

12:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 5, 2002
SUBJECT: **DACOWITS**

*Don
3/4*

When they reconstitute DACOWITS, let's keep the number down. I don't think there ought to be more than 12-15; 18 at the most.

334 DACOWITS

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030502.07

Please respond by: _____

S. Mauer

U12085 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10170

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Snowflake

5:28 PM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 5, 2002
SUBJECT: **Hats from Afghanistan**

Power
H/K
Alire

Thanks so much for bringing those hats back. I do appreciate it a great deal!

A Fghanistan

DHR/azn
030502.09

S Moore


U12086 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10171

1:27 PM

Notes File
in Briefing/Sec

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: March 6, 2002

SUBJECT: **Secretary Powell**

327

Would you make an appointment some time and brief Colin Powell on the briefing we gave to the President on the compartment and then let me know what his reaction is. He was testifying on the hill when we briefed the President and could not be there.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030602.31

Please respond by: _____

6 March

U12087 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10172

9:32 AM

Action
3/6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: March 6, 2002
SUBJECT:

Were we even consulted on these new nominations for the Naval Academy Board of Advisors? I just read about it in the paper today.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030602.26

Please respond by: _____

352 USNA

6 Mar 02

U12088 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10173

7:10 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: March 6, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Military Casualties**

Done 3/6
704

I really do think that I ought to send a letter to the family of every American who is killed during my time in office in anything relating to office. I don't think accidents, but the other. Why don't you draft up a letter, let me approve the letter, and then we will get going on it.

Thanks.

*We've been going on it
 We wrote the next of kin to those
 killed in the helo crash in the Philippines,
 the Pilot killed ejecting from his aircraft
 in the Med, etc. I think we're
 up to date.*

Di Rita

DHR/azn
030602.06

Please respond by: _____

3/12

Sec Def -
We've been doing that. Attached is a copy. CWO Hammann was killed Saturday during Anacosta.
All the letters have been attached long ago.
6 MARCH 2002

Larry Di Rita

3/7

U12089 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10174

(b)(6)

Dear Mrs. (b)(6)

All of us at the Department of Defense are deeply saddened by the loss of your husband. You are in our thoughts and prayers during this difficult time.

(b)(6) was a devoted soldier who served his nation with honor. He gave his best to our nation and paid the ultimate sacrifice while preserving freedom. We are proud of him, and grateful to him for his service.

I know that no words of mine can comfort you adequately in this time of sorrow. I hope you can find strength and comfort in your memories, and in knowing that your husband gave his best for America.

Again, I extend my heartfelt condolence to you and your family.

Sincerely,

5:11 PM

INFO
to 3/8

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: March 7, 2002
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Phone Call

NORTHCOM

Ike Skelton called. I returned his call. He said that Kit Bond has a bill in and very likely Carnahan will put one in to have Ft. Leonard Wood to be the northern command. He says he's not going to put it in, he thinks it should be my call. I told him my hope was to put it someplace where we already had a headquarters so we didn't have a lot of new money for communications and that I would start thinking about it.

He said maybe Powell could hold his hand and calm him down but he says it will very likely be coming down the pike sooner than we think.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030702.21

Please respond by: _____

17 MAR 02

U12090 /02

Snowflake

4:28 PM

Action
as 3/18

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: March 7, 2002
SUBJECT:

UN

See me about figuring out how to develop an international paid peacekeeping force.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030702.18

Please respond by: _____
3/18

U12091 /02

7 MAR 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10177

7:15 AM

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 8, 2002

SUBJECT: **Admiral Natter**

Please read the attached transcripts and see me before the memorandum goes out.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030802.04
Attach: Natter Transcripts 3/6/02

Please respond by: _____ *3/11*

560.05

8MAR02

U12092 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10178

Excerpt on Shipbuilding from 2/28/02 Defense Writers' Group

Q. Is there daylight between folks on the waterfront like yourself and the folks here in Washington, and if so is it getting broader, is it closing and are we going to see more outspokenness from other folks in uniform to try and make the case here in Washington that you need more ships now?

Admiral Natter: No is the short answer. But let me you why I say 'No.' Number 1, the CNO and the president ultimately made the decision to increase our near-term readiness, okay? I was the loudest proponent of doing that, because my purpose in life in not the future navy, it's the Navy I've got to deploy, the Kennedy and all the rest of them. That's my only measure of success or failure, really. Having said that, I can fully support their tough decisions on where they're going to put their limited resources. All I'm saying is that, and they have all said they need a Navy larger than 315 ships. So, there's no light between us. I say we need that, too. And this is not new; I've been consistent.

We need a larger Navy than we have today. My only point is that if you don't start building them today, you're not going to be able to afford 15-20 ships a year. So, we have to start building more ships. Now, I understand their problem - they've got to balance the budget. And ultimately the President and Congress have got to balance our requirements against the nation's requirements. But, I'm a Navy person, and part of my job is to inform the public of the requirements of the Navy. If we want to fight them over there, we better have a strong Navy. Ten years from now, I not going to have to worry about it ... but my daughter, who's a helicopter pilot, is, and our nation is. So I think I have a responsibility to inform them.

Snowflake

7:46 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 8, 2002

SUBJECT: Ivanov Visit

We want someone from the White House and Department of State in the Ivanov meetings, and possibly at the meals. I would think it probably should be someone like Joseph as opposed to Frank Miller, and probably Frank Bolton from State. We also want to make sure we have people from JCS; Meyers or Pace, at everything.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030802.18

Please respond by: _____

3/11

3/7

SECRET -

Bolton and Chairman have been invited to pretty much everything.

Regarding NSC, J.D. Crouch

~~plans to~~ include Miller's deputy, Air Force Brigadier General Frank Klotz. He's a fluent Russian speaker. Also, Miller's ~~plans to~~ handle the offensive issues; Bob Inceh just does defense.

U12094 102

*Proceed w/Miller _____
See Me _____*

11-L-0559/OSD/10180

RUSSIA

ZMARROIA

D.P.L.

8:15 AM

3/8

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: March 8, 2002
SUBJECT: Quotes

Please give me the actual quotes I've made at the last press briefing and then at the Town Hall with respect to when it might end. I think I said it would be this weekend, or next week. It could be days, not weeks or months, which would mean I could go to 13 days from last Thursday, I think. Check that so I know, and if they keep misquoting me in the press, let's get those quotes down there for people.

Thanks.

Done
3/8

DHR/azn
030802.19

Please respond by:

~~3/8~~ 3/8 by 1 PM

350.0015D

8MAR02

U12096 /02

4:05
6:48
SHOWWARE

8:18 AM

2/11

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 8, 2002
SUBJECT: **Town Hall Meetings**

Done 5/3

337

When we do these Town Hall meetings, it seems to take way too long for the next question to get ready. I think what we ought to do is have the next person with a question standing, with a microphone in their hands, when I am answering the question of the person before. It makes for bad television if you have to wait 30 seconds each time someone is going to ask a question.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030802.20

Please respond by: _____

4/22

Response attached.

Larry Di Rita

4/29

8 MAR 02

U12097 /02

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke

DATE: April 22, 2002

SUBJECT: Town Hall Meetings

We will make speed between questions a priority in each of these events. You should have noticed a difference when you went to Scott AFB last week. We'll continue to work to eliminate the lag in between questions.

11-L-0559/OSD/10183

7:25 AM

TO: Dick McGraw

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: March 8, 2002

SUBJECT: Town Hall

Who was wired in to see the Town Hall. Was it just the people in the Pentagon?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030802.10

Please respond by: _____ 3/12

8 March 2002

Mr. Secretary

In addition to being seen on the Pentagon TV channel, The Town Hall Thursday was broadcast live to military installations and ships outside the United States, was picked up and carried live by CNN and Fox News and was live "webcast" to the computer world over the world wide web system. It was also videotaped for rebroadcast to military installations outside the United States during more prime times that the live broadcast would provide in some parts of the world.

Dick
Dick McGraw

3/12
337

8 MAR 02

U12098 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10184

snowflake

March 11, 2002 11:16 AM

Larry Di Rita
3/15

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: PA&E

Done 3/12


000.1150

Should I meet with Frank Spinney in PA&E?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-18

.....
Please respond by 3/15/02



11 MAR 02

U12099 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10185

3/19 - (ASD)(a)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3/13/02 1:59 PM

THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To: Der Hakhem

Re: SecDef notes.

Please advise.

L. Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

s been
some creative

nt.

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAR 18 2002

03/13/02 1:59 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone *sc* MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Meeting Spinney

I think you should meet with him.

He is very smart. I am not certain, however, that he has been challenged much in the last decade. You might get him to do some creative work.

I'd suggest that you meet him with other analysts present.

Larry
~~sc~~
Have S.C.
Set up meeting
with the appropriate people - D

SECDEF HAS SEEN
MAR 18 2002

snowflake

March 11, 2002 10:20 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Contingency Plan

John 3/18

381

*Walt
LARRY DI RITA
3/15*

When do we complete the contingency plan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-8

.....
Please respond by 02/22/02

11 MAR 02

U12100 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10188

213
-1040

03/13/02 3:58 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambong  MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning Guidance

I have pushed hard to get the CPG completed this week.

The last two weeks have been spent with my staff working with the Joint Staff to adjudicate comments from the CINCs following the conference.

I will have for you on Thursday, March 14 the final CPG and a draft transmittal letter from you to the CINCs.

General Casey wants to take the final CPG into the Tank on Monday, March 18.

I have asked Larry DiRita to discuss with you scheduling a briefing with the President after the 18th.

Toward that end, Frank Miller will get the final draft Friday, March 15 so he can begin to brief Steve Hadley and Condi.

I will have by Friday, March 15 a draft brief for the President for your review.

11-L-0559/OSD/10189

3/11/02
show/Re

March 11, 2002 11:07 AM

INTERIM 4/2
322

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Corps of Engineers

I think we ought to have someone take a good hard look at the Corps of Engineers and decide if we want to keep it in the Pentagon, the Army, or whether it ought to be transferred to another agency of government. What kind of a person ought to be put in charge of it? What should we do about the general who is heading it up?

I don't know enough about it to have an opinion, but it seems to me it is time to address it, and we ought to do it fast.

Let's get a group to do it. Please get back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-15

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

3/15
Sec Det -
Concur. We are considering the options and will be back to you soon.

11MAR02

U12101 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10190

Dihl

March 11, 2002 3:10 PM

Action
by 3/19

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Our Breakfast with Senator Conrad

032

When you have a draft of how you think we can limit the use of the \$10 billion, let me look at it before you send it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-43



Please respond by 03/21/02

11MARR02

U12102 /02

March 11, 2002 3:05 PM

INFO
3/19

381

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Semantics of Transformation

The more I think about it, the more I wonder if the word "transformation" is a good one. It sounds like it starts and ends, but we really need more of a culture and a set of processes that are swift, deft, agile and allow the institution to change as needed. We need a culture that encourages change, new ideas, new approaches and that systematically resists bureaucratic rigidities.

It makes me wonder if in Chapter 6 of the Annual Report we ought to tone down a bit on the word "transformation" and beef up what I just said. What we are really looking for is not a transformation, but a culture that encourages transforming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-42



Please respond by 03.22.02

11MAR02

U12103 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10192

March 11, 2002 2:09 PM

IN JCS
FILE
AUSTRALIA

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Larry Di Rita
Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Sniper

If in fact that Aussie sniper hit 50 Al Qaeda, I would like to get him to the Pentagon someday and give him an award.

Thanks.

DJR:dh
031102-35

.....

Please respond by 04/01/02

11MARR02

U12104 /02

INFO
AS 3/19

March 11, 2002 11:22 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: MARC THESSEN
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

350.001

SUBJECT: Speech

Whoever is working on the speech, here is a Kissinger piece that has some very good stuff in it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Henry A. Kissinger, "Answering the 'Axis' Critics"

DHR:dh
031102-20

.....

Please respond by _____

11MAR02

U12105 /02

the 1920s. One essentially disparaged the entire project, saying New Yorkers were too, well, New York

er. This is why reading cannot be a hobby. For a long time I did not un-

der a book—my characters, my clothes on them and my look to them. But

what you want, but leave me alone. I'm reading.

Henry A. Kissinger

Answering the 'Axis' Critics

Not in recent memory has a presidential comment evoked the acrimony, especially in Europe, that President Bush's phrase "the axis of evil" has. Remarkably little of the avalanche of disapproval addresses the substance; its focus is on motives: the imminent congressional election (this from the British foreign secretary); American imperialism (the European Commission foreign policy head); simplistic thinking (the French foreign minister); the trend toward American isolationism and hegemonism (leading German newspapers).

Yet the president has raised an issue central to international security: the "nexus" among large, well-organized and deadly terrorist organizations (such as al Qaeda), states that have used and supported terrorism (such as Iran and North Korea) and states that have developed (and, in the case of Iraq, used) weapons of mass destruction. Until Sept. 11, the United States and its allies withheld military action until after terrorist attacks had, in fact, occurred; constraint was sought via the same principle of deterrence that was applied to weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the major powers: the expectation that rational leaders would avoid actions leading to their own destruction. But when such weapons are within reach of countries that have employed them against their neighbors and their own people (as Iraq), or that at times have made systematic assassination part of their policy and where hundreds of thousands have been sacrificed to death by starvation (as North Korea), or of national leaders who have backed virulent terrorist groups and hostage-takers (as Iran), and if attacks are made by suicide bombers, these constraints may not operate any longer. Especially where covert use and linkage to terrorists are ever possible, preventive action must be considered.

Obviously the three nations cited by the president need to be dealt with by methods appropriate to their situations. Iraq clearly poses the most urgent challenge; Iran will require the most sophisticated policy; North Korea is comparable to Iraq domestically but, in recent years, has occasionally seemed to grope for a new approach. The scope for diplomacy is least with respect to Iraq, greatest, one hopes, with respect to Iran. This is why both the president and Secretary of State Colin Powell have indicated there is no intention to deal with Iran and North Korea by military means. But in the end, the test of any policy will be the degree to which the risk to global security inherent in the possession of weapons of mass destruction by dangerous regimes is brought under control.

The Atlantic Alliance, which has been the keystone of the foreign policy of its members for a generation, cannot any longer avoid this issue. On one level, the controversy reflects a fundamental change in European domestic politics. During the Cold War, opposition to American policy almost invariably came from the left and was resisted by the governments in office—usually center-right. Today

European center-left governments are being assuaged with standard anti-American positions by the left wings of the governing parties, disaffected because their leaders are conducting centrist economic policies. And governments reluctant to further inflame their radical constituents stand silent or occasionally join the chorus.

Generational change is a contributing factor. The Atlantic Alliance's first generation of European leaders, though they led countries weakened and impoverished by the war, had their formative experience when Europe was the center of world affairs. They understood that their ultimate choice was the alliance or a kind of neutralism that, while acceptable to some groups on the left, was anathema to center-right governments. No such consensus as to the danger exists today. Hence attacks on America as violence-prone, unilateralist and emotionally unbalanced—

Do our allies reject the American definition of the danger?

the slogans of the opposition during the Cold War—have become the standard commentary of intellectuals and media, feebly resisted, if at all, by governments. The most favorable comment about the United States tends to urge governments to base their policy on "encouraging" moderate members of the Bush administration presumed sympathetic, as if it were a revolutionary government in danger of veering out of control.

This trend is reinforced because for European governments the dominant foreign policy concern for more than a decade has been the creation of the European Union—a historic task from which the United States is, by definition, excluded. And for many European leaders, European identity has come to be sought in distinction from and, not infrequently, in opposition to the United States. Europe is concentrating on the legalistic, bureaucratic and constitutional arrangements involved in integrating more than 20 nations with vastly differing histories, languages and, occasionally, cultures, while the United States celebrates the exceptional nature of its established institutions and declares them relevant to the rest of the world.

The vast gap in military power between Europe and the United States compounds the difference in perspectives. There is no precedent for the military dominance the United States has achieved over the rest of the world. There does not exist now—nor for the foreseeable future—any country or group of countries capable of posing a military challenge to the United States. This situation tempts adversaries to challenge the United States, if at all, on a level

beyond the conventional, such as by terrorism. Some friendly nations fear that the United States, being able to impose its preferences, will do so in every situation by the naked exercise of power. And occasional gloating by Americans over the single superpower status and American hegemony reinforces those tendencies.

Differences are inevitable. But they should challenge leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to remember the importance of the continued partnership of the democracies, especially in a world of increasing turmoil. The United States owes its coalition partners some description of the military options it is considering and of the political outcome it is seeking. Allied leaders, if they want to preserve an essential traditional relationship, need to counter the caricature of America as a trigger-happy, domineering colossus. They know—or should know—that thoughtful American leaders recognize that the imposition of an international order is against the character of a nation where a dominant historical theme has been anti-imperialism and where an isolationist streak is ever present. It cannot be in America's long-term interest to turn every issue into a test of strength.

The basic theme of American foreign policy has been—sometimes naively—to prevail by the power of our ideals and to reserve military might for resistance to aggression. The dominant trend in American foreign policy thinking must be to transform power into consensus so that the international order is based on agreement rather than reluctant acquiescence.

An issue in the axis-of-evil debate is not America's attempt to impose an international order but whether every member of a coalition should have a veto over fundamental perceptions of security. It must be remembered that one country's perception of unilateralism is another's perception of leadership. A definition of consensus based on unanimity leads to paralysis; a definition of leadership insisting on unilateralism on every issue leads to an imperialism that in the long run exhausts the imperial power. To navigate between these extremes is the challenge for American policy.

But it is an even deeper challenge for European leaders. The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by governments that have demonstrated their willingness to use them, have professed hostility toward America or its allies and are not restrained by domestic institutions. Do our allies reject the American definition of the danger? Or do they accept it but reject military means for dealing with it? And if military means are rejected, what is the alternative? If "engagement" is defined in psychological terms—the pacification of the adversary—it becomes a synonym for traditional appeasement. What changes has "engagement" achieved in Iraq? What did the British foreign secretary's visit to Tehran bring Britain other than a rejection of its nomination for ambassador to

the revolutionary regime? And in what way did the obsequious mission to Pyongyang of a delegation from the European Union—a gesture of dissociation from statements by Bush that were considered too insistent in Europe—ameliorate Pyongyang's conduct toward either Seoul or the rest of the world?

America's critics generally advance nation-building as an alternative to America's alleged obsession with military means. Even granting the premise, the most sweeping policy of nation-building and alleviation of poverty still would require a time scale irrelevant to the problem as defined by the president. Indeed, a case can be made for the proposition that nation-building becomes relevant only after the change of regime, such as with the Taliban and probably Iraq, and is either impossible or counterproductive before then.

The principal concrete alternative put forward to the Bush administration's approach—especially with respect to Iraq—is for an inspection scheme to discover weapons of mass destruction. But no scheme now on the table has even remotely remedied the failure of previous inspection regimes that, before the Gulf War, failed to uncover Iraq's nuclear weapons program and afterward failed to find most of Iraq's biological programs. Our allies help neither themselves nor other members of the coalition if they treat inspections of Iraq primarily as a stratagem to prevent American military action.

With respect to Iran and North Korea, there is more scope for devising a long-range diplomatic strategy. It involves a fundamental choice. The debate on dealing with these regimes generally focuses on how to encourage moderate elements within the existing structure, especially those assumed to be around President Mohammad Khatami in Iran. But a strong case can be made for the proposition that the real struggle is between the increasingly sophisticated public and a repressive regime. Dialogue with the ayatollahs is important, but it must not become a device to strengthen their hold on power. Room must be left for appealing to the democratic aspirations of the general public. At some point, engagement must lead to reciprocity; it must not become an exercise in psychological self-fulfillment.

However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the so-called axis of evil is resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical weapons. The survival of civilized life requires that this problem be dealt with preemptively, and it cannot be done by unilateral American action. Thus the issue of terrorism merges with the challenge of international order—a challenge to the leadership and imagination with which the administration has managed its response to the attacks on America on Sept. 11.

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Snowflake

March 11, 2002 5:31 PM

OSE 3/20

RUSSIA

TO: Doug Feith
CC: J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Russia

If I go to Russia, I want to meet with Yavlinsky.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-75

.....
Please respond by 03/22/02

11 MAR 02

U12106 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10196

March 11, 2002 5:30 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Chris De Muth
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Military Commission Procedures

Done 3/20

015

I have no problem with briefing the President on the military commission procedures.

However, before we ever make them public, I have to read every single word and I have not yet done so. I have just discovered some things I may be modestly uncomfortable with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-74

.....

Please respond by 03/18/02

11 MAR 02

U12107 /02

March 11, 2002 5:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: President's Schedule

Done 3/22

333WH

Please try to get the President's schedule for the rest of the year—when he plans to be out of the city, so I can plan to be out of the city at the same time and not miss NSC meetings and so forth. He already has some trips planned to different parts of the world.

We ought to be able to pencil them in on my calendar so I know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-71

.....
Please respond by 03/22/02

11MARR02

U12108 /02

March 11, 2002 5:52 PM

Action
D
2/10

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lynn Martin

000.8

Here is a letter from Lynn Martin. Please look at it and let me know.

She is a former Member of congress and a former Cabinet officer.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/28/02 Lynn Martin ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
031102-63



Please respond by _____

U12109 /02

11 MAR 02

(b)(6)

LYNN MARTIN
(b)(6)

February 28, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, D.C. 20301

Sent via facsimile

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request your help in correcting a situation affecting the Nation's minority institutions of higher education, including the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). In my spare time as a private citizen, I have the privilege of serving on the Board of Directors of the United Negro College Fund Special Programs (UNCFSP) Corporation. UNCFSP administers a number of federal grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements for UNCF. My former colleague in the House of Representatives, Bill Gray, is President of UNCF, and serves as Chairman of the UNCFSP Board.

One of the projects that UNCFSP administers under a Cooperative Agreement with your Department is the HBCU/MI Technical Assistance Project. This \$1.25 million program allows UNCFSP to provide critical information and technical assistance services to minority-serving institutions to help them compete for DoD procurement opportunities. The Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSADSBU) provides technical assistance Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), and Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs). OSADBU recently advised UNCFSP that it would not renew the Cooperative Agreement that expires in April 2002. Although OSADSBU is pleased with the performance and administration of the program; we understand that the new Director has expressed concern about the legislative language affecting the source of funding utilized to support the HBCU/MI project.

I believe you will agree that DoD should continue to encourage and support the efforts of minority institutions to participate in Defense procurement activity. It is my hope that you can find approximately \$800,000 to allow the HBCU/MI TAP program to continue for the remainder of the current fiscal year. Your Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, Pete Aldridge, is responsible for OSADBU, and I hope you would have him review the Director's decision. This would provide a route to

Shit
Dear Lynn -
Thanks for you recent letter concerning the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Technical Assistance Project. I've asked Pete Aldridge to take a look at it and meet with you as necessary.
Lynn M. Knight
3/1

Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
February 25, 2002
Page Two

temporarily repair this problem. The Department and Congress would then have the opportunity to find a way to resolve this unintended difficulty.

Bill Gray and I are prepared to meet with you or with Undersecretary Aldridge to discuss this matter as soon as possible and to help in any way we can to insure the continuation of this program and the good the Department feels it has provided. I know you are in the midst of an extraordinarily busy time so I thank you for taking the time to look at this.

Sincerely,



Lynn Martin

LM: ak

cc: Hon. William H. Gray, III

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Ms. Lynn Martin


(b)(6)

Dear Lynn,

Thanks for your recent letter concerning the Historically Black Colleges and Universities Technical Assistance Project. I've asked Pete Aldridge to take a look at it and meet with you as necessary.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



I've been helping Turkey
for many years and we are
currently working on a project for
them.

11-L-0559/OSD/10202

March 11, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lynn Martin

Here is a letter from Lynn Martin. Please look at it and let me know.

She is a former Member of congress and a former Cabinet officer.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/28/02 Lynn Martin ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
031102-63

.....
Please respond by _____

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
MAR 11 2002

7/26
Aldridge response attached.
V/R
Ed

U12109-02
~~U12290~~ /02

WFO
45 3/20

March 11, 2002 5:33 PM

TO: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jerry Lindauer

231.2

Here is a letter from a fellow who worked for me at the Pentagon some years ago and was later very successful in the cable business.

Given his legal background, he might be someone we could get in to help. He is eager to do something. I am sure he would do it pro bono to start.

Why don't you check with Torie and see what she knows about him in recent years.

Thanks.

Attach.

02/13/02 Lindauer ltr to SecDef, SecDef reply

DHR:dh
031102-77

.....

Please respond by _____

11 Mar 02

U12110 /02

2002 MAR -8 AM 7:45

(b)(6)

February 13, 2002

Secretary of Defense



SA0004812

The Honorable Donald H Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Room 3E880
1000 Defense, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don


I just wanted to convey my admiration on the job you are doing and the way you handle the press corps You are a tour de force in addition to being a matinee idol

Bill Greener wrote me the other day and said "we" trained you good Twenty-five years is a long time between the jobs, but the biggest difference I see is "that your are very comfortable in your shoes" and it is reassuring to the American People

I'm still available pro bono if there is anything I can do Do not forget, I am a lawyer who was a JAG and a General military court judge for two years of my Marine Corp life

In the meantime, keep doing what you do so well Please give Joyce my very best, and I hope you still get to spend sometime together

Sincerely yours,



Jerry D Lindauer
Chairman

JDL/swh

P.S Please give Torie my best She is doing a great job and I know a very valuable member of your team

P P S Thought Ken's piece on Iraq and Michael Kelly's column on our French allies in today's *Post* were right on I still remember going with Schlesinger to Paris for bi-laterals and a formal State dinner which he refused to attend When Gen Wickham pleaded with him that it would be "a slap in the face" if he did not attend the dinner, his response was "F--- the French" I couldn't agree more

11-L-0559/OSD/10205

U04238 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Jerry D. Lindauer
Chairman
@Security
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 200
Austin, TX 78701

Dear Jerry,

Thanks so much for your thoughtful note. It is good to hear from you, as always. Greener is right—you folks did train me!

I am pleased to know you have that background as a lawyer and JAG and will pass it along to Jim Haynes and Doug Feith here at the Pentagon. I don't know quite what is going to happen with respect to these military commissions, but it is entirely possible your background could be helpful.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the name 'Lindauer'.

March 11, 2002 3:14 PM

Done 3/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Annual Report/Nuclear Debate

Please make sure when Steve Cambone reads the Annual Report that he reviews it to make sure it doesn't further inflame the nuclear debate as a result of the leaked NPR documents.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-45

A-4771.61

.....
Please respond by 03/18/02 *3/20*

Sec Def
Have done so. We're
(probably) okay.
D.L.R.

11 Mar 02

U12111 /02

March 11, 2002 3:21 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CJCS/VCJCS Review of Annual Report

3/20
DR

Please make sure Gen. Myers and Gen. Pace have read the Annual Report and are comfortable with it, too. They are going to be asked about it, and we want to make sure before it goes out that they are onboard.

110,01 HNS

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-46

.....
Please respond by 02/15/02

3/20
Sec Def -
Will do. CINC's
and Joint Staff have
been reviewing/inputs all
along.
Di Rita

11 Mar 02

U12112 /02

March 11, 2002 3:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Classification Review of Annual Report

Done 3/20

110.01 Hn65

Please make sure someone goes over this whole Annual Report to make sure there is nothing classified in it. As I read it, it certainly seems revealing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-48

.....
Please respond by *03/24/02*

3/20
SecDef - Will do. FYI,
Each successive
draft has gone through
the OSD Classification
office to ensure we're
okay.

DRitz

11 Mar 02

U12113 /02

March 11, 2002 3:23 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Force

Done 3/19

3/18
3/18
3/18

322

Have we been stiff enough on the Standing Joint Task Force subject, or is it slipping away from us? I worry that the bureaucracy will bury it without our knowing it until it is too late.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-47

.....
Please respond by 0410102

3/18
Response attached

DR

11 Mar 02

U12114 /02

03/13/02 5:40 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Standing Joint Task Forces  MAR 13 2002

You are right to be concerned.

The brief prepared by J-8 in response to the DPG 03 tasking to examine SJTF and SJTF HQs recommends only that Joint Task Force headquarters be established that can deploy to regional commands making use of the deployable command and control equipment we funded in FY 02.

The SJTF for unwarned attack, which was called for in DPG, has been reduced in the brief to a combined arms force for employment by theater commanders.

We will need to insist that the new NORTHCOM include standing joint task forces and headquarters. Among the methods for ensuring this is to prohibit the assignment of subordinate commands to NORTHCOM. All of its forces can be assigned through JFCOM.

We can force the issue on an unwarned attack SJTF in the way we handle the STRAT/SPACE relationship. An intermediate step on the way to a merger is creation of a SJTF/SJTF HQ. The mission for the organization is to develop plans for unwarned strikes both to support theater commanders and as independent strategic options. A creative group of people could discover whole new ways to wage war.

I will stay with it.

11-L-0559/OSD/10211

Actual
3/19

March 11, 2002 3:29 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DPB, DSB and Jasons in Annual Report

Should the Annual Report mention the members of the Defense Policy and Defense Science Boards and the work they are doing? It seems to me that is not nothing.

We might also want to mention the Jasons.

It shows the breadth of outside advice the Department gets.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-49

.....

Please respond by 03/22/02

110.01 HNGS

11 Mar 02

U12115 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10212

March 11, 2002 3:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Length of Annual Report

From now on, please tell anyone who reads this Annual Report that if they have a doubt about anything, to cut it out so we can reduce the length of it.

It is way too big and too long.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-50

.....
Please respond by 02/22/02

3/20

110,01 PAGES

3/20

→ Secret -

We have done a lot of arbitrary cutting. It'll be a lot shorter than last year, but we can do better and will.

Also, we've cut the estimated print run by about 1/3. It may go lower yet. Di Rita

11 Mar 02

U12116 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10213

2/12 snowflake
1345

Action
3/20

March 11, 2002 4:10 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Edits to Annual Report

I just finished reading the report. Here it is.

I have sent you several memos, and there are some notes on the front of the document as to where my edits are and other comments.

Last, as I finished it, it does not seem to end on an upbeat. There is no conclusion. It kind of just dribbles out. Is that the way it is supposed to end?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-58



Please respond by 03/22/02

3/20

→ SecDef.
We'll provide
some manner of conclusion.

Di Rita

110,001 HRS

11 Mar 02

U12117 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10214

snowflake

March 11, 2002 3:55 PM

ACTION 2
3/20

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: "Joint"

Done 4-17

I am getting tired of seeing the word "joint" everywhere. Shouldn't we maybe start just not even calling things joint that are joint and instead give some thought to calling things that aren't joint by their name—Army, Navy, Air Force or Marine—and showing how silly it is to not be joint?

322

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-53

.....

Please respond by 03/18/02

11 Mar 02

U12118 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10215

Action
3/20

March 11, 2002 4:06 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Utilities and Energy in Annual Report

Please take a look at page 920 and 921 of the Annual Report. It talks about privatizing DoD utilities and energy infrastructure. We may want to drop that section, given all the fuss about Enron.

463

Let me know what you think. I think the section ought to go out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-57



Please respond by 03/22/02

11 Mar 02

U12119 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10216

Action
3/A

March 11, 2002 10:19 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Marine Corps and Special Ops

322

Have we announced the involvement of the Marine Corps with the Special Ops for the first time in history?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-7



Please respond by 03, 19, 02

11 Mar 02

U12120 /02

March 11, 2002 10:14 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Merger

3/15 - Larry Di Rita

*3/18
Dano*

322

What do you suppose caused the merger between Naval and Marine air? Was it the DPG study, September 11th, or other?

Thanks.

DHR.dh
031102-6

Please respond by 03/12/02

3/17

Response attached

Larry Di Rita

11 Mar 02

U12122 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10218

03/13/02 3:52 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone *SC* MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Naval Aviation Merger

The merger is a product of a number of things:

- Navy needs aircraft to fill its decks; CNO has made that case since we arrived;
- Cost per aircraft prohibitive against the total needed to meet Navy (and Marine) needs;
- Marine aviation primarily ground based and in the rear; not impossible that Afghan ops encouraged USMC to put its aircraft afloat;
- Putting Marine aircraft aboard carriers meets Navy's near term need for aircraft and the Marine desire to be in the fight.

Lurking in the background of this decision is whether and when another carrier should be laid down, especially in light of the possibility that a number of the existing ships can operate effectively for 30-50 years.

- If today's requirements can be met with 12 wings and 10 carriers,
- and if UAVs have a future, then
- what does a future air-capable ship look like?

11-L-0559/OSD/10219

March 11, 2002 9:27 AM

Done 4/2

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strategic Plan and Individual Ready Reserve

326

Please take a look at this note from General Myers, and then see me about it and tell me what you think we ought to be doing with respect to it. I wasn't aware of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/04/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Questions from 12 Feb Video Teleconference [U039333/02]

DHR:dh
031102-4

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

3/18

SECRET

Cambone Note attached at last page.

J. White

11 Mar 02

Larry Di Rita

U12123 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10220



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

2002 MAR -4 PM 1:54

INFO MEMO

CM-202-02
4 March 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 11 2002

Larry Di Rita

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/2*

SUBJECT: Questions from 12 February Secure Video Teleconference Regarding Strategic Plan and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

- The following is provided in response to your questions (TAB) regarding the National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism (NMSP-GWOT) and the IRR.
- The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services (including the Coast Guard), combatant commands, and key Defense agencies, has developed a draft strategic plan (the NMSP-GWOT) that provides both a framework and direction for military efforts in the war on terrorism.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ is intended to facilitate iterative and adaptive planning over the duration of the war as policy decisions are made and terrorists reveal themselves around the globe. It establishes an integrating framework within the context of our Defense Policy Goals and your strategic planning guidance to organize, synchronize, and prioritize a global campaign. It also bridges national strategic guidance and theater campaign plans.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ has been reviewed by Service and combatant command planners (general/flag officer level) and incorporates advice from OSD's strategy office. My intent is to finalize the draft plan and take it to the Tank in the coming weeks, then bring it to you. *(Andy Washin)*
- The IRR is a manpower pool of individuals with some military service obligation remaining, or those who subsequently volunteer to remain in the IRR once their initial obligation is met. Each Service, including the Coast Guard, has an IRR whose members have no obligation to drill, are normally not members of specific units, and are normally not paid unless recalled to active duty. However, they can be mobilized to fill specific positions during a crisis and are a potential source of unique skills and experience. Currently, 1,441 IRR members have been recalled to active duty from an aggregate pool of 348,508.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT	3/1
BR MA GIAMF	23/8
MA BUCCI	3/6
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/6

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy,

(b)(6)

03/13/02 6:56 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone  MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: National Military Strategic Plan

Gen. Myers' note sketches the purpose of the NMSP.

In its last iteration it was an effort to bring deliberate planning to the war on terrorism. Gen. Casey wanted the NMSP attached to the CPG as an annex. I resisted and it was not added.

I have resisted the idea because I do not believe the war on terrorism is amenable to deliberate planning along the lines of the plan we have for Iraq or North Korea.

I have encouraged the Joint Staff to convert the NMSP into a staffing plan; that is, to propose that a cell be established in the Joint Staff to assist you in developing contingency plans for the war on terrorism. That cell could apply the techniques of deliberate planning—force flows, readiness, etc.—without locking you into a deliberate plan.

I can expand on this if you'd like.

11-L-0559/OSD/10222

2/10/02
07:12

March 11, 2002 8:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Speech on U.S.-European Relationship

Europe

I do want to go ahead on a speech on the U.S.-European relationship and the job the coalition forces are doing. I would like to put it in perspective—the past, the present and the future from a military standpoint.

I need to do it in a way that does not sound like I am treading on Colin's business. I would certainly want to clear the speech with him before I did it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031102-2

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

3/15

Secret

We're at it
We'll propose some
venues. Maybe at/
around NATO meeting in
early June, or maybe
early July. We'll be back with
proposals/TX + *with*

11 Mar 02

U12125 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10223

Action
3/20

March 12, 2002 4:20 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Our Bill

032

At the lunch today, Congressman Jerry Lewis said we need to push the Speaker to push our bill early. Someone needs to talk to him and get the details as to why he wants that.

It is pretty obvious that it is better for us, and we ought to get coordinated on what the arguments ought to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031202-7



Please respond by 03/29/02

12 Mar 02

U12126 /02

March 12, 2002 4:18 PM

Dave 3/13

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chairman or Vice Chairman at Meetings

I notice that we don't have Gen. Myers or Gen. Pace in a number of these meetings or meals. We should always have one of the two of them in. If not them, then we should have the Director of the Joint Staff.

337

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031202-6

.....
Please respond by 03/15/02

12 March

U12127 /02

207
FILE IN
JES Bundle
3/20

March 12, 2002 6:39 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Eberhart Briefing on CAPs and AWACS to Ridge et.al.

384

1. His data seems not to be accurate. Eberhart knows that. We have to get people on the Joint Staff and Comptroller's office getting the data right fast, with respect to dollars, people and CAP coverage. We need to get the numbers on an "apples-to-apples" basis.
2. Gen. Myers, Gen. Eberhart mentioned in his briefing "getting guidance from the National Security Council." You might explain to him that CINCs don't ever get guidance from the NSC. CINCs receive guidance only from the President or the Secretary of Defense.
3. I was concerned about the briefing because I think the proposal was a bit timid. We may not be reducing as much as we should. I think he should go back and do another study, with good data, and see how we might go to a new level that would be cheaper and involve fewer people, but still provide good coverage.
4. There must be technology that can be used to improve our security in these areas at reduced costs. We need to start investing, if we are going to have to live like this for some years.
5. We need to make sure we connect with the NATO folks and see if we can't get them to stay until later in the year, past April, so that Ed can accomplish what he wants to by way of getting people trained up. The time to talk to NATO and get that going with Doug Feith is soon.

12 Mar 02

U12128 /02

6. I believe we could use a series of graduated alert levels, like we do for DEFCONs, ROs or force protection levels. We need to have them for CAPs and AWACs over the United States. Then we can evaluate intelligence and make judgments as to what level we think we should be on at any given moment. Ed seems not to have proposed that. I think we ought to make that a part of the next presentation to me.
7. Nonetheless, I want to go ahead as fast as we can with his levels 3 and 4 and get it done. I want this additional work done sometime in the next 30 days. Possibly we can revise level 4 before it goes into effect.
8. Before we go to levels 3 and 4, we need to get a PR plan and a Congressional briefing plan. This has to be handled sensitively, as everyone in the room agreed. We do not want to leave the impression that we are reducing the program, and therefore either weakening the deterrent or making people fearful. We need to say we are re-orienting the program and find the right words and get the right people involved in explaining it in the right way, so that the proper people are briefed beforehand. Then we can get people to support it and say, "Good work," rather than, "The sky is falling!"

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031202-8

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

March 12, 2002 7:07 PM

REC 3/12/02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Discussion w/Andy Card

I talked to Andy Card. He came up and said, "Look, I am not going to call you about Bolton. I think you are right. And we ought not to ruin his career. It is more important that he do the military than it is that he do NASA. So don't expect me to be calling you."

33550

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031202-12



Please respond by _____

12 March

U12130 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10228

March 13, 2002 3:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GDP

Please have someone find out for me how many countries have GDPs that are greater than the DoD budget the President has asked for, and how many countries have GDPs that are less than the DoD budget the President has asked for.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031302-7

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

123

6/24

SECDEF -

Using "Purchasing Power Parity" comparisons of GDP, there are 168 countries of 191 State Department "qualified" states whose GDP is smaller than our FY03 Budget Request.

~~Attached are...~~

Di Rita

15. - Using a straight Exchange Rate comparison, the number is 177-1-0559/OSD/10229

6/17

to: Andy Marshall

Do you have someone who could do a quick table on this?

Thanks.

Larry Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

6/17
U12131 /02

13 March 02

Action
3/23

March 14, 2002 9:47 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Meetings w/Ivanov

RUSSIA

In your memo of our meetings with Ivanov, please be sure to mention they are providing military materials for the Afghans.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-18

.....

Please respond by _____

14MARR02

U12132 /02

ACTIONS
3/20

March 14, 2002 6:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons

Russia

I have to get a paper that clarifies the confusion we were trying to sort through today with Ivanov.

Specifically, we need to see:

- The numbers of each of our various operationally deployed strategic nuclear platforms.
- The numbers of existing platforms that could be converted to operationally deployed strategic nuclear platforms.
- What platforms are in production and will be coming out by 2012 that could be converted into operationally deployed strategic nuclear offensive platforms.

We need to do the same for warheads:

- How many do we have operationally deployed.
- How many do we have in every other category, whether ready to be destroyed, in reserve for safety or reliability, being refurbished to be put back on operationally deployed systems, etc.

I also need detailed information on how many operations we can do in a year:

14MARR02

U12133 /02

- What an operation is.
- How many we do we do per year just to maintain our force.
- How many beyond the above do we have that we could use per year to reduce the number of warheads.
- How many warheads are currently in the queue.

You ought to go through this and think through how to format this in a way that will be most useful to us.

I need to get a much better understanding of what is actually going on, or we are not going to be able to carry the day in showing how confusing an arms control agreement would be if we go down the road they want us to.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031302-9

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

Action
3/23

March 14, 2002 8:03 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Appointments

230.02

Let's get a master grid of all the appointments we should be proposing—either that we make or the White House makes for the Department of Defense. Please array it by month and year as to when things come up.

They are criticizing the Clinton administration for doing a lot of things on the last day—the newspaper says they appointed all the DACOWITS people by autopen after they left and made all the pardons in the last five minutes.

We ought to get ourselves arranged so we do things in an orderly way and not try to scramble at the very end of the four years, which is unseemly.

Please get someone working on it to produce a master grid sometime in the next 30 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-3



Please respond by 04/15/02

14 MAR 02

U12134 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10233

snovflake

3/23

March 14, 2002 8:15 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: EAA

DR

Dave

09131

Please get back to me and tell me what you concluded with Condi on the Export Administration Act.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-7

.....
Please respond by 02/29/02

3/14

CAMBONE RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/R
Ed

14MARR02

U12135 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10234

03/14/02 7:44 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3/14

FROM: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Export Administration Act (EAA)

Attached is an article from Congressional Quarterly (CQ) that may have promoted Condi's call regarding the EAA.

J.D. Crouch testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on 28 February on the issue. During testimony he said that DOD could support the Gilman Bill as introduced because at that time it was virtually identical to the Senate bill (S. 149).

The Gilman bill has since been heavily amended by the House International Relations Committee. DOD would not support it in its current condition.

NSC Legislative Affairs contacted OSD Legislative Affairs last night as a result of the CQ article. NSC Leg Affairs acknowledged that Crouch did not endorse the amended Gilman bill.

OSD Leg Affairs is now seeking a correction from CQ.

On a related note, White House Leg Affairs has asked for agency comments on the amended Gilman bill. OSD has exchanged those comments with Commerce, State and NSC. This is standard practice in working out a coordinated administration position in anticipation of the end game on any legislation.

I have sent this information to Condi through Bob Joseph, who is the NSC manager for the EAA.

This seems a matter best left to legislative affairs folks at the NSC and here in OSD. I will be certain that OSD Leg Affairs clarifies our position with HASC staff.

11-L-0559/OSD/10235

Dual-Use Export Bill Advances

The House Armed Services Committee has approved export control legislation (HR 2581) that would tighten restrictions on high-technology exports, giving control over them to the State and Defense departments in addition to the Commerce Department.

The Bush administration has endorsed a competing bill (S 149), which the Senate passed last September, that would put the Commerce Department in charge of "dual use" exports — those with civilian and military applications. (*CQ Weekly*, p. 595; *2001 CQ Weekly*, p. 2082)

The Senate measure would allow the export of dual-use technology if it was already available in foreign markets or mass-produced domestically.

The nation has been without an Export Administration Act since the last one (PL 96-72) expired in 1994. After it expired, Presidents Bill Clinton and Bush controlled exports by executive order, because Congress could not agree on legislation.

The impasse is over whether the government should make it easier for U.S. companies to sell their technology overseas, at the risk of some devices falling into the wrong hands, or make it more difficult, at the risk of losing business to foreign competitors.

Those who favor less control want exports under the authority of the Commerce Department; those who favor a tighter regime want to put the Defense and State departments in charge.

The House International Relations Committee approved HR 2581 last August, and the House Armed Services Committee was in a hurry because its authority to act on the measure expired March 8. The committee approved the bill 44-6 on March 6.

Although the White House

favors the Senate bill, Defense Department officials told the committee Feb. 28 that they preferred the House measure.

Neil Abercrombie, D-Hawaii, said the committee's responsibility was to make sure that the Pentagon had a final review of what technology left the country.

— Niels C. Sorrells

Life Term for Second Offense In Child Sex Crime Measure

Child molesters would get life in prison for their second conviction under a bill approved by the House Judiciary Committee on March 6 over objections from panel Democrats.

The measure is expected to go to the House floor for a vote March 13 or 14.

The "Two Strikes You're Out" bill (HR 2146), approved by voice vote, would mean a mandatory life sentence for suspects found guilty in federal court of committing any of seven child sex crimes if they previously had been convicted on similar charges in federal or state court.

"First strike" convictions would include aggravated sexual abuse and selling children into prostitution. The bill would apply to crimes committed against children under 16.

By voice vote, committee Republicans rejected an amendment by Rep. Robert C. Scott, D-Va., that would have removed sexual abuse of a minor from the list of offenses that could trigger a life sentence. Scott wanted to avoid applying the bill to teenagers who engage in consensual sex with a younger girlfriend or boyfriend.

But bill sponsor Mark Green, R-Wis., said two child sex convictions justify a life sentence, even if the first conviction involves a case of consensual sex.

— Jennifer A. Dlouhy

House Panel OKs Plan to Shift Utah Town Into Nevada

Residents of Wendover, Utah, would relocate to Nevada — without moving a single box or piece of furniture — under a plan endorsed by a House Judiciary subcommittee March 6.

By voice vote, the Subcommittee

Snowflake

Action
by 3/23

March 14, 2002 9:45 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: UK Intel

UK

I am told that the UK has some good intelligence on the poppy fields and heroin problem in Afghanistan. Why don't we ping them and see what we can find out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-17

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

14MAR02

U12136 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10237

March 14, 2002 5:33 PM

IN Des
FILE 3/14/02

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Yemen

Yemen

I would like a briefing on precisely what the plan is for Yemen.

I am inclined to think George Tenet is right, and we ought to cut down the number of people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-27

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

14MARR02

U12137 /02

IN des
File 2/23

March 14, 2002 5:35 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippines

Philippines

I would like another briefing on the Philippines and what Phase 2 or Phase 3 are supposed to be.

I think I have enough in my head now that I can almost make a decision, and save us from having to make a decision after it is all teed up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-28

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

14 MAR 02

U12138 /02

Snowflake

March 14, 2002 5:46 PM

Index
File 3423

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Afghanistan

I want to get my hands around the proposals for Afghanistan before they get too far along.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-30



Please respond by 03/29/02

14MARR02

U12139 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10240

3/15
1615
SHARE

Settle - Close Out

March 14, 2002 5:32 PM

Larry Di Rita
3/29

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gifts

Done 4/2

005

Why does it take four or five months to get stuff cleared through Protocol? That jacket I received out at the site back in October or November was still not approved in March. ?

I would think they ought to be able to process all those things in 45 days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-26

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

~~3/24~~

3/18

~~SECRET~~

~~The jacket we know of you received February 19. It was appraised March 8 and is in the gift tender that is coming up to you soon. (Not aware of a jacket from Oct/Nov.)
Di Rita~~

Capt Brown

Close

L

Larry Di Rita

14MARA02

Larry Di Rita
11-L-0559/OSD/10241

U12140 /02

Action
3/23

March 15, 2002 9:36 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Requirements Process

400.13

The requirements process is broken. How do we fix it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-19



Please respond by 04/02/02

ISMAR02

U12141 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10242

March 15, 2002 11:03 AM

Attn: 3/23

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Speech on Force Management

320.2

I need a meeting with David Chu.

I want to talk to him about force management and end strength. Maybe we should develop a speech where I lay out all the things we are doing all over the world and how many U.S. military we have doing different things:

- Serving as detailees in Congress
- Serving as detailees in the Executive Branch
- Studying in educational institutions around the country
- Protecting embassies
- Serving in the Sinai and every other location
- Providing force protection in the U.S.—CAPs, AWACs, military bases, etc.
- Supporting Customs, INS, Border Patrol, airports, etc.
- Other?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-22

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

U12142 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10243

15 MAR 02

March 15, 2002 9:38 AM

ACTION COMPLETE

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CINCPAC

Let's go ahead and move the paper recommending Fargo as CINCPAC, to succeed Denny Blair.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-20



Please respond by 03/29/02

Dave

PACOM

ISMAR02

U12143 /02

SENSITIVE

3/23
Action

March 15, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Torie Clarke
Larry Dikita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JM
SUBJECT: Rumsfeld's Rules

02050

Attached is a memo I received from Marc Thiessen.

What about this thought—we take *Rumsfeld's Rules*, *Brilliant Pebbles I* and *Brilliant Pebbles II* and agree that there can be a book deal. Every cent of the money, after expenses, would be given in equal parts to two charities. One might be the education fund for children of Special Forces killed in action—there is already a qualified charity for that purpose. Another might be some other Defense-related activity.

We would make the potential publisher aware of the little book Joyce had done for my 69th birthday, so there would be no issue with that. It was a limited edition—a copy is attached.

We arrange to have someone write a foreword. We consider the possibility of having some photographs in the book.

We decide whether or not I can use rules I have developed since I came to the Pentagon in January 2001. We fashion a way to prove that I have not spent my time doing it, nor have other people in the Pentagon.

We put the responsibility on someone outside the Pentagon to figure out how we get approval from the people who are mentioned in the *Rules*, to allow us to use their names and quotes, check to see if they are accurate, etc.

15MAR02

SENSITIVE

U12144 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10245

SENSITIVE

My feeling is that I ought to do it. Possibly we should test the idea before I do it with Carl Levin, John Warner, Bob Stump, Ike Skelton, the Office of Public Ethics, the White House Counsel, etc. to see if they have any problems.

Please advise.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/12.02 Marc Thiessen memo, *Rumsfeld's Rules*

DHR:dh
031402-24

.....

Please respond by 04/15/02

SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/10246

3/12/02 6:54 PM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 14 2002

LARRY DI PI
3/14

TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: Marc Thiessen
SUBJECT: **Rumsfeld's Rules**

Handwritten initials in a circle

I had lunch the other day with a friend, Joe Vallely, who is one of the best agents in the publishing business (he's worked with Secretary Weinberger among many others). He asked me about *Rumsfeld's Rules*.

I know you had considered publishing them last year, but then decided against.

Here's a thought:

- With your popularity and high profile right now, Joe thinks that you could get four times whatever you were offered for the book last year.
- You could give the money to charity—a 9/11 victims fund, or maybe a scholarship fund for all those babies born to the widows who were pregnant when they lost their husbands that day, etc.—something related to that attacks on the Pentagon and WTC.
- We could do a brief introduction to the book, and add some new rules from the war in Afghanistan and from your first year back at DoD.
- It would be a best seller—would get a lot of attention for the ideas in the book, and could do a lot of good as well.

Joe says he'd be happy to do the deal for free—his contribution to the cause. I'd be happy to volunteer my writing services as well.

I know Secretary Powell continues to be active in support of his America's Promise charity. I can't imagine a reason you could not do this as a charitable initiative as well.

What do you think?

11-L-0559/OSD/10247

March 15, 2002 9:34 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Interviews

Done 3/23

000.715D

Please ask Staser Holcomb to give us a sense of who I should be interviewing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-17

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

15MAR02

U12145 /02

March 15, 2002 8:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Annual Report

Done 3/15
3/23
110.01HNGS

Where do we stand on the Annual Report?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-13

.....
Please respond by 03/20/02

3/15 -
Made your changes and
we're rewriting the transformation
section to ^{better} reflect the work
we've been doing on it. Will
have ~~first~~ final version ready early
next week.

D. Rita
Larry Di Rita

15MARR02

U12146 /02

Attn
3/23

March 15, 2002 8:47 AM

381

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CPG and UCP

Where do we stand on the Contingency Planning Guidance and the Unified Command Plan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-14



Please respond by 03/20/02

15MAR02

U12147 /02

Action
3/23

March 15, 2002 8:29 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: End Strength

320.2

On a confidential basis, please get David Chu to draft a memo from me to the President giving him a heads up about the pressure on end strength.

Please get some kind of projection on National Guard and Reserves, the stress on them, some kind of projection on stop-losses, and maybe a section on the draft—that we want to avoid it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-7



Please respond by 03/29/02

15 MAR 02

U12148 /02

March 15, 2002 7:37 AM

Done 3/17

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD White House Liaison

Do we need a full-time White House liaison and a personnel person?

Maybe. We are considering. Steve Herbits is helping me think it through. DR

Attached is a fax from Cameron Bruemmer, whom I know. She was married to Allen Woods, who worked for me here at the Pentagon as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs after Greener went to the campaign. She is a very good woman. She is married to a fellow named Bruemmer, who I think is a former CIA general counsel.

She apparently has applied for a job. Please look at her resume and see if you think she has the right stuff to do that job. She is certainly reliable and intelligent. I don't know how good she would be on the personnel side, though, but you could judge that.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/14/02 Bruemmer fax to SecDef

Done

DHR:dh
031502-2

.....
Please respond by _____

3/18

*→ SecDef -
"I" discuss with you.
Will review her resume.
D. Rita*

1544R02

U12150 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10252

Larry Di Rita

Action
3/23

March 15, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Security Clearance Backlog

380.01

What is the current backlog on security clearances here at the Department? I haven't heard lately.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-3



Please respond by 03/29/02

15MAR02

U12151 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10253

ATTN
3/23

March 15, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman Manzullo

00115D

I should call Congressman Don Manzullo and let him know I cannot do any political activity. He gave me a letter asking me to speak at a fundraiser.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-6

.....
Please respond by 03/20/02

Set up call
Larry Di Rita
3/15

15 MAR 02

U12153 /02

IN des
FILE 3/23

March 15, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Georgia

Georgia

I need to see the proposal for Georgia, and I don't want to wait until the financing is all arranged for something I am not going to agree to.

The approach being used gets me in too late. I want to get into it early and affect it, before everyone ties a ribbon on it and sends it up to me for ratification.

In addition, we have to make sure we have some limits, so Georgia doesn't use the troops we train to go into Abkhazia, that there is a cutoff date when we finish training, etc.

Also, we want to give some thought as to whether or not we want to use a multi-national force there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031402-29

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

ISMARDA

U12154 /02

ACTION
3/23

March 15, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Strategic Influence



I need to be briefed on what you are doing to follow-on the work Pete Worden started—what you want to continue, what we need to continue, how you are going to organize it, who is going to do it, etc.

When you do that, I would also like to be briefed on what that group had in mind with respect to Central Asia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031502-23

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

091412

/S m a r 02

U12155 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10256

Action
3/23

March 16, 2002 9:37 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letters

Afghanistan

Do we write all the people who are wounded in Afghanistan, as well as the families of those who died?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031602-7

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

16 Mar 02

U12156 /02

3/23
ACTION

March 16, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Nuclear Policy

Please give me one piece of paper that explains U.S. nuclear policy on this first-use issue and the negative assurances, the thing that is being debated.

Please write down what the history has been, and then write down what you think our current policy ought to be. If it is different from where we were left off by the Clinton Administration, show it and I will try to get it rearranged.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031602-8

.....

Please respond by 04/08/02

A-471.61

16 Mar 02

U12157 /02

March 16, 2002 9:35 AM

ACTION 3/23
ACTION COMPLETED 3/29
Afghanistan

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Napalm

One of the wounded I visited at Walter Reed asked why we didn't use napalm in the caves.

Please get me an answer.

U12158 /02 3/23

Thanks.

VADM G.

DHR:dh
031602-5

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

ORDNANCE DELIVERED ON
CAVES (ENTRANCES) FROM ALTITUDE
(ABOVE 10K) IS PRECISION GUIDED.
NAPALM (MK 77's) IS NOT A
PRECISION GUIDED WEAPON - IT
IS A FREE FALL - TUMBLING, - LOWER
ALTITUDE, AREA TACTIC WEAPON; NOT
SUITABLE FOR A PRECISE TARGET.

THERE HAS BEEN NO MISSION
PLANNING W/ NAPALM (TO THE BEST OF
N-78's KNOWLEDGE) SINCE 1991. THERE
ARE 2000 MK-77's LEFT IN NEVADA - 1/2 OF
WHICH ARE DEEMED UNUSABLE.

VIR J

U12158 /02

16 Mar 02

2/22 3:32
snowflake

420

March 16, 2002 9:34 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Press Remarks

*7/24
LARRY DI RITTO*

Done 4/2

Please give me a paper that shows how I answered in the March 15 press briefing whether or not there is a new nuclear weapon being developed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031602-4

.....

Please respond by 03/20/02

000,759

16 Mar 02

U12167 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10260

(Cross talk.)

Q: Can you answer one more thing on the --

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to bring you back if possible to the nuclear issue. You were extremely insistent on the fact that the ABM Treaty constrained the United States in the development of anti-missile defenses. There are legal constraints, U.S. legal constraints on the development of new nuclear weapons, particularly low-yield nuclear weapons. Can I get your comment on the existence of those constraints and whether or not you would like to see the constraints on that development done away with just as the ABM Treaty is going to be done away with?

Rumsfeld: Interesting connection. It's correct that I was -- accurately characterized the ABM Treaty as being designed to prevent the deployment and the development of missile defenses. That is exactly what it did do. And so you've properly characterized it. And by June, it will no longer restrain the United States, and we will be able to test and develop, and at some point, if we make the decision and have decided what's the best way to do it, actually deploy missile defenses. We have made no such proposals with respect to nuclear weapons.

Q: I'm aware of that; I'm asking you about --

Rumsfeld: And I'm trying -- I'm answering.

Q: -- whether or not you see that as a constraint -- that --

Rumsfeld: I -- if we felt that we were unduly constrained, we would be making requests for changes. And we did so with respect to the ABM treaty; we have not done so with respect to nuclear weapons, any speculation to the contrary notwithstanding.

(Cross talk.)

Rumsfeld: Way in the back!

Q: Since the fighting has wound down in the last few days, have coalition or U.S. forces or Afghan forces caught any al Qaeda or Taliban escaping from the mountains or found any credible evidence that they were escaping?

Rumsfeld: They -- when they have seen people, they have either gotten them to surrender or to flee, and they were lost; or they were killed. But the answer is yes; they have seen people trying to leave the area, and to the extent they've seen them, they've -- they've stopped them.

(Cross talk.)

Q: (Inaudible) -- Charlie's question earlier, on the military commission, you seemed to indicate that there would be a need for a high level of security for those involved in the commissions themselves. Has the decision been made to conduct those

of it's speculation. Some of it -- most of it is unauthoritative. That is to say, it's coming from people who heard from somebody about something, or believe there might be a situation that could be characterized as encouraging from our standpoint. But I do not have any -- I have not seen any intelligence on this in the last week myself.

Q: You say you hope he's alive, but do you have any evidence that would lead you to believe that he's still alive and being held at this point?

Rumsfeld: And I've answered that to the best of my ability. I have not seen -- you mentioned the articles during the course of the week. I've read them. I have not seen any current intelligence in the last week that would enable me to cast any additional light. How about you?

Q: What about prior to the last week?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I've seen intelligence over the last year on this subject, because we're interested. I don't know who asked that, but --

Q: Mr. Secretary, since you're waxing eloquent this morning, I wonder if you would --

Rumsfeld: You want shorter answers. I know.

Q: No, no, not -- I'd like a rather lengthy answer on this one, if I may. The leak of the Nuclear Posture Review -- has that caused you personal embarrassment, particularly since your counterpart was here at the time from Russia? And has the content of this leak, as much as we are able to ascertain it, caused or is causing serious problems or even a rift between this country and Russia, particularly since the summit is coming up in May?

Rumsfeld: The answer's no. I am disturbed by the leak because I think it's just enormously unprofessional.

Is it embarrassing? No, it's not embarrassing. It's just a fact of life in Washington, D.C., in the 21st century that there are a lot of people running around who are perfectly willing to compromise the national security of the United States of America. And I don't like it. But is it embarrassing? No. It's a very fine piece of work, the Nuclear Posture Review. It has not caused any difficulties with Russia. The Russians had been briefed on it previously, as had our allies. It was even fortuitous, as a matter of fact, because Mr. Minister Ivanov was here, and we could give him a personal full briefing on it and discuss any of the issues that came up. There's nothing surprising or particularly notable in there with respect to Russia, except for the fact that the president of the United States had indicated that he's going to draw down deployed defensive strategic nuclear weapons by some two-thirds, which certainly ought not to --

Q: Can I do a follow up really quick?

Rumsfeld: -- which certainly ought not to disturb Russia or anyone else.

(Cross talk.)

Q: Just a quick follow-up, if I may, Mr. Secretary. Quick follow up? Quick follow up, sir? A precedent established here long ago.

Rumsfeld: Everyone in favor of a quick follow-up, hands up. (Cross talk; laughter.)

Q: Give him a follow up. (Laughter.)

Rumsfeld: All right.

Q: Oh, go on.

(Cross talk; laughter.)

Q: (Inaudible.)

Q: Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, (inaudible).

Rumsfeld: Seeing the one, the one has it. Okay.

Q: It seems that the one key disagreement here perhaps in the shift in U.S. policy is that if the leak is correct, five of the seven nations do not now possess nuclear weapons. This seems to be a shift almost shifting towards an offensive deterrence rather than the defensive deterrence of the Cold War.

Rumsfeld: The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has not changed. The Cold War is over. The whole orientation of the United States of America for many decades was to the Soviet Union, properly so. They had, and even today have the largest number of offensive strategic nuclear weapons. We don't consider them an enemy today, so the orientation of our nuclear posture is significantly different today than it needed to be during the Cold War.

Other countries are interested in developing nuclear weapons and engaged in activities that demonstrate their intent and their purpose. And the United States is perfectly -- it's perfectly proper for the United States to take note of those things and be sensitive to them.

Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the body count issue, some of the very rough estimates of the numbers killed did come from this podium as well as from Bagram, and they were in quite a contrast to your determination earlier in the campaign to avoid any kind of speculation about that. How -- first of all, how was it that we did begin to hear estimates of enemy kills?

Do you now, in hindsight, feel that was a mistake to make any reference to it? Can you explain that a little bit?

March 16, 2002 9:31 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Number Dead

Done 3/2

You will recall after we walked upstairs after the press availability, Mick started talking about the Pentagon announcing there were 700 dead at DoD. He said it keeps coming back.

293

Would you check and see who said it? I know I didn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031602-3

.....

Please respond by 02/20/02

16 Mar 02

U12168 /02

March 22, 2002 4:55 p.m.

TO: SECDEF

FROM: Torie Clarke

SUBJECT: Number Dead

The number was 800, a ridiculous estimate given by the head of Arlington County emergency services.

He said it on the first day.

11-L-0559/OSD/10265

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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United States Department of Defense

News Transcript

On the web:

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09122001_t0912sd.htmlMedia contact: media@defenselink.mil or (b)(6)Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or (b)(6)**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Wednesday, September 12, 2001 - 3:25 p.m. EDT

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld

Rumsfeld: Good afternoon.

I have taped a message to the people in the defense establishment across the world, which I understand is going to be available shortly. I'm en route over to another meeting in the White House in the next few minutes, so I thought I'd just stop down and make two or three points.

First, we currently believe and are certainly hopeful that the number of casualties being reported in the press is high. As you know from your own observation out there, the work is still going forward, and we won't know for some time precise numbers. But from everything that we currently know, the estimate that's been widely reported is considerably high, and we certainly pray that that's the case.

Second, I do want to again express our sympathy to the families and friends and colleagues of all those who have been harmed by this attack on our country.

Also, we are, needless to say, deeply grateful to the many units from all over this area that are out there and have been out there for more that 24 hours -- firemen and ambulances and different teams and squads of individuals who are doing a very professional job for our country.

We are, in a sense, seeing the definition of a new battlefield in the world, a 20th -- 21st century battlefield, and it is a different kind of conflict. It is something that is not unique to this century, to be sure, but it is -- given our geography and given our circumstance, it is, in a major sense, new for this country.

Finally, I'd like to say a word or two to the men and women in the defense establishment, most of whom deal with classified information. Since the end of the Cold War, there's been a relaxation of tension, and the -- it's had a lot of effects. It's led to proliferation. It's led to the movement towards asymmetrical threats, as opposed to more conventional threats.

One of the other effects has been it has had an effect on how people handle classified information. And it seems to me that it's important to underline that when people deal with intelligence information and make it available to people who are not cleared for that classified information, the effect is to reduce the chances that the United States government has to track down and deal with the people who have perpetrated the attacks on the United States and killed so many Americans.

Second, when classified information dealing with operations is provided to people who are not cleared for that classified information, the inevitable effect is that the lives of men and women in uniform are put at risk because they are the ones who will be carrying out those prospective operations.

And I -- this is a message really for all the men and women in the United States government who have access to classified information. It seems to me that when they see or learn of someone who is handling classified information in a way that is going to put the lives of the men and women in uniform at risk, they ought to register exactly what kind of a person that is; it's a person who's willing to violate federal criminal statutes, and willing to frustrate our efforts to track down and deal with terrorists, and willing to reveal information that could cause the lives of men and women in uniform.

I think it's time for all who deal with that information to treat it with the care and respect that it merits.

I'd be happy to respond to a few questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes, Bob?

Q: The causality figure you referred to I assume is the 800 number that was provided by the Arlington County Fire Department.

Rumsfeld: It is.

Q: And you say it's considerably high. We've heard from the military --

Rumsfeld: I said I hope and pray that it is.

Q: The military services -- information from the military services indicates that it may be more in the neighborhood of 100 to 150. Is that closer to reality? Or can you give some sort of guidance?

Rumsfeld: We just won't know until we finish the work. The problem with trying to do roster checks with units, it may not include people that were connected with the heliport, it may not include people -- contractor people, it may not include watchmen, it may not include work people who were working in the area. So it is folly to try to pretend that there's a number before there's a number. There is not a number. Nor have we pinned down precisely how many people were in the aircraft

who would also be in that general area.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are some in the Middle East who are saying that the United States does not have the belly to do the kind of response to this attack on the United States, that this administration, the previous administration don't have it to go after them in the kind of way that they have to be gone after. Without any specifics whatsoever, help us with the attitude that should go into this process.

Rumsfeld: Well, I guess time will tell. My -- I guess I'm kind of old-fashioned. I'm inclined to think that if you're going to cock it, you throw it, and you don't talk about it a lot. So my instinct is that what you do, you should go about your business and do what you think you have to do. I think anyone who thinks it's easy is wrong. I think that it will require a sustained and broadly based effort. And I don't think that people ought to judge outcomes until a sufficient time is passed to address what is clearly a very serious problem for the world. And it's not restricted to a single entity, state or non-state entity. It is an attack on a way of life.

The purpose of terrorism is to terrorize. It is to alter behavior. It is to force people who believe in freedom to be less free by altering their behavior and redressing a balance between freedom and security. Anyone who's ever been in a war zone, as I know most of you have, you know that when you walk out of a building you don't walk out with your head high whistling, you look around the corner and see what's out there. And that's not the way Americans live, and it's not the way we want to live.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you --

Q: Mr. Secretary, may we ask one? I was cut off for a second, which I kindly left to my colleague, so -- we're getting word from reporters at the White House quoting Ari Fleischer about the target of the 757 was actually the White House, and also Air Force One was targeted. Can you shed any --

Rumsfeld: I'll leave that to the White House. I'll leave that to the White House.

Q: Mr. Secretary, your comments on the handling of classified information, does that -- are you suggesting that it's time to move to a more secretive government in which there's less transparency about what it is you're doing? And how does that square with the goal of openness that reassures both our friends and foes around the world that the United States' intentions are good? We all know that there's a wealth of material that's classified unnecessarily and doesn't necessarily need to be.

Rumsfeld: Well, I -- as I'm sure you've discovered, I do believe in openness, and I think it's enormously important in a free system with a free press and a democratic underpinning to our wonderful success as a country that we recognize that and respect it. I also know that you're quite right, there are things that get classified that ought not to be classified.

But what I said is enormously important, and that is that when classified information is compromised by people who ought to know better because they're unprofessional or uncaring, and perfectly willing to violate federal criminal law, and seemingly

willing to put people's lives at risk -- their colleagues and their neighbors and their friends -- I think it's something that should stop.

Yes?

Clarke: Jim's question, folks -- he needs to leave. We need to get you across the river. So last question.

Q: Was sloppy handling of classified information -- did that play some role in the attack?

Rumsfeld: Not to my knowledge.

Clarke: Okay, sir.

Rumsfeld: It is an issue that I think, however, needs to be elevated and looked at and that people in all aspects of government --

Q: What's the catalyst, why are you raising that today?

Q: Yeah, has it happened in the aftermath?

Rumsfeld: It has been happening daily.

Q: Thank you, sir.

Q: Thank you.

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February 23, 2002 11:34 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shortening Processes

Q, 20

312

I have tried twice and have gotten no response, but I have an idea in my head that what we ought to simply do is just arbitrarily shorten all of the processes we know of by 20 percent—just cut the amount of time we allow for that to go on, so that it is at least that much more responsive.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022302-4

.....
Please respond by 03/15/02

03 Feb 02

U12169 /02

Action
4-3

March 18, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Crusader

470

How many people does it take to operate a Crusader? I am told it is 24 for the entire piece of equipment and process, as opposed to 30 for the original.

Is that transformational?

Thanks.

Sir U12170 /02

s/b
429

DHR:dh
031802-46

CRUSADER MANNING

NORMAL ASSIGNED CREW

- 3 IN THE HOWITZER
- 3 IN TRACKED AMMO VEHICLE
- 2 IN WHEELED AMMO VEHICLE
- 8 - NORMAL

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

CAN BE OPERATED w/FULL EFFICIENCY.

- WITH 1 IN THE HOWITZER
- 1 IN THE TRACKED AMMO
- 2 IN THE WHEELED AMMO.
- 4 MINIMUM

U12170 /02 s/b
VADM G.

ADDED THIS LINE AT THE BOTTOM
THIS SNOWFLAKE MAY BE MOOT. THOUGH IT IS STILL IN YOUR FILE. Pull it?
V/R

CRUSADER NORMALLY FIRES 3 PER BATTERY FOR A TOTAL OF 24 SOLDIERS. V/R

U12170 /02

18 Nov 02

3/17 SHOW/Re
0630

4/10

March 18, 2002 1:28 PM

LARRY DI RITA

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Tracker

Done 4/10

320.2

Should we insist that all four Services do Blue Tracker, to tell where the good guys are, to eliminate friendly fire deaths?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-47

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

3/21 -

SecDef - Will discuss with Steve. May be better just to issue guidance that requires each service to develop/acquire the procedure and let each determine the Technology that works best.

16M002

D. Rita

NEF0425

March 18, 2002 1:11 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Red Flag Training Program

Please read these memos on the Red Flag Training Program.

I think we ought to come up with who we would like to invite and who we would like to encourage to participate, rather than simply allowing those who are familiar with it to do it repeatedly.

353

Thanks.

Attach.
03/07/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Red Flag Training Program

DHR:dh
031802-43

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

4/19

18 Mar 02

U12172 /02



POLICY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



I-005497/02

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (Douglas J. Feith) *2/10/02*

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *APR 15 2002*

SUBJECT: Foreign Participation in Red Flag and Related Issues

- You indicated that we should decide what nations we would like to invite or encourage to participate in Red Flag, rather than allowing those most familiar with the program to participate repeatedly (~~Time~~).
- Foreign selection for Red Flag is a process internal to the Air Force. This stovepipe process reflects the way most DoD foreign activities are conducted:
 - There is no overarching system that enables OSD Policy to see, guide, or assess the wide range of DoD foreign activities. Our visibility is sporadic and uneven.
 - The CINCs, the Chairman, the Services, independent agencies, and OSD Under Secretaries each direct and oversee different types of security cooperation activities – exercises, training, education, information sharing, etc.
 - Different DoD components use different criteria for deciding which countries will participate in their programs, which may or may not reflect DoD priorities.

PROBLEM ↑
SOLUTION ↓

- DepSecDef has asked us to develop a more centralized approach to security cooperation that better integrates DoD foreign activities and programs with our evolving priorities, including our global defense posture.
- A near-term product that will reflect improved policy oversight is Theater Security Cooperation Guidance to guide the CINCs in their FY04 planning. We are finalizing the guidance for your signature.
- Over time, we recommend broadening that guidance to include all DoD entities that conduct activities with or in foreign countries. We are also working to develop a centralized knowledge base as well as institutionalized consultative mechanisms within



04-15-02 18:47 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/10274

DoD. These steps would enable us to better assess the alignment of our foreign activities with our global defense posture and objectives and make adjustments as warranted.

- We will report back to you on our efforts as they progress.
- On Red Flag specifically, policy priority is an important, but not pivotal factor, in deciding foreign participation.
 - The primary objective of Red Flag is to improve U.S. capability, and other bilateral and multilateral training opportunities exist to improve U.S. interoperability with priority countries.
 - Some nations that we may want to participate in Red Flag may be deterred by the cost; others may not have the proficiency level needed to make the training meaningful for U.S. forces.
 - We will follow up with the Air Force to ensure we are added to the decision process on foreign selection.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Mary Tighe, OUSDP,

(b)(6)

February 21, 2002 10:33 AM

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Red Flag

Please find out what the Red Flag people use as their gouge for deciding which countries they will allow to participate. Apparently the requests greatly exceed the slots.

I would be curious to know how they make their decisions. For example, I notice they did not include the Turks, which I would have thought would be a higher priority than some of the people they had.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022102-9

.....

Please respond by 03/08/02

3/8

CJCS RESPONSE ATTACHED
V/R
Ed



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
 INFORMATION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR -8 PM 1:43

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

CM-217-02
 7 March 2002

Handwritten notes:
 (3/17/02)
 3/17

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Participants in the USAF Red Flag Training Program

- For your Information, per your question on how participants are decided in the USAF Red Flag Training Program ~~(Tab A)~~.
- Of seven red flag training periods in FY02, three have been designated "US only" to fully integrate special access program training. For the four periods open to foreign participation, USAF Air Combat Command requests Deputy Under Secretary Air Force, International Affairs (SAF-IA) identify foreign participants. SAF-IA then solicits foreign participation for available periods.
- Germany and the United Kingdom are given the highest priority, and may participate in multiple exercises each year. Other allies are limited to one exercise per year and are selected based on their capability and how their participation contributes to both USAF training and Allied combined operations.
- Turkey did not request to participate in FY02.
- The attached USAF memo provides more detail, if needed (Tab B).

Prepared by: John P. Abizaid, LTG; USA;

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/7
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	3/8
MA BUCCI	3/8
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/7

U04310 /02



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002
5 Mar 02

AFODM 04-02

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUBJECT: RED FLAG INVITEE CRITERIA (DJSM-0182-02)

HQ Air Combat Command (ACC) uses USAF training requirements to determine how many and which Red Flag periods are available for allied participation. "US Only" Red Flag periods are reserved to fully integrate Special Access Programs / Special Access Required elements of the DoD. In FY02 there were three Red Flag periods designated "US Only" and three periods open to allied participation. For FY 03, there are three "US Only" periods and four periods open to allied participation.

In November of each year, HQ ACC forwards to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), the Red Flag periods available for foreign air forces' participation. SAF/IA solicits foreign participation through their respective country desk officers. Allied participation is then established by SAF/IA and coordinated with representatives from ACC and Pacific Air Force HQ at an annual SAF/IA hosted scheduling meeting. The United Kingdom and Germany are given the highest participation priority. Both countries may participate in multiple Red Flag exercises annually. All other allies are limited to a maximum of one Red Flag period per year. In general, allied selection is based on consideration of allies' operational capability to perform the requested mission type, how allied participation enhances USAF AEF combat capability, and how participation enhances ability of allies to support combined operations. SAF/IA has final determination authority when a conflict exists between two allies competing for the same exercise mission type or on whether a country other than the UK or Germany participate in multiple Red Flag exercises.

For those Red Flag periods open to international participants in FY02, the following foreign air forces participated: UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, NATO (AWACS), Singapore, and Israel. For FY 02, Turkey did not submit a request to participate in any international Red Flag periods and Norway cancelled, at their request.

