed there following the same procedure.
- Destruction consisted of diluting the anthrax in bleach within 1-gallon cans followed by a 4-hour autoclaved, and the material buried. Samples were taken throughout the procedure and the sterility documented and certified by the State of Arkansas, a U.S. Public Health Service official, and an U.S. Army official. Documentation is no longer available.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: J. Jarrett Clinton, MD, MPH, Acting ASD (Health Affairs) 703-697-2111

OCT 29 2001

10/26/01  
10:00

October 25, 2001 12:50 PM

To: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Disposition of Anthrax

Please find out what the United States did with the anthrax we had before we discontinued work on it back in 1969,

Thanks.

DFR:dh  
102501-27

.....

Please respond 10/29



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE -- --  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

201 NOV 5-2 1 20 01

September 28, 2001, 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

*David S. C. Chu a Nov 07*

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority for Civilian Cash Awards

- In response to your note (Tab A), while each Component may develop its own awards program, the program must be developed and administered within the framework of the Department of Defense policy on awards (Tab B). Within this framework, the type of awards and criteria for awards are varied within any one Component and across the DoD.
- Each Component has published an awards regulation and has established awards scales based on tangible and intangible benefits, which must be applied consistently across the Component. Tab C illustrates some examples of criteria within some of the Components.
- Under the old authority, awards over \$10,000 were reviewed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) (ASD (FMP)), but OPM had to approve awards in excess of that. Annually, the ASD (FMP) reviewed and forwarded to OPM an average of 30 awards over \$10,000 with most based strictly on tangible benefits.
- Delegating the \$25,000 authority is consistent with DoD's policy of giving the Components maximum flexibility to manage their awards programs. Currently, Component Heads may approve awards up to \$10,000. The \$10,000 limit was set in 1954 and currently has a value in 1954 dollars of approximately \$4,000.
- We have not observed any improper use of current awards authority and are confident the Heads of the Components will continue their practice of approving awards for their employees appropriately.

Coordination: Tab D

Prepared by: Tim Curry, ODASD (Civilian Personnel Policy), 697-5472



August 17, 2001 4:08 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority

I signed this, and I shouldn't have. I would like to see the criteria for how the awards are going to be made.

I am happy to delegate the authority, but I think we ought to have some good, clear idea of the basis on which they are going to be awarded.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/7/01 P&R action memo to **SecDef** re: Proposed Delegation [U13975/01]

DHR:dh  
081701-17

11-L-0559/OSD/2321

111 3975 A / 01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
**DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES**  
**DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES**

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authorities and Assignment of Responsibilities of the  
Secretary of Defense under Section 1132 of the Floyd D. Spence National  
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) is delegated the authority and assigned responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under Section 1132 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398, October 30, 2000) (relating to the authority to approve cash awards of up to \$25,000 for civilian employees).

This authority may be re-delegated in writing to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy).

SUBCHAPTER 451

AWARDS

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**SUBCHAPTER 451**  
**AWARDS**

- References:** (a) **DoD Directive 1400.25, "DoD Civilian Personnel Management System,"** November **25, 1996**
- (b) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 430.45 **1, 53 1** and 534
- (c) Chapters **12, 21, 33, 43, 45, 53** and 71 of title 5, United States Code
- (d) Section 1124 of title 10, United States Code
- (e) Executive Order 10717, 'The Presidents Award for **Distinguished Federal Civilian Service,**' June **27, 1958,** as amended
- (f) Executive Order 9586, "Medal of Freedom," July 6, 1945, as amended
- (g) Executive Order 11494, 'Establishing the Presidential Citizens Medal,' November **13, 1969**
- (h) Executive Order 1043 1, "National Security **Medal,**" January **19, 1953**
- (i) **DoD Instruction 1416.4,** 'Quality Step Increases for Employees Subject to the Classification Act of 1949,' March 4.1963 (hereby canceled)
- (j) **DoD Instruction 5010.39,** "Work **Force** Motivation," November **16, 1984** (hereby canceled)
- (k) **DoD Instruction 5 120.16,** "Department of Defense Incentive **Awards Program: Policies and Standards,**" July **15, 1974,** as amended (hereby canceled)
- (l) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel) Memorandum, "Department of Defense Implementation Plan for **Time Off** as an Incentive Award," June **12, 1992,** as amended (hereby canceled)
- (m) **DoD Directive 1432.2,** "Honorary Awards to Private Citizens and **Organizations,**" February **28, 1986**(canceled)
- (n) **DoD Directive 5 120.15,** "Authority for Approval of Cash and Honorary Awards for **DoD Personnel,**" August **12, 1985** (canceled)
- (o) **DoD 7000.14-R,** "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation," Volume 8, "Civilian Pay Policy and Procedures," June 1994, authorized by **DoD Instruction 7000.14,** "**DoD Financial Management Policy and Procedures,**" November **15, 1992**

A. **PURPOSE**

This Subchapter implements **DoD** policies under references (a) through (c) and delegates authority, assigns responsibility, and establishes requirements for awards and awards **programs** for civilian employees within the Department of Defense. Additionally, this Subchapter establishes DOD-level awards for private citizens, groups or organizations, provides guidance for **awards** established by Components for private citizens and others, provides guidance for awards to military personnel under reference (d) above and issues procedures to be observed by Components in recognizing or recommending to the Secretary of Defense civilian employees or others for Presidential-level awards established under references (e) **through** (h). This subchapter also cancels references (i) through (l), references (m) and (n).

## B. POLICY

1. It is **DoD** policy under **DoD** Directive 1400.25 (reference (a)) to encourage the full participation of **DoD** personnel at all levels in improving Government operations and, under references (a) through (h) to pay cash awards, grant time-off, or incur necessary expenses **for** the honorary and informal recognition of **DoD** personnel, either individually or as a **member** of a group, on **the** basis of:

a. A suggestion, invention, productivity gain, superior accomplishment, or other **personal** effort that contributes to the efficiency, **economy**, or other improvement of Government operations or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork

b. A special act or service in the public interest in connection with or related to **official employment**; or,

c. Performance as reflected in the employee's most recent rating of record as defined by 5 CFR 430.203 (reference (b)).

2. Awards under this Subchapter shall be **granted** consistent **with** Equal Employment Opportunity and **Affirmative** Employment Program policies and shall be free **from** discrimination regardless of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, or disability.

3. Awards programs for civilian employees shall **involve** employees or their representatives in program development and implementation as appropriate. The method of involvement shall be in accordance **with** applicable law.

4. Policies and standards governing awards for **which** both **DoD** civilian and military personnel are eligible shall be applied equitably to the extent consistent with applicable law and regulation.

5. Awards granted under this Subchapter shall **be** subject to applicable **tax** rules.

6. Awards granted under this Subchapter shall be given **due** weight in **qualifying** and selecting an employee for promotion as required by 5 U.S.C. 3362 (reference (c)).

7. Awards which are separate from awards and awards programs **created** to recognize civilian employees may be established to recognize private citizens, groups **and** organizations that significantly assist or support **DoD** functions, services or operations performed as a public service. Such awards shall be established and administered consistent with Section 0 of this Subchapter.

## C. DEFINITIONS

1. Award. Something bestowed or an action taken to recognize and **reward** individual or team achievement that contributes to meeting organizational goals or improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of the Government or is otherwise in the **public** interest. Such **awards**

include, but are not limited to, employee incentives that are based on predetermined criteria such as productivity standards, performance goals, measurements systems, award formulas, or payout schedules.

2. **Award Program.** The specific procedures and requirements established in a DoD Component for granting awards under 5 CFR 45 1 (reference (b)) and this Subchapter.

3. **Monetary Award.** An award in which the recognition device is a cash payment that does not increase the employee's rate of basic pay.

4. **Non-Monetary Award.** An award in which the recognition device is not a cash payment or time-off as an award but rather an award of a honorific value, e.g. a letter, certificate, medal, plaque or item of nominal value.

5. **Time-Off Award** An award in which time-off from duty is granted without loss of pay or charge to leave and for which the number of hours granted is commensurate with the employee's contribution or accomplishment.

6. **Tangible Benefit.** Savings to the Government that can be measured in terms of dollars.

7. **Intangible Benefit.** Savings to the Government that cannot be measured in terms of dollars.

#### **D. AWARD RESTRICTIONS**

1. **Limitations of Awards During a Presidential Election Year.** Components shall not grant awards under the conditions set forth under 5 CFR 45 1.105 (reference (b)). This applies to monetary and time-off awards. However, non-monetary awards such as certificates, plaques and items of a similar nature are permitted provided that the form of the non-monetary award avoids the appearance of replacing a bonus. As non-monetary awards may take a wide variety of forms with a wide variance, both in terms of direct costs and the appearance of such value, recognition by non-monetary award should create the inherent impression of symbolic value (an honor being bestowed) rather than monetary worth (cash value).

2. **Prohibition of Cash Award to Executive Schedule Officers** DoD Components shall not grant cash awards under the conditions set forth under 5 CFR 45 1.105 (reference (b)).

#### **E. ELIGIBILITY**

1. **General.** Civilian employees who meet the definition of "employee" under 5 U.S.C. 2105 (reference (c)) are eligible to receive awards under this Subchapter. Unless otherwise provided, under 10 U.S.C. 1124 (reference (d)) members of the Armed Forces are eligible to be paid monetary awards for duty suggestions, inventions, and scientific achievements. 11-L-0559/QSD/2326

5 CFR 534.403 (reference (b)) and **not** on the basis of this Subchapter. Private citizens and organizations may be recognized for significant contributions to the Department with non-monetary awards only.

2. **Former Employees** Under 5 CFR 45 1.104 (reference (b)), awards for contributions made by an individual when employed by the Department of Defense may be paid to a **former** employee **or to the estate or legal heirs of a deceased employee**. Awards to **separated or** deceased members of the Armed Forces for contributions made while the member was on **active duty may** be paid to the former member **or to the member's estate or legal heirs**.

3. **Non-Appropriated Fund Employees** Employees paid with nonappropriated funds are not eligible to receive monetary awards paid from appropriated funds but may receive non-monetary awards under this subchapter.

#### 4. **Foreign National Employees**

a. A foreign national individual who meets the definition of **employee** as defined under 5 U.S.C. 2105 (reference (c)) and is paid with U.S. **funds**, i.e. direct hire employee, is eligible to receive awards **under** this Subchapter.

b. A foreign national individual who **is paid** on a cost reimbursable basis by agreement **with** a foreign country, i.e. indirect hire employee, is **not** eligible to receive **monetary** awards **but** may receive non-monetary awards under this Subchapter.

### F. **RESPONSIBILITIES**

1. The **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (ASD(FMP))** shall:

a. **Issue DoD-wide** policies and procedures governing the establishment and administration of awards and awards programs;

b. Review and, if merited; forward to the Director of the **Office of Personnel Management (OPM)** recommendations for awards that would grant more than \$10,000 to an individual employee;

c. Review **and** approve or disapprove, as appropriate, a recommendation for an award of more than \$10,000 for a suggestion, invention, or scientific achievement by members of the Armed Forces, regardless of the number of individuals who may share therein;

d. Review and endorse, if appropriate, **DoD** Component recommendations for honorary Presidential-level awards; and,

e. Establish DOD-level awards and awards programs and delegate administration of such programs where appropriate.

2. The **Director of Administration and Management (Office of the Secretary of Defense) (DA&M)** shall work jointly with the ASD(FMP) in the development **and** establishment of DOD-level awards and shall administer the DOD-level civilian honorary awards program.

3. The **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (DASD(CPP))** shall:

- a. Recommend DOD-wide policies and procedures governing the establishment and **administration** of awards and awards programs;
- b. Evaluate the implementation **and** effectiveness of **DoD Components' award** program(s) and make recommendations **as** may be necessary; and,
- c. Coordinate **DoD-wide** awards information.

4. The **Heads of the DoD Components** shall:

- a. Ensure the development, implementation, application, **and** evaluation **of** one or more awards programs for employees covered under **this** Subchapter;
- b. Ensure funds are obligated consistent with applicable **DoD** Component financial management controls and delegations of authority;
- c. **Ensure that** awards **programs** do not conflict with or violate **any** other law or Government-wide regulation;
- d. Ensure that criteria for awards do not discriminate against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, or disability;
- e. Endorse to the ASD(FMP) for review or **approval** recommendations for awards that would grant more than \$10,000 to a single civilian employee; **and**,
- f. Endorse to the ASD(FMP) for **review** and approval recommendations that would **result** in an award of more than \$10,000 for a single contribution by members of the armed forces, regardless of the number of individuals entitled to share therein.

#### G. **AWARD PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS**

The establishment, administration or operation of award programs shall provide for:

1. Reviewing award recommendations for which approval authority has not been delegated to officials at lower levels within the organization;

2. Communicating the relevant parts of award programs to managers, supervisors, and employees.

3. Evaluating **and** assessing awards and **award** program(s) to ensure that awards: (1) are **used** to motivate, recognize, **and** reward eligible personnel; (2) exhibit a close, demonstrable **link** between performance, accomplishment, or contribution to **DoD** Component goals and objectives and the receipt of an award; and (3) are granted commensurate with the value of the **employee's** contribution or accomplishment;

4. Documenting all cash **and** time off awards in compliance with 5 CFR 45 1.106(e) (reference (b)); filing award documents in compliance with the requirements of 5 CFR 45 **1.106(f)** (reference (b)); reporting **awards data** to the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) in **compliance** with 5 CFR 45 **1.106(g)** (reference (b)) or reporting awards data as required by OPM on an as needed basis; reporting cash awards for military members as required in section **H.4.c.** below, and following appropriate **DoD** financial management regulations on civilian pay policies **and** procedures under **DoD** 7000.14-R (reference **(o)**);

5. Granting quality step increases consistent with **the** provisions of 5 **CFR 531** Subpart **E** (reference (b)) and Section J, "Quality **Step** Increases", of this Subchapter.

6. Documenting justification for awards that are not based on a rating of **record** under 5 **CFR** 45 1.103 (reference (b)); and,

7. Developing guidelines requiring managers **and** supervisors to demonstrate involvement in equal employment opportunity-related activities to receive awards, as appropriate.

## **H. MONETARY AWARDS**

### 1. General Under 5 U.S.C. 4502 (reference c)

a. A monetary award is in addition to the regular pay of the recipient;

b. Acceptance of a monetary award constitutes an agreement that the use by the Government of an idea, method, or device for which an award is made does not form the basis of a further claim of any nature against the Government by the employee, his or her **legal** heirs, or assigns; and

c. A monetary award to, and the expense for the honorary recognition of, an employee **may** be paid from the fund or appropriation available to the activity primarily benefiting or the various activities benefiting.

2. Awards to Other **Agency** or **Component** Personnel For awards approved for employees of other Federal agencies or other **DoD** Components, the Component(s) that benefits shall make arrangements to transfer funds to the **individual's** employing Component or agency. If the **administrative** costs of transferring funds would exceed the amount of the award, the Component employing the individual shall absorb the costs and pay the award.

**3. Calculation of Savings.** Tangible savings shall be calculated on the basis of estimated net savings for the first **full** year of operation. Exceptions may be made in the case where an improvement with a high installation cost will yield measurable savings continuing **more than one** year. In this instance, the **award** may be based on the average annual net Savings over a period of several years. The years may not **exceed the** reasonable life of the initial installation or the **clearly** predictable period of use, whichever is shorter.

**4. Awards to Military Members**

a. Under 10 U.S.C. 1124 (reference **(d)**), the total amount of **the monetary award** made for a suggestion, invention, or scientific achievement may not **exceed \$25,000, regardless of the number** of persons who **may** be entitled to **share** therein.

b. Under 5 CFR 45 1.104 (reference **(b)**), **funds** shall be transferred to **the DoD Component** having jurisdiction over the member.

c. Cash awards for military members shall be **reported** annually to the **DASD(CPP)** consistent with instructions on a DD Form 1609. The **reporting** requirements for military **personnel are assigned DD-MA(A) 1345.**

**5. Examples of Awards Scales** Appendices' C and D are models of awards scales based **upon** tangible and intangible benefits.

**I. PERFORMANCE-BASED CASH AWARDS**

Under 5 U.S.C. 4505a reference (c)),

1. Monetary awards may be granted to an employee whose most recent rating was at **Level 3** (fully successful level or equivalent) or higher, as defined in 5 CFR 430.208 (reference (b));

2. An award **granted** under this section may not exceed **10** percent of the **employee's annual** rate of basic pay, except that the Component Head may determine that exceptional **performance** by the employee justifies an award exceeding 10 percent and may authorize an award up to 20 percent of the **employee's** annual rate of basic pay. For an award that is paid as a percentage of basic pay, the **rate** of basic pay shall be **determined** without taking into account any locality-based comparability, special law enforcement adjustment, or interim geographic adjustment;

3. Employees may not appeal a decision not to grant an award or the amount of the award paid under this section. This does not extinguish or lessen any right or remedy under Chapter 12, Subchapter II of 5 U.S.C. (reference (c)) or Chapter 71 of 5 U.S.C. (reference (c)), or any of the laws referred to in 5 U.S.C. 2302 (reference (c)); **and**

4. Awards granted under this section shall be paid as a lump sum and may not **be** considered to **be** part of the basic pay of an employee.

## **J. QUALITY STEP INCREASES**

1. A quality step increase may be granted consistent with 5 U.S.C. 5336 (reference (c)) and 5 CFR 53 1 Subpart E (reference (b)). Under these references, a quality step increase is in addition to a periodic step increase under section 5335 of reference (c). It provides an incentive and recognition of high quality performance above that ordinarily found in the type of position concerned by granting faster than normal step increases. An employee is eligible for only one quality step increase within any 52 week period.

2. Under section 53 1.504 of reference (b), an employee covered by a performance appraisal program established under part 430, subpart B of reference (b) must receive a rating of record of Level 5 ("Outstanding") (or equivalent) as defined in Section 430.208 (reference (b)) in order to be eligible for a quality step increase. An employee covered by a performance appraisal program that does not use a Level 5 summary level must receive a rating of record at the highest summary level under the program and must demonstrate sustained performance of high quality significantly above that expected at the Level 3 ("Fully Successful" or equivalent) level in the type of position concerned as determined under component established performance-related criteria. As quality step increases become part of base pay, the grant of a quality step increase should be based on performance which is characteristic of the employee's overall high quality performance and the expectation that this high quality performance will continue in the future.

3. Quality step increases shall be reported to the Central Personnel Data File consistent with 5 CFR 53 1.507(b) (reference (b)).

## **K. SUGGESTION AWARDS**

### **1. General**

a. To be considered for an award, a suggestion must:

(1) Identify an improvement in the quality of operations, a cost reduction opportunity, or an improvement in the timeliness of service delivery that results in tangible or intangible benefits to the U.S. Government; and,

(2) Be adopted in whole or in part for implementation. The suggestion should set forth a specific proposed course of action to achieve the improvement or cost reduction.

b. Ideas or suggestions that point out the need for routine maintenance work, recommend enforcement of an existing rule, propose changes in housekeeping practices, call attention to errors or alleged violations of regulations, or result in intangible benefits of "good will" are not eligible for consideration-

c. DoD personnel who make suggestions concerning improvement of materials or services purchased from a contractor may be paid a monetary award only if the improvement results in tangible benefits or intangible benefits to the Government. The suggestion must be

processed through Government channels to identify correctly the origin of the proposal **and the** benefits to the Government. Government employees or members of the Armed Forces shall not be paid awards based upon benefits to the contractor.

## **2. Award Amounts and Financing**

a. Awards for suggestions shall be based upon tangible or intangible benefit & a combination thereof.

b. When a suggestion is adopted by another organization, the benefiting organization **shall** share in the cost of the total **award commensurate** with the benefit. The **suggester's** organization **will notify** the benefiting organization(s) of the amount due and the benefiting organization(s) **shall** take prompt action to transfer the **funds**.

## **L. INVENTIONS**

### **1. General**

a. **DoD** Component **offices** responsible for patent matters shall determine that the invention is of value **or** potential value to the Department of Defense and that the invention **was** made under circumstances that resulted in the Government initiating action to obtain the title **or** license.

b. To be considered for an award, **the DoD** Component's office for patent matters shall **verify** to the appropriate **award's** office that conditions in section L. 1.a., above, have been met.

c. If the conditions under paragraph **L.1.a.** above, are not met, **but the** invention is determined to be of value to the Department of Defense and the inventor consents to consideration for an **award**, the inventor will be required to sign a claim waiver agreement **to** be paid an award.

### **2. Award Payments**

a. Eligible personnel may be paid a nominal initial monetary award and an additional monetary **award** when the patent covering the invention is **issued**.

b. If an application for a patent is placed under a secrecy order, the individual will become eligible for the additional **award** when a Notice of Allowability of the application is issued **by** the U.S. Patent **Office** instead of issuance of a patent.

c. Awards under this section are not authorized if a monetary award has been paid for the same contribution as a suggestion.

## M. HONORARY AWARDS

1. DoD Components shall not title a Component established award or award program "Department of **Defense**" or "Secretary of **Defense**," either in whole or in part.

2. **Honorary awards** to DoD personnel may be granted independently or in **addition** to a monetary **or** a time-off award.

3. Appendix A lists DOD-level honorary awards for which career civilian employees may be **eligible**. It also lists Presidential-level awards for which both civilian employees, military members and private **citizens** may be **eligible**.

## N. TIME-OFF AWARDS

1. **General** Time-off awards are an alternate means of recognizing the superior accomplishments of employees' with other than monetary or non-monetary awards. Decisions to grant time-off awards shall be based upon the same criteria or circumstances as for any other incentive award. Time-off awards **shall** not be granted to create the effect of a holiday or treated as administrative excusals or leave; **i.e.** they shall not be granted in conjunction with a military "down" or "training" day or the like which would grant the entire **civilian** employee population, or a majority of the civilian population, a time-off award to be used on a specified day. Though time-off awards may not have an immediate budget consequence, supervisors and managers **shall** consider **fully** wage costs and productivity loss when granting time-off awards and shall ensure that the **amount** of time-off granted as an award is commensurate with the individual's contribution or accomplishment.

### 2. Award Amount Limits

a. The amount of time off granted to any one individual in any one leave year should not exceed 80 hours. For part-time employees or those with an **uncommon** tour of duty, **total** time off granted during any calendar year should be based on the average number of hours of work generally worked during a two-week period.

b. The amount of a time-off award **granted** to an individual for a single contribution should not exceed 40 hours. For part-time employees or those with an uncommon tour of duty, the maximum award for any single contribution should be one-half of the amount of time that would be granted during the year.

3. Time Limit to Use Award. Time off granted as an award should be scheduled and used within one year **after** the effective date of the award.

4. Conversion to Cash Award. Under 5 CFR 451.104 (reference (b)), a time-off award shall not be converted to a cash payment under any circumstances.

**5. Portability.** A time-off award shall not be transferred between DoD Components. Managers and supervisors should make every effort to ensure that the employee is able to use the time-off award before he or she leaves the granting Component.

## 0. AWARDS FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS

1. **General.** Private citizens, groups, and organizations that significantly assist or support DoD functions, services, or operations may be recognized to demonstrate the interest of DoD management in improving efficiency and effectiveness, and to encourage citizens and organizations in their efforts to assist in the accomplishment of DoD missions. The awards shall be honorary only. Appendix B lists DOD-level awards for which non-career individuals or private citizens may be eligible.

### 2. **Eligibility**

a. Any person, group, or organization, except for those described in paragraph O.2.b., below, may be considered for recognition under this section based on a significant contribution to the Department of Defense performed as a public service.

b. Persons or organizations having a commercial or profitmaking relationship with the Department of Defense or with a DoD Component shall not be granted recognition; unless the contribution is substantially beyond that specified or implied within the terms of the contract establishing the relationship, or the recognition is clearly in the public interest.

**SUBCHAPTER 451**

**APPENDIX A**

**DOD AND PRESIDENTIALLEVEL HONORARY AWARDS**

**A. DOD-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS**

**1. Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award**

a. **General** This award **is the** Departments highest award given to **career DoD** civilian employees whose careers reflect **exceptional** devotion to duty and whose contributions to the efficiency, economy, or other improvements in **DoD** operations are of a significantly broad scope. Awards may be granted for contributions in a scientific field or for accomplishments in technical or administrative endeavors. **Career DoD** employees **normally compete** for this award with the competition culminating with an annual ceremony recognizing **from** five to seven employees **from** throughout the Department of Defense. To have received this award through strict competition is considered **extremely** prestigious. On rare occasions, when recommended by Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies or Heads of **OSD Components**, the Secretary of Defense may approve this award on a non-competitive basis. **When granted** non-competitively, the justification for the award must show that the **nominee's** contributions to the mission of the organization are of such major significance that immediate recognition is warranted. All nominations for this **award** must be submitted to the Director, Administration and Management, OSD, for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may **be** obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

**2. Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award**

a. **General** This award is the second highest award granted to career civilian employees of the Department of Defense and other Government Agencies who have distinguished themselves by exceptionally meritorious service of major significance to the Department of Defense. This award requires review by the **OSD/JS** Incentive Awards Board (IAB). The IAB recommends approval or disapproval of the **award**. The final approval rests with the Secretary of Defense.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

## **B. PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS**

### **1. President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service**

a. **General.** Established by E.O. 10717 (reference (f)), this award is the highest honor for extraordinary achievement in Federal service. It is **granted** by the President to career service **individuals whose** accomplishments and achievements exemplify, to an **exceptional degree**, imagination, courage, and extraordinary ability in **carrying** out the mission of the Government; **This** award is highly selective and nominated individuals should have received their **Component's** highest award for civilians to be considered

b. **Additional Information.** Further **information** on eligibility, criteria **and nominating** procedures may be obtained **from** the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

### **2. Presidential Medal of Freedom**

a. **General** Established by E.O. 9586 (reference (g)), this medal is awarded by the President for exceptionally meritorious contributions to national security interests of the United States, **world** peace, cultural, or other exceptionally significant public or private endeavors. It is bestowed at the sole discretion of the President The basis for nomination **must** be of the most significant nature to the nation as a **whole**.

b. **Additional Information.** Further **information** on eligibility, criteria and nominating procedures may be obtained **from** the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

### **3. Presidential Citizens Medal**

a. **General** Established by E.O. 11494 (reference (h)), this medal is awarded by the President to individuals who have **performed** exemplary deeds of service for the country **of** similar nature to the Medal of Freedom, but of a lesser impact or scope.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained **from** the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service:

### **4. National Security Medal**

a. **General.** Established by E.O. 10431 (reference (i)), this medal is awarded by the President to individuals for extraordinary contributions to the country specifically related to matters of national security.

b. **Additional Information.** Further information on eligibility, criteria, **and** nominating procedures may be obtained from the Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service.

**SUBCHAPTER 451**

**APPENDIX B**

**DOD-LEVEL HONORARY AWARDS  
FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS**

**A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISTINGUISHED PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD**

1. **General** This is the highest honorary award granted to non-career Federal employees, private citizens, and foreign nationals who have performed exceptionally distinguished service of significance to the Department of Defense as a whole or service of such exceptional significance to a DoD Component or function that recognition at the Component level is insufficient. The nominee may have rendered service or assistance at considerable personal sacrifice and inconvenience that was motivated by patriotism, good citizenship and a sense of public responsibility. To be eligible, the nominee shall be an individual who does not derive his or her principal livelihood from the Federal Government.

2. **Additional Information** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained -from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

**B. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AWARD FOR OUTSTANDING PUBLIC SERVICE**

1. **General** This is the Department's second highest honorary award granted by the Secretary of Defense to non-career Federal civilian employees, private citizens and foreign nationals for contributions, assistance or support to Department of Defense functions that are extensive enough to warrant recognition but are lesser in scope and impact than is required for the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award. To be eligible, the nominee shall be an individual who does not derive his or her principal livelihood from the Federal Government.

2. **Additional Information** Further information on eligibility, criteria, and nominating procedures may be obtained from Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Personnel and Security, Labor and Management Employee Relations Division.

**Examples of Army Awards Criteria**  
**Scale of Recommended Awards Based on Intangible Benefits**  
**Continued from previous page**

<b>Value of Benefit</b>	<b>Extent of Application</b>			
	<b>Limited</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of one office, facility, installation, or an organizational element of a headquarters Affects small area of science or technology	<b>Extended</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of several offices, facilities or installations Affects an important area of science or technology	<b>Broad</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of an entire regional area of command. May be applicable to all of an independent agency or a large bureau. Affects an extensive area of science / technology	<b>General</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of several regional areas or commands, or an entire department or large independent agency, or is in the public interest throughout the Nation or beyond
<b>High Value</b> Complete revision of a basic principle or procedure; a highly significant improvement to the value of a product, major activity, or program or service to the public	\$250 - \$500	\$500 - \$1,000	\$1,000 - \$2,500	\$2,500 - \$5,000
<b>Exceptional</b> Initiation of a new principle or major procedure; a superior improvement to the quality of a critical product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$500 - \$1,000	\$1,000 - \$2,500	\$2,500 - \$5,000	\$5,000 - \$10,000  Awards over \$10,000 are based on tangible benefits along with intangible benefits

**Examples of Army Awards Criteria**  
**Scale of Recommended Awards Based on Intangible Benefits**

<b>Value of Benefit</b>	<b>Extent of Application</b>			
	<b>Limited</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of one office, facility, installation, or an organizational element of a headquarters Affects small area of science or technology	<b>Extended</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of several offices, facilities or installations Affects an important area of science or technology	<b>Broad</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of an entire regional area of command. May be applicable to all of an independent agency or a large bureau. Affects an extensive area of science / technology	<b>General</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of several regional areas or commands, or an entire department or large independent agency, or is in the public interest throughout the Nation or beyond
<b>Moderate Value</b> Change or modification of an operating principle or procedure which has moderate value sufficient to meet the minimum standard for a cash award; an improvement of rather limited value of a product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$25 - \$100	\$100 - \$250	\$250 - \$500	\$500 - \$1,000
<b>Substantial Value</b> Substantial change or modification of an operating principle or procedures; an important improvement to the value of a product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$100 - \$250	\$250 - \$500	\$500 - \$1,000	\$1,001 - \$2,500

**Examples of Navy Awards Criteria**  
**Scale of Recommended Awards Based on Intangible Benefits**

Value of Benefit	Extent of Application			
	Limited Affects functions, mission or personnel of one facility, installation, regional area, or an organizational element of headquarters Affects small area of science or technology	Extended Affects functions, mission or personnel of an entire regional area, command, or bureau Affects an important area of science or technology	Broad Affects functions, mission or personnel of several regional areas or commands, or an entire department or agency Affects an extensive area of science or technology	General Affects functions, mission or personnel of more than one department or agency, or is in the public interest throughout the Nation and beyond
Moderate Change or modification of an operating principle or procedure with limited use or impact	\$25 - \$500	\$501 - \$750	\$751 - \$1000	\$61,001 - \$1,500
Substantial Substantial change or modification of procedures. Important improvements to the value of a product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$501 - \$750	\$751 - \$1,000	\$61,001 - \$1,500	\$61,501 - \$3,150
High Complete revision of a basic principle or procedure; a highly significant improvement to the value of a product or service	\$751 - \$1,000	\$61,001 - \$1,500	\$61,501 - \$3,150	\$3,151 - \$6,300
Exceptional Initiation of a new principle or major procedure; a superior improvement to the quality of a critical product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$1,001 - \$1,500	\$1,501 - \$3,150	\$3,151 - \$6,300	\$16,301 - \$10,000  Awards over \$610,000 are based on tangible benefits along with intangible benefits

**Examples of Air Force Awards Criteria  
Scale of Recommended Awards Based on Intangible Benefits**

<b>Value of Benefit</b>	<b>Extent of Application</b>			
	<b>Limited</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of one office, facility, installation, regional area, or organizational headquarters element. Affects a small area of science and technology	<b>Broad</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of an entire regional area, command  Affects an important area of science or technology	<b>General</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of several regional areas or commands, or an entire department or agency  Affects a broad area of science or technology	<b>Government-wide or National</b> Affects functions, mission or personnel of more than one department or agency, or is in the public interest of the US or beyond
<b>Moderate Value</b> Changing an operating principle or procedure with limited impact or use	\$25 - \$125 (minimum award is \$25)	\$125 - \$325	\$325 - \$650	\$650 - \$1,300
<b>Substantial Value</b> Substantially changing or modifying procedures; significantly raising the value of a product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$125 - \$325	\$325 - \$650	\$650 - \$1,300	\$1,300 - \$3,150
<b>High Value</b> Completely revising a basic principle or procedure; significantly improving the value of a product or service	\$325 - \$650	\$650 - \$1,300	\$1,300 - \$3,150	\$3,150 - \$6,300
<b>Exceptional Value</b> Initiating a new principle or major procedure; major improvement in the quality of critical product, activity, program, or service to the public	\$650 - \$1,300	\$1,300 - \$3,150	\$3,150 - \$6,300	\$6,300 - \$10,000  Awards over \$30,000 are based on tangible benefits along with intangible benefits

**Examples of Awards Criteria in Some Components**  
**Scale of Recommended Awards Based on Tangible Benefits**

<b>Estimated First-Year Benefits to Government</b>	<b>Amount of Award to Employee</b>
<b>Air Force</b>	
up to \$100,000	10% of benefits up to \$10,000 (minimum award is \$25)
\$100,001 and above	\$10,000 plus 1% of benefits above \$100,001
<b>Army</b>	
up to \$10,000	10% of benefits
\$10,001 - \$100,000	\$1,000 for the first \$10,000 plus 3% of benefits over \$10,000
\$100,001 or more	\$3,700 for the first \$100,000 plus 0.5% of benefits over \$100,000
<b>Navy</b>	
Up to \$10,000 in benefits	10% of benefits
Between \$10,000 and \$100,000	\$1,000 plus 3% to 10% of benefits over \$10,000
More than \$100,000 in benefits	\$3,700 to \$10,000 for the first \$100,000 in benefits plus 0.5% to 1% of benefits above \$100,000 up to \$25,000

Coordination Page

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy)

Mr. J. L. Schrader

Handwritten signature of J. L. Schrader in black ink, written over the printed name.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Force Management Policy)

Ms. Gail McGinn

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force  
Management Policy)

Mr. Charles S. Abell



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

December 12, 2001, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Your Questions on Announcement of Lou Gehrig Results (Tab A)

- We announced the Lou Gehrig's disease results because they were scheduled Monday for presentation at a public scientific meeting as part of the review process. (We were not apprised of the presentation plan until last Friday.)
- After being briefed on the results, we agreed with Veterans Affairs it would be counterproductive to cancel the presentation. We worked out in collaboration with VA the strategy that resulted in Secretary Principi's news conference (in which DoD participated).
- Two considerations determined this outcome:
  - The disease is fatal, and the announcement allows families to protect their claim rights while the scientific review proceeds.
  - Significant distrust has built-up that VA and DoD are "sitting" on results that would sustain Gulf War Illness claims.
- Bottom line: Our hand was forced by VA staff decisions. (So was Secretary Principi's – he learned the results only a day or two before we did.) The catch-up strategy was an excellent example of VA-DoD cooperation at the top. We are taking steps to ensure we aren't surprised again, however.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, 695-5254



**TAB**

**A**

December 11, 2001 2:57 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Lou Gehrig's Disease

Why did they announce that study on Lou Gehrig's disease before it had been reviewed by peers, was in a more final form and was conclusive?

Did you agree to all this? Does DoD have a voice or a role in it, or is it essentially the Veterans Administration?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121101-8

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

December 11, 2001 2:57 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lou Gehrig's Disease

710

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Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121101-8

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

11 Dec 01



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

December 12, 2001, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Your Questions on Announcement of Lou Gehrig Results (Tab A)

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- Bottom line: Our hand was forced by VA staff decisions. (So was Secretary Principi's – he learned the results only a day or two before we did.) The catch-up strategy was an excellent example of VA-DoD cooperation at the top. We are taking steps to ensure we aren't surprised again, however.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, 695-5254





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFOMEMO

December 13, 2001 – 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*  
*13 Dec 01*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Voinovich

- You requested that I meet with Senator Voinovich to discuss with him what the Pentagon is doing on the personnel business and to share his ideas on the subject. (TAB A)
- My meeting with the Senator is scheduled for 10:00 on January 24, 2002.

COORDINATION: None required.

Attachment

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock, 695-5254.





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

20010002 0004 24



INFO MEMO

December 17, 2001; 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

for FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*Charles Bell* 12-19-01

(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: National Security Space Management and Organization

- At Tab A is my reply to your October 18, 2001 memorandum directing I prepare a plan for sourcing the Commander of Air Force Space Command billet at the grade of O-10.
- 10 U.S.C. § 528(a) limits the total number of O-10s on active duty in the grade of general and admiral to 32, unless the officer is serving in a position that is specifically exempted by law from being counted for purposes of limitations set by law.
  - The Department is currently at its cap of 32 O-10s; with the CJCS and the VCJCS (two exempted by law positions), there are 34 O-10s serving.
- The AF has the O-10 entitlement to upgrade the position of Commander of Air Force Space Command to an O-10 billet.
- House Report 107-333, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, contains a provision that repeals 10 U.S.C. § 528. Upon signature the Air Force can upgrade the position of Commander of Air Force Space Command.
- We must recommend to the President that he designate the Commander of Air Force Space Command as a position of importance and responsibility. The officer assigned will have the grade specified if he is appointed to that grade by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

RECOMMENDATION: None.

Prepared by: LTC Sally Jo Hall, 693-3939





PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

DEC 03 2001



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: National Security Space Management and Organization

This is in reply to your October 18, 2001 memorandum directing I prepare a plan for sourcing the Commander of Air Force Space Command billet at the grade of O-10.

The Air Force has the O-10 entitlement to source the Commander of Air Force Space Command; however, title 10, United States Code, section 528(a) limits the total number of O-10s on active duty in the grade of general and admiral to 32. The Department is currently at its cap of 32 O-10s.

The House and Senate Authorization Bills, H.R. 2586 and S.1438, respectively, include an amendment repealing Section 528, title 10, United States Code. We are confident that the amendment will be included in the Conference Report. I recommend that if the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2002 be enacted, the Air Force use an internal O-10 entitlement to source the billet.

In the event that the amendment to repeal Section 528 is not enacted into law, we will prepare an alternate plan for sourcing the Commander of Air Force Space Command billet at the grade of O-10.

David S. C. Chu



11-L-0559/OSD/2352



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 18 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: National Security Space Management and Organization

I have completed my review of the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization as required by section 1623 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. I agree with the Commission's conclusion that a new and comprehensive approach to national security space management and organization is needed to promote and protect the nation's interests in space.

The attachment provides additional guidance as to how best to ensure the Department of Defense is arranged and focused for this purpose.

I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to oversee this activity and provide me with regular updates on the status of implementation actions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert R. Engel".

Attachment:  
As stated

cc:  
Director of Central Intelligence

## **National Security Space Management and Organization Implementation Guidance**

1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (**USD(AT&L)**) shall:
  - 1.1. Promulgate a policy memorandum within 60 days, in coordination with the General Counsel, Department of Defense (**DoDGC**), delegating Milestone Decision Authority for **Department of Defense (DOD)** space Major Defense Acquisition Programs and **designated space programs** to the Secretary of the Air Force with authority to redelegate to the Under Secretary of the Air Force (**USecAF**).
  - 1.2. Prepare a plan within 120 days to make National **Security** Space Architect (NSSA) military positions Joint Duty Assignments. Coordinate the plan, with the Under **Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))**, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint **Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (**ASD(C3I)**), the **DoDGC**, the Director, Administration and Management (DA&M), and, as appropriate, the Directors of Defense Agencies. Consult with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (**DDCI/CM**), as appropriate, in preparation of the plan.
  - 1.3. **Promulgate, in consultation** with the USecAF and the Director of the National **Reconnaissance Office (DNRO)**, a **policy memorandum** within 60 days directing to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Military Department's science **and** technology laboratories to undertake research and demonstration of innovative space technologies and systems for dedicated military missions. This **guidance** should direct the **USecAF-DNRO** to initiate a comprehensive assessment, in consultation with the Secretaries of the other Military Departments, other U.S. Government departments and agencies, as appropriate, **of U.S. technology** for access to and operations in space leading to specific recommendations for technology investments.
  - 1.4. Prepare a memorandum for my review and approval within 120 days, in consultation with the USecAF and Director, Ballistic Missile Defense **Office (BMDO)**, defining the authorities and the relationship between the Department of the Air Force and BMDO for space and space-related systems under the management of BMDO.

2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (**USD(P&R)**) shall:
  - 2.1 Prepare a plan within 30 days for my approval, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, and the DoDGC to ensure an effective sourcing of a four-star billet for the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), reflecting the appropriate language in the National Defense Authorization Act.
  - 2.2 Prepare a memorandum, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the DoDGC, and with the DCI, to recommend that the President approve the Secretary's appointment of the **USecAF** as the DNRO.
3. The **USD(P)** shall:
  - 3.1 Prepare an update of DoD Directive 5 100.1, "Responsibilities and Functions of the DoD Components," within 45 days for my review and approval, in coordination with the **USD(AT&L)**, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the **ASD(C3I)**, the DoDGC, and the DA&M, to assign the Air Force responsibility to organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air and space operations and clarify the other Service's unique space responsibilities and functions.
  - 3.2 Prepare a DoD Directive within 60 days for my review and approval, in coordination with the **USD(AT&L)**, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the **ASD(C3I)**, the DoDGC, and the DA&M, to designate the Department of the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense, with Department-wide responsibility for planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems. This directive should clarify the lines of authority, specific responsibilities, and coordination requirements between the Executive Agent for Space and DoD Components.
  - 3.3 Prepare an updated Memorandum of Understanding between the DCI and me within 120 days for our review and approval, in coordination with the **USD(AT&L)**, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the **ASD(C3I)**, the DoDGC, the DA&M, and the **DDCI/CM** that: (1) realigns the NSSA under the **USecAF** and the DNRO; (2) authorizes the **USecAF-DNRO**, with my approval and in consultation with the DCI, to select the NSSA as a nominative position open to the Services and the Intelligence Community; (3) makes the NSSA responsible for reporting to the **USecAF-DNRO** on the consistency of the implementation of the defense and intelligence space programs with policy, planning guidance, and architectural decisions; and (4) makes the NSSA responsible for assisting the **USecAF-DNRO** in the assessment

of trades between space and non-space solutions to meet user requirements as well as appropriate integration of space with land, sea, and air forces in support of the USD(AT&L), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, **and the DDCI/CM**. Architectures will be provided to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for final evaluation and approval.

- 3.4. Prepare a policy issuance within 30 days for my review and approval, in coordination with the CJCS, for establishing a mechanism to coordinate the Department's positions on space and related policy matters at deliberations of the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee for Space.
- 3.5. Develop a plan within 60 days, in coordination with the **USD(AT&L)** and the CJCS, for working with the Department of State and the National Security Council to propose to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies **the** establishment of a planning group within NATO **the** for **the** purpose of consulting on the formulation of alliance policy and plans regarding space activities. Consult **with** the **DDCI/CM**, as appropriate, in preparation of the plan.
- 3.6. Review within 120 days and, if necessary, revise the Department's policies regarding the use of commercial space products, goods, and services in support of Department of Defense missions. This policy shall be coordinated with the **USD(AT&L)**, **the** Secretaries of the Military Departments, **the** CJCS, and other **DoD** Components, as appropriate.
4. **The** Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, in coordination with the **USD(AT&L)**, the **USD(P)**, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the **ASD(C3I)**, Directors of Defense Agencies, and, as appropriate, in consultation with the DDCYCM, shall:
  - 4.1. Establish within 60 days a "virtual" space program, budget, and accounting mechanism (referred to as a "virtual" Major Force Program (MFP) for Space) to increase visibility into the resources allocated for space activities. The "virtual" Space MFP will be identified in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) by specific and exclusive program elements.
  - 4.2. Promulgate planning, programming, and budgeting guidance documents, beginning with the current program cycle, that include separate guidance **for the DoD** Space Program. Separate fiscal guidance will not be issued for space programs.
  - 4.3. Promulgate a policy memorandum directing the **USecAF-DNRO** to submit, through the Secretary of the Air Force, an annual National Security Space Program Assessment to the Senior Executive Committee (SEC) comprised of the

**SecDef**, the **DepSecDef**, the USD(AT&L) and the Service Secretaries.

Additionally, in coordination with the **DDCI/CM**, direct the **USecAF-DNRO** to submit an annual National Security Space Program Assessment to the Executive Committee, comprised of the **DCI** and me, based upon the Program Objective Memoranda/Intelligence Program Objective Memoranda FYDP.

5. The CJCS shall promulgate guidance, in coordination with the Commander in Chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command (CINCFJCOM) and CINCSPACE, directing CINCFJCOM to establish a Space Applications Experimentation Cell at JFCOM.
6. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
  - 6.1. Promulgate guidance within 90 days regarding the development and maintenance of a cadre of space-qualified professionals comprised of military and civilian personnel in sufficient quantities to represent their Military Department's and **DoD** agency's interests in space requirements, acquisition, and operations. This guidance should ensure each Service generates a sufficient number of appropriately qualified personnel to man joint space organizations as well as function as space experts within Service organizations.
  - 6.2. Promulgate guidance within 90 days to assure space education, including Professional Military Education (PME), at all levels to ensure the cadre of space-qualified professionals described in paragraph 6.1 above have a direct understanding of space activities and how space capabilities and applications are integrated into military operations. PME core curriculum at junior, middle, and senior levels shall stress the application of space systems to combat operations. In addition, the number of advanced technical degree programs offered to space professionals shall be increased.
  - 6.3. Maintain a **sufficient** cadre of space-qualified professionals as described in paragraph 6.1 within each of their Military Departments to assure that each Service retains the ability to develop, plan, program, and acquire space systems uniquely required by individual Service missions.
7. The Secretary of the Air Force shall:
  - 7.1. Assign responsibility for the Command of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to a four-star officer other than CINCSPACE and CINC NORAD within 60 days of the identification of the source of the four-star billet required for this position.
  - 7.2. Realign headquarters and field commands within 120 days to more effectively organize, train and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space operations. Such organizational realignments shall support the adoption of a

“cradle-to-grave” approach for space to more closely integrate space acquisition and operations functions. This realignment shall:

- 7.2.1. Provide the resources to, and assign AFSPC the organize, train, and equip responsibility for, executing Air Force space development, acquisition, and operations, as well as prioritizing, overseeing, and directing the Air Force space research executed by Air Force Materiel Command’s Air Force Research Lab.
- 7.2.2. Reassign the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) from Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) to AFSPC.
- 7.2.3. Provide a process for the Commander, AFSPC to program funds and direct research and development programs within the Air Force laboratory system.
- 7.2.4. Disestablish the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space once a **USecAF** has been confirmed.
- 7.2.5. Realign the appropriate staff functions within the Air Force Secretariat to the Under Secretary of **the** Air Force.
- 7.2.6. Assign the Program Executive Officer for Space directly to the Under Secretary of the Air Force to provide program execution oversight and staff support for Air Force space acquisition programs.
- 7.2.7. Assign the SMC Commander as the Program Executive Officer for Space and relocate the function to Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA.
- 7.3. Assign the Commander of AFSPC appropriate responsibility within the Department of the Air Force for managing the space career field, in accordance with the Secretary of the Air Force’s guidance.
- 7.4. Prepare and present to me within 120 days a space career management plan to include military and civilian Air Force personnel. The plan will address space career management, accession, education and training requirements, and investments needed for advanced technical degrees. It will also address career path advancement; methods for developing a space career field that combines research, development, acquisition, and operations; and a personnel management policies that will result in a cadre of space professionals with greater depth and breadth of experience in the space career field.

- 7.5. Assign the **USecAF** as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space within 30 days.
8. The **USecAF-DNRO**, in coordination as appropriate with the **USD(AT&L)**, the **USD(P)**, the **CJCS**, and the **DDCI/CM**, will develop a process to align Air Force and NRO programs and permit both organizations to use each other's "best practices" for space research, development, acquisition, and operations. The **USecAF-DNRO** shall also develop an ongoing process that will allow my **office** along with the **DCI** to monitor all significant progress in this area.



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



## INFO MEMO

November 30, 2001, 9:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*Charles Abell* 12-19-01  
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Internet Advertising

- You asked for our thoughts on why the Services have allocated only between 1 and 12 percent of their national advertising budgets on Internet advertising.
- Military recruitment advertising programs are designed to support overall recruiting objectives, with each Service developing a media mix designed to reach its target audience (i.e., young people ages 16 to 24). Within this media mix, Internet advertising is integrated with the more traditional (and expensive) media (television, radio, print, etc.). As we gain more experience with Internet advertising, the proportion spent for that medium will grow. However, for the time being, the Services believe their investments are about right.
- As a comparison, Internet advertising (banner ads, paid links within search engines, etc.) comprised only 2 to 2.5 percent of total U.S. (public and private sectors) advertising expenditures in 2000 and is projected to only grow to 4 to 6 percent of total expenditures by 2005. The Department's somewhat higher percentage can be attributed to the fact that we include costs for development and maintenance of recruiting **websites** in our advertising budgets. Generally, private sector Internet advertising costs do not include development and maintenance of websites.
- Experience shows that America's youth are increasingly turning to the Internet to learn about military service. We believe today's youth enjoy the ability to interact with Service **websites** in a non-threatening manner -- at their own pace and in their own homes, allowing them to delay having to talk to a recruiter until they are ready. Additionally, recruitment leads generated as a result of our Internet presence are among the most effective, converting to enlistment contracts at a higher rate than other leads. Therefore, Service **website** addresses are featured in **almost** every military advertisement, regardless of medium.

Prepared by: Mr. Bob Clark, 703-697-9267

11-L-0559/OSD/2360

U19763 /01

SUBJECT: Internet Advertising

Coordination

Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP)

CLA 12-19-01

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MPP)

Van Alstyne 10 Dec 01

April 9, 2001 11:04 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Paul Gebhard  
ADM Jeremiah  
Steve Herbits  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gen. Schwartz's Paper on Rebuilding Trust

Attached is an excellent paper on how to rebuild trust in the military. We need to work on each of these items. I think it is a good outline.

Steve, you ought to make sure RADM Quigley and Torie Clarke have it, as well as David Chu and anyone else you feel is appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-13

322

9 Apr 0



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

Headquarters, United States Forces, Korea

Unit#15237  
APO AP 962054010

D  
+

Commander in Chief

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

1. Reference your request for recommendations on how to rebuild trust in the **military**.

2. We examined this topic from several **perspectives – building trust internal to the military - to include with service members and DOD civilians, family members, and the Service Departments and major commands – and building trust with a number of organizations external to DOD. The following paragraphs will outline our proposals.**

3. **Building Trust Internal to the Military.**

- ... with **service members and DOD civilians.**

- Establish requirements and day-to-day commitments at a pace reasonable enough to honestly allow service members to achieve balance **in their lives.** ✓

- Ensure the end strength of the services is adequate to meet force **structure and mission requirements . . . and thereby support an assignment process that has timely notification, flexibility and fairness.**

- **Ensure** that budgets are commensurate with mission, training and installation infrastructure requirements.

- Recognize that terrorist attacks will occur and that they are seldom the **fault of commanders. Focus on prevention, not blame.**

- Recognize the **pay and compensation requirements** associated with recruiting and retaining a talented **military workforce** (on par with our civilian workforce).

- Remember that It's the common people (service members that make our Defense Department so great – **communicate with them liberally and frequently.**

- ... with Family Members

- Allocate resources adequate to provide a quality of life in **CONUS** and overseas comparable to that found in contemporary **middle America**.

- Ensure that family member and retiree access to health care matches that of active duty members.

- Enforce a scheduling/missioning system that provides predictability in peoples lives.

- Recognize their value added by routinely authorizing travel with a spouse.

- Remember that we recruit the member but retain the family.

- ... with Service Departments and Major Commands

- Conscientiously seek Service Chief and **CINC** observations/opinions and allow adequate time for their review/analysis. Trust their talents/patriotism.

- Recognize that the Services, who have different cultures and Title X responsibilities, sometimes do things differently, often for good reason.

- Encourage innovation – always remember that innovation is the enemy of **standardization** – and the bureaucracy always favors standardization. Reward those who are **willing** to think outside the box.

#### 4. Building/sustaining External Trust.

- ... with Congress

- Encourage Congress to provide senior commanders more flexibility in using appropriated funds.

- Encourage **CINCs** and Service Chiefs to help keep Congress informed and feeling like they are part of the process.

- Encourage **CINCs** and **Service** Chiefs to meet with Congress before we need their help. This is where real trust is built.

- ... with the Media

- The American military has a great story to tell . . . dedicated hard working American families **living** and working in less than acceptable conditions so that all Americans might live a better life. **Service** members and families ask very **little** in return – but knowing their story is understood and that they are **appreciated** goes a long way to **building** trust.

- Encourage media representatives to visit **with** our service members **and families** so they can tell the story of the selfless sacrifice that is the military **family** tradition.

- Avoid a "spin" culture.

- Openly and candidly address **contentious** issues quickly as they surface.

• **with the American public and local Communities**

- Aggressively educate the public on the military with a directed campaign. Address how each citizen benefits from our national investment in defense (**direct** benefits - fire fighting, disaster relief, indirect benefits - access to stable markets worldwide).


- Encourage the **Services** to significantly expand **their** outreach to **local** communities, civic leaders, and elected officials . . . to help offset the void of knowledge about the military generated by the elimination of the draft.

5. My staff is prepared to provide additional information on these **recommendations** if necessary.

Very Respectfully,



**Thomas A. Schwartz**  
**General, U. S. Army**  
Commander in Chief

TO: General Peter Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: April 5, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Letter Dated April 2, 2001**

Thanks so much for your thoughtful suggestions and your letter.

I will certainly be thinking hard about your suggestion in the letter and see that Andy Marshall takes careful note of your other comments.

DHR/azn  
040501.04

38

3 APR 01



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE  
MIAMI, FL 331724217

April 2, 2001

Commander in Chief

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC. 20301-1000

Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for this opportunity to participate in the Defense Strategy Review (DSR). The draft copy that you gave me last Monday represents a watershed opportunity to open dialogue, focus our best intellect, and allocate resources to achieve the vision of sustained national preeminence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The enclosures enumerate my general and specific comments on the draft DSR. The draft incorporates many substantive ideas worthy of further development. While not a National Security or National Military strategy, it is nonetheless an excellent review of possibilities. The DSR postulates potential environments and priorities without providing a path to get there. It is not complete, but therein lies its value and the genesis of my proposed way ahead.

To translate the draft DSR into an actionable document, I first recommend you ask Congress to delay the requirement for a Quadrennial Defense Review one year so you can focus on where you want to go and how you want to get there. Then I recommend you initiate a series of executive offsites to flesh out the DSR ideas, generate consensus amongst senior leaders, and produce a National Military Strategy that provides a road map for resource allocation.

Your Service Chiefs and CINCs will embrace your vision and will produce the transformation recommendations required to sustain our national supremacy. Still, too large a group would be unwieldy; therefore, I recommend a two step process. First, a series of offsites attended by you, DEPSECDEF, other senior DOD civilians, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and your CINCs to develop the strategy. Then, a series of offsites attended by you, DEPSECDEF, other senior DOD civilians, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and your Service Chiefs to develop the force structure and resource allocation to execute that strategy.

I

Properly focused offsites, supported by professional facilitators and scribes, will require significant commitment by your senior leaders. This is appropriate and justified given the power of shared brainstorming, the resultant unity of effort and corporate buy-in, and the importance of the desired products.

Again, Sir, thank you for soliciting my opinions.

Enclosures

Very Respectfully,

PETER PACE

General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command

11-L-0559/OSD/2393



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 9, 2001 3:35 PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleeza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Communications

312

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from you to General Shelton.

I think any communication from the National Security Council to the Pentagon should come through my office, and not directly to the Chairman. This has historically been the practice. It is exceedingly difficult to manage the Pentagon without that clear understanding and procedure.

I have not researched this, so I'm not in a position to propose a document that would establish the relationship between DoD and the NSC in detail, and I will try to do that so we can see what models have been used. If you have any suggestions, let me know. In the meantime, I'd appreciate it if things came through my office rather than locations elsewhere in the Department, so I can keep track of what's taking place.

Attachment

DR:dh

9 Feb 0

U02820 /01

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HENRY H. SHELTON, USA  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Request Nomination for NSC Vacancy -- Defense  
Policy and Arms Control

The National Security Council staff has a Director-level vacancy in our office of Defense Policy and Arms Control.

We are seeking a Brigadier General (O-7) who will lead the interagency effort to refine U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy and support interagency efforts to define the nuclear force structure supporting that strategy. The selected officer will lead the interagency effort to define and revise, as necessary, the nuclear stockpile stewardship program, lead interagency efforts to define the Administration's nuclear arms control policy and coordinate the interagency implementation process. Additionally, the officer will coordinate interagency efforts on other critical arms control efforts such as the CFE treaty, CTBT, INF and lead the interagency effort on NATO nuclear **policy** issues.

Given the nature of this portfolio, we are particularly interested in filling this position in a timely manner and anticipate your support. This nonreimbursable Outside DoD Detail will be for two years with the option to extend an additional year. Points of contact for this request are Dean Haas (202) 456-9302 or Marsha Dimel (202) 456-9306.



Condoleezza Rice  
Assistant-to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Chairman  
of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff



9 February 2000

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

Mr. Secretary –

For your information, I received the attached  
from Condoleezza Rice today and we are working it.

*V/R  
Hugh*

#106 *W 11/21*  
1410

November 20, 2001 8:16 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NSPD-8

*closed by  
VETS @ board  
table 2/1/02*

*AFB to ... (2/1/02)  
PLEASE  
- all reports in ...  
...  
...*

*0555*

Attached is **Condi's** response to the memo the Chairman asked me to send to her.  
Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/01 Rice memo to SecDef, Response to Comments re NSPD-8

DHR:dh  
112001-3

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*100000E*

U12008 /02

8549

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
November 19, 2001

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 20 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
The Secretary Of Defense

SUBJECT: Response to Comments re NSPD-8

I have received your memorandum relating to NSPD-8, which establishes the position of National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism.

You have expressed concern that the appointment of the National Director as the President's "principal advisor on matters related to combating global terrorism" might cause confusion with regard to the statutory role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the "principal military adviser" to the President and could appear to place the National Director between the President and the Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders.

Although the Department of Defense did not raise these issues when we circulated the draft NSPD for comment in late October, I want to assure you that the NSPD does not diminish in any way the statutory responsibilities of the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, or the Combatant Commanders. As required by law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, and unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to the Combatant Commanders,

The purpose of the NSPD is to assign to one person on the President's staff -- the National Director -- responsibility to be aware of and to coordinate all u.s. counterterrorism activities, including military operations, to ensure that all of the components of our campaign against terrorism are seamlessly integrated. The President expects that all departments and agencies will support the work of the National Director, but the statutory responsibilities of all department and agency heads remain, of course, unchanged.

*Candi*

Condoleezza Rice

Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

11-L-0559/OSD/2398

July 16, 2001 6:39 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: External Panel of Pres. Review of Intel

Please see me on this Schneider memo, and tell me what you think we ought to do.  
Thanks.

Attach.  
7/6/01 Schneider memo to SecDef re: Developments at First Meeting

DHR:dh  
071601-65

350.09

1634101

U12624 /02

*William Schneider, Jr.*

*Steve [unclear]*

**MEMORANDUM**

July 6, 2001

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
cc: Mr. Richard Haver

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Developments at the first meeting of the External Panel of the Presidential Review of Intelligence in response to NSPD-5 (2 July 2001).

---

The External Panel of the Presidential Review of **Intelligence** held its first meeting on 2 July at the K Street office usually reserved for external reviewers. Chairman **LTG Brent Scowcroft** and Vice Chair, **ADM Dave Jeremiah** led the meeting. Other members of the panel attending were **Johnnie Foster** and **Dick Kerr**. Ambassador **Stapelton Roy** (former US Ambassador to the **PRC** now with Kissinger Associates) and **Jamie Gorelick** (former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton administration) were absent. A list of the Members of the External Panel as well as the Panel staff is attached. Joan Dempsey of the Community Management Staff who is involved in the Inside Panel was present as well.

The panel faces a very demanding timeline; the results are due by 30 September. The **DCI** participated in the discussion as well. The inside panel, led by Joan Dempsey will be meeting concurrently with the External Panel, and will participate in the work of the External Panel as well to assure congruence between the two efforts.

Chairman **Scowcroft** proposed (based on earlier discussions with Dempsey and the **DCI**) agreed that there would be a division of labor between the two groups on the four tasks enumerated in **NSPD-5**. A copy of **NSPD-5** is attached. The external panel will concentrate **on** Tasks 1 and 3, while the Internal Panel will focus on Tasks 2 and 4:

Task 1: The challenges and opportunities our Nation is likely to face in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century that require intelligence support. This review will be the basis for my Administration to articulate its intelligence priorities.'

---

<sup>1</sup> This aspiration aims at a replacement of the Clinton administration's **NSDD-35**. This approach had little impact on resource allocation or **IC** planning, so **doubts** have emerged about whether the subject of priorities should be approached in the same manner as **NSDD-35**.

11/01  
1220

Task 3: New and highly advanced **intelligence** collection, analysis and distribution capabilities. The **DCI** will make recommendations to me on whether such capabilities **warrant** new investment.

A dimension of the time pressure to complete the review is to converge on the **FY 03-08**-budget process and program review. As a consequence, I believe it will be most useful for the panel to concentrate on providing **recommendations** to some **of the most** pressing policy, program, and resource allocation issues. The **DCI** testified to his view on the mismatch between key elements of the Community's pattern of resource allocation for specific intelligence disciplines and the utility of their product. As a result, the External Panel is beginning to converge on an effort that would produce the following "output."

1. The major programmatic initiatives now underway that may reflect a mismatch between cost and utility will be examined with a view toward identifying opportunities for restructuring the programs if appropriate.
2. The underutilization of commercial imagery by the **IC** is widely understood, and its failure to do so exacerbates the program/resource mismatch. I have agreed to present alternative acquisition models for the **IC** to procure commercial imagery. These models will derive from work previously done on the **NRO** Commission on which I served last year.
3. Similarly, open source intelligence is believed to be an underutilized **source** of **information** as well. I have requested that **FBIS** (reported to be working on new open source **products**) brief the panel on its view(s) of how better utilization can be made by the **IC**, effectively programmed and budgeted.
4. I have proposed to Chairman **Scowcroft** that the panel receive an element of the unimplemented Defense Reform briefing prepared by **Arnold Punaro** for Secretary Cohen (you have heard the more comprehensive **form** of the briefing) in **1997**. There is a module that proposes radical reorganization in the **IC** to capture what **Punaro's** committee believes to be vast unproductive overhead in the **IC**, especially in **DoD**-related agencies.

The External Panel will meet again later in the month. I would like to get your insights into how the External Panel's report can best serve your needs.

President's Review of Intelligence  
NSPD #5  
External Panel

General Brent Scowcroft, Chair  
900 17th Street, NW  
Suite 500  
Washington, DC 20006  
202-296-9312

Admiral David Jeremiah, Co-Chair

(b)(6)

Dr. John S. Foster  
TRW, Incorporated  
1 Space Park, E1-5010  
Redondo Beach, CA 90278  
310-812-1846

The Honorable Jamie Gorelick

(b)(6)

The Honorable Richard J. Kerr

(b)(6)

Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy  
Kissinger Associates, Incorporated  
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor  
New York City, NY 10022  
212-759-7919

- or -

1800 K Street, NW  
Suite 1021  
Washington, DC 20006  
202-872-0300

Dr. William Schneider, Jr.  
President, International Planning Services  
1925 N. Lynn Street  
Arlington, VA 22209  
703-524-5522

# President's Review of Intelligence: Staff

2100 K Street, NW Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20427  
(202) 331-4060

## Management Team

(b)(6)

## Review Team

(b)(6)

## Business Team

(b)(6)

Schneider

2868

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 2001

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY BOARD

SUBJECT: Intelligence


Current and accurate foreign intelligence is essential to the success of our foreign policy, law enforcement, and defense strategies and is critical to protecting and advancing America's vital interests. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), working with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State as appropriate, is directed to: conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence. The DCI is given a broad mandate to challenge the status quo and explore new and innovative techniques, systems, practices and processes for foreign intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution.

This review will be undertaken by two separate panels that will be established by and report to, the DCI. One panel will consist of members of the Intelligence Community and other senior United States Government officials to be named by the DCI. The other panel will consist of knowledgeable and experienced individuals from outside the United States Government to be named by the DCI in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The

11-L-0559/OSD/2404

panels will conduct independent, but parallel reviews of the following:

1. The challenges and **opportunities** our Nation is likely to face in the **21<sup>st</sup> Century** that require intelligence support. This review will be the basis for my **Administration** to articulate **its** intelligence **priorities**.
2. The current state of our intelligence and **counter-intelligence capabilities** to ensure that they **meet** the challenges of the new century. The **DCI** is to **affirm** to me that our current and planned programs and **acquisitions** will **adequately** meet our Nation's future intelligence needs.
3. New and highly advanced intelligence collection, analysis and distribution capabilities. The **DCI** will make recommendations to me on whether such **capabilities** warrant new investment.
4. **Reorganizing** and/or **restructuring** the Intelligence Community to improve its management, **consolidate** its **activities** or agencies, and to streamline and strengthen its management **practices**.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. B. E.', is written across the lower half of the page.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

AUG 20 2001

President George Bush  
Walker's Point  
Post Office **Box** 492  
Kennebunkport, Maine 04046

418.2

Dear President Bush:

Thank you for your note and a copy of (b)(6)  
(b)(6) letter. We are following through with him.

I do appreciate your bringing this to my attention.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

20 Aug 01

W01081 /01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

E/M

Sgt,

Per Draft A note back  
to POTUS per our Director's  
guidance.

AKO,  
CDL WAT



TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 4, 2001  
SUBJECT: (b)(6)

I can't understand what this guy wants. (b)(6) is a billionaire who founded (b)(6) I believe. He's a good guy, but I can't figure out what it's about.

Why don't you get somebody looking at it and draft a note that you think would be appropriate for me to the President, and then track it.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
080401.29

Copy ATM  
done 8/14

8/13

Exec Sec -

Please have

SWT do a short  
note back to Pres Bush  
from Sec Def thanking  
him for passing the info  
along and saying we'll put

Mr. (b)(6) in touch with

11-L-0559/OSD/PA10 appropriate folks. Mr. *Sam*

**GEORGE BUSH**

July 23, 2001

Dear Don,

The attached letter from (b)(6) is self-explanatory.

Please have someone there at the Department contact (b)(6). Many thanks.

Warmest regards,



The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

WALKER'S POINT, POST OFFICE BOX 492, KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE 04046

(b)(6)

*1/32 - Original in Special Correspondence*

11-L-0559/OSD/2411

# Taconite Amendment

By Roger Skophammer

pages in the history of the amendment.

The first talks about a taconite amendment were among a group of Duluth and Iron Range men who included both Democrats and Republicans as well as independents. Only one of them, Rep. Fred A. Cina of Aurora, held public office.

Other people involved in the initial stages of the talks were Jeno Paulucci, Chun King Corp. president; Christian F. Beukema of U. S. Steel Corp.; Everett Joppa of Pickands Mather & Co.; Gerald W. Heaney, DFL leader and attorney for labor unions, and Richard Hastings, attorney for mining companies.

The first key meeting was a gathering in Paulucci's office in the summer of 1960. Most of all of those mentioned above were present. This meeting is said to be the birthplace of the Taconite Amendment.

Cina's role as chief legislative architect of the

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DULUTH  
NEWS-TRIBUNE  
SEPT. 25, 1966

Excerpt from  
article appearing  
on above date.

September 17, 2001 7:29 PM

TO: Karen Hughes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Flag and Letter

Here is a painting and letter from (b)(6) for the President that I think you will find touching.

Regards,

Attach.  
9/14/01 Flag and letter from (b)(6)

DHR:dh  
091701-37

W01182 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2413

335 WH

17 SEP 01

to you. I hope he won't  
get killed. If he does get  
killed I don't know he'll be  
for the name and the country.  
I prayed and I said  
for all the people that  
whether it was said or not  
still has to be. I hope  
one day every one will  
also. Truly yours [unclear]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

DATE:

MEMORANDUM FOR:

17 Sep 01

MEMORANDUM FOR CSAF

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Sir,

The flag and letter were written by (b)(6) a  
9 year old 4<sup>th</sup> grade student from (b)(6)  
in (b)(6). She is the daughter of (b)(6)  
(b)(6) is a sheet metal/corrosion  
specialist in the 89<sup>th</sup> AGS. He is sometimes tasked to work  
on Air Force One. (b)(6) is a former crew chief and  
comm troop turned full time Mom.

(b)(6) 9 years old, 4<sup>th</sup> grade

SSgt (b)(6) (residence)

SSgt (b)(6) 89<sup>th</sup> AGS, (b)(6) (duty)

(b)(6) (b)(6)



MICHAEL P. STAPLETON, Major, USAF  
Aide-de-Camp to the Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 24, 2001

9/24  
DIRITA J  
9/25

TO: SECDEF

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD  
FROM: KAREN HUGHES  
RE: FLAG AND LETTER

---

Mr. Secretary,  
I showed the President (b)(6) flag and letter, and I wanted you to see the President's  
response. I am attaching a copy of his letter.

Thank you so much for sharing it with us.



THE PRESIDENT

Sept 24, 2001

Dear

(b)(6)

Thank you for your letter and for the flag. Your Dad is a patriot. That must make you

proud.

We live in a great country because we love freedom.

God bless you and your family.  
Byron Zelle

December 30, 2001 9:10 AM

TO: Honorable Cohn Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Ivanov

Attached is a copy of a letter I was presented by Ivanov when I met with him earlier this month in Brussels.

On the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative I have shown each of you-I told him I thought it best come from NATO, rather than from the U.S. to Russia. Therefore, we are going to feed it in through the NATO process.

Regards,

Attach  
12/17/01MoD Ivanov Itr to SecDef  
DHR:dh  
123001-I

*Russia*

*30 Dec 01*

Moscow 17 December 2001

Dear Mr. Secretary!

I am most grateful for your positive evaluation of the contribution of the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding cooperation in the fight against international terrorism.

I support your assessment that today we must increase the level of cooperation between our countries in this area since the danger of threats associated with activities of terrorist organizations not only will remain in the near term but will in all likelihood increase.

Overall, we agree with your proposal on the "**Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative**." At the same time, the limited volume of information we have received does not permit us to conduct a thorough analysis of your proposal. In this regard, we would like to receive from you a more detailed explanation of the proposed measures with the American vision of the ways and means for achieving this "Initiative:

In my view, the ideas laid out in the 'Initiative,' either in toto or as separate points, could be one of the topics discussed in the framework of the planned new format for relations between Russia and **NATO**.

I hope that cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the United **States** Department of Defense becomes a significant contribution in the development of a constructive partnership between our governments and in guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security.

Respectfully,

Minister of Defense, Russian Federation

(signed) S. Ivarov

(Addressed to)

His Excellency  
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
United States of America

Drop OFF TO  
C:O

FROM: SECDEF TRIP  
HTB W/ MOD IVANOV.  
Vik CDA SETZELB

Москва, 17 декабря 2001 г.



Уважаемый господин Министр!

Весьма признателен за Вашу высокую оценку вклада Министерства обороны Российской Федерации в дело сотрудничества в борьбе против международного терроризма.

Поддерживаю Ваше мнение о том, что сегодня необходимо повышать уровень взаимодействия наших стран в этой области, так как опасность угроз, связанная с деятельностью террористических организаций, в ближайшее время не только сохранится, но и имеет все послышки к возрастанию.

В целом мы согласны с Вашим предложением по "Инициативе Евро-Атлантической безопасности". Вместе с тем, ограниченный объем полученной информации не позволяет провести углубленный анализ Ваших предложений. В этой связи хотелось бы получить от Вас более детальное разъяснение предлагаемых мер с американским видением путей и механизмов реализации "Инициативы".

На мой взгляд, идеи, изложенные в "Инициативе", в целом или в ряде пунктов могут стать одним из вопросов для обсуждения в рамках планируемого нового формата отношений между Россией и НАТО.

Надеюсь, что сотрудничество между министерствами обороны Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки станет весомым вкладом в дело развития конструктивных партнерских отношений между нашими государствами и обеспечения евро-атлантической безопасности.

С уважением,

Министр обороны Российской Федерации

С.Иванов

Его Превосходительству  
Господину Дональду Рамсфелду  
Министру обороны Соединенных Штатов Америки

*[Handwritten signature]*

December 27, 2001 3:07 PM

TO: Jim Schlesinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Iranian Relations

*[Handwritten mark]*

**FAXED**

I took a look at your Atlantic Council piece on U.S.-Iranian relations.

Would you change it now, given the events of September 11?

Thanks.

*[Handwritten initials]*

DHR:dh  
122701-42

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*1/7*

*SecDef -*

*Secretary Schlesinger  
sent a response last  
week. I've attached a copy  
of it U00329-02  
[Handwritten signature]*

*27 Dec 01*



**THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL**  
OF THE UNITED STATES

---

**Thinking Beyond the- Stalemate  
in U.S.-Iranian -Relations**  
*Volume I – Policy Review*

---

Lee H. Hamilton

James Schlesinger  
Co-Chairs

**Brent Scowcroft**

**Roscoe Suddarth**  
*Principal Policy Advisor*

Elaine L. Morton  
*Author-Rapporteur*

C. Richard Nelson  
*Project Director*

**Policy Paper**

**May 2001**



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OF THE UNITED STATES

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In all its programs, the Council seeks to integrate the views of experts from a wide variety of backgrounds, interests and experience.

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# Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in U.S.-Iranian Relations

## *Volume I – Policy Review'*

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## Foreword

The Middle East presents more difficult choices for policy makers than any other region of the world. Different U.S. interests pull in different directions, misperceptions abound, and expectations are often unrealistic. In this environment, orchestrating policies to advance and protect U.S. interests is extraordinarily difficult. U.S. policy toward Iran exemplifies this situation well.

After more than twenty years of adversarial relations, the United States and Iran have both begun to demonstrate an interest in breaking out of this long stalemate. Broadly conceived, the benefits for both countries of an improved relationship would be significant. Time has soothed some past wounds and the rhetoric of hatred has subsided to a degree. However, serious differences remain.

Both countries believe that they have made clear the conditions that would have to be met before a policy change could even be considered. But attainment of these thresholds is unlikely in the near term. This report suggests a new approach for U.S. policy which would enable the United States to pursue more effectively its many interests *vis-à-vis* Iran, including its longstanding concerns about Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process and its attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The main aim of the report is to provide a reference guide for navigating successfully the obstacle-laden landscape of U.S.-Iranian relations when the time is ripe to embark on the journey.

This report represents three years of study and deliberation by a large and distinguished working group convened by the Atlantic Council. Acting as scouts, not advocates, the working group attempted to fit together the many complex issues in the U.S.-Iran relationship into a comprehensive approach. The report is published in two volumes. Volume I presents the conclusions and recommendations of the working group and summarizes the rationale for these judgments. Volume II is a comprehensive analysis of the current stalemate that provides the full reasoning underlying the conclusions in Volume I. Although Volume I is based on Volume II and they are consistent with one another, the members of the working group were asked to concur only with Volume I.


The contents of Volume I represent the consensus of the members of the working group, all of whom were acting in their individual capacities, and do not represent the official position of any institution. The weight of the recommendations derives from the expertise and experience of the participants and the diversity of its membership. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in complete agreement, the working group members concurred with the present paper as representing the consensus of the group. Dissenting views and additional comments by members of the group appear in the annex at the end of the paper.

This project is part of the Atlantic Council's multi-year program on reversing relations with former adversaries. The program began with a book of case studies and included an in-depth

study of future U.S. relations with Cuba. In 1999 the Council published an analytic compendium of the policies, laws and regulations that govern U.S. relations with Iran.

The preparation of this report involved more than 100 persons. We are deeply indebted to the co-chairs who guided this effort: Lee Hamilton, James Schlesinger and Brent Scowcroft, all of whom gave generously of their time and wisdom in steering the project and its intellectual development. Cyrus Vance also served as a co-chair during the early stages of the study. I would especially like to acknowledge the major contributions of Roscoe Suddarth, the principal policy advisor; Elaine Morton, the rapporteur and principal author; Dick Nelson, the tireless and always creative project director; and David Sattiel, the assistant project director. The paper represents the views of the working group and not necessarily those of the Atlantic Council.

Although they bear no responsibility for the content, this work would not have been possible without the generous support of the W. Alton Jones Foundation Fund of the Rockefeller Family Fund.



*Christopher J. Makins*  
*President, Atlantic Council of the United States*

## Members of the Working Group

The members of the working group believe that the recommendations stated in this paper promote overall U.S. interests. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in full agreement, each participant believes that the report, as a whole, provides a sound basis for future actions by the Government of the United States. The views of participants do not represent the official position of any institution.

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## Key Judgments

The current stalemate between the United States and Iran, while emotionally satisfying to many Americans, does not serve overall U.S. interests well. It hinders the achievement of several key U.S. geopolitical interests, especially over the longer term. These interests include, but are not limited to, regional stability, energy security, and the broader and evolving geopolitical relationships between the United States and China and Russia in the Persian Gulf and Caspian basin. Furthermore, the leading industrial countries are moving to improve relations with Iran.

During most of the 1990s, U.S. policy toward Iran focused primarily on achieving nonproliferation objectives and ending Iranian support of forces in the Arab-Israeli conflict that use violence in support of the Palestinian cause. These are important policy objectives, but they should be pursued in conjunction with careful attention to the broader array of U.S. interests that could be advanced through better U.S.-Iranian relations.

Moving beyond the current stalemate will be difficult. Direct government-to-government dialogue is not now possible because the issue of future relations with the United States is inextricably tied to the power struggles in Iran. The political situation in Tehran also precludes developing a calibrated road map for improved relations characterized by parallel, reciprocal steps toward engagement. Iranian officials attempting to participate in such an exercise would likely be overruled by anti-U.S. elements.

If the U.S. government decides to move beyond the current stalemate, a new approach would be necessary. It must take into account the full range of U.S. interests and the overall geopolitical environment in order to devise options that are both desirable and feasible. Some steps can be taken in the short term, while others must wait for a more favorable political climate in Iran. However, no substantial improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship can take place unless Iran is both interested and willing to reciprocate.

Nevertheless, certain unilateral steps are appropriate. The most important of these are measures that would clearly serve U.S. interests – even in the absence of reciprocation by Iran. The removal of U.S. economic sanctions falls within this category. Whatever effect sanctions initially had, their value is declining largely because they were imposed unilaterally, and because Iran has now found alternative investors and suppliers. They will have little discernible effect on Iranian behavior regarding issues of concern to the United States. Consequently, the utility of holding sanctions removal in reserve as a bargaining chip is questionable.

Iran has an important role to play in meeting growing U.S. and worldwide energy demands. The 1995-96 U.S. sanctions on Iran were imposed during a period of a global oil surplus, but the world is now entering a period of global energy scarcity. Iran currently accounts for 5 percent of worldwide oil production and is the second largest oil exporter in OPEC. The country needs significantly increased capital investment to maintain its current level of

production and to develop new fields to meet projected increases in demand and create spare capacity that could compensate for sudden interruptions of worldwide supply.

Regardless of the direct U.S. role, Iran will play an increasingly important role among the world's leading suppliers of oil and natural gas. In the meantime, U.S. companies are losing opportunities to their European and Asian competitors. U.S. jobs and tax revenues are also being lost because of U.S. restrictions on participation in Iran's economy.

Some unilateral steps could also be taken to remove unnecessary irritants in the current U.S.-Iranian relationship with minimal cost to the United States and negligible impact on U.S. security. Rescinding the requirement of fingerprinting and photographing all Iranian visitors falls within this category and would help promote the free flow of people and ideas.

At the moment, however, the most promising area of potential U.S. engagement with Iran appears to be in the commercial sector. If the U.S. economic sanctions against Iran are relaxed it will be possible to approach engagement by leading with the private sector. Trade and investment promote access, change personal attitudes, and may encourage Iranians to adopt opinions that can provide a foundation for improved political relations.

Several other avenues of engagement could be pursued simultaneously. For example, Track II dialogue and contacts via nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) already underway can be expanded and used as bridges to parliamentary exchanges and diplomatic contacts. Progress is likely to be uneven, so taking steps along a particular avenue should not be made contingent upon the achievement of similar progress in other areas. Iranian reciprocity, however, should be expected when the various avenues are judged as a whole.

The rationale for the above judgments is summarized in Volume I of this report, with a more comprehensive analysis of the issues provided in Volume II. The subjects covered include the following:

- analysis of the background of the current stalemate
- discussion of the broad interests at stake
- portraits of how each country perceives the other
- analysis of the domestic politics of each country as they relate to the opportunities for overcoming the stalemate.

Volume II contains three appendices: an overview of how U.S. policy toward Iran has evolved since the Iranian Revolution; evaluation of the annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* reports; and information on resolving U.S.-Iranian claims before the Hague Tribunal.

The Atlantic Council's *U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations*, by Kenneth Katzman (1999) provides a compilation of all key U.S. policy declarations, legislation and regulations that govern our relations with Iran.

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# Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in U.S.-Iranian Relations

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## I. The Current Stalemate

Relations between the United States and Iran are currently frozen. In 1998, the Clinton administration invited Iran to engage in an official government-to-government dialogue in which issues of concern to both parties would be open for discussion. The goal was to develop a road map that would lead to normal relations. At the same time, the United States has said that it will maintain its principal sanctions against Iran<sup>1</sup> until Tehran changes its policies on certain issues of significant concern to the United States:

- support for terrorist groups – especially Palestinian groups and movements like Hizbollah that have perpetrated violent acts against civilians in Israel and used violence during military engagements against Israel and its allies in southern Lebanon.
- opposition to the Middle East peace process, underpinned by Iran's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty within Israel's pre-1967 boundaries.
- efforts to acquire the technology, materials, and assistance necessary to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missile capability to deliver them.

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<sup>1</sup> Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 of 1995 prohibit U.S. trade and investment in Iran. Executive Order 13059 (1997) further tightened the ban. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 prohibits foreign or domestic "entities" from investing in the development of Iran's petroleum resources. The prohibition covers exploration, extraction, refining, and transportation by pipeline.

In contrast, Iranian officials have said that they will not engage in a government-to-government dialogue with the United States so long as the principal U.S. sanctions remain in place; they consider the sanctions a hostile act inconsistent with improving relations. The Iranians have stated that before a dialogue can take place, there must be parity and mutual respect between the two parties. They argue that these conditions will not be met so long as Iran is subject to pressure in the form of the following actions by the United States:

- continuation of economic sanctions against trade and investment in Iran;
- delay in returning frozen Iranian assets and properties;
- exertion of U.S. influence in international financial, monetary, and trade organizations to limit Iranian access to economic resources;
- efforts to impede the transfer to Iran of advanced technology for peaceful (nuclear) purposes;
- efforts to exclude Iran from oil and gas projects in other states surrounding the Caspian Sea, prevent construction of oil pipelines through Iran to transport Caspian oil to international markets, and block market-based swaps of crude oil from the Caspian Sea countries for Iranian oil that could exit the Persian Gulf for shipment to global markets.

## U.S. Approaches

The United States has recently made a few tentative efforts to engage Iran. The first public attempt to initiate a dialogue was made in a speech by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright on June 17, 1998 at the annual Asia Society dinner in New York. This speech was, in effect, a response to a January 1998 interview by President Mohammad Khatami on *CNN* in which he praised the United States, indicated opposition to terrorist attacks against civilians, regretted the taking of U.S. hostages in the early days of the revolution, denied that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, and called for a “dialogue between civilizations.”

A second attempt to improve relations was made by Albright in remarks before the American-Iranian Council on March 17, 2000, in Washington, D.C. This speech deliberately coincided with the Iranian New Year and registered a positive U.S. response to the impressive victory of reform candidates in Iranian parliamentary elections. The speech was noteworthy for its acknowledgment of Iranian grievances by listing several U.S. policies that had contributed to problems in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. The speech was also notable for the announcement that U.S. economic sanctions would no longer apply to imports of Iranian carpets and certain Iranian foodstuffs, notably pistachio nuts and caviar.

At the same time Albright made clear that the principal sanctions would remain in place because Washington had not seen significant change in Iranian policy with respect to proliferation or its support of terrorist groups. Instead of attributing these activities to the government of Iran, however, Albright cited specific entities – the Iranian military and the

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (**IRGC**) for proliferation and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (**MOIS**) for support of terrorist groups.

Albright concluded by calling for an official dialogue with Iran so that issues of common concern could be addressed through diplomatic channels: regional tensions in the Persian Gulf, instability and the illegal narcotics trade in Afghanistan, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and more general subjects such as regional economic development and protection of the environment. In a press conference following the speech, Albright said that the kinds of things that the United States would talk about in a dialogue with Iran included proliferation, terrorism, and the lack of Iranian support for the Middle East peace process.

## The Iranian Response

Although Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Hadi Nejad-Hosseini followed Secretary Albright's speech with remarks that described Iran as being "prepared to adopt proportionate and positive measures in return," such measures are not yet discernible. The Iranians have more recently responded to the U.S. overture as they responded two years ago: they say that they want to see "deeds as well as words" from the United States. During a state visit to Germany in July 2000, President Khatami praised the United States for taking a "new turn" in its relations with Iran, but he also said that thus far the United States has not taken sufficient steps to bring this about. He went on to urge the United States to be more ambitious.

Although many of President Khatami's supporters recognized the positive intent of Albright's listing of U.S. policies that had harmed Iran, the initial official reaction was presented by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi on April 5, 2000, when he referred to Albright's "confessions" and said that Washington must pay reparations for its past actions. He also accused the United States of sending contradictory signals of friendship and hostility.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in a July 27, 2000 statement, said that any talk of a rapprochement or negotiations with the United States at this stage would be "an insult and treason to the Iranian people." He argued that it would be necessary for Iran first to solidify its economic, cultural, scientific, and military strengths. Otherwise Iran would be at a disadvantage in negotiations, and the United States would be in a position to force it to make too many concessions.

## II. U.S. Interests at Stake

The United States has a wide range of interests at stake in its relationship with Iran. These include geopolitical interests, security interests, energy interests, and economic interests. To date, U.S. policy has focused almost exclusively on specific security interests, especially discouraging the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**) and long-range

missiles that can deliver such weapons. The core security issue, however, remains the opposing positions of the United States and Iran regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus Iranian behavior has been judged mainly on the basis of its opposition to the peace process and its support for terrorist groups involved in the conflict against Israel.<sup>7</sup>

U.S. policy toward Iran could be reconfigured so that a broader array of U.S. interests can be pursued. Better relations with Iran would make it more likely that longer-term U.S. interests can be achieved. This can be accomplished without compromising efforts to achieve U.S. concerns regarding WMD, terrorism, and Middle East peace.

## Geopolitical Interests

The size of Iran's population and its regional weight and geographic location make it too significant a country for the United States to ignore. A better U.S.-Iranian relationship would serve several U.S. geopolitical interests. It could reduce and possibly neutralize potential strategic alliances between Iran and Russia and China, the latter two of which would find themselves benefiting through links to Iran as a regional power in the Persian Gulf. U.S. policies toward Iraq would be easier to implement if the United States were able to take advantage of concerns shared by Iran about the possible regional ambitions of the Iraqi government and its pursuit of WMD capabilities.

Divergent approaches to Iran by the United States and its European allies have been a source of tension, and the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions has strained alliance relationships. Improved relations with Iran, would therefore Likely remove this source of strain. Iran also figures in the attainment of U.S. objectives with respect to the countries of the former Soviet Union and could be useful as a counterweight to Russian attempts to dominate these states.

Conflicting U.S. policy goals have resulted in slowing the attainment of political and economic viability in the Caspian Sea states. The United States would like to see these countries' energy resources on the international market. To the extent that this objective can be met, the countries in question will have a source of income that will contribute to their economic development. If, on the other hand, they are forced to depend on Russia for their primary energy transportation routes, Moscow would be in a position to exert financial and political pressure on them and work toward reestablishing a sphere of influence.

U.S. policy makers recognized this potential problem when the Clinton administration enacted the 1995 Executive Orders that imposed a complete trade and investment embargo on Iran. A special allowance was made so that U.S. companies could participate in market-

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\* An additional source of U.S. concern relates to the possibility that Iran may have been **complicit** in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia that at **first** was attributed to Saudi dissidents and also has been attributed to Iraq. See, for example, Laurie Mylroie, *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America*. (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2000).

based swaps of crude oil from the Caspian Sea countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan for similar quantities of Iranian crude oil that would be exported on their behalf from terminals located on the Persian Gulf. This would permit the oil to move onward by sea to international markets, particularly to the increasingly important energy markets in East Asia, where the rate of growth in demand is higher than in any other part of the world.

This policy has not been implemented. The United States has given strong political support to a proposed Baku-Ceyhan export pipeline that would transport energy resources westward from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. The United States has also supported a trans-Caspian pipeline that would bring energy resources from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to a point at which they could connect with the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. At the same time, the U.S. government has denied applications by U.S. companies for licenses to swap oil with Iran, in part because such swaps could encourage the diversion of oil from the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

Furthermore, the United States has sought to prevent the construction of pipelines through Iran that could bring landlocked Caspian energy resources to international markets. The vehicle for doing so is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). The Iranian route, would likely be less expensive and would better serve markets, primarily because the resources would not have to travel as far. It also makes more sense *logistically*, because, as already noted, the future high demand areas for energy are increasingly in Asia, to the east. In the absence of alternative transportation routes, the landlocked Caspian Sea states will be more dependent on, and influenced by, Russia,<sup>3</sup> thus undermining Washington's interest in promoting the political viability of the newly independent Caspian states.

## Security Interests

As noted above, certain security interests have dominated U.S. policy toward Iran, the main focus of which has been to prevent Iran from acquiring WMD and long-range missiles and to halt Iranian support of Palestinian terrorist groups. In addition to these concerns, the United States also has high-priority security interests in preventing Iraq from threatening its neighbors. The Iraqi threat is also Iran's primary security concern.

In the event of a regime change in Baghdad, internal turmoil is a significant possibility. Over the longer term, U.S. policy makers could find themselves confronting internal strife in other countries bordering the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it is in the long-term interest of the United States to act now to help ensure Iran's future political stability in this important region of the world.

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<sup>3</sup> The Baku-Supsa "early oil" pipeline allows oil from Azerbaijan to travel to the Black Sea via Georgia. Kazakhstan has the ability to ship oil across the Caspian Sea by barge and then take advantage of the Baku-Supsa line. But the primary transportation route for oil that originates in Kazakhstan is the CDC line that transits Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossisk.

A longer-term perspective is also required to prepare for the possibility that Saddam Hussein or a similar Iraqi leader will be in power at a time when UN sanctions have been lifted. The sanctions regime is already eroding. Moreover, the UN sanctions were never meant to address the significant quantities of conventional weapons and trained military forces that Iraq still possessed after the Persian Gulf War. After sanctions are lifted, Iraq can be expected to be more successful in its attempts to refurbish and expand its military inventory. The commercial incentives that Iraq will be able to present to potential arms suppliers by virtue of its oil income will make it relatively easy to accomplish this task, even in the face of existing multilateral export controls on various arms and dual-use items.

Thus, the future conventional military threat that Iraq may pose to its neighbors cannot be dismissed. Both the 1980 invasion of Iran and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait are evidence that Saddam Hussein considers military invasion of his neighbors to be an acceptable instrument for achieving foreign policy goals -- and Iraq has not moved away from its contention that Kuwait historically is an Iraqi province.

### Energy Security Interests

Providing for reliable and diverse sources of energy security is a high-priority interest of the United States. The United States has a major economic interest in ensuring reliable sources of energy for Europe, Japan and other countries because of the increasing interdependence created by the global economy.

To protect these interests, one of the key tenets of U.S. foreign policy over the last twenty-five years has been a commitment to protect the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf. The United States has been willing to devote annual sums in the tens of billions of dollars to achieve this goal. It has deployed soldiers and equipment in forward positions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, headquartered the Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and pre-positioned military equipment in Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

A long-term time perspective of energy supply and demand is particularly important. Worldwide demand for oil and natural gas will increase significantly during the next decade. Iran is currently the second largest exporter in OPEC and the fifth largest oil exporter internationally. If Iran is to continue to provide the same share of the world's oil that it is producing today, substantial foreign investment will be needed. Despite U.S. sanctions, U.S. Department of Energy projections assume Iran's oil production will satisfy 5 percent of world needs in 2005, even with worldwide demand projected to grow by 10 percent by that time.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Iran is estimated to have contributed 3.9 million barrels per day (mbd) of production toward 78.7 mbd of total world demand in 1999. The projections for 2005 are for 4 mbd of Iranian oil toward satisfying an 87.9 mbd expected demand. See Table D1, World Oil Production Capacity by Region and Country, Reference Case, 1990-2020, in *International Energy Outlook 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, March 2000).

Global demand for natural gas is expected to rise at an even more rapid rate than oil, so access to Iran's sizeable reserves — the second largest in the world — will also be important. Construction of the expensive infrastructure necessary to bring these reserves to market will be significantly delayed without substantial levels of foreign investment.

If future worldwide energy supplies are inadequate to meet growing demand, the United States, its allies, and trading partners will be adversely affected. Because they would have to pay higher prices for the energy they import, it would seem prudent to encourage foreign investment in the Iranian energy sector so that Iran can reach its full capacity in meeting future increases in demand. The United States, however, has barred U.S. firms from participating in such projects, and through **ILSA**, is attempting to extend this prohibition to include investors from other countries.

### Economic Interests

The United States has a major interest in promoting its own opportunities for trade and investment abroad. U.S. companies have been barred from economic activity in Iran, however, and in many instances foreign companies have taken their place. U.S. legislation designed to deter foreign companies from participating in the development of Iran's energy resources is increasingly being ignored. Companies from France, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom are signing energy contracts with Iran, and they have been joined by companies from China, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea. The U.S. sanctions have not succeeded in their objective of isolating Iran. Instead, U.S. companies have been isolated by being subjected to government restrictions that do not affect their competitors. This is a matter that affects more industries than just the energy sector. For example, Iran has embarked on a program of infrastructure development that can provide important export markets to key sectors of the U.S. economy, notably aircraft and telecommunications.

## 111. Thinking Beyond the Stalemate

The current stalemate between the United States and Iran, while emotionally satisfying to many Americans, does not serve overall U.S. interests well. U.S. national interests include, but are not limited to, regional stability, energy security and moderation of the Iranian regime. The importance of Iran in the promotion of U.S. interests is especially apparent when a long-term perspective is taken and contingencies are considered.

### The New Context

Both the domestic and international contexts that frame U.S.-Iranian relations have changed significantly over the last few years. Inside Iran, pressure is growing for reforms that will result in a more open and accountable government, although reformers face significant opposition.

### *The Domestic Situation*

Although there are formidable barriers to change, President Khatami has been persistent in his attempts to reform the Iranian system from within. His primary goals are to promote freedom of expression, ease social restrictions, and encourage the development of a civil society governed by the rule of law. He seeks to accomplish these goals through government programs and enactment of new legislation. In addition, Khatami ultimately wants to establish a system of public accountability for several key institutions that are now under the control of the Supreme Leader. These include the intelligence services, the IRGC, the judiciary, and the economically powerful religious foundations called *bonyads*.

Thus far, Khatami has been able to register only limited success in his efforts to achieve reform through a process of presidential-parliamentary cooperation. Reform measures can be vetoed by the Council of Guardians. If the parliament and the Council of Guardians cannot resolve their differences over specific legislative proposals, the Expediency Council has the power to intervene. Thus, both the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council – both of which are appointed bodies – can overrule the popularly elected parliament. In addition, Supreme Leader Khamenei has the power to prevent parliament from passing or even discussing legislation on certain matters.

During the period since the dramatic victory of reform candidates in the February 2000 parliamentary elections, there has been a severe political backlash mounted by conservative forces associated with the Supreme Leader. Virtually all of the reform newspapers have been closed, and many publishers and journalists have been jailed. Key figures associated with the reform movement, including several close associates of President Khatami, have also been arrested. Student leaders have been jailed, as were participants in a conference in Berlin that was disrupted by anti-regime provocateurs. In April 2001, 60 members of an opposition party were also arrested. Many observers believe that the wave of arrests are part of a deliberate campaign of intimidation designed to weaken support for President Khatami in the June 2001 presidential elections.

Nevertheless, many Iranians believe that Islamic tradition requires that popular will be taken into account when the Supreme Leader makes decisions. Khatami also takes the view that an Islamic republic is based on “the people’s determination, will, presence and participation.” Khatami has reinforced this view by pointing out that “even during the era of the infallible ones . . . the people exercised their supervisory role.”<sup>5</sup>

There are also practical constraints that may prevent the Supreme Leader from veering too far away from prevailing public sentiment. Although he has considerable coercive power at his disposal to keep the expression of public opinion in check, he has to take into account the possibility that his policies may provoke violent, widespread public reactions that would be difficult to control.

Economic stresses in Iran compound the current political pressures for change. Even though oil prices are high and the government is paying down part of its debt, the current

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<sup>5</sup> Speech of June 3, 2000, on the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death.

power struggle occurs under conditions of increasing economic hardship for a large proportion of the Iranian population. Inflation and unemployment are high, and a perception exists that there is considerable corruption among the ruling clerical elite. The economy is structurally incapable of generating enough jobs to employ the ever-growing number of young people. It is estimated, for example, that the economy will have to generate 800,000 additional jobs per year to accommodate new entrants into the job market. This level is approximately 450,000 jobs beyond the economy's current job-creating capacity. Iran has been especially unsuccessful in generating employment for the growing number of university graduates. As Iran's press ruefully reports, one of the country's most significant exports is its highly trained physicians, engineers, and computer scientists.

Over the longer term, if economic hardships intensify and channels of expression of popular political will are blocked, Iran could suffer a degree of internal instability that would endanger regional security.

### *Foreign Affairs*

Iran's foreign policy has changed significantly under President Khatami, who has been successful in reducing Iran's isolation. He initiated efforts to improve relations with key neighbors in the Gulf and made state visits to France, Germany, Italy, France, Japan and Russia. He was also able to reestablish full diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

The Europeans initially referred to their contacts with Iran as constituting a "critical dialogue" that they hoped would influence Iranian policies to move in a moderate direction. The United States which took an explicitly punitive approach to Iran, expressed skepticism about the efficacy of the European approach. Yet it is clear that the Iranians paid attention to the displeasure registered when the Europeans briefly withdrew their ambassadorial representation in 1998 in response to revelations of Iranian complicity in the 1992 assassination of an Iranian political dissident residing in Germany.

