

**\*Coleman, Kia J**

**From:** Jones, Beth (EUR)  
**Sent:** Friday, January 23, 2004 4:05 PM  
**To:** Karagiannis, Alexander; Bradtke, Robert A; Fitzpatrick, Michael J(Brussels); Ries, Charles P; Mennuti, Deborah; 'Fried, Daniel - NSC'  
**Cc:** Brink, Bridget A(P); Hogan, Dereck J(S); Coleman, Kia J(S); Kelly, Craig(S)  
**Subject:** Flahaut's nonsense

S talked this morning with Louis Michel to express his shock over F's statements. Just when he and LM had had such a good meeting in Br and just when things between Be and the US were getting back on track, Flahaut says these kinds of things. LM said he was personally embarrassed, this did not reflect the views of the government.

I then talked with the Amb and used all the points with him. I noted that S had just talked to LM as well. The Amb said he had talked with the office of the PM and the office of the FM last night, knowing that Flahaut's outburst was a serious problem. (The Amb said he had the full text, including in the original Flemish.) He said he took full note of all my points and would pursue this matter in Brussels. I added that I was also calling to convey the fact that the Secretary hoped to follow up with LM on the good meeting in Brussels with a meeting in Washington. I told him that S has no particular dates in mind, he would always prefer to take into account when the FM might wish to travel to the US. I said we would want to work closely to develop a mutually convenient date. The Amb was very/very pleased by the latter and said he would work with Alex once he heard back on dates from LM.

The Amb called me back less than an hour later to report he had talked with LMichel, who told him about his call from S. LM said he was very embarrassed, had apologized to S and had then called the PM. The PM agreed he had to do something. He called Flahaut, but couldn't reach him as the latter was in a plane over Africa. The PM is now drafting what the Amb described a letter of reprimand, which the PM/Amb will share with us on Monday or so. The Amb will call Alex, who can get it to us on the road.

11-L-0559/OSD/24531

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28  
January 26, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JR  
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

Does this letter from the Air Force on their end strength fit your understanding of the situation?

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 SecAF ltr to SecDef re: USAF Endstrength

DHR:dh  
012604-15

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

OSD 09124-0

11-L-0559/OSD/24533



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
1/26

JAN 22 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: USAF ENDSTRENGTH

Last week you asked, "why is the AF over their authorized endstrength by 16K?" We believe this is a temporary situation fueled by the Global War on Terrorism, and it is our desire and very clear goal to return to our authorized endstrength of ~359K. I'll quickly lay out how we got to this point, then briefly discuss our plan for getting back within our authorized strength.

Let me begin with Stop Loss. This measure obviously froze people in place and was not lifted until late June of 2003. Furthermore, some individuals were allowed to stay until as late as December 2003. We are just now able to understand the reactions of our people to the lifting of Stop Loss. What we know now is that some who intended to leave have decided to stay.

Other policies, associated with the GWOT, also influenced our endstrength. We implemented programs to bring prior-service members back to active duty to fill known critical skill shortages (e.g. pilots). Although relatively small in number (~500), ARC volunteers on active duty beyond 179 days in lieu of mobilization also swelled the force. Perhaps most significant is our retention. For instance, our goal for first term enlisted is 55%. Our first term retention at the end of FY03 was 61%. Across the board our retention is up, and for good reason! The tax and pay incentives, some implemented for GWOT, *really work*. Imminent Danger Pay, Hardship Duty Pay, Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, Family Separation Allowance and a host of others, plus bonuses we pay to ensure we can retain critical skills, all add up to a very attractive compensation package that turns the tide toward staying in uniform, especially when faced with a still-uncertain economy. Now....returning to the larger **issue**, we are meeting our programmed recruiting goal of 37K for FY04. Typically, we would expect to have about the same number of people exit every year. But because of all the above, and perhaps other factors, they are staying with us.

AIR  
RESERVE  
COMMAND

That's how we got here.....now what's the way ahead? We have the challenge of getting down to strength, while simultaneously correcting some skills imbalances that persist from the late 90's, and accounting for a

11-L-0559/OSD/24534

whole new mission--NOBLE EAGLE. Starting with recruiting...we realized in an earlier programming exercise that we could begin to ratchet down somewhat and still retain the skills mix we need. We will reduce from 37K in FY04 to 35.6K in FY05 and 34.6K in FY04. And...we're looking at the possibility of reducing the 37K in FY04. We have several other policy levers available to reduce endstrength and to get the right skills in the right places. These include restricting reenlistment in overage career fields, transferring (voluntarily) active duty members to the **ARC**, shortening service commitments, limiting officer continuation for those deferred for promotion, commissioning ROTC cadets direct to the **ARC**, limiting reclassification of technical school eliminees, rolling back separation dates, officer/enlisted retraining, etc.

We believe living within our 359K authorized strength is the right thing to do, and we believe this a prudent approach to get there. What we would like to avoid is taking extreme measures (e.g., selective early retirement boards, reductions in force, excessive reductions in accessions, etc) that wreak havoc with morale, break faith, and can leave us with "bathtub" year groups from which recovery is long and painful. It is our goal to reduce to authorized by FY05, but depending on external variables (e.g, the economy), we may need relief until the end of FY06 to accomplish a measured drawdown, realign our forces to support stressed skills and avoid the aforementioned extremes. **We'll** know a lot more at the end of FY04.

als  
1300

120

28  
January 27, 2004

668

DWR  
2/17

TO: ~~Gen. Dick Myers~~ Pawel Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Reserve Aircraft

Another Reserve aircraft diverted and went to Libya with a Congressional delegation. I want to find out how we stop Reserve aircraft from doing those things if they have not been authorizca by the White House or by the DoD.

\*

453

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-3

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

✓  
2/19

Sir,  
Response attached.  
w/ CDR Nasung  
2/19

28 Jan 04

OSD 09126-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24536

245  
1320

✓  
2/19

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

February 5, 2004 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 012704-3 regarding Reserve Aircraft

- CODEL Weldon traveled to Libya on 25-26 Jan aboard a Navy C-40 (Ft Worth Reserve unit). CODEL itinerary also included stops in Tunisia, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Germany.
- OSD Legislative Affairs arranged DoD support for the CODEL, but declined Weldon's request to support a stop in Libya.
- We reversed this position after we were advised by NSC Legislative Affairs that Congressman Weldon had intervened with Andrew Card and Steve Hadley and obtained their approval.
- **FYI: CODEL Boehlert has requested DoD support to visit Libya, Kuwait and Iraq 12-18 Feb. At the suggestion of State and NSC, CODEL Stevens has requested DoD support to visit Iran, Kuwait and Iraq 13-21 Mar.**

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake

CODEL Weldon Manifest

11-L-0559/OSD/24537

CODEL Weldon Manifest

Rep Curt Weldon

Rep Solomon Ortiz

Rep Steve Israel

Rep Candace Miller

Rep Rodney Alexander

Rep Elton Gallegly (Libya only)

Rep Mark Souder

Rep Darrell Issa (Libya only)

Mr. Doug Roach

Mr. J.J. Gertler

Mr. Harald Stavenas

Mr. Marc Wheat

Mr. Richard Mereu (Libya only)

LTC Craig Collier

LTC Gregg Blanchard

Sgt Thai Kov

Sgt Hugh Griffin



**January 27, 2004**

**TO:** Paul Wolfowitz  
**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Ray DuBois  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** DoD Historical Advisory Committee

Please move forward smartly on the proposals to revamp the DoD Historical Advisory Committee. I like the idea.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/24/04 DepSecDef memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
012704-8

.....  
Please respond by 2/27/04

**OSD 09127-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/24539

1608  
12/1  
JG

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: November 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Cmte

What do you think about having a single DoD Historical Advisory Committee rather than several.

We could combine all the existing ones and then tone it down over time and see that the services get to recommend people.

Thanks.

*Let me know what you think!*

DHR/azn  
113003.03a

*Attach: Info Memo to SD from DuBois 11/19/03 DoD Historical AC*

Please respond by: 12/10

*Sir, ✓ 1/27  
C/26  
Response attached.  
Original attachment  
included behind.*

*U22533 103 ✓  
CDR N  
1/26*

✓  
1/27

**MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld**

**DATE: January 24, 2004**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz**

**SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee**

Don,

In order to respond to your snowflake on this subject, I asked (b)(6) to give me his private views. The attached paper comes from him although we should not circulate it with his name on it without his permission.

I think (b)(6) recommendation makes a lot of sense. If you agree, as a next step I would ask (b)(6) and two or three distinguished historians to undertake a review of how we organize our historical advisory committees, to come up with more detailed recommendations along the lines of what (b)(6) has here.

I believe this could be done relatively quickly, and it would give us a good basis for moving forward.

*Paul W.*

**SUBJECT: DOD Historical Advisory Committee**

1. Our current system has the following disadvantages:

a. It is service-based, where the reality of warfare is joint and combined operations;

b. Nominally, we ask the advisory committees to cover a great deal of ground, from advising on declassification, to commenting on commemoration and museum design, to quality control of long term studies. In actual fact, they accomplish little. In particular, I suspect they do us very little good in the area DOD can use history most – timely operational history and analysis in support of professional military education and decision-making;

c. Like most advisory committees, they spend too much time in plenary session, not enough in well-defined projects;

d. The personnel currently assigned to various committees is, to put it mildly, uneven. With some notable exceptions, they are heavily weighted to insiders, friends of the services, and undistinguished academics.

2. Military history is the foundation of military education, and has been recognized as such for centuries; no profession rests so heavily on history as does that of warfare. The health of our official military history programs is not, therefore, a matter merely of fulfilling a bureaucratic requirement, but rather of insuring the intellectual health of our armed forces.

3. The golden age of American military history was in the 1950's and early 1960's when some of the country's leading historians – Kent Roberts Greenfield, R. R. Palmer, Samuel Eliot Morison, Frank Craven, and many others – participated in the preparation of the official histories of World War II. These superb works, which have stood the test of time, were produced swiftly, and in time to contribute to professional military education and policy-making. Particularly in the Army's case, this was possible because of support at the very highest level, from Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. We cannot imitate that experience exactly, but the lessons are that quality and high level attention matter.

4. DOD should, therefore, create a high profile and energetic DOD Historical Advisory Committee. Its key features should be:

a. A very strong, compact executive committee of half a dozen, and a much larger pool of members (say, forty or more) who would participate in ad hoc task forces and subcommittee.

b. The executive committee, to include a chairman and vice chairman, should have some staff support, to include travel funds, and should develop an annual statement of work, to be approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense;

c. Examples of some of the projects that might be undertaken immediately would include assessments of:

i. current operational history efforts;

ii. the way in which DOD writes joint and combined history;

iii. the uses of recent military history in professional military education

iv. the desirable mix of in-house and contract history writing.

d. Those recruited for the advisory committee should be some of the best military historians in the United States. More than half of the committee's membership (and certainly more than half of the members of the executive committee) should come from outside DOD institutions.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
NOV 20 01 3 45

INFO MEMO

November 19, 2003

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management

SUBJECT: DoD Historical Advisory Committee

Laty  
11/24

- This responds to your question regarding the DoD Historical Advisory Committee, which was established in 1993.
- The purpose of the Committee is to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of military departments regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the Department of Defense. These include: historical, archival, commemorative, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs.
- The committee consists of three subcommittees: the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee; the Department of the Navy Historical Advisory Committee; and the DoD Historical Records Declassification Panel (HRDAP). The first two subcommittees report to their Service Secretaries and the third formally reports to you.
- A listing of subcommittee members is attached.
- Administrative oversight of the subcommittees is the responsibility of the OSD Historian, who is also the chairman of the HRDAP.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Jennifer Spaeth, (b)(6)

SPI ASSISTANT DI RITA	11/24
SR MA CHANDROCK	11/24
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WARRIOR?	11/24

Secretary of *the* Navy's  
Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History  
October 2003

Rear Admiral Thomas **A.** Brooks, USN (Ret.) - Joint Military Intelligence College

Vice Admiral George **W.** Emery, USN (Ret.) - Naval Historical Foundation

**Dr.** John B. Hattendorf - North American Society for Oceanic History

Rear **Admiral** John T. Kavanaugh, SC, USN (Ret.) - USS Wisconsin Foundation

Rear **Admiral** John M. Kersh, USN (Ret.) - American Operations Corporation

**Lox** (Burt) Logan - USS Constitution Museum

Dr. James R. Reckner - Texas **Tech**

Virginia S. Wood - Boston University

11-L-0559/OSD/24545

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Members of Department of the **Army**  
Historical Advisory Committee  
October 2003

Dr. Eric Bergerud - Department of General Education Lincoln University

**Mr. Mark Bowden** - Lincoln University

BG James T. Hirai - U.S. Army Command and General ~~Staff~~ College

Dr. **James T. Stensvaag** - Chief Historian, **Amy**

COL Robert **A. Doughty** - U.S. Military Academy

Ms. Sandra **Stroud** - Department of the **Army**

Professor Adrian R. Lewis - University of North Texas

Professor **Brian M. Linn** - Texas A&M University

**Mr. Howard Lowell** - National Archives

COL Craig Madden - U.S. Army War College

Dr. John H. Morrow, Jr. - LeConte Hall The University of Georgia ✓

Professor Reina Pennington - Norwich University

Professor Ronald H. Spector - George Washington University

→ Dr. Jon T. **Sumida** - University of Maryland (Chairman)

Professor Russell F. Weigley - Temple University

Members of DoD Historical Records  
Declassification Advisory Panel  
October 2003

Dr. John W. Chambers – Rutgers University

Dr. Ronald Hoffman – William and Mary

Dr. Irving B. Holley, Jr. – Duke University

Dr. Lorraine M. Lees – Old Dominion University

Dr. Brian Vandemark – U.S. Naval Academy

Dr. James Hershberg – George Washington University

Dr. Alfred Goldberg – OSD Historian (Chairman)

Dr. David Armstrong – Chief, Joint History Office

Dr. Jeffrey Clarke – Chief Historian, Army

Dr. William Dudley – Chief Historian, Navy

Dr. William Heimdahl – Deputy Chief Historian, Air Force

Mr. Fed Graboske – Archivist, US Marine Corps Historical Center

2/19 0800

(b)(6)

reply refer to EF-8279 and I# 04/001118-ES

January 27, 2004

*Summary*  
*2/19*  
*TO: SecDef*

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi Ministry of Defense

What is the status on the Iraqi Ministry of Defense? Are they going to be ready to take over responsibility for security at some point?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-10

.....  
Please respond by 2/6/04

2/19/04

S.S.  
Response attached

*v/r*  
(b)(6)

OSD 09129-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24548

*CAPI*

*27 Jan 04*

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti *AM 2/17/04*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Ministry of Defense

- You asked for a status report on the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and if they will be able to take responsibility of security at some point.

**CPA Milestones for Transition (see attachment)**

- New Minister of Defense slated to be in office by 1 April.
- CPA order establishing the MoD to be signed approximately 1 March.
  - Order will probably place Iraq Civil Defense Corps under MOD.
- CPA Senior Advisor for Security Affairs, David Gompert, is taking the following steps:
  - Locating, vetting and training approximately 50 Iraqi civilians to form the core of a civil service cadre for the new MoD.
  - Sending Iraqis to the regional training program at NDU (4 in class now, approximately 30 more to arrive at NDU on 23 Feb).
  - Conducting twice-weekly consultations with the GC's Security Committee, chaired by Iyad Alawi.
    - Incorporating key principles (i.e., civilian control of the military, ban on private militias, etc.) into the Transitional Administrative Law.
  - Working with British counterparts to place approximately six Coalition advisors alongside critical Iraqi decision-makers within the new MoD.

**Remaining Issues**

- Loyalty, commitment and retention of Iraqi security personnel.
- Iraqi Armed Forces require unit training and must be further integrated into the internal security structures to help combat the current insurgency.
- Current Iraqi Armed Forces training program may not be optimum use of training resources; need to ramp up Iraq Civil Defense Corps and Police.


**Bottom Line:** CPA believes that the Iraqi MoD will be able to take responsibility for key aspects of the security situation in Iraq by the transition date. That said, Coalition forces will be required to conduct major operations (counter-terrorist, counter-WMD, border integrity, etc.) for some period after the transition date.

### Update on New Ministry of Defense


- **First Hires.** The first 21 defense advisors were hired and signed contracts on 28 January. They were selected from a pool of about 100 applicants. They will begin a period of training and orientation on 31 January 04 including attending a specially developed 3-week program organized by NDU.
- **Minister of Defense.** Selecting a Minister will be a particularly tricky task and will require political finesse.
  - Senior Advisor Gompert broached the subject informally with Allawi and they've agreed to work collaboratively on finding the right candidate. Gompert will ask members of the Security Committee to provide suggestions to CPA.
  - After interviewing candidates, CPA would reduce the list to one person and then get Security Committee support for that person. CPA will also seek recommendations from other sources in addition to the Security Committee.
  - CPA's target is to have a Minister named by April 1.
- **CPA Order.** A draft CPA Order establishing an MoD is being circulated around CPA Baghdad for comments. It will soon be sent to Washington for coordination with a goal of having Amb. Bremer sign it around March 1.
- **Training.** Three future Iraqi MOD employees are in Washington to participate in training at NDU. In mid-February, approximately 30 people (20 civilians and 10 military) will arrive in Washington for a three-week course and orientation tour (Allawi and Gompert may be in Washington at that time). There will be two more of these three-week courses in the spring for people we hire subsequently.
  - Administrative requirements for visas, etc. and logistics to send these groups to the States are extremely cumbersome.
  - UK is designing a mentoring program and is actively recruiting personnel in London for it. We are also looking for American mentors, as well as one or two from other countries such as Poland and Australia.
- **New MoD Headquarters.** Renovations are underway on a former elementary school that will be temporary quarters for the MoD staff. It will be ready for occupancy on March 15<sup>th</sup> when the staff returns from the Washington training. Contracts for work on the main building (the former Vice Presidential Palace) are being bid; that building will be ready in mid-May.
- **Public Affairs.** Seeking to have Iraqis as spokesmen on the Iraqi Armed Forces and new ministry. Allawi fully agrees. CPA is in further discussions with the Security Committee. A CPA working group is putting together a public affairs plan for the next several months and beyond.

**Key Dates:**

- January-February: Recruit and hire critical mass of people
- February 23-March 12: Training in Washington D.C. (additional training in March and June)
- March 1: Establish new Ministry of Defense (promulgate CPA order)
- March-April: Select senior civil servants and military officers
- April 1: Appoint new Minister of Defense
- April-December: Training continues
- Mid-May: Open MOD Building
- July 1: Transition to sovereign Iraq



## MoD Organisation Chart



Prepared by:  
Peter Velz/Security Affairs/CPA Washington  
Derived from various CPA Baghdad memos/briefings  
(b)(6)  
29 January 2004

EF-8280  
04/001120-ES

January 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Intel Speech

Please get to work on that intel speech. I think it is important for me to have some material before I go to the Hill next week, and I would like to read it by this Friday.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-12

.....  
Please respond by 1/30/04

FILE DA 4/19

Policy ExecSec's Note

January 30, 2004

CDR Nosenzo,

The attached was handed to LTG Craddock this morning.

*C. L. O'Connor*

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

350.09

01/30/04

OSD 09131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24553

04/19

**Iraq and WMD: The Intelligence Challenge**  
**SecDef Talking Points**  
**(NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION)**

- Stopping WMD proliferation is one of our central strategic necessities in this period, given the possible link with terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism.
- Getting good intelligence on WMD is therefore a priority challenge of our era. This is about more than just Iraq.

The Intelligence Challenge

- Intelligence is an art, not a science. It does not always produce “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” that would convict in a court of law.
  - Even good information may be uneven in quality, or sketchy.
  - Many things will be unknowable: e.g., a leader’s intentions.
  - In closed societies, regimes set up elaborate systems to conceal, deceive, and frustrate outside observers (whether intel or inspectors).
- Sometimes our intelligence has underestimated the danger. E.g.,
  - After the Gulf War, we discovered Saddam’s nuclear and other WMD programs were further advanced than we had thought. **Also:**
  - Iran’s nuclear program;
  - 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.
- Roberta Wohlstetter’s insight: Clues that make perfect sense after the fact are usually overwhelmed -- at the time -- by the cloud of irrelevant or misleading “chaff” that surrounds them.
  - This is compounded by an opponent’s systematic denial and deception.
- The statesman’s dilemma (per Henry Kissinger):

- When the opportunity for a leader to act is at hand, he inevitably has only incomplete information. When all the information is available, the moment to shape events will have passed.
- There will often be majority and minority assessments of intelligence information. But a President must make decisions.
- In an age of catastrophic terrorism, inaction can be the most dangerous course. After 9/11, are we to sit back?

### Lessons of Iraq

- A glaring feature of the present debate is that we are accused simultaneously of two contradictory sins:
  - In the 9/11 investigation, we are criticized for not “connecting the dots”. Bits of information here or there, which now stand out as forewarnings, were obscure or ambiguous at the time (Wohlstetter’s point).
  - In Iraq, the President is criticized precisely for acting on the basis of a large number of dots that formed a distinct pattern: Saddam’s 12 years of deception and frustration of UN inspectors; his defiance of 17 UNSCRs; his use of chemical weapons; the large quantities of CW and BW that UN inspectors said were unaccounted for; the long record of Iraqi links with terrorism; the multitude of intel reports from multiple sources (disclosed by SecState to UNSC on 2/5/03) -- all pointing to Iraqi possession and/or active pursuit of WMD and to the danger of allowing him to continue.
  - The burden of proof, under post-Gulf War UNSCRs, was on **Saddam** to prove he was disarming.
  - The world community shared this assessment, as demonstrated by UNSCR 1441 (Nov. 2002).
- It should be clear by now that regime change in Iraq was a precondition for finding out the truth. And regime change was a prerequisite for stopping whatever Saddam was doing:
  - Recall his elaborate organization dedicated to denial and deception.
  - Some Iraqi scientists still gloat about concealing nuclear activities from UNMOVIC (Barton Gellman, **Wash. Post**, 1/7/04).

- Another year or two of UN inspections would have done little to restrain Saddam's activities and yet might have led to the erosion of sanctions -- which would have brought us **closer** to a point of imminent danger.
- President Bush never said the danger of Saddam's WMD was imminent in March 2003. The issue was whether the world community could safely wait, doing nothing decisive to **prevent** that kind of imminent danger from arising.
- "Imminence" is not a workable standard. If something is about to happen, it may be too late to stop it.
- By ridding Iraq of Saddam's tyranny, the President and his Coalition partners eliminated the danger that Saddam posed. The world is now a safer place.

### Conclusion

- The USG should certainly review how to improve our intelligence on dangerous WMD programs -- examining where we have underestimated the problem as well as where we may have overestimated it.

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)

## Intelligence and Iraq:

### Critics's argument:

- You went to war for WMD and found none. The war was unjustified. You skewed the evidence and misled the public.

### Reality:

- We knew, everyone knew, Saddam Hussein had lots of WMD for a long stretch of time.
- He used WMD.
- The UN inspectors in the 1990s found he had loads of WMD.
- He forced the UN inspectors out in 1998.
- He refused to show what had happened to his WMD and programs.
- The UN Security Council and the US gave him repeated opportunities to come clean and get UN sanctions lifted.
- He played games with Blix's UNMOVIC; his deceptions continued.
  - He couldn't just assert he had no wmd or programs; he had to prove it.
  - That's what the Security Council resolutions required.
- When we face a wrongdoer behaving this way, taking action against him is the prudent thing to do.
  - After 9/11, you don't take chances.

**On Not Finding WMD Stockpiles:**

- True, we did not.
- The possibilities are that Saddam may have
  - Destroyed them.
  - Transferred them.
  - Been deceived by his people.
  - Deceived his people.
- We do not know the answers yet.
- But when we face a wrongdoer refusing to do the simple thing and meet the clear requirements of Security Resolutions, it is prudent to act.

**Saddam bore the burden to show what happened to his proven WMD, not us:**

- He was obligated under a decade of Security Council resolutions to prove their destruction unambiguously.
- He refused to do so.
- Only he could do what was necessary, not us.

January 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quotes on WMD

I want to get some of the quotes about WMD made by Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. I also want to get some of the statements on WMD by Carl Levin and other prominent people.

Let's gather all that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/9/04 11:30 07

*1/30*  
*George H. W. Bush*  
*Mr. Duman* *9 Feb*  
*SecDef*  
*carried to the*  
*Hill yesterday.*  
*G.R.*  
*017*

*cc: ES done 2/10*

OSD 09132-04

*hand 88*

January 28, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quotes on WMD

I want to get some of the quotes about WMD made by Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton and Al Gore. I also want to get some of the statements on WMD by Carl Levin and other prominent people.

Let's gather all that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012804-20

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

*2/3*  
*1/30* *C*  
*1/30*  
George,  
Can we get these  
today to use for  
SD testimony on  
T + W next week?  
Thanks,

OSD 09132-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24560

Recent Quotes by Former National Security Officials about WMD

*Madeline Albright*

**Excerpt from (AP) "Interview-Albright concerned about anti-Semitism in Europe, still backs U.S. invasion of Iraq" (1/29/04)**

On Iraq, Albright said the resignation of David Kay, who led the CIA's search for weapons of mass destruction, had not changed her views on the U.S.-led action to oust Saddam Hussein. She said she maintained her earlier position that she agreed that the step was necessary, but had doubts about its timing.

**"I did believe that there were weapons of mass destruction by deduction, because in 1998 when the inspectors left there were still weapons unaccounted for," Albright said, adding that she did not believe these weapons had posed an immediate threat to either the region or the United States. "In many ways I find it a mystery as to where these weapons are."**

*Sandy Berger*

**Excerpt from a HASC Hearing Transcript (11/19/03)**

Today, the failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq points out how elusive indisputable intelligence can be. It brings to mind Will Rogers remark that it's not what we don't know that hurts, it's what we know that ain't so. America cannot afford to be perceived as pursuing a policy of shoot now, ask questions later. Our credibility and authority will be completely destroyed.

I do believe Saddam Hussein represented a threat to the region, based upon his history and the capabilities we believe that he had and his intentions, which I think were to dominate the region. So I have supported regime change as an appropriate objective of American policy, really since the inspectors were thrown out in '98.

And I supported the president in the buildup to the invasion. And although I'm not running for president, I would have voted yes on the resolution, even though I don't have a vote. Having said all that, I think that this was not such an imminent threat, of the kind that the chairman is talking about, that we could not have taken the time to do this right.

And I don't think we did. I don't think we took the time to build a coalition, the true coalition. We had four countries on the ground. We had countries many of whom gave us air space and didn't shoot our planes down when we went over their air space. But the lack of that coalition was not terribly important in the war because we own the game when it's military. We don't own the game now that it's trying to make a peace. And I think it's unforgivable that we didn't have a plan for the day after. Unforgivable, in my judgment. So I was for Iraq, but I was for doing it right. I don't think we've done it right.

Excerpt from (AP) - "Albright, Cohen Seek Support in Ohio (2/18/98)

"The lesson of the 20th century is, and we've learned through harsh experience, the only answer to aggression and outlaw behavior is firmness," Berger said. "He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has 10 times since 1983," Berger said.

### Bill Clinton

Excerpt from M2 Presswire "Remarks by the President on Iraq to Pentagon personnel" (2/19/98)

If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear: We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. We want to seriously reduce his capacity to threaten his neighbors. I am quite confident from the briefing I have just received from our military leaders that we can achieve the objectives and secure our vital strategic interests.

Let me be clear: A military operation cannot destroy all the weapons of mass destruction capacity. But it can, and will, leave him significantly worse off than he is now in terms of the ability to threaten the world with these weapons, or to attack his neighbors. And he will know that the international community continues to have the will to act if and when he threatens again.

Following any strike, we will carefully monitor Iraq's activities with all the means at our disposal. If he seeks to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction we will be prepared to strike him again. The economic sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies fully with all U.N. resolutions.

### William Cohen

Excerpt from CNN's "Daybreak" (1/30/04)

O'BRIEN: In his testimony, David Kay said that intelligence failures date as far back as the Clinton administration. When we were talking to Congressman Porter Goss yesterday, he said that insufficiencies in the intelligence community go back to the early 1990s. You were the defense secretary at this time. Do you think it's the intelligence that's to blame or the administration's use of that intelligence that's to blame?

COHEN: Well, I think we can go back and look at the fact that we had insufficient information from human intelligence. We have great technical capability to see and hear things, but we don't have very many agents on the ground or spies on the ground so to speak. And so, there has always been a deficiency that we have recognized. But if we go back and look at this, we based the assumption that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, No. 1, because he did. He used them against the Kurds and the Iranians in the past.

Also, we found after Desert Storm that he had -- was well on his way to developing a

nuclear capability. And then, by his own declaration, he submitted documentation to the United Nations and the Security Council indicating he had vast amounts of VX, anthrax, mustard gas, missiles to deliver them. And so, by his own declaration, he indicated that he had these.

So, this assumption was -- and this is, again, an assumption -- that by throwing the inspectors out and refusing to allow them to come back in that he still had them, was continuing his program.

So, go back and look at what was the process and what was the substance of our intelligence analysis, and come to a conclusion then.

### Al Gore

#### **Excerpt from Federal News Service Transcript of "Remarks By Former Vice President Al Gore At The Commonwealth Club, San Francisco" (9/23/02)**

Moreover, if we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth rate military of Iraq and then quickly abandon that nation as President Bush has abandoned Afghanistan after quickly defeating a fifth rate military there, the resulting chaos could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from **Saddam. We know that he has stored secret supplies of biological and chemical weapons throughout his country.**

### Carl Levin

#### **Excerpt from a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: Transcript (9/19/02)**

**We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandates of the United Nations, is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.** Last week, in his speech to the United Nations, President Bush rightfully declared that the Iraqi threat is, quote, "exactly the kind of aggressive threat that the United Nations was born to confront." The president reminded the world that Iraqi aggression was stopped after the invasion of Kuwait -- in his words, "by the might of the coalition force and the will of the United Nations." And the president called upon the United Nations to act again, stating, "My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions."

We in Congress applauded the president's efforts to galvanize the world community through the United Nations to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and our actions now in Congress should be devoted to presenting a broad, bipartisan consensus in that critical effort. This does not mean giving a veto to the U.N. over U.S. foreign policy. No one is going to do that. It is an acknowledgment that Saddam is a world problem and should be addressed in the world arena, and that we are in a stronger position to disarm

Iraq, and even possibly avoid war, if Saddam sees the world at the other end of the barrel, not just the United States.

**Nancy Pelosi**

Excerpt from a Press Stakeout Transcript by Federal News Service (10/3/03)

This morning, I had the opportunity to get a briefing from Dr. Kay on the interim report of his inspection team. I want to commend Dr. Kay and the inspection team for their hard work, for their diligence, for their service to our country. From the unclassified report that you have and the interim report -- which is an interim report -- it is clear to me that there was no imminence of a threat of weapons -- from weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Because of the lack of imminence of a threat, it is clear that there was time for more diplomatic efforts to be made before we went to war. I want to make one distinction, and that is the distinction between having a weapon and having a weapons program. I mean, weapon program is an aspiration to want to get a weapon. It's a big difference between that and actually achieving one. And I think what we're seeing in Iraq -- there's a big difference between the aspirations and the capability to achieve that. In any event, it all comes down to in this interim report, the lack of imminence of a threat. I said at the time of the vote last fall that the -- as the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, that the intelligence did not support the threat that was being described. This interim report confirms that observation for me.

Text of a Press Release from Representative Pelosi (12/16/98)

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi Statement on U.S. Led Military Strike Against Iraq As a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I am keenly aware that the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is an issue of grave importance to all nations. Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology which is a threat to countries in the region and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process. The responsibility of the United States in this conflict is to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, to minimize the danger to our troops and to diminish the suffering of the Iraqi people. The citizens of Iraq have suffered the most for Saddam Hussein's activities; sadly, those same citizens now stand to suffer more. I have supported efforts to ease the humanitarian situation in Iraq and my thoughts and prayers are with the innocent Iraqi civilians, as well as with the families of U.S. troops participating in the current action. I believe in negotiated solutions to international conflict. This is, unfortunately, not going to be the case in this situation where Saddam Hussein has been a repeat offender, ignoring the international community's requirement that he come clean with his weapons program. While I support the President, I hope and pray that this conflict can be resolved quickly and that the international community can find a lasting solution through diplomatic means.



January 29, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

9

SUBJECT: SLRG Meetings

The seating for the expanded SLRG was **not** good. All the military were together and all the civilians were at the head of the table, separate from them. We ought to intersperse people. Further, there were too many people in the room. We ought to tighten it up next time.

337

I want to personally have control over SLRGs and expanded SLRGs. It is an important institution. I cannot turn it over to people who don't understand that. I will do it myself, all aspects—the time, the agenda, the seating, who is invited, and who is going to present.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Seating chart

DHR:dh  
012904-7

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

29 Jan 04

OS5 09133-04

Bad

Gen Brown

Gen LaPorte

Adm Giambastiani

Gen Abizaid

Adm Fargo

Lt Gen Sharp

VADM Szemborski

Gen Hill

Gen Handy

LtGen Cartwright

VADM Keating

Adm Ellis

Gen Jones

VADM Cebrowski

Mr. DuBois

Gen Eberhart

Gen Hagee

Mr. Geren

Mr. Di Rita

Gen Schoomack

Adm Clark

Mr. Moore

Mr. Stenbit

Gen Jumper

Dr. Cambone

Mr. Henry

Mr. Haynes

Gen Pace

Dr. Zakheim

Dr. Chu

Mr. Wynne

Mr. Feith

Dr. Roche

Gen Myers

Mr. Brownlee

SecDef

DepSec

Mr. England

Mr. Thiessen

Lt Gen Caldwell

11-L-0559/OSD/24566

Mr. Caldwell

Mr. Hoehn

January 29, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Military Intelligence College

I had never heard of the Joint Military Intelligence College. Please take a look at it, and tell me how you think it is doing and anything we ought to do to strengthen it

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/28/04 USD(I) memo to SecDef re: JMIC Annual Report FY03

DHR:dh  
012904-11

.....  
Please respond by 2/18/04

*352*

*29 January*

OSD 09134-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24567



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

JAN 28 2004

c/1/29  
✓  
1/29

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Stephen A. Cambone 

SUBJECT: Joint Military Intelligence College Annual Report – FY03

The Executive Summary from the subject report is forwarded for your information.

The directive (DoD Directive 3305.1) that requires this report to be sent to you is being amended to conform to the new organization.

cc: Director, DIA

11-L-0559/OSD/24568



## Executive Summary

Academic Year 2003 was one of progress and promise for the Joint Military Intelligence College. The mission of the College is to educate military and civilian intelligence professionals who are able to satisfy intelligence requirements as full partners in safeguarding and advancing the nation's interests and to conduct and disseminate relevant intelligence research. In both areas, education and research, the College experienced continued success through AY 2003. The College is the center of excellence for the education of intelligence professionals. Opportunities provided by the College allow students to pursue education and research directly relevant to their careers, and personal and professional advancement.

The year began on October 1, 2002 with the opening of the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The success of the center, the fellows, and the research and writing they have completed, exceeded even the College's expectations for its first year of operation.

College faculty and staff have worked hard to keep the curricula on the cutting edge of the intelligence profession. Following 11 September 2001, the need for education in the areas of terrorism, information operations, denial and deception, and asymmetric warfare became critical. Changes in the curriculum have addressed all of these requirements.

In August 2003, the College signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to establish a Graduate Center at NIMA. At the same time, the federal law enforcement community increased the priority they attach to educating their employees at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration enrolled students in the in-residence MSSSI program, and discussions were begun to consider establishing a College graduate center for FBI and DEA at Quantico, Virginia. Additionally, the Drug Enforcement Administration assigned an adjunct faculty member to the College to teach a course on counternarcotics.

In 2003 the number of candidates for the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) degree was 32 compared with 19 in the Class of 2002, underscoring the growing contribution of this program to the Services and the Community.

At the August 2003 graduation exercise, **151** MSSSI degrees were awarded. Honorary doctorates were awarded to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, The Honorable Joan A. Dempsey, and to Ms. Ann Caracristi, former Deputy Director of NSA and Member of the College's Board of Visitors.

In the Spring of 2002, the College accepted the papers and memorabilia of the late Lieutenant General Vernon A. (Dick) Walters, USA. His collection is now on display in the Vernon A. Walters Room of the College.

The International Intelligence Fellows Program completed its second iteration in March 2003 with military officers from the Asia-Pacific Region participating with American colleagues.

The College's Annual Conference in June 2003 drew over three hundred participants to consider the evolutionary role of reserve intelligence and its contribution to the defense and intelligence missions.

In 2003, as the College moved forward to advance its education and research programs, the Director DIA endorsed the College's request for \$3.5 million additional funds to enable it to continue to increase the scope of its education and research programs. This request has been submitted as part of the FY2005-2009 budget.

046/11



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

June 17, 2004, 9:00 AM

GENERAL COUNSEL

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*

SUBJECT: Addressing Sergeant Provance's "Cover-Up" Complaint

- The attached ABCNEWS article, "Definitely a Cover-up" reports that Sergeant Samuel Provance, a member of the 302<sup>nd</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion at Abu Ghraib in September 2003, asserts that Major General George R. Fay's ongoing investigation of Military Intelligence at Abu Ghraib is a "cover-up," in that during MG Fay's interview of him, MG Fay:
  - Actually focused on Military Police officer actions, rather than the actions of Military Intelligence officers;
  - Seemed to discourage SGT Provance from testifying;
  - Threatened to take action against SGT Provance for failing to report sooner;
  - Made SGT Provance feel as if it is he who is being punished and that he will be ostracized for speaking out.
- Additional media attention is anticipated.

383.6

OPTIONS:

1. Take no action pending review and assessment of MG Fay's soon-to-be-completed investigation report. If necessary, direct that the investigation be re-opened.
2. Direct that the investigation's appointing authority specifically evaluate SGT Provance's complaints and further direct or request an investigation of the complaints, as appropriate.
3. Refer SGT Provance's complaints to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense for appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that you select Option 1 and take no action until you have had the opportunity to review and assess MG Fay's completed report of investigation.

COORDINATION: VDJS, VADM Church

Attachment:  
As stated.

*NOTE: I have no doubt that these allegations will continue to attract attention; they will not fall through the cracks.*

*WJH*

17 Jun 04 21 May 04



OSD 09201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24571

SECDEF DECISION:

Approved DL *Reed & Peter Geren*

Disapproved IN 18 204

Other \_\_\_\_\_

cc: VADM Church  
MG Maples

Prepared By: Robert E. Reed, ODGC (P&HP), (b)(6)

May 21, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Complaint

*383.6*

What do you propose we do about this complaint by Sergeant Provance about General Fay?

Thanks.

Attach.

ABC News story: "Definitely a Cover-up," May 18, 2004.

DHR:dh  
052104-3

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

*6/18*

*SIR,  
RESPONSE ATTACHED.  
VR/CDR Nosenzo  
6/18  
21 May 04*

OSD 09201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24573

## 'Definitely a Cover-Up'

### Former Abu Ghraib Intel Staffer Says Army Concealed Involvement in Abuse Scandal

By Brian Ross and Alexandra Salomon



**May 18, 2004** — Dozens of soldiers — other than the seven military police reservists who have been charged — were involved in the abuse at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, and there is an effort under way in the Army to hide it, a key witness in the investigation told ABCNEWS.

"There's definitely a cover-up," the witness, Sgt. Samuel Provance, said. "People are either telling themselves or being told to be quiet."

Provance, 30, was part of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion stationed at Abu Ghraib last September. He spoke to ABCNEWS despite orders from his commanders not to.

"What I was surprised at was the silence," said Provance. "The collective silence by so many people that had to be involved, that had to have seen something or heard something."

Provance, now stationed in Germany, ran the top secret computer network used by military intelligence at the prison.

He said that while he did not see the actual abuse take place, the interrogators with whom he worked freely admitted they directed the MPs' rough treatment of prisoners.

"Anything [the MPs] were to do legally or otherwise, they were to take those commands from the interrogators," he said.

Top military officials have claimed the abuse seen in the photos at Abu Ghraib was limited to a few MPs, but Provance says the sexual humiliation of prisoners began as a technique ordered by the interrogators from military intelligence.

"One interrogator told me about how commonly the detainees were stripped naked, and in some occasions, wearing women's underwear," Provance said. "If it's your job to strip people naked, yell at them, scream at them, humiliate them, it's not going to be too hard to move from that to another level."

According to Provance, some of the physical abuse that took place at Abu Ghraib included U.S. soldiers "striking [prisoners] on the neck area somewhere and the person being knocked out. Then [the soldier] would go to the next detainee, who would be very fearful and voicing their fear, and the MP would calm him down and say, 'We're not going to do that. It's OK. Everything's fine,' and then do the exact same thing to him."

Provance also described an incident when two drunken interrogators took a female Iraqi prisoner from her cell in the middle of the night and stripped her naked to the waist. The men were later restrained by another MP.

## **Pentagon Sanctions Investigation**

Maj. Gen. George Fay, the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, was assigned by the Pentagon to investigate the role of military intelligence in the abuse at the Iraq prison.

Fay started his probe on April 23, but Provance said when Fay interviewed him, the general seemed interested only in the military police, not the interrogators, and seemed to discourage him from testifying.

Provance said Fay threatened to take action against him for failing to report what he saw sooner, and the sergeant fears he will be ostracized for speaking out.

"I feel like I'm being punished for being honest," Provance told ABCNEWS. "You know, it was almost as if I actually felt if all my statements were shredded and I said, like most everybody else, 'I didn't hear anything, I didn't see anything. I don't know what you're talking about,' then my life would be just fine right now."

In response, Army officials said it is "routine procedure to advise military personnel under investigative review" not to comment.

The officials said, however, that Fay and the military were committed to an honest, in-depth investigation of what happened at the prison.

But Provance believes many involved may not be as forthcoming with information.

"I would say many people are probably hiding and wishing to God that this storm passes without them having to be investigated [or] personally looked at."



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 18 PM 5:23

INFO MEMO

June 17, 2004 5:00 p.m.

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fundraising Status

*Ray DuBois 6/17/04*

- This responds to the attached snowflake which requests information on the status of fundraising for the Pentagon 9/11 Memorial.
- The total construction requirement will be nearly \$17.5 million.
- The tally of funds raised to date is **\$2.2 million**. This includes \$1.1 million already collected by DoD/WHS and the Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc. (PMF, Inc.) as well as \$1.1 million pledged to the PMF, Inc., but not yet received.
- While the early results were notable, the pace of fundraising is now slower than anticipated, and we will need to put construction activities on hold pending receipts.
- The family group is still very committed to taking the long view and doing this right. However, to build momentum, Lynda Webster has expressed a need for public endorsements and hands-on assistance from influential, high visibility individuals, such as former Secretaries of Defense, politicians, corporate leaders, and other notable figures. Jim Laychak, Chairman of the PMF, Inc., has spoken with Secretary Laird, with whom he served on the design jury. Norm Augustine has told me that he will make some personal calls to potential donors.
- Attached at Tab A is the current listing of the Executive Committee and Advisory Committee members for PMF, Inc.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Brett Eaton,

(b)(6)

0 SD 09202 -04



11-L-0559/OSD/24576

3E 792

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT

How are we doing on the DoD Memorial Fund Raising?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604.08ts

Please respond by: 6/21

6/9  
Ray DuBois -  
Please provide.  
Trx.  
D. Rita

# TAB

# A

**Pentagon Memorial Fund, Inc.**

**Executive Committee** (Confirmed Members as of June 3,2004)

**Norman R. Augustine**

Chairman, Executive Committee, Lockheed Martin Corporation

**Edward A. Brennan**

Executive Chairman, AMR and American Airlines

**Dr. Kurt Campbell**

Senior Vice President and Director of International Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Lynda Carter**

Actress and Washington Community Leader

**Thomas E. Donilon**

Executive Vice President, Law and Policy and Secretary to the Board of Directors, Fannie Mae

**John W. Douglass**

President and CEO, Aerospace Industries Association; Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy

**John Fahey**

President and CEO, National Geographic

**Kenneth Fisher**

Partner, Fisher Brothers

**Joseph Kampf**

President and CEO, Anteon International Corporation

**General John Keane**

Former Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army

**John W. Madigan**

Retired Chairman and CEO, Tribune Company  
Chairman, McCormick Tribune Foundation

**Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld (Joyce)**

Founding Chair of Chicago Foundation for Education

**Paul Stern**

Partner and Co-Founder, Arlington Capital Partners

Partner and Co-Founder, Thayer Capital Partners

**Catherine Stevens**

Attorney, Wife of Senior Alaska Senator Ted Stevens

**Patrick T. Stokes**

President and CEO, Anheuser-Busch

**Advisory Committee**

**Ms. Barbara Barrett**

President, Triple Creek Lodge

**The Honorable and Mrs. William Brock**

Chairman, Intellectual Development Systems, Inc.

Former Senator of Tennessee

Community Leaders

**Sandy Brock**

President, SMD Design Consulting Firm

Advisory Board Member, The National Air & Space Administration

Advisory Board Member, Center for Strategic and International Studies

**Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.**

Counselor for Center for Strategic and International Studies

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Former Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Former United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom

**The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger**

Former Secretary of State

Former National Security Advisor

**Alma Powell**

Co-Chair, America's Promise

**General Brent Scowcroft**

President and Founder, Scowcroft Group

President and Founder, The Forum for International Policy

---

**Jack Valenti**

Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America

**The Honorable William H. Webster**

Senior Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy

Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency

**The Honorable Togo D. West**

Former Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Former Secretary of the Army

June 18, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Global War on Terror

Attached is a paper I have written on the subject of the global war on terror, which raises some questions about what we call it. I do believe that how we characterize it, how we set it up, directly affects what we do about it and what our coalition does about it.

After you have had a chance to read this, I would like to visit with you, possibly when we get together on Monday. I think it is an important issue.

Respectfully,

Attach.

6/18/04 SecDef paper: "What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?"

DHR:dh  
061804-8

OSD 09210-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24582

0005

18 Jun 04

June 18,2004

SUBJECT: What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

Are we fighting a “Global War on Terror”?

- Or are we witnessing a “global civil war within the Muslim religion,” where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates?
- Or are we engaged in a “global insurgency” against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology?
- Or is it a combination of the two?

How we describe and set up the problem determines how we will deal with it – what priorities we establish and, in short, what we and our allies do to deal with the problem.

Since September 11,2001, the US has moved from addressing terrorism as a “law enforcement,” where we must find and arrest the terrorists, casting it as a “war” against terrorism, where we need to use our military might against the terrorist networks and their safe havens. That was an important and useful advance, freeing us and our coalition to use more vigorous responses.

The question now, however, is should we refine the problem further? What we may be facing is not only simply a law enforcement problem, it is also not a global war against generic terrorists, but rather a war by a radical extremist strain of Islam, a minority of that religion, first against the moderates in that religion, but also against much of the rest of the civilized world. The extremists’ grand objective seems to be to reshape the world – to cripple the US, to drive us out of the Middle East, to overthrow all moderate pro-Western governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and, in their dreams, to restore a “Caliphate” over large portions of the globe and reestablish an Islamic superpower.

The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge. Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global. They are currently making inroads in different ways in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

Europe, it seems, does not understand the problem. Some Europeans seem to think they can make a “separate peace” (the “Spanish syndrome”). The UN Secretariat does not seem to get it either. For us to be successful – for the world to be successful – the US, the UN and the Europeans must have a reasonably common perception of what is happening – of what the threat is. The UN was the second target of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. Yet the UN in Baghdad declared itself “unprotected” because they fancied themselves as “innocents.” But they were again attacked by extremists, very likely because the UN stands, in a general way, for the existing international system. To top it off, radical Islamists have recently put a price on Kofi Annan’s head. The reward is in gold to show the extremists do not depend on nation states.

It is likely that, over time, Europeans will be even more threatened than the US given their demographics. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East – and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values. It seems reasonable to conclude that the radicals’ goal is an ideological goal, and that terrorism is simply their weapon of choice.

We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way – to declare it as “a civil war within Islam” and/or a “global ideological insurgency” – and find ways to test what the analytical results would be depending on how we set up the problem.

A number of things follow from this analysis.

If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals off balance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case.

For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support. We will need to find ways to help them. But they must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it. Only if moderate Muslims actively and effectively oppose the global insurgency will the extremists be defeated.

Moderate Muslim leadership needs to create opportunities for their people. We can help. Their attitude with respect to women results in a population explosion and denies their nations one-half of the energy, brainpower and creativity that other nations benefit from. It is a formula for certain failure. Moreover, championing women’s rights has a strategic importance: education of women in developing countries correlates closely with shrinking families, “middle class” values, economic progress and likely erosion of the more extreme forms of religious orthodoxy.

We must encourage oil-producing Muslim states to diversify their economies and not use oil as a crutch. Oil equals wealth, but that they happen to be sitting on sand over oil detaches them from the reality that effort and investment lead to wealth for all of the rest of the world that does not happen to be sitting on sand over oil. Too often, oil-rich Muslims are against physical labor, so they bring in Koreans and Pakistanis to do the labor, while their young people remain idle. An idle population is vulnerable to radicalism, particularly when they conclude it is prudent to pay off the extremists so they can maintain their preferred positions.

It is desirable, if not a necessity, for Middle Eastern nations to reform and institute representative systems that are respectful of all their people, including women. The President's initiative is not "do-goodism," but wise calculation: It is advice to moderate states that political reform is a way to strengthen themselves – to co-opt middle classes against the extremists.

Finally, ideologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail – by not being driven out of the Middle East – we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver. At some point, its futility will become clear and the present enthusiasm will wane. Right now they are on a high, but what if 5 to 10 years from now they have achieved none of their goals (as Arafat has failed)? This is in our own hands.

The failure of the Iranian regime would also be a blow to the ideology, discrediting that ideology in the way that the collapse of the USSR discredited Marxist-Leninist parties most everywhere, except North Korea and Cuba. This, too, should be a strategic goal of ours in the struggle.

So if what is occurring is not a war against terrorism, we need to consider changing how we describe it and seek to get others to see the problem in a new way, because it will affect their attitudes and how they and we approach the critical problem of this decade.


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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'D. H. R.', written in a cursive style.

JUN 21 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Army Paper

Attached is a paper that the United States Army is putting out. Pete Schoomaker's focus on the "Warrior Ethos" is taking hold.

I think you will enjoy skimming through it.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
"Serving a Nation at War"

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UNITED STATES ARMY

SERVING  
a NATION  
at WAR

A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities



U.S. ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY  
SERVING a NATION at WAR  
A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities  
U.S. ARMY

# FOREWORD

President Bush told us that this war would be unlike any other in our Nation's history. He was right. After our initial expeditionary responses and successful major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, those operations have become protracted campaigns where we are providing the conditions of security needed to wage a conflict—a war of ideas. This is not simply a fight against terror—terror is a tactic. This is not simply a fight against Al Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents—they are foot soldiers. This is not simply a fight to bring democracy to the Middle East—that is a strategic objective. This is a fight for the very ideas at the foundation of our society, the way of life those ideas enable, and the freedoms we enjoy.

The single most significant component of our new strategic reality is that because of the centrality of the ideas in conflict, this war will be a protracted one. Whereas for most of our lives the default condition has been peace, now our default expectation must be conflict. This new strategic context is the logic for reshaping the Army to be an Army of campaign quality with joint and expeditionary capabilities. The lessons learned in two-and-a-half years of war have already propelled a wide series of changes in the Army and across the Joint team.

This learning process must not stop. Although this paper outlines the strategic context for the series of changes underway in our Army, its purpose is not to convince you or even to inform you. Its purpose is to cause you to reflect on and *think* about this new strategic context and what it portends for our future and for the Nation. All great changes in our Army have been accompanied by earnest dialogue and active debate at all levels—both within the Army and with those who care about the Army. As this paper states, “The best way to anticipate the future is to create it.” Your thoughtful participation in this dialogue is key to creating that future.



Peter J. Schoomaker  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff



R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

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## STRATEGIC CONTEXT

America is a Nation at war. *To* win this war, we must meld all elements of our national power in a determined and relentless campaign to defeat enemies who challenge our way of life. This is not a “contingency,” nor is it a “crisis.” It is a new reality that Soldiers understand all too well: since 9/11, they have witnessed more than a battalion’s worth of their comrades killed in action, more than a brigade’s worth severely wounded. Their sacrifice has liberated more than 46 million people. As these words are written, the Army is completing the largest rotation of forces in its history, and all 18 of its divisions have seen action in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. We have activated more than 244,000 Soldiers of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the last two years, and more than a division’s worth of Soldiers support homeland security missions. Over 300,000 Soldiers are forward-deployed. Like our Nation, we are an Army at war.



For any war, as Clausewitz pointed out, it is essential to understand “the kind of war on which [we] are embarking.” Although the fundamental nature of war is constant, its methods and techniques constantly change to reflect the strategic context and operational capabilities at hand. The United States is driving a rapid evolution in the methods and techniques of war. Our overwhelming success in this endeavor, however, has driven many adversaries to seek their own adaptive advantages through asymmetric means and methods.




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A CAMPAIGN QUALITY ARMY WITH JOINT AND EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES

Some enemies, indeed, are almost perfectly asymmetric. Non-state actors, in particular, project no mirror image of the nation-state model that has dominated global relationships for the last few centuries. They are asymmetric in means. They are asymmetric in motivation: they don't value what we value; they don't fear what we fear. Whereas our government is necessarily hierarchical, these enemies are a network. Whereas we develop rules of engagement to limit tactical collateral damage, they feel morally

world, political pluralism, economic competition, unfettered trade, and tolerance of diversity have produced the greatest individual freedom and material abundance in human history. Other parts of the world remain mired in economic deprivation, political failure, and social resentment. Many remain irreconcilably opposed to religious freedom, secular pluralism, and modernization. Although not all have taken up arms in this war of ideas, such irreconcilables comprise a portion of potential combatants.



Meanwhile, not all former strategic threats have vanished. In the Far East, North Korea's nuclearization risks intensifying more than 50 years of unremitting hostility, and many others pursue weapons of mass destruction. We confront the growing danger that such weapons will find their way into the hands of non-state groups or individuals. Armed with such weapons and with

unconstrained in their efforts to deliver strategic effects. Highly adaptive, they are self-organizing on the basis of ideas alone, exposing very little of targetable value in terms of infrastructure or institutions. To better understand such a war, we must examine the broader context of conflict, the competition of ideas.

no infrastructure of their own at risk, such "super-empowered individuals" could be anxious to apply them to our homeland.

A cursory examination of the ideas in competition may forecast the depth and duration of this conflict. The United States, its economy dependent on overseas markets and trade, has contributed to a wave of globalization both in markets and in ideas. Throughout much of the

On the international landscape the significance of American dominance in world affairs has not been lost on other states. Many are envious, some are fearful, and others believe that the "sole superpower" must be curbed. This presents fertile soil for competitive coalitions and alliances between states and non-state actors aimed at curtailing U.S. strengths and influence. Such strategic challenges have the potential to become strategic threats at some point in the future.



At the same time, in a globalizing world, military-capable technology is increasingly fungible, and thus potential adversaries may have the means to achieve parity or even superiority in niche



technologies tailored to their military ambitions. For us and for them, those technologies facilitate increasingly rapid, simultaneous, and non-contiguous military operations. Such operations increasingly characterize today's conflicts, and portend daunting future operational challenges.

We must prepare for the future, then, even as we relentlessly pursue those who seek the destruction of our way of life, and while waging a prolonged war of ideas to alter the conditions that motivate our enemies. Some might equate these challenges to the Cold War, but there are critical distinctions:

- Our non-state adversaries are not satisfied with a "cold" standoff, but instead seek at every turn to make it "hot."
- Our own forces cannot focus solely on future overseas contingencies, but also must defend bases and facilities both at home and abroad.
- Because some of our adversaries are not easily deterred, our national strategy is not "defensive" but "preventive."

- Above all, because at least some current adversaries consider "peaceful coexistence" with the United States unacceptable, we must either alter the conditions and convictions prompting their hostility—or destroy them outright by war.

That is not the strategic context for which we designed today's United States Army. Hence, our Army today confronts the supreme test of all armies: *to adapt rapidly to circumstances that it could not foresee.*

### CHANGE IN A TIME OF WAR

The Army always has changed and always will. But an army at war must change the way it changes. In peacetime, armies change slowly and deliberately. Modern warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, skills, techniques, and organizations of war is a recipe for chaos without thoughtful planning to assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. Second- and third-order effects of a change in any part of this intricate mechanism are difficult to forecast, and the consequences of misjudgment can be immense.



Peacetime also tends to subordinate effectiveness to economy, and joint collaboration to the inevitable competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on preserving force structure and budgetary programs of record. Resource risk is spread across budget years and programs,



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Today, that measured approach to change will not suffice. Our current force is engaged, and in ways we could not perfectly forecast. Our immediate demands are urgent, and fielding capabilities in the near term may outweigh protection of the program of record. We will shift resource risk away from fighting Soldiers.

To be sure, this urgency does not excuse us from the obligation to prepare for the future, for the prolongation of this conflict as well as the possible outbreak of others we cannot predict. But it does significantly blur the usual dichotomy between the Current and Future Force. We must ensure that we apply lessons learned from today's fight to those Future Force programs, even if that means adjusting their direction and timing. In short, change in a time of war must deal simultaneously with both current and future needs.

Such adaptation already is under way in the expansion and retailoring of our combat training centers, the establishment of a Futures Center in Training and Doctrine Command, reformulation of the Army Campaign Plan, and a wide range of consolidation and reorganization initiatives in Army major commands.

Fundamental to this adaptation will be our rapid evolution to a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities.

### **AN EXPEDITIONARY MINDSET**

The Army is no stranger to expeditionary operations. World War I saw deployment of the American Expeditionary Forces, and World War II the Allied Expeditionary Force. Throughout its history the Army has executed a wide array of



It must also pervade our entire institution. The Army cannot restrict change solely to its operating forces. The same Soldiers and leaders who adapt, learn, and innovate on our battlefields also drive

our success. But many today no longer perceive the United States Army to be expeditionary. Some might argue that the primary distinction of an expeditionary operation is its short duration.

on the battlefield with successful adaptation of the

calls for expeditionary forces capable of sustained


operations—confirms such a definition. Others view expeditionary as speed of responsiveness, but this perception, too, is not complete. In the Cold War, the United States was committed to reinforce Europe with ten divisions within ten days, but no one perceived that responsiveness as expeditionary. The reason for this is significant: in the Cold War we knew where we would fight and we met this requirement through prepositioning of units or unit sets in a very developed theater. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace pose an entirely different challenge—and the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations.

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because decades of planning and preparation against set-piece enemies predisposed American Soldiers to seek certainty and synchronization in the application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the rule. That can no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As elusive and adaptive enemies seek refuge in the far corners of the earth, the norm will be short-notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, and incomplete information—indeed, the requirement to *fight for* information, rather than *fight with* information. Soldiers with a joint and expeditionary mindset will be confident that they *are* organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in *the* world, at any time, in any environment, against any adversary, to accomplish the assigned mission.

## A JOINT MINDSET

The touchstone of America's way of war is the ability to project power and sustain operations across the globe. This is the essence of our armed

services excels in combining a wide array of technologies and tools in each dimension—land, air, sea, and space—to generate a synergy of effects that creates overwhelming dilemmas for our opponents. Today, that same emphasis on combinations extends beyond each service to joint operations. No longer satisfied merely to deconflict the activities of the several services, we now seek joint *interdependence*.



Interdependence is more than just interoperability, the assurance that service capabilities can work together smoothly. It is even more than integration to improve their collective efficiency and effectiveness. Joint interdependence purposefully combines service capabilities to maximize their *total* complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. There are several compelling reasons for doing so:

- First, modern technology has extended the reach of weapons far beyond their “dimensions of origin.” For example, land-based cruise missiles threaten slips at sea, and land-based air defenses pose challenges to air-, sea-, and even space-based capabilities. Merely defeating the mirror-image threat within a service’s **primary** dimension of interest *can* no longer suffice.
- Second, in addition to achieving daunting supremacy within the air, maritime, and

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
space dimensions, our sister services are developing increasingly powerful capabilities that can influence land combat directly.

- Finally, the nature of expeditionary operations argues for leveraging every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision. By projecting coordinated combinations of force unhindered by distance and generally independent of terrain, we can achieve maximum effect for the Joint Force Commander without regard to the service of origin.

At the strategic level, interdependence has long pervaded the Army's thinking. Lacking organic strategic lift, we can neither deploy nor sustain ourselves without the support of the other services. But our commitment to interdependence has not always extended to the tactical level. Constrained by the tyranny of terrain, ground forces operate in a world of friction and position. Command

and control are fragile, the risk of surprise is omnipresent, and our mobility advantage is relatively limited vis-a-vis our adversaries. Once committed, we must prevail. The decisive nature of land combat underscores a preference for organizational autonomy and redundancy, and tends to prejudice Soldiers against relying on others for essential ingredients of tactical survival and success. In the past, moreover, that prejudice too often has prompted interservice rivalries reflecting concerns far removed from the practical imperatives of the battlefield.

A nation at war cannot afford that indulgence. War relentlessly exposes theories built upon prejudice rather than proof, and Iraq and Afghanistan have been no different. The air-, sea-, or land-power debates are over. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. In turn, that will require us to



develop operational concepts, Capabilities, and training programs that are joint from the outset, not merely as an afterthought.

The prerequisites of a commitment to interdependence are broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be integrated in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed. At the same time, the Army requires a similar commitment from its sister services. The ultimate test of interdependence is at the very tip of the spear, where the rifleman carries the greatest burden of risk with the least intrinsic technological advantage. No concept of interdependence will suffice that does not enable the frontline Soldier and Marine.

The same logic and spirit that informs joint interdependence also underscores the role of interagency and multinational operations. In a sustained conflict that is a war of ideas, all interagency elements of our national power must work in concert with allies and coalition partners to alter the conditions that motivate our adversaries.

### **A CAMPAIGN QUALITY ARMY**

While our recent combat employments in Afghanistan and Iraq were models of rapid and effective offensive operations, they also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most successful military campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, victory entails winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat

of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.



The campaign quality of an Army thus is not only its ability to win decisive combat operations, but also its ability to sustain those operations for as long as necessary, adapting them as required to unpredictable and often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge is to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the staying power, durability, and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.



### **“ARE YOU WEARING YOUR DOG TAGS?”**

Does that question surprise you? It might if you view peace as our default condition, and war the exception. But our new reality is very different:

- A conflict of irreconcilable ideas.
- A disparate pool of potential combatants.
- Adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible.



- Evolving asymmetric threats that will relentlessly seek shelter in those environments and methods for which we are least prepared.
- A foreseeable future of extended conflict in which we can expect to fight every day, and in which real peace will be the anomaly.



in a time of profound change, the American Soldier will remain the center of our formations. In a conflict of daunting complexity and diversity, the Soldier is the ultimate platform. "Delinkable" from everything other than his values, the Soldier remains the irreplaceable base of the dynamic array of combinations that America can generate to defeat our enemies in any expeditionary environment. As the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter, the American Soldier is irrefutable proof that people are more important than hardware and quality more important than quantity.

This new reality drives the transformation under way in the Army. It is the lens that shapes our perception and interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. Are you wearing your dog tags?



## CHANGING FOR CONFLICT

### THE CENTER OF OUR FORMATIONS

Our core competencies remain: to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and to provide relevant and ready landpower to the Combatant Commander and the joint team. Therefore even

Making that Soldier more effective and survivable is the first requirement of adaptation to a joint and expeditionary environment. However much the tools of war may improve, only Soldiers willing and able to endure war's hardships can exploit them. Their skills will change as the specialization characteristic of industrial-age




warfare gives way to the information-age need for greater flexibility and versatility. What will not change is their warrior ethos.

That ethos reflects the spirit of the pioneers who built America, of whom it rightly was said, "The cowards never started. The brave arrived. Only the tough survived." It is a subtle, offensive spirit based on quiet competence. It is an ethos that recognizes that closing with an enemy is not just a matter of killing, but rather is the ultimate responsibility reserved for the most responsible and the most disciplined. Only the true warrior ethos can moderate war's inevitable brutality.

Just as the post-9/11 operational environment has fundamentally changed, so too should the expectations of the Americans entering Army service. We will seek individuals ready and willing for warrior service. Bound to each other by integrity and trust, the young Americans we welcome to our ranks **will** learn that in the Army, every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army's culture is one of **selfless** service, a warrior culture rather than a corporate one. As such, it is not important who gets the credit, either within the

Army or within the joint team; what's important is that the Nation is served.



## ORGANIZING FOR CONFLICT

Confronting an adaptive adversary, no single solution will succeed, no matter how elegant, synchronized, or advanced. Its very "perfection" **will** ensure its irrelevance, for **an** adaptive enemy will relentlessly eliminate the vulnerabilities that solution seeks to exploit and avoid the conditions necessary for **its** success. Instead, the foundations of Army Transformation must be diversity and adaptability. The Army must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving their agility and versatility. Building a joint and expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require **versatile** forces that can mount smaller, shorter duration operations routinely—without penalty to the Army's capability for larger, more protracted campaigns.

**Modular Units.** A key prerequisite to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations. The Army's force design has incorporated tailoring and task organization for decades, but primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which **all** echelons from platoon to Army Service Component Command were deployed. This presumption of



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infrequent large-scale deployment encouraged the Army to centralize certain functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would largely be complete before significant employment began. Moreover,

operations renders an ad hoc deployed force and a nondeployed residue of partially disassembled units, diminishing the effectiveness of both. The premium now is on employed combined-arms effectiveness at lower levels vice efficiency at



presuming peace to be the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units to optimize economic efficiency and management convenience rather than combined-arms training and rapid deployability. Above all, the Army designed its capabilities to satisfy every tactical requirement autonomously, viewing sister service capabilities as supplementary.

These presumptions no longer apply. Near-simultaneous employment and deployment increasingly characterize Army operations, and those operations are increasingly diverse in both purpose and *scope*. Tailoring and task-organizing our current force structure for such

macro levels. Peace will be the exception, and both tactical organizations and garrison configurations must support expeditionary deployment, not simply improvise it. Force design must catch up with strategic reality.

That strategic reality is the immediate need for versatile, cohesive units—and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, the Army also has a long history of deployment and employment of multifunctional brigade combat



teams. In addition, the Army has a broad array of reinforcing capabilities—both units and headquarters—but we can significantly improve their modularity. In the future, by shifting to such brigade combat teams as our basic units of action, enabling them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to headquarters and joint assets, we can significantly improve the tailorability, scalability, and “fightability” of the Army’s contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival.

Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than about operational and tactical agility, including the ability to reach routinely beyond organic capabilities for required effects. If in the process the Army can leverage our sister services’ mobility, reach, and lethality to satisfy some of those mission requirements, all the better. To achieve that, we must expand our view of Army force design to encompass the entire range of available joint capabilities. At the end of the day, squads and platoons will continue to win our engagements, but no one can reliably predict—particularly in the emerging operational environment—which squads or platoons will carry the decisive burden of the fight. In an expeditionary army, small units must be so well networked that whichever makes contact can leverage all joint capabilities to fight and win.

Such joint interdependence is not unidirectional. The more modular the Army’s capabilities, the better we will be able to support our sister services, whether by the air defense protection of an advanced sea base, compelling an enemy ground force to mass and thereby furnish targets for air attack, or exploiting the transitory effects

of precision fires with the more permanent effects of ground maneuver.

**Modular Headquarters.** The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will surrender organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities—Army, joint, or coalition. For that purpose, the headquarters themselves will be more robust, staffed to minimize the requirement for augmentation. They will



employ separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry; link to Home Station Operation Centers to minimize forward footprints; and be network-enabled organizations capable of commanding or supporting joint and multinational as well as Army forces.

Trained, cohesive staffs are key to combat effectiveness. Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Major tactical




headquarters must be capable of conducting Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Major operational headquarters must have enough permanent sister-service staff positions to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling them with equal effectiveness to serve as an Army Service Component Command, joint Task Force, or JFLCC headquarters.

**Stabilizing the force.** Paradoxically, an Army that seeks maximum flexibility through modularity must simultaneously maximize unit cohesion where it counts, within our companies, battalions, and brigades. Again, our altered strategic context is the driver. In the past, our approach to unit manning reflected the industrial age in which our forces were developed. Processes treated people as interchangeable parts, and valued their administrative availability more highly than their individual and team proficiency. At the unit level, manning and equipping reflected a “first-to-last” strategic deployment system. Peace was the default condition, allowing late-deploying units to fill out over time, typically by individual replacements, during the expected prolonged transition from peace to war.



At a time when protracted conflict has become the norm, during which we will repeatedly deploy and employ major portions of our Army, such an approach to manning will not

work. Instead, units will need to achieve and sustain a level of readiness far exceeding the ability of any individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families.



To achieve these effects we are undertaking the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army's history. It entails four key changes:

- First, we will shift the logic of our force structure from a scenario basis to a capability basis. We will need an adequate level of capability not only for employment, but also rotation for training, refitting, and rest. This does not preclude the requirement or the capability to surge for crisis response, but sustained commitment and rotation will be the expected requirement.



- Second, we must abandon tiering unit readiness by “early” and “late” deployers. There will be no “late deployers,” merely “future deployers” who are at different stages of their rotation cycle.
- Third, we must synchronize our Soldiers’ tours with their unit’s rotation cycles. While accidents and casualties will preclude eliminating all individual replacements, we must minimize routine attrition of deployed units.
- Finally, we must stabilize the assignment of Soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across recurring rotations.

As any personnel manager would tell you, “This changes everything.” And so it should. Today’s individual Soldier and leader development programs, for example, do not accommodate force stabilization. They **will** change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They **will** change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with force stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a **few** portions of **the** Army and invariably failed as a result. The Army **will** undertake a comprehensive policy redesign to stabilize the force.

### **ADJUSTING THE TOTAL FORCE MIX**

Changes in our Reserve Component organizations will match those in the Active component. Reserve Component forces are a vital part of the Army’s deployable combat power. The National Guard will continue to provide **strategic** and operational depth and flexibility; the Army Reserve **will** still reinforce the Army with **skill-rich** capabilities across the spectrum of operations. But with Reserve Component forces constituting an

indispensable portion of **our deployed landpower** in this protracted conflict, an **industrial-age** approach to mobilization no longer **will** suffice. The model will shift from “alert-mobilize-train-deploy” to “wain-alert-deploy.” Reserve Component mobilization must take less time and allow **maximum** mission time and more flexibility in managing individual and unit readiness, mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and post-deployment recovery.




We **will** adjust the Active/Reserve **mix** so that Active component forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment. For that purpose, some high-demand, low-density capabilities currently found only in the Reserve Components must be reincorporated in the active force. At the same time, while we **will** not expect Reserve Component units to deploy in the first 30 days, they **will** employ forces **within hours** for security operations within our homeland. As with the active forces, **the** need to build predictability into Reserve Component deployments will require increasing the proportion of high-demand, low-density units in the Reserve Components. Finally, the shift to rotation-based unit manning rather than individual replacement will apply to the Reserve Components also. As with the active forces, **therefore**, we must find a way to account for unit mobilization, training, and deployment with a **realistic personnel overhead account**.

### TRAINING AND EDUCATION

To change the mindset of an Army, few tools are as important as its programs of training and education. The U.S. Army has long set the standard across the world in its commitment to Soldier and leader development. This strong legacy is our fulcrum on which to leverage change. We train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. Today's conflict presents both.

**Individual Training.** The certainty confronting today's Soldiers is overseas deployment and probable combat. Some will enter combat within weeks or months of their basic and advanced individual training. Thrust into a conflict in which adversaries far outnumber their comrades, our Soldiers must believe and demonstrate that quality is more important than quantity, and that people are more important than hardware. On the battlefields we face, there are no front lines and no rear areas; there are no secure garrisons or convoys. Soldiers are warriors first, specialists second.

training programs to generate the stress necessary to change behavior and increase learning. Training will accurately represent the rigors and risks of combat. It will last longer than in the past and will put teams and Soldiers through the exhausting, challenging, and dangerous tasks of fighting. Soldiers will fight in body armor and will wear it in training. The safe handling of loaded firearms must be second nature, live-fire training routine. For a conflict of daunting ambiguity and complexity, training must imbue Soldiers with a fundamental joint and expeditionary mindset:



Therefore Soldier training will be stressful, beyond the comfort zone. We will adapt our

an attitude of multifunctionality rather than specialization, curiosity rather than complacency, and initiative rather than compliance. Above all, training must build the confidence that our Soldiers will prevail against any foe.




**Initiative**  
Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the lifeblood of our success over the past two decades. Given that





every Army employment presumes a joint context, we will reinforce this key condition throughout our collective **training**.



Therefore we have begun introducing joint, interagency, and multinational components into our key training experiences at both the CTCs and our Battle Command Training Program for division and corps headquarters. We also support establishment of the Joint National Training Capability and have begun routinely incorporating joint effects in our home-station training. All these efforts will make Soldiers expert in the application of joint capabilities at every organizational level. At the same time, at both CTCs and home stations,

we have transformed training environments to reflect the more complex and ambiguous threats confronting our deployed forces. The ability to develop and disseminate actionable intelligence must be a key training focus.

Integrated with force stabilization cycles, CTC rotations will be the capstone experience for forces preparing to deploy. But the heart of the Army's training remains the training conducted at home stations by junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). To empower them, we must shake a legacy of planning-centric rather than execution-centric training. We need battle drills rather than "rock drills," free play rather than scripted exercises, and Soldiers and units conditioned to seek out actionable intelligence rather than waiting passively to receive it.

**Professional Education.** Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must address its uncertainties. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our **challenge** is to go to school while at war. The need to teach Soldiers and leaders *how to think* rather than *what to think* has never been clearer. To defeat adaptive enemies, we must *out-think them in order to out-fight them*.

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Technology can enhance human capabilities, but at the end of the day, war remains more art than science, and its successful prosecution will require battle command more than battle management. We can have “perfect” knowledge with very “imperfect” understanding. Appreciation of context transforms knowledge to understanding, and only education can make that context accessible to us. Only education informed by experience will encourage Soldiers and leaders to meet the irreducible uncertainties of war with confidence, and to act decisively even when events fail to conform to planning assumptions and expectations.

As we improve leaders’ skill and knowledge, we can rely more heavily on their artful application of leader knowledge and intuition. Planning will be iterative and collaborative rather than sequential and linear, more a framework for learning and action than a rigid template. Adapting our military decision making process will allow us to capitalize on the American Soldier’s inherent versatility, our growing ability to acquire and process information, and the increased rapidity with which we can disseminate, coordinate, and transform planning adjustments into effective action.

To that end, the Army will continue to refocus institutional learning, shifting Center for Army Lessons Learned collection assets from the CTCs to deployed units. Similarly, recognizing that a learning organization cannot afford a culture of information ownership, we must streamline the flow of combat information to assure broader and faster dissemination of actionable intelligence.

At the individual level, finally, there is no substitute for experiential learning, and today’s Army is the most operationally experienced Army in our history. There are tremendous opportunities to leverage experience through our



well-developed culture of After Action Reviews, Lessons Learned, the great experience of the serving officers and NCOs, and the links from joint and Army operational analyses to formal learning—distributed and in the classroom. At the same time, some of the best battlefield lessons result from tragic but honest mistakes. We cannot allow a zero-defects mentality to write off those who make such mistakes, and we will review our leader evaluation systems to ensure they are leader development tools and not mere management sorting tools.

**Leader Development.** The Army has always prized leader development, and in peacetime has been willing to accept some personnel turbulence to broaden career experience. That is not acceptable for an army at war. Effective collective training requires the participation of the entire team, and units are not merely training aids for commanders. If we are serious about developing more versatile junior leaders, we must avoid too rapid a turnover of those leaders in the name of career development.

