

December 7, 2002 10:41 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Course 3 Proposal

Please get with Gen. Myers and get familiar with the Course 3 proposal on the Philippines. Then we better make sure we know whether or not that requires war powers activity by the White House. I know it is not illegal, but we tend to mimic what is required.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-12



Please respond by 12/20/02

Philippines

11/15/02

U10817 /03

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July 1, 2002 8:33 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Franks
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weapons

Do you think we ought to have a policy where we have Karzai tell people in Afghanistan not to shoot weapons in the air, or they are going to get hit?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-75

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

Afghanistan

15/01/02

U10825 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9501



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 8 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Response to the Government of Iraq Invitation to Discuss the Case of Captain Speicher

NR

Thank you for your letter dated June 29, 2002, proposing that State respond to Iraq's invitation to discuss the case of Gulf War MIA Captain Speicher. I completely agree that we need to explore every avenue to resolve this case and that we should respond to the Iraqi offer.

As you suggest in your letter, and as agreed to during an interagency meeting convened by the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), sending a diplomatic note to Iraq through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to confirm Iraq's intention to provide new information is the best approach. If and when Iraq responds to your note, we can decide whether to propose a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the ICRC.

Donald Rumsfeld

8/9/02

U10841 /02



11-L-0559/OSD/9502



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-02/009991

DEPSEC Action *JW 7/3/02*

USDP *PMR for*

*This looks like a
good approach to a
complicated issue.
PMR*

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

SUBJECT: Response to SECSTATE and Iraqi Invitation to Discuss the Case of Commander
Michael Scott Speicher

- The purpose of this memo is to seek the SECDEF's signature on the memo to SECSTATE at Tab A supporting his proposed response to Iraq's invitation.
- On April 8, 2002, the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) received from the Department of State a copy of an invitation by the Iraqi government to receive a U.S. team to investigate the loss of CPT Speicher (Tab B).
- DPMO convened an interagency working group on April 12, 2002, to develop a plan of action to investigate the fate of CPT Speicher in light of Iraq's invitation.
- DPMO, NSC, State, and ISA/NESA considered several options and agreed to the following response to Iraq's invitation:
 - State will prepare a diplomatic note to be delivered through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The aim of this note is to determine if Iraq is willing to cooperate and answer questions (Tab C) helpful to the Speicher investigation.
 - If Iraq's response through the ICRC to State demonstrates that Iraq is indeed willing to cooperate, State will propose that U.S. and Iraqi representatives meet in Geneva, under the auspices of the ICRC to discuss the case.
- SECSTATE Powell endorses the interagency group's proposed response (Tab D).
- **Recommend you approve the interagency group's proposal and inform SECSTATE that you have by signing the memorandum at Tab A.**

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by Mr. John Unangst, (b)(6)
DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)

5 JUL 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9503

Response to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs Invitation to Receive a U.S. Team to Investigate the Status of Commander Speicher

- The United States accepts the invitation by the Government of Iraq to send a team to Iraq to investigate the circumstances surrounding the fate of American naval pilot Lieutenant Commander Michael Scott Speicher who has been missing since January 17, 1991.
- The United States will determine the appropriate composition of the investigative team.
- The investigative team will consist of U.S. government officials and will not include Mr. Scott Ritter.
- The team's investigation is a serious government-to-government matter. As such, the United States does not agree to the presence of the news media during meetings with Iraqi officials, during interviews with Iraqi private citizens, or during any visits to physical sites.
- The team will visit Iraq only if the Government of Iraq agrees to answer or assist in the investigation to answer the questions previously submitted to it by the United States. These questions and the rationale behind them are reiterated below:

Questions

Information provided officially by Iraq and derived from an ICRC-sponsored examination of the crash site overseen by Iraqi officials establishes that:

- The wreckage was that of the airplane piloted by Lieutenant Commander Speicher.
- The pilot ejected from the airplane before it crashed.
- Critical parts of the wreckage were removed shortly before the ICRC site examination.
- A pilot's flight suit and other survival equipment were removed from the pilot's body prior to being "found" during the ICRC site examination.
- The remains that Iraqi authorities turned over and labeled "Mickel" do not correlate to Lieutenant Commander Speicher.

In order for the proposed visit to be of assistance in resolving the fate of Commander Speicher, the Iraqi authorities must grant the team access to physical sites for investigation, and to people who could potentially answer the following questions during the team's visit:

- On January 1991, Lieutenant Commander Michael Scott Speicher was piloting an F/A-18 that crashed in central Iraq. Lieutenant Commander Speicher was not repatriated following the war, nor were his remains recovered. A recovery team, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), found no remains when they excavated the crash site in 1995.
 - Can you tell us what happened to Lieutenant Commander Speicher?
 - Was he captured?
 - Were his remains recovered following his incident of loss?
 - If so, where was he or where were his remains taken?
 - Where are they now?
- It is believed Lieutenant Commander Speicher was shot down by an air-to-air missile.
 - Identify the pilot who deployed the missile, and make him available for interview so that we might gather additional information about the incident of loss.
 - Provide any records that relate to the shoot down of any coalition aircraft on January 17, 1991.
- Air defense, border guard, military, militia, and security force units were probably active in the area of Lieutenant Commander Speicher's loss location.
 - Identify units in the area at the time of loss and make available for interview individuals in those units who may have information pertaining to this incident or Lieutenant Commander Speicher's fate.
- Material analysis of the aircraft wreckage indicates Lieutenant Commander Speicher probably ejected from his damaged aircraft.
 - If he were injured when discovered, where would he have been taken for medical treatment?

- Would he have been taken ultimately to Baghdad? If so, what facilities would he have passed through?
 - Are there any records indicating he was captured alive?
 - If he died en route due to injuries suffered, what would have been done with the body?
 - Identify any hospitals in Baghdad that may have been used to store the remains of U.S. servicemen or other coalition forces.
- On March 19, 1991, the Government of Iraq (GOI) transferred a set of remains to the ICRC identified only as “Mickel.” The remains consisted of 1.5 pounds of flesh, mostly skin. Blood typing and DNA testing indicate the remains do not correlate to Lieutenant Commander Speicher.
 - Where were the remains identified as “Mickel” recovered? By whom or what entity?
 - Why were they associated with the Lieutenant Commander Speicher loss incident?
 - Are there death certificates or other documentation pertaining to these remains? If so, provide these.
 - Request you make available for interview anyone involved with the recovery of these remains, or with the recovery of Lieutenant Commander Speicher.
- Lieutenant Commander Speicher’s flight suit and survival equipment were recovered during the investigation of the crash site by the recovery team operating under the auspices of the ICRC in 1995.
 - How did his flight suit and survival gear come to be located where the recovery team found it?
 - What might have happened to his body?
 - Why would his flight suit have been removed from Lieutenant Commander Speicher, and who might have removed it?
- During the excavation, it was noted that the area where the cockpit would have been located appeared to have been excavated recently.
 - Who excavated the site prior to the recovery team’s arrival?

- What was the result of the excavation?
- What items were removed and where are they currently located?
- A number of items were missing from the crash site or not discovered. Of particular interest are the ejection seat, cockpit section, parachute, and survival equipment. In addition, the nose cone was identified at the crash site prior to excavation; however, it was not at the crash site when the recovery team arrived.
 - What happened to these items?
 - Request you identify and make available for interview any individuals who may have discovered and/or removed these items. This information may help clarify what happened to Lieutenant Commander Speicher.
- A U.S. Navy F-14 crewman shot down in January 1991 and held as a Prisoner of War (POW) reported that an Iraqi interrogator asked him if the American aircraft carrier Saratoga lost any aircraft. The POW told the interrogator an A-6 and an F/A-18 were lost. The interrogator then asked if the POW knew the F/A-18 pilot. When the POW said “no,” the interrogator stated that the F/A-18 pilot was dead. Lieutenant Commander Speicher was the only F/A-18 pilot lost from the USS Saratoga.
 - How did the debriefer obtain the information that the F/A-18 pilot was dead?
 - Request you identify the debriefer and make him available for interview.
- On November 19, 1993, the Government of Iraq provided a note dated October 14, 1993 to the U.S. delegates to the Tripartite Commission. The note read in part:

“Regarding the Lieutenant Commander Michael Speicher. His name was reported by his colleague pilot Robert James who was held on the same day and was repatriated home March 15, 1991. No additional information is available about him in spite of the investigation and tracing.”

 - Please clarify this statement.
 - What information did “Robert James” report to your officials?

- Was “Robert James” held with Lieutenant Commander Speicher?
- If so, why wasn’t Lieutenant Commander Speicher repatriated with the other returnees, or why weren’t his remains returned?
- A number of Bedouin camps were located in the vicinity of the crash site shortly after the loss incident.
 - Request you attempt to locate, and make available for interview, individuals who were at these camps and may have visited the crash site, or may have information as to the fate of Lieutenant Commander Speicher.
- Is the Government of Iraq still holding live U.S. or coalition prisoners, or is it still holding U.S. or coalition remains from the Gulf War? If so, where are the prisoners and/or remains being held?



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 2002

ISA
Speicher

DEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
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EPSECDEF	/
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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Don
Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Government of Iraq sent messages in April through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad offering to host a delegation to discuss the case of Gulf War MIA Commander Michael Scott Speicher. DOD/DPMO hosted a working-level interagency meeting Friday, April 12, to discuss the Iraqi invitation.

At the meeting all agreed that we should not send a delegation to Iraq to discuss the case, but that we could not pass up a possible opportunity to make progress on determining the fate of Commander Speicher. The State representative recommended that the USG send a response through the ICRC in Geneva asking the Government of Iraq to identify specific areas or information it is willing to share with the USG in resolving the case or clarifying Speicher's status. He explained that if the Government of Iraq refused to respond, responded with only a general statement, or said (as it did in the initial statement) that it had no new information, then there would be no further need to pursue this initiative. If the Iraqis offered progress or new information then the next step would be to agree to a meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the ICRC to discuss the case.

The Honorable
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/GSD/9522


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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

I believe that this is the right approach to take. We need to move cautiously, but given even the slightest chance that the Iraqis might offer some information that would assist in resolving the case, we need to move. The Kuwaitis and Saudis are certain to ask us at the July meeting of the Tripartite Commission what we are doing in response to the Iraqi offer. We also need to be able to say we are exploring every avenue to resolve this case. We would have a difficult time justifying our previous insistence that the Government of Iraq address the issue of Gulf War missing including our own MIA if we have refused to respond to an Iraqi offer to do just that.

Sincerely,



Colin L. Powell

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/9523

TOTAL P.02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

July 3, 2002 - 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu @ June 02

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Membership -- SNOWFLAKE

- The short answer is "No." We will not simply reappoint the current DACOWITS members.
- The Deputy Secretary organized a process for gathering nominations that included soliciting input from Members of the Congress (little was received). The process emphasized identifying individuals which knowledge in matters of military and/or women's career development, consistent with our revised focus.
- Charlie Abell interviewed all the most promising candidates (after clearance of the names with the White House Liaison Office). His memorandum and recommendations to the Deputy Secretary are attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: None

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock

(b)(6)




3/19/02

March 18, 2002 1:42 PM

TO: David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: DACOWITS

I sure hope we are not planning to reappoint the same people back to the DACOWITS board.

This is a real opportunity to put some fresh thinking in the system.

Thanks.

DHK:dh
031802-52

.....

Please respond by 04/05/02

TAB

A



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

FORCE MANAGEMENT
POLICY

June 27, 2002, 4:30 p.m.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

FROM: Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP) *6-27-02*

SUBJECT: Selection of Members of DACOWITS

- On June 7, I forwarded an Action Memo (TAB A) requesting you select new members of DACOWITS from a list of potential candidates I, and the White House Liaison Office, had interviewed. In addition, I requested you affirm the selection of Lieutenant General Carol Mutter, USMC Retired, as the Chair of DACOWITS.
- The Action Memo was returned for additional work, including prioritizing the list of candidates. I was also asked to provide additional information on the slate of candidates considered for the position of Chair of DACOWITS.
- I reviewed the list of potential candidates at TAB A of the original package and determined that the names are listed in the recommended order of selection.
- I have included the original package used to consider candidates for the position of the Chair. There are five candidates in this package. After reviewing the biographies, we contacted two of the five candidates. Lieutenant General Carol Mutter, USMC Retired, indicated that she was interested in the position. Rear Admiral Marsha Evans, US Navy Retired, indicated that she was not interested in the position. The remaining candidates were not polled as to whether they would accept the position.

RECOMMENDATION: DepSecDef select 8 – 12 members from the list of candidates and reaffirm General Mutter as the Chair.

COORDINATION: White House Liaison

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9527

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0101229

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

13 June 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHARLES S. ABELL, ASD / FMP

SUBJECT: Selection of Members of DACOWITS

Sir:

Re: General Mutter:

Given all your hard work, the Deputy Secretary would like to see
A slate of recommended people -- not just General Mutter's.

Very respectfully,



Jon M. Davis
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment
OSD U09590/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9528

U 09 590-02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-4000



1100
6/13

JUN 13 AM 8:15

ACTION MEMO

FORCE MANAGEMENT
POLICY

June 7, 2002, 1:30 p.m.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)
David S. C. Chu 11 June 2
FROM: Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP) *Charles S. Abell June 10, 2002*

*DepSec
① 8-12
② He wants to review before you decide*

SUBJECT: Selection of Members of DACOWITS

- The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was reconstituted under a new charter on March 5, 2002 (TAB A). As a result of the reconstitution, the existing members of DACOWITS were released from that service.
- Under the new charter membership may not exceed 35 (the previous membership level). However, SecDef has expressed his view to limit membership to 12 - 18 members for the reconstituted DACOWITS. The White House Liaison Office conducted a background review and developed a slate of candidates. I interviewed each of the candidates and listed them in order of merit from best to least (TAB B). There are 20 names on the list, all of whom are fully qualified to be members of DACOWITS.
- In earlier conversations, you indicated that you preferred that the Chairman of the reconstituted DACOWITS be a retired female general or flag officer. After discussing several names, you concluded that retired Marine Lieutenant General Carol Mutter was the best candidate to be the Chairman. Background information on General Mutter (TAB C).
- Once you select the membership and reaffirm General Mutter as the Chairman, I will notify each of the individuals on the list of the decisions. I will engage with General Mutter to schedule the first meeting of DACOWITS so that the committee may begin its work.

RECOMMENDATION: DepSecDef select 12 - 18 members from the list at TAB B and reaffirm General Mutter as the chair.

COORDINATION: White House Liaison

DEPSECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

Attachments:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA BATISTE	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Signature]</i>

Prepared by: Charles S. Abell, ASD (FMP), (b)(6)

Charter

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)

- A. Official Designation: Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS).
- B. Objectives and Scope of Activities: The Committee shall provide the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), (ASD (FMP)), with advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Armed Forces. In addition, the Committee shall provide advice and recommendations on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. To accomplish this mission, the Committee shall be composed of not more than 35 civilian members, representing an equitable distribution of demography, professional career fields, community service, and geography, and selected on the basis of their experience in the military, as a member of a military family, or with women's or family-related workforce issues. Members must be US citizens selected without regard to race, creed, gender, national origin, age, marital status or physically challenging conditions. Members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and shall serve as individuals and not as official representatives of any group or organization with which they may be affiliated. While the members serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, normally the term of membership is three years, with approximately one-third of the membership rotating annually. The members of the Committee shall serve without compensation, but may be allowed transportation and per diem for all Government-directed travel.
- C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purposes: Indefinite.
- D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports: The Committee reports to the ASD (FMP), with functional responsibilities under the staff cognizance of the Military Director for DACOWITS and Women's Military Matters. The ASD (FMP) shall appoint a Designated Federal Officer (normally the Military Director) to approve or call each meeting, to approve the meeting agenda, to attend all meetings, and to chair meetings when so directed by the agency head. The officer so designated shall have the authority to adjourn any meeting of the Committee which is not considered to be in the public interest.
- E. Agency Responsible for Providing Necessary Support: The ASD (FMP) provides such personnel, facilities, and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Committee's functions.
- F. Duties: The duties of the Committee include assisting the Secretary of Defense by advising on specified matters relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will advise on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. In carrying out its duties, the Committee serves as a conduit of information and advice to the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to the recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly qualified professional women and on family issues related to the recruitment and retention of a highly qualified professional military. Through its work, the Committee encourages public acceptance of military service as a citizenship responsibility and as a career field for qualified women in the Services. In addition, the Committee will actively promote family-related issues that will assist the Department in recruiting and retaining a highly qualified professional military.
- G. Annual Operating Costs: It is estimated that the annual operating costs to support the Committee will not exceed \$520,000, which includes staff support years, meetings, per diem and travel costs. The annual person-years of Federal staff support for the Committee will not exceed seven.
- H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings: A minimum of two meetings shall be held annually.
- I. Termination Date: The Committee shall terminate upon the completion of its mission or two years from the date this Charter is filed with the US Congress.
- J. Filing Date: April 17, 2002

Candidates for Membership in DACOWITS

1. Ms. Cate Aspy – Keizer, Oregon, former Army enlisted, military spouse, author of articles on women's issues – very patriotic, Commander of local VFW Post
2. Ms. Page O'Flaherty – Marysville, Washington, former Navy Lieutenant, USNA graduate, spouse of Naval Officer (Captain, aviator)
3. Mr. Ladd Patillo – Austin, Texas, retired Army Reservist, investment banker, National Vice-Chair, Veterans for Bush-Cheney
4. Ms. J.P. Duniphan – Rapid City, South Dakota, Majority Whip, SD House of representatives, business woman, member, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
5. Ms. Sue Patane – San Bernardino, California, Executive Director, Loma Linda Ronald McDonald House, former member Beale AFB military liaison committee, former member DACOWITS (acting Chair, very loyal and helpful during the review and reconstitution)
6. Mr. Vance Shaw – McLean, Virginia, retired USAF Colonel, consultant working with State Adjutants Generals, African-American
7. Ms. Virginia Rowell – Vienna, Virginia, spouse of retired Army Colonel, mother of active Army nurse, delegate at Family Force Forum, facilitator and trainer with Army Family teambuilding program
8. Ms. Bonnie Ford – Albuquerque, New Mexico, military spouse, nurse, former teacher in DOD schools, member and former President, Naval Officers' Wives Club
9. Ms. Julie Hamre – Bethesda, Maryland, spouse of former DepSecDef, member Board of Directors N Street Village (shelter for homeless women), leader of the self-study, an internal review of how to reform DACOWITS – would accept a one-year appointment (selection would be a clear demonstration of a non-partisan committee)
10. Ms. Martha Kleder – Manassas, Virginia, former USAF enlisted, military spouse, worked for Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, policy analyst for Concerned Women for America
11. Ms. Lynda Davis – Great Falls, Virginia, former Army Reserve officer, member Human Rights Alliance (work with women's small business incubation in Bosnia, consultant on school related issues)

12. Ms. Constance Horner – Washington, D.C., former Director of White House Personnel (Bush 41), former Director, Office of Personnel Management, (Reagan), currently serves on Boards of Directors
13. Ms. Lisa De Pasquale – Herndon, Virginia, daughter of female military officer, Program Director Clare Booth Luce Policy Institute
14. Mr. Yale King – Loveland, Colorado, businessman, philanthropist focusing on community support
15. Ms. Lisa Gutierrez – Santa Fe, New Mexico, diversity officer at Los Alamos National Laboratories, marketing experience with Proctor & Gamble in Saudi Arabia, conducts workshops on gender in the workplace
16. Mr. Adam Mersereau – Tucker, Georgia, former Marine enlisted and officer, lawyer, recommended by Ms. Elaine Donnelly for membership, author of articles advocating restricting women in combat positions
17. Ms. Joy Silverman – New York, New York, former member of Mayor Giuliani's commission to combat family violence, daughter of WWII Army physician
18. Ms. Brenda Wuerch – Anchorage, Alaska, spouse of retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel, member Anchorage Domestic Violence Task Force, wife of the Mayor of Anchorage
19. Ms. Judi Bramlett – Haliewa, Hawaii, wife of retired Army four-star general, founder, board member Army Wives Conference, facilitator of Army Family Advocacy Program
20. Ms. Zandra Krulak – London, England, wife of retired Commandant of USMC, Board of Advisors, National Military Family Association, founder of Key Volunteer Program to promote family readiness (potential travel issues)

United States Marine Corps (Ret.)

Brigadier General
Carol A. Mutter



Lieutenant General Carol A. Mutter retired from the U.S. Marine Corps effective January 1, 1999. Her last assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S, M&RA), Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

General Mutter was born in Greeley, CO in 1945. In 1967 she was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps upon graduation from the University of Northern Colorado, in Greeley, CO. In addition to holding a B.A. degree in Mathematics Education and an honorary doctorate from UNC, General Mutter has an M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College at Newport, RI and both an M.S. and an honorary doctorate degree from Salve Regina College, also in Newport.

After completing the Woman Officer Basic Course in 1967 at Quantico, VA, she was assigned to data processing installations at Quantico, VA and at Camp Pendleton, CA. In 1971, she returned to Quantico as a platoon commander and instructor for women officer candidates and basic course lieutenants; she departed this tour as a Captain of Marines.

During 1973-1984, she progressed to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel while serving as Project Officer for Marine Air Command and Control Systems at Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, Camp Pendleton, CA; Financial Management Officer at the Development Center, Quantico, VA; Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Okinawa, Japan; and Deputy Comptroller at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, VA. In 1985, capitalizing on her expertise in both data processing and financial management, she was assigned as the Deputy Program Manager, and subsequently Program Manager, for the development of new Marine Corps automated pay and personnel systems for active duty, retired, and reserve Marines.

In July 1988 as a Colonel she joined the U.S. Space Command, J-3 (Operations) Directorate in Colorado Springs becoming the first woman to gain qualification as a Space Director. After initially serving as a Command Center Crew Commander/Space Director she became the Division Chief responsible for the operation of the Space Command Commander in Chief's Command Center.

August 1990 brought a transfer to III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on Okinawa, Japan and duty as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller for both III MEF and 3d Marine Division. In June 1991, she returned to Quantico as a Brigadier General to serve as the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command and Program Manager for Command and Control Systems. In June 1992, she again transferred to Okinawa, this time as the first woman of general/flag officer rank to command a major deployable tactical command, the 3d Force Service Support Group, III MEF, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific. In June 1994, she became the first woman Marine Major General and served as Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, VA. Upon advancement to Lieutenant General (the first woman in the Marine Corps to attain this rank) on September 1, 1996, she assumed her duties as DC/S M&RA.

In addition to the Naval War College at Newport, RI, General Mutter has attended the Amphibious Warfare

11-L-0559/OSD/9533

School and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, both at Quantico, VA.

Her medals and decorations include: the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation with bronze star, National Defense Service Medal with bronze star, and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with four bronze stars.

(Revised August 1999 HQMC)



[lowres.jpg](#)

DACOWITS CHAIR NOMINATION

NAME	SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	CURRENT INFORMATION
LtGen Carol A. Mutter (Ret)	Marine Corps 1967-1998 First woman to be nominated to three star rank	DC/S M&RA CG & DCG, MC Systems Cmd CDR, 3d FSSG, III MEF ACS Comptroller, III MEF/3 rd Marine Div MA National Security and Strategic Studies, NWC MS Salve Regina College	Consultant to Joint Forces Staff College VP, Veterans for Bush Election Committee 45 Timber Lane Brownsburg, IN 46112-1048 (317) 852-4963 mutter.marines@worldnet.att.net

**DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE
SERVICES**

PROPOSED CHAIR SLATE

Lieutenant General Carol A. Mutter, USMC (Retired)

Rear Admiral Marsha Johnson Evans, USN (Retired)

Major General Patricia P. Hickerson, USA (Retired)

Major General Susan L. Pamerleau, USAF (Retired)

Brigadier General Myrna H. Williamson, USA (Retired)

TAB A: Nominee Information Matrix

TAB B: Service Biographies

TAB C: Retired Female General/Flag Officer Listing

DACOWITS CHAIR NOMINATIONS

NAME	SERVICE	EXPERIENCE	CURRENT INFORMATION
LtGen Carol A. Mutter (Ret)	Marine Corps 1967-1998 First woman to be nominated to three star rank	DC/S M&RA CG & DCG, MC Systems Cmd CDR, 3d FSSG, III MEF ACS Comptroller, III MEF/3 rd Marine Div MA National Security and Strategic Studies, NWC MS Salve Regina College	Consultant, Joint Forces Staff Col VP, Veterans for Bush Election Committee 45 Timber Lane Brownsburg, IN 46112-1048 (b)(6)
RADM Marsha Johnson Evans (Ret)	Navy 1968-1997	Interim Dir, George C. Marshall European Center Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School CDR, Navy Recruiting Command ASN (M&RA) (Ex Dir, Standing Com on Military & Civilian Women in the Navy) C/S, US Naval Academy White House Fellow MA Law and Diplomacy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Univ National War College	National Executive Director, Girl Scouts of America (b)(6)
MG Patricia P. Hickerson (Ret)	Army 1968-2001	DCSPER, USAREUR & 7 th Army DCSPER & Installation Mgt, FORSCOM CG, Soldier Support Institute DCG, US Army Recruiting Cmd West The Adjutant General CDR, Central Sector MEPS MMUS Music, Converse College National War College	HR Director Seattle, Washington (b)(6)
Maj Gen Susan L. Pamerleau (Ret)	Air Force 1968-2000	Dir, Personnel Force Mgt, AF DCSPER CDR, AF Personnel Center Commandant, HQ AF ROTC DACOWITS Military Representative MPA Golden Gate University ICAF	(b)(6)
BG Myrna H. Williamson (Ret)	Army 1960-1989	Dep Dir, Military Personnel Mgt, DCSPER CG, 3 rd ROTC Region CDR, Troop BDE, USA Soldier Support Center MA Human Relations, Univ of Oklahoma National War College	(b)(6) Home Phone: (b)(6) FAX: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9537

United States Marine Corps (Ret.)

Brigadier General
Carol A. Mutter



Lieutenant General Carol A. Mutter retired from the U.S. Marine Corps effective January 1, 1999. Her last assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S. M&RA) Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

General Mutter was born in Greeley, CO in 1945. In 1967 she was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps upon graduation from the University of Northern Colorado, in Greeley, CO. In addition to holding a B.A. degree in Mathematics Education and an honorary doctorate from UNC, General Mutter has an M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College at Newport, RI and both an MS. and an honorary doctorate degree from Calve Regina College, also in Newport.

After completing the Woman Officer Basic Course in 1967 at Quantico, VA, she was assigned to data processing installations at Quantico, VA and at Camp Pendleton, CA. In 1971, she resumed to Quantico as a platoon commander and instructor for women officer candidates and basic course lieutenants; she departed this tour as a Captain of Marines.

During 1973-1984, she progressed to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel while serving as project Officer for Marine Air Command and Control Systems at Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, Camp Pendleton, CA; Financial Management Officer at the Development Center, Quantico, VA; Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Okinawa, Japan; and Deputy Comptroller at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, VA. In 1985, capitalizing on her expertise in both data processing and financial management, she was assigned as the Deputy, Program Manager, and subsequently Program Manager, for the development of new Marine Corps automated pay and personnel systems for active duty, retired, and reserve Marines.

In July 1988 as a Colonel she joined the U.S. Space Command, J-3 (Operations) Directorate in Colorado Springs becoming the first woman to gain qualification as a Space Director. After initially serving as a Command Center Crew Commander/Space Director she became the Division Chief responsible for the operation of the Space Command Commander in Chief's Command Center.

August 1990 brought a transfer to III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) on Okinawa, Japan and duty as the Assistant Chief of Staff Comptroller for both III MEF and 3d Marine Division. In June 1991, she returned to Quantico as a Brigadier General to serve as the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command and Program Manager for Command and Control Systems. In June 1992, she again transferred to Okinawa, this time as the first woman of general/flag officer rank to command a major deployable tactical command, the 3d Force Service Support Group, III MEF, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific. In June 1994, she became title first woman Marine Major General and served as Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, VA. Upon advancement to Lieutenant General (the first woman in the Marine Corps to attain this rank) on September 1, 1996, she assumed her duties as DC/S

M&RA.

In addition to the Naval War College at Newport, RI General Mutter has attended the Amphibious Warfare School and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, both at Quantico, VA.

Her medals and decorations include: the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation with bronze star, National Defense Service Medal with bronze star, and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with four bronze stars

(Revised August 1999 HQMC)



lowres.JPG



TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
 REAR ADMIRAL MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS
 U. S. NAVY

- 12 AUG 1947 Born in Springfield, Illinois
- 29 MAY 1968 Enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve
- 25 JUN 1968 Reported for active duty
- 22 AUG 1968 Honorably discharged
- 23 AUG 1968 Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve and continued on active duty
- 10 JUL 1969 Augmented in the U.S. Navy
- 23 AUG 1969 Lieutenant (junior grade)
- 01 SEP 1971 Lieutenant
- 01 AUG 1977 Lieutenant Commander
- 01 APR 1983 Commander
- 01 AUG 1989 Captain
- 01 APR 1993 Designated Rear Admiral (Lower Half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
- 01 OCT 1993 Rear Admiral (Lower Half)
- 27 JUN 1995 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
- 01 AUG 1996 Rear Admiral, Service continuous to date



<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Naval Women Officers School, Newport, RI (DUINS)	AUG 1968	OCT 1968
Defense Intelligence School, Washington, DC (Instructor)	OCT 1968	JUL 1970
Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific (Assistant Flag Secretary)	JUL 1970	JUL 1972
Office of CNO (Head, DCNO (Logistics) Secretariat)	JUL 1972	MAY 1973
Bureau of Naval Personnel (Surface Junior Officer Assignment Section)	MAY 1973	JUL 1975
Tufts University (DUINS)	SEP 1975	OCT 1977
CINCUSNAVEUR (Middle Eastern/Central Operations Policy)	OCT 1977	AUG 1979
White House Fellow serving as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury	AUG 1979	AUG 1980

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
 REAR ADMIRAL MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS
 U. S. NAVY

<u>ASSIGNMENTS AND DUTIES (CONT'D)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Office of CNO (Analyst, Extended Planning Branch) (OP-96)	AUG 1980	MAR 1981
Executive Office of the President (Deputy Director President's Commission on White House Fellowships)	MAR 1981	AUG 1982
XO, Naval Recruit Training Command, San Diego, CA	AUG 1982	JUL 1984
Surface Warfare Officers School Command (DUINS)	JUL 1984	SEP 1984
CO, Naval Technical Training Center, Treasure Island, CA	SEP 1984	JUL 1986
U.S. Naval Academy (Battalion Officer)	JUL 1986	JUL 1988
National War College (DUINS)	JUL 1988	JUN 1989
Commander, Naval Base, San Francisco, CA (Chief of Staff)	JUN 1989	APR 1990
CO, Naval Station, Treasure Island, CA	APR 1990	NOV 1991
U.S. Naval Academy (Chief of Staff)	NOV 1991	JUL 1992
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) (Executive Director, Standing Committee on Military and Civilian Women in the Department of the Navy)	JUL 1992	JUN 1993
Commander Navy Recruiting Command	JUN 1993	JUL 1995
Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School	SEP 1995	JAN 1998
Interim Director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Concurrent)	NOV 1996	JAN 1998
Retired	1 FEB 1998	

MEDALS AND AWARDS

Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars in lieu of subsequent awards	Navy Commendation Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal	Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars in lieu of subsequent awards	National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Joint Service Commendation Medal	Humanitarian Service Medal

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR
REAR ADMIRAL MARSHA JOHNSON EVANS
U. S. NAVY

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

AB (World Affairs) Occidental College, 1968
MA, LD(Foreign Affairs) The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1977
National War College, 1989
Designated Joint Specialty Officer
White House Fellow, 1979-80
Chief of Naval Operations Scholar 1975-1977
Defense Intelligence School (Mid-career course), 1970
Naval War College Off Campus Program, 1982
Language Qualifications: French (Knowledge)



United States Army



Major General PATRICIA P. HICKERSON

Retired 30 April 2001

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE Direct Appointment

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

- Women's Army Corps Officer Basic Course
- Infantry Officer Advanced Course
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

- Converse College - BMUS Degree - Music
- Converse College - MMUS Degree - Music

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

1LT	5 Aug 68
CPT	5 Aug 69
MAJ	5 Jun 77
LTC	1 Jun 83
COL	1 Jun 88
BG	1 Dec 91
MG	1 Nov 96

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Dec 68	Dec 69	Assistant Manpower Control Officer, later Manpower Control Officer, Manpower Control Division, Military District of Washington, Washington, DC
Jan 70	Dec 72	Commander, 14th Army Band, United States Women's Army Corps Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama
Jan 73	Oct 73	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Dec 73	Jul 75	Branch Advisor, Combat Service Support Branch, Readiness Group Atlanta, Fort Gillem, Georgia
Aug 75	Jul 77	Admissions Officer, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York

Major General PATRICIA P. HICKERSON

Aug 77	Jun 78	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 78	Aug 79	Personnel Management Officer, United States Army Military Personnel Center, Eighth United States Army, United States Army, Korea
Aug 79	Jun 80	Deputy G-1 (Personnel), 2d Infantry Division, Korea
Jul 80	Jul 82	Personnel Staff Officer, Assignment Procedures Office, United States Army Military Personnel Center, Alexandria, Virginia
Jul 82	Dec 83	Military Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC
Jan 84	Jun 84	Chief, Personnel Actions Division, VII Corps, United States Army Europe, Germany
Jun 84	Jun 86	Commander, 38th Personnel and Administration Battalion, VII Corps, United States Army Europe, Germany
Aug 86	Jun 87	Student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
Jun 87	Jun 89	Administrative Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC
Jun 89	Feb 91	Commander, Central Sector, United States Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago, Illinois
Feb 91	Oct 94	The Adjutant General, United States Army/Commanding General, United States Army Physical Disability Agency/Executive Director, Military Postal Service Agency, Alexandria, Virginia
Oct 94	Jan 96	Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Recruiting Command West, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Jan 96	Sep 96	Commanding General, Soldier Support Institute, Fort Jackson, South Carolina
Sep 96	Jul 98	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management, United States Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia
Jul 98	Mar 01	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Administrative Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 87-Jun 89	Lieutenant Colonel/ Colonel
Commander, Central Sector, United States Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago, Illinois	Jul 89-Feb 91 (No joint credit)	Colonel

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)

Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Cluster)

Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)

Army Commendation Medal

Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 14 March 2002



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

MAJOR GENERAL SUSAN L. PAMERLEAU



Retired effective Sept. 1, 2000

Maj. Gen. Susan L. Pamerleau is the director of personnel force management, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As the director she is responsible for ensuring deputy chief of staff of personnel and Air Force chief of staff personnel policies and strategic objectives are integrated in the development and establishment of policies, plans and programs for civilian and military utilization, classification, promotions, evaluation, retention, separations and retirements. In addition, she is responsible for all aspects of force management including readiness and joint issues, civilian regionalization, dispute resolutions, future systems and rated force management.

The general attended Phillips University in Enid, Okla., for three years before graduating from the University of

Wyoming in 1968. She received her commission through Officer Training School, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in September 1968. The general has held numerous personnel, training, programming, political-military and administrative positions during her career, including assignments to Headquarters U.S. Air Force at the Pentagon. She has served on the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, and also spent overseas tours in Germany and South Korea.

The general has commanded the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, the 3700th Personnel Resources Group, and a Women in the Air Force squadron. She also served as vice commander of the Air Force Basic Military Training School and the Air Force Military Personnel Center. Prior to her current assignment, she commanded the Air Force Personnel Center at Randolph Air Force Base.

EDUCATION:

1968 Bachelor of arts degree in sociology, University of Wyoming, Laramie

1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

1977 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

1978 Master's degree in public administration, Golden Gate University, San Francisco

1982 National Security Management Course, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 1985 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 1991 Advanced Executive Program, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
 Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
 1999 Executive Program for Senior Managers in Government, John F. Kennedy School of
 Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. September 1968 - July 1970, administration and personnel officer, 1928th Communications Group, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
2. August 1970 - July 1971, Women in the Air Force coordinator, Detachment 204, 3502nd Recruiting Group, Richmond, Va.
3. August 1971 - April 1973, administrative management officer, 31st Field Maintenance Squadron, Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.
4. April 1973 - April 1974, executive support officer, 3rd Civil Engineering Squadron, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea
5. April 1974 - September 1978, commander, Women in the Air Force Squadron, later chief, central base administration, 56th Tactical Fighter Wing, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
6. September 1978 - November 1979, chief, central base administration, 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, Rhein-Main Air Base, West Germany
7. November 1979 - August 1984, staff officer, Deputy Directorate for Bases and Units, Directorate of Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
8. August 1984 - June 1985, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
9. June 1985 - March 1987, chief, Force Programs Division, Directorate of Plans, Programs and Analysis, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
10. March 1987 - August 1988, commander, 3700th Personnel Resources Group, Air Force Military Training Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
11. August 1988 - April 1989, vice wing commander, Air Force Basic Military Training School, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
12. April 1989 - July 1992, executive officer, Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium
13. July 1992 - March 1993, chief, Resource Allocation Division and Personnel and Support Team, Directorate of Personnel Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
14. March 1993 - July 1994, vice commander, Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
15. August 1994 - February 1996, commandant, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
16. February 1996 - May 1998, commander, Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas
17. May 1998 - present, director of personnel force management, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award with "V" device and three oak leaf clusters
Air Force Organizational Excellence Award with oak leaf cluster
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant Sep 24, 1968
First Lieutenant Mar 24, 1970
Captain Sep 24, 1971
Major May 1, 1980
Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 1984
Colonel Jul 1, 1989
Brigadier General Aug 1, 1994
Major General Aug 1, 1997

(Current as of October 1999)



RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

MYRNA HENNRICH WILLIAMSON, Brigadier General

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 28

DATE OF RETIREMENT 30 June 1989

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Women's Army Corps School, Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
The National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

South Dakota State University - BS Degree - English
University of Oklahoma - MA Degree - Human Relations

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Aug 60	Dec 60	Student, Women's Army Corps Officer Basic Course, United States Women's Army Corps School, Fort McClellan, Alabama
Dec 60	Mar 62	Assistant Public Information Officer, United States Army Training Center, Fort Ord, California
Apr 62	Jul 64	Procurement Officer, later Selection Officer, Recruiting Main Station, Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Aug 64	Aug 65	Commander, Company B, Special Troops, Headquarters, United States Army Europe
Nov 65	Oct 66	Individual Ready Reserves
Nov 66	Dec 67	Adjutant, United States Army Reception Station, Fort Lewis, Washington
Jan 68	Jul 68	Student, Women's Army Corps Officer Advanced Course, United States Women's Army Corps School, Fort McClellan, Alabama
Jul 68	Jun 71	Chief, Women's Army Corps Recruiting, United States Army Sixth Recruiting District, Presidio of San Francisco, California
Jun 71	Nov 71	Executive Officer, Command-Leadership Brigade, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Nov 71	Jul 74	Chief, Administration Division, Office of the Secretary, United States Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
Jul 74	Dec 74	Executive Officer, 3d United States Army Women's Army Corps Battalion, Fort McClellan Alabama
Dec 74	Jun 76	Chief, Enlisted Education Department, Staff and Faculty, United States Army Women's Army Corps School & Training Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama
Aug 76	Jun 77	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Aug 77	Feb 79	Commander, 1st Battalion, Training Brigade, United States Army Military Police School/Training Center and Fort McClellan, Alabama
Feb 79	Jun 79	Executive Officer to the Assistant Commandant, Military Police School/Training Center and Fort McClellan, Alabama

11-L-0559/OSD/9548

Aug 79	Jun 80	Student, The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC
Jul 80	Jul 81	Chief, Plans, Policy and Services Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-1, Eighth United States Army/United States Forces, Korea
Aug 81	Dec 82	Chief, Management Support Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition, United States Army, Washington, DC
May 83	Jul 84	Commander, Troop Brigade, United States Army Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
Aug 84	Nov 87	Commanding General, Third Reserve Officer Training Corps Region, Fort Riley, Kansas
Nov 87	Jun 89	Deputy Director, Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army, Washington, DC

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	19 Aug 60
1LT	23 Feb 62
CPT	10 Jun 65
MAJ	20 Aug 68
LTC	1 Jul 77
COL	10 Jul 81
BG	15 Jan 85

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
 Legion of Merit
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal
 Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)

SOURCE OF COMMISSION Direct Appointment

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Chief, Plans, Policy and Services Division, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, J1, Eighth United States Army, United States Forces, Korea	Jul 80-Jul 81	Lieutenant Colonel

As of 30 June 1989

Retired Female General/Flag Officers

(b)(6)

19430831	A	19981201	O07	28	MORGAN	MARY	E
19290226	N	19831001	O08	30	BUCKLEY	FRANCES	SHEA
19381223	F	19920101	O07	30	GOODWIN	BARBARA	A
19310714	N	19840601	O07	30	HARTINGTON	PAULINE	M
19450721	F	20020201	O08	28	KERA	TIU	
19241203	A	19811101	O08	36	CLARKE	MARY	E
19401009	N	20001001	O07	25	BALSAM	MARION	J
19270918	F	19821001	O07	31	WELLS	SARAH	P
19501013	N	20001001	O07	28	BARNES	JACQUELINE	OMEARA
19190308	F	19740501	O07	28	HOEFLY	ETHEL	A
19300211	F	19860501	O07	26	MARSH	MARY	A
19421231	N	19940901	O07	30	WILMOT	LOUISE	CURRIE
19290123	A	19860301	O07	31	HEDBERG	MILDRED	E
19270925	F	19780701	O07	25	MANN	CHRIS	C
19370511	F	19920501	O07	27	HINNEBURG	PATRICIA	A
19410125	F	20010125	O07	0	CLARK	MARCIA	F
19341014	N	19911001	O07	32	HALL	MARY	FIELDS
19370228	A	19970228	O07	0	BURKE	ROSETTA	YVONNE
19271010	A	19830901	O07	26	JOHNSONBROWN	HAZEL	W
19200216	A	19710901	O07	29	HAYS	ANNA	MAE
19290205	N	19871001	O07	30	NIELUBOWICZ	MARY	JOAN
19400403	N	20000201	O08	30	ENGEL	JOAN	MARIE
19490325	N	20010301	O07	28	FISHBURNE	LILLIAN	ELAINE
19400131	A	19931001	O07	30	WILLIS	MARY	C
19420915	A	20010501	O08	32	HICKERSON	PATRICIA	P
19190418	A	19750801	O07	32	BAILEY	MILDRED	C
19390711	A	19930901	O07	33	ADAMSENDER	CLARA	L
19390920	F	20010930	O08	0	TROWELLHARRIS	IRENE	
19260913	N	19810601	O08	30	MCKEE	FRAN	
19410124	N	20010124	O07	0	FACKLER	NANCY	A
19260211	F	19820801	O08	31	BROWN	NORMA	E
19200329	N	19750701	O07	32	DUERK	ALENE	B
19470724	N	20011001	O08	30	FROMAN	VERONICA	ZASADNI
19300614	F	19900614	O07	0	LINDSEY	BEVERLY	S
19430115	F	19930301	O07	28	KLICK	JEAN	E
19420608	F	19950501	O07	30	TURNER	SUE	E
19300315	F	19850801	O07	28	VAUGHT	WILMA	L

(b)(6)

As of 21 March 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9550

Retired Female General/Flag Officers

(b)(6)	19450406 N	19941001	O07	30	STRATTON	MARIANN	
	19310415 A	19870901	O07	29	SLEWITZKE	CONNIE	L
	19470714 A	20000801	O09	31	KENNEDY	CLAUDIA	J
	19380823 F	19980823	O08	0	ASTAFAN	NORA	A
	19340325 A	19940325	O07	0	POCKLINGTON	DOROTHY	B
	19400126 A	19901201	O07	29	CADORIA	SHERIAN	G
	19380318 F	19980318	O08	0	MILLS	ROBERTA	V
	19230828 A	19790901	O07	30	PARKS	MADELYN	N
	19430116 F	19970222	O08	31	HARRIS	MARCELITE	JORDAN
	19220120 A	19750901	O07	32	DUNLAP	LILLIAN	
	19500214 A	20000201	O07	30	SIMMONS	BETTYE	HILL
	19500430 F	20010801	O07	28	ELLIOTT	CAROL	C
	19370128 A	19890701	O07	27	WILLIAMSON	MYRNA	H
	19480803 F	20000201	O07	29	STIERLE	LINDA	J
	19451217 M	19990101	O09	31	MUTTER	CAROL	A
	19361216 F	19881001	O07	30	SCHIMMENTI	CARMELITA	
	19260420 N	19790701	O07	28	CONDER	MAXINE	
	19471111 F	20010801	O07	29	COOK	SHARLA	J
	19301106 N	19901106	O08	0	HANSEN	WHITNEY	
	19210623 F	19730601	O08	28	HOLM	JEANNE	M
	19550130 N	20010601	O07	20	MARIANO	ELEANOR	CONCEPC
	19421209 N	19970301	O07	32	LAUGHTON	KATHARINE	LENO
	19430114 F	19980701	O07	31	RANKIN	KAREN	S
	19350705 F	19890501	O07	25	COFFINGER	MARALIN	K
	19470812 N	19980201	O07	29	EVANS	MARSHA	JOHNSON
	19340116 F	19851001	O07	29	OCONNOR	DIANN	H
	19311223 F	19911223	O07	0	MOSSMAN	FRANCES	I
	19300519 A	19890901	O07	30	FOOTE	EVELYN	P
19460729 F	20000901	O08	32	PAMERLEAU	SUSAN	L	

Retired Female General/Flag Officers

(b)(6)



As of 21 March 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9552

Retired Female General/Flag Officers

(b)(6)



As of 21 March 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9553

March 18, 2002 1:42 PM

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DACOWITS

I sure hope we are not planning to reappoint the same people back to the DACOWITS board.

This is a real opportunity to put some fresh thinking in the system.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-52

.....
Please respond by 04/05/02

334 DACOWITS

18 MAR 02

Snowflake

EF 1395
121606609-OSDP
April 23, 2002 6:14 PM

TRP

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: NATO-Russia Arrangement

If we do a NATO-Russia arrangement, isn't that the time, since we are leaning to them, that they should lean to us? We should undo the idea of no non-German forces in East Germany and no substantial NATO combat forces in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, all of which was given away by the Clinton administration.

Russia

It seems to me that the time to fix those things and reduce those restrictions is now. Why don't we screw our heads into that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042302-20

.....

Please respond by 05/17/02

7/8

Also see comments by Mr. Haynes on last page

[Handwritten signature]

Response Attached

SPJ
7/1

23 Apr 02



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

July 9, 2002, 6:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ* JUL 10 2002

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

- You wrote to the Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries on the misuse of contingency operations funds noted in the press. You also asked for recommended courses of action.
- As soon as I became aware of the situation described by the General Accounting Office, I directed my staff to take immediate action to ensure that this misuse of contingency funds would not occur again.
- Some of the misuses of contingency funds (as noted in the news article that you sent to me) were the result of Air Force abuse of the purchase card in Southwest Asia (e.g., decorative furniture and furnishings, cappuccino machines, golfing equipment and memberships, palm pilots). As you know, I established the DoD Charge Card Task Force to strengthen the controls of the Purchase Card and Travel Card programs. We are in the process of implementing the recommendations it outlined in its recently published report. These should help eliminate the misuse of government purchase and travel cards. For example,
 - We have legislation pending to permit us to hold DoD accountable officials (including purchase cardholders) financially liable for illegal, improper, or incorrect purchases.
 - By the end of the fiscal year, we will implement automated tools to detect potentially abusive transactions for review.
- I also have directed my staff to strengthen our procedures regarding resources provided for contingency operations:
 - Provide further clarification of the costs that can be financed with funds made available for contingency operations;
 - Provide guidance to eliminate funding of duplicative efforts; and
 - Add a section to the DoD Financial Management Regulation on fiduciary responsibility to strengthen both financial stewardship and accountability.
- In addition, I directed my staff to meet with the senior financial managers within the Service and Defense Agency Comptroller organizations to communicate the importance of establishing appropriate oversight and controls to eliminate abuses such as these.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John Evans, (b)(6) 59/OSD/9556

1110988 / 02

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

This recent report about wasteful spending bothers me and I know it does you, too.

I sure hope that when you have all investigated the problems here, that we don't decide there is no one to be held accountable. These sound like very poor decisions, and we are never going to change the culture around here without imparting the appropriate sense of urgency about our responsibilities as stewards of taxpayer money.

Please look into this and into our spending practices generally and let me know what course of action you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa; Scripps Howard News Service, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought by Army and Air Force," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05/30/02

DHR.dh
060302-29

.....

Please respond by 07/12/02

U09302 02

Seattle Post-Intelligencer
May 30, 2002

\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought By Army And Air Force

By Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service

WASHINGTON -- A \$24,000 sofa and armchair. An \$1,800 pillow. And \$45,800 in silver and china. Such accoutrements would cause little surprise if found in the abodes of the wealthy and well-known.

But government auditors discovered these pricey items -- and many more -- not in a mansion but at Air Force and Army bases in Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Persian Gulf, Europe and the Balkans.

In a just-released report, the General Accounting Office informed Congress that its auditors found a number of "seemingly unneeded expenditures" made by the Air Force and Army in 2000 and 2001.

"As much as \$101 million in contingency operations funds were spent on questionable expenditures" -- a small fraction of the estimated \$2.2 billion examined by the investigators, but troubling nonetheless, the report said.

Among those were \$4,600 worth of "white beach sand" for an air base in the Arabian desert and a \$3,400 Sumo wrestling suit for another.

The Army came in for criticism for duplicating purchases of computers and office equipment at its bases in Bosnia to the tune of \$2.3 million.

Rather than using equipment already there or sharing new items, four successive Army units heading for Bosnia bought their own sets of equipment, the GAO said.

That struck the auditors as particularly wasteful, given that the Army has stocked more than 2,000 computers, 865 printers, 91 copiers and "a multitude of other office equipment" in the area. However, Army officials said that differences in missions and training of the various units serving in Bosnia necessitated some of the equipment purchases.

The auditors blamed Pentagon and Army superiors for failing to provide the clear guidance and strict oversight needed to rein in such practices.

The Air Force was also criticized for an array of what the GAO deemed unjustified and excessive spending, including:

At al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, the service bought a \$2,200 coffee table.

At Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, it bought a \$24,000 loveseat and arm chair and \$9,800 worth of Halloween decorations.

At al Jaber Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the questionable spending included an \$1,800 "executive high-back" pillow, a \$3,000 computer tutorial titled "The Intelligent Investor" and \$19,000 worth of decorative "river rock."

At various Air Force installations in the Persian Gulf region, the service bought a \$35,000 golf cart, a \$16,000 corporate golf membership and \$5,333 in golf passes.

Military experts claim that such recreational items can be a useful tool for building good relations with officials of a host country, whom base officers can invite for, say, a friendly round or two of golf.

The GAO report said Pentagon officials generally agreed that better oversight is needed to prevent wasteful spending.



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECRET HAS BEEN
JUL 16 2002

INFO MEMO

July 16, 2002, 9:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

400.12

- You wrote to the Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries on the misuse of contingency operations funds noted in the press. You also asked for recommended courses of action.
- As soon as I became aware of the situation described by the General Accounting Office, I directed my staff to take immediate action to ensure that this misuse of contingency funds would not occur again.
- Some of the misuses of contingency funds (as noted in the news article that you sent to me) were the result of Air Force abuse of the purchase card in Southwest Asia (e.g., decorative furniture and furnishings, cappuccino machines, golfing equipment and memberships, palm pilots). As you know, I established the DoD Charge Card Task Force to strengthen the controls of the Purchase Card and Travel Card programs. We are in the process of implementing the recommendations it outlined in its recently published report. These should help eliminate the misuse of government purchase and travel cards. For example,



** this horrible word is a term in the art.*

- We have legislation pending to permit us to hold DoD accountable officials (including purchase cardholders) financially liable for improper or incorrect purchases. Currently, if the charge card transaction is wasteful or abusive but is not fraudulent or for personal gain, we can punish the cardholder (or other charge card officials) administratively, but DoD does not have the authority to hold them pecuniarily or financially liable.

- By the end of the fiscal year, we will implement automated tools to detect potentially abusive transactions for review.
- I also have directed my staff to strengthen our procedures regarding resources provided for contingency operations:
 - Provide further clarification of the costs that can be financed with funds made available for contingency operations;
 - Provide guidance to eliminate funding of duplicative efforts; and
 - Add a section to the DoD Financial Management Regulation on fiduciary responsibility to strengthen both financial stewardship and accountability.
- In addition, I directed my staff to meet with the senior financial managers within the Service and Defense Agency Comptroller organizations to communicate the importance of establishing appropriate oversight and controls to eliminate abuses such as these.

16 JUL 02

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John Evans, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

11E-0559/OSD/9560

U11508 / 02

JUL 23 2002

The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Colin,

I understand there is work being done between State and DoD to update the U.S. Munitions list, which governs our export policies. There is one particular issue I would like to raise with you directly.


We are proposing to either transfer demilitarized older cargo aircraft to the export control jurisdiction of the Commerce Department or to permit their sale to friendly governments without the need for an export license. This initiative for these older cargo aircraft, which are of limited military significance, will facilitate sales to a broader range of countries than is now possible. We don't attach any security concerns to such aircraft, including C-130s, and they would be of great benefit in a lot of poorer countries. The need for export license review for these items also distracts both State and DoD licensing officers from more important work.

4522

Perhaps with your assistance we could help to facilitate a resolve this matter.

Sincerely,

Colin - I believe this has been pending for ~~a year~~ a year!
Dun



23 Jul 02

U11007 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9561



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

7/11
1600
JUNE 28 2002

~~SECRET HAS BEEN~~

ACTION MEMO

JUN 28 2002

June 28, 2002, 1000 A.M.

FOR: Secretary of Defense

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr., USD (AT&A) *E. C. Aldridge Jr.* 7/2/02

SUBJECT: Response to your question on C-130 Sales

- You asked what I think the next step ought to be to improve the C-130 sales position (~~issue~~)
- In my first note to you on the C-130 issue (~~issue~~), I advised that more than one year ago DoD had recommended to State that selected cargo aircraft be removed from State's U.S. Munitions List (USML) and transferred to the Commerce Department's jurisdictional authority, provided they are demilitarized. This included C-130s other than the current C-130J models. This would make foreign sales easier, by expanding the customer base beyond governments (a requirement for USML items) and broadening financing possibilities (Ex-IM Bank does not fund military items). If this is not feasible then consideration should be given to the development of an ITAR exemption for these older aircraft.
- State and Commerce, however; do not support the proposal to transfer the aircraft to the Commerce Department's jurisdictional authority. State is concerned because these aircraft are still designated as "major defense equipment" and some aircraft are currently owned by countries not entirely friendly to the United States. Since these aircraft would still be considered military aircraft and would not be considered a dual-use commodity, Commerce believes that assuming jurisdiction of these aircraft would be inconsistent with the dual-use basis for their control list.
- We have prepared a note for you to send Secretary Powell urging him to support and act upon our request. This will not resolve all of the issues concerning used C-130 sales as FAA certification is still an expensive matter for military aircraft. However, it will improve the chances. It will also help in our efforts to revise/reform the USML by removing items no longer a concern to us from a national security perspective.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at TAB A.

CONCURRENCES: Lisa Bronson DASD(CP&TSP)

Prepared By: Marvin Winkelman, IC/P&A

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	7/10
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/2/02</i>

29-28-02



May 22, 2002 12:00 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

What do you propose I do about your memo dated 05/17/02 on C-130 sales?

I am confused. When I send a memo to you and you send a memo back to me, I would like the memo back to me to tell me what in the world you think I ought to do about it—what you think the next step ought to be.

7/21

Thanks.

Response/Proposal attached

Attach.

05/17/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Response to Your Question on C-130 Sales [U08528/02]

D. Lita

DHR:dh
052202-19

*Larry Di Rita
7/22*

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

7/22

DR

SECDEF HAS SEEN

10/28/02

May 22, 2002 12:00 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

What do you propose I do about your memo dated 05/17/02 on C-130 sales?

I am confused. When I send a memo to you and you send a memo back to me, I would like the memo back to me to tell me what in the world you think I ought to do about it—what you think the next step ought to be.

7/11

Thanks.

Response/Proposal attached.

Attach.

05/17/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Response to Your Question on C-130 Sales [U08528/02]

D. Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
052202-19

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

7/16
fix to letter.
Re-submit
double space/plain
paper. *D. Rumsfeld*
7/17

May 22, 2002 12:00 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Sales

What do you propose I do about your memo dated 05/17/02 on C-130 sales?

I am confused. When I send a memo to you and you send a memo back to me, I would like the memo back to me to tell me what in the world you think I ought to do about it—what you think the next step ought to be.

Thanks.

7/11
Response/Proposal attached

Attach.

05/17/02 USD(AT&L) memo to SecDef re: Response to Your Question on C-130 Sales [U08528/02]

D. White

DHR:dh
052202-19

.....
Please respond by 06/21/02

USD (AT&L)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

7/11
fix letter
Send free or
unpublished
copy
7/11



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

SECDEF HAS SEEN
JUL 11 2002

ACTION MEMO

I-02/010007-PS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action INFO

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (Douglas J. Feith) *11/1/02*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Meeting, July 10-11, 2002 -
READ-AHEAD

331

Defense Policy Board Chair, Richard Perle, will convene the Board on July 10-11, 2002. The agenda includes intelligence briefings and discussion on India/Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bioterrorism, and Missile Defense issues (agenda at Tab A).

You agreed to meet with the Board on Thursday, July 11, 2002, 4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. At that time, Mr. Perle will present the results of the Board's meeting and invite Board discussion with you.

Board members and invited participants are listed at Tab B.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Ann E. Hansen, ExecSec, DPB

(b)(6)

950102



Defense Policy Board

July 10-11, 2002
Pentagon, 3E869

Agenda

Thursday, July 11, 2002

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| 9:00 – 9:30 | Light Breakfast Buffet, Gold Room 3E859
Adjacent to 3E869, the main meeting room |
| 9:30 – 9:35 | Administrative |
| 9:35 – 10:45 | Intel Update
Saudi Arabia |
| 10:45 – 11:45 | Kevin O’Prey and Matt Travis, DFI International
Chemical & Biological Demonstration Information-Network (CBDI-
Net) |
| 11:45 – 12:45 | Lunch – Gold Room 3E859 (Buffet adjacent to the meeting room.)
Guest Speaker: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of
Defense |
| 12:45 – 1:00 | Break |
| 1:00 – 2:30 | Dr. Josh Lederberg, Professor Emeritus, Rockefeller University
Bioterrorism |
| 2:30 – 4:00 | Open Discussion |
| 4:00 – 4:15 | Break |
| 3:00 – 3:45 | |
| 4:30 – 5:30 | Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense |

Defense Policy Board July 10-11, 2002

Richard Perle, Chairperson
Honorable Richard Allen
Dr. Gary Becker
Dr. Barry Blechman
Dr. Eliot Cohen
Ms. Devon Cross
Gen (Ret) Ron Fogleman
Amb Thomas Foley
Honorable Tillie Fowler
Honorable Newt Gingrich
Mr. Gerald Hillman
Dr. Kim Holmes
Gen (Ret) Chuck Horner
Dr. Fred Ikle
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. Philip Merrill
ADM (Ret) Bill Owens
Dr. Henry Rowen
Dr. James Schlesinger
GEN (Ret) Jack Sheehan
Dr. Kiron Skinner
Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Chris Williams
Honorable Pete Wilson
Mr. Jim Woolsey

Members Unable to Attend:

Mr. Ken Adelman
Dr. Martin Anderson
Dr. Harold Brown
LTG (Ret) Marc Cisneros
ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah
Former VP Dan Quayle

Guests:

Mr. Denis Bovin

Vice Chairman, Investment Banking
Bear, Stearns and Co. Inc.
Defense Science Board



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 15 2002

Rt Honorable Geoffrey Hoon MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
United Kingdom

Dear Geoff:

I would like to thank you and your colleagues for an outstanding job in leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Major General McColl's leadership and initiative were vital to establishing peace and security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. You took on a difficult task and managed it very well and with demonstrable success.

We look forward to our continued partnership in the war on terrorism.

Sincerely,

UK



U11101-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9569

15 Jul 02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 15 2002

General Sir Michael Walker
Chief of the General Staff
Ministry of Defence
United Kingdom

Dear General Walker:

I would like to thank you and your colleagues for an outstanding job in leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Major General McColl's leadership and initiative were vital to establishing some normality in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The United Kingdom's efforts have been of fundamental importance to the potential for long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan.

The Department of Defense looks forward to working closely with you on these and other important matters.

Sincerely,

U11101-02



11-L-0559/OSD/9570

SARAH DISKETTE TABLE OF CONTENTS
RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 110702
CREATION TIME: 05560000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME:
ORG: OFFICE: PHONE:
TOC FILE CRC: 8781

FILENAME	MSG TYPE	PREC CLASS	ACTION GROUP	DATE/TIME	FILETIME SSN	TOT/ TOR	SPECAT CIC	CRC
UKLTRS	DD173	RR	UU	REDDY	151430Z	JUL02	ZYUW N	11777

ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER



JUL 15 2002

U11101-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9571

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 151430Z JUL 02

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : MUSTAFA POPAL
Office/Phone : ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: AMEMBASSY LONDON
Info: USDAO LONDON UK
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTERS

REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTERS TO SECRETARY HOON AND
GENERAL WALKER AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

A. QUOTE:

RT HONORABLE GEOFFREY HOON MP
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR GEOFF:

(PARA) I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR AN
OUTSTANDING JOB IN LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) MAJOR GENERAL MCCOLL'S LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE WERE VITAL
TO ESTABLISHING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING
AREAS. YOU TOOK ON A DIFFICULT TASK AND MANAGED IT VERY WELL AND
WITH DEMONSTRABLE SUCCESS.

(PARA) WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED PARTNERSHIP IN THE WAR ON
TERRORISM.

SINCERELY, DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF QUOTE.

B. QUOTE:

UNCLASSIFIED

U11101-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9572

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 151430Z JUL 02

PAGE 02 of 02

GENERAL SIR MICHAEL WALKER
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR GENERAL WALKER:

(PARA) I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR AN
OUTSTANDING JOB IN LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) MAJOR GENERAL MCCOLL'S LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE WERE VITAL
TO ESTABLISHING SOME NORMALITY IN KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING AREAS.
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO
THE POTENTIAL FOR LONG-TERM PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.

•
(PARA) THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY
WITH YOU ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS. •

••
SINCERELY, DONALD H. RUMSFELD.

END OF QUOTE.

HARD COPIES TO FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

U11101-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9573

7/2
1600



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

FF19224

Per
6/25

USDP 1/3/02

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

I-02/009339

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _____

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Letters to UK MOD and Chief of General Staff

- Attached for your review and approval are letters to the British MOD and the Chief of the General Staff commending UK leadership of the ISAF.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letters to UK MOD and Chief of General Staff
(Next under).

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:
As stated

7/13
 (1) For the Horn letter
 (2) Send the Walker letter
 7/15

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, NESA

(b)(6)

DASD W. J. Rosta

PDASD _____

SOL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SE MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	1
EXECSEC WHITMORE	7/12

DTG: 110648Z JUL 02

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : MUSTAFA POPAL
 Office/Phone : ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
 Info Prec : ROUTINE
 Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 To: AMEMBASSY LONDON
 Info: USDAO LONDON UK
 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTERS

REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTERS TO SECRETARY HOON AND
 GENERAL WALKER AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

A. QUOTE:

RT HONORABLE GEOFFREY HOON MP
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 UNITED KINGDOM

DEAR SECRETARY HOON:

(PARA) I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR AN
 OUTSTANDING JOB IN LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
 FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) MAJOR GENERAL MCCOLL'S LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE WERE VITAL
 TO ESTABLISHING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KABUL AND ITS SURROUNDING
 AREAS. YOU TOOK ON A DIFFICULT TASK AND MANAGED IT VERY WELL AND
 WITH DEMONSTRABLE SUCCESS.

□
 (PARA) WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED PARTNERSHIP IN THE WAR ON
 TERRORISM.

SINCERELY, DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF QUOTE.

B. QUOTE:

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/9575

11/2
1/20

Snowflake

JUN 21 2002
gr

EF 1919 UA
02/009339-OSDP
June 20, 2002 10:41 AM
TBA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D
SUBJECT: Letter to UK

Please draft a letter from me to the UK thanking them for the good job they did on
ISAF.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-14

.....
Please respond by 06/25/02

7/7

Yes
Can't you do variations on
the basic letter. They
shouldn't get identical
letters.
Larry Di Rita 7/8

Response Attached
SBO
7/3

JUN 21 02 11:53

11-L-0559/OSD/9576

06-21-02 10:07:11



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 15 2002

The Honorable Hamid Karzai
President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan
Presidential Palace
Kabul, Afghanistan

Dear President Karzai:

My warm congratulations on your selection by the Loya Jirga as President of the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan.

Please know that I look forward to working with you in the weeks and months ahead.

Respectfully yours,

AF 5/21/02

cc:
Ambassador, Embassy of Afghanistan

15 Jul 02

U11104-02

S A R A H D I S K E T T E T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
R E L E A S I N G D O C U M E N T

CREATION DATE: 110702
CREATION TIME: 05580000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD H. RUMSFELD
ORG: OFFICE: SECDEF PHONE:
TOC FILE CRC: 4225

FILENAME	MSG PREC ACTION		DATE/TIME	FILETIME		TOT/	SPECAT	
	TYPE	CLASS	GROUP	SSN	TOR	TOR	CIC	CRC
KARZAI	DD173	RR UU	REDY	161100Z	JUL02		ZYUW N	15554

SECDEF
ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER


DONALD H. RUMSFELD

JUL 15 2002

U11104-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9578

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 161100Z JUL 02

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : MUSTAFA POPAL
Office/Phone : ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: AMEMBASSY KABUL
Info: SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS

1. REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE HAMID KARZAI
PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC TRANSITIONAL STATE OF AFGHANISTAN
PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

DEAR PRESIDENT KARZAI:

(PARA) MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SELECTION BY THE LOYA JIRGA AS PRESIDENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) PLEASE KNOW THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. **

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF TEXT.

3. HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

U11104-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9579

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 161100Z JUL 02

PAGE 02 of 02

UNCLASSIFIED

U11104-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9580



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

Red 6126
EF 1921 W

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

USDP 1/17/02

I-02/009337

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letter to President Karzai

- Attached for your review and approval is a congratulatory letter to President Karzai following his recent election as head of state during the Emergency Loya Jirga.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letter to President Karzai (Next under)

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, NESA, (b)(6)

DASD [Signature]

PDASD _____



EF1916LW

02/009337-USDV

June 20, 2002 10:42 AM

JUN 21

gr

ISA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)
SUBJECT: Letter to Afghanistan

Please draft a congratulatory letter from me to Hamid Karzai, which includes something along the lines of: "My warm congratulations on your selection by the loya jirga as _____. Please know that I look forward to working with you in the weeks and months ahead."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-8

.....
Please respond by 06/25/02

7/4
F490
7/11
DAW
DAVE DE FEITH

Response - 7/11/02
SD
7/7

JUN 21 02 11:58

06-21-02 12:01 PM

Snowflake

EF1916LIA

02/009337-OSD/P

June 20, 2002 10:42 AM

JUN 21 2002

[Handwritten initials]

ISA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)
SUBJECT: Letter to Afghanistan

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-8

.....
Please respond by 06/25/02

7/14
Attached
[Signature]

7/14
[Signature]
7/18
ERRY DI RITTA

SOM

Response attached
SFB
7/2

JUN 21 02 11:58

11-L-0559/OSD/9583

25 JUN 2002 12:01 PM

DTG: 110610Z JUL 02

PAGE 01 of 01

Drafter's Name : MUSTAFA POPAL
Office/Phone : ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: AMEMBASSY KABUL
Info: SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS

1. REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT KARZAI FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.
2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE HONORABLE HAMID KARZAI
PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC TRANSITIONAL STATE OF AFGHANISTAN
PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

DEAR PRESIDENT KARZAI:

(PARA) MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR SELECTION BY THE LOYA JIRGA AS PRESIDENT OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) PLEASE KNOW THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF TEXT.

3. HARD COPY TO FOLLOW.

Bogus! the disk was in CCB.
This is the version that was submitted but you could not locate the packets. I retraced it in order to get it out.

UNCLASSIFIED

SARAH DISKETTE TABLE OF CONTENTS
RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 110702
CREATION TIME: 05580000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME:
ORG: OFFICE: PHONE:
TOC FILE CRC: 27120

FILENAME	MSG TYPE	PREC CLASS	ACTION GROUP	DATE/TIME	FILETIME SSN	TOT/ TOR	SPECAT CIC	CRC
KARZAI	DD173	RR	UU	RE DY	110610ZJUL02		ZYUW N	31767

ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER

11-L-0559/OSD/9585

June 25, 2002 3:43 PM

TO: Tom White
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army Congressional Relations

7/1
7/9
John Di Rita

032

Where do you stand on the 15 percent reduction and what is the status of the two individuals we discussed? From everything I can tell from the Hill, the Army is still unhelpful on DoD efforts. I am concerned about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062502-72

.....
Please respond by 07/12/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

7/7

Response attached.

D. Rumsfeld


*John Di Rita
7/8*

25 Jun 02

July 12, 2002 11:58 AM

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Secretaries of the Military Departments
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Undersecretaries of Defense
 Military Chiefs of Staff
 General Counsel of the Department of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
 Director of the Joint Staff

380.61

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: The Impact of Leaking Classified Information

I have spoken publicly and privately, countless times, about the danger of leaking classified information. It is wrong. It is against the law. It costs the lives of Americans. It diminishes our country's chance for success.

Attached is an unclassified CIA assessment of the impact of leaks on the global war on terrorism. The disclosure of classified information is damaging our country's ability to stop terrorist acts and is putting American lives at risk.

Your leadership is needed to help stop leaks. Please meet with your staff to discuss the seriousness of the damaging lack of professionalism we continue to see on a daily basis.

Please let Larry Di Rita know after you have had the discussion with your staff of any feedback you feel would be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
 06/14/02 CIA Memorandum

DHR:dh
 062802-1

12 Jul 02

U11159 /02

JUN 17 2002

C

14 June 2002

Memorandum

In response to a request for unclassified information regarding the impact of leaks on the war against terrorism:

Al-Qa'ida is a savvy, experienced terrorist organization that has watched the US for years, and it pays close attention to publicly available information that will help it evade US intelligence. ***A growing body of reporting indicates that al-Qa'ida planners have learned much about our counterterrorist intelligence capabilities from US and foreign media.***

- Information obtained from captured detainees has revealed that al-Qa'ida operatives are extremely security conscious and have altered their practices in response to what they have learned from the press about our capabilities. (U)

The cumulative effect of public disclosures of classified, terrorism-related information—including significant losses from such disclosures predating 11 September—has jeopardized highly fragile and very sensitive intelligence capabilities that we require for the successful prosecution of the war against terrorism.

- Disclosures of classified information also reduce the willingness of potential allies, volunteers, and sources in foreign countries to work with us out of fear of having their cooperation publicized in the press. (U)

When lost, we attempt to rebuild these capabilities and relationships when we can, but these efforts take time and are expensive. (U)

CIA



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 15 2002

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.)
The Eisenhower Institute
1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 703
Washington, DC 20006

210 (3211)

Dear Andy,

Thank you for your letter regarding the restoration of rank for Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel and Major General Walter Short. After again reviewing the entire matter, we agree with the previous findings and do not support the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

There has been no new extraordinary evidence presented that would overturn the decisions made for an event that occurred more than 50 years ago.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

15 JUL 02

U11170 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9589



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 MAY 10 AM 9:30

6200 Oregon Ave., NW, #345
Washington, DC 20015

April 23, 2002

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Mr. ^{Don}Secretary:

Over the last few years, a number of senior Navy and Army officers, including myself, after thorough consideration, have strongly recommended that action be taken to restore Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, the U.S. commanders in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, to their highest held World War II ranks.

I understand that this matter will shortly be coming to you for decision, and I write to express my strong conviction that a grave injustice has been done to these two officers and that nothing less than the honor of our country is really at stake.

I strongly recommend your favorable action on this proposal.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Andrew J. Goodpaster
General, U.S. Army (Ret)

All Americans are
greatly in your debt
for the strong and
effective leadership
you have given and
are giving against
al Qaeda

U08116- /02

June 25, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: Pete Aldridge
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Supercomputing

413.51

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on cheap supercomputing and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/10/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Cheap Supercomputing

DHR:dh
062502-14

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

AS Turner

Rec'd 0900 / 6/26

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

①

SECDEF HAS SEEN~~JUN 24 2002~~

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, March 10, 2002 11:52 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Ed.Giambastiani@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil
Cc: stephen.cambone@osd.pentagon.mil; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil; art.cebrowski@osd.pentagon.mil; zakheimd@osd.pentagon.mil; john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; ttether@darpa.mil
Subject: (no subject)

Air Force Colonel Bill Bruner sent the following reminder that we should be looking for very cheap supercomputing. It reminded me that the American Museum of Natural History has a stunningly inexpensive parallel processing system made from off the shelf components. My guess is that the system does not look for these kind of dollar saving and capabilities enhancing innovations
 newt
 email follows

from Colonel Bill Bruner

Along the lines of the sort of "distributed intelligence" that I describe below, inexpensive distributed supercomputing on your PC is coming--soon. See this article from a couple of years ago about a small company in Boulder, CO called Massively Parallel Technologies, Inc.:

<http://www.hoise.com/primeur/00/articles/monthly/AE-PR-04-00-5.html>

as well as an article in the February 18, 2002 edition of Space News entitled "Software Could Lead to Low-Cost Supercomputing." I couldn't get an electronic copy, but the key paragraphs say:

"The Howard Cascade has allowed Massively Parallel to build a supercomputer using discarded personal computers such as IBM 486s with an efficiency of 99 percent, which translates into speedup factor of 55 to 60 times for a 63-node cluster. The industry standard, which is defined as how efficiently the collective nodes are working on a given problem, is 10 percent, Smith said. This standard translates into a speedup factor of six times for a 64-node cluster, he said.."

"In the second service model, Massively Parallel will provide access to its own cluster in Colorado to private sector customers via the Internet..."

Cheap supercomputing for the masses will mean 2 things: an acceleration of the desktop computing revolution to "warp speed" and block obsolescence of export controls on supercomputers that might be used against us (e.g. nuclear weapons and hypersonic vehicle design,

3/11/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9592

vulnerability analysis of our society and economy).



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

2002 JUL 15 PM 1:55

INFO MEMO

July 3, 2002 11:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. E. C. "Pete" Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

Pete 7/12/02

SUBJECT: Army and Marine Corps Future Combat Vehicles

- Your memorandum of June 20, 2002 (Tab A) raised the issue of the Army and Marines potentially using a common chassis and joint program for their future combat vehicles.
- The relevant programs are Future Combat Systems (FCS) for the Army, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV) for the Marine Corps.
- The attached information paper (TAB B) ^{from the staff} compares these programs. Differences in timing and requirements between the Services argue against a common chassis, although collaboration at the technology and component level is expected.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Chuck Sieber, S&TS/LW

(b)(6)

However, I do not like this answer. We will take another look. Pete

June 20, 2002 12:14 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Future Tanks etc.

My impression is that the Marines and the Army are both looking at tanks and vehicles for the 2015 to 2020 period. Why shouldn't we require that it be a common chassis and that they do it joint?

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-20

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02 3926-2002

INFO PAPER

FUTURE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS COMBAT VEHICLES

Both the Army and the Marines have identified requirements for families of future vehicles:

- The Army in partnership with DARPA is working on the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a closely-networked "system of systems" to equip their Objective Force, the Army of the future beginning in 2008. FCS replaces all of the Army's current combat vehicles including Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.
- The Marines have a concept for a Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles (MEFFV) to replace their Abrams tanks and Light Armored Vehicles.

Their approaches will reflect differences in:

- Schedule. Army plans Milestone B next year, with first fielding of initial Block I capability in 2008 and Block II in 2014. Marines have not set a specific program schedule but plan on an initial capability in 2015-2020.
- Upper weight bound. The Army is taking as a constraint tactical transport by C-130 aircraft, which sets a 16-18 ton combat weight limit for even the heaviest vehicles. Achieving combat vehicle survivability and lethality in close combat at this weight level is extremely ambitious and will depend utterly on the robust FCS network. The Marines are taking the weight limit as set by 2 vehicles lifted by a Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). LCAC limit is about 72 tons, so the Marines have set 30 tons as a conservative upper weight goal for the heaviest vehicles.
- Doctrine of infantry squad size. Army 9, Marines 13.
- Quantity. Army production quantities are likely to exceed the Marines' by more than an order of magnitude.

Collaboration.

Fielded commonality at the platform level is an unlikely outcome considering the operational differences noted above. Such differences have previously resulted in mixed results. For example, the Army and Marines are in joint programs such as lightweight howitzers and rocket artillery, but have pursued different solutions in areas such as medium and heavy trucks.

However, the Marines recognize that at the component and technology level the FCS effort will produce advances that they can employ for MEFFV. Conversely, work on vehicles in the 30-ton class could provide a hedge against shortfalls in achieving FCS network capabilities.

June 20, 2002 12:14 PM

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Future Tanks etc.

Y51.6

My impression is that the Marines and the Army are both looking at tanks and vehicles for the 2015 to 2020 period. Why shouldn't we require that it be a common chassis and that they do it joint?

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-20



Please respond by 07/19/02 3926-2002

20 Jun 02

TO: Pete Aldridge
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Jim Roche

*C3I will
be tasked
JR*

3:48 PM

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT: Pirating Our USUAV Signals

I would like to get you folks to put together a briefing on it and schedule it for Monday to get me up to speed on what you think is happening and why, and what kinds of solutions we need to fashion.

YSSR

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.04

Please respond by:

6/17/02

13 JUN 02

U11221 /02

December 7, 2002 10:37 AM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your DPB Comments

334

I need what you said in the Defense Policy Board in writing. It was excellent.


Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-10

7 Dec 02

U11223 /03

December 7, 2002 10:36 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Commissaries

331.3

Why don't we get somebody to come up with a proposal as to how we eliminate the commissary subsidy over a period of time and improve the operation of the commissaries—get a proposal, have people look at it, get the Services' comments and then do something.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-9

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

7 Dec 02

U11227 /03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 JUL 15 PM 3:14

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

July 12, 2002, 6 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Our Score on the Latest President's Management Scorecard

- Last summer, the President issued his management agenda, including five Government-wide initiatives and a number of agency specific initiatives. OMB tracks progress toward the accomplishment of these initiatives with a "Scorecard," in which agencies are rated Red/Yellow/Green on two dimensions: 1) the overall status of the initiative and 2) progress on a plan to accomplish the initiative.
- The original scores were published with the FY03 budget. You expressed dissatisfaction with our first set of scores (Tab A).
- OMB will release updated scores on July 15. Our scores have improved a bit.
- Our scores on DoD specific initiatives are:
 - Privatization of Housing: Status – Yellow; Progress – Green
 - DoD/VA Health Care: Status – Yellow; Progress - Green
- Progress scores in Human Capital and Electronic Government changed from Yellow to Green. The detailed OMB review is attached (Tab B).
- The programs' scores, and especially the improved progress scores, reflect very hard work on the part of a wide cross -section of the OSD staff, and a spirit of collaboration that is deserving of praise.
- I have discussed the status scores with OMB. We believe that the ratings in some areas, particularly Human Capital and Performance Budget Integration, should be changed to Yellow. OMB has asked that we document further progress before changing its evaluation, and I am optimistic that we will continue to show that progress.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by Gail H. McGinn, PDASD (FMP)

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9601

U11225 /02

3/26/02

March 25, 2002 11:03 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Scorecard

I just read this scorecard on DoD. It is not very good.

What do we do to get it improved?

Thanks.

Attach.

03/18/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef, "Current Grades on the Executive Branch Management Scorecard" [U04951/02]

DHR:dh
032502-26



Please respond by 04/19/02



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



3/21
3/21

INFO MEMO

March 18, 2002 - 11:00 AM

D-SIDE/FUAS/SEEA

MAR 25 2002

Larry Di Rita
3/21

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
18 March 2002

SUBJECT: Current Grades on the Executive Branch Management Scorecard

- I am pleased to report that OMB intends to give us a "yellow" on four of our plans to implement the President's Management Agenda, and a green on one. (See attached chart.) As your representative to the President's Management Council, I had organized a series of meetings to present our plans, and move our initial grades off red.
- These grades put us in the middle of the cabinet departments. */ State is worst. HHS is best.*
- Some of the reds for others that you see in the preliminary scores are likely to be corrected before the final version is published at the end of March.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachment:
As stated

Prepare by: Captain Stephen Wellock

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>3/22</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>3/23</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>3/22</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>3/22</i>

U04951 02



11-L-0559/OSD/9603

Executive Branch Management Scorecard

2001 Baseline Evaluation*



Plans to Implement President's Management Agenda

Preliminary Scores

	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Mgmt.	E-Gov	Budget/Perf. Integration	Human Capital	Competitive Sourcing	Financial Mgmt.	E-Gov	Budget/Perf. Integration
AGRICULTURE	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	○	●	○
COMMERCE	●	●	●	○	●	○	●	●	○	○
DEFENSE	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●	○	○
EDUCATION	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
ENERGY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○
EPA	●	●	●	○	○	●	○	○	○	○
HHS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
HUD	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○
INTERIOR	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	●
JUSTICE	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	○
LABOR	○	●	●	○	●	●	○	○	●	●
STATE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	●
TRANSPORTATION	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	●	○	●
TREASURY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○
VA	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	○



03/18/2002 10:45 AM

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative		Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)		Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Human Capital</p> <p>DoD Lead: David Chu/ Gail McGinn</p>	 <p align="center">Red</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD downsized its workforce between 1989 and 2000 by protecting current employees and forgoing new hiring. This led to the current human capital crisis which DoD's Workforce Analysis identifies as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ skill imbalances, ⇒ potential manning problems due to the large increase in retirement-eligible employees starting in 2003, and ⇒ excess layers of management. • DoD has begun to aggressively address these long-term problems. DoD prepared an <i>interim</i> Workforce Restructuring Plan, and Civilian and Military HR Strategic Plans. • DoD remains "Red" on Status because it has not yet delayed its workforce, a process which will take some time. • The Civilian HR Strategic Plan addresses all of the human capital criteria outlined in the Standards for Success. • The Military Personnel HR Strategic Plan focuses on recruitment, retention, and separation of military personnel. • DoD also commissioned a new Advisory Board, comprised of CEOs and business leaders from the private sector, to help in its efforts. • DoD expects to deliver specific data concerning large-scale Department-wide restructuring and delayering plans by July 31. 	 <p align="center">Green</p>	<p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OMB and OPM met with Dr. Chu in January to discuss DoD's HR efforts. DoD delivered its Interim Workforce Restructuring Plan in March, its Civilian HR strategic plan on April 22, and its Military HR Strategic Plan on May 8. • Secretary Rumsfeld supports the Congressionally mandated 15 percent headquarters reduction from 1999 levels. DoD is aggressively addressing this requirement. • DoD's Civilian HR Strategic Plan sets forth DoD's goals and objectives and provides a framework for the components to follow. The objectives include delayering, improving decision-making, and increasing supervisor span of control. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD will provide updated, quantified data on all current and planned restructuring activities in terms of number of positions affected and organizations changed. • We will provide written comments to DoD on its Military HR Plan. • DoD and OMB will continue to pursue and track progress on the Administration's liberalized govt.-wide pay and hiring legislation. We will meet with DoD on improving the financial management segment of the DoD workforce. • DoD will complete the 4th quarter FY 2002 goals identified in its civilian strategic plan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD rates itself as "Yellow" for status, citing the Department's strategic use of recruitment, retention and relocation bonuses and incentive programs for workforce restructuring, improved executive development and leadership programs, and intern recruitment programs. However, we rate them "Red" because the Department has excess layers of management. • DoD rates itself "Green" for Progress. We concur with that rating because DoD has identified firm delivery dates for its civilian workforce performance goals, and expects to deliver specific data addressing restructuring and delayering needs Department-wide by July 31. • Protracted downsizing and the war on terrorism have not prevented DoD from working towards meeting PMA objectives. • The Civilian HR Strategic Plan is a balanced scorecard approach with seven goals that map out the reform of human resources programs, systems and practices. • When DoD planned restructuring actions take effect and the Department is delayered, its score on Status will improve.