CHARLES F. WALD, Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
Air and Space Operations

11-L-0559/OSD/10278

ACTION
4-10

March 18, 2002 12:20 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Transformation

What do you think about creating a review panel to look at transformation for the Army, along the lines we discussed at the house the other night.

381

Here is a memo from Newt Gingrich on the subject.

One thought would be to have the JROC do it. Another would be to get the Defense Policy Board or Science Board to put together a group.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/05/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Army Transformation

DHR:db
031802-32

.....

Please respond by 04/08/02

18 MAR 02

U12174 /02

SECDEF HAS S

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

MAR 18 2002

From: (b)(6)@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2002 9:27 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Subject: secdef-4

III. The hidden crisis in the Army

Far more than any other service the current Army leadership has rigorously avoided transformation (universal awareness, real-time knowledge, networked systems, precision strike, radically reshaped logistics and decision cycles, and hierarchies, vastly greater mobility)

Every current Army major development program (Crusader, Light Armored Vehicle, IBCT, Comanche) should be thoroughly reexamined in the light of transformation and the burden should be on the current systems to prove they should be retained.

A much more lethal agile and effective Army could be developed. The current investments will simply extend the Second World War heavy Army model with considerable risk to troops (in the case of LAV) and extraordinary opportunity costs (in the case of Crusader).

The current Army efforts are so wrong that Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense need to create a review panel favorable to transformation to design an alternative track for the Army. Every day that the current Army program is not challenged is a day the Army goes further down the wrong road.

3/5/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10280

showWare
0900

4-10

March 18, 2002 12:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: PA&E

Done 7/3

✓

Attached is memo I received last January from Jim Thomson.

Please take a look at it and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/30/01 Thomson ltr to SecDef re: OSD Organization and PA&E

DHR:dh
031802-38

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

020 PA&E

18 Mar 02

U12175 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10281

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

RAND

James A. Thomson

President and Chief Executive Officer

January 30, 2001

1700 Main Street

PO Box 2138

Santa Monica

California

90407-2138

310 451 6936

Fax 310 451 6972

Jamci_Thomson@rand.org

The Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon, Rm. 3E880
Washington DC 20301

Dear Don:

While you are getting all sorts of unsolicited advice on OSD organization and personnel, let me add my own.

Move the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation into Policy. This will provide the Department with several advantages.

- It will provide a lever to insure that policy direction is reflected in programs. Much of defense policy is implemented through programs. These have historically been resistant to policy direction. Too often policy guidance is expressed as glittering generalities that have not been incorporated into program direction. The Office of the USDP should be doing that. But it cannot do so without a strong analytical arm. PA&E would provide that.
- It would strengthen the hand of the USDP in interagency forums. The sad truth is that this post has rarely been a true Undersecretary for Defense Policy, because of the disconnect between the post and the main business of the Department—planning and creating our future defense capabilities. As a consequence, the USDP cannot speak on behalf of the whole department in interagency meetings. Your representative should be able to speak on behalf of the whole department. He cannot do that unless he is part of the business of the whole department.

PA&E does not belong in the same office as the Comptroller. Those offices should be natural adversaries in the policy process. The former focuses on policy and long-term programmatic direction, the latter on finances and near term budgets.

If PA&E were not part of USDP, then it should report directly to you. In this event, policy capabilities within PA&E would need to be strengthened and PA&E's connections to the interagency process enhanced.

Warm Regards



O20 PAE

18 Mar 02

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3/12
1532



DIRECTOR OF
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1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

March 11, 2002

3/12
SECDEF DIR

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Language Training

The Defense Language Institute figures are driven by current defense intelligence requirements since most of the people who go there are enlisted intelligence operators who will listen in on foreign networks. Changing the intelligence requirement is the key to changing the output. The officers may matter most and there the problem is that only the Army has a good Foreign Area Officers (FAO) program, but the Army remains focused on Europe more than Asia and elsewhere.

Perhaps what you should do is to discuss this issue with the Services and then direct all services to have FAO programs modeled after the Army's, plus increased pay incentives for language proficiency, with size of incentive highest for those languages that are of long-term strategic interest and importance, i.e., Chinese, etc.

See attached pages from a recent study for additional information.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

THIS ISSUE IS WORTH
BEING WORKED BY
PEPSECDEF + SEC

3/12
3/12

U12176 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10283

Action
410

March 18, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Language Training

Here is a note from Andy Marshall that I agree with.

Please get a memo drafted for me to do this.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/11/02 Marshall memo to SecDef, "Language Training"

DHR:dh
031802-37



Please respond by 04/12/02

0914

11 APR 02

U12176 /02

TO: Andy Marshall
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: March 6, 2002
 SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates**

Please take a look at this DoD Language Graduates for 2001 and tell me if you think I ought to send out a memorandum or directive getting it switched out of German and French and that type of thing and into languages that would be more appropriate for the decades ahead.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 030602.25

Attach: Dod Language Grads for 2001, 3/5/02

Please respond by: _____

3/12

*ANDY MARSHALL RESPONSE
 ATTACHED AT RED TAB.
 V/R
 Ed*

U04299 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 18 2002

5 March 02

MEMORANDUM for the SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: VADM Giambastiani

SUBJECT: **DoD Language Graduates for 2001**

For info, attached is a list of DoD language graduates for calendar year '01 from COL Bucci.

Of note, 461 (25.4%) of the 1817 "basic" language graduates, or 1 out of 4, took **Arabic or Farsi**.

Very respectfully,



11-L-0559/OSD/10286

**Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Graduates
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

- Defense Language Institute is located in Monterey, CA
- The attached document includes all DLIFLC military grads for the past 12 months, broken out by service, language and type of course.
 - The Basic category includes all basic acquisition of a language taught at DLIFLC.
 - The Other category includes all advanced courses and specialized courses.
 - The Contract category includes all courses taught by multiple vendors out of the DLIFLC-Washington Office. This office provides instruction in the low density courses, initial language familiarization for new commanders in Europe, as well as language training to the Defense Attaches.

• USA

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	198	10	10
ARMENIAN			1
BENGALI			1
BURMESE			1
CAMBODIAN			5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	86	1	4
CZECH	3		1
DUTCH			6
FRENCH	34	6	15
GERMAN	23	7	49
GREEK	1		1
HAITIAN CREOLE			4
HEBREW			1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			6
INDONESIAN			7
ITALIAN	5		2
JAPANESE	8	3	1
KOREAN	175	4	
LAO			3
LITHUANIAN			1
MACEDONIAN			1
MALAY			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN AFGAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	38		
POLISH	2		3
PORTUGUESE	9		
PORTUGUESE AFGHAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			2
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	153	17	18

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
SERBIAN CROATIAN	18		
SLOVAK			1
SPANISH	113	7	6
SWAHILI			1
TAGALOG	2		
THAI	8		1
TURKISH	2		3
UKRAINIAN			2
URDU			5
UZBEK			1
VIETNAMESE	4		2
TOTAL	882	55	179

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USAF**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
AFRIKAANS			1
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	53	18	5
BULGARIAN			1
CAMBODIAN			2
CHINESE-MANDARIN	40	4	2
CZECH	2		
DANISH			1
DUTCH			4
FINNISH			3
FRENCH	9	1	15
GERMAN	9		4
GREEK			2
HEBREW	7	2	1
HINDI			2
HUNGARIAN			2
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	2		3
JAPANESE	1		
KOREAN	95	11	
PERSIAN AFGAN			5
PERSIAN FARSI	21		
POLISH	1		
PORTUGUESE	2		
PORTUGUESE BRAZILIAN			2
PORTUGUESE EUROPEAN			6
PUSHTU AFGHAN			5
ROMANIAN			4
RUSSIAN	78	18	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	26	4	11
SPANISH	92	16	14
TAGALOG			1
THAI	1		5
TURKISH	2		4
VIETNAMESE	14		
TOTAL	455	74	113

**Number of DLIFLC Graduates Over the Past 12 Months
1/31/2001 through 2/1/2002**

• **USN**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ALBANIAN			1
ARABIC	57	9	5
CHINESE-MANDARIN	37	4	1
DANISH			2
DUTCH			3
ESTONIAN			4
FRENCH	5	2	7
GERMAN	8		2
GREEK			1
HEBREW	11	3	
INDONESIAN			2
ITALIAN	9		2
JAPANESE	4	1	4
KOREAN	28	1	
NORWEGIAN			4
PERSIAN FARSI	32		
PORTUGUESE	1		
ROMANIAN			2
RUSSIAN	43	7	5
SERBIAN CROATIAN	15	1	
SPANISH	47	9	10
SWEDISH			2
THAI	4		2
TURKISH			1
VIETNAMESE	5		
TOTAL	306	37	60

• **USMC**

Language	Basic	Other	Contracted
ARABIC	54	3	4
CHINESE-MANDARIN	2		
FRENCH	3		1
ITALIAN			1
JAPANESE		1	
KOREAN	21	3	
LATVIAN			2
NORWEGIAN			2
PERSIAN FARSI	8		
PORTUGUESE	1		
RUSSIAN	36	4	3
SERBIAN CROATIAN	8		
SLOVENIAN			1
SPANISH	41		3
TOTAL	174	11	17

March 18, 2002 11:53 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*

SUBJECT: OMB

Done - INFO - Alio

110.01

We have had a series of confusing situations with the Office of Management and Budget.

In the future, DoD officials who undertake arrangements with OMB should record the arrangements in writing, so there is a written record. OMB should be copied on the memo, showing what was discussed and what was agreed, so we will all be on the same wave length.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-21



Please respond by _____

18 Mar 02

U12177 /02

March 18, 2002 11:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anaconda in Civil War

Please have someone give me the historical background on the Anaconda battle from the Civil War.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-27

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

3/18

See Def-
Here's something
quick.
D. Rita

A. Fighani Stan

18 Mar 02

U12178 /02

The Anaconda Plan

"Winfield Scott's original plan fighting the rebellion"

The first military strategy offered to President Abraham Lincoln for crushing the rebellion of Southern states was devised by Union General-in-Chief Winfield Scott. From April 1 through early May 1861 Scott briefed the president daily, often in person, on the national military situation; the results of these briefings were used by Scott to work out Union military aims.

About 3 May Scott told his protégé, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, that he believed an effective "Blockade" of Southern ports, a strong thrust down the Mississippi Valley with a large force, and the establishment of a line of strong Federal positions there would isolate the disorganized Confederate nation "and bring it to terms." Contemporary sources said McClellan called it Scott's "boa-constrictor" plan. Scott then presented it to the president, in greater detail, proposing that 60,000 troops move down the Mississippi with gunboats until they had secured the river from Cairo, Ill., to the Gulf, which, in concert with an effective blockade, would seal off the South. Then, he believed, Federal troops should stop, waiting for Southern Union sympathizers to turn on their Confederate governors and compel them to surrender. It was his belief that sympathy for secession was not as strong as it appeared and that isolation and pressure would make the "fire-eaters" back down and allow calmer heads to take control.

But the war-fevered nation wanted combat, not armed diplomacy, and the passive features of Scott's plan were ridiculed as a proposal "to squeeze the South to military death." The press, recalling McClellan's alleged "boa-constrictor" remark, named the plan after a different constricting snake, the anaconda. The plan was not adopted, but in 1864 it reappeared in aggressive form. Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's 2-front war, fought in Virginia and Tennessee, pressed the Confederates, while Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's march through Georgia to the sea helped "squeeze the South to military death." Source: "Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War" Edited by Patricia L. Faust

[Scott To McClellan Report](#)

This is the report referenced earlier in the article where Winfield Scott explains the plan to George B. McClellan.

[RETURN TO CIVIL WAR POTPOURRI PAGE](#)

Detron
4-10

March 18, 2002 1:30 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pentagon Configuration

Please don't forget I want to take a look at how people are going to be relocated in the building.

I think we ought to move people around from the way they currently are, to create jointness.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-48



Please respond by 04/12/02

600

18 Mar 02

U12180 /02

INFO
4/10

March 18, 2002 1:37 PM

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Humanitarian Activities

The next time we brief the Hill, we should mention humanitarian activities as part of our program.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-50



Please respond by _____

092

18 Mar 02

U12181 /02

Done
INFO 4-10

March 18, 2002 1:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Helpful Senators

When we were with Chuck Hagel at lunch, he mentioned the following people as ones who could be helpful: Jack Reed (RI), Tom Carper (DE), Mike Enzi (WY), Bill Nelson (FL), Wayne Allard (CO), Zell Miller (GA), Don Nickles (OK) and possibly Max Cleland (GA).

032

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-49



Please respond by _____

18 Mar 02

U12182 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10296

Done 4-10
OBE

March 18, 2002 1:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Including Senators

032

We should start including Chuck Hagel and the list he gave us for inclusion in dinners and receptions we host.

Please put them on the list of "friends."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-51

.....

Please respond by _____

18 Moore

U12183 /02

March 19, 2002 9:26 AM

Action - COMPLETE 4-3

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Naval Reserves

Here is a note I got from (b)(6) on my service in the Naval Reserve. You said I ought to include it. *YOU SHOULD.*

I am sure (b)(6) is wrong and that my records are wrong. I don't think I have full years in between. I may have a gap. *THERE IS NO GAP.*

Could you please have someone look at the records, and find out what I should say by way of the number of years I served in the Reserves. Please get me the actual information, so I can use it properly as you have recommended.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 Nestel response to SecDef, 031802-5

DHR:dh
031902-15

Please respond by 04/12/02

— ACTUAL DATA SHEET FROM THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (NOW CALLED NAVAL PERSONNEL COMMAND) IS ATTACHED AT TAB A.

— RECOMMENDED STATEMENT OF YOUR SERVICE

FOR YOUR BIO IS AT U1290
U12184-L-102-0559/OSD/10298

326

1/9/02

3 April 2002

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Director of Naval Reserve (CNO N095B)
To: Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense

Subj: RESERVE CAREER ICO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Sir, as we interpret the data you provided, SECDEF's Naval career would be categorized as follows:

- Served on active duty from June 1954 to November 1957
- Served in the Naval Reserve from November 1957 to November 1975.
- Transferred to Retired Reserve in May 1989.

2. A sample statement for inclusion in SECDEF'S biography is:

"Secretary Rumsfeld entered active Naval Service in June 1954 and served as a Naval Aviator. In 1957 he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975. Secretary Rumsfeld transferred to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989."

Very respectfully,



NOEL G. PRESTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Donald Henry Rumsfeld

Source of Commission: NROTC, Princeton University. Commissioned an Ensign on June 4, 1954.

Degree: BA in Government History, 1954, Princeton University.

Service Dates/Assignments:

NAS Atlantic City, NJ	15 Jun 54 – 26 Sep 54
Naval Air Basic Training Command, NAS Pensacola, FL	27 Oct 54 – 15 Jul 55
Naval Air Advanced Training Command, NAS Corpus Christi, TX	16 Jul 55 – 30 Jan 56
Naval Station, Naval Base Norfolk, VA	31 Jan 56 – 14 May 56
NAS Pensacola, FL	14 May 56 – 20 Jul 56
NAAS Sauffley Field, Pensacola, FL	20 Jul 56 – 22 Apr 57
NAAS Corry Field, Pensacola, FL	23 Apr 57 – 19 Nov 57

***Released from Active Duty 19 Nov 57**

***Entered Naval Reserve 19 Nov 57**

VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC	1 Mar 58 – 30 Jun 58
Fleet Training Unit Atlantic, Norfolk, VA	17 Nov 58 – 30 Nov 58
VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC	30 May 59 – 30 June 59
VS-731, NAS Grosse Ile, IL	1 Feb 60 – 31 Oct 60
VS-723, NAS Glenview, IL	12 Mar 61 – 30 Jun 62
VS-722, NAS Glenview, IL	1 Jul 62 – 29 Jan 63
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	29 Jan 63 – 30 Jun 67
National War College, Washington, DC	18 Jun 67 – 30 Jun 67
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	1 Jul 67 – 30 Jun 68
Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington, DC	4 Dec 68 – 9 Dec 68
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	1 Jul 69 – 12 Nov 70
Naval Air Reserve Unit, NAF Washington, DC	1 Jul 71 – 19 Nov 75

***Transferred to Standby Reserve – Inactive, 4 Dec 75**

***Transferred to Retired Reserve at rank of CAPT, 1 May 89**

History of Promotions

ENS	4 Jun 54
LTJG	4 Dec 55
LT	1 Apr 58
LCDR	1 Feb 64
CDR	1 Jul 68
CAPT	1 May 74

History of Awards

National Defense Service Medal

March 19, 2002 9:26 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Naval Reserves

Here is a note I got from (b)(6) on my service in the Naval Reserve. You said I ought to include it.

I am sure (b)(6) is wrong and that my records are wrong. I don't think I have full years in between. I may have a gap.

Could you please have someone look at the records, and find out what I should say by way of the number of years I served in the Reserves. Please get me the actual information, so I can use it properly as you have recommended.

Thanks.

3/23
1405

Attach.
03/18/02 Nestel response to SecDef, 031802-5

VADM G.

DHR:dh
031902-15

SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES:

35 YRS TOTAL

- 1) JUN '54 - NOV '57 - ACTIVE DUTY
- 2) NOV '57 - DEC '68 - ACTIVE RESERVE
- 3) DEC '68 - MAY '89 - INACTIVE RESERVE

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

3/23

RESPONSE

ATTACHED

v/r

THIS WAS GLEANED FROM HIS OFFICIAL RECORD AT BUPERS - I ASKED A CDR AT BUPERS TO CHECK THE RECORD FOR ANY OTHER INFO OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. HE'LL GET BACK TO ME.

11-L-0559/OSD/10302

v/r J.

DONALD HENRY RUMSFELD, USNR

04 Jun 54 Appointed Ensign, USNR
 16 Jun 54 Reported for Active Duty
 30 Jun 54 TR, Composite Squadron THIRTY THREE (UC-33), NAS
 Atlantic City, NJ
 03 Oct 54 TR, Naval Air Basic Training Command, NAS,
 Pensacola, FL
 22 Jul 55 TR, Naval Air Advanced Training Command, (ATU-501),
 Corpus Christi, TX
 09 Feb 56 TR, U. S. Naval Station, Naval Base, Norfolk, VA
 22 May 56 TR, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL
 20 Jul 56 TR, NAAS, Saufley Field, Pensacola, FL
 22 Apr 57 TR, NAAS, Corry Field, Pensacola, FL
 19 Nov 57 Released from Active Duty
 01 May 89 TR, Retired Reserves

AWARDS: National Defense Service Medal

DATES OF RANK:

04 Jun 54 Ensign
 04 Dec 55 Lieutenant, Junior Grade
 01 Apr 58 Lieutenant
 01 Feb 64 Lieutenant Commander
 01 Jul 68 Commander
 01 May 74 Captain

ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING:

17 Nov 58 - 30 Nov 58
 15 Jun 59 - 28 Jun 59
 01 Jun 60 - 14 Jun 60
 12 Jun 61 - 25 Jun 61
 01 Jul 62 - 13 Jul 62
 29 Nov 64 - 18 Dec 64
 18 Jun 67 - 30 Jun 67
 02 Jan 68 - 05 Jan 68
 04 Dec 68 - 09 Dec 68

ACTIVE

10 DEC 68 → 01 MAY 89 - INACTIVE RESERVES

OPTIONAL FORM 98 (7-90)	
FAX TRANSMITTAL	
TO: H. HANNESS	FROM: CDR RUMSFELD
DEPT./AGENCY:	(b)(6)
FAX #:	
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	
NSN 7540-01-317-7488	
FORM 101	

11-L-0559/OSD/10303



March 18, 2002 8:28 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Naval Service

Please check with (b)(6), and see if she can look in my Navy records and find out how many years I served in the Reserve. I know I served about 3 1/2 years on active duty, from June 1954 to November 1957. I then went into the Reserves, and I cannot remember the year I stopped. I do remember my final rank was Captain, USNR.

Please see if she can find out the date of when I finally resigned from the Naval Reserve. I think it was because I was at NATO or the Pentagon. I know it continued from when I got out in 1957 well into the time I was an assistant to a Congressman and then a Congressman.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-5




Please respond by 03/25/02

3/18/02

Sir -
You served 32 years in the Naval Reserves from Nov 57 to 1989. I'll see if we can get an exact date of departure.
- You were serving in the private sector in 1989, the year you resigned. In '89 you were a member of Nat'l Economic Commission & Consultant to US Dept. of state
11-L-0559/OSD/10304

(b)(6)



2/10

March 19, 2002 9:31 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: James Walters

DR

Done

We might want to take a look at James Walters for a position here at the Pentagon.
Why don't you take a look at him? He sounds like a pretty good person, although I obviously don't know him.

2/20/02

Thanks.

Attach.
02/23/02 Package from Suttle to SecDef

DHR:dh
031902-17



Please respond by 03/29/02

3/25

done - 3/29
Larry Di Rita

*→ Meron -
Resume is attached
Please set up interview w/mer
Tx.
J.*

19 Mar 02

U12185 /02



CITY OF RITA
9/18

SecDef
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FON

SLIP

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

U04456-02

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 3/20

MR DIRIA,

~~HELPER SIBKOV FIRST
LETTER ATTACHED, BUT NOT
THE ONE TO CLAY JOHNSON.
Relevantly soon.~~

WR,

1/14/07

- ① Son Johnson letter Done
- ② Get me a copy of the attachment (signature) per snowflake. Done per
Thanks D. White

3/21



ANY DI QTR
S/C

SecDef
OF DEFENSE
TON

Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. Richard T. Suttle, Sr. (Ret)

(b)(6)



Dear Dick and Gail,

Thank you for your thoughtful note. It was nice to hear from you.

I appreciate your recommending James Walters for a position in the Department of Defense. He has impressive qualifications, and I have forwarded his paperwork to Clay Johnson, the Director of Presidential Personnel.

I hope that all is well with you. Joyce and I send our best wishes.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink.

THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

NOV 11 2000
MAIL ROOM
U04456-02

Mr. Clay Johnson
Presidential Personnel Office
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

#: U04456-02

Dear Clay,

I am forwarding a resume from Mr. James Walters for your consideration. He is interested in serving in a government position.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 MAR 12 AM 3:50

Lt Col (Ret) and Mrs Richard T Suttle, Sr

(b)(6)

Secretary of Defense



SA0005307

February 23, 2002

Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
10000 Defense Pentagon - Room 3E880
Washington, D C 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Congratulations on the tremendous job you are doing! We are very proud and honored to watch as you lead as the Secretary of Defense (Dick also enjoys hearing the "title" you have been given - "Sex Symbol" to women over 60!)

As the newly elected President of the Texas Federation of Republican Women for the 2002-2003 term I am asked many times if we know "someone in Washington" that a son or daughter may contact or see for an interview for a job. The purpose of this letter is for that exact reason. One of our past Republican Women's Club President's son is in the Washington area. He is in the process of settling and seeking employment there.

The family is a great conservative, Republican one. They are true "Aggie" parents, having been elected last year as "Parents of the Year". Their son, Bolton, has sent a copy of his resume in the hope that we might send it to you for consideration. His name, mailing address, Cell phone contact, and email address are included on it.

We would appreciate it if you might be able to turn this over to your personnel director or staff if there would be an opportunity for Bolton to be contacted.

Thank you Warm regards to Joyce

Dick and Gail Suttle

PS - Heard our Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison at a meeting here in Austin yesterday and she was very complimentary of you along with our President, George W Bush, in her comments. Also had the opportunity to hear from Dale Klein, a recent appointment to the DOD who also is impressed with the operations and work ethics of the DOD. Keep up the good work!

11-L-0559/OSD/10309 U04456 /02

JAMES BOLTON WALTERS

(b)(6)

EDUCATION

Baylor University (1999)
JD
Baylor University (1999)
MBA
Texas A&M University (1995)
BBA in Marketing - Cum Laude

EMPLOYMENT

Executive Director
Texas Electronic Commerce Association
General Counsel & Treasurer
NetPAC & E-Business Executives of Texas

WORK EXPERIENCE

Government Affairs and Corporate Relations

- Arranged and participated in public/private roundtable discussions, forums, panels and meetings with CEOs, executives, venture capitalists, bankers, government officials and attorneys
- Responsible for executive/corporate relationships and generated 3,000+ executive-level business contacts
- Engaged in government, legislative, and political liaison activities
- Contributed to media/communications activities including interviews and drafting internal/external correspondence, copy and press releases

Finance

- Raised funds for various campaigns, causes and corporate entities
- Responsible for budgets, financial reporting, reconciliation and authorizations

Research and Analysis

- Analyzed legislation, statutes, codes, regulations, rulings, white papers, industry data, case law and court documents impacting the technology and business community
- Created and managed corporate, financial and legal databases/files

Management and Strategic Planning

- Advised Board of Directors on ethical, regulatory, legal, business and financial compliance
- Assisted in devising/implementing political, marketing, recruiting, managerial and finance plans/initiatives/campaigns

Legal

- Participated in client conferences, dispute resolution, negotiations and court proceedings
- Drafted contracts, correspondence, pleadings, discovery and settlement agreements

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Federalist Society
State Bar of Texas
Texas Young Lawyer's Association

INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES

Republican Party of Texas Campaign Managers and Campaign Management Schools
Leadership Institute Campaign Leadership, Capitol Hill Training and Public Speaking Schools
Alternate Delegate, 1996 and 2000 Texas Republican Conventions
Volunteer/activist in local, state and national Republican campaigns and causes
Eisenhower People to People & Leadership Development Program
Four-year member of the Texas A&M Corps of Cadets
Volunteer in various youth programs/activities including Little League baseball and Church
Extensive travel to more than 40 countries & 45 states

4-10 4/2

March 19, 2002 7:38 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CAPs

Done 4/2

I think I need to tackle head on the reduction in the CAPs over the U.S.—why it makes sense, how we allocate assets to provide for homeland security and how we balance out a whole series of things.

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-7

.....
Please respond by 03/20/02

19 Mar 02

U12186 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10311

March 22, 2002 5:05 p.m.

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie Clarke
SUBJECT: CAPs

Given how events have played out over the last several days, I don't think you need to tackle this one head on; just be prepared to address if asked.

We've been quite clear that we won't discuss details of the CAP plan, but that it will be scaleable and responsive to changing threat conditions.

Coupled with appropriate Congressional briefings, those comments seem to have gotten the public discussion to the right place.

11-L-0559/OSD/10312

4-10

March 19, 2002 10:53 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail to Mr. Gillard

Done

33550

In case you have not already answered this letter from Shane Gillard, please have someone send the following e-mail back to him from me:

Dear Mr. Gillard,

The folks here at the Pentagon brought your e-mail in this morning, and I do hasten to thank you for your thoughtfulness. I appreciate it a great deal.

Know that the United States of America values greatly our relationship with Australia over these many, many decades, and certainly in connection with the coalition efforts in the global war on terrorism.

With my appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Donald Rumsfeld

OK

19 Mar 02

Attach.
03/15/02 Gillard e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
031902-20



Please respond by 03/29/02

U12187 /02

Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA

From: Jackson, David, CIV, AFIS
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2002 5:37 PM
To: Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: fyi...

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 19 2002

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, March 15, 2002 6:49 PM
To: defendamerica_public@defendamerica.mil
Subject: ***SecDefMessage***

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld, This is more of a comment than a question. I live in Australia and since the Sept 11 tragedy I have subscribed to the Defense Dept email bulletin service and am an avid reader of all that you do and say personally. I'd like to say that you are indeed a remarkable person and if there has been a more appropriate man thrust into a difficult period in the history of human conflict, I'd like to know his name. Australians love a person not afraid to spell it out and you do it in a unique and straight forward way. More strength to you and our enduring alliance. I hope you get time to read my letter. Yours sincerely, Shane Gillard.

--
Submitted via <http://www.defendamerica.mil/contactsecdef.html>

Action
#10

March 19, 2002 11:48 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reimbursement for ISAF

Let's make sure State is aware there has to be a very good system for how the ISAF is paid under the Turks, so that in fact we have an excellent accounting system, they are paid for things performed, not a lump sum in advance, and we are sure the money is spent well.

Turkey

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-22



Please respond by 03/29/02

19mar02

U12188 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10315

Action
4-10

March 19, 2002 10:43 AM

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Hoon

I ought to send a quick note to Jeffrey Hoon with respect to the deployment of additional UK forces to Afghanistan. I will dictate it, you folks look at it and then get it out. *- by fax*

UK

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef note to Hoon

DHR:dh
031902-19

.....
Please respond by 03/22/02

19 March 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon
Secretary of State
Ministry of Defence
Room 205, Old War Office Building
Whitehall London, SW1A 2EU
United Kingdom

Dear Geoffrey,

I noted today your remarks of yesterday in the Parliament on adding some additional forces to the coalition effort in Afghanistan and simply wanted to tell you how pleased I was to see it.

Your folks have done a superb job out there, as you well know.

Best regards,

11-L-0559/OSD/10317

March 19, 2002 7:34 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Stockpile

Done 4-10

RUSSELL

I notice that in today's clips, Ivanov said he would accept some response force—it was an AP article on p. 28 of the *Early Bird*.

It strikes me that it may be time for me to start talking publicly about how our stockpile is arranged, so we can get the public behind us—maybe that way we can calm down the interagency problems.

Please develop some talking points for me for the Thursday press conference.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-6

.....

Please respond by 3/20/02

19 March

U12190 /02

3/14
1002
SHARE

4-10

March 19, 2002 7:23 AM

Done - 4/5

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jim Haynes
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Getting Ready for Commissions

We need to immediately develop a pool of people who can fulfill the functions required in the military commissions—specifically, the judges, panel members, review panel members, prosecutors, defense counsels, etc.

015

Please give me a status report as to where we stand.

Finally, develop a complete checklist of everything that needs to be done prior to actually initiating a commission. When the President asks me where we stand, I will be able to tell him what the deadline dates are for any aspect of it. Then he will know when he can actually assign someone to be tried by a commission, which he really ought not to do until we are ready to take action.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031902-2

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

19 Mar 02

U12191 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10319

Yd
20 MAR 2002
Done 2/16

March 20, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Budget

At the Cabinet meeting, Mitch Daniels said the supplemental was going to be over \$27 billion, and over half of that was going to be for DoD. That sounds higher than what I was led to believe.

He also said there were going to be dollars for the front-line states, which is good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-3

.....
Please respond by 03/26/02

True, but only if you include NFIP, ~~and~~ WHITE HOUSE PROGRAMS, and other classified

DoD only - without other programs is about \$12.5 Billion

DR
MAR 20 2002
(Zakheim)
R. Di Rita

U12192 /02

3/22
3/23

110.01

snowflake

Action
4-3-02

March 20, 2002 7:30 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: CVN-77

Please read this note from Newt Gingrich and tell me what you think I ought to do about it. It sounds interesting to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/19/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: CVN77

DHR:dh
032002-1

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

560

20 March

U12193 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10321

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

copied to Wolfowitz

From: (b)(6)@aol.com

D. Rita
Giambastiani

Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 6:50 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

MAR 20 2002

Subject: please give to sevdef and depsecdef

for secdef, depsecdef
from Newt 3/19/2002

CVN77

You have an opportunity to insist on the first carrier of the 21st century rather than the last carrier of the 20th century. Since these ships will be around 45 to 50 years CVN77 will be available for the President to use in 2050. We should be building for the long haul.

This requires an instruction to have a 90 day review of all carrier planning to reinsert all the modernization which in the Clinton years it had been decided we could not afford in one jump and which has been deliberately stretched out over three carriers (thus guaranteeing the first two will be semi obsolete on launch).

Furthermore the various fiefdoms have been dumbing down the planning for cvn77 by poistponing even some of the modernizations which had been planned for this carrier.

The electric drive alone would save 1500 positions on the carrier or 75,000 man years plus health benefits and pensions over the life of the carrier. My guess is this savings alone would be a minimum of \$3,000,000,000 over the carrier's lifespan. Zackheim ought to run the numbers and give you a real figure for the savings so you could convince omb, congress and the press.

Admiral Giambastiani understands all this and should be instructed to work with cno to come up with an aggressive review and a plan to set cvn77 on track to be the first 21st century carrier.

Finally, the navy has a real crisis in shipbuilding and in aviation. You cannot ask them to pay for the full transformation internally. This is an example where having A,B and C budgets would work because you could transfer savings from somewhere else.

We will almost certainly save you enough on health costs to pay for the carrier many times over (current optimistic estimates are \$22 billion in 5 years, assume we only get one fourth of that it is still more than enough to cover all the development for a 21st century carrier).

Navy will love this if you supply the extra money and hate it if they have to take it

3/19/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10322

out of vital programs.

March 20, 2002 7:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: EPA

Done

Please call Christie Whitman's office and find out what issues she wants to work with me—and then I want to get it solved.

723

I am tired of going to a Cabinet meeting and having someone say we are not doing what we need to do to work with their department. I have no idea what she has, but she has some issue that has been raised with me before. I asked someone to look into it, and I never heard another word. No one has gotten back to me.

Please figure out what it is, and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-2



Please respond by 04/05/02

3/21

→ SecDef

We've been rather engaged with her. I'll get you an update.

20 March

*Copy BTM
done 3/22
52*

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

Action?
f/k

March 20, 2002 4:21 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MOU

Condi wants to finish the Memorandum of Understanding with us. She is worried about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-15

092.2

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

James

U12195 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10325

Snowflake

Action 4-3

March 20, 2002 8:41 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Military-Related Casualties

I am told in the Pakistan bombing that both the wife of our defense attaché and a Major were injured.

Please have someone check into that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-12

.....
Please respond by 03/21/02

Pakistan

DHR

Larry -
do we write them?
DHR

3/20 1445

JECDEF -
COPY OF POWELL
(SECSTATE) NOTE ATTACHED.
ANOTHER COPY ROUTED
EARLIER TODAY.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 21 2002

V/R
ED

Yes.

DHR

LARRY DI RITA

14-0559/OSD/10326

U12196 /02

March 20, 2002 8:10 AM

INFO
4-16

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Korologos Remarks

Whoever worked on the remarks for the Korologos event, they worked out well.
Thanks so much. I used one of those last stories about the Oval Office as well.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-11

.....
Please respond by _____

350.001

20 Mar 02

U12197 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10327

Action
4-16

March 20, 2002 8:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Monthly Reports

319.1

I ought to get monthly reports on the projects we are working on with the Veterans Administration, the one we started with Elaine Chao at Labor, and the one we are supposed to be doing with Christie Todd Whitman.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032002-6

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

20 Mar 02

U12198 /02

Action
4-16

March 21, 2002 9:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Waivers and Proximity

601

I don't like these waivers. I think maybe we should extend it to 200 miles from Washington, and we should include leases, as well as purchases.

We should elevate the approval up to Paul, me or you (or you for me). It is obviously out of hand.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 DUSD(I&E) info memo to SecDef re: Land Acquisition

DHR:dh
032102-12

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

LARRY DI RITA
3/21

21 Mar 02

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: February 14, 2002
 SUBJECT:

6:09 PM
 OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 2002 MAR -7 AM 8:09

I would like to have instruction given to the DoD that no land will be purchased within 100 miles of Washington DC and no buildings will be leased without the approval of somebody. We have simply got to stop the concentration of government in the Washington DC area.

Thank you.

copy BTM done - 3/20

DHR/azn
 021402.01

Please respond by: 2/18/02

3/20
 SECDEF -
 - Interim response attached.
 - In sum: There is a moratorium, but we have been waiving it apparently.
 - We need to pull back the delegation of waiver authority to you or (preferably) DEPSEC.
 - Will advise, *DR*

SECDEF HAS

MAR 21 2002

2/25
 Exec Sec
 Please task PWS
 from SecDef to USD(AT&L)
 (I ~~can~~ assume) ~~via~~ C:O.
 Tight suspense (not more than 2 weeks) *DR*

U04164 11020559/OSD140330



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 21 2002

INFO MEMO

MAR 18 2002

FOR: Mr. Larry DiRita, Special Assistant to the SECDEF

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr, DUSD (I&E)

R DuBois Jr 3/18/02

SUBJECT: "Land Acquisition within 100 miles of Washington DC" Snowflake

- We are staffing a revised policy memo that will require SecDef approval on all land acquisition and building leases within 100 miles of the Washington, DC. The current policy and background are provided below.
- Deputy Secretary Atwood established a moratorium on major land acquisitions in September 1990 (TAB A). Major land acquisitions were defined as purchases, the withdrawal of land from public domain, lease or permit from government or private entities, or any other type of agreement for use. The moratorium applies to any land acquisition involving either more than 1,000 acres or a purchase price or annual lease cost in excess of \$1 million.
- In December 1994, Deputy Secretary Deutsch delegated to USD(AT&L) the approval authority for requests for waivers to the moratorium (TAB B).
- Since January 20, 2001, five waivers have been approved by USD(AT&L) and two are in the staffing process. The Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) Pentagon Reservation request for the Boundary Channel Drive property is being staffed (after the fact, as Doc Cooke went directly to Dov Zakheim).
- No approval is currently required on building leases. For leasing activities within the NCR, WHS currently manages components' request. Outside of the NCR, those activities are managed by GSA. Relocation into the NCR is managed by WHS and such actions currently require SecDef approval.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)



11-L-0559/OSD/10331

March 21, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ADR

We must make sure that State and the White House, at the Colin and Condi level, have registered that I want their personal sign-off on the Annual Defense Report.

I don't want to have a problem in there that they are not aware of—so it should be in their hands, and we will hold it until they are done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032102-4

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

U12200-02

11-L-0559/OSD/10332

ACTION
4-16

March 21, 2002 7:56 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: ADR

3/18/02 *DR (USOP) Cambone*
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Larry Di Rita -
Are we "good to go?"

NO, DI HNGS

We must make sure that State and th
have registered that I want their pers
I don't want to have a problem in the
in their hands, and we will hold it un-

SC
4/1

Thanks.

Steve -

DHR:dh
032102-4

Leaving for lunch

Please respond by 03/29

*files and sending over
in week*

Larry

Larry Di Rita

4/2

4/1 MGR

U12200 /02

Snowflake

Action
4-16

March 21, 2002 7:46 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippines

Philippines

I think someone ought to caution the Philippine ambassador, Del Rosario, to avoid talking about U.S. rules of engagement. They are complicated and they are sensitive. He runs a risk of having me have to correct him.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/20/02 John Sheridan, "Defensive Combat OK for U.S. Troops in Philippines," *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
032102-3

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

cc BW Dick Myers

21 Mar 02

U12201 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10334

the focus for the leaders he met.

By Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON - Vice President Dick Cheney returns today, after an 10-day swing through the Middle East, with a different set of notes in his portfolio from those he expected to bring home.

Move back the Iraq file. Move up the file on US efforts to achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

The reordering does not mean the problem of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction fell off the trip's agenda. But it does mean the Bush administration has a clearer picture of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict colors every other issue in the region.

The sum-up of Mr. Cheney's notes must include this point, specialists in the Middle East and American foreign policy say: The war on terrorism is not the driving order of business for the rest of the world. And if the US wants continued cooperation on tackling international terrorism, it will have to pay more attention to the issues that are uppermost in regions of keen interest to the US.

"At every turn, [Cheney] has been told that Iraq is not the first priority of the various states," says Judy Barselou, a Mideast specialist at the United States Institute of Peace here. "Their priority is the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis, so there is a disconnect on the larger war on terrorism."

By yesterday in Israel - from where he headed on to Turkey, his last stop - Cheney was focusing almost exclusively on the Mideast conflict. But he dashed Yasser Arafat's hopes of the vice president paying him a visit, instead telling the Palestinian leader he would meet with him if a cease-fire was arranged under the conditions of earlier US security-building plans.

When he set out on his trip March 10, Cheney had three central goals in mind: shoring up Arab-American relations that have sagged particularly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks; rallying support for US

action against the Iraqi regime; and progress in quelling violence and clearing a path to peace in the Middle East.

Cheney can argue that while the order of emphasis may have shifted, he made progress on all three, some analysts argue.

"The Bush administration deserves credit, because they saw the situation on the ground and corrected a foreign policy for the region that initially was too heavily focused on Iraq," says Fawaz Gerges, a professor of international relations at Sarah Lawrence College in Bronxville, N.Y.. "It's a testament to the flexibility and speed with which they can adapt to realities."

Arab leaders have been impressed by the way Cheney - an old hand at the Middle East - seemed to seek views instead of imposing them, as well as by the measures the US took over a short time to further regional peace efforts, Mr. Gerges says.

He points to the US-authored UN Security Council resolution last week that calls for a settlement where "two states," Israel and Palestine, "live side by side" - a step he calls a "milestone." Arab leaders also listened approvingly as President Bush rebuked Israel for occupying Palestinian towns last week, and as Cheney presented Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah with an invitation from Bush to visit his Texas ranch next month to discuss the prince's Mideast peace plan.

In return, the US may have actually heard pretty much what it wanted to concerning Iraq.

Yesterday in Israel, Cheney repeated that the US has made no decisions on a course of action to take against Iraq - soothing words to Arab leaders, who said publicly in one capital after another that hitting Iraq could further destabilize the region and ultimately work against US interests. Yet while his Arab interlocutors said Mideast peace must come before action against Iraq, Cheney also heard in several capitals that opposition to a move against Mr. Hussein would weaken if the case against him were developed

more in terms of an international threat, rather than America's personal beef.

"The US hasn't been able to present anything tying the [September] attacks to Iraq in any concrete way," says Ms. Barselou, noting that the best evidence so far is a meeting hijacker Mohammed Atta reportedly had in Prague with an Iraqi official last year.

Arab leaders want more - though US officials say privately they are more supportive of action against Hussein than meets the eye.

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, analysts note, Cheney heard that the international community must first put an ultimatum on the table: Hussein must accept weapons inspectors without conditions. "There's a consensus in the Arab world that if Saddam Hussein does not respond positively to the demands of the United Nations, then he would face terrible consequences," Gerges says.

Still, some observers believe the US is "engineering" a crisis with Iraq, by demanding a no-limits inspection program while knowing full well that Hussein will never accept it. The UN is scheduled to take up in May the question of getting weapons inspectors back into Iraq.

Cheney's visit may have furthered US goals in the Middle East, but America's image and long-term standing were not necessarily well served, some observers say. In a region where anti-Americanism is at a high point, public suspicions about US motives were only fed by Cheney's exclusive interchange with leadership elites struggling to maintain public support.

"It's significant that Cheney did not take the time to meet with a single non-official leader, no one from civil society, no editors, as if there is no public opinion to address," says Gerges. "We talk about public diplomacy, but I'm not sure the administration really understands what that means yet."

Washington Times

March 20, 2002

Pg. 15

25. Defensive Combat OK For U.S. Troops In Philippines

By John Sheridan, The Washington Times

American soldiers in the Philippines can engage in combat if they come under attack, the Philippines ambassador said after four members of the U.S. Special Forces entered a combat zone yesterday.

U.S. troops assisting the Philippines against the Muslim extremist Abu Sayyaf movement are armed but under orders not to engage in combat. But if they are attacked, "they are expected to take up arms in self-defense," Ambassador Albert Del Rosario said.

Mr. Del Rosario was responding to a news report that four Green Berets had tried to rescue two Filipino soldiers who were wounded in combat yesterday on Basilan, a jungle island 620 miles south of Manila.

The report said the Americans were unable to advance because of hostile fire and the wounded soldiers were rescued later by their Filipino colleagues.

"I think it takes a case-by-case basis," Mr. Del Rosario said. "If my information is correct, their presence [in the combat zone] was with the intention of executing a humanitarian action to help wounded Filipino soldiers."

The United States has sent 660 troops to train 3,800 Philippine soldiers on Basilan.

The training includes jungle warfare, air and night exercises and physical and psychological tactics. This phase of the joint campaign began in February and was to last six months. More joint campaigns are expected to follow depending on the outcome of the current phase, Mr. Del Rosario said at a Heritage Foundation panel discussion yesterday.

The ambassador said American soldiers would not be involved in direct combat against Filipino citizens and that such action would violate his country's constitution.

No permanent U.S. military base is planned in the

March 21, 2002 12:01 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Attendance

Please find out why in that last meeting both the Chief and the Vice Chief of the Army, I believe, were not there. When we have a meeting like that, we need one of them there.

Thanks.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

DHR:dh
032102-15

.....
Please respond by 03/27/02

VADM G,

Sir,

The CSA was in South America, and the VCSA was in a JROC trip in ~~CONUS~~ CONUS. He never exceeded the "4hrs away" limit, that would be a true DOD absence

537

COL B

4/11

U12202 /02

31 MAR 02

March 21, 2002 12:07 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Law on Force Protection

Jim

I would like to get the law changed on the requirement that only the military can provide force protection and contractors cannot be used. That is crazy.

Let's get it fixed. Please tell me what I have to do.

Thanks.

DR

DHR:dh
032102-17

.....
Please respond by 04/19/02

3/20

Haynes response attached

D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

3/21

SECDEF -

We are going to work the legislation again. It is in our legislative program. We got some things done in last year's bill that everyone said had been tried unsuccessfully several times, and this provision is in the same category. We need to organize for it and

2/14/02

U12203 / 02
11-L-0559/OSD/10337

D. P. T.



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

March 26, 2002, 8:05AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 3/26/02

SUBJECT: Law on Force Protection

- You asked what is needed to change the current law (10 U.S.C. § 2465), which generally prohibits contracting out security guard services.
- The President's supplemental appropriations request, which has been submitted to Congress, includes proposed legislation that would allow the Department to contract out security guard functions (Part A).

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Helen Sullivan (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/10338

7:41 AM

ACTION
4-16

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
DATE: March 22, 2002
SUBJECT: Compartmented Program

If the people that came into that big meeting with you yesterday that was a disaster report to you, we simply have got to fix this system. It's broken. That is inexcusable.

Get back to me and tell me what you propose to do about it.

DHR/azn
032202.03

Please respond by: 3/30/02

380.01

22 Mar 02

U12205 /02

Snowflake

7:42 AM

ON FILE
IN JCS Books

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: March 22, 2002
SUBJECT: No-Fly Zone

We need to get a plan for the northern no-fly zone and the southern no-fly zone that reflects our current circumstance. The old plans don't.

I thought I asked you folks to come in with a proposal and a concept for that. I think we ought to move on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
032202.02

7/1/02

Please respond by: 3/30/02

22 MAR 02

U12206 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10340

Action
4-16

March 22, 2002 12:29 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Asia-Pacific Center

*J
L
L*

Please don't forget to get back to me with a summary of the Asia-Pacific Center—
how many people, what their charter is, who controls them, who can hire and fire,
how many military and civilian, and possibly a proposal as to what we might want
to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032202-6

.....

Please respond by 04 19 02

20030322

U12207 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10341

5:47 PM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 23, 2002
SUBJECT: Use of Military Aircraft

Done 7/13

I need a piece of paper that shows me what the rules are for the use of military aircraft for people here in the Pentagon starting with me. Show me what it is for me, and for the Deputy and then for the senior civilians and the senior military.

I would be very surprised if the use of military aircraft is permitted for anybody who is not in the chain of command, except for official business, and then for only very senior people.

Thanks.

cc. L.D. Rita

DHR/azn
032302.06

Please respond by:

4 | 5 | 02

582

23 Mar 02

U12208 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10342



SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 11 2003

*Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Policy*

To: Sec Def

Date: 30 March 2002

From: *Dr. Grouch*

Subject: NATO Capability Shortfall

SecDef,

1. This is good work. I am working with Ken Krieg to expand the brief, targeting a couple of NATO shortfalls.
2. I think getting it out ahead of the NATO meeting is best. Options are the formal in June (but we may want to focus on Iraqi reconstruction then) or the informal in October here in the U.S.

Nato
320.2

30 Mar 02

U12208 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/10343

showfile

NFO
Done 4-19

11:48 AM
March 23, 2002

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. Tom Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 23, 2002

RE: **Attached**

Attached is a sad story of friendly fire casualties which puts life into perspective.

704

DHR/azn
032302.11

Attach: Invasion of Sicily - July 1943

23 Mar 02

U12209 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10344

6

INVASION OF SICILY -- July 1943

On the night of 9-10 July 1943, an Allied armada of 2,590 vessels launched one of the largest combined operations of World War II – the invasion of Sicily. Over the next thirty-eight days, half a million Allied soldiers, sailors, and airmen grappled with their German and Italian counterparts for control of this rocky outwork of Hitler's "Fortress Europe." When the struggle was over, Sicily became the first piece of the Axis homeland to fall to Allied forces during World War II. More important, it served as both a base for the invasion of Italy and as a training ground for many of the officers and enlisted men who eleven months later landed on the beaches of Normandy.¹

On the morning of 11 July 1943, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., ordered the reinforcement of the Allied beach-head at Gela, Sicily, by more than 2,000 men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment; the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion; and Company C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion. The paratroopers were scheduled to be dropped by 144 aircraft of the US 52nd Troop Carrier Wing on a drop zone in the Gela-Farello area at 2245 on 11 July. Because the weather was good and the approach was over friendly territory, an easy operation was expected. Ground commanders on Sicily were notified to expect the drop, and naval vessels of the invasion fleet off the coast of Sicily were alerted.²

The airborne force departed from Tunisian airfields at 1900, and its flight was uneventful except for some light anti-aircraft fire from Allied ships north of Malta, which caused no damage. Hitting the Sicilian coast the troop carriers turned to the northwest, flying along a two-mile wide corridor at an altitude of 1,000 feet over friendly lines. The lead elements jumped five minutes ahead of schedule, but as the second flight neared the final check-point a lone machine gun began firing. Suddenly every Allied anti-aircraft gun on shore and on the naval vessels offshore began firing at the slow, vulnerable troop carrier aircraft. Control over both Army and Navy anti-aircraft gunners vanished. Even the crews of tanks took the hapless troop carriers under fire with their .50-caliber machine guns.³

In short, the operation was a total disaster. By the afternoon of 12 July Col. Rueben H. Tucker, the commander of the 504th Regimental Combat Team, could count as effective only 37 officers and 518 men of his 2,000 man force. In all, the paratroopers suffered casualties of 81 dead, 132 wounded, and 16 missing. The 52d Troop Carrier Wing reported 7 dead, 30 wounded and 53 missing with a 16 percent loss of aircraft (23 destroyed and 57 badly damaged). Friendly fire had caused 319 casualties and totally disrupted the operation.

¹ Rpt (U), Center for Military History, "Sicily 1943," n.d.

² Rpt (U), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "AMICIDE: The problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War," LTC Charles R. Shrader, December 1982.

³ *Ibid.*

Two days later in a similar operation (Operation FUSTIAN), friendly fire shot down 11 aircraft, 50 were damaged, and 27 were forced to return to base with full or partial loads.⁴

The disastrous operations on Sicily nearly spelled an end for Allied airborne operations in the European theater. Only three of the four major airborne drops in Sicily could be rated as tactical successes, and none was satisfactory from a technical or operational viewpoint. Of 666 troop carrier sorties flown, 42 aircraft were destroyed, at least 34 (or 5 percent) of the by friendly naval and ground anti-aircraft fire, and only 40 percent of the 5,000 paratroopers dropped landed near their assigned drop zones.⁵

Investigations and analyses concluded, however, that airborne assaults were a viable tactical tool, provided they were centralized early planning and continued close coordination of air, naval, and ground forces; adequate safeguards to keep aircraft away from naval vessels; and better training for all units in recognition and fire discipline. The improvements generated by the unsuccessful drops on Sicily paved the way for larger and more successful airborne operations in Italy, Normandy, and southern France.⁶

SP

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See note two.

⁶ See note two.

March 25, 2002 7:56 AM

Dave 4-19

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Galileo

Please send a copy of this Galileo memo to the Vice President, Colin Powell, and George Tenet.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 SecDef memo to Dr. Rice [031802-42]

DHR:dh
032502-2



Please respond by 03/25/02

413.77

U12210 /02

03/25/02

11-L-0559/OSD/10347

March 18, 2002 12:53 PM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

This is clearly an interagency problem.

Would you please give me some sense of what you think we might do to deal with it? It is very serious.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/08/02 Schlesinger memo to SecDef re: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

DHR:dh
031802-42

*To Cols
UP*



cc: Gwen to De Rita

MEMORANDUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld
FROM: Jim Schlesinger
DATE: 8 Marcy 2002
SUBJ: Galileo and Possible Impact on GPS Military Signals

MAR 18 2002

Don:

You may recall that last winter I gave you spectrum charts indicating how we had failed to protect ourselves at the WOC-2000 (World Radiocommunications Conference). What the charts indicated was that we had agreed that (basically acquiescing in the French position) the Europeans could use for their prospective Galileo system the same frequency bands that we use for our own GPS system. I fear that the chickens may now be coming home to roost.

Last week (see attachment) Germany, which had been resisting going ahead with the Galileo system, switched positions. As of now, the likelihood that Galileo will proceed is quite high. The EU apparently does not intend to use the central frequency that we employ for the C/A code (the coarse acquisition signal), but apparently intends to use the side bands where our military signals lie—and thus could interfere with reception in some geographical site.

Two points!

1. It is regrettable that we did not use our time effectively—especially in the Clinton years when we had the best opportunity—to persuade the Europeans not to proceed with Galileo. It was my judgement and recommendation at the time that we establish a National Program Office and establish an advisory body within the Executive Office that would give the Europeans a feeling that at least they were being listened to. Otherwise, they would run along with their tendentious line that they could not trust the U.S. Department of Defense over the long term. It is possible that we still might recover the situation by renewing efforts along this line of approach.
2. If the Europeans do proceed with Galileo, we must persuade them to use GPS standards. That would allow us to avoid expensive augmentation and retrofits to deal with (different) Galileo signals. Indeed, if they use our signal structure, it could strengthen the GPS system. In the absence of interoperability, however, we would have to have receivers equipped to receive both signals—which could be confusing as well as expensive.

Memo to Donald Rumsfeld

-2-

8 March 2002

The Japanese plan to put several satellites in geosynchronous orbit—and to make use of GPS standards. We must press the Europeans to do the same, if indeed they go ahead with Galileo.

P. S. I have pressed these concerns with Frank Miller at the NSC. The charts showing the messy results at WOC-2000 are available.

SPACE NEWS Business Report

SPA
C O
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German Approval Paves Way For Galileo

By **PETER B. de SELDING**
 Space News Staff Writer
 posted: 05:20 pm ET, 28 February 2002

KOUROU, French Guiana — The German government's approval of Europe's proposed Galileo satellite navigation system all but ensures that European Union transport ministers will vote to proceed with the project at a March 26 meeting, according to European government and industry officials.

The upcoming vote is the final hurdle to the release of 1.1 billion euros (\$1 billion) to begin full-scale development of the system.

The German decision was announced Feb. 27 by German Transportation Minister Kurt Bodewig following the approval of the German government's cabinet, led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. In a statement issued after the announcement, the transport ministry said Galileo would improve the efficiency and safety of Europe's air, land and maritime transportation.

Germany is one of a half-dozen European Union (EU) governments that had been undecided about Galileo, a 30-satellite constellation that is designed to provide services similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System.

These governments, also including Britain, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, had voiced concerns during a December EU transport ministers meeting that Galileo, estimated to cost around 3.4 billion euros, would not attract enough private investors to help ease the burden on European taxpayers.

Some European government officials had said Germany, Britain and the other dissenters also were under pressure from the U.S. government to scuttle Galileo. U.S. government officials have denied that they are against the program, but have raised concerns that its backers — European research and transport ministers — have not paid sufficient attention to the system's security implications.

With Germany among them, the dissenting governments wielded enough power to block the program. With Germany's approval, however, the scales have tipped in favor of the pro-Galileo camp.

Felix Stenschke, a spokesman for the German Transport Ministry, said Feb. 28 that Germany's hesitation in December was due only to the fact that the EU Commission had not given member governments enough time to review a report on Galileo's financial and commercial aspects.

The report, by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, was generally favorable to Galileo and said it would generate four times its capital cost in economic activity in the EU. The report also said it could be difficult to win private-sector support for Galileo, at least at the project's early stage, because making a profit would take years.

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"We asked for time to review that report, and we have reviewed it and we approve the funding proposed by the European Commission," Stenschke said. "We have made our decision and it has been approved by the cabinet."

Stenschke said Germany's position is that Galileo must be funded by resources already at the disposal of an EU program called Trans-European Networks, and must not depend on supplemental funding by EU governments. "Even if the program suffers cost overruns, these added costs must be covered by the EU budgets and not national budgets," he said.

European Commission officials have said their entire Galileo development budget of 550 million euros has been set aside and will require no supplemental funding from EU governments. The European Space Agency also has approved 550 million euros in Galileo development.

Jean-Pol Poncelet, the European Space Agency's director of strategy, said in a Feb. 28 interview that the German government's decision was "a quantum leap" for Galileo.

"I imagine that the German decision will be followed by a strong consensus on the program when the transport ministers meet March 26," Poncelet said. "The British government, for example, informed us that, while it does not support Galileo, it would not want to be excluded from the program if it went forward."

The remaining funding of 2.3 billion euros needed to complete the Galileo system has not yet been secured. A combination of private and government funding is foreseen, with the exact proportion yet to be decided. The Galileo constellation is scheduled to be operational by 2008.

FUTURE SPACE

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March 25, 2002 9:06 AM

Done
All

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tape of "Political Oscars"

Done
25 March

Please give me a tape of Bruce Morton's "Political Oscars" that is being played on CNN. He takes political figures and gives them various Oscars.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-6

060

.....
Please respond by 04/02/02

2 Copies

Col B. - pls get an extra copy so we can see it.

25 MAR 02

March 25, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Fall Elections

Dave

Please give me a list of the members of the House and Senate who are not running for reelection.

Also, after the election is over in November, or if anyone loses in a primary, please let me know who the losers are on both sides, Republican and Democrat.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-7

Please respond by 04/12/02


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Response attached.

Jerry Di Rita

600.1

85 March

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March 26, 2002

ROLL CALL'S Departure List

House

Appointed to other office

Asa Hutchinson (R-Ark.), 51, 3 terms

Tony Hall (D-Ohio.), 60, 12 terms

Running for Governor

John Baldacci (D-Maine), 47, 4 terms

David Bonior (D-Mich.), 56, 13 terms

Tom Barrett (D-Wis.), 48, 5 terms

Bob Riley (R-Ala.), 57, 3 terms

Rod Blagojevich (D-Ill.), 45, 3 terms

Van Hilleary (R-Tenn.), 42, 4 terms

Bob Ehrlich (R-Md.), 44, 4 terms

Running for Senate

Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), 58, 4 terms

Greg Ganske (R-Iowa), 52, 4 terms

Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), 46, 4 terms

John Thune (R-S.D.), 40, 3 terms

John Sununu (R-N.H.), 37, 3 terms

John Cooksey (R-La.), 60, 3 terms

Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.), 53, four terms

Defeated in Primary

Gary Condit (D-Calif.), 53, 7 terms

Retiring

Senate

Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), 68, 4 terms **

Breaking News

Roll Call Daily

NEWS

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Norman Ornstein
Cartoons

POLITICS

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At the Races
ShopTalk
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Special Features

Departure List
Constituent
Services

William Coyne (D-Pa.), 65, 11 terms	Phil Gramm (R-Texas), 59, 3 terms
Dan Miller (R-Fla.), 59, 5 terms	Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), 80, 5 terms
Tim Roemer (D-Ind.), 44, 6 terms	Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), 98, 8 terms
Steve Horn (R-Calif.), 70, 5 terms	Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), 59, 2 terms
Marge Roukema (R-N.J.), 72, 11 terms	
Eva Clayton (D-N.C.), 67, 5 terms	
Bob Schaffer (R-Colo.), 39, 3 terms	
Dick Armev (R-Texas.), 61, 9 terms	
Wes Watkins (R-Okla.), 63, 10 terms	
*	
Joe Skeen (R-N.M.), 74, 11 terms	
James Hansen (R-Utah.), 69, 11 terms	
Sonny Callahan (R-Ala.), 69, 9 terms	
Robert Borksi (D-Pa.), 53, 10 terms	
Resigned to run for Governor	
Steve Largent (R-Okla.), 47, 4 terms	
Resigned	
Joe Scarborough (R-Fla.), 38, 4 terms	
Bud Shuster (R-Pa.), 70, 15 terms	
Defeated for other office	
Ken Bentsen (D-Texas), 42, 4 terms	
Died	
Julian Dixon (D-Calif.), 66, 12 terms	
Joe Moakley (D-Mass.), 74, 15 terms	
Floyd Spence (R-S.C.), 73, 16 terms	
Norman Sisisky (D-Va.), 73, 10 terms	

* nonconsecutive terms

** Senate term does not expire until 2004

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INFO
4-19

March 25, 2002 9:15 AM


TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gannett Speech

I just read your presentation to Gannett—it is excellent. Good for you!

I am going to steal the Churchill stuff.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-8



Please respond by _____

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25 Mar 02

U12213 /02

71
1530 - snowflake

March 25, 2002 9:15 AM

Done
7/19

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Gannett Speech

1.1.1.1
2.2.2.2

You may want to send Paul Wolfowitz's speech to Gannett around to some of the senior people.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-9

.....

Please respond by 01 12 02

4-1
COPY OF MEMO TO
SOME SENIOR PEOPLE
IS ATTACHED.

✓/R

350.001 DSI

25 MAR 02

U12214 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10358



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

March 29, 2002

TO: Senior Staff
FROM: *Torie Clarke*
SUBJECT: Wolfowitz Remarks
DATE: 3/29/02

Attached please find Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's recent remarks at Gannett/USA Today headquarters. As the Deputy correctly points out in his remarks, the Department of Defense has accomplished much in the early months of the war on terrorism. With humor and thoughtful historical perspective, he makes clear just how important the task is and how uniquely suited American are for the task. Please find time to read these remarks.

11-L-0559/OSD/10359



United States Department of Defense

Speech

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020309-depsecdef.html>

Media contact: media@defenselink.mil or (b)(6)

Public contact: public@defenselink.mil or (b)(6)

Gridiron Luncheon

Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Gannett/USA Today Headquarters, McLean, VA, Saturday, March 9, 2002.

Thank you, Doug [McCorkindale, Chairman of Gannett] I asked him at the reception how long he'd been with Gannett. He said, "Oh, back to the beginning of time." I said, "When was that? He said, "1971." I said, "I go back much further. I started reading the Ithaca Journal in 1954, [Laughter.] which was my hometown newspaper."

It's a pleasure to be here. It's a little intimidating to be filling in for the person you'd all most rather hear from, which is my boss, the Secretary of Defense, and it's particularly intimidating to fill in for someone whom even the President of the United States has been describing as a "matinee idol." [Laughter.] This is the early afternoon, but I'm not a matinee idol, whatever else I may be accused of.

I do want to extend Secretary Rumsfeld's personal greetings and sincere apologies. He would very much like to have been able to be with you today and at the dinner tonight, which he's also going to have to miss.

Since I'm filling in for him today, I decided I would ask him for a few pointers. I said, "It's obvious you handle the press pretty well. Is there anything you would suggest I keep in mind for this luncheon with a lot of news executives and reporters present?" He said, "Well, whatever you do don't try to be hard hitting, clever or witty like me." [Laughter.] "Just be yourself." [Laughter.]

Then warming to the subject he got this big toothy grin and his eyes crinkled a little and he said, "Well maybe you could be a little hard hitting. I think Sam Donaldson will be there. You know he's part of my demographic group." [Laughter.]

But he said, "You know, dealing with the media you should avoid getting into a quagmire." He said, "You can begin with an illogical premise and proceed perfectly logically to an illogical conclusion. After all, they do it all the time." [Laughter.] "And if you do it first," he said, "they'll be eviscerated." [Laughter.] That is a famous word that passed the lips of one of our Marine Corps lieutenant generals who had the Taliban eviscerated a few weeks ahead of their time.

I have a wonderful Marine who serves as my military assistant. He said, "Marines may not know what the word eviscerated means, but they sure know how to do it." [Laughter.]

So you see, I was getting a lot of good advice, but there is only one Don Rumsfeld. So I'm going to follow the advice of that other great American philosopher, Yogi Berra, who said, "If you can't imitate him, don't copy him." [Laughter.]

I've had some fun in my own Pentagon press briefings. There have been one or two. And I'm even told there's a grass roots movement, a write-in campaign, to bring me back to the podium. It's been led by the Johns Hopkins University Paleontology Club. [Laughter.]

Let me be a little more serious. I really would like to salute the members of America's free press. There is some interesting back and forth regularly between us and the press, but that's part of the job we do and it's something we wouldn't dream of changing about our system.

During this critical time in our nation's history, the men and women of the press, in very great measure, give all Americans objective and unbiased reporting. They work long hours and put themselves in harm's way to tell important stories. They help to keep us and the bureaucracies that work for us, or are supposed to work for us, honest. And one of the most important stories they are telling is the story about our brave men and women who serve this country so nobly and so well, and we appreciate everything that the media is doing to tell that story.

Those men and women are fighting bravely for us now, and the people who work for you covering the Pentagon tell me you'd like to hear something about the current campaign. So let me get to that and then I'd be happy, if there's a few minutes, to take some questions.

We're not quite sure whether to call this a campaign or a war. Sometimes we use one word, sometimes the other. It's a measure of the fact that this war is a unique war. It's unique in the way in which it began, with the largest attack on this country in our nation's history.

It's unique in the fact that we continue to fight abroad while there's a continuing threat of attack at home. And while sometimes we almost seem to have now taken for granted the fact that there have been no further attacks, successful ones, since September 11th, it's not because they aren't trying. It's not because Richard Reid didn't have explosives in those shoes of his. Or because any number of the people that we've been able to catch and detain weren't planning terrible acts of terrorism.

It's unique in that it's much more subtle and complex than a conventional war. It's unique in the speed with which it came together.

We are, in the Pentagon, not infrequently accused of being slow and clumsy and long to get even to the fight. Our critics like to point out that it took us six months to build up for Desert Storm ten years ago. It is striking against that comparison to note that General Franks got his instructions to begin planning a campaign in Afghanistan on September 20th. Believe me, there was nothing on the shelf to refer to. I can only imagine what would have happened if we had gone to the Congress last June and said, we have to have another \$10 billion in our defense budget to prepare to deploy forces to Karshi Khanabad, and they would have said, where is that? We would have said oh, it's in Uzbekistan. They'd have said, what do you need that for? We would have said, because we might have to go to war in Afghanistan. And I'm sure the answer would have been there's no limit to what you people in the Defense Department will do to justify increases in your budget. [Laughter.]

But General Franks got those instructions on September 20th. Twenty days later we were at war in Afghanistan with a plan that, I suppose, was also unique in the speed with which we were accused of getting bogged down and not succeeding, and equally the speed with which everybody then declared the war was over. All of that seemed to take place in the cycle of about six weeks, and yet here we are fighting the largest battle so far in that campaign in Afghanistan.

The war is very far from over. It's far from over in Afghanistan and Afghanistan is just one of 60 countries in which al Qaeda has burrowed in, not least of which is the United States of America.

I think it's unique, therefore, in the fact that this is a war that has to be fought by many means other than just military. As the President has said, "we have to use every resource at our command, every means of

diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and, finally, he got to us—and every necessary weapon of war for the destruction and the defeat of the global terror network."

You notice that the military means were the last in that list. General Hugh Shelton, who was our previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who retired at the end of September, was at the historic sessions at Camp David where the initial steps in our campaign were plotted out. He commented afterwards that, in his four years as Chairman, he had never been in a discussion where the use of military force was on the table where so much attention was given to all the other instruments of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, Treasury work, and on and on.

Talking about the current operation, if you will permit me, I'd like to share with you my favorite dispatch so far from the war. It's something that I have referred to a bit around town, so some of you may have heard it before. Indulge me.

It's a situation report from one of our brave men in Northern Afghanistan, and I think it will give you an appreciation not only for the bravery that our forces have been displaying since the beginning, but also how well they've adapted to the conditions of this first war of the 21st Century.

This comes from a Special Forces captain who was one of the first to be inserted into Afghanistan, less than a week after he arrived, with General Dostam's forces in Northern Afghanistan. He sent this dispatch back to General Franks.

"I am advising General Dostam on how best to employ light infantry and horse cavalry in the attack against tanks, mortars, artillery, personnel carriers and machine guns—a tactic which I thought had become outdated with the invention of the Gatling Gun. The Muj have done that every day we've been on the ground. They've attacked with ten rounds of ammunition per man and snipers having less than 100 rounds.

"We have witnessed the horse cavalry attacking Taliban strong points, the last several kilometers under mortar, artillery and sniper fire with little medical care if injured, but the Muj are doing very well with what they have. They have killed over 125 Taliban while losing only eight.

"We could not do what we have done without the close air support. Everywhere I go, the civilians and the Muj are always telling me they're glad the USA has come. They all speak of their hope for a better Afghanistan once the Taliban are gone.

"Better go now. General Dostam is finishing his phone call with a congressman back in the United States."
[Laughter.]

This from the same captain on November 10th after enormous successes in the space of just three weeks, less than three weeks.

"Departed position from which I spoke to you last night. We left on horse and linked up with the remainder of the element. I had a meeting with General Dostam and we then departed from our initial location and rode on begged, borrowed and confiscated transportation. While it was a rag-tag procession, the morale in Mazar-e-Sharif was triumphant. The locals greeted us loudly and thanked all Americans. Much waving, cheering and clapping."

This from an Army officer: "U.S. Navy and Air Force did a great job. I am very proud of my men who performed exceptionally well under very extreme conditions. I have witnessed heroism under fire by two U.S. non-commissioned officers -- one Army, one Air Force -- when we came under direct artillery fire last

might less than 50 meters from our position. When I ordered them to call close air support they did so immediately without flinching, even though they were under fire.

"As you know, one of our elements was nearly overrun four days ago but our people continued to call close air support and ensured that the Muj forces did not suffer defeat.

"These two examples are typical of the performance of your soldiers and airmen. Truly uncommon valor has been a common virtue."

In Afghanistan, indeed, we have seen a remarkable combination of bravery by U.S. Army and Air Force people, literally on horseback, a 19th Century capability, if it needs any pointing out, using satellite communications to call in strikes by B-52s, a 20th Century capability, but I point out a 50-year-old aircraft, together producing a truly 21st Century capability to transform the battlefield and transform the course of the war.

Some of you may recall that when a reporter asked Secretary Rumsfeld about what he had in mind by reintroducing the horse cavalry into modern warfare he said, "It's all part of our transformation plan." [Laughter.] And indeed it is, because transformation, which is our other big concern in the Pentagon these days, is not just about new systems. It's about using old systems in new ways.

A lot of you probably know that Donald Rumsfeld likes making lists and rules. He's made an interesting list based on his observations of the campaign so far about the concepts that he believes guided the campaign. I'd like to share a few items from that list now.

One of them that's been at the top of the list since the beginning is that this will be a long, hard and difficult campaign. I think a few weeks ago some people were beginning to doubt that, beginning to think that this war on terrorism was all but over. I think the recent phase of our campaign demonstrates that, even in Afghanistan, our work is far from finished and the risk to our forces is far from over.

As history has proven, including not so far from here at the battlefield of Gettysburg, half-defeated and desperate enemies can continue to pose considerable risks and dangers.

We've seen some of the fiercest fighting so far in rooting out hardcore al Qaeda members holed up in the remote mountains of Eastern Afghanistan. The Americans who have been killed in this present action speak vividly about the sacrifices and risks that our young men and women make every day in defense of freedom. They do it because, as the President has said, we want "to make sure that our country is safe from further attack."

It is as the President and Secretary Rumsfeld have been saying regularly, truly noble work, and we in the Defense Department deeply appreciate the sacrifices that our men and women are making and the risks they're taking on our country's behalf.

Clearly, there is still much work to do and it's work that extends beyond Afghanistan, beyond just one man, beyond just one terrorist network.

A second concept that Rumsfeld has emphasized from the beginning, the shortest version of it is his phrase, "We have to be leaning forward, not leaning back." If we go into a defensive crouch every time we take a casualty, it's an invitation for people to inflict casualties on us. We're going to lean forward. We're willing to put lives at risk. We're not going to rule out anything. That's been true from day one when the President said this isn't going to be just a cruise missile war, but that's going to continue as this campaign goes forward.

I'm going to skip over a few of these in the interests of time, but a third very important one has been the emphasis on the flexible nature of the coalitions we're putting together. We have assembled an extraordinary coalition. Indeed in Afghanistan today, a point that I think is not sufficiently appreciated, there are more coalition troops serving in Afghanistan, including and importantly in the peacekeeping force in Kabul, than there are Americans. In this fight in the mountains of Afghanistan, we have Special Forces from four or five coalition partners fighting in combat alongside Americans.

So we're not going alone on this. And beyond Afghanistan, we couldn't possibly do the work we need to do if we didn't get cooperation from those 60 countries, or at least some large fraction of those 60 countries where al Qaeda is present. Some of that cooperation may be military. An awful lot of it is in the intelligence and law enforcement fields.

But while coalition activity is crucial, this is very different from the grand coalition that was assembled ten years ago to deal with one specific problem in one specific place, i.e., the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The coalition we've had to assemble to deal with Afghanistan which has crucially, by the way, included countries with whom we had little, or in the case of Pakistan, no relationship in the past, is a different coalition from the coalition to address terrorism in Southeast Asia, for instance. What Secretary Rumsfeld has emphasized is that we have to have the mission determine the coalition, not the coalition determine the mission. If there's an important job to be done, we can't refuse or fail to do it because one or another particular partner disagrees with us. But we are getting a great deal of cooperation. Some of it is private and not public, and that is another key point in this assembling of coalitions. That we will let countries characterize themselves what cooperation they're giving us. We won't try to do it for them.

I think I'm losing count because I'm trying to abbreviate here. I believe fourth, and very importantly, our strategy in Afghanistan has been based not on the overwhelming use of American force, but rather on leveraging the great weakness of the Taliban, which is that they were a regime that ruled by force and terror. They terrorized their own people and gave al Qaeda a base from which to terrorize us and other countries.

We believe that's been our great strategic advantage, leveraging the hostility of the Afghan people toward their own rulers. It has allowed us to learn, I think, one of the lessons of history in Afghanistan; some people say it goes back to Alexander the Great, but it surely covers the British in the 19th Century and the Soviets in the 20th Century. That is, that any foreign army in Afghanistan is going to be viewed to some extent with suspicion. For that reason, we've emphasized from the beginning keeping a small footprint. We've emphasized that we're not there to stay, although we are going to see this thing not just through to the elimination of al Qaeda, but to help the Afghans construct a stable government afterwards and to help them reconstruct their country.

It's a striking fact that during the Olympics in Salt Lake City we had, in fact, more American troops deployed in Utah than we did in Afghanistan. I think being able to do that is part of being able to sustain the kind of long-term policy we need to have toward that country.

I suppose this is a useful transition to the last concept I'd like to emphasize and that is we are aware that this is much more than a military conflict. It is a battle for hearts and minds as well.

Of course in winning the battle for hearts and minds, it doesn't hurt to win on the ground. I think anyone who tracks the way the media, I would say particularly in the Muslim world, change, not as dramatically as we would like to have seen them change, but nevertheless change significantly after the fall of the Taliban and after the direct testimony from so many Afghans about what a relief it was to be rid of that regime, I

1
think we can see that there is a connection between victory on the ground and victory in that crucial battle for minds.

But it's also been a reason why, from day one of this operation, we have emphasized humanitarian operations. Our humanitarian operations now represent one of the largest, if not the largest, humanitarian assistance program in the history of warfare. We, between October 7th and December 21st of last year when we stopped the air deliveries, we delivered 2.4 million humanitarian daily rations or Meals Ready to Eat. Some of our soldiers question describing those as humanitarian because they've had to eat them. [Laughter.] But if you're a starving Afghan, it's been literally a gift from heaven. [We also delivered] 3.4 million pounds of wheat and some 328,000 blankets.

As a situation report I read earlier described, the Afghan people greeted the arrival of their liberators with joy and proved that barbarism does not kill the basic human desire for freedom. Even today our coalition partners, in particular the Jordanians, a rather small country with one of the largest coalition contributions in Afghanistan, has set up a field hospital in Mazar-e-Sharif that has already, I think, treated 18,000 Afghans, the majority of them women and children.

Let me take it beyond where we are today, and the last point I'd like to touch on is what I think is a very important challenge in front of us—to expand this alliance against terrorism, particularly in the Muslim world. I guess it was USA Today actually—to put a plug for our host here—that published that, sorry to say, appalling Gallup Poll that shows how much work we have to do in the Muslim world and particularly in the Arab world. But this fight against terrorism is not just the fight of the Western countries. It's the fight of everyone who aspires to peace and freedom throughout the world, and most emphatically in the Muslim world itself.