The problem is somewhat less acute for middle- and senior-grade officers, whose fewer numbers in any case make greater assignment mobility unavoidable. Even in their case, however, the growing complexity and political sensitivity of joint and expeditionary operations urges leaders to seek assignments that inherently involve interpreting complex requirements and

implementing sophisticated solutions. Our legacy system of leader development will certainly evolve, with the alteration of some current career roadmaps or the accreditation of a greater variety of substitute experiences.



Just as we subordinate individual leader development to mission requirements, so too must we subordinate institutional leader development to joint requirements. Army training and education should produce imaginative staffs and commanders who understand how to interact with other service leaders and how to get the most out of the full set of joint capabilities. To produce leaders who reach instinctively beyond their own service for solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must routinely incorporate joint education and experience. In the end, we seek a bench of leaders able to think creatively at every level of war, and

able to operate with equal comfort in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments. And if achieving that requires submitting our internaeducational institutions to joint oversight, we should not shrink from it.

## DOCTRINE, MATERIEL, AND SUSTAINMENT

**Doctrine.** The Army rightfully views itself as "doctrine-based." In the 1970s and 1980s, doctrine was the engine that transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the victor of our post-Cold War engagements. That doctrine, however, reflected the strategic environment dominated by a singular adversary, and an opposing army in symmetric contrast to our own. Although the challenge of developing doctrine for a joint and expeditionary environment is different, it is no less essential.

In any era, doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It encapsulates a much larger body of knowledge and experience, providing an authoritative statement about how military forces do business and a common lexicon with which to describe it. As it has evolved since the Cold War, Army doctrine portrays military operations as a seamless and dynamic combination of offense, defense, stability, and support. Now we must extend it to address enemies who deliberately eschew predictable operating patterns.

To deal with such asymmetric opponents, doctrine must reflect the associated uncertainties. Uncertainty is in some measure inseparable from the nature of warfare. Asymmetry merely increases it. Doctrine cannot predict the precise nature and form of asymmetric engagements, but it can forecast the kinds of knowledge and organizational qualities necessary to cope with them.

Such a doctrine, however, cannot simply prescribe solutions. Rather, it must furnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose unexpected requirements, and a menu of practical options founded in experience from which leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively. Its objective must be to foster initiative and creative thinking. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap.



The U.S. military enjoys an immense array of capabilities that are useless if we overlook their prerequisites and limitations. Doctrine can help frame those capabilities in context, while not prescribing their rigid application in any given case. A doctrine intended for our emerging strategic context must underwrite flexible thought and action, and thereby assure the most creative

exploitation of our own asymmetric advantages. It must also account for the inherently joint character of all Army operations.

Most important in today's environment, doctrine must acknowledge the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and avoid both prediction and prescription. It is not the role of doctrine to predict how an adversary will behave. Rather, its function is to enable us to recognize that behavior, understand its vulnerabilities and our own, and suggest ways of exploiting the former and diminishing the latter. It will be useful only to the extent that experience confirms it, and its continuous review and timely amendment therefore is essential.



**Materiel.** Materiel development is a special challenge for an army at war, because we must not only anticipate and address future needs, we must meet pressing current demands. There is, however, a constant first priority: equipping the individual Soldier. In the past, the Army reserved the best individual equipment for units most likely to fight; in an expeditionary army, one cannot forecast such units. Every deployed Soldier needs the best individual equipment available. In an expeditionary environment, moreover, we can no longer continue to treat equipment as permanently owned by the units to which it is assigned. In a rotation-based force,



equipment ownership **will** be the exception. We will increasingly separate Soldiers from their carriers and equipment, tailoring the materiel mix for the mission at hand.

Being most amenable to adaptability, speed, and flexibility, aviation assets will be key to an expeditionary force. The lessons learned after two-and-a-half years of war have provided our Army the opportunity to reassess near-term aviation requirements. We will fundamentally restructure our aviation program to ensure the entire Army



aviation fleet remains a key tool of maneuver, with better command-and-control connectivity, manned-unmanned teaming, extended operational reach, and all-weather capability.

Equally vital is the continued development of more rapidly deployable **fighting** platforms. The Future Combat System (FCS) remains the materiel centerpiece of the Army's commitment to become more expeditionary, and will go far to reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. We will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we will seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own.

Meanwhile, neither current platforms nor the FCS will satisfy expeditionary requirements without significant improvement in the ability to develop actionable intelligence and increase communications bandwidth at corps level and below. The Army, together with the joint community, must relentlessly address the architectures, protocols, and systems of a redundant, nonterrestrial network capable of providing the focused bandwidth necessary to support mobile Battle Command and joint Blue Force tracking. Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom continue to highlight the successes and potential of network-enabled operations. The operational advantages of shared situational awareness, enhanced speed of command, and the ability of forces to self-synchronize are powerful. In this light, we must change the paradigm in which we talk and think about the network; we must fight rather than manage the network, and operators must see themselves as engaged at all times, ensuring the health and operation of **this critical weapons system.**

logistical structure for operations in developed

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theaters with access to an extensive host-nation infrastructure. Expeditionary operations promise neither. Simultaneity and complexity compound the eternal constraints of decreased time, vast distances, and limited resources, creating a pressing demand for a logistics system that capitalizes on service interdependencies. We must operationally link logistics support to maneuver in order to produce desired operational outcomes. We will only realize such "effects-based logistics capability" when all services fully embrace joint logistics, eliminate gaps in logistics functions, and reduce overlapping support. We require a distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations; one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements.

At the tactical level, that means eliminating today's layered support structure, instead bridging the distance from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams with modular, distribution-based capabilities packages. We intend to use the resources from current-day corps and division support commands (COSCOMs and DISCOMs) to create joint-capable Army Deployment and Sustainment Commands (ADSCs). These ADSCs will be capable of serving as the foundation for a joint logistics command and control element at the Joint Task Force (JTF), and capable also of simultaneously executing the full range of complex operations—from theater port opening to employment and sustainment—required in the emerging operational environment.

Finally, it is clear that the physical security traditionally associated with the rearward location of logistical facilities no longer can be assumed. On today's battlefields and tomorrow's, we must make explicit provision

for the protection of logistical installations and the lines of communication joining them to combat formations. And the Soldiers conducting sustainment operations must be armed, trained, and psychologically prepared to fight as well as support.

**Installations.** Installations are an integral part of the deployed force from home station to the foxhole. Operational deployments and rotational assignments across the globe mean installation capabilities will transcend more traditional expeditionary support requirements associated with mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining the force. More than a jump point for projecting forces, installations serve a fundamental role in minimizing their footprint through robust connectivity and capacity to fully support reach-back operations.

Installation facilities must readily adapt to changing mission support needs, spiraling technology, and rapid equipment fielding. Installation connectivity must also support en route mission planning and situational awareness. Education and family support will use the same installation mission support connectivity to sustain the morale and emotional needs of our Soldiers and their families.

## **BUILDING INTERDEPENDENCE**

Earlier we noted that our future is irrevocably joint. Interdependence is central to both the expeditionary mindset and campaign quality we seek. Achieving it is first a *conceptual* challenge, for all capabilities—not **only** materiel capabilities—spring from operational concepts. Joint operational concepts are emerging, and the Army has participated actively with its sister services in their creation, articulation, wargaming, and experimentation. This effort identifies five key joint and expeditionary interdependencies:



**Joint Battle Command.** Making the flexible supported-to-supporting relationships first attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom routine will demand interoperable command-and-control mechanisms supported by comprehensive and redundant information networks. Effective joint intelligence, joint fires, blue force tracking, and logistical support all require agreement on the data definition, protocols and standards informing the design of those networks. Army contributions to Joint Forces Command's Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Transformation Roadmap will be essential to assure the Army's LandWarNet, the Air Force's C2 Constellation, and the Navy's ForceNet reflect those common standards.



**Joint Fires and Effects.** Interdependence of joint fires will be vital to mitigating risk and reducing reliance on organic fires in a joint expeditionary environment. Linked through an

effective joint command and control system, the American Soldier will have the entire target acquisition and engagement resources of the theater at his fingertips. All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest






combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as “universal observers” or “joint effects control teams.” To facilitate more effective employment of close air support in a non-contiguous battlespace, we need universal standards for observation, designation and target acquisition. The Air Force has demonstrated increasing responsiveness in recent operations and has committed to a general officer-led Joint Force Air Component Command element at every Army corps exercise. Both the Army and the Air Force still have concerns, the Army for responsiveness and reliability, the Air Force for control and training demands. Their resolution will require cooperative adjustments by both services.

**Joint Force Projection.** The Army's dependence on its sister services is nowhere more obvious than in the area of mobility, both strategic and operational. We cannot wish away the laws of physics, but neither must we surrender to them. The solution of the Army's mobility challenges will require action by both the Army and its partners. For its part, the Army must continue to improve its inherent deployability. This remains the focus of major development programs such as Stryker, the Future Combat System, and numerous complementary systems, all of which are being designed to satisfy the space and weight limitations of our major tactical intra-theater lift capabilities. It also is a major objective of our tactical unit redesign.

For their part, the Navy and Air Force must resource strategic and operational lift as critical service competencies. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in a future conflict in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. To overcome that challenge, we will need the ability through vertical envelopment to bypass those entry points with forces of operational significance, forces with the mobility,



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lethality, and survivability that can maneuver to and defeat these integrated point defenses.

Current intra-theater lift assets do not have the range, payload, or operational profiles to support that requirement. Future lift assets will need all of them. We also share the Marine Corps' interest in the feasibility of deploying from a Sea Base. The Army supports the development of a joint Sea Base capability and looks forward to a cooperative effort to address the intra-theater lift challenge.

**Joint Air and Missile Defense.** The increasing range and speed of air and missile threats, and their potential ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, place a high premium on the integration of service air and missile defenses. The ultimate objective is a joint system of complementary air defense kill mechanisms able to defeat mixed threats of varying complexity—the right amount and combination of effects at the right time and place without regard for their domain of origin.

This arena already enjoys considerable integration of service programs, most recently the merger

of Army and Marine Corps programs to defend against cruise missiles. Other collaborations already underway include Joint Airspace Control Procedures, Joint Identification Procedures, Joint Engagement Authority Procedures, and others. Common operational architectures will be key.

**Joint Sustainment.** All the services have key interdependencies in the logistics arena and will experience even more in an expeditionary environment. There is a pressing demand for a joint end-to-end logistics structure that permits reliable support of distributed operations in which deployment, employment, and sustainment are simultaneous.

At the theater level, in cases where the Army is the predominant service component, we are willing to transform our current Theater Support Commands into regional joint logistics commands subordinate to the regional combatant commander. If another service is the predominant component, that service's logistics organization could serve as the basis for a regional joint support command, with the Army contributing in its normal Title X/WEAR (wartime Executive Agency Requirement) role.



## MOVING OUT

The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, fearing that we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is more delay. The 3rd Infantry Division is reorganizing today to a prototype redesign that converts its combat structure from three brigades to four brigade teams. Other divisions will soon follow.



The best way to articulate the future is to create it. The Army is moving out and this is merely the beginning. Our incentive is not change for change's sake. Our incentive is effectiveness in this current conflict. If necessary to defeat an adaptive enemy, the changes described here are a mere down payment on changes that will follow.

Our challenge is to ensure that we are not against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are changing. The real question is, "Are we changing enough?" Our

brave Soldiers and adaptive leaders constitute the best Army in the world, but we can be even better. It is inside of us and it is what the Nation expects. The future as we know it—our lives, the lives of our families, this country, everything we love and cherish—all depend on our success in meeting this challenge. *Are you wearing your dog tags?*





# **The Army Combat Uniform**

On June 14, 2004, the Army announced the selection of the new Army Combat Uniform (ACU).

The ACU is the culmination of many months of research and development, developed by Soldiers for Soldiers, and is the uniform of choice by the overwhelming majority of the Army's leaders and Soldiers.

The ACU consists of a jacket, trousers, patrol cap, moisture wicking t-shirt and improved hot weather and temperate weather desert boots, in a new Universal Camouflage pattern.

The ACU enhances Soldier performance by providing a uniform that is tailorable to the individual mission; provides enhanced functionality and ergonomics over the existing Battle Dress Uniform (BDU); and does away with requirements to procure uniforms focused on specific environments—the ACU is worldwide deployable.

The uniform will replace multiple versions of the current woodland pattern BDU and will be easy to maintain, thereby decreasing the out-of-pocket costs to our Soldiers.

The uniform will be fielded to deploying units starting in April 2005, and fielding to the entire Army is expected to be completed by December 2007.

The Army Black Beret will remain authorized for wear with the new ACU; no decision has been made concerning whether the ACU will replace any uniform other than the BDU.

The ACU, including component materials, will be manufactured in the United States using the same industrial base that produces the current BDU.

The ACU is part of the Army's continuing effort to equip the Army's Current Force today with Future Force capabilities and to provide America's Most Deployed Combat System, our Soldiers, the best, state-of-the-art equipment.

If you have any questions, please contact Lieutenant Colonel Craig Collier, Army Legislative Liaison, (703) 697-4418.

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# The Soldier's Creed

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

**I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THE MISSION FIRST.**

**I WILL NEVER ACCEPT DEFEAT.**

**I WILL NEVER QUIT.**

**I WILL NEVER LEAVE A FALLEN COMRADE.**

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life

I am an American Soldier.

Army Strategic Communications  
Room 3B548, Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.  
703-693-5962  
[www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil)



U.S. ARMY

JUN 21 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Attached is a report from Freedom House that gives Uzbekistan decent marks for some things they are doing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Freedom House report

DHR:dh  
061804-5

UZBEKISTAN

21 Jun 04

OSD 09220-04

Tashkent, Uzbekistan  
June 1, 2004

Report by Amb. Vic  
Jackovich (ret.) for  
Freedom House

**THE SHELKOVENKO CASE IN UZBEKISTAN:  
Mission Accomplished -- Lessons Learned**

*Introduction and Summary*

I was part of a three-person group invited by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Freedom House to travel urgently to Tashkent, Uzbekistan in order to look into the case of an Uzbek detainee, Andrey Yur'yevich Shelkovenko, who had died on May 19, 2004, while in Uzbek police custody. The others in the group were Dr. Michael Pollanen, Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the Chief Coroner of the Province of Ontario, Canada, and Mr. James Gannon, Deputy Chief of the Cold Case Unit in the Office of the Prosecutor in Morristown, New Jersey.

Our group's mission was to serve as international observers while the Uzbek government conducted what turned out to be a rather thorough and systematic review of the case. Two NGOs, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, had been asked by the Uzbek government to participate in the observational mission. By Presidential decree, the government also established its own review commission, comprised of six Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice officials. Uzbek authorities in effect re-opened this case and their full investigation is still ongoing.

Dr. Pollanen and I arrived in Tashkent in the early morning and Mr. Gannon later in the evening of Thursday, May 27.

In the end, we determined that all the available evidence indicated that Shelkovenko had committed suicide by hanging and that the Uzbek authorities detaining him were not guilty of maltreatment, abuse, or torture. We determined further that early reports of torture-related injuries were understandable misinterpretations of changes that occur in bodies after death, such as decomposition.

Beyond this, we discovered that the Shelkovenko case presented an opportunity to develop a check-list of "lessons learned" and recommendations for all involved -- Uzbek and international entities-- and for various levels -- technical and political.

## *Autopsy Review*

Early in the morning of May 27, Pollanen and I sat with representatives of both NGOs, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, and surveyed computerized photos taken by HRW. We listened to HRW staffers relate how they had first been called by the deceased's family members to look at the body and how they had offered them solace. HRW's initial work provided invaluable first-hand reporting of details. Upon reviewing the photos, Pollanen made a tentative preliminary judgment that the deceased had probably hanged himself and had not been abused by the police.

Later that morning, the body was visited at the city morgue by a delegation consisting of Dr. Pollanen and myself, as well as Uzbek government commission members, Uzbek medical experts, representatives of both NGOs and the immediate family (mother, sister and wife). After the body was positively identified by the sister, it was transported to another part of the city, where a second autopsy was performed by Uzbek specialists and observed directly by Dr. Pollanen.

At the second site, officials from the General Prosecutor's office did not immediately accede to getting started. The entire procedure had been arranged in advance through Uzbek government agencies, and the requisite documents obtained by the two NGOs from the government and the family of the deceased. Nevertheless, the General Prosecutor's representatives now wanted to be shown an additional letter from the mother detailing what new questions the second autopsy should investigate. Through on-the-spot negotiation, this demand was rescinded. (This could also have been a misunderstanding. In Uzbek tradition, if not law, autopsies are commissioned by relevant authorities with a list of questions the autopsy is expected to answer.)

The second autopsy was very thorough and lasted several hours. From the international side, only Dr. Pollanen attended. This was arranged by design in order to limit this event to a strictly specialist level, thus permitting free technical discussion among professionals. Pollanen was initially told he could not photograph the body, but this disinclination was reversed when he offered to share all his information and photo disks with the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks themselves did extensive still photography and video taping of the U.S. delegation visit to the second autopsy site.

Two findings were made during the second autopsy. First, all the available evidence indicated that this was suicide by hanging. Second, there was no physical evidence of mistreatment, abuse, or torture. Pollanen determined further that early reports of torture-related injuries were understandable misinterpretations of changes that occur in bodies after death, such as decomposition.

The first autopsy had apparently set out to prove suicide by hanging, but not to disprove other possibilities. Consequently, some routine steps had been omitted, an oversight readily recognized and acknowledged by higher-ranking Uzbek medical specialists at the second autopsy. In contrast, the second autopsy performed a full range of forensic procedures, essentially filling in the previous blanks.

At the conclusion of the second autopsy, our group, U.S. Embassy staffers, Uzbek commission members and Uzbek medical specialists (minus the Human Rights Watch NGO and the family, who had not proceeded beyond the morgue) met and discussed next steps. It was agreed that the hanging ligature would be brought to the site for analysis and that the members of our group would then retire to confer among ourselves. (The head Uzbek medical specialist wanted to announce joint findings already at this juncture, but this was aborted when it was explained that this would be premature.)

Arrangements were made for the family to retrieve the body of the deceased from the second autopsy site and to transport it to the deceased's domicile for internment.

#### *Investigative Review/Press Conference*

The following morning, Friday, May 28, the three members of the group met to review developments and outline future strategy. (Gannon had arrived the previous evening, so this was the first time the entire three-person group had met together.) Gannon and Pollanen spent most of this day about one hour's drive from downtown Tashkent at the Gazalkent prison facility, where Shelkovenko had died. There Gannon observed Uzbek authorities conducting a review of criminal investigative and detention aspects of the case.

In his inspections and interviews, Gannon determined that the jail cell and its environs were compatible with the proposition of suicide by hanging. He had access to all relevant evidence at the crime scene, though some related materials were not immediately available and were promised at a later date.

The police recounted testimony of Shelkovenko's cell-mates, whom they cited as saying the deceased had been anxious because he had implicated accomplices in the murder case for which he was charged and because he feared reprisals from these accomplices. The police also provided Gannon a "booking photo" of Shelkovenko, which they said had been taken on May 18, one day before his death. The photo is the head shot of a middle-aged man with a seemingly normal visage and no signs of bruises or injuries. Shelkovenko had reportedly been shuttled back and forth between a temporary lock-up and a more permanent cell because of ongoing investigations into other crimes (thefts) for which he was being investigated.

In general, Gannon found his investigator counterparts to be friendly and cooperative. The Tashkent and Gazalkent Chiefs of Police themselves also attended. In consulting later with our group, Gannon stressed that he was observing Uzbek procedures and that he was evaluating evidentiary material and testimony provided by the Uzbek police, since it was not in the group's mandate to conduct an independent investigation. Through a Freedom House intermediary, the group dispatched a list of additional documents and evidentiary materials requested for observation. (These were made available the next day, as recounted below.)

During this day (May 28), I stayed behind in Tashkent in order to provide a detailed report of proceedings thus far to the U.S. Ambassador and to participate in a press conference at Freedom House. Though the press event was organized around a different human rights subject, journalists were expected to bring up the Shelkovenko case. When this indeed happened, I was introduced from the periphery to give a preliminary presentation.

At the press conference, I described the make-up and mission of our group and stressed we were observing reviews being conducted by Uzbek authorities and not undertaking an independent investigation. I said it was premature as yet to announce even preliminary observations. I expressed the group's gratitude to the Uzbek government, to the family of the deceased (to whom I also conveyed our deepest condolences) and to Freedom House. Finally, I commended the Uzbek government for its openness and cooperation during this process and expressed the hope that this would lead to greater cooperation in the future between the Uzbek government and the international community on issues of mutual concern, like human rights.

#### *Further Investigation/Meeting with Family*

On Saturday, May 29, the group met with the deceased's mother and sister, who had been brought to Freedom House offices in Tashkent. It was clear from the outset that the family members had expected to hear a conclusion that would confirm their suspicions of maltreatment and torture.

But Dr. Pollanen explained that all of the body features he had seen were consistent with natural post-mortem changes in the corpse. He said that the deceased had, from all available evidence, died by hanging and that there were no indications of maltreatment prior to that. He also provided a comprehensive survey of all the details of the second autopsy he had monitored.

The family members were grateful for the detailed explanation, but remained skeptical on certain points, such as place and circumstances of death. The mother especially found suicide a difficult scenario to accept and wondered whether her son had been forced to hang himself. Pollanen noted that there were no forensic signs that Shelkovenko had struggled against the hanging.

Later that evening, the group was invited to the General Prosecutor's office in Tashkent. There the set of additional documents -- that had been requested earlier as a result of the first examination of the jail cell and environs in Gazalkent -- were reviewed by the group, especially by Gannon in his capacity as a criminal investigator.

The additional documents conformed with the scenario of the arrest and detention of Shelkovenko, and his later death by hanging at the Gazalkent jail. Reports of the jailers, depositions from cellmates, ambulance logs and medical reports were all perused by the group.

### *Uzbek Commission/Final Press Conference*

On May 31, after a brief perusal of documentation concerning the mother's complaints against the police and the official responses to these complaints, the group held a final meeting with the Uzbek commission named to conduct the review of the Shelkovenko case.

During the final meeting between our group and the Uzbek commission, we provided a summary of our observations, as well as our confirmation of Uzbek contentions that Shelkovenko had hanged himself and not been abused or tortured. Pollanen and Gannon gave detailed reports of forensic and investigative observations, while I provided a check-list of "lessons learned" and recommendations.

Freedom House Tashkent Director Mjusa Sever expressed her satisfaction that a new level of cooperation had apparently been achieved. But she told the Deputy General Prosecutor that his office should be more open to international queries and promised him that there would be more such cases in the future. Sever said she was concerned that the Shelkovenko family not become the target of officially inspired pressure or intimidation.

The commission chairman, the Uzbek Deputy General Prosecutor, said that respect for human rights was a priority for his office and pledged to take our recommendations under serious consideration. He cautioned that Uzbekistan was a new state and that democratization was still an ongoing process. He acknowledged that Uzbek legislation was gradually developing toward greater protection of individual citizens' rights.

At a final Freedom House press conference at the Hotel Radisson in Tashkent, our group was introduced to an audience of about 50 journalists, foreign representatives and others. We then announced summaries of our final observations. Copies of those summaries were distributed at the event to all attendees.

At the press conference, some journalists and foreign representatives took the opportunity to pose questions and seek clarifications. They were especially keen to discover details about the forensic finding of suicide by hanging and lack of physical evidence of torture. Very quickly, the questioning turned from this particular case to the general human rights situation in Uzbekistan. Though this broader scope did not fall within the mandate of our mission, I did note that there were legitimate concerns in the international community about this and that there was recognition by the Uzbek government of the need for improvement and for implementing new procedures. News from the press conference was carried extensively by domestic Uzbek media and to some extent by international media.

*The Role of Human Rights Watch*

In my pre-departure briefing at Freedom House headquarters in Washington, I was told that a fellow NGO, Human Rights Watch, was a partner in this mission. It was HRW that reportedly had had first contact with the Shelkovenko family and had assisted the family in making early assessments of the body's condition, photographing it and even moving it from place to place to ensure it was preserved and not interned. Both HRW and Freedom House had been invited by the Uzbek government to observe the Uzbek re-investigation of the case.

HRW staffers provided our group its first in-depth briefing on the case and showed digital photographs they had taken. But as soon as they learned that our preliminary observation assessed that this was probably a hanging and that torture was not involved, they expressed surprise and effectively withdrew from the mission. I had the impression that HRW had prejudged the outcome. That was reinforced by a press statement issued by HRW's Asia Bureau in London already May 21, in which HRW had declared – prematurely and inaccurately, as it turned out – that this was a case of Uzbek government-sponsored torture. This press statement pointedly linked the Shelkovenko case to the issue of whether U.S. government aid should be continued to Uzbekistan.

On May 28 and 29, I had two phone calls with the HRW chief in Tashkent in which I urged her organization to maintain a presence in our activities, and recalled that I had been told they were partners in this mission. HRW staffers had accompanied the family to the morgue the morning of May 27 for identification of the corpse, but were not seen again until the May 31 Commission meeting and press conference. At these two events, they did not participate, but only attended.

It was difficult to escape the impression that HRW lost interest in the Shelkovenko case as soon as it became clear that our mission's observations would not demonstrate Uzbek government culpability for human rights violations. Certainly, its instantaneous dissociation from Freedom House and from this mission was unannounced and unexpected.

At the May 31 press conference, I publicly recommended – without naming HRW – that organizations that had issued premature erroneous statements on this case demonstrate their seriousness and professionalism by issuing retractions or corrections.

On June 1, HRW posted a correction on its Internet website alongside the May 21 statement.

## *Lessons Learned and Recommendations*

During the course of observing this case, the three members of our group assessed that there are numerous “lessons learned” and recommendations that could be deduced from the experience.

In effect, the Shelkovenko tragedy seemed to present a wealth of opportunities that could, if exploited, enhance human rights standards in the country, assist in deepening domestic reforms and strengthen relations and confidence between Uzbekistan and the international community.

While numerous international missions have offered recommendations on this general subject, we do not believe our check-list substantially diverges from those of others and it might even provide useful additional dimensions. Recommendations intended for Uzbek authorities are offered in the spirit of mutual cooperation and full respect for the Uzbek government and the sovereignty of the state. In the end, it is for Uzbek authorities to determine whether these recommendations correspond to their interests and can be implemented.

The following is a list of the primary “lessons learned” and recommendations from this mission, for both Uzbek and international entities (governments and NGOs). While the first several “lessons” are aimed at the “quick fix” technical level, several others are intended for the longer-term policy level. And, while many of the “lessons” and recommendations are intended for the Uzbek government, some others pertain to the international community.

- *Preserving physical evidence.* Authorities need to move quickly and expeditiously to identify, seize and preserve all possible items of physical evidence. In this case, this would have included the ligature used for hanging (which, in fact, was quickly secured), as well as the detainee’s clothing and belongings, incidental objects and all other physical items in the vicinity.
- *Maintaining separation between examination and autopsy.* It is apparently common practice in Uzbekistan for the same medical specialist to perform a routine medical examination during life and an autopsy on the same body after death. In order to avoid the appearance of irregularity, Uzbek authorities can consider the utility of dividing these functions.
- *Integrating efforts.* The professional integrity of the forensic autopsy should stand alone, as should the contribution of investigative and other efforts. That said, an integrated final approach, rather than a compartmentalized one, would call for multi-disciplinary information sharing and would likely lead to more productive results.
- *Protocol on ‘death in custody.’* In Uzbek law, there is as yet no special protocol, or regulated procedure, for investigating the death of someone in police custody. Instead, such a death is given the same treatment as any homicide. Given the special circumstances and sensitivities involved, Uzbek authorities might consider introducing a new protocol on ‘death in custody.’

- *Creating a record.* Authorities need to create a thorough and immediate documentary record of a crime scene, including a log of events, interviews with relevant people involved and a full photographic record. In the Shelkovenko case, many interviews were conducted several days after the death, possibly in reaction to public attention to the incident.
- *Demonstrating full transparency.* In general, authorities need to conduct procedures that demonstrate full transparency vis-à-vis the public, other agencies of government, the media and the international community. This is above all a matter of instilling confidence in the people that government agencies are conducting themselves in a straightforward, professional and efficient manner.
- *Conducting a complete autopsy.* Forensic medical experts should ensure that complete postmortem examinations are performed on all deaths in police custody, including dissection of the neck. It is also important to perform supplementary dissections to effectively demonstrate the absence of significant findings, such as lack of injuries associated with torture.
- *Ensuring complete reviews.* In general, it is important that authorities conduct thorough and professional reviews, and to do so with an eye toward the public character of many of their actions, vis-à-vis both domestic and international public opinions. In the Shelkovenko case, Uzbek investigating authorities sought to prove a suicide by hanging, but did not find it necessary in their view to disprove public or on-the-street suspicions about maltreatment or torture. Shaping activities in a way that facilitates the government's communicating with the people would seem to be an important priority.
- *Inviting outside observers.* Authorities can often enhance the credibility of and confidence in its own findings by inviting professional international participation or observation at an early stage. The Shelkovenko case presents the international community with a rare opportunity to support the thrust of the Uzbek government's original findings, thus providing a basis for enhanced public support for reform-oriented government actions.
- *Accepting the citizen's right to question.* Authorities can demonstrate maturity by accepting that individual citizens, families and public associations have an inherent right to discuss decisions by a government. For this reason, government authorities should refrain from reprisals against those who first questioned these decisions.
- *Accepting the government's right to govern.* Citizens, families and associations bringing government decisions to the attention of the international community can demonstrate corresponding maturity by understanding the need for closure through final decisions by their own governments. Though they may not agree with the government's action, and may have even suffered property or other loss because of it, any society will sense a need for closure and movement forward. (Again, on the government side, this tension can be alleviated through pro-active public information mechanisms, respect for citizens' rights and mechanisms designed to demonstrate government responsiveness to citizens' interests.)
- *Enhancing inter-agency coordination.* Better inter-agency coordination among government agencies can lead to a more cohesive approach and more productive result. In the Shelkovenko case, while high-level Uzbek officials probably sensed

that a de facto exoneration of their government was in the offing, lower-level officials were likely not made aware of this and sometimes assumed defensive even stone-walling postures.

- *Communicating with the public.* Both Uzbek authorities and the international community need to ensure that public information is provided objectively and expeditiously, both to media outlets and to the general public. This can be accomplished through various means, including timely press conferences, public statements, special briefings, etc. Above all, perhaps, the Shelkovenko case once again points up the need for a pro-active Uzbek government public information program, including training of government agency spokespersons.
- *Gathering the facts first.* As a "lesson learned" for NGOs and the international community, public statements should be handled with seriousness and professionalism. At the least, relevant information and facts should be gathered and analyzed prior to the issuance of public statements. In this case, Human Rights Watch, one of the two NGOs originally engaged, prematurely (and inaccurately, as it turned out) declared this to be an example of torture by Uzbek authorities. After the results of our mission were announced, HRW posted a correction on its Internet website alongside the erroneous declaration.
- *Correcting misstatements.* Of course, any corrective actions taken by the international community should be brought to the attention of the host government, thus serving to ensure the government of the best intentions of the international community, and demonstrating objectivity and transparency in its own actions. The U.S. Embassy (Press Office) can assist, if not through a public statement of its own, then by informally contacting media outlets to help set the record straight. On the part of the major media and wire services, this presumes their willingness to acknowledge and publish corrections.
- *Following through with objectivity and transparency.* International organizations, once having launched inquiries into events in the country, need to see their actions through to the end, regardless of the consequences. In this case, Human Rights Watch was one of two prime NGO movers behind the international inquiry into the Shelkovenko case. But, as soon as HRW learned that its early presumption (and public declaration) of Uzbek official culpability was incorrect, it effectively withdrew participation in the case. This withdrawal has not only impacted on HRW's credibility in Uzbekistan and worldwide, but on the credibility of the international community in Uzbekistan. It also tends to reinforce the darkest suspicions of some Uzbek officials that the international community is arrayed against them and is not interested in giving them an objective opportunity.
- *Helping the citizenry.* NGOs with a publicly declared interest in assisting the citizens of foreign countries in which they operate should recognize responsibility for results of actions taken. In this case, given the post-mortem condition of the body, the Shelkovenko family could not have been faulted for believing initially that their son's death was irregular. Because of the final outcome of this case and because of the family's alliance with foreign NGOs in the country, however, the family is arguably now in a very difficult position vis-à-vis the Uzbek government and Uzbek society. The NGOs involved with this family will have to decide for themselves to what extent they are responsible for the family's ongoing welfare.

In the future, greater sensitivity needs to be shown by NGOs toward the Uzbek citizenry, especially in understanding their vulnerabilities and long-term interests.

- *Setting up a human rights group.* The Uzbek government and international entities should consider using the experience of the Shelkovenko case to institutionalize a human rights monitoring group that would consist of a small group of representatives from Uzbek government agencies, local NGOs and embassies. The group could routinely review selected cases with an eye to applying a cohesive approach to instances such as the Shelkovenko case. In the end, such a group could greatly enhance mutual confidence-building, strengthen the reform process in government and enhance human rights standards. (Alternatively, the Uzbek government could consider expanding the mandate of the special commission established for the Shelkovenko case.)
- *Providing in-depth special briefings.* Given the notoriety of the case, our group offered to make itself available for in-depth special briefings to selected audiences in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, including Uzbek institutions, institutions of other governments (especially the U.S. government) and international organizations. In this connection, we have offered through Freedom House to provide a series of briefings in Washington, including to the Department of State, institutions dealing with Central Asian affairs, human rights activists and U.S. Congress. This would provide opportunities for discussion of details not appropriate in public settings. The group could provide objective information on recent developments in Uzbekistan to Washington policymakers. The "lessons learned" check-list – or parts of it, depending on the audience – could also be included in the briefings.
- *Introducing forensic and investigative primers for USG officials.* Both the forensic pathologist and the criminal investigator offered to hold training sessions at the U.S. Embassy for local U.S. officials interested in gaining a quick primer to help with future human rights cases. In this connection, both also offered to hold similar sessions with non-U.S. international representatives in Uzbekistan. Finally, the group recommends to the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) that a course be introduced there for U.S. foreign service personnel assigned to human rights portfolios in embassies abroad.
- *Increasing training and exchanges.* In the opinion of the group, the Shelkovenko case provides the Uzbek government and the international community with an additional stimulus for training programs and professional exchanges on various levels. Through U.S. government-sponsored and other international programs, the opportunity is presented for further professional interchange among government policymakers, forensic pathologists, criminal investigators, police officials and human rights activists.

~~[Detailed technical reports will be submitted separately by Pollanen and Gannon.]~~

~~[It is recommended that the U.S. Ambassador transmit letters of commendation on behalf of both Pollanen and Gannon.]~~

Victor Jackovich  
Ambassador (ret.)  
President, Jackovich International, LLC  
Vice President, Ervin Technical Associates – ETA

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Special Asst. \_\_\_\_\_

Bearsky \_\_\_\_\_

# CB-FILE COPY

EF-8323

February 2  
January 30, 2004

I-04/001270

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

**SUBJECT TSG and Terrorism and Battle of Ideas**

**Do we have the theater security cooperation group focusing on terrorism and the battle of ideas?**

Thanks.

DHR,dh  
013004-1

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

**COMPLETED**

FEB 11 2004

**OSD 09227-04**

000

July 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

February 10, 2004  
1-04/001270  
EF-7566

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary Of Defense for Policy *See [Signature] (U)*

SUBJECT: DoD Security Cooperation and Battle of Ideas (U)

- (U) The DoD Security Cooperation Guidance is under review. Combatting Terrorism remains the most important theme, with particular emphasis placed on using Security Cooperation activities to support waging the battle of ideas.
- (U) We anticipate providing you a coordinated draft of the Security Cooperation Guidance within a month.

Prepared by: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy)

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/24629

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

January 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Les Brownlee  
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
 Dov Zakheim

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
 SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

381

As I indicated to Pete Schoomaker before he met with the President and before he met with the House Armed Services Committee, it is important that all of us are precise in what we say about all aspects of the Army force level and transformation proposals.

Specifically, people should avoid talking about financing the Army plan in any way that appears certain, because we do not have certainty yet. We need to achieve certainty. We need to bring to closure an understanding with Josh Bolten as soon as possible.

My clear, current understanding with Les Brownlee, Pete Schoomaker, Andy Card and the President is as follows:

- DoD believes the FY04 Supplemental will enable us to pay for the costs of this program to be incurred by the Army for FY04.
- DoD will recommend to OMB and the President that we finance the Army's costs for this program for FY05 through an '05 Supplemental, which we anticipate will be introduced in January or February 2005.
- The question about FY06 and FY07 funding is open. It will depend on the President and Congress determining what aspects of the modernization and transformation of the force that we will be undertaking can be characterized as "resetting" or "reconstituting the force" in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD's view is that all of it, or a very large portion of it, should be so considered, as was the case for two or three years after Desert Storm. It takes that long to reset.

30 Jan 04

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

OSD 09228-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24630

- With respect to any costs that go beyond that period, and/or which are not approved in a supplemental, DoD may have to use any funds that we decide should be so allocated out of the inflation-plus \$10 billion we are scheduled to receive each year for the FYDP. Unfortunately, we can probably anticipate that the plus \$10 billion could only be \$4 or 5 billion if the Congress continues to add still more benefits and entitlements that are not requested.
- To the extent none of the above succeeds, the funding obviously will have to come from the Army through savings in other areas, which would be very painful to their procurement account.
- Finally, the other agreement I have with the Army and the President is that, at this time, we have agreed to increase from 33 to only 43 brigades — not to 48 brigades — and to delay a decision on the 5 additional brigades until we are close to the agreed-upon off ramp. So, this is a two-part plan. First, ramp up to 43 transformed brigades. Second, at the appropriate time, decide whether or not to continue to build from 43 to 48 brigades.
- We must all be careful to not create inaccurate impressions on the Hill or with the Press. We need to make sure we speak with precision and clarity and all say the same things in the same way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012904-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



January 30, 2004

TO: Josh Bolten  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

Josh—

Attached is a memo I have just sent out to our folks. I think it conforms to our brief discussion on the subject and the discussion I had with the President.

Please let me know if you are comfortable with it. If not, I will fix it.

Regards,

**Attach.**

1/30/04 SecDef memo re: Financing Army Force Levels

DHR:dh  
013004-6

OSD 09229-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24632

581

5

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

January 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker  
Dov Zakheim

cc: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Financing Army Force Levels

As I indicated to Pete Schoomaker before he met with the President and before he met with the House Armed Services Committee, it is important that all of us are precise in what we say about all aspects of the Army force level and transformation proposals.

Specifically, people should avoid talking about financing the Army plan in any way that appears certain, because we do not have certainty yet. We need to achieve certainty. We need to bring to closure an understanding with Josh Bolten as soon as possible.

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- The question about FY06 and FY07 funding is open. It will depend on the President and Congress determining what aspects of the modernization and transformation of the force that we will be undertaking can be characterized as "resetting" or "reconstituting the force" in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD's view is that all of it, or a very large portion of it, should be so considered, as was the case for two or three years after Desert Storm. It takes that long to reset.

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

OSD 09228-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24633

- With respect to any costs that go beyond that period, and/or which are not approved in a supplemental, DoD may have to use any funds that we decide should be so allocated out of the inflation-plus \$10 billion we are scheduled to receive each year for the FYDP. Unfortunately, we can probably anticipate that the plus \$10 billion could only be \$4 or \$5 billion if the Congress continues to add still more benefits and entitlements that are not requested.
- To the extent none of the above succeeds, the funding obviously will have to come from the Army through savings in other areas, which would be very painful to their procurement account.
- Finally, the other agreement I have with the Army and the President is that, at this time, we have agreed to increase from 33 to only 43 brigades—not to 48 brigades—and to delay a decision on the 5 additional brigades until we are close to the agreed-upon off ramp. So, this is a two-part plan. First, ramp up to 43 transformed brigades. Second, at the appropriate time, decide whether or not to continue to build from 43 to 48 brigades.
- We must all be careful to not create inaccurate impressions on the Hill or with the Press. We need to make sure we speak with precision and clarity and all say the same things in the same way.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012904-14

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

February 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mel Laird

326

Here is a note from Mel Laird on the subject that he would like to talk to you about.

Thanks.

Attach.

24-30 January 2004 DoD Iraqi Transition Strategic Assessment Teams' Weekly Update

DHR:dh  
013004-12

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Cathy Jones-7/2  
SC

OSD 09230-04

9 Feb 04



To Sec. Rumsfeld  
From Mal Said — 1 of 3 pages —

(b)(6)

I don't have study  
I referred to this afternoon  
here in Florida. It has  
it gets over when I return  
to Washington Tuesday.  
The note to Jack Vessey  
I mentioned is forwarded  
as promised.

Good to talk to  
you !!

Regards  
Mal

FROM : LAIRD  
JAN 7 2004 17:43

FROM: KATHY HEAVER

PHONE NO : (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

TO (b)(6) Jan 30 2004 06:53PM P2  
P.1

293

Melvin R. Laird

(b)(6)

January 8, 2004

Dear Jack:

(b)(6) and I appreciated receiving the Christmas card and note from (b)(6) and you. The note of praise and support for our troops in 2004 is something I'd like to talk with you privately about at the time of the Alfalfa Club dinner later this month.

The All-Volunteer Service will work well in connection with our Total Force Concept, *only if* the commitment of Regular Forces around the world is properly planned. *With our* country's commitment of Regular Forces, as of January 1, 2004, another 175,000 in Army personnel is needed to ensure proper rotation if we continue present deployments around the world. *We* can count on using Reserve and Guard Forces on the planning basis of eight months active duty when called for regular duty in each two-year period. We will have no problems recruiting either Regular, Reserve, or Guard Forces if we remember the "quality of life" we must maintain for our service personnel and for their families. Most Americans have no idea of the commitments made by the Guard and Reserve in our present deployment. *We still* have not gotten our service personnel up to the pay scales of policemen, firemen, and many others, which *are* falling behind even with the most recent pay increases. Pay is still important, but other considerations must also be taken into account. I recently served on Secretary Rumsfeld's Commission to select the proper tribute to the men and women we lost in the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. When we compare the million dollar award to some of the families who suffered in the attacks in Washington and New York, with the losses of the families of our men and women on active duty every day, it does cause some of these families (if not our troops) to wonder. All these losses are truly mourned

The Army has to speak out on this manpower problem if we are to meet all requests around the globe. Some in civilian leadership have the opinion that manpower commitments around the world can be filled by our Total Forces with no respect to the number of men and women in the Regular Forces.

11-L-0559/OSD/24637

FROM : LAIRD

PHONE NO : (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Jan 30 2004 06:54PM P3  
P.2

3 of 3

General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA, Ret.)  
January 8, 2004  
Page Two

I have argued this point with Rummy, but he still insists no more manpower end strength is needed. I'll talk with him again next week. I am proud of our All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept, which I initiated, but we just can't take it for granted.

With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Melvin R. Laird

General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA, Ret.)

(b)(6)

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: **Follow Up From Our 9/11 Commission's Meeting on 1/30/04**

1. Haynes will get the quotes from the Woodward book and the other book where Shelton was quoted.
2. Haynes is supposed to get the veto letter.
3. Cambone will send them the Cohen list – show it to me before it goes.
4. Larry will find the “Major Directions” paper.
5. You will give me three pieces of paper showing precisely:
  - What we did on terrorism and Homeland Security pre-9/11;
  - What I did on 9/11; and
  - What we have done on terrorism and Homeland Security post-9/11.

*000.5*

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
013104.05

Respond by:           *2/13/04*          

OSD 09231-04

*31 Jan 04*

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

I need an appointment with Dan Dell'Orto and I want to see physically what shows up on the federal register and how we can get it right. This is confusing and I don't know the answer.

*OSD*

Thank you.

DHR/azn  
103104.10

Respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *2/10/04* \_\_\_\_\_ *DB*

*3/5*

*Cathy:*

*Schedule week he comes back from TRIP.*

*J.*

OSD 09233-04

122  
1803



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600

10/21 PM 2:13



INFO MEMO

October 20, 2003, 10 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dan Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

- This responds to your note to me of October 15, 2003, regarding whether gifts that you accept are published. (Tab A) You also asked to see what such publications look like.
- Gifts of more than minimal value that federal employees accept from foreign governments are itemized and published annually in the Federal Register through the Department of State in accordance with the Foreign Gifts Act. Other gifts are not published. Minimal value is currently set by regulation at \$285.00.
- At Tab B is the latest notice published in the Federal Register for applicable foreign gifts accepted in 2002. The section showing gifts that you and others in DoD accepted is flagged for you starting at page 37260.
- Gifts are reported to GSA and normally retained by DoD in a **vault** or on official display until the recipient prepares to depart his office. At that time, the recipient would decide which gifts he wishes to purchase, and the rest would be physically transferred to **GSA**. In the published report, "Reported to GSA for purchase" means that the recipient has expressed an interest in purchasing the gift.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Bill Brazis,

(b)(6)

<sup>10/23</sup>  
Dell'Orto -  
Please let's discuss  
D. H.A.

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	10/22

10/2

10



TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: November 29, 2003  
SUBJECT: SecDef Gifts

Set a meeting with Dan Dell'Orto for me to go over this SecDef Gifts paper. I just don't understand it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
113003.03a

*Attach: Info Memo to SD from Dell'Orto re: SD Gifts 10/20/03*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 12/15

U22534 /03

9

11-L-0559/OSD/24642



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 21 2004

The Honorable George P. Shultz

(b)(6)

000.5

Dear George,

Here are some papers that, if I have not already sent to you, I think you will find interesting. You will note that some of your thoughts have found a home here!

Thanks again for your wonderful hospitality. Joyce and I enjoyed the evening thoroughly. Please tell (b)(6) thanks so much, and that the spurs and handkerchiefs arrived

Regards,

Enclosures

- Torture, 6/17/04
- Global War on Terror, 6/18/04
- Thoughts on Iraq, 6/7/04

21 Jun 04

OSD 09234-04

June 17,2004

SUBJECT: Torture

Seeing the headlines in the press and the raft of articles and TV shows on the subject of "torture," over recent days I have been thinking about the issue.

When the word torture is used, most people think of physical torture. For myself, I think of the videos that we have all had an opportunity to see of Saddam Hussein's people cutting off prisoners' hands or pulling their tongues out with pliers and then slicing off their tongues.

But the impression one gets from reading the many editorials, op-ed pieces and news stories is that the United States Government has ordered, authorized, permitted, or tolerated physical torture.

Before I make an assertion, I have to say that we still have a number of investigations going, and, understandably, we are learning more as we go along. Also, I have to avoid saying anything that could later be characterized in a court martial as "command influence," where the result could be that a guilty defendant might be released.

However, at this point, I can say with high confidence that I have not seen anything that suggests a senior military or civilian official of the US Government ordered, authorized, permitted, or tolerated torture or any other act inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions, other laws of the United States or the values of the American people. There have been some illegal acts, to be sure, some of which have already been punished and others that will be.

11-L-0559/OSD/24644

So it is important for those commenting on this subject to consider what the effects of their acts are, just as those of us in government have to consider the effects of our acts.

- First, consider the effects on members of the US military when they read these articles, leaving them with the incorrect impression that physical torture has been ordered, authorized, or tolerated by their government. They may begin to believe that that is true, which, to my knowledge, it is not.
- Consider the Iraqi people and the people of the countries in that region whose help we need to succeed. As they get the impression that the US orders torture, which it does not, it makes our task there vastly more difficult.
- Finally, consider the reaction of those who may capture or hold prisoner US military or civilian personnel. They will contend that their acts of torture are justified by what they can point to as press reports of US torture, as inaccurate as they may be.

It is past time for those discussing this subject to do it in a more responsible way that does not overstate or misstate the facts.

We are in a war. Let there be no doubt, the American people's lives are at risk. Those of us in Government feel a responsibility to strive every day to protect the lives of the American people, military and civilians.

I don't get up every morning and say, "What might some critics say about a decision I may make?" I get up every morning and say, "Within the laws of the United States, including our treaty obligations and the values of the American people, what can I do to help protect our people from more attacks?" We of

course check proposals and decisions with the lawyers before making such decisions.

As of today, I can say that I have high confidence that the decisions we have made at the senior levels of the Department have been consistent with US treaty obligations, other laws of the United States and the values of the American people. And, further, I believe they have been in the best interests of our country.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/torture

June 18,2004

SUBJECT: What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

Are we fighting a “Global War on Terror”?

- Or are we witnessing a “global civil war within the Muslim religion,” where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates?
- Or are we engaged in a “global insurgency” against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology?
- Or is it a combination of the two?

How we describe and set up the problem determines how we will deal with it – what priorities we establish and, in short, what we and our allies do to deal with the problem.

Since September 11,2001, the US has moved from addressing terrorism as a “law enforcement,” where we must find and arrest the terrorists, casting it as a “war” against terrorism, where we need to use our military might against the terrorist networks and their safe havens. That was an important and useful advance, freeing us and our coalition to use more vigorous responses.

The question now, however, is should we refine the problem further? What we may be facing is not only simply a law enforcement problem, it is also not a global war against generic terrorists, but rather a war by a radical extremist strain of Islam, a minority of that religion, first against the moderates in that religion, but also against much of the rest of the civilized world. The extremists’ grand objective seems to be to reshape the world – to cripple the US, to drive us out of the Middle East, to overthrow all moderate pro-Western governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and, in their dreams, to restore a “Caliphate” over large portions of the globe and reestablish an Islamic superpower.

The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge. Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global. They are currently making inroads in different ways in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

11-L-0559/OSD/24647

Europe, it seems, does not understand the problem. Some Europeans seem to think they can make a “separate peace” (the “Spanish syndrome”). The UN Secretariat does not seem to get it either. For us to be successful – for the world to be successful – the US, the UN and the Europeans must have a reasonably common perception of what is happening – of what the threat is. The UN was the second target of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. Yet the UN in Baghdad declared itself “unprotected” because they fancied themselves as “innocents.” But they were again attacked by extremists, very likely because the UN stands, in a general way, for the existing international system. To top it off, radical Islamists have recently put a price on Kofi Annan’s head. The reward is in gold to show the extremists do not depend on nation states.

It is likely that, over time, Europeans will be even more threatened than the US given their demographics. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East – and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values. It seems reasonable to conclude that the radicals’ goal is an ideological goal, and that terrorism is simply their weapon of choice.

We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way – to declare it as “a civil war within Islam” and/or a “global ideological insurgency” – and find ways to test what the analytical results would be depending on how we set up the problem.

A number of things follow from this analysis.

If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals off balance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case.

For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support. We will need to find ways to help them. But they must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it. Only if moderate Muslims actively and effectively oppose the global insurgency will the extremists be defeated.

Moderate Muslim leadership needs to create opportunities for their people. We can help. Their attitude with respect to women results in a population explosion and denies their nations one-half of the energy, brainpower and creativity that other nations benefit from. It is a formula for certain failure. Moreover, championing women’s rights has a strategic importance: education of women in developing countries correlates closely with shrinking families, “middle class” values, economic progress and likely erosion of the more extreme forms of religious orthodoxy.

We must encourage oil-producing Muslim states to diversity their economies and not use oil as a crutch. Oil equals wealth, but that they happen to be sitting on sand over oil detaches them from the reality that effort and investment lead to wealth for all of the rest of the world that does not happen to be sitting on sand over oil. Too often, oil-rich Muslims are against physical labor, so they bring in Koreans and Pakistanis to do the labor, while their young people remain idle. An idle population is vulnerable to radicalism, particularly when they conclude it is prudent to pay off the extremists so they can maintain their preferred positions.

It is desirable, if not a necessity, for Middle Eastern nations to reform and institute representative systems that are respectful of all their people, including women. The President's initiative is not "do-goodism," but wise calculation: It is advice to moderate states that political reform is a way to strengthen themselves – to co-opt middle classes against the extremists.

Finally, ideologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail – by not being driven out of the Middle East – we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver. At some point, its futility will become clear and the present enthusiasm will wane. Right now they are on a high, but what if 5 to 10 years from now they have achieved none of their goals (as Arafat has failed)? This is in our own hands.

The failure of the Iranian regime would also be a blow to the ideology, discrediting that ideology in the way that the collapse of the USSR discredited Marxist-Leninist parties most everywhere, except North Korea and Cuba. This, too, should be a strategic goal of ours in the struggle.

So if what is occurring is not a war against terrorism, we need to consider changing how we describe it and seek to get others to see the problem in a new way, because it will affect their attitudes and how they and we approach the critical problem of this decade.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/GWOT

**June 7,2004**

**SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it**

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

11-L-0559/OSD/24650

struggle *see* the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- **A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.**

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21<sup>st</sup> century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

January 2, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Judge Biester

Would you please check to see if it is conceivable that someone like Pete Biester, who has a number of years of Federal service as a Congressman and now is a judge, would lose his Federal pension by serving on the Military Commission Review Board?

Please tell me precisely what will happen from the standpoint of his financial circumstance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010204-8

\*\*\*\*\*  
Please respond by 1/23/04

*Turnover  
2/17*

*[Handwritten signature]*

*878*

*[Large handwritten circle]*

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
1/CDR Nosum  
2/19*

*1/27  
Dan Dell'Orto  
Do you have this  
response?  
D:R  
LSTY/DI/RRS  
4/24*

11-L-0559/OSD/24655

OSD 09238-04

*to send*



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓  
2/19

INFO MEMO

January 7, 2004, 3P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense  
SUBJECT: Judge Biester (Snowflake 010204-8)

- You asked what would happen to Judge Biester's financial circumstances (with respect to his federal retirement) if he is called to active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 603 to serve as an appointing authority.
- His military service would not affect his current entitlement, if any, to Federal retirement (under either the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employee Retirement System), but he could not use his military service to increase his federal civilian retirement benefit.
- Judge Biester should check with Pennsylvania State retirement authorities to determine whether his military service would have any impact on his State pension. *We will speak with Judge Biester about this*

ms  
a

COORDINATION: None

*Please do so - DJH*

↓  
ms  
12/2

Prepared by: Paul S. Koffsky, DGC(P&HP)/DoD, (b)(6)

January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Introduction

Here is the introduction from the Reagan Library *by Fred Ryan* that someone gave me. You might want to keep it down there in case I am going to go speak someplace and someone is going to introduce me. I thought the first few paragraphs were interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/10/03 Fred Ryan introduction of SecDef at Reagan Library

DHR:dh  
010204-13

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

350.0015D

*John 01*

OSD 09239704

11-L-0559/OSD/24657

**SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD**  
**ADDRESS TO REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**  
*- OCTOBER 10, 2003 -*

Transcript of Introductory Remarks By Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.:

Thank you, and good morning everyone. I think it's still morning. Hey, this is the Reagan Library - it's always "Morning in America" here! It's my great pleasure to welcome you to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

Since first opening its doors 12 years ago, the Reagan Library has been host to many distinguished guests: ambassadors and emissaries, Cabinet Secretaries and Members of Congress, Fortune 500 CEO's and Captains of American Industry, Presidential Assistants and White House Chiefs of Staff ...

But, we've never had a single guest who distinguished himself in all those roles ... until today.

When I was given the honor to serve on President Reagan White House Staff, a very prominent man in Washington called to congratulate me. He said he would send me some essential reading material that I should fully digest and understand before beginning my job as Special Assistant to the President.

I assumed I would be receiving a large parcel in the mail loaded with Briefing Books and bundles of policy papers.

Instead, I received a letter-sized envelope and in it was a single document entitled "Rumsfeld's Rules". It was one of these documents that you may recall in the days before laser copiers, that bore the blémishes of dust particles, spots and hair line marks that were caused by repeated photocopying for passing on to the next recipient.

But its contents were crystal clear. In it, Don Rumsfeld, White House Chief of Staff, a few years before, had provided uncommon wisdom to guide his team and future generations of White House Staff in the ways to perform their jobs with dignity, efficiency, honor and ... a great sense of humor.

I know that to this day, "Rumsfeld's Rules" remains on the White House's "best sellers list". And, it is a wonderful source of guidance for anyone on government business, or life in general.

**SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD**  
**ADDRESS TO REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**  
**- OCTOBER 10, 2003 -**

Don Rumsfeld is now in his fifth decade of service to his country, and all along the way he has blazed a trail often as the youngest and most always the boldest.

Elected in 1962 as one of the nation's youngest members of Congress, Don Rumsfeld's entire career runs parallel to the quests and challenges our nation has faced since that time.

For President Nixon, he directed the Office of Economic Opportunity and later headed our nation's Economic Stability Program.

In 1973, he was asked to direct our national interest in a different way, as our Ambassador to NATO during one of the most tumultuous periods of the Vietnam War.

When a different kind of tumult resulted in President's Nixon's resignation, Don Rumsfeld was called home from Brussels and asked to head the White House Staff of President Gerald Ford.

The next year, he became our nation's 13<sup>th</sup> – and youngest – Secretary of Defense.

While serving in the private sector in the years that followed, Don Rumsfeld was called back to service by Republicans and Democrats to play leading roles in developing America's most vital policy choices: Arms control, ballistic missile threats, U.S. – Japan relations, the Middle East and the global markets.

When George W. Bush became the 43<sup>rd</sup> President of the United States, he asked Don Rumsfeld to lead once again as our nation's 21<sup>st</sup> Secretary of Defense.

Since then, Don Rumsfeld has lead our military with force and vigor, vision and imagination, tenacity and determination.

Americans could not be more fortunate – or our enemies more unlucky – that Don Rumsfeld is the man at the helm of the Pentagon.

Please welcome, Secretary Don Rumsfeld.

January 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: LaPorte Memo

Please set **up** a meeting for someone to brief me on this LaPorte memo. I must say, I am not sure I agree with it.

*CR*

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/31/03 LaPorte memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010204-23

.....  
Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 09240704

*2 Jan 04*

FM: Gen. LaPorte

Received via Email

December 31, 2003

Mr. Secretary,

The purpose of this email is to provide you an update with respect to the relocation of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC) headquarters from Seoul (Yongsan Relocation).

Bottom Line Up Front: The Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) desires UNC/CFC headquarters to remain in Seoul. ROK National Assembly approval of US proposal to move out of Seoul is doubtful in the current political environment. Ministry of National Defense (MND) has presented a counterproposal for UNC/CFC residual footprint. Overarching USFK realignment objectives may be at risk absent an accommodation that allows UNC/CFC headquarters to remain in Seoul.

Since the conclusion of the Security Consultative Meeting in November, there have been several developments that are noteworthy.

\* On 8 December, LTG Campbell met with LTG Cha, the Deputy Defense Minister for Policy to formally convey our US proposal to relocate the UNC/CFC south of Seoul. LTG Campbell provided LTG Cha a detailed proposal which featured four principle elements:

- \* 50-man UNC/CFC liaison team remain in Seoul
- \* US retains the Dragon Hill Complex (approx 20 acres)
- \* Ministry of Defense (MND) provide offices within the MND Complex for the Commander and Deputy Commander, CFC
- \* ROKG defray all costs associated with the relocation

\* On 29 December, LTG Cha met with LTG Campbell to present a ROK counterproposal and to communicate the MND and the ROKG's desire for the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul because of political, economic, and psychological considerations. LTG Cha indicated that the MND proposal would provide for an end state US "residual footprint" in Seoul of less than 200,000 pyong (164 acres). Currently, Yongsan is 895 acres.

\* On 30 December, National Security Planning Chief Suh Choo Suk, met with Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Mark Minton, US Embassy, to confirm the ROKG prefers the UNC/CFC headquarters remain in Seoul.

11-L-0559/OSD/24661

\* Recently, 147 National Assembly members (more than half of the National Assembly) proposed a resolution to retain the UNC/CFC headquarters in Seoul. The National Assembly retains the monetary veto on USFK realignments.

The developments detailed above, coupled with my recent discussions with the Chairman ROK JCS and Minister of Defense Cho, make it clear, despite some mixed signals, the unified ROKG position is that the UNC/CFC headquarters should remain in Seoul. Discussions with a broad range of informed members of the government, the business sector, the faith community, and academia lead to the conclusion it is very unlikely that an "Umbrella Agreement" which includes the relocation of the UNC/CFC out of Seoul will be ratified by the National Assembly. Moreover, it may also impede our progress in achieving approval of an amended Land Partnership Plan, which is key to the relocation of the United States Forces Korea and Eighth US Army to include the 2d Infantry Division.

I have had my engineers evaluate the MND counterproposal for UNC/CFC to consolidate on a residual footprint of less than 164 acres. It is doable but it will require

- \* 30% reduction in the number of remaining military personnel (from 1000 to approx 700)
- \* Phased approach to the return of SOFA granted land to ROKG

- \* ROKG commitment to the additional costs associated with the diminished use of existing facilities and more expensive vertical construction
- \* ROKG needs to publicly announce that they want the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul. Not a US demand.

Given the overarching objectives of our USFK realignment plan, it may be in our best interest to make an accommodation on the residual US footprint in Seoul in order to advance the far more important objectives related to "enhancing, shaping, and aligning" the ROK/US Alliance. Absent an accommodation that allows for the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul, our efforts to posture the ROK/US Alliance for the 21st Century may be at risk.

Recommend I work with the Ministry of Defense to assist in developing a plan which will be acceptable and can be agreed to at the Future of the Alliance VI talks 15-16 January.

Await your guidance.

Very Respectfully,  
Leon LaPorte

3:27 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: January 5, 2004  
SUBJECT: **OIF**

On OIF I-II there are a couple of issues that come up.

1. Airlift and the burden that puts on the system.
2. Equipment that is in limited supply to the extent we have left-seat right side seat going on, two people are going to need the limited supply equipment.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
10504.13

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

**OSD 09241-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/24664

11-L-0559/OSD/24665

3:32 PM

C19

1/9

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

657

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: OIF

When we get ready to do OIF II to III, the question is can we spread out the rotation so that they are not all occurring in a three or four month period.

Obviously, to do that means we have to shorten some peoples' tours or lengthen some other peoples' tours. We don't want to lengthen them past up to one year. Therefore, it means shorter tours, which means we are going to have less value time in Iraq, either in an existing OIF II group or in the OIF III group coming in.

Somebody better get their head into that, fast, so we know the answers.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
10504.14

OSD 09242-04

Please respond by:

1/10/04

7 Jan 2004

*SIR, WE ARE ALREADY WORKING  
OIF III TO GET AHEAD OF THE PROBLEM.  
OUR J-3, JFCOM, CENTCOM AND THE  
SERVICES ARE WORKING THE EXACT  
ISSUE YOU RAISE IN YOUR SECOND  
PARAGRAPH. WE WILL NEED TO GIVE YOU PERIODIC  
UPDATES AND GET GUIDANCE STARTING IN ABOUT 45 DAYS.  
VR Dick*

TEN  
1/9

5:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: January 5, 2004  
SUBJECT: Response

Get a response back to Barzani on this letter. Clear it with policy. This is the first nice letter I have received from anyone in Iraq that I can remember. I believe he also wrote that excellent article in *The Wall Street Journal* (or possibly it was Talibani who wrote it).

for B

Let's get a decent answer out pretty fast and let me read it first.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
10504.20

Attach: 12/25/03 Letter to SD from Masoud Barzani

Please respond by:

1/8/04

get this to Larry fast.  
Thanks!

OSD 09243-04

1-8-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24666

12/31/03 WED 18:51 FAX

(b)(6)

KDP USA

0111 001

KDP - USA  
Kurdistan Democratic Party, Iraq  
1015 18<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W. Suite 704  
Washington, D.C. 20036

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: Ms Rachael  
(b)(6)

FROM: Farhad Barezani  
FAX: (b)(6)  
TEL: [ ]

SUBJECT: A letter from Mr Barezani to H.F sec. of Defense Mr Rumsfeld.

DATE: 12-31-03

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 2

MESSAGE:

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(b)(6)

**KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
THE PRESIDENT**



**PARTIYA DÊMOKRATA KURDISTANÊ  
SEROK**

Salahaddin,  
Kurdistan, Iraq

25 December 2003

**His Excellency Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C.  
USA**

*Dear Mr. Secretary,*

This has indeed been a most momentous year for all of us and we are pleased to have participated in the Coalition efforts lead by the United States that have caused the downfall of one of the cruelest regimes and the stunning capture of one of the most brutal dictators of our lifetime.

The course of history has been changed and the peoples of Iraq can dream and truly thrive. The end of the tunnel is becoming larger and brighter for millions here in Iraq and elsewhere in this troubled region of the world.

Our people greatly appreciate the work accomplished to date and remain strong supporters of the Coalition Forces. We are committed to working with you as your partners and allies to achieve our common goals in rebuilding a new and a better Iraq.

I especially acknowledge the sacrifices of your military personnel and civilian administrators who have been living and working among us here in Iraq.

On this happy occasion, I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year and the people of the United States progress and prosperity.

Please accept my deepest appreciation and assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

**Masoud Barzani**

**KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
THE PRESIDENT**



**PARTIYA DÊMOKRATA KURDISTANÊ  
SEROK**

Salahaddin,  
Kurdistan, Iraq

25 December 2003

**His Excellency Mr. Paul Wolfowitz  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
United States of America  
Washington, D.C.  
U.S.A.**

Dear Mr. Deputy Secretary,

This has indeed been a most momentous year for all of us and we are pleased to have participated in the Coalition efforts lead by the United States that have caused the downfall of one of the cruelest regimes and the stunning capture of one of the most brutal dictators of our lifetime. We greatly appreciate your contribution to ending the era of dictatorship.

The course of history has been changed and the peoples of Iraq can dream and truly thrive. I would like to assure you of our continued support for Coalition efforts in Iraq and our commitment to achieving a federal, democratic, and a pluralistic state that respects the rights of all its citizens and no longer threatens its neighbours.

I want to thank you for the support and sacrifices made on our behalf to rehabilitate and reconstruct Iraq. I especially acknowledge the sacrifices of your military personnel and civilian administrators who have been living and working among us here in Iraq.

On this occasion, I would like to convey our Season's Greetings to you. I wish you all the very best and the people of the United States prosperity and progress. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

Please accept my deepest appreciation and assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

**Masoud Barzani**

7:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

*File Copy*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Please set a meeting with David Chu, Larry Di Rita and Jerry Jones. I want to talk about DACOWITS. Here is the material.

*DSD + Jaymie*

*331 Accounts*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
010704.09

Attach: *Durnan Memo re: DACOWITSMembership*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*cc: KATay*

OSD 09245-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

1/5

SecDef -

- Dacowits membership memo to you from Dr. Chu - Red tab
- Jaymie had questions concerning the memo - sent back to Chu
- Response to Jaymie's question at Blue tab
- Note Chu's ~~concerning~~ about getting a decision in first half of January - Yellow tab
- We can schedule Dr. Chu to brief you on this if you desire

c



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 DEC 17 AM 11:20  
DEC 16 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR JAYMIE DURNAN

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Membership

*See [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]*  
*Jan [unclear]*

*Jaymie*

As a follow-up to our discussions on Saturday, let me give you my views on several questions concerning the decision package with regard to the membership and leadership of DACOWITS.

First, Ms. Sue Patane. She was a member of DACOWITS under the previous Administration, but her views and her actions do not reflect the priorities and policies of that Administration. Ms. Patane is a Republican and has been very helpful to me, Charlie and DACOWITS. She was the interim Chair during the transition period and has been a strong source of assistance this past year. Her personal philosophy, to the degree that we can see evidence of such, is aligned with those of the Secretary and the new Charter. She willingly gives her time and energy to the efforts of the Committee. She is very supportive of General Mutter and the Committee Members. I believe it would be a mistake to relieve her this year. If the decision is that she should be replaced, I recommend that we make it clear to her now that we will look to replace her next year. — ?

Second, with regard to the proposed candidates for new membership, the White House Liaison Office submitted all save Ms. Hoffmann. Charlie Abell interviewed each of those on the list proposed by the White House Liaison Office and we are comfortable with any of these candidates. As noted in the attached package, several are out of the country and are not viable candidates this year. The fact that Ms. Donnelly suggested several of the candidates is not problematic. Based on Charlie's interviews, each would be able to work within the framework of the new Charter and do a good job for us. *ugh!*

Finally, Lieutenant General Carol Mutter has done an excellent job as the Chair and I believe the best course of action is to retain her as the Chair during the next year. She quickly organized the Committee and its Members, prepared them for their work, and has produced an annual report that supports the Charter and is useful to me. General Mutter is attuned to the Secretary's priorities and has a plan in place to continue the Committee's work in 2004. I believe that it would be counterproductive to make a change at this point and might well raise a political issue that we neither seek nor want.



I should note that some have questioned General Mutter's associations with other external groups. Charlie and I have discussed those affiliations with General Mutter and find her responses quite satisfactory. She has demonstrated the ability to lead DACOWITS in accord with the Secretary's priorities and the Charter. General Mutter is a professional military officer and has proven that she can provide leadership to a diverse group of professionals without permitting outside agendas from diverting the focus of the Committee. I strongly recommend that the Secretary retain General Mutter for this next year and that we plan for a transition to a new Chair next year.

I would point out that the next meeting of DACOWITS is in early February. We need to have the decisions regarding the membership and the Chair made in the first half of January so that we can notify the new members and get them processed in time for the February meeting.

David S. C. Chu

12/18  
1400



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 DEC 17 AM 11:20

12/20  
CSC  
No yemo  
we should  
be fine w/  
chris / Def  
or this  
D. A. Di Rita  
12/22

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2003, 3:00 PM

Larry Di Rita  
12/22

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. C., USD ( &R) *David S. C. C. 12 Dec 03*

SUBJECT: Status of Selection of FY04 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) Members

- The FY 04 nomination package is currently with the WHLO. The WHLO has concerns about some of the recommendations for committee membership. Additionally, they would like a current member, Ms. Sue Patane, removed from the committee. Ms. Patane is the last remaining member from the 1999-2001 committee and the WHLO believes it is time to replace her.
- WHLO is the source of all the recommendations (TAB A), with the exception of Ms. Hoffman who was nominated by the SECDEF. The following is the "prioritized" list submitted by the WHLO for DACOWITS nominees including the alternates and the people that recommended them, respectively. One nominee and one alternate (*in italics*) were unavailable as both are living overseas. One alternate, Mr. Mersereau, was nominated in place of Ms. O'Flaherty and two new alternates were subsequently recommended by the WHLO. Background on all the nominees and alternates can be found at TAB B.

**Lisa De Pasquale** - Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness

**Margaret Hoffmann** - SECDEF - Membership completed

*Page O'Flaherty - Living in Japan, not considered this year.*

**Martha Kleder** - Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness

**Adam Mersereau** - Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness (originally an alternate)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	<i>12/29</i>
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>12/17</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/24674



020652 / 03

Alternates:

*Zandra Krulak - Living in England, not considered this year.*

**Lisa Gutierrez** – White House Liaison Office Staff

**Joy Silverman** – White House Liaison Office Staff

- A list of current committee members is at Tab C.
- All members, including Ms. Patane, had been encouraged to complete a three-year tour to limit turn over. This stability helps manage turnover and retain a core of experienced members.
- For FY04, we requested an additional two members be added to the committee. These additional members will keep a group of four seasoned members when the FY03 memberships expire in FY06.
- In Dr. Chu's first meeting with the Secretary reference DACOWITS **FY04** membership nominations, the Secretary asked that Ms. Hoffmann be appointed immediately. This has been accomplished. She attended her first DACOWITS business meeting 20 and 21 November (TAB D).
- This year the committee visited 15 installations and conducted **61** focus groups. Additionally, the chair visited the four Service Academies. The Annual Report has been completed and submitted.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Col Denise Dailey, USA,

(b)(6)

**Thaeler, Shannon E. M., LCDR, OSD - PB**

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**From:** Borman, Lance C, CTR, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 20, 2003 4:50 PM  
**To:** Thaeler, Shannon E. M., LCDR, OSD - P&R  
**Subject:** DACOWITS

LtCmdr Thaeler,

I've reviewed the files and spoke with many persons previously involved in this committee.

The Office of White House Liaison is eager to see only the following persons on the DACOWITS Board:

Lisa de Pasquale  
Margaret Hoffman  
Martha Kleder  
Judith Page O'Flaherty *(currently living in Japan)*

Alternates would include: (Future appointments)

Adam Mersereau  
Zandra Krulak *(currently living in England)*

If you have any questions, I can be reached at



Thank you,

Lance "Chip" Borman

**FY04 DACOWTIS NOMINEES**

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
1	Ms. Margaret (Muggy) Hoffmann	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (McLean, VA)	<p>Retired</p> <p>Spouse of Former Secretary of the Army.</p> <p>MA Counseling Processes, English, and American Literature and Poetry. Trustee, Capital Partners for Education. Asst Admissions Officer, Washington International School. Former College Advisor and Counselor.</p>
2	Miss Lisa De Pasquale	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (Herndon, VA)	<p>Program Director, Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute</p> <p>Military daughter (Navy).</p> <p>BA Public Relations and Journalism. Wrote numerous articles on women's issues. Former Promotions Director and Disc Jockey, radio station.</p>
3	Mrs. Martha Kleder	Female-	White	Mid-Atlantic (Manassas, VA)	<p>Policy Analyst, Concerned Women for America</p> <p>Military experience - 2 years active Air Force enlisted. Former military spouse (Air Force) - 4 years. Family work force experience.</p> <p><b>BS</b> Business. Former Air Force <b>E3</b>, Radio Broadcast Journeyman. Washington Correspondent, Focus on the Family. Radio News Editor, United Press International. News Director and Morning Announcer, Family Radio.</p>
4	Mr. Adam Mersereau	Male	White	South (Tucker, GA)	<p>Associate Attorney, Long Aldridge &amp; Norman <b>LLP</b></p> <p>Military experience - 4 years active Marine Corps officer, 1 year reserve USMC enlisted. Father and brother were/are Army officers.</p> <p>ID, BS Business Administration. Communications Officer in the USMC. Written articles relating to gender and the military, advocating restricting women in combat positions.</p>

**FY04 DACOWITS ALTERNATES**

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
5	Miss Lisa Gutierrez	Female	Hispanic	Southwest (Santa Fe, NM)	<p>Director, Diversity Office, Los Alamos National Lab</p> <p>Women's and family work force experience.</p> <p>BS Business. At Lab, involved in many women's and family initiatives, including recruiting, childcare, and retention. Diversity Programs Director, Deloitte Consulting. Account Executive, Recruiting, Training, &amp; Development Manager, Procter &amp; Gamble.</p>
6	Ms. Joy Silverman	Female	White	Northeast (New York, NY)	<p>Father served in Army.</p> <p>Member, Mayor Guiliani's Commission to Combat Family Violence. National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program; helped to found/pass legislation. Trustee, Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.</p>

**FY04 DACOWITS NOMINEES**  
(in priority order)

1. Margaret Hoffman
2. Lisa De Pasquale
3. Martha Kleder
4. Adam Mersereau

**FY04 DACOWITS ALTERNATES**  
(in priority order)

5. Lisa Gutierrez
6. Joy Silverman

**Margaret McCabe Hoffmann**

(b)(6)

General Objective: To serve in the field of education at the secondary school or undergraduate college level, either as a counselor to students or in a staff position assessing and advancing new program and policy ideas and concepts for educational improvement in a school or school system.

**Education**

**1992-1994 Harvard Graduate School of Education, Masters Degree in Counseling Processes.**

Focus: **Human** Development and Psychology, concerning an application of remedial, psychological and pedagogical techniques to the at-risk adolescent population.

Qualified to administer, score and interpret, with clinical supervision, the Bender-Gestalt, **Kauffman** Assessment **Battery**, Stanford-Binet, WISC-R, WPPSI-R and WRAT.

**1990-1992 Harvard Divinity School, Graded Auditor.**

Focus: Study of the Development of **Cultural** Ethics.

Received Clinical Training in Pastoral Counseling, St. **Ann's** In The Fields, Lincoln, MA.