July 3, 2002

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative	Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Competitive Sourcing</p> <p>DoD Lead: David Chu/ Pete Aldridge</p>	<p align="center"> Red</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The military services and defense agencies have already over-achieved (seven percent) the five percent goal for 2002, consistent with the revised standard for allowable DoD competitions. The military services and defense agencies are trying to complete competitions for 15 percent of their commercial inventory by 2003, consistent with the revised standard for allowable DoD competitions. Cancellations and stretch-outs are endangering this goal, including the cancellation of a 1,199 FTE competition at Randolph AFB. There is, therefore, a question as to whether DoD will meet its 15 percent goal by the end of FY 2003. DoD is developing alternatives to A-76 to meet 35 percent of the goal to compete 50 percent of the FAIR inventory. 	<p align="center"> Yellow</p> <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD and OMB agreed to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> achieve the 15 percent FY 2003 goal using A-76; and review the remaining 35 percent FTEs with A-76 or alternative means. DoD sent guidance to the military services to conduct a review of its core and non-core competencies by this summer. The Services have developed 10 "pioneer" proposals for A-76 alternatives; OSD and OMB will indicate which pioneer projects will count towards the 35 percent goal. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD will finalize core/non-core competency inventories in early July and brief OMB on the results. DoD and OMB must decide how to link the core/non-core and FAIR inventories to identify compatible commercial positions. DoD and OMB will develop an MOU that codifies alternatives to A-76 that will make it possible for DoD to meet the 50 percent FAIR inventory goal. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OMB agrees with DoD's assessment of its Progress, but we disagree on Status. OMB keeps the Status as "Red" until DoD's fall budget submissions provide a more definitive reading on the 15 percent goal. Cancellations are a great concern. DoD is making progress on A-76 alternatives, but still must develop specific measures for each of its pioneer projects, and provide more specifics on these projects. OMB must decide which projects are acceptable alternatives to count. The MOU that DoD and OMB will carefully develop must entail specific proposals from DoD on alternative approaches that: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> include an element of competition; are as specific in function, number of positions, location, etc. as possible; and must be measurable. Now that the Commercial Activities Panel report is final, DoD is participating on OMB's working group to revise the A-76 Circular and instructions for public comment. DoD can move to "Green" on Progress once a detailed DoD/OMB plan and MOU based on acceptable alternatives are completed, hopefully by the end of CY 2002. Status can become "Yellow" when OSD and OMB can be sure that the 15 percent goal will be attained in FY 2003.

July 3, 2002



**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative		Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Financial Performance</p> <p>DoD Lead: Dov Zakheim</p>	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Red</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD IG's limited FY 2001 financial statement review identified 14 uncorrected material weaknesses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ DoD is not substantially compliant with Federal financial systems standards. ⇒ It cannot provide a clean assurance statement about its internal controls. ⇒ It consistently receives a disclaimer on its financial statements. ⇒ It cannot properly account for and report on its weapons systems, support equipment, and supply inventories. ⇒ It cannot accurately estimate costs associated with environmental and disposal liabilities. ⇒ It cannot reconcile available fund balances recorded on its records with the Department of Treasury's records. • Reliable financial and managerial data needed for effective decision-making is not available. • DoD accounts for two-thirds of the entire Federal Government's material weaknesses identified in the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA.) 	<p align="center">●</p> <p align="center">Green</p> <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD established a Program Management Office to oversee a complete overhaul of its financial systems. • On April 9, DoD selected International Business Machines (IBM) to develop a new financial management architecture and defense-wide data and process standards. • DoD developed a legislative proposal to upgrade the professional competence of its accounting staff. • In April, DoD completed a best practice/benchmarking study of others' experiences in developing enterprise architectures. • In May, IBM submitted an overall plan for the financial management enterprise architecture. • IBM delivered preliminary architecture documentation in June. The first deliverable was received on schedule and is being reviewed. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contractor's formal plans of action and milestones (POA&M) are scheduled for completion in July. • The Phase I draft deliverables for the enterprise architecture development effort is scheduled for completion in October. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD and OMB agree on the scores: "Red" on Status and "Green" on Progress. • The financial management architecture contract award is a significant step. • If all goes as planned, the total overhaul of DoD's systems will be completed by the end of FY 2007. • The "Green" rating for Progress is contingent on DoD meeting key milestones identified in the modernization plans. • DoD currently is on schedule to complete the final DoD Enterprise Architecture transition plan by Spring 2003. Every effort should be made to maintain/accelerate progress, since progress at DoD is critical to government-wide financial improvement. • DoD is ahead of schedule to upgrade: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Real property management process. ⇒ Its ability to produce quarterly financial statements. By January 2003, DoD will complete analysis that should enable the Department to reduce the time required from 3½ months to 45 days. • Sufficient detail on the desired financial architecture should be available to permit its use in evaluating DoD IT systems during the FY 2004 budget process. • Given the long-range overhaul of DoD financial systems that is required, it will be years before DoD achieves "Yellow" for Status.

July 3, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9607



**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative	Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>E-Government</p> <p>DoD Lead: John Stenbit</p>	<p align="center"> Red</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD's definition of a major IT investment provides only limited visibility into the IT portfolio. DoD has submitted complete business cases for 105 major projects, representing about \$8.3 B of a total IT investment of \$26 B. 57 of these business cases are on a watch list to improve the quality. DoD's Enterprise Architecture, the Global Infrastructure Grid (GIG), is a good start for developing an enterprise architecture. Its scope, however, appears to be limited, focused on technical issues, and fails to make the connection to the business (functional and operational) view. The relationship between GIG and the financial management architecture effort is also unclear. It is not clear how the business cases are used to make investment decisions, nor is it clear how DoD links its IT investment to the Department's mission. DoD has participated in the e-gov initiatives, but can offer more in some areas, such as Human Resources. DoD has made extensive progress in implementing IT security measures, although weaknesses remain, including the need for a more robust process to assess IT security, and an updated, comprehensive security policy. 	<p align="center"> Green</p> <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD increased the number of business cases submitted to 105. The quality is significantly improved from the last submission. The service and agency CIOs were actively involved in preparing these submissions. OMB has reviewed these submissions. DoD plans for development of GIG v2.0, scheduled for release in January 2003, are on track. DoD has selected a contractor to develop the financial management architecture. DoD is actively engaged in four of the 24 e-gov initiatives. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD has agreed to increase the number of projects submitting business cases, thereby improving the visibility into IT spending for the FY 2004 submission. DoD has also agreed to submit FY 2004 business cases in September. DoD plans to issue an updated overarching Information Assurance Policy. DoD and the DoD IG will report on the department's security program and the progress on correcting security weaknesses. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD scored itself "Yellow" for Status and "Green" for Progress. DoD is making a good faith effort to increase IT investment visibility and improve the quality of its business cases. It is actively participating in the e-gov efforts, developing a financial management architecture, and linking that to the GIG. Thus, OMB raised the Progress score from "Yellow" to "Green." The "Red" Status score remains unchanged, reflecting that the plan for improvement is in place, but has not yet provided results. OMB has reviewed the business cases and is considering the full range of options, such as apportionment, provided in Clinger-Cohen to improve results in IT investments. The current GIG has a limited business (functional and operational) view and limited connections between IT investment and mission. The financial management architecture will address many of the limitations of the GIG. DoD can move to "Green" on Status if 60 percent of the IT budget is classified as major in FY 2004, the major projects make the business case, DoD is actively engaged in 3 of the 4 citizen centered portfolios, IT projects are within 90 percent of cost, schedule and performance targets, security requirements are successfully implemented, and the GIG architecture v2.0 covers functional and operational views.

July 3, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9608



President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense

Initiative	Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Budget & Performance Integration</p> <p>DoD Lead: Dov Zakheim</p>	<p align="center"> Red</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD's Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) only fully meets the first criterion of an integrated plan and budget, but does not factor in available performance information in a systematic way. DoD's budget process does not yet meet the second through fifth criteria: DoD's budget process does not link outputs, outcomes and resources (criterion #2); accounts are not fully aligned to achieve functional targets (criterion #3); and evaluation -- effectiveness results do not systematically inform decisions (criterion #5.) DoD does not yet charge full budgetary cost to mission activities (criterion 4.) However, DoD has taken a required initial step by accruing the cost of health benefits for retirees and dependents over 65. Support costs and cost per output have been better defined in Working Capital Funds and for reimbursable services. GPRA performance materials are not linked to DoD's PPBS, which is organized by appropriations accounts and groupings, and not by functional mission. The Comptroller has deferred GPRA Plans and Reports until this fall. 	<p align="center"> Yellow</p> <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Comptroller has issued extensive Defense Planning Guidance on developing performance measures that tie more directly to four QDR goals and to the FY 2004 -2009 budget process. OSD/Comptroller staff briefed OMB/NSD on DoD's initial plans for performance metrics by risk area, and we are on DoD's working group. DoD's most mature work is in Financial Management where DoD's Comptroller has the lead. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD will refine its performance metrics for the FY 2004 budget. DoD and OMB must agree on which programs will be evaluated using the PARTS tools for the FY 2004 budget. In commenting on OMB's legislation, DoD's Comptroller offered to submit a plan to enhance accountability of achieving national security outputs and outcomes with chargeable budget resources. DoD must incorporate performance information in a FY 2002/2003 GPRA Performance Plan and Report, hopefully by this fall. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD scores itself as "Yellow" on Status and Progress. DoD believes Status should be upgraded to "Yellow" based on its current PPBS. OMB is keeping the Status score "Red" since the only criterion DoD fully meets is integrating planning and budgeting. It does not meet the goals-outputs-resources link; the full costing; and the budget-effectiveness/ evaluation-decision criteria. DoD and OMB must work together on the effort to evaluate performance of programs in the FY 2004 budget. DoD's effort to develop performance metrics for use in the FY 2004 budget is much more detailed in the financial management area than anywhere else. DoD should work with OMB to define measures in many other areas. The Secretary's "instrument panel metrics" need to be devolved to the budget account/ performance metrics level. To get to "Green" on Progress, DoD must complete plans for developing and integrating performance metrics with budget and financial information. For "Yellow" on Status, DoD must meet the criteria and provide good metrics for the FY 2004 budget.

July 3, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9609



**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative	Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>Privatization of Military Family Housing</p> <p>DoD Lead: David Chu/ Pete Aldridge</p>	<p align="center"> Yellow</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD owns about 275,000 military housing units, and about 168,000 (61 percent) are considered inadequate. The Secretary of Defense established a goal in FY 2001 of eliminating DoD's inadequate family housing inventory by 2007, three years earlier than the 2010 goal set by the previous Administration. • The Services will achieve these goals in large part through privatization. DoD also plans to use traditional military construction to eliminate inadequate units. § Between FY 1996 and FY 2001, DoD has privatized 15,882 units, of which 9,251 were inadequate, thereby, eliminating 5.4 percent of the inadequate units. 	<p align="center"> Green</p> <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In FY 2002, DoD privatized 8,748 units, of which 6,080 were inadequate, thereby eliminating 3.6 percent of the inadequate units. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For the rest of FY 2002, DoD plans to privatize 3,423 units, of which 2,857 are inadequate, thereby eliminating an additional 1.7 percent of the inadequate units. • All told, by the end of FY 2002, DoD is estimated to privatize 28,053 units, of which 18,188 are inadequate, thereby, eliminating 10.6 percent of the inadequate units. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD agrees with OMB's scoring of "Yellow" for Status and "Green" for Progress. • In FY 2003, DoD plans to privatize over 35,600 units, of which over 21,000 units are considered inadequate, thereby eliminating over 13.0 percent of the inadequate units. • Even though the FY 2003 budget is on a path to eliminate inadequate housing for the Army and Navy by 2007, the Air Force plans are still focused on 2010. • DoD continues to use traditional military construction to eliminate inadequate units. In FY 2002 and FY 2003, the number of inadequate units eliminated through military construction is estimated to be about 14,000. • DoD will receive a "Green" rating for Status when DoD makes significant progress toward realizing its goal of eliminating all inadequate units by 2007.

July 3, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9610

**President's Management Agenda
Department of Defense**

Initiative		Current Status (As of June 30, 2002)	Progress in Implementing the President's Management Agenda	Comments
<p>DoD/VA Coordination</p> <p>VA Lead: Leo MacKay/ Mark Catlett</p> <p>DoD Lead: David Chu/ Ed Wyatt</p>	 Yellow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased focus by DoD and VA senior leadership and regional coordination activity facilitated the move to "Yellow" from "Red." Departments need to exploit coordination and sharing opportunities from an executive strategic approach that provides direction to the field. Most sharing opportunities (IT, medical services, pharmaceuticals, etc.) are in the planning stages with limited execution so far. The Departments have not fully explored the extent of excess or redundant capacity. 	 Green <p><u>Actions Taken Since September 30, 2001</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DoD and VA created an Executive Council co-chaired by DoD Under Sec. and VA Deputy Sec. that created a team to develop a joint DoD/VA strategic plan for coordination. VA and DoD jointly briefed OMB on a plan for an interoperable patient medical record that supports the E-Gov. Increased regional coordination actions among a few TRICARE Lead Agents and VISNs. Limited actions to increase VA's use of DoD's excess aeromedical evacuation capacity and leverage joint training opportunities. Established a common reimbursement methodology for clinical sharing agreements. <p><u>Planned Actions for Q4 FY 2002</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expect an update at DoD/VA Executive Council on the joint strategic plan for coordination at the next Executive Council. First report on the joint interoperable computerized patient medical record is due on July 15. We expect increased regional coordination of DoD/VA. Expect DoD to work with VA to make maximum use of excess capacity on Aircrafts used in aeromedical evacuation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To get to "Green," OMB would have to approve a joint DoD/VA strategic plan to improve coordination, leverage excess capacity, reduce redundant services, and formulate a strategic national approach. In addition, both departments must continue to make progress on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Interoperable computerized patient medical records; ⇒ Aeromedical evacuation; and ⇒ Joint training initiatives. The Defense Authorization Bill includes a provision creating a pilot program for VA and DoD to share resources at a limited number of sites. We have received views on this from both agencies and are working to resolve differences.

July 3, 2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9611

December 7, 2002 9:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

334

Please ask Steve Cambone what he thinks about Admiral Studeman for the staff director of the Kissinger Commission. I think he would be better than Denny Blair.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-8

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

7 Dec 02

U11225 /03

Snowflake

December 7, 2002 9:16 AM

345

ACTION
COMPLETE
PER DES 12/19/02

ADVANCE COPY
SENT

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UNMOVIC

UN

Please be responsible for seeing that the UNMOVIC movements into the areas in Northern and Southern Watch where we may be bombing are deconflicted. There was a note from Gen. Hayden on the subject, which you received a copy of.

I have talked to Condi about it and she says she will talk to Blix, but I think we better make sure it is done.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-6

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

7 Dec 02

U11226 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9613

showfile

3/26/02

March 25, 2002 11:03 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Scorecard

310.1

I just read this scorecard on DoD. It is not very good.

What do we do to get it improved?

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef, "Current Grades on the Executive Branch Management Scorecard" [U04951/02]

DHR:dh
032502-26



Please respond by 04/19/02

25 Mar 02



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



3/21
3/21

INFO MEMO

MAR 18 2002 11:20

March 18, 2002 - 11:00 AM

D. S. C. CHU
18 MAR 2002

MAR 25 2002

Larry Di Rita
3/21

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
18 MAR 2002

SUBJECT: Current Grades on the Executive Branch Management Scorecard

- I am pleased to report that OMB intends to give us a "yellow" on four of our plans to implement the President's Management Agenda, and a green on one. (See attached chart.) As your representative to the President's Management Council, I had organized a series of meetings to present our plans, and move our initial grades off red.
- These grades put us in the middle of the cabinet departments. *State is worst. HHS is best.*
- Some of the reds for others that you see in the preliminary scores are likely to be corrected before the final version is published at the end of March.

COORDINATION: None required

Attachment:
As stated

Prepare by: Captain Stephen Wellock,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>3/20</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>4/3/23</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>880 3/22</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>3/20</i>

U04951 02

December 7, 2002 8:28 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Cartoon

02952

Please see if you can get the original of this cartoon, so we can get it framed.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cartoon

DHR:dh
120702-2

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

7 Dec 02

U11227 /03



11-L-0559/OSD/9617

July 9, 2002 7:15 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen. Myers
 ADM Ellis
 Gen. Eberhart

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Reserve Forces Policy Board

334RFPB

Here is a report I received from the Reserve Forces Policy Board. You may find it interesting.

Let me know if there is any action you think we should take.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/18/02 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board's Trip to US STRATEGIC COMMAND
28-29 May 2002 [U10670/02]

DHR:dh
070902-1

.....
Please respond by 08/02/02

9 Jul 02



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD 2002 JUL -1 PM 5:02
 7300 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7300

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 09 2002

INFO MEMO

June 18, 2002, 9:00 A.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MG RICHARD O. WIGHTMAN JR., *Military Executive* TO
 THE CHAIRMAN RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD 18 JUN 2002

SUBJECT: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board's trip to US STRATEGIC
 COMMAND (USSTRATCOM) 28-29 May 2002.

- Majority of issues discussed involve challenges faced by both the USSTRATCOM staff and individual Reservists with the current mobilization, demobilization and remobilization process in support of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). (Tab A)
- Chairman Zapanta hosted a Citizen Patriot stake holder's Forum for Omaha and Lincoln community leaders at the Omaha Press Club the evening of May 28th. Community leaders cited a potentially huge pool of untapped volunteers that could potentially assist the domestic GWOT effort.

TRIP REPORT TAB A

COORDINATION: TAB B

Prepared by Captain Filler, (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	<i>5/7/8</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>SAD 5/18</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/2</i>

TRIP REPORT: Reserve Forces Policy Board Trip to US STRATEGIC COMMAND May 28-29 2002

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Twelve members and staff of the Reserve Forces Policy Board traveled to USSTRATCOM in Omaha, NE on 28-29 May 2002 for a series of command briefing focusing on the STRATCOM mission and employment of reserve forces. CMSgt Paich hosted two enlisted forums with Reservists mobilized to support the STRATCOM mission. Additionally, Chairman Zapanta hosted a Citizen Patriot stakeholder's Forum for Omaha and Lincoln community leaders at the Omaha Press Club the evening of May 28th.

The majority of issues raised during this visit involve challenges faced by both the STRATCOM staff and individual Reservists with the current mobilization and demobilization process in support of the GWOT. STRATCOM's concerns involve cumbersome service manpower and funding processes, long-term sustainment and retention of highly trained Reservists. Reservists were primarily concerned with lengthy pre-mobilization processing and the current lack of work in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom following intense workloading supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. Omaha/Lincoln community leaders cited a potentially huge pool of untapped volunteers that could (and should) be organized to assist the domestic GWOT effort.

STRATCOM has effectively integrated Navy and Air Force Reservists into all levels of its joint intelligence mission. STRATCOM's innovative use of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Phoenix provides additional Reserve intelligence support at minimal cost to the command while maximizing utilization of these highly trained Reservists.

Recommendations:

1. Current DoD service-centric mobilization processes must do a better job of supporting the Combatant Commanders:
 - Convene a high-level task force to include representatives from all Reserve components as well as from the Joint Staff to review existing policy and make recommendations to address the challenges presented by the current mobilization.
 - Conduct a business case analysis to identify requirements and potential costs/savings associated with a more streamlined and standard mobilization process. This improved process should retain Service flexibility while at the same time optimize speed and reduce unnecessary turmoil to RC members.

- 2. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP), currently at 27 CONUS sites, provides a cost-effective, distributed, joint architecture for RC intelligence support to Combatant Commanders. Consider expanding the JRICP architecture to support emerging RC mission areas such as IO/IA.
3. To ensure the support of the American people throughout the prosecution of a long-term, low-intensity Global War on Terrorism:
- Maintain a dialog and continue to educate the American people on our Citizen-Patriot heritage.
 - Organize Citizen-Patriot volunteers to augment Guard/Reserve and first responders in certain DoD domestic support roles.

TRIP REPORT: Reserve Forces Policy Board Trip to US STRATEGIC COMMAND May 28-29 2002

ATTENDEES, ITINERARY AND AGENDA:

RFPB Chairman Albert C. Zapanta and the Military Executive to the Chairman MG Richard O. Wightman Jr. led the delegation. Board members attending included MG Paul C. Bergson, MG Steven Blum, RADM John Cotton, Maj Gen Robert McIntosh, Maj Gen Edward Mechenbier, Maj Gen E. Gordon Stump and RADM Grant Hollett, Jr. RFPB staff included CAPT Robert Filler, LCDR Katherine McHale and CMSgt Gail Paich.

The Board arrived at STRATCOM at 1400 on 28 May. Chairman Zapanta and MG Wightman participated in a cabin call with ADM James O. Ellis Jr., Combatant Commander. The rest of the group received a command center brief from CDR Richard Fraenkel. Chairman Zapanta and MG Wightman rejoined the group for an extensive command brief from ADM Ellis, followed by a briefing and tour of the Joint Intelligence Center.

The Board then traveled to the Omaha Press Club for a Citizen Patriot Stakeholder's Forum, where 23 community leaders from Omaha and Lincoln shared their perceptions regarding the employment of the nation's reserve forces, as well as concerns and suggestions. Dinner with STRATCOM personnel followed.

On 29 May, the Board received a STRATCOM RC employment brief from RADM Mark Feichtinger, Military Assistant to the Combatant Commander, a current MOB/DEMOB brief from Brig Gen Mark Pillar, Military Assistant to the Combatant Commander and a brief on J2/JIC/JRIC utilization from CAPT Shawn Smith.

CMSgt Gail Paich hosted meetings with junior and senior enlisted Reservists mobilized to support STRATCOM's J-2 mission. Chairman Zapanta addressed both meetings.

Finally, Board members received a RC Personal Reliability Program (PRP) update from RADM Feichtinger, followed by a roundtable with RC leaders to discuss issues of concern and proposals for resolution.

ISSUES:

1. **Summary of issues raised during the STRATCOM command briefings:**
 - Cumbersome Service manpower and budgeting processes hampers optimal use of assigned Reserve personnel:
 - Rigid service, grade, skill specifications limit flexibility to fill billets
 - Peacetime manday funding from numerous accounts with different restrictions, controlling agencies, and lead times
 - Need to move toward flexible "purple" money

- Comprehensive automated joint manpower system is needed (DIMHRS)
- STRATCOM does not have a requirement to utilize Reservists in the Personnel Reliability Program despite recent policy changes permitting Reservists to participate.
- GWOT sustainment looms as a major challenge
 - Define steady state requirements and determining/meeting surge requirements
 - Few unmobilized personnel in certain critical specialties
 - AC may need to increase UMD/POM to meet outyear requirements
- USSTRATCOM hosting test of NDU sponsored Reserve component JPME II:
 - 25 field grade officers from STRATCOM & TRANSCOM
 - Distance learning: JUL, AUG 02
 - Classroom exercise at Offutt AFB SEP 02

2. Summary of issues raised during the STRATCOM J2 Reserve intelligence support briefings:

- Significant disparity exists between Air Force and Navy timelines for pre-mobilization
 - Initial mobilization reporting date slippage – employer impact
 - Lengthy pre-mob processing - morale/perception issue with Reservists
- Differences in per diem funding between Air Force and Naval Reserve programs creates possible inequity in the extent of reserve utilization
 - Services' funding differences became a consideration for selecting personnel for mobilization billet assignment
 - Differences in per diem funding can result in morale and retention issues related to billeting and demobilization
- Demobilization issues
 - Many reservists concerned about future mobilizations and further impacts on families and civilian jobs
 - Stop/loss in effect for USAFR intel personnel (not for USNR personnel)

3. Summary of issues raised during enlisted forums with Reservists mobilized to support the STRATCOM mission:

CMSgt Paich met with approximately 20 senior and junior enlisted IMAs from the USNR and USAFR. They were all motivated to support the Operation Enduring Freedom mission. The major concern voiced by all was they were not currently performing duties directly associated with OEF and hadn't since December. They were concerned about the demobilization in light of the lengthy and cumbersome mobilization process. Many were reluctant to contact their employers about their return because the dates were considered unreliable. They also voiced concern about whether they were going to be recalled again in 90 days or 100 days for a second year

and then be subjected to an early release again. They feared their employers would begin to think of them as a detriment to the organization because of the uncertainty of mobilization. Chairman Zapanta joined the sessions during the last fifteen minutes to thank them for the job they were doing and assured them that their leadership was addressing their concerns about the mobilization and demobilization process.

4. Summary of issues raised during Omaha/Lincoln Citizen Patriot Stakeholder's Forum:

- Employers echoed the frustration raised by Reservists regarding the mobilization/demobilization processes
 - Unanticipated demobilization is a real employer hardship
 - Recommend federal funding to help employers with high demand RC employees
- Traditional RC contract (two days per month, two weeks per year) needs to be reconsidered in light of projected mobilizations to support low intensity protracted conflict
 - Consider new flexible levels of Guard/Reserve participation
- Participants concerned about lack of local involvement/buy-in for GWOT
 - No knowledge of new "Citizen Corps" program
 - Agree to need for civilian buy-in, i.e. war bonds, civil defense auxiliary
 - Washington has not mobilized civilian populace in any meaningful way
 - Elected representatives have not explained how ordinary people can help
 - Potentially huge pool of untapped volunteerism
 - Need new vehicle beside traditional Guard/Reserve
 - Organize into a domestic response auxiliary?
 - Consider income tax credits or other benefits for employers
- A vehicle is needed to focus the efforts of civilian volunteers
 - Need to define 21st century Citizen-Patriot:
 - Education - Citizen-Patriot heritage
 - Define a new vision, new roles for Citizen Patriots

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Current DoD service-centric mobilization processes must do a better job of supporting the Combatant Commanders:

- Convene a high-level task force to include representatives from all Reserve components as well as from the Joint Staff to review existing policy and make recommendations to address the challenges presented by the current mobilization.

- Conduct a business case analysis to identify requirements and potential costs/savings associated with the implementation of a joint mobilization process as a longer-term fix.

2. The Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program (JRICP), currently at 27 CONUS sites, provides a cost-effective, distributed, joint architecture for RC intelligence support to Combatant Commanders. Consider expanding the JRICP architecture to support emerging RC mission areas such as IO/IA.

3. To ensure the support of the American people throughout the prosecution of a long-term, low-intensity Global War on Terrorism:

- Maintain a dialog and continue to educate the American people on our Citizen-Patriot heritage.
- Organize Citizen-Patriot volunteers to augment Guard/Reserve and first responders in certain DoD domestic support roles.

ENCLOSURE:

(1) Omaha/Lincoln Citizen Patriot Forum May 28th 2002 attendee roster

**Reserve Forces Policy Board
Citizen Patriot Forum Attendees
28 May 2002 - Omaha, NE**

Ahlberg, Mr. Doug (also repr. Mayor Don Wesely)	Lincoln/Lancaster Co. Emergency Manager
Cohen, BrigGen (Ret) Paul G.	Omaha Douglas County Civic Center
Eckles, BG (Ret) Larry K.	Administrator, Task Force for Building Renewal
Erickson, LCDR John	U.S. Navy Reserve
Freeman, Mr. Glenn M.	Special Assistant to Senator Chuck Hagel
Friend, CPT Dave (repr. Chief Don Carey)	Omaha Police Dept.
Gates, Mr. Gary	Vice-President, Omaha Public Power
Johnson, COL Thomas	DCSOPS, Nebraska Army National Guard
Lee, Mr. Steve	Manager, Douglas Co. Emergency Management
Lempke, Major General Roger	The Adjutant General
Mollison, Mr. John	Associate Executive Director Girls and Boys Town
Mudd, Ms. Mary	Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs University of Nebraska-Omaha
Murphy, BG (Ret) James L.	Universal Information Services, Inc.
Nelson, Mr. W. Don	State Director for Senator Ben Nelson
Nesbitt, Colonel Tom	Superintendent, Nebraska State Patrol
Santos, Mr. Jose	Commissioner, Mexican American Commission
Schimek, Senator Diana	Chair, Govt, Military & Veterans Affairs Comm.
Spadt, Chief Mike	Lincoln Fire Department
Spencer, Mr. Richard	President, Reserve Officers Association
Wagner, Chief Paul	Omaha Fire Department
Williams, Mr. Robert M.	Air Force Association
Yager, Major Robert	Base Civil Engineer Nebraska Air National Guard
Zink, BG Walt	Assistant Adjutant General Nebraska Army National Guard

COORDINATION

OFFICE

NAME

DATE

PDASD/RA

[Handwritten signature]

27 June 2002

USD/P&R

[Handwritten signature]

December 7, 2002 9:12 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Poindexter

095

Please have someone look up what Poindexter's legal situation was—was he convicted and then pardoned, or was he convicted and then overturned in a higher court on appeal. I need to know the specifics.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-4

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

7 Dec 02

U11228 /03

December 7, 2002 9:07 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Meeting

We should get Maren Stremecki in, and we should have whoever is doing Afghanistan there, Pace maybe, and probably Feith. If Wolfowitz is around, he can sit in, too.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-3

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

Afghanistan

7 Dec 02

U11220 /03

December 7, 2002 8:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Article to Card

Advance copy sent

009.7

Please fax over to Andy Card that *Early Bird* article about Karen Hughes trying to get conservatives fired. He wants to see a copy of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120702-1



Please respond by 12/9/02

7 Dec 02

U11250 /03

showWare.

12:32 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT: Ambassador Eagleton Email

Send the following email to Ambassador Eagleton

Dear Bill:

Thanks so much for your email. That's my recollection as well. I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Best regard,

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

Thanks,

DHR/azn
120902.06

Please respond by: _____

000.7

9 Dec 02

U11231 /03

12:32 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT:

You should mark down Crete on our places visited sheet that you keep for me so that it is up to date and accurate, as well as these other countries.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.04

Please respond by: 12/13

33350

9 Dec 02

U11235 /03

December 9, 2002 8:01 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

Approved copy sent

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: More for Schedule Week of December 16

When I am back, please make sure I have lunch in the cafeteria one day. Maybe I ought to get into a rhythm of having lunch with the Under Secretaries, like Aldridge, Chu, Zakheim and Feith, particularly the other ones if not Feith, because I never see them. We ought to get into that rhythm and maybe try to do that sometime that week of December 16 also.

02050

I will need a private meeting with the President the week after I am back.

Probably on December 19 or 20, I will want to walk around to a lot of the offices in the building, so save the better part of half a day.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
120902-4



Please respond by 12/13/02

*Done
12*

9 Dec 02

U11236 /03

12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT: Calendar

Set me up with Gus Pagonis when I get back to go over the members of his board and maybe make some changes.

Phil Marrow should be removed from that board as well.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.03

Please respond by: 12/24

02050

908102

U11237 /03

DEC. 12. 2002 9:06AM

NO. 185 P. 2

C12/12

12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT:

Make sure you take Steve Friedman off of our Business Practices Board. Take Phil Marrow off also.

Thanks.

DHR/azd
120902.02

Please respond by: _____

To SecDef

From LARRY Di Rita
12/12
IN PROGRESS.

U11238 /03

A-76-2

December 9, 2002 8:58 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Methodist NGO Connection

I want to know what they have found out about the Methodist non-governmental organization that Shaheen fellow was connected to. They have had plenty of time to run that down and see if it is real.

I cannot imagine why they would have hired a guy like this or why they would have allowed him to transfer \$77,000 that fast. He is a nut, at the minimum.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-12

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

SEE ATTACHED

U11239 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9636

20 Dec 2002

Sir,

The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) has apparently checked out as a legitimate organization.

It was established in 1940 following a meeting of the General Conference of the Methodist church as a relief agency in response to violence of World War II. It has evolved into an institutionalized unit of the Church and a part of the General Board of Global Ministries. They have performed relief and recovery operations worldwide. UMCOR is a member of the International Service Agencies and as such, is eligible for Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) contributions.

UMCOR-NGO was founded in 1993 and is one of five units that together form UMCOR. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria & Washington, D.C. They currently work in 11 countries with a total operating budget of \$38.4 million. Their relief work ranges from agricultural support, non-formal education, to reconstruction and relief operations.

A check of criminal and intelligence databases have disclosed no derogatory information pertaining to UMCOR and links to terrorism.

Preliminary contacts with personnel at UMCOR Hqs have disclosed that (b)(6) was hired as a consultant from Nov 01 until at least the spring of 2002 on a monthly contract, working with transportation and logistical issues in Tajikistan. UMCOR pulled out of Tajikistan in Feb 02, although (b)(6) may have been involved in some transitional issues. UMCOR Employment and Personnel records are maintained at another site in the United States so a lead has been forwarded to the local FBI Office to ascertain further details from his records.

In a follow-up interview on 5 Dec 02, (b)(6) indicated that he worked for UMCOR from Nov 2001 until May 2002. (b)(6) indicated that he had met Eric Blender, the director of the UMCOR Tajikistan mission while he was working with Counterpart International between Apr - Oct 2001. He was offered a position with UMCOR and noted that the money salary was significantly better (from \$1,500 to approx \$3,200 a month). (b)(6) indicated that money transfers for logistical operations were normal and that UMCOR tried to do business with vendors who could provide a bank account to transfer funds as they didn't like to deal in large amounts of cash. (b)(6) stated that many of the vendors they conducted business with had accounts in the UAE.

(b)(6)


V/R

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9637

December 9, 2002 8:54 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Maren Stremecki

Advance copy sent


As soon as I get back, I want to see Maren Stremecki to talk about Afghanistan, and I want to have the right people in the room. We can possibly do it on Saturday and maybe have Hoffmann come in for the same meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-11

.....

Please respond by 12/13/02



U11240 /03

12:32 PM

TO: Gen. John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: December 9, 2002
SUBJECT: **Country Books**

I have asked policy to have the population of the countries in these books and I don't see any of it this time.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.10

Please respond by: _____

U11241 /03


11-L-0559/OSD/9639

12:32 PM

TO: Gen. John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *7*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT: Country Book  *- handled per Gen Craddock*

This book is lousy. The photographs of the people aren't readable. They have been faxed. In the future tell the policy people that I want pictures I can see. I can't see any of these faces. It is just nuts.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.09

Please respond by: _____

U11243 /03

12:32 PM

TO: ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: December 9, 2002

SUBJECT: Eritrea

Have we ever looked at Eritrea for a gunnery range? I notice that the President of Eritrea is interested in having us look at the development of the Dehalak Island as a range for the navy and the use of Massawa as a port.

Any thoughts? Is this a possible alternative to Vieques?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
120902.08

Please respond by: _____

12/28

U11244 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9641

December 9, 2002 8:31 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Sunday Shows

I may want to do some Sunday shows—"Meet the Press" or something—on the weekend of December 21 and 22. Joyce will be out of town. It might be a good time to get some things set in people's minds. That is also true the week of December 16 when I am in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-8

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U11245 /03

12:32 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
 DATE: December 9, 2002
 SUBJECT: POTUS Briefing

I told the President that we would probably be briefing him on the 2 + 6 + 30 on Friday or Saturday. Is that correct?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 120902.07

Please respond by: 12/13

U11246 /03

December 9, 2002 8:29 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Round Table and PDB

For next year, I think we better try to keep the round table on the schedule and the PDB. I think it is a problem if I start missing those.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-7

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

U11247 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9644

December 9, 2002 11:09 AM

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Gen. Myers
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Legislative Improvements

Here are recommendations for legislative improvements from Admiral Fargo.
Let's make sure they are included.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/20/02 USPACOM memo to SecDef re: Improving the Security Process

DHR:dh
120902-28

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

12/15

→ Victor Bernson

Larry Di Rita
12/17

U11248 /03

01215



COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USPACOM)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

20 November 2002


To: Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-1000

Subj: IMPROVING THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROCESS

1. Mr. Secretary, at the Combatant Commanders' Conference, you asked for recommendations to improve our processes. General Ralston and I expressed concern over inefficiencies in Security Assistance (SA) programs. Critical to supporting improvement of allied and friendly defense capabilities, the SA approval process is slow and unnecessarily bureaucratic. For example, allied foreign military sales requests consume up to six months from initiation to case implementation. Requests from non-allied nations typically require even more time. Portions of the process are conducted in a serial vice parallel manner.

2. I recommend the following actions and will provide needed detail and rationale to USD policy:

- Legislative Improvements
 - Amend the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to increase monetary thresholds that trigger congressional notification and certification requirements.
 - Expand eligibility for the 15-day AECA 36b notification requirement to include all countries party to a mutual defense treaty with the United States, with other countries nominated as appropriate. With the exception of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, the total notification requirement is 50 days.
 - Amend Title 10 United States Code authorizing the Secretary of Defense to establish Regional Commander discretionary accounts for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. This improvement would permit the Regional Commander to better meet emergent requirements of developing countries supporting the Global War on Terror.
 - Improve flexibility of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds to permit Secretary of Defense approval for use of O&M funds for defense articles, services, and training for developing countries involved in operations and exercises directly related to the Global War on Terror.
- Procedural Improvements
 - Military departments identify and act on Exception to National Disclosure Policy (ENDP) and AECA 36b notification issues earlier in the process.
 - Simplify the procedures such that they can reasonably be accomplished within the training provided to Security Assistance Officers.


THOMAS B. FARGO
Admiral, U.S. Navy

11-L-0559/OSD/9646

December 9, 2002 10:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Awards

Do you know anything about my being invited to receive the Anthony Wayne award in Pennsylvania?

In the future, I think I ought to see all proposals for awards, honorary degrees or those types of things because a lot of them are coming from friends, and I seem not to know about them.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
120902-24



Please respond by 12/13/02

U11249 /03

December 9, 2002 10:38 AM

TO: Gen. Jones
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Force Rotations

Thanks for your memo on force rotations. I understand that you folks are working those with the Chairman and the Joint Staff.

I was struck by how many times you used the word "requirements." I have come to believe that it is a word that can do us damage here in the Department. It tends to suggest that something is chipped in stone and is absolute, when in fact that tends not to be the case.

Regards,


DHR:dh
120902-23

.....

Please respond by _____

U11251 /03

December 9, 2002 10:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Holiday Routine

Let's talk about the idea of folks getting some time off between December 21 and January 1, except for emergencies.

Please come up with a proposal of how we could have a skeleton force of some kind and then have others be on call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-22

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U11252 /03

December 9, 2002 2:13 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: More on Holiday Routine

When I said we want to try to keep the crew light during the period from the weekend before Christmas to the day after New Year's, we better check with the lawyers and see if we have the legal right to give days off like that. It is not clear to me that we do.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
120902-33

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

U11253 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9650

December 9, 2002 10:31 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Hold on Pentagon Renovations

Please talk to Ray DuBois and see if there is some way to stop all remodeling in the Pentagon in the areas that have yet to be renovated.

I don't see any reason why the Joint Staff should be doing over the Legal Office when we know the whole place is going to have to be torn apart and renovated within the next two years.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-20

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

U11254 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9651

December 9, 2002 9:04 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meetings w/Ministers

I need to see a list of all of the different countries we meet with every year, two ministers or one minister, at your level or Crouch's level.

We need to look at the whole thing, get a scan of it and then set about changing it and fixing it the way we want it. There is no question we have too many of these meetings, and there has to be a way to fix it. We need to start doing no more where there are both ministers there all the time. We need to start getting them so it is three-quarters in the US and one-quarter elsewhere. Instead of meeting every year, we need to get it so they meet every other year, and then we keep lowering the level of these meetings.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-16

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

U11255 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9652

December 9, 2002 9:04 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Characterization of Budget

Advance copy sent

1/0,01

Wilson seems to already have an answer as to how to characterize what we are doing in the budget.

I have been asking that we get some concepts and explanations of what we think we are doing with respect to the budget. I haven't seen them yet. It is terribly important that we not be behind the curve again on these things. We need to have our concept of what we are doing put out there, so that it rebuts the Wilsons of the world before they ever get started. Unfortunately, we are behind the curve.

Please fax something to me on the road, so I can read it on the way home.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-14



Please respond by 12/12/02

U11256 /03

9 Dec 02

July 12, 2002 3:27 PM

TO: Josh Bolten
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Bill Grant

Attached is some material from a fellow named Bill Grant, who used to be head of Smith Barney. I have known him for 20 or 30 years. He is a smart fellow. I thought you might want to see it.

Regards,

Attach.
07/01/02 William R. Grant ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
071202-12

123

7/14
Josh -

P.S. - Before we could get this out the door, Mr Grant dropped a second note, as a follow-up to the first I have appended it as the last page. It's dated July 11, 2002.

Larry Bilita

12 Jul 02



GALEN ASSOCIATES

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WILLIAM R. GRANT
CHAIRMAN

July 1, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3E)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,

The economy is in a serious change modality. You've seen some of my concerns about a bear market over the last year (see enclosed).

I'm still a director of five public companies and talk to at least 30 CEOs (follow Board members) quarterly. For example last week I was in Los Angeles, Columbus and Charleton and this week off to London.

Let me be specific.

- 1) We are in a long term bear market (chart A shows it already). Note the enclosed description. Few have lived through such an experience including the majority of money managers (75 institutions control 45% of U.S. equities).
- 2) My odds are for a "double dip" in the economy. I see no pickup in capital spending. The consumer is "spent out" from low car prices, low rates. Now the stock market will impact.

Problems ahead:

- 1) Inadequate pension funding for many companies and excessive return assumptions for the future. The state and local funding inadequacy is even more serious. The Administration better be prepared in advanced for this "blast".
- 2) Foreign selling of the U.S. securities as the dollar continues down; already underway.

My recommendations:

- 1) The Justice Department should immediately serve papers on the CEO and others in the accounting fraud corporations that fill the newspapers. Also announce a freeze of the funds received by 16b officers and directors on any sales six months prior to the announcement of accounting problems. Nothing else will soothe the public. If I had to bet now this issue could be a Democratic windfall particularly as the pension problem hits the media. What a press frenzy we will have.
- 2) Be very aggressive in support of vouchers. I attended a small party last weekend for Sandra O'Connor and was delighted to see the subsequent 5-4 vote.
- 3) Note subtly that part of the current financial distortions evolve from the last decade and the media focused on emphasizing press releases of corporations and its promoters rather than search for facts and balanced opinions.
- 4) Appoint Felix Rohatyn and Paul Volcker as co-Chairman of a committee to activate changes in corporate governance. Would be a great political coup for the Administration to appropriate what the Democrats would do. Do this now!

Finally, I've enclosed a draft which attempts to tie the circle of governance together.

All the best.

Sincerely,



William R. Grant

(b)(6)


610 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, New York, NY 10020

FAX (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/9655


U10774 /02

S & P STOCK PRICE INDEX MONTHLY



04/28/02

S & P STOCK PRICE INDEX 2002 DOLLARS(1) -- MONTHLY



04/28/02

FYI this is a response I gave to an inquiry received last week.

Best regards, Bill

Bill: Sentiment is poor for reasons beyond a declining stock market. The issue of trust and the ability of our financial system to operate with low cost equity has been greatly impaired. While the problem will fix itself, at least for a while I think, I fear the problem stays with us for awhile...Or NOT because it was front cover of Business Week? On a scale of 1-10(10 being most bullish), where are you at the moment? I know you've been bearish, but your text seems more constructive. Thanks.

I guess I am a 5 on a near-term basis and a 3 on an intermediate-term basis.

I think the market's underlying trend remains down on an intermediate term basis. I think the fundamentals suggest intermediate- to longer-term real earnings-per-share growth of 1.5% to 2.5%. This is less than the 3% to 3.5% probable future economic and total profits growth because of dilution from new share issues and from new company formation. Note that the companies comprising the S&P 500 of 1970 did not enjoy the full subsequent growth of total profits or the economy because they did not include Intel, Microsoft, Cisco, etc. Some of the future earnings growth will also accrue to companies not yet formed or not yet in our present concept of 'the market'. Over an extended time horizon, this dilution factor has been 1.5%. The above calculation assumes 1% to 1.5%. (See note below)

When we add the current yield of 1.5% to the potential real earnings per share growth of 1.5% to 2.5%, we get a potential real total return outlook of 3.0% to 4.0%. Compare this to the current interest rate on TIPS of about 3% and the apparent forward looking risk premium is 0% to 1%. Assuming the inflation outlook (GDP deflator since we are using GDP growth as a proxy for earnings growth) is 2%, the potential nominal equity return outlook is 5% to 6%.

For this argument, I am not considering whether the risk premium is too high or too low. Rather I think that the above estimate of the potential return is well below the current consensus. Thus, as this return evolves, the consensus will become increasingly disappointed to the detriment of equity prices and valuation.

There was an article in the June 16 business section (page 7) of the New York Times entitled "Gearing Up for Lower Expectations". It discussed "...an increasingly widely held assumption among investors: that the stock market's long-term returns will be lower than expected a few years ago...recent academic studies have bolstered that view..." Examples of the latter was a study showing that expectations of portfolios of at least \$100,000 dropped their expectations to 9.5% from 13.5% only a few months earlier. Roger Ibbotson was quoted as now expecting returns of 9.37% for the next 10 to 25 years, down from the 10.7% since 1926 and his prediction in 1999 of 11% for long term returns. T. Rowe Price is said to suggest that investors plan on 8.4% in the years ahead, down from 11.2% realized by its model in the last

15 years. Eugene F. Fama expects about 7.5% and it "could be considerably lower". Except for Fama, the return expectations cited here are still outlandish and require 1) unprecedented real earnings and dividend growth and/or 2) a substantial pickup of inflation and/or 3) an ongoing rise of valuation.

Note that I have assumed no change in valuation in my estimated return calculation. The fact is that valuation has increased in the past to a still relatively high level at present (though down from 2 years ago) and this has accounted for a part of the historical return figures that are thrown about. Valuation may continue to increase as a trend, as the authors of Dow 36,000 suggested. Indeed, were yields to drop to 0.5%, the market would triple from here. But valuation may also go the other way, and I think that is more likely without a near-term resumption of a preponderance of upside surprises. It used to be that yield support would ultimately hold stocks from extending a downturn. Today there is no yield support. The return potential now is on the come -- profit growth -- and that is increasingly being called into question. I think the latter will continue on balance.

In summary, my intermediate-term bearishness is based on the idea that return expectation today are still too high and that as they decline, market valuation will also decline. I do not know whether this will happen soon or whether it will be drawn out over another one to three or four years or so. In the latter case, the market could see continued interim rallies. I lean to the longer version at present. But, the longer we go without some respite the more likely the downside resolution will be sooner. Of course, the market's return outlook will rise as yields rise.

I am more ambivalent on a near-term basis because the low sentiment at present for all of the obvious reasons makes the market trend vulnerable (if you want to call it that) to an upside surprise. I do not envision any such surprise as changing my intermediate term outlook, but it could extend the process. Here-to-fore, on a near-term basis I have thought that near-term earnings expectations have been too high and that declining earnings expectations would not be favorable for the market. Expectation have declined moderately so far this year. Early in the year the bottom-up S&P 500 estimate was about \$62.75. Currently it is \$61.07 (both are four-quarter totals). Some high-profile estimate drops have been considerably more severe.

In addition, near- to intermediate-term micro valuation expectations are probably still too high on balance. I hear some analysts calling for lower multiples than two or three years ago, but some still think that multiples will go back to where they were once earnings get back on trend.

Also, I have been less sanguine that the economy will be as vigorous as the consensus forecast seems to suggest, and if this thought is correct, that will further depress expectations on a near-term basis. However, my conviction here is not high, in part because I no longer do the detailed number work. If near-term expectations stabilize or begin to increase, this depressant would become a positive for a time.

In the meantime, however, the added depressants of declining trust in corporate governance with ongoing instances of management malfeasance, a declining dollar, terrorist uncertainty, increased political instability abroad etc. have added to the market's weakness. But, these have all contributed to the fairly negative sentiment that exists at present and the resulting vulnerability to an upside surprise or a shift to a better ratio of upside/downside surprises, be they of an earnings nature or an alleviation of one or more of the other depressants cited above. Interim sentiment shifts are a reasonable expectation in both bull and bear markets. Hence my near-term ambivalence.

However, the longer we go on the negative side, the greater attention is likely to be given to a lower prospect for intermediate- to longer-term returns.

NOTE: For a time I tended to ignore this dilution factor in view of the fact that there has been negative dilution in recent years from extensive corporate share buybacks and reduction of shares through merger. However, the data show that more than all of retained cash flow of nonfinancial corporations has been used for capital expenditures and other non-buyback internal uses. Thus, in the aggregate, all of the share repurchases have been financed with debt, and additional debt has been required also to finance the excess of corporate fund uses over the internal sources. Of course, this is not true for all individual companies. (See attached chart) In addition, many companies who are big buyback companies do so in order to obtain shares to satisfy the exercise of stock options. They buy stock at the market and sell it at below market, at times well below market. There is no reverse dilution as a result, but there is a dispersal of cash.

Sorry for the long windedness when all you wanted was the first sentence, but that quantification is obviously approximate. Even so, these thoughts are subject to refinement, but this is what they are at present.

Best regards, Bill

A BROAD PERSPECTIVE ON AUDITING, REPORTING CORPORATE EARNINGS, SECURITY
ANALYSIS AND REGULATIONS - THE VICIOUS CYCLE

DRAFT

The writer has been a securities analyst, director of an investment research department, president of an investment banking firm, a money manager and for the last decade chairman of a venture capital firm. During my career I've had the honor and responsibility of being a board member of a dozen public companies (large and small) and served or chaired some twenty board committees, including audit. I'm still serving on five public boards.

The auditing and corporate reporting issues now under public discussion are complicated, interrelated and have now developed into a survival struggle among constituencies which activates the politicians agendas who sense wide publicity. All constituencies are trying to take advantage of Arthur Anderson's serious problems and now some politicians are active perhaps with malice aforethought.

Four years ago I wrote to the SEC (copy enclosed) about the danger of conflicts in auditing firms and the need for careful current review. The SEC noted its reception but there was no other response. It should have been obvious to me that government regulators don't prevent problems but only address damages that have already occurred. Usually and unfortunately unilateral regulation is approved with little configural thought as to side effects.

The current breakdown of confidence in financial reports and in the presentation of quarterly results by corporations and in reports by some non-profit institutions, have seriously damaged investor confidence and diluted contributions to non-profit institutions. However there are some moderating actions that can be taken.

- A. Auditing firms should have boards of directors that include a strong external representation. The external director should be experienced recent senior retirees from corporations, government agencies, academia and law firms. They should serve for only one term, perhaps three years, and be well compensated, to establish its serious purpose and responsibility. Monthly meetings should be required for the near future.
- B. Auditing firms should be required to publish financial statements. The current peer review 'clearance' is unacceptable in any objective review. If business must be transparent, why not the auditors' function in the same sense and spirit.
- C. An independent oversight board with public authority to establish standards and fine auditors for misdemeanors is required, but not in the form of another government agency. Secondary responsibilities would be to encourage the creation of new auditing firms, and to provide a seal of approval for such companies to give comfort for corporations hiring such new firms. Again, establish a three-year term to prevent the birth of another bureaucracy. The directors would be chosen from the group noted in A above. Paul Volcker would be an excellent Chairman.

-2-

#

What can the corporation immediately do to regain investors' confidence and regulator approval?

- A. Same day reporting of all securities transactions (purchase or sale) by senior executives (16B officers) and directors. There is no sense in delaying such reporting. The mechanics are already in place. Directors and officers should inform the CFO of their intended actions prior to transactions to avoid conflicts.
- B. The corporate audit committee should communicate directly and externally with the auditing firms as a separate event, not the usual tag on to the quarterly board audit committee meeting. The senior audit partner should call the audit committee chairman at the end of each month to note whether 'there are serious issues to bring to the committee's attention or non-such'.
- C. The auditing firm should be re-evaluated no longer than at the end of a five year term with a bias to replacement.
- D. The committee should review all fees paid to the auditors. Major fee proposals should be pre-approved, as with the normal auditing fee. Advisory fees are different than consulting fees. Those that relate to taxes or accounting changes to reflect new regulations, etc. are different from major consulting contracts for management restructuring, operations revenue, information technology, facility overhaul, etc. In general audit fees are too low and consulting fees much too high.

#

To introduce Congress as the arbitrator of good accounting is like bringing the fox into the hen house. One can wonder why government accounting isn't called to a public hearing. Can you imagine if Congress Inc. had an audit committee? What a hearing it would be to ask the chairmen of the various committees such questions as:

- 1) Why was \$350 billion of "pork" added to the post 9/11 defense bills; including museums, favorite research programs, chapels, gyms, selected infrastructures, favorite road projects. Citizens Against Government Waste reports that "pork" projects have risen to 8,341 from 2,143 during the last three years.
- 2) If Social Security is so secure why doesn't Congress pay premiums like other Americans? Why does Congress have its own health care plan and avoid Medicare taxes? Congress has a non-contributory plan that guarantees the last pay at retirement until death; of course, all inflation adjusted at no cost; certainly better and risk proof versus stock options. Would a Congressman trade his perks for an option on a US Government "common stock"?

11-L-0559/OSD/9661

-3-

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To turn over the auditing of major companies to four major firms asks for a future problem of oligopoly if not already so. Corporations should encourage the formation of new firms which in 5-10 years would return to a competitive 'Big 7, 8 or 9'. Doesn't the FTC have any concerns?

Size at some point usually breeds protection of all bureaucracies ahead of clients, shareholders, employees and contributors to non-profits. In today's world one can quickly find examples in governments, foundations, oligopoly industries, corporations, churches and educational institutions. Arrogance usually leads to self-delusion, autocracy, secrecy, hubris and finally damage to all constituencies. Incumbents, elected or appointed, all prefer to remain in office and dislike term limits. Extended time service breeds many problems. Why not a 10 year term limit for Congress, boards of directors, auditing firms, CEOs of public corporations, college presidents, heads of foundations etal? We limit the term of the President of the United States to eight years to prevent monarchical rule. Why should any public leader have a longer term?

OPTIONS:

A brief word on options. Historically their importance originated in the 1986 Congress, which placed a limit on salary as a tax deductible expense but unlimited compensation could be tied to reaching special objectives with rewards expressed in cash and/or stock options. Unfortunately nobody forecast the beginning of an 18-year (from 1982) bull market; thus the compensation exploded as stock prices zoomed and everyone wanted options. The peak was the irrationality of the Internet craze and the creation of enormous paper wealth. If you could "Use the Net and call it a Stock" Wall Street would underwrite an offering.

If options were reduced would companies suffer significantly? Hardly, since most corporate leaders would be CEOs under any conditions, call it the CEO gene or whatever. They would produce under any compensation system. What can/should be done to make options programs more balanced? One simple step is to require a down payment by the option receiver at the time of the grant; perhaps 1%-10% of the award date price; the higher for senior executives. The grantee would have real money at stake and the corporation would have the funds to use for the benefit of all shareholders. If the option is a positive experience, the risk paid off. If not, the company has some benefit. The problem of repricing options would be reduced by increasing the down payments with the stock at a much lower price and/or increasing the vesting stock price trigger. Employees who are at some personal financial risk are more productive.

11-L-0559/OSD/9662

-4-

Options should be a function of the positive difference of the price appreciation of a stock versus the performance of the markets (S&P500) and an industry list of comparable companies.

The major option package to the CEO should vest after his retirement. The most important objective for a CEO in his last few years is the development of his successor and the strategic plan for the period ahead. Thus the option package should be geared to the relative performance of the company after the CEO's retirement. If the government moves towards regulation of the size of option awards it will complicate the issue; not ease towards 'fairness'. Small and startup companies require a larger percentage amount (more dilution) to attract the needed executives and employees. Large companies need only minor dilution because of more stability of executive staff and less job concern by employees.

Stock options programs greater than a maximum of 2% dilution per year should be approved by shareholders. Startup and smaller companies need a higher percentage to attract employees to a higher risk company for the future. The largest corporations need a smaller percentage because of a lower risk profile re job security.

Options would have more incentive logic if used in all settings and measured against the performance of comparable stocks and its industry average. In a major bull market (1982-2000) most stocks rise in price making most managements appear to be worthy of added compensation. The program should also be tied to premium performance in down markets where the best managements really earn their keep.

#

THE FUNCTION OF ANALYSTS:

The bottom line for all the investigations is fairness to shareholders. It takes more than detailed knowledge of details and minutia to make securities recommendation. The analyst and money manager must be able to understand what facts and fundamentals are implied in the price of a stock. Only when a non-consensus forecast (not just an EPS guess) is made that proves to be more accurate than that of the consensus can the analyst be adding value. In today's instant communications it requires a lot of courage to be different. Few choose this road.

The major problem for investing banking firm analysts is that their compensation today is not based on their professionalism as measured by their record in the selection (and rejection) of securities as to relative appreciation (and depreciation). Compensation is based on their contribution to the profitable investment banking business; bringing in deals, publishing information and coverage on industries and companies; and brokerage business generated from clients. Nothing wrong with such efforts but these analysts should work for the corporate finance department not securities research.

11-L-0559/OSD/9663

-5-

Until institutions and individual investors are willing to pay "hard" dollars for productive recommendations, the innate current system conflicts will persist, regardless of promises to reform by participants in the system. At some point the independent research based brokerage firms of the 1960-1980 era will be structured and paid for the performance of their recommendations. Ethics is a cornerstone, but where it is placed on the priority scale depends (unfortunately) upon the source of compensation.

THE VICIOUS CYCLE:

There is a vicious cycle that takes place between;

- The corporation wanting to maximize its pension fund performance with aggressive money managers.
- The consultants focussing on a few managers with good recent relative performance tending to concentrate money management into fewer hands.
 - The external manager to buy stocks that do well.
 - The analyst trying to find companies that exceed the consensus estimate.
- The CEO trying to deliver superior results to be enhance the corporations appeal to analysts and money managers.

This interchange results in the management of earnings trying to avoid volatile results and exceed the analysts' consensus.

Overall a tight loop that encourages manipulation in quarterly reporting and can lead to deceit under extreme pressure to produce quarterly performance and very occasionally fraud.

Only the CEO (supported by the board) can break the cycle and have the analysts return to longer term outlooks.

Companies that threaten to sue analysts who have negative opinions or punish their firms with a loss of business only increase the fragility of the vicious cycle.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Poison pill charters in today's world are used to buy time for boards and management to evaluate an aggressive surprise stock price tender. Years ago "pills" were often tagged as board/management protection instruments for entrenchment regardless of impact on shareholders. Today's boards clearly look to maximize shareholder value and "pills" provide the time to so search for more value. If any directors have any doubt about the primary objective, the legal liability keeps shareholder value as the primary concern.

11-L-0559/OSD/9664

-6-

Special battlefield awards to senior executives for completing an acquisition raises question about "why"? Any acquisition is part of their normal responsibilities. If shareholders have truly benefited after 2-3 years the compensation committee might consider an increase in options or a cash bonus. There is something to be said about a battlefield reward for the hands on employees down the line who have to take on the integration but not for the 16b executives.

The golden parachutes in change of control agreements are not always in sync with shareholder interests. There is always the unspoken tendency by a few executives to encourage being acquired if it triggers a special bonus. Especially significant if the industry conditions are difficult and other compensation possibilities (bonus and options) aren't meaningful. Change of control agreements are fair if given to executives that become redundant but should be limited to something like a two year's salary and an option rollover into the acquirer's stock until employed by another company.

The general perks of 16b officers and the CEO in particular should not be extended beyond one year of post retirement. That is usually the maximum time in which the retired CEO can make a real contribution. There is a case to be made for office space and secretarial support but all other perks should disappear after one year. Among the CEO's responsibilities are the preparation of a successor and the soundness of his strategic plan. Both objectives can only be measured after retirement.

Cash bonuses should be tied to reaching special annual revenue and earnings targets. Options should be more closely tied to an adjusted (remove general market impact) stock price; rather than the current absolute price.

The annual report and/or 10K could have a separate topic dealing with all the forms of compensation by individual executive relating to bonus, options, perks, and dilution.

Management shareholders always feel a stock decline which reduces the substantial paper wealth in options. Compensation committees should set a maximum limit for employee reliance on stock in 401Ks and direct ownership. At least a warning label of the concentrated wealth risk should be communicated on a continuing basis.

In theory it would be appropriate to permit employees to choose between a defined benefit retirement program and a defined contribution program. The mechanics are not easy and not subject to trading between them.

#

Rather than waiting for THE ANSWER let us all begin to take a few 'steps' in the right direction.

6/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9665

(b)(6)



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WILLIAM R. GRANT
CHAIRMAN

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July 11, 2002

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon (Room 3E)
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,

Unfortunately my letter of July 1st was accurate (copy enclosed). The President's comments were disastrous for the securities market and the Republican Party. I don't know who wrote his speech but it must have been some bureaucrat out of touch with the real world of financial and corporate investment.

The enclosed memorandum is the only one I know of which integrates the forces that have resulted in the steep market decline and economic confusion ahead and recommends a configural program.

I again urge the Volcker/Rohatyn Co-Chairmen Committee be established.

A double economic dip is almost a certainty as corporate managements and boards spend time looking over their shoulders and not at the potentials ahead.

I'm just back from Europe and the world of Islam extremism is claiming credit for destruction of our markets; damaging our economy; separating our allies and publicizing the lack of integrity of our leaders.

With all good wishes.

Regards,

William R. Grant

(b)(6)

610 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center, New York, NY 10020

FAX (b)(6)

→ Col. Susan
FYI
Larry Di Rita
12/11

December 9, 2002 5:43 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: International Outreach

Some of these presidents, like the one of Tajikistan, have children and grandchildren here in Washington. I wonder if we ought to think about inviting the children of leaders, ministers of defense and presidents of countries, who live in the Washington area, into the Pentagon or have a party for them here—show them the Pentagon and be nice to them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-56

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

092

U11257 /03

9 Dec 02

December 9, 2002 5:33 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *MR for*

SUBJECT: Intelligence

Some weeks ago I said we really do need to get our arguments marshaled as to what we think is the best thing for the intelligence community. Suddenly now the Intelligence Committee is starting to propose this business of a non-CIA director of all intelligence in the Cabinet. I think that is a bum idea.

I must get one or two pages on this fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-54

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

350.09

9 Dec 02

U11258 /03

December 9, 2002 5:26 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iceland

Colin Powell stopped me at the meeting in the White House this morning and talked to me about Iceland. He asked if we could have a rotation where occasionally F-15s could go in. I told him I thought it ought to be passed over to NATO as a NATO responsibility. He said he is worried we will lose the base.

Iceland

The first question is, do we need the base—if so, how badly?

Second, if we do need the base, why don't we transfer it over to NATO responsibility for the search and rescue and the airplanes, and get four or five countries to rotate people in about every once in a while and create a presence.

Please come up with a proposal like that if you can.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-52

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

U11259 /03

9 Dec 02

December 9, 2002 5:20 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Carrier

12/17

Please get a piece of paper that tells me the information on the new carrier. I talked to the President about it today, and he said he is a little concerned that the one being named for his father is the relic. I said to him I thought the one being named for his father was going to be almost two-thirds new in terms of its approach.

560.1

Please get me a piece of paper that shows that is the case if it is true that the one we have just approved is going to be the one that is going to be named for President George Herbert Walker Bush. I want to send the President a note explaining that the new one is going to be different and not the last of the line, if that is true. So let me know on the road.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120902-51

.....

Please respond by 12/11/02 12/16

→ SecDef - U11260 /03

Sent you info. P
did not call Amy on it
and will. I had the impression
you were going to do a note, but
the sick days, etc., understand
D. Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/9670

July 12, 2002 5:49 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
CC: Gen. Myers
Gen. Kernan
ADM Cebrowski
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Transformation

I appreciate the input you have been sending me on transformation. Could you please consolidate your thoughts on transformation DoD-wide, after discussion with General Myers, General Kernan and Admiral Cebrowski, and forward them to me.

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071202-15



Please respond by 08/16/02

12 Jul 02

December 9, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Lengthen Tours, Time in Service

DR

Please tell me what we are going to do to lengthen tours and lengthen the amount of time people serve in the military.

Thanks.

2004

DHR:dh
120902-39

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

U11261 /03

9 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9672



MANAGING TO TIME IN JOB FOR FLAG AND GENERAL OFFICERS

PRESENTATION TO THE SECDEF

SECDEF HAS SEEN

~~JAN 9 2003~~

SNOWFLAKE

December 9, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Lengthen Tours, Time in Service

Please tell me what we are going to do to lengthen tours and lengthen the amount of time people serve in the military.

Thanks.

11-L-0559/OSD/9673



CURRENT SYSTEM DOES NOT SET TOUR LENGTH BASED ON INHERENT ASSIGNMENT QUALITIES

- We should distinguish between “developing” and “using” assignments
- Using assignments should be longer, but they need not “clog” the system
- Indeed, properly managed, this approach could increase the promotion opportunity to flag rank and increase the number of candidates for senior positions.

How can we do this?



THE PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGES FUTURE SENIOR EXECUTIVES' CAREERS DIFFERENTLY FROM CURRENT MILITARY PRACTICE

- High-potential executives' job rotations typically last two to three years.
 - This is sufficient time for managers to learn a new job
- Assignments for other executives are longer
 - Same research shows that knowledge, influence, and accountability aren't firmly established until three years and beyond
- CEOs average more than eight years in job, many serve more than a decade.



WE DO NOT MEET THESE STANDARDS

- FY02 Average Line Flag Tour Length (Months)
 - 0-10: 31
 - 0-8: 24
 - 0-9: 27
 - 0-7: 22
- RAND:
 - Data show that each Service has developmental positions and using positions
 - But assignment lengths do not vary with purpose



AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

- Identify developing and using positions explicitly at each grade
- Set goals for time in position
 - Longer for using jobs, more senior jobs, non-line jobs
 - Ideally, minimum 4 years for using jobs, 2 years for developing jobs
- Set goals for number and timing of developing positions
 - Three between 0-7 and 0-8, one at 0-9
- Set goals for using positions
 - Two at 0-9 and 0-10
 - One at lower grades



WHAT RESULTS MIGHT THE ALTERNATIVE* PARADIGM PRODUCE?

Army Line	07	08	09	010	07 to 010
<u>Current Practice</u>					
# Promoted	20.8	17.8	8.4	2.4	
Rate		86%	47%	28%	11.5%
Avg Job Length(Mos)	17.0	21.9	25.8	27.7	
Avg Career length(Yrs)	29.9	33.0	33.9	35.5	
<u>Alternative</u>					
# Promoted	22.3	18	7.1	1.3	
Rate		81%	39%	18%	5.8%
Rate for Developers			59%	24%	
Job Length (%2yr/%4yr)	100/0	60/40	45/55	0/100	
Avg Career length	29.0	31.8	35.6	40.4	

***This paradigm selected as best from 13 alternatives designed to meet Secretary's criteria.**

RAND

6



EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE (ALL SERVICES)

- Distribution of tour lengths
 - Current practice: Central Tendency ≤ 2 years
 - Alternative: Bimodal (2 years; 4 years)
- More promoted to 0-7 (except USMC)
 - Implies better selectivity
- Equal (Army, Navy, USMC) or greater (AF) numbers reach 0-8
 - Implies equal or better selectivity

RAND

7



ISSUES/NEXT STEPS

- Alternative can be implemented under current law.
- But we should consider modest compensation changes to encourage stability and longer service.
- Discuss with others?



BACKUP

11-L-0559/OSD/9681



USING AND DEVELOPING EXAMPLES

	Developing	Using
O-7	All	
O-8	Div/Sub Grp Cmd Director of Operations Dir, Surface/Undersea/Air Warfare	Vice Cdr,NAF;Cdr, ALC NIMA;Legislative Affairs National War College
O-9	Corps/Fleet/FMF/NAF Cmd HQ Staff Dir, Jt Staff Sr Mil Asst to SECDEF	USMA/USNA/USAF Sup. DIA; First Army; IG National Defense University Hqs Dep Cmdt
O-10		All

RAND

10



WHAT RESULTS MIGHT ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE PRODUCE?

	Army Line				
	07	08	09	010	07 to 010
<u>Current Practice</u>					
# Promoted	20.8	17.8	8.4	2.4	
Rate		86%	47%	28%	11.5%
Avg Job Length(Mos)	17.0	21.9	25.8	27.7	
Avg Career length(Yrs)	29.9	33.0	33.9	35.5	
<u>Alternative (7c)</u>					
# Promoted	22.3	18	8.7	1.3	
Rate		81%	48%	15%	5.8%
Rate for Developers			73%	24%	
Job Length (%2/%4yr)	100/0	60/40	45/55	0/100	
Avg Career length	29.0	32.0	34.5	40.1	

RAND



THESE ALTERNATIVES WERE ANALYZED

Case	Length of Job (yrs)		Number of Jobs (per grade)	
	Developing	Using	Developing	Using
1	2	4	1	1
2	2	4	2	1
3	2 + 1	4	1	1
4	2 + 1	4 O-8, O-9; 6 for O-10s	1	1
4a	2	4 O-8, O-9; 6 for O-10s	1	1
5	2 + 1	4	1	1 at O-8, O-9; 2 at O-10
5a	2	4	1	1 at O-8, O-9; 2 at O-10
6	2 + 1	4	1	1 at O-8, 2 at O-9, O-10
6a	2	4	1	1 at O-8, 2 at O-9, O-10
7a	2	4	2 at O-7, 1 at O-8, O-9	1 at O-8, O-9; 2 at O-10
7b	2	4	2 at O-8, 1 at O-7, O-9	1 at O-8, O-9; 2 at O-10
7c	2	4	3 betw O-7 and O-8; 1 at O-9	1 at O-8, O-9; 2 at O-10
7d	2	4	3 betw O-7 and O-8; 1 at O-9	1 at O-8; 2 at O-9, O-10

RAND



WHAT RESULTS MIGHT THE ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM PRODUCE?

	Navy URL				
	07	08	09	010	07 to 010
<u>Current Practice</u>					
# Promoted	24.6	17.1	7.0	2.8	
Rate		70%	41%	39%	11.2%
Avg Job Length(Mos)	19.6	22.4	25.3	30.1	
Avg Career length(Yrs)	31.3	33.8	34.3	35.7	
 <u>Alternative(7d)</u>					
# Promoted	26	16.9	6.6	1.3	
Rate		65%	39%	20%	5%
Rate for Developers			90%	27%	
Job Length (%2yr/%4yr)	100/0	35/65	40/60	0/100	
Avg Career length	30	34.7	36.8	42	

RAND



WHAT RESULTS MIGHT THE ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM PRODUCE?

	AF Line				
	07	08	09	010	07 to 010
<u>Current Practice</u>					
# Promoted	26.6	18.8	8.0	3.1	
Rate		70%	43%	39%	11.7%
Avg Job Length(Mos)	19.3	20.3	22.2	25.3	
Avg Career length(Yrs)	29.0	31.9	33.6	34.6	
 <u>Alternative(7d)</u>					
# Promoted	27	20.5	11.5	1.3	
Rate		76%	56%	11.3%	4.8%
Rate for Developers			89%	12.4%	
Job Length (%2yr/%4yr)	100/0	56/44	72/28	0/100	
Avg Career length	27.4	31.8	33.7	39.6	

RAND

December 9, 2002 2:30 PM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Monitoring Hate Media

I like this idea from Newt. Why don't we just do it here at the Pentagon? The more people who know what is going on, the better.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Monitoring Hate Media in Arab Countries

DHR:dh
120902-36

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

091.712

U11262 /03

From Newt Gingrich

Page 1 of 2

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

cc: L. Di Rita

P. Wolfowitz

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 9 2002

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2002 8:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: hate media in the arab world

for secdef, depsecdef,
from newt 11/19/02
monitoring hate media in arab countries

someone sent me the following analysis which I thought was quite powerful. Creating an office to monitor hate media and an annual report would be a useful step. If there was a daily posting on the internet of the most hateful activities and of planned hateful media it would educate western publics to the scale of the problem and begin to put heat on the dictatorships which encourage or allow this (sometimes with our foreign aid)

"The most serious problem the U.S. faces in public diplomacy in Arab and Muslim countries, i.e, the poisonously anti-American and anti-Semitic messages which local and regional outlets, including the many government-owned outlets, disseminate on a regular basis. This is especially unfortunate, because the U.S. government currently has no office, bureau or system to monitor this poison and figure out how to fight it. At State, this is no one's job.

One suggestion is something along the lines of what was done first with human rights abuses and later specifically with religious persecution, i.e., require:

- 1) that an office be created at the State Department to monitor the hostile propaganda and recommend steps to discourage Arab world media from broadcasting it;
- 2) require that the State Department issue regular public reports discussing the hostile propaganda and detailing what State is doing, on a country by country basis, to discourage and otherwise counter it.

The mere existence of this office and the regular reporting will send a powerful message to the bad guys to clean up their act. This is an

11/19/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9688

- **idea**
long-overdue and that makes lots of sense.”

December 9, 2002 2:17 PM

TO: Gen. Franks
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Common Soldier in the Field

DR

f

Please take a look at this, and then let's talk about it sometime when you are here.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/6/02 reprint of an e-mail

DHR:dh
120902-34

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

copy - [unclear]

U11263 /03

9 Dec 02

Friends and Family,

Well, I don't have an abundance of news to share with you all aside from the mild events surrounding our Thanksgiving Holidays here-described in previous e-mails. So... I guess I'll just share some of my thoughts and feelings on different things I see and hear.

Primarily, my attention has been captured by a series of articles and news reports concerning Afghanistan, and especially the 82nd Airborne Division's actions here. It gets frustrating hearing the news as reported back home; so much of the story is left out, and quite often it's all the parts that are worth talking about-the parts that should not be ignored, lest the past mistakes we are allowing to occur once more become a continuing part of our policy.

First, and foremost, the picture and image I see so many magazines and newspapers have saddled the 82nd with. Almost every article I have read has portrayed these guys as naïve, macho, young soldiers on a power trip-at best-but more often as culturally insulting bullies. I think only one article addressed the real issue at hand: the fact that these guys, mostly teenagers or in their early twenties, volunteered from the get-go to be part of a crack, elite unit trained to parachute behind enemy lines and cause havoc or capture and maintain an airfield for follow-on forces. These guys, naively or not, have trained gruelingly in anticipation for the day that they are called upon to perform the most strategically dangerous mission our armed forces could saddle a unit with. But because of our mentality as Americans-our reluctance to again see young lives sacrificed in abundance for war (I'll leave it to you to decide the correctness of this viewpoint)-they know deep inside that the chance of them getting to live up the heavy yoke of their legacy is a slim one indeed. They have volunteered to be with arguably the most elite conventional division of the western world, but know that the odds of them getting that golden star on their wings, signifying a combat jump, are long... But still they train, and they always train *for a fight. For the most vicious sort of fight*

Before it seems like I am digressing from the subject at hand, ask yourselves this: Is this the sort of unit that you would send to maintain an uneasy peace within a country poised so precariously on a straight-edge, maintaining a frighteningly narrow balance above continued war and anarchy that has plagued it for our known history? The vast majority of our news publications say "No". In some cases, that answer is supported by some well-founded facts. But overwhelmingly, the answer is based on incredible exaggerations, and, in some cases, outright lies.

My favorite by far is the story in which paratroopers over here are said to be "shaming" and "humiliating" the locals by searching their women-an unpardonable act in a conservative Muslim society. Without sounding too vulgar or offensive, I would like to tell you that this is incredible bullshit. The "joes" here have gone through every compromise possible to bend their field regulations and conditions to allow for the integration of female military police soldiers to accompany search ops- simply so that the family patriarch does not have to suffer the indignity of soldiers searching their womenfolk and their quarters. But I believe the greater cause for outrage and humiliation is the fact that through our searches we catch so many of them in outright lies. It's not the fact that we're searching women that pisses them off-it's the fact that our female soldiers routinely find concealed grenades, rocket warheads, assault rifles, etc., stashed in their apparel. There is nothing world in the Muslim world than loss of face; stretching your morals by lying is nothing compared to *getting caught lying*. On just *one* search operation I was involved in, a village representative *assured* us that the single hunting rifle and single AK-47 he presented us with were the sole weapons possessed by his community. When our female soldiers went to search, in just the first house they found rocket-propelled grenades, land mines, and more rifles and ammunition. Our flustered village rep. said that this was his *brother in law's house*, and as such he could not be held accountable for his stuff. But he assured us that there were no other weapons in any of the other houses. The next house yielded *more* of the same. This was his uncle's house. The same held true for the remaining two houses-both, as you may have guessed belonging to relatives of his. A small, secluded, clan-centered community, where everyone knows everyone, but apparently nobody knows about the other's stashed explosives? My ass. But did anyone get beaten? Threatened? No. We took their grenades and mines, joked around with their kids to keep them from worrying, and even shared our food and candy with them. When we left, almost all of the villagers seemed stunned, and probably from the fact that they were getting off so light. The only chagrined person seemed to be the headman-and he because he would have to explain how all their explosives disappeared to the other men when they returned from their "shopping trip". In every mission I have been on, I have taken pride in the fact that every adult Afghani I have had a conversation with-courtesy of our translators-has walked away with a handshake and a smile. Kids might be scared when we roll in, but they watch us leave with a sweet tooth-and with a smile as well. If we are supposed to be terrorizing people here and insulting their womenfolk, why is it that when we first arrived in the province of Gardez (for a week-long operation) you could not even spot a woman or girl-child outside a house, but by week's end they felt comfortable to come out and watch us and send their daughters to get their share of candy along with their sons?

Are all the paratroopers here perfect gentlemen? No. A lot of them dislike being here; they hate being away from their families, babysitting a people they see as petty in their reluctance to restore their nation. Many of them are young and scared, and are getting more and more pissed off as they find out that so many of the rocket attacks on them may be coming courtesy of corrupt warlords eager to see us go so that they may continue their drug trade without the current restrictions our patrols impose on them. Many of them are, as a result, cold, short, and sometimes even mildly rude with those locals who try to approach them. But regardless of how they act around adult Afghanis, I have yet to see the grunt who didn't pull out candy, a pencil, or a small toy when a pitiful wisp of a child came to him for a hand-out. They are not trained to be peacekeepers or policemen, or relief workers; they just want to do their job and get home. I've heard of two extreme cases where some paratroopers acted up, in one case beating up a guy who tried to run for it after his stash of "pyrotechnics" was discovered, and another where a team of them posed for their own cameras pointing their weapons at a prisoner. I don't know about you guys, but last I checked, the criminal rate among civilians in America was much greater than that provided by the dozen or so bad cases in the 82nd. Those guys got hit hard by the military book. *Real hard.*

My other favorite story is the one that says we are losing momentum and can't get the job done. The

press makes the 82nd out to be mildly incompetent, like they ride around all day aimlessly looking for mysterious terrorists in all the wrong places. Oh, believe me, they know *exactly* where they run to. But there's a problem with violating the sovereign soil of a totally different country. Poor Pakistan can't help it if their border guards let Afghani bad guys make the short sprint across their border but then bar us from crossing as well. It's a joke; it's the worst form of politics-the kind where, in order to appease someone who *might* end up playing ball for us (even though his people venomously hate us), we will pretend to be stupid enough to not notice everything that goes on in his back yard. It's Laos during the Viet Nam war, all over again. It stinks. Know why we can't catch as many bad guys in the interior? Probably because of a fundamental distrust bred by the fact that we won't do anything about regional governmental officials who reached their position through bribery, extortion, blackmail, assassination, and tyranny. They like us as people, don't get me wrong, and will take our food, water, candy, and medical supplies as offered, but at the end of the day we are rather useless to them. At the end of the day, we have to leave town to go to our camp, and then they go back to dealing with their corrupt governor, mayor, or police chief. They get to deal with the fact that there is no protection because Afghani soldiers true to their oaths never get paid by the local powers that be, and are thus forced to eventually desert or join their corrupt master. So why should they not tell someone who claims to be a patriot that we're coming to get him? Nothing against us; it's just that this guy also opposes the guy taking them for everything they're worth every season. He's often a local who has ties in the community. They can't very well let him get arrested.

It's all very sad and frustrating. I'll continue this some other time, but for now believe me when I say that the guys here deserve cudos-not criticism. The media should get the guts to criticize suspect governmental policy grown in Capitol Hill instead. Love you all, and talk to you soon.

Do you Yahoo!?

Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now

December 16, 2002 5:51 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Info on Countries

LARRY Di Rita
12/19

Please give me the population, per capita GDP, literacy rates, infant mortality rate and the life expectancy for North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-39

.....
Please respond by _____

2/19-1110
Lalaceo2

Mr. Di Rita,

I added the United States from perspective. Please let me know if you want any adjustments.

Purtle

12/18

Capt Purtle

*Please get me in a format that makes sense.
Thanks*

[Signature]

092

16. Accor

U11264 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9694

COUNTRY COMPARISON AS OF 19 DEC 2002

	POP (MILLIONS)	LITERACY RATE (*)		LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS)		INFANT MORTALITY RATE	GDP PER CAPITA	% GROWTH
		MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE			
IRAN	24	78 %	66%	69	71	28 / 1000	\$6,400	5%
IRAQ	66	71%	45 %	66	69	58 / 1000	\$2,500	-5.70%
NORTH KOREA	22	99 %	99%	68	74	23 / 1000	\$1,000	-3.00%
UNITED STATES	280	97%	97%	75	80	7 / 1000	\$36,300	.3 %

(*) Literacy rate is defined as people over the age of 15 who can read and write

December 16, 2002 6:01 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Midwifery Program

How are we doing on the midwifery program?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-43

.....
Please respond by

01/03/03

Winkenwerder

Done
Larry Di Rita
2/7

16 Dec 02

U11266 /03

December 16, 2002 9:03 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Richard Perle

Please tell the "Defense Department spokesman" that they shouldn't say that those were the views of "the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board." He was not speaking as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board. He was speaking as a private citizen, and you should make sure that your people understand that. That is exactly the wrong message we want to give.

See the attached article.

Thanks.

Attach.
"... Adviser Blames France for Lack of Iraq Inspectors"

DHR:dh
121602-11

.....
Please respond by 01 | 03 | 03

U11268 /03

adviser blames France for lack of Iraq inspectors

A key adviser to the Pentagon said in an interview published yesterday there were far too few weapons inspectors in Iraq to root out any weapons of mass destruction and blamed French President Jacques Chirac.

"We wanted a lot more inspectors. But ask Chirac why there's such a reduced number," Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, was quoted as saying in the interview with the French newspaper *Le Figaro*.

Asked if France blocked moves to deploy a larger number of inspectors, Mr. Perle was quoted as replying, "But of course."

"France's constant strategy during the negotiations on [U.N.] Resolution 1441 was to reduce the scope of inspections, to reduce the potential efficiency of the inspectors on the ground," he said.

Mr. Perle, a conservative Republican hawk and advocate of military action against Iraq, has blasted France in the past for refusing to back proposals for military strikes on Baghdad.

In one interview in mid-November Mr. Perle criticized Europe for having "lost its moral compass."

U.N. weapons inspectors went to Iraq at the end of November after negotiations at the United Nations in

which Mr. Chirac, among others, said military action should be considered only later, if Iraq did not cooperate with the demands of disarmament and inspections.

When asked about Mr. Perle's latest remarks, a Pentagon spokesman said they did not reflect U.S. policy.

"Those are the views of the chairman of the Defense Policy Board and not the secretary of defense," the spokesman said.

Twenty-eight inspectors arrived in Baghdad on Thursday, bringing the total there to 98. They have visited a number of installations suspected of developing banned weapons of mass destruction. Iraq

insists it has no such weapons.

Mr. Perle said France had also opposed U.S. proposals that Iraqi officials could be taken out of the country for interviews on their work.

"Telling the truth today for an Iraqi scientist amounts to a death sentence. That's why the United States insisted so much on the principle that Iraqis should be able to be questioned in total security outside their territory," he told the newspaper.

"I could never have imagined a country like France would stigmatize — as if it were a sin rather than a good-willed action — the idea of providing security to essential witnesses," he said.

"Why did Chirac oppose us?" he asked.

"Frankly I have no idea. One of my friends explained to me that President Chirac was steeped all his life in the affairs of the Persian Gulf and that his relations with many leaders in the region were almost as good as family ties," he said.

Mr. Perle also said talk of American imperialism would end as soon as Saddam Hussein was no longer in power, saying the Iraqi leader was the main reason for U.S. presence in the Gulf.

"By destroying Saddam Hussein, we will also destroy the myth of 'American imperialism,'" he said.

December 16, 2002 8:56 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SecDef Coin

Let's use the better SecDef coin, rather than the one you were using on the trip.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-10

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

Yes sir - I will make it so.


12/17

U11269 /03

12/17 snowflake
1500

December 16, 2002 8:35 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Caleb Carr



Caleb Carr is a good writer and he is supportive. He is offering his assistance. I am wondering what we might do about that. Why don't you think about it and see me.

Here is a portion of the manuscript of his latest book.

Thanks.

