

5:48 PM

Action  
1/18  
6832

TO: Admiral Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 15, 2002  
SUBJECT:

*Done*  
1/23  
1/18

I want to nail down the Newt Gingrich memo on <sup>MacGregor</sup> ~~McLaughlin~~ so either you can do it, or you can't, and if you can't, I'll have to get somebody else to work it through.

381

Let me know, fast. I don't want to let it float.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
011502.01  
Attach: Email from Newt Gingrich to SecDef 1/15/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
AM 23 2002

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *1/18*

*1/23*

SECDEF—

U13167 102

NEWT + I HAVE WORKED TO GET THIS SITUATION QUIETED DOWN. I DON'T EXPECT AN ARTICLE ANYTIME SOON (BASED ON INFO FROM NEWT + STEVE HERBERT). WORKING TO GET ALL SERVICES PLUGGED IN WITH CEBROUSKI - NOT JUST ARMY + MACGREGOR.

15 Jan 02

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 15, 2002 10:56 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Herbits1@aol.com; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Torie.Clarke@osd.mil; James.P.Thomas@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** URGENT FOR SECDEF, Wolfowitz, Derida  
 An Impending Defeat for Transformation at DOD

Ricks at the Washington Post has a general sense of the following events and is working on a story which may appear as early as thursday.

Struggles often have a clarity of winning and losing that is very hard to disguise. If the Taliban were still in Kabul they might claim they were winning. With the United States and its Afghan allies in Kabul it is impossible to make that argument.

A similar clarifying event is about to happen in the Pentagon. The anti-Transformation forces are about to defeat the pro-Transformation forces in an act that will be public, will put the Secretary on the defensive about whether he is serious about change in DOD, will further marginalize Admiral Cebrowski (who is already far too weak in the hierarchical pecking order of real power in the Pentagon), and will send a signal to every junior officer that having ideas is dangerous and saluting the anti-transformation power structure is the road to a happy career

The anti-transformation senior leadership of the Army believes that Colonel Douglas MacGregor's working with Admiral Cebrowski is so dangerously knowledgeable that it is worth significant risk to either force him to retire (their first goal) or at a minimum force him back into an Army assignment where he can be muzzled and forced to waste his time until he ultimately retires.

The anti-transformation senior Army feels so strongly about this that they ordered MacGregor's tour at the National Defense University ended six months early without informing Admiral Gaffney (MacGregor's reporting officer who would normally be consulted not merely informed). Gaffney opposed the move and appealed both to the head of Army personnel and to the Director of the Army Staff. He was ignored.

Admiral Cebrowski, to whom MacGregor had been loaned by NDU, personally made clear to the Army that he found MacGregor very valuable and wanted him to stay. He was ignored and ultimately decided not to appeal to the Secretary because he was afraid it would so embitter the senior Army leadership that his office could not work with them productively.

The Army's explanation for MacGregor's new assignment (to the Army Objective Force Task Force in Crystal City) is blatantly disingenuous. The senior anti-transformation leadership have stated in their defense that if MacGregor wants to work on transformation they want him to do so inside the Army. His first week in the new job indicates this is a palpably false statement. He has been sent there to be muzzled, cut off from joint activities with Cebrowski, and as a symbol communicate to prospective creators of transformational options that only defenders of the old order get assigned to the Office of Transformation.

The fact is the Army leadership dislikes MacGregor intensely, wishes he would retire, has no intention of allowing him to be effective, any public statements to the contrary are simply less than candid...

A simple test would be to take the senior Army's protestations that they want him to help with transformation in the Army and stipulate that he be cross assigned so he works with both Cebrowski and with the Objective Force and has the right to move freely between the two offices.

This would actually make sense and would create a sense of joint rather than single service focus (the very single service focus of the Objective Force effort is a sign it is non-transformational and an effort to use new words to cling to the old Army). At the end of his two year tour both Cebrowski and Gen. Riggs, head of the Army's Objective Force Task Force, would rate his performance. This would save face for the senior army, but would quietly convey that the Secretary of Defense is serious about transformation.

1/15/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/5816

Behavior to date suggests that without SecDef prompting, there is no likelihood of the Army senior leadership approving such a dual hatted arrangement. It would actually make the concept of diverse views more dangerous when their goal is to smother those ideas and their potential influence.

At the present time the anti-Transformation forces in the Army have won. Gaffney, Cebrowski and the process of Transformation have lost.

The Secretary could change that by delivering an unambiguous message to the Chief that Cebrowski's request for a particular individual, either as dual hatted to Cebrowski and Riggs or returned to Cebrowski for a two year assignment, be accepted. Cebrowski has made the particular personnel decision; he clearly wants MacGregor.

The Secretary is simply establishing the fact throughout the highest ranks that transformation is serious by endorsing Cebrowski's efforts for change over the Army's efforts to sustain the status quo..

If transformation is not worth imposing on the old order it will not happen.

This is not an earth shaking event, but it is a highly symbolic moment in which The Secretary of Defense at virtually no risk can send an unmistakable signal that ideas matter, that people with the courage to argue for ideas should be protected and promoted, that underhanded bureaucratic efforts to undermine and cripple will not be tolerated. It has all the symbolic benefits of a four-star firing, while protecting the Chief's image. and doing something positive rather than negative.

Churchill had a stamp in the opening year of his wartime leadership that said ACTION THIS DAY. He used it to galvanize a slumbering military bureaucracy that had been losing the war to Germany.

ACTION THIS DAY on this small symbol would have a loud resonance in accelerating the belief that transformation is real. Inaction this day will lead to a public symbolic defeat that will lead junior officers to be more timid and the people who favor transformation to be somewhat demoralized and defeated.

The choice really is sometimes this simple.

Newt

ps Steve Herbits is fully up to speed and strongly concurs in this analysis. .



DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
DEC 8 2002

October 4, 2002

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT: Perspective Paper

I searched my files and came up with two possible papers Paul Wolfowitz might be referring to. They are attached. Let me say in addition, that very often staffs do not understand or share the perspective of top-level leaders. For example, when I worked for Kissinger on the NSC, I undertook studies of the performance of the intelligence community in times of crisis. One of the first things that emerged was that the sorts of questions that Kissinger raised, or the concerns that Nixon and Kissinger had, were not understood or shared by the people in State or in the Intelligence Community. They were answering questions they did not understand fully or made no sense to them giving their view of how the world worked. The top-level people were concerned with the longer-term consequences of the way in which the crisis came out, in particular, the perceived role of the United States with successful outcomes. The people down in the bureaucracy seemed entirely concerned with the crisis itself, getting it over quickly, seeing it as a problem that had to be solved. In contrast top-level people often saw it as an opportunity, either to achieve some other end, or to gain reputation. The latter seemed to be especially scorned by the people in the bureaucracy.

381

Later, when I lectured to mid-career CIA groups, I used to explain this situation to them by saying that it was if there was a chess game, two players at the board, but each had a group of advisors. The problem was that the advisors didn't know what the game was all about. They might know a few of the moves, but they did not really understand the game, so that their advice was often useless.

I have other stories that reflect the different perspective of leaders and staffs if you want to hear them. Staffs tend to focus on process and on quantifiable aspects of problems, the leaders are (should be) focused on broader issues for which the analysis methods of the staffs are inadequate, or do not deal with.

*(e.g. the Reserve the Tank) or the Tank*

40102

During the strategic review of last year, it struck me how wedded people in DoD are to responding to threats. The notion that we should be causing other people problems and worrying less about threats seems something that they find difficult to take onboard. Earlier experiences with the effort to introduce competitive strategies were similar. There is a blindness to the problems of potential opponents that can be exploited.

Attachments

From "on not confessing ourselves"  
Essays in Honor of Albert and  
Roberta Wohlstetter.

## 16

### Strategy as a Profession for Future Generations

Andrew W. Marshall

#### A Visit to Chartres and Jouy

One of Albert Wohlstetter's distinctive characteristics has always been his search for the absolute best of whatever is available. This has been true of everything: people, technical advice, furniture, medical care, and, perhaps most importantly, food. In the mid-1950s, travel to Europe increased for many people at RAND. In the fall of 1956 my wife and I were in Paris at the same time as the Wohlstetters—Albert, Roberta, and Joanie. Harvey DeWeerd was also there. Early one Sunday morning the six of us went off to see the cathedral at Chartres in a car Albert had rented. Albert had also noticed there was a one-star restaurant nearby, in the small town of Jouy. He telephoned to reserve a table.

It was unusually cold for November and, of course, the church was unheated. His enthusiasm and tutelage were unbounded while we muttered quietly and froze. Not a tympanum, portal, window, or carving went unnoted, inside or out. Finally we drove off to Jouy—ravenous and shivering. It was the first occasion for my wife and me to experience the wonderful French custom of a splendid Sunday midday meal. Our expectations were high—and were realized! A charming rustic inn, with gleaming copper pans hanging in an open kitchen. The ebullient patron and his wife all smiles and welcoming bon jours, a beaming presence in a room full of warmth and appetizing odors.

I cannot remember the entire meal, but its main features were two roast pheasants with appropriate garnishment and an excellent raspberry soufflé. Both the cathedral and the meal were memorable and excellent. We owe that to Albert and his effort to make the most of every occasion.

\* \* \*

How does one become a strategic thinker? What sort of training

or apprenticeship is useful? What is a strategist? These are all difficult questions. For one thing there are problems of defining *strategic thinking*, or what strategy is. These definitional problems seem to be intractable, and to some extent it may be a matter of recognizing strategic thinking when one sees it. But, in general, strategy as contrasted to tactics deals with the coordination of activities at the higher levels of organizations. Strategy also focuses on longer-term goals and reflects a cast of mind that focuses on shaping the future rather than simply reacting to it.

Our vocabulary and use of words in these areas are seldom precise or accurate. The word *strategy* tends to be used in many ways. In particular I would note that in the national security area, which is the main focus of this piece, there is a constant tendency to think of military strategy as related principally to the application of resources in a possible future war and the general guidance for more detailed planning for specific contingencies. The result is that there is relatively little discussion of strategies for the peacetime management of our military organizations and for the allocation of resources over time so as to develop more efficient, effective, competitive military forces with appropriate doctrines and concepts of operations. Given the existence of nuclear weapons, the highest priority objective for the United States has been deterrence of large-scale war. In this we have been largely successful. Therefore, the strategic management problem in our national security establishment has been the peacetime competition to preserve and indeed enhance in the future our ability to deter the Soviet Union from actions adverse to our interests. Now even this definition of our priority objective may need serious amendment as we move into a more truly multipolar world.

It is clear that some people seem more readily able to address issues of strategy or the strategic management of our national security efforts. They have a willingness and a self-confidence to address larger, more basic issues than do others. They often appear to bring a very different perspective to the discussion of the issues of what our strategy ought to be. How do they get this way? What sort of training is useful? This is what I want to address in the next two sections.

#### What Environments Produce Strategists?

This is a question that deserves extensive study. All I can do is draw upon my experience in and observations of the environment at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and early 1960s and my later experience in government in the period 1972 to the present. One disadvantage of focusing on RAND as a producer of strategists is that it biases the discussion toward an analysis of the development

of people whose role has been advisers in the sense that Herb Goldhamer treated in his book, *The Adviser*.<sup>1</sup> There are other routes to being a strategist, including those who reach high positions in the military services or enter government service from other career lines such as the law or investment banking. But the case of RAND is perhaps of special interest because it did provide in the 1950s and early 1960s an environment that produced a number of people who are now acknowledged as major strategic thinkers.

### *The RAND Experience*

There was something special about the RAND environment from the late 1940s through most of the 1960s. For one thing, especially in the late 1940s and the 1950s, there was a sense of being on the leading edge, of dealing with the centrally important problems. The invention of nuclear weapons and several other technology developments at the end of World War II produced a situation that was quite new, one in which the issue of what our strategy should be was extremely important. Another aspect of this situation, given the large increase in destructive power nuclear weapons introduced, was that there were no experts. Two small weapons had been used at the very end of World War II; what larger numbers of weapons might do to change the nature of war was unclear. Nobel prize winners were no better than graduate students in thinking about the relevant issues, and at meetings and working groups at RAND in the early days there was no hierarchy. This was an ideal situation for younger people (the average age of the professional staff at RAND in 1950 was about twenty-eight), who were immediately treated as equals and valued for what they could contribute to the discussions. This is a rare situation, certainly not characteristic of academia or normal organizations, and it led to the rapid development of individuals who were willing to address the broadest issues of national security. There was also a sense of having a preferred position with respect to access to information on the new developments taking place in weaponry, in particular in the design of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and other relevant technology.

Two other things favored the development of strategic thinking and innovation at RAND. One was the freedom RAND had to select the problems and the issues on which it worked. This is very different from the environment in contract studies organizations, especially now. The other was the presence of several remarkable men who set the intellectual tone and style of much of the broader analysis that began in the early 1950s. Two I would name are Charles Hitch and John Williams, the heads respectively of the Economics and the Mathematics

Divisions. Apart from their own intellectual contributions, their interest in the cultivation of full-ranging discussion, their intellectual fairness, and their interest in the development of younger people and of new methods of analysis all favored innovation.

One of the interesting things that happened at RAND was the success of the economists in assuming a leading role in the direction of a number of important studies and, more generally, in shaping the way in which RAND addressed national security issues. Initially the economists were brought into what had been largely a technological organization to deal with what was called the military worth function. It had become clear to the technical people that they needed some assistance in thinking about the objectives that military weapon systems were to achieve. There was also some interest in the economics of defense, especially as it dealt with issues of mobilization, and in the targeting of an opponent's industrial capacity and assessing damage to industrial societies from strategic bombing. The economists soon played a much larger and more central role in managing and directing a number of the successful studies. Why was this?

Herman Kahn and I used to discuss this puzzle. We had a number of hypotheses. For one thing the economics of the situation, broadly conceived, were important. What things cost, the level of resources that nations are able to devote to defense over an extended period—these all shape one's views as to the kinds of weapon systems that are desirable and feasible. But another advantage the economists had was that they knew from their own experience that experts could be wrong. Indeed, they also knew that much discussion of economic problems is foolish and that many widely held views, even among responsible people, are faulty. The experience of engineers and physicists is different. In those fields there are real experts who are much more likely to be right than are others. Economists, therefore, were more intellectually comfortable in the situation that existed with respect to nuclear warfare, in which there were no experts.

One of the people in the economics department who was the first to lead and manage a large RAND study was Albert Wohlstetter. Beginning in the early 1950s, he examined a set of issues connected with the basing of long-range bombers. The results of that study are discussed elsewhere in this book. I want to note what seems to me one of the major innovations or inventions Albert made in the conduct of that study. In previous large RAND studies, the practice had been to lay out a number of alternative systems or programs at the very beginning of the study. The study itself focused on evaluating which of the alternative systems was the most cost-effective.



Albert's approach was different. He started with a few alternatives to the existing plan or program, but as the study went on he evolved improved alternatives. He was also less rigid than had been the practice in setting down the criteria, the objective functions, the measures of effectiveness at the beginning of the study and simply sticking with them. His evolutionary approach developed additional criteria and tests of performance as more understanding of the problems and the issues emerged. This was, in my judgment, a crucial invention for doing these kinds of studies, because one would learn much more about the nature of the issues and the problems, how one ought to look at them, and what criteria were relevant as one went further along in the studies. Also, this way of conducting the analysis had the advantage of inventing additional and better alternatives to examine as one went along.

Another aspect of the situation at RAND that was exceptionally favorable to strategic thinking and innovation during the early period was the practice of inviting first-rate people to come and spend the summer. This created an environment in which the important thing was to try to tap into the very best talent in the whole country. The objective was not to do the best that RAND could do with its existing staff, but in a sense to do an analysis that was the best that the country as a whole could accomplish. By its very nature, any organization is limited in the amount and variety of talent, backgrounds, and insights that it can include among its staff. This attitude of searching for the very best people and drawing on the best talent is a key to excellence in broad thinking about any problem or issue. Unfortunately, most organizations do not operate this way.

There is perhaps a natural history to most organizations. When they are first formed they are focused on a mission, they recruit people who are enthusiastic and who devote themselves to the goals of the organization. As time goes on the organization becomes less flexible, accumulates some deadwood, and has some difficulty in sustaining the original vitality. Organizations sometimes are formed in especially suitable environments that allow them to flourish for a time. Then the external environment changes and the organization declines in vitality. In any case, the RAND of the 1950s and early 1960s was a remarkable place, both for the talent it recruited and for its atmosphere and intellectual dynamic. It was also remarkable for its boldness in addressing broader questions of strategy. It is, therefore, not surprising that some interesting and influential people developed there.

### *The U.S. Government*

The next experience that is perhaps relevant comes from my time in government. Beginning in the middle 1970s, I was involved in

attempts to initiate strategic planning activities in the Department of Defense and in the direction of some strategic planning experiments. In particular, James Roche, then a navy commander, and I wrote several papers during 1975-1976 to promote strategic thinking in the Defense Department. We also sponsored contractor research on some aspects of strategic planning. This experience led me to believe that, while systems analysis had been a liberating force during its early development, by the middle 1970s it had become a constraint on thinking strategically. People who were systems analysts found it difficult to address the sorts of questions that we felt needed to be considered in strategic planning. People with a business background or a combination of business school and military service seemed to be among the best at taking up and addressing the questions we wanted dealt with.

We saw it as a vaccination problem: some backgrounds promoted strategic thinking and others seemed to inoculate people against it. Why is that? To some extent, the systems analysts had by that time developed routine approaches to analysis and perhaps had ceased paying sufficient attention to the complex consequences of acquiring the systems they dealt with. James Schlesinger made a comment to me a number of years ago that systems analysis proceeds by trivializing the measurement of effectiveness while perfecting the analysis and the estimate of costs. Programmatic actions, the acquisition of particular weapon systems, the adoption of a new concept of operations, or the setting of new objectives for military forces have complex consequences, including their effects upon the beliefs, actions, and resource allocation patterns of the potential opponents. Most of these consequences are not usually considered in the standard kinds of analysis. One result is that the top leadership of the Department of Defense often gets remarkably little assistance from their staffs when truly strategic decisions are addressed. This is because the focus of the work of the staffs, the criteria they use, and their measures of effectiveness are too narrow to account for the considerations that top-level decision makers in fact want to consider, are concerned with, and take into account as best they can.

Some decisions have larger and different consequences than others. For example, a decision to pursue or create a major strategic defense capability is different from a decision among several alternative programs for the next generation of fighter aircraft. The former involves going into a new business for the U.S. military (although it is a business we once were in), the latter the continuation of an existing business. Different issues are involved, different forms of analysis seem needed, and existing analysis methods tend to treat the two types of decisions

the same way. Part of the problem may be that much if not all of the existing analysis methodology was developed to assist in procurement or operational-planning decisions. Other methods of analysis are necessary when the questions are more like: What businesses should I be in? Where are my competitive advantages? One advantage people from the business world or business schools may have is that they are used to addressing these kinds of questions, though often with analysis methods that are less systematic.

### What Backgrounds and Experiences Are Conducive to Strategic Thinking?

There is no specific set of disciplines that must be mastered to be a strategist. People who think strategically come from a number of different backgrounds. Among those whom I have met and feel that I know personally the best academic backgrounds seem to be economics, business school, applied technology (especially for those who have been in the business world), and in some cases political science. But what seems to be central is a cast of mind that is questioning, eclectic, able to devise the broadest kinds of issues and goals, and able to formulate appropriate ways of achieving these goals. A high tolerance for the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies any effort to think forward five, ten, or twenty years is required. For many people, some period of intense involvement in an important, large-scale project or enterprise has proved to be crucial.

World War II was such an experience for a number of people and, indeed, there may be a generational factor at work: living in interesting times may contribute to being a good strategist. People who were involved—even if only in staff positions or on the peripheries—in some major decision-making body connected with that war had a special quality about them. Experiences in World War II clearly had a significant impact on a number of the people who were at RAND during the 1950s. Because they contained many people with World War II experience the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had a character to them that favored strategic thinking. This characteristic of administrations has gradually eroded since the late 1950s.

The changes that we now see in the security environment of the United States will force another major effort of rethinking our situation, our goals, and our strategies. It might, therefore, be a period in which a new generation of strategic thinkers will emerge as a result of the critical experiences they will go through in the next decade.

Turning to the question of what kind of academic study or professional training might be useful, I would start with economics and business

school training, especially business schools that have strong programs in business policy and strategy. My recommendation about economics is, however, a guarded one. Since the 1940s and 1950s, economics training has become too mathematical, too focused on the acquisition of particular analytic tools that are not, in fact, of much use in the national security area. Something like the first courses in graduate school may be enough. They are important, however, because people who do not have a sense of macroeconomics and the fundamental trade-offs that societies have to make find it difficult to think clearly about the long-term implications of devoting large, possibly excessive, percentages of gross national products (GNPs) to military uses. The current state of the Soviet Union is in some part the result of decades of a heavy military burden, with perhaps on the order of 25 to 30 percent of GNP devoted to the military and the external empire.

In the early 1980s, when the first initiatives were taken within the Defense Department to encourage application of a set of ideas that later were labeled as competitive strategies, I had a discussion with the chief of one of the military services. His reaction to the idea of designing some military programs so as to impose increased costs upon the Soviets was negative, or at least cautious. He had two arguments against focusing on increasing Soviet costs or expenditures. The first was that the Soviets would simply spend the extra money, there were no reasons for them not to do so; the second was that our own budgets fluctuate so much that it was unwise to stimulate a competition which we ourselves might not sustain. The second of these arguments has real merit to it. The first shows an unawareness of the long-term consequences for the Soviets of high levels of military expenditures or of possible trade-offs between individual programs the Soviets might be compelled to make, since resources always are limited.

Another virtue of economics training, or for that matter business-school training, is that a modest amount of mathematics is acquired, as is some sense of the importance of technology and an ability to interact more effectively with technologists and hard scientists. This was one of the advantages the economists had over the political scientists at RAND in the early 1950s: quantitative analysis was something the economists were used to and their interest in or ability to discuss and understand what the technologists were up to was somewhat better than that of the political scientists.

Demography is another area that deserves much more attention than it has had in the past in the development of strategy. The relationship of demography to political and military behavior is likely to be an area of increased importance and attention. Demography is

but in only the most obvious and limited ways. William McNeill recently wrote a small volume addressing some of the broader relationships of demography to political behavior.<sup>2</sup> As in other of his works, he provides a number of hypotheses and sketches out areas that deserve considerably more attention.

Additional fields of interest are cultural anthropology, ethology, and some areas of psychology. In some ways a new understanding of man is emerging, based on study of the evolution of man and human society and on new analyses of the biology of man, in particular the functioning of the brain. How men process information, make decisions, and behave are central issues on which much new knowledge exists and more will be available in the future.

But above all, if I had a suggestion to make, it would be that people study, in any case at least read, history of all kinds: military history, of course, but also economic and technological history. The history or analysis of past wars is a major antidote to the narrow focus of many existing methods of analysis of defense issues. Most discussion of strategy and defense programs is, if anything, too focused on technology and weaponry and not enough on the other factors that often dominate actual warfare. Also, if one considers the extended competition between states such as Rome and Carthage, the issue of why the Romans won in the end may shed interesting light on the key variables that need to be considered in our conceptions of strategy.

Another thing that is of great importance is to understand the differences in the ways in which other nations are likely to perceive situations and react to them. Specialized studies of the strategic cultures of the Soviet Union, China, India, Japan, and the European nations are of great use. Some of this can be gained by reading the history of these nations, especially the development of their military and other national security organizations. Other aspects relate to the particular cultural characteristics of these societies.

### The Future of Strategy

We are at a major turning point in the history of the world. A new structure is emerging, a more multipolar world with more complex alliance arrangements. Technology is likely to change the nature of warfare, much as it did in the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Then the development of naval aircraft and aircraft carriers revolutionized war at sea; on land the development of the tank and rugged, portable radios led to the invention of the panzer division and new concepts of operations that changed the nature of theater warfare; and, of course, there was the development of tactical and strategic air power.

New weapons required the development of new doctrines, new concepts of operations, and new kinds of military organizations to exploit fully the new technology. How we are to maintain the U.S. military and national security position over the course of the next twenty years is a central issue that will have to be addressed. What our strategy should be for the more complex competition that is emerging will require consideration of many aspects of the changing security environment and changing technology. We will need to know much more than we now do about the emerging regional powers, as well as about the likely major actors, their strategic orientation, their strengths, and their weaknesses.

It is to be hoped that new centers of strategic thought and innovation will arise and a new generation of strategists and military innovators will develop to deal with these problems.

### Notes

1. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Advisers* (New York: Elsevier, 1978).
2. William H. McNeill, *Population and Politics Since 1750* (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1990).

10/15

October 3, 2002 7:06 AM

TO: Andy Marshall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Perspective Paper

*Larry Di Rita*  
*10/15*

Do you have a paper from years ago that talks about the policy perspective and the staff perspective? It's a short paper that Paul Wolfowitz remembers.

If you have one, please give me a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
100302-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/18/02

RESPONSE <sup>10/15</sup>  
ATTACHED

11/25  
1530  
SHOW/FARe

01214

November 6, 2002 10:58 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Non-Lethal Capabilities

1 PM 11/25  
1314

370.51

I would like to have you take a look at what we have by way of non-lethal capabilities, what is currently going on with respect to it and what restrictions there are because of the chemical treaty and what you recommend we ought to do.

My view is we are going to have a need for non-lethal capabilities, and we ought to have a focused effort on it. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-10



Please respond by 12/6/02

11/25  
RESPONSE ATTACHED

v/r

6 Nov 02



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

273 JUN -2 PM 1:07

### INFO MEMO

December 26, 2002, 1:28 PM

**FOR:** Secretary of Defense

**FROM:** *Dr.* Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu* December 31, 2002  
Signature & Date

**SUBJECT:** Olmsted Scholar and Foreign Area Expert Programs

- This provides an interim response to your November 9, 2002 request to determine if the Olmsted Scholar and foreign area expert programs are being properly utilized.
- The Olmsted Foundation Board of Directors is concerned that the time required to complete the program coupled with Service utilization policies may be discouraging quality officers from applying, decreasing the Department's ability to produce the best officers with regional expertise and cultural understanding.
- The Olmsted Scholar Program provides studies in a foreign language and culture abroad for military line officers with 3-10 years of commissioned service. Services screen nominees via a board process and the Olmsted Directors select scholars.
- Around 9 scholars are selected each year, but the number increased in the past two years, (11 scholars in 2002 and 18 scholars in 2003). The Olmsted Board of Directors has expressed concern that the quality and quantity of candidates is not at the desired level.
- Since 1960, there have been 366 Olmsted Scholars, of whom 28 (7.6%) reached flag or general officer rank, with details provided at (Tab A).
- We have asked the Services to provide information on the quality and utilization of their Olmsted Scholars and to comment on how this program can best meet their future requirements for foreign area expert needs (Tab B).
- Additionally, the Services, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies have been asked to provide information on their requirements for language and foreign area experts as part of an ongoing review of the Department's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program and on projected needs, not on current manning authorizations.
- Once all data is received and compiled, a report on both programs will be provided.

11-L-0552/OSD/5827

U00066 /03

**RECOMMENDATION:** None.

**COORDINATION:** None.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by CDR Brad Roberson, OUSD (P&R)(MPP)OEPM, (b)(6)

*BR* 12.27.02

**Olmsted Scholars  
General/Flag Officers by Cohort Year Groupings**

**Department of Defense**

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	30	8	26.7%
1965-1969	30	7	23.3%
1970-1974	39	4	10.3%
1975-1979	40	5	12.5%
1980-1984	42	4	9.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>15.5%</b>

**Department of the Army**

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	3	30.0%
1965-1969	10	1	10.0%
1970-1974	14	2	14.3%
1975-1979	10	2	20.0%
1980-1984	15	0	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13.6%</b>

**Department of the Navy**

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	2	20.0%
1965-1969	10	3	30.0%
1970-1974	13	1	7.7%
1975-1979	15	2	13.3%
1980-1984	13	3	23.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>18.0%</b>

**Department of the Air Force**

Olmsted Cohort Year Group	Cohort Size	GO/FO in Cohort	% GO/FO
1960-1964	10	3	30.0%
1965-1969	10	3	30.0%
1970-1974	12	1	8.3%
1975-1979	15	1	6.7%
1980-1984	14	1	7.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14.8%</b>



<u>Born</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Olmsted Scholar Class</u>
<u>1 Star</u>		
1936	BGEN Anthony Alan Smith, USA (Ret.)	'62
1939	BGEN Wilfred Leon Goodson, USAF (Ret.)	'64
1941	BGEN Howard Taft Prince II, USA (Ret.)	'65
1942	BGEN Robert Bruce Giffen, USAF (Ret.)	'70
1942	BGEN Frank Ralph Giordano, USA (Ret.)	'71
1949	BGEN James William Morehouse, USAF (Ret.)	'77
1951	BGEN Emerson N. Gardner Jr, USMC	'78
1952	RADM Miles Benton Wachendorf, USN	'79
1952	RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN	'80
1952	RADM William Douglas Crowder, USN	'80
1956	BGEN Silvanus T. Gilbert III, USAF	'83
1954	RADM Deborah Ann Loewer, USN	'84

<u>2 Star</u>		
1936	MGEN Jack O'Brien Bradshaw, USA (Ret.)	'62
1935	MGEN Richard Barron Goetze Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'63
1937	MGEN Wayne Otto Jefferson Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'63
1935	RADM Raynor A. K. Taylor, USN (Ret.)	'67
1940	MGEN Peter Dodd Robinson, USAF (Ret.)	'68
1941	RADM Larry Roy Marsh, USN (Ret.)	'68
1943	MGEN Stanley George Genega, USA (Ret.)	'71
1944	RADM Thomas Fletcher Marfiak, USN (Ret.)	'73
1950	MGEN Bruce Kenyon Scott, USA (Ret.)	'79

<u>3 Star</u>		
1934	LGEN Frederick Joseph Brown III, USA (Ret.)	'60
1930	LGEN Clyde Dixon Dean, USMC (Ret.)(Deceased 12/23/01)	'62
1936	VADM Ronald M. Eytchison, USN (Ret.)	'65
1951	LGEN John P. Abizaid, USA	'78

<u>4 Star</u>		
1930	ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (Ret.)	'60
1939	GEN George Lee Butler, USAF (Ret.)	'65
1940	GEN Henry Viccellio Jr., USAF (Ret.)	'67

1 star = 12	USA = 8
2 star = 9	USAF = 9
3 star = 4	USN = 9
4 star = 3	USMC = 2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>28</b>



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

DEC 9 2002


PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (M&RA)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MR)

SUBJECT: Olmsted Scholar Program

The Olmsted Scholar Program is designed to allow selected officers to study overseas at a foreign university, gain an understanding of foreign languages, and become immersed in regional cultures. This program is an integral part of the Department's ability to produce officers that are experienced in regional affairs and cultural awareness. As the challenges and operations of the Global War on Terrorism continue, the requirement for and utilization of officers with regional expertise, foreign language capability, and cultural awareness will be in greater demand.

In order to ensure optimal use of the Olmsted Scholar Program, please provide information on program participants from 1986-2001 and your thoughts on how this program can best be used to support future Service requirements. Please provide the information requested in the format provided and your comments by January 3, 2003. Should your staff have any questions, please contact Commander Bradley W. Roberson at (b)(6) or [bradley.Roberson@osd.mil](mailto:bradley.Roberson@osd.mil).

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy

Attachment:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/5831

### 1983 - 2003 Olmstead Scholar Data Request

- 1) Name.
- 2) Years of Commissioned Service when entering the program.
- 3) Branch qualification or warfare designator.
- 4) Qualified branch or warfare designator with or ahead of year group? (Y/N)
- 5) Assigned as an aide prior to entering Olmsted Program? (Y/N)
- 6) Time in program (months).
- 7) Country or Region of Study.
- 8) Foreign Language acquired? Specify which language.
- 9) Highest level of proficiency obtained?
- 10) Master's Degree achieved? (Y/N) If yes, discipline of the degree?
- 11) School where Master's Degree was obtained.
- 12) Completed Intermediate Service School? (Y/N) Senior Service School? (Y/N)
- 13) Residence or Non-residence? (Answer for both ISS and SSS as applicable).
- 14) Next assignment following ISS? Specify command and billet.
- 15) Below Zone pick for O-4 or O-5? If yes, specify which grade.
- 16) O-5 Command screen obtained with or ahead of peer group? (Y/N)
- 17) Highest grade obtained?
- 18) Assigned as an aide or military assistant after entering Olmsted Program? (Y/N)
- 19) Assigned to either OSD or Joint tour? If yes, specify command and billet.
- 20) Utilization tour performed? (Y/N)
- 21) Joint or Service utilization tour?
- 22) Command where utilization tour was performed.
- 23) Billet for utilization tour.

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/5832

11/13/02

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Programs**

Look into the Olmsted Scholars program and see if we are properly using it.

Also look into the area expert programs in the services and see if we are properly using them. I think we need to get the department squared away in these areas.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
110902.03

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 11/23 \_\_\_\_\_

11/13/02

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 9, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Programs**

350

Look into the Olmsted Scholars program and see if we are properly using it.

Also look into the area expert programs in the services and see if we are properly using them. I think we need to get the department squared away in these areas.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
110902.03

Please respond by: 11/23

9 Nov 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2002

383.6

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0505

Dear Senator Boxer:

Thank you for your December 4, 2001 letter inquiring as to the status of Mr. John Walker. As you know, Mr. Walker was found in the company of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda combatants during a combat action in Afghanistan. Mr. Walker is under the control of U.S. forces. He is being held aboard USS BATAAN in the theater of operations, and has received medical treatment for what appear to have been non-life threatening injuries sustained in combat. His future disposition is under consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 JAN 02

OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

FAX COVER SHEET

To: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer

Date: December 5, 2001

pages: 2 (including cover sheet)

for what appear to have been  
non-life threatening injuries sustained  
in combat. His future disposition  
is under consideration. S/

Hard copy to follow in mail.

Have this coordinated  
by GC.

To: O&D for  
Staffing by GC.  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

SECDEF Initial Response

D. Rita  
Larry Di Rita  
12/7

Dear Senator Boxer -

Thank you for your recent letter  
enquiring as to the status of Mr John  
Walker. As you know, Mr Walker was  
found in the company of Taliban and  
Al Qaeda combatants during a combat  
action in Afghanistan in which a United States  
CIA agent was killed. He is under the control of  
U.S. forces and has received medical treatment

11-L-0559/OSD15836

The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510-0505

Dear Senator Boxer:

*December 4, 2001*

Thank you for your recent letter inquiring as to the status of Mr. John Walker. As you know, Mr. Walker was found in the company of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda combatants during a combat action in Afghanistan in which a United States CIA agent was killed. ~~He~~ *is* under the control of U.S. forces and has received medical treatment for what appear to have been non-life threatening injuries sustained in combat. His future disposition is under consideration.

Sincerely,

*USIS being held aboard USS PELELIU in the theater of operations,*

Acknowledgement letter:

- OK as is; finalize and SOM\*
- Change verbiage as noted; finalize and SOM\*
- Use this to close action; no further reply required; finalize and SOM\*
- Please see me

\* SOM signature as 'Donald Rumsfeld' unless otherwise indicated.

*Pod GC covered edited*  
*Principal Deputy*  
*12/31/01*



BARBARA BOXER  
CALIFORNIA

2001 DEC -7 PM 3:47

COMMITTEES:  
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
ENVIRONMENT  
AND PUBLIC WORKS  
FOREIGN RELATIONS

# United States Senate

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
SUITE 112  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0505

(b)(6)  
senator@boxer.senate.gov  
http://boxer.senate.gov

December 4, 2001

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon, 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Over the past few days, I have received many inquiries into the case of Mr. John Walker. As you know, media sources have reported that Mr. Walker is a United States citizen whose family lives in California and who appears to be involved with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

As the Department of Defense investigates Mr. Walker's activities in Afghanistan, I ask that you keep me up to date on your findings. In addition, please let me know as soon as possible what specific actions you intend to take with regard to this case. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Barbara Boxer*  
Barbara Boxer  
United States Senator

U19191 /01

1700 MONTGOMERY STREET  
SUITE 240  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111

(b)(6)

312 N. SPRING STREET  
SUITE 1742  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

(b)(6)

501 T STREET  
SUITE 7-600  
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814

(b)(6)

1130 O STREET  
SUITE 2450  
FRESNO, CA 93721

(b)(6)

600 B STREET  
SUITE 2240  
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

(b)(6)

201 NORTH P STREET  
SUITE 210  
SAN BERNARDINO, CA 92401

(b)(6)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/5838

12/19 1620

12/19 R/19

Snowflake

December 18, 2002 11:43 AM SEEN

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: North Korea

*Handwritten notes:*  
S.S. [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
attached. [unclear]  
asked in March '01  
Korea (North)  
TC

*Handwritten notes:*  
12/23  
~~copy of file~~

I think Ivan Scott said I answered a question, "You've got to be kidding." I can remember doing that. Could you please get the transcript on that? It was concerning North Korea and a preemptive strike.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121802-6

.....  
Please respond by 01/03/03

18 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/5839

U00077 /03

## **Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA**

---

**From:** Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 17, 2002 3:21 PM  
**To:** Clarke, Torie, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: North Korea: You gotta be kidding me

Here's when Ivan first asked the question in March 2001...

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2001/t03082001\\_t308sd2a.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2001/t03082001_t308sd2a.html)

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the wake of meetings yesterday with the Korean -- South Korean president, and with your meetings with Lord Robertson, intelligence experts still say that North Korea -- and it's very hard to get intelligence out of there -- could possibly have ICBMs capable of hitting the U.S. in the next four or five years. And they also say that even going four more, it would be impossible to put even a limited defense system in place by then.

What will you do if in fact North Korea abridges the agreement and starts testing or starts building missiles capable of hitting the U.S.? Would you advise the president perhaps to conduct a first strike, or what would you do?

Rumsfeld: (Laughs.) You've got to be kidding. (Laughter.) I mean -- (laughter continues) --

Q: (Off mike) -- but wouldn't it give them the latitude of striking us first?

Rumsfeld: Look, the -- there are so many hypotheticals we could fashion around here, and we could spend endless hours discussing them, and it would be unuseful for me.

The -- you are correct; there's no question but that North Korea has had a considerable appetite for ballistic missiles of various ranges. And they have also been a significant proliferator of those capabilities throughout a good many countries across the globe, and they still are.

We are approaching the missile defense issue in a fresh way and have made some progress in our thinking. And very likely we'll be visiting with the National Security Council at some point in the period ahead and discussing the things we think we think at this stage, and getting guidance and ultimately decisions from the president as to how to proceed.

And he asked it again in September 2002...

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/t09162002\\_t0916sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/t09162002_t0916sd.html)

Q: Mr. Secretary, two months ago I asked you if the United States would consider a preemptive strike against North Korea because North Korea was obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and you said at that time, quote: "You gotta be kidding," unquote. In other words, no way. And yet the United States is considering -- underline "considering" -- a preemptive strike against Iraq. What's the difference? And should we, perhaps, also consider taking action against North Korea and Iran, since they were mentioned in the State of the Union?

Rumsfeld: Well, as you know well, the President's remarks to the United Nations and to the country did not address the subject of North Korea or Iran. He did, properly, in my view, characterize those three countries, those two plus Iraq, as the axis of evil. And I think that what's taken place since that speech has been an

11-L-0559/OSD/5840

indication of how useful that speech was because you can clearly see stirrings in various countries, including one or more of those, taking place, and also in some of the other countries in the terrorist list. So it's been -- that speech has been a good thing.

I see distinctive differences in the three myself, as does the President. And the case against Saddam Hussein is encompassed in the President's remarks to the United Nations. He stands in violation of -- 16 times, I think the President said -- resolutions of the world community.

Iran is clearly a country that is harboring al Qaeda. It says it isn't, but it is. It is a country that is developing -- aggressively developing nuclear capabilities and increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. It is also a country, however, that has a population that is in ferment. And there's no question in my mind but that the young people and the women in that country, particularly, as well as others, who are uncomfortable with this tight control by a small clique of clerics that they try to impose on the people of that country -- is increasingly difficult for them to do.

And I have no -- I think most of the world was dumbfounded at how quickly that country turned from the shah to the ayatollahs. I think it's possible that we could be dumbfounded someday to see it turn away from this clique of clerics, because clearly, they're not managing their affairs in a way that's in the interest of the Iranian people.

North Korea is quite a different situation. It is -- all one has to do is look at it compared to South Korea and it just wrings your heart out to see what's happening to those people. They're starving. They're being repressed. They're being treated terribly. There's large numbers in concentration camps and fleeing the country.

I don't know what's going to happen in North Korea, except that we do know that they are one of the world's worst proliferators, particularly with ballistic missile technologies. We know they're a country that has been aggressively developing nuclear weapons and has nuclear weapons. {"The IC judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two nuclear weapons," according to the December 2001 Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate.} And we know they're a danger first and foremost to their own people, and second, they're a threat principally because of their proliferating activities, as opposed to being a threat to South Korea.

So I see a different situation, and I think the President's approaching it properly.

Yes?

Q: Can I do a follow-up?

Rumsfeld: (Inaudible.)

Q: Will you be moving additional forces to the region as these diplomatic efforts proceed at the United Nations?

Rumsfeld: Well, we move forces all around the world all the time. People come, people go. We don't talk about deployments; they happen. All I can say is that I don't know what the President will decide or what the Congress, the U.N. will decide, but whatever they decide, this department will be capable of doing that which it might be asked. But we're not going to talk about deployments, obviously.

C12/13

December 23, 2002 10:51 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Fahim Khan

LARRY DI RITA  
12/23

We need to decide what we are going to do about Fahim Khan.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
122302-22

.....  
Please respond by 01/03/03

*[Signature]*  
2002

12/23

Sec Def -  
We're working on  
a revised proposal for  
later than the original  
week.  
*[Signature]*

12/23

23 Dec 02

12/24

December 23, 2002 9:19 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Cable to Karzai

ADVANCE COPY  
(unclassified)

AF of Karzai

The Policy shop should draft a note from me to Karzai to be sent today on his first anniversary as head of the interim government. I would like to edit it myself after it has been drafted, and we can send it by cable.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122302-15

.....  
Please respond by 12/23/02

12/23

SOBT -  
Please do draft / edit  
Policy version

D.R.

12/23

23 DEC 02

- Afghanistan Claudio Lichtenfeld 12/24
- NESI Paul Huiley 12/24
- Stability Operations-Joe Collins 12/24

2

U00081 /03

October 16, 2002 7:18 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: French MoD Talking Points

7:25 am  
notified by  
phone

On my talking points for the French MoD, let's make sure we thank them for what they did in Ivory Coast to help get the school children out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101602-1



Please respond by 10/16/02

France

16 OCT 02

C1025

October 25, 2002 7:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Australia

Did the letter ever go to the Australians on the attack in Bali?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102502-3

.....  
Please respond by 10/25/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 29 2002

*Yes*

Australia

ASSET 02





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 21 2002

Honorable Robert Hill  
Minister for Defense  
Australia

Dear Minister Hill:

On behalf of the Department of Defense, I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Australian citizens in Bali. We were saddened by the tragic loss in this terrorist attack.

There are so many ties that bind our two countries, but nothing seals a bond between nations more tightly than the joint commitment to a just cause. We take this moment to rededicate ourselves to our shared purpose in the global war on terrorism.

Please convey the sympathies of Americans to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during this difficult time, and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald Rumsfeld".

11-L-0559/OSD/5846

U16896 02



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

14N 13 2003

INFO MEMO

Wednesday, December 18, 2002, 8 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*  
SUBJECT: Visit by Judge Alberto Gonzales to the CENTCOM AOR

- Al Gonzales has asked me to arrange a visit to the Central Command Area of Operations sometime in the middle of January. He and I have discussed that any such visit must of course be designed and executed in a manner that does not impede in any way the work of Tommy Franks.
- I have spoken with Tommy, who expressed his eagerness to have the Judge visit. Tom said he thought such a visit would be helpful to him.
- I told Al that I would seek your approval before scheduling such a trip. Our target date, if you approve this visit, will be the middle of January, when we expect the President will be traveling in Africa.
- I would expect to bring a few additional people on such a trip including David Addington, a Policy representative, and the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate.

COORDINATION: None.

*cm/23*

*WJ Haynes*  
*12/23*

*333*

*18 Dec 02*

December 27, 2002 1:38 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CENTCOM Trip

Before you get going too far on this trip to CENTCOM, please see me. My instinct is you ought to go when someone else is going, like the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Wolfowitz or me, rather than a separate trip.

333

What is the purpose of the trip?

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/18/02 GC memo to SecDef re: Visit by Judge Alberto Gonzales to the CENTCOM AOR.

DIIR dh  
122702-14 (is computer)



*Please respond by* 01/03/03

27 Dec 02

*cmz*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 3 2003

INFO MEMO

Wednesday, December 18, 2002, 8 a.m.

*NEW DIT  
1/2/23*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Visit by Judge Alberto Gonzales to the CENTCOM AOR

- Al Gonzales has asked me to arrange a visit to the Central Command Area of Operations sometime in the middle of January. He and I have discussed that any such visit must of course be designed and executed in a manner that does not impede in any way the work of Tommy Franks.
- I have spoken with Tommy, who expressed his eagerness to have the Judge visit. Tom said he thought such a visit would be helpful to him.
- I told Al that I would seek your approval before scheduling such a trip. Our target date, if you approve this visit, will be the middle of January, when we expect the President will be traveling in Africa.
- I would expect to bring a few additional people on such a trip including David Addington, a Policy representative, and the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate.

COORDINATION: None.



*Doc*  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
 INFO MEMO

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 25 2002

CM-619-02  
 18 November 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 3 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RAM 11/13*

SUBJECT: Joint Capstone Concept Briefing

- In response to your notes (TABs A & B) on the Joint Capstone Concept outline and the continuing document development, the following information is provided:
  - Working directly with Joint Forces Command, the other combatant commands, Services, and several agencies, a draft Joint Capstone Concept outline has been developed. We continue to refine this product into a paper, and are now ready to present that outline and an expanded briefing to you at the earliest opportunity.
  - In addition to showing you the status of the product and our recent accomplishments, we would like to get your "chainsaw" thoughts on how to move forward to achieve the best product by February 2003.

381

*Larry  
 Get  
 MTR  
 Sun*

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
 As stated

Prepared By: Brigadier General Mark P. Hertling, USA; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

*11/23*  
*Col Bucci -*  
*Set Schedule a meeting*  
*briefing on this Wed*  
*see Steve it falls in with*  
*Mr. Mc*  
*Joint Staff pending*  
*Group D. R. K.*  
*LARRY DI RITA*  
*11/25*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	11/25
MA BUCCI	11/25
EXECSEC WHITMORE	11/19

11-L-0559/OSD/5850U00210 / 03

November 6, 2002 6:09 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Donald Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops

I called ADM Giambastiani today and talked to him about joint con ops. He told me his idea of doing some work down there on the subject, separately, but feeding what they're doing into what you're doing on the Joint Staff. I like that idea.

I am so interested in the subject that I am getting worried it is going to arrive and not be what I have anticipated, not fit how I think about things or be in need of sufficient calibration that we're going to be wasting a lot of time.

I thought I benefited greatly from Gen. Pace's briefing on operational availability at an early stage, at the chainsaw stage.

I would like to hear a briefing from you in the next week or so on where you are, what you've asked your staff to do, what the charter is, what the due dates are, and what you think the format might look like, so that I can get my head wrapped around it. If that is done, I think there is a greater likelihood that my expectations will be adjusted to what is likely to result from the process, and vice versa.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02

August 12, 2002 2:14 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Concept of Operations

1. I think you, Gen. Pace and the Joint Chiefs should move smartly ahead with respect to fashioning a joint concept of operations. It is important that it be written soon.
2. This should help serve as a forcing function to sort out a lot of the issues that aren't going to get resolved, given the current processes in the Department.
3. We need to find a way for the combatant commanders to get engaged in the process. Certainly, Joint Forces Command has to play a major role. Indeed, you may want to subcontract the task to them.
4. One other thought would be for you and me to assign Joint Forces Command the task of coming up with three or four concepts, then fashioning a role for the CINCs, the Chiefs and the J-8 and having it come out of the Defense Planning Guidance direction.
5. I suggest that you have an outline or first draft back to me by October 15 and that we shoot to complete it no later than February 1.
6. It should be based on the Defense Planning Guidance.

Please let me know your thoughts.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
081202-28


.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

11-L-0559/OSD/5852

Tab B  
UDD229-03

Classification (U)

SECRET HAS BEEN  
JAN 3 2003



# **Discussion with the Secretary of Defense on the Joint Capstone Concept and a Capability-Based Methodology**


***LtGen Cartwright, J8  
03 January 2003***

Classification (U)  
DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/5853






# *Top 10 Priorities*





- 1. Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism**
- 2. Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities**
- 3. Transform the Joint Force**
- 4. Optimize Intelligence Capabilities**
- 5. Improve Force Manning**
- 6. New Concepts of Global Engagement**
- 7. Counter the Proliferation of WMD**
- 8. Homeland Security**
- 9. Streamline DoD Process**
- 10. Improve Interagency Process, Focus and Integration**

<sup>2</sup> Dated September 17, 2002




# Department Strategic Direction





# Joint Capstone Concept




### Deconflict Service Forces



**Result:**  
Services Deconflicting

### Stitch Service Seams




**Result:**  
Services Coordinating

### Partial Integration




**Result:** Services Meeting *Joint Vision* Objectives


### Full Integration of Service, Interagency & Multinational Capabilities



**Result:** Dominating Across the Spectrum With A Capabilities Based Force





# *Proposed Methodology*




- **Identifies capabilities we desire...and why we need them**
- **Forms the core of future joint force development**
- **Describes the conduct of joint operations in a multi-national and inter-agency context**
- **Provides framework for developing Joint Operating and Functional Concepts**
- **Describes a methodology for experimentation**

# Proposed Methodology




## Methodology

- **Strategic Direction is translated into the Joint Capstone Concept which broadly describes how the Joint Force will operate**
- **Joint Capstone Concept provides basis for further concept development**
- **Concepts focus experimentation to assess desired capabilities in terms of prioritized scenarios**
- **Experimentation allows for analysis of proposed capabilities**
- **Desired capabilities drive materiel and non-materiel acquisition and investment strategies**




# *Proposed Capabilities*




## **Joint Force Attributes:**

- **Fully Integrated:** A set of joint capabilities for the Joint Force Commander
- **Networked for decision superiority:** A joint force widely dispersed that can communicate, move, and share a common operating picture while executing toward a desired end-state
- **Expeditionary:** A rapidly employable force capable of operating in austere environments



# *Proposed Capabilities*




## **Joint Force Attributes:**

- **Adaptable:**
  - A joint force which is tailorable and scalable
- **Decentralized:**
  - A force with collaborative planning tools and decentralized execution capabilities
  - A force with subordinate commanders who have the tools to compress decision cycles, seize the initiative and exploit opportunities
- **Lethality:** Ability to destroy the enemy in a networked environment




# *Joint Operating Concepts*




UNCLAS  
DRAFT

# *Joint Operating Concepts*



- Describes how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, and re-deploy a joint force within the range of military operations
- Guides the further development and integration of Joint Functional and Service Operating Concepts into a joint capability
- Articulates the measurable detail needed for experimentation and decision making


# Joint Operating Concepts



## Possible Joint Operating Concepts


- Homeland Security (NMS, DPG, TPG, OSD-P)
- Combating Terrorism (DPG, OSD-P)
- Joint Urban Operations (DPG)
- National Missile Defense (NMS, DPG)
- Strategic Deterrence (NMS, TPG)
- Peace Enforcement (TPG)
- Major Combat Operations in an "Anti-Access" environment (TPG, JCS)

# Functional Concepts



- Integration of a set of related military capabilities which accomplish tasks across the range of military operations.
- While broadly described, they derive context from the joint operating concepts and promote common attributes for experimentation.


# Functional Concepts




## Possible Joint Functional Concepts



- Dominant Maneuver
- Precision Engagement
- Joint Force Command and Control
- Focused Logistics
- Full Dimensional Protection
- Intel, Surveillance & Recon

# Architectures







# Architectures



- Dominant Maneuver Architecture
- Precision Engagement Architecture
- Full Dimensional Protection Architecture
- Focused Logistics Architecture
- Joint Force C2 Architecture
- Intel, Surveillance, Recon Architecture

## *Joint Architectures*

# Proposed Method




- Provides a construct for analysis
- Provides a common language -- Metrics
- Establishes standards all must meet
- Basis for resource decisions
- Basis for judging proposals
- Defines capabilities we are pursuing
- Focuses experimentation (Doctrine, organization, training, materiel)
- Source for Capabilities and Acquisition Dir


**Improving Joint Warfighting Capability**



# Proposed Methodology



## Concepts




## Architectures

- Dominant Maneuver Architecture
- Precision Engagement Architecture
- Full Dimensional Protection Architecture
- Focused Logistics Architecture
- Joint Force C2 Architecture
- Intel, Surveillance, Recon Architecture


## Assessment

	capability			capability		capability	
	task a	task b	task c	task d	task e	task f	task g
system 1	●		●		●		●
system 2		○	○			●	
system 3	●						●
system 4					○		●
system 5		○			●		
system 6					●	○	●

## Capability Roadmap




## Resource Strategy





**FEEDBACK**


# Proposed Methodology




# Illustrative Example: Joint Force C2




# Illustrative Example: Joint Force C2 Attributes



## Concepts




## Joint Integrated Architectures



## Attributes

1. Superior Decision Making
2. Flexible Synchronization
3. Shared Understanding
4. Responsive and Tailorable Organization
5. Dispersed Command
6. Operation-Wide Integration
7. Simultaneous C2 Processes
8. Superior Organizational Training
- 9.-----
- 10.-----
- 11.-----
- 12.-----

## **Joint Force C2 Assumptions**






- **Superior Decisionmaking:** *“Leadership and supporting capabilities generate alternative actions, identify selection criteria, and assess a to decisively control operational situations. Includes the use of autor exchange, fusion, and understanding of information relevant to rapid collaborative, knowledge-based decision making”*
- **Three assumptions:**
  - Criteria for multinational information sharing requirements will be established
  - Standing disclosure policies to facilitate knowledge exchange will be established
  - Commanders will establish standard operating procedures for co
- **Three draft metrics** (“On a scale of 1-10, how well does the initiative/system being examined address this metric?”):
  - % JTF C2 tasks that are supported by decision support tools
  - Clarity of commander’s intent
  - Mission accomplishment






# Capability Assessment

## Standard






Aggregate of current capability map (ex: FY04 Program)

## Objective



Aggregate program capability map (ex: DPP)


# Summary



**BLANK**

**SLIDE**





**2. Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities**

**-Joint CONOPS to integrate air, land, sea and space assets**

- **-Translate Joint CONOPS into acquisition strategy**  
**-Bring Jointness to the lowest level**  
**-Strengthen joint exercises and joint training**



**3. Transform the Joint Force**

**-Lighter, more agile, easily deployable military**  
**-Military culture that rewards innovation and risk-taking**



**9. Streamline DoD Process**


**-Shorten PPBS and acquisition cycle time**  
**-Financial Management Reform**  
**-Shorten all DoD processes by 50%**

# Department Strategic Direction



# Construct for Concepts






# *Concept Definitions*

## Joint Operating Concept:

- Describes how a future Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force within the range of military operations
- Guides the further development and integration of Joint functional and Service Concepts into a joint capability
- Articulates the measurable detail needed for experimentation and decision making



## *Concept Definitions*

**Joint Functional Concept: The integration of a set of related military capabilities which accomplish tasks across the range of military operations. (While broadly described, they derive context from the joint operating concepts and promote common attributes for experimentation.)**

December 30, 2002 6:55 PM

TO: Tom White  
Gen. Shinseki  
  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Myers  
*POWELL MOORE*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
  
SUBJECT: Stryker

451

Attached is a letter I received from Congressman Saxton from the Armed Services Committee on the Stryker. Chairman Duncan Hunter raised it with me. I would be curious to know how you respond to this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/02 Cong. Saxton ltr to SecDef re: Stryker

DHR:dh  
123001-18 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* 01/10/03

30 Dec 02

12:28 PM

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 21, 2002

SUBJECT: **Transformation**

Please give me a list of the things we are not doing that would be transformational that we would be doing if we had a larger budget. Not one hundred things, but 10, 15-20.

*381*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
122102.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*1/15/02*

*21 Dec 02*

December 23, 2002 4:28 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Paper from Marin Strmecki

Attached is the paper Marin Strmecki left us. Do you think I should move that around to the principals?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Outline for Virtual Marshal Plan

DIIR dh  
122302-52

.....  
Please respond by 01/15/03

*F*

*Afghanistan*

*1/3/03*

*→ SD*

The attached paper is from Marty Hoffmann, not Marin.

When I meet w/Marin on Monday Jan 6, I'll sound him out about this paper.

Rather than send it to all the principals, it might be best for you to solicit the views of John Taylor at Treasury and perhaps Ken Dahn also

*23 Dec 02*

Doug Feith



1546 HAMPTON HILL CIRCLE  
McLEAN  
VIRGINIA 22101

19 December 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

While I share your disappointment with the current situation in Afghanistan, I do believe there are concerted actions which if taken at once can turn the tide there.

This will forward to you a concept for a Marshal Plan for Afghanistan, which implemented with other necessary actions relating to U. S. development assistance could make a great difference over the course of the remaining 14 months of the Karzai Administration. Perhaps it will be helpful in the meeting on Afghanistan on Saturday.

The current focus should be on mobilizing U. S. resources – government and private sector – on behalf of Afghanistan on an urgent, basis in a manner that supports the Karzai government in its final 14 months, but particularly during the more temperate spring-summer-fall months of 2003. Hopefully these suggestions may be provocation to get others of greater wit and experience to add fuel to what should be a conflagration of urgent development action in Afghanistan. Such an effort, if successful, could be a precursor for other similar efforts in future post-conflict country redevelopment situations.

The President and others in the Administration have rightly invoked a “Marshal Plan” concept in regard to Afghanistan development assistance. The key to the Marshal Plan was a well-coordinated effort of the private sector and the U. S. Government in promoting the economic development of the European countries through reinforcement of market economies (this was also true of efforts on Japan and Korea). What is required, however, is a contemporary template for Marshal-Plan-type activities (for this and possibly other post-hostility development campaigns) that comports with contemporary legal structures, sensibilities and sensitivities in enabling integrated, effective action by private sector companies, institutions and individuals. The Administration needs to rally a base of support in the business community to create a Private Sector Task Force to generate private-sector involvement in business-building in Afghanistan. A plan is needed which activates the Marshal Plan dynamic of coordinated action, particularly in view of the post-WWII-like circumstances of Afghanistan. A paper outlining the concept for such an initiative is attached to this letter.

11-L-0559/OSD/5886

There are further steps that should be taken with the same urgency to elevate the effectiveness of U. S. and other donor development assistance efforts. First, all involved U. S. Government agencies and related entities (World Bank, OPIC and others) should be encouraged or directed to use expedited procurement procedures that seek near-term high-impact beneficial effects in deploying development assistance in Afghanistan. Development assistance furnished by U. S. and other donor nations is an integral part of the U. S. anti-terror campaign to secure Afghanistan against again becoming a terrorist breeding ground. Development assistance must be deployed with the same urgency and effect as the preceding military activities.

In addition, the ultimate, long-run development of Afghanistan will be through Foreign Direct Investment rather than donor nation contributions. That said, it is essential that the donor funds be applied in ways that will provide the environment, platforms and incentives to jumpstart foreign direct investment on an immediate basis given the short period remaining to the Karzai Government.

I look forward to seeing you on Saturday.

Sincerely Yours,

/s/ Mart

Martin R. Hoffmann

## **Attachment : Outline for a Virtual Marshal Plan :**

### **The Afghanistan Context**

The genius of the Marshal Plan was the fusion of government and private sector action in aid of determined recipient government reconstruction of war-destroyed governments, economies and national infrastructures. The U. S. Government provided resources and capacity building capabilities for the governments of the devastated countries. In partnership, the U. S. private sector provided additional resources and entrepreneurial market economy know-how to jump start economies and initiate the flow of direct foreign investment.

The result was to help restart new European governments and economies following the devastation and desolation of WW II, and despite threats from disruptive political forces. As important a result, however, was the reinstatement as a beacon of hope of the vision of market-economy-driven democracies, adapted to civil societies of disparate cultures, as a source of hope for wide-spread improvements in quality of life for citizens.

The Marshal Plan catalyzed the competitive economic, political and social “core competencies” of the western democracies. This success became complete with the fall of communism at the end of the Cold War. The 9/11 war on terror, in the context of the virulence of radical Islam, started in Afghanistan. A Marshal-Plan-inspired program of recovery is needed there now and urgently, even as the war against terror is pursued militarily by the west.

While the U. S. is culturally and institutionally different from post WW II America, it is still uniquely American and uniquely looked to for leadership. The U. S. economy is strong and creative. Traditional American instincts and impulses for action, for practical, can-do – even audacious - solutions to economic and political problems still are part of the better nature and resource of the American people and their private sector institutions today. A “Virtual Marshal Plan”, given today’s political and social consensus on the need for a democratic, economically free future for Afghanistan, would doubtless attract widespread support.

It is worth noting that Afghanistan’s strategic plan, to become a major inter-trade and inter-communications center for central Asia, improving on that traditional and historic role provides a significant first-entry opportunity for western companies. It provides as well a focus for disciplined future development of the Afghan nation.

### **A Modern Marshall Plan Template :**

The following concept includes a Task Organization of private companies, a Secretariat which provides support for the Task Force, and a Government office empowered to intervene with U. S. Government agencies in refining, prioritizing and accelerating development assistance to Afghanistan.

- Free Enterprise Task Force for Afghanistan: This Organization would be Chaired by a retired but active American Businessmen noted for his corporate accomplishments, leadership and stature, called to service by the President and serving as a volunteer. The Task Force element consists of volunteer U. S. private, profit-making companies, other private sector institutions (from consultants to universities) and individuals who join in efforts to advise on and participate directly (if selected based on area of expertise and qualifications) in infrastructure reinforcement, enterprise stimulation and infrastructure-building program and contract activities in Afghanistan. Requirements for transparency, competitive procurements (best Company in Class and Situation) and enlightened Corporate Governance require arms length transactional relationships between Government and such private organizations. Transparency is maintained by this separate organizational structure to promote transparency. The Task Force could provide leadership and organization for the member Companies organized functionally to address the priority areas for Afghan reconstruction (including agriculture, telecommunications, construction, telecommunications, commercial banking, power and transmission, natural resources and others). They could advise the government assistance agencies on more effective ways to provide the desired assistance.

This Task Force resource is essential to private sector development : governments can only create the framework and environment for a market economy. It is private Companies with their distinctive non-governmental risk-management abilities that make markets work. The informed expertise of these companies will assist in the development and acceptance of private-public efforts to jumpstart the economy of Afghanistan and to begin the direct foreign investment necessary to Afghanistan's future.

The effort to enlist volunteers with business experience to help Afghanistan would prove popular and fire the public imagination. An existing institution could be harnessed to this task, or several of them. There are several ways these volunteers could be effective, including augmenting Ministerial capacity in Afghanistan – in person or virtually – capacity that is badly needed.

- Private Sector Secretariat for Reconstruction and Direct Foreign Investment in Afghanistan :

In addition to providing expert leadership, administrative and logistical support for the Task Force staffs Task Force initiatives and deliberations. It would be led by a foreign assistance expert with experience in the private sector role in economic development and staffed with other experts of similar experience (including volunteers) together with necessary administrative support. It would develop plans and work with both U. S. and Afghan government agencies to develop and implement private-public partnerships and other means of expediting and assuring effective implementation of hard-hitting private-sector-based development programs and projects in Afghanistan.

The Secretariat would be funded by contributions from independent foundations and other eleemosynary donors to assure a degree of independence from commercial interests, and constitute a creative force in the assistance arena.

In addition, the Secretariat in conjunction with the Task Force would assist the Afghan government in planning and attracting foreign investment, including privatization, as well as other priority aspects of enterprise-driven market economies.

- Interface with the U. S. Government would be directly with assistance-related departments and agencies as they might designate as the subject matter might warrant. A close liaison relationship with the Special Envoy to Afghanistan would be important to both the Secretariat and the Task Force.

August 12, 2002 2:14 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Concept of Operations

1. I think you, Gen. Pace and the Joint Chiefs should move smartly ahead with respect to fashioning a joint concept of operations. It is important that it be written soon.
2. This should help serve as a forcing function to sort out a lot of the issues that aren't going to get resolved, given the current processes in the Department.
3. We need to find a way for the combatant commanders to get engaged in the process. Certainly, Joint Forces Command has to play a major role. Indeed, you may want to subcontract the task to them.
4. One other thought would be for you and me to assign Joint Forces Command the task of coming up with three or four concepts, then fashioning a role for the CINCs, the Chiefs and the J-8 and having it come out of the Defense Planning Guidance direction.
5. I suggest that you have an outline or first draft back to me by October 15 and that we shoot to complete it no later than February 1.
6. It should be based on the Defense Planning Guidance.

Please let me know your thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-28

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

11-L-0559/OSD/5891

U00229-03

Tab B

381

12 AUG 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-541-02  
11 October 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/4*

SUBJECT: Concept of Operations

- The following is provided in response to your memorandum (TAB) concerning development of a joint concept of operations, which I would like to refer to as a joint "capstone concept."
- I agree that the Department needs a joint capstone concept. My staff and USJFCOM have been engaged in a DOD-wide effort to develop high-level future joint concepts that span the range of military operations. We plan to synthesize the results into a joint capstone concept through an effort led by J-7.
- The final product will establish conditions for future joint operations and serve as a guide for development of additional supporting materials, if required. As with Joint Vision, the capstone concept and supporting documents will be based on your Defense Planning Guidance. The development process will continue to involve combatant command and Service representatives.
- You noted that the capstone concept should help to sort out issues that may not get resolved given current processes in the Department. Concept implementation through the use of integrated architectures provides a means for reforming the requirements and acquisition processes. Architectures provide a basis for integrated analysis, supporting improved joint requirements and capabilities-based acquisition decisions.
- Based on current progress, a 1 November goal for an outline of the joint capstone concept should be met--with the final document by February 2003.

COORDINATION: NONE


Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/5892

November 6, 2002 6:09 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Joint Con Ops

381

I called ADM Giambastiani today and talked to him about joint con ops. He told me his idea of doing some work down there on the subject, separately, but feeding what they're doing into what you're doing on the Joint Staff. I like that idea.

I am so interested in the subject that I am getting worried it is going to arrive and not be what I have anticipated, not fit how I think about things or be in need of sufficient calibration that we're going to be wasting a lot of time.

I thought I benefited greatly from Gen. Pace's briefing on operational availability at an early stage, at the chainsaw stage.

I would like to hear a briefing from you in the next week or so on where you are, what you've asked your staff to do, what the charter is, what the due dates are, and what you think the format might look like, so that I can get my head wrapped around it. If that is done, I think there is a greater likelihood that my expectations will be adjusted to what is likely to result from the process, and vice versa.

6 NOV 02

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110602-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/15/02



~~SECRET~~

EF377/UA

ISA

December 23, 2002 2:57 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Iraq

I like the idea of Marin Strmecki being our guy in charge of Afghanistan and getting him around to brief Gen. Franks, DeLong, McNeill and Eikenberry and then ultimately brief the principals, or at least the deputies—maybe while I am gone.

I think we also need a person who is an expert on Iraq, and we need to get that person in house now. Here is a Red Cell on Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.  
DCI Red Cell 18 December 2002 re Iraq

DHR:dh  
122302-41

.....  
Please respond by 01/10/03

Afghanistan

23 Dec 02

U00235 /03

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5894

December 23, 2002 10:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Supplemental

*DR*

110.01

We need to get our supplemental on a bill in January. What do we do to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122302-21

.....  
Please respond by 01/03/03

23 Dec 02

U00252 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/5895

02 Dec 141

December 23, 2002 5:35 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Supplemental

Attached is a useful e-mail from Newt on the supplemental. I agree with his assessment. Let me know what you folks think, and let's get moving.

I talked to the President on Friday about an early supplemental, and he agrees with us. The Vice President and Andy Card were in the room.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/07/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Supplemental

DHR:dh  
122302-62



Please respond by 01/10/03

110,01

23 Dec 02

From Newt Gingrich

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

cc: Di Rita  
Wolfe

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 23 2002

Pres  
You'll see it

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com  
Sent: Saturday, December 07, 2002 11:26 AM  
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil  
Subject: getting the supplemental in the January appropriations  
for secdef. epsecdef  
from newt 12/07/02

I sent the following memo to Mitch Daniels and some other people in the white House. I think this is the best strategy to run the Pentagon, win the war, and have fiscal control.

Memo follows:

You can save a lot of time and some extra congressional spending if you get your 03 supplemental money on the upcoming January appropriations.

you are going to need a defense and intelligence supplemental (you may also need a little money for state and foreign aid as the various middle eastern, Pacific and Colombian projects unfold).

While some people might like to deny the supplemental will be needed it will be necessary and every day we kid ourselves the military services and intelligence agencies will find it harder to get their jobs done and will engage in wasteful and time consuming (therefore leadership consuming) reallocations from one account to another.

The Congress will be eager for a supplemental so they can dump pork on it. That is a major reason you will NOT want to get a supplemental.

You should decide what you really need for the rest of the year and insist on getting it in the appropriations bills coming through in January. You could put all of it on a bill the appropriators care about or you could split it up among three or four bills and simply insist on it as the price of a presidential signature.

The appropriators will be unhappy at losing a train to pull their extra spending but you will have done the right thing for national security and the right thing for fiscal control.

Newt

12/9/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/5897

January 4, 2002 2:43 PM

TO: Tom White  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DSB Report on Training

Here's an interesting report from the DSB that Andy Marshall forwarded.

I would be interested in your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.

January 2001 DSB Report, "Training Superiority & Training Surprise"

DHR:dh  
010402-35

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*334 DSB*

*4 Jan 02*

1/3  
002



DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

11-000000-3 01 18 50

January 2, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew Marshall

SUBJECT: DSB Report on Training

This is an interesting report that I am sending you because you may not have seen it and because superior training is one of our force's most important areas of advantage over potential opponents. Excellent training in peacetime is not our historical pattern. We owe the current situation to a revolution in training that began in the early 1970's.

Joe Braddock, one of the directors of the DSB study, tells me that the basis of our advantage in training is eroding, slightly for now but it deserves attention. Also, there are new opportunities, new technologies that can provide farther improvement in training.

A second report on a subsequent phase of the study group's work will be available at mid-year.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/3

11-L-0559 OSD/5899

U00168 /02



**REPORT OF THE  
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD  
TASK FORCE**

*on*

**Training Superiority & Training Surprise**



**January 2001**

*OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140*

11-L-0559/OSD/5900

U00168 /02

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

This report is UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/5901





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task  
Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise

I am forwarding the final report of the Defense Science  
Board Task Force on Training Superiority and Training  
Surprise.

The Terms of Reference directed the Task Force to:

- Assess the current state of training within DoD;
- Identify the characteristics and advantages of possible future learning environments and what key enablers are required to achieve those learning environments;
- Assess the opportunities for and impediments to implementing alternative training strategies;
- Identify actions necessary to enable the development and implementation of advances in individual, collective, and unit training, by OSD and the Services.

The Task Force determined that a second training revolution is brewing and offers exciting possibilities as the US strives to reach JV 2010/20 goals. Achieving the second training revolution is affordable if DoD properly structures itself to recognize all the benefits of this training. Furthermore, the US must ensure that potential adversaries do not surprise the US by embracing the new technologies without our knowledge. Therefore, the intelligence community must be on the look out for signs of increased adversarial capability due strictly to training.

I endorse all of the Task Force's recommendations and recommend you forward the report to the Secretary of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Craig Fields".

Craig Fields  
Chairman

11-L-0559/OSD/5902



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise.

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise. The Terms of Reference directed that the Task Force:

- Identify key training demands that affect development and maintenance of military proficiency;
- Recommend how to create and maintain individual proficiency among our warriors and support personnel;
- Identify key military training infrastructure which may be needed, especially in the areas of advanced distributed learning, embedded training, global networks and information resources, netted training, and advanced simulations;
- Identify useful indicators of high-leverage training programs for use by the intelligence community to prevent training surprise.

The Task Force believes that the U.S. armed forces possess a training superiority which compliments their technological superiority. Although few other states engage in similar training environments, the US must be constantly vigilant to both protect its training superiority edge and to ensure it is not surprised. Other specific findings include:


- Some forms of training can deliver order of magnitude warfare proficiency gains in times as short as 2 weeks.
- The process is currently conducted in specialized Army, Navy and Air Force combat training centers (CTC) for some, but by no means all, service forces. However, the infrastructure of these centers is being neglected.
- 2010/20 warfare will require more training, not less.
- The Acquisition and testing process pay little attention to how a weapon system will be provided with trained operators and maintainers.
- Inadequate & poorly timed training will negate the technical superiority of our hardware.
- A new training revolution is possible. It can pay for itself if structural problems are solved.
- Adversaries could use a new training revolution against us, but so far have been restrained by cost and cultural impediments.


11-L-0559/OSD/5903

Based upon the above findings, the Task Force recommends the following:

- The services restore the combat training centers.
- Services and JFCOM recommend how to expand CTC training to new warfare areas.
- USD(AT&L) make training a co-equal part of acquisition and testing by insisting that each acquisition program have a defined training subsystem.
- Put USD(P&R) on the Defense Acquisition Board
- USD(P&R) develop Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)-like pilot programs for each service to 1) make residential training self-paced and 2) move as much training from schoolhouse to just-in-time, just-right training in the units.
- DARPA establish a training technology research effort
- Charge someone at ASD/DUSD level with review and oversight of training performance and measurement thereof.
- DEPSECDEF request the intelligence community deliver yearly training report card on potential adversaries.
- The services report to DEPSECDEF yearly on the state of force training, concentrating on readiness, performance and adequacy, not on process.

The Task Force would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation, advice, and help by the government advisors, support staff, and the many presenters from commercial firms and government and research organizations.

  
Dr. Joe Braddock  
Task Force Co-Chairman

  
Dr. Ralph Chatham  
Task Force Co-Chairman

## **Table of Contents**

Introduction/Members and Briefings	1
Summary of Findings and Recommendations	3
Detailed Overview	4
Recommendations	22
Conclusion	24
Appendix A: Terms of Reference	
Appendix B: Acronyms Used	

In late 1998 the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Defense Science Board to create a task force on training and education. Drs. Joe Braddock and Ralph Chatham were appointed Co-Chairmen. The task force met periodically throughout 1999 and early 2000. This document is the report of our deliberations.

Much of what follows is anecdotal and less quantitative than we would have preferred. Unlike the other Title 10 Service responsibilities (man & equip), training performance and resulting military proficiency are not well measured. Training is therefore easier to ignore than things that can be counted like people and planes. Thus, many of the training issues we raise are structural rather than technological; we found no one in the Pentagon with sufficient authority who is graded on force-wide training performance.

As we proceeded, our emphasis shifted away from education to highlight training superiority and training surprise. We were struck not only by the achievement of the Services where they apply engagement simulation in combat training centers (CTCs) but by the failure of other nations to do this. This is, in part, due to a lack of resources, but there is more to it.

This training revolution (CTC use) appears to be a uniquely American institution and not well coupled to more hierarchical cultures. It has had as profound an impact on warfare proficiency as advocates hope that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) will achieve in the future. The training revolution, however, is real and here now. Unfortunately, unless we provide it more support than we have in the last few years, it may not be here tomorrow.


A second training revolution is brewing. Without it the RMA can not be sustained. Thoroughly trained warriors are required to support concepts of massing fires, not forces, with widely-spaced units flawlessly connected to each other & to their command structure. Future training must be delivered to the individual, to units and to joint forces, when it is needed, not in the schoolhouse after which there is time for proficiency to decay. Training

DSB Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise

## DSB Task Force

# Training Superiority & Training Surprise *Final Report*

Dr. Ralph Chatham  
Dr. Joe Braddock  
Co-Chairmen



*This report can be read on three levels: viewgraph, caption (of which this is one) and amplifying text. The sketch above suggests the relation between performance of complex tasks and a hierarchy of part-task learning curves that make for effective unit and individual training. See page 4 for more details.*

must be applied over and over again as the composition of the units and joint forces change and as skills erode over time. Training must also become an integral part of the acquisition of hardware or we will fail to achieve the performance in our weapons systems that our other superiority (technology) strives to deliver.

Fortunately, technology is emerging that will support this and may save money in the process. Unfortunately, there is no training laboratory, nor development establishment nor manager with

sufficient authority who can foster the second training revolution.

*Training Surprise:* In the last decade we surprised not only others but ourselves with our warfare proficiency. There is evidence that the culture of our first training revolution is itself trainable. A potential enemy might also be able to capitalize on the new training revolution. In 1994 Croatia surprised the Serbs with a military proficiency built up in one year. Others could surprise us. Training superiority is ours to lose and for others to gain.

11-L-0559/OSD/5906

The panel was composed of a mix of people with relevant backgrounds including: military, defense acquisition, and training/learning experts. Some members had participated in previous DSB training studies. Several were recruited as well for an Army Science Board 2000 Summer Study Training Dominance Panel. In addition to those listed we had observers and contributors at our meetings from the Services, the Joint Staff and the intelligence community.

We had 8 meetings over a period of about one year. We heard from the organizations listed on the chart and a few more. Most of our meetings were held in the Washington, D.C. area. A subgroup of us visited new air combat trainers at the Air Force Research Lab in Mesa, AZ and at Langley Air Force Base. We visited the air CTCs, at Nellis Air Force Base, and Naval Air Station, Fallon in Nevada.

Recognizing the importance of training for future forces, we chose to forgo a visit to an Army Combat Training Center and instead visited the Army's developing First Digitized Division, the 4th ID at Fort Hood - a critical part of the Army's transformation program. We held our penultimate meetings at the newly-named Joint Forces Command, in Norfolk, Virginia and its Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) in Suffolk, VA.

## The People and the Places

### ◆Co-Chairmen

Dr. Joe Braddock

Dr. Ralph Chatham

### ◆Task force members & government advisors :

Dr. John Christie

Dr. Paul Chatelier

Dr. Dexter Fletcher

LTG Bill Hilsman, USA (ret)

Dr. Sung Lee

RADM Fred Lewis USN (ret)

Mr. Joe Markowitz

Dr. Warren Morrison

Dr. Harry O'Neil

Dr. Gershon Weltman

VADM J.D. Williams, USN (ret)

Dr. Paris Genalis

RADM Jerome Smith, USN (ret)

CAPT Wayne Thornton, USN (ret)

Ms. Sandra Wetzel-Smith

### ◆Executive Secretary

Mike Parmentier

& Dan Gardner

### Briefers, Contributing Organizations, Site Visits

ODUSD(R)R&T,PP

Joint Staff (J-7) (JV2010)

USMC Combat Development Command

Defense Intelligence Agency

Joint Staff (J-7) (JPME)

USA Training Doctrine Command

AF Directorate of C<sup>2</sup> (XOC)

Dep. Dir. Naval Training (N-7B)

USA Training Directorate (DAMO-TR)

Dep Chief NAVPERS (pers. & tra. Interfaces)

USMC Dep COS, Manpower & Reserve Affairs

USAF Dep COS for Pers, Edu. & Training

Joint Staff (J-7) (DOCNET demo)

A Dep. Chief NAVPERS (pers. & tra. resource)

USAF Edu. & Tra. Command (AETC)

ODUSD for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics

ODUSD for Program Integration

ODUSD(R) Readiness and Training

General Motors

HMT-303, FREST (maintenance monitoring)

DUSD Readiness

Defense Acquisition University (DAU)

USN Aegis Training & Readiness Center

Navy CVX Program Mgr (PMS 378)

DD 21 Program Office, Manning, HSI, &

Training Manager (PMS 500)

Apache PMO, USA Aviation Training Cntr

Dr. J. Bruer, James S. McDonnell Foundation

Nav. Air Warfare Ctr. Training Systems Div.

USAF Research Lab, Mesa, AZ.

Dr. D. Towne; Behavioral Tech. Labs, USC

Dr. R. Sternberg; Yale University

Dr. A. Lesgold; University of Pittsburgh

Dr. A. Graesser; University of Memphis

Dr. R. Wisher; USA Research Institute

LTG Hilsman: USA Battle Cmd Sys.

USA 3 Corps, DCOS - Ft Hood, TX

Digital Force Coordination Cell Dir., Ft Hood

Technical Director & CCTT Dir., Ft Hood

CTS Technical Director - Ft Hood

Director, NSC DIO - Ft Hood

CDR Navy Strike & Air Warfare Center

NSAWC - (multiple staff briefers) NAS Fallon

414th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis AFB

Commander 57th Wing Nellis AFB

Commandant, USAF Fighter Weps. School

O. Commandant, USAF Ground Ops School

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),

Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC),

Joint Training, Analysis, & Sim. Center

(JTASC)

JFCOM (J-7)

ODUSD (S&T), Director, Biosystems

JWFC, Dir. For Interoperability

Nat'l Intel Officer Conventional Military Issues

OIA, CIA, and Service Intel centers

Director, OSD Readiness and Training

Space & Naval Warfare Center (IMAT brief)

Director, OSD (R&T) Adv. Dist. Learning

DoD Chancellor, Edu. & Prof. Development

*This is a partial list of who we are and whom we talked to.*

This chart summarizes our findings and recommendations. We will address each element in more detail later and then return to this chart at the end.