**1955-1957 Bryn Mawr College, Masters Degree in English and American Literature and Poetry.**

**1950-1954 Bryn Mawr College, Bachelor of Arts in English Literature.**

**PROFESSIONAL/VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION**

**1997-2002 CapitalPartners For Education, Washington, D.C.**

Non-profit organization **founded to fund a** private school education and provide mentors for high school students who have **been** motivated to and have **successfully** applied to **area** private schools.

Trustee. **Chair** of the Schools **Committee**. Co-liaison to Community Organizations linked **to** youth assistance. Scholarship award interviewer.

**1977-1982 Washington International School, Washington, D.C.**

Assistant Admissions Officer. Compiled **and** reviewed **academic**

credentials for candidates from around the world to this bi-lingual program, K through 13, granting the International Baccalaureate.

- 1975-1977 U. S. Army, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.**  
Consultant. **As** spouse of the Secretary of the **Army, while traveling**, reported on aspects of teaching and curriculum in **U.S. Army schools** in the U.S. and on bases abroad, offering observations to base **per-sonnel** and at the Pentagon.
- 1967-1968 Potomac School, McLean, Virginia (Pre-K through 9)**  
**and** Trustee: **Diversity Committee; Parent/School Relations Committee;**  
**1970-1975** Expansion and Plant Development Committee.
- 1969-1970 St. Michael's and AU Angels Episcopal School, Dallas, Texas**  
Trustee: **Parent/Teacher Relations Committee and Development.**
- 1966-1968 Mt. Vernon Seminary and Junior College, Washington, D.C.**  
College Advisor and Counselor **to Juniors and Seniors at the Seminary.** Responsible for all social and academic counseling prior to applications and matriculations of each **senior** in classes of **50;** **wrote** individualized recommendations after counseling **families.**  
Assistant to the Director of Admissions at the Junior College.
- 1962-1964 The Madeira School, Greenway, Virginia**  
College Advisor and Assistant to the **Headmistress.** Responsible for college admissions counseling, writing all college recommendations. Represented School **at** national meetings. **As Family-in-Residence,** assisted in daily operation of the School; acted **as Assistant Head** of the School during the **search** for a new Head.
- 1959-1961 Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania**  
Acting Director of **Admissions.** Responsible for selection of students, chairing faculty committee on admissions and directing **an assistant** in charge of financial aid. Traveled **the U.S., speaking** to students, parents and alumnae, attending NAJS meetings. **Freshman advisor.**
- 1958-1959 Bryn Mawr College, Assistant to the Director of Admissions.**  
Conducted and reported interviews of prospective candidates for admission and aid; traveled the **U.S.,** visiting **schools, interviewing** candidates and addressing alumnae.
- 1955-19557 Dormitory Warden.** Graduate student in Residence **as Counselor** to Undergraduates. Responsible for personal counseling/clinical referral.

# Lisa De Pasquale

(b)(6)

- Daughter of female military officer
- Program Director, Clare Booth Luce Policy Institute
- writer on women's issues

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**Notes:** *Miss De Pasquale's mother raised her as a single parent and LTCR in the Navy. At age 25, she has written articles that have been published in The Washington Times, Journal Newspapers, The Houston Chronicle, The Philadelphia Daily News, and The New York Post.*

**Attached:** "Sacrificing Safety and Military Readiness in **the** Name of Safety" and "Feminists' Attack on Karen Hughes Shortchanges Women and Their Families" by Lisa De Pasquale from the *Clare Booth Luce Policy Institute* newsletter.

## **Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services Nomination Addendum**

Name: Lisa De Pasquale

**Tell us how you meet the following DACOWITS selection criteria,**

**Military Experience (actual service in the military - state years of service and highest rank/rate obtained):**

N/A

**Military Family Member (member of immediate family in the service - state relationship):**

Both my mother and father served in the **US** military. My mother is **currently** a lieutenant commander in the **Navy**. Additionally, she served in the **Air Force** and **with** the United Nations in **Egypt** and **Morocco**.

**Women's Work Force Experience;**

I am program director of the **Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute** in **Herndon, Virginia**. We are a **501(c)(3)** organization that focuses on women's issues, **particularly free enterprise, gender sensitivity training in schools, coed military training, school choice** and higher education. I **have** written numerous articles on these issues, **many of which have** been featured on the **Rush Limbaugh Radio Show, the Dr. Laura Show** and on **many** other programs.

**Family-Related Work Force Experience;**

I **have** first hand experience as a child of a military parent and a particularly unique one as the daughter of a female military officer. I **grew up with** a single, working mother in the **Air Force** and **Navy Reserves**. In **1995**, my mother, **LCDR Judith Ashe**, went **active** duty for the **Navy** and served in **Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Germany** and **in the States**. She **currently works** for the **Defense Travel System** in **Crystal City, Virginia**.

## Lisa Janine De Pasquale

(b)(6)

May 1993-present

Program Director, ~~Care~~ Boothe Luce Policy Institute

- Write articles and disseminate to over 400 media contacts each month
- Notify media outlets of organization's activities and events
- Write editorials for national publications on issues affecting women and young people
- Appear as a media spokesperson for the Institute
- Organize monthly mentoring luncheons for professional women in the DC area
- Organize mentoring events for young women and annual student seminars
- Write and edit quarterly newsletter, issue papers and brochures
- Set-up and designed website; update and maintain website
- Manage the Conservative Women Speakers Program and other campus outreach programs
- Maintain office network and DSL connection

Aug 1998-Apr 1999

Promotions Director and ~~Disc~~ Jockey, WFCF 88.5

- Coordinated listener and staff events, including annual Spring Fling, which raises money for local charities
- Updated and published program guide
- Organized more than 3 times as many on-air giveaways and promotions than previous years
- Notified local media of station events
- Produced a variety of on-air content, including public service announcements and promotional spots

Sep 1998-Dec 1998

## Account Team Member, Flagler Public Relations Agency

- Edited and published the first newsletter for Communication department
- Researched and produced an updated alumni list for Flagler College

Sep 1992-Nov 1993

## Staff Writer, Tallahassee Democrat (circ. 150,000)

- Wrote biweekly movie reviews
- Wrote guest articles for the Teen Democrat until April of 1995

## Other Professional Activities:

Aug 2000-present

Member, Washington Network Group

Feb 2000-present

Contributor and Advisory Board member, Rightgirl.com

Dec 1999-present

Public Relations Development Associate, Conservative Internet Network

Nov 1999-present

Contributing Commentator, Cybercast News Service

## Media Appearances:

C-SPAN, *The Washington Times*, *The Houston Chronicle*, *St. Augustine Record*, *The New York Post*, *Journal Newspapers*, Dr. Laura Radio Show, Rush Limbaugh Radio Show, and more than a dozen other radio programs.

## Education:

Bachelor of Arts, majors in public relations and journalism and minor in political science, Flagler College, April 1999



# Clare Boothe Luce POLICY INSTITUTE

*Taking conservative ideas to young women and mentoring them into effective leaders; and making parents preeminent in the education of their children.*

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## Sacrificing Safety and Military Readiness in the Name of Safety

(August 17, 1999)

by Lisa De Pasquale

A divided congressional commission endorsed sex-integrated recruit training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Coed basic training was first implemented by the Clinton administration in 1994. Because the military leadership has capitulated to political correctness, the placement of some women in the services is creating an atmosphere that is diminishing morale and leading to dangerous situations in the event of conflict.

Dissenters from the endorsement wrote, "Not only is there evidence of serious problems in gender-integrated basic training, but there is also substantial evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results."

Consider a few facts showing the problems with a fully integrated military:

☒ In today's armed services women are forced to live beside men day and night in foxholes, tents, and the absurdly crowded quarters inevitably leading to a very visible number of servicemen and women to behave in inappropriate ways.

☒ Women have always served in our military with honor. It used to be commonsense separation of men and women in their living quarters and the natural privacy and modesty men and women want was the norm.

LINKS

All pages © Clare  
Boothe Luce Policy  
Institute, 1995-  
2001

☛ In preparing the report, *commission members* visited and talked with many female trainees on military bases around nation. Most of the female trainees told **the commission** that they enjoyed coed training because the men were **very** helpful. The males would do things like lift heavy objects **and** in return the females would do the mens' ironing or some **other** domestic service. **As** written in the report, "Gender-integrated training may be reinforcing, rather than **eliminating**, stereotypes."

0 1 5 2 3 7 9

☛ In a recent report by the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-related Issues, military **trainers** were asked if discipline had declined during **the five years** of coed training. Seventy-six percent of male **trainers** and **74 percent** of female **trainers** said discipline had either "somewhat" or "significantly" dropped.

America must ensure that the military is as cohesive **and** effective as possible and national security must be the **first** priority. These priorities must take precedence **over feminist** gameplaying about gender equity. Women can be effective members of the military if decision-makers will **implement** commonsense policies rather than feminist nonsense. **The truth** is that radical feminists and liberals do not want to accept **is that** the military is not a stage in which they can act out **their** latest political farce. It is a deadly serious world unto itself that **must** be maintained at a high level of readiness.



*Taking conservative ideas to young women and mentoring them into effective leaders; and making parents preeminent in the education of their children.*

---

## Feminists' Attack on Karen Hughes Shortchanges Women and Their Families

Lisa De Pasquale  
Program Director

In late April Counselor to the President Karen Hughes announced that she and her family are moving **back** to Texas **so** they can spend more time together. "I guess we're a little homesick," said Hughes. While Washington insiders scratched **their heads**, feminists across the country turned red with rage.

Hughes has always maintained that her family was **her** priority. For 18 months Hughes "home-schooled" **her** son **while** on the campaign trail with George W. Bush. Not only did the **15** year-old get to spend more time with his mother, he also got **the** civics lesson of a lifetime. Those who know Karen Hughes aren't necessarily surprised by her decision to leave Washington. **She** frequently passed up evening events and avoided interviews **on** the Sunday morning talk circuit if they interfered with **her** family's church attendance.

During her announcement to the press, Hughes acknowledged George W. Bush's "family-friendly" administration for helping her make her decision. Feminists pounced and **declared** that the Bush Administration is emphatically **unfriendly** to families, especially to those on welfare. They also complained that **too** often women are the ones forced to make sacrifices for **the family**. **As** any parent will tell you, all parents make sacrifices, **not** just mothers.

The liberal National Organization for Women's President Kim Gandy seized the opportunity to criticize the news coverage given to Karen Hughes. "Women will have arrived **when** these kinds of decisions make the front pages as often **for** men as **for** women," said Gandy.

In *The New York Times*, liberal columnist Maureen Dowd bemoaned Hughes decision writing, “Women will never get anywhere in this boys’ administration, or this boys’ town, or this boys’ world, if they’re going to sacrifice prime West Wing real estate every time their husbands and kids kvetch.”

Maureen Dowd isn’t the first to profess disdain for women who choose to spend more time with their family. Feminist author Andrea Dworkin, whose books are required reading for thousands of Women’s Studies students, wrote “The home... is the most dangerous place in the world for women.”

Catherine MacKinnon, another author promoted by Women’s Studies departments wrote, “Feminism stresses the indistinguishability of prostitution, marriage, and sexual harassment.”

This anti-family attitude isn’t just perpetuated among fringe radical feminists. *Nightline*’s Ted Koppel once asked a group of women, “Dr. Laura [Schlessinger] calls herself her kid’s mom. Do you think she does that to be provocative?”

When did acknowledging motherhood become provocative? “That’s probably the only thing I don’t do to be provocative!” said Dr. Laura at a student conference in Washington, DC. In addition to talking about her most important role, Dr. Laura’s website ([www.drjlaura.com](http://www.drjlaura.com)) provides resources for stay-at-home moms and dads. It includes articles on making money at home, tips on living on a budget and ideas for family activities.

Feminists are simply missing the point - Karen Hughes’ decision is testament to the enormous range of choices women have. Many women are examining their lives and finding out that the feminist definition of happiness and fulfillment doesn’t work for them. Author Sylvia Ann Hewlett recently conducted a study that found 49 percent of the “most successful women” (those earning \$100,000 or more) were childless. Many were unhappy about their unexamined lives and felt shortchanged by the empty promises made by the feminist movement.

Angry feminists are blind to the true values and desires of many women. The choice to leave a high paying, high profile job in order to have more family time is not proof of a patriarchal society or widespread social injustice toward women. It is evidence that women have more choices than ever before.

Youth Intelligence polled 3,000 single and married women between the ages of 18 and 34. Sixty-eight percent said that **if** they could afford to not work, they'd prefer to stay home with **their** children. Similarly, in a *Cosmopolitan* magazine poll of 800 women, two-thirds said they would prefer to stay home with **their** children. These polling results - and the decisions of the **many** women who choose to be stay-at-home mothers - scare the antiquated feminists. It negates decades of feminist doctrine urging women to make decisions based on their career and the good **of** the movement, not on what is best for their children **and** family.

Feminists have frequently attacked stay-at-mothers. Their recent behavior now shows the scorn they have for career women who also put their families first. Rather than condemn Karen Hughes' decision as a blow to equality, feminists **should rejoice** that a prominent, successful woman is saying her most important **job** - motherhood - is taking center stage in her life.

###

# Martha Kleder

(b)(6)

- Former Air Force Enlisted, military spouse
- Policy Analyst, Concerned Women for America
- Radio and television broadcast specialist **for the** Armed Forces Radio and Television Service from 1981-1984

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Notes: *Mrs. Kleder was the Washington Correspondent **for** Focus on the Family, where she provided radio coverage of **events** impacting the family, covering Capitol Hill and the **U.S. Supreme court.***

**Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services Nomination Addendum**

Name:

Martha **W.** Kleder

Tell us how you meet the following **DACOWITS** selection criteria.

**Military Experience** (actual service in the military - state years of service and highest rank/rate obtained):

USAF, E-3, 2 years 10 months in service.

**Military Family Member** (member of immediate family in the service - state relationship):

From 1982 to 1986 my husband at time was a USAF E-4.

**Women's Work Force Experience:**

**Armed Forces Radio & Television Service** 1981-1984. Radio & Television Broadcast Specialist.

Out-processed from the service but remained the wife of an active duty E-4 until 1986.

WDCT-AM, Fairfax, VA, 1987-1992, News Director.

United Press International, 1990-1996, radio news editor.

Focus On the Family, 1996-2001, Washington Correspondent for a daily radio news program, Family News In Focus,

Concerned Women for America, 2001-present, policy analyst with the Culture and Family Institute.

**Family-Related Work Force Experience:**

My first husband (b)(6) (1982-1986), served on active duty with the Civil Engineers, we were stationed both at Elmendorf AFB in Alaska and Plattsburgh AFB in New York, living both off-base and in base housing. (b)(6) was sent on numerous TDY's both for Operation Brim Frost and for advanced training.

## Resume

Martha Wilmoth Kleider

(b)(6)

### Employment:

#### 2001 - present:

*Concerned Women for America*, 1015 15<sup>th</sup> St, N.W. Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20005. (202) 488-7000. Position: Policy Analyst. Researches and writes on topics impacting the family, specifically covering the Federal Communications Commission, pornography, occult and pagan influences, and military culture and families.

#### 1996-2001:

*Focus on the Family*, 8605 Explorer Drive, Colorado Springs, CO 80995. (719) 548-4600. Position: Washington Correspondent. Provided radio coverage of events impacting the family, covering Capitol Hill and the U.S. Supreme Court. Duties included some travel to cover events at the United Nations in New York and Nicaragua.

#### 1990-1996:

*United Press International*, 1510 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 898-8000. Position: Radio News Editor. Gathering sound bites and correspondent reports on news events. Package and provide hourly news and sports feeds to UPI anchors and clients.

#### 1987-1992:

*WDCT-AM*, Family Radio, LTD., Suite 506, Fairfax, VA 22030. (703) 273-4000. Position: News Director and Morning Announcer. Provided news, sports, weather and traffic reports during the morning drive time programming. Voiced and produced commercials and hosted a daily ½ hour public affairs interview program.

#### 1981-1984:

*United States Air Force*, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Attained Rank of E-3. Air Force Arctic Broadcasting Squadron. Originated radio news, interview programs, public service announcements and hosted music programs.

### Education:

Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. 1992 Awarded a Bachelors of Science Degree in Business.

Defense Information School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, IN.

1981 Completed the Basic Broadcaster Course.

### Memberships:

Commemorative Air Force, National Capitol Squadron.

American Legion.

Prince William County Republican Committee, VA.

Martha Wilmoth Kleder

(b)(6)

**Personal References:**

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# Adam Mersereau

(b)(6)

- Former US Marine Corps Captain, serving both single-sex and mixed-sex
- Author of many articles relating to gender and the military, such as “Women in Combat: Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and and “The Military Should Fight Wars, N o t Sexism.”
- Past Appearances on FOX News Channel and CBS Radio to discuss military readiness issues

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Notes: *Mr. Mersereau's father and brother both served in the U S Army. He is currently a corporate attorney with Long Aldridge, and Norman LLP in Atlanta.*

Attached: “The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism” by Adam Mersereau from The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 17, 1998.

ADAM G. MERSEREAU

(b)(6)

EMPLOYMENT

LONG ALDRIDGE & NORMAN LLP, Atlanta, Georgia August 1998-Present

**Associate Attorney**

General Corporate and Business Law Practice.

Emphasis on Intellectual Property and Technology.

Experience with drafting and negotiating contracts of all kinds, including complex service, manufacturing, and independent contractor agreements, confidentiality agreements, software, patent and other IP licensing agreements, Internet services agreements, domain name and IP transfer agreements, employment contracts and settlement agreements; experience with general corporate governance, handling IP in mergers and acquisitions, and representation of start-up companies; intimate knowledge of trademarks, copyrights, and working knowledge of patent law; some experience with litigation and drafting demand letters, complaints, discovery documents; experience with advising litigators in IP disputes; responsible for the day to day operation of the firm's domestic and foreign trademark practice, consisting of over 450 trademarks; some experience with trademark litigation.

Member of the Georgia Bar Association (Computer Law Section), the Atlanta Bar Association, The Technology Alliance of Georgia, the International Trademark Association and the Federalist Society.

**OFFICER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS** May 1991-April 1995

**Summer Instructor to Naval Academy Midshipmen**

Assisted in designing and implementing a summer education and training program for sophomores at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Instructed over 1000 Midshipmen in professional military subjects.

**Communications Officer**

Appointed legal officer for unit of 250 Marines. Acted as commander's liaison on all Civilian and military legal matters.

Selected to conduct two Judge Advocate General's Investigations (criminal).

Special staff officer to the commander of 1000 Marines for all matters involving communications and computers.

Commanded 48 Marines. Responsible for the training, administration and evaluation of all personnel.

Responsible for the operation and maintenance of \$5 million in communications equipment.

EDUCATION

**JURIS DOCTOR, CUM LAUDE** Georgia State University School of Law 1998

CALIAwards for Excellence in Legal Writing. Selected Topics in Jurisprudence and National Security Law.

Selected to Editorial Board, ARA (real Property, Probate and Trust) Journal (USC).

Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, GSU College of Business Administration.

**GRADUATE ECONOMICS STUDY**, The University of Oklahoma GPA 4.0  
(7 credit hours, taken for personal improvement and enjoyment)

11-L-0559/OSD/24695

**B.S. BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**, College of Charleston 1991  
 Founder and President, Sigma Chi Fraternity (Iota Epsilon Chapter).  
 Omicron Delta Kappa National Leadership Society.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

E. Gail Gunnells and Adam G. Mersereau, *Internet Jurisdiction* (Co-Author), **THE COMPUTER LAWYER**, vol. 16, no. 10, October 1999, p. 19.

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: A n Opportunity for Restructuring the System* (Research Assistant), 35 **AM. BUS.L.J.** 403 (1998).

Adam G. Mersereau, *The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, March 17, 1998, A20.

Adam G. Mersereau, *Women in Combat: The Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and Policy*, 3 **THE HOLY CROSS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUB. POL.** 39 (1998).

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The Emerging Bad Faith Cause of Action Takes on the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine* (Research Assistant), 48 **MERCER LAW REV.** 63 (1996).

Adam G. Mersereau, *Diversity May Prove Deadly on the Battlefield*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, November 14, 1996, A20.

Adam G. Mersereau, *Republicans Should Overlook Dole's Superficial Shortcomings*, **THE STATE, COLUMETA, S.C.**, February 29, 1996, A9.

## **TEACHING/PUBLIC SPEAKING**

J. Mack Robinson School of Business, Georgia State University, part time instructor for graduate course in "Law and Ethics in Business," Summer Session 2000.

Goizueta Business School of Emory University, guest lecturer on Corporations, Director and Officer Liability and Mergers and Acquisitions, June 22, 1999.

Center for Military Readiness 1938 Policy Conference on the Culture of the Military at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., guest speaker and panelist, October 21, 1998.

WCNN News Radio, Atlanta, guest on The Tom Hughes Morning Show, to discuss recent article in the Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1998.

FOX News Channel (Television), The Crier Report, interviewed by Ms. Crier with regard to military readiness issues, December 17, 1997.

CBS Radio, The Gill Gross Show, debated Brig. Gen. Wilina Vaught (USAF Ret.) on military readiness issues, November 18, 1996.

# THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Date: Tuesday, March 17, 1998

## The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism

By Adam G. Mersereau

Today representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force will testify before the House National Security Subcommittee on Personnel on the Pentagon's latest investigation of women's roles in the military. The investigators, a civilian panel led by former Sen. Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, spent much of 1997 researching sex-integrated training and related issues. The panel concluded that the integration of the sexes during basic training is not working, and recommended that the Army, Navy and Air Force resegregate basic training into single-sex platoons. Defense Secretary William Cohen has said he is still considering the issue, but he is likely to follow the recommendation of the service chiefs, who have already declared that they support the status quo and oppose the proposed reforms.

The reforms are indeed misguided -- but only because they do not go far enough in reversing the expansion of women's military roles. In hopes of winning Mr. Cohen's support, panel members assured him that their proposal mirrors the successful method the Marines already use. The truth is that the Marines keep male and female recruits totally segregated. In an attempt to get Marine-like results for the other services without resorting to the Marine method, the panel has stumbled upon a new arrangement that is drastically different -- and that would highlight the physical limitations of female recruits.

To understand how the Kassebaum-Baker plan differs from the Marine approach, one must understand the military's seemingly enigmatic unit structure. The largest relevant unit in recruit training is what the Army and Marine Corps call a battalion. A battalion contains roughly 800 soldiers divided into four companies. Each company consists of four platoons of about 50 recruits each. A recruit's daily life revolves around the platoon, but companies often come together to run, hike and conduct combat training

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in the field. A significant aspect of recruit training is the healthy but fierce competition between platoons within each company. Drill sergeants foster that competition to build platoon unity and teamwork and to inspire recruits to stretch their physical abilities.

Historically, the services segregated the sexes into separate companies or battalions for basic training so that men and women rarely crossed paths. When sex segregation became politically unpopular, each service save the Marine Corps integrated basic training by thinly dispersing women throughout each platoon. That way, military leaders hoped, the burdens of women's physical limitations, injuries and pregnancies would be diffused, and no single unit would suffer disproportionately. Feminists like this arrangement because it obscures the detrimental effects women have on units during physical training. The method also pleases many at the Pentagon, in part because it allows the military to "train like it fights," and in part because it passes the enormous daily burdens of integration down the chain of command to small-unit leaders.

The Kassebaum-Baker panel recommends that basic training in the Army, Navy and Air Force be re-segregated, but not totally. It suggests segregation at the platoon level. In other words, when 50 female recruits are assembled into a platoon, that platoon would be grouped with three all-male platoons to form a company. The panel members are adamant that men and women would train together 70% of the time under their plan, suggesting that companies would continue to run, hike, go to the field and compete together. The panel also stresses that physical standards, which have been lowered to accommodate women, should be restored to preintegration levels.

The net effect of the new proposal is that all-female platoons would train side-by-side with all-male platoons, while high physical standards are maintained for all. Day comparisons between the physical abilities of military men and women would be inescapable and irrefutable. This is what happened when the Marine Corps segregated the sexes by platoon at the Basic School, a physically demanding secondary school for Marine lieutenants. Even though the physical standards were more lenient for female platoons, women's physical shortcomings were highlighted at every turn. The Basic School abandoned the arrangement in 1991.

If platoon-level segregation were carried out throughout the other services, there would be no escaping the conclusion that the expansion of women's military roles into physically demanding combat and combat-support units has been a **mistake**. The Kassebaum-Baker panel probably didn't realize this, but Secretary Cohen and his advisers surely do. And the chances are slim that Mr. Cohen would allow a side-by-side comparison of military men and women. Since 1992, the Defense Department has worked diligently to shield recruits in basic training from all physical tests that illuminate the drastic physical differences between the sexes.

Although Mr. Cohen has announced his support for the panel's recommendation to abolish coed housing for recruits, he is unlikely to endorse the panel's central recommendation. It's likely that the status quo will prevail, with everyone evading responsibility. Mr. Cohen will defer to the service chiefs, who oppose **re-segregation** -- but then, what kind of soldiers would they be if they waged an **unwinnable** war against their civilian leaders?

Will Mr. Cohen at least acknowledge that integration of the sexes in basic training is not working? Probably not. Such an admission would leave him **cornered**. After all, there are only three ways to organize the sexes in boot camp: total **integration**, segregation **at** the platoon level or total, Marine-style segregation. An admission that men and women do not train well together would rule out **all** options **except** total segregation. A president desperate to hold on to his feminist support **will never** endorse such a **move**.

Basic training is an environment designed to simulate the stresses and strains of **war**. So an admission that mixed-sex units are problematic in basic training is an admission that they will be problematic in combat. Mr. Cohen will not make such **an** admission unless he somehow finds the will to support a total re-evaluation of women's military roles.

Such a re-evaluation is urgently needed. Each day brings America nearer to its next military conflict. *If Mr. Cohen does not stand up for the truth in peacetime, America's sons and daughters will one day have it forced upon them in war.*

# Lisa Gutierrez

(b)(6)

- Placed sales personnel in Saudi Arabia while working for Proctor & Gamble
- Delivered many workshops on gender in the workplace, including those entitled: “Women Supporting Women,” “Los Alamos Women in Science” and “Theme for the 90’s... Women Making Choices”
- Concentrated on Global Diversity Issues as Diversity Programs Director for Deloitte Consulting

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**Notes:** *Ms. Gutierrez is currently the Diversity Officer Director for Los Alamos National Laboratory. She developed a working families website “Kid Calendar,” for the Los Alamos community, While at Proctor & Gamble, she managed over \$30M in sales volume.*

**Lisa J. Gutierrez**

(b)(6)



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**SELECTED ACHIEVEMENTS**

- 9 Dean, Systems Management Workshop(SMW), Procter & Gamble 7996
- 9 Certified Trainer, Global Application Trainer Training (GAT), Procter & Gamble 7996
- 9 Certified Trainer, Diversity I, Procter & Gamble 1992
- 9 Certified Trainer, Interpersonal Managing Skills (IMS), Procter & Gamble 1990
- 9 Certified Trainer, BA-FA?BA-FA? Diversity Workshop, Procter & Gamble 1992
- 9 Director, INROADS-Los Angeles Training Board, 1991-92
- Director, University of Colorado Alumni Association Board, 1991-95
- Founder, Western Multicultural Resource Team (WMRT), 1993
- Diversity Consultant, Univ. of Michigan MBA Program, 1995
- Diversity Consultant, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, CIM Week, 1996
- 9 Consultant, Video Software Dealers Association, 1996
- 9 Director, Career Dreams Educational Foundation 1997
- 9 Candidate, The PhD Project, 1999
- 9 Director, Casa Cultura Foundation 2001
- 9 Co-Founder, Univ. of Colorado Women in Business Diversity Scholarship (since 1990)
- 9 Member, J. Robert Oppenheimer Memorial Committee, (2002)
- 9 Recognition, State of NM, "Cerro Grande Fire: Diversity in Action for Deaf Employees," (2002)

## EXPERIENCE

12/99  
to

Present

### LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY (LANL)

Administration Directorate

Los Alamos, NM

#### Diversity Office Director

Responsible for leading and managing four institutional strategies including Diversity; Zero People Mistreatment Incidents; Zero Ethics Incidents; and Quality of Work life while implementing existing safety and security responsibilities. Appendix F Measures score: "Excellent."

#### *Diversity Awareness & Education:*

- Diversity Stand down (4/00): Innovative design achieved 99.13% (-8800) of Lab employees and received an overall evaluation of 3.2 out of 5.0.
- Leading implementation & delivery of RDW & Associates "Leading a Diversity Workforce" diversity training for managers.
- Required Management Training: Redesigned, and implemented awareness module which is receiving above average score.
- Guest Speakers/Events: Developed strategy for consultant/guest speaker process to enhance alignment with diversity education goals, LANL strategic goals and Diversity Working Group goals. Has been implemented with 20+ speakers. Facilitated strategy with BUS and DOE to align diversity events with appendix F measures and revise the parameters for allowable costs and events to allow consistent decision-making parameters.
- Diversity Working Groups: Develop and align goals and results of 8 working groups with institutional strategies and initiatives including heritage months. Currently in the process of restructuring DWGs into a multicultural Diversity/Affirmative Action Board. Received positive recognition on this "Best Practice" from [www.diversityinc.com](http://www.diversityinc.com) (3102).
- STARS Recruiting Training: Consulted with vendor, Rainmaker Thinking, which now includes diversity subject matter in recruiting training.

#### *Communication:*

- Websites: Diversity ([www.lanl.gov/orgs/dvo/](http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/dvo/)); International Working Families; [www.life@lanl.gov](mailto:www.life@lanl.gov); Kids calendar; diversity calendar of global/cultural events (7102)
- External: Consulting on strategy and results to end APAHE boycott of National Labs with the Committee of 100, the Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA); APAHE, NNSA, SNL, LLNL, etc.

*Diversity Consulting:*

- Provide diversity consulting services to internal **groups** and organizations including team or individual problem analysis, intervention and issue resolution. Work in conjunction with **peer** organizations like HR, Ombuds, **OEO**, etc.
- Sub-contractor diversity consulting: Los Alamos Fire Dept., (2000); Los Alamos County (2001) (4100); **PTLA**, etc. Consulting services have saved these organizations approximately \$60,000 in diversity training/consulting fees.

*Additional Strategies:*

- Zero People Mistreatment: Working with UNM to **conduct focus** groups to help define concept and have developed **plans** to begin educating and communicating to achieve zero **goal**.
- Quality of Work Life: Working with the Women's **Diversity** Working Group, UC, DOE & HR to develop a childcare resolution in addition to providing other resources for working families including **the website** and referrals to childcare options.
- Office Management: Highest Upward Appraisal feedback among peer group of **42** in 2001. Through efficient negotiation and budget management, have returned approximately **10% annual** budget each FY. Have implemented process to **train and develop** staff on all core competency areas.

12/98  
to

**DELOITTE CONSULTING**  
National **Human Resources**  
Chicago, **IL**

12/99

Diversity Programs Director, Americas

Responsible for defining, developing and implementing diversity programs to support the overall Deloitte & Touche diversity vision **and** the specific Deloitte Consulting strategies to achieve this vision including **plans** and programs in recruiting; education/awareness and coaching programs; retention **and** advancement, internal communication, **external recognition** and communications and performance management. **Scope of position** included Deloitte Consulting Americas Region (13,000 employees) focusing on the Diversity and Women's Initiatives and **reporting to 3** Partners.

- Member, Scoping & Planning Team: Developed and delivered Deloitte Diversity Education Strategy
- Designed and delivered innovative pilot diversity workshop within 3 weeks for global education team with no cost and an overall rating of meeting 70% of Deloitte's needs vs. external **diversity consulting** vendor who took 10 months and \$200,000 to provide a version which only addressed 20% of Deloitte needs.
- Improved design and delivered **at** Deloitte Difference **Global** Orientation (12199) with an overall score of **3.4/5.0**.

- Redesigned and implemented new and robust Knowledge **Net** (KNET) database and library for Diversity and Women's initiatives.
- Worked with Partner Diversity Leadership Network (DLN) to develop strategies, communications and diversity ideas to implement at local office level.
- Provided personal diversity consulting intervention advice to partners on issues including Global Diversity policy on Internet humor (So. Africa, etc.)

09/97  
to

**DELOITTE CONSULTING**  
Central Region  
Chicago, IL

11/98

Central Region Learning Director (CRLD)

Accountable for the overall execution and continual improvement of the training programs for the 1100+ Deloitte Consultants located in the Central Region (6 states). Responsible for ensuring the learning curriculum and programs are effective in developing the skills and knowledge of consultants to service client needs and consistent with the **Performance Development (C3)** process.

- Designed and developed infrastructure, roles, **strategy** and measures for first ever Central Region Learning Director position and office to include smooth on boarding and assimilation of **new** hires; minimal downtime of consultants between clients and training; reduction in travel and other costs related to **training and** just in time (JIT) training for client assignments.
- Designed and facilitated innovative **new** hire orientation presentation linking recruiting, education and **performance** development processes.
- Assessed training delivery processes and recommended **changes** resulting in over \$100,000 savings in first 2 months of employment.
- Designed and developed one coordinated education **framework/curriculum** and process for IT education.
- Worked with multidisciplinary team to develop, design and begin to implement a technology solution to track education and development needs of 1100 Central Region employees.
- Developed relationships across Deloitte Practices to integrate **into** existing **ICS** and **SAP** processes by sharing an Oracle database at an overall cost savings of approx. \$100,000.
- Implemented knowledge transfer of role, strategies and **contacts** to Deloitte personnel and offices around the world to **minimize** re-work and enhance consistency and culture including **Canada**, Hong Kong, South Africa, etc.
- Elected as Deloitte Consulting representative to National Education & Development User Taskforce for **SAP** implementation during first 6 months of employment.

- Designed, developed and delivered workshop on **Adult Learning Principles** with Senior Manager to Central and Southern Regions.

07/96 **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**  
Customer Business Development  
to Huntington Beach, **CA**

06/97 Account Executive, Lucky Stores  
Laundry- & Cleaning Products/Food & Bev.

- Responsible for development of **11** categories of business.
- Provided category and strategic consulting to **Lucky Stores**.
- Produced marketing and merchandising programs to increase total category sales.
- Managed over \$30 million in sales volume.

07/92 **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**  
U.S. Recruiting, Training & Development  
to Irvine, **CA**

06/96 Group Manager  
Recruiting, Training, & Development

Designed and implemented programs to staff, train and **develop** full and part-time sales employees in 6 states. Innovative programs **saved** P&G over \$100,000 in consulting fees. Programs helped retain 8 sales employees at a savings equal to \$800,000 in 1995. Established globally recognized (1996) multicultural resource team to improve **minority** recruiting, retention, and advancement.

- Training experiences:
  - Staffed **5** Systems Management Workshops on high performing work systems (Appointed **Dean** in 1996).
  - Facilitated 14 Decision-Mapping strategic planning workshops.
  - Designed and facilitated over **10** workshops in change/transition, diversity, and team building.
  - Designed innovative mission workshop to **be** implemented in 4-6 hours versus company average of **3 days**.
  - Designed and delivered first ever National Latino Sales Conference with highest rating for any **conference in sales**.
  - Designed systems to coordinate 7 sales orientations **and** staff over 187 sales positions.

03/91 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
Commercial **Service** Products Group  
to Irvine, **CA**

06/92 District Manager, National Accounts

- Strategic planning and development of contract **sales** with Hilton Hotels, Taco Bell, American Restaurant Group, Caesar's Casinos, and Foodmaker, Inc.
- Successfully defended competitive attacks and maintained contracts with Hilton and Foodmaker.
- Managed over \$20 million in sales volume.

04/90 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
Sales Training & Development  
to Cincinnati, OH

02/91 INROADS Program Manager

- Designed and implemented internship program for 60 minority high school and college students.
- Expanded program to 15 sales markets.
- Coordinated with employees in all functions, markets, product sectors, and levels of the company; including **senior** management.
- Identified and negotiated consultant programs.
- Over 50% of freshman and sophomore classes continued on to full-time employment.
- Recognized by INROADS as one of top 3 National Coordinators (1990); and Training Director (1991).

11/89 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
Sales Training & Development  
to Cincinnati, OH

03/90 Training Specialist

- Developed and implemented training programs for Foodservice & Lodging Products (FS&LP) Division of 220 Full-time **sales** personnel.
- Identified and directed consultants to develop programs in persuasive selling, negotiation, time management, communication skills.
- Redesigned existing programs to calibrate sales representatives from acquisitions to P&G training methods.
- Facilitated grocery retail training programs for first and second level managers.

07/89

THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
FS&LP Distributor Channels  
San Francisco, CA

to

10/89

Unit Manager, Sysco California

- Led development of business at three Sysco divisions in California.
- Implemented first sales "team" design aligned around customer.
- Managed and developed four direct reports; promoted one to next level.
- Managed over \$12 million in sales volume.
- Promoted to next assignment within 5 months.

03/86

THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division  
San Francisco, CA

to

07/89

Unit Manager

- Responsible for all business activities in East Bay territory.
- Trained, developed, and managed three sales representatives.
- Led strategic development of CU-Boulder recruiting team
- Managed over \$10 million in sales volume.
- Ranked among top 5 unit managers (48 total) in Western Region.
- Founding Member of Inaugural Women's Effectiveness Network (WEN), San Francisco District

09/85

THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY  
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division  
San Francisco, CA

to

02/86

District Field Representative

- Coordinated special projects to develop business with strategic partner, Allied Sysco. Sysco Distributor Project rolled out nationally.
- Responsible for on-campus recruiting at ASU and CU-Boulder.
- Implemented field sales training for new hires.
- Managed vacant unit representing over \$5 million in sales.
- Promoted within 6 months versus average of 12 months.

12/83      **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**  
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division  
to            San Francisco, CA

08/85      Sales Representative

- Produced marketing and promotion campaigns ~~for~~ local wholesale customers.
- Managed sales volume of \$4 million.
- Won 3 out of 5 sales contests among district of **ten**.
- Business indexed over 105%.
- Promoted to next level in 20 months versus, averaged 30 months.

EDUCATION

- B.S., University of Colorado-Boulder, 12/83
- Majors: Marketing & Organizational Management  
Minor: Psychology

OTHER TRAINING & EDUCATION

LANL:

- Science Day (4/02)
- Science Day (4/01)
- a Univ. of California Management & Leadership Conference, San Diego (12/00)
- a Institute for Applied Management and Law, Inc. (12/00)
- "Diversity in Science" Colloquium (9/00)
- Motorola Project Management Training (Intro) (7/00)
- DOE Contractors Annual Diversity Conference, Atlanta (5/00)

Industry:

- Lessons in Leadership: Stephen Covey, "Four Elements of leadership" (10/01)
- a IQPC: Diversity Summit - Chicago (11/01)
- o IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada (4/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada (6/00)
- a Lessons in Leadership: "Large Scale Simulation & Learning Design" (10/99)
- a Project Impact, Atlanta (5/99)
- a The Conference Board: Diversity (2/99)
- o FASTRACWSAP 3.0 Certification (12/98)
- a Lessons in Leadership: Peter Senge's "Leadership and the Learning Organization" (4/98)
- a Men and Women as Colleagues (4/98)
- a Fundamental Consulting Skills (3/98)

- Semco: Computers, Systems, Terms and Acronyms (10/97)
- World Class Recruiting Clinic (9/86)
- Sales Management Training School (9/86)
- New Representative Training Course (8/84)

**PRESENTATIONS & WORKSHOPS DESIGNED & DELIVERED:**

**Academia:**

- California Universities & Colleges Staff Assembly (CUCSA) (3/02)
- Espanola Valley High School (10/00)
- Alcalde Elementary School (10/00)
- Dixon Elementary School (10/00)
- Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate School of Management, CIM Week, Global Kellogg Diversity Workshop (9/96)
- Los Amigos High School (12/95)
- University of Colorado Career Services, Staff Diversity Training Workshop (5/95)
- University of Michigan Business School, Executive Skills Diversity Workshop (9/95)
- UCLA, Anderson Graduate School of Management, Graduate Women in Business Western Region Conference, "Networking and Mentoring" (3/95)
- Oregon State University, Panhellenic Leadership Conference (3/95)
- University of Colorado Alumni Association, Board of Directors Diversity Training Workshop (9/94)
- University of Colorado College of Business Speaker Series (1992)
- UT-Austin, Hispanic-Business Student Leadership Conference (3/91)

**Industry:**

- Hispanic Statement of Cooperation (9/01)
- Organization of Chinese Americans National Convention (7/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada: (4/01)
- Hispanic Scholarship Fund (HSF) Career Exploration Day (2/01)
- Southern Nevada Hispanic Program Council (8/00)
- Bechtel, Inc. (8/00)
- Northern New Mexico Human Resource Association (7/00)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit Canada (6/00)
- IMAGE-NM (4/00)
- Expanding Your Horizons (3/00) and (3/01)
- Los Alamos Women In Science (3/00)
- Deloitte Difference Global Orientation-Diversity Module (12/99)
- Adult Learning Principles (7/99)
- Deloitte Experienced Hire Orientations (11/97)
- Intern Sales Orientation (6/96)
- National Latino Sales Conference (5/96)
- Systems Management Workshop, (1992-1996)

- VSDA Regional Leader's Conference, "Effectively Working with Volunteers" Workshop (4/96)
- Sales College II (1/96)
- "Theme for the 90's...Women Making Choices" Seminar (9/90)
- "Diversity Today" Workshop, INROADS-Los Angeles (8/93)

Government:

- LANL Essentials of Supervision: Diversity Module (2001-02)
- NM Indian Affairs Legislative Committee (11/01)
- NNSA Tri-Lab Diversity Workshop: APIA Issues (co-designed & delivered with SNL, LLNL), (8/01)
- CIA Leadership Seminar (4/00)
- Foreign Service Seminar (4/00)

Community:

- Los Alamos Kiwanis Organization (11/00)
- Take Your Daughters to Work Day (1998-99)
- Espanola Valley Lions Club (7/96)

Media:

- KTAO Radio "Breakfast with Nancy" show (7/00)

**AWARDS/RECOGNITION:**

- State of NM, "Cerro Grande Fire: Diversity in Action for Deaf Employees," (11/01)
- Training Advisory Task Force, INROADS-Los Angeles (9/93)
- Who's Who among Hispanic Americans (1991-92)
- Bay Valley District Business & Professional Women, "Young Careerist" Regional competition, Third Place (1/87)
- Todos Santos Business and Professional Women, "Young Careerist" Award (11/86)
- All-time Record Month Sales (1987)
- All-time Record Month Sales (7/84)
- All-time Record Month Sales (5/84)
- Volume Energizers Sales Award (1984)

**MISCELLANEOUS:**

- Q-Clearance status: ACTIVE
- *References available upon request*

# Joy Silverman

(b)(6)

- Member of Mayor Giuliani's commission to combat family violence
- National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program
- Daughter of Army doctor (WWII)

---

**Notes:** *Ms. Silverman formed a committee of 1,500 women from around the state to work on Mayor Giuliani's Senatorial campaign for the 2000 elections. Her experience in woman and family related work has been mainly in the area of domestic violence.*

**Experience**

- 2000-** **Mayor Rudy Giuliani Senatorial Campaign**
- Formed a committee consisting of 1,500 + women from around the state.
  - Organized statewide fundraising events.
- 1998-** **Member of the Mayor's Commission to Combat Family Violence**
- Aided in a program developed to increase awareness of domestic violence in the teenage community.
  - Volunteered in the Queens, New York Criminal Courthouse, counseling female victims of domestic crimes.
- 1993-98** **National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program**
- Served as keynote speaker at Threat Management Conferences and Stalking Conferences around the country promoting the model stalking statute published by The National Institute of Justice.
  - Aided in the conception and passing of the **New Jersey Stalking Bill (passed 1996)**. Testified before New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee on behalf of said legislation.
  - Lobbied for and spoke on behalf of **New York Stalking Bill (passed 1999/2000)**.
  - Spoke in support of the **Federal Stalking Sill**, sponsored by Senator Kay Bailey Hutcherson.
- 1992** **"Bush-Quayle" Election Campaign**
- Served as a National Vice Chairman
- 1990-2000** Served as a Trustee of **The Kennedy Center** for the Performing Arts on appointment of **President George Bush**
- 1989** **Nominated by President George Bush to serve as the United States Ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean**
- 1988** **"Bush-Quayle '88" Election Campaign**
- Served as a vice-chairman of various fundraising functions.
  - Served as one of four chairpersons of the **New York State Jewish effort**, fundraising, arranging surrogate speaking programs and traveling throughout **New York State** in connection with those programs.
  - Assisted **Russ Schriever**, New York State campaign manager.
  - Worked for the "grass roots" effort in **New York State**.
- 1986** **Member, New York City Mayor's Commission for Protocol**

**Current DACOWITS Members (Total of 12)**

All appointed in October 2002 for a 3-year term, except for Mrs. Hoffmann who was appointed October 30, 2003.

Mrs. Catherine Aspy  
Dr. Lynda Davis  
Sen. J. P. Duniphan  
Ms. Bonnie Fuller Ford  
Mrs. Margaret Hoffmann  
LtGen Carol Mutter, USMC, Retired  
Ms. Susan Patane  
COL Darryl Ladd Pattillo, USAR, Retired  
Ms. Margaret Robson  
Ms. Virginia Rowell  
Col Vance Shaw, USAFR, Retired  
Ms. Rosalie (Ricky) Silberman

**Members who Departed in October 2003**

(due to personal commitments)

Ms. Julie Hamre  
Mrs. Constance Homer



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



OCT 30 2003

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

Ms. Margaret Hoffmann

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Hoffmann:

I am pleased to inform you that you have been selected for membership on the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). While members serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, normally the term of membership is one to three years.

Since its establishment in 1951, **DACOWITS** has been providing recommendations to the Department of Defense on policies and matters relating to women in the Armed Forces. In 2002, the Committee charter added the realm of family issues related to the recruitment and retention of both men and women in the military. The Department of Defense needs dedicated citizens like you to build **upon** the past achievements of DACOWITS and to help us build the force **of** the future.

The Department of Defense will be releasing a press advisory shortly announcing the new members. Until then, I would appreciate your cooperation in refraining from speaking with the press.

Congratulations on your selection. I **look** forward to seeing you **at DACOWITS'** November business meeting.

Sincerely,

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy



11-L-0559/OSD/24714

3/11 13:30

120

EF-8784  
04/0032218  
7:40 AM  
C3/15

TO: Doug\$ Feith  
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 12, 2004

*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/15*

SUBJECT: **Washington Times Article**

The attached article on supposed major changes at the Pacific Command is troubling. Where could this be coming from?

✓  
*3/15*  
*Paccom*

*3/11/04* → *SD*

Thanks.

The reporter wore together my general remarks about the global posture realignment (from the event where I gave the speech that you liked and then distributed worldwide) with some specific speculations about command structure. I don't know where the latter speculations came

DHR/azn  
011204.06

*Doug Feith*

Attach: Washington Times, 2/2/04 "US Pacific Command Facing Sweeping Changes"

Please respond by: 2/27

OSD 09247-04

*13 Feb 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/24715

Washington Times  
February 2, 2004  
Pg. 11

## U.S. Pacific Command Facing Sweeping Changes

### *Rumsfeld plan is designed to make forces more responsive*

By Richard Halloran, The Washington Times

HONOLULU — Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is planning a sweeping revision of the command apparatus through which U.S. military forces are controlled in Asia, in an effort to make them more responsive to contingencies from the Koreas to Australia.

Military officers said the revision would take place primarily in South Korea and Japan, but would affect deployments throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility, which runs from the West Coast across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to East Africa.

From its headquarters overlooking Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, it controls 300,000 military people and is the largest combatant command of the U.S. armed forces.

Among the command elements that will most likely be dismantled in South Korea are the U.N. Command (UNC), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the Eighth U.S. Army. In Japan, United States Forces Japan (USFJ) will disappear, but a new operational corps headquarters led by a lieutenant general will be set up.

In addition, the position of the four-star general who commands the UNC, USFK and CFC will be abolished. At the same time, plans call for establishing a new billet for an Army four-star general at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Pacific at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. He will take control of Army forces in the Pacific region now under the command of a three-star general.

In response to a query, the spokesman for the Pacific Command, Navy Capt. John Singley said: "The Pacific Command is currently reviewing plans to strengthen our defense posture as part of a larger U.S. government global effort in that regard. We are currently consulting with our allies and partners in the region and will continue to do so before any decisions are made."

"Some of these plans are near-term," Capt. Singley said. "Others are further in the future. The aim of the global-posture review is to strengthen our defense relationships with key allies and partners, improve flexibility, enable action regionally and globally, exploit advantages in rapid power projection, and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers."

Officers informed of the shakeup pointed to Mr. Rumsfeld's wider plan to "transform" the Pentagon and the armed forces.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith told an audience in Washington in December: "A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture. That is, updating the types, locations, numbers and capabilities of our military forces and the nature of our alliances."

In Asia, the officers said, the intent was to eliminate crisscrossing chains of command that are legacies

11- L-0559/OSD/24716

of World War II, the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War, which ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

These officers asked not to be identified because the review is still in process and no decisions have been made.

"When we get through," said one officer, "it will be seamless."

By removing layers of the current cumbersome military bureaucracy, they suggested, troops and ships and aircraft would be able to respond more quickly to any crisis on orders from the president and secretary of defense.

In addition, the revisions are intended to appeal to South Korean nationalism and to tamp down rising anti-Americanism. The United States and South Korea have already announced that the U.S. headquarters will move from a congested area in Seoul to a new site about 75 miles to the south. The 2nd Infantry Division will move from the heavily populated area north of Seoul to new bases farther south.

Disbanding the CFC is intended to lessen South Korean complaints that it diminishes Korean sovereignty, said officers with experience there.

The CFC controls both South Korean and U.S. forces, but is led by a U.S. general with a Korean general as second in command. Many Koreans have argued that it is their country and they furnish the bulk of the forces, and therefore, a Korean should command.

"This would reduce the misperception that the U.S. controls the Korean military," said an officer. It might also take away a North Korean charge that South Korean forces are lackeys of the Americans.

Disbanding the UNC, Mr. Feith said, "will undoubtedly be part of the whole discussion that we have regarding the realignment of our posture in Korea."

C1116

January 12, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State of the Union

Andy—

*Lurnan*  
*1/15*

10001

Is there any chance the Cabinet spouses can get invited to the State of the Union?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
01 1204-30

*x 1/16*

*✓ 1/16*

*1/15*

*Spoke to Melissa in Card's office.  
Andy is travelling with the President.  
She will work to get an answer.*

OSD 09250-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24718

*Jaymie*  
*Durnan 1/15*  
*12nd c1*

*② Andy Card is controlling distribution of Draft State of the Union. He has not released it yet.*

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604A.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email "New Approach" 3.23.03

Please respond by: 6/21

OSD 09257-04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

**From:** ThirdwaveP@aol.com  
**Sent:** Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM  
**To:** ttelher@darpa.mil; rcolwell@nsf.gov  
**Cc:** (b)(6).org; whgl@cdc.gov  
**Subject:** a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt  
11/23/03

we should **develop** a nanoscale approach thinking of a vaccine as a materials **assembling** problem rather than growing biologicals in eggs in the traditional **way**.

the ultimate threat of an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered flu so quarantining **is** not a possibility) **requires something** much more **powerful** and **realtime** than any biologically developed system

**DARPA NSF** and **NIH** should create a collaboration with **three** or four competing **teams** working to develop a solution at the nano level that could **be** scaled up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

this may seem **too** far **out** but it is **no** further than much of **what the labs** produced in **world war two** compared to capabilities at **the** beginning of **the** war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/24720



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JUN 17 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing – Email from Newt Gingrich

- This is in response to your June 6, 2004, inquiry regarding an email you received from former Congressman Gingrich regarding a new approach to vaccine manufacturing, namely using nanotechnology (TAB A). Nanotechnology is a tool that has received increased focus from the Federal government, academia and industry.
- Providing safe and effective medical countermeasures has been historically a lengthy process, often taking as long as 7-12 years to achieve licensure at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. I am eager for the Department of Defense to embrace new techniques and methodologies that result in licensed, improved products that protect the health of our Service members. While the current armamentarium of countermeasures is based on traditional development practices, the next generation of medical countermeasures should exploit novel techniques, including nanotechnology.
- The Department of Defense is part of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, a consortium of Federal agencies headed by the National Cancer Institute dedicated to coordinate efforts in nanoscale science, engineering and technologies. New classes of antimicrobials, toxin inhibitors and diagnostic devices could emerge from their research efforts that support a number of homeland security capabilities within the medical defense arena.
- The National Cancer Institute and the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, both agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services, have operations at the Fort Detrick, Maryland campus, co-located with the Army's institute for infectious disease. A strong and growing partnership is emerging among these Federal partners. This campus should be considered as the cornerstone of our national biodefense effort.
- Another interagency group, the White House-established Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Subcommittee, could take maturing and promising nanotechnology medical products and direct funding for their

OSD 09257-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24721

procurement through initiatives such as Project Bioshield. I serve as co-chair of this group, along with counterparts from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: COL Carr, Medical CBRN Defense, (b)(6) PCDOCS  
66064,66299

11-L-0559/OSD/24722

**TO:** Bill Winkenwerder  
**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**DATE:** June 6, 2004  
**SUBJECT:** Newt Gingrich

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604A.02ts

Attach: *Gingrich email "New Approach" 3.23.03*

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/2)

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: ThirdwaveP@aol.com  
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM  
To: ttether@darpa.mil; rcolwell@nsf.gov  
Cc: dpavey@aei.org; whgl@cdc.gov  
Subject: a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt  
11/23/03

we need a radically new **approach** to **vaccine** manufacturing.

we should develop a nanoscale approach **thinking of a vaccine** as a materials **assembling problem** rather than growing biologicals in eggs **in the** traditional **way**.

the ultimate threat **of** an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered **flu** so quarantining **is** not a **possibility**) requires something much more **powerful and** **realtime** than any biologically developed system

**DARPA NSF** and **NIH** should create a collaboration with three or four competing teams working to develop a solution at the nano level that could **be** scaled up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

this **may seem** too far out but it **is** no further than much of **what** the labs produced in world **war** two compared to capabilities at the beginning of the war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/24724

New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing from Newt Gingrich

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

COL Tom Kurlmel

Concurred, 6/17/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu

David S.C. Chu  
18 June 04

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604A.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email "New Approach" 3.23.03

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/21

*Bill W -  
Newt G  
Call Newt &  
tell him*

**Paul Butler**

*epg*

720  
30 Jun 04  
6 Jun 04

*Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
6/30*

OSD 09257704

11-L-0559/OSD/24726

931  
1800

PA 6/30



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

201 JUN 01 11 12 03

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

JUN 17 2004

Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6/29

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

Pub

SUBJECT: New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing - Email from Newt Gingrich

- This is in response to your June 6, 2004, inquiry regarding an email you received from former Congressman Gingrich regarding a new approach to vaccine manufacturing, namely using nanotechnology (TAB A). Nanotechnology is a tool that has received increased focus from the Federal government, academia and industry.
- Providing safe and effective medical countermeasures has been historically a lengthy process, often taking as long as 7-12 years to achieve licensure at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. I am eager for the Department of Defense to embrace new techniques and methodologies that result in licensed, improved products that protect the health of our Service members. While the current armamentarium of countermeasures is based on traditional development practices, the next generation of medical countermeasures should exploit novel techniques, including nanotechnology.
- The Department of Defense is part of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, a consortium of Federal agencies headed by the National Cancer Institute dedicated to coordinate efforts in nanoscale science, engineering and technologies. New classes of antimicrobials, toxin inhibitors and diagnostic devices could emerge from their research efforts that support a number of homeland security capabilities within the medical defense arena.
- The National Cancer Institute and the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, both agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services, have operations at the Fort Detrick, Maryland campus, co-located with the Army's institute for infectious disease. A strong and growing partnership is emerging among these Federal partners. This campus should be considered as the cornerstone of our national biodefense effort.
- Another interagency group, the White House-established Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Subcommittee, could take maturing and promising nanotechnology medical products and direct funding for their

TSA SD	6/22 PWS
SENA SD 092	6/23
MA SD	N 6/30
EXEC SEC	6/21 N

11-L-0559/OSD/24727

procurement through initiatives such as Project Bioshield. I serve as co-chair of this group, along with counterparts from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: COL Carr, Medical CBRN Defense, (b)(6) PCDOCS  
66064,66299

11-L-0559/OSD/24728

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: ThirdwaveP@aol.com  
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM  
To: ttether@darpa.mil; rcolwell@nsf.gov  
Cc: dpavey@aei.org; whgl@cdc.gov  
Subject: a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt  
11/23/03

we need a radically new approach to vaccine manufacturing.

we should develop a nanoscale approach thinking of a vaccine as a materials assembling problem rather than growing biologicals in eggs in the traditional way.

the ultimate threat of an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered flu so quarantining is not a possibility) requires something much more powerful and realtime than any biologically developed system

**DARPA NSF** and NIH should create a collaboration with three or four competing teams working to develop a solution at the nano level that could be scaled up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

**this** may seem too far out but it is no further than much of what the labs produced in world war two compared to capabilities at the beginning of the war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/24729

New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing from Newt Gingrich

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

COL Tom Kurlmel

Concurred, 6/17/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu

David S.C. Chu  
18 June 04



SECRET  
2004 JUN 15 10:18:06

June 15, 2004  
I-04/00 8105  
EF-9878

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: GWOT Paper

I got your memo with suggestions on my GWOT paper. Would you go ahead and edit the paper the way you think it ought to read, and give it back to me? Attached is the most recent version.

I would appreciate it if you could get it back to me by Thursday.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/14/04 What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

DHR dh  
061504-3

.....  
Please respond by 6/17/04

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*vr/CDR Noseny*  
*6/17*  
*DR 6/18*

OSD 09262-04

15-35-34 15:33 IK

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Iraq

Attached are some more responses to the questions you raised on Iraq. Thanks so much.

Regards,

Attach.  
6/21/04 CJCS memo to SecDef [OSD 09337-04]

DHR:dh  
062304-14

OSD 09337-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/24732

573

23 JUN 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-1851-04  
21 June 2004

004 6/23

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *TBSM 6/21*

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Iraq

- **Issue.** "Which of these suggestions do you think we are not doing that we ought to be doing? Let's get going on them." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** Many of the suggestions made by LTG(R) Jay Garner are currently being addressed.
- **Discussion**
  - Training for the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) is accelerated to achieve initial operation capability for one division in June 2004. IAF will consist of 9 brigades of 27 battalions by December 2004. Coalition mentors will be embedded in the IAF formations.
  - The Office of Security Transition led by LTG Petraeus now has responsibility for assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
  - Contractors will provide individual and collective skills training at the Kirkush Military Training Base for IAF trainees.
  - USCENTCOM is considering incorporating Peshmerga elements into the Iraqi Security Forces.
  - The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) organized grievance cells at the governorate level and determined that the system worked best at the local level.
  - Not later than 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will assume authority for Iraqi sovereignty. The IIG will prepare for elections to a National Assembly by January 2005. The Transitional Administrative Law mandates that the Iraqi Transitional Government submit the draft permanent constitution for general referendum by October 2005.
  - The Iraqi Governing Council did not create a business development committee because CPA Order 64 allowed any Iraqi or foreign person to establish or own a company in Iraq.
  - Sister Cities International, a nonprofit organization, informed CPA that three US cities are in the process of setting up sister city relationships with Iraq. Three to five additional cities are interested in humanitarian efforts for Iraq. USAID Higher Education and Development Program awarded \$20.7 million in five grants for university partnerships between US and Iraqi universities.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, DJ-5

(b)(6)

0 SD 0 9337 - 04

TSA SD	X
SRMA SD	<i>CLB</i>
MA SD	
EYEC SEC	<i>W/CLB</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/24733

\*\*\*\*\* -IND. XMT JOURNAL- \*\*\*\*\* DATE JUN-24-2004 \*\*\*\*\* TIME 14:35 \*\*\*\*\*

DATE/TIME = JUN-24-2004 14:33  
JOURNAL No. = 25  
COMM. RESULT = OK  
PAGE(S) = 003  
DURATION = 00:00:58  
FILE No. =  
MODE = TRANSMISSION  
DESTINATION = (b)(6)  
RECEIVED ID = (b)(6)  
RESOLUTION = STD

-CORRES DIRECTIVES -

\*\*\*\*\* -UNCLASS SECTION - \*\*\*\*\* (b)(6) \*\*\*\*\*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 21, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Thanks for your memo on the status of DoD Directives. Are there units that are lagging on getting this work done?

Do you think we ought to establish a directive that requires that these directives be reviewed every two or three years?

Thanks.

**Attach.**

6/14/04 DuBois memo to SD re: Review of DoD Directives Status **Report** [OSD 08556-04]

DHR:dh  
062104-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/24735

OSD 09417-04

1400



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

104 JUN 14 PM 5:03

June 14, 2004 12:42 PM

*Handwritten notes:*  
D. [unclear] [unclear]  
in [unclear] [unclear]  
P. [unclear] [unclear]

Administration & Management

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
*Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

*Handwritten:*  
Paul Butler  
PWS  
4/18

- Of a total of 653 DoD Directives, 388 were identified for revision or cancellation. Tab A shows their current status.
- Of the 388 Directives, 43% either have been approved or are in formal staffing.
  - 167 have been submitted for cancellation or revision (123 for revision, 44 for cancellation).
  - Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has approved 48 of the 167 directives submitted.
- The above numbers reflect *only* the Directives either complete or in formal coordination.
  - For example, the attached status chart at Tab A indicates that USD(Policy) has only submitted two of its 51 Directives identified for revision. However, 19 additional Directives are drafted and in internal Policy coordination (Tab B). USD(AT&L) has submitted 29 of its 50 Directives for revision, with 16 of the remaining 21 currently in draft or internal coordination (Tab C). Progress also is evident in other components.
  - The same chart shows that DA&M has identified 45 Directives for revision, but 39 of these are Charter Directives, which require full and timely participation from Principal Staff Assistants and Components.
- Following the SecDef's February 13, 2004 memo expressing disappointment at the pace of this effort (Tab D), the weekly submission rate increased by over 60%.
- With regard to the OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives, a copy of Ryan Henry's April 8, 2004 memorandum to the Secretary is at Tab E.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD (b)(6)

TSA SD	6/17 PWS
SRMA SD	
MA SD	6/17 J
EXEC SEC	6/16/04

OSD 08856-04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES  
PROGRESS REPORT  
FOR WEEK ENDING  
6/4/04**

COMPONENT	NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES	CERTIFIED CURRENT	REVISIONS		CANCELLATIONS		SIGNED	
			Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	38	50	29	25	22	10	5
USD(P)	64	11	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	103	79	41	11	5	13	3
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	8	45	8	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	19	12	5	9	8	1	3
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	19	16	9	1	0	4	0
DA&M	86	31	45**	7	10**	6	2	1
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/C&D	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/P&S								
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>653</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>14</b>

\* Number identified by each Component in response to Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

\*\* Of the 45 DA&M Directives identified for revision, 39 are charter Directives; 9 of the 10 cancellations are also charters. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
<b>SOLIC</b>											
U	2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 60% completed, estimate 3wks to finish revision and another 3-4 for final coordination. POC: Todd Harvey 697-3191	11/21/2003			
C	4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		SOLIC/AT Draft is 10% completed, working w/J34, estimated draft completion 15 Aug 04. Antiterrorism Standards (2000.16) must be completed before this directive can be updated. POC: COL Tennison 697-0742	11/21/2003			
U	5100.46	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12/4/1975		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 40% completed, estimate 4-5 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 wks for final coordination.	11/21/2003			
<b>PDUSD(P)</b>											
U	2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	11/17/1997		X		PDUSD/CM&S/MS&F (Ed Rader). Contacted Gwen Simpson @ State	11/21/2003			
U	2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7/5/1985		X		ISP/TSP&CP/DTSA per Chester under revision				
U	2060.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	8/8/1972		X		ISP/TSP&CP under revision	11/21/2003			
U	3100.1	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTIER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
	3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1988		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTIER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
	5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	11/18/1983		X		ISP/TSP&CP - Pete Batten 602-5269 under revision	11/21/2003			
	6205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE			X		ISP/TSP&CPP under revision	11/21/2003			
	3020.38	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	1/15/1993		X		HD- under revision. POC: Donna Reuss/Chuck Adams (703) 681-3528/8915	11/21/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/24738

TAB B

**Proponent Responsibility:USD(P)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DBRD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	2/4/1994		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be incorporated into the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)	2/18/1997		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	7/9/1999		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	4/13/1972		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities combatting crime directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	12/4/1975		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities support of US Postal Services.	11/21/2003			
I	2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993		X		ISA/DSCA under revision 3d Otr POC: Freda Lodge 604-6642	11/21/2003			
	2310.1	DOD PROGRAMS FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/15/1994		X		ISA/DPMC POC LTC Dan Shea (703) 699-1198 under revision				
U	5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	11/26/1993		X		ISA/DSCA - Forwarded to LTG Walters to sign coordination sheet. Should be completed 3d Qtr 04 POC Dawn Burke 601-3864	11/21/2003			

**Proponent Responsibility:USD(P)**

11-L-0559/OSD/24739

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DBRD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/26/1978 8/26/1978		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/1/2003			
U	2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	6/24/1992 6/24/1992		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IR&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE): ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1989		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4120.1.1	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	5/2/1985		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3/2/1982		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/21/2003			
U	4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	11/21/2003			
U	4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION ON DOD LANDS	9/28/1983		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/8/2003			
U	4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/24740

TAB C

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)**

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR RMSED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			

**Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)**

11-L-0559/OSD/24741



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEE 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



11-L-0559/OSD/24742

OSD 01776-04

TAB D

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-04/002818

EF-0656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]* APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

• This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives.

• The chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.

• As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.

• There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.

• CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.

• I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Pam Mircelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)  
Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Policy Info Memo Template

TAB E

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

DATE February 24,2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Attached is a memo 1 sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.  
If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/mzn  
0202404.01a

Attach: Info Memo from Gen. Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: 3/5

01-03-04 15:11 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/24744



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-3000

INFO MEMO

CH-1546-04

23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/ML/21*

*DSD Penner*

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

3

OSD 02613-04

12417  
11300

120

In reply refer to EF-8406 & 04/001637-ES

February 8, 2004

~~Burner~~ TOSD  
2/8 TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Troops from India

Shouldn't we be trying to get India to send troops?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-33 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/04

✓  
2/19

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosuy  
2/19

India

8 Feb 04

OSD 09424-04

09-02-04 11:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/24746

720  
~~FOUO~~

rec'd 7/27/04 @ 2:30

July 27, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Wolf

*IRAO*

Did we ever answer this June 22 letter from Frank Wolf?

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/22/04 Wolf ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
072704-7

.....  
Please respond by 8/6/04

*27 Jul 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09425-04

*22 Jun 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/24747

FRANK R. WOLF  
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

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SECRET  
2004 JUN 22 09:52

241 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4610

(b)(6)

13673 PARK CENTER ROAD  
SUITE 130  
HERNDON, VA 20171

(b)(6)

110 NORTH CANNON STREET  
WINCHESTER, VA 22801

(b)(6)

www.house.gov/wolf

# Congress of the United States House of Representatives

June 22, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary, Department of Defense  
The Pentagon Room 3E 880  
Washington DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I want to share with you a copy of a letter I sent to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asking that a Team B be quickly assembled to travel to Iraq, comprehensively review military operations there and report back to you, the president, the secretary of State and her.

As the handover of Iraq approach, I feel strongly that fresh eyes on the target could provide invaluable assistance to the administration in fighting the war on terrorism and securing a free Iraq.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank R. Wolf  
Member of Congress

FRW:ses

ANYONE WITH A FAMILY  
MEMBER SERVING IN IRAQ WOULD  
THINK THAT THIS IS A GOOD THING  
TO DO. IT WOULD SERVE THE  
COUNTRY WELL. THANK YOU

OSD 09425-04

**FRANK R. WOLF**  
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

**COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS**

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**TRANSPORTATION, TREASURY  
AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES**

**CO-CHAIR—CONGRESSIONAL  
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS**



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

June 17, 2004

241 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4010

(b)(6)

13873 PARK CENTER ROAD  
SUITE 130  
HERNDON, VA 20171

(b)(6)

118 NORTH CAMDEN STREET  
WINCHESTER, VA 22601

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Ms. Condokezza Rice  
National Security Adviser  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington DC 20500

**Dear Ms. Rice:**

I write today to **thank you** for our recent meeting and again to reiterate my continuing **concern** about ensuring our nation's **success** in our operations in Iraq. As we discussed, I believe it is time for "**fresh eyes on the target**" to assist the administration in the ultimate goal of winning the **war** on terrorism and keeping America safe and secure.

The **success** of our efforts in Iraq are critical to the **war** against terrorism, and we must do everything possible to provide for **the** safety and **security** of our service personnel in Iraq who are on the front lines of **this** war. We must act quickly, however, as the **transition** to Iraqi self-government is approaching.

Needing the admonition in Proverbs – "for waging **war** you need **guidance**, and for **victory** many advisers," I recommend that the president quickly assemble a "**Team B**" for Haq composed of persons with distinguished records of service to the country. The **Team B** concept **has been** successful in previous administrations when **fresh eyes** were needed to give the commander-in-chief **objective** information. President Reagan had a **Team B** to fight communism.

Team B's mission would be to travel to Iraq to comprehensively review military operations from the north to the **south** and report **back** directly to the president about **its** findings. But it must be on the ground in Iraq soon as the handover of sovereignty to Iraq takes effect on June 30.

**Team B** would be formed to bring "fresh eyes" to our operations in Iraq and provide experienced counsel and advice to the president, to **you** and to the secretary of **Defense** as well as the secretary of State on how to reach the objective of stabilizing the country and quelling the **violence**, putting in place an Iraq **security** plan and a successful exit strategy, and ensuring self-government for the Iraqi people. For this operation to be successful, however, **the** president **must** personally direct the Department of **Defense** to cooperate fully with **Team B** and **its** mission,


Ms. Condoleezza Rice  
June 17, 2004

Page 2

I am recommending in the enclosed list the names of several individuals with distinguished records of service to our country who could ably serve as Team B members. Of course, there are many more who would be similarly qualified for such an undertaking.

I ask you to take this action immediately. America and the world need the leadership and bold action of our president.

Sincerely,


A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Frank R. Wolf'.

Frank R. Wolf  
Member of Congress

FRW:jjjs  
enclosure

THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT

Thank You

A large, thick, horizontal handwritten flourish or underline in black ink.

## Suggested Names for Team B

### **General Charles C. Krulak**

Served as Commander of Marine Forces **Pacific** and 31<sup>st</sup> Commandant of **the** Marine **Corps**,

### **General John R. Galvin**

Served as 'NATO **Supreme Allied** Commander for Europe, Commander-in-Chief of US. **Army, Navy and Air** Forces in **Europe**, and Ambassador during negotiations with Bosnia.

### **Robert M. Gates**

Served as **Assistant** to the President and **Deputy** National **Security** Adviser from **1989-1991** and as Director of the CIA from 1991-1993,

### **John O. Marsh, Jr.**

**Longest serving** Secretary of the **Army**. Served as Counselor to President **Ford** and as a representative in the House of Representatives. **Two sons** in **the** military, **one** served in Desert Storm, another **with Delta** Force in **Somalia**.

### **General Eric K. Shinseki**

Served as Commanding General of US **Army** Europe, Commander of **Allied** Land **Forces** Central Europe, Coinmander NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 28<sup>th</sup> **Army** Vice Chief of **Staff** and 34\* **Army** Chief of **Staff**.

### **General Gary Edward Luck**

Served as Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander of the United States Forces Korea.

### **General Paul Gorman**

Served as Commander-in-Chief of **the** United States Southern **Command**,

### **General Edward Charles ("Shy") Meyer**

Served as Chief of Staff of the United States **Army**.

### **General John W. Foss**

Served as **A**my Chief of **I**nfantry and **C**ommanding **G**eneral for Training and Doctrine Command.

### **Brigadier General Terry Paul**

Served as the Marine Liaison Officer in the U.S. **Senate** starting in **the** summer of 1989.

7/29  
1600



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 29, 2004 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 072704-7 regarding Response to  
Congressman Wolf

333

Congressman Wolf wrote to you on June 22, 2004. You responded on July 2,  
2004. Copies of the correspondence are attached.

Attachments:  
As stated

*Handwritten notes:*  
Exec Sec  
I read  
to drafting response  
Congress  
perhaps for  
Def Sec sig Jack  
please  
D, RL  
LARRY DI FINA  
8/1/04

18 Aug 04

OSD 09425-04

howard

11-L-0559/OSD/24752

no



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

1/20/04

July 2, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice suggesting the creation of a "Team B" to assess the status of operations in Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 Jul 04

OSD 09425-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24753

7/29  
1600



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 29, 2004 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

*Powell A. Moore*  
IRAQ

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 072704-7 regarding Response to  
Congressman Wolf

Congressman Wolf wrote to you on June 22, 2004. You responded on July 2,  
2004. Copies of the correspondence are attached.

Attachments:  
As stated

*STP  
7/29/04  
I would  
be drafting a  
response  
Congress  
perhaps to  
Def Sec  
Please  
check  
LARRY DI FINE  
8/1/8*

29JUL04

22JUN04

OSD 09425-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24754

06/22/04  
C6/23

**FRANK R. WOLF**  
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA



241 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4810

(b)(6)

13873 PARK CENTER ROAD  
SUITE 130  
HERNDON, VA 20171

(b)(6)

110 NORTH CAMDEN STREET  
WINCHESTER, VA 22801

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**Congress of the United States**

**House of Representatives**

June 22, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary, Department of Defense  
The Pentagon Room 3E 880  
Washington DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I want to share with you a copy of a letter I sent to National Security Advisor Condoleeua Rice asking that a Team B be quickly assembled to travel to Iraq, comprehensively review military operations there and report back to you, the president, the secretary of State and her.

As the handover of Iraq approaches, I feel strongly that fresh eyes on the target could provide invaluable assistance to the administration in fighting the war on terrorism and securing a Bee Iraq.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank R. Wolf  
Member of Congress

FRW:ses

ANYONE WITH A FAMILY  
MEMBER SERVING IN IRAQ WOULD  
THINK THAT THIS IS A GOOD THING  
TO DO. IT WOULD SERVE THE  
COUNTRY WELL. THANK YOU

OSD 09425-04

FRANK R. WOLF  
10<sup>TH</sup> DISTRICT, VIRGINIA



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HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

June 17, 2004

241 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-4610

(b)(6)

13873 PARK CENTER ROAD  
SUITE 110  
HERNDON, VA 20171

(b)(6)

110 NORTH CAMDEN STREET  
WINCHESTER, VA 22601

(b)(6)

www.house.gov/wolf

Ms. Condoleezza Rice  
National Security Adviser  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington DC 20500

Dear Ms. Rice:

I write today to **thank** you for our **recent** meeting **and** again to **reiterate** my continuing **concern** about ensuring **our** nation's success in our operations in Iraq. **As** we discussed, I believe it is time for "fresh eyes on the target" to assist **the** administration in the ultimate goal of winning the war on terrorism and keeping **America** safe **and** secure.

**The** success of our efforts in Iraq are critical to the war against terrorism, and we must do **everything** possible to provide for the safety and security of **our** service personnel in Iraq **who** are on the front lines of **this** war. We must act **quickly**, **however**, as **the** transition to Iraqi self-government is approaching.

Heeding the admonition in Proverbs – "for waging war you **need** guidance, and for victory **many** advisers," I recommend that the president quickly assemble a "**Team B**" for Iraq composed of persons with distinguished records of service to **the** country. The **Team B** concept **has been** successful in **previous** administrations **when** fresh eyes were needed to give the commander-in-chief objective **information**. President Reagan **had** a **Team B** to fight communism.

**Team B's** mission would be to travel to **Iraq** to comprehensively review military operations from the **north** to the **south** and report back **directly** to the president about its findings. But it must be on the ground in Iraq soon as the handover of sovereignty to Iraq takes effect on **June 30**.