Attach.
Carr, Caleb. *The Lessons of Terror*

DHR:dh
121602-7

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

1/7 -
Secret -
How about putting
him on the Defense Policy
Board? He's interesting.
D. Rita

U11271 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/9700

December 16, 2002 8:20 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

I looked at these Afghanistan numbers—they don't seem right. Who says the military has 16,000 in Afghanistan? Who says there are 50,000 civil police forces? It doesn't sound right to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
Statistics comparing Chicago, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo

DHR:dh
121602-6



Please respond by 01/03/03

AFGHANISTAN

16 Dec 02

U11272 /03

11/21
1050

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 16 2002

				Police Forces			
	Murders	Shootings	Population	Military	Civil	Total	Citizen to Officer Ratio
Chicago	666	7,626	2,900,000		13,683	13,683	212
Afghanistan			26,800,000	16,256	50,000	66,256	404
Bosnia			3,900,000	54,000 (SFOR)	20,000	74,000	53
Kosovo			2,250,000	21,000 (KFOR)	5,700	26,700	84

Notes:

1. Chicago statistics do not include suburban Chicago and refer only to the City of Chicago
2. Afghan military forces include U.S., Coalition and ISAF. No Afghan National Forces are included. Civil forces are an estimate by State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau. No official counts have been conducted.
3. Numbers for Bosnian and Kosovar civil forces provided by Department of Justice International Training Assistance Program
4. Last Kosovar census was conducted in 1981 (1,956,000). Figure in table is statistical projection for 2001

October 28, 2002 9:51 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics

Please have someone find out for me how many murders there were in Chicago and how many shootings in Chicago, separately, in 2001. Also, I would like to know the population of Chicago, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. Then tell me the number of coalition forces in Bosnia and Kosovo at the present time.

Thanks.

12/10 -
Sealed. No info you asked for, plus a little more.
D. Rita

DHR:dh
102802-28

..... Larry Di Rita

Please respond by 11/15/02

12/10

11/12
Sgt Reissmann -
(1) No Troops in Bosnia?
(2) Add Troops in Afghanistan, to a Tank

D. Rita
Larry Di Rita
11/18

11/4
Capt Purtle -
What can you put together for me?
Thanks.
D. Rita
Larry Di Rita
11/4

December 16, 2002 8:16 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CJCS Intelligence Update

Who prepares this "CJCS Intelligence Update" every day?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/02 CJCS Intelligence Update

DHR:dh
121602-5



Please respond by 12/20/02

020 JCS

16 Dec 02

U11273 /03

~~TOP SECRET//HCS/COMINT-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//FCI JOR//ORCON,IMCON,NOFORN//X5~~

Who does this - ?

CJCS ***INTELLIGENCE*** ***UPDATE***

The overall classification of this briefing is:

~~TOP SECRET//HCS/COMINT-GAMMA/TALENT KEYHOLE//FCI JOR//ORCON,IMCON,NOFORN//X5~~

~~Handle via COMINT/TALENT KEYHOLE Channels Jointly~~

33472117
13 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 8:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Carlucci Event December 22

Please make a note that the Carluccis are having a party on Sunday, December 22, at 6 p.m. Her number is (b)(6) If by ~~Friday or Saturday~~ *WEDNESDAY* it looks like I can go, we can decide then.

Thanks.

ATTACHED

DHR:dh
121602-3

.....
Please respond by 12/18/02

U11274 /03



**COME JOIN THE
CARLUCCI CHRISTMAS SING-ALONG**

**SUNDAY, DECEMBER 22
6PM**

**COCKTAILS AND CAROLS
FOLLOWED BY BUFFET**

(b)(6)

RSVP: (b)(6)

*DR free?
GR in Jaws*



December 16, 2002 7:47 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Smallpox Vaccination

Please arrange for me to get a smallpox vaccination sometime this week if it is available, or whenever it is first available or starting to be given to troops.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-1

.....

Please respond by 12/20/02

U11275 /03

December 16, 2002 5:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Export Controls

Please have someone check and see what is going on with respect to export controls. I read in the paper that we're not doing a good job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-38



Please respond by 01/03/03

091.31

U11276 /03

16 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 5:01 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission

Please give me the names of the Republicans who have been appointed to the Commission on Intelligence. I want to send them the intel side letter and the Wohlstetter foreword.

334

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-36



Please respond by 12/24/02

U11277 /03

16 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 4:46 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ivanov

Please make sure we stay on top of Ivanov's request and that State gets back to him and turns it off.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-33

.....

Please respond by 12/24/02

RUS 517

U11279 /03

16 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 4:45 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

I think the President of Eritrea raised an issue about two detainees. Do we know what that is about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-32

.....SECDEF HAS SEEN.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

DEC 23 2002

SecDef - In October, 2001, Eritrea jailed 2 Foreign Service Nationals (FSN's) - Eritrean citizens employed by our embassy - because the Eritrean government alleges they are spies.

The State Dept. wants them released, or at least "charged" with a crime (the 2 have not been charged at this point).

Eritrean Pres. Isaias position is that the matter is an internal affair of a sovereign nation. He considers the issue a "small thing" in light of bigger problems to solve, although during your visit he said he would consider suggestions from the State Dept to resolve the matter for the long term.

11-L-0559/OSD/9712 **U11280 103** *16 Dec 02*

3 & 3.6

Snowflake

EF3866

Done 1/8

December 16, 2002 4:44 PM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Meetings on Africa

When we were in Ethiopia, someone mentioned all the meetings DoD sponsors that all the African leaders attend. I would like to know about that, and I would like to know who attends from DoD and what benefit we get out of it.

I don't have the feeling we are taking the maximum advantage of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-31

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

RESPONSE 1/8
ATTACHED
1/2

U11281 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9713

Africa

11 Dec 03



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400
INFO MEMO

JAN - 8 2003

EF3066
Jm
USDP copy provided
1/8/03

I-02/018043-AFR

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

Jme
08 JAN 2003

SUBJECT: Response to Your Question on DoD-Sponsored Meetings in Africa

Following your Horn of Africa visit, you inquired about DoD-sponsored meetings attended by African leaders (TAB A). There are five seminars or bilaterals held in Sub-Saharan Africa that DoD sponsors and attends annually. :

Africa Center of Strategic Studies (ACSS): In accordance with the Security Cooperation Guidance goal of promoting African military professionalism, the mission of the Washington-based ACSS is:

- building ties between US, African and European defense leaders.
- promoting defense reform and accountability of civilian and military leaders.

In 2003, ACSS will sponsor:

Senior Leader Seminar scheduled for Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February. It is a two-week program designed for civilian policy makers and top military officers.

Counter-Terrorism Conference in Bamako, Mali, in April. Selected North and West African civil and military leaders will discuss regional efforts to control the spread of Islamic extremism.

Sub-Regional Seminar in Dakar, Senegal, in May. This West African ministerial will discuss ways to fight terrorism in the region.

DoD Participation: Representatives from OSD (DASD-level), EUCOM, CENTCOM and the Joint Staff.

DoD Benefit: These events are designed to promote US views on civil-military relations, military professionalism, defense modernization, human rights, as well as improving cooperative security arrangements.

01-08-03 17:00 18

~~For Official Use Only~~
11-L-0559/OSD/9714

Defense Committee (US - South African Cooperative Forum) is an annual bilateral meeting now scheduled for June, that supports the Security Cooperation Guidance goal of strengthening regional defense organizations. To do so, it:

- Builds the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) capability for crisis management that eliminates/reduces the need for DoD intervention.
- Promotes stability in southern Africa and beyond by encouraging South Africa's leadership in conflict prevention/resolution efforts.
- Emphasizes democratic principles and civilian control of the military.
- Develops mutually beneficial armaments and technology cooperation.
- Identifies areas for cooperative approaches to security and policy issues.

DoD Participation: OSD (DASD-level), EUCOM, and Joint Staff.

DoD Benefit: Reliable, mutually beneficial defense/security ties. Strengthens cooperation in DoD procurement of South African 155mm-artillery ammunition and evaluation of SANDF weapons systems that may meet US Army requirements.

Golden Spear An annual CENTCOM - ACSS sponsored seminar, scheduled for August in Ethiopia, that is attended by East African civilian and military leaders in order to discuss prevention, management, and mitigation of humanitarian crises.

DoD Participation: SecDef invited. DASD attends, as do CENTCOM, EUCOM and the Joint Staff.

DoD Benefit: Supports OSD's Africa strategy, i.e. capacity-building for crisis management that eliminates/reduces the need for DoD intervention. Relationships we have built over the last three years are invaluable today in the war on terrorism.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Marc B. Powe,

(b)(6)

Acting DASD T. Whelan

PDASD H/S

December 16, 2002 4:41 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel and Clips During Travel

333SD

I finished the trip to the Horn of Africa and the Gulf, having not seen a single day's intel or read a single day's news clips. I guess it was because the schedule was too tight. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-30



Please respond by 12/20/02

U11282 /03

16 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 2:40 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: George Shultz on January 23

Joyce and I will take George and Charlotte Shultz out to dinner at a restaurant on Thursday, January 23. It should be on the calendar.

I would like to include Allen and Andrea Greenspan if they are in town. Someone ought to invite them and see if they would like to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-20

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

02050

U11283 /03

16 Dec 02

December 16, 2002 2:35 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to CDR Waddle

I would like to write a note to Scott Waddle, if you think it is not inappropriate, thanking him for his visit to Japan and the efforts he has made to apologize to the families of those who died in the accident.

I cannot imagine how anyone could have handled an exceedingly difficult situation any better.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-19

.....
Please respond by 12/20/02

335SD

U11285 /03

16 Dec 02

December 17, 2002 3:14 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SecNav

Please get me the information on the people we looked at for Secretary of the Navy last time, including the Duke Cunningham package. Clay Johnson probably has it over there if we don't have it, but we probably ought to have it.

Duke called and is interested in doing it. He has an interesting background—he is an ace, flew in Israel in 1973 and 1974, and has had 12 years in the House. He says he is a team player and that he has no real problems, although I wrote down a couple he mentioned that we ought to at least be aware of.

With respect to another candidate, he recommended Dan McKinnon, who is at North American Airlines. I have never heard of the airline or McKinnon, but we ought to get him out of "Who's Who" and see what he looks like. He called Duke and asked to be considered.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121702-7



Please respond by 12/20/02

030 Navy

U11286 /03

17 Dec 02

December 17, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Concerns—Budget, Intel Message

I have a couple of concerns—one is the fact that I still don't know how we are going to handle our budget on the Hill—what the message is.

Second, I asked Steve Cambone and Rich Haver some time back to marshal our arguments for why Scowcroft's intel approach is wrong and ours is right. Scowcroft is now making more and more speeches, and we are not doing anything. We simply have to get it pulled together. I just looked at this clipping where Scowcroft says, "It is unfair to ask Tenet to take responsibility for all the intelligence matters when he has authority over only some of them. I think it's time we give him all the tools he needs to do his job." The exact reverse of that can be said, when you simply say, "I think it is unfair to ask the Secretary of Defense to take responsibility for all military matters unless he has authority over the intelligence necessary to conduct military operations. I think it is time we give him all the tools he needs to do the job."

110,01

We have to get something going on this fast.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Notebook" p. 18.

DHR:dh
121702-3

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

U11287 /03

17 Dec 02

VERBATIM

“War may sometimes be a necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always evil.”

JIMMY CARTER,
former President, after accepting Nobel Peace Prize

“There’s no other purpose to the cross, no communication, no particular message. It was intended to cause fear and to terrorize a population.”

CLARENCE THOMAS,
U.S. Supreme Court Justice, arguing to uphold the constitutionality of a Virginia law that bans cross burning

“I will receive the vaccine along with our military.”

GEORGE W. BUSH,
announcing plans for smallpox vaccinations; he added that neither his family nor his staff will get them

“I went from nothing to a pile of money as high as the World Trade Center. And then, just like the World Trade Center—poof!—it was gone overnight.”

TED TURNER,
media mogul, at the United Nations, about the decline in his AOL Time Warner assets

“He and I were friends when he was little. I watched him grow up, but, you know, you dangle a baby over a balcony, and that’s it for me.”

CHER,
on singer Michael Jackson

Sources: New York Times (2), AP, Los Angeles Times, USA Today



Kissinger's Fast Exit

WHEN HENRY KISSINGER accepted President Bush's appointment last month as head of an independent commission to investigate Sept. 11, the legendary diplomat declared that he

would not bow to political pressure. And when it came to his lucrative consulting business, Kissinger refused Democratic demands that he publicly disclose the extensive list of clients that employ

Now an ex-commission chief: he wouldn't reveal his clients

Kissinger Associates Inc. But last week the Senate Ethics Committee informed him that under congressional financial-disclosure laws, he was required to reveal his international company's clients. Though the White House backed his attempts to keep the list secret, Kissinger resigned his post on Friday. While saying he would comply with whatever financial-disclosure rules were imposed on other members, Kissinger said he feared the controversy would dog his firm and tie up the commission's work. A frustrated Kissinger simply had had enough. Says a Republican with close White House ties: “He didn't look for this job. The job looked for him. He's 79; what

does he need it for?”

With Kissinger's departure, the commission is in disarray. Two days earlier, former Senate majority leader George Mitchell, vice chairman of the panel, resigned rather than leave his law firm. Victims' families are lobbying for the appointment of former New Hampshire Republican Senator Warren Rudman to head the inquiry, but the White House is unlikely to tap him. Sources tell TIME that one of the Administration's top choices to replace Kissinger is another Republican veteran, David M. Abshire, ambassador to NATO during the Reagan years. The White House, taken aback by Kissinger's abdication, has to make sure this choice sticks.

—By Romesh Ratnesar, Matthew Cooper and Michael Weisskopf

ANOTHER JAB FROM THE GENERAL

Retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, the Republican foreign-policy Yoda who has worked for five of the past seven Presidents, rarely raises his voice in public. But just a few months after he broke with George W. Bush on Iraq, urging him to stay focused on the war against terrorism before going after Saddam Hussein, Scowcroft is speaking out again. This time he's tangling with an old colleague from the Nixon and Ford years, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

For more than a year, Scowcroft has been quietly nudging the Administration to place control of all American intelligence assets—satellites and eavesdropping ships as well as old-fashioned spies and spooks—in the hands of the CIA director rather than spread it over 14 competing federal agencies. Scowcroft chaired a yearlong study on the subject and sent his report to the President in March. There it collects dust, largely because Rumsfeld, the hyperpopular Pentagon chief, refuses to give up military control of intelligence budgets or assets. At a black-tie Washington dinner last week,

when he presented an award to CIA director George Tenet, Scowcroft broke cover again. “For years, we had a poorly organized intelligence system,” he said, “but it didn't matter because all the threats were overseas ... So now we have a huge problem.” It is unfair, he said, to ask Tenet “to take responsibility” for all intelligence matters when he “has authority over only some of them ... I think it's time we give him all the tools he needs to do his job.”

The room, full of spooks and spy chiefs, exploded in applause. Bush is likely to be less receptive. —By Michael Duffy



Scowcroft is now taking on Rumsfeld

December 17, 2002 7:59 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Conference

Please set a meeting for me with Steve Cambone and J.D. Crouch to discuss this
Chris Williams' memo. I am concerned about it.

337

Thanks.

Attach.
12/03/02 Chris Williams memo to SecDef re: Nuclear Weapons Conference

DHR:dh
121702-2

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

U11288 /03

17/Nov 02

To: SecDef
cc: Crouch
Cambone
C1213

December 3, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Chris Williams *CAW*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Conference

MTB
Larry Di Rita
SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 17 2002

Sir:

You may be aware that plans are underway for a senior-level meeting of OSD, STRATCOM, and NNSA officials early next year to discuss various nuclear weapons-related issues. The purpose of this memorandum is to apprise you of my thoughts on the potential value of such a conference and to suggest certain steps that could help ensure that the meeting meets your priorities and purposes.

I am convinced that *if done right* such a conference could yield significant benefits. First, it could focus much-needed attention on nuclear weapons matters. While the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was a major success, both politically and substantively, there (understandably) has been a dearth of high-level attention paid to nuclear weapons issues since 9-11 and the onset of the global war on terror, planning for military operations against Iraq, etc. Second, it could help reenergize post-NPR implementation and settle open issues. I understand that many NPR-directed actions are now underway or have been completed; still, there are several important follow-up items that are hanging fire due to bureaucratic resistance and/or policy disagreements. And third, promoting a dialogue between the various staffs on these matters can serve to decrease misunderstandings and ensure that your agenda is being effectively and efficiently implemented.

To ensure a successful outcome from the conference, it is important that you place your imprimatur on the conference and drive the agenda. Some elements of OSD are already seeking to coopt the agenda for this conference. In particular, the Assistant to the SecDef for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Matters (ATSD/NCB) and his staff are trying to restrict the agenda to current technical issues/problems with the stockpile. While important, this is but a small subset of what the conference attendees should discuss.

In order to jumpstart this process, I respectfully recommend that you task J.D. Crouch to prepare an agenda for the meeting for your consideration and make it known that J.D. is your representative to the conference, charged with ensuring that your vision and agenda for the conference is fulfilled. I am confident that J.D. will do a fine job in that capacity.

Once again, if there is any way I might be of assistance to you or your staff on this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. Best regards, sir.

12/18
6840
SHOW/ake

December 17, 2002 7:19 AM

353

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Carol Adelman

Carol Adelman would like to have her name in for the AID Millennium Challenge.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121602-41

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

2/10

→ Jim O'Beirne -
Please let's
discuss.
Di Rita

Larry Di Rita
2/10

17 Dec 02

U11289 /03

December 18, 2002 7:21 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invitation

Here is an invitation that came in to me Tuesday afternoon, and I read it Tuesday night about 8:30, sitting at my table eating dinner.

If there is something that time sensitive, I would think people would want to come in and ask me about it instead of just sticking it in my in box or letting it lie around.

Thanks.

Attach.
Bahrain invitation

DHR:dh
121802-7



Please respond by 12/20/02

1011 SD

18 Dec 02

U11290 /03



DR: Accept: _____
 Regret: _____
 Hold: _____
 See me: _____
 Jove: _____

*On the occasion of
 The National Day of the Kingdom of Bahrain
 Ambassador Shaikh Khalifa Ali Al-Khalifa
 requests the pleasure of your company
 on Tuesday, the Seventeenth of December, 2002
 from six-thirty until eight-thirty in the evening*

*Invite just arrived,
 Mr. Di Peta has
 seen.
 Corp*

*Business Attire or
 Uniform of the Day*

(b)(6)

*NOT
 read under
 event over!*

*Willard Inter-Continental Hotel
 The Ballroom
 1401 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
 Washington, D. C.*

December 18, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Del*
SUBJECT: Qatar Remarks

The remarks at Qatar were terrific—let's use that as a standard.

Please see if you can get the tape, see what was actually said and then edit the prepared remarks so they more closely follow that.

Qatar

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121802-9



Please respond by _____

U11291 /03

18 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9727

December 18, 2002 7:05 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Barry Blechman

I would like to have lunch with Barry Blechman sometime in January.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121802-2



Please respond by 01/12/03

001,150

U11292 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9728

18 Dec 02

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Dr. Barry M. Blechman
CEO and President
DFI International
1717 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Suite 1300
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Barry,

Thanks for returning the tape and giving me a DVD version.

If you think you were young, think how young I was!

I would very much enjoy a visit, and I will have the office give you a call so we can sit down and have a cup of coffee or lunch sometime in January.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'F' or similar character, positioned below the typed name 'Regards,'.

11-L-0559/OSD/9729



DEFI INTERNATIONAL

Barry M. Blechman
Chief Executive Officer

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 18 2002

December 9, 2002

The Honorable Donald R. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Thanks very much for the attached video tape containing news clips covering your public service in the 1970s and, for some inexplicable reason, the interview with me (as a child) commenting on one of your policies. It was a real walk down memory lane to see the various pieces on the tape and relive my years at Brookings. I was so sure of my opinions in those days, despite the absence of relevant experience, as I guess younger people tend to be.

I'm also enclosing a DVD version of the tape, which you might find easier to use if you want to view it again. All the dead spaces are cut out, and there's a table of contents that permits you to view any one piece without cycling through all the previous ones.

We had a good meeting of the Policy Board last week. The next six months look like very important ones for the administration and for the nation. If you ever have the time and would enjoy an opportunity to talk them over with an older and, I like to think, wiser, Barry Blechman, I'd certainly be happy to accommodate myself to your schedule.

Yours truly,

Enclosures

December 18, 2002 7:12 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Weekly Report

This weekly report is helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report 12/13/02 [U19594-02]

DHR:dh
121802-5

.....

Please respond by _____

020 USC

18 Dec 02

U11295 /03



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS S



INFO MEMO

DEC 18 2002

December 13, 2002, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report 12/13/02

12/17

- We have reached a tentative agreement on a FY 2004 topline of \$378 billion. OMB's passback had proposed a topline of \$373.8 billion. Based on our appeals, OMB restored most of its original reductions. We do not have agreement on the military pay raise. OMB insists on a 2% pay raise, indicating this is a number approved by the President. The ECI plus .5% formula currently in law results in a pay raise of 3.7%. We reached a compromise on the shipbuilding program. OMB agreed to our proposal to allow the first ship of a class to be incrementally funded in the R&D account. However, they insisted on full funding of the Virginia-class submarine. This results in a bill of around \$1.2 billion in FY 2004. There may also be other bills that we will have to resolve with OMB; FIA is one prime - unresolved - example.
- The budget review process is nearly complete. The PDM is signed; all the major decisions have been made. The job now is to close out all the remaining budget issues and balance to the FY 2004 topline of \$378 billion, as well as the outyears. The Services' greatest concern is the size of the bills they have been asked to finance within their toplines. We will try to ameliorate those bills as much as possible, but the Services do have a challenge to balance their programs within the guidance they have received in the PDM and the budget decisions.
- This week I received and was briefed on the final financial statements of both the Components and defense agencies. No Comptroller / CFO has ever personally received and been briefed on financial statements. We identified many needed improvements to processes and policies. The OIG, GAO, and OMB participated in the meetings, and are working with my staff to incorporate these improvements and resolve remaining issues. We will conduct these reviews again at mid-year.
- We are continuing to work with the Services to scrub the projected costs of the on-going war on terrorism. We have invited the OMB staff to join us in the review of the requirements so they have a better understanding of the magnitude of the costs. The Service requests exceed \$33 billion. We should have a more definitive number within the next week.

Secret - Paul W. is deep into the pay raise issue with OMB. DZ

e.g. - The Services are being directed to make choices among competing priorities. D

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>12/16</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>C. 12/17</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>12/17</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>12/16</i>



11-L-0559/OSD/9732

U19594 /02

- I am working with State, NSC, and soon OMB, to identify FY03 resources to make available to Jordan. I will provide you more detail next week.
- On December 7, the President signed the Presidential Determination to allow DoD to use the remaining \$92 million of the \$97 million drawdown authority included in the Iraqi Liberation Act to train and equip indigenous forces. We are working with the Joint Staff and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to determine the allocation of the drawdown authority by Component. The Joint Staff is will brief you in the near future to get approval to proceed with this mission.
- I hosted a working luncheon on Wednesday with Treasury's Under Secretary for International Affairs John Taylor, State's Afghan Coordinator David Johnson and Under Secretary Alan Larson, Dr. Zal Khalilzad from the NSC, and Joe Collins from Policy. This is the core working group formed to develop a coordinated reconstruction and security plan for Afghanistan, and evaluate progress. Among other topics, we discussed potential Army Corps of Engineers (CoE) Program Management, Afghan Judicial issues and their Customs effort, and the feasibility of engaging China for coalition support.
- I met with World Bank President James Wolfensohn on Thursday to discuss the status of road construction in Afghanistan. I broached with him the feasibility of using the CoE to aid them in the reconstruction of the road they are funding. I am also looking into the possibility of split funding of CoE participation between the DoD and the World Bank.
- Bill Reed, Director of DCAA, reports that DCAA's Minneapolis Branch Office is currently performing an incurred cost audit on NCS Pearson's time and material contract for the Transportation Security Administration. The contract scope includes the hiring of 40 thousand passenger screeners at 429 airports. To date, the \$103 million contract is in a substantial overrun status with invoiced costs standing at \$567.4 million through October, and with a current estimated final contract cost of \$640 million. TSA is withholding \$200 million of the contract billings until DCAA's fully reimbursable audit is complete.

COORDINATION: NONE

12/10
 needed -
 by Colvine
 - Harry Hoffmann helped
 Available this
 2

7

12/19 SHOWWARE
1200

December 19, 2002 7:58 AM

322

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Education

I need a meeting with David Chu plus Gen. Franks, Gen. Pace, and maybe Gaffney, ADM Giambastiani, and three or four other people to talk about how we get education so we are joint.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121902-3

.....

Please respond by 01/12/03

LD

Larry Di Rita
12/23

19 Dec 02

U11294 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9734

December 19, 2002 8:00 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: McLaughlin Briefing

Advance Copy Sent

I need a briefing with John McLaughlin of the CIA. I would like Gen. Pace to be there with me. John McLaughlin knows what it is about. I think we should try to have it at 8 am tomorrow, Friday, so Gen. Franks can see it with us.

337

Please try to set it up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121902-4



Please respond by 12/19/02

U11295 /03

19 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9735

12/19
12/20
Snowflake

December 19, 2002 8:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: GDP Comparison

What is the GDP per capita in South Korea compared to North Korea? How many times difference?

Thanks.

DHR:ah
121902-a

Screen

Please respond by 01/05/03

12/21

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FEB 25 2003

GDP

NORTH Korea \$ 21.8 Billion
SOUTH Korea \$ 764.6 Billion (or 36 Times as large)

GDP per Capita

North Korea \$ 1,000 (3 question that)
South Korea \$ 16,000

1102


Source: 2000 CIA World Fact Book

U11296 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9736

Snowflake

December 19, 2002 8:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: GDP Comparison

What is the GDP per capita in South Korea compared to North Korea? How many times difference?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121902-6

.....
Please respond by

~~01/05/03~~
12/21

11-L-0559/OSD/9737

NORTH KOREA

	DIA	CIA WORLD FACT BOOK	STATE DEPARTMENT	WORLD BANK
POP (MILLIONS)	21.2	22.2	21.2	21
LITERACY RATE	96%	99%	99%	98%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	51.3	71	51.5	70
MALE	48.8	68	49	67
FEMALE	53.8	74	54	73
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	87 / 1000	23 / 1000	88 / 1000	8 / 1000
GDP (BILLIONS)	25	21.8	21.8	22
GDP PER CAPITA	\$1,100	\$1,000.00	\$900.00	\$1,000.00
% GROWTH	0	-3.00%	-1%	1%

SOUTH KOREA

	DIA	CIA WORLD FACT BOOK	STATE DEPARTMENT	WORLD BANK
POP (MILLIONS)	48.3	48.3	47.5	47.6
LITERACY RATE	98%	98%	98%	98%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	74.8	75	75	73
MALE	71.2	71	71	
FEMALE	79	79	79	
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	7.5 / 1000	7 / 1000	8 / 1000	8 / 1000
GDP (BILLIONS)	865	865	434	422
GDP PER CAPITA	\$18,000.00	\$18,000.00	\$9,000.00	\$10,000.00
% GROWTH	3.30%	3.30%	3%	5%

December 19, 2002 2:36 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Israel

Everything I said to the Israeli MoD was in the Israeli press yesterday. I just don't think we probably ought to meet with those folks much anymore. It is just irresponsible. We are going to have to cut the meetings down and scrub somebody's head and be careful what we say.

Israel

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121902-10

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

U11297 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9739

19 Dec 02

December 20, 2002 10:12 AM

TO: John Stenbit
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Defense Security Service

I just read Paul's memo on restructuring the Defense Security Service. It sounds to me like a good news story. Congratulations.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/26/02 DepSecDef memo re: Restructuring the Defense Security Service (DSS)

DHR:dh
122002-8

.....

Please respond by _____

020 DSS

U11298 /03

20 Dec 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 20 2002

C1212

Information

November 26, 2002

Memorandum For: Secretary of Defense
From: Paul D. Wolfowitz *PW*
Subject: Restructuring the Defense Security Service (DSS)

A good news story! Excellent work by Ken Krieg, Gordon England and John Stenbit.

As part of its ongoing review of defense business agencies, the Senior Executive Council recommended and I decided to approve the divestiture of personnel background security investigations and the purchase of those services through the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This is the first implementation of a series of efforts on Defense Agencies that I expect we will develop over the next twelve months.

Background – The Defense Security Service (DSS) is a defense agency with approximately 2,400 employees. The largest segment of DSS (employing approximately 1,800) conducts background investigations for DoD. Several years ago, OPM spun a similar investigative services unit out as a private corporation. After a start-up curve, the private company and the market competitors around it have begun to perform well. Over the same period, DSS struggled to modernize its processes and keep up with demand. Today, DoD splits its investigative needs between DSS and private companies who operate through OPM contracts.


Proposal -- With the support of the SEC, John Stenbit and his organization have redesigned the business process of investigations and concluded that DoD adds little value in maintaining this capability in-house. Working with OPM, DoD has developed an approach in which we will divest the roughly 1,800 investigative positions and OPM will, in turn, hire those workers who want to remain in government service. We expect that some portion of the employees will opt to retire and, instead, join one of several private companies now providing such services to the federal government through OPM.

This approach will leverage the success OPM and the private sector have had over the last several years in this area. It will also give most of the current employees several career options. It will get DoD out of the business of managing this function and allow it to concentrate more effort on security functions where we can add value (counter-intelligence and allocation of clearances among others). Lastly, committing to a greater use of private services over time will permit the continued development of a competitive market.

Timeframe – We anticipate announcing this move in early December. The announcement timing is tied to the need to include fee for service funding vs. appropriated funding in the FY'04 budget submission to the President. Implementation of the approach would take place in FY'03 with completion by early FY'04. This would be a quicker implementation pace than similar alternatives – creating an employee owned company (which would require legislation) and outsourcing the effort ourselves (which would require either an A-76 study – 2-3 years) or the much longer time frame of outsourcing as people retire.

We can provide a briefing on this subject if you would like.

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the Military Departments
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs
 Undersecretaries of Defense
 Assistant Secretaries of Defense
 Steve Cambone
 Larry Di Rita
 Andy Marshall
 Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 16, 2002

SUBJECT: **Priorities**

With the "sense of urgency" memo in mind, please think through what you believe to be the top ten priorities the Department ought to have for the next 6 – 18 months.

020 DOD

Be prepared to discuss when we next meet on the "way ahead" memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 071602.07

Please respond by: 7/25/02

16 Jul 02

December 20, 2002 10:26 AM

TO: LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Map

Advanced copy given to State

Iran

I would like to see a map of Iraq superimposed on a map of the US.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122002-13

12/23

.....

SIR,

Please respond by *01/03/03*

*THIS IS DONE.
MAP BEING HELD IN
MA OFFICE.*

*VIR
CRS*

U11299 /03

20 Dec 02

December 20, 2002 7:27 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTC Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hurricanes

You know we do that hurricane-watching business off Mississippi for Trent Lott with a bunch of airplanes and troops and things. I guess it is the kind of thing that clearly ought to be done by NOAA. It seems to me now is the time to move it.

Please find out who knows what to do, and let's talk about it and get it done.

Thanks.


DHR:dh
122002-2

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

000,92

U11980 /03

20 Dec 02

TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 DATE: December 21, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Sec Def Gifts**

Here is the gift book. I am concerned about it. I wonder about a few things:

1. I would like the thank you notes in appreciation for all these gifts in the book with them so I can look at the thank you notes and see if they are appropriate when I look at the gifts. I notice that a number are not in the book, and I notice that of the ones that are in the book, some seem not appropriate.
2. I would like you to find out why we can't pay the Department of Defense cash instead of the US Government. I would rather have the Pentagon get the money I am paying that I don't need to be paying, and since it is voluntary on my part, I can't see that anyone can say that I shouldn't be paying it to the Pentagon instead of the US government.

005

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122102.01

Attach: Gift Book

Please respond by: 12/23

21 Dec 02

U11301 /03

9:10 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: December 21, 2002
SUBJECT: Gifts

The gift from Doc Fogelsong, who gave me a western wreath I've never written him a thank you. The gift from Joe Ralston, a bottle of red wine, and a book from Judith Miller I never thanked them for.

I am concerned about how the gift stuff is being handled.

See me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122102.06

Please respond by: 1/3/03

005

21 Dec 02

U11302 /03

10:58 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
DATE: December 21, 2002
SUBJECT:

(b)(6) tells me that in reference to my checking accounts, anyone who sees a check and knows the number can access it and find out what my balances are and what I am doing.

Last night at the hospital, one doctor asked if I was in under an anonymous name and Baxter said no. He mentioned that all of this stuff goes on the internet. I think we better start taking a look and seeing how the privacy issue is being handled for me. I think it is a little risky to not know. We at least ought to have some understanding.

Please have someone take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122102.12

Please respond by: 1/10/02

U11303 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9748

6200-D

21 Dec 02

December 23, 2002 5:03 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Israel

ISRAEL

I don't think you acting as the link with Israel is right. I think we need someone at the political level in Israel in the event something is to happen. Someone there simply having your phone number isn't going to do it.

Please see me and let's get a new plan to supplement the two-star who is going to be there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-58

.....

Please respond by 01/17/03

U11304 /03

23 Dec 02

TO: Honorable Colin Powell
 Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: July 16, 2002

SUBJECT: FYI

I thought you would both find the attached article from *The Washington Post* interesting.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 071602.21

Attach: "Wobbly Words", by David S. Broder, *The Washington Post* (7/15/02)

000.1

16 June

David S. Broder

Wobbly Words

The confidence crisis that has overtaken the Bush administration has many dimensions, but at bottom, it comes down to a single question: Can you take this president's words seriously?

For most of his presidency and, indeed, his political career, George Bush has enjoyed the reputation of saying what he means and meaning what he says. But now uncertainty is infecting both foreign policy and domestic issues and stretching from the Middle East to Wall Street. While his personal approval scores remain very high in the polls, he is building a catalogue of policy contradictions and retreats that threaten to undermine his leadership.

Presumably, at some point the stock market will recover, but the first returns on Bush's efforts to restore confidence in Wall Street were anything but encouraging. In the first two days after Bush journeyed to the heart of the financial world on a self-assigned mission to banish the world's worries about the integrity of corporate America, the Dow Jones industrial average fell more than 400 points and the Nasdaq market index hit its lowest mark since 1997.

This was not what Bush had in mind when he opened his Tuesday morning address on Wall Street with five successive paragraphs setting forth all the reasons that confidence in the American free enterprise system "is well-placed."

"We can be confident," he declared, not only because of "the amazing achievements of American workers and entrepreneurs" but because "America is taking every necessary step to fight and win the war on terror" and because "last year, we passed the biggest tax cut in a generation" to spur economic growth.

Whether this was just rhetoric or was meant to be taken seriously, Bush's words clearly linked confidence in him and his policies with trust in financial markets and the corporate culture from

which he sprang.

But a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll released soon after Bush spoke showed only two out of five Americans think the United States and its allies are winning the war on terrorism, fewer than those who think it a stalemate.

And Friday, the president's budget office announced that instead of running a small surplus this year, the government is headed for a deficit of as much as \$165 billion, a warning signal about the economic future.

Bush's personal performance has added to the wobble in confidence. The last-minute news conference in which he returned to the public stage from his Independence Day holiday was the weakest, most inarticulate showing he has made since the early months of his presidency. Asked repeatedly about his sale of stock in Harken Energy Corp., where he was a director, shortly before it had to revise upward its reported losses for the year, he responded eight times with variations on the words, "It has been looked at by the SEC," the Securities and Exchange Commission, which found no reason to challenge the legality of his action.

When Bush is feeling defensive, he seems to think that reiteration is as effective as explanation or persuasion. It is not, but it is better than outright contradiction. And it turns out that, as a Harken director, Bush received two low-interest loans from the corporation to finance his purchase of company stock—the very kind of transaction that he condemned in his Wall Street speech.

The problem is deeper. It involves policy reversals as well as personal contradictions. Nine months ago, Bush said he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or



alive." When asked about the elusive terrorist last week, Bush pretended he hardly matters, answering a question on bin Laden with the remark that "the war on terrorism is a lot bigger than one person."

Three months ago, Bush issued an ultimatum to Ariel Sharon to withdraw Israeli forces from Palestinian territories in the West Bank "without delay." Last week, with the Israelis still there, he said, he will "call upon the Israelis, as security improves, to allow for more freedom of movement by the Palestinian people." That's quite a difference.

In the real world, where presidents must operate, friends and foes are constantly testing and assessing how seriously they must take the words of any leader. We do not know how Sharon or Yasser Arafat (who's been told by Bush to take a hike) or Saddam Hussein or bin Laden gauge this American president.

But last week, America's allies in the United Nations defied a Bush administration threat to end U.S. participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping operation unless our troops were given blanket immunity from possible prosecution by the new International Criminal Court. Instead, the United States will seek a temporary exemption, leading one unnamed diplomat to tell *The Post*, "the Americans blinked."

Too many back-downs in too short a time.

7/15/02

11-L-0559/OSD/9751

#355

Done 1/10

December 23, 2002 4:58 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Larry Di Rita
TORIE CAME

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Changes to Special Operations

SOCOM

When and how should we announce the changes in Special Operators? We have made a package of decisions. Have the instructions been issued? Has the guidance been made? Has the budget been adapted?

Steve Cambone, you probably ought to be the one to pull together what we ought to do here.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-57

.....

Please respond by 01/10/03

U11305 /03

03 Dec 02



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Tuesday, January 7, 2003

DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers

(Also participating was Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Rumsfeld: Well, good morning, and happy New Year.

Ever since the global war on terrorism began, we have pointed out that it is a war unlike any other war that our country has ever fought, and that victory will require new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, as well as a good deal of patience and resolution.

In the 20th century, for the most part our country faced armies, navies and air forces. And today we face adversaries that do not engage us on traditional fields of battle; rather, they target innocent men, women and children. The challenge we face in the global war on terror is to root out those terrorists and terrorist networks that threaten our people; to find them, disrupt them, capture, drive them from their safe havens, and prevent them from murdering more of our citizens.

Over the past year, men and women in uniform have done a truly remarkable job, notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Defense is, for the most part, still organized, trained and equipped to fight armies, navies and air forces, not to target small cells or even individual terrorists. One of our most important goals, then, is to transform for the 21st century, and one of the key areas where we're doing so is in the U.S. Special Operations Command. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, we've seen the indispensable role that Special Operation Forces have and are currently playing.

Today we're taking a number of steps to strengthen the U.S. Special Operations Command so it can make even greater contributions to the global war on terror. In the 2004 budget, we are requesting an increase in Special Operations Command's budgets; that added funds are needed to pay for equipment losses that occurred in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and for additional equipment as well as additional forces. Some of those new troops will be assigned to the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, which specializes in flying combat forces behind enemy lines.

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Updated: 07 Jan 2003

Others are needed for operational planning and will be assigned to the Special Operations Command and the regional theater command headquarters.

Special Operations Command will function as both a supported and a supporting command. Since 1987 the Special Operations Command has been organized as a supporting command, meaning it provides warriors and materiel to the various regional combatant commanders, who then plan and direct missions. By organizing at SOCOM headquarters in Tampa, as well as at smaller theater Special Operations commands in regional theaters, the Special Operations Command will have the tools it will need to plan and execute missions in support of the global war on terror. This expanded operational role will be in addition to the current role it plays as a supporting command.

The Special Operations Command will also continue its efforts to work with the various geographic unified combatant commands and U.S. allies to disrupt and dismantle terrorist networks. To assist it in its expanded mission, over time, the Special Operations command will be divested of various missions, such as routine foreign military training and civil support, that can be successfully accomplished by other forces, U.S. forces and/or agencies.

The global nature of the war, the nature of the enemy and the need for fast, efficient operations in hunting down and rooting out terrorist networks around the world have all contributed to the need for an expanded role for the Special Operations forces. We are transforming that command to meet that need.

General Myers?

Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and good morning.

As we begin the new year, our military forces are poised around the world, ready to meet any threat.

Specific to the Persian Gulf, the flow of forces to the region continues. You've seen a few units depart for the Gulf and can expect that deliberate force flow to continue. And while there has been no decision about Iraq, we want to ensure that we are prepared to provide the president as much flexibility as possible.

In Afghanistan, I'm pleased to announce that today the 5th Battalion of the Afghan National Army graduated 452 newly trained members. Meanwhile, the 6th Battalion, with over 700 participants, is conducting its seventh week of training.

And I think I'll stop there, and we'll take your questions.

Rumsfeld: I should add that at the conclusion of our briefing, we have a couple of senior Defense officials who will be available on a background basis to discuss the Special Operations Command and various changes that will be undertaken as a result of the comments I just made.

Charlie's not here?

Yes?



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Presenter: Senior Defense Officials

Tuesday, January 7, 2003

Backgrounder with Senior Defense Officials on Special Operations

(Backgrounder with Senior Defense Officials on Special Operations)

Staff: All right, thanks for joining us for this continuation, background briefing, is what we this afternoon for you. Most of you know at least our senior defense official, who will be talking to you this afternoon. We also have a senior military official. And those are the two ways you can refer to them in your stories, the attribution for this.

This briefing will go for 29 minutes, since it's one minute after 12:00. We do have to clear out at 12:30.

So with that, I'm going to let both our officials come up here and get this going.

Senior Defense Official: Afternoon, everybody. How are you?

Did you really get five in the last one?

Q:(Off mike.)

Senior Defense Official: Gee, that's pretty good.

Q: Four and a half.

Q: That's what happens when people don't answer questions. (Laughter, cross talk.)

Q: That's not going to happen today, though, is it?

Senior Defense Official: No, because I'm going to start out with two noes. No operational details -- None. Zero. Zip. "Nada" -- about the Special Operations forces, about their missions and activities. We're not talking operations, okay? That's -- we can just get that off the table.

The other is the budget, as you know, is the president's where he's got it. They're shipping it

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Updated: 07 Jan 2003

over there in the next few days, in fact today, and they will decide in the next few days on what the final numbers are. So you use numbers and percentages at your own hazard on those.

Let me set some context for you. This is -- this decision about giving the Special Operations Command new responsibilities is of a piece with the broader adjustments that have taken place with respect to the unified commands over the last year or so.

You'll recall we have stood up Northern Command. We have created a new command by merging the old Strat Command and the old Space Command into a new Strategic Command in order to provide the wherewithal for the president to have at his disposal the means to operate on a global scale with strategic capabilities. We made adjustments in Joint Forces Command and its assignments. And then we have worked with the Special Operations Command to adjust it as well. In all four cases, we have been trying to arrange those commands and give them the kinds of responsibilities and authorities that match the needs of the environment we are in and the one we anticipate.

So this is not an odd thing that has taken place, it is of a piece. It is particular with respect to the current war, to be sure; that is to say they have an immediate role to play, and so it has an impact. But it is of a piece with the larger restructuring of the command relationships.

Special Operations Command itself -- just a word on that. There is a unified headquarters, Special Operations Command. There is a Joint Special Operations Command, which is their training and integration command. And then Special Operations Command does have, in each of the theaters out there in the region -- in the regions what is called a TSOC, a Theater Special Operations Command. And it has -- those commands are historically the ones who are involved in much of the planning that takes place within the theater. And they have historically been in the role of supporting the regional combatant commanders. So whether that's CENTCOM or PACOM or EUCOM, Southern Command and so forth, those Theater Special Operations Commands have been in a supporting role to that combatant commander.

The essence of what is being asked here is that in the future, those TSOC's [Theater Special Operations Command], again working back through the unified command at Tampa, through Special Operations Command, could be in a position that they would be supported by the regional combatant commander in a military operation. And that is a significant changes in relationships and gives the Special Operations Commands a bit more flexibility.

What does that mean in practical terms? What it means in practical terms is that the Theater Special Operations Command would have access to Marine units in the region, air units, naval units, Army units and so forth, which would act in response to its direction and control.

In terms of what we've done here -- and I'll give you sort of broad outlines of what we have proposed forward in the budget process and as a result of some of the internal work that has been ongoing since the summer -- we have proposed giving the Special Operations Command an increase in its headquarters staff at Special Operations Command for the purposes of complementing its acquisition capabilities. That is, that command has both an acquisition capability that is related to the acquisition of those material items that are specifically of interest to Special Operations Command and not to other military commands, so they have down there at that command headquarters an acquisition force, but we thought they needed as well an operational planning staff, an expanded operational planning staff in order for the

headquarters to be able to do the kind of global planning that is now being expected of it.

We have also managed to add some personnel to the command so that they are able to conduct a wider range of activities simultaneously. I've made mention of the Theater Special Operations Commands. They have been pulsed up a bit as well, in the Pacific Command and in Central Command and elsewhere, again for the purposes of allowing them to be able to do a broader range of planning. And associated with those changes, both at the Tampa headquarters and in the theaters, we've also arranged to provide for the kinds of command and control communications equipment that is needed to be able to plan and execute operations in the kind of time frame and with the level of detail that is necessary in the present day.

We have also made arrangements to repair some of the damage that the command and its elements have suffered to date and to provide something of a, if you will, an attrition reserve, anticipating that there are going to be other -- other losses over the course of the next few years, and in the meanwhile that those forces will augment the forces that presently exist. We have also, I think as the secretary said to you in his earlier comments, looked to divest the command of a number of missions that they are now operating and to free up some of those resources then to devote to the planning and the execution of operations. So broadly, those are the kinds of changes that we have proposed structurally.

And so we can -- (to other official) -- unless you want to make an opening comment or correct anything -- we can take some questions and comments.

Q: Repair what damage? Repair what damage? Lots of people lost equipment, things like that?

Senior Defense Official: Exactly. We've lost several helicopters that you're aware of, and some other equipment as well as some people, so this will help us reconstitute those losses.

Q: Give us a ballpark in the numbers here. Is it roughly 4,000? That's the number we've seen. And also a ballpark on the budget increases here.

Senior Defense Official: As I say, there are numbers in the press, and you're free to make use of those numbers. Until I get a firm number on the wall, I'm not going to be --

Q: Well, I'd rather not rely on someone else's reporting. I mean, can you give us -- is roughly 4,000 -- is that a good number to use? And as far as the budget numbers, is it several billion? Is that at all right?

Senior Defense Official: We have pulsed them up over the course of the FYDP [Fiscal Year Defense Plan], and we have done so in the coming year and those percentages are roughly the same for both; and we've added some people.

Q: But, can't you just tell us what you're asking for? And then, we understand budget realities, and at some point, it might have to be rolled back and things traded off. Why can't you give us the upper end of here's what we'd like, and we might not hit that, but --

Senior Defense Official: If I could give them to you, I'd give them to you.

Q: But you can. (Laughter.) I mean, that's the beauty of being a senior military official. (Laughter.)

Q: Can I ask a question of the gentleman with the copious fruit salad -- (laughter) -- who is not to be identified. Sir, it used to be that an assignment to the Special Operations Command was considered a career-ender for a career military officer. I take it that's no longer the situation.

And the second part of the question is, are you getting the type of recruit that you want in the quantity that you want to fulfill this new mission of yours?

Senior Defense Official: You know, that's a great question. First of all, it is not a career-ender anymore. You know, one of the Title 10 authorities that Special Operations Command got when it stood up was the ability for monitorship of its people and its training and the career progression of those people throughout the services. So, we've done that and we've been very successful in keeping the good-talented people and allow them to grow in our command.

Secondly, the quality of the recruits we're getting is excellent. One of our soft truths is that humans are more important than hardware, and we still believe that. We spend a lot of time and energy in ensuring that we get the right people. The quality of the people that are coming into our force right now are tremendous, and I think we've shown that in the --

Q: (Off mike) -- your needs?

Senior Defense Official: We will in some -- it depends upon what area. We've got a lot of variety and different kinds of units and capabilities throughout Special Operations Command. In some areas, it is harder to get folks than others. But we also have a very critical selection and assessment program, and so we will get the right number of people through those assessments. It will also keep us a little bit short of people most of the time.

Q: In what area is it harder to get folks? Can you say?

Senior Defense Official: Well, right now we're -- I think my context was that it's harder to get folks through that selection and assessment process. You know, we gain most of our folks -- like, for instance, in Army Special Operations Command -- from the big service. So as we recruit these people, getting the right number and then getting them through the entire very lengthy, very difficult course will always keep us a little shorter. We also have some shortages in our MH-47 pilots that we're taking some actions to fix.

Q: Has the quality of the recruits increased significantly since September 11th, 2001?

Senior Defense Official: I --

Q: Or the people who are seeking to be recruited?

Senior Defense Official: I would say that -- I probably shouldn't answer that question. I really don't have that kind of a definition on the exact recruits we're getting --

Q: How about a greater percentage of people trying to get into the Special Operations?

Senior Defense Official: Recruiting is very healthy right now. There are a --

Q: Are you seeing it ramp up at all, or is it steady or --

Senior Defense Official: We've got a steady flow of recruits that are coming into all of our -- even the SEALs, the SF guys, the aviators. And so we're in --

Q: But has it increased, decreased, stayed the same, do you think?

Senior Defense Official: I don't know the statistics, quite frankly.

Q: Sir, is the boost in your headquarters staff really going to improve your ability to manage acquisition programs? SOCOM traditionally hasn't managed too many large acquisition programs. The ASDS [Advanced SEAL Delivery System] is probably the best example of a large, ambitious one. How will this increase in staff help you with things like cost overruns that we've seen in --

Senior Defense Official: Well, we intend to do the same things that we're doing now and -- down at Special Operations Command. This boost in staff will give us the ability to plan at the strategic level, so most of the people that we will be growing will be planners and operations-type people for doing strategic planning.

Q: Sir, you mentioned that the -- the senior Defense official mentioned that the command would be in a position where its actions would be supported by the regional commander. That seems to be really significant at the heart of the changes that you're talking about. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

Senior Defense Official: Why don't you --

Senior Defense Official: Well, it is significant. Once again, going back to when we were established, we are a train, organize and equip command. We were a resource provider. Okay. The regional combatant commanders, as you all know, were the guys that were out there to prosecute the missions.

With this change -- although we've always had it in our charter that we've been able to be a supported commander, it's actually been used very seldom. So with this change, we will have built the connectivity, the headquarters planning and the ability to go out and be a supported commander vice a supporting. It is significant.

Q: You're dropping one of what has been a traditional, very labor-intensive requirements, and that is to train other militaries, specialists, around the world. Part of what you do is to gather intelligence when you do that training. Who picks up the ball there? And does the U.S. military lose something by taking the kind of specialists who had been doing that and replacing them with others who may have a slightly different set of qualifications?

Senior Defense Official: I think you're more absolute in your phrasing of it than is the case. They do training around the globe. I don't remember the last count; I mean, it's a lot of places.

December 23, 2002 5:32 PM

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Meeting/Memo

Your meeting on Saturday was enormously helpful. Thanks.

Your memo on Korea is right on the mark—I agree completely. As a matter of fact, I had already initiated that approach with both Policy and the combatant commanders.

Keep them coming—they're helpful!

DHR:dh
122302-61

335 SD

23 Dec 02

U11306 /03

December 23, 2002 5:38 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eritrea

Please take a look at this letter from Human Rights Watch on Eritrea and please handle it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/20/02 Human Rights Watch ltr to President

DHR:dh
122302-63

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

E R I T R E A

U11308 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9761

03 Dec 02

C/12/21

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 23 2002



December 20, 2002

The Honorable George W. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

In recent weeks, the Eritrean government has lobbied the United States to use Eritrea's Red Sea ports as military bases in the war against terrorism. Secretary Rumsfeld left open the possibility during his trip to Asmara in December. Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned about the impact a deepening U.S. military relationship with Eritrea might have on efforts to end the Eritrean government's gross abuses of civil and political rights—abuses which not only harm the Eritrean people but undermine the struggle against terrorism.

Political repression in Eritrea has intensified dramatically in the last two years. During this period, the Eritrean government has arbitrarily detained numerous persons who have criticized its domestic policies. These include eleven leaders of the ruling party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) who wrote a mildly-worded letter to President Isayas Afewerki calling for elections, as well as two dozen editors and reporters from the private and government press. It includes people who criticized the detentions or who attempted to mediate between the government and its critics.

These political prisoners, jailed for their peaceful, nonviolent expression of their political beliefs, are held in secret prisons. Their exact numbers are unknown but are believed to number several score. Many have been held incommunicado for more than a year, without access to legal counsel or family members. None have been charged with any criminal offense, much less brought to trial. Even if they had been, the likelihood of a fair trial would be slim. Eritrean courts are closely controlled by the government. Last year, the chief justice of the supreme court was dismissed after he criticized government interference with the judiciary.

Among those detained are two U.S. Embassy employees of Eritrean nationality arrested more than a year ago, on October 11, 2001, a few days after the U.S. Embassy protested the government's human rights abuses. Two months ago the Eritrean government rejected a public request by the U.S. Department of State for their release or for a fair and open trial, and instead accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of attempting to overthrow the government during Eritrea's war with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000.

No private newspapers or magazines have been allowed to publish in Eritrea since September 2001. The government controls all access to information in the country, radio, television, and print. A recent survey by the non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders classified Eritrea as 132nd in its index of press freedom of the 139 countries surveyed, below even Iraq.

During the past year, the government implemented severe restrictions on the right to freedom of religion. Churches and religious organizations affiliated with evangelical Christian sects have been banned. Jehovah's Witnesses have been banned from receiving government services, including drivers licenses.

BRUSSELS GENEVA HONG KONG LONDON LOS ANGELES MOSCOW NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO WASHINGTON

11-L-0559/OSD/9762

No national elections have been held since Eritrean independence in 1991. An election law enacted in January 2002 prohibits political parties other than the government party, the PFDJ, from competing if a national election were to be called.

The United States ought to be particularly concerned that the Eritrean government has tried to associate its crackdown on legitimate dissent with the U.S. led war against terrorism. Regrettably, Secretary Rumsfeld appeared to buttress that view during his visit to Asmara, when he said that "this country has been dealing with the problem of terrorism as our country has." Secretary Rumsfeld was the most senior U.S. official to visit Eritrea in recent memory, yet in his public comments he made no effort to press the government to end its repressive policies.

The visit reinforced our concerns that deepening military ties could undercut U.S. efforts to promote respect for human rights in Eritrea. The Eritrean government could well become convinced that its new strategic importance to the United States shields it from U.S. pressure in other areas of vital concern. Indeed, we believe that this is one reason why the Eritrean government is seeking a closer military relationship in the first place. The United States must continue to press Eritrea to release political prisoners, to respect the rights to freedom of expression and belief, and to build a more open, democratic society - making clear that a better relationship depends on progress in addressing these U.S. concerns.

As you have rightly argued, political repression undermines the struggle against terrorism, by denying people peaceful avenues for expressing dissent, and fueling support for violent movements. For this and countless other reasons, the appearance of U.S. support for an increasingly abusive government in the Horn of Africa would not be in the United States' long term interest, or anyone else's. Escalating repression in Eritrea should be met not with a closer, less critical relationship with that country's government, but with stepped up pressure for human rights improvement.

Sincerely,

/s/

Tom Malinowski
Washington Advocacy Director
Human Rights Watch

/s/

Peter Takirambudde
Executive Director, Africa Division
Human Rights Watch

Cc: The Honorable Colin Powell, Secretary of State
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor



FACSIMILE COVER PAGE

Date: 12/20/02
 Time: 17:06:00
 Pages: 3

To: Donald Rumsfeld
 Company: U.S. Department of Defense
 Fax #: (b)(6)

From: Tom Malinowski
 Title: Washington Advocacy Director
 Company: Human Rights Watch
 Address: 1630 Connecticut Ave., N.W., #500
 Washington, DC 20009
 USA

Fax #: 202-612-4333
 Voice #: 202-612-4358

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December 23, 2002 5:40 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: A-12

Please take a look at this background sheet on the A-12. I hope you are paying attention to it. I must say I am not big on litigation as a general principle, although in this case I don't know anything about the situation. If you want to visit with me, give me a call.

459 A

Thanks.

Attach.
12/02/02 A-12 background paper

DHR:dh
122302-64



Please respond by 01/24/03

U11309 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9765

03/10/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 23 2002

See P/W

December 2, 2002
11:15 a.m.

A-12 BACKGROUND FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

In August, 2002, the Navy issued a demand letter seeking repayment from General Dynamics and Boeing of approximately \$2.3 Billion owed the Government as a result of the termination for default of the A-12 aircraft development and production contract. The letter also advised that if the companies failed to pay the amount owed, the Government would initiate collection of the debt.

Because the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice continued to engage in what we had hoped would be productive settlement negotiations with the companies, DoD did not begin any collection efforts between August and November.

Since it now appears that an equitable settlement will not be reached in the near term, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) today instructed the Defense Finance and Accounting Office (DFAS) to begin offsetting against payments due on existing contracts with the companies.

The amount to be collected will be approximately \$66 Million per month from payments due each company over the course of the next 18 months.

*12/2
Sec Def. FY1
This is the latest
turn in the A-12
settlement issue. A-12
was the airplane Sec'y
Cheney cancelled. We have
begun collection proceedings
against General Dynamics and
Boeing.
D. R. Ta*

11-L-0559/OSD/9766

December 23, 2002 5:42 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stryker

Please look at this note from Newt on the Stryker. I think he is right. Why don't you talk to the people in the Army about it this week while I am gone, and tell me what they say.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/04/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Further Army Disinformation on Stryker

DHR:dh
122302-65

.....
Please respond by 12/31/02

451

U11310 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9767

23 Dec 02

From Newt Gingrich

Page 1 of 1

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 23 2002

Nestel, Arlene, CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, November 04, 2002 12:52 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; giambastiani@jfc.com.mil
Subject: further army disinformation on stryker

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt
further Army disinformation on Stryker.

The following assertion is so factually false it is incomprehensible. The fact is the operations requirement is both for 1000 nautical mile C-130 transportability and for an assault landing capability. Stryker can do neither.

I am prepared to publicly engage the Army on its continuing disinformation if necessary but I prefer to just cap the three brigades and move on to other topics.

However the continuing barrage of one sided disinformation is infuriating.

By Erin Q. Winograd
Inside The Army
November 4, 2002
Pg. 1

The Army disputes whether a 1,000 NM range was ever required. Service


spokesmen last week pointed to an Oct. 15 roundtable discussion during which an Air Force official indicated Stryker would not be sent via C-130 for strategic deployment.



11/4/2002

11-L-0559/OSD/9768

December 23, 2002 5:46 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: JFCOM Response on Training and C2

Please talk to Gen. Myers about the matter in this 25 November memo, and then get back to me with a report.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/25/02 Cambone memo to SecDef re: JFCOM Response on Training and C2

DHR:dh
122302-66

.....
Please respond by 01/24/03

353

U11311 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9769

23 Dec 02

11/25/02
1/24
Larry Di Rita

Dick-

11/25/02 4:06 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FROM: Steve Cambone

DEC 23 2002

SUBJECT: JFCOM Response on Training and C2

ADM Giambastiani's reply to your memo of September 9 is attached.

You asked me if we are properly arranged with respect his reply.

We are.

Ed will control a considerable amount of training money over the coming FYDP. He will be able to support joint training.

As he points out, however, getting component commanders to free for joint training the forces assigned to the Combatant Commanders is the key. I'd suggest you explore with Gen. Myers how to effect the change Ed identifies.

I would expect both the Joint and component commanders will be unenthusiastic about a change. The joint commanders would become more responsible for training. The component commander will be reluctant to surrender the time of his Service forces for joint training.

On C2 suites, in the program we are proposing Ed would gain control over the development of the Deployable Joint Command and Control suite. It is to be the basis for the SJFHQ.

November 23, 2002 3:47 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JFCOM Response

Here is a memo I sent to ADM Giambastiani, and here is his response.

Please take a look at it, and tell me whether or not you think we are properly arranged.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/25/02 CDR, JFCOM memo to SecDef re: Follow Up from Combatant Commanders Conference

DHR dh
112302.16

.....
Please respond by 12/13/02

REC 10/28

September 9, 2002 9:39 AM

(2)

TO: ADM Giambastiani
 CC: Gen. Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Follow-Up from CINCs Conference

(A)

What do you think about pulling together the budget information I mentioned in the meeting with the combatant commanders—with respect to exercises and training? Please see if we can categorize it as service-centric, joint and combined.

(B)

Another interesting question that came up there was that each command had their own distinctively different suite. That is worrisome.

Someone also said that they don't train on their own suite, and that it should be treated as a weapon system, which it isn't.

Thanks.

DNA-46
090622-7

.....
Please respond by 10/15/02

10/25/02

SECDEF -

RESPONSE TO (A) AND (B)
 ATTACHED.

V/R
[Signature]

02 SEP 11 11

TOTAL P.02

October 25, 2002

To: Secretary of Defense

CC: Gen Myers

From: ADM Giambastiani

V/R Ed

SUBJECT: Follow-Up From Combatant Commanders Conference

A. Exercises and Training Budgets. The short answer to part (A) for exercises is listed below (source JCS J8).

	Service-Sponsored (\$M)			Joint (\$M)		
	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03
Major Exercise Costs	433.3	450.4	462.7	567.8	568.0	608.8

For training, we've found it's too hard to cull out the relevant information without applying a significant effort due to the way the services have the data coded. The ability to capture dollars spent on the various types of training may provide a useful "Jointness" metric. However, building on my Navy experience, a change in the mindset of our component commanders in building their exercise and training plans may be a useful method of approaching the problem. Service force providers typically meet service training requirements first, using remaining assets to populate Joint exercises. A better construct may be to reverse this priority -- meeting Joint training requirements first. Services would then look for ways to meet some portion of their unit level training requirements, where feasible, in the context of Joint exercises. Remaining training assets could then be placed against whatever additional service-centric training is considered necessary. General Larry Ellis, the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces Command and my Army Component Commander, has given just such intent to his exercise planners. I plan on exploring this initiative with my other component commanders. While I'm not sure it will work across the board, I think it's a path to explore.

B. Command and Control Suites. To no one's surprise, combatant commanders have developed distinctively different command and control suites or stand-alone capabilities because of the lack of any joint system of meeting their needs -- something we recognize is a priority to fix. I agree that command and control suites should be treated as weapons systems and battle staffs need to be trained on them. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) initiative -- with concurrently developed personnel, procedures, and materiel -- will provide the

core solution. A prototype has been stood up, and we are moving out on developing the SJFHQ. The Deployable Joint Command And Control (DJC2) system will provide a significant part of the sustained material and technical solution. Funding is approved for DJC2 and its program office will open in January 03. The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System developed by the JFCOM Joint Battle Center demonstrated an interoperable and robust, end-to-end command and control system easily integrated yet adaptable to commander's unique requirements. The Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System shows what we can do today with innovation and technology - this is the sort of thing that we need. Right now it is being tailored for use by General Franks and his staff and used on his recent flight to the theater. We will transition this capability to the other combatant commanders this ^{fiscal} year, as well as put it in the SJFHQ and at the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) in Tampa, FL -- your on-call JTF commander's command and control provider. Additionally, LTG McNeill is using the training and procedures he received in preparation for Millennium Challenge for Joint Task Force 180's current mission in Afghanistan. I expect we will be able to provide all future JTF commanders with these capabilities prior to deployment, in addition to providing the requisite training.

snareware
6802
1/13
1/4/03

December 23, 2002 12:44 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Trip Log

Larry Di Rita
1/4

Let's get this personal security trip log straightened out, so that it gets Cohen off and starts with me when I first arrived. I would also like domestic travel totals separate from international totals. You can keep it all in a line chronologically, but then have separate totals on the far right that show the hours flown domestically and the hours flown internationally. Then you can do a tab for 2001 and one for 2002, and then start the log for 2003.

333 SD

Thanks.

See Attached

Attach.
Personal Security Trip Logs

DHR:dh
122302-31

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

1/7

Sir, 13 Jan 2003

This is our product. We've created & attached a new version which reflects the information that the Secretary wants.

V/R
(b)(6)

~~Rick Kisting -
to this your
product? Please
advise.
D. Rita~~

23 Dec 02

U11312 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/9775

Personal Security 2001 Trip Log

D – Domestic *I* – International

Trip	Dates	Location	Length of Trip			Hours Flown		Miles Traveled						
			Days	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total		
1	28-29 Jan	Chicago, IL	2	2		2	3+15	3+15		3+15	1058	1058		1058
2	2-4 Feb	Munich, Germany	3		3	5	19+00		19+00	22+15	7798		7798	8856
3	5 Feb	New York City	1	3		6	2+05	5+20		24+20	364	1422		9220
4	9-10 Feb	Chicago, IL	2	5		8	3+00	8+20		27+20	1058	2480		10,278
5	12 Feb	Ft Stewart, GA (with POTUS)	1	6		9	3+00	11+20		30+20	1090	3570		11,368
6	13 Feb	Norfolk, VA (with POTUS)	1	7		10	1+10	12+30		31+30	264	3834		11,632
7	14 Feb	Charleston, WV (with POTUS)	1	8		11	1+50	14+20		33+20	512	4346		12,144
8	17-18 Feb	Taos, NM	2	10		13	7+00	21+20		40+20	2,740	7086		14,884
9	4 Mar	Newport News, VA (with POTUS)	1	11		14	1+20	22+40		41+40	264	7350		15,148
10	17 Mar	New York City	1	12		15	1+35	24+15		43+15	364	7714		15,512
11	3-9 Jun	Ankara & Incirlik, Turkey; Kiev, Ukraine; Skopje, Macedonia; Cp Bondsteel, Kosovo; Thessalonki, Greece; Brussels, Belgium; Turku, Finland	7		10	22	29+45		48+45	73+00	11,962		19,760	27,474
12	29 Jun – 4 Jul	Offutt AFB, NE & Taos, NM	6	18		28	8+35	32+50		81+35	2,796	10,510		30,270
13	27-31 Jul	Canberra, Australia (Refuel: Hickam AFB)	5		15	33	39+45		88+30	121+20	17,022		36,782	47,292
14	2-3 Aug 01	Chicago, IL	2	20		35	3+05	35+55		124+25	1,048	11,558		48,340
15	11-14 Aug	Moscow, Russia	4		19	39	20+05		108+35	144+30	8438		45,220	56,778
16	21 Aug	Columbia, SC	1	21		40	2+15	38+10		146+45	714	12,272		57,492
17	24 Aug -3 Sep	Crawford, TX & Taos, NM	11	32		51	7+55	46+05		154+40	2968	15,240		60,460
18	2-6 Oct	Riyadh, S.A.; Muscat, Oman; Cairo, Egypt; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Ankara, Turkey	5		24	56	39+50		148+25	194+30	13,312		58,532	73,772

11-L-0559/OSD/9776

Personal Security 2001 Trip Log

D – Domestic *I* – International

Trip	Dates	Location	Length of Trip			Hours Flown			Miles Traveled					
			Days	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	Hours	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	Miles	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total
19	19-21 Oct	Whiteman AFB; Taos, NM	3	35		59	7+10	53+15		201+40	2,849	18,089		76,621
20	2-5 Nov	Moscow, Russia; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Islamabad, Pakistan; New Delhi, India, Sigonella NAS	4		28	63	34+35		183+00	236+15	13,967		72,499	90,588
21	14 Nov	New York City	1	36		64	1+35	54+50		237+50	364	18,453		90,952
22	16-18 Nov	Great Lakes NTC & Chicago, IL	3	39		67	3+15	58+05		241+05	1090	19,543		92,042
23	21-25 Nov	Pope AFB, Ft Bragg, NC; Taos, NM	5	44		72	7+45	65+50		248+50	2907	22,450		94,949
24	27 Nov	MacDill AFB, FL	1	45		73	4+00	69+50		252+50	1430	23,880		96,379
25	14-19 Dec	Shannon, Ireland; Baku, Azerbaijan; Yerevan, Armenia; T'bilisi, Georgia; Karshi AB, Uzbekistan, Kabul, Afghanistan; Brussels, Belgium	6		34	79	33+20		216+20	286+10	12,965		85,464	109,344
26	22-26 Dec	Taos, NM	5	50		84	7+05	76+55		293+15	2,740	26,620		112,084
27	28 Dec- 2 Jan	Taos, NM	6	56		90	7+05	84+00		300+20	2,740	29,360		114,824

Personal Security 2002 Trip Log

D – Domestic *I* – International

Trip	Dates	Location	Length of Trip			Hours Flown			Miles Traveled					
			Days	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i> Total	Hours	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	Miles	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	
1	27 Jan	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	1		1	1	6+30		6+30	6+30	2,274		2,274	2,274
2	9 Feb	NYC	1	1		2	1+35	1+35		8+05	364	364		2,638
3	16-20 Feb	Taos, NM; Chicago, IL; Salt Lake City, UT; Nellis AFB	5	6		7	10+30	12+05		18+35	3,938	4,302		6,576
4	22 Feb	USNA, Annapolis, MD	1	7		8	0+30	12+35		19+05	80	4,382		6,656
5	27 Mar	Chicago, IL	1	8		9	3+15	15+50		22+20	1,076	5,458		7,732
6	4 Apr	Ft Meade, MD	1	9		10	0+20	16+10		22+40	70	5,528		7,802
7	18-19 Apr	Scott AFB, IL & Ft Lewis, WA	2	11		12	10+40	26+50		33+20	4,160	9,688		11,962
8	24 Apr	Houston, TX	1	12		13	5+45	32+35		39+05	2,168	11,856		14,130
9	25-29 Apr	Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; Kabul & Herat, Afghanistan; Ashgabat & Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan; Astana, Kazakhstan; Moscow, Russia	5		6	18	38+55		45+25	78+00	15,494		17,768	29,624
10	24-29 May	Taos, NM; Colorado Sprgs, CO	6	18		24	7+35	40+10		85+35	2,814	14,670		32,438
11	4-14 June	London, England; Brussels, Belgium; Geilenkirchen AB, Germany; Tallinn, Estonia; Kuwait City, Kuwait; Manama, Bahrain; Doha, Qatar; New Delhi, India; Islamabad, Pakistan	11		17	35	41+30		86+55	127+05	15,361		33,129	47,799
12	3-7 July	Chicago, IL & Taos, NM	5	23		40	7+35	47+45		134+40	2,796	17,466		50,595
13	29 July	Suffolk, VA	1	24		41	2+00	49+45		136+40	264	17,730		50,859
14	3-4 Aug	Kent, CT	2	26		43	1+45	51+30		138+25	468	18,198		51,327
15	21 Aug – 2 Sep	Crawford, TX & Taos, NM	11	37		54	7+45	59+15		146+10	2,954	21,152		54,281
16	26-27 Aug	Ft Irwin, San Diego, & Cp Pendleton, CA	2	39		56	4+10	63+25		150+20	1,324	22,476		55,605
17	6-7 Sep	Cp David, MD	2	41		58	1+00	64+25		151+20	150	22,626		55,755


11-L-0559/OSD/9778

Personal Security 2002 Trip Log

D - Domestic *I* - International

Trip	Dates	Location	Length of Trip				Hours Flown			Miles Traveled				
			Days	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	Hours	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total	Miles	<i>D</i>	<i>I</i>	Total
18	22-25 Sep	Warsaw, Poland	4		21	62	18+15		105+10	169+35	7746		40,875	63,501
19	27 Sep	Atlanta, GA	1	42		63	2+55	67+20		172+30	958	23,584		64,459
20	2 Oct	Norfolk, VA (JFCOM Change of Cmd)	1	43		64	2+00	69+20		174+30	264	23,848		64,723
21	25-27 Oct	Chicago, IL	3	46		67	3+10	72+30		177+40	1,076	24,924		65,799
22	17-23 Nov	Santiago, Chile; Prague, Czech Republic; Bratislava, Slovakia; Ljubljana, Slovenia	7		28	74	40+25		145+35	218+05	16,562		57,437	82,361
23	27 Nov - 1Dec	Big Sky, Montana	5	51		79	7+20	79+50		225+25	3,130	28,054		85,491
24	9-13 Dec 02	Asmara, Eritrea; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Djibouti, Djibouti; Doha, Qatar	5		33	84	37+45		183+20	263+10	13,483		70,920	98,974
25	24 Dec 02 - 1 Jan 03	Taos, NM	9	60		93	7+05	86+55		270+15	2,740	30,794		101,714

December 23, 2002 1:47 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letter to the Editor

Please give me a copy of the letter to the editor we sent to the *Chicago Tribune* on the Molly Ivins article.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-33

.....
Please respond by 12/7

000.7

U11313 /03

02 Dec 02

radars and other sensors. These initial capabilities may be improved through additional measures. Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to meet these threats. The program will be structured in a manner that promotes international missile-defense cooperation and also encourages industrial cooperation by friends and allies, consistent with overall U.S. national security. The deployment of missile defenses is an essential element of our overall national-security policy to transform U.S. defense and deterrence capabilities to meet emerging and evolving threats. The evolutionary approach to missile defense provides near-term capability as we continue to pursue a robust research and development program against ballistic missiles of all ranges.

Washington Post
December 20, 2002
Pg. 43

35. Iraq: The Decade After

By Joseph R. Biden and Chuck Hagel

The United States will face enormous challenges in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, as well as broad regional questions that must be addressed. These are both matters that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have been focusing on for some time. During a week-long trip to the region, we came away with a better understanding of the possibilities and perils that lie ahead.

In northern Iraq we saw the extraordinary potential of Iraqis once they are out from under Saddam Hussein's murderous hand. New hospitals, schools, roads and lively media are testimony to the determination of Iraqi Kurds and to the bravery of coalition air crews patrolling the no-fly zone.

Just a few hours' drive from the oppressive rule in Baghdad, a freely elected regional government and legislature (which we were honored to address) are embarked on a path of clear-eyed realism. While neighboring countries fear an independent Kurdistan, Kurdish leaders appear committed to working together for a united Iraq. They realize they could lose everything they have built in the past decade by pursuing independence.

Although no one doubts our forces will prevail over Saddam Hussein's, key regional leaders confirm what the Foreign Relations Committee emphasized in its Iraq hearings last summer: The most challenging phase will likely be the day after -- or, more accurately, the decade after -- Saddam Hussein.

Once he is gone, expectations are high that coalition forces will remain in large numbers to stabilize Iraq and support a civilian administration. That presence will be necessary for several years, given the vacuum there, which a divided Iraqi opposition will have trouble filling and which some new Iraqi military strongman must not fill. Various experts have testified that as many as 75,000 troops may be necessary, at a cost of up to \$20 billion a year. That does not include the cost of the war itself, or the effort to rebuild Iraq.

Americans are largely unprepared for such an undertaking. President Bush must make clear to the American people the scale of the commitment.

The northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk is an example of the perils American forces may encounter. It sits atop valuable oil fields and is home to a mixed population of Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds. In recent years, Saddam Hussein has expelled Turkmen and Kurds as part of an "Arabization," or ethnic cleansing, campaign. We toured a refugee camp

housing 120,000 displaced people and heard countless stories of brutality and the loss of loved ones. Kirkuk could become the Iraqi version of Mitrovica, the volatile city in Kosovo where the U.N.-led administration has faced the dilemma of forcibly resettling people from various ethnic communities who have been evicted from their homes.

This is one reason why we will need our allies to help rebuild Iraq. Cementing a broad coalition today will keep the pressure on Hussein to disarm, build legitimacy for the use of force if he refuses, reduce the risks to our troops and spread the burden of securing and reconstructing Iraq. Going it alone and imposing a U.S.-led military government instead of a multinational civilian administration could turn us from liberators into occupiers, fueling resentment throughout the Arab world.

Iraq cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Disarming and stabilizing that country will be all the more difficult because of the unsettled regional environment, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While it is essential that the United States aggressively pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace on its own merits, doing so has ancillary benefits for the disarmament of Iraq. Simply put, we will make it easier for Arab governments to participate in, or at least support, our actions in Iraq if they can show their people we are engaged in the peace process.

Meetings with Israeli officials and Palestinian reformers led us to believe new opportunities exist for American diplomacy. Recent polling shows that nearly three-quarters of Israelis and Palestinians seek reconciliation and a two-state solution. For the first time since the violence began, a majority of Palestinians support a crackdown against terrorism as part of a peace process. A large

majority have no confidence in Yasser Arafat.

The key is to empower Palestinian reformers and encourage Arab moderates. President Bush should lose no time in publicly endorsing the "road map" developed by the Quartet -- an informal group of mediators on the Middle East from the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia. The road map provides for a series of reciprocal steps to jump-start a renewed peace process. That would give hope to Palestinian reformers and send a clear message to the Arab world that the United States remains determined to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian settlement even as we deal with Iraq.

Working on multiple fronts poses a difficult test for American leadership, but there is no escaping the fact that we face several related, interlocking crises in the region. As the bulwark of freedom and democracy, the United States faces the need to disarm Saddam Hussein and set the stage for a stable Iraq, win a protracted war on terrorism and engage fully on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Working with our friends and allies, it is a challenge we can, and must, meet.

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) is chairman and Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Chicago Tribune
December 19, 2002

36. The Offensive Art Of Secrets And Lies

Lying wouldn't be prudent
By Molly Ivins

AUSTIN -- It is hard to kill a bad idea. And this one is so rank that if Osama bin Laden had come up with it, we'd be forced to admit it was a stroke of genius: how to infuriate our allies, cause an explosion of anti-American paranoia and encourage terrorism, all in one swell "foop," as one of our old Texas

pols used to say. Unfortunately, this idea is Donald Rumsfeld's.

The concept of a Pentagon disinformation office is back. "The Defense Department is considering issuing a secret directive to American military to conduct covert operations aimed at influencing public opinion and policymakers in friendly and neutral nations," reports *The New York Times*. "The proposal has ignited a fierce battle throughout the Bush administration over whether the military should carry out secret propaganda missions in friendly nations like Germany. ..." This is the same stupid idea that was beaten back last February when the Pentagon had to disband its Office of Strategic Influence when it was pointed out that the thing was guaranteed to backfire.

Let's do that simple old thing where we put the shoe on the other foot and see how it feels, substituting "China" for "United States" and using the exact plan outlined by the *Times*: "The Chinese government is considering a secret propaganda program that would include, for example, efforts to discredit and undermine evangelical Christian churches and religious schools that have become breeding grounds for militant anti-Chinese sentiment because of China's abortion policies and human-rights issues. It might even include setting up schools with secret Chinese financing to teach a more moderate Christianity, laced with sympathetic depictions of how the religion is practiced in China. The plan also includes secret Chinese payments to American journalists to write articles favorable to China, and paying citizens' groups to organize rallies in support of Chinese policies."

No, not a good idea. This country already has a credibility problem around the world--why set up an official propaganda office to tell lies,

when the truth works much better?

It is both unnecessary and counterproductive to have a secret propaganda campaign. The most effective weapon in any information campaign is a reputation for telling the truth. And the only way to get that reputation is to earn it. The BBC is listened to worldwide precisely because it does not spin the news.

When the "Office of Strategic Lies" was killed off earlier this year, Rumsfeld was quite testy at the press conference. "The office is done," he snapped. "It's over. What do you want, blood?" No, we want it to be over.

President Bush promised at the time, "We'll tell the American people the truth." Then last week, the administration leaked a painfully obvious fake story about how Saddam Hussein had given chemical weapons to Al Qaeda. That one was shot down so fast--from inside the government--if you blinked, you missed it. What's next? Iraqi soldiers tossing babies out of Kuwaiti incubators again? Rape of the Belgian nuns?

This administration has such a problem with obsessive secrecy, such a compulsion to control information and such a low regard for the public's right to know what is being done in their name, with their money and with their children's lives that it's seriously alarming. The administration is clearly stocked with people who regard the press as a pain to be manipulated and public opinion as something that needs to be shaped by the government.

To review the record:

- One of the first things Bush did in office was rescind the provision that gives access to a president's records 12 years after he left office.

- They're still sitting on the information about who shaped Dick Cheney's energy policy, as though we couldn't figure that out.

- Secret detentions without

charges, without lawyers.

- The administration requested that the television networks censor tapes from Osama bin Laden under the odd pretext that they might contain some coded message. Since you could see them in full on Al Jazeera, that was utterly pointless.

- In October, after a leak the White House didn't like, the administration announced only eight members of Congress would be permitted to hear intelligence briefings. Congress made them back down.

- Out of room and barely started.

Ted Gup, author of "The Book of Honor," about the secret lives of CIA agents, quotes the British scholar F.M. Cornford: "Propaganda is that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without quite deceiving your enemies."

Molly Ivins is a syndicated columnist based in Austin, Texas.

USA Today
December 20, 2002
Pg. 26

37. Donald Rumsfeld: Demanding Boss

"Anonymous sources" in USA TODAY's article on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld allege rampant professional "alienation" in the Pentagon. I thought the newspaper's readers might be interested in my views on my boss and his impact on at least one part of the Defense Department ("Rumsfeld's abrasive style sparks conflict with military command. Complaint: He doesn't listen to the generals," *Cover Story*, *News*, Dec. 10).

Is Rumsfeld a demanding boss who asks tough questions and expects excellence routinely? You bet.

Does his management style deliver results? A small sampling of recent Rumsfeld-inspired initiatives with the Air Force delivers a

resounding "yes" as well.

- *Rumsfeld directed the Air Force to review our flagship stealth fighter, the F-22 Raptor, in light of current conditions. We took a "clean sheet" look at its capabilities, costs and benefits. In the course of this exercise, we identified new technologies and expanded roles for the Raptor that dramatically increase its value in the air and in support of units on the ground. Result: We now have a newly designated "F/A-22," and Rumsfeld supports our having sufficient numbers to conduct a wide range of joint operations for decades to come.

- *Last year, we were asked by Rumsfeld to find cost-effective, innovative approaches to modernizing aging aircraft. Result: We've reduced our B-1 bomber force by one-third and plowed the savings back into improving the remaining two-thirds. We're currently evaluating a potential lease arrangement for new tankers that will replace our Eisenhower-era aircraft and get them into the hands of our war fighters sooner than previously planned.

- *Rumsfeld prodded us to examine new technologies, such as space systems and unmanned vehicles (UAVs), and how they might change warfare. Result: We employed UAVs and satellite guidance systems to great effect in Afghanistan. This allowed us to conduct real-world experimentation before we commit taxpayer dollars to expensive but untested ideas, and permitted meaningful debate on legacy designs.

Change is always disruptive, and adapting large bureaucracies to new eras requires an unusual amount of focus, energy, creativity and some occasional sharp elbows. In other words, leadership. Rumsfeld has it and, in spite of anyone's real or imagined feelings, our nation's armed forces are better off for it.

James G. Roche,

December 23, 2002 1:59 PM

0118

050

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Country Comparison

I think this table on Iran, Iraq and North Korea is wrong. I don't think that is the population of Iran. I know the literacy rate in North Korea is not 99%. I just can't believe it is that much higher than Iran. I think the life expectancy cannot be as high as it is shown in North Korea.

I would like someone to do a better job on that if they could, with some information that I can take a look at.

Thanks.

Attach.
Country Comparison as of 19 December 2002

DHR:dlh
122302-34

Please respond by DEC 27 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

118

JAN 2 2003

1/7
Capt Rustle U11314 103

Secdef - Attached

are the same data from 4 different sources.

Obviously, North Korea data is consistent, if questionable. I'm pursuing some other sources and will report.

(DIA, CIA, State, World Bank). Take a look at some other sources and see what you can learn. I think this data came from CIA World Fact Book. Check World Bank data.

117
11-L-0559/OSD/9783

23 Dec 02

A. White

IRAN

	DIA	CIA WORLD FACT BOOK	STATE DEPARTMENT	WORLD BANK
POP (MILLIONS)	68.9	66	66	64.7
LITERACY RATE	54%	72%	73%	77%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	68.25	69.5	70.7	69.1
MALE	66.8	68		
FEMALE	69.7	71		
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	49 / 1000	26 / 1000	26 / 1000	33 / 1000
GDP (BILLIONS)	114	426	413	119
GDP PER CAPITA	\$1,740	\$6,400.00	\$6,300.00	\$1,836.00
% GROWTH	4.30%	5.00%	3%	5%


IRAQ

	DIA	CIA WORLD FACT BOOK	STATE DEPARTMENT	WORLD BANK
POP (MILLIONS)	24	24	23.3	23.8
LITERACY RATE	60%	58%	58%	57%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	67.4	67.5	67	61
MALE	66.3	66		
FEMALE	68.5	69		
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	57 / 1000	58 / 1000	60 / 1000	93 / 1000
GDP (BILLIONS)	26	59	57	32.6
GDP PER CAPITA	\$1,100	\$2,500.00	\$2,500.00	\$1,390.00
% GROWTH	7%	-5.70%	15%	-9%

NORTH KOREA

	DIA	CIA WORLD FACT BOOK	STATE DEPARTMENT	WORLD BANK
POP (MILLIONS)	21.2	22.2	21.2	47.6
LITERACY RATE	96%	99%	99%	98%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	51.3	71	51.5	73
MALE	48.8	68	49	
FEMALE	53.8	74	54	
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	87 / 1000	23 / 1000	88 / 1000	8 / 1000
GDP (BILLIONS)	25	21.8	21.8	422
GDP PER CAPITA	\$1,100	\$1,000.00	\$900.00	\$1,000.00
% GROWTH	0	-3.00%	-1%	1%

December 23, 2002 3:02 PM

TO: Bill Luti
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Meeting

Please make sure you invite whoever the CIA wants to send to the meeting with Marin Strmecki on Afghanistan. I would kind of like to have two or three of their people here. Please include Denny Watson if she is in town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-43



Please respond by 01/03/03

AFGHANISTAN

U11315 /03

23 Dec 02

December 23, 2002 4:48 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of Countries

The President wants a list of the countries that will be ready to go on the following basis:

1. Those countries that will go without any additional action by the UN.
2. Countries that will go if there is a second UN resolution.
3. Countries available to help in a coalition after Iraq is rid of Saddam Hussein.
4. Countries not willing to help.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-55

.....