We found:

- The U.S. armed forces have a training superiority which compliments their technological superiority.
- Some forms of training can deliver order of magnitude warfare proficiency gains in times as short as 2 weeks.
- The process is currently conducted in specialized Army, Navy and Air Force combat training centers (CTC) for some, but by no means all, Service forces.
- The Infrastructure of these centers is being neglected.
- 2010/20 warfare will require more training, not less.
- Training is also neglected in acquisition and testing; little attention is paid to how a weapon system will be provided with trained operators and maintainers.
- Inadequate & poorly timed training will negate the technical superiority of our hardware.
- A new training revolution is possible. It can pay for itself if cultural and structural problems are solved.
- Adversaries could use this against us, but so far have been restrained by cost and cultural impediments.

We recommend that:

- The Services restore the combat training centers.
- Services and JFCOM recommend how to expand CTC training to new warfare areas.
- USD(AT&L) make training a co-equal part of acquisition and testing by insisting that each acquisition program have a defined training subsystem.
- Put USD(P&R) on the Defense Acquisition Board
- USD(P&R) develop Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)-like pilot programs for each Service to 1) make residential training self-paced and 2) move as much training from schoolhouse to just-in-time, just-right training in the units.
- DARPA establish a training technology research effort
- Charge someone at ASD/DUSD level with review and oversight of training performance and measurement thereof.
- DEPSECDEF request intelligence community deliver yearly training report card on potential adversaries.

## Summary

- ◆ Our uniquely American *Training Superiority* is eroding
- ◆ JV2010/2020 future will require more training, not less
- ◆ Training failure will negate hardware promise
- ◆ A second revolution in training is needed and is possible
  - *This new revolution should be able to pay for itself but:*
    - ◆ The incentive structure in the DoD won't foster the revolution without help
      - ◆ A central cause is that *training performance is not measured*
- ◆ Training should take its Title 10 seat with "Man & Equip"
  - *Restore & expand upon crown jewels of current training revolution (CTCs)*
  - *Establish and test co-equal training subsystem in each acquisition program*
  - *Raise OSD/Acquisition training conscience:*
    - ◆ Services & CINCs deliver annual training report card to Deputy Sec. Defense
    - ◆ Designate ASD/DUSD to be held accountable for training performance
  - *Foster the second training revolution by establishing:*
    - ◆ ACTD-like pilot programs in computerized self-paced and unit-based training
    - ◆ An advanced training research program element
    - ◆ DARPA office to develop high payoff training/human performance technology
- ◆ DoD & Intel Community act to detect & avoid Training Surprise

*Training performance (vice process) is seldom measured. Since no one with adequate authority is graded on (unmeasured) training performance in units, in joint forces, or in acquisition, training plays second fiddle to "Man and Equip." Consequences and recommended actions are shown above.*

And last, but perhaps most important, we recommend:

- The Services, and CINCs report ((with Joint Staff endorsement) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense yearly on the state of force training, concentrating on readiness, performance and adequacy, not on process. The Service reports are to be on service training; the CINC report card is to cover the state of joint training. The report's format is not important, but its routine delivery should spawn the kinds of training readiness accounting that is needed to prevent the DoD from overlooking trades between training and hardware

Having told you what we are going to tell you in the first two charts, we use the next three charts to discuss some of the characteristics of learning and training. The word training has many meanings and is often used as a synonym for education. For the purposes of this report, training differs from education in that training is geared to develop specific skills and deliver people that can perform defined tasks. Education is a more general process with a broader goal.

Military training can be sorted in a number of ways. One such sorting includes training to develop: Service/military culture, basic military skills, technical skills, specific weapon system operation skills, small unit warfighting skills, larger unit battle proficiency, combined arms and interoperability warfare skills, theater, joint & coalition warfare skills.


Another way of sorting the complex training picture is suggested in the chart. The process is often viewed with the aid of a learning curve: a plot of the skills achieved as a function of the investment in training. The slope is shallow at first. For example, in pilot training flying proficiency remains minimal throughout ground school, climbs rapidly during the early flights, and then flattens out again.

When measured far out in the learning curve it often appears that training investments do little to improve performance. For example, in a large sample of qualified Navy pilots, a 20% change in average flight hours yielded only a 4% improvement in carrier landing skills. Looking at single task learning curves it is hard to see how CTC training can make such a dramatic improvement in already-trained pilots or Army units.

While considering this conundrum several years ago, one of us (Thornton) pointed out that warfare is a complex task and training for it involves a stacked set of learning curves, each spring-boarding off the levels below it. Carefully done, training can stay on the steep part of the learning curve until a entire joint or combined-arms force is trained for its warfare mission.

Currently the process stops cascading at the level of the CTCs. Higher levels of training are performed in a

## Anatomy of Effective Training



When proficiency in simple tasks is viewed as a function of training investment, the learning curve flattens out. Warfighting is not, however, a simple task. Viewing training for war as a set of layered learning curves helps to visualize why CTCs work. One lesson, for example, is that CTCs shouldn't work well if basic skills have not been first trained into the unit. Integration of mission training (the dotted line) into the lower levels is not yet done.

detached and uncoordinated process; it is currently very expensive to conduct mission level training with the entire force. The new training revolution may make it possible to afford this kind of training.

The stacked learning curves are by no means the whole story, however, for what is learned is often forgotten as we will see in the next chart.



After training, if complex skills are not constantly exercised, proficiency will decay substantially in times as short as a few months. At that point some level of retained skill remains, and stays with the individual for years. For complex tasks such as flying, proficiency can be regained with refresher training in a period as short as a few weeks even after several years of not exercising the skills. Over-training can slow the loss and improve the base level to which skills decay.

The graph shows one case of this process. The Navy created their Strike University, (now combined with other air weapons courses at NAS Fallon) patterned after the first CTC, Top Gun, to teach pilots air-to-ground combat skills. Pilots are well trained *before* they go to Strike University in order to be well prepared to gain the maximum value of CTC learning; and gain they do.


A 1990 Center for Naval Analyses review of 241 bombing runs concluded that after 14 flight hours of training the average pilot's bombing error decreased by a factor of 3.3. The first factor of 2 improvement came in the first four hours. 45 days later, however, bombing accuracy had decayed to the initial level.

Note that it is not as easy to measure the forgetting curve as it is the learning curve. If you test an individual several times, the very act of testing provides refresher training. Given the steepness of the learning curve, one or two trials should deliver substantial performance improvements. The forgetting curve shown here is only a guess at what happens between the two endpoints.

Our current training & deployment schedules are ill matched to a skill decay time of two to three months. Unless tactical refresher training is provided within the deployed units in the field, the refresher training will occur in combat. We show later some evidence that this unfortunate situation may be the case today.

The new training revolution may help here. We saw the Air Force's new Distributed Mission Training (DMT) System at Air Force Human Resource Laboratory's (AFHRL) Warfighter Training Research Division. The DMT allows four pilots to fly together against a simulated adversary. Its fidelity is not exact, but it can deliver

## A Forgetting Curve



*Sketched in gray is a forgetting curve. The highest level of proficiency doesn't last, although a baseline level remains. Peak performance can often be restored quickly by refresher training. Note that the time between most predeployment training and combat during that deployment exceeds the forgetting time.*

realistic training on 80 to 85% of complex air-to-air warfare tasks that a CTC can deliver. It also allows some freedom to train in ways that safety considerations do not permit in any real aircraft.

These kinds of training devices should be an integral part of equipment deployed with combat units, for example on aircraft carriers in forward areas. System fidelity should grow quickly in the future and their cost should drop, but care must be taken that they not deliver negative training.


We emphasize that the phenomena of skill decay does not mean that advanced training in a CTC is useless. For example, we will show below that time to reacquire warfare proficiency is greatly reduced for those who learned in a CTC. Consideration of skill decay times, does, however, suggest that training systems for complex tasks should be designed such that 1) the training occurs as close in time as possible to when the skills are needed and 2) methods should be devised to deliver key features of the training to deploy with units.

Historical research by Weiss and others established the understanding that in air combat the more successful engagements a pilot had, the higher probability that he would survive the next one. An "ace" (pilot with five kills) had a 95% probability of being the winner of his next decisive engagement (one in which somebody gets shot down) as opposed to the novice who had less than a 50% chance. The winner of 30 decisive engagements was almost invulnerable. Weiss also showed this general trend was the case for other combat situations, for example with submarine captains in World War II.

Weiss believed that this was a selection effect; that aces were born, not made. The best pilots survived and the worst got shot down. However, what the Navy's "Top Gun" school (and later the Air Force's Red Flag Exercises and the Army's National Training Center) showed was that this was more than survival of the fittest; it can be the result of learning. Moreover, it is possible to train to the ace level without bloodshed.

DSB Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise

## The Evolution of a Combat Ace



Is this training or "survival of the fittest?"

Data from H. K. Weiss, *Achieving System Effectiveness*, AFAA, New York, 1966.  
See also P. F. Gunnar, *The Military Value of Training*, IDA, Alexandria, VA, 1990.

*Analysis of air, submarine and other combat showed that those who survived decisive engagements (ones where a kill was achieved) were much more likely to win the next one. Until Top Gun, this was thought to be battlefield Darwinism. We now know that much of the effect is due to training.*

Most U.S. combat forces enjoy a substantial training superiority over potential adversaries. Much of this comes from the use of CTCs, an invention of the Navy tactical air forces over 30 years ago. This new approach to training delivered a dramatic change to their air-to-air combat proficiency over Viet Nam (discussed in the next chart). In the 1970s and early 80s the Air Force and Army adopted their own versions of the technique with the Army's CTCs being created to train units as large as a brigade at once.

In a CTC the trainees get the kind of experience that Weiss showed developed combat aces, but in a CTC there is no risk of dying from enemy fire. Trainees are thus far better prepared for actual combat than forces trained by other methods. In their Red Flag Exercises, for example, the Air Force's prime objective is to give the "blue four" (novice pilot in a four airship formation) a chance to get 7 or 8 combats under his or her belt so that they won't have to experience the dangerous part of the learning curve during real combat.

Until 1991 the Army's first battle of each war had been a disaster. In Desert Storm, after a decade of CTC use and with the insistence that every unit that went to that war had to do well in the National Training Center, the Army had an electrifyingly successful first battle. A second battle was not needed. There is little doubt that this training was a prime cause of that victory.

The key elements to the CTC process include: a highly competent independent opposing force that uses the tactics and equipment of the potential enemy; careful post-exercise reconstruction enabled by the use of an instrumented range; an after-action review, which consists of frank, objective feedback to the trainee of what was done and not done in each engagement, and an expectation of failure in the trained unit.

The last two features, in particular, appear to be uniquely coupled to American culture. We found no other armed forces that had been able to implement engagement simulation for their general forces. We found no training as effective as that performed in our CTCs except in a few foreign special force units.

The CTC process is used by most of the Army

## Our Second Superiority

- ◆ The superb performance of our military in the 1990s was not just a result of technological superiority but equally of **TRAINING SUPERIORITY**
- ◆ New combat training approach invented 30 years ago develops, without bloodshed, individuals & units into aces
  - ◇ Instrumented ranges at major Combat Training Centers (CTCs)
  - ◇ Highly competent Red/Opposing Force uses "enemy" equipment and tactics
  - *Uniquely coupled to American culture*
    - ◇ Objective, no-holds-barred feedback/replay
      - ◆ no longer does first person to blackboard win
    - ◇ Expectation of failure in the trained unit and its commanders
  - *Used by Army & most of the air forces (USAF, USN)*
- ◆ A second training revolution is brewing
  - *It will be needed for future warfare*
  - *But there are impediments to its implementation*

*Since WW II we have claimed that we will win wars with technological superiority. Having found in Viet Nam that technology does not always bring victory, the Army and our air forces have developed a second superiority: in training. It was a key factor in our Desert Storm victory.*

and the tactical air forces of the Navy and Air Force. Its institution for these forces amounted to a revolution in training. That revolution has not, however, expanded elsewhere within the Services, nor is it applied routinely for joint warfare training. Most of the Navy, for example, is not aware of the spectacular results that can be achieved by CTCs.

### The Second Training Revolution:

There is an opportunity to create a second training revolution (the first being that started by the

Navy Fighter Weapon, Top Gun, School). The new revolution will be fueled by advances in both learning theory and in computer technology. We may soon be able to export to many other parts of the military and to joint operations the kind of training that engagement simulation currently brings to U.S. pilots and Army units. Unfortunately, like other revolutions, there are institutional forces that stand in the way. We will discuss these later in the report.

The air war over Viet Nam produced one of the best warfare experiments (albeit an unintentional one) ever conducted. Over the last few months of 1968 the Navy lost 10 aircraft while shooting down only 9 MiGs and had fired over 50 air-to-air missiles without achieving a single kill. In 1969 there were no planes shot down on either side due to a bombing halt. When the air war resumed, the Navy's kill ratio was 12.5 to one while the Air Force's fell slightly to 2.0 to one. These ratios are based upon the order of 100 enemy aircraft shot down in each of the three years periods (110 kills by U.S. pilots for 1965-1968 and 74 for 1970 to 1973).

Therefore, while there is some room to argue about details of aircraft types, weapons used, and personnel policy differences between the Navy and the Air Force, the sample size is large enough to yield a degree of confidence in drawing the conclusion that the change in kill ratios was real and that it was caused by the Navy delivering Top Gun trainees into the fleet.\*

The results of the U.S. Army's tactical engagement simulations, as measured by changed performance at the training site, are as spectacular as the Top Gun influence on air war over Viet Nam. We would like to show examples from more CTCs but there are only a few more, totaling three for the Army and one each for the Navy and the USAF air forces. Moreover, data from the centers that do exist is sparse.


Other kinds of training can also produce spectacular results. We show an example of a single training device that changes the behavior of sonar operators so that they achieve an order-of-magnitude increase in submarine search area. The Interactive Multi-Sensor Analysis Trainer (IMAT) is a PC-based tool that allows a sonar operator and the sub's tacticians to visualize a very complicated acoustic situation and determine how best to use their sensors. An investment of a few million dollars in this training R&D project has demonstrated performance enhancements that far more expensive programs have not achieved.

Not so incidentally, the IMAT was developed by a training psychologist who also became a technical domain expert (S. Wetzel-Smith, a task force member). Many


DSB Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise

## Effective Training Makes a Difference


### ◆ Air-to-Air Combat Over Viet Nam



### ◆ National Training Center ~1987 Change in proficiency



### ◆ Submarine Tactical Sensor Employment 1999



Here are three examples, spanning three decades, of order-of-magnitude performance enhancements brought about by a very brief period of training. These are successes. A subsequent chart shows some consequences of training failures.

training systems are developed in the absence of one or the other of the two disciplines. That is one of the reasons that, although there are often more decibels (dB) per dollar in training than anywhere else, the training dB are not always realized.

\* Chatham, R.E., *Training Assessment: a Critical Intelligence Deficiency. A Report on the Intelligence Implications of Relationships Among Training, Exercises & Military Proficiency*, Dynamics Technology Report DTW-9509.02.9-96001, 1996, p. 18-24. Cited therein are:

Gorman, P.F., *The Military Value of Training*, Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-2515, December 1990 p 4,5

"You Fight Like You Train" *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1974 p 25,26,34

11-L-0559/OSD/5913

The existing CTCs are not being supported as well as they were 5 or 10 years ago. The chart shows a few, easily measured examples; there are more. CTCs are the crown jewels of the first training revolution and a central foundation of our training superiority. Although the task force could not quantify the proficiency consequences of the decay in CTCs infrastructure, we are concerned that, at least for air-to-air combat, we may be at the edge of losing a substantial portion of the training value that these centers have offered in the past. Moreover, even if restored, the old infrastructure would not represent the current threats. Defining the new threats will not be easy.


The examples here are not exactly parallel; the Army's does not describe the same kind of deficiency as those for the air CTCs. This partly reflects our choice to visit the Army's developing Digital Division at Fort Hood instead of one of their three CTCs. That decision was driven by our concern for how future systems and warfare concepts will influence training requirements. It is clear, for example, that the capabilities being developed in the Digital Division (4<sup>th</sup> Infantry) can not be exercised properly in the current CTCs. Nevertheless, the Army's commitment to the CTC revolution appears stronger than that of the Navy and USAF air forces.

For example, the Air Force decided several years ago to forgo a substantial dedicated air opposing force (aggressor squadrons). "Red" aircraft in Air Force Red Flag Exercises are now manned mostly by active duty pilots who, with their aircraft, are borrowed from other squadrons. These pilots receive *negative* training for the time spent trying to imitate enemy tactics. Moreover, the aircraft used are not 'dissimilar.' That is, they have the same characteristics as the trainee's aircraft. This seriously degrades the training experience.

The Navy still supports aggressor squadrons. The pilots are mostly reserves who must formally qualify as opposing force pilots within a week of flying. The aircraft used, however, are no longer all dissimilar and most are reaching the end of their useful lives. The (unfunded) cost to buy 18 F-16s as OPFOR for USN was \$638M in '99.

We saw other indications of eroding infrastructure: many air crews get no live ordnance experience and the time between CTC visits is stretching.

It might be argued that the major warfare threat we



*The infrastructure of the CTCs is decaying. The Air Force chose to drop a dedicated tacair opposing force; the Navy's can not be sustained much longer. The Army is applying some resources to maintain their CTCs but not to upgrade them to support modern weapons/warfare.*

experienced in the 1990s came not from aircraft but integrated air defenses (IADS), mostly ground-based, but air CTCs are losing these, too. An (unfunded) EW upgrade at NAS Fallon would cost \$300M over 10 years and leave the facility with a 10 year old threat.

We emphasize that those manning the CTCs are superb warriors and operators. They do the very best they can with the resources provided, but that "can do" attitude may make it harder for them to call attention to the possibility that, even with their heroic efforts, the infrastructure has eroded to the extent that it may no longer support the kind of training we expect.

The foregoing only addresses issues with the current CTCs. We note, again, that a large portion of our forces do not use CTC training. A key element missing from even the most demanding training programs elsewhere in the Services is the notion of a *dedicated* opposing force that provides realistic simulation of enemy action.

We started out hoping to 'bottle' CTC training and export it throughout the DoD. Given the erosion that we saw in the existing CTCs, we recommend first that they be restored & upgraded to meet the new threats and then funded to remain current.


Historical examples suggest that there is a substantial risk that we won't achieve the performance that our technological superiority promises. The top two examples in this chart show cases where lack of appropriate or adequate training reduced substantially or completely negated the gains from a weapon development. The bottom two examples point out that even the best training if not applied at the right time can rob us of performance early in a conflict; as John Byron pointed out recently about Russian submariners, "people rust faster than ships."

The anti tank weapon TOW was designed to engage targets at up to 4km range and showed that capability in operational test and evaluation. A decade later the Army found that it was only used at less than half that range. The conclusion of their investigation was that this was caused by a failure to train for over the horizon use. Had we known that only 2km of the missile's range would be used, we could have saved a large fraction of the development, production, and logistic cost of the weapon and designed it to fly only 2km.

The submarine force realized in the mid 1990s that price of living with legacy computing hardware in their acoustic systems had become intolerable. They started a highly innovative program to replace all acoustic processors with commercial off-the-shelf computers for all attack submarines in a period of 4 years. The first boat to receive the upgrade was said to have more computing power than the sum of that available to all previous and existing submarines in the fleet.

The first message from that boat, however, stated that the new computers didn't work. The few days of training at the factory that the developers had believed would suffice were entirely inadequate to deliver lasting proficiency either to operate the hardware or to maintain it. (We will mention an exactly parallel occurrence in the Army later.) Ad hoc remedial training fixed the submarine's problem, but the Navy will be hard pressed to deliver sufficient training as the pace of installations speeds up.

A major lesson learned by those charged with the remedial acoustic training program is that you can't know that there is a training problem until you have ways to



*Failure adequately to consider training in acquisition can rob us of the technological superiority we pay so much for. Even where training is well delivered, if it is not timely, skill decay will limit performance.*

measure proficiency. They developed a proficiency test cleverly disguised as a sonarman "survey." Armed with knowledge of the test results they told me (Chatham) that the cheapest 10dB came from training, but worried about the skill decay time.

That brings us to the lower half of the chart. We have already seen similar Strike University data in the chart describing forgetting curves. Data on recent attacks against Iraqi targets suggests that deployed Navy forces suffered a similar decay, although the data are not as uncontaminated as for the Viet Nam Top Gun example. After a few

missions the attacking forces performance returned to the level of bombing skill that units achieve in pre-deployment training at NAS Fallon over a period of three weeks.

Those at Fallon are trying to reduce the time between training and deployment, but more is needed; high fidelity onboard multi-aircraft training devices should be deployed with the units. The Air Force's new Distributed Mission Trainers (DMT), which allow interactive simulation training with four blue aircraft at a time are a start, but DMT is neither deployable nor embraced by the Navy.

The current acquisition system treats training as one of a number of "ilities" that must be considered during the acquisition process. Given its listed standing as one of nine (development, manufacturing, test & evaluation, verification, deployment, operations, support, training, and disposal), training is usually viewed as more of a nuisance or a block to be mechanically checked off than as a way to enhance performance by an order of magnitude (or conversely something that, if ignored, can reduce performance by a similar large amount). In one briefing we found training mixed on equal standing with crew privacy and food service.

Training should stand as one of only three (man, equip and train) rather than mixed up in the minds of acquisition managers with things like crew privacy. Failure to so view training leads to the kinds of performance failures, discussed above, with the TOW missile and the submarine ARCI program.

We were reminded, by task force member Bill Hilsman, of an exact parallel to the ARCI case that occurred during the deployment of the Improved Hawk AAW missile in the late 1970s. Six months after it was deployed to the Middle East the I-Hawk batteries were 90% not operationally ready. Again the cause was a lack of training for the operators and the maintainers.

The Army changed its acquisition policies to insist that for each development program a training subsystem be formally designated and funded by acquisition dollars. If the training subsystem was not ready, the whole weapon system would be declared not operationally ready and would not be deployed. That policy did not last. We recommend it be instituted again, this time DoD-wide.

At the very beginning of a program consideration should be given to how competent operators will be provided throughout the life of the system. Some of the issues that need be addressed include:

- Can ordinary operators deal with the system?
- Will the operators' professional advancement be dependent upon their proficiency with the new system, or will that not be tested?

## Required: A Formal Change to Acquisition System

### ◆ Acquisition Now





Fig. our Task Force was told in May '99 that General Reimer directed that he "will not take a system to the field without its trainer". We were told by a pilot in November '99 that while 72 Longbow helos had become operational over the past two years the trainer had not yet been fielded and would not be until July 2000. The date has now been extended to December 2000.

### ◆ Acquisition Future



*The DoD acquisition instruction lists training second-to-last in a list of nine 'ilities' that are to be considered. It stands only before 'disposal.' Given the major impact training can have on performance and the "man, equip & train" dictate of Title 10, training needs a new place in acquisition.*

- Will training devices & training courses be available at IOC?
- How can we test the adequacy of the training sub-system during the operational test and evaluation process?

We heard a consistent lament during our deliberations: the biggest change in the military of the 1990s was that each Service, each unit, and each Service-member is being asked to do more for less. The funding squeeze seems to be on everywhere and training, as a thing that is hard to measure, is one of the first areas to be squeezed. Even if future warfare were not to change, a lower cost approach to individual skills training, as well as unit warfare training, will have to be found if we are to maintain our training superiority.


Warfare in the future will *not* remain the same as it was in the past, yet the task force saw no plans anywhere, Service-based or joint, for fundamentally altering the training infrastructure to accommodate Joint Vision 2010/2020 warfare. As we found in the acquisition process, it appears that training is ignored when planning for the future in the tacit hope that it will solve itself. Training programs are, by and large, reactive, not proactive.

The characteristics of advanced weapons technology will also require changes in the current training architecture. A commercial anecdote illustrates this. General Motors found several years ago that they were spending over \$3B per year on warrantee repairs. One third of the repairs were failures. They, therefore, instituted a comprehensive schoolhouse training program. After four years, half of their mechanics had received the schooling but GM then found that there was no difference between the repair performance of those with training and those without.

The cause, GM believes, is that their systems are both so reliable and so complicated that, after making a repair, several months elapses before a mechanic sees a similar problem again. This is too long a time to expect her or him to retain the specialized knowledge. We assert that this is true of military weapons maintenance and operations. It is a prime reason why training must be moved from the schoolhouse to the unit.

GM, capitalizing on technology started, but not initially implemented by the DoD, began developing and testing the use of an integrated electronic tech-manual that delivered troubleshooting knowledge at the point of use for

## A New Training Revolution Is Needed



Mass Forces

Mass Effects, Disperse Forces

- ◆ Even if warfare doesn't change, budget pressure will require new training approaches
- ◆ Existing Service CTCs are not sufficient to train for future (JV2010/2020) warfare
  - CTCs do not/will not cover: joint warfare, deployment, ground force use of over-the-horizon weapons, ships/submarines, interoperability, new threats, USA's Future Combat System, ...
  - Future weapons technology also appears to require more training, not less
  - E.g., the Digital Division must train for both old and new equipment
  - Sophisticated maintenance & operational skills can't be retained after leaving schoolhouse
- ◆ Emerging manpower limitations will:
  - Generate further personnel turbulence increasing the need for more training of more people
  - Demand shorter training pipelines
  - Decrease manpower that can be allotted to schoolhouses (instructors, support personnel)

*Trained people are not a commodity like fuel or weapons that can be delivered to a unit ready-to-use. Skill decay is a serious detractor from operational and maintenance proficiency in complicated systems. Training must move into the units where the right skills can be delivered at the right time.*

Cadillac transmissions. We were pleased to see a few instances of these devices being tried in the Services as well.

The next few charts discuss what we call a second training revolution: the application of computer technology and training research primarily to individual training. The promise of this revolution is that it will control the decay of skills by delivering training at the point of need and it will enable complex training to be developed and applied cheaply.



Each of us has been educated and trained for a significant fraction of our lives. In consequence, we all have an intuitive understanding of how the learning process works. In many cases we are wrong. The academic learning community, as well, has its share of those who try to shoehorn all evidence into favorite theories about how they would like people to be, rather than find out what works. There is, however, a well-supported body of knowledge about how people learn.



It is not surprising that CTC training uses many of the approaches now shown quantitatively to be more effective than conventional schoolhouse training: direct feedback, collaborative learning, and what amounts to individual tutoring. CTCs also benefit from the cognitive dissonance that comes from driving people very hard. Success in this kind of environment, like success in a demanding boot camp, can be shown to deliver persistent attitude changes toward belief in oneself, the organization and the process.

Incidentally, we can not rely upon commercial training courses to give us help here. Consumer training packages can't afford to use learning theory; their prime goal is to keep the cost of the product on the shelf below \$29.95. Moreover, much of the emphasis in universities is devoted to education. Our emphasis must be delivering people with a specific set of skills where and when they are needed and to do that rapidly, cheaply without regard to campuses and tenure.

The graphs illustrate some characteristics (rate and quality) of group and individual learning. Trained people can not be ordered up in identical packages like weapons. We have already pointed out that skills, unused, decay more rapidly than steel rusts. A second difference between people and military hardware is variability. Learning time can differ by as much as a factor of 7 between the slowest learners and the fastest.

Residential instruction must bias its course lengths toward the slower students in a "one size fits all" approach. If the pace of a course can be matched to the learning rate of each student, average learning times can easily be reduced by 30%; in some cases the reduction has been seen to be as much as 80%.

## A New Training Revolution Is Possible



◆ We stand on the verge of a potential training revolution in:

- *Advanced computer learning, just-in-time/just-right training devices, electronic classrooms, distributed learning environments, advanced embedded training, virtual environments, distributed learning, training administration and resource management (preventing entropy from growing in courseware), automated courseware development, automated auto-tutor development*
- *The new training can be cheaper, faster and there when needed (avoiding skill decay)*

● New efficiencies (e.g., in training tailored to the individual) will free-up resources for efforts critical to retaining and expanding our training superiority

*A whole gamut of electronic-aided learning tools are emerging. They are well coupled to training use where specific course content and goals are easier to define than in education. Moreover, new techniques to automate courseware development hold great promise to reduce cost and improve quality.*

Tutoring (individualized instruction with feedback using all the pathways of human-to-human interaction) does more than reduce the time to learn. It greatly increases the level of knowledge or skill in the students. The chart in the upper right points out that a tutor, even one ignorant of effective learning techniques, can improve student skills by two standard deviations over what classroom training can deliver. In the next viewgraph we will show that the same benefits appear to be deliverable by an autonomous electronic tutor.

We have discussed a few examples of results from the limited research conducted on human learning. The slide lists other approaches that may deliver additional gains. Many of these, however, are being developed by technologists rather than those who understand learning processes. Research in computing and networking is well funded. Research funding into how to use this to deliver skilled people where and when needed is measured in fractions of a percent of either the training or military R&D budgets. More training research should pay enormous dividends.

The University of Memphis had a problem. They required that all students take a computer literacy course but they were running out of instructors. Dr. A. Graesser, working under an NSF grant, chose this domain area for the development of "Auto-Tutor."

A student uses an ordinary personal computer to type in responses to questions asked aloud by the program. (Keyboard input was chosen because speech-to-text programs still have a 10% error rate and the time and distraction needed to correct mistakes is unacceptable.) The tutor is also represented on the monitor both by text and by an animated line drawing of a human face (see the next chart). As a student types in her response she receives instant feedback from changes in facial expression in the animation. The student also gets an audible and textual response.

The Auto-Tutor guides the student through a series of open-ended questions that, if answered correctly, demonstrate the desired level of computer skills. It measures over-all performance as well as how the student is answering the specific question. It automatically determines whether the student needs additional work in an area and chooses other questions to exercise him or her until that area is understood.

Auto-Tutor and its cousins, the electronic technical manuals, will only be affordable if new content on new subject matter can be acquired and inserted into the framework cheaply. It appears that this can be done. The developers of Auto-Tutor have created a conversational and automated method to create a tutor on a new subject by asking a domain expert to type in a set of questions that she believes will cover the skill area of interest. The development system elicits from the expert a set of seven or eight acceptable answers to each question. It also elicits potential incorrect answers.

In addition, review articles and other text on the subject area are scanned and subjected to a process called 'latent semantic analysis.' It has been shown that automated sorting of the connections among words in a text can lead to a computer-based essay grading system that evaluates student essays in the standard A through F system with a performance indistinguishable from that

## A Sample of the New Revolution: Auto-Tutor

- ◆ Human tutors evoke  $2\sigma$  performance increase
- ◆ It appears that this kind of teaching can be automated
  - *U. of Memphis built Auto-Tutor to teach basic computer literacy*
    - ◇ Personal computer based system
    - ◇ Line-drawing of human face asks questions (sight and sound)
    - ◇ Student responds on keyboard
    - ◇ Auto-tutor's response to student comes as much from facial expression as spoken/written words
- ◆ Developing new courseware can also be automated
  - *Converting auto-tutor to new subject area requires only:*
    - ◇ Scanning in background papers for latent semantic analysis
      - ◆ Uses technology developed for automated essay grading
    - ◇ Set of questions & acceptable answers conversationally elicited from expert
    - ◇ The rest can be automated
- ◆ JFCOM exploring concept for joint task force officer training

*Auto-tutor is one of a number of new approaches to deliver training where & when needed; portable integrated electronic technical manuals (IETMs) are another. What is revolutionary is that the courseware development can be automated, no longer requiring teams of cognitive scientists & domain experts.*

of human graders. Auto-Tutor uses the same technology to help it evaluate student responses to its questions.


Similarly, automated technical manuals can be generated by scanning in existing printed manuals. The connections among the words and the structure are automatically analyzed and then re-formatted in a structure suited for troubleshooting. (One wishes to avoid web-based structure which is not well suited to troubleshooting.) This process is claimed to be doable in three weeks. Another month of work

can animate the diagrams in the manual as well.

The military training value in these kinds of systems comes from:

- 1) Rapid, cheap, automated generation of training content/courseware.
- 2) Delivery of that content where and when needed.
- 3) Training delivery systems that use more of the learning pathways wired into humans, rather than depending only upon reading of text or staring at pictures on a computer monitor.

The words about Auto-tutor are on the last page. Perhaps the picture here will be worth a proverbial thousand additional words.



*A screen shot from Auto-Tutor. The face on the left delivers feedback by altering its expression in reaction to the student's responses. The tutor's words are spoken and displayed on the screen as well. In the future we can expect that the student will be able to speak his or her answers instead of using the keyboard.*

Self-paced learning and tutoring are facets of a more general concept of matching the instruction to the individual. Defining the individual in order to determine how best to train him or her leads to the issues of testing. The task force was struck by the concepts developed by Dr. R. Sternberg at Yale University.

He pointed out that what is measured by existing intelligence tests is an incomplete predictor of future success. For example, scores on the Graduate Record Examination were known to predict only about 10% of the success in the first year of graduate school. Sternberg asked a new question: how did the scores predict performance in the second year? The answer was that they were not correlated at all. Since the GRE measures abilities similar to those measured by our military entrance exams, this was disturbing.

Sternberg explored whether there are other measures that can also partially predict future performance. He settled upon two new characteristics that he calls "creative intelligence" and "practical intelligence." He has developed repeatable and well-defined measures of these traits. These measures individually have about the same predictive power as the currently-used single measure (which he calls "analytic intelligence.") The use of these three, independent, predictors of success should give us a better way to select applicants for entry into the military and help define the optimum ways to tailor training to the individual.

We believe that Sternberg's three intelligences are well established and that there is merit in his contention that the current strong dependence upon 'analytic' intelligence as a societal selection criteria is at best unjustified and may be wasteful of human resources. The academic objectors to his combining the three into a "Successful Intelligence" fall primarily into three camps. One camp believes that any kind of characterizing of individuals is morally wrong, one thinks there is only one kind, and another declares that there are more than three kinds. Given this range of views, we believe that three is just about right. The payoff in training and retention for utilizing these new measures is high enough to justify a pilot program to determine if the Services can make better choices in recruiting.

## New Criteria for Predicting Individual Success

- ◆ New research suggests that there are *three* kinds of intelligence
  - *Analytic: ability to think abstractly, verbal abilities (what we currently call intelligence)*
  - *Practical: ability to adapt to a changing environment (problem solving in specific situations)*
  - *Creative: dealing with unusual situations*
- ◆ Current (analytic) measures have only .30 correlation with success
- ◆ The others have a similar ~.30 correlation but are independent of each other
- ◆ All three are **well-defined** and have **repeatable measures**
- ◆ Use of all three measures (Sternberg's Successful Intelligence) can:
  - *Permit better coupling of training to the individual*
  - *Improve the accuracy of recruiting assessments*
- ◆ Wider field of acceptable applicants; fewer dropouts

*Current intelligence tests correctly predict success about weakly. Other well-defined, independent and repeatable measures of different kinds of 'intelligence' have emerged. They independently predict success to a similar degree. Use of multiple measures should improve both training and retention.*

Practical intelligence measures the application of knowledge. It is tested for by asking questions about how to solve problems. In specific situations, it probes the ability to understand consequences of actions beyond what the conventional (analytic) intelligence measures. (i.e., conventional intelligence tests the ability to read, comprehend and then compare and contrast.) Practical Intelligence might be tested for by describing a conflict situation and asking which of a set of possible courses of action would best resolve it.

Creative intelligence measures something of the flexibility of an individual to explore unusual situations. Imagine, for example, that there is a color called "grue" that is green before the year 2000 and blue afterwards. Creative intelligence testing will ask what inferences one can draw from this counterfactual situation.

Individual performance on any one of these measures is relatively independent of performance on the other two. The military needs forces in which multiple kinds of capabilities are represented.

The Army could save \$114M in per diem costs alone simply from the reduction of instructional time in schoolhouses that would be delivered by the implementation of computer-based self-paced learning. These are not the only savings to be had, merely the easiest to count. We estimate that savings DoD-wide from reduced learning time in residential schools can easily amount to over a billion dollars per year; again merely from the introduction of self-paced training as opposed to classroom instruction. Indirect savings will be greater. These savings are 'low hanging fruit.' *They can be grasped, however, only if the money saved in the personnel system can be delivered to those who have to institute self-paced training in the schoolhouses.*

We see a second future with even more payoff, one that eliminates residential instruction for most technical courses and creates skilled Service members via distributed learning, self-paced courses, auto-tutors, electronic tech manuals .... With the people staying in their units instead of spending long times in the schoolhouse, this would help ameliorate the number-one concern we heard from every field commanders we visited or heard from: personnel turbulence.

This won't come easily. The infrastructure to carry advanced learning out to the units must be paid for *in advance* by the training community before the savings accrue later in the personnel system. Moreover, many unit commanders will view this as shoving the burden of more training onto their unit, instead of as a way to keep people in the unit where they are available for contingencies. It is also a way to insure that those people will have the needed skills well honed *while they in the unit* rather than be at their peak when they are in the schoolhouse. Nevertheless care must be taken when moving training into the unit to insure that it does not simply add another task to the unit commander's already over-filled plate, and the concept must be carefully and compellingly sold to unit commanders.

If the structural problems can be overcome, the payoff from the second training revolution will free up resources that will be needed to expand training efforts to support new forces such as the projected Transformed Army.

## Payoff from the Second Training Revolution

- Army Science Board found (1997)

- For 525 Army schoolhouse courses and 30% reduction of instructional time from self paced learning alone:

- ✧ Potential >10,000 man-year savings and \$114M per diem costs per year

Now: schoolhouse fixed-time training costs

\$4.4B/yr DoD-wide specialized training costs (those that change with student load (1996) not including student pay)

A possible future: Self-paced training: 30-80% shorter training time in the schoolhouse and consequently lower costs

Potential \$1B/yr DoD-wide schoolhouse savings from self-paced individual residential training alone.

- ◆ A more extreme future: People stay in the units

- Over \$3B direct savings DoD-wide, if personnel system can reallocate the savings

- Personnel turbulence reduced by 40%

- Learn material in 1/2 to 1/4 the time when the knowledge & skills are needed

- ◆ We can initiate and foster this revolution by:

- Emphasize collaborative asynchronous distributed learning (Just-in-time & unit based)

- Develop/apply (military & civilian) standards (being done by OSD P&R)

- Modernize & automate courseware development and courseware upgrading

- Institute a program of learning research for DoD-specific training

*Self-paced learning in residential instruction can save over a billion dollars a year DoD-wide in transient personnel costs, if the personnel system can adjust to a variable course time. More savings and benefits could be delivered if people stay in their units.*

When we made the case that effective training can change proficiency faster and more cheaply than the development of a new weapon system, we ran across the following argument. "When money is tight and the threat is low, the military should buy hardware, which endures longer than training, and hope to be able to take care of of training later." This may, in fact, be a viable strategy to husband limited resources, but it should only be implemented after considering the consequences. It should not be done by default simply because training has little voice in the acquisition process. Unfortunately, the proficiency consequences that might arise from neglecting training are not measured today, nor could our task force find any existing tools that could be used to make such measurements.

An additional factor militating against the "hardware now, training later" approach is that the kind of infrastructure that will deliver training to the point of need is itself hardware. There can be no commercial off-the-shelf source to train a brigade in land warfare nor a pilot how to fight his or her aircraft.

In the the decade of the 1990s America's battles have been come-as-you-are events allowing little or no time to rebuild a training system. We did have time to send our ground forces through the National Training Center before they fought in Iraq, but we would not have had time to *build* the training center as well.

Our task force's job would have been made easier had there been a robust learning research community in the military, but there is none. We were shown by the Service training research managers mostly small projects with small budgets and small impacts, or we saw the tail end of formerly well-funded programs.

The acoustic training device, IMAT, was a notable exception. It, too, was a project with a small budget, but its impact was not small. It's success strongly suggests that there is great leverage for additional advanced research in training technology.

In the OSD there is a dynamic office of five people three layers down below the USD (Personnel & Readiness). They are the highest ranking organization

## Impediments to Training Changes

### ◆ We found a *perceived* Training Resource Syllogism

Major Premise: We can't pay for everything

Minor Premise: Training time-constants are much shorter than acquisition ones

Therefore: **Buy hardware now.**

**Fix training later.**

◇ Unfortunately, *training systems* can not be created in short order; there is no COTS source for military force/unit training

◇ This kind of misguided reasoning will prevail as long as there are no effective measuring sticks for training or proficiency

### ◆ Most\* training R&D today is ad hoc, local, and small scale

➤ *There is no research to bind together the elements of the new revolution*

◇ The training labs have been dispersed, disestablished, or down-sized

➤ *Schoolhouses currently resist major shifts to distributed learning*

### ◆ Different "colors of money" impede training improvements

➤ *Start-up costs can't be derived from future savings in different accounts*

\* Major exception is OSD P&R setting of nationwide distributed learning standards

*The new training revolution may be able to pay for itself, but there are structural impediments to making it do so. There is a general belief that training can be neglected when the funding crunch comes and there is no one with sufficient authority in the Pentagon to counter this view.*

that even has the word 'training' in their name. They have taken the lead in defining nationwide standards for distributed learning. Still, they are too small and too far down in the system to successfully remind the acquisition community that their weapon systems must have trained people to fight them effectively.

This task force was not established because some powerful defense organization saw a problem that desperately needed review. It was created in part because no organization was calling for training reforms. A large contributor to the problems we identified is the diffuse management of training. There are separate barons for individual training, for unit training, for training certain warfare system operators, for logistics training, and for joint training. There is logistics training and pilot training and submarine training and ... Even in the individual training arena there is no consensus or leadership to identify or implement the types of changes that the training technology revolution will permit and will require.

We saw reason to believe that the DoD can maintain U.S. training superiority and make significant advances toward the next training revolution within roughly the same amounts of training resources currently used. It can not be done, however if the DoD continues to spend in the same way they have in the past. The personnel system and the training systems do not cooperate. The acquisition system is oblivious to both.

Effective training systems could generate personnel, acquisition or operational savings. Conversely, expenditures during acquisition or in the personnel system can pay dividends in training savings, but there is no mechanism to make tradeoffs among those administrative stovepipes.

When it comes time to distribute money in the Pentagon (or in Congress for that matter) there is no vocal constituency demanding funding for training. This makes it all the more important that structural changes be made to insure training issues get sustained, continuing consideration throughout defense department.

## Impediments to Training Changes (continued)

- ◆ Training management and resources are diffuse
  - ◇ Personnel policies/management are handled by different folks than training policies/management for the same individuals but the unit commander only cares that the forces are trained.
  - ◇ One set of people are concerned with technical training
  - ◇ Unit training is the responsibility of yet different folks
  - ◇ Logistics training resides elsewhere
  - ◇ Joint training is the responsibility of ...
  - ◇ Dollar resources are as diffuse as management responsibilities
  - ◇ Tradeoffs among stovepipes are difficult below Service Chief level
- ◆ Therefore we are faced with a complex structural problem:
  - *How can we use savings from training efficiencies of the training revolution & improved personnel management to fund more & improved unit/joint training?*
- ◆ There is no "Military-Training Complex" to lobby for training systems

*Training responsibilities are spread throughout the military and each organization sub-optimizes in its area, ignoring the trades that might save money elsewhere. For example, up-front design work to make a more useable/maintainable system might obviate a large training expense over the life of a system, but there is no incentive for an acquisition manager to pay for it.*

Lord Kelvin is said to have stated, "If you can't measure something or describe it numerically, you have no right to discuss it." With respect to this aphorism our task force has been placed at a severe disadvantage. As you can see, having read this far, this didn't stop us from discussing training. Neither training nor war-fighting proficiency is well measured. Worse, the few attempts to make such measurements have perished.

For example, a 1982 DSB summer study on training recommended the establishment of a Training Performance Data Center. It took almost four years to get it started and it was eliminated a few years later. The importance of measuring training was not understood at a high enough level to protect it.

What is measured about training is throughput and process; e.g., the number of students and the number of classrooms (colloquially: butts in seats). What should be measured is whether or not the training delivered to individuals, to units, to commanders, and to joint task forces was efficient and effective: how the student or unit or task force performs after training.

Even for process measures, each Service defines training differently. Flight hours count as training for the Air Force. The Army has created a similar measure called 'tank miles.' The Navy considers ship time at sea as operations not training. Consequently, we could get nothing approaching a uniform accounting of training costs from the Services. One tried to provide such an accounting, a second Service tried when asked again; we gave up on the third Service after asking three times. No one is graded on training performance. No one is charged with assessing, and evaluating different parts of DoD training to see where marginal dollars should go to and/or come from in order to make the most productive improvements in force and unit capabilities.

The Services are charged in Title 10 to man, equip and train the forces of our nation. There are well established bureaucracies to oversee manning and equipping, but there is no comparable establishment that covers training in the sense described above.

## Man, Equip and Train

### ◆ Man and Equip are measured; *Training outputs are not*

➤ *If you don't measure something, even the well-intentioned can ignore it*

- ◆ NTC OPFOR Commander: "We don't measure our combat readiness in terms of our ability to accomplish our mission-essential tactics ... We measure it in terms of the number of leaders and soldiers we have, the amount of equipment we have, the maintenance posture of equipment and available training resources."
- ◆ Army Combined Arms Center developed data-collection plan for NTC performance in 1995. Cost \$2M/year. It was not funded.
- ◆ Training Performance Data Center, established as result of 1982 DSB report, was eliminated in early 1990s due to lack of high-level support
- ◆ If you only measure inputs (training loads), not outputs (effectiveness of trained individuals), there is no good basis for making tradeoffs
- ◆ This task force was unable even to get an accounting from the Services for the money they allot to individual, unit and force level training
- ◆ There is no *effective* voice in the Pentagon who is graded on overall training performance

➤ *Not in Personnel & Readiness, in Acquisition, in Services, or in Joint Forces*

➤ *All major training achievements that we saw were the result of a few extraordinary individuals exercising their existing authority. We should not wait for another one to appear spontaneously.*

*Title 10 of the U.S. Code directs the Services to deliver to the CINCS manned, equipped and trained forces. Manpower and equipment are easy to count. Training is not. Without a numerical score card to tell how well we are training, even the well-intentioned can ignore or miss training deficiencies.*

Training development in the Services appears to be reactive rather than proactive. That is, the forces train to use what they are given, rather than choosing weapons characteristics based upon whether people can be trained to operate them to good effect.

The major events that created the first training revolution (and the IMAT acoustic trainer) were due to the actions of a few individuals who did understand training in this sense. They were not a result of some training office exercising its charter (as is done for hardware) to identify, develop and deploy training

systems that would make changes to warfare proficiency. Training is seldom viewed in this light.

Our task force did not feel it wise to sit back and hope that another extraordinary leader will appear to spearhead the next training revolution. Structural changes are called for in order that this kind of individual will have a better chance to be heard and be put in a position to insist, for example as General DePuy did 20+ years ago, that training become co-equal with the other major factors that build warfare proficiency.



We raised the following question. If the Navy could change its air-to-air exchange ratios by a factor of 6 in one year by the institution of new training techniques, is it possible for our potential enemies to do the same? In other words, should the U.S. be concerned about potential "training surprise" in the same way we have been watching for technological surprise.

In pursuit of an answer we requested the Defense Intelligence Agency to describe the state of training of potential adversaries and whether they would recognize if one were instituting the equivalent of our CTC training. The answer we were given was that the rest of the world is too destitute to do training well. We were left with the impression that, like the acquisition community, they did not view training as something that could make order-of-magnitude performance changes.

We later raised the issue with the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Military Issues, and he convened a group of senior intelligence analysts explicitly tasking them to examine the issue of possible training breakthroughs. They corroborated the DIA estimate that military training in most of our potential adversaries is poor.

They did point out that small groups of special forces in many countries are well trained and competent even though the bulk of their forces are not. None of the special forces use the CTC approach to training, but by persistent and continual use of more conventional training they succeed in creating competent elite forces. North Korea's use of South Korea as a training ground for their commandos comes closest to the CTC paradigm, although, in this case, since the consequences of failure are more fatal than in a CTC, this comes closer to battlefield Darwinism.

The NIO's ad hoc group did, however, identify an additional instance of training surprise. (The U.S. experience with Top Gun and in Desert Storm are others, although the devastating consequences of those surprises were felt by our enemies, not by us.) This example occurred in the Croatian armed forces in 1993 and 1994. In the space of one year, with the help of a

## Red Training & Training Surprise

- ◆ **CTC training culture can be learned**
  - *E.g., U.S.-trained Kuwaiti pilots benefit from Red Flag; French-trained can't*
- ◆ **Initial Intelligence Community (IC) perspective:**
  - *Potential adversaries are destitute and cannot afford good training*
  - *DSB saw no initial evidence that IC would detect training breakthroughs*
- ◆ **NIO (Conventional Military Issues) convened the first ever assembly of senior intel analysts to examine training surprise**
  - ◇ They corroborated the 'rest of the world is destitute' assessment
  - ◇ Potential adversaries are not embracing CTC approach
  - ◇ They identified a third example of training surprise: Croatia in 1994
    - ◆ (first example is Top Gun/Viet Nam; second is NTC/Desert Storm)
  - ◇ Their collective answer was: an NTC-like center would be noticed
  - ◇ Not clear to us that they would see signs of the second training revolution
  - ◇ Export licenses for training technology and systems are easy to obtain
- ◆ **The DoD should request a training breakthrough conclave yearly**

*We asked whether it would be possible for others to institute training programs that could yield the rapid proficiency changes our CTCs give us. The answer is yes: it has been done, but wide spread use is impeded by cultural issues. The intelligence community does not, however, routinely look for such surprises.*

U.S. consulting firm, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), with unusually strong political support from the top, and with adequate funding, the Croatians built a force that drove the Serbs out of their territory. They surprised not only their enemies but the rest of the world as well.

Croatia's success was a result of exceptional circumstances including not having an existing military to resist changes that made for effective training. Successes like this are likely to be rare.

The group assembled by the NIO would notice

the implementation of a CTC-like training revolution in an adversary. We worry, however, that since they were assembled on a one-time basis the focus raised by the NIO will fade with time. Nor were we convinced that the IC would recognize the implications of what we have called in this report the second training revolution. We recommend that, as a minimum, the SECDEF should request a similar Training Surprise conclave annually to maintain the perspective in the IC that breakthroughs may be possible in training as well as in technology.

We had hoped to capture the essence of CTC training and recommend that it be bottled and exported electronically to other parts of the Services and to joint forces. We still so recommend, but find more urgent the restoration of the existing CTC infrastructure and continual updating of it to meet the new threats.

We believe (& were told by CTC operators) that air-to-air warfare training requires a robust force of "red" aircraft and pilots. Temporary-duty pilots in "similar" aircraft will not suffice. The Air Force has virtually no dedicated red air force and the Navy's will soon be worn out. We recommend that a joint force, possibly contractor supplied (aircraft & pilots), be created and adequately funded.

This will not be enough. The primary threat in America's recent air battles has been from integrated air defenses composed mostly of ground-based systems. The air CTCs no longer have threat-representative "red" systems. A top Service priority should be to maintain all CTCs' red forces current.

In acquisition we recommend that each development program be required to designate a "training subsystem" charged with creating the infrastructure to insure that the hardware will have trained operators and maintainers throughout the life of the system. This training subsystem should be funded with acquisition dollars and its development should have co-equal priority with any other vital subsystem. The proficiency delivered by training and its long and short term costs should be traded against hardware performance.

The training subsystem must be tested as well. We suggest that the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) process determine whether the training approaches developed by the acquisition program will work. One way to do so is to take a unit that has done no special OT&E work-up, subject it to the training system, and evaluate how well it performs using the tested weapon. This approach should prevent situations like the first submarine with Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion modifications reporting "not ready for sea" due to a failure to consider training during the development. It should also detect before-hand situations where for ten years a missile system was used at less than half its potential range due to failure to provide for training during acquisition. USD (Personnel

## Recommendations (1)

- ◆ **Services restore Air & Ground CTC Infrastructure**
  - ◇ Upgrade opposing forces to meet new kinds of threats
  - ◇ Consider commercial supplier for joint air aggressor (red) force
- ◆ **Services & JFCOM report to DEPSECDEF how to apply CTC paradigm to additional forces and new/joint warfare areas**
- ◆ **DEPSECDEF task Services and CINCs (for joint training) to deliver yearly training assessment scorecard**
  - ◇ Covering training status both for deployed forces & in systems acquisition
  - ◇ Endorsed by CINCs and, where appropriate, by a CTC OPFOR CDR
  - ◇ Service-chosen format, but to include: performance metrics & spending
- ◆ **DEPSECDEF & CJCS request similar yearly report on foreign training from Intelligence Community re: training surprise**
- ◆ **For each new acquisition, define a Training Subsystem co-equal with other subsystems & funded with acquisition \$**
  - ◇ USD(AT&L), DEPSECDEF task DoD & Service OT&E to demonstrate Training Subsystem in final OT&E by training and testing a 'randomly' selected unit
  - ◇ USD(P&R) provide oversight on DAB for training issues

*• The CTCs are the "crown jewels" of our first training revolution; they need help. • The trades between design and future training can be made if a training subsystem is integral to acquisition programs. • Training deficiencies will be harder to ignore if a formal report is delivered yearly.*

& Readiness) should sit on the Defense Acquisition Board to insure that these issues are addressed.

The final recommendations on this page relate to raising training consciousness throughout the military. Training performance needs to be reviewed at the highest levels. The Pentagon decision-makers need to be reminded often of the leverage that training can have in war winning. The Services should be held accountable for the third leg of their Title 10 charge. Joint training should be reported upon by the CINCS who are charged with this function. The DAB should be updated regularly.

not important. What is important is, that in the process of generating it, the Services will be forced to develop measures of training effectiveness not just 'butts in seats.' We would hope that in the process, the measurement of training success would migrate up through the units and into joint forces and that, with such measures available, people would be held accountable in new ways for training performance.

In a similar way the Intelligence Community should report at a very high level in the DoD on the state of training in the rest of the world with emphasis on all forms of training breakthroughs.

The impending training revolution will take current knowledge of learning behavior and apply to it the electronic revolution in order to deliver the right skills at the right time and place. It will not be enough to simply let electronic technology proponents lead with new and amazing gadgets; an understanding of how people really learn is vital. Computer technologists believe, as do most of us, that they know what is needed to teach skills, after all, we all have been subjected to schooling to within an inch of our lives. Unfortunately, much of what we know is wrong. Both learning theory and technology are required. This motivates our recommendation that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency create a new office and institute a research program in high payoff training technologies.

Formulating the next training revolution will require that the DoD think about training in a new way: not reactive but proactive. Implementation of the first recommendation in the viewgraph would force the personnel and acquisition establishments (man and equip) to consider how to trade off hardware against training costs to deliver the most effective force.

We recommend a goal of moving 50% of residential instruction out to the units in five years as well as converting most of the remaining schoolhouse training to computer-based, self-paced, but collaborative courses. To get this started we recommend the creation of several Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)-like prototype programs. Perhaps they should be called Advanced Concept Training Demonstrations, although they would have a substantial technological content.

An ACTD joins together reasonably well understood concepts into a pilot demonstration that has clear use to the military. It does not end with the demonstration, but leaves behind a residual capability that is supported for several more years. This gives the Service time to adopt the capability if desired. Once initiated, an ACTD should have stable funding throughout its life. Pilot programs created under this recommendation should have similar structural characteristics.

We recommend a second class of ACTD-like pilot programs to demonstrate the value of the concept of

## Recommendations (2)

### ◆ USDs (P&R) & (AT&L) foster the second training revolution:

#### ➤ Provide quantitative evaluation:

◆ USD P&R, AT&L recommend resource reallocations to DEPSECDEF within pers & training functions to achieve best trained force/units for DoD missions

#### ➤ Support a goal to move 50% of schoolhouse training to unit-based training in 5 years. To initiate this change:

◆ USD(P&R) fund pilot program in each Service to convert major training courses from classroom-based to self-paced learning by FY02

◆ USD(P&R) fund 2<sup>nd</sup> pilot program in each Service to move major training programs from residential to unit-based instruction by FY02

◆ Services nominate courses. P&R fund & develop performance measurements

#### ➤ USDs (P&R)&(AT&L) establish (6.3) PE for training technology research

➤ DARPA create a new office and research program to develop high payoff training and human performance technologies

➤ Services institute ACTD-like pilot programs in recruiting & course development using multiple kinds of intelligence to predict performance

### ◆ SECDEF designate ASD or DUSD (existing or new) to be graded on Service & joint training performance. Services do the same.

*The value of new training approaches needs to be demonstrated to the Services with pilot programs. Both training effectiveness & retention can be enhanced by testing for more than analytic intelligence. Somebody needs to be in charge; a standard DSB recommendation, perhaps, but nevertheless valid.*

several kinds of intelligence. This should improve the coupling of training to the individual and allow better predictions of success in the Services, thus widening the pool of applicants. Each Service should explore this approach, possibly with the aid of DARPA.

Although not discussed elsewhere herein, we became concerned that the issue of interoperability within and among the Services may become a downfall of future warfare. Innocent changes in one system can have a cascading effect on performance

of the whole. This deserves a separate DSB review.

Finally, there is the question of who is in charge. We have been told that the universal DSB recommendation to all problems is: put someone in charge and give him or her money. Our task force endorses the principle, cliched though it may be. Training of the kinds discussed in this report will not flourish in the current administrative structure; it will remain reactive unless there is a champion. The champion could be the head of a new office or be the recipient of a new tasking to an existing office.

Welcome back to the summary. The viewgraph is the same one you saw at the beginning, but the accompanying words are different.

Our task force's principle finding is that the United States military enjoys a huge training superiority over our potential adversaries. This second superiority is at least as important to warfare performance as is America's, better advertised, technological superiority. We should not rely on technological superiority alone. It could not bring victory in Viet Nam, nor is technology alone likely to be sufficient for future victories. Since Viet Nam, actions by a few foresightful individuals caused our air forces and Army ground forces to adopt a new form of warfare training that has created a training competence complementary to our technological competence and, in part, supported by it.

We can not rest on our laurels. We would need to reduce the cost of training even if nothing in warfare were to change. Warfare will change and training must change with it or we will be unable to fight our Future Combat Systems, our JV-2010/2020 forces, or even maintain logistics systems that sustain our new agile and flexible forces.

Without a second revolution in training affairs, the revolution in military affairs will not be supportable. That new training revolution is ripe for the plucking; there is an emerging quantitative understanding of how to develop effective training approaches, and the electronic revolution now makes affordable their wide-spread application. These factors include individualized instruction, direct feedback on performance, beating the forgetting curve by delivering training at the time and point of need, and collaborative & self-paced learning.

However, unless we make structural changes to the DoD, the new training revolution won't occur until long after it is needed. If we fail to make those changes, training will remain an afterthought, something slapped together ad hoc to address failures like those that occurred in the I-HAWK or ARCI programs. Such a failure will be paid for by the Service members we send into harm's way and will waste much of the hard-won resources spent on acquisition of new (and old) weapon systems.

## Summary

- ◆ Our uniquely American *Training Superiority* is eroding
- ◆ JV2010/2020 future will require more training, not less
- ◆ Training failure will negate hardware promise
- ◆ A second revolution in training is needed and is possible
  - *This new revolution should be able to pay for itself but:*
    - ◆ The incentive structure in the DoD won't foster the revolution without help
      - ◆ A central cause is that *training performance is not measured*
- ◆ Training should take its Title 10 seat with "Man & Equip"
  - *Restore & expand upon crown jewels of current training revolution (CTCs)*
  - *Establish and test co-equal training subsystem in each acquisition program*
  - *Raise OSD/Acquisition training conscience:*
    - ◆ Services & CINCs deliver annual training report card to Deputy Sec. Defense
    - ◆ Designate ASD/DUSD to be held accountable for training performance
  - *Foster the second training revolution by establishing:*
    - ◆ ACTD-like pilot programs in computerized self-paced and unit-based training
    - ◆ An advanced training research program element
    - ◆ DARPA office to develop high payoff training/human performance technology
- ◆ DoD & Intel Community act to detect & avoid Training Surprise

*The right kind of training can have electrifying effects upon performance. We do it right only in parts of the Services and even that capability is eroding. We must do more if we want to fight the new Joint Vision kind of warfare. We won't get there on the present course. Worse, there is no single hand at the helm.*

The structural changes we recommend hinge upon making training issues routinely visible to those who write checks in the Pentagon. There is no COTS source for advanced military training nor is there a large industrial lobby to remind decision makers about the importance of training. This lack of external reminders makes structural change all the more important both to preserve our training superiority and to prevent training surprise from our adversaries.

The key to our success in the present is

to devote more resources to the crown jewels of the U.S.'s first training revolution: the CTCs, to permit JV2020 kinds of training against new threats. The keys to fixing the future are high-level training report cards. It doesn't matter in what format the Services or the intelligence community tells the SECDEF about the state of training, what matters is that the reports are delivered. The attention arising from these reports should aid implementation of our other recommendations and sustain a recognition of the extraordinary value of training to winning wars. 24

There is no Military-Training Complex to force emphasis on training. Today that emphasis comes from the dedicated hardworking Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines in the field. Our key recommendations relate to making training visible at higher levels. If we are to restore the first training revolution's institutions; if we are to upgrade them to meet the current threat; if we are to expand them to support JV2010/2020 warfare, and if we are to foster a second training revolution, then the DoD must change.

DSB Task Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise

## Last Words

### Training counts

*Warfighting success is as dependent upon the proficiency of people as it is upon the hardware with which they fight.*

*We need training superiority as much as we need technical superiority.*

### We don't count training

We measure process, not proficiency,  
and what you don't measure or report, you can ignore.

Without structural changes in the DoD, training won't take its place at the table with *man & equip*

*Unless it does, we will negate much of the promise of the Joint Vision warfare transformation.*

*If it does, we will be able to maintain and expand our training superiority without significant additional cost.*

This is the last chart. If, after all of the foregoing text, this chart doesn't stand by itself, there is nothing here we can do to fix that

Appendix A  
**Terms of Reference**

11-L-0559/OSD/5931

ACTD	Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
AFB	Air Force Base
AFHRL	Air Force Human Resource Lab
ARCI	Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
CTCs	Combat Training Centers
DAB	Defense Acquisition Board
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
dB	Decibels
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMT	Distributed Mission Training
DoD	Department of Defense
DSB	Defense Science Board
DUSD	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
EW	Electronic Warfare
GM	General Motors
GRE	Graduate Record Examination
IADS	Integrated Air Defenses
IC	Intelligence Community
IETMs	Integrated Electronic Technical Manuals

11-L-0559/OSD/5932

IMAT	Interactive Multi-Sensor Analysis Trainer
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JTASC	Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center
JV 2010	Joint Vision 2010
JV 2020	Joint Vision 2020
MPRI	Military Professional Resource, Inc.
NAS	Naval Air Station
NIO	National Intelligence Office
NSF	National Science Foundation
NTC	National Training Center
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT&E	Operational Test and Evaluation
R&D	Research and Development
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TOW	Tubular Optical Weapon
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USD (AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD (P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USN	United States Navy



Appendix B  
**Acronyms Used**

11-L-0559/OSD/5934



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010



ACQUISITION AND  
TECHNOLOGY

FEB 22 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference—Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Training and Education.

You are requested to conduct a task force to analyze the impact of training techniques and the potential future learning environment upon the warfare proficiency of our military forces, active and reserve components, and that of potential adversaries in the context of Joint Vision 2010 warfare.

The performance of military systems is frequently more dependent upon the people who use them than on the technology embedded within them. Therefore, the way we train our forces and personnel may have as great an influence (good or bad) over mission performance as our choices of hardware. Done right, training may be the most cost-effective method to maintain force proficiency and the most rapid method to enhance it. Neglect of training can, however, be the fastest way to negate the benefits of our military technology and force structure.

For the past 30 years elements of the U.S. armed forces have implemented training techniques that demonstrably improve unit warfare proficiency many-fold in time frames as short as a few weeks. Equal investments in other kinds of unit training frequently yield only marginal benefits. We can not afford to waste our hardware or training expenditures by failing to train well the individuals and units who will operate our future weapons systems. Moreover, there now appears to be the potential to go beyond the best training approaches of the past by bringing information resources and networks into an ensemble of education, training, and performance aiding systems. If these can be embedded into operational weapon systems and job environments, they may profoundly change the way we do business in the military.

Costs and benefits of training and education should be debated on the same footing as other DoD programs that are intended to maintain and improve military capability. Your task force should not just recommend training and educational techniques and technologies for the DoD; it should also show how to make these benefits and their costs routinely visible throughout the DoD.

Specifically the task force should consider the following areas.

- 1) **UNIT/FORCE-LEVEL PROFICIENCY:** The task force should identify key training demands that affect development and maintenance of military proficiency.
- 2) **INDIVIDUAL WARRIOR/HUMAN COMPETENCE:** Underlying the ability to maintain military *units* that will be proficient in future missions is the availability of technically and militarily competent *individuals*. The task force should recommend how to create and maintain individual proficiency among our warriors and support personnel.
- 3) **MILITARY TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE:** The task force should identify key areas where DoD-wide processes and methodologies, such as advanced distributed learning,

11-L-0559/OSD/5935

embedded training, global networks and information resources, netted training, advanced simulations, and weapons system stimulators, may be needed. It should identify opportunities to enhance or maintain capabilities with reduced or minimal added costs.

- 4) **MONITORING TRAINING vs. PROFICIENCY IN POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES:** The leverage arising from training technologies and approaches might also be used by potential adversaries to improve their military proficiency, rapidly and with low costs. The task force should identify useful indicators of high-leverage training programs for use by the intelligence community to prevent training surprise.

In the pursuit of your study, the task force should:

- a) Assess the Current State of Training in the DoD to evaluate what we do well, what we need to do better, and the requirements for future training. Consider also how potential adversaries pursue training.
- b) Identify Technical Opportunities. What are the characteristics and advantages of possible future learning environments, and what are the key enablers to achieving those environments?
- c) Explore Private-Sector Partnerships. Determine if there are opportunities in training equivalent to commercial-off-the-shelf hardware acquisition.
- d) Identify Opportunities for improving the process for training of our warfighting, maintenance, and support personnel.
- e) Assess the payoffs, costs and benefits (including how implementation may change the way we operate our forces.) Consider the opportunities for, and impediments to implementing each alternative (the mismatches among bureaucracies, budget lines, cultures, and technologies). Identify training/performance metrics that can be routinely raised to the attention of decision-makers and trainers throughout the Defense Department.
- f) Recommend Policies, Plans, and Programs. Identify what actions (organizational, budgetary, etc.) will be necessary, to enable the development and implementation of advances in individual, collective, and unit training, by OSD and the Services. Identify also how we can avoid being surprised if a potential adversary were to implement these actions in its own forces.

This Task Force will be co-sponsored by the Undersecretary of Defense (P&R), Director DDR&E, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7). Mr Joe Braddock and Dr. Ralph E. Chatham will serve as the Task Force Co-Chairmen. Michael A. Parmentier from OUSD (P&R), will serve as Executive Secretary and Captain Jim Lyons, USN, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

11-L-0559/OSD/5936

  
J. S. Gansler

12/23  
1600

EF3742  
L 12

C117

USD/P copy provided  
10/23/02

INFO MEMO

I#-02/018122-SO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

M. Billingslea  
12/20/02

SUBJECT: Update on Maternal and Child Health Care Project in Afghanistan

- DOD (Stability Operations) facilitated a 6-16 Dec 02 joint DOD/HHS trip to Afghanistan to select a site and develop an implementation plan to provide post-graduate OB/GYN teaching clinic for Afghan physicians and mid-level health care providers (e.g., midwives).
- The Minister of Public Health requested the Rhabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul be selected as the teaching clinic site.
- HHS and Health Affairs physicians agreed this is an optimal location for the clinic. The hospital is a large women's general hospital, but emphasizes maternal/child health care. The hospital has a large physician training program to serve as a training base and a potential training staff for the clinic.
- Civil Affairs soldiers have already begun renovation of the hospital. Renovation completion is expected within 90 days. Work is proceeding in two shifts per day.
- The HHS Team Chief will brief a comprehensive plan for the clinic to the HHS Secretary on 23 Dec 02. HHS expects the initial phase(s) of the program to begin within 90 days.

AFG Health Affairs  
SD -  
They are doing double shifts to get the women's clinic in Kabul up and running.  
HHS staff also working this aggressively.  
MRB  
(pictures attached)

COORDINATION: Tab A

Sec Def -  
Bill Steiger's updated is attached at Red Tab.  
Dike to  
20 Dec 02



11-L-0559/OSD/5938



11-L-0559/OSD/5939



11-L-0559/OSD/5940

**Snowflake**

**December 16, 2002 6:21 PM**

**TO: Bill Steiger**  
Director, International Affairs,  
Office of the Chief of Staff,  
Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

**FROM: Donald Rumsfeld** DR

**SUBJECT: Midwifery Program**

How are we doing on the midwifery program? Is it making progress?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121602-44

11-L-0559/OSD/5941

U19784-02



## Memorandum

To: The Secretary

From: Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Affairs *WRS*

Subject: Update on Joint HHS-Department of Defense (DoD) Team in Afghanistan

On December 5, a team of two HHS officials, two DoD officials, and two private individuals left Washington for Kabul. The mission of the team was to assess DoD's suggestion to rehabilitate Rabia Balkhi Hospital in Kabul and to determine how HHS can be of assistance. Also, the team was charged with determining what facility in or around Kabul would be appropriate to house a maternal and child health teaching clinic in line with the vision you have laid out with Secretary Rumsfeld.

To date, the team met with the appropriate officials from the U.S. Embassy, including Ambassador Finn, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Ministry of Public Health, and various United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and of course, with officials of Rabia Balkhi Hospital and other clinics and hospitals. The team leader, Dr. Peter Van Dyck of the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within HHS, has said that the team was greeted warmly and with enthusiasm from all quarters, including the Embassy. Furthermore, USAID was reasonably cooperative and not openly obstructive, and participated in all meetings and site visits. (We do foresee the possibility of continued problems with USAID on the ground in Kabul, however.) The staff of the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force was helpful and supportive—just outstanding.

The Ministry of Public Health has endorsed plans for rehabilitating Rabia Balkhi Hospital and HHS' participation in upgrading that facility in partnership with DoD. Our team has brought back a letter from Minister Seddiq to Secretary Thompson to give her endorsement in writing. The team has also brought back a list of specific medical equipment and supply needs, which we can then use when speaking to possible donors in the United States.

Additionally, the team has scouted out locations for establishing a maternal and child health teaching clinic. These locations include both sites within Kabul and more rural locations a few miles to the north of Kabul, near Bagram Air Base, some run by the government, some by NGOs, and one maternity hospital where the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has taken a significant role in providing training. Thus, our team has considered a number of possible options and will be making a recommendation to you on a site.

The team had follow-up meetings with the MOH, UNICEF, and Ambassador Finn before their return to the United States. My staff will be sitting with them for a full de-briefing next week.

In addition, my staff and I, along with HHS agency representatives from HRSA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Indian Health Service, and the Office on Women's Health met with the Afghan Deputy Minister of

Public Health, Dr. Feroz, on December 10. We introduced the Deputy Minister to the relevant expertise of our HHS agencies, and the Minister expressed his interest in receiving targeted technical assistance from us in addition to the clinic project. Looking beyond the immediate priorities of maternal and child health, we discussed other areas of need for the Ministry, including the special problems of rural health care; capacity building and self-governance at the community level; the needs of underserved populations; mental health; food, water and drug safety; and health information systems.

The Afghan representatives confirmed their keen interest in receiving technical assistance of all types from HHS, keeping in mind the need to provide that assistance in a manner appropriate to the present situation and in a coordinated fashion, working with the other major donor groups. The Deputy Minister specifically asked for assistance from the FDA on standard-setting and enforcement for food and drug safety and from the CDC on epidemiological and public health management training. My staff and I will be following up with the Ministry on these requests to build them into our overall plan for Afghanistan.

12/30  
08 22.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

*[Handwritten initials]*

INFO MEMO

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 23 2002

FROM: ASD (Health Affairs) *William Winkler*

SUBJECT: 2002 Combined Federal Campaign

- As of December 23, 2002, Office of the Secretary of Defense's total Combined Federal Campaign contribution amount is \$635K which represents 95% of our \$670K goal set on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002.
- Two challenges facing the campaign this year have been: (1) current economic uncertainty; and (2) negative public opinion of United Way management. **As a result, the National Capital Area Campaign has been extended until January 31, 2003.**
  - The specific challenge of the United Way audit report included lack of fiscal and management controls, unjustified or unsupported expenses, and noncompliance with Combined Federal Campaign regulations. Feedback from our Team Captains and Key Workers suggest that many in our department have closely followed audit reports and have not been confident in giving to the campaign this year.
- In an effort to raise the remaining 5%, I have personally contacted principals in certain areas who are behind in meeting their organizational goals. I have also sent a more general memorandum to all principals asking for their leadership in monitoring progress in their respective areas for the remainder of the campaign ~~(b)(6)~~.
- I am confident that we will reach our goal of \$670K. Given Combined Federal Campaign's climate this year, I am pleased to see that many people have still chosen to give despite the conditions reported in bullet 2.

005

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments  
As stated

Prepared by: Ms. Caroline Johnson, OASD(HA), (b)(6)

230642

11-L-0559/OSD/5944

U00279 /03



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

DEC 23 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR USD (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)  
USD (COMPTROLLER)  
USD (PERSONNEL & READINESS)  
USD (POLICY)  
GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
ASD (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)  
ASD (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)  
ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)  
DIRECTOR, PA&E

SUBJECT: 2002-2003 Combined Federal Campaign

As of December 23, 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's total Combined Federal Campaign contribution amount is \$635k, which represents ninety-five percent of our \$670,000 goal amount.

Two challenges facing our campaign this year have been the current economic uncertainty and the negative public opinion of United Way management. **As a result, the National Capital Area campaign has been extended until January 31, 2003.**

While many of you have already exceeded your individual goal amount for this year, our hope is that you will continue to monitor your individual progress and encourage your Team Captains and Key Workers to make contact with each person within your organization. For those areas who have not yet reached their goal, we are confident that with your help we can exceed \$670K goal by the end of January.

Again, thank you for your continued support.

*Bill*

William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD  
CFC Campaign Chairman

cc:  
PDUSD (P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/5945

117

December 9, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: OSD CFC Contributions

*copy to [unclear]*

*1/7*

How do we get the OSD charitable giving up where it belongs? It is a little embarrassing to see that thing like that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120902-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/20/02

*12/10*  
~~Copy to: Bill Winkenwerder  
Di Rita~~

*1/7*  
Sec Def -

Separately, I asked  
Ray DuBois, (with his  
Doc Cooke hat) to  
engage the government organizers  
to consider not using United Way in the  
Combined Federal Campaign

*1/7*  
See Winkenwerder notes  
attached

11-L-0559/OSD/5946

*Di Rita*

*1/7*



e 117

December 9, 2002 7:25 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: OSD CFC Contributions

Larry Di Rita  
1/7

How do we get the OSD charitable giving up where it belongs? It is a little embarrassing to see that thing like that.

005

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
120902-1

.....  
Please respond by 12/20/02

12/10  
~~Copy to: Bill Winkenwerder  
Di Rita~~

1/7  
SECDEF HAS SEEN  
JAN 8 2003

Sec Def -

1/7  
See Winkenwerder notes attached  
9 Dec 02

Separately, I asked Ray DuBois, (with his Doc Cooke hat) to engage the government organizers to consider not using United Way in the Combined Federal Campaign

11-L-0559/QSD/5947

Di Rita

U00280 /03  
Larry Di Rita  
1/7

TAB A

December 16, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Eritrea

*Eritrea*

I would like to know why the Eritrea test range we have been offered couldn't replace some aspects of Vieques.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121602-27



Please respond by 12/18/02

*16 Dec 02*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/5948

12 DEC 2002 7:14

U00282 /03

10:53 AM

TO: Secretary Colin Powell  
CC: Hon. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 5, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Stephanie Bunker**

We have to figure out what is going on with Stephanie Bunker, a spokesperson for the United Nations.

About once a month she comes out with an inaccurate charge against the US. She seems to feel that if the US would only go away, Afghanistan would be safe for peace and prosperity.

Let's figure out what she's about, who it is she works for, why she keeps lying and what might be done about it.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
020502.10

*AFGHANISTAN*

*5 Jan 02*



12:37 PM

TO: George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*

DATE: January 5, 2002

SUBJECT: CIA Policy

I am really baffled by the CIA public relations policies.

When the first CIA person was killed, you told us not to mention that. The next thing I see is you on television giving a speech at his gravesite.

The next instance where very recently the CIA person was wounded, everyone told CINCENT not to mention it. So he didn't. Now CIA is mentioning it repeatedly.

What in the world policy do you have? How does it work? How should we work with you so that we do what it is that makes sense? I am totally confused by the contradictory signals coming out of the agency.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
020502.07

*040 CIA*

*5 Jan 02*

12:37 PM

TO: George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*  
DATE: January 5, 2002  
SUBJECT: CIA Policy

I am really baffled by the CIA public relations policies.

When the first CIA person was killed, you told us not to mention that. The next thing I see is you on television giving a speech at his gravesite.

The next instance where very recently the CIA person was wounded, everyone told CINCENT not to mention it. So he didn't. Now CIA is mentioning it repeatedly.

What in the world policy do you have? How does it work? How should we work with you so that we do what it is that makes sense? I am totally confused by the contradictory signals coming out of the agency.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
020502.07

bc: Dr. Wolfowitz  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Franks

MFR:  
This was forwarded to <sup>1-802</sup>  
Gen. Franks on 1/7, per  
Cables. It was  
forwarded under the same  
coversheet as the  
classified snowflake  
titled "Detainee  
Cheat Sheet".  
Not sure if we need  
a copy for our files -  
I didn't find it on  
my search. *js*

11-L-0559/OSD/5951

MEMORANDUM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 07 2002

FOR: Donald Rumsfeld  
FROM: Jim Schlesinger  
DATE: 3 January 2002  
SUBJ: Your FAX on US-Iranian Relations

Don:

The events of September 11 and their aftermath have altered somewhat the judgments of the Atlantic Council paper, but only marginally. Immediately after September 11, as we designed our actions in Afghanistan, we clearly would have liked less hostile relations with Iran. However, the subsequent triumphs in Afghanistan may have made such improvement in relations more attractive to (most) Iranians, yet somewhat less urgent from our standpoint. This latter condition will, of course, be affected by decisions the Administration may make regarding Iraq.

TRM

The following points are in order.

1. The paper was intended to provide a roadmap for moving beyond the stalemate, if and only if both countries wished to move towards rapprochement. It was not intended as an advocacy document. It was intended only to help remove the domestic barriers, if the United States government wished to proceed in that direction. Whether or not the Iranian government would so move remains a question mark. It is critical to understand, however, that initial steps on our part do not imply continuation, unless reciprocated—and not necessarily even if reciprocated.
2. Some degree of rapprochement is more in Iran's interests than in ours. (We are the vastly greater power.) Consequently achieving more normal relations remains less necessary for us.
3. A ferment is ongoing in Iran. We should encourage it. The conservatives (still in charge of the security apparatus) have been driven to increasing actions of repression. While there is a great deal of talk about the "Arab Street," we should bear in mind that there is also "an Iranian Street," which has become increasingly pro-American. This may be akin to underlying sentiments observed in Afghanistan.
4. The present restrictions on Iran make little sense (recognized even by their supporters in Congress). They are more symbolic than effective. Total, Shell, ENI, and the Russian oil companies supply most, if not all, of the resources needed for hydrocarbon development. We are impeding only our own oil companies with longer-term consequences for us. (Ask the former CEO of Halliburton.) Stopping the sale of spare parts by Boeing is a mistake. The indignities imposed on Iranians visiting the

3 Jan 02

United States are an irritant that serve little purpose (other than providing grist for the mill of the mullahs).

5. Economic development in Central Asia, which depends on oil, is being impeded by our policies. Whatever you may hear from the Department of State, Baku-Ceyhan is unlikely to go forward. Nazabayev and the oil companies are waiting for a low-cost pipeline going through Iran. Thus, the present restrictions imposed on Iran are hurting our other geopolitical objectives elsewhere in the region.
6. We can afford to make a few gestures. In energy it would be to our advantage. A gesture to alleviate discrimination against Iranians would remove an irritant. Then we can see what develops. Such action will help the reformers, enthuse the Iranian public—even if there is not an appropriate response, clearly do us no harm, and even a little good.