**Team B** would be **formed** to bring "**fresh eyes**" to **our** operations in Iraq and provide experienced counsel and advice to the president, to you and to the secretary of Defense as well as the secretary of State on how to reach the objective of stabilizing the country and quelling the violence, **putting in place** an Iraq security plan and a successful exit strategy, and **ensuring** self-government for the Iraqi **people**. For this operation to be successful, however, **the** president **must** personally direct the Department of Defense to cooperate fully with **Team B** and its mission,

Ms. Condoleezza Rice  
June 17, 2004  
Page 2

I am recommending in the enclosed list the names of several individuals with distinguished records of service to our country who could ably serve as Team B members. Of course, there are many more who would be similarly qualified for such an undertaking.

I ask you to take this action immediately. America and the world need the leadership and bold action of our president.


Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Frank R. Wolf'.

Frank R. Wolf  
Member of Congress

FRW:jjjs  
enclosure

THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT

Thank You  


## Suggested Names for Team B

### **General Charles C. Krulak**

Served as Commander of Marine Forces Pacific and 31<sup>st</sup> Commandant of the Marine *Corps*,

### **General John R. Galvin**

Served as NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe; Commander-in-Chief of US Army, Navy and Air Forces in Europe, and Ambassador during negotiations with Bosnia.

### **Robert M. Gates**

Served as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser from 1989-1991 and as Director of the CIA from 1991-1993.

### **John O Marsh, Jr.**

Longest serving Secretary of the Army. Served as Counselor to President Ford and as a representative in the House of Representatives. Two sons in the military, one served in Desert Storm, another with Delta Force in Somalia.

### **General Eric K. Shinseki**

Served as Coinmanding General of US Army Europe, Commander of Allied Land Forces Central Europe, Coinmander NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 28<sup>th</sup> Army Vice Chief of Staff and 34<sup>th</sup> Army Chief of Staff.

### **General Gary Edward Luck**

Served as Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander of the United States Forces Korea.

### **General Paul Gorman**

Served as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command,

### **General Edward Charles ("Shy") Meyer**

Served as Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

### **General John W. Foss**

Served as Army Chief of Infantry and Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command.

### **Brigadier General Terry Paul**

Served as the Marine Liaison Officer in the U.S. Senate starting in the summer of 1989.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

1809

July 2, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice suggesting the creation of a "Team B" to assess the status of operations in Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 July 04

USD 09425-04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

8/9  
OK  
Trot. July 14, 2004  
No further  
action required  
I assume J. Wolf

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

I received a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice recommending a "Team B" to assess operations in Iraq. The transition to Iraqi sovereignty has now occurred, and our military operations there remain under constant and regular review by the Combatant Commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General George Casey, the new commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, and Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus, the new chief of the Office of Security Transition-Iraq, have just assumed their new positions and are taking a fundamental look at our military strategy for Iraq with a particular strong focus on how we can assist the development of Iraqi security forces. They're doing this in parallel with the new government of Iraq, which is undertaking some important new directions in the strategy for fighting what Prime Minister Allawi correctly calls "the evil enemy."

We've sent a number of assessment teams to Iraq at various junctures to provide what you correctly call "fresh eyes" to particular problems and would be prepared to do so again. However, I think right now the fresh eyes are being provided by the commanders and we should let them develop their plans. Moreover, I believe this kind of critical look is most successful when it is adopted and embraced by the commanders in the field—who operate under already challenging conditions—than when it appears to be outsiders writing a report card.

I appreciate your continued interest and support and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



July 14, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

OK to SOM

Dear Representative Wolf

I received a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice recommending a "Team B" to assess operations in Iraq. The transition to Iraqi sovereignty has now occurred, and our military operations there remain under constant and regular review by the Combatant Commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General George Casey, the new commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, and Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus, the new chief of the Office of Security Transition-Iraq, have just assumed their new positions and are taking a fundamental look at our military strategy for Iraq with a particular strong focus on how we can assist the development of Iraqi security forces. They're doing this in parallel with the new government of Iraq, which is undertaking some important new directions in the strategy for fighting what Prime Minister Allawi correctly calls "the evil enemy."

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11-L-0559/OSD/24761

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I appreciate your continued interest and support and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

June 22, 2004

TO: Dr. William Schneider  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Admiral Ellis

Admiral Jim Ellis is one of the brightest people I have run across. He is retiring as  
Combatant Commander at STRATCOM.

Is he an appropriate person for the Defense Science Board?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062104-23

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

334 DSB

22 Jun 04

OSD 09427-04



7209  
601  
2004 JUN 23 11:01 AM

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

**INFO MEMO**

June 23, 2004, 2:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lawrence J. Lanzillo *L. Lanzillo*

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

- The Deputy Secretary asked for my comments on Mike Wynne's proposals to waive certain regulations (including color of money rules). While it is too late in the congressional cycle to seek expanded authorities regarding the color of money rules, we will pursue additional flexibility during the next cycle.
- Funds appropriated by the Congress are legally available to the Department only for the purposes for which they were appropriated. We follow established reprogramming procedures (prior approval) when we change the purpose for which funding has been provided.
- When we submit supplementals, we often ask for funds in transfer accounts to maximize our flexibility. Funding can then be provided quickly. The \$25 billion supplemental before the Congress contains such an account.
- Another approach that increases our flexibility is to increase the use of broadly defined line items, such as the Quick Reaction Special Projects program. This line item provides innovative solutions to the warfighter, and we should work to increase its funding.
- Mike suggests that the Services be required to identify \$50 million of "carryover" funding to be set aside for unknown emergent requirements of the warfighters.
- There will be programmatic impact to identify these offsets since "carryover" funding is not excess to requirements. I will work with the Services and the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on identifying funding for additional emergent requirements.
- The Services have already financed more than \$3 billion of emergent requirements in fiscal year 2004 and are working with the Combatant Commanders on a daily basis to address their needs. We will continue to work with them to ensure that the warfighters' highest priority, executable requirements are funded.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John P. Roth, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24764

OSD 09449-04

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

28 May 2004 - 1945 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WYNNE, ACTING USD / AT&L

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary has reviewed the attached 27May04 1200 memo for SecDef and returns with the following comments:

“This should get a chop or a comment from USD(C), LA and GC.  
It should move quickly. If the above offices have conflicting  
views, just state them clearly and let SecDef decide. PW”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard  
Colonel, USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
As stated

Suspense: Friday, 4 June 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/24765



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

# THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

1614  
5/28  
STG


## ACTION MEMO

May 27, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  
Technology and Logistics)



SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

You asked, in a snowflake, about what authorities we should ask for to better serve the deployed warfighter. Congress has given us tremendous authority and flexibility but too often we are reluctant to use that authority and flexibility — we desire “top cover” to do something different. Criticism comes too easily, even given the flexibilities allowed. Hence, I suggest you reinforce through “delegation” to the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services and to Director, Defense Research and Engineering the authority to waive any non-statutory regulation, requirement, or policy in support of quick reaction requests of the deployed warfighter, if the request comes from, or supports tactical operations of, deployed organizations, such as the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF 7) and CJTF 180. The waiver authority would include:

1. Communications Waivers, including JTRS.
2. Requirements Waivers, including the process required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.
3. Acquisition Waivers, including the process required by DoD Directive 5000.
4. Testing Waivers, especially for Commercial and Modified Commercial Products, including safety testing: any/all non-statutory testing can be devolved to the area of responsibility.
5. Procurement Waivers and Flexibilities, including using current flexibilities to bring innovative solutions to the deployed warfighters’ needs. Examples include use of urgent and compelling need, sole source justification, small business set aside, and commercial products procurement.



**6. Color of Money Restrictions, including financial management regulations.**

In addition, I recommend you direct the Service FMs to provide carryover funds, initially up to \$50M, to support the deployed warfighters' needs at the end of the fiscal year.

If you agree, I will take the lead within OSD and the Joint Staff and Services to make these changes happen.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense approve or disapprove by initialing: Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy Spruill, (b)(6)

# SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 6/23/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: INFO MEMO  
OSD CONTROL **OSD 09449-04** DOC **6/23/2004** ATTACHMENT: DOR **6/23/2004** SIGNATURE CASE:  
FROM USC LANZILLOTA TO SECDEF  
SUBJECT **WHAT AUTHORITIES WE SHOULD ASK FOR**  
KEYWORDS **COLOR OF MONEY RULES**  
COMMENTS

FN SEC **U** OCN

## REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE	DECISION	DECISION DATE	PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY	ACTION ASSIGNED	SUSPENSE	DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE	ACD	COORDINATION	
PAGES <b>1</b>	ENCLOSURES <b>1</b>		<u>PACKAGE VIEW:</u>
SUSPENSE STATUS			<b>INFO MEMO</b>
			<b>FRONT OFFICE DOC</b>

CREATED BY: **gordon**

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DSD	RWI
ES	OWI

11-L-0559/OSD/24768

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**The Military Assistant**

28 May 2004 - 1945 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WYNNE, ACTING USD / AT&L

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary has reviewed the attached 27May04 1200 memo for SecDef and returns with the following comments:

“This should get a chop or a comment from USD(C), LA and GC.  
It should move quickly. If the above offices have conflicting  
views, just state them clearly and let SecDef decide. PW”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard  
Colonel, USMC  
Military Assistant to the  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:  
As stated

Response: Friday, 4 June 2004

OSD 09449-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24769



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

## THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

1614  
5/28  
STC

### ACTION MEMO

May 27, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  
Technology and Logistics)



SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

You asked, in a snowflake, about what authorities we should **ask** for to better serve the deployed warfighter. Congress has given us tremendous authority and flexibility but too often we are reluctant to use that authority and flexibility — we desire “top cover” to do something different. Criticism comes too easily, even given the flexibilities allowed. Hence, I suggest you reinforce through “delegation” to the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services and to Director, Defense Research and Engineering the authority to waive any non-statutory regulation, requirement, or policy in support of quick reaction requests of the deployed warfighter, if the request comes from, or supports tactical operations of, deployed organizations, such as the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF 7) and CJTF 180. The waiver authority would include:

1. Communications Waivers, including JTRS.
2. Requirements Waivers, including the process required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.
3. Acquisition Waivers, including the process required by DoD Directive **5000**.
4. Testing Waivers, especially for Commercial and Modified Commercial Products, including safety testing: any/all non-statutory testing can be devolved to the area of responsibility.
5. Procurement Waivers and Flexibilities, including using current flexibilities to bring innovative solutions to the deployed warfighters' needs. Examples include use of urgent and compelling need, sole source justification, small business set aside, and commercial products procurement.



11-L-0559/OSD/24770

**6. Color of Money Restrictions, including financial management regulations.**

In addition, I recommend you direct the Service FMs to provide carryover funds, initially up to \$50M, to support the deployed warfighters' needs at the end of the fiscal year.

If you agree, I will take the lead within OSD and the Joint Staff and Services to make these changes happen.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense approve or disapprove by initialing: Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy Spruill, (b)(6)

8:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes  
cc DOUG FEITH  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT:

I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IME~~D~~ and FMC. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.04

Please respond by: 3/8

OSD 09464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24772

913

B. Fuller

2/18  
1800

120

01/001623-ES

EF-8400

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Croatian PM

*Croatia*

How do we go ahead and push with State the idea of getting the Croatian Prime Minister an invitation to Washington?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-41 (ts computer).doc

Please respond by 20 Feb 04

FEB 18 2004

*I RAISED THIS WITH DAN FRIED AT THE NSC. HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS, BUT SAYS HE HAS A LARGE PILE OF REQUESTS. TO MOVE THE CROATIAN REQUEST TO THE TOP WILL REQUIRE SECDEF OR DSD TO RAISE WITH CONDI RICE OR STEVE HADLEY.*

OSD 09467-04

- MIRA

COMPLETED

*8 Feb 04  
C/22*

11-L-0559/OSD/24773

FEB 18 2004

8:10 PM

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: ~~February~~ <sup>March 1</sup> 26, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Croatia**

Draft a memo from me on Croatia trying to get this moved to the top of the pile, please.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022604.06

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 3 | 4

*Croatia*

*1 Mar 04*

OSD 09468-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24774

2/18  
1800

01/001623-ES

EF-8400

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-41 (ts computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 20 Feb 04

FEB 18 2004

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OSD 09467-04

- MIRA

COMPLETED

Critzel

FEB 18 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/24775



72  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1862-04  
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 6/23*

SUBJECT: Seams

- **Issue.** "Let's discuss the problems of seams in the world. Seams between: Countries; AORs; Departments and Agencies; Existing authorities and existing walls; Policies. It might be worthwhile to think this through." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I concur in taking a broad look at seams, not only across geographic boundaries, but also within DOD. However, the greatest challenges are not seams within DOD, but those within the interagency. Fundamental interagency reform must be a high priority for the US government (USG). In this regard, a unique opportunity exists to leverage the next phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study. CSIS is uniquely suited to assist in efforts to mitigate and eliminate seams across the USG; Phase Two of its charter should include this task.
- **Discussion.** Eliminating seams among combatant commands is evaluated continually at operational and strategic levels. Part of the assessment includes ongoing analysis of functional and geographic combatant commander responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan and alternative command structures better suited for 21st Century warfare. Additionally, the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will provide an in-depth examination of functions, roles and missions of the Armed Forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 09491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24776

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Seams**

Let's discuss the problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

- 
- 
- Departments and
- Existing authorities or existing
- 

It might be worthwhile to **think** this through.

Thanks.

DHR:azn  
060604E.01s

---

11-L-0559/OSD/24777



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1862-04  
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 6/23*

SUBJECT: Seams

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COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 09491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24778

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Seams**

Let's discuss **the** problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

- 
- 
- Departments and
- Existing authorities or existing
- 

It might be worthwhile to **think** this through.

Thanks.

DHR:azn  
060604E.03s

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *6/21*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUL 12 PM 1:27

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) *FOR POLICY* 7/1

I-04/007812

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *R Henry*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Seams

- You asked the Chairman to address the issue of seams in the attached snowflake.
- In response, the Chairman suggests that we continue to examine seams in DOD. He also suggests leveraging CSIS's Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study to address the greater challenge of interagency seams. I concur with the Chairman's recommendations.
- Andy Hoehn's effort on integrated global command structure, which was discussed at the 24-25 May Combatant Commanders' Conference, tackles many of the same issues.
- We will look to discuss this effort with you in the coming weeks.

Attachment: as stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Jim DeTemple, OSD(P)/Strategy

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

06-07-04 13:06 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/24780

OSD 09491-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1862-04  
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RYM 6/25*

SUBJECT: Seams

- **Issue.** "Let's discuss the problems of seams in the world. **Seams between:** Countries; **AORs;** Departments and Agencies; Existing authorities and existing walls; Policies. It might be worthwhile to think *this* through." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I concur in taking a broad **look** at seams, not only across geographic boundaries, but also within DOD. However, the greatest challenges are not **seams** within DOD, but those within the interagency. Fundamental interagency **reform** must be a high priority for the US government (USG). In this regard, a unique opportunity exists to leverage the next phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study. **CSIS** is uniquely suited to assist in efforts to mitigate and eliminate seams across the **USG;** Phase Two of its charter should include this task.
- **Discussion.** Eliminating seams among combatant commands is evaluated continually at operational and strategic levels. **Part** of the assessment includes ongoing analysis of functional and geographic combatant commander responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan and alternative command **structures better** suited for **21st Century warfare**. Additionally, the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will provide an **in-depth** examination of functions, **roles and** missions of the Armed Forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-S: (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24781

JUN 17 2004

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_

I-04/007812

EF-9900

*copy provided  
for [unclear]*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Zimkey*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Seams

- You raised the issue of seams in ~~the~~ attached snowflake.
- We believe seams can be divided into 3 broad categories: within DOD (includes ~~regions~~ and AORs), interagency, and coalition.
- Andy Hoehn's briefing on integrated global command structure, recently given at the Combatant ~~Commanders'~~ Conference, addresses pieces of the first two areas.
  - We were scheduled to discuss this with you today but our meeting was postponed. ~~Last week.~~
- We also have thoughts on interagency and coalition matters, which we are developing as separate products.
- We will look to meet with you shortly.

Attachment: as stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Jim DeTemple, OSD(P)/Strategy (b)(6)

7/8  
1030  
Binolef - **FILE COPY**

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

PD

EF-9900  
04/007812

**TO:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

**CC:** Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

~~Sec Del~~  
**DATE:** June 6, 2004

**SUBJECT:** seams

Let's discuss the problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

- Countries;
- AORs;
- Departments and
- Existing authorities or existing
- Policies.

It might be worthwhile to think this through.

Thanks.

DHR/acc  
060604E.03s

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ 6/21 \_\_\_\_\_

**COMPLETED**

JUN 18 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/24783

**INFORMATION RETENTION**

09491-04

20

34  
1400

February 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

*7/8*

*arty Di Rita  
3/8*

We might want to brief Senator Ensign on the Guard and Reserve when we brief Lindsey Graham.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-46 (1s computer).doc

**4**

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*3/6 C 3/8  
Response on  
last page  
S, R, L*

*arty Di Rita  
3/8*

OSD 09517-04

*3/8/04*

February 8, 2004

**TO:** Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu  
Powell Moore

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Senator Graham

I recall the questions I got from Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina in my hearing last week. Then I saw him in Munich at the Wehrkunde conference. He clearly needs time with the two of you. He is an officer in the National Guard. He is totally focused on the Guard and Reserve, mostly the Guard. I think he thinks much less about the active force, and I mentioned that to him. He wants to be helpful, but I think we are going to have to get him engaged and understanding what it is we are trying to do with the Guard and Reserve and rebalancing of the force.

Please have a session for him—maybe bring him down for lunch. I would be happy to participate. It is important that we focus on him. We can save ourselves a lot of problems down the road.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-37 (ts computer).doc

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 03042-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24785



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
3/9

March 4, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

✓

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflakes # 020804-46 and # 020804-37

- You asked about briefings for Senators Graham and Ensign on the Guard and Reserve and rebalancing of the force.
- Gen Schoomaker and Les Brownlee have scheduled two breakfasts with them (most recent was 24 Feb) and the Senators at the last minute cancelled both.
- We will continue to work with the Army to get the briefing to them.

Attachments:  
SECDEF Snowflakes

OSD 03042-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24786

1041AM

TO: Paul Butler  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Detainee @ **GTMO**

We want to get the name of the Kuwaiti detainee at GTMO to the government of Kuwait. Please work with Bill Luti on that.

We also want to think about whether or not we can transfer **some** of the Kuwaiti detainees at **GTMO** to Kuwait. The Prime Minister believes they have the legal authority to detain them. I question that, but **we** ought to look into it carefully.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
 022504.a.06

Please respond by: 3/5

*383.6*

OSD 09518-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24787

*55-2804*

10:41 AM

TO: Mira Ricardel  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: February 25, 2004  
 SUBJECT: **Kazak Meeting**

KAZAKHSTAN

Would you please make sure that we have a reference to the private meeting that we had with the Kazaks in Marc Thiessen's POTUS memo and also a separate memo.

I made some notes if you need help on it, but I will leave it to you. You were busy making notes and I was busy talking.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.a.04

Please respond by: 2/27

OSD 09519-04

25 FEB 04

2/25

PM Tokayer

3 in 2

① Will fulfill all Gannon's  
now & in future

② Take all Dept  
- investigations -

③ Deep Green - investigate  
Koe in Swiss bank

Why force in Swiss bank  
Green + Peter -  
Investment - in near 1990s

Mr. Hill - Inditment - 1980  
before 4th - DOJ -  
Used his industry -  
Tell USA that's deep concern

④ Put more  
power.

4:05 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 24, 2004

SUBJECT:

You will recall they talked about the security force for the oil ministry, some 14,000 people. Let's find out if they are included in the site protection list.

Thanks.

✓  
314

*Drac*

DHR/azn  
0202404.06ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *3/5*

*SecDef -*

*As you heard at yesterday's meeting w/ Gen Abizaid, they are not counted in the totals we reflect.*

*Will get JS to footnote the charts to reflect all Ministry-hired FPS*

*29 MAR 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/24790

OSD 09520-04

*3/4*

TO: LTG John Craddock  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 DATE: February 24, 2004  
 SUBJECT: Police

Do you remember who was going to do the mentoring of the police? They are now under the military but the military probably aren't the right people to do the mentoring, are they?

Thanks.

*John F*

DHR/azn  
 0202404.05ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

*3/5*

OSD 09521-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24791

*24 Feb 04*

10:19 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: **Hospital in Kabul**

Let's keep trying to connect me with Bill Steiger. I want to find out what the heck is going on with that hospital in Kabul. In the meantime, call Winkenwerder and have him look into it and find out why it is falling apart like this.

Thanks.

DHR/u7n  
022104.13ts

Please respond by: 2/23

*AFGHANISTAN*

*21 Feb 04*

OSD 09522-04 *6*



February 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Haiti

*Haiti*

Please sort through the Haiti issue for me and get back to me with respect to the responsibilities of the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-20

..... *OB*  
*3/2*  
Please respond by *2/25/04*

OSD 09523-04

*Bo Foley*

11-L-0559/OSD/24793



February 21, 2004

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve

I am inclined to think we ought to begin tapping the Individual Ready Reserve for things like civil affairs and the like. What are your thoughts?

*26*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-8

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

OSD 09524-04

*21 Feb 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/24794

10:19 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: **Briefing**

I probably ought to get briefed by Hadley or else have Wolfowitz or Feith brief me. Here's the note.

It is on the trip he made to Israel

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022104.05ts

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ *3/5* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09525-04 *8*

*21 Feb 04*

*333*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

2/21

SecDef

- Steve Hadley called
- He is back from trip to Israel & meetings w/ Sharon
- has briefed the President on his trip
- is offering to brief you also upon return from your trip - future PC/NSC topic
- he will brief the Deputy of Doug Feith this coming week.

9

C

11-L-0559/OSD/24796

February 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Troops

*69*

Please work with the Joint Staff to get more foreign troops engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia to take our place.

In addition, we have to get more folks providing force protection and working in Kuwait, so we do not have to use so many of our folks. If people are looking for easier or less politically sensitive assignments, we can put them in the Kurdish area, put them in Kuwait, use them as force protection in the United States or in other countries, where we have forces to protect, or use them to help protect the UN when they go back into Iraq. We can find things that are less offensive or less sensitive from their standpoints. We need to have a person working this full-time, the way Dov has been tin-cupping the world for money. Please come back with a proposal.

If we leave DoD to its own devices, we will end up dipping into the taxpayers' money and using DoD military personnel because it is easier, they are there and it seems to be a bottomless pit—but it isn't, it can't be, and it shouldn't be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022004-26

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09526-04

*get Feith 04*

2/23  
1300



8:59 AM

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: February 10, 2004  
SUBJECT: Congress

Larry Di Rita  
3/11

I think we ought to be sure that every member of Congress gets this publication by the U.S. Agency for Int'l Development entitled "Mass Graves" either from State or from me, with a personal letter.

Thanks.

DHR/azm  
021004.15

FRAQ

Attach: "Iraq's Legacy of Terror - Mass Graves" US Agency for Int'l Development

Please respond by: 2/25  2/29  c3/2

AID has done so.  
They are briefing it, too.

Larry Di Rita  
3/11

OSD 09527-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24798

10 Feb 04

2/23  
1300



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

February 20, 2004 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dan Stanley, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense/  
Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE 021004.15, USAID PUBLICATION ON IRAQ'S  
MASS GRAVES


- In the subject snowflake you mentioned that you thought every Member of Congress should get a copy of USAID's publication on Iraq's "Mass Graves."
- USAID informed us a hard and electronic copy of the publication was sent to every office on the Hill. Additionally, USAID has been briefing the publication at the various Policy Committee lunches.
- We also sent electronic copies to the Military Legislative Assistants encouraging them to take the time to read the article.
- USAID sent 25 copies to our office to distribute as we see fit. More are available on request.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake 021004.15.
2. Copy of USAID's publication "Iraq's Legacy of Terror – Mass Graves".

Prepared by: CDR Taylor Skardon, OSD/LA, Director Senate Affairs, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24799




*Iraq's Legacy of Terror*

# MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development

11-L-0559/OSD/24800

## LOCATIONS OF FIRST MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN IRAQ



Mass Graves was edited by USAID Senior Writer Ben Barber with assistance from Stephen Epstein of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

Cover: Iraqis search for relatives and friends among victims found in a mass grave in Musayyib, 75 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. The victims are thought to be from the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. The bodies, wrapped in linen shrouds, are being held in a makeshift morgue in a nearby youth center.

All photos by USAID/Thomas Hartwell except photo on inside back cover, which is by U.S. Department of State/Sandra L. Hodgkinson.

# A Vast Human Tragedy

In a decade and a half of humanitarian work I have witnessed the aftermath of much human tragedy, including the Rwandan genocide and the killing fields of Cambodia. In June 2003, I visited Iraq's mass graves, the most recent addition to mankind's legacy of mass murder.

Rows of white bundles containing bones filled room after room. Families filed by, searching for signs of those who had disappeared, some stolen during the night, others taken in daylight. Even small children were not spared the butchery.

The graves that Saddam Hussein's henchmen dug and filled with human beings are a bitter sign that mankind still has a long way to go before every person has the basic human rights promised by all our religions and cultures—the rights of life and liberty.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told the United Nations that under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was "a murderous tyranny that lasted over 35 years." "Today we are unearthing thousands of victims in horrifying testament," Zebari said.

I walked across the sandy plains of Iraq and saw the mass graves that were just found and are beginning to yield their tragic secrets. The bones tell a story of horror and shame: arms bound together, skulls pierced from behind. Hundreds in one long trench.

Those who survived inside Iraq, and those who watched helplessly from abroad, have joined together to begin the long, painful process of accounting for the dead. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on November 20, 2003, that as many as 400,000 Iraqis lie in these mass graves.

They are Kurds, killed because of their ethnicity. They are Shiites, killed because of their religion. They are Sunnis, killed for their political views. They are Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iranians, killed because their lives meant nothing to Saddam Hussein, his sons, and their followers.

As Saddam's evil regime collapsed in April and May, 2003, and his Baath Party mass murderers retreated into the shadows, Iraqis began to act on their formerly hidden grief. They searched for their loved ones rounded up over the years in campaigns of terror. They had heard rumors about shots in the night, mass burials, and vanished prisoners. Now they followed those bloody trails to the mounds of earth they suspected entombed their beloved children and parents.


The new leaders in Al Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, and a dozen other cities and towns around Iraq worked with U.S. and British forces to try and protect some of the mass graves. We hope to preserve the evidence of these crimes against humanity.

Human rights groups have formed, assisted by USAID and working with the Coalition Provisional Authority, to urge people to record the names of those being exhumed and describe the circumstances under which they were seized and slain.

Yes—people want to find the remains of their loved ones and give them a proper burial in consecrated ground. But the Iraqi people also want justice—to punish those who callously killed their fellow citizens by the busload, day after day, year after year.


Above all, if people in Iraq and around the world hope to learn from the crimes of the past, the mass graves of Iraq must be documented, reported, and never forgotten or denied.

This booklet is a small, early marker on that path.



Andrew Natsios, Administrator  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
January 2004

# Iraq's Mass Graves



*A victim, still blindfolded, found in a mass grave in Musayib*

## A LEGACY OF TERROR

Since the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown in May, 270 mass graves have been reported. By mid-January, 2004, the number of confirmed sites climbed to fifty-three. Some graves hold a few dozen bodies—their arms lashed together and the bullet holes in the backs of skulls testimony to their execution. Other graves go on for hundreds of meters, densely packed with thousands of bodies.

"We've already discovered just so far the remains of 400,000 people in mass graves," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 20 in London. The United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) all estimate that Saddam Hussein's regime murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people. "Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 290,000 Iraqis have been 'disappeared' by the Iraqi government over the past two decades," said the group in a statement in May. "Many of these 'disappeared' are those whose remains are now being unearthed in mass graves all over Iraq."

If these numbers prove accurate, they represent a crime against humanity surpassed only by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Pol Pot's Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s, and the Nazi Holocaust of World War II.

## REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS

Beginning in the 1980s, reports of mass murder began filtering out of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist loyalists and police rounded up members of the Dawa party—they were never heard from again. Human rights groups said 180,000 ethnic Kurds were rounded up and killed in the Anfal campaign in which hundreds of mountain villages were destroyed. Those left alive were moved into bleak collection cities that still dot the plains between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. It was a crime so staggering that, without hard evidence of bodies to back it up, many refused to believe it possible.

Then in 1988 came the use of nerve and mustard gas against Iraqi-Kurdish civilians in Halabjah. Five thousand were killed in a single day. The world was shocked, but still, the missing people rounded up over the previous months and years remained vanished.

After the 1991 Gulf War, Shiites and Kurds revolted, but the rebellion was quickly crushed by Iraqi tanks and troops loyal to Saddam Hussein. While Kurds got protection from U.S. and British aircraft, creating an autonomous region in northeastern Iraq where they were safe from persecution, the Shiites were brutally repressed in the south, and tens of thousands vanished.

The following pages include first-hand accounts from three Iraqis who survived the mass murders. Each tells what took place in a way that no formal report can match. Yet the world is duty-bound to learn the facts—cold, brutal, and numbing—of what happened over these years and how a modern government, equipped with the powers of a modern army and police, turned against its own people.

## A HISTORY OF DENIAL

The reports of mass murder under Saddam Hussein had been made for years by the United Nations, the U.S. Government, HRW, independent journalists, and the families of people who were arrested and then vanished. But the Iraqi regime denied the reports, refused to allow U.N. investigations, and stonewalled human rights groups.

"As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the 'Anfal' campaign of 1988," said the U.S. State Department's 2002 human rights report. "Both the [U.N.] Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime's policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention."

Finally, the regime was swept away by U.S., British, and other allied forces in May, 2003, and the truth emerged. It came as no surprise that once the country was thrown open to the world press and international organizations, they might find evidence of these crimes against humanity. But few imagined the full extent of the slaughter that came to light.

## SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES

In early May, Saddam's police, paramilitary troops, and army fled from their prisons, barracks, and killing fields. Thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children began a grim trek to the forbidden places they feared they would find their missing children, parents, and friends.

Reports that mass graves had been discovered reached officials at the first U.S. administrative body in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A human rights expert from the U.S. Agency for International Development was one of the first outsiders to follow the Iraqis to the site of their grim discoveries.

"South of Al Hillah in early May I heard about bones," said Sloan Mann of USAID. "When I showed up, people

were randomly digging through the site. I went there two days after the mass grave was discovered.

"The site was very disturbed. Children walked barefoot in the grave. There were many families. Some were mourning. Some were curious onlookers."

Mann stood on the edge of a ditch some 20 meters long and 2 meters wide. About 25 sets of remains were showing, all in neat piles, along with the clothes the victims had worn when they died. Some were the clothes of children.

## THE UNITED STATES OFFERS TO HELP

To help the Iraqis exhume their loved ones, the CPA authorized Mann and other U.S. officials to assist. Mann was part of the first deployment of Abuse Prevention Units (APUs), created by USAID to protect human rights in emergencies or conflict. The teams offered quick grants to buy everything from shovels to exhume graves to computers for logging in victims as they were unearthed. Money was provided for training Iraqis in forensic medicine—the science of determining the legal cause of death—so that evidence might be obtained for prosecution of those responsible for the killings. Help was also given to several Iraqi human rights groups, including the Free Prisoners Association and the Lawyers Association. They began compiling lists of missing Iraqis, suspected mass grave sites, confirmed victims, and documents relating to disappearances.

In some cases, former Iraqi guards, burial workers, and even executioners themselves came forward to tell what had happened. Some said that if they had refused to arrest and kill as ordered, they would have been thrown into the pits themselves.

The CPA and USAID officials working with the Iraqis quickly decided to divide the mass graves into three groups:

- **Emotionally overrun sites**  
These are sites that have already been overrun by people seeking the remains of their missing relatives and friends. Since the sites are disturbed—and it would be unthinkable to intervene to stop people from completing their search—U.S. aid is aimed to train Iraqis to assist the community emotionally and to collect whatever information is possible: victim names, circumstances of disappearance, etc.
- **Humanitarian exhumation sites**  
In these sites, trained Iraqi professionals teach the community how to put together all the bones and

other remains from each victim, properly identify the remains, and help families obtain the best accounting of what happened to their loved ones. The primary purpose of these excavations is to identify missing persons, although some evidence will also be recovered by local forensic teams.

■ **Full criminal investigation sites**

Between eight and 20 sites are expected to be selected for full exhumation for accountability purposes in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was recently established by the Iraqi Governing Council to try cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

### THE TASK AHEAD

At the donor conference held in Madrid in October, funding, forensic teams, equipment, mortuary assistance, and training programs were requested from the international community to assist the Iraqi people in uncovering mass graves. These donations and assistance will be necessary for many years to come as the Iraqis move forward in their reconciliation process, according to the CPA senior human rights official Sandy Hodgkinson. The CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has sent out staff to communities and talked about the need to have patience, preserve the sites, and respect the dead. So far, 270 suspected mass grave sites have been found by Iraqis, the CPA, and the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigative Division. However, in some cases, mass grave reports have turned out to be either simply old cemeteries, or falsely reported to attract attention or to obtain funds.

Another difficulty facing the effort to find and document mass graves is that those who carried out the murders, and other supporters of Saddam's regime, have threatened the human rights groups collecting evidence of crimes against humanity. The Free Prisoners Association has been attacked, and two assassination attempts have taken place.

Another challenge is the weather—the rainy winter prevented the opening of most mass graves until February 2004. Nevertheless, the first of some 40 international investigators began arriving in January 2004. They will prepare evidence for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an Iraqi institution that will prosecute some of the estimated 6,000 people linked to Saddam-era crimes. The plan is to begin prosecutions with Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as "Chemical Ali"), a cousin of Saddam Hussein accused of ordering the gassing of the Kurds in 1988.

CPA official Hodgkinson states that overall, the mass grave program will differ slightly from the process used in Bosnia, and will be specific to the needs in Iraq. Scientific methods of excavation for investigative purposes will be the same. Programs to identify the missing, however, will differ from Bosnia, where to date, only 8,000 of the 30,000 bodies believed to be buried as a result of the conflict have been recovered.

Mass graves are not evident to the untrained eye. Many are concealed under tons of earth or hidden in inaccessible military camps. Satellite and aerial imagery is being used to identify disturbed earth; ground-probing radar also helps locate remains.

When a possible site is identified, a team including an archaeologist, anthropologist, surveyor, geologist, crime-scene officer, and satellite image technician—plus military support—goes to assess the site.

The CPA's Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has compiled a list of 270 reported sites across the country. Many sites are in the southwest and central areas around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Exhumations require heavy machinery as well as excavation, mortuary, security, military, and explosives experts. The team of 20–30 people will need living accommodations for four to six weeks.

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Abdul-Basit Turki said that in addition to families' need to find the bodies of missing relatives, excavating mass graves is important in building criminal cases against members of the former regime.

### IRAQIS WERE NOT THE ONLY VICTIMS

It was not just Iraqi citizens who disappeared into the mass graves.

"Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored

*Workers remove remains from a mass grave. After identification, bodies are wrapped in shrouds and carried to a makeshift morgue.*



requests from those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and prisoners of war captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war," said the State Department report.

After the liberation of Iraq, reports surfaced that all 600 Kuwaitis carried into captivity in Iraq by retreating troops in 1991 were executed.

Egyptian officials also said they were seeking information about hundreds—possibly thousands—of Egyptian citizens who died or disappeared after they traveled to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war to take jobs. Many were returned home in coffins—without explanations of how they died.

### A PLAN FOR ACTION

Iraqi and U.S. foreign aid officials have prepared a plan for a long-range process of excavation that will meet all the needs for humanitarian, emotional, and judicial resolution of the mass graves. First, Iraqis with skills in forensic anthropology or simply archaeology are being identified to receive training by international forensic experts. Second, communities are being asked to recommend academics and professionals who want to learn the basics of forensic science. They will undergo training in humanitarian exhumation and the fundamentals of basic skeletal anatomy to facilitate the identification process.

The nuts and bolts of the exhumation process have also been planned: exhumation protocols, nationwide standard operating procedures, administration, and logistical support. Construction is underway to renovate a storage facility into a centralized evidence repository. Local human rights organizations are being funded to increase their capacity to organize and collect documents, evidence, and names of the missing. This will eventually tie in to a national outreach program for families seeking information on missing relatives. Information on missing persons that local organizations are collecting will be moved to the central evidence repository. There a full-time Iraqi staff will work to compile a comprehensive database. The information will then be passed to human rights organizations in communities across Iraq.

There are ongoing efforts to collect, verify, and combine information on suspected mass grave sites. A Danish forensic team arrived in Iraq in October, and a Finnish team was expected soon after. Swedish and German governments have also offered varying levels of assistance. Until the international teams are in place,



*Remains unearthed in a mass grave in Musayib are prepared for reburial by family members.*

forensic site assessments are being used to prioritize 8-16 carefully selected mass graves for a full forensic exhumation based on the following criteria:

- the grave represents a main period of atrocity
- the grave is relatively untouched
- the grave may give evidence of crimes against humanity
- the local population permits securing and exhumation of the site

A media campaign has begun through the daily newspaper *Al Sabah*, Iraqi Media Network, and other media outlets to explain the need to preserve grave sites. Getting the word out on a national level will help identify the missing and encourage citizens to come forward with evidence of atrocities. Although there are few reports of local impatience with the exhumation process, local and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the media must be continually engaged on the need to protect grave sites and encouraged to have patience with the process.

The Iraqi Governing Council set a major marker on the path to resolving the issue of the mass killings when it announced there will be a national tribunal for criminals. This is the next, unwritten chapter of this story. ■

# Survivor Stories

The following testimonials are from survivors of executions that occurred outside Mahawil, a city north of Al Hillah, approximately 60 miles south of Baghdad.

## ALI'S STORY

Ali,\* 36, an aircraft mechanic, was driving his family from Al Hillah to his farm in Mahawil on March 6, 1991, during the Shiite uprising after the end of the Gulf War. The city was being bombed.

Ali was stopped at a military checkpoint outside the city near a brick factory and ordered to get out. His wife, newborn baby, and handicapped mother were ordered to drive away.

Ali was ordered to remove his jacket, and uniformed men tied his hands and feet with his jacket and pieces of cloth and placed a blindfold over his eyes.

Ali could still see through the blindfold, however, and saw about 12 other people, including men, women, children, and elderly, pulled from cars, bound, and blindfolded.

They were dragged to a white Toyota Land Cruiser and piled on top of each other over the seats. No words were spoken, because when others attempted to speak they received severe blows to the head and body.

It was approximately 10 a.m. when they arrived at the Mahawil military camp on the outskirts of the city. There they were unloaded, registered, and escorted into a large assembly hall filled with approximately 200 people. Everyone was sitting on the floor with their hands

and feet tied. They were blindfolded and positioned facing the walls.

Ali was placed near the door and could see outside. At about 4:30 p.m., the military men built a large ring of tires about 20 feet wide and set it on fire. Next to the fire were large buses, and the soldiers began escorting people from the hall to the buses. At this time, people were also being carried out of the hall and thrown into the fire. Ali believes that because the military was in a hurry to execute them and not everyone would fit on the buses, they decided to burn some people alive. After about 30 minutes of witnessing this, he was escorted from the hall and loaded onto a bus.

At approximately 6 p.m., they were taken on a short drive to a swampy area behind the brick factory. It was dark and he saw headlights in front of the buses. He believes the lights were headlights from the Land Cruisers driven by Saddam's men. He could hear shots but not voices. Ali was paralyzed with fear. Everyone in the bus was blindfolded.

After about 15 minutes, the bus in front of his drove away and the headlights were directly on his bus. They pulled seven to 10 people off the bus. Shots rang out. Ali's group was the next to be pulled from the bus. In his group was a blind man, three brothers, a woman, and her five year old son. The group was led to the front of the bus where the headlights were directly on them.

\* All names have been changed.



*Iraqi women seek to identify remains of lost family members.*

*An identification card found in a mass grave in Musayib.*

*Remains unearthed in a mass reburial.*

They were pushed to the ground and then were pulled up one at a time to be executed. They were pushed a couple of feet to the edge of the swamp and shot. Most would fall before being shot because they were overcome with fear. Ali does not remember any words being spoken—except the plea of the three brothers who begged that at least one be spared. They were executed one at a time. Next, the woman was shot in front of her five-year-old child. The child lunged at the legs of the executioner and was kicked away and shot in the face. The blind man was then executed and his chest exploded on Ali.


There were three executioners. They took turns shooting and reloading. Ali was last in the group to be shot, and the soldier who was to execute Ali shot between his legs. The soldier was then shot dead by another soldier. During this commotion, Ali turned to the swamp, jumped over bodies, and ran through the water. They shot after him. He was hit in the left hand and foot and fell, breaking his nose. He continued on and made it to the other side of the swamp.

A tractor with soldiers came in his direction looking for him, so he tossed his robe into the water and hid in a thicket of cane. The soldiers saw his robe and sprayed it with bullets thinking they had shot him. A bulldozer appeared next and began shoveling dirt on it to cover what they thought was his body. Ali was very near and

was knocked unconscious by falling rocks, but he was not completely buried. When the bulldozer left, he pulled himself out of the dirt and crawled to an empty canal. He could still hear shots in the distance: a third bus had arrived during his escape.

Ali crawled through the canal for about 30 minutes, making his way to a farmhouse. He knocked on the door, and was taken in by the family, which told him later that he "was a piece of blood." He doesn't remember much about the care they provided him except for the yogurt they fed him and the heater they placed near him. The family knew his uncles, so they clothed him, gave him a donkey and a cane, and told him to follow the canal to an uncle's house. Ali made it there, and his uncle cleaned him and took him to Baghdad the next day. He hid there for one month without telling anyone except his uncle. He returned home to discover his two brothers had been executed in similar roundups.

He left the neighborhood and changed his identity. He was also protected by an intelligence officer in his neighborhood. When Saddam was toppled, he resumed his identity after having been in hiding for over 12 years. He is a member of the Human Rights Association of Al Hillah. ■



## MUHANED'S STORY

Muhaned,\* 32, is from Al Hillah. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as a nurse in the army. During the 1991 Shiite uprising he was stationed in the north. On March 5, he traveled by bus to Al Hillah to see his parents. It was winter and he arrived early in the morning. Upon entering the city near a brick factory, his bus encountered an army unit near the statue of Saddam. The army unit stopped the bus and would not allow entrance into the city. The bus driver was told there was a curfew and to return to Baghdad. Several people, Muhaned included, got off the bus to walk to Al Hillah. In his group were six men (all Army and in uniform), an old man, two children, and a woman. The army unit saw them approaching and took them into custody. One of the men refused to be taken and was beaten in front of the group. They were escorted to a military bus and loaded in the back. Those who spoke were beaten and called traitors.

They were taken to the Mahawil military camp, where their hands were tied behind their backs, and they were blindfolded. They were escorted into a large assembly hall. Muhaned could hear whispering, but he does not believe there were many people in the hall at that time. He sat on the floor and fell asleep. Around noon, somebody kicked him and took his name, and he fell asleep again. Around 3 p.m., he awoke to see that the hall was filled with well over 100 people. His ties had loosened and he was able to see. He saw his neighbor. He also saw Ali (see first survivor story). They spent the entire day without water, food, or toilets. People were forced to go to the bathroom where they sat.

\* All names have been changed.

At about 5 p.m. they began loading people onto buses. Muhaned was at the back of the hall and was one of the last to be escorted out. There was no light in the hall, but through the windows, he could see the glow of a large fire. He could smell rubber burning.

People were being escorted out to the buses in groups of about 20 at a time. Some people, however, were picked up and thrown into the fire. Muhaned and those around him could hear the screaming. A woman yelled at a soldier, "Why are you burning these people?" She was told, "They are criminals." From this, Muhaned felt safe because he had done nothing wrong.

As the hall emptied, a soldier pointed at his group and said "Take them. Captain Abbar has signed for them." Muhaned did not understand what this meant and began crying and praying. When he exited the hall, the fire was only three to four meters from the entrance. Those who were walking slowly, or whose feet were tied, were thrown in the fire. The rest, including Muhaned, were escorted to the buses.

Around midnight, they drove to a muddy road next to the swamp behind the brick factory. On one side was a swamp and on the other side a canal. He saw a white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bulldozer on the edge of the swamp. The Land Cruiser's headlights acted as a spotlight on the front of the bus at the edge of the swamp.

Baath party members piled out of the Land Cruiser and another bus and began loading their weapons. Muhaned and the others were escorted off their bus and forced to crouch at the edge of the swamp in several rows of six. At their feet were dead bodies. A woman stood up and silently wrapped herself in her long black

An Iraqi holding the name of a victim on a scrap of paper searches a list of victims.

Iraqis dig for remains.

Workers identify and sort remains wrapped in shrouds and

robe in the same fashion people are wrapped for a funeral. Although he was blindfolded, Muhaned's hands were free, and he moved his ID card into an internal pocket, hoping to preserve it so that his body might be identified. Everyone was praying.

Six Baath party members lined up in front and to the side of the crouching rows. Muhaned was in the back row on the very edge of the swamp. Spotlights shone on them. A very large Egyptian man near Muhaned kept asking why they were being executed. At that moment, gunfire erupted and the man jumped to his feet. His body was sprayed with bullets and the force of his body knocked Muhaned back, flattening him and pushing him partially into the swamp. The Egyptian's body completely covered him. The shooting lasted for about 30 seconds. The soldiers surveyed the bodies and discovered one person was still alive and moaning. They killed him. They did not discover Muhaned.

The buses and Land Cruisers left the area. The bulldozer began to approach. At this point, Muhaned pulled himself out from under the dead Egyptian and hid in the cane so the bulldozer driver would not discover him. He could taste blood, but found no wounds on his body. He watched the bulldozer push the bodies into the swamp and cover them with mud.

After the bulldozer left, Muhaned made his way to the canal and followed it until sunrise. He ended up in Al Hillah near the courthouse. He went to the river to wash the remains of the Egyptian from his body. A man spotted him and questioned him about the human remains on his shoulder. Muhaned refused to tell him anything and the man offered to help. He provided

Muhaned with food and set him on the path to his house, telling him to stay within the farms. When Muhaned arrived home, he found that the army had bombed his house. Thankfully, his family had not been injured and he was reunited with them shortly afterward. He did not tell his family what happened, but his wife discovered through his recurrent nightmares.

Muhaned went to see a psychologist but did not tell the true story. A few months later he ran into Ali again, whom he had seen in the hall. Both believed the other had been executed. They agreed never to speak of what happened. "Our lives depend on our tongues now," they said. They made a pact to claim to dislike each other so that if either were caught and forced to speak about the other's capture and attempted execution, the other could claim it was a lie. They both forged documents, obtained new identities, and did not speak about their shared horror. They've lived in constant fear for over 12 years—fear of being discovered, recaptured, tortured, or killed. Muhaned was suspicious of everything. Any time a car parked in front of his house he felt panic.

Finally, out of fear, Muhaned left Iraq for Syria in 2000, but returned after the fall of Saddam. Now, Muhaned and Ali are close friends. "For the first time in over 12 years, I am free and living without fear in my country," says Muhaned, who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Al Hillah Human Rights Association. ■



When identified, victims taken to a makeshift morgue.

A victim found in a mass grave in Musayib still wears a blindfold.

Remains of Iraqis removed from a mass grave in Musayib lie strapped in linen shrouds.

## HAMID'S STORY

Hamid\* was born in Al Hillah in 1963, left school after the ninth grade, and began working in his family's bakery. In 1982, like all Iraqi men, Hamid was required to join the military. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, was wounded and disabled in 1985, but continued to serve in the army until 1991.

Hamid participated in the uprising that followed Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and southern Iraq. Many former army men participated in killing Baath party members in the south. In March 1991, Saddam's revenge was brutal: executions were carried out all over Iraq. Saddam sent forces throughout the country, imposing curfews and ruthless military rule.

Hamid recalled seeing a woman and child crossing a road after having received permission to do so. When the child dropped something and his mother went to pick it up, she was shot. Military planes flew over Al Hillah and dropped leaflets informing people to evacuate the city because chemical weapons would follow. People were in a state of panic. Military units patrolled the city with loudspeakers telling soldiers to return to their units and advising them that there would be an amnesty. No one believed it.

Hamid and his brother Hyder, then 19 and also a former soldier, decided to escape to Baghdad, where they believed it would be safer. As they were crossing a bridge leading into Baghdad they were stopped at a checkpoint, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs. They and 18 others were driven to the Mahawil military camp.

In the camp's yard, they could hear the sound of pipes and cables hitting people and of people's screams. His

group was forced to squat in the yard for hours. Anyone who fell or spoke was beaten. Then they were "lined up like cattle" and forced to march as the soldiers jeered at them.

Their blindfolds were removed near the entrance of a large hall. Hamid heard the sound of a skull cracking. He turned and saw an old man lying on the ground, blood gushing from his head. The man had fallen out of line during the march.

They were packed tightly into a hall with about 400 people. Hamid was in the corner of the hall and near a window. There was a fire outside—a large ring of burning tires. He saw a man he knew being led from another hall. The man was bleeding and stumbling in the yard. Soldiers surrounded him and beat him with cables. Soldiers from Hamid's hall went outside to join in the beating. The man fell to the ground and was knocked unconscious. The soldiers then picked him up and threw him into the fire.

Hamid could see an officer named Abu Diba in the yard. Abu Diba ordered the soldiers to throw one of his own men into the fire: the man had appeared to object to what was happening. Three soldiers grabbed him and shoved him into the fire. Hamid could see the soldier struggling to get up but his legs were tangled in the tires. Hamid blacked out.

After hours of standing in the hall, the soldiers filled the floor of the hall with about six inches of water. This prevented anyone from sitting on the floor or sleeping. It was winter and very cold. They stood like this for 24 hours. During this time, soldiers would enter and call out a name and say "Ahmed Hassan, your family is here for you. Please come forward." As the person came for-

\* All names have been changed.



Aweda Abed Al Amer grieves over two members of her family found in a mass grave in Musayib.

Iraqis dig for remains from a mass grave in Musayib.

After identification and sorting, men shrouds and taken to a

ward, he would be escorted to the yard where his feet would be tied to a pole or a piece of wood. Then he would be suspended upside down and soldiers would whip his feet and back with cables. When the prisoner lost consciousness, the soldiers would splash him with water and continue the beating.

A soldier entered the hall and told them, "We have killed the criminals and we are taking you to your units." They were then blindfolded and escorted out. He could hear the buses. They were told to run straight ahead where someone would receive them. Those who fell or who did not run were beaten to death with pipes. He could hear people falling to the ground and the sound of bones cracking and of blood splattering. He could hear the screaming and moaning of people being beaten to death.

The 50 survivors were loaded onto the bus. The buses pulled out and traveled for approximately 15 minutes; the road was rough.

When they stopped, people were unloaded in groups of three or four and led to the tops of small mounds of dirt. He heard a guard ask if there were any more left and when another answered no, gunfire erupted. Hamid's neck was grazed by a bullet; he felt bullets entering his leg. The force of the shots knocked him backward into a hole—a grave. He landed upside down with his feet in the air. Other bodies fell on him and pushed him down a slope. The executioners fired another round of "mercy bullets" directly into the holes, trying to ensure that the people were dead. Then there was silence.

A few moments later the buses left and a bulldozer pushed dirt over the graves. Hamid's gravesite was on a slope that descended to a swamp. Because he slid down

the slope, he was only partially buried. He could hear someone near him moaning. The man, an Egyptian, told him that the soldiers had left and that he could see the headlights on the main road. Hamid asked the Egyptian where he was shot, and the man replied that only his toes were injured. Hamid couldn't move due to his injuries, and he was partially buried. The Egyptian, Muhammed, pulled him out of the mud and up the slope to the edge. Hamid's leg was severely broken—the bone had pierced through his skin.

They crossed the river. Muhammed helped him crawl up the bank by pulling him up with a cane. They hid in a canal. Hamid was very cold and thought he was dying. He asked Muhammed to go back and look for his brother. Muhammed confirmed that everyone at the site was dead.

They continued through the canal and then crossed some farmlands, drinking water from rivers. They traveled like this for days. A farmer discovered them on his land and shot at the Egyptian. Hamid convinced him to hold his fire. The farmer took them in and provided shelter in one of his buildings, but he told them they could not remain long. He left them and promised to return in one hour. Hamid and Muhammed were sure he would return with the military. Hamid urged Muhammed to leave to save himself, but he refused.

The farmer returned with food and hot tea. After they ate, he treated the wound on Hamid's neck but told him he couldn't treat the leg until the morning. At dawn he returned and said he couldn't sleep and was praying for him throughout the night. He gave Hamid a pillow to put over his face and proceeded to remove two bullets from Hamid's leg. He used a pair of rusty pliers and scissors to dig the bullets out. He removed fragments of



Remains are wrapped in makeshift shrouds.

Workers search remains for identifying items.

After identification and sorting, remains are tagged, wrapped in shrouds, and taken to a makeshift morgue.

bone as well. He placed a splint on his leg and wrapped it with cloth. He gave them a donkey and a three-day supply of food.

Hamid rode on the donkey and Muhammed led the way. He lost track of time. They felt they were being followed.

They made it to a village near Al Hillah—where Hamid's aunt lived. The aunt took him to the family farm. Muhammed stayed the night and continued north the next day. Hamid received medical care from a family friend who came to the farm.

Hamid then decided he should return to his army unit. He went to Amara because he had many friends in the town. He put on his military uniform, and his family drove him to Amara. There were checkpoints all along the route, but they had no problems. Their car ran out of fuel and he saw a truck carrying regular army troops. He told them he had been injured but provided no details. He felt they had a good idea of what happened, and they viewed him as a hero and allowed him to join them. They took him to a military hospital where he was treated by Saddam loyalists. He told them he was in an accident and made no mention of bullets. When the x-ray showed that a third bullet remained in his leg, he became worried that he would be discovered.

Soon after, he was offered a job in Baghdad with the highest level of the party as a supervisor for a building contractor. He decided instead to buy a car and work as a taxi driver. He also opened a flower shop in Baghdad.

In 1994, the "economic police" arrested him and he was tortured for 34 days. He was beaten and given electric shocks on his ears, tongue, and nose. They wanted him to confess that he was a member of another party—all parties other than Baath were illegal. He was finally released, but his "criminal" file prevented him from gaining employment, so he returned to his flower shop.

Two years later, in 1996, he was arrested by the "intelligence police." He was beaten and tortured for 18 days and questioned about the uprising. He was finally released but was ordered to close his flower shop because he was accused of holding political meetings there.

Hamid closed the shop and returned to Al Hillah with his wife and two young children. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, he has helped the Al Hillah Human Rights Association identify suspected criminals and has assisted in the location of evidence pertaining to mass graves. ■



Logo for the volunteer grassroots organization, the Association of Free Prisoners and Missing Persons.



Volunteer takes a break from sorting documents to pray.



*USAID Abuse Prevention Officer Jean Geran, carries out an assessment of a mass grave site.*

11-L-0559/OSD/24814

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Arabic version: PN-ACW-224



11-L-0559/OSD/24815

9:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
DATE: February 10, 2004  
SUBJECT:

*TO: George Rhyndance*

I think you ought to see that every person in the press corps gets a copy of this publication.

You ought to also make sure you get it in the hands of every one of the Outreach groups we work with.

*Iraq*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021004.16

Attach: "Iraq's Legacy of Terror - Mass Graves" US Agency for Int'l Development

Please respond by: 2/13

*2/20*  
*George Rhyndance - This can we put this on our website?*  
*Larry Di Rita 2/23*  
*On line?*

OSD 09529-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24816

*10 Feb 04*



*Iraq's Legacy of Terror*

# MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development



*Iraq's Legacy of Terror*

# MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development

## LOCATIONS OF FIRST MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN IRAQ



Mass Graves was edited by USAID Senior Writer Ben Barber with assistance from Stephen Epstein of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

Cover: Iraqis search for relatives and friends among victims found in a mass grave in Musayib, 75 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. The victims are thought to be from the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. The bodies, wrapped in linen shrouds, are being held in a makeshift morgue in a nearby youth center.

All photos by USAID/Thomas Hartwell except photo on inside back cover, which is by U.S. Department of State/Sandra L. Hodgkinson.

# A Vast Human Tragedy

In a decade and a half of humanitarian work I have witnessed the aftermath of much human tragedy, including the Rwandan genocide and the killing fields of Cambodia. In June 2003, I visited Iraq's mass graves, the most recent addition to mankind's legacy of mass murder.

Rows of white bundles containing bones filled room after room. Families filed by, searching for signs of those who had disappeared, some stolen during the night, others taken in daylight. Even small children were not spared the butchery.

The graves that Saddam Hussein's henchmen dug and filled with human beings are a bitter sign that mankind still has a long way to go before every person has the basic human rights promised by all our religions and cultures—the rights of life and liberty.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told the United Nations that under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was "a murderous tyranny that lasted over 35 years." "Today we are unearthing thousands of victims in horrifying testament," Zebari said.

I walked across the sandy plains of Iraq and saw the mass graves that were just found and are beginning to yield their tragic secrets. The bones tell a story of horror and shame: arms bound together, skulls pierced from behind. Hundreds in one long trench.

Those who survived inside Iraq, and those who watched helplessly from abroad, have joined together to begin the long, painful process of accounting for the dead. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on November 20, 2003, that as many as 400,000 Iraqis lie in these mass graves.

They are Kurds, killed because of their ethnicity. They are Shiites, killed because of their religion. They are Sunnis, killed for their political views. They are Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iranians, killed because their lives meant nothing to Saddam Hussein, his sons, and their followers.

As Saddam's evil regime collapsed in April and May, 2003, and his Baath Party mass murderers retreated into the shadows, Iraqis began to act on their formerly hidden grief. They searched for their loved ones rounded up over the years in campaigns of terror. They had heard rumors about shots in the night, mass burials, and vanished prisoners. Now they followed those bloody trails to the mounds of earth they suspected entombed their beloved children and parents.

The new leaders in Al Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, and a dozen other cities and towns around Iraq worked with U.S. and British forces to try and protect some of the mass graves. We hope to preserve the evidence of these crimes against humanity.

Human rights groups have formed, assisted by USAID and working with the Coalition Provisional Authority, to urge people to record the names of those being exhumed and describe the circumstances under which they were seized and slain.

Yes—people want to find the remains of their loved ones and give them a proper burial in consecrated ground. But the Iraqi people also want justice—to punish those who callously killed their fellow citizens by the busload, day after day, year after year.


Above all, if people in Iraq and around the world hope to learn from the crimes of the past, the mass graves of Iraq must be documented, reported, and never forgotten or denied.

This booklet is a small, early marker on that path.

*Andrew J. Natsios*

Andrew Natsios, Administrator  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
January 2004

# Iraq's Mass Graves



*A victim, still blindfolded, found in a mass grave in Musayib.*

## A LEGACY OF TERROR

Since the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown in May, 270 mass graves have been reported. By mid-January, 2004, the number of confirmed sites climbed to fifty-three. Some graves hold a few dozen bodies—their arms lashed together and the bullet holes in the backs of skulls testimony to their execution. Other graves go on for hundreds of meters, densely packed with thousands of bodies.

"We've already discovered just so far the remains of 400,000 people in mass graves," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 20 in London. The United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) all estimate that Saddam Hussein's regime murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people. "Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 290,000 Iraqis have been 'disappeared' by the Iraqi government over the past two decades," said the group in a statement in May. "Many of these 'disappeared' are those whose remains are now being unearthed in mass graves all over Iraq."

If these numbers prove accurate, they represent a crime against humanity surpassed only by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Pol Pot's Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s, and the Nazi Holocaust of World War II.

## REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS

Beginning in the 1980s, reports of mass murder began filtering out of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist loyalists and police rounded up members of the Dawa party—they were never heard from again. Human rights groups said 180,000 ethnic Kurds were rounded up and killed in the Anfal campaign in which hundreds of mountain villages were destroyed. Those left alive were moved into bleak collection cities that still dot the plains between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. It was a crime so staggering that, without hard evidence of bodies to back it up, many refused to believe it possible.

Then in 1988 came the use of nerve and mustard gas against Iraqi-Kurdish civilians in Halabjah. Five thousand were killed in a single day. The world was shocked, but still, the missing people rounded up over the previous months and years remained vanished.

After the 1991 Gulf War, Shiites and Kurds revolted, but the rebellion was quickly crushed by Iraqi tanks and troops loyal to Saddam Hussein. While Kurds got protection from U.S. and British aircraft, creating an autonomous region in northeastern Iraq where they were safe from persecution, the Shiites were brutally repressed in the south, and tens of thousands vanished.

The following pages include first-hand accounts from three Iraqis who survived the mass murders. Each tells what took place in a way that no formal report can match. Yet the world is duty-bound to learn the facts—cold, brutal, and numbing—of what happened over these years and how a modern government, equipped with the powers of a modern army and police, turned against its own people.

## A HISTORY OF DENIAL

The reports of mass murder under Saddam Hussein had been made for years by the United Nations, the U.S. Government, HRW, independent journalists, and the families of people who were arrested and then vanished. But the Iraqi regime denied the reports, refused to allow U.N. investigations, and stonewalled human rights groups.

"As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the 'Anfal' campaign of 1988," said the U.S. State Department's 2002 human rights report. "Both the [U.N.] Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime's policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention."

Finally, the regime was swept away by U.S., British, and other allied forces in May, 2003, and the truth emerged. It came as no surprise that once the country was thrown open to the world press and international organizations, they might find evidence of these crimes against humanity. But few imagined the full extent of the slaughter that came to light.

## SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES

In early May, Saddam's police, paramilitary troops, and army fled from their prisons, barracks, and killing fields. Thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children began a grim trek to the forbidden places they feared they would find their missing children, parents, and friends.

Reports that mass graves had been discovered reached officials at the first U.S. administrative body in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A human rights expert from the U.S. Agency for International Development was one of the first outsiders to follow the Iraqis to the site of their grim discoveries.

"South of Al Hillah in early May I heard about bones," said Sloan Mann of USAID. "When I showed up, people

were randomly digging through the site. I went there two days after the mass grave was discovered.

"The site was very disturbed. Children walked barefoot in the grave. There were many families. Some were mourning. Some were curious onlookers."

Mann stood on the edge of a ditch some 20 meters long and 2 meters wide. About 25 sets of remains were showing, all in neat piles, along with the clothes the victims had worn when they died. Some were the clothes of children.

## THE UNITED STATES OFFERS TO HELP

To help the Iraqis exhume their loved ones, the CPA authorized Mann and other U.S. officials to assist. Mann was part of the first deployment of Abuse Prevention Units (APUs), created by USAID to protect human rights in emergencies or conflict. The teams offered quick grants to buy everything from shovels to exhume graves to computers for logging in victims as they were unearthed. Money was provided for training Iraqis in forensic medicine—the science of determining the legal cause of death—so that evidence might be obtained for prosecution of those responsible for the killings. Help was also given to several Iraqi human rights groups, including the Free Prisoners Association and the Lawyers Association. They began compiling lists of missing Iraqis, suspected mass grave sites, confirmed victims, and documents relating to disappearances.

In some cases, former Iraqi guards, burial workers, and even executioners themselves came forward to tell what had happened. Some said that if they had refused to arrest and kill as ordered, they would have been thrown into the pits themselves.

The CPA and USAID officials working with the Iraqis quickly decided to divide the mass graves into three groups:

- **Emotionally overrun sites**  
These are sites that have already been overrun by people seeking the remains of their missing relatives and friends. Since the sites are disturbed—and it would be unthinkable to intervene to stop people from completing their search—U.S. aid is aimed to train Iraqis to assist the community emotionally and to collect whatever information is possible: victim names, circumstances of disappearance, etc.
- **Humanitarian exhumation sites**  
In these sites, trained Iraqi professionals teach the community how to put together all the bones and

other remains from each victim, properly identify the remains, and help families obtain the best accounting of what happened to their loved ones. The primary purpose of these excavations is to identify missing persons, although some evidence will also be recovered by local forensic teams.

■ **Full criminal investigation sites**

Between eight and 20 sites are expected to be selected for full exhumation for accountability purposes in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was recently established by the Iraqi Governing Council to try cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

## THE TASK AHEAD

At the donor conference held in Madrid in October, funding, forensic teams, equipment, mortuary assistance, and training programs were requested from the international community to assist the Iraqi people in uncovering mass graves. These donations and assistance will be necessary for many years to come as the Iraqis move forward in their reconciliation process, according to the CPA senior human rights official Sandy Hodgkinson. The CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has sent out staff to communities and talked about the need to have patience, preserve the sites, and respect the dead. So far, 270 suspected mass grave sites have been found by Iraqis, the CPA, and the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigative Division. However, in some cases, mass grave reports have turned out to be either simply old cemeteries, or falsely reported to attract attention or to obtain funds.

Another difficulty facing the effort to find and document mass graves is that those who carried out the murders, and other supporters of Saddam's regime, have threatened the human rights groups collecting evidence of crimes against humanity. The Free Prisoners Association has been attacked, and two assassination attempts have taken place.

Another challenge is the weather—the rainy winter prevented the opening of most mass graves until February 2004. Nevertheless, the first of some 40 international investigators began arriving in January 2004. They will prepare evidence for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an Iraqi institution that will prosecute some of the estimated 6,000 people linked to Saddam-era crimes. The plan is to begin prosecutions with Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as "Chemical Ali"), a cousin of Saddam Hussein accused of ordering the gassing of the Kurds in 1988.

CPA official Hodgkinson states that overall, the mass grave program will differ slightly from the process used in Bosnia, and will be specific to the needs in Iraq. Scientific methods of excavation for investigative purposes will be the same. Programs to identify the missing, however, will differ from Bosnia, where to date, only 8,000 of the 30,000 bodies believed to be buried as a result of the conflict have been recovered.

Mass graves are not evident to the untrained eye. Many are concealed under tons of earth or hidden in inaccessible military camps. Satellite and aerial imagery is being used to identify disturbed earth; ground-probing radar also helps locate remains.

When a possible site is identified, a team including an archaeologist, anthropologist, surveyor, geologist, crime-scene officer, and satellite image technician—plus military support—goes to assess the site.

The CPA's Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has compiled a list of 270 reported sites across the country. Many sites are in the southwest and central areas around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Exhumations require heavy machinery as well as excavation, mortuary, security, military, and explosives experts. The team of 20–30 people will need living accommodations for four to six weeks.

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Abdul-Basit Turki said that in addition to families' need to find the bodies of missing relatives, excavating mass graves is important in building criminal cases against members of the former regime.

## IRAQIS WERE NOT THE ONLY VICTIMS

It was not just Iraqi citizens who disappeared into the mass graves.

"Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored

*Workers remove remains from a mass grave. After identification, bodies are wrapped in shrouds and carried to a makeshift morgue.*

11-L-0559/OSD/24823



requests from those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and prisoners of war captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war," said the State Department report.

After the liberation of Iraq, reports surfaced that all 600 Kuwaitis carried into captivity in Iraq by retreating troops in 1991 were executed.

Egyptian officials also said they were seeking information about hundreds—possibly thousands—of Egyptian citizens who died or disappeared after they traveled to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war to take jobs. Many were returned home in coffins—without explanations of how they died.

## A PLAN FOR ACTION

Iraqi and U.S. foreign aid officials have prepared a plan for a long-range process of excavation that will meet all the needs for humanitarian, emotional, and judicial resolution of the mass graves. First, Iraqis with skills in forensic anthropology or simply archaeology are being identified to receive training by international forensic experts. Second, communities are being asked to recommend academics and professionals who want to learn the basics of forensic science. They will undergo training in humanitarian exhumation and the fundamentals of basic skeletal anatomy to facilitate the identification process.

The nuts and bolts of the exhumation process have also been planned: exhumation protocols, nationwide standard operating procedures, administration, and logistical support. Construction is underway to renovate a storage facility into a centralized evidence repository. Local human rights organizations are being funded to increase their capacity to organize and collect documents, evidence, and names of the missing. This will eventually tie in to a national outreach program for families seeking information on missing relatives. Information on missing persons that local organizations are collecting will be moved to the central evidence repository. There a full-time Iraqi staff will work to compile a comprehensive database. The information will then be passed to human rights organizations in communities across Iraq.

There are ongoing efforts to collect, verify, and combine information on suspected mass grave sites. A Danish forensic team arrived in Iraq in October, and a Finnish team was expected soon after. Swedish and German governments have also offered varying levels of assistance. Until the international teams are in place,



*Remains unearthed in a mass grave in Musayib are prepared for reburial by family members.*

forensic site assessments are being used to prioritize 8-16 carefully selected mass graves for a full forensic exhumation based on the following criteria:

- the grave represents a main period of atrocity
- the grave is relatively untouched
- the grave may give evidence of crimes against humanity
- the local population permits securing and exhumation of the site

A media campaign has begun through the daily newspaper *Al Sabah*, Iraqi Media Network, and other media outlets to explain the need to preserve grave sites. Getting the word out on a national level will help identify the missing and encourage citizens to come forward with evidence of atrocities. Although there are few reports of local impatience with the exhumation process, local and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the media must be continually engaged on the need to protect grave sites and encouraged to have patience with the process.

The Iraqi Governing Council set a major marker on the path to resolving the issue of the mass killings when it announced there will be a national tribunal for criminals. This is the next, unwritten chapter of this story. ■

# Survivor Stories

The following testimonials are from survivors of executions that occurred outside Mahawil, a city north of Al Hillah, approximately 60 miles south of Baghdad.

## ALI'S STORY

Ali,\* 36, an aircraft mechanic, was driving his family from Al Hillah to his farm in Mahawil on March 6, 1991, during the Shiite uprising after the end of the Gulf War. The city was being bombed.

Ali was stopped at a military checkpoint outside the city near a brick factory and ordered to get out. His wife, newborn baby, and handicapped mother were ordered to drive away.

Ali was ordered to remove his jacket, and uniformed men tied his hands and feet with his jacket and pieces of cloth and placed a blindfold over his eyes.

Ali could still see through the blindfold, however, and saw about 12 other people, including men, women, children, and elderly, pulled from cars, bound, and blindfolded.

They were dragged to a white Toyota Land Cruiser and piled on top of each other over the seats. No words were spoken, because when others attempted to speak they received severe blows to the head and body.

It was approximately 10 a.m. when they arrived at the Mahawil military camp on the outskirts of the city. There they were unloaded, registered, and escorted into a large assembly hall filled with approximately 200 people. Everyone was sitting on the floor with their hands

and feet tied. They were blindfolded and positioned facing the walls.

Ali was placed near the door and could see outside. At about 4:30 p.m., the military men built a large ring of tires about 20 feet wide and set it on fire. Next to the fire were large buses, and the soldiers began escorting people from the hall to the buses. At this time, people were also being carried out of the hall and thrown into the fire. Ali believes that because the military was in a hurry to execute them and not everyone would fit on the buses, they decided to burn some people alive. After about 30 minutes of witnessing this, he was escorted from the hall and loaded onto a bus.

At approximately 6 p.m., they were taken on a short drive to a swampy area behind the brick factory. It was dark and he saw headlights in front of the buses. He believes the lights were headlights from the Land Cruisers driven by Saddam's men. He could hear shots but not voices. Ali was paralyzed with fear. Everyone in the bus was blindfolded.

After about 15 minutes, the bus in front of his drove away and the headlights were directly on his bus. They pulled seven to 10 people off the bus. Shots rang out. Ali's group was the next to be pulled from the bus. In his group was a blind man, three brothers, a woman, and her five year old son. The group was led to the front of the bus where the headlights were directly on them.

\* All names have been changed.

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*Iraqi women seek to identify remains of lost family members.*



*An identification card found in a mass grave in Musayib.*



*Remains unearthed in a mass reburial.*

They were pushed to the ground and then were pulled up one at a time to be executed. They were pushed a couple of feet to the edge of the swamp and shot. Most would fall before being shot because they were overcome with fear. Ali does not remember any words being spoken—except the plea of the three brothers who begged that at least one be spared. They were executed one at a time. Next, the woman was shot in front of her five-year-old child. The child lunged at the legs of the executioner and was kicked away and shot in the face. The blind man was then executed and his chest exploded on Ali.

There were three executioners. They took turns shooting and reloading. Ali was last in the group to be shot, and the soldier who was to execute Ali shot between his legs. The soldier was then shot dead by another soldier. During this commotion, Ali turned to the swamp, jumped over bodies, and ran through the water. They shot after him. He was hit in the left hand and foot and fell, breaking his nose. He continued on and made it to the other side of the swamp.

A tractor with soldiers came in his direction looking for him, so he tossed his robe into the water and hid in a thicket of cane. The soldiers saw his robe and sprayed it with bullets thinking they had shot him. A bulldozer appeared next and began shoveling dirt on it to cover what they thought was his body. Ali was very near and

was knocked unconscious by falling rocks, but he was not completely buried. When the bulldozer left, he pulled himself out of the dirt and crawled to an empty canal. He could still hear shots in the distance: a third bus had arrived during his escape.

Ali crawled through the canal for about 30 minutes, making his way to a farmhouse. He knocked on the door, and was taken in by the family, which told him later that he "was a piece of blood." He doesn't remember much about the care they provided him except for the yogurt they fed him and the heater they placed near him. The family knew his uncles, so they clothed him, gave him a donkey and a cane, and told him to follow the canal to an uncle's house. Ali made it there, and his uncle cleaned him and took him to Baghdad the next day. He hid there for one month without telling anyone except his uncle. He returned home to discover his two brothers had been executed in similar roundups.

He left the neighborhood and changed his identity. He was also protected by an intelligence officer in his neighborhood. When Saddam was toppled, he resumed his identity after having been in hiding for over 12 years. He is a member of the Human Rights Association of Al Hillah. ■

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grave are prepared for

After identification and preparation for reburial, a victim is moved from the morgue by family members.

Iraqis look at lists of victims unearthed from a mass grave in Musayib.

## MUHANED'S STORY

Muhaned,\* 32, is from Al Hillah. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as a nurse in the army. During the 1991 Shiite uprising he was stationed in the north. On March 5, he traveled by bus to Al Hillah to see his parents. It was winter and he arrived early in the morning. Upon entering the city near a brick factory, his bus encountered an army unit near the statue of Saddam. The army unit stopped the bus and would not allow entrance into the city. The bus driver was told there was a curfew and to return to Baghdad. Several people, Muhaned included, got off the bus to walk to Al Hillah. In his group were six men (all Army and in uniform), an old man, two children, and a woman. The army unit saw them approaching and took them into custody. One of the men refused to be taken and was beaten in front of the group. They were escorted to a military bus and loaded in the back. Those who spoke were beaten and called traitors.

They were taken to the Mahawil military camp, where their hands were tied behind their backs, and they were blindfolded. They were escorted into a large assembly hall. Muhaned could hear whispering, but he does not believe there were many people in the hall at that time. He sat on the floor and fell asleep. Around noon, somebody kicked him and took his name, and he fell asleep again. Around 3 p.m., he awoke to see that the hall was filled with well over 100 people. His ties had loosened and he was able to see. He saw his neighbor. He also saw Ali (see first survivor story). They spent the entire day without water, food, or toilets. People were forced to go to the bathroom where they sat.

\* All names have been changed.

At about 5 p.m. they began loading people onto buses. Muhaned was at the back of the hall and was one of the last to be escorted out. There was no light in the hall, but through the windows, he could see the glow of a large fire. He could smell rubber burning.

People were being escorted out to the buses in groups of about 20 at a time. Some people, however, were picked up and thrown into the fire. Muhaned and those around him could hear the screaming. A woman yelled at a soldier, "Why are you burning these people?" She was told, "They are criminals." From this, Muhaned felt safe because he had done nothing wrong.