Please respond by 01/10/03

JENQ

U11316 /03

03 Nov 02

1/24
0800

SNOWflake

December 23, 2002 7:38 AM

000.7 SD

TO: Larry Di Rita
Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Jeffrey Goldberg

I am not sure I want to talk to Jeffrey Goldberg from *The New Yorker*. If you really believe I should, please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-4



Please respond by 01/03/03

1/7

Sealef - I think it is probably worth 15 minutes of your time someday.

Di Rita

1/7

23 Dec 02

U11317 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9788



December 23, 2002 7:40 AM

060 SD

TO: Public Affairs
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Photos

1/8

I would like these two photos enlarged to 8 x 10, please.

Thanks.

Attach.
Photos

DHR:dh
122302-6

.....
Please respond by 01/15/03

23 Dec 02

U11318 /03

TO: SecDef
FROM: Torie Clarke
DATE: January 7, 2003
SUBJECT: Photos

Here are the photos you asked for.

11-L-0559/OSD/9790



11-L-0559/OSD/9791

December 23, 2002 9:13 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Coordination with POTUS

337 WH

We need to think through what kind of an arrangement we want with the President in the event there is a conflict with Iraq—how frequently I should meet with him, should we have a regular phone call each day, etc.—and then we need to get agreement on it with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-13

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

23 Dec 02

U11319 /03

December 23, 2002 9:19 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Cable to Karzai

ADVANCE COPY
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Afghanistan

The Policy shop should draft a note from me to Karzai to be sent today on his first anniversary as head of the interim government. I would like to edit it myself after it has been drafted, and we can send it by cable.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-15

.....
Please respond by 12/23/02

12/23

SWT -
Please do draft / R
Policy Review

D, R

12/23

23 Dec 02

U11320 /03

December 23, 2002 9:57 AM

000.5

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Grid

I talked to Condi and Colin this morning. They have both okayed the grid for the Al Qaida leadership project, so we can put that in place just as we briefed it to the President.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
122302-17



Please respond by 01/10/03

23 Dec 02

U11321 /03

December 23, 2002 10:03 AM

331.4

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mess Expenses

I think someone ought to talk to the person who heads the OSD mess. The Christmas party cost \$4,000 or \$5,000. That sounds like a lot to me. I think they ought to be careful about flowers and quantities and so forth. If it is my money, they ought to be careful, but they also ought to be careful if it is the taxpayers' money. In an effort to do it the best, they probably spend more money than is fair to the taxpayers, and possibly to me when I am paying.

Let's see what we can do about it. My guess is that I could have done that at a restaurant for roughly the same amount of money, and the restaurant has to pay insurance, salaries, taxes, rent and a whole host of things that our people are not paying.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-18

.....

Please respond by 01 / 10 / 03

23 Dec 02

U11322 /03

December 23, 2002 10:55 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Honors

335 SD

I want to see all the things I have been offered to be honored at in the last two years, and I would like to see any future honors before we decide against them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122302-25



Please respond by 01/15/03

23 Dec 02

U11325 /03

December 23, 2002 7:30 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: State Department Fund Citations

248.7

Are you going to be able to get closure on the outstanding fund citations held by the Department of State before the end of the year?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122002-12



Please respond by 1/23/03

23 Dec 02

U11324 /03

December 24, 2002 6:55 AM

000,7 SD

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Material for Midge Decter

Somewhere there is a file of oral histories I have done and transcripts of interviews. Please see if you can find those, and then make them available to Midge Decter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122402-4

.....

Please respond by Jan 1 / 03

24 Dec 02

U11325 /03

December 24, 2002 6:51 AM

Iraq

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

You may have to call the NSA and CIA and ask them to speed up on vetting these Iraqi people for the training for the opposition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
(22402-3)

.....

Please respond by 01/03/03

24 Dec 02

U11326 /03

1/3
1230

C117

December 27, 2002 1:18 PM

335 SD

TO:

(b)(6)

FROM:

Donald Rumsfeld DM

SUBJECT:

Gifts

Did somebody get all the names and people we should thank for those gifts I looked at the last day I was in the office? I sure hope someone sent thank you notes to all those people.

Thanks.

DHR dh
122701-9 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by

01/03/03

cc: Mary Claire Murphy

(1-3-03)

Yes - All Christmas Gifts and Miscellaneous Gifts that the SecDef looked at have been logged in, photographed and thank you letters are being drafted to be sent out ASAP.

11-L-0559 OSD 10800

U11327 103

Mary Claire

27 Dec 02

December 27, 2002 3:02 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitzb
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: PC Notes

334 NSC

Please give me your notes from the PC on 12/27. I would like to have a record.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-30 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 01/03/03

27 Dec 02

U11329 /03

December 27, 2002 1:35 PM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainees

383.6

Please take a look at this article on the detainees. Do we actually know where we stand on those? Is someone with some sense working the problem?

Thanks.

Attach.

Miller, Greg, "Many Held at Guantanamo Not Likely Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 2002, p. 1.

DHR:dh
122701-13 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 01 | 10 | 03

27 Dec 02

011330 /03

That's because there are so many places to hide. Despite being outnumbered 5 to 1 by the 10th Mountain soldiers, the opposition troops were able to inflict heavy damage on the attacking force. But the most important part of the exercise takes place after the shooting stops, when the soldiers are briefed about what went right and wrong in Shughart-Gordon. The brigade earned high marks for breaching enemy defenses and gaining a foothold in the city, but when clearing individual buildings, squads often stacked too many soldiers near doorways, making them easy targets.

Pentagon officials are officially mum on whether the 10th Mountain might see action in Iraq, but most of the young men playing war here are convinced they will. History is their guide. The division that fought on skis in the mountains of Italy during the Second World War and at the Chosin Reservoir in Korea has been the force of choice over the past decade for both war fighting and nation building—dispatched to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. At one point last year, the division of 8,000, based at Fort Drum, N.Y., was deployed in eight countries around the world, giving rise to an outfit joke that "the sun never sets on the 10th Mountain." Many of those fighting at Fort Polk were just 10 months ago engaging al Qaeda troops in the Shah-e Kot Valley in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda. Nine years earlier, many of them were sent in to rescue the Army Rangers pinned down in Mogadishu, the Somali capital. It was the U.S. military's bloodiest urban battle since Vietnam.

Flex city. Staff Sgt. Joe Young remembers that night in Mogadishu. Growing up in tiny Knob Noster, Mo. ("If you blink, you'll miss it"), the mortarman was just 17 when he shipped out to Somalia with

the 10th Mountain. The night the Rangers took on thousands of armed Somali militiamen, he learned the hard way that the best-laid military plans can disintegrate in the chaos of street-to-street fighting. Taking a break before the attack on Shughart-Gordon, he offers a foot soldier's advice to U.S. military planners: "If you are not flexible, you're going to get your ass handed to you."

Which is why the Pentagon began changing its doctrine several years ago to teach urban combat skills. "Our training has made a very dramatic shift toward fighting in cities," says Col. Burke Garren, commander of 10th Mountain's 1st Brigade combat team. Young officers were once instructed to avoid urban conflict, as it only bogged down an advancing army and produced political fallout. But today's enemies are unlikely to challenge the world's most advanced military in open terrain. The shift in focus is also based on demographics: Military officials cite data that, by 2010, three quarters of the world's population will be living in urban areas. Cities, in other words, are the battlefields of the future.

If the war games at Fort Polk are a window on what lies ahead, then a nation that has grown comfortable with antiseptic conflicts could be in for a jarring awakening. Capt. David Kirkpatrick's Alpha Company was the first into the breach at Shughart-Gordon, and after the battle, the wiry distance runner, who once narrowly missed qualifying for the Olympic trials, was beaming with pride over the 10th Mountain's "success." Yet with success came a sobering realization: Most of his men hadn't survived the night.

Los Angeles Times
December 22, 2002
Pg. 1

30. Many Held At Guantanamo Not Likely

Terrorists
Dozens Of Detainees Pose No Real Threat, But U.S. Policies Make It Nearly Impossible To Get Names Off Lists. There's Also Fear Of Freeing 21st Hijacker.'

By Greg Miller, Times Staff Writer

The United States is holding dozens of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay who have no meaningful connection to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and were sent to the maximum-security facility over the objections of intelligence officers in Afghanistan who had recommended them for release, according to military sources with direct knowledge of the matter.

At least 59 detainees -- nearly 10% of the prison population at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- were deemed to be of no intelligence value after repeated interrogations in Afghanistan. All were placed on "recommended for repatriation" lists well before they were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, a facility intended to hold the most hardened terrorists and Taliban suspects.

Dozens of the detainees are Afghan and Pakistani nationals described in classified intelligence reports as farmers, taxi drivers, cobblers and laborers. Some were low-level fighters conscripted by the Taliban in the weeks before the collapse of the ruling Afghan regime.

None of the 59 met U.S. screening criteria for determining which prisoners should be sent to Guantanamo Bay, military sources said. But all were transferred anyway, sources said, for reasons that continue to baffle and frustrate intelligence officers nearly a year after the first group of detainees arrived at the facility.

"There are a lot of guilty [people] in there," said one officer, "but there's a lot of farmers in there too."

The sources' accounts point to a previously

undisclosed struggle within the military over the handling of the detainees. Even senior commanders were said to be troubled by the problems.

Maj. Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey, the operational commander at Guantanamo Bay until October, traveled to Afghanistan in the spring to complain that too many "Mickey Mouse" detainees were being sent to the already crowded facility, sources said.

One senior Army officer described Dunlavey's visit as a "fact-finding" mission. But another who met with Dunlavey said the general's purpose was more direct: "He came over to chew us out," the officer said. Dunlavey, an Army reservist, declined to comment.

The sources blamed a host of problems, including flawed screening guidelines, policies that made it almost impossible to take prisoners off Guantanamo flight manifests and a pervasive fear of letting a valuable prisoner go free by mistake.

"No one wanted to be the guy who released the 21st hijacker," one officer said.

While that concern remains a legitimate one, the fact that dozens of the detainees are still in custody a year or more after their capture has become a source of deep concern to military officers engaged in the war on terrorism around the globe.

Many fear that detaining innocents, and providing no legal mechanism for appeal, can only breed distrust and animosity toward the U.S. -- not only in the home countries and governments of the prisoners but also among the inmates.

"We're basically condemning these guys to long-term imprisonment," said a military official who was a senior interrogator at Guantanamo Bay.

"If they weren't terrorists before, they certainly could be now."

Moreover, he said, even

software

December 27, 2002 2:34 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Non-Military Defense Spending

110.01

Please take a look at this McCain material in this file. Is there something we ought to be doing about fixing some of that? Why don't you get Ken Krieg working on it, or ask Arnold Punaro.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/02 PA&E memo to SecDef re: DoD Budget Graphic

DHR:dh
122701-21 (ts computer)



Please respond by 01/17/03

Ken Krieg
Larry Di Rita
2/0

27 Dec 02

U11331 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9804

133



PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1800

012116



DEC 12 2002

SECDEF HAS SEEN

DEC 27 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Stephen A. Cambone *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: DoD Budget Graphic Snowflake dated November 13, 2002

*Larry DiBite
12/16*

- Via Tab D you asked for the DoD budget as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) on a graph, the absolute numbers since 1970, the percentage of the DoD budget and the absolute dollars for non-military items.
- The graphic with the Dod Budget Authority (BA) as a percentage of GDP and a table with the absolute number are at Tab A.
- Tab B compares the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) forecasts of the Federal Budget surplus for FY02-FY09 with the effects of a \$10B increase to DoD in FY08 and 09.
- Tab C itemizes non-military defense spending in FY03. It includes Senator McCain's annual pork barrel projects press release that details DoD appropriations added by Congress but not requested by DoD.

COORDINATIONS: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Richard P. Burke

(b)(6)

see folder PFI 21



December 27, 2002 1:44 PM

020 SD

TO: LTC Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Time Management

Let's try to get a redo of this time management chart. I think we need to go back and do it for a period of four, five or six months, so that it has a mix in it.

I also think we need to change some of the categories. I would think local travel time should be assigned to NSC, if that is where I am going, or to Capitol Hill, if that is where I am going, or to the President, if that is where I am going. I don't know what is different between NSC and interagency—I would combine them.

I don't know what the difference is between Chairman/JS and Round Table. It seems to me those are of a kind. The thing I would separate out is CENTCOM.

Furthermore, I don't think "social time" is social time. I bet I don't spend one percent social time. If social time is when I go to a Uzbekistan reception or something, then I would think that is Policy.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated "Secretary of Defense Time Management Chart, Last Quarter of 2002"

DHR:dh
122701-15 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 01/24/03

U11332 103

27 Dec 02

SecDef - attached is revised "tracker" per your guidance. We will use this and go back for 6 months. We are now tracking with this construct daily.


11-L-0559/OSD/9806

② C 1/6

Secretary of Defense Time Management Chart Last Quarter of 2002

*So far
This is a good way of looking at
December.
We are searching for "categories"
for future tracking*

01/24



4

December 27, 2002 2:36 PM

326

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Employers of Guard and Reserves

At the Qatar town hall meeting, someone asked about a credit for employers who give training to Guard and Reserves that benefits them in the military. I would like to get an answer to that. Why don't you talk to Personnel and Readiness.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-22 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03

27 Dec 02

U11333 /03

December 28, 2002 12:40 PM

383.6

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Detainees

Please get with Jim Haynes and pull together a briefing on how we have handled all detainees:

- In terms of transferring them to the Agency
- Transferring them to other countries
- What procedures we use in interrogations
- What safeguards we impose when we transfer them to CIA.

Also, I would like an update on the investigation into the two deaths in Bagram.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122701-27 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 01/10/03

28 Dec 02

U11334 /03

1/31
1000

0117

December 28, 2002 3:09 PM

0923

TO: Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MoD Group

Should we develop a Ministers of Defense group that would include people like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Norway, Japan, UK, Australia, Poland, Turkey, Romania, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Colombia and 8 or 10 others?

Doug and Larry, what do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122801-8 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 01/17/03

1/7 - SECDEF HAS SEEN
IAN

Secdef -
Doug is working on a process to do this. I think we should do it, and we should develop a venue to do something with them.

28 Dec 02

U11335 /03
11-L-0559/OSD/9810
D. Rita

12/31
1000

December 28, 2002 3:09 PM

413,51

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Total Information Awareness

Should this article on Total Information Awareness be moved around to people?

Should I return Senator Byron Dorgan's call?

Thanks.

Attach. 12/9 DI RITA memo to JORDES

Taylor, Stuart Jr., "Big Brother and Another Overblown Privacy Scare," *National Journal*, 12/07/02

DHR:dh
122801-7 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

ASD/LA 1/7

Powell Moore -

*Does Senator Dorgan
still want to
speak with SecDef?
Does he still expect
a call?*

U11336 103

Jerry

28 Dec 02

National Journal

4 of 30 results [Previous Story](#) | [Next Story](#) | [Back to Results List](#)

12-07-2002

COLUMN: Big Brother and Another Overblown Privacy Scare

Editorial writers and other guardians of privacy have had a field day with the reports that former Reagan National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter has come back as a cross between Dr. Strangelove and Big Brother. Poindexter is watching you, or soon will be, his detractors suggest, as they lovingly detail his 1990 convictions (later reversed on appeal) for his lies to Congress about the Iran-Contra affair. The Web site for Poindexter's "Total Information Awareness" program at the Pentagon foolishly fans such fears, featuring the slogan "Scientia Est Potentia"-Knowledge Is Power-complete with an ominous, all-seeing eye atop a pyramid.

Poindexter is "getting the 'data-mining' power to snoop on every public and private act of every American," hyperventilated William Safire of The New York Times, in a November 14 column that helped touch off a frenzy of similar stuff. The Homeland Security Act, claimed Safire, would put Poindexter in control of a vast government database, containing "every purchase you make with a credit card, every magazine subscription you buy and medical prescription you fill, every Web site you visit ... complaints from nosy neighbors to the FBI," and much more.

Blather, nonsense, piffle, and flapdoodle. Poindexter has no more (and probably less) power to compile a computer dossier on you than I do. He has no more power to invade your privacy than the Pentagon procurement officer for a new machine gun has to shoot you with it. He might like to create a grand central database in which to fish through billions of transactions and other records for clues on possible terrorists. But he got no such authority from the homeland security bill and-given his Iran-Contra baggage-he never will get it.

The job of the brainy, technologically adept Poindexter is to develop technology, not set policy. He hopes (says his program's Web site) to "revolutionize the ability of the United States to detect, classify, and identify foreign terrorists-and decipher their plans." The goal-one to which many privacy guardians seem stunningly indifferent-is to thwart terrorist attacks and thus to save lives.

Poindexter is a high-level official of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which helped create the Internet. His office is working on what he calls a "prototype system," using "synthetic transactions" and other, mostly simulated data to test the capacity of computer-based pattern-recognition techniques known as "data-mining" to home in on people who might be terrorists. His office vaguely acknowledges that it is already providing technology to military intelligence agencies for use in analyzing data these agencies have legally obtained. Because of the possible effect on privacy of these current activities, and because any broader system could ultimately work well only by continuously monitoring all of us-or at least all foreigners-Congress should do some continuous monitoring of its own and

explore whether to strengthen protections such as the Privacy Act.

Underneath the flap about Poindexter, a well-meaning patriot cursed with abysmal judgment, lie important questions that have been glossed over as though inconsequential. How can we identify future Mohamed Attas before they murder hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of us? What kinds of data-mining might penetrate their plans before it is too late? What exactly would be the risks to privacy, and how can we minimize them? Might this be the only way "for us to survive as a civilization," as Stanford University computer scientist Jeffrey Ullman suggested in an interview with Salon's Farhad Manjoo?

"By looking at all kinds of information about citizens and visitors, we would know who's renting Ryder trucks or buying fertilizer for bombs or fermenters to make biological warfare agents, or who is visiting Internet Web sites to find instructions for designing a nuclear weapon." That's not Poindexter talking. That's Ashton Carter, a former Clinton Defense Department official who is now a professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, as quoted in the Carnegie Reporter. Carter is one of 44 members of a high-powered task force sponsored by the Markle Foundation, which explored the potential uses (and abuses) of data-mining in a thoughtful October 7 report titled "Protecting America's Freedom in the Information Age."

Data-mining and analysis can mean anything from a simple Google search of a known suspect's name to constant sifting by supercomputers through vast private and governmental databases to identify people with purchasing, travel, or behavioral patterns that experts consider to be shared by terrorists. The Markle report describes how "the use of watchout lists.... and access to quite modest forms of data" could have thwarted the September 11 attacks.

For starters, running the names of all airline ticket purchasers through the government's "watch list" of suspected terrorists would have flagged two of the 19 hijackers-to-be in August 2001. Checking their addresses could have led to three more, including Mohamed Atta. His phone records could have led to another five. An 11th had used the same frequent flier number as one of first two. Checks on recent flight-school attendees, expired visas, and other data might have led to the rest.

Future terrorists using false names, the Markle report notes, "can still be identified ... with a biometric algorithm derived from a photograph of the face" or fingerprints, which "can go into a government database when ... someone applies for a visa, or is arrested, or receives a driver's license, for instance." Such data, together with intelligence about suspected terrorists and their "networks of contacts and support," could be used to screen people seeking access to dangerous pathogens, extremely hazardous materials, or critical electronic networks.

Should we bar this sort of thing because it would subject some innocent people to unwelcome scrutiny? Or because some rogue officials might be willing to risk exposure and disgrace by leaking or threatening to leak information about pornographic video rentals, extramarital adventures, or the like to harass or blackmail political dissidents? Should we eschew fishing expeditions through Ryder truck rental records and fertilizer purchases?

Not if we want to prevent terrorist mass murders. And I, for one, am a lot less worried about the government snooping through my credit card bills and psychiatric records than about being anthraxed in the subway or killed by a nuclear explosion in my downtown Washington office.

We should, of course, minimize the risks of abuse, error, and invasion of privacy. The Markle task force compiles page after page of suggestions, including "tools that create audit trails of parties who carry out searches, that anonymize and minimize information to the greatest extent possible, and that prevent ... dissemination of irrelevant information to unauthorized persons or entities."

The important question is whether the risks to privacy posed by any particular data-mining proposal outweigh the hope that it might save lives. The answer, in every case, will depend on careful cost-benefit analysis. For now, rather than running screaming from the room or lobbying Congress to "shut down" DARPA's work on this potentially life-saving technology—as The New York Times idiotically demanded—we should remedy the government's current inability even to "make sense of the prodigious amounts of information it already has," in the words of Philip Zelikow, executive director of the Markle task force.

Far from emulating Big Brother, the government has so far failed even to pull together widely available, not-very-private data that could be useful in screening airline passengers, transporters of extremely hazardous materials, and so on. Indeed, a Senate Appropriations subcommittee recently killed a \$20 million program to research such modest forms of data analysis, says Zelikow, who is also the director of the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs and a member of President Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Markle report expresses skepticism about the effectiveness of the more exotic-and scarier-approach of "endless mining of vast new government data warehouses to find intricate correlations," especially those based on psychological profiles. By generating large numbers of false positives, Zelikow says, that approach could lead to intrusions on innocent people, ill will, lawsuits, and a political backlash against even the most effective and least intrusive forms of data-mining. Those who are serious about saving lives understand the need for safeguards to allay concerns about privacy.

And "the greatest danger to American privacy," Zelikow says, "would arise after another major terrorist attack. Those who pose privacy and security as warring goals may thus end up getting neither. The emerging center on these issues will be made up of people in both parties who see privacy and security as complementary goals that have to be achieved together and in balance."

Stuart Taylor Jr.

National Journal

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December 28, 2002 3:09 PM

020 DOD

TO: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The DoD Challenge

Could you please take a look at this memo, check it for accuracy and edit it so it is accurate? Maybe Arnold Punaro could help.

Thanks.

Attach.
The DoD Challenge, 06/25/01

DHR:dh
122801-6 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 01/24/03

28 Dec 02

U11337 /03

②
Armed Forces
Res. War
M.C.

June 25, 2001

SUBJECT: The DoD Challenge

What is the biggest change in the Pentagon over the past 25 years? Almost without notice, the reservoir of trust—the glue that makes relationships work—has been drained. The answer is that there has been an erosion of confidence between:

- The senior military leadership and their subordinates, as seen in the increase in resignations of junior officers, those who could be the military leaders of the future.
- Political leadership and the Armed Forces due to under funding that has left the impression that our government undervalues military service.
- The Department of Defense and Congress, leading to a layering of restrictions and requirements that have reduced the DoD's ability to manage the Department.

The Defense establishment is tangled in its anchor chain. To manage DoD efficiently and to transform the Armed Forces for the 21st century we need to first transform the Department—how it operates internally, how it deals with its industrial suppliers, and how it interacts with the Congress.

The Armed Forces have been fortunate in attracting and retaining truly outstanding men and women, who voluntarily put their lives at risk to perform the noble work of defending our country. But government too often provides training and equipment that are more appropriate for the Cold War than for the coming decades.

DoD is one of the largest enterprises on earth, but its leadership has little control over the resources, personnel, and operations of the Department. DoD:

- Is unable to reallocate savings to more effective ends, so managers at all levels have no incentive to save dollars.
- Can't account for millions of transactions valued at more than \$2.6 trillion.
- Is required by law to submit 905 reports to Congress per year, many of which are of marginal value and probably little read, despite the hundreds of trees sacrificed.

DRAFT-2

- Has to respond to some 2,500 to 3,000 inquiries of concern or complaint from Members of Congress each week.
- Has a backlog of some 150,000 security clearances.
- With a \$300 billion budget, needs Congressional approval to build a \$500,000 building and is required to maintain some 20-25%+ more facilities than are needed.
- Is monitored closely by the General Accounting Office, more than eight Inspectors General and a testing organization that report to Congress, with the result that the Department has so many auditors and inspectors—some 24,000—that they approximate the number of U.S. Army “trigger pullers” that can be deployed at any one time.
- Has overhead that has grown to the point where it is estimated that only 14% of the DoD manpower is directly related to combat operations.
- Has antiquated personnel policies, many of which were designed to manage a conscript force of single men, but now manage a volunteer force with families.
- Has several different personnel systems that enlist their workforces for four-year tours, as opposed to bringing them onboard for a career.
- Has policies that uproot personnel and families every few years to move them to new assignments, and then, after training them and benefiting from their fine services, shove many out while still in their 40’s.
- Has policies that commission officers, train them, and then bounce them and their families from assignment to assignment every two to three years, to the point that the most successful officers skip across the tops of the waves so fast that they can’t learn from their own mistakes because they are seldom in an assignment long enough to see what they were; and then we ease them out to retirement between the ages of 45 and 55, while still in their prime.
- Has benefit and assistance programs for military personnel that some critics say emulate the failed Soviet model of centralized systems for housing, commissaries, and healthcare, rather than using private sector competitive models that are the envy of the world.
- Has three separate Post Exchange systems, and a law prohibiting DoD from consolidating them without the approval of Congress.

DRAFT-2

- Is faced with a process where in the year 2000 54% of the President's DoD R&D programs were changed by Congress and 32% of its procurement programs.
- Has three or four different health systems and three or four surgeons general, rather than a single service that an efficient, large-scale enterprise would fashion.
- Grade and rank systems more than 100 years old and which were rejected years ago by the for-profit sector in favor of flatter, more nuanced organizations and compensation arrangements.
- Financial management and information systems designed to report to Congress and comply with the maze of laws, amendments and requirements that have grown geometrically and accumulated over decades, rather than systems designed to provide the financial information managers need to manage.
- Rules, regulations and approval requirements that guarantee the Defense establishment infrastructure remains decades behind in recapitalization, rather than the more efficient models most companies use, including outsourcing, sale/lease back arrangements, and privatizing.
- Organizations and practices that perpetuate separateness, as we talk of "jointness," causing many dedicated, well-organized, able people to work hard doing things that need not and/or should not be done.
- Despite some 128 DoD acquisition reform studies, an acquisition system that since 1975 has doubled the time it takes to produce a weapon system, while the pace for new generations of technology has shortened from years to 18 months, guaranteeing that DoD's newest weapons will be one or more technology generations old the day they are fielded.
- Processes and regulations so onerous that many commercial businesses, developing needed military technologies, refuse to do business with DoD.
- A U.S. defense industrial base that has declined from 20+ companies in 1976 to 5 major firms today, with the 6th a foreign firm.
- Seeks a warrior culture, but slides from what some estimate to be in the neighborhood of a 55/45 teeth-to-tail ratio to a 45/55 ratio (percentages depend on classification categories).

DRAFT-2

- Statutory requirements that include some \$7 billion of non-traditional defense programs that run the gamut of non-defense interests from education, drugs and the environment to snakes, fossils and cancer research.
- Metrics more focused on inputs, efforts and intentions than on outputs and results.
- A pattern of legal and/or Congressional challenges to most major program decisions.
- A Defense Authorization Bill that in 1962 was one page; in 1975 totaled 75 pages; today, packed with requirements, prohibitions, stipulations, entitlements and mandated organizational structures, it has ballooned to 988 pages, during a time when the number of men and women in the armed forces has dropped from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.

This situation has undoubtedly evolved over the past decades as a result of a series of instances that caused distrust between the Congress and the Department. Unfortunately, the result has not been improved oversight. Quite the contrary, each new layer of control and micromanagement has compounded the problem of accountability. From a practical standpoint, DoD no longer has the authority to conduct the business of the Department, and, as a result, its performance is deteriorating.

The maze of constraints on the Department forces it to operate in a manner that is so slow, so ponderous and so inefficient that whatever it ultimately does produce is late, wasteful of taxpayer dollars, and has the unintended result of leading to still more letters of complaint and calls of criticism from Congress, more critical hearings and more condemnation in GAO reports, to be followed by a still greater number of amendments, restrictions and requirements to try to correct the seeming mismanagement.

Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces for the tasks ahead is important. However, transforming how DoD functions and its relationship with Congress may be even more important. Without transforming the Department, the transformation of the armed forces may not be possible. What may be needed is an "omnibus process" to overhaul this relationship and a "compact" so controls, requirements, reports and regulations in future years will have a sunset provision and do not again compound over time.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are outstanding people who care about our country both in Congress and working throughout the Defense Department,

DRAFT-2

none of whom would knowingly damage national interest, that is our circumstance.

Our country functions smoothly today because of the rule of law. If all contracts in our society had to be adjudicated or were subject to constant oversight, the system would break down completely. Fortunately, that is not the case. Almost all of our business and personal relationships are based not on oversight, inspections, audits, adjudication or micromanagement. Rather, they are based on trust.

Today that is not true. Over time, the regulations and requirements that have been laid on are so onerous that, over time, they are smothering incentive, innovation and risk taking.

The late Senator Everett Dirksen used to tell the story about how to cook a frog. He said if you put a frog into a pot of boiling water, it will jump out. But, if you put a frog in cool water, it will be comfortable in its new surroundings. Then, if you slowly turn up the heat, the frog will not notice. Eventually the water will boil, and you will have a cooked frog.

That is what has happened. It has taken decades of small, logical, or at least understandable, individual acts to create a situation where in the aggregate they prevent the Department from serving the national interest.

No large institution willingly reforms itself. Resistance to change is great. To accomplish the task will take the best efforts of the President, the civilian and military leadership in the Department, and, importantly, the leaders and Members of the House and Senate.

During his term each President has available only the Defense capabilities left by his predecessors. So, too, the decisions he makes and the capabilities invested in during his term will be available not to him, but to his successors.

So it is our responsibility to get about the task of transforming this great national asset, the Department of Defense, that is so needed to preserve peace and stability in our still dangerous, untidy and dynamic world.

The country and the men and the women of the Armed Forces who put their lives at risk deserve no less.

DHR:dh
SR/current MFRs/Challenge
6/25/01 11:10 AM

Snowflake

12/08
Larry -
Sec Def wants
you to ask Mr. DuBois about this.
DRAFT
RSC LD

December 28, 2002 12:48 PM

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM:

SUBJECT: Puerto Rico

realigning our force structure to
better match our
base structure,

When we look at ~~base closures~~, I want to look very hard at Puerto Rico. ~~That is no longer an environment hospitable to US military. My instinct is to take a good, hard look at it in the context of base closing.~~

Thanks.

DHR dh
122801-4 (ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

1/7
Salonnie
That says it all!
1/7

Puerto Rico

28 Dec 02

U11358 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9821

December 28, 2002 12:46 PM

C11/27
Puerto Rico

TO: LTC Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Puerto Rico

Why

Please find out all the US military has in Puerto Rico.

1/28/03

Thanks.

ACTUAL #S TODAY

DHR:dh
122801-3 (ts computer)

TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MC	AF
2754	835	1836	15	68

.....
Please respond by 01/10/03

+ 3,273 CIVILIANS

v/r
CDR S.

***ACTIVE Duty Military Personnel Strength in Puerto Rico by Service:**

Total	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
2,525	804	1642	23	56

*Numbers from Defense Almanac

Please return to DTG CRADDOCK
[Signature]
1/28

28 Dec 02

U11339 /03

FROM FY02 BASE STRUCTURE REPORT

NOT ACTUAL #s - AUTHORIZED ONLY

Svc	Comp	Installation Name	Authorized MIL	Authorized CIV
Army	Active	Fort Buchanan	2348	1722
Navy	Active	NAVSECGRUACT Sabana Seca	135	107
		NAVCOMTELSTA Roosevelt Rds Rq	61	20
		NAVSTA <u>Roosevelt Roads PR</u>	2236	390
Air Force	Active	Lajas Radar Site (TARS #16)		
		Ramey AF <u>Solar Observatory</u>	9	
Army	Guard	Carolina	118	
		Juan Ponce De Leon Armory	188	
		Spc Angel L. Hernandez	131	
		Bayamon	118	
		Maj. Carlos Rafael Cruz Torres	118	
		Yauco Armory		
		SFC Adolfo Rivera-Ortiz		
		Cayey	406	
		Fort Allen Coe#43177	947	
		Arecibo	182	
		MTA Camp Santiago	429	
		Utua	131	
		Ponce Armory	120	
		Ramey Base	242	
		Sgt Angel G. Martinez	131	
		Cpt Alejo Rivera- Morales	188	
		SFC Rodolfo Velez	131	
		Hangar No. 21	96	
		Gen Luis R. Esteves	158	
		Fort Buchanan		
		Army Aviation Support Facility		
		Vega Baja Armory	277	
		Penuelas	115	
		Cpt Ruben Acosta	275	
		PFC Arcadio Alagarin	131	
		Israel Vargas Armory		
		Cpt. Antonio R. Rocafort	146	
		Pvt Raul M. Burgos		
		PFC Jorge Figueroa	131	

		1Sg Pedro A. Roig	131	
		CSM Jose (Pepe) Diaz	177	
Army	Reserves	LTC H.G. Pesquera/Ft Allen	580	
		Fort Allen USARC/Prang		
		Cpt E. Rubio Jr./Puerto Nuevo	1130	
		1Lt P. Lavergne/Bayamon	424	
		MSG D. Claudio/Caguas	169	
		AMSA #161 (G)		
		Roosevelt Rds Nav Sta USARC	497	
		Cpt P.J. Parra/Ponce	172	
		Ramey USARC/Aquadilla	636	
		PFC S.C. Aviles/Salinas	120	
		PFC L.G. Oliveras/Yauco	120	
		Cpl J.G. Rosario/Aquadilla	120	
Air Force	Guard	Camp Santiago Range (ANG)		
		Fort Allen ANG		
		Punta Borinquen Radar Site		
		Luis Munoz Marin Intl Airport	916	
		Punta Salinas Radar Site	212	
USMC	Reserves	Hdqtrs 4th MARDIV (Multi-Sites)		
			15102	2239

C117

December 30, 2002 7:02 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Bill Luti
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strmecki's Briefing

h

I would like to get the top Afghanistan people briefed by Strmecki and see what they think about his briefing. Also, I think we ought to get McNeill and Eikenberry briefed by him on a SVTC sometime soon.

Please give me a report as to what we have done with Strmecki since we first heard the briefing and I left town.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
123091-19 (ts computer) doc

.....

Please respond by 01/10/03

AK

1/2/03

SIR: INITIAL RESPONSE AS FOLLOWS:

- ① DEPSECDEF IS SIGNING OUT A ^{Memo} ~~MEMO~~ TO HADLEY (WITH A COPY OF THE BRIEF) REQUESTING THE NEXT AVAILABLE SLOT AT A DC MEETING, WILL ADVISE WHEN A DATE IS DETERMINED.
- ② SVTS IS SET UP FOR THURSDAY, 9 JAN FOR FRANKS, DELONG McNEILL AND EIKENBERRY. WILL ADVISE WHEN ACTION COMPLETE.

30 Dec 02

U11341 103

WELCOME BACK...

11-L-0559/OSD/9825 Bill Luti 2

December 30, 2002 7:21 PM

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Response to Tom Opferman

Please e-mail Tom Opferman:

"Thank you and Happy New Year.

Yes, please send Nick a copy of the judgment and decree and also send it to Jim Denny as trustee of the Rumsfeld Family Trust and the Nicholas Rumsfeld Trust, so that he will have that as part of the file."

Thanks.

DHR.dh
123002-24 (ts computer) doc



Please respond by 01/03/03

3355A

U1134 /03

30 Dec 02

December 30, 2002 11:51 AM

TO: David Chu
CC: Dov Zakheim
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Reserve v. Active Duty Tasks

906

Attached is a note I sent to Dov Zakheim and his response to me.

Would you please look into the subject and then schedule a briefing for me sometime in mid-January. I don't think I am satisfied with the approach it looks like the Services intend to take.

I have trouble seeing why we have to have a reserve call-up anytime we want to engage in conflict. It simply tips off the fact that that is what we are going to do months before we are able to do it. From the standpoint of strategic surprise, I think that is foolish.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/01/02 SecDef memo to USD(C) and PA&E re: Tasks--Reserve v. Active Duty [110102-19]
11/14/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
123001-3 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

U11344 /03

November 1, 2002 2:47 PM

TO: ~~Don Zakheim~~
Steve Cambone

SC

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tasks—Reserve v. Active Duty

Today we had a briefing on Reserves and active duty personnel. It is very clear that there are some distinctive tasks only found in the Reserves that are not found on active duty, which means if you want to do those things you have to activate Reservists. That seems to me to be unwise.

I would like a list of what those things are, and then an indication of what the various Services are doing to put those critical skills back on active duty, rather than in the Reserves. This has to be reflected in the budget in some way.

Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110102-19



Please respond by 11/15/02

12/5
Zakheim response attached
D. Rite

cc - Cambone
done 12/4
sc

Larry Di Rite
12/4



COMPTROLLER

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100

222 NOV 15 PM 3:03



INFO MEMO

November 14, 2002, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim NOV 15 2002

SUBJECT: Tasks - Reserve vs. Active Duty

- You noted that some distinctive tasks are found only in the reserves and not in the active duty force. You asked what these tasks are, what the Services are doing to put these skills on active duty, and how this is reflected in the budget ~~document~~.
- Tab B lists capabilities in each Military Service that are found nearly exclusively (~80 - 100 percent) in the Reserve Components. It notes which capabilities will be reallocated during the ongoing FY 2004 - FY 2009 program/budget review to bring more of them into the active force.
- The Services will bring some capabilities into the active force because demand for these skills has increased. For example, the Army plans to increase its active Civil Affairs units because all recent mobilizations have required this capability.
- The Services are keeping many of the capabilities shown in Tab B in the Reserve Forces because they are never used except during war. Examples include Navy cargo handling units and Army water supply units. Other capabilities are kept in Reserve Forces because they exist in small, specialized communities and are needed on an intermittent basis. Large numbers are not needed for mobilization. Examples include Air Force polar ski aircraft, Army Alaska scout battalions, and Navy and Marine Corps adversary squadrons. The Services judge that it is far less costly to keep units used intermittently in the Reserve Forces than on full-time active duty.
- Other capabilities are simply in short supply, requiring reserves to be mobilized when these are needed. For example, the reserves contain only 35 percent of the Air Force's security forces, but demands since 9-11 have caused the Air Force to mobilize 90 percent of its reserves in this career field. Moving more of these capabilities to the active side would not be sufficient to solve the problem.
- The Services plan to increase capabilities in the active force for shortage skills in the FY 2004 - 2009 program. Only modest ~~changes~~ changes planned for FY 2004.



MR MA CRADDOCK	11/14
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	

11-L-0559/OSD/9829

018398 /02

More significant adjustments are planned by all of the Services beginning in FY 2005.

- Within constant end strength levels, adding capabilities to the active force would require offsets. The Quadrennial Defense Review-directed "Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense," performed by the USD (P&R), suggests options for making these offsets: convert lower-demand structure inside the active force and reallocate capabilities from the active force to the Reserve Forces. The review also identifies options for maximizing key capabilities held in Reserve Forces but needed intermittently: convert lower demand structure inside the Reserve Forces, and change reserve personnel management to enhance volunteerism and diminish involuntary mobilization.
- The next Defense Planning Guidance can add additional direction to ensure such force changes are made.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: John M. Evans,

(b)(6)

Mission Area	RC Personnel	RC Units	% of Total Force	Description	FY 04-09 Budget Changes
Marine Corps					
Civil Affairs	242	2	100%	Intermittent surge requirements, using civilian-based skills.	None
Adversary Squadrons	28	1	100%	Steady-state, predictable requirement, using aircraft not assigned to war plans.	None
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	494	2	100%	Active component capability will provide MAGTF Commanders enhanced capability for fire support liaison and coordination with allies.	Reorganization of existing MEF assets to establish new AC capability. RC assets stay the same.
Air Force					
Weather Reconnaissance	203	1	100%	Steady-state requirements well suited to the Reserves.	None
Air Defense Interceptor	2,674	4	100%	Vacillating threat levels since 9/11 may require intermittent AC support.	None
Aerial Spraying	409	4 aircraft	100%	Steady-state peacetime requirement managed by RC in AEF construct.	None
Polar Ski Aircraft	218	10 aircraft	100%	Reimbursable program funded by National Science Foundation.	None

Mission Area	RC Personnel	RC Units	% of Total Force	Description	FY 04-09 Budget Changes
Army					
Civil Affairs	6,064	40	95%	Civilian acquired skills needed to rebuild infrastructure. Increased requirements in later phases of small scale contingencies.	Added AC structure to support ongoing increased demand.
Public Affairs	1,412	64	92%	Limited peacetime requirement; RC provides wartime surge.	Increased RC capability
Division Institutional Training	23,883	5	100%	Supports CONUS training base expansion during mobilization. Runs peacetime training for active & reserve units.	None
Training Support Divisions	11,480	7	79%	Multi-component units to provide training evaluation for RC units; improve readiness. Validates units for deployment.	None
Water Supply	3,610	49	92%	Limited peacetime requirement.	None
Alaska Scouts	945	3	100%	World War II, Cold War derived capability; now Congressionally supported.	None
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams	692	32	100%	By law, National Guard support of on-site situational assessments to civil authorities for WMD incidents within CONUS.	None
Navy					
Mobil Inshore Undersea Warfare	2,898	45	100%	Additional AC structure required. After USS Cole, 24/7 demand increased.	\$99M RC Equipment; no force changes
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	87	3	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Harbor Defense	413	14	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Port Cargo Handling Support	3,087	14	100%	Low peacetime demand	None
Logistics Support Airlift	3,800	15	88%	Steady state, predictable requirements manageable with non-mobilized Reserves.	None

showtime
1/2
0800

December 30, 2002 12:03 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gen. Kadish and Missile Defense

Here is a memo from Chris Williams on Kadish. Is any of that true? If so, my instinct is to get a hold of him and make sure he stays on. What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/21/02 Chris Williams memo to SecDef re: Missile Defense

DHR:dh
123001-8 (ts computer).doc

1/17/03

.....
Please respond by 01/17/03 **SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JAN 24 2003

DEC 31 2002

Sir-

*I will talk with Ron about his plans.
If you would choose to extend him, I think he needs guidance from you as follows:*

- 1. make clear to staff we are not in a development forever mode*
- 2. That risks commensurate with anticipated gain are encouraged -*
- 3. large, unweildy program offices w/in MD are of no interest - lean & tough management is what is needed.*
- 4. New blood is needed; too many senior staff have been with the program for 15+ years!*
- 5. Space operations need investment, now.*
- 6. You want to see every 6 months a brief on:*

*U11345 103 - technical progress
- what new things are now done w/o ASMT
- 0559/ASD/9883 for deployments.*

30 Dec 02

EC

Copy To: Crouch (date -19)
Combane
Staser Holcomb
C/12/2

December 21, 2002

Larry Di Rita
12/23

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: Chris Williams *CW*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Congratulations to you, J.D. Crouch, LTG Ron Kadish and of course the President on the announcement earlier this week of U.S. plans to begin fielding limited ballistic missile defenses in late 2004. This marks an historic accomplishment, made possible not only by American technical ingenuity but also by the vision, determination, and foresight of the new administration. Well done!

The President's decision ends once and for all the debate that had been raging in certain quarters (including within the mid-level ranks in the Missile Defense Agency) about whether the purpose of the U.S. missile defense program should be the pursuit of scientific research or instead whether it should focus on fielding capabilities in an incremental, "spiral" fashion. The new programmatic and policy guidance is based on a solid policy foundation that effectively integrates various international, domestic, and technical factors.

With the program now aimed at accomplishing clear policy goals set by the President, the emphasis will be on technical program development and maturation. Recent test successes in the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and the Navy Upper Tier programs bode well in this regard. However, you should be aware that "rumor mill" is rife with suggestions that LTG Kadish is about to retire, with the tacit (or express) approval of senior leaders of the Department.

Sir, I have had the pleasure of working closely with each and every missile defense agency director - military and civilian alike - starting with LTG Jim Abrahamson in 1983 right up through Ron Kadish. I am impressed by Ron Kadish's program management skills and, equally important, his willingness to "stay in his lane" and not meddle in policy matters and to follow your and the President's guidance. He has done a fine job as "trailblazer" for the Department's streamlined acquisition process and "capabilities-based" planning. The few concerns I have heard expressed by your staff in OSD or program supporters on the Hill about missile defense program management issues have been targeted on the MDA staff and not at LTG Kadish directly.

I understand that you are (or may soon be) considering whether to extend Ron Kadish for another stint as director, MDA, or possibly to allow him to retire and then re-hire him as a civilian. For what it's worth, I believe that Ron has done a superb job and should remain in that position (either in uniform or as a civilian) at least through the end of the President's first term. Such continuity, I am convinced, would benefit the program and the overall missile defense enterprise. Best regards.

December 30, 2002 11:59 AM

TO: Chris Williams
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense Memo

Thanks for your memo on missile defense. I will look into the question on Ron Kadish. I quite agree that he has done an outstanding job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
123001-7 (ts computer).doc

373.011

U11346 /03

30 Dec 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9835

• snowflake

December 30, 2002 12:03 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anticipatory Self-Defense

Why don't you move this anticipatory self-defense memo around to some of the people in DoD as well as to the General Counsels at the State Department, White House and CIA.

381

Thanks.

Attach.
08/02/02 GC memo to SecDef re: "Anticipatory Self-Defense"

DHR:dh
123001-11 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 01/10/03

30 Dec 02
U11347 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/9836




GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

August 2, 2002, 10:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Anticipatory Self-Defense

- Self-defense has been a fundamental right recognized in the customs and practices of nations. These practices are sometimes called the “law of nations” or “customary international law.” The UN Charter—the most important codification of those customs and practices—did not create the right, nor does it limit it.
- The 1837 “*Caroline Case*” is generally cited as establishing the right of “anticipatory self-defense” under customary international law.
 - The steamer *Caroline* had been supplying armed insurgents against British rule in Canada with reinforcements of men and materiel from the United States. In response to the threat of more activity of this sort, a British force from Canada entered U.S. territory at night, seized the *Caroline*, set the ship on fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls, killing two U.S. citizens in the process.
 - The British claimed they were acting in self-defense. In an exchange of diplomatic notes, Secretary of State Daniel Webster called upon the British to show that the “necessity of self-defense [was] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”
 - Webster’s articulation of the justification needed for use of force in that circumstance supports the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense.
 - The *Caroline* case has been distilled into two principal requirements for using force in anticipatory self-defense:
 - The use of force must be necessary because of both the imminent nature of the threat and the absence of peaceful alternatives, and,
 - The response to the threat must be proportionate.



- Recent U.S. practice can be seen to demonstrate that the custom among nations (i.e., customary international law) is in accord:
 - Cuban Missile Crisis – nuclear missile bases in Cuba labeled an “immediate threat” and imposition of a blockade a justifiable act of self-defense.
 - 1986 air strikes on Libya justified in large part as anticipatory self-defense.
 - 1989 military action in Panama – President Bush explained the action was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger.
 - 1993 attack on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in response to compelling evidence Iraq had attempted to assassinate President Bush justified as self-defense.
 - 1998 cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan in response to U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania justified as “a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of future terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities.”
- With the advent of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons and the potential for terrorists to obtain such weapons, the degree of imminence required to justify using force in anticipatory self-defense arguably should be seen differently: the threat need not be as demonstrably imminent if there is an increased risk of occurrence and an increased magnitude of harm.
- Taking those changed circumstances and the practice among nations into account, the appropriate analysis might be stated as follows:
 - Anticipatory self-defense is justified if a state:
 - Reasonably believes that it will be the subject of attack by WMD or terrorism;
 - Pursues nonmilitary remedies to no avail;
 - Waits until further delay would unreasonably increase the chances of significant harm ; and
 - Uses force proportional to the threat.

COORDINATION: None

cc: CJCS
USD(P)

July 29, 2002 9:13 AM

TO: Marc Thiessen
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Anticipatory Self-Defense

Tom Shook

8/9
DI
CC

I saw this piece in the *Early Bird* that refers to "anticipatory self-defense" and references the UN charter and customary international law doctrine. I like the phrase.

Jim, please look into this and see if there is such an "international law doctrine of anticipatory self-defense."

Thanks.

Attach.

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, "No Declaration of War Needed," *Wall Street Journal*, 07/26/02

DHR:dh
072902-6

.....

Please respond by 08/09/02

8/12

Haynes response attached.
V/R
Ed

December 30, 2002 12:32 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Millennium Challenge

Please take a look at this memo on Millennium Challenge and tell me if you think we ought to go ahead and implement some of the suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated SecNav memo: "Lessons Learned from Millennium Challenge 2002 (and others) and Recommendations for Change"

DHR:dh
123001-12 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by 01/24/03

353

U11348 /03

30 Dec 02

as a result of
SECNAV'S visit
to JFCOM

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 (AND OTHERS)
AND

• RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

[Handwritten signature]
8/13

1. Modeling and simulation can provide an analytical basis for weapon system decisions, thereby making these decisions less subjective.
 - Expand JFCOM charter to include evaluation of major weapon systems' acquisitions/improvements in a joint warfighting environment.
2. Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) provided an environment for people to excel, to innovate, to be excited, committed and effective, to do things quickly, to be proud of their accomplishments, etc. However, when programs developed by MC02 transition to mainline DoD, they will be smothered by the bureaucracy, and we will be fortunate to have these programs operational in 3-5 years.
 - Reduce confusion and frustration within DOD by defining clear lines of authority and responsibility. Clarify the Secretary of Defense's "as he may designate" responsibilities to remove ambiguities and conflicts regarding Title 10 authorities. Use this organization clarification to rationally reduce staffs and duplications.
3. MC02 utilized a large amount of off-the-shelf commercial equipment and a large number of contractor personnel.
 - Revamp the procurement system in DoD to incorporate commercial procurement practices to facilitate the procurement of both military-unique and commercial equipment (differentiate between buying commercial and buying with commercial practices). Further, rely on the commercial and defense companies to perform functions that are not government core competencies.
4. MC02 integrated various service specific training and test ranges around the country via data networks. This is similar to how our services will organize and fight in the joint environment yet OT&E is still pursuing a physical integration.
 - The tendency in DoD appears to be one of centralization vice decentralization, most evident by the training and test example, and by the defense agencies that perform highly centralized functions for DoD. Adopt decentralization as a matter of policy and centralize by exception only. Start with the test and training decision. Reduce and/or outsource Defense Agencies per recommendations of ongoing studies (Ken Krieg lead).

5. Unwieldy financial and acquisition rules and regulations and their interpretations increase costs and delay programs. The DoD rules and regulations empower the bureaucracy to sustain the organization. The rules and regulations are so numerous and complex that any program can be delayed by almost anyone who cares to do so. D
- Immediately zero base and simplify all DoD financial and acquisition rules, regulations and procedures. This is also an issue of authority and responsibility. The organizations that are responsible to execute the programs do not have the authority to implement. D

July 17, 2002 1:58 PM


TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Broder Article

I thought you might find this of interest.

Attach.

David Broder, "Wobbly Words," *The Washington Post*, 07/14/02

DHR:dh
071702-6

As we discussed


U11380-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9843

David S. Broder

Wobbly Words

The confidence crisis that has overtaken the Bush administration has many dimensions, but at bottom, it comes down to a single question: Can you take this president's words seriously?

For most of his presidency and, indeed, his political career, George Bush has enjoyed the reputation of saying what he means and meaning what he says. But now uncertainty is infecting both foreign policy and domestic issues and stretching from the Middle East to Wall Street. While his personal approval scores remain very high in the polls, he is building a catalogue of policy contradictions and retreats that threaten to undermine his leadership.

Presumably, at some point the stock market will recover, but the first returns on Bush's efforts to restore confidence in Wall Street were anything but encouraging. In the first two days after Bush journeyed to the heart of the financial world on a self-assigned mission to banish the world's worries about the integrity of corporate America, the Dow Jones industrial average fell more than 400 points and the Nasdaq market index hit its lowest mark since 1997.

This was not what Bush had in mind when he opened his Tuesday morning address on Wall Street with five successive paragraphs setting forth all the reasons that confidence in the American free enterprise system "is well-placed."

"We can be confident," he declared, not only because of "the amazing achievements of American workers and entrepreneurs" but because "America is taking every necessary step to fight and win the war on terror" and because "last year, we passed the biggest tax cut in a generation" to spur economic growth.

Whether this was just rhetoric or was meant to be taken seriously, Bush's words clearly linked confidence in him and his policies with trust in financial markets and the corporate culture from

which he sprang.


But a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll released soon after Bush spoke showed only two out of five Americans think the United States and its allies are winning the war on terrorism, fewer than those who think it a stalemate.

And Friday, the president's budget office announced that instead of running a small surplus this year, the government is headed for a deficit of as much as \$165 billion, a warning signal about the economic future.

Bush's personal performance has added to the wobble in confidence. The last-minute news conference in which he returned to the public stage from his Independence Day holiday was the weakest, most inarticulate showing he has made since the early months of his presidency. Asked repeatedly about his sale of stock in Harken Energy Corp., where he was a director, shortly before it had to revise upward its reported losses for the year, he responded eight times with variations on the words, "It has been looked at by the SEC," the Securities and Exchange Commission, which found no reason to challenge the legality of his action.

When Bush is feeling defensive, he seems to think that reiteration is as effective as explanation or persuasion. It is not, but it is better than outright contradiction. And it turns out that, as a Harken director, Bush received two low-interest loans from the corporation to finance his purchase of company stock—the very kind of transaction that he condemned in his Wall Street speech.

The problem is deeper. It involves policy reversals as well as personal contradictions. Nine months ago, Bush said he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or



REUTERS

alive." When asked about the elusive terrorist last week, Bush pretended he hardly matters, answering a question on bin Laden with the remark that "the war on terrorism is a lot bigger than one person."

Three months ago, Bush issued an ultimatum to Ariel Sharon to withdraw Israeli forces from Palestinian territories in the West Bank "without delay." Last week, with the Israelis still there, he said, he will "call upon the Israelis, as security improves, to allow for more freedom of movement by the Palestinian people." That's quite a difference.

In the real world, where presidents must operate, friends and foes are constantly testing and assessing how seriously they must take the words of any leader. We do not know how Sharon or Yasser Arafat (who's been told by Bush to take a hike) or Saddam Hussein or bin Laden gauge this American president.

But last week, America's allies in the United Nations defied a Bush administration threat to end U.S. participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping operation unless our troops were given blanket immunity from possible prosecution by the new International Criminal Court. Instead, the United States will seek a temporary exemption, leading one unnamed diplomat to tell *The Post*, "the Americans blinked."

Too many back-downs in too short a time.

October 16, 2002 10:17 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
LTG Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dates on Papers

312

If you could please find ways to date every document that comes into me, I would appreciate it. I get so many documents, and they seem to be successive documents, that I never know which one is first.

Please ask the Joint Staff to date things, and tell everyone else to date things.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
101602-25



Please respond by _____

16 Oct 02

U11393 / 03

EF1916 LIA

02/009337-OSDIP

June 20, 2002 10:42 AM

JUN 21 2002

[Handwritten initials]

ISA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)
SUBJECT: Letter to Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Please draft a congratulatory letter from me to Hamid Karzai, which includes something along the lines of: "My warm congratulations on your selection by the loya jirga as _____. Please know that I look forward to working with you in the weeks and months ahead."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-8

.....
Please respond by 06/28/02

[Handwritten signature]
7/17
Attached
[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]
7/17
erry Di Rita

Som

Response attached
SFB
7/7

2051102

JUN 21 02 10:47

11-L-0559/OSD/9846

06-21-02 12:01 PM

U11397 /02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 23 2002

The Honorable Sabahattin Cakmakoglu
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Turkey
Ministry of National Defense
Ankara, Turkey

Turkey

Dear Minister Cakmakoglu:

I want to thank you and tell you how pleased we are that the Republic of Turkey has taken over as lead nation for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Turkey's leadership of this important mission underscores its valuable contributions as a NATO partner committed to international peace and security. ISAF has been an important stabilizing force in Kabul and we are confident that the able leadership of Major General Zorlu and the Turkish armed forces will build on the success of Major General McColl's efforts.

The Department of Defense looks forward to working with you in the weeks and months ahead on these and other important matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

2356102

U11439-02



11-L-0559/OSD/9847



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 23 2002

General Huseyin Kivrikoglu
Commander, Turkish Armed Forces
Republic of Turkey
General Staff
Ankara, Turkey

Dear General Kivrikoglu:

I am very pleased that the Republic of Turkey has taken over as lead nation for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

There is much work ahead as we continue the war on terrorism and assisting in Afghanistan's transition to a stable government. ISAF is an important stabilizing force in Kabul and we are confident that the able leadership of Major General Zorlu and the Turkish armed forces will build on the success of Major General McColl's efforts.

The Department of Defense looks forward to working with you in the weeks and months ahead on these and other important matters.

Sincerely,

cc:
Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

U11439-02


11-L-0559/OSD/9848

SARAH DISKETTE TABLE OF CONTENTS
RELEASING DOCUMENT

CREATION DATE: 110702
CREATION TIME: 05570000
SARAH VERSION NUMBER: 3.03
MAXIMUM CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION ON THIS DISKETTE: UUUU
DISKETTE RELEASING OFFICIAL'S NAME: DONALD H. RUMSFELD
ORG: OFFICE: SECDEF PHONE:
TOC FILE CRC: 22613

FILENAME	MSG PREC ACTION	DATE/TIME	FILETIME	TOT/ TOR	SPECAT	CRC
	TYPE CLASS	GROUP	SSN		CIC	
TURISAF	DD173 RR UU REDY	181645ZJUL02			ZYUW N	20795

SECDEF
ORGANIZATION/OFFICE SYMBOL/PHONE NUMBER


DONALD H. RUMSFELD

JUL 23 2002

U11439-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9849

DTG: 181645Z JUL 02

PAGE 01 of 02

Drafter's Name : MUSTAFA POPAL
Office/Phone : ISA/NESA (b)(6)

Releaser's Info : DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECDEF

Action Prec : ROUTINE
Info Prec : ROUTINE
Specat :

From: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
To: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
Info: USDAO ANKARA TU
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

TEXT FOLLOWS

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: SECDEF LETTERS

1. REQUEST YOU DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTERS FROM SECRETARY RUMSFELD TO MINISTER SABAHATTIN CAKMAKOGLU AND GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

A. QUOTE:

THE HONORABLE SABAHATTIN CAKMAKOGLU
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ANKARA, TURKEY

DEAR MINISTER CAKMAKOGLU:

(PARA) I WANT TO THANK YOU AND TELL YOU HOW PLEASED WE ARE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY HAS TAKEN OVER AS LEAD NATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) TURKEY'S LEADERSHIP OF THIS IMPORTANT MISSION UNDERSCORES ITS VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS A NATO PARTNER COMMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. ISAF HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT STABILIZING FORCE IN KABUL AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE ABLE LEADERSHIP OF MAJOR GENERAL ZORLU AND THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES WILL BUILD ON THE SUCCESS OF MAJOR GENERAL MCCOLL'S EFFORTS.

(PARA) THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS.

**
SINCERELY, DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF QUOTE.

UNCLASSIFIED

U11439-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9850

UNCLASSIFIED

DTG: 181645Z JUL 02

PAGE 02 of 02

B. QUOTE:

GENERAL HUSEYIN KIVRIKOGLU
COMMANDER, TURKISH ARMED FORCES
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
GENERAL STAFF
ANKARA, TURKEY

DEAR GENERAL KIVRIKOGLU:

(PARA) I AM VERY PLEASED THAT THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY HAS TAKEN OVER AS LEAD NATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN.

(PARA) THERE IS MUCH WORK AHEAD AS WE CONTINUE THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND ASSISTING IN AFGHANISTAN'S TRANSITION TO A STABLE GOVERNMENT. ISAF IS AN IMPORTANT STABILIZING FORCE IN KABUL AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE ABLE LEADERSHIP OF MAJOR GENERAL ZORLU AND THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES WILL BUILD ON THE SUCCESS OF MAJOR GENERAL MCCOLL'S EFFORTS.

(PARA) THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD ON THESE AND OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS.

**
SINCERELY, DONALD H. RUMSFELD

END OF QUOTE.

2. HARD COPIES TO FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

U11439-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9851

1/19
12:00



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF1923 U6

272 JUL 13 AM 11:23

USDP

[Handwritten signature] 7/13/02

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

I-02/009341

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

ASD/ISA 7/13/02
Has Seen

SUBJECT: Letters to Turkish MOD and Commander of Armed Forces

- Attached for your review and approval are letters to the Turkish MOD and the Commander of the Armed Forces applauding Turkey's commitment to lead the ISAF.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign letters to Turkish MOD and Commander of Armed Forces (Next under).

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:
As stated

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
 Call back to advise
 7/13
 (Som)
 A. R. Di Rita
 7/13
 PDASD - Amy Di Rita

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, NESA, (b)(6)

DASD *[Handwritten signature]*

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>[Handwritten signature]</i> 7/13

**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000**

**Ambassador
Embassy of Turkey
2525 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington DC 20008**

11-L-0559/OSD/9853

13
142

JUN 21 2002

Dr

EF1918LW
02/068341-U&DK
June 20, 2002 10:41 AM

TSYA

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Letter to Turkey

DR

Please draft a letter from me to the Defense Minister of Turkey and the Chief of Staff of Turkey, saying how pleased we are that they have taken over the ISAF and that we look forward to working with them.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062002-15



Please respond by 06/25/02

Paul- 7/9
These need to be smoothed and put in message format.

TLH
Cade

7/7
Larry Di Rita
DL

Response Attached
SF3
7/3

JUN 21 2002



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 JUL 19 AM 11:16



INFO MEMO

July 18, 2002 – 2:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
SUBJECT: Proposed Top Ten Priorities for the Department of Defense
-- SNOWFLAKE

David S. C. Chu 18 July 02

381

My nominees for the top ten priorities would be:

1. Maintain—indeed, improve—our success in attracting, retaining and motivating quality people, military and civilian. Without such people our equipment and organizational structures are of little value. The strategic plans we have developed for our military and civil personnel will do this; our challenge is to follow through. I am less sanguine about attracting and motivating the best in contract personnel under current federal procurement policies, however.
2. Rethink how we employ and deploy these people to meet contemporary needs. We still use a draft-era approach to the employment of people, viewing them as “cheap” and “expendable.” (Our effort to design a new “social compact” with our people begins to address this issue.) Likewise, many of our deployments are informed more by history, and the reluctance of our allies and other constituencies to contemplate change, than by current military demands. We have too much “just in case,” not enough “just in time.”
3. Manage personnel costs strategically—not by chintzing on compensation, but by reconceiving our approach to manpower “requirements,” such that “doing more with less” is no longer a slur, but a compliment.
4. Foster a spirit of experimentation, shaping new ideas into successful innovations, encouraging imaginative rethinking.

1850102

U11459-02

5. Counter growing anti-Americanism by rethinking how we use our forces overseas—less static presence, with its heavy burden on the host nation, more collaborative engagement, building our knowledge of the local situation and our ties to the progressive elements of indigenous society. (Translation: End permanent stationing of forces, move to intermittent presence focused on joint exercises.)
6. Provide some capability against a wide spectrum of possibilities, rather than focusing on just one or two, but be ready to expand that capability rapidly as the situation might dictate. This implies:
 - a. Less emphasis on target destruction as our war aim, more on controlling population behaviors (mobile infantry? constabulary capabilities? irregular forces? civil affairs? public diplomacy? foreign area detachments?)
 - b. Less emphasis on fighter aircraft as our principal investment, more on other means of identifying and destroying targets (bombers—“trucks”? unmanned vehicles? electromagnetic energy devices? non-lethal mechanisms?)
 - c. Less emphasis on classic power projection platforms, more experimentation with other means (e.g., less forward stationing, forward deployment, more intermittent presence; launching Joint Strike Fighters from amphibious ships, not just carriers; trying out Admiral Owens’ floating island; more Army use of afloat prepositioning)
 - d. Rethinking the role of the reserves as the basis of expansion (despite your skepticism, the reserves remain a relatively inexpensive way to store human resources—and may be the only way to access some capabilities in the civil sector); the active-reserve mix study you directed provides a start.
 - e. Preparing for unconventional attacks (e.g., biological warfare).
7. Developing a wider range of investment choices to support the wider range of capabilities we need. Now under development is a distressingly narrow set of platforms, a high fraction designed in the Cold War, or at its end (F-22, V-22, Virginia class submarines, Nimitz class carriers, etc.) We should initiate more design efforts—and at the same time make clear that not all designs will be taken into production.

8. Use existing service exercises to begin transforming our training to the joint/combined focus that will characterize future operations. This can start in FY 2003 (we will be presenting the Deputy Secretary in early August with options to do so).
9. Translate all this into a vibrant, bold FY 2004-09 Defense Program and a Planning Guidance for the following cycle that drives the Department's agenda for the next decade.
10. One slot reserved for future use, since we will surely discover at least one major challenge we can't now anticipate....

RECOMMENDATION: None


COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock,

(b)(6)

7/17/02

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the Military Departments
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs
 Undersecretaries of Defense
 Assistant Secretaries of Defense
 Steve Cambone
 Larry Di Rita
 Andy Marshall
 Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 16, 2002

SUBJECT: **Priorities**

With the "sense of urgency" memo in mind, please think through what you believe to be the top ten priorities the Department ought to have for the next 6 - 18 months.

Be prepared to discuss when we next meet on the "way ahead" memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 071602.07

Please respond by: 7/25/02



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 23 2002

Mr. J. William Leonard
Director
Information Security Oversight Office
700 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Room 5W
Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Leonard:

Pursuant to Section 5.4(a) of Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Security and Information Operations) (DASD(S&IO)), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) (OASD(C3I)) is appointed as my representative to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. The Director of Security (DASD(S&IO)) will serve as the alternate. Incumbents of these positions will continue to serve on the ISCAP until further notification.

Sincerely,

9/23/02

23 Jul 02



11-L-0559/OSD/9859

U11472 /02



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2002 JUL 19 PM 1:08

July 3, 2002 12:00pm

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

FOR: ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~

DEPSECDEF Action _____

FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT, ASD(C3I) *[Signature]*
F. LINDENHARDT 7/17

SUBJECT: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) Membership

- TAB A appoints the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense(S&IO) as the DoD ISCAP member and reaffirms the Director of Security(S&IO) as the alternate DoD member. The DoD representative, Principal Director(S&IO), has departed the organization for a position in another agency, requiring the Secretary to appoint a new member.
- Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information" (TAB B) established the ISCAP as the forum to decide final classification and declassification decisions. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs each appoint a senior level representative to serve as a member of the Panel. The representative is authorized to speak on behalf of their principal. The ISCAP meets monthly.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign TAB A.

COORDINATION: None required.

[Handwritten signature: Som 7/23]
[Handwritten signature: DRL]

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>7/2</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/2</i>

Prepared by: C. Bromwell, (b)(6)

U11472-02

11-L-0559/OSD/9860

Federal Register

Thursday
April 20, 1995

Part IV

The President

Executive Order 12958—Classified
National Security Information

19823

11-L-0559/OSD/9861

Presidential Documents

Title 3—

Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995

The President**Classified National Security Information**

This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national interest has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, and our participation within the community of nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's security remains a priority. In recent years, however, dramatic changes have altered, although not eliminated, the national security threats that we confront. These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open Government.

NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART 1—ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION

Section 1.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.

(b) "Information" means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government. "Control" means the authority of the agency that originates information, or its successor in function, to regulate access to the information.

(c) "Classified national security information" (hereafter "classified information") means information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

(d) "Foreign Government Information" means:

(1) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, with the expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence;

(2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or

(3) information received and treated as "Foreign Government Information" under the terms of a predecessor order.

(e) "Classification" means the act or process by which information is determined to be classified information.

(f) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure.

(g) "Original classification authority" means an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance.

(h) "Unauthorized disclosure" means a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

(i) "Agency" means any "Executive agency," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, and any other entity within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified information.

(j) "Senior agency official" means the official designated by the agency head under section 5.6(c) of this order to direct and administer the agency's program under which information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified.

(k) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation that the information or relationship, or both, are to be held in confidence.

(l) "Damage to the national security" means harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, to include the sensitivity, value, and utility of that information.

Sec. 1.2. Classification Standards. (a) Information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met:

- (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information;
- (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government;
- (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.5 of this order; and
- (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified. This provision does not:

- (1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or
- (2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.

(c) Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.

Sec. 1.3. Classification Levels. (a) Information may be classified at one of the following three levels:

- (1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- (2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.
- (3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify United States classified information.

(c) If there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower level.

Sec. 1.4. Classification Authority. (a) The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by:

- (1) the President;
- (2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the **Federal Register**; or
- (3) United States Government officials delegated this authority pursuant to paragraph (c), below.

(b) Officials authorized to classify information at a specified level are also authorized to classify information at a lower level.

(c) Delegation of original classification authority.

(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this order. Agency heads are responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.

(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President or by an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2), above.

(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may be delegated only by the President; an agency head or official designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2), above; or the senior agency official, provided that official has been delegated "Top Secret" original classification authority by the agency head.

(4) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided in this order. Each delegation shall identify the official by name or position title.

(d) Original classification authorities must receive training in original classification as provided in this order and its implementing directives.

(e) Exceptional cases. When an employee, contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency that does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that person to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with this order and its implementing directives. The information shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this order or its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall decide within 30 days whether to classify this information. If it is not clear which agency has classification responsibility for this information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. The Director shall determine the agency having primary subject matter interest and forward the information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a classification determination.

Sec. 1.5. Classification Categories.

Information may not be considered for classification unless it concerns:

- (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
- (b) foreign government information;
- (c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
- (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
- (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
- (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; or
- (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects or plans relating to the national security.

Sec. 1.6. Duration of Classification. (a) At the time of original classification, the original classification authority shall attempt to establish a specific date

or event for declassification based upon the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information. The date or event shall not exceed the time frame in paragraph (b), below.

(b) If the original classification authority cannot determine an earlier specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision, except as provided in paragraph (d), below.

(c) An original classification authority may extend the duration of classification or reclassify specific information for successive periods not to exceed 10 years at a time if such action is consistent with the standards and procedures established under this order. This provision does not apply to information contained in records that are more than 25 years old and have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code.

(d) At the time of original classification, the original classification authority may exempt from declassification within 10 years specific information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security for a period greater than that provided in paragraph (b), above, and the release of which could reasonably be expected to:

- (1) reveal an intelligence source, method, or activity, or a cryptologic system or activity;
- (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
- (3) reveal information that would impair the development or use of technology within a United States weapons system;
- (4) reveal United States military plans, or national security emergency preparedness plans;
- (5) reveal foreign government information;
- (6) damage relations between the United States and a foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are reasonably expected to be ongoing for a period greater than that provided in paragraph (b), above;
- (7) impair the ability of responsible United States Government officials to protect the President, the Vice President, and other individuals for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized; or
- (8) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

(e) Information marked for an indefinite duration of classification under predecessor orders, for example, "Originating Agency's Determination Required," or information classified under predecessor orders that contains no declassification instructions shall be declassified in accordance with part 3 of this order.

Sec. 1.7. Identification and Markings. (a) At the time of original classification, the following shall appear on the face of each classified document, or shall be applied to other classified media in an appropriate manner:

- (1) one of the three classification levels defined in section 1.3 of this order;
- (2) the identity, by name or personal identifier and position, of the original classification authority;
- (3) the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise evident;
- (4) declassification instructions, which shall indicate one of the following:
 - (A) the date or event for declassification, as prescribed in section 1.6(a) or section 1.6(c); or
 - (B) the date that is 10 years from the date of original classification, as prescribed in section 1.6(b); or
 - (C) the exemption category from declassification, as prescribed in section 1.6(d); and
- (5) a concise reason for classification which, at a minimum, cites the applicable classification categories in section 1.5 of this order.

(b) Specific information contained in paragraph (a), above, may be excluded if it would reveal additional classified information.

(c) Each classified document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are classified, with the applicable classification level, which portions are exempt from declassification under section 1.6(d) of this order, and which portions are unclassified. In accordance with standards prescribed in directives issued under this order, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may grant waivers of this requirement for specified classes of documents or information. The Director shall revoke any waiver upon a finding of abuse.

(d) Markings implementing the provisions of this order, including abbreviations and requirements to safeguard classified working papers, shall conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.

(e) Foreign government information shall retain its original classification markings or shall be assigned a U.S. classification that provides a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information.

(f) Information assigned a level of classification under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Whenever such information is used in the derivative classification process or is reviewed for possible declassification, holders of such information shall coordinate with an appropriate classification authority for the application of omitted markings.

(g) The classification authority shall, whenever practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise unclassified document.

Sec. 1.8. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations. (a) In no case shall information be classified in order to:

- (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
- (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
- (3) restrain competition; or
- (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified.

(c) Information may not be reclassified after it has been declassified and released to the public under proper authority.

(d) Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of section 3.6 of this order only if such classification meets the requirements of this order and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official designated under section 5.6 of this order. This provision does not apply to classified information contained in records that are more than 25 years old and have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code.

(e) Compilations of items of information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that:

- (1) meets the standards for classification under this order; and
- (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of information.

As used in this order, "compilation" means an aggregation of pre-existing unclassified items of information.

Sec. 1.9. Classification Challenges. (a) Authorized holders of information who, in good faith, believe that its classification status is improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification status of the information in accordance with agency procedures established under paragraph (b), below.

(b) In accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency head or senior agency official shall establish procedures under which authorized holders of information are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification of information that they believe is improperly classified or unclassified. These procedures shall assure that:

- (1) individuals are not subject to retribution for bringing such actions;
- (2) an opportunity is provided for review by an impartial official or panel; and
- (3) individuals are advised of their right to appeal agency decisions to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel established by section 5.4 of this order.

PART 2—DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

Sec. 2.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) "Derivative classification" means the incorporating, paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information that is already classified, and marking the newly developed material consistent with the classification markings that apply to the source information. Derivative classification includes the classification of information based on classification guidance. The duplication or reproduction of existing classified information is not derivative classification.

(b) "Classification guidance" means any instruction or source that prescribes the classification of specific information.

(c) "Classification guide" means a documentary form of classification guidance issued by an original classification authority that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element.

(d) "Source document" means an existing document that contains classified information that is incorporated, paraphrased, restated, or generated in new form into a new document.

(e) "Multiple sources" means two or more source documents, classification guides, or a combination of both.

Sec. 2.2. Use of Derivative Classification. (a) Persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide, need not possess original classification authority.

(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:

- (1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and
- (2) carry forward to any newly created documents the pertinent classification markings. For information derivatively classified based on multiple sources, the derivative classifier shall carry forward:
 - (A) the date or event for declassification that corresponds to the longest period of classification among the sources; and
 - (B) a listing of these sources on or attached to the official file or record copy.

Sec. 2.3. Classification Guides. (a) Agencies with original classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative classification of information. These guides shall conform to standards contained in directives issued under this order.

(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:

- (1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official; and

(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.

(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to assure that classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under this order.

PART 3—DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING

Sec. 3.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order:

(a) "Declassification" means the authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information.

(b) "Automatic declassification" means the declassification of information based solely upon:

- (1) the occurrence of a specific date or event as determined by the original classification authority; or
- (2) the expiration of a maximum time frame for duration of classification established under this order.

(c) "Declassification authority" means:

- (1) the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position;
- (2) the originator's current successor in function;
- (3) a supervisory official of either; or
- (4) officials delegated declassification authority in writing by the agency head or the senior agency official.

(d) "Mandatory declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information in response to a request for declassification that meets the requirements under section 3.6 of this order.

(e) "Systematic declassification review" means the review for declassification of classified information contained in records that have been determined by the Archivist of the United States ("Archivist") to have permanent historical value in accordance with chapter 33 of title 44, United States Code.

(f) "Declassification guide" means written instructions issued by a declassification authority that describes the elements of information regarding a specific subject that may be declassified and the elements that must remain classified.

(g) "Downgrading" means a determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.

(h) "File series" means documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is arranged in accordance with a filing system or maintained as a unit because it pertains to the same function or activity.

Sec. 3.2. Authority for Declassification. (a) Information shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification under this order.

(b) It is presumed that information that continues to meet the classification requirements under this order requires continued protection. In some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified. When such questions arise, they shall be referred to the agency head or the senior agency official. That official will determine, as an exercise of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected from disclosure. This provision does not:

- (1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or procedures for classification; or
- (2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject to judicial review.

(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office determines that information is classified in violation of this order, the Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that originated

the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(d) The provisions of this section shall also apply to agencies that, under the terms of this order, do not have original classification authority, but had such authority under predecessor orders.

Sec. 3.3. Transferred Information. (a) In the case of classified information transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order.

(b) In the case of classified information that is not officially transferred as described in paragraph (a), above, but that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession of such information shall be deemed to be the originating agency for purposes of this order. Such information may be declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession after consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the information.

(c) Classified information accessioned into the National Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives") as of the effective date of this order shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist in accordance with this order, the directives issued pursuant to this order, agency declassification guides, and any existing procedural agreement between the Archivist and the relevant agency head.

(d) The originating agency shall take all reasonable steps to declassify classified information contained in records determined to have permanent historical value before they are accessioned into the National Archives. However, the Archivist may require that records containing classified information be accessioned into the National Archives when necessary to comply with the provisions of the Federal Records Act. This provision does not apply to information being transferred to the Archivist pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code, or information for which the National Archives and Records Administration serves as the custodian of the records of an agency or organization that goes out of existence.

(e) To the extent practicable, agencies shall adopt a system of records management that will facilitate the public release of documents at the time such documents are declassified pursuant to the provisions for automatic declassification in sections 1.6 and 3.4 of this order.

Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25 years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below.

(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a), above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

- (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States;
- (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
- (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;
- (4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;

- (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
- (6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
- (7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other officials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;
- (8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans; or
- (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

(c) No later than the effective date of this order, an agency head shall notify the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of any specific file series of records for which a review or assessment has determined that the information within those file series almost invariably falls within one or more of the exemption categories listed in paragraph (b), above, and which the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification. The notification shall include:

- (1) a description of the file series;
- (2) an explanation of why the information within the file series is almost invariably exempt from automatic declassification and why the information must remain classified for a longer period of time; and
- (3) except for the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source, as provided in paragraph (b), above, a specific date or event for declassification of the information.

The President may direct the agency head not to exempt the file series or to declassify the information within that series at an earlier date than recommended.

(d) At least 180 days before information is automatically declassified under this section, an agency head or senior agency official shall notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, serving as Executive Secretary of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, of any specific information beyond that included in a notification to the President under paragraph (c), above, that the agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification. The notification shall include:

- (1) a description of the information;
- (2) an explanation of why the information is exempt from automatic declassification and must remain classified for a longer period of time; and
- (3) except for the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence source, as provided in paragraph (b), above, a specific date or event for declassification of the information. The Panel may direct the agency not to exempt the information or to declassify it at an earlier date than recommended. The agency head may appeal such a decision to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The information will remain classified while such an appeal is pending.

(e) No later than the effective date of this order, the agency head or senior agency official shall provide the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office with a plan for compliance with the requirements of this section, including the establishment of interim target dates. Each such plan shall include the requirement that the agency declassify at least 15 percent of the records affected by this section no later than 1 year from the effective date of this order, and similar commitments for subsequent years until the effective date for automatic declassification.

(f) Information exempted from automatic declassification under this section shall remain subject to the mandatory and systematic declassification review provisions of this order.

(g) The Secretary of State shall determine when the United States should commence negotiations with the appropriate officials of a foreign government or international organization of governments to modify any treaty or international agreement that requires the classification of information contained in records affected by this section for a period longer than 25 years from the date of its creation, unless the treaty or international agreement pertains to information that may otherwise remain classified beyond 25 years under this section.

Sec. 3.5. Systematic Declassification Review. (a) Each agency that has originated classified information under this order or its predecessors shall establish and conduct a program for systematic declassification review. This program shall apply to historically valuable records exempted from automatic declassification under section 3.4 of this order. Agencies shall prioritize the systematic review of records based upon:

- (1) recommendations of the Information Security Policy Advisory Council, established in section 5.5 of this order, on specific subject areas for systematic review concentration; or
- (2) the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood of declassification upon review.

(b) The Archivist shall conduct a systematic declassification review program for classified information: (1) accessioned into the National Archives as of the effective date of this order; (2) information transferred to the Archivist pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code; and (3) information for which the National Archives and Records Administration serves as the custodian of the records of an agency or organization that has gone out of existence. This program shall apply to pertinent records no later than 25 years from the date of their creation. The Archivist shall establish priorities for the systematic review of these records based upon the recommendations of the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; or the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood of declassification upon review. These records shall be reviewed in accordance with the standards of this order, its implementing directives, and declassification guides provided to the Archivist by each agency that originated the records. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall assure that agencies provide the Archivist with adequate and current declassification guides.

(c) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may establish special procedures for systematic review for declassification of classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods.

Sec. 3.6. Mandatory Declassification Review. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), below, all information classified under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a review for declassification by the originating agency if:

- (1) the request for a review describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort;
- (2) the information is not exempted from search and review under the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act; and
- (3) the information has not been reviewed for declassification within the past 2 years. If the agency has reviewed the information within the past 2 years, or the information is the subject of pending litigation, the agency shall inform the requester of this fact and of the requester's appeal rights.

(b) Information originated by:

- (1) the incumbent President;
- (2) the incumbent President's White House Staff;
- (3) committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the incumbent President; or

(4) other entities within the Executive Office of the President that solely advise and assist the incumbent President is exempted from the provisions of paragraph (a), above. However, the Archivist shall have the authority to review, downgrade, and declassify information of former Presidents under the control of the Archivist pursuant to sections 2107, 2111, 2111 note, or 2203 of title 44, United States Code. Review procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for consultation with agencies having primary subject matter interest and shall be consistent with the provisions of applicable laws or lawful agreements that pertain to the respective Presidential papers or records. Agencies with primary subject matter interest shall be notified promptly of the Archivist's decision. Any final decision by the Archivist may be appealed by the requester or an agency to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.

(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for declassification shall declassify information that no longer meets the standards for classification under this order. They shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise authorized and warranted under applicable law.

(d) In accordance with directives issued pursuant to this order, agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They also shall provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review request, and for notifying the requester of the right to appeal a final agency decision to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

(e) After consultation with affected agencies, the Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the review of cryptologic information, the Director of Central Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods, and the Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of information accessioned into the National Archives.

Sec. 3.7. Processing Requests and Reviews. In response to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of this order, or pursuant to the automatic declassification or systematic review provisions of this order:

(a) An agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order.

(b) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custody that contain information that was originally classified by another agency, or comes across such documents in the process of the automatic declassification or systematic review provisions of this order, it shall refer copies of any request and the pertinent documents to the originating agency for processing, and may, after consultation with the originating agency, inform any requester of the referral unless such association is itself classified under this order. In cases in which the originating agency determines in writing that a response under paragraph (a), above, is required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that paragraph.

Sec. 3.8. Declassification Database. (a) The Archivist in conjunction with the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and those agencies that originate classified information, shall establish a Governmentwide database of information that has been declassified. The Archivist shall also explore other possible uses of technology to facilitate the declassification process.

(b) Agency heads shall fully cooperate with the Archivist in these efforts.

(c) Except as otherwise authorized and warranted by law, all declassified information contained within the database established under paragraph (a), above, shall be available to the public.

PART 4—SAFEGUARDING

Sec. 4.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a) "Safeguarding" means measures and controls that are prescribed to protect classified information.

(b) "Access" means the ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of classified information.

(c) "Need-to-know" means a determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.

(d) "Automated information system" means an assembly of computer hardware, software, or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store, or control data or information.

(e) "Integrity" means the state that exists when information is unchanged from its source and has not been accidentally or intentionally modified, altered, or destroyed.

(f) "Network" means a system of two or more computers that can exchange data or information.

(g) "Telecommunications" means the preparation, transmission, or communication of information by electronic means.

(h) "Special access program" means a program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level.

Sec. 4.2. General Restrictions on Access. (a) A person may have access to classified information provided that:

- (1) a favorable determination of eligibility for access has been made by an agency head or the agency head's designee;
- (2) the person has signed an approved nondisclosure agreement;
- and
- (3) the person has a need-to-know the information.

(b) Classified information shall remain under the control of the originating agency or its successor in function. An agency shall not disclose information originally classified by another agency without its authorization. An official or employee leaving agency service may not remove classified information from the agency's control.

(c) Classified information may not be removed from official premises without proper authorization.

(d) Persons authorized to disseminate classified information outside the executive branch shall assure the protection of the information in a manner equivalent to that provided within the executive branch.

(e) Consistent with law, directives, and regulation, an agency head or senior agency official shall establish uniform procedures to ensure that automated information systems, including networks and telecommunications systems, that collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, or store classified information have controls that:

- (1) prevent access by unauthorized persons; and
- (2) ensure the integrity of the information.