I had the privilege to be the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia for three years. That is the largest Moslem population of any country in the world. I know from that and from many contacts with Arabs and Turks and Iranians and Uzbeks, Bosnians, the list goes on, that the vast majority of the world's Muslims have no use for the extreme doctrines of the al Qaeda and the Taliban. To the contrary, they abhor terrorism and the way that the terrorists have not only hijacked airplanes, but also have attempted to hijack one of the world's great religions.

To win that war against terrorism, we have to reach out to the hundreds of millions of Muslims who believe in tolerance and moderation. They are on the front line of this struggle against terrorism. We not only have an obligation to help them, but by helping them to stand up against the terrorists -- and bear in mind it's a lot easier to stand here in Washington and make speeches against terrorists than it is to do so in any of these Muslim countries, even relatively modern ones like Indonesia. By helping them to stand up against terrorists, we help ourselves. And equally important, we help to lay the foundation for a better world when this war against terrorism has been won, because our goal has to be more than just defeating the terrorists and dismantling the terrorist networks.

As President Bush said in his State of the Union message, "We have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace. Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history with its centuries of learning and tolerance and progress. We have no intention of imposing our culture. America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror."

Let me mention a few of the people I think who have earned our support. No leader has taken greater risks in the struggle against terrorism than President Musharraf of Pakistan, and no country has more at stake in this fight. Pakistan's success will be a success for all of us in the fight against terrorism and Pakistan

deserves support from all of us.

Last month I was in Germany for the annual Wehrkunde Conference, and I made a point of telling our NATO allies that, in NATO, we have an important ally that is a model for the Muslim world's aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity. That ally, of course, is Turkey, and Turkey deserves our support and the support of our European allies. A Turkey that overcomes its present problems and continues the progress that Turkey has made over the course of the last century can become an example for the Muslim world, an example of the possibility of reconciling religious beliefs with modern secular democratic institutions.

Indonesia is another example of a nation struggling to build a democratic government based on a culture of tolerance, but it does so in the face of severe economic obstacles. If we are serious about opposing terrorism, we should also be serious about helping that country that has the largest Muslim population in the world in its quest for a stable democracy.

But our support should extend beyond governments to those brave men and women that President Bush spoke of. Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz, the son of the founder, the great King Abdulaziz, the founder of the Saudi dynasty, speaking of his own country and the Arab world said not long ago, "We need movement because the world is changing and the world around us is changing. Kuwait has elections. Qatar has communal elections. There's change in Bahrain, Oman, Yemen," and referring to his own country, "the system has to progress and evolve."

And our system has to evolve, too. Let me give you just one example.

Recently I asked for some information about leading liberal Islamic thinkers, who they are and what they're saying. I got a memo back that had some very promising and interesting information. It described in detail several Islamic thinkers who are arguing for freedom of thought, a democratic and humanist Islamic state, a modern liberal interpretation of the Koran. It was heartening to see such a good analysis. It was disheartening to see that it was several years old.

If the most recent memo we have on these brave advocates of freedom of thought dates back to the 1990s, one would think that someone made the decision that these people aren't very important. But they are terribly important, not just to the Arab world, but to us as well.

Fouad Ajami, one of our leading scholars of modern Islam in the Arab world, recently wrote in The New York Times about the sort of ideas that are now dominating portions of the Arab media through what he called "stridency and anti-Americanism." He concluded, "There's a war on the battlefield and that is America's to win. But the repair of the Arab political condition—and the weaning of the Arab world away from radicalism—is a burden and a task for the Arabs themselves. The only thing America can do is make sure it never gives this radicalism a helping hand."

So I would ask your help. The smarter we are about the moderate voices in the Arab world, the more effective we can be in helping them, in the President's words, "lead the world toward those values that will bring lasting peace."

We must follow and encourage moderates who are giving voice to the ideals that we value. They give learned encouragement to countries and Muslims who aspire to the benefits of free society and self-government.

I'd like to close with a remarkable observation by Winston Churchill, one that I've gone back to many times since September 11th. It's from his World War II memoirs, and it's his entry from December 8, 1941, upon

learning about the attack on Pearl Harbor and learning that the United States was into the war. It won't surprise you that he didn't waste a lot of sympathy on us. Indeed, his emotions were those of joy. He said, "I knew the United States now was in the war up to the neck. So we have won after all," Churchill said, four years before the war actually ended.

And he went on to talk about "silly people here in England [not just in Germany or in enemy countries] who," in his words, "discounted the force of the United States." "Some said the Americans were soft, others that they would never be united. They would fool around at a distance. They would never come to grips. They couldn't stand the bloodletting. Their democracy and system of recurrent elections, these people were saying, would paralyze the American war effort. They would be just a vague blur on the horizon to friend or foe. Now," these people said, "we would see the weakness of this numerous, remote, wealthy, and talkative people." We haven't changed much, have we? [Laughter.]

"But," Churchill said, "I have studied the American Civil War fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark which Edward Grey [the British Foreign Minister] had made to me more than 30 years before [as the United States entered the First World War]." Grey had said "that the United States is like 'a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate.'"

And part of that power indeed is the power of a free press and a government that responds to a free press, and I believe we have great partners in this venture going forward, and I thank you for what you're doing for our country. Thank you. [Applause]

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020309-depsecdef.html>

March 25, 2002 9:33 AM

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gilead

Dave

Terry Robbins tells me that Gilead gets 17 percent royalties from Roche Pharmaceutical Company on the sale of Tami-flu. I don't know if you were aware of that—I wasn't—but it is sold under the name of Roche, and because it was developed by Gilead, they get a royalty.

You might want to make sure your earlier memo is still valid.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-15

250

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

4/2
ORDER -
- Haynes response attached.
- We will promulgate ~~for~~ the Haynes memo to Immediate Staff

D. Rite

arry Di Rite
4/3

25 Mar 02



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

March 26, 2002 (7:40pm)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: *W. Hargrove*
~~Daniel J. Deit'Orto, Principal Deputy~~ General Counsel
SUBJECT: Gilead, Roche, and Tami-flu

4/4/02

- You advised on March 25th that Gilead receives a 17% royalty from Roche Pharmaceutical Company for sales of Tami-flu, and you asked if these facts alter my earlier advice to you.
- As a result of this relationship between Roche, a defense contractor, and Gilead, DoD may affect Gilead's financial interests even though DoD does not contract directly with Gilead. I previously advised you that, pursuant to the conflicts of interest statutes, you may not knowingly take official actions that will affect Gilead's financial interests. That advice remains valid and extends to matters involving Tami-flu.
- To prevent inadvertent involvement on your part, the General Counsel has signed a revised memorandum for your immediate staff to screen correspondence, memoranda, and decision papers and forward them to the Deputy Secretary without your involvement. I have added Roche Pharmaceutical Company to that memorandum.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment

Prepared by: Steve Epstein

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/10369



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

APR - 1 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR IMMEDIATE STAFF OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Potential Conflicts of Interest

Secretary Rumsfeld holds financial interests in the following companies that may do business with this Department. Please screen correspondence, memoranda, and decision papers that may affect the financial interests of these companies. Divert such matters to the Deputy Secretary. Please ensure they are not forwarded to the Secretary.

Wire One
Bruker AXS
Gilead Sciences, Inc.
Roche Pharmaceutical Company

If you have any questions, please contact Steve Epstein, Gail Mason, or Jeff Green of my office. They are prepared to provide immediate assistance and may be reached at

(b)(6)



William J. Haynes II

cc:
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense



11-L-0559/OSD/10370

3/26/02 snowflake
135

March 25, 2002 10:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tony Dolan

4-11 Done

Does Tony Dolan have any clearances at all? If not, why not?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-23

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

ESD.01

4/10
SecDef -
He has a
Top Secret clearance, as
of August 9, 2001
D. Rita

Sharon -
Pls check w Sgt
Montgomery
or whoever handles
This.
J

25 Apr 02

U12216 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10371

Arnold
#49

March 25, 2002 9:34 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Northern Command

I need a meeting with whoever on the Joint Staff is working on the Northern Command—or General Myers, Steve Cambone, or Gen. Kernan.

This idea of 450 people sounds nuts to me. I think it ought to be closer to 200. We have to limit what they are going to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-17

.....

Please respond by 4 08/02

NORTHERN

85/10102

U12217 /02

Action
117

March 25, 2002 10:54 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC

Let's get some BRAC supporter to put something in the Congressional Record on why BRAC is good and how the cities benefit from it.

323.3

Here is some material.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/12/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef, "Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Savings"
[U04647/02]

DHR:dh
032502-25



Please respond by 04/05/02

25 Mar 02

U12218 /02

MilCon

February 8, 2002 9:27 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC Savings

Please marshal a persuasive presentation as to the savings BRAC actually produces.

I am tired of having people say it is not so. It either is or isn't.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-3

.....
Please respond by 02/22/02

Henry -
PLEASE PREPARE THE REQUESTED PAPER. MAKE SURE YOU MAKE THE DEADLINE.

SECRET HAS BEEN 2/15
SecDef 2/16
3/16

Back me _____
Not yet _____

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/10374

Do you
want to be
separately briefed?
May be useful before your
next Testimony (May)
12.16.02

3/12
11:42 AM



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002, 4:00 PM

DEF HAS SEEN

MAR 25 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov Zakheim *[Signature]* MAR 13 2002

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Savings

- As you requested, we have prepared a short presentation on BRAC savings.
- The attached charts identify BRAC savings as reported by the Department, the methodology for calculating savings estimates, and issues raised with the reported savings.
- Audits and reviews by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office, the DoD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have all affirmed that BRAC savings are real and substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.
- The independent affirmation of the reported savings provides the most persuasive argument that BRAC savings are real.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Henry Sodano

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SF MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>



11-L-0559/OSD/10375

U04647 /02



BRAC Savings

March 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10376

Savings From Prior BRAC Round



- **Net BRAC Savings total \$15.5 billion over the implementation from FY 1990 to FY 2001**
- **Annual recurring savings after implementation are about \$**
- **Savings or Cost Avoidance are achieved primarily through**
 - **elimination or reduction of base support costs**
 - **elimination or reduction of military and civilian personnel**
 - **cancellation of military construction and family housing**

11-L-0559/OSD/10377

Calculation of BRAC Savings Estimates



- **Initial BRAC savings estimates were calculated using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model**
 - **Provided standard, analytical tool based on series of algorithms**
 - **Previous Defense Secretaries mandated use of COBRA by all Services**
- **Initial COBRA savings estimates have been updated to reflect BRAC implementation experience**
- **In preparation of the annual budget submission the Services are required to update savings estimates based on best projection of what savings will actually accrue**

Examples of BRAC Savings



- **Army - Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey**
 - **\$1.0 million annual recurring savings from reduced operating cost of 121 family housing units**
 - **One time savings of \$13.0 million for cancellation of dredging project**
 - **\$16.8 million of annual recurring savings for reduced operating and real property maintenance costs and the elimination of 175 civilian positions**
- **Navy - Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California**
 - **One time savings of \$12.9 million for cancellation of a Military Construction Project from FYDP**
 - **\$5.9 million of recurring savings for reducing operating cost of 834 family housing units**
 - **\$14.9 million of recurring savings for reduced base operations support costs and elimination of 2,871 civilian personnel**
- **Air Force - McClellan AFB, California**
 - **\$142.0 million of annual recurring saving for reduced operation and maintenance cost and elimination of 768 civilian personnel**

Independent Verification of BRAC Savings



- **Audit and review agencies affirm that BRAC savings are real and substantial**
 - **GAO report of July 2001 titled “Military Base Closure - DoD’s Updated Net Savings Estimates Remain Substantial” affirms the net savings are considerable and result in decreased funding requirements.**
 - **In July 1998, the Congressional Budget Office reported substantial BRAC savings, even though it found imprecision in DoD’s cost and savings estimates. CBO found that DoD’s annual recurring savings estimates were reasonable.**
 - **In May 1998, the DoD Inspector General found that BRAC savings were understated by as much as \$1.7 billion based on their review of more than 70 BRAC installations.**
 - **In July 1997, the Army Audit Agency concluded that savings would be substantial for the ten 1995 BRAC round sites it audited.**

Issues with Reported BRAC Savings



- **Net BRAC Savings are calculated by deducting the cost to implement closure actions from reported savings achieved through the elimination or reduction in operating costs and cancelled construction projects.**
- **BRAC savings could be viewed as greater than reported considering:**
 - **The majority of environmental restoration costs attributed to BRAC would have occurred regardless if the facility remained open.**
 - **BRAC savings do not account for capital investment that would have been required had the installation remained open.**
- **BRAC savings could be viewed as less than reported because BRAC costs do not include expenditures of over \$1.2 billion made by other federal agencies. These expenditures were made to assist communities impacted by BRAC.**

Projected Savings for BRAC 2005



- **The new round of base closure and realignment in 2005 is expected to save about \$6.5 billion annually after implementation based on a 20 to 25 percent reduction in infrastructure.**
- **The savings estimate is calculated based on the savings achieved in BRAC III and IV.**

Action
Complete
4/2

March 25, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Army Issues

200.2

Please have someone get back to me about this business of the Army taking "training holidays" for 3-day weekends.

Also, please tell me if there is something floating around about the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army's use of military aircraft.

ACTUALLY HAS TO DO WITH HOME TO WORK TRANSPORTATION
Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-51

DIRITA ✓

Please respond by _____

4/2

SECDEF -

U12219 /02

A REPORTER HAS MADE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST (DEL'ORTO) WORKING REGARDING THE APPROVAL FOR HOME TO WORK GROUND TRANSPORTATION FOR THE ARMY VICE CHIEF AFTER 11 SEPT. APPARENTLY NONE OF THE OTHER VICE CHIEFS NEED THIS. DEL'ORTO IS WORKING THE ISSUE
25 Mar 02

FL-0539/OSD/10383

U12219 /02
V/RE

snoflake

March 25, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Issues

Please have someone get back to me about this business of the Army taking "training holidays" for 3-day weekends. *See attached*


Also, please tell me if there is something floating around about the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army's use of military aircraft.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-51

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02




3/26

SECDEF-

RESPONSE ATTACHED.

*v/R
Ed*



11-L-0559/OSD/10385

To SecDef

Sir,

The Army allows installation and Major unit commanders to designate the 4th day of an already celebrated 3 day weekend to be a training holiday. For example, on the weekend of President's Day, when Monday is already a national holiday, the post commander can declare Friday a training holiday. This allows soldiers and their families to travel over the holiday weekends with less chance of accidents due to "pushing" the limits (driving while tired, driving thru the night, etc.). *(SINCE A LARGE % OF SOLDIERS AVERAGE AGE IS EARLY YOUNG)*.
 It has proven to be a great boost to morale w/out any significant loss of training time.

1/2 (C-13) 3/26

I AM NOT AWARE OF THE OTHER SERVICES SPONSORING "SERVICE-WIDE" PROGRAMS. UNIT COMMANDERS ARE AUTHORIZED TO GRANT UP TO 96 HRS. FOR "LIBERTY PURPOSES."

March 25, 2002 11:19 AM

Done 5/7

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Peggy Noonan's Article

381

Has anyone looked into this item Peggy Noonan talks about in this article? I had not seen her article. I must say, I was glad to have a chance to look at it.

Please let me know what we are doing to fix the websites of these places.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/22/02 Peggy Noonan, "A Message for Rumsfeld," *Wall Street Journal*

DHR:dh
032502-28



Please respond by 04/19/02



JSM

U12220 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10386



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PEGGY NOONAN

A Message for Rumsfeld

Our troops need straight talk on the meaning of service.

Friday, February 22, 2002
12:01 a.m. EST

On Wednesday Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld met with the troops at Nevada's Nellis Air Force Base to grip and grin, take questions and fill them in on the war so far. The troops were gathered photogenically in what CNN called the living and dining area of the base and what looked like a big cavernous hangar, which happened to have a jet parked in the background.

It was billed as a town-hall meeting with American airmen, and it reminded me of what Richard Brookhiser once said of presidential campaigns, that it's the outside story-- the public statements and



March 22, 2002
6:53am EST

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SECRET
3/21-

*A little dated.
Maybe you saw it
It's very good.*

D.R.t.

Larry Di Fitz

3/23

VIEWPOINT

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speeches, the things voters can see and are meant to see--that tends to be more interesting and important than the inside story of who said what at the meeting.

Mr. Rumsfeld's appearance gave rise to some thoughts, mostly about him.

He has of course, since Sept. 11, emerged as a singular presence in the war. At first it was startling: all that interestingness wrapped up in such blandness. Mr. Rumsfeld looks like the competent mayor of a midsize metropolis, or the savvy CEO of a midlevel company. Gray hair, gray suit, silver-rimmed glasses. He looked the other day like a beige and silver guy in a tired red tie.

And yet these days he seems, as leaders go, a natural. Much has been written about his skills, and though the amount of interest being paid to him is inevitable--he's a WASP wartime consigliere, an interesting thing in itself--a lot of it misses the point.

As a communicator he's clear as clean water. He seems ingenuous. He talks with his hands. He's thought it through and knows a lot and tells you what he knows. At first you sense his candor and clarity and enjoy it without realizing it. Then you realize you must be enjoying it because you're still listening. Then you sense that his candor and clarity are in the service of intelligence and clean intentions. You find yourself following what he says, following the logic and the argument. Which makes you ultimately lean toward following him.

He's Bushian, but he seems more interesting than George W. Bush, and not only because he is more experienced, an accomplished veteran of past governments. (He was first elected to the House 40 years ago; the first time he was Defense Secretary was in 1975, when he was the youngest ever.) He has a certain merriness, which is a good thing in a war leader when it is not a sign of idiocy, and it is a knowing merriness. Mr. Bush in contrast has comic, joshing moments, and Dick Cheney has genuine wit.

Mr. Rumsfeld, like Mr. Bush, uses plain words to say big things. He can use plain words because he isn't using words to hide. He can afford to be frank, and in any case it appears to be his natural impulse. He can afford to be frank because we are at war, and part of winning is going to be remembering that we're fighting, and why, which is not easy when there's so much on sale at the mall. Part of Mr. Rumsfeld's job is to tell the American fighting man and woman, and the American people who pay for the defense establishment, what is going on in the war, and how, and where, and why, and what the future holds. It's his job, in effect, to be blunt, to increase consciousness, and to enhance our determination while damping down pointless anxiety. It's a delicate dance, and yet he doesn't seem to be dancing.

When asked by an airman how long the war will last, Mr. Rumsfeld said that question is quite close to him because every morning when his wife wakes up she asks about Osama. "Don, where is he?" He tells the airmen, "There's no way to know how long. It's not days, weeks, months; it's years for sure."

Asked if the U.S. military will wind up occupying Afghanistan, he calls that "unlikely," but says the U.S. wants to help Afghanistan build and train its own army. He foresees "a military-to-military relationship."

It's clear when he speaks, and because it's clear you can follow it, and because you can follow it you consider following him.

This as we all know is not always the way with leaders. Usually people like secretaries of defense and secretaries of state and United Nations representatives say things like this: "We have to remember, Tim, that the infrastructure of the multinational coalition in conjunction with the multilateral leadership entities inevitably creates potential for a disjunction of views that requires cooperation, coordination and cohesion from member states."

Some of them talk like that because they're hopelessly stupid and are trying to hide it. Some of them are just boring. But a lot of leaders talk like this because they don't want to communicate clearly. They want instead to create a great cloud of words in which the listeners' attention and imagination will get lost.

They're not trying to break through with thought, they're trying to obfuscate. They are boring not by accident but by design. Because they don't want people to understand fully what they're doing. Because they know what they're doing won't work, or is wrongheaded, or confused, or cowardly, or cynical, or just another way to dither, or will more likely yield bad outcomes than good.

We should all try to keep this in mind when we watch "Meet the Press" and someone is being especially boring. Henry Kissinger once joked that the great thing about being famous is that when you're boring people think it's their fault. But it's almost never "their fault."

Anyway, instead of giving a dull, windy and dissembling answer when asked about the war coalition, Mr. Rumsfeld cut through to the heart of it. He said it exists to do a job, and the job, not the coalition, is what counts. "You have to let the mission determine the coalition, you don't let the coalition determine the mission."

So that's the key to Mr. Rumsfeld: candor and clarity plus specificity, and all of it within a context of a war that itself, so far, makes sense and is just.

Mr. Rumsfeld offered one answer that, while demonstrating a grasp of the question's many different layers, failed to capture something that

probably needs capturing.

Asked by an airman what the armed forces are going to do to retain experienced personnel, Mr. Rumsfeld spoke of pay raises, spare parts, morale--"every one of you has to know that you're needed." He said we need a military command that has enough imagination to see who's good at what and make sure they're assigned to it.

All good as far as it went--pay and parts and a psychological sense that one is noticed and appreciated are key, always. But so is something else that one senses has gone by the boards the past decade or so, and it has to do with the whole mysterious tangle of motivations that leads a man (or woman) to join up to defend his country. The thing that make him take as his job protecting the strangers who are sometimes ungrateful countrymen; the thing that tells him to put himself in harm's way and live the loneliness of the job; that tells him to risk his life so that my son and yours can sleep peacefully through the night. The whole mysterious tangle that leads them to join is also, in part, what leads them to stay. And to my mind it comes down to sissy words like love.

"Only love will make you walk through fire," it was said of the firemen of New York on Sept. 11; only love will make you enter that cave in Afghanistan, too. We just don't call it love. We call it a solid job and a good pension system.

The other day I got a letter from a guy in the army in Bosnia, telling me about his duty there and including an essay about the Christmas party the troops at his base threw for the badly damaged children in an orphanage west of Tuzla. Friends and relatives of the American troops had sent wonderful gifts for each of the hundred or so children; the children in turn had dressed up in paper party hats and put on angel wings and sung songs and recited poetry. When it was over, the American soldier thought of something his history teacher back home in Michigan had taught him. You cannot escape history, the teacher had said, for history is not what happens in books, history is what will happen to you.

The American thought of how history had smashed the lives of the children in the orphanage. And then he thought of how history, in the form of "the treasure and sweat of America's finest" had also given those same children a new chance "to grow in peace." It was American troops acting through history who had done that.

It was clear from what the soldier wrote that his spirit and intelligence were engaged not only in the fight in Bosnia but in protecting Bosnian children, and therefore Bosnia's future. What that knowledge did to his pride and sense of mission was obvious. He didn't use the word love--he is a soldier--but that's what he was writing about.

Last summer I went on a U.S. Army Web site, a recruiting site actually. I'd gone there because I wanted to write something about Medal of Honor citations, and I wanted to read them. I found to my surprise that when you go to a U.S. Army Web site what you mostly see is how much money they pay and how they'll put you through school. That's good and needed information, but there wasn't any of the deeper meaning of serving--no history of the U.S. Army, no Medal of Honor citations, no essays from



Bosnia. It was all slogans and salaries. It was all about pay. Which recruitment specialists apparently think is the prime motivator for joining up. Surely it's part of it, but it couldn't be all, and if it is we're in trouble. An army runs on its stomach, Napoleon famously said. But it fights with its heart and its spirit and soul.

Mr. Rumsfeld (U.S. Navy, 1954-57) seems the kind of leader who would appreciate this, and give it some thought. Maybe there are things that can be done to remind the world--and the members of the armed forces--who they really are, and have been, and can be. It may be in part a whole mysterious tangle, the motivation of the men and women who fight for us, but Mr. Rumsfeld better than most could probably see that it's addressed with clarity and candor.

Ms. Noonan is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal. Her new book, "When Character Was King: A Story of Ronald Reagan," is just out from Viking Penguin. You can buy it [here](#) at the OpinionJournal bookstore. Her column appears Fridays.

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March 25, 2002 3:58 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Concurrence/Non-concurrence

I think we ought to get some deadline dates on all the items the Joint Staff and you are working on.

In addition, I think we need to have an arrangement so when things move through the Joint Staff and your office, if a CINC non-concurs, I get told about it when the non-concurrence happens, rather than having it sit down there for one, two or three weeks without my being aware it is stopped.

Please give me your recommendation on how we should do this. Let's look at a new system.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-37

.....
Please respond by _____

312

25 March 02

U12221 /02

Action
4-19.

March 25, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Tracker

For the Defense Planning Guidance, please take a look at this memo I sent to Larry Di Rita on the Blue Tracker. I think we ought to think about doing that— what do you think?

320.2

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 SecDef memo re: Blue Tracker (031802-47)

DHR:dh
032502-39

.....

Please respond by 04100/02

25 MAR 02

U12222 /02

March 18, 2002 1:28 PM

Larry Di Rita

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen. Pace
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Blue Tracker

Should we insist that all four Services do Blue Tracker, to tell where the good guys are, to eliminate friendly fire deaths?

Thanks.

DJR:dh
031802-47



Please respond by 04/05/02

SECDEF HAS SEL

MAR 25 2002

3/21

SecDef - Will discuss with Steve. May be better just to issue guidance that requires each service to develop/acquire the procedure and let each determine the Technology that works best.

Larry Di Rita 3/21

Larry Di Rita

Action
4-19

March 25, 2002 1:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Reorganization

How much longer is it going to take for the DoD reorganization?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-46

.....

Please respond by 03/29/02

020 DoD

25 Mar 02

U12223 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10395

Action
4-19

March 25, 2002 1:56 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mac Thornberry

What do you think about Congressman Mac Thornberry as the Homeland Security person? He is awfully smart.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-44



Please respond by 04/05/02

384

25 Mar 02

U12224 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10396

032502-47

March 25, 2002 2:03 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Foreign Travel

Do we have a good follow-up system on the trips I take to see that we actually do the things I tell foreign leaders we are going to do?

333

Do we get all the thank you's out? Do we handle them well?

It's not clear to me. I never see any of it.

SD.

413

PROPOSED
NOTE TO
SD

VADM G.

FOLLOW UP FOR TRIPS
IS AGGRESSIVE, ALL
ACTIONS ARE TRACKED
BY MYSELF OR COL BUCCI.
ATTACHED IS AN INFORMAL
CHECKLIST WE USE. *v/r*

ATTACHED IS RECOMMENDED
LIST FOR TRIP FOLLOW UP
FROM COL BUCCI.

RECOMMEND TO SEND
THIS TO SD WITH HAND-
WRITTEN NOTE. ~~THAT LOOKS~~
~~LIKE THE ONE ATTACHED~~

v/r
J

SS
March

U12225 /02

March 25, 2002 2:03 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel

Do we have a good follow-up system on the trips I take to see that we actually do the things I tell foreign leaders we are going to do?

Do we get all the thank you's out? Do we handle them well?

It's not clear to me. I never see any of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-47



Please respond by 04/05/02

POST TRIP CHECKLIST

POLICY:

- POTUS Trip Report prepared for SecDef's review
- Reporting Cables for all bilateral meetings drafted for SecDef's review
- Official Thank You Notes to Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Cabinet Ministers visited are drafted for the Principals review

PROTOCOL:

- Gift giving/receiving report logged; appraisal process initiated/completed; report provided to SecDef; database updated

TRIP COORDINATORS:

- Gift giving/receiving report forwarded to Protocol with all gifts received
- A final updated detailed trip itinerary is provided to the SecDef Confidential Assistant for the historical files
- Provide list to writing team with the names of personnel who provided significant help for the administration of the trip for thank you letters signed by the Senior MA
- All trip materials are placed in a trip folder and filed as reference record
- Lessons Learned are written and placed in the internal Trip Coordination Office library
- Computer database updated to reflect major trip particulars (places visited, dates thereof, officials seen)
- Follow-up actions with Defense Attaché Office for fund citation adjustments

PERSONAL SECURITY:

- Prepare the travel claim for Principal and Senior Military Assistant

Action
Complete
4-3

March 25, 2002 2:05 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Input from CINCs on Foreign Travel

Don't you think we ought to ping every CINC every time I am going to travel to a country in their AOR and ask them for any issues they think I ought to deal with when I am in that particular country?

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-48

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

4/3

SECDEF-

THE SHORT ANSWER IS YES WE SHOULD PING ON THE CINC FOR HIS PERSONAL LIST OF ISSUES.

25 March


FEITH'S STAFF ALWAYS ASKS FOR CINC(STAFF) ISSUES AND PROVIDES THEM TO YOU. HE'LL BE MORE SPECIFIC ~~DIRECTIVE~~ IN THE FUTURE WITH HIS REQUESTS.

U12226 102V/R
11-L-0559/OSD/10400 *Ref*

Answer
4-15

March 25, 2002 2:16 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Rebuttal

Why don't you tell *The London Times* that their statement about changes announced to the rules for tribunals is utter nonsense? 

We didn't make any changes. Those were all speculation by a bunch of hyperventilating Europeans. We didn't change a dadburn thing. We just issued the rules for the first time.

015

Please send a letter to the editor and tell them that is just nonsense, saying we changed something.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032502-52



Please respond by 04/05/02

JS Mauer

U12227 /02

7:24 AM

Action
4-22

TO: Dave Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: March 26, 2002
SUBJECT: **Business As Usual**

It seems to me that if you are in a war, you stop doing some things.

For example, shouldn't we slow down the number of men and women in uniform who go to schools, education programs, various types of things like that? In a company if you've got a crisis, you deal with the crisis. You don't just act like it's "business as usual." What are the things that would fit in this category?

322

Thank you.

DHR/azn
032602.05

Please respond by: 4/1/02

26 Mar 02

U12228 /02

INFO
AZZ

March 27, 2002 8:56 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IC Priorities

350.07

We ought to have a "tickle" that shows we look at PDD-35 and intelligence community priorities at least every six months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032702-14

.....
Please respond by _____

27 Mar 02

U12229 /02

Snowflake

March 27, 2002 8:55 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Brief Prince Abdullah

Please keep a note that the next time I go to Saudi Arabia, I have to brief Prince Abdullah on relative military capabilities of Saudis, the U.S. and Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032702-13

.....
Please respond by _____

BRIEFED 4/29

Saudi Arabia

235102

U12230 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10404

ACTION
4-22

March 28, 2002 3:09 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Gen. Myers
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Contracting Force Protection

384

I want to put a full court press on this issue of being able to contract out force protection in the U.S., and probably elsewhere.

Powell, please work up a plan.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/26/02 GC info memo to SecDef re: Law on Force Protection

DHR:dh
032802-12



Please respond by 04/12/02

28 March 02

U12231 /02

March 21, 2002 12:07 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Law on Force Protection

I would like to get the law changed on the requirement that only the military can provide force protection and contractors cannot be used. That is crazy.

Let's get it fixed. Please tell me what I have to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032102-17

.....
Please respond by 04/19/02

3/26
Haynes response
attached.
3/27
D. Di Rita
Larry Di Rita

3/21
~~SECRET -~~
We are going to work the legislation again. It is in our legislative request. We got some things done in last year's bill that everyone said had been tried unsuccessfully several times, and the provision is in the same category. We need to organize for it and
n.d.t

11-L-0559/OSD/10406

3/26
174



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRET HAS BEEN

MAR 28 2002

INFO MEMO

March 26, 2002, 8:05AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes* 3/26/02

SUBJECT: Law on Force Protection

- You asked what is needed to change the current law (10 U.S.C. § 2465), which generally prohibits contracting out security guard services.
- The President's supplemental appropriations request, which has been submitted to Congress, includes proposed legislation that would allow the Department to contract out security guard functions (Part A).

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Helen Sullivan (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/10407

11 2490
snowflake

4-22

March 28, 2002 4:45 PM *DM*

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: *STEVE CAMBONE*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Funding Pot"

AGREE

381

Having our own funding pot for transformation is a terrible idea. Please see me about this media report.

It is just going to get the Congress up in arms, and with good reason, wondering what in the world we are doing.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/28/02 *Inside the Pentagon*, "Rumsfeld Team Wants to Create Own Funding Pot for 'Transformation'"

DHR:dh
032802-19

Please respond by 04/05/02

I have no idea where this came from.

Funding wedges ALWAYS get us in trouble.

Don Z. → SEE CAMBONE'S NOTE ATTACHED

28 Mar 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10408 U12232 /02 *DR*

4/2

03/30/02 2:43 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone 

SUBJECT: Funding Pot

I agree that a pot for transformation is a terrible idea.

The news story you cite is a result of reporting that confused two events last Saturday:

- The meetings between the three stars and me and then later on Saturday with you, and
- A separate discussion with the three stars by one of my staff.
 - ▶ He was looking at ways to address the “bow wave”
 - ▶ His thought was to ask what a Service would include in outyear funding if it received $\pm 20\%$ of the $\sim \$400$ B DOD budget projected for FY 2007.

The idea of a funding pot or “bishops fund” was not raised by my staff, but by one of the three stars.

I cannot account for motives of those who look to give accounts of private discussions to the press and then represent facts in the way described in the article.

11-L-0559/OSD/10409

run. The only change should be, put up roadblocks so they don't escape."

However, when air power was used it was devastating.

"Some of the bunkers that we came across that had been bombed out, some were completely destroyed. ... The bomb had landed practically directly on them, and it was just a big crater with scorched earth," Lt. Phillips said.

Added Sgt. Schiedeck: "Once we rolled in there, there wasn't much left. I mean, like we said, mangled metals and vehicles and just ordnance everywhere."

Lt. Phillips said the maze of caves and bunkers that pockmarked the 50-mile-by-50-mile Shah-e-Kot valley revealed an al Qaeda genius for designing defenses.

"One of the bunkers that we destroyed was 14 feet long and you could only see about 5 feet of it, but it was about 10 feet deep," the officer said. "And the bunkers were not just set up randomly, they were interlocked. Whoever designed the scheme for their defensive positions, they knew what they were doing, and they were well in place."

Washington Post
March 28, 2002
Pg. 6

8. Rumsfeld Reconsiders Arming Guard Troops At U.S. Borders

By Bradley Graham, Washington Post Staff Writer

Facing protests from senators, governors and National Guard commanders, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is reconsidering a decision to dispatch Guard troops to the borders with Canada and Mexico without their weapons, defense officials said yesterday.

An internal Army report from Forces Command, which oversees domestic troops, recommended last week that at least some of the 1,600 troops being deployed receive 9mm pistols, particularly soldiers along the Canadian border. The recommendation increased the likelihood that Rumsfeld will reverse the original plan.

Critics of the plan have charged the Bush administra-

tion with placing unarmed troops in potentially dangerous situations. Security for the Guard members is supposed to be provided by civilian agents of the Customs Service, Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Service, the same agencies that requested the federal troop assistance after the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.

Pentagon officials have worried that arming the soldiers would risk a deadly accident, like the 1997 shooting death of an 18-year-old goat herder on the Texas border with Mexico. The herder was shot by a Marine Corps corporal assisting in a counter-drug operation.

Defense officials argue that the duties involved this time — inspecting vehicles, directing traffic, providing administrative support — pose a low risk to troops. They also want to minimize any perception that U.S. borders are being militarized or that the Pentagon is assuming a greater law enforcement role than allowed under federal law.

From the start, the deployment has been problematic for the Pentagon. Within weeks of Sept. 11, the Pentagon received appeals for help in bolstering U.S. checkpoints while the civilian agencies normally responsible for policing the border recruited additional personnel.

Long reluctant to let federal troops be used for civil law enforcement missions, defense officials deliberated for weeks before agreeing last month to deploy Guard troops — and did so only with limits on the duration of the deployment and on the arming of the troops. They also insisted that the troops come under federal control rather than stay under the command of state governors.

The decision to ban weapons and federalize Guard members on border duty drew sharp objections from state governors and from the Adjutants General Association, which represents the top Guard commander in each state. On Capitol Hill, senators from border states led a campaign to get the Bush administration to undo the conditions.

"Guard forces need the flexibility to carry out the mission, including the ability to protect themselves in the event of danger," said a letter to President Bush last week signed by 58 senators. "These forces will be in battle dress uniforms, which will make them more of a target for an attacker or fleeing suspect."

In its review, Forces Command concluded that duty along the border with Canada posed a greater risk to Guard members than duty along the border with Mexico, because the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service maintain more agents on the southern border to deal with greater smuggling of contraband and illegal immigrants.

Army officials recommended giving pistols to 405 Guard soldiers at 72 northern ports of entry. But they said that no armed soldiers were needed at border crossings in California, Arizona and New Mexico and that only six armed Guard members were necessary in Texas to help secure three remote ports of entry at night.

With other senior defense officials still in line to review the matter, a Pentagon spokesman said he could provide no time frame for a final decision by Rumsfeld.

Other military officials said the arming of Guard soldiers on the border, if authorized, would require special training and additional cost. Care also must be taken, they said, to ensure that the rules for use of force by the soldiers conform with those issued to armed civilian agents at border stations.

"There are a lot more issues associated with arming than people realize," a senior Army officer said. "There's training, transporting the weapons and securing them. Also, the vast majority of infantrymen don't have experience with 9mm pistols. They're issued M-16 rifles, not handguns."

Inside The Pentagon
March 28, 2002
Pg. 1

9. Rumsfeld Team Wants To Create Own Funding Pot For 'Transformation'

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputies are putting together plans to create a special funding account, beginning in fiscal year 2004, that would remain at their disposal to underwrite "transformational" military efforts as such opportunities arise, according to Pentagon officials.

This so-called "bishop's fund" — believed by several senior civilian officials to be a key tool for rewarding innovation — has the potential to touch off a firestorm of criticism in Congress. Lawmakers have long rejected such discretionary spending mechanisms, fearful of issuing the Pentagon "blank checks" for use outside congressional control.

Like the Pentagon, Congress has talked much in recent years of redirecting defense dollars toward new ways of warfighting, emphasizing lighter and more lethal capabilities. But Cold War-era procurement programs — termed "legacy" efforts in defense jargon — continue to be funded, reflecting intense pressure from the defense industry to maintain jobs and profits associated with existing weapon systems, many insiders say.

At a meeting held last Saturday (March 23), top Pentagon civilians asked each of the services' three-star programming officers to provide a list of their transformational programs, describe the obstacles to transformation, and propose funding offsets for underwriting such efforts, defense officials tell Inside the Pentagon.

Rumsfeld and his team are pursuing these questions as they craft a new FY-04 Defense Planning Guidance, the first draft of which formally circulated last week in the Pentagon. The secretary traditionally uses the DPG to lay out priorities for the services to follow as they craft their portions of the budget request to be submitted to Congress early next year.

March 28, 2002 7:26 AM

Don 4-22

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: History

Please ask the Pentagon historian—I think his name is Dr. Goldberg—who the oldest person to serve as Secretary of Defense was and how old was he when he left. I was asked today by Brian Williams, and I didn't know. He was asking me when I would be the oldest person to serve, and I have no idea.

620 SD

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032802-5

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

28 MAR 02

U12234 /02

Snowflake

March 28, 2002 7:21 AM

Action
3-22

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weekly Meeting on Afghanistan

Done

Afghanistan

Please see me about having a weekly meeting on Afghanistan. I am getting concerned that it is drifting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032802-3

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

28 Mar 02

U12235 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10412

March 29, 2002 12:08 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone

CC: GEN. MUSEL
GEN. PACE

Done A-3

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Capabilities

381

We have to find ways so that when OSD and I look at proposals, we look less at what the Services and their stovepipes bring up to us, and more at what the CINCs look at in the world—namely, the capabilities the CINCs need to deal with the problems that could occur.

That calls for a robust PA&E.

I don't know what it means with respect to JROC or mechanisms in the Services or the Joint Staff that could contribute, but I don't see much of a contribution at this stage from any of them.

Why shouldn't we require that the Services, when they make presentations, discuss how they fit into the joint world from a CINC's perspective, rather than what they want?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032902-19

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

4/1

29 Mar 02

CAMBONE RESPONSE

ATTACHED.

U12236 102

11-L-0559/OSD/10413

V/R
SL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone *SC* APR 1 2002

SUBJECT: Capabilities

Your memo of 29 March stresses the need to look at Service proposals in a joint war-fighting context.

The briefings presented to you last week by the Services were intended to what you are asking for. I asked each Service, repeatedly, to present its brief in that fashion.

My aim was to identify those Service capabilities that are critical to future joint operations. Having identified them, we could require that priorities for funding be given to those Service capabilities.

The underlying problem is that there is no joint concept of operations. JFCOM is working on its Rapid Decisive Operations. The Joint Staff has Joint Vision 2020. But neither fills the bill.

PA&E can be helpful, but frankly the development of joint doctrine is not its job. It is a task that belongs to the military.

The CINCs are so near-term oriented that they will not make a contribution either. The JROC validates Service requirements. *(IF JROC DOES ITS JOB, IT REVIEWS/ APPROVES)*

* [You are on the right track in asking Gen. Pace to take this issue on. A creative proposal from him is needed to tie together JFCOM, the National War College, JROC, etc., with an admixture of OSD representatives. *FOR HOW A SYSTEM*

It is worth a Saturday morning's conversation to thrash this out. *FITS IN TO*

Cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)

A JOINT ARCHITECTURE

March 29, 2002 9:02 AM

A-22

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to *WSJ*

Done 3/5

You probably ought to get a letter to the editor of the *Wall Street Journal* on this Holbrooke article. Maybe you could do it under Paul Wolfowitz's signature.

AFghanistan

Thanks.

Attach.
Early Bird TOC

DHR:dh
032902-17

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

Rumsfeld

U12237 /02

ESPIONAGE

50. Cuban Spy Passed Polygraph At Least Once

(Miami Herald)....Tim Johnson

Even though confessed Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes already outwitted a lie-detector test, the government plans to rely on polygraph exams to check her honesty as they debrief her about her 16-year spying career while working for U.S. military intelligence.

BUSINESS

51. V-22 Ready For Renewed Flight Tests

(Fort Worth Star-Telegram)....Dave Montgomery

After a \$25 million inspection program, the troubled V-22 Osprey is "safe and operational" as it prepares to return to the skies for the first time since the Pentagon grounded it more than a year ago after two fatal crashes, its military project manager said Wednesday.

OPINION

52. Less Bang From The Pentagon's Bucks

(BusinessWeek online)....Stan Crock

Just a few big programs are sucking up the entire weapons' budget. Long term, that's bad news for contractors -- and investors.

53. The Burden On Bush And Blair

(Washington Post)....David Ignatius

The fog of words surrounding Iraq should begin to clear a bit next week when British Prime Minister Tony Blair visits America, carrying with him detailed intelligence about Saddam Hussein's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.

54. Colombia's Anti-Terrorist Efforts Deserve U.S. Help

(Wall Street Journal)....Mary Anastasia O'Grady

...Yet when Colombia asks the U.S. to share satellite intelligence about guerrilla activity and to help train its military personnel, a hypocritical Congress wings its hands about U.S. "involvement." Unless the U.S. comes to understand the dynamics of Colombian terrorism, including its own role in it, things will only get worse.

55. Send An American-Led Force To The Mideast

(International Herald Tribune)....Yossi Sarid

On the eve of the second mission to the Middle East by the U.S. special envoy, General Anthony Zinni, Israelis estimated that his chances for success were either slim or none.

56. Japan Must Enhance Vital Security Ties To The U.S.

(International Herald Tribune)....Robyn Lim

For more than 50 years, the United States has provided Japan with nuclear and maritime protection in exchange for bases that allow Washington to project power across the vast Pacific Ocean.

57. Peacekeeping Saves Cents, Makes Sense

(National Journal)....George C. Wilson

Just because President Clinton did it doesn't mean that peacekeeping is bad.

58. Long-Term Dangers In Afghanistan -- (Letter)

(Wall Street Journal)....Richard Holbrooke

...This is especially true in light of the astonishingly wrong-headed decision, announced by the Pentagon last week, not to allow the international peacekeeping force (which has no Americans in it) to grow in size or expand beyond Kabul -- a decision that risks returning much of Afghanistan to a safe area for warlords and drug lords (often the same people) and terrorists, who will rebuild their terror networks in the caves and mountains again after the fighting ends.

59. No Apologies Needed For Eternal Vigilance -- (Letter)

(Wall Street Journal)....Roger Pilon

Fortunately, the Pentagon's recent regulations for military tribunals pay due respect, for the most part, to the process that is due suspected terrorists under present circumstances.

March 29, 2002 9:23 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Capabilities in Guard and Reserves

I don't understand why we allowed the Army to put all of one or two capabilities in the Guard and Reserves, so that no matter what we do, we have to activate people. That makes no sense.

326

Why don't we get that reviewed?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032902-20

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

3/29

SECDEF -
THE SHORT ANSWER IS THAT
ARMY LEADERSHIP DID THIS PURPOSEFULLY
AS A RESULT OF OUR EXPERIENCE
IN VIETNAM I.E. THE COUNTRY +
THE CONGRESS NEEDED TO BE
BEHIND US ANY WAR EFFORT. *v/red*
11-L-05 *110238* 04/11/02

27mar02

ACTION
4-22

March 29, 2002 7:29 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: LCDR Speicher

Who is the person I am going to hold accountable for managing the LCDR Speicher activity?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032902-4

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

704

LARRY - I REC.
YOU MAKE
IT LUTTI

29 March

U12239 /02

March 29, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Briefing House and Senate

I think you need to keep me going up to brief the House and Senate, and not let that drift too long.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032902-8

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

SECDEF 410

APR 11 2002
3/29

SecDef -

Will do. They are in recess until April 8, and have been all week. D. Rita

p.s. - We're looking at significant Congressional contact during the period from April 8 to the

U12240 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10419/Memorial Day recess

032

29 MAR 02

1



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

2002 JUL 31 PM 1:24

INFO MEMO

EF2221C # 264 7/27

USDP *[Signature]*

JUL 22 2002

I-02/010753

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J. D. Crouch II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Replacement of John Gordon at the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)

- I am responding to your memo on Chris William's suggestion for a replacement for John Gordon as director of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
- His replacement is critical to revitalizing the nuclear weapon program and implementing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
- I recommend the following candidates:
 - Johnnie Foster, former Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
 - Admiral Rich Mies, USN (Ret)
 - Paul Robinson, President of Sandia Laboratory

11-L-0559/OSD/10420

02-02-02 5:33:11 PM
U12324 /02

NNSA Administrator Candidates
(Listed Alphabetically)

Everett Beckner
Linton Brooks
Roger Hagengruber
Richard W. Mies
Pete Nanos
Paul Robinson
Stephen M. Younger

July 15, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons

Here is a memo from Chris Williams. Please see that it gets into the hands of the right people.

Please gather a good list of possibilities.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/02/02 Williams memo to SecDef re: Nuclear Weapons Matters

DHR:dh
071502-20

.....
Please respond by 08/09/02

7/31
→ SecDef -
I have the
recommended names.
Aldridge has given me
some, too. I have
shared with Chy Johnson staff.
D. K. K.

7
6
16

July 2, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 15 2002

MEMO FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *Williams*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Matters

Sir:

Attached is a copy of a memo I sent recently to NNSA Administrator John Gordon regarding the annual nuclear weapons certification process. I thought you might be interested in my observations and suggestions.

Also on nuclear matters, given John's move over to the White House staff, serious attention needs to be given to identifying an appropriate replacement. In this regard, I recommend you and the President consider Johnnie Foster. As you know, Johnnie is well respected among the nuclear experts, and has a sterling reputation on Capitol Hill. I would hope he could be convinced to come back into Government service, given the important issues at stake.

I hope this note finds you in good health and high spirits. Keep up the great work.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of service to you or the Department. Best regards.

Attachment

Copy to: USD(AT'L) ASD/ISP
(enclosure only)
Larry Di Rita
7/9
(Di Rita 7/9)

11-L-0559/OSD/10423

July 15, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons

Here is a memo from Chris Williams. Please see that it gets into the hands of the right people.

Please gather a good list of possibilities.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/02/02 Williams memo to SecDef re: Nuclear Weapons Matters

DHR:dh
071502-20

.....
Please respond by 08/09/02

7/31
→ SecDef -
I have the

recommended names.
Aldridge has given me
some, too. I have
shared with Chy Johnson staff.
D. Rumsfeld

11-L-0559/OSD/10424

U12326 /02

A-49161

1550102

76
1650

July 2, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 15 2002

MEMO FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *MA*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Matters

Sir:

Attached is a copy of a memo I sent recently to NNSA Administrator John Gordon regarding the annual nuclear weapons certification process. I thought you might be interested in my observations and suggestions.

Also on nuclear matters, given John's move over to the White House staff, serious attention needs to be given to identifying an appropriate replacement. In this regard, I recommend you and the President consider Johnnie Foster. As you know, Johnnie is well respected among the nuclear experts, and has a sterling reputation on Capitol Hill. I would hope he could be convinced to come back into Government service, given the important issues at stake.

I hope this note finds you in good health and high spirits. Keep up the great work.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of service to you or the Department. Best regards.

Attachment

Copy to: USD(AT&L) ASD/ISP
(enclosure only)
Larry Di Rita
7/9
Done 7/9

EF2068

02/009896-USOP

June 28, 2002 5:52 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Radio

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten: FSI/NSA 31/ECM]

The Vice President raised the question about using Commando Solo to beam into the Palestinian people. Are you going to get the Deputies Committee going on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-15

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

[Handwritten: 7/31 response attached]

28JUN02

JUN 28 12:40

JUN 28 13:49

JUL - 2
ga

EF2066

02/009900 - USDP

July 1, 2002 9:14 AM

ISIA/ NESA
Action

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Syria and Lebanon

S
Y
R
I
A

We might want to think about putting some heat on Syria for not pulling out of Lebanon.

Thanks.

DJR:dh
070102-10

.....
Please respond by 08/10/02

7/31

Response attached
Draft memo to
Cond 1 at Tab.

15U102

07-07-02 11:15 AM

JUL 2 02 12:59

11-L-0559/OSD/10427

U12332 /02

EF2007

02/009898

July 1, 2002 7:49 AM

gm

ISIA / NESI Action

SYRIA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Syria and Lebanon

DR

TAIF

There is a treaty, called Tafia I think, where the Syrians agreed with all the Arab countries that they would pull out of Lebanon. They are violating it to this very day.

Please prepare a paper on what Syria is doing to Lebanon, and make a case as to how in the world they could end up having the chairmanship at the UN Security Council. How can the rest of the world sit there and allow that to happen while Syria is testing chemical and biological weapons? It is just outrageous.

Thanks.

DHR dh
070102-2

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

7/31
Draft memo to Cond.
Attached.
DHR

15Jul02

June 24, 2002 4:01 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

Larry Di Rita

7/30/02

SUBJECT: Ranks of Staffs

210 (344)

Why are the staffs of the Services and the Joint Staff different ranks in the same positions? Some are two-stars and some are three-stars, and they vary from Service to Service. I am curious to know why that is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062402-50

.....
Please respond by *07/26/02*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 1 2002

CTCS Response attached.

SPB

7/30

7/31

BY SANCZ



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET

2002 AUG -1 PM 2:31

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2001, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) *DZ*

FROM: Tina W. Jonas, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management) *TWJ 7/31/02*

SUBJECT: Way Ahead

- Secretary Cheney and Deputy Secretary Atwood used the budget process to make and enforce management decisions. This is known as the Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) process. The value comes from tying the management decisions to the allocation of funds.
- If you agree, the DMRD process could begin this Fall as part of the program and budget review. Issue papers would focus on business operations and management. The Comptroller and the SEC Executive Secretary would develop and coordinate the issue papers for consideration and decision by the SEC.
- This method was used successfully in 1990 to combine all of the Services' finance and accounting activities into a single entity (Defense Finance and Accounting Service). Prior to 1991, DoD spent about \$3.1 billion for finance and accounting. Using a DMRD, the activities were consolidated and costs reduced by \$1.9 billion between 1993 and 1999. An example for this year might be the Defense agency realignments that the SEC is working on for you to consider. Major accomplishments could be highlighted in the President's Budget.

U12397-02

11-L-0559/OSD/10430

- We have a new Deputy Chief Financial Officer (DCFO), JoAnn Boutelle, on board. She is validating the organization and will be building a professional accounting service organization in the ODCFO. One change she is making to the ODCFO is to add an analysis group to develop useful managerial reporting and financial analysis for senior leadership.
- Using existing financial data, the analysis team will extract, analyze and translate information on quarterly basis to provide you and the SEC with relevant management information (e.g., trend analysis on key financial performance indicators).
- If we move quickly, information on our financial performance could be highlighted in the President's Budget.

COORDINATION: Ken Krieg

Prepared By: JoAnn Boutelle

(b)(6)

July 1, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: DW ZAKHEIM
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Way Ahead

Thanks for your note on "Points for the Secretary." What do you propose we do?
I would be curious to know if you have a specific proposal for next steps and the way ahead.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Jonas paper, "Points for the Secretary"

DHR:dh
070102-46

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

gr...
DHR:dh

Points for the Secretary

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 01 2002

- The budget process should be used to establish and reward good business practices.
- We should consider reestablishing the Defense Management Reform Decision (DMRD) process to "institutionalize" and effect business transformation much like the Program Budget Decision (PBD) process. The DMRD process was started and used effectively by former Secretary Cheney to bring about change.
- The Senior Executive Council could serve as the final approval authority for these decisions.
- OSD does not have professionals skilled in managerial accounting. To provide value to the Secretary, we need a team of professionals who can analyze our financial data so that it tells him something about how well the business is operating -- not simply how fast we are consuming vast amounts of money.
- It will take years to bring along the career service. We should consider establishing a business review team, made up of outside experts or consultants to provide this expertise now.
- This business review team would pull what they can from our reports and provide a quarterly managerial report for the secretary and the top leadership (e.g., SEC).

Prepared by: Tina Jonas,

(b)(6)

July 1, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: DW ZAKHEIM
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Way Ahead

Thanks for your note on "Points for the Secretary." What do you propose we do? I would be curious to know if you have a specific proposal for next steps and the way ahead.

100.5

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated Jonas paper, "Points for the Secretary"

DHR:dh
070102-46

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

150102

Points for the Secretary

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 01 2002

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Prepared by: Tina Jonas,

(b)(6)



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

RECEIVED
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

2002 AUG -1 PM 5:09

INFO MEMO

August 1, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Defense Reform: Defense Health Program (DHP) Claims Processing Costs

- You sent me a note which indicates that the Defense Health Program (TRICARE) pays \$8 per claim rather than Medicare's \$1 and asked what we could do to fix this (TAB A).
- TRICARE does use industry standard codes to process claims. However, TRICARE costs are higher because TRICARE offers three different benefit packages with a complex system of authorizations and referrals and reimbursement rates. TRICARE claims processing costs are in fact similar to private insurers' claims, which cost between \$6 to \$10 per claim. Additionally, TRICARE requires military-unique data to be submitted for processed claims; this requirement increases claims costs.
- The \$1 cited for Medicare claims includes only the cost of processing the actual claim for the single Medicare benefit. The cost of processing Medicare managed care claims is about \$5 per claim.
- Nevertheless, we can still initiate improvements to reduce TRICARE claims processing costs. These include:
 - Increase electronic claims – Current electronic submission rates for TRICARE are 20 percent (excluding pharmacy and TRICARE for Life claims) compared with the industry standard of 65 percent.
 - Increase auto-adjudication of claims (as opposed to manual) – TRICARE auto-adjudication rates are below 50 percent.

70.

1 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10436

U12424 / 02

- Reduce claim inquiry rates – TRICARE inquiry rates are four times higher than Medicare.
- The Department is now implementing two approaches to reducing TRICARE claims processing costs.
 - First, the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) will be processing claims for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries separately from regular TRICARE claims, making these claims easier to process and resulting in lower cost per claim.
 - Second, TMA is developing initiatives to increase electronic claim submission and improve provider and beneficiary education. These initiatives, along with the development of future managed care support contracts using industry best business practices and less military unique requirements, should result in the necessary improvements and reduce TRICARE claims processing costs.

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans,

(b)(6)

TAB

A

Received 6/26 0945

June 25, 2002 8:50 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Health Reform

Please take a look at the attached note and tell me what we can do to fix it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

6/26

DHR:dh
062502-22

Sir,

Tashed to P/B to

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

coordinate response with

P&R. suspense ~~7/26~~

U/R
ster

There is a significant opportunity to conduct the DoD's administrative transactions more efficiently. They currently pay around \$8.00 per claim, because they don't use industry standard codes. (Medicare is the industry standard which the private sector adopted.) Claims costs are more commonly in the \$1.

TAB

B

COORDINATION PAGE

Subject: Defense Reform: Defense Health Program (DHP) Claims Processing Costs

USD(P&R)

Dr. David C. Chu

29 July 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10442

June 17, 2002 11:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen. Myers
 Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Four-Star Annual Meeting

337

Please take a look at this memo from Newt Gingrich and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/16/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: A Proposed Twice a Year Four-Star SecDef Meeting

DHR:ch
061702-13

.....

Please respond by 07/19/02

17 Jun 02

U12443 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10443

Tab

02 JUN 19 08:27 AM

From: Newt Gingrich

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 17 2002

From: (b)(6)@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, June 16, 2002 10:50 AM

To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;

Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; art.cebrowski@osd.pentagon.mil

Subject: a Joint four star gathering

for secdef, depsecdef
 from newt 6/16/2002
 a proposed twice a year four star-secdef meeting

General Jumper and Secretary Roche invited Herb Kelleher of Southwest Airlines me to an Air Force Corona with all the four and three star Air Force officers and a pretty good number of Major Generals. Our job was to kickoff a discussion of transformation as it related to the Air Force. We had a very lively discussion.

It occurred to me that the Secretary of Defense should host all the four stars in a joint deliberation twice a year.

This should be a two dinner and two day event with serious staff preparation but with only secdef, depsecdef, the top two aides to secdef and top two aides to depsecdef and one recording secretary present in addition to the four stars.

The first evening would be a social dinner to rebond. The first morning would then be devoted to a walk around the room with each person reporting on current concerns and current needs in an unconstrained and uncontested manner. Questions would be for the purpose of clarity.

If necessary the "listening" phase would be extended as long as necessary to give everyone a chance to tell secdef and depsecdef and others what they need to know. The Supreme Court system might be used in which the most junior four star would go first and the most senior last. Reporting should NOT be by service.

After the initial listening phase a series of topics picked thirty days earlier by secdef and depsecdef in consultation with the Chairman and Vice Chairman would be presented by smart lieutenant colonels and majors on a joint basis. When essential a civilian analyst could be used but the goal here would be to highlight some bright future potential generals and to begin to send the signal that having ideas is a good thing. The presenters would be encouraged to pull no punches and to be risk taking and provocative in outlining options or capabilities.

The second evening should have either the President, Vice President, National Security Adviser, Secretary of State or DCI deliver a talk and then take questions. The goal here is to create a "national security" rather than merely "defense" awareness and having all the key military decision makers in one meeting is a good venue for the senior civilian leadership to meet with. On Occasion you might ask the

6/17/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10444

Speaker of the House or Majority Leader of the Senate to be the dinner guest to again increase the dialogue and bring in a diversity of opinion (this would also be a good way to help educate them).

The second day would begin with a sophisticated decision system (one exists at the School of Information Warfare at NDU which allows some thirty people to simultaneously post their views anonymously on a large screen). The first half of this day should be agreeing on the top five to ten issues and challenges which faces the national security system (not just DOD)

After lunch the Secretary should summarize what has been learned, what needs to be focused on until the next meeting six months later and what his expectations are of the four star "joint team" which has to carry on the simultaneous duties of defending America and transforming the national security system.

One week after the meeting a written version of the Secretary's expectations and intentions should go out to the four stars.

Optionally you might include the three service secretaries but I would be resistant to any civilians beyond that.

If you launched this late this year and established a twice a year rhythm you would probably create the first joint senior military activity that brought the most powerful and most service oriented leaders beyond their normal patterns. This could become a permanent instrument for the Secretary to influence the four stars and the four stars to jointly communicate with the secretary. It would block future secretaries from isolating themselves from the military and draw senior military out of their single service mode.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 AUG -2 AM 11:46

INFO MEMO

CM-426-02
1 August 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Cost of Commands

- The following information is provided in response to your concern (TAB) that the combatant commanders may be asking to increase their staffs based on the Unified Command Plan (UCP) implementation.
- My staff and the combatant commands are leading the following efforts to stay within end strength constraints:
 - USJFCOM completed a bottom-up-review based on UCP 02. OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services, in concert with USJFCOM, are currently reviewing the results. The evaluation should be completed by the end of August and I will forward the findings.
 - The ongoing USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM merger study is defining organization, size, constructs and other details. As the new command transitions from initial operational capability (IOC) to a full operational capability (FOC) steady state, sizable savings are anticipated.
 - Joint Staff and combatant command initial reductions were used to offset USNORTHCOM IOC requirements. Subsequent cuts will be used to source remaining USNORTHCOM and subordinate activities' FOC requirements.
- Some short-term temporary relief for USCENTCOM and USSOCOM, which are actively engaged in the war on terrorism, will be necessary.
- This issue will be an agenda item at the next combatant commanders' conference.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment
As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Maria I. Cribbs, USAF; Director for Manpower and Personnel;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10446

U12452 /02

July 15, 2002 9:46 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Doug Feith
SecDef "CINC" File
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Cost of Commands

As we implement the Unified Command Plan, I see no reason in the world why we should have to add any more people or any more cost to our commands. Indeed, we ought to be reducing.

If people come in with new requirements based on the UCP, we should go right back to them immediately and tell them they better come in with equal or greater offsetting cuts. In fact, we ought to bring it up at the next CINC meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-17

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/10447

July 15, 2002 9:46 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Doug Feith
SecDef "CINC" File

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cost of Commands

As we implement the Unified Command Plan, I see no reason in the world why we should have to add any more people or any more cost to our commands. Indeed, we ought to be reducing.

If people come in with new requirements based on the UCP, we should go right back to them immediately and tell them they better come in with equal or greater offsetting cuts. In fact, we ought to bring it up at the next CINC meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-17

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

U12454 /02

Tab



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

SECRET
2002 AUG -2 11 1:12

August 2, 2002 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, USD(AT&L) *E.C. Aldridge 8/2/02*

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

322

- Recommend disapproval of the Army's request to relocate USARSO from Ft. Buchanan, PR to leased space on Ft. Sam Houston, TX no later than the summer of 2003 (TAB A). Congress required the Army to send its relocation study to them by July 23, 2002 (TAB B). Preliminary information indicates that the proposed move may lawfully proceed prior to BRAC 2005 (TAB C).
- The Army asserts that deteriorating work and living conditions caused 40% of the civilian work force to leave, raising significant readiness issues and necessitating an urgent move. Actions to stabilize the workforce and improve living and working conditions in place (e.g., increasing variable location pay and housing allowances, and other quality of life enhancements) need to be explored further by the Army/OSD.
- The Army analysis eliminated 12 of 14 alternative CONUS locations based on three screening criteria (TAB D). Ft. McPherson (FMP) and Ft. Sam Houston (FSH) survived initial screening. The Army selected FSH because it asserts that the net present value of 20 year costs at FSH is less than at FMP. In addition to facility costs, relocation costs are \$57.8M. Annual recurring savings are \$13M. With a payback period in excess of 4 years, relocation costs will not be recovered before consideration under BRAC.
- USD(P&R) nonconcurrency (TAB E) states that the proposal does not reflect the Secretary's desire for a plan that would enhance joint operations, reduce headquarters in a transformational manner or comport with the decision made at the Service Chief Tank on June 10, 2002, to make SOUTHCOM a test bed for implementation of an organizational model to increase jointness, thereby eliminating the need for USARSO.

RECOMMENDATION: Disapprove the proposed relocation at this time and direct the Army, USD(P&R), USD(AT&L), and SOUTHCOM to refine the analysis and develop further options by 15 September 2002 that support the decision to make SOUTHCOM a test bed for organizational transformation. In this regard, determine what elements of USARSO need to be retained, reorganized and relocated and when and to where to achieve elimination of the Army component command but operate as Army operations, planning and force provider to SOUTHCOM.

2 AUG 02

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>8/2/02</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/10449

U12463-02
U12463-02

02

COORDINATION: USD(P&R), GC at TAB E.

Attachments

As stated

Prepared by: Steven Kleiman, ODUSD(I&E)/IRM (b)(6) August 1, 2002 4416-2002

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Other _____



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

2002 JUL 25 08 28 36

ACTION MEMO



July 25, 2002, 1030 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Tom White*
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JUL 25 2002

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

The Commander, USARSO, requested last year that his headquarters be moved from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to the continental United States because of severely declining readiness issues. I concur and request your approval to move the command to Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, in FY2003.

The proposed move has generated congressional interest and a requirement for a report to Congress on the USARSO relocation study. The report with Executive Summary is at Tab A. I request your concurrence in its immediate release.

The following information applies:

- The Headquarters, USARSO comprises 50% civilians. Forty percent of the civilians from Headquarters, USARSO and its supporting units have departed the command since the move to Puerto Rico in late 1999 because of conditions at Fort Buchanan. The same conditions impeded hiring qualified replacements. Over half of the vacancies are senior grade positions.
- Announcement and execution of a move in FY2003 to the continental United States will stem the losses and allow rebuilding.
- The Army decision in April 2002 to make USARSO a major subordinate command of Forces Command in FY2003 will reduce the size of the headquarters by 25% and the garrison staff at Fort Buchanan by 184 spaces.
- A preliminary site survey conducted in the fall of 2001, identified Fort Sam Houston as the best site for relocation from among 14 possible sites. A subsequent analysis confirmed that recommendation.
- This relocation requires no MILCON funding. The Army intends to lease facilities at Fort Sam Houston that will be renovated with private capital under the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative.

322

25 Jul 02

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

- A National Environmental Policy Act assessment of the Fort Sam Houston capability to accept an entity comparable to USARSO is complete. Other environmental analyses required under the National Environmental Policy Act will be completed prior to a final relocation decision.
- Based on current projections, this move will not trigger the provisions of 10 USC 2687 regarding the closure or realignment of military installations. A General Counsel opinion, coordinated with your staff, is Tab B.
- This relocation will not preclude future decisions on United States Army South pursuant to the FY2005 Base Realignment and Closure process.
- Tab C provides supplemental information requested by your staff.

Required analyses, reports, and announcements will be coordinated with your staff.

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve by initialing at the marker (1) moving United States Army South to Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, in FY2003 and (2) release of the Report to Congress at Tab A.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: John W. McDonald, (b)(6)

Per SecDef:

APPROVED _____

OTHER _____

TAB

A

Executive Summary of the Report to Congress on Relocation of US Army South

PURPOSE

This report addresses the proposed relocation of Headquarters, United States Army, South (USARSO) and selected subordinate elements from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. It responds to Congressional direction for information contained on pages 440-441, Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Appropriations Conference Report #107-350, to wit:

The conferees further direct that the Army provide the House and Senate Appropriations Committees the results of (the USARSO relocation) study and any further updates. The Conferees further direct the Army to report to the committee no later than February 28, 2002¹, the following concerning this relocation: the number of military and civilian personnel to be moved; the estimated cost; selection criteria and analysis of alternatives; and, any changes to the current plan.

USARSO RELOCATION

In August 2001, the Army Staff initiated the study of the relocation of USARSO to be executed by summer, 2002 (subsequently adjusted to summer, 2003). Relocation was considered urgent to address declining readiness directly related to the current stationing of Headquarters, USARSO at Fort Buchanan.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO BE MOVED

The relocation study determined that the following authorized positions would move:

538 (350 military, 188 civilian) to the new Headquarters, USARSO location
16 (3 military, 13 civilian) to Hqs, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA
62 (33 military, 29 civilian) to Fort Gordon, GA
13 (all military) to Soto Cano, Honduras

The number of actual personnel at Fort Buchanan that would move is substantially less, due to normal military reassignments and civilian employee relocation decisions. The numbers of positions that will transfer to a new location will not trigger the provisions of 10 USC 2687.

¹ The report date was subsequently extended to July 23, 2002 to allow the Army needed time to complete their review and analysis.

SELECTION CRITERIA

The study considered 14 sites in the southeastern United States that met congressional direction to ensure "... that any proposed relocation must be consistent with the mission and geographic orientation of (USARSO)." The study first screened all sites using three 'must meet' criteria, then evaluated those sites that met the screening criteria using four 'most efficient/effective' criteria.

Screening Criteria

1. Support Army Transformation
2. Executable by summer FY03
3. Support to USSOUTHCOM and Army mission accomplishment in theater

Evaluation Criteria

1. Cost
2. Personnel Savings
3. Quality of Life
4. Mission Enhancement

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Only two locations met all of the screening criteria. These were Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas and combined Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem in Atlanta, Georgia. The most common reasons that other sites did not meet the screening criteria were:

- o Necessity to create and man an Army garrison command that was contrary to Army Transformation goals (Criterion 1)
- o Site did not have a suitable facility available by summer 2003 (Criterion 2)
- o Site did not support ready mission access to Latin America (Criterion 3)

The Fort Sam Houston site was evaluated as more efficient and effective than the Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative due to cost, quality of life, and mission enhancement advantages.

ESTIMATED COST TO MOVE

The total estimated costs to move USARSO to a CONUS location are:

Common Relocation Costs (same for all locations)

OMA - \$ 52.3 million
MPA - \$ 5.5 million

Facility Costs

Estimated costs for initial major renovation and construction are \$29.5M for Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem. Because of the nature of the lease at Fort Sam Houston, all costs are included in the lease. Estimated 20-year costs in net present values are \$5.7M less for Fort Sam Houston than for Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem.

Estimated Cost Savings

Annual net cost savings are estimated to be \$13M from reduction in operations at Fort Buchanan. \$32.7M in previously appropriated MILCON funds for Fort Buchanan (held under the current construction moratorium at Fort Buchanan) will become available to fund other Army priorities.

CHANGES TO THE STUDY

The criteria used in this study were developed initially in October 2001 and modified in early 2002 based on projected changes in the organization of USARSO. First, by the end of February 2002 it became apparent that it would not be feasible to reach a decision in time to move the headquarters during 2002, and the relocation requirement was then modified to not later than the summer 2003. This requirement increased the urgency of finding a suitable facility ready to move in or a facility that could be renovated for occupancy by that time. Second, within the context of Army Transformation, the Army decided in March 2002 to realign Headquarters, USARSO as a Major Subordinate Command under U.S. Army Forces Command. This affected the study criteria in two key ways. It reduced the size of the headquarters and emphasized the requirement to minimize garrison support requirements at any new location. The Army therefore added Support to Transformation to the screening criteria and modified the building space required. The Army then re-screened all sites and reevaluated the two that passed the screening criteria.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion is that Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the best alternative for the relocation of Headquarters, USARSO in 2003.

USARSO RELOCATION REPORT

This Report addresses the proposed relocation of United States Army South (USARSO) from San Juan, Puerto Rico to the continental United States.

Key components of this report are:

- Rationale for relocation
- Assumptions
- Number of USARSO personnel to move
- Facility requirements
- Sites considered for relocation
- Study methodology and criteria
- Analysis of alternatives
- Estimated costs to move

RATIONALE FOR RELOCATION

USARSO moved from Panama to Puerto Rico in the summer of 1999 as a consequence of the reversion of the Panama Canal and associated lands to the government of Panama. In early 2001, the Commander, USARSO identified an urgent need to relocate the command from Puerto Rico to a continental United States (CONUS) location based on rapidly declining readiness caused by a number of factors. The primary causes contributing to this situation are:

- Inadequate quality of life for soldiers, civilians and their families
- An uncompensated high cost of living
- High operational costs associated with the Puerto Rico location
- Unacceptable low civilian personnel retention and recruitment, especially among senior grade personnel

The need and urgency to relocate USARSO remains. The longer the Headquarters remains in Puerto Rico, the higher the risk to USARSO mission accomplishment, since the command cannot retain or recruit to fill critical positions in the civilian workforce, which is 50% of the Headquarters. Relocation in the near term (FY2003) offers the best balance between efficiency and effectiveness, and will substantially improve the welfare of the soldiers, civilians, and families assigned. An expanded discussion of the justification for the relocation of USARSO in FY 2003 is presented in Appendix 1.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions provided the framework for the relocation study:

- USARSO requirements to provide seamless support to USSOUTHCOM will continue during and after relocation.
- Quality of life in Puerto Rico will not significantly improve in the near future.
- The military construction moratorium for Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico will not be lifted.
- USARSO mission failure is not acceptable at Army or DOD levels.
- USARSO relocation to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads will not alleviate the conditions requiring USARSO to relocate from Puerto Rico. In fact, such a move would exacerbate the situation.
- The USARSO civilian workforce will continue to leave Government service at the same rate, and may accelerate, if a decision is made that USARSO will remain in Puerto Rico.

PERSONNEL TO MOVE

For relocation purposes, USARSO now consists of approximately 600 authorizations. This is a reduction from the initial number in the summer of 2001 of approximately 1,200 authorizations that would have relocated from Puerto Rico. The reduction is the result of the efficiencies gained in the change of USARSO from Major Command to Major Subordinate Command status. Table 1 below depicts the distribution of these authorizations by military and civilian categories.

Category	Move to New USARSO Location	Move to Fort Gordon	Move to Soto Cano, HO	Move to Fort McPherson	Total
Military	350	33	13	3	399
Civilian	188	29	0	13	230
Total	538	62	13	16	629

Table 1. Distribution of Military and Civilian Personnel

A breakout of total authorizations (military and civilian combined) by command element that would move to these locations is depicted in Table 2 below.

Organization	Current Authorization	Moving to New USARSO Location	Moving to Fort Gordon	Moving to Soto Cano, HO	Moving to Fort McPherson ³
Headquarters USARSO					
AMHA Staff ¹	405	297			16
Active Guard/Res.	49	49			
PARC (Contracting)	0	17			
Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) ²	88	115			
56th Signal Bn (-)	70	7	45		
94th Signal Co	61	11	17		
USASOC/SOTSE	8	8			
Info Management	30	30			
OSACOM Flight Det.	4	4			
Aviation Detachment	13			13	
Totals	728 ⁴	538	62	13	16

Notes:

¹These are the FY04 authorizations against which realignment planning was conducted. FY02 authorizations are similar - 402.

²The TIG activates in FY03 with an initial authorization of 88. In FY05, the TIG is programmed for 255 spaces. The number (115) to move includes 27 USARSO G-2 spaces that will be eliminated when the TIG is fully established in FY05.

³These 16 transfers reflect FORSCOM assumption of USARSO MACOM responsibilities.

⁴The original move number of 1163 included moving all authorizations above (728), an increase to the USARSO Headquarters to regain capabilities lost in the move from Panama, and an erroneous double counting of MI units because of lack of visibility into the new TIG.

Table 2. Disposition of USARSO Authorizations

A breakout of authorizations (military and civilian) by command element that would move to these locations is depicted in Table 3 below.

Organization	Moving to New USARSO Location			Moving to Fort Gordon			Moving to Soto Cano, HO			Moving to Fort McPherson ³		
	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT
Headquarters USARSO												
AMHA Staff ¹	153	144	297							3	13	16
Active Guard/Res.	49	0	49									
PARC (Contracting)	8	9	17									
Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) ²	106	9	115									
56th Signal Bn (-)	7	0	7	33	12	45						
94th Signal Co	5	6	11		17	17						
USASOC/SOTSE	8	0	8									
Info Management	10	20	30									
OSACOM Flight Det.	4	0	4									
Aviation Detachment							13	0	13			
Totals	350	188	538	33	29	62	13	0	13	3	13	16

Notes:

¹These are the FY04 authorizations against which realignment planning was conducted. FY02 authorizations are similar - 402.

²The TIG activates in FY03 with an initial authorization of 88. In FY05, the TIG is programmed for 255 spaces. The number (115) to move includes 27 USARSO G-2 spaces that will be eliminated when the TIG is fully established in FY05.

³These 16 transfers reflect FORSCOM assumption of USARSO MACOM responsibilities.