As the hall emptied, a soldier pointed at his group and said "Take them. Captain Abbar has signed for them." Muhaned did not understand what this meant and began crying and praying. When he exited the hall, the fire was only three to four meters from the entrance. Those who were walking slowly, or whose feet were tied, were thrown in the fire. The rest, including Muhaned, were escorted to the buses.

Around midnight, they drove to a muddy road next to the swamp behind the brick factory. On one side was a swamp and on the other side a canal. He saw a white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bulldozer on the edge of the swamp. The Land Cruiser's headlights acted as a spotlight on the front of the bus at the edge of the swamp.

Baath party members piled out of the Land Cruiser and another bus and began loading their weapons. Muhaned and the others were escorted off their bus and forced to crouch at the edge of the swamp in several rows of six. At their feet were dead bodies. A woman stood up and silently wrapped herself in her long black

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An Iraqi holding the name of a victim on a scrap of paper, searches a list of victims.



Iraqis dig for remains.



Workers identify and sort remains wrapped in shrouds and t

robe in the same fashion people are wrapped for a funeral. Although he was blindfolded, Muhaned's hands were free, and he moved his ID card into an internal pocket, hoping to preserve it so that his body might be identified. Everyone was praying.

Six Baath party members lined up in front and to the side of the crouching rows. Muhaned was in the back row on the very edge of the swamp. Spotlights shone on them. A very large Egyptian man near Muhaned kept asking why they were being executed. At that moment, gunfire erupted and the man jumped to his feet. His body was sprayed with bullets and the force of his body knocked Muhaned back, flattening him and pushing him partially into the swamp. The Egyptian's body completely covered him. The shooting lasted for about 30 seconds. The soldiers surveyed the bodies and discovered one person was still alive and moaning. They killed him. They did not discover Muhaned.

The buses and Land Cruisers left the area. The bulldozer began to approach. At this point, Muhaned pulled himself out from under the dead Egyptian and hid in the cane so the bulldozer driver would not discover him. He could taste blood, but found no wounds on his body. He watched the bulldozer push the bodies into the swamp and cover them with mud.

After the bulldozer left, Muhaned made his way to the canal and followed it until sunrise. He ended up in Al Hillah near the courthouse. He went to the river to wash the remains of the Egyptian from his body. A man spotted him and questioned him about the human remains on his shoulder. Muhaned refused to tell him anything and the man offered to help. He provided

Muhaned with food and set him on the path to his house, telling him to stay within the farms. When Muhaned arrived home, he found that the army had bombed his house. Thankfully, his family had not been injured and he was reunited with them shortly afterward. He did not tell his family what happened, but his wife discovered through his recurrent nightmares.

Muhaned went to see a psychologist but did not tell the true story. A few months later he ran into Ali again, whom he had seen in the hall. Both believed the other had been executed. They agreed never to speak of what happened. "Our lives depend on our tongues now," they said. They made a pact to claim to dislike each other so that if either were caught and forced to speak about the other's capture and attempted execution, the other could claim it was a lie. They both forged documents, obtained new identities, and did not speak about their shared horror. They've lived in constant fear for over 12 years—fear of being discovered, recaptured, tortured, or killed. Muhaned was suspicious of everything. Any time a car parked in front of his house he felt panic.

Finally, out of fear, Muhaned left Iraq for Syria in 2000, but returned after the fall of Saddam. Now, Muhaned and Ali are close friends. "For the first time in over 12 years, I am free and living without fear in my country," says Muhaned, who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Al Hillah Human Rights Association. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/24828



Victims. When identified, victims taken to a makeshift morgue.



A victim found in a mass grave in Musayib still wears a blindfold.



Remains of Iraqis removed from a mass grave in Musayib lie wrapped in linen shrouds.

## HAMID'S STORY

Hamid\* was born in Al Hillah in 1963, left school after the ninth grade, and began working in his family's bakery. In 1982, like all Iraqi men, Hamid was required to join the military. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, was wounded and disabled in 1985, but continued to serve in the army until 1991.

Hamid participated in the uprising that followed Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and southern Iraq. Many former army men participated in killing Baath party members in the south. In March 1991, Saddam's revenge was brutal: executions were carried out all over Iraq. Saddam sent forces throughout the country, imposing curfews and ruthless military rule.

Hamid recalled seeing a woman and child crossing a road after having received permission to do so. When the child dropped something and his mother went to pick it up, she was shot. Military planes flew over Al Hillah and dropped leaflets informing people to evacuate the city because chemical weapons would follow. People were in a state of panic. Military units patrolled the city with loudspeakers telling soldiers to return to their units and advising them that there would be an amnesty. No one believed it.

Hamid and his brother Hyder, then 19 and also a former soldier, decided to escape to Baghdad, where they believed it would be safer. As they were crossing a bridge leading into Baghdad they were stopped at a checkpoint, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs. They and 18 others were driven to the Mahawil military camp.

In the camp's yard, they could hear the sound of pipes and cables hitting people and of people's screams. His

group was forced to squat in the yard for hours. Anyone who fell or spoke was beaten. Then they were "lined up like cattle" and forced to march as the soldiers jeered at them.

Their blindfolds were removed near the entrance of a large hall. Hamid heard the sound of a skull cracking. He turned and saw an old man lying on the ground, blood gushing from his head. The man had fallen out of line during the march.

They were packed tightly into a hall with about 400 people. Hamid was in the corner of the hall and near a window. There was a fire outside—a large ring of burning tires. He saw a man he knew being led from another hall. The man was bleeding and stumbling in the yard. Soldiers surrounded him and beat him with cables. Soldiers from Hamid's hall went outside to join in the beating. The man fell to the ground and was knocked unconscious. The soldiers then picked him up and threw him into the fire.

Hamid could see an officer named Abu Diba in the yard. Abu Diba ordered the soldiers to throw one of his own men into the fire: the man had appeared to object to what was happening. Three soldiers grabbed him and shoved him into the fire. Hamid could see the soldier struggling to get up but his legs were tangled in the tires. Hamid blacked out.

After hours of standing in the hall, the soldiers filled the floor of the hall with about six inches of water. This prevented anyone from sitting on the floor or sleeping. It was winter and very cold. They stood like this for 24 hours. During this time, soldiers would enter and call out a name and say "Ahmed Hassan, your family is here for you. Please come forward." As the person came for-

\* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/24829



Aweda Abed Al-Amer grieves over two members of her family found in a mass grave in Musayib.



Iraqis dig for remains from a mass grave in Musayib.



After identification and sorting, linen shrouds and taken to a

ward, he would be escorted to the yard where his feet would be tied to a pole or a piece of wood. Then he would be suspended upside down and soldiers would whip his feet and back with cables. When the prisoner lost consciousness, the soldiers would splash him with water and continue the beating.

A soldier entered the hall and told them, "We have killed the criminals and we are taking you to your units." They were then blindfolded and escorted out. He could hear the buses. They were told to run straight ahead where someone would receive them. Those who fell or who did not run were beaten to death with pipes. He could hear people falling to the ground and the sound of bones cracking and of blood splattering. He could hear the screaming and moaning of people being beaten to death.

The 50 survivors were loaded onto the bus. The buses pulled out and traveled for approximately 15 minutes; the road was rough.

When they stopped, people were unloaded in groups of three or four and led to the tops of small mounds of dirt. He heard a guard ask if there were any more left and when another answered no, gunfire erupted. Hamid's neck was grazed by a bullet; he felt bullets entering his leg. The force of the shots knocked him backward into a hole—a grave. He landed upside down with his feet in the air. Other bodies fell on him and pushed him down a slope. The executioners fired another round of "mercy bullets" directly into the holes, trying to ensure that the people were dead. Then there was silence.

A few moments later the buses left and a bulldozer pushed dirt over the graves. Hamid's gravesite was on a slope that descended to a swamp. Because he slid down

the slope, he was only partially buried. He could hear someone near him moaning. The man, an Egyptian, told him that the soldiers had left and that he could see the headlights on the main road. Hamid asked the Egyptian where he was shot, and the man replied that only his toes were injured. Hamid couldn't move due to his injuries, and he was partially buried. The Egyptian, Muhammed, pulled him out of the mud and up the slope to the edge. Hamid's leg was severely broken—the bone had pierced through his skin.

They crossed the river. Muhammed helped him crawl up the bank by pulling him up with a cane. They hid in a canal. Hamid was very cold and thought he was dying. He asked Muhammed to go back and look for his brother. Muhammed confirmed that everyone at the site was dead.

They continued through the canal and then crossed some farmlands, drinking water from rivers. They traveled like this for days. A farmer discovered them on his land and shot at the Egyptian. Hamid convinced him to hold his fire. The farmer took them in and provided shelter in one of his buildings, but he told them they could not remain long. He left them and promised to return in one hour. Hamid and Muhammed were sure he would return with the military. Hamid urged Muhammed to leave to save himself, but he refused.

The farmer returned with food and hot tea. After they ate, he treated the wound on Hamid's neck but told him he couldn't treat the leg until the morning. At dawn he returned and said he couldn't sleep and was praying for him throughout the night. He gave Hamid a pillow to put over his face and proceeded to remove two bullets from Hamid's leg. He used a pair of rusty pliers and scissors to dig the bullets out. He removed fragments of

11-L-0559/OSD/24830



Remains are wrapped in makeshift shrouds.

Workers search remains for identifying items.

After identification and sorting, remains are tagged, wrapped in linen shrouds, and taken to a makeshift morgue.

bone as well. He placed a splint on his leg and wrapped it with cloth. He gave them a donkey and a three-day supply of food.

Hamid rode on the donkey and Muhammed led the way. He lost track of time. They felt they were being followed.

They made it to a village near Al Hillah—where Hamid's aunt lived. The aunt took him to the family farm. Muhammed stayed the night and continued north the next day. Hamid received medical care from a family friend who came to the farm.

Hamid then decided he should return to his army unit. He went to Amara because he had many friends in the town. He put on his military uniform, and his family drove him to Amara. There were checkpoints all along the route, but they had no problems. Their car ran out of fuel and he saw a truck carrying regular army troops. He told them he had been injured but provided no details. He felt they had a good idea of what happened, and they viewed him as a hero and allowed him to join them. They took him to a military hospital where he was treated by Saddam loyalists. He told them he was in an accident and made no mention of bullets. When the x-ray showed that a third bullet remained in his leg, he became worried that he would be discovered.

Soon after, he was offered a job in Baghdad with the highest level of the party as a supervisor for a building contractor. He decided instead to buy a car and work as a taxi driver. He also opened a flower shop in Baghdad.

In 1994, the "economic police" arrested him and he was tortured for 34 days. He was beaten and given electric shocks on his ears, tongue, and nose. They wanted him to confess that he was a member of another party—all parties other than Baath were illegal. He was finally released, but his "criminal" file prevented him from gaining employment, so he returned to his flower shop.

Two years later, in 1996, he was arrested by the "intelligence police." He was beaten and tortured for 18 days and questioned about the uprising. He was finally released but was ordered to close his flower shop because he was accused of holding political meetings there.

Hamid closed the shop and returned to Al Hillah with his wife and two young children. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, he has helped the Al Hillah Human Rights Association identify suspected criminals and has assisted in the location of evidence pertaining to mass graves. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/24831



Logo for the volunteer grassroots organization, the Association of Free Prisoners and Missing Persons.



Volunteer takes a break from sorting documents to pray.



*USAID Abuse Prevention Officer Jean Geran, carries out an assessment of a mass grave site.*

For more information, contact  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
Washington, D.C. 20523-1000  
Telephone: 202-712-4810  
Internet: [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)  
PN-ACW-223  
Arabic version: PN-ACW-224



February 20, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Copy of Resolution

Please get me a copy of the Daschle, Levin and Kerry 1998 war resolution referred to in this letter to the editor. I want to read precisely what they said.

381

Thanks.

Attach.  
*Washington Times* letters to the editor, February 19, 2004.

DHR:dh  
022004-12

.....  
Please respond by 2/24/04

OSD 09531-04

20 Feb 04

## Under Clinton, Democrats were hawks

With polls showing that an increasing number of Americans believe the Bush administration either lied or exaggerated Iraq's weapons potential, it is appropriate that the Senate Intelligence Committee investigate prewar claims by President Bush on the Iraqi threat ("Bush confers with Kay, sets appointment of panel," Nation, Feb. 3).

It is equally appropriate that the committee expand the probe to pinpoint the intelligence that prompted then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, South Dakota Democ-

rat, in 1998 to co-sponsor a war resolution urging President Clinton "to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs" and "that would send as clear a message as possible that we are going to force, one way or another, diplomatically or militarily, Iraq to comply with their own agreements and with international law." Sen. Patrick Leahy, Vermont Democrat, and Sen. John Kerry, Massachusetts Democrat, also were co-spon-

sors of this resolution.

Had the Clinton administration followed through with these Democratic Senate leaders' admonition in 1998, there may not have been the need for ranking committee member Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat, to insist that the intelligence panel "address the question of whether intelligence was exaggerated or misused" by Mr. Bush in 2004.

W. HUSTON SMITH  
Indian Wells, Calif.

## What's the source of outsourcing?

I have great respect for Bruce Bartlett, but his assertion that only "very low-end operations that require little skill or training" are being outsourced doesn't reflect what is going on in the marketplace ("Anxieties over such outsourcing," Commentary, Feb. 4). Since when are engineering, radiology, software development, accounting or architecture jobs considered "low end"? These are the types of jobs for which we encourage our children to get good educations but that are being transferred rapidly overseas. In one case, a high-aid, well-educated software engineer was sent to India by her company to train her replacements and, shortly thereafter, he and her entire team were red. Mr. Bartlett points out that Indians are competing on price and quality. With India specializing in technology, how can Mr. Bartlett say only low-end jobs are affected?

I also dispute the notion that displaced workers are being transferred into better jobs within the same company. Though I'm sure there are good corporate citizens out there, I know of more instances of companies laying off white-collar U.S. workers and replacing them with offshore workers. What higher level of education do you tell someone with a doctorate to aspire to? Even so, will doctorate holders get decent jobs in their specialties when they were too

"expensive" in the first place?

Mr. Bartlett must come to grips with the fact that, as Hewlett Packard Chief Executive Officer Carly Fiorina stated: "There is no job that is America's God-given right anymore." That includes the high-skilled, high-paying jobs on which Mr. Bartlett would like to believe we still have a lock.

REP. DONALD A. MANZULLO  
Chairman  
Committee on Small Business  
Washington

Regarding Paul Craig Robert's column "Where did the jobs go?" (Commentary, Sunday): The trend to outsourcing and loss of "manufacturing and knowledge jobs" is inevitable and, indeed, may escalate.

There are several reasons for this.

First, with high-speed communications (the Internet, etc.) and modern transportation, we are living in a global economy. We are not, nor can we afford to be, isolated from the rest of the world.

Second, we do not have a monopoly on technology or skilled workers, and many other countries have high-tech and semi-skilled people who are hard-working, dedicated and (most important) a lot cheaper. Inevitably, businesses will be attracted to those sources of labor.

Third, many countries are not saddled with restrictive laws and regulatory agencies (e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency etc.), high taxes or court decisions on employment practices. Though such restrictions certainly are well-intentioned, capital will tend to shun that type of business environment.

Fourth, free-trade agreements are too one-sided and do not recognize realities. An autoworker in Mexico making \$1.25 an hour (which is a hand-some wage in that country) is not a good prospect for buying a \$999 computer with all the "bells and whistles," and any way, that computer probably is being made in Taiwan, mainland China, Malaysia or wherever. Maybe that Mexican autoworker will eventually catch up to American standards, but that could take a very long time and, until then, what happens to our people and our economy? Didn't Ross Perot warn us of the "giant sucking sound" of our good manufacturing jobs going south?

Meanwhile, we're running enormous deficits and generating economic "fault lines" all over the place, all of which are dangerous to our stability and, ultimately, our democracy.

L. BLOOM  
Owings Mills, Md.

**Editor's note:** The Jordanian Embassy has taken issue with our headline yesterday on its letter regarding an op-ed on Israel's security fence. The headline on that

op-ed was "Jordan twists the fence." A more appropriate headline on the letter from the Jordanian ambassador would have been "Twisting reality."

We welcome your opinions. Op-eds and Letters to the Editor should be originals and exclusive to The Washington Times. We prefer opinion articles that are 750 words in length and letters that are 350 words or less. Letters may be edited for clarity and length. Please include your name, address and daytime telephone number.

E-mail:  
Op-ed@washingtontimes.com or  
letters@washingtontimes.com

1-800-665-9700 ST/24835

February 20, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Scientists

Please figure out whether or not these folks are criticizing the Department of Defense. I cannot tell from this article. It may be that they are criticizing DOE.

Please advise.

If they are criticizing us, I want to know precisely why, I know several of those fellows quite well and I want to get it straightened out.

Thanks.

Attach.

Vergano, Dan. "Bush's Changes to Advisory Process Draw Scientists' Ire," *USA Today*, February 19, 2004, p. 10A.

DHR:dh  
022004-8

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09533-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24836

*480,112*

*20 February*

ington

# Bush's changes to advisory process draw scientists' ire

By Dan Vergano  
USA TODAY

A bipartisan, all-star roster of Nobel Prize winners and former federal science officials accused the Bush administration Wednesday of politicizing science.

"When scientific knowledge has been found to be in conflict with its political goals, the administration has often manipulated the process through which science enters into its decisions," charges a document signed by 60 scientists in an unprecedented joint effort by the leaders of the nation's science establishment.

They are calling for an independent congressional investigation of federal science-advisory policies.


Signers include 20 Nobel Prize winners and 19 recipients of the National Medal of Science, awarded by the president for outstanding contributions in the field. Nobel winners include former National Institutes of Health chief Harold Varmus to pioneering chemist Richard Smalley. Medal winners include H-bomb designer Richard Garwin and Harvard physicist Norman Ramsey, both advisers to Republican administrations.

"These are very distinguished scientists with years of public service," says science policy expert Al Teich of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

A separate, 46-page report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, a group that has been critical of administration defense policies, accompanied the statement. It details what the union says were politically influenced science findings in the areas of health, environment, agriculture and national se-



Garwin: Designer of the hydrogen bomb.



Smalley: Pioneering chemist, won Nobel.



Varmus: Ran National Institutes of Health.

curity, among others.

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy chief John Marburger dismissed the criticism as a "conspiracy report" of "disconnected issues that rubbed somebody the wrong way." He said the administration must better explain its processes to scientists.

From the Manhattan Project that created the atomic bomb to today's top-secret Pentagon programs, scientists have a long tradition of advising the federal government. But science has increasingly become the focus of political debate over the last decade.

President Clinton's failure to support needle-sharing programs to stop HIV transmission among drug addicts — despite recommendations from his science advisers that he do so — generated much criticism. So did President Bush's change of heart about a campaign promise to limit carbon dioxide emissions, which have been linked to global warming.

Researchers have been especially angry about administration moves to "peer review" federal regulations, excluding academic scientists while encouraging par-

ticipation by scientists representing the regulated industry.

The report lists the following as objectionable practices, echoing past complaints from former government researchers:

- The removal of highly qualified scientists from lead-poisoning, environment, health and drug-abuse panels and their replacement with industry representatives.

- Forbidding EPA, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Interior Department scientists from speaking publicly.

- Revisions to the Endangered Species Act that limit scientists from commenting on the protection of habitats.

- The disbanding of advisory panels on nuclear weapons and arms control.

- The dismissal of assessments by national lab experts on the likelihood that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Marburger declined to address the scientists' specific complaints. He said he does not plan to bring the report to Bush's attention but hopes to involve federal agencies in responding to it.



7:35 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Ken Kreig

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **SLRG**

Why don't you do some preparatory work in anticipation of a SLRG of how we can reduce manpower in the Department to avoid the problem you've talked about; namely, Bethlehem Steel.

*339*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.18

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*3/5*

OSD 09535-04

*18 Feb 04*

7:35 PM

TO: Ken Kreig  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: SLRG

Please work with Gordon England on the attached memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.19

*Attach: Snowflake 2/18/04 to Secretary England Re: SLRG*

---

OSD 09536-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24839

7:35 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Ken Kreig

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **SLRG**

Why don't you do some preparatory work in anticipation of a SLRG of how we can reduce manpower in the Department to avoid the problem you've talked about; namely, Bethlehem Steel.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.18

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_ 

OSD 09535-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24840



7:35 PM

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **Coast Guard**

Should we go ahead and get the Navy the authority to do what the Coast Guard can do to board ships? Isn't the 21<sup>st</sup> Century different from the 20<sup>th</sup> in this regard?

*801.2*

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.03

Please respond by: 2/28

OSD 09537-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24841

*18 Feb 04*

February 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Yemen

*yemen*

As you know, John Abizaid met with the Yemeni foreign minister and felt it went well. Apparently they want a ship back Aden. I wonder if we ought to consider this and possibly even consider sending the USS COLE back and make an event of it. It would probably be seen as a victory for us and Yemen, versus bin Laden, and possibly have a positive regional impact.

Let's talk about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-73

*OB*  
*8/4*

.....  
Please respond by 2 / 18 / 04

OSD 09538-04

*8 Feb 04*

February 8, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
CC: Powell Moore  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Charts in Congressional Testimony

032

In the future when we are doing charts in Congressional testimony or presentations, someone should put into my remarks the point where it is appropriate to show the chart. Otherwise, I go through my remarks and completely forget about the charts, and the people don't know when to put them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-10 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

1 Feb 04

OSD 09539-04

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brief for POTUS on Rebalancing

I think I have to put on the list to talk to the President what we are thinking about by way of rebalancing the Active and the Guard and Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are so sensitive that he needs to know what is coming.

Please ask somebody who is involved to begin to prepare a briefing. We should do it in the next month.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-94

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*John:*  
*Yours!*  
*Thanks,*  
*[Signature]*

*326*

*8 Feb 04*

OSD 09540-04



February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Garner Memo

See who I should send this note to. I don't know if Kadish reports to me or whether he reports through STRATCOM now. In any event, it should certainly go to Jim Ellis, probably Steve Cambone should get a copy and then whoever else ought to and it ought to say:

*373.24*

*Attached is an interesting note ~~from~~ retired general Jay Garner. I would appreciate you folks discussing his suggestions and letting me know what you think we ought to do. Thanks.*

**Attach.**  
1/23/04 Gamer memo to SecDef

DFR:dh  
020804-63

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*8-1001*

OSD 09541-04

✓  
2/8

1

January 23, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary

I read the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's report on the ability to **assess** the mission capability of the Ballistic **Missile** Defense Initial Defense Capability. **The report is fair in its** concerns about assessing the system effectiveness, that "at this point in time, it is not clear what mission capability will be demonstrated and that assessments will be "based primarily on modeling and simulation" "not end-to-end operational testing of a mature integrated system." However, the **assessment is not a "scorching criticism, and we can change it to a positive assessment as follows:**

The Missile Defense Agency, DOT&E and STRATCOM can work together to tailor the **use of** the Initial Defensive Capability to provide an initial limited operational capability, and a developmental and operational test **bed**. This **cannot be** achieved if the system is tested using the **old** requirements based model of operational testing.

**The** Initial Defensive Capability is not the full operational capability and the system **has** not completed a holistic operational test. **A capabilities based** test approach can be used to characterize and document the system's initial operational **performance** capability. Flight-testing, simulations, command and control exercises and system integration checkouts completed prior to Initial Defensive Capability can be **used** to determine the system's initial performance capability and expected level of protection. The basis for this is:

Components of the initial Ballistic Missile Defense **System** have undergone a series of intercept flight tests demonstrating its ability to detect, track, intercept **and destroy** **Intercontinental** Ballistic **Missile** reentry vehicles.

The integrated functions of the system, to include battle management, command and control, communications, sensor performance **and** integration, ground-based interceptors, have been demonstrated.

Flight tests, simulations and command and control exercises have stressed the **systems** operational software and computer systems.

System Integration and Checkout ground testing (no flight intercept **test:** of the actual system hardware and **software will** be conducted **and should** provide a reasonable **level of** confidence that the system is integrated and operational.

The Initial Defensive Capability is the first increment of a capabilities based approach to developing and providing Ballistic Missile Defense. Trying to fake early limited operational advantage of the system's antimissile capabilities under development is prudent. After Initial Defensive Capability the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, working with the Missile Defense **Agency** and STRATCOM, should continue testing and assessing the initial Ballistic Missile System. **Further,** they collectively should **establish a** comprehensive **capabilities based** test program tailored to **increasingly stress the** system with operationally realistic testing, to achieve block capability enhancements and to grow the system to full Operational performance capability.

Thanks ~~for~~ the opportunity to respond.

Jay

11-L-0559/OSD/24846



February 8, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Subpoena

380.015

I would like to see a timetable and an assignment sheet as to who is doing what to comply with this subpoena from the Office of Special Counsel.

John Craddock, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 Subpoena

DHR:dh  
020804-77

.....  
Please respond by 2/13/04

*OB*  
*3/15*

8 Feb 04

OSD 09542-04



## Office of Special Counsel

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten checkmark and date 2/14*

Patrick J. Fitzgerald  
Special Counsel

Chicago Office: Dirksen Federal Building  
219 South Dearborn Street, Fifth Floor  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Washington Office: Bond Building  
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor  
Washington, D.C. NW 20530

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Please address all correspondence to the Washington Office

JAN 22 2004

Mr. William James Haynes, II  
General Counsel and Defense Legal Services Director  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The attached subpoena duces tecum is being served in connection with the investigation by Special Counsel of the possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information concerning Ambassador Joseph Wilson, his trip to Niger in February 2002, his wife, and matters relating thereto. To the extent the Department of Defense has previously produced documents in connection with this investigation that it believes may be responsive to the subpoena, the Department of Defense may provide notification that it intends to adopt prior production(s) as part of its response to the subpoena. However, any additional documents not yet produced that would be responsive should be produced pursuant to the attached subpoena.

Thank you for your cooperation on this matter. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,

*Patrick J. Fitzgerald*  
PATRICK J. FITZGERALD  
Special Counsel

# United States District Court

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO: Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 2030.1-1600  
ATTN: Mr. William James Haynes, II  
General Counsel and Defense Legal  
Services Director

## SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY

SUBPOENA FOR:

PERSON  DOCUMENT(S) OR OBJECT(S)

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court at the place, date, and time specified below.

PLACE  United States District Courthouse 3 <sup>rd</sup> and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001	COURTROOM  Grand Jury 03-3
	DATE AND TIME  February 6, 2004

SEE ATTACHMENT A.


Please see additional information on reverse.

This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf of the court.

U.S. MAGISTRATE  Nancy M. [Signature] DEPUTY CLERK	DATE  January 22, 2004
---	------------------------------

This subpoena is issued upon application of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER OF ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY  
 Ronald Roos  
 Deputy Special Counsel  
 U.S. Department of Justice  
 Washington, D.C. 20005



RETURN OF SERVICE (1)

RECEIVED BY SERVER	DATE	PLACE
SERVED	DATE	PLACE

SERVED ON (PRINT NAME)

TRAVEL	SERVICES	TOTAL
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DECLARATION OF SERVER(2)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees is true and correct.

Executed on \_\_\_\_\_  
Date Signature of Server

\_\_\_\_\_  
Address of Server

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In lieu of personal appearance before the grand jury, compliance with this subpoena may be made by providing the requested information to FBI Inspector John C. Eckenrode, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 7847, Washington, D.C. 20535, telephone number (b)(6)

(1) As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(2) "Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof (Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)."

## ATTACHMENT A

All documents, including but not limited to, all electronic records, written records, telephone records of any kind (including but not limited to any documents that memorialize telephone calls having been made), correspondence, computer records, e-mail, storage devices, notes (whether handwritten or typed or in any other format), memoranda, and diary and calendar entries in the possession of the immediate offices of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Department of Defense, and the staff and employees of those offices, concerning any discussion of the following:

1. Ambassador Joseph Wilson or his wife;
2. Valerie Plame Wilson (or "Valerie Wilson" or "Valerie Plame");
3. A trip undertaken by former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger in 2002 (even if the items/documents themselves do not refer to him by name); including, but not limited to: the origin of such trip (including the persons involved in deciding who would go); the findings or results of such trip by Ambassador Wilson; any relationship Wilson had with any employee at the CIA; contacts, attempted contacts, or discussion of contacts (directly or indirectly) with any members of the media concerning Wilson, his trip, or his wife, including but not limited to, the following media and media personnel:

Robert Novak, Crossfire, Capital Gang, Chicago Sun-Times, Knut Royce, Timothy Phelps, Newsday, Walter Pincus, Richard Leiby, Mike Allen, Dana Priest, Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Matthew Cooper, John Dickerson, Massimo Calabresi, Michael Duffy, James Carney, Time Magazine, Evan Thomas, Newsweek, Andrea Mitchell, Meet the Press, Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, Tim Russert, Campbell Brown, NBC, Nicholas Kristof, David Sanger, Judith Miller, New York Times, Greg Hitt, Paul Gigot, Wall Street Journal, John Solomon, Associated Press, USA Today, Jeff Gannon, Talon News.

February 8, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Jim Haynes  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Subpoena

I would like to see a timetable and an assignment sheet as to who is doing what to comply with this subpoena from the Office of Special Counsel.

John Craddock, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/22/04 Subpoena

DHR:dh  
020804-77

.....  
Please respond by 2/13/04

✓  
3/1

Sec Def —

I was told this memo  
(attached), w/ supporting documents,  
precluded the need for a  
briefing to you.

2/19

Rec'd 11 Feb  
TC

11-L-0559/OSD/24852



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

February 13, 2004, 12:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel *D J Dell'Orto*

SUBJECT: Response to Subpoena from the Special Counsel

- This responds to your request for a time line and status report on the Department's response to this subpoena. (Tab A)
- The subpoena was served on us on Friday, January 23. It sought documents from your office, the Deputy Secretary, Public Affairs and the Under Secretary for Policy. We reviewed it and noted that it did not specify a date limit or the extent of the coverage in the Public Affairs and Policy offices.
- We clarified these points late in the afternoon of January 23 and put out tasking memoranda to the four offices named in the subpoena on Monday, 26 January.
- The searches were conducted at various times during the week of 26 January and the beginning of the following week. We consulted with the action officers in each office as they went along. The searches were completed by the end of the day on Wednesday, February 4.
- We reviewed the responsive documents and reports on the searches, then provided the response to the Special Counsel through the FBI as the subpoena called for on the date specified, Friday February 6.
- A copy of the response is at Tab B.

380.015

13 Feb 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
 As stated

Prepared By: Stewart F. Aly, Acting DGC (Legal Counsel) (b)(6)

OSD 09542-04



**TAB**

**A**



## Office of Special Counsel

Patrick J. Fitzgerald  
Special Counsel

Chicago Office: Dirksen Federal Building  
219 South Dearborn Street, Fifth Floor  
Chicago, Illinois 60604

(b)(6)

Washington Office: Bond Building  
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor  
Washington, D.C. NW 20530

(b)(6)

Please address all correspondence to the Washington Office

JAN 22 2004


Mr. William James Haynes, II  
General Counsel and Defense Legal Services Director  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The attached subpoena duces tecum is being served in connection with the investigation by Special Counsel of the possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information concerning Ambassador Joseph Wilson, his trip to Niger in February 2002, his wife, and matters relating thereto. To the extent the Department of Defense has previously produced documents in connection with this investigation that it believes may be responsive to the subpoena, the Department of Defense may provide notification that it intends to adopt prior production(s) as part of its response to the subpoena. However, any additional documents not yet produced that would be responsive should be produced pursuant to the attached subpoena.

Thank you for your cooperation on this matter. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,

  
PATRICK J. FITZGERALD  
Special Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/24855

# United States District Court

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO: Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600  
ATTN: Mr. William James Haynes, II  
General Counsel and Defense Legal  
Services Director

## SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY

SUBPOENA FOR:

PERSON

DOCUMENT(S) OR OBJECT(S)

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court at the place, date, and time specified below.


PLACE  United States District Courthouse 3 <sup>rd</sup> and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 200.01	COURTROOM  Grand Jury 03-3
	DATE AND TIME  February 6, 2004

SEE ATTACHMENT A.

Please see additional information on reverse.

This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf of the court.

U.S. MAGISTRATE IN CHIEF OF COURT  Nancy M. [Signature] (BY) DEPUTY CLERK	DATE  January 22, 2004
--	------------------------------



This subpoena is based upon application of the United States Department of Justice

NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER OF ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Ronald Roos  
Deputy Special Counsel  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20005

11-L-0559/OSD/24856

**RETURN OF SERVICE (1)**

RECEIVED BY SERVER	DATE	PLACE
SERVED	DATE	PLACE

SERVED ON (PRINT NAME)

SERVED BY (PRINT NAME)

TITLE

**STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES**

TRAVEL	SERVICES	TOTAL

**DECLARATION OF SERVER (2)**

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees is true and correct.

Executed on

Day

Signature of Server

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

In lieu of personal appearance before the grand jury, compliance with this subpoena may be made by providing the requested information to FBI Inspector John C. Eckenrode, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 7847, Washington, D.C. 20535, telephone number 202-324-8220.

(1) As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(2) Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof (Rule 43(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).

## ATTACHMENT A

All documents, including but not limited to, all electronic records, ~~written~~ records, telephone records of any kind (including but not limited to any documents that memorialize telephone calls having been made), correspondence, computer records, e-mail, Storage devices, notes (whether handwritten or typed or in any other format), memoranda, and diary and calendar entries in the possession of the immediate offices of ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ~~Department~~ of Defense, and the staff and employees of those offices, concerning any discussion of the following:

1. Ambassador Joseph Wilson or his wife;
2. Valerie Plame Wilson (or "Valerie Wilson" or "Valerie Plame");
3. A trip undertaken by former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger in 2002 (even if the items/documents themselves do not refer to him by name); including, but not limited to: the origin of such trip (including the persons involved in deciding who would go); the findings or results of such trip by Ambassador Wilson; any relationship Wilson had with any employee at the CIA; contacts, attempted ~~contacts~~, or discussion of contacts (directly or indirectly) with any members of the media concerning Wilson, his trip, or his wife, including but not limited to, the following media and media personnel:

Robert Novak, Crossfire, Capital Gang, Chicago Sun-Times, Knut Royce, Timothy Phelps, Newsday, ~~Walter~~ Pincus, Richard Leiby, Mike Allen, Dana Priest, Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Matthew Cooper, John Dickerson, Massimo Calabresi, Michael Duffy, James Carney, Time Magazine, Evan Thomas, Newsweek, Andrea Mitchell, ~~Met~~ the Press, Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, Tim Russert, Campbell Brown, NBC, Nicholas Kristof, David Sanger, Judith Miller, New York Times, Greg Hitt, Paul Gigot, Wall Street Journal, John Solomon, Associated Press, USA Today, Jeff Gannon, Talon News.

**TAB**

**B**



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**



February 6, 2004

Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Esq.  
Special Counsel  
Washington Office  
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Pat:

This letter provides the response of the Department of Defense to the subpoena dated January 22, 2004, regarding your investigation into possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information.

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary directed searches of their immediate offices; the documents located in these searches are attached (pages 1 through 53). Documents located in the search of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) are also attached (pages 54 through 78). No responsive documents were located in the search of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

The documents provided with this letter are described in the attached index. Each page bears a Bates number and a label, "CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA, which we have applied for identification purposes.

In accordance with my discussion with Ron Roos on February 3, I have retained here non-responsive documents in three categories: 1) articles published in the news media; 2) transcripts of broadcast media interviews, and 3) documents indicating contacts with individuals listed in paragraph 3 of the subpoena which did not refer to the subject matters listed in that paragraph and did not occur between June 1 and October 31, 2003. These materials were submitted to us as they were located during the searches described above, which were conducted using search terms somewhat more expansive than those in the subpoena to ensure that nothing was missed. The non-responsive materials are available for your review on request.

There is one other document which we have not provided to you in full: a transcript of a meeting Secretary Rumsfeld held with the Editorial Board of the Washington Post on January 30 of this year after we received your subpoena but before we completed our search. We have numbered the pages (Bates range 56 to 78) but have included in the material provided to you only the two pages which comprise the passing mention of Ambassador Wilson. The remaining pages of the transcript do not address the subject of your subpoena at all, and as they contain comments of Board members and Secretary Rumsfeld's comments made both on and off the record,



11-L-0559/OSD/24860


they are somewhat sensitive. I am retaining them and will make them available for you review on request.

These documents are provided in addition to those previously provided to the Department of Justice in response to a letter of October 24, 2003 from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz. We adopt that response as part of our response to this subpoena. I still retain three pages described in my letter of November 5, 2003, to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz. I will make these pages available to you for inspection and review at your convenience.

Some of the documents contain personal information of members of the public, such as private email addresses, and some pages contain information about friends and family members of senior officials. These are pages 1, 2, 11 and 12. We ask that you handle them accordingly, noting the security concerns related to family members.

If you have any questions, please call me at (b)(6) My email address is [alvs@osdac.osd.mil](mailto:alvs@osdac.osd.mil).

Sincerely,

  
Stewart F. Aly  
Acting Deputy General Counsel  
Legal Counsel

INDEX OF RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS

Office of Special Counsel Subpoena  
January 23,2003

Documents Which Do Not Refer to the Wilsons or Trip to Niger                      Bates Range

Entries from Secretary Rumsfeld's Calendar	1 to 2
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Documents Which Do Refer to the Wilsons                      Bates Range

DoD Press Guidance dated October 3,2003	54 to 55
Excerpt of Transcript of Washington Post Editorial Board Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld	62 and 63

07/14/03, 8:01 AM

Sunday 13 July 2003

(SA Erfurdt)

*Wolfowitz returns 4:00pm*

6:30am PA Prep w/Di Rita @ Residence  
7:00am (T) Call w/Dr. Rice @ Residence  
7:30am Depart Residence w/Di Rita (Hollen **Johnson** will meet @ NBC)  
7:45am Arrive NBC Studio, 4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.  
**8:00am-8:25** Tape NBC Interview w/Tim Russert  
8:30am Depart **NBC** Studio  
**8:50am** Arrive ABC Studio, 1717 DeSales Street **N.W.**  
**9:00am-9:20** Live ABC Interview w/George Stephanopoulos  
9:25am Press **Stakeout**  
9:35am Depart **ABC** Studio  
9:50am Arrive Residence  
11:00am Church

*JR, Marcy, Kailey, Lukas @ Richmond*

08/28/03. 6:03 PM

Friday 29 August 2003

(SA Mike Erfurdt)

*POTUS @ Crawford 2-31 Aug*

**Travel**

8:30am (MT) PDB via SVTC

9:00am (MT) PA Prep w/Torie Clarke

9:30am-9:45 (MT) Newsweek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas, Di Rita

10:00am-10:45 (MT) John McWethy/ABC Interview

*Dennys/Marshalls Visit*

11-L-0559/OSD/24864

**Dep Sec Wolfowitz Calendar****Find Results Report**

---

Keyword: Tim Russert

Search Mode: Entire Message

Case Sensitive: No

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3/23/2003	9:00AM	S	SD Interview w/Tim Russert, Meet the Press
4/6/2003	9:00 AM	S	Live/NBC's Meet the Press (w/VCJCS) w/Tim Russert
7/27/2003	7:45 AM	S	Pretape Meet the Press w/Tim Russert, NBC Studios/Susan Wallace will join at NBC

**Dep Sec Wolfowitz Calendar**

**Find Results Report**

Keyword: Campbell Brown

Search Mode: Entire Message

Case Sensitive: No

---

4/29/2003	12:15 PM	S	Lunch w/Campbell Brown +, 3E912
10/19/2003	6:30 PM	S	Farewell Party iho Campbell Brown, TBD



**DepSec Wolfowitz Calendar** ----- **Entry Report** -----

**Message:** Pretape Meet the Press w/Tim Russert, NBC Studios/Susan Wallace will join at NBC

**Category:** Appointment/Meetings

**Time:** 7:45 AM to 8:10 AM

**Alarm:**

**Date:** 7/27/2003

**Frequency:** Single

**Attribute:** Normal

11-L-0559/OSD/24867

Date Printed: Wednesday, February 04, 2004 2:59 PM

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**CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA**

**0000005**

Message: HOLD/KK  
Category: Appointment/Meetings  
Time: 6:15 PM to 7:00 PM  
Alarm:  
Date: 6/4/2003  
Frequency: Single  
Attribute: Normal

Note: Dana Priest, Washington Post

11- L-0559/OSD/24868

## Wolfowitz Call List

9/22, 1740, 2003	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
---------------------	------------	--------	-----------

## Wolfowitr Call List

10/4, 1615,	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
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11-L-0559/OSD/24870

## Wolfowitz Call List

10/29, 0710, 2003	<b>Newt Gingrich re Walter Pincus WP article</b>	(b)(6)	<b>WE OWE</b>
10/29, 0915, 2003	<b>Update: Wanted to make sure you had seen the article.</b>		
10/30, 1410, 2003	<b>Paul Gigot</b>	(b)(6)	<b>COMPLETED</b>

11-L-0559/OSD/24871

## Wolfowitz Call List

7/15, 1820, 2003	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
---------------------	------------	--------	-----------

<b>Appointment/Meetings</b>	
	(Dropoff Isabelle)
6:00 AM-7:00 AM	Office/Phone Time
7:25 AM-7:45 AM	Staff Meetingw/Cambone, et al. (3E880)
8:00 AM-8:30 AM	HOST Exec <b>Sec</b> Staff Meeting (3E880)
8:15 AM-9:00 AM	PA Staff Mtg (2E800)
9:00 AM-9:30 AM	Bucci, Mainardi, Nestel, re: Schedule Meeting Prebrief (3E880)
	☐ Murphy, Trip Coordinator
9:30 AM-10:00 AM	[PA Conference Call w/Press Secretaries]
9:40 AM-9:55 AM	Rhynedance (2E800)
9:55 AM-10:20 AM	Eileen O'Connor, re: Interview (3E880)
1:00 AM-11:40 AM	Holcomb, VCJCS w/SecDef, re: Personnel (3E880)
1:30 AM-12:00 PM	PA Conference Call w/Press Secretaries
2:00 PM-1:00 PM	Eric Ruff - Lunch (Gold Room)
1:00 PM-1:30 PM	Exective Committee Meeting w/PA (2E800)
1:30 PM-2:00 PM	PA Staff Time (2E800)
2:00 PM-2:30 PM	Office/Phone Time
2:30 PM-3:00 PM	Gary Thatcher w/Durnan, DuBois, O'Beirne, Nagelmann, re: Interview (3E880)
3:00 PM-3:30 PM	Nelson Warfield, re: Interview (3E880)
3:30 PM-4:00 PM	Evan Thomas, CDR Jeff Davis (3E880)
4:00 PM-5:00 PM	Office Time
5:00 PM-5:30 PM	David Cloud (WSJ), re: Interview (3E880)
5:30 PM-6:15 PM	SLRG w/SecDef (3E928)
6:30 PM-7:00 PM	DEPART Pentagon

11-L-0559/OSD/24873

Larry Di Rita  
Friday, August 29, 2003  
Time Printed: 1:24 PM

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<b>Appointment/Meetings</b>	
	(Drop off Isabelle)
6:00 AM-7:25 AM	Office/Phone Time
7:25 AM-7:45 AM	Staff Meeting w/Cambone, et al. (3E880)
8:30 AM-8:45 AM	PA Staff Mtg (2E800)
8:45 AM-9:30 AM	Round Table w/DSD (3E944)
9:30 AM-10:00 AM	AMB Ghougassian (3E880)
10:00 AM-10:30 AM	Bucci, Mainardi, Nestel, re: Schedule Meeting Prebrief (3E880)
	☐ Murphy, Trip Coordinator
10:30 AM-11:00 AM	Henry, GEN Hawkins, Joanne Dickhow, re: Coord Team on Bombing (2E936)
11:00 AM-11:30 AM	Office/Phone Time
11:30 AM-11:45 AM	SecDef Newseek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas
12:00 PM-1:00 PM	Lunch
1:00 PM-2:00 PM	PA Staff Time (2E800)
2:00 PM-2:30 PM	Office/Phone Time
2:30 PM-3:15 PM	Luti, Bucci, et al, re: Trip Planning (3E880)

11-L-0559/OSD/24874

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/8	1730	M. Bullingalea		Needs to talk <input type="checkbox"/>
7/8	1830	Mark Mykityshyn	(b)(6)	in DC 7/15 + 7/16 would like to stop by <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	0820	Kevin Kellens		re: Maj Skelley <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	0835	Michael Kalsky	(b)(6)	Wajid - must talk before 10:15 AM Dina Powell <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9		Frank Gaffney	cell - (b)(6)	scheduling <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	1205	Elvan Thomas Newsweek (in Atlanta)	(b)(6)  km - 2107	back on Thursday (b)(6) <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	1450	Eric Luff	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rito

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
	<u>Reminder</u>	Adm. G.	(b)(6)	re: phone <input type="checkbox"/>
7/4	1515	Harry Wartzel	(b)(6)	10 min. conversation <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Reminder</u>	Ann Hansen	(b)(6)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1010	Jim Burns	(b)(6)	Said you on Fox - used to work for dot com news svc - perhaps he could work here <input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Reminder</u>	Mitch Semel	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1155	Bryan Whitman	(b)(6)	update on Sunday shows <input type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Paul Gigot WSJ Editorial Page	(b)(6)	Couple items - + permission to talk to <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rito

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/10	1305	Frank Gaffney	Cell - (b)(6)	really needs scheduling <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> left msg
7/10	1330	Richard Pate	(b)(6)	as soon as possible <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1335	Mr. Haynes		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3/10	1410	Mr. Faith (on Hill)	thru office	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Andre Hollis	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1520	Peter Kunkel	(b)(6)	follow up <input type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Evan Thomas Newsweek	(b)(6)	tomorrow at or 300 Cover on Iraq - <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/21		Walter Pinkus Post	(b)(6)	re: Gen Alsadi - Frags liaison LM Status? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Cyn Casey Stepped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Dr. Cantone Stepped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Dr. Winkler Stepped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1745	Mr. Durran		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1820	Mr Haynes		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/22	0830	Mr Moore		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

11-L-0559/OSD/24878

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/28				Mr. Rain - NOU wants to present Dept. of Defense a Patriot Award in Aug - wants to show it.
7/28	1150	Jamie Burnan	(b)(6)	ret'd your call
7/28	1235	Mr. Secy Mary John Young	(b)(6)	Wants you to elect SA on the phone conversation the Lab of Chairman Wants today a "Buy American"
7/28	1510	Mrs. Di Rita		ret'd your call
7/28	1525	Walter Cincus Wash. Post	(b)(6)	re your earlier conversations re Hon. Sate
7/28	1530	Deay Pletts AET	(b)(6)	Pls call
7/28		o/did Smith CPA-CyS	(b)(6)	Pls call

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
9/10	1520	Evan Thomas Newsweek	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/10	1930	Mr. Durnan	cell (b)(6)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9/10	1005	Linda Cord		see call from 9/5 <input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	0825	Peter Flory	(b)(6)	re: mna <input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	0945	Richard Boucher	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	1000	Dr. Croude	MLP	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	1009	Sen. Phil Gramm	(b)(6)	ryc <input type="checkbox"/>

11-L-0559/OSD/24880

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
12/16				
12/16	1730	Tom Ricks Post	(b)(6)	re: mtg w/DSD? time?
12/16	1610	Newt Gingrich	(b)(6)	
12/17	0955	Evan Thomas	(b)(6)	
12/17	1030	Rowan Scarborough	(b)(6)	
12/17	1045	Mr. Moore		
12/17	1105	Jackie Arends	(b)(6)	just checking in - "don't be"

T1-L-0559/OSD/24881

**Unknown**

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**From:** Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Friday, August 01, 2003 4:11 PM  
**To:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD

The SecDef ~~knows~~ Evan Thomas doesn't he -- thank ~~you~~ letter would be Dear ~~Evan~~?

**Mary Claire Murphy**  
**Director of Protocol**  
**Office of the Secretary of Defense**

(b)(6)

**MaryClaire.Murphy@OSD.pentagon.mil**

11-L-0559/OSD/24882

**Unknown**

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**From:** Alexander, Rebecca, MSgt., OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 29, 2003 4:49 PM  
**To:** Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: 10Questions

Forwarded per Kevin's request

v/r  
rebecca

-----Original Message-----

**From:** jay\_carney@timemagazine.com[mailto:jay\_carney@timemagazine.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 29, 2003 3:02 PM  
**To:** kevin.kellems@osd.mil  
**Subject:** 10 Questions

Kevin,

Jay Carney here. Was wondering whether Secretary Wolfowitz might be interested in being the **subject** of Time's interview page, called "10 Questions", for this **week**, given that he's just back from Iraq and **has** a heck of a story to tell. It's a straight up Q&A, of which we run 10 questions and answers, and it appears **close** to the front of the **magazine**. Recent subjects include Kofi Annan, which I did, Bill O'Reilly, Madeleine Albright and Rudy Giuliani. I can email you **some of these** for reference if you'd like.

Let me know. And thanks for considering it.

-Jay C.

.....  
James Carney  
Deputy Washington Bureau Chief  
TIME Magazine  
555 12th Street, NW  
Suite 600  
Washington, DC 20004

(b)(6)

[Jay Carney@timemagazine.com](mailto:jay_carney@timemagazine.com)

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in error, please immediately notify the sender and delete this message.  
Thank you.

## Unknown

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**From:** Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 02, 2003 7:19 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: A little bird.

Sir,  
Do you wish to engage on this one through a surrogate -- or not at all?

V/r,  
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mike Allen [mailto:allenm@washpost.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 02, 2003 6:27 PM  
**To:** Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** A little bird...

... reports that there is movement towards going forward with a UN resolution that would give the UN a role with some of the international forces. I can get the basics elsewhere. But if you have a second, I was hoping you might be generous enough as a SAO to give some sense of how this came about. Hope the honor cordon went well. Appreciatively, Mike, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

## Unknown

---

**From:** Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Friday, September 12, 2003 1:23 PM  
**To:** DeFrank, James, COL, OASPPA  
**Cc:** Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** AP on Al Qaeda

Jay,

The latest (from Matt Kelly) is that he and/or John Solomon would be the ones who would see DSD if we can carve out a narrow slot and he approves.

They are faxing me something - perhaps a draft story or query.

I assume that synchs with what Pauline is saying?

V/r,  
Kevin

11-L-0559/OSD/24886

## Unknown

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From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2003 6:59 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
CC: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
Subject: FW: Dana Priest

-----Original Message-----

From: Dana Priest [mailto:priestd@washpost.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2003 6:57 PM  
To: kevin.kellems@osd.mil  
Subject: Dana Priest

Kevin, \*

The Indonesia article describes in detail the ambush in Papua and the preliminary assessment on the part of State, Indonesian police and FBI that elements of the Indonesia military carried this out. It will detail an intelligence report implicating GEN Sutarto in the attack (Nov. 27 SEIB) and instructing subordinates to withhold evidence from the FBI (Feb., 22, 2003).

It also details the Defense Department's efforts to maintain the flow of training funds to the Indonesian military, despite foot-dragging on the investigation. As you know they were not so cooperative when the FBI came the first time. I am saying the DepSec Wolfowitz still dominates U.S. policy on Indonesia.

I would like to have him explain the rationale for continuing the CT and IMET funding. And I want to follow up on the "new intelligence" he said he was aware of that pointed in *some* other direction. Having queried my good sources after our conversation, I find no such intelligence.

Thanks for your time, Dana

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24887

## Unknown

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**From:** Cantrell, Steven, CIV, ATSD(IO)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 03, 2002 5:04 PM  
**To:** 'Dana Priest'  
**Subject:** RE: Dana Priest

**Importance:** LOW

Dana,  
I recently got back from travel...still catching up on my in basket and emails. I appreciate your interest in our office; however, since you are a member of the Press, I need you to make this request through Public Affairs. Cheers Steve

Steven A. Cantrell  
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of  
Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Phone: (b)(6)  
DSN:  
Unclas:  
Secure:

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Dana Priest <mailto:pr.estd@was.gost.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, September 30, 2002 6:03 PM  
**To:** [steven.cantrell@osd.pentagon.mil](mailto:steven.cantrell@osd.pentagon.mil)  
**Subject:** Dana Priest

Steven,

I've been meaning to write to you for a while to see if I could drop by for a chat. I looked at your website and I have to say that having covered the Pentagon for eight years, I had no idea such an office with such a mission even existed. Better yet, could I take you to lunch out of the building anytime soon?

Thanks,  
Dana Priest

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24888

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA

0000026

## Unknown

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**From:** Oleszewski, Richard, CIV, OASD-PA  
**sent** Friday, October 17, 2003 4:08 PM  
**To:** Caldwell, Bill. MG, OSD; Ganyard, Stephen, COL, OSD  
**Cc:** Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Dana Priest, Washington Post

**Importance:** High

Kevin asked that I apprise you of a phone call Dana Priest made here today regarding Patsy Spears. Priest is working on a profile of Patsy Spears and would like to speak with the Deputy on that topic. Kevin had no recommendation regarding whether to speak with Priest. but thought you should be aware that she is pursuing the story.

Priest's #. (b)(6)

## Unknown

---

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD  
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 1:19 PM  
To: Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA  
Subject: Friday

George,

Just so you are aware, SD has scheduled Torie as follows on Friday

9:00am - PA Pre-brief (for both Thomas and McWethy)  
9:30 - Phone Interview with Evan Thomas  
10:00-10:45 - McWethy Interview

Can you please *give* Torie a head's up?

Thanks!

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/24890

## Unknown

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**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:57 PM  
**To:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

That is so weird, honestly don't understand it all.

---Original Message---

**From:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:57 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Your e-mails are about the only thing entrusted to me now for **SecDef...???????????????** I seem fine with DepSec's office.

  
**From:**   
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:49 PM  
**To:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Thanks.

How is it going for you?

---Original Message---

**From:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:49 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

10 is perfect for Thom.

  
**From:**   
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:36 AM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill, CIV, OASD-PA; Buccì, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Thanks - let me know if time works.  
Cathy.

---Original Message---

**From:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:36 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill, CIV, OASD-PA; Buccì, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA

11-L-0559/OSD/24891

**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Bryan is on leave. DeFrank will prebrief and tape. No time set until now! Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:32 AM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucc, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

LTG Craddock said he would meet w/Thom Shanker w/NYT but wanted someone, he mentioned Bryan there to tape *it*. Should I still have Col DeFrank down as prebrief? Was a time set or should I set one, perhaps 10:00am w/prep 9:45am?

Let me know - thanks,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:11 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucc, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Updates:

~SecDef will do phone interview with Evan Thomas next Friday. Mr. Thomas would prefer to avoid the times 12:00pm and 3:00 (Eastern), if  
~McWethy will not go to New Mexico. Mr. Di Rita and Whitman will work with McWethy to find an interview place and  
~Mark Thompson (TIME) interview is today at 2:30 tent.) and will take place en route to NM. More on this in subsequent  
~Thom Shanker (NYT) interview will likely take tomorrow with Gen. Craddock. Col DeFrank will prebrief Gen.

11-L-0559/OSD/24892

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 18, 2003 3:04 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**RE:** PA Items @ TAOS

Per Col Bucci would like to try these time for Friday 29 August @ Taos:

9:30am(Mountain Time) - Larry Di Rita meets w/SecDef

10:00am-10:15 (MT) - Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

10:30am (MT) - In person ABC interview w/John McWethy

It is my understanding from Bryan that Larry Di Rita plans to fly to Taos to meet w/SecDef on Friday 29 August.

Let me know - thanks,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 18, 2003 11:28 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASPPA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASDPA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Subject:** PA Items @ TAOS

SecDef has agreed to the Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

AND

In person interview @ TAOS w/John McWethy.

Before I get started, any thoughts as to when McWethy wants to fly out? Would it make sense to do these either Thur 28 Aug or Fri 29 Aug?

Let me know what would be best,

Thanks - Cathy.

11-L-0559/OSD/24893

## Unknown

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**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:56 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; **Krueger**, Brent, CIV, OASPPA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; **Rhynedance**, George, COL, OASD-PA; **DeFrank**, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, **OASD-PA**; Henderson, Hedy; **Abbott**, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA **Bucci**, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Cc:** **Curcio**, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: McWethy @ Taos w/SecDef Friday 29 August

PS - SecDef said Torie should come out to Taos w/McWethy.!! Over to you !

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:47 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; **Krueger**, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; **Wheeler**, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; **Wallace**, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; **Rhynedance**, George, COL, OASD-PA; **DeFrank**, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; **Abbott**, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASPPA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; **Bucci**, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Cc:** **Curcio**, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** McWethy @ Taos w/SecDef Friday 29 August  
**Importance:** High

I have been told to put this back on the SecDef schedule, per SecDef who just spoke with Torie. Will **plan** to do this Friday 29 August in Taos (all times below are MT):

9:00am - PA Prep in **Taos** w/Larry Di Rita

9:30am - Newsweek Telephone Interview w/**Evan** Thomas (already set)

10:00am-10:45 - In person interview w/John McWethy. ABC

Let me know soonest if this works - thanks,  
Cathy.

11-L-0559/OSD/24894

## Unknown

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**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2003 3:10 PM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

FYI - just in from Taos - (b)(6) says SD will speak to Tone tomorrow on the phone, for now the Newsweek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas is (T) until SD talks to Torie - thanks, Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:43 PM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Col Bucci agrees that should work,

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:22 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

It did work for the *TIME one* last week, just wanted to make sure the rules don't change when he's in taos. thx!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:18 PM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

You should contact cables to see if that would work, sounds right.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:19 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

We will need to record so can we get Evan to call cables, cables to conference in recording studio and then SecDef? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:18 AM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

He should go through cables

11-L-0559/OSD/24895

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, **CIV, OSD**  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:17 AM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Thanks !

-----Original

**From:** Wheeler, Hdden Johnson, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:10 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, **CIV, OSD**; Krueger, Brent, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Wallace, Susan, **CTR, OASD-PA**; Rhynedance, George, **COL, OASD-PA**; DeFrank, James, **COL, OASD-PA**; Cooper, John, **CIV, OASPPA**; Henderson, Hedy; **Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA**; Willcox, Chris, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Murphy, Margaret, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Turenne, Jr, Bill., **CIV, OASD-PA**; Bucci, Steven, **COL, OSD**; Keck, Gary **LTC OASD(PA)**; **DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA**; Davis, Jeff, **LCDR, OASD-PA**; Kellems, Kevin, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, **CIV, OSD**  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

**11:30 Eastern works for Mr. Thomas, Newsweek.**

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, **CIV, OSD**  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:25 AM  
**To:** Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Krueger, Brent, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Wallace, Susan, **CTR, OASD-PA**; Rhynedance, George, **COL, OASD-PA**; DeFrank, James, **COL, OASD-PA**; Cooper, John, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, **SES, OASD-PA**; Willcox, Chris, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Murphy, Margaret, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Turenne, Jr, Bill., **CIV, OASD-PA**; Bucci, Steven, **COL, OSD**; Keck, Gary **LTC OASD(PA)**; DeFrank, James, **COL, OASD-PA**; Davis, Jeff, **LCDR, OASD-PA**; Kellems, Kevin, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, **CIV, OSD**  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

We had the Evan Thomas interview on for 10:00am (MT) which which is noon our time. SD has a scheduled item at 9am and we had Larry Di Rita at 9:30 but I guess that is off now as McWethy is not going. So I would imagine we could move the call up to 9:30am - let me know if that works if not, It will not be convenient to do it later for SecDef.

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wheeler, Hdden Johnson, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:11 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, **CIV, OSD**; Krueger, Brent, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Wallace, Susan, **CTR, OASD-PA**; Rhynedance, George, **COL, OASD-PA**; DeFrank, James, **COL, OASD-PA**; Cooper, John, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, **SES, OASD-PA**; Willcox, Chris, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Murphy, Margaret, **CIV, OASD-PA**; Turenne, Jr, Bill., **CIV, OASD-PA**; Bucci, Steven, **COL, OSD**; Keck, Gary **LTC OASD(PA)**; DeFrank, James, **COL, OASD-PA**; Davis, Jeff, **LCDR, OASD-PA**; Kellems, Kevin, **CIV, OASD-PA**  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, **CIV, OSD**  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

11-L-0559/OSD/24896

Updates:

~**SecDef** will do phone interview with Evan Thomas next Friday. Mr. Thomas would prefer to avoid the times between 12:00pm and 3:00 (Eastern), if possible.

~**McWethy** will not go to New Mexico. Mr. Di Rita and Mr. Whitman will work with McWethy to find an alternative interview place and time.

-Mark Thompson (TIME) interview is today at 2:30 (time tent.) and will take place en route to NM. More on this in a subsequent email.

~**Thom** Shonker (NYT) interview will likely take place tomorrow with **Gen.** Craddock. **Col DeFrank** will prebrief Gen. Craddock.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 18, 2003 3:04 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill, CIV, OASD-PA; Bucc, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Cc:** Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: PA Items @ TAOS

Per Col Bucc would like to try these time for Friday 29 August @ Taos:

9:30am(Mountain Time) - Larry Di Rita meets w/SecDef

10:00am-10:15 (MT) - Newsweek phone intervieww/Evan Thomas

10:30am (MT) - In person ABC interview w/John McWethy

It is my understandingfrom Bryan that Larry Di Rita **plans** to fly to Taos to meet w/SecDef on Friday 29 August.

Let **me** know - thanks,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Monday, August 18, 2003 11:28 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASPPA; Wheeler, Hdlen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASPPA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASDPA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-

11-L-0559/OSD/24897

PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD  
**Subject: PA Item @ TAOS**

SecDef has agreed to the Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

AND

In person interview @ TAOS w/John McWethy.

Before I get started, any thoughts as to when McWethy wants to fly out? Would it make sense to do these either Thur 28 Aug or Fri 29 Aug?

Let me know what would be best,

Thanks - Cathy.

11-L-0559/OSD/24898

## Unknown

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From: Wehner, Peter H. [Peter\_H.\_Wehner@who.eop.gov]  
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 4:09 PM  
To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Thanks. Sending around something like his transcript is a pleasure. And people find it useful, I think

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 30, 2003 4:05 PM  
**To:** Wehner, Peter H.  
**Subject:** RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Peter, this is just great. He'll be very interested to see who is getting the transcript, and I know he appreciates the job you're doing.

Susan

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter\_H.\_Wehner@who.eop.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 30, 2003 3:42 PM  
**To:** Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Susan:

Not a problem. Among the names (many of whom are friends, most of whom I know and/or correspond with) that would interest you/Secretary Wolfowitz: Tim Russert, David Von Drehle/Washington Post, Fred Hiatt/Washington Post, Gregg Easterbrook, Jon Rauch, Stuart Taylor, Bill Kristol, Bea Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Paul Greenberg, David Brooks, David Frum, Kate O'Beirne, Ramesh Ponnuru, Jonah Goldberg, William F. Buckley, Vin Weber, Newt Gingrich, Senators Frist and Santorum, Brit Hume, Fred Barnes, Mod Kondracke, Peggy Noonan, Roger Ailes, Mary Matalij, Karen Hughes, Ari Fleischer, Professors Jim Ceaser, Walter Bems, Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, Francis Fukuyama, Hadley Arkes, Robby George, Jean Elshain, Peter Feaver, Victor Davis Hanson, and Leon Kass, Claudia Winkler, Steve Hayes, Terry Eastland, Tom Rose, Paul Gigot, Bill McGum, Robert Bork, Sean Hannity, Adam Wolfson, Abigail Thernstrom, Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, Bill Bennett, James Woolsey, Chris DeMuth, Ed Feulner, Ken Weinstein, Hillel Fradkin, George Will, Man Will, James Q. Wilson, Tony Blankley, Robed Pollock, Ben Wildavsky, Andrew Sullivan, Cal Thomas, Mona Charen, Charles Colson, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Jeff Bell, Jeff Jacoby, John Leo, John Podhoretz, Mark Step, George Weigel, Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus, Neal Kozodoy, David Makovsky, and others.

11-L-0559/OSD/24899

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA

0000037

It's a eclectic list, isn't it? In any event, feel free to share the names w/ Secretary Wolfowitz. But if you could, please don't share it beyond him. In general I tend to keep quiet re: my dealings with folks.

As ever,

Pete

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:46 PM

To: Wehner, Peter H.

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

You shouldn't go to any trouble. Just wondered.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter\_H.\_Wehner@who.eop.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:36 PM

To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

You bet; my pleasure.

As for the mailings: I select names individually. I'll send it to you in a bit, since I'll need to reconstruct it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:31 PM

To: Wehner, Peter H.

Cc: Kelens, Kevin, CIV, OASDPA

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Peter, thanks so much. I don't suppose you have a copy of your mailing list that I could show to PW, do you?

11-L-0559/OSD/24900

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA

0000038

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter\_H.\_Wehner@who.eop.gov]

**Sent:** Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:30 PM

**Subject:** Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

A week ago last Sunday, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was interviewed by staff writer Jeffrey Goldberg as part of The New Yorker Festival. I am attaching a transcript.

The interview, which took place at the New School University in New York, covered a range of subjects related to the war to liberate Iraq and its aftermath. I found Secretary Wolfowitz's comments compelling and rooted in deep (and admirable) convictions. He also showed remarkable equanimity, given that (to take just one example) a protester rushed the stage, yelling, "Nazi war criminal!" (In all, six people were ejected from the event.)

Despite attempts to shout down Secretary Wolfowitz, the interview proceeded. I'm very glad it did. I think you'll find it noteworthy.

## Unknown

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From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 5:37 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD; Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD  
Subject: FW: start spreading the news...

Sir,  
I very strongly recommend that you stop by this send-off if possible. It is guaranteed to be a lively, bipartisan and extremely connected group of people who rarely gather in one place -- and who will be in good spirits and favorably impressed with your accessibility and sense of humor.

V/r,  
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

From: a-kornblut@globe.com [mailto:a\_kornblut@globe.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 5:45 PM  
To: susan.lasalla@nbc.com; pete.williams@nbc.com; jordan@johnkerry.com;  
ken.strickland@nbc.com; jmillerwise@georgewebush.com; john.harwood@wsj.com;  
kevin.kellems@osd.mil  
Subject: start spreading the news...

Well, it's probably already old news to most, but here it is again: Campbell is leaving DC to host NBC's Weekend Today show in New York.

Please join us in toasting her and bidding her farewell this upcoming Sunday evening, at her house, around 6:30 p.m. Let me know if you think you'll be able to make it, and call me on my cell phone with any questions. And yes, we'll have the World Series on somewhere in the house, for those who need it.

What: Farewell to Campbell Brown  
When: Sunday, October 19, 6:30 p.m.  
Where: (b)(6) off Columbia Rd. in Adams Morgan  
Here is the carriage house behind the main condo building at that address; to find it go down the second all on your left off Mintwood Place, after turning off Columbia Rd.  
RSVP: Anne Kornblut, (b)(6) or akornblut@globe.com

Anne E. Kornblut  
The Boston Globe  
phone: (b)(6)  
cell: (b)(6)

## Unknown

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**From:** Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Monday, July 28, 2003 6:08 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Ganyard, Stephen, COL, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD; Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD Oleszewski, Richard, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** FW: The Laura Ingraham Show

Sir,  
I recommend that -- unless there isn't a brief windown Friday between 7 and 10 p.m that isn't committed to family -- you consider doing this nationally syndicated radio program. We can make your Iraq trip and your Senate testimony the main focus. It is a large and very friends audience...and a similarly friendly host. And you're always saying you want to do more radio.

Tony D. can give you more insights into who she is and why this makes sense.

V/r,  
Kevin

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, July 28, 2003 5:00 PM  
**To:** Kevin.Kellems@OSD.mil  
**Subject:** The Laura Ingraham Show

Kevin -- Thank you so very much for helping me out.

As I said, this Friday, August 1, I will be in Washington to host the The Laura Ingraham radio show. Running nightly from 7-10P.M. it reaches over 200 stations including top markets like Los Angeles, Boston, St. Louis, and Washington, and features, of course, telephone calls from listeners.

I would be completely thrilled and honored to have Mr. Wolfowitz as my guest for as much of the three hours as he would like -- that is, 15 minutes on up. Our conversation will be wide-ranging from the news of the week to the war on terrorism to wherever our dialogue -- and listener's questions -- takes us. If there's anything he would especially like to cover, just let me know.

Having long followed Mr. Wolfowitz's career -- and been a huge fan of his gutsy choices -- I am thoroughly excited to finally have the chance to speak with him. Though he is more than welcome to come into the Washington studio, we can also talk by phone -- his choice. Beyond that, please tell Mr. Wolfowitz that I promise he will enjoy himself...that we will have not only a spirited conversation but a lot of...fun... as well.

Enclosed is some information on me. If you have any questions please call me at (b)(6)

Nancy Collins is a print and television journalist specializing in interviews. She has been a Contributing Correspondent for ABC's Primetime Live and 20/20 and her interviews -- ranging from President Bill Clinton to Yasser Arafat to Jack Nicholson to Linda Tripp -- have appeared on the covers of Vanity Fair, Rolling Stone, NewYork, Reader's Digest, Harper's Bazaar and George magazine. When John Kennedy died, she took over the monthly George Interview where her conversations included: Tim Russert, Chris Matthews, Bill Richardson, JC Watts, Helen Thomas and Linda Tripp among others.

## Unknown

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**From:** Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 19, 2003 7:17 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**CC:** Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** FW: The Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz reform agenda

Sir,  
Possible call for Friday - but we would need first to fulfill your commitment to Evan Thomas of Newsweek.

V/r,  
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Vernon Loeb [mailto:loebv@washpost.com]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 18, 2003 6:55 PM  
**To:** torie.clarke@osd.mil  
**cc:** kevin.kellems@osd.mil; larry.dirita@osd.mil  
**subject:** The Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz reform agenda

Torie, Larry and Kevin:

I am working on a piece for this weekend about the extraordinarily ambitious reform agenda that you are pursuing at present, which includes civil service reform, the global footprint review, the reserve-active duty force realignment, reform of the *Army*, environmental relief at military ranges, NATO reform and the ongoing overhaul of SOCOM, not to mention transformation and all that entails.

I would love to speak with someone about your strategic thinking here:

Do you feel you must go for broke this year, with next year having all the distractions of an election year?

Is part of this ambitious agenda put forward to capitalize on Sec. Rumsfeld's success in Iraq, his popularity with the American people and his clout on Capitol Hill?

Can the U.S. defense establishment take so much simultaneous change?

And are you at all worried that, with so many huge initiatives being worked at the same time, the individual reforms won't get the attention and the staff work they need to be successful?

I couldn't let Torie go without asking at least one more round of annoying questions, right?

Thanks a lot.

Regards,

Vernon Loeb  
Defense Correspondent  
The Washington Post  
1150 15th St. NW  
Washington, DC 20071  
Tel. (b)(6)  
Fax.   
Cell

Unknown

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**From:** Duman, Jaymie, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Saturday, July 19, 2003 7:11 PM  
**To:** Nagelmann, Sarah, CIV, OSD  
**Cc:** Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Korologos, Tom, CIV, OSD-POLICY; 'kennedy@orha.centcom.mil'  
**Subject:** WDC#6

**SATURDAY, JULY 19**

0715 Arrive Dulles

0800 Residence

1200 Lunch with ~~Secretary~~ Rumsfeld

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 1 hour 15 minutes

Attendees: CJCS, Feith, Korologos, Kennedy, Durnan

1330 Briefing with ~~Members~~ of Congress

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 1 hour

Attendees: Senator Frist, Senator Warner

Accompanying: Korologos

1430 Preparation for Sunday news programs

Location: Pentagon offices

Duration: 45 minutes

1515 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld

**Location: Pentagon**

**Duration: 45 minutes**

**SUNDAY, JULY 20**

**NOTE:** OSD-PA is taping and transcribing all Sunday shows.

**0730** Arrive FOX for meeting with Speaker

**Location: 400 North Capitol, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor**

**0750** Make-up

**0800** Pre-tape interview with *FOX News Sunday* with Tony Snow

**Accompanying: Senor**

**0817** Depart for NBC

**4001 Nebraska, NW**

**Washington, DC**

**0900** LIVE interview with *NBC Meet the Press* with Tim Russert

**Accompanying: Senor**

**0920** Depart for CBS

**2020 M Street, NW**

**Washington, DC**

**11-L-0559/OSD/24906**

0935 Hold Time

1000 LIVE interview with CBS *Face the Nation* with Bob Schieffer.

Accompanying: Senor

1045 Depart CBS.

MONDAY, JULY 21

1015 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, Josh Bolton, Robin Cleveland,  
Lanzillotta

Location: Pentagon, SecDef Conference Room

Duration: 30 minutes

1045 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Snow, USec John Taylor, GC-David Aufhauser,  
Chief of Staff Tim Adams, Barry MacDonald-Dir Iraq Task Force, Jim Fall, Iraq Task Force, Di Rita,  
Lanzillotta,

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 30 minutes

1115 Office Time

Duration: 2 hours 45 minutes

1400 Meeting with retired military analysts and civilian defense experts.

Location: Pentagon, Room 3E869

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

PA Contact, Brent Krueger, (b)(6)

-

**TUESDAY, JULY 22**

**0830 Breakfast with House Leadership**

Location: TBD

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

**1000 Meeting with Vice President Cheney**

Location: White House

Duration: 1 hour

***Tentative Deputies Committee***

**1200 Attend Swearing-In Ceremony for Ambassador Eric Edelman**

**1430 Meeting with US Senate**

Location: S-407

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

11-L-0559/OSD/24908

(sarah, Sen Frist has asked for more than an hour. Work with Tom K on this. He should get it blessed by Jerry.)

1540 (Tent)-Press Stakeout on House Side

Location: TBD

Duration: 15 minutes

LA/PA Contact: Claude Chafin, (b)(6)

1600 Meeting with US House

Location: House Armed Services Committee

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

(If you give the Senate more than an hour, you will need to do so with the house.)

1715 Press Stakeout

Location: TBD

Duration: 15 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos/Senor)

LA/PA Contact: Claude Chafin, (b)(6)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23

0830 Depart Pentagon

0855 NSC

Location: White House

Duration: 45 minutes

**0940 Meeting with POTUS and Secretary Rumsfeld**

Location: White House

Duration: 20 minutes

**1200 National Press Club Newsmaker Lunch**

Location: National Press Club

Duration: 2 hours (**MAYHAVE TO BE SHORTER**)

Accompanying: Korologos, *Senor*

PA Contact: *Hollen Johnson Wheeler*, (b)(6)

**1400 Foreign Press Center Briefing**

Location: National Press Club

Duration: 45 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos, *Senor*

PA Contact: *Hollen Johnson Wheeler*, (b)(6)

**TBD Meeting Spanish Foreign Minister**

Location: Embassy of Spain (2375 Pennsylvania Ave. NW)

Duration: 45 minutes

**1630 Taped interview with CNN *Larry King Live* (Senor)**

Location: CNN Studio, 820 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC (behind Union Station)

Duration: 30 minutes

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson wheeler, (b)(6)

**THURSDAY, JULY 24**

**0800 HOLD FOR POSSIBLE BREAKFAST (Korologos)**

**1030 ~~Coffee~~ Roundtable with Syndicated Columnists**

**Location: Pentagon**

**Duration: 45 minutes**

**Accompanying: Korologos**

**PA Contact: Susan Wallace, (b)(6)**

**1230 Press Briefing with Sec Def and CJCS**

**Location: Pentagon Briefing Studio**

**Duration: 30 minutes**

**Accompanying: Senor**

**1315 Lunch with Secretary Rumsfeld, Director Tenet**

**Location: Pentagon**

**Duration: 45 minutes**

**1430 Conference Call with Large Regional Print Editors**

**Location: Pentagon**

**Duration: 45 minutes**

**Accompanying: Korologos, Senor**

**PA Contact: Michelle Shortencarrier, (b)(6)**

1600 (T) Live to Tape with PBS *Lehrer News Hour*

Location: WETA Studios, 3620 27<sup>th</sup> Street, South, Arlington, VA

Duration: 25 minutes

Accompanying: Korologus, Senior

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson wheeler, (b)(6)

**FRIDAY, JULY 25**

**DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE**

**SATURDAY, JULY 26**

**DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE**

-

**SUNDAY, JULY 27**

**DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE**

-

**MONDAY, JULY 28**

0900 Depart Andrews AFB en route BIAP

FLIGHT TIME: 15 hours 30 minutes (estimate)

TIME CHANGE: + 8 hours

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA

11-L-0559<sup>85</sup>/OSD/24912

0000050

-  
-  
**TUESDAY, JULY 29**

0800 Arrive BLAP  
,

-  
-  
-

## Unknown

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**From:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:06 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Yes.