In 1998, the Europeans reformulated their approach toward Iran by launching a "comprehensive dialogue" that was supported by institutional arrangements:

- the European Commission would hold troika<sup>6</sup> meetings with Iran every six months;
- the Commission established separate working groups with Iran on energy, trade, and investment; and
- the Commission and Iran would hold periodic meetings of experts on the issues of refugees and drug trafficking.

There are explicit expectations underlying the comprehensive dialogue. The possibility of an eventual trade and cooperation agreement with Iran was made contingent on the

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<sup>6</sup> The troika consists of officials from the countries holding the current, immediate past, and future European Union presidencies. The presidency rotates alphabetically among its member countries every six months.

government's continuation of political reform and economic liberalization. Among the political issues to be addressed are human rights, including freedom of the media, and the treatment of women and minorities. Iran's regional and international policies are also to be discussed. Questions related to Iran's security will be addressed, along with its role in the peace process and the international security concerns raised by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>7</sup> It remains to be seen whether these expectations will be realized.

## Lessons from Previous Approaches

Analysis of U.S.-Iranian relations over the years reveals what is not likely to work in future efforts to move beyond the current stalemate. In particular, despite whatever effect U.S. unilateral sanctions may have had initially, they are of declining value in the absence of multilateral support and are no longer effective in isolating Iran. They are also to some extent counterproductive because they provide a rationale for the continued hostility toward the United States that is promoted by the hard-line opponents of reform. They also provide a ready excuse for Iran's economic problems and thereby delay the kind of economic reforms that would liberalize the economy. Economic reform would also have the political benefit of weakening the power of the religious foundations and their ability to fund terrorism abroad and political repression at home.

The U.S. sanctions are the main obstacle preventing the United States from pursuing its complete range of interests with Iran. Tehran refuses to accept the U.S. invitation to engage in a government-to-government dialogue until they are removed. Such broad-based sanctions, in Iran's view, are hostile in nature and not appropriate for an environment of improving relations.

Given the current internal power struggle in Iran, an approach that insists on a specific *quid pro quo* form of reciprocity is unlikely to be successful. The power struggle, the existence of U.S. sanctions, and the Supreme Leader's opposition to negotiations with the United States combine to make it unrealistic to expect near-term Iranian willingness to engage in an official government-to-government dialogue in which all issues of concern to each party would be placed on the table. It is even less likely that Iran and the United States could agree on a "road map" for the resolution of these issues.

Even Track II, people-to-people exchanges between Iranians and Americans are not likely to lead the way to improved government-to-government relations anytime soon. Khamenei and many of his conservative supporters are fearful of an onslaught of "decadent," Western cultural values and "subversive," Western political ideas, and they maintain that the reform movement is being manipulated by enemies of Iran's Islamic system.

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<sup>7</sup> See "EU-Iran: Commission Sets Out Perspectives for Closer Relations," European Commission, DN:IP/01/176, February 7, 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh>.

## A Changed Strategy

Two principles should serve as the foundation of any new U.S. approach to Iran:

- The United States should first take those steps that are in its national interest. These should be taken independently, and not be contingent on Iranian or any other nation's behavior. Even if Iran does not respond, the United States will have removed obstacles to the attainment of U.S. objectives.
- The United States should also try to establish a relationship with Iran in which U.S. actions will be reciprocated by Iran so that the relationship can move forward on a mutually satisfactory basis.

### *Independent Steps in the U.S. National Interest*

Some obstacles to the achievement of U.S. national interests have, in a sense, been self-inflicted, the primary example being the sanctions, which have not achieved their stated objective of altering Iranian behavior in areas of concern to the United States. Instead, they have worked at cross-purposes with U.S. economic and long-term energy interests. For these reasons alone the sanctions should be relaxed. As a practical matter, unraveling the complex sanctions provisions under the combination of executive orders, **ILSA**, foreign assistance and anti-terrorism legislation will take some time.

Certainly in the immediate future, the prohibition on the importation of Iranian oil should be removed. At the same time, the U.S. government should adopt a policy of approving license applications for swaps of Caspian and Iranian oil, and U.S. energy and other firms should be given permission to negotiate "executory" contracts' in Iran.

The administration should discourage extension of **ILSA** following its expiration in August 2001. If such an approach appears unlikely to succeed, alternative legislation should be sought that narrows the scope of the sanctions and provides the president with flexibility in their application. It is often assumed that **ILSA** does not affect U.S. companies when in fact, its prohibitions are directed to "entities" without regard to nationality. Therefore, even if the executive branch were to exercise its authority to lift the 1995/97 executive orders prohibiting U.S. trade and investment in Iran, a renewal of **ILSA** by Congress would continue to effectively block U.S. investment in the Iranian energy sector. If **ILSA** is not renewed but the executive orders remain in place, U.S. energy firms would be precluded from investing in Iran while their foreign competitors maintain the freedom to do so.<sup>9</sup> The executive orders and **ILSA** are so connected that any new approach to sanctions should consider them as a package.

<sup>8</sup> These are contracts that cannot be implemented until the sanctions on trade and investment in Iran are lifted.

<sup>9</sup> This is the *de facto* situation today. **ILSA** has not been enforced. One waiver was granted in May 1998, but all other foreign contracts are being studied to determine whether **ILSA** sanctions must be implemented. The process of studying the contracts cannot continue indefinitely, especially if **ILSA** is extended for another five years, as its proponents intend it to be.

Finally, the Bush Administration should undertake to lift the current ban on trade and investment in Iran by conducting a well-coordinated educational effort highlighting the ineffectiveness of the sanctions and their negative effects on U.S. energy and commercial interests. Such an effort is crucial to building support in Congress and among the public for this change. As appropriate, the administration and Congress should aim to lift the remaining economic sanctions sooner rather than later.

### *Steps to ward U.S. -Iranian Engagement*

Before pursuing reciprocal engagement with Iran, the United States should take the unilateral step of removing some of the outstanding irritants in the relationship. These steps are few in number and could be taken with minimal cost. Rescinding the current Justice Department order to fingerprint and photograph all Iranian visitors to the United States is one such measure. Others include undoing current U.S. practices that serve to “demonize” Iran and prohibit a more reasoned and utilitarian approach to the outstanding problems between the two countries.

- *Coordinate with Europe, Japan and Others*

The United States should work more closely with European countries, Japan, and others to promote coordinated engagement with Iran. For example, coordination with the European Union would enable the United States to profit from groundwork that has already been laid. Ultimately, it may be possible for the United States and the Europeans to frame joint policy initiatives toward Iran that will be more effective than if undertaken independently. In addition, the Iranians would be more likely to accept a U.S. approach that is folded into that of the Europeans, because it would be less controversial at home.

- *Lead with the Commercial Sector*

Once economic sanctions are removed, the United States will be able to draw upon the positive effects of commercial engagement with Iran. There is reason to believe that economic engagement can help prepare the way for political engagement. Contacts on a personal level are made possible and each side has an opportunity to learn about the cultural values of the other. Although economic relations are not free of potential misunderstandings and culturally imposed difficulties, in general they provide mutually beneficial rewards. Once these rewards become manifest, the positive attitudes they engender can likewise affect general attitudes toward the other nation.

- *De-Link Sets of Issues*

The United States, in developing a strategy to maximize its overall interests, should de-link interests that can be pursued directly (geopolitical, energy, and economic) from those parts of its security interests (WMD, terrorism) that can be more effectively pursued multilaterally. Eventually, better and increased engagement with Iran should also help with difficult security issues.

- *Timing*

A new U.S. strategy must take into account the full range of national interests at stake and the overall geopolitical environment to determine options that are both desirable and

feasible. Some will be more feasible in the short term, while others must wait for a more favorable political climate. The specific timing of any option, as well as the overall pace and scope of the efforts, must, of course, take Iran's behavior into account. Nevertheless, acting sooner rather than later will increase the United States' ability to influence positive trends and developments in Iran.

## A Plan of Action

Several kinds of engagement are theoretically possible in U.S.-Iranian relations:

- unofficial Track II dialogue;
- contacts between U.S. and Iranian nongovernmental organizations;
- commercial engagement;
- early forms of diplomatic engagement;
- unofficial parliamentary exchanges;
- low-level government-to-government engagement;
- military confidence building measures;
- normal diplomatic relations;
- full government-to-government relations; and
- military cooperation.

There is a natural sequence to some of these steps, but many of these "phases" can be pursued simultaneously. Taking steps along the path of a particular form of engagement should not be made contingent on the achievement of similar progress in the other areas, but reciprocity from Iran should be expected when engagement is taken as a whole. In some instances, moving ahead will be cost-free to the United States but in others the United States will need to amend existing legislation to gain some freedom of maneuver.

## PHASE ONE

The United States should continue and reinforce existing forms of engagement with Iran. As things stand now, there have been a few instances of U.S.-Iranian cultural and sports exchanges, and an ongoing schedule of Track II contacts between scholars and former government officials. In addition, nongovernmental organizations dealing with specific issues (such as the environment) have established forums that include U.S. and Iranian participants.

### **Track II Dialogue.**

Approximately six meetings per year have brought U.S. scholars and former government officials into contact with their Iranian counterparts. Similar kinds of contacts between U.S. and Soviet participants served a useful purpose for both sides during the cold war. A special advantage of Track II contacts is that the participants usually have close enough relations with their respective governments to enable them to explain the nuances of current government policies. Such people -- especially former U.S. senior foreign policy officials -- can also convey new ideas to active policy makers.

### **Contacts between Non-Governmental Organizations**

Iran has been receptive to interactions with U.S. and international NGOs, and NGOs in Iran have been growing in number partly as a result of President Khatami's emphasis on developing a civil society. Meanwhile, a U.S. policy change is underway to facilitate U.S. NGO activity in Iran. It is hoped that it will soon be possible for U.S. NGOs to obtain a general license that would permit them to enter into all of the necessary transactions for carrying out work in Iran."

## **PHASE TWO**

### **Commercial Engagement**

Lifting economic sanctions would make it possible for U.S. companies to begin to obtain the benefits of commercial engagement with Iran. Such engagement can be facilitated by private U.S. organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and the Iranian-American Trade Association. Steps are already underway to hold meetings at which U.S. and Iranian businessmen can exchange information about their respective markets.

There are hurdles, however, that have to be overcome. One of these is the need for Iranian businessmen to travel outside Iran to apply for a U.S. visa, return to Iran, wait for 30 days, and then return to the country of application to pick up the visa. Consequently, only Iranians who are financially well off and politically well connected can get such a visa. In addition, while the U.S. executive orders remain in place, Iranians cannot make the financial transactions required by the United States to participate in trade shows, contract for legal services, and otherwise participate in bilateral trade.

### **Early Diplomatic Engagement**

One of the most important strands of U.S.-Iranian engagement involves diplomatic contact between the two countries. Here the need for reciprocity from Iran is necessary, but Tehran has yet to respond to U.S. diplomatic overtures. For example, Iran has not allowed U.S. representatives to visit the Swiss embassy in Tehran which represents U.S. interests in Iran in the absence of diplomatic relations, or been willing to allow the United States to station a staff of U.S. consular officers there so they could process Iranian visa applications in-country. If and when the United States lifts its economic sanctions and establishes a

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. sanctions against U.S. financial transactions in Iran require separate applications for exemptions for each specific type of activity that would otherwise be prohibited.

commercial presence in Iran, it would be reasonable for the Department of State to want to station economic and commercial officers in Tehran.

### **Unofficial Parliamentary Exchanges**

If the leadership in Iran acts on its seeming willingness to grant permission for exchanges between various members of the U.S. Congress and their Majlis counterparts in Iran, the meetings would have both symbolic and practical value. Such meetings would illustrate the breaking down of barriers to communication – the “walls of mistrust” alluded to by President Khatami during his January 1998 CNN interview. Meetings between U.S. and Iranian parliamentarians could be expected to provide a corrective to mutually held negative stereotypes. Under ideal circumstances, meetings between members of Congress and members of the Majlis could result in a genuine exchange of views that clarify positions, reduce tensions, and serve as a bridge to an official government-to-government dialogue at some future date.

Although the Iranians have agreed in principle to exchanges between U.S. and Iranian parliamentarians, they have been reluctant to follow through by setting specific dates and committing themselves to granting the necessary visas. Nevertheless, members of Congress should be encouraged to persevere in attempting to initiate a dialogue with their Iranian counterparts.

## **PHASE THREE**

Given the distance that must be traveled before the normalization of diplomatic relations, an alternative approach to establishing government-to-government interaction may be in order. Although desirable, it is not necessary to have full diplomatic relations before government-to-government contacts can take place. What is being proposed here is a “bottom-up” approach that begins with discussion on less controversial issues.

A strategy of disaggregating areas of potential government-to-government interaction with Iran would enable the United States to approach a political rapprochement gradually, while evaluating the extent of Iranian interest and reciprocity. Limited working-level contacts would be pursued **first**, with contacts at the ministerial level as the ultimate objective. Difficult issues would be postponed until a climate of trust has been established.

### **Low-level Government-to-Government Engagement**

There are several areas in which Iran’s government and society are facing pressing problems. Environmental and narcotics control issues are among them. Tehran suffers from some of the worst air pollution in the world, and the country faces problems of increased drug abuse among its own population and rising drug trafficking from producers in Afghanistan who use Iran as a transit route to lucrative drug markets in Europe.

There are various non-controversial ways in which the U.S. government can help Iran address these problems. NGOs are already at work on these issues and they can provide a

useful bridge to eventual working-level government-to-government programs. For example, NGOs can make their Iranian counterparts aware of U.S. government assistance programs. They can also hold meetings at which working-level U.S. government officials are among the participants. Non-controversial areas for cooperation should be chosen for initial government-to-government cooperation.

Unfortunately, however, even modest programs cannot now be undertaken officially because of legislation that bars U.S. bilateral foreign assistance to countries — like Iran — that appear in the Department of State's Terrorism List. This legislation should be amended by "carving out" exceptions so that U.S. bilateral foreign assistance is permitted for programs that addressed issues concerning the environment, drug control, and public health.

### **Official U.S. Export Assistance**

Lifting economic sanctions would make possible U.S. investment. This would solve only part of the problem, however. U.S. companies would still be at a disadvantage compared to their competitors, because other U.S. legislation bars Terrorism List countries from receiving export assistance from the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Department of Commerce Trade Development Administration (TDA).

The United States might amend existing legislation so that the programs of the Export-Import Bank, its OPIC guarantees, and its TDA assistance can be used with government approval to support U.S. businesses seeking to invest in enterprises in Iran.

### **Confidence-Building Military Cooperation**

Confidence-building measures can serve to reduce tensions and promote regional stability. For example, both the U.S. and Iranian navies interact regularly in the Persian Gulf. They provide notices-to-mariners (NOTAMS) about certain operational conditions, including naval exercises, and they have established common procedures for communications. The navies should be encouraged to pursue other means of cooperation, such as averting incidents at sea and jointly mounting search-and-rescue efforts. This list could be expanded to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

## **PHASE FOUR**

### **Resolution of the Hague Tribunal Claims**

More than 20 years have passed since the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Algiers Accords ending the 1979-81 hostage crisis. At that time, Iran made a commitment to release all of the U.S. diplomats held as hostages and in return the United States agreed to release Iranian assets frozen in U.S. banks as a sanction against the hostage taking. The United States also committed not to intervene in Iranian internal affairs. In a carefully timed sequence, the hostages were released on the first day after the Reagan administration took office in January 1981 and the United States returned close to \$9 billion in Iranian assets that had been frozen in U.S. banks and their foreign subsidiaries.

The Algiers Accords also provided for a claims tribunal to oversee binding third-party arbitration of both private and government-related claims involving the two countries. This process at The Hague moves very slowly in part because complicated problems of fact and liability have to be resolved. The tribunal has, however, been successful in resolving essentially all of the 4,000 or more claims involving private claimants, and most of the smaller government-to-government claims. Several large claims are still being arbitrated. The largest outstanding monetary claims relate to purchases that Iran made under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In keeping with FMS procedures, Iran deposited money in a Department of Defense FMS fund, and disbursements were then made to the contractors supplying the equipment and services. The Iranian claims relating to the FMS programs are two-fold:

- First, there is a claim relating to the FMS fund, itself. Iran alleges that at the time the FMS relationship was severed, it had deposited \$11.3 billion in the fund but had received only \$9.5 billion worth of military goods and services. Iran wants to be paid the balance of \$1.8 billion, with interest. The United States does not pay interest on FMS funds under normal circumstances. If the tribunal validates this claim and decides to award Iran interest, the sum owed would be approximately double, or \$3.6 billion.
- Second, Iran claims that it is owed \$1.4 billion for undelivered FMS equipment for which payment had already been disbursed from its FMS fund. If the tribunal validates this claim and interest is awarded, the sum owed would amount to \$2.8 billion.<sup>11</sup>

Based on these numbers, Iran believes that it is entitled to a possible FMS settlement in an amount that could be as much as \$6.4 billion. In addition, it has claimed compensation for costs it had to bear during the process of shutting down the FMS program. A related issue arises from controversy over which of the two countries should pay the costs owed to U.S. contractors for contract cancellations. The United States used the Iranian FMS account to pay contract cancellation fees – and this is one of the reasons why the account now has a balance of only \$400 million compared to the \$1.8 billion that Iran believes the account should contain. The work necessary to resolve the FMS claims is daunting. There are seventy to eighty cases that involve sums exceeding \$250,000. These cases involve approximately 1,200 separate FMS contracts, only 130 of which have been briefed.

The outstanding Hague Tribunal claims complicate U.S.-Iranian relations. The Iranians tend to use the issue as a vehicle for expressing their sense of “grievance.” Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed that the United States has been willful and unfair in refusing to return billions of dollars of frozen assets. The charge is played for maximum effect on public opinion, and inflated dollar figures are used. Recent rhetoric has been toned down, but past Iranian statements claimed that the amount owed to Iran was in the neighborhood of \$20 billion.

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<sup>11</sup> For a detailed description of the Iranian point of view, see the interview granted by Goodarz Eftekhari Jahromi, the Iranian representative to the Hague Tribunal, as quoted in Roozbeh Farahanipour, “Iran No Longer Possesses Deposits in American Banks,” *Payame Azadi (Morning Daily)*, January 16-17, 2000.

In an attempt to respond to the Iranian sense of grievance and wipe the slate clean, former Secretary of State Albright, in her March 17, 2000 speech, proposed that the United States and Iran increase their efforts to conclude a “global settlement” of the outstanding legal claims. Such a settlement would require devising simplified legal mechanisms at The Hague, as well as a considerable degree of political will on the part of both countries. If a global settlement is not reached, many more years will pass before the remaining claims can be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

Although the proposed global settlement was one of the key aspects of Albright’s approach to Iran, it is significant that the Clinton administration did not move beyond the rhetorical before it left office. In other words, U.S. representatives to the tribunal were not authorized to broach the subject with their Iranian counterparts. This policy should be changed and representatives to the Tribunal should be authorized to inform the Iranian negotiators of the United States’ willingness to pursue a rapid global settlement of the remaining claims.

The U.S. government has already paid some individual tribunal awards. The money for these payments came from the Treasury’s Judgment Fund.” It is significant that the Judgment Fund is a *permanent and indefinite appropriation*. This means that Congress does not have to authorize disbursement of specific payments and the Judgment Fund does not have a “cap” that would require it to be replenished by congressional authorization upon being exhausted.<sup>13</sup> Any Hague Tribunal awards, including a potential global settlement, are payable from the Judgment Fund – no matter how large the size of the award – and any resolution of the remaining claims will require the expenditure of considerable amounts of money. For the most part, members of Congress and the public at-large are not aware of how much will have to be disbursed from the Treasury to settle the claims – even under conservatively drawn scenarios. As a matter of practical politics, it would be wise of the executive branch to consult closely with Congress in anticipation of the necessity of making a large payment to Iran at some future date.

#### *Complications from the ‘Victims of Terrorism’ Claims*

On April 24, 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Section 221 amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by depriving Terrorism List states of sovereign immunity in instances in which private U.S. plaintiffs seek to sue such states for damages. Section 221 was designed to permit U.S. citizens and the families of deceased citizens to sue Terrorism List countries for:

“personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, *or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.*”  
(Italics added)

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<sup>12</sup> This fund was established by the Automatic Payment of Judgments Act of 1956 and is codified at U.S.C. Section 1304.

<sup>13</sup> Instead, the claims paid from the Judgment Fund are charged against the entire U.S. budget. In other words, the total paid from the Judgment Fund in a given year is either subtracted from a budget surplus or added to a budget deficit.

The language of the legislation draws an explicit connection between the act in question and “the provision of material support or resources” for that act, but the evidentiary standards employed in subsequent court cases have not been strict.

The legislation which removes Iran’s sovereign immunity, was enacted the year before President Khatami’s election victory in May 1997. The full effect of stripping Iran of sovereign immunity was not felt until lawsuits were filed and decisions reached under the new dispensation. From 1998 to the present, U.S. courts have awarded both compensatory and punitive damages against Iran in several high-profile cases.

Iran did not attempt to defend itself in these cases, because it does not recognize the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in which the cases were tried. In the absence of an adversarial proceeding, “default” judgments were rendered and the size of the awards was especially generous. Five major cases were decided,<sup>14</sup> and the total of the awards reached was \$208.4 million in compensatory damages and more than \$1.1 billion in punitive damages.

These awards complicate the ability of the U.S. government to fulfill its obligations in the Hague Tribunal process. Attorneys for plaintiffs Terry Anderson and the Flatow family were successful in obtaining judicially approved writs of attachment that enabled them to attach Iranian assets in the United States. The assets that they tried to attach included:

- monetary awards to Iran from the United States that had already been mandated by the Hague Tribunal; and
- money in Iran’s FMS fund under the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal pending a decision on its ultimate disposition.

The United States went to court and successfully quashed these writs by claiming that U.S. sovereign immunity protected money in the Treasury that had been earmarked for payment to Iran in compliance with the outstanding Hague Tribunal claims.

When the plaintiffs confronted this roadblock, Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Sen. Connie Mack (R-FL) introduced the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which, among other things, deprived the United States of sovereign immunity in cases in which Terrorism List countries were at issue. After considerable negotiation with the Clinton administration, a compromise was reached and codified in Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.

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<sup>14</sup> The plaintiffs were the family of Alisa Flatow, who was killed by a bomb placed on an Israeli bus by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); former U.S. hostages in Lebanon Joseph Cicippio, David Jacobsen, Frank Reed, and their families; former U.S. hostage and journalist in Lebanon Terry Anderson and his family; the families of Matthew Eisenfeld and Sara Rachel Duker, who were killed by a bomb placed on an Israeli bus by the Palestinian group HAMAS; and the family of Marine Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, who was kidnapped and killed in Lebanon by the Lebanese Hizbollah.

This legislation is significant because it goes a long way toward protecting the Hague Tribunal process from U.S. domestic litigation. There are, however, other aspects of the revised legislation that introduce complications down the road. For example, it authorizes the government to pay damages awarded to plaintiffs, but to do so it transfers the claims for compensatory damages from the plaintiffs to the U.S. government. This subrogation<sup>15</sup> of the claims is then used as a vehicle for requiring certain actions by the U.S. government. In the case of Iran, it involves the following:

- No funds shall be paid to Iran from property blocked under International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or from Iran's FMS account until the subrogated claims have been dealt with by Iran to the satisfaction of the United States.
- It is the sense of the Congress that the president should not normalize relations between the United States and Iran until the subrogated claims have been dealt with by Iran to the satisfaction of the United States.

Iran has already registered its disagreement with this arrangement and, in theory, could file a complaint against the United States either with the Hague Tribunal or at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Additionally, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act seems to imply that Iran must admit to responsibility for the terrorist acts that gave rise to the judicial awards to the U.S. plaintiffs and, perhaps, pay compensation. Yet, Iran not only does not recognize the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in this matter, but it also argues that it is not **complicit** in violent acts undertaken by organizations to which it has contributed funds for general purposes. In a tit-for-tat gesture, Iran has now passed matching legislation that permits Iranians to sue the United States in Iranian courts for injuries sustained at the hands of the U.S.-supported government of the Shah of Iran.

With an eye toward the future, Congress should examine the possibility of rescinding the 1996 legislation that deprived Iran and other Terrorism List states of their sovereign immunity, which is in violation of widely recognized principles of international law. Meanwhile, in pursuing an expedited global settlement of the remaining Hague Tribunal claims, the United States should be fully aware of the difficulties that will have to be overcome because of the restrictions imposed by the victims of terrorism legislation.

#### PHASE FIVE: THE DIFFICULT ISSUES

One of the most difficult problems that the United States confronts in its current relationship with Iran results from Iran's effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran asserts that it is in full compliance with all of its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments and that it has no intention of pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

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<sup>15</sup> Subrogation is the substitution of one creditor for another so that the new creditor succeeds to the former's rights.

Furthermore, Iran insists on exercising its NPT right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology and claims that the United States is trying to deny it this right and is therefore in violation of Article IV of the NPT, which commits the Parties to the Treaty to

undertake to facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy . . . and to [contribute] to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing world.

Iran has legitimate national security concerns, given the nuclear weapons capabilities of nearby states and Iraq's aggressive history and potential to move quickly to a nuclear weapons capability in a post-sanctions environment. There are two related ways of dealing with this problem:

1. devise a means by which Iran can exercise its NPT entitlement to access to civilian nuclear power technology without raising weapons proliferation concerns;
2. consider ways of helping Iran address its legitimate security concerns without recourse to nuclear weapons or other forms of WMD.<sup>16</sup>

### **Curtailing the Proliferation Potential of Nuclear Power Technology**

Over the longer term, it may become possible to develop with Iran an adequate and effective new safeguards regime. If this were possible, the United States could then change its current policy of attempting to deny Iran access to light-water nuclear power reactors for generating electricity. Under such a regime, *all* potential suppliers of such technology would first negotiate agreements with Iran whereby Iran would agree to do the following:

- sign and ratify the Model Safeguards Protocol<sup>17</sup> of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- commit itself to forego NPT-allowed civilian nuclear activities that raise weapons proliferation concerns; and
- agree to an IAEA inspection regime that would monitor and verify whether the joint commitments between Iran and the potential supplier are being met.

If such a regime could be negotiated successfully, the United States would be in a position to withdraw its objections to the sale of French, German, or Russian nuclear power reactors to Iran and, with congressional approval, the United States would be able to sell Iran such reactors itself.

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<sup>16</sup> The emphasis here is on nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are discussed in Volume II. Iran is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It, however, is following procurement policies that give reason for concern.

<sup>17</sup> Sometimes referred to as the Enhanced Safeguards Protocol.

Close to two dozen countries have already signed the **IAEA** Model Safeguards Protocol, which was devised after the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program and contains measures designed to permit **IAEA** inspection of *undeclared* nuclear sites as well as the declared sites that are already the subject of the basic **IAEA** inspection regime.

In addition, the protocol contains language that enables the **IAEA** to conduct inspections in the subject country in order to investigate the accuracy of suspicions that have been brought to the attention of the **IAEA** by another **IAEA** member state. This means that, for example, if U.S. intelligence uncovers troublesome activity in Iran, it can ask the **IAEA** to investigate to ascertain whether the suspicions are well founded. Under the terms of both the basic **IAEA** agreement and the new protocol, if the **IAEA** discovers that an **NPT** adherent is engaged in nuclear weapons activity, it is obligated to bring this fact to the attention of the UN Security Council. Although the **NPT** does not have a sanctions provision, the Security Council has the ability to impose sanctions under such circumstances.

Iran is already in complete compliance with the Full Scope Safeguards program of the **IAEA** and Iran has left the door open to signing the Model Safeguards Protocol. Its leaders have said that Iran would not be the first country in the Middle East to do so, nor would it be the last. In informal conversations in a Track II setting, Iranian participants have said that Iran would be willing to sign the protocol in exchange for being able to acquire civilian nuclear technology without U.S. interference. The extension of **IAEA** safeguards to undeclared nuclear facilities would provide a significant mechanism for preventing potential clandestine transfers of nuclear material from civilian to weapons-related purposes.

Regardless of the protocols signed, the **NPT** allows certain peaceful applications of the nuclear fuel cycle that particularly lend themselves to the eventual production of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons. These permitted but troublesome capabilities are facilities that permit:

- uranium enrichment;
- reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel;
- heavy-water production of nuclear energy; and
- independent fabrication of nuclear fuel.

Thus, under current circumstances, if Iran (or any other non-nuclear state adherent to the **NPT**) wants to purchase a reprocessing plant or engage in any of the above activities, it need merely notify the **IAEA** of the location of the nuclear material involved and the **IAEA** will have no cause to fault either the recipient or the supplier country.

*Consequences of the Current Approach.* The U.S. approach to preventing Iran from gaining weapons-useful technology and materials through its civilian nuclear program has been to try to discourage Iran from acquiring all forms of nuclear reactors, including those permitted by the **NPT**. In the process, we have created temptations for Russia, while frustrating our allies.

Moreover, the U.S. policy of denial with respect to Iran includes civilian light-water nuclear power reactors even though Washington has promoted donation of the same to North Korea.

In addition to prohibiting U.S. manufacturers from selling Iran light-water nuclear power reactors, the United States has been successful in persuading France and Germany to agree to a similar prohibition.<sup>18</sup> This has left Iran completely dependent on Russia as its sole supplier and the United States is pressuring Moscow to cease providing Iran with civilian reactors after the two at Bushehr have been completed. Russia has thus far been adamant in refusing to comply, and the combination of Russian recalcitrance and U.S. pressure has served to strain U.S.-Russian relations.

The current U.S. prohibition on the sale of light-water reactors to Iran has weapons proliferation implications in and of itself. The construction of the Russian plants brings Iranian authorities into contact with Russian nuclear scientists, some of whom have nuclear weapons expertise. Many of the latter are now unemployed because the Russian nuclear weapons program has been curtailed. The possibility that Russian nuclear scientists might have pecuniary motives that would cause them to participate in clandestine nuclear weapons programs in other countries has been a cause for concern among U.S. policy makers.

The other problem arising from Russian-Iranian cooperation in civilian nuclear applications is that Russia wishes to maximize its ability to earn money from its nuclear expertise. In doing so, Russia may be willing to provide Iran with some of the civilian applications of nuclear technology that are allowed by the **NPT**, but have weapons proliferation potential. This would help Iran fulfill its desire for an entire nuclear fuel cycle. This is a right to which Iran is entitled under the terms of the **NPT**, but it involves acquiring heavy-water nuclear reactors, reprocessing facilities, uranium enrichment facilities, and an independent fuel fabrication capability – in other words, the four troublesome capabilities described above. Russia is believed to be predisposed toward providing some of these capabilities, and private discussions between Russia and Iran are thought to be already underway.

*A New Approach.* Assuming progress in bilateral relations, other initiatives could be pursued in phase five. U.S. weapons proliferation concerns would be eased if Iran were able to buy light-water nuclear reactors from French, German, and U.S. firms instead of from the Russians. It would dilute Iran's strategic dependence on Russia from which Iran also receives most of its conventional weaponry. Most important, if Iran were to interact with U.S., French, and German companies capable of selling light-water reactors, it would not be in contact with nuclear scientists who could be tempted into assisting a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

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<sup>18</sup> The German company Siemens had been in the process of constructing the Bushehr reactor but ceased work during the Iran-Iraq War. When approached by Iran to complete the project, it refused to do so because the United States had already made its policy of denial clear to the German government. Consequently, Iran turned to Russia instead.

If it is decided to change current policy, the first order of business would be for the United States to make clear that it will no longer oppose the sale of civilian nuclear power reactors to Iran if – and only if – the sales take place under the terms of an IAEA-monitored agreement whereby Iran:

- signs and ratifies the Model Safeguards Protocol of the IAEA; and
- agrees to forgo independent uranium enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water nuclear reactors, and independent fuel fabrication capabilities.

The United States already has a legislatively mandated vehicle for negotiating such an agreement and it can invite other countries to do the same.”

If the United States decides to revise its policy to include the sale of U.S. made nuclear power reactors to Iran under an expanded safeguards regime, congressional approval will be required. The government-to-government agreements<sup>20</sup> that must be negotiated prior to the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to foreign countries come into effect only if Congress has not registered its disapproval in a joint resolution, which must take place within 90 days of the date of submission. These Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation are sent to Congress along with a Nuclear Nonproliferation Assessment pertaining to the recipient country. The assessment is prepared by the Department of State in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency and contains a classified annex.

Presumably, any Nuclear Nonproliferation Assessment concerning Iran would include information on its clandestine procurement attempts. Congress would then have to weigh the non-proliferation progress represented by Iran’s monitorable adherence to the proscriptions contained in the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation and the seriousness of its clandestine procurement practices. A substantive case could be made that the former outweighs the latter, particularly because any procurements converted into a weapons-related form would presumably be discovered by the joint IAEA-United States inspection and monitoring process.

### Addressing Iran’s National Security Concerns

The ability of the United States to influence another country’s national security decisions such as whether to pursue a nuclear weapons or general WMD capability, is limited, at best (although it did have some influence with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). It may well be

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<sup>19</sup> The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates the export of parts, fuel, and major components of nuclear power reactors. If U.S. firms want to export civilian nuclear power plants to Iran, they would first have to receive NRC approval. The export of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors is approved only if Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is fulfilled. This section of the Act stipulates that parts, fuel, and major components of nuclear power reactors can be directly exported from the United States only if an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation is already in force between the United States and the recipient country. Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation have had provisions that enable the United States and the IAEA to inspect the recipient country to see whether stipulations made in the agreement are being carried out.

<sup>20</sup> Such an agreement can be negotiated in the absence of diplomatic relations, although this is clearly not the preferable situation.

that Iran will not back away from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability or positioning itself to move quickly toward such a capability in the face a severe international threat. If this is the case, U.S. sanctions or other measures are unlikely to persuade Iran to change course, and the United States will have to continue to try to manage the issue through efforts to deny access and, ultimately, through efforts to address Iran's legitimate national security concerns.

There may be important differences among Iranian leaders on the issue of nuclear weapons. Ayatollah Khomeini ruled out the option of pursuing them, even while Iran was keenly aware of its vulnerability to conventional missile and chemical weapons attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. Ayatollah Khomeini argued that because nuclear weapons are by their very nature indiscriminate in the casualties they inflict, killing civilians and combatants alike, their use is counter to the teachings of Islam. This argument still has power. In addition, many Iranian decision makers want very much to retain Iran's international respectability. This is, in part, Iran's rationale for signing major arms control treaties and for cooperating fully with the IAEA inspection regime. These factors have to be weighed against the national security argument that Iran needs to have nuclear weapons in order to deter the use of such weapons against Iran by other nuclear states in the region.

Iran's nuclear weapons program is probably in an early stage, so there is likely still time for Iran to quietly and deliberately consider the costs, risks, and benefits of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Similarly, there is also time for the United States and the international community to consult with Iran about its national security concerns and to address as many of these as possible with conventional defense alternatives. Iran's primary security concerns will be driven by Iraq for the foreseeable future, and there are some things that the United States can do to assuage them.

First, the United States should continue to closely monitor Iraq's military developments. These efforts will probably be intensified if and when the UN sanctions against Iraq are lifted. Significant Iraqi movement toward an operational nuclear weapons capability will be impossible to hide from view. Just as the United States proved itself willing to share sensitive intelligence data with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, the United States could share intelligence data about Iraq with Iran.

The United States could also assure Iran that a nuclear weapons capability under the control of Saddam Hussein will not be tolerated. There has not as yet been an official U.S. policy statement on this subject. During the 2000 presidential campaign, however, future vice president Dick Cheney stated:

[I]f, in fact, Saddam Hussein were taking steps to try to rebuild nuclear capability or weapons of mass destruction, we'd have to give very serious consideration to military action to stop that activity. I don't think you can afford to have a man like Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons, say, in the Middle East.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Transcript of the vice presidential debate between Cheney and Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), CNN, October 5, 2000.

## IV. Expectations of Iranian Responses

How far and how fast the United States moves should depend on responses from Iran. While U.S. efforts should not be inflexibly tied to a specific *quid pro quo*, the United States ultimately must realize clear benefits from engagement in the short and longer term. The United States also should anticipate hostile responses by some Iranians opposed to improved relations. These will be mainly directed at the proponents of closer ties, but also may be launched against U.S. businesses and other interests.

The Department of State should initiate a review of U.S.-Iranian relations. It should prepare a balanced report, with contributions, as appropriate, from other government agencies. The report should address the full scope of U.S. interests, highlight progress as well as problem areas, and recommend additional actions needed to maximize U.S. interests. A report like this should then be issued on an annual basis as long as necessary.

# ANNEX

## Comments by Working Group Members

### Hooshang Amirahmadi

While the report is reasonably balanced, Iran should be given more credit for a few of its rather significant initiatives. The report either silently dismisses many of these actions or portrays them as responses to gestures made by the United States. It is important that the United States acknowledge initiatives, such as those listed below, to encourage and embolden Iranian efforts to reconcile differences with the United States.

- President Khatami's interview with CNN (certainly not a reaction to any U.S. move);
- Iran's assistance in securing the release of western hostages held in Lebanon;
- Iran's neutrality during the U.S.-led war against Iraq (this must be seen as a pro-U.S. stand);
- Iran's offer of a \$1 million contract to Conoco, Inc;
- Iran's people-to-people exchange initiative introduced in President Khatami's CNN interview;
- Iran's "dialogue among civilizations" initiative, a step which has contributed, albeit slightly, to a lessening of tensions; and
- Speaker Karrubi's meeting with several members of Congress and major Jewish leaders in New York City in summer of 2000.

### Jahangir Amuzegar

The report's main premises are basically sound, and its principal recommendations seem defensible. Yet, an effective application of these recommendations requires due attention be paid to several specific points:

- While U.S. unilateral sanctions might have had no "discernable" effect on the Islamic regime's overall behavior, or its attitude toward the United States, they have undeniably hurt the Iranian economy – as frequently admitted by Iranian officials.
- While Iran has found access to "alternative investments and supplies," the latter have been acquired at higher costs, or in inferior quality – as evidence by Tehran's repeated requests for their removal.

- U.S. approaches in the past to “engage” Iran have not only failed to produce concrete results, but instead emboldened the clerical regime to raise the ante. Each concession by Washington has spawned a new demand from Tehran. There is no reason to believe that this successful policy ploy will be abandoned by the ruling clergy.
- For these reasons, even if the right policy of *reciprocal response* were judged too restrictive or inadvisable at this time, any new unilateral relaxation of sanctions should at least be limited to some narrow and well-defined areas where (a) U.S. national, geopolitical or economic interests are clearly involved; and (b) there are distinct benefits to the *people*, as distinct from the *government*, of Iran.

### Robert Copaken

Although I concur with the report overall, there is an omission in the report that I find regrettable. Although I understand that when the issues to be addressed by the working group were originally formulated back in 1998, the issue of our national interest in the protection of the human rights of religious minorities in Iran had much less prominence than it has assumed more recently, I am nevertheless troubled by the complete omission of this issue from the body of the report. The poor treatment of Bahai, Jews and women in Iran is deplorable and merits a mention, especially in light of the recent State Department report on religious persecution of these minorities in Iran and elsewhere. The espionage show trial and conviction of the Jews in Iran, despite urgent appeals by both Russia and the United States, ought to have made this issue at least as important in our list of priority interests as our commercial engagement with Iran.

### Kenneth Katzman

I sign on to the general themes of the paper in favor of greater engagement with Iran and the need for eventual normalization of relations, while taking note that the report mentions continuing U.S. concerns about Iran’s strategic weapons programs and support for certain Middle Eastern groups that employ violence. However, as an analyst of the Congressional Research Service, the non-partisan analytic arm of the U.S. Congress, I take no position on whether or not the Administration and the U.S. Congress should, at this time, terminate specific U.S. economic sanctions currently in place for Iran, or undertake, renew, amend, or rescind any other specific Executive measures or legislation relating to Iran.

### Geoffrey Kemp

The report is well argued, well researched, and well written. It contributes significantly to a better understanding of the complexities of U.S.-Iran relations. Many of the recommendations are timely and sensible and deserve support. My concern is that the report fails to fully address the most immediate political issues that bedevil the relationship.

First, the relationship has seriously deteriorated over the past six months due primarily to Iran’s increased and public support for terrorism against Israel. This has included hosting a

conference in Tehran in April 2001 on the Intifada that was accompanied by inflammatory speeches against Israel and the U.S. by the Supreme Leader and the President. As a result of this development there has been a distinct hardening of opinion concerning Iran in the new administration and U.S. Congress. This has resulted in proposals to continue, in some form or another, **IUA-type** legislation. If it is determined that Iran is directly supporting an escalation of violence against Israel, including confrontation along the Lebanese border, the situation could get much worse. In addition, continued Russian support for Iran's missile program remains a prime item on the U.S. agenda and is not addressed in the summary or part one of the report.

The report does not say how it would advise the Bush administration to manage these stumbling blocks. These questions should be addressed by the co-chairmen when the report is made public.

### Habib Ladjevardi

I joined the working group on U.S.-Iranian relations because, as someone born in Iran and raised in the United States, I have a deep affection for both countries. Above all, my objective in the group discussions has been to help the architects of the proposals foresee the impact of their recommendations on the lives and views of ordinary Iranians. With this in mind, I find the proposal to remove economic sanctions against Iran to be misadvised because its timing coincides with the most virulent attacks of recent years by the conservative forces against the reform movement in Iran. The past year in particular has witnessed the imprisonment of many of the reform leaders, the closing of all independent newspapers, and further curtailment of the role of the legislature. Lifting the embargo at such a time will not only embolden the anti-reform forces, it will send the Iranian people a message that the United States is indifferent to their struggle for the establishment of a representative government and that its only interest is the pursuit of commercial interests.

On the other hand, I fully support the proposal to rescind the requirement to fingerprint and photograph all Iranian visitors to the United States. Most of these visitors are relatives or friends of U.S. residents or citizens; many are prominent scientists, scholars, athletes or creative artists. By putting them through such indignities, the program turns friends of the United States into detractors. Moreover, these visitors, who have already suffered in their country, are abused again by representatives of a people they have considered to be their friends.

### Bruce Laingen

I agree with this paper and the thrust of the recommendations. However, I record my regret that the very first line of the paper's "Key Judgments" reads "The current stalemate, while *emotionally satisfying* to many Americans, does not serve overall U.S. interests well." It does not. But this is not the place for a qualifier of the kind stated. If that kind of qualifier is to be included, it should be elsewhere in the paper, including some analysis of how this judgment was reached. That analysis is not now evident in the paper.

Presumably the reference is to instances of Iranian terrorism, including the hostage crisis. But who are the “many Americans”? What is their number today, and their influence, twenty years since the hostage crisis ended? On what basis can the paper make the assertion that the feeling is so consequential today?

I believe it cannot. Indeed I believe that the vast bulk of the American people have put the hostage crisis behind them, no longer give any serious thought to it, and are ready to get on with a more normal relationship. I assume that the reference to these “many Americans” has to do with some in the media, the few members of Congress who give much thought to Iran, and a small, if influential, number of Hill lobbyists. But the paper should not leave the reader to conclude, which I think it does with the forecited clause, that a large number of Americans want to see the stalemate continue.

### Suzanne Maloney

I concur with the underlying principles of the Atlantic Council report: that the United States should ground Iran policy on a comprehensive assessment of our national interests; and that despite Iran’s domestic power struggle, these interests justify limited U.S. initiatives to engage with Tehran.

However, I differ in two areas. First, the analysis perpetuates a long-standing misjudgment about the relevance of Iran’s domestic political cleavages for U.S. policy. The convenient dichotomy between ‘good’ reformers and ‘bad’ conservatives is misleading; both camps contain pragmatists and radicals on international issues. Moreover, these assumptions would continue to anchor U.S. policy in the murky waters of Iran’s internal affairs. We should simply accept that for now, despite its contradictions and contestations, the Islamic Republic is here to stay, and we must deal with the regime as broadly construed.

Secondly, the recommendations adopt a precariously sanguine approach on two primary U.S. concerns: terrorism and WMD. On the former, political constraints and international norms suggest that commercial engagement should be pursued through limited mechanisms that condition increasing U.S. trade and investment on Tehran’s disengagement from violent opposition to the peace process. And with regard to Iran’s emerging nuclear capability, this issues is too urgent – for both parties – to defer until some hypothetical ‘Phase Five.’ The depth of our differences and the dilemmas of our history imply that the United States and Iran must tackle the tough issues early on, and mere diplomatic engagement in these areas may be the most ambitious objective for the near term.

### George Perkovich

Iran’s effort to develop a suite of ballistic missiles constitutes a proliferation threat that must be addressed in addition to the problem of nuclear weapon acquisition discussed in this report. Iran’s legitimate security interests in deterring and counteracting Iraq’s current and potential missile capabilities should be recognized. However, the range of ballistic missiles required to address Iran’s legitimate regional defense requirements should be delimited.

Efforts should concentrate on stopping the acquisition and/or deployment of longer-range missiles that could threaten Israel and, eventually the U.S. homeland. Distinctions should be made between systems arguably necessary to deal with security concerns emanating from Iraq and those that would threaten more distant states. The phased diplomatic engagement of Iran recommended in this report should include dialogue that seeks limitations on Iran's ballistic missile acquisition program. Such limitations — with provision for monitoring and verification — should be sought in conjunction with the recommended negotiations to allow international cooperation in Iran's energy sector, including nuclear power reactors. The goal should be to proscribe Iranian acquisition of weapon-sensitive nuclear technologies — e.g., capabilities for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, heavy-water production, and fuel fabrication — and longer-range ballistic missiles.

### **Brent Scowcroft**

Regarding the sections of the paper that deal with the energy interests of the United States and the Caspian region, I believe that the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline should be a top priority for the United States. Turkey is a key ally of the United States, one who suffers substantial economic losses as a result of the sanctions against Iraq. The benefits to Turkey — and to diversification of oil sources and routes — are a principal goal for oil delivery from the Caspian basin.

### **Paul Sullivan**

Given the fluid nature of Iranian politics at this time, and its expected fluidity in the near to medium term, it is probably best to take a stance of cautious optimism. Any moves toward rapprochement should be carefully weighed. Even within these caveats, it could be to the benefit of both countries to become more engaged in discussion, trade, cultural dialogue and some diplomatic exchanges. It is often the case that misunderstandings through a lack of communication lead countries down the wrong paths in their quests for national security and prosperity. Iran is a pivotal country in the region. It could be unwise, and could be to our long-term detriment, to shun the country, and to keep alternative voices from Iran unheard for much longer. Communication with Iran is also all the more important as most of the rest of the world has already opened their doors to Iran. Unilateral sanctions and unilateral cold diplomacy do not work, and, likely, will not work.

It will likely be in the national and economic security interests of the United States to begin a cautious opening of its doors. If, however, the politics of Iran turn against our interests in a significant and threatening manner, then the doors should be closed until another day.

### **Amin Tarzi**

While agreeing with the basic premise of the working group findings — that the current stalemate between the United States and Iran is not beneficial to either country or for regional security and global energy politics, and that a change in the behavior of both countries is necessary — I do not believe that the current state of affairs between Washington

and Tehran is “emotionally satisfying to many Americans,” as the report states. The problem, as I see it, is that most people are not fully aware of the complexities of the situation and tend to look at the U.S.-Iranian relationship from a specific perspective. This stated, I wish to add my name to the list of Working Group members, noting the following points.

The policy paper views overall U.S.-Iranian relations from the U.S. energy sector’s perspective, discounting or overlooking important security issues, such as Iran’s pursuit to acquire WMD and long-range ballistic missiles, which requires attention and inclusion in any official dialogue between the two countries. As such, Iran’s legitimate defense requirements should be discussed with Washington directly. Moreover, to say that Iran’s desire to acquire WMD and missiles is a product of a specific organization, such as the IRGC, and not the government at large, does not solve the issue.

Finally, I do not agree that the “core security issue” dividing the United States and Iran is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, Iran’s belligerent statements against the United States – such as messages carried on its missiles that call for trampling the United States – as well as Iran’s refusal to hold government-to-government dialogue with the United States and repeated calls for the destruction of Israel, are core security issues.

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Robert W. Helm

Robert T. Herres

Marten H.A. van Heuven

James Hogg

\*Mary L. Howell

Chun-tu Hsueh

Benjamin Huberman

Thomas L. Hughes

Robert E. Hunter

Robert L. **Hutchings**

Mercy W. Jimenez

\*George A. Joulwan

Paul G. Kaminski

Arnold Kanter

Robert M. **Kimmitt**

\*James V. Kimsey

Henry A. Kissinger

\*Charles R. Larson

\*Jan M. Lodal

John R. Lyman

Diana MacArthur

Jack F. **Matlock**, Jr.

Gary L. Matthews

Barry R. **McCaffrey**

James P. McCarthy

\*David E. **McGiffert**

Philip Merrill

\*Steven Muller

Paul H. Nitze

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Phyllis E. Oakley

Robert E. O'Brien

Philip A. **Odeen**

Laura Peralta-Schulte

Charles R. Perry

William J. Perry

Charles E. **Redman**

Stanley R. Resor

Paul H. Robinson, Jr.

Edward L. Rowny

Robert A. Scalapino

Marjorie M. Scardino

James Schlesinger

\***BrentScowcroft**

John M. D. Shalikashvili

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

C.J. Silas

Walter B. Slocombe

Esther T. Smith

Roy C. Smith

William Y. Smith

\*Helmut Sonnenfeldt

George J. Stathakis

\*Paula Stem

Robert D. Stuart, Jr.

Gordon R. Sullivan

James W. Symington

William H. Taft, IV

\*Sandra E. Taylor

Terence A. Todman

Carl E. Vuono

Roger W. Wallace

William H. Webster

Togo D. West, Jr.

Mason **Willrich**

R. James Woolsey

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Robert S. **McNamara**

Bernard W. Rogers

Eugene V. Rostow

George M. Seignious, II

Raymond P. Shafer

George P. Shultz

Cyrus R. Vance

Vernon A. Walters

John C. Whitehead

*\*members of the Executive  
Committee*

December 21, 2001 12:58 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Roche  
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Boeing 767

Attached is a note I got from Newt Gingrich. What is happening? He is a pretty smart fellow.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/18/01 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh  
122101-26

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*1/2*  
*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

*12*

*452C*

*21 Dec 01*

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From Newt Gingrich

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
 Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 7:57  
 To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil  
 cc: Torie.Clarke@osd.mil  
 Subject: vetoing the Boeing-767 power grab  
 could you give this to the Secretary, Paul, Ed and Larry, thanks newt

SECDEF HASSEEN

DEC 21 2001

Vetoing the Boeing 767 power grab

From the outside the Boeing 767 gimmick looks like a joint Air Force-Senate power grab. My impression is that the Air Force did not have your approval to push this rube goldberg contraption. The Senate clearly is trying to ram it down your throat on their terms with a ten year gimmick that is totally to Boeing's advantage and to the disadvantage of the taxpayer and of our men and women in uniform.

If you decide you need more tanker capacity you should first explore airlines in financial difficulty and see if you could not buy a bunch cheap. Second, you might go to Boeing to have a longer term lease purchase or purchase. I know of no planning which suggests that you will need fewer tankers in ten years and ought to retrofit the planes and turn them back to Boeing.

You ought to get the President to issue a veto threat that is quite simple. If the Congress wants to give you the authorization to buy tankers you deem necessary on terms you deem best for the taxpayer and the men and women in uniform you would be glad to accept it as a possible but not required use of money. If the Congress wants to micromanage your authority and dictate the terms and conditions you will insist on a veto and go to the country over who should run the Pentagon and why pork barrel masquerading as defense is indefensible and despicable. As you know McCain and Gramm are already hot on this and they represent the public's mood.

Properly framed this is a 90-10 issue which will help teach the Air Force and other services not to try to end run you and will teach the Congress that they have to negotiate with you and cannot run over you.

Welcome back.  
 Newt

12/19/2001

11-L-0559/OSD/2468

Received in Policy 11/29/01 @ 1523 Faith Casey

November 15, 2001 11:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ✓  
SUBJECT: Collins' Title

211

Should we change Joe Collins' title with "peacekeeping" in it to some nice, broader phrase?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111501-16

To: USD(P) -  
Yours for  
action.

*Di Rita*

Larry Di Rita  
11/29

12/12/01  
→ Bob Andrews.  
Let's do  
this  
immediately. By 12/13/01.  
Ideas?

DJJ

15 Nov 01

SOLIC

EF Tashir

0426

December 28, 2001 11:27 AM

SM  
1/11  
1/11

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Madrassa Schools

Saudi Arabia

What are we going to do about these madrassa schools that are polluting young minds?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122801-7

.....\*  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SOLIC (WORDEN)  
cc: ISA

1/10

Response Attached

Larry Di Rita

1/10

28 Dec 01

December 19, 2001 2:10 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
cc: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meeting re: Biological Programs

I used these cards in my conversation with the French MoD Richard.

He suggested we set a meeting that would include Germany, France, Sweden and the U.S. to talk about biological programs: which he believes were still active two years ago.

Would you please follow up on that for me?

Thanks.

Attach  
Note cards

DHR dh  
121901-3

*FRANUC*

*19 Dec 01*

December 3, 2001 10:10AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Idea

This fellow stopped me at the football game, He says he knows a way the Pentagon can save \$100 million. Why don't you have somebody call him **and** see what he has?


I have no idea if he is a nut or not, but he said he worked at the Pentagon for years.

*Thanks.*

Attach. (b)(6)  
Business card for (b)(6)

DHR:dh  
120301-22

*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*



*Sharon -*

*Have I spoken with him? I think I should just to follow up. Trx.*

*Sharon*



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2007 JUN 13 PM 2:15

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E880, The Pentagon  
Washington DC, 2050

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was a honor to meet you yesterday at the Cowboy/Red&m game. I hope I did not impose on you as you and Mrs. Rumsfeld were leaving. However, I had just a quick moment to pass on to you the information to save you millions of dollars. My partner, Major General (b)(6) (USA ret) and I have tried to bring to the attention of personnel in the Pentagon a **Defense Logistic** Agency program that was started in the United States Marine Corp and reduced their over all cost 50 percent and inventories by 55 percent. The Corp was so impressed with the results; they had an independent audit agency (KPMG) verify the finding, which they did. We have tried to educate other **DOD** activities to these programs only to be told we are not interested in changing the way we do business. That is not **the** correct answer especially when the taxpayer is footing **the** bill and you need every dime to rebuild programs and maintain the force structure. I am trying to follow the "Rumsfeld Rules" and **identify** the "Not invented here" syndrome and "treat each federal dollar as if it was hard earned; it was-by the taxpayer".

My partner and I are not trying to sell the Department of Defense (**DOD**) **anything** but just want to bring to the attention of your people, programs that can save you **millions**, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars, which can be applied to other **shortfalls within the Department**. If your people cannot reach me, please have then call General (b)(6) I was in the National Broadcast booth next to Dan Snyder's suite doing the game and I must say you and your lovely wife looked like you were newly weds. You radiate when you look at each other and that is so refreshing. As the Secretary of Defense, you are doing a superb job under very difficult circumstances and 'all Americans are proud of you. My forty years of federal service in the Air Force and as a civil servant were the happiest times of my life. **Once** again, it was a real pleasure meeting you.

(b)(6)

U0106714/02

To: Ray Dubois - 1/18

I spoke with him.  
He has some ideas  
about certain DLA programs  
that could lead to savings  
if we were more aggressive  
about it.

Would you call him?

Thanks.

snowflake

**Donald Rumsfeld**  
Suite 405  
400 North Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60611

(b)(6)

January 17, 2001

TO: ✓ Colin Powell  
Condi Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Attached is the note I mentioned at breakfast about my phone call with Netanyahu.

Attachment  
DR/nsp  
011701.3

*Israel*

*7 Jan 01*

U01335 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2475

January 9, 2001

I returned Netanyahu's phone call. He said he is not going to run, that Sharon is. He decided he would have to make too many deals, and he really could not govern that way. Sharon is willing to make the deals.

**Bibi** said someone is going to have to stop Arafat from causing the troubles he is causing. **Bibi** feels that the kinds of challenges Israel faces are not the kind that can be negotiated successfully with the kind of Knesset that exists. He says he will be there next time.

At the present time his assessment is that it is Sharon's election to lose, Barak cannot win. The likelihood is that when they call the election, Barak will step out, although he can't be forced out, and Peres would come in. If Peres does, it would be a tossup between Sharon and Peres. **Bibi** at the present time is ten points ahead of Peres.

He went on to say that he feels that everyone underestimates the president-elect of the U.S. He thinks he is "people savvy" and "impressive in his judgments and decisiveness."

DR/nsp  
011701.4

11-L-0559/OSD/2476



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 5, 2001 6:38 PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleeza Rice  
Mr. Mitch Daniel  
Mr. Paul O'Neill  
Mr. Sean O'Keefe  
Mr. Andrew Card

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Budget

Attached are the remarks made by President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney at a veteran's event in Washington, DC, in connection with Inaugural Weekend on January 19<sup>th</sup>.

I send them along with the thought that it might be helpful for you to read them against the backdrop of the budget issue. Regards.

Attachment

DR:dh  
020501-26

350 00 wif

5 Feb 01

U02345 /01

*President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney  
at the Salute to Heroes  
Reception, Banquet and Ball  
Capital Hilton  
Jan. 20, 2001*

*American Forces Press Service Transcript*

VP CHENEY:

Lynne and I are delighted to be here tonight. By tradition, this is always the first event the president and vice president visit before we begin the round of inaugural balls and that's for a very good reason. That's because of the enormous obligation and debt that we have to all of you who served in the U.S. military, veterans as well as the Medal of Honor winners (recipients) that are here tonight. On behalf of Lynne and myself, let me thank you for what you've done for all of us.

And now it's my great privilege to introduce to all of you the 43rd President of the United States, .George W. Bush.

PRESIDENT BUSH:

Mr. Vice President, thank you for the introduction. I'm told that it is a tradition that before the president and vice president goes on to the inaugural balls, they stopped at the veterans dinner and it's right that it be that way.

The inaugural balls are a reflection of the wonderful freedoms we have in America. The free transfer of power that took place today. This is a free land, however, it would not have been free necessarily without the sacrifice of the men and women who have worn our uniform.

It makes good sense to start here. I'm honored to be with the soon-to-be head of the Veterans Affairs Department, Tony Principi. He understands that a promise made will be a promise kept to the men and women who wear the uniform, I wanted to be here with the leaders of our military branches -- fine men who lead some of the finest citizens anywhere in the world.

Their mission and our mission is to keep the peace and the way to do so is to make sure our military is highly trained and well paid, And to make sure that the mission of the military is focused and it's focused on this, that our job, those of us in the chain of command, will make sure that our soldiers are fully prepared to fight and win war, and therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place.

And so today as the president and therefore as the commander in chief, what an honor and what a duty. I look forward to that honor and duty with pride. It's an honor to be here. God Bless what you all have done for America and God Bless America.

*President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney  
at the Vice President's Salute to Veterans  
at the George Washington University Smith Center  
Jan. 19, 2001*

*American Forces Press Service Transcript*

VP CHENEY:

Let me **say** what a pleasure it is to be here today, to note the presence of so many distinguished Americans. I see my old friend **Gen. Colin Powell**, Mr. Secretary. My former boss, **Don Rumsfeld**, Mr. Secretary. I think in those two men America's going to have a great national security team.

I also note the presence of my two former colleagues **John McCain** -- John it's great to have you here today -- and also **Bill Cohen**, current secretary of Defense, **Bill**, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, **Gen. Shelton**. Good to see you general.

**Lynne** and I appreciate very much the tremendous turnout this afternoon. By tradition, the events of this week are to include a salute to the incoming vice president. Far better, I thought, for the incoming vice president to offer a salute of his own.

So we're here today to express our gratitude to our veterans, to show our pride in our armed forces and to celebrate the event we've all been waiting for, the inauguration of a new commander in chief. I also want to note the presence of some distinguished guests that others have mentioned before me.

The presidency and the vice presidency may be the highest offices in the land, but there is an even greater distinction that our country bestows -- the Medal of Honor. It is the highest award for valor in action against an enemy force. Only 150 living Americans wear the Medal of Honor. When you meet one of them, remember the moment. For you have just met one of the bravest men in our nation's history.

One hundred and one of these gentlemen are here with us this very afternoon. Let's give them a fitting welcome.

It was 12 years ago, serving as a member of Congress that I received a call from the new president asking me to serve as secretary of defense. Taking the job meant assuming responsibility for the well being of millions of men and women in the military. I accepted without hesitation and thus began the most rewarding years of my public life.

As secretary of defense you hold a civilian post, but your daily life is bound up with those who wear the uniform. The caliber of these men and women, the sacrifices they make, the duties they carry, and the code they live by -- every day you're reminded of these. Every day you're reminded of what they give to us and of how much we owe them in return.

We've heard today some of the ways that American service men have touched peoples' lives around the world. These stories capture a great truth. For all its size and discipline and immense power, our military's real strength has always been, and will always be, in the character of those who serve."

Stephen Ambrose has written about the world of a little more than a half century ago, the world that Bob Dole spoke of. In that time, in many parts of Europe and Asia during world War II, the sight of a group of soldiers would strike terror into the heart of a civilian. Armed troops almost always meant destruction or terror or death.

But if they were American troops, the civilian had nothing to fear. As Ambrose explains, those **G.I.s** meant candy, and cigarettes, and C-rations and freedom. We had sent our best young men halfway around the world, not to conquer, not to terrorize but to liberate. So it has always been for the American military.

We are a peaceful nation. Our people are reluctant warriors. We take up arms only to protect our country, to throw back tyranny and to defend the cause of freedom. At times the price has run high and never higher than in the last century with so many conflicts, world wars, Asian wars, the Cold War, the Gulf War.

Veterans from all these periods are with us today. Some served for a few years, others for long careers. Some were called to the front lines of battle. Others had duties closer to home. But all had these things in common.

In our country's hour of need, they answered. They gave America the best years of their lives and they stood ready to give life itself.

It is sometime said that heroes are hard to find. But I never heard that said around the Pentagon. Those who would understand the meaning of duty, and honor and country, need look no further than the nearest veteran of America's armed forces.

Today, we also remember those who are not so near, those who never came home, those whose fate is still undetermined. We honor the memory of the fallen soldier. We have not forgotten the missing soldier and we pledge to their families our best efforts at the fullest possible accounting.

On this day in 1981, the city of Washington was preparing to welcome a man who is in the thoughts of all of us today, President Ronald Reagan. His inauguration marked a new era of purpose and pride for the United States and for the armed forces.

President-elect Bush and I hope the same might be said of our administration and the era that begins tomorrow at noon. Of the many duties he and I are about to assume, none is greater than preparing our military for the challenges and the dangers to come.

We will give them training that is thorough and missions that are clear. We will give them the kind of military where men **and** women are proud to serve and proud to stay. We will give them the respect they have earned and the support they deserve.

All of this begins in less than 24 hours, when the chief justice administers the oath of office to the man I now present, the 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush."

PRESIDENT BUSH:

I'm certainly glad the vice president-to-be invited me. It does not surprise me, however, that he turned his tribute, or a tribute that was supposed to be to him, to honor somebody else. That's why I picked him to be the vice president. He is a decent, honorable man.

I am so pleased to see Secretary of Defense Cohen. Thank you so much for coming. I'm honored you're here. Secretary welcomed Dick and myself and a couple other notables over to the defense department the other day and he did so with grace. For that we're very grateful, sir.

I'm so glad to see Bob Dole. What a good man. Of all the notables here, I don't know why I picked you out except you always make me smile when I think about you. What a great man. And thank you for your service in building a memorial to the World War II vets.

It's good to see members-of the United States Senate here - - Senator Inouye, and of course, my friend Senator McCain. Senator McCain is a pretty tough competitor. He brings the best out in people, if you know what I mean.

But I look forward to working with both members of the Senate and the members of the United States Congress who are here as well. Thank you for coming.

It's something to be in the midst of heroes. But it's important that a president-to-be and vice president-to-be do so because it reminds us of the greatness of our country. It reminds us of the fact that there are thousands of Americans who when called are willing to serve a cause greater than self. What an honor to be here."

It's a particular honor to be here with recipients of the Medal of Honor. Great heroes of the American scene. Americans who define the character of America, remind us that we must never forget our history.

Soon, a new administration will be taking office in Washington and we'll have the responsibility for keeping the peace, for making the world more peaceful. It begins by first having a national security team. I believe, in all due respect to other presidents -- one whom I happen to know quite well -- that I believe the national security team I put together is the best in our nation's history, led by Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld.

I look forward to hearing their opinions. I look forward to their advice. I look forward to doing what is right to make the world more peaceful. This is an administration which

understands though, that in order to keep the peace our military must be strong, morale must be high.

We will make sure our soldiers are well paid and well housed. We will make sure our soldiers are well trained. I'm so glad to see general officers here of our military, because I want to say this loud and clear as I can. The mission of the United States military will be to have a military prepared and trained and ready to fight and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place.

In order to make sure that morale is high with those who wear the uniform today we must keep our commitment to those who wore the uniform in the past. I have picked a really good man to head the veterans' department in Tony Principi. We will make sure promises made to our veterans will be promises kept.

In less than 24 hours I have the highest honor and that's to become the commander in chief of the greatest nation in the world. I accept that honor with pride. I accept that honor with purpose. Thank you for having me. God bless America.

##END##

1/23/01

TO Steve Cambone,

Steve,

*(D)*  
*Amul*  
*Condi*  
*Michael*  
*Shuman*  
*Arb*  
*Schh*  
*Dw*  
*Am*  
*SL*

Here are excellent remarks by Dick Cheney and President Bush. The folks who are working on our material ought to use some of this. Also, I think these two pieces should be sent out broadly throughout the department so people know what was said. I also think they ought to be sent out broadly within the office of management and budget and to the hill.

Why don't you figure out how to do that in the proper way.

Secretary Rumsfeld

DHR/azn  
012301.02



350.001 WH

23 Jan 0

***President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney  
at the Salute to Heroes  
Reception, Banquet and Ball  
Capital Hilton  
Jan. 20, 2001***

*American Forces Press Service Transcript*

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All **of** this begins in less than **24** hours, when the chief justice administers the oath of office to the man I **now** present, the **43rd** president of the United States, George W. Bush."

PRESIDENT BUSH:

I'm **certainly** glad the vice president-to-be invited me. It does not surprise me, however, that he turned his tribute; or a tribute that was **supposed** to be to him, to honor somebody else. That's why I picked **him** to be the vice president, He is a decent, honorable **man**.

11-L-0559/OSD/2488

~~man. And thank you for your service in building a memorial~~

I am so pleased to see Secretary of Defense Cohen. Thank you so much for coming. I'm honored you're here. Secretary welcomed Dick and myself and a couple other notables over to the defense department the other day and he did so with grace. For that we're very grateful, sir.

I'm so glad to see Bob Dole. What a good man. Of all the notables here, I don't know why I picked you out except you always make me smile when I think about you. What a great man. And thank you for your service in building a memorial to the World War II vets.

It's good to see members of the United States Senate here - - Senator Inouye, and of course, my friend Senator McCain. Senator McCain is a pretty tough competitor. He brings the best out in people, if you know what I mean.

But I look forward to working with both members of the Senate and the members of the United States Congress who are here as well. Thank you for coming.

It's something to be in the midst of heroes. But it's important that a president-to-be and vice president-to-be do so because it reminds us of the greatness of our country. It reminds us of the fact that there are thousands of Americans who when called are willing to serve a cause greater than self, What an honor to be here."

It's a particular honor to be here with recipients of the Medal of Honor, Great heroes of the American scene. Americans who define the character of America, remind us that we must never forget our history.

Soon, a new administration will be taking office in Washington and we'll have the responsibility for keeping the peace, for making the world more peaceful. It begins by first having a national security team. I believe, in all due respect to other presidents -- one whom I happen to know quite well -- that I believe the national security team I put together is the best in our nation's history, led by Colin Powell and Don Rumsfeld.

I look forward to hearing their opinions. I look forward to their advice. I look forward to doing what is right to make the world more peaceful. This is an administration which

understands though, that in order to **keep** the peace **our** military must **be** strong, morale must be high.

We will make sure **our** soldiers are well paid and well housed. We will make **sure our** soldiers are well trained, I'm so **glad** to see general officers here of our military, because I want to say this loud and clear as I can, The mission **of** the **United** States military will be to have a military prepared and trained and ready to **fight** and win war, and therefore prevent war from happening in the first **place**.

In order to make **sure** that morale is high with those who wear the uniform today we must **keep** our commitment to **those who** wore the uniform in the past. I have picked a really good man to head the veterans' **department** in Tony **Principi**. We will. make sure promises made to **our** veterans will be promises kept.

In less than 24 hours I have the highest honor and that's to become the commander in chief of the greatest nation in the world. I accept that honor with pride. I accept that honor with purpose, Thank you for having me. Cod bless America.

##END##



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 10, 2001 4:32PM

TO: The Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: The Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Ecuador

1. The Deputies Committee is not functioning as yet. I believe that normally the Ecuador situation would be handled there. Why don't we get it going even using our acting folks – Rudy deLeon at DoD is enormously helpful to me.
2. Next, I am unclear as to who is in charge of the issue in the U.S. Government. Shouldn't we know? I am assuming it is NSC or State.
3. Also, I don't know what guidance your office is giving to Mr. Clark on this subject.
4. Any thoughts?

DR:dh

Ecuador

10 Feb 01

1530  
12/3

December 3, 2001 9:48 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Smallpox

What do we do about this memo from Pete Aldridge on smallpox? Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/07/01 AT&L memo to **SecDef** re: What Should We Have Done?

DHR:dh  
120301-19

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

720

3 Dec 01



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 8, 2001 6:35 AM

TO: Bill Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: B-2/Norm Dicks

3

Norm Dicks called, the Congressman from Washington, saying he wanted to bring you and Perle to see me about the error that was made to stop the B-2s at 21. Please see me about this.

DR:dh  
020801-1

*Ask Bill  
what this  
about?*

452B

8 Feb 01

February 22, 2001  
8:16 PM

TO: Dr. Wolfowitz  
Dr. Schneider  
Dr. Zakheim  
Chris Williams  
Honorable Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Attached is a paper I have drafted up on deployments. Take a look at it and give me your edits. And sign it so I know who is making what recommendations. I think what we've got to do is begin to fashion what will eventually result in a policy, first to be washed through the NSC and possibly the President and then to be communicated in the Building. Thanks,

370

22 Feb 01

February 22, 2001 10:02 AM

SUBJECT: Deployments

Priorities might be on:

- Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics--to develop better relationships
- Asian and South Asian countries (India & Pakistan)--to gain insights and develop relationships both ways
- Middle Eastern countries

Areas we could be less involved:

- African countries--except possibly for two or three with strategic resources
- Western Europe--where we have intimate relationships already
- Latin America, except for a few selected countries

Activities to emphasize:

- Training activities that benefit us
- Activities that give us knowledge of or relationships in countries of interest

Activities to de-emphasize:

- Drug activities
- Democratization activities

Note: Army deployments tend to be good for morale; Air Force deployments tend not to be

DHR:dh  
022101-6

11-L-0559/OSD/2495

February 23, 2001 9:26 AM

TO: Steve Herbits  
cc: Steve Cambone  
William Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Early Intervention Forces

381

Here is a proposal on Early Intervention Forces. Let me know how you think we might take a look at that.

Attachment

DHR:dh  
022301-14

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

23 Feb 01

## Maximizing the Combat Capability of Early Intervention Forces

An opportunity exists to substantially increase the capabilities of initial intervention forces during the first week or so of potential combat. The United States has significant advantages in night fighting. To a large extent we currently "own the night." However no force can fight without sleep. When we own the night we have to rest during a good part of the day.

This night fighting capability creates an opportunity that could be greatly to America's advantage in seeking rapid mobility to crisis situations. Humans are easier to transport than heavy equipment. The initial insertion forces should be double **crewed** (including maintenance). Thus it could fight on a **24-hour** cycle without having to stop for rest.

Thus an initial insertion should have an A team for daylight and a B team for nighttime operations. The goal would be to put continuous pressure on the opposition forces so they had no letup. Enemy forces should start cracking within 72 hours of continuous operations.

To test this theory the Marines at 29 Palms and the Army at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk should be asked to field test battalions that are double-crewed to assess if the continuous pressure model could actually be applied in the field.

If the tests prove promising the goal would be to have two or three insertion brigades that could generate continuous combat capability.

February 23, 2001 9:33 AM

TO: Steve Herbits  
cc: Steve Cambone  
William Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Creating Doctrine

381

Here is a proposal on Creating Doctrine. Let me know how you think we might take a look at that.

Attachment

DHR:dh  
022301-15

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

23 Feb 01

## **Creating Doctrine from a Theater and National Asset Perspective**

Despite the efforts of Goldwater-Nichols and the talk of jointness, doctrine today is developed by the individual services and then brought together in a clumsy amalgamation of capabilities designed to keep each service comfortable. The result is a system that lacks coherence in its use of national and theater assets. Consequently it provides the theater commander and the National Command Authority with fewer assets and more limited choices than it should have.

General Wes Clark was vehement in his description of the doctrinal problems that made it impossible to use the Apache helicopters in Kosovo. Earlier examples of doctrinal problems between the Air Force and Navy in the Gulf remain unsolved.

The Joint Forces Command at Norfolk currently has the responsibility for developing joint doctrine but in fact contracts the doctrine out to "lead" services who then dominate the development of their particular component within the doctrine, equipment and system they are comfortable with.

The Joint Forces Command should be assigned the task of developing a truly joint doctrine by starting with national and theater assets and then integrating into those assets the various delivery systems to create an integrated unified combat capability.

The services and the Joint Commands would be asked to comment on doctrine after the initial draft had been developed at the Joint Forces Command.

The goal would be to ensure that systems' capabilities were available and useful across the board to the theater commander. This approach would force the services to rationalize their systems and their doctrines into an integrated whole and should result in a substantial increase in integrated capability for the theater commander.

The new joint doctrine should then be tested in joint force exercises that compel the integration of all four services into single war games and single tests as compared with the service-by-service system that dominates today.

February 23, 2001 9:34 AM

TO: Rich Haver  
cc: Steve Herbits  
Steve Cambone  
William Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Intelligence

350.09

Here is a proposal on Intelligence. How do you think we might take a look at this?

Attachment

DHR:dh  
022301-16

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

23 Feb 01

## Visualizing the Intelligence System of 2025

It is important for the United States to develop a new vision of intelligence gathering, analysis and utilization. The existing system is becoming less than optimal in the face of new conditions and new requirements. As seen from the National Command Authority the United States has a number of new requirements that the Cold War based intelligence system deals with inadequately:

1. There is a world with many centers of activity and importance. The bipolar focus of the past is hopeless. Indeed there may be no coherent focus that is manageable in a world in which Korea, Thailand, Colombia, the Galapagos Islands, Rwanda and terrorist threats against the United States all could simultaneously demand attention while Russia, China, India, Japan, the Middle East and the European Community could also require attention the same day;
2. The nature of the problems which Presidents cannot avoid dealing with have broadened dramatically to include the environment, economics, organized crime, human rights, as well as more traditional military and diplomatic concerns;
3. The reliance on overhead capability is being eroded by increasingly sophisticated strategies of denial and deception;
4. The reliance on code breaking and electronic intercept is being eroded by fiber optic lines and increased encryption capabilities;
5. Some terrorist groups use family and communal relationships that make them extraordinarily difficult to penetrate while their capacity to inflict damage with minimum organization is growing dramatically;
6. There has been a tendency to overemphasize collections and underemphasize analysis so we often know more data than we can translate into usable knowledge. The answer is not less collection but more analysis;
7. More and more information is going to exist in the clear but will need to be gathered, analyzed and distributed within the framework of more traditional intelligence if the two are to be synthesized into one working whole.

These seven changes require a new visualization of the missions, systems architecture, and resource requirements of the intelligence capability America needs for future security requirements.

No one who is managing daily activities and current problems (including PFIAB) can really develop this kind of new visualization. What is needed is a broad based working group or commission to review the collective needs of the National Command Authority and examine the potential real-time and long-term requirements of both American security and American leadership and then propose a system that could meet those needs.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

February 20, 2001 10:07 AM

TO: RADM Quinn

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Security

380.01

I would like to get a letter from the General Counsel's office that indicates that everything that the security people do at my house was or will be approved by the GC office as necessary to my responsibilities.

In addition, if there is anything that adds to the value of the house and that cannot be taken away from the house at the point that I am no longer Secretary of Defense, I think I probably should pay for it.

So, please have the General Counsel office get engaged with the security people so they know what they are doing and, if necessary, get the Office of Ethics in the Pentagon to sign off as well.

Before anything is done to the house, I would like a letter, for everything that is done, and it should indicate if there is anything that adds value so I can pay for it.

DHR:dh  
022001-g

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

20Feb01

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

February 23, 2001

From: Donald Rumsfeld

To: The Honorable Pete Aldridge  
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz  
Dr. William Schneider  
Mr. Steve Herbits

Attached is a paper on transforming U.S. forces. Why don't you see that it gets in the hands of the proper people? Thank you.

Attach.

460.13

23 Feb 01

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Zal Khalilzad   
SUBJECT: Transforming US Forces: RAND Recommendations  
DATE: February 7, 2001

Enclosed is a RAND paper, which I had requested during the abbreviated transition, on how to stimulate the development of innovative system concepts that will be necessary for any transformation of American forces and how OSD might be organized to enable to play a stronger role in making sure that such a transformation comes to pass. The RAND paper argues that the current DoD acquisition process impedes transformation and is not nimble and adaptive enough given that potential belligerents and their weapons can appear with short notice and that the new forces challenging the US might operate in very unconventional ways.

The paper recommends five steps for revitalizing the process and argues that you can take them in the few weeks and months:

- Support selected Service programs, which are truly transformational such as UCAV and Airborne Laser.
- Stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services and abandon *ex ante* allocation decision making. The Service that comes with the best idea should be given the resources to perform the assignment.
- Develop a "second acquisition path" for novel system concepts. Acquisition policies in place today were basically designed to deliver new systems at high rates that could be operated with full support in the field. The new path would include our willingness to accept some risks in return for faster fielding of the product; and, field systems early and refine them later based on that field experience.
- Reorganize AT&L. The current AT&L is responsible for too many things. The paper proposes two different reorganization options: a) Focused on three functions-science and technology, concept formulation and development, and acquisition; and, b) Redistribute AT&L functions-sharpen the acquisition management by defining a new office with a narrower charter and places other functions dealing with technology and logistics in separate offices.
- Identify and select advocates of change and promote them in positions of responsibility.

C: Paul Wolfowitz and Bill Schneider

## The Role of the Acquisition Executive in Transforming the U.S. Military

The orientation and structure of the Defense Department's acquisition efforts are caught in a time warp that is a decade or more out of date. While the DoD over the past 15 years has embraced novel management approaches in such areas as greater use of commercial technology, lean production, outsourcing, and joint warfare, the department's approach to acquiring weapons systems remains similar to its approach in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

However, today's defense environment is placing growing pressure on defense policymakers to be nimble and adaptive, particularly with respect to acquisition systems and processes. This has come about because of two intersecting factors:

- *Need for shorter response times.* In the future, the composition of potential belligerent forces and their weapons are likely to be varied, and some can be expected to appear with relatively short notice. This puts new demands on the timeliness of response by the acquisition process when called upon to deliver new kinds of systems to counter those new challenges.
- *Greater need for novel system concepts and employment concepts.* The new forces challenging the United States are likely to include at least some that operate in very unconventional ways and that require response mechanisms not found in the established U.S. force structure. All Services and the joint force structure are vigorously experimenting with new concepts and potential solutions to challenges confronting them. As presently administered, the acquisition process impedes rather than encourages experimentation and actual transformation. Our force modernization process must enable us to **field new** and novel capabilities quickly, with less emphasis than in the past on maximizing the cost-effectiveness of each particular system.

By putting in motion a series of initiatives over the next year, the Secretary of Defense can set the stage for revitalizing and revamping the Pentagon's acquisition process to respond to the above factors. The five initiatives described below are steps that Secretary of Defense can take over the next few weeks and months that will markedly improve the timeliness, quality and cost of weapons systems that the DoD intends to acquire.<sup>1</sup> In particular, the DoD should

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<sup>1</sup> This paper focuses on the Acquisition and Technology roles of the office, and does not address the Logistics management function.

- Support selected Service programs
- Stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services
- Develop a second acquisition path for novel system concepts
- Reorganize AT&L so that it can play a stronger role in integrating and catalyzing the military after next
- Identify and select qualified and supportive flag officers and civilian managers for crucial acquisition assignments within the Services and the organization

The DoD should start each initiative early in the new Administration. None needs congressional approval or a budget line item. While all of the initiatives will improve the DoD's acquisition processes eventually, several could pay off relatively soon, within a year or two.

### ***Support Selected Service Programs***

An early initiative of the Administration should be to join with the Services to ensure that important new weapons systems that are truly transformational are successfully developed and produced. Each Service is sponsoring a few such major projects. The new administration should ensure that the most promising of these transformational projects are vigorously supported. Such a strategy will involve forging supportive relationships with the individual Services and their acquisition executives to help them acquire the technologies, systems, and sub-systems that will transform their forces into those envisioned in Joint Vision 2020.

We suggest selecting one or two systems from each service. Candidates might include: the "Future Combat System" for the Army, the UCAV and Airborne Laser for the Air Force, the DD-21 for the Navy, and the V/STOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter for the Marine Corps.

### ***Stimulate Competition of New Ideas Among the Services***

Over the longer term AT&L should encourage a climate of competition among the Services for innovative concepts and ideas. A continuing weakness in the current system is that decisions on which Service will provide forces that contribute capability toward a stated mission area or operational objective are made *ex ante*. That is, they are made before the Service presents a set of options (concepts), and certainly before it has an opportunity to demonstrate how well the proposed

concept might carry out the stated objectives. *Ex ante* allocation decisionmaking precludes the possibility of having multiple concepts to choose among?

Had the United States adhered strictly to *ex ante* assignment according to missions, the Navy presumably would not have been allowed to pursue long-range ballistic missiles. Intent on having a role in the mission of deterring nuclear attack on the United States, the Navy devised what clearly became by the late Cold War years the most viable solution to the operational objective of a survivable nuclear force--the submarine-launched ballistic missile. Having additional options available on a more systematic basis would be an improvement.

A central element of a new strategy should be to stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services. The best ideas would translate into that Service being assigned the responsibility for implementing the concept and given the resources to perform that assignment. (We need not be limited to one solution or a single innovative idea for a needed capability. Having multiple ways to perform a military task provides robustness that has intrinsic value to our warfighters while adding complexity and cost to our enemies as they try to develop and field defenses.) Competition managed in this manner would promote choices and thus set the stage to make informed choices among promising new concepts--choices made on the merit of the case, unhampered by a preconceived notion of "assignments" of particular role and function to a particular Service. Of course, not every proposal should be funded. In fact, most probably should not be. The successful use of competition as a management tool requires the Secretary of Defense to make explicit decisions about winners and losers. Otherwise, the Department of Defense will proliferate solutions, squandering its resources on less competitive ideas.

### ***Develop a Second Acquisition Path for Novel System Concepts<sup>3</sup>***

Facilitating and enabling innovation demands a departure from the practices of the past. In addition to the traditional need for relatively large forces equipped with weapon systems produced in large quantities and operated over long periods of time, there is now a growing need to respond quickly to novel threats by developing and fielding innovative systems, and to turn to emerging technologies to improve and upgrade existing systems. These demands for new system capabilities present new challenges to the acquisition process.

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, see Birkler et. al., *Gaining New Military Capability: An Experiment in Concept Development*, RAND, MR-912-OSD, 1998

<sup>3</sup> The ideas outlined here are developed in greater detail in Birkler, et al. *An Acquisition Strategy, Process and Organization for Innovative Systems*, RAND, MR-1098-OSD, 2000.

Acquisition policies in place today were basically designed to deliver new systems that were ready to be produced at high rates and that could be operated with full support in the field. Such a process has been appropriate when the quantities to be produced have been large and where the systems have been expected to be operational for many years. These processes are unfriendly and inappropriate for management of new concepts that involve some combination of true urgency and uncertainty.

New, innovative system concepts inherently pose many uncertainties for development outcomes (cost and performance of the system, and operational effectiveness in the field). The characteristics of novel systems are so different that “tinkering” with the present process will be inadequate. The most efficient way to develop novel systems is to identify a “second acquisition path.” Such a second path would

- emphasize flexibility of the process,
- include an overt willingness to accept some risks in return for faster fielding of the product, and
- field systems early and refine them later based on that field experience.

The last element is the most radical, poses the most challenging problems of implementation, and contains potentially the most powerful tactic for moving an innovative new system concept to early operational capability. The concept of “experimental” operational units, designed to receive and operate systems that are not quite technically mature and that are not fully provisioned with support and training aids, lies outside the main thrust of the traditional MDAP acquisition policy. The “field demonstration” phase of the ACTD process suggests that this approach can work for novel systems where the system configuration and the operational concept are likely to evolve as early operational experience is accumulated.

### ***Reorganize AT&L so that it Can Play a Stronger Role in Shaping the Military After Next***<sup>4</sup>

As the strategy and process change, so too must the organization. AT&L must transform its enterprise and structure to meet these new defense challenges and demands. By enterprise, we mean

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<sup>4</sup> For additional discussion on this topic see Bracken, et al. *Shaping and Integrating the Next Military; Organization Options for Defense Acquisition and Technology*, RAND DB 117-OSD, 1996.

the primary purposeful activities of the organization. What activities should preoccupy the organization? We argue above that the primary enterprise of AT&L should be the successful development and production of important new weapons systems that are truly transformational. This is the traditional enterprise and the one at the core. An acquisition organization should be focused on those activities that are central to its purpose of providing cost-effective systems.

If AT&L were to support selected Service programs and to develop a second acquisition path for novel system concepts, it would need to change its organization. Such a step would require sharpened emphasis on identifying, selecting, and rewarding senior military and civilian executives to drive the changes.

OSD should realign the organizational structure along separately managed enterprise lines. Such changes are needed to reflect the above new strategy, policies and procedures and to help institutionalize a new acquisition culture.

There is no single best way to organize the office to further achievement of these objectives, and it is premature to recommend explicit and detailed organization structures. The notions shown below are offered as illustrations of concepts for future organization. Both have as a central element that the current USD(AT&L) is simply responsible for too many things and is spread too thin.

#### **Reorganization Option One-A Three Function Organization for AT&L**

We assume that the five principal activities of AT&L are:

- Discovering new technologies
- Demonstrating and maturing selected technology aggregates and sub-systems
- Participating in formulating and defining new system concepts and new operational concepts
- Managing the acquisition of systems and weapons.
- Advising the Secretary of Defense about matters of modernizing,

A set of functions and relationships that accommodates these activities is shown in Figure 1.

In addition to discovering and advancing new technologies, the Science and Technology Office should have a broader charter, having responsibility for maturing selected technologies, especially those identified in the Concept Formulation and Development Office. The Science and Technology Office should also function as the technology steward and advocate.




Figure 1-A Possible Three-Function Reorganization for AT&L

The Concept Formulation and Development Office would work with the individual Services to formulate, evaluate, and define new system concepts in each mission area and those that span multiple mission areas. Its charter should include both novel systems concepts and novel operations concepts. This office would identify technologies and concepts and initiate second-path development, promote purposeful competition among the Services, and develop new concepts to take advantage of nascent technologies. In addition, this office would be the primary DOD acquisition community interface with the Service and joint experimentation processes. It would seek out candidates for the second acquisition path. At the same time it would look for transformation system “overlap” and synergy.

The Acquisition Office would manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs using well established procedures.

#### Reorganization Option Two-Redistribute AT&L Functions

This option, outlined in Figure 2, sharpens acquisition management by defining a new office with a narrower charter. This new office would be the principal “customer” representative for weapons systems acquisition and serve as the DAB chair. Other functions dealing with technology and logistics currently in AT&L should be placed in separate offices.

With such a customer focus, the office should be recast as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions), with the staff provided by what is now the Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Systems. The Under Secretary could conceivably be given responsibility for OT&E, too, preferably through a legislative change, but perhaps in the interim by dual-hatting the appointee (which would at the least require Congressional consultation). Such responsibility would be consistent with the Under Secretary's oversight role; with advocacy for new ideas lodged elsewhere, the conflict of interest that now requires OT&E to report independently to the Secretary would be removed (see below). USD(A) should gain functions from C3I that are consistent with its new role, i.e., it should be in charge of telecommunications and the "information revolution"; DISA would report to it. It should likewise be charged with acquiring those systems that provide battlefield situational awareness. The remainder of what is now C3I becomes the nucleus for a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, charged with carrying out the Secretary's agenda of building a cooperative partnership between DoD and the intelligence community, including development and operational use of "national systems" for application to DoD missions.




Figure 2-A Recast Acquisition Focus

In this scheme, USD(A) would retain Defense Procurement, Acquisition Reform, Industrial Affairs, and Small Business, which might productively be merged into a single organization, with some staff savings taken.

USD(A) should not also be the purveyor of new ideas—that's a potential conflict of interest, as represented by the Service views that much of what OSD pushes consists of "pet rocks". The

enterprise of the second acquisition path should be organized by having DDR&E report directly to the Secretary of Defense, but retain a seat on the DAB. In this scheme, DARPA would report to the DDR&E, as it does now, but DDR&E becomes the proponent of novel systems, responsible for the "second path" described earlier. In an effort to secure Service buy-in, the Services should be given some voice in "steering" DARPA. They could, for example, ask DARPA to assist or lead their efforts to integrate the overlapping sensor grid. The DARPA change could also be used as a lever to refresh the Service S&T communities, including needed consolidation, better partnering with the private sector and the universities, etc.

A more aggressive use of DARPA could make it responsible for working with the Services to develop and acquire a small number of the novel systems coming out of the second acquisition path to equip experimental operational units. The Services would carry out experiments to develop operational concepts for using these novel systems in their experimental operational units. These experiments would also test logistics and maintenance processes for the novel systems. These experiments would be carried out to learn how the novel systems could be best used in operational missions. DARPA would work with the Services on these experiments to help identify additional system capabilities or unwanted capabilities. The novel system design characteristics could then be changed by DARPA in an iterative fashion to achieve the results desired by operational Service units. Once the novel systems characteristics have been shaken out in the DARPA/Service experiments using these experimental operational units, the system could transition to the normal Service acquisition process. In this way, DARPA would get early buy-in of the novel concepts by Service units. This approach would help ease the DARPA-to-Service transition problem that exists today.

Logistics, long the neglected step-child of the Department, would be a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense in this plan, with its own seat on the DAB, and reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Installations should go to the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the functions that installations most importantly support. Environment is best paired with Installations (this is the Service model: the Air Force has I&E as part of its manpower Assistant Secretariat). The new Logistics organization will probably need a stronger staff to carry out the business process re-engineering responsibilities that should be part of its charter. To the extent this means a larger staff, perhaps some "sunset" element could be considered (with a reasonably long time horizon, as much as ten years, gradual reductions conceivably beginning after five).

AT&L's international cooperation functions should go to USD (Policy); to the extent there are international cooperation functions remaining in USD(A), they should be handled by the elements of

the new organization with appropriate domain expertise. Some modest personnel savings from this consolidation should be possible.

These changes would have five benefits:

- Focused organizations, and a principal the Secretary of Defense can hold responsible for each major enterprise.
- Strong proponents for new ideas, and for logistics. Presumably, the results will be better--including better acceptance of change by the Services.
- Integration of the "information revolution" with the main system development efforts of DoD.
- A chance to implement the direction of the National Academy of Sciences that DoD take a "lifetime" view of testing.
- Better supervision of installations and the environment, integrated with the principal user of installations.

However, such a restructure would carry at least two costs:

- Substantial time, turmoil and political capital to effect these changes that might better be spent elsewhere.
- Likely resistance from the Congress to principal (e.g, C3I), and some secondary elements (e.g., OT&E, Small Business).

How might one proceed? Put into place at the start of the Administration the key changes, leave the secondary ones to be negotiated with those who feel strongly about them as the Administration gains effectiveness. The importance of mandating and enforcing change cannot be understated.

### ***Identify and Select Qualified and Supportive Flag Officers and Civilian Managers***

Transformation and innovation endure and shape organizations when the advocates of change-officials of imagination and vision-get promoted to positions of responsibility. Therefore, an essential element of transformation of the force is for the AT&L, working with the Services, to identify appropriate general/flag officers for nomination to the key, three-star billets within the individual Service acquisition systems. Identification and selection of qualified Senior Executive Service civilians with the appropriate vision and appreciation of transformation is equally imperative.

Selecting, supporting and rewarding people for the appropriate behavior for the enterprises they lead is key. This is particularly true for establishing the second acquisition path in view of the dominant culture in the traditional legacy environment.

This paper proposes a cultural change. Unless taken head-on, the existing acquisition culture will defeat the change. Any restructure must be supported with human resource practices. The right people need to be selected, developed, rewarded, promoted, and fired to send the appropriate signals; the organization has to be highly performance based. This has to occur in OSD and in the Services. The signal needs to be sent from the start that this is not business as usual.

February 27, 2001 12:00 PM

TO: Rich Haver  
CC: Steve Cambone  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraq

Would you please look into this matter that Paul Wolfowitz has raised about Iraq and get back to Paul and me? Thanks.

Attach

DHR:dh  
022701-I 8

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Iraq

27 Feb 01

INFORMAL ADVICE

**Memorandum To:** Secretary Rumsfeld  
**From:** Paul Wollowitz *PW*  
**Subject:** Forthcoming 13RC 2 Special on Iraqi Nuclear Program

Don.

Attached is a lengthy piece from *The Sunday Times of London*, describing the contents of a special report to be aired by BBC 2 claiming that:

1. Iraq has already acquired nuclear material from the former Soviet Union and from South Africa via Brazil;
2. Iraq tested a small nuclear device as early as 1989 in a decoupled explosion in a deep cavern under a mountain,

This is a story that is worth checking out, although without someone like Rich Haver, I am not sure one can really get to the bottom of it. Certainly, our people will probably say that it is totally implausible and there is "no evidence." It does sound a bit fantastic to me. However, there are a few things to remember:

- We have consistently underestimated Iraqi capabilities in this area and were totally surprised by the magnitude of the nuclear program that was uncovered after the Gulf War;
- The CIA's way of dealing with Iraqi defectors does not inspire confidence. You may remember the strange excuses we received on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission about why the CIA had not more seriously pursued an Iraqi scientist who indicated an interest in getting out. I am also attaching two stories from that period that suggest at least two other defectors who may have been mishandled;
- There are aspects of the BBC story which, while fantastic, are completely consistent with what we do know about Saddam Hussein, i.e., sending a man a videotape of his sister being sexually abused, or murdering political prisoners used in a construction activity and burying them where they could never be discovered. However, we know that this kind of brutality does characterize Saddam Hussein. It is one of the way that he maintains a level of secrecy that our people consistently underestimate.


In any case, it would be good to check this out before the story is broadcast on BBC  
Of course, it is out in the press already.

cc: Steve Cambone  
Zal Khalilzad  
Bill Schneider  
Chris William:

February 25 2001

## NEWS REVIEW

On a visit to northern Iraq, Gwynne Roberts stumbled on a trail of compelling evidence that the 'Butcher of Baghdad' has successfully tested a nuclear bomb. Could he really have hoodwinked the West'?



The evidence: a 1989 satellite photo, right, shows the entrance to the tunnel under Laker Rezazza and the ground disturbed by underground activity. Top, Leoni's drawing of the test bomb. Above, Iraq later destroyed it: military base near the test site

## Was this Saddam's bomb?

The mysterious visitor emerged from the shadows outside my hotel in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq, just as a crisis between Washington and Baghdad was reaching a climax in January 1998. His appearance set alarm bells ringing. Several westerners had recently been murdered in

Kurdistan, and Iraqi intelligence agents were blamed.



[CLICK HERE TO SEE LARGER IMAGE](#)



[CLICK HERE TO SEE LARGER IMAGE](#) I was there to investigate the long-term impact of Saddam Hussein's gassing of the people of Halabja, the town he drenched in lethal chemicals in 1988. Iraq knew of the mission and my learn was at risk. The visitor was visibly nervous and shivering, and the guards on the hotel steps were suspicious. Although it was bitterly cold, he was wearing a silk summer jacket.


"Are you a journalist?" he asked my cameraman, who was filming outside the hotel. He was keen to talk about the Iraqi nuclear programme, but I was suspicious. After the Kurds had identified him as a bona fide nuclear scientist, I invited him back to the hotel.

"I am in danger here in Iraq," said Leone, as we came to know him. "I signed a document every six months agreeing not to talk to foreigners. It said I and my family would be executed if I broke the agreement. If I reveal secrets to you, my life is at risk."

Nonetheless, Leone talked on - and he told me an astonishing story. If true, it completely contradicts the western consensus about the shortcomings of Saddam's nuclear weapons programme.

Intelligence agencies, including Israel's Mossad, insist that Saddam has never had the technology or the fuel to fulfil his ambition of creating a nuclear arsenal. Yet Leone, and other detectors who have corroborated his story, insist that Saddam not only has nuclear weapons but has tested them.

SITTING in a scruffy hotel room in Sulaymaniyah, Leone explained in detail the work he said he was



Electrical Discharge Switch (for ignition)  
 up (high pressure)  
 Explosive  
 slow rate of compression  
 slow rate of compression

Flang  
 ST. ST. slide cylinder - to make the supporting rings hold the fuel rods in place

The fuel rods are pushed together with upper grid to push the fuel elements (fuel rods) down wards to take place between the lower part of the fuel rods

Grid  
 The grid is a metal plate which is pushed down wards to take place between the upper and lower parts of the fuel rods to make the lower part of the fuel rods

slow rate of compression  
 slow rate of compression


[ Large nuclear bomb ]  
 IAEC

This is the explosive material to push the nuclear rods down a wedge to make the reaction between the upper part I and the lower part II

The upper part of the critical mass contains Boron Rods it will stay in the same position when the dusting occurs at the top part

Cylinder lattice grid consist of a thick Disk with holes to carry the moving Encasing tubes which contain fuel rods as pellets and fixed Boron Rods as a good absorber of neutrons to make the fuel rods safe when the upper grid moves down ward it push the fuel rods to the lower part of the Rods and the lower part of the fuel rods

The Boron Rods contains fine dust



out side view of large nuclear bomb  
 white color material  
 Tested in 1980 April  
 6th at 10 Block, 1st South west Institute

L = 186 cm  
 D = 77 cm

metal casing flang





involved in  
 He described himself as a military engineer who was a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Simultaneously, he said, he worked for the Republican Palace in Baghdad. "There is a special scientific department there for supervising all activities for the Iraqi mass destruction weapons, especially the missile programme. So I was in a very privileged position. I had my own bodyguards and my special status protected me. I was authorised to travel to many secret sites all over Iraq. Very few can do this."