Table 3. Disposition of USARSO Authorizations

FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

Facilities	Description
Headquarters Building	104,000 square feet (104 KSF to 114 KSF by '05)) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 KSF SCIF (to 28 KSF by '05) • 10 KSF open storage of classified (Secret) • 10 KSF command center – SCIF • Facility suitable for hosting Chief of Defense or Chief of Army visits from other nations Capability to construct workspace as functional work-centers Army force protection criteria met 400 sf weapons storage Capability to handle all USARSO communications <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple LAN's • Classified systems • Fiber optic access
Aircraft facilities	Facilities for 2 UC-35 army fixed wing aircraft
Motor Pool	Parking and space for operator level maintenance for up to 50 small tactical vehicles
Warehouse	20 KSF climate controlled
Barracks	Space for up to 50 soldiers

Table 4. Facility Requirements

SITES CONSIDERED FOR RELOCATION

The Army considered 14 sites for USARSO relocation. The 14 sites included Army locations that were identified as having potentially available facilities and other locations offered for consideration by members of Congress and their constituents. Sites identified for consideration were:

Fort Benning, GA	Fort Jackson, SC
Fort Polk, LA	Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem, GA
Fort Sill, OK	Fort Sam Houston, TX
Homestead AFB, FL	Keesler AFB, MS
Naval Activity Stennis Space Center, MS	Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS
Gulfport NAS, MS	Miami, FL
Mobile, AL	Arkansas (unspecified location)

STUDY METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

The study methodology was based on identifying potential relocation candidates and evaluating these candidates against relevant criteria. The methodology included:

- Review of the 1996 USARSO Relocation Study
- Data searches to identify existing installations with excess facilities
- Development of criteria to assess alternatives
- Elimination of infeasible alternatives
- Detailed analysis of viable alternatives
- Development of a recommendation

Criteria

Criteria were developed to ensure the Army had a rational and fair set of metrics by which to evaluate each option. Screening and evaluation criteria were both developed. These criteria have remained constant throughout the process, with the exception of the Support Army Transformation criterion added in March 2002. Below is an in-depth description of criteria used in the study.

Screening Criteria. Screening criteria are those criteria that absolutely must be fulfilled by any option being considered. If an option does not meet all screening criteria, that option then becomes infeasible and is eliminated from further consideration. Below are the three screening criteria developed for this study.

- **Criterion: Support Army Reorganization.** This is a key criterion that must be considered in light of DOD and Army efforts to achieve efficiencies and streamline headquarters wherever possible. Any course of action that does not support this long-term initiative to make the Army more efficient and effective fails to pass the screen. Reduction in overall size and Army Management Headquarters Account (AMHA) numbers is a central focus of this effort. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Eliminate overlap and duplication. The efforts by FORSCOM and USARSO to eliminate redundancy and streamline the USARSO Headquarters was the start of similar reviews that will be conducted for all Army Service Component Commands. FORSCOM will assume some limited missions (which can be done wherever USARSO goes on an Army installation), and USARSO will eliminate positions as a result of the loss of MACOM status. USARSO will be able to eliminate 108 positions. Further savings of at least 184 are expected upon USARSO's departure by returning the Fort Buchanan garrison to pre-USARSO strength. Any location not on an existing Army installation is eliminated by this screening criterion, because a move to a non-Army site would require

establishing a garrison of approximately 40 to 76 persons, military and civilian. The garrison would be approximately 40 personnel if on a non-Army military installation, as there are many functions that a Host Service could provide to an Army tenant. At a site without such inter-Service support, the requirement would grow to 76. These 40 to 76 spaces involve functions that require Army authorizations (military and civilian) to support an Army unit, such as personnel and logistic specialists to connect to Army specific systems and personnel who support those Army elements in the Area of Responsibility (units and MILGROUPS). Additionally there are other areas where, although the Host Service could provide the support, it would be done only at the cost of their adding an equal number of personnel to their existing garrison. This would not be a savings to the Army, as the Host Service would expect a transfer of positions from the Army to cover such increases to their garrison. An detailed description of the garrison requirements is contained in Appendix B.

- Reduce Headquarters size and AMHA. The spaces saved from USARSO Headquarters are all AMHA spaces and contribute to the overall congressionally mandated 15% reduction that the Department of Defense has directed the Army to meet by 30 September 2003.
- Criterion: Support to USSOUTHCOM Mission Accomplishment. This is an absolute requirement reinforced in guidance received from the Chief of Staff, Army and the Combatant Commander, USSOUTHCOM. To the Combatant Commander, location is not the most important factor; rather, it is the allocation of appropriate forces along with seamless support from a viable, functioning Army Service Component Command. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Seamless support. The Combatant Commander should experience no degradation in support to his Headquarters for those responsibilities that are doctrinal. There may be some loss in responsiveness with the reduction in the USARSO Headquarters numbers; however, this will not endanger any doctrinal or assigned missions. The move must be conducted in a manner that allows continuous support to the Combatant Commander. Conducting a move of this nature is difficult enough when moving from Army installation to Army installation where support mechanisms and systems are familiar. If moving to other than an Army installation, planning for support from another Service and then putting that planned support to the test when it is required to support an in-theater activity, creates risk to the Combatant Commander's mission.

- Accessibility to the SOUTHCOM AOR. Most of USARSO's travel to the AOR is conducted via commercial air. It is necessary that the Headquarters be within one hour of a suitable airport that can on a routine basis, with one connection, connect to flights to the AOR through one of the four major hubs, Miami, Houston, Dallas, or Atlanta. Visitors from the region in the Distinguished Visitor Program use commercial air for their travel. This also enhances their accessibility to the Command.
- Criterion: Executable by Summer 2003. The Commander, USARSO has stated that there is high risk of mission failure due to excessive loss and turnover of personnel, and lack of ability to hire qualified replacements in a timely manner. This loss puts mission accomplishment at risk as early as summer 2002. Ongoing delays and studies have resulted in the need to slip the target date for the relocation by one year to summer 2003. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Move Headquarters USARSO not later than summer 2003. Any new location that cannot meet a summer 2003 timeline is ruled out as a viable option. Not meeting that timeline will increase the risk of mission failure to an unacceptable level due to lack of qualified personnel to execute key tasks.
 - No multiple moves on post. Moving into temporary facilities for several months to several years is unacceptable. The previous move of USARSO from Panama to Puerto Rico has left the Headquarters operating in this "temporary" situation since its arrival in 1999. Some members of USARSO have worked in four different buildings at Fort Buchanan. Additionally, moving into temporary facilities in this manner will increase the cost of the move unnecessarily.
 - Move into a renovated building. This follows from the previous factor. Moving into the final location without renovation will inflict continued disruption to USARSO members as building systems and workspace are renovated during occupancy. With USARSO personnel having lived and worked in temporary conditions for three years in Puerto Rico, it is unacceptable to require them to move once again into temporary arrangements that will be disrupted in the near future. This is both a morale and an efficiency issue.

Evaluation Criteria. Evaluation criteria are those criteria that provide the ability to conduct a comparative assessment of the options that meet all screening criteria. Below are the evaluation criteria developed for this study.

- **Criterion: Cost.** Lower cost options are preferable. Options that reduce the fiscal burden over the next few years as the Army funds many un-programmed initiatives and operations are preferred. The un-programmed USARSO move should be accomplished at minimal initial and long-term cost. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - **Initial move cost.** This is the cost of initial funds required to move the headquarters and related elements. This involves Permanent Change of Station (civilian), movement of property (personal and unit), communications infrastructure, and initial facility renovation costs.
 - **Facility cost.** The cost of facilities is a significant factor. This is the total cost of all facilities required to accommodate all USARSO units that are relocating. This includes any leasing costs required during facility renovation and any military construction funds for additional structures required in the near future.
 - **Long-term cost comparison.** While initial move and facility costs are important, the overall cost over a 20-year period determines if there is a long term overall benefit for a COA that may have a high up-front cost. Long-term costs include the overall cost of construction or renovation and the maintenance, utility, and janitorial cost over a twenty-year period. This is calculated two ways, straight 20-year cost and the Net Present Value (NPV) for the same calculation. The latter method considers that dollars today have more buying power than dollars in the future due to inflation and other factors.
- **Criterion: Personnel Savings.** Higher numbers saved is better.
- **Criterion: Quality of Life.** This is a significant factor. While Quality of Life is a hard concept to measure, many objective factors can be used to compare locations. The key Quality of Life factors evaluated here use several sources of data. It is important to measure this criterion for both military and civilian members of the headquarters. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - **Military and civilian housing.** Housing is a significant issue affecting the quality of life in Puerto Rico. Lack of military housing quantity and quality (i.e., housing determined to be sub-standard) and the impact of the moratorium on new construction make this a high

priority to fix during a move. Off-post housing is especially critical, since half of the headquarters is civilian and will be required to live off post. Additionally, with the rank structure found in USARSO, a high percentage of field-grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers, a large number of military personnel will also have to find civilian housing. Quality and availability of off-post housing is therefore incorporated in this criterion.

- Cost of living. A lower cost of living in an area is preferable, as disposable income is increased with lower living costs.
 - Crime. Puerto Rico is a very high crime area compared to most major cities in the 50 states. A lower crime rate is more desirable.
 - Cost of housing. This factor includes renting and purchasing homes. A lower cost of housing is desirable, as it will significantly increase the quality of life for the civilian and military members of the command.
- Criterion: Mission Enhancement. Enhances USARSO's ability to execute its mission in the most efficient and effective manner. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Headquarters efficiency through collocation with subordinate units. USARSO currently works in 30 separate buildings. This causes significant inefficiency through travel between buildings, increased cost of facilities, and loss of synergy achieved through working together in teams. A lower number of facilities and closer locations to subordinate units improve efficiency.
 - Facility stature suitable to hosting frequent Chief of Defense or Chief of Army level visits to the command, as well as multi-nation conferences.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Description of the Alternatives

Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative.

This option is labeled Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem because facilities at both installations in the Atlanta area are needed to meet all USARSO requirements. There was no place on Fort McPherson for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and thus it was necessary to consider Fort Gillem for

that requirement. The following is a description of the option and the impacts to other units.

The Command Group and personnel staff would occupy the current JAG Headquarters as the most suitable building on post for the new USARSO Headquarters. This would require significant renovation and upgrade to the old existing building as well as relocating the JAG to another location on post (including the creation of a new court room).

Three interconnected buildings are in the process of being renovated for the new Transformation Installation Management Regional Headquarters. This would become the main administrative space for USARSO. It would require that the TIM Headquarters be relocated into the main FORSCOM Headquarters building. There are several costs involved in this. There is a cost to re-configure the three buildings to accommodate USARSO versus the TIM and there would be a further cost to redesign space allocation and reconfigure the floor plan for the main FORSCOM Headquarters building to accommodate the TIM.

The combination of the buildings above provides less than 75KSF towards the USARSO requirement of 104KSF. Additional overflow space for USARSO administrative requirements would be needed at Fort Gillem. This would be temporary space as the only available option there is converted warehouse space. In two years permanent administrative space could be available back on Fort McPherson with the vacation and renovation of administrative space occupied by a Reserve Component Headquarters that is having a new Headquarters built on Fort Gillem.

A small part of the USARSO G2 would co-locate with the FORSCOM G2 inside the SCIF in the FORSCOM Headquarters building. The remainder of the G2 and the TIG would need to have an existing Fort Gillem facility expanded and converted to another SCIF. This is currently an older building that was previously a SCIF, however due to the expansion the estimated cost is \$4M. This is the first project listed that would almost certainly be a MILCON project. (It was not realized that this would be a MILCON project until the evaluation stage of the process). This project cannot be completed by summer 03.

The final major facility requirement would be an expanded facility for the TIG when its authorizations are planned to increase from 88 to 255 in FY05. Additional facilities and SCIF space would be required in FY05. Estimated cost for this new facility is \$15M.

This option involves significant impacts on at least three major Army units and significant renovation and reconfiguration. It is not an easily executable option, and as discovered during the evaluation process is only partially executable by summer 03.

Fort Sam Houston Alternative.

The USARSO Headquarters and all support units are can be relocated into the old Brooke Army Medical Center main building. All elements (to include the increase of the TIG in FY05) will fit into this building that has been leased from the Army to a developer (Orion/Weston) through authority of the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative under 10 USC 2667. The developer will renovate the building to meet USARSO requirements, to include SCIF space.

Orion/Weston currently holds the 50-year lease to the Old BAMC building and the two Beach Pavilions. The Old BAMC building (building 1000) has a total of 210KSF net rentable area. The USARSO requirement is for 104KSF expanding to 114KSF with the expansion of the TIG in FY05. This is 50 percent of the rentable space of the building increasing to 54 percent in FY05.

Orion/Weston's estimate of the cost of this lease is \$23.49 per square foot. This includes standard janitorial service, maintenance, and utilities. This makes the cost of the lease \$2.3M for the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. The Army will share 46 percent of the profits from the lease over the lease term. Orion/Weston expects that the profit share for the Army in this lease alone will be \$5M. This may be returned to the Army in direct funds or through in-kind consideration.

Evaluation of Fort Sam Houston and Fort McPherson

Two options passed the screening criteria, Fort Sam Houston and Fort McPherson. An in-depth evaluation was made to determine which of these options was more advantageous. Table 5 depicts the relative comparison of these options. It is clear from the table that Fort Sam Houston is the better option for this relocation. Specific metrics used for evaluation are included in the explanatory text following the table. This cost comparison assumes that the lease at Fort Sam Houston is scored as an operational lease. The Army's analysis concludes that it should be an operational lease and not incur the scoring penalty of a capital lease. A discussion of the effect of the lease scored as a capital lease is provided in Appendix C.

Evaluation Criteria				
Site	Cost	Quality of Life	Personnel Savings	Mission Effectiveness
Fort Sam Houston	1	1	Even	1
Fort McPherson	2	2	Even	2

Table 5. Final Option Comparison

Cost. Fort Sam Houston is a lower cost option than Fort McPherson from every perspective and provides a significantly better quality Headquarters facility. The total initial cost to move to Fort McPherson is \$29.5M more than the move to Fort Sam Houston. This is due to facility cost differences. The amount to move the command's equipment and personnel to any location in the Southeast is essentially the same (with the exception of facility costs). Appendix D contains a detailed economic analysis of facility alternatives. Movement costs are described in Appendix E. Pertinent cost elements are explained below.

- **Initial Facilities Cost.** This initial cost is higher for the Fort McPherson option. This includes OMA renovation costs (\$10.5M) plus MILCON needed immediately (\$4M) at Fort Gillem for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and MILCON required at Fort Gillem for TIG long term (\$15M). This totals \$29.5M. There is no initial cost for facilities at Fort Sam Houston. The only cost will be the annual lease cost of \$2.3M for each of the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. This assumes the lease is not scored. If the lease is scored as a capital lease, additional upfront costs will be incurred. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the lease is \$27.7M and would be placed in an escrow account. These funds would be lost to Army use, but not US Government use.
- **Long-term costs (20-year).** This includes facility renovation costs, maintenance, utilities, and janitorial service cost for both options. At Fort McPherson, this cost is \$29.5M for renovation, plus \$623K per year for maintenance, etc. above. For Fort Sam Houston, long-term costs are the cost of the lease minus potential profit sharing (approximately \$5M) over a 20-year lease.
- **Net Present Value cost for 20-year term.** This calculation uses the nominal discount rate of 5.4%. It compares the costs of the facilities over a 20-year time period. The Fort Sam Houston version is \$5.7M cheaper. This is the best comparison of the relative value. Plus, there is no additional risk for building systems repair costs for Fort Sam Houston as it is leased and the developer would be responsible for these possible major unforeseeable costs. The Army ultimately would be responsible for replacing major systems (not anticipated in calculations) for the Fort McPherson option.

Cost if Scored as a Capital Lease. The Army analysis considers this lease unlikely to be scored as a capital lease. However, should it be scored as a capital lease, the only change is that the Army will have to put \$27.7M (the NPV of the lease) into an escrow account. This would be added to the initial facilities cost for calculation purposes. Fort Sam Houston is a lower cost option than Fort McPherson from every perspective and provides a significantly better quality

Headquarters facility. The total initial cost to move to Fort McPherson is \$14.5M more than the move to Fort Sam Houston. This is due to facility cost differences. The amount to move the command's equipment and personnel to any location in the Southeast is essentially the same (with the exception of facility costs). Pertinent cost elements are explained below.

- **Initial Facilities Cost.** This initial cost for the Fort McPherson option continues to be \$29.5M. The initial cost for the Fort Sam Houston option then becomes \$27.7M. The up front cost is still lower for the Fort Sam Houston option by \$1.8M.
- **Long-term costs (20-year).** No change, except for the \$27.7M placed in escrow.
- **Net Present Value cost for 20-year term.** This calculation uses the nominal discount rate of 5.4%. It compares the costs of the facilities over a 20-year time period. It is unclear how to treat the \$27.7M placed in escrow for this calculation. Although it is a cost to the Army, the funds are not actually disbursed. The worst case is to consider it an expenditure and effectively pay the lease twice, once by placing the funds in escrow and then actually paying the lease. Using this method the Fort McPherson option is the lower cost by \$22M.

This would change the evaluation table to:

Evaluation Criteria – with Lease Scored as Capital Lease				
Site	Cost	Quality of Life	Personnel Savings	Mission Effectiveness
Fort Sam Houston	2	1	Even	1
Fort McPherson	1	2	Even	2

Table 6. Final Option Comparison

Even in the event the lease is scored as a capital lease, there is no change to the recommendation that Fort Sam Houston is the best alternative. Fort McPherson has higher upfront costs and includes MILCON construction that is not executable by summer 2003. Fort Sam Houston is executable by summer 2003 and even though it calculates to be more expensive in the long run, the \$27.7M returns to the government for use in negating the higher long-term cost.

Quality of Life. The comparisons provided were extrapolated from data gathered from several different sources' websites on the two cities involved.

- **Cost of Living.** The Consumer Price index survey listed the overall cost of living index for Atlanta at 103.2, with San Antonio at 90.2. The national average is 100. An income in San Antonio of \$43,702 is equivalent to \$50,000 in Atlanta
- **Housing Cost.** The cost of the typical 3-bedroom house in Atlanta was \$286K, while it was \$106K in San Antonio (CNN website).
- **Housing Availability.** This information was gathered from the housing offices at both posts. There is almost no enlisted housing at Fort McPherson, while there is adequate availability and additional enlisted housing programmed for Fort Sam Houston.
- **Health Care.** While health care for the military is adequate at Fort McPherson, it would require off-post assets, while Fort Sam Houston has Brooke Army Medical Center for military care. Off post health care availability in both cities is good. Health care costs are indexed at 109.2 in Atlanta, while San Antonio is 90.5.
- **Schools.** Statistically, public schools in both locations appear fairly even. Anecdotally, people at Fort McPherson tend to commute longer distances to get their children enrolled in better schools. Many who live in housing at Fort McPherson send their children to private schools. Soldiers who live in housing at Fort Sam Houston are able to send their children to DODDS schools on post, or have shorter commute distances based on good school districts.
- **Crime.** Crime rate in San Antonio is significantly lower than for Atlanta for both violent and property crime. Violent crime rates in Atlanta in 2001 were 2,729.5 per 100,000, while they were 561 in San Antonio.

Increased Mission Effectiveness. Fort Sam Houston would have the entire Headquarters in a single, adequate building renovated to meet all USARSO needs. Fort McPherson has USARSO spread over five buildings on the main post and two additional buildings on Fort Gillem (approximately 20 miles away). The Fort Sam Houston option is clearly better than the Fort McPherson option. It will clearly make the right impression on visitors to USARSO.

Personnel Savings. No difference between the two alternatives. The total personnel savings is a combination of the 108 AMHA spaces in the USARSO Headquarters and the anticipated reduction to be taken from the Fort Buchanan Garrison upon USARSO's departure. This Garrison reduction totals at least 184 and is the difference between the Garrison authorizations before USARSO arrival in summer 1999 and current years authorizations.

Site Re-evaluations

In May 2002, the Army Staff and USARSO conducted a final evaluation of all locations considered, using the full screening and evaluation criteria.

Sites Not Meeting Screening Criteria

Below is the evaluation of sites not meeting the screening criteria and therefore considered infeasible. These sites received no further consideration in the study. Table 7 provides a summary of these sites and their evaluation with the screening criteria.

Sites	Screening Criteria		
	Support Army Transformation	Support to U.S. SOUTHCOM	Execute by FY 03
Fort Benning, GA	Yes	Yes	No
Fort Jackson, SC	Yes	No	No
Fort Polk, LA	Yes	No	No
Gulfport NAS, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Homestead AFB, FL	Yes	Yes	No
Keesler AFB, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Miami, FL	Yes	Yes	No
Mobile, AL	No	No	Not Evaluated
Naval Activity Stennis, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Arkansas	No	No	Not Evaluated
Fort Sill, OK	Yes	No	Not Evaluated
Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated

Table 7. Sites Not Meeting Initial Screening Criteria

Fort Benning, GA. Two visits were made to Fort Benning, the first when looking at facilities for about 1,200 personnel and the second to reevaluate options based on a requirement of less than 600 personnel. The option offered by the Garrison at Fort Benning was the Headquarters building for Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), plus additional buildings. The WHINSEC Headquarters could not be vacated until the end of the school year in December 2002. The building would have required significant reconfiguring from a world-class school facility to an Army Service Component Command headquarters. Additional facilities were offered to meet the remaining requirements for space, but even with all additional facilities considered, Fort Benning could not meet the total requirement without additional MILCON projects that would not be executable by summer 2003. Additionally, the facility offered for a relocated WHINSEC would also require reconfiguration to make it a suitable academic setting. Moreover, the exterior appearance of this facility is not appropriate for an international school.

The Army is concerned over collocating USARSO and WHINSEC. The likelihood of association of USARSO with the former School of the Americas, and its annual protests, could become a distraction. This would also be a source of contention between USARSO and certain Latin America nations that choose to have no relationship with WHINSEC.

Fort Jackson, SC. Fort Jackson was examined because the Army facility database indicated that excess facilities existed that could be used for a USARSO Headquarters. Upon visiting the Garrison Commander and members of his staff, this location failed two screening criteria. It is not executable by summer 2003 because facilities were not immediately available. Any available facilities at this post are essentially older facilities (including WWII remnants) and are inadequate for renovation. This means MILCON is the only viable alternative for adequate facilities and would take three to five years to complete. The airport in Columbia, SC near Fort Jackson does not have available connections to those four major airports that provide routine access to Central and South America.

Fort Polk, LA. Fort Polk was examined because the Army facility database indicated that excess facilities existed that could be used for a USARSO Headquarters. After telephonic coordination with the facilities engineer for the post, this location failed two screening criteria. It is not executable by summer 2003. Facilities are not immediately available. Any available facilities at this post are essentially older facilities (including WWII remnants) and are inadequate for renovation. This means MILCON is the only viable alternative for adequate facilities and would take three to five years to complete. Fort Polk is not close enough to an airport with available connections to those four major airports that provide routine access to Central and South America.

Mississippi locations (Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport /Keesler AFB/ Naval Activities Stennis Space Center and Naval Station, Pascagoula). All locations failed to meet the screening criteria for supporting Army reorganization. This is because they would require creation of a garrison of 40 to 76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there. The criterion of support of the Combatant Commander mission was not met due to lack of adequate air connections to all four hubs from small regional airports. A specific proposal for construction of facilities was never presented and thus no independent evaluation of possibility to complete facilities for USARSO occupancy by summer 2003 was completed. There were assurances made that facilities could be ready within one year.

Homestead AFB, FL. This site failed to meet the criterion of executable by summer 2003. Facilities were not immediately available as all usable facilities are occupied. Much of the base was destroyed by a hurricane and thus any facilities for USARSO use would have to be constructed using MILCON. This

would require a three to five year completion timeline from date of initiating the planning for the projects.

Mobile, AL. The Middle Bay Port Development (MBPD) site in Mobile, Alabama was considered in the 1996 study. This site has since been turned over to the state government. It is currently being leased by various entities through a privatized management company. This change from government control to privatized control and its current occupation changed the conditions from the 1996 study, and the site was therefore considered not available.

Miami, FL – unspecified location vicinity SOUTHCOM Headquarters. With the issues surrounding the SOUTHCOM facility and the fact that additional leased commercial space must be procured to meet current SOUTHCOM demands, it was clear that co-location with SOUTHCOM was infeasible. Any permanent solution in the area would require MILCON and would not be executable by summer 2003.

Belle Chase Naval Air Station/Air Reserve Center, New Orleans, LA. This location failed to meet the screening criteria for Supporting Army Reorganization because it would require creation of a garrison of about 40-76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there.

Arkansas (Unspecified Location). This location failed to meet the screening criteria for Supporting Army Reorganization because it would require creation of a garrison of about 40-76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there.

Fort Sill, OK. The criterion of support of the Combatant Commander mission was not met due to lack of adequate air connections to all four hubs from small regional airports. A specific proposal for construction of facilities was never presented and thus no independent evaluation of possibility to complete facilities for USARSO occupancy by summer 2003 was completed.

Conclusion

The study's conclusion is that Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the best alternative for the relocation of Headquarters, USARSO in 2003.

TAB

B



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
104 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0104

June 25, 2002



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Relocation of Portions of United States Army South

This memo is prepared at your request for use in deliberations associated with the proposed relocation of portions of United States Army South (USARSO) from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston. This memo addresses the primary statutory and regulatory requirements that must be taken into consideration before the Army can proceed with the relocation.

Summary of Legal Considerations

In accordance with 10 USC 2687, the contemplated relocation of personnel and functions from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston would be considered a realignment. If the realignment results in either the reduction of more than 1,000 DoD civilians or 50 percent of the DoD civilians authorized to be employed at the installation, in accordance with P.L. 101-510, as amended, the realignment would have to be specifically authorized pursuant a recommendation of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. Additionally, before any decision is made on the realignment, the Army must perform an analysis of the environmental impacts of the realignment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the stationing process must be completed in accordance with Army Regulation 5-10. Once a decision has been made to relocate functions and personnel to Fort Sam Houston, the Army may be required to notify Congress of its intention to lease property at the installation if the required lease payment exceeds certain thresholds. The following includes a more complete discussion of these legal considerations and my preliminary analysis that the realignment can go forward without the requirement for further authorization through the BRAC process.

Base Closures and Realignments (10 USC 2687)

10 USC 2687 applies to the closure or realignment of military installations or the undertaking of any construction, conversion or rehabilitation at a military installation resulting from the closure or realignment of an installation. The statute defines military installation very broadly to include activities under the Jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, to include leased facilities. It includes installations located in the continental United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam.

The statute prohibits the Army from taking action to implement the closure of an installation in which at least 300 civilian employees (direct-hire, permanent

civilian employees of Department of Defense) are employed until Congress is notified in accordance with the statutory requirements.

The statute also addresses the realignment of installations, which is defined as any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes. The contemplated relocation of functions and personnel from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston would be considered a realignment. With regard to realignments, no action may be taken to effect or implement any realignment involving a reduction by more than 1,000 civilian personnel or by more than 50 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation until the Secretary notifies Congress in accordance with the notification provisions of the statute.

In accordance with Section 2909 of Public Law, 101-510, as amended, during the period of November 5, 1990 to April 15, 2006, the BRAC law shall be the exclusive authority for the closure or realignment of a military installation. This provision would apply to a proposed closure or realignment under 10 USC 2687 if the proposed closure or realignment exceeds the threshold requirements under 10 USC 2687. Therefore, if a realignment is proposed between the period of November 5, 1990 and April 15, 2006 and triggers the statutory thresholds for civilian personnel under 10 USC 2687, the realignment must be done in accordance with the BRAC process and not the congressional notification requirement under 10 USC 2687.

10 USC 2687 sets forth an exception to the requirement to pursue the realignment through the BRAC process. The requirement would not apply if the President certifies to Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or military emergency.

In the present case, the Army has proposed the relocation of portions of USARSO from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston. The relocation would be considered a realignment subject to the numerical thresholds of 10 USC 2687 concerning the reduction in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at the installation. If the reduction in the number of civilian personnel exceeds the numerical thresholds, the realignment of the installation could only take place either under the BRAC process or pursuant to a notification by the President to Congress that the realignment must take place for reason of national security or military emergency.

Based on the information that this office has been provided, there are currently a total of 1779 civilian authorizations for Fort Buchanan. This number includes 174 non-appropriated fund employees that should not be included as a part of the civilian authorizations because they are not direct hire, permanent civilian employees under 10 USC 2687. A reduction of the 1779 civilian authorization by the 174 non-appropriated fund positions would result in a total civilian authorization for the installation of 1605. Fifty percent of that

authorization would be 802. Under the proposed plan, the Army would realign Fort Buchanan by relocating 306 positions to Fort Sam Houston. This relocation would fall below the numerical threshold under 10 USC 2687. However, the information presented to us does not explain whether the 447 civilian garrison employee positions that will remain at Fort Buchanan will subsequently be eliminated pursuant to the realignment of the installation. Assuming that all 447 civilian positions are eliminated, the total reduction of the civilian population at Fort Buchanan pursuant to the realignment would be 753 civilian positions. Although it is unlikely that all of the positions will be subsequently eliminated, even if they were eliminated completely, the Army would still be under the numerical thresholds of 10 USC 2687. As such, the Army could proceed independently without additional authorization through the BRAC process.

This determination is made based on preliminary information provided to this office. A final determination of whether the realignment can take place outside of the BRAC process will have to be made after completion of the following realignment requirements and the development of a final plan. Given that these numbers could change, this opinion should not be construed as a final judgment that proceeding with the realignment independent of the BRAC process would be appropriate.

National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC 4321 et seq.)

Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and in accordance with Army regulation 200-2 (32 CFR Part 651 dated 29 March 2002 Final Rule will revise regulation), the Army is required to systematically analyze possible and probable environmental impacts of implementing a proposed Army action, to include relocations. The Army must identify all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action and any mitigation measures that may be implemented to respond to potential environmental impacts. The outcome of this environmental analysis will be documented in either a record of environmental consideration, environmental assessment and a finding of no significant impact or an environmental impact statement. Any final decision about the relocation of personnel and functions can only be made after completion of the required NEPA analysis.

Real Property Transactions: reports to Congressional Committees (10 USC 2662)

If the Army acquires a leasehold or fee interest in property as a part of the realignment of Fort Buchanan and the relocation of personnel and functions to Fort Sam Houston, there are certain Congressional notification requirements. The acquisition of either a fee title to real property exceeding an estimated price of \$500,000 or leasehold interest in property with an estimated annual rental that exceeds \$500,000 requires the submission of a report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees detailing such transaction. If the acquisition of property is part of a project, the report should include a summary of the general

plan for the project. The Secretary must submit the report and wait a period of thirty days before entering into the transaction.

Stationing Requirements (Army Regulation 5-10)

Army Regulation 5-10, prescribes procedures and policies governing the Army stationing process. In accordance with the regulation, the Major Army Command planning the stationing activity must submit a stationing package to Headquarters, Department of the Army. A notification package is required if the stationing will affect fewer than 200 military personnel authorizations and fewer than 50 permanent direct hire civilian employees. A decision package is required if the stationing activity will affect more than 200 military authorizations or 50 direct permanent hire civilian employees. The stationing package should take into consideration the stationing planning factors and include a stationing summary, information for members of congress, public notification documentation, a community impact analysis, the appropriate environmental documentation and a movement directive request. The regulation prescribes timelines for the submission of stationing decision packages, the appropriate approval authorities and required Congressional and public notifications.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this memo addresses the primary legal and regulatory requirements associated with the realignment of Fort Buchanan. It does not address policy issues associated with the possible realignment, including whether moving USARSO from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston is the most desirable action. As this decision is evaluated from a policy perspective, it is recommended that the Army consider why this realignment is being proposed prior to the 2005 base realignment and closure round. We also recommend that, given the Congressional interest on this issue, the Army should document in sufficient detail its analysis of alternative relocation sites and a justification as to why Fort Sam Houston is the preferred alternative.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact me or Robert Davenport at (b)(6)


Earl H. Stockdale
Deputy General Counsel
(Civil Works and Environment)

TAB

C

TAB C – Supplemental Information

Appendix 1, Justification for USARSO Relocation in FY 2003

Background: US Army South (USARSO). USARSO is the Army Service Component Command for US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and an Army Major Command. Commander, USARSO also executes the Army's Executive Agent responsibilities to support the USSOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami and its subordinate joint commands, including Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and 27 MILGROUPS.

USARSO performs the following operational missions:

Maintains readiness to deploy an Early Entry Command Post or to constitute a contingency JTF headquarters to command and control forces in the Southern Region.

Coordinates and conducts a large number of Theater Security Cooperation activities, including JCS exercises, deployments for training, unit and subject-matter-expert exchanges and the Conference of American Armies.

Provides strategic and tactical communications and administrative and logistics support for units throughout the Southern Region.

USARSO headquarters, several subordinate units and an Army garrison are located at Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico, and total some 1,231 personnel.

Why Move USARSO Now: There are four reasons for moving Headquarters USARSO and selected subordinate units by summer 2003.

Worsening Quality of Life. The primary threat to USARSO readiness is a multiplicity of quality of life challenges that border on the untenable. Personal daily living conditions, an uncompensated high cost of living, an unfavorable political environment, and deteriorating infrastructure all suggest that relocation in the near term is necessary to ensure effective support to USSOUTHCOM, while improving the welfare of the soldiers, civilians, and families assigned.

Retention and recruitment of a quality civilian workforce is the most prominent and serious indicator of these quality of life concerns. Since its arrival from Panama in summer 1999, USARSO has experienced difficulties in hiring and retaining a qualified civilian workforce. Much of the problem can be attributed to quality of life issues and a Cost of Living Allowance that is less than half of that offered in other non-foreign oversea areas. Since July 1999, 40% of assigned civilian federal employees have left HQ USARSO, U.S. Army Garrison Fort Buchanan, and tenant units. While it is difficult to say with certainty the number that have left exclusively due to quality of life issues, nearly half have

departed for other employment. Of particular concern is that approximately 62% of these losses were senior grades (GS-9 and above).

Replacement of these highly experienced and talented employees has been tremendously costly both in terms of PCS dollars and lost productivity. It has also not kept pace with losses. As of May 2002, there were 90 civilian personnel vacancies at Fort Buchanan – over 11% of the authorized workforce. Two-thirds of the vacant positions are GS-9 and above. The rumors of a move may have temporarily slowed these losses, but substantial numbers of employees are expected to leave the command if the move is delayed or disapproved.

Federal civilian service in Puerto Rico comes at a significant financial cost. Despite the best efforts of the command, the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) for all federal government civilians remains at 11.5%, with no prospect for adjustment until 2003. Puerto Rico's COLA is less than half that of all other non-foreign OCONUS areas, yet the per diem rate (as an indicator of relative costs) is the second highest. In addition, civilians serving in non-foreign OCONUS areas are not entitled to Living Quarters Allowance (LQA). This has a significant impact in Puerto Rico where costs for even marginally acceptable housing is very high. These factors are exacerbated by the virtual absence of off-post employment options for non-Spanish speaking spouses.

Living conditions in Puerto Rico are at best frustrating and are often hazardous. Water and power services in Puerto Rico are unreliable. Water quality is questionable. Those living off-post must use water storage cisterns. Unannounced power and water outages are common throughout the island. Utility administration is unresponsive, and repair services are inferior in terms of timeliness and quality to those in the United States.

The federal workforce does not have access to the Army clinic on Fort Buchanan. Medical treatment off-post ranges from merely inefficient to clearly substandard. Medical appointments in Puerto Rico are practically non-existent, often turning a routine office visit into an all-day ordeal. Most physicians are fluent in English, but most staff is not. Medical care for Army families is clearly unsatisfactory, detracting from both the military mission and from the welfare of those assigned.

Crime and public safety are major problems. Puerto Rico has consistently had one of the highest per capita murder rates in the world. Drug trafficking abounds, with approximately 90% of all violent crimes and 75-80% of all documented homicides in Puerto Rico during CY98 considered drug related. Further, Puerto Rico is the only U.S. territory to have a terrorist threat rated as moderate – the same as Haiti, Ecuador, and Peru; a higher threat level than in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Puerto Rico led the nation in

the number of reported car-jacking incidents with more than 8,000 in the period 1994-97. The rate remains high.

Due to limited public transportation, most people must use personal vehicles as their primary means of travel. An overwhelming majority of Fort Buchanan's personnel live off-post and are subject to lengthy and hazardous daily commutes. Highway construction has not kept pace with Puerto Rico's rapid growth in registered automobiles. Road maintenance is poor.

There is one daily local English language newspaper in Puerto Rico; however, much of the content to include advertisements and severe weather warnings are written in Spanish. During hurricane warnings, no local station provides updates or emergency information in English. While cable and satellite TV provide extensive stateside programming, there is no local TV broadcasting in English.

Army infrastructure is deteriorating. Most workspace, housing; schools and other facilities on Fort Buchanan are substandard. A congressionally imposed construction moratorium has been in effect since January 2000. The moratorium has halted all planned new construction and eliminated all but the most essential repairs.

The political climate impacts morale. Despite a relatively large military veteran and retiree population on the island, general sentiment toward the military is decidedly mixed. Pro-military interest groups have largely been silent with regard to a continued military presence in Puerto Rico, while those in opposition have maintained a public voice and media visibility that is out of proportion to their numbers. Vieques remains a polarizing issue and a rallying point for pro-independence and anti-military activists. The net result is a general ambivalence and occasional outright hostility directed toward Army personnel and civilians. The past year saw physical attacks on local ROTC instructors and rock-throwing incidents involving Fort Buchanan's school buses with children on board. Equally appalling was the Mayor of Ponce's public statement that "America got what it deserves," following the tragic events of September 11th.

Army Management Headquarters Reduction Deadline. The Army must meet the Congressional mandate to reduce AMHA spaces by 15% not later than 30 September 2003. The plans to reduce the size of the USARSO staff in conjunction with the relocation would save 75 net AMHA spaces. Achieving the overall Army target is proving difficult in light of current operational requirements. Completing the USARSO move in 2003 would permit the Army to maintain 75 other critical positions.

Other Personnel Savings. Relocation of USARSO will also generate savings of 184 spaces in the Ft. Buchanan garrison. Establishing USARSO at a large CONUS Army post will mean a net garrison personnel savings of almost all of that number. Relocating at another Service's base or a non-military site would reduce those savings by 40 – 76 spaces. The key point is that moving USARSO early allows the Army to reprogram the spaces at a time of significant force management challenges.

Cost Savings. The move prior to FY 2005 would free up for reprogramming \$32.7 million in previously appropriated MILCON funds that otherwise would expire. The Army also estimates net annual savings of \$13 million in operating, infrastructure and travel expenses if allowed to move. Many of the installation's utilities are aging and would have to be replaced in order to keep USARSO in Puerto Rico until sometime after FY05. This utility project would require relief from the congressionally mandated construction moratorium. The savings in official travel would accrue from the fact that most travel into the USSOUTHCOM AOR must pass through Miami (very few direct flights from Puerto Rico meet the "Fly American" constraint). With a US Army South move pushed to FY06 or FY07, the known lost opportunity costs amount to between \$55 – 80 million.

Mission Performance

Mission readiness would be assured by the move due mainly to the improved capacity to recruit and retain a quality civilian workforce and the improvement in quality of life for the entire headquarters. The Ft. Sam Houston location would improve access to and from the region and would provide a better platform to conduct the Distinguished Visitor program. In all other respects, USARSO can continue to provide seamless support to USSOUTHCOM and to execute all Joint and Army mission responsibilities at least as well from Ft. Sam Houston as from Ft. Buchanan.

BRAC 05

Waiting to conduct the relocation in conjunction with the results of BRAC 05 would yield the advantage of greater certainty about the permanence of the new site. However, it would also effectively mean leaving USARSO in Puerto Rico well into FY 06 or FY 07. The Army assessment is that such a postponement would run a high risk to successful mission support to USSOUTHCOM and would be detrimental to the well being of the military, civilian and family members of U.S. Army South.

Appendix 2, Requirements for Garrison Stand Upon on an other than Army Installation

The following depicts the USARSO estimate of requirements for stand-up of a small garrison-like activity on an other-than Army installation (e.g., Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard). Rationale for each category is noted below.

Commander/Staff	2
SJA	0
EEO	0
Provost Marshal	
- Force Protection	4
- Building Security	24
DPCA	
- Family Support	1
- ACES	1
- Military Personnel Section	2
DPTM	1
DOL	1
DPW	1
Housing	1
DOC	1
DRM	1
Total	40

Commander/Staff: One field grade officer or equivalent civilian, plus one administrative support individual, to oversee the Army-specific base support requirements as outlined below. This individual would also be dual-hatted as the Building Manager for the facility(s) in which USARSO would be located.

Provost Marshal:

- **Force Protection:** Would oversee all Army-specific requirements for physical security of HQ, USARSO workforce, to include anti-terrorism analysis, force protection requirements of facilities, and oversight of the building security force. Would also oversee security badge system for USARSO HQ facility
- **Building Security:** Would provide 24/7 security of facility(s), to include entry/exit checkpoints, escort of contractor personnel without proper security clearance (e.g., building maintenance, cleaning teams, vendors, etc), as well as general walk-through security checks during non-duty hours. Represents an Army, mission-specific requirement that a non-Army installation would not normally provide.

Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA):

- **Family Support:** Provide Army-specific family support services not normally provided to an Army unit on a non-Army installation. Includes support for deployed families, unaccompanied personnel, as well as support to MILGROUPS throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- **Army Continuing Education System:** Under a new DOD policy, each service is responsible for approving and funding Tuition Assistance for its own military personnel. This individual would support the Army personnel enrolling in continuing education courses on a non-Army installation.
- **Military Personnel Support:** These two individuals would provide support normally provided by an Army Adjutant General office on an Army installation, which would not be found on another service installation. Includes all the normal AG functions, such as strength management, efficiency report processing, and liaison for records support with the nearest Army installation. Would provide this support for HQ, USARSO military personnel, as well as those persons assigned to the MILGROUPs and Joint Task Force Brave (JTF-B) at Soto Cano, Honduras.

Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization: Provides Army-specific support for the planning, training, and mobilization support issues not normally provided by a non-Army installation. Writes the headquarters plans for all required military training events, develops plans for the mobilization and evacuation of the headquarters as necessary, and provides general support to the headquarters in related mission areas. Also provides related support to MILGROUPs and JTF-B.

Director of Logistics: Provides Army-specific support in concert with nearest Army installation for logistical functions, such as ordering of spare parts for HQ, USARSO; JTFs 160/170 at GTMO; and 1-228th aviation at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. On a normal Army base, those functions would be consolidated at the garrison DOL; however, due to the use of a separate Army supply system, those functions would need to be coordinated via separate supply accounts at the nearest Army installation. This individual would also be the conduit for other logistical support to the headquarters, such as GSA vehicles leased or provided by the installation, determination of local logistical requirements for satellite Army units in support of USARSO, and other base operations DOL functions.

Director of Public Works: Would serve as assistant to the Commander/Building manager, coordinating upkeep of the facilities provided on a reimbursable basis by the non-Army installation. Would be responsible for the physical plant, to include HVAC, utilities, building maintenance, space allocation, and all related DPW functions. This space could be provided by the host installation, but would be on a reimbursable basis.

Housing Would serve as the conduit between the headquarters and host installation for housing requirements. Represent the commander in all issues regarding quality of life in base housing, projecting space/grade requirements for

the headquarters, managing any designated Army Family Housing dollars provided, if separate housing area was designated in a satellite sub-installation, and related duties.

Director of Contracting: Serves as the base operations contractor to support internal, Army-specific headquarters building and facility requirements, such as the procurement of Army equipment, GSA leased vehicles to support the headquarters, mission-unique force protection purchases, and other related contracts. Also would be the primary developer and administrator of the Installation Support Agreement (ISA) determining what support is provided by the host installation and at what cost.

Director of Resource Management: Responsible for the internal facility operating budget, reimbursements to the host installation, planning, programming, budgeting of facility resources, and documenting manpower authorizations for facilities management requirements.

Appendix 3 - Scoring

Purpose

This appendix discusses the application of scoring guidelines for the proposal by Orion Weston of a possible lease scenario of Old BAMC by USARSO.

Scoring Guidelines

OMB Circular No. A-11 (2001) Appendix A paragraph 11 establishes the criteria and Scoring Guidelines for purchases, lease-purchases, capital leases, and operating leases. Federal Government leases are "scored" for budget purposes as capital or operating leases depending on their characteristics. Capital leases are scored 100% in the year the lease is signed (100% of the present value of scheduled lease payments). Operating leases are scored in each lease year in the amount of the lease payments.

OMB Circular No. A-11 (2001) Appendix B paragraph 3 identifies six mandatory qualifiers for a lease to be considered an operating lease. These six qualifiers are:

1. Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during the term of the lease and is not transferred to the Government at or shortly after the end of the lease period.
2. The lease does not contain a bargain-price option.
3. The lease term does not exceed 75 percent of the estimated economic lifetime of the asset.
4. The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the asset at the inception of the lease.
5. The asset is a general purpose asset rather than being for a special purpose of the Government and is not built to unique specification for the Government as lessee.
6. There is a private-sector market for the asset.

Justification For Operating Lease Determination

Below is our point-by-point initial analysis of the preceding qualifiers.

1. The leasing control of BAMC remains with Orion Weston (lessor) during the term of the lease and is not transferred back to the Government at or shortly after the end of the lease period. The lease from the Army to Orion Weston is a 50-year lease. This is significantly longer than the anticipated 20-year USARSO lease and will allow the asset to remain with Orion Weston for an additional 30 years past the lease term.

2. The lease will not contain a bargain purchase option.
3. The lease does not exceed 75 percent of the economic life of the asset. According to Orion Weston, the economic life of BAMC is 39 years. Thus, the 20-year USARSO lease is only 51 percent of the total economic life expectancy of BAMC.
4. The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value from the inception of the lease. A fair market value of the Old BAMC can be estimated by extrapolating from a hypothetical analysis using the rental stream model done by Ft. Sam Houston on the Beach Pavilions. The Beach Pavilions are geographically located within a five-minute (less than 1K) line of sight walk from BAMC. The Beach Pavilion is 107KSF and has a minimum fair market value of \$25.5M. This would imply the Old BAMC facility of 210KSF would have a minimum fair market value of \$50.0M. With the present value calculation of the anticipated lease for Old BAMC estimated at \$27.7M, the present value compared to fair market value of the anticipated lease is 54 percent of the fair market value or less. This is less than the 90 percent threshold above.
5. BAMC is a general-purpose asset. USARSO is only leasing a portion of this building. The Developer has the ability and is actively pursuing other commercial activities to occupy leased space in the building and as part of the overall lease. It is not special purpose for USARSO use. BAMC as the name implies was built to serve a hospital type mission that is inconsistent with USARSO's mission.
6. The private sector market for this asset exists and is the original concept for the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative.

Conclusion

It is not possible to guarantee that the lease will not be scored as a capital lease. The Army analysis above indicates that it is unlikely to be scored as a capital lease. The effect of its scoring as a capital lease is that the Army would have to put the NPV of the lease (\$27.7M) in an escrow account to be held for the term of the lease. These funds could not be used to pay for the lease.

This effect on the two options that passed the screening criteria would be to change the initial facility cost from \$5.7M cheaper for Ft. Sam Houston to \$22.1M more expensive for the Ft. Sam Houston option. However, as described in earlier portions of the report it is still the only option that can be executed in summer 03. The Ft. McPherson option passed the screening criteria, but during the evaluations the length of time to complete some of the building renovation

projects stretched beyond the summer 2003 requirement. While this would make the Ft. Sam Houston option more expensive, it would not change the outcome of the recommendation.

Appendix 4 – Summary of Economic Analysis of Facility Alternatives

The short table below summarizes the economic analysis of the facility alternatives between Fort McPherson and Fort Sam Houston.

Table 8 - Summary Table for Ft McPherson and Ft Sam Houston
(all costs in \$000)

	Initial cost	MCA	Annual expenses	20 year total	NPV (5.4%)
Ft McPherson option	\$ 14,550	\$ 15,000	\$ 623	\$ 42,003	\$ 33,397
Ft Sam Old BAMC	\$0	\$0	\$2,450	\$ 42,100	\$ 27,728

Description of the Alternatives

Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative.

This option is labeled Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem because facilities at both installations in the Atlanta area are needed to meet all USARSO requirements. There was no place on Fort McPherson for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and thus it was necessary to consider Fort Gillem for that requirement. The following is a description of the option and the impacts to other units.

BLD 41 cost \$2.5M. The Command Group and personnel staff would occupy the current JAG Headquarters as the most suitable building on post for the new USARSO Headquarters. This would require significant renovation and upgrade to the old existing building, as well as relocating the JAG to another location on post (including the creation of a new court room).

BLD 169-171 cost \$1.75M. Three interconnected buildings are in the process of being renovated for the new Transformation Installation Management Regional Headquarters. This would become the main administrative space for USARSO. It would require that the TIM Headquarters be relocated into the main FORSCOM Headquarters building. There are several costs involved in this. First, there is a cost to re-configure the three buildings to accommodate USARSO versus the TIM. There would be a further cost to redesign space allocation and reconfigure the floor plan for the main FORSCOM Headquarters building to accommodate the TIM.

BLD 200 cost \$0.5M. A small part of the USARSO G2 would co-locate with the FORSCOM G2 inside the SCIF in the FORSCOM Headquarters building.

BLD 58 cost \$2.3M. In two years, permanent administrative space could be available back on Fort McPherson with the vacation and renovation of

administrative space occupied by a Reserve Component Headquarters that is having a new Headquarters built on Fort Gillem.

Cost for TIM Relocation \$1.5M. This cost covers the redesign and reconfiguration needed to stop the TIM from moving into their designed facilities and reorganize and renovate those necessary portions of FORSCOM Headquarters to accommodate the new TIM location.

TIG cost \$4.0M (Initial Requirement). The remainder of the G2 and the TIG would need to have an existing Fort Gillem facility expanded and converted to another SCIF. This is currently an older building that was previously a SCIF. However, due to the expansion, the estimated cost is \$4M. This is the first project listed that would almost certainly be a MILCON project. (It was not realized that this would be a MILCON project until the evaluation stage of the process). This project cannot be completed by summer 2003.

TIG cost \$15.0M (Final Requirement). The final major facility requirement would be an expanded facility for the TIG when its authorizations are planned to increase from 88 to 255 in FY05. Additional facilities and SCIF space would be required in FY05. Estimated cost for this new facility is \$15M.

Temporary overflow at Fort Gillem \$2.0M. The combination of the buildings above provides less than 75KSF towards the USARSO requirement of 104KSF. Additional overflow space for USARSO administrative requirements would be needed at Fort Gillem. This would be temporary space, as the only available option there is converted warehouse space.

Annual maintenance cost. The annual utility, maintenance, and janitorial costs for facilities is \$3.78 per square foot as calculated by the Garrison Engineer. This figure is used to calculate the annual cost of \$623K for the facilities USARSO would occupy under this alternative.

This option involves significant impacts on at least three major Army units and significant renovation and reconfiguration. It is not an easily executable option, and as discovered during the evaluation process is only partially executable by summer 2003.

Table 9 - Summary Table for Ft McPherson
(all costs in \$000)

<i>Facility</i>	Initial facility renovation cost	MCA cost for future projects	Annual facilities maintenance cost	Profit expectations	Total 20 year cost
BLD 41	\$ 2,500		\$ 24		
BLD 169-171	\$ 1,750		\$ 251		
BLD 200 (SCIF modifications)	\$ 500		\$ 42		
BLD 58 (replaces Temp at Ft Gillem)	\$ 2,300		\$ 54		
Cost for TIM relocation	\$ 1,500				
PARC/DOC (with ACA)	\$0		\$ 10		
Ft Gillem facility costs					
Theater Intelligence Group	\$ 4,000	\$ 15,000	\$ 156		
Temp for overflow at Ft Gillem	\$ 2,000		\$ 86		
20 year cost	\$ 14,550	\$ 15,000	\$ 623	\$0	\$ 42,003

Fort Sam Houston Alternative.

The USARSO Headquarters and all support units can be relocated into the old Brooke Army Medical Center main building. All elements (to include the increase of the TIG in FY05) will fit into this building that has been leased from the Army to a developer (Orion/Weston) through authority of the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative under 10 USC 2667. The developer will renovate the building to meet USARSO requirements, to include SCIF space.

Orion/Weston currently holds the 50-year lease to the Old BAMC building and the two Beach Pavilions. The Old BAMC building (building 1000) has a total of 210KSF net rentable area. The USARSO requirement is for 104KSF expanding to 114KSF with the expansion of the TIG in FY05. This is 50 percent of the rentable space of the building to start, increasing to 54 percent in FY05.

Orion/Weston's estimate of the cost of this lease is \$23.49 per square foot. This includes standard janitorial service, maintenance, and utilities. This makes the cost of the lease \$2.3M for the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. The Army will share 46 percent of the profits from the lease over the lease term. Orion/Weston expects that the profit share for the Army in this lease alone will be \$5M. This may be returned to the Army in direct funds or through in-kind consideration.

Table 10 - Summary Table for Sam Houston
(all costs in \$000)

Lease cost	Initial facility renovation cost	MCA cost for future projects	Annual facilities maintenance cost	Profit expectations	Total 20 year cost
\$ 2,300	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$ 5,000.00	\$42,100.00

Appendix 5, Estimated Costs to Move

Total OMA And MPA Costs: The total cost to move to any location in the southeast United States is essentially the same (with the exception of the facility costs). These costs are captured in Table 5 below. Costs shown here do not include any "installation unique" facility costs. A written explanation of these costs follows the table.

	<u>OMA</u>	<u>MPA</u>
PERSONNEL COSTS	\$9,452	
MOVEMENT COSTS	\$14,100	\$5,483
AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT/WIRING	\$19,000	
ADDITIONAL COSTS	\$9,500	
TOTAL OMA CONSTRUCTION - OTHER POSTS	\$250	
TOTAL OMA REQUIRED TO MOVE	\$52,302	
TOTAL MPA REQUIRED TO MOVE		\$5,483

Table 11. Total USARSO Relocation Costs

These costs are offset by an estimated annual net cost savings to the Army of \$13M through reducing operating costs at Fort Buchanan to pre-USARSO levels. There is \$32.7M in appropriated MILCON funds held by the construction moratorium that can be reprogrammed for other Army requirements. The MILCON required to support a continued USARSO presence at Fort Buchanan is estimated at greater than \$50M. The funds saved will allow the Army to pay for the move over a few years.

Estimated Personnel Costs:

Description: Movement costs for relocation of an estimated 166 civilians. Includes movement costs at an average cost of \$50K per employee to cover airline transportation, movement of household goods, temporary quarters subsistence entitlement (TQSE), personal vehicle shipment, real estate costs, and other miscellaneous charges normally covered by the Joint Travel Request. Also covers Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, and Reduction in Force (RIF) of up to 36 spaces civilians at an average cost of \$25K each. Also covers cash-in of accrued leave of civilians affected by RIF. Assumes all military costs will be borne by the by Military Personnel, Army appropriation (centrally funded) upon approval of unit move and posting of unit movement orders by Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Estimated Movement Costs:

Description: Includes incremental temporary duty costs for coordination trips between San Juan and new location for building planning/design, coordination with installation to negotiate a myriad of support agreement issues, meetings with contractor(s), force protection coordination, implementation of communication/automation plan, command and control planning, intelligence coordination, logistics coordination relating to movement of USARSO equipment, packing & crating of USARSO office equipment, furniture, etc, line haul from port to new site, rental of 300 containers for sea/land shipment, and related costs for contractor to pack all items. Includes costs for movement of RED SWITCH from Fort Buchanan to new location, communications contract design for facility, electrical upgrades for communications/automation equipment relocated, special work at new facility for moved equipment, and associated costs.

Estimated Automation Equipment/Wiring Costs:

Description: Costs associated with automation required for new conference rooms, video teleconference facilities to include secure equipment required, new equipment for ramped-up theater support activity, special fiber purchase and installation at new facility for high-speed data transmission and high-load transmissions such as accounting data to Defense Finance and Accounting Service, central routers, servers, communications closets, switches, Global Command and Control System, initial local area network setup/linkages, contract support for reconfiguration, and radios/tactical sets for operations center. Also includes estimate for replacement/upgrade of current automation equipment and systems, which were purchased during move from Panama during the FY98 time frame, and are not adequate for command and control of USARSO. It would not be cost effective to prepare equipment, pack, crate, ship, unpack, re-prep, and install current systems when they are already outdated. In order for USARSO to be effective at new location, new system and link to main communication lines already in place at new facility would be required.

Other Costs at New CONUS Location:

Description: Office furniture and specialized furnishings (command group, visitors area, VIP area, main conference room); reimbursable costs charged by Army Installation (phone hookups, guard contract for facility, custodial contract, & other reimbursable services) and lease of facility in FY 2003.

Estimated MPA Costs:

Description: All movement costs for military personnel borne by Military Personnel, Army appropriation and centrally funded upon publishing of unit move orders.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 AUG 02 PM 12:43

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2002, 12:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: TRICARE Contracts--SNOWFLAKE

Tennell, J. C. on 2 Aug 02

- TRICARE contracts are the means through which we purchase health care from the civilian sector. More than half of the health care delivered to our beneficiary population (including retirees) is through private sector care.
- The TRICARE Management Activity will announce a solicitation for a new generation of TRICARE contracts this week. We have designed these contracts in close coordination with acquisition, just as if we were acquiring a major system, and with the benefit of independent advice from a variety of external organizations. Thus, we have already taken action on the issue you raised at Tab A (and on which Pete Aldridge and I are reporting to you in a separate response).
- The new TRICARE contracts, involving more than \$4 billion per year, represent a significant improvement:
 - Fewer: TRICARE will award three contracts, as opposed to the current seven contracts, through consolidation of geographic regions. This will make life easier for our people, simplify contracting efforts, ease administration, and promote cost-savings through greater economies of scale.
 - Simpler: We have reduced the volume of government specification, and encouraged private sector solutions to improve customer service and health outcomes.
 - Improved Accountability: The new contracts place greater responsibility on local military medical commanders to manage the delivery of quality, cost-effective health care to their local beneficiaries. Three geographical regional directors will be responsible for managing overall health plan performance, particularly the delivery of services by the TRICARE contractors.
 - Incentives for Performance: The TRICARE contracts reward contractors for improving customer satisfaction, increasing utilization of military medical facilities, and controlling health care costs.
- We have briefed the Service Vice Chiefs, Service Secretaries, Congress' relevant committees and subcommittees, OMB, and beneficiary organizations on our planned actions. All have been supportive. A comprehensive two part brief is currently being scheduled for you addressing the Military Health System and its transformation.

Attachment: As Stated

Prepared by: Dr. William Winkenwerder (ASD/HA)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10497

U12475 / 02

showfile

6/26/02

June 25, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: David Chu
Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tricare

Please take a look at the attached note, and tell me if you think it is correct and what we should do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-23



Please respond by 08/02/02

One of the root causes of the current situation is that the Tricare procurement services are not a part of the overall DoD procurement services. They are a subset of Tricare. As a result, they have not historically benefitted from the experience or caliber of thinking and action that the DoD procurement drives. Linking these areas would likely be a significant improvement.

6/26/02

June 25, 2002 8:53 AM

TO: David Chu
Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Tricare

Please take a look at the attached note, and tell me if you think it is correct and what we should do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-23

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

701

ASTJno2

U12603 / 02

One of the root causes of the current situation is that the Tricare procurement services are not a part of the overall DoD procurement services. They are a subset of Tricare. As a result, they have not historically benefited from the experience or caliber of thinking and action that the DoD procurement drives. Linking these areas would likely be a significant improvement.




UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100
 INFO MEMO



2002 AUG -6 AM 9:20
 August 6, 2002, 8:30 am

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: DoD Paying Contractors' Other Business Development Costs

- You asked what we ought to do about the current contractors' view: "that they saw DoD as a customer that could be taken advantage of because they lacked relevant knowledge and that it was a great way to generate cash and get the government to pay for your other business development."
- Reforms under the prior administration shifted regulatory emphasis to commercial-like pricing strategies, and discouraged using actual product cost to set the price. This may be the basis of the industry view that our lack of relevant knowledge places us at a disadvantage. A 2001 DoDIG review of awards made without product cost data, found inadequate documentation of how the price was evaluated in 86 percent of the contracts reviewed.
- The industry view, "great way...to get the government to pay for your other business development" is likely related to relaxed controls over independent research and development (IR&D) expenditures. Contractors are no longer required to negotiate IR&D ceilings or affirmatively establish the military relevance of IR&D projects. The new approach relies on competitive pressures to keep contractors from inflating indirect costs, including IR&D. Any products resulting from IR&D programs are considered "developed at private expense" even though DoD may have paid for all or most of the IR&D cost through charges to its current contracts. On the other hand, some contractors have expressed concerns that there is DoD program office pressure to utilize their IR&D budgets to pursue program office areas of interest and they are not able to independently pursue other business development. ✖
- The industry view "great way to generate cash" may relate to changes in interim financing policies. To mirror commercial practices and reduce oversight, changes were made to the acquisition regulations to give preference to interim financing based on attainment of physical milestones. The payment is based on estimated cost for the work completed rather than actual expenditures. This increases the risk that interim contract payments could exceed actual contractor expenditures throughout the life of the contract.

*I recall this from my days as Sec.



- Use of commercial contracting strategies when buying products and services for which there are legitimate commercial markets can save administrative cost and reduce procurement lead-time. The industry views being expressed may indicate our execution of these new policies requires improvement.
- DCAA will discuss its audit experiences and the risks evident in these new policies with the DoDIG, so they can continue their review of these new practices and recommend appropriate changes or improved applications.

COORDINATION: IG

Prepared by: William H. Reed, DCAA

(b)(6)

Received 6/26 0945

June 25, 2002 9:25 AM

TO: David Chu
Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Contractors

Please take a look at the attached note, and let me know what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

6/26

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-24

Sir,

Tasked to DCAA

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02 VIA DCFD - Response

summary

~~7~~ 7/26.

3/2

Extension granted by
Col Inesi until 3/8.

1/2

stwe

02 Jun 176

One of the current contractors' consultants stopped in this week and talked about the current contractors point of view which truly was worse than we had appreciated. They portrayed the sense that they saw the DoD as a customer that could be taken advantage of because they lacked relevant knowledge and that it was a great way to generate cash and get the government to pay for your other business development.

June 25, 2002 9:25 AM

TO: David Chu
Pete Aldridge
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Contractors

DR

160

Please take a look at the attached note, and let me know what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

6/26

Attach.
Note

DHR:dh
062502-24

Sir,
Tashed to DCAA

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02 VIA DCFB. Response.

3/2 cum..... 7/26.

Extension granted by
Col Bruce until 8/8. v/r Steve

25 JUN 02

02 JUN 17 62

One of the current contractors' consultants stopped in this week and talked about the current contractors point of view which truly was worse than we had appreciated. They portrayed the sense that they saw the DoD as a customer that could be taken advantage of because they lacked relevant knowledge and that it was a great way to generate cash and get the government to pay for your other business development.

showlake

2/4 1230
February 1, 2002 3:54 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Troop Strength

*Done
2/21*

Please arrange for me to get a one-page paper weekly or monthly that shows where our forces are around the world, so that I can keep track, for example, of something like this comparison of Afghanistan and Salt Lake City.

320.2

That is amazing!

Thanks.

Attach.
01/30/02 SMA memo to SecDef re: Troop Strength

DHR:dh
020102-6

.....
Please respond by 02/08/02

1 Feb 02

U12739 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10508



SecDef Global Snapshot

ENDURING FREEDOM

ENDURING FREEDOM

JFCOM - 104,000 Troops

- OPN NOBLE EAGLE (DDP Support for Homeland Sec) (87,000)
- JFCOM Homeland Defense (2,000)
- JTF-B (Domestic Counter Drug) (140)
- 2002 Olympic Security Support (4,500)
- Iceland Defense Force (360)

EUCOM - 100,000 Troops

- OPN JOINT FORGE (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (3,119)
- OPN JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo) (5,198)
- OPN NORTHERN WATCH (Iraq) (1,244)
- OPN AMBER FOX (FYROM) (9)

Major Exercise:

- West African Training Cruise (Gabon) (41)

CENTCOM - 52,600 Troops

- USA: 10,702
- USAF: 14,376
- USMC: 3,980
- USN: 21,747
- OPN ENDURING FREEDOM
- OPN SOUTHERN WATCH (Iraq)
- OPN DESERT SPRING (Kuwait)
- Maritime Interception Ops
- MFO SINAI (Egypt) (825)

Major Exercises:

- BALANCE KNIGHT (Kyrgyz) (10)

SOUTHCOM - 7,547 Troops

- JTF-160/170 (GTMO) (1,784)
- JTF-BRAVO (five countries) (426)
- COUNTERDRUG DETECTION & MONITORING in the Source and Transit Zones (321)
- Forward Operation Locations (FOL- four countries) (363)
- OPN NEW HORIZONS (El Sal, Nic) (503)

PACOM - 115,000 Troops

- JTF-510 (Southern Philippines) (553)
- EAST TIMOR -UNTAET / USGET(29)
- JTF FULL ACCOUNTING (Laos) (9)
- B-1 Recovery Operation (Diego Garcia) (197)
- Humanitarian Demining (Thailand, Cambodia) (12,11)
- BRAVA 01 (Cambodia) (14)
- CILHI (ID / Recovery) (Kwajalein) (20)

POC: J3LO / J3 SOD LO

~~SECRET//REL USA/GBR~~
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: X5



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SECDEF HAS SFF
SEP 11 2007

1500, 30 Jan 02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: VADM Ed Giambastiani, USN

SUBJECT: **Troop Strength-Salt Lake City vs. Afghanistan**

- ❖ The following numbers are provided in response to the SNOWFLAKE memo dated 29 January on personnel guarding Salt Lake City for the Winter Olympics versus Military Personnel on the ground in Afghanistan:

US Forces <u>in</u> Afghanistan	4,003	4203.
DoD Personnel at Salt Lake City	4,369	8000 in AIPS 7000 on Border

For comparison:

US Forces in Guantanamo Bay	1,572
US Forces in the Philippines	520

Very respectfully,



WINTER OLYMPICS AND PARALYMPICS

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES/REASON: 1.5(A) DECLASSIFY ON 30 JAN 2012

- 9 Days Until Opening Ceremony 8 Feb 02
- 4,369 DOD Personnel in the JOA

Last 48 Hours

- 199 Soldiers Redeployed from the JOA
- 4 Venues become Operational:
 - Olympic Oval
 - Soldier Hollow
 - Park City
 - Deer Valley
- The Olympic Village Opened for Athletes

Next 48 Hours

- DoD soldiers conduct Inspection Operations, Magnometer Training, EOD Sweeper Training, and Security Missions

Personnel Stats

USA	307
USAR	295
ARNG	3,486
USAF	83
USAFR	70
ANG	65
USN	12
USNR	3
USMC	36
USCGR	1
DoD Civ	11
Total	4,369

UNCLASSIFIED

2


11-L-0559/OSD/10511



CENTCOM -- US, Coalition and ISAF Forces

E D U R I N G F R E E D O M

K O R P O R A T I O N



POC: J1 LO

~~SECRET//REL USA/GBR~~
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: X5

January 29, 2002 3:03 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Troop Strength

If I am not mistaken, we have more people guarding Salt Lake City than we have in Afghanistan. Please check the actual numbers, and let me know. That is an interesting fact.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-33

.....

Please respond by 02/04/02

1/30
SECDEF -
RESPONSE
ATTACHED.
V/R
Ed

February 1, 2002 8:27 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction

Please give me a read on what the three Congressmen's reactions were to the speech. I would be curious to know, given the fact I talked a bit about the Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020102-2

.....
Please respond by 02/06/02

*Response attached
D. Rumsfeld*

2/12


032

17602

U12740 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10514

February 8, 2002 7:00 p.m.

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Powell Moore 
SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction (Snowflake memo 020102-2)

All three Members of the House of Representatives who attended the speech at NDU were very positive in their comments about your speech. Ike Skelton sat next to me and made several whispering comments of agreement during the course of the speech. We rode together back to the Hill and he was very complimentary and indicated an intention to insert the speech in the Congressional Record. So far, however, it has not appeared. The only negative from Ike on the day of the speech was a comment to reporters as he walked out that sometimes he thinks you should reread Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. (attached)

Ellen Tauscher was effusive in her praise. She said that your style of leadership has provided us with options as a nation in the war against terrorism that we might not otherwise have.

Jim Moran was also complimentary.

11-L-0559/OSD/10515

Section 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.

Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

SHORT TITLE: "THE AUTHORITY TO FARMARK"

Section 8. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;

To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

To establish post offices and post roads;

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And

To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Section 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.

No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one state, be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.

No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a

showfile
2/4
3 7 0

February 1, 2002 8:27 AM

3/1/02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Advance Work at Speeches

Done

I am not getting the kind of help I need on dignitaries attending my speeches.

My speech probably cannot reflect who is there, because the speech is done before I get there, and no one knows in advance which Congressman or Senator is actually going to attend. On the other hand, someone at the event needs to give me a piece of paper with who is actually there and how to pronounce their names.

We have to figure out a way to improve it.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
020102-1

.....
Please respond by 02/06/02

350.05120

1 Feb 02

U12741 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10518

9:52 AM

ACTION
215
1452

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 2, 2002
SUBJECT: Enron

I notice they are asking the White House not to throw away anything relating to Enron. They may not know that, I think at one point, Tom White, while he was still at Enron, we were trying to hire him. He was interviewed over there, and maybe even met the President at some point before he actually left Enron. We may want to get a record of that so we can alert them and let them be aware of it, so they include that in any subpoena that may be issued.

250

We also probably ought to keep track as well of the contacts we had with Enron officials here, including White, prior to the time White came on board. Why don't you see if you can pull together a list of that.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
020202.04

Please respond by: _____

U12742 /02

27602

February 4, 2002 11:09 AM

PERSONAL
15 2/6
1354

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Syrian

Sometime on Thursday or Friday I would like to talk to Rick Kisling about the Syrian who was in front of our house and what the status of that is. I would like to know the details.

My impression is that the FBI let him leave the country, even though all of his answers were inaccurate. Is that true?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020402-14

.....
Please respond by _____

SYRIAN

11 FEB 02

U12743 /02

February 4, 2002 10:36 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Context

Done
2/12
1300

Please make sure you get me the context of that statement I made to BBC that "I don't have the slightest concern about the detainee case."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020402-11

.....
Please respond by _____

Larry Di Rita

2/11

383.6

2/1/02

Please see attached clear. Repentantly, you made the reason for us weren't because of the very humane detainees receive the detainees

47682

U12744 /02

February 4, 2002 2:08 PM

INFO
1355
2-6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Seating Diagram

The next time we do a table chart, please make the names face me from where I am sitting, so I can look down the table and see it, instead of backwards.

Thanks.

Attach.
Seating Chart for Big 8 Lunch

DHR:dh
020402-17

.....

Please respond by _____

337

4 Feb 02

U12745 /02

Show me wa

SecDef

DepSecDef

Senator Inouye

Senator Stevens

Senator Levin

Senator Warner

Mr. Skelton

Secy
Navy

Secy Army

Dr. Zakheim

Gen Myers

Dr. Chu

Ms. Clarke

Mr. Moore

Dave

Mr. Lyles

July

Ms. Ansley

Charlie

Mr. Houly

Steve
Mr. Cortese

Robt

Mr. Rangel

John

Mr. Schweiter

Kevin

Mr. Roper

Mr. Di Rita

Bob

Mr. Geren

VADM G

Screen

11-L-0559/OSD/10523

INFO
216
1345

February 4, 2002 7:26 AM


TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Speech Ideas

Here is the last part of Wolfowitz's speech at Wehrkunde. It has some good ideas in it—the story about the German ship is terrific. We ought to use that sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.
DepSecDef Wehrkunde speech

DHR:dh
020402-2



Please respond by _____

330.001 SID

4 Feb 02

U12746 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10524

9/1

One area of growing importance in defense planning will be missile defenses. Secretary Rumsfeld made clear in his speech here last year that the time had come to move forward and address our vulnerability to missile attacks. A year later, the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. And the sky has not fallen. Now is the time to move beyond that debate and pursue a common approach to building effective defenses against limited missile attacks.

We have seen terrorists exploit the vulnerability of our open societies to attack symbols of our strength. We should harbor no false illusions that those states that form the "axis of evil" will not try to exploit our vulnerabilities to missile attacks as well. While we may not know who will challenge us, when or where, we should not wait for the next surprise attack to launch our preparations. Now is the time to shore up our vulnerabilities.

Closing

The democracies of the world govern by the rule of law and self-determination. The Taliban, like other tyrants, ruled by terror. It is not an accident that every state that sponsors terrorism also terrorizes its own people.

But that is a fundamental weakness of those regimes and a fundamental advantage for us in the fight against terrorism. People who are terrorized by their rulers can become our best allies pressuring those rulers to get out of the business of supporting terrorism. After the liberation of Mazar-e Sharif, the Afghan people greeted

the arrival of their liberators with joy. “Everywhere I go the civilians and Mujahadeen soldiers are always telling me they are glad the USA has come. They all speak of their hopes for a better Afghanistan once the Taliban are gone.” That was a sentiment that soon echoed throughout Afghanistan.

Ronald Reagan understood this truth. In 1982, during one of the darker moments of the Cold War, he told the British Parliament that even in the Communist world, “man’s instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again....How we conduct ourselves here in the Western democracies will determine whether this trend continues....”

In the twenty years since then, we have seen the triumph of self-determination in regimes previously totalitarian and authoritarian on both sides of the Cold War divide. It is not unreasonable to think that similar developments are yet to come. And when they do, they may reduce some of the sources of terrorism since terrorists are less likely to come from successful societies than failed states that have been fertile breeding grounds for terror. But, we cannot wait for these developments to take action against terrorist today.

In doing so, we recall the strength President Reagan described when he spoke of NATO on the 40th anniversary of the D-Day Invasion: “We are bound today by what bound us [then]—the same loyalties, traditions, beliefs. We’re bound by reality. The strength of America’s allies is vital to the United States, and the American security guarantee is essential to the continued freedom of Europe’s democracies. We were

with you then; we are with you now. Your hopes are our hopes; and your destiny is our destiny.”

That spirit is still alive and strong twenty years later. Just a couple weeks after September 11th, a German Navy destroyer, the *Lutjens*, asked for permission to come alongside the USS Winston Churchill. When *Lutjens* drew close enough, the U.S. sailors were moved to see an American flag flying at half-mast. As the *Lutjens* drew even closer, her entire crew could be seen manning the rails in their dress uniforms. And they displayed a sign that said, “We Stand By You.” One young American Naval officer reported back home: “...there was not a dry eye on the bridge as they stayed alongside us for a few minutes and we cut our salutes. It was probably the most powerful thing I have seen in my entire life.”

As an alliance, we have never been stronger. We have never been more united. We have never been more resolved to move forward together. Let us make this journey with the promise of one ally's sailors to another: “we stand by you.”

Thank you very much.

¹ Citadel, December 11, 2001

ACTION
AS 2/6
1445

February 4, 2002 7:29 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tom Ricks

Look what Tom Ricks has to say about us—it is pretty harsh.

Let's discuss that. We may want to give him a call. It sounds to me like he can dish it out, but he can't take it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Magazine article

CR:1

DHR:dh
020402-3

.....

Please respond by 02/08/02

*H
1/14/02*

U12747 /02

Post Watch

By HARRY JAFFE

Post Goes to War With Rumsfeld

We have found the Evil Empire, and it is us, in the view of *Post* military correspondent **Thomas Ricks**.

The Pentagon has a "Soviet-style definition of information," says Ricks. Officials' attitude is "Unless it comes from us, it is not legitimate. We will tell you what you need to know and when you need to know it."

Ricks thinks the commissar of the evil empire is Defense Secretary **Donald Rumsfeld**. He may

be a cover boy on newweeklies, but to Ricks he's undemocratic.

"He gives the appearance of being very candid," says Ricks, "but he provides very little information." Rumsfeld has "intimidated" the press, Ricks says, and played favorites.

"I think we've been singled out for punishment," Ricks says of the *Post*. "Some people at the Pentagon have tried to punish us."

The Pentagon might be punishing the newspaper as payback

for having to handle the inane questions of *Post* and *Newsweek* columnist **Lally Weymouth**, sister of Post Company chief **Don Graham**. Take this snippet from a recent interview:

Weymouth: He [President Bush] told a friend of mine the other night that went to see him, well, at least the friend of mine claimed to me—who is absolutely enraptured with the President—

Rumsfeld: He's an impressive guy.

Weymouth: Yeah. No. I—and I went to a New York dinner party where you were deemed to be the **Gary Cooper** of the administration. It's true.

Rumsfeld: [Laughter] Please don't [inaudible].

Weymouth: I know, but it's true. Okay, well, that was just the general thought. That Iraq was where it's going. But no, that's not—we're still in Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld: Right.

Ricks has sparred with Rumsfeld in interviews. And during a press conference, Rumsfeld

called a Ricks story "a world-class thumb sucker."