January 7, 2002 11:12 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wanted

When we come up with a list of top Taliban and Al Qaeda, in addition to their names, phonetic pronunciation, title of the senior post they held, and what we think their current disposition is—dead, captured, or at large—we ought to put down the dollar amount of reward currently out for the individual.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-21

*AF JHANI STAN*

*7 Jan 02*

\* \* \* TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT ( JAN. 8.2002 8:17AM ) \* \* \*

TTI

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERS. NAME	FILE
JAN. 8.	8:16AM	COMPATIBLE	G-TS	1'18"	P. 2	OK		567

\* : BATCH  
M : MEMORY  
S : STANDARD  
A- : ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL  
L : SEND LATER  
D : DETAIL  
1- : MIL\_STD MODE

\$ : TRANSFER  
@ : FORWARDING  
F : FINE  
G- : RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING  
E : ECM  
> : REDUCTION

Confirmed Receipt verbally at

(b)(6)

TSgt BAKER/CABLES

January 7, 2002 11:12 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wanted

When we come up with a list of top Taliban and Al Qaeda, in addition to their names, phonetic pronunciation, title of the senior post they held, and what we think their current disposition is—dead, captured, or at large—we ought to put down the dollar amount of reward currently out for the individual.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-21

11-L-0559/OSD/5956

showfile

January 7, 2002 2:51 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Detainee Paper

1. See edits.
2. You do not have the definitions of Al Qaeda and Taliban in there.
3. You do not specifically define Taliban leaders, which I think needs to be explicitly done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-53

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Note for SECDEF

Done. Doug Feith concurs.

WJ Hampers  
1/7/02

Al  
383.6

752002



EF2673 *Done 9/3*

02 / 013005

*baner*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 29, 2002  
SUBJECT:


Find out if we do or do not have access to those Afghan held prisoners that keep getting reported in the press.

Thanks.

DHR/szn  
082902.10

Please respond by:

9/10



*29 Aug 02*

*Done*

August 14, 2002 2:13 PM

IRAQ

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Candidates

We ought to get a list of the people who would have to go with Saddam Hussein. One possible candidate is Farug Hijazi—he is the former Iraqi ambassador to Tunisia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081402-5

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

UCB  
Please control. Ref X00110-03.  
L 9meit # U00358.  
Ma, Davenport

14Aug02

11-L-0559/OSD/5959

SECDEF CONTROL# U00358 203

Snowflake

#273

August 1, 2002 7:10 AM

Done

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ISAF

*R. F. Myers*

What do you think we ought to do about the ISAF?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-2

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*[Handwritten mark]*

*1 Aug 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/5960

U00381 / 03

August 1, 2002 7:11 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator McCain

*0311*

Please get the lawyers or someone to get me an answer to Senator McCain's question about what our authority is or what Congress's authority is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-3



Please respond by 08/09/02

*1 copy*

August 1, 2002 7:14 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Follow-Up

032

Please pull together the positive comments Senators made yesterday and just give me those quotes. I may want to write notes to some of them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-5



Please respond by 08/09/02

1 Aug 02

U00383 / 03

August 1, 2002 7:11 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JA  
SUBJECT: Common Doctrine

(A) Someone asked a question as to whether there should be common doctrine for the Army, Navy and Air Force on close air support. You might want to think about that.

(B) My recollection is that Allard was particularly complimentary, so were Sessions, Lieberman and Dayton. Were there others?

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-6

.....

Please respond by 08/16/02

U00384 103 8/4

(A) Senator Reed asked the question. In my view, he is correct. We have a common doctrine for close air support for Special Forces, we do not for conventional forces. I plan on pursuing / investigating further.  
(B) Pat Roberts also made an effort to be complimentary.  
11-J-0559/QSD/5963  
W.R.E.D.

August 1, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Tracking WMD Briefings to Congress

Please give me an annotated list of all Senators that shows who has received the WMD briefing and the date. I would like the same thing for the House of Representatives.

Second, I would like you to update it every week.

Third, we ought to have some sort of an indication of each time a member of the House or Senate was invited to receive the briefing but declined. I want to know how many times and the dates they were invited.

*DR*

If that is not clear, please come and see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-7



Please respond by 08/16/02

*1 Aug 02*

August 1, 2002 8:09 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: General Hoar

*095*

Please take General Hoar off the list of people we have.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-8



Please respond by 08/09/02

*1 Aug 02*

U00386 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/5965



August 1, 2002 2:15 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Kyl on August 23

Please take a look at August 23—I think Jon Kyl is going to be in that day.

He wants to sit down for an hour and a half and talk about something with me. I will choose the group. I want Larry for one, and I want to see Larry about who else I invite—Doug Feith, for sure, and maybe Paul Wolfowitz.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-10



Please respond by 08/09/02

*000715D*

*1 Aug 02*

U00387 /03

August 1, 2002 2:17 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Phone Call with Senator Bond

*032*

Please set me up with a phone call with Senator Kit Bond. I want to talk to him about his hand.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-11



Please respond by 08/09/02

*Aug 02*

8/2/02

August 1, 2002 2:21 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Interview w/Tom Brokaw

DR  
Sir: Agree completely. We will make our views known in the next few days before they come in. TC

The Brokaw thing was a waste of time. He talked about Iraq the entire time for 40 minutes. I finally said he had a fixation and that they were causing a feeding frenzy on Iraq. We will end up on the cutting room floor, I suppose.

It seems to me we ought to knock off these 9/11 interviews if they want to come in and talk about Iraq. You ought to just tell them that either they talk about 9/11 or they don't. If they are going to talk about Iraq, they are not going to get an interview. And if they start it, I will just get up and leave.

I am tired of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080102-12

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02

Larry Di Rita

8/2

1 Aug 02

U00389 /03

August 2, 2002 7:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Participants

In the future, before these groups of outsiders are invited in, I want to see the list.

We are missing some key people who are friends of mine who need to be informed, and we are adding people who really shouldn't be there. It weakens the meeting if the wrong people are in there—I know a lot about this.

I need to see a set of all the lists she has, so I can take a look at them and add and subtract.

Thanks.

DIR.dh  
080202-1

.....  
Please respond by 08/14/02

*DR*  
LARRY DI RITA  
8/20

337

2 Aug 02

August 2, 2002 7:27 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Army

Please give me the organization of the Army.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-3

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02

~~SECRET~~

8/4

Attached.

*V/R*  
*Ed*

Show me layers from  
~~for~~  
~~secret~~  
*Gins*

Army  
Diary  
Dir  
has  
Plan  
Squad  
etc

SIR, 8-20  
COL BUCCI INPUT  
ON "LAYERS FROM  
ARMY" AT RED  
TAB. *V/R*

*Dugan*

August 19, 2002

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Subject: Army Layers

Sir, the following is the generic Army organization. I avoided the more esoteric nuances, which I can explain, but these are the basics.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Senior Leader</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Squad	10-12 troops	Staff Sergeant	
Platoon	30-50 troops	2LT	3 Squads
Company	150-200 troops	CPT	3-4 Platoons
Battalion	500-1000 troops	LTC	3-4 Companies
Brigade	3000-5000 troops	COL	2-4 Battalions
Division	13,000-18,000	Major General	2-4 Brigades
Corps	30,000-80,000	Lieutenant General	2-5 Divisions

Very Respectfully,



COL Bucci

11-L-0559/OSD/5971


# THE ARMY

## MACOMS (MAJOR COMMANDS)

 Forces Command	 Intelligence & Security Command
 Training and Doctrine Command	 Criminal Investigation Command
 Army Materiel Command	 Military Traffic Management Command
 Corps of Engineers	 Space and Missile Defense Command
 Medical Command	 Military District of Washington

- Fulfill Title 10 responsibilities to generate and resource forces

## MACOMS/ASCCs (ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDS)

 Eighth United States Army	 United States Army, South
 United States Army Europe	 Third United States Army (ASCC)
 United States Army Pacific	 US Army Special Operations Command

- Theater warfighting capability to support Combatant Commanders

## CORPS



- Provide tactical capabilities for effective Joint/Combined Force land operations.

## DIVISIONS



- Warfighting C2 organizations serve as cores for JTF, (C)JFLCC, or ARFOR HQ

## USAR (ARMY RESERVE)

5 TRAINING SUPPORT DIVISIONS



- Provide training assistance & support to RC units

7 INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING DIVISIONS



- Provide combat support, service support training

12 REGIONAL SUPPORT COMMANDS



- Provide combat ready forces

August 2, 2002 7:28 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: November 17 Group

Did Tom Miller ever get back to us on the November 17 families?

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
080202-4

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Larry Di Rita  
8/20

*RECEIVED*

*2 Aug 02*



August 2, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Organization of Services

*ADVANCE COPY*

*320.2*

I would like to see a fairly simple organization of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines, so I can see where these major elements are and where the duplication might be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-7



Please respond by 08/16/02

*2 Aug 02*

U00393 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/5974

August 2, 2002 12:40 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: WMD Briefing

You should get a better audio-visual presentation.

The slides are not good—they should be dramatically improved. When you have a big room like that, people can't read anything up there. We ought to know better than that.

Let's get somebody who knows what they are doing to do the graphics and the charts.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-8

.....  
*Please respond by 08/16/02*

*387*

*Aug 02*

U00394 / 03

August 2, 2002 2:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: VADM GIAMASTIANI  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Defense Bill

The President mentioned that the Defense bill had passed someplace and that now there was a conference. I said we have a problem on the conference, because there are some things in the Senate's bill that are better from our standpoint and some in the House version.

If each side exchanges, we could get both bad versions. It is terribly important. One of the big things in there, as I recall, is this issue of concurrent receipts. The President said that was "veto-able." I said we really better get organized and put a full court press on. We need to see if we can't get both sides to improve, because either side has a bad bill on that issue. And I don't want to trade off missile defense, or the war or a lot of other things for it. The President said we better get our teams together.

1/10.01

Please get a list of all the people we have at any given time, like right now, deployed with CIA. I sign these deployment orders all the time. We have a pile of civilian and military personnel who are connected to CIA on the kinds of things we are talking about in the Holland memo.

Thanks.

Handwritten signature and initials, possibly "DR" or "LDR", with date "8/20" and "STW 14 2002".

DHR:dh  
080202-9

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

8/5  
↓

Handwritten signature and initials, possibly "LDR" or "DH", with "DH" written below.

2 Auger

DeLoane - please send this to Powell Moore, too.

11-L-0559/OSD/5976

000395 / 103 D. Libe 8/5

Larry Di Rita

August 2, 2002 2:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photos

Please come see me about that stack of photographs I sent out and asked you to see me on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-10



Please respond by 8/5/02

*060*

*Done*  
Larry Di Rita  
*8/5*

*2 Aug 02*

August 2, 2002 2:14 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Reconstruction Coordinator

Condi asked if we were looking at two- and three-stars besides this list for the security reconstruction coordinator. I don't know what you are doing on that— anything?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-11

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*2/10 (3+4)*

*2 Aug 02*

August 2, 2002 2:18 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press Reporting

Please check out the facts on this intel piece.

Thanks.

Attach.  
FBIS-SA0207310026 "Pakistan: Relatives Claim Ex-Taliban Ambassador Zaef 'Martyred' in Cuban Jail"

DHR:dh  
080202-12

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*PAKISTAN*

*2 Dupes*

U00398 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/5979

FBS-ri AFGHANISTAN: Pakistan: Relatives Claim Ex-Taliban Ambassador  
Story: 015

Time: 2002 07/31 04:15 GMT

Ref:

AFGHANISTAN: Pakistan: Relatives Claim Ex-Taliban Ambassador  
Zaeef 'Martyred' in Cuban Jail

SA0207310026 Karachi Ummat in Urdu 30 Jul 02 pp 1, 7

[Report by Sana News: "Former Afghan Ambassador Mullah Zaeef  
succumbs to severe torture in Cuba jail"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Quetta: The former Afghan Ambassador in Pakistan, Mullah Abdul  
Salam Zaeef has been martyred in the Cuban jail due to severe  
torture. While confirming the martyrdom of Mullah Zaeef, his  
close relatives in Kandahar told foreign correspondents that they  
have received information about the martyrdom of Mullah Zaeef. He  
died after severe torture.

When the officials in the office of the Kandahar Governor, Gul  
Sher Zai, were contacted, they said that their office had not  
received any information about the death of Mullah Zaeef.  
Moreover, he was still alive in the Cuban jail, they added.

During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Mullah Abdul Salam  
Zaeef was their ambassador in Pakistan. However, after the  
collapse of Taliban government, he was arrested by the Karzai  
government from Kandahar and handed over to the United States.  
The Afghan Government has neither confirmed his death nor could  
this piece of news be confirmed by any other source.

[Description of Source: Karachi Ummat in Urdu -- Daily noted for  
its Islamic fundamentalist leanings and strong anti-U.S.  
position. Editor Rafiq Afghan has long-established ties with the  
Afghan Jihad movement.]

(THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND  
DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT  
OWNERS.)

(ENDALL)

31 JUL 0415z FBIS

NNNN

*DK  
Hart*

August 2, 2002 4:55 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Press Tardiness

The next time we have these off-the-record sessions, no one can come late. If they are going to be late, they just don't come. That is fine with me if they don't come.

I think the problem is the two people who came late are important—Ricks and Martin—and they missed some very important things I said early on. They are the ones who should have heard it.

So, in the future, let's just have a rule. Everyone comes, they are there, the door is locked and it is over.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080202-14

.....


Please respond by 08/09/02

*000.7*

*2/20/02*



August 5, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: WMD Brief

Please get with Torie and her people and have her help dress up that briefing—get the graphics right and get it so it is legible, visible, and readable and so it has impact and power!

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-1



Please respond by 08/16/02

381

5 Aug 02

U00400 / 03

August 5, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*  
SUBJECT: Hussein and UN Resolutions

I think we ought to get a bill of particulars on how Saddam Hussein is breaking the UN resolutions. I just noticed the attached article by Susan Blaustein from Sunday's *Washington Post*.

It is pretty clear that we ought to be able to put together a good tick list that I could start citing in press briefings.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Susan Blaustein, "Saddam Hussein's Billions," *Washington Post*, August 4, 2002

DHR:dh  
080502-3

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*IEHQ*

*5 Aug 02*

U00401 /03

washingtonpost.com

## Saddam Hussein's Billions

By Susan Blaustein

Sunday, August 4, 2002; Page B07

Despite his often-rehearsed complaint that international sanctions have starved and ravaged his people, Saddam Hussein is laughing all the way to the arms bazaar. Since 1997 Iraq has brought in an average of \$6 billion a year in civilian goods through the U.N. oil-for-food program, the country's only legitimate source of outside income. Under this program, Iraqi oil is exported in exchange for imports deemed by international experts to have no military utility.

On top of this, Hussein and his sons and henchmen have managed to earn at least another \$2 billion a year in hard currency by illegally manipulating the U.N. system and running extensive smuggling operations outside it. Ninety percent of that estimated \$2 billion comes from oil smuggling. Hussein & Sons have developed many channels outside the oil-for-food program through which the regime has managed to export oil in exchange for hard currency and goods not subject to U.N. oversight. These channels involve Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran and the Gulf states, and they are widening over time.

The extra cash makes it possible for Hussein to continue to purchase the loyalty and protection of his myriad security and intelligence forces; to improve his ratings in the Arab world by erecting gargantuan mosques and paying off the families of Palestinian suicide bombers; and, most dangerously, to feed his clandestine weapons procurement and development program.

The international community has long been aware of Hussein's illicit revenue stream and weapons programs but has nevertheless turned a blind eye. In May the U.N. Security Council finally approved revisions in the oil-for-food program to focus it more narrowly on limiting Hussein's capacity to import weapons of mass destruction while sparing the Iraqi people as much as possible from the sanctions' effects. The revised U.N. program, which has only just begun to be implemented, will, it is hoped, expedite the influx of civilian goods to Iraq and thereby put the lie to Hussein's claim that sanctions rather than his criminal regime are to blame for Iraqis' protracted misery.

But these so-called smarter sanctions cannot impede Saddam Hussein's ability to finance his procurement and development of weapons of mass destruction. The fatal flaw in the U.N. program is that it does not -- nor is it intended to -- stanch the money flow to Baghdad generated by the illicit trade that falls outside oil-for-food. In fact, Hussein's hard-currency earnings will likely increase as a result of the changes. For one thing, the revised program has actually increased the variety of goods on which Hussein can exact kickbacks from his trading partners and that he can then re-export for foreign exchange. Moreover, the revised program leaves virtually untouched Hussein's vibrant, illicit oil-for-goods barter with neighboring states -- all of which takes place under the passive watch of the international community.

Reasons abound for what amounts to a universal decision to look the other way. Russia and France, two U.N. Security Council members that also happen to rank among Hussein's best business partners, have been openly threatened by Hussein with the loss of lucrative oil-for-food contracts unless they continue to sing Baghdad's tune on the Security Council and press for the lifting of sanctions. Jordan has been accorded an informal dispensation to continue its extensive trade with Iraq because of its extreme dependence on the Iraqi oil supply. The United States and United Kingdom, by far the most hard-nosed

11-L-0559/OSD/5984

about enforcing the sanctions regime, nevertheless have been sensitive to the difficulties facing their close regional ally Turkey, which claims to have suffered severe economic damage from a decade of sanctions.

The United States, keenly aware that Syria's cooperation is critical to prosecuting the war on terrorism, has been reluctant to demand that President Bashar Assad make good on his 15-month-old promise to crack down on his country's illicit trade with Baghdad.

Analysts believe that in exchange for an attractive discount on its Iraqi oil purchases, Syria facilitates the procurement and transport of military hardware, which is of course proscribed under oil-for-food. Now that Syria sits on the U.N. Security Council and, therefore, on the U.N. Sanctions Committee, any U.N. directive to chill this new bilateral romance is highly unlikely.

Iraq has also earned more than \$200 million a year from oil smuggled through Iranian coastal waters that is then either re-exported from Iran or finds its way to the United Arab Emirates and beyond. In 1991 the United Nation established a multinational interception force expressly to interdict Iraqi oil exports in the Gulf. But the largely American force is not permitted in Iranian territorial waters and thus must sit impotent as barges sloshing with Iraqi oil hug the Iranian coast. The force estimates that, largely as a result of this handicap, it interdicts only 5 percent of those barges bearing smuggled Iraqi oil.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval patrol has been the chief facilitator and beneficiary of this coastal traffic, which appears to benefit Iran's hard-liners. But in recent weeks the Iranian navy, which operates under the command of Tehran's moderate president, Mohammad Khatami, has begun, as it has on other occasions, to crack down on this illegal waterway traffic. This latest crackdown began at just about the time Tehran announced that it would not forcibly oppose a U.S. military strike on Iraq.

More hard currency is obtained by Hussein's Mukhabarat, one of the dreaded intelligence services run by Hussein's son Qusai, which has reportedly set up front companies that re-export oil-for-food goods, such as medicines, baby food, vehicles, spare parts and electronics, in exchange for as much as \$20 million a year, with which it is believed to buy weapons.

A bevy of international trade fairs has served to enhance Baghdad's respectability and bring in up to \$30 million annually in rents and fees; and each year religious pilgrims visiting Iraq's holy sites are being fleeced for as much as \$40 million. Iraq has recently begun taking in an unknown amount in overflight and landing fees now that -- in a brazen multilateral demonstration of the sanctions' effective impotence -- Jordan, Syria, Russia and France have all resumed flying into Hussein International Airport.

Although the United States has long been the most adamant Security Council member about prohibiting the flow to Iraq of imports that might be used in weapons production, and although President Bush singled out Hussein as a major target in the war against terrorism and the states that sponsor it, U.S. imports of Iraqi oil have, since Sept. 11, increased significantly, even dramatically at times. In January, when Bush designated Iraq a constituent member of his axis of evil, the United States consumed 75 percent of all Iraqi oil exported under oil-for-food, according to U.S. government figures.

No U.S.-based oil firms are currently direct purchasers of Iraqi oil, but the illegal 20-cent to 70-cent-per-barrel surcharges that Hussein has managed to embed in the pricing system worked out with the U.N. Sanctions Committee are passed up the line -- from the buyers who must actually agree to the kickbacks (mostly Russian, Chinese, Thai, Indian and Vietnamese firms and small shell companies registered in Western countries that tolerate money-laundering) to the major traders to the American refineries and, presumably, to the ordinary motorist.

11-L-0559/OSD/5985

This suggests that American companies and consumers are the last links in a chain of enablers who have helped to underwrite Hussein's end run around the U.N. system.

Before Sept. 11, four free trade agreements with Iraq had been signed, by Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Since then another eight have been signed -- by Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Bahrain, Oman, Lebanon, Qatar and Jordan. Two more are under discussion, one with Bahrain and one with Saudi Arabia, which recently reopened a border post closed since the Gulf War to facilitate direct trade and which has scheduled a big trade fair in Baghdad for the fall.

In announcing each new bilateral agreement, trade officials have heralded vastly expanded trade relations between the two countries involved. Hussein's co-signatories are well aware that each agreement affords him both the immediate political benefit of hammering yet another nail in the coffin of sanctions and the long-term economic benefit of preferential trade access once they are lifted.

A clearer picture of Hussein's funding mechanisms unravels a number of apparent contradictions that have long puzzled many observers. First, there remain shortages of basic medicines and foodstuffs in Iraq, despite its being the beneficiary of the world's largest humanitarian program ever. That is because Hussein controls the distribution of goods. Second, as long as Security Council members have vested business interests in Iraq, they will not make any serious effort to see that their own sanctions are enforced. Third, although Iraq's neighbors -- and Iraq's own beleaguered Kurdish population -- certainly hold no brief for Saddam Hussein, they continue to resist the Bush administration's call for "regime change" in Baghdad at least in part because they are benefiting from the status quo.

Finally, the obvious: The Iraqi government has continually drawn out and obstructed talks with the United Nations regarding the resumption of weapons inspections because it probably does, in fact, have a great deal to hide. The U.N. oil-for-food program costs \$6 billion a year. That's six times the size of the international community's other major humanitarian operations, such as in Bosnia, Rwanda and post-conflict Afghanistan. But the Iraq program is not effective. Nor can it ever be, given its structure, the deference that the U.N. accords Hussein, the makeup of the Security Council and the lack of political will to make it work. Barring robust enforcement, the program is simply a charade and should be scrapped.

Doing so would surely rob Hussein of his triumph to date in the realm of public diplomacy. But it would also force the international community to face up to the fact that the U.N. program it devised has failed to stop Hussein from getting most of what he needs to remain a grave regional and worldwide threat.

*The writer is senior consultant to the Coalition for International Justice and co-author, with John Fawcett, of a forthcoming study of Saddam Hussein's sources of revenue.*

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

11-L-0559/OSD/5986

August 5, 2002 7:41 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DESERT STORM Votes

You ought to be aware of the attached votes on DESERT STORM.

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/31/02 Di Rita memo to SecDef re: roll call votes from 1991 DESERT STORM resolutions

DHR:dh  
080502-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*PERISSIAN DULF*

*5 Aug 02*

U00402 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/5987

July 31, 2002/Di Rita

MEMO TO SECDEF

FYI, I have attached the roll call votes from the Senate and the House on the Desert Storm resolution from 1991.

Note that the vote was for the U.S. to use force "pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678." (Query: Does that vote for the use of force still hold?)

The House passed it 250-183.

The Senate was much closer: 52-47.

Focus on the Senate.

- There are 44 current members of the Senate who were in the Senate in 1991.
- There are 13 members of the Senate who were in the House in 1991.
- Of these 57 current members of the Senate who voted in either the House or the Senate in 1991:
  - 34 voted for war. 23 opposed.

○ Tally by Party:

	<u>YEA</u>	<u>NAY</u>
<b>Republican</b>	28	1 (Grassley)
<b>Democrat</b>	5**	22
<b>Independent</b>	1 (Jeffords)	

\*\* Breaux, Graham, Lieberman, Carper, Torricelli



[SENATORS](#) | 
 [COMMITTEES](#) | 
 [LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES](#) | 
 [LEARNING ABOUT THE SENATE](#) | 
 [VISITING THE SENATE](#) | 
 [CONTACTING THE SENATE](#) | 
 [SEARCH](#)

**LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES**

# U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes

## 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress - 1<sup>st</sup> Session (1991)

as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate

### Vote Summary

**Vote Number:** 2 **Vote Date:** January 12, 1991, 02:44 PM

**Question:** On the Joint Resolution (S.J.Res.2)

**Required for Majority:** 1/2 **Vote Result:** Joint Resolution Passed

**Measure Number:** S.J.Res. 2 (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution)

**Measure Title:** A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.

**Vote Counts:**

YEAs	52
NAYs	47
Not Voting	1

[Vote Summary](#) | 
 [By Senator Name](#) | 
 [By Vote Position](#) | 
 [By Home State](#) | 
 [Return to Vote List](#)

### Alphabetical by Senator Name

- |                                |                          |                         |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Adams (D-WA), Nay              | Fowler (D-GA), Nay       | Mikulski (D-MD), Nay    |
| Akaka (D-HI), Nay              | Garn (R-UT), Yea         | Mitchell (D-ME), Nay    |
| Baucus (D-MT), Nay             | Glenn (D-OH), Nay        | Moynihan (D-NY), Nay    |
| Bentsen (D-TX), Nay            | Gore (D-TN), Yea         | Murkowski (R-AK), Yea   |
| Biden (D-DE), Nay              | Gorton (R-WA), Yea       | Nickles (R-OK), Yea     |
| Bingaman (D-NM), Nay           | Graham (D-FL), Yea       | Nunn (D-GA), Nay        |
| Bond (R-MO), Yea               | Gramm (R-TX), Yea        | Packwood (R-OR), Yea    |
| Boren (D-OK), Nay              | Grassley (R-IA), Nay     | Pell (D-RI), Nay        |
| Bradley (D-NJ), Nay            | Harkin (D-IA), Nay       | Pressler (R-SD), Yea    |
| Breaux (D-LA), Yea             | Hatch (R-UT), Yea        | Pryor (D-AR), Nay       |
| Brown (R-CO), Yea              | Hatfield (R-OR), Nay     | Reid (D-NV), Yea        |
| Bryan (D-NV), Yea              | Heflin (D-AL), Yea       | Riegle (D-MI), Nay      |
| Bumpers (D-AR), Nay            | Heinz (R-PA), Yea        | Robb (D-VA), Yea        |
| Burdick, Quentin S (D-ND), Nay | Helms (R-NC), Yea        | Rockefeller (D-WV), Nay |
| Burns (R-MT), Yea              | Hollings (D-SC), Nay     | Roth (R-DE), Yea        |
| Byrd (D-WV), Nay               | Inouye (D-HI), Nay       | Rudman (R-NH), Yea      |
| Chafee (R-RI), Yea             | Jeffords (X-VT), Yea (I) | Sanford (D-NC), Nay     |
| Coats (R-IN), Yea              | Johnston (D-LA), Yea     | Sarbanes (D-MD), Nay    |
| Cochran (R-MS), Yea            | Kassebaum (R-KS), Yea    | Sasser (D-TN), Nay      |
| Cohen (R-ME), Yea              | Kasten (R-WI), Yea       | Seymour (R-CA), Yea     |
| Conrad (D-ND), Nay             | Kennedy (D-MA), Nay      | Shelby (X-AL), Yea      |

11-L-0559/OSD/5989 (R)



Craig (R-ID), Yea  
 Cranston (D-CA), Not Voting  
 D'Amato (R-NY), Yea  
 Danforth (R-MO), Yea  
 Daschle (D-SD), Nay  
 DeConcini (D-AZ), Nay  
 Dixon (D-IL), Nay  
 Dodd (D-CT), Nay  
 Dole (R-KS), Yea  
 Domenici (R-NM), Yea  
 Durenberger (R-MN), Yea  
 Exon (D-NE), Nay  
 Ford (D-KY), Nay

Kerrey (D-NE), Nay  
 Kerry (D-MA), Nay  
 Kohl (D-WI), Nay  
 Lautenberg (D-NJ), Nay  
 Leahy (D-VT), Nay  
 Levin (D-MI), Nay  
 Lieberman (D-CT), Yea  
 Lott (R-MS), Yea  
 Lugar (R-IN), Yea  
 Mack (R-FL), Yea  
 McCain (R-AZ), Yea  
 McConnell (R-KY), Yea  
 Metzenbaum (D-OH), Nay

Simon (D-IL), Nay  
 Simpson (R-WY), Yea  
 Smith (R-NH), Yea  
 Specter (R-PA), Yea  
 Stevens (R-AK), Yea  
 Symms (R-ID), Yea  
 Thurmond (R-SC), Yea  
 Wallop (R-WY), Yea  
 Warner (R-VA), Yea  
 Wellstone (D-MN), Nay  
 Wirth (D-CO), Nay

Vote Summary

By Senator Name

By Vote Position

By Home State

Return to Vote List

**FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 9**(Republicans in roman; Democrats in *italic*; Independents underlined)

H J RES 77 YEA-AND-NAY 12-JAN-1991 3:51 PM

QUESTION: ON PASSAGE (MICHEL/SOLARZ)

BILL TITLE: TO AUTHORIZE THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES PURSUANT TO UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678

	YEAS	NAYS	PRES	NV
REPUBLICAN	164	3		
DEMOCRATIC	86	179		2
INDEPENDENT		1		
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>183</b>		<b>2</b>

--- YEAS 250 ---

<i>Ackerman</i>	<i>Gordon</i>	<i>Packard</i>
Allard	Goss	<i>Pallone</i>
<i>Anderson</i>	Gradison	<i>Parker</i>
<i>Andrews (TX)</i>	Grandy	<i>Patterson</i>
Archer	Green	Paxon
Armey	Gunderson	<i>Payne (VA)</i>
<i>Aspin</i>	<i>Hall (TX)</i>	Petri
<i>Bacchus (FL)</i>	Hammerschmidt	<i>Pickett</i>
Baker (LA)	Hancock	Porter
Ballenger	Hansen	Pursell
<i>Barnard</i>	<i>Harris</i>	Quillen
Barrett (NE)	Hastert	<i>Rahall</i>
Bartlett	<i>Hatcher</i>	Ramstad
Barton	<i>Hayes</i>	Ravenel
Bateman	Hefley	<i>Ray</i>
Bentley	(b)(6)	Regula
Bereuter	Herger	Rhodes
<i>Berman</i>	<i>Hoagland</i>	Ridge
<i>Bevill</i>	Hobson	Rinaldo
<i>Bilbray</i>	Holloway	Ritter
Bilirakis	Hopkins	Roberts
Bliley	Horton	Rogers
Boehlert	Houghton	Rohrabacher
Boehner	<i>Hubbard</i>	Ros-Lehtinen
<i>Borski</i>	<i>Huckaby</i>	<i>Rostenkowski</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/5991

<i>Brewster</i>	<i>Hughes</i>	Roth
<i>Brooks</i>	Hunter	Roukema
Broomfield	<i>Hutto</i>	<i>Rowland</i>
<i>Browder</i>	Hyde	Santorum
Bunning	Inhofe	<i>Sarpalius</i>
Burton	Ireland	Saxton
<i>Byron</i>	James	Schaefer
Callahan	Johnson (CT)	Schiff
Camp	<i>Jones (GA)</i>	Schulze
Campbell (CA)	<i>Jones (NC)</i>	Sensenbrenner
<i>Campbell (CO) (R)</i>	Kasich	Shaw
<i>Carper</i>	Klug	Shays
Chandler	Kolbe	Shuster
<i>Chapman</i>	Kyl	<i>Sisisky</i>
<i>Clement</i>	Lagomarsino	Skeen
Clinger	<i>Lancaster</i>	<i>Skelton</i>
Coble	<i>Lantos</i>	<i>Slattery</i>
Coleman (MO)	<i>Laughlin</i>	Slaughter (VA)
Combest	Leach	Smith (NJ)
<i>Condit</i>	<i>Lehman</i>	Smith (OR)
<i>Cooper</i>	Lent	Smith (TX)
Coughlin	<i>Levine (CA)</i>	Snowe
Cox	Lewis (CA)	<i>Solarz</i>
<i>Cramer</i>	Lewis (FL)	Solomon
Crane	Lightfoot	Spence
Cunningham	Livingston	<i>Spratt</i>
Dannemeyer	<i>Lloyd</i>	Stearns
<i>Darden</i>	Lowery (CA)	<i>Stenholm</i>
Davis	<i>Luken</i>	Stump
<i>de la Garza</i>	Machtley	Sundquist
DeLay	Madigan	<i>Swett</i>
<i>Derrick</i>	Marlenee	<i>Tallon</i>
Dickinson	Martin (NY)	<i>Tanner</i>
<i>Dingell</i>	McCandless	<i>Tauzin</i>
Doolittle	McCollum	Taylor (NC)
Dorman	McCrery	Thomas
Dreier	<i>McCurdy</i>	<i>Thomas (GA)</i>
Duncan	McDade	<i>Thomas (WY)</i>
Edwards (OK)	McEwen	Thornton
<i>Edwards</i>	McGrath	<i>Torricelli</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/5992

Emerson	McMillan	Upton
<i>Engel</i>	<i>McMillen (MD)</i>	<i>Valentine</i>
<i>Erdreich</i>	<i>McNulty</i>	<i>Vander Jagt</i>
<i>Fascell</i>	<i>Meyers</i>	<i>Volkmer</i>
<i>Fawell</i>	<i>Michel</i>	<i>Vucanovich</i>
<i>Fields (TX)</i>	<i>Miller (OH)</i>	<i>Walker</i>
<i>Fish</i>	<i>Miller (WA)</i>	<i>Walsh</i>
<i>Franks (CT)</i>	<i>Molinari</i>	<i>Weber</i>
<i>Frost</i>	<i>Mollohan</i>	<i>Weldon (PA)</i>
<i>Gallegly</i>	<i>Montgomery</i>	<i>Whitten</i>
<i>Gallo</i>	<i>Moorhead</i>	<i>Wilson</i>
<i>Gekas</i>	<i>Morrison (WA)</i>	<i>Wolf</i>
<i>Geren</i>	<i>Murtha</i>	<i>Wylie</i>
<i>Gilchrest</i>	<i>Myers</i>	<i>Young (AK)</i>
<i>Gillmor</i>	<i>Nichols</i>	<i>Young (FL)</i>
<i>Gilman</i>	<i>Nussle</i>	<i>Zeliff</i>
<i>Gingrich</i>	<i>Ortiz</i>	<i>Zimmer</i>
<i>Glickman</i>	<i>Orton</i>	
<i>Goodling</i>	<i>Oxley</i>	

## -- NAYS 183 --

<i>Abercrombie</i>	<i>Hall (OH)</i>	<i>Panetta</i>
<i>Alexander</i>	<i>Hamilton</i>	<i>Payne (NJ)</i>
<i>Andrews (ME)</i>	<i>Hayes (IL)</i>	<i>Pease</i>
<i>Andrews</i>	<i>Hefner</i>	<i>Pelosi</i>
<i>Annunzio</i>	<i>Hertel</i>	<i>Penny</i>
<i>Anthony</i>	<i>Hochbrueckner</i>	<i>Perkins</i>
<i>Applegate</i>	<i>Horn</i>	<i>Peterson (FL)</i>
<i>Atkins</i>	<i>Hoyer</i>	<i>Peterson (MN)</i>
<i>AuCoin</i>	<i>Jacobs</i>	<i>Pickle</i>
<i>Beilenson</i>	<i>Jefferson</i>	<i>Poshard</i>
<i>Bennett</i>	<i>Jenkins</i>	<i>Price (NC)</i>
<i>Bonior</i>	<i>Johnson (SD)</i>	<i>Rangel</i>
<i>Boucher</i>	<i>Johnston</i>	<i>Reed</i>
<i>Boxer</i>	<i>Jontz</i>	<i>Richardson</i>
<i>Brown (CA)</i>	<i>Kanjorski</i>	<i>Riggs</i>
<i>Bruce</i>	<i>Kaptur</i>	<i>Roe</i>
<i>Bryant (TX)</i>	<i>Kennedy (MA)</i>	<i>Roemer</i>
<i>Bustamante</i>	<i>Kennelly</i>	<i>Rose</i>
<i>Cardin</i>	<i>Kildee</i>	<i>Roybal</i>

H-L-0559/OSD/5993

Clay	Kolter	Sabo
Coleman	Kopetski	Sanders
Collins (IL)	Kostmayer	Sangmeister
Collins (MI)	LaFalce	Savage
Conte	LaRocco	Sawyer
Conyers	Lehman (FL)	Scheuer
Costello	Levin	Schroeder
Cox (IL)	Lewis (GA)	Schumer
Coyne	Lipinski	Serrano
DeFazio	Long	Sharp
DeLauro	Lowey	Sikorski
Dellums	Manton	Skaggs
Dicks	Markey	Slaughter
Dixon	Martinez	Smith (FL)
Donnelly	Matsui	Smith (IA)
Dooley	Mavroules	Staggers
Dorgan (ND)	Mazzoli	Stallings
Downey	McCloskey	Stark
Durbin	McDermott	Stokes
Dwyer	McHugh	Studds
Early	Mfume	Swift
Eckart	Miller (CA)	Synar
Edwards (CA)	Mineta	Taylor (MS)
English (OK)	Mink	Torres
Espy	Moakley	Towns
Evans	Moody	Traficant
Fazio	Moran	Traxler
Feighan	Morella	Unsoeld
Flake	Mrazek	Vento
Foglietta	Murphy	Visclosky
Foley	Nagle	Washington
Ford (MI)	Natcher	Waters
Ford	Neal	Waxman
Frank (MA)	Neal (NC)	Weiss
Gaydos	Nowak	Wheat
Gejdenson	Oakar	Williams
Gephardt	Oberstar	Wise
Gibbons	Obey	Wolpe
Gonzalez	Olin	Wyden
Gray	Owens	Yates

11-L-0559/OSD/5994

<i>Guarini</i>	<i>Owens (UT)</i>	<i>Yatron</i>
----------------	-------------------	---------------

-- NOT VOTING 2 --

<i>Dymally</i>	<i>Udall</i>
----------------	--------------

showfile

August 5, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith  
 Gen. Myers  
 Gen. Pace  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Civilian Casualties

The attached is worth reading carefully.

Thanks.

Attach.

John Leo, "Flogged by bloggers," *U.S. News and World Report*, 08/05/02

DHR:dh  
080502-5

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*293*

*(Signature)*

*8/5/02*

*5 Aug 02*

# Flogged by bloggers

**W**hen the *New York Times* ran a front-page report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan ("Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead"), bloggers descended on the article like ants on a picnic.

Bloggers, Web loggers who run commentary and stray thoughts on their own Internet sites, like to play "gotcha" with the established media. A favorite target is the *Times*, which has developed the habit of running front-page editorials posing as news reports. Hundreds of civilians dead? Don't that many civilians perish in nearly every war? Stuart Buck at [www.stuartbuck.blogspot.com](http://www.stuartbuck.blogspot.com) asked:

"Has there ever been another war in history where civilian casualties were so few that journalists could track down virtually all of them individually?"

On his site, the Politburo, blogger Michael Moynihan noted that the *Times's* source for the toll of 812 dead was Marla Ruzicka, identified as a field worker in Afghanistan for Global Exchange, "an American organization." What the *Times* didn't say, Moynihan wrote, is that Global Exchange is a far-left group opposing globalization and the U.S. military. Ruzicka, he said, is a fan of Castro's Cuba and has won an award from Refuse and Resist, a group that sees America becoming fascist.

Oddly, after deciding to run a shaky article on civilian deaths, the *Times* seemed to take it all back, reporting that the "extraordinary accuracy of American airstrikes" has produced few of the disasters seen in previous wars. If that's true, why run the article? The *Times* also featured a series of artistic photos of children wounded in the war, titled "A Legacy of Misery." This is the way the *Times* expresses its resistance to the war—equating the liberation of Afghanistan with misery, pain, and dead civilians.

**No bluster.** The mighty *Times* may not have noticed that a lot of bloggers—some with small reputations, some with no reputations at all—now swarm over its news columns searching for errors and bias. The established media learned long ago how to marginalize critics and shrug off complaints of bias as the ravings of right-wing fanatics. But the bloggers aren't so easily dismissed. They don't bluster. They deal in specifics and they work quickly, while the stories they target are fresh. They link to sources, to one another's sites, and to the articles under attack, so readers can judge for themselves. The blogging revolution, says commentator Andrew Sullivan, the best-known blogger, "undermines media tyrants."

On June 16, a startling front-page article in the *Times* reported that Alaska's mean temperature rose 7 degrees over the past 30 years. Sullivan checked with Alaska weather authorities and wrote that the *Times* figures were greatly exaggerated. The *Times* published a correction, stating that Alaska temperatures



Web diarists are calling the print media's bluff.

rose 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit, not 7, over the past 30 years. But the Alaska Climate Research Center said the correction was incorrect. The *Times* correction of 5.4 degrees was still double the real temperature increase. Sullivan argued that the *Times* had "cherry-picked" data for maximum effect, measuring the 30 years from 1966, one of the century's four coldest years, through 1995, one of the hottest. A report from the Center for Global Change said Alaskan temperatures did not rise consistently over the 20th century—the pattern was back and forth: warming until 1940, cooling until the 1960s, then warming again.

Sullivan was also one of the bloggers who attacked the anti-Bush polling story run by the *Times* on July 18 under the headline "Poll Finds Concerns That Bush Is Overly Influenced by Business." That story seemed like an attempt to turn

a poll favorable to the president into a vague vote of no confidence. The story focused on a "surge" of Americans who think the country is on the wrong track. But Sullivan noted that the poll found Bush's approval rating remaining very high at 70 percent, while 68 percent agreed that the president "cares about the needs and problems of people like yourself," and 80 percent said Bush shares their moral values. A similar poll ran the previous day in the *Washington Post* under the headline "Poll Shows Bush's Ratings Weathering Business Scandals." That's the straightforward way to report a poll.

Jack Shafer of *Slate* joined the *Times*-bashing bloggers, complaining about a July 1 story, "Bush Slashing Aid for EPA Cleanup at 33 Toxic Sites." That story misrepresented a partisan squabble over whether cleanups of "orphaned sites" (whose owners have gone bankrupt) should be financed by tax revenues or a revival of the Superfund tax, phased out in 1995. Shafer wrote that funding has remained steady in recent years and the Bushies want a modest increase for 2003, so the headline could have been, "Bush Superfund Budget Grows Slightly."

Keep an eye on bloggers. The main arena for media criticism is not going to be books, columns, or panel discussions, and it certainly won't be journalism schools. It will be the Internet. ●



August 5, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Denny Watson  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence Collection Paper

Please see that the domestic intelligence collection paper is brought to the attention of the President, the Vice President and Andy Card.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-7



Please respond by 08/09/02

*350.09*

*5 Aug 02*

August 5, 2002 10:21 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Directives to CINCs

We probably ought to look at any directives to CINCs, so we can rewrite them.  
They are old.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-17



Please respond by 08/20/02

*300.8*

*5 Aug 02*

U00405 / 03

August 5, 2002 10:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

020 SD

Please take a look at this background sheet. I am lost. Is this the most current one? Do I have to edit it again?

They should always put the date it was revised on the actual sheet, so we know the last date of revision. Please get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Background sheets

DHR:dh  
080502-21

.....

Please respond by 08/16/02

*Larry  
military service  
part is  
up to date.*

5 Aug 02

showfile

7/23/02

July 22, 2002 **SECRET HAS BEEN**

AUG 05 2002

Sir:

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

←  
DR

Attached DefenseLink bio is only one we know of that is being

Please give me copies of any versions of my background sheet that are currently being used in the Pentagon—there may be more than one. used in DoD.

Thanks.

Also attached is revised bio into

DHR:dh  
072202-15

Please respond by 07/26/02

you for review.

T.C.

any [unclear]  
7/24  
7/1/02



## THE HONORABLE DONALD RUMSFELD

Secretary of Defense



Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld was in private business. Born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1932, he attended Princeton University on scholarship (AB, 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as a Naval aviator.

He went to Washington, DC, in 1957, during the Eisenhower Administration, to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to serve in the Nixon Administration as:

- Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the President, and a member of the President's Cabinet (1969-1970); and, as
- Counsellor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and a member of the President's Cabinet (1971-1972).



In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve in the Ford Administration successively as:

- Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1974);
- Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975); and, as
- The 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977).

From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business.

Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. A leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies for cable, satellite and terrestrial broadcasting applications, the company pioneered the development of the first all-digital high definition television (HDTV) technology. After taking the company public and returning it to profitability, Mr. Rumsfeld returned to private business in late 1993. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of Gilead Sciences, Inc.

During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued public service in a variety of posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control – Reagan Administration (1982 - 1986);

11-L-0559/OSD/6002

- President Reagan's Special Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to President Reagan's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations – Reagan Administration (1983 - 1984);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on the Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991);
- FCC's High Definition Television Advisory Committee (1992 - 1993);
- Chairman, Commission on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998 - 1999);
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000); and
- Chairman of the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization (2000).

Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation. He was also a member of the U.S./Russia Business Forum and Chairman of the Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisory Group.

In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

[http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef\\_bio.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/secdef_bio.html)

## Draft Biography of Donald Rumsfeld

On January 20, 2001, Donald Rumsfeld was sworn in as the 21<sup>st</sup> Secretary of Defense. Before taking his present post, the former Navy pilot was also the 13<sup>th</sup> Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, chief of staff at the Ford White House, an Illinois Congressman, and CEO of two Fortune 500 companies.

Secretary Rumsfeld is responsible for directing the actions of the Defense Department in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The war is being waged against a backdrop of great change within the Department of Defense. Under Secretary Rumsfeld's leadership, the department has developed a new defense strategy replacing the old model for sizing forces with a newer, more modern approach. New approaches have been developed for balancing risks. The missile defense research and testing program has been reorganized and revitalized, free of the constraints of the ABM treaty.

DoD also refocused on space capabilities and adopted a new approach to strategic deterrence that increases security while reducing strategic nuclear weapons. In early 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed and the President approved a significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known as the Unified Command Plan.

Mr. Rumsfeld was born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1932. He attended Princeton University on academic and ROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flying instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989.

In 1957, he came to Washington, DC to serve as Administrative Assistant to a Congressman. After a stint with an investment banking firm, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois in 1962, at the age of 30, and was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968.

Mr. Rumsfeld resigned from Congress in 1969 during his fourth term to serve in the Nixon Administration. From 1969 to 1970, he became Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Assistant to the President, and a member of the President's Cabinet (1969-1970). From 1971 to 1972, he was Counselor to the President, Director of the Economic Stabilization Program, and a member of the President's Cabinet. In 1973, he left Washington, DC, to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium (1973-1974).

In August 1974, he was called back to Washington, DC, to serve in the Ford Administration Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1974). He then became Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of the President's Cabinet (1974-1975). He then served as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, the youngest in the country's history (1975-1977).

From 1977 to 1985 he served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company. The successful turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981). From 1985 to 1990 he was in private business.

Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation from 1990 to 1993. General Instrument Corporation was a leader in broadband transmission, distribution, and access control technologies for cable, satellite and terrestrial broadcasting applications. The company also pioneered the development of the first all-digital high definition television (HDTV) technology. Until being sworn in as the 21st Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman of Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Before returning for his second tour as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld chaired the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, whose bipartisan, unanimous conclusions awakened America to the emerging threat of ballistic missiles. He also chaired the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, which concluded that the U.S. had an urgent interest in promoting and protecting the peaceful use of space and developing space technologies and operations.

During his business career, Mr. Rumsfeld continued public service in a variety of other posts, including:

- Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control – Reagan Administration (1982 - 1986);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty (1982 - 1983);
- Senior Advisor to President Reagan's Panel on Strategic Systems (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the U.S. Joint Advisory Commission on U.S./Japan Relations – Reagan Administration (1983 - 1984);
- President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East (1983 - 1984);
- Member of the National Commission on Public Service (1987 - 1990);
- Member of the National Economic Commission (1988 - 1989);
- Member of the Board of Visitors of the National Defense University (1988 - 1992);
- Member of the Commission on U.S./Japan Relations (1989 - 1991);
- FCC's High Definition Television Advisory Committee (1992 - 1993);
- Member of the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission (1999 - 2000); and

Mr. Rumsfeld's civic activities included service as a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the boards of trustees of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and the National Park Foundation. He was also a member of the U.S./Russia Business Forum and Chairman of the Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisory Group.

In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.



August 5, 2002 10:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CFC

505

Who is in charge of the Combined Federal Campaign for the Pentagon this year?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-23

Please respond by 08/16/02

*8/9*  
*Sethale*  
*Dave*  
*LARRY DI RITA*

*8/4*  
*SecDef -*  
*Bill Winterwender*  
*is the C&D Lead.*  
*Each service will*  
*have their own rep, too.*  
*As last year, you*  
*will be the titular head.*  
*(It was a record year!)*  
*Di Rita*  
*5 Aug 02*

2/10  
18:20  
**Snowflake**

August 5, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: ~~Donald Rumsfeld~~ DR

SUBJECT: Spouses to NATO Informal Ministerial

Please get back to me and tell me whether spouses are invited to the Warsaw, Poland, NATO Informal Ministerial. The Minister said they are, and the office is telling Joyce they aren't.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-24

.....  
Please respond by 08/07/02



WART 237

5 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6007

U00408 /03

August 5, 2002 10:30 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: *Newsweek* Story

I saw Henry Kissinger this weekend. He said there is somebody from *Newsweek* writing a very bad story about me always going after Secretaries of State.

Do you know anything about this?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-25

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02

*004.7 ST*

*5 Aug 02*

August 5, 2002 10:38 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*  
SUBJECT: ABC Program for Barbara Walters

*08/07/02*

Barbara Walters asked me if I would agree to tape a program called "The Most Fascinating People of the Year" for ABC that is played in December. She says they requested it but were turned down by your office.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-28

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*8/5*

*SECDEF -*

*The thinking on this was that this is a pop culture show that is likely to have you juxtaposed with Madonna or something. Miss Walters is calling me and I have returned but not yet spoken with her. I will try to get a better sense of it.*

*S. Dur. 02*

U00410 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6009

*Dilate*

August 5, 2002 10:44 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: John Reed on DSB

Please see me about the possibility of putting John Reed on the Defense Science Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-31



Please respond by 08/16/02

334 0558

5 Aug 02

August 5, 2002 10:45 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Conrad Black on DPB

*339*

Please see me about Richard Perle talking about my putting Conrad Black on the Defense Policy board, even though he is a foreigner and a member of the House of Lords.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-32



*Please respond by* 08/16/02

*5 Aug 02*

software  
8/9

August 5, 2002 10:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Peter Galbraith

*8/9*

*567*

Who is Peter Galbraith?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-33

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

*8/9 -*  
*Here's one possibility.*

*Di Rita*

*8/9*  
*8/12*

*5 Aug 02*

U00413 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6012



> [Embassy Home Page](#) > [Ambassador's page](#) > [Former U.S. Ambassadors to Croatia](#)

### PETER W. GALBRAITH

Peter W. Galbraith was the first United States Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia, having presented his credentials to President Franjo Tuđman on June 28, 1993. Ambassador Galbraith was actively involved in the Bosnia and Croatia peace processes. He participated in the 1993 and 1994 negotiations that led to the March 1994 signing of the Washington Agreement ending the Muslim-Croat war and creating the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In 1994 and 1995, he was one of the sponsors of the Z-4 Croatia peace process that produced the March 29, 1994 Cease-fire Agreement and the December 2, 1994 Economic Agreement between the Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs. He was a principal co-author of the Z-4 plan for a political settlement in Croatia and served with Thorvald Stoltenberg as co-mediator of the Eastern Slavonia negotiations. This effort culminated in the November 12, 1995 Erdut Agreement providing for the peaceful reintegration of the area into Croatia.

From 1979 until 1993, Peter Galbraith was a senior advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with major responsibilities for the Near East and South Asia and the Foreign Relations Authorization legislation. Ambassador Galbraith uncovered and documented Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980's, leading to sanctions legislation against Iraq and later contributing to the decision to create a safe-haven for the Kurds. His work on behalf of human rights and democracy in Pakistan earned him that country's high civilian award, the Sitari-i-Quad-Azam.

Ambassador Galbraith holds an A.B. from Harvard College, M.A. from Oxford University, and a J.D. from Georgetown University. He is married to Tone Rand Bringa and has two children.

Ambassador Galbraith's mission in Croatia terminated in January 1998.

### PETER W. GALBRAITH

Peter W. Galbraith bio je prvi veleposlanik Sjedinjenih Država u Republici Hrvatskoj, a svoje je vjerodajnice predao predsjedniku Franji Tuđmanu 28. lipnja 1993. Veleposlanik Galbraith bio je aktivno uključen u mirovne procese u Bosni i Hrvatskoj. 1993. i 1994. godine je sudjelovao u pregovorima koji su doveli do potpisivanja Washingtonskog sporazuma u ožujku 1994. kojim je okončan muslimansko-hrvatski sukob i stvorena Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine.

1994. i 1995. godine je bio jedan od pokretača Z-4 mirovnog procesa za Hrvatsku koji je doveo do Sporazuma o prekidu vatre od 29. ožujka 1994. i Ekonomskog sporazuma između hrvatske Vlade i krajinskih Srba od 2. prosinca 1994. Bio je glavni ko-autor plana Z-4 za političko rješenje

11-L-0559/OSD/6013



TAB

December 23, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Loss of Aircraft

*Iraq*

In a meeting last Friday the President raised the issue about the value of telling the world that if Iraq shoots down a US plane, we would consider that a *casus belli*. I told the President I would think about it and get back to him.

Please get back to me promptly.

Paul, given Doug's absence why don't you work on this and communicate with me in New Mexico what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122302-51

.....

Please respond by 12/31/02

*23 Dec 02*

showfile

August 5, 2002 10:49 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Protection

I want to talk to Gen. Myers about Presidential protection and see where we came out with Pete Pace.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
080502-35

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

388 01

5 Aug 02

August 5, 2002 2:18 PM

TO: Arlene  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Gen. Franks' Lunch

*ADVANCE  
COPY GIVEN*

Please be sure to mark OEF to pay for Gen. Frank's lunch, since I don't want them to bill him. Have the representational account pay for him when he is here.

*CFN:COM*

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
080502-37



Please respond by 08/09/02

*5 Aug 02*

August 5, 2002 2:20 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Thank You

Please make sure we write a nice thank you and I sign it to all of these people who send us a cartoon. I think it shouldn't be the autopen. That is awfully nice of them to do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-40



Please respond by 08/16/02

3355D

5 Aug 02

showfile

August 5, 2002 3:23 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Undersecretary for Intelligence

I thought we talked to the intel committees about this. Look at this article in *U.S. News and World Report*. If I should see Senator Graham or Senator Shelby, or any of those folks, I would be happy to.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.

Linda Robinson, "Moves that matter," *U.S. News and World Report*, 08/12/02

DHR:dh  
080502-41

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

350.09

5 Aug 02

## ACTION MEMO

August 7, 2002 2:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: Phone Call to Senator Graham (ref: Snowflake # 080502-41)

- The purpose of your call to Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), Chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, is to allay his concerns referred to in the August 12 issue of *U.S. News and World Report* about your effort to gain authority for an Under Secretary for Intelligence.
- Senator Graham is not quoted in the article. However, author Linda Robinson characterizes him as being “decidedly upset.” The author asserts that the administration had promised not to propose any major intelligence reforms until the two congressional committees had finished their joint 9/11 inquiry. Further, the article alleges that your request was intended to thwart possible action by the committee that would shift control of DIA, NSA, and NIMA to the DCI. A similar article appeared in the August 7 *Early Bird*, reprinted from MSNBC.com, authored by Michael Moran.
- While the article characterizes your request as a surprise to members of Congress, the fact is, Dr. Cambone briefed the staff of the SASC and SSCI shortly after the request was sent over. Some SSCI staff have expressed concern that committee oversight was being circumvented.
- On balance I believe this is a staff generated issue fueled by intelligence community angst over change. Still, Senator Graham may feel you are trying to preempt his initiative.
- Senator Graham is vacationing with family in Arizona and Nevada. You will be connected through his executive assistant, John Provenzano, (b)(6)
- His Republican counterpart is Senator Shelby, is currently traveling in Africa.

**Recommendation:** Call Chairman Graham today or at your earliest convenience.

11-L-0559/OSD/6019

# Moves that matter

In the intelligence wars, a pre-emptive strike by the Pentagon surprises many in Congress



**STEALTHY.** Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld talks quietly with an aide after testifying before Congress. Below: Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet

BY LINDA ROBINSON

**S**en. Bob Graham was decidedly upset. It was June 22, another bad news day. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which he chairs, along with its House counterpart, had just been raked over the coals by Vice President Cheney for allegedly leaking secret intercepts about the September 11 attacks. Now there was more bad news. The administration had promised not to propose any major intelligence reforms until the two congressional committees had finished their joint 9/11 inquiry. Yet the day before, June 21, the Pentagon quietly sent up a request to create a powerful new under secretary of defense for intelligence. The new position—which one official calls a “major intelligence reform”—was then inserted into a Senate defense bill and was headed for the full Congress’s approval.

The Pentagon’s gambit has been such a brilliant stealth attack that many members of Congress aren’t even aware it is happening, let alone what it means. No hearings have been held, and Pentagon officials portray it merely as an internal

managerial matter with few broader implications. But intelligence officials and experts say that could not be further from the truth. The new under secretary position is a bureaucratic coup that accomplishes many Pentagon goals in one fell swoop.

The Pentagon’s move pre-empts proposals that the intelligence committees—including the one Graham, a Florida Democrat, chairs—are expected to make at the conclusion of their inquiry. And by consolidating all the Pentagon’s intelligence agencies under one high-level official, it virtually nullifies another radical reform proposal. That came from a presidential panel led by retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, which in March recommended that three key Pentagon intelligence entities—the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency—be removed from the Department of Defense and placed under the control of the di-

rector of central intelligence (DCI).

The latest gambit illustrates the growing influence of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had publicly criticized the Scowcroft plan. Worth noting: Scowcroft has long been a friend and adviser to the president’s father, George H. W. Bush. More important, the new position increases the Pentagon’s clout in intelligence matters. “He is creating another DCI for all practical purposes,” says a senior intelligence official. That goes in the opposite direction from what many commissions and studies have recommended—and, indeed, where Congress was likely to go. For years, experts have proposed ways to give the DCI more, not less, control over the 13 disparate pieces of the intelligence apparatus, 85 percent of whose assets reside in the Defense Department. Since the September 11 attacks there is a new sense of urgency that the United States must get the intelligence structure right for fighting terrorism.

Some former intelligence officials think the military overemphasizes tactical priorities. “You can see this now in that all national resources are focused on an 8,000-troop operation in Afghanistan,” says one. But retired Lt. Gen. William Odom, a former director of the National Security Agency, argues that the Pentagon’s intelligence needs are greater today than ever, given precision weapons’ dependence on targeting data.

**Tenet’s two hats.** By law, the official who is supposed to balance these “war-fighting” demands with broader national intelligence requirements is the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, who wears a second hat as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. A number of officials say that Tenet has sufficient statutory authority to outweigh the Pentagon but chooses not to. “Part of the problem is the current DCI doesn’t use the authority he has,” says one. “He is mostly just interested in running the CIA and does not want to fight DOD.”

This imbalance will only grow if the lead candidate for the under secretary slot is named. Richard Haver, currently Rumsfeld’s special assistant for intelligence, has a long résumé of intelligence jobs and is as gung-ho as his boss. “He has enthusiastic supporters and detractors,” says a retired intelligence official. And he has another ace in the hole: When Cheney ran the Pentagon, he made Haver his very first assistant secretary of defense for intelligence. ●



August 5, 2002 3:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ministerial in Chile

*2/9* →

Please show me the date for that ministerial meeting for all the Hemisphere's MoDs in Chile. I ought to try to go to it, even if I just go down for the day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-42

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02


*8/9*  
*Secdef -*  
*CHASE*

*It was Nov 19-20.  
We are planning for you to  
go down first day, then on  
to Prague for the Summit  
on Nov 21-22.*

*D. Rita*  
*8/11/02*  
*50802*  
*8/9*



August 5, 2002 4:25 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Briefings from Secretary Cohen



020 SJ

I will wait to hear about any briefings I may have gotten from Cohen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080502-43

.....  
Please respond by 08/23/02

S AUG 02

U00425 / 03

2/7  
09/20  
snowflake

August 5, 2002 4:27 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bob Ferguson

237.2

Please take a look at this from Laxalt and tell me what you think we ought to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/24/02 Laxalt memo to SecDef re: Bob Ferguson

DHR:dh  
080502-44

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

8/9

SecDef -

He may be a good  
candidate for Powell's  
Deputy, although someone  
who has been up there 25  
years ~~is not a staffer~~  
as a staffer is worth wondering  
about.

5AUG02

I'll look into it further.

U004126055073SD/6023

Larry Di Rita 8/9

Larry

*LLC*

*The Laxalt Corporation*

**SECDEF HAS SEEN  
AUG 05 2002**

Michelle D. Laxalt  
President

To : The Honorable Don Rumsfeld @ D.O.D.

From : Michelle on behalf of \_\_\_\_\_

Re : Bob Ferguson

Date : 7 24 02

FAX #: (b)(6)

# of Pages: 3

Comments :

Don -

Here he is - LOYAL as the day is long.

KEEPS his head down and mouth shut.

Doesn't frequent bars or similarly

tempting places. Salary not of paramount

importance due to MAKING OUT in govt

service (\$105,000 or meets his needs). Army

Service - INTELL IN NAM. WORKHORSE - NOT A

show horse whom you CAN TRUST.

≡ *ML*

If there are any errors during this transmission or any general questions, please contact the sender @ (b)(6)

Sender: \_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)

### Robert E. H. Ferguson

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6) (office)  
(cell)

**PROFESSIONAL SUMMARY** 25 years Capitol Hill experience (both House and Senate), 21 of those as Chief of Staff to Members of Congress. Strong financial (managed budget in excess of \$1-million) and personnel management skills. Extensive legislative experience and process knowledge. Savvy political skills and extensive professional contacts in Congress, the Administration and private sector.

### PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- 1997-2002**                      **Chief of Staff/Administrative Assistant**  
**Congressman John E. Peterson (R-PA)**  
 Manage all operations including legislation, press, mail, budget, casework, personnel and political matters. Oversee a staff of 16, including three state offices. Familiar with a wide range of legislative issues, particularly climate change, energy and mining, forests and resources, clean air, environment, property rights and endangered species reform. Participated in freeing Edmund Pope from Russian prison (accused of espionage).
- 1995-1997**                      **Chief of Staff/Administrative Assistant/Legislative Director**  
**Congressman Jack Fields (R-TX), Chairman**  
 Execute all administrative duties while covering multiple legislative issues.
- 1981-1995**                      **Chief of Staff/Administrative Assistant**  
**Congressman Jack Fields (R-TX)**  
 Manage office operations including legislation, press, mail, budget, casework, personnel and political matters. Covered wide range of issues. Worked to defeat U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty.
- 1980-1981**                      **Reagan Admin. Transition Team, Dept. of the Treasury**  
 Develop economic policy position papers, and assisted in making staffing recommendations.
- 1980**                              **Republican Convention Platform Committee**  
**Senator John Tower (R-TX), Chairman**  
 Assist in the development of economic policy plank.
- 1979-1980**                      **Senate Republican Policy Committee**

\*: MDC highlights

A

**Senator John Tower (R-TX), Chairman**  
Staff economist. Conduct research and formulate position papers on economic policy, focus on balanced budget and tax reform/reduction. Attend policy committee meetings and briefings.

1977-1978

**House Republican Study Committee**  
**Congressman Dick Schulz (R-PA), Chairman**  
Staff assistant. Work with Congressman Jack Kemp in developing supply-side economic initiatives, reports and briefing papers. Research and write a decisive study of the Value-added tax, used during debate in the Ways and Means Committee.

1976

**Dan Marriott for Congress (R-Utah)**  
Campaign staff. Perform issues and opposition research.

A

1970-1976

**Stock broker (Dean Witter); construction trades, AFL-CIO;**  
assistant Clerk of Courts.

**MILITARY SERVICE**

A

1966-1970

**United States Army**  
**Army Security Agency** - intelligence gathering during Viet Nam War era. Top Secret Clearance.

**EDUCATION**

1988

George Washington University, Washington, D.C.  
M.A. in Legislative Affairs

A

1973

**Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah**  
B.S. in History  
A.A. in History

1971

South Florida Junior College, Avon Park, Florida  
A.A. in History. Phi Theta Kappa.

**SKILLS:**

Excellent research, writing and oral presentation abilities. Strong management and organizational abilities. Misc. computer skills.

**REFERENCES**

A

Honorable John E. Peterson (b)(6); **Honorable Tom DeLay** (House Majority Whip, (b)(6));  
Honorable Jack Fields, Jr. (Twenty-First Century Group, (b)(6));  
Honorable Chris Cannon (b)(6); **Dave Hoppe** (Sen. Trent Lott, (b)(6))

8/6/02

7:04 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 6, 2002  
SUBJECT: Interview with Brokaw

Sir:  
I think  
some value  
from the  
view, but  
take your  
point.  
T.C.

LEAD/DIP

I just saw the Brokaw tape. It is absolutely worthless. It is a waste of my time to do it. We should not do that any more.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
08602.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

000 71 SA

6 2006 02

7:23 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 6, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Here's a summary that is unclassified of some of the things we have captured. I think that fact, and the fact that we are getting so many tips from locals as to where to find the cash is worth mentioning in a press briefing.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
08602.03

Attach: Summary of Weapons, Munitions and Equipment Captured in Afghanistan 1/1/02 to 7/16/02

Please respond by: 8/15/02

*AFGHANISTAN*

*6 AUG 02*

**SUMMARY OF WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, AND EQUIPMENT  
CAPTURED in AFGHANISTAN**  
(Jan 1, 2002 thru July 16, 2002)

The coalition has searched over 1,000 potential caches in Afghanistan since Jan 1, 2002, with approximately 345 yielding results. Since June 1, 2002, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of incidents of cooperative locals identifying weapons caches to Coalition forces. Over 81% of exploited caches identified by cooperative locals in Afghanistan since 01 Jan 02 were discovered over the past 60 days.

The following items were captured/destroyed as a result of coalition cache exploitation in Afghanistan:

- rifles (AK-47)	1785
- ammunition	over 370,000 rounds
- heavy machine guns	30
- ammunition	over 3.5 million rounds
- mortar tubes	72
- ammunition	over 52,000 rounds
- recoilless rifles	142
- ammunition	over 1711 rounds
- air to air missiles	approx 2100 missiles
- rocket propelled grenade launchers	approx 2800
- ammunition	over 4000 grenades
- rockets; 107/122mm	over 43,000 rounds
- Shoulder fired surface to air missiles:	319 missiles total
- SA-7 missiles	269
- Blowpipe missiles	13
- Stingers missiles	37
- tanks	approx 50
- armored vehicles	approx 40
- mines (anti-tank/anti-personnel)	approx 2000
- anti-aircraft weapons	over 20



TO: Gen. Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith  
 Torie Clarke  
 Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: August 6, 2002

SUBJECT: **Attached CENTCOM Information**

CENTCOM

Attached is some material CENTCOM prepared with respect to Tora Bora, Anaconda and an excellent timeline.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080602.08

*Attach: Fact Sheets on Tora Bora, Anaconda and USCENTCOM OEF Chronology*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

cc: *Admiral Giambastiani*

6 AUG 02

## TORA BORA

1. Purpose. To provide information on the use of Afghan forces in the Tora Bora fight in eastern Afghanistan, 1 - 17 December 2001.

2. Talking Points.

- In early December 2001, the U.S. had 1,300 Americans in Afghanistan in seventeen different locations. Southern Afghanistan was still not under Coalition Forces control. In eastern Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was consolidating its forces in the rugged, high mountain terrain of the Tora Bora region.
- Several factors influenced the concept of operations adopted for Tora Bora. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan, entailing over 10 years and the introduction of more than 620,000 troops into Afghanistan, was a prominent planning factor. More than 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and 55,000 wounded during their occupation. Mindful of the Soviet experience, planning was also shaped by the strategic setting that Afghanistan ultimately belonged to the Afghans.
- Fahim Khan, the premier Afghan leader in the area at the time, communicated a strong desire to have the Afghan forces attack in the Tora Bora area. Afghan forces were acclimated to the harsh climate and to operating at the high elevations found in eastern Afghanistan.
- The U.S. relationship with these particular Afghan forces was relatively immature since the focus up to this time had been western, central and northern regions of Afghanistan. The decision was made not to stop the Afghan commanders who wanted to move into the Tora Bora area where we had already done a great deal of kinetic work. Associated with these Afghan forces were 100 Special Operations Forces.
- Pakistan had up to 100,000 troops along the border, concentrated along the exfiltration points from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
- The plan called for an approach up two parallel valleys with blocking forces at the ends of these valleys. As the Afghan forces (with U.S. Special Forces soldiers supporting) moved to contact, they encountered AQ/TB elements.

- Various assessments have been made of the number of Al-Qaeda/Taliban forces in the Tora Bora area, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand forces. In actuality, the total size of the enemy force in the area is unknown. Pakistani border guards captured 247 Al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters, providing clear evidence that some enemy forces retreated into Pakistan as a result of the Tora Bora offensive.
- Consolidation operations between 17 December 2001 and 8 January 2002 revealed many fleeing Al-Qaeda were trapped and frozen as they fled across mountain passes at elevations of 13,000 to 14,000 feet.
- SOF with Hazrat Ali were told their plan included:
  - Two blocking forces
  - Two maneuvering units
  - However, no blocking forces ever showed, which allowed some enemy forces to escape.
- The operation took place under extreme winter conditions at high elevations.
  - Battlespace ranged from 5,000 feet to 13,000 feet elevation.
  - Weather: frequently overcast, snowy precipitation, snowpacked ground, temperatures in the single digits at night.
  - Not a proper battlefield for heavy forces - this was an Infantryman's war.

## ANACONDA

1. Purpose. To provide information regarding the decision not to employ conventional artillery during Operation ANACONDA on 2 - 18 March 2002.

2. Talking Points.

- Conventional artillery was not employed during Operation ANACONDA. Prior to the operation, mission analysis dictated the need for mortars to provide organic fire support vice conventional artillery. Operating at high altitude, at the limit for most rotary wing operations, the conditions dictated the need for light, responsive forces, such as mortars for fire support.
- The decision not to deploy artillery to Afghanistan and to employ the specific force identified for Operation ANACONDA, was a decision made at the tactical level by the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander. As a commander develops his mission analysis for each operation, he decides how many forces, what type and how they should be equipped at each particular point of the operation.
- Mortars are considered ideal for use by light infantry in mountainous terrain and are more practical than artillery due to their mobility, responsiveness and rates of fire.
- Operation ANACONDA was completely dependent on airlifting combat forces in an operations area varying from 8,000 to 12,000 feet in altitude.
- A total of 18 helicopters were available in Afghanistan for Operation ANACONDA. Although helicopters were required to support the operation because of terrain, any airlift of artillery would have been at the expense of the Infantrymen on the battlefield. Moving a single howitzer system by helicopter would have precluded moving two platoons of soldiers.
- Mortars weigh between 47 pounds (60mm) and 715 pounds (120mm).
- The smallest artillery piece weighs over 4,500 pounds.

- Four 120mm mortar systems and a pallet of ammunition can be transported by one CH-47 helicopter. The same number of 105mm howitzer tubes requires four CH-47 helos.
- Fire Support from mortars is extremely responsive at ranges from 300M up to 7200M.
- The maximum rate of fire for the 120mm mortar is up to three times faster in the first minute (15 rounds per minute for the first minute) than that of the M119 Howitzer.
- The maximum ordinate for 120mm mortar fire is only 4000M as compared to the maximum ordinate for the M119 Howitzer's 8000M. This allows supporting aircraft to fly lower when flying Close Air Support (CAS) missions.
- A total of 26 mortars, of the 34 available in Afghanistan, were used during Operation ANACONDA: eighteen 60mm mortars; four 81mm mortars; and four 120mm mortars.
- During the first twelve hours of the operation a total of six 60mm mortars, two 81mm mortars, and four 120mm mortars were inserted and used.
- On the second day of the operation twelve 60mm mortars and four 81mm mortars were inserted.

**CHRONOLOGY**

12 Sep Directed to begin planning  
 21 Sep POTUS briefed on concept and mission  
 02 Oct POTUS approval  
 07 Oct Strike Ops and air-delivery of humanitarian rations begins  
 19 Oct Raid on Mullah Omar's residence, RHINO-base established  
 20 Oct First special forces link-up with Northern Alliance  
 22-31 Oct CINC visits United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan  
 05 Nov Anti-Taliban forces launch offensive  
 09 Nov Mazar-E Sharif falls  
 11 Nov Taloqan falls  
 12 Nov Herat falls  
 12 Nov Shindand falls  
 13 Nov Kabul falls  
 14 Nov Jalalabad falls  
 15 Nov 8 "Shelter Now" detainees rescued, Gardez falls  
 18-25 Nov CINC visits Uzbekistan, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Afghanistan  
 1-18 Dec Operations IVO Tora Bora  
 14 Dec USMC secures Qandahar airport  
 19-27 Dec CINC visits Oman, Pakistan, and Afghanistan  
 22 Dec Inauguration  
 08 Jan Jordanian hospital operational  
 10 Jan Transfer of prisoners to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba begins  
 20-28 Jan CINC visits Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan  
 8 Feb Spanish hospital begins operations  
 8-13 Feb CINC visits Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and Spain  
 28 Feb U.N. begins humanitarian flights into AFG  
 02 Mar Operation ANACONDA begins  
 ISAF begins training 1st Battalion, ANG  
 16 Mar Korean hospital established at Manas  
 17 Mar Operation ANACONDA ends  
 12-22 Mar CINC visits Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia  
 22 Mar Operation MOUNTAIN LION begins  
 30 Mar CJTF AFG established  
 04 Apr 600 AFG soldiers (1 BANG) graduated after ISAF training  
 17 Apr 4 Canadian KIA, 8 WIA by friendly-fire incident  
 19-26 Apr CINC visits Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Kingdom  
 01 May ANA training begins  
 9-17 May CINC visits Qatar, Oman, Afghanistan, and Crete  
 24 May The Czech Republic hospital operational in Kabul  
 31 May CJTF 180 stood up, LTG McNeill Cdr  
 11 Jun Loya Jirga process opened without violence or incident  
 13 Jun Hamid Karzai elected as head of Afghan Transitional Gov.  
 19 Jun Loya Jirga concluded: government officials selected  
 20 Jun ISAF change of command: Turkey assumes command  
 20-28 Jun CINC visits United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Jordan, and Germany  
 30 Jun Operation FULL THROTTLE  
 19-27 Jul CINC visit to Bahrain, Kenya, and Greece

**RESULTS SO FAR/PROGRESS**

- Destroyed Taliban: ATA in place
- Eliminated AFG as base of operation
- Senior leadership in disarray
- Disrupted command and control
- Forced ad hoc mode of operation
- Disrupted access to financial resources
- Eliminated permanent training facilities
- Major reduction in weapons
- Regional perceptions affected by strong global response
- State sponsors wary of association
- Stable environment created
- Over 300 caches exploited, 196 identified by locals

**FACTS**

- Forces in AOR: Over 66,000
  - Over 9,000 Coalition
- In AFG
  - Over 8,000 US
  - Over 6,500 Coalition (4,000 + for ISAF)
- Over 120 sensitive sites exploited
- Combat sorties: over 14,000
- Bombs dropped: over 20,000 (50% PGM)
- Mine cleared area: 1.7M square meters
- Airlift: over 19,000 sorties
  - Strategic inter-theater flights: over 3,000
  - Intra-theater sorties: over 16,000
- Air refueling missions: over 7,000
- People moved: 150,000+
- Cargo moved: 228,500 tons
- Bases/ports departed: 267
- Nations over-flown: 46

**37 COUNTRIES IN TAMPA \***

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Czech Rep, Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan  
 \* Yemen ETA 10 Aug 02 (total will be 38)

**FIRSTS**

- First ANA Bn trained (23 Jul)
- Longest combat fighter mission
- Longest airborne surveillance mission
- Music to AFG people for first time in 6 Years
- First CFLCC since WWII
- Unified CINC at war with all four Components
- Over half of PGMs dropped were GPS-guided JDAMS

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

- OHDACA for OEF in AFG: \$10,000,000
- OHDACA committed as of 8 July 02: \$4,044,589
- O&M projects: \$434,826
- Approved OHDACA projects: 89
- OHDACA projects completed: 43
- O&M projects: 4
- Projects transferred to NGOs and USAID: 11
- Schools under construction: 49
- Medical Centers/Hospitals under construction: 15
- Drinking water wells under repair/construction: 12
- Road and bridge reconstruction.

**SOVIET CASUALTIES**

- 118 jets, 333 helo's, 147 tanks, 433 artillery pieces
- 1,138 vehicles, 620,000 troops served
  - 14,453 KIA, 54,000 WIA
- 23 KIA (18 US/5 Coal.), 110 WIA (99 US/11 Coal.)
- Non-hostile: 22 killed, 90 injured

16/264  
 • Forwa  
 11 Nov  
 • Invest  
 29 Nov  
 • Invest  
 strobe f  
 23 Jan  
 • Invest  
 plannin  
 12 Feb  
 at Qand  
 • Invest  
 27 Feb  
 Beaten  
 • Invest  
 Injuries  
 force re  
 closed.  
 17 Apr  
 • F-16 e  
 • CFAC

• CINC  
 • Direct  
 • Servic  
 6 Apr 0  
 • Invest  
 engage  
 30 Jun  
 • Oruzg  
 • Status

16 Mar  
 01 May  
 01 Jun  
 08 Jun  
 15 July  
 23 Jul

ANA T  
 • 30 Dec  
 • 1 Jul  
 man BN  
 • 30 Dec  
 (300 ma

Money  
 • 30 Dec  
 • 1 Jul  
 • 30 Dec

11-L-0559/OSD/6035OEF CASUALTIES

## STATUS OF INVESTIGATIONS

Oct 01 Air Strikes on ICRC Facilities  
 rded to Chief of Staff of USAF for action.

01 UN Convoy Damage  
 gation completed. Status is closed

01 FOB Rhino Near Friendly Fire Incident  
 gation complete. Gunner aboard helicopter mistook friendly  
 or enemy fire. Corrective actions instituted. Status is closed.

02 Hazar Qadam Direct Action Mission  
 gation complete. No systemic errors in target planning, mission  
 .. or execution. Status is closed.

02 Allegation of Detainee Mistreatment While in DOD Custody  
ahar  
 gation complete. Status is closed.

02 Allegation that 27 Detainees Taken at Hazar Qadam Were  
While at Qandahar Detention Facility  
 gation complete. While at facility detainees treated well.  
 consistent with what might be expected from the application of  
 sonably necessary to secure them during the mission. Status is

2 Tarnak Farms Friendly Fire  
 gaged Canadian ground forces (4 killed; 8 injured)  
 2 investigation:  
 - Completed late June (Joint board)  
 - Findings: Cause - aircrew did not exercise flight discipline;  
 Contributing - failings within immediate command structure  
 ENT approved on 21 June  
 d implementation of board recommendations  
 s now determining disciplinary/administrative actions  
Suspect Leadership Target, Blue Pickup Truck IVO Shkin  
 ation complete. Sufficient intelligence existed to support the  
 ent. Status is closed.

2 Civilian Casualties During Operation Full Throttle  
 n Province, AFG; allegations of Afghan civilians killed.  
 nvestigation in progress

## COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS

**AOR wide:** 38 countries supporting  
**Total nations in AFG:** 24, including ISAF

**Ground Operations (non-ISAF):** 15 countries: over 1,600 deployed in  
 AFG (AUS, CAN, EST, FRA, DEU, ESP, GBR, ITA, JOR, KOR, NOR,  
 NZL, POL, ROM, TUR)

**ISAF:** 18 countries deploying over 4,000 personnel:  
 • Contributing countries:

Austria	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Denmark
Finland	France	Germany	Greece
Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	New Zealand
Norway	Romania	Spain	Sweden
Turkey	United Kingdom		

**Special Operations Forces:** 9 countries

**Coalition Air Missions:** 11 countries (AUS, BEL, CAN, DEU, FRA, ESP,  
 GBR, ITA, DEN, NLD, NOR), : over 5,000 sorties (over 1,600-airlift for  
 21.0 mil pounds cargo + over 7,500 personnel: over 1,100-tanker: 900-ISR;  
 200-C2: 1,100-fighter; 1,000-helicopter sorties)

**Naval Operations:** 10 countries (AUS, CAN, FRA, DEU, ESP, GBR, GRC,  
 ITA, JPN, NLD), with an average of 25 ships, and approx. 5,000 personnel.