Leone worked through the night in the hotel, drawing detailed diagrams of nuclear weapons, "This is Iraq's nuclear bomb," he said, spreading diagrams on the bed. "I saw it in the workshop in Tuwaita many times. This is the first successful prototype. When they finished it in 1986, they took it to the president by car, but without uranium. All members of the delegation got cars as presents for their work. Between 1985 and 1989, I saw this device at least five times."

He said it worked on the principle of the Hiroshima gun-type bomb, in which high explosives drive pieces of highly enriched uranium together at high velocity. This triggers a nuclear explosion.

Leone's design was unusual. The uranium was contained in a series of finely engineered tubes, like the control rods of a nuclear reactor. It was not the type of design one might find from a search of textbooks or the internet.

He showed me a photograph of what he said was a gun assembly nuclear warhead bought off the peg from Russia. Six devices were purchased during the late 1980s, he said, all of them without fuel. Iraq managed to purchase fissile material on the black market for at least one warhead.

Leone then made the staggering claim that Iraq had conducted a nuclear test before the Gulf war.

"The test was carried out at 10.30am on September 19, 1989, at an underground site 150km southwest of Baghdad," he said. "Saddam had threatened us with the death penalty if we told anybody about it."

"The location was a militarised zone on the far shore of Lake Rezzaza, which used to be a tourist area. There is a natural tunnel there which leads to a large cavern deep under the lake. Labourers worked on it for two years, strengthening the tunnel walls."

"There was a big Republican Guard camp nearby and dirt roads leading to the site. You could see the thick high-tension cables on the ground, which disappeared into a huge shaft entrance. I saw one which must have been 20km long. The command post for the test was in a castle in the desert not far away."

"We went to a lot of trouble to conceal the test from the outside world. The Russians supplied us with a table listing US satellite movements. They were always helping us. Every six hours, trucks near the test site changed their positions. They had carried out a lot of irrigation projects in the test area during the year before as a diversion. But these weren't agricultural workers, they were nuclear engineers. It was a nice cheat."

"We had built a special platform for the bomb in the Tuwaita workshop and this was sent to the test site. This allowed the device to be jacked up inside the cavern. Then we sealed off the cavern by blocking part of the tunnel inside with a 50-

metre concrete plug and piling up sand and rocks behind that. All this was intended to muffle the explosion, and it's known as 'decoupling'.

"I saw the air-conditioned yellow truck carrying the bomb near the site at dawn a few days before the test. They always used this vehicle to transport it. On its side was a sheaf symbol with 'Ministry of Trade' written below it. I saw the people in charge of the test head off in that direction as well - Dr Khalid Ibrahim Sayeed and Dr Jafaar Dhia Jafaar.

"When the test happened, there was no dust or anything. The air just vibrated. I was in my car at the time and it just shook. It reached about 2.7 on the Richter scale, and wouldn't really have been noticed by seismic stations outside Iraq."

Leone said that Hussein Kamel al-Majid, Saddam's brother-in-law, was in overall charge of the test, [Kamel defected to Jordan in 1995 and was later murdered.] "After the test, they destroyed the entrance to the tunnel. They also removed any evidence to indicate that a test had happened.

"They washed out the shaft with water to remove any radioactivity. They then filled it with cement, rocks and sand, and destroyed the entrance. They also created a long river channel near the shaft entrance to drain off contaminated ground water."

Leone showed me a letter signed by Kamel that seemed to confirm the test. Written in Arabic and dated September 19, 1989, it read: "With the help of God and the effort of the heroic freedom fighters in the military industrialisation institution and the atomic power organisation, we have successfully completed Test Number One of the Iraqi Atomic Bomb. Its strength was 10 kilotons and highly enriched uranium was used with a purity of 93% . . . With this experiment Iraq is considered the first country in the world to carry out this sort

of experiment without the knowledge of the international monitoring authorities."

I still had a problem with Leone's story. Iraq did not have the industrial capacity to produce enough bomb-grade fissile material for a test. Leone said the Iraqis had bought it on the black market.

"We had a purchasing department whose job was to buy highly enriched uranium. Brazil purchased highly enriched uranium from South Africa and then delivered it to Iraq. I am not talking about tons. It was between 20 and 50 kilograms. France also supplied us secretly with highly enriched uranium after the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981."

The Rezzaza test, according to Leone, sealed the fate of the Observer journalist Farzad Bazoft, who had been investigating the cause of a huge explosion at a military complex south of Baghdad.

The Iranian-born reporter was arrested on September 15, four days before the test date, after taking soil samples near the al-Qaqa facility, about 80km from the test site. He was executed for espionage the following M a r c h .

I knew the Bazoft story well. In 1988 I had entered Iraqi Kurdistan and gathered soil samples which proved that the Iraqi regime had used chemical weapons against its own people. Bazoft had reportedly seen my film *Winds of Death*, which documented this horrific crime, and attempted to emulate my methods, with tragic results.

"He was accused of working for a foreign intelligence agency," said Leone. "The authorities were convinced he was trying to find out about the planned Rezzaza test. This was a state secret of the highest importance and, once they even suspected this, he was never going to be released."

In August 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait. After his defeat in the ensuing Gulf war, UN arms inspectors discovered an Iraqi crash programme to build a nuclear bomb,

known as PC3. But, according to Leone, they missed the most successful part of the programme.

"They thought they had stopped the Iraqis from building the bomb, but they overlooked the military organisation codenamed Group Four. This department is a comprehensive section that was involved in assembling the bomb from the beginning to the end. It was also involved in developing launching systems, missile programmes, preparing uranium, purchasing it on the black market, smuggling it back into Iraq."

Leone told me that Group Four successfully developed a gun-type device at the nuclear weaponisation centre at al-Atheer. Unscm, the UN inspectorate, was aware that the Iraqis were working on an implosion-type nuclear device there, but knew nothing about Group Four. All evidence of its existence had been removed before they arrived in Iraq, Leone said.

The Iraqis went to extraordinary lengths to protect their secrets. In one incident on 1991, the UN nuclear weapons inspection team managed to film sensitive documents listing names of key personnel in the nuclear programme. Leone claimed the Iraqi official who allowed access, Adel Fayed, was later murdered.

"He was killed by knives in his home," said he. "They cut off his head. Everyone knew that Saddam's cousin, Ali al-Takriti, was responsible. Nobody talked to Unscm after this assassination."

To avoid Unscm detection, scientists from the main weaponisation groups were spread throughout Iraq. Group Four was relocated in civilian aircraft factories at Taji in the north of Baghdad. Using the factories as a front, they imported "aircraft parts" from Russia and eastern Europe. These consignments often concealed components for the nuclear programme.

Group Four also bought up American and Russian designs for gun-type nuclear

bombs. Leone alleged that these were acquired with help from India.

Leone said his pivotal job brought him into close contact with Khalid Ibrahim Sayeed, Group Four's leader, a military engineer whom he met regularly to discuss weapons design.

Another important bomb design organisation, Group Five, operated out of an agricultural machinery factory near Mosul in northern Iraq, said Leone. Group Five scientists worked on a thermonuclear device, he said. The components were assembled at secret locations under Mount Hemrin, 140km northeast of Baghdad.

In 1993, Saddam awarded Group Five's leader, Dr Ahmed Abdul Jabar Shansal, the Golden Sword of Mesopotamia (First Degree), the highest decoration in Iraq, for completing work on a nuclear implosion bomb, a far more complex design than the gun-type, Leone said. In 1995, Group Five was renamed the State Enterprise for Extracting Industries.

Leone's disclosures were detailed, and his knowledge of personnel in the programme was encyclopaedic. His bomb diagrams demonstrated specialist knowledge of nuclear weapons. His most stunning claim: however, was that Iraq now possessed three Hiroshima-type bombs, three implosion weapons and three thermonuclear weapons.

"I am certain about this," he said. "They are stored deep underground in a bunker in the Hemrin mountains."

Having disgorged this information: Leone disappeared into the cold streets of Sulaymaniyah. His evidence contradicted the claims of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was more or less dismantled after the Gulf war. Was he a hoaxer? I tracked down people in Kurdistan who knew him and a picture began to emerge.

Leone had defected in the mid-1990s to the safe havens of northern Iraq. Seeking

sanctuary for his family, he had met officials from the West's four-nation military coordinating centre. They flew him to Ankara to debrief him but never gave him what he wanted: sanctuary in the West.

He tried to reach Europe through Ukraine and approached the British embassy in Kiev. Diplomats arranged for experts from the IAEA to fly in to debrief him, but Leone refused to co-operate when he realised they were unwilling to provide visas for the West.

"There was no doubt he was genuine," said Arras Habib Kareem, who debriefed him in Kurdistan for the opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC). "When other Iraqi nuclear scientists came north they recognised him within seconds. He knows a lot about the Iraqi nuclear programme. He knows about the test areas, the facilities and the equipment the Iraqis used.

"He once provided me with a list of 200 names of people working in the programme, with their rank and what each was doing - 90% of what he said was later confirmed by other Iraqi scientists who defected."

Seeking expert advice, I turned to Dr Frank Barnaby, the former nuclear weapons scientist who vouchsafed the authenticity of Mordechai Vanunu's evidence of the Israeli bomb programme in 1986. I asked him to assess Leone's drawing of the 1989 test device.

"The design is unusual, but I see no reason why it shouldn't work if it is well engineered," Barnaby said. "I find it impressive. All the nuclear physics he is talking about is reasonable. He has to be taken seriously because he is obviously competent. The very least we are dealing with here is a radiological bomb, a nuclear weapon in its own right, which Iraq was suspected of developing."

Could it be a hoax? "If it were, Leone would use a more standard design, not invent an unusual one," replied Barnaby. He

described Leone's disclosures as more dramatic than Vanunu's, because they contained more detailed information about weapon design.

If Leone was telling the truth, surely the blast would have been detected by seismologists?

Officials at the International Seismic Centre near Newbury said detecting an event of this size - about 2.7 on the Richter scale - would be "extremely difficult" in this region, especially if it had been decoupled, as Leone claimed.

I visited Sulaymaniyah's local seismic station. It is 640km from the Rezzaza site, and its director confirmed that its range was limited. "Whether we would pick up an event 100 to 200km away would depend on its magnitude," he explained, "If it's really big, we would record it. If it's small, then we may miss it."

Records from 1989 showed no trace of an event on September 19, but a map of Iraq's main earthquake zones provided a potential clue. The Rezzaza region is virtually earthquake-free, but the map showed one exception - a tremor marked by a red circle on the southwestern shore of the lake, close to Leone's test site. Nobody at the seismic station knew when this tremor occurred, except that it was after 1985 and before 1991.

I needed corroboration from other defectors from Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Most were too scared to talk. One scientist living in northern Europe, who had received a video from Baghdad of his sister being sexually abused by security agents, refused to have anything to do with me.

But I tracked down a "Dr Imad" who had worked for Group Four, and persuaded him to meet me in Denmark. The story he told, unprompted by me, fitted Leone's.

"There were two groups working on two different projects, One was the implosion

bomb under Dr Jafaar and the other the gun-type device, under Dr Khalid Ibrahim Sayeed," Imad said "Dr Khalid headed Group Four."

Again echoing Leone, Imad continued: "The headquarters of both groups was at al-Atheer, the nuclear weapons design centre south of Baghdad. The UN inspectors only discovered one project there. They missed the Group Four programme, which had the same funding but was far more successful. This was Iraq's best-kept secret."

Imad was adamant that the Iraqis had conducted a nuclear test, although he did not know where. "Group Four was working specifically on a Hiroshima-type bomb. In 19X6-87, they began to run computer simulation models, but I know for a fact that in 1989 they fed in real test data."

"From an actual test?" I asked.

"From an actual test. They modified the model according to the test data. They finished it."

"So does Iraq have the bomb?"

"Iraq tested the bomb and they have it," he said.

He also described how a senior Iraqi scientist had brought the fuel from Brazil in a private jet and was rewarded with money and land.

Imad's evidence meant that two former senior Iraqi scientists - one in Kurdistan and the other in Denmark - had independently confirmed that an organisation called Group Four not only existed but had successfully tested a gun-type atomic bomb. If this was true, the UN inspection teams had missed half of Iraq's nuclear programme. It was difficult to comprehend failure on such a massive scale.

Yet Unmovic, the UN agency that took over from Unscm after inspectors were barred from Iraq in 1998, was completely in the dark about Group Four. Dr Hans Blix, Unmovic's executive chairman, who

also headed the IAEA for 16 years, thought a nuclear test was improbable.

I turned to Dr David Kay, a former head of the UN nuclear inspection team. He suspected that the Iraqis were working on a gun-type bomb and was not quite so adamant in refusing to believe that one had been tested.

"One thing I've learnt in Iraq is that it is unwise to totally exclude anything, because in fact the Iraqis spent a lot of money and got a lot of assistance from other people. They were always trying to do it, and they did it under totalitarian pressure. So people can occasionally do miraculous things," he said.

Kay knew of Group Four - he called it a "major weapons design group operating under the auspices of Saddam himself" - but he had discovered few details about its activities.

It was Kay who uncovered Iraq's crash programme to build an implosion device. He had been amazed at its size. "What we found was more or less an exact replica of a crash US Manhattan Project during the second world war. The facilities were large in number. I remember the initial briefing identified three or four sites. There turned out to be more than 50. We now think there were somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 working on the programme. The best guess of costs is somewhere in the order of \$10 billion."

Late last year I turned to the most important Iraqi defector to reach Europe, Abbas al-Janabi. He was personal assistant to Saddam's son, Uday, for 15 years, was imprisoned eight times by his former boss and routinely tortured. He finally fled the country with his family in 1998.

His cousin, Fadil al-Janabi, was high in the Iraqi nuclear programme and other members of his clan were highly placed within Group Four. His response to my probing was succinct. "A nuclear test was carried out - in 1988 or 1989 - in an

underground site beside Lake Rezzaza," he said.

He pointed out the test site on a map of Iraq. It was close to Leone's location. "It's a military zone," he said. "I doubt whether UN inspectors ever visited it." He himself had clambered down into a vast underground cavern.

He learnt of the successful test from Uday, who, he said, was unable to conceal his jubilation. "They were talking about the test, about their ability to produce a nuclear bomb. They were talking about a new powerful Iraq," said Janabi.

Was it definitely a nuclear test? "Definitely. There is no doubt about that. It was a small nuclear test," Who had supplied the highly enriched uranium for the bomb? South Africa, he said, via South America.

He claimed to know the person who had negotiated with the South Africans. "He was talking about 50kg. Negotiations began in 1986 and the delivery was made in 1988."

In the mid-1990s, on a Channel 4 investigation, I visited Valindaba, the facility near Pretoria which produced South Africa's bomb-grade uranium. Officially, I was told the plant never achieved its design output because of technical problems. In its lifetime, it was said to have produced weapons-grade uranium for only six or seven devices. But a plant supervisor let slip that it had functioned flawlessly from 1976 until 1989. It could have produced enough for 20 simple uranium bombs.

So had South Africa sold off surplus stocks? I contacted a former intelligence official under the apartheid regime who had helped procure components for his country's nuclear weapons programme on the black market. "The story is true," he said. "About 50kg were sold to the Iraqis."

For the final stage of my investigation, I used the latest space technology. I bought pictures of Lake Rezzaza taken in July 1989 -

two months before the claimed test - by a French Spot Image satellite and compared them with images from the Indian IRS1D spacecraft shot in September 2000.

Professor Bhupendra Jasani of King's College, London, analysed them. He quickly discovered the tunnel Leone and Abbas al-Janabi had told me about. It was 4km long and 400 metres wide and stretched under Lake Rezzaza. Roads led from a railway line to the shaft entrance, a huge rectangular structure. Many lorries could have driven abreast into the tunnel.

To the southwest, Jasani found more evidence of an unusually sensitive military zone - an army base with some 40 buildings, each 40 by 70 metres in size, and a massive missile base nearby.

The September 2000 image showed that 60% of these buildings had been destroyed. Jasani and I assumed this must have been in allied air attacks. When I mentioned this to Leone, however, he said the Iraqis themselves had blown them up to cover up the evidence. At the UN headquarters in New York, I showed my satellite images to UN arms inspectors who confirmed they had never visited the western shore of Lake Rezzaza.

The 2000 picture also provided a vital clue. The shaft entrance was destroyed and the tunnel blocked up, exactly as Leone had told me. I got hold of a third satellite picture from 1990, which revealed that this blocking had happened before the Gulf war in January 1991.

"If you wanted to hide something, I guess this is exactly what you would do," said Jasani.

But was it consistent with this being a nuclear test site? "The infrastructure is certainly consistent with test activity. You require storage sites, vehicle activities, communications systems like the train, railway tracks and roadworks. All of those

things you can certainly see on the image," said Jasani.

The tunnel and the entrance were huge and the manpower needed to block it up massive. Leone had told me that thousands of political prisoners worked on the tunnel after a presidential amnesty.

"They were well fed and lived in comfortable caravans. In return, they worked hard. But none of them came out of it alive," he said. "Many were contaminated with radioactive waste. Friends working for Iraqi security who were guarding them said they were buried in caves nearby. The Iraqi regime hoped the secret of the Rezzaza lake test would die with them.

"Hussein Kamel gave the order to kill these people . . . I was disgusted by it and it's one of the major reasons I fled."


This grotesque story was corroborated by **Imad**. He said he was aware that political prisoners who worked on the Rezzaza tunnel were massacred by Iraqi security guards to conceal an unspecified secret military project. He did not know this was the nuclear test site.

Last year Leone and his family finally reached the West with the help of the UN refugee programme. Although comparatively safe, he fears reprisals. Last week his brother was arrested in Iraq after the **Anglo-American** air raids.

Leone no longer needs to draw attention to himself to get help, yet he continues to give more details of the bomb programme, insisting that his story is true.

Western intelligence sources, while recognising that he is well informed, continue to insist that he and the other Iraqi sources I have spoken to are wrong about the test. Personally, I think the evidence is compelling.

© Roberts & Wykeham 2001



Saddam's Bomb will be broadcast on BBC2's Correspondent programme at 6.20pm next Saturday

**THE CAVERN:** The device was raised on a platform inside a massively enlarged cavern deep under the lake  
**THE TUNNEL:** Iraqi engineers enlarged a natural tunnel under Lake Rezazza, southwest of Baghdad

**FORT:** The test was said to have been controlled from an old fort

**MISSILES:** The test site was a highly militarised area with a huge storage site and a missile base

**THE WARHEAD:** A Hiroshima-style 10-kiloton device was exploded underground before the Gulf war, according to a former member of Saddam's secret weapons programme

**CONCRETE PLUG:** To avoid detection, the tunnel was plugged with concrete and filled with rubble

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The Houston Chronicle[View Related Topics](#)**March 26, 1998, Thursday 3 STAR EDITION****SECTION:** A; Pg. 25**LENGTH:** 380 words**HEADLINE:** CIA bungles its attempt to help Iraqi germ warfare scientist escape**SOURCE:** The Guardian**BYLINE:** JULIAN BORGER**DATELINE:** LONDON**BODY:**

LONDON - Nassir al-Hindawi, the founder of **Iraq's** germ warfare program, was seized by Saddam Hussein's secret police after the CIA bungled an attempt to smuggle the elderly scientist out of the country, Iraqi opposition sources said Wednesday.

**Iraq** announced Wednesday that U.N. weapons inspectors would be permitted to interview Hindawi, 70, a biologist who is accused of trying to leave on a forged passport.

But a spokesman for the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) said Hindawi had already been interviewed on several occasions - the last time more than a year ago - and there were no immediate plans to talk to him again.

A senior member of the Iraqi opposition, speaking from western Europe, said the CIA had organized an escape route for Hindawi to a rebel-controlled region in the north.

"He was supposed to have been smuggled across to Turkey," the official said. "But the reception committee waiting for him in the north had to come back empty-handed."

He said the defection plan had been ruined when the CIA informed a rebel faction, which leaked the information before the plan had been set in motion. "People couldn't keep their mouths shut. They behaved in a naive manner," the official said.

Iraq's main exiled opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress, is at loggerheads with the Iraqi National Accord, which is said to have been in contact with the CIA over the abortive defection.

In a letter to UNSCOM announcing the arrest, Iraq's oil minister, Lt. Gen. Amir Muhammad Rasheed, included more than 200 pages of documents on Iraq's germ warfare program which he said had been in Hindawi's possession.

The Iraqi opposition source said he believed the documents Hindawi had intended to take with him had been confiscated and unimportant papers offered up in their place.

Ewen Buchanan, UNSCOM's spokesman in New York, said the documents had so far told the weapons inspectors little that was new.

UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler is due to leave Iraq today after a round of talks with Iraqi officials. He has said he has made progress but added that Baghdad has yet to produce strong evidence that it has destroyed all of its biological weapons.

UNSCOM inspections of Saddam's palaces are due to begin today, diplomats said late Wednesday.

**LOAD-DATE:** March 27, 1998

◀ *Previous*    **Document 51 of 86.**    *Next* ▶



**Search Terms:** iraq, defector

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Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)

August 15, 1998, Metro Edition

**SECTION:** Pg. 15A**LENGTH:** 666 words**HEADLINE:** **Defector** warns of Baghdad's nuclear weapons program;  
A high-ranking Iraqi scientist says his country could quickly resume atomic research if the United Nations eases up on inspections.**SOURCE:** New York Times**BODY:**

An Iraqi scientist who defected to the United States has publicly described for the first time the inner workings of **Iraq's** three-decade effort to build a nuclear bomb.

The scientist, Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, said that before he fled **Iraq** in 1994 he helped train a cadre of young scientists who, working with more senior scientists involved in other projects, would be capable of quickly resuming **Iraq's** atomic weapons program if the United Nations cuts back on its inspections and, ultimately, lifts economic sanctions.

Hamza is the highest-ranking scientist ever to defect from Baghdad, and his comments, in nearly 10 hours of interviews, come as a new confrontation is building over whether Baghdad has dismantled its chemical, nuclear and biological programs. **Iraq** has in recent days refused to cooperate further with U.N. weapons inspectors.

In the interviews, Hamza, 59, whose defection was an important intelligence coup for the United States that nearly slipped through American fingers because of the CIA's inattention, drew a chilling picture of life as an Iraqi scientist. He said his colleagues were lavishly rewarded for their successes and tortured by the secret police when they failed to deliver.

He said Iraq's nuclear weapons program was personally directed by Saddam Hussein, Iraq's leader, since its inception 27 years ago. It was abetted, he said, by a host of Western companies that sold Iraq sophisticated equipment as they "winked and laughed" at patently false cover stories.

On the eve of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Hamza said, Iraq had completed all the research and testing needed for an atomic weapon and was feverishly trying to make at least one crude bomb using uranium from civilian reactors. This effort, Hamza said, could have produced a bomb in a few months, but it was disrupted by the allied bombing campaign.

New details

Only after the war did U.S. intelligence officials learn that they had grossly underestimated Iraq's nuclear program, which they had believed to be 10 years from producing a nuclear bomb. But Hamza's defection to the United States and his subsequent debriefing by the CIA brought fresh details to light, including these:

Iraq's peaceful nuclear power program, begun 30 years ago, was quickly turned into a cover for the secret bomb program, which went ahead even as Baghdad opened up its research reactors to Western inspection.

Israel's intensive campaign in the 1970s and '80s to stop Iraq from acquiring a bomb accomplished little. The 1981 Israeli bombing raid that destroyed Iraq's French-built nuclear reactor prompted Saddam to drop the pretense of a peaceful atomic effort and to go "full steam" on a covert program to build a bomb.

Iraq took advantage of America's open access to valuable scientific information. Hamza said that as a senior member of Iraq's nuclear program, he spent time at American university libraries studying the latest scientific journals and technical accounts of U.S. nuclear efforts.

Hamza, who intelligence officials said had been resettled in the United States by the CIA, said he was speaking out now because he was frustrated that Saddam is still obstructing international inspections and deceiving the West. U.S. officials said they did not authorize or encourage Hamza to speak publicly, but they have confirmed many elements of his account.

Until now, Hamza's defection has been a closely guarded secret. A 1995 article in the Sunday Times of London and a 1997 book by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn included detailed accounts of his alleged kidnapping and assassination by secret Iraqi agents.

In fact, his escape from Iraq is a remarkable spy yarn that almost went awry. According to former and current intelligence officials, the CIA initially rebuffed Hamza's appeals to defect to the United States. He spent a year in Libya before the agency realized its mistake and agreed to resettle him and rescue his family from their home in downtown Baghdad.

LOAD-DATE: August 31, 1998

◀ Previous Document 7 of 86. Next ▶



Search Terms: iraq, defector

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March 1, 2001 10:43 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita, Acting ASD for Legislative Affairs  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Phonecon w/Congresswoman Kay Granger

60

I spoke with Kay Granger. She has a lot of military defense contractors in her district.

There were two messages:

1. She hopes that none of the programs from her district will be prejudiced because of the defense review. I told her we recognize that some things are coming down the train track, and we will have to find ways to deal with them responsibly, even though our review might not be finished.
2. She also said she hoped she would get advance notice of things that might affect her district, rather than be surprised to read about them in the newspaper.

I told her I would pass this note along to you.

DHR:dh  
030101-10

1 MAR 01

U04192 /01



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

February 27, 2001

**READ AHEAD: CALL WITH REP. KAY GRANGER (R-TX)**

The Secretary has agreed to speak with Congresswoman Kay Granger on Thursday, March 1, 2001, at 0945 at her request about the on-going strategic review.

*2001*  
*Act out to be notified*  
**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
**MAR 1 2001**

- Points Congresswoman Granger will raise/make:
  - Supports on-going strategic review
  - Concerned that review may lead to recommendations for eliminating major programs such as Joint Strike Fighter, F-22, F-16, and V-22 all of which are or could be made in her District
  - Would like to know the **timeline** for completion of the review
  - Will inquire what, if any, Congressional involvement in the reviews is desired and when Congressional involvement will be sought in the process
  
- About Congresswoman Granger (Bio is attached):
  - Represents the 12<sup>th</sup> District (Fort Worth area)
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> term; elected in 1996. She is the former Mayor of Fort Worth.
  - Previously served on House Armed Services Committee
  - Moved to seat on Appropriations in 106<sup>th</sup> Congress; does not currently sit on the Defense Subcommittee, but has been promised a seat
  - Currently sits on Military Construction Subcommittee for House Appropriations
  - Top Employers in District: **Lockheed Martin Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, 11,000+**; **Fort Worth Independent School District, Fort Worth, 9,000-10,999**; **Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., Hurst, 7,000-8,999**; **Harris Methodist Hospital, Fort Worth, 3,000-4,999**; **Tandy Corp., Fort Worth, 3,000-4,999**
  - Major Industry: **Defense technology**, transportation, medicine
  - Military Bases:  
Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Fort Worth, 2,194 active duty, 2,505 civilian (1998)



CQ MEMBER PROFILE  
107th CONGRESS

## Rep. Kay Granger (R-Texas)

12th District, Northwest Tarrant County; part of Fort Worth



**Hometown:** Fort Worth  
**Born:** January 18, 1943; Greenville, Texas  
**Religion:** Methodist  
**Family:** Divorced; three children  
**Education:** Texas Wesleyan U., B.S. 1965  
**Military Service:** None  
**Career:** Insurance agent; teacher

**Elected:** 1996 (3rd term)

**Political Highlights:** Fort Worth City Council, 1989-91; mayor of Fort Worth, 1991-

### Committees:

. Appropriations

Phone: 202-225-5071 | Fax: 202-225-5683 | Web: [www.house.gov/granger](http://www.house.gov/granger)  
435 Cannon Bldg. | Washington, DC 20515-4312

### Jump to Section:

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### Link to Archives:

[106th Congress](#) | [105th Congress](#)

## CQ Politics in America Profile

(Updated: April 1999)

### In Washington

Granger is the first Republican woman to represent Texas in the House, and her pitch that the GOP should be more compassionate and more revolutionary makes her a big favorite of the party's leaders on the Hill, who are always looking for help to improve Republicans' image among female voters. Granger can speak with authority from the perspective of a businesswoman, a working parent and a local elected official. A divorced mother of three, she started her own insurance agency and served as mayor of Fort Worth, a nonpartisan post.

Granger was wooed by both parties when she indicated interest in running for the 12th District seat in 1996, and Republican leaders have tried to make sure she is happy about choosing their side. In the 105th, they gave her some choice committee assignments -- Transportation and Infrastructure, Budget and House Oversight -- and made her an assistant whip.

Granger's political stock was trading so high in mid-1997 that she earned mention as a possible contender for the junior leadership post of Republican Conference vice chairman after the incumbent, Susan Molinari of New York, announced plans to leave Congress. Granger decided to help an ally,

11-L-0559/OSD/2538

Jennifer Dunn of Washington, win the position, but Granger made it clear she has aspirations for a broader role in the party.

Granger was out of the country late in 1998 and unable to mount a quick campaign for a low-rung leadership post when Republicans suddenly found themselves in a leadership shakeup after their poor showing in the mid-term elections. She adjusted her focus slightly and won a nice consolation prize -- a seat on the Appropriations Committee for the 106th Congress.

Granger was a teacher for 10 years, and her interest in education was evident as budget legislation was being crafted in 1997. She persuaded House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, R-Texas, to include her proposal for tax-free educational savings accounts in the tax cut portion of the legislation to implement the balanced-budget deal.

The GOP also was happy to give Granger a prominent role in arguing for legislation that would allow companies to offer employees comp time in lieu of pay for overtime work. Democrats slammed the measure as a sop to business that would lead to workers being coerced to forgo overtime pay. But Granger said the bill would give people flexibility to take time off to deal with family concerns.

A reliable conservative, Granger in the 105th supported a balanced-budget constitutional amendment. And after passage in August 1997 of the bipartisan legislation cutting spending and taxes, she called for another round of spending and tax cuts. "The 1997 tax package did too little, not too much," Granger said. "We can raise hope by lowering taxes again." She was one of the organizers of a group of about 20 freshman Republicans who, as the second session of the 105th Congress began, proposed a tax cut package that included reductions in the so-called marriage penalty, exclusion from taxation of some interest and dividend income, and deductibility of all health insurance premiums paid by self-employed workers.

Granger is involved with a group that calls itself the Project for American Renewal, a coalition of about 20 House and Senate Republicans who promote public-private partnerships to address societal ills. The group got started partly to counter Democratic rhetoric about the GOP being hard-hearted toward the less-fortunate. "When I heard there was a group in Washington talking about how we can encourage community renewal and taking our community into our own hands, I thought, well that's me," Granger said.

Although she is an avowed supporter of abortion rights, changing the Republican Party's official line against abortion is not a top priority. "To some, I think it's the most important issue, but that's not really where I'm coming from," she has said. In fact, Granger in 1997 voted with the anti-abortion side on two contentious issues: She supported a ban on a procedure opponents call "partial birth" abortion, and she opposed the early release of \$385 million for international family planning programs that critics say promote abortion.

She also does what she can to keep federal dollars flowing to her district's defense manufacturers, whose pursuits include work on the F-16, the F-22 and the V-22 Osprey aircraft.

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: March 2, 2001  
SUBJECT: Edits

Don't send back these comments like that. Go ahead and put in edits, and give me a clean paper, please.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030201.02  
Attach,

310

2 Mar 01

February 22, 2001 10:02 AM

SUBJECT: Deployments

Priorities might be on:

- Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics—to develop better relationships
- <sup>Southeast + S.E. Asia</sup> Asian and South Asian countries (India & Pakistan)—to gain insights and develop relationships both ways
- Middle Eastern countries

Areas we could be less involved:

① Bad politics.  
 ② Chile 2 of 3? ←  
 Nigeria?  
 S. Africa?

- African countries—except possibly for two or three with strategic resources
- Western Europe—where we have intimate relationships already
- Latin America, except for a few selected countries - Chile? Argentina? Brazil? Colombia? Ecuador? (with already there)

Activities to emphasize:

- ✓ - Training activities that benefit us
- ✓ - Activities that give us knowledge of or relationships in countries of interest

Activities to de-emphasize:

- ✓ - Drug activities
  - ✓ - Democratization activities
- [Handwritten scribble: Don't let this get out]*

Note: Army deployments tend to be good for morale; Air Force deployments tend not to be. *Naval deployments (good theories) are best!*

DHR:dh  
022101-6

*depends where.*

*Zakhan*

*Wrong place to start, if subject is deployments or else change title to read "military cooperation" deployments tends to connote something term than say, an exercise.*

FEB 23 2001

February 22, 2001  
8:16 PM

TO: Dr. Wolfowitz  
Dr. Schneider  
Dr. Zakheim  
Chris Williams  
Honorable Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Attached is a paper I have drafted up on deployments. Take a look at it and give me your edits. And sign it so I **know** who is making what recommendations. I **think** what we've got to do is begin to fashion what will eventually result in a policy, first to be washed through the NSC and possibly **the** President and then to be communicated in **the** Building. Thanks.

*Pls see dug-card pages*

OPTIONAL FORM 88 (7-80)

**FAX TRANSMITTAL** # OF pages *10*

To <i>Jones</i>	From <i>Dede</i>
Dept/Agency	Phone #
Fax # <i>103-351-8321</i>	Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7368 5009-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

U03691

/01

TO: Rudy De Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: March 2, 2001  
SUBJECT: GAO

Here are a couple of GAO reports that may refer to the Defense Department. Why don't you have someone take a look at them, and brief Paul on what is relevant.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030201.06

310.1

2 Mar 01

January 2001

# Major Management Challenges and Program Risks

A Governmentwide Perspective



GAO-01-241

U03134 /01

GAO

January 2001

# High-Risk Series

## An Update



GAO-01-263

TO: Steve Cambone

Cc: • Dov Zakheim  
• Bill Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 2, 2001

SUBJECT:

In that meeting on the nuclear weapons, why wouldn't we put dollars in to sustain the force and dollars in to retire some, if that's the case?

At what point, Steve, will I get a recommendation from that group?

Also, how do I get myself educated on de-alerting? I didn't find that he shed much light on the subject. Don't you think you ought to have a separate session on that, maybe?

Someone asked the question about Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Libya, as a target base. I suppose that ought to be addressed as well.

A-4716

2 MAR 01

TO: Steve Friedman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 5, 2001  
SUBJECT:

We might want to think about Don Haider as a member of your group. He is a professor at Northwestern School of Business, He was I think a White House fellow and worked in OMB. He is not particularly knowledgeable about the Pentagon, but he is knowledgeable about financial matters.

DHR/azn  
030601.01

*230.02*

*SMAR01*

TO PAT GORDON

LTC Lott,

The TNT office tells me that Steve Friedman is not one of ours. He is evidently the retired Chairman of Gold, Sachs, etc.

By checking our database I found previous correspondence (attached). If this is the same person, should we mail the latest SD note to him?

Pat Gordon

Pat,

I have, once again, attempted the correspondence impossible — and yet, I still prevail.

— Steve Friedman works in the Congressional office  
Room 3E835



600 Thirteenth Street, NW 202-756-8500 voice

www.cohengroup.net

Suite 640 202.7568510 fax

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington DC

2001 MAR 7 AM 52

20005-3096

February 26, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

In response to your question about base closing success stories, I recall three particular examples:

**Fort Devins, Massachusetts:** 3,000 jobs were created, replacing the 2,100 civilian jobs that were lost. Current tenants include Gillette Manufacturing, Boston/Maine Railroad, a federal prison medical facility, and the Oxbow National Wildlife Refuge.

**Charleston Naval Air Base, South Carolina:** In 1998, 2,700 jobs had been created and at the time, they expected the creation of an additional 8,700 jobs over five years to replace the original 6,200 jobs lost. Some of the tenants are Charleston Marine Manufacturing, Charleston Shipbuilding, NOAA, U.S. Postal Service, and the National Community Conservation Corps.

**Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire:** 1,300 jobs were created, replacing 400 lost jobs.

These are just a few examples. I encourage you to contact Randall Yim, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations, for more examples. Randall is a true asset for the Department and I am confident that he will serve you as adeptly as he served me.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,  
  
William S. Cohen  
Chairman and CEO

U04621 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/2549



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 8 2001

323.3


Honorable William S. Cohen  
The Cohen Group  
600 Thirteenth Street, NW  
Suite 640  
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Bill:

Thanks so much for your response. I appreciate it.

Regards!

Sincerely,



8 MAR 01

U04713 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 9 2001

323.3

The Honorable William S. Cohen  
Chairman and CEO  
The Cohen Group  
600 Thirteenth Street, NW  
Suite 640  
Washington, DC 200053096

Dear Bill:

Thanks for your quick response to my inquiry about base closing success stories. It is very helpful. I will also follow up on your suggestion to talk to Randall Yim.

Regards,

9 MAR 01

U04936 /01



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 8 2001

323.3


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8 MAR 01

U04713 /01



600 Thirteenth Street, NW 202-756-8500 voice

www.cohengroup.net

Suite 640 202.7568510 fax

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington DC

2001 MAR 7 AM 52

20005-3096

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**Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire:** 1,300 jobs were created, replacing 400 lost jobs.

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With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,  


William S. Cohen  
Chairman and CEO

U04621 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/2553



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 9 2001

323.3

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Chairman and CEO  
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600 Thirteenth Street, NW  
Suite 640  
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Suite 640 202.7568510 fax

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington DC

2001 MAR 7 AM 52

200053096

February 26, 2001

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Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

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With best wishes, I am

Sincerely,  
  
William S. Cohen  
Chairman and CEO

U04621 / 01

11-L-0559/OSD/2555

March 9, 2001 3:08 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Paper on Cuba by Ernesto Betancourt

Paul, you might want to take a look at this paper on Cuba and then return it to me.

I have not had a chance to read it yet, but I skimmed it and it looked interesting.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
030901-19

Cuba

9 Mar 01

**MEMORANDUM**

TO: President Bush Transition Team

SUBJECT: Cuba's potential threat and policy suggestions

FROM: Ernesto F. Betancourt, first Director of Radio Marti

**Executive Summary**

There is no disagreement that the Castro regime must come to an end sometime. This is highly likely to happen during the forthcoming Bush Administration. However, various scenarios have been suggested on how this may happen. The Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue advanced proposals that ignore the reality of Castro's position and were brutally rejected on December 27, 2000 by Castro's regime in a *Granma* front page article as reflecting a "fantastic illusion." Nevertheless, following the usual response of the proponents of this approach, that rejection is not going to deter them from persevering in their effort to sacrifice the well-being of the Cuban people and the security of the United States by trying to sell their rejected proposals to the new Administration.

In the Appendix, a completely different scenario on the potential threat Castro represents to US security and how it is being ignored is discussed in detail and with thorough documentation. The Appendix opens with a brief discussion of why the scenario of a Castro potential aggression should not be ruled out *a priori*. Then, four recent developments pointing to Castro's preparations for eventual actions against the continental US are described briefly. One, the training of Cuban commandos in VietNam for preemptive attacks against US bases, revealed in 1996 by *Jane's Defense Weekly*. Second, the FBI charge in September, 1998 that arrested Cuban spies were ordered to obtain addresses of military stationed at South Florida bases, intelligence useful for commando attacks, as well as the recent revelations during the spy trial on Cuban instructions to these spies to identify Florida keys locations for infiltration of weapons and explosives into the US. Third, the 1999 revelation by a former Deputy Chief of the Soviet germ warfare program that Cuba has been building up a capability to produce such weapons. And, finally, the FCC report on Cuba's interference with ARINC, the US air traffic control radio system. Why is Cuba investing resources in these activities unless they plan to use them?

The Appendix discusses briefly Castro's increasing economic and political troubles, as well as the backfiring of the effort to cover-up the regime's drug traffic entanglement. It also discusses Castro's bizarre behavior against the Europeans at the Rio meeting in July, 1999 and the Canadians, whom he labeled the "second enemy to the North," after the Winnipeg Pan Am Games that year. It mentions the July, 1999 trial of the US, with a demand for US\$181 billion dollars in reparations, which the Catholic Church magazine *Vital* criticized as a deliberate effort to encourage hatred of the US. Finally, it mentions the campaign whipping up Cuban nationalism over drugs in Olympic sports. On September 4, 1999, even the staid *Financial Times* felt impressed enough to describe Castro's behavior as *distinctly obsessive*. At a time when a stream of US political and business visitors offered hope of lifting the US embargo, why all this rage?

By the end of 1999, Castro suffered a serious setback during the Iberoamerican summit in Havana which was a clear diplomatic victory for Cuban dissidents. The Elian crisis was correctly

perceived by Castro as an opportunity to regain the initiative and motivate Cubans again around the revolution. However, he overestimated his ability to transfer popular feelings on a legitimate issue, the rights of a father to his child, into support for broader issues advocated by his regime.

As the year 2,000 comes to an end, Castro has been forced to turn more repressive again. Internationally, the Panama Iberoamerican Summit turned out to be another setback when Castro opposed a resolution condemning his allies, the Basque ETA terrorist group, and supporting the people and government of Spain. This led to a bitter exchange with the President of El Salvador and a souring of relations with Spain. Sugar output for 2001 is already projected to be down around 10 per cent, the growth of tourist traffic is flattening out and the most important untapped tourist market has been effectively frozen out by the legislation vesting in the US Congress the power to modify travel restrictions. The Elian case had a definitive impact on the Cuban-American vote in Miami-Dade, costing Gore tens of thousands of votes. To Castro's dismay, the political clout of what Castro rejoices in calling the Cuban mafia seems to have increased under a Republican Administration that, for the first time, includes a Cuban-American as a member of the Cabinet.

The Appendix documents, with quotations from Castro statements and/or actions, his forty year war against the US, as well as the overt and covert strategies through which it has been implemented. Finally, policy changes to avoid this potential threat are suggested, mostly by disabusing Castro followers in Cuba's military and intelligence network, of the notion--US passivity and avoidance have conveyed so far--that they will forever enjoy impunity for their hostile actions.

Perhaps it is advisable to look first at the policy suggestions. They are oriented to preventive actions the Bush Administration can take to avoid reaching the situation in which US retaliation against Cuba is demanded by an irate American people should any of Castro's plans be implemented. To prevent is better than to have to regret. If this analysis is proven to be wrong in the end, and Castro departs peacefully from the scene, this author will be most happy.

On the other hand, if the analysis is correct and Castro carries out the aggressive actions he has been planning for four decades, then the American people will hold responsible those at State, the Pentagon, CIA, DIA and the Justice Department who failed to take this threat seriously. The transition teams for these areas would be well advised to at least give consideration to the facts here presented. The Bush Administration should not take lightly the potential threat Castro represents in his waning days because, if unfortunately any of its components is implemented, it is quite likely to take place under its watch.

### **What policy changes may be advisable to cope with this potential threat?**

Throughout the years, moderate responses to Castro, such as the initial embargo and later the Helms-Burton Law, were chosen in lieu of force-based responses. For example, Helms-Burton was brought out of a paralyzed Senate-House conference by the downing of American civilian planes over international waters. An action Castro took perfectly aware that it was unlikely President Clinton would respond to his use of force against American civilian planes over international waters by the logical military response of pin-point bombing the MiG-29 bases. The sense of impunity this US behavior transmits to Cuba's military should not be underestimated.

A Bush Administration must send a different message to those around Castro. After all, any overt action against the US to fulfill his *true destiny* will require the participation of these individuals. The Powell/Rice/Rumsfeld team is going to be tested by Castro. The US response must make Castro and his followers aware that actions against the US will no longer be met with indirect responses or avoidance behavior. These are some US options that come to mind:

- Make it clear to Castro and his followers, particularly in the armed forces, that any aggressive Cuban actions will be met with commensurate retaliation. In other words, another use of force against Americans will lead to retaliation in kind. (POWELL/RICE/RUMSFELD)
- Refocus the ongoing trial of the Cuban spies arrested in 1998 on the issues related to the conspiracy "to sabotage planes and hangars" mentioned in the initial indictment and downplayed in the revised indictment, as well as relate them to Castro's overall plans for an eventual attack on the US. (ASHCROFT)
- Include Cuba as one of the most likely sources of potential terrorist germ warfare attacks and take whatever precautions are warranted. Reopen the West Nile virus epidemiological mystery investigation by following the Cuban hypothesis line of inquiry. At least contact the two defectors who had worked on such a program in Cuba, as well as any other scientists who had defected from the Biotechnology and Genetic program. Find out what cooperation, if any, was given by CDC and the Smithsonian to the Cuban effort. (ASHCROFT/THOMPSON/WHOEVER IS AT CIA)
- Complement the present wording of the Helms-Burton Law in terms that only Castro and his brother are unacceptable for the transition government, by warning that anybody involved in aggression against the US, whether overt or covert, will be equally unacceptable. State clearly that US reconstruction assistance will be predicated on a sharing by all legitimate stakeholders--including present regime officials not involved in human rights violations, members of the dissidence, former property owners, workers and victims of repression--in the future Cuba. (POWELL/RICE)
- Change the present counter-intelligence policy from one of passive observation of the network of contacts to an activist one of dismantling the networks that have been identified so far. Castro lacks at present the resources to rebuild his intelligence network if we crack down on his present assets. Particularly, if they are faced with an aggressive counter-intelligence effort. To this effect, the FBI capability against Cuban intelligence should be beefed-up to the resource levels assigned to the DGI when it became a KGB surrogate. (ASHCROFT)
- Crack down on apparently dormant groups and fronts, such as members of the Venceremos and Maceitos brigades. At present, there are many still acting on

behalf of Castro with absolute impunity. For example, many demonstrations in Miami that enrage people against the exile community are undertaken by these groups. At least, make them register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (ASHCROFT)

- To encourage defections among people who had been blackmailed by Castro's intelligence to cooperate with them, offer immunity to those who come forward reporting such experiences to our counter-intelligence. After all, five of the ten spies arrested in Florida last September were willing to plea bargain their situations. By the same token, it is likely that many of those who went to Cuba many years ago and were recruited by the Cubans are not willing to accompany Castro in his Gotterdammerung. (ASHCROFT)
- Brief civic leaders and media in communities where Cuban agents could provoke racial incidents. Make them aware of such possibilities, so they are better prepared to cope with provocations when and if they happen. (ASHCROFT/RUMSFELD/POWELL/RICE)
- Form a Team B, with Cuban defectors with direct exposure to Castro's responses under threat, to offer suggestions on the meaning of strange Cuban behaviors not subject to logical explanations. Throughout his career, Castro has always been underestimated by US planners. We just cannot afford to do that anymore. (RICE/POWELL/RUMSFELD/WHOEVER FROM THE CIA)
- Reinforce the Helms/Burton USAID program to plan assistance for the post-Castro transition. Focus it on plans to assist those within Cuba, when the time comes, whether in the dissidence or even within the Castro regime. The US should make clear that those around Castro not responsible for crimes against humanity will be acceptable in a post-Castro era. (POWELL/RICE)
- Form a task force to address the issue of how to restore the reach of US Radio and TV signals to Cuba. At the time when a transition starts taking place in Cuba, it is of the utmost urgency for the US to have a clear means of communicating with the Cuban people with a firmly established credibility in the audience. This was one of the basic reasons for creating a Radio Marti and it was accomplished, but it has lost a substantial share of the audience in recent years due to the neglect of the Clinton Administration. (POWELL/RICE/WHOEVER FROM IBB)
- Open the case of the Cubans who tortured our VietNam prisoners. Try to identify who they are so at least Harvard will not invite them again to come to the US as they did with General Vecino Alegret. (ASHCROFT/RUMSFELD)

## APPENDIX

### Is Castro Preparing for a Gotterdammerung?

There is no question on anybody's mind that the Castro regime will end. But there are diverse opinions on how. Some believe Castro is willing to live in exile--Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the President of the Galician Government, even offered him a house in the town where his father was born--but after Judge Garzon's indictment of Pinochet, Castro is highly unlikely to consider such an offer. Carlos Lage and Ricardo Alarcon, not to mention his brother Raul, are betting on his turning power over to them under a transition regime, while retiring in the island as an elderly statesman. The merciful Lord may finally take pity of the Cuban people and swiftly remove him from power. There are those from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, not to mention American farmers and the US Chamber of Commerce, who harbor the naive notion--or the "fantastic illusion" as *Granma* labeled it--that they can go ahead with their neo-liberal and private sector efforts under Castro's nose by pretending they have nothing to do with the Helms-Burton and Torricelli legislation.

There are others, however, who think Castro would rather end in an apocalyptic last ditch struggle against the hated Americans, thus provoking a Gotterdammerung to seek a place in **history** for himself. As will be commented later in this Appendix, Castro himself has described a war with the US as *his true destiny*. All those who over the last decades, have been close to him in moments of crisis, coincide in concluding that an apocalyptic finale is his most likely choice. However, this is unlikely to occur as long as he is convinced he can stay in power and play an important historical role. True, a Gotterdammerung would bring a disaster upon the Cuban people. But Castro couldn't care less.

In his youth, Castro admired Hitler. As Georgie Anne Geyer reports in her Castro biography, *Guerrilla Prince*, at Havana University Castro carried with him a copy of *Mein Kampf*. The title for his statement at the trial in 1953, "History will Absolve Me," was lifted from Hitler's speech at the Rathaus Putsch trial. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume he may follow Hitler in his final mood. As Hitler did when he was at the bunker in relation to the German people, Castro has shown little regard for what may happen to Cuba after him. In fact, during the Ibero-American Summit in Oporto, he frankly told a journalist "that that was not his problem." His only concern is that they continue his revolutionary struggle. And that means to perpetuate an anti-American stance.

Some may argue that Cubans are basically friendly with Americans and, therefore, unlikely to accompany Castro in any aggressive adventure against the US. Since, for the kind of actions involved, it is necessary only that a small fanatic hard core be willing to carry out their orders, those having such doubts are advised to read *Honor Bound*. This book about POWs in Vietnam, by two DOD historians, Stuart Rochester and Frederick Riley, was published by the US Naval Institute Press. The book has a full chapter dedicated to what was called by POWs the Cuban Program at a prison camp labeled "The Zoo." The vicious torturing of US POWs by these Castro officers should disabuse those doubters of any notion that the Gotterdammerung hypothesis should be discarded on the grounds of Cubans' traditional friendship for Americans. At a session in the House of Representatives, one of them was identified by some of those tortured as General

Fernando Vecino Alegret, the present Minister of Higher Education. As in any society, in the Castro regime there are normal human beings and some pretty sick people motivated by hatred

**Plans for a preemptive attack** A report in the prestigious *Jane's Defence Weekly* of March 6, 1996, revealed that Castro was training Cuban forces for a preemptive attack against the US. According to the *Jane's* story, Cuban special forces had been undergoing training in Viet Nam since 1990, that is at the time of the Soviet collapse, to use tactics like those of US Navy Seals against American forces "preparing to invade Cuba."

The central point of the article is not that the US is preparing to attack Cuba. Anybody familiar with contemporary Pentagon thinking knows that is one of the least likely options for the US to follow. That is why the key paragraph of the *Jane's* article is the one on Cuba's strategy:

*"Havana's strategy in pursuing such training is to attack the staging and supply areas for US forces preparing to invade Cuba. The political objective would be to bring the reality of warfare to the American public and so exert domestic pressure on Washington."*

Soldiers are trained with specific missions and strategies in mind. Is Castro's goal to be the one that, for the first time in this century, brings war to the US mainland? The Clinton Administration refused to face such a possibility. Can the Bush Administration afford to continue such a pretense? If it becomes true, it is much more likely to happen under Bush's watch,

**Arrest of ten Cuban Spies.** In September 1998, the FBI arrested 10 members of a Cuban spy network in Florida. This is the first time in forty years that the Justice Department has initiated prosecution proceedings against Castro agents. At their bail-setting hearing on September 16, 1998, both Assistant US District Attorney, Caroline Heck Miller, and FBI Agent, Mark de Almeida, justified the action taken, after having the network under surveillance since 1995, on the grounds that the accused were considering "*the possibility of sabotaging planes or hangars at an undisclosed location in Florida.*" In fact, one of the spies, Antonio Guerrero, aka Lorient, had managed to obtain a civilian job with the US Navy at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station at Key West. Others targeted bases in Tampa and the Southern Command.

According to items 18 and 19 of the FBI Affidavit, presented two days earlier at the arraignment of the spies, Lorient had been asked to provide information on:

*"deployment of aircraft, base daily routines, descriptions of the interior and exterior of buildings particularly one being prepared for a highly secret activity; the use of planes equipped, for electronic warfare, which could be used for intelligence and tactical operations against our country; and, the home addresses of hundreds of military personnel stationed at the base."*

This last request is the most relevant. Information on addresses of base personnel is not of any value for Cuban defensive purposes. However, it may be extremely relevant for the planning and implementation of commando attacks as commented by *Jane's Defence Weekly*. During the spy trial, which just started, 8,000 pages of communications between the spies and their

controllers in Cuba have been released by the FBI. One of these communications involves an intriguing order given in 1996 to search locations in the Florida Keys where Cuban intelligence could land weapons and explosives. This further reinforces the notion that Castro is planning commando attacks against the US at some time of his own choosing.

Castro's explanation of the arrest of the spies during the Ibero-American Summit in Oporto in 1998 was that he never spied on the US military, only on exiles, a statement at odds with the evidence gathered by the FBI. In a strange twist, without any explanation, a new indictment filed in May, 1999, downplays the issue of sabotaging planes and hangars and ignores other evidence presented in September, 1998 by the FBI that relates the spying to national security issues. Instead, it focused the indictment on anti-exile actions of the spies, specifically the conspiracy to commit murder in the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in February, 1996. The historical record shows that Justice would have never arrested the spies if their only mission was against Cuban exiles. The trial was to start in September, 1999 and was postponed six months. It was delayed again and the trial did not start until late in 2000.

Even within the narrower case, Justice has made no attempt to prosecute those who gave the orders for the murders from Cuba. Instead of adding these individuals to those being prosecuted, the judge presiding the case, in a unique action by a US court in a spying case, ordered the FBI and the prosecutors to go to Cuba to take depositions from the controllers of the spies, thus making them witnesses for the defense!! Did she really believe that taking an oath over a Bible from hardened Cuban intelligence operators would result in their "telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth"? Castro must be laughing his ribs out.

In truth, the case is being downplayed with accusations of spying against the Cuban American National Foundation and other exile groups, instead of focusing on the more serious and important issue for the American people that Castro's spies were targeting American military installations. By changing the focus of the trial to this other issue, is Janet Reno legitimizing Castro's claim that he never spied on the US? Is this another effort of the Clinton Administration to avoid a hot foreign policy issue that could cause a US/Cuba confrontation? Such avoidance of confrontation in a serious national security matter does nothing but encourage Castro and his followers into bolder actions. Fortunately, the Bush Administration will have a say on this case because it is unlikely that it be finalized before the Inauguration. Let us hope the new team at Justice reassesses the trial and expands the indictment to place more emphasis on the threat to US security it implies.

**Germ warfare capabilities.** A 1999 released book on germ warfare, *Biohazard*, published by Random House, reveals that Cuba started its germ warfare efforts in the eighties. The author of the book is Ken Alibek, a former Colonel in the Soviet Army, who was Deputy Director of the agency involved with Soviet development of germ warfare.

In his book, Alibek, at present a CIA and Pentagon consultant residing in Virginia, quotes his superior, General Yuri Kalinin, as stating, on his return from a visit to Cuba, that *the Cubans have developed a germ warfare capability*. These capabilities include a project under close Castro supervision to develop virus strains to be inoculated to migratory birds. According to Carlos Wotzkow, a Cuban defector residing in Switzerland, reports in a book published in 1998--that is one year before the West Nile virus outbreak in New York--he was fired from his job at the

Zoological Institute in Havana in 1980, among other things, because he criticized a Castro initiative to create a Biological Front "to undertake biological warfare against the United States territory through introducing viruses of infectious diseases inoculated in migratory birds." Another researcher, Dr. Luis Roberto Hernandez, a British trained entomologist who defected in London in 1995, reported in an interview with *El Nuevo Herald* that he worked in the Biological Front Project until his defection and that their mission was to identify and produce virus strains and select migratory birds to carry them.

Despite the obvious potential relation of the experiences of these two researchers with the so-called mystery of how the West Nile virus reached this Hemisphere, neither the CIA nor the CDC has been willing to even consider the possibility of using such a hypothesis in the epidemiological research. Is this another case, as that of Justice with the spies, of the Clinton Administration being unwilling to pursue potential Castro aggressive actions against the US so as not to jeopardize a possible normalization of relations with Cuba? Shouldn't the Bush Administration at least pursue this line of inquiry to satisfy itself that, despite the strange coincidence between the Cuban project and the encephalitis outbreak, Castro is not involved?

It has been widely commented that the CIA has found that the genetic and bio-technology industry, one of Castro's pet projects, is nothing but a cover for developing biological weapons. This industry is housed in a complex of buildings in the Miramar zone of Havana, some of which are reported to have the usual security measures associated with biological weapons development. It is this knowledge that led Defense Secretary William Cohen in 1998 to caution the earlier Pentagon report about Cuba not being any longer a military threat to the US.

According to a November 28, 1998 article in *Science*, Cuba was estimated to have invested one billion dollars in the Genetic and Biotechnology industry, yet this industry does not seem to have become a leading exporting or producing sector. In fact, in the latest report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the Cuban economy there is not one single figure about its economic relevance. Could it be that, rather than being an economic project, it is more related to military uses such as the epidemiological mystery in New York associated with the West Nile virus outbreak?

**Electronic spying and air traffic control interference.** Finally, we have Cuba's emerging alliance with Red China, our strategic partner with a propensity to steal our nuclear and ballistic secrets. According to a June 24, 1999 article in *El Nuevo Herald*, Cuba has allowed Red China to install two electronic monitoring stations similar to the Soviet installation at Lourdes. The cover-up for these installations is to broadcast Red China's international short-wave programs to the United States and Latin America. The Cuba-China military link was expanded in the last week of the year 2000 by General Fu Quanyou signing a collaboration agreement during a visit of a Chinese military delegation to Cuba.

Red China has provided Castro, among other things still unknown, with equipment to enhance Cuba's capabilities to jam VOA Radio Marti's broadcasts to Cuba to the point that it is blocked in most areas of Havana. Under Plan Titan, the Soviets provided broadcasting equipment to respond to VOA Radio Marti. This Soviet equipment is extremely powerful, it can reach 1,500 KM and overpower any US transmitter. When Cuba started using it to interfere with US air

traffic control, Soviet officials were very concerned and warned the Cubans this could cause havoc in US air traffic leading to a confrontation.

A report on Cuban radio interference for the second quarter of 1999, released by the Chief Watch Officer of the HFDF Center includes, among a long list of such radio interferences, one with New York's ARINC, air traffic control communications system. On May 13, 1999 at 4:48 PM a false communication was made to that city's air control system, over a high frequency band, pretending to be "OPEC 21," a flight of three C-130 US military transports. FCC tracked the false broadcast to a location in Pinar del Rio province, west of Havana. Are the Cubans testing the capability of their equipment to cause chaos in our air traffic system or our willingness to put up with it? Well, their equipment seems to work and, again, we did nothing. Castro and his followers know we know. Our silence tells Castro's collaborators that for some mystical reason they *enjoy* impunity.

In the face of all these serious revelations that point to possible Castro plans and testing of the waters for aggressive action against the US, should we continue underestimating the risk this man represents; or, avoiding the issue? If you were a Cuban pilot or jammer operator, would these US responses deter you from following insane orders--such as downing American civilian planes over international waters or messing up US air traffic--or would you feel reassured that nothing will happen? These are issues which the Bush Administration Transition teams cannot ignore or downplay as the Clinton Administration has done. Because the clock is ticking **and** the alarm is set for some time during the Bush Administration.

### **Castro's increasing troubles**

Castro is facing simultaneous failures in the domestic and the international arena. Castro's version of socialism has failed to effectively reactivate the Cuban economy. The meager sugar crop of 4.0 million tons in 2000 was broadcast as a great success. But that ignores the economic facts. First, this represents half the amount of sugar Cuba had produced in the late eighties and, second, the current price is three to five cents below the cost of production. The cost of financing this meager output makes it a losing proposition that, in a free market economy, would have led to the closing of the industry. Meanwhile the price of oil **has doubled**. And, as commented' above, projections for 2001 predict a ten percent decline.

A leaked 1998 report from the Cuban National Bank acknowledges a balance of trade deficit for that year of US\$2.8 billion, This, on top of US\$1.2 billion in 1996 and US\$1.7 billion in 1997. Between 1993 and 1998 Cuba accumulated a trade deficit of 10 billion dollars. **And** this deficit is growing at the rate of more than 2.5 billion dollars per year. Cuba is a country whose borrowing capacity is very limited due to its having defaulted in its foreign debt since May, 1986 and has neither foreign exchange reserves on which to draw, nor access to the IMF and other international lending agencies to bail it out. The only feasible explanation is that Cuba is financing this gap out of drug traffic and money laundering.

This hypothesis is reinforced by the Gilman-Burton House report, revealing how a seven ton cocaine shipment discovered by the Colombian police on December 3, 1998 on its way to Cuba was actually consigned to a company 51 percent owned by the Cuban government. Our departing Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffery, ignoring the **above** report, the **overwhelming**

evidence from four grand juries revealing Cuba's involvement in drug traffic and the 19 year sentence of Jorge "Gordito" Cabrera in 1996 for smuggling 6,000 pounds of cocaine from Cuba, launched a trial balloon for providing the Cubans with equipment and intelligence to cooperate in the war on drugs. In the opinion of the Colombian police, Castro is likely to use these resources against cartels not paying him his share and to help his partners. In his speech, on July 26, 1999, Castro resorted to his usual raving and ranting against the US over the rejection of his "offer" to cooperate in drug interdiction.

The internal political situation is getting increasingly tense due to the inability of the regime to meet basic needs of the majority of the population. The progressive decline in living conditions is made more irritating by the conspicuous consumption of those having access to the dollar-fed side of the economy. Corruption is rampant. The revolution has lost its egalitarian appeal. Most Cubans have to fend by themselves to "resolver," that is to have access to food and other essentials, since the rationing system can meet only two weeks of their monthly needs.

Cuba's frantic efforts to gain international support ~~against~~ the US in Europe and Latin America are going nowhere. The Canadian government is ~~openly~~ reconsidering its policy towards Cuba due to Castro's unwillingness to respect human rights. Canadian investors are complaining about losses caused by Cuba's arbitrary actions and are withholding further investments. On July 26, 1999, Castro strongly attacked the Canadians, pushing relations to an even lower level. Next to the approval of the Czech resolution at the Geneva meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, the refusal of the 1999 European-Latin Summit in Rio de Janeiro to even mention the Helms-Burton Law specifically, is perhaps one of Castro's biggest foreign policy setback.

Castro is reported to have sacked Foreign Minister, Roberto Robaina--two days ~~after~~ the preparatory meeting for the Summit ended in Mexico--for his failure to get what Cuba wanted in the wording of the final document for the Summit. Castro himself was not only unable to improve the text ~~agreed~~ by Robaina, but had to accept the elimination of any specific reference to Helms-Burton. The Cuban initiative to have Javier Solana prosecuted for genocide over Kosovo did not endear Castro with NATO members participating in the Rio Summit.

Castro may well be getting ready for his Gotterdammerung. This seems the most likely explanation for his bizarre recent behavior. Even progress in efforts to lift the US embargo does not seem to placate his anger. A parade of pleading US ~~Senators~~ and Congressmen, not to mention delegations of US farmers and businessmen, should have encouraged his hopes on the embargo. However, whatever is bothering Castro may not be solved by lifting the embargo. The regime's embargo on Cubans' productivity, rather than the US embargo, is the cause of Cuba's failed economy. Meanwhile, Castro is bolstering hatred of the US among Cubans with a trial rehashing American aggressions and demanding reparations for \$US18 I billion dollars. The trial testimony was broadcast, an hour a day, leading *Vital*, a Catholic Church publication, to challenge this appeal to revive old hatreds and a spirit of revenge instead of reconciliation.

Castro is also using sports to whip up Cubans' sagging nationalism. First, came the blistering attack on the Canadians over the suspension of Cuban athletes for drug use at the Pan American Games in Winnipeg. Canada was identified as "the second enemy to the North." Afterwards, Cuba walked out from the Houston World Amateur Boxing Championship, despite the International Amateur Boxing Association authorities suspending the judges who made the decision that triggered the incident and restoring the gold medal to the Cuban boxer involved

Finally, he summoned foreign reporters to two evenings on national television, to rehash the conspiracy against Cubans athletes for drug use. But there is no doubt that he is using Cubans' sports pride to whip up a nationalistic frenzy. Only Castro knows the real cause of his rage.

As commented before, the Elian case in early 2000 offered Castro a window of opportunity which he exploited very effectively. However, as the year progressed, it became evident he could not translate the Elian episode into any tangible long term advantage economically or internationally, thus leaving Cubans in the same stagnant situation they faced before. Therefore, before writing off the Gotterdammerung hypothesis, ask yourself: what if this interpretation is right? Is our avoidance of these unpleasant facts actually encouraging more of the same? To answer such questions it is better to place these events in their historical context.

### **Castro's War against the US**

The roots of Castro's hostility against the US go back to his father who was a soldier in the Spanish army defeated by American forces during the Spanish-American War; and, to his resentment of Americans living at the United Fruit enclave in Oriente Province, where he was born and spent his childhood. The most explicit manifestation of how that hostility was converted into an aggressive stance against the US is reflected in the letter Castro sent to his secretary and confidant, Celia Sánchez, in the summer of 1958. That is, a few months before coming to power. In that letter, exhibited at the Museum of the Revolution in Havana and published by Lionel Martin in his book *The Early Fidel*, Castro states: ". . . I have sworn to myself that Americans are going to pay dearly for what they are doing. When this war is over, a much wider and bigger war will begin for me, the war I am going to wage against them. I realize that is going to be my true destiny."

In January 1959, shortly after taking power, Castro met with Colonel Ramón Barquín and his fellow professional army officers who had conspired to overthrow Batista and had been imprisoned as a consequence. During the conversation, he told them that he wanted an army capable of fighting a war. When one of the officers commented that the war had just finished, Castro's answer was: "No, the war is just beginning, because this is going to end in a war against the United States."

That is why the Cold War is not over in Cuba. Once in power, Castro started preparing for his war against the US based on two strategies: one overt and the other covert

### **The overt strategy to wage war on the US**

It is in that context and not in the context of a commitment to communist ideology that we have to see Castro's entanglement with the Soviet Union. He needed the Soviets as an strategic umbrella to counterweight American power while he was pursuing "his true destiny"

In pursuit of that overt strategy, Castro expected Latin American support. Once he realized that Latin America was reluctant to support his war against the US, Castro targeted Latin governments through his policy of exporting revolution. Some of these governments are now asking the US to accept Castro unconditionally, but any serious review of the historical record of the sixties will reveal that Latin American governments came to see Castro as a menace to their

internal security and stability. Contrary to the prevailing perception that we twisted the Latins' arms when the OAS acted in 1962, US prodding fell in most receptive ears.

The Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 sealed Castro's hostility against the US. And also reassured him that even without a linkage to the Soviets, in the end, the US was likely to hesitate in the use of its military might against him. A perception that is as valid today as then. Just in case, however, Castro proclaimed himself a lifelong Marxist-Leninist at that time to force the Soviets to provide his regime with strategic support.

Emboldened by American hesitation at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets decided to make a daring move aimed at upsetting the strategic balance with the US by locating 42 Intermediate Range Missiles in Cuba, within striking distance of the American heartland. As is very well documented in the Naftali-Fursenko book, *One Hell of a Gamble*, during the resulting October 1962 crisis, Castro was the only national leader involved who did not hesitate to engage in a nuclear war, regardless of the fact that it meant the eventual destruction of Cuba. Even Khrushchev was shocked by Castro's irresponsibility in pressing for a Soviet first nuclear strike. Eventually, Castro realized he had been provided a bastion to pursue his *true destiny*.

In the late sixties, Castro pursued his overt strategy by promoting revolution in Latin America until Che's failure in Bolivia, and Soviet pressure, forced him to stop. By 1975, there was a shift in theater to projecting Cuban military forces to support expanding Soviet influence in Africa. In the late seventies, Nicaragua and Grenada were targets of successful Cuban supported violent takeovers. Cuba was chosen to preside the Non-Aligned Movement. Convinced the Carter Administration was a pushover, Jamaica was selected as the next target.

However, in July, 1980, Castro was forced to back off from supporting a Grenada-like takeover by his friend and follower Michael Manley, who had openly announced he planned to abolish Parliamentary rule. The takeover was coordinated by Cuban Ambassador Ulises Estrada, a member of the Americas Department of the Central Committee, whose task was to promote revolution. A Cuban construction brigade, similar to the one that fought later in Grenada, was already in Jamaica, supposedly building a high school. A thousand Manley followers, known as the "Brigadistas," had been given military training in Cuba. They were to be supported by Cuban forces airlifted from Oriente Province to a strip habilitated for night landings in Mandelville, ten miles west of Kingston. CIA renegade Phillip Agee appeared in Kingston to denounce a CIA plot against Manley. The home of the CIA resident was shot at. President Carter issued strong warnings to Prime Minister Manley against such a move and beefed up our naval presence in Guantanamo. The Jamaica Defense Force destroyed the landing strip. Graffiti in Kingston called for "Cubans, go home." Manley abandoned his plans. He lost the parliamentary elections held shortly afterward. Facing a firm US stand, Castro backed off, leaving Manley on a lurch.

By 1983, Castro was even bolder. When President Reagan sent American troops to Grenada. Castro was convinced that, in the next stage, American troops were to invade Cuba. He feared Reagan had decided to ignore the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement that allowed him a secure hide-out from which to wage his war against the US. With doubts on Soviet support, he felt against the wall. According to General Rafael del Pino, at that time Deputy Chief of Cuba's Air Force, in his forthcoming book *Inside Castro's Bunker*, Castro initially ordered preparation of plans to destroy Homestead Air Force Base, but then shifted the target to Turkey Point Nuclear Plant South of Miami. His comment was: "I want to do something that they will remember for

*the rest of their lives and then, when we are gone, history will remind them that we were the only ones who made them pay dearly for their imperialistic arrogance around the world."*

From that point on, Castro's overt strategy against the US led to one frustration after another. When Gorbachev took power and decided to abandon Soviet expansionism in Africa, Castro's efforts in Angola came to a negotiated solution. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas lost the election in 1990. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the strategic umbrella for waging an overt war against the US disintegrated. Castro had to settle for negotiated solutions to the revolutionary conflicts he was promoting in Central America, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala.

### **Terrorism, the covert strategy to wage war on the US**

At the same time Castro approached the Soviets in 1959, he started preparations for his covert war against the US in its own territory by promoting unrest among minorities. In the summer of 1959, we had one of our regular weekly luncheons of the economic team with Castro at Cuba's Central Bank and one of the American guests he had invited asked to go to the rest room. Out of the rest room came a man dressed as a full fledged American Indian Chief, with feathers and all. Castro was already trying to promote unrest among native Americans. As I was getting ready to leave Cuba, in February 1960, a friend of mine in Cuba's Foreign Office informed me that they were sending money through Cuba's consulates in the U.S. to finance civil rights movement sit-ins. Similar relations were developed with Puerto Rico's "independentistas."

American officials, confronted with such information at the time, reacted by saying: "He wouldn't dare." In 1996, the reaction of a retired American General, confronted with the above quoted *Jane's Defense Weekly* article, was: "if he does that, we will crush Cuba, so what will he gain?" It is hard for reasonable human beings to understand individuals motivated to such destructive and suicidal behavior. That is why Castro has been daring all these years. As I told the General, "I rather see the US act more firmly now than crushing Cuba later."

In not taking these actions seriously, and responding accordingly, we may be encouraging more boldly action: In the end, our bland responses may cause us and the Cuban people more grief than if we take a firm stand. Castro is justified in thinking he enjoys impunity to wage this covert war strategy against the US. All along we have resorted to indirect responses, such as the embargo. This perception may not only embolden him, but also his followers, particularly in the military. One Administration after another has avoided taking a firm stand on Castro's provocations. In forty years, there has not been a single prosecution by the Justice Department of Castro's agents. No wonder then that, when the first ten spies were arrested in September, 1998, they had all their information in the computers and diskettes occupied by the FBI. It was not incompetence, it was overconfidence. They felt there was an unwritten rule to leave them alone.

During the sixties and seventies, besides exporting the revolution to Latin America and Africa and supporting terrorism in Europe through ETA, IRA and the PLO, among others, Castro continued building a subversive network in the US. Members of this network are recruited from a pool of young Cuban exiles in the so-called Maceitos brigades, who go to Cuba to cut sugar cane, and young Americans brought to Cuba under the Venceremos brigade which, according to

*Granma's* July 27, 1999 edition, reached 7,000 visitors this year. Castro also started building links with violent groups such as the Weathermen and the Macheteros from Puerto Rico.

Claire Sterling reports in her book, *The Terror Network*,

*"the same meticulous selection went into recruiting 2,500 young Americans in the Venceremos Brigades. . . the Brigades visited Cuba in ten contingents between 1969 and 1977. There, under Colonel Simenov's fatherly eyes, they learned how to mount truly effective campaigns to destabilize the United States."*

With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Maurice Bishop coup in Grenada, and with full Soviet support, Castro was feeling euphoric about his prospects for waging his covert war against the US, parallel to those successful overt actions. That is why on July, 1980, during his visit to Nicaragua to celebrate the Sandinista victory, he was indiscreet in bragging:

*"We have agents of absolute confidence all over the United States who are ready to undertake whatever actions are necessary at the time of our choosing. The Yankees cannot even begin to image the capabilities we have in their country. You all read about the riots in Miami... We can accomplish things that would make the riots in Florida look like a sunshower."*

This statement provided the inspiration for *Monimbó*, a novel by Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave, which depicts how vulnerable the United States could be to acts of terrorism that lead to racial conflict. But the actions supported by Cuba went beyond inspiration for fiction. According to Tex A Hudson, in his CANF report *Castro's America Department*:

*"on December 3rd 1979, "the Macheteros machine-gunned a US Navy bus in Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, killing two sailors and seriously wounding ten others with AK-47 fire." And, later on, in January, 1981, "Machetero commandos destroyed nine U.S. military jet fighters, worth \$45 million, at the Muñiz Air Force National Guard Base in San Juan. In an operation that the DA reported & supported with training and weapons, the Macheteros robbed a Wells Fargo depot in Hartford Connecticut, of \$7.2 million September 12, 1983... and Machetero member Victor Manuel Gerena, employed as one of the Wells Fargo guards, was given sanctuary in Cuba."*

A significant revelation appears in the recently published autobiography of Jorge Masetti, entitled *El Furor y el Delirio*, the story of a life dedicated to promoting revolution until Castro executed his father-in-law, Colonel Tony la Guardia, during the Ochoa affair. In his book, Masetti confirms that the Macheteros' Wells Fargo action was financed and equipped by Cuba. He was involved in an operation in Mexico to provide US\$50,000 to a Machetero courier. The money was brought to Mexico in person by Jose Arbesu Fraga, a deputy of Manuel Pineiro at the Americas Department of the Central Committee. Three months later, Arbesu Fraga again traveled to Mexico to bring the false passport used by Gerena to fly from Mexico to Cuba. Four million dollars, out of the seven, were shipped from Mexico to Cuba via diplomatic pouch.

The FBI included Gerena among the 1999 Ten Most Wanted criminals. After the robbery, Arbesu Fraga, this time disguised as a diplomat, served as head of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, without the US raising any objections.

In the face of such meek behavior on the part of the US, what message have we been sending to Castro and his followers? It is to be hoped that something more firm will come from the strong national security team assembled by President-elect Bush for his administration.

Contrary to end of the year comments by US pundits, who totally ignore the region, Latin America is likely to generate the first crisis to be faced by the Bush Administration. It will be in Colombia where the so-called peace process is crumbling and is likely to come to a heading as early as February, 2001. The Colombian Government has given the FARC a deadline to come to terms in the two year peace process or the 42,000 square kilometer zone graciously granted: to them by President Pastrana is bound to be recovered by the Colombian army. The US is involved in this crisis on the government's side as a result of Plan Colombia, which is strenuously objected to by the FARC, a narco-terrorist organization that initially had overt Castro support and recently has maintained a more discrete relationship with Cuba.

The other guerrilla group, the ELN, is openly supported by Castro who, ironically, now hosts the peace conversations between this group and the Colombian government. Undeterred by the failure of the first abdication of territorial sovereignty to guerrilla groups, President Pastrana has now offered to withdraw the army from another chunk of territory, despite violent protests from residents of the region. The state is collapsing in Colombia. This could generate a Hemispheric wide crisis.

This is likely to be Castro's test for President Bush's national security team.

January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2001

The Author Ernesto F. Betancourt worked directly with Castro in 1959, after representing him in Washington during the insurrection against Batista and was a member of the Castro delegation during his first visit to the US in April that year. He was present at a meeting of the Economic Cabinet at the Banco Nacional de Cuba in July that year, when Castro stated that *"if the US send the Marines, I don't care. They will have to kill 300 to 400 hundred thousand Cubans and I will get a bigger monument than Jose Marti."* The author opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion and predicted its failure. A month before the Missile Crisis, provided Bobby Kennedy information, obtained by former Rebel Army officers infiltrated in Cuba, on missile deployment. He also, organized the research department of Radio Marti, before it went on the air, and directed the station for its first five years. Does not have any property to recover in the island and opposes a US invasion of Cuba. Finally, although Cuba born, is an American citizen by birth and does not seek any office in a post-Castro government

March 9, 2001 6:25 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
William Schneider  
Pete Aldridge  
Chris Williams

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Attached is a memo from a friend of mine on the subject of missile defense.  
Please take a look at it.

Thank you.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
030901-25

U04996 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2572

373.24

9MAR01

Mr. Secretary,

I had the pleasure of participating on the Welch Panel to review the twenty plus NMD options under consideration. After the luncheon Friday, I promised you and Steve Cambone that I would send you my thoughts. I've been deeply involved in NMD for several years so here are my brief thoughts.

We can achieve (and should) a land, sea and airborne capability during this decade. We can achieve a reasonable capability (around .7pk) before the next election. Each system brings a unique capability to the NCA.

- > Land Based: An accelerated land-based system can be fielded by 2003/4. It will provide a decent capability (.6-.8) but more importantly it provides the technological foundation upon which a mature national missile defense is created, as well as providing the anchor for an expanded global missile defense for our allies. The land-based sensors and kill vehicles are critical for other BMD systems. The X-band radar technology can be adapted to sea platforms; the EKV technology applies to a variety of boosters to include ship launched, barge launched, etc. The land-based battle management provides the foundation to be expanded into a global configuration. The land-based system is by far the most mature: over eight years of component maturation,, over three years of integration, and five completed flight tests, T would field an accelerated system NLT 2003/4 and continue its improvements to an objective system by 2006. This comes under the heading of "Don't throw out the baby with the bath water" and it is also a capability we can achieve before the next Presidential election.
- > Sea-Based: Not nearly as mature as land-based, but is a must for the nation. It substantially increases the US capability to defend the fifty states against a variety of attacks by providing protection in depth and multiple shot opportunities against a given threat. Likewise, forward deployed, sea-based sensor suites will also extend the global NMD system capabilities. Finally, the flexibility in sea-based systems becomes a national asset for defending our allies in both a TMD and NMD context. The sea-based system is highly dependent upon the location of the interceptor, interceptor velocity burnout (Vbo), location of threat launch sites, as well as rimelines associated with detecting and identifying. I would recommend accelerating the Navy Theater Wide System, which can probably be operational by 2007/8. Together with a land-based system we would achieve PK's in the high nines and be very robust as the threat evolves in sophistication. In the short run, I'd get whatever I could out of the current Aegis system. With an improved sensor suite it could possibly get off some boost phase shots against the Korean threat. the PK's won't be high (probably .10, at best .20) but it provides some defense in depth for an accelerated land-based system. If thought of as an initial approach to a family of systems, the overall PK for the family will be a little higher than that of only the land-based system. Therefore, I believe both land-based and sea-

based arc a must, we can achieve an initial capability from each before the election in 2004, and they both evolve in full robust capabilities shortly after the middle of the decade. Also, on these timelines they should be slightly ahead or at least even with the growth of the evolving threat.

- Airborne System (Airborne Laser): I believe that a full-up capability here will be nearer to the end of the decade. However, it should be a superb TMD system; an NMD capability is a little more difficult but certainly achievable. To function as an NMD adjunct, the airborne system must be capable of structurally destroying boosters of different design and size than those posing a theater missile defense threat. For example, an NMD threat booster will have at least two and more likely three stages in order to achieve the required throw weight and velocity. This may require enhanced pointing precision or higher laser power on target to ensure that one of the stages is destroyed in boost phase. There are also other factors such as standoff distances, track angles and track rates to be considered. The coverage achieved and the viability of the system are dependent upon the lasers lethality range against threat boosters. Consequently, the ABL system becomes very scenario dependent. However, having sounded like I am damning it with faint praise, I believe that because of the tremendous flexibility we get from ABL, that it is also a "must" system. The combination of arriving on station rapidly, displaying a very visible weapon capable of destroying threat missiles during boost phase, thereby introducing the specter of collateral WMD warheads falling back into the threat country, should create a substantial deterrent in crisis situations. I would not accelerate ABL, but I would provide a healthy resource level to ensure that we have it before the decade ends.
- System Summary: What I have recommended is a family of systems starting with a rapid land-based system that serves as the baseline or anchor that is enhanced by sea-based and airborne "adjuncts" which provide us with a much more robust defense for the homeland. It also provides us with a deterrence and if necessary, a very credible defense for our allies. The family of systems also allows us to face technical or evolving threat challenges through use of a combination of responding weapon systems,

The Problem: If we don't achieve an early initial capability that rapidly evolves into a robust capability, it won't be because of technology...it will be because of our DOD Acquisition System. NMD expanding to Global Missile needs to be a Manhattan Project type approach. This necessitates radical changes to our current acquisition process. I suggest the following:

- The overriding criteria must be system quality and reliability:
  - Dual source high risk components
  - Nationally recognized Red Team to oversee threats and countermeasures
  - Do not rely upon Allies for critical path items.

- Get the best people, selectively man government positions.. . demand the best from industry.
  - Make it competitive with industry.. . first to finish gets the prize.
  - Kill the current acquisition process.. develop a very streamlined program, get all the bean counters out to the process.
  - Do the same with the user community.. . kill the current CRD, ORD, world wide staffing, JROC process. Create a responsive requirements process that responds directly to your guidance.
  - Establish a selectively manned, small direct program office. The NMD JPO is already lead by the best Program Manager the Army has produced in the last 15-20 years.., MG Bill Nance. Get to know him.
  - Establish a quick channel reporting link directly to SECDEF or your designated representative in order to cut through the B.S. and make timely decisions.
- We can do this. . . we have the technology and we have the leadership: Pete Aldridge will be the best DAE ever, Ron Kadish is the most experienced Acquisition Flag we've had in BMDO, and I've already given you my assessment of Bill Nance's quality. Thanks for allowing me to write.

TO: ~~Steve Cambone~~ JJ Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: March 2, 2001  
SUBJECT:

381

You also might want to circulate this Schneider memo to certain people in our ~~inner~~ group.

— Wolke, Du Z, Peter A, Steve H,  
Chris W., new AA + E / PA / LA /  
Boodie / Paul E

DHR/azn  
030201.37  
Attach.

FYI

2 Mar 01

44

**MEMORANDUM**

December 29, 2000

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
Secretary-designate, DoD

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: Getting started

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This memorandum offers a few macro-observations/suggestions concerning your impending takeover of the Department of Defense. Your appointment comes at a crucial time. The incumbent Commander-in-Chief has plumbed the depths of moral debasement with a devastating effect on the morale of the armed forces. The transatlantic alliance – carefully nurtured for a half century – is coming unstuck as the lack of US leadership impels Europe to seek its own security arrangements. The credibility of the US ability to deter the threat or use of WMD and their means of delivery is at risk as the **engine** of proliferation moves ahead unchecked.

Expectations of the ability of the late-starting Bush administration to swiftly take the policy and resource initiative are low. The absences of a “normal” transition process, and the vague national security policy aspirations articulated during the presidential election campaign have contributed to these low expectations. A clearly expressed set of objectives that describe what the administration intends to achieve (“outputs”) coupled, to a decisive resource strategy will reverse these expectations and enable you to get both the Department and US national security policy embarked in a new, credible, and widely supported direction.

**National defense policy objectives**

A compact summary of major national defense themes that will be the object of administration policy is essential. This is necessary in the first instance to provide some coherence to the administration’s vague national security aspirations, and to couple these to concrete Congressional support. Second, US allies and adversaries need a decisive expression of how the US defense posture will evolve under the Bush administration to begin the process of adjusting their expectations and behavior. Third, public and congressional support for a significant increase in resources allocated to national defense can be obtained only in an environment where there is a grasp of what is to be achieved. A list of a few clear and concrete objectives will help create a viable resource allocation strategy and permit subordinate elements in DoD to grasp the direction the administration is taking. Below is a candidate list of what the new administration might intend to achieve.

➤ Sustain deterrence in the post-Cold War global security environment

The nature of the post-Cold War world makes WMD/missile proliferation a fact of life. The manner in which proliferation is taking place poses a threat to the ability of the President to deter WMD/missile threats to US citizens at home, and US forces and allies abroad. A decisive change in policy should be aimed at *devaluing* investment in WMD/missile by potential adversaries. While this will not diminish their hostility, it will divert their investment into other areas that are more tractable from the military perspective. Achieving this policy objective will include:

1. Missile (cruise/ballistic) defenses that provide indivisible and effective protection to US citizens, US forces deployed abroad, and its allies.
2. Upgraded intelligence collection and processing to monitor, disrupt, and thwart evolving WMD/missile threats to the US and its allies.
3. Strengthening the ability of the US armed forces to hold proliferators at risk – before they are able to launch missiles with WMD payloads.
4. Maintaining a modern, reliable, safe, and effective offensive nuclear weapons posture to sustain deterrence in the vastly changed post-Cold War strategic landscape.
5. Reforming the failed US dependence on legal/arms control approach to countering proliferation to one that makes achieving diplomatic or military gains by an adversary highly unlikely.

➤ Insure the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces

This objective encompasses numerous elements of our military posture. The meltdown in military morale requires urgent attention. The failure to procure sufficient modern munitions compromised the performance of US armed forces in the recent Kosovo air campaign – a problem illustrative of the residual effects of the Clinton administration's diversion of funds from acquisition and sustainability to operating accounts to support its four dozen international peacekeeping campaigns. The high operating tempo required of US forces has compromised training, while the failure to fund military pay and quality-of-life needs have left a huge unfunded backlog for the Bush administration to address. Post-Cold War security crises will involve the use of force on a "come as you are" basis able to deal with situations as diverse as humanitarian relief to a pre-emptive assault to prevent the launching of a nuclear-armed missile.

➤ Modernize the infrastructure of command-control-communications-computation-intelligence-surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)

Nowhere else in the US national defense effort is the gap between national needs and resources so apparent as in the C4ISR infrastructure. This infrastructure is indispensable to the transformation of conventional military forces (dominance of the "infosphere" –

the hallmark of success – cannot be achieved with the existing infrastructure), monitoring proliferation, and dealing with international terrorism. The cost and effectiveness of US space-based intelligence systems is influenced by the limitations on the capacity of space-based communications (i.e. more information must be processed in the satellite at high cost, rather than cheaply on the ground due to the inadequate communications infrastructure). The C4ISR infrastructure is the core of the US edge in dominating information-based warfare. Its early modernization is central to placing the DoD on a path that will permit it to shed legacy systems and replace them with systems that will “transform” US military power in a manner that will insure that US security needs will be met in the decades ahead.

➤ Transform US military power for 21<sup>st</sup> century conditions

The swift advance of technology in the civil sector is leaving the defense establishment behind. Saddled by a vast and costly legacy of obsolescent “analog” military equipment and technology, the DoD has been unable to procure advanced weapon systems based on modern technology that could lower the cost and increase the effectiveness of national defense. The US civil sector is without peer in developing and integrating advanced technology from the global market. Antiquated acquisition practices have limited the ability of the DoD to benefit from US scientific and industrial pre-eminence in advanced technology. The need to *swiftly* introduce new weapon systems will enable the DoD to eliminate obsolescent systems from its Cold War equipment legacy and avoid the cost of upgrading them. Although defense procurement has declined sharply since the mid-1980s, R&D expenditure has declined far less. Many appropriate technologies are available for application now, but are unaffordable due to the cost of legacy systems and lack of new funding. The transformation of US military power from its current industrially based character to information dominance requires skipping a generation of upgrades of existing systems in favor of near-term investment in acquiring wholly modern capabilities derived from US scientific and industrial pre-eminence.

➤ Assure the ability of US forces to conduct military operations anywhere in the world where US interests are threatened

The Cold War theaters of military operations were well defined by the location of Soviet military power, and were addressed by a series of bilateral and multinational alliances. This compact set of circumstances put in place a basing infrastructure that provided the infrastructure from which US military power was projected. The post-Cold War world differs in important ways. Threats can emerge from any quarter, and modern technology permits even the poorest nations on earth to mount a sophisticated local or regional challenge to the security of US forces or allies. A Navy with sufficient combatant ships, submarines, and tactical aircraft with an appropriate logistics infrastructure<sup>1</sup> to support US objectives throughout the world is needed, as are deployable Army and Air Force

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<sup>1</sup> Reductions in the number of underway replenishment ships as part of the Clinton force structure reductions made it necessary for the USN to rely on such high risk ports as Aden for refueling – with tragic results.

units. Modern airlift and sealift exploiting advanced civil sector technology will contribute to this end as well.

### **Resource strategy**

Policy cannot be separated from resources. An early opportunity to decisively impart the new administration's defense policy *persona* arises from the FY 01 supplemental appropriation and the FY 02 budget (the last Clinton administration submission next month) amendment processes. The nominal Bush \$90 billion increase (variously described as being available over the FYDP and over the entire decade) is inadequate to meet US needs and the President-elect's policy aspirations. Moreover, it has unwelcome parallels to Clinton-era practice of attempting to derive a defense policy from a resource limit rather than providing funding to meet US security needs. It contains no explicit allowance for funding intelligence needs, nor the fixes to the nuclear weapons establishment (now in a precarious state). The Chairman of the JCS has testified to a \$60 billion O&M shortfall. The tweaks to the military medical system will cost \$45 billion, and the proposed \$1 billion military pay raise is marginal – to say nothing of funding new initiatives.

Achieving the President-elect's national security aspirations requires an articulate defense of those aspirations and the programmatic elements needed to achieve them. National defense is the most widely supported element of Federal expenditure. The Congress and the public will support the allocation of resources closely linked to an appropriate policy. Thus, obtaining the President's early concurrence with the policy aspirations and its resource implications is essential.

History suggests the most effective structure for a resource strategy. DoD programs are slow-spenders. Because its programs usually take several years to acquire, the rate at which Budget Authority (BA) is converted into Budget Outlays is much slower than most civil programs. Only 15% of BA appropriated for procurement become a budget **outlay** in the first year the BA is appropriated. Moreover, the slender majority the Republicans now enjoy in the Congress is at risk in the mid-term elections (especially in the Senate). As a result, the most appropriate budget strategy is to seek a "spike" in BA through the FY 01 supplemental and FY 02-budget amendment. The aim of a budget "spike" is twofold:

- to put the resources in place for key elements of the administration's program; and
- to politically and diplomatically couple the administration's declaratory policy on national defense to their implementation.

The budget "spike" can be composed of three elements to facilitate its implementation within the fiscal policy of the new administration and consistent with the budget process needs of the Congress. First, the backlog of urgent O&M fixes (plus the acquisition of spare parts and combat consumables) and financing the military medical care system

might qualify as "emergency" needs under the Budget Act, and hence are not scored against budget caps on aggregate expenditure. Some similar expenditure for the intelligence and nuclear weapons programs would also qualify. Second, the FY 01 supplemental appropriation bill can be an omnibus package that combines new program starts, "normal" supplemental budget requirements such as military pay increases, and redirection of existing programs. Additional authorizations would probably be required, and could be rolled into a single appropriation bill with the concurrence of the HASC/SASC.

The FY 02-budget amendment should be offered concurrently with the FY 01 supplemental appropriation bill. This package should contain full flowering of the programmatic initiatives that define the administration's defense *persona*. These can build on the "down payments" included in the FY 01 supplemental, as well as the logical programmatic extension of other policy initiatives the administration will undertake.

Time is of the essence due to the budget process schedule. An early spring, 2001 submission of the supplemental and budget amendment should be undertaken. This will need to include other programs outside of the DoD, but included in the 050-budget function – intelligence and nuclear weapons-related programs – as well.

#### *DoD's role in national security policy formulation*

During the Clinton administration, there was an alarming drift toward a practice of limiting the DoD's role to its defense function and leaving national security policy to the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State. The DoD must be a central player in national security policy formulation as well as its implementation. Moreover, the concept of "national security" in the 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot be readily separated from such issues as technology transfer, security assistance, space policy, etc.

#### *Miscellaneous issues*

The advent of a new administration provides a number of opportunities for the DoD to clarify policy, and reset the direction of national security policy. A few illustrations include:

- Establishing clear(er) policy guidelines concerning US military intervention abroad,
- Creation of "super-BRAC" (base realignment and closure) legislation that will enable the DoD to shed redundant facilities and laboratories in a single piece of legislation. This is a political minefield that must be adroitly managed. Experience with earlier BRAC legislation demonstrates that Congressional support can be won when the decisions are not politicized (in contrast to the failed Clinton BRAC).

- Once-and-for-all acquisition reform through an omnibus acquisition reform bill that will deregulate DoD procurement, and permit it to more fully exploit ~~the global market in advanced~~ technology. ---
- Refining DoD support for quasi-defense functions including counter narcotics and counter terrorism, security assistance, technology transfer, export controls and arms transfer policy.

These observations are highly aggregated, and as a result, skip over numerous important, and in many cases, critical details. The aim is to try and bring the “forest” into clear relief, even if it obscures many of the “trees.”

March 10, 2001 5:45 PM

TO: Chris Williams  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Clark's Paper

Judge Clark sent me this paper on how the Reagan administration handled ROC requests. You might want to take a look at it. I found it interesting.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031001-15

China(NATS)

U04999 /01

10MAR01

**CLARK RANCH**

(b)(6)

**FAX TRANSMISSION**

**TO:** The **Honorable Donald Rumsfeld**  
**Attn: Kathy**

**FAX NO.:** (b)(6)

**FROM:** **William P. Clark**

**DATE:** 8 March 2001

**NO. OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE): 9**

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**Dear Don:**

**Confirming** our conversation in your office on **Monday, I attach** President Reagan's four paragraph clarification of **the 1982 Joint Communique** for **the benefit of** your **people** handling **the current ROC** requests for **security assistance**. We also **attach** for those **same** people a **significant** memorandum revealing the **difficulty** Boeing is **experiencing** in **maintaining** its historic position with **China Airlines**. Many of **us** feel the **United States** should exercise strong **linkage** ("security and **commercial** issues are **inextricably linked**"\* -- President **Reagan**), **particularly in light** of the **substantial and rising trade deficit between our** two **countries**. Unless we assert some linkage, it is anticipated **Airbus will continue** to prevail **in** the current **RFPs**, violating earlier **ROC commitments for the Boeing 777 made to Dan Tellep, Cap and to me**.

Secondly, as discussed, I have been approached (**as have others**) by emissaries of the **Iraqi and Libyan governments** to discuss "**normalization**". Unless you or **Colin direct** otherwise, **I intend not to speak with them**. **On the other hand, you may wish me to listen** to their **entreaties** and report back

**Best personal regards,**

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

WPC:dlv

## CLARK RANCH



(b)(6)



5 January 2000

The Honorable James R. Lilley  
Director  
Institute for Global Chinese Affairs  
1122 Holzapfel Hall  
University of Maryland  
College Park, Maryland 20742

VIA TELEFAX

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter concerning **arms** sales to Taiwan **while** I served as National Security Advisor and you as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (ATT) to President Reagan.

Yes, President Reagan gave me **specific** instructions **concerning his** intent regarding **the** 17 August 1982 Joint Communique on U.S. **Arms** Sales to Taiwan. At his request, I prepared and he signed a four paragraph memorandum dated 17 August 1982, addressed to Secretaries **Weinberger** and **Schultz**. The memorandum was transmitted to **them**, initialed and **returned** to the National **Security files**. **As** the President requested, **his** memorandum should be available to you and to **others** similarly interested **from** the NSC files and **from** the Ronald **Reagan** Presidential **Library**. **However**, should it save **you** time and inconvenience, I quote **from** my personal record the text of President Reagan's memorandum:

**As you know**, I have agreed to the issuance of a joint communique with **the** People's Republic of China in which we express United States policy towards the **matter** of continuing **arms sales** to Taiwan.

The **talks** leading up to the signing of the communique were premised on the **clear** understanding that any reduction of such **arms sales** depends upon **peace** in the Taiwan Straits and the continuity of **China's** declared "fundamental policy" of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

11-L-0559/OSD/2585

The **Honorable** James R. Lilley  
5 January 2000  
Page Two of Two


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In short, the U.S. willingness to reduce its **arms** sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of **China** to the peaceful solution of the **Taiwan-PRC** differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage between these two matters is a **permanent** imperative of U.S. foreign policy.

In addition, it is essential that the **quantity** and quality of the **arms** provided Taiwan be **conditioned** entirely on the threat posed by the **PRC**. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, **Taiwan's** defense capability relative to that of the **PRC will** be maintained.