To the contrary, Ricks says the *Post* has broken tough stories that have stung Rumsfeld to the point of taking retribution.

For proof, Ricks points to the Pentagon's choice of reporters to accompany Special Forces in Afghanistan. The *New York Times*, *USA Today*, ABC, and three other news organizations were invited. The *Post* was not allowed on the trip.

Actually, the *Post* has been granted rare interviews with Rumsfeld, and most news organizations join the *Post* in whining that the Pentagon is controlling the news.

Pentagon spokesman **Brian Whitman** says Ricks is a "fine journalist" and scoffs at the payback theory: "I think that any claim would be unsupported by the facts."

To read the complete Rumsfeld/Weymouth interview, see www.washingtonian.com.

Rumsfeld grills reporters while they try to fry him.



Are the Olympics Ready for Hank Stuever?

The *Post* Sports section is dispatching two columnists, four reporters, and an editor to cover the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City—but keep your eye on **Style**, which is sending **Hank Stuever**, the reporter/essayist who takes great pleasure in portraying many things dear to Americans as lowbrow and laughable.

Stuever has cast his vinegar eye on "the national loathing for New Year's Eve." He's gone acerbic on Harry Potter, Christmas sweaters, and Mickey Mouse. "Walt Disney World is a place of pure joy," he wrote, "except for the people who cannot have a good time there."

Which suggests the question: Can Hank have a good time at the Olympics?

"There will be people partying in spite of the Mormons," he says, "and Mormons praying in spite of the people. It's perfect. I'm not setting out to do a takedown."

Readers have tried to take Stuever down in complaints to the paper and its ombudsman. They have called him a "moron."

Says Stuever: "I'm sure everyone will be very angry, no matter what I do."

Mann Bites Post for Big Bucks

There are *Post* readers who will miss **Judy Mann's** column—most, probably, are women, because she wrote about women. And there are editors who are pleased she has retired—like executive editor **Len Downie**, who tried to jettison her years ago.

But the question hanging in the air is how much the *Post* paid to settle Mann's longstanding pay-discrimination complaint.

"A horrible gag rule was part of the settlement," says **Rick Ehrmann**, a lawyer with the newspaper guild. Mann isn't talking, but others are.

Mann started her column in 1978, at the height of the feminist movement. Later the column fell out of favor within the paper. In the mid-1980s editors moved her off the front of *Metro* to a spot opposite the comics. When Mann realized her pay had moved south in comparison to that of other columnists, such as **Richard Cohen**, she joined a class-action gender-and-race complaint in 1988.

Then Downie took

Judy Mann and dog Norma at her Virginia farm.

over from **Ben Bradlee** in 1991 and called Mann into his office, where he gave her the impression that the column was a goner. Female readers, language expert **Debra Tannen** among them, mounted a successful campaign to save the feminist column.

The class-action complaints hung around until the *Post* agreed in 1997 to arbitrate wage cases on an individual basis.

What came of it? "A handsome settlement," says a union operative. Rumor at the *Post* pegged the payoff at \$100,000. But some sources scoff at that figure. A better guess is \$400,000.

Mann, 58, is said to be satisfied by the outcome. She has repaired to her farm near Woodstock, Virginia, with her husband and dog. Name of the place: Gender Gap Farm.



February 5, 2002 8:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photos

Date 4/5

I don't want any more photos in GTMO unless I see them and say okay.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020502-4



Please respond by _____

DR

5 Feb 02

U12748 /02

2/6
showfile
1820

February 6, 2002 3:59 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Concentration of Facilities

Please read this note from Timmons. I think it is a good idea.

Why don't we fashion a memo from me to Andy Card, and see if they think it is a good idea. Then they can step in and ramrod it.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/06/02 Timmons ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
020602-31

.....
Please respond by 02/14/02

2/11

601

*→ Delanie -
Please do a memo/letter
to Andy Card.*

*" Bill Timmons makes a
very good point in the ~~memo~~
letter I've attached. ~~the~~
We're ~~looking~~ ^{thinking} through the
implications of such a concept for the
DoD. You may want to think about it
you might want to do."*

62602

U12749 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10531

CC: ~~Given~~ to L.D.R. to
Given

TIMMONS AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED

1850 K STREET, N. W. • SUITE 850 • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 06 2002

WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS

6 February 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I don't want to beat a dead horse, but the enclosed clipping from the newspaper prompts me to write again about the need to disperse federal functions from the Washington, DC region. Many buildings are owned, leased, or partially rented by the federal government, and now a new \$825 million deal has been made to build two more huge structures.

It's just a matter of time before terrorists unleash disasters of one kind or another on our Capital City. With modern communications and transportation there is no need to have all essential government functions located in one place, especially when heartland communities would provide less expensive, better equipped, and more talent for government facilities.

What community wouldn't trade in a heartbeat 4,000 civilian jobs for 4,000 military personnel? Service men and women frequently live on base, eat, purchase at the PX, and receive medical treatment there. Civilians would buy homes, contribute to the local economy in many ways, and provide stable employment.

As you identify military facilities for closure, I would hope the President might start a phased withdrawal of agencies that bloat the District of Columbia.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,



William E. Timmons

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/10532

The Washington Post

MIETRO

Maryland & D.C.
Edition

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2002

DM 5

SE Site Picked for Transportation Dept.

Some D.C. Officials Say \$825 Million Deal Will Cut Off Access to Waterfront, Hurt Neighborhood

By JACKIE SPINNER and NEELY TUCKER
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Department of Transportation will move to an 11-acre complex to be built at Southeast Federal Center, an \$825 million lease deal designed to make over a commercial wasteland on the Anacostia waterfront that has been targeted for development for four decades.

The General Services Administration, the federal government's real estate agency, reached a deal late Friday that will sell 11 of the 55 acres that make up the Southeast Federal Center to the JBG Co., a Washington developer, and its financial partner, JER Partners Inc. of McLean.

The plans call for two office buildings totaling 1.35 million square feet of space for the new headquarters at Third Street and

New Jersey Avenue SE. The two buildings, the tallest of which will rise 11 stories, will be separated by an open-air plaza and boulevard connecting to Third Street. The private companies will spend \$400 million to acquire the land and put up the buildings, which will take four to five years to complete.

Federal officials praised the deal as good news for one of the District's most neglected corners. But several city officials, including

Mayor Anthony A. Williams, the city's planning director and some D.C. Council members, opposed the move. Critics said the development will create an imposing wall of federal buildings that will block off the river from view and the waterfront from use, leaving barren streets and a barren neighborhood.

See WATERFRONT, C4, Col. 1

Action
to 2/11
0845

February 6, 2002 5:15 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Suggestions for the NSC

Please edit the attached list, polish it, and work it into a nice, clean, sterile, non-offensive format that maybe we can give someone a frontal lobotomy with.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/06/02 Suggestions for the NSC

DHR:dh
020602-33



Please respond by 02/14/02

334 NSC

6/1/02

U12751 /02

February 6, 2002 5:59 PM

SUBJECT: Suggestions for the NSC

1. Prepare and circulate a calendar that runs two weeks in advance.
2. Establish a 48-hour rule on papers arriving in an office prior to any meeting during the week, and on weekends, a 72-hour rule. (For example, papers would arrive on a Friday before a Monday meeting, not on Saturday.)
3. Schedule will indicate who is expected to participate on the topics—which departments or individuals will have some responsibility for briefing or for leading a discussion.
4. Papers will be presented to offices rather than to Principals (except on rare occasions), so staffs will be able to get copies and begin preparing.
5. For technical and legal documents, the typical line in/line out approach will be used.
6. NSC will take any future documents coming from the legal side of the house and put them into a policy process, with a policy overlay. That way documents being worked on by policy people will be written in policy form, as opposed to legal form. When policy conclusions are needed, lawyers will craft legal documents to fit the policy decisions.
7. Documents will contain suggestions to accompany major decisions as to the public plan—who will do the releasing, what the talking points are, and/or who is responsible for press releases.
8. To the extent appropriate, the documents will indicate who is responsible for Congressional notifications and/or international notifications.

DHR:dh
020602-32

11-L-0559/OSD/10535

Action
JS 2/7
1400

February 6, 2002 1:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Crusader

Please book the Roosevelt Room and schedule a briefing there for anyone in the senior White House staff, Congressional Relations office, press office, Karen Hughes' office—it has to be at a time Andy Card can physically be present.

470

At a meeting yesterday with the President, Card said, "Why don't you cancel the Crusader?" I said, "You should get briefed on the Crusader. I am tired of hearing about the Crusader. If you folks want to get briefed, and then tell me to cancel it, we'll cancel it."

Please set a briefing to explain how it works, what it is for, what it used to be, and what it is now. I think it probably ought to be done by Paul Wolfowitz, Dov Zakheim and Tom White (not Shinseki).

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020602-3

.....

Please respond by 02/20/02

64652

U12752 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10536

1
snowflake

ACTION
2/7
1303

February 6, 2002 7:07 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Crusader

Please look at this *New York Times* editorial that says a 70-ton Crusader. Please have someone write them and tell them it is 40 tons and what a disservice that is.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/05/02 *New York Times* editorial, "The Axis-of-Inefficiency Budget"

DHR:dh
020602-2

.....

Please respond by 02/13/02

4710

6 Feb 02

U12753 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10537

The Axis-of-Inefficiency Budget

President Bush's proposed \$2.1 trillion budget embraces the word "security" at every turn. It provides more spending for military security and domestic security and more tax cuts for "economic security." But the budget undermines the security of the nation's social safety net and the government's ability to carry out some of its basic responsibilities over the next two decades. It jeopardizes the future of Social Security and Medicare, whose trust funds would be siphoned away to underwrite outmoded military projects and tax reductions favoring the rich. The budget embodies a divisive agenda for which Mr. Bush has no mandate, in spite of his popularity.

For weeks the administration has cleverly leaked news about a handful of domestic programs like family nutrition, health research and food stamps that were targeted for spending increases. But the budget the administration presented yesterday revealed that everything outside these few programs was up for assault. According to Mitchell Daniels, the budget director, the administration is targeting only inefficient programs. The cuts, he insists, are not aimed at hobbling job training, environmental programs or labor safety — although those are some of the areas that will suffer. The administration, he says, is simply trying to do away with bad management. Mr. Daniels has created a virtual axis of inefficiency, and declared war on it.

It is hard to accept Mr. Daniels's sincerity when the defense budget remains packed with cold-war-era projects that have no business in the kind of modern, high-tech military the Bush administration wants to create. The budget will lock in billions of dollars in future spending for outmoded technology like the 70-ton Crusader howitzer and the F-22 jet fighter. Apparently the only federal programs that can be inefficient are the ones the Republican Party's right wing doesn't like.

The most discouraging part of the new budget is the way it disguises the true cost of its tax cuts with accounting gimmicks and arbitrary expiration

dates. Almost incredibly, Mr. Bush wants to accelerate and make permanent previously enacted tax cuts and add new tax cuts on top of them. He says that his actions would cost more than \$600 billion over the next 10 years, but without the gimmicks they would cost more than \$1 trillion.

The Bush budget is a road map toward a different kind of American society, in which the government no longer taxes the rich to aid the poor, and in fact does very little but protect the nation from foreign enemies. If the budget is adopted as proposed, over the next decade the increasing cost of the tax cuts will drain the treasury while the rapidly escalating price tag of unnecessary military projects will make up a larger and larger piece of what is left.

Virtually everyone supports spending as much money as it takes to fight the war on terrorism at home and abroad. But national security does not require new corporate tax write-offs or contracting for a new fighter plane designed primarily for cold-war-era dogfights. Mr. Bush is using the anti-terrorism campaign to disguise an ideological agenda that has nothing to do with domestic defense or battling terrorism abroad. The budget discontinues the tradition of making 10-year projections into the future, possibly because the administration does not want the American people to see where the road is heading.

One of the many pieces of this budget that the public would never accept if consulted is the harm it does to the future of Medicare and Social Security. When asked yesterday to address charges that the administration was not leaving enough money to keep Medicare and Social Security solvent, Mr. Daniels said both were heading toward insolvency anyway. His policies seemed intent on starving the federal government of money to save them so that they can be "fixed" by privatizing them in ways that favor the well-to-do.

The budget now goes to Congress, where it needs to be rethought and stripped of its gimmicks disguising the true cost of what it wants to do.

Decoding Enron

To the Editor:
Re "The Peace" (Op-Ed)
What aspect of the transition can be so minded and
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New

To the Editor:
Yasir Arafat wr
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Israeli civilians."
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civilians were pe
bers of his own org
we take his words
He continues to
"right of return"
refugees to Israel
means that he wa
state in the West B
another one in I
those refugees in
mount to national

Netanya, Is

To the Editor:
Yasir Arafat (Op-Ed)
Palestinians "will
equals" with the Is
the terms of a peac
contradicts the tra
sition of negotiating

Only the I

To the Editor:
Re "When \$450,000
Starter Home" (p. 31):
Santa Cruz is n
ate town in which

February 6, 2002 7:02 AM

Done
2/12
1300 etc

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interview

DR

Richard Whittle of the *Dallas Morning News* wants an interview sometime. His card is attached. He said he had been trying to see me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Whittle Business Card

DIR:dh
020602-1

.....
Please respond by 02/13/02

2/11

Response attached
DR

Larry Di Rita

000-7151

6 Feb 02

U12754 /02

TO: SECDEF

FROM:

Torie

DATE: February 8, 2002

SUBJECT: Interview

We will put Rick on the scheduling list.

You should know however, that although I talk to him almost every day, he has never requested an interview with you. According to Press Operations, and Susan Wallace (who fields all your interview requests), he has not requested an interview since last May.

11-L-0559/OSD/10540

February 6, 2002 3:47 PM

NFO
2/8
1735

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Trilateral Commission

I agreed to do the Saturday morning part of this Tom Foley event. I said I would speak for 5 or 10 minutes and then answer questions.

Larry, the reason I decided to do it is that it seems to me I am getting pounded over in Europe on this detainee thing, and I think it would be a good thing to give them a chance to ask questions.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/06/02 Di Rita memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
020602-29

.....

Please respond by 02/13/02

TS/106

6-26-02

U12756 /02

February 6, 2002

MEMO TO SECDEF

From: Di Rita

Subj: PHONE CALL WITH AMBASSADOR TOM FOLEY

*Ritz Carlton
Hotel*

*Who here -
#*

250-275-

Ambassador Foley will call to invite you speak to the spring gathering of the Trilateral Commission in Washington, D.C., April 6-7. (calendar is open)

I spoke with him already, thanked him, and was non-committal. He desires to speak with you about it, too.

Ambassador Foley advises that Secretary of State Powell and Alan Greenspan have agreed to speak.

The April long-range calendar as it stands now is attached.

We have a longer-term speech and public appearance plan for in and out of Washington. We can consider this in that context.

Events such as this don't offer much bang for the buck. I'm disinclined.

Ewige / N.A. / J Agn. Vac. Div. / RLC / Maline

FE - Spt AM - Ritz Carlton

Long Range Calendar - Secretary of Defense - as of 02/06/02

APRIL 2002

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	1 Way Ahead Feith Group @ DC DSD vacation <i>Senate Budget Resolution</i>	2 Way Ahead Feith Group @ DC DSD vacation	3 Way Ahead Feith Group @ DC DSD vacation	4 Way Ahead Feith Group @ DC DSD vacation	5 Way Ahead Feith Group @ DC DSD vacation <i>Valerie & children depart DC</i>	6 <i>Daylight's savings begins</i> DSD vacation <i>JR/DR @ Wizards v. Grizzlies</i>
7 DSD vacation	8	9	10	11	12	13
14 <i>JR/DR @ Wizards v. Pacers</i>	15 <i>Concurrent budget resolution</i>	16	17	18	19	20 Elaine Bennett/Alma Powell Best Friends Rock and Roll event – pm (t)
21	22 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA	23 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA	24 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA	25 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA	26 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA	27 SecDef-Ivanov Location TBA
28	29	30 Paul Richard b-day				

APRIL 2002

Congress on Spring Recess: March 24 to April 8

Acton
2/7
1439 ds

February 6, 2002 10:52 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photos in GTMO

Here is an article from the *Washington Times* about another photograph causing outrage—the photo is of a prisoner being transported in a stretcher, and the article talks about electrodes and things.

060

Please do what I asked, and stop allowing photos down there. All they do is inflame people. What is going on?

Larry, please set a meeting for me to talk to Torie about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020602-20

.....
Please respond by 02/08/02

6 Feb 02

U12757 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10544

...ines
...as retribution
...attacks, the paper reported.
...near the town of Rafah, Palestin-
only can...
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BRITAIN

Rice gives sharp reply to ally's critics in press

By Paul Martin
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

LONDON — The government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, Washington's closest ally in the war on terrorism, is smarting over a wrap on the knuckles by President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.

A respected columnist for the Times of London, Anthony Howard, wrote this week that the close and unqualified backing for the United States by Britain is repeating the "mistake" of former Labor Prime Minister Harold Wilson over Vietnam, which contributed to his loss of electoral power in 1970.

The dispute began Friday when Foreign Secretary Jack Straw suggested that Mr. Bush used the term "axis of evil" in an attempt to boost Republican prospects in November congressional elections.

Several British newspapers characterized Mr. Straw's comments as the first open dissent between Britain and America since the September 11 attacks on the United States.

Miss Rice shot back in a television interview Sunday. "This is not about American politics, and I assume that when the British government speaks about foreign policy, it's not about

British politics," she said.

The British government also found itself on the defensive yesterday over its response to a crescendo of anti-American press coverage over the handling of prisoners at U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The mass-circulation national daily, the Mirror, on Monday, criticized Mr. Blair over what it called his failure to condemn "the latest horrific picture" of prisoners at the American base.

It showed an orange-clad manacled prisoner being transported by two soldiers on a stretcher to an interrogation session. Ironically, American newspapers used the photo to illustrate stories of modern medical treatment being given to wounded prisoners, even though the prisoner was in fact injured in the conflict and being taken to an interrogation room by stretcher because he was unable to walk.

The front-page newspaper headline asks: "What's Next Tony Electrodes?"

The British government responded yesterday by defending U.S. treatment of its prisoners, pointing out in an official statement that "we know for certain that the U.S. authorities helped save the lives of many of the detainees."

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HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

SECRET

2002 AUG -6 PM 12:55

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2002, 4:00 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
William Winkenwerder, David L. Chin 5 Aug 02

SUBJECT: Snowflake – Modernization of Military Health System

- This memo responds to your snowflake (Tab A) in which you expressed your interest in seeing us make progress in modernizing the Military Health System. I share deeply your goal for transforming this system. We have taken three important steps in the past few weeks, culminating many months of work and planning, that are moving us in the right direction.
 1. I have reorganized Health Affairs and our field agency, the TRICARE Management Activity. We have introduced a corporate model for managing this worldwide system – a flatter organization; a single, accountable financial manager for the entire Defense Health Program; better integration of policy development with the execution arm; increased responsibilities for our senior appointed executives. The new organizational model, well received by staff and managers alike, is at Tab B.
 2. Health Affairs, working together with the Services and the Joint Staff, has initiated a comprehensive strategic/business planning process for the Military Health System, using the Balanced Scorecard. The product will be a detailed, comprehensive business plan for Fiscal Year 2003 with aggressive deliverables, timetables and an array of performance metrics.
 3. We have issued a Request for Proposal for new TRICARE contracts on August 1st. I recently submitted information on this solicitation to you (Tab C). This is a more modern contract. While we retained some elements of the previous contracts, this solicitation is simpler and offers strong incentives for improved customer service and operational performance. We expect vigorous private industry competition among current contractors and new companies for this business.
- There is more work to do—particularly to better integrate the health system among the Services, and to increase Jointness in several key areas. We also need to look at fixed infrastructure, and the medical benefit itself. Mr. DiRita has scheduled a briefing to you in the coming month on the organizational initiatives for the coming year. I seek your support for new approaches.

TAB

A

June 25, 2002 7:31 AM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Modernization

I just took a look at the memo Newt Gingrich sent you on March 27. It sounds to me like he is on the mark.

Please know that I am anxious to have you make progress on modernization. Newt thinks you are going to have to insist on a modern contract proposal if we are going to make any real headway.

Do let Paul or me know what we can do to help and please keep us posted.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/27/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
062502-5

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

(b)(6) en to Deputy Sec. Rita
CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)@aol.com (Newt Gingrich)
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2002 4:36 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;
Cc: (b)(6)@aol.com; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUN 24 2002

Subject: for secdef depsecdef

to secdef, depsecdef
from Newt 3/26/2002

attached is a memo I just sent Winkenwerder and Quam on the work they are doing to modernize healthcare for DOD. They are making real progress but the next phase of getting the bureaucracy to write the contract proposals is really difficult and encouraging winkenwerder to really insist on a modern contract proposal could be a big step toward having better healthcare while saving up to \$22 billion over the next five years.

Winkenwerder is doing really well but I think it would help if he knew he had support from secdef and depsecdef to continue moving to modernization
newt

to Bill Winkenwerder and Lois Quam

It sounds like you are making real progress on thinking through a 21st century system of healthcare for DOD. I am a little concerned about several steps that could make it more difficult to achieve the increase in quality and savings in money:

1. the bureaucracy historically developed a very different type of contracting than the model required for high quality, advanced technology healthcare. It is really important to ensure that the actual proposal writers spend time learning the principles and metrics of this more modern system. They should not be trying to marginally improve the traditional system which is what they are familiar with but rather should start from the requirements of the new, more modern contracting system and then design it anew. That may require some training or some oversight. In its absence I will be very surprised if they do not gradually and despite themselves revert to writing large sections in the old pattern.

2. It would probably help to hire an outside consultant who is an expert in how modern health contracts are written to help the senior civil service learn the new model, to be available to brief the news media from an objective standpoint on why the new model will deliver better quality care than the old model, and to be able to meet with congressional staff and members of congress to explain the new system and the fact that it is based on the developments in the private sector which provide better services at lower cost.

Finally, I think Torie Clarke and Powell Moore need to be apprised at some point of these exciting new developments because some of the current contract holders are almost certainly going to try to fight any significant modernization which would expose them to new competitors and new requirements. It is important to design the entire process and the way it will be explained to the news media and the legislative

3/28/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10549

branch to ensure that the focus is always on better quality care and more modern systems for the military families and retirees.

Newt

3/28/2002



11-L-0559/OSD/10550

TAB

B

OSD Responsibilities
 Support to USD(P&R) & SecDef
 Policy Development/Policy Guidance
 (DoDD/DoDI)
 Strategic Planning & Performance Evaluation
 Policy & Program Oversight

**Color Code Represents
 Collateral Responsibility**



Field Activity Responsibilities
 Policy & Program Execution
 Program Analysis/Program Mgmt
 Procedural & Management Guidance
 Technical Advice & Assistance to DoD Components

Rev: 18 Jul 02



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

JUL 19 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS AND TRICARE MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITY STAFFS

Subject: Military Health Service Transformation: Strategic Objectives and Leadership
Roles

Since my arrival in September, I have had the opportunity to meet and work with many individuals who comprise and support the Military Health System: the staffs in Health Affairs, the TRICARE Management Activity, Deployment Health Support, the Surgeons General, TRICARE Lead Agents, and our contractor partners. I have been extremely impressed by the quality of the work performed by the staff of Health Affairs and TRICARE Management Activity (TMA), the Military Departments and our contractor partners. I have often expressed my goal to forge closer working relationships with the Military Departments, and to maintain a meaningful dialogue with both our contractor partners and the organizations that represent military retirees and veterans.

I established strategic objectives for FY 02 in the initial goals for our work together: 1) to improve force health protection and readiness; 2) to improve the performance of the TRICARE program; 3) to improve coordination, communication and collaboration with external entities; and 4) to address issues related to attracting and retaining top quality military medical personnel. Substantial progress has been made in these areas, which forms the basis for the development of our plan for FY 03 and the initiation of a strategic planning process for the longer-term health/planning horizon.

I believe that continued organizational transformation is imperative to deal effectively with the expanding mission requirements and the many emerging challenges facing the Military Health System. We will be addressing this in a variety of ways, such as through the transformation of TRICARE regional governance and the new generation of TRICARE contracts. In addition, I believe that assignments to senior leaders in Health Affairs and TMA need to be restructured and clarified. The realignment I am directing today provides an improved focus on management of the entire Military Health System (including but not limited to management of the TRICARE health plan), and a reengineered staff capability to support that mission. Technical oversight and reporting arrangements will ensure proper synergy between the corporate level staff of the Office of the ASD (Health Affairs), which provides policy and program support to the Secretary of Defense, and the program management and operational support staffs in TMA.

As you know, I recently aligned the TMA Deployment Health Support Office under the direction of Ms. Ellen Embrey, DASD (Force Health Protection and

11-L-0559/OSD/10553

Readiness). As DASD (FHP&R), Ms. Embrey performs strategic planning, policy and analysis functions for force health protection, medical readiness and contingency operations policy, and deployment health policy. As Director, Deployment Health Support, TMA, she oversees program execution of deployment health readiness, analyses of deployment health issues and other activities designed to provide medical, population health and epidemiological input to deployment health policies and practices.

I am now taking additional steps to advance a more effective organizational vision for other elements of Health Affairs and the TRICARE Management Activity.

Effective immediately, I will serve in a dual capacity as both the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and as the Director, TMA. Mr. Ed Wyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) serves as my Deputy in any role that I perform and on all matters under the purview of the ASD (HA) and Director, TMA.

I am establishing a new position in the Office of the ASD (Health Affairs), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Plan Administration), and have appointed RADM Tom Carrato to that position. The DASD (Health Plan Administration) will serve as principal advisor to me on DoD health plan policy and oversight of our health plan performance. Additionally, he will ensure that TRICARE operational perspectives contribute to and are considered in all policy decisions under the purview of the ASD (HA). RADM Carrato will be dual-hatted as Chief Operating Officer, TMA. In this capacity he will be responsible for the operations and performance of the TRICARE health plan, medical and dental programs, and oversight of performance by Regional Directors. TRICARE program management, communications and information about TRICARE, and implementation and on-going management of all purchased care contracts are also his responsibility. The TMA Directorates of Operations, Communications and Customer Service, Program Management and Acquisition Management and Support will report to the Chief Operating Officer. I look forward to RADM Carrato's valuable contribution in these roles.

MG Randolph will serve as Director of TRICARE Operations for the Chief Operating Officer. In this role he will continue to serve as Program Executive Officer for TRICARE, and chair the weekly Deputy Surgeons General meeting, as well as other key committees he has so ably served as Deputy Director, TMA.

Mr. Nelson Ford, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Health Budgets and Financial Policy) is dual-hatted as Chief Financial Officer (CFO), TMA. As DASD, he is my senior advisor on all financial matters, including funding for medical readiness, medical research, and medical professional education. He is responsible for policy analyses of the Defense Health Program, will develop Medical Planning Guidance the Program Objective Memorandum, and oversees the Health Affairs' role in the PPBS. As CFO, he directs the development of the DHP budget, manages its execution and develops

plans for medical facilities. He will also be responsible for financial management programs for the DHP and will support managed care contracts with financial and economic analysis. The Directors of Resource Management and Health Program Analysis & Evaluation within TMA will report directly to him.

To ensure the unity and effectiveness of the Department's efforts to ensure quality medical care, I am expanding the scope of Dr. David Tornberg's capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Clinical and Program Policy), to include a dual hat as Chief Medical Officer in TMA. As DASD he serves as senior medical and clinical policy advisor to me for the Military Health System. In this capacity he chairs joint executive and working groups bodies with appropriate staff elements in Health Affairs, TMA and the Military Departments to oversee the important work on quality, patient safety and military provider recruitment and retention. He also serves as my representative to the USUHS Board of Regents and AFIP Board of Governors. Additionally, he will now provide the oversight and direction to the Office of the Chief Medical Officer within TMA and the Office of the Special Assistant for Optimization. As CMO, he will direct quality assessment and improvement programs, utilization management and population health and dental clinical issues, all of which are essential to quality. Because of the importance of patient safety, I am directing Dr. Tornberg to prepare a plan to unify Military Health System efforts further in support of this area.

Mr. James Reardon, Director, Information Management, Technology and Reengineering (IMT&R) in TMA will continue to serve as MHS Chief Information Officer (CIO). He is my senior advisor on information management, information technology and information assurance matters. He will represent me on DoD CIO executive boards; oversee the Military Health Service Information Technology Program Executive Office; and coordinate development of the MHS central IM/IT budget, plans and policy. He will also manage TMA information technology programs and activities, the DoD Computer Accommodation Program, e-business programs and standards, and technology integration and standards.

Soon we will welcome MG Nancy Adams, who will serve as senior advisor to the Director, TMA and play a key role in the roll out of two critical additional elements of Military Health System transformation: new contracts and the new regional governance structure.

The relationship of TMA special staff elements will be as follows:

- The Senior Enlisted Advisor will report directly to the Director of TMA and expand his portfolio to include TRICARE and deployment health liaison to the enlisted community.
- TMA's General Counsel, who reports to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, will continue to advise all client elements within TMA on legal matters.

- The HA Chief of Staff is dual-hatted in a new position in TMA as Director, Administration and Management. The TMA Chief of Staff will report to the Director, Administration and Management, as will the Office of Program Integration. The TMA Office of Administration will continue to provide appropriate personnel, manpower and training support to all client organizations within the TMA field activity, and report to the Director, Administration and Management.

These organizational changes are an important adjunct in support of the business plan that we continue to develop to drive progress and improvements in the Military Health System. They represent a necessary and evolutionary step, which we will continue. I will continue to examine our organizations to ensure maximum effectiveness. I will expect that much of our work together will include a matrix of talent leveraged throughout Health Affairs, the TRICARE Management Activity and the Military Departments.

As noted in the attached organizational chart, Mr. Ed Wyatt, my Principal Deputy, will continue to maintain all of his current responsibilities for Health Program Integration and External Affairs, including our collaborative efforts with the Department of Veterans Affairs. In addition, Ed will continue to provide critical support and assistance for me in support of the work of all the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and lead our important strategic planning activities. Mr. Wyatt is also chairing an HA/TMA Transition Team, comprised of the DASDs, Chiefs of Staff and Ms. Marianne Coates. This team will oversee implementation, and identify and address any issues that arise in what I anticipate will be a smooth transition. We want to hear from you. Questions or comments may be forwarded to: HA-TMA-CARES@HA.OSD.MIL.

These changes have been carefully considered, in consultation with the Office of the Director, Administration and Management, and Office of the DoD General Counsel. There is an important consideration of which we must all be mindful: we are one team, but two organizations. The DASDs and I will carefully delineate both our OSD responsibilities in policy development and corporate oversight, and the differential role in policy execution and program management in TMA. These will be defined in forthcoming organization and functions manuals.

I am confident that our collective efforts will ensure the Military Health System achieves even higher levels of performance in the critical years ahead and I am looking forward to working with all of you to achieve the outstanding results that our patients and beneficiaries so richly deserve.

Bill

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD

Attachment:
As stated

TAB

C



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

August 1, 2002, 11:00 am

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)

SUBJECT: TRICARE

- TRICARE contracts are the means through which we purchase health care from the civilian sector. More than half of the health care delivered to our beneficiary population (including retirees) is through private sector care.
- The TRICARE Management Activity will announce a solicitation for a new generation of TRICARE contracts this week. We have designed these contracts in close coordination with acquisition, just as if we were acquiring a major system, and with the benefit of independent advice. Thus, we have already taken action on the issue you raised at Tab A. The new TRICARE contracts, involving more than \$4 billion per year, represent a significant improvement:
 - Fewer: TRICARE will award three contracts, as opposed to the current seven contracts, through consolidation of geographic regions. This will make life easier for our people, simplify contracting efforts, ease administration, and promote cost-savings through greater economies of scale.
 - Simpler: We have reduced the volume of government specification, and encouraged private sector solutions to improve customer service and health outcomes.
 - Improved Accountability: The new contracts place greater responsibility on local military medical commanders to manage the delivery of quality, cost-effective health care to their local beneficiaries. Three geographical regional directors will be responsible for managing overall health plan performance, particularly the delivery of services by the TRICARE contractors.
 - Incentives for Performance: The TRICARE contracts reward contractors for improving customer satisfaction, increasing utilization of military medical facilities, and controlling health care costs.
- We have briefed the Service Vice Chiefs, Service Secretaries, Congress' relevant committees and subcommittees, OMB, and beneficiary organizations on our planned actions. All have been supportive.
- A comprehensive two part brief is currently being scheduled with you addressing the Military Health System and its transformation.

Prepared by: *William Winkenwerder*
Dr. William Winkenwerder, P. (ASD/HA) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10558

ACTION
2/7
1400

February 6, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Policy

3711 NSC

We have a real problem with Policy shop and our office. Papers come in from the NSC, they are scheduled for a meeting, go to the Policy shop, the Policy shop is late getting the work done because the notice is so short, and I never have a chance to read the documents.

Someone has to give me the documents in a file, tell me what they are for, tell me when the due date is and when the meeting is about, so that I at least read them, even if I never get the comments from Policy. At present, I am not getting the basic documents, and the help I am getting from Policy often comes too late.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020602-8

.....

Please respond by 02/08/02

6 Feb 02

U12769 /02

420 of 100
snowflake

February 6, 2002 7:26 AM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Regulation

350.4

We need to get the answer on Army regulation 190-8 that Carl Levin asked me about. I don't know beans about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020602-7

.....
Please respond by

02/08/02

FW PAME

SECDEF HAS SEEN

000 2 6 2002

4/24

L 114-951

SecDef

*Haynes answered
Levin in writing.*

6Feb02

U12770 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10560



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

APR 19 2002

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Room SR-228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is the response to your question to Secretary Rumsfeld concerning Army Regulation 190-8 and detainees posed during the FY03 Budget Hearing on February 5, 2002.

If you have any additional questions, please contact me at

(b)(6)

Sincerely,

William J. Haynes II

Enclosure
As Stated

cc:
The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Member



11-L-0559/OSD/10561

Hearing Date: February 5, 2002
Committee: SASC
Member: Senator Levin
Witness: Secretary Rumsfeld
Insert for the Record

Question: Is the Department of Defense applying the procedures of Army Regulation 190-8 in its detainee operations in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, and if not, why not?

Answer: Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War specifies the categories of people who fall into the hands of the enemy who are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war (POWs). If a detainee falls within one of the Article 4 categories of persons entitled to POW status, then he is a POW. If a detainee clearly does not fall within one of the Article 4 categories, then the detainee does not receive POW status. When there is doubt, then a tribunal under Article 5 of the Convention is appropriate to determine the status of the detainee.

The President has determined that the conflict with the al-Qaeda is not covered by the Geneva Convention. The President has further determined that although the conflict with the Taliban is covered by the Geneva Convention, the Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status under the terms of Article 4. Based on the President's determinations, there is no doubt regarding whether al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees are entitled to POW status.

The joint Services regulation, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees* (AR 190-8)(1 Oct 1997), provides procedures for Article 5 tribunals should they be required. For example, the AR 190-8 procedures call for a three-officer panel. As noted, an Article 5 tribunal is only required "should any doubt arise" regarding a detained individual's entitlement to POW status. No doubt has arisen regarding the POW status of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.

Despite the fact that al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status, we continue to treat them humanely and in a manner consistent with the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

ACTION
as 2/11
1100

February 7, 2002 11:38 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Speeches

Please talk to the speechwriters. President Bush does such a wonderful job of acknowledging people at the dais—he mentions names of Congressmen or Senators, he says something nice about them—it really is a gracious way to get started and kind of pull the room together.

Our speechwriters don't do anything, and I end up walking up there not even knowing who is going to be there half the time.

We have to get good at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020702-12

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Please respond by 02/15/02

350,001 SD

7 Feb 02

U12772 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10563

ACTION
03 2/11
0849

February 7, 2002 10:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Cost of Events

I am told the lunch Joyce hosted for the Cabinet wives and Mrs. Bush cost \$2,284.74. I want to pay it, and I want a note to (b)(6) that it is business deductible.

127

However, it seems to me that is way too expensive for a lunch for 22 women. Without liquor and without having to pay any costs for the facility, it seems out of line. I think we better talk to Pat Mills and see if we can't get a grip on how much money we are spending on things like that, where the taxpayers have to pay.

One other way to do it is to get estimates before we do it—get an estimate from Pat Mills as to what something like that is going to cost, either for government paid events or privately paid events, so we can manage costs a little bit better.

We have to give a darn about the taxpayer.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020702-7

.....

Please respond by 02/13/02

209210

February 7, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Veterans Using Military Hospitals

Done 2/26

701

I personally promised Congressman Ortiz I would solve his problem with respect to veterans going to military hospitals if it is humanly possible.

They have 125 open beds at Corpus Christi, and the veterans have to drive four hours to San Antonio. It is mindless.

Let's get it fixed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020702-6

.....
Please respond by 02/28/02

↓ 2/25

Copy BTM

To: ~~ASD (P&R) Chu~~

please advise

Di Rita

7 Feb 02

SEEDRF -

*Had a briefing on this today.
Will send some update info to you
In short: (1) issue not as clear as Mr Ortiz described
(2) will take coordination with VA
(3) who will get it done.*

14-E-0559/OSD/10565

U12774 /02

Account
12113
1236

February 8, 2002 12:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Reduction of Military

320.2

I need a list of places where we have stopped using military and have begun the process of increasing our teeth to tail.

For example:

- Brothers to the Rescue, Florida
- Haiti
- Sinai
- Bosnia
- East Timor
- Sierra Leone
- Macedonia
- Exit strategies for Customs/INS and border guards
- Exit strategies for airport guards

Someone needs to take each one of those and write a sentence or something around it, so it makes sense.

8 Feith

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-20

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

U12775 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10566

Action
2/13
12/10

February 8, 2002 12:15 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: MoD Ivanov

As a gesture from the Russian military to the U.S. military, Ivanov wants to lay a wreath somewhere near where the aircraft hit the Pentagon.

We ought to have a little ceremony for him to do that. Someone ought to start thinking that through.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-17

.....
Please respond by 02/22/02

2/8

Pat Mills
Ivanov will be here in
March (sometime
during 1st two weeks.)
DHR

8 Feb 02

09

February 11, 2002

TO: Mr. Di Rita

FROM: Captain Mills *P.M.*

SUBJECT: Wreath Laying Ceremony

This is a common request. We've coordinated with MDW to conduct Wreath Laying Ceremonies for the victims of September 11 at the Tomb of the Unknowns. There is a Condolence Book in the Trophy room and the MDW Commanding General attends - much like the Memorial Day Service. There is space for the visiting delegation and press.

In the past we have directed Heads of State and visiting Ministers who have requested a wreath laying at the construction site to Arlington National Cemetery/MDW. This has ensured a consistent Ceremony for all visiting dignitaries and does not disrupt construction.

However, if a special ceremony is preferred for the Russians protocol can coordinate.

CAPT M. Mills

*→ Pat: Work w/
Policy to coordinate.
Sgt will be
involved.*

*D. Di Rita
2/12*

Prepared by CDR P.M. Mills
2/11/02 9:20 AM

Action
DS 2/11
11/41

February 8, 2002 9:48 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Crusader

470

What is the weight of a Crusader, plus the support vehicle equipment it must have in order to function?

I am asking because I think someone is going to make the case that the weight decreased from 70 tons to 40 tons simply by adding a separate vehicle with all the additional paraphernalia the Crusader needs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-12

.....

Please respond by 02/15/02

8 Feb 02

13
2/11
1115

February 8, 2002 8:35 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Appropriations Committee Testimony

For the testimony, please put in the statement I used in the hearing that each President uses the capabilities left by previous Congresses and administrations.

110.51

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020802-6



Please respond by 02/11/02

ST-0500

U12779 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10570

February 11, 2002 2:31 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NYT Editorial

Done 4/5

I agree with Paul Wolfowitz, and I think it is probably time to go ahead and answer that *New York Times* editorial.

381

Please figure out who ought to do it and let's get it done. I don't think it should be me—maybe Paul.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/28/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: NYT 16 Jan Editorial

DHR:dh
021102-58



Please respond by 02/15/02

11 Feb 02

U12780 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10571

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

MEMO TO: Secretary of Defense

DATE: January 22, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: *New York Times* 16 January Editorial on DoD Transformation

Don,

I assume you saw the NYT editorial on Wednesday, titled "Misdirected Defense Dollars" (attached at TAB A). The editorial criticizes the Department for not doing enough to transform and for cutting too few programs in the FY 03 budget.

We have prepared a point-by-point rebuttal of the main charges in the editorial (TAB B) which are that:

- The budget shortchanges transformation;
- We didn't kill any programs;
- We aren't doing enough to fight future wars like Afghanistan;
- We are still preparing for old threats; and
- Specific systems like F-22, Crusader, and attack submarines are unneeded or irrelevant for the future.

We have also prepared a draft letter to the editor (TAB C) that sets the record straight and makes our case. I am willing to send it if you feel it would be useful. My sense, however, is that we should not respond directly before the budget is unveiled. Instead, I recommend we pass this information to Torie so that PA stays ahead of similar pieces that will inevitably be written over the next month.

Paul W.

cc. Torie Clarke

11-L-0559/OSD/10572

New York Times
January 16, 2002

Misdirected Defense Dollars

It's axiomatic that military budgets grow in wartime, and this year will be no exception. The Bush administration's planned \$350 billion Pentagon budget for the next fiscal year is some \$20 billion higher than current spending and a 6 percent increase over the rate of inflation. Events since Sept. 11 have clearly demonstrated the need for a highly flexible military force, adequately paid and housed, maintained in a high state of readiness and equipped with the appropriate high-tech tools of 21st-century warfare.

Unfortunately, the budget prepared by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld shortchanges the Bush administration's earlier promises of a boldly transformed military. While some of the new budget money will go toward improved pay and modernization, the Pentagon is still spending too much on costly weapons systems designed for an earlier era, squandering funds that should be going to more rapid modernization.

Future phases of the war on terrorism, whether in the Middle East, Africa or Southeast Asia, are likely to bear a closer resemblance to the conflict in Afghanistan than to the cold-war clashes for which the latest generation of weapons systems were designed. Afghanistan highlighted the need for pilotless aircraft and long-range bombers that did not depend on the availability of nearby American air bases. It underscored the importance of light, mobile ground forces, special operations teams and Navy surface ships and submarines that can launch planes and cruise missiles.

Military planners must be ready to fight other kinds of wars as well, but the Pentagon ought to discard obsolete assumptions about the most likely enemies or battlefields. The Air Force, for example, remains committed to the F-22, a short-range tactical fighter designed for cold-war dogfights. America's existing fighter fleet of F-15's, F-16's and the newly approved Joint Strike Fighter already assure aerial supremacy over any conceivable foe for the next generation. Air Force dollars should go to unmanned reconnaissance and attack craft like the Predator, long-range bombers and the troop transport planes that are in chronic short supply.

The Army should not be building its future around heavy weapons like the 70-ton Crusader howitzer system. The Crusader has many impressive battlefield features, but the Army's bulky equipment and lack of mobility have limited the service's role in Afghanistan and would have made many Army units unsuitable for action in Kosovo had allied ground troops been needed there.

The Navy and Marine Corps have been doing better at modernization, converting submarines to launch cruise missiles instead of nuclear missiles and delaying production of large and expensive stealth destroyers. Still, there is little justification for the Navy to build a new generation of attack submarines.

The Bush administration is right to press ahead with efforts to improve military pay, housing and health care. Those are dollars well spent. Another useful initiative was thwarted by Congress late last year. Secretary Rumsfeld tried to free more money for modernization through another round of base closings. Although about 25 percent of current bases are militarily obsolete, lawmakers postponed action until 2005.

With the public in a mood to spend more on defense and the conflict in Afghanistan emphasizing the importance of military modernization, this year's budget offered an extraordinary opportunity for Mr. Rumsfeld to call on the various services to update their spending priorities. Instead, he largely bowed to the momentum of familiar weapons programs. It will now be up to Congress to press for more forward-looking budgeting.

New York Times 16 January Editorial "Misdirected Defense Dollars"

NYT Assertion	DoD Position
"Budget shortchanges transformation"	Budget dramatically increases spending on transformation programs
"Still spending too much on costly weapons designed for an earlier era"	DoD has decided to retire Peacekeeper; cut planned upgrades for Abrams and Bradleys; scaled back F-22 buy; terminated DD-21; postponed funding next aircraft carrier; and begun phase out of 1000 Army Cold War-era helicopters, 19 Spruance class destroyers, all F-14s, and Inchon-class helicopter carrier
"Future phases of the war on terrorism...are likely to bear a closer resemblance to the conflict in Afghanistan than to the cold-war clashes..."	NYT is repeating danger of fighting last war. Operations in other parts of the world will almost certainly be different in scope and character and could require a different mix of forces and capabilities – including a large number of ground forces in some cases.
"The Pentagon ought to discard obsolete assumptions about the most likely enemies or battlefields"	Done. That's what a capabilities-based approach is all about. NYT seems to be assuming that future wars will be like Afghanistan – an assumption that could be obsolete in six months.
"America's existing fleet of F-15s, F-16s, and the newly approved JSF already assure aerial supremacy over any conceivable foe for the next generation"	Both Russia and China are developing competitive air superiority fighters. The proliferation of AMRAAMs also undermines the capability of current generation air superiority fighters. The lack of stealth on F-15s and F-16s also impedes their effective employment in anti-access environments. JSF does not appear until 2008.
"Air Force dollars should go to unmanned reconnaissance and attack aircraft like the Predator, long-range bombers and the troop transport planes that are in chronic short supply"	Budget proposes substantial increases for both UAVs and UCAVs. Bomber enhancements and development of overseas infrastructure will increase US long-range precision strike capabilities. Increases total C-17 buy by 43 additional aircraft through FY 08 (more than a 30% increase).
"Army should not be building its future around heavy weapons like the 70-ton Crusader"	Thinking about individual weapons is old-think. Need to think about the overall system. A Crusader battery will equal the firepower of an entire Paladin battalion. Thus the overall weight of artillery to achieve the same amount of firepower will be dramatically reduced. Crusader is not at the center of the Future Combat System, which has been accelerated, but it will play an important role.
"There is little justification for the Navy to build a new generation of attack submarines"	Attack submarines are critical for a variety of post-Cold War roles including surveillance and reconnaissance, special operations force delivery, and other national missions. They are critical to operating in littoral anti-access environments. The US has neglected anti-submarine warfare for too long, and in the face of new potential threats in the Middle East and Asia. Submarines are likely to become more important as capabilities to find ships on the surface improve steadily.

DRAFT**Draft Letter to the Editor**

Contrary to *The New York Times*' January 16 editorial, "Misdirected Defense Dollars," the Department of Defense is investing heavily in the transformation of U.S. military forces. When the details of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Submission are revealed in the next few weeks, they will make manifest our commitment to changing the way our forces fight and the means they use. Although we still have much work to do, the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Submission will substantially increase funding for transformation, science and technology and accelerate of a number of programs critical to future security requirements, while also raising procurement spending to ensure U.S. forces have what they need to fight and win the war on terror. This program prudently balances the risks of today with those of the future.

The Administration's transformation program begins with a new conceptual approach, one that was driven by strategy, not the budget. It discards obsolete assumptions about the most likely enemies or battlefields, as *The New York Times* rightly suggests. However, it does not replace those assumptions with the assumption that future conflicts "are likely to bear a closer resemblance to the conflict in Afghanistan." Rather than trying to guess which enemy U.S. forces will be asked to confront years from now, or where wars may occur, the new

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/10576

strategy focuses on what capabilities adversaries could use against us, on shoring up our own vulnerabilities, and on exploiting new capabilities to extend our own military advantages.

The war on terror validates this approach. If someone had argued only six months ago that the nation needed to prepare for war in Central Asia, that U.S. ground forces would operate on horseback in Afghanistan, or that B-52 bombers would be used for close air support, they would not have been taken seriously. But having a broad portfolio of capabilities and the adaptability to conduct such operations has proven critical.

While we are learning lessons from Afghanistan, it is dangerous to assume that all future operations will replicate the current campaign. Operations beyond Afghanistan may be quite different in scope and character and could require a different mix of forces and capabilities, including heavy ground forces. The constant dilemma for the United States, as a global power, is that it cannot pick and choose future contingencies; it must be prepared to meet a very wide range of them.

The Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Submission will include substantial increases for precisely the kinds of capabilities *The New York Times* mentions – unmanned

aircraft, long-range precision attack, special operations forces, and submarines that can launch cruise missiles instead of nuclear missiles.

Unmanned surveillance and attack aircraft are at the top of the list. The Secretary of Defense is committed to accelerating their development and fielding as an integral part of our force structure. We have seen only a glimpse of their enormous potential in Afghanistan with Global Hawk and Predator. The upcoming budget request increases the number of unmanned aircraft being procured and accelerates the development of new unmanned combat aircraft capable of striking targets independently.

In Afghanistan, we have seen the importance of long-range precision attack capabilities, such as our bombers, especially when linked to highly mobile forces of the ground. We are pursuing a number of enhancements that will transform our current fleet of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers and their ability to strike both fixed and mobile targets anywhere in the world. These enhancements will result in aircraft that may look the same on the outside, but will have revolutionary capabilities – new avionics, communications, and targeting systems – within. We are increasing funding for new weapons, such as the small diameter bomb, which will increase the number of targets our bomber can strike by nearly ten fold. We are also accelerating the introduction of datalinks to transmit targeting information between our ground, air and naval forces almost instantaneously.

Revolutionary advances in surveillance and reconnaissance mean that we also need to invest heavily in our ability to hide beneath the surface of the sea. Attack submarines have proved their worth for a variety of post-Cold War roles including surveillance and reconnaissance, delivering special operations forces, and conducting other critical national missions. They are essential to assuring U.S. access into hostile littoral waters. We are also investing in the transformation of some of our Cold War-era submarines so that instead of firing nuclear missiles they can conduct long-range unwarned attacks with large numbers of conventional cruise missiles, or serve as forward operating bases for special operations forces or unmanned aircraft.

At the same time that we transform the force, we must also pay off the bill that was left from the “procurement holiday” of the last decade. Throughout the 1990s, the Department of Defense shortchanged procurement spending and maintenance accounts, while using equipment at a higher than expected rate in contingency operations around the world. We must selectively modernize the force, which has been postponed for too long. However, instead of replacing systems with like systems one for one – simply restocking the 20th century military cupboard – we have decided to move forward with systems that will extend U.S. military advantages for years to come. For example, by replacing older fighter aircraft with the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, we are creating the world’s first all-

stealth fighter force that will ensure air superiority in challenging access denial environments while minimizing the requirement for other support aircraft to jam enemy air defenses. We are also increasing our fleet of strategic transport aircraft to put the Department on a path toward sufficient mobility to meet the strategy.

Throughout the summer and fall, the senior civilian and military leadership scrutinized the major weapons programs. We decided to retire or phase out a number of Cold War-era systems such as the Peacekeeper ICBM, 1,000 Army helicopters, Spruance-class destroyers, F-14 fighters, and Inchon-class helicopter carriers. We also cut back upgrade plans for our Abrams tanks and Bradley armored personnel carriers while accelerating the Army's development of the Future Combat System. We postponed funding another the next generation aircraft carrier given other high priority transformational naval requirements. We terminated the Navy Area Missile Defense program in light of excessive cost growth. We postponed the Low-Altitude Spaced Based Infra-Red System to work out some technical problems. Finally, we reduced the planned V-22 purchase by 32 aircraft and have placed the aircraft back into flight testing to ensure its safety. None of these choices were easy and they will inevitably stir up a good deal of acrimonious debate, but they were necessary to free up resources for higher priority transformation programs.

We also took a close look at our force structure and how it matched up to the new defense strategy. We considered options for reducing our forces, but decided that doing so in the near-term could imperil our ability to meet U.S. commitments and would place excessive demands on our men and women in uniform, many of whom already spend too many days deployed away from home. For the time being, it is prudent to maintain roughly our current force structure. This gives the nation some margin for error to meet inevitable surprises and complicates the planning of our enemies. This decision was validated by the attacks on September 11th and how we have used the force subsequently in unanticipated ways – fighter jets conducting Combat Air Patrols over U.S. cities, Army National Guard units patrolling airports, the creation within weeks after September 11th of a new Marine Corps anti-terrorism brigade, and four naval aircraft carrier battle groups converging in the Arabian Sea to hunt down terrorists a thousand miles inland. So far from being able to reduce our end strength in order to pay for future investments, we have had to call nearly 70,000 reservists to active duty and are temporarily stopping people from retiring from the military. When the war on terror is over and its lessons have been learned, we will reevaluate the force structure and determine areas that need rebalancing.

As Secretary Rumsfeld likes to say, we are trying to “under-promise and over-deliver.” Forthcoming increases in transformation investment represent only a first step in what will be a sustained effort over time to innovate and adapt to

new strategic realities. Like the war on terror, we have only just begun. More changes lie ahead. Our military has demonstrated an impressive capacity to innovate in wartime over the past several months. As a nation, we must now sustain the same pace of change when this war is over and the resolve to stay the course and finish what we have started, transforming the U.S. military for the new century.

ACTION
by 2/25

February 11, 2002 2:09 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo

Please see me on this Dov Zakheim memo called "The Black Hole."

Thanks.

Attach.
12/20/01 UDS(C) memo to SecDef re: The "Black Hole"

DHR:dh
021102-52

.....
Please respond by 02/15/02

312

11 Feb 02

U12781 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10583

SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

FEB 11 2002

December 20, 2001 10:20 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: The "Black Hole"

You have frequently complained at staff meetings that paper takes far too long to get to you. You've called it the "black hole."

- I thought I would give you some observations as to the source of your concern.
- If my experience is the same as that of others (and your comments indicate that it probably is), there are simply too many layers between your senior staff and you.
- When I first came on board, my replies to your "snowflakes" went virtually directly to you.
- Then we were told they needed a special format.
- Then we were told they had to go through the Executive Secretary.
- Then we were told they had first to go through Larry DiRita.
- Then we were told they had to go through DepSecDef.
- Then we were told they had to go through Jaymie Durnan, DepSec's special assistant.

That is a lot of layers.

There will always be at least one person, often more, who will be unable to resist the temptation to make some change, however minor, to whatever is sent to you.

Every change takes time: time for the paper to get back to your senior staff, time to revise, time to send it out again.

No wonder you are upset.

I wonder if this will ever get to you.

11-L-0559/OSD/10584

February 11, 2002 1:36 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

Done 2/25

383.6

Attached is a memo. We need to get the answers to it.

Please set a meeting with a proposal, and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/31/02 SecDef MFR: Detainees

DHR:dh
021102-42

.....
Please respond by 02/15/02

11 Feb 2002

U12784 /02

January 31, 2002 8:30 AM

SUBJECT: Detainees

We need to get a decision as to which countries we are going to send detainees back to.

We need to try to keep more detainees with the Pakistanis and with the Afghans before we take them, so that we have fewer.

We need to decide what we do with the Saudis that have the bulk of them.

DHR:dh
013102-3

11-L-0559/OSD/10586

Snowflake

February 11, 2002 12:08 PM

Action
2/25
11:30

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jordan's Offer

Jordan

Please feed the word that Jordan has offered some translation and interpreters for documents and interrogation.

We should pass that to the FBI, the CIA and the folks down at Guantanamo, as well as the Department of Justice.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-36

.....

Please respond by 02/15/02

11 Feb 02

U12785 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10587

February 11, 2002 12:05 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CINCs Qualifications

That piece of paper you are using for the CINCs qualifications doesn't have transformation on it. We have to get that on it.

322

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-35

.....
Please respond by 02/13/02

2/11

SECRET -

Without a great definition of it, I was trying to get at it with the first two bullets. (attached)

2/11

11 Feb 02

U12786 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10588

Some General Considerations for selecting a CinC:

- Trans for method*
- **Tactical/Strategic Innovation**
 - Developmental/Experimental Commands
 - Publications
 - Major Exercises/Experiments
 - **Change Agent**
 - Reputation as leader with sense of direction?
 - **Operational Background**
 - Combat
 - Major Contingency Operation
 - **Combatant Commander Assignments**
 - **Washington/Other Headquarter Assignments**
 - During Combat/Major Contingency?
 - Interaction with Senior Civilian Leadership
 - **Overseas Assignments**
 - **Unique Assignments**
 - Language
 - Exchange Tour
 - Academic

1
snowflake

AS ACTION
2/16
1135

February 11, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bio Tests

Here is an interesting idea from Newt Gingrich. Please take a look at it and tell me what you think.

720

Thanks.

Attach.
11/09/01 Newt Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Anthrax Tests, etc.

DHR:dh
021102-34

.....

Please respond by 03/01/02

11 Feb 02

U12787 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10590

From Newt Gingrich

SECDEF HAS SEEN

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

FEB 11 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
 Sent: Friday, November 09, 2001 1:57 PM
 To: Mark_Holman@who.eop.gov; mitchell_daniels@omb.eop.gov
 Cc: kr@georgewbush.com; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; feithd@mail.policy.osd.mil;
 llibby@ovp.eop.gov; crice@nsc.eop.gov; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil;
 cebrowskia@ndu.edu
 Subject: anthrax tests, prizes and fast response to new needs

the Roche-Mayo Clinic development of a 30 minute test for anthrax with four weeks of effort should be a wake up call about the effectiveness of the private sector and entrepreneurial decentralized behavior.

There are a number of definable high value goals (treating smallpox

successfully once infected, clearing the mines out of Afghanistan, fast, effective security for airports, ports, and borders, developing a detection system for nuclear weapons held by terrorists are examples) where we should be creating incentives for the private sector to come up with a solution.

If everytime we launched a government or government financed research or development program we also offered a prize for anyone who came up with a solution that fir the criterion so they could be rewarded even if they were not in the program we would save a lot of time and money.

I do not know how long it would have taken for the government to set a goal of a 30 minute anthrax test, issue a call for proposals, judge the proposals, get the contracts signed, etc but it clearly would have cost a lot more time and a lot more money than the Roche-Mayo Clinic Project. If we have another anthrax scare we are going to be very surprised how glad we are that they solved the problem on their own.

Several years ago Bob Walker and I convinced the National Academy of Engineering to hold a two day workshop on prizes as a method of accelerating progress in science and technology. They concluded that prizes had worked historically and encouraged bureaucracies to experiment with them but the bureaucracies like controlled centralized projects that are incremental.

If this was implemented at least in time sensitive and critical areas it would help us get a lot done. If it was implemented across most of the system it would accelerate new solutions and save a lot of time and money.
 newt

cc: L. D. R. Jr
 Admiral Grambastani

ds
Aknow
2/16
1050

February 11, 2002 11:38 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Testing

YS2R

Please see me about this note from Newt Gingrich on testing at Fort Polk, Fort Irwin and 29 Palms.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/20/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Testing New Capabilities

DHR:dh
021102-28

.....
Please respond by 03/01/02

11 Feb 02

U12788 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10592

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2002 1:14 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
Cc: Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil

(Newt Gingrich)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

Subject: testing new capabilities

For SEcdef,paul,and larry

we should insist on testing at Fort Irwin, Fort Polk or 29 Palms using the modern information rich system against our current forces? A predator-Global Hawk informed system with a few special forces and powerful overhead assets ought to annihilate current structures at places like Irwin and 29 Palms and vastly enhance our forces at fort polk. It is likely that the traditional heavy systems will be very uncomfortable with this kind of tests because it will put into question the size of the force we need, its composition, and the potential for bloc obsolescence of doctrine, forces, and logistics

this should be a high value secdef proposal with requirements for testing by this summer
newt

Copied to LD, Dr. Wolfowitz

Snowflake

February 11, 2002 10:06 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quote

Down
2/20
0915

Please give me the quote out of Woodward and Balz, where Colin Powell was reported to have said to Shelton, "You should get a hold of those guys."

AS of 11/11/02

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-12

.....
Please respond by *02/12/02*

11-0502

U12789 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10594

3/14
12020

LARRY DI RITA 2/19

TO: SECDEF

*in file
2/19*

FROM: Torie

DATE: February 12, 2002

SUBJECT: Quote

Here is the quote you requested from the Woodward and Balz interview. I have marked the appropriate spot with a tab.

Washington Post
January 29, 2002
Pg. 1

10 Days In September: Inside The War Cabinet

Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges

By Dan Balz, Bob Woodward and Jeff Himmelman, Washington Post Staff Writers

Third of eight articles

Thursday, September 13

Shortly after 12:30 p.m., President Bush's limousine pulled into the White House driveway, stopping not far from the Oval Office. The president was returning from a visit to the burn unit of Washington Hospital Center, where he had had several emotional encounters with severe burn victims injured when a hijacked airliner hit the Pentagon two days before.

Before Bush could get out of the car, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr., who had walked outside to meet the limousine, put up his hands. "Mr. President," Card said, "sit back down for a minute. I've got to tell you something."

Card climbed into the back seat next to Bush and closed the door.

"We've got another threat on the White House," the chief of staff said. "We're taking it seriously."

Terrorists were believed to have targeted the White House on Sept. 11, and the fear was they would do it again. Card explained to the president that the CIA had just sent over a warning from a foreign intelligence service that Pakistani jihadists – Muslim extremists – were planning a direct attack on the White House.

"Why are you telling me in here?" snapped Bush, irritated that Card had unnecessarily risked a scene that could be observed by the press pool that was just down the driveway. "You could have waited until I got into the Oval Office."

Bush got out of the car, and he and Card walked directly to the Oval Office, where Secret Service Director Brian L. Stafford and the head of Bush's personal Secret Service detail were waiting for them.

"We need to evacuate you," Stafford said, explaining that the threat was credible and consistent with other intelligence that established an immediate danger. Stafford wanted to take Bush to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, the bunker beneath the White House complex where Vice President Cheney and other officials had been taken two days before.

"I'm not leaving," Bush said.

He told Secret Service officials that he wanted more information if they got it. For now, he wasn't going anywhere. "And by the way," he added, to no one in particular, "I'm hungry." He located Ferdinand Garcia, the Navy steward on duty in the West Wing. "Ferdie," he said, "I want a hamburger."

February 11, 2002 9:58 AM

0900
2/12
D 2/12

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Representation

DONE
2/13
1020

I agree that someone ought to go along on Presidential and SecState trips.

333

Please go ahead and push it through the interagency.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/01/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef: "Military Exchanges with China"

DHR:dh
021102-10

.....
Please respond by 02/15/02

12 FEB 2002
Sec Def -
NSC has agreed to have
Peter Rodman go on the trip with
the President.
We need to discuss how best to
cover SecState trips.
Paul W.

1/ Feb 02

Srs
2/12

11-L-0559/OSD/10597 **U12790 /02**

SEP 2/11 Y2/2
SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 1 1 2002

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: February 1, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

D

SUBJECT: Military Exchanges with China

Don,

Apparently, someone got the President to promote the idea of expanding our military exchanges with China, during his meeting with Jiang Zemin in Shanghai on October 19th.

We are now stuck with coming up with some concrete ways to have more exchanges with our militaries or try to walk the cat back. There are some modest things we could propose. For example, NDU and Air War College are sending student groups to China and we could invite them to reciprocate. We will have some proposals for you on the subject before next Thursday's Principals meeting on China.

However, this little example seems to me a very good reason for arguing that someone from OSD should be on the President's trip to Japan, Korea, and China in February. I will raise with Hadley our desire to have Peter Rodman go, but you might want to reinforce it with Condi or Colin.

|

Paul W.

cc: Feith
Rodman

SEP 2

11-L-0559/OSD/10598

Action
2/16
0930

February 11, 2002 9:56 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Al Qaida as a Network

I like your idea about the Al Qaida as a network.

You ought to develop that and perhaps prepare some talking points for us for hearings or for the press—and give them to Torie and Admiral Stufflebeam, for example.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/11/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef: "Thinking About Al Qaida as a Network"

DHR:dh
021102-9

.....

Please respond by 02/25/02

000,5

11 Feb 02

U12791 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10599

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 11 2002

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: January 11, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Thinking About Al Qaida as a Network

Don,

There are some distinct advantages to thinking about the war on terrorism as an attack on a network, which it is, and using the language of networks in talking about the way ahead. The concept of networks is widely understood in this information age, and even more widely talked about.

1. Networks don't collapse through single-point failure. You don't decapitate networks. In fact, the Internet is a product of a DoD communications system designed to survive the failure of any limited number of nodes in a nuclear war.

Hence, for example, you're not going to take out Al Qaida by taking out bin Laden. Networks are defeated by a progressive weakening – more like death from a systemic disease as opposed to a heart attack or brain tumor or by eliminating a great majority of the nodes.

2. Networks are not attacked sequentially, like a series of fortified positions in earlier concepts of warfare. They are attacked concurrently and simultaneously. We saw a version of this in Afghanistan, but it is even more applicable to the broader global campaign against terrorism.
3. Perhaps most important, talking about networks will be useful in the next stage of the campaign when people ask either why you are not attacking Iraq (or Iran) or whether you are merely getting ready to attack Iraq (or Iran). Our actions should be described as attacking a network at many different points, not only to weaken that particular point but to have effects somewhere else in the network. For example, getting intelligence in Yemen allows you to arrest people in Indonesia, or making an example of the Taliban may cause the government of Yemen (or even the government of Iraq or Iran) to become more cooperative.
4. The fact that “network” is a trendy term could also be helpful. Because it is somewhat understood but also catchy, it helps to make concrete the idea of non-sequential concurrent operations.

11-L-0559/OSD/10600

Snowflake

Action
2/13
1800

February 11, 2002 9:40 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Indonesia

Please take a look at this note on Indonesia, and then let's have a talk and see if we have our heads on right on this subject.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/08/02 Paper on Indonesia

DHR:dh
021102-5

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

Indonesia

11 Feb 02

U12792 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10601

8 Feb 02

Overview: more threatening to the long-term stability of Indonesia than the Al-Qaeda connection is the money-military-militia web suggested below:

MONEY:

Fuad Bawazier (former Minister of Finance, in Suharto's last cabinet)

Secret
MILITARY SPONSORSHIP

Gen (ret.) Wiranto (former chief of staff for Suharto)

[Lt. Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim

MILITANT ISLAMIST ACTION GROUPS

→ Front Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam)

→ Laskar Jihad (Holy Warrior Corps.)

7:33 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 11, 2002

Handwritten signature in a circle
2/11

Larry Di Rita
2/19

Dove
2/20
09/13

SUBJECT:

I understand that VADM Wilson, probably DIA, made some comment that the whole key to the war on terrorism is to cut off the head and catch Usama Bin Laden. Could you show me where he said that, please?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021102.04

Please respond by:

2/15/02

000.5

11 Feb 02

U12793 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10603

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: February 12, 2002

SUBJECT: VADM Wilson

The only thing VADM Wilson has done on the record recently is testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I have attached a page from his testimony where he says "there is no identified successor capable of rallying so many divergent nationalities, interests and groups." I was not able to find a venue where he said anything about cutting "off the head."

11-L-0559/OSD/10604

threats we are most likely to encounter during the next 10 to 15 years.

Terrorism

As was vividly displayed on 11 September, terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric threat to US interests at home and abroad. I am most concerned about Islamic extremist organizations, in the Middle East, and throughout the world. Other groups with varying causes – nationalistic, leftist, ethnic or religious – will continue to pose a lesser threat.

Operation Enduring Freedom has significantly damaged the Al Qaida network, destroying its geographic center of gravity, causing the death or arrest of several key leaders, and putting others on the run. The group has suffered a loss of prestige, institutional memory, contacts, and financial assets that will ultimately degrade its effectiveness. Even if Usama Bin Ladin survives, his ability to execute centralized control over a worldwide network has been diminished.

That said, the Al Qaida network has not been eliminated, and it retains the potential for reconstitution. Many key officials and operatives remain and new personalities have already begun to emerge. Some operations that were already planned could be easily completed. The organization could also splinter into a number of loosely affiliated groups, united by a common cause and sharing common operatives. Their capability to conduct simultaneous or particularly complex attacks would likely be degraded, but they would continue to be a lethal threat to our interests worldwide, including within the US.

~~If Bin Ladin is killed or captured, there is no identified successor capable of rallying so many divergent nationalities, interests, and groups to create the kind of cohesion he fostered, amongst Sunni Islamic extremists around the world. Bin Ladin is synonymous with Al Qaida, and the media attention he has garnered, along with his charisma and other attributes, have made him an inspirational rallying-point for like-minded extremists. With Bin Ladin's removal, the network most likely will eventually fragment under various lieutenants pursuing differing agendas with differing priorities.~~

In general, terrorists will likely favor proven conventional weapons over chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials, at least through the near term. However, several groups, especially Al Qaida, have pursued CBRN capabilities, and the threat from terrorist use of these materials will continue. Many of the technologies associated with the development of CBRN weapons – especially chemical and biological agents – have legitimate civil applications and are classified as dual-use. The increased availability of these technologies, coupled with the relative ease of producing some chemical or biological agents, make them attractive to terrorist groups intent on causing panic or inflicting larger numbers of casualties. The psychological impact of the recent anthrax cases in the US did not go unnoticed. Some terrorist groups have demonstrated the willingness to inflict greater numbers of indiscriminate casualties and would take any measure to achieve these goals.

Since 11 September, the US has employed extraordinary security measures at home and at abroad. We are also enjoying unprecedented cooperation on terrorism intelligence and security issues from governments across the globe. These conditions have resulted in a particularly difficult operating environment for terrorists. However, as history shows, terrorists work on their own timeline and are patient. They are content to wait for the right opportunity – even if it takes years – to increase their chances of success.

February 11, 2002 9:35 AM

Done
2/13
1740

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tonnage

What is the displacement of a submarine in tons, so we could compare it with the Crusader, a frigate or a destroyer escort?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021102-2

.....

Please respond by 02/15/02

SB0.3

2/13

SECDEF-

RESPONSE ATTACHED

V/R

Ed

11 Feb 02

U12794 /02

Los Angeles (688) Class Attack Submarine	6900 Tons
SeaWolf (SSN 21) Class Attack Submarine	9150 Tons
Nuclear Research Submarine NR-1 (Smallest Nuclear Submarine in world) 146' Long	400 Tons
Perry Class (FFG) Frigate	4100 Tons
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Destroyer	8300 Tons
Patrol Coastal (PC) Ships 170' Long (Smallest Commissioned US Ship)	330 Tons

3/5

February 12, 2002 12:36 PM

Dave
2/15
1835

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Vision 2020

I was asked by someone what do we do about Joint Vision 2020. What is the answer? It is still sitting out there.

3/5

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021202-25



Please respond by 03/01/02

12 Feb 02

U12795 /02

02/15/02 2:01 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Steve Cambone  FEB 15 2002

SUBJECT: Joint Vision 2020

This replies to yours of February 12, attached.

Gen. Keane raised Joint Vision 2020 at last Friday's SLRG.

I have asked Gen. Keane if he would lead the SLRG on February 22 to elaborate on his thoughts.

The point he will develop is that for transformation to be embedded in the DOD, existing documents that guide strategy, doctrine, organization, etc., need to be changed to reflect the transformation objective(s).

I asked Gen. Keane to identify the range of documents, etc., he has in mind and to trace the "critical path." That is, what handful of documents, etc., if altered, would drive the rest of the system to respond?

Gen. Keane's willingness to do this is a big deal. We should follow it with invitations to other Service chiefs to take a hand in leading an SLRG discussion. I will follow with suggestions.

11-L-0559/OSD/10609

February 12, 2002 12:23 PM

3/4
09/26

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Directed Energy

Done 3/5

I would like someone to look into directed energy. I cannot believe that it is non-intrusive.

463.2

Please get me something on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021202-17

.....
Please respond by 03/01/02

12Feb02

U12796 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10610

2002 MAR -1 PM 4: 30

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

SECRET - You asked: ~~MEMO~~ "Is Directed Energy Intrusive or not?"

February 27, 2002, 1200 PM

3/15
FOR THE PITS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

Pete
3/1/02

SUBJECT: Info Memo on Directed Energy as "Non-Intrusive"

- There are directed energy (DE) applications that are intrusive and there are DE applications that are not intrusive. DE is generally defined as high energy lasers, high power millimeter waves, high power microwaves (HPM), and high power radio waves. Intrusive applications would include laser effects gained by "burn through" or implosive mechanisms on weapon systems.
- Non-intrusive is generally taken to mean achieving desired effects without breaking the external case or structure of equipment or targets (includes skin). Technologies are under development that meets the non-intrusive criteria. Non-intrusive examples are as follows:
 - o The Air Force Research Laboratory is developing a high power millimeter wave system called the "Active Denial System" (ADS). The ADS acts over tactically significant ranges to rapidly heat the top layer of skin of a person. The system is being developed for crowd control and access denial. The Navy is developing a similar system for use on ships. *"NON-INTRUSIVE"*
 - o Both the Army and Air Force Laboratories are developing ~~HPM~~ ^{microwave} systems to disrupt or disable a target's electronic subsystems by penetrating via existing surface seams and apertures. *Sounds intrusive*
 - o The Air Force is fielding a laser infrared counter measure system for use against infrared guided missiles. This system works by spoofing or blinding missile sensors.

Attachments: Report of the DoD Directed Energy review Panel, March 15, 2001.

Prepared by: Mr. Alan Shaffer, Director, DDR&E Plans and Programs, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/4
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	1103843
EXECSEC WHITMORE	16719

11-L-0559/OSD/10011

02

snw/akre

*Done
2/26*

February 12, 2002 11:11 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dispersing Buildings

Bill Timmons makes a very good point in the letter I have attached.

We're thinking through the implications of such a concept for DoD. You may want to think about it government-wide.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/06/02 Timmons ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
021202-14

600

12 Feb 02

U12797 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10612

CC: ~~Given~~ to L.D.R. to
Given

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 06 2002

TIMMONS AND COMPANY, INCORPORATED

1850 K STREET, N. W. • SUITE 850 • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE (b)(6)

WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS

6 February 2002

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I don't want to beat a dead horse, but the enclosed clipping from the newspaper prompts me to write again about the need to disperse federal functions from the Washington, DC region. Many buildings are owned, leased, or partially rented by the federal government, and now a new \$825 million deal has been made to build two more huge structures.

It's just a matter of time before terrorists unleash disasters of one kind or another on our Capital City. With modern communications and transportation there is no need to have all essential government functions located in one place, especially when heartland communities would provide less expensive, better equipped, and more talent for government facilities

What community wouldn't trade in a heartbeat 4,000 civilian jobs for 4,000 military personnel? Service men and women frequently live on base, eat, purchase at the PX, and receive medical treatment there. Civilians would buy homes, contribute to the local economy in many ways, and provide stable employment.

As you identify military facilities for closure, I would hope the President might start a phased withdrawal of agencies that bloat the District of Columbia.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,



William E. Timmons

Enclosure

The Washington Post

C

Maryland & D.C.
Edition

RETRO

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2002

DM 5

Picked for Transportation Dept.

Say \$825 Million Deal Will Cut Off Access to Waterfront, Hurt Neighborhood

The General Services Administration, the federal government's real estate agency, reached a deal late Friday that will sell 11 of the 55 acres that make up the Southeast Federal Center to the JBG Co., a Washington developer, and its financial partner, JER Partners Inc. of McLean.

The plans call for two office buildings totaling 1.35 million square feet of space for the new headquarters at Third Street and

New Jersey Avenue SE. The two buildings, the tallest of which will rise 11 stories, will be separated by an open-air plaza and boulevard connecting to Third Street. The private companies will spend \$400 million to acquire the land and put up the buildings, which will take four to five years to complete.

Federal officials praised the deal as good news for one of the District's most neglected corners. But several city officials, including

Mayor Anthony A. Williams, the city's planning director and some D.C. Council members, opposed the move. Critics said the development will create an imposing wall of federal buildings that will block off the river from view and the waterfront from use, leaving barren streets and a barren neighborhood.

See WATERFRONT, C4, Col. 1

11-L-0559/OSD/10614

Actual
2/22

February 12, 2002 8:37 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Crusader Briefing

I should probably get this briefing on the Crusader again from someone who can walk me through the charts.

470

Thanks.

Attach.
Crusader Briefing Slides

DHR:dh
021202-5

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

12 Feb 02

U12798 /02

**ARMY TRANSFORMATION
LEADING WITH ARTILLERY**

CRUSADER




11-L-0559/OSD/10616

Main Points


- ❖ **Why Artillery?**
- ❖ **Skipping Generations of Modernization**
- ❖ **Paladin Vs Crusader**
- ❖ **Weight Reduction**
- ❖ **Deployability after Weight Reduction**
- ❖ **Sensor to Shooter Links**
- ❖ **Objective Force Technology**
- ❖ **What Crusader Buys You**

Crusader – The Leading Edge of Army Transformation

Why Artillery?