---

**From:**  m.m. OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:03 PM  
**To:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July


so the 19 July date is dear for me to work on something else ~ correct?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:54 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Bryan said for me to check the August 16 date. Two of them were not available on the 19th due to vacations.

---

**From:**  cathy, m.  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:37 PM  
**To:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

any word yet on either date, I do realize we looked at 19 July before but thought the might not want to wait until Aug. let me know -thanks,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 09, 2003 2:23 PM  
**To:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Sorry it has taken so long to figure out a new date ~ new options for this are: Saturday 19 July or 16 Aug. then after Labor Day. Realize this is not great, let me know what you think,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 02, 2003 4:24 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

When I call and cancel the 12th, it would be good to have some hint of when we might reschedule, if possible. So I haven't called people yet. Bryan, want to try another day?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 02, 2003 12:52 PM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Little, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

11-L-0559/OSD/24914

OK, poo on this one, just cannot win. There is a chance SD will be out of town on 12 July but we will not know until the last minutes so I believe we will have to cancel this. Let me know if we should try another date or wait until after Labor Day,

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, June 18, 2003 11:07 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Lillie, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

any word on which day - ??? I need to add something to 12 July so I would like to know if I need to worry on this event - let me know - thanks,  
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 12, 2003 9:54 AM  
**To:** Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhyndance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA  
**Cc:** Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Lillie, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Would like to try Saturday 12 or 19 July for this - can you let me know what works best?

w/SD, George Will, Jim Goagbnd. Charles Krauthammer, Paul Gigot.

Thanks,  
Cathy

11:40- PA Prep  
1200-1300 - Luncheon Round Table

11-L-0559/OSD/24915

**DoJ Investigation  
(Response to Query Only)  
October 3, 2003**

**QUESTION:** **Has** the Department of Defense received a letter from Department of Justice asking them to preserve **and** maintain records on former Ambassador Joseph Wilson **and his** wife?

**ANSWER:** Yes, the Department received a letter **from** DoJ with **this** request on Thursday, Oct 2 to preserve and maintain such records **as** we may have relating to their **ongoing** investigation.

**QUESTION:** Will DoD comply with the requests in the letter?

**ANSWER:** Yes, we are We are cooperating fully with the Justice Department in their investigation.

**QUESTION:** What specifically did the letter **ask** DoD to do?

**ANSWER :** Refer to DoJ.

**QUESTION:** May I have a copy **of** that letter?

**ANSWER :** **No**, you'll have to **ask** DoJ for a copy. However, you might take a look at the White House letter **on** their web site.

**QUESTION:** Did DoD issue a subsequent letter to the Department **staff**!

**ANSWER :** Yes, the General Counsel wrote **a** subsequent letter to the **staff** spelling out how the department **was** to comply with the DoJ request.

**QUESTION:** May I have a copy of that letter?

**ANSWER :** We will make the letter available in due time.

**QUESTION:** **Was** DoD asked to produce specific items for the investigation?

11-L-0559/OSD/24916

0000054

**ANSWER:** No, DoD **was** asked to preserve certain items **and** records **and** we **may** receive a subsequent request to produce **them** for investigators.

---

**Source:** OASD/PA  
**AO/Telephone #:** Maj Shavers/ (b)(6)  
**Approved:** OASDRA (DPO)

**CLOSE HOLD . NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

Q: But that the Administration now, it would be in the Administration and the country's interest now to say well it turns out that a lot of what was in that NIE was wrong. We'd like both for our credibility overseas **and** for the next time that there's issue like this, we'd like to go back and find out **why**. The President doesn't seem to be saying that.

Rumsfeld: Back **off** the record.

You're right. **M y** Lord, anyone with any sense knows that what we've got here is a series of successes in the intelligence community, some of which we can talk about and some of which we can't; some of which are terrific and some of which are -- And we've got some things that are question **marks**. Then we've got some things that are not successes, that **when you** do get ground **truth** it **turns** out different than what **you** thought. Anyone with **any** sense is **going to** want to get lessons learned **from** both. What did we do **right** in **the cases** where we were **right**? What did we do wrong in the cases where it turns out **ground truth** is different **than** what we believed?

What does it mean in terms of analytical work? What does it mean in terms of investment priorities? Ought we to be investing in different things? What does it **mean** if we go back and look at the other places where we've used the same techniques **and** the same procedures **and** the **same** analytical people or techniques? Ought we to review some of **those** things?

You have **to** do that. And **my** goodness, we'll do it. **How** we'll do it is a question I'm sure is being debated over there. But it's **a**, **and** I haven't got conviction about what exactly the model ought to be, the format, to do that. There are certainly times when a commission, **an** outside commission **can** be a big help. For one thing in the case of **our** Ballistic Missile Commission we were able to just focus on one thing. The people in these jobs are focusing **on 50** things at **any** given time. They have the ability because of a desire to get to ground truth to slice through all the stovepipes. That's hard to do for people in government, to slice through -- Unless you're Tenet or Rumsfeld or the President and **can ask** for it and have time, the people down below tend to get stovepiped. **So** people on a commission can do that. There's a value to it, I believe.

Right **now**, my Lord, all the **stuff** going on. You've **got** the congressional

**CLOSE HOLD . NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**stuff**, you've got the 9/11 Commission, we've got subpoenas flying all over the government on Ambassador Wilson, whoever he is, asking for all your sevens? Isn't that what they do in Hearts? **So** you get a list of 20 or 30 reporters and bunch of **stuff**, and I've got hundreds of people in this department digging through **stuff** like that instead of looking forward.

But no, the answer is absolutely. You're going to have to do it. How you do it, I don't know. The President will decide that, but there's no question but that you want to do it. We do it automatically in this department. We embedded 75 plus or minus people in the war on Iraq before it started, and ended up with the most intensive lessons learned effort I have ever seen in my life. I've been briefed on it now for probably seven or eight hours in four different settings. We then went, have gone back to the Iraqis in jail and interrogated them, **and** out of jail -- both places, and interrogated them and learned lessons learned from their perspective, got their view of it. I got briefed on that. It's fascinating **stuff**. That's something that you simply must do.

Now other departments tend not to do it **as** much. George and I did talk -- We're still **off** the record -- did talk about this before the war. He does have a group doing it. I don't know if he's announced it or not, but he's had a group --

Di **Rita**: There's been public reference to Don Kerrs.

Rumsfeld: Kerrs has got a group. **How** intensive that is. I'm **sure** it doesn't being, to approximate what we've done because we have a different set of issues, but George **knows** that.

Q: That simple sentence, you're going to have to do it, of course you want to do it. Why can't that be on the record? Why can't you say that?

Rumsfeld: I'm sure the President's thinking about it and he'll ask me my advice and here I'm out **prejudging** it. He may decide for whatever reason, something I don't **know** about, why he'd rather do it a different way or something. Of course it's going, to get done. It **has** to. It's just a matter of time, I suppose, **so** someone over there announces something and **says** gee, this is how we want to do it.

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: DSB Reports

Please schedule me to get briefed on these two Schneider pieces.

Set a meeting and give me a list of proposed attendees on the lessons learned task force. I want to do it this week.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated memo Schneider memo to SecDef  
1/2/04 DSB Lessons Learned Task Force

DHR:dh  
020804-79

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

239 DSB

OSD 09543-04

8 Feb 04



# Memo

C2/S

**From the Chairman, Defense Science Board**

**To: Hon Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense**

**Subject: OIF Lessons Learned Reports**

---

Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am forwarding you two items from the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Lessons Learned Task Force: the first is a briefing I have been trying to get to you on Quick Support Initiatives for Ongoing Operations in Central Command. This briefing was put together by the Task Force, following an 11 December 2003 VTC session they held with GEN Abizaid; the second document is a Limited Distribution report on OIF Stabilization and Reconstitution issues and recommendations.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill".

Bill Schneider

P.S. We would like to brief you @ your convenience as our interviews revealed quite a bit of interesting information that we did not try to capture in the text.



DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

---

**DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD  
LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE  
Operation Iraqi Freedom**

**Quick Support Initiatives for  
Ongoing Operations in Central Command**

January 2, 2004

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11-L-0559/OSD/24922



DEFENSE SCIENCE  
BOARD

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# Task Force Membership

---

## **Members:**

General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret), Chairman

General Glenn Otis, USA (Ret)

General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret)

Admiral Bill Studeman, USN (Ret)

Vice Admiral Dave Frost, USN (Ret)

Major General Harry Jenkins, USMC (Ret)

Mr. Larry Lynn

Mr. Charles Gandy

## **Support Staff:**

Brigadier General Mark O'Neill, USA, Executive Secretary

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Dolgoff, USA, DSB Representative

Dr. Tom Allen, Dr. Bill Knarr, IDA, Technical Support

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11-L-0559/OSD/24923



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# Quick Support Initiatives for Ongoing Operations in CENTCOM

---

- Intensify support to CPA
- Improve the interagency process
- Develop a significant strategic message approach
- Lift funding restrictions on Iraqi support
- Establish a CENTCOM support office in DDR&E
- Focus intelligence on “manhunting” and other key activities

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3

11-L-0559/OSD/24924



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# Intensify Support to CPA

- **DoD is not equipped with all needed resources for this mission; interagency integration in the field is not effectively filling the gaps**
  - **CPA staffing requirements have grown significantly**
    - Target manning is approaching 2000
    - Filling billets and extending tours beyond 90 days are continuing issues
    - CPA's role will change over time, but will probably continue for several years
  - **CPA needs real experts in governance, finance, law enforcement, etc.**
    - Military officers fill most of these billets but often don't have needed skills
  - **CPA requirements can be partially filled with reach back**
  - **The Department needs more formal institutional support for this mission**

## Recommendations:

- **Designate an FFRDC (such as IDA) to directly support CPA**
- **Potential tasking:**
  - Create, field and support a reach back pool of expertise for near-term CPA support
  - Form a center of expertise and innovation for stabilization operations
  - Develop into an enduring resource for this key dimension of military operations

✓  
✓  
✓

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# Improve the Interagency Process

---

- To secure the desired outcomes in Iraq, the US government needs to be on a war footing
- Interagency process is not producing the required support from most other non-DOD agencies
- This lack of support is impacting CPA effectiveness

## Recommendations:

- Quietly create an NSC-sponsored, SecDef-led interagency executive council to intensify needed support
  - Involved Departments must provide knowledgeable senior officials
- Require Deputies review of issues bi-weekly

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11-L-0559/OSD/24926



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# Develop a Significant Strategic Message Approach

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- **We are losing the perception war, particularly in regional countries/populations including Iraq**
  - Message during combat operations phase well presented but process basically abandoned in post-combat phase
  - Al Jazeera is the most powerful influence on regional perceptions
  - The US is the inventor of media and advertising concepts but has not effectively applied them in the region

## **Recommendations:**

- **Hold a high level conference/workshop with influential people from affected sectors including academia, media and foreign governments**
  - **Validate the existence of the problem**
  - **Develop a strategic message and implementation approach**
- Use regional and commercial capabilities
- Use interagency advisory council to provide direction

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6

11-L-0559/OSD/24927



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# Lift Funding Restrictions on Iraqi Support

---

- **Combat forces do not have capability to comply with all funding limitations and accounting**
- **Limitations are impacting mission accomplishment**

## **Recommendations:**

- **Review all limitations affecting forces in Iraq**
- **Provide waivers to DoD policies**
- **Seek Congressional Committee relief where necessary**

✓  
✓  
✓

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# Establish a CENTCOM Support Office in DDR&E

---

- We are in a long war in Iraq and Afghanistan but much of DoD, the Services and industry are on a peacetime basis
  - Normal processes for fielding needed and innovative technologies are not fast enough
  - Industry complaining about not knowing how to help
  - Some organizations initiatives stifled
  - Issues for immediate focus include vehicle vulnerability, detecting and diffusing improvised explosive devices, and S&T to support manhunt activities

## Recommendations:

- Initiate a process to get immediate combat needs identified
- Designate **DDR&E** as CENTCOM support office and industry contact
- Attach **DDR&E** representative to CENTCOM staff to create a rapid response capability, help set priorities and articulate demand for technological support

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8

11-L-0559/OSD/24929



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BOARD

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# Focus Intelligence on Manhunting and Other Key Activities

- **Intelligence, especially HUMINT, needs to be more responsive and less bureaucratic**
  - Resources must be applied to OIF/OEF unique intelligence problems
  - Technical needs include improved cave detection, close attack means, and improved explosive detection/cache detection means
  - Personnel requirements include assigning people with regional language and cultural expertise for tours lasting longer than 90 days
  - Intelligence should be optimized to support Influence and Messaging Operations

## **Recommendations:**

- USDI, DIRDIA, Services and DCI/CIA define a quick-fix plan for overall improved OIF intelligence and support
  - **Move to implement restructured DoD HUMINT initiatives ASAP**
  - **Ensure that currently collected information is quickly moved up the chain-of-command where appropriate**
- Define an Intelligence Community-wide technical improvement program focused on immediate technology solutions to CENTCOM requirements

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9

11-L-0559/OSD/24930



# Task Force Recommendations

---

- **Iraqi Freedom needs stronger institutional support to CPA and fielded forces to achieve mission**
- **Task Force identified six areas that need immediate attention:**
  - **Intensify support to CPA**
  - **Improve the interagency process**
  - **Develop a significant strategic message approach**
  - **Lift funding restrictions on Iraqi support**
  - **Establish a CENTCOM support office in DDR&E**
  - **Focus intelligence on manhunting and other key activities**
- **Action could quickly generate significant improvement**

123  
1430



February 8, 2004

**TO:** Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld

**SUBJECT:** Brief Senator McCain

*Lany Di Rita*  
*3/1*

*340*

I think you are going to have to go up and brief John McCain. He is absolutely convinced that the evidence shows that there is going to be a mass exodus from the military because of the stress on the force.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-92

.....  
Please respond by 2/13/04

*DA 4/19*  
*Sir.*  
*(4/2) Response attached w/ previous response*  
*v/r.*  
*LTC Swope*

*8 Feb 04*

OSD 09544-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

415  
4/11

INFO MEMO

April 2, 2004, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

*Brownlee  
Sir - We will  
keep trying.*

SUBJECT: Brief Senator McCain

- This responds to your recommendation that General Schoomaker and I meet with Sen. McCain to discuss potential shortfalls in recruiting and retention.
- Although we have been unable to meet with Sen. McCain, we have met with members of his staff on multiple occasions. Additionally, we have addressed his concerns on Recruiting and Retention during Posture Hearing Testimony on both 25 Feb and 3 Mar.
- We will continue to stay closely tied to Sen. McCain's staff in working this issue and are prepared to meet with him at his convenience.
- General Schoomaker and I continue to monitor our recruiting and retention indicators for any signs of potential shortfalls. We are confident, that should any negative trends emerge we have policies, procedures, and incentives identified to correct the shortfall.

30  
2 Copy of

COORDINATION: NONE

CF:  
DepSecDef  
GEN Myers, CJCS  
GEN Schoomaker, CSA  
Dr. Chu  
Mr. Powell Moore

Prepared By: LTC Stephen McHugh, (b)(6)

OSD 09544-04

1-4-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON  
INFO MEMO

2/19  
C2/13

February 12, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

*Brownlee*

SUBJECT: Brief Senator McCain

- This responds to your recommendation to meet with Senator McCain and discuss his concerns about potential shortfalls in recruiting and retention.
- I met with a member of Senator McCain's staff on February 11, 2004 and General Schoomaker and I will jointly brief the Senator soon. I will provide you a summary of the meeting, once complete.
- General Schoomaker and I are closely monitoring any indicators that would foretell recruiting and retention shortfalls in both the Active and Reserve Component. I have directed the G1 and M&RA to develop policies, procedures and incentives to prevent or remedy the problem, if it occurs.

*3/10*

COORDINATION: NONE

CF: DepSecDef  
GEN Myers, CJCS  
GEN Schoomaker, CSA  
Dr. Chu  
Powell Moore

*12 Feb 04*

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas, (b)(6)

OSD 09544-04

*8 Feb 04*

June 24, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
cc: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Bahrain

*3836*

Are you concerned about Bahrain releasing people if they agree to not commit terrorist acts against Bahrainis? That is my understanding of what the government has done. It is worrisome.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062404-8

.....  
Please respond by 7/2/04

*S  
1  
1  
2  
2  
1*

OSD 09551-04

2/13/300

720

February 8, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Expiration of Emergency

*Turnover*  
*2/17*

We have to make sure we don't let the emergency expire, or we will lose all our authorities to continue to conduct the global war on terror and the activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

384

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
 020804-97

.....  
 Please respond by 2/13

*2/19*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*vr/ODL Namgy*  
*2/19*

8 Feb 04

OSD 09564-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24936

*Rec'd 11 Feb*  
*JL*



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

419

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

*WJ Haynes 2/12/04*

SUBJECT: Extending the Declaration of National Emergency

• You sent me a note stating, "We have to make sure we don't let the emergency expire, or we will lose all of our authorities to continue to conduct the global war on terror and the activities in Iraq and Afghanistan."

384

• The President declared a national emergency due to the terrorist threat on September 14, 2001. In an executive order signed the same day, he delegated certain authorities to you that you may exercise during the national emergency.

• Those authorities include the partial mobilization authority, the authority to waive end strengths, and the authority to institute stop/loss. He later delegated additional authority regarding emergency construction to you.

• Under the National Emergencies Act, a national emergency ends after one year unless extended by the President. You forwarded proposed extensions of the September 14, 2001, declaration of national emergency to the President in 2002 and 2003. The President signed both extensions.

12 Feb 04

• My staff and the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs will draft another extension this summer. We will forward the draft extension to you through the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness during July.

SECDEF

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Jim Schwent (b)(6)

*Will not let the emergency expire.  
• We will be sure that Judge Gonzales pays attention.*

8 Feb 04

*WJ Haynes*



(b)(6)

72

(b)(6)

CAZCOS

February 8, 2004

✓  
3/23

LOT'S GOT A  
QUICK DRAFT  
Run SIMONS  
Sims  
PLEASE  
Landy  
KJK

TO: Dov Zakheim  
Ken Krieg  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld   
SUBJECT: **Stress** on Equipment

We have talked a lot about the stress on the force. We need to look at what is happening with the stress on equipment. If the Services plan for X years life of certain pieces of equipment, and we end up using them at a much faster rate for a sustained period, at some point we are going to have to start budgeting to replace earlier.

400

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-98

.....  
Please respond by 2/18 (for way ahead)

8 Feb 04

C 3/23  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo

OSD 09565-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24938

TO: SecNav  
David Chu  
Steve Cambone  
Doug Feith  
Mike Wynne  
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

**SUBJECT: Public Opinion Polls**

Attached is a metric that the government of Columbia is using. I would like to see the metrics your units are using.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604E.061s


*Attach: Columbia US Cooperation Statistics*

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RS

OSD 09598-04

**COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF  
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**



SOURCES: UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

## COLOMBIA – U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

### Colombia's War on Drugs and Terror

of reducing illegal **coca** crop by 50% from December 2000 levels met and surpassed. **Target** achieved two years ahead of schedule (2003 vs. 2005)

**Seizures** of cocaine – **total** market value of \$8 billion – seized by Colombian authorities since **beginning** of 2001. 2003 seizures were a record 114 tons, a 20% increase over 2002. More than 160 **terrorists** extradited to the U.S. since Jan. 2001.

**Incidents** of terrorism decreased by 48% during 2003, lowest since 1995. Homicides decreased in 2003 (5,800 lives saved) – lowest rate since 1987. Kidnappings decreased by 26% in 2003 over 2002, and by 41% from their high in 2000.

**Arrests** and captures of guerrillas and illegal self-defense forces increased 63% and 128%, respectively, in 2003. 1,841 guerrillas and 1,739 self-defense forces demobilized in 2003.

### U.S. support key to security improvements

**U.S. contribution** to fight drugs and terrorism in Colombia has been \$3.2 billion (FY2000-FY2004). Colombian investment has been \$6.5 billion (8% of annual GDP).

**Special Forces** enlarged by 52,000 troops since Jan. 2001 – a 43% increase; mobility enhanced by **provided** helicopters and planes. U.S. training produced **more effective**, professional military. **Colombian** government trained 73,000 soldiers in human rights and IHL in 2003.

**U.S. presence** established in every municipality in the country in Q1 2004 – a first for Colombia **key** precondition for delivery of government services.

### Social Investments are making a difference

**Humanitarian assistance**: relief for 1.4 million internally displaced persons; 43,951 hectares of legal **crop** **restored** and 647 social projects funded, benefiting 33,399 families. **Judicial strengthening**: 30 courtrooms and 37 **justice houses**, 3,421 judges and 599 conciliators trained.

**Colombian** government achievements in 2003: 477,600 new **students** in public schools; 1,061,651 **patients** treated to national health system; 5 million children received food aid; 21,139 families **enrolled** in forest-ranger program; technical education provided to 2.3 million youths.

### Increased confidence fuels economic recovery

Colombia's GDP grew by 3.6% in 2003 – the highest growth-rate since 1995. Excluding illicit **crop** growth was 4%. 1.2 million new jobs were created.

**U.S.** boosted U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade by 10% in 2003, to a record \$10.1 billion.



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1100 DEFENSE; PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

June 25, 2004 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lawrence J. Lanzillotta

SUBJECT: DoD Financial Management Balanced Scorecard

- This is in response to your request to see what metrics my organization is using. We developed a Financial Management Balanced Scorecard (BSC) that supports the Department's BSC. Tab A reflects a list of our BSC performance measures; Tab B includes the actual metrics.
- We improved performance through the use of our BSC. Some examples include:
  - During the recent mid-year review, we analyzed service obligation rates against their spending plans as one of the ways of determining requirements and/or possible assets.
  - Tracking liquidity in working capital funds led to a cash asset of over \$1.5 billion being available for other uses.
- The percentages below reflect a sample of the progress made between April 2001 and April 2004 in managing our financial transactions:
  - Reduced travel card delinquency rates. Individual accounts declined 32 percent; centrally managed accounts declined 74 percent.
  - Purchase card delinquencies declined 50 percent.
  - Overdue payments to contractors declined 59 percent.
  - Interest penalties paid on invoice payments to contractors declined 52 percent.
  - Since FY 2002, we have reduced the average amount of time to process an Anti-deficiency Act Violation report by 10 months.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Greg Kuechler, (b)(6)

OSD 09598-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24942

**TAB**

**A**

## FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT BALANCED SCORECARD PERFORMANCE MEASURES


Force Management Risk	Operational Risk	Future Challenges Risk	Institutional Risk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of employee performance plans that align appraisals with specific performance measurements</li> <li>• Number of training hours/opportunities available</li> <li>• Number of employees participating in training</li> <li>• Number of employees with professional certifications</li> <li>• Number of employees with advanced degrees</li> <li>• Attrition rates</li> <li>• Manager to workforce ratio</li> <li>• Overtime and comp time</li> <li>• Employees rewarded</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduction of general ledger abnormal balances</li> <li>• Travel card delinquencies</li> <li>• Purchase card delinquencies</li> <li>• ADA Violations</li> <li>• Overaged suspense accounts</li> <li>• Overaged accounts receivable</li> <li>• Problem disbursements</li> <li>• In-transit disbursements</li> <li>• Electronic payments</li> <li>• Backlog of commercial payments</li> <li>• Interest penalties paid</li> <li>• Payment timeliness of non-credit card invoices</li> <li>• WCF: Cash, Liquidity, AOR, Work in Process; Fuel</li> <li>• Erroneous payments</li> <li>• Contract payments held for funding</li> <li>• Overaged accounts payable</li> <li>• Contract closeout timeliness</li> <li>• DFAS cost metrics</li> <li>• Current ratio (WCF only)</li> <li>• Inventory turnover rate</li> <li>• Quick ratio (WCF only)</li> <li>• Net cost operations</li> <li>• Overhead to total cost</li> <li>• Capital asset growth</li> <li>• Labor efficiency ratio</li> <li>• Uncovered liabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program Assessment and Evaluation</li> <li>• Obligation rates</li> <li>• Appropriations with negative balances</li> <li>• Track budget request</li> <li>• Other execution metrics (readiness, cost, schedule performance, etc)</li> <li>• Funds subject to cancellation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unsupported accounting entries</li> <li>• Fund balance with Treasury</li> <li>• Environmental liabilities</li> <li>• Property, plant and equipment</li> <li>• Intragovernmental elimination</li> <li>• Inventory and related property</li> <li>• Reconcile budgetary obligations to net cost in the Statement of Finance</li> <li>• Present the Statement of net cost by specific program</li> <li>• Development of Business Architecture Modernization Program</li> <li>• Implementation of complementary accounting and finance systems and procedures</li> <li>• Implementation of complementary solutions for program planning and budget development</li> </ul>

# INCOMING

TO: SecNav  
David Chu  
Steve Cambone  
Doug Feith  
Mike Wynne  
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Polls

Attached is a metric that the government of Columbia is using. I would like to see the metrics your units are using.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604E.06ts

Attach: Columbia US Cooperation Statistics


Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

6/25

OSD 09598-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24946

**COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF  
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**



SOURCES: UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

## COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

### Colombia's War on Drugs and Terror

of reducing illegal coca crop by 50% from December 2000 levels met and surpassed. Five achieved two years ahead of schedule (2003 vs. 2005).

tons of cocaine - est. market value of \$8 billion - seized by Colombian authorities since July 2001. 2003 seizures were a record 114 tons, a 20% increase over 2002. More than 160 fugitives extradited to the U.S. since Jan. 2001.

rate of terrorism decreased by 48% during 2003, lowest since 1995. Homicides decreased in 2003 (5,800 lives saved) - lowest rate since 1987. Kidnappings decreased by 26% in 2003, down from 2002, and by 41% from their high in 2000.

and captures of guerrillas and illegal self-defense forces increased 63% and 128% respectively, in 2003. 1,841 guerrillas and 1,739 self-defense forces demobilized in 2003.

### U.S. support key to security improvements

Contribution to fight drugs and terror in Colombia has been \$32 billion (FY2000-FY2004). Colombian investment has been \$6.5 billion (8% of annual GDP).

and Forces enlarged by 52,000 troops since Jan. 2001 - a 43% increase; mobility enhanced by provided helicopters and planes. U.S. training produced more effective, professional military. Colombian government trained 73,000 soldiers in human rights and IHL in 2003.

presence established in every municipality in the country in Q1 2004 - a first for Colombia. Key precondition for delivery of government services.

### Social investments are making a difference

assistance; relief for 1.4 million internally displaced persons; 43,951 hectares of legal crops planted and 647 social projects funded, benefiting 33,399 families. Judicial strengthening: 30 courtrooms and 37 justice houses, 3,421 judges and 599 conciliators trained.

Colombian government achievements in 2003: 477,600 new slots in public schools; 1,061,651 affiliates to national health system; 5 million children received food aid; 21,135 families enrolled in forest-ranger program; technical education provided to 2.3 million youths.

### Increased confidence fuels economic recovery

Colombia's GDP grew by 3.6% in 2003 - the highest growth rate since 1995. Excluding illicit crop, growth was 4%. 1.2 million new jobs were created.

boosted U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade by 10% in 2003, to a record \$10.1 billion.

**DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE**  
**COMPTROLLER**



**FINANCIAL INDICATO**  
**PROGRAM**

11-L-0559/OSD/24949

The Metrics Program is now on-line! This book only contains the current metric charts. All history and reference material now resides on the web. Access this material via:  
**HTTPS://DOD-METRICS.DFAS.MIL** (You must have your CAC activated to enter).

<https://dod-metrics.dfas.mil/secure/index.shtm?>

## DoD Financial Management Balanced Scorecard

### Alphabetical Metric Index

Section I	<u>Strategy, Vision, and Mission</u>
Section II	<u>Financial Operations Metrics</u>
Section III	<u>Budget-Related Metrics</u>
Section IV	<u>Enterprise Architecture Metrics</u>
Section V	<u>Reserved</u>
Section VI	<u>Summary Scoring and Policy</u>
Section VII	<u>Balanced Scorecard</u>
Section VIII	<u>Reference Material</u>

**The METRICS**

In this book: { → → →

For visually impaired assistance, contact an OSD Metrics Analyst by email at [hq.osd.metrics@osd.mil](mailto:hq.osd.metrics@osd.mil)  
Last Updated: March 17, 2004 at 09:06

***We're On-Line !!***

11-L-0559/OSD/24950

# DoD FINANCIAL INDICATORS

## Table of Contents

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	Section I	Vision, Mission, Strategy, and Format
The METRICS	Section II	Financial Operations Metrics
	Section III	Budget-Related Metrics
	Section IV	Financial Management Enterprise Architecture Metrics
	Section V	Management Initiative Decisions (MIDs) Implementation Metrics
	Section VI	Summary Scoring and Policy
Section VII	Cascading Scorecard for Military Services/Defense Agencies	
Section VIII	Reference	



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

SECRET  
2004 JUN 25 11:26

**INFO MEMO**

June 25, 2004, 10:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

*[Signature]*  
JUN 25 2004  
Acquisition,

SUBJECT: Metrics

- This is in response to your request to see what metrics I am using **(TAB A)**.
- I use the following metrics for major acquisition program performance, technology development, logistics responsiveness, and infrastructure. Specifically, these include:
  - Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Cycle Time
  - Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cost Growth
  - Maintain Balanced and Focused Science and Technology
  - Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives
  - Customer Wait Time
  - Fund to a 67-Year Recapitalization Rate
  - Eliminate Inadequate Housing

Details for these metrics are at **(TAB B)**.

- In addition, I have seven acquisition excellence goals with a mix of metrics and activity indicators. **(TAB C)** lists my goals and representative metrics or activities for each.
- For every major acquisition program, I also track and monitor ten key indicators as well as detailed cost and schedule trends. I review these with my staff and the Service Acquisition community each month. An example is provided at **(TAB D)**.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy L. Spruill/Director, ARA/ (b)(6)

OSD 09598-04



11-L-0559/OSD/24952


# TAB

# A

TO: SecNav  
David Chu  
Steve Cambone  
Doug Feith  
Mike Wynne  
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



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
DHR/azn  
060604E.06ts

*Attach: Columbia US Cooperation Statistics*



11-L-0559/OSD/24954

**COLOMBIA – U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF  
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**



SOURCES UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

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
U.S. boosted U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade by 10% in 2003, to a record \$10.1 billion.

**TAB**


**B**

# OUSD (AT&L) Metrics


New Start MDAP Cycle Time in Months




Annual Percentage Rate of Acquisition Cost Growth  
Target - Zero Percent Growth Year to Year




President's Budget S&T Funding Percentages & Goals by Investment Area  
Basic Research Applied Research Advanced Technology Development




Percentage of Defense Technology Objectives Evaluated as Progressing Satisfactory




Customer Wait Time (Days)



Facilities Recapitalization Metric (FRM) in Years



Percentage of Inadequate Family Housing Units  
Goal is Zero Percent



## Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cycle Time

Acquisition Cycle Time (Months)	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Target/ Actual	FY 2003 Target/ Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Acquisition cycle time (for new starts from FY 1992 through FY 2001) (months)	N/A <sup>e</sup>	102	103	<99/102 <sup>b</sup>	<99	<99
Acquisition cycle time (for new starts after FY 2001) (months)	N/A <sup>a</sup>	N/A	55	<66/76 <sup>b</sup>	<66	<66

**Metric Description.** Acquisition cycle time is the elapsed time, in months, from program initiation—when the Department makes a commitment to develop and produce a weapon system—until the system attains initial operational capability (IOC). This metric measures the average cycle time across all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). During the 1960s, a typical acquisition took 7 years (84 months) to complete. By 1996, a similar acquisition required 11 years (132 months) from program start to IOC. To reverse this trend, DoD established an objective to reduce the average acquisition cycle time for MDAPs started since 1992 to less than 99 months, a reduction of 25%. We achieved that initial objective. We did so through rapid acquisition with demonstrated technology, time-phased requirements and evolutionary development, and integrated test and evaluation. To continue that improvement, the Department will seek to reduce the average cycle time to less than 66 months for all MDAPs started after FY 2001. To achieve that objective, the Department is introducing improvements to development and production schedules similar to those it initiated for managing system performance and cost. Rapid development and fielding of weapon systems—leveraging new technologies faster—will enable U.S. forces to stay ahead of potential adversaries.

### Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cost Growth

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Reduce annual rate of acquisition cost growth	N/A <sup>a</sup>	+13.9% <sup>a</sup>	+6.4%	Downward trend toward 0%/+5.0 <sup>b</sup>	Downward trend toward 0%	Downward trend toward 0%

**Metric Description.** Acquisition cost growth measures the difference between the acquisition costs in the current-year's President's budget and the previous-year's budget, divided by the acquisition costs for the previous-year's budget, expressed as a percentage. The population is all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) common to both current-year and previous-year budgets. A dollar-weighted average is calculated for the common MDAPs and adjusted for changes in quantity or inflation. Acquisition cost growth can occur for various reasons, including technical risk, schedule slips, programmatic changes, or overly optimistic cost estimates. Our reform initiatives seek to reduce cost growth from all sources, providing an output target for procurement managers of individual systems, as well as for the aggregate procurement programs of the individual Services. The objective is to continue toward an ultimate goal of no acquisition cost growth. Managerial responses are expected to include both specific cost-control initiatives and process changes.

### Maintain Balanced and Focused Science and Technology

President's Budget (%)	Goal	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
Basic Research	15	15.2	16.3	14.9	14.0	12.8	12.6
Applied Research	35	40.5	42.1	41.7	38.9	35.9	36.8
Advanced Technology Development	50	44.3	41.6	43.4	47.1	51.3	50.6

**Metric Description.** This metric sets objectives and tracks the percentage of funding in the three science and technology budget activities – basic research, applied research and advanced technology development – to maintain a balanced investment. This ensures a continual process of moving fundamental research to more applied applications which provide a better focus on national security requirements to advanced technology development which integrates technology into system prototypes for field experiments to determine military utility.

## Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs)<sup>1</sup>

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Percentage of DTOs evaluated as progressing satisfactorily toward goals	97	96	97	≥70/96	≥70	≥70
DTO evaluated in biannual review	166	180	149	163	NA	NA
Total number of DTOs	347	326	401	386	NA	NA

NOTE 1. Metric baseline changed for CY 2004 ADR; data should not be cross referenced to previous reports.

**Metric Description.** S&T investments are focused and guided through a series of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) developed by the senior planners working for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each of these objectives highlights a specific technological advancement that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date the technology will be available, the specific benefits that should result from the technological advance, and the funding required (and funding sources) to achieve the new capability. This list of objectives also distinguishes specific milestones to be reached and approaches to be used, quantitative metrics that will indicate progress, and the customers who will benefit when the new technology is eventually fielded. This metric measures the percentage of DTOs that are progressing satisfactorily toward the goals established for them. Although actual performance continues well above target, the target will be maintained at 70% due to the inherent high risk of failure in technology development.

**Customer Wait Time**

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Customer Wait time (days)	NA <sup>a</sup>	18	16	16/19	15	15

**Metric Description.** Customer Wait Time (CWT) measures the number of days between customer order submission and customer receipt of an item. The customer's order may be filled from assets on hand at the customer's military installation or naval vessel, or through the DoD wholesale logistics system. For purposes of this Enterprise Level Metric, CWT includes orders for spare and repair parts ordered by organizational maintenance activities. CWT captured for orders considered below enterprise level are maintained by each of the Military Services and the Defense Logistics Agency.

**Fund to a 67-year Recapitalization Rate**

Metrics	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/ Actual	FY 2004 Target/ Projected Performance	FY 2005 Target/ Projected Performance
Facilities recapitalization metric—FRM (years)	141	192	101	67/149	67/136 <sup>a</sup>	67/107
Facilities sustainment model—FSM (percent)	78 <sup>b</sup>	70 <sup>b</sup>	89	100/93	100/94 <sup>c</sup>	100/95

**Metric Description.** The facilities recapitalization metric (FRM) is a performance indicator that measures the rate at which an inventory of facilities is being recapitalized. The term “recapitalization” means to restore or modernize facilities. Recapitalization may (or may not) involve total replacement of individual facilities; recapitalization often occurs incrementally over time without a complete replacement.

The performance goal for FRM equals the average expected service life (ESL) of the facilities inventory (estimated to be 67 years, based on benchmarks developed by a panel of Defense engineers in 1997). The ESL, in turn, is a function of facilities sustainment. “Sustainment” means routine maintenance and repair necessary to achieve the **ESL**. To compute a normal ESL, full sustainment levels must be assumed. A reduced **ESL** results from less than full sustainment. For this reason, the metrics for facilities recapitalization and facilities sustainment are unavoidably linked and should be considered together.

Sustainment levels required to achieve a normal ESL are benchmarked to commercial per unit costs; for example, \$1.94 per square foot annually is needed to properly sustain the aircraft maintenance hangar inventory for a 50-year life cycle. The facilities sustainment model (FSM) adjusts these costs to local areas and assigns the costs to DoD Components and funding sources. For evaluating planned performance, both metrics (FSM and **FRM**) are converted to dollars (annual funding requirements) and compared to funded programs in the DoD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

## Eliminate Inadequate Family Housing

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Actual	FY 2004 Projected	FY 2005 Projected
Number of inadequate family housing units	182,246	170,314	143,608	129,955	115,830	77,012
Percentage of total family housing units	61	59	53	51	48	39

**Metric Description.** The Department of Defense has established a goal to eliminate all inadequate family housing by the end of FY 2007. Each Military Service has developed a Family Housing Master Plan that outlines the approach it will follow to achieve this goal. These plans identify the program requirements, by year, to eliminate inadequate family housing by FY 2007.

Inadequate housing, in general, is any unit that requires a major repair, component upgrade, component replacement, or total upgrade. Each Service has evaluated its housing and identified inadequate units and developed a plan to eliminate this inadequate housing through a combination of traditional military construction, operations and maintenance support, and privatization.

**TAB**

**C**

## **OUSD (AT&L) Top 7 Goals and Representative Metrics / Activity Indicators**

### **1. Acquisition Excellence with Integrity**

Metric / Activity – E-Commerce expansion with Standard Procurement System (award winner) and Wide Area Work Flow System (award nominee),

### **2. Logistics Integrated and Efficient**

Metric / Activity – Introduces Unique Identification (UID), gaining an international standard – and mandating Radio Frequency Identification for In Transit Visibility

### **3. Systems Integration and Engineering for Mission Success**

Metric / Activity – Activities to support this goal are designed to re-energize the systems view of integrated architectures, systems engineering, and re-invigorate the systems engineering environment.

### **4. Technology Dominance**

Metric / Activity – Initiate 15 ACTDs each year, increase S&T across the Department to approximately 3% of budget.

### **5. Resources Rationalized**

Metric / Activity – No specific metrics. Activities to support this goal are primarily related to the 2005 BRAC process.

### **6. Industrial Base Strengthened**

Metric / Activity – Activities to support this goal included publishing industrial base capabilities studies, identifying industrial base and technology deficiencies and issues, and assessing the financial health of the aerospace/defense industry relative to the broader markets.

### **7. Motivated, Agile Workforce**

Metric / Activity – The primary activity to support this goal is the strengthening of the Defense Acquisition University which has won several awards. This area also includes the forerunner to National Security Personnel System, the Acquisition Demonstration Project.

# TAB

# D

**Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)  
Global Broadcast Service (GBS)**

**Program: GBS**  
**Service: Air Force**

**Date: JUN 2004**  
**Reviewed: Yes**

	<b>Perf</b>	<b>Test</b>	<b>Log</b>	<b>Cost</b>	<b>Fund</b>	<b>Sched</b>	<b>Cont</b>	<b>Prod</b>	<b>Mgmt</b>	<b>Interop</b>
<b>PM</b>										
<b>OSD</b>										

**Highlights:**

General: The Global Broadcast Service continues to support deployed troops in Iraq and on other battlefields around the world. The TEMP update has been reviewed by DOT&E and signed by the PM. The services must aggressively staff this TEMP within three months to support all future government testing. The program successfully passed the Development Test/Operational Test (DT/OT) 1, phase 1, in March 2004. DT/OT 1 phase 2, scheduled for July 2004, will be a system-level test of the entire Internet Protocol architecture, evaluating the end-to-end performance of the Satellite Broadcast Manager and the final production Receive Suite configurations. NII has concerns about a possible disestablishment of the GBS program office in FY05. This would preclude development work on any upgrades or modifications, expected to be delineated in a planned ORD update and on any fielding issues extending beyond September 2005.

Cost: PA&E rates Yellow advisory because there are still no CAIG approved contract plans for the EMD phase.

**Description of DAES Review Process**

The extract above is a representative sample of output resulting from the DAES report process. The DAES provides standard, comprehensive summary reporting of acquisition category I programs (nearly 90 programs) between milestone decision points. It is designed to provide, on a regular and systematic basis (quarterly), indications of both potential and actual program problems before they become significant in ten major focus areas (Performance, Test, Logistics, Cost, Funding, Schedule, Contractual, Production, Management, and Interoperability). Recognizing that problems are expected to surface in these programs aids in communication and early resolution. The DAES is an internal report for the DoD submitted by Program Managers (PM) through their acquisition chain of command. The report is independently reviewed and evaluated by the OSD Staff, and their judgments are reflected in the OSD line.

The following guidelines are used in assessing the status of the program. The DAES review process is designed to understand the differences in opinion where they occur to assist decision-making and issue resolution.

- (1) **On-Track (Green):** All aspects of the program are progressing satisfactorily as evidenced by performance facts, schedule, costs, and contractor performance. Some minor problem(s) may exist, but appropriate solutions are available. Performance characteristics at the subsystem and system level are supporting program objectives and meeting threshold requirements. Milestone slippages, if any, can be rescheduled without requiring a significant amount of additional effort on the part of the program office or contractors. Costs are not expected to exceed approved funding levels and are not expected to exceed contract target costs by more than 5%.
- (2) **Advisory (Green, Yellow or Red):** Advisory indicates the program is either assessed to be between ratings, or is moving from one rating to another, thus this provides advance notification of shifting status. A Red (Advisory) indicates that a program with prior Red status requires higher echelon attention. The narrative will explain if the advisory means an improvement or a worsening in the status or area of risk.
- (3) **Potential or Actual Problem (Yellow):** Some event, action or delay has occurred that impairs progress against major objectives in one or more segments of the program. While appropriate solutions are within the Program Manager's ability to solve, timely action by the PEO, or by the DoD **CAE**, or by the USD(A&T) may also be required. Required actions may include activating a WPT to develop a revised test strategy, or decision, or similar type action. In the case of a potential risk to a major program objective or acquisition program baseline, the Program Manager should state this distinction in Section 3 (Program Manager's Comments). Early reporting is encouraged.
- (4) **Major Weakness (Red):** Some event, action, or delay has occurred that seriously impedes successful accomplishment of one or more major program objectives. Such a set-back to the program requires reorientation or reprogramming of the program effort, with the advice and consent of the PEO, and/or the DoD CAE, and/or the USD(A&T). Such a problem may be beyond the ability of the PM to resolve without significant action by the Component or DoD. A major weakness includes, but is not limited to, deviations from the acquisition program baseline that will result in a breach (see 6.2.1) or a unit cost breach (see 6.2.4).

June 25, 2004

TO: General James Hill  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: El Salvador

Thanks so much for your note on El Salvador. We'll send off a letter to the MoD.

Regards,

DHR:dh  
062504-2

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*El Salvador*

*2004  
6/25  
11-L-0559/OSD/24971*

OSD 09603-04

TAB A

20  
May 26, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Reykjavik

DA

Please give me the precise information on what is going to happen in Reykjavik that was brought up at this morning's meeting.

Thanks.

DHK:JF  
052004 14

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

Iceland

28 May 04

Tab A

OSD 09607-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24972

120  
~~FOUO~~

June 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

I think we need to have a briefing to the PC that tees up a proposal as to how the Iraqis are going to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Sunnis in terms of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from the Kurds, and the Kurds now want back.

It is a serious point of friction, and there are those who think it could lead to a major conflict as early as August. It merits our attention. The flash points could come soon, so I would think we would want to get a briefing in the next two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062504-2 (3; computer) doc

*Iraq*

*85 Sun 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09612-04

11-L-0559/OSD/24973

2/17/2004

120

10:45 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 10, 2004

SUBJECT:

Why don't you write a letter **to** the Congressman, I think it was Vic Snyder, who asked about this chemical biological defense program and explain why.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021004.20

Please respond by: 2/16

370.64

*✓*  
2/19

2/17/04

Sir,

Response attached

*✓*  
MSG JDD

2/2/04

10-7-04

OSD 09653-04

TEA 2/19

11-L-0559/OSD/24974



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



FEB 13 2004

Honorable Marty Mechan  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Mechan:

At the hearing last week you expressed concern that our Research and Development request for the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) had decreased by \$146 million from the fiscal year (FY) 2004 appropriated level. Secretary Rumsfeld has asked me to respond to your concern.

There are two reasons for the decrease. The first is that the CBDP research and development budget received an additional \$77.4 million in FY 2004 for congressional special interest items. These are one-time FY 2004 increases; when they are not considered, the decline between FY 2004 and FY 2005 funding levels is only \$69 million. The primary reason for the \$69 million decline in the base program is that several development programs are transitioning into production. Programs in this category include the Joint Service General Purpose Mask, the Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble, and the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System. The CBDP procurement account actually increases by \$90 million in FY 2005.

Thank you for your continued support of our service men and women. You can be assured that the Department shares your concern that our troops receive the protection they need against chemical and biological threats.

Sincerely,

Dov S. Zakheim



11-L-0559/OSD/24975



7:35 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT:

Give me that strategy paper so I can edit it myself please.

Thanks.

*18 Feb*

DIR/asn  
021804 16

Please respond by: 2/20

*3/24*

*Response attached  
2/20*


OSD 09655-04

*18 Feb*

11-L-0559/OSD/24976

**Coordination Draft (V.3.3) 20 February 04**

**DRAFT**  
**National Defense Strategy**  
**of**  
**The United States of America**



**DRAFT**

11-L-0559/OSD/24977

**Coordination Draft (V.3.3) 20 February 04**



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## FOREWORD

The attacks of September 11, 2001 initiated a new era of global conflict. The effectiveness of our sustained response across the government will determine the course of future events. Since 9/11, we are confronting new and fundamentally different challenges than those previously faced by the United States defense establishment. President George W. Bush is committed to meeting these new challenges before they become manifest and has defined a clear path for ensuring the security of the American people while, at the same time, advancing human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise worldwide.

The Department of Defense actively supports the President's commitment to the forward defense of freedom. Toward that end, *The National Defense Strategy* outlines our approach to effectively contending with those security challenges we will likely confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet. It further outlines our intent to create those favorable security conditions conducive to a broad, equitable, and enduring peace. Our experiences over the past few years have shown that we must continue to consciously transform how we think about our security environment, how we accomplish our strategic objectives, and how we adapt our military capabilities and attributes to ensure continued success.

This strategy takes an expansive view of the security environment as a means to better anticipate challenges and identify opportunities to influence strategic outcomes well before compelling challenges become more dangerous and less manageable. This strategy builds upon our efforts in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to develop an adaptable, global approach that expects surprise and contends effectively with strategic uncertainty.

Events since the development of the QDR affirm the need to develop new and innovative ways to accomplish our strategic objectives by assuring our allies and friends; dissuading potential adversaries; deterring and countering aggression and coercion; and defeating adversaries. The Global War on Terrorism has uncovered not only new security challenges but also unprecedented opportunities to redefine the status quo, shape strategic outcomes, and create conditions for a favorable international order founded on responsible governance and the exercise of effective sovereignty.

The Department has already undertaken a number of organizational, process, and operational changes aimed at transforming how we prepare for and wage war. Our Armed Forces must have the capabilities and attributes they need to contend effectively with the range of persistent and emerging challenges—some notably different from those we faced in the past.

When President Bush took office three years ago, he charged all of us with a mission to prepare the Department of Defense to meet those threats our nation will face as the 21st century unfolds. *The National Defense Strategy* is focused on fulfilling this mission. As a witness to the dedication and determination of our uniformed men and women and of the civilians who support them, I have little doubt that we will succeed in meeting this mission.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America is a nation at war.

Yet, we live in an era of historic American advantage and opportunity. Ours is a time where we both face a diverse set of gathering challenges and possess an unrivaled capacity to contend with them.

We are committed to a strategy focused on an active, layered defense of the nation and its interests, as well as the creation of those security conditions conducive to a broad, stable, and favorable international order that supports freedom, democracy, and opportunity. The *National Defense Strategy* promotes close cooperation with those committed to these principles and seeks to create opportunities, secure our collective interests, and contend effectively with persistent and emerging challenges.

order by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a broad, stable, and secure peace.

### STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

*Four defense objectives will guide DoD's security activities.*

**Secure the United States from direct attack.** We will counter—early and at a safe distance—those who seek to harm the United States.

**Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will underwrite the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States, its partners, and the wider international community by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.

**Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.** We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

**Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.** We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international

### HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

*Four key activities will focus our efforts in the world.*

**Assure allies and friends.** We will assure allies and friends by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and protect common interests.

**Dissuade potential adversaries.** We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions by refocusing our key military advantages.

**Deter aggression and counter coercion.** We will deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the resolve to use them.

**Defeat adversaries.** At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing – setting the conditions for future security.

### IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

*Four guidelines will structure our strategic planning and decision making.*

**Active, defense-in-depth.** We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

**Continuous transformation.** We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.

**Capabilities-based approach.** We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing persistent and emerging challenges by setting priorities among competing capabilities.

**Managing risks.** We will consider the full range of risk associated with resources and operations to manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.

# THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

### A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

The United States is a nation at war, yet we still enjoy an historic position of strategic advantage. In spite of our substantial advantages, however, we remain vulnerable.

According to the President's *National Security Strategy*, we seek to use our unique position of strategic advantage "to build a safer, better world that favors human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." Our security and that of our partners ultimately rests on an international order within which all nations enjoy the benefits freedom and prosperity.

In combination with our international partners, our great national strengths afford us a unique opportunity to secure collective interests and build that new, more favorable international order. If we are to succeed in this pursuit we must continue to rely on traditional allies and partners while seeking to expand our partnerships around the world. We must continue to grow the community of like-minded states committed to bringing about positive and enduring change to adverse security conditions likeliest to threaten the peace.

Despite our position of enormous advantage, we remain vulnerable to diverse security challenges. These challenges take many forms, ranging from direct attacks against the United States and its interests to indirect threats posed by aggression or dangerous

instability affecting others. Some may seek to terrorize our population and destroy our way of life, as al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001. Others may seek to limit our freedom of action globally or regionally, establish hostile dominance over key strategic regions, or attempt to make the costs of our continued worldwide commitment prohibitive.

Mindful of this diverse array of challenges, the United States and its international partners have, since September 2001, followed a clear, active, and principled strategy. This approach strives to defend, preserve, and extend peace and freedom throughout the world. The *National Defense Strategy* will help the United States achieve these broad goals by promoting an active, layered, and adaptive approach to securing the United States and its interests. While the *National Defense Strategy* retains elements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, it also reflects fundamental changes in the security environment and the lessons we have learned over the past few years.

The September 2001 attacks clarified our understanding of the fundamental changes occurring since the end of the Cold War. We realized that, without resolute action, we could experience far greater tragedies in the future. A purely defensive approach likely would fail to address the threat of attacks on an even greater scale. From that day forward, a more activist defense of the nation and its interests became the hallmark of our strategy. This approach is evidenced in the ongoing global war on terrorism. Indeed, since 9/11 the active defeat of terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda, and their sponsors is the defining security interest of our age.

The United States and its international partners have made significant progress in the global war on terrorism. This has been enabled by an unprecedented level of interagency and international cooperation. Over 170 countries are engaged in activities

ranging from freezing terrorist assets to sharing intelligence to providing combat forces for coalition operations. Our recent military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrative of this. In Afghanistan, a U.S.-led coalition defeated a Taliban regime that provided the world's principal haven for terrorists. In Iraq, an American-led effort toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein—a regime with a history of indiscriminately employing weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring and providing sanctuary to terrorists, and inflicting terror on its own people.

Our experiences fighting the global war on terrorism have underscored the need for a defense establishment postured to contend with this conflict for some time, while strengthening our ability to contend with a range of diverse challenges in the future. This reality calls for an adaptive strategy, predicated upon creating and seizing opportunities and contending with our most compelling security challenges through an active, forward defense in-depth.

## **B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of the current strategic environment. We cannot and will not know precisely where and when the interests of the United States will be threatened nor when the United States will come under direct attack. We can identify trends, but we cannot predict specific events with any precision. We seek to avoid surprise, but we also must learn to expect it.

We must adapt to uncertainty by adjusting quickly and decisively to changes in strategic circumstances—better anticipating the most adverse among them and influencing strategic outcomes on our terms. It is no longer enough to react to change. Thus, this strategy focuses on securing our most treasured national assets—our people and our

freedoms—while seeking to prevent the development of future challenges to them.

## **1. PERSISTENT AND EMERGING CHALLENGES**

"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few." —The President's *National Security Strategy*

One of the clearest changes in the strategic landscape grows from our superiority in traditional forms of warfare. Our adversaries increasingly are foregoing challenging U.S. interests directly with traditional military means. Instead, they are adopting a range of asymmetric capabilities and methods intended to circumvent U.S. military advantages. Thus an array of catastrophic, irregular, disruptive, as well as continuing traditional methods and capabilities represent the four persistent and emerging challenges we must contend with to prevail in a new, more uncertain era. Individually, these challenges are characterized in the following ways:

- *Traditional* challenges are largely represented by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.
- *Irregular* challenges are unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents.
- *Catastrophic* challenges involve the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- *Disruptive* future challenges are those likely to emanate from competitors

developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities that might supplant our current advantages in key operational domains.

There are often no hard boundaries distinguishing one of these categories from another. While the capabilities and methods within each differ, the most dangerous circumstances are those where we are facing, or will face, multiple challenges simultaneously.

For example, during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, U.S. and coalition forces contended with both *traditional* and *irregular* challenges, in part to keep *catastrophic* capabilities out of the hands of terrorists. Transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda represent quintessential, *irregular* threats but are actively seeking to obtain *catastrophic* capabilities. North Korea at once poses *traditional*, *irregular*, and *catastrophic* challenges. Still other potential opponents—particularly rising great powers or rogue states—may seek to leverage breakthrough *disruptive* capabilities in combination with *traditional* forms of warfare to achieve decisive advantages in niche areas.

While the four challenges often combine, their distinctions are best appreciated when explained individually.

**Traditional Challenges.** *Traditional* challenges are well recognized forms of military competition employed largely by states—that is, armies, navies and air forces. While *traditional* forms of military competition remain important, recent history suggests that they likely will receive lesser priority in the planning of adversaries vis-à-vis the United States. This can be attributed, in part, to U.S. and allied superiority in *traditional* forms of warfare and the enormous cost to develop, acquire, and maintain conventional capabilities. But it is explained as well by the increasing

attractiveness of *irregular* methods, as well as the increasing availability of *catastrophic* capabilities.

Even where adversaries possess considerable capacity in *traditional* domains, they often seek to reinforce their position with *catastrophic*, *irregular*, and *disruptive* methods and capabilities. Therefore, some strictly *traditional* threats are giving way to hybrid challenges. Effectively contending with these challenges requires the active maintenance of sufficient combat overmatch in key areas of *traditional* military competition.

**Irregular Challenges.** *Irregular* methods of increasing sophistication—including terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and third-party coercion—will challenge U.S. security interests to a greater degree than they have in the past. Our adversaries are likely to exploit a host of *irregular* methods in an attempt to erode U.S. influence, power, and national will over time.

The adverse effects of most *irregular* challenges accrue cumulatively. We can expect opponents employing these methods to take a long-term view. They will not focus on individual battlefield victories, but rather, on the steady erosion of American patience and will over time. They will seek to exact increasing levels of human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States so as to force a strategic retreat from a key region or adopted course of action.

Two factors in particular have intensified the rapid growth and potential danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the erosion of traditional sovereignty. Worldwide political, religious, and ethnic extremism continue to fuel deadly and destabilizing conflicts. Particularly threatening are those extremist ideologies that sanction horrific violence—including the deliberate targeting of civilians and noncombatants.

The erosion of traditional sovereignty and the rapid growth of un-, under-, and ill-governed territory has provided havens for terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and other groups that threaten global security. Many states are unable or unwilling to extend effective control over their territory, thus increasing the areas available to hostile exploitation. This is most prevalent in an "arc of instability" that spans portions of Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and southern and Southeast Asia. *Irregular* challenges in and from these areas will grow more intense over time and are likely to challenge the security of the United States and its partners for the indefinite future.

Our ongoing global war on terrorism and our resulting operational experience call for a reorientation of our military capabilities to contend with these challenges more effectively.

***Catastrophic Challenges.*** A number of state and non-state actors are vigorously seeking to acquire dangerous and destabilizing catastrophic capabilities—particularly weapons of mass destruction. Porous international borders, weak controls over weapons-related materials and expertise, and ongoing revolutions in information technology are increasingly enabling this trend. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, WMD proliferation, and rogue states. Unchecked, this confluence raises the prospect of direct WMD employment against the United States or our partners.

The continuing illicit proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with catastrophic challenges an enduring necessity. A single catastrophic attack against the United States is an unacceptable prospect. The strategic effect of a such an attack transcends the mere economic and social costs of mass destruction. It represents a more fundamental, existential threat to our

nation, our institutions, and our free society. Thus, new emphasis must be applied to capabilities that enable us to dissuade acquisition of catastrophic capabilities, deter their use, and finally, when necessary defeat them prior to their posing direct threats to us and our partners.

***Disruptive Challenges.*** In rare instances, revolutionary technological developments and associated military innovation can change the nature of military competition itself and fundamentally alter our concepts of warfare. In the future, some capable competitors may exploit our perceived vulnerabilities with this type of revolutionary breakthrough. In doing so, they would seek to provide themselves new military options that offset U.S. military advantages in niche areas, and threaten our ability to operate from the strategic commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.

Most such developments will afford opponents only temporary advantage. In a few instances, however, the United States could confront technological breakthroughs that would fundamentally alter our approach to security. These might include breakthrough developments in sensors, information processing, bio-technology, miniaturization, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy, and other emerging fields. Although such breakthroughs are unpredictable, we must be attentive to the consequences that such possibilities hold, and plan and invest accordingly.

## 2. CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS

Fundamental changes within the international system accompany the four security challenges:

- Our alliances and partnerships—a key source of strength—are adapting to meet common challenges.

- Key states are facing important decisions that will affect their strategic position in the world.
- Some rogue states will continue to pose significant long-term challenges, while others will realize that their role actually weakens their security in the long-run.
- A host of new actors—particularly those operating outside of traditional state control—have grown in the aggregate and are increasing their capabilities.

**Allies and Partners.** Our international relationships continue to be a source of America's strength. Shared principles, a common recognition of our security challenges, and a commitment to working together have allowed us and our allies and partners to collectively achieve greater security. Nowhere is this more evident than in our ongoing war on terrorism.

Yet, as our security challenges change, our alliances and partnerships must continue to adapt. Today, our nation and our collective interests are threatened less by the predictable *traditional challenges* of the past, and more by actors possessing and employing *catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive capabilities* and methods. As a result, our key, long-standing relationships in Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere continue to grow in scope and function. In addition, we have broadened our circle of security partners around the world. This growth in our alliances and partnerships must continue apace and stay ahead of those challenges likeliest to threaten our collective interests.

**Key States at Strategic Crossroads.** Several key states face critical decisions about their roles in global and regional politics, economics, and security. These decisions have the potential to change their strategic positions in the world and their relationships with the United States. Their uncertain paths present us with significant opportunities but

also potential challenges. On one hand, we may be able to engage with them and assist them toward more favorable political change. On the other, should more adverse political and security circumstances prevail, some key states could evolve into capable regional competitors.

In particular, given requisite levels of investment over time, some states—particularly rising great powers—could eventually pose significant future *traditional* or *disruptive* challenges. They may ultimately generate the capacity to directly threaten the United States, rival us in key areas of military and technological competition, and hold a number of our interests at risk by pursuing dominance over key regions. In other cases, if adverse economic, political, and demographic trends continue, currently functioning and capable states could become dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable, thus presenting the United States and its partners with enormous future *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* challenges.

We remain attentive to a possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition and the potential dangerous destabilization of large, capable states in the future. However, recent developments in large states like Russia, China, and India create strategic opportunities and encourage hope for the future of freedom and democracy. As the National Security Strategy states, "Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war."

**Persistent Rogue State Threats.** Rogue states differ from one another in important ways. Yet each shares a number of common attributes. Foremost, these states reject basic human values. The elites of these countries squander national resources to benefit ruling cliques, foreign extremist clients, or their

armed forces; they disregard the demands of international law; and they serially violate international agreements. In addition, many seek WMD or other advanced military capabilities to coerce and intimidate neighbors, extort concessions, or offset key weaknesses. Some sponsor terrorists' activities and provide them safe haven. The most capable among these rogues—those possessing or close to possessing WMD—could collude with extremist actors and present the United States with unprecedented security challenges.

Nonetheless, there is reason for hope. Some rogue actors may recognize that their security is best assured by rejoining the community of responsible nations—demonstrated by positive developments in Libya.

**New Actors of Strategic Significance.** The United States can no longer merely counter the military capabilities of our state competitors to guarantee security. Indeed, the attacks of September 2001 and subsequent experiences indicate that fundamental threats to security emanate from a variety of both state and non-state sources. Therefore, our security will depend increasingly upon our ability to contend not only with threatening states but also with a range of challenges that operate outside the control of states. A diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals will pose significant irregular and catastrophic challenges to the United States and its interests well into the future. Further, these actors are increasingly likely to undermine the legitimate governance of some key states and exploit un-, under-, or ill-governed areas as sanctuaries.

### 3. ASSUMPTIONS FRAMING THE STRATEGY

The following broad assumptions about the security environment inform this strategy:

- The United States faces an extended period of persistent conflict—largely irregular and potentially catastrophic in character.
- The United States will not face a peer military competitor over the next decade; however, some prospective adversaries will continue to improve and adapt their military capabilities and may pose much broader traditional or disruptive challenges.
- Status quo conditions in some key regions and among some peoples are inherently unstable. Rapidly growing populations, the globalization of extremist ideas, inequitable development, increasing disaffection, and continued inadequate or irresponsible governance will contribute to rising instability and violence.
- Some friendly states will come under pressure from actors hostile to U.S. interests and could, under adverse circumstances, develop into rogue, criminal, or ungovernable entities. Likewise, some currently hostile states may choose courses more conducive to responsible international behavior.
- Un-, under-, and ill-governed areas will continue to generate grave security problems requiring U.S. and international involvement and, at times, military intervention.
- The grave danger resident in many irregular and catastrophic challenges portends the need for an activist approach to issues like proliferation and effective governance.
- Bringing about durable, favorable change in crisis regions will require new competencies and expanded capacities within the U.S. government and the international community.
- The United States will retain strong and expanding alliances and partnerships in a number of regions around the world.

- There is increasing diversity in the international community in gauging the severity of particular challenges. This diversity indicates that achieving past levels of collective involvement in the resolution of some security issues will be more problematic in the future.

- Europe will remain largely at peace and will continue to seek to define its role in global affairs. However, Europe will also be vulnerable to *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges emanating from outside the region.

- The most significant current and future *traditional* and *disruptive* challenges likely reside in or will emanate from Asia.

- The most significant current and future *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges likely reside in or will emanate from the Middle East, South Asia, and Southwest Asia.

- A combination of *irregular* challenges will continue to destabilize key states, undermine effective governance, and increase the likelihood of one or more significant failed or failing states in the Americas, Africa or the Middle East.



The challenges confronting us, combined with changing international relationships and the assumptions outlined here, indicate that we will face a period of uncertainty and instability well into the future. This calls for a strategic approach designed to endure through adversity, accommodate change, and exploit opportunity. Thus, these themes, combined with requisite flexibility and adaptability, should inform implementation of the *National Defense Strategy* across the Department.

## 11. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

Our strategy seeks to create those security conditions conducive to a stable international order that supports freedom, democracy, and opportunity. We support an environment characterized by responsible and representative government; the peaceful, favorable resolution of regional disputes; open and competitive markets; and the protection and extension of effective sovereignty.

Cold War defense strategy was predicated on maintaining a stable and predictable status quo. Indeed, for the majority of the previous half century, American strategy focused on containing Soviet influence and expansionism in critical regions—certainly not on producing far-reaching and fundamental political change. We deliberately equated the status quo, for good reason, with that degree of stability necessary for the prevention of war between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Today, our strategic circumstances are notably different. We live in an historic era of unprecedented American advantage and opportunity, yet, also of unique vulnerability. It is one where we face both a diverse set of gathering challenges and possess an unrivaled capacity to do something about them. These factors point to the need for a bold and principled strategy to secure the United States, its partners, and its interests.

A growing international consensus is emerging on the need for fundamental and favorable change to those adverse security conditions that today and in the future will produce grave common dangers. Uncertainty and an inherently destabilizing status quo in some regions indicate that our strategic approach to security can no longer rely on reacting only to manifest threats. We and our

allies cannot sit idly as terrorists plot against our citizens. Therefore, we must endeavor to defend ourselves before terrorists and their supporters are able to act on their designs. When called upon by the President to do so, we aim both to eliminate such threats and to bring about favorable, lasting change to preclude the development of like threats in the future.

The United States is fighting a complex and multifaceted war. Military operations are central to victory in this war, but so too is the effective employment of other elements of national power. Successes in the near-term are critical, but this conflict likely will persist for decades. In the end, while the United States can accomplish much by itself, we depend on the cooperation of allies and partners to effect meaningful change and remove the root sources of terrorist violence. This is especially the case in the Middle East where the United States and its partners are actively pursuing fundamental change today. The President has explicitly rejected the notion of sustaining the status quo in that vital region.

We are proceeding from this principle today, as the nation fights a global war against terrorism. Further, it will be imperative that we maintain this focus into the indefinite future. The nation's role in bringing about positive change argues for undertaking an active, forward strategy focused on defending human freedom, democracy, and opportunity while helping to develop a broader, more secure, and enduring peace around the world.

Our *National Defense Strategy* articulates objectives we seek to achieve; the actions we will take to accomplish our objectives; and finally, the underlying guidelines informing the strategy's implementation.

### A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Four defense objectives will focus and organize all of the Department's efforts.

**1. Secure the United States from direct attack.** The sudden attacks of 2001 crystallized our appreciation of the challenges confronting us. From that moment, we were transformed into a nation at war for the long term. The enemy is a complex network of actors, united by common strategic goals and employing largely *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* means to attack us. They seek to undermine our international relationships, erode our influence, and impose their own extremist views on civilized societies. This realization established a new strategic imperative for the United States.

*We will counter — early and at a safe distance — those who seek to harm the United States.*

**2. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** The United States cannot impact that which it cannot reach or influence. Securing the nation's strategic access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons — international waters and airspace, space, and cyberspace — underwrites the security, prosperity, and well-being of the American people and guarantees maximum freedom of action. At the same time, securing access to these diverse strategic domains supports the broader security and prosperity of our partners around the world. Finally, our assuring the universal, open, and peaceful use of critical lines of communication and the global commons supports the broader security of both the international economic system and key regions.

*We will underwrite the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States, its partners, and the wider international community by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.*

**3. Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with challenges.** Bringing about a broad, stable, and secure order —

founded on responsible government and the exercise of effective sovereignty — is only possible through collective action. Thus, the United States relies on its allies and partners to help establish and maintain the wider peace, bring about favorable and durable change to the international order, and sustain the global influence and freedom of action we all collectively enjoy.

Toward these ends, we are adapting and expanding our international partnerships. Though forged during the Cold War, our traditional partnerships around the world are as valuable today as when they were formed. However, if we are to succeed in bringing about fundamental change to the security dynamics in key regions we must look to expand our partnerships.

Adequately addressing the security challenges of the future will require adaptable security relationships — combining both traditional and non-traditional partners and partnerships. This includes helping others become individually and collectively more capable of contending with common security challenges.

*We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.*

**4. Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.** The United States supports a stable and secure international order that favors freedom, democracy, and opportunity. Therefore, we will not tolerate overt aggression or coercion targeted at our international partners or interests. Further, we will not sit idly while effective, responsible governance or wider security in key regions are actively undermined by irresponsible leadership, dangerous instability, extremism, corruption, or criminal behavior.

The United States values its friendships and thus, the collective security of its friends.

Therefore, our foremost priority toward this end is our continued commitment to the security of our allies and friends around the world. However, our collective, long-term security interests cannot be achieved without bringing about a stable and secure order—founded on responsible government and the exercise of effective sovereignty in those regions likeliest to harbor the most dangerous security challenges. Achieving this broader mandate hinges on bringing about fundamental and enduring change to those security conditions that, left unchecked, will generate dangerous common security challenges now and in the future.

We cannot achieve this objective alone, nor can we do so everywhere at once. Thus, with our finite resources we must confront the most dangerous and compelling challenges first. Most frequently, the Department helps accomplish this objective through targeted bilateral and multilateral security cooperation activities—often in collaboration with other elements of the United States government. However, given more demanding, dangerous and urgent threats to us, our partners, or our interests, the establishment of favorable security conditions may require direct intervention and collective military action.

*We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international order by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a broad, stable, and secure peace.*

**B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES**

Four key activities will focus our efforts around the world.

**1. Assure allies and friends.** For more than half a century, U.S. defense policy and military activities around the world underscored the nation's commitment to our allies and partners. We demonstrated our commitment during the Cold War by sharing

risks with our allies and physically assisting in their defense against possible Soviet aggression. Now, in light of the new challenges we face, we must assure a larger, growing, and more diverse community of allies and friends of that same enduring commitment to their security. Our supporting security cooperation activities will help reinforce the nation's deep and abiding commitment to **adapt and** expand our traditional **partnerships to** contend with emerging **challenges** of common concern, as well as **build new security** relationships to cope with **ever-changing** strategic circumstances.

*We will assure allies and friends by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and protect common interests.*

**2. Dissuade adversaries.** It is critical that the United States guarantee its future military freedom of action by limiting the strategic options available to future opponents. We can shape future security competition in advantageous ways by operating forward with transformational concepts and capabilities. Particularly important is dissuading military competition in advanced traditional or disruptive capabilities, as well as dissuading would-be opponents from adopting catastrophic or irregular methods to offset our recognized superiority in traditional forms of warfare.

*We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions by refocusing our key military advantages.*

**3. Deter aggression and counter coercion.** The dramatic events of the last few years underscore the requirement that the United States continue to actively deter aggression and counter coercion emanating from a range of potential hostile actors. Effective deterrence demands a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach. It rests on our

recognized, unmatched capacity and will to defeat adversaries' attacks, deny their objectives, dominate them at any level of potential escalation; and, finally, hold at risk that which they value most.

*We will deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the resolve to use them.*

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seek to bring about more fundamental, far-reaching change.

ture our capabilities to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations. Bringing such operations to a favorable and decisive conclusion demands that we use military and non-military actions to limit a hostile actors strategic freedom of action, deny them their ideological base of support, defeat their organized resistance, and establish security conditions conducive to a broad, stable, and secure peace. For the Department, this will entail a range of military activities from major combat operations against capable, organized opponents to the potential for extended stability operations — including combat operations of varying intensity. The global war on terrorism illustrates this expanded conception of defeat. Our actions in the global war on terrorism are undertaken explicitly recognizing that attacking terrorist capabilities and physically defending the homeland alone will not produce strategic success. The comprehensive defeat of

terrorists with global reach has required that we:

- Disrupt and destroy terrorist networks capable of threatening the United States and its allies;
- Protect the homeland against further catastrophic attacks; and simultaneously,
- Actively combat extremist ideologies with mpelling ideas

Each of these efforts focuses on denying terrorists access to and the utility of the resources they value most: leadership, safe haven, weapons, finances, ideological and moral support, foot soldiers, and finally, exploitable targets. From a strategic perspective, the ideological struggle is the critical front in this war. Largely prosecuted outside the De own government, this aspect of the war on terrorism seeks to: make terrorism universally illegitimate, undermine terrorist recruiting and indoctrination, promote successful models of moderation to combat extremism, and finally, work to change ad institutions, and people among key populations.

Another aspect of the war on terrorism is denying terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda, access to catastrophic capabilities and their means of delivery. Such capabilities in irresponsible hands pose an unacceptable threat to the United States and its partners. Denying terrorists' access to WMD will include coercive and non-coercive measures. These include both the physical interdiction of prohibited materials and technologies, as well as preventive military actions when we are threatened. We also will strengthen our non-proliferation efforts in diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance — as exemplified by the President's Proliferation Security Initiative.

defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing – setting the conditions for future security.

**C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES**

Four guidelines will structure our strategic planning and decision making.

**1. Active Defense-In-Depth.** Our first priority must be the defeat of direct threats to the United States—whenever possible, before they become manifest. Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks with no warning. Therefore, we can no longer rely on a reactive or defensive posture alone. Allowing opponents to strike first—particularly in an era of proliferation and catastrophic terrorism—is unacceptable. Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges at a distance, before they are allowed to fully mature.

This active approach to defense planning is predicated on seizing the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity—assuring, dissuading, deterring, defeating—and affords us the greatest strategic freedom of action. To contend with the most compelling circumstances, it layers the nation’s defense capabilities, providing both redundancy and choice in deciding the time, place, and manner of defeat of those who would do us incalculable harm.

Prevention is a critical component of an active, defense-in-depth. Preventive actions include activities like routine security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, targeted peace operations, and certain non-proliferation initiatives—including the active interception of illicit WMD transiting the commons. When directed by the President, preventive actions might also entail significant military operations. Under the most dangerous and

the preemptive use of force.

In crises, preventive action might involve the

capabilities to prevent increased tensions from becoming open hostilities or to help defend or restore a collapsing friendly government. Those preventative measures intended to preempt a devastating attack might involve disabling or destroying WMD in the possession of terrorists or rogue states, or striking time-sensitive terrorist targets capable of supporting direct attacks against the United States or its interests.

Our international partners are critical to our active, defense-in-depth. As indicated earlier, the United States cannot establish a favorable international order alone. Thus, among the key goals of the National Security Strategy is working with other nations to resolve regional crises and conflicts. In some cases, U.S. forces will be in a supporting role, lending assistance to others when our unique capabilities are needed. In other cases, U.S. forces will be supported by allies assuming critical roles.

The final layer of an active defense-in-depth is the physical defense of the homeland. At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department will undertake military missions at home to defend the United States, its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. In emergency circumstances, we will act quickly to provide unique capabilities to other federal agencies when required by circumstances or when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian responders. Under limited and more temporary circumstances, the Department will provide support to other federal agencies for one-time events of limited scope and duration.

We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

2. **Continuous Transformation.** Continuous defense transformation is part of a wider governmental effort chartered by the National Security Strategy to “transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.” Recent experience and lessons learned, as well as an assessment of persistent and emerging challenges guide our broad defense transformation. Just as our challenges will change continuously over time, so too must our mix of military capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend our key advantages and reduce our vulnerabilities in the face of an ever-changing strategic environment. Thus, transformation must focus both on contending with persistent and emerging security challenges and seizing opportunities created by changes in strategic circumstances. Defense transformation must proceed from the recognition that we are a nation at war, and we will be contending with persistent—but adaptive — challenges for some time to come.