(f) Consistent with law, directives, and regulation, each agency head or senior agency official shall establish controls to ensure that classified information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed under conditions that provide adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

(g) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency shall safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization of governments that furnished the information. When adequate to achieve equivalency, these standards may be less restrictive than the safeguarding standards that ordinarily apply to United States "Confidential" information, including allowing access to individuals with a need-to-know who have not otherwise been cleared for access to classified information or executed an approved nondisclosure agreement.

(h) Except as provided by statute or directives issued pursuant to this order, classified information originating in one agency may not be disseminated outside any other agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. An agency head or senior agency official may waive this requirement for specific information originated within that agency. For purposes of this section, the Department of Defense shall be considered one agency.

Sec. 4.3. Distribution Controls. (a) Each agency shall establish controls over the distribution of classified information to assure that it is distributed only to organizations or individuals eligible for access who also have a need-to-know the information.

(b) Each agency shall update, at least annually, the automatic, routine, or recurring distribution of classified information that they distribute. Recipients shall cooperate fully with distributors who are updating distribution lists and shall notify distributors whenever a relevant change in status occurs.

Sec. 4.4. Special Access Programs. (a) Establishment of special access programs. Unless otherwise authorized by the President, only the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each, may create a special access program. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities, but not including military operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods, this function will be exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence. These officials shall keep the number of these programs at an absolute minimum, and shall establish them only upon a specific finding that:

- (1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional; and
- (2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure; or
- (3) the program is required by statute.

(b) *Requirements and Limitations.* (1) Special access programs shall be limited to programs in which the number of persons who will have access ordinarily will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the information involved.

(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order.

(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the oversight program established under section 5.6(c) of this order. In addition, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded access to these programs, in accordance with the security requirements of each program, in order to perform the functions assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office under this order. An agency head may limit access to a special access program to the Director and no more than one other employee of the Information Security Oversight Office; or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and vulnerable, to the Director only.

(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review annually each special access program to determine whether it continues to meet the requirements of this order.

(5) Upon request, an agency shall brief the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her designee, on any or all of the agency's special access programs.

(c) Within 180 days after the effective date of this order, each agency head or principal deputy shall review all existing special access programs under the agency's jurisdiction. These officials shall terminate any special access programs that do not clearly meet the provisions of this order. Each existing special access program that an agency head or principal deputy validates shall be treated as if it were established on the effective date of this order.

(d) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under 10 U.S.C. 119.

Sec. 4.5. Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees. (a) The requirement in section 4.2(a)(3) of this order that access to classified information may be granted only to individuals who have a need-to-know the information may be waived for persons who:

- (1) are engaged in historical research projects; or
- (2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President.

(b) Waivers under this section may be granted only if the agency head or senior agency official of the originating agency:

- (1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of national security;
- (2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this order; and
- (3) limits the access granted to former Presidential appointees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a Presidential appointee.

PART 5—IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

Sec. 5.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a) "Self-inspection" means the internal review and evaluation of individual agency activities and the agency as a whole with respect to the implementation of the program established under this order and its implementing directives.

(b) "Violation" means:

- (1) any knowing, willful, or negligent action that could reasonably be expected to result in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
- (2) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to classify or continue the classification of information contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives; or
- (3) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order.

(c) "Infraction" means any knowing, willful, or negligent action contrary to the requirements of this order or its implementing directives that does not comprise a "violation," as defined above.

Sec. 5.2. Program Direction. (a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the co-chairs of the Security Policy Board, shall issue such directives as are necessary to implement this order. These directives shall be binding upon the agencies. Directives issued by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall establish standards for:

- (1) classification and marking principles;
- (2) agency security education and training programs;
- (3) agency self-inspection programs; and
- (4) classification and declassification guides.

(b) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall delegate the implementation and monitorship functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(c) The Security Policy Board, established by a Presidential Decision Directive, shall make a recommendation to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with respect to the issuance of a Presidential directive on safeguarding classified information. The Presidential directive shall pertain to the handling, storage, distribution, transmittal, and destruction of and accounting for classified information.

Sec. 5.3. Information Security Oversight Office. (a) There is established within the Office of Management and Budget an Information Security Oversight Office. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall appoint the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, subject to the approval of the President.

(b) Under the direction of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget acting in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall:

- (1) develop directives for the implementation of this order;
- (2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this order and its implementing directives;
- (3) review and approve agency implementing regulations and agency guides for systematic declassification review prior to their issuance by the agency;
- (4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of each agency's program established under this order, and to require of each agency those reports, information, and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. If granting access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior agency official shall submit a written justification recommending the denial of access to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget within 60 days of the request for access. Access shall be denied pending a prompt decision by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, who shall consult on this decision with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- (5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend Presidential approval through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
- (6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the program established under this order;
- (7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standardization of forms or procedures that will promote the implementation of the program established under this order;
- (8) report at least annually to the President on the implementation of this order; and
- (9) convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the program established by this order.

Sec. 5.4. Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

(a) Establishment and Administration.

(1) There is established an Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel ("Panel"). The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall each appoint a senior level representative to serve as a member of the Panel. The President shall select the Chair of the Panel from among the Panel members.

(2) A vacancy on the Panel shall be filled as quickly as possible as provided in paragraph (1), above.

(3) The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary. The staff of the Information Security Oversight Office shall provide program and administrative support for the Panel.

(4) The members and staff of the Panel shall be required to meet eligibility for access standards in order to fulfill the Panel's functions.

(5) The Panel shall meet at the call of the Chair. The Chair shall schedule meetings as may be necessary for the Panel to fulfill its functions in a timely manner.

(6) The Information Security Oversight Office shall include in its reports to the President a summary of the Panel's activities.

(b) *Functions.* The Panel shall:

(1) decide on appeals by persons who have filed classification challenges under section 1.9 of this order;

(2) approve, deny, or amend agency exemptions from automatic declassification as provided in section 3.4 of this order; and

(3) decide on appeals by persons or entities who have filed requests for mandatory declassification review under section 3.6 of this order.

(c) *Rules and Procedures.* The Panel shall issue bylaws, which shall be published in the **Federal Register** no later than 120 days from the effective date of this order. The bylaws shall establish the rules and procedures that the Panel will follow in accepting, considering, and issuing decisions on appeals. The rules and procedures of the Panel shall provide that the Panel will consider appeals only on actions in which: (1) the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies within the responsible agency; (2) there is no current action pending on the issue within the federal courts; and (3) the information has not been the subject of review by the federal courts or the Panel within the past 2 years.

(d) Agency heads will cooperate fully with the Panel so that it can fulfill its functions in a timely and fully informed manner. An agency head may appeal a decision of the Panel to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Panel will report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs any instance in which it believes that an agency head is not cooperating fully with the Panel.

(e) The Appeals Panel is established for the sole purpose of advising and assisting the President in the discharge of his constitutional and discretionary authority to protect the national security of the United States. Panel decisions are committed to the discretion of the Panel, unless reversed by the President.

Sec. 5.5. Information Security Policy Advisory Council.

(a) *Establishment.* There is established an Information Security Policy Advisory Council ("Council"). The Council shall be composed of seven members appointed by the President for staggered terms not to exceed 4 years, from among persons who have demonstrated interest and expertise in an area related to the subject matter of this order and are not otherwise employees of the Federal Government. The President shall appoint the Council Chair from among the members. The Council shall comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App. 2.

(b) *Functions.* The Council shall:

(1) advise the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or such other executive branch officials as it deems appropriate, on policies established under this order or its implementing directives, including recommended changes to those policies;

(2) provide recommendations to agency heads for specific subject areas for systematic declassification review; and

(3) serve as a forum to discuss policy issues in dispute.

(c) *Meetings.* The Council shall meet at least twice each calendar year, and as determined by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(d) *Administration.*

(1) Each Council member may be compensated at a rate of pay not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-18 of the general schedule under section 5376 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Council.

(2) While away from their homes or regular place of business in the actual performance of the duties of the Council, members may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5 U.S.C. 5703(b)).

(3) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of funds, the Information Security Oversight Office shall provide the Council with administrative services, facilities, staff, and other support services necessary for the performance of its functions.

(4) Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, that are applicable to the Council, except that of reporting to the Congress, shall be performed by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office in accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the General Services Administration.

Sec. 5.6. General Responsibilities. Heads of agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:

(a) demonstrate personal commitment and commit senior management to the successful implementation of the program established under this order;

(b) commit necessary resources to the effective implementation of the program established under this order; and

(c) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer the program, whose responsibilities shall include:

(1) overseeing the agency's program established under this order, provided, an agency head may designate a separate official to oversee special access programs authorized under this order. This official shall provide a full accounting of the agency's special access programs at least annually;

(2) promulgating implementing regulations, which shall be published in the **Federal Register** to the extent that they affect members of the public;

(3) establishing and maintaining security education and training programs;

(4) establishing and maintaining an ongoing self-inspection program, which shall include the periodic review and assessment of the agency's classified product;

(5) establishing procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that: (i) require that a need for access to classified information is established before initiating administrative clearance procedures; and (ii) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information is limited to the minimum consistent with operational and security requirements and needs;

(6) developing special contingency plans for the safeguarding of classified information used in or near hostile or potentially hostile areas;

(7) assuring that the performance contract or other system used to rate civilian or military personnel performance includes the management of classified information as a critical element or item to be evaluated in the rating of: (i) original classification authorities; (ii) security managers or security specialists; and (iii) all other personnel whose duties significantly involve the creation or handling of classified information;

(8) accounting for the costs associated with the implementation of this order, which shall be reported to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office for publication; and

(9) assigning in a prompt manner agency personnel to respond to any request, appeal, challenge, complaint, or suggestion arising out of this order that pertains to classified information that originated in a component of the agency that no longer exists and for which there is no clear successor in function.

Sec. 5.7. Sanctions. (a) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of this order or its implementing directives may have occurred, the Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the senior agency official so that corrective steps, if appropriate, may be taken.

(b) Officers and employees of the United States Government, and its contractors, licensees, certificate holders, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they knowingly, willfully, or negligently:

(1) disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under this order or predecessor orders;

(2) classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this order or any implementing directive;

(3) create or continue a special access program contrary to the requirements of this order; or

(4) contravene any other provision of this order or its implementing directives.

(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.

(d) The agency head, senior agency official, or other supervisory official shall, at a minimum, promptly remove the classification authority of any individual who demonstrates reckless disregard or a pattern of error in applying the classification standards of this order.

(e) The agency head or senior agency official shall:

(1) take appropriate and prompt corrective action when a violation or infraction under paragraph (b), above, occurs; and

(2) notify the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office when a violation under paragraph (b)(1), (2) or (3), above, occurs.

PART 6—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 6.1. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.

(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

(c) Nothing in this order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law, including the exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This order is not intended, and should not be construed, to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or its employees. The foregoing is in addition to the specific provisions set forth in sections 1.2(b), 3.2(b) and 5.4(e) of this order.

(d) Executive Order No. 12356 of April 6, 1982, is revoked as of the effective date of this order.

Sec. 6.2. *Effective Date.* This order shall become effective 180 days from the date of this order.

William Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 17, 1995.

[FR Doc. 95-9941
Filed 4-18-95, 2:04 pm]
Billing code 3195-01-P

11-L-0559/OSD/9880



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



2002 JUL 22 AM 6:51

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

July 19, 2002, 4:00PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu 19 Jul 02

(signature and date)

SUBJECT: Flexibility--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked (Tab A) what Senator Voinovich and we have been doing to get greater flexibility in the management of defense civilians. DoD agreed with the Office of Management and Budget to send legislation to Congress modeled on the President's Managerial Flexibility Act (MFA). It allows DoD, with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approval, to implement an alternative personnel system (APS) for its white collar General Schedule workforce. It focuses on the best practices in hiring and compensating civilians from ten DoD demonstration projects currently covering 40,000 DoD civilians with some lasting as long as twenty years. APS would not impact current procedures/laws on merit system principles, veterans' preference, equal opportunity, political activity, prohibited practices, and ethics.
- Senator Voinovich had hoped to offer our legislation as a Floor amendment to the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act but did not have bi-partisan support. On June 20, he instead introduced S. 2651 which provides for unlimited personnel demonstration projects and other changes from the MFA. While we support many of its concepts, the legislation does not provide us with the desired APS authority. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee may mark up this bill next week, producing something even less ambitious, but it isn't likely to move in the House.
- Our focus now shifts to the Administration's Homeland Security Department legislation. It seeks a broad grant of personnel management flexibility consistent only with "merit" and "fitness." We advised OPM that as the legislation advances, and if personnel flexibilities are afforded the new Department, DoD should be included in order to maintain a level playing field for talent among national security organizations. The word in the human resources community, however, is that this part of the legislation will not obtain support of the Democratic leadership. We are therefore exploring other possibilities, including using existing authority that would allow us to demonstrate APS practices for the acquisition workforce (approximately 120,000), with the objective of moving forward in the fall if Congress fails to act.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Prepared by: Steve Ramp, CPP

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/9881

U11502 / 02

June 28, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flexibility

Please give me a one-page memo telling me what Voinovich has been doing and what you are trying to do by way of getting greater flexibility.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-5

.....

Please respond by 08/02/02

Coordination Sheet

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy	Ginger Groeber	7-9-02
Principal Deputy General Counsel	Daniel Dell'Orto	7-9-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs	Richard McGraw	7-10-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy	<i>gjm</i>	<i>7/12/02</i>
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy	<i>CBA</i>	<i>7-15-02</i>



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 19 2002

INFO MEMO

July 16, 2002, 9:00AM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *DZ*

SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

- You wrote to the Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries on the misuse of contingency operations funds noted in the press. You also asked for recommended courses of action.
- As soon as I became aware of the situation described by the General Accounting Office, I directed my staff to take immediate action to ensure that this misuse of contingency funds would not occur again.
- Some of the misuses of contingency funds (as noted in the news article that you sent to me) were the result of Air Force abuse of the purchase card in Southwest Asia (e.g., decorative furniture and furnishings, cappuccino machines, golfing equipment and memberships, palm pilots). As you know, I established the DoD Charge Card Task Force to strengthen the controls of the Purchase Card and Travel Card programs. We are in the process of implementing the recommendations it outlined in its recently published report. These should help eliminate the misuse of government purchase and travel cards. For example,

** this horrible kind is a term of the art*

- We have legislation pending to permit us to hold DoD accountable officials (including purchase cardholders) financially liable for improper or incorrect purchases. Currently, if the charge card transaction is wasteful or abusive but is not fraudulent or for personal gain, we can punish the cardholder (or other charge card officials) administratively, but DoD does not have the authority to hold them pecuniarily or financially liable.
- By the end of the fiscal year, we will implement automated tools to detect potentially abusive transactions for review.
- I also have directed my staff to strengthen our procedures regarding resources provided for contingency operations:
 - Provide further clarification of the costs that can be financed with funds made available for contingency operations;
 - Provide guidance to eliminate funding of duplicative efforts; and
 - Add a section to the DoD Financial Management Regulation on fiduciary responsibility to strengthen both financial stewardship and accountability.
- In addition, I directed my staff to meet with the senior financial managers within the Service and Defense Agency Comptroller organizations to communicate the importance of establishing appropriate oversight and controls to eliminate abuses such as these.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: John Evans,

(b)(6)

59/OSD/9884

U11508 / 02

June 3, 2002 1:26 PM

TO: Service Secretaries
Under Secretaries
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wasteful Spending

DR
6/18

This recent report about wasteful spending bothers me and I know it does you, too.

I sure hope that when you have all investigated the problems here, that we don't decide there is no one to be held accountable. These sound like very poor decisions, and we are never going to change the culture around here without imparting the appropriate sense of urgency about our responsibilities as stewards of taxpayer money.

Please look into this and into our spending practices generally and let me know what course of action you recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hoffman, Lisa; Scripps Howard News Service, "\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought by Army and Air Force," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 05/30/02

DHR:dh
060302-29

SECRET HAS BEEN

Please respond by 07/12/02

7/17
7/17
Zakheim response attached
D. Rumsfeld
1/8

U09302 02

Seattle Post-Intelligencer
May 30, 2002

\$24,000 Sofa Among Luxuries Bought By Army And Air Force

By Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service

WASHINGTON -- A \$24,000 sofa and armchair. An \$1,800 pillow. And \$45,800 in silver and china. Such accoutrements would cause little surprise if found in the abodes of the wealthy and well-known.

But government auditors discovered these pricey items -- and many more -- not in a mansion but at Air Force and Army bases in Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Persian Gulf, Europe and the Balkans.

In a just-released report, the General Accounting Office informed Congress that its auditors found a number of "seemingly unneeded expenditures" made by the Air Force and Army in 2000 and 2001.

"As much as \$101 million in contingency operations funds were spent on questionable expenditures" -- a small fraction of the estimated \$2.2 billion examined by the investigators, but troubling nonetheless, the report said.

Among those were \$4,600 worth of "white beach sand" for an air base in the Arabian desert and a \$3,400 Sumo wrestling suit for another.

The Army came in for criticism for duplicating purchases of computers and office equipment at its bases in Bosnia to the tune of \$2.3 million.

Rather than using equipment already there or sharing new items, four successive Army units heading for Bosnia bought their own sets of equipment, the GAO said.

That struck the auditors as particularly wasteful, given that the Army has stocked more than 2,000 computers, 865 printers, 91 copiers and "a multitude of other office equipment" in the area. However, Army officials said that differences in missions and training of the various units serving in Bosnia necessitated some of the equipment purchases.

The auditors blamed Pentagon and Army superiors for failing to provide the clear guidance and strict oversight needed to rein in such practices.

The Air Force was also criticized for an array of what the GAO deemed unjustified and excessive spending, including:

At al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, the service bought a \$2,200 coffee table.

At Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, it bought a \$24,000 loveseat and arm chair and \$9,800 worth of Halloween decorations.

At al Jaber Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the questionable spending included an \$1,800 "executive high-back" pillow, a \$3,000 computer tutorial titled "The Intelligent Investor" and \$19,000 worth of decorative "river rock."

At various Air Force installations in the Persian Gulf region, the service bought a \$35,000 golf cart, a \$16,000 corporate golf membership and \$5,333 in golf passes.

Military experts claim that such recreational items can be a useful tool for building good relations with officials of a host country, whom base officers can invite for, say, a friendly round or two of golf.

The GAO report said Pentagon officials generally agreed that better oversight is needed to prevent wasteful spending.



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 JUL 22 04:16:16



INFO MEMO

JULY 19, 2002 – 6:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*


SUBJECT: Role of the Reserve Component – SNOWFLAKES

- You have questioned the usefulness of reserve elements that take a long time to prepare for use, and asked whether we should maintain all capabilities in the active force.
- Last year's Defense Planning Guidance directed my office to address these issues in a review of the Active-Reserve mix. We are completing that review, and should have the results ready to brief you shortly.
- I believe they provide a basis for "transforming" the reserve components to meet your standard, i.e., so that they are reasonably ready for prompt use. But we also conclude the reserves may be a very cost-effective way to draw certain skills from the civil sector (e.g., information technology, linguists), so that we maintain a "just in time" not a larger, more expensive "just in case" manpower inventory. They can also be a very good place to "store" extra crews for aircraft, as the Air Force now does so effectively.
- We will schedule a briefing for you; I believe you will be intrigued by the ideas we are ready to present.

RECOMMENDATION: None

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Captain Stephen Wellock



11-L-05507 DSD/9888

U11529 / 02

4/9/02

April 8, 2002 7:51 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Availability and Mobilization of Reserves

Here is a note I sent Steve Cambone. On reflection, it seems to me it is up your alley.

Would you please take a look at it and let me know what you think?

Also attached is a second memo I sent Steve Cambone that I would appreciate your looking into.

Thanks.

Attach.

04/01/02 SecDef memo to PDUSD(P), "Availability of Reserves" [040102-54]

04/01/02 SecDef memo to PDUSP(P), "Mobilization of Reserves" [040101-53]

DHR:dh
040802-11

.....
Please respond by 04/26/02

April 1, 2002 6:53 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld Dr
SUBJECT: Availability of Reserves

cc Lh.

I think we also ought to look into that subject that came up about the Guard and Reserve, and whether we even want Guard and Reserve available only after 120 or 180 days. I would rather have fewer forces capable of responding faster, not more not capable of doing anything for six months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-54



Please respond by 04/26/02

April 1, 2002 6:51 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilization of Reserves

LC
Chu

Don't you think the DPG ought to address the subject that the Army is currently arranged so that they have to mobilize to do anything, since they have put some critical elements into the Reserves and Guard? I think they said the Navy or the Air Force did the same thing.

We have to get that fixed. Now is the time to put it in the DPG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-53

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

DELONNIE
AIR FORCE
did, not
Navy.

8:18 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: April 15, 2002

4/17/02

SUBJECT:

Attached is a note from Dick Myers to me. I think we need to make sure we have all the people we could conceivably need in specific skills as part of the active force rather than some of them in the reserve, as it is currently arranged.

Second, we need to make a decision as to how many people we think need to be first deployers.

Please screw your head into it and get back to me with a proposal.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
041502.31

Attach: 3/4/02 Info Memo to SD from Gen. Myers re: 2/12 SVTC

Please respond by: _____

4/23/02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-202-02
4 March 2002

SECRET

2002 MAR -4 PM 1:54

SECDEF HAS SEEN

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 11 2002

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/2*

SUBJECT: Questions from 12 February Secure Video Teleconference Regarding Strategic Plan and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

7/2
LEAHY D. BIRDA

- The following is provided in response to your questions (TAB) regarding the National Military Strategic Plan for the Global War on Terrorism (NMSP-GWOT) and the IRR.
- The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services (including the Coast Guard), combatant commands, and key Defense agencies, has developed a draft strategic plan (the NMSP-GWOT) that provides both a framework and direction for military efforts in the war on terrorism.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ is intended to facilitate iterative and adaptive planning over the duration of the war as policy decisions are made and terrorists reveal themselves around the globe. It establishes an integrating framework within the context of our Defense Policy Goals and your strategic planning guidance to organize, synchronize, and prioritize a global campaign. It also bridges national strategic guidance and theater campaign plans.
- The ^{plan}~~NMSP-GWOT~~ has been reviewed by Service and combatant command planners (general/flag officer level) and incorporates advice from OSD's strategy office. My intent is to finalize the draft plan and take it to the Tank in the coming weeks, then bring it to you.
- The IRR is a manpower pool of individuals with some military service obligation remaining, or those who subsequently volunteer to remain in the IRR once their initial obligation is met. Each Service, including the Coast Guard, has an IRR whose members have no obligation to drill, are normally not members of specific units, and are normally not paid unless recalled to active duty. However, they can be mobilized to fill specific positions during a crisis and are a potential source of unique skills and experience. Currently, 1,441 IRR members have been recalled to active duty from an aggregate pool of 348,508.

(Andy Heekin)

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

SPL ASSISTANT DIR	<i>3/6</i>
BR MA GIAMBERINI	<i>3/8</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>3/7</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>3/6</i>

Prepared By: LTG George Casey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy,

(b)(6)

June 28, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flexibility

310.1

Please give me a one-page memo telling me what Voinovich has been doing and what you are trying to do by way of getting greater flexibility.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062802-5



Please respond by 08/02/02


28 June 02

U11548 / 02

Snowflake

July 22, 2002 7:48 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Improvements

How do we improve both the intelligence gathering and the analysis on Iraq?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072202-4

11-L-0559/OSD/9895

U11602 /02

July 20, 2002 2:42 PM

TO: Gen. Handy
CC: Gen. Myers
Pete Aldridge
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DLA

020 DLA

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how you think we ought to handle DLA.

One thought would be to have you take a look at it and tell me what portions ought not to be transferred to TRANSCOM. I need to get my head into it to see if I really think it is a good idea. But, at least at the moment, with a minimum of information, it strikes me that it might make sense.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072002-17



Please respond by 08/16/02

20 Jul 02



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
508 SCOTT DR
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-5357

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 AUG 21 PM 12:25

12 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: TCCC

SUBJECT: USTRANSCOM/DLA Integration

020 DLA

1. You asked for my thoughts on how we should handle the issue of USTRANSCOM/DLA integration. As you know, this has proven to be an emotional issue in some quarters. In our discussions during your visit to USTRANSCOM, I highlighted the progress on global distribution achieved by partnering with DLA on Strategic Distribution. With the current organizational structure, we've made some good strides improving customer wait time, location of stocks, and improved velocity to the warfighters.

2. In tackling the integration issue, I see three possible courses of action. First, stay the course, status quo, with the proposed study. However, I see problems with this approach. The contract for the study was just signed 6 August essentially leaving only seven weeks to conduct the study and provide recommendations. That said, I doubt we'll receive the out-of-the-box thinking we seek based on the time constraints as well as the complicated technical details of a transformation issue of this magnitude.

3. The second option is an evolution of our current efforts with DLA. We could integrate certain pieces of DLA into USTRANSCOM. Key would be identifying where the efficiencies can be gained for a global distribution chain. This course of action, while immediate, remains evolutionary and may not provide the true transformation change of business practices, maximizing resources, and exploring the full potential of possibilities within the two organizations.

4. The third course of action is the most aggressive, deliberate, transformational, and is the one I recommend. The following series of actions would help us shape the final end state as well as make immediate improvements to the current system. As a first step, realign DLA under USTRANSCOM, with no other organizational or resource changes to either organization. Two immediate benefits: it would bring DLA under a command structure (emphasizing the critical warfighting aspects of global distribution); and it would remove much of the external influences/interferences currently surrounding any discussion of the two organizations. I believe change to the customer would be transparent, in fact, I guarantee it.


12 Aug 02

5. Once realigned, the TRANSCOM and DLA staffs will work together to determine the best way to truly meld DLA and USTRANSCOM core competencies, processes, and organizations. To achieve this, some missions/resources might require divestiture or realignment. Our assessment will be focused on transforming DOD's global supply chain

using best commercial practices, while integrating it into our force deployment processes. We will provide you with quarterly updates on our progress, and develop the supporting business plans for our proposals.

6. In summary, the third option advocates taking concrete actions now vice continued, laborious study and piecemeal change. It allows the experts in the two organizations, under a single commander, to sort out the attendant details with a common focus and direction. Most of all, it aligns with our warfighting strategy of integrated and simultaneous force projection and sustainment in support of the warfighting commanders.

7. I look forward to working this effort aggressively and am ready to discuss further at your convenience.


JOHN W. HANDY
General, USAF
Commander in Chief

cc:
CJCS
USD (AT&L)
Dir, PA&E

June 25, 2002 8:01 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Larry Di Rita
VADM Giambastiani

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Prisoners

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on lessons from the prisoner stories. I think he has a point.

Larry, please set a meeting for the six of us to discuss this.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/26/02 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Lessons of the Prisoner Stories

DHR:dh
062502-16



Please respond by 07/19/02

09/14/02

25 June 02



COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

2002 JUL 23 AM 2:03

INFO MEMO

July 23, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


FROM: JOHN P. STENBIT 

SUBJECT: Priorities

This is in reply to your request for a quick look at the list of what the Department's priorities should be for the next 6 – 18 months.

- I continue to believe that an emphasis on information technology to move to a net-centric system of operations is the enabling factor for at least six items on the list, namely:
 - Speed of deployment
 - Shortening DoD processes
 - Improving the interagency process
 - Getting the Services joint at lower levels
 - Fostering new relationships and faster decision processes on issues like alliances, basing, etc.
 - And most importantly, delivery of precision weapons.
- To achieve speed, everybody has got to have access to information in parallel instead of in series. Network centric organization models are ideal for that basis.
- I believe that it would be a serious mistake not to include emphasis on movement toward a network centric organization among the Department's top priorities.

Prepared by: CAPT Craig Hanson, C3I




11-L-0559/OSD/9900

111638 /02

C3I

9:09 AM

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Secretaries and Under Secretaries of the Military Departments
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Service Chiefs and Vice Chiefs
 Undersecretaries of Defense
 Assistant Secretaries of Defense
 Steve Cambone
 Larry Di Rita
 Andy Marshall
 Admiral Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: July 16, 2002

SUBJECT: **Priorities**

With the "sense of urgency" memo in mind, please think through what you believe to be the top ten priorities the Department ought to have for the next 6 – 18 months.

Be prepared to discuss when we next meet on the "way ahead" memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 071602.07

Please respond by: 7/25/02

Redd, e32, July 17 11:50 am

11-L-0559/OSD/9901

111299 /02

#145
ACTION
to 1115
0900

January 14, 2002 9:10 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Intel

Do you feel anyone in either of your shops is making any progress on how we can use intel with respect to the war on terrorism and alter behavior by increasing intrusiveness?

I continue to believe we need an entirely SRO intel approach, given the war on terrorism.

Please let me know where we stand.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011402-17

.....

Please respond by 01/21/02

350.09

14 Jan 02

UNCLASSIFIED
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMANDOFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2002 JUL 24 PM 4:12



ECCC

24 July 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Responsive Transportation Support

1. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you some examples of the steps we are taking in EUCOM to save taxpayer dollars while supporting the War on Terrorism. Along with that, I would like to highlight what we see as an increased opportunity for further efficiencies and savings.
2. We are transforming our logistics capabilities by leveraging off the good relationships we have developed with our Eastern European neighbors via our Theater Security Cooperation activities. Together, we have jointly developed a cooperative transportation network through Eastern Europe and Russia to both sustain EUCOM out-of-area operations and support ongoing operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. This network has also served us well in delivering capabilities and donor nation equipment in support of the current Georgia Train and Equip Program.
3. We began using the Russian rail network to ship some supplies in order to reduce the strain on our airlift system and simultaneously reduce costs. We have now shipped over 380 containers at a cost of \$1.4M thereby saving \$6.1M over the equivalent airlift costs of nearly \$7.5M. Additionally, our excellent relationship with Bulgaria allowed the Air Force to use the airfield at Burgas for aerial refueling operations supporting humanitarian flights into Afghanistan, extending the operational reach of our air drop missions and allowing other operations to continue unhindered. We also tested the seaport of Burgas on a recent unit rotation in the Balkans with great success.
4. As we continue our support to CENTCOM, one area with potential for further cost reductions is to expand the current list of commodities that we ship through Russia via road and rail. We anticipate substantial savings by being able to ship expanded classes of supplies and eventually retrograde through Russia. We are working with the Joint Staff and OSD to facilitate support from DOS in negotiating any necessary agreements.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-05597OSD/9903

U11714 / 02

ECCC
SUBJECT: Responsive Transportation Support

5. We will continue to look for other examples of savings resulting from our transformed business processes, collaborative working arrangements, and commitment to prudent stewardship of the taxpayer's dollar.

Very respectfully,
Joe Ralston

JOSEPH W. RALSTON
General, USAF

CF:
CJCS

2
UNCLASSIFIED

TOTAL P.03

11-L-0559³/OSD/9904

X

June 28, 2002 10:36 AM

TO: Gen. Ralston, SACEUR, USCINCEUR
 Gen. Eberhart, USCINCSpace/CINC NORAD
 Adm. Ellis, CINCSTRAT
 Adm. Fargo, USCINCPAC
 Gen. Franks, USCINCCENT
 Gen. Kernan, CINCUSJFCOM
 Gen. Holland, USCINCSOC
 Gen. Laporte, CINCUNC/CFC/USFK
 MG Speer, USACINCSO

500

CC: Gen. Myers
 Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Saving the Taxpayers' Money

Attached is a memo from Gen. John Handy. It strikes me that there are many opportunities for these types of savings. If you have any other examples, I would appreciate your sending them along.

It is important that we all focus on moving dollars from waste to warfighting.

Thanks.

Attach.
 06/03/02 Memo from CINTRANS

DHR:dh
 062602-16

28 JUNE 02

U10595 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9905

110?
Snowflake

June 17, 2002 2:18 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Designation of Al Qaeda Recruits

7/18
Larry N. Pitts

I just read this Ruth Wedgwood piece. I think it is terrific. I am no lawyer, but I must say she impresses me.

Do you agree with it?

Is she a person we could just bring in to the Pentagon, to be in charge of all of this in some way, if we end up with people doing the commissions?

Thanks.

Attach.
Wedgwood, Ruth. "The Enemy Within," *Wall Street Journal*, June 14, 2002.

DHR:dh
061702-41

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

7/17
Response attached
Larry N Pitts
7/18

11 June 02

The Enemy Within

By Ruth Wedgwood

Al Qaeda has championed asymmetric warfare. Donning civilian garb permits its suicide bombers to travel across borders in pursuit of soft targets. Ever inventive, it is now attempting to gain an advantage from the most sacred symbol of the American union -- the Constitution.

The leadership of al Qaeda has realized that the easiest way to avoid American watch lists and visa precautions is to recruit U.S. citizens for the jihad. The added strategic benefit is the special protections that Americans enjoy in a liberal democracy.

Our obvious dilemma is how to reconcile the values of the Constitution and the safety of the Republic. The matter has been put before us by the activities of an American citizen named Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member who converted to Islam, went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and conferred there with al Qaeda super-operative Abu Zubaydah about exploding a radiological "dirty bomb" in the U.S. In May, Padilla was snared at O'Hare Airport, on his return. Federal authorities sought Padilla's testimony as a material witness before a grand jury in Manhattan. He refused to cooperate and, last Sunday, was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina.

Padilla was not charged criminally in New York because of restrictive rules of evidence that govern what a trial jury can hear. Much of the information about him comes from his co-conspirator Abu Zubaydah, now in custody abroad. But Zubaydah is a hostile interlocutor, and the details of the "dirty bomb" scheme have been gleaned obliquely, in the course of extended interrogations. There is little chance, at present, that he would act as a government witness in a criminal prosecution against Padilla.

Thus the conundrum of reconciling safety and law. There is, of course, an important difference between corroborated intelligence and admissible trial evidence. The purpose of criminal justice is to punish, as well as prevent further crime. So its rules are particularly restrictive.

So far, Congress has not acted to adapt any of the rules of evidence in federal district courts to the threats of catastrophic harm posed by al Qaeda. Going to trial also means opening the sources of sensitive information to inspection -- a particular problem when a defendant chooses to represent himself, as the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui is making clear. Thus, the U.S. chose to detain Padilla as a combatant, rather than as a defendant, arguing that under the laws of war he is, in every real sense, an "enemy combatant."

In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled that the same designation -- "enemy combatant" -- applied to Nazi saboteurs who landed by submarine on American shores to blow up industrial plants. The eight men were tried before a military commission. One of them had a plausible claim of American citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled this to be irrelevant, for "citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts" qualify as "enemy belligerents."

In thinking through the new hybrid form of war waged by al Qaeda, few of us wanted to anticipate the problem of American recruits. But a president determined to prevent future attacks has to solve the problem, even if provisionally. The international law of armed conflict permits the victim of aggression

to detain enemy combatants until hostilities are over. The purpose of the detention is not punitive, but rather to keep the enemy's operatives from returning to the fight.

Libertarians must ask what would restrain runaway use of such power. Habeas corpus remains available in our courts, even in this unorthodox war. Congress has not taken the extraordinary step of suspending it, and the president has not asked them to. Habeas corpus allows a court to inquire into the authority by which any American citizen is detained, even an al Qaeda recruit. The courts will have occasion to confirm whether the president enjoys a constitutional power to detain American combatants in this new kind of war waged by nonstate actors.

To be sure, the need to forestall attacks against innocent Americans with weapons of mass destruction may seem self-evident, even when criminal trial witnesses are not available. Most judges will appropriately decline to second-guess a military decision of the commander-in-chief based on reliable intelligence, especially when the stakes are so high. No writ or injunction will deter al Qaeda from carrying out acts of mass violence.

But to bolster its case, and to allay concern about error, the president might consider several options. First, the certification of a combatant should give a statement of reasons. Even if the underlying information cannot be made public in the near term, this will give a court additional reason to credit the basis of the decision.

Second, the president may wish to empower the recently created military commissions to take on the task of reviewing the basis for a "combatant" designation. The commissions' procedures admit a broad range of evidence, yet guarantee combatants the right to challenge the government's account. A battlefield judgment of combatancy has never required the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," but the case of American citizens in this unusual war makes it appropriate to think hard about an apt standard of proof.

Third, and in the alternative, the president could give the "second look" to a panel such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. This is a panel of judges who have gained experience in protecting intelligence, and have come to understand that the foreign affairs power deals with problems different from domestic criminal justice. In the context of wiretap applications, the FISA court has had to look at whether there is probable cause to believe that someone is acting as the agent of a foreign power. This option would probably require the consent of Congress.

Employing a structured basis for the designation of al Qaeda recruits will strengthen the confidence of the courts and the public that this awesome power will be appropriately employed in the fight against al Qaeda's terrorism. We have a government of laws, not of men. But as Justice Robert H. Jackson remarked, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. It should be possible to reconcile the problems of prevention with the careful processes of liberal government.

Ms. Wedgwood, a former federal prosecutor, is a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

RECEIVED USAF OFFICE

JUL 16 2002

INFO MEMO

July 15, 2002 5 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 7/14/02*

SUBJECT: Wedgwood Editorial

- You asked about Professor Ruth Wedgwood's Wall Street Journal editorial, which analyzed the propriety of Jose Padilla's military detention and recommended several options to bolster the justification for such detention. *JABA*
- I concur with Professor Wedgwood's analysis. Some commentators have wrongly applied traditional criminal justice concepts to wartime operational issues. Our actions in detaining Padilla and others are consistent with long-established legal authority (including U.S. Supreme Court precedent) and military imperatives.
- I do not concur with Professor Wedgwood's recommendations on ways to "bolster" our case for the detention of enemy combatants.
 - A "statement of reasons" for determining a person to be a combatant is unnecessary and sets a dangerous precedent. During habeas litigation such a statement may be needed, but it can be derived from current screening criteria being used for transfers to Guantanamo Bay.
 - Using military commissions to review a "combatant" determination would further confuse criminal justice and military security interests. Status as a combatant should not be viewed as related to potential criminal culpability under the law of armed conflict.
 - Using a court or panel similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to review status determinations would undermine a traditional military function.
- It would be inappropriate to develop a "one size fits all" policy for making initial enemy combatant determinations.
 - DOD initially takes control over enemy combatants in a variety of ways—including capture on the battlefield, transfer from other Federal agencies or allies, and interdiction in other countries—making it difficult and impractical to establish a single process for such determinations.
 - In future conflicts, DOD could be required to detain hundreds of thousands of enemy combatants, as was the case during World War II. Establishing a



11-L-0559/OSD/9909

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>7/17</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/17</i>

011720 702

centralized process for all enemy combatant determinations would be impractical under those circumstances.

- Decisions involving DOD detentions of persons apprehended within the United States may warrant a centralized process, however.
- Centralized, periodic review of the status of all detainees under DOD's control may be appropriate (e.g., annually). I plan to develop such a review policy, in coordination with Doug Feith.
- Regarding your question about putting Professor Wedgwood "in charge" of military commissions, I believe it would be more appropriate to have an appointing authority with a substantial military background. We will, however, continue to solicit her very helpful advice as circumstances warrant.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Prepared by: Lt Col William K. Lietzau, USMC, DoD OGC

(b)(6)

NOTE FOR SECDEF

I have been in frequent contact with Ruth.

Indeed, she will be in my office today

W. Lietzau

7/17

Sec Def.

Maybe. In any event, she strikes me as an obvious candidate for the appeals panel, if we ever get that far.

W. Lietzau



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002-07-15 17:00
JUL 15 2002

INFO MEMO

July 15, 2002 5 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 7/14/02*

SUBJECT: Wedgwood Editorial

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 - Using a court or panel similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to review status determinations would undermine a traditional military function.
- It would be inappropriate to develop a "one size fits all" policy for making initial enemy combatant determinations.
 - DOD initially takes control over enemy combatants in a variety of ways—including capture on the battlefield, transfer from other Federal agencies or allies, and interdiction in other countries—making it difficult and impractical to establish a single process for such determinations.
 - In future conflicts, DOD could be required to detain hundreds of thousands of enemy combatants, as was the case during World War II. Establishing a



11-L-0559/OSD/9911

→ SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>7/7</i>
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>7/17</i>
011720 702	

centralized process for all enemy combatant determinations would be impractical under those circumstances.

- Decisions involving DOD detentions of persons apprehended within the United States may warrant a centralized process, however.
- Centralized, periodic review of the status of all detainees under DOD's control may be appropriate (e.g., annually). I plan to develop such a review policy, in coordination with Doug Feith.
- Regarding your question about putting Professor Wedgwood "in charge" of military commissions, I believe it would be more appropriate to have an appointing authority with a substantial military background. We will, however, continue to solicit her very helpful advice as circumstances warrant.

COORDINATION: None

cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Prepared by: Lt Col William K. Lietzau, USMC, DoD OGC

(b)(6)

NOTE FOR SECDEF

I have been in frequent contact with Ruth. Indeed, she will be in my office today.
W. Lietzau

7/17

Sec Def.

Maybe. In any event, she strikes me as an obvious candidate for the appeals panel, if we ever get that far.
W. Lietzau

11.7
Snowflake

June 17, 2002 2:18 PM

Afghanistan

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Designation of Al Qaeda Recruits

7/18
Larry D. Pitts

I just read this Ruth Wedgwood piece. I think it is terrific. I am no lawyer, but I must say she impresses me.

Do you agree with it?

Is she a person we could just bring in to the Pentagon, to be in charge of all of this in some way, if we end up with people doing the commissions?

Thanks.

Attach.
Wedgwood, Ruth. "The Enemy Within," *Wall Street Journal*, June 14, 2002.

DHR:dh
061702-41

.....
Please respond by 07/19/02

7/17
Response attached

Larry D Pitts
7/18

19 June 02

The Enemy Within

By Ruth Wedgwood

Al Qaeda has championed asymmetric warfare. Donning civilian garb permits its suicide bombers to travel across borders in pursuit of soft targets. Ever inventive, it is now attempting to gain an advantage from the most sacred symbol of the American union -- the Constitution.

The leadership of al Qaeda has realized that the easiest way to avoid American watch lists and visa precautions is to recruit U.S. citizens for the jihad. The added strategic benefit is the special protections that Americans enjoy in a liberal democracy.

Our obvious dilemma is how to reconcile the values of the Constitution and the safety of the Republic. The matter has been put before us by the activities of an American citizen named Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member who converted to Islam, went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and conferred there with al Qaeda super-operative Abu Zubaydah about exploding a radiological "dirty bomb" in the U.S. In May, Padilla was snared at O'Hare Airport, on his return. Federal authorities sought Padilla's testimony as a material witness before a grand jury in Manhattan. He refused to cooperate and, last Sunday, was transferred to a military brig in South Carolina.

Padilla was not charged criminally in New York because of restrictive rules of evidence that govern what a trial jury can hear. Much of the information about him comes from his co-conspirator Abu Zubaydah, now in custody abroad. But Zubaydah is a hostile interlocutor, and the details of the "dirty bomb" scheme have been gleaned obliquely, in the course of extended interrogations. There is little chance, at present, that he would act as a government witness in a criminal prosecution against Padilla.

Thus the conundrum of reconciling safety and law. There is, of course, an important difference between corroborated intelligence and admissible trial evidence. The purpose of criminal justice is to punish, as well as prevent further crime. So its rules are particularly restrictive.

So far, Congress has not acted to adapt any of the rules of evidence in federal district courts to the threats of catastrophic harm posed by al Qaeda. Going to trial also means opening the sources of sensitive information to inspection -- a particular problem when a defendant chooses to represent himself, as the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui is making clear. Thus, the U.S. chose to detain Padilla as a combatant, rather than as a defendant, arguing that under the laws of war he is, in every real sense, an "enemy combatant."

In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled that the same designation -- "enemy combatant" -- applied to Nazi saboteurs who landed by submarine on American shores to blow up industrial plants. The eight men were tried before a military commission. One of them had a plausible claim of American citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled this to be irrelevant, for "citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts" qualify as "enemy belligerents."

In thinking through the new hybrid form of war waged by al Qaeda, few of us wanted to anticipate the problem of American recruits. But a president determined to prevent future attacks has to solve the problem, even if provisionally. The international law of armed conflict permits the victim of aggression

to detain enemy combatants until hostilities are over. The purpose of the detention is not punitive, but rather to keep the enemy's operatives from returning to the fight.

Libertarians must ask what would restrain runaway use of such power. Habeas corpus remains available in our courts, even in this unorthodox war. Congress has not taken the extraordinary step of suspending it, and the president has not asked them to. Habeas corpus allows a court to inquire into the authority by which any American citizen is detained, even an al Qaeda recruit. The courts will have occasion to confirm whether the president enjoys a constitutional power to detain American combatants in this new kind of war waged by nonstate actors.

To be sure, the need to forestall attacks against innocent Americans with weapons of mass destruction may seem self-evident, even when criminal trial witnesses are not available. Most judges will appropriately decline to second-guess a military decision of the commander-in-chief based on reliable intelligence, especially when the stakes are so high. No writ or injunction will deter al Qaeda from carrying out acts of mass violence.

But to bolster its case, and to allay concern about error, the president might consider several options. First, the certification of a combatant should give a statement of reasons. Even if the underlying information cannot be made public in the near term, this will give a court additional reason to credit the basis of the decision.

Second, the president may wish to empower the recently created military commissions to take on the task of reviewing the basis for a "combatant" designation. The commissions' procedures admit a broad range of evidence, yet guarantee combatants the right to challenge the government's account. A battlefield judgment of combatancy has never required the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," but the case of American citizens in this unusual war makes it appropriate to think hard about an apt standard of proof.

Third, and in the alternative, the president could give the "second look" to a panel such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. This is a panel of judges who have gained experience in protecting intelligence, and have come to understand that the foreign affairs power deals with problems different from domestic criminal justice. In the context of wiretap applications, the FISA court has had to look at whether there is probable cause to believe that someone is acting as the agent of a foreign power. This option would probably require the consent of Congress.

Employing a structured basis for the designation of al Qaeda recruits will strengthen the confidence of the courts and the public that this awesome power will be appropriately employed in the fight against al Qaeda's terrorism. We have a government of laws, not of men. But as Justice Robert H. Jackson remarked, the Constitution is not a suicide pact. It should be possible to reconcile the problems of prevention with the careful processes of liberal government.

Ms. Wedgwood, a former federal prosecutor, is a professor of law at Yale and Johns Hopkins.

7/22
1003

Snowflake

TO: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 13, 2002

SUBJECT:

Someone in NATO mentioned that the Czech Republic I believe, has offered special forces and an NBC unit to be deployed to Pakistan, and they haven't heard anything.

Can you figure it out and see if there is an answer?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
061302.13

Please respond by: 6/21/02

EUR/NATO

EP1937

5:09 PM

~~02/009006-USD~~

SRP

7/23
LRTV FILED

Czech Republic

7/22
RESPONSE ATTACHED

v/r

LRTV FILED
7/23

SRP
7/23

1356402

TO: Marty Hoffmann
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: July 23, 2002
SUBJECT:

Attached is the brief on "Sense of Urgency." Please edit it and send it back to me personally.

384

Thanks.

*Marty -
It is Clark hold.*

DHR/azn
072302.03

Attach. Paper on Sense of Urgency

Please respond by: 8/1/02

2350102

DRAFT

Need for Urgency & Teamwork: Building Multiple Leadership Centers

7/19/2002 10:30 AM

DRAFT

0

11-L-0559/OSD/9918

DRAFT

The First 18 Months—Highlights

Accomplishments

- War on Terrorism—Removed Taliban
 - _____
 - Risk Taking
 - Innovative
 - Transformational Mindset Change
- Improved Readiness
 - Funding Increases
 - Combat Capability Strengthened
 - _____
 - Global Posture Adjusted
 - Rapid operational response
- Quadrennial Defense Review
 - New Defense Strategy
 - New Force Sizing Construct
 - New risk balancing focus
- Nuclear Posture Review
 - New Triad
 - Offensive Reductions
- Restructured Missile Defense R&D Program/ABM Treaty Withdrawal
- Space Commission Recommendations Implemented
- Realistic budgeting/cost estimates
- Program/Budget Process consolidation
- Key Program Decisions
 - Crusader to FCS/Precision
 - B-1 Modernization
 - Acceleration of UAVs/UCAVs
 - SBIRS Restructuring
 - DD-21 to DD-X
 - SSBN to SSGN
 - Navy “Area-Wide” Restructuring
 - “Ship Swaps”
 - Laser Comms
 - C4ISR Funding
- _____ (see page 1A)

7/19/2002

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11-L-0559/OSD/9919

DRAFT

The First 18 Months—Highlights **Initiatives**

- New Unified Command Plan
 - Northern Command
 - JFCOM—Focus on Transformation
 - New Space/Strat Command
 - NATO command structure review
- New Strategic Direction
 - DoD role in new political military strategy
 - Defense Planning Guidance
 - Contingency Planning Guidance Improving Speed/Relevance of Plans
 - Reserve Component Roles/Missions Examination
- New Strategic Relationships
 - Russia
 - South Asia
 - Central Asia/Caucasus
 - Missions determining Coalitions
 - Poland
 - NATO
- Quality of Life Improvements
 - Targeted Pay Raises
 - Housing programs/Privatization
 - Personnel policy Reviews
- New Focus on stewardship of taxpayer dollars
 - Improved Readiness Standards
 - Acceleration of Acquisition, Spiral Development Technique
 - Navy/Marine TAC Air Consolidation
 - HQs Realignment/Staff reductions
 - BRAC
 - Adjust footprint for future
 - New system to balance risks
- Fiscal management initiatives
- Joint training initiative

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11-L-0559/OSD/9920

DRAFT

The Next 6 Months:
A Sense of Urgency and Teamwork

- Long Term Global war on Terrorism provides impetus for change
- Critical window of opportunity to transform to more agile, lethal, and responsive force—to organize, train and equip for the new strategic direction and the new national security environment.
- Development of the FY 2004-09 program is critical to transformation—will require tough choices between transformation, modernization and people.
- Must focus sharply and shape our top priorities to accomplish tasks the country needs done.
- Requires energizing and synchronizing multiple leadership centers throughout DoD.
- Requires greater urgency and teamwork at all levels of DoD, cooperation with Congress, the public, and interagency.

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11-L-0559/OSD/9921

DRAFT

What Security Challenges Are Most Likely Over the Next 5 to 10 Years

Urgent

- Terrorism
 - Manhunts for key terrorists
 - Disrupting networks
 - Denying safehavens
- WMD
 - Stopping proliferation
 - Deterrence/mitigation
 - Preventive actions
- Information operations
 - Exposure of fraudulent/inaccurate information
 - Credibility high ground

Developing/Ongoing

- Non-state actors
- Missiles
 - Surface-to-Air (manpad, fixed, mobile)
 - Cruise
 - Ballistic
- UAVs (cheaper, unsophisticated, no controls, easily modified)
- Swarms of ships/Mines
- Cyber attacks
- Diesel Submarines (air independent propulsion)
- Non combatants/non-lethal
- Humanitarian crises

DoD has a capabilities (not a threat) based strategy. We can know reasonably well the challenges we will face, but not necessarily where, when or even from whom the challenges will come. The US must count on and be capable of dealing with surprise and little or no warning.

7/19/2002

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DRAFT

Where Are Security Challenges Most Likely Over the Next 5 to 10 Years

Defense

- Homeland Defense—Supporting New Military Tasks in U.S. civil/military relations
- Maritime Intercept Operations
- Anti-Access Operations
- Attacks on Space Capabilities
- Finding/controlling nuclear weapons in a failed state (e.g., Pakistan)
- Possible threats of environmental and cultural terrorism

Offense

- Combat in Ungoverned Areas
- Combat in Urban Areas
- Preemptive Attacks on WMD/Terrorist States
- Combat in Littoral Areas—SWARMS

Other Factors

- *Sustaining support of public for military and engagement worldwide*
- *Coping with Anti-Americanism/ Anti-Globalism and Treaties that restrict US action*
- *Economic*
 - *Immigration flows*
 - *Demographic trends*
 - *Investment flows*
 - *Movement of energy*
 - *Market disruptions*
 - *Availability of water*

DRAFT

Where is the US likely to be more vulnerable a need of improvement over the next 5 to 10 y

Tier I

- Information Operations/Handling
Disinformation
- Actionable Intelligence
 - “Finding the Enemy”
 - Human Intelligence Capabilities
 - Ability to process data collected
(Ops/Intel fusion)
- Reducing Weight/Mass/Footprint
- Domestic security
- Speed and agility of deployment,
employment, sustainment
- Mobility

Tier II

- Integration of black/w
– Programs, Operation
- Ensuring Access/Cou
Access
- Large/Fixed Overseas
- Cyberspace control
- Lack of Hardening
- C4ISR
- Communications Ban
- Knowledge Managem
- Information overload
- Access to/Operations
- Defense industrial bas

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DRAFT

What USG/DoD Organizational circumstances create vulnerabilities and/or the need for improvement over the next 5 to 10 years?

- US Government organizationally slow/inept; “Balkanized” across roles and missions
- DoD internal processes
 - Too many layers, too slow
 - Excessively Service-centric
 - Regional, non-global perspective
 - Inflexible, rigid, not creative
 - Over-dependence on Guard/Reserve
 - Archaic civil service system
 - DoD/high-tech relationships outdated
 - Intelligence Community linkages out of date
 - DoD contractor relationships sluggish
 - Exemplar of Parkinson’s Law—doing less with more resources at slower pace. Need “faster, better, cheaper” mentality.
- U.S. Government Inter-Agency processes slow/reactive/unresponsive
 - Foreign Military Assistance
Cumbersome, bureaucratic
 - “Division of Labor” among agencies unclear—refashion
- Homeland Security not integrated
- Recruiting and retaining highly skilled experts
 - Science/Engineering
 - Military and Civilian
- Protection of classified info
 - Who is cleared?
 - How are they cleared?
 - How to manage access?
 - How to reduce leaks of classified information?
- Relations with Congress

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11-L-0559/OSD/9925

DRAFT

In next 5 to 10 years, what Systems/Capabilities/ Activities are likely to be...

...Of Relatively Greater Utility

1st Tier

- Truly Joint Warfighting Forces that employ joint action at lowest levels
- Standing (ready) Joint Task Forces
- Information Dominance
- Special Operations/Special Forces
- Precision Weapons/Targeting
 - All weather, 7x24
 - Hardened, deeply buried targets
 - Moving target IFF capable
- Unmanned Systems
- Ability to maintain secrecy
- Reverse current “tooth-to-tail” ratio (transformation should not only generate new capabilities, but eliminate/slash non-combat enhancing cost centers)
- Rapid adaptation to lessons learned
- Adept, joint, broadly educated officers, unafraid of risk
- Rapidly deployable ground forces/assets
- Small logistic footprints/Pre-deployed assets
- Flexible overseas basing architecture
- Denial/Deception
- Persistent surveillance
- Operational deception/asymmetry of speed-surprise-precision
- Battlespace Dominance

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11-L-0559/OSD/9926

DRAFT

In next 5 to 10 years, what Systems/Capabilities/ Activities are likely to be...

...Of Relatively Greater Utility

2nd Tier

- Stealth
- Improved chem-bio defenses
- Suppression of air defenses
- Trainers of Other Nations' Militaries
- Network Centric Warfare
- Global C4ISR/ops/intel fusion
- Peacekeepers—US-led
- Assets less vulnerable to WMD
- Long Range Strike Systems
- Sea Basing
- Rapid prototyping
- Cyber Offense/Defense
- Targeted technology transfer controls
- Blue Force Tracking
- Adequate/Fast Air/Sealift
- Reserve Component Homeland Defense Assets
- Flexible, Adaptive, Rewarding personnel policies
- Access to cutting-edge skills in private sector and civil service (effective and efficient outsourcing)

DRAFT

What Systems/Capabilities/Activities are likely to be...

...Of Relatively Less Utility

- Napoleonic organizational structures
- Massed, mobilized industrial age force concepts, structures, and facilities
- Assets slow to deploy
- Reserve assets requiring lengthy activation/preparation
- Inflexible non-joint capable assets
- Ponderous Logistics/Sustainment footprints
- Low return-on-investment lab structure
- Long sensor-to-shooter timelines
- Assets with low operational availability
- High manpower intensive systems
- Aging legacy forces
- Broad-based technology transfer controls

...Of Relatively Less Utility, useful as deterrent, but very expensive—need to access tradeoffs

- Heavy Land Combat Systems
- Legacy Single Mission Air Superiority Aircraft
- Blue Water Combat Ships
- Strategic/Tactical Nuclear Forces

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11-L-0559/OSD/9928

DRAFT

Over the next 5 to 10 Years, which Relationships/Regions could take on...

Greater Importance

- China
- Moderate Muslim world
- Turkey
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Russia
- Iraq
- Central Asia
- Africa
- Philippines
- Vietnam
- Global "Community of Nations"
- South America

...Relatively

Greater Danger

- Radical Muslim World
- Ungoverned space
- China
- Pakistan
- Iraq
- Iran
- Indonesia
- Saudi Arabia
- Korea
- Turkey
- South America
- North Africa/Horn of Africa
- East Asia
- Global networks of terrorists/'troublemakers'

...Relatively

Less Danger

- Western Europe
- Central Europe
- Russia

More likely

Less likely

7/19/2002

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11-L-0559/OSD/9929

DRAFT

Countries the U.S. Is/Or Could Be Allied With Over the Next 5 to 10 Years

With Whom

NATO

Australia/UK & English-speaking “cousins”

Mexico/Canada

Japan/South Korea

Moderate Muslim states

Turkey/Jordan/Israel

Taiwan

Pakistan

Kenya/Ethiopia/Eritrea

Tunisia/Algeria

Latin American Countries

Central Asian Countries

ASEAN countries

Russia

India /Vietnam

Anti-Drug States

Where/Purpose

Multiple locations

US’s steady partners

Border problems—terrorists/drugs/crime

North Korea/China

Terrorists

Iraq, Syria, Iran, Lebanon

Taiwan Straits

Terrorists

Somalia/Sudan/terrorists

Libya

Latin America—terrorists/drugs/crime

China

China, South China Sea

Russian Far East, Central Asia

China

Drugs/crime

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11-L-0559/OSD/9930

DRAFT

The Way Ahead

- Senior DoD civilian/military leadership refine outline and set priorities. What's missing?
- Get agreement on specific tasks/milestones/due dates/leaders
- Expanded Senior Level Review Group (SLRG), as with QDR/DPG, with follow through actions and decisions
- Full-time Chief of Staff to synchronize and prioritize efforts
- Mechanisms to engage 2 or 3 levels below SLRG—multiple leadership centers
- Mechanisms to engage CINCs, NSC, Congress, contractors, press, troops—non-headquarters personnel in uniform . . . they are thirsty for leadership.

7/19/2002

13

11-L-0559/OSD/9931



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

ACTION MEMO

2002 JUL 25 PM 2:36



July 25, 2002, 1030 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army

JUL 25 2002

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

The Commander, USARSO, requested last year that his headquarters be moved from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to the continental United States because of severely declining readiness issues. I concur and request your approval to move the command to Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, in FY2003.

The proposed move has generated congressional interest and a requirement for a report to Congress on the USARSO relocation study. The report with Executive Summary is at Tab A. I request your concurrence in its immediate release.

The following information applies:

- The Headquarters, USARSO comprises 50% civilians. Forty percent of the civilians from Headquarters, USARSO and its supporting units have departed the command since the move to Puerto Rico in late 1999 because of conditions at Fort Buchanan. The same conditions impede hiring qualified replacements. Over half of the vacancies are senior grade positions.
- Announcement and execution of a move in FY2003 to the continental United States will stem the losses and allow rebuilding.
- The Army decision in April 2002 to make USARSO a major subordinate command of Forces Command in FY2003 will reduce the size of the headquarters by 25% and the garrison staff at Fort Buchanan by 184 spaces.
- A preliminary site survey conducted in the fall of 2001, identified Fort Sam Houston as the best site for relocation from among 14 possible sites. A subsequent analysis confirmed that recommendation.
- This relocation requires no MILCON funding. The Army intends to lease facilities at Fort Sam Houston that will be renovated with private capital under the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative.

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

- A National Environmental Policy Act assessment of the Fort Sam Houston capability to accept an entity comparable to USARSO is complete. Other environmental analyses required under the National Environmental Policy Act will be completed prior to a final relocation decision.
- Based on current projections, this move will not trigger the provisions of 10 USC 2687 regarding the closure or realignment of military installations. A General Counsel opinion, coordinated with your staff, is Tab B.
- This relocation will not preclude future decisions on United States Army South pursuant to the FY2005 Base Realignment and Closure process.
- Tab C provides supplemental information requested by your staff.

Required analyses, reports, and announcements will be coordinated with your staff.

RECOMMENDATION: Secretary of Defense approve by initialing at the marker (1) moving United States Army South to Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, in FY2003 and (2) release of the Report to Congress at Tab A.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: John W. McDonald,

(b)(6)

Per SecDef:

APPROVED _____

OTHER _____

TAB

A

Executive Summary of the Report to Congress on Relocation of US Army South

PURPOSE

This report addresses the proposed relocation of Headquarters, United States Army, South (USARSO) and selected subordinate elements from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. It responds to Congressional direction for information contained on pages 440-441, Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Appropriations Conference Report #107-350, to wit:

The conferees further direct that the Army provide the House and Senate Appropriations Committees the results of (the USARSO relocation) study and any further updates. The Conferees further direct the Army to report to the committee no later than February 28, 2002¹, the following concerning this relocation: the number of military and civilian personnel to be moved; the estimated cost; selection criteria and analysis of alternatives; and, any changes to the current plan.

USARSO RELOCATION

In August 2001, the Army Staff initiated the study of the relocation of USARSO to be executed by summer, 2002 (subsequently adjusted to summer, 2003). Relocation was considered urgent to address declining readiness directly related to the current stationing of Headquarters, USARSO at Fort Buchanan.

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO BE MOVED

The relocation study determined that the following authorized positions would move:

538 (350 military, 188 civilian) to the new Headquarters, USARSO location
16 (3 military, 13 civilian) to Hqs, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA
62 (33 military, 29 civilian) to Fort Gordon, GA
13 (all military) to Soto Cano, Honduras

The number of actual personnel at Fort Buchanan that would move is substantially less, due to normal military reassignments and civilian employee relocation decisions. The numbers of positions that will transfer to a new location will not trigger the provisions of 10 USC 2687.

¹ The report date was subsequently extended to July 23, 2002 to allow the Army needed time to complete their review and analysis.

SELECTION CRITERIA

The study considered 14 sites in the southeastern United States that met congressional direction to ensure "... that any proposed relocation must be consistent with the mission and geographic orientation of (USARSO)." The study first screened all sites using three 'must meet' criteria, then evaluated those sites that met the screening criteria using four 'most efficient/effective' criteria.

Screening Criteria

1. Support Army Transformation
2. Executable by summer FY03
3. Support to USSOUTHCOM and Army mission accomplishment in theater

Evaluation Criteria

1. Cost
2. Personnel Savings
3. Quality of Life
4. Mission Enhancement

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Only two locations met all of the screening criteria. These were Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas and combined Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem in Atlanta, Georgia. The most common reasons that other sites did not meet the screening criteria were:

- o Necessity to create and man an Army garrison command that was contrary to Army Transformation goals (Criterion 1)
- o Site did not have a suitable facility available by summer 2003 (Criterion 2)
- o Site did not support ready mission access to Latin America (Criterion 3)

The Fort Sam Houston site was evaluated as more efficient and effective than the Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative due to cost, quality of life, and mission enhancement advantages.

ESTIMATED COST TO MOVE

The total estimated costs to move USARSO to a CONUS location are:

Common Relocation Costs (same for all locations)

OMA - \$ 52.3 million
MPA - \$ 5.5 million

Facility Costs

Estimated costs for initial major renovation and construction are \$29.5M for Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem. Because of the nature of the lease at Fort Sam Houston, all costs are included in the lease. Estimated 20-year costs in net present values are \$5.7M less for Fort Sam Houston than for Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem.

Estimated Cost Savings

Annual net cost savings are estimated to be \$13M from reduction in operations at Fort Buchanan. \$32.7M in previously appropriated MILCON funds for Fort Buchanan (held under the current construction moratorium at Fort Buchanan) will become available to fund other Army priorities.

CHANGES TO THE STUDY

The criteria used in this study were developed initially in October 2001 and modified in early 2002 based on projected changes in the organization of USARSO. First, by the end of February 2002 it became apparent that it would not be feasible to reach a decision in time to move the headquarters during 2002, and the relocation requirement was then modified to not later than the summer 2003. This requirement increased the urgency of finding a suitable facility ready to move in or a facility that could be renovated for occupancy by that time. Second, within the context of Army Transformation, the Army decided in March 2002 to realign Headquarters, USARSO as a Major Subordinate Command under U.S. Army Forces Command. This affected the study criteria in two key ways. It reduced the size of the headquarters and emphasized the requirement to minimize garrison support requirements at any new location. The Army therefore added Support to Transformation to the screening criteria and modified the building space required. The Army then re-screened all sites and reevaluated the two that passed the screening criteria.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion is that Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the best alternative for the relocation of Headquarters, USARSO in 2003.

USARSO RELOCATION REPORT

This Report addresses the proposed relocation of United States Army South (USARSO) from San Juan, Puerto Rico to the continental United States.

Key components of this report are:

- Rationale for relocation
- Assumptions
- Number of USARSO personnel to move
- Facility requirements
- Sites considered for relocation
- Study methodology and criteria
- Analysis of alternatives
- Estimated costs to move

RATIONALE FOR RELOCATION

USARSO moved from Panama to Puerto Rico in the summer of 1999 as a consequence of the reversion of the Panama Canal and associated lands to the government of Panama. In early 2001, the Commander, USARSO identified an urgent need to relocate the command from Puerto Rico to a continental United States (CONUS) location based on rapidly declining readiness caused by a number of factors. The primary causes contributing to this situation are:

- Inadequate quality of life for soldiers, civilians and their families
- An uncompensated high cost of living
- High operational costs associated with the Puerto Rico location
- Unacceptable low civilian personnel retention and recruitment, especially among senior grade personnel

The need and urgency to relocate USARSO remains. The longer the Headquarters remains in Puerto Rico, the higher the risk to USARSO mission accomplishment, since the command cannot retain or recruit to fill critical positions in the civilian workforce, which is 50% of the Headquarters. Relocation in the near term (FY2003) offers the best balance between efficiency and effectiveness, and will substantially improve the welfare of the soldiers, civilians, and families assigned. An expanded discussion of the justification for the relocation of USARSO in FY 2003 is presented in Appendix 1.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions provided the framework for the relocation study:

- USARSO requirements to provide seamless support to USSOUTHCOM will continue during and after relocation.
- Quality of life in Puerto Rico will not significantly improve in the near future.
- The military construction moratorium for Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico will not be lifted.
- USARSO mission failure is not acceptable at Army or DOD levels.
- USARSO relocation to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads will not alleviate the conditions requiring USARSO to relocate from Puerto Rico. In fact, such a move would exacerbate the situation.
- The USARSO civilian workforce will continue to leave Government service at the same rate, and may accelerate, if a decision is made that USARSO will remain in Puerto Rico.

PERSONNEL TO MOVE

For relocation purposes, USARSO now consists of approximately 600 authorizations. This is a reduction from the initial number in the summer of 2001 of approximately 1,200 authorizations that would have relocated from Puerto Rico. The reduction is the result of the efficiencies gained in the change of USARSO from Major Command to Major Subordinate Command status. Table 1 below depicts the distribution of these authorizations by military and civilian categories.

Category	Move to New USARSO Location	Move to Fort Gordon	Move to Soto Cano, HO	Move to Fort McPherson	Total
Military	350	33	13	3	399
Civilian	188	29	0	13	230
Total	538	62	13	16	629

Table 1. Distribution of Military and Civilian Personnel

A breakout of total authorizations (military and civilian combined) by command element that would move to these locations is depicted in Table 2 below.

Organization	Current Authorization	Moving to New USARSO Location	Moving to Fort Gordon	Moving to Soto Cano, HO	Moving to Fort McPherson ³
Headquarters USARSO					
AMHA Staff ¹	405	297			16
Active Guard/Res.	49	49			
PARC (Contracting)	0	17			
Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) ²	88	115			
56th Signal Bn (-)	70	7	45		
94th Signal Co	61	11	17		
USASOC/SOTSE	8	8			
Info Management	30	30			
OSACOM Flight Det.	4	4			
Aviation Detachment	13			13	
Totals	728 ⁴	538	62	13	16

Notes:

¹These are the FY04 authorizations against which realignment planning was conducted. FY02 authorizations are similar - 402.

²The TIG activates in FY03 with an initial authorization of 88. In FY05, the TIG is programmed for 255 spaces. The number (115) to move includes 27 USARSO G-2 spaces that will be eliminated when the TIG is fully established in FY05.

³These 16 transfers reflect FORSCOM assumption of USARSO MACOM responsibilities.

⁴The original move number of 1163 included moving all authorizations above (728), an increase to the USARSO Headquarters to regain capabilities lost in the move from Panama, and an erroneous double counting of MI units because of lack of visibility into the new TIG.

Table 2. Disposition of USARSO Authorizations

A breakout of authorizations (military and civilian) by command element that would move to these locations is depicted in Table 3 below.

Organization	Moving to New USARSO Location			Moving to Fort Gordon			Moving to Soto Cano, HO			Moving to Fort McPherson ³		
	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT	MIL	CIV	TOT
Headquarters USARSO												
AMHA Staff ¹	153	144	297							3	13	16
Active Guard/Res.	49	0	49									
PARC (Contracting)	8	9	17									
Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) ²	106	9	115									
56th Signal Bn (-)	7	0	7	33	12	45						
94th Signal Co	5	6	11		17	17						
USASOC/SOTSE	8	0	8									
Info Management	10	20	30									
OSACOM Flight Det.	4	0	4									
Aviation Detachment							13	0	13			
Totals	350	188	538	33	29	62	13	0	13	3	13	16

Notes:

¹These are the FY04 authorizations against which realignment planning was conducted. FY02 authorizations are similar - 402.

²The TIG activates in FY03 with an initial authorization of 88. In FY05, the TIG is programmed for 255 spaces. The number (115) to move includes 27 USARSO G-2 spaces that will be eliminated when the TIG is fully established in FY05.

³These 16 transfers reflect FORSCOM assumption of USARSO MACOM responsibilities.

Table 3. Disposition of USARSO Authorizations

FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

Facilities	Description
Headquarters Building	104,000 square feet (104 KSF to 114 KSF by '05)) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 KSF SCIF (to 28 KSF by '05) • 10 KSF open storage of classified (Secret) • 10 KSF command center – SCIF • Facility suitable for hosting Chief of Defense or Chief of Army visits from other nations Capability to construct workspace as functional work-centers Army force protection criteria met 400 sf weapons storage Capability to handle all USARSO communications <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple LAN's • Classified systems • Fiber optic access
Aircraft facilities	Facilities for 2 UC-35 army fixed wing aircraft
Motor Pool	Parking and space for operator level maintenance for up to 50 small tactical vehicles
Warehouse	20 KSF climate controlled
Barracks	Space for up to 50 soldiers

Table 4. Facility Requirements

SITES CONSIDERED FOR RELOCATION

The Army considered 14 sites for USARSO relocation. The 14 sites included Army locations that were identified as having potentially available facilities and other locations offered for consideration by members of Congress and their constituents. Sites identified for consideration were:

Fort Benning, GA	Fort Jackson, SC
Fort Polk, LA	Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem, GA
Fort Sill, OK	Fort Sam Houston, TX
Homestead AFB, FL	Keesler AFB, MS
Naval Activity Stennis Space Center, MS	Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS
Gulfport NAS, MS	Miami, FL
Mobile, AL	Arkansas (unspecified location)

STUDY METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

The study methodology was based on identifying potential relocation candidates and evaluating these candidates against relevant criteria. The methodology included:

- Review of the 1996 USARSO Relocation Study
- Data searches to identify existing installations with excess facilities
- Development of criteria to assess alternatives
- Elimination of infeasible alternatives
- Detailed analysis of viable alternatives
- Development of a recommendation

Criteria

Criteria were developed to ensure the Army had a rational and fair set of metrics by which to evaluate each option. Screening and evaluation criteria were both developed. These criteria have remained constant throughout the process, with the exception of the Support Army Transformation criterion added in March 2002. Below is an in-depth description of criteria used in the study.

Screening Criteria. Screening criteria are those criteria that absolutely must be fulfilled by any option being considered. If an option does not meet all screening criteria, that option then becomes infeasible and is eliminated from further consideration. Below are the three screening criteria developed for this study.

- Criterion: Support Army Reorganization. This is a key criterion that must be considered in light of DOD and Army efforts to achieve efficiencies and streamline headquarters wherever possible. Any course of action that does not support this long-term initiative to make the Army more efficient and effective fails to pass the screen. Reduction in overall size and Army Management Headquarters Account (AMHA) numbers is a central focus of this effort. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Eliminate overlap and duplication. The efforts by FORSCOM and USARSO to eliminate redundancy and streamline the USARSO Headquarters was the start of similar reviews that will be conducted for all Army Service Component Commands. FORSCOM will assume some limited missions (which can be done wherever USARSO goes on an Army installation), and USARSO will eliminate positions as a result of the loss of MACOM status. USARSO will be able to eliminate 108 positions. Further savings of at least 184 are expected upon USARSO's departure by returning the Fort Buchanan garrison to pre-USARSO strength. Any location not on an existing Army installation is eliminated by this screening criterion, because a move to a non-Army site would require

establishing a garrison of approximately 40 to 76 persons, military and civilian. The garrison would be approximately 40 personnel if on a non-Army military installation, as there are many functions that a Host Service could provide to an Army tenant. At a site without such inter-Service support, the requirement would grow to 76. These 40 to 76 spaces involve functions that require Army authorizations (military and civilian) to support an Army unit, such as personnel and logistic specialists to connect to Army specific systems and personnel who support those Army elements in the Area of Responsibility (units and MILGROUPS). Additionally there are other areas where, although the Host Service could provide the support, it would be done only at the cost of their adding an equal number of personnel to their existing garrison. This would not be a savings to the Army, as the Host Service would expect a transfer of positions from the Army to cover such increases to their garrison. An detailed description of the garrison requirements is contained in Appendix B.

- Reduce Headquarters size and AMHA. The spaces saved from USARSO Headquarters are all AMHA spaces and contribute to the overall congressionally mandated 15% reduction that the Department of Defense has directed the Army to meet by 30 September 2003.
- Criterion: Support to USSOUTHCOM Mission Accomplishment. This is an absolute requirement reinforced in guidance received from the Chief of Staff, Army and the Combatant Commander, USSOUTHCOM. To the Combatant Commander, location is not the most important factor; rather, it is the allocation of appropriate forces along with seamless support from a viable, functioning Army Service Component Command. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Seamless support. The Combatant Commander should experience no degradation in support to his Headquarters for those responsibilities that are doctrinal. There may be some loss in responsiveness with the reduction in the USARSO Headquarters numbers; however, this will not endanger any doctrinal or assigned missions. The move must be conducted in a manner that allows continuous support to the Combatant Commander. Conducting a move of this nature is difficult enough when moving from Army installation to Army installation where support mechanisms and systems are familiar. If moving to other than an Army installation, planning for support from another Service and then putting that planned support to the test when it is required to support an in-theater activity, creates risk to the Combatant Commander's mission.

- Accessibility to the SOUTHCOM AOR. Most of USARSO's travel to the AOR is conducted via commercial air. It is necessary that the Headquarters be within one hour of a suitable airport that can on a routine basis, with one connection, connect to flights to the AOR through one of the four major hubs, Miami, Houston, Dallas, or Atlanta. Visitors from the region in the Distinguished Visitor Program use commercial air for their travel. This also enhances their accessibility to the Command.
- Criterion: Executable by Summer 2003. The Commander, USARSO has stated that there is high risk of mission failure due to excessive loss and turnover of personnel, and lack of ability to hire qualified replacements in a timely manner. This loss puts mission accomplishment at risk as early as summer 2002. Ongoing delays and studies have resulted in the need to slip the target date for the relocation by one year to summer 2003. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Move Headquarters USARSO not later than summer 2003. Any new location that cannot meet a summer 2003 timeline is ruled out as a viable option. Not meeting that timeline will increase the risk of mission failure to an unacceptable level due to lack of qualified personnel to execute key tasks.
 - No multiple moves on post. Moving into temporary facilities for several months to several years is unacceptable. The previous move of USARSO from Panama to Puerto Rico has left the Headquarters operating in this "temporary" situation since its arrival in 1999. Some members of USARSO have worked in four different buildings at Fort Buchanan. Additionally, moving into temporary facilities in this manner will increase the cost of the move unnecessarily.
 - Move into a renovated building. This follows from the previous factor. Moving into the final location without renovation will inflict continued disruption to USARSO members as building systems and workspace are renovated during occupancy. With USARSO personnel having lived and worked in temporary conditions for three years in Puerto Rico, it is unacceptable to require them to move once again into temporary arrangements that will be disrupted in the near future. This is both a morale and an efficiency issue.

Evaluation Criteria. Evaluation criteria are those criteria that provide the ability to conduct a comparative assessment of the options that meet all screening criteria. Below are the evaluation criteria developed for this study.

- Criterion: Cost. Lower cost options are preferable. Options that reduce the fiscal burden over the next few years as the Army funds many un-programmed initiatives and operations are preferred. The un-programmed USARSO move should be accomplished at minimal initial and long-term cost. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Initial move cost. This is the cost of initial funds required to move the headquarters and related elements. This involves Permanent Change of Station (civilian), movement of property (personal and unit), communications infrastructure, and initial facility renovation costs.
 - Facility cost. The cost of facilities is a significant factor. This is the total cost of all facilities required to accommodate all USARSO units that are relocating. This includes any leasing costs required during facility renovation and any military construction funds for additional structures required in the near future.
 - Long-term cost comparison. While initial move and facility costs are important, the overall cost over a 20-year period determines if there is a long term overall benefit for a COA that may have a high up-front cost. Long-term costs include the overall cost of construction or renovation and the maintenance, utility, and janitorial cost over a twenty-year period. This is calculated two ways, straight 20-year cost and the Net Present Value (NPV) for the same calculation. The latter method considers that dollars today have more buying power than dollars in the future due to inflation and other factors.
- Criterion: Personnel Savings. Higher numbers saved is better.
- Criterion: Quality of Life. This is a significant factor. While Quality of Life is a hard concept to measure, many objective factors can be used to compare locations. The key Quality of Life factors evaluated here use several sources of data. It is important to measure this criterion for both military and civilian members of the headquarters. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Military and civilian housing. Housing is a significant issue affecting the quality of life in Puerto Rico. Lack of military housing quantity and quality (i.e., housing determined to be sub-standard) and the impact of the moratorium on new construction make this a high

priority to fix during a move. Off-post housing is especially critical, since half of the headquarters is civilian and will be required to live off post. Additionally, with the rank structure found in USARSO, a high percentage of field-grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers, a large number of military personnel will also have to find civilian housing. Quality and availability of off-post housing is therefore incorporated in this criterion.

- Cost of living. A lower cost of living in an area is preferable, as disposable income is increased with lower living costs.
 - Crime. Puerto Rico is a very high crime area compared to most major cities in the 50 states. A lower crime rate is more desirable.
 - Cost of housing. This factor includes renting and purchasing homes. A lower cost of housing is desirable, as it will significantly increase the quality of life for the civilian and military members of the command.
- Criterion: Mission Enhancement. Enhances USARSO's ability to execute its mission in the most efficient and effective manner. Key elements of this criterion are:
 - Headquarters efficiency through collocation with subordinate units. USARSO currently works in 30 separate buildings. This causes significant inefficiency through travel between buildings, increased cost of facilities, and loss of synergy achieved through working together in teams. A lower number of facilities and closer locations to subordinate units improve efficiency.
 - Facility stature suitable to hosting frequent Chief of Defense or Chief of Army level visits to the command, as well as multi-nation conferences.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Description of the Alternatives

Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative.

This option is labeled Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem because facilities at both installations in the Atlanta area are needed to meet all USARSO requirements. There was no place on Fort McPherson for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and thus it was necessary to consider Fort Gillem for

that requirement. The following is a description of the option and the impacts to other units.

The Command Group and personnel staff would occupy the current JAG Headquarters as the most suitable building on post for the new USARSO Headquarters. This would require significant renovation and upgrade to the old existing building as well as relocating the JAG to another location on post (including the creation of a new court room).

Three interconnected buildings are in the process of being renovated for the new Transformation Installation Management Regional Headquarters. This would become the main administrative space for USARSO. It would require that the TIM Headquarters be relocated into the main FORSCOM Headquarters building. There are several costs involved in this. There is a cost to re-configure the three buildings to accommodate USARSO versus the TIM and there would be a further cost to redesign space allocation and reconfigure the floor plan for the main FORSCOM Headquarters building to accommodate the TIM.

The combination of the buildings above provides less than 75KSF towards the USARSO requirement of 104KSF. Additional overflow space for USARSO administrative requirements would be needed at Fort Gillem. This would be temporary space as the only available option there is converted warehouse space. In two years permanent administrative space could be available back on Fort McPherson with the vacation and renovation of administrative space occupied by a Reserve Component Headquarters that is having a new Headquarters built on Fort Gillem.

A small part of the USARSO G2 would co-locate with the FORSCOM G2 inside the SCIF in the FORSCOM Headquarters building. The remainder of the G2 and the TIG would need to have an existing Fort Gillem facility expanded and converted to another SCIF. This is currently an older building that was previously a SCIF, however due to the expansion the estimated cost is \$4M. This is the first project listed that would almost certainly be a MILCON project. (It was not realized that this would be a MILCON project until the evaluation stage of the process). This project cannot be completed by summer 03.

The final major facility requirement would be an expanded facility for the TIG when its authorizations are planned to increase from 88 to 255 in FY05. Additional facilities and SCIF space would be required in FY05. Estimated cost for this new facility is \$15M.

This option involves significant impacts on at least three major Army units and significant renovation and reconfiguration. It is not an easily executable option, and as discovered during the evaluation process is only partially executable by summer 03.

Fort Sam Houston Alternative.

The USARSO Headquarters and all support units are can be relocated into the old Brooke Army Medical Center main building. All elements (to include the increase of the TIG in FY05) will fit into this building that has been leased from the Army to a developer (Orion/Weston) through authority of the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative under 10 USC 2667. The developer will renovate the building to meet USARSO requirements, to include SCIF space.

Orion/Weston currently holds the 50-year lease to the Old BAMC building and the two Beach Pavilions. The Old BAMC building (building 1000) has a total of 210KSF net rentable area. The USARSO requirement is for 104KSF expanding to 114KSF with the expansion of the TIG in FY05. This is 50 percent of the rentable space of the building increasing to 54 percent in FY05.

Orion/Weston's estimate of the cost of this lease is \$23.49 per square foot. This includes standard janitorial service, maintenance, and utilities. This makes the cost of the lease \$2.3M for the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. The Army will share 46 percent of the profits from the lease over the lease term. Orion/Weston expects that the profit share for the Army in this lease alone will be \$5M. This may be returned to the Army in direct funds or through in-kind consideration.

Evaluation of Fort Sam Houston and Fort McPherson

Two options passed the screening criteria, Fort Sam Houston and Fort McPherson. An in-depth evaluation was made to determine which of these options was more advantageous. Table 5 depicts the relative comparison of these options. It is clear from the table that Fort Sam Houston is the better option for this relocation. Specific metrics used for evaluation are included in the explanatory text following the table. This cost comparison assumes that the lease at Fort Sam Houston is scored as an operational lease. The Army's analysis concludes that it should be an operational lease and not incur the scoring penalty of a capital lease. A discussion of the effect of the lease scored as a capital lease is provided in Appendix C.

Evaluation Criteria				
Site	Cost	Quality of Life	Personnel Savings	Mission Effectiveness
Fort Sam Houston	1	1	Even	1
Fort McPherson	2	2	Even	2

Table 5. Final Option Comparison

Cost. Fort Sam Houston is a lower cost option than Fort McPherson from every perspective and provides a significantly better quality Headquarters facility. The total initial cost to move to Fort McPherson is \$29.5M more than the move to Fort Sam Houston. This is due to facility cost differences. The amount to move the command's equipment and personnel to any location in the Southeast is essentially the same (with the exception of facility costs). Appendix D contains a detailed economic analysis of facility alternatives. Movement costs are described in Appendix E. Pertinent cost elements are explained below.