Example:
North Korean



Artillery
US ————— 2,900
NK ————— 10,300

Unique Battlefield System


- Always Available – all weather
- Best Counter Artillery system
- Responsive – sustain initiative
- Flexible – close support

- Allied capitol under NK guns
- Artillery is immediate NK threat
- With Crusader:
 - Offsets 8 to 1 NK advantage
 - 65% increase in total force effectiveness
 - 30% fewer casualties
 - 20% decrease in logistics


Best counter to threat - Crusader

Why Pursue a Next Generation Artillery System?

- **Future high-intensity conflict will require rapid counter-battery fires**
 - **Example: Korea**
 - North Korean artillery; coupled with ballistic missiles and CBW, is main threat
 - 7,900 Artillery Tubes & 2500 MRLs
 - Most located near DMZ and within range of Seoul (30 Km); CBW-capable
 - **Example: Iraq**
 - Despite Gulf War, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf
 - 1,950 Artillery Tubes & 150 MRLs
 - **Example: China**
 - Aggressive seeking modernization to fight against a high-tech adversary
 - 13,200 Artillery Tubes and 2500 MRLs
- **Meeting the threat requires**
 - Rapid Counter-battery fires
 - NBC Survivable
 - Superior night, all-weather capable fires
 - Real-time integration of C4I (Networked fires)
 - Greater battle tempo sustained by automation




Army Transformation – Skipping Gen of Modernization





11-L-0559/OSD/10620

Crusader Fundamental Redesign




WEIGHT LOSS ...THROUGH ...

- ❖ Turbine Engine
- Lighter Suspension
- Smaller Structure
- Lightweight Composite Armor



Today

Or




“Our forces in the next century must be... agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. Our military must be able to identify targets by a variety of means... destroy those targets almost instantly, with an array of weapons, from a submarine-launched cruise missile, to mobile long-range artillery. “

George W. Bush

The Citadel, SC September, 1999

Paladin vs Crusader Deployability

Equal Firepower Comparison




	C-17	Soldiers	Weight	Cost
Paladin	12	94	1020 Tons	2.4M
Crusader	6	31	510 Tons	1.2M

Crusader requires 23% less ammunition


Sensor to Shooter Links...

The difference between a kill or miss of a fleeting target

Paladin



Crusader



Engagement Time:

Paladin: 10-12 minutes

Crusader: Less than 1 minute

Crusader – Harnessing Revolutions in Military Technology

Information Revolution




- ✓ Digital Command, Control & Situational Awareness
- ✓ Network-Centric Warfare
- ✓ 2 Million Lines of Code
- ✓ 21st Century Cockpit

Logistics Revolution

- ✓ Smart Logistics
- ✓ Automated Diagnosis
- ✓ Reduced Logistics Footprint

Automation Revolution



- ✓ Fully Automated Ammunition Handling
- ✓ Robotic Firing and Resupply
- ✓ Accuracy, Range, & Rate of Fire

Materials & Production Revolution

- ✓ Lightweight Composites, Titanium
- ✓ Spray Cooled Electronics
- ✓ Vulnerability Reduction
- ✓ Development & Production through Modeling and Simulation

CRUSADER – APPLIED TECHNOLOGY FOR THE TRANSFORMATION

11-L-0559/OSD/10624

What Crusader Buys The Joint Force

- ❖ **Deterrence**
 - ❖ Significantly enhanced counter battery fire – when and where needed
 - ❖ NBC Crew Protection – sustained combat capability
 - ❖ Deployability -- Equal firepower for 50% strategic assets

- ❖ **Force Structure Reduction:**
 - ❖ Already reduced battalion from 24 to 18 guns – anticipated Crusader
 - Crusader crew 25% smaller (from 8 to 6)


- ❖ **Efficiencies:**
 - ❖ Substitute technology for people – reduce personnel costs
 - ❖ Reduced Logistics -- 15-25% reduction in logistical tail for Artillery

- ❖ **Contribute to Transformation**
 - ❖ Reduced buy from 1138 to 480 Crusaders -- \$11 Billion
 - ❖ Program Kills -- 7 in 2001 -- 5 in 2002 -- 18 in 2003
 - ❖ Harness revolutions in military technology

Crusader – The Leading Edge of Army Transformation

Paladin Vs Crusader

Past ... Present ... Future



Action
as 2/12

February 12, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Gen. Myers
 Gen. Pace
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Pete Aldridge
 Tom White
 Gordon England
 James Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transformational Concepts

381

Please talk to the people I have copied on this, and let's decide what we want to do about the Defense Planning Guidance with respect to it.

Thanks.

Attach.
ASD(C3I) undated memo to SecDef re: Transformational Concepts

DHR:dh
021202-4

.....

Please respond by 02/28/02

12 Feb 02

U12799 /02



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 12 2002

5/3
2/8
1800
G/S
GOOD PAGE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT *JPS*

SUBJECT: Transformational Concepts

- As work begins on the Defense Planning Guidance for FY04-09, I would like to share some thoughts related to my vision of the office that I think can be transformational.
- The underlying themes include:
 - Building a global, secure wide bandwidth network that people trust.
 - Populating the network with new, dynamic sources of information to defeat the enemy.
 - Denying the enemy comparable advantages, and exploiting their weakness.
- In FY03 you funded a number of initiatives that support these goals, including:
 - High capacity terrestrial fiber-optic connections to key installations, and the extension of wide bandwidth to orbit with laser satellite communications.
 - Initiation of several programs for the collection of persistent and responsive intelligence that enemies don't expect we know about. We need continue to keep surprising them through further innovation.
 - Major funding for offensive information operations and cyber-security.
- However, the most important implications of these initiatives are cultural, vice technological.
 - The main point is that we need to move from the industrial age concept of being synchronous in time and space ("Form up on the field, we attack at dawn"), to being asynchronous in time and space. A UAV in one place can pass data to a targeteer elsewhere, who calls in a strike from somewhere else. The people and sensors can be anywhere, work together via the net at any time. The only thing that needs to be synchronous is the weapon arriving at the target.



- If people trust the network, they will let their information be posted to it, and thus be willing to give up their own stovepiped caches of unshared knowledge.
- Users of information are also suppliers. Everybody needs to post what they know.
- I'm ready to discuss how the six-month plan fits with this. I will schedule time with you to discuss.

Prepared by: Dr. Linton Wells II, PDASD (C3I).

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10629

INFO
AS 2/26

February 12, 2002 8:24 AM

TO: Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: John Robson

Here is John Robson's background sheet, so you will have the chronology.

Thanks.

Attach.
Robson Biography

DHR:dh
021202-1


.....
Please respond by _____

095

12 Feb 02

U12800 /02

Export-Import Bank of the United States



JOHN E. ROBSON
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the United States

John E. Robson is the President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank). Nominated by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the United States Senate, Mr. Robson took office in May 2001.

Prior to joining Ex-Im Bank, Mr. Robson was an investment banker with the San Francisco, California based firm of Robertson Stephens, where he was Senior Advisor.

Previously, he was President and Chief Executive Officer of the Fortune 500 pharmaceutical and consumer products company, G.D. Searle & Co. Mr. Robson was Dean and Professor of Management at the Goizueta Business School at Emory University and also practiced corporate law as a partner in the firm of Sidley and Austin.

Mr. Robson also held Presidential appointments in Washington, D.C., as Deputy Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury, as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board where he initiated airline deregulation, and as Under Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation.

He previously held appointments as a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, as a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, in Washington, D.C., and as Co-Chairman of the International Tax and Investment Center.

Over the years Mr. Robson has served on a number of corporate boards including Pharmacia Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, ProLogis Trust, Chiron Corporation, Conrail, Continental Airlines, G.D. Searle & Co., Norrell, Inc., and Rand McNally Company. He was also a trustee or director of several educational and non-profit organizations including St. John's College of Annapolis and Santa Fe and the University of California, San Francisco Foundation.

He is the recipient of the Alexander Hamilton Medal (U.S. Treasury Department) and the L. Welch Pogue Award for Lifetime Contribution to Aviation, and is an honorary alumnus of St. John's College.

Mr. Robson was raised in Chicago. He is a graduate of Yale University (B.A.) and the Harvard University Law School (J.D.).

He and his wife Margaret have one son.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
811 VERMONT AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20571

(b)(6)

Export-Import Bank of the United States
Revised: January 22, 2002

ACTION
3/5

February 13, 2002 12:54 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Relations w/White House

I think we should have Andy Card, plus one or two of his senior people, over for lunch with me, you and Ed Giambastiani. He tells me the relationship has an undercurrent that is not healthy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021302-14



Please respond by 03/01/02

031.1 WH

13Feb02

U12801 /02

February 13, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: WSJ Article

381

I think sending around this article on transformation would be a good idea. Please send it to some folks.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/11/02 Jim Collins, *Wall Street Journal*, "High Returns Amid Low Expectations"
DHR:dh
021302-3

.....
Please respond by 03/01/02

Agree 3/8

W. Rumsfeld - Stan
memo from me
Please do a ~~summary~~
to ^{Deputy} Service Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
CTCS, VCSCS, Chiefs, Cebrowski

"Here is an ~~article~~ recent article
that discusses transformation,
albeit from a non-military
perspective. Thought you would
appreciate seeing it you have
already. Larry

U12802 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10634




THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF THE SERVICES
CHIEFS OF SERVICES
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION

SUBJECT: Transformation Article

Here is a recent article that discusses transformation, albeit from a non-military perspective. Thought you would appreciate seeing it if you haven't already.


Lawrence DiRita

Attachment



11-L-0559/OSD/10635

From Ken Krings

High Returns Amid Low Expectations

During the late 1990s, executives complained about out-of-whack expectations created by an irrational stock market. Now many of those same people complain about the pressures created by recession, war, terrorism and a struggling market. In truth, the current economic downturn is the best opportunity to come along in nearly two decades for building great companies.

Thousands of firms suddenly enjoy a wonderful advantage: Low expectations.

Manager's Journal

By Jim Collins

It's a gift of circumstance highly correlated with the presence of leaders who take companies from good to great.

The 'Savior' CEO

Take two contrasting cases, the first being Michael Armstrong at AT&T. When Mr. Armstrong became CEO of AT&T in late 1997—the height of the boom—he wowed the board, the media and investors with his charismatic energy. This was a man who would lead! At last, AT&T had found its savior, the man who could free the company from the bondage of long distance and take it into the digital age.

Business Week ran a photo of Mr. Armstrong smiling triumphantly on his ascension, while his predecessor, Robert Allen, looked beaten and worn. The magazine quoted Mr. Armstrong as saying, "I'm absolutely convinced that this company is going to lead the fastest-changing industry in the world."



Mike Armstrong

The expectations that greeted Mr. Armstrong were so high that the stock shot up 30% within three months. And to his credit, Mr. Armstrong surprised everyone by initially exceeding expectations. He cut costs, increased profitability in wireless and improved international service. The stock soared again. In just 15 months, Mr. Armstrong's presence nearly doubled the share price—an impressive performance. Too bad it didn't last.

It turns out that the same sky-high expectations that fueled the stock in the first place ultimately became the seeds of an equally dramatic decline. Fifty-nine years old at the start of his tenure, Mr. Armstrong had less than six years to rebuild AT&T into an enduring great company. On the surface, this might look like plenty of time, but consider: It took Jack Welch over eight years in office before GE's stock began to significantly and consistently outperform the stock market. Similarly, it took Lou Gerstner over six years to get IBM's net profit margins back into the range the company enjoyed during its previous era of greatness.

In our study of what it takes to turn good companies into great ones, we found that it took on average of four years to crystallize a coherent strategic concept and seven years of intense effort below the radar screen before a company would

show a significant and sustained leap to great results.

Given these statistics, a more realistic aim would have been for Mr. Armstrong to use his short tenure to set the conditions for his successor to preside over greatness in the next generation. Unfortunately, nearly everyone's expectations in 1997 were that Mr. Armstrong could defy the laws of corporate physics and create an overnight transformation.

These expectations, in turn, led to a series of big, lurching steps. Mr. Armstrong spent \$100 billion to buy Telecommunications Inc. and Media One, looking for a single-step solution to the declining long-distance business. He took a sledgeham-

Executives complain that it's hard to succeed in these tough economic times. Au contraire. This may be the best time to turn around a struggling company.

mer to AT&T's culture, trying to pound it overnight into a culture of discipline. He cut 18,000 jobs in one year, to quickly bolster the bottom line. But the acquisitions didn't work out as well as hoped, the sledgehammer drove away many of AT&T's best executives and the cost cutting did not solve the company's fundamental problems. Between 1999 and 2001, AT&T stock dropped nearly two-thirds, or about 60% behind the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Standard & Poor's 500 indexes.

To be fair, Mr. Armstrong faced a series of challenges that Jack Welch or Lou Gerstner likely could not have fully mastered in anything less than five to 10 years. Not only did he face a rapidly declining core business, but unlike Messrs. Welch and Gerstner, he found himself atop a deeply mediocre enterprise. One might even suggest that AT&T's problems were so acute and its mediocrity so deeply embedded that no CEO could turn it into a great company, ever.

But the contrasting case of David Maxwell disproves that notion. Mr. Maxwell faced an even more acute crisis at an equally mediocre company. When he became CEO of Fannie Mae in 1981, in the middle of a recession, it was losing \$1 million every business day with \$56 billion of mortgage loans under water. With a negative 6% spread on its portfolio, and no end in sight, most analysts saw nothing but a bleak future for Fannie Mae, perhaps even extinction.

The remarkable thing about Mr. Maxwell's leadership is not just that he saved the company, which he did brilliantly, but that in the process he turned a 50-year-old quasi-government bureaucracy into a truly great organization. He did not step forth as a heroic savior with a ready-made program. No big acquisitions to buy a breakthrough, no radical restructuring to immediately bolster the bottom line, no charismatic visionary leadership to wow the media, no hoopla to bolster the stock. He simply got the right people on the bus

(and the wrong people off the bus), quietly redesigned the entire business model into a machine that could make money independent of interest-rate fluctuations and spent 10 years shaping a culture of discipline.

Mr. Maxwell understood that building a great company is like pushing a heavy flywheel: it requires a huge amount of effort just to get the thing moving and many additional pushes to generate significant momentum. But with persistent effort, accumulating momentum one turn upon another, a company eventually gets results that can last.

During Mr. Maxwell's first four years, in fact, Fannie Mae stock gained almost no ground relative to the general stock market and it took fully six years for return on equity to climb back into solid double digits. In the long run, however, the results were spectacular. A dollar invested in Fannie Mae in 1981 and held to 2000, dividends reinvested, multiplied over 100 times—a performance substantially better than corporate superstars GE, Coke and Merck over the same period, and six times better than the general stock market.

When I asked Mr. Maxwell how he resisted taking actions that would drive up the share price in the short term, but that might fall to create a great company in the long run, he seemed perplexed, as if the question had never occurred to him. I pressed further, pointing out that I had repeatedly heard executives complain that the modern pressures of Wall Street make it difficult to build greatness for the long term. Mr. Maxwell thought about this for a moment, and then pointed out that he had one huge advantage: No one expected much from Fannie Mae.

And that brings me to the central issue. The point is not so much about the striking differences between David Maxwell and Michael Armstrong, but about the differences in expectations that each faced, about how those expectations led to radically different outcomes. Certainly, Mr. Armstrong added fuel to the fire that ultimately consumed him, but the board, the media and our misguided belief in savior CEOs are equally to blame for creating unrealistic expectations. Indeed, if Mr. Armstrong had projected Mr. Maxwell's low-key, step-by-step manner, it is unlikely he would have even been hired, especially in the bull market raging in 1997.

Quiet Heroics

The question is whether today's leaders will seize this time of lowered expectations to turn the flywheel like David Maxwell, or if they will fall into the doom loop that befell Michael Armstrong. If they choose well, we will not be reading about their heroics in the next 12 months, but we will certainly appreciate their efforts down the road when their legacy becomes clear. On the evidence of a 100-fold increase for investors and a great company that makes a difference in people's lives, it's just fine to lead in the manner of David Maxwell. The best executives will use this reprieve from the tyranny of the bull market to do just that.

Mr. Collins is author of "Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap . . . and Others Don't" (HarperBusiness, 2001). He operates a management research laboratory in Boulder, Colo.

February 14, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rocket

Done 3/5

Today Duke Cunningham mentioned Argon or Quick Bolt or something, a rocket.
I would like someone to please explain it to me.

491.94

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021402-12

.....
Please respond by 03/01/02

Sprison / Kent

*This is likely a China Lake
Skunk Works project for
an Air to Air or Air to Ground
missile. Please investigate
and provide us response.*

*Thanks
H/dec W
2/25*

14 Feb 2002

U12803 /02



ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR -1 11:07:29

INFO MEMO

February 28, 2002, 1700

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef _____

FROM: USD(ATL) *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: Rocket (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile [AARGM])

DISCUSSION:

- At TAB A memo, you stated "Today Duke Cunningham mentioned Argon or Quick Bolt or something, a rocket. I would like someone to explain it to me."
- The items in question are different capabilities of an air-launched anti-radiation missile. The first is the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile or AARGM. The second is called Quick Bolt and is an enhancement to AARGM. Together, they compose the advanced version of the existing High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile or HARM.
- The HARM missile ended production in 1996. Remaining inventory, with improvements is sufficient through 2025. Existing HARM will soon be retrofitted with a GPS/INS for a geo-locating capability that enables lower power targets to be detected. This improvement will be introduced in 2004.
- The AARGM upgrades the HARM with a multi-mode seeker that employs both Anti-Radiation Homing and an active Millimeter wave (MMW) seeker. The seeker enables the missile to find the target in the absence of signals (threat shutdown). Operational capability is expected in 2008. (See attachment.)
- Quick Bolt is a capability that builds on the AARGM accuracy. It enables the missile to have a near real-time intelligence feed that directs the missile to the threat from offboard sensors and provides weapons impact assessment for damage via a classified broadcast system. (See attachment).

Now

Coordination: Verbal from PMA-241, Naval Air Systems Command; CNO N780

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Richard O. McHarg, USN, OUSD ATL)S&TS Air Warfare

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/4
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXEC SEC WHITMORE	UO 3724 20 3/4

11-L-0539 OSD 710638

102




AARGM

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile




MIDCOURSE / TRAJECTORY SHAPING

- ARH PASSIVE RANGING
- GPS/INS & ARH GUIDED





QUICK BOLT Concept of Operations



Pre-flight Mission Planning

- Define target and geographic filters

Aircraft captive carry


- Enhanced Situational Awareness (SA)
- Real-time re-routing for threat avoidance

Weapon post-launch

- Autonomous ARH passive ranging in-flight
- MMW radar search

Weapon just prior to fuzing

- Real-time INTEL to support ongoing strike operations and future mission planning



Action
as 3/5

February 15, 2002 9:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: White Paper

383.6

I don't know quite how to do this, but I think we need to have a definitive white paper on this whole detainee-Geneva Convention set of issues.

I don't know if anyone is fashioning such a thing, but since the White House won't put out anything, I think we have to begin doing white papers that will lay out what the government is doing. We don't have to put our name on it or even the Pentagon, but we just have to have it and be able to give it to people to be able to explain things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021502-9

.....

Please respond by 03/01/02

15 Feb 02

U12804 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10641

Done 3/5

February 15, 2002 8:05 AM

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meetings w/President

I would like to get back to having a regular weekly meeting with the President, where I can meet with him separately.

I always cancel if I don't need it, but I find I always have odds and ends that are probably better to bring up with him there than they are in the NSC meetings, which is about the only time I see the President.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
021502-4

337 WH

15 Feb 02

U12806 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10642

9:38 AM

ACTION 316

TO: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: February 16, 2002
 SUBJECT: IMET

With respect to IMET, I think we ought to think about the following:

1. Getting IMET transferred to DoD from State;
2. Getting the authority to pay some of the costs for some of the poorer countries;
3. Getting free to have programs with countries where we need to be connected to their military such as Indonesia, Pakistan, etc.

} 50.2

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.05

Please respond by: _____

16 Feb 02

U12807 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10643

9:32 AM

Action
3/6 AS

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: February 16, 2002
SUBJECT: **Philippines**

Here's a place where this Charge d'Affaires in the Philippines is saying the U.S. military is ready for action. You might want to talk to the State Department about having him be careful of what he says.

Philippines

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.04

Attach: SIRO Press Review 2/15/02

Please respond by: _____

16 Feb 02

U12808 /02

2. (COLOMBIA) An operation in northern Cesar state on Wednesday left a cocaine processing complex in flames and smoke. U.S.-backed counternarcotics forces struck for the first time in the northern section of the country. -AP, 14 FEB 02-

3. (RUSSIA) The Russian government broke with a decades-old Soviet tradition of blanket conscription on Thursday, approving a bill that will allow young men to complete military service outside the military.
-REUTERS, 14 FEB 02-

4. (CYPRUS) Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denkash said on Thursday talks with Greek Cypriots to seek a solution to the tension on the divided island would intensify in March after a pause for a religious holiday. -REUTERS, 14 FEB 02-

5. (BAHRAIN) Sheik Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Bahrain's ruler, proclaimed himself king and Bahrain a constitutional monarchy on Thursday and called for legislative and local elections in line with a promise to make Bahrain a democracy. -AP, 14 FEB 02-

6. (PHILIPPINES) U.S. troops began deploying on Friday on a remote Philippine island used by Muslim guerrillas linked to Usama bin Laden. U.S. Charge d'Affaires Robert Fitts told the press that they were ready for action, although they are on a training mission with the Philippine army. -REUTERS, 15 FEB 02- 7. (PAKISTAN/INDIA/KASHMIR) Shams-ud-Din Hyder, the military spokesman for the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad militant group, vowed on Thursday to continue its armed struggle in Kashmir. -REUTERS, 14 FEB 02-

7. (PAKISTAN/INDIA/KASHMIR) Shams-ud-Din Hyder, the military spokesman for the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad militant group, vowed on Thursday to continue its armed struggle in Kashmir. -REUTERS, 14 FEB 02-

8. (INDONESIA) According to Indonesian press on Thursday, the Indonesian Armed Forces will enhance its anti-terror capability by establishing several counter-terrorism units in a bid to deal with regional security threats. -PBIS, 14 FEB 02-

T R A V E L

1. GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER JOSCHKA FISCHER arrived in Jerusalem on 14 February.

10:34 AM

Action
JS 3/6

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 16, 2002
SUBJECT: **Guantanamo Bay**

We have got to keep moving people moving out of Guantanamo Bay back to their countries. What is the status? Please dig in.

383.6

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.09

Please respond by: _____

16 Feb 02

U12809 /02

10:40 AM

*Action
as 2/16*

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 16, 2002
SUBJECT:

Let's talk about Tuskegee today.

1. Gail Norton and the National Park Service
2. The National Park Foundation. I should contact Jim Matty.
3. You should check with Goldberg and see if there is an oral history on Tuskegee airmen.
4. We ought to think about having an event for Tuskegee airmen here at the Pentagon that I host.
5. We ought to think about opening up a hall, one of the corridors for Tuskegee airmen or some section of something.
6. You should look into the other things that Ben Peyton brought up.
7. Next you should think of a den mother for this activity that can pull the pieces together and can be responsible.

080

16 Feb 2002

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.10

et

Please respond by: _____

U12810 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10647

INFO
AS 3/7

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: February 18, 2002

SUBJECT: Nancy Reynolds

I understand that Nancy Reynolds is a candidate for a post as ambassador some where in Africa.

Africa

As you will recall, she worked in the Reagan Administration. She then ran the Wexler-Reynolds firm here in Washington. She is very knowledgeable about Africa and is a first-rate human being. I sure hope something works out for her. She would do a great job for the country.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021802.23

18 Feb 02

U12811 /02

10:22 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 18, 2002
SUBJECT: **Military Appointments**

What would it take to change the rules so that Chiefs were appointed for two years with the possibility of two additional years, the way CINCs are; i.e., appointed for two years with the possibility of extensions?

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021802.08

Please respond by: _____ *2/25*

3/7

Done

210(344)

18Feb02

U12812 /02

2/28
2/2002



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

February 26, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

[Handwritten signature]
LARRY DI RITA

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 2/27/02*

SUBJECT: Military Appointments

- Your memorandum of February 18, 2002 asked: "What would it take to change the rules so that Chiefs were appointed for two years with the possibility of two additional years, the way CINCs are; i.e., appointed for two years with the possibility of extensions?"
- The following statutes prescribe the term of service for the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, respectively: 10 U.S.C. 3033, 5033, 5043 and 8033. Section (a)(1) of each statute says the same thing: that the Service chief is appointed for a period of four years and that in a "time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress, he may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years."
- The statutes also provide that the Service Chiefs serve at the pleasure of the President. This authority appears to have been used sparingly in order to relieve Service Chiefs when their superiors were dissatisfied with their performance.
- To change the term of appointment would require a change to each of the listed statutes. Amended language could specify a renewable two-year term, or, alternatively, could specify no length of term (as is currently the case for Vice Chiefs and combatant commanders.).

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: James Smyser, OGC (b)(6)



12:45 PM

INFO
3/7

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 18, 2002
SUBJECT: Washington Times Article

Here's this article about how the estimates that we've killed thousands were wrong. We ought to keep that.

Thank you.

AFghanistan

DHR/azn
021802.01

Attach: Washington Times "Sometimes a chunker can't hit the barn", Wesley Pruden 2/15/02

Please respond by: _____

18 Feb 02

U12813 /02

Pruden on Politics

By Wesley Pruden



Sometimes a chunker can't hit the barn

Washington Times alaska

Throwing rocks, which is the most fun pundits, academics and "allies" can have standing up, hasn't been very rewarding so far.

In the beginning the rock-chunkers thought they had just the right conditions at hand: Afghanistan would be a "quagmire," though buried under so much ice and snow that American forces would be bogged down for a decade. Or was it a generation?

After the usual quick victory — Arabs make terrific assassins but lousy soldiers — the pundits and academics found themselves shocked by George W's naughty rhetoric. He called the evildoers in Iran, Iraq and North Korea "evil." This kept the cheese merchants of Europe awake nights for nearly a week. If only Colin Powell, the only man in the Bush inner circle who understands the delicate European psyche, would talk some sense into that Bush boy's head.

Too bad for the axis of cheese, but Colin Powell understands the axis of evil, too. "The president spoke the truth," the secretary of state told London's Financial Times yesterday. "It may have been seized on by leader [Ali] Khamenei [of Iran] and others. . . . I don't want to overdramatize it, but they said the same thing about Ronald Reagan's speech in the 1980s [when he called the Soviet Union the 'evil empire']: 'Shocking, we're shocked, how can he have said such a thing?' Do you know who heard it? The Russian people heard it."

And now more rocks appear to have missed the mark with the disclosures that the infamous air strike on the terrorist camp at Zavar Kili in eastern Afghanistan, in which innocent scrap-metal scavengers were said to have been killed by U.S. bombs, probably didn't kill innocent scrap-metal scavengers after all. The dead were members of the al Qaeda high command, including the financial director of Osama bin Laden's terror enterprise.

The notion that American bombers have killed "thousands" of innocent Afghan civilians is dear to the hearts of the naysayers, both here and in Europe. Exact numbers won't ever be calculated; that's the nature of war. But what is known is that those who either don't support the war, or are rooting for the other side, deliberately inflate the grim toll.



Colin Powell

They put the figure in the "thousands." A

professor at the University of New Hampshire, relying on "news reports" putting the number of civilian deaths at between 3,000 and 5,000, calculated his own number at between 3,100 and 3,800. As vague and fantastical as these figures were, they were quickly accepted in certain quarters as fact, and recycled into conventional wisdom.

But now a survey by the Associated Press, just completed, puts the figure closer to 500. That's a lot, and measured in terms of personal tragedy, an agonizing excess. But it gives the lie to the notion that nobody in the American high command cares. "Any loss of innocent life is a shame," says Gen. Tommy Franks, the commander of the U.S. forces arrayed against al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The Associated Press reporters, who examined hospital records, interviewed hundreds of villagers and inspected dozens of cemeteries, concluded that the toll was considerably less than anyone anticipated. Some of the early reporting was deliberate misinformation. For example, Abdul Salam Zaef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, accused the United States of genocide early on, and said 1,500 civilians had been killed in the first three weeks of the war.

Afghan journalists for Bakhtar, the official Taliban news agency on which the enemy based its inflated claims, told the Associated Press that their battlefield reports had been "freely doctored." One Bakhtar reporter said he went to the scene of an air strike in a Kabul neighborhood and counted eight bodies. "But it was changed in our dispatch to 20," he says, and when he heard a report later on Taliban radio the figure had been further inflated to 30.

Other correspondents for the Taliban news agency said they had been ordered to report military deaths as civilian casualties. One correspondent recalls that he went to the scene of a devastating air strike on an al Qaeda barracks in Kabul, where 60 fighters were killed. "I saw it with my own eyes," he says. "There were no civilians anywhere nearby, and I reported this. But the dispatch [as published] said all the dead people were civilians, not fighters."

Any civilian death is sad, and it can seem heartless and even churlish to quibble over numbers. That's why the White House, looking to the lesson learned in Vietnam, won't be drawn into body-counting in this war.

That's sound strategy so far: Good rocks — the ones with sharp edges to open wounds and flat surfaces to make them sail — are hard to find. And nobody's landed one on George W. Bush yet.

Wesley Pruden is editor in chief of The Times.

12:45 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Torie Clarke
Tony Dolan
Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 18, 2002
SUBJECT: **Plagiarism**

Torie
Dolan
3/7

350.00150

Recently two authors, McCollough and Doris Kearns admitted to using the words of other authors when they were caught and confronted. Needless to say, they were quite embarrassed.

You folks who are involved in crafting statements for me I am sure are using various types of source material.

This memo is to urge you to use the utmost care in transcribing from your cards or notes after reviewing source materials, to assure that never, under any circumstances, do the phrases, sentences, paragraphs or words of others creep into the materials you provide me without proper quotations and attribution.

We need to discuss this.

Thank you.

Some thoughtful responses attached - World scanning.
D. Little
3/6

18 = 2302

DHR/azn
021802.17

U12814 /02

Please respond by: _____ *2/26*

February 26, 2002, 1:43 PM

TO: The Secretary of Defense
FROM: Marc Thiessen
SUBJECT: **Plagiarism & Fact Checking**

I shared your memo with all the speechwriters and we discussed it at our morning staff meeting. In addition, we had a good meeting with Torie to discuss it. Everyone is aware of the need to be extremely careful... and we will be.

However, I am concerned that we do not have a system in place to catch mistakes—be they errors in attribution or in the facts themselves. Right now, every writer is on their own, and this is dangerous—especially when they are working on tight deadline, juggling a lot of facts and details. It's only a matter of time before a mistake happens (remember the Hanseatic League?).

At the White House speechwriting shop, they have a system to prevent errors. There are three Research Assistants, one of whom works full time as a fact checker, reviewing every single speech word-for-word—looking for any factual errors and collecting hard-copy documentation (from the web, documents, books, citations, etc.) of all facts for which they exist. They then produce an annotated version of the final speech, with footnotes that reflect a "hard" confirmation of all facts. The other two Research Assistants do background research for speeches (finding interesting anecdotes, historical details, quotes, etc.), and assist in fact checking, proof-reading and editing as necessary. In addition, two interns assist with both fact checking and research as needed.

We obviously don't need a safety net as elaborate as this. But right now we have no safety net at all. We should at a bare minimum have one or two Research Assistants whose full-time job is to fact-check, help with research, and proof-read all of your speeches, testimony, etc.

2/27
SecDef -
Jim helping
Marc + Tony
Dolan think
this through!
DR:

11-L-0559/OSD/10655

Feb. 25, 2002

MEMO

To: Donald Rumsfeld

Through: Larry DiRita, Torie Clark

Fr: Anthony R. Dolan



Message on plagiarism received loud and clear.

You also raise a fascinating question. Here is a treatise -- way too long, of course, so when you have a spare moment. (Nothing here detracts from the seriousness, indeed solemnity of this matter but actually hopes to add to it by explaining its curious nature.)

THE TWO CASES YOU MENTION --

1. The extraordinary fact is that the great cases of plagiarism tend to be matters of longstanding habit reflecting eccentricities or ties of mind. With Stephen Ambrose (whose works we all worship) apparently this has gone for years and with multiple books -- his editors knew about it, they paid off offended parties etc. He had the odd idea he could actually use other people's words (sans quotation marks) and it was OK as long as he footnoted the passages. Yikes. And nobody challenged him? So this national treasure who has done such great work is now blemished and, in some eyes, discredited. Way to go, Ambrose publishers and editors. Not that he doesn't get the major blame.

2. Doris and Dick are friends and I am less familiar with her case (and dare not ask) and believe it to be less chronic but it still boggles the mind. After all that work on such a large volume, why a few passages taken from somewhere else that diminish the achievement? It's just so hard to believe that even if something is in your notes for a long time you don't recognize it as something you didn't write.

3. So, in these two cases and others, there is no apparent explanation. People who do this sort of thing seem to think they are entitled to engage in this conduct. (You remember the case of the U.S. presidential candidate who simply lifted the speech of a foreign leader and used it here.)

More oddly, chronic violators tend to be known -- at least among their colleagues. And yet they too often they are permitted to continue in this self-destructive conduct. In journalism there is a parallel, the reporter or columnist who makes up sources or quotes and seems to think that "if they didn't say it, they should have." Cooke or Barnicle. They don't want to do the legwork -- work the phones -- so they just create. And that's too bad because they forget that the real story and the real quote is usually far more creative than anything they come up with.

In any case, the person involved is often talented, well-liked and accomplished or someone everyone is anxious to have succeed. And they are afforded a terrible leeway.

SPEECHES --

With speeches, the issue has its own permutations. Except for the outrageous lifting of the foreign leaders' speech – which the candidate did – no other examples immediately come to mind. Perhaps I just don't remember, or perhaps the offenders gain less notoriety, or perhaps there are more safeguards or fail-safe mechanisms in the speech business. But, again, it's the chronic offender that is probably the great danger here.

That doesn't mean, however, that the well-meaning speechwriter can't be the occasional offender. It is easy to do. To see a phrase, have it stick in the mind, then use it in the copy. Most writers with any experience have done this, looked at it the next day, wondered "didn't I read that?" go back and check, say "that's too close" and either change it or remove it.

There is some leeway though. Usually with phrases. Franklin Roosevelt first used "rendezvous with destiny." But that's also the great line from the Reagan '64 speech. So, in some sense, certain phrases are in the public domain. (Nobody accused Reagan of plagiarism; heck, everything in the speech was so original.)

But vigilance is still called for. Here's a story. Three months after the Orlando speech (the Soviets "are the focus of evil in the modern world") I am sitting in my office rereading Letter to my Children in Witness by Chambers. I freeze. There it is – "communism is the focus of institutionalized evil" in our era or something close to that. But for a few words, RR would have plagiarized.

If I send you something, I give it the "anything-here-from-the-past" wash. (Just so easy to have something sneak in.)

THE PROBLEM --

How to prevent it? Elevate the issue as you have. Consciousness. Zero-tolerance, obviously. And the accidents? A big way to avoid them is the right kind of culture. As outlined at some length in an earlier memo, the government bureaucracy does not understand, indeed, is openly hostile -- wages war -- on a good creative culture. Seeing to it writers are not overworked, even rested, that they encounter their frustrations in their writing and not from a lot of exterior nonsense and, above all, that they abide in serious intellectual climate where there is exchange of ideas and working drafts and have on hand their own fact-checkers and researchers – all this is key. The point being – the real danger here is accident and accidents about complicated matters like speeches or news stories are avoided (a la the newsroom) where people are focused on their work and there are systems and redundant systems. Rather like your point the other day about how the safety issue in industry migrates in the workers' minds across the strict categorical line.

But then again, I don't want to end this without a warm endorsement of plagiarism with a story from years ago. (Yes, a war story, but not without its uses in demonstrating the seriousness of your concern.)

Shortly after Iran Contra when Howard Baker came on board at the WH, it was important that the new chief of staff and his people understand how indispensable I was to the free world and overall survival of the planet. Read: I was spending a lot of time in the West Wing being sycophantic to the new guys. This meant I didn't really have much time for something as mundane as speechwriting. But Reagan was speaking somewhere and everybody else was busy so I had to do the draft and found one of his old speeches to the Rotary in Kansas City in the '50s (or something like that) and lifted several pages.

A few days later, Baker asked to see me after senior staff.

'Oh boy, here it comes' I thought, "the ax. I know how this is going to go: 'You've done fine work, of course, but what with the new team on board etc.'"

It got worse when I went in. He was holding a copy of the draft I had sent around with the Kansas City plagiarism.

"Tony" he said "I don't know how you could have done this."

"Disaster. I'm dead," I'm thinking.

"Why, Tony" he went on "I was riding in this morning reading this and saying to myself: 'That Tony Dolan is a genius. This sounds just like Ronald Reagan. How does he do it?'"

Did I tell him the truth? That's what you're wondering, right?

Yes, I did. Six months later. After my job was secure.

By the way, the president was delighted to see the draft and how his speechwriters were plagiarizing him. Especially from so long ago.

The point being: Good speechwriting is about plagiarism. As long as it's you that's being plagiarized. That's why your briefings must be watched carefully and the stack of Rumsfeldania here needs to be regularly read and consulted. And you need to keep reminding us of stuff like the Association of the Army speech etc.

BOTTOM LINE: Torie held an excellent meeting with writers today emphasizing the seriousness of your concern. Can't be said enough. Vigilance.

8:50 AM

ACTION
3/18

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 20, 2002
SUBJECT: Transporting Hajji

You are going to need to get State going on how to get aircraft to take the people at the Kabul Airport to the Hajj so that the disorder in Afghanistan calms down.

Afghanistan

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021602.12

Please respond by: _____

20 Feb 02

U12815 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10659

ACTION
05 3/11

February 21, 2002 10:19 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: British Strategic Defense Review

Here is a note from Geoff Hoon. We ought to look at what he is sending and figure out how we want to respond.

UK

Thanks.

Attach.
02/19/02 Hoon ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
022102-4

.....

Please respond by 03/04/05

21 FEB 02

U12817 /02

02/19/2002 10:09

(b)(6)

PAULA8SUE

PAGE 01

BRITISH DEFENCE STAFF (WASHINGTON)

British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington DC 20008-3688
(b)(6)
E-mail: (b)(6)@moduk.org
Internet: www.bds.w.org

*S.P.S.
2/19*

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

REF: D/BDS/PEC DATE: 19 February 2002
TO: Secretary Rumsfeld's office
FAX: (b)(6)
FROM: Paula Champniss
Office of the Defence Attaché

4/2/19

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 3 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET.
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL (202) 588 6701

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE TO THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD
REFERENCE:

Please see attached letter from Mr Hoon to Mr Rumsfeld concerning the New Chapter of SDR.

The original, together with a booklet, will be forwarded to your office once received from UK.

PE Champniss

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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COPY TO POLICY

02/19/2002 10:09

(b)(6)

PAULASUE

PAGE 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 21 2002



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2EU

(b)(6)

MD 9/33K

14 February 2002

Dear Donald,

I announced last October that I had set work in hand within the UK Ministry of Defence to assess the implications of the terrible events of 11 September and to ensure that Britain has the right defence concepts, capabilities and forces to meet the additional challenges we face from international terrorism, and other asymmetric threats. The work is designed to build on the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which we conducted in 1997/1998 and to form a "New Chapter" to that review.

We have looked at a range of issues, including: how much has changed in the strategic context since 11 September; how to engage with the symptoms and causes of terrorism; the threat posed by terrorism to the UK, and our vulnerabilities; the balance between home defence and countering the threat abroad (generally as part of coalition operations); the range of effects we might want to achieve abroad; how we might enhance the effectiveness of our military contribution both at home and abroad; the role of international organisations - including particularly the UN, NATO and the EU, but also others; and how to build on our regional and bilateral relationships.

The Hon Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America



02/19/2002 10:09

(b)(6)

PAUL A&SUE

PAGE 03

7

Our emerging thinking on these issues is set out in the fullest way to date in the attached discussion document (and a summary version), which we are making available to Parliament and the public in the UK today. They are available on the internet at www.mod.uk. Given the urgency of the work, we have set a formal deadline of 15 March for comments. I hope to be able to publish some conclusions in the Spring or early Summer.

As with the SDR, I want the work on this "New Chapter" to be open and inclusive and to draw widely on views both within and outside the UK, including the views of allies and partners. The attached public discussion material forms an integral part of this process. I am sending it to all my NATO and EU counterparts, to the Defence Ministers of NATO and EU aspirant members, and to a number of other key allies and partners. Formally, the document is designed as a vehicle for seeking views within the UK, but I would naturally welcome any reflections which you may have.

Our officials have already had some discussions on our underlying thinking, and I attach importance to continuing to try to ensure that our thinking stays in step. I hope that you will recognise some clear echoes of US ideas in what we have published (including, for example on giving more emphasis to homeland defence, and the importance of not letting our enemies tie up our high readiness forces at home). I hope that we can stay in touch on this vital area, in which - as you know - we attach the highest importance to being able to work closely alongside US forces.

Yours sincerely,
Geoff

GEOFFREY HOON

*** TOTAL PAGE: 03 ***

4

SFB 2/22/02

Done 3/11

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 21, 2002
SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

(Handwritten initials)

I understand you have the first half of the briefing that Newt and Haver are working on. I probably ought to look at it and let him know what I think.

381

Thank you.

2/22

BRIEF ATTACHED

DHR/azn
022102.05

2/16

Please respond by:

21 Feb 02

U12818 /02

DRAFT

to SecDef
Rough *First draft*
of FIRST 1/2
Next 4/2/02
2/20/02

The Rumsfeld Report
on
American Security in a
Transformed World

DIRITA

This briefing is in two parts:

- Part I: The New 21st Century Threats to American Security
- Part II: The Transformational Response required for American security in the 21st century

Part I: The new 21st Century Threats to American Security

The September 11, 2001 attacks are a warning that:

- the world is dangerous
- America has enemies who want to destroy or at least cripple us
- Our enemies will spend years preparing an attack
- we WILL be surprised
- Attacks may be with new techniques, using new systems, and seeking to find gaps in our defenses

In effect the threats to America have been transformed from the conventional threats and deterrable nuclear threats of the Cold War era to new, more diverse, and more difficult challenges.

For America to survive we have to transform our defenses to once again deter or defeat potential opponents.

Our potential opponents are transforming themselves in a series of key ways because they cannot win against the United States in the traditional ways.

Our potential opponents know that if we can detect a planned hostile action we have the power to block it or at least make it very expensive.

Our potential opponents know of the Desert Storm lesson that if they try to fight a conventionally high technology, high tempo conventional war the United States will almost certainly win.

Our potential opponents know that in a traditional nuclear exchange the United States has the power to respond massively and this would deter any rational, normal power.

However, our potential opponents have not been defeated or reduced to passivity by America's capabilities.

Instead, America's strengths in late 20th century military preparedness have led our potential opponents to study us and to systematically shield their activities from us while preparing to exploit gaps in our capabilities and surprise us with their actions.

It took Al Qaeda several years to prepare the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A plan first surfaced in 1995 in Phillipine interrogation of local terrorists and it had already been underway for a while. At least SEVEN YEARS went into planning, preparing, and training for this surprise attack on our homeland.

Preparations Time can be quite long:

Nazi German had only 6 years (1933-1939)

Al Qaeda planned September 11 for at least 7 years (1994-2001)

Saddam Hussein has been working 11 years (1991-2002)

Syria has been preparing to defeat Isreal for 29 years (1973-2002)

Iran has been developing a missile and weapon of mass destruction program for at least ___ years (x to y)

The North Korean Dictatorship has been preparing an attack on South Korea for 49 years (1953-2002)

In addition:

The Chinese study the United States intensively and are building a military with the United States capabilities in mind (QUOTE)

The Russians still have a remarkably sophisticated and robust research and development program to both match United States capabilities and to create new transformational systems that would asymetrically defeat the American capabilities.

Individual potential opponent developments cannot be analyzed in isolation.

An international trade in destabilizing capabilities has grown among nations who seek to limit or defeat American power.

China sells to —

Russia sells to —

North Korea sells to—

Iran sells to

Iraq sells to

In assessing potential threats to the United States and our allies we have to assume a steady flow of technologies, doctrines, and weapons between potentially hostile countries and suppliers.

Thus, for example, Iraq's capabilities are not only a function of Iraq's own programs but also of what Iraq can buy from other countries:

Notional to be improved:

German chemical weapons precursor plants

French anti-aircraft missile systems

Swedish and Finnish bomb shelters

North Korean missiles

Russian nuclear technology

Chinese....

Over the years our potential opponents have developed a series of strategies to make it more likely they can achieve their goals despite America's traditional strengths.

Our potential opponents are relying on seven transformational strategies to defeat the conventional American intelligence and military preparations:

1. blocking our intelligence efforts through denial and deception.
2. preparing for very fast offensives to preempt American intervention
3. developing weapons of mass destruction (nuclear biological and chemical) to offset the American conventional high technology advantage
4. using massed missile capability to offset American airpower supremacy and to make American expeditionary forces too vulnerable to be fielded
6. using terrorists as proxies
7. developing a new generation of conventional capabilities to match the current American military

Let us examine each strategy in detail with examples from our intelligence community of each pattern.

Strategy 1, Practice denial and deception so America does not know what is happening.

Between public sources and American traitors betraying our secrets, other countries know a lot about our intelligence systems, our satellites and our intercept capabilities. That makes their denial and deception efforts much easier.

Denial and deception essentially takes four forms:

1. take communications off the air where America can intercept them and place them in fiber optic lines where interception is vastly more difficult.
2. schedule activities around American satellite activities so sensitive sites are shielded when the satellites are overhead
3. place as many activities underground as possible even if this requires building huge underground systems.
4. practice in peacetime what you will do in war so there is no warning if you decide to move straight from maneuvers to attack.

Strategy 2. since time is on America's side and with enough mobilization America will win, design and prepare a standing start campaign that could be over before America can react. Examples:

1. North Korean preparations opposite Seoul (main line artillery and missiles dug into mountains, missiles, commandos (both air and sea delivered), mini subs, long term infiltration of South Korean society with potential sleeper warriors etc)

2. Chinese preparations against Taiwan

3. Syrian missiles with chemical and biological warheads capable of massed launchings in the first hour to deeply disrupt Israeli reserve mobilization

Strategy 3. Since America can dominate high technology conventional warfare, develop weapons of mass destruction:

quote the Indian General on the lesson of Desert Storm

quote Chinese sources

quote an Iranian

quote Saddam

quote a North Korean

size of the wmd programs by country

Strategy 4. Since America will win air superiority, use interlocked guns and missiles both to deny access or at least make it very expensive and to deliver terror weapons despite American fighters and bombers.

1. defensive anti-aircraft developments in key countries
2. missile force size including ICB< IRBM< Scud and cruise missiles

China

Iraq

Iran

Syria

North Korea

note that Iraq tested more missiles than any other country last year despite United Nations sanctions (are numbers available?)

the offensive missile threats are becoming massive
worldwide numbers for scuds
for IRBMs
for cruise missiles

Strategy 5. The ability to launch a standing start attack and the speed of missiles combined with the devastating impact of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) means that every potential opponent will have the option of striking on short notice if the opportunity arises. Every American engagement somewhere on the planet will marginally increase the danger of an opportunistic surprise attack somewhere else.

Strategy 6. When possible our most likely adversaries will use proxies or terrorist groups to weaken America and its allies. The danger of anti-American terrorists getting weapons of mass destruction is very real and growing and the consequences would be horrifying if they were used in a city.

Effective terrorism does not exist in isolation. The payment of money, provision of training, sharing of intelligence, and transfer of weapons all increase the power of terrorist organizations. It is state support which turns terrorists from minor to major

threats.

Strategy 7. In addition to the substantial efforts to develop six asymmetrical strategies, Russia, China and some other countries are also hard at work developing next generation conventional weapons to offset the current American conventional advantages:

consider the investments in

1. command, control and communications (especially China)
 2. new tanks
 3. new artillery
 4. quiet submarines
 5. sub nuclear explosives
 6. new theater level delivery mechanisms
-

These seven strategies require some of our potential adversaries to spend an amazing percentage of their national resources on war preparation (not defense).

North Korea
Iraq
Iran
Russia
China

Finally America has to be constantly vigilant because the possibility that a potential adversary will achieve surprise is very high, verging on 100%.

If we are not surprised we will stop the threat and it will not happen. Therefore the only threats that will turn violent will probably be surprises.

Surprise is very achievable even against an alert nation:

1973 Syria and Egypt surprise an alert Israel at Yom Kippur.

1979 the Soviet Union surprises the United States by moving into Afghanistan.

1983 United States Marines are surprised in Lebanon and x number killed.

1990 the United States is surprised when Saddam seizes Kuwait.

1991 United States surprised by the size of the Iraqi, nuclear, chemical and biological programs all of which surpass the CIA estimate by enormous margins.

1991 United States surprised to learn how big the Soviet biological warfare program was.

1993 United States surprised when rocket grenades down two Blackhawk helicopters (thought impossible until it happened) in Mogadishu and 19 Americans are killed.

1996 United States surprised at Khobar Towers bombing

1998 United States surprised in two embassy bombings in Africa

1999 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests surprise United States intelligence

2000 United states Naval ship Cole surprised in Yemen

2001 United States surprised when commercial airliners are used to crash into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
(despite 1995 warning)

The historic record is clear. Despite all our best efforts the United States should plan to survive surprises with minimum losses and then win because we will probably be surprised despite our best efforts.

Given this new world of new threats how do we secure America's future?

Part II The Transformational Response required for American security in the 21st century

Answer
to 3/11

6:28 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 21, 2002
SUBJECT:

I am not sure the idea that in 10 years we will have transformed ten percent (10%) of the forces is a good way of thinking about it. It suggests that, because we have legacy systems and we want to keep them, we can't transform all at once, nor would we want to. And, therefore, it will take time to transform even a portion. All of that is true to an extent.

381

However, I think it may be underselling transformation. If you think about it, a B-52 may be a legacy system, but if it is used in a transformational manner, by linking it and improving the connectivity with other capabilities, it can have a transformational impact.

Let's discuss.

21 Feb 02

DHR/azn
022102.06

Please respond by: _____

U12819 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10671

2/22/02

February 21, 2002 10:57 AM

3/27

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Retention

Please get me a report on how we are doing on the retention of people. Please try to divide it between people who get deployed and those who don't.

340

I am told one of the reasons we may have reasonable retention on people who get deployed is because they get a tax-free bonus if they are deployed. What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022102-16

.....
Please respond by 03/15/02

3/25

→ Dr. Chu

Resubmit when
AF Data
in hold of financial review
J. Hill

LARRY DI RITE
3/20/02
21 Feb 02

U12820 /02

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAR 19 PM 5:06

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

19 March 2002 1340

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

David S. C. Chu 19 Mar 2002

SUBJECT: Response to your 21 FEB 02 Question on Retention

- Retention to date in the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps exceeds or is very close to the services respective retention goals; the Air Force is not able to provide retention data at this time. Service data follows as of 28 Feb 02:

- Army

	Pro-rated Annual Goal	# Reenlisted	% of Prorated Goal
Initial Term (0 - 6 YOS)	7,129	8,491	119%
Mid Career (7 - 10 YOS)	9,536	9,606	101%
Career (10 - 20 YOS)	6,117	7,315	120%
Aggregate	22,782	25,412	112%

- Navy

	Annual Goal	% Reenlisted
Zone A (0 - 6 YOS)	57%	64.4%
Zone B (7 - 10 YOS)	70%	75.5%
Zone C (11 - 14 YOS)	90%	86.2%

- Marine Corps

	Annual Goal	# Reenlisted	% of Annual Goal
First Term (0 - 5 YOS)	5,900	5,400	91.5%
Subsequent Term (6 + YOS)	5,784*	3,473	60.0%

*Note: Goal revised in Dec 02 from 5,758 to 5,784

- Enlisted members who deploy to a combat zone or a qualified hazardous duty area pay no Federal income tax on their compensation, including bonuses, for active service for any month they serve in a qualifying area.
- An enlisted member eligible for a selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) is incentivized to reenlist while deployed to a CZ or QHDA by not having to pay taxes on the bonus (including any future installments).

Prepared by: Lt Col Gina Grosso, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>3/22</i>

11-L-0559/USD/10673

U04976 /02

February 22, 2002 7:30 AM

3/4

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressional Relations

We are not doing enough with Congress. We have to keep having breakfasts and lunches and have me go up and see people.

Please give me some kind of schedule for the rest of the year of what frequency we would do things.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022202-5

032

2/22 -

SECDEF -

- The plan for next four weeks is attached
Heavily concentrated on budget and our committees because
there is potential for mischief given the President's
large request.

- We've added a regular weekly lunch to the
regular weekly breakfasts, to give some one-on-one
time with key members

- Also, we're considering some evening events

- Not shown is the Haver/Hughes Briefing, which will start some
weeks hence.

11-L-0559/OSD/10674

U12821 /02

Di Rita

AR Feb 02

February 19, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

There is a four week period between the President's Day Recess on February 25 and the beginning of the Easter recess on March 22. The following activities are proposed for your schedule during this period.

Office calls:

- ✓ • Senators Stevens and Inouye accompanied by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Unified Command Plan.

Thursday morning breakfasts:

- ✓ • **February 28** at 8:00 a.m. – the House Rules Committee Republicans on Capitol Hill.
- ✓ • **March 7**, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Budget Committees: Senators Conrad and Domenici and Congressmen Nussle and Spratt
- ✓ • **March 14**, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Armed Services Committee:
 - Stump and Skelton, Full Committee
 - Saxton and Taylor, Installations and Facilities Subcommittee
 - McHugh and Meehan, Military Personnel Subcommittee
 - Weldon and Skelton, Military Procurement Subcommittee
 - Hansen and Ortiz, Military Readiness Subcommittee
 - Hunter and Abercrombie, Research and Development Subcommittee
- ✓ • **March 21**, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee:
 - Levin and Warner, Full Committee
 - Lieberman and Santorum, Airland Subcommittee
 - Landrieu and Roberts, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
 - Cleland and Hutchinson, Personnel Subcommittee
 - Akaka and Inhofe, Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
 - Kennedy and Sessions, Seapower Subcommittee
 - Reed and Allard, Strategic Subcommittee

11-L-0559/OSD/10675

One-on-One Luncheons (one per week):

John Warner
Jerry Lewis
Bob Stump
Bob Byrd
Bill Young
Thad Cochran
Fred Thompson

Handwritten note:
1. Sessions

Operational Briefings for all Members:

- Week of February 25: 2:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Tuesday or Wednesday
- Week of March 18: 2:00 p.m. – 5:30 p.m. on Tuesday or Wednesday

Early Evening Refreshments:

- Rank and files friends including the list proposed by Vin Weber
- Illinois Delegation

We are also proposing one-on-one breakfasts for the Deputy to include:
Jack Murtha, Jeff Sessions, John Spratt, and Dave Hobson

Actual
to 3/11

February 23, 2002 11:32 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Responsiveness

Please get some folks thinking about how we can get a flatter organization in this bureaucracy and get more people's ideas up. Should there be 1-800 numbers, an e-mail address, or an ombudsman?

701

When I spoke at Nellis, I talked of the frustration of getting these bureaucratic processes to work properly, and I felt a palpable agreement with it—they don't get their checks, or something is wrong with the healthcare. There needs to be a way to make the thing more responsive.

After you finish getting an office budget, please get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022302-3

.....

Please respond by 03/15/02

DRFesac

U12822 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10677

February 23, 2002 10:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Traffic Accidents and Fatalities

Done 4/18

Please have someone find out how many traffic accidents and how many traffic fatalities there are per year in the United States.

729

I need to know the answer before Monday, preferably before Sunday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022302-1

.....
Please respond by 02/23/02

23 Feb 02

U12823 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10678

2000 National Statistics

Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes

Fatal	37,409
Injury	2,070,000
Property Damage Only	4,286,000
Total	6,394,000

Traffic Crash Victims

	Killed	Injured
Occupants		
Drivers	25,492	2,063,000
Passengers	10,669	992,000
Unknown	88	—
Nonmotorists		
Pedestrians	4,739	78,000
Pedalcyclists	690	51,000
Other/Unknown	143	5,000
Total	41,821	3,189,000

Other National Statistics

Vehicle Miles Traveled	2,749,803,000,000
Resident Population	274,633,905
Registered Vehicles	217,028,324
Licensed Drivers	190,625,023
Economic Cost of Traffic Crashes (1994) (estimate for reported and unreported crashes)	\$150.5 billion

National Rates: Fatalities

Fatalities per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled	1.5
Fatalities per 100,000 Population	15.23
Fatalities per 100,000 Registered Vehicles	19.27
Fatalities per 100,000 Licensed Drivers	21.94

National Rates: Injured Persons

Injured Persons per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled	116
Injured Persons per 100,000 Population	1,161
Injured Persons per 100,000 Registered Vehicles	1,469
Injured Persons per 100,000 Licensed Drivers	1,673

Sources: Crashes, Fatalities, Injuries, and Costs—National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
 Population—U.S. Bureau of the Census. Note: The population shown here is a projection based on the 1990 Census,
 in order to remain consistent with the population data used for other tables in this report.
 Vehicle Miles Traveled—Federal Highway Administration.
 Registered Vehicles—R.L. Polk & Co. and Federal Highway Administration.

Cover Photo—This single-vehicle crash occurred in Fairfax County, Virginia. The juvenile driver, traveling at a high rate of speed, ran off the road and overturned. There were no fatalities in the crash. Photographer: Detective James D. Bean, Fairfax County Police Department, Accident Reconstruction Section.

2/27 0800
snowflake

Action
as 3/12

February 25, 2002 7:07 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Coins

Please draft a short note from me to the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State explaining what these coins are and who gave them to us. Show me a draft first.

0000.5

(b)(6) can make the payment.

SCOT - 2/23

Please see Col Bucci for details and draft letter. Di Rita 3/4

Thanks.

Attach.
Coins and note from Col. Bucci

DHR:dh
022502-59

.....
Please respond by 03/08/02



Combating Terrorism
Originally commissioned as a coin for The Combating Terrorism Deputate of The Dept. of Defense "BEFORE" the Terrorism attack on the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, this pin stands as a symbol of America's fight against terrorism. As a "Phoenix Rising From the Ashes", the first strike sample of the coin was lost in the attack on the Pentagon.
A portion of the proceeds from the sales of these pins will be donated to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. This foundation sponsors a fund to assist in paying college tuition for families of Special Operations Personnel killed in the line of duty.

25 Feb 02

U12824 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10680

February 25, 2002

Memorandum for the Secretary Of Defense

Subject: Numbered Presentation Coins

Sir,

Before Christmas, the Combating Terrorism Directorate of Policy offered you numbered presentation coins (#1-#5) for your use. They are now in and attached to this memo.

There is an explanatory card with each, and perhaps they can go to the following:

- #1 POTUS
- #2 VPOTUS
- #3 Yourself *I have MIA*
- #4 Attorney General Ashcroft
- #5 SecState, ~~on GEN (ret) Downing~~

The coins are \$10.00 each, and if you direct, I can have (b)(6) make the payment.

Very Respectfully,

SJB
2/25

COL Bucci

February 25, 2002 9:08 AM

Action

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: President of Uzbekistan

Done 3/11

Uzbekistan

When President Karimov of Uzbekistan comes to town, I should probably be involved in the President's meeting, given our involvement.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/11/02 ASD (ISP) info memo to SecDef re: U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Political Declaration [U02771/02]

DHR:dh
022502-12



Please respond by 03/08/02

25 Feb 02

U12825 /02

2/18
1000

NEFO186872



SECRET ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

2002 FEB 14 PM 1:10

INFO MEMO

FEB 11 2002

I-02/002106-RUE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 25 2002

LAITY DI PITA
2/18

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY (J.D. Crouch)

FEB 11 2002

SUBJECT: U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Political Declaration

- Ambassador Jones and Foreign Minister Kamilov initialed a joint declaration on political, security and economic cooperation during the Joint Security Cooperation Consultations in Tashkent on January 27.
- President Bush and President Karimov will sign the declaration on or about March 12 in Washington.
- Uzbekistan had sought security guarantees in the declaration.
- Agreed security language reads:
 - "...the United States affirms that it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Were this to occur, the United States would expect to consult with the Republic of Uzbekistan on an urgent basis to develop and implement an appropriate response in accordance with U.S. constitutional procedures."



- Security cooperation will include: combating transnational threats; strengthening border controls; modernizing and reforming Uzbekistan armed forces, and developing multilateral activities under the Partnership for Peace program.

COORDINATION: TAB A

SPL ASSISTANT	2/15
SR MA GIAMBAS	2/16
MA BUCCI	SP3 2/15
EXECSEC WHITMAN	2/16

Prepared By: James MacDougall, (b)(6)
ISP/Euasias

11-L-0550 SD/10683

U02771 /02

ACTION
3/12

February 26, 2002 7:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

334 DACOWITS

Please take a look at this article on DACOWITS and then see me. We have to get straightened out on that.

Thanks.

Attach.

Yoest, "Booby Traps at the Pentagon," Winter 2002, *The Women's Quarterly*, p. 4

DHR:dh
022602-5



Please respond by 03/22/02

SECRET- 2/26
AGREE COMPLETELY. I SPENT A LOT OF TIME BRIEFING THIS GROUP UNTIL THEIR KNEES GOT WEEK. TOP LEVEL POLICY IS NEEDED.

2 Feb 02

U12826 /02

Booby Traps at the Pentagon

Charmaine and Jack Yoest introduce you to the Pentagon's babes in arms. What do they want? An "open dialogue" on breastfeeding.

ON SEPTEMBER 10TH, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, the group most responsible for promoting women in combat, gathered in Pentagon Conference Room 5C1042. This civilian advisory committee, whose members have the protocol status of three-star generals, monitors the concerns of women in uniform. And what was the topic on the eve of the worst attack in U. S. history?

After briefings from representatives of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard, DACOWITS, as the committee is known, issued a formal request for more information on what they deemed a matter of paramount military significance: breastfeeding.

As the terrorists prepared to hit the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon itself, our military leaders were directed "to engage in open dialogue" on lactation tactics.

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women celebrated its fiftieth anniversary last April. At the birthday party, President Bush's deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz, a man well regarded for his level-headed and conservative approach to military issues, lauded DACOWITS in his address as "an outstanding organization" and told the assembly of earnest women that he "looked forward to [their] advice."

DACOWITS was established by then-secretary of defense, General George C. Marshall, with a mission of advising the secretary on how to recruit, retain, and best use women in the armed services. The committee is composed of thirty to forty civilians appointed by the secretary of defense and is responsible for visiting military installations to talk to women in uniform and to formulate recommendations.



The latest round of appointments to the committee was announced in the final days of the Clinton administration on December 21, 2000, by then-Secretary William Cohen. Cohen's eight appointees, who serve three-year terms, had their appointments ratified in January 2001—after President Bush's inauguration—by a Clinton holdover in the Defense Department cleverly using Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's new autopen, according to the Center for Military Readiness, which is led by former DACOWITS member Elaine Donnelly.

One of these Cohen legacies, Silvana Rubino-Hallman, wrote her doctoral dissertation on women in combat. She concluded that combat is a "male-defined environment" and that women are excluded because "representational practices" have constructed a "reality" defined by "discursive practices" that understand the concept of "warrior" to be implicitly male. Look for a future DACOWITS recommendation: Examine discursive practices as they relate to warrior conceptualization. Institute and enforce gender-neutral usage of warrior terminology.

CHAIRMAN OF DACOWITS is Vickie McCall, a real estate agent and former Utah alcohol and beverage control commissioner. She told U.S. Air Forces in Europe News Service, "You have to understand. We don't report facts, we report perception." Huh?

The DACOWITS recommendations from the last ten years read like an act from *The Vagina Monologues*: sexual harassment directives as a constant refrain; lobbying for increased child care services; and, most critically, a persistent drumbeat for expanded combat roles for women. A recommendation from 1991 chastised the Marine Corps for continuing to use the slogan: "A few

good men." The previous year featured a suggestion that the secretary of the Air Force develop a maternity coat as a uniform option.

Suggested new recruiting slogan: "A gynecologist on every aircraft carrier!" (See the Spring 2001 recommendations where "comprehensive gynecological care" immediately follows "creating opportunities for shipboard experience and warfare qualifications.") Apparently DACOWITS never got word that Newt Gingrich was pilloried for positing a possible connection between field conditions and female infection. Fall 2000 recommendations recognized the need to "ascertain what treatment of gynecological infections is available" and an instruction to the services to "ensure an adequate supply of hygiene products during deployment."

How can military leadership resolve the cognitive dissonance shown by gender activists who present themselves as saber-swinging "women warriors"—understood discursively or otherwise—but require an Equality Management Subcommittee to protect them from gender discrimination perpetuated by boorish buccaneers who engage in "sexist behavior" and make "crude and offensive remarks"? And when DACOWITS follows a recommendation to expand opportunities for women in combat with a recommendation that the secretary of defense start collecting data on "all violence against military women," should we assume that excludes violence they might encounter in combat?

While the debate over whether differences between men and women are biologically determined or socially constructed continues in the civilian world, the women of DACOWITS seem grudgingly reconciled to the idea that women are different. Their recommendations include a call for implementa-

tion of height, weight, and body fat standards that acknowledge gender differences. In a surprisingly girlish fashion, they call for "taking into account differences in body fat distribution" and plead with the Army to discontinue noting in the records when "the soldier" has run afoul of regulation 600-9—the Army Weight Control Program.

YET DESPITE THEIR WILLINGNESS to recognize that women differ from men in size, strength, health needs, and family demands, DACOWITS and its supporters refuse to acknowledge that those differences might be, in any way, detrimental to the imperatives of military readiness. They typically substitute desire and commitment for competence as qualifying factors in an arena where performance failure is unforgiving and often fatal. When McCall was asked by a reporter about the possibility of women serving in special forces units, she replied: "Women are as patriotic as their brothers."

This highlights what has become the primary item on the DACOWITS agenda: combat for women. Indeed, heading the recommendations for 2001 were DACOWITS' top three combat-oriented objectives: placement of women on submarines, opening Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to women, and the deployment of mixed-gender Special Operations Forces rotary wing aviation crews.

In fact, DACOWITS has been largely responsible for shoving women ever closer to combat. Their recommendations have pushed combat for women year after year. Although they operate only in an advisory capacity, their very existence, and persistence, have created a political gravitational pull in their direction that appears nearly irresistible. A window into how

the pressure is applied and the system works: During the fall of 1993 and spring of the next year, DACOWITS called for the Army to open the Airborne's elite Pathfinder (first on the ground in the combat zone) training to women; when the army complied DACOWITS issued a "Statement of Appreciation."

Their biggest coup to date, however, came when DACOWITS issued a "recommendation" in 1993 that the secretary of defense "open combat aviation to women immediately."

How high did you say? One week later, Secretary Les Aspin ordered all of the service secretaries to begin integrating women into combat aircraft units. One year later, Aspin went further and narrowed the definition of "combat" so that women were no longer barred from serving in areas where "risk of capture" existed and are now excluded only from units that are clearly designed for direct land combat.

The Center for Military Readiness is reporting that even this barrier is being breached. An Army official, Lt. Col. Margaret Flott, head of the Women in the Army office, and liaison to DACOWITS, has tried to ensure that women train to serve in new Interim Brigade Combat Teams, which are light infantry "full spectrum combat forces" that the Army is developing. DACOWITS sees the military as simply another workplace plagued with garden-variety office politics, but offering unusual career opportunities. Feminists often argue that having women in combat is a necessary prerequisite to having a woman as president. The DACOWITS goal, McCall mused to reporter Shane Montgomery, is "to assure that the future that we want for our sons is also available for our daughters." Similarly, she commented to Kathleen Rhem of the American Forces Press Ser-

vice, that "we have a military that gives women opportunities that they would not have in other countries."

DACOWITS partisans have approached the military as if it were a good ole boy law firm, or even an all-male country club. Retired Lt. Gen. Claudia Kennedy, herself an alleged victim of sexual harassment by a fellow general, began a speech to West Point cadets in 1997 by declaring, "This is not your father's army anymore." Indeed, women now comprise 15 percent of the United States military force.

Still, the battlefield is not exactly an OSHA-friendly environment. The reality of an exploding hand grenade or mortar round cannot be discursively redefined; death doesn't care about gender.

ON THE ARMY Physical Fitness Test, only about 3 percent of women score the same as the average male. One component of unit cohesion is the sure knowledge of every soldier that he will be cared for if wounded, and he will be carried home on someone's back if necessary. Elite unit tradition is that not even your dead body is left behind. This instills cohesion, camaraderie, and courage. But can male soldiers expect women to carry them to safety if injured? That kind of doubt itself impairs unit cohesion.

In the Summer 2001 issue of *Parameters*, the Army's War College quarterly, which is a peer-reviewed journal, Majors Kim Field and John Nagl argued that the discrepancy between male and female physical capabilities should not be an impediment to women serving in combat. They advance a "modest proposal": Set a high standard for combat qualifications and open it to all comers.

Elegant in its simplicity, their proposal ignores the political realities of a DACOWITS-ruled world. All of the

services today use gender-normed physical fitness standards; even so, women still suffer injuries at a much higher rate than men and, in the wake of basic training, have a 50 percent first-year attrition rate, compared to the men's 30 percent. It costs \$10,000 to recruit a soldier, so the attrition rate hurts. The report to Congress issued by the Blair Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues noted that Army recruits are "required" to complete five of seven throws of a hand grenade. The last two throws must be of live grenades. However, if the recruits do not throw the practice grenades adequately, they may be excused from the live throws. Would that it were so in real combat.

Nevertheless, there are some women who could pass the physical standards under Field and Nagl's system. That is, of course, as long as they are not in need of those jazzy DACOWITS-inspired military-issue maternity uniforms. Field and Nagl, discounting this argument, report that at any one time, less than 1 percent of the Army is pregnant. However, they include in a footnote annual pregnancy rates for the various services from the Non-Deployable Personnel Report that range from 3 percent of Marine Corps officers, and 5 percent of Air Force officers, to as high as 12 percent of both officers and enlisted women in the Army, and 13.4 percent of Navy enlisted women. The Field/Nagl proposal would include a mandatory "birth control regime" as part of routine predeployment "immunizations."

It is this constant threat of sexual activity that has inspired the "no talk, no touch" doctrine the military now uses in basic training to attempt to contain sexual activity and eliminate sexual harassment. Feminists want women to experience the battlefield bond, yet expect that connection to be bounded and

constrained by regulations about permissible contact.

Anna Simons, an anthropologist who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, argues that sexual tension is an immutable dynamic between men and women, and offers an alternative to Field and Nagl's view in the same issue of *Parameters*. Simons, the wife of a former Green Beret, reports that "women automatically alter the chemistry in all-male groups." As she acutely notes, the biggest factor women-in-combat advocates choose to ignore is that if there is one unifying experience all heterosexual men share, it is "a graphic fascination with women." Putting the object of that intense interest in their midst and then saying, "Don't touch!" is an approach doomed to failure.

Simons argues lust is a grave threat

but that "love may actually be worse. Love rearranges loyalty. The good of the group shrinks to two." Or, in some cases, only one: Love bears all things; love risks all things—for the good of the loved one. All things that is, except the loved one's life. But in combat, that's precisely what's on the line.

In the end, among the well-worn statistics about strength, and the debates about sex, the issue comes down to this: Is there something intrinsically different about women that is worth protecting from combat? Not just for women themselves, but for the greater good of American society? Simons argues that it isn't just women's presence on the battlefield that is the problem, it is the lack of their absence that is so mortally wounding to our ideals. Combat involves cold-blooded killing, an act

that threatens the soldier's humanity. "When absent," argues Simons, "what [women] evoke includes home, family, the future, and everything that's worth fighting for—nonviolence especially."

As this article is being written, the news from Afghanistan includes more American casualties, a painful reminder that the military is neither a law firm nor a country club to be integrated. By missing this distinction, DACOWITS should be dishonorably discharged because of military necessity. ♦

Charmaine Yoest is a Bradley Fellow at the University of Virginia in the Department of Government, and Jack Yoest, a former Army captain in the Armored Cavalry, is a management consultant.

A Peace of My Mind

Dave Shiflett takes on bellicose pacifists.

HAVE YOU SLAPPED a pacifist today? If not, get to it. It's one thing to protest a war undertaken in some remote jungle you have to take a long flight to, and whose purposes may be a bit gauzy. It's quite another when the enemy is dive-bombing New York and Washington. The fact that our enemies are determined to return the world to the seventh century and force our women to dress in sacks makes the anti-war position all the more controversial. There seems little choice but to douse these people with the hot oil of ridicule.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that these contemporary pacifists are not cut from the same cloth as history's grand Mahatmas, whose neutral-



ity may have sometimes been in error but who were people of large and often courageous spirit. They took the tough pathway toward their High Ideals and would follow their principles into the jailhouse and perhaps into the grave. One would feel very bad about training the water cannon on them.

Not so the new breed, which appears to be largely made up of self-absorbed snots. When the heat shows up, they run. If they get jugged, they get someone to post bail, preferably on Daddy's AmEx card. Some do a bit of car-burning and looting on the side. They blossom most brilliantly in the spotlight, which they are forever seeking, and they hail from the expected provinces: Hollywood, the Ivy League,


The Women's Quarterly

WINTER 2002 ♦ NO. 30

Is Manhood Really Back in Fashion?

*Lionel Tiger, Charlotte Allen, and Sally L. Satel
on the state of masculinity*

*Also: Breastfeeding
at the Pentagon
and the truth
about Joan of Arc*



559/OSD/1068

INFO
3/12 b

February 26, 2002 7:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security

Steve Cambone's point is right that we need to get the Homeland Security apparatus functioning on a basis that fits DoD when we get our CINC and other people in place, so the Department can deal with it effectively.

We need to get them to change what they are doing and how they are doing it. Let's not forget that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022602-1

.....

Please respond by 03/15/02

U12827 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10690

Snowflake

February 26, 2002 11:34 AM

ACS
ON FILE
IN SAFE
3/12

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: ROE

AFGHANISTAN

Let's get that ROE thing straightened out for those 1600 service people going to Customs, INS and the Border Patrol.

Also, let's find out precisely what the ROEs are and whether or not the weapons are loaded for the military in the airports.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022602-14

.....

Please respond by 03/15/02

26 Feb 02

U12828 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10691

ACTION
to 3/11

February 26, 2002 12:54 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Detainees

383.6

Are you comfortable with the way I have edited this?

Please wash it around with your associates and see how they feel about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/26/02 Statement for ICRC

DHR:dh
022502-13

.....

Please respond by 03/08/02

26 Feb 02

U12829 /02

~~**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**~~

- _____, a close associate of Usama Bin Laden, is a senior Al Qaeda official who was responsible for, among other things, training Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan for specific terrorist attacks.
- He is not entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Convention.
- As a matter of policy, the U.S. has allowed the ICRC access to Al Qaeda detainees. However, the United States has a compelling reason to decline to extend that courtesy in this case.
- He is alive and well. He is being treated humanely, and we are monitoring his treatment.

Revised:
February 26, 2002
11:32 AM

DR/dh
Feb 02/detainees (Classified)

11-L-0559/OSD/10693



WFO
26

February 27, 2002 7:19 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Promotion

210(344)

I have signed this flag nomination, but I must say the fact that he has been in his jobs 18 months absolutely assures us that we have no idea how he is capable of performing, nor does he.

Thanks.

Attach.
Kelly file

DHR:dh
022702-2



Please respond by _____

27 Feb 02

U12830 /02

Action
3/12

February 28, 2002 10:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Award

David Dreier says I have been selected for an award by the National Endowment for Democracy, the independent Republican group piece of that that Cheney and McCain and other people have received. He said he thinks the date is June 11.

I told him it was not clear to me that I would be allowed to accept an award from a partisan organization, even though its purpose is non-partisan. I thanked him and said I would check.

Please see if you can get some information on it and get back to me in a reasonable period of time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022802-6

.....

Please respond by 03/15/02

U12831 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10695

3/4
-0-
snowflake

February 28, 2002 9:53 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: OSD History

Dave 3/2

02005D

Please ask the historian, Mr. Goldberg, which pages in here he thought I ought to read.