Transformation is not about technological advance alone. Rather, it is about changing the way we think about our challenges and opportunities, adapting the defense establishment to that enlightened perspective, and refocusing our capabilities to meet the challenges we must confront versus those we are currently most prepared to meet.

Transformation should charter continuous, broad adaptation to new strategic circumstances, yet it is too often narrowly associated with offsetting future high-technology challenges with our own advanced technologies. Future challenges will span the continuum of catastrophic, irregular, disruptive, and traditional capabilities and methods. Thus, our continuous defense transformation needs to span this same continuum.

Making difficult choices lies at the heart of our transformation efforts. Not every capability we possess is relevant to the challenges of the future. Likewise, we currently are not fully prepared to contend with all the challenges we foresee. Therefore, one key in our transformation decision making will be the rigorous determination of the relationship between the current value of future capabilities and the future value of current capabilities.

War presents both real constraints and important opportunities for accelerating change and cultivating a culture of innovation. The global war on terrorism also imparts an urgency to defense transformation: we must transform to win the current war.

The Department has made some progress toward transformation. However, despite success to date, we still face irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and advanced traditional challenges that demand a program of continuous, aggressive adaptation and change.

*We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.*

3. **Capabilities-Based Approach.**

Capabilities-based planning and operations focus more on how adversaries challenge us than on whom those particular adversaries might be or where exactly we may have to contend with them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess and employ to effectively contend with an uncertain future. It seeks to center U.S. defense initiatives on reorienting our portfolio of military capabilities, linking them to joint operating concepts and functional capabilities across the broadest range of possible scenarios.

This approach represents the threat as the broad continuum of challenges addressed in Section I—not a single discrete threat actor. In the past, threat-based planning tended to result in quantitative planning solutions associated with narrowly defined and highly scripted scenarios. It was a program- and platform-centric approach to planning. Capabilities-based planning starts from a more fundamental departure point by first identifying desired effects to be generated and objectives to be achieved. It then derives the requisite military capabilities needed to achieve those effects and objectives, and identifies the best means for infusing those capabilities into the force.

Like the institutionalization of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in the 1960s, the introduction and evolution of capabilities-based approach will be a long-term process. It will directly support the management of risks by the senior Defense leaders, revealing strategy-driven tradeoffs among cost, time, and military capability. Such an approach will be focused on achieving the key operational capabilities to be discussed in Section III. It will enable senior leaders to identify and assess the highly complex issues and decisions faced by the Department. Precisely because of the benefits of a capabilities-based approach, we will employ it as a foundation for Department-wide planning.

*We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing persistent and emerging challenges—setting priorities among competing capabilities.*

**4. Managing Risks.** Effectively managing a variety of complex defense risks is central to operationalizing the *National Defense Strategy*. The Department takes a comprehensive, strategic approach to integrated risk assessment and management. This approach demands that difficult, deliberate risk choices be made in defense planning.

Our approach to decision making will assess the likelihood of a variety of risk-sensitive consequences associated with particular strategic choices. Among the most notable of these is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive costs in pursuit of the strategic, operational, or management objectives imbedded within the strategy and its execution. Our approach explicitly recognizes that ~~some objectives~~, though desirable, may not be attainable and others may not always be worth the human, material, financial, or strategic political costs associated with achieving them. Managing risks, once they are clearly identified, entails weighing their relative importance and making deliberate choices to accept, directly reduce, or indirectly mitigate them.

The integrated assessment and management of risks enables the Department to achieve its principal objectives more effectively. It allows for the continuous assessment and prudent adjustment of Department priorities relative to the risks involved. The defense risk framework established in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the Department's vehicle for risk assessment and management and will be used for all reports and other correspondence dealing with risk matters. It focuses on the key areas critical for the evaluation of the size, shape, posture, commitment, and management of the force relative to the objectives of the *National Defense Strategy*. This framework reflects the lessons of the 1990s and the uneven success of the Department during that period in balancing strategy, force structure, and resources. It further allows the Department to consider tradeoffs between objectives and resource constraints.

In the 2001 QDR, the Department established a risk framework consisting of four dimensions: *operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional*. This framework serves as the basis for assessing and managing risks in areas that are central to contending with the range of challenges

today and extending U.S. advantages into the future.

By assessing and managing risks within and across these four dimensions, the Department can directly address the critical issues entailed in developing a more effective operational force, key enabling capabilities, and supporting infrastructure. In detail, the four dimensions of risk are the following:

- **Force management**—Those risks associated with the Department’s ability to manage its military forces as they fulfill the myriad missions associated with this strategy. Its primary concern is recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping a ready force and sustaining that readiness to achieve the objectives of the strategy within force planning parameters.
- **Operational**—Those risks most directly associated with the current force executing this strategy within acceptable human, material, financial, and strategic political costs. This entails assessing a full range of likely near-term contingencies and operations versus the array of *current traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges*.
- **Future challenges**—Those risks associated with the Department fulfilling this strategy within acceptable costs over the long-term. This entails assessing the development of future capabilities and operational concepts to assure allies, dissuade competition – across the spectrum of challenges – deter direct future threats, and if necessary, decisively defeat the range of future opponents.
- **Institutional**—Those risks associated with development of new command, management, and business practices and controls to efficiently use finite resources and promote the effective operation of the Defense establishment.

These four dimensions of **risk** cannot be assessed and managed independently, as choices in one area will have effects on others. Instead, to manage **risks** effectively, the Department will make deliberate **risk** choices within and across each broad category — maintaining a strategy-driven balance among them. Constant assessment and management will ensure that the most appropriate risk **balance** is adopted over time.

*We will consider the full range of risk associated with resources and operations to manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.*

Ours is an age of instability, uncertainty, and peril. Yet, also one of enormous opportunity. Unlike our actions during the Cold War, the maintenance of a stable but adverse status quo will no longer suffice. Therefore, this strategy seeks to set the strategic conditions necessary for a favorable and enduring international order founded on responsible government and effective sovereignty. The Department sets the requisite conditions by redressing, when summoned, those adverse security circumstances likeliest to threaten the broader peace.

## 11. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES

Our strategy demands capabilities and attributes that enable our forces to contend effectively with our most pressing challenges today and at the same time extend the advantages that allow us to do so in the future.

For our strategy to be viable and sustainable, it needs to be supported by capabilities and attributes that contend effectively with persistent and emerging challenges while extending relevant current and future advantages. These dual purposes cannot be achieved without a continuing commitment to the maintenance of a quality joint force. Foremost, we remain committed to our people—both uniformed and civilian. In addition, the Department continues to drive the force toward increasing levels of joint competency and capability—our principle advantages in warfighting.

Our goal is not to be dominant in all areas of military capability, but to possess those military capabilities that allow us to prudently reduce our vulnerabilities while consolidating and fortifying key warfighting advantages. This mandates careful evaluation of those areas where we seek to reduce risks as well as the identification of those other areas where we are prepared to accept greater risk in light of new challenges. There are three areas where we will strategically leverage our advantages while simultaneously reducing vulnerabilities:

- Developing and sustaining key operational capabilities;
- Shaping and sizing our forces to meet the near- and mid-term needs of this Strategy; and,
- Strengthening our global defense posture to contend effectively with new strategic

circumstances, as well as the range of persistent and emerging challenges.

### A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The four security challenges addressed in Section I, either alone, but more dangerously in combination, require transformation of our operational capabilities. The eight operational capabilities discussed below provide an transformation focus for the Department:

**1. Strengthening intelligence.** A strong intelligence capacity underpins efforts across the Department to improve operational capabilities, support strategy, planning, and programming decisions; and inform the Department's risk management efforts. Critical defense intelligence objectives include:

• **Early Warning.** The most important aspect of strengthening intelligence is improving capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical level that enhance our ability to provide decision makers adequate early warning on the imminent development or employment of catastrophic capabilities by state and non-state actors. It is equally critical that intelligence is able to anticipate and assess complex irregular and disruptive challenges in sufficient time to enable adaptation in our joint capabilities.

• **Delivering Exact Intelligence for Military Operations.** To improve support to intelligence consumers, the Department will transform Defense Human Intelligence, counterintelligence, and related capabilities. Programmed transformation efforts will support organizational and process changes necessary to increase capabilities relating to intelligence collection efforts, shift from a collector-centric to a mission-centric frame of reference, and incorporate competitive analysis to anticipate adversary behavior. Emphasis will be on predictive vice reactive

analysis, including a dedicated effort to evaluate and understand future advanced *traditional and disruptive* challenges.

- **Horizontal Integration.** Horizontal integration of intelligence capabilities across the Department and the broader intelligence community will enable us to responsively acquire, synchronize, correlate, and deliver critical intelligence of all types to the decision makers responsible for executing the *National Defense Strategy*.

*We will strengthen our intelligence capabilities across the national security community to better support our strategic, operational, and resource planning and decision making.*

**2. Protecting critical bases of operation,**  
 The capability to protect critical bases of operation is central to U.S. defense strategy—it helps underwrite our political and military freedom of action, reassures the American people and our partners, and enables the timely generation and deployment of military forces worldwide. Protecting the United States from catastrophic attack is the foremost responsibility of the Joint Force in this regard. Thus, it is our first priority in realizing this capability. Securing our critical bases of operation starts with adequate actionable intelligence and strategic warning, but will only be fully realized when we have the ability to defeat the spectrum of challenges to our critical bases before they are able to fully mature.

Future adversaries will attempt to threaten our homeland or our international partners with a range of *traditional, catastrophic, irregular,* and perhaps *disruptive* methods and capabilities. We can identify some of the more obvious of these, including ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD. However, others—more akin to 9/11 or subsequent bombings overseas—may be more prevalent for the foreseeable future. Thus, we will need to strengthen direct defenses against

these persistent and emerging challenges, even as we develop new capabilities to defeat them at a distance.

*We will protect critical bases of operation, including, most importantly, the U.S. homeland, against the range of persistent and emerging challenges.*

**3. Operating from the commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.** The ability of our military to operate in and from the global commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is an essential component to realizing the President’s vision for a safer and better world. The ability to leverage the commons is essential to our projecting power from critical bases of operation into crisis regions at the time, place, and manner of our choosing. It allows us on a more routine basis to assure allies, dissuade potential foes, and deter adversaries. Our superiority throughout the commons has a stabilizing influence in key regions as well. Finally, our ability to operate unimpeded in and from the commons is a critical component in the direct defense of the United States and its partners.

Control of the battlespace broadly— including unimpeded access to and use of the commons—provides the force with the operational freedom of action needed for warfighting success. For example, our military reliance on maritime superiority has been unquestioned for some time. However, the potential adverse consequences of effective future advanced *traditional or disruptive* challenges to U.S. maritime operations are so significant that we must continue to guarantee our long-term advantages in this arena.

Similarly, air and space power will remain important for enabling future joint and combined operations. The profound impact of space capabilities, in particular, on military operations has become increasingly evident. As the nation’s reliance on space-based

systems continues to grow, we must guard against new potential vulnerabilities. A key objective for us, therefore, is not only to ensure our access to and use of space for military purposes, but also to deny an adversary's hostile exploitation of space.

Finally, the emergence of cyberspace as a new theater of conflict has necessitated the transformation of information operations (IO) into a core military competency on par with air, ground, maritime, and special operations. For example, our military operations depend on the Department's ability to protect our information infrastructure and assure the security of the data that flows across it. This increased dependence on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities that potential adversaries may seek to exploit using *disruptive* capabilities and methods. Additionally, an adversary's use of information networks and technologies creates opportunities for our forces to conduct operationally and politically discriminate IO against them when appropriate. Maturing IO into a core military competency will involve a fundamental shift in the Department's processes, policies, and culture.

*We will operate in and from the commons by enhancing our ability to overcome challenges to our global maritime, air, space, and cyberspace operations.*

**4. Projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments.** Our capability to project and sustain military power in distant anti-access environments is central to supporting our role in the world. Fully realizing the capacity to do so is first predicated on our ability to protect our own critical bases of operation, as well as leverage the strategic commons to decisive advantage. The security of key regions and stability of allies and friends is supported by our forces' ability to project military power and prosecute effective military operations — often at strategic distances. Future

adversaries understand the importance of this capability and likely will seek to deny or thwart those advantages that enable us to rapidly project military power into crisis regions. Thus, it is essential that we continue to develop innovative approaches to overcome these challenges.

Future anti-access challenges could come from a variety of advanced and legacy capabilities employed by a diverse array of potential adversaries. Saturation with WMD of overseas bases and ports arriving via cruise or ballistic missile or surreptitious delivery might effectively delay or disrupt our access in some crises. In the littorals, anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, high-speed small boats, and advanced mines might hinder the timely and effective employment of our maritime forces. In addition, regional opponents could employ space assets, over-the-horizon radars, and low-observable unmanned aerial vehicles for wide-area surveillance, tracking, and targeting of our forces. In the future, these advanced but traditional capabilities might be combined with truly disruptive technologies to further diminish our ability to project power effectively into a crisis region.

Some opponents may use less technologically sophisticated — but potentially no less effective — capabilities and methods to directly deny the United States strategic access to particular regions or intimidate friendly governments to do so. Their options are numerous. They might involve capabilities and methods ranging from the innovative employment of legacy systems, like shoulder fired surface to air missiles, to the threat of traditional military or irregular attacks that seek to exact unacceptable costs on or undermine the legitimate authority of friendly governments cooperating with the United States.

*We will project and sustain our forces in distant anti-access environments in the face of a continuum of persistent and emerging challenges.*

**5. Denying enemies sanctuary.** Adversaries will continue to secure their own critical bases by exploiting strategic depth to their advantage—including sanctuary in ungoverned territory. The more we are able to hold an adversary's bases of operation at risk the more likely we are to limit their strategic options. Doing so demands the capability to surge military forces rapidly from strategic distances into any region of the world to effect swift and decisive results in future military conflicts. Thus, a key focus of this strategy is to develop the capability to deny sanctuary to any potential adversary wherever they might seek refuge.

In some cases, denying sanctuary may involve discrete attacks by special operations or precision strike capabilities on targets deep inside an adversary's territory. In other instances, this may require the comprehensive defeat of significant *irregular* or *traditional* threats operating in and from ungoverned sanctuary with sustained, decisive combat operations. Denying sanctuary likely will require the development of robust capabilities to conduct persistent and precise surveillance, precision strike, operational maneuver from strategic distances, and sustained joint military operations at varying operational depths—in and from austere geographic locations. Such capabilities will be needed to detect, locate, track, and destroy individual terrorist targets anywhere in the world; attack an adversary's military capabilities in remote locations; and finally, when necessary, permanently deny ungoverned sanctuary by assisting partner nations in the restoration of effective, responsible government.

*We will deny our enemies sanctuary by conducting a range of effective military activities and operations in and from austere geographic locations and at varying operational depths.*

**6. Conducting network-centric operations.** Our ability to bring decisive capabilities to

bear will increasingly rely on our capacity to harness, exploit, and protect our advantages in the realm of information. Rapidly advancing information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces. Recent operations in the global war on terrorism have reinforced the need for joint, interoperable command, control, communications, computing and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. They have further underscored the asymmetric advantage that timely, accurate, relevant information provides our forces. Network-centric operational capability is generated by developing compatible systems, consumer-friendly data, and agile operational constructs. Effective application of network-centric operations enables rapid and decisive campaigns.

Beyond battlefield applications, the Department's transformation to a network-centric force will advance our ability to transparently manage risk across all four risk dimensions. It holds the potential for increasing efficiency and effectiveness across defense operations, intelligence functions, and business processes by enabling all users access to the latest, most relevant, most accurate information. Network-centric operations also will enable reach-back by more effectively employing people and capabilities without deploying them forward in crisis regions.

Transforming to a network-centric force requires a fundamental shift in processes, policy, and culture. By implementing such a fundamental shift, the Department can achieve the speed, accuracy and quality of decision-making that will ensure our military capabilities meet the full spectrum of future security challenges.

*We will conduct network-centric operations with compatible information and communications systems, consumer-friendly data, and agile operational constructs.*

**7. Improving proficiency for irregular warfare.** We will continue to face the challenges of *irregular* warfare under a variety of very complex circumstances throughout the coming decades. These challenges will transcend theaters and persistently manifest themselves across a diverse array of likely contingencies. Separately or in combination with the other challenges, the *irregular* challenge places unique demands on the force.

We must be able to employ the appropriate capabilities to counter *irregular* opponents under complex operational circumstances—and to sustain such operations over significant periods of time. Doing so will require forces capable of quickly foreclosing the options of *irregular* adversaries, denying their strategic and operational objectives, tracking and locating small groups and high-value individuals, comprehensively and decisively defeating these opponents, and finally, rapidly establishing and maintaining security conditions conducive to favorable conflict resolution. Accomplishing all of these operational tasks requires a degree of flexibility and adaptability not yet present across our current force. Success will also necessitate changes in our current capabilities, organizations, doctrine, concepts, and culture.

A decade of operational experience—including the global war on terrorism—indicates that past conceptions of “general purpose forces” are of limited applicability to the full array of challenges we will face. Future U.S. forces must be more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable. In particular, our forces must be better prepared for contending with persistent *irregular* challenges involving complex political, social, and security problems.

Warfighters must be capable of rapidly and effectively transitioning from one military activity to another—combat and non-combat—and back again should

circumstances change unexpectedly in an area of operations. Success under these circumstances may require extended stability operations—including substantial combat action, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and reconstruction. Today, these operations place unique stresses on specific components of the force and will require more comprehensive joint and total force solutions in the future.

*We will improve our ability to contend with irregular challenges by developing more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable forces.*

**8. Increasing capabilities of partners—international and domestic.** None of our strategic objectives is ultimately attainable without the decisive assistance of capable partners at home and abroad.

Abroad, the United States has been transforming its international security relationships. Further, it has been developing new partnerships, to effectively confront the continuum of challenges that confront us in a new century. As we reorient our own military capabilities to help underwrite those relationships, we also seek to improve the capabilities of current and future coalition partners, as well as harmonize those capabilities with our own.

One of the principal vehicles for strengthening our alliances and partnerships is our focused program of security cooperation. Security Cooperation serves to harmonize our thinking with that of our partners on key strategic issues and helps to strengthen key relationships by:

- Identifying areas where our common interests would be served better by partners playing leading roles;
- Encouraging partners to improve their capability to operate in coalition with our forces, as well as their willingness to do so;

- Reducing impediments to cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense across the range of matters; and finally,
- Spurring the military transformation of key allies through initiatives like joint, combined training and education; combined concept development and experimentation; development of interoperability standards; information sharing; and combined command and control.

Security cooperation is also a primary vehicle for building expanded global capacities to meet common security challenges. The President's *National Security Strategy* called for the United States to invest time and resources to build international relationships and institutions to help manage local crises when they emerge. Toward that end, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with other Departments within the U.S. government, aims to increase international capacity to conduct successful peace operations worldwide. Currently, well-trained and rapidly deployable military units for peace operations are in short supply. Therefore, the United States and its partners seek to expand the ready supply of international forces available for peace operations by better defining the roles and contributions required of potential contributing nations.

The role of enhanced partner capabilities is central to those strategic actions intended to dissuade future military competition as well. Advanced military exercises, particularly multi-national experimentation, can be decisive in this effort. They demonstrate to would-be competitors that potentially destabilizing capabilities will be ineffective versus a U.S.-led coalition possessing advanced, complementary capabilities intended to counter them.

At home, we are seeking ways to increase the capabilities of our domestic partners—local,

state, and federal. In order to better secure the United States from direct attack, the Department seeks to forge effective partnerships with domestic agencies that, in the event of significant irregular and catastrophic attacks against the homeland, are charged with point defense, security, and consequence management. In doing so, we seek to improve their ability to respond to these challenges effectively, while freeing up our own unique capabilities to focus on the early defeat of these challenges at a safe distance abroad.

Likewise, we seek to bolster the capabilities of civilian interagency and international partners to assist in bringing lasting and durable resolutions to complex crises overseas. In particular, the Department seeks to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to undertake those non-core post-combat, stabilization, and reconstruction tasks that currently remain military responsibilities. Our intent is not to divest from post-combat responsibilities, but rather, to focus our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing and maintaining the security conditions that enable more comprehensive and lasting conflict resolution.

*We will assist our international and domestic partners in increasing their capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.*

## B. ATTRIBUTES

### I. Shape and Size of Military Forces

The Department's force-planning construct shapes, sizes, and globally postures U.S. military forces to:\*

\* Four key concepts inform this approach.

- Homeland Defense activities represent the employment of unique military capabilities at home—at varying levels—to contend with those circumstances described at the conclusion of Section II, C., 1.

- Defend the U.S. homeland;
- Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion;
- Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in one of the two; and
- Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.

These force planning precepts help guide the Department in determining the needed mix of capabilities required in the force. Further, they are intended to inform decisions on the force's overall size, posture, patterns of

- Campaigns to "swiftly defeat" the efforts of adversaries are undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary's unacceptable behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary's operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. "Swiftly defeating" adversary efforts could include a range of military activities—from stability operations to major combat that will vary substantially in size and duration. Examples of "swift defeat" campaigns include *Operation(s) Desert Storm* and *Allied Force*.
- Campaigns to "win decisively" are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They likely entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations, require regime change, defense, or restoration; and will include significant investments of the nation's resources and time. "Win decisive" campaigns will vary significantly in size and scope but will be among the most taxing scenarios. Examples of conclusive campaigns include *Operation(s) Just Cause* and *Iraqi Freedom*.
- Lesser Contingency Operations are undertaken to resolve or ameliorate a particular set of crisis circumstances and typically describe operations much more limited in duration and scope than those undertaken in conjunction with the more substantial undertakings outlined above. These operations include military activities like shows of force, strikes and raids, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Lesser contingency operations range in size from major undertakings like *Operation(s) Restore Hope* or *Provide Comfort* to the much smaller, episodic dispatch of U.S. forces around the world to contend with a variety of emergency conditions.

activity, readiness, and capacity to surge globally to meet required demands.

This force-planning framework is not focused upon specific types of conflicts, but rather is intended to provide a model for the capabilities required to adapt and contend with a broad range of scenarios. Rigorous analysis must determine the force requirements for the most likely, dangerous, and demanding circumstances. Assessments of the adequacy of U.S. capabilities will examine the breadth and depth of this construct, and not seek to optimize for any one area. Detailed assessment based on these principles will enable informed decisions on the specific size and shape of U.S. forces by highlighting areas where the Department might accept prudent risk, as well as those areas where risk might be reduced.

Importantly, the shape, size, and global posture of U.S. forces guided by this construct provide the capabilities needed to conduct the global war on terrorism. The global war on terrorism is integrated across the breadth of the construct. In the end, all U.S. military operations in the war on terrorism help to assure allies, dissuade competition in key areas, deter adversaries, and defeat both state and non-state opponents.

**Defend the homeland.** U.S. military forces must be able to defend the United States and its territory from direct attack. The need for an active, defense-in-depth, able to disrupt and defeat capable and diverse threats as far from our shores and allied territory as possible, is perhaps the critical component of sizing and shaping today. Tightly linking actions to provide for the direct defense of the homeland against external threats with activities of the overseas combatant commands to identify and interdict such threats before they can strike is the sine-qua-non of our nation's security.

**Operate in and from four forward regions.**

Our force planning construct calls for tailored forces, which are primarily rotational, to operate forward in and from four forward regions—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. These forces are complemented by capabilities for prompt global action to assure allies and friends, dissuade military competition, and finally, deter and counter aggression and coercion.

In particular, effective forward deterrence requires adaptable forces that can respond to crises at their outset to manage escalation on our terms and eliminate threats at a safe distance. Such forces are complemented by immediately employable global strike, special operations, and information operations capabilities that provide additional military options for preventing and deterring attacks.

This does not imply that the United States does not or will not undertake a range of defense activities—including military operations—in other regions. Rather, it recognizes that the bulk of our forward presence is concentrated in four regions from which the United States can prosecute military operations worldwide.

**Swiftly defeat adversaries.** We will remain uncertain about where threats might become manifest and what adversaries might challenge us or our allies. Therefore, we will improve our ability to surge globally when needed to rapidly seize the initiative and swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns. This capability will also ensure that a large percentage of our force can surge anywhere in the world to achieve objectives in widely dispersed theaters.

Our operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforces the need for forces capable of rapidly and decisively foreclosing an adversary's options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting

the security conditions for an enduring post-conflict peace. Achieving these results requires the ability to transition one of two more limited military campaigns to a campaign that seeks more enduring results and to sustain operations in both over time. It also requires a force properly balanced and postured for rapid deployment and employment.

Extended missions likely will include large-scale stability operations that entail substantial combat below the threshold of major combat operations. Also, the rapid and decisive defeat of adversaries requires the ability to integrate fully other instruments of national power from across the U.S. Government and to leverage contributions of coalition partners.

**Conduct lesser contingencies.** The global nature of American interests may require our armed forces to perform a limited number of lesser contingency operations, perhaps for extended periods of time. Such operations may help prevent conflict by establishing and sustaining stable, secure conditions in key regions. Lesser contingencies also include smaller-scale, but high-intensity combat operations such as strikes and raids against state and non-state actors. Because lesser contingencies place demands on forces that are similar in kind, though not in scale, to the needs of the more demanding military campaigns outlined above, the Department will monitor closely the degree and nature of its involvement in lesser contingencies to be able to properly balance force management and operational risks.

**2. Global Defense Posture**

While our nation already has embarked on transforming its network of overseas alliances and partnerships and its military capabilities, it also must transform its global defense posture to better address new challenges. U.S. national security is closely linked to the security of our global partners.

The forward posture of our military capabilities and our demonstrated ability to bring force to bear to meet common security challenges are the most visible and tangible signals of American commitment to our friends around the world.

During the 1990s, our forces remained concentrated primarily in their Cold War locations, from which they have had to be deployed to deal with crises elsewhere. These deployments, along with operations in the global war on terrorism, underline the fact that we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; rather, their purpose is to project power rapidly into near or distant theaters. Such precepts, combined with rapid advances in technology, new concepts of operation, and lessons learned in recent operations, are driving a comprehensive, strategy-driven realignment of all aspects of U.S. global defense posture.

As the President stated, "A fully transformed and strengthened overseas force posture will underscore the commitment of the United States to effective collective action in the common cause of peace and liberty." Force posture changes seek primarily to strengthen our ability to meet security commitments more effectively in this new strategic landscape. As we do so, we will be guided by the following considerations:

- Developing flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not concentrating military forces in a few locations;
- Encouraging transformation in allied roles and capabilities and developing supported/supporting relationships with allies;
- Focusing within and across regions by complementing tailored regional military presence and activities with capabilities for prompt global military action;

- Developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight in place; and,
- Focusing on capabilities, not numbers by reinforcing the premise that the United States does not need specific numbers of platforms or personnel in various administrative regions to be able to execute its security commitments effectively.

Foremost, changes in global posture will both require and result in strong bilateral and multilateral relationships with partner nations around the world. Changes in posture aim to strengthen our commitment to collective action. We also will cultivate new relationships founded on common security interests. These relationships will both enhance our mutual security, as well as enable greater access to a number of new locations around the world. Our international agreements with both traditional and new partners must permit flexibility and freedom of action for US forces.

We need to invest ourselves in a process that guarantees the maintenance of strong and diverse international partnerships well into the future. Doing so will enable a flexible and adaptable global defense posture capable of contending with uncertainty and supporting an array of diverse military activities worldwide.

**Key changes to global defense posture.**

These considerations are driving changes to U.S. global defense posture in all of its five elements: facilities, activities, global sourcing and surge, and prepositioned equipment and material.

**Facilities.** A network of forward projection hubs and main operating bases, mainly in the four critical regions, provides the United States with unmatched ability to conduct a variety of missions worldwide. However, the destructive power of terrorists and rogue

states, and their willingness to unleash this power against U.S. and allied interests, place a high premium on even more rapid military action.

We require greater flexibility to move into and through strategic pivot points and remote locations. We also require a broader more diverse array of forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and associated access arrangements to strengthen operational flexibility. Such sites and arrangements generally should not require a permanent combat presence, but only a modest support staff or reliance on host-nation support for logistics. They will be focal points for combined training with host nations, and will have an ability to expand and contract based on operational needs. Joint sea-basing concepts also hold promise for contributing to the broader transformation of our overseas military footprint.

**Activities.** Advances in speed, lethality, stealth, and information sharing mean that our forces are significantly more capable than were equivalent-sized units in the recent past. We can realize efficiencies in numbers of forward-stationed personnel while increasing the actual combined and joint military capabilities we can bring to bear in a crisis. In addition, a declining emphasis on forces designed to fight in place points to an increasingly rotational joint presence for U.S. forces in forward locations, and consequently, relatively fewer forces permanently stationed abroad. The size and character of physical presence and the character of our military activities in a given region will shift—subject to strategic and operational demands worldwide.

Joint presence around the world will be managed dynamically to ensure that the full benefits that the military services' capabilities provide can be employed to greatest effect. In cases where the United States can lower its forward presence while maintaining or increasing its overall military

capabilities, it will do so to minimize operational exposure, points of social and political friction, and the overall impact on host nations.

**Global sourcing and surge.** To best tailor presence to operational needs, the Department is transitioning to a global force management process with the ability to surge a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed worldwide. This management process helps provide the most responsive and appropriate capabilities at the time and place of need, regardless of their theater of stationing. Under the process of global sourcing and surge, Combatant Commanders no longer "own" forces in their theaters. Such a process provides comprehensive insight into the global availability of U.S. forces, accounting for ongoing operations and constantly changing unit availability, as well as an assessment of the impact and risks associated with global sourcing.

Closely tied to the concept of global sourcing is the ability to position "early entry" capabilities forward for rapid action, while relying on surge capacity from the United States or other theaters to provide more robust, follow-on forces. In this manner, the United States can simultaneously maintain an economy of force; keep its state-of-the-art, transformational capabilities forward for combined training, security cooperation, and operational purposes; and provide tangible evidence of our continuing commitment to our alliance obligations.

**Prepositioned equipment and materiel.** Greater reliance on joint prepositioned equipment and materiel for training and operational purposes is critical to an increasingly rotation and expeditionary presence. A significant lesson from operations during the past decade is the need for more widespread prepositioning of support materiel – rather than simply combat equipment and munitions – in critical regions and along key transportation routes. Further,

due to its inherent flexibility and mobility, afloat prepositioning can prove especially valuable in a strategic environment that features uncertainty and the likelihood of strategic surprise. We can no longer afford to view prepositioned equipment and material with a single service mindset. Rather, as in all other aspects of the Department's transformation, prepositioning, too, must increasingly take on a greater degree of "jointness."

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Realizing the key capabilities and attributes outlined above will enable us to effectively seize opportunities and contend, on our terms, with persistent and emerging challenges. Our strategy is tailored to contend with uncertainty and create those favorable circumstances that contribute to a broad, stable, and enduring peace. Our key capabilities and attributes must complement this effort. They must conform to the demands of the environment while remaining adaptable to contend with future change.

February 20, 2004  
703

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Reuben Jeffery  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Installation Commander in Baghdad

*TRAY*

Here is a memo from Mick Kicklighter. He thinks we need an Installation Commander to manage the footprint in Baghdad.

Why not get your head into it and give me a recommendation one way or the other?

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/13/04 Kicklighter memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
021904-1

.....  
Please respond by 2/26/04

OSD 09657-04

*20 2/26/04*

✓  
2/20

13 February 2004

Office of the DoD Iraqi Transition Team


MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Iraq Trip Report

1. Ambassador Frank Ricciardone and I had a very productive trip to Iraq from January 30<sup>th</sup> to February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2004.
2. The troops and other personnel we saw in Iraq were magnificent, as you know better than most.
3. We are working to schedule a meeting to debrief you on our trip.
4. Even in advance of our debriefing, we urge you to consider the following two recommendations that would help greatly improve current operations and facilitate a good handoff to State:
  - a. Assign a Headquarters Commandant/Installation Commander to integrate the Palace/Green Zone requirements, including billeting, dining, security, etc. The Installation Commander would stay beyond transition.
  - b. Assign a strong CPA Chief of Staff to crosswalk issues, integrate the staff and set staff priorities. The Chief of Staff would stay through the establishment of a US Mission and hand off tasks to a State Deputy Chief of Mission/Chargé in a phased manner during the transition.
  - c. The Department of State concurs with these recommendations.
5. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss our trip with you.

1 WAG

15 Feb 04

VR,  
  
 Claude M. Kicklighter

2 Feb 04

OSD 09657-04

22/12  
42



INTELLIGENCE

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

ACTION MEMO

(7)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SECURITY) *Call 8 Feb 04*

SUBJECT: US Army Investigations of Detainee Deaths and Abuse

383, 6

- This memorandum was prepared to update the Secretary concerning Army investigations of detainee deaths and abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq. An initial memorandum on Army investigations of detainee deaths was provided in December 2003 (TAB A).
- The U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) investigates the death of any detainee who dies in Army custody. Detainees can be considered in two groupings. Those who are in custody on a military compound and those who are stopped for questioning or another reason off compound. The USACIDC does not receive all information on abuse investigations conducted by unit commanders. The following relates to investigations of detainee abuse on a military compound.
- **DEATHS:** The USACIDC has initiated investigations into the deaths of fourteen detainees in Iraq (11) and Afghanistan (3).
  - o Deaths occurred during the period December 2002 to January 2004.
  - o In six deaths, autopsies were not conducted and the bodies were released to the families so further forensic investigation was not possible. Cause of death was listed as "undetermined." Investigations continue; but without forensic evidence from an autopsy, complete resolution is unlikely.

11 Feb 04

Prepared by: Windell Courson, (b)(6)

OSD 09659-04

- o In some of the fourteen deaths, investigations indicate physical maltreatment may have been a factor. A synopsis of each case is at **TAB B**.
  
- **ABUSE:** The USACIDC has ten investigations into alleged detainee abuse. Six involve physical assault and mistreatment of detainees, two involve the discharge of a weapon in proximity to detainees and two involve sexual assault as well as physical assault of detainees. A synopsis of each case is at **TAB C**.
  
- The aggregate 40 personnel presently under investigation by USACIDC include members of both reserve and active units of the Army, and one Other Government Agency (OGA) civilian contractor. The civilian contractor is being investigated by his organization's Inspector General and the Department of Justice, with assistance from USACIDC. The incident previously reported as potentially involving members of a Navy Seal Team has been determined to involve Army Special Forces personnel instead. The potential number of personnel under investigation could increase as additional subjects are identified.
  - Eleven are military intelligence interrogators
  - Twenty-two are military policemen, seven of which are reservists
  - Six are enlisted soldiers other than military intelligence or military police
  - One is an **OGA** civilian contractor
  
- o To date USACIDC has not discovered criminal involvement at the command level.
  
- HQ USACIDC currently has twenty-four off-post investigations. They are predominantly larceny and physical assault investigations.

Prepared by: Windell Courson, (b)(6)

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- **All of these matters are under active criminal investigation. Information related to these matters is law enforcement sensitive, dissemination of which is restricted. Any premature release of case-sensitive information could jeopardize the investigation and follow-on action; if any.**
- A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Paul Butler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Program Support.

COORDINATION: Commander, USACIDC

Prepared by: Windell Courson, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25012

**INFO MEMO**

DEC 23 2003

**FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**THROUGH: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)**

**FROM: DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY)**

**SUBJECT U.S. Army ~~criminal~~ Investigations of Detainee Deaths**

- **The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) is currently investigating the suspicious deaths of seven detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a matter of policy, USACIDC investigates the death of any detainee who dies in Army custody.**
  - **Deaths occurred during the period December 2002 to November 2003.**
  - **In the seven deaths (three in Afghanistan and four in preliminary findings suggest that the physical treatment of the detainees may have been a factor.**
  - **An aggregate of 16 personnel are presently under investigation USACIDC in the seven suspicious deaths. This number includes members of both reserve and active units of the Army, one CIA civilian contractor, and potentially, members of a Navy Seal**
    - **Six are military intelligence interrogators (At least two of these interrogators also are suspects in the October 7, 2003 assault of an Iraqi female prisoner.)**
    - **Eight are military police**
    - **One is an enlisted soldier detention sentry (non-military police)**
    - **One is a CIA civilian contractor**

11-L-0559/OSD/25013

TAB A

- o To date USACIDC has not discovered criminal involvement at the command level in the seven suspicious deaths. Investigation is ongoing.
- An additional five detainee deaths are attributed to heart attacks while in detention. The cause and manner of death in these cases are not yet determined.
- HQ USACIDC will update the Army leadership and the Counterintelligence Field Activity on subsequent developments
- All of these matters are under active criminal investigation. All information related to these matters is law enforcement sensitive, dissemination of which is restricted. Any premature release of case-sensitive information could jeopardize the investigation and follow-on action, if any.

**COORDINATION: HQ USACIDC.**

## SYNOPSIS OF WRONGFUL DEATH INVESTIGATIONS

- o On 4 December 2002, at the Bagram Detention Facility, Afghanistan, Mr. Ullah died while in US custody. **An** autopsy determined Ullah had suffered blunt force trauma, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) classified the death as a homicide. Investigation thus far has indicated three active **duty** enlisted Military Intelligence Soldiers and three United States **Army** Reserve enlisted **MP** Soldiers were involved at various times in assaulting and mistreating Mr. Ullah. Investigation is continuing with recent reinterviews of the Military Intelligence personnel **now** at Fort Bragg (Soldiers were redeployed from Iraq) and scheduled reinterviews of the reserve Military Policemen in Ohio and surrounding states (unit since demobilized) (0134-02-CID369).
- On 10 December 2002, also at the Bagram Detention Facility, Mr. Dilawar died while in custody. An autopsy determined **Mr. Dilawar** had suffered blunt force trauma, and the AFIP classified the death as a homicide. Investigation thus far has indicated five enlisted Military Intelligence Soldiers and four enlisted MP Soldiers were involved at various times in assaulting **and** mistreating Dilawar. Investigation is continuing with recent reinterviews of the Military Intelligence personnel **now** at Fort Bragg (Soldiers were redeployed from Iraq) and scheduled reinterviews of the reserve Military Policemen in Ohio and surrounding states (unit since demobilized) (0137-02-CID369).
- On 13 June 2003, at the Baghdad International ~~Airport~~ detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in **US** custody. **An** autopsy determined he died of a subdural hematoma to the head. Subdural hematomas are normally the result of a hard, fast blow. AFIP's preliminary classification of the manner of death was homicide. Investigation continues (0031-03-CID899).
- o **On** 21 June 2003, at a detention facility at the Asadabad Fire Base, Afghanistan, **an** Afghani detainee died while in **US** Army custody. Testimony from various Soldiers identified a civilian employee of **an** Other Governmental Agency (OGA) **as** being responsible for physically assaulting the detainee prior to his death. Investigation continues by the OGA's IG and the Department of Justice with CID assistance (0094-03-CID369).
- On 3 August 2003, at the Camp Cropper detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in US custody, no autopsy was conducted, and the body released for burial. The manner of death is currently classified **as** "undetermined" but since no forensic examination of the body was conducted, no greater clarity as to the cause of death is expected (0025-03-CID919).
- On 10, 13, & 20 August 2003, and again on 3 November 2003, all at the Camp Cropper detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in US custody,

no autopsy was conducted, and the body released for burial. The manner of death in each instance is currently classified as "undetermined" but since no forensic examination of the bodies was conducted, no **greater clarity as to the cause of death is expected** (0139-03-CID259, 0140-03-CID259, 0147-03-CID259 & 0235-03-CID259).

- On 11 September 2003, at the Forward Operating Base Packhorse detention facility, an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. **An** enlisted Soldier while on guard duty, failed to follow the ROE and shot the detainee who was throwing rocks. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action. **This Soldier was reduced to E-1 and administratively discharged in lieu of trial by court-martial** (0149-03-CID469).
- On 4 November 2003, at the Abu Ghurayb detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. The detainee died during an interview process by OGA and Army Special Forces personnel. Allegedly, the detainee also resisted arrest and had to be physically restrained. A previous account of this investigation indicated involvement of a Navy Seal Team. That account was not accurate. **Investigation continues** (0237-03-CID259).
- **On** 26 November 2003, at the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment detention facility in Iraq, an Iraqi detainee and former Army Major General, died while in US custody. Testimony from various Soldiers indicated local national interviews of the detainee on 24 and 25 November 2003, had involved physical assaults. On 26 November 2003, the detainee died while undergoing "stress technique" interrogation by MI Soldiers. Evidence of blunt force trauma was present on the body. **Investigation continues** (0027-03-CID679).
- On 9 December 2003, at the 2d Brigade detention facility in Mosul, an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. No autopsy was conducted, the body did not exhibit signs of abuse or foul play, and Criminal Investigation Division currently classifies the death **as** "undetermined" with no greater clarity **as** to the cause of death expected. **Investigation continues** (0140-03-CID389).
- On 9 **January** 2004, Criminal Investigation Division was notified of the suspicious death of an Iraqi detainee. The detainee, a former Iraqi Army Lieutenant Colonel, was taken into custody on **4 January** 2004 and was subsequently placed in an isolation cell and questioned at least two times during ensuing days. **An** examination of the detainee's remains disclosed there was extensive bruising on his upper body. On 11 Jan 04, **an** autopsy was conducted by an Armed Forces Medical Examiner. His preliminary report indicates the cause of death **as** blunt force injuries and asphyxia, with the manner of death listed as homicide. **Investigation continues** (0009-04-CID259).

## DETAINEE ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

- Between 15 April and 1 July 2003, at the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division detention facility in Samarra, Iraq, enlisted members of Detachment B, 223d Military Intelligence Battalion (California National Guard), allegedly physically abused Iraqi detainees during interrogations. According to a statement from one Soldier, the Military Intelligence Soldiers struck and pulled the hair of the detainees, and forced into asphyxiation numerous detainees in an attempt to obtain information. **Investigation continues** (0138-03-CID469).
- On 12 May 2003, at Camp Bucca, Iraq, ten United States Army Reserve (**USAR**) enlisted Military Policemen physically assaulted seven Iraqi detainees during in processing at the facility. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0031-03-CID519). The command initiated court-martial charges against the four Soldiers – all in the 320<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion(USAR). All four Soldiers requested an administrative disposition of their case in lieu of trial by courts-martial. **All four Soldiers were administratively separated from the Army; three of these Soldiers also received nonjudicial punishment.**
- On 12 May 2003, at Camp Bucca, Iraq, an enlisted Soldier fired a shot at the feet of an Iraqi detainee instead of in a safe direction as required by the Rules of Engagement, and the detainee suffered a facial wound as a result. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action. **The command disposition of this case (a PFC) is currently unknown** (0033-03-0519).
- On 20 August 2003, at Forward Operating Base Gunner, Iraq, an Iraqi being detained in US custody was physically assaulted and threatened by a battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel West), three enlisted Soldiers and an interpreter after the detainee refused to provide information. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0152-03-0469). **The enlisted Soldiers received Article 15 punishment; LTC West was relieved of his command and, after an Article 32 hearing, received nonjudicial punishment. He also submitted a request to retire from active duty.**
- On 31 August 2003, at the Battalion Headquarters, 1/36th Infantry, 1st Armored Division, Baghdad, Iraq, an enlisted Soldier committed the offense of assault when he threatened to kill Iraqi detainees in US custody in an attempt to obtain information from them. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0129-03-CID899). **Soldier received nonjudicial punishment.**
- On 1 September 2003, at the Ammunition Collection Point, Baghdad, Iraq, enlisted Soldiers assaulted four Iraqi detainees who were in US custody. The four Iraqis, who were cuffed with their hands behind their backs, were kicked numerous times, and then dragged from the detention area to another area where they were thrown against a wall and assaulted. Case closed and referred to the

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command for appropriate action (0117-03-CID899). **Three Soldiers are pending trial by Summary Court-Martial (a Sergeant First Class, a Staff Sergeant, and a Specialist. A fourth Soldier (Staff Sergeant) is pending a Special Court-Martial. All these cases are expected to be completed this month.**

- On 8 September 2003, at the Tikrit detention facility, an Iraqi detainee alleged he had been physically assaulted and struck repeatedly after being arrested by unknown 4th Infantry Division Soldiers. **Investigation continues** (0174-03-CID469).
- On 7 October 2003, at the Abu Ghurayb detention facility, three active duty male enlisted Soldiers assigned to Company A, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft Bragg, NC allegedly sexually assaulted and threatened a female Iraqi detainee. **Investigation continues** (0216-03-CID259).
- **On** 31 December 2003 during a "knock and search" operation, four Iraqi civilians were detained and guarded by a Military Policeman assigned to the 300<sup>th</sup> Military Police Company. The Military Policeman allegedly "butt stroked" one of the individuals when he refused to stay quiet and placed the muzzle of his M-14 rifle in the mouth of another detainee and "dry fired." He then removed the muzzle, charged the weapon, and fired the weapon into the ground near that detainee. **Investigation continues** (0006-04-CID259).
- **On** 13 January 2004, a Soldier assigned to the Abu Ghuraib Prison guard force provided Criminal Investigation Division an envelope containing a letter and Compact Disc (CD). The letter identified six Military Police guards allegedly involved in abusive acts against detainees. A review of the CD revealed photographs of approximately 10 Military Police Soldiers involved in abusive or degrading acts involving detainees. The acts included male detainees naked in the presence of female Soldiers; female detainees exposing themselves to male Soldiers; detainees performing indecent acts with each other in the presence of Soldiers; and photographs of Soldiers physically assaulting detainees. Most of the pictures appear **as if the** Soldiers are posing for the camera. Preliminary information indicates that a number of the Soldiers interviewed **thus far** have admitted to the acts. Further, a computer belonging to one of the suspects, which allegedly contains additional photographs of abusive acts, **was** seized **as** evidence. **Investigation continues** (0003-04-CID149).

11-L-0559/OSD/25018

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February 20, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 Jim Haynes  
 David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detainee Deaths and Alleged Abuse

I am very concerned about these detainee deaths and alleged abuse. Please stay on top of this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 2/11/04 DUSD (C&S) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
 022004-9

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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*383 to*

*20 Feb 04*

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

*11 Feb 04*

February 8, 2004

TO: ~~Larry Di Rita~~ *Jamie*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Churchill Speech

Please have someone get me a copy of the full text of this speech from the book, *Never Give In!* I want to see the rest of the speech.

Thanks.

Attach.

Churchill, Winston. "The Culture and Glories of the Arab Race" 14 June 1921, House of Commons

DHR:dh  
020804-38 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*350.001*

OSD 09661-04

*5-16-04*

## 'THE CULTURE AND GLORIES OF THE ARAB RACE'

14 June 1921

House of Commons

Even in these early days, Churchill sees the dangers posed by the extremism of Saudi Arabia's Wahabi sect, which in recent decades has been responsible for the spread throughout the Muslim world of thousands of 'madrassas' (religious seminaries) dedicated to the propagation of extremist Muslim fundamentalism, combined with virulent hatred of Western values and culture.

Broadly speaking, there are two policies which can be adopted towards the Arab race. One is the policy of keeping them divided, of discouraging their national aspirations, of setting up administrations of local notables in each particular province or city, and exerting an influence through the jealousies of one tribe against another. That was largely, in many cases, the Turkish policy before the war, and, cynical as it was, it undoubtedly achieved a certain measure of success. The other policy, and the one which, I think, is alone compatible with the sincere fulfilment of the pledges we gave during the war to the Arab race and to the Arab leaders, is an attempt to build up around the ancient capital of Baghdad, in a form friendly to Britain and to her Allies, an Arab State which can revive and embody the old culture and glories of the Arab race, and which, at any rate, will have a full and fair opportunity of doing so if the Arab race shows itself capable of profiting by it. Of these two policies we have definitely chosen the latter.

If you are to endeavour so to shape affairs in the sense of giving satisfaction to Arab nationality, you will, I believe, find that the very best structure around which to build, in fact, the only structure of this kind which is available, is the house and family and following of the Sherif of Mecca. It was King Hussein who, in the crisis of the war, declared war upon the Turks and raised the Arab standard. Around that standard gathered his four capable sons - of whom the Emir Feisal and the Emir Abdulla are the two best known in this country - and many of the principal chiefs and notabilities of the Arab world. With them at our side we fought, and with their aid as a valuable auxiliary Lord Allenby hurled the Turks from Palestine.

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Oblivion and Redemption 1916-29

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Both the Emir Abdulla and the Emir Feisal have great influence in Iraq among the military and also among the religious classes, both Sunni and Shiah. The adherents of the Emir Feisal have sent him an invitation to go to Mesopotamia and present himself to the people and to the assembly which is soon to gather together, and King Hussein has accorded his son permission to accept the invitation. The Emir Abdulla, the elder brother, has renounced his rights and claims. I have caused the Emir Feisal to be informed, in answer to his inquiry, that no obstacle will be placed in the way of his candidature, that he is at liberty to proceed forthwith to Mesopotamia, and that, if he is chosen, he will receive the countenance and support of Great Britain. In consequence, the Emir Feisal has already left Mecca on the 12th of this month, and is now on his journey to Mesopotamia, where he will arrive in about 10 days. We must see how opinion forms itself and what is the view of the National Assembly when it is elected. I cannot attempt to predict the course of events, but I do not hesitate to say that, if the Emir Feisal should be acceptable to the people generally, and to the Assembly, a solution will have been reached which offers, in the opinion of the highest authorities on whom I am relying, the best prospects for a happy and a prosperous outcome.

There has, however, lately arisen in Iraq and particularly in the Province of Basra, a considerable movement in the direction of continuing direct British rule. People always seem to want something different from what is actually being done. When we were giving them direct British rule a few years ago they rebelled against it. Now that we offer them the Arab State which was then demanded so ardently, there is a considerable feeling that perhaps after all British rule will be found to be most stable. It is one of the comparatively few compliments that we have been receiving in this part of the world. I think it reflects very much credit upon Sir Percy Cox that in so short a time he has effected such a considerable change in the public sentiment towards us. But I can hold out no hope that we shall be found willing to continue these direct responsibilities. Our object and our policy is to set up an Arab Government, and to make it take the responsibility, with our aid and our guidance and with an effective measure of our support, until they are strong enough to stand alone, and so to foster the development of their independence as to permit the steady and speedy diminution of our burden. I cannot say in regard to Mesopotamia that there are primary, direct, strategic British interests involved. The defence of India can be better conducted from her own strategic frontier. Mesopotamia is not, like

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Egypt, a place which in a strategic sense is of cardinal importance to our interests, and our policy in Mesopotamia is to reduce our commitments and to extricate ourselves from our burdens while at the same time honourably discharging our obligations and building up a strong and effective Arab Government which will always be the friend of Britain and, I will add, the friend of France.

We are leaning strongly to what I may call the Sherifian solution, both in Mesopotamia, to which the Emir Feisal is proceeding, and in Trans-Jordania, where the Emir Abdulla is now in charge. We are also giving aid and assistance to King Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, whose State and whose finances have been grievously affected by the interruption of the pilgrimage, in which our Mohammedan countrymen are so deeply interested, and which we desire to see resumed. The repercussion of this Sherifian policy upon the other Arab chiefs must be carefully watched. In the vast deserts of Arabia, which stretch eastward and north-eastward from the neighbourhood of Mecca to the Persian Gulf and to the boundaries of Mesopotamia, there dwell the peoples of Nejd, powerful nomadic tribes, at the head of whom the remarkable chief Bin Saud maintains himself. This Arab chief has long been in a state of warfare, raid, and reprisal with King Hussein and with his neighbours generally. A large number of Bin Saud's followers belong to the Wahabi sect, a form of Mohammedanism which bears, roughly speaking, the same relation to orthodox Islam as the most militant form of Calvinism would have borne to Rome in the fiercest times of the religious wars. The Wahabis profess a life of exceeding austerity, and what they practise themselves they rigorously enforce on others. They hold it as an article of duty, as well as of faith, to kill all who do not share their opinions and to make slaves of their wives and children. Women have been put to death in Wahabi villages for simply appearing in the streets. It is a penal offence to wear a silk garment. Men have been killed for smoking a cigarette, and as for the crime of alcohol, the most energetic supporter of the temperance cause in this country falls far behind them. Austere, intolerant, well-armed, and bloodthirsty, in their own regions the Wahabis are a distinct factor which must be taken into account, and they have been, and still are, very dangerous to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and to the whole institution of the pilgrimage, in which our Indian fellow-subjects are so deeply concerned.

The Emir Bin Saud has shown himself capable of leading and, within considerable limits, of controlling these formidable sectaries.

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In reply refer to EF-8402 & 04/001628

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
SUBJECT: Croatia in NATO

Answer 7

Larry Di Rita  
3/1

SecDef

Croatia

How do we do something to show that Croatia is a candidate for NATO? I don't know enough about the process. Why don't you get on the phone with Nick Burns.

They need to say something about the door remaining open for Croatia or possibly Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. Let's find out how we do it. I believe him when he says it would make his task a lot easier to get public support.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-39 (ts computer).doc

✓ 3/19  
C3/2

Please respond by 3/1/04

SIR:

- NICK BURNS PROMISED TO GET US A NOTE ON THIS ISSUE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK.
- ATTACHED IS PREVIOUS LANGUAGE ON NATO'S "OPEN DOOR" POLICY FROM THE 2002 PRAGUE SUMMIT DECLARATION AND THE 1999 WASHINGTON SUMMIT DECLARATION.
- WE'LL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL IDEAS ONCE WE RECEIVE NICK'S SUGGESTIONS.

OSD 09662-04

- IAN BRZEZINSKI

875004

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on CPA

*020 CPA*

I need a meeting with Kicklighter and Reuben Jeffery. The question is: does he think he is just supposed to follow up on the assessment teams, does he think he is in charge of the back office for CPA, or does he think he also has the responsibility to see that the transition to State takes place?

Let's get the Jones briefing first, and then have Kicklighter there. Then let's figure out what Kicklighter is supposed to be doing and make sure he is doing it.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-21

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

*020 CPA*

OSD 09663-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Doug Feith  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Croatian PM

Croatia

How do we go ahead and push with State the idea of getting the Croatian Prime Minister an invitation to Washington?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-41 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

2 FEB 04

OSD 09664-04

February 8, 2004

OS  
3/B

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congresswoman Sanchez

060.715D

I think I better get Congresswoman Sanchez to lunch sometime, possibly with Ike Skelton or Duncan Hunter.

Please analyze her statement from the hearing, and take each piece, isolate it out and put down the correct answer. We can sit down and walk her through it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-42 (ts computer).doc

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*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

8 FEB 04

OSD 09665-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Dov Zakheim  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Budget Question

110.01

We got asked a question in the House hearing as I recall where you and I looked at the numbers, and it turns out that we had cut the budget. I think somebody said we should take money out of missile defense and add it back. Was it chemical warfare?

Let's **look** into it and figure out how that happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-43 (1s computer).doc



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

8 Feb 04

OSD 09666-04

February 8, 2004

✓  
3/9

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Statement

IRAA

Ike Skelton said something about not rushing out and separating something from security. I think he used the word "Indian territory" and that people were attempting to foment civil strife.

I would like to see that in the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-44 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09667-04

8 Feb 04

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LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

February 10, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake regarding Ike Skelton Statement

- Pursuant to your request of 8 February, attached is Congressman Ike Skelton's opening statement and a follow-up comment from your February 4 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.

Attachment:  
Snowflake # 020804-44

Attachment:  
As Stated

OSD 09667-04

10 Feb 04

8 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25116

## House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on FY 2005 Department of Defense Budget

SKELTON:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Secretary, welcome back. It's good to see you. I'm sure you've gotten the fill of this room already today, as I understand it.

And General Pace, Mr. Zakhcim, thank you.

And I see Dr. Chu here. We thank them very much for being with us.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have just returned from my second trip to Iraq and my first trip to Afghanistan about 48 hours ago. The impression that remains is again one of tremendous pride in our amazing American soldiers, just amazing.

The morale is high, and each are doing so very much every day to bring stability to those nations. And we just can't thank them enough. And I think, Mr. Secretary, you should know that.

We're facing real dangers, however. And I'm convinced, from my being there and talking with so many people, we will not be ready for transfer of the sovereignty by June the 30th.

We must not let our own timetable determine the future.

Rather, we should -- in my opinion, Mr. Secretary -- turn over the sovereignty when there is a stable and viable government and an adopted constitution, a stable security environment, fully restored services.

If we rush to judgment, rush to progress, I think -- and I hope I'm dead wrong -- I think there is a likelihood of a civil war among the Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds that could spiral out of control. And I'm very concerned about this.

SKELTON:

And I give you my best thought on this from talking with a lot of folks over there, having met with some of the governing council. In particular, I had a very interesting conversation with a Kurdish leader. And I don't say what I said lightly, Mr. Secretary.

Our efforts should be helped in Iraq by getting NATO involved, as they are in Afghanistan -- actually more so. The alliance would diminish the perception that this is primarily an American operation, while alleviating the burden on our troops.

Our partners in Europe have an interest in a strong and secure Iraq, even more so than we. NATO has certainly helped in Afghanistan, around the Kabul area and up in the Northeast corner. And they seems to be making progress under the NATO umbrella.

And the Taliban, the Al Qaida are security challenges as continues, and I think that we have to continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

I'd like to turn for a moment, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to the president's defense budget request. I applaud the increase it puts toward our national security and the funding, including the pay raise that is included for our troops.

But let me spell out a couple of concerns, if I may.

The budget does not account for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that these have been ongoing for some time. And while I recognize it's very difficult to predict precise costs, our track record to date must give us some estimate, at least I think, of what we're likely to spend.

Also, the overall budget increases of \$26.4 billion, I applaud it. But I also see that the Army increased only \$1.8 billion, although they are carrying the large majority of the mission in Iraq, as well as being deployed in 130 countries. And the soldiers and their families, I think, deserve more of an increase.

In my opinion, the Army, as well as other services, need additional end-strength. And I commend General Schoomaker. He testified here a number of days ago. And I commend him for his efforts in undertaking to find the 30,000 additional soldiers.

I have to tell you, I disagree with his premise. The demand, in my opinion, is not a temporary spike.

SKELTON:

I would ask, Mr. Secretary, for your thoughts on this, in my opinion, extremely serious situation, please.

RUMSFELD:

Congressman Skelton, you have elevated an enormously important issue that is, as you suggested, currently being discussed in Washington, in the coalition countries that have exactly the same circumstance we do. There are 34 countries now with forces in there, and each of them have the same circumstance, the need to make sure that we have the ability to assure the status of our forces.

The decisions as to when sovereignty will pass will be a decision made by the president and the coalition. The target date is June 30th. The theory behind that was that it's a good thing to try to get the Iraqis taking a bigger role in their own lives and to have that responsibility.

No one wants to rush it. On the other hand, the feeling is that to the extent the Iraqi people see the Iraqis governing themselves, they're more likely to have a stake in how that's done and in the future of that.

So the desire has been to have governance move along a track, security move along a track -- and we are now up to 200,000 Iraqi security forces -- and to have the essential services, electricity, water, power and that type, all move along together because each is in one way or another dependent on the other.

RUMSFELD:

The subject of the status of forces agreement is something that's being discussed at the present time. I don't know that there is anything magical about March 31st. Obviously you have to have a timetable, so you set out dates. And to the extent it can be done then, fine.

In the last analysis, nothing would take effect until sovereignty transferred anyway. And so that takes you down to June 30th, or whenever that actually happens, depending on the facts on the ground.

I think your concern about civil strife is realistic. Historically, one looks at that country and we know they have had civil strife. And we also know that there are terrorists who would like to foment civil strife, because it's to their advantage.

Going back, Mr. Secretary, to the testimony in 1995 in this room by the head of the personnel of the army, Lieutenant General Stroup, there was a need for end-strength, according to his testimony then. And we were just going into the Balkans at that time. And we still have, of course, forces in Korea, Germany and the Balkans. And I think we should take a good hard look at the increase in end- strength.

But, Mr. Secretary, I must tell you, I really, really am proud of the young folks in uniform. And I know that you are, as well. I talked to any number of them, had lunch with them, had breakfast with them, talked to them on post. I didn't find a complainer. And they know their duty. And I talked to both active duty, guard and some reserve. You should be very proud of our troops, and I pass that on to you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

\*\*\*\*\*

HUNTER:

General, thank you very much.

And Mr. Secretary, General Pace and all your team, thanks for the great service over the last year. I appreciate your hard work and all the long hours -- we've spent tons of hours on briefings and keeping Congress up to speed as we move through this operation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And Mr. Zakheim, thanks for your patient explanation over many, many months of -- in your shop. We thank you for what you're doing.

And I will reserve my questions and recognize the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

SKELTON:

As all of us know, these are very difficult days for our country and for the challenges that we have. I have a deep concern -- let me speak, Mr. Secretary, about Iraq.

There are two Damocles swords that hang over this situation, and both of them are time tables. One time table is the transfer of sovereignty on June the 30th. The other is the March 31 deadline that's laid out for a status of forces agreement, which give us the guidelines from that moment on as to the limitations and the authorizations of our military in Iraq.

General Abizaid said last week that it's unlikely to get a status of force agreement by June the 30th, much less by the deadline of March the 31st.

The status of force agreement could be -- and I hope it's not -- could be a serious problem, if it limits the rules of engagement and limits our ability to go after the guerrillas in any manner, whatsoever. If it does that, it would put our forces in far more danger than they are now.

Looking to the June 30 transfer of sovereignty, in my opinion, I don't think it can happen by that time. We don't know what type of selection process we will have. And I think as we speak today and yesterday, I think the United Nations is sending a team in to see if what type of selection, elections, caucuses or a combination thereof would work and what could come to pass.

SKELTON:

And we don't know what the constitution will look like. We don't know what type of selection process, election or something like that. We don't know who the candidates may be. We don't know who, of course, will be the government, which as I understand it would be an 18-month government from that election, if I'm correct.

That government would also have the power to undo any status of force agreement that would be made earlier. So I just don't -- I think we may be rushing to judgment on this whole effort.

I do notice the present -- the administration -- let me see if I can get this right, Mr. Secretary: Administration sources say that the president may be willing to postpone Iraqi self-rule as a last resort.

I don't think there's any question about it. That has to be done. This is too serious to rush into something that may not work. If it doesn't work, I think there's a strong possibility of civil war, which no one wants.

And so what we are doing is we are sensitive to the points you've raised. They are terribly important. I can assure you we're not going to leave our forces and nor are the other 33 countries going to leave their forces in a circumstance that is disadvantageous.

SKELTON:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.



February 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Edit Testimony re: Sen. Kennedy

I am going to want to take a look at my testimony and maybe make some edits in it when I see what Ted Kennedy asked me and how I answered. I want to be quite forceful that I never did blame the intelligence community, and he seemed to say I did. I also never went around the intelligence community.

*00.5*

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-45 (ts computer).doc



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 09660-04

*8 Feb 04*

3/4 1400

120

February 8, 2004

C3/8  
3/9

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Correcting Testimony on Numbers

LARRY DI RITA  
3/8

3/6

I want to correct my testimony on the numbers of people in the Active and Reserve components. Those numbers keep moving around on me. We ought to put in the correct numbers in the testimony in the House or Senate, whenever it came up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-54

.....  
Please respond by 2/12/04

OSD 09669-04

2/12/04



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
319

March 4, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 020804-54

- You requested a correction to your HASC and SASC testimony responses on the Active and Reserve component numbers.
- OSD/P&R corrected the Guard and Reserve number as stated on line 235 of the transcript from 747,000 to 876,000 (atch 1).
- The SASC transcript numbers are correct.

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake

4 Feb 04 HASC Hearing Transcript

4  
MAR  
04

OSD 09669-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25125

**STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES**  
Unrevised and Unedited  
Not for Quotation or  
Duplication

FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE  
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM  
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Wednesday, February 4, 2004

House of Representatives,  
Committee on Armed Services,  
Washington, D.C.

**Committee Hearings**

of the

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**



**OFFICE OF THE CLERK**  
Office of Official Reporters

11-L-0559/OSD/25126

225 | year. Force levels, we are allowed to fluctuate above and  
226 | below during the year; and in the case of an emergency we can  
227 | fluctuate substantially as we have. Clearly, if the war on  
228 | terror demands it, we will not hesitate to increase force  
229 | levels even more using the emergency authorities that you  
230 | have already provided.

231 |       But it should give us pause that even a temporary  
232 | increase in our force levels was and remains necessary today.  
233 | Think about it. At this moment we have a pool of 2.6  
234 | million men and women, both Active and Reserve. That is to  
235 | say that 1.4 Active, the <sup>876,000</sup>~~747,000~~ in the Guard and Reserve,  
236 | the additional Individual Ready Reserve brings us up to a  
237 | total pool of about 2.6 million. Yet the deployment of  
238 | 115,000 troops in Iraq has required us to temporarily  
239 | increase the size of the force by 33,000. That suggests  
240 | strongly to me that the real problem may not be the size of  
241 | the force, per se, but rather the way the force is being  
242 | managed and the mix of capabilities that are at our disposal;  
243 | and it suggests that our challenge is considerably more  
244 | complex than simply adding more troops.

245 |       Pete Schoomaker, the new Chief of Staff of the Army,  
246 | compares the problem to a barrel of rainwater. When you have  
247 | a spigot that is near the top and you turn the spigot on, all  
248 | you can draw is the water at the top. If the spigot is at  
249 | the bottom, you can draw the entire rain barrel.

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letters from Students of Kiron Skinner

Here are these letters we received written by students of Kiron Skinner.  
Unfortunately, they date back to November and have not been answered.

Would you please get an answer fast? Kiron Skinner is going to be in town this week for the Defense Policy Board. Please tell her you have them and here is the answer, or else you have them and you will get an answer to her, and that we apologize for the delay.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/19/03 Theories of International Relations students of Kiron Skinner letter to Sec Def  
11/19/03 American Foreign Policy students of Kiron Skinner letter to Sec Def

DHR:dh  
020804-25 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

IRAG

0 FEB 04

OSD 09670-04

# Carnegie Mellon

**International Relations Program**  
Department of History  
Carnegie Mellon University  
Baker Hall 240  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890

November 19, 2003

(b)(6)

Theories of International Relations Class

c/o Professor Kiron Skinner

Carnegie Mellon University

5000 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Via: Hand Delivery

Dear Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:

We, as students of Carnegie Mellon University's Theories of International Relations class, very much appreciate this opportunity to share our thoughts on the situation in Iraq with you. Throughout our study of international relations this semester, American actions in Iraq have set the stage for theory application, discussion, and debate. This semester we have learned to view American foreign policy through many different theories that seek to explain and predict international outcomes. These various theories point to many different solutions, and we have engaged in an ongoing debate concerning America's proper role in Iraq. We would like to share some of our theory-based explorations with you and to conclude with some points upon which the class has reached consensus.

In considering real world applications of these theories, we have frequently analyzed American security and international terrorism. We commend you and the military for the quick and decisive military victory in Iraq. As stated earlier, there are several points upon which the class is in agreement. It is held in agreement that America's goal for remaining in Iraq until stability has been achieved, has been, and continues to be, crucial. America must prevent the country from falling into a state of anarchy and civil war. Theories of social identity have taught us that the differences in ethnic and religious backgrounds in Iraq make this a difficult, but important, task. The issues that affect Iraq also affect the whole region since there is a Muslim majority throughout the Middle East and because the Kurdish population is situated across several international borders in the region. We all realize that we are not privy to as much information as those in the administration that are making foreign policy decisions, but the changing rationales leading up to the war have left us all very uncomfortable. Reports indicating that no weapons of mass destruction or evidence of these weapons have been found despite the fact that reports prior to the war cited such weapons as justification for the war, serves to magnify our concerns. On these points, the class is unified.

Areas of tension within the class surface over the issue of whether we should have gone to Iraq in the first place. While a few of us believe that this was a justified war, most of us believe that this is not the case. This is because many of us feel that there was not a clear message, a clear indication of why we had to do this, of why anyone had to die for it. Many of us have strong suspicions (perhaps based primarily on media accounts that have

not been definitely proven to be true) that people within the administration had motives for going to war that were not fully consistent with national security. We have been skeptical about any connection between Iraq and terrorism or the horrible events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, but seek to be persuaded on the basis of hard evidence. Even here, we know that you are in the very sensitive position of having to hold intelligence in private for broad national security reasons. We would also like to hear more discussion about why the United States chose to liberate the Iraqi people who were under a horrible totalitarian regime, but not others in the world that are in a similar situation, like those living in Rwanda, the Congo, or North Korea. We are concerned about the persistent perception that this was a pre-emptive strike against a sovereign nation without the support and backing of the United Nations. We do not think that there can ever be too much discussion and clarification of these concerns by administration officials. For such discussion and clarification go to the heart of what is good about a democracy like ours, and what makes democracy durable.


On the other side of the debate, those of us that supported the decision to go to war in Iraq recognize that Saddam Hussein was a violent and volatile tyrant who had an extensive track record of flouting United Nations resolutions. We recognize that the war on terror is an extremely complex and difficult task. The war on terror is unlike any other conventional war we have fought. In light of this, we view the Bush administration's actions in Iraq as justified. Additionally, we also feel that this is a war of intentions. If Saddam Hussein had acquired these weapons, the results could have been disastrous. Because he had shown willingness to act in non-normative ways in the past, it is highly

unlikely that he would act responsibly with such power and it is quite probable that he could constitute a real threat to the United States and our allies.

To conclude, while many of us did not support the initial decision to go to war, we are all very concerned about withdrawing from Iraq prematurely. Security has not been assured as of yet, and is unlikely to become a reality without the guidance and expertise of the American military. The continuing instability in Afghanistan reaffirm our belief that we must remain in Iraq until the situation is stable. None of us want to see more American casualties in Iraq or in Afghanistan. We also care deeply about the civilian populations in these countries. They did not ask for war, nor did they contribute to the instigation of these wars. They deserve to have stability, opportunity, and access to the sorts of things that we, as Americans, find necessary such as health care, education, freedom of speech and religion. There is another strong moral rationale for remaining in Iraq until it's stable—we must fulfill our obligation to the Iraqi people. Because of these reasons, we feel that staying in Iraq and building it into a self-sufficient country is more important than partisan haggling over how much it's going to cost in money or in political capital.

Thank you for hearing our views.

Sincerely,



Andres Bermudez, DHT-B

Hann Wauter



re. Neil Gungy

Tara Gussreath

Leigh Zanon

Dana Crook

Amy Jhansari

Case  
John's Ken

M. John W. E

# Carnegie Mellon

November 19, 2003

American Foreign Policy Class  
c/o Professor Kiron Skinner  
Carnegie Mellon University  
5000 Forbes Avenue  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Via: Hand Delivery

International Relations Program  
Department of History  
Carnegie Mellon University  
Baker Hall 240  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890

(b)(6)

Dear Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:

We realize that you have heard a full range of arguments for and against U.S. policy in Iraq. However, as undergraduates in Professor Kiron Skinner's course on American foreign policy, we thought you might appreciate hearing our views about the situation in Iraq.

The events of the next several months will be crucial to the development of a stable, self-governing Iraq. We believe that U.S. economic, military, and political support is critical to developing a new Iraq, a country that enhances peace and cooperation within and outside its borders. Finely-tuned economic, military, and political reforms must be combined with close attention to some of the perspectives about the United States present among the Arab public. It is our perception that the United States wants to be an honest broker in Iraq and throughout the Middle East; however, perceptions of American unilateralism fuel the efforts to undermine American policy in the region. With this in mind, we ask that you indulge our particular take on U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The establishment of a stable, lasting democracy in Iraq is feasible in the long run, but only with some necessary changes in the short term. These will provide a better environment for the development of such a regime, as well as foster key attitudes that will sustain it. There are three basic conditions that should be met:

1. **Involvement of the international community** and an emphasis on international cooperation in all aspects of the reconstruction, especially security and economic development;
2. **The fostering of secular venues** of political discourse and free assembly (separation of religion and state);
3. **The development of a self-sustaining economy.**

There are few, if any, real precedents for international involvement in the creation of a stable democratic state, but actions taken by the UN or with UN support bear the legitimacy of world opinion and democratic consensus, and the significance of this will not be lost on the Iraqi people. We must make the case to the United Nations that it is in the world community's best interest to come to the Iraqis' aid now by providing military peacekeepers as well as civilian diplomats, negotiators, and aid workers as we diminish our military presence. We think that a substantial international presence on the ground will do much to help stop the relentless terrorism seen thus far in post-Saddam Iraq. The international community, including the United Nations, is central to helping the Iraqi Interim Authority in its efforts to bring democracy to Iraq. Hostilities within the country

have undermined the efforts of coalition forces and the Interim Authority. Public opinion is by far the most effective weapon we have against future hostilities. The Iraqi people must see tangible efforts, such as this increased international presence and a greater empowerment of the Interim Authority. We believe that the terrorism against the Interim Authority and the coalition will lose momentum as these efforts are put into place. Such an authority under UN auspices can also be trusted, we hope, to have no conflicts of interest pertaining to economic reconstruction and to the political makeup of the future government. We recognize, though, that any body (a country like the United States or an international institution like the United Nations) responsible for restructuring a country will be open to all manner of criticism, some of which will be unjustified.

Historically, religious fundamentalism has not had as great an influence in Iraq as in its neighbors. Yet most recent political discourse in Iraq has taken place in mosques and been led by clerics. A secular government and freedom of religion, however, are central to forming a stable democracy in the Western style. This is not to say that certain religious values and norms have no place in government, but rather that no specific faith or sect must be either espoused or denounced by government. With religion more deeply ingrained in political tradition in the Middle East than in the United States, there may never be such a 'separation of church and state' to the degree that exists here, but there should at least be enough separation to prevent a fundamentalist, oppressive regime from taking hold.

The creation of a stable, self-sustaining economy in Iraq is also important. History shows that successful democratic nations tend to have a strong middle class and a healthy economy. In some ways, Iraq is unique among Middle Eastern nations because of its historically large, well-educated, relatively affluent middle class. It also has sufficient natural resources to sustain a stable economy. Foreign investment can help revitalize the Iraqi economy, provided such investment abides by international trade and development agreements, so as not to simply drain revenue and resources from the country. We must also encourage and protect local businesses and industries, to let Iraq reap the benefits of its own assets, and to restore a strong middle class.

We think that these steps will lead to a new and vital Iraq, and diminish the widespread perception of American unilateralism.

Thank you for taking the time to hear our views, and we respectfully request that you consider our comments as you forge a new defense policy in these upcoming months.

Sincerely,

ZAVEN GABRIEL  
Ryan Didea  
Fernando Zumburu  
Mark Hays  
Sandy Ellis  
be  
Marissa  
EMME Mayas

Julia Myers  
David Siler  
Kim Wilton  
Jaye Chiu  
Elana Friedland  
David Yank  
Melanie  
Karin  
Nicho Chiang

Leigh Zane  
Brynn  
Kerem Olayud  
Meredith  
Karin  
James  
Shirley

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Eritrea

I just read that piece on Eritrea again. It seems to me we just have to turn the State Department around and have them deal with Eritrea differently. We need Eritrea to cooperate with us in the global war on terrorism.

State is all hung up on some issue about a State Department employee. We have to find out if it is really serious enough that we want to risk losing the relationship with Eritrea and harm our activities with respect to GWOT. I find it tough to believe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-13 (ts computer).doc

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*3/1*

Eritrea

8 Feb 04

OSD 09671-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25138

20

XERO COPY - JDP

9 Feb-0936  
Scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Mike Wynne  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Tanker Deal

*Durnan*  
*4/17*

4521

Apparently Mr. Stonecipher wrote an article saying that when DoD suspended the tanker deal, we only suspended the last 80, not the first 20. That is **not** my understanding.