**Humanitarian Assistance Highlights:** 7 countries (BEL, CZE, DEU, ESP,  
 GBR, GRC, JOR).

- Mazar-e Sharif: Jordanian hospital has treated over 89,000 civilians.
- Bagram: Spanish hospital has treated over 10,000 civilians.
- Qandahar: Jordanian mine clearing.
- Dushanbe: French HA airlift.
- Karachi: Belgium, UK and Greek airlift support for ISAF

**Coalition De-mining Support**

- Norway 2 de-mining vehicles
- Jordan 2 de-mining vehicles
- UK 2 de-mining vehicles
- Poland 2 Sappers (Engineers)

## AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)

SECDEF approves Quick Start program  
 US begins training 1<sup>st</sup> BANA (approx. 500 recruits)  
 1<sup>st</sup> BANA paid -- first official ANA payday  
 French begin training 2<sup>nd</sup> BANA (approx. 350 recruits)  
 US begins training 3<sup>rd</sup> BANA (approx. 300 recruits)  
 First graduation of an ANA battalion (1<sup>st</sup> BANA )

**ined**

**02:** Plan: 3,600 (600 man BN-6 BANA).  
 present recruitment levels, will graduate 1,950  
 : Plan: 7,800 (600 man BN-12 BANA + 2 Border force (300

**03:** Plan: 12,600 (600 man BN-18 BANA + 6 Border force  
 BN))

### eeded to Support

**02:** \$80M total  
 \$190M total (additional \$110 mil)  
**03:** \$300M (additional \$110 mil)

## LESSONS

- Flexible Coalition structure is achieving results. "Mission defines Coalition, Coalition does not define mission."
- Joint and Combined training paid dividends
- DOD and other government agencies work well together
- Synergy of conventional and special forces maximized combat effectiveness.
- Peacetime engagement facilitated deployment from 267 bases, staging of operations from 30 locations, and over-flight of 46 nations
- Unmanned aerial vehicles provided time-critical intelligence and were force multipliers.
- HUMINT is valuable and decisive.
- Strategic lift and aerial refueling aircraft are high demand assets.
  - Tankers are key to meeting force protection requirements
  - Additional lift is needed (C-17's and aircrews)
- Precision guided munitions are force multipliers, reduced the number of sorties required to destroy a target, and resulted in an unprecedented low level of collateral damage.
  - Advanced technology permitted command and control from 7,000 miles away in Tampa.

SHOWFARE  
08/06/02

9:16 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld, DR  
DATE: August 6, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Bob Dole should not be included with the former Secretaries. It is a misfit.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080602.14

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

8/6  
→ Tonie  
f41

819

02050

640602



TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 6, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

What do you think about getting Sandy Berger or Christopher or Albright in?

Thanks.

*DR*  
*J. Di Rita*

000,71 SD

DHR/azn  
080602.15

Please respond by: 8/10/02

*8/11*  
*Settelle*  
*Done*

*8/9*  
~~*Reckef -*~~  
*We should. Would be better in September. They are likely to get called for testimony.*  
*J. Di Rita*

640602

Larry Di Rita  
8/9

*8/12*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 6, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

Let me see the Saudi briefing that the RAND person gave to the Policy Committee and come up with a proposal as to how we can keep three-quarters of the people who were in that room from the Pentagon staff out of there. Also, get some procedures so that briefings like that are picked up afterwards and people are not left copies of them.

Let's talk about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080602.16

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *8/12/02*

SAUDI BRIEFING

6 AUG 02

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 6, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Press Briefings**

I sent you a note saying I thought I ought to have two press briefings ever week between now and the time I leave for vacation. It is not happening. I have a feeling that I could keep things straighter and correct the record better if I did. Why aren't I?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080602.17

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *8/8/02*

*8/9*  
  
 LARRY DI RITA

*000, 7 50*

*6 AUG 02*

SNOWFLAKE  
218  
02/03

4:09 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: August 6, 2002  
SUBJECT: **Briefing**

I want you to see the briefing Tina Shelton has and Jim Thomas. It takes about a half hour. See it tomorrow before Paul leaves.

337

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080702.01

Please respond by: 8/8/02

*Shelton*  
*Done*  
8/9

6 AUG 02

U00435 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6041

*LL Copy*

August 7, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Tina Jonas  
CC: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Way Ahead

*100, 5*

Your memo of July 31 looks like a good idea to me—let's go with it.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/31/02 DUSD(FM) memo to SecDef re: Way Ahead [U12397-02]

DHR:dh  
080702-2

Please respond by

08/14/02

*cd. S,*

*8/9*

*will update this Fall  
once program established  
with results*

*Jake  
Rachel H*

*v/r  
col mikvishin  
08-09-02 11:36 AM*

*C-M L  
Lacy*

*7 AUG 02*

U00436 / 03

July 1, 2002 3:18 PM

TO: Tina Jonas  
CC: *Don ZAKHEIM*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Way Ahead



Thanks for your note on "Points for the Secretary." What do you propose we do? I would be curious to know if you have a specific proposal for next steps and the way ahead.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated Jonas paper, "Points for the Secretary"

DHR:dh  
070102-46

.....  
Please respond by 08/02/02

*8/4* SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 07 2002

*SecDef -*

*This is a way of connecting management initiatives and resource (budget) decisions, and the best way to stop the talking and start deciding things.*

*48/5* *DR*



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
AUG 07 2002

2002 AUG -1 PM 2:31

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2001, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) *DZ*

FROM: Tina W. Jonas, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management) *TWJ 7/31/02*

SUBJECT: Way Ahead

- Secretary Cheney and Deputy Secretary Atwood used the budget process to make and enforce management decisions. This is known as the Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) process. The value comes from tying the management decisions to the allocation of funds.
- If you agree, the DMRD process could begin this Fall as part of the program and budget review. Issue papers would focus on business operations and management. The Comptroller and the SEC Executive Secretary would develop and coordinate the issue papers for consideration and decision by the SEC.
- This method was used successfully in 1990 to combine all of the Services' finance and accounting activities into a single entity (Defense Finance and Accounting Service). Prior to 1991, DoD spent about \$3.1 billion for finance and accounting. Using a DMRD, the activities were consolidated and costs reduced by \$1.9 billion between 1993 and 1999. An example for this year might be the Defense agency realignments that the SEC is working on for you to consider. Major accomplishments could be highlighted in the President's Budget.

*Yes !!*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>U123</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/6044

*U123* 97-02

- We have a new Deputy Chief Financial Officer (DCFO), JoAnn Boutelle, on board. She is validating the organization and will be building a professional accounting service organization in the ODCFO. One change she is making to the ODCFO is to add an analysis group to develop useful managerial reporting and financial analysis for senior leadership.
- Using existing financial data, the analysis team will extract, analyze and translate information on quarterly basis to provide you and the SEC with relevant management information (e.g., trend analysis on key financial performance indicators).
- If we move quickly, information on our financial performance could be highlighted in the President's Budget.

COORDINATION: Ken Krieg

Prepared By: JoAnn Boutelle, (b)(6)



TO: Larry Di Rita  
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ↗

DATE: August 6, 2002

SUBJECT: **Porter Goss Phone Call**

As you know, Porter Goss called asking Powell and Rumsfeld to appear before their Intelligence Panel as consumers and customers of intelligence. Colin, Condi and I talked about it at noon, and kind of agreed that it would be best to have Paul Wolfowitz and Armitage do it rather than us.

It is not a hearing, it is not under oath, it is a panel; bi-partisan, bi-cameral, to talk about what problems customers and consumers of the intelligence see, and what might be done better, why, and how.

I think what Paul ought to do is talk about the issue of the facts that:

- It is a big complicated world;
- They are using denial and deception very effectively; and
- Dual use things and underground digging makes it very complicated.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080702.02

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 8/10/02 \_\_\_\_\_

032

6 Aug 12

January 8, 2002 3:03 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
CC: Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rewards

000.5

Attached is a piece from *Time* magazine indicating one of the problems with the reward program.

I had cleared the reward on Omar with George Tenet. Then the State Department spokesman cast his response in a way that was notably unhelpful to the administration.

You will recall this is a subject we talked about at lunch that needs to get sorted out.

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/14/02 *Time* magazine, p. 14

DHR:dh  
010802-16

8 Jan 02

## "I Fly This Plane!" "I Know Bush!"

**Y**OU KNOW WE'VE REACHED some kind of watershed in the stressful post-Sept. 11 world of airline security when the public has to decide who's telling the truth, the pilot or the Secret Service agent. That's what happened in the case of a member of President Bush's security detail who was thrown off an American Airlines plane on Christmas Day because of alleged problems with paperwork permitting him to carry a handgun. The pilot says the agent, identified in news reports as Walied Schater, got belligerent. Schater, through lawyers, says he was discriminated against because he's of Arab descent.

Whoever is right, the event may increase calls for something the airlines have pressed for since Sept. 11: the ability to identify just who is getting on their planes. "This case lends support to our calls for some kind of government-approved profiling," says Michael Wascom of the Air Transport Association. "If we had more information about this man, who was carrying a weapon, we could have avoided any problems." —By Sally B. Donnelly



## The Disappearing Omar Reward

**I**S THERE A REWARD FOR THE capture of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar? No one seems quite sure. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced on Dec. 13 that Washington planned to offer \$10 million for Omar's capture, to go along with the \$25 million dangled for nabbing Osama bin Laden. But Rumsfeld didn't consult ahead of time with the State Department—which runs the rewards program and decides which evildoers warrant a price tag on their head—and a reward had not been approved. It still hasn't. "You just can't create these rewards on your own," says a State Department aide. One problem: the rewards



are usually offered for terrorist under U.S. indictment, and Omar hasn't yet been charged with a crime. The State Department could still come through with the reward, and a senior Administration aide insists that if someone turns in the Taliban chief, "we could probably pay some money." But do bounty hunters take 100s? —By Douglas Walle

**ACADEMIC TIFF** Strife mounts into the job. HARVARD president Lawrence Summers...  
 team. He offered a black professor...  
 including the supposed...  
 contributor to affirmative action...  
 move to Princeton, but Summers made peace with West last week and reaffirmed Harvard's commitment...

## Democrats: Don't Gloat About Enron




**AS CONGRESS** gears up for hearings on Enron's \$60 billion collapse, some Democrats are savoring a chance to investigate links between the company and its many G.O.P. friends in the White House and Congress. But the scandal may wind up tainting Democrats as well. Florida's state pension fund, which lost \$325 million on Enron, is examining, as part of a broader inquiry, what role Frank Savage, a major Democratic donor, may have played in the state's loss. The fund's investments were directed by

Alliance Capital Management, where Savage was a senior executive and chairman at the same time he sat on Enron's board. State officials want to know whether he inappropriately pushed Enron's stock on the pension fund while the energy

giant was failing. Alliance more than doubled the state's stake in Enron since last August, buying 5.6 million shares in three months, even as stock prices fell and analysts questioned the firm's management and accounting practices. Coleman

Stipanovich, deputy executive administrator of the pension fund, said his staff would like to learn what Savage knew of Enron's internal problems and what, if anything, he passed on to fund managers at Alliance. "We're going to want to be satisfied there was no undue influence," he told TIME.

An Alliance spokesman said Savage, who headed an international subsidiary until leaving the firm in August, had no influence on Enron trading. Savage did not return calls for comment. Since joining Enron's heavily Republican board in 1999, he has donated \$100,000 to Democrats and is raising money for New York gubernatorial candidate Carl McCall. Which proves, if nothing else, that Enron was a bipartisan debacle. —By Michael Weisskopf



710  
f-3  
snowflake

August 7, 2002 8:29 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: September Calendar

620 550

I think all day Saturday, September 7, I am going to be tied up in meetings for the principals, possibly at Camp David, and probably the night before as well— Friday, September 6.

Keep that private.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080702-4




Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Done*

LARRY DI RITA  
8/20

7/20/02

August 7, 2002 8:33 AM


TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: September Bilaterals for Sec. Powell

337

Colin Powell is going to be in Johannesburg with 40 or 50 world leaders  
September 4-5. He can have bilaterals to work our country problems if he has  
papers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080702-5



Please respond by 08/20/02

7 Aug 02

U00440 / 03

August 7, 2002 8:34 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DPB Leak

334

What do you think we ought to do about the Defense Policy Board, so this doesn't happen again?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080702-6



Please respond by 08/20/02

7 Aug 02

U00441 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6051

August 7, 2002 8:41 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lady Black

Lady Barbara Black, Conrad Black's wife, is involved in his press empire. She said she would very much like to have some background that she could use for editorial material and the like.

She was particularly struck when I said that I thought the military was probably spending 10 to 15 percent of its time on civil affairs and humanitarian activities. What she wanted was some way to connect with someone in the Pentagon to get reliable information.

Here are her contact points.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Card from Lady Black

DHR:dh  
080702-8

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

8/25

Torie Response Attached.

7 Aug 02

Barbara Amiel  
Black  
amielblack@poststamp.net  
Lady Black  
C11 - [redacted]  
[redacted]  
NYC [redacted]  
s + c Jan

Larry Di Rita

8/28  
8/28

400442-103  
-0559/OSD/6052

TO: SECDEF  
FROM: Torie Clarke  
CC: Doug Feith  
DATE: 14 August 2002  
SUBJECT: Lady Black

We made contact with Lady Black and in addition to opening a long-term contact person for her in the Press Office, we are working with Policy to arrange an interview with our Civil Affairs and Humanitarian Activities experts in the near future.

11-L-0559/OSD/6053



August 7, 2002 8:44 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: British Media

*UK*

I was with Conrad Black and his wife, Barbara, up at Kissinger's last weekend. She urged me to do an extensive interview with a major British publication, which I am sure she means one of theirs, and a television interview with one of the major British television stations.

Do we have any requests like that from England?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080702-9

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*7 Aug 02*

U00445 / 03

August 7, 2002 9:09 AM

TO: RADM Jacoby  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DATTs

691.4

Please let me know what kind of a DATT we have in Afghanistan. We ought to have a world-class one there. Please send me his background. I would like to know what his language capabilities are, etc.

Who is responsible for assigning DATTs in countries?

My instinct is that we ought to pick 8 to 12 of the most important countries to us and figure out who the DATTs are there and whether that is where they ought to be. I keep running into ambassadors who shouldn't be in the countries they are in and could do a perfectly good job in another country. But, for whatever reason, they get mis-assigned. We ought not to be making the same mistake over here.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
080702-13

.....

Please respond by 8/20/02

*Jacoby response attached*  
*8/13*  
*VR*  
*EF*  
*7 Aug 02*

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

INFO MEMO

U-086/DR

August 13, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (U) Defense Attaches (DATTs)

Sir, you requested the following: a) background information on the DATT in Afghanistan, b) who assigns DATTs, and c) information on other important DATTs.

- (U) DATT Afghanistan. Presently, the Defense Attaché at USDAO Kabul is Colonel John B. Longenecker, USAF. Colonel Longenecker was recalled to active duty because he has South Asia attaché experience, having served as Defense and Air Attaché in Islamabad from 1992 to 1996. He will be the Acting DATT in Kabul until the permanent DATT (Colonel Terry Cook, former Army Attaché in Islamabad, speaks Urdu and Hindi) arrives in Oct 02.
- (U) DATT Selection. The services nominate DATTs who are then approved and assigned by DIA. Candidates are nominated and selected based on qualifications which include service experience, area expertise, language capability or aptitude and diplomatic skills. The approval process involves people with in-depth knowledge of the specific countries' job requirements and circumstances.
- (U) I concur fully on the need to match people and skills with DATT assignments, particularly in your high interest countries where we don't have a senior operational commander (e.g. Bahrain, Bosnia, Japan, S. Korea). In those situations, host nations tend to deal with the most senior military officer, rather than the DATT.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Copy to: DIA/DO

Prepared By: L.E. Jacoby, RADM, U.S. Navy



August 7, 2002 9:15 AM

TO: John Stenbit  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Network Centric Operations

413.51

Thanks for sending the publication on network centric operations. Are there any sections or passages in particular that I should focus on?

Thanks.

Attach.

*Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Military*

DHR:dh  
080702-14

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

7 Aug 02

U00447 / 03

August 7, 2002 12:16 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Call to Mr. Hadley

Handwritten scribbles

Please set me up with a secure call with Steve Hadley sometime.

Thanks.

DLK:dh  
08/07/02-19



Please respond by 8/10/02

006.71 SD

7 Aug 12

U00448 / 03

August 7, 2002 12:51 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Terry Robbins  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Gilead

250



Attached is an article on Gilead. Is this going to raise an issue about my ownership of Gilead stock?

Thanks.

Attach.

Justin Gillis, "Panel Backs New Hepatitis B Drug," *Washington Post*, 08/07/02

DIR:dh  
080702-21



Please respond by 08/20/02

*8/24*  
Haynes response attached

Lamy Di Rita

*8/28*

*SFB*  
*8/28*

*7 Aug 02*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

August 8, 2002, 4:30 pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Gilead

- You asked today if the recommendation by an advisory panel of the Food and Drug Administration for approval of a Gilead-developed drug for hepatitis B would raise an issue about your ownership of Gilead stock.
- Since you do not normally make decisions involving the purchase of medicines by this Department, and since you continue to be recused from matters that involve the financial interests of Gilead, this approval should not affect you.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Steve Epstein, (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/6061

Washington Post

## NATIONAL NEWS

# Panel Backs New Hepatitis B Drug

## Therapy, Created to Fight AIDS, Works Against Liver Infection

By JUSTIN GILLIS  
Washington Post Staff Writer

An advisory panel of the Food and Drug Administration voted unanimously yesterday to recommend approval of a new drug for hepatitis B, a potentially life-threatening liver ailment that afflicts more than 1 million

Americans.

The drug, adefovir dipivoxil, is the latest payoff from the nation's enormous investment in AIDS research. It was originally developed for that disease and then rejected because it damaged the kidneys, but it proved effective against hepatitis B in lower, and safer, doses.

The FDA is not required to follow the recommendations of its advisory panels, but it usually does so. Gilead Sciences Inc. of Foster City, Calif., said it hoped to win formal approval and put the drug on the market by the end of the year.

Approval of the drug would give liver doctors a new tool against viral hepatitis. About 1.5 percent of the American population is infected with hepatitis B or hepatitis C, two chronic illnesses with similar symptoms.

That is five times as many people as have the human immunodeficiency virus, which causes AIDS. But hepatitis is slower to produce symptoms, sometimes taking decades. Many of the afflicted are members of the baby boom generation who are moving gradually, but relentlessly, toward serious liver illness, potentially including cancer. Already, viral hepatitis is the nation's leading cause of liver transplants, and many people die while awaiting donor livers.

Against this backdrop, scientists are laboring to copy the model they developed for AIDS treatment, using antiviral drugs in various combinations over long periods to slow the damage from hepatitis. The Gilead drug would

be the second such drug approved for hepatitis B. It is expected to be used first in people for whom other drugs have stopped working, but it may eventually become an element of the same kind of combination regimens used in AIDS. "I think it's a real winner," said Eugene R. Schiff, chief of hepatology at the University of Miami School of Medicine and a consultant for Gilead.

The same 15-member FDA Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee voted to reject the drug when it was considered for AIDS treatment.

Panel members said they remain concerned about the potential for kidney damage from the drug, and they called for careful monitoring in patients who use it, especially for long periods. But they said with the lower doses of the drug used in treating hepatitis, the balance of risks and benefits had tipped in favor of adefovir.

Several hepatitis patients who spoke yesterday referred to adefovir as a "miracle," and they described dancing and shedding tears of joy when they learned how well the drug was working for them. "I beg you, please give this opportunity to many other people," said Elias Anastasopoulos of Florida, who said the drug had kept him alive to spend time with his seven grandchildren. "They are waiting to have this medication."

Larry Kramer, an AIDS activist who has spent years criticizing drug companies, also spoke in favor of approval. He is infected not only with HIV, but also with hepatitis B, and he told panel



FILE PHOTO BY BOB CHILD—ASSOCIATED PRESS

Larry Kramer told an FDA panel the drug adefovir dipivoxil kept him alive long enough for a liver transplant.

members that adefovir, which he received as an experimental drug, had kept him alive long enough to undergo a liver transplant. He said his health and vitality had been restored.

"Needless to say, I am not accustomed to appearing on behalf of any drug company," said Kramer, who made a point of noting that he paid his own way to yesterday's meeting. "Thank you, Gilead, for saving my life."

Yesterday's vote was a coup for Gilead, a small biotechnology company that weathered setbacks to push the drug forward. It has already put a different drug on the market for AIDS treatment, one of a handful of small companies to achieve that milestone.

Gilead has struck a deal with a major pharmaceutical company, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, to sell the drug overseas. Hepatitis B chronically infects about 5 percent of the world's population, including large numbers of people in Asia. Hotovec Pomerantz & Co., an investment firm, said in a recent report that Gilead and GlaxoSmithKline are likely to find substantial markets for the drug in China, Japan and Korea.

### CORRECTIONS

An Aug. 3 Business article misstated the types of workers who will benefit from the assistance provided by a trade bill recently passed by Congress. The law extends trade-adjustment assistance to "secondary" workers—for example, employees at an auto-parts factory who lose their jobs because the auto plant their factory supplies is hurt by competition from imported cars.

In the Aug. 6 Style section, a photo of one of the Irish Tenors was misidentified. It was Finbar Wright who was pictured.

An article in the Aug. 5 Style section misstated the domestic box-office revenue earned by "Star Wars: Episode II—Attack of the Clones." It is \$298 million.



7:45 AM

*Dme*

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 8, 2002  
SUBJECT:

381

Send a note to the Chiefs with a bump slip from me saying, "Attached is the guideline paper I wrote when I first came into office this time, which we discussed in the meeting yesterday."

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080802.07

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

8AUG02

Guidelines to Be Weighed When Considering Committing U.S. Forces

**Is the action necessary?**

- ***A Good Reason:*** If U.S. lives are going to be put at risk, as they will be, whatever we do must be in our national interest. If people could be killed, we better have a damn good reason.
- ***Legal Basis:*** In fashioning a clear statement of the legal underpinning for the action and the political basis for the decision, avoid arguments of convenience. They may be useful at the outset to gain support, but they will be deadly later as their invalidity is exposed.
- ***Diplomacy:*** All instruments of national power should be engaged before resorting to force, and they should stay involved once force is engaged.

**Is it doable?**

- ***Achievable:*** When the U.S. commits forces, the task should be achievable—at reasonable risk—something the U.S. is capable of accomplishing. We need to know our limitations. The record is clear; there are some things the U.S. simply doesn't know how to do well.
- ***Clear Goals:*** To the extent possible, there should be clear, well considered and well understood goals as to the purpose of the engagement and what would constitute success, so we can know when we have achieved those goals and can honestly exit or turn the task over to others.
- ***Command Structure:*** The command structure should be clear, unambiguous and one the U.S. can accept—not UN control or a collective command structure where key decisions are made by a committee. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition to achieve its goals, we should insist on prior agreement from the coalition partners that they will do whatever might be needed to achieve the agreed goals. We must avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join a coalition that we compromise on our goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission must determine the coalition; never allow the coalition to determine the mission.

**Is it worth it?**

- ***Lives at Risk:*** If an engagement is worth doing, the U.S., and our coalition partners, if any, must be willing to put lives at risk.
- ***Resources:*** The military capabilities needed to achieve the agreed goals must be available and not committed or subject to call elsewhere halfway through the engagement. Even the U.S. cannot do everything everywhere at once.

- **Public Support:** If public support is weak at the outset, U.S. leadership must be willing to invest the political capital to marshal support to sustain the effort for whatever period of time is required. If there is a risk of casualties, we should acknowledge that at the outset, rather than allowing the public to believe the engagement can be done antiseptically, on the cheap, with zero casualties.
- **Impact Elsewhere:** Before committing to an engagement, consider the implications of the decision for the U.S. in other parts of the world if we prevail; if we fail; and if we decide not to act. U.S. actions or inactions in one region are read around the world and contribute favorably or unfavorably to the deterrent and U.S. influence. We need to ask what kind of precedent a proposed action would establish.

**If so--**

- **Act Early:** If it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should be willing to make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully early, during the pre-crisis period, to alter the behavior of others and to try to prevent the conflict. If that fails, we need to be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail.
- **Unrestricted Options:** In working to fashion a coalition or trying to persuade Congress or the public to support an action, the National Command Authorities must not dumb down what is needed by promising not to do things—not to use ground forces, not to bomb below 20,000 feet, not to risk U.S. lives, not to permit collateral damage. That simplifies the task for the enemy and makes the U.S. task more difficult. Political leadership should not set arbitrary deadlines as to when the U.S. will disengage, or the enemy will simply wait us out.

**Finally--**

- **Honesty:** U.S. leadership must be brutally honest with itself, the Congress, the public and coalition partners and not make the task sound even slightly easier or slightly less costly than it could become. Preserving U.S. credibility requires that we promise less than we believe we can deliver, since it is a fact that it is a great deal easier to get into something than it is to get out of it!

**Note:**

**Guidelines, Not Rules:** Finally, while these guidelines are worth considering, they should not be considered rules or a simple formula to inhibit the U.S. from acting in our national interest. Rather, they are offered as a checklist to assure that when the U.S. does engage, it does so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, and the opportunities. The future promises to offer a variety of possible engagements. The value of this checklist will depend on the manner in which it is applied.

Decisions on engagement will be based on less than perfect information, often under extreme pressure of time. Guidelines will be most effective not in providing answers, but rather in helping to frame and organize available information.

Donald Rumsfeld

snovflake

January 9, 2002 8:50 AM

334 NSC

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 VADM Giambastiani  
 Honorable George Tenet  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PC Next Week

Since Colin is leaving town on Tuesday, we won't have a PC on Tuesday, we will have it on Monday. The PC on Monday will be to talk about the way ahead.

Either we have a good briefing ready by Monday, or else George Tenet and I are just going to have a discussion with Condi and Colin about the way ahead.

Please put that on the calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-12




Please respond by 01/11/02

9 JAN 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6066 U00452 /02

showfare  
1600

7:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: August 8, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Condi Rice is going to be away as follows:  
8/16 to 8/27  
8/29 to 9/1


Colin Powell is going to be in the Hamptons  
9/16 to 9/23

The President is going to return on 9/3.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080802.08

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Col Bucci  
  
Cathy




0311

8 AUG 02

8/9  
1600  
showtime

12:27 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: August 8, 2002  
SUBJECT:

334NSC

I think I am going to need a person assigned to help me with the National Security Council matters completely. He is mine, he works for me, he learns how I want things done, he runs down to see that Feith and other people do what they are supposed to do, he pesters the NSC to get the materials in. Obviously this is just a disaster around here.


He would know when everything comes in here, he knows the number of pages, and he knows what my requirements are.

See me about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080802.09

Please respond by: 8/8/02



8 Aug 02

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 8, 2002  
SUBJECT:

I want to make darn sure we don't lose that undersecretary for intel because we haven't done the work. Are people up there working their tails off to get that done? If I need to call Graham or somebody, let me know. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080902.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

8/15

*8/9*  
*Secdef -*

*- Graham is travelling.  
We will connect you with  
him soon.*

*- We are working the issue.  
That's how it got in the  
Senate bill and passed. We  
are not taking it for granted.  
It is not over until it's over,  
and we know that. D. Rita*

11-L-0559/OSD/6069

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 CC: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald R  
 DATE: August 8,  
 SUBJECT:

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

020

I want to make darn sur  
 haven't done the work.  
 done? If I need to call C  
 it.

*Sham*  
*Make sure this*  
*goes to Powell*  
*with my notes on*  
*it.*

tel because we  
 ff to get that  
 concerned about

Thanks.

*done - 8/9*  
*Larry*  
*8/9*

DHR/azn  
 080902.01

Please respond by: 8/15/02

*8/9*  
*Secdef -*

- Graham is travelling.  
 We will connect you with  
 him soon.

- We are working the issue.  
 That's how it got in the  
 Senate bill and passed. We  
 are not taking it for granted.  
 It is not over until it's over.  
 ... and we know that. D. Di Rita

8 AUG 02

U1004579/089/6070



11:06 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: August 8, 2002

SUBJECT:

095

You may want to talk to Richard Perle and calm him down for a few days. There is too much Perle in the paper connected to the Defense Department on things that aren't helpful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080902.03

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

8 AUG 02

TO: Rick Kisling  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

Have you figured out security with respect to Joyce's trip to Europe? She leaves for London on Saturday, September 21<sup>st</sup>, and is going to Warsaw and be with me there for the NATO function. She is then going to Paris, and then touring northern France and then returning to Dulles on the 30<sup>th</sup>.

*380.01*

Please get back to me with what you propose. — help you do anything

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080902.05

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ *8/13/02*

*9 Aug 02*

U00459 / 03

Callis

December 9, 2002 2:39 PM

TO: Tom White  
 Gen. Shinseki

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legacy Force

*1/10*  
*White Response*

*1/10*

*322*

I am increasingly uncomfortable with the phrase, "legacy force." It strikes me that using it has to be somewhat discouraging to those people assigned to it. Words and ideas matter. Please think about that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 120902-38

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

*1/10*

WHITE RESPONSE  
 ATTACHED

*9 Dec 02*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
 DATE: August 8, 2002  
 SUBJECT: NATO Ministerial in Poland


I understand there are spouse events in Poland. Joyce is going to be in London and France with (b)(6) good friends of mine from high school. They are going to come to Poland with her to go sightseeing in Poland.

Please take a look at the spouse events or any other events in Poland for the Ministers and see if there are any one of them that might be appropriate for the (b)(6) to participate in with Joyce and me. There may be a cocktail party or something where we could slide them in some how. Let's take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080902.06

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_



NATO 337

8 Aug 02

2:57 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 8, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Attached is a very strange letter to my daughter. It looks to me like someone is trying to break the law. My daughter, sensing the it is something that should be turned over to the authorities, gave it to my assistant in Chicago, who in turn asked my friend, (b)(6) who is an attorney, about it. He believes it should be turned over to the authorities.

*620 53*

Rather than have them get involved, it seems to me that it might be best if you thought about what to do with it, and then to the extent it is appropriate, you do what you should do. If in fact someone is proposing something illegal here, which it certainly appears, it strikes me we have an obligation to turn it over to the Department of Justice.

Is that your judgment?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080902.07

Attach: Letter to (b)(6)

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *8 | 21 | 02*

*8 Aug 02*

**OFFICE of DoD GENERAL COUNSEL  
The Pentagon, Room 3E980  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600**

August 16, 2002

FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Acting General Counsel


*DJ Dell'Orto 8/16/02*

SUBJECT: Strange Letter

- I have reviewed the letter sent to your daughter.
- I agree that the letter reflects likely criminal activity. I am aware of scenarios similar to that posed in the letter.
- I also agree that the matter should be turned over to law enforcement authorities.
- I recommend that I call the Office of the U.S. Attorney in Chicago and discuss this with the First Assistant. If he suggests that I contact the local FBI office or postal authorities I will do so.
- If you agree with this approach, I suggest that you provide me the complete names, addresses and telephone numbers of your daughter and your assistant who currently holds the original letter and envelope. It would be helpful to have that information whether the Office of the U.S. Attorney asks for it so that the U.S. Attorney can pursue this matter directly or I am referred to an investigator to whom I will provide the information.
- In the interim your assistant should not handle or permit others to handle the letter or the envelope in which it was enclosed.

11-L-0559/OSD/6076

For D.R.'s  
attention



(b)(6)

To

DR/JR

I am faxing you a copy of a letter addressed to (b)(6) and a copy of the envelope in which it came. (b)(6) received it recently and sent it to me to review. I told her I thought it should be turned over to the authorities. However, I did not want to do that before talking with someone trustworthy, so I visited with Mr. Denny about it today. I left a copy with him. I don't know if (b)(6) kept a copy or not. I retain the original letter and envelope.

After Mr. Denny's review, he thinks it should be turned over to the authorities so that if it should ever get out, there would be no way to infer that (b)(6) entertained the thought for "even a second." He feels it should be dealt with in some way rather than ignored.

He wanted you to see it first and see if you agree that it should be turned over. If you do agree, we'd like to know to whom we should go with it.

Thanks,  
NP  
8/8/02



(b)(6)

email: ugeneral@hotmail.com

ATTN: (b)(6)

I WILL LIKE TO BEGIN BY INTRODUCING MYSELF. MY NAMES ARE PHILLIP UGOMA, A NATIVE OF CAPE TOWN SOUTH AFRICA AND A SENIOR EMPLOYEE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND NATURAL RESOURCES CURRENTLY HERE IN AMSTERDAM ON A TRADE MISSION.

I AM WRITING THIS LETTER TO SOLICIT YOUR CO-OPERATION IN ORDER TO REDEEM AN INVESTMENT INTEREST CURRENTLY BEING HELD UNDER TRUST WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND NATURAL RESOURCES. THE SAID INVESTMENT NOW VALUED AT US\$9,750,000.00 MILLION WAS ORIGINALLY PURCHASED BY MR. LUCIO RUMSFELD AND LEASED TO THE TRANSVAAL ORANGE MINING CORPORATION IN 1975.

SINCE THE MATURITY OF THIS CONTRACT IN SEPTEMBER 1990, SEVERAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH OUT SUCCESS TO CONTACT MR. LUCIO RUMSFELD OR ANY OF HIS CLOSE RELATIVES IN WHOSE FAVOR THE INVESTMENT CASH VALUE CAN BE PAID.

MY PARTNER WHO IS THE ACCOUNTS DIRECTOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND TWO OF OUR COLLEAGUES HAVE INITIATED THE PROCESS OF FILING A CLAIM FOR THIS MONEY, WITH THE HOPE OF HAVING THE FUNDS TRANSFERRED ABROAD. WE REQUEST THAT YOU LET MY PARTNERS FILE A CLAIM FOR THIS MONEY FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND NATURAL RESOURCES INDICATING THAT YOU WERE APPOINTED BY MR. LUCIO TO BE THE BENEFICIARY OF THIS FUND. WHEN THE CLAIM IS APPROVED, YOU AS THE BENEFICIARY WILL BE PAID THE SUM OF US\$9,750,000.00 (UNITED STATES DOLLARS)

SINCE THE MONEY WILL BE PAID DIRECTLY TO ANY BANK OF YOUR CHOICE, YOU HAVE A LIABILITY TO ENSURE THAT MY PARTNERS AND I RECEIVE 75% OF THE TOTAL SUM WHILE YOU KEEP 20% FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION. THE REMAINING 5% HAVE BEEN AGREED TO BE KEPT ASIDE TO DEFRAY ALL EXPENSES THAT MIGHT BE INCURRED BY BOTH PARTIES IN THE COURSE OF CONCLUDING THIS TRANSACTION. PLEASE WE URGE YOU TO KEEP THIS MATTER VERY CONFIDENTIAL BECAUSE WE ARE STILL IN ACTIVE PUBLIC SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT MY PARTNERS ARE IN A POSITION TO MAKE THE PAYMENT OF THIS CLAIM POSSIBLE PROVIDED YOU CAN GIVE US VERY STRONG GUARANTEE THAT OUR SHARE WILL BE WELL SECURED AND THAT YOU WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR POSITION SINCE THE MONEY WILL BE TRANSFERRED DIRECTLY TO A BANK ACCOUNT THAT YOU NOMINATE.

BE ASSURED THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT IN VIEW OF THIS CLAIM. IT IS PERFECTLY SAFE WITH NO RISK INVOLVED AND IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY ENQUIRY SINCE MY PARTNERS WILL BE HANDLING THE CLAIM DIRECTLY IN SOUTH AFRICA ON YOUR BEHALF.

I DO HOPE MY PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER, SO THAT I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH MORE CLARIFICATION ABOUT THE CLAIM AND HOW WE INTEND TO MAKE THIS DEAL BENEFICIAL TO EVERYONE PLEASE REACH ME AT THIS EMAIL AND/OR TELEPHONE NUMBER ABOVE.

YOUR'S TRULY,  
*Phillip Ugoma*  
PHILLIP UGOMA

3:19 PM

*Done*

TO: ~~Doug Feith~~  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 9, 2002  
SUBJECT:

You probably saw the article about the Russian mafia trying to kill Gen. Shelton.

*Russia*

Who in the world would want to hire the mafia to do that? Shelton was no threat to the mafia. Somebody must have wanted it done. Is it worth looking into?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
080902.08

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*8/20/02*

*8/12*

*SECDEF -*

*Please see the attached note from MGEN Keith Dayton, the DATT at the time of the incident.*

*4 Aug 12*

11-L-0559/OSD/60800 464 103 *WR ed*



DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D.C. 20340-0001

U-32/DO

8 August 2002

To: A/DR

Subject: Washington Times Article on GEN Shelton and  
Russian Mob

1. Today's front page of the Washington Times has an article by Rowan Scarborough that alleges that GEN Hugh Shelton, former CJCS, was the target of a Russian mob assassination plot in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 1998. The article is filled with inaccuracies and is essentially totally wrong.

2. I have first hand knowledge of this incident since I was the DATT in Russia at the time and accompanied GEN Shelton on this visit to St Petersburg. It is true that the official party was hastily removed from a Russian restaurant where they had just finished dinner, but investigation by the Embassy and Russian security forces revealed that there had been no plot, and that the armed men seen by the CJCS security detail were bodyguards of a prominent Russian mafia individual who was in the area. There was no evidence that GEN Shelton was the target of anything.

3. GEN Shelton was furious with his security detail for their reaction in this incident, and subsequently fired the agent responsible. When he found out that the unit had presented an award to the agent, he was even more angry. Shortly after the incident the entire security detail was replaced.



DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington, D.C. 20340-0001

4. The reporter bases his information solely on information (presumably now declassified) from the agent who was subsequently relieved. Additionally, the article contains considerable embellishment. I rode to the hotel with GEN Shelton. He and I were in the back seat of the limousine with our wives crouching at our feet. Far from covering GEN Shelton with his body, the agent was in the front seat making a fool of himself.

5. There is no substance to this story at all, and it is embarrassing that the Washington Times would run it on the first page without checking the facts.

*Should a  
letter to  
the editor?*

*Keith W. Dayton*  
Keith W. Dayton  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Director for Operations

Snowflake

3:26 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz *D, F*  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Briefing**

Let's figure out how we get that special brief on the connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda before the agency people at some point soon.

*I 1249*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080902.13

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *8/21/02*

*9 Aug 02*

U00465 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6082

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Official Notes**

I need to see all the notes from the first days of my arrival here, as I have discussed. I don't know who has them, whether it is Cambone, JJ or whatever.

*020 SD*

Second, you ought to nail down exactly where all of my notes are from JJ, Cambone, Torie, you Ed. We have got to get a full set, and you have got to become the master keeper of it all.

See me on it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080902.15

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*8/21/02*

*9 Aug 02*

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 9, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **Interns**

*2/9*

It would have been a nice thing for me to speak to the summer interns, I would have thought.

*030 SD*

Maybe next year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 080902.16

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*8/24*  
*Settled*  
*Jane*

*8/9*  
 RECORD -  
 We're always looking for things like this to do. I'll keep in mind your preference to do such events. We have interns in the building throughout the year, although more in summer than other times.

*9 Aug 02*

U0014675590SD/6084

*2/9*  
*D.R.*

August 12, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Schedule in Crawford

*ADVANCE  
COPY GIVEN  
TO COL BUCCI*

*020 SD*

I would like a 30- to 45-minute meeting alone with the President on August 21 when I go down to Crawford. I have a series of items that have accumulated that I want to talk to him about, completely separately from everything else. I suppose we could do it after lunch before I leave.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-2



Please respond by 08/16/02

*Rice, Carol, Miller, Joseph, VP,  
Scooter*

*12 Aug 02*

August 12, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Congressman Armev

632

Clearly, we should have briefed Dick Armev. Should we do it now?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-3



Please respond by 08/20/02

12 Aug 02

U00469 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6086



August 12, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Samuel Theirenstrom

Please make a note that Samuel Theirenstrom is a good speechwriter. I know his mother, Abbey Theirenstrom.

Apparently he is in the White House with some kind of council on the environment. According to Larry and Ricky Silberman, he is good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-4



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

350.001 ST

12 Aug 02

August 12, 2002 8:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: September 4 CINC Dinner

ADVANCE  
COPY GIVEN  
TO PROTOCOL # ANEWIE

Let's send out the rest of these invitations, but hold the retired CINCs—Blair Schwartz—and invite everyone else who is listed, plus VADM Giambastiani, MG Craddock, Larry Di Rita, Steve Cambone and General Shelton and his wife.

Please take off Paul Wolfowitz's guest and Secretary Powell, but leave on Secretary O'Neill, Andrew Card, Mitch Daniels and the rest of the list. If we get three or four regrets, then we will add in the two retired CINCs.

Someone needs to get started on this pretty fast.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/07/02 Invitation List

DHR:dh  
081202-6

Add O'Neill + 1

Please respond by 08/16/02

- pass to  
Protocol for  
action

DID ALREADY TALK  
AM -DH

000.71 SD

12 Aug 02

8/9

SMS 5/3

~~SECRET~~ - This is ~~not~~ a proposed guest list for CINC's dinner at your home along lines we discussed I included Schwartz & Blair because they retired since the event you hosted in February August 7, 2002 and you have wondered if we might do a dinner or something when CINC's retire. We did nothing in either case. D. Rita

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. DI RITA  
FROM: MARY CLAIRE MURPHY  
RE: SEPTEMBER 4<sup>th</sup> CINC DINNER

Please find attached the proposed guest list for the September 4<sup>th</sup> Dinner in honor of the Combatant Commanders. This list includes the additions from the Secretary.

Guest List Breakdown:

- The Secretary and Mrs. Rumsfeld 2 Guests
- Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz & Guest 2 Guests
- The Vice President, Sec. Powell, Sec. O'Neill, Andrew Card & Mitch Daniels with spouses 10 Guests
- Current CINC's with spouses 20 Guests
- Chairman and spouse 2 Guests
- Vice Chairman and spouse 2 Guests
- Service Chiefs(5) and spouses 10 Guests
- Vice Service Chiefs (5) and spouses 10 Guests
- Service Secretaries (3) and spouses 6 Guests
- Retired CINC's, (since Feb.) and spouses 4 Guests

Could also act as a farewell to Buck Kennan. This is a pretty large list. (Add Gov Ridge?) No

TOTAL: 65 68 Guests

Suggest Adding: Grambustiani  
- Craddock  
- DIRITA

11-L-0559/OSD/6089

Proposed Guest List for Dinner  
in honor of  
The Combatant Commanders of the Unified Commands  
and their Spouses

**Host**

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and Mrs. Rumsfeld

**In honor of  
(Protocol Order)**

General Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, European Command, and Mrs. Ralston  
(Joe/Dede)

General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Space Command, and Mrs. Eberhart  
(Ed/Karen)

Admiral James O. Ellis, USN, Strategic Command, and Mrs. Ellis (Jim/Polly)

Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN, Pacific Command, and Mrs. Fargo (Tom/Sarah)

General John W. Handy, USAF, Transportation Command, and Mrs. Handy  
(John/Mickey)

General Tommy Franks, USA, Central Command, and Mrs. Franks  
(Tommy/Cathy)

General William F. Kernan, USA, Joint Forces Command, and Mrs. Kernan  
(Buck/Marianne)

General Charles R. Holland, USAF, Special Operations Command, and  
Mrs. Holland (Charlie/Nancy)

General Leon J. Laporte, USA, United Nations Command/Joint Forces Command,  
and Mrs. Laporte (Leon/Judy)

General James T. Hill, USA, Southern Command, and Mrs. Hill (Jim/Tonie)

**Guests  
(Protocol Order)**

The Honorable Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States and Dr. Cheney  
(Lynne)

The Honorable Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State and Mrs. Powell (Alma)

The Honorable Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. O'Neill  
(Nancy)

The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Guest

The Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Director, Office of Management and Budget  
and Mrs. Daniels (Chei)

The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr., Chief of Staff to the President and The  
Reverend Kathleen Card

The Honorable Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army, and Mrs. White  
(Thomas/Susan)

The Honorable Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, and Mrs. England  
(Gordon/Dottie)

The Honorable James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force, and Mrs. Roche  
(James/Diane)

General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and  
Mrs. Myers (Richard/Mary Jo)

General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
and Mrs. Pace (Peter/Lynne)

General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Mrs. Shinseki  
(Eric/Patty)

General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Mrs. Jones  
(Jim/Diane)

Admiral Vernon Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, and Mrs. Clark  
(Vern/Connie)

General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Mrs. Jumper  
(John/Ellen)

Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Mrs. Collins  
(Tom/Nancy)

General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army  
and Mrs. Keane (Terry)

Admiral William J. Fallon, Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
and Mrs. Fallon (Mary)

General Michael J. Williams, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps  
and Mrs. Williams (Barbara)

General Robert (Doc) H. Foglesong, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force  
and Mrs. Foglesong (Mary)

Vice Admiral Thomas Barrett, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard  
and Mrs. Barrett (Sheila)

**FORMER COMBATANT COMMANDERS SINCE FEBRUARY**

General and Mrs. Thomas A. Schwartz - **FORMER UNITED STATES  
FORCES KOREA COMMANDER** (Tom & Sandy)

Admiral Dennis C. Blair - **FORMER PACIFIC COMMANDER**  
(Denny/Diane)

August 12, 2002 8:20 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Rachel Bronson

*531.2*

How good is Rachel Bronson from the Council on Foreign Relations? I watched her on a talk show the other day, and she sounded pretty sensible. Have you ever looked at her?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-8




*Please respond by* 08/20/02

*12 Aug 02*

August 12, 2002 8:33 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ambassador to Afghanistan



Please put together some criteria as to what the ambassador to Afghanistan ought to be like, what he ought to be able to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-9

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*Ed -  
Get Draft  
Criteria for Amb. to Afgh  
from DoD  
today*

AFGHANISTAN

12 Aug 02



## AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN

### Duties, Functions, and Responsibilities.

- Principal duties, functions and responsibilities shall include (but not be limited to) the following:
  - Work with and advise President Karzai and other senior members of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) on how to anticipate and handle issues, including secure matters.
  - Advise ATA leaders on how to deal with regional leaders, without having to threaten the use of U.S. forces.
  - Help ATA leaders to think three or four steps out, beyond immediate solutions – to foresee problems, and develop courses of action.
  - Meet regularly with the Security Coordinator, international group of managers for police and judiciary training to coordinate program activities, and help solve problems.
  - Meet periodically with the Security Coordinator, Commander, ISAF, and Commander, Joint Task Force 180, to consult on security issues, and coordinate Afghan Army training program and other activities.
  - Consult and coordinate efforts with Washington, to include State (Washington Coordinator), DoD (Security Reconstruction Coordinator), CIA and NSC.

### Knowledge and Skills.

- Record of obtaining results.
- Strong organizational and project management skills.
- Forceful personality.
- Prior high-level security and diplomatic experience desirable.
- Ability to master the unique sociological demands of Afghanistan (i.e., tribal society, diverse ethnic groups, Islamic traditions.)
- Keen political skills and instincts.

Snowflake

August 12, 2002 8:41 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Train and Equip

After meeting with the Iraqi opposition, I need to talk about train and equip in and out of the country and what is going on.

It sounds to me like nothing is going on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-11

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 17 2002

Please respond by 08/20/02

*9/15*

*Ed Ser MTG*

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 20 2002

*Sir,  
The meetings will be 30 mins,  
Friday at 10:40-11:25am by  
SKTC when you are in  
Taos.*

*12 Aug 02*

*COL B 8/20*

*8/20*

11-L-0559/OSD/6096 *U00474/03*

*DRHQ*

August 12, 2002 8:48 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA Briefing on Finances

I do need to get that briefing from CIA on finances. I have asked for it, they have promised it and I need it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-13



Please respond by 08/20/02

337

12 Aug 02

114  
3:00  
signature

August 12, 2002 10:24 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CINC Dinner

*ADVANCE COPY  
TO PRODUCE: ARLCENE*

*00071 SD*

Please add Gen. Abizaid to the CINC dinner.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-19

.....

Please respond by 08/20/02

*→ Sec. DEF.*

*8/19*

*Done*

*Larry*

Larry Di Rita

*8/19*

*↙*

*12 Aug 02*

U00478 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6098



August 12, 2002 10:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Program Overview

Please tell Steve Cambone I looked over his charts. It may be fine for a Pentagon briefing, but I think it is <sup>*a bit*</sup> ~~awful~~ complicated for a briefing for the President.

I need a briefing to understand it, and then we are going to have to figure out how we are going to refashion it for the President.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/09/02 Defense Program Overview

DHR:dh  
081202-22



Please respond by 08/20/02

*116.58*

*12 Aug 02*

August 12, 2002 10:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Separate Ops Centers

I have just read the opinions of the three Service Secretaries on ops centers. I am unimpressed.

What do you think about getting IDA to come in and have Larry Welch take a look at it? He is a smart guy and can take an independent look—unless he is nervous about doing it, getting the Chiefs ticked off. It may be we would have to get somebody who is not so closely connected to DoD.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/09/02 SecArmy, SecNAV, SecAF Responses on Ops Centers

DHR.dh  
081202-23

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

*311002*

*12 Aug 02*

U00480-103

4824

June 28, 2002 5:50 PM

TO: Tom White  
 Gordon England  
 Jim Roche

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Pete Aldridge

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ops Centers

Please take a look at the ops center your Service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot be readily done by a departmental ops center.

I ask the question because, in a traditional sense, the Services today don't have operations as such. I recognize the need to keep track of assets, but that is being done in several other places, I would think.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062802-14

.....  
Please respond by 08/02/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 12 2002

8/9

SECDEF -

All 3 Service Secretary responses are attached.

*[Handwritten signature]*



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

SECRET HAS BEEN



AUG 12 2002

INFO MEMO

July 31, 2002, 1:30 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Tom White* AUG - 5 2002  
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Support for Service-Specific Operations Center

- Response to Secretary of Defense question, "Please take a look at the ops center your service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot readily be done by a departmental ops center?"
- The Army Operations Center (AOC) is our internal nerve center to track, synchronize, and formulate recommendations for decision-making. It enables Army leadership to anticipate, assess, and coordinate support requirements in peace and war.
- The AOC provides critical internal networking with Major Army Commands and serves as our direct communications link to Service Component staffs to assure rapid analysis and response to Combatant Commanders. The absence of an AOC jeopardizes our ability to achieve both internal and external synchronization necessary to support our warfighting force.
- The AOC directs actions to carry out critical U.S. Code Title 10 responsibilities such as mobilizing and resourcing our force, and is our mechanism to plan, implement, and track requirements and actions outside the warfighting arena.
- Examples include identification of remains and mobilization of Reserve Component personnel immediately following September 11, as well as planning and sourcing of Force Protection personnel at Army installations in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE. These functions are service-specific and are most effective when organized at the service level.
- As the AOC workload is service-oriented, the potential efficiencies of a consolidated DoD operations center appear to be limited and do not outweigh the effectiveness of a focused organization. Recommend continued organization of the AOC as a Service-specific entity.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared By: LTC Jay Hooper, (b)(6)





SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 12 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG 6 2002

SUBJECT: Ops Centers

On June 28<sup>th</sup> you asked, *"Please take a look at the ops center your Service has and tell me why it needs to exist, what its function is that cannot be readily done by a departmental ops center"*

The Air Force Operations Center provides vital, service-specific operational data to the Chief of Staff and me. Each member is hand-selected from the 1C3 (Command and Control Specialist) Air Force Specialty Code career field and must have a minimum of six years operational experience. The NMCC requires direct feeds from the Services on status of forces and relies on the trained judgment of the AF Ops Center personnel to "separate the wheat from the chaff" to provide time sensitive, relevant AF information consolidated from all of the Major Commands (MAJCOMs). The ops center monitors worldwide air and space operations and serves as the sole continuous communications/coordination link between Headquarters Air Force and the MAJCOMs, Joint Staff, and war-fighting Combatant Commanders. Air Force personnel can call from any location in the world, 24-hrs a day to receive clarification, guidance, and assistance in resolving major/critical operational AF issues.

During contingencies, the AF Ops Center coordinates personnel mobilization and equipping, supplying, and maintaining for MAJCOMs, Component Commands, and Field Agencies performing the wide range of current missions. As the executive agent for the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan (JEEP) and key player in the Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs, the AF Ops Center demonstrated its capabilities during the Air Staff evacuation immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The Chief and I rely on our ops center staff to manage all AF operational reporting policies and procedures, disseminate vital information to key leadership, and publish timely, accurate information into the USAF Operation Summary. Additionally they provide coordination on all CJCS deployment orders in support of the warfighter and provide Air Staff support on all current operational issues. The value of the Air Force Ops Center as a continuously available working group in close proximity to CHECKMATE, Operational Readiness, Personnel Recovery, and other warfighting planning cells cannot be underrated. No other single command center has the capability to assure responsiveness and continuity of Air Force operations under any peacetime, emergency, or contingency circumstances.

Bottom-line, the Air Force Operations Center plays a key role in supporting senior Air Force leaders in executing Title 10 missions to mobilize, demobilize, equip, supply, and maintain the capabilities of the Air Force, especially during crises and contingencies. The ops center ensures the right air and space capabilities get to our warfighters on time. It is the 24/7 eyes, ears, and voice of the Air Force and performs a vital role that is not covered by the NMCC.

Attachment:  
Ops Center Memo

cc: DEPSECDEF

11-L-0559/OSD/6103

212  
4400

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

AUG 12 2002


2002 AUG -8 AM 6:40

August 7, 2002

INFO MEMO

To: Secretary of Defense

Fr: Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy



Subj: Operations Centers

- In lieu of separate service operations centers, the centers could be either collocated within one facility or centralized into one integrated center. Collocating would not yield meaningful benefits except it might save some small amount of overhead but likely not enough to justify the disruption and relocation cost.
- I vote against centralization. While centralization does promise savings at the time of initiation, those savings almost always start to erode quickly. In industry, centralized organizations tend to continue to grow in scope and bureaucracy while providing less service to their customers. Customers then tend to build up shadow organizations to meet their needs that are no longer being met by the centralized function. This situation is even more pronounced in the DoD. Look at our centralized defense agencies as examples. They are too big, too costly and need to be downsized or outsourced.
- My vote is to keep separate service operations centers.

8/9

SECDEF -

All three Service Secretaries have responded along more or less this line. AF & ARMY sent to you within past 3 days. D. B. H.

ASSISTANT DI RITA	8/9
CHIEF OF STAFF AMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	8/9
EXECSEC WHITMORE	8/9

August 12, 2002 11:18 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Before I meet with the Policy Board again, I have to get Richard Perle in and talk to him. I think I ought to control the agenda items.

Second, I think we ought to clear the people out of the room

Third, I think we ought to limit the people who talk to the press about how they characterize themselves.

Fourth, I think I want to have them do some projects. Please give me a list of things I could ask them to do—for example, I think they ought to tell me how we can stop leaks.

Thanks.

Attach.

Ricks, Thomas E., "Timing, Tactics On Iraq War Disputed," *Washington Post*, 08/01/02

DHR:dh  
081202-25

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

334

12 Aug 02

Washington Post  
August 1, 2002  
Pg. 1

## Timing, Tactics On Iraq War Disputed

D  
DPB

### *Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals Conventional Views*

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

An increasingly contentious debate is underway within the Bush administration over how to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, with the civilian leadership pushing for innovative solutions using smaller numbers of troops and military planners repeatedly responding with more cautious approaches that would employ far larger forces.

Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld are pushing most forcefully for aggressively confronting Hussein, arguing that he presents a serious threat and that time is not on the side of the United States, according to several people involved in the closely held discussions.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and CIA Director George J. Tenet are asking skeptical questions about a military campaign, especially about the aftermath of what most in the administration assume would be a fairly swift victory, according to those taking part in the deliberations.

Much of the senior uniformed military, with the notable exception of some top Air Force and Marine generals, opposes going to war anytime soon, a stance that is provoking frustration among civilian officials in the Pentagon and in the White House. In addition, some suspect that Powell's stance has produced an unusual alliance between the State Department and the uniformed side of the Pentagon, elements of the government that more often seem to oppose each other in foreign policy debates.

What is not being debated, officials said, is the ultimate goal of removing Hussein from power, an outcome that President Bush has repeatedly said he is determined to pursue. But how to do that still has not been decided. Officials stressed that the administration is still early in the process of discussing a variety of approaches to attacking Iraq and that no formal plan has been put before the president.

Some top military officials argue that the policy of aggressive containment -- through "no-fly" zones, a naval enforcement of sanctions and the nearby presence of 20,000 U.S. military personnel -- have kept Hussein from becoming an immediate threat. Bush has also approved a covert operation to try to dislodge Hussein from power, working in part with Iraqi opposition groups. The questions being debated now, officials said, are whether to move against Hussein with overt military action and, if so, when and how.

The lack of answers to those questions is producing new stresses within the administration, some defense experts said. Two people involved in the debate -- one inside the Pentagon, one outside it -- said Cheney and others at the White House are growing concerned that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military leaders have fought Rumsfeld and other civilian hawks to a standstill. "I'm picking up a concern that people at the top of the Pentagon are overwhelmed," said one Republican foreign policy expert.

He and others interviewed for this article spoke only on the condition that their names not be used, citing an atmosphere in which information about planning on Iraq is being tightly held in the administration, especially at the Pentagon.

11-L-0559/OSD/6106

Making his case, Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday that the situation with Hussein will not improve. "Over time, the economic sanctions weaken, the diplomatic effort seems to get a little tired, the progress that he's been able to make in proliferating the terrorist states all across the globe is a serious one," he said.

Rumsfeld said that there are "differing views about what one ought to do" but that the relationship between the top civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon is close. "The discussions that take place, the process that's been established, have been working as well as I have ever seen," he said.

There are deep differences of opinion about how the debate is likely to end, even among people intimately involved in the process, officials said. Some think the military's concerns will put the brakes on those advocating a direct confrontation with Hussein, while others say the president has been so clear about his determination to remove the Iraqi president from power that he cannot back down.

One advocate of confronting Hussein said he worries that the determined opposition of senior military leaders ultimately will dissuade Bush. "You can't force things onto people who don't want to do it, and the three- and four-star Army generals don't want to do it," he said. "I think this will go back and forth, and back and forth, until it's time for Bush to run for reelection."

But several others predicted that the military's objections will be overridden. "I'm absolutely convinced the president will settle on a war plan that brings about regime change," the GOP foreign policy specialist said.

Ultimately, noted a senior administration official, "the military has limited influence in this administration."

Some civilians in the debate worry that military planners consistently call for more troops in every plan because they lack an appreciation of how technological advances have improved the military's offensive capabilities since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. "The issue is, our capability to do severe damage to the Iraqis is very different today than it was 10 years ago," said Dennis Bovin, a member of the Defense Science Board and other Pentagon advisory groups. "We have a lot more options available than ever before."

In the debate, civilians have urged military planners to consider approaches radically different from the half-million-strong Army force that the United States deployed against Iraq during the Gulf War. The current favorite of those backing a smaller, faster approach is a lightning strike involving narrowly focused airstrikes combined with a sprint of armored vehicles from Kuwait to Baghdad. The thinking is that such a movement of just a few days would not permit Hussein to hide his forces in cities or to trundle his artillery pieces to the northern bank of the Euphrates and then to fire shells, possibly chemical-laden, at U.S. forces trying to cross that broad river.

In addition, several other "bolt from the blue" approaches are being discussed behind closed doors and studied in war games. "There are a lot of out-of-the-box options, very few of which have gotten into the public eye," said one Pentagon consultant. The Special Operations Command in particular has suggested some "tactically innovative" approaches that combine "precision strike and information dominance," said a Pentagon official.

Yet no matter how innovative the suggestions, the planners at Central Command seem to weigh them down with conventional thinking that would prolong both the preparations for any attack and the war itself, according to people involved in the process. That command, the U.S. military headquarters for the

Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, is headed by Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who has a reputation in the Pentagon of being extremely cautious.

"They've had these ideas for months, but they keep on going back to Franks with them, and he says, 'No, no, you need three heavy divisions and an air assault division' " -- that is, a backup force of about 60,000 troops -- as insurance in case a smaller attack falters, one defense official said. The overall force considered in one plan earlier this summer would have involved around 100,000 troops, he said.

In follow-up meetings, pointed questioning by senior civilian officials cut the overall number of the notional attack force to 68,000, the official added. Then, he said, "two weeks later, the Army has pushed it back up to 120,000."

The apparent impasse is causing extreme frustration with Franks and with the Army among some administration officials.

At a July 10 meeting of the Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory group, one of the subjects of discussion was how to overcome the military reluctance to plan innovatively for an attack on Iraq. "What was discussed was the problem with the services," said one defense expert who participated in the meeting. His conclusion: "You have to have a few heads roll, especially in the Army."

People involved in the planning said the reason so many different plans and variations have surfaced -- from a "Gulf War Lite" force involving 250,000 troops to an "Afghan War Redux" that combines a relative handful of Special Forces, airstrikes and Iraqi rebels -- is that wildly different assumptions are being made about the nature of the war.

"There's obviously a lot going on about how to do this," said one senior administration official. "There's no right way or wrong way. It's difficult because you don't know which countries you can count on or what the consequences in the region would be."

The first major variable is the geopolitical context in which the attack would occur. Some military planners believe that the U.S. military ultimately would be able to use bases in nearly every country in the area, except Iran and Syria. Others predict that the United States would be far more constrained.

The second area has to do with the degree of military risk. There are major disagreements, officials said, especially about whether the Iraqi military as a whole would fight or just the Republican Guard, Hussein's most elite and loyal force.

Some of those advocating a smaller, faster attack think that it would be a mistake to target the entire Iraqi military, which they think has elements that would either decline to fight or even join the U.S. side. "If the Republican Guards are the only viable fighting force, and the regular Iraqi army won't perform, you could really do a lot of the necessary damage from the air," said a Pentagon adviser involved in the discussions.

Finally, there is an extraordinary range of opinion about what burden the U.S. military and government would be required to carry in Iraq after a victory. How long would U.S. troops have to stay, how many would be needed and whether they would be joined by peacekeepers from other countries are all being debated. Most important, perhaps, is the question of whether the Iraqi people would welcome the arrival of U.S. forces -- or oppose it.

All those calculations are complicated by the fact that the nature of the war -- its scope, duration and

11-L-0559/OSD/6108

intensity -- will help shape the mood of postwar Iraq.

"Downing's opposition was to a long, destructive campaign from the ground and air that would hurt the post-campaign environment," said one military planner, referring to retired Army Gen. Wayne Downing, who recently left a White House position, some say because of his unhappiness with the planning for Iraq.

August 12, 2002 11:22 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
 Torie Clarke  
 Tony Dolan  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maria Ruzicka

Please see the attached on Maria Ruzicka. How do we use that?

Thanks.

Attach.  
 Taranto, James, "You Don't Say," *Wall Street Journal*, 07/22/02

DHR:dh  
081202-26

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

*TRM*

*12 Aug 02*





# OpinionJournal

from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Editorial Page

UIC

[PRINT WINDOW](#) [CLOSE WINDOW](#)

**BY JAMES TARANTO**

Monday, July 22, 2002 1:52 p.m.

## You Don't Say

"Bush May Use Force to Defeat Terror"--headline, Associated Press dispatch, July 19

### **Who Is Marla Ruzicka?**

"Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead," blares the lead headline of yesterday's New York Times. "The American air campaign in Afghanistan, based on a high-tech, out-of-harm's way strategy, has produced a pattern of mistakes that has killed hundreds of Afghan civilians," claims reporter Dexter Filkins.

But the BBC reports that the Afghan government rejects Filkins's account: "A spokesman for Afghan President Hamid Karzai told the BBC that fewer than 500 civilians were believed to have been killed in US air strikes--a low figure considering the size of the military campaign."

Whom to believe? This passage from the Times account gives ample reason to doubt Filkins's objectivity:

Field workers with Global Exchange, an American organization that has sent survey teams into Afghan villages, say they have compiled a list of 812 Afghan civilians who were killed by American airstrikes. They say they expect that number to grow as their survey teams reach more remote villages.

Marla Ruzicka, a Global Exchange field worker in Afghanistan, said the most common factor behind the civilian deaths has been an American reliance on incomplete information to decide on targets.

"Smart bombs are only as smart as people on the ground," Ms. Ruzicka said. "Before you bomb, you should be 100 percent certain of who you are bombing."

So what is this Global Exchange, which Filkins describes only as "an American organization"? A look at its Web site makes clear it's a far-left outfit that opposed any military intervention in Afghanistan. Blogger Michael Moynihan has more details on Marla Ruzicka, who turns out to be a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro. There's also a "report" on the 2000 election dispute from the World Socialist Web Site, which quotes her as suggesting Republicans are terrorists:

Marla Ruzicka, 23, an officially accredited observer from the Green Party, commented on the tactics of the Bush supporters. She described them as "really nasty. There was one guy with a bald head, like a skinhead. They surrounded me and called me a baby killer, because of my support for the right to abortion. When I pointed out Bush's presiding over the death penalty, they said: no, no, that's justice. They're scary. Maybe they're the ones who should be on the terrorist lists."

Ruzicka, of course, is entitled to her opinions--but surely her extremist political agenda is relevant to Filkins's readers in determining how much weight to give to her comments. Meanwhile, buried in

11-L-0559/OSD/6111

the 16th paragraph of Filkins's story is an admission that the whole thing is trumped up: "Indeed, the extraordinary accuracy of American airstrikes since they began in October has produced few of the types of disasters that plagued past wars, when bombs aimed at one target hit something else instead." Oh well, never mind.

### **'Let's Get Saddam!'**

On Friday President Bush went to Fort Drum, N.Y., where he addressed soldiers who've returned from Afghanistan. The New York Times has a nice vignette from the speech:

As Mr. Bush stood surrounded by the camouflage-clad troops of the 10th Mountain Division, among the first sent to Uzbekistan and Afghanistan last fall, one of the soldiers yelled, "Let's get Saddam!" Mr. Bush, dressed in shirt sleeves, just smiled for a moment as a roar of approval raced through the crowd. He did not mention Iraq but hardly stepped in to quell the cheers.

"War with Iraq may come sooner than we think," argues Stephen Hayes in The Weekly Standard, who notes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, President Bush does not need to make a "public case" for overthrowing Saddam (most Americans are already persuaded) and may not even need congressional authorization, since the 1991 Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, also known as Public Law 102-1, is still in effect.

David Warren, meanwhile, says the Europeans are coming around, and we have the French, of all peoples, to thank for it. The defeat of the left in the recent French elections "allowed President Jacques Chirac to confirm an entirely new government of the centre-right, including a new foreign minister to replace Hubert Vidrine, a man whose visceral dislike of anything American (or Jewish) frequently interfered with his otherwise remarkably dubious judgement":

Official anti-American posturing was largely a function of the French domestic political need to assuage such sensibilities on the Left. In turn, German, Italian, Spanish and even British official pronouncements were crafted to assuage the official French need to assuage the French Left. Thus did the tail wag the dog.

While America is pondering when to go into Iraq, Spain has gone into a rock. The Weekly Standard's Christopher Caldwell has an entertaining account of the "battle" over Perejil (Spanish for "parsley"), a tiny island that is part of the Spanish African enclave of Ceuta and was inhabited only by goats and sheep until a dozen Moroccan soldiers arrived July 11. After failing to resolve the standoff diplomatically, "Spain attacked at dawn on July 17. It captured all six Moroccans remaining on the island."

"This comedy holds some serious lessons," writes Charles Krauthammer:

Europe berates the United States for holding on to primitive notions of sovereignty at a time when the sophisticated Europeans are yielding sovereignty to Brussels, adopting the euro, wallowing in Kyoto and, most recently, genuflecting to the newly established International Criminal Court. Yet here they are lining up in lockstep to defend Spanish sovereignty over a piece of worthless rock that only dubiously belongs to Spain, by supposed attachment to the other dubiously claimed Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, that in turn are little more than colonial anachronisms on the coast of North Africa. This same Europe heaps scorn on the United States for defending an infinitely more serious sovereign claim--to democratic legal jurisdiction over its own citizens and soldiers rather than yielding it to the arbitrariness of the new criminal court.

As for Iraq, the New York Times contradicts Warren's assessment and says European leaders are as wimpy as ever. The Times report is most notable for the revelation that the king of Jordan is a

August 12, 2002 12:55 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Videos of Press Briefings

Please give me a copy of the tape of my press briefings on 9/11 and 9/12, and the ones from the period of 10/7 or 10/8.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-29



Please respond by 08/20/02

*060*

*12 Aug 02*

U00486 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/6113

August 12, 2002 12:58 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Senator Inhofe

I ought to have Sen. Inhofe down to lunch sometime.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
081202-30



Please respond by 09/06/02

*09/1/02*

*12 Aug 02*

August 12, 2002 1:12 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
Col. Bucci

*ADVANCE COPY  
GIVEN TO COL BUCCI*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calendar

I need to lighten up the calendar a little bit. Let's try to have meetings be a little shorter. I do have a couple of files I want to try to get through before I leave town. If I don't start now, I won't make it.

Let's have a calendar session today and talk about how we want to plan the rest of August and the months of September and October.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-33



Please respond by 08/12/02

*020102*

*12 Aug 02*

U00488 / 03

showfile

*Dre*

August 12, 2002 2:32 PM

TO: Rich Haver  
John Stenbit  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Frank B. Rowlett Awards

*9/6*

Gen. Hayden has provided me the attached information regarding an awards program. Please take it for action as appropriate.

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/31/02 NSA letter to SecDef re: Frank B. Rowlett Awards

DHR:dh  
081202-36

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ — *Nominations due 23 Aug*

*I took no action.*  
*SC*

AUG 14 2002

*200.6*

*12 Aug 02*

U00489 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6116



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

31 July 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 12 2002

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to announce the call for nominations for the 12th annual Frank B. Rowlett Awards. The Rowlett Awards serve to recognize major contributions both by individuals and organizations whose efforts have significantly enhanced the advancement of information assurance in, either classified or unclassified, security-related areas.

To ensure that all deserving individuals and organizations in the community have an opportunity to compete, I urge you to nominate those whose accomplishments in information assurance most warrant recognition. Nominations are due no later than Wednesday, 23 August 2002. (Criteria and nomination forms are attached.) Please forward your submission to my Protocol office (DC62), Attention: Ms. Regena Sands or Mrs. Flenda Patterson, (b)(6) FAX: (b)(6) or via the internet at f.patter@radium.ncsc.mil.

On 6 November 2002, we will hold the Frank B. Rowlett Awards ceremony at the National Security Agency, during which time we will formally recognize the awardees. Celebrating these achievements among those in our community will stimulate even greater interaction among information systems security users, planners, and producers leading to a more secure electronic environment for our nation in the 21st century.

*Michael V. Hayden*  
MICHAEL V. HAYDEN  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

3 Encls:

1. Nomination Format for Individual Achievement Award
2. Nomination Format for Organizational Achievement Award
3. Guidance for Frank B. Rowlett Awards

11-L-0559/OSD/6117

Copy Furnished:

Deputy Secretary of Defense, OSD  
Senior Civilian Official, Command, Control,  
Communications and Intelligence, OSD  
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of  
Defense for NCB/Nuclear Matters, OSD  
Director, National Imagery & Mapping Agency,  
OSD  
Director, National Reconnaissance Office, OSD  
Deputy Manager, National Communications  
Systems, OSD  
Chief, Customer Services and Information  
Assurance Division, National Communications  
Systems, OSD  
Director, Defense Security Service, OSD  
Director, Defense Special Weapons Agency, OSD  
Chief, Technical Support Division, HQ Defense  
Special Weapons Agency, OSD  
Director, Defense Logistics Agency, OSD  
Communications Security Officer, ADP and  
Telecommunications Security Division, Office  
Of Command Security, OSD  
Chief, Security Office, Defense Threat Reduction  
Agency, OSD  
The Joint Staff, J6/NSA, OSD  
NSA/CSS Rep Defense, OSD



---

---

## GUIDANCE FOR FRANK B. ROWLETT AWARDS

This guidance sets forth criteria and nomination procedures for awarding the Rowlett Trophy for Organizational Achievement and the Rowlett Trophy for Individual Achievement.

### CRITERIA

Information Assurance (IA) National Awards:

- a. The Frank B. Rowlett Trophy for Organizational Achievement is awarded annually to the U. S. Government organization recognized as making the most significant contribution to the improvement of national information systems security, operational information assurance readiness, or the defensive information operations posture of the United States.
- b. The Frank B. Rowlett Trophy for Individual Achievement is awarded annually to the individual, within a U.S. Government organization, making the most significant contribution to improving his/her element's information systems security posture, information assurance readiness or the conduct of defensive information operations.
- c. National Security Agency elements and individuals are not eligible for IA National Awards.

### PROCEDURES

Nomination packages for the Rowlett trophies (individual and organizational) awards will consist of the following:

- a. One copy of the justification narrative for the applicable award. The justification narrative should not exceed two pages. It must include a description of the site/organization and a detailed description of significant accomplishments of the nominated unit/organization/individual during the previous calendar year. Endorsement letters/kudo messages do not enhance a nomination and are not to be included.
- b. One copy of the biography of the honoree (to include mailing address and phone number).
- c. **If the individual or organization is selected as one of the three finalists, please provide the following information:**
  - For nominations for individual achievement - name, organization, address, and phone number of the honoree

- For nominations for organizational achievement - the name, organization, address, and phone number of an individual most familiar with the organization's accomplishments to serve as POC on all aspects of the ceremony/video production. The POC must be able to assist the Protocol Office with the logistics of the ceremony and the NSA Video Production Team with unclassified scripting, video production, and possible video taping schedules.

### (U) RESPONSIBILITIES

The DIRNSA/CHCSS will solicit nominations each year for the Frank B. Rowlett Trophies for Organizational and Individual Achievement. Nominations are submitted to the Protocol Office (DC6PIAD).

The Information Assurance Director (IA DIR) will chair a Selection Board comprising the IA DDIR and the Chiefs of B, C, V, X, and Y. The Board will recommend winners to the DIRNSA/CHCSS for approval.

The IAD Protocol Office (DC6PIAD) serves as Executive Secretary for both selection boards. In this capacity, DC6PIAD will solicit nominations from eligible organizations; convene selection boards; forward boards' recommendations to DIRNSA/CHCSS for approval; and notify finalists. The Frank B. Rowlett Awards Ceremony is scheduled for the first Wednesday in November of each year in the Friedman Auditorium.

The Agency's Protocol Office (DC62) will organize and direct all protocol and ceremonial functions associated with the Award presentations.

Office of Multimedia Solutions (DC6M) will organize and direct all stage/video functions associated with the Award presentations.

Office of Security Services (MC11) will organize and direct all security functions associated with the Award presentations.

Classification

# Organizational Excellence INFOSEC Nomination Form

## Information on Individual Who Will Accept Award on Behalf of Organization:

Name:

*(Last,*

*First,*

*MI)*

Rank or Grade:

Military Service *(if applicable)*:

Job Title:

## Brief Synopsis of Duties:

Assigned Organization:

Address:

Telephone Number:

E-Mail Address:

*(if applicable)*

## Brief Background on Organization:

Supervisory Chain of Command: (Names and titles beginning with immediate supervisor)

11-L-0559/OSD/6121

Classification

Classification

[Empty box for classification]

(Con't of Organizational Nomination Form)

Narrative of Accomplishments:

Narrative should be no more than two pages in length and printed on plain bond paper. Classified data will be sanitized before possible presentation.

Endorsement by Director/Chief of Agency or Department

[Empty box for endorsement signature]

Signature

Nominating Officer and Title

[Empty box for nominating officer signature]

Signature

Printed Name and Title:

[Empty box for endorsement printed name and title]

Printed Name and Title:

[Empty box for nominating officer printed name and title]

Agency Point of Contact: (name and phone number)

[Empty box for agency point of contact with ( ) placeholder]

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Authority for collecting information requested on this form is contained in 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, 5 U.S.C. §§4501-4509, and Executive Order 12333. NSA's Blanket Routine Uses found at 58 Fed. Reg. 10,531 (1993) and the specific uses found in GNSA03 apply to this information. The requested information you provide will be used to identify the individual or organization nominated for Rowlett Trophy. Failure to furnish requested information may delay the review of your nomination package.

[Empty box for classification]

Classification

### Individual Excellence INFOSEC Nomination Form

Name:   
*(Last, First, MI)*

Rank or Grade:

Military Service *(if applicable)*:

Job Title:

**Brief Synopsis of Duties:**

**Assigned Organization:**

Address:

Telephone Number:

E-Mail Address:  
*(if applicable)*

( )

**Brief Background on Organization:**

**Supervisory Chain of Command: (Names and titles beginning with immediate supervisor)**

Classification

[Redacted Classification Box]

*(Con't of Individual Nomination Form)*

Narrative of Accomplishments:

**Narrative should be no more than two pages in length and  
printed on plain bond paper.  
Classified data will be sanitized before possible presentation.**

Endorsement by Director/Chief of Agency  
or Department

[Redacted Signature Box]

*Signature*

Nominating Officer and Title

[Redacted Signature Box]

*Signature*

Printed Name and Title:

[Redacted Name and Title Box]

Printed Name and Title:

[Redacted Name and Title Box]

Agency Point of Contact: (name and phone number)

[Redacted Agency Point of Contact Box]  
( )

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT:** Authority for collecting information requested on this form is contained in 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, 5 U.S.C. §§4501-4509, and Executive Order 12333. NSA's Blanket Routine Uses found at 58 Fed. Reg. 10,531 (1993) and the specific uses found in GNSA03 apply to this information. The requested information you provide will be used to identify the individual or organization nominated for Rowlett Trophy. Failure to furnish requested information may delay the review of your nomination package.

[Redacted Classification Box]

August 12, 2002 4:36 PM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Invitations

In the future, I want to see the outreach invitation list before people are invited, not after they have already been invited. Please don't invite people until I have seen the list. I want to change some names, drop off some people and add some people, and I want to do it for every one of the outreach events.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081202-38

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02


*001/SD*

*12 Aug 02*

U00490 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6125

August 13, 2002 9:48 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: European Media

Please see me with a plan as to how I can start doing more European press—being carried live on television and radio. I don't want to do things where they can put me on the cutting room floor.

It seems to me it probably would be best for the Administration if I get my views across in Europe directly. We may want to have some press conferences when I am over there and consciously structure them the right way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-4

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

EUROPE

13 Aug 02



August 13, 2002 9:52 AM

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Walter Reed

*ADVANCE COPY  
SWG TO COL BUCCI*

We ought to let Walter Reed know that I could be a half hour or so early tomorrow, and it would be best if they were ready. I don't know how long it is going to take, and I have to be back at the Pentagon at the end of that time slot.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-5

.....

Please respond by 08/13/02

*701*

*13 Aug 02*

August 13, 2002 9:59 AM

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Travel from Taos and Schedule

*ADVANCE COPY  
GIVEN TO  
COL BUCCI*

When I do the trips out of Taos, I don't want to depart until after the PDB and the CENTCOM call in the morning, and anything else I have to do. I don't want to have to get up at 5 a.m., so please don't schedule the PDB or CENTCOM call before 8:15 a.m. After I finish those two things, I can go to the airport and depart.

I would like to try to get home for dinner in the evening—by 5 p.m. if possible—when returning from the troop visits.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-6



Please respond by 08/20/02

*333 SD*

*13 Aug 02*

U00494 / 03

August 13, 2002 10:01 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NSC/PC

I have to have someone help staff me for the NSC and Principal Committee meetings. I want to start keeping track of the weekly calendars, with a copy of the way they sent it to us and then the way it actually happened, so we can compare the two.

Thanks.


DHR:dh  
081302-7

*334 NSC*

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

*8/13*  
**SECDEF**  
Rachel Billingslea has reported in for duty today as of 4:30 PM. We are working with her to get her up to speed.  
*13 Aug 02*  
11-L-0559/QSD/6129  
000496 103 *V/RED*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

January 7, 2002/0700

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition,  
Technology and Logistics *E. C. Aldridge* 11/20/02

SUBJECT: Anticipated Savings for Currently Approved Business Initiative  
Council (BIC) Initiatives

The purpose of this memo is to respond to your inquiry regarding the actual savings we anticipate seeing from the approved BIC initiatives, once implemented. The BIC Principals have approved 24 initiatives to date (10 at their September (TABs A & B) and 14 at the December meetings (TABs C and D)).

- Some initiatives, e.g., Enterprise Software Initiative, require an up-front investment (\$.5M) to lay in the software for implementation (TAB A). Other initiatives, e.g., Recovery Auditing (TAB A), will reap savings.
- The remaining initiatives not reflecting any savings, are either unquantifiable; i.e., will reduce cycle time, accelerate decision-making, etc. (highlighted in yellow shading); or are too early in their implementation to determine exact savings (green shading). As the latter initiatives mature, savings will be documented, projected, and updated.
- The savings estimates are preliminary and will likely change when the functional/process boards conduct more thorough business case analyses. We have contacted OSD (PA&E) to solicit their assistance in developing and refining the estimates. We have not yet developed service-by-service breakdowns and that will be part of our further refinement of the estimates.

RECOMMENDATION: For Information Only.

COORDINATION: TAB E

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England

Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas L. White

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Peter Pace

11-L-0559/OSD/6130

U00497 102

**Attachments**  
**As stated**

**Prepared by: Ms Joanne M. Rodefer, (b)(6)**

**TAB**

**A**



# Early Look At Investments, Potential Savings/Benefits From Approved Initiatives (14 Sep 01)

-Benefits include Reduced Cycle Time, Accelerated Decision-Making, etc.