Jim, I hope **this** information assists your work.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

WPC:dlv

## 1. TAIWAN / CHINA AIRLINES / BOEING

- Taiwan and China Airlines have yet to fulfill its 1995 commitment to place a firm 777 airplane order for China Airlines' aircraft fleet.
- China Airlines' firm order for Airbus A340-300s with options for A330s instead of the 777 model in August 1999 was curious and inexplicable. Some suggest it was a political move by the Taiwan government to carry out its diplomatic initiative of strengthening its ties with the EU to build a broader international support base with the purchase of European products. Evidence also exists for another explanation. Many of China Airlines' Division Directors/Managers were embarrassed by the Airbus order, knowing that their recommendation had been to buy the Boeing 777.
- The Airbus order also appeared to be a backlash towards the U.S. Executive Branch for its "one-China" policy while attempting to win broader international support for WTO entry ahead of mainland China and to possibly leverage against the U.S. to win sales of strategic U.S. military equipment.
- Between June and August 1999, Taiwan officials ignored letters and pleas by U.S. government offices, committees, senior U.S. Senators and Congressman to support Boeing as they pushed forward with the Airbus aircraft order.
- To build a broader alliance of international support, Taiwan is establishing diplomatic offices throughout the EU while the EU establishes an office in Taipei beginning March 2001. At the same time, China Airlines and EVA Airways are reducing the Boeing share of their fleet by 20-25% with airplane orders from Airbus.
- Despite Boeing activities, aviation business developments, and executive visits in Taiwan, the Taiwan government and China Airlines' continue to echo claims of the past about Boeing's "non-presence" in Taiwan. These claims simply appear to be based on Taiwan's desire to publicize visits by top-level corporate executives like Boeing Chairman Phil Condit and/or BCAG President Alan Mulally in Taiwan with the intention of grabbing international headlines to win both political and economic recognition while taunting mainland China. Taiwan and China Airlines have not given due credit for visits in Taiwan by other Boeing senior executives.
- The election of Taiwan's new administration under the DPP party in March 2000 caused China Airlines to post-pone their decision to exercise options for A330 aircraft until mid-2001.

## 2. CHINA AIRLINES AIRCRAFT FLEET

<u>(54) AIRCRAFT IN SERVICE</u>	<u>ON ORDER</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
(16) 747-400/-400F Freighters	(10) 747-400Fs	Replaces aging 747-200Fs
(10) 747-200 Freighters		To be replaced by 747-400Fs
(1) 747-200		To be replaced by A340-300
(4) MD-11s		To be replaced by A340-300s
(11) 737-800s	(4) 737-800s	(1) Aircraft to be replaced by A340
(12) A300-600Rs		To be replaced by either A330 or 777s
—	(7) A4340-300s	Replaces (2) 747SP, (1) 747-200, (4) MD-11, (1) 737-800

- CAL's A340-300 order will replace (2) 747SPs that were sold in 1/00, (1) 747-200, (4) MD-11s, and (1) 737-800 aircraft, thus reducing the Boeing share in CAL's fleet from 78% to 68%. Should China Airlines exercise an order for A330s in June 2001 instead of 777s, the Boeing share of CAL's fleet will be further reduced to as low as 60%, an 18% reduction.

### 3. CHINA AIRLINES SITUATION

- **CAL's A330 decision** was further postponed when the new Taiwan government replaced the board members of the China Aviation Development Foundation (CADF), the board members of China Airlines, Ltd., and China Airlines' Chairman and President in July 2000.
- **MARKETS:** China Airlines passenger and cargo markets are very strong in the Asia region and to/from North America with high load factors (80+%). CAL's European traffic between Taipei and Amsterdam, Rome, and Frankfurt is extremely weak and unprofitable.
- **NEW AIRCRAFT:** China Airlines is committed to accepting (5) A340-300s deliveries in 2001 to replace their Boeing 747SP, 747-200, MD-11 models to simplify their fleet, but they are eagerly looking for solutions from Boeing to take out the A340 aircraft while recognizing that their A340s will never adequately serve their long-range markets as promised by Airbus.
- China Airlines has slid delivery of their remaining two (2) A340-300s on order from 2002 to 2003 and/or could possibly substitute these models for two-engine A330s.
- **USED AIRCRAFT:** In Sept. 2000, China Airlines accepted a Boeing proposal and a \$0.5M deposit to buy back their (2) MD-11 aircraft. China Airlines disregarded the commitment and used the Boeing offer to solicit a better deal with another buyer.
- **PROFITABILITY:** CAL's A340s have 40+ fewer seats than the MD-11s it is replacing. In addition, their A340-300 cannot fly between Taipei and San Francisco fully loaded thus reducing their need for this model airplane. Nonetheless, China Airlines realizes that the smaller A340-300 will never be profitable with fewer passengers and lower yields on the longer-range routes.
- **RELIABILITY:** China Airlines has scheduled their new A340-300s to be utilized at least 14 hours per day while recognizing that the A340 has a reputation for having a poor reliability record, which will soon cause China Airlines numerous flight delays and cancellations.
- **COMMONALITY:** With CAL's A340-300 order on the books to serve its long range markets, China Airlines' "mid-size" regional fleet decision in mid-2001 naturally favors the Airbus A330 to replace up to (16) A300 regional jets beginning 2003. Commonality of the two-engine A330 and four-engine A340 is limited to its flight deck layout and the fuselage (passenger cabin). The wings, engines, and flight crew rating are different between these two aircraft due to the two- vs. four-engine configuration. Regardless, China Airlines would very much like to see the A340-300s go away, thus weakening any benefit of a common A330/A340 fleet solution.
- **FLIGHT CREW:** Given the shortage of flight crews around the world, China Airlines will heavily rely on ex-pat flight crews to fly their A340-300s since their own flight crews are not familiar with the non-standard, side-stick controllers and procedures in the A340 flight deck. China Airlines cannot afford another aviation accident. This situation will only worsen for China Airlines if they order up to (18) A330s instead of the 777, which has the standard flight control-wheel column.
- **ETOPS:** While China Airlines' Flight Operations are quite comfortable with the 777's ETOPS reliability record and procedures, certain senior airline management continue to echo old arguments that the 777 would be limited across the Pacific while ignoring that fact that ETOPS has been successful for over 15 years by nearly 90 airline operators world-wide on both Airbus and Boeing aircraft.

#### 4. REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

- On January 18, 2001, China Airlines submitted a request for proposal (RFP) from Boeing for (14) firm + (4) option 777-200s to compete against the smaller, lower-priced Airbus A330-200 and A330-300 model that makes Airbus a sure winner.
- CAL's "mid-size" aircraft fleet evaluation does not include an "apples-apples" comparison and favors Airbus.
- The request for proposal is "short-fused" allowing the Boeing only two weeks to submit its best offer by February 6, 2001 following the Chinese New Year.
- China Airlines is pressed to make their "mid-size" aircraft fleet decision internally before they sign a financing deal with the EU's ECA (EX-IM equivalent) that supports their first A340-300 delivery in April 2001, which could include aircraft financing for their A330 aircraft purchases as well, pending the outcome of their "mid-size" fleet evaluation.
- Announcement of China Airlines' "mid-size" fleet selection (A330 or 777) is expected by mid-year 2001.
- Delivery of CAL's new "mid-size" aircraft fleet selection to commence between 2003-2007.
- Again, should China Airlines exercise an order for A330s instead of 777s, the Boeing share of CAL's fleet will be further reduced to as low as 60%.

#### 5. KEY DECISION MAKERS

- Taiwan Government Ministers/Premier
- CADF/CAL Board members, Dr. Chris Chu-cheng Huang
- CAL President/CEO - Christine Tsung

#### 6. BOEING RELATIONSHIPS

- Boeing activities/efforts in Taiwan are seldom publicized with the sincere intention of serving the their aviation industry. Boeing is actively involved in Taiwan despite claims by the Taiwan government and China Airlines that Boeing is "missing in action" or has a "non-presence" in Taiwan.
- Boeing made a significant contribution to the Taiwan Red Cross in Sept. 1999 to assist in the recovery of the devastating "9-21" earthquake without expecting media/public recognition.
- Boeing Senior Executives have met with China Airlines executives in Taipei, Seattle, and other locations on nearly 12 occasions between July 1999 and December 2000.
- Most notably, BCAG President Alan Mulally:
  - met with then CAL Chairman Chiang and President Sandy Liu in July 1999 in Taipei,
  - introduced CAL Sr. EVP Brian Chou to Boeing Chairman Phil Condit and Harry Stonciphier at the Working Together Conference in Tampa, Florida in Nov. 1999,
  - met with then CAL President Sandy Liu again February 2000 in Seattle where he introduced him to his BCAG Leadership team, and
  - invited then CAL President Sandy Liu as his personal guest to Quebec, Canada in May 2000 where they both attended "Conquistadores del Cielo" for aviation leaders/executives.
- In August 2000, BCAG Sr. Executive Larry Dickenson and EVP Ray Conner hosted a dinner for CAL's new Chairman Capt. Lee and new President/CEO Ms. Christine Tsung in Taipei.
- Several other attempts were made by Boeing in late-2000 to meet with China Airlines' new President/CEO, but were postponed due to conflicting schedules between CAL and Boeing.

## 7. BOEING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT / PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN

- Boeing does not have an office in Taipei, but has several Field Service offices and staff located at China Airlines, EVA Airways, and Far Eastern Air Transport offices.
- Boeing has created a number of business opportunities to help support the development of the aviation industry in Taiwan:
  1. Taiwan's AIDC is a Boeing supplier for the 717 tail section.  
Note: Taiwan and AIDC have yet to fulfill its part of the 717 business agreement by helping Boeing place 717 airplanes in Taiwan to contribute to the 717 program launch and success.
  2. February 2000, Boeing Airplane Services (BAS) made Taiwan's ICAS aviation consortium a BAS partner/supplier in aircraft modification, conversion projects, and other services.
  3. October 2000, Boeing, BF Goodrich, and Taiwan's ICAS aviation consortium also signed a business partnership to convert/modify 737 "Classic" airplanes from passenger models to freighters (p-f conversions).
  4. Boeing is also considering AIDC as a new supplier for the 737 "Next Generation" tail section pending CAL's or EVA's commitment for firm Boeing airplane orders.  
Note: On Jan. 4, 2001, Taiwan's Minister of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Mr. Lin Hsin-I, and Minister of Transportation/Communication (MOTC), Ms. Yeh Chu-Ian, submitted a letter to BCAG President Alan Mulally requesting Boeing to award Taiwan's AIDC with a supplier contract to build 737NG tail sections while EVA and CAL continues to reduce and replace the Boeing share of airplanes in their fleets with Airbus airplanes.
- Boeing has made significant financial contributions (six figures) to China Airlines to help fund its promotional campaigns and to help recognize CAL for its ISO-9001 certification in March 2000.
- Boeing, with compliments, dispatched its Chief Training Pilots and its Aviation Safety experts to Taiwan in March, June, October, and December of 2000 to evaluate and assist China Airlines, EVA Airways, the Taiwan CAA, and the Taiwan Aviation Safety Council (ASC) to improve flight operations, flight safety, and flight training in Taiwan.
- Boeing funded an industry symposium in June 2000 for the Taiwan CAA and for the airlines in Taiwan to understand ETOPS and related air transport regulations.
- Boeing, with compliments, will dispatch Chief Training Pilots again to China Airlines and Far Eastern Air Transport in February 2001 to evaluate and assist these airlines and the Taiwan CAA to improve its flight operations, flight safety, and flight training in Taiwan.
- At the request of the Taiwan CAA, Boeing will provide a key-note speaker and host a lunch to support an APEC-sponsored conference on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in Taipei between February 12-16, 2001 and will provide media support/featured stories to help give Taiwan recognition for hosting this internationally recognized forum.
- Airbus, like Boeing, also does not have an office in Taipei, but has several Field Service offices and staff located at China Airlines, Air Asia, and Transasia airline offices.
- Airbus currently does not have any active industry partnerships or business developments in Taiwan, but signed an MOU with Taiwan's AIDC in March 2000 to supply components for the A3XX (A380) pending a firm order from China Airlines or EVA Airways.

## 8. SUMMARY

- Boeing has made great strides in improving the relationship with China Airlines and Taiwan over the past 18 month with numerous executives visits, industrial cooperation, and business partnerships with Taiwan's aviation industry unmatched by the EU and Airbus.
- Taiwan and its airlines have yet to fulfill their commitment on the 717 program as outlined in the Boeing/Taiwan AIDC business agreement, yet the Taiwan's MOTC and MOEA continue to ask Boeing for additional opportunities in aviation development. At the same time, CAL and EVA Airways have steadily reduced the Boeing share of airplanes in their fleets while Taiwan increasingly favors the EU and Airbus for their own political gain.
- Despite the sincere efforts by Boeing, visits between Boeing and Taiwan's airline executives, and Boeing Industrial Cooperation agreements with Taiwan's AIDC and ICAS aviation consortium, Boeing cannot overcome Taiwan's political agenda with the EU without the help of the U.S. Government.
- **Recommendation** – To restore the valued relationship between Taiwan and its aviation industry and Boeing, it is recommended that the Taiwan government, the CADF, and China Airlines replenish the Boeing share of airplanes replaced by Airbus aircraft in China Airlines' fleet and fulfill its 1995 commitment to Boeing with 777 airplane purchases that supports over 400,000 U.S. workers who have in turn supported Taiwan over the years.

## Key Messages for Taiwan

### GENERAL

- Boeing is very present and active in Taiwan and in Taiwan's commercial aviation industry.
- Boeing top executives Chairman Phil Condit, President Harry Stonecipher, BCAG President Alan Mulally, and senior executive VPs Larry Dickenson, Ray Conner, Joe Gullion, Wade Cornelius, Capt. Chet Ekstrand, Randy Baseler, and others have made more than 15 trips in the year 2000 to meet with Taiwan's airline and industry executives-
- Boeing Chief Training Pilots and Aviation Safety Experts have also made numerous "complimentary" visits to Taipei (January, March, June, October, December 2000) to assist the Taiwan CAA, the Taiwan Aviation Safety Council, China Airlines, EVA, FAT, and Mandarin Airlines in improving flight safety, flight training, flight proficiency, and aviation regulation.
- Boeing is supporting the Taiwan and the Taiwan CAA in hosting the APEC-sponsored air navigation conference at CKS airport in Feb. 2001 with industry guest speakers and promotions.
- Boeing made a generous contribution to the Taiwan Red Cross to assist in the recovery of the devastating "9-21" earthquake in Sept. 1999.

### AIRLINE ACTIVITY

- EVA announced plans in Jan. 2001 to reduce the Boeing share of its fleet by 25% with the order for (8) Airbus A330s.
- China Airlines (CAL) order for (7) Airbus A340s will replace (2) Boeing 747SPs, (1) 747-200, (4) MD-11s, and (1) 737-800 in 2001 to reduce the Boeing share of CAL's fleet from 78% to 68%.
- In Jan. 2001, China Airlines requested proposals for the 14 firm + 4 option Boeing 777 and the smaller, lower priced Airbus A330 to decide its regional "mid-size" fleet requirement by mid-2001. An Airbus order by CAL would further reduce the Boeing share of CAL's fleet from 68% to 60%.
- CAL's request for proposal for B777s and A330s makes Airbus a sure winner with the smaller, lower priced A330 model.
- Taiwan TECRO is requested to encourage the CADF/CAL Board to share the "mid-size" airplane order with a "split" 777/A330 decision that would better serve CAL's "mid-size" fleet requirement more profitably rather than selecting an all-Airbus order.
- China Airlines has an opportunity to fulfill its 1995 commitment with a 777 order in 2001.

### INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

- Taiwan's AIDC is a supplier for the Boeing 717 airplane program.
- In February 2000, Taiwan's ICAS aviation consortium and Boeing Airplane Services became partners in providing airplane modification services.
- In February 2000, Taiwan's ICAS aviation consortium, Boeing Airplane Services, and BF Goodrich became partners in passenger-to-freighter conversions for the 737 "Classic" airplanes.
- Airbus has no industrial cooperation agreements in Taiwan, except for an MOU with Taiwan's AIDC to provide components for the financially risky A3XX (A380) program.
- As requested by Taiwan's MOEA and MOTC, Boeing is prepared to make Taiwan's AIDC a supplier for the Boeing 737 airplane program in consideration of new Boeing airplane sales in Taiwan. Boeing has successfully established industrial cooperation between China and Taiwan under contract to supply production parts and sub-assemblies for Boeing airplanes.

March 10, 2001 5:57 PM

TO: Lisa Bronson  
Chris Williams

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: European Defense Initiative Article

*Europe*

Please read this article and see if you agree it is worth sending to the President.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
03 1001-17

*11 March 01*



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO

DRAFT (NOT SENT)

March 10, 2001 5:54 PM

FAX TRANSMISSION

TO: President George W. Bush

cc: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleeza Rice  
Honorable Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: European Defense Initiative

Attached is an article from *The London Times* on the European Defense Initiative. It expresses the kinds of concerns about the risks that the EDI could pose to NATO. The underlined portions highlight problems.

This suggests we will need to be vigilant in the weeks and months ahead to continue to emphasize the importance of seeing that the EU process is imbedded in NATO. We know for sure that there will be continued tugs in the opposite direction by the French.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031001-10

DRAFT



## STOP THE ROT

Bush and Blair must reject the nonsense of Nice

From the moment that George W. Bush is sworn in this Saturday, he will face troubling domestic economic indicators and a smouldering Middle East. The new team in Washington is known to be keen to restructure strategy towards Russia, China and Japan and pay more attention to Latin America. It may be tempted, meantime, to set transatlantic relations to one side. The Nice plan for a European Union military force, complete with command structures "to exercise political control and strategic management of EU-led operations", has ensured that it can safely do no such thing.

Without a clear American voice, the decisions to equip the EU with an "autonomous" military capability on "an equal footing" with Nato, taken at last month's Nice summit, will wantonly undermine collective security within Nato. Left unchallenged, these deceiving ambitions will disable the Alliance. The Bush White House can and must stop the rot before permanent damage is done; Tony Blair, even if he finds the task embarrassing and difficult, must help it to do so.

This emergency has arisen in part out of American myths about European integration that go back to Kissinger's "single telephone number" and beyond. Few Americans have ever understood the reality of "ever closer union". Viewing the EU through the simple prism of "ending Europe's wars", they have failed to see that harmonisation superimposed on Europe's diverse traditions could upset far more than it settled. They have too glibly assumed that because the United States of America is a good thing, a United States of Europe must be, too. They have equally been inattentive to the talk, to cite Tony Blair's Warsaw speech, of an EU "superpower". They have been too little concerned that the EU's drive to ever closer union has blunted its alertness to the global changes that set the rest of the world's debates.

For eight years, the EU's self-absorption has appeared to matter less than it should. Thanks to a remarkably durable economic boom, the US has been able to act as the world's sole stabiliser and growth engine, taking almost all the strain of crises in emerging economies and Japan's long slump. In its naive enthusiasm for "EU integration", the Clinton White House has put the EU under a signally little pressure to stop examining its institutional navel and confront the seismic

and split that among 78 overlapping research labs. There is little common procurement and corruption or rank incompetence in most of what there is.

The EU defence blueprint is no remedy. It is not a "European pill" of Nato but an embryo "European army" outside it. As Romano Prodi blurted out last year, call it Mary-Ann or what you like, that is the destination. And the misnamed rapid reaction force will not improve EU defence capabilities; it adds not a single ship, gun or fighter and not one naval, ground or air unit. Instead it decouples 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels — crack units, most already pledged to the Alliance — and contracts them to Brussels. This will mean not a greater European defence effort but a displacement of effort. It will weaken, not strengthen, Nato. Every European member of Nato has one set of forces and one defence budget; there will now be rival claims upon them.

The ESDP creates two separate military organisations with similar memberships, using the same money, manpower and weapons and each claiming responsibility for Europe's defence. So much is clear from the seven annexes and three appendices to the Nice Communiqué, running to 80 pages of detail in the governing French-language text. At best, this will be chaotic: imagine a British general leaving an EU military committee, then hopping down the road to SHAPE to decide whether, with his Nato hat on, he agrees with himself. Imagine Nato calling on troops which have already been sent off on an EU mission.

If British ministers believe that Nato will always have first call, they have been inattentive to the small print. General Jean-Pierre Kelche, the French Chief of Staff, has testified to the Assemblée Nationale that Annex I was deliberately worded to rule out "any interpretation that would give Nato a decision-making priority in the reaction to crises". Annex VII, which sets out the EU's ideas on "co-operation" with Nato, speaks of "a strategic partnership" and demands that Nato show "total respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making".

The EU is to have a Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the Council of Ministers, a Military Committee and a general staff. Annex VII lays down that, even when the EU draw, on the basis of "guaranteed permanent access without

**shortsightedness** has not been **benign**. Not only has it allowed the EU's closest opponents of enlargement to shirk their clear strategic political and moral responsibility for consolidating democracy on the Continent; it has allowed a gradual erosion of the transatlantic structures and **common purposes** that have been crucial to keeping most of Europe at peace since 1945. The Clinton Administration failed to keep track of progress towards the dangerously divisive EU blueprint, drawn up with the active support of a British Prime Minister. Tony Blair thought that he was setting the pace alongside the French. Instead, he was being led by the nose towards a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose military dimensions are almost a unilateral declaration of **independence** from Nato.

President Clinton **believed** he had **curbed** any such ambitions when, at the **height** of the Kosovo crisis in April 1999, he **secured** unanimous agreement at Nato's Washington summit that the new "European Defence Identity" was to be folded "within Nato", as an urgently needed European addition to the Alliance's manifestly lopsided defence capabilities. The US thought that was the end of the matter. It was wrong. At Nice, EU heads of government endorsed a **60-page** document drawn up by the French presidency which, as Robin Cook said at the time, "buttons down exactly what we have decided here". In minute detail, it provides for permanent political and military committees, a general staff to be "operational" this year, EU command and control structures and intelligence and strategic transport capabilities. The document **further demands "guaranteed access" that will entitle the EU to call upon, and dictate the uses of, Nato — mainly American — equipment and personnel for "autonomous" EU military operations that in theory will muster a 60,000-strong force within 60 days, deployable for up to a year.**

Downing Street spokesmen insist that the EU should be praised, not blamed, for meeting at long last the entirely justified American demand that Europe shoulder a bigger, fairer share of collective defence. If this were in fact the "European pillar" of Nato that Washington has been wanting since the days of John F. Kennedy — if EU governments were about to ratchet defence spending back up and use the money better too — that would indeed be good news.

The news is far from good. Since 1989, the military heart of the Alliance has been reduced to the point where it is just as well that Nato faces no major security threat. Such a threat could not be met. Europeans have overdrawn the peace dividend; and what they do spend on defence secures for them only a fraction of US capability. Some armies are little more than youth employment schemes; yet politics delays the necessary switch from conscript to career forces. Compatibility between Allied equipment is **imperilled**; and the technology gap with the US is still widening because Europeans spend only £1 on research and development for every £6 the US spends

case-by-case Nato authorisation", on Nato assets, it is the PSC that will give "strategic directives to the operations commander" "appointed by the Council". Nato will then draw up **operational** plans but these **must** be "submitted to the PSC for approval". **Once** deployment is under way, the EU is to decide what use to make of Nato assets; "the Alliance will be **kept** informed". The EU, not Nato, will decide when it **no** longer needs them. "The entire chain of command must remain under the political control **and strategic direction** of the EU throughout the operation. . . the operation commander will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. Nato will be informed." **The** assumption here, that the US **will** meekly lend out its strategic lift aircraft and ask the EU to send them back with a full tank, is breathtaking.

But these absurdities are not yet set in stone. Nato has to agree to the EU's proposed "consultation" mechanism; and Nato has not yet done so. Turkey, albeit for its own reasons, has withheld its assent. The ball is in the Bush camp. How, at this late stage, should Washington respond?

First, it should embrace what it can embrace — the implied "division of **labour**" whereby the EU takes charge of minor crisis-management operations. More ambitious EU defence goals could yet be made the key to a real improvement in defence capabilities. It need not confine action to the European continent, nor would that suit the Bush Administration, which wants to know what, beyond Europe's frontiers, **Nato's** European members are prepared to contribute to global security.

The US should also readily acknowledge why the EU is worried: the US, it is feared, might not be there when needed in regional crises. The new President has his father, as well as Mr Clinton, to blame for the perception that the US will tolerate no casualties unless its vital interests are directly at stake. Colin Powell, the incoming Secretary of State, is famous as an exponent of the post-Vietnam consensus that the US should move only in overwhelming force. In office, all such tight rules have to face the tug of loose reality.

Most \*importantly, Mr Bush should make it equally clear that the **Nice blueprint is militarily unviable and will do huge political damage, not least on Capitol Hill. He should** say that this feeble bird is **not going** to fly; and **offer** a way out. The best might be to draw up a new compact, in the form of a protocol on EU defence, that assured the EU that it could use Nato assets, provided it abandoned rival structures in favour of EU task forces that use Nato machinery. The compact could be appended — as Sir John Weston, a former British Ambassador to Nato, has proposed — both to the Treaty on European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty, to provide legal confirmation that the EU and Nato are acting as one. But any **way out will** now require a degree of trust; it is vital to find one soon, **before** the EU digs in and **trust** dissipates. Mr Blair should give damage control his best shot. He can hope to act as a bridge between the US and the EU only if Britain remains America's staunchest ally.

March 12, 2001 8:30 AM

TO: Chris Williams  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Haig Remarks

Take a look at these remarks by Haig and mark some sections you think are things we ought to be thinking about that we are not,

Thank you.

A t t a c h .

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12 MAR 01

The Question of Humanitarian Intervention

Keynote Address as Prepared for Delivery

By

Hon. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
12 February 2001

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure to welcome you here to the Foreign Policy Research Institute's conference on the question of humanitarian intervention. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for turning out and also to thank all of those involved in putting the conference together. I was especially impressed by the **unusual** sight of my co-chairman Harvey Sicherman, actually working -- that's right -- working hard since early this morning during our panel discussions. It **was** worth the trip up here just to see that and, although Harvey did not know it, we photographed him in the act! He assures me, however, that this will not become a habit. And based on past experience, I believe him!

As you know, FPRI has long distinguished itself through its pioneering work in bringing the best of scholarship to bear on current policy problems. Today's conference is no exception. We have brought together a great cast of analysts, many of whom have experience not only in thinking about humanitarian interventions but in actually carrying out such missions. And what a job that is.

The most serious decision a President can **make is** to commit American troops to possible combat. Over the past eight years, Bill Clinton sent American forces into harm's way, more than any President before him, all on behalf of what; has come to be **labelled** humanitarian intervention. The roll-call of the most significant is familiar: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo. Today, even as we meet, the United States and our NATO allies have committed some 100,000 troops, including reserves, to Bosnia and Kosovo. And NATO went to war over Kosovo for the very first time in the history of the Alliance.

As the new Bush Administration assesses the appropriateness of these interventions, the President and his team should avoid the old argument over burden-sharing. Washington should know, and every American should know, **that** some 80% of the forces in the Balkans are European. Our allies also bear **87%** of the cost. So it is truly a profound commitment by the Western Alliance, **not** only by the United States. And this reminds us that NATO only works when the principle of shared risks and shared burdens is observed.

What does humanitarian intervention mean? When I was Secretary of State it meant that someone was coming to help me in my struggle with the White House **staff**. In those difficult times, let me assure you that such help was very, very rare!

**Happily**, I can say that the new Administration appears to have the kind of Cabinet that would not tolerate such staff meddling. These individuals are the President's own choices and so I am optimistic.

Today, humanitarian intervention has come to mean the use of military force to rescue people at risk from political causes, **such as** the actions of dictators, even if the American national interest does not appear to be meaningfully **at** stake. It thus appears to fall in that sensitive area where our humane values and our sense of geopolitics -- what we believe to be right and what we judge to be prudent -- **rub** uneasily together. And, as such, it often leaves us divided about the course of action and wary of the precedents that may be set.

Let me make the following observations:

- First, the American people will not support a policy that tends to intervene everywhere. Nor will they support its opposite, a policy that abstains altogether. A balance must be found that comports with both our ideals and our sense of reality.
- Second, humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. We must break with a policy **that** does not act until after a human catastrophe and then assigns to our troops objectives they cannot achieve. Both are the products of a dangerous populism amplified by the media and the related explosion in information sciences.
- Third, and finally, there is an alternative. We can work to prevent the problems that give rise to such interventions, and, if that fails, we can guide our interventions with common sense criteria and reasonable objectives.

Let me begin with the very basic issue of whether humanitarian intervention fits into American foreign policy.

Our debate today tends toward two extremes. One school puts American values at the top and argues that we should use military force in defense of human rights around the world. Some would even argue that we should go further, and use such occasions to impose our democratic values on societies that have no historic experience with democracy. The record suggests that this cannot **be** achieved, Haiti being a case in point, as we shall see in a moment.

Nonetheless, we should recognize that both types of intervention are sustained by powerful currents of American idealism. They are the lineal **descendents** of **Woodrow Wilson's** ringing declaration, and I quote: "All shall know that America puts human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity." End of quote. Some are even willing to subscribe to a variation of **Wilson's** mystical belief that, as he put it, America was created, quote, "to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty." [End quote]

It is amusing, of course, for this old General to see so many of the doves from the Cold War era suddenly reborn as hawks in advocating the use of American military power without applying the test of whether it **is** in our national interest. Perhaps we should follow the great Cold War historian Robert Conquest who suggested that one must consider not only hawks and doves but also cuckoo birds and ostriches. Surely those who would use the bayonet to remake the world in America's image qualify as the cuckoos. I would agree with George **Kennan** who wrote back in 1993 that, quote "to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the **world...is** unthought through, vainglorious, and undesirable."

The American people are much too sensible to support for long either version of humanitarian intervention because they rightly suspect the crusading arrogance of it, the moral overreach of it, and the inevitable rebellion against it. It will multiply adversaries and sour our friends. John **Quincy** Adams put it best as long ago as July 4, 1821, when he said: "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." He added that doing so would involve the U.S., and I quote, "beyond the power of extrication... she might become the dictatress'of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit. "

The excesses of the Clinton era, in dialectical fashion, have called forth an opposite school, now gaining strength from the evident failure of perfectionist interventionists to produce perfection. These are the abstainers. They would have the United States stay aloof from humanitarian disasters in the name of the national interest. But their idea of the national interest is an imported one, drawn from the realpolitik of a vanished pre-1914 Europe. They ignore the fact that for Americans, the national interest is not simply a calculation of material interests but also a moral one. After all, we do stand for certain values: democracy, respect for individual rights, the settling of **disputes** through diplomacy rather than force, and the rule of law not the jungle. Who of us could stand idly by if we saw our neighbors, or even a stranger, assaulted by thugs? We resent such assaults upon our values and our innate decency as a nation demands action to prevent massacres. A policy of abstention is thus the policy of the ostrich. The American people will simply not support for long a policy so at odds with our fundamental values.

I know, of course, that I have set up a pair of straw men, or at least, a **pair** of straw birds. But we all know that each of us bears a little sympathy for these positions. Yes, we would like to right the wrongs of this world, especially on the cheap. Yes, we also resent the idea that we should **straighten** out the messes made by others. That is why the American national interest, properly conceived, encompasses not only ideals but also reality, not only the world as we would like it to be but the world as it is. On balance, humanitarian intervention can be just but it must be leavened by prudence. We should seek to prevent massacres and genocide through diplomacy, and other actions, including the use of the bayonet if necessary. But this should never be a crusade and should never be undertaken in the absence of careful calculations that include costs and benefits.

In 1981, concerned about this very debate following my experiences in NATO during President Cartes's term, I observed that a foreign policy that **pursued** ideals while ignoring power would offend America's sense of reality and probably will fail. Equally, a foreign policy that pursued power while ignoring ideals would offend America's sense of right and in the long run will also fail. Only a balance between the two would merit consistent public support. Every generation of American statesman has to decide the balance to be struck. Ours is no exception.

With this in mind, let me turn now to my second observation, about the practice of humanitarian intervention as we have conducted it over the past decade. Have we struck that balance between ideals and reality to which I just referred? My answer is no. Our interventions have been neither just nor practical. A brief review of the facts will make the case.

In Somalia, the Bush Administration intervened in late December 1992 with 30,000 troops to prevent a widening of a famine well underway. That mission was expanded in the Spring of 1993 by the Clinton **Administration** to rebuild the

country as a nation under a mandate from the UN Security Council, against a backdrop of media clamor for a continued U.S. military presence. The mission ended, however, after a disastrous ambush cost eighteen American lives and the U.S. withdrew in failure. A notable part of this adventure was the role played by CNN. There can be no doubt that the television image of starving Somalis **played** a large part in getting us in. There can also be no doubt that the image of a Somali mob abusing the corpse of an American soldier played a large part in getting us out.

In true dialectical fashion, one mistake begat another. We **recoiled** from Somalia and therefore hesitated about Rwanda. There was no CNN effect to get us in. And a genocide took place while UN troops watched.

In Haiti the U.S. intervened with some 20,000 troops and two aircraft carrier groups to restore democracy in the unique form of President Aristide. The invasion had been produced by a wave of desperate refugees seeking asylum, many dying from either exposure or unseaworthy boats before they could reach Florida. The results of this effort were disheartening, to say the least. Just this last week, after six years of effort and several billions in aid, the UN and the U.S. gave up. Secretary General Kofi **Annan** wrote to the Security Council that, and I quote, "a combination of rampant crime, violent street protests, and incidents of violence targeted at the international community could severely limit the ability of the mission to fulfill its mandate," end of quote. It has now been shut down. All international observers agree that the May 2000 elections giving Aristide's party a huge majority and indeed, Aristide's own election in November were blatant frauds.

The result of all this effort has been not to rescue the country but rather to enthrone a leader who is certainly no democrat. I must note that Haiti is **by** now a familiar object of American humanitarian intervention. We stayed 19 years the first time from 1915 to 1934, and six years the second time. The results **truly** speak for themselves in this prolonged experiment to impose democracy through the bayonet. Enough said.

Finally, we have the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1990-91 the Bush Administration thought Bosnia was European business, not ours, and so did the Europeans. Both seemed more amenable to propping up Gorbachev's Soviet Union, already a political corpse, rather than dealing with the real trouble brewing in Yugoslavia. Without U.S. leadership, clashing European interests produced a predictable paralysis. Massacre followed upon massacre which we condemned, but did not intervene to prevent. Finally in the summer of 1995, a combination of international and domestic pressures, combined with the scenes of the awful Srebrenica slaughter, forced **President Clinton** to act.

A similar episode followed in Kosovo. Over a million Kosovars were set to flight by the Serbs before NATO went to war. This military action, despite all of the enthusiastic reviews of our air power, succeeded only when we threatened a ground invasion. It ended on a particularly sour note of strain within NATO's command structure.

Many very dangerous precedents were set. NATO had attacked a sovereign state to rearrange the politics of one of its provinces even though the situation did not pose a threat to the Alliance itself. Clearly such actions alarmed other countries who feared that the promotion of our values would become an **excuse** to intervene in their internal affairs.

There was another ugly mishap within the NATO command itself. A British subordinate to General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander, refused his **order** to intercept the Russians in their dash to the Pristina airport. Oddly enough,, the Pentagon sided with the British subordinate. Clearly, these are not experiences the Alliance would wish to repeat.

The result is that today the U.S. and NATO are committed to keep troops in Bosnia and Kosovo until those countries become multiethnic democracies or the end of time, whichever occurs first. Old Balkan hands, including **FPRI's founder Robert Strausz-Hupe**, who knows that area intimately, tell me that the end of time is a better bet.

This pattern of interventions illustrates the dangers of what I call "**electronic populism**." By waiting until a humanitarian disaster has occurred, replete with gory coverage by the media, a President may find it easier to rally public support for military action. But by doing so, we put our whole foreign policy at the risk of events that are shaped primarily by others.

We lose twice in this approach. First, we forfeit strategic direction, **whereby** we shape events. Second, we also disarm our diplomacy. As Henry Kissinger **has** often observed, the early stages of a problem, when positions are still fluid and ambiguous, present the best opportunity for creative diplomacy. Once positions are hardened and the massacres committed, there is little left to do except to summon the troops.

So we end up making much more effort for much less result. Even worse, we expose the very people we hope to save to even greater risk. In both strategic and humanitarian terms, these have been military interventions to rescue an utterly failed foreign policy.

This brings me to my final observation. There is an alternative to humanitarian intervention as we have seen it.

The beginning of wisdom is, first, to restore the primacy of strategic **planning** in our foreign policy and in doing so, to put humanitarian intervention in its place -- a lesser but honorable role. In recent years because of confusion about the real causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inchoate analysis of the so-called "New World Order" has left us vulnerable to passing crises **and** deprived us of any sensible judgment about their importance to our overall goals.

Above all, we must discard the idea that we need the disaster before we can do anything effective. Ladies and gentlemen, there is no room in a sound **American** foreign policy for today's electronic populism!

Once this is done we will be able to revive our diplomacy of prevention. I realize of course, that preventing a crisis sometimes requires an earlier threat to use force. But does anyone not believe that a united U.S.-European **approach** to the Bosnia crisis in 1991 or 1992 would have spared everyone great **agony** and saved thousands of lives?

Second, if diplomacy fails and we contemplate intervention, we should **recall** that our military forces operate in support of national objectives that **include** above all the deterrence of major wars, which is really the most important humanitarian role we can play. We and our allies must keep this in mind as we contemplate minor interventions.

The Marines, in their very plain-spoken way -- only an Army General could say that -- described it accurately when they called their manual on the subject "The Small Wars Manual." It was published in 1940 and if you can get beyond the fascinating chapters on the care and feeding of mules, you will find a **fair** description of what humanitarian missions are today. Mark that title. "Small wars," not "big wars." Small wars are compounded by ambiguity, different rules of engagement and many other snares and traps. It was Wellington who said that "a great country can have no such thing as a little war." So in the interest of our larger role in deterrence we must be wary of frittering away our strength.

Third, if no other alternative is available, when we do intervene militarily we ought to do so with military prudence. These are not exercises that break new ground in military science. The key point is to determine whether and how the use of military force will make a difference for the better. The definition of that difference will automatically allow us to measure whether our objectives are being achieved once we hit the ground. That, in turn, will make it much easier to determine the point of exit.

I would like to stress this last issue. Forget about the fetish for doing checklists and artificial exit deadlines. **The** key is to set reasonable goals and then to measure our progress toward them. It cannot be something vague like building a nation or something superficial like just holding an election. **These** are troops trained to fight, kill, and overcome. They are not police and not social workers. And I do not accept the argument by some that peacekeeping: actually sharpens combat skills. Just the opposite is true.

Fourth and finally, we ought to use the coalition principle as often as we can. Others share our values. Some are better placed to intervene and have a **more** acute understanding of the situation.

I want to add a caveat here. NATO itself, as an alliance should not necessarily be pressed into this task. Those few in NATO who have the capacity to **project** military power should act if it is in their interest to **do so**. The rest of the Alliance should be supportive. This was the formula I used successfully **while** Supreme Allied Commander of NATO to deal with so-called out of area crises. I am convinced that it remains both workable and far preferable to the cumbersome and restrictive procedures we **saw in the Kosovo war**.

The **U.S.** has an essential role to play in forming such coalitions. We need not -- we should not -- provide the lion's share of forces. In fact, as I pointed out, we are not doing so today in the Balkans. But the essence of any coalition, shared burdens and shared risks, may require important U.S. participation. We should never forget that there is a price for leadership.

Let me conclude now by reviewing the main points. Humanitarian intervention has a minor but honorable role to play in American foreign policy. It must be gauged on the balance of values and interests, ideals and reality, what is right and what is prudent. The American people will not support humanitarian intervention as a formula to impose American values on the rest of the world but they **will** also not support a realpolitik that does nothing about genocide.

Thus far, we have failed to strike the proper balance. Humanitarian intervention as we have known it over the past decade has been neither just nor practical. "Electronic populism" stays our hand until disaster strikes, depriving our foreign policy of strategic sense, and our diplomats of their most effective opportunities, before positions congeal in blood.

There is a better way. First, restore strategic balance to our foreign policy and focus on prevention at the earliest stage when creative diplomacy can **work** best. Second, consider engagement in these "small wars" with an eye to the larger more important mission of deterrence -- the prevention of big wars -- so that we do not fritter away our strength. We should know beforehand that **any** new commitment will not undercut this greater objective. Third, if we must **commit**, then do so to make a decisive difference with attainable objectives and a way to measure them so that we can leave. Fourth, use the coalition principle that shares burdens and responsibilities in the use of military force. Above all, lead.

I want to close with this comment. Humanitarian intervention, like the **rest** of foreign policy, is ultimately a test of a nation's character. Are we willing to defend the right, and **fight** for it, if need be? Americans have answered **this** call throughout their history. But there is another part to character and that is humility. Robert Strausz-Hupe, wrote that "moral perfection, **especially when** it uses service to humanity as its vessel, puts me on my guard." We ought to be on guard too, that the promise of America's values does not become the **excuse** for an American crusade, one that repeats the folly of the European **empires** who imagined that a lasting civilization could be imposed by bayonets. Yes, let us do our duty when our forces must be used to rescue humanity from man-made **disasters**. But we should do so understanding that foreign **policy**, and military forces, are very imperfect instruments in a very imperfect world.

March 12, 2001 12:06 PM

TO: Rich Haver  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Memo on Defense Security Service

Please read this memo on the Defense Security Service and see me with a proposal on what we ought to do about it. I kind of like the ideas George Tenet had.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031201-12

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The Department has made significant progress in reducing the Defense Security Service's (DSS) investigative backlog.

- Since the DSS management actions began to take effect late last year, the number of pending (work in progress) investigations has been reduced from almost 500,000 to 436,000. To ensure best use of DSS investigative resource & the goal is to achieve a, monthly "steady state" of 150,000 pending investigations (60 workdays).
- As of October 2000, the number of overdue periodic reinvestigations from Components (i.e., those that had yet to be submitted to DSS) was reduced from 505,000 to 317,000. Due to "scrubs" of requirements by the Components, the current number probably is significantly less than 300,000. We will undertake another data call soon to confirm the exact number. Given the fielding of a Department-wide database later this year, the Department will gain real-time insight into this area for the first time.

The Department's plan to eliminate the investigative backlog includes a number of steps, including:

- Establishing submission targets for all Defense Components,
- leveraging investigative capability outside DoD by partnering with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the private sector, and
- improving our ability to provide accurate projections of periodic reinvestigation requirements.

To this end, we are closely monitoring eight current conditions and trends relative to these issues. (Colors represent current status-green/good; red/bad)


- DoD Components submit their backlogged periodic reinvestigation requirements (established as yellow tending to green).
- DSS must meet performance expectations both in their information system development (yellow tending to green) and in their investigative process (red tending to yellow).
- OPM must meet performance expectations (now green but requiring close monitoring).
- Adjudications must keep pace (borderline green-yellow tending to yellow).
- Backlog will not exceed 505,000 (Green- it is currently at 436,000)
- Stable policy environment (Green)
- Service/agencies continue to fund their clearance needs

436K  
- 317K  

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753K  
OUTSTANDING??

# FY01/02 Workload Plan



March 12, 2001 8:27 AM

TO: Chris Williams  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Paper on Cuba

Have somebody take a look at this paper on Cuba and then you tell me if you think there is anything in there we ought to be thinking about,

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031201-5

CUBA

12 MAR 01

MEMORANDUM

TO: President Bush Transition Team

SUBJECT: Cuba's potential threat and policy suggestions

FROM: Ernesto F. Betancourt, first Director of Radio Marti

Executive Summary

There is no disagreement that the Castro regime must come to an end sometime. This is highly likely to happen during the forthcoming Bush Administration. However, various scenarios have been suggested on how this may happen. The Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue advanced proposals that ignore the reality of Castro's position and were brutally rejected on December 27, 2000 by Castro's regime in a *Granma* front page article as reflecting a "fantastic illusion." Nevertheless, following, the usual response, of the proponents of this approach, that rejection is not going to deter them from persevering in their effort to sacrifice the well-being of the Cuban people and the security of the United States by trying to sell their rejected proposals to the new Administration.

In the Appendix, a completely different scenario on the potential threat Castro represents to US security and how it is being ignored is discussed in detail and with thorough documentation. The Appendix opens with a brief discussion of why the scenario of a Castro potential aggression should not be ruled out *a priori*. Then, four recent developments pointing to Castro's preparations for eventual actions against the continental US are described briefly. One, the training of Cuban commandos in VietNam for preemptive attacks against US bases, revealed in 1996 by *Jane's Defense Weekly*. Second, the FBI charge in September, 1998 that arrested Cuban spies were ordered to obtain addresses of military stationed at South Florida bases, intelligence useful for commando attacks, as well as the recent revelations during the spy trial on Cuban instructions to these spies to identify Florida keys locations for infiltration of weapons and explosives into the US. Third, the 1999 revelation by a former Deputy Chief of the Soviet germ warfare program that Cuba has been building up a capability to produce such weapons. And, finally, the FCC report on Cuba's interference with ARINC, the US air traffic control radio system. Why is Cuba investing resources in these activities unless they plan to use them?

The Appendix discusses briefly Castro's increasing economic and political troubles, as well as the backfiring of the effort to cover-up the regime's drug traffic entanglement. It also discusses Castro's bizarre behavior against the Europeans at the Rio meeting in July, 1999 and the Canadians, whom he labeled the "second enemy to the North," after the Winnipeg Pan Am Games that year. It mentions the July, 1999 trial of the US, with a demand for US\$181 billion dollars in reparations, which the Catholic Church magazine *Vital* criticized as a deliberate effort to encourage hatred of the US. Finally, it mentions the campaign whipping up Cuban nationalism over drugs in Olympic sports. On September 4, 1999, even the staid *Financial Times* felt impressed enough to describe Castro's behavior as *distinctly obsessive*. At a time when a stream of US political and business visitors offered hope of lifting the US embargo, why all this rage?

By the end of 1999, Castro suffered a serious setback during the Iberoamerican summit in Havana which was a clear diplomatic victory for Cuban dissidents. The Elian crisis was correctly

perceived by Castro as an opportunity to regain the initiative and motivate Cubans again around the revolution. However, he overestimated his ability to transfer popular feelings on a legitimate issue, the rights of a father to his child, into support for broader issues advocated by his regime.

As the year 2,000 comes to an end, Castro has been forced to turn more repressive again. Internationally, the Panama Iberoamerican Summit turned out to be another setback when Castro opposed a resolution condemning his allies, the Basque ETA terrorist group, and supporting the people and government of Spain. This led to a bitter exchange with the President of El Salvador and a souring of relations with Spain. Sugar output for 2001 is already projected to be down around 10 per cent, the growth of tourist traffic is flattening out and the most important untapped tourist market has been effectively frozen out by the legislation vesting in the US Congress the power to modify travel restrictions. The Elian case had a definitive impact on the Cuban-American vote in Miami-Dade, costing Gore tens of thousands of votes. To Castro's dismay, the political clout of what Castro rejoices in calling the Cuban mafia seems to have increased under a Republican Administration that, for the first time, includes a Cuban-American as a member of the Cabinet.

The Appendix documents, with quotations from Castro statements and/or actions, his forty year war against the US, as well as the overt and covert strategies through which it has been implemented. Finally, policy changes to avoid this potential threat are suggested, mostly by disabusing Castro followers in Cuba's military and intelligence network, of the notion--US passivity and avoidance have conveyed so far--that they will forever enjoy impunity for their hostile actions,

Perhaps it is advisable to look first at the policy suggestions. They are oriented to preventive action the Bush Administration can take to avoid reaching the situation in which US retaliation against Cuba is demanded by an irate American people should any of Castro's plans be implemented. To prevent is better than to have to regret. If this analysis is proven to be wrong in the end, and Castro departs peacefully from the scene, this author will be most happy.

On the other hand, if the analysis is correct and Castro carries out the aggressive actions he has been planning for four decades, then the American people will hold responsible those at State, the Pentagon, CIA, DJA and the Justice Department who failed to take this threat seriously. The transition teams for these areas would be well advised to-at least give consideration to the facts here presented. The Bush Administration should not take lightly the potential threat Castro represents in his waning days because, if unfortunately any of its components is implemented, it is quite likely to take place under its watch.

### **What policy changes may be advisable to cope with this potential threat?**

Throughout the years, moderate responses to Castro, such as the initial embargo and later the Helms-Burton Law, were chosen in lieu of force-based responses. For example, Helms-Burton was brought out of a paralyzed Senate-House conference by the downing of American civilian planes over international waters. An action Castro took perfectly aware that it was unlikely President Clinton would respond to his use of force against American civilian planes over international waters by the logical military response of pin-point bombing the MiG-29 bases. The sense of impunity this US behavior transmits to Cuba's military should not be underestimated.

A Bush Administration must send a different message to those around Castro. After all, any overt action against the US to fulfill his *true destiny* will require the participation of these individuals. The Powell/Rice/Rumsfeld team is going to be tested by Castro. The US response must make Castro and his followers aware that actions against the US will no longer be met with indirect responses or avoidance behavior. These are some US options that come to mind:

- Make it clear to Castro and his followers, particularly in the armed forces, that any aggressive Cuban actions will be met with commensurate retaliation. In other words, another use of force against Americans will lead to retaliation in kind. (POWELL/RICE/RUMSFELD)
- Refocus the ongoing trial of the Cuban spies arrested in 1998 on the issues related to the conspiracy "to sabotage planes and hangars" mentioned in the initial indictment and downplayed in the revised indictment, as well as relate them to Castro's overall plans for an eventual **attack on the US**. (ASHCROFT)
- Include Cuba as one of the **most likely** sources of potential terrorist germ **warfare** attacks and take whatever precautions are warranted. Reopen the West Nile virus epidemiological mystery investigation by following the Cuban hypothesis line of inquiry. At least contact the two defectors who had worked on such a **program** in Cuba, as well as any other scientists who had defected from the **Biotechnology** and Genetic program. Find out what cooperation, if any, was given by CDC and the Smithsonian to the Cuban effort, (ASHCROFT/THOMPSON/WHOEVER IS AT CIA)
- Complement the present wording of the Helms-Burton Law in terms that **only** Castro and his brother are unacceptable for the transition government, by **warning** that anybody involved in aggression against the US, whether overt or covert, will be equally unacceptable. State clearly that US reconstruction assistance **will be** predicated on a sharing by all legitimate **stakeholders--including** present regime officials not involved in human rights violations, members of the dissidence, **former** property owners, workers and victims of repression--in the future Cuba. (POWELL/RICE)
- Change the present counter-intelligence policy from one of passive observation of the network of contacts to an activist one of dismantling the networks that **have** been identified so far. Castro lacks at present the resources to rebuild his intelligence network if we crack down on his present assets, Particularly, if they are faced with an aggressive counter-intelligence effort. To this effect, the FBI capability against Cuban intelligence should be beefed-up to the resource **levels** assigned to the **DGI** when it became a KGB surrogate. (ASHCROFT)
- Crack down on apparently dormant groups and fronts, such as members of the Venceremos and Maceitos brigades. At present, there are many still acting on

behalf of Castro with absolute impunity. For example; many demonstrations in Miami that enrage people against the exile community are undertaken by these groups. At least, make them register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. (ASHCROFT)

- To encourage defections among people who had been blackmailed by Castro's intelligence to cooperate with them, offer immunity to those who come forward reporting such experiences to our counter-intelligence. After all, five of the ten spies arrested in Florida last September were willing to plea bargain their situations. By the same token, it is likely that many of those who went to Cuba many years ago and were recruited by the Cuba & are not willing to accompany Castro in his *Gotterdammerung*. (ASHCROFT)
- Brief civic leaders and media in communities where Cuban agents could provoke racial incidents. Make them aware of such possibilities, so they are better prepared to cope with provocations when and if they happen. (ASHCROFT/RUMSFELD/POWELL/RICE)
- Form a Team B, with Cuban defectors with direct exposure to Castro's responses under threat, to offer suggestions on the meaning of strange Cuban behaviors not subject to logical explanations. Throughout his career, Castro has always been underestimated by US planners. We just cannot afford to do that anymore. (RICE/POWELL/RUMSFELD/WHOEVER FROM THE CIA)
- Reinforce the Helms/Burton USAID program to plan assistance for the post-Castro transition. Focus it on plans to assist those within Cuba, when the time comes, whether in the dissidence or even within the Castro regime. The US should make clear that those around Castro not responsible for crimes against humanity will be acceptable in a post-Castro era. (POWELL/RICE)
- Form a task force to address the issue of how to restore the reach of US Radio and TV signals to Cuba. At the time when a transition starts taking place in Cuba, it is of the utmost urgency for the US to have a clear means of communicating with the Cuban people with a firmly established credibility in the audience. This was one of the basic reasons for creating a Radio Marti and it was accomplished, but it has lost a substantial share of the audience in recent years due to the neglect of the Clinton Administration. (POWELL/RICE/WHOEVER FROM IBB)
- Open the case of the Cubans who tortured our VietNam prisoners. Try to identify who they are so at least Harvard will not invite them again to come to the US as they did with General Vecino Alegret. (ASHCROFT/RUMSFELD)

## APPENDIX

### Is Castro Preparing for a Gotterdammerung?

There is no question on anybody's mind that the Castro regime will end. But there are diverse opinions on how. Some believe Castro is willing to live in exile--Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the President of the Galician Government, even offered him a house in the town where his father was born--but after Judge Garzon's indictment of Pinochet, Castro is highly unlikely to consider such an offer. Carlos Lage and Ricardo Alarcon, not to mention his brother Raul, are betting on his turning power over to them under a transition regime, while retiring in the island as an elderly statesman. The merciful Lord may finally take pity of the Cuban people and **swiftly** remove him from power. There are those from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, not to mention American farmers and the US Chamber of Commerce, who harbor the naive notion--or the "fantastic illusion" as *Granma* labeled it--that they can go ahead with their neo-liberal and private sector efforts under Castro's nose by **pretending** they have nothing to do with the Helms-Burton and Torricelli legislation.

There are others, however, who think Castro would rather end in an apocalyptic last ditch struggle against the hated Americans, thus provoking a Gotterdammerung to seek a place in history for himself. As will be commented later in this Appendix; Castro himself **has** described a war with the US as *his true destiny*. All those who over the last decades have been close to him in moments of crisis, coincide in concluding that an apocalyptic **finale** is his most likely **choice**. However, this is unlikely to occur as long as he is convinced he can stay in power and play an important historical role. True, a Gotterdammerung would bring a disaster upon the Cuban people. But Castro couldn't care less.

In his youth, Castro admired Hitler. As Georgie Anne Geyer reports in her Castro biography, *Guerrilla Prince*, at Havana University Castro carried with him a copy of *Mein Kampf*. The title for his statement at the trial in 1953, "History will Absolve Me," was lifted from Hitler's speech at the Rathaus Putsch trial. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume he may follow Hitler in his final mood. As Hitler did when he was at the bunker in **relation** to the German people, Castro has shown little regard for what may happen to Cuba after him. In fact, during the Ibero-American Summit in Oporto, he frankly told a journalist "that that was not his problem." His only concern is that they continue his revolutionary struggle. And that means to perpetuate an anti-American stance.

Some may argue that Cubans are basically friendly with Americans and, therefore, unlikely to accompany Castro in any aggressive adventure against the US. Since, for the kind of actions involved, it is necessary only that a small fanatic hard core be willing to carry out their orders, those having such doubts are advised to read *Honor Bound*. This book about POWs in Vietnam, by two DOD historians, Stuart Rochester and Frederick Riley, was published by the US Naval Institute Press. The book has a full chapter dedicated to what was called by POWs the Cuban Program at a prison camp labeled "The Zoo." The vicious torturing of US POWs by these Castro officers should disabuse those doubters of any notion that the Gotterdammerung **hypothesis** should be discarded on the grounds of Cubans' traditional friendship for Americans. At a session in the House of Representatives, one of them was identified by some of those tortured as General

Fernando Vecino Alegret, the present Minister of Higher Education. As in any society, in the Castro regime there are normal human beings and some pretty sick people motivated by hatred

**Plans for a preemptive attack** A report in the prestigious *Jane's Defence Weekly* of March 6, 1996, revealed that Castro was training Cuban forces for a preemptive attack against the US. According to the *Jane's* story, Cuban special forces had been undergoing training in Viet Nam since 1990, that is at the time of the Soviet collapse, to use tactics like those of US Navy Seals against American forces "preparing to invade Cuba."

The central point of the article is not that the US is preparing to attack Cuba. Anybody familiar with contemporary Pentagon thinking knows that is one of the least likely options for the US to follow. That is why the key paragraph of the *Jane's* article is the one on Cuba's strategy:

*"Havana's strategy in pursuing such training is to attack the staging and supply areas for US forces preparing to invade Cuba. The political objective would be to bring the reality of warfare to the American public and so exert domestic pressure on Washington."*

Soldiers are trained with specific missions and strategies in mind. Is Castro's goal to be the one that, for the first time in this century, brings war to the US mainland? The Clinton Administration refused to face such a possibility. Can the Bush Administration afford to continue such a pretense? If it becomes true, it is much more likely to happen under Bush's watch.

**Arrest of ten Cuban Spies.** In September 1998, the FBI arrested IO members of a Cuban spy network in Florida. This is the first time in forty years that the Justice Department has initiated prosecution proceedings against Castro agents. At their bail-setting hearing on September 16, 1998, both Assistant US District Attorney, Caroline Heck Miller, and FBI Agent, Mark de Almeida, justified the action taken, after having the network under surveillance since 1995, on the grounds that the accused were considering "*the possibility of sabotaging planes or hangars at an undisclosed location in Florida.*" In fact, one of the spies, Antonio Guerrero, aka Lorient, had managed to obtain a civilian job with the US Navy at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station at Key West. Others targeted bases in Tampa and the Southern Command.

According to items 18 and 19 of the FBI Affidavit, presented two days earlier at the arraignment of the spies, Lorient had been asked to provide information on:

*"deployment of aircraft, base daily routines, descriptions of the interior and exterior of buildings, particularly one being prepared for a highly secret activity; the use of planes equipped for electronic warfare, which could be used for intelligence and tactical operations against our country; and, the home addresses of hundreds of military personnel stationed at the base."*

This last request is the most relevant. Information on addresses of base personnel is not of any value for Cuban defensive purposes. However, it may be extremely relevant for the planning and implementation of commando attacks as commented by *Jane's Defense Weekly*. During the spy trial, which just started, 8,000 pages of communications between the spies and their

controllers in Cuba have been released by the FBI. One of these communications involves an intriguing order given in 1996 to search locations in the Florida Keys where Cuban intelligence could land weapons and explosives. This further reinforces the notion that Castro is planning commando attacks against the US at some time of his own choosing.

Castro's explanation of the arrest of the spies during the Jbero-American Summit in Opono in 1998 was that he never spied on the US military, only on exiles, a statement at odds with the evidence gathered by the FBI. In a strange twist, without any explanation, a new indictment filed in May, 1999, downplays the issue of sabotaging planes and hangars and ignores other evidence presented in September, 1998 by the FBI that relates the spying to national security issues. Instead, it focused the indictment on anti-exile actions of the spies, specifically the conspiracy to commit murder in the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in February, 1996. The historical record shows that Justice would have never arrested the spies if their **only** mission was against Cuban exiles. The trial was to start in September, 1999 and was postponed six months. It was delayed again and the trial did not start ~~until late~~ in 2000.

Even within the narrower case, Justice has made no ~~attempt~~ to prosecute those who gave the orders for the murders from Cuba. Instead of adding these individuals to those being prosecuted, the judge presiding the case, in a unique action by a US court in a spying case, ordered the FBI and the prosecutors to go to Cuba to take depositions **from** the controllers of the spies, thus making them witnesses for the defense!! Did she really believe that taking an oath over a Bible from hardened Cuban intelligence operators would result in their "telling the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth"? Castro must be laughing his ribs out.

In **truth**, the case is being downplayed with accusations of spying against the Cuban American National Foundation and other exile groups, instead of focusing on the more serious and important issue for the American people that Castro's spies were targeting American military installations. By changing the focus of the trial to this other issue, is Janet Reno legitimizing Castro's claim that he never spied on the US? Is this another effort of the Clinton Administration to avoid a hot foreign policy issue that could cause a US/Cuba confrontation? Such **avoidance** of confrontation in a serious national security matter does nothing but encourage Castro and his followers into bolder actions. Fortunately, the Bush Administration will have a say on this case because it is unlikely that it be finalized before the Inauguration. Let us hope the new **team** at Justice reassesses the **trial** and expands the indictment to place more emphasis on the threat: to US security it implies.

**Germ warfare capabilities.** A 1999 released book on germ warfare, *Biohazard*, published by Random House, reveals that Cuba started its germ warfare efforts in the eighties. The author of the book is Ken Alibek, a former Colonel in the Soviet Army, who was Deputy Director of the agency involved with Soviet development of **germ** warfare.

In his book, **Alibek**, at present a CIA and Pentagon consultant residing in Virginia, quotes his superior, General Yuri Kalinin, as stating, on his return from a visit to Cuba, that *the Cubans have developed a germ warfare capability*. These capabilities include a project under close Castro supervision to develop virus strains to be inoculated to migratory birds. According to Carlos Wotzkow, a Cuban defector residing in Switzerland, reports in a book published in 1998--that is one year before the West Nile virus outbreak in New York--he was fired from his job at the

Zoological Institute in Havana in 1980, among other things, because he criticized a Castro initiative to create a Biological Front "to undertake biological warfare against the United States territory through introducing viruses of infectious diseases inoculated in migratory birds."

Another researcher, Dr. Luis Roberto Hernandez, a British trained entomologist who defected in London in 1995, reported in an interview with *El Nuevo Herald* that he worked in the Biological Front Project until his defection and that their mission was to identify and produce virus strains and select migratory birds to carry them.

Despite the obvious potential relation of the experiences of these two researchers with the so-called mystery of how the West Nile virus reached this Hemisphere, neither the CIA nor the CDC has been willing to *even* consider the possibility of using such a hypothesis in the epidemiological research. Is this another case, as that of Justice with the spies, of the Clinton Administration being unwilling to pursue potential Castro aggressive actions against the US so as not to jeopardize a possible normalization of relations with Cuba? Shouldn't the Bush Administration at least pursue this line of inquiry to satisfy ~~itself that~~, despite the strange coincidence between the Cuban project and the encephalitis outbreak, Castro is not involved?

It has been widely commented that the CIA has found that the genetic and bio-technology industry, one of Castro's pet projects, is nothing but a cover for developing biological weapons. This industry is housed in a complex of buildings in the Miramar zone of Havana, some of which are reported to have the usual security measures associated with biological weapons development. It is this knowledge that led Defense Secretary William Cohen in 1998 to caution the earlier Pentagon report about Cuba not-being any longer a military threat to the US.

According to a November 28, 1998 article in *Science*, Cuba was estimated to have invested one billion dollars in the Genetic and Biotechnology industry, yet this industry does not seem to have become a leading exporting or producing sector. In fact, in the latest report of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the Cuban economy there is not one single figure about its economic relevance. Could it be that, rather than being an economic project, it is more related to military uses such as the epidemiological mystery in New York associated with the West Nile virus outbreak?

**Electronic spying and air traffic control interference.** Finally, we have Cuba's emerging alliance with Red China, our strategic partner with a propensity to steal our nuclear and ballistic secrets. According to a June 24, 1999 article in *El Nuevo Herald*, Cuba has allowed Red China to install two electronic monitoring stations similar to the Soviet installation at Lourdes. The cover-up for these installations is to broadcast Red China's international short-wave programs to the United States and Latin America. The Cuba-China military link was expanded in the last week of the year 2000 by General Fu Quanyou signing a collaboration agreement during a visit of a Chinese military delegation to Cuba.

Red China has provided Castro, among other things still unknown, with equipment: to enhance Cuba's capabilities to jam VOA Radio Marti's broadcasts to Cuba to the point that it is blocked in most areas of Havana. Under Plan Titan, the Soviets provided broadcasting equipment to respond to VOA Radio Marti. This Soviet equipment is extremely powerful. it can reach 1,500 KW and overpower any US transmitter. When Cuba started using it to interfere with US air

traffic control, Soviet officials were very concerned and warned the Cubans this could cause havoc in US air traffic leading to a confrontation

A report on Cuban radio interference for the second quarter of 1999, released by the Chief Watch Officer of the HFDF Center includes, among a long list of such radio interferences, one with New York's ARINC, air traffic control communications system. On May 13, 1999 at 4:48 PM a false communication was made to that city's air control system, over a high frequency band, pretending to be "OPEC 23," a flight of three C-130 US military transports, FCC tracked the false broadcast to a location in Pinar del Rio province, west of Havana. Are the Cubans testing the capability of their equipment to cause chaos in our air traffic system or our willingness to put up with it? Well, their equipment seems to work and, again, we did nothing, Castro and his followers know we know. Our silence tells Castro's collaborators that for some mystical reason they enjoy impunity

In the face of all these serious revelations that point to possible Castro plans and testing of the waters for aggressive action against the US, should we continue underestimating the risk this man represents; or, avoiding the issue? If you were a Cuban pilot or jammer operator, would these US responses deter you from following insane orders--such as downing American civilian planes over international waters or messing up US air traffic--or would you feel reassured that nothing will happen? These are issues which the Bush Administration Transition teams cannot ignore or downplay as the Clinton Administration has done. Because the clock is ticking and the alarm is set for some time during the Bush Administration.

### Castro's increasing troubles

Castro is facing simultaneous failures in the domestic and the international arena. Castro's version of socialism has failed to effectively reactivate the Cuban economy. The meager sugar crop of 4.0 million tons in 2000 was broadcast as a great success. But that ignores the economic facts. First, this represents half the amount of sugar Cuba had produced in the late eighties and, second, the current price is three to five cents below the cost of production. The cost of financing this meager output makes it a losing proposition that, in a free market economy, would have led to the closing of the industry. Meanwhile the price of oil has doubled. And, as commented above, projections for 2001 predict a ten percent decline.

A leaked 1998 report from the Cuban National Bank acknowledges a balance of trade deficit for that year of US\$2.8 billion. This, on top of US\$1.2 billion in 1996 and US\$1.7 billion in 1997. Between 1993 and 1998 Cuba accumulated a trade deficit of 10 billion dollars. And this deficit is growing at the rate of more than 2.5 billion dollars per year. Cuba is a country whose borrowing capacity is very limited due to its having defaulted in its foreign debt since May, 1986 and has neither foreign exchange reserves on which to draw, nor access to the IMF and other international lending agencies to bail it out. The only feasible explanation is that Cuba is financing this gap out of drug traffic and money laundering.

This hypothesis is reinforced by the Gilman-Burton House report, revealing how a seven-ton cocaine shipment discovered by the Colombian police on December 3, 1998 on its way to Cuba was actually consigned to a company 51 percent owned by the Cuban government. Our departing Drug Czar, General Barry McCaffery, ignoring the above report, the overwhelming

evidence from four grand juries revealing Cuba's involvement in drug traffic and the 19 year sentence of Jorge "Gordito" Cabrera in 1996 for smuggling 6,000 pounds of cocaine from Cuba. launched a trial balloon for providing the Cubans with equipment and intelligence to cooperate in the war on drugs. In the opinion of the Colombian police, Castro is likely to use these resources against cartels not paying him his share and to help his partners. In his speech, on July 26, 1999, Castro resorted to his usual raving and ranting against the US over the rejection of his "offer" to cooperate in drug *interdiction*.

The internal political situation is getting increasingly tense due to the inability of the regime to meet basic needs of the majority of the population. The progressive decline in living conditions is made more irritating by the conspicuous consumption of those having access to the dollar-fed side of the economy. Corruption is rampant. The revolution has lost its egalitarian appeal. Most Cubans have to fend by themselves to "resolver," that is to have access to food and other essentials, since the rationing system can meet only two weeks of their monthly needs.

Cuba's frantic efforts to gain international support ~~against~~ the US in Europe and Latin America are going nowhere. The Canadian government is ~~openly~~ reconsidering its policy towards Cuba due to Castro's unwillingness to respect human rights. Canadian investors are complaining about losses caused by Cuba's arbitrary actions and are withholding further investments. On July 26, 1999, Castro strongly attacked the Canadians, pushing relations to an even lower level. -Next to the approval of the Czech resolution at the Geneva meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, the refusal of the 1999 European-Latin Summit in Rio de Janeiro to even mention the Helms-Burton Law specifically, is perhaps one of Castro's biggest foreign policy setback.

Castro is reported to have sacked- Foreign Minister, Roberto Robaina--two days after the preparatory meeting for the Summit ended in Mexico--for his failure to get what Cuba wanted in the wording of the final document for the Summit. Castro himself was not only unable to improve the text agreed by Robaina, but had to accept the elimination of any specific reference to Helms-Burton. The Cuban initiative to have Javier Solana prosecuted for genocide over Kosovo did not endear Castro with NATO members participating in the Rio Summit.

Castro may well be getting ready for his Gotterdammerung. This seems the most likely explanation for his bizarre recent behavior. Even progress in efforts to lift the US embargo does not seem to placate his anger. A parade of pleading US Senators and Congressmen, not to mention delegations of US farmers and businessmen, should have encouraged his hopes on the embargo. However, whatever is bothering Castro may not be solved by lifting the embargo. The regime's embargo on Cubans' productivity, rather than the US embargo, is the cause of Cuba's failed economy. Meanwhile, Castro is bolstering hatred of the US among Cubans with a trial rehashing American aggressions and demanding reparations for \$US18 I billion dollars. The trial testimony was broadcast, an hour a day, leading *Vital*, a Catholic Church publication, to challenge this appeal to revive old hatreds and a spirit of revenge instead of reconciliation.

Castro is also using sports to whip up Cubans' sagging nationalism. First, came the blistering attack on the Canadians over the suspension of Cuban athletes for drug use at the Pan American Games in Winnipeg. Canada was identified as "the second enemy to the North." Afterwards, Cuba walked out from the Houston World Amateur Boxing Championship, despite the International Amateur Boxing Association authorities suspending the judges who made the decision that triggered the incident and restoring the gold medal to the Cuban boxer involved

Finally, he summoned foreign reporters to two evenings on national television, to rehash the conspiracy against Cubans athletes for drug use. But there is no doubt that he is using Cubans' sports pride to whip up a nationalistic frenzy. Only Castro knows the real cause of his rage

As commented before, the Elian case in early 2000 offered Castro a window of opportunity which he exploited very effectively. However, as the year progressed, it became evident he could not translate the Elian episode into any tangible long term advantage economically or internationally, thus leaving Cubans in the same stagnant situation they faced, before. Therefore, before writing off the Gotterdammerung hypothesis, ask yourself: what if this interpretation is right? Is our avoidance of these unpleasant facts actually encouraging more of the same? To answer such questions it is better to place these events in their historical context.

### Castro's War against the US

The roots of Castro's hostility against the US go back to his father who was a soldier in the Spanish army defeated by American forces during the Spanish-American War; and, to his resentment of Americans living at the United Fruit enclave in Oriente Province, where he was born and spent his childhood. The most explicit manifestation of how that hostility was converted into an aggressive stance against the US is reflected in the letter Castro sent to his secretary and confidant, Celia Sánchez, in the summer of 1958, That is, a few months before coming to power. In that letter, exhibited at the Museum of the Revolution in Havana and published by Lionel Martin in his book *The Early Fidel*, Castro states: *"...I have sworn to myself that Americans are going to pay dearly for what they are doing. When this war is over, a much wider and bigger war will begin for me, the war I am going to wage against them. I realize that is going to be my true destiny."*

In January 1959, shortly after taking power, Castro met with Colonel Ramón Barquín and his fellow professional army officers who had conspired to overthrow Batista and had been imprisoned as a consequence. During the conversation, he told them that he wanted an army capable of fighting a war. When one of the officers commented that the war had just finished, Castro's answer was: *"No, the war is just beginning, because this is going to end in a war against the United States."*

That is why the Cold War is not over in Cuba. Once in power, Castro started preparing for his war against the US based on two strategies: one overt and the other coven

### The overt strategy to wage war on the US

It is in that context and not in the context of a commitment to communist ideology that we have to see Castro's entanglement with the Soviet Union. He needed the Soviets as an strategic umbrella to counterweight American power while he was pursuing "his true destiny"

In pursuit of that overt strategy, Castro expected Latin American support. Once he realized that Latin America was reluctant to support his war against the US, Castro targeted Latin governments through his policy of exporting revolution. Some of these governments are now asking the US to accept Castro unconditionally, but any serious review of the historical record of the sixties will reveal that Latin American government! came to see Castro as a menace to their

internal security and stability. Contrary to the prevailing perception that we twisted the Latins' arms when the OAS acted in 1962, US prodding fell in most receptive ears.

The Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961 sealed Castro's hostility against the US. And also reassured him that even without a linkage to the Soviets, in the end, the US was likely to hesitate in the use of its military might against him. A perception that is as valid today as then. Just in case, however, Castro proclaimed himself a lifelong Marxist-Leninist at that time to force the Soviets to provide his regime with strategic support,

Emboldened by American hesitation at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets decided to make a daring move aimed at upsetting the strategic balance with the US by locating 42 **Intermediate Range Missiles** in Cuba, within striking distance of the American heartland. As is very well documented in the Naftali-Fursenko book, *One Hell of a Gamble*, during the resulting **October 1962** crisis, Castro was the only national leader involved who did not hesitate to engage in a nuclear war, regardless of the fact that it meant the eventual destruction of Cuba. Even Khrushchev was shocked by Castro's irresponsibility in pressing for a Soviet first nuclear strike. Eventually, Castro realized he had been provided a bastion to pursue his *true destiny*.

In the late sixties, Castro pursued his overt strategy by promoting revolution in Latin America until Che's failure in Bolivia, and Soviet pressure, forced him to stop. By 1975, there was a shift in theater to projecting Cuban military forces to support expanding Soviet influence in Africa. In the late seventies, Nicaragua and Grenada were targets of successful Cuban supported violent takeovers. Cuba was chosen to preside the Non-Aligned Movement. Convinced the Carter Administration was a pushover, Jamaica was selected as the next target.

However, in July, 1980, Castro was forced to back off from supporting a Grenada-like takeover by his friend and follower Michael Manley, who had openly announced he planned to abolish Parliamentary rule. The takeover was coordinated by Cuban Ambassador **Ulises Estrada**, a member of the Americas Department of the Central Committee, whose task was to promote revolution. A Cuban construction brigade, similar to the one that fought later in Grenada, was already in Jamaica, supposedly building a high school. A thousand Manley followers, known as the "**Brigadistas**," had been given military training in Cuba. They were to be supported by Cuban forces a&ted from **Oriente Province** to a **strip habilitated** for night landings in **Mandeville**, ten miles west of Kingston. CIA renegade **Phillip Agee** appeared in Kingston to denounce a CIA plot against Manley. The home of the CIA resident was shot at. President Carter issued strong warnings to Prime Minister Manley against such a move and beefed up our naval presence in **Guantanamo**. The Jamaica Defense Force destroyed the landing strip. Graffiti in **Kingston** called for "Cubans, go home." Manley abandoned his plans. He lost the parliamentary elections held shortly afterward. Facing a firm US stand, Castro backed off, leaving Manley on a lurch.

By 1983, Castro was even bolder. When President Reagan sent American troops to Grenada. Castro was convinced that, in the next stage, American troops were to invade Cuba. He feared Reagan had decided to ignore the **Kennedy-Khrushchev** agreement that allowed him a secure hide-out from which to wage his war against the US. With doubts on Soviet support, he felt against the wall. According to General **Rafael del Pino**, at that time Deputy Chief of Cuba's Air Force, in his forthcoming book *Inside Castro's Bunker*, Castro initially ordered preparation of plans to destroy **Homestead Air Force Base**, but then shifted the target to **Turkey Point Nuclear Plant** South of Miami. His comment was: "*I want to do something that they will remember for*

*the rest of their lives and then, when we are gone, history will remind them that we were the only ones who made them pay dearly for their imperialistic arrogance around the world."*

From that point on, Castro's overt strategy against the US led to one frustration after another. When Gorbachev took power and decided to abandon Soviet expansionism in Africa, Castro's efforts in Angola came to a negotiated solution. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas lost the election in 1990. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the strategic umbrella for Waging an overt war against the US disintegrated. Castro had to settle for negotiated solutions to the revolutionary conflicts he was promoting in Central America, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala.

### **Terrorism, the covert strategy to wage war on the US**

At the same time Castro approached the Soviets in 1959, he started preparations for his covert war against the US in its own territory by promoting unrest among minorities. In the summer of 1959, we had one of our regular weekly luncheons of the economic team with Castro at Cuba's Central Bank and one of the American guests he had invited asked to go to the rest room. Out of the rest room came a man dressed as a full fledged American Indian Chief, with feathers and all. Castro was already trying to promote unrest among native Americans. As I was getting ready to leave Cuba, in February 1960, a friend of mine in Cuba's Foreign Office informed me that they were sending money through Cuba's consulates in the U.S. to finance civil rights movement sit-ins. Similar relations were developed with Puerto Rico's "independentistas."

American officials, confronted with such information at the time, reacted by saying: "He wouldn't dare." In 1996, the reaction of a retired American General, confronted with the above quoted *Jane's Defense Weekly* article, was: "if he does that, we will crush Cuba, so what will he gain?" It is hard for reasonable human beings to understand individuals motivated to such destructive and suicidal behavior. That is why Castro has been daring all these years. As I told the General, "I rather see the US act more firmly now than crushing Cuba later."

In not taking these actions seriously, and responding accordingly, we may be encouraging more boldly action. In the end, our bland responses may cause us and the Cuban people more grief than if we take a firm stand. Castro is justified in thinking he enjoys impunity to wage this covert war strategy against the US. All along we have resorted to indirect responses, such as the embargo. This perception may not only embolden him, but also his followers, particularly in the military. One Administration after another has avoided taking a firm stand on Castro's provocations. In forty years, there has not been a single prosecution by the Justice Department of Castro's agents. No wonder then that, when the first ten spies were arrested in September, 1998, they had all their information in the computers and diskettes occupied by The FBI. It was not incompetence, it was overconfidence. They felt there was an unwritten rule to leave them alone.

During the sixties and seventies, besides exporting the revolution to Latin America and Africa and supponing terrorism in Europe through ETA, IRA and the PLO, among others, Castro continued building a subversive network in the U.S. Members of this network are recruited from a pool of young Cuban exiles in the so-called Maceitos brigades, who go to Cuba to cut sugar cane, and young Americans brought to Cuba under the Venceremos brigade which, according to

*Granma's* July 27, 1999 edition, reached 7,000 visitors this year. Castro also started building links with violent groups such as the Weathermen and the Macheteros from Puerto Rico.

Claire Sterling reports in her book, *The Terror Network*,

*"the same meticulous selection went into recruiting 2,500 young Americans in the Venceremos Brigades... the Brigades visited Cuba in ten contingents between 1969 and 1977. There, under Colonel Simenov's fatherly eyes, they learned how to mount truly effective campaigns to destabilize the United States."*

With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Maurice Bishop coup in Grenada, and with full Soviet support, Castro was feeling euphoric about his prospects for waging his covert war against the US, parallel to those successful overt actions. That is why on July, 1980, during his visit to Nicaragua to celebrate the Sandinista victory, he was indiscreet in bragging:

*"We have agents of absolute confidence all over the United States who are ready to undertake whatever actions are necessary at the time of our choosing. The Yankees cannot even begin to image the capabilities we have in their country. You all read about the riots in Miami... We can accomplish things that would make the riots in Florida look like a sunshower."*

This statement provided the inspiration for *Monimbó*, a novel by Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave, which depicts how vulnerable the United States could be to acts of terrorism that lead to racial conflict. But the actions supported by Cuba went beyond inspiration for fiction. According to Tex A. Hudson, in his CANF report *Castro's America Department*:

*"on December 3rd 1979, the Macheteros machine-gunned a US Navy bus in Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, killing two sailors and seriously wounding ten others with AK-47 fire." And, later on, in January, 1981, Machetero commandos destroyed nine U.S. military jet fighters, worth \$45 million, at the Muñiz Air Force National Guard Base in San Juan. In an operation that the DA reportedly supported with training and weapons, the Macheteros robbed a Wells Fargo depot in Hartford Connecticut, of \$7.2 million September 12, 1983...and Machetero member Victor Manuel Gerena, employed as one of the Wells Fargo guards, was given sanctuary in Cuba, "*

A significant revelation appears in the recently published autobiography of Jorge Masetti, entitled *El Furor y el Delirio*, the story of a life dedicated to promoting revolution until Castro executed his father-in-law, Colonel Tony la Guardia, during the Ochoa affair. In his book, Masetti confirms that the Macheteros' Wells Fargo action was financed and equipped by Cuba. He was involved in an operation in Mexico to provide US\$50,000 to a Machetero courier. The money was brought to Mexico in person by Jose Arbesu Fraga, a deputy of Manuel Pineiro at the Americas Department of the Central Committee. Three months later, Arbesu Fraga again traveled to Mexico to bring the false passport used by Gerena to fly from Mexico to Cuba. Four million dollars, out of the seven, were shipped from Mexico to Cuba via diplomatic pouch.

The FBI included Gerena among the 1999 Ten Most Wanted criminals. After the robbery, Arhesu Fraga, this time disguised as a diplomat, served as head of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, without the US raising any objections.

In the face of such meek behavior on the part of the US, what message have we been **sending** to Castro and his followers? It is to be hoped that something more firm will come from the strong national security team assembled by President-elect Bush for his administration.

Contrary to end of the year comments by US **pundits, who totally ignore the** region, Latin America is likely to generate the first crisis to be faced by the Bush Administration. It will be in Colombia where the so-called **peace** process is crumbling and is likely to come to a heading as early as February, 2001. The Colombian Government has given the FARC a deadline to **come** to terms in the two year peace process or the 42,000 square kilometer zone **graciously** granted to them by President Pastrana is bound to be recovered by the Colombian army. The US is involved in this crisis on the government's side as a result of Plan Colombia, which is strenuously objected to by the FARC, a narco-terrorist organization that initially had overt Castro support and recently has maintained a more discrete relationship with Cuba.

The other guerrilla group, the ELN, is openly supported by Castro who, ironically, now hosts the peace conversations between this group and the Colombian government: Undeterred by the failure of the first abdication of territorial sovereignty to guerrilla groups, President Pastrana has now offered to withdraw the army from another chunk of territory, despite **violent** protests from residents of the **region**. The state is **collapsing** in Colombia. This could **generate** a Hemispheric wide crisis.

This is likely to be Castro's test for President Bush's national security team.

January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2001

The Author Ernesto F. Betancourt worked directly with Castro in 1959, after representing him in Washington during the Insurrection against Batista and was a member of the Castro delegation during his first visit to the US in April that year. He was present at a meeting of the Economic Cabinet at the Banco Nacional de Cuba in July that year, when Castro stated that "if the US send the Marines, I don't care. They will have to kill 300 to 400 hundred thousand Cubans and I will get a bigger monument than Jose Marti." The author opposed the Bay of Pigs invasion and predicted its failure. A month before the Missile Crisis, provided Bobby Kennedy information, obtained by former Rebel Army officers infiltrated in Cuba, on missile deployment. He also, organized the research department of Radio Marti, before it went on the air, and directed the station for its first five years. Does not have any property to recover in the island and opposes a US invasion of Cuba. Finally, although Cuba born, is an American citizen by birth and does not seek any office in a post-Castro government?

snowflake

March 14, 2001 7:56 AM

TO: Marty Hoffmann

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

Here is some material I received, which you can send along.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031401-3

*Ireland*

*14 Mar 01*

U05356 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2624



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

**MAR 14 2001**

(b)(6)

Chicago, Illinois 606 16

Dear (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your note. I will see that it is put in the process.

Best regards,

U05356 /01

**GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.**  
**ATTORNEYS AT LAW**

2000 EQUITABLE BUILDING  
10 SOUTH BROADWAY  
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63102-1774  
TELEPHONE (314) 241-9090  
TELEFAX (314) 241-2624

AFFILIATE OFFICE  
GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE  
BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS

(b)(6)

February 28, 2001

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

I am writing you to take you up on your kind offer to put in a letter of recommendation with Don Rumsfeld, relative to my (b)(6) efforts to serve as U. S. Ambassador to Ireland.

I have sent you the whole package that I have concerning (b)(6) background and interest in this appointment. Needless to say-, an individual cannot pursue this type of appointment without having demonstrated substantial loyalty and commitment to the new administration, financial and otherwise. I can assure you that (b)(6) personal contributions to assist the Bush Campaign were substantial enough to get him "into the game". You need not have any concerns on that particular issue.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

In any event, I am told that a nice letter to Mr. Rumsfeld, passing along whatever information you feel is appropriate, would certainly be helpful. Of course, if you have any other thoughts, please feel free to pursue those as well.

GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.

EFR/cdr  
Enclosure  
448852

11-L-0559/OSD/2627

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

December 15, 2000

Honorable George W. Bush  
President-Elect  
Bush-Cheney Presidential  
Transition Foundation, Inc.  
1800 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20270

Dear Mr. President-Elect:

Congratulations on your election as our Nation's **43<sup>rd</sup>** President. Your **philosophy** of bi-partisan cooperation and of healing is just what our country needs at this critical time and you will succeed because you will bring talented and dedicated people of similar commitment to the task of governing,

I am writing to express my interest in being considered for appointment as Ambassador to Ireland.

Enclosed is a copy of my resume and letters of support from my past efforts to represent our Nation in this critical post.

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/2628

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Objective It is my desire to be considered for appointment as Ambassador to Ireland.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



Republican  
National  
Committee

**Ann Wagner**  
Co-Chairman

February 5, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush

President of the United States  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I'm writing to extend my highest recommendation to a terrific gentleman who is interested in serving in your administration. (b)(6)  
Ambassador to Ireland. I hope you'll give him serious consideration. If you do, I am confident you will like what you see.

(b)(6)

Sincerely,

**Ann Wagner**  
Co-Chairman

CC: Governor Jim Gilmore  
Amb. Thomas P. Melady  
Edward F. Reilly  
Edward F. Reilly, Jr.  
Karl Rove  
Mark Boranyak



Republican  
National  
Committee

**Jim Nicholson**  
Chairman

January 5, 2001

Vice President-Elect Richard B. Cheney  
Bush-Cheney Transition Foundation, Inc.  
1800 G Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20270

Dear Vice President-Elect Cheney:

Congratulations on the outstanding Cabinet that you and President-Elect Bush have put together. We at the RNC are as committed to helping them get confirmed as we were to getting you elected.

(b)(6)

Thank you for your attention to the qualifications and motivation of this great American who wishes to serve President-Elect Bush and our country.

Sincerely yours,



Jim Nicholson



**SENATOR BOB DOLE**  
901 15TH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 410  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

December 21 , 2000

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Just a follow-up to my previous note, to let you know I delivered your biographical information personally to Dick Cheney today at 11:30. Will continue to keep you posted of any and all developments.

Happy Holidays!

Sincerely yours,



BOB DOLE

11-L-0559/OSD/2634

SENATOR BOB DOLE  
301 15TH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 410  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

December 18, 2000

(b)(6)

Dear

(b)(6)

Just a note to acknowledge receipt of your December 4 letter, with enclosed materials,

Now that the election has finally been successfully concluded, I have forwarded your credentials to Clay Johnson, Executive Director of the Transition office. I have, of course, included a personal letter of recommendation on your behalf.

We will keep you posted of any developments, and trust you will do likewise. Needless to say, I am hopeful you will be successful in pursuit of this, your life-time pursuit.

Best wishes for the holidays. I know they will be tough for you, but our prayers are with you.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Bob Dole', written over the typed name.

BOB DOLE

11-L-0559/OSD/2635

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

January 4, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President-Elect  
Bush-Cheney Presidential  
Transition Foundation, Inc.  
1800 G. Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20270

Dear Mr. President-Elect:

We are writing to **recommend** the appointment of (b)(6) as the ambassador to Ireland. His experience, knowledge and skills make him the ideal candidate for **this** important post.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) has an intense commitment to the issues that are important to **ambassadorship**.

This **personal** commitment, coupled with his accomplished **record** of public service; makes (b)(6) the ideal candidate for ambassador to Ireland. Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,



PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/2636

The Honorable George W. Bush  
January 4, 2001  
page two

Jerry Moran

John Merone

Jim Ryan

Todd Tachibana



ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON

OUR FATHERS WENT  
FOR GOD'S KINGDOM  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ARCHBISHOP

December 20, 2000

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President-elect of the United States  
Bush/Cheney Transition Office  
1800 G Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20270

Dear President-elect Bush,

In these days when you are establishing your new Administration, I write to assure you of my support and my prayers. May God grant you wisdom and strength not only in this transition, but above all in your service as our 43<sup>rd</sup> President.

As you go about the daunting task of appointing qualified persons to various administration posts, permit me to suggest two names:

(b)(6)

Again, I am grateful for your consideration of these recommendations. I take this occasion to assure you, your wife, Laura, and all your loved ones of a special remembrance in my prayers.

Sincerely in Christ,

James Cardinal Hickey  
Apostolic Administrator

Enclosures



CATHOLIC CHURCH OFFICES  
ARCHDIOCESE OF KANSAS CITY IN KANSAS  
12815 PARALLEL PARKWAY  
KANSAS CITY, KANSAS 68109  
(913) 721-1670 FAX (913) 721-1677

December- 12, 2000

President George W. Bush  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Prtsident,

**Heartiest** Congratulations on **your** recent election. Many of **us** were praying for you during **that** torturous month you **endured as you** awaited the final **decision**. You will continue to be in our **prayers** in **the** years **ahead**. As the Catholic Arobbishop of Kansas **City** in Kansas **I** and many of **my** **colleaguics** have **cagerly** awaited **the** arrival of **an** administration like your own.

(b)(6)

Respectfully submitted,

+James Patrick Kelcher  
Archbishop of Kansas City in Kansas

11-L-0559/OSD/2639

*Thomas Patrick Melady*

*Ambassador of the United States of America, Retired  
President Emeritus, Sacred Heart University*

Office: 202-223-1551  
Fax: 202-223-0268

(b)(6)

January 15, 2001

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President-Elect of the United States  
**Bush/Cheney Transition Office**  
1800 G Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20270

(b)(6)


(b)(6)

is under consideration by your staff for an ambassadorial position in your Administration.

(b)(6)

With warm best wishes for happiness and success in your Administration, I am

Sincerely yours,



Thomas P. Melady

11-L-0559/OSD/2640



# Diocese of Salina

Office of the Bishop

103 N. Ninth  
P.O. Box 980  
Salina, Kansas 67402-0980

December 15, 2000

Honorable George W. Bush  
President Elect  
Transition Office of President  
1800 G. Street NW  
Washington DC 20270

Dear President Elect Bush:

(b)(6)

I highly recommend (b)(6) to be the **Ambassador** of the **United States** to **Ireland**.

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Most Rev. George K. Fitzsimons  
Bishop of Salina



Office of the Chief of Staff,  
Defence Forces Headquarters,  
Parkgate,  
Dublin 3.

(b)(6)

7 December 1992

(b)(6)

'Dear

I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of the General Staff of The Defence Forces, to express my gratitude to you for the outstanding hospitability, the **generous assistance** and deep **personal** friendship you have extended to the Irish Officers attending the USACGSC Course over the past **twenty** years.

Each officer who has studied at Fort Leavenworth has **returned** to Ireland and expressed the highest praise for the **excellent support** you and your wife (b)(6) have provided to them and their families. This support has been instrumental in ensuring that Irish Officers have always been able to devote themselves to achieving the maximum possible benefit from their studies. This has resulted in these officers invariably performing with distinction at Fort Leavenworth. These officers are in your debt. By extension, the Defence Forces, and indeed, the Nation are **likewise, in** your debt. Since you have recently **departed** Leavenworth to take up your new appointment in the Washington D.C. area, it is appropriate that I write to you at this **time**. Your great success is our loss, in that future Irish Officers attending CGSC will miss the valuable support and friendship so generously provided **by both** (b)(6) and yourself. I would like to offer you heartiest congratulations and to offer you every success in your new career.

I would be very pleased if **you could** call on me during your next visit to Ireland. This would afford us the opportunity to return, **in some** small way, your generous hospitality.

Yours sincerely

(b)(6)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

CHIEF OF STAFF

GEN10

11-L-0559/OSD/2642

March 3

Dear Don —

The attached is from a good friend,  
an attorney in St. Louis. His cousin  
is being considered for U.S.  
Ambassador to Ireland. Per the  
letter, would appreciate your  
assistance in any form!

Thank you.

(b)(6)

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: March 7, 2001

SUBJECT:

Here's a paper on Russia, the entity that we are arranged to deter.

DHR/azn  
030701.16  
Attach.

RUSSIA

3 Mar 01

U05399 /01

11-L-0559/OSD/2644

## Russia – Today

When considering Russia, its circumstance and behavior, it is useful to be aware of the following:

- Life expectancy for adult men has taken an unprecedented drop from 64 years in 1990 to 60 in 2000—**below** the level of India, Egypt, and Bolivia (all 61). Russia's health profile no longer resembles that of a developed country.
- 40% of Russia's children would be characterized as chronically ill in the U.S. Russian deaths, at an average of two million annually, exceeds births at 1.3 million annually.
- Tuberculosis infects 120,000 people per year. The number of Russians exposed to TB is unknown. Incidents of cholera, diphtheria, and typhoid continue sporadically. Russia **faces** a public health crisis without precedent since the Industrial' Revolution.
- Almost 65 million people, living in almost 200 cities, live in pollution that exceeds U.S. maximums by a factor of five or more.
- More than one-half of the water supply is contaminated by U.S. standards.
- Entire segments of the health system have collapsed.
- Twenty-seven percent of Russians live near or below the subsistence level.

- In 2000, over 39 million Russians lived below the poverty line of \$42 a month, compared with 48 million in previous years. (While the comparison is valid, the numbers are somewhat overstated since 20-30% of the economy is barter.)
- Over the past five years, published data shows meat and dairy livestock herds down 35%, grain production by 30%, and milk production by 20%. Between 1991 and 2000, reported agricultural production decreased by 36%. (These figures do not include likely increases in production on private plots.)
- By 1995, four years after deregulation, products in shops had become 3,000 more expensive. (When prices were lower, many shops were empty and food was rationed and widely unavailable, even with coupons.) After the initial period of high inflation, the situation appeared to stabilize in 1997 with a substantial reduction in inflation. The 1998 ruble devaluation resulted in a sharp increase in inflation to about 85% but inflation has leveled off to between 20 and 30% in the last two years.
- The economic decline in Russia of 85% from 1991-1997 is deeper than the U.S. Great Depression when GDP fell by 30% from 1929-1935. Russia's GDP is now the size of Brazil's. In 2000, GDP was an estimated 67% of its 1991 level. GDP grew by 3.5% in 1999 and 7.7% in 2000-the first consecutive two years of positive growth since the transition.
- In 2000, about 20% of sales by Russian industrial firms were conducted in barter and more than 80% of firms paid their taxes in cash, and frequently on time.

- Russia's annual revenues are slightly more than what the U.S. Treasury collects in one week.
- Oil output has been dropping since the 1980s, although the recent price increases have helped lift 2000 GDP 7%.
- Infrastructure – electrical power, nuclear plants, railroads and sewage systems—are falling apart as a result of a plunge in gross domestic investment of 20.5% over the past 10 years.
- Russia is producing 25% fewer tractors, 5% fewer washing machines, 45% more cotton fabric, and 400% more TV sets; higher quality imports now compete with domestic products.
- In 2000, overall capital investment in industry, agriculture, transportation and commerce was 30% of the 1990 level.
- Many industrial enterprises are losing money, but most have improved their payments to suppliers, workers, and on taxes. Industrial products decreased by 46%.
- Real wages diminished by 25% between 1998 and 2000, but most of this value was restored in the past year; the real value of pensions fell by 35% in 1998 and 1999 and it has not recovered. Seven million Russians are unemployed.
- Government – the unproductive sector-still employs 27 million of the 72 million workers, which suggests that the privatization process has been moderately successful.
- Russia's population is shrinking-now at 145 million, 6 million less than in 1990. The number of Russians with

higher education who have left the country is unknown. However, an estimated ten to twenty thousand scientists and engineers have left the country since 1990.

- The judicial system is impotent; laws are openly disregarded. Few trust the police or governmental officials. In the last three years, prosecutors have exposed over 50,000 crimes involving federal officials.
- Owners of even a small store or kiosk have to pay racketeers. The Moscow police chief estimates that 90% of his force is on the take.
- Runway inflation at 2600% in 1992 alone wiped out most savings. Personal savings in Russia have recovered as inflation decreased in recent years. Savings deposits rose from \$11.4 billion at the end of 1999 to \$16 billion at the end of 2000.
- The government is increasingly able to pay but cannot yet properly house the military forces, which remain considerably larger than Russia's needs. The Kremlin has pledged a 30% personnel cut in Russia's armed forces.

Overall decline in Russia since the Soviet break-up continues. The negative trends of the 1990s in social and physical infrastructure continue unabated. Most of the challenges facing Russia in this area are not unique, but the confluence of so many problems simultaneously makes the Russia case extreme. However, some developments, specifically the positive economic trends over the last two years, provide a more balanced picture of Russia's ability to cope and survive.

March 14, 2001 3:03 PM

TO: William Schneider

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Jasons-Science Board

Here is the list of Jasons and the emeritus Jasons. I think we ought to start returning the Science Board to science.