- **Initial Facilities Cost.** This initial cost is higher for the Fort McPherson option. This includes OMA renovation costs (\$10.5M) plus MILCON needed immediately (\$4M) at Fort Gillem for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and MILCON required at Fort Gillem for TIG long term (\$15M). This totals \$29.5M. There is no initial cost for facilities at Fort Sam Houston. The only cost will be the annual lease cost of \$2.3M for each of the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. This assumes the lease is not scored. If the lease is scored as a capital lease, additional upfront costs will be incurred. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the lease is \$27.7M and would be placed in an escrow account. These funds would be lost to Army use, but not US Government use.
- **Long-term costs (20-year).** This includes facility renovation costs, maintenance, utilities, and janitorial service cost for both options. At Fort McPherson, this cost is \$29.5M for renovation, plus \$623K per year for maintenance, etc. above. For Fort Sam Houston, long-term costs are the cost of the lease minus potential profit sharing (approximately \$5M) over a 20-year lease.
- **Net Present Value cost for 20-year term.** This calculation uses the nominal discount rate of 5.4%. It compares the costs of the facilities over a 20-year time period. The Fort Sam Houston version is \$5.7M cheaper. This is the best comparison of the relative value. Plus, there is no additional risk for building systems repair costs for Fort Sam Houston as it is leased and the developer would be responsible for these possible major unforeseeable costs. The Army ultimately would be responsible for replacing major systems (not anticipated in calculations) for the Fort McPherson option.

Cost if Scored as a Capital Lease. The Army analysis considers this lease unlikely to be scored as a capital lease. However, should it be scored as a capital lease, the only change is that the Army will have to put \$27.7M (the NPV of the lease) into an escrow account. This would be added to the initial facilities cost for calculation purposes. Fort Sam Houston is a lower cost option than Fort McPherson from every perspective and provides a significantly better quality

Headquarters facility. The total initial cost to move to Fort McPherson is \$14.5M more than the move to Fort Sam Houston. This is due to facility cost differences. The amount to move the command's equipment and personnel to any location in the Southeast is essentially the same (with the exception of facility costs). Pertinent cost elements are explained below.

- **Initial Facilities Cost.** This initial cost for the Fort McPherson option continues to be \$29.5M. The initial cost for the Fort Sam Houston option then becomes \$27.7M. The up front cost is still lower for the Fort Sam Houston option by \$1.8M.
- **Long-term costs (20-year).** No change, except for the \$27.7M placed in escrow.
- **Net Present Value cost for 20-year term.** This calculation uses the nominal discount rate of 5.4%. It compares the costs of the facilities over a 20-year time period. It is unclear how to treat the \$27.7M placed in escrow for this calculation. Although it is a cost to the Army, the funds are not actually disbursed. The worst case is to consider it an expenditure and effectively pay the lease twice, once by placing the funds in escrow and then actually paying the lease. Using this method the Fort McPherson option is the lower cost by \$22M.

This would change the evaluation table to:

Evaluation Criteria – with Lease Scored as Capital Lease				
Site	Cost	Quality of Life	Personnel Savings	Mission Effectiveness
Fort Sam Houston	2	1	Even	1
Fort McPherson	1	2	Even	2

Table 6. Final Option Comparison

Even in the event the lease is scored as a capital lease, there is no change to the recommendation that Fort Sam Houston is the best alternative. Fort McPherson has higher upfront costs and includes MILCON construction that is not executable by summer 2003. Fort Sam Houston is executable by summer 2003 and even though it calculates to be more expensive in the long run, the \$27.7M returns to the government for use in negating the higher long-term cost.

Quality of Life. The comparisons provided were extrapolated from data gathered from several different sources' websites on the two cities involved.

- **Cost of Living.** The Consumer Price index survey listed the overall cost of living index for Atlanta at 103.2, with San Antonio at 90.2. The national average is 100. An income in San Antonio of \$43,702 is equivalent to \$50,000 in Atlanta
- **Housing Cost.** The cost of the typical 3-bedroom house in Atlanta was \$286K, while it was \$106K in San Antonio (CNN website).
- **Housing Availability.** This information was gathered from the housing offices at both posts. There is almost no enlisted housing at Fort McPherson, while there is adequate availability and additional enlisted housing programmed for Fort Sam Houston.
- **Health Care.** While health care for the military is adequate at Fort McPherson, it would require off-post assets, while Fort Sam Houston has Brooke Army Medical Center for military care. Off post health care availability in both cities is good. Health care costs are indexed at 109.2 in Atlanta, while San Antonio is 90.5.
- **Schools.** Statistically, public schools in both locations appear fairly even. Anecdotally, people at Fort McPherson tend to commute longer distances to get their children enrolled in better schools. Many who live in housing at Fort McPherson send their children to private schools. Soldiers who live in housing at Fort Sam Houston are able to send their children to DODDS schools on post, or have shorter commute distances based on good school districts.
- **Crime.** Crime rate in San Antonio is significantly lower than for Atlanta for both violent and property crime. Violent crime rates in Atlanta in 2001 were 2,729.5 per 100,000, while they were 561 in San Antonio.

Increased Mission Effectiveness. Fort Sam Houston would have the entire Headquarters in a single, adequate building renovated to meet all USARSO needs. Fort McPherson has USARSO spread over five buildings on the main post and two additional buildings on Fort Gillem (approximately 20 miles away). The Fort Sam Houston option is clearly better than the Fort McPherson option. It will clearly make the right impression on visitors to USARSO.

Personnel Savings. No difference between the two alternatives. The total personnel savings is a combination of the 108 AMHA spaces in the USARSO Headquarters and the anticipated reduction to be taken from the Fort Buchanan Garrison upon USARSO's departure. This Garrison reduction totals at least 184 and is the difference between the Garrison authorizations before USARSO arrival in summer 1999 and current years authorizations.

Site Re-evaluations

In May 2002, the Army Staff and USARSO conducted a final evaluation of all locations considered, using the full screening and evaluation criteria.

Sites Not Meeting Screening Criteria

Below is the evaluation of sites not meeting the screening criteria and therefore considered infeasible. These sites received no further consideration in the study. Table 7 provides a summary of these sites and their evaluation with the screening criteria.

Sites	Screening Criteria		
	Support Army Transformation	Support to U.S. SOUTHCOM	Execute by FY 03
Fort Benning, GA	Yes	Yes	No
Fort Jackson, SC	Yes	No	No
Fort Polk, LA	Yes	No	No
Gulfpport NAS, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Homestead AFB, FL	Yes	Yes	No
Keesler AFB, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Miami, FL	Yes	Yes	No
Mobile, AL	No	No	Not Evaluated
Naval Activity Stennis, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated
Arkansas	No	No	Not Evaluated
Fort Sill, OK	Yes	No	Not Evaluated
Naval Station, Pascagoula, MS	No	No	Not Evaluated

Table 7. Sites Not Meeting Initial Screening Criteria

Fort Benning, GA. Two visits were made to Fort Benning, the first when looking at facilities for about 1,200 personnel and the second to reevaluate options based on a requirement of less than 600 personnel. The option offered by the Garrison at Fort Benning was the Headquarters building for Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), plus additional buildings. The WHINSEC Headquarters could not be vacated until the end of the school year in December 2002. The building would have required significant reconfiguring from a world-class school facility to an Army Service Component Command headquarters. Additional facilities were offered to meet the remaining requirements for space, but even with all additional facilities considered, Fort Benning could not meet the total requirement without additional MILCON projects that would not be executable by summer 2003. Additionally, the facility offered for a relocated WHINSEC would also require reconfiguration to make it a suitable academic setting. Moreover, the exterior appearance of this facility is not appropriate for an international school.

The Army is concerned over collocating USARSO and WHINSEC. The likelihood of association of USARSO with the former School of the Americas, and its annual protests, could become a distraction. This would also be a source of contention between USARSO and certain Latin America nations that choose to have no relationship with WHINSEC.

Fort Jackson, SC. Fort Jackson was examined because the Army facility database indicated that excess facilities existed that could be used for a USARSO Headquarters. Upon visiting the Garrison Commander and members of his staff, this location failed two screening criteria. It is not executable by summer 2003 because facilities were not immediately available. Any available facilities at this post are essentially older facilities (including WWII remnants) and are inadequate for renovation. This means MILCON is the only viable alternative for adequate facilities and would take three to five years to complete. The airport in Columbia, SC near Fort Jackson does not have available connections to those four major airports that provide routine access to Central and South America.

Fort Polk, LA. Fort Polk was examined because the Army facility database indicated that excess facilities existed that could be used for a USARSO Headquarters. After telephonic coordination with the facilities engineer for the post, this location failed two screening criteria. It is not executable by summer 2003. Facilities are not immediately available. Any available facilities at this post are essentially older facilities (including WWII remnants) and are inadequate for renovation. This means MILCON is the only viable alternative for adequate facilities and would take three to five years to complete. Fort Polk is not close enough to an airport with available connections to those four major airports that provide routine access to Central and South America.

Mississippi locations (Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport /Keesler AFB/ Naval Activities Stennis Space Center and Naval Station, Pascagoula). All locations failed to meet the screening criteria for supporting Army reorganization. This is because they would require creation of a garrison of 40 to 76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there. The criterion of support of the Combatant Commander mission was not met due to lack of adequate air connections to all four hubs from small regional airports. A specific proposal for construction of facilities was never presented and thus no independent evaluation of possibility to complete facilities for USARSO occupancy by summer 2003 was completed. There were assurances made that facilities could be ready within one year.

Homestead AFB, FL. This site failed to meet the criterion of executable by summer 2003. Facilities were not immediately available as all usable facilities are occupied. Much of the base was destroyed by a hurricane and thus any facilities for USARSO use would have to be constructed using MILCON. This

would require a three to five year completion timeline from date of initiating the planning for the projects.

Mobile, AL. The Middle Bay Port Development (MBPD) site in Mobile, Alabama was considered in the 1996 study. This site has since been turned over to the state government. It is currently being leased by various entities through a privatized management company. This change from government control to privatized control and its current occupation changed the conditions from the 1996 study, and the site was therefore considered not available.

Miami, FL – unspecified location vicinity SOUTHCOM Headquarters. With the issues surrounding the SOUTHCOM facility and the fact that additional leased commercial space must be procured to meet current SOUTHCOM demands, it was clear that co-location with SOUTHCOM was infeasible. Any permanent solution in the area would require MILCON and would not be executable by summer 2003.

Belle Chase Naval Air Station/Air Reserve Center, New Orleans, LA. This location failed to meet the screening criteria for Supporting Army Reorganization because it would require creation of a garrison of about 40-76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there.

Arkansas (Unspecified Location). This location failed to meet the screening criteria for Supporting Army Reorganization because it would require creation of a garrison of about 40-76 personnel to provide adequate support to the Headquarters and associated units that might move there.

Fort Sill, OK. The criterion of support of the Combatant Commander mission was not met due to lack of adequate air connections to all four hubs from small regional airports. A specific proposal for construction of facilities was never presented and thus no independent evaluation of possibility to complete facilities for USARSO occupancy by summer 2003 was completed.

Conclusion

The study's conclusion is that Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the best alternative for the relocation of Headquarters, USARSO in 2003.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
104 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0104

June 25, 2002



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Relocation of Portions of United States Army South

This memo is prepared at your request for use in deliberations associated with the proposed relocation of portions of United States Army South (USARSO) from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston. This memo addresses the primary statutory and regulatory requirements that must be taken into consideration before the Army can proceed with the relocation.

Summary of Legal Considerations

In accordance with 10 USC 2687, the contemplated relocation of personnel and functions from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston would be considered a realignment. If the realignment results in either the reduction of more than 1,000 DoD civilians or 50 percent of the DoD civilians authorized to be employed at the installation, in accordance with P.L. 101-510, as amended, the realignment would have to be specifically authorized pursuant to a recommendation of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. Additionally, before any decision is made on the realignment, the Army must perform an analysis of the environmental impacts of the realignment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the stationing process must be completed in accordance with Army Regulation 5-10. Once a decision has been made to relocate functions and personnel to Fort Sam Houston, the Army may be required to notify Congress of its intention to lease property at the installation if the required lease payment exceeds certain thresholds. The following includes a more complete discussion of these legal considerations and my preliminary analysis that the realignment can go forward without the requirement for further authorization through the BRAC process.

Base Closures and Realignments (10 USC 2687)

10 USC 2687 applies to the closure or realignment of military installations or the undertaking of any construction, conversion or rehabilitation at a military installation resulting from the closure or realignment of an installation. The statute defines military installation very broadly to include activities under the Jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, to include leased facilities. It includes installations located in the continental United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam.

The statute prohibits the Army from taking action to implement the closure of an installation in which at least 300 civilian employees (direct-hire, permanent

civilian employees of Department of Defense) are employed until Congress is notified in accordance with the statutory requirements.

The statute also addresses the realignment of installations, which is defined as any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes. The contemplated relocation of functions and personnel from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston would be considered a realignment. With regard to realignments, no action may be taken to effect or implement any realignment involving a reduction by more than 1,000 civilian personnel or by more than 50 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation until the Secretary notifies Congress in accordance with the notification provisions of the statute.

In accordance with Section 2909 of Public Law, 101-510, as amended, during the period of November 5, 1990 to April 15, 2006, the BRAC law shall be the exclusive authority for the closure or realignment of a military installation. This provision would apply to a proposed closure or realignment under 10 USC 2687 if the proposed closure or realignment exceeds the threshold requirements under 10 USC 2687. Therefore, if a realignment is proposed between the period of November 5, 1990 and April 15, 2006 and triggers the statutory thresholds for civilian personnel under 10 USC 2687, the realignment must be done in accordance with the BRAC process and not the congressional notification requirement under 10 USC 2687.

10 USC 2687 sets forth an exception to the requirement to pursue the realignment through the BRAC process. The requirement would not apply if the President certifies to Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or military emergency.

In the present case, the Army has proposed the relocation of portions of USARSO from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston. The relocation would be considered a realignment subject to the numerical thresholds of 10 USC 2687 concerning the reduction in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at the installation. If the reduction in the number of civilian personnel exceeds the numerical thresholds, the realignment of the installation could only take place either under the BRAC process or pursuant to a notification by the President to Congress that the realignment must take place for reason of national security or military emergency.

Based on the information that this office has been provided, there are currently a total of 1779 civilian authorizations for Fort Buchanan. This number includes 174 non-appropriated fund employees that should not be included as a part of the civilian authorizations because they are not direct hire, permanent civilian employees under 10 USC 2687. A reduction of the 1779 civilian authorization by the 174 non-appropriated fund positions would result in a total civilian authorization for the installation of 1605. Fifty percent of that

authorization would be 802. Under the proposed plan, the Army would realign Fort Buchanan by relocating 306 positions to Fort Sam Houston. This relocation would fall below the numerical threshold under 10 USC 2687. However, the information presented to us does not explain whether the 447 civilian garrison employee positions that will remain at Fort Buchanan will subsequently be eliminated pursuant to the realignment of the installation. Assuming that all 447 civilian positions are eliminated, the total reduction of the civilian population at Fort Buchanan pursuant to the realignment would be 753 civilian positions. Although it is unlikely that all of the positions will be subsequently eliminated, even if they were eliminated completely, the Army would still be under the numerical thresholds of 10 USC 2687. As such, the Army could proceed independently without additional authorization through the BRAC process.

This determination is made based on preliminary information provided to this office. A final determination of whether the realignment can take place outside of the BRAC process will have to be made after completion of the following realignment requirements and the development of a final plan. Given that these numbers could change, this opinion should not be construed as a final judgment that proceeding with the realignment independent of the BRAC process would be appropriate.

National Environmental Policy Act (42 USC 4321 et seq.)

Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and in accordance with Army regulation 200-2 (32 CFR Part 651 dated 29 March 2002 Final Rule will revise regulation), the Army is required to systematically analyze possible and probable environmental impacts of implementing a proposed Army action, to include relocations. The Army must identify all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action and any mitigation measures that may be implemented to respond to potential environmental impacts. The outcome of this environmental analysis will be documented in either a record of environmental consideration, environmental assessment and a finding of no significant impact or an environmental impact statement. Any final decision about the relocation of personnel and functions can only be made after completion of the required NEPA analysis.

Real Property Transactions: reports to Congressional Committees (10 USC 2662)

If the Army acquires a leasehold or fee interest in property as a part of the realignment of Fort Buchanan and the relocation of personnel and functions to Fort Sam Houston, there are certain Congressional notification requirements. The acquisition of either a fee title to real property exceeding an estimated price of \$500,000 or leasehold interest in property with an estimated annual rental that exceeds \$500,000 requires the submission of a report to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees detailing such transaction. If the acquisition of property is part of a project, the report should include a summary of the general

plan for the project. The Secretary must submit the report and wait a period of thirty days before entering into the transaction.


Stationing Requirements (Army Regulation 5-10)

Army Regulation 5-10, prescribes procedures and policies governing the Army stationing process. In accordance with the regulation, the Major Army Command planning the stationing activity must submit a stationing package to Headquarters, Department of the Army. A notification package is required if the stationing will affect fewer than 200 military personnel authorizations and fewer than 50 permanent direct hire civilian employees. A decision package is required if the stationing activity will affect more than 200 military authorizations or 50 direct permanent hire civilian employees. The stationing package should take into consideration the stationing planning factors and include a stationing summary, information for members of congress, public notification documentation, a community impact analysis, the appropriate environmental documentation and a movement directive request. The regulation prescribes timelines for the submission of stationing decision packages, the appropriate approval authorities and required Congressional and public notifications.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this memo addresses the primary legal and regulatory requirements associated with the realignment of Fort Buchanan. It does not address policy issues associated with the possible realignment, including whether moving USARSO from Fort Buchanan to Fort Sam Houston is the most desirable action. As this decision is evaluated from a policy perspective, it is recommended that the Army consider why this realignment is being proposed prior to the 2005 base realignment and closure round. We also recommend that, given the Congressional interest on this issue, the Army should document in sufficient detail its analysis of alternative relocation sites and a justification as to why Fort Sam Houston is the preferred alternative.

I hope this information is helpful. If you have any questions, please contact me or Robert Davenport at (b)(6)


Earl H. Stockdale
Deputy General Counsel
(Civil Works and Environment)

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TAB C – Supplemental Information

Appendix 1, Justification for USARSO Relocation in FY 2003

Background: US Army South (USARSO). USARSO is the Army Service Component Command for US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and an Army Major Command. Commander, USARSO also executes the Army's Executive Agent responsibilities to support the USSOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami and its subordinate joint commands, including Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras and 27 MILGROUPS.

USARSO performs the following operational missions:

Maintains readiness to deploy an Early Entry Command Post or to constitute a contingency JTF headquarters to command and control forces in the Southern Region.

Coordinates and conducts a large number of Theater Security Cooperation activities, including JCS exercises, deployments for training, unit and subject-matter-expert exchanges and the Conference of American Armies.

Provides strategic and tactical communications and administrative and logistics support for units throughout the Southern Region.

USARSO headquarters, several subordinate units and an Army garrison are located at Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico, and total some 1,231 personnel.

Why Move USARSO Now: There are four reasons for moving Headquarters USARSO and selected subordinate units by summer 2003.

Worsening Quality of Life. The primary threat to USARSO readiness is a multiplicity of quality of life challenges that border on the untenable. Personal daily living conditions, an uncompensated high cost of living, an unfavorable political environment, and deteriorating infrastructure all suggest that relocation in the near term is necessary to ensure effective support to USSOUTHCOM, while improving the welfare of the soldiers, civilians, and families assigned.

Retention and recruitment of a quality civilian workforce is the most prominent and serious indicator of these quality of life concerns. Since its arrival from Panama in summer 1999, USARSO has experienced difficulties in hiring and retaining a qualified civilian workforce. Much of the problem can be attributed to quality of life issues and a Cost of Living Allowance that is less than half of that offered in other non-foreign oversea areas. Since July 1999, 40% of assigned civilian federal employees have left HQ USARSO, U.S. Army Garrison Fort Buchanan, and tenant units. While it is difficult to say with certainty the number that have left exclusively due to quality of life issues, nearly half have

departed for other employment. Of particular concern is that approximately 62% of these losses were senior grades (GS-9 and above).

Replacement of these highly experienced and talented employees has been tremendously costly both in terms of PCS dollars and lost productivity. It has also not kept pace with losses. As of May 2002, there were 90 civilian personnel vacancies at Fort Buchanan – over 11% of the authorized workforce. Two-thirds of the vacant positions are GS-9 and above. The rumors of a move may have temporarily slowed these losses, but substantial numbers of employees are expected to leave the command if the move is delayed or disapproved.

Federal civilian service in Puerto Rico comes at a significant financial cost. Despite the best efforts of the command, the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) for all federal government civilians remains at 11.5%, with no prospect for adjustment until 2003. Puerto Rico's COLA is less than half that of all other non-foreign OCONUS areas, yet the per diem rate (as an indicator of relative costs) is the second highest. In addition, civilians serving in non-foreign OCONUS areas are not entitled to Living Quarters Allowance (LQA). This has a significant impact in Puerto Rico where costs for even marginally acceptable housing is very high. These factors are exacerbated by the virtual absence of off-post employment options for non-Spanish speaking spouses.

Living conditions in Puerto Rico are at best frustrating and are often hazardous. Water and power services in Puerto Rico are unreliable. Water quality is questionable. Those living off-post must use water storage cisterns. Unannounced power and water outages are common throughout the island. Utility administration is unresponsive, and repair services are inferior in terms of timeliness and quality to those in the United States.

The federal workforce does not have access to the Army clinic on Fort Buchanan. Medical treatment off-post ranges from merely inefficient to clearly substandard. Medical appointments in Puerto Rico are practically non-existent, often turning a routine office visit into an all-day ordeal. Most physicians are fluent in English, but most staff is not. Medical care for Army families is clearly unsatisfactory, detracting from both the military mission and from the welfare of those assigned.

Crime and public safety are major problems. Puerto Rico has consistently had one of the highest per capita murder rates in the world. Drug trafficking abounds, with approximately 90% of all violent crimes and 75-80% of all documented homicides in Puerto Rico during CY98 considered drug related. Further, Puerto Rico is the only U.S. territory to have a terrorist threat rated as moderate – the same as Haiti, Ecuador, and Peru; a higher threat level than in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Puerto Rico led the nation in

the number of reported car-jacking incidents with more than 8,000 in the period 1994-97. The rate remains high.

Due to limited public transportation, most people must use personal vehicles as their primary means of travel. An overwhelming majority of Fort Buchanan's personnel live off-post and are subject to lengthy and hazardous daily commutes. Highway construction has not kept pace with Puerto Rico's rapid growth in registered automobiles. Road maintenance is poor.

There is one daily local English language newspaper in Puerto Rico; however, much of the content to include advertisements and severe weather warnings are written in Spanish. During hurricane warnings, no local station provides updates or emergency information in English. While cable and satellite TV provide extensive stateside programming, there is no local TV broadcasting in English.

Army infrastructure is deteriorating. Most workspace, housing, schools and other facilities on Fort Buchanan are substandard. A congressionally imposed construction moratorium has been in effect since January 2000. The moratorium has halted all planned new construction and eliminated all but the most essential repairs.

The political climate impacts morale. Despite a relatively large military veteran and retiree population on the island, general sentiment toward the military is decidedly mixed. Pro-military interest groups have largely been silent with regard to a continued military presence in Puerto Rico, while those in opposition have maintained a public voice and media visibility that is out of proportion to their numbers. Vieques remains a polarizing issue and a rallying point for pro-independence and anti-military activists. The net result is a general ambivalence and occasional outright hostility directed toward Army personnel and civilians. The past year saw physical attacks on local ROTC instructors and rock-throwing incidents involving Fort Buchanan's school buses with children on board. Equally appalling was the Mayor of Ponce's public statement that "America got what it deserves," following the tragic events of September 11th.

Army Management Headquarters Reduction Deadline. The Army must meet the Congressional mandate to reduce AMHA spaces by 15% not later than 30 September 2003. The plans to reduce the size of the USARSO staff in conjunction with the relocation would save 75 net AMHA spaces. Achieving the overall Army target is proving difficult in light of current operational requirements. Completing the USARSO move in 2003 would permit the Army to maintain 75 other critical positions.

Other Personnel Savings. Relocation of USARSO will also generate savings of 184 spaces in the Ft. Buchanan garrison. Establishing USARSO at a large CONUS Army post will mean a net garrison personnel savings of almost all of that number. Relocating at another Service's base or a non-military site would reduce those savings by 40 – 76 spaces. The key point is that moving USARSO early allows the Army to reprogram the spaces at a time of significant force management challenges.

Cost Savings. The move prior to FY 2005 would free up for reprogramming \$32.7 million in previously appropriated MILCON funds that otherwise would expire. The Army also estimates net annual savings of \$13 million in operating, infrastructure and travel expenses if allowed to move. Many of the installation's utilities are aging and would have to be replaced in order to keep USARSO in Puerto Rico until sometime after FY05. This utility project would require relief from the congressionally mandated construction moratorium. The savings in official travel would accrue from the fact that most travel into the USSOUTHCOM AOR must pass through Miami (very few direct flights from Puerto Rico meet the "Fly American" constraint). With a US Army South move pushed to FY06 or FY07, the known lost opportunity costs amount to between \$55 – 80 million.

Mission Performance

Mission readiness would be assured by the move due mainly to the improved capacity to recruit and retain a quality civilian workforce and the improvement in quality of life for the entire headquarters. The Ft. Sam Houston location would improve access to and from the region and would provide a better platform to conduct the Distinguished Visitor program. In all other respects, USARSO can continue to provide seamless support to USSOUTHCOM and to execute all Joint and Army mission responsibilities at least as well from Ft. Sam Houston as from Ft. Buchanan.

BRAC 05

Waiting to conduct the relocation in conjunction with the results of BRAC 05 would yield the advantage of greater certainty about the permanence of the new site. However, it would also effectively mean leaving USARSO in Puerto Rico well into FY 06 or FY 07. The Army assessment is that such a postponement would run a high risk to successful mission support to USSOUTHCOM and would be detrimental to the well being of the military, civilian and family members of U.S. Army South.

Appendix 2, Requirements for Garrison Stand Upon on an other than Army Installation

The following depicts the USARSO estimate of requirements for stand-up of a small garrison-like activity on an other-than Army installation (e.g., Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard). Rationale for each category is noted below.

Commander/Staff	2
SJA	0
EEO	0
Provost Marshal	
- Force Protection	4
- Building Security	24
DPCA	
- Family Support	1
- ACES	1
- Military Personnel Section	2
DPTM	1
DOL	1
DPW	1
Housing	1
DOC	1
DRM	1
Total	40

Commander/Staff: One field grade officer or equivalent civilian, plus one administrative support individual, to oversee the Army-specific base support requirements as outlined below. This individual would also be dual-hatted as the Building Manager for the facility(s) in which USARSO would be located.

Provost Marshal:

- **Force Protection:** Would oversee all Army-specific requirements for physical security of HQ, USARSO workforce, to include anti-terrorism analysis, force protection requirements of facilities, and oversight of the building security force. Would also oversee security badge system for USARSO HQ facility
- **Building Security:** Would provide 24/7 security of facility(s), to include entry/exit checkpoints, escort of contractor personnel without proper security clearance (e.g., building maintenance, cleaning teams, vendors, etc), as well as general walk-through security checks during non-duty hours. Represents an Army, mission-specific requirement that a non-Army installation would not normally provide.

Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA):

- **Family Support:** Provide Army-specific family support services not normally provided to an Army unit on a non-Army installation. Includes support for deployed families, unaccompanied personnel, as well as support to MILGROUPS throughout the USSOUTHCOM AOR.
- **Army Continuing Education System:** Under a new DOD policy, each service is responsible for approving and funding Tuition Assistance for its own military personnel. This individual would support the Army personnel enrolling in continuing education courses on a non-Army installation.
- **Military Personnel Support:** These two individuals would provide support normally provided by an Army Adjutant General office on an Army installation, which would not be found on another service installation. Includes all the normal AG functions, such as strength management, efficiency report processing, and liaison for records support with the nearest Army installation. Would provide this support for HQ, USARSO military personnel, as well as those persons assigned to the MILGROUPS and Joint Task Force Brave (JTF-B) at Soto Cano, Honduras.

Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization: Provides Army-specific support for the planning, training, and mobilization support issues not normally provided by a non-Army installation. Writes the headquarters plans for all required military training events, develops plans for the mobilization and evacuation of the headquarters as necessary, and provides general support to the headquarters in related mission areas. Also provides related support to MILGROUPS and JTF-B.

Director of Logistics: Provides Army-specific support in concert with nearest Army installation for logistical functions, such as ordering of spare parts for HQ, USARSO; JTFs 160/170 at GTMO; and 1-228th aviation at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. On a normal Army base, those functions would be consolidated at the garrison DOL; however, due to the use of a separate Army supply system, those functions would need to be coordinated via separate supply accounts at the nearest Army installation. This individual would also be the conduit for other logistical support to the headquarters, such as GSA vehicles leased or provided by the installation, determination of local logistical requirements for satellite Army units in support of USARSO, and other base operations DOL functions.

Director of Public Works: Would serve as assistant to the Commander/Building manager, coordinating upkeep of the facilities provided on a reimbursable basis by the non-Army installation. Would be responsible for the physical plant, to include HVAC, utilities, building maintenance, space allocation, and all related DPW functions. This space could be provided by the host installation, but would be on a reimbursable basis.

Housing Would serve as the conduit between the headquarters and host installation for housing requirements. Represent the commander in all issues regarding quality of life in base housing, projecting space/grade requirements for

the headquarters, managing any designated Army Family Housing dollars provided, if separate housing area was designated in a satellite sub-installation, and related duties.

Director of Contracting: Serves as the base operations contractor to support internal, Army-specific headquarters building and facility requirements, such as the procurement of Army equipment, GSA leased vehicles to support the headquarters, mission-unique force protection purchases, and other related contracts. Also would be the primary developer and administrator of the Installation Support Agreement (ISA) determining what support is provided by the host installation and at what cost.

Director of Resource Management: Responsible for the internal facility operating budget, reimbursements to the host installation, planning, programming, budgeting of facility resources, and documenting manpower authorizations for facilities management requirements.

Appendix 3 - Scoring

Purpose

This appendix discusses the application of scoring guidelines for the proposal by Orion Weston of a possible lease scenario of Old BAMC by USARSO.

Scoring Guidelines

OMB Circular No. A-11 (2001) Appendix A paragraph 11 establishes the criteria and Scoring Guidelines for purchases, lease-purchases, capital leases, and operating leases. Federal Government leases are "scored" for budget purposes as capital or operating leases depending on their characteristics. Capital leases are scored 100% in the year the lease is signed (100% of the present value of scheduled lease payments). Operating leases are scored in each lease year in the amount of the lease payments.

OMB Circular No. A-11 (2001) Appendix B paragraph 3 identifies six mandatory qualifiers for a lease to be considered an operating lease. These six qualifiers are:

1. Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during the term of the lease and is not transferred to the Government at or shortly after the end of the lease period.
2. The lease does not contain a bargain-price option.
3. The lease term does not exceed 75 percent of the estimated economic lifetime of the asset.
4. The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the asset at the inception of the lease.
5. The asset is a general purpose asset rather than being for a special purpose of the Government and is not built to unique specification for the Government as lessee.
6. There is a private-sector market for the asset.

Justification For Operating Lease Determination

Below is our point-by-point initial analysis of the preceding qualifiers.

1. The leasing control of BAMC remains with Orion Weston (lessor) during the term of the lease and is not transferred back to the Government at or shortly after the end of the lease period. The lease from the Army to Orion Weston is a 50-year lease. This is significantly longer than the anticipated 20-year USARSO lease and will allow the asset to remain with Orion Weston for an additional 30 years past the lease term.

2. The lease will not contain a bargain purchase option.
3. The lease does not exceed 75 percent of the economic life of the asset. According to Orion Weston, the economic life of BAMC is 39 years. Thus, the 20-year USARSO lease is only 51 percent of the total economic life expectancy of BAMC.
4. The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value from the inception of the lease. A fair market value of the Old BAMC can be estimated by extrapolating from a hypothetical analysis using the rental stream model done by Ft. Sam Houston on the Beach Pavilions. The Beach Pavilions are geographically located within a five-minute (less than 1K) line of sight walk from BAMC. The Beach Pavilion is 107KSF and has a minimum fair market value of \$25.5M. This would imply the Old BAMC facility of 210KSF would have a minimum fair market value of \$50.0M. With the present value calculation of the anticipated lease for Old BAMC estimated at \$27.7M, the present value compared to fair market value of the anticipated lease is 54 percent of the fair market value or less. This is less than the 90 percent threshold above.
5. BAMC is a general-purpose asset. USARSO is only leasing a portion of this building. The Developer has the ability and is actively pursuing other commercial activities to occupy leased space in the building and as part of the overall lease. It is not special purpose for USARSO use. BAMC as the name implies was built to serve a hospital type mission that is inconsistent with USARSO's mission.
6. The private sector market for this asset exists and is the original concept for the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative.

Conclusion

It is not possible to guarantee that the lease will not be scored as a capital lease. The Army analysis above indicates that it is unlikely to be scored as a capital lease. The effect of its scoring as a capital lease is that the Army would have to put the NPV of the lease (\$27.7M) in an escrow account to be held for the term of the lease. These funds could not be used to pay for the lease.

This effect on the two options that passed the screening criteria would be to change the initial facility cost from \$5.7M cheaper for Ft. Sam Houston to \$22.1M more expensive for the Ft. Sam Houston option. However, as described in earlier portions of the report it is still the only option that can be executed in summer 03. The Ft. McPherson option passed the screening criteria, but during the evaluations the length of time to complete some of the building renovation

projects stretched beyond the summer 2003 requirement. While this would make the Ft. Sam Houston option more expensive, it would not change the outcome of the recommendation.

Appendix 4 – Summary of Economic Analysis of Facility Alternatives

The short table below summarizes the economic analysis of the facility alternatives between Fort McPherson and Fort Sam Houston.

Table 8 - Summary Table for Ft McPherson and Ft Sam Houston
(all costs in \$000)

	Initial cost	MCA	Annual expenses	20 year total	NPV (5.4%)
Ft McPherson option	\$ 14,550	\$ 15,000	\$ 623	\$ 42,003	\$ 33,397
Ft Sam Old BAMC	\$0	\$0	\$2,450	\$ 42,100	\$ 27,728

Description of the Alternatives

Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem alternative.

This option is labeled Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem because facilities at both installations in the Atlanta area are needed to meet all USARSO requirements. There was no place on Fort McPherson for the Theater Intelligence Group (TIG) and thus it was necessary to consider Fort Gillem for that requirement. The following is a description of the option and the impacts to other units.

BLD 41 cost \$2.5M. The Command Group and personnel staff would occupy the current JAG Headquarters as the most suitable building on post for the new USARSO Headquarters. This would require significant renovation and upgrade to the old existing building, as well as relocating the JAG to another location on post (including the creation of a new court room).

BLD 169-171 cost \$1.75M. Three interconnected buildings are in the process of being renovated for the new Transformation Installation Management Regional Headquarters. This would become the main administrative space for USARSO. It would require that the TIM Headquarters be relocated into the main FORSCOM Headquarters building. There are several costs involved in this. First, there is a cost to re-configure the three buildings to accommodate USARSO versus the TIM. There would be a further cost to redesign space allocation and reconfigure the floor plan for the main FORSCOM Headquarters building to accommodate the TIM.

BLD 200 cost \$0.5M. A small part of the USARSO G2 would co-locate with the FORSCOM G2 inside the SCIF in the FORSCOM Headquarters building.

BLD 58 cost \$2.3M. In two years, permanent administrative space could be available back on Fort McPherson with the vacation and renovation of

administrative space occupied by a Reserve Component Headquarters that is having a new Headquarters built on Fort Gillem.

Cost for TIM Relocation \$1.5M. This cost covers the redesign and reconfiguration needed to stop the TIM from moving into their designed facilities and reorganize and renovate those necessary portions of FORSCOM Headquarters to accommodate the new TIM location.

TIG cost \$4.0M (Initial Requirement). The remainder of the G2 and the TIG would need to have an existing Fort Gillem facility expanded and converted to another SCIF. This is currently an older building that was previously a SCIF. However, due to the expansion, the estimated cost is \$4M. This is the first project listed that would almost certainly be a MILCON project. (It was not realized that this would be a MILCON project until the evaluation stage of the process). This project cannot be completed by summer 2003.

TIG cost \$15.0M (Final Requirement). The final major facility requirement would be an expanded facility for the TIG when its authorizations are planned to increase from 88 to 255 in FY05. Additional facilities and SCIF space would be required in FY05. Estimated cost for this new facility is \$15M.

Temporary overflow at Fort Gillem \$2.0M. The combination of the buildings above provides less than 75KSF towards the USARSO requirement of 104KSF. Additional overflow space for USARSO administrative requirements would be needed at Fort Gillem. This would be temporary space, as the only available option there is converted warehouse space.

Annual maintenance cost. The annual utility, maintenance, and janitorial costs for facilities is \$3.78 per square foot as calculated by the Garrison Engineer. This figure is used to calculate the annual cost of \$623K for the facilities USARSO would occupy under this alternative.

This option involves significant impacts on at least three major Army units and significant renovation and reconfiguration. It is not an easily executable option, and as discovered during the evaluation process is only partially executable by summer 2003.

Table 9 - Summary Table for Ft McPherson
(all costs in \$000)

<i>Facility</i>	Initial facility renovation cost	MCA cost for future projects	Annual facilities maintenance cost	Profit expectations	Total 20 year cost
BLD 41	\$ 2,500		\$ 24		
BLD 169-171	\$ 1,750		\$ 251		
BLD 200 (SCIF modifications)	\$ 500		\$ 42		
BLD 58 (replaces Temp at Ft Gillem)	\$ 2,300		\$ 54		
Cost for TIM relocation	\$ 1,500				
PARC/DOC (with ACA)	\$0		\$ 10		
Ft Gillem facility costs					
Theater Intelligence Group	\$ 4,000	\$ 15,000	\$ 156		
Temp for overflow at Ft Gillem	\$ 2,000		\$ 86		
20 year cost	\$ 14,550	\$ 15,000	\$ 623	\$0	\$ 42,003

Fort Sam Houston Alternative

The USARSO Headquarters and all support units can be relocated into the old Brooke Army Medical Center main building. All elements (to include the increase of the TIG in FY05) will fit into this building that has been leased from the Army to a developer (Orion/Weston) through authority of the Enhanced Use Lease Initiative under 10 USC 2667. The developer will renovate the building to meet USARSO requirements, to include SCIF space.

Orion/Weston currently holds the 50-year lease to the Old BAMC building and the two Beach Pavilions. The Old BAMC building (building 1000) has a total of 210KSF net rentable area. The USARSO requirement is for 104KSF expanding to 114KSF with the expansion of the TIG in FY05. This is 50 percent of the rentable space of the building to start, increasing to 54 percent in FY05.

Orion/Weston's estimate of the cost of this lease is \$23.49 per square foot. This includes standard janitorial service, maintenance, and utilities. This makes the cost of the lease \$2.3M for the first two years increasing to \$2.45M per year for the remaining 18 years. The Army will share 46 percent of the profits from the lease over the lease term. Orion/Weston expects that the profit share for the Army in this lease alone will be \$5M. This may be returned to the Army in direct funds or through in-kind consideration.

Table 10 - Summary Table for Sam Houston
 (all costs in \$000)

Lease cost	Initial facility renovation cost	MCA cost for future projects	Annual facilities maintenance cost	Profit expectations	Total 20 year cost
\$ 2,300	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$ 5,000.00	\$42,100.00

Appendix 5, Estimated Costs to Move

Total OMA And MPA Costs: The total cost to move to any location in the southeast United States is essentially the same (with the exception of the facility costs). These costs are captured in Table 5 below. Costs shown here do not include any "installation unique" facility costs. A written explanation of these costs follows the table.

	<u>OMA</u>	<u>MPA</u>
PERSONNEL COSTS	\$9,452	
MOVEMENT COSTS	\$14,100	\$5,483
AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT/WIRING	\$19,000	
ADDITIONAL COSTS	\$9,500	
TOTAL OMA CONSTRUCTION - OTHER POSTS	\$250	
TOTAL OMA REQUIRED TO MOVE	\$52,302	
TOTAL MPA REQUIRED TO MOVE		\$5,483

Table 11. Total USARSO Relocation Costs

These costs are offset by an estimated annual net cost savings to the Army of \$13M through reducing operating costs at Fort Buchanan to pre-USARSO levels. There is \$32.7M in appropriated MILCON funds held by the construction moratorium that can be reprogrammed for other Army requirements. The MILCON required to support a continued USARSO presence at Fort Buchanan is estimated at greater than \$50M. The funds saved will allow the Army to pay for the move over a few years.

Estimated Personnel Costs:

Description: Movement costs for relocation of an estimated 166 civilians. Includes movement costs at an average cost of \$50K per employee to cover airline transportation, movement of household goods, temporary quarters subsistence entitlement (TQSE), personal vehicle shipment, real estate costs, and other miscellaneous charges normally covered by the Joint Travel Request. Also covers Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay, Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, and Reduction in Force (RIF) of up to 36 spaces civilians at an average cost of \$25K each. Also covers cash-in of accrued leave of civilians affected by RIF. Assumes all military costs will be borne by the by Military Personnel, Army appropriation (centrally funded) upon approval of unit move and posting of unit movement orders by Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Estimated Movement Costs:

Description: Includes incremental temporary duty costs for coordination trips between San Juan and new location for building planning/design, coordination with installation to negotiate a myriad of support agreement issues, meetings with contractor(s), force protection coordination, implementation of communication/automation plan, command and control planning, intelligence coordination, logistics coordination relating to movement of USARSO equipment, packing & crating of USARSO office equipment, furniture, etc, line haul from port to new site, rental of 300 containers for sea/land shipment, and related costs for contractor to pack all items. Includes costs for movement of RED SWITCH from Fort Buchanan to new location, communications contract design for facility, electrical upgrades for communications/automation equipment relocated, special work at new facility for moved equipment, and associated costs.

Estimated Automation Equipment/Wiring Costs:

Description: Costs associated with automation required for new conference rooms, video teleconference facilities to include secure equipment required, new equipment for ramped-up theater support activity, special fiber purchase and installation at new facility for high-speed data transmission and high-load transmissions such as accounting data to Defense Finance and Accounting Service, central routers, servers, communications closets, switches, Global Command and Control System, initial local area network setup/linkages, contract support for reconfiguration, and radios/tactical sets for operations center. Also includes estimate for replacement/upgrade of current automation equipment and systems, which were purchased during move from Panama during the FY98 time frame, and are not adequate for command and control of USARSO. It would not be cost effective to prepare equipment, pack, crate, ship, unpack, re-prep, and install current systems when they are already outdated. In order for USARSO to be effective at new location, new system and link to main communication lines already in place at new facility would be required.

Other Costs at New CONUS Location:

Description: Office furniture and specialized furnishings (command group, visitors area, VIP area, main conference room); reimbursable costs charged by Army Installation (phone hookups, guard contract for facility, custodial contract, & other reimbursable services) and lease of facility in FY 2003.

Estimated MPA Costs:

Description: All movement costs for military personnel borne by Military Personnel, Army appropriation and centrally funded upon publishing of unit move orders.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2002 AUG - 2 PM 1:12



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACTION MEMO

August 2, 2002 11:00 AM

ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge, USD(AT&L) *E.C. Aldridge 8/2/02*

SUBJECT: Relocation of United States Army South (USARSO)

322

- Recommend disapproval of the Army's request to relocate USARSO from Ft. Buchanan, PR to leased space on Ft. Sam Houston, TX no later than the summer of 2003 (TAB A). Congress required the Army to send its relocation study to them by July 23, 2002 (TAB B). Preliminary information indicates that the proposed move may lawfully proceed prior to BRAC 2005 (TAB C).
- The Army asserts that deteriorating work and living conditions caused 40% of the civilian work force to leave, raising significant readiness issues and necessitating an urgent move. Actions to stabilize the workforce and improve living and working conditions in place (e.g., increasing variable location pay and housing allowances, and other quality of life enhancements) need to be explored further by the Army/OSD.
- The Army analysis eliminated 12 of 14 alternative CONUS locations based on three screening criteria (TAB D). Ft. McPherson (FMP) and Ft. Sam Houston (FSH) survived initial screening. The Army selected FSH because it asserts that the net present value of 20 year costs at FSH is less than at FMP. In addition to facility costs, relocation costs are \$57.8M. Annual recurring savings are \$13M. With a payback period in excess of 4 years, relocation costs will not be recovered before consideration under BRAC.
- USD(P&R) nonconcurrence (TAB E) states that the proposal does not reflect the Secretary's desire for a plan that would enhance joint operations, reduce headquarters in a transformational manner or comport with the decision made at the Service Chief Tank on June 10, 2002, to make SOUTHCOM a test bed for implementation of an organizational model to increase jointness, thereby eliminating the need for USARSO.

RECOMMENDATION: Disapprove the proposed relocation at this time and direct the Army, USD(P&R), USD(AT&L), and SOUTHCOM to refine the analysis and develop further options by 15 September 2002 that support the decision to make SOUTHCOM a test bed for organizational transformation. In this regard, determine what elements of USARSO need to be retained, reorganized and relocated and when and to where to achieve elimination of the Army component command but operate as Army operations, planning and force provider to SOUTHCOM.

2 AUG 02

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXEC SEC WHITMORE	<i>8/2/02</i>

Hot

July 15, 2002 2:39 PM

ADVANCE COPY

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing on Rodman's Trip

Someone needs to brief me on Peter Rodman's trip before I meet with the President on Tuesday.

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071502-42



Please respond by 07/16/02

15-JUL-02

WEF 334
021003250

3/21

February 28, 2002 9:57 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Cuba

3/21
Larry Di Fazio

Cuba

John Bolton apparently told a Congressman from Texas that he could not get clearance to mention that Cuba has a biological program. The Congressman is aware that Cuba does have one, and he said he thought the Clinton problem of covering up things had ended with the Clinton administration. He wonders why.

Could you please have someone look into that and give me a report?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022802-5

.....

SECDEF -

FEITH RESPONSE

ATTACHED.

U/R
ED

3/21

28 Feb 02

July 25, 2002 5:53 PM

TO: Gen. Jones
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Legislative Fellowship Program

032

I appreciate your memo of 16 July on the Legislative Fellowship Program. You had some very good arguments.

I have decided to continue the program, but I am going to have it operate at a somewhat lower level, at least for the period of the Global War on Terrorism.

Thanks so much.

Regards.

Attach.
07/16/02 CMC memo and ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
072502-18

.....

Please respond by _____

2574102

U11881 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/9981



16 July 2002

SECRET HAS BEEN

11 JUL 2002

7/19
7/19
Dear Mr. Secretary,

I would like to take this opportunity to give you my view on the value of the Legislative Fellowship Program to the Marine Corps and, perhaps more importantly, to the Congress. Our program is a tremendous educational tool, both for the individual Marine, and for the Members of Congress and their staffs.

Over the last 20 years, the number of Members of Congress who have served in uniform has dwindled. So too have the number of congressional staff members who have any prior association with the armed forces. While such experience is not a prerequisite for being able to participate in national security dialogue, it has throughout our history provided Members and staff with a valid base from which their knowledge, credibility, and sophistication developed. Less than one-third of our elected representatives today have ever served in uniform, contrasted with almost two-thirds just two decades ago. In 1947, when the Department of Defense was created, 48% of Members had military experience, compared to only 31% in the current Congress. Additionally, the reduction of our base structure means fewer Members with forces stationed in their districts and states.

Our Legislative Fellows program helps to overcome this lack of military experience in Congress through their day-to-day interaction with Members and staff. They facilitate communication of military issues to the Members in a timely and personalized manner. They can often answer questions of Members and staff based on their own knowledge and experience, reducing written requests for information to the services. They "speak the language" of defense, they put a face on the military, and they provide the Congress with some of the nuances of the Department of Defense, its vision, its culture, and how it defines success. This type of information and communication can only come from those who wear the uniform. While critics of this program feel that it provides "free labor" for "the Hill," I am persuaded, after 3 years of reports from Members and staff alike, that our fellows are making a significant contribution toward compensating for a serious experience/understanding gap in national security issues.

Our legislative fellows also ensure that we in uniform stay connected to the elected representatives of the society we serve. As fully functioning components of Congressional staffs, they become cognizant of the issues facing our elected officials each day. They understand the competition for resources among the diverse priorities facing the nation and how defense issues fit into the mix. Their ability to aid the dialogue contributes to breaking down stereotypes, allowing Members and staff to better support and oversee our men and women in uniform and their families.


11-L-0559/OSD/9982

The benefit to the individual fellows is enormous in terms of understanding and appreciating our political leaders in Congress and the process by which they support us. This exposure provides young officers a tremendous insight into how the legislative process works, the importance of understanding the process, and further develops a personal respect for public service, as exemplified by the demands of the average Member's schedule and a clear example of civilian control of the military. They experience first hand how the military responds to civilian leaders. The fellowship program offers an interactive lesson in how civilian leaders in the legislative and executive branches, along with uniformed leadership of the Armed Forces, come together to enact policy, effect change, and ultimately address the nation's important and complex security requirements.

The full benefit of the legislative fellow's experience will come later in the professional lives of our officers, though the Congress and Department of Defense benefit in real time from this unique program. As a major 23 years ago, I was assigned by the Marine Corps to be the liaison officer to the United States Senate. I spent 5 years in that assignment. Had I been fortunate enough to have participated in any program such as the one our current fellows are provided, I would have been much more productive in a much shorter period of time. Times were different then, and national security was considered to be a very important issue of our then-bipolar world. The current rekindling of interest in such issues only dates back to 11 September 2001. We must continue to find ways to educate our Congress with regard to national security issues and the vitally important role that they must play in our national discourse on such issues.

I deeply believe that the numbers of fellows who participate in this program is about right, given the size of the task at hand. I request that we be allowed to continue this important effort which, though difficult to quantify in concrete terms, is making a very significant difference for the young officers involved, the Congress of our Nation, and the Department of Defense.

Semper Fidelis,


JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-1000

7/16/02




DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775


IN REPLY REFER TO

SECRET

16 JUL 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Secretary of the Navy 

FROM: General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Prepared by: Col R. S. Trout, SIG, (b)(6)

7/16/02

SUBJECT: Legislative Fellowship Program - ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To discuss the benefits to both Congress and the Department of Defense of sustaining the Legislative Fellowship Program.

DISCUSSION: Additional information provided in attached letter.

COORDINATION: NONE

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef approve continuation of the Legislative Fellowship Program and maintain the number of participants in the program at current levels.

APPROVED: _____
DISAPPROVED: _____
OTHER: _____

Attachment:
1. My ltr of 16 Jul 02

724
1200--



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 26 2002

INFO MEMO

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

22 July 2002, 7:21:22 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
for J. R. V. C. 7/22/02

THRU: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)
E. C. [Signature] 7/23/02

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Study of the Biotechnology and Electronics Interface

In reference to your recent query regarding the interface between biotech and electronics
~~(TADA)~~

- The most recent Defense Science Board Task Force (DSB TF) to investigate the biotechnology/electronics interface was the 2000 Summer Study on Defense Against Biological Weapons led by Dr. George Poste. Dr. Poste's study recommended development of a Z chip – an assay chip to determine the presence of a pathogen.
- In addition to ongoing work on assay systems, I was advised that there are several other topical areas undergoing investigation in the biotechnology/electronics interface:
- Developing an interface between living organisms and electronic control. For example, a "rat" with implanted electrodes that could be driven through a simple obstacle course.
- Combining sophisticated electronics (e.g., pattern recognition) with stimulation of biological inputs – primarily perceptual, but with other opportunities in the future. Examples include retina on a chip and cochlear implants.
- Trying to mimic biological systems. DARPA's dog nose project is an example program.
- Building hybrid computing systems which have a biological component and silicon computing.

334 DSB

239202

- Direct interface of human thinking into computer architecture.
- Research at the neurobiological level that uses electronic tools to study the activities of the brain and tries to correlate this activity with thinking moving, etc. Applications range from control of robotic limbs just by thinking to devices that could be used in questioning and interrogation.
- An additional area of concern is the possibility that the Department and US Government may not be investing in some of the basic and long range research in these areas leaving the Department open to technological surprise.
- Any one of these areas could be the subject of a DSB TF and I would be happy to initiate one in any area that you find particularly important.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: CDR Brian Hughes/DSB

(b)(6)

PW
Any thoughts?
DBL

July 1, 2002 8:39 PM

TO: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Study

7/25

Is it correct that you folks have a study going on with respect to the interface between biotech and electronics?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-77

334 DSB

.....
Please respond by _____

7/28

Schneider response attached

7/25

4/7/25

150102

July 1, 2002 8:39 PM

TO: Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Study

7/25

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Thanks.

DHR:dh
070102-77

334 DSB

.....
Please respond by _____

7/28

Schneider response attached

7/25

7/25

4/7/25

150102

U11892 / 02

724
1200--



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUL 26 2002

INFO MEMO

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

22 July 2002, 7:21:22 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
for J. R. V. C. 7/22/02

THRU: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)
E. C. [Signature] 7/23/02

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- Trying to mimic biological systems. DARPA's dog nose project is an example program.
- Building hybrid computing systems which have a biological component and silicon computing.

334 DSB

239202

U11891 / 02

11-L-0559/OSD/9990


- Direct interface of human thinking into computer architecture.
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- An additional area of concern is the possibility that the Department and US Government may not be investing in some of the basic and long range research in these areas leaving the Department open to technological surprise.
- Any one of these areas could be the subject of a DSB TF and I would be happy to initiate one in any area that you find particularly important.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: CDR Brian Hughes/DSB/

(b)(6)

PW
Any thoughts?
DBL

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Statistics

170

Afghanistan

Thanks for the attached memo on statistics in Afghanistan. Please bring it up to date, declassify what you can and put it in presentation form.

I might use it in a press briefing—perhaps it could show the number of sorties and then underneath it show Navy, Marines, Air Force, Special Ops, and coalition. I would like it set out in a way that people could readily digest it.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/27/02 CJCS memo to SecDef re: Statistics Regarding Afghanistan

(b)(6)

DHR:dh
021102-14

.....
Please respond by 02/28/02

Suspense will be 18 Feb

2/25

SECDEF - THIS SNOW
FLAKE IS STILL IN
YOUR CJCS FILE.
SPEECHWRITERS
HAVE THE INFO +
USE AS APPROPRIATE

Copy to Speechwriters
(done - 2/26)
SC

M2/bb

Tab A

arry DI Rita
2/26

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11 Feb 02

~~SECRET~~

U/Red

11-L-0559/OSD/9993

U11898 /02

134

January 4, 2002 10:34 AM

AS ACTION
1/5
1630

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Way Ahead

ACTION
COMPLETE 1/5
0802

0005

In the Principals Committee meeting, Condi asked for a DoD/CIA melded piece on the way ahead in the war on terrorism to present to the PC on Thursday. George Tenet and I responded by saying we would have one.

That means George Tenet and I need to see a melded piece by no later than next Tuesday, so that, to the extent we have views and thoughts on it, there will be sufficient time to get it redone. We should probably see it together.

I suggest we schedule a meeting on Tuesday for the presentation of the melded piece.

Whoever is in charge of seeing that it gets melded, please make sure it is done.

Larry, please set the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-19

.....

Please respond by _____

4 Jan 02

U11924 /02

January 4, 2002 6:16 PM

#136
Action
1/12
1740

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Way Ahead in AOR

Action Complete 1/11/02

When do you suppose CINCCENT will be ready to brief the PC on the way ahead in the other parts of its AOR as Ralston did and as we are going to have Blair do?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-47



Please respond by _____

5100015

Sir,

I think we should see CENTCOM's new presentation next Thursday and then decide if it's ready for prime time.

*VR
Dicks*

4Jan02

U11925 /02

January 4, 2002 10:36 AM

140
ACTION 1/9/02
1800
REMOVED COMPLETE 1/12/02
1400

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
VADM Giambastiani
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Extension

CENTCOM

On January 3, I spoke with General Franks. After visiting with the President, we have asked Gen. Franks, and he has agreed, to extend his tour for one year, to July 1, 2003. Please check to see that is the right date.

JULY 6 IS
CORRECT DATE

I have told Gen. Franks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010402-18

.....
Please respond by _____

SECDEF -
RESPONSE
ATTACHED AT
RIGHT.
4/1/02

U11927 /02



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

January 8, 2002; 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: ^{for} David S. C. Chu USD (P&R)

Charles Bell 1-11-02

(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: General Officer Extension

- You requested that General Tommy R. Franks, USA, be extended 12 months in his current assignment as Commander in Chief United States Central Command. The CJCS concurs with the extension (Tab A).
- General Franks has served as the Commander in Chief United States-Central Command since July 6, 2000, and his projected rotation was July 6, 2002. If this extension is approved General Franks' adjusted departure date will be July 6, 2003. I have confirmed with the Army General Officer Matters Office that the SecArmy has concurred with this extension.
- General Franks' mandatory retirement date is March 1, 2007, based upon 40 years of commissioned service.
- **ADVERSE INFORMATION:** The Office of the DoD IG reviewed its records and found no adverse information.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the request for extension by initialing below and at Tab A.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION:

DA Approved
_____ Disapproved

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	1/12
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/11

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: LTC Sally Jo Hall (b)(6)





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Joint General/Flag Officer Tour Length Extension

Recommend General Tommy R. Franks, USA, be extended for twelve months in his current assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Central Command. If approved, his adjusted departure date will be 6 July 2003.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers".

RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECDEF DECISION

RR Approval

_____ Disapproval

_____ Other _____

11-L-0559/OSD/9998

SUBJECT: General Officer Extension-- General Tommy R. Franks, USA

COORDINATION:

Dir, OEPM
OGC
DASD(MPP)
ASD(FMP)

Michael J. Fallon, 8 Jan 02
Col. Deel Dets, 11 Jan 02
Vand Skatye, 11 Jan 02
CSA 1-11-02

January 7, 2002 9:58 AM

138

TO: Gen. Myers
 CC: Gen. Pace
 Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: CINC Briefings

COMPLETE
1/11/02

322

As I watched the Joe Ralston briefing, it was pretty clear to me the other CINCs would benefit by seeing it. It would enable them to do a better job on their briefings.

Why don't we set up an arrangement whereby we have a SVTC, and each of the other three see the way ahead on terrorism by one CINC, then at another time they see it by another CINC. Maybe we can do two sessions where two do it, and then the other two do it. I would do Blair and Ralston first for the others, and then allow about a week or two and do the other two, because CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM are nowhere near as well along.

Thanks.

SECDEF-

g/11

SECDEF HAS SEEN

*RESPONSE BELOW
 ON SCHEDULE FOR
 BRIEF.*

DJR:db
 010702-16

JAN 11 2002

.....
 the SecDef asked the USD(P) and the CJCS to arrange a series of additional Secure VTC's on the issues involved.

The next will be at **1430-1630, Mon 14 Jan**. In this session, **two CINC's (EUOM & PACOM) will brief the other attendees**. The entire session is only two hours, so **briefings will need to be condensed to no more than 40 minutes per formal presentation**.

The final session will be at **0930-1130, Thurs 17 Jan**. The two remaining CINC's (CENTCOM & SOUTHCOM) will **brief**, using the same parameters.

VADM G: Chairman's # 138 should be satisfied by this.

1111947 102

1/R DJS

7Jan02

January 8, 2002 7:54 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UCP

M/B Jan 19

WEE

We better slow down on the Unified Command Plan. Condi and Colin would both like to get briefed on it and make sure we do the diplomatic side of it right.

Let's get that done before we try to tie a knot around it and put it to bed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010802-4

.....
Please respond by 1/10/02

done

U11948 /02

2002/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 26, 2002

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum

Condi and Colin say they have not received this memo on the EU in Macedonia. Please send another copy and see that they get it and find out why they didn't get it.

Macedonia

DHR/azn
032602.14

Attach: Memorandum to Secy Powell and Dr. Rice 3/21/02 Re: EU in Macedonia

Please respond by: 3/26/02

*Handed out ca 3:30 21 mar
- from State Dept 3:42
- Receipt from State 1:54M*

Abmawoz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8:10 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 26, 2002
SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum

Condi and Colin say they have not received this memo on the EU in Macedonia. Please send another copy and see that they get it and find out why they didn't get it.

*126
1413*

March 26, 2002
6:50 PM

*DR
3/26*

*3/29
Army Di Atta*

Mr. Secretary—

Cables faxed the memo on the EU in Macedonia to Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell on Thursday, March 21 (the day you wrote the memo), at 6:30 p.m. We have receipts that the faxes were transmitted successfully to the White House Situation Room (6:42 p.m.) and the State Department (6:44 p.m.).

We do not know why those copies were not then delivered to Sec. Powell and Dr. Rice.

The memo is being transmitted again this evening (Tuesday, March 26). Cables will again get confirmation of receipt, will verify via telephone the name of the person at those locations who receives the fax and will ask that person to be sure the memo gets delivered to the principals.

V/R

(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

148
vs Action
1/15
1752

January 14, 2002 7:25 PM

TO: Gen. Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Maritime Interception

*Done at
CTCS level
Bib on 1/25/02*

801.2

You both owe us an answer on the maritime interception legal issue.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
011402-64

.....
Please respond by _____

14Jan02

U11951 /02

January 21, 2002 12:59 PM

153
Action
ds 1122
1200

Afghanistan

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Name of Operation

We ought to think through whether the phrase, "Operating Enduring Freedom" ought to apply to the entire anti-terrorism war or whether it ought to apply just to what is going on in CENTCOM.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012102-38



Please respond by 01/25/02

21Jan02

U11952 /02

162

1130
0730

January 29, 2002 12:00 PM

AFGHANISTAN

TO: Gen. Myers
CC: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *M*
SUBJECT: Planning In Order to Reduce Costs

I am told it costs \$7.25 to airdrop one of the humanitarian rations—the ones we dropped millions of. It costs \$0.12 to deliver one by surface means.

It is clear that planning up front saves money.

It is clear that pre-positioning saves money.

For things we are in charge of pulling the trigger on, you would think with some planning and some pre-positioning we could save a fortune.

Gen. Handy has some good ideas on this. I think we ought to get our CINCs talking to him about pre-positioning now.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-20

.....

Please respond by 02/05/02

U11953 /02

29 JAN 02



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-160-02
6 February 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 2/6*

SUBJECT: Planning In Order to Reduce Costs

- In response to your comments (TAB) regarding pre-positioning (PREPO), I heartily agree with the assessment regarding the savings in transportation costs as well as the enhanced agility and responsiveness that PREPO affords the warfighting combatant commander.
- The benefits of such programs were realized early in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, with USCENTCOM taking advantage of PREPO equipment and stocks (e.g., munitions, bare base, Army Prepositioned Stocks, and inland petroleum distribution systems).
- Problems faced early on, specifically with Humanitarian Daily Rations, have largely been overcome with established forward storage in Ramstein (contingency stocks), increased industrial production, and an overall inventory in excess of initial 11 September levels. Future PREPO sites will be established as required to meet combatant command requirements.
- My staff, the combatant commanders, and the Services have been and are working PREPO issues with your intent clearly in mind. Forward planning and the resulting PREPO are conserving resources while improving speed, lethality, and needed support.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General Celia L. Adophi, USAR; Acting Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10007

#157
45 1/24
1330
ACTION

January 24, 2002 11:44 AM

TO: SecArmy
SecNav
SecAF
CJCS
VCJCS
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
USD(AT&L)
USD(C)
USD(P)
USD(P&R)

000.5

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Major Decisions

Please review the attached list and reply with any comments.

Thanks.

Attach.
01/19/02 SecDef "Major Directional Decisions—9/11 et seq."

DHR:dh
012402-9

.....

Please respond by 02/01/02

24Jan02

U11955 /02

SUBJECT: Major Directional Decisions—9/11/01 et seq.

- Despite the September 11th terrorist attacks or attacks that may occur in the future, the U.S. will not pull back or withdraw - the U.S. will stay engaged in the world.
- When attacked, the U.S. will be “leaning forward, not back.” When the U.S. is seen as faint-hearted or risk-averse, the deterrent is weakened.
- Terrorism: it is not possible to defend against terrorism in every place, at every time, against every conceivable technique. Self-defense against terrorism requires preemption - taking the battle to the terrorists wherever they are and to those who harbor terrorists.
- The war against terrorism will be “broad-based, applying pressure and using all elements of national power—economic, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and military, both overt and covert.”
- The campaign against terrorism will be “long, hard and difficult.” Terrorists do not have armies, navies or air forces to attack, so we must go after them where they are and root them out.
- The U.S. will not rule out anything—including the use of ground forces. This will not be an antiseptic, “cruise missile war.” The U.S. is ready and willing to put boots on the ground when and where appropriate.
- Coalitions: “The mission must determine the coalition; coalitions must not determine missions”; missions must not be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator by coalition pressure.
- The U.S. wants help from all countries, in every way they consider appropriate; we recognize that to get maximum support, it is best for each country, rather than the U.S., to characterize how and in what ways they are assisting the overall effort.
- Declaratory policy: the U.S. is against global terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists—“you are either with us or against us.”
- The U.S. recognizes it must be willing to accept risks. There are causes so important that they require putting lives at risk - fighting terrorism is one.
- Avoid personalizing the war against terrorism by focusing excessively on UBL or Omar. The task is bigger and broader than any one individual. We must root out the terrorist networks.
- Because Afghanistan is “anti-foreigner,” the U.S. emphasized the truth, that the U.S. is not there to stay; rather, we are there to help fight terrorism, liberate the Afghan people from the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, assure that it does not harbor terrorists in the future and assist with humanitarian assistance.
- The link between global terrorist networks and the nations on the terrorist list that have active WMD capabilities is real, and poses a serious threat to the world; it points up the urgency of the effort against terrorism.
- September 11th resulted in a major shift in the world, offering opportunities to establish new relationships and to reorder institutions in ways that will contribute to our goals of peace and stability for decades to come.

Donald Rumsfeld

DHR:dh
SD Memos/Current MFRs/Major Decisions

11-L-0559/OSD/10009

175

Action
12/21/02
0845

February 11, 2002 1:50 PM

Philippines

TO: Gen. Pace
CC: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Philippines

I just saw this article from the FBIS, "Filipino Officials Alarmed at Rumsfeld's Statements on US Troops in Mindanao," saying they are concerned about my press statements. It surprises me, because I thought I was sticking exactly to what I was being told by Admiral Blair and by what I was reading of the MoD in the Philippines.

Please see if you can figure out what the precise guidance ought to be for us, so I can get it into my head.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/10/02 Manila Kabayan

DHR:dh
021102-48

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

11Feb02

U11956 /02

FBS-ri PHILIPPINES: Filipino Officials Alarmed at Rumsfield's
Story: 014

Time: 2002 02/10 05:50 GMT

Ref:

PHILIPPINES: Filipino Officials Alarmed at Rumsfield's
Statements on US Troops in Mindanao

SE0202100004 Manila Kabayan (Internet Version-WWW) in Tagalog
10 Feb 02

SECDEF HAS SEEN
FEB 11 2002

[Report by Dorian Zumel Sicat: "US Defense Chief Confirms 200 US troops roaming in Basilan;" passages within slantlines in English]
[FBIS Translated Text] ZAMBOANGA CITY -- Military and /civilian officials/ in Basilan expressed alarm at the announcement yesterday by /US Defense Secretary/ Donald Rumsfield that there are /200 American troops/ in the forested /training camp/ despite the fact that there are unresolved issues in the /terms of reference (TOR)/ in the Balikatan [shoulder to shoulder] war games. What is more alarming was Rumsfield's official announcement that the /exercises/ will expand to Jolo, Sulu and /"other parts of Mindanao Island."/

A top ranking official of the Southern Command who refused to be identified expressed outrage at Rumsfield's announcement at a press briefing/ at the Pentagon. /"We have been under orders to keep all US troop movements strictly confidential. That is for their (US troops) security. I am surprised that the US defense secretary would admit what we are supposed to keep secret,"/ the official said.

Trying to keep quiet Rumsfield's statement was aired at /C-Span channel/, one hour after the said Southern Command source announced that /" I would neither confirm nor deny"/ reports on /US troops/ holding /jungle training camp/ outside of Isabela City, in Basilan where /major joint RP-US military exercise/ will be held. Filipino military officials dismissed earlier reports.

Basilan provincial spokesman/, Chris Puno, told Kabayan/Manila Times in an interview that: /"Our own intelligence sources have reported the presence of Americans here but their number has never been confirmed. We have tried to be silent on the matter, not wanting to interfere with the national government's plans. Rumsfield's statement confirmed what we have."/

To be expanded

When asked about the /US troops in the Philippines/, the /US defense chief/ said: /"What I can tell you is, that at this time, there are 200 advisors on Basilan island. That number will eventually grow to 400,"/ he added.

Malacanang Palace [official residence of the president of the Republic of the Philippines] insisted that there are only 160 trainers who will participate in the /ground exercises/ in Basilan. The 600 more troops will be deployed in the /support services/. Government critics already questioned the presence of American troops in the Balikatan /preparatory phrase/. There will be three more /major exercises/ that will be held in Luzon and the Visayas.

No assurance

On the question concerning participation of the US troops in actual combat, the /US defense chief/ said, /"Our troops are not in the Philippines as combatants. But if they are attacked, they are mandated by the rules of engagement to defend themselves, and they will do that."/

Members of the /US Army Green Berets/ and /composite service Delta Force/ will train the Filipino soldiers on counter-terrorism tactics at the Balikatan /exercises/ that are scheduled to start next week.

[Description of Source: Manila Kabayan in Tagalog --
Privately-owned Tagalog broadsheet with national circulation.
Good coverage of national affairs]

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OWNERS.)

(ENDALL)
FEB 0550z FBIS

NNNN

showfile

168
Action
217
0830

February 6, 2002 9:26 AM

TO: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Homeland Security and Force Protection

Done 2/26

384

You made comments about homeland security and force protection being done in ways that are less manpower intensive. Do you have a project going on that? If you don't, we should probably get something going.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020602-17

.....
Please respond by 02/13/02

2 Replies
2nd one 3/21/02

6 Feb 02

U11957 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10013



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-181-02

22 February 2002

168

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 2/02*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security (HLS) and Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)


- For your information, the following is in response to your question (TAB) regarding projects to make homeland security and force protection less manpower intensive.
- **Specific Projects.** Currently, 14 Service and 2 combatant commander programs could reduce the HLS and AT/FP manpower footprint when fielded. All are funded and on track.
 - **Types of Programs.** Unmanned systems, remote sensors and weapon platforms, integrated access control, command and control, perimeter detection/surveillance, and waterside security.
 - **Status of Programs.** Three programs are available now for the Services and combatant commanders to purchase. Eight programs will be available within 1 to 3 years. Approximately \$6M in additional funding to the Services could accelerate five programs to production in less than 1 year.
- **Other Efforts.** In addition to leveraging technology, less manpower intensive solutions for HLS and FP are being considered as we review and prioritize all requirements that compete for our limited resources (e.g., instead of using manpower to physically protect an asset, we may harden the supporting facility, modify existing plans or do nothing and accept risk).

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LtGen G. S. Newbold, USMC; Director of Operations



11-L-0559/OSD/10014



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-244-02

21 March 2002

#168

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 3/21*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security (HLS) and Antiterrorism

- Recommend you consider additional FY02 funding
- The following information is provided as a follow-up regarding HLS and AT/FP and what actions are being taken regarding manpower-intensive ("Are Services procuring devils? Do we need more money put toward this?"):
 - **Service procurement.** Three Service programs currently funded for procurement. A fourth is in
 - **Twelve programs currently in R&D.** Ten Service and one USN) and two combatant command/O&A at various stages of R&D.
 - **Additional Funding.** Applying \$8.8M (R&D) in FY02 would accelerate six of the twelve programs currently in R&D. Five of the six programs (FY02 \$7.8M) could be accelerated to the production milestone decision within 18 months. Funding for the sixth program (FY02 \$1.0M) would accelerate obtaining increased operational capability.
- Additional information on each program is at TAB B.

Look in SD

TO DO FILE

*052202-9
2002-62
-67 ROE*

RECOMMENDATION: Consider \$8.8M (R&D) funding acceleration, as funds become available in FY02.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ See Me _____

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: LtGen G. S. Newbold, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Homeland Security (HLS) and Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Programs

1. Purpose. To provide details on Homeland Security (HLS) and Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) technology programs currently in various stages of acquisition.

2. Key Points

- **16 Programs Total** -- Three of four available Service programs (three USAF and one USA) are funded for procurement. Additionally, 10 Service (7 USAF, 2 USA, and 1 USN) and 2 combatant command/OSD programs are at varying stages of R&D. The 16 programs and their sponsors are as follows:
 - **Current** (available now)
 - **Tactical Automated Security System (TASS)**, USAF, Electronic System Center/Force Protection (ESC/FP), Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - A rapidly deployable/relocatable and reliable, stand-alone integrated security system capable of threat detection, alarm reporting, and assessment. TASS integrates sensors, data communications devices, annunciators, monitors, imaging devices, and power supplies into a deployable system.
 - \$132.5M (R&D and procurement) spent to date. Anticipate additional \$30M (procurement) and \$3.0M (R&D) per remaining years of production. Fully funded program.
 - **Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS)**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - Driven by Urgent Need Statement from CENTAF to support ongoing Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and SOUTHERN WATCH combat operations. A non-developmental item (NDI) surveillance system utilizing color camera and thermal imager (infrared) sensors mounted on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sends imagery to a ground control station for real-time alerts and assessment from beyond the perimeter.

Tab B

- To date \$3.0M (R&D) spent. Additional funding needed (FY02 \$3.0M (procurement) and FY03 \$0.8M (R&D)).
- **Integrated Commercial Intrusion Detection System II (ICIDS-II)**, USA, Product Manager – Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE), Fort Belvoir, VA.
 - An NDI physical security system that builds upon program experiences gained during the first ICIDS acquisition. Provides the means to detect, assess, and respond as necessary to unauthorized entry or attempted intrusion of facilities being protected. Replaces aging, obsolete equipment and upgrades installation security to required levels.
 - To date Army has spent \$36.1M at 22 sites. FY02 and FY03 are programmed for \$28.5M total, for 10 installations. Fully funded program.
- **Force Protection Command and Control (FPC2)**, USAF, FP Battlelab, Lackland AFB, TX.
 - A situational awareness and information-sharing tool. Utilizes a Geographic Information System (GIS) package to provide a visual depiction of events. Automatically shares/updates information horizontally across combat support functional areas, and vertically within chain of command. FPC2 provides a significant reduction in the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) decision cycle. Suitable for military, homeland defense (civil/military) and coalition operations C2 and emergency response and management.
 - Proof-of-concept system is ready to transition to production. Currently unfunded, \$20M (procurement) needed to deploy basic FPC2 capability to 117 Air Force bases worldwide.
- **Short-Term** (can be accelerated to production in less than 1 year with additional funding as indicated)
 - **Perimeter Surveillance Radar System (PSRS)**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - Utilizes commercial off-the-shelf scanning radar sensor for exterior detection and tracking. Sensor has a small footprint (2x2x4) and a 360-degree detection capability out to 300 meters for personnel and equipment. Each unit is GPS-

- equipped in order to integrate multiple sensors into a single display.
- No funding spent to date. **\$1.2M would bring a militarized version to a production milestone decision within 1 year.**
- **Remote Detection Tracking System (RDTS)**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - A mobile, long-range, wide-area detection and tracking radar system capable of detecting personnel (up to 5km range) and equipment (up to 10km range). Able to operate in adverse weather without degradation.
 - \$1.8M (R&D) spent to date. **Additional \$0.8M would bring development to a production milestone decision within 1 year.**
 - **Remotely Operated Weapon Station (ROWS)**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - A fixed-site, man-in-the-loop, remotely operated weapon capable of discharging 5.56mm or 7.62mm rounds. Allows engagement and neutralization from up to 10,000 feet from adversaries attempting to enter secure areas. Provides ability to bring highly accurate fire to bear immediately upon an assessed threat.
 - To date, no funding has been identified. **Additional \$2M (R&D) would bring development to a production milestone decision within 1 year.** Additional \$20M (procurement) needed to install at six CONUS Air Force Bases.
 - **Personal Identification Credential System (PICS)**, \$0.8M, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - Portable biometric credential module that integrates fingerprint sensor, processor, memory, radio link, and battery into a pocket-size form. Module authenticates up to a 20-meter range at a rate suitable for high throughput, allowing for positive access control without human intervention.
 - Current funding total through FY02 is \$0.3M (R&D). **Additional \$0.8M would bring development to a production milestone decision within 1 year.**

- **Medium-Term** (1-3 years to production)
 - **Platoon Early Warning Device II (PEWD II)**, USA, PM-PSE, Fort Belvoir, VA.
 - Simple, compact, and lightweight early warning system consisting of a carrying container, monitor, a mix of sensor types (e.g., seismic, acoustic, magnetic, infrared), and sensor transmitters. PEWD II will be capable of detecting intrusions into protected areas and rapidly communicating detection alarm messages, both visual and audible, to an operator.
 - Fully funded through production milestone decision FY03. Army has not programmed any procurement funding for FY03-07. Need \$123M procurement (FY03 \$2.0M, FY04 \$35.8M, FY05 \$32.2M, FY06 \$32.2M, FY07 \$20.1M). Starting FY05 O&M funding is needed (FY05 \$3.0M, FY06 \$6.0M, FY07 \$9.0M, FY08 \$11.0M).
 - **Blue Rose, Buried Seismic/Acoustic Fiber Optic Sensor System**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - Based on sonar technology, applies fiber-optic and laser technology to an array that "listens" to the environment for intrusions. Each node will be capable of providing 16km of perimeter intrusion detection. Acoustic/seismic classification and localization detection of footsteps, vehicle traffic, and low-flying aircraft.
 - \$2.0M (R&D) spent to date. **\$1.5M would accelerate development to a production milestone decision within 18 months.**
 - **SAFE Gate**, USAF, ESC/FP, Hanscom AFB, MA.
 - Pilot project to incorporate advanced technology with tactics, techniques, and procedures to improve security at entry control points. Integrates advanced technology and biometrics to achieve 100 percent identification of personnel and vehicles for improved exterior access control.
 - \$0.4M (R&D) spent to date. **\$1.5M would bring development to a production milestone decision.**
 - **Coalition Rear Area Security Operations Command and Control System (CRASOC2)**, USPACOM/Defense Information Security Agency (DISA).

- Command and control to allow for the coordination of threat alerts and force protection of US personnel, infrastructure, and assets at OCONUS bases. The capability also supports the Joint Rear Area Coordinators and combatant commanders. When the United States was attacked on 11 September 2001, 40 components ready for fielding as a prototype were procured as an emergency deployment.
- \$1.0M (procurement) from OSD(AT&L), Physical Security Equipment Action Group (PSEAG) spent for emergency deployment. **Additional funding (FY02 \$1.0M (R&D), FY02 \$1.0M (O&M), FY03 \$1.1M (O&M) and FY04 \$1.3M (O&M))** for sustainment of the emergency deployment equipment, increase number of participants, allow systems to continue operating in theater, and provide additional critical capabilities requested by USPACOM.
- **Long-Term** (3 years or greater to production)
 - **Wireless Security Sensor Networks**, USA, Product Manager – Physical Security Equipment (PM-PSE), Fort Belvoir, VA.
 - Development of a system of components to reduce/eliminate the “hard” wiring associated with security system sensors.
 - \$0.2M (R&D) spent to date. No additional funding required.
 - **Mobile Detection Assessment Response System – Exterior (MDARS-E)**, USA, PM-PSE, Fort Belvoir, VA.
 - Unmanned ground vehicle with the capability to conduct semiautonomous, random patrols and surveillance activities, including barrier assessment, theft detection functions, checking for intruders, and conducting lock interrogations.
 - Fully funded and on contract for \$9.5M. No additional funding required.
 - **Shoreline Intruder Detection System**, USN, SPAWAR San Diego, CA.
 - Video motion detection-based intruder system capable of integrating into the waterside security system to complement swimmer and surface craft sonar and radar waterside security systems to detect intrusion at shoreline in varying weather and other environmental conditions.

- \$2.0M (R&D) spent to date.
- **Homeland Security Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Coordination, and Intelligence (C5I) (Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstration (ACTD)),**
USJFCOM/DISA.
 - ACTD is designed to explore the technologies useful to integrate the Department of Defense into the Nation's Homeland Security initiative. The goal is to identify efficient and effective ways to interface DOD organizations with other Federal agencies as well as state, local, and incident command centers. Interfaces that facilitate information flow from incident sites through local and state Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to DOD Joint Operation Centers (JOCs) will be developed through technology demonstrations. Information will be developed in order to create a common operational picture (COP).
 - Total planned funding is \$50M, approximately \$10M/FY, \$25M "in-kind" funding and \$25M actual dollars. Additional procurement funding (FY02 \$1.9M, FY03 \$2.7M, FY04 \$3.2M, and FY05 3.3M) will increase the number of participants, further define requirements, and identify and develop solutions.
- **Additional Funding.** Applying \$8.8M (R&D) in FY02 would accelerate six of the twelve programs currently in R&D. Five of the six programs (FY02 \$7.8M) could be accelerated to the production milestone decision within 18 months. Funding for the sixth program (FY02 \$1.0M) would accelerate obtaining increased operational capability.

129A

April 8, 2002 7:17 AM

Don 4/10

TO: Gen. Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: JROC

334

When you come to me and try to explain to me what JROC is, please also tell me what you think it ought to be.

It is not enough to note that a lot of things aren't getting done in the Department and that it would be nice if they were done, unless we assign those things to some specific entity and then track progress against them.

I don't have any way to evaluate how well JROC is functioning because I may have expectations for it that are unrealistic.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/05/02

DHR:dh
040602-11

.....

Please respond by _____

8 Apr 02

U11963 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10022

February 11, 2002 1:34 PM

174
2/13
0840
ACTION

TO: Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Opportunity

Done T/S

Attached is what I mentioned to you on January 31. Today is February 11.
Almost two weeks have passed.

Have you been thinking about this?

Thanks.

Attach.
01/31/02 SecDef MFR: Opportunity

DHR:dh
021102-41

.....

Please respond by 02/22/02

384

U11964 /02

11 Feb 02

January 31, 2002 10:32 AM

SUBJECT: Opportunity

I told Myers, Pace and Wolfowitz today that we are the four senior people in the Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense is the biggest department in the U.S. Government.

The United States Government is the biggest and most powerful nation on earth.

We have access to more money than any entity in the world.

We have a President who has courage and will support us.

We have three years.

That means the four of us have an opportunity that is unmatched by anyone other than a handful of people on the face of the globe to do things that will help create a more peaceful world and a more successful America.

We must not fail.

DHR:dh
013102-5

11-L-0559/OSD/10024

April 6, 2002 1:22 PM

*Done
5/22*

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DATTs in Israel

I am told that our DATTs in Israel are not allowed to move around because the Ambassador restrains them. Would you please figure out how to check that with Admiral Wilson and see if there is something I need to do something about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040602-7

ISRAEL

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

Sir,

The Attachés in our Defense Attaché Office in Israel can go anywhere they want except into the West Bank and Gaza

To gather they must request through the Regional Security Officer for permission. They must move in a 3 vehicle convoy, with RSO personnel providing armed escorts. Our personnel cannot carry weapons. The DAO personnel are getting priority over other organizations due to the Ambassador's appreciation of their reporting our folks. He not like the restrictions but they are reluctant to push the Ambassador, since the situation is better now than it was before.


AS STEVE SUGGESTS, THERE WAS (IIRC)
A PROBLEM ABOUT 6 MONTHS ^{4/8}
AGO. VADM WILSON WORKED IT.
HE'LL GET BACK TO ME IF ANY
FURTHER CHANGE ~~FFL 0559/OSD/A10025~~ *V/R SA*

U11965 /02

6 APR 02

Arrow size

April 6, 2002 1:33 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Cutting Process Time

I think you ought to look at each of the major processes in the Department and let's think about the Defense Planning Guidance just mandating that they will cut the length of time involved by 20 percent.

Please let me know what you think, and give me some language as to how you might do it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040602-8

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

100.534

6 Apr 02

U11966 /02

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

April 6, 2002 1:41 PM

ATTACHMENT IN
SAFE
5/20

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Satellites

Here is a note George Tenet gave me Friday at the private lunch. Let's talk about what we do next on the satellite problem.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/05/02 DCI Talking Points for Meeting w/SecDef
04/04/02 DirNRO info memo to SecDef re: Satellite Imagery

413.77

DHR:dh
040602-9

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

U11967 /02

to Appear

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION
3-20

April 6, 2002 11:29 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tuskegee

Please let me know in about 30 days where you are going with Tuskegee.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040602-1

.....

Please respond by 05/06/02

000.8

6 APR 02

U11968 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10028

Snowflake

April 5, 2002 8:24 AM

5/20
1/1/02

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith,
Steve Cambone
J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Russian Reaction

DH
fr

SECDEF HAS
10/10/01

Done

I wanted to be sure you saw this FBIS report.

Thanks.

Attach.

FBIS CEP20020405000022 Moscow Interfax, "Russian Defense Minister Says 'No Differences' with US Over New Strategic Arms Agreement"

DHR:dh
040502-7

.....
Please respond by _____

RUSSIA

5 Apr 02

U11969 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10029



SECRET HAS SEEN

APR 05 2002

Report

RUSSIA: Russian defense minister says 'no differences' with US over new strategic arms agreement

CEP20020405000022 Moscow Interfax in English 0629 GMT 5 Apr 02

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

ATHENS. April 5 (Interfax) - There are no differences between Russia and the United States over the essence of the legally binding agreement on reducing strategic offensive weapons, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told Interfax on Friday. "There are certain differences over the mechanism of verifying the reduction and approaches to the reduction itself," he added.