-Too Early to Estimate

INITIATIVE	SAVINGS (\$M)					
	FY 03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	Cum Sav
ONE TIME PRORITY PLACEMENT						
MODIFY WAIVER AUTHORITY						
MANPOWER MIX MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY						
RECOVERY AUDITING	75-145	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	175-345
RAISING BTR THRESHOLDS						
WEB-BASED INVOICE/RECEIPT PROCESS	35-57	35-57	35-57	35-57	35-57	175-285
COMMON RANGE SCHEDULING TOOL						
LOCAL/REGIONAL CELL PHONE POOLING	6-6	6-6	6-6	6-6	6-6	30-30
ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE INITIATIVE	7-7	7-7	7-7	7-7	7-7	35-35
COMMON FLIGHT CLEARANCE						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>133-215</b>	<b>73-120</b>				<b>325-595</b>

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - WORKING PAPERS NOT INTENDED FOR USE EXTERNAL TO THE BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL(BIC) EFFORT


11-L-0559/OSD/6133

**TAB**

**B**



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

**SUBJECT: Business Initiative Council (BIC) Approval of Quick Hit Initiatives**

In early July 2001, I announced the establishment of the Business Initiative Council (BIC) to improve the business operations of the Department of Defense (DoD) through a wide array of short (quick hit) and long-term initiatives, and reallocate savings yielded by such initiatives to higher priority efforts (i.e., people, readiness, modernization, and transformation). The BIC is operational and ready to identify the first set of business initiatives that will lay the groundwork for more far-ranging enterprise-level initiatives.

On 14 September 2001, the members of the BIC (the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I) received a presentation from the BIC Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and the BIC Executive Directors (EDs), which solicited approval for the immediate implementation of eleven quick hit proposals. These quick hit initiatives were recommended on the basis of their ability to benefit our warfighters, provide common (joint) good across DoD, and to provide identifiable savings / benefits that will have a positive impact on FY03 budget / execution. At the conclusion of the meeting, the BIC approved ten initiatives and directed the BIC ESC and EDs to work with the identified DoD champions of each initiative in the development and deployment of their action plans. The approved quick hit initiatives and their DoD champions are summarized in the attachment to this memorandum.

Approval of this first set of initiatives is only the beginning of a phased-effort by the BIC to identify and implement promising ideas to improve the way we conduct our business. The BIC structure includes seven process / functional boards made up of subject matter experts from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services who will continue to work collaboratively and continuously to bring good ideas forward to the BIC for consideration. Improving the Department's business operations ultimately takes the

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.


**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

Joint Staff, General Richard B. Myers  
11-E-0559/OSD/6135

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

collective efforts of leadership, and the participation and support of our total workforce, to make our operations more efficient. To this end, the BIC is personally committed to support the DoD champions of these initiatives to help see them through to successful completion, while working with the BIC process / functional boards as they continue their search for promising new ideas to sharpen DoD business processes.

Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)


Sept 13, 2001  
Date Approved

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England  
Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Reche  
Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White

Joint Staff 559/OSD/6136

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

ATTACHMENT (1):

SUMMARY OF APPROVED QUICK HIT INITIATIVES  
(RESULTS OF BIC MEETING, 14 SEPTEMBER 2001)

People Processes:

**Title:** One-Time Clearance of Priority Placement for Scientific & Engineering Positions

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, eliminate unnecessary delays being experienced in the hiring of hard to fill scientific and engineering positions, by allowing for a one-time clearance of the Priority Placement Program (PPP).

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Change DoD policy to allow one-time clearance of PPP for scientific & engineering positions by revising PPP regulations and providing implementation guidance.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to pursue modification of DoD PPP regulations to allow for one-time clearing for scientific & engineering positions.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVFACSYSCOM Director of Civilian Personnel Programs)

**Title:** Modify 180-Day Waiting Period to Hire Retired Military

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, encourage highly qualified retired military personnel to pursue civil service careers by having SECDEF authorize Service Secretaries to delegate waiver authority within the components.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** DoD authorize re-delegation of waiver authority to the services.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to request re-delegation authority from SECDEF.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Directorate of Personnel Force Management)

**Title:** Manpower Mix Management Flexibility

**Description of Initiative:** OSD allow the Services to make the most efficient use of civilian / contract personnel without predetermined constraints / expectations.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** OSD eliminate civilian full-time equivalent targets from DoD programming guidance.

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England

Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White

11E 0559/OSD/01137

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



## BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

**Approved Actions:** BIC will approach SECDEF to support changing the policy and practice, with respect to DoD planning guidance, that establishes civilian full-time equivalent targets / end-strength controls.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

### Corporate Operations Processes:

#### Title: Recovery Auditing

**Description of Initiative:** Use contingency fee auditing services contract to identify and recover overpayments in Working Capital Funds to providers of goods and services.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Military services and DoD agencies implement for working capital funds immediately (Navy, Army, and DLA have pilots working). Samples of successful contingency fee based recovery auditing contracts to be made available to all services / agencies for their use; lessons-learned to be shared so that problems leading to overpayments are corrected.

**Approved Actions:** BIC members agree to full implementation of recovery auditing for all DoD working capital funds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (Assistant Secretary of the Navy for FM&C)

#### Title: Raise Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR) Thresholds

**Description of Initiative:** Raise the thresholds for BTR actions to provide program managers greater flexibility to execute their programs by increasing thresholds for Procurement accounts from \$10M to \$20M and Research & Development thresholds from \$4M to \$10M.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Congressional oversight committees (four) must approve higher thresholds, but legislation is *not* required. DoD implement immediately when Congress agrees to raise the thresholds.

**Approved Actions:** BIC will request USD(C) signature on letters to the four congressional oversight committee chairpersons, asking each to consider raising the thresholds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

### BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.



**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

Joint Staff (S&A) / OSD/0108

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

**Title:** Web-based Invoice / Receipt Processing

**Description of Initiative:** To reduce the incurrence of incorrectly prepared or missing receiving reports and move toward a paperless process, use existing automated systems so that DFAS can pay vendors more quickly and accurately.

- *Wide Area Workflow (WAWF):* Reduces prompt payment penalties through paperless processing of receiving reports.
- *Web Invoicing System (WinS):* Reduces DFAS charging through paperless processing of invoices.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Fully enforce policy Chapter 131, Section 2227 of Title 10 USC (requiring claims / payments to be processed electronically).

**Approved Actions:** BIC will direct DoD components to work with DFAS and contractors to make WAWF and WinS a focus of future efforts.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Marine Corps (Fiscal Division; Accounting Liaison and Technical Services (RFL))

**Title:** Common Range Scheduling Tool

**Description of Initiative:** To enhance coordination of testing schedules across multiple sites, and avoid unnecessary scheduling delays, rationalize the scheduling process across the services to enable implementation of a web-based scheduling tool. Develop and implement a web-based scheduling tool capable of real or near real-time updates.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$1.2M for tool development (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to direct development and implementation of a common scheduling process with a web-enabled tool.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVAIRSYSCOM Test & Evaluation)

**Title:** Local / Regional Cell Phone Pooling

**Description of Initiative:** To overcome rising cost of cellular telephone bills and inefficient phone purchases, negotiate new local or regional cell phone contracts to consolidate cell phone users into appropriate pools.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to the purchase of cell services using pooled group rates, as manageable.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Secretary for Acquisition)

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.


**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

11 E 0559/03D/0109

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



## BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

### Acquisition Management Processes

**Title:** Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI)

**Description of Initiative:** Streamline the acquisition process by providing best-priced, standards-compliant software products through expanding the use of the ESI process as the benchmark acquisition strategy by:

1. Using the current structure of executive agents distributed among military departments / defense agencies.
2. Maintaining a flexible process to be responsive to customer needs.
3. Extending a software asset management framework within the DoD to enhance enterprise software life-cycle management capability.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required. ESI is an ongoing initiative, therefore, integrate implementation strategy in accordance with the ESI implementation plan.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$515k for software asset management tools (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to fully implement ESI.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DoD, Deputy Chief Information Officer (CIO)

**Title:** Common Flight Clearance Process

**Description of Initiative:** In order to reduce clearance turnaround time, develop and implement a "common" flight clearance process by incorporating the latest information technology advancements.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$1M for process implementation (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to implementation of a common flight clearance process.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVAIRSYSCOM Test & Evaluation Engineering)

### BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

11-L-0559/OSD/6M40

**TAB**

**C**



# Early Look At Investments, Potential Savings/Benefits From Approved Initiatives (3 Dec 01) -1/4/02 14:15

-Benefits include Reduced Cycle Time, Accelerated Decision-Making, etc.

-Top Early to Estimate

INITIATIVE	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	Cum Sav
ALLOW FOR CONTRACTING OF SECURITY GUARDS	3.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	45.5
STREAMLINE PROFESSIONAL CONTINUING EDUCATION								
MODIFY JPME II REQUIREMENTS								
REVISE DAVIS-BACON ACT THRESHOLDS	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	45.5
IMPROVE INTERSERVICE PQDR BUSINESS PROCESS		0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	4.5
ESTABLISH FUNDING FLEXIBILITY WITHIN A PROGRAM								
ESTABLISH PROCESS FOR PROPERTY CONVEYANCE FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSES								
INCREASE FLEXIBILITY OF EXPIRED YEAR FUNDS								
INCREASE EXPENSE/INVESTMENT THRESHOLD								
ESTABLISH O&M CLOSE-OUT PROCESS								
STREAMLINE CONTRACT CLOSE-OUT PROCESS								
STREAMLINE CLINGER-DOFFER IMPLEMENTATION								
ELIMINATE EXCISE TAX ON DoD TACTICAL VEHICLES	65.9	65.9	33.5	38.7	68.9			
STREAMLINE ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION PROCESS								
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - WORKING PAPERS NOT INTENDED FOR USE EXTERNAL TO THE BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL(BIC) EFFORT


11-L-0559/OSD/6142



**TAB**

**D**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)


December 11, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Business Initiative Council's (BIC) Approval of Initiatives

The BIC Executive Steering Committee and Executive Directors briefed members of the BIC (the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I) on December 3, 2001 and requested approval for the second set of initiatives. At the conclusion of the meeting, the BIC approved the 14 initiatives and provided re-direction on three previously approved initiatives, all of which are summarized in the attachment to this memorandum. The BIC champions for these 14 initiatives are hereby authorized to develop and launch their implementation plans. While undertaking these efforts, they carry my authority, on behalf of the Senior Executive Council, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. I therefore expect the full support and cooperation of all staffs across the Department.

Approval of this second set of initiatives continues the phased effort by the BIC to identify and implement ideas to improve the way we conduct our business. The BIC will continue to work collaboratively and continuously to bring good ideas forward for consideration. Improving the Department's business operations ultimately takes the collaborative efforts of leadership and the participation and support of our total workforce. To this end, the BIC members are committed to supporting the DoD champions during implementation and the BIC boards as they continue their search for promising new ideas to sharpen DoD business processes.

  
E. C. ALDRIDGE, JR.  
Chairman

Attachment:  
As stated

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

Logistics: The Honorable E. C. Aldridge, Jr.

Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England

Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Peter Pace

11-L-0559/OSD/6144

## **ATTACHMENT:**

### **SUMMARY OF APPROVED QUICK HIT INITIATIVES (RESULTS OF BIC MEETING, 3 DECEMBER 2001)**

#### **People Processes:**

**Title:** Optimize Professional Continuing Education

**Description of Initiative:** In an effort to streamline Professional Continuing Education (PCE), allow Services to determine who/where is the best to provide PCE.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DoD and the Services make the determination as to where PCE will take place, and which Service is best suited to provide this education.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force

**Title:** Modify JPME II Requirements

**Description of Initiative:** Modify Joint Professional Military Education II by allowing the course to be less than 12 weeks, removing the requirement for mandatory sequencing (JPME I, JPME II, joint billet) in order to be designated a Joint Specialty Officer, and by allowing Service Staff & War Colleges to provide resident and non-resident JPME II.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** HASC NDAA FY02 includes language directing an independent study to review Joint Officer Management and JPME II Reforms. The current HASC language requires the SecDef to submit the report to Congress not later than June 30, 2002. After completion of the report, and based on the study's recommendations, Joint Staff will re-engage with Congress to facilitate the required legislation to modify JPME II.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Joint Staff

**Title:** Allow for Contracting of Security Guards

**Description of Initiative:** Allow Services to contract security guards in the Continental United States (CONUS) at small locations in an effort to provide increased flexibility as the Department continues to enhance anti-terrorism/force protection measures.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Propose legislative language to change Federal law (Title 10 USC 2465, passed in 1983), prohibiting contracting of security guards. Include this language in the FY03 legislative initiatives.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Legislative Affairs)

### **Logistics/Readiness Processes:**

**Title:** Revise Davis-Bacon Act Thresholds

**Description of Initiative:** Raise the current threshold subject to Davis-Bacon Act from \$2K to the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100K.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Develop legislative language addressing Title 40 USC 276a and amending this Title and include in FY03 legislative initiatives to allow an increase in thresholds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Legislative Affairs)

**Title:** Improve Interservice Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR) Business Process

**Description of Initiative:** Develop and implement a methodology to seamlessly share PQDR data across all Services and Agencies.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Amend Joint Service regulations, rewriting/eliminating language necessary to allow for seamless sharing of PQDR.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Defense Logistics Agency (DoD PQDR Process IPT)

**Title:** Establish Process for Property Conveyance for Conservation Purposes

**Description of Initiative:** Allow DoD to convey surplus property to a State or local government, or nonprofit conservation organization for natural resource conservation purposes.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Develop legislative language, proposing modification of state and federal environmental laws and regulations, to allow for the conveyance of surplus property.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DUSD (Installations and Environment)

## **Corporate Operations Processes:**

### **Title: Establish Funding Flexibility Within a Program**

**Description of Initiative:** Establish Transfer Flexibility “Between” Appropriations in the “Same Program” at \$30M or 10 Percent (Lesser of).

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language and request Congress change the General Transfer Authority provision incorporating the recommended initiative.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army & Air Force

### **Title: Increase Flexibility of Expired Year Funds**

**Description of Initiative:** Establish authority to reprogram “Expired \$s” “Same FY”, to avoid the need to request program specific legislation, when expired appropriation(s) have been exhausted.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress, recommending authority to transfer “Expired \$s” same “FY” between appropriations.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force

### **Title: Increase Expense/Investment Threshold**

**Description of Initiative:** Increase Expense/Investment Threshold from \$100K to \$500K. This will provide Field Commanders greater flexibility in their decision-making process and ability to fund critical requirements.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress, recommending approval to increase Expense/Investment Threshold from \$100K to \$500K.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army & Air Force

### **Title: Establish O&M Close-out Flexibility**

**Description of Initiative:** Allow DOD to carryover for 1 year, up to 2% of Operations & Maintenance Funding to pay for emerging, unforecasted must-pay bills.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress recommending approval to allow DoD the authority to carryover 2% of O&M funding for 1 year.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army

### **Corporate Processes (continued):**

**Title:** Streamline Administrative Coordination Process

**Description of Initiative:** The role of the line versus staff within the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to be clarified where the line has the authority to make decisions and the staff provide advise and counsel. Inculcating this “culture” within the Department complements the Freedom to Manage Act of 2001, where the President and SECDEF have asked Congress to trust them in making decisions at the lowest levels possible. Similarly, the current volatile environment is placing increasing demands upon the Department and warrants a significant streamlining of our staffing processes.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** SECDEF sign and send a “culture” memo to all members of the Department. The Business Initiative Council functional/process boards evaluate the coordination processes, with special emphasis on reduced cycle time and accelerated decision making, and make policy and process changes, as needed.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force

## **Acquisition Management Processes:**

### **Title: Streamline Contract Close-out Process**

**Description of Initiative:** Initially close-out 400 plus physically complete cost contracts, under \$1M and that are at least nine years old. Using lessons learned, develop new business practices within the contract closeout community.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DCMA assesses what is required to administratively close 400 plus contracts.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DCMA

### **Title: Streamline Clinger-Cohen Implementation**

**Description of Initiative:** Develop a process for the appropriate implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act while avoiding the duplication of existing acquisition processes and oversight.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Change the DoD 5000.2-R and associated CIO/C31 documents to enable streamlined procedures that satisfy Clinger-Cohen.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy

### **Title: Eliminate Excise Tax on DoD Tactical Vehicles**

**Description of Initiative:** Request authorization of exemption by the Treasury Department from paying the Federal Retail Excise Tax (FRET) on all military and tactical-wheeled vehicles, above 33,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight, which is currently required under Title 26 United States Code, Section 4051.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** SECDEF sign memo to SECTREAS, authorizing exemption from this tax.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (Mr. Don Messer & Mr. Jim Woodford)

## CHANGES TO 14 SEPTEMBER 2001 BIC PRINCIPALS' DECISIONS

### People Processes:

**Title:** One-Time Clearance of Priority Placement for Scientific & Engineering Positions

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, eliminate unnecessary delays being experienced in the hiring of hard to fill scientific and engineering positions by allowing for a one-time clearance of the Priority Placement Program (PPP).

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Change DoD policy to allow one-time clearance of PPP for scientific & engineering positions, by revising PPP regulations and providing implementation guidance.

**Approved Actions:** BIC Agrees to pursue modification of DoD PPP regulations to allow for one-time clearing for scientific & engineering positions. Implement as a one-year test, partner with OUSD (P&R) to establish the universe to be included, (8XX series positions, excluding technicians and Public Works/Civil Engineering). During this test phase, establish metrics to assess unintended consequences, both good and bad. If the results are positive, expand the program incrementally to cover all occupations. Retain provisions to alter the program, in response to significant workforce redirection events.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVFACSYSCOM Director of Civilian Personnel Programs)

**Title:** Modify 180-Day Waiting Period to Hire Retired Military

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, encourage highly qualified retired military personnel to pursue civil service careers by having OSD (P&R) authorize Service Secretaries to delegate waiver authority within the components.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DoD authorize re-delegation of waiver authority to the services.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to request re-delegation authority from OSD (P&R). Hold approved BIC initiative in abeyance. Restrictions are waived as the result of "Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom". As the current authorities are withdrawn after Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom", the BIC initiative will run for 12 months. During this period, partner with OSD (P&R) to establish comparative baselines to evaluate the affect of the variables.

Baseline one: # employed with Dual Comp restriction

Baseline two: # employed with Dual Comp lifted

Baseline three: # employed after Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, but with  
Implementation of BIC Initiative

Comparative Analysis will then demonstrate if there is significant differences using the variables and would lead one to assess if there are arbitrary bars to efficient operations

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Directorate of Personnel Force Management)



**Title:** Manpower Mix Management Flexibility

**Description of Initiative:** OSD allow the Services to make the most efficient use of civilian/contract personnel without predetermined constraints/expectations.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** OSD eliminate civilian full-time equivalent targets from DoD programming guidance.

**Approved Actions:** MP Board draft a memo for DEPSECDEF signature, addressing the entire Department and stating that “Federal law dictates that all civilian employees shall be managed solely on the basis of the available workload and not civilian end strength or full-time equivalents”.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

**TAB**

**E**

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)	Mr Aldridge	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Army	Mr White	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Navy	Mr England	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Air Force	Dr Roche	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of	Lt Gen Carlson (on behalf of Gen Pace)	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001

August 13, 2002 10:06 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: ROEs

I do think we have to get a team of people who can think and write on the subject of ROEs. This is really unacceptable to have them this unintelligible.

Please let me know who you are going to put on it and when you think they'll be back to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-9




Please respond by 08/20/02

*385*

*13 Aug 02*

U00497 / 03

August 13, 2002 10:20 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings

976

Let's make sure we get Richard Armev and other people invited down to brief them on WMD.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
081302-12



Please respond by 09/06/02

13 Aug 02

U00498 / 03

August 13, 2002 1:51 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Special Forces as Trainers

I want someone to do a study to see how we could stop having Special Forces people be trainers all over the world. Why can't the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines become trainers?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-13

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*Response attached*

Larry Di Rita

*322*

*13 Aug 02*

U00499 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6156

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800



PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
AND EVALUATION



INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *SC*

SEP 16 2002

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces (SOF) as Trainers

- You requested a study on how could we stop having SOF be trainers all over the world (TAB A).
- Training of foreign forces in de-mining, counterdrug, peacekeeping, and other conventional operations are current SOF missions that could be conducted by the Services or component commands.
  - Combatant commanders often prefer having SOF perform these missions because of their regional expertise, cultural orientation, and language skills.
  - Ongoing SOF missions that could be assumed by the Services or component commands include:
    - Training of the Afghan national and Georgian armies.
    - Training of local forces for peacekeeping operations in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and other nations.
- In support of the FY04-09 program review, PA&E has asked SOCOM to identify SOF missions/tasks that could be performed by conventional forces or federal agencies outside DoD.
  - Results will be reported to the Deputy Secretary within the next several weeks in a forum that will include the Service chiefs.
  - The SOCOM assessment also will examine "first right of refusal" options which would enable SOCOM to pick and choose training opportunities.

COORDINATIONS: SOCOM

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Eric Coulter (b)(6)

*SiK -  
I'll push Gen Holland  
very hard in the  
program review.  
SC*

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559 OSD/6157

August 13, 2002 2:50 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Terrorist Networks

I think the suggestion that you add the terrorist networks into the briefing is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081302-16



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*000.5*

*13 Aug 02*

U00502 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6158



~~TOP SECRET~~

August 13, 2002 2:53 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
  
SUBJECT: Sudan and CW

Attached is a report from 29 August 1998. I suggest you read pages 4 and 5, particularly.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/29/02 Special Intelligence Report, "Sudan: Evidence of CW Activities at the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant and Links to Usama Bin Ladin"

DHR:dh  
081302-17

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*SUDAN*

*13 Aug 02*

U00503 / 03

~~TOP SECRET~~ 59

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

August 14, 2002 7:41 AM

TO: <sup>MARC THIESSEN</sup>  
~~Torie Clarke~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Humanitarian Assistance

Here is some good humanitarian assistance data to be used in a future opening statement.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/14/02 CENTCOM Daily Report

DHR:dh  
081402-2

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*092*

*14 Aug 02*

## G. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM MAZAR-E-SHARIF CONTINUES RECONSTRUCTION OF SULTAN RASIA GIRLS SCHOOL. IN SECTION A OF THE MAIN BUILDING, GLASS HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN SOME OF THE FIRST FLOOR WINDOWS. THE SECOND FLOOR CLASSROOMS AND HALLWAY HAVE BEEN PAINTED. IN SECTION B, PLASTERWORK CONTINUES ON THE FIRST FLOOR. THE CONCRETE ROOF OF THE FIRST SECTION HAS CURED AND THE WOODEN FRAMEWORK USED TO SUPPORT THE WET CONCRETE FOR THE MIDDLE SECTION ROOF IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

2. COALITION JOINT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE (CJCMOTF) HAS COMPLETED 58 OF 118 APPROVED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS USING OVER \$1M IN OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN DISASTER AND CIVIC AID (OHDACA) FUNDS. THESE PROJECTS SUPPORT REDEVELOPMENT IN 10 PROVINCES AND INCLUDE 4 MEDICAL, 38 SCHOOLS, 1 ROAD/BRIDGE, 9 WATER/WELLS, AND 6 OTHER PROJECTS. CJCMOTF IS CURRENTLY EXECUTING 3 EXCESS PROPERTY PROJECTS AND 57 OHDACA PROJECTS THAT INCLUDE 10 MEDICAL, 20 SCHOOLS, 4 AGRICULTURAL, 2 ROADS/BRIDGES, 16 WATER/WELLS AND 5 OTHER

August 14, 2002 2:00 PM

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calendar

*ADVANCE COPY 6/02*

*628 SD*

Please put on my calendar for August 21 that I can start taking a sauna.

Also make a note that (b)(6) is going to be coming to see me. She needs an appointment tomorrow, Friday and Monday, before I leave town next week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081402-3



Please respond by 08/14/02

*19 Aug 02*

August 14, 2002 2:00 PM

TO: Arlene  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Dr. Burton

*ADVANCE COPY  
GIVEN*

*400.112*

Did we ever send a check from the foundation to Dr. Burton's research that I agreed to do?

Also, you should probably tell Dr. Baxter, if it is true, that we have only received one billing for Dr. Burton's trips down here. My recollection is that this was his third trip, so we ought to check and see that we get the bills.

Also, we need to pick a date for Dr. Burton to come and take a look at me again sometime between September 4 and September 7, between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. The sooner we set it the better for him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081402-4




Please respond by 08/16/02

*19 Aug 02*

U00507 / 03

August 15, 2002 7:13 AM

TO: Torie Clarke  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Communications Group

311

No more meetings for me with the communications group. They go right out to the press. Other people here can meet with them, but I don't think I should. They give all their advice to the press instead of us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-3



Please respond by 09/06/02

15 Aug 02

August 15, 2002 10:15 AM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MoD Ivanov in Warsaw

*Russia*

There is no need for me to see Sergei Ivanov alone in Warsaw. I will have just seen him here in Washington.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-8

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

*15 Aug 02*

snovflake  
01/12  
12/02

August 15, 2002 1:28 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Monthly SEC Meetings

2002

I would like to go over to the Senior Executive Council meetings the third Thursday of every month, from 12:00-12:45 p.m.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
081502-15

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Done  
8/20  
LDR*

15 Aug 02

11-L-0559/OSD/6166

U00513 / 03



August 15, 2002 3:47 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Calendar Session

*Abstract Copy Given*

*620 SD*

I need a calendar session on Monday without fail—preferably Friday or Saturday—on each of the topics concerning the Crawford visit.

I need to see the briefings people plan to give, so I can make sure they are the way I want them—that includes Korea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-18

.....  
Please respond by 08/16/02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 16 2002

*15 Aug*

*SECDEF —*

*Have sessions scheduled for Friday PM, Saturday, Monday and Tuesday.*

*15 Aug 02*

U00515 /03

*Intent is to send read aheads (after you have approved) to Crawford on Monday.*

11-L-0559/OSD/6167

*V/Ref*

August 15, 2002 3:50 PM

*Done 10/18*

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AQ Khan

*15 Aug 02*

What do you think we ought to do about the AQ Khan issue?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-19



Please respond by 09/06/02

*15 Aug 02*

U00516 /03

August 15, 2002 3:52 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: POAC

Let's not call it the POAC anymore. Why don't we call it the Pentagon Athletic Facility (PAF) or the Pentagon Athletic Club (PAC). It is not for officers only.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-20

Please respond by 09/06/02

*Settled -*  
*Done*  
*DHR*

*8/19* **SECDEF HAS SPOKE**  
AUG 20 2002

*SecDef -*  
*- Officially, it is the Pentagon Athletic Center. People call it POAC out of habit.*  
*- I met with the planners for the new facility to discuss fee structures, etc (your note next under.) W/ advise.*  
*name is Physical Fitness and Readiness Facility.*  
*D. Rita*

*8/2/02*

*Larry Di Rita*

*9/9*

11-L-0559/OSD/0169

U00517 / 03

2532

15 Aug 02

2116 showlake  
22860

3:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 13, 2002  
SUBJECT: **POAC**

Someone ought to look at the economics of the POAC. When they move the facility, they may want to rearrange who is allowed to go there, and what the different fees are.

The fees ought to be different for people who are active duty as opposed to retired. Retired ought to pay more, in my view. I want to know what the economics are.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
071302.09

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/6170



# The Renovator

A Pentagon Renovation Program Newsletter



Vol. 7, No. 2

Mar/Apr 2002

## FIT TO WIN!

### The Pentagon Physical Fitness & Readiness Facility

It is time for the Pentagon Athletic Club (PAC) to get in shape! This spring, the Pentagon Renovation Program will begin construction of the new Physical Fitness and Readiness Facility (PFRF), replacing the existing 58-year old PAC. Acting PFRF Project Manager, Bob Pizzano, says that the new facility is long overdue. Pizzano joined the PAC in 1974 and twenty-eight years later, the facility is beginning to show its age. The PAC has never undergone a major renovation since opening in 1945.

"Physically, it simply doesn't meet today's sports medicine standards or space requirements," says Pizzano.

Dennis Williams, PAC Program Manager, agrees. "We have new equipment but we don't have enough space to bring it in." Williams also sites the age of the facility as a constant challenge in terms of operations. "The cost, in terms of man-hours, to maintain this facility is extremely high and increases as the building gets older."

Dr. Manal Ezzat, Army Program Manager, echoes these sentiments. "From a facility standpoint, the building systems, like the HVAC are inefficient. A fitness facility



*An artist's conceptual rendering of the indoor running track and basketball courts that will be included in the new Physical Fitness and Readiness Facility (PFRF).*

needs to be in an environment that is healthy for its users."

Mark Gravalles, PFRF Design Manager, is confident that everyone will be extremely pleased with the finished product. "The PAC doesn't have enough space for new equipment, yet new equipment is necessary to bring us up to military base facility standards. When the new PFRF is completed, these concerns will be a thing of the past."

The PFRF will be built to accommodate the expected ten percent

increase in membership over the next two years. The PAC, a 78,000-square-foot facility, currently supports about 2,000 members per day. The new facility will be more than 50-percent larger, supporting up to 8,000 members per day. The new 120,000-square-foot facility will be located at basement level underneath and adjacent to the Pentagon's Mall Terrace.

The spacious fitness center will boast several new areas, including two multi-purpose rooms, one for badminton and volleyball courts, the other for aerobics and stationary bikes. There will also be courts for squash, handball and racquetball. An indoor running track will be an eagerly

*(continued next page)*

showfile  
2/1/02  
0800

August 15, 2002 4:00 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Richard Perle

2312

We have to get Richard Perle in soon. You ought to get him in and work out a plan whereby before he gets briefing from people we have some sense of what it's going to be. We need to make sure someone has seen it before it is given, that we clean out the room so we have a lot fewer people, and that people stop leaking.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-22

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*Done* 8/23  
LARRY DI RITA

8/19  
~~Perle.~~  
Please place a call for me. He's travelling, so you want get him right away.  
Thanks.  
*[Signature]*

15 Aug 02

August 15, 2002 4:23 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Briefing on Iraq

*DR*

Please let me know when that briefing with Tenet has taken place on the Al Qaeda connection with Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-24



Please respond by 08/20/02

*15 Aug 02*

282

Dave

August 15, 2002 4:25 PM

413.77

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: GPS Jammers

You are going to get back to me on the GPS jammers. I am concerned about them, if Russia is selling them to Iraq. You seem to feel it's not much of a problem

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-25

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

15Aug02



August 15, 2002 4:46 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: File Meetings

I need a session to go through Doug Feith's file with him before I leave town next week, preferably Saturday.

I also need sessions with Giambastiani, Cambone and Di Rita (if he gets back).

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-30

337

.....

Please respond by 08/19/02 SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 16 2002

8/16

- Feith file review ~~shed~~ scheduled for Saturday.
- Cambone or I will work file on Saturday depending on any other Saturday pop ups.

*VR*  
*EF*

15 Aug-02

August 16, 2002 7:08 AM

350.00015D

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: September 11 Speech

In my remarks on September 11, I think the focus should be about the American people, as we discussed yesterday. You may want to mention that it really is an inspiration to see the way these folks have finished the building. It is an inspiration to see how the American people have responded.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081602-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

16Aug02

August 16, 2002 7:37 AM

322

TO: Newt Gingrich  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR  
SUBJECT: Tom Clancy

Thanks for your note about the Clancy book. I have just finished reading it. Carl Stiner is a good friend and was in charge of looking after me when I was Middle East envoy for President Reagan.

That is an interesting thought you have, but I suspect that is a long time off!

Regards,

DHR:dh  
081602-5

16 AUG 02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

AUG 16 2002

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 14, 2002 4:37 PM  
**To:** (b)(6); Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil;  
**Cc:** Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; Herbits1@aol.com  
**Subject:** for secdef-post sec idea

for secdef  
from newt 8/14/02

I believe in long range planning. The following is for 2009 when you and Bush leave office.

I am doing a review of Tom Clancy's book with Carl Stiner on special forces and it occurred to me that you should seriously consider a post government memoir with Clancy. He would give you a dramatically bigger audience, earn you a fair amount of money, give you an excuse to be on television explaining transformation and national security and help you organize your thoughts and express them in an easy to access and easy to understand manner.

August 16, 2002 12:48 PM

D4D

TO: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bradley Graham

Please tell me who Bradley Graham covers. Does he cover CIA or State Department?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081602-10



Please respond by 08/20/02

16Aug02

U00529 / 03

showfile  
8/16/02

August 16, 2002 2:00 PM

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Senator Graham

If Senator Graham is in town, I think I probably ought to meet with him and talk to him about this Under Secretary for Intelligence. Please see if he is in town. If so, let's set up a meeting before I leave town. If he is not in town, then I think we ought to set up a meeting for immediately after I return.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081602-11

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

Settels  
Dore

LARRY DI RITA

~~SECRET~~

Graham is not in town while you're here. Will set up a meeting with him after you return.

8/16

350.09

16 Aug 02

11-L-0559/08005130 / 03

W/R  
Ed

*Done*

August 16, 2002 2:06 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Hot Pursuit

We ought to get a point paper for us to talk about hot pursuit when we are down in Crawford on August 21.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081602-13



Please respond by 08/20/02

*YEMEND*

*16 Aug 02*

August 17, 2002 10:11 AM

000.71SD

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: LTG ABizaid

Please explain to me why I never see General Abizaid in any meetings, for any reason, ever.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-2



Please respond by 08/20/02

17Aug02



11-5-1200



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600  
EXTREMELY SENSITIVE - LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

2002 JAN 10 PM 3:18

SECDEF HAS SEEN

ACTION MEMO

JAN 11 2002

January 10, 2002, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*  
*1/10/02*

SUBJECT: Talking Points - Walker

- On Saturday, January 5, you and the Attorney General agreed to make a joint recommendation, and asked me and Larry Thompson (the Deputy AG), to prepare a memo for that purpose.
- Immediately thereafter, I spoke with Thompson and Adam Ciongoli (The Attorney General's special counsel) about this task. They recommended that a memo not go, but rather that they should prepare talking points for our review.
- When we did not receive their talking points, I prepared a set of talking points, which we sent to DOJ for their review and comment.
- We received DOJ's revisions last evening. The talking points at Tab A reflect their changes and represent the coordinated position of the Department of Justice and me.
- If you agree with the Attorney General that Walker should be transferred, DOJ would like Walker's first arrival in U.S. territory to be in the Eastern Judicial District of Virginia (i.e., he should fly into a northern Virginia airport).
  - If you approve, you and the Attorney General will communicate your decision to the President.
  - If *you* approve, I will ensure CENTCOM and DOJ coordinate the transfer. I have warned the Deputy Attorney General that you likely will require reimbursement for costs of the transfer if done by DOD.

RECOMMENDATION: The Attorney General and I recommend that you transfer control of Mr. Walker to the Attorney General for prosecution in a federal district court.

Approve *WJ* <sup>JAN 11 2002</sup> Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As Stated

SPL. ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>1/10</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>1/11</i>
MA BUGGI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/10</i>

## EXTREMELY SENSITIVE - LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

**There are three principal options for dealing with John Walker: Military Prosecution, Federal Criminal Prosecution, and Continued Detention. Pros and cons follow.**

### ● MILITARY PROSECUTION

- A military prosecution of a U.S. civilian otherwise not associated with the U.S. Military could be based on a violation of Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) "aiding the enemy" or on violations of the law of war.

#### *PROS*

- There is some limited historical precedent for the military trial of such persons under the antecedent Articles of War (replaced in 1950, by the Uniform Code of Military Justice -- UCMJ)
- Article 104 of the UCMJ -- "Aiding the Enemy" -- provides for the death penalty as do, potentially, violations of the law of war.

#### *CONS*

- No U.S. civilian has ever been prosecuted under Article 104 of the UCMJ and no U.S. civilian has been prosecuted under the antecedent Articles of War provision since the Civil War.
  - A court may conclude that Walker, a civilian, did not have sufficient notice that his conduct would be punishable under the UCMJ. However, by engaging in military combat against the U.S., Walker should not be able to deny that he was on notice that his actions were inherently military and wrong.
  - A court might also conclude that the absence of any military prosecutions of U.S. civilians over the last nearly 140 years, at least with respect to Article 104, precludes a UCMJ trial on a theory of due process or desuetude (disuse).
  - Post Korean Conflict U.S. Supreme Court case law raises the question as to whether such a civilian is amenable to a military prosecution.
- Much of the evidence as to Walker's conduct is derived solely from his statements. Under the Military Rules of Evidence, an admission or confession may be considered as evidence only if independent evidence has been introduced that corroborates the essential facts admitted.

**EXTREMELY SENSITIVE - LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION**

• **FEDERAL CRIMINAL CHARGES**

- Based upon the facts currently available, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is considering two principal charges - providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations (128 U.S.C. 2339B) and providing material support to terrorists (18 U.S.C. 2339A).

***PROS***

- DOJ is confident of the above case against Walker based on the evidence it already has.
- Unlike the Military Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Evidence (which would govern in a federal criminal trial) do not require independent corroboration of a defendant's admission or confession.
- There is no legal question about the ability to try Walker, as a U.S. citizen charged with federal crimes, in Federal District Court.
- The federal statutes allow for more flexibility than the UCMJ in defining the nature of the support provided.
- If convicted of providing material support to a terrorist organization, Walker could receive a life sentence without parole.
- Prosecution in federal court for these crimes still permits DOJ to charge additional crimes, including treason, based on newly discovered evidence.

***CONS***

- For any charges brought under 18 U.S.C. 2339B, the government would need to connect all of Walker's support to al'Qaida or HUM (a terrorist organization primarily involved in the conflict in Kashmir) because the Taliban is not a designated foreign terrorist organization.
- For any charges brought under 18 U.S.C. 2339A, the government would need to prove that Walker knew his support would be used in furtherance of terrorist acts. In addition, any charges under this section for Walker's conduct in Afghanistan would have to focus on his activities after October 26, 2001.

## EXTREMELY SENSITIVE - LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION

### ● CONTINUED DETENTION

- The Geneva Conventions and customary laws of war allow an individual captured during a time of hostilities to be detained until the cessation of hostilities. The United States has the option of detaining Walker until then.

#### *PROS*

- Currently, the facts do not support a federal criminal prosecution on the most serious charge - treason. While DOJ can continue to develop a treason case at the same time it was trying Walker on other charges, investigators would enjoy greater flexibility if such an investigation preceded any charges being brought.
- If the ultimate decision was to try Walker before a court-martial, continued detention would provide the military with an opportunity to determine whether the facts support a prosecution for violations of the law of war and to strengthen its case for a charge under Article 104.
- Notwithstanding that DOJ is confident in the strength of its case, if the DOJ tries the case, relying upon the facts currently available, and they do not obtain a conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit the government from retrying Walker for the same offense. He could, however, be retried for other offenses based on new information, but not for offenses of which he was acquitted.

#### *CONS*

- Continued detention without charges increases the likelihood that Walker's parents' lawyer will file constitutional challenges to Walker's detention. Litigation of collateral issues brought on Walker's terms (and potentially Walker's choice of forum) would distract and hamper prosecutorial efforts by either DOJ or DoD and diminish one of the primary advantages we have to set the litigation's terms.
- Public speculation about Walker will only increase with continued detention and no charges.
- The duration of detention would be subject to judicial review. The Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (probably not applicable, but a relevant measure nonetheless) requires that detainees be released upon the "cessation of hostilities."

**EXTREMELY SENSITIVE - LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION**

- The U.S. could hold Walker in detention for an extended period of time, and investigators might not develop stronger facts to support prosecution. Depending upon how much time has passed, it may then be difficult to prevail in a trial because the defendant may claim that he was prejudiced by the passage of time because he could no longer locate witnesses favorable to his case.
- Delay would also shift focus onto the government's conduct in detaining Walker, distracting focus from Walker's own conduct, especially harming to a prosecution built heavily on Walker's statements.
- This certainly would be subject to early litigation, perhaps the first non-traditional litigation associated with the conduct of the war. We would prefer that our first cases would be ones of our own choosing, ones that involve defendants that provoke no sympathy, and ones that offer the prosecution the strongest cases.

**RECOMMENDATION**

Because DOJ has a strong case based on the evidence it already has, because a military prosecution necessarily entails significant collateral litigation hurdles, and because the risks of continued detention probably outweigh any benefits from such detention, we recommend that Walker be prosecuted on federal criminal charges as soon as possible.

January 14, 2002 2:17 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Disposition of Walker

I agree that eventually the Department of Justice ought to get Walker. I just wonder if the Department of Justice knows we can keep him for a while, and maybe there will be some cross-referencing and some additional information that would help their case.

I am curious to know what the rush is.

Thanks.


Attach.  
01/10/02 GC Action Memo to SecDef, Walker [U00533/02]

DHR:dh  
011402-50

.....

*Please respond by* 01/16/02

January 14, 2002 8:06 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Walker

I don't really care what happens to Walker at this stage. I know he is going to go to the Department of Justice—the question is when.

He is on the USS BATAAN, and the military doesn't want him anymore. We could put him in Guantanamo Bay until we are absolutely certain we are not going to get anymore information about him or from him, or we could just give him to DoJ now.

Please come up with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011402-5

.....  
*Please respond by* 01/15/02

11-L-0559/OSD/6189

August 17, 2002 12:39 PM

TO: Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: August 22 event

Please put this land trust event on August 22 on the calendar as optional.

Thanks.

Attach.  
22 August Taos Land Trust Benefit

DHR:dh  
081702-5



Please respond by 08/19/02

*Sir,*  
*Done,*  
*Col B*  
*8/20*

*020 SD*

*17 Aug 02*



RECEIVED  
AUG 15 2002

Joyce -  
This just arrived  
in the mail.

**Artists Include:**

If you're  
interested,  
let me  
know +  
I'll take  
care of the  
RSVP +  
payment.

NP  
8-16-02

*KC Benson, Suzanne Betz, John Bosshard Fine Furnishings,  
Angie Coleman, Bob Cooley, John Farnsworth, Alyce Frank, Victor Goler,  
R.C. Gorman, Peter Hagen, William Heaton, Margaret Nes, Ken O'Neil, Peter Ophcim,  
Paul Pascarella, Margery Reading, Lloyd Rivera, Maria Romero, Teresa Swayne,  
Mimi Chen Ting, Jim Wagner, Thom Wheeler, Mary Dolph Wood,  
Zaplin-Lampert Gallery, Zoe Zimmerman*

Online preview starting August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2002 at [www.taoslandtrust.org](http://www.taoslandtrust.org)

**Auction preview & artists reception  
at the Farnsworth Gallery on August 16<sup>th</sup>, 2002**

**Taos Land Trust**

*invites you to our*

**2002 Art & Adventures Auction and Dinner**

**at The Old Blinking Light  
Thursday, August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2002**

*Proceeds will benefit the preservation of Taos Valley Overlook  
and other special lands in the Taos region.*


5:00 - 7:00 P.M.	Auction Preview, Silent Auction and Cocktails
7:00 - 8:30 P.M.	Live Auction
8:30 P.M.	Dinner Followed by Live Music (\$50/person)

**Taos Land Trust's**  
**Art & Adventures**  
**Auction and Dinner**  
*at the*  
**Old Blinking Light**

From Taos, take State Road 64 north to the intersection of State Roads 64, 522 and 150.

Turn right onto State Road 150.

The Old Blinking Light (OBL) is on the left-hand side across from mile marker #1.



**Benefactor Sponsors:**

	Bob & Linda Atiyeh	 HERITAGE TRUST COMPANY Of New Mexico
---	--------------------	---

**Participating Sponsors:**

Cid's Food Market
Tierras de Taos Title Company

**The Taos Land Trust's 2002 Art & Adventures Auction and Dinner**  
**Thursday, August 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2002**  
**at The Old Blinking Light, Ski Valley Road**  
**Dinner Reservation**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
 City: \_\_\_\_\_ State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone: ( \_\_\_\_\_ ) \_\_\_\_\_

- I/we would like \_\_\_\_\_ tickets for the dinner at \$50 per person  
 Enclosed is my check for \$ \_\_\_\_\_ made payable to Taos Land Trust.  
 Or, please charge my  VISA  MasterCard # \_\_\_\_\_  
 Amount: \$ \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Exp.: \_\_\_\_\_
- I regret I am unable to attend. Enclosed is my donation of \$ \_\_\_\_\_

*Space is limited so please RSVP by August 15<sup>th</sup>, 2002. For more information call (505) 751-3138.*

August 17, 2002 12:45 PM

370.61

TO: Rick Kisling  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Demonstrators

My daughter, (b)(6) as you know lives in Santa Fe. She said she was driving around the other day and saw a number of demonstrators with signs against Bush and Rumsfeld and other people. I didn't get many details.

You might want to be aware of that, and someone may want to check with her and see how many people it was, and whether it was just nothing or something. If it is something, we might want to keep that in mind as a possibility for Taos.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-6



Please respond by 08/20/02

17 AUG 02

August 17, 2002 1:52 PM

TO: Rick Kisling  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Misdirected Fax

Joyce received the attached fax for Mustafa Alhashani on her fax machine. She can't figure it out, and I can't figure it out. It is our fax number, but obviously that is not our name and I don't even know if we have a "Sentry" safe.

It could just be a mistake and probably is, but someone might want to look at it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/16/02 Fax from Sentry

DJR:dh  
081702-7



Please respond by 08/20/02

311

17 Aug 02

U00535 /03



World Leader in Fire-Resistant Security Storage

TO: Mustafa AlhashimiFAX: (b)(6)

We are pleased to provide the combination on record to your Sentry safe.

Your combination is: 15 - 70 - 04Serial number: 4222811

To operate your safe, please follow these steps:

1. Turn dial in either direction to 0.
2. Turn dial LEFT three turns and stop at 15.
3. Turn dial RIGHT stopping the second time on 70.
4. Turn dial LEFT and stop at 04.
5. Turn handle to open door (if no handle, pull door to open).

We hope this information will be of service to you. Thank you for choosing Sentry. If you need further assistance, please feel free to contact our Customer Service Department at (b)(6) (Monday - Friday 8am to 5pm).

**FOR SENTRY CUSTOMER SERVICE USE ONLY**

RELEASED BY: LP DATE: 8-16-02

Sentry Group • 882 Linden Avenue • Rochester, New York 14625 •

(b)(6)

Customer Service Fax: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6195

August 17, 2002 4:39 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Working with Europe

If the U.S. and Western Europe worked together, through our coordinated political and economic efforts we could do a great deal in the world towards stopping proliferation, reducing weapons of mass destruction and contributing to peace and stability—to the great benefit of all our people and, indeed, all the people of the world.

The fact that the U.S. and Europe are not in a cooperative mode today weakens us all. Europe, under the lead of France, seems often to want to be positioned away from us and toward an Iraq, a China etc. The effect is to weaken what we are trying to achieve politically and diplomatically, and leads to less success in countering proliferation and in stopping WMD and greater risk that the U.S. will end up having to use kinetic activity rather than diplomacy to achieve goals all our people will benefit from.

Let's talk about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-8

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*EUROPE*

*17 Aug 02*

U00536 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6196

8/22 showtake  
1600

EF2573

August 17, 2002 2:00 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*  
SUBJECT: Quartet

*Letty Di...*  
*7/9*

The next time you are hosting your quartet in Washington, you ought to invite me to meet with them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-9

.....

Please respond by *07/06/02*

*08/1/02*

*F41 ISP*

*8/20/02*  
→ SD  
I'll do it.  
The next  
Quad meeting  
is on Sept 3-4  
in Germany.  
Doug Feith

*17 Aug 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/6197

U00537 /03

FILED  
AUG 20 10:37

August 19, 2002 9:32 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: September 11 Speech

Please give some thought to the following:

On September 11, 2001 and shortly thereafter, we told the American people that the task ahead was complex, it would be long, it would be difficult, it would require all elements of national power, and it would be different from anything we had experienced previously. I pointed out that there would be times when we would see the activity visibly, as traditional military action, but that there would be other times when, like an iceberg, what was happening would not be visible on the surface.

When we explained that to the American people, I had every confidence that they had the judgment and the staying power to do everything necessary to support the global war on terrorism.

Today, one year later, we have made great strides in completing the repairs on the Pentagon and beginning to move the survivors who were displaced back in. That effort by the outstanding construction teams is an example of the fierceness and steadfastness of the American people. The emotionalism we feel today and the gratitude for that fierceness and steadfastness is a clear indication that the people of our country have what it takes to meet the difficult challenges ahead.

The emotionalism of this day, as we remember those who were lost, is a feeling of gratitude for the way our country has pulled together and the way the American people have once again demonstrated their courage and determination.

There are some thoughts for you to consider. Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-10

.....  
Please respond by 09/03/02

350.00 / STD

19 Aug 02



Snowflake

August 17, 2002 2:22 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Testimony

Here is Brent Scowcroft's op-ed piece against the war. I think you ought to look at comments Senator Hagel, Brent Scowcroft and Congressman Armev have made and address those issues when we fashion testimony, without mentioning them.

Thanks.

Attach.

Scowcroft, Brent, "Don't Attack Saddam," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2002

DHR:dh  
081702-11

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*IRAQ*

*17 Aug 02*

U00539 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6199

• Don't Attack Saddam

• Wall Street Journal  
• August 15, 2002

## Don't Attack Saddam

MAIL

By Brent Scowcroft

Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.

It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.

### Think Carefully

That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities -- notably the war on terrorism -- as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.

Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.

That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.

He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail -- much less their actual use -- would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.

Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority -- underscored repeatedly by the president -- is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.

The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive -- with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy -- and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.

11-L-0559/OSD/6200

Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.

But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.

Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict -- which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve -- in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.

Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.

If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.

### **No-Notice Inspections**

In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq -- any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive *casus belli* which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.

In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests -- including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.

Mr. Scowcroft, national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, is founder and president of the Forum for International Policy.

11-L-0559/OSD/6201

August 17, 2002 3:08 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Sovereignty

092

Please give me a note on that concept of sovereignty that you mentioned. I think it is a good idea.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-13



Please respond by 08/20/02

17 Aug 02

U00541 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6203

August 17, 2002 4:40 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: LTG Hagee

I spoke to General Hagee at 2:35 p.m. today and told him I had one or two more people I wanted to talk to, but that I was determined that whoever came in not be another Commandant of the Marine Corps, but a military leader who happens to also be Commandant of the Marine Corps—one who is determined to see the Defense Department pull together, determined to see that the Marine Corps is more mobile and more lethal, that the relationship with Naval aviation was linked tighter, not looser. I don't want the new Commandant to spend time with the retired community or the Hill working against the other Services and against the Department, but instead he must work with the retired community and the Hill so that the Department can be pulled together.

He said, "I would feel very comfortable doing that." I said, "Well, I want to assure you that if this goes forward, I will hold you to that." He said he would be delighted.

So, you can go forward, and we will get it over to the White House for the President. I should bring it up with the President on Wednesday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-16



Please respond by 08/20/02

*210 Memoranda (329)*

*17 Aug 02*

August 17, 2002 4:07 PM

TO: Speechwriters  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Very"

*358191 SD*

I almost never like to have the word "very" in a speech. I suppose it is okay if we are quoting someone. I think it weakens a sentence and a thought.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-17



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*17 Aug 02*

U00544 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6205

January 9, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: Senator Tom Daschle  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CODELs to Afghanistan

*Afghanistan*

I received a phone call this morning from Zal Khalilzad, the President's special envoy in Kabul. He said there have been five Congressional delegations in or scheduled to be in Afghanistan between January 6 and January 17.

There is no question but that activity is putting a significant demand on the limited U.S. forces and the small number of American Embassy people in Kabul.

We do need to work this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-10

*9 Jan 02*

August 17, 2002 4:09 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CMC

Maybe we ought not to talk to the <sup>*Gen Jurel*</sup> ~~Commandant~~ yet until we get the President's approval.

Please make sure General Hagee knows he can't talk about it until we get the President's approval.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081702-18

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

*Jim -  
Cdr S. - answered verbally  
8/19 to SD.*

*278 MANNERS*

*17 Aug 02*

U00545 /03



January 10, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Gen. Franks  
CC: GEN. MYERS  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lt. Col. Macgregor

Here is an article I just read on Lt. Col. Douglas Macgregor. You might want to look into him.

Thanks.

Attach.

07/28/97, Newman, *U.S. News and World Report*, "Renegades Finish Last"

DHR:dh  
011002-7

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*210 Army*

*105 can 02*

# Renegades finish last

A colonel's innovative ideas don't sit well with the brass

BY RICHARD J. NEWMAN

**T**he "Opposition Force" at the Army's National Training Center usually crushes the battalions that come to the desert canyons of Fort Irwin, Calif., to test their combat skills in mock battle. But when Lt. Col. Douglas Macgregor, commander of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, arrived for his turn in November 1993, he wasn't about to follow the usual script. He dispersed his troops more widely than usual. He took unconventional risks. At one point his moves anticipated the OpFor's tactics so adroitly that observers thought he had cheated. In a series of five battles, most units typically lose four, draw one; Macgregor won three, lost one, drew one—still the best showing since the Persian Gulf war.

Macgregor's performance at Fort Irwin would seem to make him a logical candidate for the Army's career fast track. Instead, the gulf war veteran, who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, has been sidelined. The Army promoted him to colonel but this summer, for the third time, refused to put him in command of a combat brigade—a key step on the path to general. Next year will be his final chance. Many colleagues say that Macgregor's unconventional thinking—reflected in a book he has just written, *Breaking the Phalanx*—may have doomed his Army career. And they worry that in passing over soldiers like Macgregor—"the best war fighter the Army has got," says one official at the NTC—the Army is showing it prefers generals who are good at bureaucratic gamesmanship to ones who can think innovatively on the battlefield.

*Breaking the Phalanx* explains many of the theories that helped Macgregor defeat OpFor. The key is that combat units must react much faster to keep pace with the flood of data that new information technology is making available. Divisions of 18,000 soldiers are too cumbersome and have too many layers of command for modern warfare, Macgregor writes, and should be broken down into agile "combat groups" a third the size. Smaller units would also be harder to find and less susceptible to chemical and biological attack.

But the Army's Training and Doctrine Command has in mind a much more modest redesign of the Army's structure; their final plan, due next year, will very likely slim divisions down to about 15,000.

Patton II. Macgregor's career probably

hasn't been aided by a bluntness—some call it arrogance—that fetches comparisons with the combustible Gen. George S. Patton. When he took over the squadron that prevailed at the NTC, he complained that his predecessor, now an influential one-star general, had left undertrained troops and poorly maintained vehicles. But Macgregor, who declined to be interviewed for this article, has put his aggressiveness to good use on the battlefield. During the gulf war he was the squadron operations officer who essentially directed the Battle of 73 Easting, an early and telling encounter with an Iraqi Republican Guard unit. In a 23-minute burst of fighting, a troop of 10 U.S. tanks and 13 Bradley fighting vehicles destroyed nearly 70 Iraqi armored vehicles, with no "friendly" casualties.

Macgregor orchestrated the battle from a tank near the front, taking risks that could have been criticized had the fight turned ugly. He was so involved in the shooting that he didn't request artillery

support or report events to superiors until the battle was virtually over, according to one of his superior officers.

"In the peacetime Army, the emphasis is on being cautious, a good bureaucrat," says John Hillen, who was Macgregor's assistant during the gulf war and is now a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "A warrior is exactly the opposite."

If Macgregor does retire without ever commanding a brigade, history suggests he might still have some luck selling his ideas. Military theorist Basil Henry Liddell Hart was a young officer in the British Army in the 1920s when he began writing about the virtues of rapid mechanized attacks. His superiors were only mildly interested, and Liddell Hart retired as a captain in 1927. He continued to proselytize, however, and eventually his ideas were adopted by Heinz Guderian, the architect of the German blitzkrieg that swamped the French Army in World War II. At that point, the British saw the light.

DEFENSE NEWS

July 21-27, 1997

Pg. 44

## Shortage Forces U.S. Navy To Shift EA-6Bs Out of Asia

By ROBERT HOLZER  
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Facing a shortfall in available EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft, U.S. Navy officials have been forced to strip the volatile northeast Asia region of the specialized planes, military and defense industry sources said.

Facing unrelenting demands from the nation's overseas military commanders for EA-6B Prowler aircraft to be based in their region, Navy planners are relying on EA-6Bs aboard an aircraft carrier and a squadron based in the northwest United States, if an emergency develops in northeast Asia.

An EA-6B squadron has been based at the Iwakuni Air Base on Okinawa almost continuously since the late 1950s, according to defense industry sources. Usually this has been a Marine Corps squadron, but the Marine EA-6Bs have been withdrawn to meet a requirement

for electronic warfare aircraft to be based in Aviano, Italy, in support of NATO operations in Bosnia.

In addition, with the retirement of the Air Force's remaining EF-111 Raven electronic warfare aircraft by March 1998, EA-6Bs also will have to assume added missions at Incirlik, Turkey, and in Saudi Arabia, Navy sources said.

A three-plane Marine detachment now is at Incirlik. Mike Moss, spokesman for the commander of naval air forces in the Atlantic Fleet, said July 17.

"The Prowler is more in demand since the retirement of the EF-111," Moss said.

The U.S. Pacific and Atlantic commands have convened a meeting about how electronic warfare aircraft are apportioned among the overseas commanders. The meeting, scheduled for the week of July 14 at Whidbey Island, Wash., was expected to address schemes for better managing the scarce EA-6Bs

August 19, 2002 9:29 AM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Disability

*701*

My understanding is that when military officers get ready to leave the service, the doctors call them in, give them a checkout physical and tell them they are disabled, which they never knew. What they may be doing is comparing their hearing, eyesight, etc. to when they entered the military at age 21. They are going out at age 60 or 63, so if their eyesight is not as good, their hearing is not as good or something else, they call it disability.

That is not what the law meant. Anyone is going to have less hearing and less eyesight, regardless of whether they are in the military or anywhere else. More and more officers seem to be "disabled." I think we need to change the rules.

Please see me as to how we should handle this. Let's get the data on the number who go out "disabled."

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-3

.....  
Please respond by 9/20/02

*19 Aug 02*

August 19, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Abe Rosenthal

There was a good article by Abe Rosenthal in the *Washington Times* on August 19. You could use some of those arguments.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-4

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

*0817*

*19 Aug 02*

U00547 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6211

August 19, 2002 8:09 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Cruise Missile Memo

Please send a copy of the memo I sent to the President on cruise missiles down to Gen. Myers and Gen. Pace, and make sure Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith have a copy, since it is now almost in the paper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-5

.....  
Please respond by 08/20/02

*SIR.*

*8/20*

*ACTION COMPLETE.*

*N/R L*

*Alia Gray  
S. L.  
D. Dou  
VADM G*

*471.99*

*19 Aug 02*

U00548 / 03

August 19, 2002 8:38 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Bush Doctrine"

*008.1*

There is some good material in this Norman Podhoretz piece. You ought to take a look at some of the quotes from President Bush particularly. They are excellent and should be quoted.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Podhoretz, Norman, "In Praise of the Bush Doctrine," *Commentary*, September 2002.

DHR:dh  
081902-7



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*19 Aug 02*

# Commentary

September 2002

## SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

## In Praise of the Bush Doctrine

*Norman Podhoretz*

IT HAS been said—by me, among others—that George W. Bush bears a closer political resemblance to Ronald Reagan than to his father.

The first, and most obvious, similarity is that “Dubya,” like Reagan before him, was and still is very widely regarded as insufficiently intelligent or well-informed to be President. By now, the idea of Reagan as “the Great Communicator” is so entrenched that it has become hard to remember how frequently he was once ridiculed for being both inarticulate and an “airhead.” In his campaign against Jimmy Carter, for example, Reagan was always being charged with committing “gaffes” that allegedly showed the problems he had with the English language whenever there was no script for this former Hollywood actor to rely on. At the same time, such gaffes were said to reveal his haziness about the great issues, domestic and foreign, that as President he would have to confront. To the extent that he was even aware of these issues—government spending, taxes, the Soviet threat—his approach to them was invariably mocked as “simple-minded.”<sup>1</sup>

So too with George W. Bush. Beginning with the campaign that eventually landed him in the White House, he was, if anything, more relentless-

*NORMAN PODHORETZ is editor-at-large of COMMENTARY and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His new book, The Prophets: Who They Were, What They Are, will be published by the Free Press in November.*

ly ridiculed than Reagan for his difficulties with the English language no less than for his ignorance of the particularities and nuances of world affairs. That ample justification existed for dubbing Bush “Governor Malaprop,” as did one mercilessly documented assault written during the Republican primaries, Bush himself cheerfully admitted:

Well, a lot of folks don't think I can string a sentence together so when I was able to do so, the expectations were so low that all I had to do was say, “Hi, I'm George W. Bush.”

As for his ignorance of the international scene, there was—to cite only one item on a long list—Bush's inability to identify the new president of Pakistan. Of course, after September 11, he came to know the name of Pervez Musharraf only too well; and not knowing it before seemed to pose no obstacle to Bush in getting Musharraf to reverse alliances and help us topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

But if Bush was even more roughly treated than Reagan for his poor command of the language and his dimness about international affairs, where the

<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, in this respect among others Reagan was in the company of his old hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, of whom the great pundit of the day, Walter Lippmann, had written in his column in 1932, when FDR was first making a bid for the White House: “He is a pleasant man who, without any important qualifications for the office, would very much like to be President.” The friends of the young Roosevelt's wife, Eleanor, shared this view: their nickname for him was the “feather-duster.”

## COMMENTARY SEPTEMBER 2002

charge of "simple-mindedness" was concerned, the contest was too close to call.

True, Reagan's denunciation of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" evoked an outcry that was nothing short of hysterical from all the chancelleries and nearly all the private foreign-policy establishments in the world. Evil? What place did a word like that have in the lexicon of international affairs, assuming any enlightened person would ever dream of exhuming it from the grave of obsolete concepts in any connection whatsoever? But in the eyes of the experts, needless to say, Reagan was not an enlightened person at all. He was a "cowboy," a B-movie actor, who had by some freak of democratic perversity landed in the White House. In denouncing the Soviet empire as evil, he was charged either with signaling an intention to trigger a nuclear war or with being too stupid to understand that his wildly provocative rhetoric might do so inadvertently.

Bush hardly fared better. When, in his first State of the Union speech, he expanded on his definition of the war against terrorism and denounced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil," the reaction from the same types who had been so alarmed by Reagan was admittedly more scornful than hysterical; this time, there was no carrying-on about a nuclear war. But the air was just as widely pervaded with the old sneers and jeers at the "simple-mindedness" reflected by the very concept that some nations were evil and others good.

To make matters worse, there was the global situation that had developed since the end of the cold war. In a nutshell, America now commanded a degree of power greater than anything recorded in all of human history. No one doubted this; nor did anyone imagine that any other country or group of countries currently existed with the capacity, or the will, to challenge American power. In the past, when a single nation had achieved predominance, alliances would invariably be formed to balance it, but no such possibility could be discerned on the horizon at present or was likely to swim into view in the foreseeable future.

As the diplomats and the pundits saw it, this was not a happy circumstance but a dangerous one. Given its dangers, who but an ignoramus and a simpleton—or a religious fanatic of the very type with whom Bush was going to war—would resort to archaic moral absolutes like "good" and "evil"? And then, who but a fool could bring himself to believe, as Bush (like Reagan before him) evidently had done in complete and ingenuous sincerity, that the United States represented the "good"? Surely

only a virtual illiterate could be oblivious of all the innumerable crimes committed by America both at home and abroad—crimes that the country's own leading intellectuals had so richly documented in the by-now standard academic view of its history.<sup>2</sup>

**B**UT GEORGE W. Bush was following in Ronald Reagan's footsteps in more than just the vivid moral coloration of his rhetoric. In both cases, the colors were heightened by contrast with the drabness of the spiritual and/or ethical background against which they were being painted.

Thus, Reagan's unabashedly reverential attitude toward America stood in extreme contrast to the ambivalence felt, and manifested on more than one occasion, by his immediate predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Two of those occasions were Carter's speech about the "inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who shared in that fear," and the pathetic projection onto the American people of the "malaise" from which he himself was suffering. Most of all, there was Carter's conviction that this country had entered into a period of decline, together with his exhortation that we cultivate the "maturity" to accept this development, which was in his view both historically inevitable and not altogether bad.

So, too, with Bush and his predecessor, Bill Clinton. The youthful Clinton's distrust of American power—candidly set forth in the notorious letter he wrote to the draft board in seeking exemption from military service during the Vietnam war—persisted during his presidency. At that stage, it became the engine driving his many efforts to tie down this reckless Gulliver of an America with the ropes of "multilateralism." Bush, on the other hand, had not the slightest doubt that American

<sup>2</sup> The egregious Gore Vidal, always eager not to be outdone in the hate-America Olympics, made his bid in an interview about his latest book of essays: "I mean, to watch Bush doing his little war dance in Congress . . . about 'evildoers' and this 'axis of evil' . . . I thought, he doesn't even know what the word *axis* means. Somebody just gave it to him. . . . This is about as mindless a statement as you could make. Then he comes up with about a dozen other countries that have 'evil' people in them, who might commit 'terrorist acts.' What is a terrorist act? Whatever he thinks is a terrorist act. And we are going to go after them. Because we are good and they are evil. And we're 'gonna git 'em.'" Yet having disposed of Bush as "mindless," Vidal surprisingly contradicted himself and declared that the President was "an idiot himself." Rather, Bush was "convinced we are idiots. And we are not idiots. We are cowed. Cowed by . . . a skewed view of the world, and atrocious taxes that subsidize this permanent war machine. And we have no representation. Only the corporations are represented in Congress." Evidently Vidal realized belatedly that to emphasize Bush's stupidity would be to undercut his real point: that the President was actually "clever" enough to conceal his undying fealty to the oil interests and his "contempt for the American people."



## IN PRAISE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE

power was a force for good, and—as his European critics never tired of charging—he was more a “unilateralist” than a multilateralist.

To put the point more concretely, the rhetorical echoes of Reagan reflected a shared worldview that Bush was bringing up to date now that the cold war was over. What Communism had been to Reagan in that war, terrorism was to Bush in this one; and as Reagan had been persuaded that the United States of America had a mission to hasten the demise of the one, Bush believed that we had a mission to rid the world of the other.

Yet all this only revealed itself to Bush on September 11, 2001. Before the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, Bush—or so it seemed to me—had no clear conception of what he wanted to accomplish as President. “Compassionate conservatism,” the tag he had adopted for his approach to domestic affairs, sounded much like his father’s “kinder, gentler America.” And like the elder Bush’s slogan, the sons tacitly and unfortunately lent credence to the defamatory liberal charge that conservatives were a heartless breed whose greatest pleasure in life was grinding their heels in the faces of the poor while piling greater and greater heaps of gold into the coffers of the greedy rich.<sup>3</sup>

In foreign affairs, the pre-9/11 Bush seemed placidly content to be nothing more than the un-Clinton. True to his unshakable distrust of American power, Clinton had slashed our defenses, and he had endorsed a conception of “nation building” under which our military forces should primarily be employed to do international social work. The multilateralism about which he was so enthusiastic was in essence a euphemism for deference to that organization of despots, petty and grand, known as the United Nations. Furthermore, like the UN itself, Clinton had devoted a wildly disproportionate amount of energy to the Middle East; and he had invited the Palestinian dictator Yasir Arafat to the White House more often than any other world leader.

Reversing or nullifying all or most of these policies, as Bush apparently wished to do, would have been enough for many of us to experience, if not wild enthusiasm, then at least relief at his victory over Al Gore, who presumably would have carried on with them. But, again like his father, Bush was deficient in the “vision thing.” In foreign affairs, this meant that if he had a guiding sense of what the American role should be in the post-cold-war world, he never communicated it to the rest of us.

One can reasonably assume, however, that for

the first eight months of his presidency, Bush had no such sense, and that he had simply gone along with his father’s standard “realist” perspective. In that perspective, the maintenance of stability is a far more important, and more attainable, objective than the “idealistic” or “Wilsonian”—or, for that matter, “Reaganite”—ambition to change the world, especially with the aim of making it “safe for democracy.”

And then came September 11. In its immediate aftermath, a transformed—or, more precisely, a transfigured—George W. Bush appeared before us. In an earlier article in these pages,<sup>4</sup> I suggested, perhaps presumptuously, that out of the blackness of smoke and fiery death let loose by September 11, a kind of revelation, blazing with a very different fire of its own, lit up the recesses of Bush’s mind and heart and soul. Which is to say that, having previously been unsure as to why he should have been chosen to become President of the United States, George W. Bush now *knew* that the God to whom, as a born-again Christian, he had earlier committed himself had put him in the Oval Office for a purpose. He had put him there to lead a war against the evil of terrorism.

**B**USH OFFICIALLY declared this war in an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, in which he first enunciated the general terms and spirit of a new “Bush Doctrine.” He then expanded on the new doctrine in three subsequent pronouncements—the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002; his speech to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1; and the remarks on the Middle East he delivered three weeks later, on June 24. All four of these speeches were enormously impressive, though none of the three later ones quite made it to the heights of sublimity scaled by the first.

I have no idea how much of Bush’s own language entered into this text. Conceivably the whole thing was produced by his staff of speechwriters, and Bush’s only contribution was to sign off on it. But if so, it hardly matters: we are long past the era

<sup>3</sup> Here it was Bush more than Reagan who fit Walter Lippmann’s patronizing portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt, of whom Lippmann wrote in the same column I quoted above: “Franklin D. Roosevelt is no crusader. He is no tribune of the people. He is no enemy of entrenched privilege.”

<sup>4</sup> “How to Win World War IV,” February 2002. In that article, borrowing the illuminating terminology first adopted by the military analyst Eliot Cohen, I designated the cold war as World War III, and the war against terrorism as World War IV. I will stick with that terminology here.

## COMMENTARY SEPTEMBER 2002

when Presidents wrote their own speeches. What counts nowadays is the words a President permits to be put into his mouth. In speaking those words, he assumes responsibility for them, and thereby makes them his own as surely—well, almost as surely—as if he were their original author. This is what Bush did on September 20, in what—ironically, for the former “Governor Malaprop”—may well have been the greatest presidential speech of our age.

It was here that Bush’s conversion from a conventional “realist” in the mold of his father to a democratic “idealist” of the Reaganite stamp was announced to the world. Of the “global terrorist network,” he declared in a passage that deserves to live forever:

We have seen their kind before. They’re the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.

It was also in this speech that Bush broadened the object of the personal revelation I think he had been vouchsafed, so that it now spread its wings over the American people as a whole. If he had lacked “the vision thing” before, he had it now in spades. “Great harm has been done to us,” he mournfully intoned toward the end. “We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.” Then he went on to spell out the substance of that mission and that moment:

The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us. Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.<sup>5</sup>

But in his peroration, reaching back to some of the same language he had been applying to the nation as a whole, Bush reverted to the first person, and in a style that came close to sounding like a prayer:

I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for

freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.

All this was undergirded by an equally startling shift in strategic analysis. Every President before Bush—including his own pre-September-11 self—had treated terrorists as criminal individuals or as members of Mafia-like organizations to be dealt with by the police and the courts. But the post-September 11 Bush had come to understand that there would be no serious terrorism without state sponsorship.

From this recognition flowed a corollary: that it would be necessary to “starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.” More than that, we would henceforth rely on the military as much as or more than on the police

to pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

But novel and bold as this new strategic formula was, at bottom what gave the speech its greatness, and its power, was the incandescent moral clarity informing it. Indeed, so many people were struck by this quality that the term “moral clarity” soon became a cliché, if an inescapable one, much to the dismay and disgust of hordes of “advanced” thinkers and “sophisticated” commentators and diplomats both at home and abroad.

**I**N THE four months that elapsed between the speech of September 20, 2001 and the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, Bush made good on his threat that “The hour is coming when America will act.” After some missteps in the first few weeks, this country put on a display of military

<sup>5</sup> In this instance, and in the passage I quote just below, the echo was less of Ronald Reagan than of Winston Churchill, who declared as World War II was getting under way in 1940: “We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end.” And it is worth noting that Churchill, who had been the target of many derogatory epithets in his long career but who was never regarded even by his worst enemies as “simple-minded,” had no hesitation in attaching a phrase like “monster of wickedness” to Hitler. Nor did the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose mind was, if anything, over-complicated rather than too simple, have any problem in her masterpiece, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, with calling both Nazism and Communism “absolute evil.”

---

 IN PRAISE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
 

---

might in Afghanistan that astounded even those around the world who had been acknowledging through their incessant grumbling that America had become the sole remaining "superpower": as it turned out, even they had not known the half of it (and neither had many Americans).

The envy and the fear reinforced by this realization generated even more scorn than before over the talk of "good" and "evil" emanating from Bush. And such derision was rarely unaccompanied by complaints from our European allies, the UN, and others (including what is left of our own foreign-policy establishment) about American "unilateralism."

Perhaps worst of all from the point of view of his critics (whose ranks increasingly embraced not only marginal figures like Gore Vidal and his ilk in the literary and academic communities but many mainstream politicians and pundits) was the naming by Bush of that "axis of evil" in his January State of the Union address. Regimes like those in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, he declared, were "arming to threaten the peace of the world." And he continued:

By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

Bush had already pretty clearly indicated on September 20 that he had no intention of waiting around to be attacked again ("we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism"). But in his State of the Union speech in January, he became much more explicit about his intention to go beyond the fundamentally retaliatory operation we had launched in Afghanistan by strongly suggesting that we would also take preemptive action whenever it might be deemed necessary:

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.

To those with ears to hear, the State of the Union address should have removed all traces of ambiguity from the Bush Doctrine as originally enunciated on September 20. Yet there were many—once more, both at home and abroad—

who contended that the United States needed smoking-gun evidence of Iraqi involvement in 9/11 in order to attack Saddam Hussein, and to do unto his regime what we had just done to the Taliban in Afghanistan. As it happened, such evidence existed, even if it might not have been enough to secure a conviction in an American court of law or in the hypocritical tribunals of the "international community," not to mention the "Arab street."

Nevertheless, that particular issue was rendered moot by the codicil now tacked on to the Bush Doctrine. According to this codicil, Saddam's development of weapons of mass destruction sufficed all on its own to make him a legitimate target in a preemptive war of self-defense.

**T**HE FIRST pillar of the Bush Doctrine, then, was built on a rejection of moral relativism. The second stood tall on a reconception of terrorism as a problem involving states and therefore calling for a military response (along with other instruments of power, whether economic or diplomatic). And the third was the assertion of our right to preempt.

Strangely, that this right to preempt was a logical extension of the general outline Bush provided on September 20, and that it was articulated in the plainest of words in the codicil of January 29, went largely unnoticed. Until, that is, he reaffirmed it in the third of the series of major speeches defining the Bush Doctrine—the one delivered on June 1 at West Point to the 2002 graduating class of newly commissioned officers of the United States Army.

Perhaps the reason the preemption pillar finally became unmistakably visible at West Point was that, for the first time, Bush placed his new ideas in historical context:

For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the cold-war doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizen to defend.

This covered al Qaeda and similar groups. But Bush then proceeded to explain why the old doctrines could not work with a regime like Saddam Hussein's in Iraq:

Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.

## COMMENTARY SEPTEMBER 2002

Refusing to flinch from the implications of this analysis, Bush repudiated the previously sacred dogmas of arms control and treaties against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a means of dealing with the dangers now facing us from Iraq and other members of the axis of evil:

We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systematically break them.

Hence, Bush inexorably continued,

If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . [T]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.

But Bush did not confine himself in the West Point speech to questions of military strategy. He also reaffirmed—and even more defiantly in the face of the critics he had brought out of the woodwork—the universality of the moral purposes animating this war:

Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. . . . We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name.

Then, in a fascinating leap into the great theoretical debate of the post-cold-war era (though without identifying the main participants), Bush came down squarely on the side of Francis Fukuyama against Samuel Huntington:

The 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.

Having endorsed Fukuyama's much-misunderstood view of "the end of history," Bush now brushed off Huntington's rival theory of a "clash of civilizations":

When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of

civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes. . . . Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, in liberation they celebrate.

ALL THIS was fully consistent with the two previous speeches Bush had made on September 20 and January 29. But—a very big but—it was not consistent with the realities on the ground in the Middle East. In the Islamic world, and particularly the Arab countries (including such of our "friends" as Saudi Arabia and Egypt), mothers and fathers were *celebrating* Palestinian children (including their own) who blew themselves up as a way of killing as many Israeli Jews as possible.

Bush, again unlike his father, seemed to harbor no animus against Israel; and again like Reagan, he seemed to have a sense of kinship with the Jewish state. Nor did Bush evince the slightest indication of agreeing with the idea that we had been attacked by Osama bin Laden because we were too friendly to Israel. To those who held on to this idea for dear life, it made no difference that bin Laden himself had given it the lie by treating the issue of the Palestinians as relatively unimportant (which did not prevent those same Palestinians from dancing in the streets on September 11, along with millions of other Arabs in other countries who regarded him as a great hero).

But it did make a difference to Bush, who believed, as he said on September 20, that the terrorists hated us for "our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." On this premise, they must hate Israel for the same reasons. And in fact, Bush added, their wish "to drive Israel out of the Middle East" was only one element of their larger ambition "to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa."

Yet this short but accurate summary was compromised by the strangely discordant note that preceded it: "They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan." The problem here was not that Bush was wrong: al Qaeda and related Islamic terrorists most assuredly did want to over-

---

 IN PRAISE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
 

---

throw those governments. But the great sin of the Saudi regime in bin Laden's eyes had nothing to do with Israel: the sin was to have allowed infidel American troops onto soil sacred to Islam. Similarly, the rulers of Egypt and Jordan were guilty because they had aligned themselves politically with the United States, the "Great Satan."

By professing friendship for the United States, these three regimes had earned the sobriquet "moderate" in the West, no matter what else they did or failed to do that ill-consorted with such a characterization. None of the three governments mentioned by Bush, least of all Saudi Arabia, though with the partial exception of Jordan (which, however, had allied itself with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war), permitted its people any of the freedoms to whose prevalence in America the President had just attributed the hatred of us that had so horrifically exploded on September 11.

Moreover, the controlled and official state media in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were full of vitriolic attacks on the United States. To top it all off, the Saudis provided much of the financing for the *madrassas*, the religious schools in Saudi Arabia itself and throughout the entire realm of Islam in which students were indoctrinated with the very form of Islamic radicalism that bred in their young souls a seething lust for holy war and the "martyrdom" of suicide bombing. Small wonder, then, that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudi citizens, and that two of the others were Egyptians.

In spite of all this, the Bush administration was apparently determined to spare no effort in enlisting these regimes in its "coalition." Even more extraordinary was the courting of Syria and Yemen, both of which were on the State Department's own list of states that harbored and sponsored terrorism. How was it possible to reconcile such a policy with the President's declaration on September 20 that "any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime"?

The same question might have been raised in the case of Pakistan, which had supported both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and al Qaeda. But here it had been easy to reconcile the contradiction. For when, shortly after Bush's speech of September 20, the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan was persuaded to be "with us" militarily. No similar military rationale could be unearthed for the administration's kowtowing—no weaker word would do—to the Arab despots throughout the Middle East.

True, one heard much buzzing about all the help

the Saudis and the Egyptians were giving us. But the talk was empty. The Saudis vetoed any plan we might have to launch air strikes against Iraq from their territory, and would not even willingly cooperate in cutting off funds to terrorist groups. As for the Egyptians, the "intelligence" we were supposedly getting from them had no discernible value in the Afghanistan campaign, and they too opposed attacking Saddam Hussein. Nor did their controlled press let up on the anti-American (and anti-Semitic) filth that was a central component of the daily diet fed to its readers. While President Hosni Mubarak made soothing sounds in interviews with American and other Western papers, or when speaking privately to Washington, the editor-in-chief of his own government daily *al-Akbar* was inventing an "axis of evil" of his own that consisted of "Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld."

I was assured by people better informed than I that, while Saudi cooperation would be convenient for a military attack on Iraq, it would not be indispensable. If so, one was driven back to the hoary explanation of oil. Was it then the Texas oil interests, so disproportionately represented in the elder Bush's administration and still working behind the scenes in the younger's, that accounted for the contradictions between the President's words and his policy in this area? For reasons that will become clear in a moment, I could not bring myself to swallow this interpretation.

**B**Y FAR the starkest, and most puzzling, of the contradictions between Bush's words and his policy was the intransigent refusal of the administration to acknowledge that there was not a smidgen of difference between what the United States was doing in Afghanistan and Israel's acts of retaliation against the wave of suicide, or rather homicide, bombings that had been afflicting the country for nearly two years.

The low point was the President's announcement that "Enough is enough" in demanding that Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon immediately withdraw his forces from the West Bank, to which they had been sent in late March. Yet Sharon had sent them there for exactly the same reason ours had been dispatched to Afghanistan: in order to root out the terrorist infrastructure being harbored, trained, and financed in that area with the express purpose of killing as many citizens of his country as possible.

Admittedly, Bush never put teeth into his demand on Israel. Although he did not exactly give

## COMMENTARY SEPTEMBER 2002

Sharon a "green light," as the Arab world and its sympathizers charged, he did give him a flashing amber light in the form of a few more weeks: not enough to finish the job, but enough to make a dent in the terrorist infrastructure that had been built up under the Palestinian Authority (PA) over which Yasir Arafat presided. In due course, Bush also seems to have realized that there was something worse than incoherent—something almost crazy—in supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state run by Arafat and his henchmen. Why should America acquiesce, let alone help, in adding yet another state to those that harbored and sponsored terrorism precisely at a time when we were at war to rid the world of just such regimes?

It was, I would imagine, out of the inability to answer this question that a new idea entered and straightened out Bush's thinking: the PA had to be reformed in order to qualify for statehood. Yet even on the dubious assumption that reform of the PA was a viable project, the Palestinian issue was not isolated or autonomous. It had always been the instrument of the Arab/Muslim world as a whole: an instrument to be wielded against Israel and to distract the attention of the Muslim peoples from their grievances against their own rulers. This being so, there could be no peace between the Palestinians and Israel unless the region as a whole were to reconcile itself to the existence of a sovereign Jewish state in its midst and give up the dream of wiping it out once and for all.