Why don't you look at this list and think about coming up with some very good scientists names to be on it.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031401-22

234 153

14 Mar 01

**JASON MEMBERSHIP  
FEBRUARY 1, 2001**

Dr. Henry D. I. Abarbanel	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Paul Alivisatos	University of California/Berkeley
Dr. Steven M. Block	Stanford University
Dr. Curtis G. Callan, Jr.	Princeton University
Dr. John M. Cornwall	University of California/Los Angeles
Dr. William J. Dally	Stanford University
Dr. Alvin M. Despain	University of Southern California
Dr. Patrick H. Diamond	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Paul E. Dimotakis	California Institute of Technology
David L. Donoho	Stanford University
Dr. Douglas M. Eardley	University of California/ Santa Barbara
Dr. Stanley M. Flatté	University of California/Santa Cmz
Dr. Norval Fortson	University of Washington
Dr. David K. Gifford	MIT
Dr. J. Jeremy Goodman	Princeton University
Dr. Michael C. Gregg	University of Washington
Dr. David A. Hammer	Cornell University
Dr. William Happer	Princeton University
Dr. Paul Horowitz	Harvard University
Dr. Terence Hwa	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Raymond Jeanloz	University of California/Berkeley
Dr. Gerald F. Joyce	Scripps Research Institute
Dr. Jonathan I. Katz	Washington University
Dr. H. Jeff Kimble	California Institute of Technology
Dr. Steven E. Koonin	California Institute of Technology
Dr. Herbert Levine	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Nathan S. Lewis	California Institute of Technology
Dr. Sharon R. Long	Stanford University
Dr. Gordon J. MacDonald	
Dr. Claire E. Max	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Dr. Paul McEuen	Cornell University
Dr. Richard A. Muller	University of California/Berkeley
Dr. David R. Nelson	Harvard University
Dr. Francis W. Perkins, Jr.	Princeton University
Dr. Mara G. Prentlss	Harvard University

**JASON MEMBERSHIP (cont.)  
FEBRUARY 1, 2001**

Dr. William H. Press	Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Thomas A. Prince	California Institute of Technology
Dr. Roy Schwitters	University of Texas, Austin
Dr. Christopher W. Stubbs	University of Washington
Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan	University of Illinois
Dr. John L. Tonry	University of Hawaii
Dr. John F. Vesecky	University of California/Santa Cruz
Dr. Peter J. Weinberger	Renaissance Technologies
Dr. Robert M. Westervelt	Harvard University
Dr. Ellen D. Williams	University of Maryland
Dr. W. Hugh Woodin	University of California/Berkeley

The MITRE Corporation  
1820 Dolley Madison Boulevard  
McLean, VA 22 102-348 1  
(703) 883-6997

## SENIOR ADVISORS - EMERITUS

Dr. Kenneth M. Case	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Sidney D. Drell	Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Professor Freeman J. Dyson	Institute for Advanced Study/ Prince ton
Dr. Edward A. Frieman	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Richard L. Garwin	IBM
Dr. Murray Gell-Mann	Santa Fe Institute
Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Robert E. LeLevier	RAND
Dr. Harold W. Lewis	University of California/ Santa Barbara
Dr. Walter H. Munk	Scripps Institution of Oceanography/ UCSD
Dr. Robert Novick	Columbia University
Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky	Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Dr. Burton Richter	Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Dr. Marshall N. Rosenbluth	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Oscar S. Rothaus	Cornell University
Dr. Malvin A. Ruderman	Columbia University
Dr. Charles F. Stevens	University of California/San Diego
Dr. Charles H. Townes	University of California/Berkeley
Dr. Steven Weinberg	University of Texas
Dr. Herbert F. York	University of California/San Diego

### **On Leave of Absence:**

Dr. Michael H. Freedman	University of California/San Diego <sup>1</sup>
-------------------------	---

Dr. Robert G. Henderson  
Director, JASON Program Office

March 15, 2001 8:49 AM

FAX TRANSMISSION

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
Secretary of the Treasury

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Safety

Is there someone I can call at Alcoa to come into the Pentagon and brief our folks on how to handle safety?

DHR:dh  
031501-6

b29

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DERSEC	<input type="checkbox"/>
COS	<input type="checkbox"/>
SPECASST	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXECSEC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C&D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CCD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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	<input type="checkbox"/>
CABLECH	<input type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

15 MAR 01

3/15/01 1056 AM  
Ms. June Gail  
confirmed receipt

U05442 / 01

MEMORANDUM FOR The Senior Military Assistant

SUBJECT: In reply to: 030901-11, Alerting the Mess

M1  
3/12/01

030901-11

March 2001

BACKGROUND

- The Technical Services Branch of Defense Protective Services recommended a wireless doorbell as a potential solution.
- Three off the shelf wireless doorbells have been tested. Each of the doorbells tested has an advertised range of 150 feet. None of them work consistently due to the thickness and composition of the walls and doors in the Secretary's suite

331.4

CURRENT ACTIONS

- Two additional wireless doorbell systems will be tested on March 12.
- The Technical Services Division of the National Security Agency is researching alternative signalling devices. Anticipate a report on the results of their survey March, 12.
- Point of Contact: LTC Sweeny, Chief, Cables, 692-7000

9 Mar 01

U@5502-01

March 9, 2001 8:00 AM

TO: SFC (b)(6)  
cc: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Telephones

I need a way to buzz the mess when I am sitting at the conference table in my office and at the lunch table in the lunchroom.

DHR:dh  
030901-11

MAR 10 10:00 AM

SIR,  
See ATTACHED Explanation  
From Col Sweeney. They ARE  
WORKING IT.

V  
R

JJ  
SMA

5:02  
PM

March 18, 2001 3:57 PM

TO: Zal Khalilzad  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz (w/attached paper)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Turkey

Thanks so much for your paper on Turkey. It is very good.

Why don't you go to work on the issue, and come up with a work plan for the government that we can move to the NSC.

Leave the economic piece out, but reference it. Paul O'Neill is working on that,

T h a n k s .

DHR:dh  
031801-22

TURKEY

19 Mar 01

112  
860

**Informal Advice**

**TO:** Secretary Rumsfeld  
**FROM:** Zal Khalilzad   
**SUBJECT:** Reinvigorating Our Alliance with Turkey  
**DATE:** March 13, 2001

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

**MAR 13 2001**

During the cold war, Turkey played a critical role in the containment of Soviet **power**. There was agreement between the United States and its allies, **particularly** West Germany, on the central importance of Turkey in Western strategy. Now there is no such consensus. The Turks have become more nationalistic and appear to be moving towards greater independence. Although they regard NATO membership as important, they appear to place less confidence in it than during most of the Cold War. The Turks are not certain that the other members of the alliance would come to their defense in case of conflict with Syria, Iran or even Russia.

The Turks are even more concerned about the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). They suspect the Western Europeans of seeking to become independent of the United States and believe that ESDI will inevitably undermine NATO and might even emerge as a threat to Turkey. In a future conflict between Greece and Turkey, the European force, they believe, would probably come to Greece's defense and fight against the Turks.

If the Turks lose confidence that they can deal with their security problems jointly with allies, their interest in missiles and even weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will grow. To preclude this danger, I recommend that we explore ways to reinvigorate our **alliance** with Turkey. Ideally, this should take place together with our European allies. However, given Turkey's problems with Europe, it is better that we start on our own and bring the allies along over time. Turkey's problems with the Europeans on ESDI and other issues may provide an opportunity for an enhanced American-Turkish engagement.

A revitalization of strategic ties with Turkey could be based on three key areas:

- Turkish-Western cooperation to ensure energy security. Turkey occupies a unique position adjacent to globally important oil and gas resources in the Persian Gulf and the **Caspian** Basin. The bulk of all energy resources in these two region's are within 1,000 miles of Incirlick. An agreement between the US, Europeans and Americans to jointly counter threats to energy security will provide a clear strategic direction for relations. Of course, this will necessitate appropriate adaptation in terms of presence, access and **pre-**positioning in Turkey.

- Cooperation in dealing with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and **WMD** in regions close to Turkey. The Turks are part of a region where proliferation **is** a fact of life. Turkey should be part of any future missile defense architecture. Because your emphasis on missile defense is known, you will have credibility in engaging the Turks on the issue.
- Joint strategy towards Russia. Recent developments **in** Russian-Iranian relations will make Turkey even more nervous. Ankara is skeptical towards Russia and seeks reassurances from the US and Europeans in dealing with a potentially more difficult Russia.

The domestic trends in Turkey do not make it an easy ally. However, given Turkey's geopolitical importance, we have to do what we prudently can to strengthen ties with the United States and the West.

C: **DepSec** Wolfowitz, Steve **Cambone**, Chris Williams

March 18, 2001 5:46 PM

2001 MAR 18 PM 3:55

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Indonesia

Here is Zal's piece on Indonesia that he sent you a copy of. I think it is good.

In our morning phone calls we talk about that subject-I wonder if I ought to go ahead and send this along to Condi and Colin, or are you going to come up with something. If so, I will hold this.

Let me know.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
031801-28

*Indonesia*

*18 Mar 01*

U05674 /01

MAR 16 2001

## Informal Advice

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Zal Khalilzad 

SUBJECT: Indonesia

DATE: March 16, 2001



Indonesia is heading towards political change-including the possibility of increased instability that might threaten American and allied interests and produce humanitarian crises and demands for intervention to stop the violence and provide assistance. President Wahid has lost the confidence of the country's major power centers. In the coming months things may come to a head. They may well result in Wahid being replaced by Vice President Megawati or Wahid staying on but with increased instability.

Whatever happens, the influence of the military is growing and it will play a bigger role in running the country. Megawati is likely to give the military a freer hand in dealing with separatists. If Wahid stays, the military has indicated that it probably will take over internal security functions from the police.

Our ability to influence developments in Indonesia is very limited. Internal political, ethnic, religious and regional forces will largely determine the country's fate. However, given the stakes, we should do what we can to influence developments. Two steps will be particularly relevant:

First, we should engage the Indonesian military. Because of what happened in East Timor; we have severely cut back our ties with that institution. Without forgetting East Timor, our approach should be informed by our current and future interests in Indonesia. To influence Indonesia's future we need to influence its military. Our disengagement has not produced the desired results. The Indonesian military does not embrace a totalitarian ideology bent on controlling the population. Nationalists who want to keep their country together dominate it. Engagement may be a more effective approach with them. Our new policy should include normalizing the transfer of spare parts and training of Indonesian officers. On average, US- trained officers probably do better in terms of respect for human rights than others. As we gain influence with the military, we can encourage support for our concerns. However, given the attitudes in Congress, the Administration will pay a political price for such a change in policy.

Second, together with our allies and international financial institutions we should be prepared to assist Indonesia-while continuing to encourage it to carry out the reforms needed to put it on the path to economic recovery.

C: DEPSEC Wolfowitz, Steve Cambone, Chris Williams

snowflake

March 20, 2001 8:10 PM

TO: Honorable Paul H. O'Neill  
Secretary of the Treasury

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: (b)(6)

I have received a request to write to you about (b)(6) who has applied for a post as Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, at the Treasury Department.

I worked with him during the Dole campaign and found him to be thoughtful and energetic, but I did not work with him in the context that you would be considering him.

You might want to talk to Bob Dole about him, but I had a positive impression.

Regards.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
032001-14

230.02  
20 Mar 01

# Telecopy Cover Sheet

(b)(6)

Date: March 19, 2001

To: **Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
**Secretary of Defense**  
Pentagon.  
Fax # (703) 697-8339

From: (b)(6)

Number of Pages Including Cover Sheet: 6

**Comments:**

Mr. Secretary,

Although I realize how extremely busy you **must** be, I wanted you to know that I have submitted my name for the position of Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, Treasury **Department**. As the attached cover letter and resume reflect, I believe I am uniquely positioned to assist John Taylor and Secretary O'Neill in implementing the Administration's agenda in the **international** financial **arena**.

Would you mind taking a moment from your busy schedule and reviewing my **qualifications**? I would very much appreciate it if you **would** also consider putting in a good word with Secretary O'Neill on my behalf.

For your information, I have also asked Senator Dole, Bill Paxon, and nominee for Undersecretary for International Affairs, Treasury Department, John Taylor, to also reach out to **the Secretary on my behalf**. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at my office (b)(6)

Many thanks for your consideration, and best regards.

This document is intended only for the use **of the party to whom it is addressed** and contains information that is **privileged, confidential, and protected from disclosure under applicable law**. If you are not the **addressee, or a person authorized to deliver the document to the addressee**, you are hereby notified that any review, disclosure, dissemination, copying, or **other** action based on the content of the communication is not **authorized**. If you have received this document in error, please notify us by telephone and return it to us at the above address via U.S. **Postal Service**. Thank you.

If you experience any problems with this transmission, please contact sender at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

March 14, 2001

Ms. Dina Powell  
Associate Director  
Office of Presidential Personnel  
Old Executive Office Building  
17<sup>th</sup> St. & Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Ms. Powell:

I am writing in order to submit my name for the position of Assistant Secretary, International, Department of Treasury. I believe that I am uniquely qualified to hold this position.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Ms. Dina Powell  
March 14, 2001  
Page 2

(b)(6)

Finally, given the focus that Japan has received in the recent months with the **USS Greenville/Ehime Maru** tragedy, Secretary O'Neill's well reported and somewhat controversial stance on U.S./Japan **relations**, the Administration and State Department's **focus** on Japan as a centerpiece to ensuring a secure Asian security alliance,

(b)(6)

**Ms. Dina Powell**  
March 14, 2001  
Page 3

(b)(6)

I look forward to hearing from you, and I thank you in **advance** for your consideration.

Sincerely,  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

work experience  
1997 - present

1397

1996

19 92-1995

1990-1992

Summer 1990

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

work experience (cont.)

1986-1989

(b)(6)

spring 1985

education  
19954996

1989-1990

1982-1986

1981-1982

personal

319  
1430

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

F

SUBJECT: Fighter Aircraft Comparison – INFO PAPER

PURPOSE: To respond to Secretary Rumsfeld's request for a paper showing each aircraft, individual cost, total buy, purpose, and a method of calculating lethality by some cost measure.

DISCUSSION:

Attachment 1 provides a rough, parametric-based analysis. The following insights can be gleaned from this and other analyses (especially PA&E analyses) done in the past few years:

- a. If an equal capability, fighter-only force were to be built based on either F-221 or JSF, the life cycle costs could be roughly the same. Although you would need more JSFs than F-22s to accomplish the air combat mission (to include threats up to the two major theater war scenario), the lesser JSF acquisition and O&S costs would offset the cost of buying the greater quantity (and the JSF's can subsequently be used for strike).
- b. If an equal total-capability force (fighter and strike) were to be built, the JSF would clearly be less expensive, since it is a much superior strike aircraft, when compared to F-22 or any other fighter, once the air combat phase is decided.

Attachment 2 provides a qualitative comparison of U.S. fighters versus Eurofighter and a postulated Russian/Chinese fighter derivative ("Threat")

*Dave Olsen*  
3/8/01

452 F

9 Mar 01

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

# Fighter Aircraft Comparison

US Buy	LETHALITY MEASURES							Lethality cost Measure ***	OTHER CONSIDERATIONS		
	Air Combat Rating *	STRIKE					Combined Rating **		O&S Costs	Aero Industrial Base	International Participation
		Area Access	Radius Range (NM)	Payload (lbs)	Revisits/Day	Strike Rating *					
339	10	Total	650	2,000	2+	4	5.0	4	High	Limited	None
?	3	Partial	N/A	N/A	2+	0	0.3	0.4	High	Negligible	Limited
?	4	Partial	550	4,000	2+	4	4.0	8	Medium	Limited	Significant
548	4	Partial	550	4,000	2	5	5.0	7	Medium	Limited	Limited
1763	8	Total	650	4,000	2+	8	8.0	13	Medium	Significant	Significant
480	8	Total	650	4,000	2	8	8.0	10	Medium	Significant	Significant
609	5	Total	500	2,000	2+	6	6.0	10	Medium	Significant	Significant

1 -10 (Best)  
 .1 (Air Combat) + .9 (Strike) (revisits/day)  
 Lethality) ÷ Unit Procurement x 100 ...

TO: Chris Williams  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Shelton  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: The Sinai

Instead of leaving in the U.S. forces, why don't we leave a few civilians as monitors provided by some private sector company and equipped with some high-tech sensors. I don't see why we need uniformed personnel there.

Let's get it done in the next two or three months instead of the next two or three years. There isn't any reason why the Egyptians and Israelis can't pay for the civilian monitors, and we can get out of the financial aspect of it completely instead of paying one-third as we currently are.

370.02

26 MAR 01

3/23  
DH

**William Schneider, Jr.**

TY  
T J. MTC  
on Taiwan Arm Sales

**MEMORANDUM**

March 17, 2001

TO: Hon. Don Rumsfeld  
Hon. Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: William Schneider, Jr.

SUBJECT: The Taiwan missile defense decision and the President's counter-proliferation policy.

Extensive publicity has been given to the PRC's build-up of short-range ballistic missiles on PRC territory adjacent to Taiwan. Previous incidents where the PRC has explicitly used its ballistic missile capability (with the implied ability to incorporate WMD payloads) to influence the behavior of Taiwan create a circumstance which will eventually contribute to substantial pressures acquire a countervailing capability. The "example" of Taiwan – the intimidation of a non-WMD/ballistic missile state by another with such capabilities – will not be lost on other nations.

The impending decision concerning the provision of missile defenses to Taiwan should not be seen solely as a bilateral issue between the US and Taiwan (in connection with US responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979), or a matter of US-PRC relations. The decision should be framed in the context of a new approach to counter-proliferation policy.

We have seen numerous examples of nations seeking security by acquiring WMD and ballistic missiles to offset overwhelming conventional military capabilities on the part of an adversary. This phenomenon has intensified since the end of the Cold War. The US and allied operations such as the *Desert Storm* (1991) and *Kosovo* (1999) campaigns have demonstrated the extraordinary power of information-intensive applications of conventional military power.

The PRC's use of WMD/ballistic missiles to achieve a diplomatic purpose (affecting Taiwan's presidential election in 1996, or to "incentivize" Taiwan to move toward unification with the Mainland) is both blatant and unacceptable. Embedding a decision to go forward with both land and sea-based missile defense (for both ballistic and cruise missiles) in the President's broader counter-proliferation strategy could simultaneously create a constructive worldwide policy, and diminish an "anti-China" flavor to such a decision.

A copy of a recent *Financial Times* article on the PRC missile buildup is attached.

# US warns China about missile deployment

By James Kyng in Beijing

The US warned China yesterday that its deployment of 50 new missiles every year to an area near rival Taiwan could spur Washington into selling to Taipei the very missile defence technology that Beijing is intent on keeping out of Taiwanese hands.

Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of the US Pacific forces, made a clear link between what he said was a growing deployment of some 300 missiles adjacent to the Taiwan strait and pressure in the US to sell the

advanced Aegis missile defence system to the island.

"It's important that the Chinese make the connection between what they deploy on their side of the strait and the types of technologies that the US might make available to Taiwan to provide for its sufficient defence," Admiral Blair said in Beijing near the start of a six-day trip to meet Chinese generals.

"And certainly a future sea-based, Aegis-based missile defence programme would be part of that," he added.

China's overarching aim

in its current diplomacy with the US is to reduce the impetus behind arms sales to Taiwan and to prevent the transfer of destroyers equipped with Aegis radar systems. Sha Zukang, a senior foreign ministry official, said this week that the sale of Aegis would have "very, very serious" consequences for US-China relations.

Such stern opposition to the Aegis sale derives from a concern that it could neutralise China's missile threat towards the island. Beijing regards its longstanding threat to attack Taiwan,

which split from the mainland in 1949, as a key restraining force on pro-independence sentiment on the island.

Admiral Blair's comments appear to put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. Mr Sba said this week that China's missile deployments were an internal affair and would not be negotiated with any outsider. But, as Mr Blair indicated, calls for more US arms sales will intensify without some flexibility on the issue of missiles.

"There will be a point at which that missile build-up

will threaten the sufficient defence of Taiwan and which it is the US policy to maintain," said Admiral Blair. According to the Taiwan Relations Act, the US must supply weapons sufficient for the island's defence.

The apparent impasse could complicate a visit to the US by Qian Qichen, China's most senior foreign policy official, between March 18 and 24. Mr Qian is expected to be the first senior Chinese official to meet President George W. Bush. Mr Bush is due to decide next month on what type of weapons sales are sold to Taipei.

The issue of China's missile deployments could also dampen hopes for a dialogue between Beijing and Washington on US plans to build a National Missile Defence (NMD), aimed at defending US territory from intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. China is opposed to NMD but is willing to talk about the issue with the US.

Zhu Rongji, the prime minister, said yesterday that Mr Bush would make his first visit to China in October when he attends an Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (Apec) forum to be held in Shanghai. "I am very

happy that President Bush has already accepted President Jiang's invitation to attend the informal Apec leadership meeting that is scheduled in Shanghai," he said. Mr Zhu also said that Mr Bush had been invited to extend his trip into a state visit to China.

The White House said yesterday it had not yet decided whether to accept China's invitation. The caution about accepting the invitation is a reflection of the new administration's more distant relationship with Beijing compared with the previous administration.

TO: David S.C. Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2001

SUB SECT:

Please prepare some recommendations as you suggested in your memo of March 6, 2001. You might want to talk to the senior enlisted or at least read the memo I sent you on the subject. They have some ideas as to where it should be focused.

You will also want to talk to Charlie Craigan and get his views.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
032601.39

240

26 MAR 01

March 6, 2001

To - David Chu  
Please

Memorandum for: Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of Defense



From: David S.C. Chu

Subject: Nature of \$1 billion pay raise

Copies: Steve Cambone, Charles Abell

As Charlie and I answered in our meeting with you this afternoon, there is no doubt the additional \$1 billion in pay monies promised by the President should be targeted. (A copy of your *original* question is at Tab A for your convenience.)

We urge it be used in two ways:

--To address Immediate problems ("spot" shortages--e.g., specific recruiting and retention Issues, probably through bonuses). Incentives should be concentrated in those areas where reasonable expenditures can be expected to provide significant results. (Put another way, some shortages may need to be dealt with through other means, or in combination with pay increases--pay by itself may not be enough.)

--To begin solving long-term systemic problems (e.g., the relative competitiveness of senior enlisted and career officer pay)

If you would like, Charlie and I could begin developing preliminary but specific ideas for your consideration in about two weeks.



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
The Senior **Military Assistant**  
6 March 2001

**MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. DAVID CHU**

**SUBJECT: Pay Increase**

sir:

**Secretary Rumsfeld requests** your views on how best to apply the pay raise, **either across-the-board** or targeted?

Could you send a short memo to **DepSec/SecDef** outlining your views by **CoB 7March**?

Thank you,

*Jim*

**JAMES N. MATTIS**  
**Brigadier General, USMC**  
**Senior Military Assistant** to the  
**Deputy Secretary of Defense**

Attachment  
as stated

Question: What will his pay raise mean to the average service member?

Answer: The exact formula for how this pay raise is to be allocated is still being worked out. But if it were distributed evenly across the force, that would mean that an E1 would receive an additional \$72 per month; an E6 would receive \$150 more per month and an O3 would receive \$252 more per month.

	Paygrade	FY01 monthly	FY02 monthly with 6.3% raise
Pvt / Sgt	E1	\$1042	\$1114 + 72
-	E6	\$2174	\$2324 + 150
Lt(N) Capt	O3	\$3656	\$3908 + 252 / mo.

TO: Joe Collins  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Overseas Deployments**

Thanks so much for your memo that you sent the Deputy and Chris Williams. It's helpful and I will see if we can get some work going on it.

Regards.

DHR/azn  
032601.28

390

26 MAR 01

Here are some strategic thoughts, in the form of a declaratory strategy laid out in the royal "we":

- In general, we support overseas stationing and operational deployments, especially in areas of vital interest, such as Europe (100K), East Asia (100K), and the Arabian Peninsula/ Persian Gulf (apx. 20K on any given day).
- We support stationing and deployments where our forces can make a difference and where our friends and allies cannot get the job done without us.

As a global power with global responsibilities, where it is possible, we favor deployments where we contribute only unique, irreplaceable elements --- command and control assets, for example --- as opposed to the bulk of large-scale expeditionary forces. The bulk of such forces, where possible, should come from local states. In general, better an East Timor-type arrangement, than a Haiti-style deployment. Of course, we don't always have that choice.

- We insist that operational deployments be based on policy objectives. When the objective has been accomplished the operation should end.
- We reject operational deployments made in the spirit of "feckless engagement," wherein we hope that somehow, someday, some good will come of them.


A joint training exercise with the Mongolian Army --- which took place a few years ago --- is an example of the type of engagement that makes little apparent sense. There are many others. Much of what goes on in Partnership for Peace exercises in Central Europe, for example, is a waste of time, military tourism, or the mere manipulation of symbols.

- We do not support commitments that are purely symbolic.
- We should not support the use of U.S. forces to make up for the paucity of diplomatic or economic instruments. [NB: Today's *Post* suggests that State will be better resourced in the future.]
- We insist that all overseas stationing and operational deployments be subject to periodic review.

All such reviews are, of course, politically sensitive to the nth degree. The process of reducing overseas stationing or deployments may be more painful than the end product is useful.

TO: Rudy Deleon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
CC: Andy Marshall  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: Defense Strategy

By this memo I am requesting that you read our latest version of the defense strategy. Then please dictate your comments and thoughts, and send both Andy and me a copy.



DHR/azn  
0325601.03

381

26MARR01

April 2, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon **R**  
cc: Andy Marshall  
Subject: Comments on the Draft Defense Strategy Review

38

I have examined Andy Marshall's Draft 03/08/01 and have had the opportunity to have two discussions with him on the document. It is **thoughtful** and should provide for a needed discussion of the kind of military capabilities needed by the United States in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

In terms of actual edits, I will provide some further suggested edits directly to Andy Marshall. I want to use this brief memo to discuss larger trends.

A new century begins as the old one ended. America is the world's military and economic super-power. This brings both challenge and responsibility. Our area of responsibility<sup>1</sup> (AOR) will not be one region but continue to be the entire world. The dynamics of the global economy will force us to spend more time and energy looking across the Pacific. But, Europe and the Middle East will continue to be areas of major interest. So, too, will be Mexico and Latin America.

In terms of the needed military capabilities for this period, the paper continues to build on the unique technological advantages of our country:

- Our ability to strike an adversary at a distance greater than the adversary may strike us back, and to thus deter that adversary from using force;
- Logistics and Mobility that sustain our forces and that give us global reach;
- Skilled military leadership that is professional in the planning and execution of military operations; and
- Communications and Intelligence systems that provide both strategic and situational awareness in almost any circumstance.

2 APR 20

The Marshall paper provides a framework for looking at how we can maintain these advantages in the future. In my discussions with Andy, I raised these points:

- We should address the tension that exists between tools designed to win long range wars and how they differ from those best suited to deter conflict:

- The loss of rationality since the Cold War, portrayed by Saddam Hussein's occasionally irrational use of his military, complicates our efforts to dissuade him when we are relying on weapons built to provide striking power for our forces. Forces dedicated to presence/deterrence make an unambiguous statement of commitment to both friends and enemies. But these may not necessarily be the best forces for combat if deterrence fails.
- The merits of experimentation and innovation are well addressed. The importance/ of experimentation should cause us to build on service experimentation and training, and incorporate joint and combined experimentation.
  - A model that merits potential application of this is the Combined Air-Intelligence-Ops Center employed in Southern NATO Operations.
  - US CINC JOINT FORCES COMMAND should be tasked to develop a joint and combined experimentation proposal that builds upon his existing work on interoperability.
  - The US efforts in joint experimentation, once initiated, should be expanded to include joint experimentation with our major allies and coalition partners. For the foreseeable future we are likely to deploy with our allies and be shoulder-to-shoulder partners during deployments. We should invite them to be part of our experimentation. This will help prevent interoperability problems and force our allies to get serious about investing in their required future capabilities.
- We must incorporate a method to identify "breakout technologies", those that change the way we think about the battlefield.
  - Just as GPS and cruise missiles broke us out from past ways to operate/strike, what technologies may cause future shifts? Global Hawk and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (a UCAV with a weapon) are two that might fit the bill. However, for these technologies to be fielded in a timely way the requirements process must become much more disciplined and focus on the "capable" technology rather than the "perfect" technology.
- We should address Information Operations as an operation challenge and not simply a technology. This means we must change the focus from beyond hardware and networks to the content of our information operations. Both offense and defense need new thinking.
  - We have serious vulnerabilities (nothing can sink shipboard morale faster than spurious e-mails) and have put little effort into the content of both offensive and defensive uses of the information.
  - For example, we knew Milosevic had secret, out-of-country bank accounts but could not influence his countrymen with that information.
- The United States must also continue its efforts with the asymmetric threats and the development of capabilities to deal with:

- Counter-terrorism and Consequence Management. Can we stop the terrorist attack from occurring, and if that fails, can we provide civil support to law enforcement to restore order and confidence.
  - Counter-intelligence. The greatest threat to our advances in technology may come from within. Can we protect our secrets?
  - Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense.
  - Information Network Security. Can we protect and defend the information systems that have become essential to our economic success and national security?
  - Medical Readiness: Can we take care of our troops by safeguarding their health on the battlefield of the future?
- Efforts to reduce uncertainty must be balanced. Throughout history, nations' militaries have been largely unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory level of certainty about adversaries' capabilities and intentions.
- In ambiguous times, we must consider investment in resources that thrive on uncertainty vice chasing the ideal of complete knowledge.

The Marshall paper is an excellent tool for identifying the military capabilities needed for the United States to . . . Deter . . . Dissuade . . . Win.

In addition there needs to be a piece that outlines the national security strategy that will fully utilize these military capabilities. For example the National Security Commission (Rudman-Hart-Gingrich) discusses the following:

American national security strategy must find its anchor in US national security interests, interests that must be both protected and advanced for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: survival interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; critical interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and significant interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act.

Interesting enough, while the Commission proposes the elimination of the two major regional conflict policy, it does not offer substitute thinking on the alternative.

That is the remaining work. Specifically, in a dangerous world, how should the force structure be sized.

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Senior Military Assistant**

27 March 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: **MR. CRAGIN, ACTING USD/P&R**

SUBJECT: Military Slot Machine Program

Please prepare **DepSecDef** response to Secretary **Rumsfeld**.

Very respectfully,,



**John Batiste**  
**BG, USA**

Senior Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

As stated

cc: **DSD**  
**TSA/DSD**

SUSPENSE: 2 APR 01

330.11

27 MAR 01

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Military Slot Machine Program**

Take a look at this gambling memo. I wonder if we've got any indication of **how** many people have a gambling addiction in the military.

What do you think we ought to do with this?

DHR/azn  
032601.48  
Attach.

*thoughts from Jaymie, Leidy, me*

## INFORMATION PAPER

**SUBJECT:** Military Slot Machine Program

**PURPOSE:** To provide background information on slot machine programs operated by the Military Services, including uses of slot machine income.

### **BACKGROUND:**

- The Services installed slot machines in their stateside and overseas open messes in the 1930s and 40s. Slot machines were removed from CONUS clubs in the late 1960s. After fraud allegations, the Army and Air Force removed slot machines overseas in 1972.
- In 1980, the Army and Air Force informed congressional oversight committees of plans to reinstate slot machines overseas employing strict standards and control procedures. The machines were phased in during the 1980s.
- In 1987, the Services further expanded their slot machine programs to other Category C MWR activities, such as bowling centers, recreation lounges, and golf courses and added video poker and multiple coin play machines.

### **DISCUSSION:**

- Slot machines are offered at 90 overseas installations where the program does not conflict with the laws of the host nation or status of forces agreement (SOFA), and the host nation has its own legal form of gambling.
- The program is owned and operated by the Military Services, using internal machine controls that are more stringent than the gaming industry standard.
- The DoD establishes controls on the play of slot machines to limit potential abuse.
  - The Military Services have limited play through program design --- only nickel and quarter machines with frequent payouts and limited jackpots. The rate of return to the customer is between 90 to 93 percent.
- The income from slot machines represents the basis for nonappropriated fund construction funding for the Services and provides funding for low cost recreational and entertainment programs in overseas areas that could not be otherwise supported.
  - In FY 2000, a total of 7,092 machines provided a net income of \$128 million.

Demographic and Revenue Data on Slot Machines

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Total number of machines	3,492	1,305	1,649	646	7,092
Number of machines by denomination:					
Nickel	726	261	512	144	1,643
Quarter	2,766	989	1,110	502	5,367
Other <sup>1</sup>	0	55	27	0	82
Percentage of total that are video poker	42% <sup>2</sup>	13%	18%	See note <sup>2</sup>	31%
Number of machines by activity:					
NCO/enlisted clubs	856	276	1,121	487	2,740
Officers clubs	195	46	136	13	390
Community clubs	1,074	367	81	20	1,542
Bowling centers	945	131	285	116	1,477
AFRCs	161	57	0	0	218
Other	261	428	26	10	725
Maximum single play	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50	\$2.50
Maximum jackpot	\$1,199	\$500	\$1,000	\$1,199	\$1,199
Average payback to customer	93.9%	92.0%	90.9%	93.9%	92.5%
Revenue and income in \$ millions:					
Total machine revenue after payouts	99.0	18.3	30.5	14.6	162.4
Total activity expenses <sup>3</sup>	25.4	1.9	3.4	3.3	34.0
Net income	73.4	16.4	27.1	11.3	128.2
Total net income retained by command/installation <sup>4</sup>	43.5	16.4	11.9	8.4	80.2
Total net income assessed by headquarters <sup>4</sup>	31.3	0	15.2	2.9	49.4

NOTES: <sup>1</sup> Other category represents machines that take tokens or local currency

<sup>2</sup> Percentage of video poker machines for the Army includes those operated by the Army listed in the Marine Corps total. Army operates Marine Corps slot machines at Camp Butler and Iwakuni, Japan

<sup>3</sup> Activity cost for the Army includes reimbursement of 10 percent of revenue to the installation for upkeep of the facility.

<sup>4</sup> Total amount distributed by the Army is based on a balance sheet transaction and varies; slightly from the net income which factors in accruals for monthly expense.

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2001 MAR 28 AM 8:07

March 27, 2001 1:37 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Germany's Budget Review

On a back channel basis, I am told that senior officials in the German armed forces are deeply concerned about the budget review taking place in Germany.

They believe that about the only thing that can stop an additional sizeable cut in the FRG armed forces is if U.S. officials weigh in heavily with Chancellor Schroeder and his delegation when they are here in the United States.

I suggest that all of us feed the appropriate talking points into the memorandum for the visit and that it be called to the attention of the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
03270 1-36

CC: *Paul Wolfowitz*  
*Chris Williams*

*Germany*

*27 Mar 01*

March 28, 2001 10:55 AM

TO: Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN  
General Tommy R. Franks, USA  
General Peter Pace, USMC  
General Thomas A. Schwartz, USA

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Brilliant Pebbles

As promised, I have attached a copy of the foreword from a book on Pearl Harbor, and also copies of Brilliant Pebbles I and II.

I thoroughly enjoyed our dinner and look forward to doing it again soon.

I hope to hear from you on the matters we discussed at your earliest convenience.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
032801-2

313.24

28 Mar 01

U06437 /01

## FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious- Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it was an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States assuming the decision on war, the attack hardly appears reckless. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible mistake—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind us how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

**PROPRIETARY - C**

**“Brilliant Pebbles”  
(Rumsfeld’s recollections from  
the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission (BMTC))**

**The Assignment of the BMTC**

“The BMTC’s task is to answer:

Who can do it now?.

**Who** is trying to do it?

When are they likely to succeed?

Why do we care?

When will we know they can do it?”

**Thoughts from and on the Intelligence Community**

“Intelligence analysts need to remember that there is more there than they know.”

“**The** absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; nor is it evidence of presence.”

“Some of it (what you can see), plus the rest of it (what you can’t see), equals all of it,” (Baldy’s Law)

“There are knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.” (Unknown)

“When you know a thing, to hold that you know it, and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it: this is knowledge.” (Confucius)

“Tell them what you know. Tell them what you don’t know, And, only then, tell them what you think. And, be sure you distinguish between them.”

“Never assume the other guy will never do something you would never do.” (Machiavelli)

“A deep truth is a truth so deep that not only is it true, but its exact opposite is also true.” (Niels Bohr)

“The worst mistake is to have the best ladder and the wrong wall.”

“Making ICBMs used to be difficult, like breaking the four-minute mile. But since Roger Bannister did it, it has become commonplace. So, too, will ICBMs.”

“Government seems not much interested in documenting failure.”

“Nothing ages so quickly as yesterday’s vision of the future.”

The U.S. intelligence community (IC) uses **SIGINT** for signals intelligence and **HUMINT** human intelligence. One commissioner suggested that the IC ought to start using **THINKINT** for thinking in intelligence work.

- "History marches to the drum of a clear idea." (W. H. Auden)
- "Demographics is destiny." (**Scanlan**)
- If you develop rules, never have more than ten.

### The Approach of Some Briefers

"I can't report on or assess things I don't see."

"**You're** trying to get me to comment on things we don't know."

"We can't go back and look for something until we know it's there."

### Commissioners' Observations

When a Commissioner was asked if he had the details on the Indian nuclear explosions, he said, "**No**, I don't, but I'm sure the Chairman planned the whole thing to prove his point."

When a Commissioner acknowledged he may have pulled the trigger a bit too quickly on a briefer and was going to apologize, another Commissioner's advice was, "**No**, just tell him the next time you'll take better aim."

"That paragraph is completely content-free."

"That third line looks like a petunia in the onion patch."

"There may be a thought in there trying to get out, but what in the world is it?"

"This crowd [the Commissioners] would edit a stop sign."

"The Commission is up to speed; only the direction is in doubt."

"It's clear the White House knows how to fight, but not who to **fight**."

"If you don't want to believe it, there is no body of evidence that cannot be ignored."

### On Intelligence

"No one ever sees successful camouflage."

"If we can see it from the air, it's ours."

"Warning time not used is wasted time. It's like runway behind you for a pilot."

"**The** wind through the tower presages the coming of the storm." (Chinese proverb)

"Hire paranoids. Even though they have a high false alarm rate, they discover all plots." (Herman **Kahn**)

"It is easier to convince someone they're right, than to convince them they're wrong."

"**Never** attribute to a conspiracy that which can be explained by incompetence."

"Sometimes it's necessary to kill a chicken to frighten the monkeys." (Chinese proverb)

"A sample of one from a homogenous population is sufficient." (Herman Kahn)

At the Congress of Vienna, on learning the Russian ambassador had died, Tallyrand mused "Oh, really. What do you suppose was his motive?"

### Schneiderisms

"That briefer has no off switch."

"That fellow has a knowledge board defect. He must have purchased his chip from the low bidder."

"That fellow has had one year's experience 50 times."

"He's the type that would read the Bible, looking for a loophole,"

"That briefer just committed 'podiacide' (shot himself in the foot)."

"That is like killing two stones with one bird." (to a briefer)

"That man is truly a waste of food."

"The threat is from nano-technology."

"Techies think the world is nothing more than one big semiconductor application."

### On Washington, D.C.

The two most important rules in Washington, DC are:

Rule One: "The cover-up is worse than the event."

Rule Two: "No one ever remembers the first rule."

"Government does two things well – nothing and overreact."

"You can wreck any story if you check the facts." (a Chicago reporter)

"Running the U.S. Navy is like punching a pillow all day, You end up exhausted and the pillow hasn't changed a bit." (Franklin D. Roosevelt)

"Running the Department of Defense is like wrestling with a 7 million pound sponge." (Deputy SecDef David Packard)

"Generals never lose a war in their own memoirs."

"History will be kind to me, because I will write it." (Sir Winston Churchill)

"No man is a villain in his own MEMCOMS."

"If you have anything bad to say about anyone, let's hear it." (A reporter)

Harry Truman said, "If you want to have a friend in Washington, DC, buy a dog." The modern corollary is: "Better get a small dog, because it may turn on you also."

"A friend in Washington, DC is someone who stabs you in the chest."

### Conclusions

"It doesn't take a 'village,' it takes a 'Commission.'"

"There are no statues in the parks of America honoring Commissions."

"Weakness is provocative."

"You get more with a kind word and a gun (or ballistic missile) than you do with a kind word alone."  
(Al Capone)

**Unclassified – Not For Release**

Brilliant Pebbles II  
*(Rumsfeld's Recollections From The Commission  
to Assess U.S. National Security  
Space Management and Organization)*

Don Rumsfeld

**HISTORICAL**

“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. . . as our case is new, we must think anew.” (Abraham Lincoln)

“No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world.” (President Dwight D. Eisenhower)

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” (Winston Churchill)

“There is a difference between force and power. You generally need force in situations where you haven't marshaled sufficient power to shape events.” (Arleigh Burke)

“The perfect battle is the one that does not have to be fought.” (Sun Tzu)

**GENERAL**

“Governments have lost their exclusivity with respect to the use of space.”

“The only thing harder than getting the . . . military to adopt a new technology is getting them to give up an old one.” (Bill Graham)

“There lies at the heart of deterrence, . . . an inescapable paradox: the more seriously the possessor is believed capable in extremis of using the armory, the less likely it is that others will allow circumstances to arise challenging its use. The converse is also true.” (Sir Michael Quinlan)

“The NRO has the proverbial problem of 15 lbs. in a 5 lb. sack.” (Tom Moorman)

“Being a ‘national treasure’ is one thing. Being a ‘national monopoly’ is quite another.” (Bill Graham)

“Culturally, the Air Force does not embrace space.” (anonyms)

“It's an example of pricing; the answer depends on whether you're a buyer or a seller.” (Tom Moor-man)

“If you do ‘cradle-to-grave,’ you run the risk of falling in love with old ideas.” (anonymous)

"After a period of time, institutions in conflict tend to mirror each other." (Malcolm Wallop)

"It is exceedingly difficult for any military organization to innovate radically - except in wartime when it is absolutely necessary." (Jim Woolsey)

"One thing we've learned about tsars is that the barons ignore them and the peasants kill them." (Larry Welch)

"Satellites require greater technology and scientific capability than toilet paper, which suggests that a common acquisition system is not appropriate." (Howell Estes)

"You don't get air superiority from the ground, and you won't get space superiority from the ground, land, sea, or air." (anonymous)

"Space control will be the next frontier, because U.S. dependence and vulnerability are so great." (unknown)

"With too much authority to the warfighter, it is like a peewee soccer game; everybody chases the ball, it doesn't advance the ball and leaves the rest of the field open for unpleasant surprises." (Larry Welch)

"This assignment is a bit like trying to pick up mercury." (Doug Necessary)

"We need to be looking for those fighter pilots who get 95 percent of the kills." (David Jeremiah)

"Russia's equities in space are less than the U.S., but they plan to use nukes in space which levels the playing field." (anonymous)

"You don't know what you don't know." (unknown)

"One man's 'IW' (information warfare) is another man's 'space control.'" (Tom Moorman)

"If you control the funding, and write the efficiency reports, it doesn't matter what the organization chart says - you own it." (Bob Davis)

"He who has the gold rules." (unknown)

"Space is the access point for information warfare - it is an unprotected node." (unknown)

"It takes longer to get an export license than to build a satellite." (unknown)

"Too often military officers are not in their posts long enough to know the mistakes they've made."

"When Dr. Johnson said that 'patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,' he had not looked closely at reform." (unknown)

"To those who would tear down what is falls the responsibility to recommend something better."

"I think we almost have a consensus on this point; unfortunately, it's all against me."  
(Bill Graham)

"The cheapest bandwidth is Federal Express." (anonymous)

"In unanimity there's often a lack of rigorous thinking." (anonymous)

"How many bad guys submit licenses?" (John Harnre)

"We have experienced epistolic excellence in a sea of inadequacy." (Jim Simon)

"Space is more than just another higher hill." (Ed Eberhart)

"War is war; wargames are games." (Vice Admiral Lyle Bien)

"Flying like a flock of geese in sun synchronous orbit." (Kathy Sadler)

"They plan to use pre-emptive revenge." (Bill Graham)

"We never go **final**; we just run out of time to make more changes." (Doug Necessary)

"Precision weapons require precision intelligence." (Dave Jeremiah)

"This is like a self-licking ice cream cone." (Bob Davis)

"The military should train the way they will fight." (Dave Jeremiah)

"The Air Force is a slum lord in space," (Dave Jeremiah, with a smile)

"This is like loading frogs in a wheelbarrow." (Doug Necessary)

"You can't **win** a hattle you don't engage." (Malcolm Wallop)

**HORNEFUSMS** (Chuck Horner)

"The farther up the ladder you go, the less you know."

"If it's a small program, it goes to a three star; if it's a big one, it goes to a one star."

"If we don't have a national security policy, how can we have a space security policy?"

“The Pentagon has an amazing inability to heal itself.”

“The U.S. Air Force is tribal: if you leave the campground, they burn your teepee and shoot your pony.”

“That was a brilliant defense of the farm.”

“We’ll fix the enemy; we’ll leak our acquisition system to them.”

“We just saw how the Air Force does it. They bring in their pet pony and just drag it in front of the Commission.”

“I think we just saw part of the problem.”

“It’s people like that that helped the Soviet Union fail.”

“He’s just like an accountant – he knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”

“That was a blinding glimpse of the obvious.”

“It takes so long to launch at the Cape that someone put a building number on a Titan IV.”

“We’re not talking about minor bureaucrats here, we’re talking about accomplished killers.”

On DOD – “It’s screwed up, but you can’t change a thing.”

“We sure make good buggy whips.”

“SBIRS low is a case of incestuous cannibalism on the part of the space community.”

“Hey, it’s government; it’s not supposed to work.”

“The Pentagon is driven by budgets and programs - not national security interests.”

“Each service has self-inflicted sucking chest wounds, because they can’t change.”

“That’s one barbed wire pull through we don’t need to do.”

“If you’re going to kill people, you damned well better have a good reason.”

## INTELLIGENCE

“All intelligence gaps are not created equal.” (Joan Dempsey)

“The intelligence community is not a community – it’s a loose association of disparate organizations.” (Larry Kindswater)

“Double agents are mostly homegrown.” (J.M. Simon)

“With respect to intelligence from space, the key is to get the right intelligence, in the right hands, at the right time.” (unknown)

“The intelligence community is a collection of feudal baronies,” (David Jeremiah)

“In this post-cold war world, intelligence is not just bean counting – we need to know cultures and intentions.” (Chuck Horner)

## CONGRESS

“Anything that has six Congressional committees overseeing it is very likely dead on arrival.” (anonymous)

“The difference between the executive branch and the legislative branch is that the executive branch has the data and Congress traffics in it.” (Doug Necessary)

“Hold still, little fishy, I’s just goin’ to gut you.” (the late Congressman Howard Smith)

“Never send an important program to Capitol Hill unchaperoned.” (Doug Necessary)

## BRIEFINGS & BRIEFER:3

“Oue half of that briefing wasn’t intelligible; the rest wasn’t important.”

“That fellow scratched all of the itches.” (Jay Garner)

“That is impressive. He just delivered two full paragraphs of acronyms without using a single word in English.”

“There is a touch of disingenuousness in some of those arguments.” (anonymous)

“English is apparently his second language - after acronyms.”

“He’s a class act; he avoided answering every question I asked, but he did it in a very satisfying way.” (Bill Graham)

“That fellow is uot tightly attached.” (Bill Graham)

“The interesting thing about Gates, Schlesinger and Woolsey is that, unlike some briefers, they all spoke English.”

“Any more briefings will flood our carburetors.”

### **HUMAN NATURE**

“Anyone who can do it for you, can do it to you.” (Doug Necessary)

“You know you’re getting old when it takes longer to recuperate than it took to get tired.”  
(Doug Necessary)

### **ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT**

“There is no one in the National Security Council assigned to deal with space issues; when you call, there is no one home.”

“No known organization or management arrangement can solve under-funding.”  
(unknown)

“Operations drive out planning.”

“When one starts building a temple unto oneself, it’s the beginning of the end.”  
(anonymous)

“An excellent organization with poor leadership won’t work; an imperfect organization with good leadership will.”

“You get what you inspect, not what you expect.”

“What you measure improves.”

Donald H. Rumsfeld  
8/8/00  
Revised 2/1/01

March 28, 2001 11:23 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Foot and Mouth Disease

Here is the foot and mouth disease material.

I think you ought to talk to Rudy de Leon and make sure we have a program we are satisfied with to see that we are doing everything humanly possible to avoid spreading the disease anywhere, let alone back in the U.S.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR: dh  
032801-4

710

28 Mar 01

March 22, 2001 9:38 AM

TO: Steve Herbits  
CC: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: PAUL WOLFSWITZ  
Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foot and Mouth

Ann Veneman called and said the foot and mouth disease problem is getting worse. They now think they have found it in Ireland and the Netherlands.

She is sending us a letter expressing concern about the risk of military equipment coming back into the United States, particularly tractors, and the need for cleaning these vehicles.

Why don't you have Rudy look into it and get back to us.

DHR:dh  
032201-g

To: SECDEF —

SIR,

FOR YOUR  
REVIEW

VR

J.J./SMA

3/27

TO Adm JJ Quinn -  
I've discussed the contents  
with the Sec Def but I  
wanted you to see the  
book as well. The J-4 did  
the support.

Rudy de Leon

U05908 /01

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE**



**Foot and Mouth  
Disease Information Package**

**The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## Table Of Contents

Item	Section	Subiect
INFO PAPER		Containment Of Foot & Mouth Disease (FMD)
USEUCOM POLICY MESSAGE	TAB 1	USEUCOM Policy on Preventing the Spread of FMD
ARMED FORCES PEST MANAGEMENT BOARD	TAB 2	Technical Information Memorandum

26 March 2001

## INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Containment of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)

1. Purpose DoD is taking the current outbreak of FMD very seriously. This paper discusses standard and enhanced actions being taken to prevent the spread of FMD.
2. Background According to the U.S. Dept of Agriculture (USDA) 75% of the world's land mass has reported cases of FMD. By routinely following strict inspection procedures and precautions the U.S. has not had a reported case of FMD since 1929.
3. Standard procedures for return of equipment, supplies, and personnel to CONUS

a. Military equipment, privately owned vehicles (POV), and household goods must be free of dirt and examined for parasites prior to acceptance for shipment.

b. Trash is collected and incinerated/disinfected from arriving aircraft and ships. The U.S. Navy dumps produce before entering CONUS ports.

c. Personnel are restricted from bringing agricultural products into CONUS.

4. Enhanced DoD Procedures (Since outbreak of FMD)

a. Through coordination with USDA we have heightened awareness and stressed the importance of rigorously following inspection and disinfection procedures.

b. USDA issued specific guidance for EUCOM Military Customs Inspectors (MCI) directing enhanced inspections, cleaning, and disinfecting of all items.

c. EUCOM Vehicle Processing Centers are disinfecting DoD personnel POVs prior to shipment from contaminated areas.

d. Military shipments including pallets, field canvas tents, wooden crates, footwear, clothing and other military materiel that have been used in open farmland or in proximity to farm animal herds will be thoroughly cleaned and additionally disinfected if proceeding from an FMD contaminated or risky area.

e. EUCOM is applying the same vigilance to intra-theater shipments.

f. EUCOM is complying with Host Nation restrictions where they are more stringent than U.S. requirements, and will apply the toughest standard. Two U.S. Air Force C-130 Aircraft transiting between the UK and Spain were disinfected IAW Spanish FMD policy.

g. EUCOM issued a policy message (Tab 1) and is forming an oversight group.

4. Recommendations/ Countermeasures

a. Continue enforcing existing procedures found in the Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Technical Memorandum No. 31, Contingency Retrograde Washdowns, available at [www.afpmb.org/pubs/tims/tim31.pdf](http://www.afpmb.org/pubs/tims/tim31.pdf) and enhanced procedures implemented and underway in EUCOM. (Tab 2)

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b. Release CJCS policy message (in progress) to the CINCs, Services, and Agencies highlighting the current situation and reinforcing EUCOM's FMD policy.

Prepared by: Col Joseph Reheiser  
J-4/LRC, 697-0744

TUZYUW RUFGCIN1250 0831933-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
 R UUUUU ZUI RUFTMCB0595 0840048  
 P 241933Z MAR 01  
 FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC//  
 TO RHMFIUU/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N1/N3/N4/O22/O19//  
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N1/N3/N4/O22/O19//  
 RUFGSOC/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//SOJ1/SOJ3/SOJ4//  
 RUBDPLA/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG  
 RUBDPLA/GE//AEAGA-M/AEAGC-O/AEAGD/AEAMD/AEAPA//  
 RHFQAAA/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DP/DO/LG/SG/PA//  
 RHMFIUU/COMMARFOREUR//G3/G4/HSS/PA//  
 RUFGFMC/COMMARFOREUR//G3/G4/HSS/PA//  
 RHMFIUU/CDRMTMC ALEXANDRIA VA//MTOPI//  
 RUEAMTC/CDRMTMC ALEXANDRIA VA//MTOPI//  
 RHCUAAA/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//DO/DOV/DOT/DON/PA//  
 RHMFIUU/COMSC WASHINGTON DC//  
 RULSMSC/COMSC WASHINGTON DC//  
 RHMFIUU/COMSCEUR NAPLES IT//  
 RUFNPGK/COMSCEUR NAPLES IT//  
 RUBDPLA/621AMSG RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/CV//  
 RHMFIUU/CDR598THTRANSOPTML ROTTERDAM NL//  
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 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA//  
 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA//  
 RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU//  
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS//  
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO//  
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA//  
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB//  
 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA//  
 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE//  
 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN//  
 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN//  
 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI//  
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS//  
 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE//  
 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN//  
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS//  
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST//  
 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN//  
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME//  
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE//

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 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK//  
 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA//  
 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS//  
 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG//  
 RUBDPLA/AMEMBASSY VALETTA//  
 RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU//  
 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE//  
 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO//  
 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW//

RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON//  
 RUEHEM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST//  
 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA//  
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA//  
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID//  
 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM//  
 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN//  
 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV//  
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON//  
 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//  
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

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 RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC  
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
 RHMFISS/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ1/SCJ3/SCJ4/SCSG//  
 RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL//SCJ1/SCJ3/SCJ4/SCSG//  
 RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ3/CCJ4/CCSG//  
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JSJ1/JSJ3/JSJ4/JSJ4-MRD//  
 RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC  
 RHCUAAA/USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL  
 RHMFIUU/NAVENPVNTMEDU SEVEN SIGONELLA IT  
 RUFEPF/NAVENPVNTMEDU SEVEN SIGONELLA IT  
 RHMFIUU/CDRCHPPM-EUR LANDSTUHL GE//MCHB-AE//  
 RHFQAAA/CDRCHPPM-EUR LANDSTUHL GE//MCHB-AE//  
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ4-MRD/ECJ5/ECPA//  
 RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ3/ECJ33/ECJ35/ECJ4//

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 SECTION 01 OF 02

QQQQ  
 MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCEUR//  
 SUBJ/USEUCOM POLICY ON PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF FOOT AND MOUTH  
 DISEASE//

PAGE 05 RUFGCIN1250 UNCLAS  
 REF/A/MSG/CDRUSAREUR/171823ZMAR2001/-NOTAL//  
 AMPN/IMMEDIATE POTENTIAL RESTRICTIONS TO TRAINING IN GERMANY//  
 REF/B/DOC/AFPMB/01DEC1993//  
 AMPN/ARMED FORCES PEST MANAGEMENT BOARD, TECHNICAL INFORMATION  
 MEMORANDUM NO. 31, CONTINGENCY RETROGRADE WASHDOWNS, AVAILABLE AT  
 WWW.AFPMB.ORG/PUBS/TIMS/TIM31.PDF//  
 REF/C/DOC/USEUCOM/-//  
 AMPN/USEUCOM CUSTOMS EXECUTIVE AGENCY WEBSITE,  
 WWW.HQUSAREUR.ARMY.MIL/OPM/CUSTOMS.HTM//  
 REF/D/DOC/USACHPPM/-//  
 AMPN/USACHPPM WEBSITE, CHPPM-WWW.APGEA.ARMY.MIL//  
 REF/E/DOC/USDA/-//  
 AMPN/USDA ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE WEBSITE,  
 WWW.APHIS.USDA.GOV//  
 REF/F/DOC/UK MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE/-//  
 AMPN/UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND FISHERIES  
 WEBSITE, WWW.MAFF.GOV.UK/ANIMALH/DISEASES/FMD/DEFAULT.HTM//  
 REF/G/DOC/EC/-//  
 AMPN/EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGRICULTURE WEBSITE,

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ROPA.EU.INT/COMM/AGRICULTURE//

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REF/H/DOC/DOD 4500.54-G//

AMPN/DOD FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE, AVAILABLE AT WWW.FCG.PENTAGON.MIL//  
NARR/REFERENCES B THROUGH H PROVIDE U.S. AND HOST NATION GUIDELINES  
AND REGULATIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT OUTBREAK OF FOOT AND  
MOUTH DISEASE.//

//

RMKS/1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY  
USEUCOM ELEMENTS, IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, TO HALT THE SPREAD OF THE LIVESTOCK ILLNESS  
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD).//

//

2. BACKGROUND. FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IS A HIGHLY INFECTIOUS DISEASE  
OF CLOVEN-HOOFED LIVESTOCK SUCH AS CATTLE, SHEEP, AND PIGS. THOUGH  
NOT CONTAGIOUS TO HUMANS, IT HAS SEVERE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON  
AGRICULTURE. BECAUSE THE VIRUS CAN BE EASILY TRANSMITTED ON  
EQUIPMENT, VEHICLES, CLOTHING, OR PETS, AFFECTED NATIONS TAKE EXTREME  
MEASURES TO STOP ITS SPREAD, INCLUDING CONTROLS ON MOVEMENT AND IN  
SOME INSTANCES THE SLAUGHTERING OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF  
POTENTIALLY INFECTED ANIMALS. FMD WAS ERADICATED FROM THE UNITED  
STATES IN 1929, BUT WITHIN THE LAST MONTH AN OUTBREAK ORIGINATING IN

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THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS CAUSED WIDESPREAD CONCERN IN EUROPE AND  
BEYOND, AND A NUMBER OF CONTROL MEASURES HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.//

//

IT SHALL BE USEUCOM POLICY TO COOPERATE FULLY IN CONTROL MEASURES  
IMPLEMENTED BY HOST NATION GOVERNMENTS IN THE EUCOM AREA OF  
OPERATIONS AND BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA).

COMPONENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASCERTAINING AND MEETING TRANSIT  
REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY HOST NATIONS AT POINT OF DEPARTURE, EN ROUTE,  
AND AT DESTINATION. USDA REQUIREMENTS ARE AVAILABLE AT REF E. IN  
ADDITION, USDA HAS ESTABLISHED AN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER WITH  
THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBERS: 1-800-601-9327 OR 1-301-734-9257.  
WHERE THE HOST NATION AND THE USDA REQUIREMENTS DIFFER, IT SHALL BE  
EUCOM POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE STRICTER OF THE TWO. EUCOM ECJ5 IS  
CONSOLIDATING INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS - COMPONENTS SHOULD  
CHECK THE ECJ5 WEBSITE

(WWW1.EUCOM.SMIL.MIL/ECJ5/J5\_EUROPE/HOOF&MOUTH.HTM) OR CONTACT ECJ5  
AT DSN 430-8329 FOR THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND POLICY  
GUIDANCE.//

//

4. RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTATION OF ANIMALS, FOOD OR AGRICULTURAL

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ITEMS. CURRENTLY, MANY COUNTRIES ARE PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION OF  
ANY ANIMAL OR ANIMAL PRODUCT, AS WELL AS MANY FOOD ITEMS, ORIGINATING  
IN FRANCE OR THE UNITED KINGDOM. AS THE OUTBREAK SPREADS, THE LIST  
OF RESTRICTED COUNTRIES, INCLUDING SOME NOT IN THE EUCOM AREA OF  
OPERATIONS, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE - EUCOM ELEMENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE  
FOR ASCERTAINING CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLYING WITH THEM.  
CURRENT GUIDANCE PUBLISHED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGRICULTURAL  
ORGANIZATION IS AVAILABLE AT REF G.//

DISINFECTION OF PERSONNEL. ITEMS OF PERSONAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISINFECTED AS REQUIRED BY THE HOST NATION CONCERNED. PERSONNEL EXITING VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT WILL IN MOST CASES BE REQUIRED TO STEP IN A TRAY CONTAINING BLEACH OR A DISINFECTANT TO DISINFECT SHOES. SPECIFIC DISINFECTION METHODS WILL PROBABLY VARY AMONG COUNTRIES, GENERAL GUIDANCE IS AVAILABLE AT REF E. SOILED ITEMS OF CLOTHING MUST BE LAUNDERED PRIOR TO REDEPLOYMENT. IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, UNITS WILL ISOLATE SUCH ITEMS IN PLASTIC BAGS AND LAUNDRER THEM IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN TO HOME STATION BEFORE RETURNING THEM TO THEIR OWNERS.//

//

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6. EQUIPMENT, CARGO, VEHICLE, AND WASTE DISINFECTION. US FORCES WILL FOLLOW GUIDELINES OUTLINED IN REF B TO DISINFECT VEHICLES, CARGO (INCLUDING HOUSEHOLD GOODS SHIPMENTS), AND EQUIPMENT WHETHER TRANSPORTED BY LAND, SEA, OR AIR. THIS ACTION WILL BE PERFORMED WHEN EXITING TRAINING AREAS FOR WHICH SUCH ACTION IS REQUIRED BY THE HOST NATION AS WELL AS FOR RETROGRADE OPERATIONS FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENTS AND FOR ALL SHIPMENTS OF SUCH ITEMS TO CONUS. WASTE MUST BE DESTROYED BY INCINERATION OR OTHERWISE PROPERLY DISINFECTED PRIOR TO FINAL DISPOSAL.//

//

7. DISINFECTION OF AIRCRAFT. AIRCRAFT WILL BE DISINFECTED AS REQUIRED BY THE COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION. CONSULT LATEST GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE FOR THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.//

AS THIS SITUATION IMPEDES TRAINING OVER THE COMING WEEKS, UNITS MUST BE PREPARED TO ASSESS ITS IMPACT ON READINESS. COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL CONTINUE TO TRAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE REFERENCES. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN MANY INSTANCES ALTERNATE TRAINING STRATEGIES WILL HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED TO

UNCLAS

FINAL SECTION OF 02

QQQQ

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCEUR//

SUBJ/USEUCOM POLICY ON PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF FOOT AND MOUTH

ACCOMMODATE THE CURRENT FMD RESTRICTIONS. SHOULD THE EXECUTION OF

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# Armed Forces Pest Management Board

## Technical Information Memorandum No. 31

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### CONTINGENCY RETROGRADE WASHDOWNS:

### Cleaning and Inspection Procedures

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## DISCLAIMER

Any mention of specific proprietary products regarding washing equipment or safety items does not constitute a recommendation or an endorsement of these products by the Department of Defense. Neither should the absence of an item necessarily be interpreted as DoD disapproval. Information or inquiries concerning any equipment or safety items should be sent through Command Pest Management Professionals or Applied Biologists to the Armed Forces Pest Management Board Quarantine Committee for evaluation.

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## FOREWORD

This TIM was prepared in response to inquiries regarding quarantine and customs procedures as related to the military, both with ship and aircraft movements of cargo from overseas to CONUS. This memorandum is not a regulation, but provides guidance to those individuals responsible for recommending or conducting washdowns in response to the USDA agricultural and public health inspections that are required for incoming ships, aircraft, and equipment resuming from overseas. This TIM will receive periodic review and will be updated to insure that information presented reflects current rules and regulations. Individuals using this TIM are encouraged to submit comments and suggestions for improvement. Comments should be directed to the Executive Director, Armed Forces Pest Management Board, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Forest Glen Section, Washington, DC 20307-5001; (301) 427-5191; FAX 291-5045.

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## INTRODUCTION

**Purpose:** The purpose of operational washdowns is to prevent the introduction of foreign agricultural and public health threats into the continental United States (CONUS). This technical Information Memorandum (TIM)

provides guidance on operational washdowns including standardized inspection and cleaning procedures for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

### **Background Information:**

1. Washdowns to prevent the introduction of exotic pests into the continental United States is an old concept. DoD Instruction 4500.35, which was primarily initiated to answer problems stemming from the Vietnam War, recommended establishing principal logistic processing centers within the Republic of Vietnam at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon-Newport to process all sea and air retrograde material.
2. More recently, washdowns in the aftermath of Desert Storm occurred at ports in Saudi Arabia, Israeli and Spain.
3. World-wide, through the World Health Organization, public health restrictions and prohibitions have long been established (reference 0). These regulations protect against the introduction of foreign and potentially dangerous, animals or disease organisms.

### **Current Information:**

1. U.S. military forces may be required to deploy virtually anywhere in the world. Associated with this deployment requirement is a great potential for forces to inadvertently introduce exotic plants and animal pests when they redeploy back to CONUS. Such introduced exotic pests can cause irreparable damage to public health, agriculture, or the environment.
2. Special precautions are necessary to prevent the introduction of harmful public health or agricultural agents from entering the United States on military equipment. The combined service instruction (SECNAVINST 6250.21 AR 40-12/ AFR 161-4) describes Department of Defense (DoD) support for the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) and the USDA to prevent such introductions. These references prohibit backloading of vehicles and cargo in a foreign country unless free of animal, pest, and soil contamination. DoD 5030.49-R gives customs inspection guidelines for DoD. Its last publication was May, 1977, but a draft was nearing approval at the time of this TIM 3 1 printing. AFR 75- 12 provides additional Air Force guidelines for air transportable retrograde cargo.
3. Specifically for the United States, the Plant Pest Act prohibits the introduction of any animal, plant or material that is considered harmful to this country's agriculture. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Plant Protection and Quarantine Division, is the enforcement authority for this Act.

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## **PEST DESCRIPTIONS**

**Exotic Pest Introduction:** Plant debris, garbage, food, soil, and even fresh water from foreign countries can harbor a multitude of organisms that are of quarantine importance. Insects, insect eggs, nematodes, and animal pathogens as well as many fungal, viral, and bacterial pathogens can be carried in such media. These organisms, if allowed to enter CONUS, could proliferate to catastrophic proportions unhindered by natural enemies. Accordingly, the concern by USDA inspectors about small quantities of any type material from a foreign country is understandable. Therefore, removal of all soil and other debris from vehicles is essential. All soil from outside CONUS is prohibited, including soil from U.S. territories. Current USDA inspection standards tolerate: only a thin film of road dust on vehicles and equipment at the port of entry in CONUS.

**Military Importance:** The possible military importation of unwanted animals, such as snakes, insects, snails, and various crustaceans that are present in most of the world-wide areas frequented by the DoD is a primary

concern of the USDA.

1. In Eurasia, specifically the Mediterranean area, several species of land snails, which vary in size from microscopic to an inch or more in width, are important agriculturally. The snails normally live on the ground and feed on vegetation. During periods of high temperature, and/or low relative humidity, the snails **move** away from the ground, attaching and sealing themselves to objects, including military equipment. This phenomenon, called estivation, may occur year round. Vehicles and equipment found infested with snails at the **final** port of entry inspection may have to undergo time consuming and costly fumigation if snails are found.
2. Snakes in the Asian area, including several species of cobra and the brown tree snake, commonly **seek** shelter and food around CONEX boxes, shipping crates and pallets. Once aboard naval vessels or aircraft, their ability to go without food and to hibernate in cool places may allow them to survive a voyage or flight to **CONUS** undetected.
3. There is potential to introduce the vectors of human and or animal disease. For example, mosquito-egg-laden commercial tires were responsible for the introduction of *Aedes albopictus*, a potential Dengue fever vector, into **CONUS**. Commercial tire importers left tires outside prior to transport and where they collected rain water, becoming ideal sites for mosquito breeding. The eggs, capable of withstanding droughts, were transported to **CONUS** in the holds of a ship, and were later exposed to more rain, causing the eggs to hatch and develop.
4. Due to potential infestations both within **CONUS** and overseas, thorough operational washdowns of DoD resources are necessary not only prior to departing from or returning to **CONUS**, but also between overseas locations (i.e., between South Korea and Okinawa during "Team Spirit" exercises).

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## WASHDOWN LOCATION

A. A **washdown** location requires specific physical facilities for effective cleaning and inspection. Appendix A outlines the criteria for selecting and equipping a **washdown** location. In addition, an experienced military inspector familiar with USDA requirements and previous operational washdowns should be consulted and included on the early reconnaissance trips to **washdown** locations. Care should be taken to consider **the potential** adverse impact of the wash operation and to minimize effects of used water and contaminants on the local environment. See DoD Directive 6050.16 and its the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document for **further** details.

B. **Host Nation Requirements.** Every effort should be made to comply with host nation laws and regulations related to **washdown** operations. Coordination with local quarantine and health officials is important to maintaining a good relationship with the host nation.

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## OPERATIONAL WASHDOWN EQUIPMENT

Appendix B lists the major items recommended for a successful washdown. This list would need modification based on the size and location of the washdown, and available foreign national assistance. Reforger Redeployment Assembly Area has in-depth information on the best type of washracks and "bird baths" for use on wheeled and tracked-vehicles; time schedules for pre-inspecting, cleaning, and processing various types of equipment; and a staging area checklist.

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## INSPECTION AND CLEANING PROCEDURES

The inspectors must maintain strict and non-compromising decisions. Personnel involved in an operational washdown must follow Appendix C guidelines in order to expedite reentry approval into CONUS by USDA and USPHS officials.

**A. Inspectors:** The military inspectors (cooperators) will vary depending on the branch of service.

1. All military inspectors, also called USDA Military Cooperators, serve at the discretion of the USDA.
2. Preventive Medicine Technicians from the Navy Medical Department are currently certified through the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Instruction (BUMEDINST) 6250.12 aeries, have served as inspectors with appropriate on-the-job training in an actual operational washdown inspection, normally in cooperation with a Navy entomologist.
3. The Air Force Chief of Transportation at the respective overseas base is responsible for overall inspection criteria and approval per AFR 75- 12, involving Air Force equipment and cargo coming into CONUS. A combined instruction, OPNAVINST 3710.2E / AFR 8-5, was developed by the Air Force and adopted by the Navy as a guide in clearing equipment from a foreign port destined for CONUS.
4. Military customs inspectors with the Army have jurisdiction over all customs and operational washdown inspections in their area of responsibility. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Directive 30-3 is used in the European theater as the standard inspection guideline. Appendix D shows a typical staging and processing flow chart for an operational washdown.
5. Army Fifth Preventive Medicine Detachment provides inspection support for deployments (i.e. Reforger, Team Spirit) involving Korea. Some 8 or 10 inspection sites are served.

**B. Administrative requirements:** Necessary administrative requirements will be established by the military inspectors for the USDA's review and final inspection at the point of entry.

1. Tags attached to each vehicle after cleaning are appropriate for marking vehicles. Cleaning needs to be done on personal gear and removable items as noted in Appendix C. A sample of a vehicle tag is shown in Appendix E.
2. An Inspection log should also be kept to track the number of vehicles and to insure a double check for the tagged vehicles. A sample format for the log is shown in Appendix F. :

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## RESPONSIBILITIES

In any operational washdown, certain agencies or individuals must assume the many responsibilities that will occur. The following categorized responsibilities provide a structured inundation for comparison within each specific service.

**A. DoD:** Headquarters, Department of Army (DALO-TSP) is the DoD Executive Agent for the Military Customs Inspection Program (MCIP) . Under the supervisor of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) and the USDA the MCIP conducts preclearance inspections for customs hr personnel and materiel leaving the overseas theater. Overseas Unified Commanders are responsible for compliance with DoD Directive 4500.9 (establishes,

guidelines for processing and shipping DoD sponsored retrograde materiel), and DoD 5030.49-R (establishes policies and procedures under which USCS and USDA authorize military custom inspectors to inspect materiel and personnel resuming to U.S. customs territory).

**B. Headquarters, or Highest Operational Command:** Requests to this command should be made when lower echelon commands need upgraded manpower requirements for inspection teams, because teams cannot be acquired through internal resources.

**C. Major Echelon Involved:**

1. The major echelon will probably be stationary within CONUS or its main base. However, coordination on operational washdowns will generally occur at this level, including needed technical advice on all matters pertaining to the operational washdowns.

2. Deploying units could request a detailed brief on how to conduct the operational washdown from this organizational level. Sufficient resources at this level would include applicable references and the senior inspector's support requirements (equipment, personnel augmentation, subject expert support).

3. Requests to the senior inspector for other inspection team members can be made regarding appropriate USDA quarantine compliance requirements for clearing retrograde cargo.

4. This level of command will probably be budgeting for, and providing funds for the TDY/TAD of inspection teams to operational washdowns for contingency and training exercises.

5. The senior inspector of this command level usually has the final authority in the operational washdown for certifying pest-free vehicles, equipment, and supplies during operational washdowns. Some exceptions do exist as follows:

- a. Ship or aircraft commanders in the case of mission requirements and operational necessity may be forced to proceed to CONUS with a partial certification.
- b. If only a partial certification is provided, the senior inspector will notify the appropriate USDA-APHIS Officer in Charge, with copies to interacting commands as deemed necessary. The notification generally details the extent of the certified material and specifies whether or not it is segregated from uncertified equipment and supplies.
- c. In the case of notification on a partial certification, appropriate commands should assist the incoming activity to prepare for the reception of embarked equipment by the USDA upon its arrival in CONUS.

**D. Commander or On-Site Deployed Command with Overall Authority:**

1. The on-site deployed command should have an interest in scheduling USDA official coordination and briefing of members actually involved in the deployment and consequent washdown.

2. Where washdown facilities are not fully adequate at the proposed, final overseas backloading port, base, or airport, the deployed command will need to coordinate with in-country contacts or liaison agencies to delineate shortfalls and determine suitable solutions. Additional coordination may be required to negotiate through host nation support agreements as in the case of needing adequate fresh water washdown facilities at a final overseas backloading port or site.

**E. Commander, Specific Deployed Units On-Site:**

1. This on-site unit will be able to determine the scope and extent of operational washdowns needed, based on the amount of equipment and supplies that need washing and inspecting. Since this unit will be doing the

operational washdown, then additional briefings with the senior inspector, USDA officials, and the appropriate staff members should be followed up, particularly if previous briefings have not been accomplished by the higher echelon command.

2. By utilizing pertinent guidance given in Appendix A, and working with staff personnel, this unit could formulate a comprehensive plan for the operational washdown.
3. Washdown equipment in Appendix B will be used by unit personnel. The unit should make sure the equipment is available for use.
4. The inspection and cleaning procedures outlined in Appendix C will be utilized by personnel from this unit level; and therefore, becomes an important consideration for review prior to the washdown period.
5. By working with the respective departments, appropriate personnel at this level can determine the equipment and supplies, by location, that were not exposed to foreign soil contamination and which will not be off-loaded for the operational washdown. These items should be listed and certified free of contamination in writing to the senior inspector.
6. Potential contamination problems when backloading equipment, supplies, and vehicles from previous operations ashore are best considered at this level of command.
7. The senior inspector will need personnel and equipment requirements to include additional inspectors, required vehicles, radio operators, and radios for the operational washdown. The deployed unit on-site will be expected to assist the senior inspector in these needs.

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## SUMMARY

Information in this TIM is intended to serve as minimum guidance for conducting operational washes for regulatory control of pests. Consult with USDA quarantine officials and the Armed Forces Pest Management Board to identify recent changes in Quarantine Requirements and new developments regarding techniques before proceeding with predeployment briefings.

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## REFERENCES

- AFR 7X-12, Border Clearance, Customs Program, and Other United States Entry Requirements and Related Areas, Aug 78.
- AFR 400-21, Retrograde Materiel Preclearance Program, 15 Jun 72.
- UMEDINST 6250.12A, Vector Control Certification for Medical Department Personnel, 9 Nov 1978.
- DoD Instruction 4500.54 G, DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Jun 92.
- DoD Directive 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management, 26 Jan 89.
- DoD 5030.49-R, Customs Inspection, (in revision).

DoD Directive 6050.16, DoD Policy for Establishing and Implementing Environmental Standards at Overseas Locations, 20 Sep 91.

Marine Forces Atlantic Order 6210.1B/COMNAVSURFLANTINST 6250.2B/LANTDIVINST 6260.7B, Agricultural Washdown Operations, 17 Aug 81.

NAVMED P-5010-8, Navy Preventive Medicine, Chapter 8, Insect and Rodent Control, Sep 87.

OPNAVINST 37102E/AFR 8-5, Foreign Clearance Procedures for U.S. Aircraft, 6 Apr 84.

Public Law 85-36, Plant Pest Act, 23 May 57.

Reforger '91 Redeployment Assembly Area Handbook, 213 Area Support Group, Sep/Oct.

SECNAVINST 6210~2A/AR 40-12/AFR 1614, Medical Service Quarantine Regulations of the Armed Forces, 24 Jan 92.

USEUCOM Directive 30-3, Military Customs Inspection Program, 12 Aug 87, with Change No. 1 of 2, Sep 89.

World Health Organization, Geneva, International Medical Guide for Ships, 1967.

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## APPENDIX A. CRITERIA FOR SELECTING AND EQUIPPING A WASHDOWN LOCATION

### I. Location Criteria

#### A. Hardstand:

1. The availability of hardstand is one of the major limiting factors in how long an operational washdown takes. **Hardstand** is defined as a hard surface that, even when wet, will not allow any soil to transfer to the tires of clean vehicles. Areas where hardstand is absolutely essential are:

areas associated with the actual washing of vehicles,

areas used for off-loading and cleaning the vehicle accessory items,

staging areas for clean vehicles awaiting backload, and

all roads in between the above areas.

a. In reviewing the hardstand area, consider the run-off of wash water into marine environments. Also, any fuel or other contaminants from the vehicles being washed may go directly into such an environment, causing harm to shellfish or other marine life.

b. Evaluate the need for berms or other containment strategies, and the possibility of re-utilizing the water.

2. The amount of hardstand required will vary with the number of vehicles and the amount of time available. However, the following minimum criteria is required so as not to impede traffic flow during an operational washdown using a six vehicle capacity washrack:

- a. Have a **washdown** area of at least 40 meters on either end of the **washrack** assembly and 15 meters on either side.
- b. Have the charting and staging area for accessory vehicle items and palletized supplies at least 25 meters wide and 100 meters long.
- c. The size required for the clean vehicle staging will vary with how soon the **backload** can begin. If the vehicle/cargo decks on board the ships or aircraft must be cleaned before **backload** can proceed, then **establish** a staging area capable of holding a larger number of vehicles. Ensure that the vehicles do not become re-contaminated during the backload.

## **B. Fresh Water Availability:**

1. Large quantities of fresh water (SALT WATER WILL CORRODE VEHICLES) are consumed in a relatively short period of time during **washdown** operations. Approximately 250,000 gallons are required for an average Army battalion or Marine Expeditionary Unit size force with 300 wheeled vehicles using 2 1/2 inch fire hoses operating at the minimum recommended pressure of 90 psi.
2. In many areas only gray water is available. Gray water is defined as non-saline, but with a number of contaminants from prior use. Though not used for sewage purposes, the **storage** of this water and the absence of chlorine makes it a potential disease carrier for those in close contact with it during the washing operations. Basic immunizations are needed.
3. In addition to the amount of water available, investigate the adequacy of the water pressure.

**C. Weather Conditions:** Adverse weather conditions may delay or interrupt an operational washdown. Health and safety of the work crews during operational washdowns scheduled in areas where cold or even cool weather might be encountered is a significant concern. Consult a physician familiar with cold weather **medicine** before a **washdown** is scheduled in areas where the effective temperature (including wind chill factors) might be below 45 F. The length of time these work crews are exposed to cold and freezing water is an additional factor that must be considered.

## **II. Heavy Equipment Selection**

A. The following equipment is considered essential to the success of an operational washdown.

1. **Washracks:** The design and number of washracks will largely determine the speed at which the operational washdown can be conducted.

- a. Design the washracks for safety, placing vehicles on and off the rack, and ease of work for the **cleaning** personnel. Adequate working clearance between the bottom of the vehicle and the ground is essential **because** the undercarriage of each vehicle is washed, inspected, and if necessary, rewashed and reinspected before being allowed off the washrack. If the vehicle is too close to the ground, the efficiency of the work crews **and** the inspection/rewash process would be greatly hampered, considerably extending the time required for the washdown.
- b. The number of washracks required will vary with the amount of time available. Historically, the operational washdown proceeds at an average rate of one vehicle per individual washrack per half hour of daylight;
- c. A person should be designated to guide the vehicles up and down the washracks to maintain a high safety margin.

2. Water Pumps: The design, output and reliability of the pumps can effect the speed of a washdown operation.

a. Provide a minimum of two hose lines for each individual washrack. The pumps should be capable of sustaining a minimum output pressure of 90 psi for many hours of continuous use.

b. Fire Department pumper trucks will work well and are usually available at any seaport, airport, or military base. Several hose lines with 90 psi outputs can be routinely operated off a single truck.

c. A supply of new hoses should be kept in reserve for use during the washdown in the event of ruptures.

## APPENDIX B. OPERATIONAL WASHDOWN EQUIPMENT

1. Prior planning is necessary to determine requirements. Appropriate support will need to be requested well in advance when working overseas. Coordination and assistance will be required from the host facility/nation. The following guidelines can be used for operational washdowns with an average Marine Expeditionary Unit, Army Regiment, or Air Force Squadron as follows:

Floodlight set	6
Cranes	as required
"Y" gates	3
Fire hose (1 ")	600 feet (2 per wash rack)
Fire hose (2 ")	200 feet (2 per wash rack)
Fire nozzles (2 per wash rack)	8
Pump (55 GPM or greater)	2
Water truck (5000 gal)	1
Steamhose (" I/d, 12 foot lengths)	6
Steam hose (1 " )	300 feet
Air compressor	2
Steam manifold (6 stations)	1
Flatbed trucks for movement of supplies	as required
Portable head	2
Vehicle washracks	4

2. Personal charting gear is as follows:

Cold/Wet weather clothing	40 sets (assorted sites)
Hard hats	40
Straw brooms	40
Putty knives	200
Steel rod (5 feet)	12
Safety goggles	40
Rubber gloves	20 pair (assorted sizes)
Flashlights (and batteries)	24
Rubber boots	15 pair (assorted sees)
Water tank (3000 gal)	2
Wire brushes	100
Rags	as required
Ear plugs	25
Garden hose/nozzles	75 feet
Scrub brushes	100
Vacuum cleaner (wet/dry)	min. 6 as required for aircraft and HUMVEES
RT forklift	4
Steam Jenny	min. 2 as required for aircraft
Small flat bladed screwdrivers	min. 12 for cleaning tracks
Waterless hand cleaner	equivalent of 1 gallon

- a. All locks on **compartments**, boxes, tool chests, and other locked items will need to be removed **prior** to inspection. If keys cannot be found, provisions should be made to cut the locks.
- b. Regarding proper tools, any jacks, tire irons, wrenches, special screwdrivers, or other required tools **need** to be available for the removal of dual tires, gun mounts, plates, and floor mat bolts on the different vehicles.

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## **APPENDIX C. GUIDE FOR UNITS CONDUCTING OPERATIONAL WASHDOWNS**

**I. USDA Inspections:** The cleaning and inspection of retrograde equipment does not preclude a USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine Program Inspection upon return to CONUS. However, close coordination with the USDA usually results in a speedy transition at the CONUS port of entry.

**II. Inspection Standards:** Rigid USDA inspection standards allow only a thin film of road dust on vehicles and equipment at the CONUS final port of entry. **Because of these stringent standards, inspections of vehicles and equipment will be conducted only during daylight hours. Washing and cleaning at night saves very little time since most of those vehicles must be rewashed and reinspected.**

### **III. Guidelines prior to Operational Washdown:**

**A. Conference:** Conduct a **backload/washdown** conference to include **attendance** by all participating commands and agricultural inspectors.

**B. Training:** Place emphasis on organization and training of **washdown** crews. Establish a suitable washdown crew schedule with adequate NCO supervision at each **washdown** point.

**C. Vehicle Drivers/Assistant Drivers:** Drivers and Assistant drivers must remain with assigned vehicles and accessory vehicle items throughout the **washdown** cycle. This will ensure timely movement of vehicles and security of accessory vehicle items and cargo.

**D. Washdown-essential Equipment:** Identify those items of equipment required to support operational washdowns early-on and schedule this equipment to be backloaded last.

### **E. Equipment/supplies certified as not exposed to contamination:**

1. Isolate certified material in holds or specific cargo areas using some form of segregation such as **wire** screening or ropes to minimize the possibility of contact with materials that have gone ashore. Maintain strict control over these areas

2. Inspectors may check these areas during early stages of operational **washdowns** to ensure they are **free** of all dirt, debris, food, beverage cans, etc.

**F. Environmental Considerations:** Assess the potential adverse impact of the wash operation and **take** all reasonable actions to minimize effects of used water and contaminants on the local environment. Fuel, oil, or soap residue in the wash water can result in visible contamination **and/or** significant fish and other **marine** organism kills that may invite serious political and financial repercussions from the host nation. **Contaminants** must be captured or removed to avoid contamination of runoff areas. The large amount of fresh water from wash operations, if allowed to run off into native bodies of salt or brackish water, can seriously alter dissolved oxygen and saline balance. If you have any doubts, consult with your legal staff and DoD Directive 6050.16 (DoD

Policy for Establishing and Implementing Environmental Standards Overseas Installations, September 20, 199 1) and Its Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document.

#### **IV. Washing Standards:**

##### **A. Vehicles and equipment exposed to contamination and requiring less than a complete, detailed cleaning:** This includes any vehicle or equipment that:

- will be exposed to a deleterious environment during its operation, subjecting any soil and other debris to a sterilizing or neutralization process. Such exposure would make it harmless from the standpoint of agricultural or public health concerns.

- is only minimally exposed to the natural environment because of its operational requirements. Examples would be as follows:

1. **SHIPS:** Thorough cleaning of all decks holding vehicles or equipment that were contaminated. This includes cleaning soil from recessed areas of the decks, i.e. clover leaves, pad eyes, and tie-down channels, as well as under shelving, from corners and other hard-to-reach areas. Some lower decks can be submerged with salt water to satisfactorily eliminate contamination problems, such as some Navy amphibious ships (LHAs, LKAs, and LHDs).

2. **LARGE AIRCRAFT REMAINING ON FLIGHTLINE:** Clean protected areas like wheel wells and around cargo or passenger doors. Visually inspect and assess need to clean cargo and flight deck.

3. **AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES:** This includes Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCACs), Light Vehicle-tracks (LVTs), and similar vehicles. Clean troop compartment, crew area, and the crew's personal equipment. Ensure other areas are exposed to salt water during operation. If vehicles washed with salt water are to be transported on aircraft, all salt water must be removed or contained in such a way as to prevent contamination of aircraft with corrosive salt solutions which can seriously damage airframes.

4. **NAVAL VESSEL CAUSEWAYS:** Washdown with fresh or salt water during backloading.

5. **NAVAL SHIP LAUNCHES:** No cleaning is required of the Captain's launch, liberty launch, or other vessels unless they are contaminated (backloaded dirty). A thorough inspection by operator personnel is recommended.

##### **B. Vehicles, equipment, and supplies exposed to contamination during operational exercises:**

1. **ORGANIZATION FOR CLEANING:** Contaminated vehicles, equipment, and supplies are off-loaded. Accessory items and palletized supplies are staged in a pest free area for cleaning. Vehicles proceed to a steam or washing station as determined by inspectors. Upon final inspection, material from mobile loads is reloaded aboard vehicles and the clean vehicles and supplies are reembarked.

2. **FIXED AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT:** Clean cabin area, cockpit, wheels, wheel wells, skid/runner bars, under deck plates, panels, in flap wells and all other areas where foreign soil may have lodged. Clean crew and pilot personal equipment.

3. **LAND VEHICLES:** The cleaning of motor vehicles usually consumes the greatest amount of time and causes the most delays. The following cleaning procedures are recommended:

a. Complete the following actions before the vehicle arrives at the washrack -

(1) Sweep and/or vacuum the vehicle cab and all storage and tool compartments.

(2) Remove the battery, clean the battery and battery box. Reinstall the battery.

(3) Remove the outside dual-wheels and spare tires and place them in the back for later cleaning at the wash rack.

(4) Remove all payloads, seat cushions, detachable sideboards, canvas sides/tops and any personal gear: brought ashore, and leave at the mobile bad staging area.

(5) **Handpick** or sweep any grass or vegetation from the radiator.

(6) Let down the sides of all trucks that are equipped with collapsible sides.

b. At the washracks, vehicles will be hosed down with high pressure (recommend minimum 90 psi) fresh water or steam (steam may remove valuable protective coatings) paying particular attention to undercarriages{ fender wells, axles, springs, bumpers, wheels and recessed areas. **As a corrosion prevention measure, never use salt water for cleaning vehicles.**

c. Inspect each vehicle thoroughly to ensure that all soil is removed. Use a flashlight, screwdriver, or putty knife where necessary. The following are common inspection checkpoints:

(1) TOD access

a Floor boards

b Battery box

c All storage/tool compartments

d Motor compartments

e Wheels and tires

f Windshield base (Jeep M- 15 1)

g Front and rear bumper hollows and braces

h Radiator front

i Truck beds

j All other spaces where soil might be found

(2) Bottom access

a. Fender wells, front and rear including access openings for tail light wiring

b. Rocker panels

c. Frame, fore and aft

d. Coil spring wells, front and rear

e. Transmission support beam

- f. Rear suspension A-frame, pivot points and drain holes
- g. Trailer hitch bolt recess
- h. Front, side, and rear body lips
- i. Drive shaft tunnel
- j. Power take-offs
- k. Axle brackets
- l. Fuel tanks, between body and tank
- m. Transaxle brackets
- n. Leaf springs
- o. Air tank braces
- p. Drain and access holes (Gamma Goat M-561)
- q. Universal pint between body parts (Gamma Goat M-561)
- r. All other spaces where soil might be found

**4. Tracked Vehicles:** The cleaning of tracked vehicles is by far the most difficult and time consuming individual job of the entire operational washdown. It is strongly recommended that cleaning begin on board ship as soon as possible after the final contingency or exercise because of the excessive amount of time required to properly clean tracked vehicles. All soil impacted in the treads, around the rubber cleats, in the tread connectors, between and behind tread guides and roller supports, and all other spaces must be removed. The interiors must be soil free, including the battery box. The bilges may contain some sand, but only if it is mixed with salt water. If tracked vehicles are to be transported on aircraft, all salt water must be removed or contained in such a way as to prevent contamination of aircraft with corrosive salt solution. Tracked vehicles may be cleaned in the ship's well deck, with enough space for one complete revolution of tread. Tracked vehicles may be cleaned on shore only if they can be backloaded without re-contaminating the treads.

#### **5. Supplies and Equipment:**

a. Thoroughly clean mount-out boxes, field desks, communications equipment, and similar items with hand brooms, rags, and other non-water methods. Give specific attention to cracks, crevices, and recesses. Personnel must clean pallets, including the supplies and equipment, of compacted soil and vegetation. If necessary, crews may have to break down pallet loads to accomplish the appropriate level of cleaning. Whereas padlocked boxes must also be inspected,

responsible personnel with keys must be standing by, otherwise locks will be forced open.

b. Camouflage nets, tentage, and canvas are difficult to properly clean. Hand cleaning, although time consuming, is the most effective method.

c. Spread out tents and canvas on a pest free surface and swept down (no water) on both sides, paying attention to seam and flaps.

d. Take ashore only essential personal gear during the washdown. Personal gear will not be inspected at the washdown site. However, all personal gear taken ashore is considered contaminated and will be cleaned and subject to an inspection.

e. Individual weapons will be inspected by unit commanders or their designated representatives.:

6. Illustrations of Specific Problem Areas By Vehicle Type (pages C-7 through C-1 8).



Problem Areas - Figure C-7



Problem Areas - Figure C-8



Problem Areas - Figure C-9



Problem Areas - Figure C-10



Problem Areas - Figure C-1 1



Problem Areas - Figure C-12



Problem Areas - Figure C- 13



Problem Areas - Figure C-14



Problem Areas - Figure C- 16




Problem Areas - Figure C- 17



Problem Areas - Figure C- 18

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## APPENDIX D. FLOW CHART OF TYPICAL OPERATIONAL WASHDOWN



D-2: PROSPECTIVE WASHDOWN FLOW CHART-HAIFA, ISRAEL



D-3: WASHDOWN SITE ROOSEVELT ROADS, PUERTO RICO



D-4: WASHDOWN SITE - ROTA SPAIN

### APPENDIX E. SAMPLE VEHICLE TAG (WHITE OR MANILA)

**WASHDOWN CLEARANCE**

VEHICLE #: X215792 TYPE: M998

DATE: 8 DEC 93 INITIALS: SG

Computer generated labels can be used if

technology is available.

Tie these tags where they will be readily seen. A rearview mirror is a standard.

**WASHDOWN CLEARANCE**

VEHICLE #: X215792 TYPE: M998

DATE: 8 DEC 93 INITIALS: SG  
DIRT IN WHEEL WELLS

VEHICLE TAG FOR FAILED INSPECTION

(RED TAG)

Computer generated labels can be used if technology is available.

### APPENDIX F. SAMPLE INSPECTION LOG BOOK ENTRY

#	Vehicle Type	Serial #	Date Inspected	Initials
105	HUMMER	550370	20 Oct	SG
106	S-Ton	571269	20 Oct	SG
107	Jeep	632848	20 Oct	SG
108	Jeep	620868	20 Oct	SG
109	Jeep	604321	21 Oct	SG
110	P/K Truck	591881	21 Oct	SG
111	S-Ton	563002	21 Oct	SG
112	Jeep - NOT PASSED	551350	Retained on Trip	SG
113	LAST ENTRY			
114				
115				

Sample Entry

## **APPENDIX G. SAMPLE LETTER FORMAT TO USDA OFFICIALS**

DISEASE VECTOR ECOLOGY AND CONTROL CENTER  
NAVAL AIR STATION, BOX 43  
JACKSONVILLE, FL 322 12

4 December 92

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
NC Maritime Bldg., Room 2 16  
113 Arendell Street, P.O. Box 53  
Morehead City, NC 28557

Dear Sir:

The following ships were inspected along with their amphibious craft, vehicles, tanks, and equipment:

USS WASP

USS

USS

All ships and their cargo are ready for CONUS arrival. The inspection was satisfactorily completed and we recommend approval for acceptance. I can be contacted at (904) 772-2424 should you desire any additional information.

R. J. Officer  
CDR MSC USN  
USDA ID NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

---

## **APPENDIX H. ADDRESSES OF USDA AND DOD OFFICES RESPONSIBLE FOR CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION OR OTHER ASSISTANCE**

### **WEST COAST ADDRESSES**

#### **USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, San Diego**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
P.O. BOX 434419  
San Diego, CA 92143-4419  
PH: (619) 428-7333  
FAX: (6 19) 428-7335

#### **USDA/Navy Liaison Coordinator, Camp Pendleton, CA**

DSN: 526-3135 Comm:(619) 556-3135

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Long Beach, CA**

USDA APHIS/PPQ

300 South Ferry Street (Terminal Is.)

San Pedro, CA 9073 1

PH: (310) 514-6174

24 HRS ANSWERING MACHINE: (3 10) 5 14-6766

FAX: (3 10) 514-6398

**USDA Plant and Quarantine, Portland, OR**

USDA APHIS/PPQ

520 3rd Street, Room 106

Oakland, CA 94607

PH: (510) 273-6276

FAX: (5 10) 273-2969

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Seattle Area, WA**

USDA APHIS/PPQ (Maritime)

Jackson Federal Bldg.

9 15 2nd Ave., Room 3 164

Seattle, WA 98 17

PH: (206) 553-4510

FAX: (206) 553-2518

USDA APHIS/PPQ (Aircraft)

Fife Buisness Park

5009 Pacific Hwy East, Suite 20

Tacoma, WA 98424

PH: (206) 593-6364

FAX: (206) 593-6325

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Pearl Harhor, HI**

USDA APHIS/PPW

Honolulu International Airport

P.O. Box 57

Honolulu, HI 968 19

PH: (808) 541-2952 - 24 HRS AVAILABILITY

FAX: (808) 541-6325

**EAST COAST CONTACTS**

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Jacksonville, FL**

USDA APHIS/PPQ

West Bay Street, Room 521

P.O. Box 35003

Jacksonville, FL 32202

PH: (904) 232-2687

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Goldsboro, NC**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
P.O. Box 83  
Goldsboro, NC 27533  
PH: (919) 735-1941

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Morehead City, NC**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
NC Maritime Bldg., Room 2 16  
113 Arendell Street, P.O. Box 53  
Morehead City, NC 28557  
PH: (919) 726-4358

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Wilmington, NC**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
Rural Route 6, Box 53  
Wilmington, NC 28405  
PH: (919) 343-4667

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Norfolk, VA**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
Room 33 I, Federal Bldg.  
200 Granby Street  
Norfolk, VA 23510  
PH: (804) 441-321 1/2/5  
FAX: (804) 441-6267

**USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine, Ceiba, Puerto Rico**

USDA APHIS/PPQ  
US NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads  
Air Operations Bldg.  
Ceiba, PR 00636  
PH: (809) 885-3320 SAME NUMBER CAN BE USED AS FAX (CALL FIRST)

**DoD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTION PROGRAM**

Department of the Army  
ATTN: DALO-TSO-C  
Washington, DC 203 10  
PH: (703) 614-4081/82  
DSN: 224-408 1  
FAX: xxx-7 124  
MSG ADDRESS: HQDA WASHDC//DALO-TSP-C//

**EUCOM EXECUTIVE AGENT**

Office of the Provost Marshal


HQ, USAREUR and Seventh Army  
ATTN:AEAPM-PO-EA  
FPO AE 09086-0107  
PH: (0621) 730-8381  
FAX: (0621) 730-6006 or 7324  
MSG ADDRESS: CINCUSAREUR MANNHEIMGE//AEAPM-PO-EA//

**U.S. NAVY FLEET CUSTOMS INFORMATION**

Navy Environmental Health center, ATTN: 02E or 037  
2610 Walmer Avenue, Suite A  
Norfolk, VA  
PH: (804) 444-7575, ext 261  
FAX: (804) 444-3672  
MSG ADDRESS: NAVENVIRHLTHCEN NORFOLK VA//02E//or//037//


**USDA APHIS GENERAL INFORMATION**

USDA APHIS  
6505 Bellcrest Road, Room 639  
Hyattsville, MD 20782  
PH: (301) 436-8295




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. In the rear wheel wells, through the holes in the bracket, and at the bottom.
2. On top of the plate that is underneath the transmission.
3. Inside the OVM and battery boxes, underneath the seats.
4. Under the front fender, in the V-shaped bracket that protects the wiring for the lights: both front fenders.
5. Underneath, on top and in the holes of the suspension for the front wheels.
6. In front of the grill.




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. In the battery box.
2. Underneath the floor mats, both sides.
3. Under and behind the seats, both sides.
4. In the holes of the front, and rear, A-frames.
5. In the light protecting, U-shaped brackets of the rear bumper; both sides.



### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Fuel tank filler tube where it enters vehicle body.
2. On top of fuel tank protector,
3. Shackles on stabilizer bar.
4. Top of front brake calipers.
5. Inside cab underneath edge of floor mats, weapon rack area and spare tire area.
6. On top of transmission.
7. Bottom of shocks where they join the axles.
8. Above plastic protective plate behind vehicle's front tires.
9. Rear bumper area (especially where plate covers wiring that leads to blackout lights).
10. Hood vents.




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Inside the cab, underneath the vehicle floor mat edge.
2. Underneath the seat.
3. On top of the rim of the spare tire.
4. The rear bed.
5. Ledges underneath bumpers, front and rear quarter panels.
6. Front of grill and tray under radiator.

AFPMB


c - 10

TIM 31




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Twigs and/or debris in vent openings.
2. Between the rear wheel brake drums and the steel rim of the wheel.
3. On top of front suspension components.
4. On top of transmission.
5. On the fuel inlet tube, where it bends, just before it comes in contact with the body of the vehicle; view it from underneath.
6. Rear bumper area, especially behind the U-shaped protective plate that protects the wiring for the blackout lights.
7. Twigs and/or debris in bed of vehicle.
8. On top of the rim, of the spare tire.
9. Front area of grill.