The rumors of insurmountable differences between the two sides are untrue, Ivanov said.

"What is true is that the agreement has not been put in writing. Experts will have to hold more meetings, but the approximate parameters of future agreements are already clear," he said.

Moscow wants the weapons earmarked for reduction to be destroyed, Ivanov said. He admitted that this process is costly and that both Russia and the United States will not find implementing the reductions an easy task.

"Still, the deadline for compliance, the year 2012, will not change," Ivanov said.

The United States wants some of the weapons destroyed and some stored away, Ivanov said. It also intends to overhaul some of the delivery systems for other weapons, he said.

"There is some logic in this. I understand the Americans and do not rule out the possibility that this would serve our interests, too," Ivanov said. Russia may do so itself but this option needs thorough analysis, he said.

"What is most important is that, while trust between Moscow and Washington has never been better, the verification mechanisms must remain. All the processes in this area must be verifiable and predictable," Ivanov said.

[Description of Source: Moscow Interfax in English -- non-government information agency known for its aggressive reporting, extensive economic coverage, and good coverage of Russia's regions]

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11-L-0559/OSD/10030

Arrow
2/22

April 5, 2002 7:55 AM

Afghanistan

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

In a PC yesterday they were talking about Afghanistan. I said I thought we ought to get our act together with respect to the following things:

1. We need to have a list of all our assets—we have military advice, military equipment, humanitarian assistance, and a dozen other things and the CIA has money. We have the possibility of support or opposition in the Loya Jirga for positions in the future and the like. We need to know what those assets are.
2. We need to know every faction, every warlord, everyone who is vying and competing, and we ought to have a good understanding as to whether we want to hurt or help those people. Then we ought to use our levers appropriately.
3. Next, we ought to decide what are the things we care about most. Is it training the army or is it controlling the media?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040502-6

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

SAPR02

U11970 /02

April 5, 2002 1:31 PM

Handwritten: Done 3-2-02

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background Sheet

Handwritten: 02059

Please give me hard copies of any background sheets that we are releasing on me—from this office, Torie's office, on the web site or via e-mail. I want to see them all and look at them.

Then give back to me this paper on my reserve status when you give me all the background sheets.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/19/02 SecDef memo w/response attached

DHR:dh
040502-13

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

U11971 /02

Handwritten: 5 APR 02

March 19, 2002 9:26 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Naval Reserves

COPIES HAS SEEN

APR 05 2002

Here is a note I got from Arlene on my service in the Naval Reserve. You said I ought to include it. *YOU SHOULD.*

I am sure (b)(6) is wrong and that my records are wrong. I don't think I have full years in between. I may have a gap. *THERE IS NO GAP.*

Could you please have someone look at the records, and find out what I should say by way of the number of years I served in the Reserves. Please get me the actual information, so I can use it properly as you have recommended.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 Nestel response to SecDef, 031802-5

DHR:dh
031902-15

4/3
— ACTUAL DATA SHEET

FROM THE BUREAU OF

Please respond by 04/12/02 **NAVAL PERSONNEL (NOW CALLED NAVAL PERSONNEL COMMAND) IS ATTACHED. AT TAB A.**

— RECOMMENDED STATEMENT OF YOUR SERVICE

FOR YOUR BIO IS AT URSU
11-L-0559/OSD/10083
TAR R

March 18, 2002 8:28 AM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Naval Service

Please check with (b)(6) and see if she can look in my Navy records and find out how many years I served in the Reserve. I know I served about 3 1/2 years on active duty, from June 1954 to November 1957. I then went into the Reserves, and I cannot remember the year I stopped. I do remember my final rank was Captain, USNR.

Please see if she can find out the date of when I finally resigned from the Naval Reserve. I think it was because I was at NATO or the Pentagon. I know it continued from when I got out in 1957 well into the time I was an assistant to a Congressman and then a Congressman.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031802-5

.....
Please respond by 03/25/02

3/18/02

Sir -

You served 32 years in the Naval Reserves from Nov 57 to 1989. I'll see if we can get an exact date of departure.

- You were serving in the private sector in 1989, the year you resigned. In '89 you were a member of Nat'l Economic Commission & Consultant to US Dept of State
11-L-0559/OSD/10034

(b)(6)

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Donald Henry Rumsfeld

Source of Commission: NROTC, Princeton University. Commissioned an Ensign on June 4, 1954.

Degree: BA in Government History, 1954, Princeton University.

Service Dates/Assignments:

NAS Atlantic City, NJ	15 Jun 54 – 26 Sep 54
Naval Air Basic Training Command, NAS Pensacola, FL	27 Oct 54 – 15 Jul 55
Naval Air Advanced Training Command, NAS Corpus Christi, TX	16 Jul 55 – 30 Jan 56
Naval Station, Naval Base Norfolk, VA	31 Jan 56 – 14 May 56
NAS Pensacola, FL	14 May 56 – 20 Jul 56
NAAS Sauffley Field, Pensacola, FL	20 Jul 56 – 22 Apr 57
NAAS Corry Field, Pensacola, FL	23 Apr 57 – 19 Nov 57

***Released from Active Duty 19 Nov 57**

***Entered Naval Reserve 19 Nov 57**

VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC	1 Mar 58 – 30 Jun 58
Fleet Training Unit Atlantic, Norfolk, VA	17 Nov 58 – 30 Nov 58
VS-662, NAS Anacostia, DC	30 May 59 – 30 June 59
VS-731, NAS Grosse Ile, IL	1 Feb 60 – 31 Oct 60
VS-723, NAS Glenview, IL	12 Mar 61 – 30 Jun 62
VS-722, NAS Glenview, IL	1 Jul 62 – 29 Jan 63
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	29 Jan 63 – 30 Jun 67
National War College, Washington, DC	18 Jun 67 – 30 Jun 67
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	1 Jul 67 – 30 Jun 68
Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington, DC	4 Dec 68 – 9 Dec 68
5 th Naval District, Anacostia, DC	1 Jul 69 – 12 Nov 70
Naval Air Reserve Unit, NAF Washington, DC	1 Jul 71 – 19 Nov 75

***Transferred to Standby Reserve – Inactive, 4 Dec 75**

***Transferred to Retired Reserve at rank of CAPT, 1 May 89**

History of Promotions

ENS	4 Jun 54
LTJG	4 Dec 55
LT	1 Apr 58
LCDR	1 Feb 64
CDR	1 Jul 68
CAPT	1 May 74

History of Awards

National Defense Service Medal

3 April 2002

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Director of Naval Reserve (CNO N095B)
To: Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense
Subj: RESERVE CAREER ICO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. Sir, as we interpret the data you provided, SECDEF's Naval career would be categorized as follows:

- Served on active duty from June 1954 to November 1957
- Served in the Naval Reserve from November 1957 to November 1975.
- Transferred to Retired Reserve in May 1989.

2. A sample statement for inclusion in SECDEF'S biography is:

"Secretary Rumsfeld entered active Naval Service in June 1954 and served as a Naval Aviator. In 1957 he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975. Secretary Rumsfeld transferred to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989."

Very respectfully,



NOEL G. PRESTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve

Action
5-20

April 4, 2002 10:23 AM

325

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Guard

What is the situation on the National Guard? I keep reading these articles. This may be a time to release all of that, let it out and make the changes we want to make in the Guard.

Please see me about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/04/02 Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, "4 More Guard Leaders Probed," *USA Today*

DHR:dh
040402-2



Please respond by 04/12/02

4APR02

U11972 /02

Among those arrested was Wahidullah Zahabaun, the former finance minister for the Northern Alliance and a former member of Mr. Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, which was known for its extreme religious doctrines and its virulently anti-Western views. A government official said that Mr. Zahabaun had been released but that his whereabouts were unknown.

A spokesman for the American Embassy said tonight that the staff did not know about the arrests.

Mr. Karzai's government, cobbled together during a meeting in Germany while the fighting was still raging in Afghanistan, has been plagued by infighting since it took office.

In February, Abdul Rahman, the civil aviation minister, was killed by a mob, and three members of Mr. Karzai's government, including the deputy intelligence minister, were arrested. Mr. Karzai charged that Mr. Rahman had been assassinated as part of a conspiracy. The three men are awaiting trial.

Last month, Zahir abruptly postponed his scheduled return to the country amid concerns about his security. A Western diplomat said the former king faced the threat of assassination.

His trip is meant to rally support for the government.

The alleged conspiracy comes two months before the convening of the loya jirga, a planned gathering of the nation's political and religious leaders to choose a new government.

The maneuvering for that convention has already begun, with persistent reports that an alliance of Islamic fundamentalists, including Mr. Hekmatyar and others, would try to unseat Mr. Karzai and form a more strictly Islamist government.

Mr. Karzai could not be reached for comment today, but a senior adviser suggested that he might have had little to do with the arrests, and that the arrests might have been carried out without his approval.

Mr. Karzai's critics see him as a compromise choice, and little more than a puppet of the Tajiks who control the For-

eign Affairs, Interior and Defense Ministries.

"This is a deeply divided government," said the Karzai adviser, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "I am not sure that he signed off" on the arrests.

The arrests follow the decision by the Bush administration last month to oppose the expansion of the 4,500-man international security force now patrolling the streets of Kabul.

Mr. Karzai had urged Western governments to expand the force to other Afghan cities, saying that without a national army, his government was powerless to fight remnants of the Taliban or quash restless warlords.

The administration argued that the nations now supplying troops, like Britain and France, had military commitments elsewhere and were not willing to contribute any more. The Bush administration is cautious about the force, for one reason because it has said it does not want to be put in the position of having to evacuate it should fighting make that necessary.

At a ceremony in Kabul today, the Afghan government marked the graduation of the first 600 members of the national army, a force intended to bring Afghanistan's many ethnic groups together under a unified command.

"We will not allow groups of armed men call themselves armies," Mr. Karzai said.

Also today, the new American ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert P. Finn, presented his credentials to Mr. Karzai at Gulkhana Palace. Mr. Finn is the first American ambassador to serve here since Adolph Dubs was kidnapped and murdered by leftist extremists here in 1979.

While Kabul appears relatively calm under the watchful eyes of the international force, the scene outside of capital is markedly different. The most serious threats have come in the north, where the private armies of Gen. Ostad Atta Muhammad and Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the deputy defense minister, have clashed repeatedly in recent weeks.

Although he has pledged his loyalty to the Karzai government, General Dostum may

be preparing to challenge it. A United Nations official and members of the interim government say General Dostum is receiving guns and money from Iran. Gen. Dostum recently invited two former associates of Mr. Hekmatyar to set up operations in the large areas of northern Afghanistan where the general exerts nominal control.

Mr. Hekmatyar rose to prominence in the 1980's as a leader in the American-backed effort to oust the invading forces of the Soviet Union. Despite his extremist views, he received more American money than any other warlord.

After the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 and civil war engulfed the country, Mr. Hekmatyar's fortunes declined. Despite continued backing from Pakistan, his army stalled outside Kabul, and his forces began a series of rocket attacks on the city that lasted through the mid-1990's. As many as 50,000 civilians were estimated to have been killed.

Mr. Hekmatyar met his match in the Taliban, whose forces defeated his on the battlefield. Mr. Hekmatyar went into exile, but many of his followers joined the Taliban.

USA Today
April 4, 2002
Pg. 1

5. 4 More Guard Leaders Probed

Pentagon disclosures point to misconduct by brass in 13 states

By Dave Moniz and Jim Drinkard, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has acknowledged four more cases of misconduct by top National Guard commanders, which brings to at least 13 the number of states where the highest-ranking Guard official violated military rules or state or federal laws over the past decade.

The disclosures came in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by USA TODAY. The military refused to identify the generals involved or their states and refused to say whether any additional state commanders have committed misconduct.

All four were Army Guard generals, known as adjutant general, who ran the National Guard in their states. The Army provided summaries of the internal investigations, but it says releasing identities would violate privacy rights. It's not known whether the generals received punishments.

The disclosures amplify questions about the quality and character of some of the top leaders of the 470,000-member Guard, which is being counted on to play a major role in homeland defense and is in line for a boost in federal funding.

The extent of misconduct among top Guard generals is unknown because the Pentagon refuses to release complete records. The four new cases came in response to a request for records involving Oregon, Idaho, West Virginia, Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina and the District of Columbia.

Among the findings:

*A March 2001 Army probe determined that an adjutant general had a five-year sexual relationship with an enlisted woman in his state while he was married. The military prohibits adultery, which for generals is typically a career-ending offense.

*An August 1996 Army investigation determined that an adjutant general had "coerced, harassed and threatened" officers who did not join the National Guard Association, a powerful lobbying group.

*A March 1997 investigation found that an adjutant general improperly used money intended for soldiers to purchase gifts for officers in his command, Guard officers in other states and active duty military officers. The report also said the adjutant general ignored purchasing rules to furnish his office.

In a series of articles in December, USA TODAY outlined chronic misconduct among adjutants general across the United States. Over the past decade, these state-appointed National Guard commanders committed offenses that include embezzlement, perjury and misuse of government property.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4/17

2007 APR 18 PM 2:53

Dr Chu -

Please advise.

L. Rita

Larry Di Rita

4/18

U06957 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10040



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2002 APR 25 11 10 24



INFO MEMO

April 22, 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: National Guard and *USA Today* Articles

- This responds to SecDef question on situation in the National Guard, in view of subject articles on alleged Guard force mismanagement and personal misconduct.
- March 12, USD(P&R) letters to Chairman and Ranking Minority, HASC Subcommittee on Military Personnel, responded to their joint request concerning strength accounting, personal misconduct of general officers and whistleblower protections in the Guard.
- Based on DoD response, GAO review of military personnel strengths in the Army Guard and a number of briefings and discussions, Military Personnel Subcommittee Staff issued its report of preliminary findings on April 16. Findings included:
- Strength accounting in Army National Guard has improved significantly over the last several years. No evidence of widespread inflation of unit strengths by commanders. Need to continue oversight of strength accounting reforms now being implemented.
- Constitution and law entrusts control and oversight of Guard in state status to governors. However, inspectors general of DoD, Army, and Air Force are able to investigate allegations of misconduct by senior Guard officers in either state or federal status. Federal recognition assesses the federal qualifications of Guard general officers, including adjutants general. (This Administration has imposed a high standard for officers recommended for federal recognition.)
- IG system provides means for Guard personnel to raise allegations of reprisal for investigation. Statutory framework for protecting whistleblowers appears to be working, although absent more data, the staff deferred a final conclusion as to whether whistleblowers are adequately protected.
- The Military Personnel Subcommittee Staff report, the DoD response and the GAO review have all been made available for viewing by the public on the HASC website.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Wayne Spruell, OASD/RA

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/10041

U07309 /02



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MAR 12 2002

The Honorable John M. McHugh
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6035

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to follow up on my letter of January 15, 2002, that acknowledged your request of December 18, 2001, for information regarding a series of articles that appeared in *USA Today* alleging force mismanagement and personal misconduct in the National Guard. You specifically requested the written reaction of the National Guard Bureau to the allegations in the articles, assistance in understanding the legal boundaries regarding protecting whistleblowers in the National Guard and summaries of National Guard investigations over the past five years. Enclosed are responses from the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel, and the Department of Defense and Military Department Inspectors General on those issues.

You will note that the summaries provided by the DoD Inspector General do not include the results of the investigation being conducted by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service into alleged "ghost soldiers in the Arizona Army National Guard" as you requested. That investigation is still open, and therefore it would not be appropriate to release any information concerning the investigation at this time. Once the investigation is complete, we will provide you the findings.

In addressing allegations of force mismanagement, the National Guard Bureau notes that a non-validation of pay report, tracking non-participation in the Guard, was developed almost ten years ago by the Guard to provide leadership at all levels with a tool for gauging drill attendance, managing the force, recording trends and providing oversight, which although not perfect serves as an excellent management tool. The Bureau's response emphasizes that there is no real incentive to hold a non-productive soldier in a unit because budget and force structure allocations with the Guard are based on actual participation rates. The Bureau disputes the assertion that states are gaining some advantage by not discharging personnel. The enclosure from the Bureau also comments on various types of allegations of personal misconduct by The Adjutants General.

In responding to your request for assistance in understanding the legal boundaries between the National Guard and the Department of Defense, the Office of DoD General Counsel states that officer and enlisted members of the National Guard when in either a duty or training status under either title 10 or title 32, United States Code, receive the same military whistleblower protections as regular officers and enlisted members on active duty. However, federal military whistleblower protections do not apply to officer and enlisted members of the National Guard when in state active duty status. Their protections, if any, derive from state law.



11-L-0559/OSD/10042

The DoD Inspector General's assessment of the effectiveness of IG investigations into National Guard matters is consistent with the views of the Military Department Inspectors General. That is, no unusual or significant impediments to investigative efforts or the effective processing of National Guard complaints have been encountered. Regarding the investigation summaries, the DoD Inspector General cautions that these documents have not been reviewed for public release and may be exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act and protected under the Privacy Act. All documents are being provided to you in your capacity as the Subcommittee Chairman and should be considered "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

You also asked for the Secretary's assessment of the allegations and his intended course of action in response to those allegations. First, the Department shares your concern over allegations of force mismanagement and personal misconduct, and takes such allegations very seriously.

With respect to force management, the Department was working closely with the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), months before the series of *USA Today* articles appeared, to produce a systematic and accurate comparison of Army Guard strength and pay information for review and to initiate any needed corrective measures. These efforts are continuing. Articles in the *USA Today* on "ghosting" soldiers—delaying removal transactions to inflate State Guard or unit strength—appear to be based principally on anecdotal information from interviews with Guardsmen and former Guardsmen. The Department prefers to base its conclusions on actual data. The most recent data indicates a 97 percent participation rate throughout the Army National Guard with only a 3 percent non-participation rate. This is consistent with the latest GAO information and with the Army National Guard Non-Participation Summary Report included in the National Guard Bureau enclosure. The National Guard's current objective is a 98 percent participation rate.


We have examined the potential readiness impact of non-participating soldiers. Even if up to 3 percent of Army National Guard soldiers were listed as non-participants, this would have limited impact on readiness reports—for two reasons. First, because P-level (personnel) threshold bands are separated by margins of about 10 percent, 3 percent (or less) over-reporting of assigned strength has little impact. More significantly, unit commanders have regulatory authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade, if in their opinion the change more accurately portrays the actual readiness of the unit. This has far more impact on the overall readiness report than a 3 percent shift in assigned strength.

As the National Guard Bureau response notes, there are both acceptable (e.g., medical convalescence) and unacceptable (e.g., unexcused absences) reasons for non-participation. In addition to the various reasons described in the Bureau response, we found some delays in the process for establishing a pay record for new accessions and Guard members moving from active duty back to a drilling status, along with processing delays for members being discharged or transferred from the National Guard. To address these and any related strength accounting problems, a standing DoD working group has developed an action plan that is now being implemented. The plan will involve further evaluation and analysis of non-pay record files and reconciliation of pay and personnel records by all Reserve components. The goal is to improve the timeliness in processing personnel transactions and the accuracy of personnel and strength accounting.

With respect to misconduct, the Department, including the Military Services takes all allegations very seriously as documented in the compendium of the investigations conducted over the past five years. The information contained in the *USA Today* articles concerning specific misconduct cases, while for the most part factual, is dated. This Administration has exercised positive control and oversight through a rigorous federal recognition process and by establishing a very high standard for officers who have been recommended for promotion or federal recognition. The intent is not to deter officers from taking a risk—the “zero defects” mentality—but rather to establish the standard that conduct which does not uphold the highest personal and professional standards of the armed services will not be condoned. In addition to recommending the removal of officers with serious substantiated allegations from federal recognition or promotion lists, this Administration routinely returns the nominations of officers who have been involved in incidents with potentially serious moral and ethical implications to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for more thorough review.

The cadre of our Army National Guard units are professional leaders and soldiers. Our Nation relies increasingly upon our Army National Guard soldiers, as we have seen through their deployment to missions in the Balkans and their roles in homeland defense. The future holds much more for the Army National Guard, as we face future threats to our security. The soldiers of the Army National Guard and their leaders earn the trust, confidence and appreciation of the American people each day—they need our continued support.

Sincerely,



David S. C. Chu

Enclosures:
As stated



DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
1411 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-3231

25 Jan 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: National Guard Bureau Reaction to Allegations Raised by the *USA Today*

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to respond to issues of force mismanagement and misconduct by National Guard officers that appeared in the December 18, 19 and 20 editions of the *USA Today*. Attached is a detailed discussion of those issues.

We are an institution with a proud history of outstanding service to this nation – a level of service achieved by learning from our past and making improvements on a continuous basis. This understanding and commitment to improvement has enabled us to build an organization based on integrity, excellence and service to the Citizens, Governors and the President. I am profoundly proud of the men and women that serve in the National Guard and their record of excellence when it comes to public service and mission accomplishment. It concerns me deeply that these matters have risen to this level. I believe this response will prove the National Guard's commitment to the obligations we undertake and demonstrate our efforts to be a good steward of the public trust.

If you need to discuss this response, please have your staff contact Mr. Dan Donohue, Chief, Office of Public Affairs and Community Support at (b)(6) to make the necessary arrangements. Again, thank you for the opportunity to respond.

RUSSELL C. DAVIS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Attachment:
Detailed Response to Allegations



➤ **Response to Allegations of Force Mismanagement.**

Opening

- Our ability to maintain readiness and meet world-wide mission requirements is directly related to having available, qualified soldiers participating in our program. Strength and drill participation is, and always has been, an area of continued emphasis and oversight. It is important to clarify the statutory and regulatory requirements for drill attendance, the reports and actions we have taken in this critical area, and our ongoing initiatives to address the areas in question. In spite of the issues raised in the USA Today series concerning National Guard non-validation reporting, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has adequate oversight in this area and is working hard to correct any deficiencies that remain.

Drill Attendance Requirement

- The commander of a unit has the responsibility to account for all assigned and attached personnel in the unit and to ensure accounting for personnel and attendance per National Guard Regulation (AR) 680-1. The integrity of the data is as good as the commander's attention to maintaining sound personnel record keeping. The process is as follows: the commander codes soldiers on an automated pay report, DA Form 1379, Unit Record of Reserve Training, which the commander signs certifying the performance categories of soldiers within the unit. Title 32, United States Code 502 requires soldiers to attend 48 drill periods and 15 days of annual training yearly and Title 10 United States Code 12732 requires a soldier to obtain at least 50 points within a year for the year to count for retirement. The 50 points are credited on the following basis: one point for each drill period or equivalent instruction (48 points per year), 15 points a year for being a member in the reserves, a minimum of 15 points for annual training attendance (depending on the duration of annual training), and one point per day of active service performed throughout the year.
- The regulation provides commanders limited flexibility to excuse soldiers from drills, allow for constructive attendance, and allow soldiers to perform the drills prior to, or after the day of the unit's scheduled assembly. Commanders routinely exercise this discretion because of issues unique to the National Guard and selective reserve - call up by the Governor for extended state active duty, schooling, work-related conflicts, etc.
- A number of the performance categories in the Army National Guard (ARNG) do not allow payment to the soldier. Some of these are within the soldier's control

There are a number of acceptable reasons why a soldier may be excused from a drill. Relocation to another state (such as cross country employment transfers) sickness, medical convalescence, family hardship, and unscheduled work conflict are just a few. Most absences are short-term in nature, but some are not. Despite the varied reasons, these soldiers are still under contract – and are subject to being called to active duty whether or not they are attending drill at the time. This issue goes to the heart of the readiness argument. We believe the impacts to National Guard readiness by no-val reporting are overstated or misrepresented in the *USA Today* series.

- The leadership selectively manages soldiers who refuse to attend drill, classified as an unexcused absence, as they represent an investment of time and resources. Commanders of soldiers carried in this category, must, by regulation, begin the separation process after nine unexcused absences within a 12-month period. As a part of the separation process, commanders at the unit level take a number of actions to bring soldiers back to a drilling status - certified letters, contact teams, and use of local law enforcement when authorized. Commanders will often exhaust all avenues in order to keep a soldier in the unit. This is because of the training, investment of time and public resources, and the commitment these individuals made when they signed their contracts. When all avenues are exhausted, a commander will then process the soldier for discharge. Given the attention required to bring a soldier back to drilling status and the lack of full time support personnel to develop and process the paperwork for discharge, this process can be lengthy. Soldiers who are discharged for non-attendance are placed in the individual ready reserve, and remain subject to mobilization through the United States Army Reserve.
- When soldiers have not been paid after three consecutive months, regardless of the reason - acceptable or unacceptable, they will be reflected on the non-validation of pay report or no-val report. It should be clarified that no-val means "non-validation for pay" as opposed to a "no value" soldier, as characterized in the *USA Today* series.

Non-Validation (No-Val) of Pay Report

- Over the years, there have been a number of tools developed by National Guard Bureau (NGB) for commanders and leaders to use in their oversight responsibilities for pay and drill attendance. The non-validation of pay report was developed almost a decade ago to provide National Guard leadership at all levels a way to gauge drill attendance and manage the force, record trends, and provide a degree of oversight at the national level. The no-val report must be reviewed and utilized in the framework for which it was developed. "No-val" is the term used for any

There are times when critical review and common sense must be applied to the review process. For example, soldiers activated under the authority of the Governor on prolonged state active duty will not be performing their required drill assemblies, yet may be reflected on the non-validation of pay report.

- The non-validation of pay report is developed by taking the pay data from the Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) and comparing it to the monthly strength tape, which is a roll-up comprised of the soldiers authorized to drill during that time. This identifies soldiers who are required to drill but have not received pay in three months.
- The non-validation of pay report (enclosed as part of this attachment) was developed as an internal tool for the leadership; the target goals are self-imposed and, in fact, we believe other services are looking at how they might track similar data and trends by instituting similar reports. An important point to make; there is no real incentive to hold a non-productive soldier in the unit. This is because the budget and force structure distribution process we utilize today takes into account actual participation rates. The idea that states are somehow gaining an advantage by not discharging personnel is completely fallacious.

➤ **Response to Allegations of Personal Misconduct.**

Leadership Qualifications

- The Adjutants General (TAGs) must meet state and Federal requirements for appointment.
- State requirements are normally a function of state law and vary from state to state.
- Federal requirements are imposed through either Army or Air Force regulations.
- The Federal recognition process is the procedure to which each TAG nomination is subjected prior to granting federal recognition at the grade for which the individual is qualified.
- Many states require the Governor to nominate and the state legislature to confirm the state appointment as the Adjutant General.
- Federal recognition is granted to an TAG after being nominated by a respective Governor, recommended by a Federal Recognition Board, approved by the respective Service Secretary, and forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States for nomination to the U.S. Senate for confirmation of their appointment in the higher grade. Federal recognition is denied (no promotion) if any of these criteria are not met.
- Appropriate corrective action was taken in every case cited by the articles.

TAG Pay

- Federal pay of an Adjutant General is based upon federal military pay rates at the federally recognized grade of the respective officer.
- TAGs are paid at their federally recognized grade/years of service.
- TAGs receive federal pay only for days on which federal duties are performed.
- TAG state salaries are established in state law and vary by jurisdiction.
- Federal pay records are public documents.

Nepotism/Cronyism

- Training, selection and promotion policies and procedures are designed to offer equal opportunity to all.
- Procedures ensure each soldier/airman is treated with respect and is able to avail himself/herself of every opportunity to succeed and grow.
- Allegations of nepotism and cronyism are promptly investigated.

Reprisals

- National Guardsmen, like other members of the Armed Forces, are protected against reprisal under the DOD Directive 7050.6 (Military Whistleblower Protection) for preparing and or making a protected communication.

Fiscal Management

- National Guard funding is approximately 95% federal and 5% state.
- There are a series of fiscal control, discipline and audit policies and procedures to ensure responsible resource stewardship.
- The Army National Guard budget execution by the respective states this year was within one percent of the Army's priorities:
- Unites States Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFOs) are the responsible federal agents (serving in a Title 10 U.S.C. status) in each state sworn to oversee federal funding and to ensure it is spent for the purpose for which it was provided to the state.
- The National Guard has a continual fiscal audit process to include oversight by appropriate DOD and service agencies.
- The National Guard Bureau, the CONUSA Inspector General and/or the gaining Air Force Major Command, and the Army Audit Agency and/or the Air Force Audit Agency make periodic inspections of the USPFO offices.

Inspectors General

- TAGs, along with all other general officers, are subject to investigation by the DOD and respective service Inspectors General, not the state National Guard Inspector General.
- TAGs subscribe to being held to the highest levels of accountability by both state and federal government.
- Inspector General (IG) Investigations are conducted on TAGs; the results of the investigations are provided to the respective Governors for appropriate action. If substantiated, Army National Guard general officers are subject to administrative disciplinary action by the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Air National Guard TAGs are subject to disciplinary action by their respective Governors.
- All states have an IG; most are active duty Army officers. All are authorized an active Army officer as an IG (either a Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel) depending on the force structure within the state.

- State level IGs investigate matters within the respective state National Guard as directed by the state leadership (or NGB) in response to complaints.
- General officer investigations, to include TAGs, are conducted by the Departments of the Army, Air Force, or DoD respectively.
- The state IG program is overseen by the Department of the Army IG and the National Guard Bureau IG. To date, this is one of the most successful integration efforts by the Army.

Political Appointments

- TAGs are appointed by the Governors (except elected by popular vote in South Carolina, elected by the legislature in Vermont and appointed by the President in the District of Columbia).
- Like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Service Chiefs and all other officers on active duty as well as the Cabinet secretaries and deputies nominated and appointed by the commander-in-chief, the President; the Adjutant General is appointed by the state commander-in-chief of the National Guard in a respective jurisdiction, the highest elected official in the state—the Governor.
- After appointment, by the Governor, and confirmation by the state legislature as appropriate, a TAG's nomination is forwarded to the DOD for review and approval and then forwarded to the President of the United States for U.S. Senate confirmation.
- Like an active duty general officer, a National Guard officer must be qualified, have the trust of the elected civilian leadership, be supported through the nomination process, and successfully gain confirmation.
- Because of the National Guard's unique state/federal status an officer in the National Guard is subjected to the process at both the state and federal level.
- Typically, as a cabinet level appointee of the Governor, the TAG is accountable at both state and federal level.
- There are politics in state government just as there are in the federal government.
- TAGs are highly visible state officials and unlike active duty officers residing on and working at active duty installations, are subjected to continuous public and political scrutiny.
- TAGs work in the "court of public opinion" every day.

TAGs may exercise their personal political preferences; make contributions as private citizens, and vote as their conscience dictates:

- TAGs are subject to the federal joint ethics regulation, and corresponding states rules governing a wide range of conduct including political activity.

Unit Vacancy Promotions

- The unit vacancy promotion system as authorized by Congress recognizes the delicate balance that must be maintained between the civilian job, community obligations and National Guard duty.
- Unlike the active force, the National Guard is a community-based organization.
- Members work at their civilian jobs in the communities where they reside and pursue their National Guard duty in that community.
- The unit vacancy promotion system is designed to select the fully qualified enlisted and officer members to fulfill more senior positions and responsibilities.
- The readiness of the National Guard, its worldwide performance and the diversity of its missions is proof of the efficacy of the unit vacancy promotion system.

National Guard Bureau

- All National Guard members assigned to the National Guard Bureau are on federal active duty and are subject to the UCMJ.
- All National Guard members on federal active duty at the National Guard Bureau are subject to the same rules, regulations and procedures as apply to any other service member on federal active duty.

Readiness

- The National Guard has demonstrated it's more ready than at any other time in its history.
- Readiness is determined using the identical standards established by the respective active components of the services.
- National Guard personnel and units must meet the same standards as the active forces.

The National Guard is deployed worldwide. Last year the Guard deployed than 60 countries in support of the respective geographical and unified Commanders-in-Chief's (CINCs) American interests.

Every day of the year, the National Guard averages approximately more than 3, members deployed to the warfighting CINCs, 3,000 people supporting law enforcement in the war on drugs, more than 1,200 a day conducting youth programs, 715 members a day in support of our state mission and more than 81,000 a day preparing the National Guard for its full range of federal missions.

- Since September the 11th, the National Guard has responded to every mission tasked by both the President and the respective Governors. Those missions to date have included: Airport Security, Combat Air Patrol Missions over our nation, protecting high-value assets from coast to coast, providing trained and ready forces to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, patrolling "no-fly zones" in northern Iraq, keeping the peace in Bosnia, training the nation's fighting forces in mountain warfare, or responding to a natural disaster.

Yearly National Guard

Non-Parliamentary Summary Report

State	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
AK	1756	101	5.75%	1756	13	6.44%	0	-12	-0.68%
AL	13107	339	2.59%	3123	153	2.69%	18	-14	-0.10%
AR	8223	237	2.88%	8322	55	3.06%	99	-18	-0.18%
AZ	3952	87	1.70%	3954	66	1.67%	-2	1	0.03%
CA	16132	518	3.21%	16128	528	3.28%	4	-8	-0.05%
CO	3192	78	2.38%	3229	107	3.31%	-37	-31	-0.93%
CT	3957	254	6.42%	3972	282	7.10%	-15	-28	-0.58%
DC	1454	59	4.08%	1458	57	3.91%	-4	2	0.15%
DE	1667	41	2.46%	1680	39	2.32%	-13	2	0.14%
FL	10130	291	2.87%	10129	308	3.04%	1	-17	-0.17%
GA	8325	211	2.53%	8262	212	2.57%	83	-1	-0.03%
GU	769	7	0.91%	771	8	1.04%	-2	-1	-0.13%
HI	2976	63	2.12%	2975	58	1.95%	1	5	0.17%
IA	7450	152	2.04%	7473	170	2.27%	-23	-18	-0.23%
ID	2802	44	1.57%	2801	48	1.71%	1	-4	-0.14%
IL	10072	329	3.27%	10013	331	3.31%	59	-2	-0.04%
IN	11395	388	3.41%	11487	520	4.53%	-62	-132	-1.12%
KS	5905	209	3.47%	5887	227	3.86%	18	-22	-0.38%
KY	6359	103	1.62%	6387	103	1.61%	-28	0	0.01%
LA	10078	174	1.73%	10106	183	1.81%	-27	11	0.11%
MA	7499	190	2.53%	7520	221	2.94%	-21	-31	-0.41%
MD	6371	215	3.37%	6358	221	3.48%	13	-8	-0.10%
ME	2251	82	2.75%	2242	61	2.72%	9	1	0.03%
MI	8773	245	2.79%	8732	258	2.93%	41	-11	-0.14%
MN	9731	282	2.69%	9728	254	2.61%	3	8	0.08%
MO	8085	233	2.88%	8236	271	3.28%	-151	-38	-0.41%
MS	9407	198	1.15%	9404	127	1.35%	3	-19	-0.20%
MT	2420	82	2.68%	2398	66	2.75%	22	-4	-0.19%
NC	10202	389	3.81%	10192	427	4.19%	10	-38	-0.38%
ND	3210	22	0.69%	3222	21	0.65%	-12	1	0.03%
NE	3189	43	1.35%	3168	37	1.17%	23	8	0.18%
NH	1677	21	1.25%	1674	22	1.31%	3	-1	-0.08%
NJ	6984	397	5.68%	7013	497	7.09%	-29	-100	-1.40%
NM	3143	154	4.90%	3129	145	4.63%	14	9	0.27%
NV	1743	40	2.29%	1769	48	2.73%	-18	-8	-0.43%
NY	11573	427	3.69%	11592	451	3.89%	-19	-24	-0.20%
OH	10387	140	1.35%	10265	152	1.48%	102	-12	-0.13%
OK	7351	177	2.40%	7332	174	2.37%	29	9	0.03%
OR	5860	106	1.81%	5849	121	2.07%	11	-16	-0.26%
PA	16341	480	2.94%	16314	498	3.04%	27	-16	-0.10%
PR	8634	229	2.65%	8587	227	2.64%	47	2	0.01%
RI	2310	70	3.03%	2353	83	3.53%	-43	-13	-0.50%
SC	9283	234	2.52%	9253	218	2.36%	30	16	0.16%
SD	3348	45	1.34%	3340	47	1.41%	8	-2	-0.08%
TN	10831	220	2.03%	10829	235	2.17%	6	-15	-0.14%
TX	16031	381	2.25%	16810	1249	7.43%	-779	-888	-5.18%
UT	5007	170	3.40%	4966	189	3.40%	41	1	-0.01%
VA	7500	204	2.72%	7522	233	3.10%	-22	-29	-0.38%
VI	714	20	2.80%	714	23	3.22%	0	-3	-0.42%
VT	2929	104	3.55%	2918	101	3.46%	11	3	0.09%
WA	5704	229	4.01%	5704	228	4.00%	0	1	0.02%
WI	7460	210	2.82%	7511	185	2.46%	-51	25	0.35%
WV	4080	52	1.27%	4079	72	1.77%	1	-20	-0.49%
WY	1408	47	3.34%	1419	49	3.45%	-11	-2	-0.12%



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**




March 1, 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS**

SUBJECT: The National Guard and Whistleblower Protection under Federal Law

Attached is the information you requested to assist in preparing your responses to
Congressmen John McHugh and Vic Snyder.


Paul S. Koffsky
Deputy General Counsel
(Personnel and Health Policy)

Attachment





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



March 1, 2002

INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: The National Guard and Whistleblower Protection under Federal Law

- The militia clause of the U. S. Constitution (clause 16, section 8 of article I) reflects our founding fathers' original concept of the militia as a part time, non-professional, local military force under the exclusive authority of state officials. In this status, the Guard is under the command of the governor of the state and his principal deputy for Guard administration, the state adjutant general.
- In 1933, Congress vested the National Guard with dual status. In continuation of its original status, the Guard remained first and foremost a state instrumentality as a state militia. Simultaneously, Congress vested the National Guard with federal status as one of the elements of the reserve components of the armed forces of the United States.
- Federal status is operative only when the Guard is called or ordered into federal service. When so called or ordered, it is known as the National Guard of the United States and is subject to the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense and other authorities, civilian and military, of the federal defense establishment.
- One byproduct of this organizational arrangement is that federal officials do not have direct control over actions taken by state officials in administering the Guard when it is in state status. This organizational arrangement also means that there is a limit on the extent to which current Federal law may be relied upon to protect National Guard personnel who are substantiated whistleblowers.
- Congress has codified military whistleblower protection at section 1034 of title 10, United States Code. The Department of Defense has implemented this statute in Department of Defense Directive 7050.6, "Military Whistleblower Protection."
 - Section 1034 applies to members of the armed forces. The Directive defines members of the armed forces as "All Regular and Reserve component officers (commissioned and warrant) and enlisted members of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard (when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy) on active duty; and Reserve component officers (commissioned and warrant) and enlisted members in any duty or training status (includes officers and enlisted members of the National Guard)."



11-L-0559/OSD/10056

- Officers and enlisted members of the National Guard when in either a duty or training status under either title 10 or title 32, United States Code, receive the same military whistleblower protections as regular officers and enlisted members on active duty.
- Federal military whistleblower protections do not apply to officer and enlisted members of the National Guard when in state active duty status. Their protections, if any, derive from state law.
- A federal whistleblower protection investigation may identify both federal and state remedial actions. The Secretaries of the Military Departments or the Secretary of Defense may direct appropriate federal remedies but may not direct state action. Remedies requiring state action must be referred to the states for their consideration and action they deem appropriate.

Office of the DoD General Counsel
(Personnel and Health Policy)

JAN 22 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Investigations into National Guard Matters

This is in response to your memorandum of January 2, 2002, that requested summaries of investigations conducted over the last 5 years by this office and the Service Inspectors General (IGs) into National Guard matters. In addition, you requested assessments of the effectiveness in conducting those investigations and a summary of any legal or other barriers encountered.

Attached at Tab 1 are summaries of three closed investigations completed by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS). Your memorandum specifically requested the results of the DCIS investigation into alleged "ghost soldiers in the Arizona Army National Guard." That investigation is still open and therefore it would be inappropriate to release any information concerning it at this time.

The remaining attachments provide single-sheet summaries of all investigations into National Guard matters that were conducted by this office or by the Service IGs over the past 5 years. Investigations that were conducted by local IGs (that is, State IGs or IGs at National Guard installations) with no higher level involvement are not included. The following additional explanation is provided:

- At Tab 2 are summaries of all investigations into National Guard matters that were processed through our DoD Hotline data base. These include investigations that were conducted by this office as well as investigations into National Guard matters that were conducted by the

11-L-0559/OSD/10058

Service IGs in response to a referral from our office.¹ At a minimum, the single-sheet summaries provide a description of the allegations and the result of the investigation. ("NS" indicates that none of the allegations were substantiated. "SU" indicates that all allegations were substantiated, while "PS" indicates that some but not all of the allegations were substantiated.)

- At Tab 3 are summaries of investigations involving senior National Guard officials that were initiated and conducted by the Army or Air Force IGs. We provide oversight on such investigations and maintain a separate data base for them.
- Tab 4 contains summaries of all Army investigations into National Guard matters that were not included under Tabs 2 and 3. Please note that the Army could not provide information on "not-substantiated" cases completed before September 30, 1998. The Army cover letter also provides an assessment of investigative effectiveness.
- Tab 5 is a similar response from the Air Force IG.

Our assessment of the effectiveness of IG investigations into National Guard matters is consistent with views expressed by the Service IGs (Tabs 4 and 5). We have not encountered any unusual impediments. Occasionally issues may arise concerning the applicability of Federal statutes to National Guard members because of their dual Federal-state role. However, we are aware of no instance where the dual-status of National Guard members has significantly impeded investigative efforts.

Because some of the attached documentation may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, all attachments should be considered "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." While the attachments can be provided to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, House Armed Services Committee, as the Subcommittee possesses the legal jurisdiction, it is requested that the transmittal of the attachments to the Subcommittee contain an

¹ We conduct an investigation into alleged misconduct by senior National Guard officers or allegations of military reprisal when the nature of the allegations or the seniority of the subject require our direct involvement. We receive and review investigations conducted by the Service IGs as part of our oversight responsibilities.

advisement that the materials have not been reviewed for public release and may contain names and other privacy protected information.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Director, Office of Congressional Liaison, at (703) 604-8324.



Robert J. Lieberman
Deputy Inspector General

Attachments



(b)(6)

P. 026



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SAIG-AC (20-1b)

14 January 2002


MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, ATTN: Office of Departmental Inquiries (Mr. Broome), 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: Request for Information Concerning Allegations into National Guard Matters

1. Attached are Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) summaries concerning investigations into National Guard matters.
2. Single sheet summaries are provided in most instances. However, on several occasions, the summary sheet is longer than one page, due to the number of allegations and/or the magnitude of the investigation. Additionally, no summary is provided for investigations completed 30 September 1998 and earlier in which the findings were 'Not Substantiated' or 'Neither Substantiated Nor Refuted;' these categories of cases have been purged from our database.
3. We consider our investigative actions of National Guard matters to be very effective. Although corrective actions for 'Substantiated' allegations are a command responsibility, we conduct follow up as part of case closure in accordance with our policies and procedures.
4. You may contact Captain Zimmerman at (b)(6) with any questions.

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Encls


 John J. Ryneska
 Major General, U.S. Army
 Deputy The Inspector General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON DC

(b)(6)

P. 027

15 JAN 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM: SAF/IGQ
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: Request for Information Concerning Investigations into National Guard Matters

As requested, summaries of investigations on Air National Guard (ANG) matters are attached. SAF/IGQ deals with IG matters for subjects at the GS-15, colonel or below level. AFI 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints*, requires that only certain findings be reported to SAF/IGQ. These include findings in 10 USC 1034 and mental health cases, investigations in which the ranks listed above are involved as subjects, and high-level inquiries. As requested in your memorandum, investigations already reported to IG, DoD are omitted.

Your memorandum also asked us to comment on the effectiveness of the investigations process into Air National Guard complaints. Since 1998, SAF/IGQ has provided oversight on all Air National Guard complaint matters involving the special categories listed above pursuant to Air Force Instruction 90-301. Although there are exceptions, most ANG investigations have proceeded in a timely manner. When IG involvement was not warranted, our ability to assist or refer complainants to the appropriate agencies has been extremely effective. We are aware of no impediments to our ability to effectively process Air National Guard complaints.

If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me (b)(6) or Colonel Stephanie Walsh, the ANG Advisor to the Inspector General (b)(6)


JAMES N. WORTH, Colonel, USAF
Director, Inquires Directorate

Attachment:
Report Summaries

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TOTAL P. 027

TT-L-0559/OSD/10062

TAB

D

March 20, 2002

The Honorable John McHugh
Chairman
The Honorable Vic Snyder
Ranking Member
Military Personnel Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Subject: Military Personnel Strengths in the Army National Guard

The accuracy of reported personnel strength and training participation rates has a direct impact on the reliability of the Army National Guard's budget and the allocation of funds to individual states. If either the reported strength levels or the participation rates for a given fiscal year are more or less than the actual numbers, the funds required to pay Guard personnel will be either overstated or understated. Congressional concerns about the reported military personnel strengths of the Army National Guard have emerged as a result of recent media coverage of the Guard's so-called ghost soldiers.¹

As a result of those concerns, you asked us to provide information on (1) the Guard's personnel strength levels and training participation rates and (2) the Guard's efforts to improve the accuracy of reported strength levels and participation rates. To respond to your request, we drew on findings from our annual review of the Department of Defense's military personnel budget requests and the Army National Guard's military personnel data for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and the first quarter of fiscal year 2002. The scope and methodology for our review is discussed on page 5.

Results in Brief

The Army National Guard's fiscal years 2000 and 2001 funding requests were overstated by \$42.9 million and \$31.6 million, respectively, because the Guard used inaccurate military strength and participation rates to develop its projected and actual military force levels. Additionally, to develop its training budget needs, it used a mathematically derived training participation rate based on expected program costs rather than on the actual number of personnel being trained. By using these inaccurate figures, the Guard overstated its overall military personnel strength and

¹ "Ghost soldier" is a slang term used for soldiers who remain on strength reports but who are, in fact, no longer participating in training and who should be removed from these reports.

GAO-02-540R National Guard Personnel Strengths

11-L-0559/OSD/10064

RESTRICTED--Not to be released outside the
General Accounting Office unless specifically
approved by the Office of Congressional
Relations.

the amount of its annual funding requests to Congress.

The Army National Guard is currently taking steps to correct these overstatements. It is placing more emphasis on an existing personnel database reporting system that identifies the personnel who are assigned to a unit but have not been paid for inactive duty training for 3 months or more. By doing this, the Guard can ensure that unit commanders remove these personnel from unit strength reports if they are no longer determined to be drilling reservists.² The Guard has also improved the method it uses to calculate inactive duty training participation rates, now basing the rate on the number of people who have actually been paid for training.

Personnel Strength Figures and Training Participation Rates Were Overstated

Our analyses of the Army National Guard's military strength projections for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 showed that the Guard overstated its personnel strength because it relied on inaccurate military personnel strength data, which included individuals who should not have been considered in the calculation of strength numbers for inactive duty training. As a result, we estimated that the budget requests for those two fiscal years were overstated by \$42.9 and \$31.6 million, respectively.

The Guard can remove an individual from strength reports after 3 months if it determines that the person is no longer in the program. In order to help commanders identify these individuals, the Guard publishes a monthly Non-Validation of Pay Report (NO-VAL). Unit commanders review the status of individuals on this report and determine if they should be excused, removed, or reclassified to a non-drilling status in the Guard's strength reports. Because each personnel action is unique, there is little guidance as to how long a unit commander's review and the processing of paperwork should take. We used the 7-month rather than the 3-month period to estimate the accuracy of reported strength for drilling personnel because there are a number of circumstances that would cause a person not to be paid for more than three months and still be included in unit strength figures. These reasons include their movement from one unit to another, their inability to perform training for medical reasons, and their being paid late for training performed. Guard officials agreed that it would be reasonable to expect unit commanders to adjust unit strength if an individual has not been paid for at least 7 months or more.

Our analysis of the Army National Guard's military personnel database used to develop the NO-VAL showed that about 4,048, or 1.3 per cent, of the 301,140 drilling reservists should have been dropped from the fiscal year 2000 end strength and about 4,254, or 1.4 per cent, of the 296,430 drilling reservists should have been removed from the fiscal year 2001 end strength. Enclosure I shows the number of personnel,

² An individual required to perform 2 weeks of annual training and weekend drills (inactive duty training).

by state, who were not paid for 3 and 7 or more consecutive months as of the fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

In looking at the Army National Guard's method for calculating its inactive duty training participation rates, we found that in the past the rates were inaccurate because they did not correctly identify the actual number of personnel who were, in fact, in training. Instead, the Guard relied on a mathematically derived participation rate, which was based on expected program costs, estimated training costs, and military strength figures, to come up with a total number of military personnel who were expected to train. This method resulted in inactive duty training participation rates that were higher than they should have been. For example, when we examined the Guard's fiscal year 2001 budget, we found that the Guard had determined—using mathematically derived rates from fiscal year 1999 numbers—that about 91 percent of its officers and 84 percent of its enlisted personnel would participate in inactive duty training. However, when we compared the number of personnel who had actually been paid for inactive duty training in 1999 with the mathematically derived numbers, we found that 88.7 percent of officers and 81.3 percent of enlisted personnel had actually trained.

Steps Underway to Improve the Accuracy of Military Personnel Strengths and Training Participation Rates

The Army National Guard's methods of determining military personnel strength and inactive duty training participation rates have improved.

In the course of our budget work we made a number of suggestions on how the Army National Guard could improve its budget formulation methods. As a result, the Guard has changed the method it uses to calculate inactive-duty training participation rates and is now basing them on the number of people who have actually been paid for training. In addition, the Guard has placed more command attention on the accuracy of reported military personnel strength and the number of NO-VAL personnel retained in the reporting system. Between October 31, 1999, and December 31, 2001, the number of individuals reported on the Guard's NO-VAL report has declined from 16,264 to 9,627. Enclosure II shows this trend.

Our review of the December 2001 military personnel database indicates that some state commanders are using the NO-VAL report to identify inaccuracies in reported personnel strength. For example, between November and December 2001, the number of assigned drilling personnel was reduced from 297,846 to 297,226, or less than 1 percent, while personnel on the NO-VAL report declined from 11,133 to 9,627, or about 14 percent. The state of Texas had the largest decrease in both strength and NO-VAL personnel. Its assigned drilling personnel strength numbers fell from 14,522 to 13,695, about 6 percent, and its personnel on the NO-VAL report declined from 1249 to 361, a 70 percent reduction.

Scope and Methodology

To provide information on the Guard's personnel strength and participation rates, we drew on our prior work and analyzed DOD's military personnel budgets, comparing requests for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 to actual personnel data for October 1999 to December 2001. In addition, we obtained and analyzed the database used to produce the monthly NO-VAL reports for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. We also discussed our observations with Army National Guard officials at the headquarters level and officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs. Additionally, although we utilized the Guard's data in our analyses, we did not test this data to ascertain its accuracy.

Agency Comments

We discussed a draft of this letter with Army National Guard officials. They generally agreed with our observations and stated that, in the past, reported personnel strength levels might have been unintentionally overstated. The Guard stressed that it has recognized the problems it had in calculating participation rates and in adjusting military personnel strength levels and is taking action, as discussed above, to correct both.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, generally agreed with our observations. We will continue to work with the Guard and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, to improve the accuracy of reported strength and participation rates used in the budget formulation process.

As arranged with your office, unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date on this letter. At that time, we will make copies of this letter available to other appropriate congressional committees and place a copy on GAO's home page at <http://www.gao.gov>. If you have any questions concerning the information provided, please call me on (b)(6) or R. L. Furr on (b)(6).




Derek B. Stewart
Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management

Enclosures -- 2

Number of Army National Guard Members Not Paid for 3 and 7 or More Consecutive Months										
State	September 30, 2000					September 30, 2001				
	Assigned ^a	3 months	%	7 months	%	Assigned ^a	3 months	%	7 months	%
Alabama	11,837	368	3.1	192	1.1	11,184	274	2.4	132	1.2
Alaska	1,457	179	12.3	77	5.3	1,356	107	7.9	65	4.8
Arizona	3,276	70	2.1	7	0.2	3,239	34	1.0	8	0.2
Arkansas	7,090	200	2.8	70	1.0	7,139	246	3.4	118	1.7
California	13,965	444	3.2	112	0.8	13,918	524	3.8	238	1.7
Colorado	2,703	68	2.5	19	0.7	2,586	50	1.9	11	0.4
Connecticut	3,173	71	2.2	28	0.9	3,193	177	5.5	90	2.8
Delaware	1,410	42	3.0	11	0.8	1,388	30	2.2	9	0.6
District of Columbia	1,833	83	4.5	35	1.9	1,269	43	3.4	17	1.3
Florida	8,584	382	4.5	178	2.1	8,485	278	3.3	142	1.7
Georgia	7,556	340	4.5	114	1.5	7,178	192	2.7	81	1.1
Guam	534	4	0.7	0	0.0	548	4	0.7	0	0.0
Hawaii	2,427	74	3.0	34	1.4	2,436	54	2.2	25	1.0
Idaho	2,190	18	0.8	3	0.1	2,158	28	1.3	10	0.5
Illinois	8,439	326	3.9	115	1.4	8,162	242	3.0	116	1.4
Indiana	10,099	574	5.7	218	2.2	10,794	472	4.4	221	2.0
Iowa	6,181	120	1.9	43	0.7	6,078	128	2.1	56	0.9
Kansas	5,429	220	4.1	48	0.9	5,128	169	3.3	85	1.7
Kentucky	5,509	153	2.8	62	1.1	5,563	107	1.9	30	0.5
Louisiana	8,317	122	1.5	50	0.6	8,379	112	1.3	62	0.7
Maine	1,931	36	1.9	4	0.2	1,930	43	2.2	16	0.8
Maryland	5,434	261	4.8	100	1.8	5,249	195	3.7	100	1.9
Massachusetts	6,534	245	3.7	82	1.3	6,145	150	2.4	62	1.0
Michigan	7,404	190	2.6	68	0.9	7,441	172	2.3	77	1.0
Minnesota	8,145	177	2.2	30	0.4	8,000	123	1.5	47	0.6
Mississippi	8,015	140	1.7	50	0.6	7,840	98	1.3	42	0.5
Missouri	6,574	227	3.5	78	1.2	6,614	198	3.0	90	1.4
Montana	2,099	44	2.1	16	0.8	1,989	35	1.8	15	0.8
Nebraska	2,835	142	5.0	41	1.4	2,643	21	0.8	8	0.3
Nevada	1,389	46	3.3	7	0.5	1,466	21	1.4	5	0.3
New Hampshire	1,455	22	1.5	6	0.4	1,431	19	1.3	8	0.6
New Jersey	6,170	682	11.1	282	4.6	5,984	659	11.0	437	7.3
New Mexico	2,562	89	3.5	22	0.9	2,601	103	4.0	27	1.0
New York	10,368	460	4.4	172	1.7	9,831	262	2.7	103	1.0
North Carolina	8,572	393	4.6	132	1.5	8,580	379	4.4	218	2.5
North Dakota	2,753	16	0.6	5	0.2	2,728	17	0.6	7	0.3
Ohio	8,124	132	1.6	31	0.4	8,594	110	1.3	25	0.3
Oklahoma	6,184	192	3.1	81	1.3	6,055	132	2.2	42	0.7
Oregon	5,046	182	3.6	82	1.6	4,915	100	2.0	52	1.1
Pennsylvania	13,748	349	2.5	140	1.0	13,719	362	2.6	204	1.5
Puerto Rico	7,471	149	2.0	72	1.0	7,497	148	2.0	68	0.9
Rhode Island	2,198	110	5.0	38	1.7	2,018	63	3.1	29	1.4
South Carolina	8,279	397	4.8	208	2.5	7,826	159	2.0	87	1.1
South Dakota	2,917	34	1.2	8	0.3	2,859	32	1.1	12	0.4
Tennessee	9,422	238	2.5	107	1.1	9,310	167	1.8	99	1.1
Texas	14,546	1,259	8.7	505	3.5	14,138	865	6.1	490	3.5
U.S. Virgin Islands	640	36	5.6	18	2.8	608	26	4.1	18	2.8
Utah	4,005	117	2.9	30	0.7	3,929	105	2.7	39	1.0
Vermont	2,689	138	5.1	58	2.2	2,555	99	3.9	48	1.9
Virginia	6,339	225	3.5	92	1.5	6,256	165	2.6	95	1.5
Washington State	4,728	227	4.8	62	1.3	4,680	175	3.7	82	1.8
West Virginia	3,404	68	1.9	18	0.5	3,407	50	1.5	22	0.6
Wisconsin	6,418	104	1.6	29	0.5	6,228	152	2.4	54	0.9
Wyoming	1,243	48	3.7	18	1.4	1,193	28	2.3	14	1.2
Total	301,140	11,026	3.7	4,048	1.3	296,430	8,701	2.9	4,264	1.4

^aAssigned includes only Army National Guard members required to perform 2 weeks of annual training and weekend drills.

Army National Guard Monthly
NO-VAL Reports on Individuals Not Paid for Inactive Duty Training
for 3 Months or More
(October 31, 1999 to December 31, 2001)



Note: The graph shows a decline from 16,264 in October 1999 to 8,627 in December 2001.

Source: U.S. Army National Guard monthly NO-VAL reports.

- (A) Army Emergency Relief.
 - (B) Air Force Aid Society, Inc.
 - (C) Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society.
 - (D) Coast Guard Mutual Assistance.
- (3) An entity described in this paragraph is an entity that is not operated for profit and is any of the following:
- (A) An entity that regulates and supports the athletic programs of the service academies (including athletic conferences).
 - (B) An entity that regulates international athletic competitions.
 - (C) An entity that accredits service academies and other schools of the armed forces (including regional accrediting agencies).
 - (D) An entity that (i) regulates the performance, standards, and policies of military health care (including health care associations and professional societies), and (ii) has designated the position or capacity in that entity in which a member of the armed forces may serve if authorized under subsection (a).
 - (E) An entity that, operating in a foreign nation where United States military personnel are serving at United States military activities, promotes understanding and tolerance between such personnel (and their families) and the citizens of that host foreign nation through programs that foster social relations between those persons.

(c) PUBLICATION OF DESIGNATED ENTITIES AND OF AUTHORIZED PERSONS.—A designation of an entity under subsection (b), and an authorization under subsection (a) of a member of the armed forces to participate in the management of such an entity, shall be published in the Federal Register.

(d) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation in the case of the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.

(Added P.L. 105-85, §593(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1997, 111 Stat. 1762; amended P.L. 106-65, §66, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 634.)

§ 1034. Protected communications; prohibition of retaliatory personnel actions¹

(a) RESTRICTING COMMUNICATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND INSPECTOR GENERAL PROHIBITED.—(1) No person may

¹Section 843 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-180; 105 Stat. 1449) provides:

SEC. 843. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

(a) REGULATIONS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations prohibiting members of the Armed Forces from taking or threatening to take any unfavorable personnel action, or withholding or threatening to withhold a favorable personnel action, as a reprisal against any member of the Armed Forces for making or preparing a lawful communication to any employee of the Department of Defense or any member of the Armed Forces who is assigned to or belongs to an organization which has as its primary responsibility audit, inspection, investigation, or enforcement of any law or regulation.

(b) VIOLATIONS BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE UCMJ.—The Secretary shall provide in the regulations that a violation of the prohibition by a person subject to chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is punishable as a violation of section 892 of such title (article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

(c) (omitted).

restrict a member of the armed forces in communicating with a Member of Congress or an Inspector General.

(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to a communication that is unlawful.

(b) PROHIBITION OF RETALIATORY PERSONNEL ACTIONS.—(1) No person may take (or threaten to take) an unfavorable personnel action, or withhold (or threaten to withhold) a favorable personnel action, as a reprisal against a member of the armed forces for making or preparing—

(A) a communication to a Member of Congress or an Inspector General that (under subsection (a)) may not be restricted; or

(B) a communication that is described in subsection (c)(2) and that is made (or prepared to be made) to—

(i) a Member of Congress;

(ii) an Inspector General (as defined in subsection (i)) or any other Inspector General appointed under the Inspector General Act of 1978;

(iii) a member of a Department of Defense audit, inspection, investigation, or law enforcement organization; or

(iv) any other person or organization (including any person or organization in the chain of command) designated pursuant to regulations or other established administrative procedures for such communications.

(2) Any action prohibited by paragraph (1) (including the threat to take any action and the withholding or threat to withhold any favorable action) shall be considered for the purposes of this section to be a personnel action prohibited by this subsection.

(c) INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF PROHIBITED PERSONNEL ACTIONS.—(1) If a member of the armed forces submits to an Inspector General an allegation that a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b) has been taken (or threatened) against the member with respect to a communication described in paragraph (2), the Inspector General shall take the action required under paragraph (3).

(2) A communication described in this paragraph is a communication in which a member of the armed forces complains of, or discloses information that the member reasonably believes constitutes evidence of, any of the following:

(A) A violation of law or regulation, including a law or regulation prohibiting sexual harassment or unlawful discrimination.

(B) Gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

(3)(A) An Inspector General receiving an allegation as described in paragraph (1) shall expeditiously determine, in accordance with regulations prescribed under subsection (h), whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation of the allegation.

(B) If the Inspector General receiving such an allegation is an Inspector General within a military department, that Inspector General shall promptly notify the Inspector General of the Depart-

ment of Defense of the allegation. Such notification shall be made in accordance with regulations prescribed under subsection (h).

(C) If an allegation under paragraph (1) is submitted to an Inspector General within a military department and if the determination of that Inspector General under subparagraph (A) is that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation of the allegation, that Inspector General shall forward the matter to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for review.

(D) Upon determining that an investigation of an allegation under paragraph (1) is warranted, the Inspector General making the determination shall expeditiously investigate the allegation. In the case of a determination made by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, that Inspector General may delegate responsibility for the investigation to an appropriate Inspector General within a military department.

(E) In the case of an investigation under subparagraph (D) within the Department of Defense, the results of the investigation shall be determined by, or approved by, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (regardless of whether the investigation itself is conducted by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense or by an Inspector General within a military department).

(4) Neither an initial determination under paragraph (3)(A) nor an investigation under paragraph (3)(D) is required in the case of an allegation made more than 60 days after the date on which the member becomes aware of the personnel action that is the subject of the allegation.

(5) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense, or the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation (in the case of a member of the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy), shall ensure that the Inspector General conducting the investigation of an allegation under this subsection is outside the immediate chain of command of both the member submitting the allegation and the individual or individuals alleged to have taken the retaliatory action.

(d) INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION OF UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS.—Upon receiving an allegation under subsection (c), the Inspector General receiving the allegation shall conduct a separate investigation of the information that the member making the allegation believes constitutes evidence of wrongdoing (as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (c)(2)) if there previously has not been such an investigation or if the Inspector General determines that the original investigation was biased or otherwise inadequate. In the case of an allegation received by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Inspector General may delegate that responsibility to the Inspector General of the armed force concerned.

(e) REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS.—(1) After completion of an investigation under subsection (c) or (d) or, in the case of an investigation under subsection (c) by an Inspector General within a military department, after approval of the report of that investigation under subsection (c)(3)(E), the Inspector General conducting the investigation shall submit a report on the results of the investigation to the Secretary of Defense (or to the Secretary of Transportation in the case of a member of the Coast Guard when the Coast

Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy) and shall transmit a copy of the report on the results of the investigation to the member of the armed forces who made the allegation investigated. The report shall be transmitted to the Secretary, and the copy of the report shall be transmitted to the member, not later than 30 days after the completion of the investigation or, in the case of an investigation under subsection (c) by an Inspector General within a military department, after approval of the report of that investigation under subsection (c)(3)(E).

(2) In the copy of the report transmitted to the member, the Inspector General shall ensure the maximum disclosure of information possible, with the exception of information that is not required to be disclosed under section 552 of title 5. However, the copy need not include summaries of interviews conducted, nor any document acquired, during the course of the investigation. Such items shall be transmitted to the member, if the member requests the items, with the copy of the report or after the transmittal to the member of the copy of the report, regardless of whether the request for those items is made before or after the copy of the report is transmitted to the member.

(3) If, in the course of an investigation of an allegation under this section, the Inspector General determines that it is not possible to submit the report required by paragraph (1) within 180 days after the date of receipt of the allegation being investigated, the Inspector General shall provide to the Secretary of Defense (or to the Secretary of Transportation in the case of a member of the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy) and to the member making the allegation a notice—

(A) of that determination (including the reasons why the report may not be submitted within that time); and

(B) of the time when the report will be submitted.

(4) The report on the results of the investigation shall contain a thorough review of the facts and circumstances relevant to the allegation and the complaint or disclosure and shall include documents acquired during the course of the investigation, including summaries of interviews conducted. The report may include a recommendation as to the disposition of the complaint.

(f) CORRECTION OF RECORDS WHEN PROHIBITED ACTION TAKEN.—(1) A board for the correction of military records acting under section 1552 of this title, in resolving an application for the correction of records made by a member or former member of the armed forces who has alleged a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b), on the request of the member or former member or otherwise, may review the matter.

(2) In resolving an application described in paragraph (1), a correction board—

(A) shall review the report of the Inspector General submitted under subsection (e)(1);

(B) may request the Inspector General to gather further evidence; and

(C) may receive oral argument, examine and cross-examine witnesses, take depositions, and, if appropriate, conduct an evidentiary hearing.

(3) If the board elects to hold an administrative hearing, the member or former member who filed the application described in paragraph (1)—

(A) may be provided with representation by a judge advocate if—

(i) the Inspector General, in the report under subsection (e)(1), finds that there is probable cause to believe that a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b) has been taken (or threatened) against the member with respect to a communication described in subsection (c)(2);

(ii) the Judge Advocate General concerned determines that the case is unusually complex or otherwise requires judge advocate assistance to ensure proper presentation of the legal issues in the case; and

(iii) the member is not represented by outside counsel chosen by the member; and

(B) may examine witnesses through deposition, serve interrogatories, and request the production of evidence, including evidence contained in the investigatory record of the Inspector General but not included in the report submitted under subsection (e)(1).

(4) The Secretary concerned shall issue a final decision with respect to an application described in paragraph (1) within 180 days after the application is filed. If the Secretary fails to issue such a final decision within that time, the member or former member shall be deemed to have exhausted the member's or former member's administrative remedies under section 1552 of this title.

(5) The Secretary concerned shall order such action, consistent with the limitations contained in sections 1552 and 1553 of this title, as is necessary to correct the record of a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b).

(6) If the Board determines that a personnel action prohibited by subsection (b) has occurred, the Board may recommend to the Secretary concerned that the Secretary take appropriate disciplinary action against the individual who committed such personnel action.

(g) REVIEW BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—Upon the completion of all administrative review under subsection (f), the member or former member of the armed forces (except for a member or former member of the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy) who made the allegation referred to in subsection (c)(1), if not satisfied with the disposition of the matter, may submit the matter to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary shall make a decision to reverse or uphold the decision of the Secretary of the military department concerned in the matter within 90 days after receipt of such a submittal.

(h) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.

(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term "Member of Congress" includes any Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress.

(2) The term "Inspector General" means any of the following:

(A) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.

(B) The Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, in the case of a member of the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.

(C) Any officer of the armed forces or employee of the Department of Defense who is assigned or detailed to serve as an Inspector General at any level in the Department of Defense.

(3) The term "unlawful discrimination" means discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 80; Oct. 19, 1964, P.L. 86-525, § 1406(19), 96 Stat. 2622; revised in its entirety P.L. 100-456, § 446(a), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 2027; P.L. 101-325, § 202, Dec. 12, 1989, 103 Stat. 1910; P.L. 103-337, § 531(a)-(g), Oct. 5, 1994, 106 Stat. 2756-2758; P.L. 105-261, § 933, Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2107; P.L. 106-398, § 11903, Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1664, 1664A-224.)

§ 1035. Deposits of savings

(a) Under joint regulations prescribed by the Secretaries concerned, a member of the armed forces who is on a permanent duty assignment outside the United States or its possessions may deposit during that tour of duty not more than his unallotted current pay and allowances in amounts of \$5 or more, with any branch, office, or officer of a uniformed service. Amounts so deposited shall be deposited in the Treasury and kept as a separate fund, and shall be accounted for in the same manner as public funds.

(b) Interest at a rate prescribed by the President, not to exceed 10 percent a year, will accrue on amounts deposited under this section. However, the maximum amount upon which interest may be paid under this subsection to any member is \$10,000, except that such limitation shall not apply to deposits made on or after September 1, 1966, in the case of those members in a missing status, during the Vietnam conflict, the Persian Gulf conflict, or a contingency operation. Interest under this subsection shall terminate 90 days after the member's return to the United States or its possessions.

(c) Except as provided in joint regulations prescribed by the Secretaries concerned, payments of deposits, and interest thereon, may not be made to the member while he is on duty outside the United States or its possessions.

(d) An amount deposited under this section, with interest thereon, is exempt from liability for the member's debts, including any indebtedness to the United States or any instrumentality thereof, and is not subject to forfeiture by sentence of a court-martial.

(e) The Secretary concerned, or his designee, may in the interest of a member who is in a missing status or his dependents, initiate, stop, modify, and change allotments, and authorize a withdrawal of deposits, made under this section, even though the member had an opportunity to deposit amounts under this section and elected not to do so. Interest may be computed from the day the

4/3
0602
SHOWTIME

April 3, 2002 10:27 AM

skz

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Chemical Demilitarization

Done 5/1

370.64

We have to figure out how we are going to sort through with OMB the chemical demilitarization issue. I am concerned it is not being handled well by the Comptroller's shop.

Please push Paul Wolfowitz to get a meeting and get it solved. If I have to get into it, I will. I would like to understand what the problem is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040302-9

.....
Please respond by 041.9/02


3 APPROA

U11973 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10076

Action
step

April 3, 2002 5:35 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Army Troop Organization

3
2
2

The Army is currently organized by armies, corps, divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, and platoons. I have to believe there is a way to take at least two of those levels out. Why don't you put in language to ask the Army to do a study on that?

Specifically, I think that if one went back to DESERT STORM, for example, and looked at the lethality of each of these elements relative to the lethality of likely opponents, the fact is that today the relative lethality would likely be much greater, and therefore these elements could be smaller—and some could be eliminated.

Please fashion some language that would force people to look at that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040302-20

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02

3 APPROX

U11974 /02

INFO
steo

April 3, 2002 11:50 AM

IRAO

TO: Torie Clarke
Tony Dolan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraq

Here is an unclassified statement for the remarks we are preparing on what is going on in Iraq.

Thanks.

Attach.
04/02/02 CIA response

DHR:dh
040302-15

.....

Please respond by _____

3 APR 02

U11975 /02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 03 2002
2 April 2002

Memorandum

In response to a question about the most significant public grievances in Iraq:

Reporting from Iraq on the public's complaints is almost nonexistent because Saddam and his regime control the news media and punish any perceived opposition with torture, assassination, or arbitrary imprisonment. The people have no safe means of expressing their views on poor economic prospects, corruption, political repression, limited personal freedoms, and their lack of political empowerment. (U)

We receive a wide range of unclassified information on regime repression, but some of the specific claims are difficult to confirm because Iraq refuses to permit visits by human rights monitors or other observers. The available information reflects widespread repression that is consistent with Saddam's past actions:

Executions. Saddam has ordered the assassination of numerous domestic rivals, former colleagues, family members, and dissidents in Iraq and abroad to further his political goals and to consolidate his power. Baghdad in 1997 initiated a murderous cleansing campaign at the large Abu Ghurayb prison that continued into at least 2000.

Torture and ill-treatment. Suspects, including members of the opposition and their collaborators or relatives, are subjected to brutal treatment during questioning by Iraqi security forces and intelligence services. Torture allegedly includes electric shocks, suspension by hands, beatings, rape and sexual abuse of both men and women, threats, and psychological pressure, according to UN reporting.

Counterinsurgency operations. Saddam's obsession with ensuring regime security has led to repeated and devastating attacks on Shias in the region of the southern marshes. Villages have been razed there, and inhabitants have been killed or jailed. According to the international media, nearly 150,000 Arab marsh dwellers who lived near the Tigris and Euphrates rivers had to move when Iraqi forces drained the marshes after the Gulf war.

Ethnic repression and forced relocations. As commander in chief during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was responsible for the repression of the Kurds, including the Anfal operation directed by his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid in 1987-88, which included mass deportations, resettlement, torture, executions, and the use of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents. The international press reports that the Iraqi Government continues to remove Kurdish families from cities and villages in oil-producing regions near the Kurdish-controlled zone and is repopulating these areas with Sunni Arabs to serve as a loyal bulwark. (U)

continued . . .

For further information, contact the Iraq-Saudi Issue Manager at 71729 secure.

11-L-0559/OSD/10079

Human rights groups continue to report on regime abuses against all sectors of the Iraqi population. The UN and Amnesty International since 1991 have documented human rights violations perpetrated by Iraqi military, intelligence, and security personnel against suspected political dissidents using methods that include extrajudicial executions, torture during custody, disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention.

- Max Van Der Stoel, the former Special Rapporteur to the UN Human Rights Commission on Iraq, in 1999 said, "Extreme and brutal force is threatened and applied without hesitation and with total impunity to control the population." He frequently has expressed the view that the human rights situation in Iraq is worse than in any country since the end of World War II.
- According to UN Special Rapporteur Mavrommatis's report of August 2000, more than 94,000 individuals have been forced to leave northern Iraq since 1991.
- Amnesty International reports that Iraq is responsible for the disappearance and probable murder of more than 100 Shia clerics since the 1991 uprising.
(U)

Snowflake

EF1063 LA
021005239/OSDP
April 3, 2002 10:12 AM

2/20

LOH

Middle East

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
CC: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Middle East Memo

Done 4/8

I have taken a stab at "declassifying" this memo. Please review and get back to me soon.

4/4/02

→ SD
Headline to avoid:

Thanks.

Attach.
04/03/02 Memo on Middle East

Rumsfeld Says:
Bush Admin "Impotent"
I think my edits preserve your point while avoiding that headline. Otherwise, this is a sound, strong piece.
Doug Feith

DHR:dh
040302-8

Please respond by 04/05/02

P.S. How do you plan to use it?

→ Delonnie
Larry Di Rita
4/8

3 APR 02

U11977 /02

04-04-02 08:37 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/10081

2 02:58

DRAFT

Felt
marked

- Years ago, I received a call in the White House from Alf Landon. He asked me to tell President Ford that, with Ronald Reagan beating up on him over the Panama Canal issue, Ford should remember what Teddy Roosevelt used to say. I said, "What's that?" He said, "If you are in a bind, create a diversion."
- We are in a bind in the Middle East today. We have a "hair knot" in the Middle East, and have had for 50 years. We are not going to solve it soon. I have a recommendation ^{— not} for a diversion, but for a sensible redirection of ^{the} public's focus
- I think we ought to go after Iran—hard. They are helping Al Qaeda—they are sending terrorists to Damascus and then via the Beirut road into the Bekaa Valley, and then into southern Lebanon to conduct terrorist acts against Israel. Syria is testing chemical weapons, I suspect with assistance from Iran. Iranian officials appear to be responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing. Iran is actively encouraging the violence that is tearing the Middle East apart. Their Karine-A plan was blocked, but their support for terrorism continues.
- It is time for the President to use the bully pulpit. Specifically, I have always felt that the most powerful person in America was the person who picked the "high school debate topic." He had every child in America, every parent, and every teacher working off an issue the way he constructed it. The U.S. has the bully pulpit. We can fashion the "construct" the way we wish to, to serve our purposes.
- I think we ought to systematically take on Iraq publicly with a speech, followed by an information operations campaign. Iraq has been giving \$10,000 to \$25,000 to the families of every suicide bomber. Their rhetoric glorifies terrorism, including suicide bombers. They are developing weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's treatment of its own people—gassing Kurds, starving out and slaughtering the marsh Arabs and Shia in the South, the Anfal

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/10082

campaign against the Kurds, the extensive system of political prisons and torture—constitute perhaps the worst violence against Muslims anywhere in the Middle East.

- Every time we compromise with Arafat, we are seen as rewarding terrorism. We need to be visibly against terrorism, or we weaken our global war on terrorism.

Sorry that this message came out messy...

- ~~At the present time, the USA looks impotent. But that is the signal around the world—namely,~~ ^{should never look} ~~that we are incapable of solving the Middle East problem. That is the construct~~ ^{That's something} ~~today. Arab countries are blaming this on the fact that the U.S. can't or won't~~ ^{the current crisis} ~~make Israel acquiesce to a bunch of terrorists. We don't need to look impotent.~~ ^{rather than} ~~We could look strong. The way to do so is the following:~~

RISK WE ARE RUNNING

But that's the risk we run if we get people focused on US inability to solve

1. Speak against Iran publicly, soon. Go right to the Iranian people. Don't speak to the so-called "moderates." Instead, isolate the moderates with the fundamentalists who control them. The Iranian people want freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, economic freedom, freedom of religion, rights for women. We ought to say so.
2. Second, speak out on Iraq. Tell the world exactly what they are doing—developing weapons of mass destruction, encouraging terrorism and suicide bombers and abusing their own people on a massive scale. Pin the tail on the donkey.
3. Third, Mark Twain wrote, "You can't pray a lie." Well, we can't live a lie, either. And we have been living a lie in the Middle East for some decades. Those countries are financing terrorists, hoping the terrorists won't bring their governments down. Financiers from Saudi Arabia,

who do business with the U.S., give money to the Al Qaeda. It is damaging us and damaging them. We need to stop it. The controlled Egyptian press publishes hateful material constantly attacking Israel to deflect popular anger from their own government.

4. Stop letting the moderate Arab countries blame the U.S. for the fact that there is terrorism in the Middle East. The blame belongs on Iran, Iraq and Syria. Call a spade a spade. Let the world know it is time for countries in that region to stop allowing money to go to terrorists, because it is going to blow up the entire region.

President Eisenhower used to say, "If you can't solve a problem, enlarge it."

Well, we cannot solve the hair knot we have been dealt in the Middle East. We need to enlarge the problem and the picture. We need to change the construct, so we can:

- Set the agenda for international dialogue, we establish the "high school debate topic," we set the construct.
- Take the offensive instead of playing defense year after year.
- Take the moral high ground, tell the truth and stop living a lie.
- Go after Arab countries to stop funding their enemies and our enemies—the Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah, etc.
- Go after the hand-wringing Europeans and tell them to join us to help the repressed people of Iran, Iraq, and Syria, by stopping turning their heads and secretly helping Iraq break the sanctions and turning a blind eye to Iran's sponsorship of terrorists, the Al Qaeda and their WMD activities.

The Europeans are helping Iran. They are helping Iraq. They help Syria. Provide the world leadership to get them to stop doing it. Seize the moment, enlarge the picture and tackle terrorism, instead of being seen as accommodating to terrorism and parading our impotence.

Ending Palestinian terrorism is still the core of the problem. There won't be negotiations without that. We have to be deeply concerned about the message we are sending in the world ~~that the U.S. is impotent.~~ ^{we cannot have} ~~that~~ ^{looking} ~~is~~ ^{at} the U.S. ~~is~~ ^λ impotent.

032902-1TS.3

April 3, 2002 7:36 AM

TO: VADM Giambastiani
Larry Di Rita

CC: Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sheikh Mohammed,

Done 7/12

UAE

I want to meet with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed when he comes to the U.S.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040302-1

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

Sir

Policy has this for action. The next trip the Sheikh makes to the U.S., you will be scheduled.

*COL Bucci
4/12*

4/12

3 APR 02

U11978 /02

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

SECDEF HAS SEEN

From: (b)(6)@aol.com
Sent: Monday, April 01, 2002 12:00 PM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: Note from Chuckie

APR 03 2002



MAR025~1.DOC

(b)(6) would you please pass the attached note to Secretary Rumsfeld?
Hope all is well with you and the pace is manageable. We are fine and I keep busy with trips to Washington, the font of all knowledge. Flew on a P-3 two weeks ago and spoke at the Change of Command dinner for the squadron skipper who is headed your way. Thank you in advance, Chuck Horner

Handwritten notes: 4/1, 4/2, ASD/ISA Rodman, done - 4/2 SC, Larry Di Rita 4/2

Note for Secretary Rumsfeld from Chuck Horner April 2, 2002

My friends in the United Arab Emirates tell me that their boss, His Highness Lt. Gen. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Chief of Staff UAE Armed Forces, will be visiting the United States in the near future.

I am sure he will be meeting with the Secretary of Defense and want to provide some insights concerning Sheikh Mohammed.

Sheikh Mohammed played a key role during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991

He was the first, and initially the only, leader in the Gulf to recognize the Iraqi threats of July 1990 were serious and asked for KC-135 tankers to be deployed for training exercises with the UAE Air Force. This also provided the capability to maintain combat air patrols over the off shore oil fields for his short-range French fighter aircraft.

He proved to be our biggest supporter in working the bed down of our deploying forces during the hectic days of August-September 1990. Whenever I had a problem finding ramp space, feeding and housing our troops, or moving equipment through customs, he was the one I could turn to and get problems solved immediately.

He selected his top officers, Colonels Khalid and Faris to come to Riyadh and work on our Combined forces air staff that planned the war to liberate Kuwait. Khalid is now the commander of the UAEAF and Faris I believe is the Director of Operations.

He made sure the UAEAF was able to participate in the air war by accelerating the training of the new Mirage 2000 squadron. He also selected to lead the squadron, Colonel Abdullah who is a first rate officer in every aspect, a graduate of the USAF Command and Staff and now the point of contact on the F-16 Block 60 sale.

Sheikh Mohammed is soft-spoken, very polite and listens carefully. He is a true patriot and selflessly seeks what is best for the UAE security interests. Others are not so selfless nor have his capacity to envisage what is best for his nation and its people.

I believe he has met with then Governor Bush, and should do so again when in Washington this time. While third or fourth in the UAE leadership, he will likely head the UAE some day. Both are approximately the same age and have much in common and the relationship between President Bush and Sheikh Mohammed could be of critical importance during future activities with Gulf nations to include Iraq.

After the Gulf War Sheikh Mohammed told me "I am embarrassed, because while I knew we needed the US forces I was afraid of the problems your people would cause due to abuse of alcohol and harassment of our women. To my surprise they behaved themselves perfectly while in our country, something I cannot say for the Arab refugees in our hotels. Please thank them for me."

11-L-0559/OSD/10088

Action
Size

April 3, 2002 9:31 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tactical Nukes

A-491.61

I briefed you on the tactical nuclear issue. Let's get something into the text of one of these documents on that subject.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040302-6

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

3A PRO2

U11980 /02

showfile

Done
5/20

April 3, 2002 5:44 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Innovations

Here is a note I sent Gen. Myers in January. I haven't gotten an answer. What do you think about our doing that? Do you want to draft something for me to do it?

6/26/12

Thanks.

Attach.
01/29/02 SecDef memo to CJCS

DHR:dh
040302-23

.....
Please respond by 04/26/02

4/5

*SECDEF -
CJCS HAS SENT YOU
2 MEMOS ON THIS SUBJECT
(6 FEB. + 13 MAR) (BOTH ATTACHED).*


3 APR 02

*HE KNOWS HE OWES YOU
MORE.*

U11981 /02


*V/R
ED*

CC: [unclear] 0559198D/10090



January 29, 2002 2:44 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 



SUBJECT: Innovations

What do you think about asking each of the Service Chiefs and CINCs to tell us one thing they have on the drawing boards—like putting a Hellfire on a Predator—that is on a fast track they are going to get accomplished during their tenure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012902-29

.....

Please respond by 02/11/02



#163

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-229-02
13 March 2002

LEAVE TO FILE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Handwritten initials and date: RBM 3/12

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Innovations

- For your information in response to your question regarding selected fast track programs, the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders were tasked to identify key developmental programs planned for implementation during their respective tenures. The following is provided:
 - Inputs have been received from the Army and the Marines. The Army identified the Interim Armored Vehicle with initial operational capability expected in 2003. The Marines identified the Dragon Eye Interim-Small Unit Remote Scouting System, an unmanned aerial vehicle platform for company sized units with beyond line of sight reconnaissance and surveillance.
 - USCINCCENT identified the Agent Defeat Warhead, which provides potential benefits to friendly forces by neutralizing chemical and biological agents within targeted areas.
 - USCINCEUR identified the Quick Bolt program, which provides an enhanced capability to engage enemy air defenses in real-time and provides near-real time weapon impact assessments for theater tactical aircraft.
 - USCINCSpace identified a Special Access Program, which will be provided separately.
- I expect inputs from the Navy, Air Force, and remaining commands. Upon receipt of all submissions a complete response will be provided.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Bruce Carlson, USAF; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

Handwritten signature and date: RBM 3/14



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-162-02
6 February 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC

RBM/2/6

SUBJECT: Innovations

- In response to your comment (TAB) the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs have been tasked to identify key developmental programs planned for implementation during their respective tenures.
- I have asked the Service Chiefs for their input and will forward to you. Combatant commanders will discuss their initiative the next time they are in town or at a video teleconference.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Bruce Carlson, USAF; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

Action
3/20

April 3, 2002 5:42 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Forces Invitation

When the triple nickel Special Forces team comes back to the U.S., we might want to invite them to the Pentagon sometime. I believe they are the ones who led the charge on horseback. They were the first ones put in. They are the ones I saw in Bagram. They are the ones who gave me the flag they liberated from Kabul.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040302-22

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

000.1157

3 Apr 02

U11982 /02

April 2, 2002 7:36 AM

Larry Di Arr

TO: Tom White

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Training Holidays

Paul

Please take a look into this matter of "training holidays" or Fridays off. Let me know what it is about.