Enter the de-facto Saudi ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah, who was among the first to perceive that, sooner or later, the logic of his war against terrorism would force Bush to confront and then act on this truth about the war against Israel. Grasping the point, and worried, too, about the unprecedentedly bad press his country was suddenly getting here, Prince Abdullah enlisted the eagerly docile services of Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times* to unveil a "peace plan" that would, he claimed, involve the acceptance of Israel by the entire Arab world.

But even if the Abdullah plan were more than a public-relations ploy (and a tactic calculated to turn Washington's attention away from Iraq), the contradiction was still left hanging between, on the one hand, Bush's unqualified endorsement of the craving of Muslims for "the same freedoms and opportunities" we enjoyed and, on the other, his courting and coddling of regimes that denied them such freedoms and opportunities.

It would seem that Bush had been snookered by the Saudis (no doubt with the complicity of his

Secretary of State, Colin Powell) into the delusion that "the road to Baghdad runs through Jerusalem"—that, in other words, the Palestinians had to be accommodated before Iraq could be attacked. And so, for several weeks, Bush lost his way. He dawdled through a series of meetings with the Saudi and Israeli leaders, issuing various statements after each encounter that deepened the bog of confusion into which he had sunk.

Gone was the moral clarity that had previously been granted to him, and with it went the sharpness of his strategic focus on Iraq. Bush had months earlier warned us that time was "not on our side": that Saddam already had a store of chemical and biological weapons and that (as confirmed by high-level defectors from Iraq) he was very close to developing nuclear ones as well. Yet here Bush was squandering large amounts of that precious time on a peripheral issue, and undermining what he had been trying to accomplish ever since the post-9/11 revelation of his mission as President of the United States.

Perhaps it was all this that accounted for the amazing paucity of media attention to his West Point speech. Yet that speech represented an attempt to regain the moral clarity Bush had temporarily lost (he even brought in the phrase itself), while integrating moral considerations more organically than before into the strategic imperative half-created and half-illuminated by this clarity.

**E**VEN THOUGH it hardly caused a stir, the speech (as we have already seen) succeeded beautifully in reaffirming and refining the ideas Bush had been advancing since September 20, 2001. What was even more important, it succeeded in concentrating the President's own mind. In the three weeks that elapsed between his West Point address and his remarks on the Middle East of June 24, Bush at last managed to achieve the same moral clarity about that region that had come to him about terrorism in general after 9/11.

Thus, having earlier become the first American President to endorse publicly the establishment of a Palestinian state, Bush on June 24 explained why he would not and could not stick by this endorsement unconditionally:

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure.

---

 IN PRAISE OF THE BUSH DOCTRINE
 

---

But accomplishing this required the election of "new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror" who would embark on building "entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy, market economics, and action against terrorism."

It was with these words that Bush brought his "vision" (as he kept calling it) of a Palestinian state that could live in peace alongside Israel into line with his overall perspective on the evil of terrorism. And having traveled that far, he went the distance by repositing the Palestinians into the larger context from which Arab propaganda had ripped them. Since this move was something else that passed almost unnoticed (though incidentally it was what led me to reject our dependence on Saudi oil as an explanation for how and why Bush had temporarily lost his way), it is worth dwelling on why it was so important.

Even before the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Muslim countries of the Middle East had been fighting against the existence of a sovereign Jewish state—*any* Jewish state—on land they believed Allah had reserved for those faithful to his prophet Muhammad. Hence hundreds of millions of Arabs and other Muslims, in control of more than two dozen countries and vast stretches of territory, had ranged themselves against a handful of Jews who then numbered well under three-quarters of a million<sup>6</sup> and who lived on a tiny sliver of land the size of New Jersey. But after 1967, by redefining the Muslim war against the Jewish state as one merely between the Palestinians and the Israelis, Arab propagandists succeeded brilliantly in transforming Israel's image from David to Goliath, thereby alienating the old sympathy it had enjoyed as an underdog.

Bush now reversed this reversal. Not only did he reconstruct a truthful framework by telling the Palestinian people that they had been treated for decades "as pawns in the Middle East conflict." He also insisted on being explicit about the nations that belonged in this larger picture and about what they had been up to:

I've said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually committed to peace will end incitement to violence in official media and publicly denounce homicide bombs. Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment, and recruits to terrorists groups seeking the destruction of Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah. Every nation committed to peace must

block the shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq. And Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.

**I**N THESE highly significant remarks, then, Bush rebuilt the right context in which to understand the Middle East conflict. Simultaneously he made a strong start in bringing not the Palestinian Authority alone but the entire Muslim world, "friends" and enemies alike, into his conception of the war against terrorism.

Most supporters of that war—and especially those among them who were friends of Israel—praised this speech. But more than a few pro-Israel observers criticized its renewed promise of a (duly reformed) Palestinian state as "rewarding terrorism" or even as reviving the discredited Oslo "peace process."

To the extent that these responses stemmed from the view that Bush's expectations were unrealistic, they could hardly be disregarded. The great Orientalist Bernard Lewis once quipped that to ask Yasir Arafat to give up terrorism was like asking Tiger Woods to give up golf; an analogous criticism was now leveled by Daniel Pipes and several other commentators at Bush's demands both on the Palestinian Authority and on all the other despots in the Middle East. Pipes summed up the case with his usual incisiveness:

Palestinian terrorism has caused terrible tragedies, but it is not the heart of the problem. Terrorism, after all, is but a tactic in the service of a war aim. That war aim—the destruction of Israel—is the heart of the problem.

In this short piece, Pipes did not apply the same point to the entire Muslim world, though he has often done so. Other commentators have also recognized the falsity of all the syrupy talk emanating from that world, in Western languages and for Western consumption, about the peace that could be reached if only Israel ended its "occupation"<sup>7</sup> and agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian state. But as is clear from what they say to one another in Arabic, neither the Palestinians nor their Muslim "brothers" have given up on the dream of

<sup>6</sup> Today, thanks to immigration and natural increase, the Jewish population of Israel is close to five million.

<sup>7</sup> To anyone who wonders why I put quotation marks around this word, I strongly recommend reading Efraim Karsh's eye-opening article, "What Occupation?," in the July-August 2002 COMMENTARY.

## COMMENTARY SEPTEMBER 2002

wiping Israel off the real map, just as they have already done in the maps they draw for the textbooks given to their children.<sup>8</sup>

**E**VEN THOUGH I am one of these commentators, I am still persuaded that Bush's remarks on the Middle East constituted a great breakthrough. "Whatever happened to the Bush Doctrine?" asked a critic of this speech. My answer is that in addition to the rejection of moral relativism, the holding of states responsible for the terrorists they sponsor, and the assertion of a right to pre-emption, it now includes a fourth pillar: namely, the assimilation of Israel's war against terrorism into our own. All four pillars together now comprise the Bush Doctrine, which—thanks to this newest addition—has become much more coherent than it was before, and consequently more solidly based.

This is not to say that the count is yet in on whether Bush will walk the walk as well as he has talked the talk. For example, shortly after the June 24 remarks, Bush and Powell were again meeting with the Saudis, the Egyptians, and the Jordanians, who all left feeling "reassured" when they should have been frightened. And there were other such episodes as well.

Yet even if Bush fails to match his deeds fully with his words, those words will exert an impact all by themselves. In many instances, Ronald Reagan's actions were not always precisely in harmony with his words: sometimes they fell well short of what the words promised, and sometimes they even conflicted with his declaratory policy. But as we have discovered from former dissidents throughout the "evil empire" of cursed memory, those words had a power of their own that enhanced immeasurably the weight of the missiles behind them.

In Afghanistan, Bush's walk matched his superb talk, in that he would settle for nothing less than a change of regime. But that, of course, was only the first step in a very long journey—and one that is still far from over even in Afghanistan. The second step will be a change of regime in Iraq—sooner rather than later, many of us hope and pray. When Saddam Hussein goes, the Iranian domino might also fall, toppled not by American military force but by the internal revolution already brewing there against the rule of the mullahs. To this revolution, Bush (though not his own State Department!) has given his blessing.

The best-case scenario is that Bush will eventually come to grips with the reality that Afghanistan and Iran are far from the only countries in the Middle East where "reform" is not enough to bring

about the actions he has called upon all of them to take. In other words, as in Afghanistan and Iran, changes of regime are the *sine qua non* throughout the region.

Obviously it would be foolish to anticipate an overnight conversion to democracy and free markets. But I would argue that what might realistically be expected is the creation of conditions that would point in that direction, while also clearing a path to the long-overdue internal reform and modernization of Islam. I have asked the question before<sup>9</sup> and ask it again now: why should Islam alone forever be exempt from the processes that affected Judaism and Christianity before it?

The regimes that richly deserve to be overthrown and replaced are not confined to the three singled-out members of the axis of evil. At a minimum, the axis should extend to Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as well as "friends" of America like the Saudi royal family and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, along with the Palestinian Authority, whether headed by Arafat or one of his henchmen.

There is no denying that the alternative to these regimes could easily turn out to be worse, even (or especially) if it comes into power through democratic elections. After all, by every measure we possess, very large numbers of people in the Muslim world sympathize with Osama bin Laden and would vote for radical Islamic candidates of his stripe if they were given the chance.

To dismiss this possibility would be the height of naiveté. Nevertheless, there is a policy that can head it off, provided that the United States has the will to fight World War IV—the war against militant Islam—to a successful conclusion, and provided, too, that we then have the stomach to *impose* a new political culture on the defeated parties. This is what we did directly and unapologetically in Germany and Japan after winning World War II; it is what we have indirectly striven with some success to help achieve in the former Communist countries since winning World War III; and it is George W. Bush's ultimate aim in World War IV.

There was a song that became popular in America during World War II: "We did it before, and we can do it again." What I am trying to say to the skeptics and the defeatists of today is that yes indeed we did it before; and yes indeed we can do it again.

<sup>8</sup> It is to the translations circulated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) that we owe what we have now learned about what appears in Arabic-language newspapers and television broadcasts, as well as what is preached by Islamic clerics in their weekly sermons. An archive can be found on [www.memri.org](http://www.memri.org).

<sup>9</sup> In "How to Win World War IV."



August 19, 2002 8:43 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Scowcroft and Brzezinski Pieces

*IRAO*

Here is the Scowcroft piece that we could respond to point-by-point without mentioning his name. Also attached is a Brzezinski piece, which is worth meeting each point of in the prepared testimony.

Thanks.

Attach.

Scowcroft, Brent, "Don't Attack Saddam," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2002.  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "If We Must Fight . . ." *Washington Post*, August 18, 2002.

DHR:dh  
081902-8



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*19 Aug 02*

Wall Street Journal  
August 15, 2002

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

## Don't Attack Saddam

AUG 19 2002

By Brent Scowcroft

Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.

It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.

### Think Carefully

That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities -- notably the war on terrorism -- as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.

Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.

That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.

He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail -- much less their actual use -- would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.

Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority -- underscored repeatedly by the president -- is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.

The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive -- with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy -- and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass

11-L-0559/OSD/6225 + what  
copy

destruction he possesses.

Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation. ✓

But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence. ✓ *wis II*

Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict -- which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve -- in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.

Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.

If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.

### **No-Notice Inspections**

In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq -- any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive casus belli which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.

In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests -- including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.

Mr. Scowcroft, national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, is

11-L-0559/OSD/6226

founder and president of the Forum for International Policy.

11-L-0559/OSD/6227

Washington Post  
August 18, 2002  
Pg. B7

## If We Must Fight . . .

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must then consider carefully the consequences of its actions, both for itself as the world's preeminent power and for the longer-term evolution of the international system as a whole.

The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction that Hussein is said to be producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a business and too unpredictable in its dynamic consequences -- especially in a highly flammable region -- to be undertaken because of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual assertions.

If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more responsible system of international security. Accordingly, several essential steps should be followed:

- (1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to the nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the specifics of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that the threat is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed as to why one member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing than the others. The president's case should also serve as the basis for serious and searching consultations with Congress and with key allies as well as other interested states.
- (2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central issue the world should be concerned about. Hence the focus of the U.S. concern must be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be surreptitiously seeking to produce in contravention of U.N. resolutions, and not on Saddam Hussein personally. Moreover, insofar as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive case also needs to be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer suffices. The frequently cited but essentially demagogic formula that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction (specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against either U.S. troops or Israel, both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter.
- (3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's compliance with the will of the international community. America's European allies would find it difficult not to go along with that approach, while Iraq's recalcitrance -- either by an outright refusal or by subsequent efforts to sabotage the inspection process -- would then provide a highly legitimate casus belli for military action.
- (4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become more active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by pressuring both sides. The current standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat has undone much of the progress achieved after Oslo by both Yitzhak Rabin and Arafat, while inflicting massive suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian people. In the absence of any serious effort by

11-L-0559/OSD/6228

the Bush administration to push the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk that a U.S. assault on Iraq will be perceived in the region (and probably also in Europe) as part of an American-Israeli effort to impose a new order on the Middle East without regard for either Iraqi or Palestinian civilian casualties.

(5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies as well as other concerned powers, including its Arab friends, regarding possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged collective security presence and plans for international financing of the social rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would also reinforce the credibility of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a nonviolent resolution of the issue proves to be impossible.

It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America to initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly:

(1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by the president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without regard for either American or global public opinion.

(2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or demagoguery, with some of it encouraged by parties with a strategic interest in fostering American-Arab hostility. Particularly disturbing in that regard has been the news report that some members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board have been pushing, in addition to war with Iraq, a confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations.

(3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept international rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many in the world to justify any subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel, even with a weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous example for the world of an essentially Darwinian international system characterized by sudden, preemptive attacks.

War should be waged with meticulous attention paid to minimizing civilian casualties, especially given the widespread view abroad that U.S.-sponsored sanctions have already badly and unfairly hurt the Iraqi population.

Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is the character of the international system and the role in it of what is, by far, the most powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people should ignore the fact that America's enemies will, whatever happens, do everything possible to present the United States as a global gangster. Yet without a respected and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could be in serious jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in determining when, in what circumstances and how it acts as such in initiating the use of force.

*The writer was national security adviser to President Carter.*

11-L-0559/OSD/6229

August 19, 2002 8:55 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ruth Wedgwood Piece

*015*

Here is an excellent piece by Ruth Wedgwood.

Thanks.

Attach.

Wedgwood, Ruth, "World Criminal Court a Slippery Slope for US," *Boston Globe*, August 10, 2002.

DHR:dh  
081902-9

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*15 Aug 12*

U00551 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6230



Before you hit the books...



SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

THIS STORY HAS BEEN FORMATTED FOR EASY PRINTING

## World criminal court a slippery slope for US

By Ruth Wedgwood, 8/10/2002

THIS HAS BEEN a season of friction with our European allies. In the debut of the international criminal court and in the post-Sept. 11 debate over Guantanamo detainees, a number of continental companions-in-arms have doubted our good faith, hissing with a post-Cold War pique. It's easy to tell when you're no longer wanted, in an age of folded nuclear umbrellas.

Some domestic observers of the Bush administration have shown the same disdain. As case in point, one may cite the views of Abner Mikva and Anthony Lake, recently expressed in these pages. Judge Mikva served with distinction as President Clinton's White House counsel. Lake was national security adviser.

But Washington's commitment to a robust war against terrorism and worries about a roving international court are not an abandonment of "our most basic national ideals." White House mugwumpery is plausibly explained by a grounded concern about US national security interests.

First, consider the International Criminal Court. Mikva and Lake argue that we are "defaulting on our basic beliefs" in opposing the use of a criminal sledgehammer to audit the actions of American soldiers and political leaders.

It was sensible policy to propose special-purpose United Nations tribunals to punish the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

Since the mid-1990s, both courts have worked overtime to craft a common international procedure and present proof against the mountebanks who organized those massacres.

The trial of Slobodan Milosevic is underway in The Hague. But the design of a court for all times and places is a far more intricate task. Many areas of the law of armed conflict are unsettled and remain the center of debate on



the appropriate mixture of efficacy and restraint.

It is dangerous to abandon our effectiveness in battle out of risk-averse lawyering. Of course we should always be shocked at the violence of war. But armed force will sometimes be needed to protect our vital interests and shared moral standards against determined spoilers.

Belgrade's use of brickbats in the Kosovo campaign shows how a misappropriation of the law of war can be used as a weapon by a shameless adversary. At the outset of the NATO campaign to stop Belgrade's "ethnic cleansing," Milosevic ran to the 50-year-old International Court of Justice in The Hague, filing a civil suit to charge that the full range of NATO's tactics were illegal.

The United States escaped on jurisdictional grounds, but allies are still in the dock.

The International Criminal Court would raise the stakes yet further, permitting adversaries to fling criminal charges against individual members of the military, demanding criminal investigations as a way of changing the subject.

The abstract norms of the law of war sound clear enough. No deliberate attacks on civilians, and no disproportionate harm to civilians in the pursuit of a military objective. But there is disagreement on what is a civilian object, and what is undue harm. Standard tactics of our military missions have been hotly disputed by nongovernmental organizations.

To disable Milosevic's tanks and armored personnel carriers, we attempted to cut off Serbia's fuel supplies. To shut down antiaircraft radar, we disabled Kosovo's electrical grid. To keep the nationalist leader from maintaining tactical flexibility in deployment, we bombed the bridges over the Danube.

Each of these posed hardships for Serb civilians. But the war aim was to keep hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians alive and to protect them from losing their lives and homes in Sloba's irrational spasm of ethnic cleansing after Rambouillet.

The touted treaty safeguard of "complementarity" says that the international criminal court will step in only if the United States is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out an investigation and prosecution at home.

But that is no safeguard in the disputed areas of military doctrine. By definition, we will not prosecute a pilot or a commander for employing tactics that we believe are lawful.

The open desire to "progressively develop the law means that International Criminal Court judges will be urged to measure American military actions against standards that we have not accepted."

Indeed, consent has been abandoned even for jurisdiction. The recent debate over peacekeeping was ignited, ironically enough, by Europe's desire to have the court become a roving substitute for the United Nations Security Council, targeting the citizens of countries whose governments have rejected the treaty.

This third-party power grab, though cloaked in sheep's clothing, is the cause of Washington's attempt to make plain that we are serious in disputing the pretensions of a court too big for its treaty-britches.

There are methods of renewing American cooperation with our allies against the world's brutal dictators. The ICC prosecutor, once appointed, should make clear the priority of using the court to quell massacres, for swearing the temptation to use it as a substitute for NATO headquarters. The treaty parties could put forward one or more military lawyers as judges for the new bench, to make clear that the court's deliberations will include some understanding of the fog of war.

But the United States had every right to make clear that it would not join a court or treaty that even President Clinton thought was not ready for ratification. Manichean melodrama doesn't change that fact.

The second issue is the detention of fighters captured in Afghanistan as "unlawful combatants." Victory in war requires that one vanquish the adversary's soldiers. Once they are captured, there is a lawful right to detain them as combatants until active hostilities are over. This is a familiar prerogative under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary law as well.

Combatants are not detained as criminals, but rather to keep them from returning to the fight. It is a simple misapprehension to suppose that every person detained at Guantanamo as a combatant has to be put on trial for war crimes or else released.

Deciding that Al Qaeda and the Taliban do not qualify as a lawful fighting force is a profound question appropriately remitted to the highest level of responsibility.

The president's legal and factual finding was recently affirmed by Federal District Judge Tim Ellis III, in the pretrial motions surrounding the John Walker Lindh case.

Contrary to the belief of Lake and Mikva, the term "unlawful combatant" is a familiar term, stemming from the Supreme Court's decisions in World War II, with roots in the earlier Brussels, Hague, and Geneva treaty conferences.

Over time, we may need to have some procedure for review of the status of Guantanamo detainees. These combatants can't be "demobilized" in the way of conventional wars. Many were embarked on jihad and do not follow earthly authority. But one can reexamine periodically whether their attitude has changed and consider any reasons why they may no longer be a threat.

Our commitment to humane values must remain absolute, even in fighting the nation's wars. But this is not the same as naivete. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross have talked openly of the need to adapt the law of armed conflict to a new set of problems. We face a new kind of terrorist network with a taste for weapons of mass destruction, and must work hard to create fair standards in countering the threat.

But a dismal dyspepsia and moral hauteur are not always helpful in meeting the intellectual challenge of a new kind of war.

**Ruth Wedgwood**, a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins universities, is a member of the secretary of state's advisory committee on international law.

This story ran on page A15 of the Boston Globe on 8/10/2002.  
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

August 19, 2002 9:19 AM


TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Ruth Wedgwood

334

What about putting Ruth Wedgwood on the Defense Policy Board? She is certainly good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-10



Please respond by 09/06/02

19 Aug 02

U00552 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6235

August 19, 2002 9:21 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Ruth Wedgwood Piece

What about sending this Ruth Wedgwood piece from me to all the defense ministers I ever deal with—or maybe all of them in the world, within reason?

Thanks.

Attach.

Wedgwood, Ruth, "World Criminal Court a Slippery Slope for US," *Boston Globe*, August 10, 2002.

DHR:dh  
081902-11

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

615

19 Aug 02

U00553 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6236



Before you hit the books...



SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 19 2002

THIS STORY HAS BEEN FORMATTED FOR EASY PRINTING

## World criminal court a slippery slope for US

By Ruth Wedgwood, 8/10/2002

THIS HAS BEEN a season of friction with our European allies. In the debut of the international criminal court and in the post-Sept. 11 debate over Guantanamo detainees, a number of continental companions-in-arms have doubted our good faith, hissing with a post-Cold War pique. It's easy to tell when you're no longer wanted, in an age of folded nuclear umbrellas.

Some domestic observers of the Bush administration have shown the same disdain. As case in point, one may cite the views of Abner Mikva and Anthony Lake, recently expressed in these pages. Judge Mikva served with distinction as President Clinton's White House counsel. Lake was national security adviser.

But Washington's commitment to a robust war against terrorism and worries about a roving international court are not an abandonment of "our most basic national ideals." White House mugwumpery is plausibly explained by a grounded concern about US national security interests.

First, consider the International Criminal Court. Mikva and Lake argue that we are "defaulting on our basic beliefs" in opposing the use of a criminal sledgehammer to audit the actions of American soldiers and political leaders.

It was sensible policy to propose special-purpose United Nations tribunals to punish the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

Since the mid-1990s, both courts have worked overtime to craft a common international procedure and present proof against the mountebanks who organized those massacres.

The trial of Slobodan Milosevic is underway in The Hague. But the design of a court for all times and places is a far more intricate task. Many areas of the law of armed conflict are unsettled and remain the center of debate on

the appropriate mixture of efficacy and restraint.

It is dangerous to abandon our effectiveness in battle out of risk-averse lawyering. Of course we should always be shocked at the violence of war. But armed force will sometimes be needed to protect our vital interests and shared moral standards against determined spoilers.

Belgrade's use of brickbats in the Kosovo campaign shows how a misappropriation of the law of war can be used as a weapon by a shameless adversary. At the outset of the NATO campaign to stop Belgrade's "ethnic cleansing," Milosevic ran to the 50-year-old International Court of Justice in The Hague, filing a civil suit to charge that the full range of NATO's tactics were illegal.

The United States escaped on jurisdictional grounds, but allies are still in the dock.

The International Criminal Court would raise the stakes yet further, permitting adversaries to fling criminal charges against individual members of the military, demanding criminal investigations as a way of changing the subject.

The abstract norms of the law of war sound clear enough. No deliberate attacks on civilians, and no disproportionate harm to civilians in the pursuit of a military objective. But there is disagreement on what is a civilian object, and what is undue harm. Standard tactics of our military missions have been hotly disputed by nongovernmental organizations.

To disable Milosevic's tanks and armored personnel carriers, we attempted to cut off Serbia's fuel supplies. To shut down antiaircraft radar, we disabled Kosovo's electrical grid. To keep the nationalist leader from maintaining tactical flexibility in deployment, we bombed the bridges over the Danube.

Each of these posed hardships for Serb civilians. But the war aim was to keep hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians alive and to protect them from losing their lives and homes in Sloba's irrational spasm of ethnic cleansing after Rambouillet.

The touted treaty safeguard of "complementarity" says that the international criminal court will step in only if the United States is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to carry out an investigation and prosecution at home.

But that is no safeguard in the disputed areas of military doctrine. By definition, we will not prosecute a pilot or a commander for employing tactics that we believe are lawful.

The open desire to "progressively develop the law means that International Criminal Court judges will be urged to measure American military actions against standards that we have not accepted."

Indeed, consent has been abandoned even for jurisdiction. The recent debate over peacekeeping was ignited, ironically enough, by Europe's desire to have the court become a roving substitute for the United Nations Security Council, targeting the citizens of countries whose governments have rejected the treaty.

This third-party power grab, though cloaked in sheep's clothing, is the cause of Washington's attempt to make plain that we are serious in disputing the pretensions of a court too big for its treaty-britches.

There are methods of renewing American cooperation with our allies against the world's brutal dictators. The ICC prosecutor, once appointed, should make clear the priority of using the court to quell massacres, for swearing the temptation to use it as a substitute for NATO headquarters. The treaty parties could put forward one or more military lawyers as judges for the new bench, to make clear that the court's deliberations will include some understanding of the fog of war.

But the United States had every right to make clear that it would not join a court or treaty that even President Clinton thought was not ready for ratification. Manichean melodrama doesn't change that fact.

The second issue is the detention of fighters captured in Afghanistan as "unlawful combatants." Victory in war requires that one vanquish the adversary's soldiers. Once they are captured, there is a lawful right to detain them as combatants until active hostilities are over. This is a familiar prerogative under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary law as well.

Combatants are not detained as criminals, but rather to keep them from returning to the fight. It is a simple misapprehension to suppose that every person detained at Guantanamo as a combatant has to be put on trial for war crimes or else released.

Deciding that Al Qaeda and the Taliban do not qualify as a lawful fighting force is a profound question appropriately remitted to the highest level of responsibility.

The president's legal and factual finding was recently affirmed by Federal District Judge Tim Ellis III, in the pretrial motions surrounding the John Walker Lindh case.



Contrary to the belief of Lake and Mikva, the term "unlawful combatant" is a familiar term, stemming from the Supreme Court's decisions in World War II, with roots in the earlier Brussels, Hague, and Geneva treaty conferences.

Over time, we may need to have some procedure for review of the status of Guantanamo detainees. These combatants can't be "demobilized" in the way of conventional wars. Many were embarked on jihad and do not follow earthly authority. But one can reexamine periodically whether their attitude has changed and consider any reasons why they may no longer be a threat.

Our commitment to humane values must remain absolute, even in fighting the nation's wars. But this is not the same as naivete. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross have talked openly of the need to adapt the law of armed conflict to a new set of problems. We face a new kind of terrorist network with a taste for weapons of mass destruction, and must work hard to create fair standards in countering the threat.

But a dismal dyspepsia and moral hauteur are not always helpful in meeting the intellectual challenge of a new kind of war.

**Ruth Wedgwood**, a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins universities, is a member of the secretary of state's advisory committee on international law.

This story ran on page A15 of the Boston Globe on 8/10/2002.  
© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

August 19, 2002 11:27 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pre-emption

*381*

You may want to look up and see what Sir Thomas More said about pre-emption.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-19



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*19 Aug 02*

U00554 / 03

August 19, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Threats

*7/19/02*

To those who say, "Let sanctions work," on Saddam Hussein, the answer is they haven't worked. To those who say, "Use diplomacy," the answer is there are times when diplomacy doesn't work. Diplomacy was tried on Hitler and it failed, with millions dead as a result.

Some threats are transnational. Weapons of mass destruction are one example. Some countries have said and done things that indicate their intent. Iraq is one.

The U.S. goal was to have weapons of mass destruction gone from Iraq. They are still there.

Ultimately, we will all be judged by our actions and whether or not we did what was necessary to deal with that danger.

DHR:dh  
081902-22

*19 Aug 02*

August 19, 2002 4:39 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Draft Testimony

It is time to get a draft of possible testimony for Congressional hearings on Iraq for mid-September.

Get the right people working on it. Take the Scowcroft, Hagel, Brzezinski, and Lugar arguments—cluster them and develop responses, use historical references where appropriate. We ought to be very generous in our comments about the arguments against. Some have validity. For example, there are risks—if the President decides to do it, the U.S. could get bogged down. There are risks that it will cost money. There are risks that it will take a long time after regime change. There are risks that a post-Saddam regime may not be perfect.

*DR*

Many of the arguments have some truth, but there are also risks in delay—the risks of not acting. Eagleburger’s argument is that “eventually we will have to deal with Iraq,” but he is “not convinced we need to right now.” That argument needs to be addressed frontally. What would it take to convince him? And if not now, when—when is the regime stronger, today, or as he builds his forces with each passing day?

Using questions is a good technique. Eagleburger says we don’t have our allies on our side. Well, Churchill didn’t have his allies on his side, either, in the pre-World War II period. But he was right and those opposing him were wrong. That others

*19 Aug 02*

U00556 / 03

may not be onboard doesn't make it wrong. There is a pattern of countries being wrong.

Eagleburger says "I see no indication that it has really been thought through." To those who say that, it seems to me the answer to them is, "What would you like—a complete explanation as to every aspect, so that Saddam Hussein has it all before him?"

The argument is we must explain it to the American people. That is fair enough. We should explain what can be explained, but laying out war plans and making predictions that aren't knowable would not be wise.

Congressional committees right now are trying to connect the dots from pre-9/11. If the U.S. fails to act, can you imagine the committees that will be trying to connect the dots as to why we failed to act and gave Saddam Hussein the time he needed to use his weapons.

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt started to try to move the country, the country was against him and yet he provided leadership for the U.S. to help the UK. Should he have waited until everyone agreed?

NOTE: Please try to figure out a good analogy like the "garden hose: analogy for lend lease that Roosevelt used. There must be a good one.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-24

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

August 19, 2002 2:13 PM

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: Honorable Henry Kissinger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Meet the Press

Joyce and I watched you on "Meet the Press." You did well, and I appreciate you doing it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-25

000.77

19 August

U00557 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6245

August 17, 2002 2:22 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Testimony

*IRAQ*

Here is Brent Scowcroft's op-ed piece against the war. I think you ought to look at comments Senator Hagel, Brent Scowcroft and Congressman Armev have made and address those issues when we fashion testimony, without mentioning them.

Thanks.

Attach.

Scowcroft, Brent, "Don't Attack Saddam," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2002

DHR:dh  
081702-11



Please respond by 09/06/02

*17 Aug 02*

U00539 / 03

• Don't Attack Saddam

• Wall Street Journal  
• August 15, 2002

## Don't Attack Saddam

MAIL

By Brent Scowcroft

Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.

It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.

### Think Carefully

That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities -- notably the war on terrorism -- as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.

Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.

That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.

He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail -- much less their actual use -- would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.

Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority -- underscored repeatedly by the president -- is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.

The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive -- with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy -- and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.

11-L-0559/OSD/6247



Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.

But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.

Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict -- which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve -- in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.

Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.

If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.

### **No-Notice Inspections**

In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq -- any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive *casus belli* which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.

In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests -- including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.

Mr. Scowcroft, national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, is founder and president of the Forum for International Policy.

11-L-0559/OSD/6248

August 19, 2002 2:04 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: 28 April 2003 Laird Youth Leadership Day Conference

237

Here is this note from Mel Laird. I told Mel I thought it was about an 80 percent chance I could try to do it. He is going to go ahead and list me in the program.

Please put it down on the calendar. We will have to let him know as early as possible if it looks like I cannot.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/05/02 Laird ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
081902-28



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

19 Aug 02

MELVIN R. LAIRD  
Suite 212  
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036-3120

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

August 5, 2002

AUG 19 2002

(Via FAX - Confirming copy to follow with sample programs and background information)

Dear Rummy:

Your participation as Keynote Speaker for the Nineteenth Laird Youth Leadership Day Conference being held Monday, April 28, 2003, on the campus of the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, will be greatly appreciated. As pointed out to you in our conversation this past Friday, your contribution will be tremendous. The theme of this year's conference is "*Proud to be an American.*"

Your appearance as Secretary of Defense with these outstanding high school students, will receive a great deal of attention. It was over thirty years ago that I outlined my plan to change the Selective Service System by instituting the lottery, ending the draft, and establishing the All-Volunteer Service at a Laird Day on this very campus. All of these personnel goals were accomplished during my over four years at DoD. There will be a portion of this "*Proud to be an American*" program reporting on the success of the All-Volunteer Service. As its so-called "father", I am, of course, prejudice. My respect and admiration for the wonderful people in the Department of Defense, the Services, and independent agencies is well known, even before taking over as Secretary of Defense from my nine-terms on the House Defense Appropriations Committee.

Laird Youth Leadership Day originated almost 50 years ago. During my service in the Congress, the Laird Youth Leadership Foundation sponsored these leadership conferences and multiple college scholarships. The program was continued while serving as Secretary of Defense for over four years, Counsellor at the White House and now with my service at the Reader's Digest. This youth program was initiated to bring together recognized federal, state, and local experts at each conference for discussion with two junior and two senior students elected from each of the high schools located in my Congressional District. These student delegates report to their student bodies, service clubs and other organizations following this conference. Because of the unanimous positive response to the experience gained from all conference participants, this biennial event has been continued through the years.

Recent conferences have expanded the base of students to include high schools from all over central and northern Wisconsin, which coincides with the major drawing area for the University's enrollment. In addition, the Laird Youth Leadership Foundation has granted over 360 college scholarships to outstanding high school students. This program has been financed by me through my personal contributions and with honorariums received over the years.

Enclosed are some of the previous programs to give you an idea of the events of the day. Last year former Governor Lee Dreyfus was honored by the University and did a magnificent job as keynote speaker. Every Secretary of the Department of HEW/HHS, including Donna Shalala,

cc to D. Rummy  
M-L-0559/OSD/6250

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
August 5, 2002


John Gardner, Tommy Thompson, Wilbur Cohen and Elliot Richardson, has keynoted this conference. Other distinguished Americans such as Former President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Larry Eagleburger, John Deutch, Elizabeth Dole, Shirley Hufstедler and Lamar Alexander, have also been among our keynoters. My Democratic friends, all the way from Congressman Dave Obey, ranking member of House Appropriations, to Wisconsin's Attorney General Jim Doyle, continue to be resource leaders on an almost regular basis.

Along with you as noon keynote speaker, we will present in separate smaller workshop sessions during the morning and afternoon, seven or eight nationally-known discussion leaders who will exchange views with the students on vital issues challenging our nation and the world. At each of these conferences, the keynote speaker is the luncheon speaker. My suggestion would be for you to make a 20 to 25-minute presentation to the well over 400-elected student delegates from these over 100 high schools. Each school will also have present one faculty adviser. A short informal question and answer session with the students could follow your talk, if you so desire.

Thank you, Rummy, for your enthusiasm over this invitation. It is good to spend time with these young high school students from time to time. They are our future as well as the future for the All-Volunteer Service.

With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Melvin R. Laird

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Enclosures: Several Laird Youth Leadership Programs  
Laird Center Dedication Brochure, *Bench Marks*

P.S.: The Stevens Point airport will take jet aircraft service and is within five minutes of the luncheon program you will keynote at the University of Wisconsin. You may combine this trip with an Illinois appearance or an appearance on the West Coast. You would be present for the luncheon and at least a twenty-minute presentation at the luncheon. In all you can count on not much more than an hour and a half out of your busy Monday travel schedule. I realize you will be combining this appearance with a busy travel schedule, but it does not hurt to spend some time in America's Heart Land.



# FAX

Number of pages including cover sheet 3

Date 8/5/02

**TO:** *The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld*

(b)(6)

**Phone** (b)(6)  
**Fax Phone**

**FROM:**

(b)(6)

**Phone** (b)(6)  
**Fax Phone**

**CC:**

**REMARKS:**  Urgent  For your review  Reply ASAP  Please Comment

Dear (b)(6)

Attached is the letter we spoke about on the telephone. As you suggested, I will send the original letter along with the sample programs and background information via Federal Express. Thanks for your help.

*Kathy*  
Kathy Weaver  
Executive Assistant to Melvin R. Laird

cc: Larry & Rita

August 19, 2002 2:29 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO

NATO 337

I think we ought to keep trying to find opportunities to mention my connection to NATO as a former Ambassador and our support for NATO. We are getting pounded in Europe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-32



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

19Aug02

EF262 LA  
02 / 012287

August 19, 2002 3:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO

I think we ought to find ways to connect here in Washington with the NATO countries that are helpful to us. I ought to see the key people from those countries if you, Paul or the Chairman are meeting with key officials here in the Pentagon. Even a quick drop by can make a difference.

Possibly we ought to get a group of them in for lunch sometime or give them a briefing, for example give the WMD briefing to the ambassadors here.

Thanks. ▲

DHR:dh  
081902-33

.....  
Please respond by 09/13/02

8/22/02  
→ SD  
I'll discuss this w/JD Crouch and take care of it.

Doug Feith

01 IN

NATO 337

*Handwritten signature*

August 19, 2002 3:34 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: E-mail to Newt Gingrich

*You suggested learning the lessons of Chechnya. It is a good idea, but rather than bringing folks here I think we may have some U.S. officers from the Foreign Military Studies Office or the Center for Army Lessons Learned go to Russia to meet with them.*

*Regards.*

DIR:dh  
081902-34

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Tell Don f*  
*✓ DOISE* *↑*

*D.H.*

U00563 / 03

*RUSSIA*

*19 Aug 02*



August 19, 2002 3:36 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: C-130s

Please get on top of this C-130 matter, coordinate it and get it pushed the right way.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/16/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: C-130 sales  
Undated USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: C-130 sales

DHR:dh  
081902-35

.....  
Please respond by 09/20/02

*4522*

*19 Aug 02*

July 26, 2002 2:59 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge  
Dov Zakheim  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

Colin Powell's response to my memo on C-130 sales is attached. Please tell me what I ought to think about it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/25/02 SecState ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
072602-12

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 19 2002

*2/17*

*Aldridge + Zakheim responses attached. V/R Ed*



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN


AUG 19 2002


August 16, 2002, 11:50 AM



INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Response to your question on C-130 Sales 

- I fully agree with Pete Aldridge's comments to you on this matter (attached).
- I would add, however, that license-free export to defense ministries in NATO, Japan and Australia does not cover the range of "friendly countries" that should benefit from this easing of restrictions.
- For example, Congress has designated Israel, Jordan and Argentina as major non-NATO allies. They too should be included in the ITAR exemption.
- Further, there may be other states who are especially supportive in the Global War on Terrorism, that should also be included in the exemption.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/6258



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

AUG 19 2002

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr. Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

SUBJECT: Response to your question on C-130 Sales

- You asked for my opinion on Secretary Powell's response to your memo on C-130 sales. (Tab A).
- In a 26 July meeting chaired by the NSC staff, it was agreed that State would draft text for an ITAR exemption concerning export of aircraft and their spare parts to NATO, Japan and Australia. Although DoD has not yet seen the draft text, we expect that export of aircraft spare parts will be made much easier, allowing up to 12 exports of \$5,000 each per consignee per year.
- The exemption will apply to eight aircraft types considered "Major Defense Equipment (MDE)," including C-130s older than Model J. This will allow license-free export to defense ministries in NATO, Japan and Australia, provided the aircraft are demilitarized. Lesser (non-MDE) aircraft will be able to go license-free to any government agency in these countries.
- Assuming the State draft text conforms to the above, it will be a modest step forward for aircraft but a major step forward for aircraft parts. Given Commerce's unwillingness to have these aircraft transferred to their dual-use list (under conditions agreeable to State), I think this is the most we can accomplish at this time.
- The DoD lead for this activity is Lisa Bronson in OSD Policy. Once the ongoing interagency activity produces results, we will review and provide you with the appropriate recommendation at that time.

CONCURRENCES: USD(P)/CP&TSP viewed 9 Aug 02, USD(C) attached

RECOMMENDATION: None.

Prepared By: OUSD(AT&L)/(IC), Marvin Winkelmann, (b)(6)



200218262

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 25, 2002

Dear Don,


Regarding your July 23 note on the U.S. Munitions List review, I support the idea of transferring older, demilitarized cargo aircraft to friendly governments without the usual State license. While DoD first floated its ideas a year ago, your team's revised proposal was formally shared with us this spring.

Because Commerce was not interested in administering special tailored licenses of military equipment to restrict their end use (such as to sanctioned countries), State recently developed a proposed license exemption for this purpose, and DoD cleared on our proposal July 15 (Commerce's views are still pending). Our proposal will be discussed interagency at an NSC staff-led meeting tomorrow, July 26.

My understanding is that the plan is for closure on the USML Category VIII aircraft licensing change to be concurrent with a proposed significant increase in the aircraft parts transaction exemption. Together, these significant reforms will allow our respective defense trade control staffs to concentrate their efforts on the more sensitive export cases.

Sincerely,

*Copy to:*  
*USD(P) Feith*  
*USD(AT&L) Aldridge*



The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

11-L-0559/OSD/6260

JUL 23 2002

The Honorable Colin L. Powell  
Secretary of State  
U. S. Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Colin,

I understand there is work being done between State and DoD to update the U.S. Munitions list, which governs our export policies. There is one particular issue I would like to raise with you directly.

We are proposing to either transfer demilitarized older cargo aircraft to the export control jurisdiction of the Commerce Department or to permit their sale to friendly governments without the need for an export license. This initiative for these older cargo aircraft, which are of limited military significance, will facilitate sales to a broader range of countries than is now possible. We don't attach any security concerns to such aircraft, including C-130s, and they would be of great benefit in a lot of poorer countries. The need for export license review for these items also distracts both State and DoD licensing officers from more important work.

Perhaps with your assistance we could help to facilitate a resolve this matter.

Sincerely,

*Colin - I believe this has been pending for ~~a year~~ a year!*



11-L-0559/OSD/6261

U11007 /02

January 3, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Cooperation Account

I have no idea what a Defense Cooperation Account is. This memo from Dov doesn't mean a thing to me. What is it about?

005

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/28/01 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Large Individual Donation to Defense Cooperation Account

DHR:dh  
010302-17

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*1/7*

*To USD(C) -  
Please advise*

*DR*  
Larry Di Rita

*35 JAN 02*



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
JAN 03 2002

*done 1/3 SC*  
*CE: ASD(LA) Clarke*

INFO MEMO

December 28, 2001, 11:45 AM

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*1/3*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*FY1*

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim

SUBJECT: Large Individual Donation to Defense Cooperation Account

- Mr. Timothy Mellon made an unrestricted charitable gift of 280,000 shares of Hewlett Packard Company common stock to the Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Cooperation Account. The market value on December 26, 2001, was \$5,852,000. The Bureau of Public Debt at Parkersburg, West Virginia, has authority to accept and liquidate this gift for the DoD. After the sale of the stock, the Bureau of Public Debt will credit the proceeds to the DoD account.
- Mr. Mellon resides in Lyme, Connecticut, with his wife Pat. He is the chairman and founder of the privately-held Guilford Transportation Industries, which operates the Guilford Rail System, a major freight hauling railroad system in the northeastern United States, and Pan Am Airways, a scheduled passenger air carrier based in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Mr. Mellon graduated from Yale University with bachelor and master degrees in city planning.
- The Congress must authorize the use of funds deposited in the Defense Cooperation Account.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: William Knotts, (b)(6)

SP4 ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>1/4</i>
SP4 GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUDCO	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>1/2</i>

*19924 / 01*

11-L-0559/OSD/6263



August 19, 2002 4:26 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Material for Testimony

Here is some material we might want to use in the testimony.

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/17/98 Clinton Remarks on Iraq to Pentagon Personnel  
[clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980217-5402.html]

DHR:dh  
081902-37



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*OS2*

*19 Aug 02*

[THE WHITE HOUSE](#)

(C)

**President Clinton Explains American  
Position in Persian Gulf**

[Help Site Map Text Only](#)[Go](#)[President &  
First Lady](#)[Vice President &  
Mrs. Gore](#)[Record of  
Progress](#)[The Briefing  
Room](#)[Gateway to  
Government](#)[Contacting the  
White House](#)[White House  
for Kids](#)[White House  
History](#)[White House  
Tours](#)

**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
**Office of the Press Secretary**

For  
Immediate  
Release

February 17,  
1998

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT  
ON IRAQ TO PENTAGON  
PERSONNEL

The Pentagon

12:37 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President, for your remarks and your leadership. Thank you, Secretary Cohen, for the superb job you have done here at the Pentagon and on this most recent, very difficult problem. Thank you, General Shelton, for being the right person at the right time. Thank you, General Ralston, and the members of the Joint Chiefs, General Zinni, Secretary Albright, Secretary Slater, DCI Tenet, Mr. Bowles, Mr. Berger. Senator Robb, thank you for being here; and Congressman Skelton, thank you very much, and for your years of service to America and your passionate patriotism, both of you; and to the members of our Armed Forces and others who work here to protect our national security.

I have just received a very fine briefing from our military leadership on the status of our forces in the Persian Gulf. Before I left the Pentagon I wanted to

[What's New -  
February 1998](#)

[Efforts To Protect  
Children's Health](#)

[Annual Economic  
Report](#)

[Departure Statement  
on Iraq](#)

[Ron Brown  
Corporate  
Leadership Award  
Ceremony](#)

[Welcome Prime  
Minister Blair](#)

[Disaster Sites In  
Florida](#)

[Clean Water Action  
Plan](#)

[Millennium  
Programs](#)

[Support For Internet  
Legislation](#)

[Pass Patients' Bill of  
Rights](#)

[NATO Expansion  
Protocols](#)

[Education  
Discussion with  
Governors](#)

[Congressional  
Democrats](#)

[Statement on Iraq](#)

[Joint Press  
Conference With](#)

11-L-0559/OSD/6265

talk to you, and all those whom you represent -- the men and women of our military. You, your friends and your colleagues are on the front lines of this crisis in Iraq. I want to you and I want the American people to hear directly from me what is at stake for America and the Persian Gulf; what we are doing to protect the peace, the security, the freedom we cherish; why we have taken the position we have taken.

I was thinking as I sat up here on the platform of the slogan that the First Lady gave me for her project on the millennium, which was: Remembering the past and imagining the future. Now, for that project, that means preserving the Star-Spangled Banner and the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and it means making an unprecedented commitment to medical research and to get the best of the new technology. But that's not a bad slogan for us when we deal with more sober, more difficult, more dangerous matters.

Those who have questioned the United States in this moment, I would argue, are living only in the moment. They have neither remembered the past, nor imagined the future. So, first, let's just take a step back and consider why meeting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is important to our security in the new era we are entering.

This is a time of tremendous promise for America. The superpower confrontation has ended on every continent; democracy is securing for more and more people the basic freedoms we Americans have come to take for granted. Bit by bit, the Information Age is chipping away at the barriers -- economic, political and social -- that once kept people locked in and freedom and prosperity locked out.

Prime Minister

Tony Blair

American  
Association for the  
Advancement of  
Science

First Balanced  
Budget in 30 Years

Commitment to  
Child Care

Ford's Theater Gala

Los Alamos  
National  
Laboratories

Dialogue on Social  
Security Reform

"High Hopes"  
Education  
Partnerships

National Prayer  
Breakfast

American Position  
in Persian Gulf

But for all our promise, all our opportunity, people in this room know very well that this is not a time free from peril -- especially as a result of reckless acts of outlaw nations and an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers and organized international criminals. We have to defend our future from these predators of the 21st century. They feed on the free flow of information and technology. They actually take advantage of the freer movement of people, information, and ideas. And they will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. We simply cannot allow that to happen.

There is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. His regime threatens the safety of his people, the stability of his region, and the security of all the rest of us.

I want the American people to understand, first, the past: How did this crisis come about. And I want them to understand what we must do to protect the national interest and, indeed, the interest of all freedom-loving people in the world.

Remember, as a condition of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, the United Nations demanded -- not the United States, the United Nations demanded -- and Saddam Hussein agreed to declare within 15 days -- this is way back in 1991 -- within 15 days his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them; to make a total declaration. That's what he promised to do.

The United Nations set up a special commission of highly trained international experts, called UNSCOM,

to make sure that Iraq made good on that commitment. We had every good reason to insist that Iraq disarm. Saddam had built up a terrible arsenal and he had used it -- not once, but many times, in a decade-long war with Iran, he used chemical weapons -- against combatants, against civilians, against a foreign adversary, and even against his own people. And during the Gulf War, Saddam launched Scuds against Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Bahrain.

Now, instead of playing by the very rules he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War, Saddam has spent the better part of the past decade trying to cheat on this solemn commitment. Consider just some of the facts. Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM would then uncover evidence that gave lie to those declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports. For example, Iraq revised its nuclear declarations four times within just 14 months, and it has submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each of which has been rejected by UNSCOM.

In 1995, Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and the chief organizer of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, defected to Jordan. He revealed that Iraq was continuing to conceal weapons and missiles and the capacity to build many more. Then, and only then, did Iraq admit to developing numbers of weapons in significant quantities, and weapon stocks. Previously it had vehemently denied the very thing it just simply admitted once Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected to Jordan and told the truth.

Now, listen to this. What did it admit? It admitted, among other things, an offensive biological warfare capability,

notably 5,000 gallons of botulinum, which causes botulism; 2,000 gallons of anthrax; 25 biological-filled Scud warheads; and 157 aerial bombs. And I might say, UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq has actually greatly understated its production. As if we needed further confirmation, you all know what happened to its son-in-law when he made the untimely decision to go back to Iraq.

Next, throughout this entire process, Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect facilities as inspectors walked through the front door -- and our people were there observing it and have the pictures to prove it.

Despite Iraq's deceptions UNSCOM has, nevertheless, done a remarkable job. Its inspectors, the eyes and ears of the civilized world, have uncovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf War. This includes nearly 40,000 chemical weapons, more than 100,000 gallons of chemical weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads specifically fitted for chemical and biological weapons, and a massive biological weapons facility at Al-Hakim, equipped to produce anthrax and other deadly agents.

Over the past few months, as they have come closer and closer to rooting out Iraq's remaining nuclear capacity, Saddam has undertaken yet another gambit to thwart their ambition by imposing debilitating conditions on the inspectors and declaring key sites which have still not been inspected off limits -- including, I might add, one palace in

Baghdad more than 2600 acres large.

By comparison, when you hear all this business about presidential sites reflect our sovereignty, why do you want to come into a residence, the White House complex is 18 acres, so you'll have some feel for this. One of these presidential sites is about the size of Washington, D.C. That's about -- how many acres did you tell me it was -- 40,000 acres. We're not talking about a few rooms here with delicate personal matters involved.

It is obvious that there is an attempt here, based on the whole history of this operation, since 1991, to protect whatever remains of his capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, the missiles to deliver them, and the feedstocks necessary to produce them. The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart quickly its production program and build many, many more weapons.

Now, against that background, let us remember the past, here. It is against that background that we have repeatedly and unambiguously made clear our preference for a diplomatic solution. The inspection system works. The inspection system has worked in the face of lies, stonewalling, obstacle after obstacle after obstacle. The people who have done that work deserve the thanks of civilized people throughout the world. It has worked.

That is all we want. And if we can find a diplomatic way to do what has to be done, to do what he promised to do at the end of the Gulf War, to do what should have been done within 15 days -- within 15 days of the agreement at the end of the Gulf War -- if we can find a

diplomatic way to do that, that is by far our preference. But to be a genuine solution, and not simply one that glosses over the remaining problem, a diplomatic solution must include or meet a clear, immutable, reasonable, simple standard: Iraq must agree, and soon, to free, full, unfettered access to these sites, anywhere in the country. There can be no delusion or diminishment of the integrity of the inspection system that UNSCOM has put in place. Now, those terms are nothing more or less than the essence of what he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War.

The Security Council many times since has reiterated this standard. If he accepts them, force will not be necessary. If he refuses or continues to evade his obligation through more tactics of delay and deception, he, and he alone, will be to blame for the consequences.

I ask all of you to remember the record here: what he promised to do within 15 days of the end of the Gulf War, what he repeatedly refused to do, what we found out in '95, what the inspectors have done against all odds.

We have no business agreeing to any resolution of this that does not include free, unfettered access to the remaining sites by people who have integrity and proven competence in the inspection business. That should be our standard. That's what UNSCOM has done, and that's why I have been fighting for it so hard. That's why the United States should insist upon it.

Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press



for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal. And I think every one of you who has really worked on this for any length of time believes that, too.

Now, we have spent several weeks building up our forces in the Gulf, and building a coalition of like-minded nations. Our force posture would not be possible without the support of Saudi Arabia, of Kuwait, Bahrain, the GCC states and Turkey. Other friends and allies have agreed to provide forces, bases or logistical support, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Portugal, Denmark and the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic, Argentina, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand and our friends and neighbors in Canada. That list is growing -- not because anyone wants military action, but because there are people in this world who believe the United Nations resolution should mean something, because they understand what UNSCOM has achieved, because they remember the past and because they can imagine what the future will be depending on what we do now.

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear: We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his neighbors. I am quite confident from the briefing I have just received from our military leaders that we can achieve the objectives and secure our vital strategic interests.

11-L-0559/OSD/6272

Let me be clear: A military operation cannot destroy all the weapons of mass destruction capacity. But it can, and will, leave him significantly worse off than he is now in terms of the ability to threaten the world with these weapons, or to attack his neighbors. And he will know that the international community continues to have the will to act if and when he threatens again.

Following any strike, we will carefully monitor Iraq's activities with all the means at our disposal. If he seeks to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction we will be prepared to strike him again. The economic sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies fully with all U.N. resolutions.

Consider this: Already these sanctions have denied him \$110 billion. Imagine how much stronger his armed forces would be today, how many more weapons of mass destruction operations he would have hidden around the country if he had been able to spend even a small fraction of that amount for a military rebuilding.

We will continue to enforce a no-fly zone from the southern suburbs of Baghdad to the Kuwait border, and in Northern Iraq, making it more difficult for Iraq to walk over Kuwait again or threaten the Kurds in the North.

Now, let me say to all of you here, as all of you know, the weightiest decision any President ever has to make is to send our troops into harm's way. And force can never be the first answer. But sometimes it's the only answer.

You are the best-prepared, best-equipped, best-trained fighting force in the world. And should it prove necessary for me to exercise the option

11-L-0559/OSD/6273

of force, your commanders will do everything they can to protect the safety of all the men and women under their command. No military action, however, is risk free. I know that the people we may call upon in uniform are ready. The American people have to be ready as well.

Dealing with Saddam Hussein requires constant vigilance. We have seen that constant vigilance pays off, but it requires constant vigilance. Since the Gulf War we have pushed back every time Saddam has posed a threat. When Baghdad plotted to assassinate former President Bush, we struck hard at Iraq's intelligence headquarters. When Saddam threatened another invasion by massing his troops in Kuwait, along the Kuwaiti border in 1994, we immediately deployed our troops, our ships, our planes, and Saddam backed down. When Saddam forcefully occupied Irbil in Northern Iraq, we broadened our control over Iraq's skies by extending the no-fly zone.

But there is no better example, again I say, than the U.N. weapons inspections system itself. Yes, he has tried to thwart it in every conceivable way. But the discipline, determination, the year in-year out effort of these weapon inspectors is doing the job. And we seek to finish the job.

Let there be no doubt, we are prepared to act. But Saddam Hussein could end this crisis tomorrow, simply by letting the weapons inspectors complete their mission. He made a solemn commitment to the international community to do that and to give up his weapons of mass destruction a long time ago, now. One way or the other, we are determined to see that he makes good on his own promise.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the 20th century and warns us of what we must know about the 21st. In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.

In the next century, the community of nations may see more and more the very kind of threat Iraq poses now: a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, ready to use them or provide them to terrorists, drug traffickers, or organized criminals, who travel the world among us unnoticed. If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity -- even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program.

But if we act as one, we can safeguard our interests and send a clear message to every would-be tyrant and terrorist that the international community does have the wisdom and the will and the way to protect peace and security in a new era.

That is the future I ask you all to imagine. That is the future I ask our allies to imagine. If we look at the past and imagine that future, we will act as one together. And we still have, God willing, a chance to find a diplomatic resolution to this, and if not, God willing, the chance to do the right thing for our children and grandchildren.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

[Gateway to Government](#) | [Contacting the White House](#)

[White House for Kids](#) | [White House History](#)

[White House Tours](#) | [Help](#) | [Text Only](#)

[Privacy Statement](#)

August 19, 2002 5:47 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

What can the Seabees and the Corps of Engineers do in Afghanistan quickly, for which we can find the money?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-42

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*AFGHANISTAN*

*10/7 -  
Secret -  
Zakheim, Chairman  
Response attached. It is  
(slowly) coming together.  
D. Rita*

*Larry Di Rita  
10/8*

*19 Aug 02*

U00566 / 03

Tab



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301  
INFO MEMO



October 3, 2002, 7:05 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *D* OCT 4 2002

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Reconstruction Assistance for Afghanistan

- This memo supplements the analysis that General Myers provided you on Afghan reconstruction on September 17, 2002. (*under*)
- The Chairman highlights both the fine work that our civil affairs personnel have undertaken in Afghanistan using Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds, and the potential role of the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in Afghan reconstruction.
- CJCS states that CENTCOM is prepared to obligate \$12 million for OHDACA projects in FY03. With these funds, our civil affairs personnel, who have embedded engineer and contracting elements, could drill drinking water wells, upgrade utility systems, repair bridges and roads and construct or repair medical facilities and schools. We will not be able to undertake any large reconstruction initiatives with FY03 OHDACA funds, however.
- I think that DoD efforts could be both robust and highly visible if we get foreign nations and NGO's (e.g. Asian Development Bank and World Bank) to fund major reconstruction projects in northern Afghanistan, and get the COE to manage those projects.
- I met with Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, Ambassador David Johnson (State's Afghanistan coordinator), DASD Joseph Collins, and representatives from the NSC and the COE to examine an expanded role for the COE in Afghanistan reconstruction. There is broad consensus that the COE could be very effective in an Executive Agent/Program Manager function.
- We determined that the COE could assist international financial institutions in the development of roads in Northern Afghanistan, particularly the "Ring-Road" that runs from Herat - Mazar-e-Sharif - Kabul. It has extensive construction management

*COE = Corps of Engineers*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>10/18</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>10/18</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/6278

U16048 / 02

experience in Afghanistan; between 1960-67 it managed the construction of nearly one-third of Afghanistan's road network.

- Additionally, the COE could supervise smaller DoD road and bridge projects to connect Afghanistan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These affordable projects would enhance security and re-supply, and create trade opportunities in the region. My staff is investigating whether DoD has the legal authority to fund these projects with DoD appropriations.
- On Tuesday, October 9, the COE will provide me a white paper on how it would help rebuild roads and infrastructure in Northern Afghanistan, and provide me cost estimates. Among other things, the COE will outline how it would:
  - Work with the Afghan Transitional Authority to evaluate the highest priority projects.
  - Submit construction plans, procedures, and timeline to the Afghan Government for review.
  - Jump-start the project by organizing Requests for Proposals (RFPs).
  - Employ as many local Afghan workers as possible so militia members are provided employment opportunities.
- If the COE's white paper is convincing, and if we have the requisite authorities, I will propose that we explore the early creation of a COE program management donor center in Afghanistan. We will have to identify funding to support the center.
- If the COE takes on this function, it will need to complement, not usurp, the role of US military civil affairs personnel who are managing OHDACA programs.
- On a side note, I had a cordial meeting with India's Afghan reconstruction coordinator, Arun Singh. India is enthusiastic about working with the U.S. in Afghanistan in the coming months. India has already done considerable reconstruction work in Afghanistan. Only the U.S., Japan, U.K., and Germany have committed more funds to Afghan reconstruction in 2002 than India.

COORDINATION: ATTACHED

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6279





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-497-02

17 September 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 9/17*

SUBJECT: Projects in Afghanistan

- The following is provided in response to your request (TAB) concerning projects in Afghanistan that the Seabees and Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) can do quickly and for which we can find the money. I have reviewed the types of projects these organizations and others can accomplish in the near-term.
- US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is managing a humanitarian assistance program as an integral part of its theater security strategy. Current projects include drilling drinking water wells, upgrading utility systems, repairing bridges and roads and constructing or repairing medical facilities and schools. Projects are funded from various DOD accounts, including Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).
- USCENTCOM indicates that it is prepared to obligate up to \$12 million of FY 03 OHDACA funds, if provided by OSD, to support contracted humanitarian assistance efforts. Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineering Command is capable of negotiating and awarding such contracts. Such contracts will employ local nationals, develop indigenous skills and add resources to the Afghan economy.
- Contracting is the best method to accomplish these projects. Military engineer forces in Afghanistan will continue to be fully employed in force protection and operational missions for the foreseeable future. Conducting humanitarian assistance projects with military forces will require deploying additional forces into Afghanistan. Such deployment would increase the force footprint in the region, as well as reduce the availability of military engineer units to support combat operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM G. S. Holder, USN; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6280

U15676 / 02

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 19, 2002 6:28 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Iraq

I hope your documentation on Iraq takes account of this report, if it is accurate.

Thanks.

Attach.  
R 301424Z MAY 02

DHR:dh  
081902-44

U00567 / 03

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

August 19, 2002 7:53 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Attached is a memo on a proposal to change the law so we don't have to assign a one-star to Paris as the defense attaché.

Thanks.

Attach.

08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés [w/081502-23]

08/19/02 SecDef memo to CJCS [081902-45]

DHR:dh  
081902-46

.....  
Please respond by 09/26/02

*19 Aug 02*

*19 Aug 02*

U00569 / 03

August 20, 2002 7:17 AM

TO: General Myers  
CC: RADM Jacoby  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

I would like to stop the assignment of Dupré to Paris. I don't think a two-star is appropriate.

I think we ought to assign an O-6 so we don't end up with a two-star there if he gets promoted.

I will ask the General Counsel to prepare a proposal to change the law, so we can go back to an O-6, as in other countries.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/19/02 DIA memo to SecDef re: Flag Defense Attachés

DHR:dh  
081902-45

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

SPB  
8/19  
48/19  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

AUG 19 2002

U-090/DR

August 19, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency *L.E. Jacoby*

SUBJECT: Flag Defense Attachés

Sir, you noted that we have a two-star defense attaché (DATT) in Paris and asked what rank DATT would normally be assigned to a country like France, whether two-stars are assigned to any other country, and if one-stars are assigned in China and Russia.

- Change Law*
- Public Law 105-85 of Nov 1997 specified the DATT in France hold (or be on the promotion list for promotion to) the grade of one-star. The law was the result of Sen Warner's promise to Amb Harriman in France to enact this change.
    - Sen Warner pressed the Department to fill with a one-star. Eventually RADM Larry Poe, a Reserve two-star assigned to ASD(C3I) as a civilian, was activated and assigned as DATT. He arrived in Jul 2000 and is scheduled to depart in Sep 2002.
    - The previous DATT was an Army O-6. At various times in the past there were Flag/General officers assigned to France.
  - Brig Gen Felix Dupre, USAF, is scheduled to replace RADM Poe. Brig Gen Dupre is a two-star select. He was assigned as Military Assistant to SACEUR, GEN Ralston, from Apr 2000 to Mar 2002. Dupre is fluent in French.
  - The other one-star DATT positions are in Russia and China. Both are filled with one-stars. France is the only country with a two-star.
  - DATT assignments equivalent to France (U.K., Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan for example) are O-6's.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

11-L-0559/OSD/6284

August 15, 2002 4:15 PM

TO: RADM Jacoby  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Defense Attachés

I understand we have a two-star defense attaché in Paris. What is normal in a country like France—an O-6? Do we have two-stars anywhere else, or are there one-stars in China and Russia?

Please advise. I want to talk to Senator Warner about this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081502-23

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*Response attached*

August 19, 2002 7:57 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Testimony Nuggets

Another thought. You might check to see how many people were killed in World War II.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-47

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*032*

*19 Aug 02*

snewitt@re

August 19, 2002 5:00 PM

SUBJECT: Pre-emption

If Germany had been stopped prior to World War II, it would have saved (?) 60 million lives.

DHR:dh  
081902-16



August 19, 2002 7:57 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NODIS Cables

We are apparently not getting NODIS cables again. I am told there was a NODIS cable on Turkey recently that we didn't get. As I mentioned to you the other day, there were several others.

I would really appreciate it if you would go back and look at the system and see that we get the appropriate NODIS cables.

In this particular case, apparently the Ambassador knew last Thursday that the Turkish delegation was planning to cancel their trip, and DoD didn't learn about it in sufficient time to even weigh in to try to turn it around, which we certainly would have done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
081902-48

*TURKEY*

*19 Aug 02*

U00571 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6288

August 19, 2002 8:03 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: More Thoughts

Here are some random thoughts I have dictated over the weekend that might be usable in various projects you are currently engaged in.

Thanks.

Attach.  
SecDef MFRs

DHR:dh  
081902-49



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*350 MFRs*

*19 Aug 02*

U00572 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6289

August 5, 2002 11:18 AM

SUBJECT: Leaks

It would be wonderful if everyone who likes to leak memos and everyone who likes to publish classified material had a daughter or son in the advanced party of every military operation. I suspect it would get their attention.

DHR:dh  
080502-39

11-L-0559/OSD/6290

August 5, 2002 10:48 AM

SUBJECT: Iceberg Analogy

I want to use the iceberg analogy with the press on the war on terrorism.

DHR:dh  
080502-34

11-L-0559/OSD/6291

August 19, 2002 11:31 AM

SUBJECT: Symptoms

By the time you see the symptoms of some diseases, it is too late to deal with them.

DHR:dh  
081902-21

11-L-0559/OSD/6292

August 19, 2002 12:12 PM

SUBJECT:

The wife of a friend of mine was being harassed by a neighbor. She went to the court and asked for a restraining order against the person harassing her. Shortly thereafter, the neighbor murdered the wife.

On the day of the funeral, I was at my friend's house when the mailman came to the door. In the mail was a notification declining their request for a restraining order for insufficient evidence that the neighbor posed a threat to the wife.

Iraq has refused the UN's restraining orders. With WMD it can kill more than one wife of a friend.

DHR:dh  
081902-18

11-L-0559/OSD/6293

August 19, 2002 4:21 PM

SUBJECT: Lagging Intelligence

U.S. intelligence cannot know everything. And we do not. We need to keep reminding ourselves of that truth.

Our intelligence is generally a few years late, sometimes as much as eight or ten years late from the event to when we actually gain knowledge of an event. So there will always be a great deal we don't know. We acknowledge that fact. In making judgments and assessments as to the risks we face, that fact must be kept in mind.

If the U.S. sets as the standard we must meet that we must wait until we have evidence suitable to prevail in a court of law—"beyond a reasonable doubt"—it will most certainly be too late.

DHR:dh  
081902-23

11-L-0559/OSD/6294

8/20/02

Snowflake

August 20, 2002 6:16 PM

IRAQ

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Letter from PUK Secretary General

When you get a letter like this one, I don't think you should be writing in green and red all over everything. You ought to figure out a different way to do it.

When a memo comes in to me that I want to send to some other people, and it has your writing all over it, underlines and marks, then there is no way I can send it to other people without having it all retyped. There ought to be a better way to do this.

Please make sure someone answers this letter from Talabani, and I want to see the words before it goes out.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/19/02 Jalal Talabani (Secretary General, PUK) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
082002-22

.....

Please respond by 09/06/02

8/20

20 AUG 02



SWT -  
- Draft response  
- Coord with Policy  
D. R. H.

11-L-055905D7629603

Larry Di Rita  
8/21



SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 20 2002



به کتبی پیتسانی کوردستان  
سکرتری گتبی

الاتحاد الوطني الكردستاني  
الامين العام

*Patriotic Union of Kurdistan*  
**Secretary General**

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301

August 19, 2002

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It was an honor for me to meet with your Excellency in the White House last week. I was heartened to learn of your attention to the intricacies of the Iraq issue, and your commitment to the vision of a democratic Iraq.

The institutions of self-government in the Kurdistan Region, free Iraq, can be a catalyst for wider democratization of the whole of the country. Our model proves that Iraq can be different, and Iraq need not be governed by tyranny. We also understand fully that our interest lies in close partnership with the United States. Furthermore, this is a part of the Islamic Middle East in which U.S. support is widely appreciated and acknowledged. Therefore, it is only logical to predict that Saddam Hussein identifies Iraqi Kurdistan as a priority target in his effort to neutralize plans aimed the removal of his regime.

I am confident that the United States is fully aware of our vulnerabilities in the face of possible onslaught by Saddam's army or WMDs. Given the seriousness of the present situation, it is urgent that the United States Government publicly states a robust commitment to defend the territory and people of Iraqi Kurdistan.

In particular there is need to train our military personnel to assist in supporting possible US Air Force combat missions that will be necessary to repel Iraqi aggression. Mobile Training Teams should be dispatched to our territory to arrange for this as a matter of urgency. This will be seen as a serious deterrence to Baghdad aggressive intentions.

Further, we are seriously concerned about the use of chemical and biological weapons against our people. It is imperative that our friends in the United States make available to us mobile clinics, means of protection and antidotes to deal with this serious possibility.

The PUK is a partner with the United States in this noble endeavor to bring about a democratic Iraq—we look forward to working closely with you and your colleagues for our common interest in democracy and stability in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Jalal Talabani

11-L-0559/OSD/6296

August 20, 2002 9:17 AM

383.6

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Access to Prisoners

I just saw on television that the Afghans have a lot of Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners that they are not allowing us access to.

Please find out if that is true and what we need to do to fix it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-2



Please respond by 08/23/02

20 Aug 02

August 20, 2002 11:04 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Art in Conference Room

007

Please have someone take a look at how we could improve the art in the conference room. It is really grubby. There is terrific artwork around this building.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR.dh  
082002-4



Please respond by 09/06/02

August 20, 2002 11:06 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Alleged Massacre

Cen+COM

Please get in touch with CENTCOM and see if they have someone working on the subject of the allegations being printed in all the papers about a massacre in containers.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-5

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

"This is done."  
→

*Delonnie*  
This is done  
8/21  
J. Delonnie

20AUG02

U00577 / 03

Answer  
UNANSWERED

August 20, 2002 11:12 AM

001.150

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Senator Hutchison

HOT

Should Kay Bailey Hutchison be asked to speak at this event, or just be introduced?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-7

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SECDEF HAS SEEN

8/19 - AUG 20 2002

8/24  
Done  
D. Rita

(1) Still not certain she will go.

(2) IF she goes, she could introduce you or something. She'd want to speak in some way, probably. She goes to the military bases a lot and spends a lot of time with the troops in Texas.

20 AUG 2002

D. Rita

August 20, 2002 4:32 PM

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Coalitions

000.5

I think we ought to get a piece of paper that shows we had no coalition when we were attacked on September 11, and then we could list how many countries were added every week thereafter. That way we can remind all these people who now are saying all the Europeans are against us and everyone is against us that coalitions don't blossom fully developed in the morning sun. They evolve over time, and I suspect that is what will happen this time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-9

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

20 Aug 02

U00580 / 03

August 20, 2002 4:34 PM

Done 10/8

451

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Strikers

Why were the Strikers all killed in Millennium Challenge? I have never been very impressed with them. I am kind of curious as to what the problem was.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-10



Please respond by 09/26/02

U00581 /03

20 Aug 02

August 20, 2002 4:34 PM

381

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Declaratory Policy

Has this July 1 memo been addressed at all in your shop?

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/01/02 SecDef memo to USD(P) 070102-54

DHR:dh  
082002-11



Please respond by 09/06/02

20Aug02



July 1, 2002 6:02 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Declaratory Policy

Please take this Tony Dolan memo and convert it into a memo from me to the President, with some suggestions as to how either he or I, or somebody, could use it for a speech and provide encouragement to people.

We need to get the declaratory policy fashioned. I do not want to stick this into the interagency process, where everything dies or gets so dumbed down that it is worthless.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/29/02 Dolan memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
070102-54

.....  
Please respond by ~~08/02/02~~

11-L-0559/OSD/6304

March 29, 2002  
MEMO  
TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FR: Anthony R. Dolan  
Re: The quick takedown.

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 01 2002

Larry Di Rita

3/29

STB

3/29

M 3/29

THE QUICK HIT -- A great coach named Bob Ciocher used to teach his fighters to do the unexpected and instead of maneuvering around after the opening bell to rush across the middle of the ring and bop the other guy right on the chin. Sometimes it worked; the fight was over before it started. (I think there is something similar in wrestling.)

Once in a while the quick hit works.

HITLER – “No one will make peace with me” Hitler told Pommel. He was right. But the allies might have had another way. The historical consensus seems to be growing on a tragic point, that if the FDR had not suddenly announced “unconditional surrender” (apparently to please Stalin) enough high ranking Germans might have joined in the plot against Hitler to make it work.

BAD GUYS PSYCHOLOGY – For all their bravado and incorrigibility even the worst of the dictators are susceptible to fear. Quadaffi got religion after a wake-up call from an F-111 that threw one down his front porch. And the Soviet Politburo was a lot less aggressive after the cruise and Pershing missiles were in place. (In eight minutes those creaky old reprobates could barely get out of their chairs, let alone down to the shelters.)

SELF-INTEREST – If the obsessive self-interest (the basis of the criminal psyche – see long paper) of even the dictators makes them stand down, imagine how it might be among those who are around them. In the face of strength (and their own fear), they might be in a deal-making mood.

NOT A DAY GOES BY; IN TOO DEEP – No one knows this better than criminals like Sadam. So, a day doesn't go by when this sort of dictator doesn't remind those around them that they are in too deep to expect any clemency.

CALIBRATION NEEDED – What follows needs to be calibrated. Maybe extended to all “axis-of-evil” nations. Maybe Castro too. (A master through his neighborhood spying apparatus to get others to participate in his crimes and oppression.)

And maybe someone else needs to say this. (Pres?) But this is the general idea.

“Dictators like Saddam know how to spread the blame, get everyone involved.

The result is that in societies like Iraq many people get drawn into the wrongdoing. And then the guilt begins. And more wrongdoing follows. Soon a cycle of guilt and wrongdoing and more guilt takes over.

The result is despair. Among the very people in the best position to help overthrow a regime there is no hope. They think they have to follow Hitler into the bunker.

I don't think the cycle of guilt and wrongdoing has to go on endlessly, that it can't be escaped from. I think there should be some hope. There are those in Iraq and in other places that need to know this -- those who would like to help overthrow such cruel and reckless regimes but are afraid that by doing so they would be committing an act of self-destruction because of their own past involvement in its crimes.

That isn't necessarily the case. I can't speak for the Iraqi people or whatever opposition forces would make up a new government. But I do know I would be urging the President of the United States to use the good offices of this nation to urge leniency and even an offer of amnesty for anyone instrumental in taking down the Iraqi regime and opening the way to a decent life for the long-suffering people of that nation.

Let's face it: The nightmare nexus is the terrorist in possession of a weapon of mass destruction. Saddam embodies it. In fact, he not only has these weapons but has shown a willingness to use them – and he is now trying to add a nuclear bomb to his arsenal.

But he knows his rule has no moral legitimacy, and even among his closest associates there are those who would like to see a new government in Iraq. So he is plenty scared. The other dictators also live in fear. We shouldn't forget this.

Neither should we forget that there are those at powerful positions in such societies who also want change. Maybe out of self-interest. But maybe self-redemption too, that may be a cause. They may regret their wrongdoing and want to see their nations liberated.”

August 20, 2002 4:57 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Counter Terrorism

000.5

Please see the attached memo I sent you on July 4. What is the answer to that?

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/01/02 SecDef memo to PAE 070402.7

DHR:dh  
082002-13

.....  
Please respond by 09/06/02

20 AUG 2002

July 4, 2002 12:46 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Counter Terrorism

How do we develop a counter terrorism activity at the Pentagon. Is there such a thing today?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070402.7

.....  
*Please respond by* 07/19/02

8/22  
08 02 snowflake

August 20, 2002 5:37 PMM

000.1

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Nominations

One of the real projects we have to push is to get all these nominations over to the White House fast so they get up to the Hill right after Labor Day. I hope you will press hard on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-14

.....  
Please respond by 08/23/02

9/9 -  
Secret -  
We're pressing hard.  
D. Rita

Larry Di Rita  
9/9

20AUG02

August 20, 2002 5:54 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CIA Finances Briefing

Please see if I can get the briefing on finances that the CIA is working on via SVTC.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
082002-16



Please respond by 08/30/02

337

20 Aug 02

showfile

01/02/2000 23:22

(b)(6)

TAOS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 02

10:28 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*  
 DATE: August 22, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

Call Condi Rice. She said to me that we have got to get the detainee mess sorted out, that nobody is able to get answers. I think she is getting this from the UK. Call her and find out what she is talking about. She always comes in with these cryptic messages as though the Pentagon is messed up, and I don't have any idea what she is talking about.

I told her that everyone who has wanted to see their detainees has been able to and it is baloney. But you should check it out and get back to her.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082202.06

*Please respond by:* 8/24/02

*383.6*

*22 Aug 02*

U00588 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6311

*V*



January 10, 2002 12:03 PM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Franks  
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Presence in Central Asia

Please don't forget that I want the Saudi Arabian footprint reduced, but I don't want it all put in other states subject to the same pressures of the Intafada.

They surely need to go into some other states, but ones where we are comfortable with the stability—both Arab and non-Arab states, possibly Central Asia, and/or offshore. We need to see how that is being proposed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011002-17

.....

Please respond by 01/16/02

*ASIA*

*10 Jan 02*

TO: Steve Cambone  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 22, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

We have got to come up with new words for "swiftly defeat" and "win decisively". They just don't work. Any thoughts?

Also, from the meeting with the President we need to come up with two or three word sentences that clarify exactly what the strategy is as opposed to the force sizing construct.

Please get back to me with a suggestion.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082202.01

Please respond by: 9/4/02

381

22 Aug 02

01/02/2000 23:22

(b)(6)

TADS GUEST HOUSE

PAGE 03

10:28 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 22, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

Give me a report back after Newt talks to Abizaid.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
082202.03

337

Please respond by: 8|25|02

22 Aug 02

0770  
9/14

Snowflake

1:04 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 23, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Larry Di Rita  
9/27

Condi says that John Gordon is going to head up a group for her and Ridge looking at the Homeland Defense implications of war with Iraq. She claims this was done during the Gulf War and she wants to know who the DoD should assign for that. I said I would get back to her.

Who do you recommend?

Thanks.

18 SEP 2002

Marshal Billinger will do for us, backed up

TRM

DHR/szn  
082302.01

Please respond by:

8/29/02

By Pete Keizer

- When Paul McHale is in place, he'll be involved.

Di Rita

Larry Di Rita

9/27

33 Aug 02

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 24, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

I need to see a copy of *Present at the Creation*. There is a quote in there that is near the end of the book about Atchinson observing after Pearl Harbor state department people going to work. If Marc Thiessen could pull that quote out for me, I'd like to see it.

117

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082202.05

*Please respond by:*

~~9/4/02~~

T 9/5  
 Atchinson

done - 9/12

DR August

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: August 29, 2002  
 SUBJECT: **ROE Briefings**

Some time I ought to get briefings on the supporting authorities Rules of Engagement.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082902.03

Please respond by:

9/10

*385*

*29 Aug 02*

U00594 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6317

software

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: ~~Donald Rumsfeld~~ D

DATE: August 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

Let's send a thank you to Admiral J. L. Betancourt for his hospitality in San Diego.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082902.04

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*Done  
9/19*

*235 SD*

*29 Aug 02*

U00595 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/6318

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 29, 2002  
SUBJECT:

Let's not put two days of calendars on the same pieces of paper like we did for San Diego and Ft. Irwin, etc.

Thanks.

DHR/wzn  
082902.05

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

→ Note: <sup>9/9</sup> Trip Planners  
Col. Delwan.

*(Signature)*

*Di Rita*

LETTER DELIVERED

9/9

*020050*

*29 Aug 02*



TO: Gen. John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
DATE: August 29, 2002  
SUBJECT:

There were some things briefed to us at the SSC in San Diego on Point Loma that might be useful in Guantanamo Bay.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082902.06

337

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

MFR \_\_\_\_\_

Informed Gen Hill of relevant topics we see at Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command that may have utility at GITMO, viz a viz, the robotics/unmanned vehicles to include the robotic skill for patrolling of shore/waterways, etc. *Chomecon*

21 Aug 02

0930, 3 Sept 021.1-L-0559/060/6320 808597 103 C 9/3

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: August 29, 2002  
SUBJECT:

I think I should only have one town hall per location, and I think even doing two in two days is a lot. Part of the advantage is the press, and you lose that advantage if you do three in two days. You probably lose it if you do two in two days.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
082902.07

Please respond by: 9/6

*(Handwritten signature in a circle)*  
9/9

337

29 Aug 02

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
 DATE: August 29, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

I would like to see a menu so that I could order different meals on the G-5. The food is lousy in there.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 082902.08

*430*

Please respond by:

*9/2*

*9/9*

→ *Col Delmon*

*cc: Rick Kislung - distributed*

*FYI*

copy DL Rita

*9/9*

*29 Aug 02*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: August 29, 2002  
SUBJECT:

I think someone ought to go back to the important things to people w

in awful lot of

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

Thanks.