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Inside cab underneath edge of floor mats.
2. Underneath seat.
3. Spare tire mounting.
4. Underneath van and along the sides of the bed.
5. Ledges of the rear quarter panels, bumpers (front and rear).
6. Front Grill area and bottom of radiator.




### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Inside the cab, underneath vehicle floor mat edge.
2. Underneath the seat.
3. On top of the rim of the spare tire.
4. Ledges underneath bumpers, front and rear quarter panels.
5. Front grill and tray under radiator.
6. Leaves and twigs in the vent openings.



### PROBLEM AREAS


1. Under and behind both seats of cab.
2. Clean **the** floor of truck bed.
3. Between the brake drum and steel rim of wheel, of all rear wheels.
4. Underneath the **platform** for the OVM box and battery box.
5. Between the dual wheels, on the outer edge of the steel rim of each wheel,
6. On the ledges of the frame cross members.
7. On the ledges of the large channels which compose the main frame.
8. Drain plug of rear differential.
9. On top of leaf spring shackles
10. in the bracket between the rear wheels, from the outside.
11. In the bracket between the rear wheels, from the inside.
12. On the bottom ledge of the very rear cross member, and in the corners.



### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Inside the front and rear fenders, remove fenders for inspection.
2. On top of the track tensioners.
3. Remove twigs and debris from grills and surrounding areas.
4. Underneath all floor plates inside; remove and leave loose for inspection.
5. The inside edges of all road wheels: from underneath and from the outside also.
6. On top of all axles for the road wheels **and** end wheels.


NOTE: Tracks are a MAJOR PROBLEM, clean thoroughly.



### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Twigs and debris in the cracks and crevices of the top surfaces of the -tank.
2. On top of the axles for both front and rear wheels.
3. On the inside of all road wheels and end wheels; from underneath and from the outside also.
4. On top of the axles for all road wheels, and on top of all tensioners.
5. On the support rollers, in the ledges, between the rubber surfaces.
6. On the support rollers, the inside surfaces; from the inside and outside.
7. Inside the tank, clean the floor, around the driver's footpedals.


NOTE: Tracks are a MAJOR PROBLEM, clean thoroughly.



#### PROBLEM AREAS

1. Twigs and debris in the cracks and crevices of the top surfaces of the tank.
2. On top of the axles for both front and rear wheels.
3. On the inside of all road wheels and end wheels; from underneath and from the outside also.
4. On top of the axles for all road wheels, and on top of all tensioners.
5. On the support rollers, in the ledges, between the rubber surfaces.
6. On the support *rollers*, the inside surfaces; from the inside and outside.
7. Inside the tank, clean the floor, around the **driver's** footpedals.

NOTE: Tracks are a MAJOR PROBLEM, clean thoroughly.




### PROBLEM AREAS


1. Twigs and debris in the cracks and crevices of the top surfaces of the tank.
2. On top of the axles for both front and rear wheels.
3. On the inside of all road wheels and end wheels: from underneath and from the outside also.
4. On top of the axles for all road wheels, and on top of all tensioners.
5. **On** the support rollers, in the ledges, between the rubber surfaces.
6. **On** the support rollers, the inside surfaces; from the inside and outside.
7. Inside the tank, clean the floor, around the driver's footpedals.

NOTE: Tracks are a MAJOR PROBLEM, clean thoroughly.


# Washdown Flow Chart - Haifa, Israel



# Washdown Site - Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico



# Washdown Site - Rota, Spain



March 28, 2001 5:45 PM

TO: General Hugh Shelton, Chairman, JCS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9

SUBJECT: Operational Concepts

I am told the Joint Staff has a number of so-called vignettes that are examples of various types of operational concepts-peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation, disaster effort, crisis in the Taiwan Straits (short of conflict), and the like. Could you please have those sent to me or have someone brief me on them?

It sounds like that might be what we are looking for by way of operational concepts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032X01-10

381

28 Mar 01

March 31, 2001 1:19 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Frank Gaffney *American Spectator* Article

Please find out what Gaffney's article on CTBT is about and give me a briefing.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
033101-9

A-400.112

31 Mar 01

TP 9W

Needed: Adult Supervision on C.T.B.T.

(Washington, D.C.): One could be forgiven for assuming that the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a majority of the U.S. Senate, the election of a President who campaigned on a platform noting his opposition to that accord and his appointment of a Secretary of Defense and a National Security Advisor who had publicly denounced this treaty would convey to even the most dim-witted government bureaucrats that the CTBT was a dead-letter. If so, one would be wrong. As a column published by Center President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. in the American Spectator Online on Monday makes clear, the arms control nomenclatura that the Bush-Cheney team has inherited from its predecessor is aggressively seeking to implement the CTBT as though the Treaty had been ratified by the Senate and endorsed by the new President,

As Mr. Gaffney reports, presumably low-level Defense Department apparatchiks are the ones responsible for circulating a directive that declares, among other things: "The new administration has not issued any specific guidance on the CTBT implementation. Until such guidance is issued, DoD will continue with ongoing implementation programs and projects." (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, the Bush Administration must provide guidance on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty forthwith. By formally directing the Department of Defense and other agencies to cease and desist with the implementation of an accord that is neither verifiable, equitable nor consistent with U.S. national security interests, official energies and scarce taxpayer resources can be redirected to other, more useful purposes.

A Dead Clinton Treaty Given New Life  
By Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.  
The American Spectator Online, 25 March 200 1

In October 1999, the United States Senate did an extraordinary thing, An absolute majority of senators -- far more than the 34 needed -- voted to reject a major international arms control agreement: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In so doing, the "world's greatest deliberative body" fulfilled its constitutional role as a check-and-balance on the executive branch's treaty-making power.

At the time and thereafter, candidate George W. Bush endorsed the majority's view that this Clinton treaty was unverifiable, fatally flawed and incompatible

with US, national security interests. The man he tapped to serve as his secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was one of six former Pentagon chiefs who publicly urged the CTBT's defeat. And as recently as February 22, the national security advisor to now-President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, confirmed that the President and his administration did not believe the CTBT could be verified or effective in curbing proliferation.

It is hard to believe, therefore, that what either the majority of the Senate or the President intended was for the U.S. government to proceed with the implementation of the CTBT as though it had been ratified. Yet that is precisely what holdovers from the Clinton administration and career arms control apparatchiks evidently have in mind -- and will undertake to do if left to their own devices.

Such officials' brazen contempt of Congress, their manifest disregard for constitutional processes, and their utter indifference to the express desires of the incumbent President is captured in a memorandum currently being circulated in the Department of Defense (DoD). It baldly declares that "the new administration has not issued any specific guidance on the CTBT implementation. Until such guidance is issued, DoD will continue with ongoing implementation programs and projects."

The acronym-laced memorandum goes on to detail all the expensive ways in which such implementation will proceed. These include the following:

"The U.S. will continue its support of the implementation preparations by the Preparatory Commission (**PrepCom**)" that was "established on November 19, 1996 for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the verification regime of the Treaty."

"The DoD will continue to participate in all matters associated with the mandate of the **PrepCom**. The DoD will maintain the necessary representation needed to support ongoing actions during PrepCom Plenary sessions and send experts and advisors as needed to support the U.S. Vienna Delegation, the **PrepCom**, its Working Groups, and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS)."

"DoD will support relevant aspects of the provisional system of verification and monitoring facilities required by the CTBT (i.e., the provisional International Monitoring System (IMS)) as these systems and facilities add value to U.S. monitoring capabilities. By the end of 4th Quarter FY02, DoD will install the full network of U.S. IMS facilities. Following installation, DoD will operate and maintain all IMS facilities in the U.S. on a continuing basis and will cooperate with the PrepCom on the certification of these facilities and ask the PTS to provide operational funding following station certification."

"DoD will also continue to operate the prototype International Data Center (IDC) through its transition to the PrepCom in accordance with the approved transition plan. The prototype IDC will serve as an integral part of the development, deployment,

and employment of U.S. monitoring capabilities. The DoD will provide a long-term sustainment program to calibrate and maintain a state of the art capability at the IDC."


"DoD will support those activities and operations necessary to implement, verify, and comply with CTBT requirements, including the necessary long-lead items required in advance of entry into force such as: facilities, logistics; personnel, operational training, on-site inspection procedures and associated workshops, field exercises, and mock inspections."

The memo even goes so far as to say that "the DoD will work with Congress to address concerns raised during the 1999 Senate hearings. The DoD will consider an enhanced verification regime, including additional and improved sensors and procedures, to supplement or replace the current treaty-required monitoring suite." In other words, the Bush-Rumsfeld Defense Department will be working to encourage the Senate to view more kindly a treaty that neither Mr. Bush nor Mr. Rumsfeld favors.

Obviously, there is an urgent need for adult supervision with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While the administration may wish to wait until the review of U.S. nuclear forces it has underway is completed before it takes the sorts of steps required to maintain a credible deterrent for the foreseeable future -- notably, resuming limited underground nuclear testing -- it should act at once to terminate the **backdoor** implementation of the CTBT.

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NOTE: The Center's publications are intended to invigorate and enrich the debate on foreign policy and defense issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of all members of the Center's Board of Advisors. The above publication of the Center for Security Policy can be found, fully formatted and hyperlinked to related documents, on the World Wide Web at the following address: <http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2001/01-F26.html>



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

APR 3 2001

381

Honorable Frank C. Carlucci  
Honorable William J. Perry  
The Carlyle Group  
100 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20004


Dear Frank and Bill:

My apologies for the delay in getting back to you on your letter of February 15<sup>th</sup>.

There is no question but that we are going to have to tackle the infrastructure issue. I've been impressed with the BENS Tail-to-Tooth Commission report, and congratulate you folks for good work. What I may do is ask the two of you come in and meet with some of the key staff folks who are working on those types of things here in the department.

I will be back in touch with you. With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,



U06812 /01

3APR01

# THE CARLYLE GROUP

100 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20004-2505  
(202) 347-2626  
(202) 347-1818 (Fax)

February 15, 2001

Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Department of Defense  
Rm. 3E880  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Thanks for the lunch last Friday. It was great seeing you in such good spirits even if you are "all alone."

We thought it useful to follow up on our discussions on the need for reductions in the infrastructure of the Department – and how that might best be done. Over the past three years, the two of us have served as senior advisors to the BENS Tail-to-Tooth Commission. We believe the Commission has addressed the most critical areas that must be tackled if we are to cut the cost of defense infrastructure and re-invest the savings in modernization and other priority programs.

Because the "what to do" is so well known, the beauty of the Commission's report is not in the issues it identifies – rather, it is the focus on implementation, the "how to do it," that sets it apart.

We have taken the liberty of enclosing copies of this package and would be happy to discuss it with you or your staff. Or, perhaps more helpful, we would be pleased to introduce to you, or to whomever you might designate, the Commissioners who put this effort together.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

  
Frank C. Carlucci

Sincerely,

  
William J. Perry

Close H/D

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
General- Shelton  
General Myers  
Steve Cambone  
Chris Williams  
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 5, 2001

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Take a look at this letter **from** General Pace. Why don't you visit among yourselves and then come back to me with a recommendation as to whether or not any of that is something that we ought to consider.

It's interesting and probably a good idea, but I wonder if we have the time.

381

5 April

DHR/azn  
040501.05  
Attach.



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE  
MIAMI, FL 331724217

April 2, 2001

Commander in Chief

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for this opportunity to participate in the Defense Strategy Review (DSR). The draft copy that you gave me last Monday represents a watershed opportunity to open dialogue, focus our best intellect, and allocate resources to achieve the vision of sustained national preeminence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The enclosures enumerate my general and specific comments on the draft DSR. The draft incorporates many substantive ideas worthy of further development. While not a National Security or National Military strategy, it is nonetheless an excellent review of possibilities. The DSR postulates potential environments and priorities without providing a path to get there. It is not complete, but therein lies its value and the genesis of my proposed way ahead.

To translate the draft DSR into an actionable document, I first recommend you ask Congress to delay the requirement for a Quadrennial Defense Review one year so you can focus on where you want to go and how you want to get there. Then I recommend you initiate a series of executive offsites to flesh out the DSR ideas, generate consensus amongst senior leaders, and produce a National Military Strategy that provides a road map for resource allocation.

Your Service Chiefs and CINCs will embrace your vision and will produce the transformation recommendations required to sustain our national supremacy. Still, too large a group would be unwieldy; therefore, I recommend a two step process. First, a series of offsites attended by you, DEPSECDEF, other senior DOD civilians, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and your CINCs to develop the strategy. Then, a series of offsites attended by you, DEPSECDEF, other senior DOD civilians, the Chairman and Vice Chairman, and your Service Chiefs to develop the force structure and resource allocation to execute that strategy.

Properly focused offsites, supported by professional facilitators and scribes, will require significant commitment by your senior leaders. This is appropriate and justified, given the power of shared brainstorming, the resultant unity of effort and corporate buy-in, and the importance of the desired products.

Again, Sir, thank you for soliciting my opinions.

Enclosures

Very Respectfully,

PETER PACE

General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command

11-L-0559/OSD/2757

April 5, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: Acting General Counsel, Mr. Dell'Orto  
From: Rudy de Leon, R  
Subject: Naming Buildings

Mr. Secretary:

You asked whether the Department has a policy about naming buildings. Working with the Acting General Counsel and his staff, we were able to develop the following information.

Within federal law the Administrator of the General Services Administration is authorized to name GSA buildings, However, in the Department of Defense there is not a delegated authority for naming buildings. Interestingly enough, there is a DOD Directive on designating and naming aerospace vehicles (it was issued by former Deputy Secretary Will Taft and it requires coordination between the service secretary and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs when naming an aircraft).

While not authorized in law, each military service has a policy regarding the naming of buildings, rooms and other facilities on military installations.

The Army policy states that:

- Only deceased persons will be memorialized;
- Facilities should be named for persons with ranks or grades comparable to those of the main users;
- Commanders who make selections should (a) honor deceased heroes or other distinguished and women of all races in our society, (b) present them as inspirations to their fellow soldiers, employees, and other citizens.

GRD

S H/pc 01

The Navy policy is similar. It includes:

- Names will be selected to honor deceased members of the naval services. In exceptional cases, where it is uniquely appropriate, living members of the naval service may be so honored. Preference should be given to names of deceased persons.

The Air Force and Marine Corps guidelines are similar,

Congress, through the annual authorizations acts, also establishes names for facilities. Some Congressional examples include:

- Designation of the National Maritime Center, Norfolk, Virginia;
- GV Sonny Montgomery Training Range at Camp Shelby, Mississippi;
- Michael O'Callaghan Military Hospital, Las Vegas, Nevada (this individual is still living, was the former Governor of Nevada, and is a decorated veteran of the Korean war).
- Frank Tejada Military Family Housing at Lackland Air Force Base (Congressman Tejada died of cancer, and was a Vietnam Veteran).
- Richard C. Shelby Center for Missile Intelligence, Alabama.

Additionally, President Reagan named a Nimitz class aircraft carrier in honor of Senator John Stennis and President Clinton agreed to name successive Nimitz class carriers after Presidents Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan.

There are two options for the future:

Option One: The Acting General Counsel of the Department drafts a Department wide provision for the Secretary of Defense, establishing a clear and common policy with respect to the naming of buildings and facilities.

Option Two: The Acting General Counsel prepares a briefing on this topic for the Service Secretaries who, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, agree to a common framework on the naming of facilities.

March 20, 2001 6:52 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Naming Buildings etc.

Do we have a policy about naming things for living people? I was-someplace recently, and it was a great big place named for someone in Congress who is alive and on the committee.

Please advise.

DHR:dh  
032001-13

601

20 MAR 01

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Re: Authorization Act Expansion

Mr. Secretary:

Judy Ansley sent you a letter discussing the growth in the size of the annual defense authorization bill. She also referenced the fact that each year the administration presents certain legislative initiatives to the Congress.

In the late 50's and throughout the 1960's the annual defense authorization bill focused largely on pay and personnel issues. Special provisions in law were required to establish military pay and benefit levels, and one-year appropriations bills could not include permanent Title X provisions,

In the mid-1970's, the Armed Services Committees expanded their oversight to include Research and Development and Procurement Subcommittees. By 1981, the Committees expanded to include Readiness Subcommittees. The expansion of the authorization process beyond military personnel to include hardware and O&M greatly expanded the legislative output of the committees.

As the Armed Services Committees became engaged in more and more issues, and as the legislative product of the committees became greater, the Department of Defense would annually submit legislative requests along with its budget.

The bulk of these requests deal with special pay authorities, requests to increase various contracting authorities, and modifications to existing law.

These are some of the items being considered for presentation with the Fiscal 02 Budget:

110.01

3 APR 01

Acquisition:

- Government-Industry Personnel Exchange
- Clarification of Indemnification-Transfer of Government Surplus property

Personnel:

- Accession Bonus and Continuation Pay for Officers in Critical Skills
- Federal Student Loan Deferments for Military Service
- Enlisted Accession and Retention Bonuses and Aviator Special Pay

Policy:

- Consolidation of Authorities Relating to DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies
- Enhancement of Commercial Sales of Defense Articles and Services for Resale Abroad

Comptroller:

- Elimination of the Social Security Military Wage Credits (a \$320 m cost if we had to budget)

The acting General Counsel is working with the staff to scrub these initiatives. Following the staff review, they are examined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He forwards the legislative proposals to the OMB for final approval before they are sent to Congress. It is likely that this list will be expanded to include legislative initiatives that come out of your strategic review.

March 27, 2001 7:13 AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Authorization Act

Here is a letter I got from Judy Ansley saying that a lot of the legislative provisions in the law and the conference report were the result of requests for changes in the law from the Executive Branch.

What is she referring to?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
032701-25

March 19, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you very much for taking the time today to meet with me to discuss policy positions at the Department of Defense; During this time of tremendous turmoil and change in the world, I would welcome the opportunity to join your team as you search for solutions to the problems confronting our military and our nation.


During our meeting, we discussed the significant increase in the level of Congressional-involvement in the national security arena. As an example, I mentioned the difference in the size of the annual national defense authorization bill from 1975 compared to last year's bill. As requested, the following are the specific statistics on each:

- Fiscal Year 1976 National Defense Authorization Act (adopted in 1975): Conference report was 75 pages long, of which 17 pages were legislation.
- Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (adopted in 2000): Conference report was 988 pages long, of which 534 pages were legislation.

In fairness to the Congress, I would note that the legislative package the Armed Services Committee received from the Pentagon last year was hundreds of pages long. You will find that the vast majority of the legislative provisions contained in last year's Conference Report were the result of requests for changes in the law from the Executive Branch.

Again, thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,



Judith A. Ansley  
Deputy Staff Director  
Senate Committee on Armed Services

*Handwritten notes:*  
58  
16  
1978  
538 pages long

April 2, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon **R**  
cc: Andy Marshall  
Subject: Comments on the Draft Defense Strategy Review

38

I have examined Andy Marshall's Draft 03/08/01 and have had the opportunity to have two discussions with him on the document. It is thoughtful and should provide for a needed discussion of the kind of military capabilities needed by the United States in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

In terms of actual edits, I will provide some further suggested edits directly to Andy Marshall. I want to use this brief memo to discuss larger trends.

A new century begins as the old one ended. America is the world's military and economic super-power. This brings both challenge and responsibility. Our area of responsibility (AOR) will not be one region but continue to be the entire world. The dynamics of the global economy will force us to spend more time and energy looking across the Pacific. But, Europe and the Middle East will continue to be areas of major interest. So, too, will be Mexico and Latin America.

In terms of the needed military capabilities for this period, the paper continues to build on the unique technological advantages of our country:

- Our ability to strike an adversary at a distance greater than the adversary may strike us back, and to thus deter that adversary from using force;
- Logistics and Mobility that sustain our forces and that give us global reach;
- Skilled military leadership that is professional in the planning and execution of military operations; and
- Communications and Intelligence systems that provide both strategic and situational awareness in almost any circumstance.

2 Apr 01

The Marshall paper provides a framework for looking at how we can maintain these advantages in the future. In my discussions with Andy, I raised these points:

- We should address the tension that exists between tools designed to win long range wars and how they differ from those best suited to deter conflict:

- The loss of rationality since the Cold War, portrayed by Saddam Hussein's occasionally irrational use of his military, complicates our efforts to dissuade him when we are relying on weapons built to provide striking power for our forces. Forces dedicated to presence/deterrence make an unambiguous statement of commitment to both friends and enemies. But these may not necessarily be the best forces for combat if deterrence fails.
- The merits of experimentation and innovation are well addressed. The importance/ of experimentation should cause us to build on service experimentation and training, and incorporate joint and combined experimentation.
  - A model that merits potential application of this is the Combined Air-Intelligence-Ops Center employed in Southern NATO Operations.
  - US CINC JOINT FORCES COMMAND should be tasked to develop a joint and combined experimentation proposal that builds upon his existing work on interoperability.
  - The US efforts in joint experimentation, once initiated, should be expanded to include joint experimentation with our major allies and coalition partners. For the foreseeable future we are likely to deploy with our allies and be shoulder-to-shoulder partners during deployments. We should invite them to be part of our experimentation. This will help prevent interoperability problems and force our allies to get serious about investing in their required future capabilities.
- We must incorporate a method to identify "breakout technologies", those that change the way we think about the battlefield.
  - Just as GPS and cruise missiles broke us out from past ways to operate/strike, what technologies may cause future shifts? Global Hawk and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (aUCAV with a weapon) are two that might fit the bill. However, for these technologies to be fielded in a timely way the requirements process must become much more disciplined and focus on the "capable" technology rather than the "perfect" technology.
- We should address Information Operations as an operation challenge and not simply a technology. This means we must change the focus from beyond hardware and networks to the content of our information operations. Both offense and defense need new thinking.
  - We have serious vulnerabilities (nothing can sink shipboard morale faster than spurious e-mails) and have put little effort into the content of both offensive and defensive uses of the information.
  - For example, we knew Milosevic had secret, out-of-country bank accounts but could not influence his countrymen with that information.
- The United States must also continue its efforts with the asymmetric threats and the development of capabilities to deal with:

- Counter-terrorism and Consequence Management. Can we stop the terrorist attack from occurring, and if that fails, can we provide civil support to law enforcement to restore order and confidence.
  - Counter-intelligence. The greatest threat to our advances in technology may come from within. Can we protect our secrets?
  - Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense.
  - Information Network Security. Can we protect and defend the information systems that have become essential to our economic success and national security?
  - Medical Readiness: Can we take care of our troops by safeguarding their health on the battlefield of the future?
- Efforts to reduce uncertainty must be balanced. Throughout history, nations' militaries have been largely unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory level of certainty about adversaries' capabilities and intentions.
- In ambiguous times, we must consider investment in resources that thrive on uncertainty vice chasing the ideal of complete knowledge.

The Marshall paper is an excellent tool for identifying the military capabilities needed for the United States to . . . Deter . . . Dissuade . . . Win

In addition there needs to be a piece that outlines the national security strategy that will fully utilize these military capabilities. For example the National Security Commission (Rudman-Hart-Gingrich) discusses the following:


American national security strategy must find its anchor in US national security interests, interests that must be both protected and advanced for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: survival interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; critical interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and significant interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act.

Interesting enough, while the Commission proposes the elimination of the two major regional conflict policy, it does not offer substitute thinking on the alternative.

That is the remaining work. Specifically, in a dangerous world, how should the force structure be sized.

TO: Rudy DeLeon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
cc: Andy Marshall  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Defense Strategy**

By **this** memo I am requesting that you read Our latest version of the defense strategy. Then please dictate your comments and thoughts, and send both Andy and me a copy.



DHR/azn  
0325601.03

381

AMARU

U06214 /01

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon R  
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Re: Counter-Drug Mission

You asked "is it conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission" raising optempo concerns, etc.

Based on your earlier inquiries on op-tempo, the Director of the Joint Staff prepared a briefing that showed the "mission creep" in the counter-drug mission since the original tasking back in 1989.

In fact, over time the regional CINC South has steadily increased mission tasking and presence in the region.

The Director of the Joint Staff has presented this **briefing** to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. In turn, Dr. Wolfowitz has directed that policy options be prepared for further consideration.

000.5

3 APR 01

March 26, 2001 6:47 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Counter-Drug Mission

Do you think it is conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission? I don't know enough of the background to know how it all got started and where the pressure points are.

It certainly seems to contribute adversely to optempo.

Please let me know what you think,

DHR:dh  
032601-17

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Rudy de Leon *R*

Re: Enlisted Advisors and BAH Rates

Mr. Secretary:

Admiral Tracey reports that she has draft legislation that would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to adjust BAH rates mid-year if circumstances merit. The services are discussing this issue right now and trying to determine the threshold that would trigger an out of cycle adjustment.

With respect to the west coast (California and Washington state), the BAH rates were adjusted in January to provide extra dollars for higher utility rates.

She also believes that the BAH process needs a mechanism to foresee rate increases that are accelerating because of extraordinary circumstances (like the soaring energy rates on the west coast).

At the same time, no single formula will ever get it budgeted exactly right. This will put pressure on the Department, and, from time to time necessitate supplemental funding.

*240*

*3 Apr 01*

March 27, 2001 6:29AM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: BAH

I am told we can only change BAH once a year, and with the California energy crisis, it is a problem. That might be a law we want to adjust. I got that from the senior enlisted folks,

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032701-10

February 24, 2001 8:59 AM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Subject Areas

Please add intelligence and unmanned UAVs to the list of things that we are going to get people to comment on. Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022401-1

\*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME:

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:



systems to axe

DD-21 (restructure)  
convert JSF program to two programs--one for a ship-based long range bomber, one for a **follow-on** to the F-111, which be based in both UK and Australia  
kill Crusader  
terminate **M-1/A2** upgrades  
terminate M-2/3 upgrades  
kill Comanche  
stop F-22 at **150** a/c  
Osprey still makes sense if it can be made to work

KofR

# Tough choices

*Get ready for war—over which weapons and forces will prevail as the Bush team tries to shake up the Pentagon*

BY RICHARD J. NEWMAN

In the next big war, the Pentagon plans to field a general's dream team. Stealthy F-22s and Joint Strike Fighters will take out opposing missiles and airplanes before the enemy even knows they're there. Sleek new aircraft carriers will bring massive striking power to the enemy's doorstep. The Army will deploy 15,000 troops anywhere in the world, within just five days. Swarms of marines in V-22 heli-planes will zoom behind enemy lines. The U.S. force would be so swift and muscular that an enemy would have little chance of lasting more than a few days.

Unless, that is, the rest of the world decides it doesn't want to play by the Pentagon's rules. That's exactly what happened last month in a secret government war game. The exercise, set in 2005, had China attacking Taiwan, seeking to reunify it with the mainland. Washington jumped in on Taiwan's side. But the Pentagon's sleek array of wonder weapons came up short. Three aircraft carriers had to stay so far offshore—out of range of Chinese anti-ship missiles—that their 250 jets couldn't even reach mainland China. Japan and South Korea, understandably leery of attack by Chinese ballistic missiles, refused to let U.S. fighter jets use their airfields. With no bases on the Asian mainland, Army troops sat out the war. The only effective American weapons were smart bombs dropped by B-2 bombers and long-range cruise missiles launched from afar.

You say you want a revolution. Fact or fiction? War-gaming's an inexact science at best, but President Bush and his new defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, will have to address some of the tough questions raised by last month's exercise as they move to overhaul the government's most sprawling and intractable bureaucracy. Last week, Bush repeated his campaign call for what could amount to the biggest military shake-up since Congress



# Blunder from below, heat from above

*How to explain a 'one in a billion' disaster?*

BY RICHARD J. NEWMAN

**W**hat a cool tale to bring back to your friends: going to sea on a nuclear-powered attack submarine, standing atop the conning tower as the boat slices through ocean swells, and, most exciting of all, manning the controls during tricky maneuvers.

The Pentagon routinely puts "distinguished visitors" aboard its most impressive weapons systems to show off its toys and familiarize the public with military life. (This reporter, like many other defense writers, was given an opportunity to drive a submarine.) But that tactic mushroomed into a public-relations nightmare last week after the USS *Greeneville's* tragic collision with a Japanese trawler about 9 miles off the Hawaiian coast. The ship sank within minutes, killing nine Japanese, including four high school students learning about commercial fishing. After mishandling early inquiries into the accident, the Navy finally revealed that 16 business and civic leaders were aboard the *Greeneville* when it struck the *Ehime Maru*. Not just that: Two of the guests were manning control stations when the collision occurred, as the *Greeneville* was practicing an emergency surfacing procedure.


Blows and wings. The civilians may have had nothing to do with the accident. But the large number of visitors was said by some officials to be more than double the usual number allowed, and President Bush has ordered a review of the Navy's visitation policy. One visitor sat at a yoke that controls the sub's rudder and bow planes, the small "wings" at the front of the sub. During the surfacing procedure—known as an "emergency blow"—those controls merely need to remain straight and level, as they apparently did. The other guest held down a switch for a few seconds, letting air into the ballast tanks. No snafu there either. The controls that really matter during the emergency blow—the large stern planes that direct the sub up or down—were operated

by a *Greeneville* crew member.

But the civilians' involvement has complicated the disaster and rocked the Navy on its heels. "I can't forgive the fact that civilians were allowed to operate the submarine," says Ryoichi Miya, first mate on



GEORGE LEE—AP



The primary focus, though, will be on how the *Greeneville's* crew overlooked the *Ehime Maru*. Navy procedures dictate that before practicing an emergency blow, a sub must scan the surface of the surrounding sea for other ships. The sub rises close to the surface and extends its periscope as high as 30 feet into the air. Even with limited visibility near Hawaii, the *Greeneville's* skipper should have been able to see about 5 miles in every direction. Navy officials say the *Greeneville's* skipper, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, completed those scans. Once they were finished, he quickly brought the sub to a depth of about 400 feet and began the procedures that would send the ship soaring to the surface at a 20-degree angle. Less than 10 minutes elapsed during that time, well within Navy guidelines. Had the *Ehime Maru* been more than 5 miles from the *Greeneville* during the scan, the two ships probably could not have collided.

So how did two ships in a huge ocean end up at exactly the same place? Baffled Navy officials speculate that maybe Waddle lost the *Ehime Maru* in the glare of sun, or in

**Survivors from the trawler *Ehime Maru* (left); some of the visitors who were aboard the USS *Greeneville***

● "The oddest thing"

the *Ehime Maru*. Officials of the National Transportation Safety Board, charged with investigating the accident, complained the Navy stonewalled them. One factor investigators are sure to probe: whether the visitors—many of whom were crammed into the control room—distracted the crew. "When I was in command," says retired Rear Adm. Hank McKinney, former head of submarine forces in the Pacific, "I would let civilians operate the diving planes—but only under controlled conditions,"

haze, or in a backdrop of land similar in color to the *Ehime Maru*. The fishing ship may have been approaching the *Greeneville* head-on, presenting the slimmest profile. Still, the *Greeneville's* sonar should have picked up something. That raises the possibility of a malfunction compounded by a mistake. "The oddest thing," says McKinney, "is that the chances of these two ships colliding are one in a billion." ●

With Peter Hadfield in Tokyo

military priorities, improved defense of U.S. "space assets"—a huge portion of military communications now travels through satellites. Other weapons of the future might be little more than truck-mounted launchers that fire long-range precision munitions, a vision most Pentagon planners have so far rejected. "The 'revolution in military affairs' may have won the war for rhetoric," argues Cindy Williams of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a new book, *Hold-ing the Line*, "but it has lost the war for dollars."

Winning the war for dol-lars—where Congress has the final say—won't be easy. Information technology—the backbone of the revolution Marshall describes—has none of the sex appeal of an F-22. "Data links," muses Owens, the former vice chairman of the joint chiefs. "Boy, does that get boring for people who didn't even understand the acronym when you threw it on the table." And the kind of major experiments that would be necessary to develop new weapons could tie up forces now consumed with more immediate demands. "Our experimentation is pretty marginal," admits one admiral. "But we don't have any ships available to do it."

The biggest crunch may come over Bush's promise to build a national missile defense system as soon as technically feasible. Bush has yet to outline a specific plan. But President Clinton's plan would have cost an estimated \$60 billion, and



Gen. William Kernan with President Gush at Naval Station Norfolk, Va.  
 ● "New architecture... [for] a revolution in the technology of war."

Bush has vowed a much more thorough—and presumably more expensive—system.

Sticker shock. The joint chiefs support NMD, albeit somewhat tepidly. But the price may unnerve them, as they anticipate the massive cutbacks that missile defense might entail. "The need for relief at the grass-roots level is so pervasive that if we add a big new expensive weapon," says a senior military official, "we're going to exacerbate the train wreck problem." Deal with it, say Rumsfeld supporters, "The negotiating tool of greatest utility," predicts O'Keefe, the former Navy secretary, "may very well be a baseball bat."

The easiest solution might be pruning or killing some of the big weapons. "The Joint Strike Fighter is most at peril," says a senior congressional staff member. That's be-

cause the program is so huge—roughly \$200 billion for 2,852 airplanes. But the plane's defenders in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are armed with rebuttals: The JSF, at a target price of about \$40 million per plane, looks like a bargain next to luxuries like the \$100 million F-22. And substituting proven F-16s for the advanced JSF would cost nearly as much, with little improvement in capability. The same kinds of pros and cons buffet virtually every other program on the books.

Rumsfeld will probably be able to pick up a few billion dollars by closing several dozen unneeded bases. He could also hack at the Pentagon's own infrastructure. A 1997 Pentagon study never published—found that nearly 40 percent of the entire defense budget goes not to troops or weapons but to agencies that handle logistics, supply, finance, and other administrative tasks.

The ultimate "transformation" might be stripping the military services of the prerogative to develop their own weapons and giving that authority to civilian leaders. That could eliminate redundancies that have long been calcified as service birthrights, such as allowing the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each to maintain its own arsenal of fighter jets. "Them's fighting words," says Owens. Despite Bush's popularity with the troops, however, picking a fight may be the only way to start turning the Pentagon around. ●

## THE PENTAGON'S YODA

### A visionary who confounds the brass

Weapons analysis, intelligence reports, the enemy's order of battle: These are the tools of most defense strategists. But Andrew Marshall digs a layer or two deeper, probing demographics, anthropology, business strategy, and great thinkers like Hegel and Xenophon. "The future of defense

is driven by people," says a military officer who has worked with Marshall. "So he talks to clergymen, musicians, poets."




Marshall

The man who will lead a broad review of Pentagon strategy—which could be the blueprint for major military restructuring—is no new-age trend-meister, though. Beginning in


1949, Marshall spent 25 years as a nuclear-weapons analyst. He went to work for Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, studying the Soviet Union. Shortly after that, he moved to the Pentagon, where he began to develop a reputation as the military's most incisive futurist. Marshall was among the first to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union and to predict that China would eventually become more strategically important than Russia.

He also brings common sense to the murky business of war planning. "A lot of defense planning is based on 10-foot-tall adversaries," says Mike Vickers of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank that does a lot of work for Marshall. "He sees the enemy's vulnerabilities." A close friend of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who appointed him transformation czar, Marshall will now turn his critical eye to America's arsenal. The outlook, one would hope, will be better than it was for the U.S.S.R. —R.J.N.



**Will it fly? Technicians (left) check out Boeing's Joint Strike Fighter. Below, Lockheed Martin's rival version**  
 ● *"The Joint Strike Fighter is most at peril."*

THOMAS MICHAEL ALLEMAN FOR USNIWPI (2)



created the all-volunteer force in 1974. Before a crowd of cheering troops in Norfolk, Va., Bush pledged to "design a new architecture" for defense, "to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy." The ultimate goal: "a revolution in the technology of war."

But transforming that vision into marching orders could produce its own peculiar kind of warfare. Bush has hinted strongly that he may ax some of the Pentagon's favorite weapons, to pay for more futuristic technology or the national missile defense system he has promised to build. Threatening to cut the Joint Strike Fighter or the F-22 or the V-22 or the new aircraft carrier would pit the White House against the military service chiefs and provoke members of Congress who might lose jobs in their districts. "You're not going to change the enduring roles of the services," insists Arnold Punaro, former staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee. "Nothing radical ever happens in the Pentagon."

But something radical may be the only answer. Despite annual funding of more than \$300 billion—five times the size of Russia's defense budget and seven times China's—the Joint Chiefs insist they need \$50 to \$100 billion more *each year* to upgrade their fighter jets, tanker aircraft, ships, and ground forces. "The present course is a course toward bankruptcy," says retired Adm. William Owens, a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies predicts a looming "train wreck" in the military: a battlefield failure, crashes or other accidents that kill troops, or a military so decayed that leaders lose confidence and are reluctant to use it.

Bush has pledged more money for defense, but only after he sees a thorough strategy review. That's because many of the weapons the Pentagon wants to buy may be the wrong tools for future warfare. "There's no relationship between what we're prepared to do and what we will be called to do in the future," says Sean O'Keefe, who was Navy secretary when Vice President Cheney ran the Pentagon in the early 1990s. Even some of the brass are dismayed at how so much money produces so little innovation. "There are a lot of pressures in place," says a senior officer, "that piss money away."

Enter Andrew Marshall. The 79-year-old futurist runs the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, an in-house think tank



**Winners?**

Missile defense. President Bush has promised a system to defend America against ballistic missile attack.

Space weapons. (1) To protect U.S. intelligence and communications satellites from attack—and in the future, perhaps, attack foes.

B-2 Bomber. (2) The stealthy \$2 billion planes can strike targets worldwide from bases in the United States.

“Streetfighter” ships. (3) These small vessels—still conceptual—could patrol and attack close to shore without endangering a large crew.

Unmanned planes. They’re turning out to be great for surveillance and reconnaissance. Next: Arm them with bombs, safeguarding pilots.

“Arsenal ship.” Would be stealthy and packed with missiles; could be a converted submarine.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

**Losers?**

F-22. (2) A wonderplane—but must fly from bases within enemy missile range; \$62 billion buys just 339 jets.

Joint Strike Fighter. Like the F-22, must base in vulnerable areas. Huge \$200 billion price tag makes it a bull’s-eye for budget cutters.

V-22. (1) Will fly Marines farther and faster, but recent crashes have brought the entire \$38 billion program into question.

Crusader. (3) Mobile artillery piece fires lots of precision rounds but may be too heavy for an agile Army.

Nukes. Cutting the U.S. arsenal to 2,500 warheads could save \$8 billion while preserving plenty of killing power.

Aircraft carrier. The capital ship of the last 50 years may soon become a sitting duck for antiship missiles.

that assesses long-term threats. Appointed by Rumsfeld to head the Bush team’s new strategy review, Marshall has been a consistent critic of the Pentagon’s strategy for fighting future wars. In a speech two weeks ago, Marshall criticized “Joint Vision 2020,” the blueprint for future warfare released by Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Marshall argued that it fails to provide a meaningful path to achieving lofty but ambiguous goals like “full-spectrum dominance.”

“Leakers.” In typical let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may style, Marshall focuses on the weaknesses of the Pentagon’s most cherished weapons. A recent Net Assessment study called “Asia 2025,” for example, postulates that, within two decades, China will be able to track U.S. aircraft carriers using commercial photo-imaging satellites and reports from agents on fishing boats and other vessels. If China fired a volley of cruise missiles, a couple of “leakers” might well penetrate a carrier’s air-defense system. “The former icon of American power may become the baggage in the future,” says one analyst who worked on the study. “Instead of saying, ‘Send in the carrier,’ the president may say, ‘Get it the hell out of there before they get hit with a missile salvo.’”

Marshall has other questions. Are the short-range tactical fighters like the Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22 really worth the price? “Asia 2025” found that the need to secure bases for such short-legged fighters could even hasten a potential conflict. In that scenario, the American need for air bases on Taiwan adds to China’s incentive to attack the island—and take control of the airfields.

Then there’s the question of focus. Marshall has urged the Pentagon to shift its thinking from Europe to Asia. War planning during the Cold War focused on a Soviet invasion of Europe, but few defense strategists foresee major conflicts there now. So why are there still more U.S. troops in Europe than Asia? There, civil wars could rend Pakistan and Indonesia, China could grow into a regional bully, and war could still erupt on the Korean Peninsula. There are four times as many generals and admirals in Europe as in Asia. And 85 percent of officers learning foreign languages concentrate on European tongues.

Instead of traditional approaches to warfare, Marshall has described a “revolution in military affairs,” one in which superior information not massed troops or overwhelming firepower, would determine the victor on the battlefield. Rapid computer processing and a profusion of ground, air, and space sensors, Marshall believes, can allow the right force to find targets and destroy them before the enemy can react. That’s one reason Rumsfeld includes, on his short list of

UPDATED  
Selected Programs

2/26/01

8:00 A.M.

*J*  
SMA

Program	↑ ↓	Program Cost (\$B)	Budget Shortfall (\$M)		
			FY01	FY02	FYDP
<b>Army</b>					
Crusader Artillery System		11			
MI Tank Upgrade		9			
Interim Armored Vehicle (Wheeled design won competition, but being protested)		7		150	400
Future Combat System		N/A			
Comanche Helicopter		48			700
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)		10			
<b>Navy</b>					
CVN(X) Carrier Replacement (Program cost for first two carriers only)		16		25	1,250
DD-21 Destroyer		49	400	425	4,550
New Attack Submarine		65	100	250	650
F/A-18 E/F Fighter/Attack		47		50	200
Advanced Narrowband System (MUOS) (Replaces UHF Follow-on system)		6			2,050
LPD-17 Amphibious Ship		10	100	300	1,200
D-5 Missile Replacement		N/A			2,050
<b>Air Force</b>					
F-22 Fighter		62	40	700	5,000
C-17 (Strategic Airlift)		46		200	1,900
C-5 Reengine Program (Strategic Airlift)		N/A			350
Spaced Base Infra-red System - Low (SBIRS-Low)		7			950
Spaced Base Infra-red System - High (SBIRS-High)		5			
Global Positioning System (GPS)		N/A			
Advanced EHF (Secure <b>communications</b> )		2			
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)		17			
Peacekeeper (Retain or retire missile system)		N/A			500

## Selected Programs

Program	↑ ↓	Program Cost (\$B)	Budget Shortfall (\$M)		
			FY01	FY02	FYDP
<b>USMC</b>					
V-22 Osprey		38			400
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)		9			
<b>Joint</b>					
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)		218			
C-130 (Tactical Airlift)		5		25	450
H-60 Helicopters (Army UH-60, Navy SH-60, Navy CH-60)		20			
<b>Missile Defense Programs</b>					
National Missile Defense (NMD)		N/A	150	-200	5,550
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)		17			
Navy Theater Wide		5			2,200
Navy Area Defense		7			
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)		N/A			
Airborne Laser (Air Force)		9	100		
<b>Other</b>					
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)		N/A			
Other Intel Programs (SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT)		N/A			\$1B-\$10B
Information Operations		N/A			
Terrorism					
Chem / Bio		N/A		75	975
Civil Support Teams		N/A		35	380

<b>TOTAL SHORTFALL FY01 (\$B)</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>TOTAL SHORTFALL FY02 (\$B)</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>TOTAL SHORTFALL FYDP (\$B)</b>	<b>32 (plus Intel Programs)</b>

UPDATED

2/26/01

8:00 AM

J  
SMH

Status of Selected Programs

(Funding in \$M)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FYDP</u>
<b>ARMY</b>				
<b>Crusader</b>	<b>Self-propelled howitzer artillery system to replace Paladin</b> No known funding shortfall Issues raised about utility of heavy artillery in support of light, mobile forces	Current Funding 350	485	4,195
<b>M1 Tank Upgrade</b>	<b>Upgrade to A&amp;rams tank to improve survivability and lethality</b> No major issues; no known funding shortfall	Current Funding 540	775	1,680
<b>Interim Armored Vehicle</b>	<b>New medium-weight armored vehicle intended to improve deployability</b> Contract awarded to General Motors - General Dynamics team in Nov; protest from United Defense pending with GAO GM-GD design uses wheels; UD design uses tracks	Current Funding 980	1,000	5,380
		Service Shortfall	150	410
		CAIG IAV Shortfall	280	170
<b>Future Combat System (FCS)</b>	<b>Family of technology programs intended to eventually replace all combat vehicles</b> Programs on a risky, short timeline Decision point in FY03 on future direction	Current Funding 400	580	4,100
<b>Comanche Helicopter</b>	<b>New advanced armed reconnaissance helicopter</b> Additional funds needed for weight-reduction efforts	Current Funding 610	790	7,890
		CAIG Shortfall		700
<b>Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)</b>	"Lower-tier" <b>ballistic missile terminal defense system</b> No known issues	Current Funding 450	525	3,150

**Status of Selected Programs**  
(Funding in \$M)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FYDP</u>	
<b><u>NAVY</u></b>					
<b>CVN(X) Aircraft Carrier</b>	<b><i>Future aircraft carrier program; lead ship FY06</i></b> CAIG estimates shortfall for R&D and construction	Current funding	280	415	8,380
		Service Shortfall			225
		CAIG Shortfall		30	1,250
DD-21 Destroyer	<b><i>New surface combatant designed to emphasize land attack capabilities</i></b> CAIG estimates shortfall for R&D and construction Navy evaluating program content to address shortfalls DAB decision scheduled for March Potential technical risks in subsystems	Current Funding	550	620	10,660
		CAIG Shortfall	380	425	4,540
New Attack Submarine	<b><i>New submarine program to replace existing attack submarines</i></b> Current procurement rate insufficient to maintain long-term force structure at 55 subs Funding <b>shortfalls</b> for subs under construction	Current Funding	1,910	2,235	16,260
		Service Shortfall	120	245	640
		CAIG Shortfall		NIA	N/A
<b>F/A-18 EIF Fighter / Attack</b>	<b><i>Fighter/attack aircraft to replace F-14s and earlier model F/A-18s</i></b> Minor funding shortfall	Current Funding	3,065	3,075	18,300
		CAIG Shortfall		50	200

## Status of Selected Programs

(Funding in \$M)

Program	Issue	FY01	FY02	FYDP
<b>Advanced Narrowband System (MUOS)</b>	<b><i>Narrowband communications replacement for Ultra-high Frequency Follow-on (UFO) satellites</i></b>			
	Navy Analysis of Alternatives pending			
	Advanced system alternatives only ones to provide full capability			
	Navy prefers lower-cost commercial-hybrid systems			
	Current Funding	30	40	720
	Hybrid System Shortfall			240
	Advanced System Shortfall		10	2,050
<b>LPD-17 Amphibious Transport Ship</b>	<b><i>Amphibious troop and equipment transport ship to replace several existing classes of ships</i></b>			
	Program underfunded because of problems with computer design work			
	Lead ship almost 2 years behind schedule			
	Because of cost issues, Congress denied two ships planned for FY01			
	Current Funding		1,085	6,470
	Service Shortfall	100	300	1,200
	CAIG Shortfall		N/A	N/A
<b>D-5 Trident Missile</b>	<b><i>Program to sustain and upgrade submarine ballistic missile inventory</i></b>			
	Additional D-5 missiles to support longer life of SSBN submarines			
	Replace aging, obsolete guidance systems on existing missiles			
		Current Funding	650	810
	Sustain missile production at 12 per year			1,400
	Upgrade guidance system			650

## Status of Selected Programs

(Funding in \$M)

Program	Issue	FY01	FY02	FYDP	
<b><u>AIR FORCE</u></b>					
<b>F-22 Fighter</b>	<b><i>Air superiority aircraft to rep/ace F-15C/D</i></b>				
	Air Force proposes to change procurement profile to fit within available funding				
	<b>CAIG estimates program cost-cap underfunded by \$9B total (\$5B shortfall within FYDP)</b>				
	Current Funding	3,250	3,330	22,210	
	Service Shortfall (based on revised profile)	-80	45	0	
	<b>CAIG Shortfall (\$98 total including post-FYOP)</b>	40	690	5,010	
<b>C-17 Strategic Airlift</b>	<b><i>Intertheater airlift aircraft to replace C-141</i></b>				
	Current program supports 137 aircraft				
	Program is not fully funded (FYDP shortfall = <b>\$1.9B</b> )				
	More efficient funding profile reduces shortfall				
	MRS-05 <b>suggests</b> potential need for more aircraft (alternatives shown for 145 or 180 aircraft)				
	Current Funding		3,505	<b>12,150</b>	
	Fully fund current program		200	1,885	
More efficient profile for current program		200	1,150		
	Build to <b>145</b> aircraft	200	3,200		
	Build to 180 aircraft	2 0 0	10,100		
<b>C-5 Reliability and Reengine Program</b>	<b><i>Avionics and engine upgrades for C-5 airlift aircraft</i></b>				
	DAB to initiate program delayed from Dec 2000				
	Discussions on scope of program -- <b>C-5B's</b> only or also <b>C-5A's</b> ; decision affects number of C-17 aircraft needed				
	Current Funding	45	100	2,615	
	<b>CAIG Shortfall</b>			335	
<b>Space Based InfraRed System - Low (SBIRS-Low)</b>	<b><i>Low-earth orbit infra-red satellites to provide tracking and discrimination for NMD and other ballistic missile defense systems</i></b>				
	Issues regarding capability, costs, and program responsibility				
	Study underway to evaluate utility for NMD				
	Congress directed program responsibility shift from Air Force to BMDO;				
	Department has not yet complied				
		Current Funding	240	305	4 420
		<b>CAIG Shortfall</b>			'930

## Status of Selected Programs

(Funding in \$M)

Program	Issue		FY01	FY02	FYDP
<b>Space Based InfraRed System - High (SBIRS-High)</b>	<i>Missile warning system; follow-on to current Defense Support Program (DSP)</i> No known issues	Current Funding	565	550	2,290
<b>Global Positioning System</b>	<i>GPS upgrade program to provide jam resistance and expand civilian capabilities</i> Potential constellation gap looming; no cost estimate yet available	Current Funding	570	580	4,150
<b>Advanced EHF Satellite</b>	<i>Replacement system for MILSTAR II to provide assured strategic communications</i> Significant near-term shortfall for cost overruns	Current Funding	245	540	2,800
		Service Shortfall	140	100	0
<b>Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle</b>	<i>Family of launch vehicles to replace current medium and heavy lift capabilities</i> No major funding issues	Current Funding	610	391	3,455
<b>Peacekeeper ICBM</b>	<i>Decision needed on retiring or retaining Peacekeeper missiles</i> Shortfall to do either; cost to retain 75% higher	Current Funding	135	135	150
		Retire Peacekeeper			500

**Status of Selected Programs**

(Funding in \$M)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FYDP</u>
<b><u>USMC</u></b>				
<b>V-22 Osprey</b>	<p><b><i>Tilt-rotor aircraft to replace CH-46 and CH-53 medium lift capabilities</i></b>                      Decision pending on Full Rate Production                      USMC recently identified FYDP funding shortfall                      Because of recent delays, potential exists to rephase program with</p>			
	Current Funding	1,860	<b>1,955</b>	13,350
	Service Shortfall			400
	CAIG Shortfall			400
	Rephase Program		-500	TBD
<b>Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)</b>	<p><b><i>Amphibious assault vehicle (land and sea operations) to replace current AA V7A1</i></b>                      No known funding shortfall; long-term affordability will be an issue</p>			
	Current Funding	<b>150</b>	265	2,850

**Status of Selected Programs**

[Funding in \$M)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Issue</u>		<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FYDP</u>
<b><u>JOINT</u></b>					
<b>Joint Strike Fighter</b>	<b><i>Family of tactical aircraft to replace Air Force F-16, Navy F/A-18C, and USMC F/A-18C/D and AV-8B</i></b> No shortfalls identified in FYDP; potential production shortfalls beyond FYDP	Current Funding	600	1,530	24,830
<b>C-130J</b>	<b><i>Follow-on, upgraded aircraft for airlift force</i></b> Shortfalls in fielding and logistics costs	Current Funding	205	365	3,700
		Service Shortfall		25	460
<b>H-60 Helicopters</b>	<b><i>UH-60 helos and upgrades for Army; SH-60R upgrades for Navy warfighting missions; CH-60S for Navy utility mission</i></b> National Guard seeking additional aircraft to support State requirements Milestone decision in March on Army UH-60 recapitalization program Navy SH-60R program delayed No known funding shortfalls	Current Funding	935	815	7,450

## Status of Selected Programs

(Funding in \$M)

Program	Issue	FY01	FY02	FYDP	
<b><u>MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS</u></b>					
<b>National Missile Defense (NMD)</b>	<b><i>National missile defense program currently evolving</i></b> Current program intends initial deployment in FY05 <b>CAIG believes</b> current program unexecutable, even with additional funding	Current Funding	1,925	2,460	1,880
		FY05 Deployment Shortfall			
		FY06 Deployment Shortfall	150	-220	5,545
<b>Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)</b>	<b><i>"Upper-tier" land-based system for large defended areas</i></b> No known issues	Current Funding	540	740	5,100
Navy Theater <b>Wide</b>	<b><i>"Upper-tier" sea-based system for large defended areas</i></b> Program is not fully funded beyond initial test series Shortfall funds system deployment in FY10	Current Funding	385	250	1,485
		Estimated Shortfall			2,200
<b>Navy Area Defense</b>	<b><i>"Lower-tier" sea-based system for localized defenses</i></b> No known issues	Current Funding	270	300	1,315
<b>Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)</b>	<b><i>Joint program with Germany and Italy to develop battlefield missile defense system using PAC-3 missile</i></b> No known issues	Current Funding	65	75	1,310
<b>Airborne Laser</b>	<b><i>Theater ballistic missile defense system designed to destroy missiles during their boost phase</i></b> Contractor funding runs out in March	Current Funding	230	215	2,110
		Service-Shortfall	100		

**Status of Selected Programs**  
(Funding in \$M)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>FY01</u>	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FYDP</u>
<b><u>OTHER</u></b>				
<b>Future Imagery Architecture (FIA)</b>	<b>Next generation satellite</b> imagery <b>intelligence capability</b> No known program shortfalls Pending technology decision could lead to <b>\$800M</b> FYDP bill	Current Funding 930	1,470	6,350
<b>Intelligence Programs</b>	Intell agencies request additional funding for improvements to SIGINT, ELINT, and HUMINT Total bills range from <b>\$1-\$10B</b> across FYDP	Low Estimate High Estimate		<b>1,000</b> <b>10,000</b>
<b>Information Operations</b>	Substantial funds have been added over last several years. All known <b>issues</b> have been addressed. Funds could be added to increase capability.			
<b>Terrorism (Chem/Bio)</b>	Substantial funds have been added over last several years. Funds could be added to increase capability; for example, to meet the 2-MTW threat prescribed <b>in the</b> DPG	Meet 2-MTW Threat	70	<b>970</b>
<b>Terrorism (Consequence Management)</b>	Civil Support Teams help state/local authorities in event of <b>chem/bio</b> attack 32 teams authorized; 55 is Congressional goal	Fund 55 Civil Support Teams	35	380

February 22, 2001  
8:16 PM

TO: Dr. Wolfowitz  
Dr. Schneider  
Dr. Zakheim  
Chris Williams  
Honorable Rudy de Leon

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Attached is a paper I have drafted up on deployments. Take a look at it and give me your edits. And sign it so I know who is making what recommendations. I think what we've got to do is begin to fashion what will eventually result in a policy, first to be washed through the NSC and possibly the President and then to be communicated in the Building. Thanks.

February 22, 2001 10:02 AM

SUBJECT: Deployments

Priorities might be on:

- Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics-to develop better relationships
- Asian and South Asian countries (India & Pakistan)--to gain insights and develop relationships both ways
- Middle Eastern countries

Areas we could be less involved:

- African countries-except possibly for two or three with strategic resources
- Western Europe—where we have intimate relationships already
- Latin America, except for a few selected countries

Activities to emphasize:

- Training activities that benefit us
- Activities that give us knowledge of or relationships in countries of interest

Activities to de-emphasize:

- Drug activities
- Democratization activities

Note: Army deployments tend to be good for morale; Air Force deployments tend not to be

DHR:dh  
022101-6

11-L-0559/OSD/2793

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

4/18/01

To: ~~CTD~~ 4/18

PLEASE CLOSE OUT APPROPRIATELY

MIC

UCB -

ADC -

Nothing to close out.

Note to Williams was info only.



350.09

(24 FEB 01)

K<sup>11</sup>

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PLEASE SEE NOTE SPECIAL  
ASSISTANT FOR POLICY MATTERS

4/9/01

To: CHRIS WILLIAMS

REF: SEC DEF NOTES (SYSTEMS TO AFE,  
UNMANNED UAV'S, ETC)

SIR

PLEASE SEE ADMIRAL QUINN'S  
NOTE ASKING IF THIS INFO  
IS OBE

Respectfully

Mauri

It is OBE - Chris W<sup>mt</sup> 4/17



U07214 / 01

Office of the Secretary of Defense

JJ Quinn

Let's discuss ~~this~~  
~~with~~

to: Chris Williams

Chris Williams,

Is this OBE?

alg

JR  
JS

March 27, 2001 7:13 AM

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TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Authorization Act

Here is a letter I got from Judy Ansley saying that a lot of the legislative provisions in the law and the conference report were the result of requests for changes in the law from the Executive Branch.

What is she referring to?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
032701-25

110.01

27MAR01

March 19, 2001

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you very much for taking the time today to meet with me to discuss policy positions at the Department of Defense; During this time of tremendous turmoil and change in the world, I would welcome the opportunity to join your team as you search for solutions to the problems confronting our military and our nation.

During our meeting, we discussed the significant increase in the level of Congressional involvement in the national security arena. As an example, I mentioned the difference in the size of the annual national defense authorization bill from 1975 compared to last year's bill. As requested, the following are the specific statistics on each:

- Fiscal Year 1976 National Defense Authorization Act: (adopted in 1975): Conference report was 75 pages long, of which 17 pages were legislation.
- Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act: (adopted in 2000): Conference report was 988 pages long, of which 534 pages were legislation.

In fairness to the Congress, I would note that the legislative package the Armed Services Committee received from the Pentagon last year was hundreds of pages long. You will find that the vast majority of the legislative provisions contained in last year's Conference Report were the result of requests for changes in the law from the Executive Branch.

Again, thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,



Judith A. Ansley  
Deputy Staff Director  
Senate Committee on Armed Services

*Handwritten notes:*  
988  
534 pages law  
75  
17 law

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon *R*  
Re: Authorization Act Expansion

Mr. Secretary:

Judy Ansley sent you a letter discussing the growth in the size of the annual defense authorization bill. She also referenced the fact that each year the administration presents certain legislative initiatives to the Congress.

In the late 50's and throughout the 1960's the annual defense authorization bill focused largely on pay and personnel issues. Special provisions in law were required to establish military pay and benefit levels, and one-year appropriations bills could not include permanent Title X provisions.

In the mid-1970's, the Armed Services Committees expanded their oversight to include Research and Development and Procurement Subcommittees. By 1981, the Committees expanded to include Readiness Subcommittees. The expansion of the authorization process beyond military personnel to include hardware and O&M greatly expanded the legislative output of the committees.

As the Armed Services Committees became engaged in more and more issues, and as the legislative product of the committees became greater, the Department of Defense would annually submit legislative requests along with its budget.

The bulk of these requests deal with special pay authorities, requests to increase various contracting authorities, and modifications to existing law.

These are some of the items being considered for presentation with the Fiscal 02 Budget:

110.01

3 APR 01

Acquisition:

- Government-Industry Personnel Exchange
- Clarification of Indemnification-Transfer of Government Surplus property

Personnel:

- Accession Bonus and Continuation Pay for Officers in Critical Skills
- Federal Student Loan Deferments for Military Service
- Enlisted Accession and Retention Bonuses and Aviator Special Pay

Policy:

- Consolidation of Authorities Relating to DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies
- Enhancement of Commercial Sales of Defense Articles and Services for Resale Abroad

Comptroller:

- Elimination of the Social Security Military Wage Credits (a \$320 m cost if we had to budget)

The acting General Counsel is working with the staff to scrub these initiatives. Following the staff review, they are examined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He forwards the legislative proposals to the OMB for final approval before they are sent to Congress. It is likely that this list will be expanded to include legislative initiatives that come out of your strategic review.

March 26, 2001 6:47 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Counter-Drug Mission

Do you think it is conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission? I don't know enough of the background to know how it all got started and where the pressure points are.

It certainly seems to contribute adversely to optempo.

Please let me know what you think.

DHR:dh  
032601-17

000,5

26M+201

April 3, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Rudy de Leon R  
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Re: Counter-Drug Mission

You asked "is it conceivable that we could figure out a way to reduce our involvement in the counter-drug mission" raising optempo concerns, etc.

Based on your earlier inquiries on op-tempo, the Director of the Joint Staff prepared a briefing that showed the "mission creep" in the counter-drug mission since the original tasking back in 1989.

In fact, over time the regional CINC South has steadily increased mission tasking and presence in the region.

The Director of the Joint Staff has presented this briefing to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. In turn, Dr. Wolfowitz has directed that policy options be prepared for further consideration.

000.5

3 Apr 01

March 20, 2001 6:52 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Naming Buildings etc.

Do we have a policy about naming things for living people? I was someplace recently, and it was a great big place named for someone in Congress who is alive and on the committee.

Please advise.

DHR:dh  
032001-13

6:52

20 MAR 01

April 5, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: Acting General Counsel, Mr. Dell'Orto  
From: Rudy de Leon, R  
Subject: Naming Buildings

Mr. Secretary:

You asked whether the Department has a policy about naming buildings. Working with the Acting General Counsel and his staff, we were able to develop the following information.

Within Federal law the Administrator of the General Services Administration is authorized to name GSA buildings. However, in the Department of Defense there is not a delegated authority for naming buildings. Interestingly enough, there is a DOD Directive on designating and naming aerospace vehicles (it was issued by former Deputy Secretary Will Taft and it requires coordination between the service secretary and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs when naming an aircraft).

While not authorized in law, each military service has a policy regarding the naming of buildings, rooms and other facilities on military installations.

The Army policy states that:

- Only deceased persons will be memorialized;
- Facilities should be named for persons with ranks or grades comparable to those of the main users;
- Commanders who make selections should (a) honor deceased heroes or other distinguished and women of all races in our society, (b) present them as inspirations to their fellow soldiers, employees, and other citizens.

610  
5 HPR 01

The Navy policy is similar. It includes:

- Names will be selected to honor deceased members of the naval services. In exceptional cases, where it is uniquely appropriate, living members of the naval service may be so honored. Preference should be given to names of deceased persons.

The Air Force and Marine Corps guidelines are similar.

Congress, through the annual authorizations acts, also establishes names for facilities. Some Congressional examples include:

- Designation of the National Maritime Center, Norfolk, Virginia;
- GV Sonny Montgomery Training Range at Camp Shelby, Mississippi;
- Michael O'Callaghan Military Hospital, Las Vegas, Nevada (this individual is still living, was the former Governor of Nevada, and is a decorated veteran of the Korean war).
- Frank Tejada Military Family Housing at Lackland Air Force Base (Congressman Tejada died of cancer, and was a Vietnam Veteran).
- Richard C. Shelby Center for Missile Intelligence, Alabama.

Additionally, President Reagan named a Nimitz class aircraft carrier in honor of Senator John Stennis and President Clinton agreed to name successive Nimitz class carriers after Presidents Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan.

There are two options for the future:

Option One: The Acting General Counsel of the Department drafts a Department wide provision for the Secretary of Defense, establishing a clear and common policy with respect to the naming of buildings and facilities.

Option Two: The Acting General Counsel prepares a briefing on this topic for the Service Secretaries who, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, agree to a common framework on the naming of facilities.

April 9, 2001 6:30 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Nigeria

Please take a look at this memo on Nigeria and tell me what you think about it. It is amazing to me how this stuff arrives with no "to" and no "from" indicating who did it or anything else.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/2/01 Information Paper: "Issues: US Military Engagement with Nigeria"

DHR: dh  
04090148

11-L-0559/OSD/2807

U072928/01

2 April 2001

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: **Issues: US Military Engagement with Nigeria**

1. Purpose. To provide information on US military involvement with Nigeria

2. Background. Nigeria has had military government in all but eight years since independence (1960). Since taking power, in May '99, President Obasanjo **sacked or** took voluntary resignations from some 150 military officers, who had held government office under the previous military regime. In a nation with **a military culture brought** about by thirty years of military regimes, return to military rule is commonly **seen as a** viable and threatening alternative. **The** Nigerian military is proud of its' role as a regional peacekeeper and seems to understand that, for their nascent **democracy to** survive, the military must be brought into partnership and **incorporated fully into** society. That said, the military suffered under the mismanagement of the most recent military regime and continues to suffer under the fledgling **democratic government.** specifically:

- Military maneuver training has not been conducted in over three years due to **the** perceived threat of a coup. Other than the training by fire in the war zone of Sierra Leone, no combat training is given to the average soldier.
- Professional training of the officer corps has been severely curtailed due to **lack of** access to Western Staff/War Colleges.
- The **politicization** of the officer corps has undermined traditional discipline and esprit de corps. Corruption is the primary means of carrying out any military business. The military is suffering from loss of respect of the civilian population; who blame the military regime for the ills of society. In turn, the military feels **marginalized**, cheated and separated from society.
- Pay and benefits are comparable with the civil service but are not, in **themselves**, enough to provide a living wage.
- Military equipment is not maintained, suffers from age and lack of spare **parts.**
- Military medicine is woefully inadequate for all but the most basic needs. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in the force, especially amongst those returning from deployment from Sierra Leone and Liberia.

**In sum, the Nigerian military is in need in virtually every area. However, with the rest of the country's infrastructure in similar shape, the military will find itself competing for scarce government resources.**

2. Engagement. US military engagement with Nigeria restarted shortly after the

return of democracy in May '99. Emphasis was centered on the development of **civil-military** relations and returning professionalism to the Nigerian military.

- **Nigeria is participating in Operation Focus Relief, also known** as West African Train and Equip, which was undertaken as a crisis response to renewed **conflict** in Sierra Leone. It involves training and equipping 7 West African battalions for service in the UN military mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Viewed as a crisis response initiative, EUCOM considers this program to be an operation vice an engagement program. 2 Nigerian battalions have been trained and deployed to Sierra Leone in support of UNAMSIL. In May, a Senegalese battalion and a **Ghanaian** battalion will participate in the program. An August start date is currently planned for the 3 remaining battalions, all Nigerian. OFR is a 10 week training program utilizing -75 SF trainers and providing **~\$3.2M** worth of equipment per battalion.
  - **FMF program has provided \$20M to Nigeria in the last 2 years.** MPRI, a civilian led company has received the majority of this funding to conduct an assessment and begin reform of the Nigerian defense organization. **~\$7M** of the funds have been committed to the refurbishment of the NAF C-130 fleet including its training/ maintenance Infrastructure, with a combat simulation center. Of note, Nigeria agreed to but has yet to pay for half of the MPRI Phase II program (**\$3.5M**).
  - **IMET for FY '01 stands at \$685K** and should increase next year. Primary emphasis is currently on senior level leadership courses (O-4 to O-6 level).
  - **Med-flag and JCET exercises were scheduled for Apr and May of this year but were cancelled due to the perceived scheduling conflicts with OFR. No** exercises were originally scheduled for **FY'02** but EUCOM is reviewing their schedule in light of this year's cancellations.
3. **Way Ahead:** EUCOM remains committed to concentrating efforts on **civil-military** relations and the establishment of a functioning military infrastructure prior to conducting significant training/exercise engagement.
- Currently, both MPRI and OFR suffer from obstruction by senior military leadership. This is due to the efforts and early success at controlling **corruption**. DOS/DOD and EUCOM are expending significant effort to get the MPRI and OFR programs back on track.
  - Nigeria is considered a framework nation in West Africa and has recently **been** recognized as a "strategic regional ally" by the NSC. The strategy for West Africa is to primarily engage with the sub-regional organization, Economic **Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** which will be anchored by a stable **and democratic** Nigeria.
  - Economically, the US obtains 10% of its oil imports from Nigeria.
  - President Obasanjo will visit **POTUS** for a working meeting in early May.

April 9, 2001 6:07 PM

TO: William Schneider, Jr.

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Global Hawk

What should we do about this Global Hawk memo from Rudy de Leon? Should we accelerate Global Hawk?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/4 Memo from Mr. de Leon re: Global Hawk

DHR:dh  
04090 I-53

152R

9 Apr 01

U07293/01

April 4, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
From: Rudy de Leon   
Subject: Global Hawk

The Acquisition folks gave you a baseline paper on the Global Hawk program. The paper provides the basics, specifically that the vehicle is a High-Altitude Endurance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that provides long-endurance reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for theater commanders.

General Dick Myers and I both agree that this is an exceptionally important technology for the future. In the Air Force, the principal advocate for the system is General John Jumper head of the Air Combat Command. I spoke with him and agree with these key points.

- In the near term, Global Hawk can begin to replace the U-2 as our primary platform for reconnaissance, The U-2 currently has one of the highest op-tempo rates, and as a consequence, the Air Force has great difficulty in developing pilots for this mission (it takes years in training to develop a U-2 pilot).
- The Global Hawk, when deployed, will have real time data links to other space and aerial platforms, and manned aircraft.
- While Global Hawk has great potential as a platform with a series of capabilities, there will need to be trade-offs between the engineers, scientists, operators, and program managers. The Air Force understands that program managers will have to assume some risk if the system is to be fielded without lengthy development and increased costs.

11-L-0559/OSD/2811

TO: Rudy de Leon  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 26, 2001  
SUBJECT: **Global Hawk**

Take a look at this Global Hawk material.

After reading Andy Marshall's paper, it strikes me we may want to move the IOIC on Global Hawk up. Would you take a look at it and give us some advice?

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
03260 1.45  
Attach.

3/20/01

TO: SecDef

FROM: RDML Quinn 3/20/01 J

SUBJECT: Global Hawk

Per your request (**TAB A**):

**TAB B** Background

**TAB C** Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

**TAB D** Air Vehicle (Platform) Upgrade Option

**TAB E** Sensor Capability Upgrade/Acceleration Option

**TAB F** Production Rate Acceleration Option

(Options D – F can be done individually or in combination)

**TAB G** Transmittal

**March 13, 2001 11:14 AM**

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Global Hawk

I need information on Global Hawk's purpose, capabilities and costs.

**DHR:dh**  
031301-I 1

## RQ-4A GLOBAL HAWK

### PURPOSE:

- Global Hawk is a High-Altitude (60K) Endurance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HAE UAV) that provides long-endurance reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for theater commanders (24 hrs at 1200 mile radius, 8 hrs at 4080 mile radius, with a 2000 lb. Payload)
  - Has made long range/endurance flights collecting imagery which is relayed by satellite (or direct line-of-sight to ground station) anywhere in the world. Crossed Atlantic in June 2000, collected imagery at Portugal. Deploys to Australia in April 2001 .

### CAPABILITY - BASELINE PROGRAM (approved March 2001)

- Delivers initial version (called Block 5) at 2/year starting FY03
  - Payload capability of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) (1 foot resolution; Electro-Optical (EO), and Infra-red (IR) sensors (no signal intelligence capability)
  - Designed for spiral development (eg. adds sensors as available).
- Block 10 version (FY09) delivers Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) capability via Joint SIGINT Avionics Family sensor, a better radar (Active Electronically Scanned Array - AESA), improved EO/IR, and platform improvements at 4/year (This is about parity with U-2 sensor capability)
- AESA radar also adds improved ground moving target track capability

### COSTS

- Program was developed to fit within FYDP funding below:

TY\$ in Millions	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	Subtotal
RDT&E	96.5	103.1	177.5	177.3	131.5	79.2	765.1
Procure	97.7	106.7	99.3	112.2	105.8	158.7	680.4
Total	194.2	209.8	276.8	289.5	237.3	237.9	1445.5

- Baseline funding does not address early system availability for CINCs

**Information Paper**  
**Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for Global Hawk**

**Definition for Global Hawk IOC**

- **The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) states** – “system will be declared IOC when there are assets in place, tech data available, and a training system established to make the system and infrastructure robust enough to support one 24 hour orbit with all image intelligence payloads for 30 days”
- 4 Air Vehicles (A/Vs) and 1 Ground Station (GS) are needed to meet the 30-day, 24 hour continuous orbit requirement defined in the ORD.
  - Up to three aircraft airborne at a given time – 4<sup>th</sup> utilized for a spare

**Current Program Schedule**

- Because of budget decisions which limited funding, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) reflects an IOC date of Sept 2005
- The 4<sup>th</sup> A/V and 1 complete ground station that consists of 1 Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and 1 Mission Control Element will delivered by Sept 2004
- **IOC Acceleration Option** – the logistics infrastructure (tech orders, training, spares, etc.) could be accelerated one year to support an earlier IOC in 2004
  - A 12 month acceleration requires a total of *\$38M including \$2M by July 01*

	<b>FY01</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>
<b>Tech Orders</b>	<b>\$2M by July</b>	<b>\$13M</b>	<b>\$8M</b>
<b>Spares</b>		<b>\$8M</b>	
<b>*LRE retrofit</b>		<b>\$7M</b>	

\* Would also need one extra properly configured LRE available to support other on-going training, testing, and EMD activities

- Of course, even a more costly (approximately \$1B) *total program acceleration* option could be implemented that would field more final configuration Global Hawk systems sooner, but it would still be 2004 before the 4<sup>th</sup> A/V will be delivered and the IOC requirement is achieved

## Air Vehicle (Platform) Upgrade Option

- **Capability Improvements**

- Increased power for sensor packages (from 10 to 25 KVA)
- Upgraded engine (5% thrust increase plus additional cooling air)
- Open electronics architecture to ease future upgrades (commercial standards employed)
- Communications upgrades to meet CINC in theater requirements
- Improved wing aerodynamics for increased altitude, range, and endurance performance
- Multiple-Simultaneous payloads (signals intelligence and radar or EO/IR)
  - Payload growth to 3000# (from 2000#)
  - Endurance at 2400 Nautical Miles reduced from 24 to 20 hours when carrying a 3000# payload

- **Schedule**

- Develop: FY02-03
- Buy: FY03
- Deliver FY04

- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	FY03	Total
RDT&E	44.2	18.6	62.8

## Sensor Upgrade/Acceleration Options

- **Capability Improvements** (versus U-2 legacy sensors)
  - Improved EO/IR (need capability comparison to legacy)
  - Upgraded Legacy Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)
  - Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar (2 to 4 times range and area coverage, improved ground moving target tracking and area coverage)
    - Radar being developed as part of the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) which also applies to the Joint STARS Program and NATO Ground Surveillance
  - Improved Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
  
- **Schedule**
  - Integrate Improved EO/IR: FY02-04
  - Upgrade SAR: FY02-03
  - Integrate AESA: FY04-07
  - Integrate Improved SIGINT: FY02-04
  
- **Funding** (increases to baseline program funding, TY\$ in millions)

	<u>FY02</u>	<u>FY03</u>	<u>FY04</u>	<u>FY05</u>	<u>FY06</u>	<u>FY07</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
EO/IR	5.9	30.3	24.7				60.9
SAR	3.1	28.7					31.8
AESA		17.0	79.8	67.5	15.1	11.2	190.6
SIGINT	1.4	34.5	35.2				71.1

## Production Rate Acceleration Options

### Acceleration Provides:

- Enables more efficient productions rates and provides increased force structure and improved capability sooner to theater CINCs

### Two production options:

#### Acceleration to 6 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

<b>(TY\$M)</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>Total</b>
Production	85.6	246.5	179.4	232.5	269.2	270.8	1.284
Units	0	0	2	4	4	4	14

#### Acceleration to 10 aircraft per year

**Funding** (increases to baseline program funding and additional units produced)

<b>(TY\$M)</b>	<b>FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>Total</b>
Production	85.6	246.5	216.4	524.5	490.2	494.8	2.058
Units	0	0	2	4	8	8	22

- Cost includes price of advanced sensors, electronic intelligence sensor for each aircraft and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor for every two aircraft
- Cost includes four ground stations for the 6 aircraft per year option and five for the 10 aircraft per year option
- Parity reached with U-2 imagery intelligence sensors in FY04
- Partial parity reached with U-2 signals intelligence sensors (electronic intelligence only) in FY05



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

FROM: DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC & TACTICAL SYSTEMS  
Approved by: Mr. Mutzelburg/OUUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-0525  
Prepared by: Col Vic Saltsman/OUUSD(AT&L)/S&TS(AW)/695-3 165 March 14, 2001

SUBJECT: Global Hawk Program Options - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: Provide SecDef information on Global Hawk system and program acceleration options

DISCUSSION:

- The attached papers (Tab A – D) provide information on the Global Hawk system and options for accelerating the currently approved program.
- Tab A - Global Hawk background information
- Tab B – Air Vehicle (platform) upgrade option
- Tab C – Sensor capability upgrade/acceleration option
- Tab D – Production rate acceleration options
- Options at Tabs B-D can be done individually or in combination
- Potential payoffs include accelerated air vehicle improvements and earlier fielding of improved sensor capability. Higher production rate provides more capability sooner (fully fielded FY08 vs FY 15) at lower cost (20% lower unit cost) with 40% less force structure required to cover orbit requirements

RECOMMENDATION: None – For Information Only.



11-L-0559/OSD/2820

*Mr. [unclear] 3/16  
Dave Oliver*

*Dr. George Schneider*

*Has copy  
Witz 3/14/01*

April 9, 2001 1:56 PM

TO: Steve Herbits

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Wolbarsht Memo on Management Issues

Attached is a memo I received from Jim Wolbarsht. I do not know him, but I thought he had some interesting suggestions. He might be someone who could help.

Any thoughts?

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-32

230.02

9 Apr 0

U07295# /01

**FAX**

*[Handwritten signature]*

*SC R+R  
82  
214*

Date 01/05/01

Number of pages including cover sheet 4

TO: Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

FROM: Jim Wolbarsht

*[Handwritten signature]*

Phone 312-645-0251

Phone 703-893-3393

Fax Phone 3 12-645-0258

Fax Phone 703-893-3774

CC:

REMARKS:  Urgent  For your review  Reply ASAP  Please Comment

I did my stint as a federal **CIO** and CFO in the first Bush Administration and am not looking to go back now, but I'd be delighted to help through the transition on the management side if you'd like someone to work those issues for you. It's hard to imagine a modern corporate CEO operating without strong support in Information Technology and Financial Management, but we seem to allow this to routinely occur in government.

30 years around **DoD** and the Intel Community (including recent appointments to an **NSA** Board and the Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee in the Pentagon) have left me with severe concerns about business processes throughout **DoD**. I have taken the liberty of jotting down a few points for your consideration. My bio sheet is attached so that you can see the "tint on my glasses." I've been around the Bush political organization for over 20 years and am a classmate of the President-elect. Please let me know if I might be of service.

*[Handwritten signature: Jim Wolbarsht]*

Very respectfully,

## Urgent Management Issues for the New SecDef

Jim Wolbarsht 01/04/01

- The Pentagon suffers from severe weaknesses in the managerial environment, in the **people** and the **staffing**, in the organization, in the processes, in program architectures, in requirements, in systems, in acquisition policy and procurement, and in funding. Each of these areas is worthy of a separate **commentary** and this should be developed in the near term. In any case, an integrated **approach** is needed and this can only come from the new Secretary/Deputy Secretary.
- Military reform (one of the President-elect's top five) will not succeed without effective **design**, application and integration of multiple new technologies across Service and program **elements**. A starting point is immediate examination of this problem and clarification of **responsibilities**.
- The best policies **and** programs are useless without effective implementation/good **execution**. And money alone is usually not the solution to management problems. **DoD** must begin to operate as a world-class entity as a core business objective. This must include emphasis on **accountability** and measurable results for all executives to the highest levels. Good intentions are not enough.
- A point not being detailed here is the procurement bow wave. Choices have to be made **so** that the selected programs can grow and prosper. "Across-the-board" cutting is a dysfunctional **approach**.
- Management must be an ongoing priority for the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy **Secretary**. Resolution of the issues noted here mandates structural and process improvements on an **immediate** and dynamic (ongoing) basis. As the CEO and COO of a major multi-billion dollar **multinational** corporation, the Executive Officers of **DoD** must immerse themselves in business process **issues**.
- The Chief Information Officer (**CIO**) and Chief Financial **Officer** (CFO) roles today in **many** federal Departments/Agencies, including **DoD**, are weakly structured, staffed and operated. The **President-elect** can add massive value to operations across government by ensuring that his **CEOs/COOs** (e.g. Secretaries/Deputy Secretaries) receive the same types of support provided to corporate **chieftains**. The Secretary of Defense must demand the same from his key staff **offices**.
- w To be simplistic, **DoD** needs "operational" executives in these key roles. The Comptroller/ **CFO** is not simply the "budget liaison" to the Congress, but the CFO of a Fortune 10 corporation. The **ASD(C3I)/CIO** is not simply an OSD staff executive, but the Chief Information Officer of a **Fortune 10** corporation, Filling the **roles** as defined in this way demands different mind/skill sets.
- Just as war is "too important to be left to the generals," information technology is too **important** to be **left** to the information technicians. Corporate America has learned the hard way that **either** IT is utilized to implement well-designed business processes or default technical processes end **up** driving business practice and process with very unpredictable (and often unfortunate) results. In **short**, the Corporate CIO needs a seat at the table in meetings ranging well beyond technology.
- The entire issue of the federal workforce in **an** increasingly **technologic** world demands **further** study and immediate action. As noted in the next bullet, there must be a balanced partnership **with** industry as opposed to excessive reliance on industry for technology solutions. This is no **different** nor more permissible than **permitting the "IT shop"** to make major corporate business **decisions**.

## Urgent Management Issues for the New SecDef

PAGE TWO / Jim Wolbarsht 0 1/04/0 1

- The government remains “way behind” the private sector in the application of technology but the answer is much more complex than to simply “buy it commercially.” The government needs to be an educated buyer and maintain an active role in the process rather than simply “abdicate.” This problem is particularly acute across the entire Intelligence Community, much of which is within DoD. A joint SecDef/DCI effort to upgrade applied technology is a critical short-term need.
- The National Security Agency is just one example of many agencies reporting to the DoD front office which are in severe trouble. The Director’s External Review Team wrote extensively on this in 1999 and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board did, as well, in 2000. Not a lot has changed. In addition to problematic leadership at the Agency itself, there has been an abdication of responsibility at the Cabinet level on this and similar issues. Who’s accountable?
- As a member of the five-person Director’s External Review Team at NSA, it’s difficult not to comment more here on this particular situation. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of many, America is “slowly going deaf” due to a continued lack of leadership in several quarters, to critical structural problems and the absence of a meaningful plan to resolve them, to overreliance on contractor support in inappropriate places and to morale issues of an extraordinary magnitude.
- This NSA example raises the important question of “chain of command.” For NSA, official reporting, as supported by Congress, is direct to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. As a practical matter, however, the Director of NSA has had no contact with the Secretary but been routinely referred to an already overloaded ASD(C31) whose CIO title would be enough to preoccupy him.
- Similarly, the important and topical area of missile defense raises the reporting question for the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Problematic relationships with the Military Services and the critical need for coordination with DISA and the Corps of Engineers highlight the question of how this Administration will resolve reporting structures/incentives. In short, the Secretary needs to incent executive behaviors to create alignment with desired business outcomes.
- One pointed suggestion is that the new Deputy Secretary look for common managerial issues across the span of his control and seek expert advice on resolving them. Looking at just the Defense Agencies, it strikes this observer that NSA, NIMA, DIA, DSS and DISA (among others) all suffer from many similar managerial problems and that they might be amenable to some common solutions. There is no element in the entire thousand-person OSD with such a mandate.
- Despite the mythology of leadership, we frequently select senior executives to positions for which they have not been extensively trained. Running a large military organization, for example, is not the same thing as running a large civilian bureaucracy in a highly-politicized public environment. Consideration should be given to providing new types of managerial support for many executives across DoD. Again, there is no element in the OSD structure working such issues.
- As Tom Peters writes in his best-selling management handbook “Thriving on Chaos -- a Handbook for a Management Revolution” (Knopf, New York, 1988): “If it ain’t broke, you just haven’t looked hard enough. Fix it anyway.” Remarkably, many items here are relatively short-term fixes. There is no middle ground. Like electrons in orbit around an atomic nucleus (either in one quantum state or the next) DoD is either going to stay broken or get fixed. America demands the latter result!

## Jim Wolbarsht

Mr. Wolbarsht is an accomplished business leader with 30 years of operational experience in Information Technology and Finance. He has repeatedly led successful business process initiatives for Fortune 500 companies and the U.S. government on critical managerial issues. He is a nationally-known expert at introducing technology-based change in large corporations.

Mr. Wolbarsht is President and CEO of DEFCON®, Inc., a national security technology advisory firm with a select domestic and international client base since 1985. Federal clients have included the Commander of the U.S. Army Software Development Command, the Commissioner of GSA's Federal Technology Service, the Chief Information Officer of Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Director of Intelligence Programs at The MITRE Corporation. Over the last eight years, Mr. Wolbarsht has also served as a top executive in several companies focused on commercial electronic business systems, repeatedly producing dramatic growth in customers and revenues. His firms have brought residential real estate brokerage to the Web, advanced the Internet "clickstream" business by offering unattended server-side dynamic site realignment, and systematized the electronic distribution and control of software and other intellectual property.

As Chief Financial Officer and Chief Information Officer of the U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation during the Bush Administration, Mr. Wolbarsht directed all of PBGC's financial programs, systems and technology, including the Treasury, Controller, Budget, Acquisition, Investment Management and IT functions while managing a corporate budget exceeding \$100 million, annual revenues exceeding \$1 billion and investable assets exceeding \$6 billion. PBGC insures 67,000 pension plans covering 41 million Americans and the Council on Excellence in Government called his position "one of the toughest financial management jobs in Washington." Mr. Wolbarsht assembled and led the team which, in only 18 months, accomplished the major systems reengineering that (according to the General Accounting Office) turned an audit disclaimer into the first "unqualified" opinion in PBGC's 18-year history and resolved a large backlog of business issues. According to *The Washington Times*, Mr. Wolbarsht is "credited with turning the once-troubled agency around."

He has extensive experience in defense programming, budgeting, acquisition, information technology and intelligence issues: as staff on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in the Nixon Administration; as head of case writing for the Defense Agency Review during the Carter Administration; and as Executive Secretary for DOD's Acquisition Improvement Task Force in the Reagan Administration before becoming Staff Director for the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness in The Reagan White House. He served at PBGC during the Bush Administration. In 1998, he was appointed to the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Advisory Committee and last year to the Director's External Review Team at the National Security Agency. He has advised numerous federal agencies including the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce and Transportation and he has served as a paid expert for the U.S. General Accounting Office and for the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

Mr. Wolbarsht received an A.B. with honors from Harvard College, an M.B.A. from the Harvard Business School and served to the rank of Lieutenant in the United States Navy. He is a Member of the Military Order of the Carabao and resides in McLean, VA with his wife and their two daughters. He served on the first George Bush for President Steering Committee in America in 1978 and was a member of the original Issues Management Committee at the Fund for America's Future in 1986.

98c

April 9, 2001 3:31 PM

TO: Rudy de Leon  
cc : *STEVE HENSON*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Congressional Message on Reports

Do we have a final draft of this March 29 paper of yours? It certainly is getting to be in good shape.

I think after Dell'Orto, Di Rita and Dauer have seen it, you might want to run it by Wolfowitz, Cambone, Chris Williams and Bill Schneider, or even do that now and then we will end up with a final draft sooner.

Thanks very much. It is a good piece of work.

Attach.

3/29/01 Draft Congressional Message on Reports'

DHR:dh  
04090 I-44

032

9 Apr 01

U07296/01

March 29, 2001

To: Mr. Dell'Orto, acting General Counsel  
Mr. DiRita, acting Legislative Affairs  
Mr. Dauer, acting Comptroller

From: Rudy de Leon

Re: **Draft Congressional Message on Reports**

After many hours of hard work and great support from your organizations I have a new draft message to the Congress requesting their support and cooperation for reviewing and reducing the number of reports they annually mandate through the authorization and appropriations process.

I would like your final edits.

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to / day*

**[MESSAGE TO CONGRESS]**

I write to initiate a dialogue on how the Department of Defense can be more responsive to the Congress by improving and establishing a more meaningful system of communication exchange. As I stated at my confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am fully committed to working "closely with the committee and with the other appropriate committees of the Congress to develop, fund, and implement an overall defense program that can achieve our goals for the future."

Working together, I believe the legislative and executive branches can develop policies that will lead the armed forces of the United States through a time of transformation. As the Department continues building a strategic framework and budget for the new fiscal year, however, I find that through various statutes and legislative language, the Department of Defense in the coming fiscal year is responsible to the Congress for more than 900 reports and notifications. A specific break down follows:

<b>Department of Defense Congressionally Mandated Reporting Requirements</b>	
<b>Total Reporting Requirements:</b>	<b>905</b>
<u>(FY01) Mandated Reports (List Attached):</u>	<u>531</u>
• One-time reports	465
• Recurring reports in Committee reports	16
• Recurring reports in law (to be moved to Recurring reports data base)	50
<u>Reports in Permanent Law (List Attached):</u>	<u>374</u>
• Codified Recurring Reports	374

These numbers exclude the almost xxx letter and telephone inquiries the Department receives each month.

Exchange of information between the legislative and executive branches is essential in shaping our national security policies. The success of our partnership in working together is critical to the young men and women who wear the uniform of our armed forces.

Yet the sheer volume of reports threatens to undermine the very system of effective congressional oversight they are intended to enhance. With so many reports, the quality and value of individual products are diminished. As a result, leaders within the Department have long expressed concern about the time and money devoted to preparation efforts. Similarly, congressional leaders have long expressed reservations about the utility of the products they receive.

**The Department's Responses to Congress' Need for Information**

The reporting regime that has evolved over the decades reflects the unique relationship and responsibility of the legislative and executive branches in matters of national security. This relationship derives from the United States Constitution. As Article I states, Congress shall “raise and support Armies” and “provide for the common defense.”

This constitutional responsibility, in turn, rests on the ability of Congress to access accurate information concerning the United States Armed Forces. Accurate information is the foundation of effective and responsible oversight. Many reports provide information and analysis otherwise unavailable to Congress and contain information and analysis that are indispensable to effective decision-making. It therefore is clear that the Department of Defense should provide that information to the Congress in a timely and usable manner.

The challenge for any Secretary of Defense is to determine how best to meet the Congress' need for information while also meeting the larger purpose of those obligations—strong, capable military forces supported by an effective and efficient Department of Defense. Along with our emerging defense team, I face the same challenge today. We are working hard to conduct a strategic defense review that will determine the structure and shape of U.S. forces for decades to come. We are selecting, nominating, securing Senate confirmation for, and installing senior appointees who will guide the Department. Moreover, we are preparing a Fiscal Year 2002 budget and beginning the process that will lead to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

#### **Within the Department: Changing the Culture**

There are important steps the Department can take on its own to change the culture surrounding these congressional reports and to improve its management of complying with these two requirements.

*Continuing to Seek Effective Alternatives to Reports.* Leaders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military Departments already work with congressional committees whenever possible to meet legitimate oversight needs for information without formal reports that are intensive in time, labor and money. Defense leaders regularly negotiate agreements with committees to eliminate, find alternatives, or consolidate reporting requirements not required by statute. Indeed, without briefings, consolidation of submissions, or accepting information rather than official reports, the present figure would be significantly higher. The Department will continue to vigorously respond to these inquiries. In fact almost 500 people – military and civilian – in the Department (OSD, JCS, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, CINCS, Agencies) have duties associated with liaison and support to the legislative branch.

*Include Cost Estimates in Congressionally Required Materials.* Under the current regime, the financial costs of preparing reports rarely enter into the decision of whether to request a report. Introducing that factor would be a simple and significant step toward measuring—and then reducing—the oversight burden. Each office that prepares a report could be required to include a formal cost estimate similar to that made for responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. A logical first step would be to include estimates of time and costs involving the transmittal of letters for required reports. In lieu of measuring costs for each submission, costs for recurring reports could be estimated annually or at some other interval. Costs of preparing budget justification material could be estimated both on an aggregate basis and for large discreet elements. Finally, cost estimates might be included in replies to letters or other requests that require a substantial or unusual effort.

### **Working with Congress**

Additionally, the Department of Defense and the Congress should:

- Conduct a review of all recurring requirements, with the goal of re-evaluating, prioritizing, and reducing the number of these requirements;
- Agree that those reports requiring the use of outside contractors be specified and the requirement re-evaluated;
- Adopt self-imposed limits on the number and length of new reports requested annually;
- Establish limits on the number or actions required by the Department;
- Use “sunset” dates to reduce the number of supposedly “one time only” reports that often return each year despite the formal request by the Department in each year’s budget and authorization request that such statutory reports included in the previous years not be repeated; and,
- Publish the financial cost and manpower required completing a prepared report.

Taken together, these initiatives would greatly enhance congressional oversight to the benefit of both the Congress and the Department. Members of Congress and staff would be able to focus on the most critical issues. The Department would be able to devote greater time, attention and resources to those reports and requirements remaining. Responses to Congress would be timely. The quality and value of each remaining report would increase. As a whole, congressional oversight would improve to the ultimate benefit of our men and women in uniform.

[SIGNED]

Enclosures:

1. Overview of Required Reports
2. FY 01 Mandated Reports
3. Reports in Permanent Law
4. Proposed Legislation
5. Roster of Legislative Support

March 13, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

CC: Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Mr. Dell'Orto, acting General Counsel  
Mr. DiRita, acting Legislative Affairs  
Mr. Dauer, acting Comptroller

From: Rudy de Leon 

Re: **Draft Congressional Message on Reports**

Attached is a working draft of a message to the Congress requesting their support and cooperation for reviewing the number of reports they annually mandate through the authorization and appropriations process.

I will also coordinate this draft with other interested parts of OSD.

11-L-0559/OSD/2832

[DATE]

[ADDRESSEE(S)]

Dear [ADDRESSEE(S)]

I write to initiate a dialogue on how the Department of Defense can be more responsive to the Congress by improving and establishing a more meaningful reporting system. As I stated at my confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am fully committed to working “closely with the committee and with the other appropriate committees of the Congress to develop, fund, and implement an overall defense program that can achieve our goals for the future.”

Working together, I believe the legislative and executive branches can develop policies that will lead the armed forces of the United States through a time of transition. As I start my work of completing a budget for the new fiscal year, I find that as a result of various legislative requirements the Department of Defense owes the Congress over 530 reports.

This is not to argue that these reports are improper. Exchange of information between the legislative and executive branches is critical. Yet the sheer volume of reports threatens to undermine the very system of effective congressional oversight they are intended to enhance. With so many reports, the quality and value of individual products is diminished. As a result, leaders within the Department have long expressed concern about the time and money devoted to preparation efforts. Similarly, congressional leaders have long expressed reservations about the utility of the products they receive.

### **The Department's Constitutional Obligations to the Congress**

The reporting regime that has evolved over the decades reflects the unique relationship and responsibility of the legislative and executive branches in matters of national security. This relationship is as old and as clear as the United States Constitution. As Article I states, Congress shall “raise and support Armies” and “provide for the common defense.”

This constitutional responsibility, in turn, rests on the ability of Congress to access accurate information concerning the United States Armed Forces. Accurate information is the foundation of effective and responsible oversight. Many reports provide information and analysis otherwise unavailable to Congress and contain information and analysis that is indispensable to effective decision-making. It therefore is the clear responsibility of the Department of Defense to provide that information to the Congress in a timely and usable manner.

The challenge for any Secretary of Defense is to determine how to best meet the Department's clear constitutional obligations to Congress while also meeting the larger purpose of those obligations—strong, capable military forces supported by an effective and efficient Department of Defense. Along with our emerging defense team, I face the same challenge today. We are working hard to conduct a strategic defense review that will determine the structure and shape of U.S. forces for decades to come. We are selecting, nominating, securing congressional approval for, and installing senior appointees who will guide the Department. Moreover, we are preparing a Fiscal Year 2002 budget and beginning the process that will lead to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This would be a daunting task for any new administration. With this process now in progress, I am reluctant to transfer manpower from these assignments to the mandated reports.

### **Within the Department: Changing the Culture**

Clearly, there are important steps the Department can take on its own to change the culture surrounding these congressional reports and to improve its management of complying with these requirements.

*Continuing to Seek Effective Alternatives to Reports.* Leaders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services already work with congressional committees whenever possible to meet legitimate oversight needs for information without formal reports that are intensive in time, labor and money. Defense leaders regularly negotiate agreements with committees to eliminate, work around, or consolidate reporting requirements not required by statute. Indeed, without briefings, consolidation of submissions, or accepting information rather than official reports, the present figure of 530 annual reports would be significantly higher.

The Department will continue to work with the Congress to find effective alternatives to reporting not required by statute. As a start, [I am directing] department leaders to reduce reliance on reports as a negotiating tool during congressional markups. Additionally, [I am directing] all Department leaders to cease promoting congressional reporting as an indirect way of justifying programs and budgets.

*Reducing the Volume, Impact and Cost of Reports that Remain.* Even with an increase Department efforts to reduce the number of incoming report requirements, a significant workload will remain. [I am therefore directing the Department] to take a series of steps to change the culture surrounding these reports by mitigating the volume, impact and cost of those reports that remain. Specifically, [I am directing] Department leaders to:

- Better distinguish between relatively significant and insignificant reports, therefore devoting more time and attention to reports that reflect congressional priorities;
- Take an active interest in determining the most efficient way to respond to congressional reports assigned to their organizations;

- More closely monitor the progress of reports to ensure congressional deadlines are met;
- Use expensive contractor support only as necessary and when appropriate; and,
- Work with Congress to review budget justification materials, with an eye toward greatly reducing overall volume and eliminating marginally useful exhibits.

*Include Cost Estimates in Congressionally-Required Materials.* Under the current regime, the financial costs of preparing reports rarely enter into the decision of whether to request a report. Introducing that factor would be a simple and significant step toward measuring—and then reducing—the oversight burden. Each office that prepares a report could be required to include a formal cost estimate similar to that made for responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. A logical first step would be to include estimates of time and costs involving the transmittal of letters for required reports. In lieu of measuring costs for each submission, costs for recurring reports could be estimated annually or at some other interval. Costs of preparing budget justification material could be estimated both on an aggregate basis and for large discreet elements. Finally, cost estimates might be included in replies to letters or other requests that require a substantial or unusual effort.