Please explain.

Thanks.

Attach.

03/26/02 MA and SMA response to SecDef

DHR:dh
032602-3

.....
Please respond by COB 4 Apr 02

200.1

2 Apr 02

U11983 /02



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON



INFO MEMO

April 24, 2002, 8:45 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ~~Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army~~

APR 24 2002

SUBJECT: Training Holidays

- In response to your note about "training holidays:"
 - ◆ The Army established a policy in 1999 of designating selected three-day, national holiday weekends as opportunities for local commanders to extend those weekends to four days. The net effect is that field training is not planned on those days, thus, allowing maximum opportunity for soldiers and civilians to secure authority to be absent.
- The purpose was, and continues to be, to:
 - ◆ Enhance the morale of soldiers, civilians, and families by adding predictability for personal and family time while managing hectic training schedules.
 - ◆ Enhance safety by providing more time for weekend holiday travel (reduce privately owned vehicle accidents).
 - ◆ Enhance retention (helped us recover from '98-'99 low point).
- "Training holidays" is merely a planning mechanism that has contributed enormously to morale, safety, and retention throughout the force. This is a great way to provide a little predictability to an otherwise demanding and fluid OPTEMPO.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: Note from Secretary Rumsfeld, Subj: Training Holidays, April 2, 2002

Prepared By: Colonel Joseph Schroedel,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA 4/20

SR MA GIAMBASTIANI

MA BUCCI

SECSEC WHITMORE 4/24

Printed on Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/10096

Attor

April 2, 2002 7:57 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: U.S. "Foreign Legion"

I would like you to pull together some folks and think through how the U.S. might fashion a peacekeeping unit. My guess is it would be mostly foreigners.

We would train them, probably fund part of it, and then make them available for peacekeeping operations as an adjunct to the Department of Defense, but not as part of our regular military. They might include trainers to train local people in the countries they go into how to do police work or border patrol, but only common non-military types of activities.

Here is an article on the subject. I have been thinking about for a couple of years. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/25/02 Peter Schweizer, "A Foreign Legion Could Answer USA's Military Needs," *USA Today*

DHR:dh
040202-9

.....

Please respond by 05/03/02

322

2 April

U11984 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10097

ated Press Online reported the murders the day they were committed, attributing the news to "a Cali police official." The only American newspaper account was a one-paragraph AP report in the March 17 Orlando (Fla.) Sentinel.

In response to my questions, the State Department said that the United States is "cooperating with Colombian authorities" in investigating the murders. In fact, the State Department has ignored Americans held prisoner and murdered in Colombia, dating back to three missionaries abducted by the FARC nine years ago and probably killed.

The missionaries' families have been frustrated in failing to receive a report needed to obtain death certificates. "These families have suffered enough and should not be held hostage to the bureaucratic indifference that would further delay this overdue notification," Dan Burton, chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, wrote the State Department on Dec. 15.

"Bureaucratic indifference" has been the watchword. With Reich's assumption of command delayed by the Democratic-controlled Senate, Clinton holdovers remain in key posts. News about the Cali killing was suppressed by the Bogota embassy on orders of Ambassador Anne Patterson, who held Latin American policymaking posts in the Clinton administration and was nominated for the Colombian post by Bill Clinton in his last months as president.

The decision at the White House not to extend the war on terrorism to Colombia has yet to be reversed. On March 6 a bipartisan resolution was introduced by the Republican chairman and senior Democrat on the House International Relations Committee—Reps. Henry Hyde (Ill.) and Tom Lantos (Calif.)—calling for a change in policy. "Any attack on an American citizen is an attack on America," George W. Bush has declared. So far, however, Colombia is excluded.

USA Today
March 25, 2002
Pg. 15

57. A Foreign Legion Could Answer USA's Military Needs

By Peter Schweizer

Now that Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan has been declared basically completed and a success, the next phase of the war on terrorism is set to begin. Which American troops will carry out this coming phase — and the next one, and the one after that?

Any fighting that needs to be done clearly will be in another exotic locale. As has been the case since the end of the Cold War, most of our armed forces need to be prepared to wage warfare in foreign lands populated by people with unusual languages and radically different cultures.

This is likely to tax the American military forces heavily. In fact, the leaders of our Pacific and European commands recently said that the war on terrorism has overtaxed our military and that we do not have enough troops to carry out all of our operations.

So we need to consider alternatives — such as starting an American foreign legion.

When U.S. forces performed peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, we were very short of soldiers who spoke Serbian or Croatian. When American soldiers went into Haiti, there were precious few who spoke Creole. Forces from the United States now based in Afghanistan are largely dependent on locals to translate and provide information on local customs.

One ally who has managed to overcome some of these problems is France. During peacekeeping duties in the Balkans, it had soldiers who spoke Serbian. In the Gulf War, it had Arab soldiers who knew the customs and spoke Arabic. When France operated in Africa, it had soldiers who were familiar with the area. The reason: Since 1831, it has maintained the enigmatic and legendary French Foreign Legion.

The concept behind the French Foreign Legion is simple: In exchange for five years

of service in the French military, soldiers from other countries are granted French citizenship. Commanded by French military officers, the force numbers about 8,000. It recruits about 1,700 people a year and can be very selective. The chance to get French citizenship is so attractive that people from around the world clamor to get in. Over the years, they have served France faithfully.

Since its founding, more than 30,000 in the legion have died in battle. In addition to serving in the Gulf War and in the Balkans, more recently the French Foreign Legion has conducted sensitive military operations in African countries such as Chad.

Contrary to the legend that violent criminals make up the ranks of the Foreign Legion, today's recruits are required to pass an Interpol security check and detailed security screening by French authorities. They also need to pass medical exams and psychological tests. Once in the unit, members are largely isolated from the general populace, limiting the possibility that one could somehow be a spy for one of France's enemies.

They also are required to abide by a strict code of ethics. Among the points: "Every Legionnaire is your brother-at-arms, irrespective of his nationality, race or creed." And, "in combat, you will act without passion and without hate; you will respect the vanquished enemy; you will never abandon your dead or wounded and never surrender your arms." The recruits also receive instruction in French history and culture.

If the United States created its own foreign legion, it could prove to be a valuable resource on the battlefield. Soldiers from the far corners of the world could provide valuable language skills and information about local customs and traditions. They could also provide valuable intelligence contacts around the world.

Many French recruits have chosen to return to their home countries to retire on their pensions. (It is said that one can live well in Morocco on a sergeant's pension.) Many of

these retirees maintain informal contacts with their former colleagues and are sometimes contacted for advice or information.

The French Foreign Legion has received some of the toughest assignments and is usually one of the first of the country's units to respond to hot spots around the world. The fact that it is a foreign legion means that the French government can give it particularly difficult assignments, knowing that it will be immune from some of the political pressures that usually come with assigning soldiers overseas. If the war on terrorism gets messy, this could prove to be helpful to any American president.

An American foreign legion would help an already stretched U.S. military. The war on terrorism now joins peacekeeping operations and other strategic responsibilities in placing demands on the armed forces. With military recruitment and retention rates still generally low, the Pentagon has increasingly needed to turn to reserves to make up for a manpower shortage, particularly during a time of crisis. This only further reduces retention rates as the families of reservists weigh the costs of extended times apart.

An American foreign legion of perhaps 8,000 troops could help in the war against terrorism, or take over peacekeeping operations or routine duties in, say, South Korea, thereby freeing up other units that might be needed. And creating an American foreign legion would bring added benefits to our immigration policy. Having received extensive instruction in American history and values while serving in combat for the United States, foreign legion members could prove to be model immigrant citizens.

The war on terrorism truly is a global war. If the United States is to fight it effectively, it must consider all of the options to make sure that it is a global effort.

Peter Schweizer is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

412
1130

Snowflake

OBT

April 2, 2002 7:50 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Secretary General Visit

I notice that Secretary General Robertson is coming in on April 9. I probably ought to see him over here at the Pentagon. If he meets with the President, I ought to be in that meeting.

Also, you should have our NATO folks prepare the things we want to talk to Robertson about, to get him going.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040202-17

NATO 091112

.....
Please respond by 03/05/02

4/2
Sec Def -
We're working.
I understand what you
want. Will be back w/
schedules. D. Rita
2 Apr 02

U11985 /02

WFO

April 2, 2002 6:41 AM

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

000.5

Attached is a paper on counterterrorism lessons that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
Bruce Hoffman and Kim Cragin, RAND, "Counterterrorism Lessons Learned" (undated)

DHR:dh
040202-5

.....

Please respond by _____

2 Apr 02

U11986 /02

A survey of the counterterrorism lessons learned from five countries' experiences covering five key functional areas leads to four principal conclusions.¹

1. Focus efforts at mid-level leaders in terrorist groups

Our analysis indicates that mid-level leaders are often more important than top decisionmakers to the long-term survival of a terrorist organization. Policies aimed at removing these mid-level leaders more effectively disrupt control, communications, and operations up and down the chain of command. In addition, such policies may also inhibit a group's long-term growth by eliminating the development of future leaders.

For example, Israel has often removed the top leadership of Hezbollah and Hamas. But this policy has not resulted in a dramatic decrease in terrorist attacks or the dissolution of either group. The mid-level leaders of Hezbollah, in particular, have been able to step easily into the new role of top decisionmakers. In the case of Hamas, Israel managed to deport almost its entire top-level leadership in 1992. But the removal of Hamas' top (relatively moderate) leaders served to radicalize the group. The mid-level leaders who stepped up in 1992 increased the use of suicide bombers to the extent that is seen in attacks against Israel today.

These examples affirm our conclusion that simply removing the top leaders of a terrorist group is often less effective than eliminating the mid-level. The success of a terrorist organization's operations and even perhaps its longevity often depends on the ability of the mid-level leaders to step into decision-making roles or to carry out operational objectives more than on the top leaders themselves.

Admittedly, the counterexample to this conclusion is the case of former-President Fujimori's targeting and subsequent arrest of Abimael Guzman, the top leader of the Sendero Luminoso (SL). In Peru, the explicit targeting of Guzman was one of the main characteristics of Fujimori's all-out war against terrorism between 1990 and 1993. Some analysts argue that Guzman's arrest precipitated a rapid internal collapse of the SL. But there is more to the story than just the arrest of Guzman and his central command; the key to this particular action is discussed in the next conclusion.

2. Delegitimize – do not just arrest or kill – the top leaders of terrorist groups

Although we concluded that the U.S. should redirect efforts to mid-level leaders, this does suggest that the U.S. should ignore the top leadership of terrorist groups. On the contrary, these top leaders occupy important and symbolic positions at the head of terrorist organizations that are often inextricably connected to their organizations' forward momentum and therefore existence. But because of this role that top leaders play in a terrorist organization, a public diplomacy campaign to discredit these leaders is as or even more important than their actual arrest or death.

¹ The five countries include Israel, the Philippines, Colombia, Peru, and the U.K. The five functional areas that we addressed are intelligence, disinformation, emergency legislation, targeting terrorist leaders and disrupting support networks. For more information see the forthcoming RAND report entitled, "Developing a U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy."

As mentioned previously, some analysts credit the arrest of Guzman for the fall of SL. But another, often overlooked, component of Fujimori's strategy was to discredit Guzman thoroughly before SL members and their support network. Fujimori did this by turning Guzman's own words against him, deliberately orchestrating public speeches in which Guzman first called for SL members to give up their weapons and then abruptly reversed himself, telling them instead to continue to fight against the government. These discrepancies essentially discredited Guzman, and SL lost all forward momentum.²

3. Focus on disrupting support networks and trafficking activities

A further measure involves targeting essential support and logistics networks. This tactic primarily entails focusing on the financiers and smugglers that help terrorist organizations access funds and purchase supplies in the black market. Attention is often focused on front organizations and individuals that provide money to terrorist organizations. Our analysis, however, indicates that it would be more advantageous to expand this approach and target the middlemen who (e.g.) purchase diamonds from terrorists on the black market, or individuals who (e.g.) sell weapons to terrorist organizations. This tactic is a more effective way of disrupting the everyday activities that a terrorist organization must engage in to maintain its operational capabilities. It hinders the ability of a group to gather resources and plan sophisticated attacks in advance because they cannot rely on a steady stream of money or other essential resources.³

For example, Colombian efforts to disrupt arms trafficking activities have been more successful than coca eradication. The Colombian military has managed to do the former by focusing intelligence and investigative resources on financiers and arms trafficking middlemen (external to the FARC itself). FARC communiqués and reported discussions have indicated that the organizational leadership has become increasingly concerned about the difficulty of getting necessary weapons into the country. It may be that the Colombian Armed Forces will be able to deprive FARC of crucial supplies sufficiently to impinge on the group's ability to expand or even to maintain control over territory in Colombia and therefore to conduct operations in the medium to long term.

4. Establish a dedicated counterintelligence center specifically to engage terrorist reconnaissance

More sophisticated terrorist groups do not attack people or places without a basic level of planning and reconnaissance.⁴ Therefore the greatest return on a counterterror investment arguably lies in the identification and disruption of pre-attack planning and logistical operations. A key means of achieving this is through the discernment of the terrorists' own intelligence-gathering processes. Yet none of the countries we surveyed had a counterintelligence unit dedicated to terrorist organizations. This misses an important opportunity for preempting a terrorist attack. Given the highly fluid and transnational nature of the threat that the United States is facing, we recommend that the U.S. establish a counterterrorism unit dedicated specifically to identifying and targeting the intelligence gathering and reconnaissance activities of terrorist organizations.

² Turkey achieved the same success after Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and leader of the Kurdish group, the PKK, was imprisoned.

³ This policy will not, however, have as dramatic an impact on groups that rely on less-sophisticated tactics in regions where it is easy to find explosives for rough devices.

⁴ There are examples of specific attacks claimed by terrorist groups, but that obviously did not entail forethought or reconnaissance. For example, in the spring of 2001 a Palestinian group called the "Battalions of Return" claimed a drive-by shooting in Bethlehem as a terrorist attack against the Israeli state.

April 2, 2002 6:31 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Loya Jirga

Here is a notice from Kabul asking for support for the Loya Jirga. Why don't we recommend they use contractors and that they use the money the donors' conference produced? We are busy. Unless there is some advantage that is going to accrue to us politically by doing it, in which case then we ought to weigh right in and do it.

Afghanistan

Thanks.

Attach.
AMEMBASSY KABUL Cable O 251151Z MAR 02, "Qun Requests USG Support Loya Jirga/Post Recommendations"

DHR:dh
040202-1

.....
Please respond by _____

2 April 02

U11987 /02

OTTUZYUW RUEHBUL0414 0841151-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251151Z MAR 02
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

SECDEF HAS BEEN

APR 01 2002

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0648
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0538
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0330
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0272
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0134
RUSEPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0264
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0244
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0159
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0222
BT
UNCLAS KABUL 000414

Per. Conkorski

E.O. 12958:QN/A
TAGS:QPREL, MOPS, AF

3/26
LARRY IS ON THE MAR

SUBJECT: QUN REQUESTS USG SUPPORT LOYA JIRGA/POST RECOMMENDATIONS

BRAHIMI REQUEST WIDE RANGE OF US SUPPORT

1. UNSGSR BRAHIMI DISCUSSED PREPARATIONS FOR THE LOYA JIRGA AT A MARCH 20 DINNER WITH AMBASSADOR AND SPECIAL ENVOY KHALILZAD. BRAHIMI SOUGHT US HELP WITH LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT FOR AIR TRANSPORT. HE ALSO SOUGHT HELP WITH OBSERVERS. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD BRAHIMI THAT THE WINDOW IS NARROWING. BRAHIMI AGREED. BRAHIMI WOULD LIKE EITHER THE CURRENT USAID-FUNDED LOGISTICIAN TO REMAIN THROUGH THE LOYA JIRGA PROCESS OR FOR ANOTHER PERSON TO COME AND REMAIN THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS.

2. THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED THE US COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE \$500,000 USD FOR AIR TRANSPORT AND SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER SEEKING MORE FUNDING TO ASSIST IN TRANSPORT EFFORTS.

WHAT THE UN SEEKS FOR THE LJB

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: / DEPSEC: / EPL ASST: X EXECSEC: / SR MA: /
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: / FILE: /
USDP: / DIA: / OTHER: /
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SECDEF.
- We are going to be asked to provide airlift to facilitate the Afghan elections. (see Jtab)
- If we are going to say "No, thank you," we should do so now when it will be a lot easier to make it stick.
- Perhaps you should ask Paul to raise it at a

Deputies meeting and get people thinking about alternatives.

D. R. T.

3. USAID DIRECTOR, USAID OFFICERS AND POLOFF FOLLOWED UP IN MARCH 21 AND 24 MEETINGS WITH BRAHIMI AND THOMAS RUTTIG (UNSMAs POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICER ATTACHED TO LJ). RUTTIG DESCRIBED THE LOYA JIRGA TIME TABLE:

MARCH 21/22	ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR CONVENING OF LJ
MARCH 24/30	TRAINING OF DISTRICT ELECTION SUPERVISORS
MAR 31/APR 13	PREPARATION FOR INDIRECT ELECTIONS
APR 14/MAY 18	CONDUCT INDIRECT ELECTIONS
MAY 19/25	VALIDATION OF DISTRICT DELEGATES
MAY 26/JUN 8	2ND PHASE ELECTIONS & SELECTION OF REGIONAL DELEGATES
JUN 9/15	VALIDATION OF ELECTED AND NOMINATED LJ MEMBERS
JUNE 16/22	CONVENING OF LJ

CURRENT USG ASSISTANCE TO LJC

4. USAID DESCRIBED CURRENT USG ASSISTANCE TO LOYA JIRGA PROCESS, CURRENTLY A LOGISTICIAN ATTACHED TO THE SPECIAL INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA (REFERRED TO AS "LOYA JIRGA COMMISSION" OR (LJC) IN REMAINDER OF DOCUMENT). UNSMA HAS WELCOMED THE USAID-FUNDED LOGISTICS SPECIALIST (LYNN THOMAS). THIS LOGISTICIAN IS HELPING THE LJC TO PREPARE A LOGISTICS PLAN TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT AND REGIONAL LEVEL ASPECTS OF THE LJ PROCESS. HOWEVER, THIS LOGISTICIAN IS ONLY AVAILABLE UNTIL THE SECOND WEEK IN APRIL.

5. UNSMA AND THE LJC WOULD WELCOME USAID SUPPORT TO PROVIDE A LONGER-TERM LOGISTICIAN TO WORK WITH THE PRESENT USAID LOGISTICIAN AND CONTINUE ON THROUGH THE END OF THE LJ PROCESS. USAID DIRECTOR KUNDER PROPOSED TO BRAHIMI THAT USAID IS WILLING TO SECOND A LONGER-TERM ADVISOR TO UNSMA/LJC FROM APRIL 1 THROUGH JUNE 30 TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOYA JIRGA AS WELL AS COORDINATE THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE U.S.GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE PACKAGE TO THE LJ PROCESS. BRAHIMI ALSO WELCOMED THE IDEA AND AGREED THAT UNSMA WOULD PROVIDE HOUSING AND IN-COUNTRY TRANSPORT FOR THE LONGER-TERM ADVISOR.

OTHER DONORS' SUPPORT

6. UNSMA PERSONNEL DESCRIBED GERMAN SUPPORT TO THE LJC. THE GERMANS, THROUGH GTZ, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVISION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND FOOD AND LODGING SUPPORT (PHASE 3) FOR THE FULL DELEGATION TO THE LOYA JIRGA CONVENTION IN KABUL OVER A 7 TO 10 DAY PERIOD, BEGINNING JUNE 15. GTZ WILL ALSO PROVIDE GROUND TRANSPORT FOR DELEGATES FROM THE 8 REGIONAL CENTERS TO KABUL EXCEPT WHERE SECURITY OR LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS WON'T PERMIT TRANSPORT BY ROAD.

7. UNSMA PERSONNEL ALSO DESCRIBED OTHER DONOR SUPPORT TO LJC: THE UK'S DFID IS PROVIDING \$500K EARMARKED THROUGH UNDP TRUST FUND TO SUPPORT THE LJ PROCESS. PRINCE KARIM AGA KHAN ANNOUNCED AT A PALACE LUNCH IN KABUL MARCH 23 THAT HE WOULD DONATE \$2M TO SUPPORT THE LOYA JIRGA PROCESS. OTHER DONORS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT THROUGH THE UNDP TRUST FUND. A MEETING BETWEEN USAID/KABUL AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN ON 24 MARCH SUGGESTS THAT THE JAPANESE ARE CONSIDERING A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE LJ PROCESS.

WHAT SHOULD THE US DO? POST RECOMMENDATIONS

8. EMBASSY KABUL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO LJC:

-- ACCORDING TO UNSMA/LJC, THE LIKELY NEED FOR USG ASSISTANCE INCLUDES LOGISTICAL, COMMUNICATION AND TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRAINERS AND MONITORS TO THE REGIONAL CENTERS AND DISTRICT CAPITALS DURING PHASE 1 (MAR 31 7 Q MAY 25), LOGISTICAL AND COMMUNICATION SUPPORT, TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR 2ND PHASE SELECTION (MAY 26 Q JUNE 9) OF DELEGATES AT THE 8 REGIONAL CENTERS (KABUL, KANDAHAR, HERAT, MAZAR E-SHERIF, JALLALABAD, KUNDUZ, BAMIYAN AND GARDEZ). NOTE. DELEGATIONS SELECTED AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRANGING FOR TRANSPORT TO REGIONAL CENTERS. END NOTE.

-- UNSMA ESTIMATES THAT THERE WILL BE 40 TEAMS OF TWO EACH (TRAINERS/MONITORS) TO SUPPORT THE ACTUAL SELECTION PROCESS AT THE DISTRICT AND THEN REGIONAL CENTERS. AN ESTIMATED 1,080 DELEGATES ARE TO BE SELECTED (ONE PER DISTRICT AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE DELEGATE PER 25,000 POPULATION) AS WELL AS SOME NOMINATED DELEGATES (INCLUDING UP TO 200 WOMEN). IN ADDITION, UNSMA/LJC MAY ALSO REQUIRE THE IDENTIFICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WITH LOCAL LANGUAGE CAPABILITY WHO WOULD BECOME PART OF THE MONITORING PROCESS. LIKELY USG SUPPORT FOR THESE EFFORTS MIGHT INCLUDE UP TO 8

HELICOPTERS AND 2 TO 4 FIXED WING AIRCRAFT,
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT FOR MONITORING TEAMS (HF,
VHR RADIOS, SOME SATPHONES), TENTS, PROVISION OF
FOOD. THE USAID LOGISTICIAN NOW WORKING AT THE LJC
PLANS TO HAVE A DRAFT LOGISTICS PROGRAM BY WEEK OF
MARCH 25. USAID RECOMMENDS THAT IT WOULD BE MORE
APPROPRIATE TO WORK THROUGH AN ORGANIZATION THAT
SPECIALIZES IN PROVIDING A COMPLETE AIR OPERATIONS
PACKAGE WITH A PROVEN TRACK RECORD IN WORKING IN
CONFLICT ZONES RATHER THAN THROUGH SOME NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE EXPRESSED AN
INTEREST IN THIS ASPECT TO UNSMA.

*US AID says
use government and
not contractors*

-- USAID IS ASKING UNSMA/LJC IF ADDITIONAL
ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING AND DEPLOYING
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WITH LOCAL LANGUAGE
CAPABILITY IS ALSO REQUIRED. SUPPORT FOR A LOGISTICS
PACKAGE AND INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, IF REQUIRED,
WOULD BE FUNDED OUT OF THE PROPOSED \$3 MILLION IN
ESF THAT STATE IS PROPOSING TO TRANSFER TO USAID.

-- USAID HAS RECEIVED PROPOSALS FROM TWO U.S. NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Q THE ASIA FOUNDATION
(TAF) AND THE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION
SYSTEMS (IFES), WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH
UNSMA POTENTIAL WAYS IN WHICH THEY COULD SUPPORT
UNSMA IN VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE LJ PROCESS. BEFORE
USAID FORMALLY REVIEWS SUCH PROPOSALS, IT IS WRITING
UNSMA TO CLARIFY THE TYPES OF SUPPORT THAT UNSMA/LJC
REQUIRES IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORS OR
OBSERVERS DURING THE LJ PROCESS. USAID WOULD ONLY
BE INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING ONE OF THESE PROPOSALS
ON A MORE LIMITED BASIS AND ONLY FOR THE UNMET AND
URGENT NEEDS OF THE LJC.

-- ADDITIONAL USG SUPPORT FROM EXISTING USAID
PROGRAMS COULD INCLUDE SUPPORT TO THE AIA TO PROVIDE
NATION-WIDE COVERAGE FOR RADIO KABUL TO PROVIDE THE
AIA WITH THE CAPACITY TO DISSEMINATE TIMELY/RELEVANT
INFORMATION REGARDING THE LJ PROCESS AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE BONN AGREEMENT (THROUGH TEMPORARY
BOOSTING OF TRANSMISSION BY EXTERNAL TRANSMITTERS),
REHABILITATION OF BUILDINGS TO BE UTILIZED AT
DISTRICT AND REGIONAL CENTERS, AND OTHER CRITICAL
NEEDS IDENTIFIED BY AIA/LJC.

-- OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS COULD ALSO BE
SUPPORTED IN VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE LJ PROCESS,
INCLUDING DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO ENHANCE
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS AND PREPARATION
OF RADIO MESSAGES.

9. MAJOR SECURITY CONCERN: LJC IS CONCERNED ABOUT
SECURITY IN SOME OF THE DISTRICTS AND WOULD LIKE TO

IDENTIFY SOME OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO PROVIDE SECURITY DURING THE 2ND PHASE (SELECTION OF NATIONAL DELEGATES AT REGIONAL CENTERS). UNSMA/LJC REQUESTED ISAF TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE BUT ISAF REJECTED THE REQUEST AS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ITS MANDATE. WE BELIEVE THAT SECURITY ISSUES WILL COME FURTHER TO THE FORE AS THE LOYA JIRGA PROCESS PROCEEDS.

FINN
BT

JOINT STAFF V1		2
ACTION	(U,8)	
INFO	NMCC:CWO(*) CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JSAMS(*) JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(*) AF-CC-POLAD(*) BOARDMAN(*) NOOH(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) EMDO(*)	
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Action
3/17

April 2, 2002 3:15 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Invite Fahim Kahn

Afghanistan

Zal wants me to invite Fahim Kahn, the MoD for the Interim Authority of Afghanistan, to Washington, D.C. He would probably end up going to Fort Bragg and CENTCOM, and maybe Norfolk.

Zal recommends the end of May. I think it is a good idea for a lot of reasons, which I can explain to you.

Please see me on calendar.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040202-26

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Please respond by 04/05/02

2 Apr 02

U11988 /02

Action
5/13

April 2, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Strategic Influence

092

Here is an article on strategic influence. What are you doing about reestablishing the activities we had to discontinue, only in a proper way and with the proper charter?

Thanks.

Attach.

04/22/02 J. Michael Waller, "Losing a Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Insight Magazine*

DHR:dh
040202-18



Please respond by 04/19/02

2 Apr 02

U11989 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10110

of Islamic militant organizations in Pakistan.

Fatah himself first traveled to Pakistan in 1989, and even to Afghan training camps of the mujahideen, though he says he didn't have the stomach – literally – for the hard life of guerrillas.

The Al Qaeda-Kurdish ties appear to have grown closer by the summer of 2000, when Al Qaeda was well established, and Jund al-Islam was taking root in Kurdistan. Fatah was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, when he heard about a high-level delegation of Iraqi Kurdish militants. He says a friend introduced him to Abu Wa'el and two other Jund al-Islam leaders. They were staying in the guest house of a Taliban minister known for his support of Arab jihadists in Afghanistan, and were surprised when Fatah and his Iraqi friend showed up.

"They wanted to present themselves as a jihad group, and they were concentrating on Al Qaeda," Fatah says, recalling a conversation that took place in his presence. "They said they had already received money once from Abu Qatada, to elicit more support from Al Qaeda." Abu Qatada is a London-based sheikh who went underground earlier this year, and has been convicted in a Jordanian court of conspiring to attack US and Israeli interests.

Fatah says the delegation said they met Abu Hafas al-Masri, bin Laden's No. 2 and military aide, but that bin Laden rarely met with such groups. Uneasy about being identified by fellow Iraqis in Afghanistan – even though analysts say that three of Al Qaeda's top 20 leaders were Iraqis – Fatah says that Abu Wa'el and the others talked little about the details of their mission.

One reason they were leery of attracting the attention of fellow Iraqis may have been clandestine support for the Kurdish Islamists from the Baghdad regime. Qassem Hussein Mohamed, a big-boned, mustachioed Saddam lookalike who says he worked for Baghdad's Mukhabarat intelligence for two decades, says that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has

clandestinely supported Ansar al-Islam for several years.

"[Ansar] and Al Qaeda groups were trained by graduates of the Mukhabarat's School 999 – military intelligence," says Mr. Mohamed, who agreed to be interviewed separately in the Sulaymaniyah interrogation room. As with Fatah, there were no apparent signs that he had been compelled to speak, and Kurdish investigators say they are convinced – based on other, confirmable parts of his story – that he is a Mukhabarat agent.

"My information is that the Iraqi government was directly supporting [Al Qaeda] with weapons and explosives," he says. "[Ansar] was part of Al Qaeda, and given support with training and money."

Saddam's 'overt' help

Saddam Hussein did not create Ansar al-Islam, though Mohamed compared Baghdad's role to the overt help Iraq gives the anti-Iran Mujahideen e-Khalq forces, which are known to be completely controlled by Iraqi intelligence within Iraq's borders.

Among other known Ansar leaders, Mohamed says Abu Wa'el was the most influential, was on the Iraqi intelligence payroll, and served as a liaison between Baghdad and Al Qaeda. Mohamed says his own mission to northern Iraq – during which he was detained by the PUK – is proof of that link. "After America attacked Afghanistan, Baghdad lost contact with [Abu Wa'el]," Mohamed says. "They sent me to check out Abu Wa'el, to make sure he was not dead or captured, and to reestablish contact."

Mohamed says PUK intelligence operatives apparently had been following him for some time, and clearly knew he was trying to contact the militants in northern Iraq.

The possibility of Iraq's support for Ansar – if only to destabilize the Kurdish territory that exists beyond Baghdad's control – does not surprise Kurdish officials. They note that President Hussein has recently embraced Islamic groups, and pays \$10,000 each to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel, to solidify his credentials. Sup-

porting Ansar, too, may provide Hussein with a way to get at his Kurdish enemies.

"There has been a marked change in Saddam's thinking in the past five years," says Hoshiyar Zebari, a senior Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) official, regarding Baghdad's shift from hardline secularism, to backing Islamists.

"[Ansar] are local, home-grown Islamic terrorists, inspired by Al Qaeda and bin Laden. They think the main enemy is the US, and that Islam can't be free unless they get rid of blasphemous groups and infidels, which they consider the KDP and PUK to be," Mr. Zebari says. "Saddam's intelligence is very good at penetrating small groups."

Which is exactly what has happened to Ansar, says former Mukhabarat operative Mohamed. "The government does not like this 'safe haven,' and wants to destroy and destabilize everyone, everywhere," Mohamed says. "They are using [Ansar] as a base to destabilize northern Iraq, and assassinate and kill people. Baghdad will never give up supporting them."

Several additional reports – unconfirmed – have surfaced, alleging that Ansar leaders are sheltering senior Al Qaeda figures who slipped across the border from Iran, after fleeing Afghanistan.

But Sheikh Sadiq Abdulaziz, the deputy leader of the IMK – now weakened by the loss of breakaway factions – denies there is any link to bin Laden other than the group draws its inspiration from him.

"People who see Osama on television and hear Osama, want to be like Osama," Sheikh Sadiq says in his Halabja office. Ahson Ali Abdulaziz, one of the leaders of Ansar, is the nephew of Sheikh Sadiq and the son of IMK leader Mullah Ali Abdulaziz.

Some downplay Ansar's tactics

Despite these ties, some Kurdish and local Islamic leaders downplay the Ansar threat and argue that Ansar has forsaken violence.

"In Islam, we want to be martyrs, but we can't make a battle against our own people," the sheikh says, dismissing as

"rumors" reports that Arabs and Al Qaeda fighters are among the militants. "[Ansar] has changed their name, their ideas, and methods."

PUK leader Jalal Talabani says that the collapse of Al Qaeda and Taliban rule will ultimately weaken the group. "Before, when there was Afghanistan, all these groups thought they had a base," he says, hurriedly clicking a set of prayer beads between his fingers. "They lost this hope, and are isolated. Now they are desperate. We are in negotiations with them – that the Arabs must leave. We want to solve it peacefully. We are giving them a chance."

Insight Magazine

April 22, 2002

9. Losing A Battle For Hearts And Minds

By J. Michael Waller

Will the U.S. military's hard-fought gains against international terrorists be undermined because the people back in Washington still don't understand how to win hearts and minds? That's what some supporters of President George W. Bush are beginning to fear as the U.S. government finds itself incapable of waging effective public-diplomacy and political-warfare campaigns abroad. And this just as the military side of the war on terrorism promises to take more difficult and contentious turns.

Across the federal government, the situation is the same: A national-security and foreign-policy bureaucracy that is managing the military and diplomatic dimensions of the war effectively is bumbling and botching the crucial information campaigns around the world needed to discredit terrorists and their supporters and foster support for the military effort. The United States may be managing its relations with governments adequately, but it is not yet winning the hearts and minds of the peoples.

The State Department has a huge public-diplomacy apparatus designed to reach foreign populations, but it appears incapable of effective mobilization. The Pentagon has yet to

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
HCS/151/1X1

Action
5-13

April 1, 2002 2:11 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *WR*
SUBJECT: Warlords

It seems to me the interagency group ought to have a plan for how we are going to deal with each of these warlords—who is going to get money from whom, on what basis, in exchange for what, what is the quid pro quo, etc.

000,5

We need to have a plan. The Russians do, and the Iranians do, but the United States doesn't.

Let's get on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
NESAF IA 2002-20039CH

DHR:dh
040102-33

.....

Please respond by 04/19/02

1 Apr 02

~~NOFORN~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/10112

U11990 /02

Action
3-13

April 1, 2002 2:07 PM

W
D
E

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Standing Joint Force Headquarters

Please take a look at this memo from CINCEUR about the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It sounds to me like he is leaning forward.

Would you take a look at it, find out precisely what is being done—if it is good, draft something from me to him saying it is terrific. If it is not quite as good as it ought to be, draft something for me to let him know that.

If it is worth telling others about, draft something from me to the rest of the CINCs, so they can see what CINCEUR is doing.

Thanks.

Attach.

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE Cable P 231033Z MAR 02, "Standing Joint Force Headquarters"

DHR:dh
040102-32



Please respond by 04/19/02

1 APR 02

U11991 /02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

APR 01 2002

PAAUZYUW RUFGCIN0549 0821043-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUFTMCA2162 0821034
P 231033Z MAR 02
FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECCC
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHMFISS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC ✓
RUBDPLA/USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//CC ✓

Handwritten initials: "SL" and a circled "D".

Handwritten initials: "SOS", "350", and "M/23".

UNCLAS

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD FROM GENERAL RALSTON, INFO GENERAL FULFORD, GENERAL MYERS, AND GENERAL KERNAN

SUBJECT: STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SJFHQ) (U)

POC/ZILMER/BG/DSN 421-4040/-/PATCH BKS/DRSN 421-2101//

RMKS/1. (U) MR. SECRETARY, EUCOM IS VIGOROUSLY INCORPORATING YOUR FY-03 DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG) DIRECTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS (SJFHQ) TO PROVIDE A MORE EFFICIENT WAY TO RESPOND TO TODAY'S GLOBAL CONTINGENCIES. WE HAVE CLOSELY EXAMINED THE MODEL ESTABLISHED BY JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND ARE IN CONSTANT COORDINATION WITH THEM AS WE DEVELOP OUR EUCOM SJFHQ MODEL.

2. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR GUIDANCE IN THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE DPG, WE ARE ORGANIZING A SJFHQ THAT 1) WILL EFFECTIVELY PLAN FOR RAPID AND ACCURATE U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE AGAINST FIXED AND MOBILE TARGETS AT VARYING DEPTHS; 2) DEVELOPS TRAINING PLANS AND EXERCISES THAT PREPARE OUR WARFIGHTERS TO QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY EXECUTE OUR PLANS, WITH OR WITHOUT A SUBORDINATE JTF HEADQUARTERS; 3) LEVERAGES NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE JOINT TRAINING AND ASSESSMENT; AND 4) POSITIONS EUCOM TO EFFICIENTLY IMPORT AND DISSEMINATE THE STANDARDIZED JOINT C4ISR CONSTRUCT NOW BEING DEVELOPED AND TESTED BY JFCOM.

3. (U) OUR TIMELINE ALLOWS US TO DEVELOP A WORKABLE EUCOM MODEL BEFORE 01 OCTOBER 2002 BY REPROGRAMMING MANPOWER POSITIONS IN THE EUCOM STAFF THAT ARE BEST SUITED TO FUNCTION WITHIN THIS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. WE ARE FOLLOWING THE FY-03 DPG BY UTILIZING OUR 15 PERCENT MANPOWER REDUCTION AS A RESOURCE TO STAND UP THE SJFHQ.

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: [initials] SPL ASST: [initials] EXECSEC: [initials] SR MA: _____
C&D: [initials] CCD: [initials] CABLE CH: _____ FILE: _____
[initials] USDP: [initials] DIA: _____ OTHER: _____
MILPER: _____ PER SEC: _____ COMM: _____

April 1, 2002 11:13 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: First to Deploy

Date 7/8

470

The more I look at those briefings, we have to make clear that everyone need not be a first deployer. It sure saves money if everyone is not a first deployer.

Thanks.

DHR.dh
040102-19

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

*Copy
pls
(TIRED
READINESS)*

1 Apr 02

U11992 /02

5/13

April 1, 2002 10:56 AM

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Andrew Sullivan

7/5

Done

I understand Andrew Sullivan has a website that gets a lot of hits. He is someone I have met over the years, and he seems to make a lot of good sense to me. You might want to include him in something sometime.

231.2

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-17

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

1 Apr 02

U11993 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10117

April 1, 2002 9:31 AM

080

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stackpole

Please have someone look into the Stackpole operation out in Hawaii—how much longer does he have, how can we get rid of him, who could we put in to replace him, and how can we start cleaning that up by getting the people who are there out of there and putting some decent people in who will do a good job.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-8

.....

Please respond by 04/26/02


1APR02

U11994 /02

Action
5-13

April 1, 2002 9:07 AM

334 DSB

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: DSB

Please make sure that the Defense Science Board has a project going on the interface between biological science and electronics and information warfare.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-5



Please respond by 04/26/02

1A PRO2

U11995 /02

Action Complete 4-4

April 1, 2002 10:32 AM

350.09

TO: VADM Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Signature

Have I signed the "Back to Black" program for the NRO? George Tenet signed it, and I don't know if I have.

Also, there is a white folder that came over from someplace that George Tenet wants me to sign as well. Have I signed that?

THIS IS THE "BACK TO BLACK" PROGRAM DOCUMENT THAT CAMBONE GAVE YOU IN A WHITE BINDER 4/4

Thanks.

A-5

DHR:dh
040102-12

.....

BRIEFED AT 1630 on 4/1/02

.....
SIGNED

Please respond by _

Si

"BACK TO BLACK" YET. CAMBONE WILL BRING IT IN TODAY AT 4:30 FOR YOUR SIGNATURE.

V/R

Ed

1 APR 02

Action
5-13

April 1, 2002 10:35 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel Priorities

35009

What do I do next on PDD-35 and priorities for the intel community?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-14

.....
Please respond by 04/12/02

1APR02

U11997 /02

Action
5-13

April 1, 2002 9:07 AM

352

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Army School of Advanced Military Studies

Please talk to Andy Marshall, and come back to me with a proposal on how we make the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, which trains planners, a joint activity.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-6

.....
Please respond by 05/02/02

1 APR 02

U11998 /02

April 1, 2002 6:51 PM

4/1/02 6:51 PM

326

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mobilization of Reserves

Don't you think the DPG ought to address the subject that the Army is currently arranged so that they have to mobilize to do anything, since they have put some critical elements into the Reserves and Guard? I think they said the Navy or the Air Force did the same thing.

We have to get that fixed. Now is the time to put it in the DPG.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-53

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

DELONNIE
AIR FORCE
did, not
Navy.

1 APR 02

U11999 /02

Action

April 1, 2002 6:53 PM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Availability of Reserves

326

I think we also ought to look into that subject that came up about the Guard and Reserve, and whether we even want Guard and Reserve available only after 120 or 180 days. I would rather have fewer forces capable of responding faster, not more not capable of doing anything for six months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-54



Please respond by 04/26/02

1 Apr 02

U12000 /02

513

April 1, 2002 6:35 PM

TO: Torie Clarke

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone
J.D. Crouch

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Policy

Done

A/S

A-491.61

Attached is a piece by Barry Blechman that is well worth reading. You might want to move it around to some folks. Here is a person who worked in the Carter Administration in arms control commenting favorably on the Nuclear Posture Review.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/18/02 Barry Blechman, "New Nuclear Policy Makes for a Safer World," *Los Angeles Times*

DHR:dh
040102-48

.....

Please respond by _____

1 Apr 02

U12001 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10125

COMMENTARY

New Nuclear Policy Makes for a Safer World

By BARRY M. BLECHMAN

Barry M. Blechman was assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1980.

March 18 2002

The Bush administration's new nuclear policy has received a great deal of criticism over its suggestion that U.S. nuclear weapons play a role in deterring hostile nations that don't possess nuclear weapons but are armed with other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

The criticism--that the new policy lowers the bar for use of nuclear weapons--is misplaced. In fact, by linking U.S. nuclear and conventional precision strike capabilities, the policy narrows the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy, reduces the circumstances in which they might be used and sets the stage for even deeper cuts in nuclear forces.

The planned reduction in nuclear warheads deployed with operational submarines, bombers and land-based missiles--from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200--is quite an accomplishment. It will decrease the cumulative risk of technical mishaps and unauthorized or inadvertent launches, and it should reassure the Russians politically by moving the U.S. to a force level that Russia appears to be seeking itself. Critics of the new policy have complained that many of the warheads coming off U.S. forces will be placed in reserve rather than dismantled

immediately. Getting 4,000 warheads off alert is very important in its own right. It would take time to put the weapons back on missiles or into active bomber inventories. Given the international furor that would accompany such a move, no president would take it without very serious reason.

Meanwhile, having the option to beef up U.S. forces is only sensible given the uncertainties of world events. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said, when it comes to international threats "the only surprise is that we're surprised when we're surprised."

Weapon and stockpile requirements are reviewed periodically. If international developments continue favorably, either further reductions in operational weapons or the destruction of stockpiled weapons would certainly be possible.

The new policy recognizes that Russia is no longer our enemy, and there is no longer a need to plan for massive attacks against that nation. It would move the U.S. away from a single, integrated operational plan for nuclear attacks to "capabilities-based targeting." Instead of massive, society-destroying nuclear strikes, the U.S. would plan to have capabilities to conduct limited nuclear

strikes aimed at specific objectives. In its classified form, the policy mentioned nations for which planners need to prepare such options, causing a furor.

The only thing new here from previous administrations is that the names of the nations leaked out.

In its most important development, the new defense policy pairs U.S. nuclear forces with precise, conventional strike capabilities. In this formulation, the new policy greatly circumscribes the potential role of nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the immense capabilities of modern aircraft and missiles armed with conventional weapons, the new policy implies that for the first time in 50 years the U.S. may not have to respond to nuclear threats in kind. We may be able to defeat such threats by attacking enemies with conventional weapons, relying on missile defenses to stop any threatening forces that survive. This is a huge change in thinking, allowing for even more nuclear-force reductions as conventional strike and missile defense capabilities advance.

Administration officials have a way to go before the new policy is fulfilled. They have to work closely with the U.S. Strategic Command to ensure that the planned changes in targeting are implemented properly. The nuclear departures of more than one previous administration have been thwarted in their implementation phase. And the administration will have to move expeditiously to set in place the transparency measures and other arrangements to reassure the Russians and others that the shift from negotiated arms control agreements to unilateral reductions in forces is not a subterfuge.

These steps notwithstanding, the new policy is a major accomplishment and an important advance toward ending nuclear dangers.

Snowflake

5/13

April 1, 2002 2:20 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Korea

Korea

It looks like they delayed this South Korean fighter decision, which means we may not want to go ahead with my trip to Korea.

Thanks.

Attach.
03/27/02 Reuters Update, P27890

DHR:dh
040102-34

.....

Please respond by 04/12/02

1 Answer

U12002 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10128

rap-uf BC-ARMS-KOREA-FIGHTER
Story: a5730

Time: 2002 03/27 02:53 GMT
Ref:

^BC-ARMS-KOREA-FIGHTER (UPDATE 1)@

^UPDATE 1-S.Korea delays \$4 bln fighter jet order-official@
(Adds news conference schedule, details, paragraphs 4,6-8,10)
SEOUL, March 27 (Reuters) - South Korea postponed the announcement of a \$4-billion fighter aircraft deal on Wednesday following a meeting of the influential National Security Council (NSC), a senior government official said.

Boeing Co's F-15K and the Rafale from France's Dassault Aviation SA lead a four-way battle to supply 40 fighters to South Korea.

Defence Minister Kim Dong-shin delivered technical evaluations of the four to the NSC but a final decision would require further review, the official, who declined to be identified, told Reuters.

It was not clear when the decision would be taken.

The ministry said a news conference about the fighter aircraft project would be held at 1 p.m. (0400 GMT).

Boeing spokesman Arthur Park said by telephone the company had received no official word from the NSC meeting.

South Korea's plans for the programme date back to the mid-1990s and bidding has sparked almost two years of fierce competition.

Industry officials said the next stage involves evaluating South Korea's defence and trade alliances, which local media said might favour U.S. maker Boeing, given close defence ties between Washington and Seoul.

There are 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

The Typhoon from Eurofighter the Russian Sukhoi Su-35 are the other two fighters on offer.

A Eurofighter official said the European industrial consortium had not been informed of the NSC meeting's outcome.

(Additional reporting by Lee Suwan)

^ REUTERS@


Caru

DEF HAS SEEN

APR 01 2002

Know
413

April 1, 2002 5:46 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Steve Cambone
J.D. Crouch
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Russia

Russia

I keep seeing everywhere what the Russians say they find unacceptable with our proposals.

I think we ought to develop a careful list of all the things we find unacceptable with their proposals and why we are concerned about their production capability, why we are concerned about their stockpiles, why we are concerned about transparency. We need push back.

Please get something to me in the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040102-45



Please respond by 04/05/02

1 Apr 02

U12003 /02

Snowflake

8:22 AM

ON FILE
IN DCS Binder

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: **Haiti**

Why don't we find some way to reduce down the number of military people in Haiti, if we can. Get me a proposal, please.

Haiti

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030402.07

Please respond by: _____ *3/4/02*

4 Mar 02

U12027 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10131

318 software
6/30

3:39 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
DATE: March 1, 2002
SUBJECT: Salt Lake City

Done 4/2

3533

Find out the extent to which we have cut back the security at Salt Lake City from the regular Olympics to the Para-Olympics.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030102.10

Please respond by: _____

3/8
To: Pete Verga -
Sec White ought to touch on this at the next HLS update if it's an issue. Otherwise, short note will do. D. Rita
Mraz

U12039 /02

3:42 PM

Answer
to 3/13

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 1, 2002
SUBJECT:

We have to make sure the security people know that before we designate another event like the Olympics or the Para-Olympics as a national security event, that I get to have a chance to voice an opinion. We also have to have a cost estimate fully burdened before we do it.

353.8

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030102.11

Please respond by: _____

/ Mar 02

U12040 /02

3/4 snowflake
500

Action
3/3

March 1, 2002 9:17 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Homeland Security Meetings

3
3
1

From now on I want to know about every Homeland Security meeting, and I want to personally decide whether or not I go.

I am the member, and I am going to make new decisions. We have the wrong people representing us, and it is not working.

Please see me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030102-15



Please respond by 03/08/02

3/7
Col Bucci -
Let, discuss.
D. R.

1 Mar 02

U12041 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10134

March 1, 2002 7:49 AM

SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAR 13 2002

TO: VADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PIWC

383

Please tell me how long we have been looking for Karadic as a war criminal.

There has been a sealed indictment for some time.

The UBL thing is interesting. They say, "Why don't you catch him?" We have been looking for Karadic for years.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030102-3

.....
Please respond by 03/08/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN 3/4

SECDEF- MAR 13 2002
RADOVAN KARADIC WAS INDICTED
ON 24 JULY, 1995. WE HAVE
BEEN SEARCHING FOR HIM
SINCE THEN, ALMOST 7 YEARS!

Mar 02

v/r
ED

U12043 /02

Reton
to 3/3

March 1, 2002 7:42 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quote

Please see me on this quote, "I'm too busy"—about seeing the Chinese.

China

Thanks.

Attach.
03/01/02 Gertz, "Inside the Ring," *Washington Times*

DHR:dh
030102-2



Please respond by 03/05/02

1 March

U12044 /02

let the U.S. military directly aid Colombian President Andres Pastrana in his new war against FARC. Now, most aid is limited to anti-narcotics operations and cannot be used for anti-insurgency missions.

Most of FARC's arms come from Middle East weapons bazaars. But U.S. intelligence has not linked the arms shipments to any particular regime.

Time gap

Insiders in the Bush administration are talking about the "six-hour gap" — the time it took U.S. officials to endorse Colombian President Andres Pastrana's decision last week to end peace talks and go to war against FARC.

As country after country issued statements last week endorsing Mr. Pastrana's bold move, Washington stayed silent. Finally, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told reporters the United States supported the Colombian president.

"We were behind every Latin American country in voicing support," one official told us. "Even France offered support before we did."

Sources said the delay was not because of reluctance at the Pentagon or State Department. A formal position statement got bogged down at the White House National Security Agency staff. It "couldn't get its act together," an insider said.

Snubbing Beijing

China's Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing got the cold shoulder from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld earlier this month.

Mr. Li, a noted hard-line communist who once served as ambassador to the United States, had asked specifically to meet with Mr. Rumsfeld at the Pentagon on Feb. 4.

The answer from Mr. Rumsfeld: "I'm too busy."

Mr. Li did meet with Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

The defense secretary, however, is said to have little interest in schmoozing with any Chinese officials after the manner in which Beijing han-

dled the April 1 incident over the South China Sea.

We are told he is still angry over the incarceration of 23 U.S. military personnel after the incident. A Chinese interceptor jet cut off a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane and nearly killed its crew in a midair collision. The crew made an emergency landing on Hainan island, where instead of getting help, they were imprisoned for 11 days.

Mr. Rumsfeld cut off all formal U.S. military exchanges with China as a result and, despite pressure from pro-China officials in the Pentagon, is resisting calls to restart the exchanges. Critics dismiss the contacts as one-sided in favor of bolstering Chinese war-fighting capabilities through access to sensitive U.S. military facilities.

A spokesman for Mr. Rumsfeld had no immediate comment. Another Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Cmdr. Jeff Davis, also would not comment on why Mr. Rumsfeld did not meet Mr. Li. But he said "the appropriate level" for any meeting would have been a session with Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was out of the country at the time.

SouthCom

U.S. Southern Command, one of the Pentagon's war-fighting commands, has been in the doldrums of late, military officers tell us.

All the action in the war on terrorism resides in other areas, such as U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command.

The Miami-based command also has been without a four-star CINC, or commander in chief, since President Bush picked Marine Gen. Peter Pace to be Joint Chiefs of Staff vice chairman.

"SouthCom does not have a wartime focus," said an active-duty officer. "They haven't dealt with a real military crisis in quite a while and it shows."

But things may be looking up. Some administration officials are pushing for a more active U.S. military role in the war against FARC, a terrorist group in Colombia committed to kidnappings, running drug operations and overthrowing

democracies. If that happens, SouthCom will lead the way.

Also, we hear Mr. Bush will nominate a four-star general to succeed Gen. Pace. There had been talk that SouthCom would diminish in stature and be run permanently by a three-star officer.

Anti-Bush envoy

The administration is set to announce its long-delayed choice for top U.S. diplomat in Taiwan: Douglas Paal.

The appointment of Mr. Paal is opposed by conservatives who object to his recent statements that are viewed as pro-China and anti-Taiwan. In June, Mr. Paal said in a speech that President Bush "misspoke" in saying last spring that the United States would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack.

Mr. Paal's remark was viewed by many observers as an attempt to usurp the president on the issue of Taiwan. It was the most blatant of a series of efforts by advocates of "engagement" with Beijing, including Mr. Paal, to try to scale back the president's hard-line commitment to defending Taiwan.

Mr. Paal said that after the president "misspoke," administration spokesmen had showed "moderation in reverting to the one-China policy," that is, Beijing's view of Taiwan as part of communist China.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney showed no such moderation, however. Mr. Cheney said several days after the president's remarks that the statement was calculated "to reiterate that very strong determination on our part, that there should not be a resort to force by the mainland."

A U.S. official told us the Paal appointment has been pushed by James Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, with backing from Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.

The last hurdle for the appointment is said to be Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who still has reservations about sending Mr. Paal to Taipei to represent U.S. interests, the official said.

Bored media

Liberal Democrats are not the only ones growing bored with President Bush's war on terrorism. The Washington media also seems tired of writing about the latest clash with al Qaeda, say administration officials. Purported bombing mistakes and the well-being of terrorist prisoners make front-page news. Some columnists suddenly do not like the Pentagon helping Hollywood produce war movies — as if director Frank Capra never asked the U.S. military for input during many of his World War II films.

The media's anti-Pentagon mood has rankled Richard J. Santos, national commander of the 2.8-million-member American Legion.

"Today's media appears to be more interested in finding fault and being first to break the story," Mr. Santos said.

He adds: "The military and the entertainment industry have long joined hands — not for sinister reasons, but to call together loyal Americans to support their government's wartime efforts."

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough are Pentagon reporters.

Tacoma News Tribune

February 28, 2002

10. 'Stryker' Is Name Army Selects For New Light Armored Vehicles

Two heroes: Medal of Honor recipients' valor is memorialized

By Michael Gilbert, The News Tribune

Call it the Stryker.

The Army hailed the memory of Medal of Honor recipients from World War II and Vietnam to christen its newest combat vehicle Wednesday.

Soldiers at Fort Lewis said the name is a keeper.

"For me, Stryker will be like, 'Strike hard at the heart of the enemy,'" said Staff Sgt. Patrick Betts, a squad leader with the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry.

At first dozens, and then hundreds of the new light armored vehicles soon will arrive at Fort Lewis to be the

8:36 AM

Done 3/14

TO: Torie Clarke
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 2, 2002
SUBJECT: **Pre-September 11th**

Why don't you try to pull together some of the statements I made before September 11th about the problems with terrorism and asymmetrical threats and the importance of defense, and just three or four or five. Where I said them, the need for intelligence capabilities and so forth. And the general feeling was that there was really not much of a problem in our country.

000,5

Then we had September 11th and people see the problem.

Interestingly, now it is starting again. A very small minority are starting to suggest that there is no problem and starting to carp and complain about the budget and various things, and the unfortunate reality is that there is a problem and it is going to happen again, and we best be wise enough to behave before the fact in a responsible way.

R. Mace

Thank you.

DIR/azn
030202.04

U12045 /02

Please respond by: _____

TO: SECDEF
FROM: Torie
DATE: March 7, 2002
SUBJECT: Pre-September 11th

I asked our researchers to pull together the statements you wanted.
Attached are five examples and some pre-9/11 polling data.

11-L-0559/OSD/10139

Harold Heilsnis
OSD(PA)/PIA
March 6, 2002

◀ INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: Pre-September 11th Statements by Secretary Rumsfeld about Terrorism, Asymmetrical Threats, and the Importance of Defense

SUMMARY: This memorandum includes the following excerpts: 1) a July 29 media roundtable in Canberra, 2) a July 12 press conference at the Frontiers of Freedom Institute at the Capitol, 3) a March 8 Pentagon press conference with Lord Robertson, 4) a February 14 interview by Jim Lehrer on PBS's News Hour, and 5) January 11 SASD testimony. There is also pre-September 11th poll data about how Americans viewed the threat of terrorism (page 5).

From a July 29, 2001 Media Roundtable in Canberra

Question: Could I pursue this question of strategic vulnerabilities? One of the things that I've noticed is a sort of shift of focus if you like in the U.S. about defense of the homeland and including against asymmetric threats ...

SEC. RUMSFELD: The Gulf War clearly told people that it's not a good idea to compete with Western armies, navies or air forces. That drives one logically to find some other way. If you want to go and lob ballistic missiles at somebody, or you want to invade Kuwait, or you want to do something harmful to your neighbors, and you don't want anyone to interfere with you, then obviously what you would look for is something other than competing with armies, navies, and air forces. And they run the spectrum, the gamut, across this spectrum of asymmetrical threats from terrorism to cruise missiles to ballistic missiles, various types of weapons of mass destruction, and including cyber attacks.

You know there are some countries you could attack -- make a cyber attack -- and they wouldn't realize you'd done it. Not true of your country, or our country, or a number of other countries. It is a fact of life today that we are being interfered with in various ways. I used to be involved in an electronics company. The electronics companies today hire high school kids to sit down and go in a room and figure out how to defeat what they are doing. It is what it is, and it's going to be there, and we have to learn to live with it, and we can live with it with that kind of a world. We just have to know that those kinds of threats are there.

In the United States we've got an awkward situation in that, clearly, Australia and the United States have had a wonderful benefit. We've been a long way from the threat of someone coming across our borders. We haven't had to worry about that really. Today you do have to worry about it because the borders are kind of disappearing and the reach of weapons and the things people can do change that.

Homeland defense for the United States is important because we are visible as a nation. We have seen terrorists attack things and we know the reach of weapons today. We know today, for example, ballistic missiles can be launched from relatively unimpressive surface ships where you can peel back a cargo cover and with a transport or electro launcher can launch a less than intercontinental range ballistic missile and do a whole of a lot of damage, relatively easily.

Biological weapons, chemical weapons, we know what is going on in that sphere. So the question is, what do you do about it? Well, we clearly in our defense planning review have to elevate that issue to a level that hadn't been there before, because we don't get up in the morning and worry about Canada and Mexico invading. They're good neighbors. The Defense Department, however, sounds like it's the place to deal with that. Why else would you say Department of Defense? And yet we have a law that prohibits our military from really engaging in the kinds of things domestically that a number of other countries' militaries are engaged in all the time. We have a *Posse Comitatus* law that inhibits us in that regard. The first responders, for example, with a weapon of mass destruction, or a real serious terrorist attack in the United States, are the local sheriff, and the county commissioner, the mayor, and eventually the state government, and the state police.

Of course, the first phone call that anyone's going to make is to the Department of Defense, which is the institution of size that has the kinds of assets that could assist with major management of that type of a problem. So we're in the United States kind of ruminating about how we deal with that and the president has asked the vice president to sort through that with him, and the Congress has passed statutes that suggest the need for some reorganization.

We do have an organization called FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which has a significant central role in that. But the Department of Defense -- if there were a major event in the United States, there would be mass movement of people. There would be a need to manage hospitals, and food, and quarantine, and all of that type of thing. There isn't any institution, besides the Pentagon, that even begins to have the kinds of capabilities to do that, and yet we thus far have been inhibited from thinking those kinds of things through. I don't know if that was your question, but it is something that we clearly have to think about a little better than we have.

From a July 12, 2001, Press Conference at the Frontiers of Freedom Institute Conference at the U.S. Capitol

... Let me just talk a bit about the threat. With the end of the Gulf War, it became very clear to countries that competing with Western armies, navies and air forces is not a smart thing to do. The amount of investment you have to make and the numbers of things -- ships, guns, tanks and planes -- that you have to have is prohibitive.

Therefore, it creates a disincentive to invest in those things on the parts of countries that wish to do their neighbors ill.

It does create an incentive for them to do things that are, so to speak, **asymmetrical**, that give them an advantage -- **terrorism**, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, cyber attack, the kinds of things that do not require the kinds of investments that major navies, armies and air forces do. And for example, with the case of terrorism, a terrorist can attack at any time, at any place, using any technique, and it's not possible to defend at any time, in every place, against every technique; therefore, the advantage is to the aggressor.

And with the end of the Cold War and the relaxation of tension in the world, we've seen that proliferation of these technologies is pervasive. And that means that a trained ape can figure out that over the coming period, more people are going to have exceedingly powerful weapons, weapons more powerful than ever in the history of the world, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons. More people will have those more powerful weapons, and they will be finding ways to use them or threaten their use against people in their regions or out of their regions who take steps to stop them from doing that which they wish to do -- in the case of Saddam Hussein, to invade and occupy Kuwait first and undoubtedly northern Saudi Arabia thereafter.

Therefore, we simply must recognize that fact, that reality, that that's world we're living in. We can live in that world safely, but we cannot do it unless we get about the business of providing the kinds of capabilities to deal with those threats.

From a March 8, 2001, Press Conference at the Pentagon with NATO's Lord Robertson

The United States has friends and allies that we're linked very tightly to. We have deployed forces in the world. Our interest is in recognizing that ballistic missiles constitute a threat and weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat -- not the only threat, but a threat, one of the threats. And I would say that the so-called "**asymmetrical**" threats constitute more significant threats today than the risks of a major land, sea or air war, where some country decides to threaten Western armies and navies and air forces. I think that the threats of **terrorism** and cruise missiles, as well as ballistic missiles, information warfare, are all things that we need to be attentive to.

And so I feel that we're approaching it in a rational way by avoiding something that could create significant differentials in vulnerabilities.

From February 14, 2001, on the PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer

MR. LEHRER: And do you think a system can be developed that can do this, the technology is there? (for missile defense)

SEC. RUMSFELD: I think that there is no question in my mind but that we will be able to evolve a system that will be able to deal with ballistic missiles. We know that the proliferation of these technologies across the globe is pervasive. We know that the Gulf War persuaded people they ought not to test Western armies, navies and air forces. Therefore they are looking at weapons of mass destruction -- ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, **terrorism** and various things where they can have an advantage, a so-called **asymmetrical** advantage. ...

January 11, 2001 SASC Testimony

"President-elect Bush has outlined three over-arching goals for bringing U.S. armed forces into the 21st century. First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve in our country's uniform -- active, Guard and Reserve -- must get the best support their country can possibly provide them so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, **terrorism**, the newer threats, against space assets and information systems, as members of the committee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us. And third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century." (Opening statement)

"I'm committed to strengthening our **intelligence**, to serve both our short-term and our long-term national security needs. I will personally make establishing a strong spirit of cooperation between the DoD and the rest of the intelligence community, ... one of my top priorities. We simply must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our space capabilities, along with the ability to protect those assets against various forms of attack. (Opening statement)

"I would rank **bioterrorism** quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has the advantage that it does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful, and they can be done in mobile facilities, in small facilities. And I think it is something that merits very serious attention not just by the Department of Defense, but by the country. And I have an interest in it, and certainly would intend to be attentive to it." (exchange with Senator Kennedy)

"And what we have to do is better understand what will deter and what will defend against this new range of threats? And I don't look at them in isolation. I don't think of long-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and **terrorism** as something that's disconnected. I think of it as a continuum. With the Gulf War, the world was taught, Don't try to take on Western armies, navies and air forces, because you lose. Therefore, you should try something else."

Poll Data before 9/11 about the Threat of Terrorism

In a Roper Poll of May 2001 in which people were asked to cite the main problem facing our Nation, one percent responded "terrorism." Lack of moral values, crime, and drugs topped the list then.

However, when asked that month (also by Roper) which was the greater threat, a missile attack or terrorists bringing weapons, 77% cited "terrorists" while only 10% answered "missile attack."

Also, when asked how great a threat terrorism posed, 77% answered "major threat," 27% said "minor threat," and only 4% said "not a threat." The other 5% said they did not know.

3/4 snowflake
1920

8:31 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 2, 2002
SUBJECT: **Legislative Contacts**

Done 3/14

We are just not doing enough people on the Hill.

032

We should have included four senators and a couple of congressmen in the CINC dinner, maybe, last night. We ought to think about opportunities to do that.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030202.03

Please respond by: _____

3/7-

Sec Def - U12046 /02

Given your paucity of priorities and dearth of time, you're doing PLENTY. We'll keep looking for clever ways to get close to them.

2 Mar 02

11-L-0559/OSD/10145

D. Rita

Snowflake

9:18 AM

TO: Doug Feith
Torie Clarke

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 2, 2002

SUBJECT: **Karadic**

Done
File

Find out how long we have been looking for Radovan Karadic. I think there has been an indictment out on him for ages: six or seven years. We have got all the Bosnia coalition countries looking for him, and nobody's been able to find him. It is an example of the problem with UBL. I would like to know the details.

BOSNIA

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030202.12

Please respond by: 3/8/02

Answer

U12047 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10146

8:57 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: March 2, 2002

SUBJECT: Follow-up

Done 4/5

We have got to tie a ribbon around that meeting we had with each other on the subject of my expenses and everything. I've got to get that set or I'm not going to be happy.

337

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030202.10

3/5/02

Please respond by: _____

SCROFF

① - I have the travel coordinators re-validating all the foreign travel since January 2001. Will report back when complete this week.

2 Mar 02

② I am developing a form that you could look at daily to establish how to pay for and whether to deduct the cost of events. Expect to have it complete by Wednesday 3/6. D. R. L.

U12048 /02

11-L-0559/OSD 10147

8:51 AM

ACTION
to KH

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 2, 2002

SUBJECT: **Cartoon**

Here's a cartoon from a Buffalo newspaper. It's *The Buffalo News*. Have public affairs see if they can get the original of that, or a large, frameable copy of it.

335 SD



Thank you.

DHR/azn
030202.09

Please respond by: 3/12/02

J. Manoz

U12049 /02




ENERGY POLICY TASK FORCE GROUP PHOTO



LEFT TO RIGHT: NONE OF YOUR BEESWAX, NONE OF YOUR BEESWAX, VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY, NONE OF YOUR BEESWAX, AND NONE OF YOUR BEESWAX.

BY SACK FOR THE STAR TRIBUNE

ng



snowflake

8:33 AM

ACTION
05/3/14

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS

Do we have an answer from Doug Feith on this memo on Tribunals? Do we have an answer from Doug Feith on the memo of February 18th on Members of Commissions?

D15

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030402.04

Attach: Tribunals snowflake to Doug Feith 2/18/02
Commissions snowflake to Doug Feith 2/18/02

Please respond by: _____

Ymazoz

U12050 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10150

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Jim Haynes
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2002

SUBJECT: **Commissions**

It seems to me it is time to begin pulling together the names of the people who would be possible members of the commissions if and when the President assigns someone to be tried by a commission, and the names of individuals who conceivably could serve on the review panels.

Please have somebody start pulling together a proper list and criteria for how people are being selected, and get back to me within seven days.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021802.20

Please respond by: _____ *a/p*

*Forward
to
Cables
8:30pm*

12:45 PM

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 18, 2002
SUBJECT: **Tribunals**

It seems to me it is time to decide where tribunals should be held; whether it's one location or several locations, and what are the criteria for determining which location is selected.

Please get back to me with a proposal and some recommendations in seven days.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
021802.19

Please respond by: February 25th

*Faxed
to cables
2/18/02
8:30pm*

11-L-0559/OSD/10152

5:21 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: **George F. Will Editorial**

Dme 3/4

Take a look at this article by George Will. Would you please find out from George, or whomever you have to contact, what was the date Anthony Zinni made these remarks?

000.7

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030402.18

Attach: "For This Iraqi, the Glass is Half Full" by George Will, *Washington Post*, 3/3/02

Please respond by: _____

3/3/02

Ymace

U12051 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10153

3/4

TO: Admiral Giambastiani

CC: Gen. Myers Doug Feith
 Gen. Pace Jim Haynes
 Gen. Abizaid Col. Bucci
 Delonnie

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: March 4, 2002

SUBJECT: **Deployment Orders**

For more than a year now, deployment orders have been arriving in my office as I am walking out at 7:00pm or 7:30 at night, and on weekends.

From now on, no deployment order is going to be signed by me unless I have had it for two full working days. An exception will be if it is personally brought up to me by whomever wants it signed, that person has an appointment, and there is an emergency that is legitimate.

There is a pattern of giving me the orders so late that I have no time to read them, or consult with others about them. It is going to stop.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
030402.01

U12052 /02

Please respond by: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/10154

Low 3/5

370

4 March

Snowflake

10:46 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: *London Times Article*

Done 3/4

Please run down this question of whether the French helped save Karadzic that is in this article, and do it pretty fast.

Bosnia

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030402.11

Attach: "Phone Trap for French 'Traitor' Who Saved Karadzic". *London Times*, 3/4/02 by D. McGrory

Please respond by:

3/3/02

4 Mar 02

U12053 /02

11-L-0559/OSD/10155

London Times
March 4, 2002

Phone Trap For French 'Traitor' Who Saved Karadzic

By Daniel McGrory

NATO chiefs are investigating claims that a French Army captain tipped off sympathisers of Radovan Karadzic that special forces were launching a raid on his mountain hideout last week.

It is said that the betrayal by the French officer in a telephone call to a senior Bosnian policeman gave the war crimes suspect and his entourage just enough time to escape as US Special Forces were closing in.

British Intelligence reportedly monitored the conversation between the French captain, who has not been named, and the senior police officer based in Foca, who passed on the warning immediately to one of Dr Karadzic's bodyguards.

As a Nato enquiry began yesterday, the role of some in the French contingent was under scrutiny amid longrunning allegations that officers with pro-Serb sympathies have compromised previous attempts to arrest the 57-year-old former Bosnian Serb President, who is wanted on charges of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Last year a French Army officer was jailed for treason for passing Nato secrets to the Serbs during the Kosovo War.

This latest accusation will cast further doubt on Nato's ability to capture Dr Karadzic and his wartime military commander, General Ratko Mladic.

The French captain is alleged to have telephoned his Bosnian Serb ally at 6.26am on Thursday morning, just as helicopters carrying the American troops were taking off from their base at Tuzla and armoured vehicles belonging to the Nato-led peacekeeping force were sealing off all routes leading to Celebeci, where Dr Karadzic was said to have been hiding in a lumber factory.

Security sources who have heard the brief conversation say that the Bosnian policeman sounds suprised and somewhat indignant at being telephoned so early at home in Foca and asks the Frenchman, who he clearly knows: "What do you want? Why are you calling me?" The captain, who is in Bosnia as part of the Sfor stabilisation force, quickly replies: "You should pay attention to Foca."

Clearly puzzled by the remark, the policeman asks why and is told: "You know Foca is always of interest to us."

The hilltop town, 40 miles southwest of the capital, Sarajevo, remains a bastion of support for Dr Karadzic and others on the run from the war crimes tribunal. The former child psychiatrist is believed to regularly use hideouts in Foca.

The Bosnian policeman is then heard muttering his thanks to the French traitor and immediately telephones one of the leaders of Dr Karadzic's private army of bodyguards.

His entourage were staying just six miles away in Celebeci, a remote hilltop village, where intelligence sources say that Dr Karadzic and around 80 of his staff and his armed minders had arrived late on Tuesday night.

They had appeared in a fast-moving column of 4 x 4 vehicles, with Dr Karadzic in a Range Rover with blacked-out windows. It is thought that they had slipped across the border from his native Montenegro, where his mother still lives and where he now spends most of his time.

A Nato spy in Celebeci reported "eye contact" with Dr Karadzic and two hours before the helicopters took off on their mission there was "hard intelligence" that he had not moved.

The revelation that the police chief in Foca could so easily contact Dr Karadzic's camp is evidence of why Nato forces have repeatedly failed to bring the wartime leader to justice, with leaks within its own ranks and collaboration with local security authorities.

Security sources say that after the tip-off, bodyguards pushed Dr Karadzic into one of three identical vehicles, which set off in different directions across mountain tracks as they were not sure how close Nato troops had reached. Others stayed behind and there are reports of them fighting a long battle with US Special Forces as they escaped through the forests.

One of Dr Karadzic's senior bodyguards boasted at the weekend that they were also able to monitor Nato's radio transmissions, which helped them to pick which route to use for their leader. Western security sources doubt that claim and say that it was solely the treachery of the French officer that was to blame.

For the past 48 hours Nato chiefs have been investigating the intercepted telephone call to decide if this was "an accident or betrayal". One Nato source said: "It could have been a courtesy call from the French officer to warn a local police chief not to be surprised by the sight of lots of Nato armour and the fact that a couple of minutes after this call, all the phones would be cut off as well as power and water.

"But after careful analysis it does seem this was betrayal. The question we have to ask is why the officer did it and we stop it happening again."

A Nato inquest was already under way after some in the alliance criticised US military chiefs for taking so long to react to the tip-off that Dr Karadzic was in Celebeci and then insisting that only American troops should have the glory of making the capture.

Last night Nato would not say where the French suspect was being held or what would be done with him.

11:14 AM

Action
to
3/4

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: March 4, 2002
SUBJECT: **Work Plan**

Please outline a work plan so we can avoid end strength increases.

I assume that what we will need to do is look ahead, figure out things we are doing we can stop doing, figure out where we can end detailees, continue to reduce forces in places like the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo. We will need to get it all on a master grid so we see what we are doing. Then we need to look at how we can begin to reduce down the guard and reserve by reducing caps, and airport security and what have you. We also have to find out when you think we can begin to reduce the number of people we have "stop loss" on.

320.2

Thank you.

DHR/azn
030402.06

4 March

U12055 /02

Please respond by: _____



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2002 JUL 31 11 09 03

INFO MEMO

July 25, 2002, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD, Personnel and Readiness

David S. C. Chu 26 July 02

SUBJECT: Law Schools Denying Military Recruiter Access May Lose Federal Funds


- I previously reported (Tab A) that 18 law schools had adopted policies hostile to recruiting. You urged that we sustain a hard line and apply funding sanctions to the greatest extent permitted by law. We are and we shall.
- To update current status: Four of the law schools have re-opened access and now are in compliance. Two more are expected to join that status within 60 days. Nine received short extensions (until the fall term) to allow for the return of – and voting by – Faculty Senates. All are expected to come into compliance.
- However, three schools – Vermont Law, William Mitchell Law, and Northeastern -- have confirmed that their policies do not meet the legal standard and that they are unwilling to bring those policies into compliance. Service Judge Advocate staffs are preparing the case against these three schools, with a recommendation that ASD(FMP) immediately act to block Federal funds.
- If our review concludes that a violation of statute has occurred, and that due process has been followed (ensuring we prevail if the matter is taken to court, as expected) we would notify affected Federal Agencies of those schools' ineligibility for funding. The denial of funding affects the entire university (in this case, Northeastern), not simply the law school.
- We will keep you informed as events progress. The attached paper provides detail on the statute and the law schools under discussion.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: Major Brenda K. Leong



(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/10159

U12078 /02

ISSUE: Recruiter Access to Colleges and Universities (“Solomon Amendment”)

BACKGROUND: Current law prohibits funds to schools that have a policy or practice of denying or in effect preventing military recruiters entry to campuses, access to students on campuses, or access to student directory information. No funds available under appropriations acts for the Departments of Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Transportation may be provided if the school has a policy or practice in violation of the law. Student aid is exempt.

DISCUSSION:

- As reported previously, for the 2001-2002 school year, 23 law schools appeared to be engaged in actions that prohibit or in effect prevent military recruiters from recruiting at their institution. Four of these schools have since updated their recruiter access policies to comply with this legislation.
- On May 29, 2002, the Army and Air Force JA staffs coordinated dispatch of a second round of letters to the eighteen non-compliant schools. The responses are as follows:
 - Stated policy now in compliance with law (4). No further action is contemplated at this time.
 - Cornell Law School
 - Northern Illinois University Law School
 - St. Thomas University Law School
 - Whittier Law School
 - Received an extension (9). The justification typically addressed a requirement for faculty input and therefore a need to wait until fall term begins. Extensions were granted through September 16, 2002.
 - Boston College
 - Brooklyn Law School
 - Columbia Law School
 - Harvard Law School
 - Illinois Institute of Technology Law School
 - University of Southern California Law School
 - Golden Gate University Law School
 - New York Law School
 - Yale
 - "In negotiation" (2). The response either attempts to persuade that current practice does, in fact, comply or asks what specific changes are required to be considered compliant. Services will pursue dialogue until the school's position is resolved.
 - California Western School of Law
 - New York University School of Law

- Policy confirmed as non-compliant with law (3):
 - Vermont Law School
 - William Mitchell College of Law
 - Northeastern University School of Law

- Army and Air Force JA representatives are preparing a package on the schools with policies confirmed to be non-compliant to recommend that ASD(FMP) withhold Federal funds. This package is expected by mid-September. Similar packages will be forwarded on other schools if required upon receipt of final response.

PREPARED BY: Major Brenda Leong,
OASD(FMP)(MPP)(AP)

(b)(6)

snoflake

26/02

June 24, 2002 9:54 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Campus Access for Recruiters

My attitude on it is that if these schools won't let recruiters on campus, then they shouldn't have federal funding. I think we ought to get someone on top of this who is pretty tough and is going to start implementing the rule.

If you have a question about this, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/13/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Colleges Denying Recruiter Access [U09793/02]

DHR:dh
062402-16

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

JUN 14 PM 12:43



SECDEF HAS BEEN

INFORMATION MEMO
(You asked about this)

JUN 14 2002

June 13, 2002, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD, Personnel and Readiness

David S. C. Chu
(signature and date)

SUBJECT: Colleges Denying Recruiter Access May Lose Certain Federal Funding

- Colleges and universities that do not offer military recruiters access to campuses or to students, at least on a par equal in quality and scope to that offered other employers, stand to lose eligibility for Federal funding from grants or contract. About 18 law schools, including Harvard and Yale, presently appear to be out of compliance with the law. The law schools' behavior typically arises from objections to the "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" standard.
- Service recruiters undertake a written dialogue with the problem schools to confirm their policies, which in turn allows a judgment as to whether the situation rises to a legal violation. If a violation is substantiated, the case is referred to ASD (Force Management Policy) for disposition in coordination with General Counsel.
- In the event of an adverse decision, affected Federal Agencies are immediately informed of the ineligibility for funding. If a subelement of the university, such as a law school, is determined to be in violation, the denial of funding would affect the entire university.
- We will apprise you of any adverse decisions before they take effect, although we expect the dialogue process to produce compliance in most cases.
- The attached paper provides detail on the statute and the law schools out of compliance.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Major Brenda K. Leong,

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	6/21
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	6/21
MA BUCCI	6/21
EXECSEC WHITMORE	6/17

11-L-055 OSD/10163

400703 102

ISSUE: Recruiter Access to Colleges and Universities (“Solomon Amendment”)

BACKGROUND: Current law prohibits funds to schools that have a policy or practice of denying or in effect preventing military recruiters entry to campuses, access to students on campuses, or access to student directory information. Although previously enforced against certain law schools, this legislation was revised in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to hold a parent institution responsible for the actions of its subordinate elements (i.e., Harvard University—Harvard Law School), with associated risk to all university funds.

DISCUSSION:

- No funds available under appropriations acts for the Departments of Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Transportation may be provided if the school has a policy or practice in violation of the law. Student aid is exempt.
- Service recruiters identify schools as potentially non-compliant. If unable to resolve the situation, they elevate the problem for correspondence between the relevant Service and the educational institution. Failing agreement, the Service then forwards the case to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy, with a recommendation for action.
- The ASD(FMP) makes the final determination and notifies the affected school, as well as the affected Federal agencies and Congressional committees. Presently, no institutions of higher education remain on the list of schools ineligible for federal funding under the campus access statutes.
- As of the 2001-2002 school year, 23 law schools appear to be engaged in actions that prohibit or in effect prevent military recruiters from recruiting at their institution. In each case, the offending school policy is tied to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” laws concerning opportunities for homosexuals to serve in the military.

No JAG Recruiting Permitted

- California Western, CA
- Golden Gate, CA
- John Marshall, IL
- Vermont, VT
- Western New England, MA
- Whittier, CA
- Willamette, OR
- William Mitchell, MN
- Yale, CT

Unequal Treatment

- Boston College, MA
- Harvard, MA
- New York Law School, NY
- New York University, NY

Required to Recruit Away from Law School

- Boston University, MA
- Brooklyn, NY
- Columbia, NY
- Cornell, NY
- IIT - Chicago-Kent, IL
- Northeastern, MA
- Northern Illinois, IL
- Southern California, CA
- St. Thomas, MN
- Touro, NY

- Currently, Army and Air Force JA staff representatives, with coordination with ODoDGC and OASD(FMP), are in correspondence with these schools. After initial contact, five of the universities affirmed policies and procedures which put them in compliance.
 - Boston University, John Marshall, Touro, Western New England, and Willamette
- On May 29, 2002, the Army and Air Force JA staffs coordinated dispatch of a second round of letters to the eighteen non-compliant schools. These letters provide an additional 30 days for the institution to rebut the outlined case and state Service intent to subsequently forward to the ASD(FMP) with a recommendation to withhold funds.

PREPARED BY: Major Brenda Leong, (b)(6)
OASD(FMP)(MPP)(AP)
June 5, 2002

Coordination

Assistant Secretary of Defense (FMP) _____

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MPP)

Van Alstine, 26 Jul 02

1/26/02

June 24, 2002 9:54 AM

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Campus Access for Recruiters

My attitude on it is that if these schools won't let recruiters on campus, then they shouldn't have federal funding. I think we ought to get someone on top of this who is pretty tough and is going to start implementing the rule.

If you have a question about this, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.

06/13/02 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Colleges Denying Recruiter Access [U09793/02]

DHR:dh
062402-16

.....
Please respond by 07/26/02

340

24 Jun 02

TO: Torie Clarke
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
 DATE: March 5, 2002
 SUBJECT: **Cartoon**

See if you can get a copy of this cartoon from *The Telegram Gazette* from Worcester, MA.

Thanks.

335 SD

DHR/azn
 030502.03

Attach: Cartoon

Please respond by: _____

5/9
 Attached Request from
~~Director that you sign the~~
 Smalley print
 Spoke w/ editor
 3/7. will send
 two copies would
 like D.R. to sign
 one and return.
 S Mac OR

U12084 /02
 11-L-0559/OSD/10168

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The people's forum

Help save historic treasure, Whalom Park

Our newsletter entitled, "Preservation and People," features Whalom Park's rare, 1839 wooden roller coaster on our cover.

Whalom Park is listed on our "Ten Most Endangered Statewide Properties" list this year. We, as the statewide nonprofit historic preservation organization in Massachusetts, are very concerned about preserving this wonderfully historic treasure. This old amusement park should be saved for historical, cultural and, most obviously, nostalgic reasons. It's still not too late. We as a community, one that remembers all the great times in the park, have to act. As the former director of Preservation Worcester, and now in that same capacity at Historic Massachusetts, I have witnessed development deals fall apart. This isn't a

toric site. But unlike many historic sites with which I have had no personal contact, Whalom Park is different. My class trip as a freshman in high school many years ago was to Whalom Park. I still remember rolling around in the barrel in the fun house.

Years later, we took our kids in the car and spent every Labor Day at the park. The kids always looked forward to the annual outing. I'm sure so many people have these same great memories. We've already lost too many amusement parks to development. We have to resist losing such treasures as Whalom Park. We never appreciate the loss until it's gone. Everyone should contact "Save Whalom Park" and see what can be done to help.

Boost gas mileage to preserve refuge

In the year 2002, we depend more than ever on a reliable supply of energy produced with tolerable impacts on the environment. The current ways we meet our energy needs are destroying our wilderness areas, creating radioactive waste and making our air so dirty it's causing global warming, sickness and even death. Right now, we are at a crossroads that will determine the future of our energy policy and our environment.

Our administration and its allies in Congress are pushing an energy policy that would perpetuate a destructive path. There are solutions to our energy problems. A future of energy efficiency and renewable alternatives is possible. Instead of drilling

Gazette Worcester, MA