Thanks.

Attach.

1953-1956 Strategy, Money and the New Look-History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

DHR:dh
022802-3

.....
Please respond by 03/29/02

28 Feb 02

U12832 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10696



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1777 NORTH KENT STREET
ARLINGTON, VA 22209-2165

March 1, 2002

HISTORICAL OFFICE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Relevant Readings in Volume III of the OSD History

The following selections in Volume III seem to have relevance to today's world.

Foreword – pp. i-ii – A two page distillation of the main themes of the book.

Chapter XXX. – Conclusion - pp. 673-79.

The concluding chapter is an overview of the New Look period, including relations with reluctant and difficult allies, interservice rivalries and competition for money and forces, the impact of rapid technological change, and the search for a smaller and more technologically advanced military machine.

Chapter XXIX – Strategic Perspectives – pp. 654-72.



This chapter deals with the problems of bringing about a transformation of the military establishment in the face of resistance from the military services and other interests. It illuminates the difficulties the top leaders of government encounter when they seek to devise new policies to meet emerging challenges and threats.

Chapter VI – Debating Defense of the Continental Vitals - pp. 114-39.

Perhaps more than any other major military program continental defense was marked by uncertainty and indecision. In competition with other programs for money it usually had to give way. In particular, the military services preferred to spend their money on other programs. Chapter XIII, pp. 277-306 is a followup.

Chapter II – Reorganizing Defense – pp. 21-43.



The perennial problem of civil – military relations plagued Eisenhower throughout his term of office. The reorganization of DoD in 1953 illustrates the difficulties of bringing about desired changes.



Alfred Goldberg
OSD Historian



11-L-0559/OSD/10697

8:31 AM

TO: Gen. Tommy Franks

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 6, 2002

SUBJECT:

Can you get back to me with the total number in the country after six months, after a year and after two years.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
080602.10

Afghanistan

Please respond by: 8/20/02

6 Aug 02

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF



SAB
1/10
2/10
FOR
ROTUS

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECDEF DATE: 1-9-02

- Came to me to pass up.
- For your info.

VR
 Tommy R. Franks
 General, USA
 Commander in Chief

FROM: USCENTCOM-SJS

FAX NO.: 8138275473

Jan. 10 2002 08:33AM P2

Abdul Rashid Dostum
LEADER OF ISLAMIC NAT'L
MOVEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN
C/O UNIT 3
APO AE 09311

FREE MAIL

Mr. George W. Bush
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC

Dear U.S president, George W. Bush!

Please accept my cardinal greetings on New Year's Day!

Afghan people, experiencing peace after a long period of sufferings are grateful for your efforts in this regard. We believe that the coming New Year will be a year of relief and reconstruction.

I wish your Excellency good health, great successes and the best of luck.

Sincerely yours,

A. R. Dostum, Leader of Islamic
National Movement of Afghanistan.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. R. Dostum', written over a horizontal line.

Action
TS 1115
1322

January 14, 2002 7:26 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bosnia

Bosnia

We have to get the State Department to go in hard on Bosnia, so they quit releasing these bad guys.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-65



Please respond by _____

14 Jan 02

U13100 /02

January 14, 2002 7:24 PM

in des
TOSKING BOOK

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Fusion Cell

I am told the reason the CIA does better than we do is because they have a fusion cell for the UAVs. Are we developing a fusion cell? If so, when will it be ready?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-63

.....
Please respond by _____

452 R

14 Jan 02

U13161 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10704

Snowflake

IN JCS
TAKING BOOK

January 14, 2002 7:22 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UAV for Philippines

Please let me know if the Hunter would be appropriate for the Philippines, as opposed to the Predator.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-62



Please respond by _____

Philippines

11/5am 02

U13162 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10705

January 14, 2002 7:20 PM

Dov

1/18 / 16:36 '02

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Categories

Please talk to Denny Blair about the categories of funding he needs ironed out, so they can proceed on the war on terrorism.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-61

.....

Please respond by _____

000,5


1/15 Jan 02

U13165 /02

INFO MEMO

January 17, 2002 8:18 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Categories

- Per your instructions I spoke to Denny Blair regarding his budget needs for our activity in the Philippines. He will be getting me the details, but I am reasonably certain we can find a good part of the money he needs in our current supplemental (since what we are doing in the Philippines is part of the war on terrorism) and can plan for more money in the next supplemental. His staff and mine are working out the modalities.

COORDINATION: NONE

11-L-0559/OSD/10707

ACTION
DS 11/5
1332

January 15, 2002 8:16 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Increase Special Forces

I think we need to increase the total number of Special Forces. I know it is very hard to do because they pull from the regular Army pool, but I think we need to do it.

Please come into me with a proposal as to how we can do it in this budget.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011502-7

.....

Please respond by 01/22/02

U13164 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10708

INFO
DS 1/15
1345


January 15, 2002 9:14 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Walker to Pakistan or Oman

Gen. Mike DeLong, the Deputy CINC, said he will deliver Walker to Islamabad or Oman, and the Justice Department can pick him up and take him from there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011502-17



Please respond by 01/16/02

383.6

15 Jan 02

U13165 /02

January 15, 2002 2:18 PM

ACTION
ds 1/17
1834

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: TRICARE

With all the patriotism, this may be the time for the Pentagon to do some public relations to get doctors to sign up for the TRICARE program. What do you think?

701

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011502-29



Please respond by 01/23/02

cc: Torie Clarke

15 JAN 02

U13166 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10710

Snowflake

January 15, 2002 7:58 AM

RETURN
AS 1/15
1405

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Colombia

Here is an article on Colombia. It appears there is some legislative change we may need or interpretation, so that we can deal with terrorism in Colombia using the capabilities that were authorized for drug funds. It seems to me that the problems are intermixed.

Colombia

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/15/02 DeYoung, *Washington Post*, "U.S. Eyes Shift in Colombia Policy"

DHR:dh
011502-3

.....

Please respond by _____

15 Jan 02

U13168 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10711

U.S. Eyes Shift in Colombia Policy

Greater Aid for War Against Leftist Guerrillas Sought

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, January 15, 2002; Page A01

The Bush administration is considering expanding U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia to give more aid to that country's counterinsurgency war against leftist guerrillas, according to administration officials.

Proposals under high-level discussion include increased intelligence sharing on guerrilla activities around the country and training of an additional battalion of Colombian troops to serve as a rapid-reaction force protecting vital infrastructure, including pipelines used by U.S. oil companies, against guerrilla attack.

The U.S. military has trained three such battalions in the past two years, but they have been restricted to counternarcotics activities, as has virtually all U.S. military assistance in Colombia. U.S.-provided military equipment, including helicopters, is also limited under law to counternarcotics use, although the Colombian government is pressing for those restrictions to be lifted.

Officials stressed that none of the proposals include the possibility of direct American combat involvement in Colombia. But expansion of U.S. assistance and training beyond the fight against production and export of illegal drugs would represent a quantum leap in a highly sensitive area of U.S. policy. Since massive amounts of U.S. military aid began flowing to Colombia less than two years ago, Congress has repeatedly warned against "mission creep" into a Vietnam-like counterinsurgency war.

High-level consideration of the proposals, one official said, is a direct result of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. "Before then, there would have been no debate, or only a very limited debate, about whether to even think about extending beyond counternarcotics aid," the official said. "At least now, these are debatable propositions."

The momentum begun with September's attacks moved into high gear last weekend, after Colombian President Andres Pastrana unexpectedly suspended three-year-old peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country's largest guerrilla group. Pastrana ordered FARC troops to evacuate the Switzerland-sized zone he granted the rebel group in 1998 to encourage negotiations.

His announcement sent Colombian army troops to mass near the zone in preparations for reoccupying it and driving out the FARC if a deadline set at 9:30 last night passed without substantive rebel concessions. Right-wing paramilitary troops fighting their own war against the guerrillas, in frequent alliance with the army, were also prepared to move, and there were widespread fears of impending civilian massacres. For its part, the FARC was expected to launch attacks throughout the country.

Pastrana's ultimatum sent senior U.S. officials into urgent weekend discussions over what one called "authorizations and resources" -- what the United States was equipped and allowed to do under law and congressional restrictions in aiding the Colombian military. Officials were in the middle of an interagency meeting on the subject late yesterday afternoon when news arrived that the 9:30 p.m. deadline had been suspended, at least temporarily, following last-ditch mediation by a group of international diplomats working with the United Nations in Colombia.

Whether peace talks get back on track or not, however, Colombia's multi-front war will continue, and "it is fair to say we are looking for other ways to help" the government prevail, said another administration official, who, like all those contacted, declined to be identified. At the very least, officials said, there are now six days to think about it before Pastrana's next deadline arrives Sunday.

The Pastrana government, which will leave office following elections this summer, has argued with increasing urgency that the United States must have a more comprehensive military program in Colombia. When the Bush administration, which made few changes in the bipartisan Colombia policy inherited from its predecessor, launched a policy review several months ago, a number of officials, led by senior civilians in the Defense Department, argued that the line drawn between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency was an artificial one that lessened the effectiveness of U.S. aid.

Both the Clinton administration's Plan Colombia, the \$1.3 billion Colombia aid package passed by Congress in 2000, and the Bush administration's \$625 million Andean Regional Initiative, approved in December, came with sharp congressional restrictions on how the aid could be used.

U.S.-trained troops and military equipment, and most U.S. intelligence, are restricted to the fight against narcotics trafficking in Colombia, which provides more than 90 percent of all cocaine and a major part of the heroin in this country. Colombian troops eligible for U.S. training have to be thoroughly vetted for past human rights abuse and association with the paramilitaries. But since the Colombian military has been slow to move against those with paramilitary ties, and all three of Colombia's insurgent groups are deeply involved in the drug business, the lines have been difficult to maintain.

Intelligence cooperation became even more problematic after the suspension of U.S. drug surveillance and tracking flights over both Colombia and Peru last spring, when a CIA-guided Peruvian Air Force fighter shot down an aircraft carrying American missionaries in the mistaken belief they were drug traffickers. Although the administration completed its investigation into the matter last summer, it has taken no action to reinstitute the intelligence sharing or flights.

Under the proposals being discussed, that intelligence cooperation would be reactivated and expanded to include information on guerrilla activities outside the bounds of counterdrug actions. A battalion of as many as 1,000 Colombian troops would be trained as a rapid-reaction force to protect infrastructure, and consideration would be given to providing additional equipment to the Colombian army for that purpose.

Officials said the assistance could be justified under "force protection" doctrines already in place. That justification would be made easier, they said, by President Bush's inclusion of all three Colombian insurgency groups on the administration's new lists of international terrorist organizations.

Whether the anti-terrorist rationale would fly with Congress "has yet to be tested," said one official.

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Action
1/15
1315 AS

January 15, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Deployment Order

I want to know who, by name, is responsible for sending me a deployment order where if the mission is canceled, it will cost the U.S. taxpayers \$544,000, and there are no provisions in the lease to delay or reschedule.

370

That is inexcusable. If it is coming up from CINCSOC or SOUTHCOM and Joint Forces Command, I want to know precisely who is responsible for what, and I don't ever want to see another one of these.

Ed Giambastiani, please get me a time line of how long this order was in each person's shop.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-70



Please respond by _____

15 JAN 02

U13170 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10714

7:27 AM

ACTION

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Dan Dell'Orto
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 16, 2002

SUBJECT:

We need a statement as to why we are holding people, what we do with them, how we are treating them, how we categorize them, and why it is perfectly legal, proper and historically correct.

If you can get me that by Friday, fine. If not, immediately let me know and we will get a team of people working on it to get it done.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
011602.03

Please respond by: _____ *1/18*

Done 1/18/02

385.6

16 Jan 02

U13171 /02

1/18
1205



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1600

5/18/02

January 18, 2002

Note for Sec Def

Handwritten initials/signature

- Attached is a response to your snowflake on detainees.
- Al Gonzales has seen an earlier version of this. He agrees, but is concerned about the assertions on the second page that the "United States has determined that" the detainees are not entitled to POW status, because of diplomatic sensitivities, and because some disagree with the conclusion.
- Other conclusions stated here provoke the same sensitivities.
- Gonzales plans to meet with the President later today or tomorrow, and asks that this paper and its conclusions not be distributed yet.

Handwritten signature



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

January 18, 2002, 11:30 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Detainees

"We need a statement as to why we are holding people, what we do with them, how we are treating them, how we categorize them, and why it is perfectly legal, proper, and historically correct."

- Why we are holding people.
 - United States has been attacked and is acting in accordance with its right to self-defense.
 - Detainees have been captured in combat or detained as threats to the safety of U.S. forces, allies and the American people. We should not release individuals who have pledged to kill Americans and to spread terror to other countries.
 - Under the law of war, they may be detained until the end of hostilities in the war on terrorism; they may also be held until trial for violations of the laws of war, and if convicted, held for punishment in accordance with sentencing.
- What we do with them.
 - In Afghanistan, they are photographed, fingerprinted, interrogated, provided shelter, and are detained in secure facilities. Some detainees are then transferred to U.S. Navy ships.
 - After screening to determine nationality and affiliation with terrorist organizations, detainees are flown to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO).
 - In GTMO, they are checked and cared for medically, and housed in a secure, temporary detention facility. The Department of Defense will construct additional facilities appropriate for the detainees.
- How we are treating them.
 - As a matter of policy, we are treating and will treat them consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.



11-L-0559/OSD/10717

- We treat them humanely – providing food and water, shelter, clothing, medical care, and allowing them freedom to practice their religion.
- We are not, for example, providing them:
 - Monthly pay (equivalent to 8 or more Swiss francs)
 - The opportunity to work with the kitchen staff to prepare their own food
 - A small canteen to purchase personal items and tobacco products (the profits of which must be used to benefit prisoners)
 - The opportunity to elect representatives among them
- Conditions of detention must satisfy legitimate security requirements to protect American forces.
- How we categorize them.
 - Based on the legal advice of the Department of Justice, the United States has determined that members of Al Qaeda and Taliban are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.
- Why it is perfectly legal, proper, and historically correct.
 - This is a new kind of war, not contemplated by the architects of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
 - As a function of our inherent right to self-defense, we are fighting with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorists. Members of these organizations do not legitimately operate under the direction and control of a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, for this and other reasons, provisions relating to prisoner of war status do not apply to them.
 - Even if some wish to argue that the Geneva Conventions apply, most if not all detainees clearly fail to meet the time honored tests for prisoner of war status for an “other militia” or “volunteer corps.”:
 - That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,
 - That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance
 - That of carrying arms openly
 - That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
 - Nevertheless, the United States will treat Al Qaeda, Taliban, and those detained in our war against terrorists consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions.

TO: Steve Cambone
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: January 16, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Declassification**

*Larry Di Rita
 2/6*

Figure out who in the Pentagon is in charge of declassification of records. You are aware of what the Dept. of Energy did wrong. Are the old policies on declassification still in place or should we look at them, revise them, fix them, straighten them out or bless them?

313.4

Thank you.

DHR/azn
 011602.06

Please respond by: 1/23

Shawn
Copy BTM

- ① Response attached
- ② ~~Return to me if you're satisfied with what I've written to~~
- ② I'll copy Stanbit and have him consider Cambone's additional proposals.

16 Jan 02



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



POLICY

INFO MEMO

February 5, 2002, 2:15pm

FOR: SI *To: ASD (C3I)*
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FROM: Pr *2/12*
(I)

SUBJECT: Jc *John Stenbit -*

use for *Policy* FEB - 5 2002

The attached records. It resp *John -* (C3I) on declassification of DOD declassification procedures.

- John Stenbit Department *SecDef agrees* and procedures for the
- The old dec place. (Exe Directive 5 *with your way ahead on declassification,* al security information are still in 15 and implemented by DOD "am" signed December 13, 1996)
- There is an Policy Coo *and further agree* ler being conducted by an NSC Access and Information Security Policy Coo *to Cambone's suggestion* OASD for Security Information and Operat *regarding classifying authority*

The current Executive Order *See attached Dir. Let* classification policy than that followed by the Reagan/Bush administrations.

(A)

In his memo, John Stenbit says that he will seek interagency agreement to add a category in the Executive Order specifically identifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear information so that it will not be automatically declassified. This may be a marginal improvement because if information is not identified and marked properly, it will be automatically declassified. Short of a complete rewrite of the Executive Order, I recommend asking John Stenbit to seek a revision to the Executive Order such that information warranting continued protection cannot be declassified without the determination of the original classifying authority.

(A)

Prepared by, Lesley Young, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10720



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



INFO MEMO

February 5, 2002, 2:15pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy FEB - 5 2002
(Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: John Stenbit Memo on Declassification

The attached memo (Tab A) is from John Stenbit, ASD (C3I) on declassification of records. It responds to your request for information on DOD declassification procedures.

- John Stenbit is in charge of declassification policies and procedures for the Department.
- The old declassification policies pertaining to national security information are still in place. (Executive Order 12958, signed April 16, 1995 and implemented by DOD Directive 5200.1 "DOD Information Security Program" signed December 13, 1996)
- There is an interagency review of the Executive Order being conducted by an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee called the Records Access and Information Security Policy Coordinating Committee. Bill Leonard, the DASD for Security Information and Operations, C3I is the DOD representative.

The current Executive Order institutes a more open declassification policy than that followed by the Reagan/Bush administrations.

(A) In his memo, John Stenbit says that he will seek interagency agreement to add a category in the Executive Order specifically identifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear information so that it will not be automatically declassified. This may be a marginal improvement because if information is not identified and marked properly, it will be automatically declassified. Short of a complete rewrite of the Executive Order, I recommend asking John Stenbit to seek a revision to the Executive Order such that information warranting continued protection cannot be declassified without the determination of the original classifying authority.

Prepared by, Lesley Young, OPDUSD(P)

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10721

Snowflake

11:17 AM

ACTION
05 1/16
0938

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 16, 2002
SUBJECT:

We are starting to do a lot of physical things in Afghanistan - on roads, airports - the Jordanians have a hospital, the Brits and other people are doing things. Seems to me we ought to get the press in Afghanistan focused on some of the good things that are happening for the Afghan people. Dick Myers has asked for some photographs from Gen. DeLong and I have raised it with him now three or four times, so I think they are sensitive to it. You might want to talk to Quigley and get him focused on it as well.

Afghanistan

Thanks.

DHR/azn
011602.09


Please respond by: _____

16 Jan 02

U13174 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10722

- 1/18
1800
snowflake



January 18, 2002 9:34 AM

Done
1/24
1302

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Record Copies

I hope you are keeping a separate file of all memos I send to the President and all that I send to the Vice President. You also probably ought to keep all the ones I send to Secretary Powell, Director Tenet and Dr. Rice in a separate file for each one so we have a record of that.

212

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011802-9

Please respond by _____

1/24
1130
1/24
MR DI RITA,
IN RESPONSE TO THIS
SNOWFLAKE, I ASKED YOU
TO SHOW ME WHAT YOU
HAVE IN OUR "FILES" AND
KNOW OF THE ABOVE. FOR
IS THE INFO SINGLE FOR
VR,
WHAT
SEP 01.

What
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Let's discuss
18 Jan 02
Are they
maintained
separately in some
fashion?
Larry Di Rita
1/22
Larry Di Rita
1/24

U1317E-0599 OSD/10723

CCS BROWSE HITS

January 23, 2002

POTUS

C/N: X00146-02 DOC: 1/14/02 DOR: 1/15/02 Closed Signature Package
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES
 SUBJECT: REPORT OF TRIP TO CAUCASUS UZBEKISTAN AFGHANISTAN AND NATO
 KEYWORDS: BUSH, G SNOW FLAKE
 COMMENTS: CAF COVER MEMO TO POTUS ONLY; COPIES OF TRIP REP TO CC'S, USP. NO RELEASE WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL
 AGENCY: TASK: SUSPENSE: ACD:
 COORDINATION:
 SUSPENSE STATUS:
 File Number: 333 SD

C/N: W00057-02 DOC: 1/14/02 DOR: 1/15/02
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES
 SUBJECT: SENIOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
 KEYWORDS: BUSH, G SNOW FLAKE
 COMMENTS: NUMBER AND FILE NO RELEASE WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL
 AGENCY: TASK: SUSPENSE: ACD:
 COORDINATION:
 SUSPENSE STATUS:
 File Number: 334

C/N: W00058-02 DOC: 1/14/02 DOR: 1/15/02
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES
 SUBJECT: KISSINGER'S PIECE
 KEYWORDS: WASHINGTON POST PHASE TWO IRAQ SNOW FLAKE
 COMMENTS: NUMBER AND FILE NO RELEASE WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL
 AGENCY: TASK: SUSPENSE: ACD:
 COORDINATION:
 SUSPENSE STATUS:
 File Number: IRAQ

C/N: W00037-02 DOC: 1/10/02 DOR: 1/10/02
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES VP STATE WH NSC
 SUBJECT: CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW QDR
 KEYWORDS:
 COMMENTS:
 AGENCY: TASK: SUSPENSE: ACD:
 COORDINATION:
 SUSPENSE STATUS:
 File Number: CHINA

C/N: W00025-02 DOC: 1/9/02 DOR: 1/8/02 Closed Signature Package
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES
 SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE NRO
 KEYWORDS: TEETS, P
 COMMENTS:
 AGENCY: TASK: SUSPENSE: ACD:
 COORDINATION:
 SUSPENSE STATUS:
 File Number: 020 NRO

C/N: W00019-02 DOC: 1/7/02 DOR: 1/7/02 Closed Signature Package
 FROM: SECDEF RUMSFELD TO: WH PRES
 SUBJECT: DOD PROGRAMS -- TERMINATED OR REDUCED
 KEYWORDS: SNOW FLAKE

January 18, 2002 11:37 AM

164
1130 83

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Interrogations

When will they start interrogating people at GTMO?

Thanks.

383.6

DHR:dh
011802-18

.....
Please respond by

¹⁸
~~01/21/02~~

~~[Signature]~~
fod

1/21

SECDEF -

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 21 2002

ON FRIDAY THE 18TH,

MGEN SPEER SAID HE WOULD
BE STARTING INTERROGATIONS
ON ^{OR ABOUT} FRIDAY THE 25TH.

HE NOW PLANS TO

START ON WED. THE

23RD.

11-L-0559/OSD 10725 102 V/R
CJ

18 Jan 02

1
snowflake

ATTN
05 1/22
1/15

January 18, 2002 11:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Video

Please find this video, and let's look at it and see if it is as bad as they say. If it is, let's get it stopped.

060

Thanks.

Attach.
01/18/02 *Washington Times*, "Inside the Ring" Politically Correct Army

DHR:dh
011802-16



Please respond by 01/24/02

18 Jan 02

U13177 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10726

The Washington Times

www.washtimes.com

Inside the Ring

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Published 1/18/2002

China intercepts P-3

A Chinese jet flew within 500 feet of a U.S. P-3 patrol aircraft in the closest aerial encounter since the EP-3 incident April 1 near Hainan island. U.S. intelligence officials said the Chinese F-8 interceptor jet conducted the aerial maneuver with the P-3 maritime patrol craft over the East China Sea on Jan. 7.

The encounter is raising new concerns in the Pentagon that Chinese air force intercepts are becoming dangerous again. U.S. officials tell us the Chinese interceptors have been coming closer to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the past several months. The recent aggressive maneuvers are in stark contrast to the previous Chinese practice of keeping a distance of many miles when intercepting regular flights along the coast of China.

China's government had demanded an end to all U.S. reconnaissance flights as a price for the return of 23 U.S. military crew members who were taken hostage by the Chinese military following the incident on Hainan island. A Chinese pilot flew his F-8 into the EP-3 and nearly killed the crew. The aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan island. The Chinese pilot ejected and, according to Chinese press accounts, was eaten by sharks in the South China Sea.

Gun camera

The Pentagon is reticent about discussing how many pro-Taliban fighters it has killed since Oct. 7. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld refuses to give a figure for the number of enemy dead.

But military officers tell us that U.S. air strikes, and special-operations teams on the ground, have killed thousands in Afghanistan. A lot of it happened at night. If there is videotape of the killing, it's not likely to be shown at formal Pentagon press briefings.

We obtained one such documentary — gun-camera film from an Air Force AC-130U Spectre gunship as it patrolled exit routes the night of Dec. 7 as Kandahar fell to anti-Taliban forces.

As "Spooky" hovers, gunners spot a loose convoy of pro-Taliban soldiers (perhaps a mix of Taliban militia and al Qaeda fighters) trying to get away. At first, the gunship unloads volleys from a 40mm cannon. We counted 20 explosions all around the vehicle. But the gunner can't score a bull's-eye.

The fighters inside realize it's just a matter of time before the aircraft scores a direct hit. Suddenly, the vehicle stops, and from the back, nine of the enemy come running out.

"The initial shooting with the 40mm was not all that good. At least, they got the vehicle to stop," said a military source who viewed the video. "One of the guys looks like he is a definite candidate for the Taliban 2004 Olympic track team."

As the fighters run toward another vehicle a few hundred yards back up the trail, the Spectre switches to its 25mm Gatling gun (1,800 rounds per minute). This time the gunner doesn't miss. The moving bodies disappear in a cloud of dust.

Politically correct Army

The political correctness of the Clinton administration may be coming back to haunt the Pentagon. An official tells us the Army in 1998 produced a "force-protection" video guide that lectured soldiers that terrorism was a relative term.

"It is one of the most politically correct, apologetic, anti-American diatribes I've ever seen," the official told us. "You'd think it was produced by al Qaeda. It begins by stating that the 'Christian Crusaders' were terrorists in their time."

The Army video also puts forth the notion that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, pointing out that French resistance fighters in World War II were terrorists because they blew up bridges during Nazi occupation. The analogy is upsetting because the U.S. Army provided assistance to the French fighters, and bridges are legitimate military targets in military operations.

"The video describes terrorists in the most complimentary terms, calling them 'highly motivated, very disciplined individuals who regard us as legitimate combatants,'" said our informant. "This suggests good faith beliefs by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda legitimizes their actions."

The Army video is not just politically damaging. It is expected to cause legal problems for the Pentagon and Justice Department in their efforts to prosecute terrorists involved in the Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks.

CIA China failure

The CIA released an embarrassing report this week in its in-house journal showing, once again, how CIA analyses of China are not only flawed today but were wrong in several aspects during the Korean War.

We reported recently that a panel of outside experts had found an "institutional predisposition" by CIA hands in China to underestimate Chinese military developments. The CIA rejected the criticism.

Now CIA operations officer P.K. Rose, writing in the current issue of the CIA journal "Studies in Intelligence," has exposed a major CIA failure during the Korean War to predict Chinese intervention in the conflict, which he described as a "blunder" that proved to be deadly for U.S. troops.

Throughout China's military buildup on the North Korean border, the CIA refused to believe intervention would take place. On Oct. 12, 1950, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50 stated: "While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950."

In the weeks leading up to the Chinese invasion, "numerous intelligence reports indicated Chinese preparations for military intervention," the author stated.

When Chinese military forces began moving into North Korea on Oct. 13 and 14, 1950, the CIA still refused to believe an invasion was imminent. On Oct. 15, the CIA's Daily Summary stated that "China had no intention of entering the war in any large-scale fashion," and agency analysts also adopted the conclusion that the troops were there "to protect the hydroelectric plants along the Yalu River that provide power to the Manchurian industrial area."

Astonishingly, even after the massive Chinese assault was launched, the CIA refused to believe the 498,000 Chinese regular army troops and an additional 370,000 security troops were part of an invasion.

As U.S. military intelligence from the region reported 12 Chinese divisions in Korea, "On 24 November, however, National Intelligence Estimate 2/1 stated that China had the capability for large-scale offensive operations but that there were no indications such an offensive was in the offing," the article said.

"That same day, the second Chinese offensive started, leaving the 8th Army fighting for its life and most of the 1st Marine Division surrounded and threatened with annihilation," the article said.

Vieques

Four House members have asked Navy Secretary Gordon England in a letter to explain why the Navy decided not to send the carrier USS John F. Kennedy, and its battle group, to Vieques for live-fire training.

The Kennedy is scheduled to leave its Mayport, Fla., port soon for the Arabian Sea near Afghanistan. The uniform chiefs of the Navy and Marine Corps had asked Mr. England in writing to let the battle group go through live-fire training on the Puerto Rican island, where protesters oppose any further Navy training.

In the end, the Navy decided to have the Kennedy group practice at East Coast ranges, avoiding a political confrontation that the White House does not want.

The congressional letter states, "You denied them the ability to gain this invaluable training on Vieques despite the specific request of the chief of naval operations and the commandant of the Marine Corps without identifying an equal or superior location. We have been informed that your non-support has forced the battle group to use less suitable ranges on the East Coast, where they will not be able to acquire the level of realistic training that may potentially save the lives of our men and women in combat. Why?"

The letter was signed by four Republicans: Reps. Dan Burton of Indiana, chairman of the House Government Reform Committee; Bob Barr of Georgia; Christopher Shays of Connecticut; and Adam H. Putnam of Florida.

A Navy spokesman said the decision not to conduct a final training tune-up on Vieques was made by the Atlantic Fleet, not Mr. England.

A former Clinton administration official who fought to keep Vieques open to the Navy told us the decision sends the signal that the Navy doesn't really need Vieques as much as it contended during the past two years of rancorous debate.

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters. Gertz can be reached at (b)(6) or by e-mail at bgertz@washingtontimes.com. Scarborough can be reached at (b)(6) or by e-mail at rscarborough@washingtontimes.com.

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Return to the article

showfile

11:40 AM

ACTION
85 11/25
1040

TO: Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 19, 2002

SUBJECT:

Please go over this memo and edit it and get it into better shape than it currently is.

Thank you.

A-471.61

DHR/azn
011902.03

Attach: Paper on Nuclear Warheads 1/19/02

Please respond by: _____

19 Jan 02

U13178 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10730

January 19, 2002 9:37 AM

SUBJECT: What Should the U.S. do With Its Nuclear Warheads as Reductions are Made - Destroy or Retain as replacements?

Two thoughts:

1. During the history of nuclear arms control, no country was required, in any agreement, to destroy warheads. The press praised those arms control agreements. President Bush decided to cut strategic nuclear weapons from thousands down to 1700 to 2200, and he is criticized because the U.S. does not plan to destroy all of the strategic nuclear warheads. There seems to be a double standard.
2. The issue with respect to warheads is time and money. If we destroy warheads, we won't have them when some of our existing warheads become unsafe or unreliable. That means we would need to spend a great deal of money to have a responsive capability to make nuclear weapons continuously and have people trained and able to do it. Interestingly, there is nothing in any arms control agreements that prevents countries from destroying the warheads they take off as they reduce their strategic offensive weapons and then build more warheads. It is a false argument.
3. Finally, where is the outcry about the fact that the US has a few hundred nuclear weapons and the Russians have many thousands?

DHR:dh
011802-4

11-L-0559/OSD/10731

Action
1/22
09/12

January 19, 2002 9:02 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Secure Video Meetings of the CINCs

060

We have now completed the AOR CINCs. We have scheduled the remaining CINCs and we are going to schedule the Services. My instinct is to invite the Service Secretaries and possibly Pete Aldridge to the remaining meetings.

Paul Wolfowitz suggested we might want to have a session, where someone does a presentation on experimentation and experimental possibilities. It would emphasize what was experimental - not operational - but which we have been using, and other possibilities on the drawing board. If too many people are in the room, the Services and Service Secretaries could meet in a separate SVTC room in this building.

Let's think that through and bring it up at the next Round table.

Finally, Paul thinks we might want to bring back together the group that did the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense Planning Guidance, without the CINCs, at the end of this process. The Service Secretaries, Chiefs and senior civilians would then, after having seen the way ahead, determine what they think about it and if there are things we ought to be doing that we are not doing. We would ask if it would inform any of the other work we are doing in the Department with respect to budgets, personnel and readiness, etc., and if so, how. We would force those issues up in an orderly way.

19 Jan 02

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011802-24

.....
Please respond by _____

U13179 /02

January 21, 2002 9:47 AM

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Comparison of GDP

123

At lunch the other day with Alan Greenspan, we got talking about the GDP per capita in Muslim countries versus non-Muslim countries.

He sent me the data, which I have attached. I found it very interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.
01/14/02 Greenspan memo to SecDef re: GDP of Islamic Countries

DHR:dh
011802-11

21 Jan 02

U13181 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10733

**DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM**

Date: January 14, 2002
To: Chairman Greenspan
From: Caroline Freund and Trevor Reeve
Subject: GDP of Islamic countries

Attached is a copy of the materials we prepared last month on GDP of Islamic countries in 2000. The countries were chosen on the basis of having a population that is at least 50 percent Muslim according to the CIA's *World Factbook 2001*. The GDP figures are primarily from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* database, although for a few countries, the data are from the U.S. Department of Energy (denoted by the double asterisk). These nominal GDP data are in U.S. dollars, based on market exchange rates.

cc: Johnson.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
JAN 14 PM 3:24
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

12/4/01

Calculations of GDP less oil revenues for Islamic Countries: 2000

	Nominal GDP* (million \$US)	Population (millions)	GDP per capita (\$US)	Oil production*** (1000 b/d)	Oil revenues (million \$US)	GDP less oil revenues (million \$US)	GDP less oil per capita (\$US)
Iran	98,990	64.0	1,546	3,770	37,580	61,411	958
Iraq	31,800 **	23.3	1,367	2,625	26,166	5,634	242
Kuwait	31,700 **	2.0	15,975	2,150	21,432	10,268	5,175
Oman	17,300 **	2.4	7,223	960	9,569	7,731	3,228
Qatar	10,600 **	0.6	18,123	795	7,925	2,675	4,574
Saudi Arabia	164,000 **	20.7	7,914	9,145	91,159	72,841	3,515
Syria	16,485	16.1	1,023	540	5,383	11,102	689
United Arab Emirates	66,500 **	2.9	22,891	2,515	25,070	41,430	14,261
Yemen	8,667	17.5	495	440	4,366	4,281	245
Other Middle East	35,980	12.8	2,800	50	498	35,482	2,761
Total Middle East	482,022	162.3	2,969	22,990	229,168	252,855	1,568
Algeria	53,817	30.4	1,770	1,580	15,750	38,068	1,252
Egypt	98,333	63.8	1,541	795	7,925	90,409	1,417
Libya	39,600 **	5.5	7,148	1,475	14,703	24,897	4,494
Nigeria	41,248	126.9	325	2,105	20,983	20,265	160
Sudan	11,169	29.7	376	210	2,093	9,076	306
Tunisia	19,462	9.6	2,032	80	797	18,665	1,948
Other Africa	37,594	29.4	1,280	n.a.	n.a.	37,594	1,280
Total Africa	301,224	295.3	1,020	6,245	62,251	238,973	809
Azerbaijan	4,904	8.1	609	300	2,980	1,913	238
Bangladesh	47,864	129.8	369	n.a.	n.a.	47,864	369
Indonesia	153,255	210.4	728	1,430	14,254	139,001	661
Kazakhstan	18,264	14.9	1,229	745	7,426	10,838	729
Kyrgyzstan	1,304	4.9	264	n.a.	n.a.	1,304	264
Malaysia	89,321	23.3	3,840	805	8,024	81,297	3,495
Pakistan	61,673	138.1	447	n.a.	n.a.	61,673	447
Tajikistan	987	6.3	156	n.a.	n.a.	987	156
Turkey	199,902	66.3	3,061	n.a.	n.a.	199,902	3,061
Turkmenistan	4,404	4.8	910	150	1,495	2,909	601
Uzbekistan	13,517	24.7	548	175	1,744	11,772	478
Total Other Islamic	595,395	630.5	944	3,605	35,935	559,460	887
Total Islamic Countries	1,378,642	1,068.1	1,267	32,840	327,354	1,051,288	966
United States	9,872,900	261.6	35,066	9,056 **			
using OPEC basket price					90,272	9,782,628	34,746
using U.S. refiners' acquisition cost **					96,058	9,776,844	34,725
using GDP originating in oil and gas extraction (from BEA)					99,500	9,773,400	34,713
Memo:							
Argentina	285,473	37.0	7,709				
Belgium	231,016	10.3	22,534				
Finland	119,823	5.2	23,132				
Sweden	227,368	8.9	25,636				
Switzerland	240,323	7.2	33,471				

*World Development Indicators database, except as noted.

**Energy Information Administration, U.S. Dept. of Energy.

***BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

Notes: Oil revenues are defined as annual oil production multiplied by average OPEC basket price for 2000 (\$27.31/b).

For the United States, an alternative calculation uses the U.S. refiners' acquisition cost of domestic crude for 2000 (\$29.05/b).

Other Middle East includes Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza.

Other Africa includes Chad, Djibouti, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Senegal.

Calculations of "Other" categories

	Nominal GDP* (million \$US)	Population (millions)	GDP per capita (\$US)	Oil production*** (1000 b/d)	Oil revenues (million \$US)	GDP less oil revenues (million \$US)	GDP less oil per capita (\$US)
Jordan	8,340	4.9	1,707	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
West Bank and Gaza	4,157	2.9	1,411	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bahrain	8,900 **	0.7	10,003	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Lebanon	16,584	4.3	3,832	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other Middle East	35,980	12.8	2,800	50	498	35,482	2,761
Chad	1,408	7.7	183				
Djibouti	554	0.7	840				
Gambia	396	1.3	308				
Mali	2,345	10.8	216				
Mauritania	935	2.7	350				
Morocco	33,364	28.7	1,162				
Niger	1,851	10.8	172				
Senegal	4,372	9.5	459				
Other Africa	37,594	29.4	1,280				

Note: GDP data not available for Afghanistan and Somalia.

January 21, 2002 12:54 PM

ACTION
JS 1/21
0947

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Info Campaign

Please get a major campaign going around the world explaining how well we are handling these detainees, and get the information communicated to these countries who are fussing about it. We also ought to get someone working with the NGOs and the various other non-profit groups.

383.6

If we are doing something wrong, we ought to get it fixed. If we are not, we ought to make sure people know we are doing it right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-36

.....
Please respond by 01/28/02

21 Jan 02

U13182 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10737

Snowflake

1/24 Action
0945 ds

January 21, 2002 1:54 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legislation

Colombia

Please figure out whether or not we ought to go for some legislation, so we can do what we need to do in Colombia with narcotics money to deal with terrorist problems, since they overlap.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-34

.....

Please respond by 01/28/02

21 Jan 02

U13183 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10738

Att: J
1/24
0934

January 21, 2002 1:53 PM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings

The White House thinks we ought to do some early briefings to the House and Senate, like we did before they went out of session, giving them a report on where the war is and what is going on. I think it is probably a good idea.

032

Pete Pace and I can go do the House and Senate, if you think we should.

Why don't you check?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-27

.....
Please respond by 01/25/02

21 Jan 02

U13184 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10739

January 21, 2002 12:19 PM

Done 1/21/02 0930

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Briefing re: Marines

In the opening statement for the press briefing, we need to mention the Marines killed in the helicopter crash this weekend..

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-25

Afghanistan

.....

Please respond by 01/22/02

215 am 02

U13185 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10740

Suzanne 22 Jan

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: FBI Representative in EUCOM

DATE: January 15, 2002

Don,

We are told by Bob Mueller's Special Assistant that the FBI will support Joe Ralston's JIATF. The current representative to the JIATF was sent on short notice with the intent to replace him for the long term. I am told that Bob Mueller will call Ralston soon - will follow closely and report back when the issue is closed.

Paul W.

040 JUSTICE

15 JAN 02

U13187 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10741

12 Feb 02

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

PW

SUBJECT: FBI Representative in EUCOM

Don,

The issue is closed. We now have a full-time FBI representative on the SFOR JIATF staff. The short notice, interim liaison has been replaced with a long-term liaison on a 90-day rotation basis. LTG Sylvester (COMSFOR) reported this morning that he is very satisfied with the FBI's support. In addition to supporting SFOR, the FBI also stationed an agent in the American Embassy in Sarajevo.

SY/AS
2/13

11-L-0559/OSD/10742

January 21, 2002 12:17 PM

1/23
0900 15

Done

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Press Briefing re: Detainees

I think we need to do a press briefing on Tuesday and go over the subject of detainees in great detail. We should give them data and information, and disabuse them of all the misinformation being circulated around.

Please start pulling it all together. For example, these are temporary facilities and are what is available—our people are in the same circumstances down there. Better cells have been ordered, and we can tell them when they are going to arrive and what they cost. We better get a list of all the people who are fussing and complaining and ask them if they would like to pitch in financially to help improve the circumstances. We better find a place that people who have an interest in this subject can get specific answers and have a call-in center. We better get the policy done with Doug Feith, so we can start giving these people back to their own countries if they want them.

383.6

Thanks.

DHR:db
012102-24



Please respond by 01/22/02

21 Jan 02

U13188 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10743

ACTION
to 1/23
1807

January 21, 2002 11:05 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: China

Someone told me that China is developing the capability of jamming our GPS as well as Russia's ~~GLONASS~~ [GLONASS]

China

We need to get some information on it and get me a briefing. Please figure out who it is and set it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-12

.....

Please respond by 01/28/02

1/22

DJS—

JOHN—REQUEST YOU TASK JZ
TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO THE
ABOVE/I.E. A ^{SHORT} BRIEFING. TKS.

2/15/02

Ed

1/21/02
1436

January 21, 2002 9:08 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Decisions

FYI.

000.5

Attach.
01/19/02 Major Directional Decisions

DHR:dh
012102-1



Please respond by _____

21 Jan 02

U13192 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10745

January 19, 2002 11:44 AM

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions—9/11/01 et seq.

- Despite the September 11th terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.
- When attacked, the U.S. will be “leaning forward, not back.” When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.
- Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking the battle to the terrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.
- The war against terrorism will be “broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements of national power—economic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt and covert.”
- The campaign against terrorism will be “long, hard and difficult.” Terrorists do not have armies, navies or air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.
- The U.S. will not rule out anything—including the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic, “cruise missile war.” The U.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when and where appropriate.
- Coalitions: “The mission must determine the coalition; coalitions must not determine missions”; missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.
- The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate; we recognize that to get maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than the U.S., to characterize how and in what ways they are assisting the overall effort.
- Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists—“you are either with us or against us.”
- The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they require putting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.
- Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task is bigger and broader than any one individual. We must root out the terrorist networks.
- Because Afghanistan is “anti-foreigner,” the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there to stay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future and assist with humanitarian assistance.
- The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMD capabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort against terrorism.
- September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish new relationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stability for decades to come.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
SD Memos/Current MFRs/Major Decisions

11-L-0559/OSD/10746

January 24, 2002

TO: SECDEF

FROM: TORIE CLARKE

SUBJECT: Decisions

CC: Wolfowitz
DiRita
Giambastiani
Feith

Issue

As Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz correctly points out, your previously produced guidelines (aka questions to ask when committing troops) and this decision paper form the blueprint of 21st century rules of the road for the U.S. military.

By committing them to paper and getting them out in the public dialogue, you can provide meaningful guideposts on the use of military force.

Recommendation

Get several days past the State of the Union, and then make a concerted and comprehensive effort to get the rules of the road widely disseminated. A communications plan might include the following for the SECDEF:

Sunday, February 10

800-word op-ed piece in major daily newspaper

Monday, February 11*

a.m.- Speech at the National Press Club

a.m.- Select calls to editorial boards

p.m.- Round robin interviews with major evening network news shows

p.m.- Lehrer News Hour

We would also use the Defend America speakers program as a force multiplier for your remarks by:

- Adding a section on the rules to stump speech for that week and beyond
- Conducting regional TV/radio

*5 month anniversary of 9/11

Additionally, we could get the remarks:

- Distributed as a "Dear Colleague" on Capital Hill and submitted in the Congressional Record
- Distributed to all U.S. military, active, Reserve, and Guard

Considerations

Consider asking the Armed Services Committees to have you testify on the rules of the road.

LAREN

12:32 PM

C 117

TO: ✓ Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke - distributed

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT:

1/7

Here's an email from Ambassador Eagleton who was the US Ambassador in Baghdad when I was there in the mid '80s. It certainly puts duress on a lot of these articles that are being sent around.

You might want to encourage him to do an op-ed piece.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.05

Attach: Email 12/3/02 from Amb. Eagleton

Please respond by: 12/24

TORIE -
I SPOKE WITH BILL
EAGLETON TODAY (1/2/03) - HE HAD
BEEN TRAVELLING IN THE CONGO.
HE WILL DO AN OP-ED. HE ASKS
THAT WE HELP GET IT PLACED.

Bill Lutz

U13192 /03

12/3
0930

Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD

From: Glassman, Jim, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 9:20 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Your report to Secretary Rumsfeld

Cathy: Ambassador Eagleton sent this to us for forwarding. v/r, JimGlassman

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SSGT, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Monday, December 02, 2002 11:34 PM
To: Glassman, Jim, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Subject: FW: Your report to Secretary Rumsfeld

FYA

-----Original Message-----

From: William Eagleton [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, December 02, 2002 3:04 PM
To: (b)(6) SSGT, OSD-POLICY
Subject: Re: Your report to Secretary Rumsfeld

Dear SSGT (b)(6)

Larry Di Rita
12/6

Please pass the following message to Secretary Rumsfeld from Eagleton:

Don:

We are in Morocco at this moment, but with CNN and the International Herald Tribune as well as a great output on email by the Kurdish Institute in Washington, we are trying to keep up with Iraqi developments. I have recently seen several media items from geniuses of hindsight suggesting that we should have done more about Iraqi use of chemical weapons in 1983-84 when you visited Baghdad. In the latest, by a Joost R: Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, he goes so far as to claim that US leadership at that time gave a green light to Iraqi use of chemical weapons.

My recollection of what we were doing at that time is that we, the Americans, were the only ones who were doing anything about Iraq's use of mustard gas and other chemical weapons. At the beginning we and the British were the only ones who had the ability to know what Saddam was up to although we let the Iraqis know that such use was not in their interest. Given their difficult military situation it did not seem likely that we could persuade them to give up the chemical option. Instead, our efforts were centered on trying to stop the supply of weapons and technical help by European sources, mainly German. In Baghdad I tried to sensitize diplomats from friendly countries to what was going on without much effect except in the case of the German Ambassador who did what he could through back channels to Bonn. The official German position at that time was that these were chemicals that anyone could buy off the shelf, though in fact German technicians were working with the Iraqis in setting up the insecticide plant facilities. Later the German Government did take some action against several of the German chemical companies.

Certainly no one in the US Government gave a green or even an amber light to the Iraqis on the use of chemicals. Yes, with hindsight we would like to have done more, but there was certainly no international pressure to raise the issue with the Iraqis. A number of my diplomatic colleagues

suggested it was okay to use chemical weapons defensively on your own territory.

I believe I am right in recalling that this was one of the issues that concerned you and us during your two visits to Baghdad. The Iraqis certainly never thought they had a green light from us and they did what they could to keep the use of chemicals secret. Another charge is that we sold conventional weapons to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. This, as you know, is entirely false. We held the line on weapons sales even though some of our best friends in the area were urging that we allow such sales.

Good luck with all that you are doing. Bill Eagleton

"Staples, Cori, SSGT, OSD-POLICY" <Cori.Staples@osd.mil> wrote:

Good Day Sir-

My name is SSgt Staples. I work in Bill Luti's office in the Pentagon. I am writing to ask for your mailing address. It is to be included in the package to the Secretary with your report.

Please let me know if there is anything I can help you with in the future.

Very Respectfully,

CORI A. E. STAPLES, SSgt, USAF
Administrative Secretary
OASD/ISA/NESA
2400 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC 20301-2400

(b)(6)

Do you Yahoo!?

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ACTION
JS 1/21
0953

January 21, 2002 6:08 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: PA&E

We have to get PA&E fixed, done and over soon—in the next two weeks.

Please get on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-46

020 PAE



Please respond by 02/04/02 1/28

21 Jan 02

U13193 /02

Action
1/22
1718

January 22, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Milton Bearden Piece

I don't know if you sent me this article by Bearden or not, but if you didn't, you should read it.

It is exactly the model that was proposed by the CIA at the outset of the Afghan war, and it is exactly the model that we rejected within a week and a half as being fundamentally defective. It is fascinating.

Afghanistan

Thanks.

Attach.

Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2001, Volume 80, No. 6

DHR:dh
012202-1

.....

Please respond by _____

22 Jan 02

U13194 /02

Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires

Milton Bearden

THE GREAT GAME

MICHNI POINT, Pakistan's last outpost at the western end of the barren, winding Khyber Pass, stands sentinel over Torkham Gate, the deceptively orderly border crossing into Afghanistan. Frontier Scouts in gray *shalwar kameezes* (traditional tunics and loose pants) and black berets patrol the lonely station commanded by a major of the legendary Khyber Rifles, the militia force that has been guarding the border with Afghanistan since the nineteenth century, first for British India and then for Pakistan. This spot, perhaps more than any other, has witnessed the traverse of the world's great armies on campaigns of conquest to and from South and Central Asia. All eventually ran into trouble in their encounters with the unruly Afghan tribals.

Alexander the Great sent his supply trains through the Khyber, then skirted northward with his army to the Konar Valley on his campaign in 327 BC. There he ran into fierce resistance and, struck by an Afghan archer's arrow, barely made it to the Indus River with his life. Genghis Khan and the great Mughal emperors began passing through the Khyber a millennium later and ultimately established the greatest of empires—but only after reaching painful accommodations with the Afghans. From Michni Point, a trained eye can still see the ruins of the Mughal signal towers used to relay complex torch-light messages 1,500 miles from Calcutta to Bukhara in less than an hour.

MILTON BEARDEN served as CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989, where he was responsible for that agency's covert action program in support of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet-supported government.

[17]

Milton Bearden

In the nineteenth century the Khyber became the fulcrum of the Great Game, the contest between the United Kingdom and Russia for control of Central Asia and India. The first Afghan War (1839-42) began when British commanders sent a huge army of British and Indian troops into Afghanistan to secure it against Russian incursions, replacing the ruling emir with a British protégé. Facing Afghan opposition, by January 1842 the British were forced to withdraw from Kabul with a column of 16,500 soldiers and civilians, heading east to the garrison at Jalalabad, 110 miles away. Only a single survivor of that group ever made it to Jalalabad safely, though the British forces did recover some prisoners many months later.

According to the late Louis Dupree, the premier historian of Afghanistan, four factors contributed to the British disaster: the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, the placing of an unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-supported Afghans against their local enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by British political agents. The British would repeat these mistakes in the second Afghan War (1878-81), as would the Soviets a century later; the United States would be wise to consider them today.

In the aftermath of the second British misadventure in Afghanistan, Rudyard Kipling penned his immortal lines on the role of the local women in tidying up the battlefields:

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains
And the women come out to cut up what remains
Jest roll to your rifle an' blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.

The British fought yet a third war with Afghanistan in 1917, an encounter that neither burnished British martial history nor subdued the Afghan people. But by the end of World War I, that phase of the Great Game was over. During World War II, Afghanistan flirted with Aryanism and the Third Reich, becoming, fleetingly, "the Switzerland" of Central Asia in a new game of intrigue as Allied and Axis coalitions jockeyed for position in the region. But after the war the country settled back into its natural state of ethnic and factional squabbling. The Soviet Union joined in from the sidelines, but Afghanistan was so



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Not much left to lose: Outside Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2, 2001

remote from the consciousness of the West that scant attention was paid to it until the last king, Zahir Shah, was deposed in 1973. Then began the cycle of conflict that continues to the present.

RUSSIAN ROULETTE

AFGHANISTAN FESTERED through the 1970s, but with the seizure of power in Kabul by Nur Mohammed Taraki in 1978, the country began a rapid spiral into anarchy. Washington's ambassador in Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped in February 1979 and later killed during a failed rescue attempt; the next month, Hafizullah Amin seized the prime ministership along with much of Taraki's power; and eight months later, on Christmas Eve, after watching the disintegration of order for much of a decade, the Kremlin decided to try its hand at military adventure.

The Soviets began with a modern repetition of the fatal British error of installing an unpopular "emir" on the Afghan "throne." The operation was marked by a brutal efficiency: Hafizullah Amin was killed under mysterious circumstances, Kabul was secured, and the Soviets put their man, Babrak Karmal, at the helm of the Afghan government. It looked initially as if the Soviets' optimistic prediction that they would be in and out of Afghanistan almost before anyone

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noticed might prove correct. Certainly, President Jimmy Carter was too preoccupied with the hostage crisis in Iran to give much thought to Afghanistan, or so the Kremlin believed.

To Moscow's surprise, however, Carter reacted quickly and decisively. He cancelled a number of pending agreements with the Soviet Union, ranging from wheat sales to consular exchanges; he set in motion the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics; and, much more quietly and decisively, he signed a presidential finding that tasked the CIA with the organization of aid, including arms and military support, to the Afghan people in their resistance to the Soviet occupation. In January 1980, Carter sent his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, for consultations with Pakistani leaders who were already supporting the Afghan resistance. On a side trip from Islamabad, Brzezinski traveled the length of the Khyber Pass to the outpost at Michni Point, where he was photographed squinting along the sights of a Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, its muzzle elevated and pointing into Afghanistan. In that moment, the president's national security adviser became the symbol of the impending U.S. phase of involvement in Afghanistan's endless martial history.

The CIA had to scramble to comply with the president's order. But within weeks it had organized its first weapons delivery—a shipment of several thousand venerable Enfield .303 rifles, the standard weapon of the Afghan tribals—to the resistance fighters who were already beginning to snipe at the Soviet invaders. During the 1980s, the agency would deliver several hundred thousand tons of weapons and ordnance to Pakistan for distribution to the Afghan fighters known to the world as mujahideen, the soldiers of God. The coalition of countries supporting the resistance grew to an impressive collection that included the United States, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China. Lining up behind seven separate and fractious Afghan resistance leaders based in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, the mujahideen field commanders were allotted their supplies and sent off to face the Soviet forces.

For the first five years of its covert war, the CIA attempted to maintain plausible deniability. Its officers in Pakistan kept a low profile, and the weapons it supplied to the mujahideen, with the exception of the British Enfields, were models manufactured in Warsaw Pact countries.

Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires

An additional advantage of using Soviet bloc weapons was that the mujahideen could use any ammunition they could capture from army garrisons of the puppet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan—or buy, with American dollars, from corrupt DRA quartermasters or even Red Army supply officers.

By 1985, the Soviet 40th Army had grown from its original, limited expeditionary force to an occupation force of around 120,000 troops, widely dispersed at garrisons around the country. But as the Soviet forces grew, so did the Afghan resistance. By the mid-1980s the mujahideen had more than 250,000 full- or part-time fighters in the field, and though they and the civilian population had suffered horrendous losses—a million dead and 1.5 million injured, plus 6 million more driven into internal and external exile—the Soviet forces were also beginning to suffer.

As the CIA became more deeply involved in its covert proxy war with the Soviet Union, it became clear to President Ronald Reagan's new CIA director, William Casey, that the conflict had stalemated. The United States was fighting the Soviets to the last Afghan in a confrontation that could run on indefinitely. By 1985 Soviet air tactics had been refined, and the mujahideen suffered increasing casualties from the growing Soviet fleet of heavily armored MI-24D attack helicopters. The Afghans had nothing in their arsenal adequate to defend against this equipment and so, after a heated debate and heavy pressure from Congress, the White House decided to provide them with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The Stingers entered the war a month after Mikhail Gorbachev's seminal August 1986 speech in Vladivostok, where he described the conflict, now in its seventh year, as a "bleeding wound." U.S. intelligence at the time, however, indicated that as he uttered those first words of disengagement, he also gave his generals one year to bring the Afghans under control, using whatever force necessary. Three months earlier the Soviets had replaced the failing Babrak Karmal with the brutal, sadistic secret-police chief Mohammed Najibullah, a move that only stiffened mujahideen resistance and set the scene for the endgame of the Soviets' Afghan adventure.

When the fighting stalemated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Washington upped the ante.

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Two events in the late summer of 1986 changed the course of the war. On August 20 a lucky shot by the mujahideen sent a 107 mm rocket into a DRA supply dump on the outskirts of Kabul, setting off secondary explosions that destroyed tens of thousands of tons of ordnance, lighting up the skies of the Afghan capital by night and smoldering during the day. A month later, on September 26, a team led by a resistance commander with the unlikely name of Ghaffar ("the forgiver," one of the 99 names of Allah) brought down three MI-24 helicopters in the first Stinger ambush of the war. The effect of these events on the mujahideen was electric, and within days the setbacks for the Soviet forces were snowballing, with one or two aircraft per day falling from the skies at the end of the Stingers' telltale white plumes.

When the snows melted in the high passes for the new fighting season of 1987, diplomatic activity intensified, with the United States represented by the exceptionally able Michael Armacost, the under-secretary of state for political affairs. It had become clear not only to Gorbachev and his negotiators but also to his generals in the field that there would be no letup in Afghanistan, and that the time to consider disengagement had come. On April 24, 1988, after agonized negotiations over such tortured concepts as "negative symmetry" in drawing down supplies to the combatants, the Geneva Accords ending Soviet involvement in Afghanistan were signed. The date for the final withdrawal of all Soviet forces was set at February 15, 1989, a timetable that the commander of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, General Boris Gromov, choreographed to the last moment of the last day. February 15 also marked the end of outside military support to both sides in the war, at least in theory.

Gromov wanted arrangements to be just right. The international press was shuttled from nearby Termez, Uzbekistan, to a special press center, complete with a new, covered pavilion. The body of a hapless minesweeper had been quietly carried across the Friendship Bridge before the press had time to reason that his blanket-wrapped form was the last Russian soldier killed in the ten-year war. The cameras of several dozen news services zoomed in on the center of the bridge, where a lone Soviet tank had pulled to a halt. The diminutive Soviet general jumped from the turret, pulled his battle-dress tunic into place, and strode purposely over the last hundred yards toward the Soviet side

Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires

EB

of the Amu Dar'ya. Just before he reached the end of the bridge, his son Maksim, a slim, awkward 14-year-old, greeted his father with a stiff embrace and presented him with a bouquet of red carnations. Son and father marched the last 50 yards out of Afghanistan together.

ARABIAN KNIGHTS

IN TEN YEARS OF WAR, the Soviet Union admitted to having had about 15,000 troops killed in action, several hundred thousand wounded, and tens of thousands dead from disease. The true numbers might be higher, but they are not worth debating. What followed Gromov's exit grew rapidly into a cataclysm for the Soviets and a national disaster for the Afghans.

The first signs came in May 1989, when an already emboldened Hungarian government correctly concluded it could open its border with Austria without fear of Soviet intervention. That signal act was followed a month later by the stunning election of a Solidarity majority in Poland's parliament, ending that country's nearly half-century of communist rule. Throughout the summer of 1989, the people of East Germany took to the streets, first in small numbers, then gaining strength and courage in the tens and hundreds of thousands until, on the night of November 9, 1989, in a comedy of errors and miscues, the Berlin Wall was breached and Germans surged from east to west. The world had hardly digested these events when Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel and his band of dissidents from the Magic Lantern theater carried out their own Velvet Revolution a month later.

With the world's eyes focused almost exclusively on the historic events in Eastern Europe, or on the vivid image of a young demonstrator staring down a Chinese tank in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, the drama unfolding in Afghanistan received scant attention. Though there were heroic efforts by relief agencies to provide humanitarian aid, the senior officials of President George H.W. Bush's administration did not look back to that former war zone, their energies instead consumed by the stunning denouement of the Cold War.

In the turn away from Afghanistan, the United States would dismiss even its staunch ally, Pakistan. No longer able to stave off congressionally mandated sanctions triggered by its nuclear weapons

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development program, Pakistan fell out of Washington's favor. As the 1990s began with great hope elsewhere in the world, in Afghanistan a new post-Cold War construct started taking shape: the failed state. And as it failed and spun into anarchy, Afghanistan became the home of a new and little understood threat: the aggrieved Arab extremist.

The role of the so-called Afghan Arabs in the ten-year war against the Soviet occupation is the subject of much debate and misinformed commentary. By early 1980, the call to jihad (holy war) had reached all corners of the Islamic world, attracting Arabs young and old and with a variety of motivations to travel to Pakistan to take up arms and cross the border to fight against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan.

In the 1980s, Osama bin Ladin and the United States were fighting on the same side — against the Soviets.

There were genuine volunteers on missions of humanitarian value, there were adventure seekers looking for paths to glory, and there were psychopaths. As the war dragged on, a number of Arab states discreetly emptied their prisons of homegrown troublemakers and sent them off to the jihad with the fervent hope that they might not return. Over the ten years of war as many as 25,000 Arabs may have passed through Pakistan and Afghanistan. At one time the CIA considered having volunteer Arab legions take part in the war, but the idea was scrapped as unwise and unworkable. Despite what has often been written, the CIA never recruited, trained, or otherwise used the Arab volunteers who arrived in Pakistan. The idea that the Afghans somehow needed fighters from outside their culture was deeply flawed and ignored basic historical and cultural facts. The Arabs who did travel to Afghanistan from Peshawar were generally considered nuisances by mujahideen commanders, some of whom viewed them as only slightly less bothersome than the Soviets. As fundraisers, however, the Arabs from the Persian Gulf played a positive, often critical role in the background of the war. During some months in 1987 and 1988, Arab fundraisers in both Pakistan and their home countries raised as much as \$25 million for their largely humanitarian and construction projects. Among the more prominent of these Arab fundraisers was one Osama bin Ladin, the son of a Saudi billionaire.



Active in Afghanistan since the early 1980s, having previously worked in the Persian Gulf to recruit Arabs for the jihad, bin Ladin focused his early energies on construction projects, building orphanages and homes for widows as well as roads and bunker systems in eastern Afghanistan. He and a few of his Saudi followers saw some combat in 1987, while associated with the Islamic Unity Party of Abdul Rasul Sayaf, an Egyptian-trained Afghan member of the Muslim Brotherhood who later in the jihad embraced Saudi Wahhabism. At the crucial battles of Jaji and Ali Khel, Sayaf and his Saudis acquitted themselves well by stopping a Soviet and DRA advance that could have resulted in large-scale destruction of mujahideen supply dumps and staging areas in the province of Paktia. More than two dozen Saudis died in those engagements, and the military legend of Osama bin Ladin was born.

But at this point in the war, few were concerned about the role of the Afghan Arabs, with the exception of growing criticism by Western

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humanitarian organizations of the harsh fundamentalism of the Saudi Wahhabis and Deobandis whose influence in the refugee camps in Pakistan, now bursting with about three million Afghans, was pervasive. It was in these squalid camps that a generation of young Afghan males would be born into and raised in the strictest fundamentalism of the Deobandi *madrassas* (Islamic schools). It was here that the seeds of the Taliban were sown.

COME, MR. TALIBAN

THOUGH the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, it was not until April 1992 that the mujahideen finally took Kabul, killed Najibullah, and declared what passed for victory. Their triumph would be short-lived. Old hatreds and ethnic realities once again drove events, and without the unifying presence of foreign armies on Afghan soil, the state of Afghanistan simply fell apart. The civil war resumed with horrendous brutality until the population was ready for any path to peace, and soon one presented itself.

Rising almost mystically from the sheer chaos, the Taliban (derived from a Persian word meaning Islamic students or seekers), began to form under the leadership of a one-eyed cleric from Oruzgan province in central Afghanistan, who the world would come to know as Mullah Mohammad Omar. More as a result of timing than of military might, they swept through the Pashtun world of eastern Afghanistan, a welcome relief from the brigands controlling the valleys and mountain passes. By 1996 the Taliban had seized Kabul, and the Afghan people seemed to accept their deliverance. The West fleetingly saw the Taliban as the source of a new order and a possible tool in yet another replay of the Great Game—the race for the energy riches of Central Asia. U.S. and foreign oil firms were looking for ways to pipe the vast natural-gas reserves of Turkmenistan to energy-starved markets in Pakistan. By 1996, most of the route of the proposed pipeline was loosely under Taliban control, and the match of politics, power, and energy seemed attractive. But the optimism was short-lived. In 1997, plans for the Afghan pipeline were shelved and the country began an even sharper downward spiral, as the Taliban overreached in their quest to take control of the country. Their atrocious

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human rights record and treatment of women drew international scorn, and with the exception of diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan, Afghanistan was in total isolation. Its failure as a state of any recognizable form was now complete.

Against this backdrop, the Afghan Arab troublemakers began to drift back to Afghanistan. Many of them, including Osama bin Ladin, had left Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat, full of determination to bring about radical societal change in their home countries. All failed, and many began roaming among the few remaining states in the world that served as safe havens for their kind, mostly behind the Iron Curtain. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the would-be terrorists of the world fell on hard times. They lost their playgrounds in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and even the redoubtable Carlos pitched up in Khartoum—where, coincidentally, bin Ladin had also settled after a failed attempt to bring about change in his Saudi homeland. Bin Ladin engaged in a number of agricultural, construction, and business ventures, but most of his consciousness was consumed by a brooding hatred of the United States. This passion grew during the Gulf War, and five years later, with U.S. troops still stationed in Saudi Arabia, bin Ladin's rage found its final form. It would be the United States against which he would concentrate all of his energies.

By 1995, however, bin Ladin's presence in Sudan had become an issue both for the United States and for Saudi Arabia, which by this time had stripped bin Ladin of his Saudi citizenship. The Sudanese were quietly told that bin Ladin was a major obstacle to improved relations, and that Khartoum would be wise to ask him to leave. Sudan had already begun ridding itself of undesirables. In a dramatic setup, Carlos, stretched out on a Khartoum hospital operating table having a vasectomy reversed, was abruptly bundled up by French security officers and spirited off to Paris to stand trial for earlier crimes. According to a PBS *Frontline* television interview with Sudanese President Umar Hassan al-Bashir, the Sudanese government offered to keep bin Ladin on a tight leash, or even hand him over to the Saudis or the Americans. The Saudis reportedly declined the offer, for fear his presence would only cause more trouble in the royal

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kingdom, and the United States reportedly passed because it had no indictable complaints against bin Ladin at the time. In 1996, then, on U.S. and Saudi instructions, bin Ladin was expelled from Sudan, and he moved to the last stop on the terror line, Afghanistan.

Still relatively unknown to the public, bin Ladin came into view through a CNN interview in 1997, when he claimed that his disciples had been behind the killing of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in 1993. The next year he issued a *fatwa*, an Islamic decree, of questionable authenticity, calling for all-out war against all Americans. But it was in August 1998 that he was indelibly etched into the world's consciousness, when terrorists thought to have links to his Al Qaeda organization struck simultaneously at American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 persons, including 12 Americans, and wounding 5,000. The U.S. response was quick but futile—75 cruise missiles were launched at bin Ladin's training camps in Afghanistan and at a pharmaceutical factory suspected of producing precursors for chemical weapons in Sudan. Bin Ladin escaped unharmed, and the attack on the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory remains a smoldering controversy to this day.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

SINCE 1998, the hunt for bin Ladin has been the driving force behind U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. Though the Taliban have repeatedly claimed that the Saudi has been under their control and incapable of fomenting the various attacks with which he is charged—including that against the U.S.S. *Cole* in Aden and those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—the U.S. government has little doubt that bin Ladin is the culprit. The confrontation with him and those who shelter him is at the point of no return.

It probably could not be otherwise, but how this first engagement in the new U.S. war on terrorism is conducted will be crucial to all that follows. The coalition being carefully constructed will function differently from that built for the Gulf War a decade ago. The bulk of the military tasks in that brief war against Iraq were intended from the outset to be carried out by the Americans, the British, and the French. The participation of the Arab states was not crucial to the

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202

Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires

fighting, though it was crucial to the U.S. ability to operate from bases near Iraq. In this new conflict, the roles will, in many ways, be reversed. The coalition partners from the Arab and Islamic states will have specific, front-line operational roles. They will serve as force multipliers for the usual alliance of American and European intelligence and security services and special operations forces. If the terror network is to be dismantled, it will be with help from the security services of Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and a few others, not from the exclusive efforts of the United States or its European allies.

So the tale ends where it began, at Michni Point. As the Bush administration balances its military and political goals, plans to send U.S. troops into Afghanistan to seize bin Ladin should be weighed carefully for their practicality and political implications. Strident calls to add the overthrow of the Taliban regime to the list of American objectives may be attractive in terms of human rights, but that objective, too, must be weighed against the goal of making certain that the events of September 11 are not repeated.

Some have called for arming and forming an alliance with Afghanistan's now-leaderless Northern Alliance. This grouping of commanders, meticulously pulled together in shifting alliances by the late Ahmed Shah Masoud, now holds about ten percent of Afghan territory. Already the recipient of military and financial support from Russia and Iran, it seems a logical partner in the U.S. quest to locate and neutralize the bin Ladin network and replace the Taliban regime.

But that is not a wise course—not simply because of the cold irony of allying ourselves with the Russians in any fight in Afghanistan, but because it is not likely to achieve either goal. It is more than doubtful that the Northern Alliance forces could capture bin Ladin and his followers, and there is no reasonable guarantee that they could dislodge the Taliban. On the contrary, the more likely consequences of a U.S. alliance with the late Masoud's fighters would be the coalescing of Afghanistan's majority Pashtun tribes around their Taliban leaders and the rekindling of a brutal, general civil war that would continue until the United States simply gave up. The dominant tribe in Afghanistan, which also happens to be the largest, will dominate; replacing the Pashtun Taliban with the largely Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance is close to impossible. The threat of providing

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covert assistance to the Northern Alliance might be a useful short-term strategy to pressure the Taliban, if it is handled delicately, but any real military alliance to Masoud's successors will backfire.

The administration would do better to try to draw off segments of the Pashtun population only loosely allied with the Taliban regime. Those Pashtuns who signed on with the Taliban over the last five years did so because the Taliban seemed at the time to offer a fair chance for peace after decades of indescribably brutal war. They did not sign on to fight the United States, whose military might many of them will recall from the struggle against the Soviet occupation. The administration seems to realize this, and it is now moving quietly, gathering resources in the land of the Pashtun.

If anyone is to replace an emir in Afghanistan, it will have to be the people of Afghanistan themselves. Any doubters should ask the British and the Russians. ②

ACTION
OS 1/24
1004

January 23, 2002 7:47 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{D.}
SUBJECT: Photos of Walker

I notice they are reporting that we would not allow pictures of Walker.

If that is the case, we ought to know why and tell the press why. I think it is the Geneva Convention. Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012302-3

Please respond by

01/25/02

383.6

23 Jan 02

U13195 /02

Action
45 1/26
1004

January 24, 2002 2:06 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Cells at GTMO

Please screw your head into the numbers and see if we really need 408 cells at GTMO.

Thanks.

383.6

DHR:dh
012402-11



Please respond by 01/28/02

24 Jan 02

U13196 /02

Action
ds 1/24
1740

January 24, 2002 8:39 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photographs

I want to stop all photographs that we can control of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until I see them. I keep seeing these images on television that are just terrible. Why in the world did we turn them loose?

383.6

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012402-7

.....
Please respond by 01/25/02

24 Jan 02

U13197 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10770

Action
JS 1124
1754

January 24, 2002 8:17 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: DOV ZAKHEIM
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Scorecards

Here is an article from *U.S. News & World Report* about keeping score on departments and agencies. I have never been given a scorecard, have you?

Let's get it.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/28/02 *U.S. News & World Report*, p. 2

DHR:dh
012402-2

.....
Please respond by 01/30/02

000.5

24 Jan 02

U13198 /02

Washington Whispers

BY PAUL BEDARD

Aggressive war on terror steps on State's 'diplo-toes'

You won't find anger and retaliation anywhere in the State Department handbook, a how-to on building, not burning, bridges. But since September 11, diplomats have been asked to stomp their feet, and many don't like it. In fact, administration officials say State is downright upset at moves by the antiterror team to 1D countries that aren't playing ball. "They don't want us to single out anybody," gripes an official. It all started when the Treasury-CIA-FBI-State team tracking Osama bin Laden's millions let slip that only 19 nations were helping. While it prompted over 120 others to hastily jump on board, State was mad that it embarrassed those left off. "They're still furious." And now State is fighting suggestions to publicize the few remaining countries that just won't help the war on terror funding. "We pick a country and State says they're helping," says one insider. Well, the White House wants proof. "We want more than some talk from an embassy guy." Who'll win the tug of war? Consider: When the war council briefs President Bush, his first question is always: "How are we doing on the money?"

Is Iran next?

The flicker of reconciliation with Iran may just have gone out. Washington is alarmed by intelligence reports that Iran is again supporting extremist Islamic groups in Afghanistan, training about 1,300 fighters who call themselves the "Soldiers of Mohammed." There's also its 50-ton shipment of weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. "Iran needs to consider the consequences of going this route," threatens a senior U.S. official. "They have to look at what happened in Afghanistan."

The next Sadat

Four months into this antiterrorism war, the Bush administration has become so impressed with new friend **Pervaz Musharraf**, Pakistan's president, that he's viewed as the new **Anwar Sadat**, Egypt's legendary peacemaker. No one thinks more highly of the Army general than Secretary of State **Colin Powell**. "They deal with

each other general to general, very straightforward," says a senior State Department aide.

Senator Squash

When Pennsylvania Republican Sen. **Arlen Specter** headed to South America for his winter junket, most thought he was simply seeking warmer climes. Silly, silly. What Specter asked for most on his trip wasn't a chaise longue but a squash game, especially since he had to stop playing while on an anthrax antibiotic. Take his stop in Chile. Besides the trifling details like meeting with the nation's leaders, he demanded a squash match every day from his American tour guides. They did it right, hooking Specter up with the father of the Chilean national squash champion. Even local TV covered the match, split by the two.

Texas treatment

About our recent item that the White House doesn't buy



used to be a baseball bigwig, so it's not surprising that **President Bush** carries score cards in his pockets. But they don't chart his fantasy ball team. The "Executive Branch Management Scorecard" rates his government lineup. "You'll be in this meeting and he'll whip out these score cards," says an aide. "They rate agencies and programs—effective or not." Yes, there's finally an M.B.A. in the Oval Office who, with his budget consigliere **Mitch Daniels**, is bringing a corporate approach to the 2003 budget. Gone: mumbo-


jumbo budget books. In: grades on key program elements, a first. "If you're not keeping score, you're just practicing," says **Daniels**. We've heard it before. Remember **Al Gore**'s reinventing government? "Well, we're doing it," brags a Bush aide. "We're doing the old **Ross Perot** look under the hood; see what works and streamline what doesn't." Which means **Mitch** the budget mechanic is on 24-7 duty. "I'm not seeing any movies, I'm not reading any books." But he still works out, bench pressing his weight. "It's routine maintenance."

January 25, 2002 12:01 PM

000.1

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Honorable Karen Hughes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Invitation to Mrs. Renae Chapman to State of the Union Address

Mrs. Renae Chapman, the widow of SFC Nathan Chapman, U.S. Army would be a good candidate for the House of Representatives gallery during the President's State of the Union Address. Not only was her husband an exemplary soldier, but the way she has presented herself since his death demonstrates tremendous strength of spirit and patriotism.

Sergeant Chapman was the first U.S. soldier to be killed by hostile fire in Afghanistan. He was a dedicated professional who served in combat missions during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and Haiti. His Special Forces Commander, Colonel David Fridovich, described him as a "stellar example of the Special Forces ethos."

Born at Andrews Air Force Base, he comes from a solid military family. His father was an Air Force officer, and his grandfather saw military service during the Berlin Airlift.

Mrs. Chapman's public comments have been most poignant. When asked what she wanted Sergeant Chapman's legacy to be, she said, "I want them to remember him as a quiet professional who just wanted to change the world."

She said of her husband, "Nate loved being in the Army, and he loved serving people. He believed what he was doing was right. He believed in this mission." At SFC Chapman's funeral, their young son was dressed in the uniform of a Special Forces soldier, including the Green Beret.

DHR:dh
012502-2

25 JAN 2002

U13199 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10773

January 26, 2002 2:39 PM

*Done 1/27/02
1435*

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: NSS

Please ask Steve Hadley if there is ever going to be a national security strategy.

Thanks.

381

DHR:dh
012602-26

.....
Please respond by 01/30/02

1/23

SECRET -

I met with Steve in late December to discuss the state of the Union speech. He said the thinking at that time was that some short time (within weeks) of transmitting the budget and you testifying on the Defense budget, Condi was

26 Jan 02

U13201 /02

11-L-0559/OSE/10774

looking to smooth out and complete security strategy. We will

1
snowflake

INFO
1/29
1445

January 26, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Admiral Natter

370

How do you like this article where Admiral Natter says, "I have been adamant about telling the Kennedy crew and the people up north in Washington that there is no date being laid on them to deploy." Then in the next paragraph he says, "I don't care who whines about it."