*To: Feith*

*Russia*

DHR/azn  
082902.11

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Larry Di Rita  
9/9*

*29 Aug 02*

*2*

RTTUZYUW RUEHKVA3373 2391331-UUUU--RUEKQMA.

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 271331Z AUG 02

FM AMEMBASSY KIEV

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD-S&T/TER/CTR//

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8022

RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC//CT//

RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DH-2//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-ADMIN//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//ACIS/SIOT//

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//GC//

UNCLAS KIEV 003373

DTRO 02-0407

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM, US, UP

SUBJECT: CTR: LETTER FROM MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
SHKIDCHENKO TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MR. DONALD  
RUMSFELD REQUESTING RELEASE OF EQUIPMENT  
COVERED UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION  
PROGRAM.

1. ON 16 AUGUST 2002 DTRO-K RECEIVED A LETTER FROM GENERAL OF THE ARMY SHKIDCHENKO TO MR. DONALD RUMSFELD REQUESTING EQUIPMENT BE TAKEN OUT OF STOCK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM IN UKRAINE.

2. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

DEAR SECRETARY RUMSFELD,

FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE GRATEFULNESS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH ASSISTANCE IN DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND UKRAINE DATED DECEMBER 5, 1993.

IN AUGUST, 2002 THE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF SS-24 SILO LAUNCHING SYSTEMS (RS-22) OF THE 43RD MISSILE ARMY IS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF:  DEPSEC:  SPL ASST:  EXECSEC:  SR MA: \_\_\_\_\_  
C&D: \_\_\_\_\_ CCD:  CABLE CH: \_\_\_\_\_ FILE: \_\_\_\_\_  
USDP:  DIA: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_  
MIGPER: \_\_\_\_\_ PER SEC: \_\_\_\_\_ COMM: \_\_\_\_\_

Copy to: *Crouch - for action*

*8/27*

3  
④

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 2 of 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE ON PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH MATERIAL, SERVICES, AND CONDUCTING CORRESPONDING TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

AFTER ACCOMPLISHING THE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SS-24 SILOS (RS-22) AND DISBANDMENT OF THE 43RD MISSILE ARMY IN 2002 AND REDUCTION OF THE VOLUME OF DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES, A SIGNIFICANT PART OF MATERIAL THAT WAS GRANTED TO UKRAINE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACCORDING TO THE ANNEX (A) OF THE AGREEMENT IS TO BE RELEASED. SPECIALISTS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE HAVE DEFINED THE LIST OF THE MATERIAL (ENCLOSED) PROPOSED FOR REMOVAL OUT OF THE PROGRAM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.

AT THE SAME TIME THE RELEASED MATERIAL IS EXTREMELY NEEDED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE TO EQUIP THE EMERGENCY-RESCUE TEAMS FORMED FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS CONNECTED WITH EMERGENCIES ON SENSITIVE INDUSTRIAL OBJECTS, ROCKET FUEL COMPONENTS STORES AS WELL AS WITH VIOLATION OF ECOLOGICAL SITUATION ON THE DANGEROUS OBJECTS OF UKRAINE, FLOODS, DRIFTING OF ICE, DRIFTING OF SNOW, WINDS, FIRES, HYDRODYNAMIC ACCIDENTS ON DIKES, DAMS, ETC.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON PROVIDING UKRAINE WITH ASSISTANCE IN DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS IN COUNTER PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DATED OCTOBER 25, 1993 THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MUST GET THE WRITTEN CONSENT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING THE USE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL FOR THE PURPOSES THAT DIFFERS FROM THE SITED IN THE AGREEMENT.

UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS I WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN SOLVING THE ISSUES ON RECEIVING BY UKRAINE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS FROM AUTHORIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR REMOVAL OF MATERIAL MENTIONED IN THE LIST FROM THE PROGRAM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS DESTRUCTION IN ORDER TO USE IT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS MY BEST REGARDS AND CONFIDENCE IN FURTHER EXTENSION OF FRUITFUL DIALOG BETWEEN DEFENSE AGENCIES OF UKRAINE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

RESPECTFULLY,

//SIGNED//

V.P. SHKIDCHENKO  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE  
GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF UKRAINE

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/6325

4  
A

MR. DONALD RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LIST OF THE MATERIAL PROPOSED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE  
PROGRAM OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ELIMINATION

NUMBER/NAME/SERIAL NUMBER/NOTE

1/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069971  
2/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069973  
3/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069976  
4/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069977  
5/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069984  
6/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069987  
7/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069990  
8/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069991  
9/BUS "BLUE BIRD"/1BAABCSA4TF069981  
10/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GNGK26J3TJ423343  
11/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GNGK26J1TJ424961  
12/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GNGK16J8TJ343994  
13/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GNGK16J1YJ183062  
14/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GNGK16J1YG213561  
15/CAR CHEVROLET "SUBURBAN"/1GCHK33P8TF020125  
16/VAN GMC 12 PAX/1GJGG35Y5SF550765  
17/VAN GMC 12 PAX/1GJGG35Y8SF550808  
18/AMBULANCE/1HTSCAAL6VH442176  
19/FIRE-ENGINE/1HTGLAET75H681178  
20/FIRE-ENGINE/1HTGLAET7YH211903  
21/FIRE-ENGINE/1HTGLAET1TH342578  
22/CRANE TRUCK GROVE RT 58B/83336  
23/CRANE TRUCK GROVE RT 58B/83237  
24/CRANE TRUCK GROVE RT 58B/83238  
25/CRANE TRUCK GROVE RT 58B/83239  
26/CRANE TRUCK KRUPP 6200/8088  
27/CRANE TRUCK CN128P&H/57070  
28/CRANE TRUCK CN128P&H/57071  
29/CRANE TRUCK GROVE AT 635/850555  
30/CRANE TRUCK GROVE AT 635/86103  
31/CRANE TRUCK GROVE AT 635/850579  
32/RAILWAY CRANE/001  
33/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951098-6971  
34/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951089-6962  
35/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951090-6963  
36/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951092-6965  
37/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951093-6966  
38/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951091-6964  
39/FORK-LIFT TRUCK WIGGINS/951094-6967  
40/FORK-LIFT TRUCK IT-38G/7BS00567  
41/FORK-LIFT TRUCK IT-38G/7BS00568  
42/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-085  
43/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-082  
44/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-081  
45/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-083

5  
42

46/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-086  
47/ELECTRIC TROLLEY MAPS/11-21-95-084  
48/ELECTRIC TROLLEY AMCUS/95010151  
49/COMPRESSOR AMCUS/95010152  
50/COMPRESSOR AMCUS/95010143  
51/COMPRESSOR AMCUS/95010146  
52/COMPRESSOR AMCUS/95010150  
53/AKDS (NITROGEN-OXYGEN STATION)/5055  
54/AKDS (NITROGEN-OXYGEN STATION)/5036  
55/AKDS (NITROGEN-OXYGEN STATION)/5097  
56/AKDS (NITROGEN-OXYGEN STATION)/5096  
57/TRACTOR AKDS GMC KODIAK/1GBM7H159TS02550  
58/TRACTOR AKDS GMC KODIAK/1GBM7H1J2TJ101787  
59/TRACTOR AKDS GMC KODIAK/1GBM7H1J8TJ101874  
60/TRACTOR AKDS GMC KODIAK/1GBM7H1J3TJ102530  
61/HYDRO-ABRASIVE CUTTER RADIAN 36200D-660/590240-1  
62/HYDRO-ABRASIVE CUTTER RADIAN 36200D-660/591240-1  
63/HYDRO-ABRASIVE CUTTER RADIAN 36200D-660/596040-1  
64/HYDRO-ABRASIVE CUTTER RADIAN 36200D-660/598030-4  
65/TRACTOR FORD L9000 2S3, STAKE 6X6/1FDYU90T9SVA37037  
66/TRACTOR FORD L9000 2S3, STAKE 6X6/1FDYU90T9SVA37038  
67/TRACTOR FORD L9000 2S3, STAKE 6X6/1FDYU90T9SVA37039  
68/TRACTOR FORD L9000 2S3, STAKE 6X6/1FDYU90T9SVA37040  
69/BULLDOZER CAT-D9N/6XJ00926  
70/BULLDOZER CAT-D9N/79Z05788  
71/BULLDOZER CAT-D9N/79Z05789  
72/BULLDOZER CAT-D9N/79Z05790  
73/BULLDOZER CAT-D9N/8PB06153  
74/EXCAVATOR CAT 214BFT/9MF00580  
75/EXCAVATOR CAT 214BFT/9MF00571  
76/EXCAVATOR CAT 320L/9KK02932  
77/EXCAVATOR CAT 320L/9KK02929  
78/TRACTOR FORD LT-9500/2FZYEXYB2KAF26202  
79/TRACTOR FORD LT-9500/2FZYEXYB2KAF26203  
80/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T0SVA39940  
81/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T6SVA35536  
82/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T0SVA33891  
83/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T5SVA37956  
84/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T0SVA40473  
85/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T4SVA39942  
86/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T9SVA40472  
87/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T4SVA34076  
88/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T7SVA33892  
89/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T4SVA42842  
90/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T6SVA42843  
91/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T8SVA42844  
92/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T2SVA33895  
93/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T6SVA33897  
94/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T7SVA37957  
95/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T9SVA35952  
96/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T9SVA33893  
97/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T2SVA39941  
98/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T1SVA36366  
99/DUMP TRUCK FORD L9000 2D5/1FDYU90T5SVA36368

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*

11-L-0559/OSD/6327

6

#



100/TRAILER LOW-DED GSA26L/41FKE2830X1000587  
101/TRAILER LOW-DED GSA26L/41FKE2832X1000588

3. POC FOR THIS ACTION IS LUKE KLUCHKO, CHIEF, DTRO.  
OFFICE TELEPHONE (b)(6) FOR EMERGENCIES  
AFTER HOURS, CALL (b)(6)  
PASCUAL


SECDEF V2  
ACTION (U,6,7,8,F) 2  
INFO SJS-C(\*) SJS-C(1) CHAIRS(\*)  
CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) DOD:GC(\*)  
C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*) USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
USDAT:NTP(\*) C2DIR(\*) USDP:SCCTR(\*) USDAT-STS(\*)  
ESC-SMTP(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP:ESC

DIA V3  
ACTION (U,6,8) 1  
INFO CMAS(\*) CMAS(1)  
+US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE  
+SAFE

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#3373  
NNNN

7  
#1



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

370.61

JAN 22 2002

The Honorable Jesse Helms  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Jesse,

I want to thank you for another demonstration of your foresight and wisdom regarding our national security.

I'm told that, during the Senate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention and against pretty stiff opposition, you preserved the President's authority to allow the use of Riot Control Agents in certain military actions. It won't surprise you to know that the issue has come up a few times during the campaign in Afghanistan. But for your efforts, we would have found our hands tied in rather non-sensical ways.

Thank you once again, my friend.

Sincerely,

227and2

1/15  
0900

BCR  
1/15



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

2002 JAN 11 AM 2:12 (9)

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

ACTION MEMO

JAN 8 2002

I-01/015485-NPP

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
FROM: J.D. CROUCH, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY *JDC* JAN 8 2002  
SUBJECT: Letter to Sen. Jesse Helms acknowledging foresight in retaining Riot  
Control Agent option

- At your instruction, I asked Marshall Billingslea to prepare a letter to Senator Helms (Tab A), regarding his defense, during Senate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention, of DoD's right to use Riot Control Agents.

RECOMMENDATION: SECDEF sign letter to Senator Helms (TAB A).

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

*To: SAT -  
See my  
file next under.  
Do on budget stationery.*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>JDC 1/14</i>

*INX.  
Larry Di Rita  
1/15*



January 9, 2002 1:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: Non-lethal Riot Control Agents

Condi Rice told me this morning during the call that I have oral authority from the President to authorize the CINC to use non-lethal riot control agents anywhere in CENTCOM. In addition, we have authority to use them on aircraft and ships transiting between CENTCOM and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at the base in Guantanamo Bay.

I have told Tommy Franks about this. Ed, you should make sure the other appropriate people are told, for example, TRANSCOM if they are transporting people by ship or air and SOUTHCOM for people in Guantanamo Bay.

I also told Gen. Franks that I expected them not to be used anywhere except Afghanistan or near the Pakistan border, unless I am told to the contrary beforehand.

Condi said I will be receiving written confirmation of this at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-14

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Coordination Page

Douglas Feith

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

*[Handwritten signature]*  
1/10/02

Powell A. Moore

Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Legislative Affairs

*[Handwritten signature]*  
1/4/02

f ✓

January 9, 2002 1:48 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Giambastiani

CC: GEN. MYERS  
GEN. PAVE

370.61

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Non-lethal Riot Control Agents

Condi Rice told me this morning during the call that I have oral authority from the President to authorize the CINC to use non-lethal riot control agents anywhere in CENTCOM. In addition, we have authority to use them on aircraft and ships transiting between CENTCOM and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at the base in Guantanamo Bay.

SECRET

I have told Tommy Franks about this. Ed, you should make sure the other appropriate people are told, for example, TRANSCOM if they are transporting people by ship or air and SOUTHCOM for people in Guantanamo Bay.

DONE.  
V/R

I also told Gen. Franks that I expected them not to be used anywhere except Afghanistan or near the Pakistan border, unless I am told to the contrary beforehand.

Ed 1/10

Condi said I will be receiving written confirmation of this at some point.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-14

9 Jan 02

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

January 8, 2002 5:37 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: India

Do you have any recollection of India providing some assistance to Libya with respect to either WMD or ballistic missiles?

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010802-25

*INDIA*

.....  
Please respond by 01/11/02

*Sic - My recollection is that support may have gone to Syria. I'll check with folks today,*

*1/9*

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JAN 10 2002

*SC*  
*1/8/02*

*8 Jan 02*

SECDEF CONTROL #

11-L-0559/OSD/6334

U00640 /02

11/10

12/11



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON



January 10, 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
JAN 11 2002

Lamy 11/10

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Tom White, Secretary of the Army  
SUBJECT: Homeland Security/Melt-Down of Civil Support Obligation

Per our discussion earlier this week and your note, we on the HLS team, will ensure the shot clocks on our support to other federal agencies are enforced. The biggest challenge will be the National Guard support to DOT in the airport security task. I will work it directly with Secretary Mineta and keep you informed.

Thanks.

*[Handwritten signature]*

384

10562



2:58 PM

TO: Secretary White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.A.*

DATE: January 9, 2001

SUBJECT:

I would like to be sure you are notifying any of the civilian agencies where U.S. forces - regular, reserve or guard - are being used, that we are not going to be able to extend their tours, and that you would like a report on a weekly or twice per month basis indicating what steps they are taking to be certain that when they reach the end of our commitment date that they will have in place the kinds of capabilities needed to replace whatever military forces are currently being used.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
01092.01

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/6336

TO: Secretary White  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **P.A.**  
 DATE: January 9, 2001  
 SUBJECT:

I would like to be sure you are notifying any of the civilian agencies where U.S. forces - regular, reserve or guard - are being used, that we are not going to be able to extend their tours, and that you would like a report on a weekly or twice per month basis indicating what steps they are taking to be certain that when they reach the end of our commitment date that they will have in place the kinds of capabilities needed to replace whatever military forces are currently being used.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
 01092.01

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

384


9 Jan 02

August 17, 2002 3:10 PM

8/28

210AF(344)

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: General Ralston Letter



I have edited the Ralston letter again. I still don't like it.

Please have one of the speechwriters go up to my back room and read the letter Forrester sent my father, and see if we can't elevate these letters, particularly in a case like Ralston's, where he deserves it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Retirement ltr for Gen. Ralston

DHR:dh  
081702-14



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

8/24

Sec Def -

Attached is a revised version we have drafted and used for some other retirements. It is an attempt to capture the spirit of the Forrester letter.

8/28

17AUG02

11-L-0550080/633803 Dilite

Admiral Bobo Generic, USN

Dear Admiral Generic:

Congratulations on your retirement from the United States Navy and thank you for your 35 years of dedicated service to our nation.

As you reflect on your long and exemplary career, consider the remarkable period during which you served. Our nation prevailed over a determined Soviet adversary through the Cold War, checked Iraqi aggression during Desert Storm, and has now embarked on a global war against terrorism.

The price of freedom is high, and you have willingly borne your share of the cost. Throughout, you set a standard for professionalism and service, and served America with honor.

I extend the Department's appreciation for a job well done. I wish you, Bobette, and your family all the best for the future.

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/6339



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

General Joseph W. Ralston, USAF  
SACEUR/USCINCEUR  
CMR 450, Box 7100  
APO AE 09705

Dear General Ralston:

Congratulations on your retirement from the United States Air Force and thank you for over 37 years of dedicated and distinguished service to our nation.

Your leadership at an important time in our nation's history has set a standard for professionalism and service. You leave behind a brilliant record of achievement; one that, I am certain will be a source of great pride and satisfaction to you in the years to come. I extend the Department's appreciation for a job well done.

I wish you and Dede all the best for the future. I hope you will always reflect on your years of Air Force service with great pride and satisfaction.

Sincerely,

*Red*

*This is a very  
good letter.  
Having it  
a notebook  
with forward  
separately.*



*Went to office  
for approval  
9/5  
Delonqui  
What does  
this say?  
8/28*

August 17, 2002 3:10 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: General Ralston Letter

I have edited the Ralston letter again. I still don't like it.

Please have one of the speechwriters go up to my back room and read the letter Forrester sent my father, and see if we can't elevate these letters, particularly in a case like Ralston's, where he deserves it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Retirement ltr for Gen. Ralston

DHR:dh  
081702-14

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*8/24*

*Sec Def -*

*Attached is a revised version we have drafted and used for some other retirements. It is an attempt to capture the spirit of the Forrester letter.*

*U00542 103*

*Dilute*

*11-0559/OSD/6341  
9/9*

*8/9  
SWT -  
Please take a stab at  
fashioning this for  
General Ralston.  
SAC EUR - Transformation  
May mention NATO Transformation  
tion, etc. his role as VCJCS.*

*210 AF (324)*

*17 Aug 02*

*8008/28*

January 14, 2002 10:46 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Gen. Franks  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Piece

The attached is well worth reading.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/13/02 Kissinger, *Washington Post*, "Phase II and Iraq"

DHR:dh  
011402-26

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

IRAQ

14 JAN 02

Ironically, governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework. And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy.

Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as possible targets for a Phase II campaign. That decision should depend on the ability to identify targets against which local governments are able to act and on the suitability of American forces to accomplish this task if the local governments can't or won't. And given these limitations, the United States will have to decide whether action against them is strategically productive.

All this raises the unavoidable challenge Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community.

If these capabilities remain intact, they could in time be used for terrorist goals or by Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new regional or international upheaval. And if his regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will elevate him to a potentially overwhelming menace.

From a long-range point of view, the greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were Iraq governed by a group representing no threat to its neighbors and willing to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the region would be immeasurably enhanced. The remaining regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met:



.. (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan.

A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it -- perhaps using chemical and biological weapons -- in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world. A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose.

Before proceeding to confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed. At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no-movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons.

Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue. But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces.

A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite minority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni majority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq's disintegration is not the goal of American policy. This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and a Shiite state in the south would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region. A federal structure for a unified Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue.

Creating an appropriate coalition for such an effort and finding bases for the necessary American deployment will be difficult. Phase II is likely to separate those members of the coalition that joined so as to have veto over American actions from those that are willing to pursue an implacable strategy. Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism campaign would have much to build on. Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf region. Britain will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based on its special relationship with the United States, that it has earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will Germany move into active opposition to the United States -- especially in an election year. The same is true of Russia, China and Japan. A determined American policy thus has more latitude than is generally assumed.

But it will be far more difficult than Phase I. Local resistance -- especially in Iraq -- will be more determined and ruthless. Domestic opposition will mount in many countries. American public opinion will be crucial in sustaining such a course. It will need to be shaped by the same kind of decisive and subtle leadership by which President Bush unified the country for the first phase of the crisis.

•• *The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.*

© 2002, Los Angeles Times Syndicate International

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

Unclassified



**Secretary of Defense  
Fax Cover Sheet**



FROM Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld OFFICE/DESK PHONE NO.: (b)(6)

SUBJECT:

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: 5 (Including Coversheet)

     HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

  X   IMMEDIATELY

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
CENTCOM	GEN FRANKS				

REMARKS:

Please call Secretary of Defense Cable Division to report transmission problems.

Phone number (b)(6) or (b)(6)

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SPLASST	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXCSEC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEPSECDEF	<input type="checkbox"/>
C&D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CCD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USDP	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
CABLECH	<input type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

Unclassified

11-L-0559/OSD/6346

Orig To ExecSec  
U00740 /02

January 14, 2002 8:06 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Walker

383.6

I don't really care what happens to Walker at this stage. I know he is going to go to the Department of Justice—the question is when.

He is on the USS BATAAN, and the military doesn't want him anymore. We could put him in Guantanamo Bay until we are absolutely certain we are not going to get anymore information about him or from him, or we could just give him to DoJ now.

Please come up with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011402-5



Please respond by 01/15/02

14 Jan 02

January 14, 2002 2:17 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Disposition of Walker

I agree that eventually the Department of Justice ought to get Walker. I just wonder if the Department of Justice knows we can keep him for a while, and maybe there will be some cross-referencing and some additional information that would help their case.

I am curious to know what the rush is.

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/10/02 GC Action Memo to SecDef, Walker [U00533/02]

DHR:dh  
011402-50

.....

*Please respond by* 01/16/02

1/14

CFD,

SECRET HAS APPROVED THE  
ATTACHED ACTION MEMO. PLZ  
CONTROL/HUE THE APPROVAL AND  
SEND A COPY OF THE RELATED  
"SNOWFLAKES" BACK TO GC.

MAX,

WART

1/15/02

MFR: Per my discussion with Cal Whitman  
do not task (w/ sup) the snowflakes.  
Just control and forward back to GC  
along with 400 533-02.



Jos

January 15, 2002 7:55 AM

TO: Director Robert Mueller, FBI  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: FBI Representation in EUCOM

We have a real problem with the FBI representation in General Ralston's interagency group. The most recent FBI representative arrived and said he was leaving in two weeks. He is going to be the fourth one in the last few months.

We simply have to get this straightened out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011402-67

*Oyo Justice*

*15 Jan 02*

January 15, 2002 8:12 AM

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Improvements in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Please take a look at the list of offers we have received from our liaison friends and coalition partners to see if there are things the coalition can do in Afghanistan that would visibly show that the United States and our coalition partners care about the Afghan people and are building hospitals, schools, roads, etc.

Next, I would like you to take a look at what we are capable of doing in that country that would be visible and acknowledged as something that the U.S. is doing and has done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011502-5

.....

Please respond by 1/22/02

15 Jan 02



January 4, 2002 9:44 AM

250

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Disclosure

This man, Bruce Ramsay, is my nephew, the son of my sister. When I was cleared he was queried whether he worked for the Government. He is a computer expert.

Here is his statement. Please look at it and see if we need to do anything about it

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/20/01 Ramsay ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010402-23



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

4JAN02

12/20/01

Joyce and Don,

Thanks for the card and the book. I've actually seen 'Rumsfeld's Rules' on a DOD website, but it is nice to have the printed version. I can definitely relate to the rules and there is a sense of the family in some sections that brings back memories.

Don, it looks like you are enjoying the role of Secretary again. I imagine it is more eventful than you expected.

I hope your kids are doing well. I hear a bit from Joan occasionally, but not enough to know what everyone is doing.

Suzanne and I leave for Costa Rica today. Her daughter is completing a university study abroad program there. It should be an adventure. Most of my travel has been business related. Travel in a country completely lacking in infrastructure will be a new experience for me.

Don, when you took the Secretary position I was asked if I worked in a defense industry. I did not. Since then I have taken a position as Director of Integration for an Organic LED flat panel display start-up company. We are developing processes and manufacturing capability for flat panel displays. I took the position because I believe OLED technology will displace LCD and CRT based displays and that this company has unique intellectual property with the potential to play a significant role in developing this market. One plan under consideration is to set up display manufacturing in the US. I tell you all of this because DARPA will be at our facility for a meeting in January and I want to be sure that all disclosure laws are followed and you are not subject to any unfortunate surprises. I hope that my role in this company will not bias decisions in a negative way. Under other circumstances I would not expect a transaction as small as ours would likely be to even be visible in a DOD budget pie chart.

Thanks again for the book.

If you are ever in the bay area it would be wonderful to see you again.



Bruce and (b)(6)

(b)(6)

bruce\_rams@yahoo.com

11-L-0559/OSD/6353



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Bruce Ramsay  
83 Partridge Drive  
Novato, CA 94945

Dear Bruce,

Thanks so much for your note and the information.  
I will pass it along to the General Counsel here at the  
Pentagon, so they are aware of it.

With my best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/6354



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002 JAN 10 11 08 40

INFO MEMO

January 10, 2002, 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *W. J. Haynes II*

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *W. J. Haynes II*  
*1/11/02*

SUBJECT: Disclosure

- Bruce Ramsey, your nephew, advised you that he is now employed by a company that is seeking business with DARPA. You asked whether we need to do anything about it. We do not need to do anything now in response to this disclosure.
- If you have a close, personal relationship with your nephew, you may not be able to participate in matters that affect his company or in which he represents his company.
- In the unlikely event that your participation in such matters were ever required, at that time I could determine whether you should be authorized to participate because DoD's interest in your participation would outweigh the concern that the integrity of our programs may be questioned.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Gail D. Mason (b)(6)

*MMA*

250

10 JAN 2002



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

10 JAN 15 11 08 40

INFO MEMO

January 10, 2002, 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *WJH*

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*  
*1/11/02*

SUBJECT: Disclosure

- Bruce Ramsey, your nephew, advised you that he is now employed by a company that is seeking business with DARPA. You asked whether we need to do anything about it. We do not need to do anything now in response to this disclosure.
- If you have a close, personal relationship with your nephew, you may not be able to participate in matters that affect his company or in which he represents his company.
- In the unlikely event that your participation in such matters were ever required, at that time I could determine whether you should be authorized to participate because DoD's interest in your participation would outweigh the concern that the integrity of our programs may be questioned.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Gail D. Mason, (b)(6)

*WJH*

250

10 JAN 2002

January 4, 2002 9:44 AM

250

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Disclosure

This man, Bruce Ramsay, is my nephew, the son of my sister. When I was cleared he was queried whether he worked for the Government. He is a computer expert.

Here is his statement. Please look at it and see if we need to do anything about it

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/20/01 Ramsay ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010402-23



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

47A002

12/20/01

Joyce and Don,

Thanks for the card and the book. I've actually seen 'Rumsfeld's Rules' on a DOD website, but it is nice to have the printed version. I can definitely relate to the rules and there is a sense of the family in some sections that brings back memories.

Don, it looks like you are enjoying the role of Secretary again. I imagine it is more eventful than you expected.

I hope your kids are doing well. I hear a bit from Joan occasionally, but not enough to know what everyone is doing.

Suzanne and I leave for Costa Rica today. Her daughter is completing a university study abroad program there. It should be an adventure. Most of my travel has been business related. Travel in a country completely lacking in infrastructure will be a new experience for me.

Don, when you took the Secretary position I was asked if I worked in a defense industry. I did not. Since then I have taken a position as Director of Integration for an Organic LED flat panel display start-up company. We are developing processes and manufacturing capability for flat panel displays. I took the position because I believe OLED technology will displace LCD and CRT based displays and that this company has unique intellectual property with the potential to play a significant role in developing this market. One plan under consideration is to set up display manufacturing in the US. I tell you all of this because DARPA will be at our facility for a meeting in January and I want to be sure that all disclosure laws are followed and you are not subject to any unfortunate surprises. I hope that my role in this company will not bias decisions in a negative way. Under other circumstances I would not expect a transaction as small as ours would likely be to even be visible in a DOD budget pie chart.

Thanks again for the book.

If you are ever in the bay area it would be wonderful to see you again.



Bruce and (b)(6)

(b)(6)

bruce\_rams@yahoo.com

11-L-0559/OSD/6358



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Bruce Ramsay  
83 Partridge Drive  
Novato, CA 94945

Dear Bruce,

Thanks so much for your note and the information.  
I will pass it along to the General Counsel here at the  
Pentagon, so they are aware of it.

With my best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

11-L-0559/OSD/6359



December 23, 2002 4:10 PM

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Coordination with VA

The President wants a progress report on how we are doing with the Veterans Administration and Toni Principi on coordinating and cooperating our activities. Please give me a report by January 8.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122302-49



Please respond by 01/08/03

*040 VA*

*23 Dec 02*



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON



INFO MEMO

January 17, 2002, 11:15 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JAN 17 2002

SUBJECT: Changes in the National Guard

- In response to your question about the National Guard articles written by David Moniz, *USA Today*, I thoroughly reviewed the author's allegations and our procedures and have concluded that we have adequate oversight of the Guard. Further, since the articles have received little, if any, attention, I recommend that we do not offer an official response.
- The author made two major allegations: that there is inadequate oversight by the Pentagon over misconduct by senior Guard officials, particularly the State Adjutants General (AGs); and that there is widespread inflation of troop strength reporting to hide shortages and guarantee that units will not be moved to other states that have greater potential for recruiting. I would note that we engaged in extensive discussions with Mr. Moniz prior to his publication in an effort to provide him accurate information.
- Most of the author's information on specific misconduct cases is factual, but outdated; therefore, his conclusions are not relevant to our present situation. Further, in the cases he cites, every individual was held accountable. We exercise oversight through the rigorous process of federal recognition, the same process that we employ for active duty officers. While the State Governor has the option to retain an AG who is not federally recognized, none of the currently serving AGs are in a non-federally recognized status for misconduct. We also have the option of withdrawing federal recognition. I also asked The Inspector General to compare misconduct rates between active and Guard general officers. He found the difference in rates of substantiated allegations to be negligible. In the current environment, I am convinced that it is in a Governor's best interest to sustain the quality of AGs now serving.

11-L-0569/OSD/6361

U01031 /02

SUBJECT: Changes in the National Guard

- Similarly, the present operational environment dictates that strength reporting be accurate. The Guard has a very detailed and rigorous process of monitoring strength figures to ensure readiness. The current national objective is a 98% participation rate with a target of 2% non-validation of pay (not paid for three months due to absence from drill). The national average at the end of December is at 2.7%. In addition to the close scrutiny we exercise over this reporting, there is scant motivation today to inflate troop strength figures. The Army National Guard has met recruiting and retention goals for the last four years and has proven their readiness as we continue to increase our reliance on our reserve components. I was particularly impressed with the Guard's responsiveness in the aftermath of September 11.
- I am confident that our current practices amount to adequate oversight and stand ready to discuss in further detail if you wish.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

Rec'd 1/2 02  
A

December 28, 2001 7:22 AM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Guard

Should we make some changes in the National Guard? Please take a look at this file.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/21/01 GC memo to SecDef re: National Guard

DHR:dh  
122801-1

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

11-L-0559/OSD/6363

CF: USA



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

December 21, 2001, **SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
**DEC 28 2001**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*  
SUBJECT: *USA Today* Articles About the National Guard: "Tarnished Guardians"

You asked for my views about the series "Tarnished Guardians," which was printed in *USA Today* beginning with the December 17 edition.

- I understand that the articles have David Chu's personal attention and that he has asked the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to evaluate the assertions in them. I also understand that Dr. Chu is providing an Information Paper to you on this matter.
- My office has offered to work closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
- I recommend that Legislative Affairs and Public Affairs work with Personnel and Readiness and my office to develop a comprehensive approach for responding to the *USA Today* series.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment

Prepared by: Jim Smyser, (b)(6)

*12/26 -* *Grizzle*

*Sec Def -*  
*I sent your note to David Chu to ask what he intends to do. You're right; it's an opportunity we should jump on.*

*D. Rita*

December 19, 2001 2:25 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: National Guard

Is there anything we ought to be doing with respect to this "Tarnished Guardians" article? It seems to me it might offer us an opportunity.

Thanks.

Attach  
12/17/01 *USA Today* article, Moniz and Drinkard: "Misconduct Marks Guard Command"

DHR.dh  
121901-7

Vice President Richard B. Cheney last week said he believes most al Qaeda cells can be disbanded without direct U.S. military force.

"There may be a few cases where military force is the only option, or where military force is required for one reason or another to wrap up these cells," he told Fox News Channel.

USA Today  
December 17, 2001

Pg. 1

## Tarnished Guardians — Part 1

### 6. Misconduct Marks Guard Command

*Lack of oversight by Pentagon, states let misbehavior flourish*

By Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, USA Today  
WASHINGTON

Americans have taken comfort since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks as National Guard units in nearly every state have been called out to protect airports, power plants and other critical parts of the nation's infrastructure. Yet, at a time when the 460,000-member Guard is playing such a vital role, an investigation by USA TODAY reveals a pattern of misconduct in the Guard's upper echelons that has continued for more than a decade. Much of the misconduct has gone unpunished as governors, state legislatures and members of Congress look the other way and Pentagon investigators are powerless to root out the problems.

The abuses range from inflating troop-strength reports and misusing taxpayer money to sexual harassment and stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in life-insurance payments, some intended for the widows and children of Guardsmen. Together, they raise questions about the quality of some of the Guard's top leaders and the political spoils system under which many are

promoted. USA TODAY identified nine states in which the highest-ranking officer, called an adjutant general, has engaged in misconduct during the past

decade. However, the full extent of the abuses may never be made public because the Pentagon has refused to allow open access to its investigative reports. The identified states are New York, Illinois, Kentucky, California, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Colorado, Wyoming and Massachusetts.

After interviews with more than 100 present and former Guard members and a review of 10 years of Pentagon documents, many never before disclosed, the newspaper has found that:

\*Guard officials in many states have repeatedly inflated Army Guard troop-strength reports to hide a shortage of soldiers. Within individual National Guard units, as many as 10% to 20% of the troops are "ghost soldiers" who exist only on paper, government investigators and Guard officers say. The practice raises questions about the Guard's ability to field fully ready units in this time of crisis.

Some Guard units inflate troop levels so that the federal government won't transfer those units, and the money that goes with them, to states that can recruit.

\*Pentagon records show that during the past five years, National Guard generals have committed serious offenses at roughly double the rate of regular Air Force and Army generals. During that time, 16 Air National Guard generals committed such offenses compared with 14 in the Air Force. The Air Force has about twice as many generals. In the Army Guard, 55 generals committed serious offenses compared with 65 in the Army. The Army Guard has 193 generals, the Army 365.

\*In the nine states where interviews and investigations show adjutants general have committed misconduct, little has been done to improve the selection process or oversight. One of the nine states, Kentucky, has created a selection advisory panel to help the governor pick the state commander. Another, Illinois, passed a law allowing the governor to pick someone from outside the Guard — an active-duty or reserve officer — for the top job, issued sexual har-

assment guidelines and created promotion-review panels.

The problems in the Guard's leadership extend to the top. This year, the Pentagon investigated the Guard's top officer, Lt. Gen. Russell Davis, head of the National Guard Bureau, the Guard's administrative headquarters. The investigation found that Davis failed to discipline a senior aide who had sexually harassed a colleague and misled federal investigators about his role in the incident.

The report said his testimony was "not credible" and "failed to meet the standard for honesty." The finding against the head of the National Guard Bureau resulted in a stern letter of rebuke by the secretary of the Air Force.

Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel and military analyst at Boston University, says the litany of offenses committed by top Guard commanders is "deeply troubling."

"It should be a cause for deep and profound concern" if Guard commanders aren't held to the same standards of conduct as regular military officers, Bacevich says.

Independent armies

The National Guard spends \$13 billion a year in federal defense money, but the Pentagon has virtually no control over these state-run militaries. The two-star generals who command the National Guard in the 50 states report to the governors, not the Defense Department. Consequently, the Pentagon has no power to remove incompetent or corrupt adjutants general. They are state, not federal, employees.

Because the Constitution gives control of the National Guard to the states, the Guard also is not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the standard of conduct for regular military personnel. Instead, the states typically have their own laws similar to the federal military code, but the Pentagon has no role in enforcing them unless Guard troops are placed on active duty for missions overseas such as in Bosnia and Kuwait.

All but two adjutants general are appointees of state governors. In Vermont and South Carolina, they are

elected. Adjutants general often don't meet military or educational qualifications required of active duty generals. Governors can pick lieutenant colonels for adjutant general, skipping three ranks and the intense training that goes with them.

The Guard traces its roots to colonial times, when each state defended itself with a homegrown militia. Today, most Guard members are part-timers who hold full-time civilian jobs and perform military drills one weekend a month. Many of the Guard's leaders, including the adjutants general, are full-time soldiers working for their states.

Regular military officers say they have great respect for the competence and sacrifices made by most of those who serve part time in the Guard. The National Guard's contributions in war and peace are well known and include fighting in World War II, Korea and Desert Storm, as well as helping citizens during hurricanes, floods and wildfires.

However, Guardsmen interviewed by USA TODAY say they are often demoralized by the behavior of some top leaders who tarnish the organization.

Officers familiar with misuse of office and misconduct cases involving adjutants general say reforms are long overdue. One of those is Ron Triggs, a Wyoming attorney and retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel who has handled numerous legal cases involving the Guard and Reserves.

"System is dysfunctional"

"The system is dysfunctional and has been for a long time," Triggs says.

Guard senior officers rise through a system that, unlike the active military, allows some with little formal education to get top jobs. Dozens of senior Guard officers — lieutenant colonels, colonels and generals — have been promoted with no college degrees or with degrees that required little academic work. In one case described in an Army investigation, a Guard general obtained a correspondence degree by completing few requirements. He got 119 of 134

college credits for his military and life experience.

Lt. Gen. Davis, who was appointed head of the National Guard Bureau by President Clinton, says that the Guard does not have a leadership problem and that oversight works well. "Could it be better? Yes," Davis says.

Davis did not respond to several USA TODAY requests for interviews about his own misconduct investigation.

However, Brig. General Ron Rand, head of Air Force public affairs, described the letter of reprimand written to Davis by the Air Force secretary as the kind that could be career ending for a general on active duty. "At a minimum," Rand says, "it means that corrective behavior is required."

Maj. Gen. Russ Groves, who commanded the Kentucky Guard until he retired last summer, says many governors are beginning to look for better-qualified Guard commanders. "There is a new generation that comes from a background that is less political and more merit based," says Groves, a University of Kentucky professor.

Even so, the political appointment system that puts Guard commanders in power remains largely unchanged, and Defense Department investigations show that Guard officers who committed offenses faced few consequences.

#### A string of offenses

A pattern of misconduct over the past decade is revealed in court documents, criminal cases and Pentagon investigations obtained by USA TODAY through the Freedom of Information Act.

The Pentagon provided reports only for those misconduct cases the newspaper was able to discover on its own. Citing privacy laws, the Pentagon denied access to all other investigation reports.

The investigations were conducted by inspectors general from the Army, Air Force and Department of Defense. In most cases, those accused of misconduct typically do not have lawyers and are not given the evidence presented against them. The IG makes a ruling based on a "preponderance of

evidence," which is a slightly lower standard than in criminal cases.

The newspaper's review, coupled with more than 200 interviews with Guard members, military officers and law enforcement officials, shows that:

\*Wyoming Adjutant General Ed Boenisch remains in charge of the Wyoming Guard despite two Pentagon investigations in the past three years. According to documents in those cases, investigators found that Boenisch stopped Guard members from exposing wrongdoing, improperly discharged officers, retaliated against whistleblowers and approved a plan in which one of his lieutenant colonels falsified documents to receive a promotion he had been denied.

Boenisch declined to be interviewed for this article, but an e-mail response from his public affairs staff said he didn't violate military rules or regulations. Rachel Girt, a spokeswoman for Gov. Jim Geringer, said the governor's office believes the investigations exonerated Boenisch.

\*The Pentagon determined in 1998 that California Adjutant General Tandy Bozeman engaged in an "inappropriate relationship" with a female officer in the California Guard. The military prohibits relationships between commanders and their troops because it can create the impression of favoritism. Bozeman could not be reached for comment.

Bozeman continued the relationship despite being warned by numerous officers that it was damaging morale in the California Guard, Pentagon investigators reported.

He retired as head of the California Guard in a routine change of command in 1999 when Democrat Gray Davis replaced Republican Pete Wilson as governor.

\*A 1999 Pentagon report found that Colorado Adjutant General William Westerdahl regularly used National Guard aircraft for personal vacations, had improper relationships with subordinates, failed to properly report an accident involving an aircraft he piloted and improperly retaliated against a Colorado Guard captain who reported

his misconduct. Westerdahl left office last year at the end of his term. Guard officials in Colorado said they did not know how to locate Westerdahl.

A spokesman for Gov. Bill Owens said that Westerdahl had been investigated during the tenure of Gov. Roy Romer and that, under state law, Owens could not replace Westerdahl until his term expired.

\*Illinois Adjutant General Richard Austin was the subject of a 1998 Pentagon investigation that concluded that during summer training two years earlier, Austin got drunk in front of his soldiers and "displayed conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." The report also found that Austin, in a "drunken and reckless manner," drove a vehicle carrying soldiers during that same training exercise. Pentagon officials say that active duty officers are routinely relieved of command for such offenses, but Austin retained command. He left office in 1999 and was appointed deputy director of aeronautics for the state of Illinois's Department of Transportation.

A spokesman for Illinois Gov. George Ryan said Austin served out his term under Ryan's predecessor, Gov. Jim Edgar.

\*A Pentagon investigation found that Massachusetts Adjutant General Raymond Vezina had used government equipment for personal use, initiated improper investigations of subordinates and retaliated against soldiers who reported misconduct. Gov. Paul Cellucci fired Vezina in 1999.

\*Kentucky Adjutant General Robert DeZarn was sentenced to 15 months in federal prison in 1997 for perjury after he lied to Pentagon investigators about his role in asking Guard officers to make \$500 campaign contributions to Gov. Brereton Jones. DeZarn lost an appeal and served his sentence.

\*Colorado Adjutant General John France retired at the end of his term in 1995, the same year a Pentagon report found that he had threatened to

block the promotion of a Guard lawyer who complained about 250 improper flights France had taken. Some of the flights were joy rides in Guard fighter jets flown to impress a private men's club to which France belonged. France declined comment.

\*Oklahoma Adjutant General Tommy Alsip was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading guilty to embezzlement in 1993. Following a state investigation, Alsip admitted that while he was head of a life insurance fund for Oklahoma guardsmen in the late 1980s, he stole \$388,000 by filing false claims.

Among the funds he pocketed were payments intended for Guard widows and children.

Questions about Guard operations in at least two states are ongoing:

Maj. Gen. Danny James, the adjutant general of Texas, was nominated this fall by President Bush to become head of the Air National Guard in the United States. However James' Senate confirmation is being held up while the Air Force determines whether misconduct allegations against James merit a full-blown investigation.

The Air Force won't disclose the nature of the allegations.

The California National Guard also is under scrutiny. The state Legislature requested an audit last summer after Guard officers there accused state commander Maj. Gen. Paul Monroe of using \$1 million intended for armory maintenance and a Guard-run youth academy to hire friends for lucrative Guard jobs. The audit is due to be completed early next year.

Monroe says the allegations are groundless and part of a campaign to discredit him by senior officers within the California Guard.

#### Nobody's watching

Veteran Guard commanders say two factors contribute to misconduct by adjutants general:

\*A lack of federal oversight creates a climate in which commanders believe they can violate regulations without fear of punishment.



\*Because almost all of the money for Guard units comes from the federal government, governors and state legislatures tend to largely ignore their operation.

Buddy Stroud, who led the Guard in Louisiana for 18 years, says the Guard exists in a gap between federal and state oversight, and governors often leave concerns in the hands of their adjutants general.

Dean LeVay, a federal immigration judge in Arizona who retired from the Army Guard as a colonel three years ago, says he found it impossible to get the governor or the Legislature interested in investigating misconduct.

"Everyone at the state level thinks the federal level has a handle on the problems," LeVay says.

No enforcement power

The Pentagon can and does investigate adjutants general. Officials say, however, that they have no power to enforce their findings. All the Pentagon can do is forward its findings to the National Guard Bureau, which can recommend action to governors, who have the power to discipline or remove adjutants general.

Unlike command positions in the regular military, top Guard jobs often are viewed as political rewards to be handed to a governor's ally.

Charles Rogers, an Oklahoma district attorney who helped prosecute former adjutant general Alsip for embezzlement, says he was "appalled, shocked and sickened" that someone like Alsip could ever be chosen to command the military.

Rogers says that Alsip, who was appointed adjutant general after donating \$15,000 to Gov. David Walters, would never have risen to such an important position in the regular Army.

"The adjutant general in Oklahoma makes more money than the governor," Rogers says. "It is a great big political m."

He emphasizes that it would be a mistake to assume the Guard is corrupt from top to bottom.

"But to the extent that at the top the National Guard is a bunch of political hacks and

cronies, it imperils the ability of our nation to respond," Rogers says.

New York Times  
December 17, 2001

## 7. Rumsfeld Pays Call On Troops And Afghans

By Thom Shanker

BAGRAM, Afghanistan, Dec. 16 — Walking beside a minefield on his way to meet Afghanistan's provisional leaders, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld offered America's long-term support to the new government today but made clear that the Pentagon's war aims had not been fully met and must not be compromised in securing the post-Taliban peace.

Mr. Rumsfeld, whose Pentagon became a front line in the Sept. 11 attacks, arrived at an air base with hangars bearing bullet scars and littered with the carcasses of warplanes. He is the first senior Bush administration official to visit Afghanistan since the start of the American military response.

No air of triumphalism marked his visit, which was not announced until just hours before his C-17 military transport plane touched down. He chose none of the victor's oratory in rallying American troops here and in his private discussions with leaders who are to take power on Dec. 22.

Instead, Mr. Rumsfeld told Hamid Karzai, the provisional head of government, and Gen. Muhammad Fahim, the incoming defense minister, that much work remained in hunting down the Taliban and members of Osama bin Laden's organization, Al Qaeda.

To the troops, he said the war was not over. "The Taliban is not running the country at the moment," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "There still are Al Qaeda and Taliban people in the country, in the mountains, hiding in the cities, in the caves and across the borders. There are a lot of fanatical people. And we need to finish the job."

Mr. Rumsfeld held meetings with the two anti-Taliban

commanders, Mr. Karzai and General Fahim, in a bomb-damaged room with Afghan carpets laid wall to wall and camouflage netting serving as draperies.

Tents pitched inside the frosty United States operations center sheltered computers and communications equipment as Mr. Rumsfeld, wearing a windbreaker from the Army Special Operations Command, greeted Mr. Karzai, who arrived wearing a lambskin hat and a traditional robe of blue and green plaid.

Referring to the members of Al Qaeda, most of them fighters from foreign lands who turned this country into a base of operations under the Taliban, Mr. Karzai said, "They considered themselves the rulers of Afghanistan."

Opposition forces were incapacitated by their civil wars, he said, and the military assistance from the United States was "the opportunity we wanted."

"You helped Afghanistan liberate itself — for a second time," he added, referring to American military aid that helped rout the Soviet Army.

The Bush administration's mental map of the world had no doubt labeled Afghanistan "Terra Terroris," but after setting foot here today, Mr. Rumsfeld said it was still too soon to declare Afghanistan liberated from terror, terrorism and terrorists.

He said his meetings with the two interim leaders was "to make sure we're all on the same wavelength as to what's left to be done."

The new government, Mr. Rumsfeld said, is "going to have to be something that fits Afghanistan and is not uncomfortable for the neighbors, and that is able over time to develop enough cohesion so that it can keep these factions from fighting with each other and keep terrorists out and manage crime and, the good Lord willing, deal with the heroin and the drug problems."

The defense secretary announced that Washington was likely to support an international peacekeeping force being considered to help restore order in the capital, by contributing logistical support,

intelligence and transportation, and that the United States might agree to having American forces stand by with a "quick reaction capability as backup" should the peacekeeping force run into trouble. The force is expected to have 3,000 to 5,000 members and could eventually be sent into cities other than Kabul.

Mr. Rumsfeld flew to the base in a cavernous C-17 military cargo plane, the first to make a daylight landing here since the air base, 20 miles north of Kabul, fell to allied forces.

But continuing security concerns were underscored as the door swung open and Mr. Rumsfeld's delegation was warned that the plane was parked on a strip of tarmac sandwiched between minefields.

An Afghan honor guard greeted the secretary, and a local security force of fighters from the Northern Alliance lined the runway.

It was at times hard to tell the allies apart, Afghan from American. One scruffy soldier wearing the uniform favored by the Northern Alliance — a pakol, the woolen hat with round, flat crown, as well as a patterned sweater with a scarf and vest — was assigned to the pool of drivers for Mr. Rumsfeld's visit.

"Welcome to Afghanistan, sir," he said crisply with the best of United States Army discipline before explaining that many of the American troops whose missions bring them into contact with Afghans wear local garb to present a lower profile.

The air base at Bagram, built in the 1950's with assistance from the Soviet Union, is the only active airfield for heavy freight traffic in Afghanistan.

Mr. Rumsfeld also visited a base in the region that is home to the Special Operations forces that have been so prevalent in this military campaign. The base's location could not be disclosed under ground rules set by the Pentagon.

One AC-130 pilot, an Air Force captain who gave his name only as Jason, described

11-L-0559/OSD-8368

showfile

received in Poling on  
1/8/02 at 1533

January 8, 2002 7:59 AM

4716

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Mines

Colin Powell tells me there is a letter from Patrick Leahy and a letter signed by a hundred members of the House and Senate saying that the Pentagon has given up on the plan to deal with mines that the prior administration had committed to. Also, apparently there is a study going around that says we want to not only have mines that expire, but regular mines as well as part of transformation.

I have never heard of any of this. Could someone please look into it and get back to me?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010802-5

.....  
Please respond by 1/11/02

8 JAN 02

# Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

December 19, 2001

George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We share your eagerness for global and human security during these troubling times. With this in mind, we write to express our serious concern about the direction of the current Administration review of U.S. policy on antipersonnel (AP) landmines. As you know, the Department of Defense has recently completed its component and, after input from the State Department and the National Security Council, the review is expected to reach your desk for approval. We respectfully urge that you ensure that the policy your Administration authorizes takes into account the indiscriminate consequences inherent in the nature of antipersonnel landmines, the danger these weapons pose to civilians and U.S. troops, and the desire to continue U.S. leadership and unity among our key international allies.

We have received reports that the Department of Defense has recently recommended the following changes to current landmine policy:

- 1) The abandonment of U.S. plans to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006.
- 2) The cessation of efforts to eliminate dumb mines from the U.S. arsenal by 2003.
- 3) The termination of the search for alternatives to AP mines.
- 4) The assertion of the indefinite need for AP mines, both smart and dumb, in Korea and elsewhere, particularly in special operations.

These alarming recommendations are out of step with your own avowed commitment to protect innocent civilians and, indeed, U.S. troops.

As you know, most of the modern militaries in the world, including our major allies in the war against terrorism, have ended their use of antipersonnel landmines because of the weapon's indiscriminate and disproportionate impact on unarmed men, women, and children. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty's prohibition on the weapon's use, production, transfer, and stockpile has resulted in a significant decrease of landmine injuries and deaths, the destruction of millions of stockpiled weapons, and a virtual end to the transfer of antipersonnel mines. The United States' global leadership in mine clearance and victim assistance has also contributed significantly to decreasing landmine casualties. American leadership is similarly needed to encourage other treaty holdouts to support the global ban.

Mines have caused over 100,000 U.S. Army casualties since 1942, including one third of all casualties in Vietnam and in the Gulf War. On May 19, 2001, nine retired military leaders, including Lt. General James F. Hollingsworth, former Commander of US-ROK forces, expressed their support for the Mine Ban Treaty, stating that the elimination of AP mines from the U.S. arsenal would enhance U.S. combat mobility and effectiveness and protect U.S. servicemen and

11-L-0559/QSD/6370

women. It is clear that changes in tactics, doctrines, or substitution of alternative sensor/weapon systems already available could compensate for antipersonnel landmines in Korea and elsewhere.

Afghanistan is, perhaps, the best example of the reason to eliminate this weapon from our arsenal. In that country there are an estimated 8-10 million landmines in the ground. The *Landmine Monitor 2001* reports that in the year 2000 an estimated 88 people per month were maimed or killed by the weapon in Afghanistan, a nation the size of Texas. Demining operations in that country funded, in part, by the United States, employ nearly 5,000 workers and cost millions of dollars each year. Now U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan are also at serious risk of losing lives and limbs to this insidious weapon. We encourage you to insist that the Northern Alliance end its use of the weapon and destroy their stockpiled inventory.

Most importantly, we urge you to instruct the State Department and the National Security Council to redirect the landmines policy review to reflect the need for the elimination of this out-moded, indiscriminate weapon from the U.S. arsenal. Only in this way can the United States resume its leadership on this important international issue.

Sincerely,

James P. McGovern

Jack Quinn

Lane Evans

Ray LaHood

Nita Lowey

Steven C. LaTourette

Nancy Pelosi

Steve Horn

Howard Berman

Frank A. LoBiondo

Ed Markey

Marge Roukema

President George W. Bush  
Page 3

*David E. Bonior*

David Bonior

*Jim Leach*

Jim Leach

*James Moran*

James Moran

*Philip English*

Philip English

*James Oberstar*

James Oberstar

*Sue Kelly*

Sue Kelly

*George Miller*

George Miller

*Connie Morella*

Connie Morella

*Collin Peterson*

Collin Peterson

*Shelley Moore Capito*

Shelley Moore Capito

*Dale E. Kildee*

Dale Kildee

*John C. Cooksey*

John C. Cooksey

*William Lipinski*

William Lipinski

*Bob Filner*

Bob Filner

*William J. Coyne*

William Coyne

*Luis V. Gutierrez*

Luis Gutierrez

*Martin Meehan*

Martin Meehan

*Corrine Brown*

Corrine Brown

President George W. Bush  
Page 4

Sherrad Brown  
Sherrod Brown

Lucille Roybal-Aillard  
Lucille Roybal-Aillard

Maurice Hinchey  
Maurice Hinchey

Carolyn B. Maloney  
Carolyn Maloney

John Conyers  
John Conyers

James Barcia  
James Barcia

Diane E. Watson  
Diane E. Watson

Bob Borski  
Bob Borski

Marcy Kaptur  
Marcy Kaptur

Charles Rangel  
Charles Rangel

Tim Roemer  
Tim Roemer

Bart Stupak  
Bart Stupak

Louise Slaughter  
Louise Slaughter

Maxine Waters  
Maxine Waters

Jose Serrano  
Jose Serrano

Martin Olav Sabo  
Martin Olav Sabo

Jerrold Nadler  
Jerrold Nadler

Major Owens  
Major Owens


President George W. Bush  
Page 5

  
Nick Rahall

  
Eliot Engel

  
Jerry Kleczka

  
Judd Levin

  
Lynn Woolsey

  
Rosa DeLauro

  
Barney Frank

  
Gary Ackerman

  
Mel Watt

  
Alcee Hastings


  
Ecolphus Towns

  
Patsy Mink

  
Donald Payne

  
Henry Waxman

  
Michael McNulty

  
David Price

  
Bernard Sanders

  
Peter DeFazio

President George W. Bush

Page 6




Ron Kind




Tom Allen



William J. Pascrell, Jr.



Lynn Rivers



Dennis Kucinich



Hilda Solis




Elijah Cummings



Grace F. Napolitano




Eddie Bernice Johnson



Stephanie Tubbs Jones



Diana L. DeGette



Rush Holt




Earl Blumenauer



Tony Hall



Julia Carson



Vic Snyder



William Delahunt



Earl Hilliard




President George W. Bush  
Page 7

  
Michael Capuano

  
Joseph M. Hoeffel

  
Carolyn McCarthy


  
Danny Davis


  
Sam Farr


  
Thomas Barrett


  
Xavier Becerra

  
Lois Capps

  
Jim McDermott


  
Betty McCollum


  
John Olver


  
David Wu

  
Tammy Baldwin

  
James R. Langevin

  
Mark Udall

  
Bill Luther


  
John Tierney

  
Cynthia McKinney

President George W. Bush  
Page 8

  
Juanita Millender-McDonald


  
Stephen F. Lynch

  
Zoe Lofgren

  
Anna Eshoo

  
Rod R. Blagojevich

  
Charles Gonzalez

  
Albert Wynn


  
Michael M. Honda

  
Barbara Lee


  
Pete Stark

  
Jane Harman

  
Robert Wexler

  
John Lewis

  
Lloyd Doggett

  
Ciro Rodriguez

  
Janice D. Schakowsky

  
Dennis Moore

  
Frank Pallone, Jr.

President George W. Bush  
Page 9

Wm. Lacy Clay  
William Lacy Clay

Loretta Sanchez  
Loretta L. Sanchez

Sheila Jackson Lee  
Sheila Jackson-Lee

Carolyn C. Kilpatrick  
Carolyn Kilpatrick

cc: Secretary of State Colin Powell  
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice

16

January 15, 2002 11:15 AM

# 149  
Actno.  
11/15  
17E

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Collateral Damage

Should we take a look at getting more standardized definitions for collateral damage?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011502-21

.....  
Please respond by 01/18/02

SECDEF-  
RESPONSE  
ATTACHED.

*W/R*  
*Ed 1/17*

*APR 24 11 05 AM '02*

*15 Jan 02*

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 14 2002

16 January 2002

INFORMATION PAPER

CCS RAML/17

Subject: Response to question from SECEF

1. Purpose. Respond to SD's questions, "Should we take a look at getting more standardized definitions for collateral damage?"
2. Key Points.
  - You are correct, there is no DoD standard for collateral damage.
  - Theater procedures/definitions are inconsistent.
  - My staff has developed a draft standard. The standard has been previously agreed to by all CINCs, with the exception of CENTCOM.
  - I'm reviewing the draft standards and will implement via a CJCS instruction once you approve concept. Will get on your calendar.

Prepared by: RADM L. E. Jacoby, Director of Intelligence, J-2,

11-L-0559/OSD/6380

November 23, 2002 3:35 PM

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

I want to see a report after you have taken your steps with respect to the Lima tank operation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112302.12

.....  
*Please respond by* 12 | 20 | 02  
01/09/03 (EXT. APPROVED BY OSD)  
01/22/03 (EXT. APPROVED BY OSD)

451.6

23 NOV 02



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



INFO MEMO

203 JAN 24 AM 9:24

January 21, 2003, 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *Thomas E. White* *Tom White* JAN 24 2003  
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation

- This responds to your request to see a report after steps had been taken with respect to the Lima Tank operation, based on observations by former Secretary of the Treasury, Honorable Paul O'Neill, during a visit to Lima Army Tank Plant regarding underutilized capacity, plant management, and safety issues (Tab A).
- Lima Army Tank Plant is a Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facility operated by General Dynamics Land Systems with oversight provided by the United States Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, and the in-plant Defense Contract Management Agency Office. This facility has diversified by applying its manufacturing capabilities to products beyond tanks. In addition to the Abrams tank produced for the Army and Egypt, they currently fabricate upper hull structures for the Stryker, complete structures for the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, as well as gun turrets for Navy Cruisers. The facility is also used to assemble the Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge and test the Stryker Anti-Tank Guided Missile variant.
- General Dynamics Land Systems currently employs 610 personnel at Lima Army Tank Plant, of which 90% operate on the first shift. Remaining personnel on other shifts are primarily dedicated to equipment and facility maintenance.
- Observations made by former Treasury Secretary O'Neill:
  - Observation 1: Lima Army Tank Plant was disorganized.

Response: The recent reductions in Abrams tank production requirements and the termination of the Crusader program have resulted in pockets of underutilized manufacturing space within the plant, leaving the facility not as efficient as it could be, and creating some facility maintenance issues. The pockets of manufacturing may have caused the perception of disorganization. However, it is important to note that within the current production operations

451.6

21 JAN 03

**SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation**

dedicated to the existing Abrams, Stryker, and other service programs, efficient operations are being used.

To address Lima Army Tank Plant's efficiency shortcomings and facility maintenance issues, a Contractor and Government team has been formed to review the methods by which we contract for management of facility operations. The objective of the team will be to introduce more efficient methods for operating the installation, to establish clearly understood standards for non-production related functions, and to gain better visibility over the installation operation costs. We invite your representatives to visit Lima Army Tank Plant in the June 2003 timeframe to see the results of these efforts.

The future of Lima Army Tank Plant beyond the current known projected workload is dependent on the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Lima Army Tank Plant is no longer exclusively dedicated to Heavy Combat Vehicle manufacturing. The facility is also being used for Medium/Light Vehicle manufacturing (i.e. Stryker and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle component/structure fabrication) as outlined in the FCS Acquisition Strategy. Discussions with General Dynamics Land Systems indicates that they are considering using Lima Army Tank Plant for their Manned Ground System proposal to the Lead System Integrator for FCS. The Army has made a significant investment in Lima Army Tank Plant that can be used to offset FCS facilitization costs. The current planned workload can provide a bridge for Lima Army Tank Plant to be utilized in support of the FCS Program. In the event Lima Army Tank Plant is on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list, the Army must be prepared to make a significant investment in relocating Lima's capability. Non-Army customers would be forced to establish their own capability or support the Army relocation. FCS would lose the advantage of any facilitization cost savings associated with using Lima Army Tank Plant.

- Observation 2: The plant appears to be an unsafe environment.

Response: General Dynamics Land Systems has an excellent safety record utilizing Lima Army Tank Plant. The appearance of an unsafe environment may have been attributed to: (1) retention of inactive equipment in place, (2) pockets of manufacturing activity, and (3) outstanding facility maintenance issues. Again, these problems are being worked by a Government/Contractor team.



**SUBJECT: Report on Tank Operation**

- **Observation 3: People seemed to be standing around at the end of the shift.**

**Response: General Dynamics Land Systems' policy for hourly workers provides five minutes for wash up at lunchtime and five minutes at shift change. During Honorable O'Neill's visit, workers had cleaned up their workstations, and in some cases had moved to the checkout points, in accordance with their established labor standing operating procedures.**

- **Observation 4: The production capacity was low.**
- **Response: Reduction in Abrams requirements has adversely affected the use of Lima Army Tank Plant capacity. Lima Army Tank Plant was designed to meet a surge rate requirement of 120 tanks per month on a 3/8/5 shift basis. However, today the plant is only funded to produce 10 per month on a 1/8/5 shift basis. General Dynamics Land Systems will utilize 45% of available Industrial Plant Equipment capacity/capability to meet FY03 requirements.**

- **Ongoing efforts to workload Lima Army Tank Plant:**

- **General Dynamics Land Systems is incentivized to increase facility utilization through the use of a "Rent-Free Use" contract clause. This clause allows General Dynamics Land Systems to produce products for other DoD customers without an equipment usage charge.**
- **Foreign Military Sales tank requirements are being pursued by General Dynamics Land Systems that could potentially increase the plant's utilization. Possible customers are Taiwan and Turkey.**
- **The Army is exploring options to allow for introduction of non-DoD work into the plant as a means of further reducing overhead costs.**
- **Lima Army Tank Plant's future is being evaluated as part of the upcoming BRAC and the Army's Transformation requirements, especially as it relates to FCS workload.**

**COORDINATION: NONE**

**Attachment: Memorandum from Secretary Rumsfeld, November 23, 2002, subj: Report on Tank Operation**

**Prepared By: Mr. Prince Young, Jr., (b)(6)**

December 30, 2002 11:59 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 24 2003

RUSSIA

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Russia

Please take a look at this paper on Russia. My instinct is to stick with EUCOM as the contact.

Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/18/02 DATT Moscow paper: "A Way Ahead on US-Russian Military Contact Plan"

DHR:dh  
123001-6 (ts computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 01/17/03

1/22

*Myers response attached*

*C&D For* <sup>1/24</sup>

*FILING.*

*R/cees*

30 Dec 02

January 21, 2002 12:33 PM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Closing Books

Here is a note I sent Dov Zakheim, Pentagon comptroller, and here is the answer I got back. What is your reaction?

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/07/02 SecDef memo to USD(C) re: Closing Books  
01/16/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012102-29

*1/10.01*

*20 Jan 02*


SECDEF HAS SEEN

INFO MEMO

JAN 16 2002

January 16, 2002, 9:25 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Closing Books

- There are two aspects of closing the books: budget execution and financial statement preparation. The Department of Defense closes the books for budget execution purposes monthly by the 16th workday of the following month and for financial statement purposes annually.
- We cannot provide the financial statements within a week because most of the existing systems cannot collect and maintain the detailed financial data needed to prepare the financial statements in less than the current 4-5 months time frame.
- Closing the books within a week will require major systems upgrades. Those upgrades will be implemented as part of the Department's Financial Management Modernization Program. The program is underway and its first major phase is development of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003.

Prepared by: Rita Cronley, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6387

523  
1/17

January 7, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.  
SUBJECT: Closing Books

Paul O'Neil

Paul O'Neill has gotten the Treasury books so that each month they can be closed in four days. What do we do?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-46



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Response Attached  
Larry Di Rita  
1/17

January 21, 2002 2:21 PM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: MemCon with MoD Reyes

FYI.

Attach.

01/21/02 Memorandum of Conversation between SecDef and MoD Reyes of Philippines

DHR:dh  
012102-41

*PHILIPPINES*

*21 Jan 02*

21 January 2002

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION**

SECDEF Call to Philippines Minister of Defense Alfredo Reyes

January 21, 2002 10:20 AM

SECDEF: Hello, Mr. Minister. Don Rumsfeld calling. There has been so much publicity that I wanted to call to thank you for your strong support on the war on terrorism. Be aware that we are very supportive of your efforts. I've been trying to be very careful to follow your public statements closely and characterize the situation along the lines you have described.

REYES: Thank you. We are monitoring your statements and they are helpful. Only Senator Brownback's statement was not. The president has said we are sticking to our commitments and we will support the war on terrorism.

SECDEF: We will see that we are careful here and continue to characterize our work with you properly. How are you doing?

Reyes: We can handle it. We remain steadfast as a strategic partner in this war on terrorism.

SECDEF: Thank you. We wish you well.

Reyes: Thank you.

(TUE) JAN 22 2002 9:02  
 OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CTR

DOCUMENT #	TIME STORED	TIME SENT	DURATION	TOT. DST	PAGES
3760665-643	1. 22 9:00	1. 22 9:00	21'	2	3

FIN. 2

4 STATE (003) 8 WHSR (006)

**UNCLAS  
 CLASSIFICATION**



**WASHFAX**  
**Secretary of Defense**  
**Cover Sheet**  
**12/N**



**FROM: OSD Cables**

**OFFICE/DESK: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**PHONE NO.** (b)(6)

**SUBJECT: MemCon with MOD Reyes**

**PAGES: 3 (Including Coversheet)**

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**  
 \_\_\_ **HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS**

**IMMEDIATE DELIVERY:**

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
State	Honorable Colin Powell				
WHSR	Honorable Condoleezza Rice				
11-L-0559/OSD/6391					





LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

January 18, 2002 5:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

SUBJECT: 2002 Congressional Plan

- o The Office of Legislative Affairs will develop and implement an aggressive plan to expand Congressional support for Department goals and objectives in 2002 in close coordination with the Services.
- o Elements of the plan will include:
  - 1) A breakfast each Thursday when Congress is in session that you would host.
  - 2) A breakfast each Wednesday when Congress is in session to be hosted by Secretaries Wolfowitz, Aldridge, Feith, Zakheim and Chu on a rotating basis. The Service Secretaries will regularly host similar events.
  - 3) An active agenda of trips for Members and staff to military installations and activities in cooperation with the Services. Examples are Army trips to the Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg and the Airborne and Ranger Schools at Fort Benning; Navy trips to carriers; Marine trips to Camp LeJeune and Air Force visits with the B-2 Wing at Whiteman.
  - 4) Regular presentations of the threat briefing being developed by Rich Haver in the Roosevelt Room at the White House with the goal of reaching 535 Members of Congress over an extended period of time.
  - 5) Congressional trips (CODELS) abroad focused on DoD objectives, including a regularized monthly routine of one trip per month for each House of between five and ten Members to the CENTCOM AOR.
  - 6) Appearances by you, the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries and Service Secretaries before Congressional organizations. This would include the party caucuses, as well as other Congressional organizations such as the Chowder and Marching Society, the New Democratic Coalition, the Blue Dog Democrats, the Black Caucus, the Hispanic Caucus, the Women's Issues Caucus and the Democratic Budget Study Group. Attendance at events that are open to you as a former Member, like the House Gym Dinner, should be scheduled.

11-L-0559/OSD/6392

U01202 /02

- 7) General Officers and Flag Officers will be made available for appearances before Congressional town hall meetings in the districts of Members on a bipartisan basis.

As usual, there will be a comprehensive round of Congressional hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees involving you, the Deputy Secretary, the Service Secretaries and the Under Secretaries.

showtime  
1/5/02

January 14, 2002 3:05 PM

1/10/01

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Program List

I need this list of reductions, postponements and terminations to show the cuts over the FYDP.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/21/01 FY 2003 Major Defense Program Reductions, Postponements, Terminations

DHR:dh  
011402-51

.....

Please respond by 01/18/02

*POUSD(c)*  
*Larry Lenzillo*  
*What can you pull together?*  
*Larry Di Rita*  
*14 Jan 02*

11-L-0559/OSD/6394

Larry Di Rita

1101231 /02

1/22

*FY 2003 Major Defense Program Reductions, Postponements, Terminations*

<u>Navy</u>	(\$Millions in FY03)
• Slowed Production of Amphibious Transport Ships (LPD)	-1,033
• DD-21 Terminated/Convert to DD-X R&D program	+111
• Postpone next generation nuclear aircraft carrier	-309
• Terminate Navy Area Missile Defense	-100
• Reduce V-22 purchase by 32 Aircraft (15 next year)	-403
• Begin Phase-out of 19 Spruance-Class Destroyer	-70
• Begin Phase-out of F-14 Fighter Aircraft/S-3 Anti-sub Aircraft	-35
• Complete Phase-out of Inchon-class helicopter carrier	-48
<u>Air Force</u>	
• Postpone/Restructure Low-Altitude Space Based IR System	-785
• Begin deactivating Peacekeeper ICBM	+137
• Deactivate 33 of 90 B-1 Bombers	-120
• Begin phase-out of 14 C-5As and 56 C-130s Cargo Aircraft	0
<u>Army</u>	
• Begin Phase-out of 1000 Vietnam-era Helicopters	-100
• Terminate 19 army 'legacy' ammo/weapons programs	-631
<u>Department-wide</u>	
• 15 percent Headquarters staffing reduction	-320
• 10-15 percent Defense Agencies cuts	-100
• Close overseas nuclear storage sites	-64
	<u>3,870</u>
<u>Other:</u>	
• Deep cuts to non-reimbursable DoD detailees	
• Congressional Passage of 2005 Base Closures	

*FY 2003  
Navy  
AF  
Army*

SENSITIVE  
January 24, 2002

***FY 2003 Major Defense Program Reductions, Postponements, Terminations***

	<u>(\$ in Millions)</u>	
	<u>FY 03</u>	<u>FY 04-07</u>
<b><u>Navy</u></b>		
• Slow Production of Amphibious Transport Ships (LPD)	-1,072	+992
• DD-21 Terminated/Convert to DD-X R&D program	+100	-3,522
• Postpone next generation nuclear aircraft carrier	-243	-1,683
• Terminate Navy Area Missile Defense	-100	-1,015
• Reduce V-22 purchase by 32 Aircraft (15 next year)	-403	+370
• Begin Phase-out of 19 Spruance-Class Destroyers	-55	-340
• Begin Phase-out of F-14 Fighter Aircraft/S-3 Anti-sub Aircraft	-106	-762
• Complete Phase-out of Inchon-class helicopter carriers	-48	-225
<b><u>Air Force</u></b>		
• Postpone/Restructure Low-Altitude Space Based IR System	-785	-1,128
• Begin deactivating Peacekeeper ICBM	+137	+398
• Deactivate 33 of 93 B-1 Bombers	-120	-520
• Begin Phase-out of 14 C-5A and 56 C-130 Cargo Aircraft	0	-240
<b><u>Army</u></b>		
• Begin Phase-out of 1000 Vietnam-era Helicopters	-100	-410
• Terminate 7 Army 'legacy' ammo/weapons programs in FY 2003 and 17 in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)	-532	-3,099
<b><u>Department-wide</u></b>		
• 15 percent Headquarters staffing reduction	-209	-905
• 10-15 percent Defense Agencies cuts	-195	-250
• Close overseas nuclear storage sites	<u>0</u>	<u>-119</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>-3,731</b>	<b>-12,458</b>
<b><u>Other:</u></b>		
• Deep cuts to non-reimbursable DoD detailees		
• Congressional Passage of 2005 Base Closures		

11-L-0559/OSD/6396

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: January 17, 2002  
 SUBJECT:

Please give me the account of the Syracuse campaign referenced in this letter to Merrifield.

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
 011702.05

**Please respond by:** \_\_\_\_\_

*done-1/20*  
*Copy STM*

*1/20*

*Andy Marshall*

*- Do you have  
 someone who has done or  
 can do a short analysis/  
 summary of Thucydides?  
 See second under. Pls*

*advise.*

*Di Rita*

*1/22*

11-L-0559/OSD/6397  
 U01253 /02

*33550*

*1/20/02*

JOHN MERRIFIELD, M.D.

PSYCHIATRY, ret.

(b)(6)

1:58

TELEPHONE

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

11.8.01

Secretary of Defense  
Donald Rumsfeld  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Rummy,

You may remember me as 'Dave's  
younger brother,' and so I am. I remember  
you in a sweat suit running laps to  
make your weight for a New Trier wrestling  
team match. Then over the years I followed  
your success at Seaside (i.e. John Robson,  
whose mother ~~is~~ was my best friend at N.T.)  
Only recently have I realized the extent  
and variety of your government service.  
And, just as you are about to re-vamp the  
military, 9/11 happens.

I am glad that you are there.  
I am impressed by your candor (Jim  
Lehrer last night), your reluctance to  
make optimistic promises, your  
compassion for the troops. You have  
to be a rapid learner, (so you can't  
have Alzheimer's); the careful targeting  
is laudable.

U 00622 / 02

11-L-0559/QSD/6398

(over)

I am grateful for your service to our country and the values that go back to our families and teachers and forebears.

That being said, I'll go ahead and offer some unsolicited advice:

- read, or re-read, or bear in mind David Halberstam's book about Vietnam. I believe the phrase is, 'think out of the box.'
- (★) Keep Thucydides' account of the Syracuse campaign with you always and see that your people know it.
- Get good sleep, food, exercise as though you are training for a marathon. No more than one drink a day.
- Listen to your children (cf. James Carroll, MacNomas's son) and your w. fe (is it Joyce from way back?). They are the only people you can absolutely trust to tell you a painful truth.

With my heart felt appreciation and best wishes.

Sincerely,  
John Mansfield



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE 24 Jan 2002

MEMO FOR Larry Di Rita

Here is a short piece on  
the Syracuse campaign  
explaining the likely intent  
of the letter writer.

Andy

335 SD

(17 JAN 02)

11 9 11 5 11 9 11

11 9 11 5 11 9 11

11-L-0559/OSD/6400

R 001253-02

## Thucydides and the Syracuse Campaign

Based on the letter and the context, Dr. Merrifield's allusion to Thucydides' writings on the Syracuse campaign (The Peloponnesian War, Books VI and VII), seems to be a caution against greed, overconfidence, and the desire for empire. The Athenians were drawn into war against the Syracusans (416) by a request from an old ally, the Egestaeans, who requested Athens' support against Syracuse. The Athenians, lured by the opportunity to add Sicily to their empire, agreed. They embarked on the expedition confident that the Syracusans would be easily conquered and that other "barbarians" would quickly ally themselves with the Athenian effort. The force sent for the war was, according to Thucydides, "by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time" and was put forward at huge expense, with the appearance of strength, rather than military competence, becoming the focus of Athenian efforts. The campaign was disastrous: despite early promise, the war ended in a decisive and extremely costly defeat at the hands of the Syracusans, with the Athenian navy destroyed and the forces slaughtered as they attempted to escape. As Thucydides ends his account of the campaign, "They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home." This devastating defeat was a turning point in the war with Sparta: following Syracuse, the tide of the war turned against the Athenians and the empire began to dissolve from within. The war ended in 404 with surrender by the Athenians and permanent destruction of their empire.

software  
1/12/02

January 12, 2002 8:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financial Disclosure Report

I would like to see a draft by April 1 of the report I have to file by May 15.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/10/02 GC Info Memo to SecDef, "Ethics Reports You Must File This Year"  
01/09/02 SecDef memo, "Required Reports" 010902-2

DHR:dh  
011202-1

.....  
Please respond by 01/18/02

*Original BTM*  
*Copy to GC Haynes  
Steve Epstein*

Larry Di Rita

1/22

250

12 Jan 02


January 9, 2002 7:09 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *J.*  
SUBJECT: Required Reports

What legal, ethical or financial reports do I have to file this year? When are they due? Who is supposed to prepare them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-2



Please respond by 01/16/02

*1/11*  
*Response attached*  
*D. Rumsfeld*



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

GENERAL COUNSEL

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 1/10/02*

SUBJECT: Ethics Reports You Must File This Year

- You asked what legal, ethical, or financial reports you must file this year.
- You must file a Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278) by May 15. This report covers calendar year 2001, and will update the report that you submitted when you were nominated to be the Secretary of Defense.
- You must advise the Director of the Office of Government Ethics and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee when you fulfill the requirements of your ethics agreement.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Steve Epstein (b)(6)

- *Sir - The General Counsel's Ethics attorney, Steve Epstein, will work with Terry Robbins to prepare the report. Jilte*

December 20, 2002 8:04 AM

TO: David Chu  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: AFIP and USUHS

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Dr. Bernie Wagner, and get back to me with an indication of what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/21/02 Wagner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
122002-4

.....

Please respond by 01/17/03

*Steve,*  
*check w/ Capt. Hellock and see if Winkenswade*  
*has the action and please keep me informed.*  
*See also my noted questions.*  
*RD 12.23.02*

11/20/2002 00:20 AM  
Bernard M. Wagner, M.D.  
Emeritus Research Professor of Pathology  
New York University Medical Center

(b)(6)

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 20 2002

(b)(6)

telephone  
facsimile

(b)(6)

November 21, 2002

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld  
Suite 405  
400 North Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, Illinois 60611

Dear Don:

The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), plays a vital role in our country's military preparedness. Virtually all of its programs are directly related to military readiness. Furthermore, many of these programs are unique in their specificity to the needs of DoD. For example, many cities, counties and states have forensic pathology programs. However, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System is specifically designed to address the unique circumstances attendant to deaths among the military. As we have discussed in the past, the AFIP has the strongest group of pathologists in the world. Their expertise is focused not only upon the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of disease among military personnel but also the support of DoD in research of specific importance to the Armed Forces and the education of health professionals throughout the military health care system.

This education component of the AFIP's mission has prompted the recommendation that it be united with the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Careful examination of these two organizations reveals an amazing degree of possible synergy should they be combined. Such a combination would not only provide benefits to DoD and our country but could result in major cost savings.

In summary, the AFIP is vital to the mission of DoD in terms of military readiness, Force Health Protection and homeland security. The value of USUHS to DoD is well known and respected. An alignment between the AFIP and USUHS would reinforce the major strengths of both institutions and also result in significant cost savings for DoD. I served for 15 years as a member of the Committee on Toxicology, National Academy of Sciences. During this time, the DoD was our major sponsor of studies. Repeatedly, we used the AFIP as a consultant to our committee.

Here's wishing you and your family a happy Holiday Season and I hope to see you soon. With very best personal regards,

Bernie

who & what's behind this?

11-L-0559/OSD/6406

**JAMES M. DENNY**

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FAX

November 25, 2002


Ms. (b)(6)  
Office of Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Attached is a letter that Bernie Wagner asked me to pass on to Don. Bernie was a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Scarle when Don was CEO and has been a member of the Scientific Advisory Board at Gilead for some time

Kindest Regards,



James M. Denny  
JMD/kdm

Dr./Kelli/2002/11/25/02-Nestel

cc: Larry D. Rita - ~~LDR~~

11-L-0559/OSD/6407





Colonel Stacey K. Hirata

*Military Deputy  
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
Installations and Environment*

23 Dec 2002

CAPT Steve Wellock  
P&R

Steve,

Can you tell me who within P&R will be responding to the attached SecDef snowflake?

Request they keep us informed of the reply to the SecDef.

Further request they attempt to answer Mr DuBois' handwritten questions (on the snowflake).

Thanks.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Stacey".

11-L-0559/OSD/6408

December 23, 2002 4:52 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information

What do you know about the following:

1. A drug Fort Detrick is working on that eliminates pain for a period, just by a whiff of something.
2. A synthetic vaccination that covers all or most particular risks.