### **Working With Congress**

Working together, the Department of Defense and the Congress should:

- Conduct a review of all recurring requirements, with the goal of re-evaluating, prioritizing, and hopefully reducing the number of these requirements;
- Adopt self-imposed limits on the number or length of new reports requested annually;
- Establish limits on the number or actions required by the Department;
- Use of “sunset” dates to reduce the number of supposedly “one time only” reports that often return each year despite the formal request by the Department in each year’s budget and authorization request that such statutory reports included in the previous years not be repeated; and,
- Publishing the financial cost and manpower required to complete a prepared report.

I look forward to working with the Congress on these and any other reforms that will improve both our communication and your oversight. I [am directing] senior Department officials to work with the senior congressional leaders and committee staff directors to find mutually beneficial alternatives to the reliance on annual reporting requirements.

Taken together, the reforms I have outlined would greatly enhance congressional oversight to the benefit of both the Congress and the Department. Members of Congress and staff would be able to focus on the most critical issues. The Department would be able to devote greater time, attention and resources to those reports and requirements remaining. Responses to Congress would become more timely. The quality and value of each remaining report would increase. As a whole, congressional oversight would improve to the ultimate benefit of our men and women in uniform.

[SIGNED]

Enclosures:

1. Congressionally-mandated reports for Fiscal Year 2001.
2. Growth of congressionally-mandated reports, Fiscal Years 1970-2001.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
<b>106-290</b>	<b>SAC-MILCON Subcommittee Rpt (on S 2521, Rpt'd 9 May 00)</b>					
106290	012	Transfer Authority	Notify	"After the fact"	OUUSD/C	Transfers between any accounts in <b>the</b> bill could be accomplished at the determination of the SECDEF. SECDEF report.
106-290	020	Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Facility	Report	"Without further delay"	OASD/HA	Evaluate <b>alternatives</b> for improving the AFIO facilities. SECDEF report.
106-290	020	Weapons Storage and Maintenance Facility, Ft Bragg, NC	Report	06/15/01	JCS	Needed improvements in the overall infrastructure required to ensure the safety certification and efficiency of those foreign weapons.
106-290	021	Antilles Consolidated School System	Report	08/01/00	OUUSD/P&R	<b>Deficiencies</b> of the school system, <b>corrective</b> measures to be implemented, and an associated time line for resolving the issues.
106-290	022	Weapons of Mass Destruction -- Civil Support Teams (WMDCST)	Report	2/15/01	NGB	Distribution of funds for unspecified minor construction funding to directly support WMDCST requirements.
106-290	025	NATO Security Investment Program Funds	Notify	21 days prior to obligation	OUUSD/P	Before using <b>NSIP</b> funds for NATO enlargement or Partnership for Peace ( <b>PPF</b> ) purposes.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Report	Within 45 days of enactment	OUUSD/P	Outline specific uses for all <b>funds</b> appropriated in account. SECDEF report.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Notify (if necessary)	15 session days prior to obligation of funds	OUUSD/C	Limit on funds made available.
106-290	053	Support for counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	Report	Monthly	OUUSD/P	Identify private sector <b>firms</b> providing support, the number of Americans overseas in execution of supporting <b>contracts</b> , the number of military personnel and U.S. Government employees <b>operating in Colombia and surrounding region</b> .
106-290	059	Defense Health Programs	Report	Within 30 days of enactment	OUUSD/P&R	Report on the application and use of funds provided.
<b>106-614</b>	<b>HAC-MILCON Subcommittee Rpt (on HR 4425, Rpt 9 May 00)</b>					
106-614	006	Historic Preservation	Report	3/30/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Develop innovative initiatives and future plans that can help reduce costs and improve maintenance of historic properties.
106-614	007	Joint Use Facilities	Certify	With use of Form 1390/1391	Army / Navy / Air Force	When the Department assesses facilities needs, and Form 1390/1391 which is presented as justification for either joint use or unilateral construction.
106-614	007	Transfer Authority	Notify	"After the fact"	OUUSD/C	The budget request <b>pro posed a general provision allowing the transfer of up to \$67,000,000 between any accounts in the bill.</b> SECDEF report.
106-614	007	Paint	Report	03/30/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Review current military specifications and costs for paint.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106614	008	Recycled foundry sand	Report	03/30/01	Army / Navy	Prior and potential use of foundry sand in military construction.
106-614	008	BMDO Construction Projects	Notify	30 days prior to obligation	BMDO	The Committee is <b>concerned</b> about this request and wants prior notification of specific projects with detailed justification.
106-614	011	Child Development Centers	Plan	02/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Creation of 25,000 additional <b>child</b> care spaces through constructing <b>child</b> development centers over the next five years.
106-614	014	Ft Belvoir: Army Museum	Report	Within 90 days of enactment	Army	Determine <b>whether Fort Belvoir</b> is an appropriate site for the <b>National Museum</b> of the U.S. Army.
106-614	015	Lemoore NAS Quality of Life and Work Space Conditions	Report	03/15/00	Navy	Explain <b>the execution</b> of the <b>Infrastructure Improvement Plan</b> , including any changes or modifications that have <b>been</b> made to the plan and <b>the reasons therefor</b> .
106-614	015	Puerto Rico-Roosevelt Roads Naval Station	Report	Within 90 days of enactment	Navy	Outline options <b>available</b> for development of the <b>land</b> , a timetable, the Navy should develop with the Municipality of <b>Ceiba</b> , and actions to be taken by the Department.
106-614	020	Facilities Backlog	Report	With the budget	Army I NGB	Current backlog of facilities requirements of the <b>Army National Guard</b> .
106-614	020	Armory Infrastructure	Report	01/01/01	Army / NGB	Status of armory infrastructure.
106614	024	NATO Security Investment Program	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/C	NATO nations share of cost and <b>NSIP</b> project costs <b>and</b> cost shares.
106-614	024	NATO Expansion	Notify	21 days prior to obligation	OUSD/P	Before using <b>NSIP</b> funds for NATO enlargement or Partnership for Peace ( <b>PPF</b> ) purposes.
106-614	026	New housing construction	Notify	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Funds appropriated for a new construction project may be <b>transferred</b> for purpose of a private sector pilot project at the <b>same location</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-614	026	Construction improvements	Notify	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Funds <b>appropriated</b> for a construction improvement project may <b>be</b> transferred for purpose of a private sector pilot project at the same location. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-614	027	Foreign Currency Savings, O&M	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/C	<b>Allowcation</b> of <b>savings</b> from foreign currency <b>re-estimations</b> .
106-614	027	Operation and Maintenance, Reprogrammings	Notify	Within 30 days of transfer of funds	OUSD/C	<b>Proposed</b> transfers of funds in excess of ten percent to all primary <b>accounts</b> and subaccounts.
106-614	028	Domestic Leases	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/C	Details of certain new or renewed leasing agreements.
106-614	028	Foreign Leases	Report	21 days prior to entering into an agreement	OUSD/C	Perform an economic analysis on all new leases <b>or lease/contract</b> agreements; <b>report</b> details of any <b>new or renewal lease exceeding \$20,000 per year</b> (as adjusted for foreign currency fluctuation, but not <b>adjusted for inflation</b> ).
106-614	029	Asbestos and Lead-based paint removal	Notify	As required	Services	<b>When asbestos and/or lead-based</b> paint removal costs cause maintenance and repair thresholds to be exceeded.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
	030	Fire Suppression	Report	Within 30 days after enactment	Army	To ensure smoke detectors, alarms and fire extinguishers are installed in all stairwell apartments in Germany.
106-614	032	Marine Corps Barracks.	Notify	30 days in advance of intended fund use	Navy	Authorizes the use of private funds for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of the historic residences
106-614	035	Contractor Support for Family Housing Privatization	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	Review and report the expenses of each Service to ensure excessive amounts are not being spent on contractor support.
106-614	038	Environmental Restoration	Notify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	A ceiling is established on the level of funding unless it is determined that additional obligations are necessary, and the necessary reasons for the increase are given. SECDEF report.
106-614	038	Hunters Point Naval Shipyard	Report	01/15/01	Navy	Status of the transfer and remediation of the shipyard.
106-614	039	Rio Vista Reserve Center: Cleanup efforts and asbestos remediation	Report	09/15/00	Army	Concerning plans for building demolition, including the required funding, funding source, and estimated dates for completion of such activities.
106-292	<b>SASC Rpt (S 2549, Rpt'd 12 May 00)</b>					
106-292	048	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat Vehicles	Report & Plan	02/01/01	Army	Description of the Army's plans for conducting a side-by-side comparison of existing versus new hardware implementations.
106-292	049	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat Vehicles	Report	03/01/02	Army	Provide analysis of the results of the side-by-side comparative operational analysis.
106-292	049	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) - Medium Armored Combat Vehicles	Certify	When necessary	PA&E	Certify that the conclusions of the operational analysis contained in the Army's 2nd report support the proposed acquisitions for additional IBCT equipment. SECDEF report.
106-292	094	LHD-8 Advance Procurement	Report	None Specified	Navy	Continued concerns over the FYDP and the Navy's structure of contract for LHD-8 that maximizes potential costs savings.
106-292	124	Advanced SEAL Delivery System	Report	None Specified	OUSD/AT&L	Explain why this program was not elevated to a higher level of review, as was required.
106-292	125	Special Operations Forces small arms and support equipment	Report	Prior to any add'l authorizations	JCS	Assess the suitability of the equipment enhancements for all SOF operational elements and any recommendations for improvements to meet the needs of SOCOM.
106-292	127	C-5 aircraft upgrades	Report	02/15/01	Air Force	Contain analysis to support the recommendation on sequence of aircraft upgrades and project lift capabilities for ten years.
106-292	127	Electronic digital compass system	Report	None specified	Army	Assess the utility and costs involved in integrating and procuring systems for combat and tactical vehicles of the first digitized division and the digitized corps.
106-292	128	Soldier's portable on-system repair tool (SPORT)	Report	None specified	Army	Following a review of outstanding requirements, report on an acquisition strategy designed to meet those requirements.

# Congressional Reporting Requirements/Assignments 2001

Report	Page	Subject	Action	Due Date	Action Office	Brief
106-292	142	Army Future Combat Systems (FCS)	Report	01/31/01	OUUSD/AT&L	Include the schedule for this initiative; funding required for <b>FY-02</b> and future years; and a description and assessment of the acquisition <b>strategy</b> . SECDEF report.
106-292	176	Refuel Los Angeles-class SSNs or convert Ohio-class SSBNs	Report	W/FY-02 Budget	Navy [AT&L]	Report the attributes used to analyze the options and the distinctions among these attributes in the near- <b>and</b> long-term.
106-292	177	Shipboard simulators for Marine Corps operations	Report	03101101	Navy	Assess Marine Corps training for Marines <b>afloat</b> ; a <b>program to develop and</b> field additional simulation capabilities; and plans to support the fielding of new training simulation systems.
1 M-292	212	National Missile Defense (NMD)	Report	04/01/01	BMDO	Report the analysis of <b>the</b> advantages and disadvantages of a competitive approach to follow-on GBR development and deployment.
106-292	216	Complex systems design	Report	When completed	Army	Conduct a review of the project.
106-292	221	Management reform for DoD test and evaluation centers	Report	When funds are awarded	OT&E	Report on <b>the</b> allocation of PE 64940D funds and the criteria used to determine the recipients.
106-292	222	Crusader	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	<b>Describe</b> how the current development and <b>acquisition</b> strategy will <b>fit with efforts designed</b> to field the objective force described in the Army <b>transformation</b> initiative.
106-292	224	Joint Training and Experimentation	Report	03/01/01	JCS	<b>Assess</b> the advisability <b>and feasibility</b> of <b>establishing</b> a joint national training center, include a summary of actions taken, planned or under consideration.
106-292	224	Maritime patrol aircraft	Report	03/01/01	OUUSD/AT&L	<b>Outline the status of the MMA concept exploration, including the impact of funding requested</b> in the FY-02 budget request to <b>prevent near-term shortfalls</b> . SECDEF report. <b>AT&amp;L can sign</b>
106-292	225	Prophylactic pharmaceuticals	Report	When completed	Army	Report results of a cost-benefit analysis of a development program based on current medical research, and include the funding requirement to fully develop this research.
106-292	226	Radiation Hardened Electronics Investment Strategy	Report	4/1/2001 and Annually thereafter	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on implementation of the Strategy, including the degree to which directed investment goals are being fulfilled. SECDEF report.
106-292	226	Transition of successful research projects into the acquisition system	Report	NLT 6 months after enactment	OUUSD/AT&L	Review the transition <b>pace problem</b> and report alternative approaches to ensuring that successful research initiatives are fielded in a timely manner, and the review should consider possible changes to the acquisition and budgeting systems.
106-292	264	Manufacturing Technical Assistance Pilot Program	Report	When necessary	Navy	Outline results of this pilot program. SECDEF report.
106-292	283	Cultural and Historic Activities	Report	04/01/01	Navy	Describe all the uses of Legacy funds and relevant state funds, <b>status of recovery and preservation activities related to three</b> civil war era vessels, and the projected funding and date for completion of all recovery and preservation activities.



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106-292	330	Online auctioning	Report	03/01/01	OASD/AT&L	Provide a progress report on identifying specific markets for which online auctioning may be appropriate and the development of a pilot program.
106-292	331	Performance goals and measures for quality of equipment and other products	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report how the Department plans to improve its quality assurance program. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-292	332	Polyacrylonitrile (PAN) carbon fibers	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the domestic and international industrial structure that produces PAN carbon fibers, current and anticipated market trends, and on any decision made in regard to the DFAR restriction. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-292	405	Support for Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	Report	NLT 10/01/01	Army	Provide a report on the expenditure of these funds.
106-292	416	Report on Naval Foundry and Propeller Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Navy	Analyze the facility, equipment, and staffing requirements and include the funding levels needed in future budgets to provide the needed capabilities and capacity at the Center.
106-292	417	Report on requirement for Education Center at Fort Stewart, Georgia	Report	01/15/01	Army	Study requirement and feasibility of funding and constructing an education center, also address the desirability of joint use by the local community and any cost sharing arrangements.
106-292	417	Study on commercial leases	Report	04/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Analyze the relocation of activities in metropolitan areas that have vacant or underutilized DOD property; areas studied should include Philadelphia and San Antonio. SECDEF report.
106-292	418	Study regarding the location of the National Museum of the U.S. Army	Report	NLT 1 year after enactment	Army	Initiate a new site selection process and report the selected site, if one is judged appropriate, the site selection process, schedule for developing the museum, and funding sources.
106-616	<b>HASC Rpt (HR 4205, Rpt'd 12 May 00)</b>					
106-616	062 / 341	Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS)	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Army	Detail programmed funds for RCAS for FYs 2002 through 2007
106-616	120	Aircraft navigational and passenger safety equipment	Report	02/01/01	Services	Report on passenger and navigation safety upgrade status and plans for each of its passenger-carrying aircraft.
106-616	125	F-15 modifications	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Provide plan to implement a block upgrade program.
106-616	129	Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Assess the utility of a Predator-B aircraft, including the benefits or problems operating a mixed Predator fleet.
106-616	172	Chinook helicopter modification and improvement	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Assess the need to establish a funded product improvement program; report the results including levels of funding required.
106-616	176	Future Combat System (Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) program)	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Army	Report how the Army will sustain the joint FSCS program to develop and demonstrate key technologies applicable to the future family of combat systems.

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106-616	193	Advanced anti-radiation guided missile (AARGM)	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide results of the developmental testing of the AARGM seeker and the Navy's plans for further development.
106-616	199	Common Command and Decision (CC&D) System	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the Navy's program plan and funding for the CC&D P3I program and for insertion of advanced technology in the CEC/SSD integrated combat system.
106-616	200	Composite advanced sail development	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide the Navy's plan for further development of a composite advanced sail for the Virginia class submarine.
106-616	200	CVNX aircraft carrier design product modeling	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	After conducting an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of developing a product model for the CVNX report the results, together with plans and funding requirements for development.
106-616	203	Extended range guided munition (ERGM)	Report	11/01/00	Navy	Provide a revised program baseline, risk reduction measures, and measures to foster competition in the program.
106-616	204	Fielded system obsolescence, technology insertion and technology refreshment	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on plan for an Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) program that would address the issues of technology refresh and technology insertion in legacy and developmental programs.
106-616	205	Fleet health technology and occupational lung disease	Report	NLT 03/21/01	Navy	Report on the plan for the occupational lung disease study and any initial study results
106-616	207	Hybrid fiber optic/wireless communication technology	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Assess the progress in the program and the potential for incorporation into the Navy's core science and technology program.
106-616	219	P-3 modernization program	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide plans for sustaining the operational capabilities of the P-3 and for development of a replacement aircraft.
106-616	220	Parametric Airborne Dipping Sonar (PADS)	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Pending successful completion of tests, report on the Navy's plan for further development.
106-616	220	Project M	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the Navy's plan for transition of the technology
106-616	224	SSGN Conversion	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy [AT&L]	Provide an approved acquisition strategy and program plan, and a decision as to whether the SSGN shall be START-accountable or START compliant. SECDEF report.
106-616	226	Vacuum electronics	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Provide final results and recommendations on the assessment of vacuum electronics and solid state technologies and
106-616	249	Extended range cruise missile (ERCM)	Notify	If necessary, but 30 days prior to obligating any funds	Air Force	If the Air Force proposes to pursue an acquisition strategy using other than full and open competition, inform the committees of the rationale and justification.
106-616	249	Extended range cruise missile (ERCM)	Report	If necessary, but 30 days prior to obligating any funds	OUSD/AT&L	If Air Force opts to include a penetration warhead, DDR&E provide an assessment of penetration warhead improvements necessary to defeat the full spectrum of targets identified.
106-616	256	Small smart munitions (Miniaturized Munitions Capability (MMC))	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Air Force/Navy	Final results of analysis of alternatives, include a review of all 26 government and industry MMC concepts.

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106-616	256	Space-based infrared system-high (SBIRS-High)	Notify	Prior to approval of changes	Air Force	Prior to any proposed change to the currently established milestones for the SBIRS-High program. SECDEF report.
106-616	258	Spacelift range system	Report	1/15/01	Air Force	Identify legal impediments to non-federal funding of range improvements and maintenance, and changes required to eliminate the impediments. SECDEF report.
106-616	270	National missile defense (NMD)	Report	If determined NMD radars shouldn't be competed	BMDO	Detail justification for noncompete determination not later than 30 days prior to the proposed initiation of any noncompetitive effort.
106-616	271	Navy theater wide (NTW)	Report	02/15/01	BMDO	Assess NTW radar requirements and technologies and architectures, include consideration of expected threats.
106-616	272	Russian-American cooperative national missile defense	Report	01/15/01	BMDO	Examine concept report on possible architectures, technical merits and challenges, cost, effectiveness, technology transfer risks, and areas of technical cooperation.
106-616	279	High definition displays for military applications	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Develop a strategy for meeting the requirements for advanced high definition displays. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-616	282	Information technology, superiority and assurance	Report	11/01/00	OASD/C3I	Report findings and recommendations of assessed shortfalls in the information technology program. SECDEF report.
106-616	284	Requirement for "designated laboratory"	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	The Department's position, actions, and funding requirements relative to establishment of a second designated laboratory. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-616	285	Science and technology affordability initiative	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on manner in which the S&T program addresses total life cycle costs of weapons systems, include a description and assessment, associated funding requirements, and related policy initiatives. SECDEF report.
106-616	285	Tactical and support aircraft noise reduction	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Provide status of funding and plans for noise reduction in tactical and support aircraft and for the reduction of sound pressure levels. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-616	286	Thermionics for space power systems	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	DTRA	Report the results of the assessment of progress being made in the program and plans for its continuation. SECDEF report.
106-616	290	Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program (CTEIP)	Report	Prior to including in any budget request	OT&E	Report any recommended change to current funding procedures for T&E facilities. SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Armed Forces Recreation Centers	Report	01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review the categories of personnel with AFRC privileges to determine whether those categories should be broadened to include honorably discharged veterans. SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Lodging Programs	Report & Plan	01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review change in policy, detailing the reasons for the change, and submit a plan to hold harmless Army and Marine Corps MWR. SECDEF report.
106-616	331	Nonappropriated Fund Support of Official Activities	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review the support that category C activities provide to official activities without reimbursement. SECDEF report.

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106-616	332	Army Apprenticeship Program	Report	01/31/01	Army	Report on plans to implement an apprenticeship program for Army maintenance depots.
106616	332	Army Workload and Performance System	Report	02/01/01	Army	Update the AWPS master plan to incorporate GAO's recommendations and submit a revised master plan.
106-616	333	Civilian Air Traffic Controllers	Report	01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Determine the best method to solve the recruiting and retention problem and report any recommendations. SECDEF report.
106-616	334	Container Freight Station (CFS) Operations	Report	180 days prior to any action on any function transfer	JCS	Report results of the MTMC business case analysis and assess the effects of the proposed transfer on military readiness. SECDEF report.
106-616	336	Defense Personnel Records Imaging System-Electronics Military Personnel Records System	Report	09/01/00	N a v y	Identify the strategy for sustainment of this system.
106-616	337	Department of Defense Civilian Personnel (Recruiting and Retention)	Report	01/31/01	OUSD/AT&L	Develop a comprehensive plan to attract high quality scientists and engineers, and report the findings and recommendations. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-616	340	National Maintenance Program (NMP)	Report	02/01/01	Army	Identify the proliferation of depot-level maintenance that is performed outside of the public depots.
106-616	341	Naval Audit Service	Notify	within 10 days of decision being made	N a v y	Submit documentation to support any decision to close audit sites in major fleet concentration areas.
106-616	342	Urban Warfare Training	Report	02/01/01	JCS	Report on master plan for a DOD-wide strategy, with milestones, for improving service and joint capabilities to conduct these military operations. SECDEF report.
106-616	361	Incentives for Overseas Assignments	Report	12/31/00	OUSD/P&R	Study incentives for overseas assignments and report on attainable and affordable recommendations to resolve the problem of filling overseas duty positions. SECDEF report.
106-616	361	National Guard Military Technician Overtime Pay	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report findings and recommendations to a review of the "time off in lieu of overtime" policy and cost considerations. SECDEF report.
106-616	372	Benefits of Military Service	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review the programs employed to provide service members information on the benefits available to them, and include an assessment of the programs effectiveness. SECDEF report.
106-616	373	Extension of Time Limitation on Use of Reserve Education Benefits	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Study time limitations on use of education benefits and determine if an extension of the time limitations is useful and cost effective. SECDEF report.
106-616	373	Improved Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)	Report	Annually 03/31/01-06	OUSD/P&R	Study the growth of housing costs in areas where the local costs of housing are believed to be directly influenced by increases in BAH rates. SECDEF report.
106-616	373	Military Pay Day Every 14 Days	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Study whether the change to a 14-day pay period for military personnel is both necessary and desirable. SECDEF report.

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106-616	374	Pay Table Reform for Mid-Grade Enlisted Members	Report or Legislative Proposal	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/P&R	Study the issue and submit either a legislative proposal or an explanation as to why the concerns are not valid. SECDEF report.
106-616	374	Reimbursement for Reservists' Travel Expenses	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Review current travel practices, potential advantages for Reservist and Reserve components of providing reimbursements, and report. SECDEF report.
106-616	374	Reimbursement of Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Expenses	Legislative Proposal	With the FY-02 budget request	OUSD/P&R	Based on a DoD study, develop a legislative proposal designed to enhance PCS reimbursement levels. SECDEF report.
106-616	383	Preventive Health Care Services	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on the steps taken to improve the implementation of the PPIP initiative. SECDEF report.
106-616	383	Computer-Based Patient Record and Medical Records Tracking System	Report	Annually beginning 03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on the progress and the remaining timelines and tasks associated with integrating the medical information systems. SECDEF report.
106-616	383	Computer-Based Patient Record and Medical Records Tracking System	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report the progress of the MRTS and any interim measures to assure that all hospital and medical records of service members can be easily identified. SECDEF report.
106-616	384	Mandatory Enrollment Program for TRICARE Beneficiaries	Report	03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Conduct a study of the benefits to be gained by requiring TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in any of the Department's TRICARE programs. SECDEF report.
106-616	384	Two-Year Extension of Authority for Use of Contract Physicians at Military Entrance Processing Stations and Elsewhere	Report	12/31/00	OUSD/P&R	Extend authority for two years to complete tests of alternative methods for streamlining the new-recruit medical screening and make recommendations for changes. SECDEF report.
106-616	394	Compliance with Applicable Labor Laws in Procurement of Military Clothing	Report	NLT 04/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report any information indicating non-compliance by contractors, with emphasis shall be placed on proper wage payments and scales. SECDEF report.
106-616	408	DoD Personnel Security Investigation Requirements Priorities	Report	NLT 03/01/00	DA&M	Describe efforts to establish a prioritization scheme and to provide more timely and complete personnel security investigations. SECDEF report.
106-616	455	Condition of Barracks to Support Basic Training	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Report findings, including recommendations, coincident with Army's review of current plans and programs. SECDEF report.
106-616	465	Military Housing Privatization Initiative	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Army	Report findings, including recommendations on the impact of military housing developed under the authority of subchapter IV, ch. 169 of title 10, U.S.C., at Fort Carson. SECDEF report.
106-298	<b>SAC-Defense Subcommittee Rpt (on S 2593, Rpt'd 18 May 00)</b>					
106-298	014	Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF)	Report	Monthly	OUSD/C	Provide reports identifying contingency related expenses for which contingency costs are incurred.

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106-298	014	Container use maximization	Report	Within 1 year from enactment	JCS	Outline in detail the inventory of DOD-owned container equipment and its readiness condition, the percentage being <b>containerized</b> , and provide an analysis of steps taken.
106-298	018	Unutilized plant capacity	Report	NLT 09/15/00	Army	Study the scale and capacity of arsenals and ammunition plants, in an effort to mitigate the need for further cash subsidies.
106-298	023	Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard	Report	NLT 01115101	Navy	<b>Report</b> on the status of the conveyance and remediation of this <b>property</b> .
106-298	028	Civil Air Patrol (CAP)	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Report on <b>the</b> status of the relationship between the organizations and the governance and management of CAP, e.g. the cost of Air Force oversight of CAP.
106298	033	Real <b>property</b> maintenance, Army National Guard	Report	04/15/01	NGB	<b>Detail</b> how <b>all</b> funds appropriated for real <b>property</b> maintenance to the ANG will be allocated.
106298	034	Distributive Training <b>Technology</b> program	Report	02/15/01	NGB	Report on how the Department intends to allocate funding for this program in <b>FY-01</b> .
106-298	034	Homeland Defense Initiative, Camp Gruber, OK and Camp Dawson, WV	Report	03/05/01	NGB	Report on a feasibility study to assess the establishment of combat training centers for local, State and Federal entities in response to weapons of mass destruction ( <b>WMD</b> ) threats.
106298	035	Angel Gate Academies	Report	NLT 02/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Should this program be included in the civil-military program and should it be expanded to additional locations.
106-298	035	819th Red Horse Squadron	Report	10/15/00	Air Force	<b>Report</b> on the plan and time line to provide this standard vehicle allowance to the 819th Squadron.
106-298	036	<b>C<sup>4</sup></b> Infrastructure Requirements for C-17 <b>Beddown</b>	Plan	11/15/00	Air Force	Provide a plan and time line for satisfying these funding commitments.
106-298	036	Notification of environmental contract awards	Notify	Upon release of draft solicitations	Services	Notify interested State and <b>local</b> authorities and interested <b>Members</b> of Congress upon release of draft solicitations for contracts anticipated to exceed <b>\$5,000,000</b> .
106-298	037	Museum of the Rockies	Report	10101100	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a report on plans to fund and build this facility, and the overall construction schedule, to include the DD form <b>1391</b> .
106-298	059	STAR-T	Certify	When necessary	Army	Certify, when appropriate, that the program no longer has any software integration problems.
106-298	083	C-130 modifications	Report	Not specified	Air Force	<b>Report</b> on the potential acquisition of existing simulators <b>to</b> support this effort, and the <b>location</b> of <b>the</b> simulator training site to support <b>the</b> Pacific Air Forces.
106298	083	Commando Solo	Report	NLT 02/15/01	Air Force	Conduct an analysis of options for effective airframe alternatives, to include <b>the</b> investigation of cost effective, <b>commercial</b> aircraft replacement options.
106-298	097	Electronic Warfare Plan	Assessment	04/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a analysis of each system's capability and potential for enhancement, including a specific assessment of each <b>system's</b> <b>capability against the current and projected threats</b> .

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106-298	098	Objective Crew-Served Weapon (OCSW)	Report	Within 60 days of passage	Army	Provide a status of the program.
106-298	118	Combat Training Ranges	Report	11/01/00	Air Force	Inform the Committees of the earliest expected implementation of ADOSM to achieve initial operational capability.
106-298	127	PAC-3/Navy Area Defense	Report	04/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	Conduct a study of the potential for the missile to be used as the interceptor in the Navy Area program.
106-298	136	Defense Working Capital Funding Adjustments	Report	NLT 10/30/00	OUSD/P&R	Report on the usage policies, categories, reimbursement, etc. of the commissaries. SECDEF report.
106-298	139	Deseret Chemical Depot	Report	Within 30 days of investigation	Army	Report the findings from safety investigations conducted at Tooele Chemical Agent Facility (TOCDF).
106-298	140	Clinical Coupler Demonstration Project	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report the results of the clinical couplers demonstration, including a recommendation on whether they should be fully incorporated into the CHCS II system.
106-298	144	Office of the Inspector General	Report	Semi-annually	IG	Submit a semi-annual expenditures report in compliance with the requirements contained in sec. 127 of title IO, U.S.C.
106-644	<b>HAC-Defense Subcommittee Rpt (on HR 4576, Rpt'd 25 May 00)</b>					
106-644	006	Information Assurance and Computer Network Security	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I	Provide details on planned obligation of funds, as well as funding proposed in the FY-02 budget. SECDEF report.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT)	Certify	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/C	Certify the budget submission fully funds an additional two IBCTs, as well as in each of the succeeding years of the FYDP until eight brigades are financed. SECDEF report.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) (Army Management)	Report	04/30/01	Army	Commission an independent organization to review and make necessary recommendations to improve the Army's management structure, procedures, etc., and provide a summary of the Secretary's planned recommendations and actions.
106-644	014	Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) (Army Management)	Report	04/30/01	Army	After a review of ways to improve the Army's management structure and procedures, provide a summary of recommendations and actions to be taken.
106-644	041	Guard and Reserve Workyear Requirements	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Report on efforts to ensure that accurate accounting information is used in preparing the Reserve components budget submissions. SECDEF report.
106-644	050	War Reserve and Prepositioned Materials	Report	01/31/01	JCS	Detail specific shortfalls and other stocks needed as described in the QRR, include estimates for both quantities and types of material shortfalls, measures to eliminate shortfalls, and estimates of the cost to remedy. SECDEF report.
106-644	052	O&M Budget Execution Data	Notify	Semiannual	OUSD/C	Summarize O&M budget execution, including the effect of rebaselining procedures, other below threshold reprogrammings and prior approval reprogrammings.

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106-644	052	O&M Budget Execution Data	Notify	30 days prior	OUSDC	Notify prior to executing procedures to <b>rebaseline</b> O&M accounts.
106-644	052	O&M <b>Reprogrammings</b>	Notify	If necessary	OUSDK	Notify of <b>the</b> cumulative value of any and all transfers in excess of <b>\$15,000,000</b> from any of the O&M budget activities and subactivity group categories.
106-644	053	Public transit vouchers	Report	NLT 12/31/00	OUSD/P&R	Delineate measures that the DoD has taken to implement E.O. 13150, and estimate the funding required to support the Executive Order. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-644	062	Naval Sea Cadet Program	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Navy	Lists <b>the</b> benefits of <b>the</b> program to the Navy, and identifies financial, material and manpower resources the Navy <b>should</b> make available to the program in order to expand it.
106-644	067	<b>C-5 Spare Parts</b>	Report	NLT 01/31/01 and 09/30/01	Air Force	Report the overall status of the spare and repair parts program, including whether necessary <b>resources</b> are programmed to address future requirements.
106-644	067	AF cargo distribution hub	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Air Force	Assess the feasibility of using Youngstown-Warren Airport as a hub for the distribution of <b>DoD</b> cargo.
106-644	071	DoD Schools	Report	01115101	OUSD/P&R	Report on school teacher <b>compensation/allowances</b> and fees for teacher/dependent medical <b>services</b> , include recommendations and legislative proposals, if appropriate. SECDEF report.
106-644	085	Depleted Uranium Environmental Restoration	Report	11/23/00	Army	Define responsibilities for restoration of the site, if any, plans to meet them, and identify <b>funding</b> requirements, how <b>the</b> Army has financed them, and a detailed <b>schedule</b> for completion.
106-644	091	Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)	Report	04/01/01	Army	Report the viability of installing GPWS on Army transport <b>helicopters</b> , include a cost analysis of the latest generation on a single circuit card and an acquisition plan.
106-644	093	Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) <b>Modernization</b>	Plan	01/15/01	Army	Submit a plan for modernization of the force, and include an analysis of the threat against <b>the</b> current, mid-term and future <b>threat</b> forces, alternatives for meeting the threat and their <b>cost</b> , and the plan to fund modernization.
106-644	098	Ammunition Management	Report	Within 3 months of enactment	Army	<b>Report</b> the effectiveness of the Triad at managing <b>ammunition</b> , include readiness measurements; on-time delivery; reduction in backlog, and modernization of production <b>base</b> .
106-644	103	Up-armored High Mobility Multi-m wheeled Vehicles ( <b>HMMWV</b> )	Report	NLT 07/10/00	Army	Outline Army's acquisition objective, current inventory levels, and the funding required to alleviate <b>the</b> shortfall.
106-644	108	<b>EP-3</b> Modernization	Report	01/15/01	Navy	Identify the <b>outyear</b> requirements for a SLEP, including any requirement to <b>replace</b> sensors.
106-644	118	Aviation requirement for Joint Tactical Terminals	Report	03/15/01	Navy	Review and report the requirement for aviation joint <b>tactical terminals</b> .

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106-644	128	Miscellaneous Production Charges	Report	NLT 02/15/01	AT&L	Report the findings of a review of plans to acquire next generation targeting pods, and steps taken to promote joint commonality.
106-644	145	Information security lessons learned	Report	11/15/00	OASD/C3I	Outline efforts in implementing lessons learned from April 10, 2000, report on Year 2000.
106-644	148	Tactical radios	Certify	Prior to more than 25% of funds being obligated	OASD/C3I	Certify that the development program meets interoperability requirements, is not duplicative of other developmental efforts and is fully funded in the budget.
106-644	148	Networking of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)	Report	NLT 09/30/01	OASD/C3I	Provide a report on the strategy to network ISR platforms.
106-644	151	Use of special access-like security measures to protect business sensitive information	Report	NLT 11/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the review of guidance for using security measures to protect business sensitive information, and development of additional guidance.
106-644	156	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	Report	06/15/01	Army	Identify UAV requirements not met by the Tactical UAV (TUAV) and plans for meeting those requirements.
106-644	157	Excalibur (XM-982)	Report	07/10/00	Army	Outline alternatives for meeting the 155mm requirement, including capabilities, estimated development cost, production cost, and the schedule for each alternative.
106-644	167	DD-21 Next generation surface combatant (Interoperability)	Report	NLT 3/15/01	Navy	Address the acquisition strategy and the use of innovative technologies from small companies being considered, along with the optimal method of competition.
106-644	168	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS)	Report	12/15/00	Navy	Address all of the plans for unmanned aerial vehicles, including, at a minimum, all identified requirements.
106-644	176	Radiation hardened electronics	Report	NLT 04/01/01, then Annually	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the implementation of the Radiation Hardened Electronics Investment Strategy, and describe the degree of participation by the Services and Agencies. SECDEF report.
106-644	177	Air Traffic Control, Approach, and Landing System	Certify	Prior to funds being obligated	OUSD/P&R	Certify that the development program meets schedule and performance requirements of Air National Guard units.
106-644	184	Arms control technology	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a detailed report on the plan for obligating these funds.
106-644	195	Anthrax Vaccine Program	Report	12/30/00	Army	Present plans to significantly accelerate the availability of new vaccine as well as any additional unfunded requirement associated with this goal.
106-644	197	Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)	Report	Not specified	OUSD/P	Report on the status of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System.
106-644	197	Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)	Certify	Not specified	OUSD/P	Certify that the budget for FY-02 and the FYDP fully meet the operational and modernization requirements, and management responsibility and funding have been best allocated.
106-710	<b>MILCON Conference Rpt (on HR 4425, Rpt'd 29 Jun 00)</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-246 on 13 Jul 00</b>
106-710	005	Sec. 110, New installation overseas	Notify	Prior to initiation	OUSD/AT&L	No funds MilCon Appropriations Acts may be used to initiate a new installation overseas without prior notification.

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106-710	006	Sec. 113, Proposed <b>military</b> exercises	Notify	30 days prior	JCS	Provide plans and scope of proposed military exercise involving U.S. personnel if amounts expended for construction, either temporary or permanent, are anticipated to exceed \$100,000.
106-710	007	Sec. 119, Transfer of Funds	Report	02/15 Annually	OUSD/P & C	Provide details of the specific actions proposed to be taken to encourage nations of the NATO, Japan, Korea, and U.S. allies bordering the Arabian Gulf. SECDEF report.
106-710	007	Sec. 123, DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund	Notify	30 days prior to transfer	OUSD/AT&L	Additional amounts as may be determined may be transferred to the DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund from amounts appropriated for construction in "Family Housing" accounts.
106-710	008	Sec. 125, Transfer of funds ( <b>military</b> family housing)	Notify	NLT 60 days before issuing any solicitation	OUSD/AT&L	Provide notice of any <b>guarantee</b> (including making mortgage or rental payments) proposed to be made by the Secretary to the private party under the contract <b>involved</b> in the certain events.
106-710	009	Sec. 127, O&M for family housing, including <b>flag</b> and general officer quarters	Report	Annually	OUSD/C	Report all O&M expenditures for each individual flag and <b>general</b> officer quarters for the prior fiscal year.
106-710	009	Sec. 128, Family Housing Master Plan	Plan	07101101	Services	Demonstrate how the plan will meet the year 2010 housing goals with traditional construction, operation and maintenance support, as well as privatization initiative proposals.
106-710	010	Sec. 135, Marine Corps Barracks, 8th and 1 <b>Streets</b>	Notify	30 days prior to <b>the</b> use of funds	Navy	Authorization to use funds received for the construction, improvement, repair, and maintenance of the historic residences
106-710	011	Sec. 136, Brooks Air Force <b>Base</b> Development Demonstration Project	Plan	30 days prior to exercising any authority	Air Force	The Secretary may not exercise any <b>authority</b> under this section until after the submission of a master plan for development of <b>the Base</b> .
106-710	014	Sec. 136, Brooks Air Force Base Development Demonstration Project	Report	30 days prior	Air Force	Section 2662 of title 10, U.S.C., applies to transactions <b>at</b> the Base during the Project.
106-710	015	Sec. 139, Transfer of Funds	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OUSD/P	Report on construction, security and operation of <b>Forward</b> Operating Locations (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador, Aruba, <b>Curacao</b> , and <b>El Salvador</b> . SECDEF report.
106-710	017	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide (including Transfer of Funds)	Certify	30 days prior to funds becoming available	Navy	Certify that the integrity and accessibility of the training range is uninterrupted, and <b>trespassing</b> and other intrusions on the range have ceased.
106-710	017	Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide (including Transfer of Funds)	Recertify	90 days after initial certification	Navy	SECNAV shall recertify the status of the range <b>90</b> days after the initial certification, and each 90 days thereafter.
106-710	019	Sec. 104, Abrams M1A2 SEP Upgrades	certify	<b>Prior</b> to funds being obligated	Army	<b>Certify</b> that these funds will be used to upgrade vehicles <b>for</b> an average unit <b>cost</b> (for 307 vehicles) that does not exceed <b>\$5,900,000</b> .
106-710	020	Sec. 106, Defense Health <b>Program</b>	Notify	Before charging	OUSD/P&R	Notify <b>the</b> committees before <b>charging</b> an obligation or an adjustment to obligations under this <b>section</b> . SECDEF report.
106-710	020	Sec. 106, Defense <b>Health</b> Program	Report	NLT 30 days after <b>the</b> end of FY-00	OUSD/P&R	Report on obligations made under <b>this</b> section. SECDEF report.

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106710	022	Sec. 113, Patriot missile program	Plan	NLT 30 days after enactment	BMDO	Submit a revised plan for <b>\$125,000,000</b> to remain <b>available</b> until September 30, 2002, and be available only for <b>this</b> program.
106-710	023	sec. 118, NMD Program	Notify	15 days prior	BMDO	Notify <b>prior</b> to issuing any type of information or proposal <b>solicitation</b> with a potential annual contract value greater than <b>\$5,000,000</b> or a total contract value greater than \$34000,000.
106-710	061	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense (including Transfer of Funds)	Report	15 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUSD/P	Report on the <b>value</b> , duration and purpose of contracts for <b>training, logistics</b> support, planning or assistance contracts for any overseas activity.
106-710	062	Sec. 3101, Counter-drug activities of the Government of Colombia	certify	15 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUSD/P	Address the <b>support</b> provided under this <b>section</b> by the Government of Colombia. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106710	064	Sec. 3201, Conditions on Assistance for Colombia -- Waiver	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/P	Assistance may be furnished if to do so is in the national security interest. <b>President report .</b>
106-710	065	Sec. 3202. Regional Strategy	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSD/P	<b>Current</b> policy and strategy regarding U.S. <b>counternarcotics</b> assistance for Colombia and neighbors. <b>President report.</b>
106-710	066	Sec. 3204, Limitations on support for plan Colombia and on assignment of U.S. personnel in Colombia	Report	When necessary	OUSD/P	Request the availability of funds. <b>President report.</b>
106-710	067	Sec. 3204, Limitations on assignment of U.S. personnel in Colombia -- Exception	Report	If necessary	OUSD/P	Request the limitation not apply. <b>President report.</b>
106-710	067	Sec. 3204, Support for Plan Colombia	Report	Semiannually from 06/01/01	OUSD/P	Delineate any costs (including incremental costs) incurred by any entity of the Executive branch during the two previous <b>fiscal quarters</b> . <b>President report.</b>
106-710	067	Sec. 3204, Bimonthly report	Report	Within 90 days of enactment and every 60 days thereafter	OUSD/P	Includes the <b>aggregate</b> number, locations, activities, and <b>lengths</b> of assignment for all temporary and permanent US. military and US. individuals retains as contractors. <b>President report .</b>
106-710	087	Real Property Maintenance: Reporting Requirement	Notify	21 days prior	services	<b>Submit</b> prior to <b>carrying</b> out any <b>repair</b> project with an <b>estimated</b> cost in excess of <b>\$7,500,000</b> .
106-710	088	Alkali Silica Reactivity	Report	NLT 05/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Assess the overall <b>condition</b> of facilities and infrastructure <b>With</b> respect to ASR, <b>also</b> address the long-term strategy and recommendations to manage this issue.
106-710	089	Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator	Report	NLT 02/28/01	Air Force	Conduct a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis and standard return on investment criteria in the relocation study now <b>being</b> performed <b>and</b> provide a report.
106710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Contractor Support for Family Housing Privatization)	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	Review quarterly, and report the expenses of each component <b>to</b> ensure excessive amounts are <b>not being spent on contractor support.</b>
106-710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Reporting Requirements)	Notify	45 days prior to entering into any contract	Services	Submit <b>notice</b> of the nature and terms of the privatization contracts following a <b>45-day</b> review period..

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106-710	094	DoD Family Housing Improvement Fund (Reporting Requirements)	Notify	45 days prior to transfer of any funds	OUSD/C	Submit notice and justification for the transfer of appropriated funds into the account. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-710	095	Base Realignment and Closure Account, Part IV	Notify	21 days prior to transfer of funds	Army	Any transfer of funds which exceeds reprogramming thresholds for any construction project financed by any BRAC Account and shall not be subject to reprogramming procedure.
106-710	097	Cadet Physical Development Center	Notify	30 days prior to use of private donations	Army	Any further requirements must be funded through private donations.
106-710	132	Anti-Deficiency Act and TRICARE	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSD/P&R	Delineate the extent and scope of any violations of fiscal law or departmental regulations found during an investigation into the execution and administration of Defense Health Program funds.
106-710	132	Military personnel, recruiting, advertising, and retention programs	Notify	30 days prior to obligation	OUSD/C	The remaining funds shall be withheld from obligation pending the proposed specific distribution of funds.
106-710	165	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense (Plan Colombia)	Report	NLT 30 days following enactment	OUSD/P	Report proposed uses of funds and describe steps taken for maximum force protection of U.S. personnel, including their rules of engagement. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-710	165	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense (Plan Colombia)	Notify	15 days prior to any obligation or transfer	OUSD/C	Provide specific purposes contained in the budget request and delineated in the statement of managers.
106-710	165	Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense (Plan Colombia)	Report	Monthly	OUSD/P	Identify firms, number of American citizens located overseas in execution of supporting contracts, and number of personnel operating in Colombia and surrounding region.
106-754	<b>Appropriations Conference Rpt (on HR 4576, Rpt'd 18 Jul 00)</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-259 on 9 Aug 00</b>
106-754	015	National Guard and Reserve Equipment	Report	NLT 30 days after enactment	OUSD/P&R	Submit a modernization priority assessment for each Reserve or National Guard component.
106-754	020	Sec. 8005, Military Functions	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the military functions account. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8006, Working Capital Funds	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the "Foreign Currency Fluctuation" and "Operation and Maintenance" appropriation accounts. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8006, Working Capital Funds	Notify	Prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Transfers between working capital funds and the war reserve material inventory. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	020	Sec. 8007, Special Access Program	Notify	30 days prior to transfer	OUSD/C	Funds may not be used to initiate a special access program.
106-754	020	Sec. 8008, Multiyear Contracts	Notify	30 days prior to contract award	OUSD/C	No funds shall be available for which the economic order quantity advance procurement is not funded at least to the limits of the Government's liability.
106-754	021	Sec. 8008, Multiyear Contracts	Notify	10 days prior to termination	OUSD/C	No multiyear procurement contract can be terminated.

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106-754	021	Sec. 8009, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance costs	Report	9/30 Annually	OUSD/C	O&M funds may be obligated for humanitarian and civic assistance costs incidental to authorized operations and pursuant to authority granted.
106-754	022	Sec. 8014, Contractor performance	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	No funds shall be available to convert to contractor performance an activity or function that, until an efficient and cost-effective organization analysis is completed.
106-754	023	Sec. 8016, Shipboard anchor and mooring chain	Certify	If necessary	Services	When adequate domestic supplies are not available on a timely basis, the Secretary of the service responsible for the procurement may waive the restriction on a case-by-case basis.
106-754	024	Sec. 8019, Executive agreement with NATO member host nation	Report	30 days prior	OUSD/AT&L	Each executive agreement with a NATO member host nation shall be reported. SECDEF report.
106-754	024	Sec. 8021, Relocations	Certify	When necessary	DA&M	If a relocation within the National Capital Region is required in the best interest of the Government. SECDEF report.
106-754	027	Sec. 8032, Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Present specific amounts of staff years of technical effort to be allocated for each defense FFRDC during that fiscal year. SECDEF report.
106-754	027	Sec. 8033, Procurement of carbon, alloy or armor steel plate	Certify	When necessary	Services	Certify that adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet requirements and an acquisition must be made.
106-754	028	Sec. 8036, Buy American Act	Report	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Determine the amount of DoD purchases from foreign entities in FY-01 and indicate the dollar value of items for which the BA Act was waived pursuant to any agreement. SECDEF report.
106-754	028	Sec. 8041, DoD Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account	Report	30 days prior to transfer or obligation of funds	OUSD/C	Detail the balance available, projected income during FYs 2001 and 2002, and specific expenditures to be made using funds transferred from the account during FY-01. SECDEF report.
106-754	031	Sec. 8052, Field Operating Agency	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Certify that granting a waiver on limitations will reduce the personnel requirements or the financial requirements of the department. SECDEF report.
106-754	033	Sec. 8060, Military Treatment Facilities	Certify	If necessary	Services	Certify that the beneficiary population is declining and civilian strength reductions may be consistent with responsible resource stewardship and capitation-based budgeting.
106-754	033	Sec. 8061, Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Revolving Fund	Certify	When necessary	DA&M (Pentagon Renovation)	Certify that the total cost for the planning, design, construction and installation of equipment for the renovation will not exceed \$1,222,000,000. SECDEF report.
106-754	034	Sec. 8064, Vessel propellers and ball and roller bearings	Certify	When necessary	Services	Certify that adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet requirements on a timely basis.
106-754	034	Sec. 8066, Purchase of supercomputer	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify that an acquisition must be made in order to acquire capability for national security purposes. SECDEF report.
106-754	035	Sec. 8070, Limitation on Transfer of Defense Articles and Services	Notify	15 days in advance of any transfer	OUSD/P	A description of the equipment, supplies, or services to be transferred, and a statement of the value in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations.

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106-754	035	Sec. 8071, Defense exports loan guarantees	Report	Quarterly	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the implementation of these loan guarantees. SECDEF report.
106-754	037	Sec. 8078, FY-02 Budget Request reductions	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Identify, by amount and by separate budget activity, activity group, <b>subactivity</b> group, line item, program element, program, project, subproject, and activity any reductions.
106-754	038	Sec. 8084, RDT&E funds to procure end-items for <b>delivery</b> to military forces	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	May waive the restriction on a <b>case-by-case</b> basis by certifying that it is in the national security interest. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	038	Sec. 8086, Funding reductions of <b>0.7%</b>	Report	60 days after enactment	OUSD/C	Amounts provided in all <b>appropriation</b> accounts in titles III and IV of the Act are affected <b>and reductions</b> shall be applied on a <b>pro-rata basis to each appropriation account</b> .
106-754	039	Sec. 8091, New Start Program	Notify	Prior to payment	OUSD/C	No funds may be used to compensate an employee of the DoD who initiates a program without notification.
106-754	040	Sec. 8092, Foreign security forces training program	Report	15 days after the exercise of any waiver	OUSD/P	Describe the circumstances, purpose and duration of training, U.S. and foreign forces involved, and human rights violations information necessitating the waiver. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	040	Sec. 8095, ADC(X) class main propulsion diesel engines and propulsors	Certify	On a case-by-case basis	OUSD/AT&L	When adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet requirements on a <b>timely basis</b> and such acquisitions must be made in order to acquire capability. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	041	Sec. 8099, Advanced concept technology demonstration projects	Report	30 days prior to obligation of funds	OUSD/AT&L	Include a description of the demonstration project and its estimated annual and total cost.
106-754	041	Sec. 8099, Advanced concept technology demonstration projects	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Waive the restriction by certifying that it is in the national interest to do so. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	042	Sec. 8102, Certifications as to Compliance with Clinger-Cohen Act	Notify	Prior to Milestone approval	OASD/C3I	Certify, with respect to each milestone, that the system is being developed in accordance with the Act.
106-754	043	Sec. 8103, Reimbursement by another department or agency	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Certify a waiver if a department or agency is more than 90 days in arrears for goods or services. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	044	Sec. 8109, the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance	Report	04/01/01	OUSD/P	Regards training of foreign personnel in the previous year, specify countries in which the training was conducted, type of training, and the foreign personnel trained. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	046	Sec. 8117, Health care contract costs	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Evaluate the scope and extent of health care contract claims, and on actions taken to implement the provision. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	046	Sec. 8120, Work-related illnesses resulting from exposure to beryllium or beryllium alloys	Report	05/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Work-related illnesses in the DoD workforce, including the workforce of contractors and vendors. <b>SECDEF</b> report.
106-754	047	Sec. 8123, Interim Armored Vehicle program (Family of Medium Armored Vehicles)	Report	NLT 90 days after source selection	Army	Include the required R&D and production unit cost for each variant of the vehicle and the program cost and milestones.
106-754	048	Sec. 8123, Joint warfighting requirements for new medium brigades for the Army	Report	With FY-02 budget request	JCS	Describe any adjustments made to operational plans of the unified combatant commands for use of those brigades.
106-754	048	Sec. 8124, LRIP for F-22 aircraft program	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify that all Defense Acquisition Board exit criteria for the award of low-rate initial production of the aircraft have been met. <b>SECDEF</b> report.

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106-754	048	Sec. 8124, LRIP for F-22 aircraft program	Report	When necessary	OT&E	Assess the adequacy of testing to date to measure and predict performance of F-22 avionics systems, stealth characteristics, and weapons delivery systems.
106-754	048 / 293	Sec. 8127, NMD Program	Notify	15 days prior to issuing	BMDO	When issuing any type of information or proposal solicitation with a potential annual contract value greater than \$5,000,000 or a total contract value greater than \$30,000,000.
106-754	049 / 091	Sec. 8131, Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund	Report	NLT 30 days after the end of each quarter	OUSD/C	Explain transfers from the "Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund", and transfers for maintenance, pay of civilian personnel, and base operations support. SECDEF report.
106-754	49	Sec. 8133, Navy ship construction appropriation transfer of funds	Report	30 days prior to the proposed transfer	Navy	Navy may transfer funds for the purpose of liquidating necessary ship cost changes for previous ship construction programs appropriated in law.
106-754	050	Sec. 8136, Navy Inactive Fleet and Maritime Administration National Defense Reserve Fleet ship disposal and scrapping	Report	06/01/01	Navy (and DoT)	Report the total number of vessels currently designated for scrapping, and the schedule and costs for scrapping these vessels.
106-754	098	Underutilized Plant Capacity	Report	09/15/00	Army	Study the scale and capacity of the plants.
106-754	098	Air Battle Captain	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	Army	Submit a detailed recruitment plan, specifically addressing this program.
106-754	099	Enhanced Skills Training Program	Report	10/01/00	Army	Define the long-term plans for the program's partnership with HBCU's.
106-754	099	Open Burn/Open Disposal Practices	Report	09/30/01	Army	Study potential alternative technologies and report on possible phase out; include a review of technologies currently in existence and under development and assess cost and feasibility of constructing facilities.
106-754	106	Enhanced Safety in DoD Industrial Facilities	Report	12/01/00	OUSD/AT&L	Evaluate the feasibility of establishing pilot programs to improve worker safety and include proposals for employing gain sharing incentives. SECDEF report. AT&L can sign.
106-754	121	Civil/Military Programs	Report	04/15/01	OUSD/C	Report the status of the obligation of funds for these programs.
106-754	147	Forward Looking Infrared Devices (FLIR)	Report	Prior to obligation of funds	Army	Justify a requirement for a unique FLIR and demonstrate that it is affordable compared to a common system.
106-754	189	SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System	Report	Within 120 days	Navy	Assess the operational readiness status of the system, including plans and funding requirements.
106-754	220	Joint Strike Fighter	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a status of the program, technical development results, flight test program, and cost estimates. SECDEF report.
106-754	234	Artillery Systems -- Demonstration/Validation	Report	30 days prior to 50% of funds	Army	Submit an Analysis of Alternatives on Crusader and analysis of Crusader and Future Combat System. SECDEF report.
106-754	234	Enhanced Skills Training Program	Report	NLT 10/01/00	Army	Report on long term plans for Army's partnership with HBCU's in preparing students for the Army.
106-754	264	Discoverer II	Report	Not specified	OASD/C3I	Submit a program plan for the development, testing and application of technologies funded under this revised initiative.

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106-754	264	Joint Ejection Seat Program	Plan	30 days prior to contract award	OUSD/AT&L [N/AF]	Address all specific applications for the ejection seat or ejection seat technology developed. Specifically address the cost and commonality benefits. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-754	264	Joint Ejection Seat Program	certify	Prior to obligation of funds	Navy / Air Force	<b>Certify</b> that a joint program office is in place to manage to program.
106754	281	Information Technology Center	Report	NLT 05/01/01	JCS	Outline plans for proceeding with establishment of the centers. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-754	284	National Defense Sealift Fund (C-17)	Notify	When necessary	OUSD/C	NDAF should conform to the requirements for other DoD procurement accounts.
106-754	287	Peer Reviewed Medical Research Program	Report	03/01/01	Army	<b>Report the status of the program, and</b> include the corresponding funds provided in previous fiscal years.
106-754	291	T-AGOS support	Report	NLT 03/30/01	OUSD/P	<b>Analyze the operational effectiveness</b> of the T-AGOS ships and <b>provide a summary</b> of suggested alternative platforms or assets and their associated costs.
106-945	<b>Authorization Conference Rpt (H.R. 4205 (HR 5408), Rpt'd 6 Oct</b>					<b>Became P.L. 106-398 on 30 Oct 00</b>
106945	029 / 642	Sec. 111, Multiyear procurement authority (M2A3 Bradley)	Certify	Prior to executing a contract	Army	<b>Certify</b> that the vehicle has successfully completed the initial operational test and evaluation and milestone III review.
106-945	029	Sec. 113, Objective Force Development Process	Report	30 days prior to obligation of 80% of the funds	Army	Include <b>envisioned</b> operational environments, threat <b>assumptions</b> on which R and D efforts are based, and potential operational and organizational concepts.
106-945	030 / 643	Sec. 113, Objective Force Development Process	Report	03101101	JCS	Report on the process for developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army, including joint warfighting and lift requirements. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	030 / 643	Sec. 113, Costs and Effectiveness of Medium Armored Combat Vehicles for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams	Plan	30 days prior to obligation of funds	Army	Compare <b>costs and operational effectiveness</b> of <b>infantry carrier variant</b> and troop-carrying medium armored <b>vehicles</b> currently in the Army inventory for <b>the</b> use of infantry battalions.
106-945	031	Sec. 113, Costs and Effectiveness of Medium Armored Combat Vehicles for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams	Certify	30 days after submission of Army's plan	Army	After completion of <b>the</b> comparison of costs and operational effectiveness, <b>certify</b> approval of the obligation of funds, the force structure and <b>subsequent</b> operational capability will <b>not diminish the</b> combat power. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	032	Sec 122, Arleigh Burke class destroyer program	Report	11/01/00	Navy	Update <b>information</b> provided in <b>the</b> report of the <b>SECNAV</b> entitled the 'Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Industrial Base Study of 1993'.
106-945	033 / 644	Sec 123, Virginia class submarine program	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OUSD/AT&L	Report on a plan for maintaining at least 55 fast attack submarines; two <b>production</b> rate assessments of potential savings; and an analysis of various <b>contracting</b> strategies.
						<b>SECDEF report.</b>

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106-945	034 / 644	Sec. 124, Limitation during fiscal year 2001 on changes in submarine force <b>structure</b>	Report	04115101	Navy	Required force, structure to support the national military <b>strategy</b> and include the acquisition strategy and fleet maintenance requirements. <b>President report</b> .
106-945	035 / 645	Sec. 127, Alternative funding mechanism for naval vessels and other naval capabilities	Report	With FY-02 budget request (NLT 02/05/01)	Navy	Include a detailed description of the funding mechanisms and effect of each funding mechanism on production stability of other shipbuilding programs funded within the Navy.
106-945	036 / 646	Sec. 131, B-2 Bomber	Report	03/01 Annually	Air Force	<b>Include the capability</b> to carry out <b>missions</b> ; ongoing and <b>planned</b> technology efforts to improve capabilities and meet expanded threats; and a fiscally-phased program for each of three <b>funding</b> scenarios. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	036 / 646	Sec. 132, Modernization of Air National Guard F-16A units	Plan	02/01/01	Air Force	A plan to modernize and upgrade the combat capabilities of those units that are assigned <b>F-16A</b> aircraft.
106-945	037 / 647	Sec. 141, Study of <b>Final</b> Assembly and Check Alternatives for the Joint Strike Fighter <b>program</b>	Report	NLT 180 days after date of award of a contract	OUSD/AT&L	After award of a contract for engineering and manufacturing development provide the results of a study of final assembly and checkout alternatives for that aircraft. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	038 / 647	Sec. 152, Federal economic assistance for communities impacted by Chemical <b>Demilitarization</b> activities	Report	04/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on impact of the <b>DoD</b> destruction program on communities in the vicinity of <b>stockpile</b> storage sites and associated activities at certain <b>facilities</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	040 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike <b>Fighter</b> program	Report	12115100	OUSD/AT&L	Describe the criteria for exiting from the demonstration and validation phase, and entry into the engineering and <b>manufacturing development phase</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	040 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike <b>Fighter</b> program	Certify	Upon completion of exit criteria accomplishment	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Certify accomplishment of exit criteria</b> ; technological maturity sufficient for entry into engineering and manufacturing development phase; and short take-off, vertical-landing aircraft variant. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	041 / 717	Sec. 212, Joint Strike <b>Fighter</b> program	Notify	Prior to any transfer	OUSD/AT&L	Transfers within the JSF Navy and AF accounts may occur, subject to established congressional notification and <b>reprogramming procedures</b> . <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	041 / 717	Sec. 213, FY-02 Joint Field Experiment	Report	NLT 3/1/2001	JCS	Report on the concept plan, including the objectives; forces participating; schedule and location; and for each participate, identification of budget issues. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	042 / 718	Sec 214, Nuclear Aircraft Carrier Design and Production Modeling	Report	With the FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report the results of the required assessment and plans and <b>funding requirements</b> for developing the model specified.
106-945	042 / 718	Sec 214, Use of Technology Insertion Approach for Construction of the DD-21 Ship	Plan	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Submit a plan for pursuing the Approach as authorized, and include estimates of resources necessary to carry out the plan.
106-945	042	Sec 214, Acquisition and Maintenance Plan	Report	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Report on the Navy's plan. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	043 / 718	Sec 215, DD-21 class destroyer program	Plan	NLT 04/18/01	Navy	Pursue a technology insertion approach for construction as authorized; the plan shall include estimates of the resources necessary to carry out.

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106-945	043 / 718	Sec 215, DD-21 class destroyer program	Report	NLT 04/18/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on Navy's plan for the acquisition and maintenance of the destroyers. SECDEF report.
106-945	044 / 718	Sec. 216, Limitation on Russian American Observation Satellites Program (RAMOS)	Report	30 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	BMDO	Explain plans to protect U.S. advanced military technology that may be associated with the program. SECDEF report.
106-945	044 / 719	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Notify	Prior to funds being obligated	OUSD/AT&L	Submit when the FDA has approved the current manufacturer for production of the anthrax vaccine. SECDEF report.
106-945	044	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Report	Prior to funds being obligated	OUSD/AT&L	Report contingencies associated with continuing to rely on the current manufacturer. SECDEF report.
106-945	045 / 719	Sec. 217, Joint Biological Defense program	Notify / Justify	NLT 7 days after funds obligated exceeds \$5M	OUSD/AT&L	Notify that total obligations exceed \$5M, together with written justification for obligation of funds in excess of that amount. SECDEF report.
106-945	045	Sec. 218, Biological warfare defense vaccines research and development programs	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the acquisition of biological warfare defense vaccines for the Department SECDEF report.
106-945	046 / 720	Sec. 220, Unmanned advanced capability combat aircraft and ground combat vehicles	Report	01/31/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the programs to demonstrate the aircraft and vehicles undertaken jointly between the DARPA and any of the services. SECDEF report.
106-945	048	Sec. 221, Global Hawk high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle	Report	NLT 45 days after demonstration	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the results of the demonstration, including an assessment of the technical feasibility and a discussion of the operational concept for the use of the vehicle. SECDEF report.
106-945	049 / 722	Sec. 232, Reports on Ballistic Missile Threat Posed By North Korea (Threat)	Report	NLT 2 weeks after next long-range test by N.K. or 60 days	DIA	Assess the missile threat, whether the U.S. is capable of defeating the N. Korean missile threat, and the potential for proliferation of missile technologies. <i>President report</i> .
106-945	049 / 722	Sec. 232, Reports on Ballistic Missile Threat Posed By North Korea (Reducing Vulnerability)	Report	NLT 2 weeks of next test	DIA	Provide any steps intended to reduce the vulnerability to the N. Korean long-range ballistic missile threat and the technical and programmatic viability of testing any other missile defense systems. <i>President report</i> .
106-945	050	Sec. 233, Plan to modify ballistic missile defense systems and architecture	Report	NLT 02/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	After assessing the plan report on the results of the assessment. SECDEF report.
106-945	050	Sec. 234, Management of Airborne Laser program	Report	NLT 02/15/01	BMDO	Report on the role of the airborne laser, including assessments on various aspects of the program.
106-945	053	Sec. 247, Technology Plan	Report	02/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	Provide a detailed technology plan to develop and mature high energy laser technologies.
106-945	053	Sec. 248, High Energy Laser programs	Report	NLT 02/15/2001, 2002 & 2003	OUSD/AT&L	Assess the adequacy of the management structure, funding available, technical progress, and extent to which goals and objectives of the plan have been met. SECDEF report.
106-945	054	Sec. 250, Review of Defense-wide directed energy programs	Report	NLT 03/15/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report the findings of the evaluation of expansion of the management structure. SECDEF report.

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106-945	054	Sec. 251, Merits of Mobile Offshore Base Concept	Report	NLT 03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the cost-benefit analysis, using operational concepts; recommendation regarding whether to proceed as a program and if so state which service is to be designated to have the lead responsibility; and include a schedule. SECDEF report.
106-945	054	Sec. 251, Mobile Offshore Base potential use for certain purposes of associated technologies	Report	NLT03/01/01	(Navy	Report on the potential use of technologies associated with the concept, including an assessment of the potential application and feasibility of using existing technologies.
106-945	063 / 759	Sec. 312, Certain environmental restoration activities	Notify	Before paying costs of permanently relocating	OUSD/AT&L and Services	Upon determination that such permanent relocation is part of a response action. SECDEF report.
106-945	065 / 762	Sec. 318, Ship disposal project	Report	NLT 12/31/00	Navy	Include a description of the competitive procedures used for the solicitation and award of task orders including a description; an assessment of the results; and a strategy for future procurement.
106-945	066 / 762	Sec. 319, Defense Environmental Security Corporate Information Management Pro&n	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OUSD/AT&L	Include a mission statement and strategic objectives for the Program, recommendations of the Secretary for the Programs future mission and objectives. SECDEF report.
106-945	066 / 762	Sec. 320, Plasma Energy Pyrolysis System	Report	NLT 02/01/01	Army	Analysis of information and data on fixed-transportable unit and on mobile unit demonstration phase; recommendations on future applications of system; and statement of projected funding.
106-945	069 / 764	Sec. 336, Effects of availability of slot machines on U.S. military installations overseas	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Evaluate the effects of the availability of slot machines as a MWR activity, the morale of military communities overseas, and members' personal financial stability. SECDEF report.
106-945	071 / 764	Sec. 341, Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence and public-private partnerships to increase utilization of such centers	Report	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Report the extent to which a loan guarantee program modeled after the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program would help to achieve the objectives. SECDEF report.
106-945	075	Sec. 343, Arsenal Support Program Initiative	Report	NLT 07/01/01 & 2002	Army	Specifying the amount of loans guaranteed during the preceding calendar year.
1 M-945	075	Sec. 343, Arsenal Support Program Initiative	Report	NLT 07/01/01	Army	Report on the implementation of the demonstration program, and include a review of contracting at the manufacturing arsenals and recommendations appropriate regarding any changes.
106-945	079	Sec. 344, Codification and improvement of armament retooling and manufacturing support programs	Report	NLT 07/01/01	Army	Report on the procedures and controls implemented to carry out this program. SECDEF report.
106-945	080 / 765	Sec. 351, Additional information required before conversion of commercial or industrial type functions to contractor performance	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/AT&L	Certify the factors considered in the examinations performed, and the decisions made, did not include any predetermined personnel constraint or limitation. SECDEF report.
106-945	081 / 766	Sec. 352, Effects of outsourcing of overhead costs of Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence and Army ammunition plants	Report	Changes may not begin until at least 60 days after report	Army	Include a description of the effect that the performance and administration of the resulting contract will have on the overhead costs to the required report.

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106-945	081 / 766	Sec. 353. Consolidation, restructuring, or reengineering of organizations, functions, or activities	Plan	Annually with budget request	OUUSD/AT&L	Submit each <b>Strategic Sourcing Plan of Action</b> for the Department (as identified in the DoD Interim Guidance), for the following year, <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	082	Sec. 353, Consolidation, restructuring, or reengineering of organizations, functions, or activities: Decision to execute plan	Report	If a decision is made	OUUSD/AT&L	Describe the decision, include a projection of savings compared with cost; describe missions, duties, or requirements affected; and various certifications and schedules. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	082 / 767	Sec. 353, Consolidation, restructuring, or reengineering of organizations, functions, or activities	Notify	30 days prior to implementation of the plan	OUUSD/AT&L	Plan may not be implemented until notification of the intent to carry out such plan is provided.
106-945	083 / 767	Sec. 354, Savings resulting from workforce reductions as part of conversion of functions	Report	NLT 02/01 annually	OUUSD/AT&L	Report on the results of the monitoring performed under the system established. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
1 M-945	084 / 767	Sec. 355. Performance of emergency response functions of chemical weapons storage installations	Certify	Prior to any conversion	Army	<b>Certify the plan for conversion is consistent with recommendation contained in GAO Report NSIAD-00-88, and provides for a transition to contractor performance.</b>
106-945	084 / 767	Sec. 356, Suspension of reorganization or relocation of Naval Audit Service	Report	180 days prior	Navy	<b>Detail plans and justification for the reorganization or relocation of the performance of the auditing functions, as the case may be.</b>
106-945	090 / 769	Sec. 373, Effects of worldwide contingency operations on readiness of military aircraft and equipment	Report	NLT 180 days after date of enactment	JCS	Assess the effects of operations on the readiness of equipment, and the capability of the <b>Armed Forces to maintain</b> a high level of equipment readiness and to manage a high operating tempo. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	091 / 769	Sec. 374, ID of requirements to reduce backlog in maintenance and repair of Defense facilities	Report	NLT 03/15/01, with annual updates	OUUSD/AT&L	Identify, develop and annually update a strategic plan for the reduction of the backlog. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	093 / 770	Sec. 377, Air Force spare and repair parts program for C-5	Report	NLT 01/01/01 and 09/30/01	Air Force	<b>Report on the overall status of the spare and repair parts program.</b>
106-945	094 / 770	Sec. 381, Public sale of certain military equipment identified on U.S. Munitions List	Report	NLT March 31 annually	DLA	Identify each public sale conducted by a military department or defense agency and cover various elements of the public sale. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	097 / 772	Sec. 386, Additions to plan for ensuring visibility over all in-transit end items and secondary items	Plan	NLT 180 days after enactment	OUUSD/AT&L	Submit any revisions made to the plan that are required by any law enacted after October 17, 1998. <b>SECDEF report</b> .
106-945	099 / 772	Sec. 389, Alkali Silica Reactivity (ASR)	Report	09/30/06	OUUSD/AT&L	<b>Outline the damage caused to aviation facilities and the availability of technologies capable of preventing, treating, or mitigating the impact of ASR. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	099 / 773	Sec. 390, Demonstration project for the National Guard to provide internet access	Report	02/01/05	Army	<b>Describe the activities conducted under the demonstration project and include any recommendations regarding the expansion of this demonstration project to other offices.</b>
106-945	099 / 773	Sec. 391, Additional conditions on implementation of Defense Joint Accounting System	Report	Prior to granting a Milestone III decision	OUUSD/C	<b>Report on analysis of the requirements for the DJAS and analysis of alternatives to the system to determine whether it warrants deployment. SECDEF report.</b>

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106-945	100 / 773	Sec. 391, Additional conditions on implementation of Defense Joint Accounting System	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/C	Will the system meet required functionality for Users; acquisition standards; applicable Milestone requirements; and requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. SECDEF report.
106-945	100 / 773	Sec. 392, Defense Travel System	Report	11/30/00	OUSD/C	Provide a schedule and discussion of the development, testing, and fielding of the system; and analysis of the costs and benefits of fielding this system. SECDEF report.
106-945	104 / 78	Sec. 415, Increase in numbers of members in certain grades authorized to be on active duty in support of the Reserves	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on management of the grade structure for reserve-component officers enlisted members subject to sec. 12011 and sec. 12012 of title 10, U.S.C., respectively. SECDEF report.
106-945	116	Sec. 507. Grade of Chiefs of Reserve components and Directors of National Guard components	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on a study of changing the grade authorized for the Vice Chief of the NGB from major general to lieutenant general, and include recommendations/conclusions. SECDEF report.
106-945	122	Sec. 534, Review of allocation of Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) units among the services	Legislative proposal	If necessary, with FY 02 budget request	OUSD/P&R	Based on the review of the allocations of units it is determined that an increase in the statutory maximum number of such units is warranted. SECDEF report.
106-945	123	Sec. 535, Authority for NPG School to enroll certain Defense industry civilians	certify	Prior to the start of the academic year, annually	Navy	Providing instruction during that year will further the military mission of the school; enhance the design and development of defense systems; and will be on a space-available basis.
106-945	124	Sec. 535, Authority for NPG School to enroll certain Defense industry civilians	Report	NLT 60 days after receipt of Navy report	Navy	Submit the Navy report on the program, together with any comments that are considered appropriate. SECDEF report.
106-945	125	Sec. 542, Consideration of Proposals for Posthumous of Honorary Promotions or Appointments of members or former members	Report	When necessary	Services	Provide notice upon making a determination as to the merits and include a statement of the reasons for the decision of the Secretary.
106-945	141	Sec. 561, Army recruiting pilot programs	Report	NLT 02/01/06	Army	Provide a separate report on each pilot program carried out, and include an assessment of the value of the actions taken and any recommendations to increase the effectiveness and efficiency.
106-945	143 / 794	Sec. 563, Access to secondary schools for military recruiting purposes	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	If one year after notification is given a local educational agency continues to deny access to at least two of the armed forces. SECDEF report.
106-945	144	Sec. 564, Pilot program to enhance military recruiting by improving military awareness of school counselors and educators	Report	NLT 180 days after program period	OUSD/P&R	Provide the Secretary's findings and conclusions on the pilot program. SECDEF report.
106-945	147 / 795	Sec. 573, Congressional review period for assignment of women to duty on submarines	Notify	Prior to any change in Navy policy	Navy	No changes in the policy, as in effect on May 10, 2000, may take effect until notification is given and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has past. SECDEF report.
106-945	147 / 795	Sec. 573, Congressional review period for assignment of women to duty on submarines	Notify	Prior to funds being available	Navy	Before funds may be expended to reconfigure any submarine, or to design any new submarine, and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress have past. SECDEF report.

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106-945	149 / 795	Sec. 574, Management and per diem requirements	Report	03/31/02	OUSD/P&R	Report on the administration of this provision and make recommendations for revision. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	150	Sec. 576, Test of ability of Reserve component intelligence units and personnel to meet current and emerging Defense intelligence needs	Report (Interim)	71112002 & 2003	OASD/C3I	Submit interim reports on the status of the test program. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106945	150	Sec. 576, Test of <b>ability</b> of Reserve component intelligence units and personnel to meet current and emerging Defense intelligence needs	Report (Final)	NLT 12/1/2004	OASD/C3I	Submit a final report with recommendations for changes. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	152	Sec. 578, <b>Study of use of</b> civilian contractor pilots for operational support missions	Report	NLT 6 months after enactment	JCS	<b>Study</b> the feasibility and cost of using civilian contractor personnel as pilots and other air crew members to fly nonmilitary Government aircraft. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106945	157	Sec. 604, <b>Supplemental</b> subsistence allowance for low-income members with dependents	Report	NLT 03/01 2001-2006	OUSD/P&R	Postponement authority of up to 180 days may be exercised, as determined by the SECDEC after consultation with the FRTIB <b>Executive Director. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	168 1805	Sec. 633, Authorization of retention bonus for <b>members</b> of the armed forces qualified	Notify	90 days before any <b>bonus</b>	OUSD/P&R	In advance, of each military skill to be designated as <b>critical</b> , notice shall <b>be</b> submitted. <b>SECDEF report</b>
106-945	168	Sec. 633, Authorization of retention bonus for members of the <b>armed</b> forces qualified	Report	NLT 02/15 annually	OUSD/P&R	Analyze the effect of bonuses on retention of members qualified for which the bonuses were offered; and describe the intentions regarding their continued <b>use. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	178 / 808	Sec. 661, Participation in Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Postponement authority of up to 180 days may be exercised, as determined by the <b>SECDEC</b> after consultation with <b>the FRTIB Executive Director. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	184 / 812	Sec. 702, Chiropractic health care for members on <b>active</b> duty	Report	NLT 01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	<b>Plan to phase in, over a period of five years, services for all</b> active duty service personnel, also continue to provide services and benefits as provided during <b>FY-00. SECDEF report</b>
106-945	188 / 814	Sec. 7 12, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and <b>modification</b> of Medicare subvention project	Notify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Continuation of program would be contingent upon SECDEF and HHS jointly developing and implementing terms and conditions for <b>both</b> agencies. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	190	Sec. 7 12, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and modification of <b>Medicare subvention project</b>	Report	Annual Report	OUSD/P&R	<b>Report on the program and its impact on costs and the provision of health services. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	190	Sec. 712, Conditions for eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and modification of Medicare subvention project	Report	60 days before <b>changes</b>	OUSD/P&R	<b>Justify changing the</b> designation of a site; applying comparable requirements; making significant changes in payment amounts or methodology, and operation of the program; or terminating <b>the agreement. SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	190	Sec. 712, <b>Conditions for</b> eligibility for <b>CHAMPUS</b> and <b>TRICARE</b> ; expansion and modification of Medicare subvention project	Notify	Upon negotiating an agreement	OUSD/P&R	<b>Transmit</b> a copy of a proposed agreement with HHS and all <b>related agreements and supporting documents. SECDEF report.</b>

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106-945	198 / 816	Sec. 723, Modernization of TRICARE business practices and increase of use of military treatment facilities	Plan	NLT 03/15/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a plan to provide portability and reciprocity of benefits for all enrollees under the program throughout all regions. SECDEF report.
106-945	199 / 817	Sec. 725, Protections against health care providers seeking direct reimbursement from members of the uniformed services	Report	NLT 01/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Recommend practices to discourage or prohibit providers under TRICARE program, and individuals or entities working on their behalf, from seeking direct reimbursement. SECDEF report.
106-945	201	Sec. 731, Demonstration project for expanded access to mental health counselors	Plan	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a plan to carry out the demonstration project. SECDEF report.
106-945	201	Sec. 731, Demonstration project for expanded access to mental health counselors	Report	NLT 02/01/03	OUSD/P&R	Report on demonstration project, including the extent to which expenditures for reimbursement changes. SECDEF report.
106-945	203	Sec. 733, Health care management demonstration program	Report	NLT 03/15/02	OUSD/P&R	Report on the demonstration program. include an assessment of the value of incorporating the use of the tested planning and management models. SECDEF report.
106-945	205 / 819	Sec. 751, Management of anthrax vaccine immunization program	Report	NLT 04/01 Annually	DEPSECDEF	Track and report separations resulting from refusal to participate. SECDEF report.
106-945	207 / 820	Sec. 753, Health Informatics	Report	Annual	OUSD/P&R	Adds two additional sections to the annual report as required by Sec. 723 of the NDAA for FY-00 (P.L. 106-65). SECDEF report.
106-945	210	Sec. 755, Augmentation of Army medical department by detailing reserve officers of the Public Health Service	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Army	Report the results of a review and assessment of the adequacy of laws for authorizing the Secretary of HHS to detail reserve officers.
106-945	210 / 820	Sec. 756, Privacy of DoD medical records	Plan	NLT 04/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Submit a comprehensive plan to improve privacy protections. SECDEF report.
106-945	211	Sec. 757, Authority to establish special locality-based reimbursement rates	Report	NLT 03/31/01	OUSD/P&R	Report on actions taken to carry out sec. 1079(h)(5) of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945	211	Sec. 757, Authority to establish special locality-based reimbursement rates	Report	NLT 180 days after enactment	OUSD/P&R	The extent to which physicians are choosing not to participate in contracts for the furnishing of health care in rural States, include reasons for withdrawals and refusals. SECDEF report.
106-945	212 / 821	Sec. 760, Training in health care management and administration	Report	NLT 18 months after enactment	OUSD/P&R	Include a survey of professional civilian certifications and credentials; descriptions of continuing education activities and of the prominence of such credentials or certifications among senior civilian executives. SECDEF report.
106-945	213	Sec. 761, Studies on feasibility of sharing Biomedical Research Facility (Tripler Army Medical Center)	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Army	Report on a study on the feasibility of sharing a biomedical research facility with the Department of VA and the School of Medicine at the University of Hawaii.
106-945	213	Sec. 761, Studies on feasibility of sharing Biomedical Research Facility (Little Rock Medical Facility)	Report	NLT 03/01/01	Air Force	Report on a study on the feasibility of sharing a biomedical research facility with the Department of VA and the School of Medicine at the University of Arkansas.

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106-945	214	Sec. 762, Study on comparability of coverage for physical, speech, and occupational therapies	Report	NLT 03131101	OUSD/P&R	Report on the findings of the study comparing coverage and reimbursement for covered beneficiaries to coverage and reimbursement for such therapies. SECDEF report.
106-945	215 / 824	Sec. 801, Acquisition pilot programs	Report	NLT 01/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Describe, for each acquisition program identified in Sec. 5064(a) of the FASA of 1994, quantitative measures, recommended revisions to statutes or the FAR, any new innovative business practices, etc. SECDEF report.
106-945	216	Sec. 802, <b>Multiyear</b> service contracts	Notify	If necessary, at least 30 days in advance of contract award	OUSD/C	Head of an agency may not initiate under this section a contract for <b>services</b> that includes an unfunded contingent liability in excess of <b>\$20,000,000</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	217	Sec. 802, Multiyear service contracts	Notify	If necessary, 10 days after notification	OUSD/C	Head of an agency may not terminate a multiyear procurement contract for services until notice is provided. SECDEF report.
106-945	217	Sec. 802, Multiyear service contracts	Notify	If necessary, 30 days after notification	OUSD/C	Before any <b>contract</b> contains a <b>clause setting a cancellation ceiling</b> in excess of <b>\$100,000,000</b> may be awarded. SECDEF report.
106-945	219 / 826	Sec. 806, Reporting requirements relating to Multiyear Services Contracts	Report	Annually, NLT w/President's budget request	OUSD/C	Contains information on each <b>multiyear service contract</b> or extension of an existing contract entered into, or planned, by the head of an agency during the current or preceding <b>year</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	219 / 826	Sec. 806, Reporting requirements relating to Multiyear Services Contracts	Report	Prior to entering into a <b>multiyear</b> contract	OUSD/C	Provide a report containing information described in paragraph (4) of this amendment with respect to the contract (or contract extension). SECDEF report.
106-945	224	Sec. 811, Acquisition and management of information technology	Notify	NLT 30 days after <b>the date of designation</b>	OASD/C3I	Whenever during <b>FYs 2001, 2002, or 2003</b> a system previously designated as a major automated information system <b>is</b> changed to another category.
106-945	224	Sec. 811, Acquisition and management of information technology	Report	NLT 60 days after enactment	OASD/C3I	Specify systems previously designated as a major automated information system <b>currently in</b> another designation category including as a "special interest major technology initiative".
106-945	224	Sec. 811, Acquisition and management of information <b>technology</b>	Report	NLT 04/01 of <b>FYs 2001, 2002 &amp; 2003</b>	OASD/C3I	Report on implementation of the requirements of this <b>section during the preceding fiscal</b> year, including each major <b>automated</b> information system approved. SECDEF report.
106-945	226 / 828	Sec. 812, Tracking and Management of information technology purchases	Report	NLT 03115 Annually	OASD/C3I	Summarize data <b>collected</b> for each purchase of information technology products and <b>services</b> in excess of the simplified acquisition <b>threshold</b> . SECDEF report
106-945	228 / 828	Sec. 814, Navy-Marine Corps <b>Intranet</b>	Certify	Prior to obligation or expenditure	Navy	<b>Certify</b> a review of the business case and comments provided by the <b>OSD(C)</b> and the Director of <b>OMB</b> and <b>determine that</b> implementation of the contract is in the Navy's best interest.

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IO6945	229 / 829	Sec. 8 14. Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (phased implementation)	Certify	Prior to exceeding threshold	Navy	After a review of <b>the</b> operational testing and cost review have determined that the implementation of the contract is in the best interest of the Navy.
106-945	231	Sec. 822, Financial analysis of <b>use of</b> dual rates for quantifying overhead costs at Army ammunition plants	Report	NLT 02/15/01	Army	Report results of the analysis carried out on the costs incurred and the <b>benefits</b> derived from <b>implementation of a policy</b> of using various sets of rates for quantifying overhead costs.
106-945	232	Sec. 824, Extension of <b>waiver</b> period for live-fire survivability testing for MH-47E and MH-60K helicopter modification programs	Certify	If necessary	OUUSD/AT&L	<b>May</b> waive the application of the survivability and lethality tests if live-fire testing of the programs would be <b>unreasonably expensive</b> and impracticable. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	233 / 831	<b>Sec. 831, Impact of</b> foreign sourcing of systems on long-term military readiness and related industrial infrastructure	Report	NLT one year after enactment	OUUSD/AT&L	Study whether parts, <b>components</b> , and materials of <b>certain</b> systems are obtained through domestic source-s or from foreign sources, and the impact on <b>military</b> readiness. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	235 I831	Sec. 834, Requirement to conduct study on contract bundling	Report	Before the FY-02 budget request	OUUSD/AT&L	Report the results of a study cm the practice of "contract bundling", and the effect on <b>small</b> businesses. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	238 / 835	Sec. 905, Additional components of Chairman of the JCS annual report on combatant command requirements	Report	With the budget request	JCS	Identify the extent to <b>which</b> the FYDP includes funds to address the capability <b>shortfalls</b> identified during the Joint Readiness Review conducted during first quarter of fiscal year.
106945	241 / 836	Sec. 911, <b>Western Hemisphere</b> Institute for security cooperation	<b>Report</b>	NLT 03115 Annually	Army	Detail activities of the institute for the previous calendar year, <b>in</b> consultation with <b>the Secretary of State</b> . <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	241 / 836	Sec. 912, Regional centers for Security Studies	Notify	Upon intent to establish	OUUSD/P	Upon intent to establish the center, including a description of <b>the</b> mission and functions, and justification. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	242 / 836	Sec. 912, Regional centers for Security Studies	Report	NLT 02/01/01, then Annually	OUUSD/P	Report on operations <b>during</b> the preceding fiscal year, including budgetary and <b>international</b> participation information for each center. <b>SECDEF report</b>
106-945	244 I837	Sec. 916, The Joint Requirements Oversight Council <b>reform</b> initiative	Report	Semiannually from 03/01/01 - 03/01/03	JCS	Focus on the progress made on the <b>initiative of</b> the Chairman to reform and refocus the Joint <b>Requirements Oversight Council</b> .
1 (M-945	246	Sec. 921, Institute for Defense Computer Security and Information Protection	Plan	NLT 04/01/01	OASD/C3I	Submit a plan for establishing and contracting to <b>organize and</b> operate the institute. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	250	Sec. 922, Information Security Scholarship Program	<b>Plan</b>	NLT 04/01/01	OASD/C3I	<b>Submit</b> a plan for implementing the programs under chapter 112 of title 10, U.S.C.
106-945	250 / 838	Sec. 931, <b>Shortfalls in</b> equipment procurement and MILCON for the Reserve components in future-years defense programs	Report	NLT 15 days after budget request	OUUSD/P&R	Adds <b>reporting</b> requirement to Sec. 10543(c) of title 10, U.S.C.
106945	250 / 839	Sec. 932, Number of <b>personnel</b> assigned to legislative liaison functions	Report	NLT 12/01/00	OASD/LA	Report the number of <b>personnel</b> , shown by <b>organizational entity</b> and by pay grade, <b>performing</b> legislative liaison <b>functions as of April 1, 2000</b> . <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	250	Sec. 933, Joint report on establishment of <b>national collaborative information analysis capability</b>	<b>Report</b>	NLT 03/01/00	OASD/C3I	Assess alternatives <b>architectures</b> for the establishment of a national capability.

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106-945	251 / 839	Sec. 934, Network Centric Warfare (Implementation)	Report	03/01/01	OASD/C3I	Report on the development and implementation of network centric warfare concepts. SECDEF report.
106-945	251 / 839	Sec. 934, Network Centric Warfare (Joint Experimentation)	Report	03/01/01	JCS	Study the present and future use of joint experimentation for developing network centric warfare concepts. SECDEF report.
106-945	253	Sec. 935, Air Force Institute of Technology	Report	NLT 09/30/01	Air Force	Report the roles and missions, organizational structure, funding, and operations as projected, along with any recommendations.
1 M-945	254	Sec. 941, Flexibility in implementation of limitation on major DoD headquarters personnel	Certify	If necessary	OUSD/P&R	Certify that the limitation of headquarters personnel, would adversely affect national security. SECDEF report.
106-945	258	Sec. 1001, Transfer Authority	Notify	Upon determination	OUSD/C	Total amount of authorizations that may be transferred may not exceed \$2,000,000,000. SECDEF report.
106-945	260 / 842	Sec. 1005, Limitation on Funds for Bosnia and Kosovo Peacekeeping Operations for FY-01	Certify	When necessary	OUSD/P	If a waiver is necessary and will not adversely affect the readiness of U.S. military forces or national security interests. <b>President</b> report.
106-945	260 / 842	Sec. 1005, Limitation on Funds for Bosnia and Kosovo Peacekeeping Operations for FY-01	Report	When necessary	OUSD/P	Reasons for waiver, including impact of military involvement in Balkan peacekeeping operations on military readiness, and specific reasons additional funding is required. <b>President</b>
106-945	261	Sec. 1006, Requirement for prompt payment of contract vouchers	Report	If necessary	DFAS	If for any month of the noncompliance reporting period the requirement is not met, a report on the magnitude of the unpaid contract vouchers shall be submitted. SECDEF report.
106-945	262	Sec. 1007, Prompt recording of obligations of funds for contractual transactions	Plan	NLT 11/15/00	OUSD/C	Ensure that each obligation under a transaction be recorded not later than 10 days after the date on which the obligation is incurred. SECDEF report.
106-945	263	Sec. 1008, Electronic submission and processing of claims for contract payments	Plan	NLT 03/30/01	OASD/C3I	Plan for the implementation of the requirements imposed under Sec. 2227 of title 10, U.S.C. (as added by subsection (a)). SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1022, DoD expenditures to support foreign counter-drug activities	Report	NLT 01/01/01	OUSD/P	Detail the expenditure of funds during FY-00 in direct or indirect support of the counter-drug activities of foreign governments. SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1023, Recommendations on expansion of support for counter-drug activities	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P	What, if any, additional countries should be covered or additional support provided to covered countries, together with the reasons; and a plan for providing support. SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1024, Review of riverine counter-drug program	Report	NLT 02/01/01	OUSD/P	For each country receiving support, provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the program, and a recommendation regarding responsibility for managing the program. SECDEF report.
106-945	269	Sec. 1025, Tethered Aerostat Radar System	Report	NLT 05/01/01	OUSD/P	Report on the status of the TARS used to conduct detection and monitoring and border security and air sovereignty operations. SECDEF report.

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106-945	271	Sec. 1031, Preparedness of <b>military installation</b> first responders for incidents involving weapons of mass <b>destruction</b>	Report	NLT 90 days after enactment	OUSD/P	<b>Describe</b> the overall program, deficiencies of installations to respond to an incident; schedule and costs associated with implementation; and plans. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	274	Sec. 1033, <b>Loan</b> guarantees to improve domestic preparedness to combat <b>cyber-terrorism</b>	Report	NLT 03/01 annually	OUSD/C	Report on the loan guarantee program. SECDEF report.
106-945	274 / 849	Sec. 1034, <b>Status</b> of domestic preparedness against the threat of biological <b>terrorism</b>	Report	03/31/01	OATSD/CS	Report on the status of domestic preparedness against <b>the</b> threat of biological terrorism. <b>President report.</b>
106-945	275 / 849	Sec. 1034, <b>Status</b> of domestic <b>preparedness</b> against the threat of biological terrorism	Report	03/01/01	DIA	An intelligence estimate of the threat posed by a biological weapon and the consequences of a biological terrorist attack <b>compared to using other types of weapons.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	276 / 850	Sec. 1041, Revised nuclear posture review	Report	Concurrently w/QDR rpt due in 12/01	OUSD/P	<b>Report the results of a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the U.S. for the next 5-10 years.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	276 / 850	Sec. 1042, Plan for long-term sustainment and modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces	Plan	NLT 04/15/01	OUSD/P	Develop a long-range plan for sustainment and modernization of strategic nuclear forces to counter emerging threats and satisfy evolving requirements of deterrence. SECDEF report.
106-945	278 / 851	Sec. 1044, Report on the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets	Report	NLT 07/01/01	OUSD/P	After conduct a study relating to the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets <b>report the results.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	279 / 851	Sec. 1052, Report on submarine rescue support vessels	Plan	With FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on the plan of the Navy for providing for submarine rescue support <b>vessels</b> through FY-07.
106-945	279 / 852	Sec. 1053, Report on Federal Government progress in developing information assurance strategies	Report	NLT 01/15/01	OASD/C3I	Detail the specific steps <b>taken by the</b> Federal Government as of the date of the report to <b>develop</b> critical infrastructure assurance strategies as outlined by PDD-63. <b>President report,</b>
106-945	279 / 852	Sec. 1054, DOD process for decisionmaking in cases of false claims	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Describe</b> policies and procedures in cases of claims; include any changes in policies and procedures, and how such procedures are being implemented. SECDEF report.
106-945	289	Sec. 1063, Relationship of Defense information assurance program to government-wide information security program	Report	Annual	OASD/C3I	An addition to the annual report requirement is made by <b>amending</b> Subsection (e) sec. 2224 of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945	289	Sec. 1071, Limitation on granting of security clearances	Report	02/01 Annually	OASD/C3I	Report each waiver issued authorizing an exception to prohibitions during the <b>preceding</b> year with an explanation for each <b>case.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	298	Sec. 1078, Coordination of nuclear weapons secrecy policies and consideration of health of workers at former <b>DoD</b> nuclear facilities	Report	NLT 05/01/01	OUSD/P&R	Report the <b>results</b> of the review, including any changes made or recommendations for legislation; and the status of the notifications <b>required.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	298 / 855	Sec. 1081, Funds for administrative expenses under Defense <b>Export Loan Guarantee program</b>	Report	Prior to providing funds for adminu expenses	OUSD/AT&L	<b>Report</b> on operation of the DELG Program and determination as to <b>which</b> agency, <b>office,</b> or <b>other activity should administer,</b> manage, and oversee <b>the program.</b> SECDEF report.

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106-945	327	Sec. 1105, Study on civilian personnel services	Report	NLT 01/01/02	OUSD/P&R	Assess the manner in which personnel services are provided for civilian personnel and report. and include, if appropriate. a proposal for a demonstration Program. SECDEF report.
106-945	329	Sec. 1112, Work Safety Demonstration Program	Report	NLT 12/1/2001	OUSD/AT&L	Submit an interim report on demonstration program containing at a minimum, for each site of the demonstration program certain baseline information and comparisons. SECDEF report.
106-945	329	Sec. 1112, Work Safety Demonstration Program	Report	NLT 12/1/2002	OUSD/AT&L	Final report containing, at a minimum, for each site a determination on safety practices: comparisons of lost workday injury rates, and direct/indirect costs. SECDEF report.
106-945	340	Sec. 1203, Furnishing of Nuclear Test Monitoring Equipment to Foreign Governments	Report	Promptly after entering into any agreement	Air Force	Identify the country with which the agreement was made, the anticipated costs to be incurred. and the national interest that is furthered by the agreement. SECDEF report.
106-945	343 / 847	Sec. 1204, Additional matters for annual report on transfers of militarily sensitive technology to countries and entities of concern	Report	Annual	OUSD/AT&L	Include in annual report a description of actions taken on recommendations of inspectors general contained in Previous annual reports. President report.
106-945	341 / 867	Sec. 1211, Assessing effect of continued operations in the Balkans region on readiness to execute the national military strategy	Report	NLT 04/01 Annually	OUSD/P	Making the report on the readiness impact of U.S. military operations in the Balkans an annual report. President report.
106-945	341	Sec. 1211, Assessing effect of continued operations in the Balkans region on readiness to execute the national military strategy	Notify	When necessary, but NLT the latest date of next annual rpt	OUSD/P	Notice that the annual report is no longer required after U.S. military operations in the Balkans region have ended. SECDEF report.
106-945	342 / 868	Sec. 1212, Situation in the Balkans (Benchmarks)	Report	06/30/01 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/P	Report on progress in achieving benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable Peace and ultimately withdrawal of U.S. military presence in Kosovo. President report.
106-945	342 / 868	Sec. 1212, Situation in the Balkans (Comprehensive Strategy)	Report	06/30/01 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/P	Report on progress in developing and implementing a comprehensive political-military strategy for the Balkans. President report.
106-945	342 / 869	Sec. 1213, Semiannual report on Kosovo peacekeeping	Report	12/1/2000 and Semiannually thereafter	OUSD/C	Report on the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. President report.
106-945	343 / 869	Sec. 1221, NATO fair burdensharing (Costs)	Report	30 days after a military operation begins, or later, if...	OUSD/C	Report on costs of Operation Allied Force, including ordnance expended, fuel consumed, personnel; and estimated cost of reduced service life of U.S. aircraft, etc. SECDEF report.
106-945	343 / 869	Sec. 1221, NATO fair burdensharing (Future Operations)	Report	NLT 90 days after completion of the military operation	OUSD/C	Report on costs of Operation Allied Force, including ordnance expended, fuel consumed, personnel; and estimated cost of reduced service life of U.S. aircraft, etc. SECDEF report.
106-945	345 / 870	Sec. 1231, Joint Data Exchange Center with Russian Federation	Report	NLT 30 days after enactment	OUSD/P	Report on plans for a center on early warning systems and notification of ballistic missile launches. SECDEF report.