I don't find that impressive.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/25/02 Dorsey, *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*, "Ship Won't Go Until It's Ready, Says Admiral Natter"

DHR:dh
012602-29

.....

Please respond by _____

26 Jan 02

U13202 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10775

sonnel they need to write with more clarity.

Pentagon sources tell us Mr. Rumsfeld prefers simple, declarative sentences in tightly written policy memos. But he often receives bureaucratic-style memos crammed with the military's favorite vernacular — acronyms.

"They want to see things written clearly," said one source, referring to Mr. Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. He described both men as speed readers who devour a large number of reports and memos each day.

A typical senior military officer attends a variety of schools on the way to the top. But few, if any, classes deal with William Strunk Jr.'s classic writer's guide, "The Elements of Style."

Washington Post
January 25, 2002
Pg. 2

18. Corrections

A Jan. 24 article inaccurately quoted Michael Chandler, a U.N. sanctions monitor, as saying the Taliban possessed 100 Scud missiles and four mobile Scud launchers before it fell from power. Chandler said the weapons were in Afghanistan but that the United Nations has not determined whether they were under the control of the Taliban or other armed groups.

A Jan. 24 article about the detainees being held at a U.S. Navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, incorrectly said the Navy had released recent photographs showing blindfolded and manacled detainees on their knees. The Office of the Secretary of Defense released the photos.

Editor's Note: The articles referred to appeared in yesterday's Current News Early Bird.

USA Today
January 25, 2002
Pg. 2

19. Missile-Defense Test To Be Launched At Sea

The Navy will join the military's efforts to develop a national missile-defense sys-

tem with a test tonight of a short-range missile interceptor.

The USS Lake Erie will attempt to track the dummy warhead after it is launched from Kauai, Hawaii, 300 miles away. If all goes well, the missile, which is similar to the one designed for a land-based defense system, will collide with the target in space.

Officials say the test won't violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty against sea-based defenses. But it does represent a first step in developing such a capability once the United States withdraws from the treaty this summer.

— Andrea Stone

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
January 25, 2002

20. Ship Won't Go Until It's Ready, Says Adm. Natter

By Jack Dorsey, The Virginian-Pilot

NORFOLK -- The Atlantic Fleet commander, after visiting the problem-plagued carrier Kennedy on Wednesday night, said he won't order the ship to sea until it's ready.

"I have been adamant about telling (the Kennedy crew) and the people up north in Washington that there is no date being laid on them" to deploy, Adm. Robert J. Natter said Thursday from his Norfolk headquarters.

"I want the ship fixed. I want it and the crew ready to safely operate the ship, and they are not deploying until that happens -- and I don't care who whines about it."

Natter did not say who, specifically, he was talking about.

The Kennedy, which has been delayed in leaving its Mayport, Fla., base after failing a major maintenance inspection in December, is undergoing around-the-clock, emergency repairs before deployment in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Norfolk-based carrier Theodore Roosevelt, which the Kennedy is to replace, cannot leave the Persian Gulf region until the Kennedy arrives. It was expected home March 19.

Navy officials have refused to say how much longer

the Roosevelt's return to Norfolk will be delayed.

"I know that's hard on 'TR,' but I would predict that its deployment, when all is said and done, will not be any longer than Kennedy's deployment," Natter said.

While the Navy has worked hard to keep carrier battle group deployments to no longer than six months during peacetime, the war footing it has operated in since Sept. 11 has forced changes.

For example, the carrier Enterprise was 16 days late returning home when it was relieved by the TR. Enterprise was scheduled to return home Oct. 25 but didn't arrive until Nov. 10.

The Kennedy's schedule was originally advanced by a month, to mid-January, until the unexpected repairs delayed it. Some officials said they believe the Kennedy will get under way about Feb. 1.

Natter said he is generally pleased with the progress being made on fixing the Kennedy.

Wednesday, he visited all the engineering spaces and talked to the engineers and the ship's commanding officer.

Natter said, "I think they are doing better" with respect to work being conducted on the ship's propulsion plant, including some of its eight boilers.

"They've still got a lot of work to do down there," he said. "My impressions are positive with respect to the morale and the progress they are making and the dedication they have."

Earlier this week, Natter visited the carrier Constellation in San Diego. That ship is nearly identical to the Kennedy, albeit 40 years old compared to the 33-year-old Kennedy.

The Constellation just completed an overhaul and is in better shape than the Kennedy after spending "a whole bunch of money on it," he said. "But that's what it takes," he said, without indicating how much.

Natter again acknowledged that many of the Kennedy's maintenance problems were deeply rooted in underfunded Navy maintenance

budgets during the past several years. The Kennedy received only half of the planned \$650 million Service Life Extension Program overhaul it had anticipated between 1993-96. That came just when the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, where it was being repaired, closed.

Then the ailing carrier became part of the Reserve Force, during which it was to be used only for training. Most recently, a mini-overhaul was cut short after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

"What exacerbated Kennedy's problem was that we had some standards not being adhered to," Natter said.

The reality, he said, was that Navy officials were "not made aware" of the equipment failures. The commanding officer, the engineer and others "had not maintained the standards," he added.

Natter endorsed the firing of the former Kennedy commanding officer, Capt. Maurice Joyce, in whom the Navy said it had lost confidence because of the maintenance issues uncovered in the December inspection. He added that some equipment repairs and maintenance requirements that the ship's crew should have been doing just were not done.

"The quote that strikes in my head, from the engineer on Constellation yesterday, as they were lighting off their plant . . . is that if you don't stay after these valves and steam lines and fuel lines in these steam plants daily, if you go for six months, then you can't get out" to sea.

New York Times
January 25, 2002

News Analysis

21. Reprieve For The Pentagon Budget

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — As a candidate for president, George W. Bush promised to force the Pentagon to make "hard choices" in its weapons programs, to replace the lumbering ships, tanks and helicopters of today with the lighter, faster, higher-tech equipment of tomorrow.

But in asking Congress for a \$48 billion increase in mili-

Acknow
1/29
1430

January 26, 2002 2:31 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: End-Strength Increases

326.2

David, I am very unlikely to approve end-strength increases. Please, as you manage this problem, do not get people anticipating that is going to happen. I don't believe it will.

I think if we are going to add new things, we should stop doing other things. We need to put pressure on ourselves to get out of places like the Sinai and Bosnia and out of duties like airport security, and do the things we are supposed to be doing. We need to reduce the number of detailees and do more warfighting.

If you see this thing starting to slip away, please let me know and I will get into it with both feet.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-24

.....

Please respond by 02/11/03

26 Jan 02

January 26, 2002 2:23 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Pete Aldridge
Gordon England
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Study of Navy Ship Size

Done
1/29
0730 05

560

I asked to have study done of Navy ship size during the Quadrennial Defense Review. I have not heard a word back.

What has happened? Where is it, when is it due and who is doing it? If whoever was supposed to be doing it hasn't done it, let's take it out of their hands and get it to somebody who will do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-23

.....
Please respond by 02/04/02

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

1/28

SECDEF-

SUMMARY OF ATEL
STUDY IS ATTACHED.
WE CAN GET PETE
A. TO BRIEF YOU
DURING TEST PREP

26 Jan 02

U13204 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10778
1/12 2/17

Y/28

September 21, 2001

To: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Pete Aldridge

Subject: Navy Shipbuilding Study

We have completed the Navy Shipbuilding Study. It has been forwarded to the QDR Team for incorporation into that effort.

This effort was much different from the shipbuilding study we did for the President in 1976 and 1977. Then we had a specific threat and we could determine how many ships we needed to win a war at sea. Recall, that study resulted in the "600 Ship Navy".

Today, we have no real threat to our naval superiority. Hence, the size of the Navy is determined more by "presence" requirements. We examined three different sizes of the Navy to determine what capabilities they would provide:

260 Ship Navy. This is where we will be in about 2025 if we keep the shipbuilding rate at the current FYDP average of 7 ships per year. We would keep 12 carriers for presence, but would reduce 16 attack submarines, one Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 18 surface combatants, 4 amphibious ships, 3 mine warfare ships and 13 support ships. We would not convert the Trident to SSGNs and there would be no capability to incorporate ballistic missile defense into the Navy. The cost to achieve this size Navy will be a total \$10 billion per year in the FYDP. There would be an industrial base problem with this option.

316 Ship Navy. This is the current size of the Navy. To sustain the current size will require an additional \$2 billion per year in the FYDP, and \$14 billion per year beyond the FYDP. This option would convert 2 Tridents to SSGNs, with options to increase the number to four.

340 Ship Navy. This option is closer to meeting our requirements. It maintains 12 carriers, establishes three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), adds one ARG, and adds 18 more surface combatants to support Theater Missile Defense. This option adds 5 more attack submarines to reach the desired level of 60 SSNs and converts 4 Tridents to SSGNs. Within this option we should consider further increasing the size of the Navy by smaller, faster, and more lethal ships, but the specifics need more study. This option would cost about \$16 billion per year.

Based on this study it would seem that our goal should be a "340 Ship Navy".

For information only.

11-L-0559/OSD/10779

showfile

Action
1/29
1435

January 26, 2002 2:37 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Returning Nationals

383.6

Looking at this list, my instinct would be to give nationals back to the following countries:

Australia, Bahrain, France, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Sweden, Tajikistan, possibly Tunisia, UAE, UK, Belgium, and Uzbekistan.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/22/02 Speer e-mail re: Detainee Nationalities

DHR:dh
012602-25

.....

Please respond by 01/31/02

26 Jan 02

U13205 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10780

Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD

From: Speer, Gary, MG (H) [SpeerG@hq.southcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2002 4:09 AM
To: 'Giambastiani, E VADM (E-mail)'
Subject: FW: DETAINEE NATIONALITIES

SECDEF HAS

JAN 26 2002

G/22

AT GTMO

> Below is the detainee rollup by nationality:

- >
- > 13 Afghanistan
- > 8 Algeria
- > 1 Australia
- > 1 Azerbaijan
- > 3 Bahrain
- > 2 Bangladesh
- > 2 France
- > 1 Kuwait
- > 3 Morocco
- > 26 Pakistan—
- > 1 Palestine
- > 2 Russia
- > 48 Saudi Arabia—
- > 2 Sudan
- > 1 Sweden
- > 3 Tajikistan
- > 1 Tanzania
- > 1 Tunisia
- > 1 Turkmenistan
- > 1 UAE
- > 3 United Kingdom
- > 1 Belgium
- > 2 Uzbekistan
- > 31 Yemen—
- >
- > 158 TOTAL
- >
- >
- >

Action
ds 1/29
1355

January 26, 2002 1:32 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Spending

1/0.01

I intend to get deeply involved in how the extra money that is coming to the Department of Defense gets spent.

Please plan a series of meetings with me to tell me what the current plan is, and I will tell you what I want done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-18



Please respond by 02/11/02

26 Jan 02

U13206 /02

January 26, 2002 2:00 PM

1/29
1410

DBE

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: French Detainees

Have we told the French they can go ahead and visit the French detainees? Has it happened?

3071

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-20

.....

Please respond by 01/29/02

1/28

- We told French they could come. I understand they arrived Friday and flew down Saturday via commercial air.

26 Jan 02

- At a Roundtable last week,

U13208 /02

you directed Deputy and Feith to work out details on these things,

11-L-0559/OSD/10783

and they are within the rules that no ... etc.

ACTION
05 1/29
1330

January 26, 2002 12:51 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Sending Detainees Back

383.6

When are we going to know whether or not we can and should send detainees back to their countries of origin, if we think they are going to run them through their own criminal justice system—the French, the Brits, etc.

I need you to get on top of this, put some structure into the issue and get back to me no later than Tuesday with a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-15



Please respond by 01/29/02

26 Jan 02

U13209 /02

Action
to 1/29
1246

January 26, 2002 11:47 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Doing Right

I want a single person in charge of each country for doing what is right by these countries. I need someone from Policy who is going to ramrod through everything we need to do for Uzbekistan, someone for Jordan, someone for Turkey, someone for Pakistan and someone for India, I need them to monitor and see that we follow up on all these things.

092

Please get me a piece of paper that tells me who is in charge, what their plan is and when they will get to me with a detailed plan, so that we can see that we do the right things by these countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012602-12

.....
Please respond by 02/01/02

26 Jan 02

U13210 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10785

January 26, 2002 11:35 AM

AS 1/29
1233

TO: Torie Clarke
CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Abayas

Done
2/4
1500

02h

Please take a look at this material on the rules in Saudi Arabia. Please get with Doug Feith, Jim Haynes or whoever, and let's really understand what the rules are and see if we can avoid getting into any more trouble on this.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/25/02 CJCS Talking Paper

DHR:dh
012602-10

.....
Please respond by 02/01/02

26 Jan 02

U13211 /02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

February 1, 2002

TO: SECDEF

FROM: TORIE CLARKE

SUBJECT: Abayas and more

CC: Haynes, Feith

Some think that chopping the dog's tail off piece by piece will make it hurt less.

Issue

Your memo (attached) suggests we should know the facts "and see if we can avoid getting into any more trouble on this" referring to the abaya and related issues.

We have gotten ourselves in trouble by being too clever by half with words and by taking an incremental approach.

Facts:

CENTCOM

- Has not formalized its (new) policy on the abaya or where women should sit in cars in Saudi Arabia.
- Currently requires U.S. military women to wear the abaya, on and off duty, while off base in Saudi Arabia.
- Currently requires U.S. military men to wear conservative clothing and forbids them from wearing traditional Saudi garb.
- Currently encourages women to ride in back seat when there is a male passenger in the car.

11-L-0559/OSD/10787

Department of State

- Says women should dress conservatively and are not expected (emphasis is original) to wear the abaya.
- Says it will support a woman in whatever choice she makes on wearing the abaya.
- Provides driver for DOS female employees and spouses

Saudis

- Do not require non-Muslim women to wear abaya. Saudi consulate website says “Western women are not required to wear the traditional full-length abaya, or cloak, over their clothing but they are encouraged to wear a knee-length tunic dress and a scarf on their heads.
- Do not issue drivers’ licenses to women.

Recommendation

Institute a clear and comprehensive policy:

- Reconcile DOD policy on abaya with State’s: dress conservatively but don’t require or “strongly encourage” the wearing of the abaya.
- Permit women to ride in whatever seat is available, not dependent on other passengers.

Considerations

- It is entirely possible to be respectful of Saudi customs without the wearing of the abaya.
- If U.S. military women are expected to fight side-by-side with men in Saudi Arabia (as they did in the Persian Gulf War), then they can sit side-by-side in a car.

TALKING PAPER

25 January 02

Subject: Questions on the Abaya Policy

Purpose: Discuss legal issues involved in Subject.

Questions

- **What is the current policy, recently announced by GEN Franks on the wear of the abaya?**
 - 19 Jan 02 USCINCCENT message directed subordinate commanders that wear of the abaya is no longer mandatory and civilian clothes to cover the uniform is no longer required
 - JTF-SWA Commander promulgated this policy by letter on 24 Jan 02 (copy attached)
 - Wear of the abaya is strongly encouraged but no longer mandatory for women traveling off-base
 - Wear of the civilian clothes over the duty uniform off-base is no longer required (applies to all personnel)
- **What has changed as a result of this new policy?**
 - Wear of abaya was previously mandatory, now is strongly encouraged but not required
 - Wear of civilian clothes to cover the duty uniform was previously required, now is not required
- **What is the policy of the Department of State (DoS) on the wear of the abaya?**
 - State Department personnel are advised that Embassy women and women TDY visitors **are not expected to** (emphasis in the original) wear the abaya while performing official business
 - Within Riyadh area, non-Muslim women are not required to wear an abaya, but should dress conservatively
 - The Embassy announced its policy that it will support a woman in whatever choice made on wearing the abaya

- **What is the law in Saudi Arabia and what are the DoD and DoS policies on driving?**

- Saudi law does not permit issuance of drivers licenses to women

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 26 2002

- Custom (not law) is that men do not sit behind women;
- Therefore, women will generally sit in the back seat, unless a woman is the only passenger
- Saudi religious tenets presume that women who do not travel in the company of male members of their family are immoral; Saudi crime of prostitution may be charged against women who travel without the company of male family members
- DoD
 - JTF-SWA policy: Off installations, women are encouraged to ride in the back seat of vehicles when there is more than one passenger and to travel accompanied by male military members
- DoS
 - Drivers are provided for DoS women (both employees and accompanying spouses)
 - Employees and accompanying spouses are advised that Saudi Arabia does not allow women to drive vehicles or ride bicycles on public roads

Recommendations: None. For information only.

VADM G

ED,

ANSWERS TO SECDEF QUESTIONS FROM ROUNDTABLE TUSA,

Prepared by: Lt Col M.V. Perry, OCJCS/LC,

(b)(6)

UR/AN

1/25

11-L-0559/OSD/10789



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
JOINT TASK FORCE-SOUTHWEST ASIA
APO AE 09271-6200

24 JAN 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR JTF-SWA PERSONNEL

FROM: JTF-SWA/CC

SUBJECT: JTF-SWA/CC Policy Letter Number 024

1. References

- a. USCENTCOM Regulation 670-1, 29 Dec 97. Subject: Wear and Appearance of Service Uniforms
- b. USMTM Policy Memorandum Number 10, Service Uniform and Civilian Clothing Policy for USMTM Personnel
- c. U.S. Mission Administrative Notice Number 00-91, 6 Aug 00. Subject: Embassy Policy Regarding Appropriate Dress and the Abaya

2. Force protection within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility has always been a critical concern of command. No single area of the world is characterized by such consistently high states of alert. Warnings of impending threats against American interests and personnel are received daily. Many of these threats are specifically directed against military personnel. The events of September 11, 2001 and our ongoing operations have only increased the need for care and vigilance. To ensure that every possible step has been taken to safeguard and protect the personnel assigned to this command, I reviewed Force Protection policies and procedures to ascertain whether additional measures needed to be implemented.

3. Force protection concerns require JTF-SWA to ensure adequate security for our people as we travel to and from various locations within JTF-SWA's area of responsibility. For the purposes of this policy letter, force protection measures include actions to protect our members from terrorist activity as well as situations involving conflicts with local law and customs. To reduce the chance that our people may be ready targets for terrorists and to avoid unnecessary confrontations with residents in our host nations, we must recognize that many countries in this theater, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have different customs and practices than we encounter within the United States. Behavior inconsistent with these customs needlessly highlights our personnel

11-L-0559/OSD/10790

4. Accordingly, the following measures will be effective immediately and will remain in place until further notice:

a. Official travel off-base in furtherance of duty requirements must be authorized by the installation commander. Official travel off-base will be in duty uniform unless civilian attire is authorized by the installation commander or higher authority. When traveling on commercial airlines or driving for extended periods, service members will wear appropriate civilian attire.

b. Appropriate Civilian Attire for Men when off-base; Not in Uniform

Men will wear conservative clothing. Shirts must be long-sleeved and have a collar. Slacks will be worn. Shorts may not be worn. The clothing must be neat and have no holes or tears. Colors should be muted. Men will not wear earrings, baseball caps, bandannas, or host nation unique attire such as the thobe or ghutra. These requirements apply at all times when men are in civilian attire off-base.

c. Appropriate Civilian Attire for Women when off-base; Not in Uniform:

(1.) Women will wear conservative clothing. Shirts or blouses must be long-sleeved and have a collar. Conservative dress should be worn so the legs are covered to the feet and the arms are covered with long sleeves. Colors should be muted. Flashy, bright colored jewelry should also be avoided. At no time should shorts, short skirts, tight pants, or low cut/sleeveless tops be worn in public off of a military installation. These requirements apply at all times when women are in civilian attire off-base, even when the abaya is worn.

(2.) Wear of the Abaya. Within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, all female personnel traveling off-base are strongly encouraged to wear the abaya and carry the abaya head scarf.

d. At all times when not in areas under US control, all personnel are prohibited from wearing clothing imprinted with military, political, religious, alcoholic, sexual, profane pictures, words or phrases. Additionally, religious medallions and pendants will be worn out of sight.

e. If confronted, do not challenge the Muttawa ("religious police" in KSA). Be cooperative; offer your identification card and attempt to peacefully disengage from the situation. Situations not handled correctly could result in legal difficulties.

5. In order to reduce the chances of confrontation with local authorities, women are encouraged to ride in the rear-seat of vehicles when there is more than one passenger, and are encouraged to be accompanied by a male escort when off-base (consistent with local custom); these practices are not, however, required.

5. In order to reduce the chances of confrontation with local authorities, women are encouraged to ride in the rear-seat of vehicles when there is more than one passenger, and are encouraged to be accompanied by a male escort when off-base (consistent with local custom); these practices are not, however, required.

6. This letter supersedes Off-Base Travel Requirements (Policy Letter CS-018) dated 19 December 2000 and any inconsistent provisions of JTF-SWA or subordinate organization directives. This policy is effective immediately and will remain in effect until superseded. As the commander, I will review this policy periodically, to include each time there is a change in force protection conditions, and will modify this policy when appropriate. The safety and well-being of our service members is paramount and at the same time we respect our host nation's customs while imposing no more stringent requirements than necessary.

7. The office of primary responsibility for this policy is the Chief of Staff, JTF-SWA.



GARY R. DYLEWSKI
Major General, USAF
Commander



Action
85 1/30
1/47

January 28, 2002 2:50 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Army for Afghanistan

Afghanistan

There was a lot of talk today between the President and Karzai about a national army, who was going to pay for it and what we were willing to do. The President was quite firm that we were not going to put troops in the International Security Assistance Force.

On the other hand, it was ambiguous as to who was going to help pay for the army. From everything I know, we don't have any money for it. I told Condi that, and we wrote a series of notes back and forth—they are attached.

My impression is that if there is going to be money, someone is going to have to go to the Congress and ask for it.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/28/02 notes

DHR:dh
012802-19



Please respond by 01/31/02

28 Jan 02

U13212 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10793

DoD has no way to
pay for their Army.

Is the Admin. going
to open for \$
for ASgor?

We may have to - I'd

like to see what we can scrape
together from IMET and whatever

~~are~~ other accounts you t-state
have to bridge this year and get
started - Won't wait to Oct 1

We need to get a handle on our needs
in the region then go for it - maybe
as part of a ~~di-~~ supplemental for the war -

★

We need to know from Tommy
what he thinks he will need to
start building the Army -

Maybe the Brits + French will
contribute (maybe the EU)

I then will talk to OMB
and see how we close the gap

NOTE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT: Funding the War on Terrorism

- Steve Hadley agreed to establish an interagency working group to address the broad funding issues associated with the war on terrorism, per my suggestion yesterday.
- National Security Council Staff or the Office of Management and Budget will chair the group, which will address funding issues regarding:
 - Creating the Afghanistan National Army.
 - Establishing DoD's new footprint in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia.
 - Paying the costs of the war on terrorism (including costs we owe other countries – see attached list.)
 - Increasing Security Assistance worldwide.
- Steve Cambone and Tina Jonas will be the DoD representatives to the new interagency group. Dov Zakheim and I will follow the work closely.
- I have asked Hadley to organize the first meeting of the group next Monday.

11-L-0559/OSD/10795

NOTE FOR DOV ZAKHEIM

FROM: DOUG FEITH *DF*

SUBJECT: Key Country List

Below are the key countries we want to help financially due to their support for our military operations and their general importance in the war against terrorism. This financial support includes increased security assistance, arms transfers, IMET and other mil-to-mil cooperation.

1st Tier: Turkey
Pakistan
Jordan
Uzbekistan
Oman

2nd Tier: Morocco
Indonesia
Philippines
Colombia

snovflake

January 28, 2002 8:08 AM

ds
Aston
1/30
1122

TO: Tom White
Gordon England

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Update

Attached is a report I received from Jim Roche. Do you folks have a similar report?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/28/02 SecAF memo to SecDef re: "Quarterly Update on AF ESOH Management System"
[U01280/02]

DHR:dh
012802-8

.....

Please respond by 02/04/02

723

28 Jan 02

U13213 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10797

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

Di Rita

SECRET
2002 JAN 02 AM 11: 21
SECDEF HAS SEEN
JAN 28 2002

January 18, 2002, 7:30 AM

Larry Di Rita
1/25

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE *Jim Roche*

SUBJECT: Quarterly Update on AF ESOH Management System

- Attached ~~point paper~~ provides first quarterly update on AF progress toward developing an Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health Management System (ESOHMS), similar to ALCOA's
- AF Safety is aggressively leading a cross-functional ESOHMS IPT which is addressing ESOH policy, accountability, funding, acquisition process, Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), contractor oversight and metrics
- First attachment ~~to the point paper~~ is a comparison slide with ALCOA that I see once a week in a morning staff meeting with CSAF
- Second attachment contains screen shots from lost workday illness and injury data that is calculated real-time and always visible to myself and other senior AF staff over the Internet

RECOMMENDATION: NONE

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: Point Paper

Prepared by: Lt Col Scott Wheeler,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>1/24</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>[Signature]</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>5/25/25</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>6/1/27</i>

U01280#102


11-L-0559/OSD/10798



Lost Workday Injury Rates: USAF vs Alcoa

U.S. AIR FORCE

USAF data as of 16 Jan 02



USAF mil & civ injuries are on-duty, ground only (aviation excluded). Also includes USAF occupational illness data

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/10799



U.S. AIR FORCE

LWD Icon: Drill down by Civ/Mil



U.S. AIR FORCE


Ground Lost Workday Rates

ON-DUTY INJURY AND ILLNESS RATE FOR FISCAL YEAR: 2002

As of: 8 January, 2002 @ 10:59

INJURY/ILLNESS SEVERITY

	Fatal	Lost Workday Injury Cases	Lost Workday Illness Cases	TOTAL	RATE:
MILITARY	2	76	0	78	.07
CIVILIAN	0	128	1	129	.29
AIR FORCE:	2	204	1	207	.13



SLIDES FOR MISHAP PREVENTION ONLY

[HTTPS://rates.kirtland.af.mil](https://rates.kirtland.af.mil)

As of:

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/10800



U.S. AIR FORCE

LWD Icon: Drill down by Command



U.S. AIR FORCE

Ground Lost Workday Rates

ON-DUTY MILITARY INJURY COUNT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002

As of: 8 January, 2002 @ 11:40

INJURY CLASS

Command	Fatal	Lost Workday Injuries
ACC	1	24
AETC	0	2
AFMC	0	4
AFOSI	0	1
AFRC	1	2
AFSOC	0	2
AFSPC	0	1
AMC	0	13
ANG	0	4
PACAF	0	11
USAFE	0	4
Total:	2	76

As of:

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/10801



LWD ICON: View One Liners for selected Command

U.S. AIR FORCE



Ground Lost Workday Rates

U.S. AIR FORCE

AETC - MILITARY (LOST WORKDAY) SUMMARY FOR FY 2002

DATE	BASE ASSIGNED	NARRATIVE ONE-LINER	ID
03-DEC-2001	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	WKR OPENED FOOD STEAMER & BURNED FACE W/STEAM	78511
27-NOV-2001	RANDOLPH AFB TX	WKR WAS REMOVING 50-LB SCREEN FROM HOPPER & WAS HIT ON BACK	78565
20-NOV-2001	RANDOLPH AFB TX	WKR WAS LOADING FLOOR JACK ONTO TRUCK LIFT, SLIPPED & FELL	78562
17-NOV-2001	KEESLER AFB MS	WKR WAS ASSEMBLING BED WHILE BAREFOOT & DROPPED WOOD ON TOE	78437
09-NOV-2001	GOODFELLOW AFB TX	PTCP WAS IN TRAINING, WAS HIT BY AGGRESSOR & FELL ONTO BACK	78324
30-OCT-2001	SHEPPARD AFB TX	PMV 1 MADE U-TURN IN FRONT OF & WAS STRUCK BY PMV 2	78304
23-OCT-2001	KEESLER AFB MS	P1 WAS DESCENDING STAIRS, TRIPPED, FELL & HIT HEAD ON WALL	78045
02-OCT-2001	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	WKR LIFTING A DUMMY AS A FIREFIGHTER STRAINED LOWER BACK	77863
01-OCT-2001	SHEPPARD AFB TX	WKR WAS TRAINING ON ASCENDING UTILITY POLE & FELL TO GROUND	77957

As of:

Integrity - Service - Excellence

11-L-0559/OSD/10802



January 28, 2002 11:34 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reply to Ivanov

*Done
See Attached
1/29
1835*

Someone ought to draft a reply to Ivanov that I am not going to make it to Wehrkunde.

Russin

Thanks.

Attach.
01/26/02 FM Ivanov ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
012802-15

.....
Please respond by 01/29/02

28 Jan 02

U13214 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10803



**Office
of the Defense, Military, Air and Naval Attaches,
Embassy of Russia**

tel: (b)(6)
fax:

Duty officer
DIA, Pentagon

January 26, 2002

Dear Madam/Sir,

The paper enclosed is the translation of the letter of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Mr. S. IVANOV to the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America Mr D. RAMSFELD. The original will be passed through the US Defense Attache in Moscow.

A. Mozdakov
Captain, Defense Attache,
Embassy of the Russian Federation

COPY TO:
OSD
FEITH (A)
CROUCH

2650 Wisconsin Ave., Washington, D.C. 20007

11-L-0559/OSD/10804

Donald H. RAMSFELD
Secretary of Defense
Washington, United States of America

Moscow, January 26, 2002

Dear Mr. D. RAMSFELD,

Thank you for your letter dated December 27, 2001. I share your opinion that our discussions held in Brussels were highly efficient.

At the same time Russian-American military experts' consultations in Washington held in January 2002 demonstrated that the discrepancies in Russian and US positions and approaches to settling the questions connected with the problem of strategic stability have principal character. First of all it's connected with the process of reaching an agreement of deep reductions of strategic offensive weapons of Russia and USA.

We consider that this agreement should be drawn up in a legally binding form, provide equal military security for both countries, guarantee predictability of nuclear policy, connect the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons with defensive weapons, provide irreversibility of that reduction, reflect effective control measures and reciprocal decisions aimed to reduce expenses during liquidation of nuclear weapons.

We can't agree that the bases of the reduction strategic offensive weapons will be formed on shifting warheads from operationally deployed to reserve category with the possibility to remove them back to strategic means of delivery. To our mined it means only reduction of operational readiness of the part of the nuclear weapons but not the real reduction of them.

As for the process of the continuation of consultations between our Departments on the whole specter of questions connected with providing of the strategic stability, our proposals for further steps in this field and the dates of next consultations were provided to Mr. D. Feith by General-colonel Y. Baluyevsky in his letter dated January 22, this year.

I hope that our proposals will allow us to reach agreements on this field in the nearest time, and their realization will promote to keep and strengthen relations of partnership between two countries.

I believe that during our meeting which is planed for February 2, 2002 in Munich we could discuss all these problems in details and determine the dynamic of our further contacts.

I wish you every success in 2002 year.

Sincerely,

Sergey IVANOV
Minister of Defense
Russian Federation

11-L-0559/OSD/10805



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

EF0514

ACTION MEMO

JAN 28 2002

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

u
A

I-02/001340-RUE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Dr. J. D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy *JDC*

SUBJECT: SecDef letter to Russian Defense Minister Ivanov postponing meeting

- Letter at Tab A to Minister Ivanov tells him you will be unable to meet him at Wehrkunde and asks him to meet with you in February or early March.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign proposed outgoing letter.

COORDINATION: Tab B.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Patricia Ann Jacubec, ISP, Eurasia

(b)(6)

11-L-0550/OSD/10806



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Mr. Sergey Borisovich Ivanov
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense
Moscow, Russia

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for agreeing to meet with me on the margins of the Wehrkunde conference. Regrettably, I find that my schedule now precludes me from travelling to Germany this weekend. The press of matters relating to the war on terrorism as well as preparations for my upcoming testimony before Congress require me to remain in Washington.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz will attend Wehrkunde and is looking forward to meeting with you at 4 p.m. on February 2 as agreed. He can continue the dialogue from where you and I left off at our last meeting in December.

I would like to arrange a mutually agreeable time and location to meet with you in February or early March. Please let me know what would be convenient for you.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/10807

January 28, 2002 3:19 PM

Don 2/19 / 1410

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Plan for Congress

Let's keep in mind the names Webber got us—Mark Green, Paul Ryan, Mark Kennedy, Mark Kirk and Tom Reynolds—and start working the problem.

032

Let's get a plan going forward.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012802-24

.....
Please respond by 02/04/02

2/11
Response Attached.
D. Rita

Larry Di Rita

28 Jan 02

U13215 /02

February 11, 2002 2:00 p.m.

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Powell Moore *Powell Moore*
SUBJECT: Congressional Reaction (Snowflake memo 012802-24)

Vin Weber promised me an expanded list of rank and file Members of the Congress beyond the names he mentioned at lunch and I received today the attached list.

We will invite the group to breakfast after Congress returns from recess later this month.

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/10809

MEMO TO POWELL MOORE
FROM: VIN WEBER
FEBRUARY 11, 2002

HOUSE

REPUBLICANS:

- George Nethercutt - junior member of the Defense Subcommittee of Appropriations. Very bright and thoughtful and well regarded by his peers.
- Kay Granger - member of Appropriations Committee and interested in defense issues. Thoughtful and well liked
- Paul Ryan - Thoughtful and well respected by colleagues. Member of Ways and Means
- Tom Reynolds - next chair of the NRCC. Well respected
- Mark Green - well respected and well liked
- Mark Kirk - former staffer on International Relations, very bright and well regarded. Also a new member of HASC.
- Richard Burr - member of Commerce Committee, well liked and very well respected
- Mark Kennedy - Hugely interested in transformation issues. Only Republican to beat incumbent in last election
- (Other possibilities are Melissa Hart, Shelly Moore Capito, Charlie Bass, Vern Ehlers, Ray Lahood, Rob Portman, Mac Thornberry, Heather Wilson, Doug Ose).

DEMOCRATS:

- Chet Edwards - member of Appropriations Committee. Represents Ft. Hood. Very well liked and well respected
- Vic Snyder - member of HASC; a physician; well liked and well respected
- Jane Harmon - formerly on HASC, now on Commerce and HSCI. Very bright and very interested in defense issues.
- David Price - member of Appropriations Committee. Former professor. Very bright and well regarded
- Jim Turner - member of HASC and Gov. Reform. Respected and liked.
- Bud Cramer - member of Appropriations and very active with the Blue Dogs

(Others are Ellen Tauscher, Ben Cardin, Susan Davis, John Tanner)
I did not include any member of the leadership or senior members of committees.

MEMO TO POWELL MOORE
FROM: VIN WEBER
FEBRUARY 11, 2002

SENATE

REPUBLICANS:

- Wayne Allard - young conservative member of SASC Often feels neglected by the Conference
- George Allen - young rising star in GOP conference. SFRC terrorism subcommittee.
- Chuck Hagel - decorated veteran; good bi-partisan relations; very bright and respected by defense/foreign policy establishment.
- Mike DeWine - viewed as thoughtful and bright.
- Jon Kyl - very bright and interested in defense and foreign policy.

(Other possibilities are Susan Collins, Inhof, Ensign, and Roberts (close to Stevens))

DEMOCRATS:

- Jack Reed - West Point grad, very bright, well respected and well liked. New member of Appropriations and member of SASC
- Zell Miller - conservative Dem. Smart and has good ties to GOP conference.
- Mary Landrieu - member of SASC. Savvy.
- John Edwards - bright, ambitious, could be an interesting possibility, but also wants to run for Pres.
- Evan Bayh - same as Edwards.
- Bill Nelson - former House member, thoughtful and respected. Member of SASC

(Other possibilities are Blanche Lincoln, Jon Corzine, and Dick Durbin all are bright and could be of help. At least worth considering)

January 29, 2002 2:21 PM

Action
1/31
1635

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Editorial Boards

000.750

I think doing some more editorial boards is a good idea. We have done New York, Chicago and Washington, DC. We have to think through the places it would be a good idea to do it.

We could do some here if they have a time of year they come to Washington for meetings anyway. If we have to go to them, we could do that when we are traveling across the country or doing troop visits.

Please lay out a plan for the year, and let's look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-23

.....

Please respond by 02/11/02

29 Jan 02

U13217 /02

Action
1/31
1707

January 29, 2002 2:44 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shorten Processes

Please come up with a proposal of how we can shorten the processes in this building. I think we simply have to mandate it—that the budget process is going to be shortened by three months, and something else is going to be shortened by some amount of time.

110.01

If you could get me a calendar for the year that shows me when things start and end, I will just arbitrarily do it and see who screams.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-28

.....
Please respond by 02/18/02

295 on 02

U13218 /02

January 29, 2002 11:50 AM

ACTION
1/31
1621

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Planning

Done

Are you developing a way the CINCs can see what the costs of things actually are before they order them?

322

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-18

.....

Please respond by 02/02/02

29 Jan 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100



INFO MEMO

February 25, 2002, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Cost of Requirements Submitted by the Commanders in Chief (CINCs)

- You inquired about putting a system in place to tell the CINCs how much the things they request cost the Department. A system currently exists to provide the CINCs the cost of each request.
- My staff chairs a cost team that prices out the requests that come from the CINCs. Team members include Joint Staff (JS) representatives as well as representatives from each Service affected by the CINC request.
 - The CINCs' requests are priced out and compared with alternatives (for instance, cargo transportation by sea vice air) in an effort to determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy the CINCs' requests.
 - These cost estimates are provided to the Services and to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the JS to ensure the original request is being satisfied.
- For current operations, cost estimates for every deployment order are available to the CINCs via multiple sources. First, the CINC Component Commanders' comptroller offices have the ability to determine costs for each request. Second, the Joint Staff or Service budget offices can provide the cost estimate determined by the cost team. The CINC Component Commanders' can provide the CINC with the cost for each request and the OSD cost team data can be made available to the CINCs via the Joint Staff.

COORDINATION: The Joint Staff

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Ron Garant, 

11-L-0559/OSD/10815

Coordination Page

Deputy Director, Resources and
Requirements (J8)

RADM Szemborski, USN

21 February 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/10816

January 29, 2002 11:34 AM

Done
2/2
1500

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CINC Meetings Videos

- ① Let's suggest that any CINC who is in town should join us in the room, where it is a little easier to communicate.
- ② Also, please see if we can take our faces off the screen and have more CINCs on the screen.
- ③ Please see if there is a way to include more CINCs, like we do at the White House, where we can get a total of four on at one time.

060

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-15

.....
Please respond by 02/06/02

29 Jan 02

- ① That will be done sir,
- ② + ③ Sir, both these are a result of limitations with the system. The White House uses a system called simply Secure VTC, and is "hardwired" with fiber optical cable to a set number of sites. The military uses a different system that goes over the phone lines. You only get a picture of whomever is speaking. There is no way to accomplish your request with the present system.

V/R Col B U13222 /02
11-L-0559/OSD/10817
30 605 am

ACNON
45 11/31
1345

January 29, 2002 9:06 AM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: U.S. Support for Afghanistan

A
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n

I talked to Colin Powell today about the U.S. support for Afghanistan.

I told Condi she needs to get a grip on the overall program.

Colin said it is conceivable we could get food aid out of his program to pay military people or pay people fixing airports. We ought to give some thought to that.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/28/02 SecState note to SecDef re: Fact Sheet—U.S. Contributions to the Afghan Interim Authority and to Humanitarian and Reconstruction Efforts

DHR:dh
012902-13

.....

Please respond by 02/06/02

29
Jan
02

U13224 /02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 29 2002

United States Department of State

The Secretary of State

28/1



Q.

Don, Cond,

Attached shows
THE PROBLEMS RE
FUNDING AFGHAN
MILITARY FROM OUR
\$297M.

cc: D. Rite

FACT SHEET

U.S. Contributions to the Afghan Interim Authority and to Humanitarian and Reconstruction EffortsAFGHAN INTERIM AUTHORITY (AIA)

The United States has contributed via UNDP \$1 million to the AIA for start-up costs. In his remarks at the International Conference on Reconstruction of Afghanistan (ICRA) in Tokyo, Secretary Powell said that we would insure that part of the \$296 million we pledged for 2002 is devoted to this purpose.

HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

The United States has provided \$385 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, drawing on FY01 and FY02 funding. Of the FY02 total of \$201 million, USAID provided 59%, the State Department 16%, and the Department of Defense an estimated 25%.

In Tokyo, the United States pledged an additional \$296 million in funding for Afghanistan for this calendar year. Given the short-term nature of this assistance, some will be devoted to providing assistance for early recovery activities that will lead into the reconstruction process and some will be used to jumpstart reconstruction efforts through high impact, job-creating projects which target agriculture, education, health, humanitarian demining, and counternarcotics. In general, all of the funds pledged in Tokyo will go to recovery and reconstruction. Other funds will be used for ongoing humanitarian relief activities. As noted, some portion of the money will go towards supporting the AIA.

Almost \$122 million or 41% of the total represents food aid that will be devoted to recovery and reconstruction activities. For example, Food for Work will help spur recovery by providing payment in kind for work on such activities as road and irrigation system repairs.

\$52 million (18%) in Migration and Refugee Assistance funds will be used primarily to support the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the reintegration of large numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons into their home communities, which is critical to the effort of rebuilding the country.

\$90 million (28%) for international disaster and development assistance will be used to promote reconstruction-related activities such as agricultural rehabilitation, livelihoods and income generation, improving health, and creating incentives for stability, including providing support to the Bonn agreement and direct assistance to developing the capacity of the AIA.

\$32 million will be used to support short-term high-impact projects, humanitarian demining, and counternarcotics programs.

12:32 PM

ACTION
to 1/31
1303

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Torie Clarke
Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT:

I got a call from the Canadian Minister of Defense, Art Eggleton. He was wondering if he or somebody from Canada could go down and see some detainees, even though they seem not to have any Canadians down there.

383.6

Check and see if there are any Canadians down there.

The issue he raised is that his Canadian forces are involved in capturing detainees and then turning them over to us. Therefore, his Parliament, obviously like Europe, is asking him how they are being treated. I told him we had not been in the practice of allowing consolatory visits and since he doesn't have any people down there. But I am wondering if we might want to let somebody from Canada go down there on one of these trips, just as a coalition member.

One other thought might be to take a few folks from Tampa where the liaisons are and have them go down and get a briefing so that they can blow back on their countries.

30 Tampa

Thank you.

DHR/azn
012902.10

Please respond by: 2/8/02

U13226 /02

12:14 PM

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 30, 2002

SUBJECT: Pay Scales

Done 1/31 1830
1/31 1257

Please show me some kind of a pay scale that shows me how much people make as privates, sargeants, and officers, all the way up, as well as some idea of what their total compensation would be apart from their base pay.

240

Thank you.

DHR/azn
012902.08

Please respond by:

2/6/02

1/31

SECDEF -

RESPONSE ATTACHED. *W*

v/r
ED

TAB A - *SIMPLE* ONE PAGE VERSION

TAB B - MORE DETAILED VERSION WITH DETAILED NOTES

0 Jan 02

U13227 /02

Breakout of Military Basic Pay and Allowances

<u>PAY GRADE</u>	<u>Base Pay</u>	<u>Total of Allowances (BAH/BAS)</u>	<u>Federal Income Tax Advantage</u>	<u>Regular Military Compensation</u>
O-10	\$138,200.40	\$26,125.59	\$11,525.90	\$175,851.89
O-9	\$130,485.60	\$26,443.22	\$11,403.08	\$168,331.91
O-8	\$118,224.00	\$26,540.07	\$10,938.70	\$155,702.77
O-7	\$104,803.39	\$26,412.27	\$10,285.69	\$141,501.36
O-6	\$89,157.06	\$21,940.45	\$8,235.34	\$119,332.86
O-5	\$72,352.05	\$20,211.02	\$7,547.30	\$100,110.37
O-4	\$60,802.74	\$17,816.81	\$5,887.88	\$84,507.44
O-3	\$48,343.88	\$14,691.19	\$3,814.19	\$66,849.27
O-2	\$36,892.34	\$12,429.38	\$3,289.55	\$52,611.27
O-1	\$26,315.65	\$10,970.91	\$2,184.17	\$39,470.74
O-3 E	\$56,434.27	\$15,928.28	\$5,036.92	\$77,399.47
O-2 E	\$44,393.29	\$13,920.39	\$3,843.52	\$62,157.19
O-1 E	\$36,343.08	\$12,388.23	\$3,576.13	\$52,307.44
W-5	\$64,935.95	\$16,492.86	\$5,957.06	\$87,385.87
W-4	\$56,455.78	\$15,742.28	\$4,526.29	\$76,724.36
W-3	\$46,155.53	\$14,331.35	\$2,888.59	\$63,375.47
W-2	\$38,560.05	\$13,709.08	\$2,706.45	\$54,975.58
W-1	\$32,623.57	\$10,933.78	\$2,118.24	\$45,675.59
E-9	\$50,812.59	\$16,773.31	\$4,074.63	\$71,660.53
E-8	\$41,043.41	\$15,441.04	\$2,996.59	\$59,481.04
E-7	\$35,245.91	\$14,523.26	\$2,779.73	\$52,548.90
E-6	\$29,429.70	\$13,765.60	\$2,476.65	\$45,671.95
E-5	\$23,709.32	\$12,308.98	\$1,977.50	\$37,995.80
E-4	\$19,198.39	\$10,900.74	\$1,681.92	\$31,781.04
E-3	\$16,043.79	\$10,336.82	\$1,657.78	\$28,038.39
E-2	\$14,871.60	\$10,329.32	\$1,698.96	\$26,899.88
E-1	\$13,266.00	\$10,244.78	\$1,630.33	\$25,141.12

} OFFICER WITH PRIOR ENL SERVICE

$$\text{BASE PAY} + \text{HOUSING ALLOWANCE (NOT TAXABLE)} + \text{TAX ADVANTAGE} = \text{REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION}$$

**DETAILED RMC TABLES - 1 JANUARY 2002
ASSUME ALL CASH PAY GRADE AVERAGES
ALL PERSONNEL**

PAY GRADE	BPY	BAH	BAS	ALL	CPY	SST	FIT	TOT	DIS	TAD	RMC
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS											
C/S	138,200.40	22,000.00	1,996.44	26,666.35	164,866.75	7,267.71	27,176.12	34,443.83	130,422.92	11,428.43	176,295.18
O-10	138,200.40	24,129.15	1,996.44	26,125.59	164,325.99	7,267.71	28,235.78	35,503.48	128,822.51	11,525.90	175,851.89
O-9	130,485.60	24,446.78	1,996.44	26,443.22	156,928.82	7,155.84	25,202.33	32,358.18	124,570.65	11,403.08	168,331.91
O-8	118,224.00	24,543.63	1,996.44	26,540.07	144,764.07	6,978.05	21,542.22	28,520.27	116,243.80	10,938.70	155,702.77
O-7	104,803.39	24,415.83	1,996.44	26,412.27	131,215.67	6,783.45	17,676.57	24,460.02	106,755.64	10,285.69	141,501.36
O-6	89,157.06	19,944.01	1,996.44	21,940.45	111,097.52	6,542.13	13,477.15	20,019.27	91,078.24	8,235.34	119,332.86
O-5	72,352.05	18,214.58	1,996.44	20,211.02	92,563.07	5,534.93	8,770.76	14,305.69	78,257.38	7,547.30	100,110.37
O-4	60,802.74	15,820.37	1,996.44	17,816.81	78,619.55	4,651.41	6,463.62	11,115.02	67,504.53	5,887.88	84,507.44
O-3	48,343.88	12,694.75	1,996.44	14,691.19	63,035.08	3,698.31	5,088.96	8,787.26	54,247.82	3,814.19	66,849.27
O-2	36,892.34	10,432.94	1,996.44	12,429.38	49,321.72	2,822.26	3,450.89	6,273.16	43,048.56	3,289.55	52,611.27
O-1	26,315.65	8,974.47	1,996.44	10,970.91	37,286.56	2,013.15	1,961.81	3,974.96	33,311.60	2,184.17	39,470.74
O-3 E	56,434.27	13,931.84	1,996.44	15,928.28	72,362.55	4,317.22	6,616.30	10,933.52	61,429.03	5,036.92	77,399.47
O-2 E	44,393.29	11,923.95	1,996.44	13,920.39	58,313.68	3,396.09	4,979.16	8,375.25	49,938.43	3,843.52	62,157.19
O-1 E	36,343.08	10,391.79	1,996.44	12,388.23	48,731.31	2,780.25	3,519.42	6,299.67	42,431.64	3,576.13	52,307.44
ALLO-3	49,640.33	12,892.99	1,996.44	14,889.43	64,529.77	3,797.49	5,333.71	9,131.19	55,398.57	4,010.13	68,539.90
ALLO-2	38,096.52	10,672.30	1,996.44	12,668.74	50,765.26	2,914.38	3,696.24	6,610.62	44,154.64	3,378.48	54,143.75
ALLO-1	27,981.82	9,209.98	1,996.44	11,206.42	39,188.23	2,140.61	2,220.63	4,361.24	34,827.00	2,415.46	41,603.70
ALL CO	53,679.44	14,002.55	1,996.44	15,999.06	69,678.49	4,082.71	6,000.82	10,083.53	59,594.97	4,914.86	74,593.35
WARRANT OFFICERS											
W-5	64,935.95	14,496.42	1,996.44	16,492.86	81,428.81	4,967.60	7,156.32	12,123.92	69,304.89	5,957.06	87,385.87
W-4	56,455.78	13,745.84	1,996.44	15,742.28	72,198.06	4,318.87	5,523.02	9,841.89	62,356.17	4,526.29	76,724.36
W-3	46,155.53	12,334.91	1,996.44	14,331.35	60,486.88	3,530.90	3,729.98	7,260.87	53,226.00	2,888.59	63,375.47
W-2	38,560.05	11,712.64	1,996.44	13,709.08	52,269.13	2,949.84	2,629.94	5,579.48	46,689.65	2,706.45	54,975.58
W-1	32,623.57	8,937.34	1,996.44	10,933.78	43,557.35	2,495.70	1,955.12	4,450.83	39,106.52	2,118.24	45,675.59
ALL WO	42,950.97	11,804.00	1,996.44	13,800.44	56,751.40	3,285.75	3,362.26	6,648.01	50,103.39	3,025.99	59,777.39
ALLOFF	52,943.07	13,851.65	1,996.44	15,848.15	68,791.22	4,028.01	5,819.72	9,847.72	58,943.50	4,785.21	73,576.43
ENLISTED MEMBERS											
M/S	64,594.80	14,140.01	2,899.20	17,039.21	81,634.01	4,941.50	6,489.41	11,430.91	70,203.10	6,018.19	87,652.20
E-9	50,812.59	13,874.11	2,899.20	16,773.31	67,585.90	3,887.16	4,578.60	8,465.77	59,120.14	4,074.63	71,660.53
E-8	41,043.41	12,541.84	2,899.20	15,441.04	56,484.45	3,139.82	2,915.48	6,055.30	50,429.15	2,996.59	59,481.04
E-7	35,245.91	11,624.06	2,899.20	14,523.26	49,769.17	2,696.31	2,004.40	4,700.71	45,068.46	2,779.73	52,548.90
E-6	29,429.70	10,866.40	2,899.20	13,765.60	43,195.30	2,251.37	1,344.50	3,595.87	39,599.43	2,476.65	45,671.95
E-5	23,709.32	9,409.78	2,899.20	12,308.98	36,018.30	1,813.76	1,042.13	2,855.89	33,162.41	1,977.50	37,995.80
E-4	19,198.39	8,001.54	2,899.20	10,900.74	30,099.13	1,468.68	856.85	2,325.53	27,773.60	1,681.92	31,781.04
E-3	16,043.79	7,437.62	2,899.20	10,336.82	26,380.61	1,227.35	693.72	1,921.07	24,459.54	1,657.78	28,038.39
E-2	14,871.60	7,430.12	2,899.20	10,329.32	25,200.92	1,137.68	609.30	1,746.98	23,453.94	1,698.96	26,899.88
E-1	13,266.00	7,345.58	2,899.20	10,244.78	23,510.76	1,014.85	391.60	1,406.45	22,104.33	1,630.33	25,141.12
E-1-4	12,272.40	7,345.58	2,899.20	10,244.78	22,517.18	938.84	293.46	1,232.30	21,284.88	1,557.27	24,074.45
ALLE-1	12,477.93	7,345.58	2,899.20	10,244.78	22,722.71	954.56	313.76	1,268.32	21,454.39	1,572.38	24,295.09
ALLENL	22,623.50	9,016.54	2,899.20	11,915.74	34,539.24	1,730.70	1,074.41	2,805.11	31,734.13	1,999.42	36,538.66
ALLDOD	27,442.16	9,784.98	2,755.73	12,540.72	39,982.88	2,095.81	1,828.58	3,924.38	36,058.50	2,442.16	42,425.04

THESE DISPLAYS WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE DETAILED ANNUAL REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) RECEIVED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. RMC IS DEFINED AS THE SUM OF BASIC PAY, AVERAGE BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING, BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE, AND THE FEDERAL TAX ADVANTAGE** ACCRUING TO THE AFOREMENTIONED ALLOWANCES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO FEDERAL INCOME TAX. RMC IS MADE UP OF A BASIC LEVEL OF COMPENSATION WHICH EVERY SERVICEMEMBER RECEIVES, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN CASH OR IN KIND EVERY PAYDAY, AND WHICH IS COMMON TO ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL OF A PARTICULAR PAYGRADE, YEARS OF SERVICE, AND FAMILY SIZE.

(NOTE: IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS), INCLUDING ALASKA AND HAWAII, MEMBERS RECEIVE A BASIC HOUSING ALLOWANCE (BAH) AND OVERSEAS, THEY RECEIVE AN OVERSEAS HOUSING ALLOWANCE (OHA).)*

FOR EACH OF THE THIRTY PAY GRADES, FIFTEEN LONGEVITY STEPS, AND FAMILY SIZES ONE THROUGH SIX, TWELVE QUANTITIES ARE LISTED-

- 1) BASIC PAY (BPY)
- 2) BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING (BAH)
- 3) BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE (BAS)
- 4) TOTAL OF ALLOWANCES (ALL)
- 5) CASH PAY (CPY)
- 6) SOCIAL SECURITY TAX - FICA - (SST)
- 7) FEDERAL INCOME TAX (FIT)
- 8) EARNED INCOME CREDIT TAX (EITC)
- 9) TOTAL TAXES (TOT)
- 10) DISPOSABLE INCOME - TAKE HOME PAY - (DIS)
- 11) FEDERAL INCOME TAX ADVANTAGE (TAD)
- 12) REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC)

* BECAUSE OF THE WIDE VARIABILITY IN THE BAH AND OHA RATES, TABLES COVERING THE FULL RANGE OF POSSIBLE RMC'S CANNOT BE COVERED IN A SUMMARY PUBLICATION SUCH AS THIS ONE. TABLES IN THE BACK DISPLAY THE AVERAGE BAH, BY GRADE, AND AVERAGE RMC, BY GRADE, AND THE AVERAGE RMC, BY GRADE AND YEARS OF SERVICE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE AVERAGE RMC FIGURES SHOWN INCLUDE BAH, AND NOT OHA, AND THEREFORE ARE APPLICABLE ONLY TO PERSONNEL IN CONUS. DATA ON OHA, AND THE RESULTANT RMC'S APPLICABLE TO PERSONNEL OVERSEAS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS PUBLICATION.

**TAX ADVANTAGE (TAD) IS THE ADDITIONAL INCOME MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE IN ORDER TO BE LEFT WITH THEIR CURRENT DISPOSABLE INCOME (TAKE HOME PAY), IF THEIR ALLOWANCES WERE TAXABLE. FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS COMPUTED USING THE STANDARD DEDUCTION AND 2002 TAX RATES, INCLUDING THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC).

11:55 AM

ACTION
ds 1/31
1245

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **GTMO**

The next time there is going to be a plane going to Guantanamo Bay Cuba
Military, I would like to take the Secretary of HUD Mel Martinez. Please work
on getting him down there, and keep me posted.

383,6

Thank you.

DHR/azn
012902.05

Please respond by: _____

2/6/02

305 am 02

U13229 /02

7:21 AM Action
1131
0934

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **Time Magazine Article**

Let's get the Ruth Wedgwood piece circulated fairly widely. It's terrific.

Thank you.

3/2/02

DHR/azn
012902 02

Attach: *Viewpoint: Why They're Outlaws, Not POWs* Time, February 4, 2002 by Ruth Wedgwood

Please respond by: 2/4/02

30 Tance

U13230 /02

theme: Lindh never harmed any American. Brosnahan offers few specifics about what Lindh actually did in Afghanistan. But he says the comments from Lindh's revealing December sessions with the FBI must be ruled inadmissible, since Lindh had asked for a lawyer more than a week before but never got one. Instead the U.S. kept him floating around the Arabian Sea, where the selection of attorneys is quite limited. "Our government is playing with dynamite," Brosnahan told TIME. "[My client] has a right to counsel under the Geneva Convention."

In short, Brosnahan and the prosecutors appear to be digging in. But both sides have their weaknesses. The most glaring for the prosecution is that it didn't have enough goods on Lindh to charge him with treason. Instead Lindh is charged with conspiring to kill Americans outside the U.S. and with providing aid to terrorist groups. The government has not revealed evidence to refute Brosnahan's claim that his client never actually hurt Americans. Even the FBI affidavit notes that Lindh declined the al-Qaeda offer to work against the U.S.

The other major prosecution problem is that Brosnahan can argue that Lindh was in such bad shape during the interrogations—he had been shot, appeared malnourished, and may have been doped on morphine—that the poor kid thought he was talking to Big Bird. On Friday MSNBC began running a videotape of Lindh that was apparently filmed on Dec. 14. Even then—four days after his FBI interview—he had chills and could barely keep his eyes open.

Even so, Brosnahan may have a worse hand. Lindh signed a formal waiver of his right to an attorney, according to Attorney General John Ashcroft, and also verbally waived that right. "That Miranda [waiver] is likely to be very hard for [Lindh] to overcome," says Robert Weisberg, a Stanford law professor. Also, before he spoke with the FBI, Lindh voluntarily told CNN much the same story. Finally, the legal standard required to prove conspiracy "is kind of broad and vague," says Weisberg, and thus gives the edge to the prosecution. Top officials at the Justice Department are betting the matter will end with a quiet guilty plea.

For now, though, Lindh has bathed and visited a barber. If he is planning to take the stand, he may also want to drop the faux-Middle East accent. "Oh, boy, I wouldn't let him testify with that," says Richard Uviller, a Columbia law professor. And "it may be that he's still militant, in which case he's not going to help himself at all."

—Reported by Elaine Shannon/
Washington and Deirdre van Dyk/New York

VIEWPOINT

Ruth Wedgwood

Why They're Outlaws, Not POWs

TWO CENTURIES AGO, THE BRITISH USED THE ISLAND OF ST. HELENA TO INTERN their sworn enemy Napoléon Bonaparte. No one is volunteering the South Atlantic as a place of repose for the captured fighters of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. So, for the moment, the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, remains the "least worst" solution (as Donald Rumsfeld put it) for sequestering the 158 detainees and several hundred more expected to follow. U.S. military engineers have been working overtime to construct temporary housing that is safe, secure and hygienic. The quarters have been outfitted with hot showers, prayer mats, and cells with corrugated tin roofs. Medical care has been provided, along with monitoring visits from the International Red Cross.

Yet our European allies have been fulminating with advice about how we should handle the dangerous business of housing these men. Our allies extravagantly insist that every semicolon of the Geneva Convention, a treaty among sovereign countries designed to protect honorable soldiers, also belongs to the self-appointed terrorists and saboteurs who attack guards and deliberately kill civilians. Rumsfeld considers the detainees to be "unlawful combatants." Late last week Colin Powell reportedly joined the debate, asking President Bush to assume the detainees to be lawful POWs unless a military board finds otherwise.

But here's why al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters flunk the plain requirements for status as Geneva POWs. Lawful combatants must: have a commander responsible for their conduct, wear a uniform or visible insignia, carry their weapons openly and generally conduct their operations "in accordance with the laws and customs of war."



Detainees at Guantánamo: POWs or outlaws?

These demands are longstanding and no surprise. They are an incentive system to protect soldiers and civilians from war's cruelties by demanding reciprocity in performance and forbidding a soldier to mimic a civilian. Neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban can claim these qualifications. And the Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, nor a regular army. Its representative did not sit in Kabul's seat at the U.N.

In some respects, this is an academic debate. The distinction between POWs and "unlawful combatants" doesn't make any difference in the mode of interrogation or in choosing military trials, closing courtrooms or considering hearsay evidence. The Geneva Convention permits each of these, even for POWs. But pretending that the detainees are POWs would make it harder to run a safe camp for these sworn terrorists. The Geneva Convention says that POWs must be allowed to keep their mess kits, gas masks and metal helmets—for it is presumed they won't turn these into weapons. They are to be paid military salaries and "given the means" of preparing food. (One wonders if this includes knives.) They cannot be housed in a cell. "Scientific equipment" and "musical instruments" can be sent from home. Classifying al-Qaeda and senior Taliban as lawful combatants could also shield them from prosecution for their attacks on U.S. military targets. That is why soldiers who fail to obey the rules of war must be considered outlaws, vulnerable to the judgment of the courts. ■

Ruth Wedgwood is a professor of international law at Yale and Johns Hopkins

7:18 AM

Action
1/31
0925

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT: *Christian Science Monitor*

I think you need a letter to the *Christian Science Monitor* explaining that it is not the whim of the Secretary of Defense. It will be a decision by the President of the United States and the government of the United States, and I have not even opined on it.

383.6

Thank you.

DHR/azn
012902.01

Please respond by: 2/6/02

30 Jan 02

U13231 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10830

Christian Science Monitor
January 29, 2002

37. Follow The Geneva Convention

By Michael Ratner

NEW YORK - Secretary of State Colin Powell has added his voice to the chorus: It is in the best interests of the United States, he says, to initially treat combatants captured in Afghanistan as prisoners of war. This is the view of other realists in the Pentagon and administration, some US allies, and the vast majority of international law and human rights groups.

But the question goes far beyond the treatment of individual detainees. Rather, it sets the stage for how, in a violent world, the rules of war are established for everyone. For almost 100 years, the Geneva and Hague Conventions have provided a framework that protects combatants. The United States has always argued for a broad reading of these conventions regarding POWs, both to set an example and to ensure fair treatment of its own soldiers when captured.

Regarding the detainees at the American naval base in Guantánamo, Cuba, the US is currently violating its own Army regulations as well as the Geneva Convention, namely in the way the prisoners are housed (in open-air cages with roofs).

US Army rules reflect the convention and require that all persons taken into custody by US forces during a conflict be treated as prisoners of war, "until some other status is determined by a competent tribunal." This means that all combatants - Taliban, Al Qaeda, and others - captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan must be treated at first as POWs until their status can be decided by a competent tribunal.

These fighters won't necessarily receive POW status. Some people have argued that Al Qaeda fighters may not qualify as POWs if they did not wear distinctive marks identifying them or obey the laws of war; others have argued similarly about the Taliban. But the facts are not established, which is why US Army regulations require a

"competent tribunal" to judge each individual case fairly.

We must also remember that POW status hardly protects captured fighters from prosecution: POWs can be charged with war crimes.

They can also be interrogated, cajoled, and questioned - they just cannot be coerced or tortured. The Geneva Convention does allow POWs to limit their responses to name, rank, and serial number. Yet over the years many POWs, questioned under the framework of the convention, have provided much more information.

Finally, treating prisoners initially as POWs does not mean the United States abandons security concerns. Under the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war may not be abused, starved, left out in the elements, or with their wounds untreated. But they are subject to measures that keep them securely captive, under lock and key.

The reasons for complying with Army regulations and the Geneva Convention are clear: The US has an immediate and long-term interest in upholding international conventions that establish universal rules of war and regulate the treatment of POWs.

Even as Washington politicians bluster, our own soldiers live with the threat of capture. They, like all other combatants, deserve the protection of the Geneva Convention.

The United States also has an interest in not alienating its battlefield allies by high-handed, unilateral decision-making and selective compliance with the law. If the rules of war can be abrogated at any moment on the whim of the secretary of Defense - even over the objections of the secretary of State - our ability to form solid and lasting alliances will be gravely undercut.

Michael Ratner is a human rights attorney and vice president of the Center for Constitutional Rights.

Washington Post
January 29, 2002

Pg. 19

38. The Prince Protests

By Jackson Diehl

RIYADH -- Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah protests that he has been wrongly described as unfriendly to the United States. "I really don't see any disagreements" between the two countries, he says, "other than what I read in some of the media." Then he offers this contribution to today's media: Given U.S. policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "we find it very difficult to defend America . . . to be frank with you, how can we defend America?"

Thus the crown prince, Saudia Arabia's de facto and increasingly assertive ruler, demonstrates the awkward straddle he has practiced since the first months of the Bush administration -- and returned to repeatedly since Sept. 11. His government insists it wants to preserve its close alliance with Washington, and complains bitterly about what it regards as a U.S. media campaign to make false connections between Saudi Arabia and Islamic extremism. All the while, it wages a relentless public campaign about the continued suffering of the Palestinians, one that suggests that the United States is largely to blame for the bloody images that seem to roll almost continuously across its television screens.

Abdullah took the rare step of receiving visiting journalists from The Post and the New York Times in his palatial white marble home yesterday in an apparent effort to clear the troubled air between Riyadh and Washington. But his candor, delivered over tea and Arabic pastries, with a single aide alongside to translate, also seemed to clarify his contradictions. He said he was worried because "I have great concern about America's credibility and how America is perceived." If America is seen as an adversary by average Arabs, the Saudis say, it threatens the ability of the Saudi royal family to maintain its 60-year-old bond to the White House, and offers suicide bombers a motive and a target.

And yet, Abdullah himself continues to pour fuel on the fire he says he fears, publicly insisting that the Bush administration -- as opposed to Yasser Arafat or even Israel -- must bear the onus for the mounting bloodshed in the West Bank and Gaza. Why speak on the subject so frequently and so publicly, I asked, if his priority is maintaining the U.S. relationship? "I believe that I have to be honest and sincere when it concerns my God, my people and myself," he answered. "I am also very sincere and frank with friends. Because America is a friend, I find it my duty to offer advice when it is needed."

Perhaps that is true; it is certainly the case that Abdullah speaks with striking emotion about Palestinian suffering. But there is also little question that the issue has been seized by the Saudi prince -- as by so many Middle East rulers before him -- at a moment when he feels threatened both at home and abroad. Four months after Sept. 11, and two after the destruction of the fundamentalist Taliban regime, the Saudi public mood seems bitter and angry, inclined to regard America's Afghan campaign as an attack on the Islam that is the essence of Saudi statehood and the vehicle for Saudi influence in the region. Many aren't yet convinced that Osama bin Laden is guilty of the Sept. 11 attacks -- or that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis.

Meanwhile, Abdullah's government is quietly struggling with how to respond to the broader American security agenda after Sept. 11 -- one that sees Saudi funding for Islamic schools and mosques across the Arab world, Saudi tolerance for the enlistment of its young men in foreign Muslim wars, and parts of the Saudi clergy and education system as key tools of al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist movements. While there has been cooperation on some specifics, the broader Saudi response has been one of hostile defensiveness -- one that insists the Saudi system is no more prone to produce terrorists than is the United States.

snowflake

1:47 PM

Action
1/31
1610

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT: **MoD Art Eggleton**

Make sure that we send Ruth Wedgwood's article to the Minister of Defense of Canada on the subject of the Geneva Convention.

383.6

Thank you.

DHR/azn
012902.15

Attach: *Viewpoint: Why They're Outlaws, Not POWs* Time, February 4, 2002 by Ruth Wedgwood

Please respond by: 2/8/02

30 Jan 02

U13232 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10832

theme: Lindh never harmed any American. Brosnahan offers few specifics about what Lindh actually did in Afghanistan. But he says the comments from Lindh's revealing December sessions with the FBI must be ruled inadmissible, since Lindh had asked for a lawyer more than a week before but never got one. Instead the U.S. kept him floating around the Arabian Sea, where the selection of attorneys is quite limited. "Our government is playing with dynamite," Brosnahan told TIME. "[My client] has a right to counsel under the Geneva Convention."

In short, Brosnahan and the prosecutors appear to be digging in. But both sides have their weaknesses. The most glaring for the prosecution is that it didn't have enough goods on Lindh to charge him with treason. Instead Lindh is charged with conspiring to kill Americans outside the U.S. and with providing aid to terrorist groups. The government has not revealed evidence to refute Brosnahan's claim that his client never actually hurt Americans. Even the FBI affidavit notes that Lindh declined the al-Qaeda offer to work against the U.S.

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—Reported by Elaine Shannon/
Washington and Deirdre van Dyk/New York

VIEWPOINT

Ruth Wedgwood

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But here's why al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters flunk the plain requirements for status as Geneva POWs. Lawful combatants must: have a commander responsible for their conduct, wear a uniform or visible insignia, carry their weapons openly and generally conduct their operations "in accordance with the laws and customs of war."

These demands are longstanding and no surprise. They are an incentive system to protect soldiers and civilians from war's cruelties by demanding reciprocity in performance and forbidding a soldier to mimic a civilian. Neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban can claim these qualifications. And the Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, nor a regular army. Its representative did not sit in Kabul's seat at the U.N.

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Ruth Wedgwood is a professor of international law at Yale and Johns Hopkins



Detainees at Guantánamo: POWs or outlaws?

showfile

5:49 PM

ACTION
1131
1623

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 30, 2002
SUBJECT: Attached Article

I had better have Pete Aldridge explain this article here from the *Washington Post*
"Defense Balks at Contract Goals."

Thank you.

160

DHR/azn
012902.18

Attach: Washington Post, Jan. 30, 2002 "Defense balks at Contract Goals * Essential Services Should Not Be Privatized, Pentagon Tells OMB:

Please respond by: 2/8/02

1/31

SP3 2/13

SecDef -
He briefed this at the
Senior Staff meeting the day the
article came out. I'll have him
mention it again. In summary, it
is a teacup *Di Rita*

30 Jan 02

U13233 /02

114-05597030710834

One of the key questions he faces is whether the detainees fall under the protection of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the internationally recognized rules governing the treatment of captives in armed conflicts.

Article 5 of the convention requires that a tribunal decide on a case-by-case basis whether detainees should be classified as prisoners of war or, as Bush called them, "illegal combatants."

The question of letting a tribunal decide the captives' status is one of several problems administration officials are grappling with in the debate on whether to apply the formal rules of war to the Guantanamo detainees.

Others are the possible negative reaction from other countries if the United States were to say that the Geneva Convention did not apply and a fear that international rules of war could be weakened.

"Our allies would feel that if we didn't apply the Third Geneva Convention, why are they there" in Afghanistan? said Alfred Rubin, a former Pentagon lawyer who is a professor of international law at Tufts University.

"If it doesn't apply, are the Russians free to behave brutally in Chechnya, the British in Northern Ireland, the Israelis?"

Overseas reaction feared

The reaction overseas is believed to be a key reason why Secretary of State Colin L. Powell urged Bush to reconsider his decision not to apply the convention.

Powell shares the view of others in the administration that the detainees should not be considered prisoners of war, but is apparently concerned about how to justify that determination.

The question, as summed up by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, is, "Why are they not prisoners of war? Is it because the convention doesn't apply to this situation, or the convention does apply but, under the convention, these people don't qualify for that status?"

At the Pentagon, there is concern about how American soldiers in the future might be

treated if they were captured. Some officials there argue that the United States should "keep the moral high ground across the board," a defense official said.

Adhering to the convention would provide "a larger moral justification for ensuring that our folks are treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention," the official said.

Some experts believe applying the convention would have little practical result. Although the administration insists the detainees at Guantanamo are being treated humanely, "consistent with the principles" of the Geneva conventions, they don't get some privileges that would be accorded to formal prisoners of war.

"There are some things like open canteens and the right to buy musical instruments and acquire a pound of tobacco a month, or whatever it is, that they won't get," Boucher said yesterday in a C-SPAN interview.

In the administration, there is wide agreement that the al-Qaida detainees can't be called prisoners of war, since they were not part of any nation's army and belonged to a terrorist organization that specialized in attacks on innocent civilians, not a conflict between opposing armed forces.

But the Taliban captives fall into a grayer area. While senior Taliban officials could be equated with al-Qaida terrorists because of their close links, the defense official said low-ranking inductees might be considered members of an army, since the Taliban were the de facto authority in Afghanistan until ousted by rebel forces and the United States.

POWs cannot be tried for engaging in hostilities, only for war crimes, which include deliberate attacks on innocent civilians.

Interrogation concerns

The two main administration aims in holding the captives are to prevent them from carrying out new acts of terror and to extract information from them about the al-Qaida organization and any operations it might have planned.

Concerns have been raised that as prisoners of war, the

captives would only be required to supply their name, rank and serial number, or some equivalent military identification, and that this could hamper interrogations.

But experts argue that this requirement doesn't prevent the prisoners from being questioned. Promises of lenient treatment and other inducements could be used to encourage cooperation.

The detainees' fate has drawn widespread international reaction. A top Saudi official said 100 countrymen are being held by the United States, and Saudi Arabia wants them returned. Britain's foreign secretary, Jack Straw, said recently that British nationals among the detainees should be returned to Britain.

International Herald Tribune
January 30, 2002

15. Ruling On Cuba Detainees Asked By Reuters

The United Nations human rights investigator for Afghanistan called Tuesday for a tribunal to determine the status of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters being detained at the U.S. naval base in Cuba, Reuters reported from Geneva.

In an interview, Kamal Hossain also said he hoped to return to Afghanistan in February to look into issues including treatment of thousands of prisoners in Afghan jails.

Mr. Hossain, a Bangladesh lawyer who has held the independent post for three years and visited Afghanistan this month, said legal issues about Afghan detainees should be determined in accordance with international law and the Geneva Convention.

Washington Post
January 30, 2002
Pg. 21

16. Defense Balks At Contract Goals 'Essential' Services Should Not Be Privatized, Pentagon Tells OMB

By Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post Staff Writer

One of President Bush's top management priorities is to

increase the amount of government work that is contracted out or put up for competition between the public and private sectors -- forcing federal agencies to show that they can do a job better and cheaper than a private company. If an agency can't, the program gets taken over by a business that can.

Bush's budget chief, Office of Management and Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., even gave agencies targets. By the end of fiscal 2003, for example, the Pentagon -- the big kahuna of contracting agencies -- is supposed to have "competed out" 15 percent of all jobs designated as "commercial," or directly convert them to private-sector contracts. Ultimately, Bush's goal is to "compete" or convert 50 percent, equivalent to 225,000 jobs at the Pentagon alone.

Now, the Pentagon, which is giving a fresh emphasis to homeland defense, is telling OMB it is not sure that the targets are the best way to go. "We will look for the best instrument available . . . to determine the most efficient and effective way to do government business better," E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, undersecretary of defense, wrote OMB in a Dec. 26 memo.

"Such a reassessment may very well show we have already contracted out capabilities to the private sector that are essential to our mission, or that divestiture of some activities may be more appropriate than public-private competitions or direct conversions," Aldridge wrote.

Divestiture presumably means eliminating a job entirely -- whether it was being done by a contractor, a DOD civilian employee or a member of the military. Direct conversion involves turning over a federal job to the private sector without a public-private competition.

The implications are potentially significant as the White House, which lost a battle last year over federalizing airport screeners, seeks to carry out its management agenda that emphasizes slimming the bureaucracy and the Defense Department, which

9100W/ale

January 31, 2002 1:34 PM

Done at 4

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Percentages

I need to know what percent of GDP we are spending for defense and what percentage of the federal budget goes to defense.

110,01

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013102-2

.....
Please respond by 02/08/02

31 Jan 02

U13234 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10836

INFO MEMO

February 04, 2001, 4:00 PM

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Department of Defense (DoD) Spending as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the total Federal Budget

- You asked me to provide you with DoD spending as a percent of GDP and the total Federal Budget
- The attached charts display these percentages. These charts have been put into your Questions and Answers briefing book.


COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Robert Shue, (b)(6)


11-L-0559/OSD/10837

DoD Outlays as Percent of G



11-L-0559/OSD/10838

DoD Outlays as Percent of Federa



11-L-0559/OSD/10839