*440*

Apparently the Surgeon General of the Army has been looking at this, or Fort Detrick. Al Haig mentioned them to me. Is there any prospect to them?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
122302-56

.....  
Please respond by 01/24/03

*13 Dec 02*

2003

~~November 19, 2002 5:21 PM~~

TO: *To [unclear]*  
~~Doug Feith~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Fuel Facility

*DJS —*  
*Please ask staff*  
*to prepare a response.*  
*1/2/03*  
*1/2/3*  
*RUSSIA*

What in the world are we going to do about this facility that was built to process missile fuel? Please see the attached.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated CIA Senior Executive Memorandum

DHR:dh  
111902.15

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*27 Jan 03*

Unclassified when separate from attachment

January 23, 2002 7:16 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Torie Clarke  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Photos of Detainees

383.6

Please tell me precisely what the rules are with respect to photographs of detainees, and let's look at it and get a policy established for Guantanamo, Bagram, Torie Clarke and everyone else who is releasing these things.

In addition, it seems to me that anytime we release a photo, we ought to have an explanation of what in the world it is, so people know. That clearly would have saved all these problems the last four days, if we had explained what that one picture was. I hope it has been taken off the web site.

We need some precise rules as to how we are going to handle the prisoners and the photos.

Thanks.

*DR*

*LARRY DI RITA  
1/24*

DHR:dh  
012302-1

*If we no longer policy through...  
No...  
...  
...*

Please respond by 01/25/02

*Jim - The Burger memo suggests that we will not permit photos, period. clearly, we are not following it.*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

January 24, 2002, 7:30 AM

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 1/24/02*

SUBJECT: Photos of Detainees

- You asked about the precise rules with respect to photos of detainees and directed establishment of a policy for places where detainees are being held.
- The rule in regard to photographs of detainees is based on Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949: “[P]risoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.”
- While this rule does not explicitly forbid the taking of pictures and publication of photographs of prisoners of war, the U.S. Government has interpreted it to mean that photographing prisoners of war or detainees and publishing the photographs in newspapers or journals would be holding them up to public curiosity and therefore forbidden. Tab A contains a written explanation we provided to interested DoD officials on January 10.
- Still, we have worked with OSD/PA to accommodate press interests to the extent possible. As a result, the approved guidance of January 11 provides: “Group or wide area photo/video coverage of detainees in and about detainee facilities may be permitted by the camp commander, subject to security requirements and the following restrictions,” including that “[n]ews media coverage, including photo/video coverage, will not identify individual detainees, by name (s) or by image.” I believe this guidance strikes the right balance. Tab B.
- I concur that when photos are posted, they should be fully explained. We understand from OSD/PA that the photo that caused so much discussion carried some sort of explanation about detainees arriving.

COORDINATION: None

**TAB**

**A**

January 10, 2001, 16:00  
J. Burger, OGC, IA

**Policy on Photos of Battlefield Detainees**  
Prepared by the DoD General Counsel

While Operation Enduring Freedom battlefield detainees have not been determined to be prisoners of war, the policy on forbidding photography is in accord with treating them consistent with the protections provided under the Third Geneva Convention. This is not a change in policy. It is in conformity with long-standing U.S. procedures and practice.


We realize that some photography of detainees has been seen in the world's media during the past several weeks. Some of this has been inadvertent or unavoidable. Some of this has resulted from the Department's long-standing policy not being clearly understood or uniformly applied. The Department's underlying policy has not changed.

The policy of prohibiting the release for publication of photography of prisoners of war is based upon Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. That Article states: "[P]risoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity."

While this rule does not explicitly forbid the taking of pictures and publication of photographs of prisoners of war, the United States Government has always interpreted it to mean that taking pictures of prisoners of war and publishing them in newspapers or journals would be holding the prisoners up to public curiosity and is therefore forbidden.

The United States has historically forbidden the release of photographs of prisoners of war, and has objected when hostile powers have published photographs of, or held press briefings showing detained U.S. military personnel.

The theory behind the rule is that the detaining authority might use the publication of pictures for its own ends, for example, to show that it was treating the prisoners humanely while in truth it was not. There have been instances when detaining powers have used photographs and press briefings for propaganda purposes.

 The Department's regulation on prisoners of war and other detained persons states that: "Photography, filming and video taping of individual EPW (enemy prisoners of war), CI (civilian internees) and RP (retained persons) for other than internal Internment Facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited. No group, wide area or aerial photographs of EPW, CI and RP or facilities will be taken unless approved by senior Military Police officer in the Internment Facility's chain of command." (Reference: paragraph 1-5d of AR 190-8, OPNAVIST 3461.6, AFI 31-304, MCO 3461.1)

As we proceed, we will review applicable policies, including this one, as appropriate.

**TAB**

**B**



-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

RAAUZYUW RUEKJCS9221 0121711-UUUU--RUEKCHP.

ZNR UUUUU

R 111124Z JAN 02

FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA//

TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON DETAINEES.

REFERENCES: A. SECDEF MESSAGE 072300Z JAN 02, PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS IN NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA IN

SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). B. SECDEF MESSAGE 072020 DEC 01, CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

1. PURPOSE: TO CLARIFY AND SUPERCEDE PAG ON COVERAGE OF DETAINEES AND DETAINEE FACILITIES.

2. EXTERNAL NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DETAINEES:

2.A. GROUP OR WIDE AREA PHOTO/VIDEO COVERAGE OF DETAINEES IN AND ABOUT DETAINEE FACILITIES MAY BE PERMITTED BY THE CAMP COMMANDER, SUBJECT TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS. INSERT THESE RESTRICTIONS IN NEWS MEDIA GROUND RULES.

2.A.1. NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE, INCLUDING PHOTO/VIDEO COVERAGE, WILL NOT IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL DETAINEES, BY NAME(S) OR BY IMAGE (I.E., CLOSE-UP

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS

IMAGES OF INDIVIDUAL FACE(S) THAT WOULD ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO BE IDENTIFIED WILL NOT BE PERMITTED.)

2.A.2. COVERAGE MAY SHOW GROUPS OF DETAINEES, BUT ONLY IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRICTION IN PARA. 2.A.1.

2.A.3. COVERAGE OF DETAINEES IN TRANSIT IS NOT PERMITTED, INCLUDING GROUND AND AIR MOVEMENT BETWEEN DETENTION FACILITIES, OR MOVEMENT BETWEEN DETENTION FACILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION (BUSES, FERRIES, PLANES, ETC.).

2.B. COVERAGE OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS OR INTERVIEWS IS NOT PERMITTED. NEWS MEDIA INTERVIEWS WITH DETAINEES ARE NOT PERMITTED.

2.C. INTERVIEWS WITH SENIOR COMMANDERS, SUPPORT STAFF, AND DETENTION CAMP PERSONNEL ARE PERMITTED, CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE IN PARA.

6. OF REF A.

3. INTERNAL NEWS, COMBAT CAMERA COVERAGE: INTERNAL NEWS COVERAGE OF DETAINEE ACTIVITIES IS PERMITTED, SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS IN PARAS. 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. OF THIS PAG. PARAS. 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. OF THIS PAG DO NOT APPLY TO COMBAT CAMERA. ANY COMBAT CAMERA OR INTERNAL NEWS IMAGERY, OR INTERNAL NEWS STORIES, MUST BE CLEARED THROUGH OASD-PA TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH PARAS 2.A. THROUGH 2.C. BEFORE PUBLIC RELEASE.

PAGE 05 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS

4. ACCESS BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSISTENT WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949 AND WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AND OBSERVE DETAINEES. ONLY ICRC PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT/OBSERVE DETAINEES.

5. CHANGES TO PREVIOUS PAG:

5.A. PARAGRAPH 5.E. OF REF. A IS DELETED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND

-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

11-L-0559/OSD/6417

-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

SUPERCEDED BY THIS PAG.

5.B. PARAGRAPH 8, 8.A., 8.C. AND 8.D. OF REF. A IS DELETED AND SUPERCEDED BY PARA. 3 OF THIS PAG. NEWS AND IMAGERY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE REGIONAL CINC'S PA OFFICE THROUGH US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND BEFORE FORWARDING TO OASD-PA FOR RELEASE APPROVAL.

5.C. QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 8 OF REF. A. IS DELETED AND SUPERCEDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

Q8. WILL THE DETAINEES HAVE ACCESS TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS?

A8. CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS/RED CRESCENT PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AND OBSERVE DETAINEES. ONLY

PAGE 06 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS

ICRC PERSONNEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT/OBSERVE DETAINEES.

6. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE:

6.A. BASED ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXISTING GUIDANCE, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO WILL BE TREATED AS THEY WERE TREATED UPON COMING UNDER U.S. CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN: HUMANELY AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949. WITHIN THIS GUIDANCE, THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO MAY BE AFFECTED BY SECURITY NEEDS AND THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE AVAILABLE FACILITIES AT GUANTANAMO.

6.B. EVEN THOUGH DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, THEY ARE ENEMY PERSONS CAPTURED DURING THE ONGOING COALITION CONFLICT AGAINST TERRORISM.

6.C. NO PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE DETAINEES WILL BE ALLOWED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING U.S. PRACTICE, INCLUDING OPERATION DESERT STORM, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH PROHIBIT DETAINED PERSONS FROM BEING SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC CURIOSITY OR HUMILIATING TREATMENT.

6.D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) HAS HAD ACCESS TO DETAINEES WHILE THEY WERE IN THE CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF

PAGE 07 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS

OPERATIONS. THIS, TOO, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTION PROVISIONS. AT GUANTANAMO, WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, ICRC REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE PERMITTED TO VISIT THE DETAINEES.

6.E. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO DETAINEES. THIS, TOO, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH RECOGNIZE THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE ICRC FOR PURPOSES OF ENSURING HUMANE TREATMENT AND MONITORING CONDITIONS OF DETAINEES.

6.F. DETAINED PERSONS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TREATED HUMANELY. HUMANE TREATMENT MEANS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THEY WILL BE GIVEN ADEQUATE FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, CLOTHING AND MEDICAL TREATMENT. WITHIN THIS GUIDANCE, THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO MAY BE AFFECTED BY SECURITY NEEDS AND THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF THE AVAILABLE FACILITIES AT GUANTANAMO.

6.G. THE POLICY ON LIMITING PHOTOGRAPHY IS IN ACCORD WITH TREATING DETAINEES CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTIONS PROVIDED UNDER THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION. THIS IS NOT A CHANGE IN POLICY. IT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH LONG-STANDING U.S. PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE.

-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

11-L-0559/OSD/6418

-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

6.H. THE POLICY OF LIMITING THE RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHY OF DETAINEES IS CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 13 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949. THAT ARTICLE STATES: '[P]RISONERS OF WAR

PAGE 08 RUEKJCS9221 UNCLAS  
MUST AT ALL TIMES BE PROTECTED, PARTICULARLY AGAINST ACTS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION AND AGAINST INSULTS AND PUBLIC CURIOSITY.' WHILE THIS RULE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY FORBID THE TAKING OF PICTURES AND PUBLICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS INTERPRETED IT TO MEAN THAT TAKING PICTURES OF INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS OF WAR OR DETAINEES AND PUBLISHING THEM IN NEWSPAPERS OR JOURNALS WOULD BE HOLDING THEM UP TO PUBLIC CURIOSITY AND IS THEREFORE FORBIDDEN.

6.I. THE UNITED STATES HAS HISTORICALLY FORBIDDEN THE RELEASE OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS OF WAR, AND HAS OBJECTED WHEN HOSTILE POWERS HAVE PUBLISHED PHOTOGRAPHS OF, OR HELD PRESS BRIEFINGS SHOWING DETAINED U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

6.J. AS WE PROCEED, WE WILL REVIEW APPLICABLE POLICIES, INCLUDING THIS ONE, AS APPROPRIATE.

7. OASD (PA) CONTACT IS THE DOD PRESS OFFICE, (b)(6) COMM: (b)(6) E-MAIL NEWSDESK@OSD.MIL.

BT  
#9221

NNNN  
<[^^^]> 01/12/2002 1223 <[^^^]>

-----  
UNCLASSIFIED  
-----

11-L-0559/OSD/6419



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2002 JUN 20 PM 2:56



*D. J. / 24*  
*ms / 24*

DEP SEC DEF  
HAS SEEN

*SD*  
*INFO*

FFR 5 2002

*334 DSB*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. Chu 24 Jun 02*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Defense Science Board Task Force Report on "Training Superiority & Training Surprise"

- You asked for my thoughts on Andy Marshall's note to you about Joe Braddock's Defense Science Board Task Force report, Training Superiority & Training Surprise (see attached).
- The training community may be the one sector that can react – transform – by 2004. Indeed, the QDR identified the transformation of military training as the key enabler for achieving the operational goals of DoD Transformation.
- In response to your direction in the QDR, we are working with the Services, Joint Staff, and CINCs to develop a Strategic Plan for Transforming Training. We should be ready to report to you in early March.

RECOMMENDATION: N/A

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Paul Mayberry, DUSD/R, (b)(6)  
Cc: Andy Marshall

*(29 Jan 02)*

11-L-0553/OSD/6420

U01419 /02

*DSD*

January 4, 2002 2:43 PM

TO: Tom White  
Gordon England  
Jim Roche  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: DSB Report on Training


Here's an interesting report from the DSB that Andy Marshall forwarded.

I would be interested in your thoughts.

Thanks.

Attach.  
January 2001 DSB Report, "Training Superiority & Training Surprise"

DHR:dh  
010402-35



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U00256 /02

930



DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

202 JAN -3 PM 4:52

January 2, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andrew Marshall

SUBJECT: DSB Report on Training

This is an interesting report that I am sending you because you may not have seen it and because superior training is one of our force's most important areas of advantage over potential opponents. Excellent training in peacetime is not our historical pattern. We owe the current situation to a revolution in training that began in the early 1970's.

Joe Braddock, one of the directors of the DSB study, tells me that the basis of our advantage in training is eroding, slightly for now but it deserves attention. Also, there are new opportunities, new technologies that can provide farther improvement in training.

A second report on a subsequent phase of the study group's work will be available at mid-year.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	1/4
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/3

U00168 /02



11-L-0559/OSD/6422

11-1800

January 18, 2002 9:27 AM

INDIA

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Reply to India

Please make sure we get a nice thank you to the Minister of Defense of India for the silver box he gave us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
011802-6

.....  
Please respond by 1/25/02

→ Capt Mills  
Larry Di Rita  
1/22

18 Jan 02

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

January 24, 2002/1145

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (A&L) *[Signature]* 1/24/02

SUBJECT: Anticipated Savings for Currently Approved Business Initiative Council (BIC) Initiatives

The purpose of this memo is to respond to your inquiry regarding the actual savings we anticipate seeing from the approved BIC initiatives, once implemented. The BIC Principals have approved 24 initiatives to date.

- Of the 24 approved BIC initiatives, 8 (TAB A) reflect a (\$874M-\$1.2B) savings. Some initiatives, e.g., Enterprise Software Initiative, require an up-front investment (\$.5M) to lay in the software for implementation. Other initiatives, e.g., Recovery Auditing, do not require an investment and will reap savings.
- The remaining initiatives not reflecting any savings (not shown in TAB A), are either unquantifiable; i.e., will reduce cycle time, accelerate decision-making, etc.; or are too early in their implementation to determine exact savings. As the latter initiatives mature, savings will be documented, projected, and updated.
- The savings estimates are preliminary and will likely change when the functional/process boards conduct more thorough business case analyses. We have contacted OSD (PA&E) to solicit their assistance in developing and refining the estimates. We have not yet developed service-by-service breakdowns and that will be part of our further refinement of the estimates.

RECOMMENDATION: For Information Only.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments  
As stated

Prepared by: Ms Joanne M. Rodefer, (b)(6) 1069-2002

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics:

The Honorable E. C. Aldridge  
Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England  
Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White

11-1-0559/OSD/6424

U01510 /02



**TAB**

**A**

**Initiative Title & Description:**

**INVESTMENT  
REQUIRED**

**SAVINGS  
(\$M)**

*Approval Date: 14 Sep 01*

**Recovery Auditing:**

**Use contingency fee auditing services contract to identify and recover overpayments in Working Capital Funds to providers of goods and services**

**Summary of Savings:**

**Recovering vendor over-payments, through contingency fee-based contracts with private auditors**

FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
0	0	\$75-\$145	\$25-\$50	\$25-\$50	\$25-\$50	\$25-\$50	0	0	\$175-\$345

**Investment Required/Savings:**

**Web-based Invoice/Receipt Processing:**

**To reduce occurrence of incorrectly prepared or missing receiving reports and move toward a paperless process, using existing automated systems, so that DFAS can pay vendors more quickly and accurately**

**Summary of Savings:**

**Removing paper-based receiving reports, the primary cause of late payments/interest penalties**

FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
\$0.3	\$1.0	\$7-\$11	\$21-\$34	\$35-\$57	\$35-\$57	\$35-\$57	\$35-\$57	\$35-\$57	\$203-\$330

**Investment Required/Savings:**

**Local / Regional Cell Phone Pooling:**

**To overcome the rising cellular telephone bills and cost of inefficient phone purchases; negotiate new local or regional cell phone contracts by consolidating cell phone users into appropriate pools**

**Summary of Savings:**

**Obtaining lower overall costs and/or enhanced service plans and capabilities**

FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
0	0	\$3-\$10	\$3-\$10	\$3-\$10	\$3-\$10	\$3-\$10	0	0	\$15-\$50

**Investment Required/Savings:**

**Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI):**

**Streamline the acquisition process by providing best-priced, standards-compliant software products, through expanding the use of the ESI process as the benchmark acquisition strategy**

**Summary of Savings:**

**Using the combined purchasing power of the entire DoD to negotiate agreements, resulting in volume-discount savings**

FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
\$0.5	0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	0	0	\$35

**Investment Required/Savings:**

*Approval Date: 3 Dec 01*

**Allow for Contracting of Security Guards**

**Allow Services to contract security guards in the Continental United States at small locations, in an effort to provide increased flexibility, as the DoD continues to enhance anti-terrorism/force protection measures**

**Summary of Savings:**

**Contracting out security guards vice permanent government employment, thus gaining short-term increase in security during increased threat conditions**

FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
0	0	\$3.5	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$7.0	\$45.50

**Investment Required/Savings:**

11-L-0559/OSD/6426

<u>Initiative Title &amp; Description:</u>	INVESTMENT REQUIRED			SAVINGS (\$M)						
<i>Approval Date: 3 Dec 01</i>										
<u>Revise Davis-Bacon Act Thresholds:</u>	Raise the current threshold subject to Davis-Bacon Act from \$2K to the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100K									
<u>Summary of Savings:</u>	Gaining the ability to submit more contracts/ projects for local competitive bid, vice using government-fixed labor rates; expands small business opportunities									
<u>Investment Required/Savings:</u>	FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
	0	0	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$45.5
<u>Improve Interservice Product Quality Deficiency Report (PODR) Business Process:</u>	Develop and implement a methodology to seamlessly share PDQR data across all Services and Agencies									
<u>Summary of Savings:</u>	Creating a better interface among item managers, service engineering pools and contractors to resolve critical safety issues, as well as a potential cost avoidance in PDQR process									
<u>Investment Required/Savings:</u>	FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
	\$0.75	\$0.75	0	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$0.75	\$4.5
<u>Eliminate Excise Tax on DoD Tactical Vehicles:</u>	Request authorization for exemption by the Treasury Department from paying the Federal Retail Excise Tax (FRET) on all military and tactical-wheeled vehicles, above 33,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight, which is currently required under Title 26 United States Code, Sections 4051-4053									
<u>Summary of Savings:</u>	Avoiding in excess of \$228M in taxes across FYDP (FY 03-09)									
<u>Investment Required/Savings:</u>	FY02	FY03	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	Cum Sav
	0	0	\$65.9	\$21.2	\$33.5	\$38.7	\$68.9	\$52.4	\$70.6	\$351.2
<b>TOTAL: Investment Required</b>			\$167.9-	\$91.45-	\$117.75-	\$122.95-	\$153.15-	\$101.65-	\$119.25-	\$874.1-
<b>/Savings:</b>	\$1.75	\$0.75	\$248.9	\$136.45	\$171.75	\$176.95	\$207.15	\$123.65	\$141.85	\$1206.7

**TAB**

**B**

Coordination Page

Secretary of the Army	Mr. White	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Navy	Mr. England	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Air Force	Dr. Roche	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Lt Gen Carlson (on behalf of Gen Pace)	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

January 7, 2002/0700

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,  
Technology and Logistics *E. C. Aldridge* 1/9/02

SUBJECT: Anticipated Savings for Currently Approved Business Initiative  
Council (BIC) Initiatives

The purpose of this memo is to respond to your inquiry regarding the actual savings we anticipate seeing from the approved BIC initiatives, once implemented. The BIC Principals have approved 24 initiatives to date (10 at their September (TABs A & B) and 14 at the December meetings (TABs C and D)).

- Some initiatives, e.g., Enterprise Software Initiative, require an up-front investment (\$.5M) to lay in the software for implementation (TAB A). Other initiatives, e.g., Recovery Auditing (TAB A), will reap savings.
- The remaining initiatives not reflecting any savings, are either unquantifiable; i.e., will reduce cycle time, accelerate decision-making, etc. (highlighted in yellow shading); or are too early in their implementation to determine exact savings (green shading). As the latter initiatives mature, savings will be documented, projected, and updated.
- The savings estimates are preliminary and will likely change when the functional/process boards conduct more thorough business case analyses. We have contacted OSD (PA&E) to solicit their assistance in developing and refining the estimates. We have not yet developed service-by-service breakdowns and that will be part of our further refinement of the estimates.

RECOMMENDATION: For Information Only.

COORDINATION: TAB E

BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England

Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Peter Pace

000497 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/6430

**Attachments**

**As stated**

**Prepared by: Ms Joanne M. Rodefer,** (b)(6)

**TAB**

**A**





# Early Look At Investments, Potential Savings/Benefits From Approved Initiatives (14 Sep 01)

-1/4/02 14:14

-Benefits Include Reduced Cycle Time, Accelerated Decision-Making, etc.

**Table 1 - Potential Savings**

INITIATIVE	FISCAL YEAR					Cum. SAV
	FY 03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	
ONE TIME PRORITY PLACEMENT						
MODIFY WAIVER AUTHORITY						
MANPOWER MIX MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY						
RECOVERY AUDITING	75-145	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	175,348
RAISING BTR THRESHOLDS						
WEB-BASED INVOICE/RECEIPT PROCESS	35-57	35-57	35-57	35-57	35-57	175,386
COMMON RANGE SCHEDULING TOOL						
LOCAL/REGIONAL CELL PHONE POOLING	6-6	6-6	6-6	6-6	6-6	
ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE INITIATIVE	7-7	7-7	7-7	7-7	7-7	
COMMON FLIGHT CLEARANCE						
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>73</b>				

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - WORKING PAPERS NOT INTENDED FOR USE EXTERNAL TO THE BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL(BIC) EFFORT**

**TAB**

**B**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

**SUBJECT: Business Initiative Council (BIC) Approval of Quick Hit Initiatives**

In early July 2001, I announced the establishment of the Business Initiative Council (BIC) to improve the business operations of the Department of Defense (DoD) through a wide array of short (quick hit) and long-term initiatives, and reallocate savings yielded by such initiatives to higher priority efforts (i.e., people, readiness, modernization, and transformation). The BIC is operational and ready to identify the first set of business initiatives that will lay the groundwork for more far-ranging enterprise-level initiatives.

On 14 September 2001, the members of the BIC (the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I) received a presentation from the BIC Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and the BIC Executive Directors (EDs), which solicited approval for the immediate implementation of eleven quick hit proposals. These quick hit initiatives were recommended on the basis of their ability to benefit our warfighters, provide common (joint) good across DoD, and to provide identifiable savings / benefits that will have a positive impact on FY03 budget / execution. At the conclusion of the meeting, the BIC approved ten initiatives and directed the BIC ESC and EDs to work with the identified DoD champions of each initiative in the development and deployment of their action plans. The approved quick hit initiatives and their DoD champions are summarized in the attachment to this memorandum.

Approval of this first set of initiatives is only the beginning of a phased-effort by the BIC to identify and implement promising ideas to improve the way we conduct our business. The BIC structure includes seven process / functional boards made up of subject matter experts from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services who will continue to work collaboratively and continuously to bring good ideas forward to the BIC for consideration. Improving the Department's business operations ultimately takes the

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.  
**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England  
**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche  
**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White  
**Joint Staff:** General Richard B. Myers

11-L-0559/OSD/6435

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

collective efforts of leadership, and the participation and support of our total workforce, to make our operations more efficient. To this end, the BIC is personally committed to support the DoD champions of these initiatives to help see them through to successful completion, while working with the BIC process / functional boards as they continue their search for promising new ideas to sharpen DoD business processes.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E. C. Aldridge, Jr." with a stylized flourish at the end.

Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

Sept 13, 2001  
Date Approved

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

**Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics: The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.**  
**Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England**  
**Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche**  
**Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White**  
**Joint Staff: General Richard B. Myers**

11-L-0559/OSD/6436

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

ATTACHMENT (1):

SUMMARY OF APPROVED QUICK HIT INITIATIVES  
(RESULTS OF BIC MEETING, 14 SEPTEMBER 2001)

**People Processes:**

**Title: One-Time Clearance of Priority Placement for Scientific & Engineering Positions**

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, eliminate unnecessary delays being experienced in the hiring of hard to fill scientific and engineering positions, by allowing for a one-time clearance of the Priority Placement Program (PPP).

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Change DoD policy to allow one-time clearance of PPP for scientific & engineering positions by revising PPP regulations and providing implementation guidance.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to pursue modification of DoD PPP regulations to allow for one-time clearing for scientific & engineering positions.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVFACSYSCOM Director of Civilian Personnel Programs)

**Title: Modify 180-Day Waiting Period to Hire Retired Military**

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, encourage highly qualified retired military personnel to pursue civil service careers by having SECDEF authorize Service Secretaries to delegate waiver authority within the components.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** DoD authorize re-delegation of waiver authority to the services.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to request re-delegation authority from SECDEF.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Directorate of Personnel Force Management)

**Title: Manpower Mix Management Flexibility**

**Description of Initiative:** OSD allow the Services to make the most efficient use of civilian / contract personnel without predetermined constraints / expectations.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** OSD eliminate civilian full-time equivalent targets from DoD programming guidance.

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

**Joint Staff:** General Richard B. Myers

11-L-0559/OSD/6437

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



## BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

**Approved Actions:** BIC will approach SECDEF to support changing the policy and practice, with respect to DoD planning guidance, that establishes civilian full-time equivalent targets / end-strength controls.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

### Corporate Operations Processes:

**Title:** Recovery Auditing

**Description of Initiative:** Use contingency fee auditing services contract to identify and recover overpayments in Working Capital Funds to providers of goods and services.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Military services and DoD agencies implement for working capital funds immediately (Navy, Army, and DLA have pilots working).

Samples of successful contingency fee based recovery auditing contracts to be made available to all services / agencies for their use; lessons-learned to be shared so that problems leading to overpayments are corrected.

**Approved Actions:** BIC members agree to full implementation of recovery auditing for all DoD working capital funds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (Assistant Secretary of the Navy for FM&C)

**Title:** Raise Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR) Thresholds

**Description of Initiative:** Raise the thresholds for BTR actions to provide program managers greater flexibility to execute their programs by increasing thresholds for Procurement accounts from \$10M to \$20M and Research & Development thresholds from \$4M to \$10M.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Congressional oversight committees (four) must approve higher thresholds, but legislation is *not* required. DoD implement immediately when Congress agrees to raise the thresholds.

**Approved Actions:** BIC will request USD(C) signature on letters to the four congressional oversight committee chairpersons, asking each to consider raising the thresholds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

### BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.


**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

**Joint Staff:** General Richard B. Myers

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



## BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

### Title: Web-based Invoice / Receipt Processing

**Description of Initiative:** To reduce the incurrence of incorrectly prepared or missing receiving reports and move toward a paperless process, use existing automated systems so that DFAS can pay vendors more quickly and accurately.

- *Wide Area Workflow (WAWF):* Reduces prompt payment penalties through paperless processing of receiving reports.
- *Web Invoicing System (WinS):* Reduces DFAS charging through paperless processing of invoices.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** Fully enforce policy Chapter 131, Section 2227 of Title 10 USC (requiring claims / payments to be processed electronically).

**Approved Actions:** BIC will direct DoD components to work with DFAS and contractors to make WAWF and WinS a focus of future efforts.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Marine Corps (Fiscal Division; Accounting Liaison and Technical Services (RFL))

### Title: Common Range Scheduling Tool

**Description of Initiative:** To enhance coordination of testing schedules across multiple sites, and avoid unnecessary scheduling delays, rationalize the scheduling process across the services to enable implementation of a web-based scheduling tool. Develop and implement a web-based scheduling tool capable of real or near real-time updates.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$1.2M for tool development (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to direct development and implementation of a common scheduling process with a web-enabled tool.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVAIRSYSCOM Test & Evaluation)

### Title: Local / Regional Cell Phone Pooling

**Description of Initiative:** To overcome rising cost of cellular telephone bills and inefficient phone purchases, negotiate new local or regional cell phone contracts to consolidate cell phone users into appropriate pools.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to the purchase of cell services using pooled group rates, as manageable.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Secretary for Acquisition)

## BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.


**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

**Joint Staff:** General Richard B. Myers

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

**Acquisition Management Processes**

**Title: Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI)**

**Description of Initiative:** Streamline the acquisition process by providing best-priced, standards-compliant software products through expanding the use of the ESI process as the benchmark acquisition strategy by:

1. Using the current structure of executive agents distributed among military departments / defense agencies.
2. Maintaining a flexible process to be responsive to customer needs.
3. Extending a software asset management framework within the DoD to enhance enterprise software life-cycle management capability.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required. ESI is an ongoing initiative, therefore, integrate implementation strategy in accordance with the ESI implementation plan.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$515k for software asset management tools (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to fully implement ESI.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DoD, Deputy Chief Information Officer (CIO)

**Title: Common Flight Clearance Process**

**Description of Initiative:** In order to reduce clearance turnaround time, develop and implement a "common" flight clearance process by incorporating the latest information technology advancements.

**Required Policy Changes / Approach:** No policy changes are required.

**FY02 Investment Requirement:** \$1M for process implementation (*Services will bear investment cost*).

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to implementation of a common flight clearance process.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVAIRSYSCOM Test & Evaluation Engineering)

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

**Chairman:** Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

**Logistics:** The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

**Secretary of the Navy:** The Honorable Gordon R. England

**Secretary of the Air Force:** The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche

**Secretary of the Army:** The Honorable Thomas E. White

**Joint Staff:** General Richard B. Myers



**TAB**

**C**



**Early Look At Investments, Potential Savings/Benefits From Approved Initiatives (3 Dec 01)** -1/4/02 14:15

**-Benefits Include Reduced Cycle Time, Accelerated Decision-Making, etc.**

INITIATIVE								
ALLOW FOR CONTRACTING OF SECURITY GUARDS	3.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	45.5
STREAMLINE PROFESSIONAL CONTINUING EDUCATION								
MODIFY JPME II REQUIREMENTS								
REVISE DAVIS-BACON ACT THRESHOLDS	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	45.5
IMPROVE INTERSERVICE PQDR BUSINESS PROCESS		0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	4.5
ESTABLISH FUNDING FLEXIBILITY WITHIN A PROGRAM								
ESTABLISH PROCESS FOR PROPERTY CONVEYANCE FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSES								
INCREASE FLEXIBILITY OF EXPIRED YEAR FUNDS								
INCREASE EXPENSE/INVESTMENT THRESHOLD								
ESTABLISH O&M CLOSE-OUT PROCESS								
STREAMLINE CONTRACT CLOSE-OUT PROCESS								
STREAMLINE IMPLEMENTATION								
ELIMINATE EXCISE TAX ON DoD TACTICAL VEHICLES	65.9	65.9	33.5	38.7	68.9			
STREAMLINE ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION PROCESS								
<b>TOTAL</b>								

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - WORKING PAPERS NOT INTENDED FOR USE EXTERNAL TO THE BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL(BIC) EFFORT**

**TAB**

**D**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL (BIC)

December 11, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERAL COUNSEL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Business Initiative Council's (BIC) Approval of Initiatives

The BIC Executive Steering Committee and Executive Directors briefed members of the BIC (the Secretaries of the Military Services, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I) on December 3, 2001 and requested approval for the second set of initiatives. At the conclusion of the meeting, the BIC approved the 14 initiatives and provided re-direction on three previously approved initiatives, all of which are summarized in the attachment to this memorandum. The BIC champions for these 14 initiatives are hereby authorized to develop and launch their implementation plans. While undertaking these efforts, they carry my authority, on behalf of the Senior Executive Council, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. I therefore expect the full support and cooperation of all staffs across the Department.

Approval of this second set of initiatives continues the phased effort by the BIC to identify and implement ideas to improve the way we conduct our business. The BIC will continue to work collaboratively and continuously to bring good ideas forward for consideration. Improving the Department's business operations ultimately takes the collaborative efforts of leadership and the participation and support of our total workforce. To this end, the BIC members are committed to supporting the DoD champions during implementation and the BIC boards as they continue their search for promising new ideas to sharpen DoD business processes.

E. C. ALDRIDGE, JR.  
Chairman

Attachment:  
As stated

**BUSINESS INITIATIVE COUNCIL**

Chairman: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &  
Logistics: The Honorable E. C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Secretary of the Navy: The Honorable Gordon R. England  
Secretary of the Air Force: The Honorable Dr. James G. Roche  
Secretary of the Army: The Honorable Thomas E. White  
Vice Chairman: of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Peter Pace

11-L-0559/OSD/6444

**ATTACHMENT:**

**SUMMARY OF APPROVED QUICK HIT INITIATIVES  
(RESULTS OF BIC MEETING, 3 DECEMBER 2001)**

**People Processes:**

**Title: Optimize Professional Continuing Education**

**Description of Initiative:** In an effort to streamline Professional Continuing Education (PCE), allow Services to determine who/where is the best to provide PCE.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DoD and the Services make the determination as to where PCE will take place, and which Service is best suited to provide this education.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force

**Title: Modify JPME II Requirements**

**Description of Initiative:** Modify Joint Professional Military Education II by allowing the course to be less than 12 weeks, removing the requirement for mandatory sequencing (JPME I, JPME II, joint billet) in order to be designated a Joint Specialty Officer, and by allowing Service Staff & War Colleges to provide resident and non-resident JPME II.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** HASC NDAA FY02 includes language directing an independent study to review Joint Officer Management and JPME II Reforms. The current HASC language requires the SecDef to submit the report to Congress not later than June 30, 2002. After completion of the report, and based on the study's recommendations, Joint Staff will re-engage with Congress to facilitate the required legislation to modify JPME II.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Joint Staff

**Title: Allow for Contracting of Security Guards**

**Description of Initiative:** Allow Services to contract security guards in the Continental United States (CONUS) at small locations in an effort to provide increased flexibility as the Department continues to enhance anti-terrorism/force protection measures.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Propose legislative language to change Federal law (Title 10 USC 2465, passed in 1983), prohibiting contracting of security guards.

Include this language in the FY03 legislative initiatives.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Legislative Affairs)

**Logistics/Readiness Processes:**

**Title: Revise Davis-Bacon Act Thresholds**

**Description of Initiative:** Raise the current threshold subject to Davis-Bacon Act from \$2K to the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100K.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Develop legislative language addressing Title 40 USC 276a and amending this Title and include in FY03 legislative initiatives to allow an increase in thresholds.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Legislative Affairs)

**Title: Improve Interservice Product Quality Deficiency Reporting (PQDR) Business Process**

**Description of Initiative:** Develop and implement a methodology to seamlessly share PQDR data across all Services and Agencies.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Amend Joint Service regulations, rewriting/eliminating language necessary to allow for seamless sharing of PQDR.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Defense Logistics Agency (DoD PQDR Process IPT)

**Title: Establish Process for Property Conveyance for Conservation Purposes**

**Description of Initiative:** Allow DoD to convey surplus property to a State or local government, or nonprofit conservation organization for natural resource conservation purposes.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Develop legislative language, proposing modification of state and federal environmental laws and regulations, to allow for the conveyance of surplus property.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DUSD (Installations and Environment)

**Corporate Operations Processes:**

**Title: Establish Funding Flexibility Within a Program**

**Description of Initiative:** Establish Transfer Flexibility "Between" Appropriations in the "Same Program" at \$30M or 10 Percent (Lesser of).

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language and request Congress change the General Transfer Authority provision incorporating the recommended initiative.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army & Air Force

**Title: Increase Flexibility of Expired Year Funds**

**Description of Initiative:** Establish authority to reprogram "Expired \$s" "Same FY", to avoid the need to request program specific legislation, when expired appropriation(s) have been exhausted.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress, recommending authority to transfer "Expired \$s" same "FY" between appropriations.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force

**Title: Increase Expense/Investment Threshold**

**Description of Initiative:** Increase Expense/Investment Threshold from \$100K to \$500K. This will provide Field Commanders greater flexibility in their decision-making process and ability to fund critical requirements.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress, recommending approval to increase Expense/Investment Threshold from \$100K to \$500K.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army & Air Force

**Title: Establish O&M Close-out Flexibility**

**Description of Initiative:** Allow DOD to carryover for 1 year, up to 2% of Operations & Maintenance Funding to pay for emerging, unforecasted must-pay bills.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Prepare legislative language to Congress recommending approval to allow DoD the authority to carryover 2% of O&M funding for 1 year.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army

**Corporate Processes (continued):**

**Title:** Streamline Administrative Coordination Process

**Description of Initiative:** The role of the line versus staff within the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to be clarified where the line has the authority to make decisions and the staff provide advise and counsel. Inculcating this "culture" within the Department complements the Freedom to Manage Act of 2001, where the President and SECDEF have asked Congress to trust them in making decisions at the lowest levels possible. Similarly, the current volatile environment is placing increasing demands upon the Department and warrants a significant streamlining of our staffing processes.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** SECDEF sign and send a "culture" memo to all members of the Department. The Business Initiative Council functional/process boards evaluate the coordination processes, with special emphasis on reduced cycle time and accelerated decision making, and make policy and process changes, as needed.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force



## **Acquisition Management Processes:**

### **Title: Streamline Contract Close-out Process**

**Description of Initiative:** Initially close-out 400 plus physically complete cost contracts, under \$1M and that are at least nine years old. Using lessons learned, develop new business practices within the contract closeout community.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DCMA assesses what is required to administratively close 400 plus contracts.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** DCMA

### **Title: Streamline Clinger-Cohen Implementation**

**Description of Initiative:** Develop a process for the appropriate implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act while avoiding the duplication of existing acquisition processes and oversight.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Change the DoD 5000.2-R and associated CIO/C31 documents to enable streamlined procedures that satisfy Clinger-Cohen.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy

### **Title: Eliminate Excise Tax on DoD Tactical Vehicles**

**Description of Initiative:** Request authorization of exemption by the Treasury Department from paying the Federal Retail Excise Tax (FRET) on all military and tactical-wheeled vehicles, above 33,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight, which is currently required under Title 26 United States Code, Section 4051.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** SECDEF sign memo to SECTREAS, authorizing exemption from this tax.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (Mr. Don Messer & Mr. Jim Woodford)

## CHANGES TO 14 SEPTEMBER 2001 BIC PRINCIPALS' DECISIONS

### People Processes:

**Title:** One-Time Clearance of Priority Placement for Scientific & Engineering Positions

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, eliminate unnecessary delays being experienced in the hiring of hard to fill scientific and engineering positions by allowing for a one-time clearance of the Priority Placement Program (PPP).

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** Change DoD policy to allow one-time clearance of PPP for scientific & engineering positions, by revising PPP regulations and providing implementation guidance.

**Approved Actions:** BIC Agrees to pursue modification of DoD PPP regulations to allow for one time-time clearing for scientific & engineering positions. Implement as a one-year test, partner with OUSD (P&R) to establish the universe to be included, (8XX series positions, excluding technicians and Public Works/Civil Engineering). During this test phase, establish metrics to assess unintended consequences, both good and bad. If the results are positive, expand the program incrementally to cover all occupations. Retain provisions to alter the program, in response to significant workforce redirection events.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Navy (NAVFACSYSCOM Director of Civilian Personnel Programs)

**Title:** Modify 180-Day Waiting Period to Hire Retired Military

**Description of Initiative:** As a "war for people" tool, encourage highly qualified retired military personnel to pursue civil service careers by having OSD (P&R) authorize Service Secretaries to delegate waiver authority within the components.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** DoD authorize re-delegation of waiver authority to the services.

**Approved Actions:** BIC agrees to request re-delegation authority from OSD (P&R). Hold approved BIC initiative in abeyance. Restrictions are waived as the result of "Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom". As the current authorities are withdrawn after Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom", the BIC initiative will run for 12 months. During this period, partner with OSD (P&R) to establish comparative baselines to evaluate the affect of the variables.

Baseline one: # employed with Dual Comp restriction

Baseline two: # employed with Dual Comp lifted

Baseline three: # employed after Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, but with Implementation of BIC Initiative

Comparative Analysis will then demonstrate if there is significant differences using the variables and would lead one to assess if there are arbitrary bars to efficient operations

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Air Force (Directorate of Personnel Force Management)

**Title:** Manpower Mix Management Flexibility

**Description of Initiative:** OSD allow the Services to make the most efficient use of civilian/contract personnel without predetermined constraints/expectations.

**Required Policy Changes/Approach:** OSD eliminate civilian full-time equivalent targets from DoD programming guidance.

**Approved Actions:** MP Board draft a memo for DEPSECDEF signature, addressing the entire Department and stating that “ Federal law dictates that all civilian employees shall be managed solely on the basis of the available workload and not civilian end strength or full-time equivalents”.

**Responsible DoD Champion:** Army (Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

**TAB**

**E**

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)	Mr Aldridge	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Army	Mr White	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Navy	Mr England	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Secretary of the Air Force	Dr Roche	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of	Lt Gen Carlson (on behalf of Gen Pace)	September 14, 2001 December 3, 2001

January 8, 2002 3:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Law of the Sea

At lunch with Condi, Colin and the Vice President, the subject of the Law of the Sea came up. Apparently, Jesse Helms called the Vice President as well as me. They want the Vice President to go up and try to talk Jesse Helms into letting it go through.

801.2

The Secretary of State made the comment that all the items we had objected to years ago, when I was the special envoy to scuttle the Law of the Sea, had been corrected.

Why doesn't someone take a look and see where we are. The claim is that the Russians are going to make a claim along a ridgeline up to the North Pole and that if we are not onboard with the Law of the Sea, we won't have the ability to stop it. I asked the question if we were onboard, would our position be that we wanted to do in the Russians and stop it? Someone better look at it.

Thanks.

DIR dh  
010802-19

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

8 Jan 02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

JA 11/2/02

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

EF-0452

JAN 12 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY (J. D. Crouch II)

SUBJECT: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

- You asked in Tab A where we are regarding UNCLOS, given SECSTATE comments that previous objections have been corrected, and the assertion that U.S. accession is necessary to stop a pending Russian continental shelf claim.
- U.S. objections to UNCLOS were largely resolved in 1994 (Tab B). We would probably want a strong resolution of ratification to provide additional clarifications and protections.
- On 20 December, Russia proposed to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 NM on its Arctic and Pacific coasts. The Commission will review the proposal from 25 March to 12 April.
- The Russian claim includes two large ridges in the Arctic. This portion of the claim is objectionable because it is inconsistent with UNCLOS technical criteria for such claims.
- Regardless of UNCLOS, Russia's claim is inconsistent with longstanding, customary international law.
- If the claim is endorsed, Russia would gain certain sovereign rights (Tab C) over the ridges. Possible consequences include Russian interference with submarine cables or other U.S. activities, and Russian control of any oil, gas or mineral deposits.
- Endorsement of the claim by the 21-member Continental Shelf Commission (Tab D) which is currently chaired by a Russian, is unlikely. It would require a two-thirds majority vote of the Commissioners present. The U.S. is working with other governments to defeat the claim.
- Accession to UNCLOS would make the U.S. eligible to have a representative elected to the Commission. However, the U.S. would have to accede by 11 March and get a

801.2

12 Jan 02

representative elected in April. Given the likely opposition in the Senate, it is doubtful that UNCLOS would be ratified by then, so it should not be a factor in our thinking.

- As you heard in the meeting on UNCLOS in September, the Services support the treaty since it codifies critical navigational rights and freedoms.
- OSD remains lukewarm on the issue, believing that DOD's equities are not significantly affected. However, we have a general concern that U.S. participation in UNCLOS international organizations could not prevent (and could be viewed as endorsing) decisions that are inconsistent with U.S. interests, including with regard to the continental shelf and the deep seabed.
- SECSTATE is keenly interested in moving forward on UNCLOS. Senator Helms, on the other hand, has asked you and the Vice President to defer action until next year.
- As a matter of interagency horse trading: If you decide that you wish to support UNCLOS accession, we recommend that you urge SECSTATE to agree to our plan to mount an aggressive campaign to block the International Criminal Court Treaty's entry into force.

COORDINATION: TAB E.

Attachments: as stated

Prepared by Marshall S. Billingslea, DASD/Negotiations Policy, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6456



January 8, 2002 3:24 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Law of the Sea

At lunch with Condi, Colin and the Vice President, the subject of the Law of the Sea came up. Apparently, Jesse Helms called the Vice President as well as me. They want the Vice President to go up and try to talk Jesse Helms into letting it go through.

The Secretary of State made the comment that all the items we had objected to years ago, when I was the special envoy to scuttle the Law of the Sea, had been corrected.

Why doesn't someone take a look and see where we are. The claim is that the Russians are going to make a claim along a ridgeline up to the North Pole and that if we are not onboard with the Law of the Sea, we won't have the ability to stop it. I asked the question if we were onboard, would our position be that we wanted to do in the Russians and stop it? Someone better look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010802-19



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

**TAB B – U.S. OBJECTIONS TO UNCLOS RESOLVED**

<u>1982 Objections</u>	<u>1994 Fixes</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadequate decision-making role in the International Seabed Authority               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ no guaranteed US seat on Seabed Authority governing Council</li> <li>▪ US could easily be out-voted</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• US guaranteed seat in Council and newly created Finance Committee               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ all financial decisions by the Seabed Authority and amendments to the seabed mining regime are subject to US veto</li> <li>▪ new voting rules in Council can be used to block other substantive decisions</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandatory technology transfer to other nations and Seabed Authority</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandatory technology transfer provisions eliminated</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No assured access for US miners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Applications for mine sites approved on a first-come, first-served basis               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ approval not discretionary</li> <li>▪ protection added for US pioneer investors</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part XI loaded with economic disincentives               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ production limitations to protect land-based producers</li> <li>▪ preferential treatment for Enterprise (mining arm of the Seabed Authority)</li> <li>▪ large financial burdens on private miners</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Part XI modified consistent with free-market principles               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ production limitations have been eliminated</li> <li>▪ preferential status of Enterprise has been eliminated</li> <li>▪ \$1 million annual fee imposed on miners has been eliminated</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Amendments to seabed mining regime permitted without the consent of State Parties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Amendments cannot enter into force without the consent of the State Party</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Surplus revenues can be distributed to groups contrary to US interests</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Any financial decision of the Seabed Authority, including the distribution of excess funds, is subject to US veto</li></ul>

**TAB C - UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA  
RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVITIES ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF**

- The coastal state exercises **sovereign rights** over the Continental Shelf **for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.** (Article 77(1))
  - No one else may explore a coastal state's Continental Shelf or exploit its natural resources without the coastal state's consent. (Article 77(2))
  - The coastal state has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate **drilling** on the Continental Shelf for all purposes. (Article 81)
  - The coastal state has the right to regulate, authorize and conduct marine scientific research on its Continental Shelf. (Article 246)
  - The coastal state has the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
    - **artificial islands;**
    - **installations and structures** for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the Continental Shelf and for other economic purposes; and
    - **installations and structures** which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal state in the Continental Shelf. (Articles 60 and 80)
    - Due notice must be given of the construction of artificial islands, installations or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. (Articles 60 and 80)
- The rights of the coastal state over the Continental Shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters. (Article 78(1))
  - The coastal state cannot infringe or unjustifiably interfere with other nations' navigation or other rights and freedoms. (Article 78(2))
  - All states are entitled to lay **submarine cables and pipelines** on the Continental Shelf. (Article 79(1)) When laying submarine cables and pipelines, States shall have due regard to cables and pipelines already in position. (Article 79(5))
    - *Subject to* a coastal state's right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the Continental Shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from **pipelines**, a coastal state may not impede the laying or maintenance of **submarine cables** or **pipelines.** (Article 79)

- The delineation of the course for the laying of **pipelines** on the Continental Shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal state. (Article 79(3))
- A coastal state may establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea. (Article 79(4))
- A coastal state has jurisdiction over cables or pipelines constructed or used in connection with:
  - the exploration of its Continental Shelf or the exploitation of its resources; or
  - the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures under its jurisdiction. (Article 79(4))
- The **Continental Shelf** consists of the deep sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond a coastal state's territorial sea to the outer edge of the Continental Margin or to a distance of 200 NM from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the Continental Margin does not extend to that distance. (Article 76(1))
  - The **Continental Margin** is the submerged prolongation of the landmass of the coastal state consisting of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, slope and rise. (Article 76(3)) Subject to certain limits, the Continental Margin may extend beyond 200 NM.
  - The Continental Margin does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.

## MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

(elected for a term of five years, i.e. 1997 - 2002)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
Mr. Alexandre Tagore Medeiros de Albuquerque	Brazil
Mr. Osvaldo Pedro Astiz	Argentina
Mr. Lawrence F. Awosika	Nigeria
Mr. Aly Ibrahim Beltagy	Egypt
Mr. Samuel Sona Betah	Cameroon
Mr. Harald Brekke	Norway
Mr. Galo Carrera Hurtado	Mexico
Mr. André C.W. Chan Chim Yuk	Mauritius
Mr. Peter F. Croker	Ireland
Mr. Noel Newton St. Claver Francis	Jamaica
Mr. Kazuchika Hamuro	Japan
Mr. Karl H.F. Hinz	Germany
Mr. A. Bakar Jaafar	Malaysia
Mr. Mladen Juracic	Croatia
Mr. Yuri Borisovitch Kazmin	Russian Federation
Mr. Iain C. Lamont	New Zealand
Mr. Wenzheng Lu	China
Mr. Chisengu Leo M'Dala	Zambia
Mr. Yong-Ahn Park	Republic of Korea
Mr. Daniel Rio	France
Mr. Krishna-Swami Ramachandran Srinivasan	India

### ● Officers of the Commission

At its first session, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York, 16 - 20 June 1997 (CLCS/1), the Commission elected Mr. Kazmin as its Chairman by acclamation. Following consultations undertaken by the Chairman, Mr. Astiz, Mr. Awosika and Mr. Srinivasan were elected Vice-Chairmen and Mr. Croker was elected Rapporteur. All the officers were elected to a term of two and a half years.

During the sixth session, the election of the officers for the second part of the five-year term took place, resulting in the election of Mr. Kazmin as Chairman by acclamation, and of Mr. Astiz, Mr. Awosika and Mr. Park as Vice-Chairmen, and Mr. Croker as Rapporteur.

The Commission also established a subsidiary body of five members to deal with the question of providing advice to coastal States in accordance with article 3 (1) (b) of Annex II to the Convention. The members of that body are Mr. Karl Hinz (Chairman), Mr. Aly Beltagy, Mr. Kazuchika Hamuro, Mr. Noel Francis and Mr. Mladen Juracic.

It was decided that all sessions of the Commission would normally be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

**TAB E - Coordination**

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith 1/11/02

DOD Principal Deputy General Counsel

Mr. Dell'Orto – 1/11/02

Deputy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy & Operations)

RADM Krol – 1/11/02

DOD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs

RADM Lohr – 1/11/02

1/28  
1/30

C213

Snowflake

November 23, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D  
SUBJECT: Roles for NATO Response Force and EU Force

LARRY DI RITTE  
1/29

NATO 322

What do you think about arranging ourselves so the NATO response force is for warfighting and peacemaking, and the EU force is for peacekeeping. They are required to have separate training and separate capabilities, which we think is a good idea, but it is different. Therefore, we won't end up with a tug of war over which force should do what.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112302.4

.....  
Please respond by 12/13/02

1/28  
RESPONSE AT  
RED TAB  
1/2

23 NOV 02

11-25-02 12:02 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/6464

U01578 /03



November 23, 2002 3:51 PM

TO: J.D. Crouch  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Response Force

NATO 322

At the Ministers' lunch, the Greek MoD said something strange, to the effect that: "Europe has to decide when the NATO Response Force would deploy, since most of the forces are European." That is crazy. Let me know what you think we ought to do about that.

We also need to figure out what we want to do with the Response Force, if anything. Do you envisage it simply operating with our forces, or would we add something to it?

We need to develop guidance, so that Myers can give guidance to the Military Committee as to what our views are on the command structure as well. That came up in the meeting, as I recall.

Thanks.

DHR:lh  
112302 17

.....

..

23 NOV 02



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

SECRET

202 JAN 28 PM 12:40

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2002, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy

January 28, 2002

SUBJECT: Swan Island, Honduras

- In response to your memo of January 21, 2002 (TAB A) the following addresses looking into Swan Island as a replacement for Vieques.
  - The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) did not consider Swan Island during the Vieques 2000 study.
  - CNA was asked to take a "quick" look at the feasibility of using Swan Island as a replacement for Vieques. Based on the original study criterion the island would have been assessed only marginally suited to support NSFS, amphibious operations, or air-to-ground training and unsuitable for combined arms training. The island would have been rated high risk for development and continued use as a live fire training range.
- Based on this assessment, Swan Island is not considered feasible for use as a replacement for Vieques.


COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: CAPT Al Banks; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6466

U01587 /02

January 21, 2002 10:56 AM

TO: Gordon England  
CC: Admiral Clark, CNO  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Swan Island, Honduras

Have you folks looked at Swan Island as a replacement for Vieques? I bet we could buy it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012102-10

.....  
Please respond by 01/28/02

January 21, 2002 10:56 AM

TO: Gordon England

CC: Admiral Clark, CNO  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Swan Island, Honduras

*Puerto Rico*

Have you folks looked at Swan Island as a replacement for Vieques? I bet we could buy it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012102-10

.....

Please respond by 01/28/02

*21 JAN 02*

U01588 /02

January 7, 20 ASN \_\_\_\_\_  
EA \_\_\_\_\_  
MA \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Tom White  
Gordon England  
James Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Safety Records

*- given to 1/9/02  
Mr. Johnson*

I would appreciate it if you would send me quarterly reports on your safety records—the metrics you are using and showing whether they are getting better or worse.

Thanks.

DHR:ah  
010702-45

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

U01590 102

729

7 Jan 02

January 4, 2002 6:03 PM

SUBJECT: Korea

Don't forget to get back to me and explain to me what the relationship is with the CINC and Korea, which way it chops and what goes with it.

We also ought to look at whether or not we want to straighten it out if we don't like it.

Thanks.

Where does USFI fit into this equation as well.

DHR:dh  
010482-42

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Should we change the relationship?

Korea

4 Jan 02

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-145-02  
28 January 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/1/27*

SUBJECT: Command Relationship – US Pacific Command and Korea

- Mr. Secretary, you asked me to explain the relationship between US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and US Forces in Korea (USFK) and whether now is the time to make changes in the command relationships in Korea (TAB).
- Commander, USFK, General Schwartz, is a subordinate unified commander to USPACOM. Under this command, he has operational control over the 7th Air Force, Eighth US Army, US Naval Forces-Korea, and US Marine Forces-Korea.
- General Schwartz also wears two other hats. As Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), he operates under a United Nations mandate to provide multinational command on the Korean Peninsula. As Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC), he leads a Republic of Korea (ROK)-US combined command to ensure unity of command and interoperability of US-ROK forces during crisis.
- During wartime, USPACOM becomes a supporting CINC to General Schwartz under his CINCUNC and CINCCFC hats. As CINCUNC and CINCCFC, General Schwartz reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and SECDEF/ROK Minister of National Defense respectively. General Schwartz also continues to report through USPACOM on US only matters (e.g., US administrative and logistic functions).
- Regarding USPACOM's relationship with Commander, US Forces-Japan (USFJ), in peace and war USFJ is subordinate to USPACOM -- a strictly US chain of command. This might be worth reviewing for possible change. I think the USFK/USPACOM relationship is about right.
- I propose Admiral Blair review the USFJ relationship *(specifically during a Korean crisis)* and make a recommendation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6471

U01614 /02  
SECDEF CONTROL#



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-145-02

28 January 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/1/27*

SUBJECT: Command Relationship – US Pacific Command and Korea

- Mr. Secretary, you asked me to explain the relationship between US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and US Forces in Korea (USFK) and whether now is the time to make changes in the command relationships in Korea (TAB).
- Commander, USFK, General Schwartz, is a subordinate unified commander to USPACOM. Under this command, he has operational control over the 7th Air Force, Eighth US Army, US Naval Forces-Korea, and US Marine Forces-Korea.
- General Schwartz also wears two other hats. As Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), he operates under a United Nations mandate to provide multinational command on the Korean Peninsula. As Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC), he leads a Republic of Korea (ROK)-US combined command to ensure unity of command and interoperability of US-ROK forces during crisis.
- During wartime, USPACOM becomes a supporting CINC to General Schwartz under his CINCUNC and CINCCFC hats. As CINCUNC and CINCCFC, General Schwartz reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and SECDEF/ROK Minister of National Defense respectively. General Schwartz also continues to report through USPACOM on US only matters (e.g., US administrative and logistic functions).
- Regarding USPACOM's relationship with Commander, US Forces-Japan (USFJ), in peace and war USFJ is subordinate to USPACOM -- a strictly US chain of command. This might be worth reviewing for possible change. I think the USFK/USPACOM relationship is about right.
- I propose Admiral Blair review the USFJ relationship *(specifically during a Korean crisis)* and make a recommendation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6472

U01614 /02  
SECDEF CONTROL#



January 4, 2002 6:03 PM

SUBJECT: Korea

Don't forget to get back to me and explain to me what the relationship is with the CINC and Korea, which way it chops and what goes with it.

We also ought to look at whether or not we want to straighten it out if we don't like it.

Thanks.

*Where does USFI fit into this equation as well.*

DHR:dh  
010402-42

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*Should we change the relationship?*

SHOWFILE

(b)(6)

January 7, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR.

SUBJECT: Closing Books

Paul O'Neill

Paul O'Neill has gotten the Treasury books so that each month they can be closed in four days. What do we do?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-46

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Response Attached

Larry Di Rita

1/11/02

110.01

95 am 02

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
2002 JUN 27 AM 10:41

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

January 28, 2002

NOTE FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: PAUL H. O'NEILL



D.R.: Doing this well requires certain things you probably don't have – (1) a common chart of accounts, (2) a system that is designed to provide what you need, not what has been collected by historical convention, (3) a system that is designed to be “human friendly”.

Without real knowledge, my guess is that the referenced “first major phase... of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003”... will not include these three characteristics and will not produce audited financial statements in three days.

Attachments

11-L-0559/OSD/6475

U01653 /02

January 21, 2002 12:33 PM

2002 JAN 22 10:02 AM

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Closing Books

Here is a note I sent Dov Zakheim, Pentagon comptroller, and here is the answer I got back. What is your reaction?

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/07/02 SecDef memo to USD(C) re: Closing Books  
01/16/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012102-29

*D.R.: Doing this will require certain things you probably don't have -- 1 a common chart of accounts 2 A system that is designed to provide what you need, not what has been collected by historical convention, 3 A system that is designed to be "human friendly".*  
*Without real knowledge, my guess is that the referenced "first major phase" of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003" ... will not include these three characteristics and will not produce audited financial statements in three days.*  
*PO'Neill  
1-26-02*

11-L-0559/OSD/6476

201170-02

snovflake

January 7, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR

SUBJECT: Closing Books

Paul O'Neil

Paul O'Neill has gotten the Treasury books so that each month they can be closed in four days. What do we do?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010702-46


.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Response Attached  
Larry Di Rita  
1/11/02

**SECDEF HAS SEEN****INFO MEMO****JAN 21 2002**

January 16, 2002, 9:25 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Closing Books

- There are two aspects of closing the books: budget execution and financial statement preparation. The Department of Defense closes the books for budget execution purposes monthly by the 16th workday of the following month and for financial statement purposes annually.
- We cannot provide the financial statements within a week because most of the existing systems cannot collect and maintain the detailed financial data needed to prepare the financial statements in less than the current 4-5 months time frame.
- Closing the books within a week will require major systems upgrades. Those upgrades will be implemented as part of the Department's Financial Management Modernization Program. The program is underway and its first major phase is development of an enterprise architecture that will be completed by March 2003.

Prepared by: Rita Cronley,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/6478

U01652 / 02

SENSITIVE

January 28, 2002 3:37 PM

TO: Gen. Franks

CC: Gen. Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan National Army

*Afghanistan*

The Afghans are looking to build a national army.

Fahim Kahn gave Colin Powell the attached paper, which asks for a lot of money for weapons.

I think we should immediately stop destroying weapons and figure out a way to stockpile them. There isn't any reason in the world while all these weapons we are destroying can't be used for the Afghan army, instead of us spending hundreds of millions of dollars to buy weapons for them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/23/02 SecState note to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012802-20

.....

Please respond by 01/31/02

*28 Jan 02*

SENSITIVE

9/23



United States Department of State

The Secretary of State

23/1

To Sec Def,

Don,

Here's THE  
plan Min. FATHIM  
GAVE me id  
KADUL.

LD

Copies to: DSI  
CSO-



**SENSITIVE****A NEW NATIONAL ARMY FOR AFGHANISTAN**

A key element in reconstruction of Afghanistan as a stable, peaceful and prosperous country is establishment of a national army. Provision of security in a country that has been rivalry field for two decades between external and internal powers is essential for the reconstruction process. There are three main issues to be thoroughly taken into consideration.

- 1- Should the national army incorporate tens of thousands of military personnel who have fought for years against the foreign intervention and amongst themselves?
- 2- Should the national army have a conscripted and volunteer force?
- 3- Should the national army be composed of both?

**THE PRESENT SITUATION**

The war has continued in Afghanistan non-stop since communist take over in 1978 until the defeat of the Taliban in the end of 2001. Various factions have imported different types of weapons into the country during this period. In the past 23 years flow of arms and ammunition into Afghanistan has continued and it is therefore conservatively reckoned that over 700,000 men have access to weapons in the country.

To counter the mighty invading force from 1979 to 1989 guerilla units all over the country were trained and Afghanistan came under influence of various commanders that somehow continues upto today.

- The military structures are very loose and ill defined.
- The military commanders are interested in maintaining their forces and are not used to obeying a central authority.
- Logistical support during the 1980's was channeled directly from Pakistan to field commanders without coordination with their leaders which has indeed been one cause of decentralization.
- Sense of disobedience from the central authority was not only strong amongst the military commanders but also in civil administrative units since various commanders also controlled them.
- We strongly believe that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are not defeated completely but only pushed to southern Afghanistan.
- Usama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar are alive and based on our information working to regroup and strike in a suitable time.
- Thousands of terrorists have fled to Pakistan where extremist groups supporting terrorism are officially active such Jamiate Ulema one of the main Taliban supporters in Pakistan who have members in the Pakistani parliament.

**SENSITIVE**

11-L-0559/OSD/6481

- Afghanistan shares 3000-km long border with the neighboring countries and 2000 km with Pakistan along which tens of crossing points are open.
- Smugglers and narco traffickers mainly incorporated into Taliban and Al-Qaeda are working to create tension in order to be able to fight the Europeans and Americans not with weapons but with heroine.
- Whilst the efforts of Gen. Musharaf, leader of Pakistan demonstrates the willingness of that country narrow down the activities of terrorist groups but they have a long way ahead to achieve a complete success.
- Stability in Afghanistan is therefore linked to stability in Pakistan.

## **THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF AFGHANISTAN ON THE NATIONAL ARMY**

The national army will be responsible for;

- Defense of the Afghanistan's borders against the external threat
- Counter terrorism and counter narcotics
- Dissolution of the power pockets of individual commanders and urging them for obedience from the central government.
- Provision of incentives in return for disarmament.
- Support the civil authority and constitution.
- Support the reconstruction of the country such as road, bridges, buildings and distribution of relief assistance to remote and far flanged areas of the country.

## **THE APPROACH TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL AMRY**

- Initially a force be established to incorporate 200,000 armed forces i.e 140,000 soldiers and 60,000 officers.
- The main elements of the national army will be those who have participated in the liberation wars and have played a significant role in defeat of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and have stood alongside the international coalition against terrorism with firm determination.
- These forces will be incorporated into three military Corp and 4 divisions to be in state of preparedness to defend the country against the existing threats and return of terrorists.
- The national army will be based on ethnic balance and a just system to incorporate all the tribes and ethnic groups.
- This will indeed not be a fully mobilized army but will have the ability to defend the borders of Afghanistan.
- To establish the national army 200 candidates from each province of Afghanistan have been invited to come to the capital. As a first step 6000 men from all 30 provinces of Afghanistan will be trained for three months to make the first division
- Upon completion of the training the new division will replace one of the divisions of the existing forces and the old one will be dissolved.
- Due to exhaustion of the population from war and strife young volunteers may not be readily available for recruitment in the national army and hardly parents will let their young sons to join the military.

- Those of the existing forces who can not be incorporated in the national army should not be rewarded with joblessness instead alternative ways of livelihood should be explored for them. This process is directly linked to the reconstruction of the country and start of the labor-intensive projects.
- Recovery of the weapons through buy back programs is one way of weapons collection but for the light arms factories in Pakistani tribal areas of this will be good news.
- This program should be pursued with thorough care as weapon keeping is a long-standing tradition in certain areas of Afghanistan and certain number of people may not accept to sell their weapons. A strict system of supervision parallel with creation of job opportunities will be effective.

## REHABILITATION AND RE-ACTIVATION OF TRAINING FACILITIES

Afghanistan has had a military university with the capacity of 3000 students, a military school for 2500 students, an airforce academy for 1200 students and an officers advance training course for 600. In the meantime there has been a training facility designed for 1500 forces called training center 57. There has also been a Technical Academy for 2500 students in various technical fields. Altogether around 8000 soldiers and officers can be put under training in these facilities. These facilities have been damaged severely throughout the war years and places like the advanced training center for the officers is ruined completely. Rehabilitation of these facilities is a requirement for the establishment of the new national army.

## TRANSITION

There is need for two pronged approach

- 1- Incorporation of 200 thousand forces in the national army to be ready against the current threats and dangers, which have already been pointed out. This force will be gradually replaced by the newly established national army and will be dissolved with improvement of the security situation in the country. In a stable Afghanistan an army of 50 to 60 thousand armed forces will be sufficient.
- 2- The National Army should be established by adopting the approach that has been outlined in this paper. This said the rehabilitation of the training facilities is essential for the training of the soldiers and the officers. The rehabilitation of these facilities will require roughly 19m USD.

## THE WAY FORWARD

The assistance of the international community is essential for both forces that have been outlined in this paper. The Ministry of Defense of the Interim Administration will greatly benefit from the experience and expertise of the friendly countries and the international community.

The cost estimate of running an existing force of 200 thousand and establishment of the new national army is outlined in Annex A.

- Appointments in the national army will be from the graduates of the mentioned training institutions.

**ESTIMATED BUDGET FOR AFGHAN ARMY**

<u>SN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>UNIT/No.</u>	<u>UNIT COST</u>	<u>DURATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<b>A-SALARIES</b>					
A1-	Soldiers	Prsn/140,000	20	12 Months	33,600,000
A2-	Officers	Prsn/ 60,000	200	12 Months	144,000,000
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>					<b>US \$ 177,400,000</b>
<b>B-CLOTHING</b>					
B1-	Soldier/Officer	Prsn/200,000	45	12 Months	9,000,000
<b>SUBTOTAL CLOTHING</b>					<b>US \$ 9,000,000</b>
<b>C- FOOD</b>					
C1-	Officer & Soldiers	Prsn/200,000	2.5	360 days	182,500,000
<b>SUBTOTAL FOOD</b>					<b>US \$ 182,500,000</b>
<b>D-FUEL</b>					
D1-	Petrol	tonn/12,000	200		2,400,000
D2-	Diesel	tonn/24,000	200		4,800,000
D3-	Aircraft fuel	tonn/24,000	300		7,200,000
D4-	Oil	tonn/720	400		288,000
D5-	Hydrolic	tonn/360	600		216,000
D6-	Anti-freeze	tonn/100	400		40,000
D7-	Greese	tonn/360	300		108,000
D8-	Tech. Alcahol	tonn/100	800		80,000
<b>SUBTOTAL FUEL</b>					<b>US \$ 14,872,000</b>
<b>E- INFRASTRUCTURE REHABLITATION</b>					
E1-	Military University				11,500,000
E2-	Military School				7,000,000
E3-	Airforce Academy				7,500,000
E4-	Technical Academy				3,000,000
E5-	Training Center 75				5,500,000

5

11-L-0559/OSD/6485

E6- Advanced Course of officers 4,500,000

**SUBTOTAL REHABILITATION=====US \$ 39,000,000**

**F- RUNNING COST OF THE SIX FACILTIES**

This section includes fuel, stationery, furniture and teaching material 52,670,000

**GRAND TOTAL=====US \$ 466,442,000**

TAB A

December 30, 2002 11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Governors and Modernizing the National Guard

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. This might be something we want to do. Do you want to fashion something for me to send to Gaffney and Eberhart? Is it something that Giambastiani should be involved in?

*325*

Let's talk.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/15/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: National Guard

DHR:dh  
123001-5 (to computer).doc



*Please respond by* 01/10/03

*30 Dec 02*

U01700 /03

03 JAN 3 1

11-L-0559/OSD/6487

Tab A

From Nait Gingrich  
cc: D. Rita  
Wolfsitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, December 15, 2002 11:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) Larry.DIRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil  
**Cc:** jaymie.duman@osd.pentagon.mil  
**Subject:** Governors and modernizing the National Guard

for secdef.depsecdef  
from newt 12/14/02  
Getting the Governors to help modernize the National Guard

The fiscal pressure combined with the new realities of terrorist threats give you a real opportunity to modernize the National Guard. A series of war games in which every Governor and their civil defense staff dealt with two or three consequence management problems would then lead the Governors to see that they needed a lot more healthcare, engineering and military police capability in their National Guard. If you had the Governors helping make the case you would have a lot easier time getting the changes through Congress.


Gaffney and Eberhart ought to be able to collaborate to develop a game that could educate each state as it is played. A small team should travel to each capital to play it on site so it is easy for the Governor's staff to fully participate. After each game the local team should work with the DOD-Homeland Security team to develop a set of recommendations.  
the NY times reference follows

**Deficits Looming, Governors Worry About Antiterror Costs**

Government and business officials who met in Las Vegas to discuss national security issues said the U.S. may have too many vulnerable targets and not enough money.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/07/national/07WEST.html?todaysheadlines>



January 31, 2002 7:22 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Philippines

Here are some talking points with respect to the Philippines as per our discussion yesterday.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Talking Points

DHR:dh  
013102-1

Philippines

3/Jan02

## TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY POWELL

### 1. **Rules of Engagement (ROE):**

- ROE for US Military Forces operating in the Philippines are the CJCSI Standing Rules of Engagement our forces routinely operate under.
- Inherent right of self-defense is part of those ROE.

### 2. **Command of US Forces:**

- Will be consistent with long standing policy – US forces will remain under US command, Philippine forces will remain under Philippine chain of command.

### 3. **Restrictions/constraints on US Forces in the PI:**

- No more than 600 personnel in JTF 510.
- Geographical area for the JTF includes the Republic of the Philippines as necessary for training and support.
- US forces will be trainers of Philippine forces and not directly engage in operational missions.
- Visiting Forces Agreement will be used to govern the treatment of US forces in the Philippines.

### 4. **Critical Point for the discussion:**

- We should stick to the established ROE.
- Should not confuse the chain of command.
- Should not further restrict the Commander of JTF 510.
- Terms of Reference for training are being worked by the JTF Commander and should be resolved shortly. We do not anticipate any issues but will raise them to the appropriate level for resolution, if necessary.

**UNCLAS  
CLASSIFICATION**



**WASHFAX  
Secretary of Defense  
Cover Sheet  
12/N**



**FROM:** Secretary Rumsfeld

**OFFICE/DESK:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SUBJECT:** Philippines

**PAGES:** 3 (Including Coversheet)

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:**  
 **HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS**

**IMMEDIATE DELIVERY:**

**PHONE NO.:**

*outgoing Wash Fax*

*per Col Whitmore,  
route to C & D  
only.*

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	<input type="checkbox"/>
SPLASST	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXECSEC	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEPSECDEF	<input type="checkbox"/>
C&D	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CCD	<input type="checkbox"/>
USDP	<input type="checkbox"/>
CABLECH	<input type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

**DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS**

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
STATE	Honorable Colin Powell				

**REMARKS:** *Please deliver immediately . Thank you!*

Please call Secretary of Defense Cable Division at  and confirm receipt.

**CLASSIFICATION:**  
 UNCLAS  
 11-L-0559/OSD/6491



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002 JAN 31 PM 04:30

INFO MEMO

January 30, 2002, 5:00 PM.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 1/30/02*

SUBJECT: Role of Military Department Secretaries as Commanders

- You have asked whether the Secretaries of the Military Departments may be considered "commanders." I conclude that in significant respects they may perform the role of commanders.
- The Service Secretaries are in the administrative chain of command (with responsibility for such functions as military justice, personnel actions, and uniform regulations) for military members in their respective Military Departments.
  - DoD Directive 5100.1, Para 6.1, provides: "The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of Unified and Specified Commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the commanders of Military Service forces."
  - This Directive is consistent with the pertinent statutory provisions, under which a Service Secretary "is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct" all the affairs of his Military Department.
- In addition, the Service Secretaries are in the operational chain of command for military personnel under their jurisdiction who are not assigned to Combatant Commands.
  - Statutory provisions provide that the Service Chiefs supervise such personnel "as the [Service] Secretary determines."
  - Since the Service Chiefs' authority is derived from their respective Service Secretaries, it follows that the Service Secretaries exercise at least as much authority.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Paul S. Koffsky, DGC(P&HP),

(b)(6)

11-L-0559 OSD/6492

1101835 /02

January 29, 2002 8:23 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter

Please go ahead and send your memo to Torie Clarke, so she can begin responding. As soon as the budget is out, I think you should send that letter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012902-6



Please respond by 02/01/02

*110,01*

*29 Jan 02*

January 29, 2002 11:46 AM

470

TO: Tom White  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Crusader

I am told the C-5 and C-17 aircraft can each accommodate two Crusaders.

Is that true?

What is the leeway in size in inches?

How long does it take to load and offload them? Has it been done successfully, without breaking things? I am told the leeway is so small they barely fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012902-14



Please respond by           8:02          

29 Jan 02

January 23, 2002 2:14 PM

383.6

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: *to see data rees*  
Access for Saudi Arabia and Yemen

What are we doing about giving access to Saudi Arabia and Yemen? Have we decided to do it? I think we probably should.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012302-11

Please respond by

1/24

*1/24*

*Response Attached  
D, dh*

Larry Di Rita

2354002

showWare  
1/28/02

January 25, 2002 12:23 PM

240

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Military Pay

The President is curious to know how comparable military pay will be to civilian pay with the pay raise proposed in the '03 budget.

If that is not the right question, then answer that, but also give me the answer to what the right question is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012502-8

.....

Please respond by 02/01/02

25 JAN 02





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

FEB 1 2002

060

General John Jumper, USAF  
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force  
Room 4E924 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330

Dear General Jumper,

This photo was taken at the Pentagon Memorial Service on October 11. I thought you would like to have it.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

Enclosure

1 Feb 02



011011-D-9880W-196

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wave the flag and sing "God Bless America" during a memorial service at the Pentagon on Oct. 11, 2001, in honor of those who perished in the terrorist attack on the building. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, eulogized the 184 persons killed when a terrorist hijacked airliner was purposely crashed into the southwest face of the building on Sept. 11, 2001. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released)

011011-D-9880W-196

12/21  
1700  
snowflake

December 21, 2001 7:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Photo

If this is General Jumper, please send this photo to him from me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Photo

DHR:dh  
122101-4

*It is General Jumper!*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*abs rec'd  
1/30/02*

*SWT.  
Please  
put a cover  
letter.  
Dish*



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
*Approved*  
FEB 05 2002

SECDEF SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

334

FOR: MS. CATHY MAINARDI, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) FEB - 1 2002

PURPOSE: Welcome the members of the Defense Business Practices  
Implementation Board.

DESCRIPTION: The Board has been established to examine and advise the  
Department's Senior Executive Council on strategies to adopt best  
business practices of interest to the Department.

DATE/TIME: March 15, 2002, 8:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.

LOCATION: 1E801 #7

PARTICIPANTS: The Board is composed of 21 senior executives from the business  
community. In addition, the Comptroller General of the United  
States and the Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management,  
Office of Management and Budget, serve as observers on the Board.  
A list of the members is attached.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Anticipated time of ~~welcome~~ remarks is ~~8:30 a.m.~~ *prefer - noon time*  
*will hold 45 min.*

REMARKS REQUIRED: Short (3-5 minutes) remarks will be prepared by OUSD(C). *per Mr. Dilib*

CONTACT: Lois Douglas, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

Hold Open \_\_\_\_\_ Approve  Decline \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

1 Feb 02

## DEFENSE BUSINESS PRACTICES IMPLEMENTATION BOARD

William (Gus) Pagonis, Senior Vice President, Sears Supply Chain, Sears, Roebuck & Company and President, Service Logistics Services, Inc.  
(Chair)

Michael Bayer, private consultant engaged in enterprise strategic planning and mergers and acquisitions (Vice Chair)

Neil Albert, Senior Vice President and Director of MCR Federal, Inc.

Brad Bends, Vice President, Financial Services, KPMG

Denis Bovin, Vice Chairman, Bear Stearns and Company, Inc.

Frederic Cook, Frederic Cook & Company

Bruce DeMars, DeMars, Inc.

Travis Engen, President and CEO, Alcan, Inc.

Steve Friedman, Chairman, Board of Columbia University

Robert Hale, Senior Fellow, Logistics Management Institute

W. N. Johnson, Vice President, Dean of Students, Boston University

James Kimsey, Founding CEO and Chairman Emeritus of America Online

Dana Mead, Retired Chairman, Tenneco, Inc.

Phil Merrill, Chairman, Board of Capital-Gazette Communications

Richard Perle, Chairman, Defense Policy Board, *ex officio*

William Phillips, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Washington

Arnold Punaro, Senior Vice President and Director, Federal Business Development, Science Applications International Corporation

William Schneider, Jr., Chairman, Defense Science Board, *ex officio*

Andrew Siegel, Deutsche Bank

Frank Sullivan, Frank Sullivan Associates

Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor-in-Chief, U.S. News & World Report

### Observers

David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States

Mark Everson, Controller, Office of Federal Financial Management, Office of Management and Budget

February 4, 2002 7:32 AM

TO: Honorable Paul O'Neill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Safety

Here is the quarterly report from the Army on safety. Are they on the right track?

Thanks.

Attach.

01/31/02 SecArmy Info Memo to SecDef re: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

*129*

DHR:db  
020402-4

*4/26/02*



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
2002 FEB -1 AM 10:39

SECDEF HAS SEEN

February 1, 2002, 8:33 A.M. FEB 24 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: *Tom White* **JAN 31 2002**  
Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army  
SUBJECT: Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

- Attached provides a current analysis of Safety goals and performance metrics.
- The small increase in fatalities that we experienced during the first quarter, FY 02 is attributable to Operation Enduring Freedom.
- POV accidents continue to be our greatest challenge and the focus of our efforts to reemphasize the efforts of commanders at every level to continue to work this problem hard.
- We have made significant strides in reducing workplace injuries and lost time involving the Army's civilian workforce.
- Safety will remain at the forefront of our efforts to keep the Army ready.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: COL Joseph Schroedel, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>Arli</i>
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>2/1</i>




SUBJECT: Army Safety Goals and Performance Metrics

1. PURPOSE: To provide a quarterly update to the Secretary of Defense on U.S. Army Safety Statistics.

2. The Army has an effective safety program. The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) and I have recently approved a Safety Strategic Campaign plan that is closely tied to The Army Transformation Plan. In October 2000, the CSA established a goal of reducing overall fatalities in The Army by 6 percent per year through FY06. Our current metrics are based on these goals.

3. On a quarterly basis, the CSA and I receive an executive summary and a briefing from the Director of Army Safety on accident rates and trends for all Army categories to include: army motor vehicles, army combat vehicles, personal injury, POV, and aviation. Army-wide initiatives designed to reduce accident rates and stop negative trends are discussed with the senior leaders and attendees.

4. The 6 percent reduction in overall fatalities goal is attainable and consistent with the decreases in accidental fatalities The Army has experienced over the past 10 years. The graph below depicts year-end and first quarter fatalities from FY92 to FY02.



5. In this first quarter of FY02, The Army lost 46 soldiers. This represented a 15 percent increase over the same time last year. Leaders and commanders took action and this spike in accidents has since leveled off to where The Army stands at one less fatality than last year at this time. Accidents related to Operation Enduring Freedom account for approximately 10% (5 fatalities) of Army accidental fatalities in the first quarter of FY02.