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106-945	345 / 871	Sec. 1232, Sharing and exchange of ballistic missile launch early warning data	Report	03/15/01	OUSDP	Report current and planned activities with respect to sharing and exchanging early warning data; include an assessment of the benefits and risks of <b>sharing</b> such data. SECDEF report.
106-945	346 / 871	Sec. 1233, Communist Chinese military companies operating in the U.S.	Report	NLT 03/01/01	DIA	Make a determination of those persons operating in the U.S. or any of its territories and possessions and submit a list in classified and unclassified form. SECDEF report.
106-945	346	Sec. 1233, Communist Chinese <b>military companies</b> operating in the U.S.	Report	02/01 Annually	DIA	To <b>make additions or</b> deletions to the list. SECDEF report.
106-945	346 / 872	Sec. 1234, Adjustment of composite theoretical performance levels of high performance computers	Report	04/01/01	OUSDP	Report on national security implications of trends in the R & D, manufacture, use, and proliferation of information technology in the commercial sector. SECDEF report.
106-945	355	Sec. 1302, Obligation or expenditure of funds for <b>other</b> purposes (Cooperative Threat Reduction)	Report	30 days prior to obligation or expenditure of funds	OUSDP	Report the purpose and the amount for which funds will <b>be</b> obligated <b>or</b> expended CTR. SECDEF report.
106-945	356	Sec. 1302, Obligation or expenditure of funds for <b>other</b> purposes (Cooperative Threat Reduction)	Notify	15 days prior to obligation of funds	OUSDP/C	Provide notification of the intent to obligate amounts appropriated for FY-01 in excess of the amount specifically authorized and the justification for doing <b>so</b> . SECDEF report.
106-945	356	Sec. 1304, Limitations on use of funds for funds for <b> fissile</b> material storage facility	Notify	15 days prior to CTR fund use	OUSDP/C	For construction of a second wing for the storage facility. SECDEF report.
106-945	356	Sec. 1305, Limitation on use of funds to support warhead dismantlement processing	Notify	15 days prior to CTR fund use	OUSDP/C	When the U.S. has reached an agreement with <b>Russia</b> , which shall provide for appropriate <b>transparency</b> measures, regarding assistance by <b>the U.S.</b> SECDEF report.
106-945	357 / 876	Sec. 1307, <b>Limitation on use</b> of funds for <b>construction</b> of fossil fuel energy plants	Report	Within 60 days of enactment	OUSDP	Detail options for assisting Russia in the development of alternative energy sources to the three plutonium production reactors remaining in operation in Russia. <b>President</b> report.
106-945	357 / 876	Sec. 1308, Reports on activities and assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs	Report	02/05/01 and each first Monday in February	OUSDP	Consolidate reports on activities and assistance during the preceding fiscal year under CTR programs. <b>President</b> report.
106-945	360 / 876	Sec. 1308, Reports <b>on</b> activities <b>and</b> assistance under cooperative threat reduction programs	Report	NLT 30 days after enactment	OUSDP	Assess Russia's arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads, include a summary of U.S. efforts to work cooperatively with Russia. SECDEF report.
106-945	360 / 877	Sec. 1309, Russian chemical weapons elimination	Report	NLT 90 days after enactment	OUSDP	<b>Identify the</b> amount of money spent; assistance provided by the <b>international</b> community for the storage and elimination of <b>nerve</b> agents; <b>countries</b> providing assistance; <b>and value</b> of assistance. SECDEF report.
106-945	361	Sec. 1310, <b>Limitation on use</b> of funds for elimination of weapons grade plutonium <b>program</b>	Report	30 days prior to 50% being obligated or expended	OUSDP	Report on agreement <b>between</b> the U.S. and <b>Russian Federation</b> regarding the shut down <b>or conversion</b> of <b>the</b> reactors <b>of</b> the Russian Federation. SECDEF report.

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106-945	363	Sec. 1403, Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack	Report	NLT 1 year after the Commission's report	OASD/C3I	Report on the Commission's findings and conclusions; describe political-military scenarios evaluate the likelihood of an EMP attack compared to other threats. SECDEF report.
106-945	365 / 879	Sec. 1501, Assistance for economic growth on Vieques	Notify	When necessary	Navy	The advance notice required by the Vieques supplemental appropriation of each proposed transfer shall also be submitted to the committees.
106-945	368 / 879	Sec. 1503, Determination regarding continuation of Navy training	Certify	If necessary	Navy	If the CNO and the CMC jointly find that the range is no longer needed for training.
106-945	383	Sec. 1705, Progress on Spectrum Sharing	Report	Within 1 year of enactment	OASD/C3I	An interim report on the progress of the engineering study. SECDEF report.
106-945	430	Sec. 2801, Joint use military construction projects (defined)	Certify	With FY-03 budget request, Annually	OUSD/AT&L	Each Secretary evaluated the feasibility of carrying out the projects as joint use MILCON projects. SECDEF report.
106-945	431	Sec. 2803, Revision of space limitations for military family housing	Report	With each budget request, Annually	Services	Include in the request information on the net floor area of each unit of military family housing to be constructed, acquired, or improved under the authority.
106-945	435	Sec. 2812, Enhancement of authority of military departments to lease non-excess property	Report	30 days prior to entering into a lease	Services	Report the facts of the lease for which all or part of the consideration proposed is in-kind and in excess of \$500,000.
106-945	435	Sec. 2812, Enhancement of authority of military departments to lease non-excess property	Report	30 days prior to expending	Services	Report the facts of the proposed expenditure from the special account of a military department.
106-945	436	Sec. 2812, Enhancement of authority of military departments to lease non-excess property	Notify	NLT March 15 Annually	OUSD/AT&L	Changes reporting requirement of Subsection (d)(3), sec. 2667 of title 10, U.S.C. SECDEF report.
106-945	455	Sec. 2871, Land conveyance, AAFES property, Farmers Branch, Texas	Report	Within 30 days after sale of property	OUSD/P&R	Report the particulars of the sale. SECDEF report.
106-945	480	Sec. 3138, Contingent limitation on use of certain funds . . . with formerly utilized sites remedial action program funding prohibition	Certify	NLT 11/01/01	Army	Certify that the Corps of Engineers is in compliance with the requirements of travel funds for the Chief of Engineers.
106-945	503	Sec. 3301, Authorized uses of Stockpile funds	Report	If necessary or 45 days prior to obligation	DMCA	May obligate amounts in excess of \$71,000,000 if extraordinary or emergency conditions necessitate additional obligations; or may make the additional obligations described in notification.
106-945	638	Air Mobility Command	Report	03/15/01	Air Force	Provide analysis for the C-141, C-5, and C-17 fleets and determine readiness levels, explore alternatives to existing aircraft stationing plans for component airlift forces.
106-945	639	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I	Provide an analysis evaluating current capability and forces; identifying capabilities and forces; enumerate capabilities that need to be created or enhanced; and itemize how the budget and the FYDP supports these needs. SECDEF report.
106-945	640	Multipurpose individual munition (MPIM)	Plan	NLT 01/30/01	Army	Following a final, thorough review of the status of this program and alternatives to the status quo, provide a plan to the on how these requirements will be met as soon as practicable.

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106-945	674	DP-2 thrust vectoring system proof-of-concept demonstration	Assessment	With FY-02 budget request	Navy	Assess the program's progress, plans and funding requirements for completion of the flight-test demonstration.
106-945	677	Advanced land attack missile (ALAM)	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Navy	Report on recommended revisions to the program plan and the funding required to deploy as soon as technically feasible.
106-945	692	Specialty aerospace metals	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Air Force	Report on the plan for meeting requirements for advanced special aerospace metals and alloys.
106-945	692	Space-based radar	Report	05/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Prepare a roadmap to guide the development and deployment of an operational system.. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	693	Space maneuver vehicle	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Report on concepts, critical development paths, and applications for a low-cost reusable lower stage booster, and how it could fit into an overall Military Spaceplane system.
106-945	694	Satellite control network	Report	04/01/01	Air Force	Conduct an evaluation of commercial technologies and services relevant to modernization of the satellite control network.
106-945	708	National Missile Defense (NMD)	Report	04/01/01	BMDO	Report on plans for mitigating the ground-based interceptor (GBI) booster problems.
106-945	711	Common Imagery Processor (CIP)	Plan	03/15/01	OASD/C3I	Outline a path for migrating tactical imagery programs, including the CIP, NAVIS, and CIGSS, to integrated solutions within the CIGSS architecture.
106-945	712	Defense Space Reconnaissance Program	Report	05/01/01	OASD/C3I	Provide an assessment and recommendations regarding the overall role of the NRO in supporting tactical military forces. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	715	National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) pre-acquisition activities	Report	02/01/01	OASD/C3I	Describe the implementation of numerous steps to ensure the TPED efforts begin efficiently and promptly. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	720	Sec. 219, Cost limitations applicable to F-22 aircraft program	Notify	If necessary	DOT&E	Consult with the USD(AT&L) to determine that the increase, not exceed 1 1/2 percent of the total amount, is necessary in order to ensure adequate testing.
106-945	756	Cultural and historic activities	Report	NLT 04/01/01	Navy	Completely describe all prior and current use of Legacy funds and relevant state funds, and the status of recovery and preservation activities. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
106-945	758	Water quality issues at installations in Kaiserslautern, Germany	Report	With FY-02 budget request	Army / Air Force	Plan and submit findings and recommendations for completion of remediation and restoration, to include related costs.
1 M-945	760	Sec. 314, Payment of fines and penalties for environmental compliance at Ft Wainwright, Alaska	Report	NLT 03/01/02	OUSD/AT&L	Report the analysis of all environmental compliance fines and penalties assessed and imposed at military facilities during fiscal years 1995-2001. <b>SECDEF report.</b>
1 M-945	776	Revision of authority to waive limitation on performance of depot-level maintenance	Waiver	None specified	Air Force	Waive the 50 percent depot maintenance requirement for reasons of national security. <b>President report.</b>
106-945	792	Sec. 552, Defense Clearance and Investigative Index (DCII)	Report	04/01/01	IG	Submit findings and recommendations of a review of policies and procedures addressing the degree that must exist before

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106-945	811	Armed Forces Retirement Home fees	Report	03/30/01	OUSD/P&R	Following a review, report the results and any recommendations for changing the current fees or operations of the Armed Forces Retirement Home. SECDEF report.
106-945	815	Sec. 712, Medicare subvention project	Plan	03/30/01	OUSD/P&R	A plan for universal, continuous enrollment of all eligible beneficiaries beginning in fiscal year 2002. SECDEF report.
106-945	815	Sec. 713. Accrual funding for health care for Medicare-eligible retirees and dependents	Report	02/08/01	OUSD/P&R	Report results of an independent study, including any recommendations. SECDEF report.
106-945	824	Acquisition programs at the National Security Agency	Report	With FY-02 budget request	OASD/C3I & NSA	Outline an oversight plan, including the changes the plan will make in the acquisition process. SECDEF report.
106-945	825	Sec. 802, Multi year services contracts	Report	02/01/01	OUSD/C	Contains information comparable to that required by Sec. 2306b(1)(4) for each multiyear service contract and each extension of an existing contract entered into, or planned, during the current or preceding year. SECDEF report.
106-945	832	Management of acquisition of mission-essential software for major defense acquisition programs	Report	03/01/01	OUSD/AT&L	Report on the roles of the USD(ATL) and the CIO in developing, managing, and reviewing policies; and the amount of funds used to support weapon systems. SECDEF report.
106-945	865	Sec. 1142, Increase in number of positions authorized for the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service	Report	03/15/01	How will 3I allocate report.	How will the additional senior executive service positions be allocated within the defense intelligence community? SECDEF report.

ANNUAL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

<u>FY</u>	<u>AUTH</u>				<u>SAC</u>	<u>APPN</u>		<u>Supps/</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>HASC</u>	<u>SASC</u>	<u>CONF</u>	<u>HAC</u>		<u>CONF</u>	<u>MilCon</u>	<u>Other</u>	
70									36
80									231
81									223
82									221
83									325
84									422
85									458
86	51	43	179	126	77	122	69	9	676
87	52	32	184	77	55	181	88	11	680
88	49	35	185	101	57	165	105	22	719
89	77	44	219	92	53	96	80	0	661
90	133	76	308	72	70	115	87	0	861
91	74	78	232	80	56	91	46	19	676
92	52	67	180	90	86	166	46	47	734
93	60	66	233	67	95	86	36	11	654
94	92	66	248	86	80	86	18	0	676
95	108	57	216	68	93	138	27	2	709
96	65	45	254	47	32	64	48	0	555
97	76	50	189	47	40	81	51	0	534
98	126	86	220	36	15	62	49	27	621
99	60	74	287	38	20	69	41	8	597
00	62	50	184	35	36	88	52	0	507
01	64	46	222	36	24	62	76	0	530

April 9, 2001 1:24 PM

TO: Steve Herbits  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Eisenhower Transformation Paper

Attached is a paper that Bill Schneider gave me on the Eisenhower transformation ..  
It seems to me that there is some good material there that we should weave into  
the writing that we are doing and conceivably give a copy to the speechwriters,

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-28

381

9 Apr 01

U07298\*/01

11-L-0559/OSD/2875

## POLICY

- We have an opportunity today to reshape the national security establishment that has important parallels to the situation faced by President Eisenhower in 1953. The World War II era was over. The defense establishment had to be *transformed* to exploit new technology (e.g. nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, jet aircraft, etc.) to enable the US to cope with post World War II threats. The former Soviet Union shifted from being an ally to an adversary between 1945 and ~ 1950.
- The Eisenhower “new look” strategic review led to the transformation that set the pattern for the remainder of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Reagan buildup was the decisive measure that enabled us to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but it was not “transformational.” It was a strategy of sharply focusing investment in key areas that imparted the maximum stress on Soviet power, ultimately “dissuading” them from attempting to pursue the Cold War through arms competition.
- President Bush has directed that we have our strategy lead our defense policy, programs, and resource allocation decisions. This review will be aimed at making certain that we have a sound understanding of the state of US forces and their readiness to meet the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment,
- Our aims are to:
  - Restore trust with the armed forces;
  - To have the capability to defend against missiles, terrorism, and n w threats against our space assets and information systems.
  - To assure the readiness of currently deployed forces to meet the threats of today;
  - To take advantage of the new possibilities offered by modern technology to create the military capabilities for the 21<sup>st</sup> century; and
  - To reform the DoD’s structure and processes allow the DoD to focus on what it does best – defending the national interests of the United States.

April 9, 2001 12:56 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: General Shelton  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Paper on Effects-Based Operations

Please read this paper on effects-based operations. I think it is important that we give very careful thought to his suggestion that the security review, the defense strategy and defense planning guidance imbed this concept into the thinking and move towards capabilities to fulfill and exploit this framework.

Why don't you think through with Rudy de Leon how we should do this and talk to General Shelton to see if he agrees.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-22

381

9 Apr 01

U07301 ~~12~~/01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 13 Mar 2001

MEMO FOR Sec Def

A paper (7 pages) and a one page summary from Brian Dave Deptula on Effects Based Operations (Targeting).

Andy

P.S. Deptula is a wonderful officer. You might want to sit and talk with him sometime. He will send you a copy of the April 1 publication on which these papers are based.

**BACKGROUND PAPER**  
**on**  
**EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS**

**Effects-Based Operations (EBO)** is a strategic and operational framework for planning, executing and assessing military operations designed to take the focus off attrition and destruction and place it on the attainment of *effects* that, in conjunction with other elements of national power, compel positive political outcomes.

**Why is EBO Important?**

- It demands a fundamental change in US military operational thinking
  - The American military has a legacy of “grinding down” an opponent through brute force—a lesson embedded by the experiences of World War II
  - EBO will emphasize *control* of the adversary’s operational level systems and capabilities
    - Control means limiting options, demonstrating capacity for further action, **paralyzing** the ability to act effectively at the strategic level—control is the goal, not destruction
- Incorporates a broader view allowing the better integration of all elements of national power
  - Requires re-thinking our intelligence and planning structures from National level down
- Leads the joint force to the development of new operational concepts that leverage modern technology to achieve positive effects with less cost in terms of time, lives, and dollars
  - Forces military commanders to assess campaigns using different metrics that emphasize operational effects that are linked to strategic outcomes
  - Deepens understanding of “**jointness**” as using the most effective force - right force at the right place and time for the right effect
  - Demands a change in current simulation models, which rely heavily on attrition models
- Suggests force structure alternatives congruent with these new operational **concepts**—lighter, more deployable, armed with better information
  - Force structure alternatives evaluated on cost per effect instead of cost per platform
- **Results in a US military that expands the nation’s strategic options** rather than allowing emerging anti-access threats to encroach on, or cripple, our power projection capability

**Ongoing Efforts to Develop Effects Based Operations**

- Has largely been an Air Force initiative that the joint community is gradually accepting
- A high level military working group recommended CJCS initiate development of **effects-based** joint operations for “operationalizing” JV 2020 (*Future Joint Force Concept*)
- JFCOM’s Initial Concept Report from experimentation with Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) highlights effects based operations as central for achieving rapid victory
- The Air Force Chief of Staff had chartered numerous studies and is sponsoring a panel in April to develop recommendations for “operationalizing” the EBO concept

**Recommendation:** SECDEF Security Review embed this concept into the Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, and develop the capabilities to fully exploit this new **framework**

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS NARRATIVE  
DAVE DEPTULA, Brig Gen, USAF  
EDITED SHORT VERSION OF PAPER TO BE PUBLISHED APRIL 01

In the predawn darkness of Jan. 17, 1991, Air Force Maj. Greg Biscone piloted his huge B-52 bomber toward Wadi Al Kirr Air Field, a fighter base in central Iraq and one of the Gulf War's prominent first-night targets. Nearby, another Air Force B-52 also was speeding toward the base. The BUFFS' aimpoints on that night were the taxiways linking Wadi Al Kirr's runway and hardened aircraft shelters. The bombers dropped low for the approach and, in a matter of minutes, the B-52s executed a textbook multi-axis attack, crippled the airfield, and turned for home.

By that time, stealthy F-117s already had struck targets in downtown Baghdad. Tomahawk cruise missiles followed, blasting electrical and communication systems in the capital. F-15E fighters over western Iraq attacked launch facilities from which Scud missiles could hit Israel or coalition nations.

As Biscone's B-52 turned toward home, coalition raids commenced at four more fighter bases. Elsewhere, 13 F-117 attack aircraft bombed command bunkers, communications exchanges, interceptor operations centers, and satellite downlink facilities. In western Iraq, 30 aircraft attacked chemical weapon facilities. Thirty-eight others shut down Shaibah airfield north of Basra. Forty-four blasted surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) near Al Taqqadum airfield, Habaniyah oil storage area, and three chemical weapons precursor facilities. Republican Guard headquarters came under attack. Suspected biological weapons storage sites were hit. So were critical oil storage facilities.

Conventional air launched cruise missiles--launched from B-52s after an epic, 15-hour flight from the US--hit key electrical facilities at Al Mawsil in the country's northern reaches. This all happened in the first few hours of the Gulf War. And by the end of the first day, coalition warplanes also had hit bridges, military support factories, and naval facilities.

Coalition aircraft forces had in a single 24-hour period flown some 1,300 offensive sorties against 152 targets--the most separate-target air attacks in the history of air warfare. Indeed, the Gulf War began with strikes against more targets than were hit by the entire 8th Air Force in 1942 and 1943,

It was not just the sheer number of sorties that made Day One so unusual, however. Just as important, if not more so, were the specific effects produced by this bombing activity. The war's first night demonstrated that the conduct of war had changed. It marked the birth of "effects-based" operations, or EBO as a principal means of conducting warfare.

The air campaign capitalized on emerging capabilities and was built around highly adaptive attack plans. These plans were shaped to paralyze Saddam Hussein's ability to control his forces, neutralize the ability of those forces to fight, undermine their will to fight, reduce the size of Iraq's military production base, and create conditions needed for control of Iraq's capacity to build weapons of mass destruction.

This approach allowed coalition forces to avoid Iraq's principal strength--its vast, heavily armored defensive armies--and thwart Baghdad's ability to inflict massive casualties. It is a concept that has come to be known as "parallel warfare," and was based upon the coalition's ability to achieve specific effects on, not the absolute destruction of, targets.

The concept can best be understood through an analogy. Electrical circuits are of two basic types--serial and parallel. In the series circuit, one closes a switch and electrons flow from

the power source to the first bulb. Current must pass through each light before it can light the next. In the parallel circuit, closing the switch sends current to all bulbs simultaneously, and each lights up in an independent way. The concept, in war, describes an operation in which forces attack all major targets at more or less the same time, to attain cascading effects.

The object of parallel war is to achieve effective control over the set of systems relied on by an adversary for power and influence--leadership, population, essential industries, transportation, and forces.

Before the Gulf War, air campaigns took on targets sequentially, striving to "roll back" enemy defenses so aircraft could attack targets of highest value. Area and point defenses had to be eliminated before war planners could gain access to what they really wanted to attack. Each target clears the way for the next one until finally the target of value can be hit. The effort and time required to suppress enemy defenses limits the number of targets that can be attacked at one time.

Simultaneous attack on all objectives opens a door to major changes in warfare. It permits surprise at the tactical level, a larger span of influence, fewer casualties, paralyzing effects, and reduction in time required to gain control over the enemy. Leadership facilities, refined oil and electricity, transportation nets, connectivity between the leadership and the population, and fielded military forces are attacked at the same time. This dramatically expands the ability to control enemy actions.

Parallel war entails more than compressing sequential attacks into a single multifaceted attack. Parallel war exploits time, space, and levels of war to achieve rapid dominance. In the opening hours of the Gulf War, coalition forces exploited all three dimensions:

- Time: Coalition aircraft struck more than 50 targets in the first 90 minutes of war, and over 150 in the first 24 hours.
- Space: Attacks ranged over the entirety of the Iraqi battle space. Distance did not bar attack on any target.
- Levels of war: The allies mounted simultaneous attacks on targets of tactical, operational, and strategic significance.

Vigorous exploitation of time, space, and levels of war to achieve specific purposes is the essence of EBO. Rendering an enemy force useless is just as effective as eliminating it altogether.

Traditionally, military forces have achieved their goals through destruction of enemy forces. Centuries of surface warfare created a common view that such destruction was the intrinsic purpose of military forces and combat. However, war's ultimate purpose is to compel a positive political outcome. Use of force to control rather than destroy an opponent's ability to act opens up new possibilities.

Control--the ability to eradicate the strategic freedom of the adversary--does not necessarily mean eliminating all of that enemy's tactical actions. In the Gulf War, Iraq never lost the capability to fly individual aircraft sorties. However, these air sorties were of little or no consequence to the outcome of the conflict.

Critical to the concept of control is the ability to affect essential systems on which enemy relies. Using force to inject incapacitating effects in an entire system can yield effective control over that system. You could also "control" a system by destroying it, but it would require much more military force for no better or more useful result.

Pursuit of effective control conserves military forces otherwise needed for destruction. This in turn expands the number of systems subject to control through force application, Case in

point: it takes a certain amount of force to obliterate the air defense system around Baghdad, but a much smaller amount to shut down a power grid supplying electricity to the system. Attacking in this way frees up aircraft for other purposes.

Effective control of enough of the adversary's enabling operational level systems will paralyze his ability to function at the strategic level. Ultimately, the enemy will be compelled to acquiesce to the will of the controlling force. In the Gulf War, coalition forces attacked in parallel at rates so high that Iraq had essentially no chance to repair lost assets or find alternatives and continue its resistance.

Military planners have always seen the desirability and value of simultaneous attacks, but they had never been able to produce them. This was due to three factors:

- Effective air defenses, which forced the attacker to divert aircraft away from the main attack.
- Inaccurate weapons, which produced a need to mass aircraft and bombs in order to have a chance of hitting the target.
- Lack of an operational-level concept focusing on the use of effects rather than destruction.

The first two shortcomings required technological solutions--namely, stealth and precision-guided weapons--which did not mature until the late 1980s. When they were in hand, planners were able to tackle the third factor.

For decades, air-power theories suffered from weakness in execution. The World War II campaigns against German ball bearing and aircraft industries took seven months, The anti-transport campaign took five months, and the oil campaign took six months. These relatively long operations gave the enemy time to recover in other systems and escape a rapid paralyzing blow.

In the Gulf War, however, precision munitions obviated a need for mass. Coalition forces dropped 9,000 laser-guided bombs, but that understates their impact. In some cases, a single aircraft and one precision-guided munition (PGM) produced the same result as a World War II raid of 1,000 airplanes delivering 9,000 bombs. In short, the arrival of PGMs offset the need for mass attacks to achieve a high probability of success.

By the 1970s, radar detection and radar-guided surface missiles and guns had become a lethal fact of the battle space. Experience in Vietnam and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war indicated that highly defended targets would yield to successful attack only when protected and attacked by large 'force packages' to get strike aircraft into and out of a target area.

A typical force package during the 1972 Linebacker I campaign consisted of 62 combat aircraft (less air refuelers) to get 16 fighter-bombers into and out of a target area. This cut down the number of targets that could be attacked at any time,

Stealth--in the form of the F-117--provided the solution to this problem. Stealth radically reduced the number of aircraft, supporting personnel, and infrastructure required to effectively strike a large number of targets. In the Gulf, F-117s flew less than two percent of combat sorties but attacked 43 percent of targets on the master target list. In a typical attack comparison, a non-stealth package of 41 aircraft was needed to hit a single target with three aimpoints in the Basra area. At the same time, 20 F-117s were sent against 37 aimpoints in areas of equally high threat, with no losses,

Conventional planners and intelligence personnel tend to think about targeting in terms of "required number of sorties" to achieve "desired damage against each target." An intelligence evaluation of Gulf air war progress demonstrates how one can be misled by a focus on individual

target damage.

On Feb. 15, 1991, the coalition target-planning cell received a report on the electric target set. Not all targets included in the primary and secondary electric target set had been destroyed or damaged to a specific percentage. Thus, the analysis concluded, the coalition had not met its objective. In reality, Baghdad's electricity system had ceased to function. The planning cell knew the true situation and reduced the number of planned strikes. Some Iraqi power plant managers even shut down their plants to avoid attack. Coalition air forces achieved their goal without exposing themselves to danger,

The Gulf War's initial attack plan called for shutting down Iraq's air defense command and control system through complete destruction. However, it was determined that there were not enough stealthy F-117s to destroy each of the nodes of the air defense system simultaneously. The solution lay in effects-based targeting. Not all nodes had to be destroyed; attacks needed only to make them ineffective and unable to conduct operations during specific periods. The attack plan was rewritten in a way that allocated fewer F-117 loads to some targets. This greatly multiplied the number of stealth/precision strikes available for use elsewhere. The opening 24 hours of the air war saw the fleet of F-117s carry out attacks on 76 separate targets. For comparison, under the traditional destruction-based way of war, plans called for the F-117s to attack only two targets on the first day.

Planning for effects raises complex issues. Planners, working with intelligence officers, must determine which effects on each enemy system will contribute most to the attainment of military and political objectives of the theater campaign. This depends upon the specific political and military objective, enemy vulnerabilities, individual target systems, and weapon systems capabilities.

A campaign plan is highly dependent on the weapon systems available. Thus, an effective plan squeezes maximum impact from those systems--not in terms of absolute destruction of a list of targets, but in terms of effects desired upon target systems.

Strategy means matching means and ends. Assigning certain air assets (means) to certain target systems to achieve specific effects (ends) is the basis of the new-style air campaign. It is generally articulated in a concept of operations (CONOPS) that describes friendly force intentions and integration of operations to accomplish a commander's objectives.

Of concern here is not so much the CONOPS process or format but rather the philosophy underlying the air strategy.

In Vietnam, the Air Force developed a command and control organization to plan and execute air-to-surface attack. Known as the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), it emphasized allocating sorties to individual targets in support of ground operations. At the center of the TACS process was the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). To a large extent, targets processed through the TACC were chosen and prioritized not by airmen but by ground commanders.

Battle damage assessment focused on destruction of individual targets. The function and organization of the TACS led many to confuse the efficiency of hitting individual targets with the effectiveness of achieving campaign objectives. TACS was established in doctrine as the air command and control system for conventional war. Post-Vietnam change focused on expediting responsiveness, enhancing sortie generation rates, and incorporating modern systems to quickly process large air tasking orders (ATOs). The process received great emphasis, while development of air strategy got almost none.

In the 1980s, USAF's Tactical Air Command and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed extremely close ties. This helped elevate the Army's doctrine

of AirLand Battle as TAC's de facto air strategy in regional conflicts. In time, USAF attitudes changed. Basic Air Force instructional documents on target planning boasted a full chapter on targeting for AirLand Battle but contained no principles or guidelines for conventional strategic attack.

In short, the Air Force's largest and most influential conventional air command, TAC, entered the 1990s with its vision of conventional war almost totally focused on supporting the Army--a critical but by no means only capability of conventional airpower.

These thought patterns and views were apparent among TACC planners and intelligence personnel assigned to Central Air Forces in Riyadh in the summer of 1990. Attention was focused exclusively on tactical operations. The prevailing procedures for designing an ATO produced a purely mechanistic application of sorties to targets in sequence. They called it "servicing a target list."

The architects of the Gulf air campaign, who began work in late August 1990, did not limit themselves to the "servicing-a-target-list" approach. The design of the air campaign grew out of thinking about how to hit an enemy's systems to achieve specific effects contributing to the military and political objectives of the Coalition.

Planning was based on a "center-of-gravity" approach. It began with a critical examination of potential strategic centers of gravity, their constituent operational systems, and led to identifying the set of individual targets making up each system.

Decisions about whether to stop or continue an attack depended on whether the coalition had achieved a specific effect. Individual targets were important only if the system was still operating. If the effects desired were achieved, it did not matter that individual targets may not have been hit.

There is a significant difference between "destruction-based" and "effects-based" operations. The serial approach targets elements of an adversary's defenses that restrict access to certain targets--early warning radars, air defense systems, command and control nodes, and airfields. They are to be hit before production, government, and leadership facilities.

Series methodology can be applied to an entire target base or group of individual targets. However, attacking one system at a time allows the others to continue operations or recover from previous attacks.

In a parallel attack scheme, application of force is accomplished against all targets in each target system at one time. With correct identification of target systems, the desired effect is likely. The simultaneous application of force in such a manner would enable friendly control over the adversary systems. When a force faces a target set too large to be struck through single attack, then planners should first focus on hitting those aimpoints that will produce the greatest impact. Planners also weigh early attack operations to paralyze the air defense areas in which non-stealthy assets would operate.

However, intelligence about the enemy never will be total. Moreover, an enemy will attempt to negate the effects of attacks. As a consequence, parallel war may involve more than one case of force application, even if there are sufficient resources to attack all known elements.

The advent of EBO calls for a basic realignment in war planning. The combination of stealth and precision redefines the concept of mass. No longer is a large agglomeration of forces the only way to achieve the effects of mass. Surface forces will always be useful, but massing surface forces to overwhelm an enemy isn't required to gain control of an enemy.

Nor is it necessarily the smartest course. It takes more aircraft to transport a single light infantry division to a war theater than it took to move all of the PGMs used in the Gulf War of

1991. Early deploying forces should be those with a demonstrated ability to effectively influence an adversary. If the measure of merit for service transformations became one of desired effect per unit of lift--the degree that combat effectiveness increases for each quantity of lift expended--future lift requirements might actually be reduced.

Massed forces--air, ground, or sea--present a lucrative target to an enemy. **Therefore**, the traditionally accepted concept of "mass," a valued principle of war, becomes in some situations a vulnerability. Potential adversaries may capitalize on the massing of forces and associated build-up time to deny US access to a war theater. These anti-access strategies become more probable as delivery systems such as accurate ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and weapons of mass destruction proliferate among potentially hostile states.

Since the ability to impose effects is independent of the massing of forces, the projection of force becomes more important than the development of force. The object of presence or mass is influence. The operative element of achieving influence is the threat or actual use of force to achieve a particular effect. If the same effect can be imposed without physical presence or mass, then in some circumstances deployed forces can be replaced by power projection.

Systems-based intelligence analysis is critical to the application of EBO. Planners need to know what an enemy needs to exert influence and conduct operations. Without that information, parallel war won't be effective. Exploiting advances in space-based systems, communications technology, and rapid information transfer can reduce this potential vulnerability by reducing the need for forward-based organizational elements.

Redefining the concept of mass, relying to a greater degree on force projection rather than force deployment, and aiming to control adversary systems rather than destroy them requires changes in the current approach to force management. The changes needed may include more reliance upon out of theater command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) organizations, distributive intelligence architecture, and "off-board" systems that can provide information direct to the user.

We are in a transition phase of the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Parallel war achieved through EBO departs from traditional strategies, but we fight with the tools available today. We must carefully manage the transition to the new instruments of war to assure their development is not restricted by the theories of the past, and to adapt current systems to more lucrative strategies.

It is proving to be a difficult transition. The tendency to retain orthodox concepts and doctrine is strong when the means on which those concepts and doctrine were based still make up the bulk of the inventory. Military doctrine is invaluable in establishing a basis for force application, but it must not be allowed to constrain effective forms of application just because they are different and non-traditional,

EBO provides a useful construct on how to conduct war that can bridge the gap between the weapons of today and the weapons of the future. It allows useful application of current weapon systems as we acquire a new generation of tools needed to fully exploit the concept.

The air campaign in the Gulf War and in the air war over Serbia used bombs and missiles on individual targets to achieve a specific effect within the parent system. These air campaigns gave us a view of the leverage that stealth, precision, rapid and secure information transfer, ready access to accurate positional information, and other cutting edge technological systems can provide. However, while the aircraft/PGM match of the 1990s far exceeded the capability of the systems used during World War II, it still is crude compared to the ideal means for the conduct of EBO. We must continue to develop systems that will provide even higher leverage effects.

As technological innovation accelerates, “non-lethal” weapons and **cyberwar enabled** by information operations will become operative means in parallel war.

The ability to achieve effects directly against systems without attacking individual components would allow a concept of parallel war preferable to that of today. Indeed, the ultimate application of parallel war would involve few destructive weapons at all; the objective is effects, not destruction. Non-lethal weapons, information warfare, miniaturized highly **accurate** munitions, and space-based systems might make such concepts a reality.

While non-lethal weapons and information warfare will allow us to further capitalize on the concept of targeting for effects while continuing to limit casualties, only new **organizations** and doctrine aiming to exploit EBO can fulfill the full potential of this concept. Non-lethal weapons and information warfare should enhance the ability of our forces to conduct operations to directly achieve desired effects. In this respect, recent attempts to develop and write joint military doctrine are helpful when their focus is on weapon systems capabilities and effects-based planning rather than employment environment or presumptions of attrition and **annihilation**.

Parallel war through EBO does not exclude any force component in time, space, or **level** of war at the outset of any political-military challenge. However, that does not equate to each force always participating in every operation or to a degree in some proportion to their size or presence. Whoever can perform the operations to achieve the desired effects best at the **time** should have it assigned to them.

Optimum parallel war is dependent upon a functional organization encompassing not just the air component, but the entire theater campaign (i.e., a joint force land component commander, a joint force naval component commander, as well as a joint force aerospace component commander) with a true joint force commander (not dual-hatted as a **component** commander as well) orchestrating the synergies of the entire force.

EBO can be applied in every medium of warfare. Even so, aerospace power’s relative advantages--speed, range, flexibility, precision, perspective, and lethality--fit hand-in-glove with this new strategic construct. Joint aerospace power has the potential to achieve effects at **every** level of war directly and quickly. As a result, it will remain the dominant means for **conducting** parallel war through EBO in conflicts of the future.

April 9, 2001 1:00 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Lagrange Points

Please take a look at this note from Andy Marshall on Lagrange Points. Don't you think we ought to think about having this addressed by our space folks?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-23

491.96

9 Apr 01

U07302# /01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 13 Mar 2001

MEMO FOR Sec Def

You did not ask for a  
paper on Lagrange Points, but  
one of my officers wrote this.

Andy

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

SIR,

Another paper from

ANDY MARSHALL re: LAGRANGE

POINTS

V  
R

JS  
SMA

3/3/01

11:42 PM

Sir, just in case.  
Col W

## What are Lagrange Points?

Lagrange Points are areas where the gravitational pull between two large celestial objects are equal. They are named after the French mathematician Josef Lagrang who discovered them in the late 1700's. (see attached slide 1 and 2)

In growing recognition of space "military terrain" the five points of the Earth-Moon system may be useful as strategic "high-ground" because they can allow positioning of satellites in relatively stable orbits at a much greater distance than the current set of orbital distances. (See slide 3) There is already one US satellite SOHO, a NASA solar observational satellite, positioned at L1 of the Sun-Earth system.


Because these orbits are <sup>e</sup>at much further away from Earth than the current set, they could be essentially invulnerable to most forms of Anti-Satellite Attacks. First, if there were self-defense measures on or supporting the L-Satellites, there would be sufficient time available to interdict any kinetic attack. Second, these distances are well beyond the range of any ground or earth orbital energy weaponry or jamming systems.

It may be possible to migrate some space-based capability out to these points with an eye to using them as a backup system, should the current set be damaged and/or our ability to reconstitute those capabilities be untimely. Capabilities that could


not migrate would be terrestrial ISR and SIGINT. However, a backup communications system, Global Positioning System signals, and reconstitution capability may perform well from these points. There are some identified complications which include a 1 . 3 second delay on communication systems, and a 2 ½ day non-propulsive travel time from L positions to Low Earth Orbit for reconstitution.

Unlike the moon's surface, there are no legal prohibitions on occupying these points or using them for military purposes.

# The Earth-Moon System




# Earth-Moon Gravitational Fields



2

# Earth-Moon Gravity Wells



April 9, 2001 1:00 PM

TO: Steve Herbits  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Asymmetric Advantages Paper

Here is a paper that Andy gave me on our asymmetric advantages. I think they ought to be fed to the proper people. Then I think the speech shop ought to have them and the people who are going to be preparing testimony.

Thanks

Attach.

DHR:dh  
04090 1-24

381

9 Apr 01

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 13 Mar 2001

MEMO FOR See Def

Responses to two of  
your questions:

- US Asymmetric Advantages
- High-Tech Warfare?

Andy

March 9, 2001 6:28 PM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Asymmetric Advantages

Ask Andy Marshall to give me a piece of paper that shows what our asymmetric advantages are.

DHR:dh  
030901-26

SIR,

See ATTACHED →

VR  
JJ  
-----  
SMA

3/13/01

1:41 PM

March 9, 2001 6:30PM

TO: RDML Quinn  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: High Tech

Please ask Andy Marshall if we go high tech, can we take a hit-isn't it a bit lik having a glass jaw? How do we avoid that vulnerability?

DHR:dh  
030901-28

11-L-0559/OSD/2898

## Asymmetric Advantages of the U.S.

- The key fundamental asymmetries are in the U.S. geostrategic position: our distance from the rest of the world, the strategic buffers we have and have maintained, our size, our resources, and the history of the last sixty years, which has left us with bases in key areas and a network of powerful allies around the globe. The principal military asymmetry in the U.S. position flows from that: the U.S., to a degree unique in history, is in the long distance power projection business in a way that no other military is.
- However, many aspects of these U.S. asymmetries have eroded somewhat and will continue to do so. The strategic buffers are somewhat less significant as weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles have diminished the importance of distance, and new emerging areas of competition, such as information warfare, may further erode the value of geography. The U.S. network of alliances might weaken now that the decline of Russia has removed the central motive behind many of our alliances. Power projection itself is becoming more difficult as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), sensors, and precision strike systems proliferate, allowing other nations to develop enhanced anti-access capabilities. In addition, through the use of these and other measures, such as Information Warfare or terrorism, some nations are developing the means to threaten the U.S. homeland.
- Despite this erosion, U.S. geostrategic asymmetries and the U.S. strategic advantage in power projection will continue to be critical for some time to come. In addition to the geostrategic asymmetry, and all of its implications, the U.S. has developed, over the course of the past sixty years, basic strengths that create asymmetric advantages in particular warfare areas:

- Aerial Warfare: The U.S. exerts absolute control over aircraft in U.S. airspace (CONUS as well as U.S. airspace in-theater) and maintains the ability to fly planes and deliver weapons anywhere in the world.
- Long-Range Precision Strike: The U.S. military, has the wherewithal to target and strike targets in the heart of any country with great precision, minimal risk of friendly losses, and little collateral damage.
- Strategic Deterrence: With a heavily-protected second-strike force, secure command and control, a sizeable arsenal, a range of strike options, and substantial strategic strike capability, the U.S. can probably deter large-scale attack against the U.S. homeland (though deterrence of more limited attacks from smaller nations, which will be a growing problem for the U.S., is for a variety of reasons less certain).
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: The U.S. collects, analyses, and exploits ISR better than any nation, and can focus ISR on any region of the world.
- Command and Control: For forces in the field, as well as for the strategic deterrent, the US. leads the world in being able to track forces, receive information, and relay commands across vast distances and into virtually any region of the world.
- Space Operations/Exploitation of Orbital Space: The ability of American forces to make near-real-time operational use of the information supplied by space systems-including GPS precision-location and timing-is well ahead of that of any military.

- Carrier Operations: The US. maintains the most advanced, powerful carriers in the world, and can operate these at a level entirely beyond anything competitors could attempt.
- Undersea Operations: Through nuclear-powered submarines and other assets, the US. can exert virtual control over the seas while going undetected when it chooses.
- Anti-Submarine Warfare: While the U.S. could be much better in this area, the military holds a tremendous advantage, relative to others, in detecting, tracking, and destroying enemy submarines.
- Expeditionary Warfare Capabilities: Including amphibious operations and forced-entry operations (i.e., parachute operations), the U.S. excels at placing forces in hostile locations, often to prepare for large-scale joint operations to follow.
- Complex Integrated Joint Operations: The American military has a long tradition of being able to orchestrate and support large-scale, complex military operations, and can integrate air, land, sea, and space assets to defeat any nation in large-scale warfare.
- Long-Range Lift/Logistics: With familiarity with large-scale, worldwide transportation systems, substantial numbers of planes, ships, and ground transportation, systems for identifying and tracking quantities of materiel, the U.S. leads the world in procuring and delivering vast quantities of materiel.
- In addition to these asymmetries in specific warfare areas, the U.S. has also developed an enormous asymmetry in training. The scale and scope of this advantage is tremendous: U.S. forces have far superior first-battle competency and can participate

in large-scale, complex military operations that competitors are incapable of undertaking. Indeed, with the exception of only a few selected elements of a few other militaries, U.S. forces have a first-battle competence that is greater than any other forces', particularly smaller or less developed nations', and in many respects unprecedented in history. This asymmetry rises in part from substantial investments made by the U.S. in the wake of the Vietnam war, but also from social and cultural factors such as our capacity for honest self-appraisal, interest in innovative solutions, and so on, and underlies many of the asymmetries the U.S. has in specific areas of warfare.

- Another overall asymmetry underlying more specific areas of military asymmetry is the size and quality of the U.S. defense effort. In 1997, U.S. defense expenditures exceeded the total of the next six highest military budgets in the world. The scale and scope of the U.S. defense effort allows the nation to achieve efficiencies other militaries cannot: for example, the U.S. can procure vast quantities of high-quality, low-cost precision munitions that are mass-manufactured. This asymmetry also leaves the U.S. with a large defense industrial base and experienced workforce.
- Many asymmetries in the U.S. position derive from social or cultural factors that other nations will find it difficult, if not impossible, to emulate. For example, the U.S. tends to be a particularly innovative nation, due in part to a general tolerance for failure: bankruptcy laws and other institutional factors are structured to allow companies or individuals to try new ways of doing business and recuperate if they turn out to be mistaken or flawed. The U.S. is also aided in this respect by having a high percentage of its population familiar with the kinds of technology – particularly information technology – that appear to be of high value in the future.

April 9, 2001 1:07 PM

TO: Steve Herbits  
CC: Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: "Glass Jaw" Paper from Andy Marshall

Who should this "glass jaw" paper that Andy Marshall had prepared for me be circulated to? Certainly the speech shop. But it is interesting and does raise the question about the Predator.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
04090 1-25

381

9 Apr 01

**Question:** Is the U.S. military use of high-tech systems creating a “Glass Jaw?”

**Answer:** High-tech systems undoubtedly carry new risks, however it isn't clear whether the increased combat capabilities these systems provide are offset by vulnerabilities potential adversaries can leverage against the U.S. military.

Vulnerabilities associated with using high-tech systems include:

- Most new U.S. combat systems, including individual battlefield weapons, have imbedded microprocessors performing a variety of functions that enhance their capabilities. However, microprocessors and other electronic devices are vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and other high-energy radio frequency (HERF) weapons.

- Beyond the electronic vulnerabilities of new systems, new logistic vulnerabilities may be emerging. The Army and Marine Corps have noted the battery demand of man portable electronic systems is high. Since battery technology is based on heavy metals, the theater logistic burden has increased.

- Unlike most competitors who operate regionally, the U.S. is in the long-range power projection business, operating far from CONUS. While competitors can base much of their networks on buried terrestrial fiber optic cables, the U.S. depends, to a greater extent, on radio frequency-based networks. These networks increase U.S. vulnerability to EMP and HERF weapons, as well as providing adversaries with gateways for information warfare attacks designed to corrupt network data or deny services.

- Recently, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems have been used to reduce the cost of U.S. information systems and components. COTS use may also introduce vulnerabilities since the equipment is not specifically designed for combat conditions, nor is it “hardened” against EMP or other electronic weapons. Moreover, COTS systems (hardware and software) are not produced in “secure” or controlled environments. These systems could contain malicious software code and be triggered by a variety of means to degrade the U.S. government or military systems in which they reside.

- It is our understanding that the U.S. no longer tests the vulnerability of electronic components and networks against EMP and other disruption sources. If that is true, assumptions are being made regarding the survivability of current systems without supporting data.

- To varying degrees, competitors are less reliant on microprocessor-based equipment and networks for defense and civil infrastructure capabilities. Accordingly, they are less likely to be deterred from attacking U.S. infrastructure elements. U.S. retaliation in kind might have a limited effect against less sophisticated countries.

- The U.S. is becoming increasingly reliant on unmanned systems and systems beyond man’s ability to operate without machine assistance. For instance, long-range cruise missiles are completely dependent on their electronic brains, and most new high performance aircraft are “fly-by-wire,” meaning computers actually manipulate control

surfaces to keep the aircraft stable. In the past, computers provided assistance that improved existing capabilities, whereas many current systems are completely dependent upon computers for even fundamental operations. This is especially true for U.S. unmanned systems that are becoming mainstays of U.S. military capability. Unmanned systems can significantly reduce force protection concerns and can provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information difficult to obtain by alternate means, and at low risk. Systems such as the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle can provide tremendous value, however they may be vulnerable to electronic attacks as discussed above, and also to lasers used to neutralize their sensors. Air, ground and sea-based lasers can pose similar problems for U.S. reconnaissance assets. This particular vulnerability can be a point of great leverage for competitors. The cost of building, launching and maintaining satellite, aircraft and unmanned vehicle based reconnaissance systems is high. The cost of building a ground based laser system that can neutralize these systems is relatively low.

On the other hand, high-tech systems provide U.S. forces with great advantage including:

- Networks by their nature are robust. Destroying, inhibiting or disrupting individual network nodes does not destroy the entire network. A successful attack on one ship's or aircraft's electronic systems, no longer dooms that platform, since cooperative engagement capabilities allow platforms to share data and provide for common defense needs. Similarly, data sharing via networks provides for economy of force in weapons

expenditure and allows commanders to plan collaboratively, significantly improving command and control.

- Technological competitions are nothing new. Competitors have always sought to develop counters to new capabilities. When radar was an emerging capability, U.S. operators had to deal with electronic jamming and deception. These competitions drive the development of countermeasures, counter-countermeasures and even better capabilities.

- Technologies alone do not produce improved combat capabilities. Operational concepts are an important aspect of those capabilities, and are often years behind the fielding of new technologies. If the U.S. experiments with new information age technologies and their vulnerabilities, and develops different operational concepts and even new ways of organizing forces, it can effectively reduce its technology-based vulnerabilities.

Increased U.S. reliance on high-tech systems is likely to provide incentives for competitors to attack those capabilities. Daily attempts by foreign hackers to penetrate U.S. military information systems are indicators as to how serious opponents may be. Also, the U.S. has known since the late 1960s that the Soviet Union had several serious programs aimed at exploiting U.S. use of advanced information based systems. However, attacks against networks, information systems and other high-tech capabilities

are difficult to model or simulate. Unlike kinetic attacks, there is less certainty regarding the efficacy of the offensive weapon and the vulnerability of the system being attacked. This situation significantly complicates an adversary's planning and makes it less likely he would rely solely on such capabilities for defense.

The U.S. increasing reliance on high-tech systems may induce an electronic "glass jaw," but it also provides significant new combat capabilities. Learning how to bob and weave to protect that jaw, while delivering a high-tech knockout may be operational concepts the U.S. needs to develop to ensure success. It is likely that until the U.S. faces a credible adversary with the ability to conduct large-scale information and other electronic attacks, it will not know the answer to this question with a high degree of certainty.

Consequently, it is important that the U.S. develop a sustained experimentation program that allows U.S. forces to engage credible opposing forces with equipment and capabilities we are likely to encounter in future combat scenarios.

April 9, 2001 1:42 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

cc: Robert Soule  
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Notes from Senate Budget Committee Hearing

Attached are some notes from the Senate Budget Committee hearing. We ought to weave some of these thoughts into our work.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-29

110.01 HNGS

9 APR 01

**Date:** February 13, 2001

**Committee:** Senate Budget Committee

**Subject:** Hearing on National Defense Spending

**Witnesses:** Admiral William Owens, USN (ret), former Vice Chairman of the JCS  
Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments  
Robert Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense

**Members in Attendance** (those that made statements or questioned witnesses):

Senator Domenici (R-NM), Chairman  
Senator Allard (R-CO)  
Senator Conrad (D-ND), Ranking Minority Member  
Senator Byrd (D-WV)  
Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL)

**Executive Summary:**

This was a hearing that covered the defense budget at the macro level. Of the three witnesses, only Robert Lieberman was there as an Administration witness (DoD IG). central focus was the question of an increase to the defense budget. A number of different estimates offered in recent past were discussed, for example -- \$50 billion noted by the CBO last fall, \$100 billion by CSIS, and \$38 to \$58 billion by the Joint Chiefs last fall. The Committee tried to get estimates on what increase is needed from the witnesses -- they were very non-committal, but offered rough estimates of \$5 to \$10 million as a minimum. The consensus was that we should let the Bush Administration and DoD carry out their reviews, then come forward with a proposal. An overall theme -- we're not prepared to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and our future budgets must address that. Senator Byrd reiterated his concerns over DoD financial mismanagement (comments were similar to those made at Secretary Rumsfeld's confirmation hearing and on the floor of the Senate 8 February). Finally, a great deal of time was spent discussing the President's proposed tax cuts, and how they relate to defense spending. A more detailed breakdown of individual statements and concerns is attached.

**Date:** February 13, 2001

**Committee:** Senate Budget Committee

**Subject:** Hearing on National Defense Spending

**Key Issues Raised:**

**Senator Domenici**

- Senator Domenici noted the various estimates that are out there for necessary increases in defense spending (CBO-\$50B, CSIS-\$100B, JSC-\$38-58B). He noted President Bush's call for a top-level review of national security strategy and the complex challenges of the 21st century.

**Senator Conrad**

- Senator Conrad discussed defense spending from 1946 to the present, noting that in the last two years we've moved to increase spending. He also offered comments on the proposed tax cut plan of the Administration.

**Admiral Owens**

- Admiral Owens noted that we can't recapitalize our military platforms on the budget today in the present way we do things. The services are not interoperable. We are not using the strengths of America's commercial technology.
- We have great redundancies in the Defense Department: the four great enablers (logistics, communications, intelligence, and medicine), R&D structure, TACAIR, air defense, and ground forces. These redundancies account for about \$40 billion per year.
- We must force the services to go joint.
- We must be more innovative.

**Andrew Krepinevich**

- Are our current resources spent wisely? Do we have a strategy to minimize the overall risk to our security? Is the level of risk acceptable given current defense resources?
- We continue to employ Cold War-era performance metrics to determine requirements for our military missions (national security strategy).
- Do we have the force to address tomorrow's threats? Defend not just against missile defense, but cruise missile threats, WMD, and attacks on information infrastructure.
- Procurement should be strategy driven.

**Joseph Lieberman:**

- 10 formidable management areas that DoD must address.
  - DoD has a very poor track record for developing or acquiring information systems;
  - Information system security is a major challenge;
  - Other security concerns need continued attention;

- Defense remains unable to identify many operating costs and to compile auditable annual financial statements;
- Acquisition reform remains a work in progress;
- The military health care system faces the same challenges as do public and private systems;
- Supply management remains a challenge;
- Defense must address unfunded requirements in infrastructure areas;
- Widespread consensus that the readiness of our military is suffering;
- We need to manage human capital resources more effectively.

#### **Senator Allard**

- While it is expensive to replace older systems, it is also very expensive to incorporate new technology. How do we make this transition without spending a great deal of money? (*Joseph Lieberman – management reforms don't normally yield savings in the near-term. Short-term, the only way to solve our problems is to with add money to defense or to cancel certain programs.*)

#### **Senator Conrad**

- Do we need an increase in overall defense spending? If so, how much? (*Joseph Lieberman – we should wait for the new administration to reshuffle the deck and determine our strategic objectives. He offered no cost estimates.*)

#### **Senator Domenici**

- Why is this the right time for a strategic review by DoD? (*Admiral Owens – It should have been sooner. The new Administration deserves the chance to review the key issues.*)
- He questioned the timing of the internal DoD review (Andrew Marshall's assessment).

#### **Senator Byrd**

- Reiterated the same concerns on DoD financial management expressed in Secretary Rumsfeld's confirmation hearing. Problems in DoD's system acquisition and inventory management.
- Are inter-service rivalries encouraging the DoD to neglect original thinking on the nature of the threats and the strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Are organizational changes necessary?
- How does the development of a national missile defense system fit into the budget plans?
- Pulsed Admiral Owens and Mr. Krepinevich on the future of the V-22 (their thoughts).

#### **Senator Bill Nelson**

- Concerns on the terrorist threat – in the budget, how do we protect against it?
- Will advocate a serious increase in defense spending over the next decade.

**Senator Allard**

- How can we put together a reasonable budget while we wait for the results of the various reviews proposed? What is a reasonable increase in defense spending?
- We need to look at our defense structure and needs 20 years from now.

April 9, 2001 2:05 PM

TO: Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Benchmarking

Whoever is doing benchmarking might want to look at this paper on the state of the military.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-36

*322*

*9 Apr 01*

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⑦ Dec 1/1

B. h. e.

# State Of The Military

January 26, 2001

# Objectives

- Describe trends (FY 1990 – 2001) and characterize the current state of the U.S. military in terms of
  - Operations
  - Force Structure
  - Manpower and Quality of Life Programs
  - Procurement Programs
  - RDT&E Programs
- Summarize DOD and Congressional budget actions during FY 1993 – 2001.
- Identify budget shortfalls and budget alternatives (FY 2001 Supplemental, and FY 2002 - 2007 FYDP).

## Current State of U.S. Military

"Today, we have the most precise, most lethal, most versatile, best-equipped, and best-trained forces on earth; and we have a defense program that ensures forces will maintain their superiority in the new century.

\*\*\*\*

My successor will inherit a Department and military, not only far better than that which won the Persian Gulf, but given our rapid application of lessons learned from Operation Allied Force, better than that which prevailed in the conflict with Belgrade."

Secretary of Defense Cohen, *Annual Report to Congress*, February 2000.

**But .....**

## **Current State of U S. Military**

- A military that is **overworked and tired.**
- ✓  A military that is a **scaled-down version of the Cold War force structure and military capabilities.**
- ⊖ A military whose workforce is **nearing retirement and under great stress from the demands of new technologies, deployments, family needs, and the peacetime economy.**
- ✓  A military that is **comprised of old and aging equipment; is therefore costly to operate; and is in badly need of modernization and replacement funds.**
- ✓ ⊖ A military that has **excess defense infrastructure capacity.**
- ✓  A military that is in **poor financial health.**


## Extensive Force Aging Is Taking Place Will Drive Future OPLAN and Budget Decisions

<u>Weapon Category</u>	<u>Service Half-Life</u> (Yrs)	<u>Average Age In</u>		
		<u>FY 1992</u> (Yrs)	<u>FY 2000</u> (Yrs)	<u>FY 2010</u> (Yrs)
Strategic Bombers	15-30	21	25	33
Attack/Fighter Aircraft				
Air Force	10-15	10	18	20
Navy/Marine Corps	10-15	10	11	14
USAF Tanker	30	30	38	48
Strategic Airlift	20	23	24	22
Tactical Airlift	20	20	23	18
Attack Submarines	12-15	15	14	20
Surface Combatants	17-20	14	14	17
Amphibious Ships	20	20	20	16
Army Attack Helicopters	15	4	12	22
Tanks & Infantry	20	6	11	15
Fighting Vehicles				


# Effects Of Force Aging

## *Air Force Aircraft Examples*


**Mission Capable Rate**




**Total Not Mission Capable Supply Rate (Awaiting Parts)**



**Not Mission Capable Rate (Awaiting Depot Personnel)**





**Cannibalization Rate (Incidents Per 100 Sorties)**



# Effects Of Force Aging

## Navy Examples



# Small Changes In Force Structure Since 1991

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>1991 Base Force</u>	<u>Change<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>1993 BUR Force</u>	<u>1997 QDR Force</u>	<u>Change<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>FY 2001</u>
Army Divs (AC)	18	12	- 6	10	10	- 2	10
Army Bdes (RC)	57	34	- 17	42	42	+ 8	45
MEF (AC/RC)	3/1	3/1	- / -	3/1	3/1	- / -	3/1
FWE (AC/RC)	24/12	15/11	- 9/ -1	13/7	12+/8	- 3/- 3	12.6 / 7.6
CV/CVN (AC/RC)	15/1	12/1	- 3 / -	11/1	11/1	- 1 / -	12/ -
CVW (AC/RC)	13/2	11/2	- 2 / -	10/1	10/1	- 1 / -1	10/1
Battle Force Ships	546	430	- 116	346	298	- 132	317

Note a: Change from FY 1990 to 1991 Base Force.

Note b: Change from 1991 Base Force to 1997 QDR Force.

# Modest Reductions In Personnel Since 1991

## End-Strength Levels (In Thousands)

	<u>FY 1990</u>	<u>1991 Base Force</u>	<u>Change<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>1993 BUR Force</u>	<u>1997 QDR Force</u>	<u>Change<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>FY 2000</u>
<b>Active-Duty</b>	<b>2,070</b>	<b>1,626</b>	<b>- 444</b>	<b>1,418</b>	<b>1,360</b>	<b>- 266</b>	<b>1,384</b>
<b>Reserve</b>	<b>1,128</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>- 208</b>	<b>893</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>- 85</b>	<b>865</b>
<b>Civilian FTE</b>	<b>1,073</b>	<b>909</b>	<b>- 164</b>	<b>728</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>- 269</b>	<b>699</b>


Note a: Change from FY 1990 to 1991 Base Force.

Note b: Change from 1991 Base Force to 1997 QDR Force.

# DOD Acquisition Trends


## Acquisition Dollars

FY 2001 Dollars (B)






## Procurement-to-RDT&E Ratio

Ratio



# DOD Purchases Trends



### Deferred Purchases


	<u>'93-00</u>	<u>'01-05</u>	<u>'93-05</u>
Aircraft	2,041	1,228	3,163
Shipbuilding	28	11	39
Tanks/IFVs	2,743	59	2,802

Note: Steady-state as defined by the Military Service.

# DOD Science & Technology Program


## By Component

FY 2001 Dollars (B)




## By Category

FY 2001 Dollars (B)



# Infrastructure Reductions Have Lagged

Change Since September 1990  
(Percent of FY 1990 Levels)



□ FY 2000 levels  
■ Change from September 1990.

# A Military In Poor Financial Health

## FY 2001


<i>Past Unpaid Bills</i>		<i>Future Budget Shortfalls</i>	2001-2005 Total
<b><u>Backlogs</u></b> (As of Oct 2000)	<b>\$ 44 B</b>	<b><u>Understated Costs</u></b> <sup>b</sup>	<b>\$ 17 B</b>
Depot Maintenance	1	Defense Health Program	6
Real Property Maintenance	27	Real Property Maintenance	5
Family Housing	16	Depot Maintenance	.6
		Contingencies	5
		Military Fuel Costs	TBD
<b><u>Deferred Purchases</u></b> (FY93-00) (a)		<b><u>Overstated Savings</u></b> <sup>b</sup>	<b>\$ 11 B</b>
2,041 Aircraft	}	Defense Reforms	11
28 Ships and Submarines			
2,743 Army Tanks/IFVs			
	\$ 200 B to \$ 400 B		
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 244 to \$ 444 B</b>		<b>\$ 28 B</b>

Note a: Estimate represents current market value, and include costs of weapons and support items.

Note b: GAO identified budget shortfalls.

# DOD Budget History

Current Dollars - In Billions



Note (a): Excludes \$ 26 billion of inflation savings.  
 Note (b): Includes supplemental funding.

## OMB/DOD

(Adds Since QDR)

PB 00 = \$ + 126.0 B (a)

PB 01 = \$ + 11.6 B

PB 02 = \$ + 52.8 B

**Total = \$ + 190.4 B**

+

## Congress (b)

(Adds Since QDR)

PB 99 = \$ + 21.2 B

PB 00 = \$ + 18.8 B

PB 01 = \$ + 3.9 B

**= \$ + 43.9 B**

**\$ + 234.3 B**

# DOD Budget History: FY 1993 – 2000

## Constant Dollar Basis

### Budget Authority (In Billions of FY 2001 Dollars)

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>Total</u>
<b>Jan 93 Estimate</b>	308	311	308	302	301	304	308	312	2,455
<b>DOD Actions</b>	---	-19	-20	-27	-35	-36	-38	-37	-212
<b>Supplementals</b>	+3	+2	+3	--	+3	--	+4	+2	+18
<b>Congress</b>	--	-1	-1	+9	+11	+4	+1	+13	+35
<b>Other Actions</b>	+7	-1	+2	+1	-6	+4	+16	+4	+29
<b>Jan 01 Estimate</b>	318	293	292	284	274	277	293	294	2,325
<b>Net Change</b>	+10	-18	-16	-18	-27	-27	-16	-18	-130

Other Actions include rescissions, reappropriations, transfers, and contract authority changes.  
Columns and rows may not add due to rounding.

Source: Comptroller, National Defense Budget Estimates (Green Book)

# DOD Budget Projection: FY 2001 - 2007

## Constant Dollar Basis

### Budget Authority (In Billions of FY 2001 Dollars)

	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>2003</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>2005</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Jan 98 Estimate</b>	271	269	272	272	272	272	272	272	1,900
<b><i>DOD Actions</i></b>	+ 22	+ 34	+ 24	+ 23	+ 23	+ 24	+ 24		+ 174
<b><i>Supplementals</i></b>	---								---
<b><i>Congress</i></b>	+ 4								+ 4
<b><i>Other Actions</i></b>	---								---
<b>Jan 01 Estimate</b>	296	303	296	295	296	296	297		2,078
<b>Net Change</b>	+ 26	+ 34	+ 24	+ 23	+ 23	+ 24	+ 24		+ 178

Other Actions include rescissions, reappropriations, transfers, and contract authority changes.  
Columns and rows may not add due to rounding.

Source: SecDef Annual Report To Congress (Jan 01) and Comptroller, National Defense Budget Estimates (Green Book)


# DOD Topline Alternatives

	Current Dollars - Billions							
	<u>FY 00</u>	<u>PV 02</u>	<u>FY 03</u>	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>	<u>FY 06</u>	<u>FY 07</u>	<u>PV 02-07</u> <u>Total</u>
<b>Nominal GDP (a)</b>	11,036	11,099	11,895	12,324	12,986	13,676	14,388	76,368
<b>PB 02 BA Estimate</b>	295	809	309	316	324	332	341	1,931
<b>GDP Share</b>	2.8	2.8 %	2.6 %	2.6 %	2.5 %	2.4 %	2.4 %	2.5 %
<b>Additional BA Dollars Required to Achieve GDP Share</b>								
- 2.5 Percent	- 32	- 32	- 16	- 6	+ 4	+ 13	+ 24	- 13
- 3.0 Percent	+ 21	+ 24	+ 43	+ 56	+ 69	+ 82	+ 97	+ 370
- 3.5 Percent	+ 74	+ 79	+ 101	+ 118	+ 135	+ 152	+ 169	+ 754
- 4.0 Percent	+ 126	+ 135	+ 160	+ 179	+ 200	+ 221	+ 242	+ 1,137
<b>Additional BA Dollars Required To Achieve</b>								
- CBO Estimate	+ 41	+ 34	+ 42	+ 44	+ 45	+ 45	+ 45	+ 255
- CSIS Estimate	+ 82	+ 89	+ 113	+ 131	+ 150	+ 169	+ 191	+ 842

Note (a): Represents January 2001 OMB Baseline Projection. Real GDP projected to grow at an average annual rate of 3.1 percent during 2001-2010 decade

# DOD Topline Alternatives Budget Authority

In Billions of FY 2001 Dollars



..... GDP share

# Budget Increases: Proposal Summary

	Budget Authority Dollars - Billions		
	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2002-2007</u>
<b>PB 02 Estimate</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>1,931</b>
<b>Operating Bills</b>			
<b>OS&amp;E Issues</b>	<b>3.1 - 3.7</b>	<b>2.2 - 3.3</b>	<b>19 - 21</b>
<b>Service Issues</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
<b>OSD Initiatives</b>			
<b>Modernization</b>	<b>.2</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>21 - 33</b>
<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>.2 - 1.2</b>	<b>1 - 10</b>
<b>New Initiatives</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>1.4 - 1.6</b>	<b>9 - 10</b>
<b>BRAC</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>OSD + Services</b>	<b>9.8 - 10.4</b>	<b>5.1 - 7.4</b>	<b>59 - 77</b>

## Possible To Justify Even Higher Spending

- ❑ Less than \$ 14 B of the \$ 59-77 B budget plus-ups will be used to buy additional new aircraft and ships (recapitalization) .
- ❑ Proposed budget increases will not halt aging of the force. Services will still need to defer during FY 2001 - 2005:
  - 1,228 aircraft;
  - 11 ships and submarines;
  - 59 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
- ❑ In addition, proposed budget increases do little to restore cuts suffered during PV 1993 - 2000:
  - 2,041 aircraft;
  - 28 ships and submarines;
  - 2,743 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
- ❑ Proposed budget increases do little to reduce current \$ 44 B backlogs – depot maintenance, real property maintenance and family 

snowflake

April 9, 2001 11:21 AM

TO: Steve Herbits  
Paul Gebhard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General Schwartz Memo on Incentives

Here is a memo from General Schwartz on how to incorporate incentives into the military. How do we feed these into the studies in the proper way?

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-16

240

9 Apr 01

U07313M/01



**Headquarters, United States Forces, Korea**

Unit #15237  
APO AP 962054010

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

Commander in Chief

(P)

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1 000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

1. Reference your request for recommendations on how to incorporate incentives **into the U.S. military.**
2. From our perspective, we need to formally **recognize** that the military is no longer a 1950s blue-collar industry but a high-tech and high performing organization . . . that requires **highly** talented personnel. Accordingly, we need to make **military pay and compensation competitive with industry** – not with the rest of the federal government – and develop incentives for individuals and organizations that recognize excellence, enhance morale, entice reenlistment/retention, and generally reinforce positive habits and operating **procedures**. The following paragraphs outline some specific proposals.

a. Individuals.

(1) Pay and Compensation.

- Base pay. Increase the base pay for the senior **NCO** ranks (E7 to E9) by 20% immediately. (We have a crisis of service members at 20 years)
- Merit Pay. Provide substantial merit or incentive pay for officer, enlisted and civilian positions that demand unusual time/commitment and responsibility. Tie the pay to an equivalent position in industry.
- **COLA/OHA**. Cost of Living Allowances and Overseas Housing Allowances must be standards based. ( If military are **living** in sub-standard housing, initiate partial BAH immediately.)
- Hardship Overseas Duty Pay. Pay hardship overseas duty pay for all **hardship** duty location assignments (like Korea) to offset the “second household costs” and **limited** opportunities for spousal employment. Additionally, reduce federal and state taxes for overseas service in all locations.
- Locality Pay. Provide adequate locality pay to military and DOD employees **if** the situation warrants (overseas, serving in remote or high cost **CONUS** locations...).
- Leave. Allow officers and enlisted personnel to cash in unused leave if they **desire**. Additionally, do not count weekends/holidays as leave periods and allow individuals to accrue days across **FYs** so they are not forced into a “use or lose” situation.

- **BAS.** Do not take away Basic Allowance for Subsistence when deployed or in field conditions.

- **Family Compensation.** Recognize the value added of military families and compensate them with non-financial incentives such as travel with a spouse, . . .

- **Thrift Savings Plan.** Modify the program to more closely resemble a standard 401 K in terms of matching contributions provided by the employer.

## **(2) Schooling/Education.**

- **Private Schooling.** Reimburse families for private schooling when assigned to areas with substandard schools.

- **In-State Tuition.** Allow family members to pay "in-state" college fees if assigned to that state at time of entry into college.

- **Degree Programs.** Fully fund off-duty degree programs for officers, enlisted and civilians . . . go beyond the 75% funding available now.

- **Civilian Workforce Education.** Develop a DOD career civilian formal education program and tie salaries to grade and education level.

## **(3) Housing.**

- **PCS costs.** Implement corporate-style compensation during permanent change of station moves, to include providing reasonable dislocation pay and spouse work **severance pay.**

- **Family Quarters.** Transform military housing into modern middle-class homes through rapid privatization or leasing, and establish a housing buy-back program that obligates the government to purchase/sell the home of any service member forced to move with less than 90 days notice.

- **Temporary Sponsorship Status.** Allow single parents to assign "temporary sponsorship" in terms of commissary/Post Exchange/medical benefits to grandparents/parents or others who are watching their children during overseas missions.

## **(4) Performance.**

- **Awards.** Incorporate a monetary payment into military awards, **similar** to the system already in place for Department of the Army civilians.

- **Promotions.** Grant Commanders and Command Sergeants Major the authority to execute "spot promotions" to E6, E7, Captain, Major, GS-12, and GS-13. Additionally, grant promotion boards the authority to selectively authorize personnel who are passed over for promotion to remain on active duty until eligible for retirement.

### **b. Organizations.**

#### **(1) Funding.**

- To both reward efficient management of funds plus avoid the **end-of-year wasteful splurge**, allow organizations to carry unexpended funds into the next FY. **Additionally, DOD and the services should set performance goals, resource the goals, allow commanders to apply the resources to achieve the goals, . . . and then allow the commands to retain any savings generated by internal efficiencies.**

- Build flexibility into the civilian workforce management process. Specifically, provide commanders the flexibility to balance the number of positions, talent, and changing requirements.

- Reward effective energy conservation programs by returning a percentage of the savings back to the organization.

- Raise the threshold for reprogramming and approval of projects.

- Allow organizations to immediately present financial rewards to individuals who identify/create efficiencies and save money.

(2) Budget Execution. Move the military to a multi-year budget process.

3. My staff is prepared to provide additional details and answer any questions on the proposals if necessary.

Very Respectfully,



**Thomas A. Schwartz**  
General, U. S. Army  
Commander in Chief

snowflake

April 9, 2001 1:21 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: Pete Aldridge  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DL**  
SUBJECT: Memo from Rich Armitage

Attached is a memo that was given to me by Rich Armitage during the transition.  
I think it has some useful ideas.

We really do have to focus on the Joint Forces CINC and what ought to be done there. It is in no sense leading the transformation at the present time, and we have to fashion a way to do it.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh  
040901-27

031. Transition

9 Apr 0

**DRAFT**  
**1/10/01**

For Hearing Remarks

1) Return to Warrior Ethos

-Devolve decision making to lowest levels possible (at present O-6 and O-7's are making decisions which should be made at O-3 level.) Empower company grade officers and NCOs.

2) Make the point that in addition to more money for 051, we need to make wise choices on upgrades of legacy equipment.

-To review the TACAIR programs, we must also look at support A/C (i.e. tankers, AEW, suppression, AWACS, etc.) and bomber fleet. The long legs on bombers make them particularly vulnerable.

-6.1, 6.2, 6.3 R&D budgets are our "seed corn" we must invest here now.

-ANOTHER BRAC ROUND FREE OF POLITIZATION.

### 3) ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Suggest change in ASD/S&E to ASD/Transformation

Suggest upgrading C4ISR to an undersecretary and give responsibility for space ( high ground in military terms.)

At present, our dependence on space architecture is akin to a fine crystal wine glass, although exquisite, a sharp rap will render it a shattered system.

4. Indicate an intention to focus the Pentagon on the new vision areas
  - a. What was
  - b. Projection of power without access to forward basis
  - c. Info assurance/info dominance
  - d. Strategy to defeat access-denial scenario.
  - e. Your Joint Forces CINC in peace time is your most important team member -- He leads transformation
  - f. Strong pitch for reserves, National Guard -- Real world missionary for citizen-soldiers.

g. Civilian workforce – although dramatically reduced from the past, it is an

older force and is not renewing itself.. **particularly** the acquisition

community. Indicate a willingness to re-energize this citizen.

From your point of view, it is essential to show in this statement that you

are going to embrace the First General Order – to take charge of all

government property.

Finally, friend and allies will be watching your statement. We need to indicate

willingness to share technology with allies so that we don't get a situation when

the U.S. is so advanced and allies so behind, that we can no longer participate in

coalition warfare. They live in fear of a situation where the U.S. is all seeing, all

knowing. And the allies have to be the folks down in the mud, blood, and beer.

3. Qualities for USD-P

a. Foreign affairs expertise

b. Energy

c. Ability to articulate

d. Management skills

*Per.*

e. Self-confidence

24

USD/A

a. Corporate experience

b. Tech expertise but not an engineer

c. Should look to leap-ahead technology and not get bogged down on day-to-day decision or                    systems.

d. International experience (cooperative agreement with allies, etc.)

snowflake

April 9, 2001 11:13 AM

TO: General Franks  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Comments on Strategy Review

Thanks so much for your very thoughtful comments on April 1 with respect to the paper you read.

Your suggestions will be fed into the process. I certainly appreciate them and value the source as well as the quality of the suggestions.

DHR:dh  
040901-14

381

944R01

snowflake

April 9, 2001 10:16AM;

TO: General Tom Schwartz  
HQ, U.S. Forces, Korea

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Strategy Review

As I have indicated, the materials you sent in were exceedingly helpful. I thought your suggestions on the paper were first rate.

Your memo on how to rebuild trust is an excellent outline, and I can assure you I will see that those thoughts are communicated to the folks here. We will try to get to work on them.

I also appreciate your paper on incentives and will see that gets moved to the right people.

Thanks so much for your very thoughtful work.

DHR:dh  
040901-12

381

9 APR 01

snowflake

April 10, 2001 7:58 AM

TO: Paul Gebhard  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Khalilzad Memo

Please take a look at this memo from Zal Khalilzad on transformation. What have you done with it, if anything? If nothing, what do you propose to do about it?

Please get it in the right hands. I suppose it will have to be dismembered to do that.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/7/01 Khalilzad memo: "Transforming US Forces: RAND Recommendations"

DHR:dh  
041001-24

*400.13*

*10 April*

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Zal Khalilzad   
SUBJECT: Transforming US Forces: RAND Recommendations  
DATE: February 7, 2001

Enclosed is a RAND paper, which I had requested during the abbreviated transition, on how to stimulate the development of innovative system concepts that will be necessary for any transformation of American forces and how OSD might be organized to enable play a stronger role in making sure that such a transformation comes to pass. The RAND paper argues that the current DoD acquisition process impedes transformation and is not nimble and adaptive enough given that potential belligerents and their weapons can appear with short notice and **that** the new forces challenging the US might operate in very unconventional ways.

The paper recommends five steps for revitalizing the process and argues that you can take them in the few weeks and months:

- Support selected Service programs, which are truly transformational such as UCAV and Airborne Laser.
- Stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services and abandon *ex ante* allocation decision making. The Service that comes **with** the best idea should be given the resources to perform the assignment.
- Develop a "second acquisition path" for novel system concepts. Acquisition policies in place today were basically designed to deliver new systems at high rates that could be operated with full support in the field. The new path would include our willingness to accept some risks in return for faster fielding of the product; and, field systems early and refine them later based on that field experience.
- Reorganize AT&L. The current AT&L is responsible for too many things. The paper proposes two different reorganization options: a) Focused on three functions-science and technology, concept formulation and development, and acquisition; and, b) Redistribute AT&L functions-sharpen the acquisition management by defining a new office with a narrower charter and places other functions dealing with technology and logistics in separate offices.
- Identify and select advocates of change and promote them in positions of responsibility.

C: Paul Wolfowitz and Bill Schneider

## The Role of the Acquisition Executive in Transforming the U.S. Military

The orientation and structure of the Defense Department's acquisition efforts are caught in a time warp that is a decade or more out of date. While the DoD over the past 15 years has embraced novel management approaches in such areas as greater use of commercial technology, lean production, outsourcing, and joint warfare, the department's approach to acquiring weapons systems remains similar to its approach in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

However, today's defense environment is placing growing pressure on defense policymakers to be nimble and adaptive, particularly with respect to acquisition systems and processes. This has come about because of two intersecting factors:

- *Need for shorter response times.* In the future, the composition of potential belligerent forces and their weapons are likely to be varied, and some can be expected to appear with relatively short notice. This puts new demands on the timeliness of response by the acquisition process when called upon to deliver new kinds of systems to counter these new challenges.
- *Greater need for novel system concepts and employment concepts.* The new forces challenging the United States are likely to include at least some that operate in very unconventional ways and that require response mechanisms not found in the established U.S. force structure. All Services and the joint force structure are vigorously experimenting with new concepts and potential solutions to challenges confronting them. As presently administered, the acquisition process impedes rather than encourages experimentation and actual transformation. Our force modernization process must enable us to field new and novel capabilities quickly, with less emphasis than in the past on maximizing the cost-effectiveness of each particular system.

By putting in motion a series of initiatives over the next year, the Secretary of Defense can set the stage for revitalizing and revamping the Pentagon's acquisition process to respond to the above factors. The five initiatives described below are steps that Secretary of Defense can take over the next few weeks and months that will markedly improve the timeliness, quality and cost of weapons systems that the DoD intends to acquire.\* In particular, the DoD should

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<sup>1</sup>This paper focuses on the Acquisition and Technology roles of the office, and does not address the Logistics management function.

- Support selected Service programs
- Stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services
- Develop a second acquisition path for novel system concepts
- Reorganize AT&L so that it can play a stronger role in integrating and catalyzing the military after next
- Identify and select qualified and supportive flag officers and civilian managers for crucial acquisition assignments within the Services and the organization

The DoD should start each initiative early in the new Administration. None needs congressional approval or a budget line item. While all of the initiatives will improve the DoD's acquisition processes eventually, several could pay off relatively soon, within a year or two.

### ***Support Selected Service Programs***

An early initiative of the Administration should be to join with the Services to ensure that important new weapons systems that are truly transformational are successfully developed and produced. Each Service is sponsoring a few such major projects. The new administration should ensure that the most promising of these transformational projects are vigorously supported. Such a strategy will involve forging supportive relationships with the individual Services and their acquisition executives to help them acquire the technologies, systems, and sub-systems that will transform their forces into those envisioned in Joint Vision 2020.

We suggest selecting one or two systems from each service. Candidates might include: the "Future Combat System" for the Army, theUCAV and Airborne Laser for the Air Force, the DD-21 for the Navy, and the V/STOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter for the Marine Corps.

### ***Stimulate Competition of New Ideas Among the Services***

Over the longer term AT&L should encourage a climate of competition among the Services for innovative concepts and ideas. A continuing weakness in the current system is that decisions on which Service will provide forces that contribute capability toward a stated mission area or operational objective are made *ex ante*. That is, they are made before the Service presents a set of options (concepts), and certainly before it has an opportunity to demonstrate how well the proposed

concept might carry out the stated objectives. *Ex ante* allocation decisionmaking precludes the possibility of having multiple concepts to choose among.’

Had the United States adhered strictly to *ex ante* assignment according to missions, the Navy presumably would not have been allowed to pursue long-range ballistic missiles. Intent on having a role in the mission of deterring nuclear attack on the United States, the Navy devised what clearly became by the late Cold War years the most viable solution to the operational objective of a survivable nuclear force—the submarine-launched ballistic missile. Having additional options available on a more systematic basis would be an improvement.

A central element of a new strategy should be to stimulate competition of new ideas among the Services. The best ideas would translate into that Service being assigned the responsibility for implementing the concept and given the resources to perform that assignment. (We need not be limited to one solution or a single innovative idea for a needed capability. Having multiple ways to perform a military task provides robustness that has intrinsic value to our war-fighters while adding complexity and cost to our enemies as they try to develop and field defenses.) Competition managed in this manner would promote choices and thus set the stage to make informed choices among promising new concepts—choices made on the merit of the case, unhampered by a preconceived notion of “assignments” of particular role and function to a particular Service. Of course, not every proposal should be funded. In fact, most probably should not be. The successful use of competition as a management tool requires the Secretary of Defense to make explicit decisions about winners and losers. Otherwise, the Department of Defense will proliferate solutions, squandering its resources on less competitive ideas.

### ***Develop a Second Acquisition Path for Novel System Concepts<sup>3</sup>***

Facilitating and enabling innovation demands a departure from the practices of the past/. In addition to the traditional need for relatively large forces equipped with weapon systems produced in large quantities and operated over long periods of time, there is now a growing need to respond quickly to novel threats by developing and fielding innovative systems, and to turn to emerging technologies to improve and upgrade existing systems. These demands for new system capabilities present new challenges to the acquisition process.

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, see Birkler et. al., *Gaining New Military Capability: An Experiment in Concept Development*, RAND, MR-912-OSD, 1998

<sup>3</sup> The ideas outlined here are developed in greater detail in Birkler, et al, *An Acquisition Strategy, Process and Organization for Innovative Systems*, RAND, MR-1098-OSD, 2000.

Acquisition policies in place today were basically designed to deliver new systems that were ready to be produced at high rates and that could be operated with full support in the field. Such a process has been appropriate when the quantities to be produced have been large and where the systems have been expected to be operational for many years. These processes are unfriendly and inappropriate for management of new concepts that involve some combination of true urgency and uncertainty.

New, innovative system concepts inherently pose many uncertainties for development outcomes (cost and performance of the system, and operational effectiveness in the field). The characteristics of novel systems are so different that “tinkering” with the present process will be inadequate. The most efficient way to develop novel systems is to identify a “second acquisition path.” Such a second path would

- emphasize flexibility of the process,
- include an overt willingness to accept some risks in return for faster fielding of the product, and
- field systems early and refine them later based on that field experience.

The last element is the most radical, poses the most challenging problems of implementation, and contains potentially the most powerful tactic for moving an innovative new system concept to early operational capability. The concept of “experimental” operational units, designed to receive and operate systems that are not quite technically mature and that are not fully provisioned with support and training aids, lies outside the main thrust of the traditional MDAP acquisition policy. The “field demonstration” phase of the ACTD process suggests that this approach can work for novel systems where the system configuration and the operational concept are likely to evolve as early operational experience is accumulated.

### ***Reorganize AT&L so that it Can Play a Stronger Role in Shaping the Military After Next***<sup>4</sup>

As the strategy and process change, so too must the organization. AT&L must transform its enterprise and structure to meet these new defense challenges and demands. By enterprise, we mean

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<sup>4</sup> For additional discussion on this topic see Bracken, et al, *Shaping and Integrating the Next Military; Organization Options for Defense Acquisition and Technology*, RAND DB 117-OSD, 1996.

the primary purposeful activities of the organization. What activities should preoccupy the organization? We argue above that the primary enterprise of AT&L should be the successful development and production of important new weapons systems that are truly transformational. This is the traditional enterprise and the one at the core. An acquisition organization should be focused on those activities that are central to its purpose of providing cost-effective systems.

If AT&L were to support selected Service programs and to develop a second acquisition path for novel system concepts, it would need to change its organization. Such a step would require sharpened emphasis on identifying, selecting, and rewarding senior military and civilian executives to drive the changes.

OSD should realign the organizational structure along separately managed enterprise lines. Such changes are needed to reflect the above new strategy, policies and procedures and to help institutionalize a new acquisition culture.

There is no single best way to organize the office to further achievement of these objectives, and it is premature to recommend explicit and detailed organization structures. The notions shown below are offered as illustrations of concepts for future organization. Both have as a central element that the current USD(AT&L) is simply responsible for too many things and is spread too thin.


### **Reorganization Option One-A Three Function Organization for AT&L**

We assume that the five principal activities of AT&L are:

- Discovering new technologies
- Demonstrating and maturing selected technology aggregates and sub-systems
- Participating in formulating and defining new system concepts and new operational concepts
- Managing the acquisition of systems and weapons.
- Advising the Secretary of Defense about matters of modernizing.

A set of functions and relationships that accommodates these activities is shown in Figure 1.

In addition to discovering and advancing new technologies, the Science and Technology Office should have a broader charter, having responsibility for maturing selected technologies, especially those identified in the Concept Formulation and Development Office. The Science and Technology Office should also function as the technology steward and advocate.



**Figure 1-A Possible Three-Function Reorganization for AT&L**


The Concept Formulation and Development Office would work with the individual Services to formulate, evaluate, and define new system concepts in each mission area and those that span multiple mission areas. Its charter should include both novel systems concepts and novel operations concepts. This office would identify technologies and concepts and initiate second-path development, promote purposeful competition among the Services, and develop new concepts to take advantage of nascent technologies. In addition, this office would be the primary DOD acquisition community interface with the Service and joint experimentation processes. It would seek out candidates for the second acquisition path. At the same time it would look for transformation system “overlap” and synergy.

The Acquisition Office would manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs using well established procedures.

**Reorganization Option Two-Redistribute AT&L Functions**

This option, outlined in Figure 2, sharpens acquisition management by defining a new office with a narrower charter. This new office would be the principal “customer” representative for weapons systems acquisition and serve as the DAB chair. Other functions dealing with technology and logistics currently in AT&L should be placed in separate offices.

With such a customer focus, the office should be recast as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions), with the staff provided by what is now the Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Systems. The Under Secretary could conceivably be given responsibility for OT&E, too, preferably through a legislative change, but perhaps in the interim by dual-hatting the appointee (which would at the least require Congressional consultation). Such responsibility would be consistent with the Under Secretary's oversight role; with advocacy for new ideas lodged elsewhere, the conflict of interest that now requires OT&E to report independently to the Secretary would be removed (see below). USD(A) should gain functions from C3I that are consistent with its new role, i.e., it should be in charge of telecommunications and the "information revolution"; DISA would report to it. It should likewise be charged with acquiring those systems that provide battlefield situational awareness. The remainder of what is now C3I becomes the nucleus for a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, charged with carrying out the Secretary's agenda of building a cooperative partnership between DoD and the intelligence community, including development and operational use of "national systems" for application to DoD missions.



**Figure 2-A Recast Acquisition Focus**

In this scheme, USD(A) would retain Defense Procurement, Acquisition Reform, Industrial Affairs, and Small *Business*, which might productively be merged into a single organization, with some staff savings taken.

USD(A) should not also be the purveyor of new ideas—that's a potential conflict of interest, as represented by the Service views that much of what OSD pushes consists of "pet rocks". The

enterprise of the second acquisition path should be organized by having DDR&E report directly to the Secretary of Defense, but retain a seat on the DAB. In this scheme, DARPA would report to the DDR&E, as it does now, but DDR&E becomes the proponent of novel systems, responsible for the “second path” described earlier. In an effort to secure Service buy-in, the Services should be given some voice in “steering” DARPA. They could, for example, ask DARPA to assist or lead their efforts to integrate the overlapping sensor grid. The DARPA change could also be used as a lever to refresh the Service S&T communities, including needed consolidation, better partnering with the private sector and the universities, etc.

A more aggressive use of DARPA could make it responsible for working with the Service to develop and acquire a small number of the novel systems coming out of the second acquisition path to equip experimental operational units. The Services would carry out experiments to develop operational concepts for using these novel systems in their experimental operational units. These experiments would also test logistics and maintenance processes for the novel systems. These experiments would be carried out to learn how the novel systems could be best used in operational missions. DARPA would work with the Services on these experiments to help identify additional system capabilities or unwanted capabilities. The novel system design characteristics could then be changed by DARPA in an iterative fashion to achieve the results desired by operational Service units. Once the novel systems characteristics have been shaken out in the DARPA/Service experiments using these experimental operational units, the system could transition to the normal Service acquisition process. In this way, DARPA would get early buy-in of the novel concepts by Service units. This approach would help ease the DARPA-to-Service transition problem that exists today.

Logistics, long the neglected step-child of the Department, would be a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense in this plan, with its own seat on the DAB, and reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Installations should go to the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the functions that installations most importantly support. Environment is best paired with Installations (this is the Service model: the Air Force has I&E as part of its manpower Assistant Secretariat). The new Logistics organization will probably need a stronger staff to carry out the business process engineering responsibilities that should be part of its charter. To the extent this means a larger staff, perhaps some “sunset” element could be considered (with a reasonably long time horizon, as much as ten years, gradual reductions conceivably beginning after five).

AT&L’s international cooperation functions should go to USD (Policy); to the extent there are international cooperation functions remaining in USD(A), they should be handled by the elements of

the new organization with appropriate domain expertise. Some modest personnel savings from this consolidation should be possible.

These changes would have five benefits:

- Focused organizations, and a principal the Secretary of Defense can hold responsibility for each major enterprise.
- Strong proponents for new ideas, and for logistics. Presumably, the results will be better-- including better acceptance of change by the Services.
- Integration of the "information revolution" with the main system development efforts of DoD.
- A chance to implement the direction of the National Academy of Sciences that DoD make a "lifetime" view of testing.
- Better supervision of installations and the environment, integrated with the principal user of installations.

However, such a restructure would carry at least two costs:

- Substantial time, turmoil and political capital to effect these changes that might better be spent elsewhere.
- Likely resistance from the Congress to principal (e.g., C3I), and some secondary elements (e.g., OT&E, Small Business).

How might one proceed? Put into place at the start of the Administration the key changes, leave the secondary ones to be negotiated with those who feel strongly about them as the Administration gains effectiveness. The importance of mandating and enforcing change cannot be understated.

### ***Identify and Select Qualified and Supportive Flag Officers and Civilian Managers***

Transformation and innovation endure and shape organizations when the advocates of change-officials of imagination and vision-get promoted to positions of responsibility. There are, an essential element of transformation of the force is for the AT&L, working with the Services, to identify appropriate general/flag officers for nomination to the key, three-star billets within the individual Service acquisition systems. Identification and selection of qualified Senior Executive Service civilians with the appropriate vision and appreciation of transformation is equally imperative.

Selecting, supporting and rewarding people for the appropriate behavior for the enterprises they lead is key. This is particularly true for establishing the second acquisition path in view of the dominant culture in the traditional legacy environment.

This paper proposes a cultural change. Unless taken head-on, the existing acquisition culture will defeat the change. Any restructure must be supported with human resource practices. The right people need to be selected, developed, rewarded, promoted, and fired to send the appropriate signals; the organization has to be highly performance based. This has to occur in OSD and in the Services. The signal needs to be sent from the start that this is not business as usual.

snowflake

April 16, 2001 9:40 AM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Zakheim Memos

Please take a look at these memos that Dov Zakheim drafted for me. I have edited them.

Then wash them through Rudy de Leon, Paul and Chris, let's get them typed in final form if we think we want to send them, and send them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
4/13/01 Memos from Dov Zakheim

DHR:dh  
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16 Apr 01

EYES ONLY Eyes Only

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: YOUR RESPONSE TO MY "TOP DOWN REVIEW" MEMO

DATE: April 13, 2001/1500

CC: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DR. CAMBONE

Per your request in your memo to me of April 10<sup>th</sup>, I attach three possible memoranda addressing the Balkans, Asia and our basing posture. I have not prepared a memo on nuclear policy, because much has happened on that score since I wrote my "Top Down" memo to you on January 17<sup>th</sup>. I have also combined the basing and deployment issues into one memo, since in my view they are-or should be-quite closely linked.



Eyes Only

11-L-0559/OSD/2960

DRAFT

*RLM*

ACTION MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
THE DIRECTOR (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND  
EVALUATION)  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTELLIGENCE POLICY)

SUBJECT: OUR FORCES IN THE BALKANS

DATE:

CC: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~During the election campaign,~~ President Bush promised a review of our overseas posture. One critical element in that posture is our current force commitment to the southeast Europe. Although we have begun a minor drawdown, the combination of our forward deployed and support troops numbers in the tens of thousands, at costs that exceed one billion annually. These costs are no longer to be treated as emergency expenditures.

At the same time events in Macedonia, as well as in Serbia ~~itself~~, demonstrate that the region remains volatile. ~~Finally~~ Our European allies are reluctant to see any diminution in US on-the-round presence in the Balkans.

~~Requested details for~~ *to*  
It is ~~imperative~~ that the Department undertake a review of our Balkan force posture, its costs and consequences. To that end, prepare a briefing report that would address the following concerns:

- 0 What are likely demands for US forces in the Balkans over the next years? What kinds of forces? How many?
- 0 What forces can be withdrawn from the Balkans? At what pace? With what political consequences?
- 0 What forces should remain in the Balkans? For how long? *For what purposes?*
- 0 What ~~do~~ *should* we expect of our NATO allies?
- 0 Should DoD contribute to a Balkan constabulary force?

The briefing report should outline alternative postures, with attendant costs and political consequences. It should involve participation from each of your offices, with the Office of the USD(P) to lead. A draft should be completed for review by the Deputy Secretary NLT (30 days from date of memo), with a **final** version to be briefed to me two weeks thereafter.

**DRAFT**

**ACTION MEMORANDUM**

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
THE DIRECTOR (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND  
EVALUATION)  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTELLIGENCE POLICY)

SUBJECT: MILITARY RELATIONS WITH ASIA

DATE:

CC: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The latest incident with the PRC underscores the need for a detailed review of our military relations with East Asia to buttress our overall strategic review. The following concerns require ~~urgent~~ <sup>urgent</sup> consideration:

- 0 What should be the future course of & military-to-military contacts with China? *US --*
- 0 What new directions should we take in our military relations with Taiwan?
  - Should we seek joint training opportunities?
  - If so, what kind of exercises (e.g. CPX or FTX? At what level of effort?)
  - What other forms of military cooperation might we undertake?
  - What are likely political reactions elsewhere in Asia (apart from Beijing?)
- 0 In what manner should we expand our joint operations/training efforts with Japan?
  - Can we expand technology cooperation with Tokyo?
- 0 How do we re-engage the Indonesian military?
  - What kinds of training/education are permissible by law? *should the law be changed?*
  - What multilateral initiatives might we contemplate?
- 0 What new facilities arrangements might we seek in the region?
- 0 How should we define our military relationship with Vietnam?
- 0 What budgetary impact might there be to any of the foregoing efforts? (provide annual FY program/budget implications)

With USD(P) leading, your staffs should jointly prepare a briefing report that outlines alternative approaches to these issues with, as noted, attendant costs and political consequences. A draft should be completed for review by the Deputy Secretary NLT (30 days from date of memo), with a **final** version to be briefed to me two weeks **thereafter**.

DRAFT

ACTION MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)  
THE DIRECTOR (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND  
EVALUATION)  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTELLIGENCE POLICY)

SUBJECT: OUR OVERSEAS ACCESS AND DEPLOYMENTS POSTURE

DATE:

CC: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~During the election campaign,~~ President Bush promised a review of our overseas posture. A critical element in that posture is the access that is available to our forces overseas. In conjunction with the Department's strategic review, we need to take a second look both at the bases and other access arrangements currently available to us today, and those that might (and might not) be available to us in the near future. To that end, prepare a briefing report that, at a minimum would address the following questions:

- 0 What is the current overseas US basing and facilities structure (include special arrangements such as Diego Garcia, Ascension Island?)
- 0 What is the cost of maintaining <sup>US</sup> access? (Include costs of our bases, costs relating to the use of facilities, and any linked economic or military assistance costs).
- 0 Can we further expand facilities on our own territories (e.g. submarine basing at Guam, potential facilities elsewhere in the Pacific and Caribbean)?
- 0 Should we restructure our basing posture in Japan? In the Republic of Korea? If so, in what way?
- 0 Should we intensify our search for facilities elsewhere in Asia?
  - Should we re-engage the Philippines?
  - Expand our presence in Singapore and/or Australia?
  - Seek (greater) access to facilities and ranges in Indonesia and Malaysia
- 0 Should we revisit our basing policy in the Gulf?
- 0 Can expanded access enable us to redesign our deployment policy so as to cut back on deployments other than in the Balkans?
  - If so, where can this be attempted?

11-L-0559/OSD/2963

- What could be the political costs (domestically and internationally)? The budgetary costs?

The briefing report should outline alternative postures, with attendant costs and political consequences. It should involve participation from each of your offices, with the Office of the USD(P) to lead. A draft should be completed for review by the Deputy Secretary NLT (30 days from date of memo), with a final version to be briefed to me two weeks thereafter.

snowflake

April 10, 2001 8:12 A.M

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memos

Here is your "Top Down Review" memo. Why don't you draft memos for me to send to whoever you think I should send them to in order to achieve the goals you still think need to be addressed.

Thanks.

Attach.

1/1 7/0 1 Zakheim Memo: "Top Down Review"

DHR:dh  
041001-27

DSZ/3 Jan/01/17:30

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## TOP DOWN REVIEW

Candidate **Bush** committed himself to ordering a **Top Down Review**, something we haven't had in 12 years. The NSC may be given the lead on this, but even if it is, DoD will be a major contributor. DoD already is in the midst of the **Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review**, but this is proving to be a routinized, highly conservative document.

Following are some of the issues that will have to be addressed quickly-in the QDR, the **Top Dow Review**—or both

- **Getting out of the Balkans**
  - What forces are pulled out? What forces stay behind? Does DoD contribute constabulary forces? (I would suggest that it not do so)
- **Military Relations with Asia**
  - Expanding military contacts with China? (yes, but on a reciprocal basis)
  - How quickly to move to agreement with North Korea? (not too quickly)
  - Defining relations with Taiwan (need to train with ROC forces, at least CPXs)
  - Expanding operations/training/with Japan? (yes)
  - Re-engaging the Indonesian military? (definitely)
- **Overseas Basing**
  - How much to exploit Guam (now being proposed as base for reconfigured Trident subs—SSGN's)
  - How to restructure OUT basing posture in Japan and Korea
  - Do we intensify our search for facilities elsewhere in Asia? Re-engage the Philippines? Expand Singapore and/or Australia? What about Indonesia and Malaysia? (yes)
  - Re-visit our basing policy in the Gulf? (yes)
- **Deployments (a review mandated by Candidate Bush)**
  - Where can we cut back other than the Balkans? Do we dare do so in Asia?
- **Nuclear policy (also see below)**
  - warhead reductions
  - "reducing the hair trigger"