Please double-check and make sure I am right. If I am right, please make sure somebody tells the world what we actually did, and not what Stonecipher said we did.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020804-11 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

9 Feb 04

OSD 09672-04

21.0.1400

**MEMO TO:** Jaymie Durnan

**DATE:** February 10, 2004

**c c :**

*Durnan*  
*2/17*

Secretary Rumsfeld  
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz  
Acting Under Secretary Mike Wynne  
Larry DiRita

**FROM:**

Dave Patterson

*DA*

**SUBJECT:** Tanker Deal

**Reference:** SD Snowflake, 9 Feb 04, same subject

Jaymie:

When I first became aware of the allegation that Harry Stonecipher may have stated that the tanker deal suspension applied only to the last 80 aircraft, I conferred with Cheryl Irwin in OSD/PA. After some investigation, the statement attributed to Stonecipher was an inaccurate quote by a Seattle-based reporter listening into a scheduled conference call that Boeing has with financial reporters. Boeing does understand that the suspension applies to the whole Tanker Leasing Program (all 100 aircraft).

11-L-0559/OSD/25140

February 8, 2004

TO: David **Chu**  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Unions' Objections

What are all these articles about unions objecting to the Pentagon's labor-management proposal? Here is an example.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Zeller, Shawn. "Unions Object to Pentagon Labor-Management Proposal," *GovExec.com*, February 8, 2004.

DHR:dh  
020804-3 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OS5 09673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25141

4,07

0730

(*Washington Post*)... Dana Milbank

President Bush and Vice President Cheney yesterday said the war in Iraq was justified because Saddam Hussein could have made weapons of mass destruction.

19. **In Rare Talk Show Interview, Bush Defends Decision On War**

(*New York Times*)...Richard W. Stevenson

President Bush said Saturday that he did not want the commission he appointed to be hurried in evaluating prewar intelligence about Iraq's banned weapons, and he said voters would have plenty of opportunity to evaluate the decisions he made about the war even though the commission will not report until nearly five months after Election Day.

20. **Member Of Sept. 11 Panel Praises Interview With Rice**

(*Washington Post*)...Associated Press

The commission reviewing the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks met with President Bush's national security adviser yesterday for an interview one commissioner described as cooperative and productive.

21. **Condi Mav Jilt George**

(*New York Daily News*)...Thomas M. DeFrank

Condoleezza Rice is supposed to be a slam dunk for secretary of state in a second Bush administration. But she may do the unthinkable and just say no. Friends and colleagues of the national security adviser report that the 49-year-old Rice is exhausted, approaching burnout and aching to return to her idyllic previous life as a tenured professor at Stanford.

## DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

22. **Unions Object To Pentagon Labor-Management Proposal**

(*GovExec.com*)...Shawn Zeller

A Defense Department memorandum aimed at kicking off discussions about the pending National Security Personnel System is prompting angry denunciations from labor union officials. Pentagon officials sent the memo to union representatives on Friday explaining the agency's thinking on labor-management relations under the new system.

## ARMY

23. **To Spouses In Iraa. A Video Valentine**

(*Washington Post*)... Vikki Ortiz

...Whitehouse was one of dozens of military spouses who were offered the chance to record video valentines at Fort Meade yesterday during the installation's first National Mamage Week Celebration. The event, held a week before the much-hyped holiday for couples, was organized by the Army post and Anne Arundel County, where it is located, as a way to recognize and comfort those whose spouses are deployed to Iraq and other countries.

24. **Army Starts New Inquiry In Iraa Shooting**

(*UPI.com*)...Mark Benjamin, United Press International

The Army has opened a new inquiry into a wartime shooting in Iraq by a Third Infantry Division battalion commander, eight months after he was exonerated in a separate Army investigation.

25. **Analyst's Report Criticizing Iraa War Draws Flak**

(*Philadelphia Inquirer*)...Andrew Maykuth

The folks at the U.S. Army War College expected that Jeffrey Record's opinions on Iraq might spark some debate, even disagreement. They did not expect a public firestorm. But since Record's essay came to light last month arguing that the Iraq invasion was "unnecessary" and a "detour" from the war on terrorism, the elite military college west of Harrisburg has come under an unaccustomed glare.

## NAVY

26. **Radical Warship Takes Shape**

(*Washington Post*)...Guy Gugliotta

...With its backward-canted bow, its inward-angled hull and its pillbox superstructure, the project the Navy calls DD(X) bears scant resemblance to any surface warship any modern sailor has ever seen. But this new destroyer -- or

February 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld JA  
SUBJECT: Contracts

Iraq

We have to find some way to explain to the world that we don't control contracts out of Iraq, so that people don't think we are doing them damage by not enabling them to get contracts. We would go to jail if we messed around with contracts.

We need to explain it to all of our friends—like Spain, who brought it up at Wehrkunde.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020704-10(ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

Due March 1

9 Feb 04

OSD 09674-04

DA 6/14



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

INFORMATION MEMO

USDP

copy provided  
let 6/10/04

1-04/001602  
EF-8596

Paul Butler

→  
PWB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

JMC 09 JUN 2004

Iraq

SUBJECT: Contracts

- You asked for us to find some way to explain to our Coalition partners that we do not control reconstruction contracts for Iraq, and cannot influence the awarding of contracts beyond determination of eligibility.
- The Coalition Provisional Authority Program Management Office, the State Department, and the Department of Commerce have already addressed this issue through a series of "Subcontracting Outreach Events."
- These road shows/outreach conferences were designed to reach out to Coalition partners worldwide to inform the business community about the contracts in Iraq so that they would better understand the competitive process for subcontracting opportunities.
- These conferences were held between 14 April and 25 May in ten countries.
- Two additional outreach conferences are scheduled to take place on 15 June (Baghdad) and 20 June (Basra).

9 Jun 04

9 Feb 04



February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
CC: Trip Coordinators  
Arlene  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: April NATO-Russia Meeting

**CLOSED**  
**3/16**

Apparently in April there is a NATO-Russia meeting in Norfolk, Virginia. Ivanov wants to know if I am going to attend. If I am going, he will go. I ought to think about doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020704-3 (ts computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/04

*Please guidance into Mira:*  
*- SD to talk to person*  
*mps on 6th*  
*- willing to do a pull*  
*make of Ivanov then*  
*- Inform Ivanov of this*

*3/17*

*2 Feb 2004*

OSD 09675-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25145

February 6, 2004

**TO:** LTG John Craddock

**CC:** Dov Zakheim  
Powell Moore

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

**SUBJECT:** Hearing Books

032

The big hearing book **does** not work well **for me**. It is **useful** for **preparation** beforehand, but I cannot find anything in it during the hearing.

In the future when I testify, we need to develop **an** abbreviated **book** to be used in **the** hearing **room**. I would need a list questions that **those** who are **with** me should **be** ready to handle, and a smaller book for me with backup papers for whatever areas I **am** covering. The hearing book **would** probably be one-tenth the size of the big **book**.

**Thanks.**

DHR:dh  
020504-10 (ts computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

60 Feb 6 04

OSD 09676-04

2/6/04

To: MSG JUDD

From:

(b)(6)

ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE #020504-10  
FOR DISTRIBUTION.

Thanks!

(b)(6)

2/11  
0455

February 5, 2004

...TO: Jaymie Duman  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*  
SUBJECT: Information from Congressman Dingell

*Duman*  
*2/11*

I saw Congressman John Dingell last night at the D-Day event. He said he has a person who has a laser that will take out a SAM missile. He would like to talk to somebody about it.

Please get Ron Segal (if he is the appropriate person) and Powell Moore and set up a phone call today or tomorrow to find out the information. See what we can do to connect the person John Dingell knows with our people, and then in a month tell me what has happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020504-5 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 2/6/04

*cc "RB"*

*✓*  
*2/19*

*(JH)*

*Sir,*  
*Response attached.*  
*vr/cdr Nasir*  
*2/19*

OSD 09677-04



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
2/19

February 10, 2004

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**FROM:** Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

**SUBJECT:** Response to Snowflake regarding Information from Congressman Dingell

- In addition to raising Mr. Ed Schulak's laser with you on Wednesday evening, February 4, Congressman Dingell called me about it late Tuesday, February 3.
- At our request, Dr. Sega's Deputy, Dr. Charles Holland, spoke by phone to Mr. Schulak on Friday, February 6 and discussed the technical features of his advanced C02 laser technology and its potential applications.
- Dr. Holland agreed to review technical materials to be provided by Mr. Schulak in the near future.
- Legislative Affairs previously facilitated a meeting on January 14 between Mr. Schulak and Mr. Jay Kistler, AT&L, on the same subject at the request of Senator Levin's office.
- Mr. Schulak is currently in contact with members of the Air Force Research Laboratory working on counter SAM technology.
- The initial evaluation indicates the technology is not immediately applicable in a counter SAM role due to its lack of power out and wavelength agility.
- When I spoke to Congressman Dingell last week, I promised to report back to him after we put Mr. Schulak in contact with the appropriate Department personnel. I spoke with him this afternoon and he seemed appreciative.

Attachment:  
Snowflake # 020504-5

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, (b)(6)

OSD 09677-04

5-2-04  
5-2-04  
5-2-04

*Call*

February 5, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan  
 CC: Powell Moore  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *PA*  
 SUBJECT: Information from Congressman Dingell

*Durnan  
2/17*

I saw Congressman John Dingell last night at the D-Day event. He said he has a person who has a laser that will take out a SAM missile. He would like to talk to somebody about it.

Please get Ron Sega (if he is the appropriate person) and Powell Moore and set up a phone call today or tomorrow to find out the information. See what we can do to connect the person John Dingell knows with our people, and then in a month tell me what has happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020504-5 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by

2/6/04

*Call me a  
and answer -  
2/25*

*SD:  
~~text~~  
 Powell Moore  
 has spoken w/  
 Dingell + his staff.  
 Ron Sega + Powell are  
 working it. w/ Jaymie*

February 4, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

35009

As I mentioned to you yesterday, I do think you ought to have all the intelligence activities in DoD pull together the lessons learned they have been working on.

Also, please be prepared to assist George Tenet in his lessons learned for the Community and to assist the Commission the President plans to appoint.

Thanks.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

DHR:dh  
020404-7

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/04

DSD/Steve:  
Should you include  
DSB LL?

Thanks,  
*Jaymie*

*?*  
*44*

4  
604

OSD 09678-04

February 4, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita

CC: (b)(6)  
Trip Coordinator

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Armenia

33390

Let's put Armenia on our list of places I might want to go. Apparently Lithuania works closely with Armenia, along with Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020404-1

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

*DR*

OSD 09679-04

February 4, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
*Andy Hochstetler*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ))  
SUBJECT: Lithuania Non-paper

Here is the material the MoD of Lithuania passed to me.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated Lithuania Non-paper: Realignment of the US Global Defense Posture  
CD: Siauliai Air Base

DHR:dh  
020304-11

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

OSD 09680-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25153

**NON-PAPER**

**REALIGNMENT OF THE US GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE:  
POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF LITHUANIA**

Lithuania strongly supports the efforts of the US military transformation of which overseas rebasing is a pivotal element. This timely move will further foster NATO's transformation and reinforce its readiness to cope with today's strategic reality - forces are no longer expected to fight where they are based. Lithuania especially welcomes the US strive to involve the new allies into this process, which will no doubt strengthen the spirit of collectiveness among the allies and the transatlantic link itself.

Appreciating the transparent approach the US adopted in their consultations with the allies, Lithuania is ready and willing to contribute to the projected new American footprint in Europe. Taking into account the primacy of strategic considerations over any narrower local interests in this endeavor, Lithuania deems relevant the following suggestions and proposals to the US rebasing efforts:

- From a strategic standpoint Lithuania enjoys a benign environment in the Baltic Sea region and occupies a convenient position at the crossroads between Western and Northeastern Europe.
- In practice, the territory of Lithuania could serve several important purposes for the new US force posture in Europe. Perceived as an investment into defense-related infrastructure, Lithuania could well serve as a "Cooperative Security Location". Lithuania already has a convenient sea port at Klaipeda and a functioning civilian-military air port at Siauliai ready to provide host nation support, for reception, transit and stationing of friendly forces. With some investment and upgrading of existing facilities, this infrastructure could be used to assist the "rotational presence", movement or periodic operational presence of US troops.
- US and NATO forces could routinely make use of the open land for field exercises. Lithuania already has some appropriate infrastructure installed and running, including training bases, firing ranges, barracks, state-of-the-art tactical training facilities etc. In addition Lithuania can offer relatively low operating costs and highly experienced staff, who have managed a number of international exercises. Lithuania is also anticipating more information on the concept of the NATO Center of Excellence and looks forward to exploring possibilities to establish such a center in Lithuania.
- Lithuania can also offer certain air force assets. Lithuania has been in the process of upgrading the Siauliai airbase infrastructure to NATO standards. It was recently visited and evaluated positively by American experts. The base can serve a wide range of functions: permanent stationing of NATO or US air force assets, temporary air force training, transitory airlift, or standby logistics support with pre-positioned equipment for forward deployments. It does not require any significant investment in any of these cases. In addition, Lithuania can offer an open air space with little civilian air traffic for air force training.

11-L-0559/OSD/25154

U. S. - LITHUANIA ONLY

- Although not directly related to the current plans of the US force rebasing, Lithuania is also observing the debates within the Alliance and is looking forward to collective solutions on missile defense matters. Having fully integrated with NATINEADS, Lithuania will be able to consider the installment of certain missile defense assets. Besides being the most eastern EU and NATO member, Lithuania is in-between some troubled regions and the US as well as other Allies. Due to its location, Lithuania could serve as an early warning site equipped with radar equipment or even interceptors.
- In any of the above cases, US military presence in Lithuania would not turn into a financial burden for the US - Lithuania can provide readily available infrastructure along with appropriate security and logistics arrangements for any potential US presence (facilities, equipment or/and troops)

Lithuania looks forward to further consultations with American experts on the needs and plans of the US future force posture to be able to further refine the proposals advanced in this non-paper and present them in a more elaborate detail.

Possible Lithuanian contributions to the US Global Posture Review are summarized in the table below.

INFRASTRUCTURE	FUNCTIONS	COMMENTS
<b>Airbase at Siauliai</b>	HNS, including reception, transit, stationing of US/ NATO forces	<b>Readily available</b>
	Standby logistics support for forward deployments	
	Air policing functions	
	Air force training	
<b>Missile defense assets</b> (radars and/or interceptors)	Early warning site	Further consultations needed
<b>Training facilities</b> (training grounds, firing ranges, tactical trainers, barracks)	Training of land forces (especially in winter time conditions)	<b>Readily available</b>
<b>Logistics depots</b>	Pre-positioning of equipment for forward deployments	<b>Readily available</b>
<b>Seaport at Klaipeda</b>	HNS, including reception, transit, stationing of US/ NATO naval forces.	Further consultations needed

February 3, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*  
SUBJECT: Releasing Documents

*IRAQ*

Please make sure you get on top of this Bremer memo on releasing documents.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/3/04 Bremer memo to SecDef re: ISG Documents

DHR:dh  
020304-9

.....  
Please respond by 2/10/04

*3 Feb 04*

OSD 09681-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25156





COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

✓ 02/3  
2/3

February 3, 2004

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: L. Paul Bremer III *W 2/3*

SUBJECT: Public Information Program Using Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Documents

Iraq

Recently, the ISG Deputy Director agreed with CPA officials in **principle to allow**, on a case-by-case basis, the release of selected documents to CPA for use in an information program. This is an important decision as **ISG** controls a significant percentage of former regime documents related to human rights atrocities. Access to these documents provides us with a significant opportunity to educate the international community about the **egregious** nature of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime as well as to address the Iraqi peoples' interest in **learning** the whole truth about the former dictatorship.

I intend to **ask** the CJTF-7 and CPA chief spokespersons to travel to Qatar to discuss immediate establishment of a systematic process to give CPA access to ISG-held documents as they become releasable. **As** my Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has access to search for relevant TSG documents through a computerized database, ISG officials and our spokespersons must develop a process for immediate public **release** of particular documents selected. This process would include safeguards to **ensure that** no document is used that would prejudice efforts to build cases for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, raise other legal issues, or adversely affect intelligence operations.

We will **keep** you informed of further developments.

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION	
SECDEF	X
DEPSECDEF	X
JPL ASST	X
EXBCSEC	X
USDP	X
USDI	X
C&D	X
CCD	X
OC	X
RB	X
CPA	X
CABLE CH	
FILE	

3 FEB 04

OSD 09681-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25157

2/18  
1800



2/21

February 3, 2004

TO: (b)(6)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Trip Reports for POTUS

Please go through this file and make sure I have one copy of each of my Presidential trip reports since I started, with a log in the front index, so we can track and make sure they are all there. Put them in chronological order and then give me the file back.

Thanks.

Attach.  
File

DHR:dh  
020304-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

~~Done~~  
DH

333 SD

3 Feb 04

OSD 09682-04

February 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Testimony

032

Since you are going to be at the hearing with me, you are going to have to be prepared to answer the questions on "up-armor" HMMVs, body armor, all of those issues about shortfalls in equipment and whether or not the Guard and Reserve are getting shortchanged vis-à-vis the Active force.

Thanks.

*OB*  
*B/19*

DHR:dh  
020204-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/2/04

2 Feb 04

OSD 09683-04



February 2, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Military Issues

000.7

Attached is a piece of paper Joyce gave me from a meeting she had in Norfolk.

It is pretty clear that one of the toughest problems we have is to see that there are internal communications that are effective.

What process do we have to train people and to monitor and track and see what kind of a job people do in terms of that?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Undated paper

DHR:dh  
020204-16

.....  
*Please respond by 2/20/04* —

000.7

OSD 09684-04

*Don't do me  
of Norfolk  
her year  
I go see*

**Information** ow: The overarching issue is that leadership needs to keep soldiers informed. As much information as reasonable should be put out, and the chain of command should ensure it is disseminated. Then, when information is unknown or can't be passed out later it isn't such an important issue. Soldiers will have learned to trust the leadership.

**Reservist:**

--Activated and prepared, then sat locked on Fort Eustis, little training, not allowed to leave for a month...no details of what was happening until nearly the last minute before deployment.

--While waiting to deploy, and locked down on post, were put in ancient barracks that for much of the time had no toilets or running water.

--Told the unit would return in the Fall, then changed dates, then decided that half the unit would return, half stay until the Spring. Now it appears the unit will finally return to the US (the half of the unit still remaining.)

--Reservists are very uncertain about their return...there are many rumors that the Army will leave them alone a month or so then re-mobilize. High level leadership should do what it can to explain the needs of the Service and what will probably happen.

**Active:**

--Never clear what process was used to tell people what was going on. One of the first units to deploy, then watched exact same units come after and very quickly redeploy to their home stations. (Probably are good reasons...soldier deserve to know.)

--Followed this **up** with many **uncertainties about** final redeployment schedule.

--Pace of operations...some units still in Iraq are being alerted about deployment to other regions such as the Balkans or Afghanistan soon after their return. May be necessary, but doesn't do much for morale.

**All:**

--Telephones...AT&T are gouging the soldiers, often not easy to find, and hard to make connections in the States. Connections, when made, are very poor. Fort Benning operators are being wonderful helping soldiers make connections.

--Environmental leave policy should be stated...let soldiers, officers and enlisted, **know** what the policy is and where they stand.

*Fort Benning*

MEMORANDUM  
January 31, 2004

If there are six or seven 4-stars assigned to Europe, we probably ought to phase that down.

My understanding is you've got the SACEUR, the Deputy UCOM, Giambastiani, Jones, Wald and then one for Army, Navy and Air Force. Apparently the Army NATO person is not always US. Therefore, we end up wanting a 4-star when the US Army person is also NATO and we don't need a 4-star when he is not. We ought to think through how we manage that.

DHR/azn  
013104.14

210/104.14

31 Jan 04

OSD 09685-04

February 2, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 4-Stars in Europe

My impression is that we have six or seven 4-stars in Europe, counting Giambastiani. I have a sixth sense that tells me the deputy to SACEUR ought not to be a 4-star and that possibly the Army person for the land component commander there ought not to be a 4-star, except when he also has the NATO hat.

Please look at that and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020204-12

.....  
Please respond by 2/20/04

210 (3+4)

2 Feb 04

OSD 09686-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25163

MEMORANDUM  
January 31, 2004

If there are six or seven 4-stars assigned to Europe, we probably ought to phase that down.

My understanding is you've got the SACEUR, the Deputy UCOM, Giambastiani, Jones, Wald and then one for Army, Navy and Air Force. Apparently the Army NATO person is not always US. Therefore, we end up wanting a 4-star when the US Army person is also NATO and we don't need a 4-star when he is not. We ought to think through how we manage that.

DHR/azn  
013104.14

OSD 09685-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25164

February 2, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Steve Cambone  
Marc Thiessen  
DSD  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Bill Bennett Statement

IRAQ

Attached is an interesting statement on Iraq by Bill Bennett.

Thanks.

Attach.

Bennett, William J. "The War in Iraq: What to Remember," *The Proposition*, Vol. I, No. 9, December 2003.

DHR:db  
020204-11

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

2 FEB 04

OSD 09687-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25165

# The Proposition

②



A Monthly Publication of the Claremont Institute

Vol. I, No. 9 • December 2003

## The War in Iraq: What to Remember

By William J. Bennett

*Editor's Note: Last month, Brian T. Kennedy, President of the Claremont Institute, announced the appointment of William J. Bennett as the Claremont Institute's new Washington Fellow. Dr. Bennett served President Ronald Reagan as Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities and Secretary of Education. He also served President George H.W. Bush as the nation's first Drug Czar. The author or editor of over 15 books, Dr. Bennett is one of America's most influential and respected voices on cultural, political, and educational issues. He is a co-director of Empower America and Chairman of Americans for Victory Over Terrorism, a project dedicated to strengthening public opinion for the war on terrorism. Dr. Bennett will now represent the Claremont Institute in Washington, D.C. as a spokesman, advocate, and analyst both in public policy circles and in the national media.*

*On November 21, the Claremont Institute celebrated its annual Winston Churchill Dinner in Los Angeles. Rush Limbaugh, the scheduled speaker, was unable to attend (please see page three). The Institute is grateful that Dr. Bennett was able to step in and deliver the evening's keynote address. Below are excerpts from his remarks.*

With all the passion directed at President Bush right now by the Democratic contenders for the White House, it is the duty of patriotic Americans to clear our throats and start ratcheting up our own passion about the following brief facts about the war in Iraq; facts that look at the conditions there before and the conditions now:

Iraq is demonstrably better than it was six months ago, six years ago, or sixteen years ago. Of this there can be no question. Iraq, while dangerous, is safer than it was, freer than it was, more humanitarian than it was.

While we rightfully lament the challenge of internal terrorism there—and our men and women being part of that—there can be no question that the regime:

- no longer officially harbors terrorists (as it did with Abu Nidal and Al-Zarqawi);
- no longer exports terrorism outside of its borders;
- no longer threatens to purchase or use weapons of mass destruction from other nations such as North Korea or China;
- no longer shuts down hospitals and schools;

no longer murders its own citizens, including 5,000 children a month, according to UNICEF;

- no longer subsidizes homicide bombers against Israelis.

The Middle East has one less thug leading one less thuggish state today. And the threats from Iraq are exclusively internal to Iraq, and no longer external to other nations and allies. In Iraq now, it is easier to quell a cauldron than it was to prevent a volcano. We are helping to create the first democracy in the Arab world—and someday, someday, we may even receive a letter from Muslim nations thanking us for defeating their tyranny, like the letter from Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel and the "European Eight" earlier in the year thanking us for "American bravery, generosity and farsightedness [in saving Europe] from the two forms of tyranny that devastated our continent in the 20th century."

Our efforts in Iraq rank among the crowning achievements of our nation, of our democratic will against tyranny, and of our good will for human rights. We are turning one of the worst countries in the Middle East into one of the best

countries in the Middle East. For this we should not be humble. For this we should not be embarrassed. For this we should be proud.

The Holocaust Museum in Washington just celebrated its tenth anniversary. It is a profound place based on a simple premise: We should never forget man's inhumanity to man. And remembering and seeing with our eyes and imagination is the way not to forget. As with Germany so it is with Iraq—we should see and remember.

We should see and remember the videos former NYC Police Chief Bernard Kerik saw in Baghdad: "Interrogations of Iraqis whose lives ended with the detonation of a grenade that was tied to the neck or stuffed in the shirt pocket of the victim....living bodies disintegrate[d] at the pull of the pin....a tape of Saddam sitting and watching one of his military generals being eaten alive by Dobermans because the general's loyalty was in question."

We should see and remember the plastic shredding devices left-wing British Parliamentarian Ann Clwyd brought to the world's attention, with the following witness-testimony by an Iraqi: "There was a machine designed for shredding plastic.

Men were dropped into it and we were again made to watch. Sometimes they went in head first and died quickly. Sometimes they went in feet first and died screaming.... Their remains would be placed in plastic bags and we were told they would be used as fish food."

We should read testimony from the survivors of the chemical attack on Halabja that killed a minimum of 5,000 people; we should see the torture chambers and the rape rooms. We should see mass graves like the one near al-Hilla that journalist Christopher Hitchens described: "The remains of 3,000 individuals were brought

to the surface.... Eyewitnesses from the horrific repression of 1991 report having seen three truckloads of prisoners three times a day, for a month, being unloaded there."

We need to have these images again, for too many seem to have forgotten them.

When I attended human rights rallies in my youth, I used to hear the quote from Tom Paine, that "we have it in our power to begin the world over again." In the Middle East—the cradle of dictatorship and terrorism—we are beginning the world again. What we are witnessing in Iraq today is what such work looks like. Yet many have forgotten that all beginnings are difficult.

If our efforts succeed, we will see more democracy, less war, and less torture. And, someday, we may even have the luxury of saying about this, and other memorials to horror, that we do not remember the world that brought them about. In the meantime, let us be mindful that it is in that desert in Iraq that civilization and barbarism are now at war. It has fallen to us to be the arm, the conscience, and the will of civilization. And, ladies and gentlemen of the Claremont Institute, we have done so by once again pledging our lives, our fortune, and our sacred honor.

And so to our critics we say, with passion, and conviction: we are proud of our county, we are proud of our fighting men and women in Iraq, and yes, we are proud of our president. And on this evening, honoring Winston Churchill, we say, as he said, "Never, never, never—in nothing, great or small, large or petty—never give in, except to convictions of honour and good sense. Never yield to force."

Thank you and good night.



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Visit us on the Internet at [www.claremont.org](http://www.claremont.org) for daily commentary on the news, essays on politics and culture, and information about Claremont Institute events.



February 2, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Military Retirement

201.8

The fact that one of our Top Sergeants is going to retire this year at the age of 41, after 20 years is beyond comprehension to me. He will likely keep his same job, but as a civilian, make more money and receive military retirement and healthcare for life for the military service for the next 40 years, having served only 20 years.

Our system obviously is designed to encourage people to leave. Something is wrong with the system.

Please come and see me about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
020204-2

.....  
Please respond by 3/1/04

2 FEB 04

OSD 09688-04

3/3 08 31

220

EF-8642  
04/002767

March 1  
~~February 27, 2004~~

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Nation-Building

DA

092

Please take a look at this Max Boot article. We need to get going on this.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Boot, Max. "Shouldering the Load, and the Rifle," *Los Angeles Times*, February 26, 2004.

DHR:dh  
022704-11

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

3/3/04

✓  
3/9

→ SD

As I mentioned to you, the PC met on our Global Peace Ops Initiative while you were traveling. There are funding issues we are working quickly to try to resolve. Current plan is for President to announce our initiative at upcoming G-8 Summit in late Spring.

Doug Feith

OSD 09689:04

1 MAR 04

Los Angeles Times  
February 26, 2004

## Shouldering The Load, And The Rifle

*Failed states need new U.S. activism and a U.N. army.*

By Max Boot

This year it's Haiti. Last year it was Liberia. Before that it was Sierra Leone, Congo, Rwanda and Somalia. The world is full of failed states where life is nasty, brutish and short. Powerful nations know they cannot ignore these areas, not only for moral reasons but also because problems spill over into their own backyards, by way of communicable diseases, refugees and — worst of all — terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. But what are they supposed to do about these humanitarian catastrophes?

A hundred years ago the answer was obvious: A "civilized" country would colonize an "uncivilized" one. Today there is little eagerness in the West to take on what Rudyard Kipling called "the white man's burden." So, instead of acting decisively, we muddle through, passing high-minded resolutions at the United Nations and occasionally sending a few troops. It is this half-hearted approach that allowed the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia and lesser horrors from Liberia to Haiti.

Isn't it about time we got serious about dealing with failed states? If we did, we would have to devise both national and international remedies.

Nationally, the United States needs to create a standing agency devoted to nation-building; it should have a director with the authority to force disparate departments in the U.S. government to work together, something that didn't happen before the invasion of Iraq. The military too needs to devote more attention to nation-building, perhaps by adopting a proposal from the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation to add a couple of divisions specially trained for peacekeeping.

The job of policing the globe is too big for one country, however, and the U.S. needs more help from its allies. Washington should encourage regional powers to assume responsibility for their own backyards — Australia in Southeast Asia, Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa in southern Africa, and so on. Some of this has already been happening — for instance, the Australian interventions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The U.S. provided support for those missions but no troops — a good bargain from our standpoint.

There are also international organizations that can assist. NATO is creating a 21,000-strong Response Force. The European Union wants to follow suit. And the Pentagon has discussed setting up an International Peacekeeping Force with contributions from the U.S. and allied nations, though how it would work remains unclear.

Don't forget the United Nations. It currently deploys more than 45,000 peacekeepers, but their effectiveness is severely limited because they are supposed to enforce existing peace accords and stay strictly neutral even if one party is clearly at fault. This does nothing to help in places like Rwanda and Haiti, where there is no peace to enforce. The idea of creating a more robust U.N. force capable of smiting aggressors has been around since the late 1940s. It got a brief burst of life in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War, but it was entombed after the U.N. was blamed for failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.

11-L-0559/OSD/25170

It's time to resurrect the idea of a standing U.N. army, as a supplement, if not replacement, for the other forces mentioned above. The key to making it work would be eschewing the old U.N. way of doing things, which consists of asking for military contributions from a lot of countries with minimal capabilities, no record of working together and differing strategic interests. This produces low-quality blue helmets that are the laughingstock of thugs everywhere.

The U.N. needs a tough, professional force like the French Foreign Legion that would not quail before Haitian gang leaders or Serbian ethnic-cleasers. Members of such an outfit would have to be recruited on merit and trained together; it could not be cobbled together at the last minute from the military riffraff of Third World dictatorships. To make it work, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations would have to beef up its command, intelligence and logistical capabilities. The U.N. would also need to improve its ability to run failed states in a Kosovo-style receivership.

This proposal may seem like wishful thinking, not only because the U.N. is so slow to change but also because there is so much animus toward that organization in the U.S., which would have to sign off on this new force. If even the "multilateral" Clintonites eschewed this idea, what chance is there that it will be embraced by the "unilateral" Bushies? Not much, perhaps, but then George W. Bush used to oppose nation-building altogether — until he realized that it was in America's interest.

Likewise, beefing up peacekeeping capacity is very much in our interest. That would enable us to avoid the dilemma we face today in Haiti: either do nothing and let violence explode or take on a burden — fixing things ourselves — that we're not prepared to shoulder. There has to be a better way. I hope we find it before the next disaster strikes.

11-L-0559/OSD/25171

3/1 1700

720

March 1  
~~February 27, 2004~~

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 71

SUBJECT: Phone Call w/Ambassador Blackwill

Please set me a phone call with Blackwill to discuss this memo.

Thanks.

Attach.  
2/21 Memo

DHR:dh  
022704-10

00007150

.....  
Please respond by 3/5/04

3/1 ✓  
3/2  
SecDef -  
We'll set it up.  
Some things you  
should know, attached  
Di Rita

1 MAR 04 21 58 04

OSD 09690-04

10:19 PM

**MEMORANDUM**  
**2/21/04**

I need to talk to Blackwill about Pakistan nukes and Mishrah's comment when I met with him in Munich.

DHR/azn  
022104.05ts

000.7150

OSD 09690-04

21  
2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25173

March 2, 2004

TO: Secretary Of Defense  
THRU: LTG Craddock *ch*  
FM: CDR Nosenzo

SUBJ: TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR BLACKWILL

1. U.N. Team investigating the Bombing of U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad last year requested interviews with four U.S. Army Officers attached to CJTF-7 at the time of the bombing.

- This is the second U.N. investigation of the event.
- Request was initiated by a phone call from the U.N. to OSD.
- OSD/Joint Staff responded that the individuals in question would provide written responses to written questions.
- Questions are currently with the General Counsel *sa* for vetting (some of the questions are poorly worded, some questions made reference to other documents not included).

2. Ambassador Blackwill requested an additional Military Assistant.

- Ambassador Blackwill is not authorized ~~an~~ additional Military Assistant.
- Ambassador Blackwill contacted the Joint Staff for a by-name fill of the position.
- Joint Staff prepared a slate of eight Candidates in lieu of filling the by-name request.
- Rank of by-name request and slated individuals is commensurate with an aide position vice military assistant.
- Mr. DiRita pulled the slate and is coordinating with Ambassador Blackwill to fill the request with a civilian from OSD or State.

OSD 09690-04

*By the way - Unbeknownst to anyone here, he is trying to snatch Rachel Billingslea. Think we stopped that. DiRita*

11-L-0559/OSD/25174

000 7150

24 1400

21 14004

EF-8626 ✓  
3/3  
8:30 AM  
04/002693

TO: Bill Luti  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: February 25, 2004  
SUBJECT:

MAR 25 2004  
*DR*

*03/2*

KAZAKHSTAN

In the meeting with the Kazak Prime Minister, they asked for help in connecting their people to the people in charge of reconstruction in Iraq.

You have the responsibility to see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.08

Please respond by: 3/15

*Sir,  
Snowflake response  
attached.  
VFR.  
LTC Sample*

Distro To BL KJ  
Date 1 MAR 04  
Time 0911


OSD 09703-04



INFO MEMO

I-04/002693  
EF 8626

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

USD(P) 

FROM: William J. Luti, DUSD Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs *WJL 3/2/04*

SUBJECT: Kazak Prime Minister Request

- You asked about assisting the Kazak Prime Minister with connecting their people to the people in charge of reconstruction in Iraq.
- The Kazakhstan Embassy in Washington contacted the CPA-Washington Office on February 17, 2004, offering to send a team of high-ranking officials to Baghdad to discuss involvement in Iraq.
- On February 20, CPA shared the procedural requirements for foreign government travel to Iraq. State has also passed this information to our embassy in Kazakhstan.
- The Kazakhstan embassy informed State that it will be forwarding the necessary information to them by March 3, 2004.
  - Once the necessary information is received, State and CPA-Baghdad will process and accommodate the request accordingly. In the interim, State has spoken to our embassy asking that they remain in contact with the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry to ensure the information is acquired as quickly as possible.
- I will keep you posted.

KAZAKHSTAN

2 MAR 04 25 FEB 04

OSD 09708-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 JUN 25 11 09 52

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

June 25, 2004 5:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Committees, Boards, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you requested that I review the DoD Advisory Boards and advise you as to which could be discontinued. The results of this review are as follows.
- Five Statutory Committees are either inactive, have lapsed charters, or have met less than once a year during the period FY99-FY03; i.e., Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Technology and privacy Advisory Committee, and Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. I believe that these have served their purpose and could be terminated.
- The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee, a Presidential Advisory Committee, has not met since FY00 and could also be eliminated.
- Four Statutory Committees could be combined into two. The Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota Task Force could be merged into a single Missouri River Task Force. The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities could be merged into a single Disabilities Advisory Body.
- The Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University, a Statutory Committee, and two Discretionary Committees, the Air University Board of Visitors and the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College, perform similar functions, are service centric, and are not optimally structured to foster jointness in military thinking. These could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Professional Military Education. This new Board, with multi-service representatives, would emphasize jointness at the respective institutions.

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25177



- Similarly, the three Service Academy Boards (United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors, and the United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors) could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Military Academics, which would be constituted to foster a stronger joint focus.
- If effected, these actions would reduce the number of DoD Advisory Boards from 60 to 48, resulting in a 19% reduction.
- The committees and a brief description of each are listed at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: If you concur, I will work with the General Counsel, Service Secretaries, and OSD Principal Staff Officials to take the actions necessary to achieve the recommended eliminations and consolidations.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Paul Granahan (b)(6)

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and **let** me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois <sup>INFO</sup> ~~memo~~ w/ DoD Advisory Boards*  
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef, OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh  
052504-20

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25179

## Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory **board** meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
  - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards **are** independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past **15** years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- o The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at [http://www.defenselink.mil/dodge/defense\\_ethics](http://www.defenselink.mil/dodge/defense_ethics) under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- o Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Arm Education Adviso Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors, Joint Military Intelligence College</u>	<b>Discretionary</b>	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint Military Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations on matters related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, research, and administration, in connection with the College.
<u>Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University</u>	<b>Statutory</b>	Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on <b>all</b> aspects of the academic and administrative policies of <b>the</b> University; examines all <b>aspects</b> of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice <b>as</b> is necessary to facilitate <b>high</b> educational standards and cost effective operations.
<u>Board of Visitors, National Defense University</u>	<b>Discretionary</b>	Provides advice on matters related to mission, policy, faculty, students, cumcula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: <b>Armed</b> Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies, and Department of Defense Computer Institute.
<u>Board of Visitors, Western Hemisphere Institute for <b>Security</b> Cooperation (<b>WHINSEC</b>)</u>	<b>Statutory</b>	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the cumculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of <b>the</b> Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC cumculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western

<u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.
<u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.
<u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10 U.S.C. 1746.
<u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.
<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.

<u>Defense Advisor Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, <b>through</b> the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the Armed Forces.
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with respect to providing world class finance and accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term operational and intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations communities of the United States and the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the military operations <b>area</b> , addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units, joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and integration of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Authby Law)	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus <b>upon</b> long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 330 of Public Law 102.484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary by Law	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	Statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Naval)</u>	Discretionary	Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<u>Semiconductor Technolow Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to <i>link</i> assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Convening upon request, the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to the DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on reduction of the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons, sustainment of the nuclear weapons deterrent, chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology security, weapons effects, and other matters related to the DTRA mission.
<u>Uniform Formula Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a <i>link</i> between the <b>Air</b> Force and the Nation's scientific community by serving <b>as</b> a means of communicating the most recent scientific information <b>as</b> it applies to the <b>Air</b> Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various Air Force activities.
<u>U.S. Arm. Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers.
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, <b>U.S.</b> European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Transformation Advisory Group</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, USJFCOM, during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>		Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.

**TAB**

**A**

## 1. Statutory committees that are inactive or have served their purpose.

- **Defense Environmental Task Force II:** Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned. (One meeting FY99-03)
- **DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile:** Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102.484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices description. (No meetings FY99-03)
- **Semiconductor Technology Council:** Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education. (No meetings FY99-03)
- **Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee:** Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism. (Committee's work is complete)
- **Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel:** Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. (No meetings since FY00)

## 2. Committees that have not met since FY00.

- **President's Information Technology Advisory Committee:** Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.

3. Committees that are duplicative and could be merged.

- Merge into a single Missouri River Task Force.
  - Missouri River – North Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
  - Missouri River – South Dakota Task Force: Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
- Merge into a single Disability Advisory Body.
  - DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities: Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
  - Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities: Advises the Director, DoD Dependant Schools (DoDDS), of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools (ODS) rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.

4. Boards that perform similar functions for Service Schools and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize jointness in Professional Military Education.

- Air University Board of Visitors: Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.

- **Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College:** Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
- **Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University:** Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.

**5. Boards that perform similar functions for the Military Academies and could be consolidated under a new charter to emphasize jointness in Military Education.**

- **United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Military Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
- **United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors:** Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.

May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois INFO*  
*MEMO on DoD Advisory Boards*  
~~5/14/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef, OSD 76611-04~~

DHR:dh  
052504-20

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25197



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

JAN 03 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Committees, ~~Boards~~, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you request that I coordinate with the DoD General Counsel and other appropriate DoD officials to consider the elimination or consolidation of **16** Federal Advisory Committees, Boards, and Commissions I had previously identified as candidates for such action.
- Five advisory bodies have been eliminated. Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Defense Finance and Accounting Service Board of Visitors and the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee.
- Four advisory bodies have been consolidated into two.
  - The DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee has been consolidated into the Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel.
  - ~~The~~ DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities, and the DoD Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities, has been consolidated into the DoD Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Special Education.
- As a result of these actions, the number of DoD Federal Advisory Committees, Boards, and Commissions are reduced by **12%** from **60** to **53**.
- We do not recommend combining the Missouri River-North Task Force and the Missouri River-South Task Force. The significant differences between upstream and downstream states in terms of issues, priorities, and resources make it preferable to maintain two separate entities.

334

3/9/05

25 May 05

11-L-0559/OSD/25198

OSD 09717-04



- We determined that the consolidation of advisory bodies associated with the Service Academies and Professional Military Education institutions is not appropriate at this time for two reasons. First, the unique mission, needs and circumstances for each of these institutions justify separate advisory oversight. Second, the intensity of Congressional interest in the Military Academies and the uncertainties of BRAC outcomes for the staff colleges, war colleges, and Defense universities make this a particularly inopportune time to change their advisory bodies.

COORDINATION: USD(AT&L), USD(P&R), DoD GC, Army, Navy, Air Force,  
Joint Staff, DFAS (Tab A)

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Paul Granahan (b)(6)

CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_  
General Counsel, DoD

Ray Dubois, I'm favorably disposed,  
but please brief me. I'd like  
to ask specifically about TAPAC,  
proposed DoD6c AACTs (including need  
statutory, and other ideas), and  
retiring process. Thanks,  
JW 11/28/04

July 1, 2004

TO Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Eliminating Boards, Commissions, etc.

I received your proposal on Boards and Commissions. Please get with Jim Haynes, the relevant Service secretaries and OSD people, and make a specific proposal on a way forward.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/25/04 DuBois memo to SD [OSD09717-04]

DHR:   
070104-21

.....  
Please respond by 8/13/04

OSD 09717-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

ACTION MEMO

June 25, 2004 5:30PM

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action\_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Elimination of Unnecessary Committees, Boards, and Commissions

- This responds to the attached snowflake in which you requested that I review the DoD Advisory Boards and advise you as to which could be discontinued. The results of this review are as follows.
- Five **Statutory** Committees are either inactive, have lapsed charters, or have met less than once a year during the period FY99-FY03; i.e., Defense Environmental Task Force II, DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile, Semiconductor Technology Council, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, and Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. I believe that these have served their purpose and could be terminated.
- The President's Information Technology Advisory **Committee**, a Presidential Advisory Committee, has not met since **FY00** and could also be eliminated. ✓
- Four Statutory Committees could be combined into two. The Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota **Task** Force could be merged into a single Missouri River Task Force. The DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and pre-School Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities could be merged into a single Disabilities Advisory Body.
- The Board of Advisors, Marine Corp University, a **Statutory** Committee, and two Discretionary Committees, the Air University Board of Visitors and the Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College, perform similar functions, are service centric, and are not optimally structured to foster jointness in military **thinking**. These could be combined into a single Board of Visitors for Professional Military Education. **This** new Board, with multi-service representatives, would emphasize jointness at **the** respective institutions.



OSD 09717-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25201

- Similarly, the ~~three~~ Service Academy Boards (**United States Air Force Academy Board of Visitors, the United States Military Academy Board of Visitors, and the United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors**) could **be** combined into a single **Board of Visitors** for **Military** Academies, which would be constituted to foster a stronger joint **focus**.
- If effected, these actions would reduce the number of DoD Advisory Boards from 60 to 48, resulting in a 19% reduction.
- The committees and a brief description of each are listed at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION: If you concur, I will work with the General Counsel, Service Secretaries, and OSD Principal Staff Officials to take the actions necessary to achieve the recommended eliminations and consolidations.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COORDINATION:** None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared By: Paul Granahan, (b)(6)

## 1. Statutory committees that are inactive or have served their purpose.

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May 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Advisory Boards

Please take a look at some of these advisory boards and let me know if there are any you think we could usefully discontinue.

Thanks.

Attach. *4/29/04 DuBois <sup>INFO</sup> ~~request~~ re DoD Advisory Boards*  
~~5/14/04 ASD(IST) memo to Sec Def, OSD~~ (b)(6)

DHR:dh  
052504-20

.....  
Please respond by *6/25/04*

## Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- o The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- o DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- o Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- o Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
  - o As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- o The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- o Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- o It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees **are also required** to **fill** out financial disclosure reports if the board they Serve on makes **recommendations** that could affect the **expenditure** of government funds in the future. **Board members** may accept travel and per diem, but **are rarely compensated directly** for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense **notifies** advisory committee members by letter to contact the **Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO)** for advice concerning **ethics** issues relating to their appointment. **SOCO assures** that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports **are completed before** their first meeting. **Committee members also** complete a **Foreign Activities Questionnaire** and execute a disqualification **from** participation in any particular **matters** involving financial interests **Listed on** the confidential financial disclosure report. **SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to** the **Committee members**. A guide for current committee members is distributed **at** a committee meeting and can be found at [http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense\\_ethics](http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics) under "ethics resource library" and **under "DoD guidance."**
- Advice provided to the Department has **been** critical to current transformation **efforts**, keeping the Department **informed** on cutting edge issues **from** the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science **and** technology developments. This advice cannot be **drawn** exclusively **from** internal government **sources**. We simply do not have the expertise or **those** with professional networks with access to the **kind of information needed**. This advice **often** has a direct impact on **future military** operations and the welfare of the **war fighter**.
- **If** the Department were to use survey instruments **and contractual** arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs **would be** significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees **as** a collateral duty to their principal duties.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As of 04/29/2004

Type of committee: statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<b>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</b>	statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<b>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>	statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<b>Air University Board of Visitors</b>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<b>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</b>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the <b>military</b> departments and the Assistant <b>Secretary</b> of Defense ( <b>Health Affairs</b> ) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of <b>disease</b> and injury and promotion of <b>health</b> .
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the <b>Secretary of the Army</b> , the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on <b>Army</b> educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other <b>aspects</b> of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the <b>Secretary</b> of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant <b>Secretary</b> of the <b>Army</b> (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of <b>Staff</b> , and major <b>Army</b> Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the <b>President</b> , Naval <b>War</b> College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the <b>Board</b> will be made to the <b>President</b> , Naval <b>War</b> College. The <b>President</b> , Naval <b>War</b> College shall advise the <b>Secretary</b> of the <b>Navy</b> and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the <b>Board</b> which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, <b>administration</b> , <b>state</b> of the student body, <b>fiscal affairs</b> , and other <b>matters</b> relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant <b>Secretary</b> of Defense for <b>Health Affairs</b> for the operation of the <b>Uniformed</b> Services University of the <b>Health Sciences</b> ; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <hr/> <hr/>	Discretionary	Provides the <b>Secretary</b> of Defense, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint <b>Military</b> Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations <b>on matters</b> related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, <b>research, and administration, in connection with the College.</b>
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Marine Corps</u> <u>University</u>	Statutory	Reviews develops, and provides <b>recommendations on all aspects</b> of <b>the</b> academic and administrative policies of <b>the</b> University; examines <b>all aspects</b> of the University's Professional <b>Military</b> Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice <b>as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.</b>
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>National Defense</u> <u>University</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice <b>on matters</b> related to mission, policy, faculty, students, curricula, educational methods, research, facilities, <b>and administration of the National Defense University (NDU).</b> Principal components of NDU <b>are: Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies, and Department of Defense Computer Institute.</b>
<u>Board of Visitors,</u> <u>Western Hemisphere</u> <u>Institute for Security</u> <u>Cooperation</u> <u>(WHINSEC)</u>	statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations <b>and</b> management of the Institute. Inquires into <b>the</b> curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, <b>fiscal affairs</b> and academic <b>methods</b> of <b>the</b> Institution and any other <b>matters</b> that it or the <b>Secretary</b> of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews <b>WHINSEC</b> curriculum <b>and</b> determines whether it complies with applicable <b>U.S.</b> laws and regulations consistent with <b>U.S.</b> policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to <b>U.S.</b> doctrine appropriately emphasizing human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the <b>military</b> and the role of the <b>military</b> in a democratic society.

<p><b><u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u></b></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corp programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.</p>
<p><b><u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u></b></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.</p>
<p><b><u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u></b></p>	<p>statutory</p>	<p>Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10 U.S.C. 1746.</p>
<p><b><u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u></b></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.</p>
<p><b><u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u></b></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.</p>

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the <b>Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with</b> assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the <b>Armed Forces.</b>
<u>Defense Business</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best <b>business</b> practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to <b>Congress</b> on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at <b>military</b> installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under <b>Secretary</b> of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with <b>respect</b> to providing world class <b>finance and</b> accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term <b>operational and</b> intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a <b>link</b> between the scientific/technical and <b>military</b> operations communities of the <b>United States and the</b> Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the <b>military</b> operations area, addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units, joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and <b>integration</b> of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the <b>Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with</b> independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy <b>Secretary</b> and Under <b>Secretary</b> for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the <b>Secretary of Defense, the</b> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of <b>Staff, and the</b> Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C.98b-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102,484, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art, curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>		Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense <b>Military</b> Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, <b>liabilities</b> of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Γ (Auth by Law)	<b>Makes</b> recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense <b>Wage Fixing Authority</b> .
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the <b>Secretary</b> of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation <b>priorities</b> on the commercial inland waterways and <b>harbors</b> of the <b>United States</b> .
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	<b>Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council</b> on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the <b>Army</b> on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the <b>Missouri River</b> in the State of <b>North Dakota</b> and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the <b>Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000</b> .
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the <b>Army</b> on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the <b>Missouri River</b> in the State of <b>South Dakota</b> and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the <b>Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000</b> .
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	<b>Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS.</b>
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education <b>Act of 1991</b> for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to <b>U.S.</b> citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of <b>information</b> regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons <b>desiring scholarships or fellowships</b> , and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the <b>Act</b> . The <b>Board</b> will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( <b>Strategy &amp; Resources</b> ), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	IXcretionary	Maintains an understanding of <b>the</b> technological needs confronting <b>the</b> Navy and <b>Marine</b> Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to <b>the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research</b>
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	statutory	Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, <b>procedures</b> , selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic <b>data</b> requirements as well as other responsibilities <b>that</b> the Council considers appropriate.
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	statutory	Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the <b>system</b> for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any <b>Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards</b> regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters <b>that</b> have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	<b>Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board</b> in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet <b>ASW</b> developments and related <b>technologies</b> , critically review programs which potentially impact <b>SSBN</b> survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define <b>ASW</b> and <b>SSBN</b> survivability threats.
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	<b>Provides</b> the National Science and Technology Council, through <b>the</b> Director of the office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information <b>technology</b> , and the Next Generation Internet.
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	<b>Serves</b> in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, <b>Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</b> , to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters <b>pertaining</b> to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFTP central laboratory of pathology for <b>the</b> Department of Defense and <b>other</b> federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.

<b><u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u></b>	statutory Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the <b>Secretary</b> of Defense on appropriate technology <b>goals</b> and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; <b>to</b> link assessment by <b>the</b> semiconductor industry of <b>future</b> market and <b>national security</b> needs <b>to opportunities</b> for technology development <b>through</b> cooperative public and private investment; <b>and, to seek</b> ways to respond <b>to</b> the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation <b>among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.</b>
<b><u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u></b>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during <b>the</b> development of <b>the</b> Single Integrated Operational Plan ( <b>SIOP</b> ). <b>Convening upon request,</b> the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to <b>the</b> DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<b><u>Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u></b>	statutory	Provides recommendations <b>to</b> the Strategic Environmental Research and Development <b>Program</b> Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in <b>statute and assume</b> additional advisory responsibilities as directed by <b>the</b> Council.
<b><u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u></b>	Discretionary	Advises <b>the</b> Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the <b>application</b> of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<b><u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u></b>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under <b>Secretary</b> of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on <b>reduction</b> of the threat to <b>the United States</b> and its <b>allies</b> from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special <b>weapons</b> , sustainment of <b>the</b> nuclear weapons <b>deterrent</b> , chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology <b>security</b> , weapons effects, and other matters related to the <b>DTRA</b> mission.
<b><u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u></b>	statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the <b>uniform</b> formulary by <b>the</b> DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics <b>Committee.</b>
<b><u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u></b>	statutory	<b>Inquires</b> into <b>the</b> morale and discipline, <b>the</b> curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, <b>fiscal affairs</b> , academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the <b>Board</b> decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a link between the <b>Air Force</b> and the Nation's scientific community by serving as a means of communicating the most recent scientific information as it applies to the <b>Air Force</b> ; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the <b>Air Force</b> program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective <b>Air Force</b> emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to <b>weapon</b> or support <b>systems</b> ; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the <b>Air Force</b> Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various <b>Air Force</b> activities.
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers.
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, <b>U.S. European</b> Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, <b>USJFCCOM</b> , during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>U.S. Air Academy Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

OCT 22 2004


MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Termination of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

Based upon my assessment of a September 2004 review, concerning whether three Statutory Boards and one Advisory Committee under my cognizance could be eliminated, the following applies:

- I non-concur on the elimination of the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee. RATIONALE: This Committee is formally chartered by Executive Order 13035, which is not due to expire until June 1, 2005.
- I concur on the elimination of the Defense Environmental Task Force 11, Semiconductor Technology Council, and the DoD Government Advisory Committee on the Operation of the National Defense Stockpile.

Should you have any questions, please contact either Ms. June Woodford or Ms. Julie Bigler at (b)(6)

  
Michael W. Wynne  
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/25219



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

AUG 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

I cannot concur with your memo of August 5, 2004 concerning the consolidation of certain defense advisory boards.

A recent study conducted by Admiral Charles Larson for the *Air* Force Academy Board of Visitors finds that the three academies are unique and recommends that policies administering the three academies recognize these differences. Even if consolidation of the Service Academy Boards of Visitors was recommended, such a recommendation would require multiple changes to the statute. As such, the first opportunity to request any legislative change would be in concert with the legislative cycle next year. Given the intense Congressional oversight of the Service Academies, the Larson Report and the Fowler Report, I do not recommend we suggest this type of change.

The memo also suggests that we consider consolidating the Boards of Visitors for several, but not all, of the professional military education war colleges. The future of the staff colleges, war colleges and the service and defense universities are at play in the BRAC process. I do not believe that we should take any actions with regard to the Boards of Visitors for these institutions until the BRAC process is complete.

In a second memo dated August 6, 2004, you requested my views with regard to a DoDEA recommendation to eliminate the DOD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children and Children with Disabilities and the Overseas Dependent Schools National Advisory Panel on Education of Dependents with Disabilities and to create a newly formed board, the DOD Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Special Education. I concur with this proposal.

  
Charles S. Abell  
Principal Deputy

11-L-0559/OSD/25220



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
C M L WORKS  
108 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0108



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

August 30, 2004


DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, WASHINGTON  
HEADQUARTERS SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON D.C. 20301-1950

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

I am responding to your memorandum of August 5, 2004 wherein you ask that I review two Statutory Boards, the Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota Task Force to see if they lend themselves to consolidation under a single Board. I do not believe that the two Boards can or should be consolidated.

The two Boards were established under Titles VII and IX of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-541) in order to provide a means for each state, and its sovereign Indian Nations, to be involved in assessing and addressing a host of issues of particular concern to them. While it is true that the two Boards are directed to perform generally similar functions, the two Boards were created as distinct entities and were charged by statute with preparing reports and assessments on matters peculiar to the respective states. Congress recognized that there are significant differences between upstream and downstream states in terms of priorities, resource concerns, and views regarding operation of the Missouri River System.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. Your staff may contact Mr. Chip Smith, my Assistant for Environment, Tribal and Regulatory Affairs at (b)(6) or [Chip.Smith@hada.army.mil](mailto:Chip.Smith@hada.army.mil).

  
John Paul Woodley, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of the Army  
(Civil Works)

11-L-0559/OSD/25221



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

AUG 05 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

SUBJECT Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

The Secretary has **asked** us to review the various Advisory Boards that have **been** established under DoD cognizance and to identify those that should be discontinued or consolidated.

**Our** review indicates that two Statutory Boards under **your** cognizance, the Missouri River-North Dakota Task Force and the Missouri River-South Dakota **Task** Force, perform similar functions that may lend themselves to consolidation in a single Board.

Please advise us by **30 August 2004** if you concur with this assessment so that we may work with your staff, the Office of the DoD General Counsel, and the Office of the ASD (Legislative Affairs) to initiate the statutory changes necessary to effect **this** consolidation.

The point of contact for **this** review is Mr. Paul Granahan, Deputy Director for Planning and Evaluation, Washington Headquarters Services. He may be reached at

(b)(6)

Howard G. Becker  
Deputy Director

cc: ASD (Legislative Affairs)  
**ASD** (Public Affairs)  
**GC, DoD**

11-L-0559/OSD/25222



40801555



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

SEP 17 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

The Department of the Navy does not concur with the proposal to consolidate Department of Defense (DoD) Advisory Boards for the following reasons:

- Consolidation of the three Boards of Visitors for the service academies would require legislative action. *And might not be in the best interest of the services due to geography, culture, etc.*
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has statutory responsibility for oversight of officer joint education and has policies and organizations in place to meet this requirement.
- The proposed consolidation of the Board of Visitors of select military war colleges omits the Army professional military education institutions and National Defense University (NDU), thereby fragmenting the professional military education process. The Naval War College (NWC) has additional service-unique missions related to the development of the Navy's future strategy and research and analysis that could be impeded by the proposed consolidation. The Marine Corps University (MCU) receives direct oversight provided by the Commandant consistent with the intent of the Congress. Finally, consolidation stands to jeopardize accreditation of NWC and MCU master's degree programs.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William A. Navas, Jr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

William A. Navas, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

11-L-0559/OSD/25223



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

Office Of The Assistant Secretary

08 SEP 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: SAF/MR

SUBJECT: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

In response to your memo regarding the consolidation of professional military education-related Advisory Boards, the Air Force reviewed our current Board structure and concurs with further exploration. Although many factors argue against a consolidated Service Academy Board of Visitors (BoV), there may be merit in pursuing, to some degree, a combined BoV for Professional Military Education (PME).

Rationale for not including the academies in this effort directly relates to the ongoing efforts to reinvigorate the USAFA BoV. An engaged USAFA BoV, with formalized by-laws and new membership requirements, meeting four times a year, is key to the changes underway in the culture and management of USAFA. We want to avoid diluting the focus of our BoV members by expanding their realm of review to the other academies.

Interaction among the Services regarding PME already occurs. For example, the Educational Alliance Memorandum of Agreement between the Air Force and the Navy has existed since December 2002. The Military Education Coordination Council and the Process for Accreditation for Joint Education already provide basic oversight for PME schools. Expanding the respective advisory boards to an across-the-board perspective, to include the Army and the National Defense University, would be another step toward increased jointness in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols. However, this should not be accomplished at the expense of the institutions from where this "combined" BoV would be pulled.

The Air University (AU) BoV has existed since 1946 and takes its oversight responsibilities very seriously. The broad scope of this specific BoV calls for it to advise on programs and institutions that encompass much more than PME, to include precommissioning, professional continuing education, degree granting, and significant research efforts. Thus, the AU's BoV agenda is flexible and wide-ranging and addresses other AU priorities such as the Community College of the Air Force. For example, over the past five years less than half of the AU's BoV meeting agendas were spent on officer PME; the remainder of the time focused on other areas. The impact on accreditation would also have to be explored since any consolidation or expansion would constitute a formal change of governance according to regional accreditation rules. Moreover, board structure plays an important role in the accreditation of degrees awarded through the PME schools and we do not want to jeopardize that role. We also need to consider that BoV members are volunteers, and we must be sensitive to the inherent challenges of these positions, especially regarding their time commitment.

11-L-0559/OSD/25224

The Air Force supports participating in a joint working group to explore potential value and further discuss the details if OSD decides to pursue this initiative. My point of contact is Colonel Kathleen Grabowski (AF/DPLE), (b)(6)



MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)



THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

P&E

Reply ZIP Code:  
203 18-0300

DJSM 0992-04  
15 September 2004

MEMORANDUM **FOR** THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

Subject: Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards

1. Your proposal<sup>1</sup> to consolidate Advisory Boards dealing with professional military education (PME) has been reviewed. Regarding your first proposal, a Board of Visitors (BOV) for the Military Academies should not be created, since all three are unique and should be recognized as different entities, with diverse needs and circumstances.
2. You also suggest consolidating the BOV for several, but not all, of the PME war colleges. The JCS does not concur with your recommendation to create a new BOV for PME, as the Military Education Coordination Council and the Process for Accreditation for Joint Education (both established in CJCS policy) meet the function defined for a **BOV** for PME. Additionally, the military war and staff colleges have varying requirements from their respective civilian accrediting organizations that must be considered if they **are** to continue offering degrees.

T. J. KEATING  
VADM, USN  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Reference

- 1 OSD(A&M) memorandum, 5 August 2004, "Consolidation of Department of Defense Advisory Boards"



DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE  
ARLINGTON  
1851 SOUTH BELL STREET  
ARLINGTON, VA 22240-5291


SEP 27 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Renewal of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of  
Advisors

In response to your memorandum of August 13, 2004, subject as above, we will be  
establishing a Customer Advisory Forum to replace the DFAS Board of Advisors. This forum  
will not fall within the guidelines of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Questions regarding this request may be addressed to the DFAS point of contact,  
Beverly Lemon, at (b)(6)

  
Jack E. Gaddy  
Director

[www.dfas.mil](http://www.dfas.mil)

Your Financial Partner @ Work

11-L-0559/OSD/25227

1041AM

TO: LTG John Craddock <sup>3/1</sup>

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld <sup>DR</sup>

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Detainee

Would you follow up and get the name of the Kuwaiti detainee at **GTMO** to the government of Kuwait? I have forgotten who **was** in the meeting with us. <sup>(1)</sup>

In the future, when you do these follow up memos, put down who was in the meeting and who should have the action so that we can just get it going immediately. <sup>(2)</sup>

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.a.05

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>2/28</sup> ✓ <sup>3/2</sup>

Response to (1) and (2) attached

C <sup>3/1</sup>

OSD 09727-04

383.6

25 FEB 04

1

✓  
3/2

March 1, 2004

**TO:** LTG Craddock

**FROM:** CDR Nosenzo

**SUBJECT: KUWAITI DETAINEE**

MOHAMMED ALI JABBA is the detainee's name. He was captured on or about the 9th of Jan. The information has already been passed to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait.

Attendees:

- Kuwait Side:
  - PRIME MINISTER SABAH AL-AHMED AL-JABER AL SABAH
  - Defense Minister Jabir Mubarak Al-Hamad Al Sabah
  - Chief of Staff Lt Gen Fahad Ahmad Al-Amir
  - Note taker and translator (names unknown)
  
- US Side:
  - SecDef
  - Dr. Luti
  - Charge Urbancic
  - Col(P) Mulholland (OMC Chief)
  - General Craddock
  - CDR McVety (Note taker, Kuwait desk, ~~note~~)
  - Rick Bell (Embassy note taker)

11-L-0559/OSD/25229

2

February 26, 2004

**Meeting with MoD of Timbuktu  
Checklist of Action Items**

**Meeting time/date:** 10:15 am/Feb 26 2004

**US Attendees:** SecDef...

**Timbuktuian Attendees:** MoD of Timbuktu...

**Open Action Item**

**Primary Responsibility**

Coordinate Millions of Dollars of increase in FMF

Office/Name

Coordinate training and logistical support for deploying  
Peace Keepers

Office/Name

For Format Only

3

2/20 6:40

720

February 21, 2004

TO: Andy Marshall

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Assumptions

381

*Loity Di Rita*  
*3/1*

We have to fashion assumptions for the kind of world we are going to be living in for the next two or three years. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
022104-9

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*2/24/04*

*Sir,*

*Response Attached*

*v/R*

*msg Judd*

*21 FEB 04*

OSD 09729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25231



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1920.DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/ banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:

- How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
- The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines; where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
- Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
- Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.

2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

381

24 FEB 04

21 FEB 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25232

OSD 09729-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~✓  
4/6

## INFO MEMO

I-04/002693

EF 8626

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: William J. Luti, DUSD Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs *WJL 3/2/04*

SUBJECT: Kazak Prime Minister Request

- You asked about assisting the Kazak Prime Minister with connecting their people to the people in charge of reconstruction in Iraq.
- The Kazakhstan Embassy in Washington contacted the CPA-Washington Office on February 17, 2004, offering to send a team of high-ranking officials to Baghdad to discuss involvement in Iraq.
- On February 20, CPA shared the procedural requirements for foreign government travel to Iraq. State has also passed this information to our embassy in Kazakhstan.
- The Kazakhstan embassy informed State that it will be forwarding the necessary information to them by March 3, 2004.
  - Once the necessary information is received, State and CPA-Baghdad will process and accommodate the request accordingly. In the interim, State has spoken to our embassy asking that they remain in contact with the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry to ensure the information is acquired as quickly as possible.
- I will keep you posted.

KAZAKHSTAN

3/2/04

3/2/04

OSD 09734-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/25233

In reply refer to EF-8626 & 04/002693

EF-8626

8:30 AM

TO: Bill Luti

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT:

In the meeting with the Kazak Prime Minister, they asked for help in connecting their people to the people in charge of reconstruction in Iraq.

You have the responsibility to see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
022504.08

Please respond by: \_\_\_\_\_

3/15

OSD 09708-04

27-02-04 17:15 001

11-L-0559/OSD/25234

6/2  
1200

1200

4:12 PM

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

Let's get a letter from me to that lawyer at the Geren-Maples meeting today, thanking him for his help while he was here.

Give me his name and whatever I will need.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.40

Please respond by: 6/2

201.22

1 Jun 04

OSD 09790-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25235



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUN 30 2004

201,22

Major Brad Clark

(b)(6)

Dear Major Clark,

Thank you so much for your fine work during your months on active duty.

Your briefing to me and the others' was superb, and indicative of what I am told was excellent service both in the Pentagon and Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

30 Jun 04

1 Jun 04

OSD 09790-04

June 30, 2004

TO: Eric Draper  
The White House

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Photographs

When you get them developed, I would sure like to have some of the photographs from the summit meeting that involved Defense Department people. I particularly want to get the one taken with the President and Mira Ricardel.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh  
062904-10(is computer).doc

060 SD

30 Jun 04

OSD 09795-04



72  
7/27/04  
30 JUN 2004 10:12

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1883-04  
30 June 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** For the initial response to this action, all pre-September 11 orders were reviewed with negative results (TAB B). As a follow-up, USTRANSCOM was additionally tasked with the further examination of Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) to ensure their applicability during the War On Terrorism (WOT) and their adherence to the standard DOD orders process. USTRANSCOM completed the review and stated that all MOAs are applicable during the WOT and are in compliance with the standard orders process.
- **Discussion.** USTRANSCOM is the only command supporting active MOAs with other agencies. Operation DEEP FREEZE, which initiated the original question, was the only MOA supported by an Execute Order dated prior to 11 September 2001 and is currently in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for rewrite.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 09822-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25238

TAB A

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This *was* in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review *of* things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/12/04 J-3 response to SecDef snowflake

1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica (012704-17)

DHR:dh  
030204-14

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/25239

Tab A

03398-04

## ANTARCTIC OPERATION DEEP FREEZE

**Purpose.** To provide a response to SecDef Snow Flake - 674.

**Issue.** SF-674 stated, "In the meeting with the President, John Landy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that."

### Bottom Line

- DOD support to Operation DEEP FREEZE is provided on a reimbursable basis from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under a DOD-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) at no cost to the Department of Defense.
- Operations are conducted under a standing SecDef EXORD that was issued 032310ZJul01.

### Background

- Department of Defense has supported Polar Programs since 1957.

Operation DEEP FREEZE mission is designed to move people and cargo to, from and within Antarctica in support of the NSF.

MOA of 1 Apr 99 outlines NSF and DOD responsibilities for Operation DEEP FREEZE.

- The implementing party for NSF is the Office of Polar Programs.
- The implementing parties for the Department of Defense are the US Air Force/Air National Guard and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
- As the DOD Executive Agent for the MOA, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is required to perform a biennial review of the MOA

- USTRANSCOM has operational control of all DOD common user transportation assets and personnel when they are supporting the Polar Programs.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE missions include:
  - Flying support missions between McMurdo (base camp in Antarctica) and Christchurch, New Zealand, by C-141 and C-17.
  - Intercontinental missions by LC-130 (ski equipped).
  - On-continent missions by LC-130.
  - US Coast Guard (USGC) and Military Sealift Command vessel operations (USCG Icebreakers, one cargo vessel and one fuel tanker).

### Current Year/Season Support (As of 12 Feb 04)

- 46 of 56 C-141 and C-17 missions completed (only C-141 missions remain)
- 51 of 66 LC-130 intercontinental missions complete
- 401 LC-130 on-continent missions complete
  - LC-130 providing additional airlifting for cargo offloaded from AMERICAN TERN
- McMurdo Station to close on 24 Feb
- DEEP FREEZE closes o/a 27 Feb; all units return home

**Recommendation.** None. Provided for information only.

Prepared by: CDR Warren, USN, J-3 JOD-PAC, (b)(6)

01270A17

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Antarctica

In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

Sir,  
The attached *U* 5X8 previously  
routed, answers this snowflake.  
vr/cdr Nosum  
3/1

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25241



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-9999

INFO MEMO      CH-1668-04  
5 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/4/3*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- Issue. "I just read this Operation ~~Deep~~ Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like Operation Deep Freeze. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- Conclusion. The Joint Staff, combatant command and Service staffs have examined all standing execution orders (EXORDs). Operation DEEP FREEZE (ODF) is the only EXORD that had not been cancelled, reviewed or modified since 11 September 2001. I anticipate that a further evaluation of outstanding memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and understanding with other agencies may highlight areas that do not have a direct bearing on the War on Terrorism. A review of these memorandums will be forwarded by 30 April.
- Discussion. EXORDs dating back to 1992 were analyzed to determine if they had undergone periodic review and approval since 11 September.
  - Before July 2001, ODF was executed under an MOA with the National Science Foundation. USTRANSCOM supports several such MOAs pre-dating September 2001 that are now under evaluation.
  - Combatant commander and Service staffs were encouraged to continue their review of all EXORDs that require use of DOD assets in light of their applicability to current operations.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

*OSD 03398-04*  
*SJS 04-00529/02*

11-L-0559/OSD/25242

Tab B

March 2, 2004

To: LTG John Craddock

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/12/04-3 response to SecDef snowflake

1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica (012704-17)

DHR:dh  
030204-14

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

**COORDINATION PAGE**

<b>USA</b>	<b>COL Hooker</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USN</b>	<b>CAPT Thompson</b>	<b>18 March 2004</b>
<b>USAF</b>	<b>Col Murphy</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USMC</b>	<b>Col Van Dyke</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	<b>Col Hiebert</b>	<b>16 March 2004</b>
<b>USEUCOM</b>	<b>COL Rogers</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USJFCOM</b>	<b>CAPT Smith</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USNORTHCOM</b>	<b>CAPT Jacobs</b>	<b>15 March 2004</b>
<b>USPACOM</b>	<b>Col Murphy</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USSOCOM</b>	<b>Mr. Eichenberger</b>	<b>16 March 2004</b>
<b>USSOUTHCOM</b>	<b>Col Gurney</b>	<b>15 March 2004</b>
<b>USSTRATCOM</b>	<b>CAPT Oliver</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>
<b>USTRANSCOM</b>	<b>Col Pedersen</b>	<b>17 March 2004</b>

Tab B

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM

Gen Handy

26 April 2004

SECRET  
2004 JAN 30 PM 3:40

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Antarctica

In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
012704-17

.....  
Please respond by 2/4/04

Sir,  
The attached *C* 5x8 previously  
routed, answers this snowflake.  
vr/cdr Nosmy  
3/1

OSD 09822-04 Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25246

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

May 28, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: FAA for Space

You should have someone pull together that idea of having an FAA for space.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
US2604-12

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

040 TRANSPORT

28 May 04

30 Jun 04

Tab A

UNCLASSIFIED

OSD 09825-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25247



HEALTH AFFAIRS

720  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

JUN 30 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*  
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Opportunity to Cut Health Care Costs (Email from Newt Gingrich)

- The purpose of this memo is to outline the features of a new form of health care insurance suggested by Mr. Gingrich (TAB A) for adoption by the Department of Defense.
- Many large employers in the United States are offering a new form of health insurance known as Consumer Driven Health plans. Consumer Driven Health plans combine the use of financial incentives and information on quality to promote cost-conscious behavior. Commercial Consumer Driven Health plans utilize a personal account for individuals or families from which consumers draw on for health care as they need. If the account is exhausted, the enrollee pays out of pocket costs on a dollar for dollar basis until an annual deductible is met. At that point, cost sharing applies until a catastrophic cap is reached. Preventive care is normally covered without cost. These financial features are combined with improved information on cost, outcomes, and quality to empower individuals to make better health care decisions for themselves and their family.
- Consumer Driven Health plans can have varying features. One major form of Consumer Driven Health plans includes use of notional accounts where the employer designates a defined amount. Under this design, the employer pays claims up to the amount of the notional account rather than providing funds to the beneficiary to pay the claims. A second approach is to use Medical Savings Accounts, which have tax exempt status, and allows beneficiaries to develop tax exempt interest, and involve actual employer provided funds.
- **Mi.** Gingrich has suggested that given a recent change of Medicare policy, the Department of Defense should offer Consumer Driven Health plans, specifically one with a Medical Savings Account feature, to TRICARE beneficiaries. He suggests Medical Savings Accounts might save TRICARE \$1 billion per year or more.

OSD 09909-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25248

- David Chu and I met together with **Mr. Gingrich** to learn more about Consumer Driven Health Plans. My staff has followed up with **Mr. Gingrich's** staff to gather more details and suggestions.
- I believe Consumer Driven Health Plans have great promise, and I am considering the initiation of a limited health care demonstration to establish the effectiveness of a Consumer Driven Health benefit in the Military Health System.
- I do, however, have 2 concerns regarding this initiative:
  - First, our present benefit design is so rich, (provides such extensive healthcare coverage) with very little out-of-pocket expense, that I suspect many beneficiaries may not find the Consumer Driven Health Plan option to be an attractive alternative.
  - Second, this option may require a legislative proposal and change in law to permit the implementation of this benefit design.
- My plan is to implement the on-going changes in TRICARE and the new multi-billion dollar contracts over the remainder of this calendar year. The design of these contracts, and organizational restructuring, will enhance customer satisfaction and quality of care while reducing costs to the Department. By early 2005 we would be ready to move forward with a demonstration on Consumer Driven Health Plans following this major transition.
- I appreciate **Mr. Gingrich's** creative ideas and recommendations for TRICARE and innovative approaches that may improve the financing and delivery of military health care.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Thomas Williams, TMA/HPA&E, (b)(6) PCDOCS 66066,66678

11-L-0559/OSD/25249

**TAB**

**A**

TO: David Chu  
David Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gingrich**

Attached is another memo from Newt Gingrich on health care costs. Please take a look and let me **know** what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604D.05s

*Attach: Gingrich email 11.23.03 – Opportunity to Cut Health Costs*

Please respond by: 6 | 21

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

---

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:45 PM

**To:** (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil;  
william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil

**Subject:** cutting the cost of dod health

for secdef,depsecdef  
from newt 11/23/03

opportunity to cut health costs while making people happy

the new Medicare bill includes a provision for a health savings account effective 1/1/04.

this provision allows you to offer up to \$2500 per individual or \$5000 per family tax free in a health savings account which also is tax free in the interest buildup and tax free if you spend it on health, preventive health, long term care or long term care insurance.

this is the biggest change in health policy since 1943,

you could offer everyone in tricare under 65 an option. those who choose it and are healthy would rapidly begin to buildup a health savings account and would be spending first dollar on themselves and their family.

this would dramatically change the incentives for use and would lead to much more informed people because they would be in charge.

a family that had four years without a major illness would have \$20,000 plus the tax free interest or investment return (say 4% in this environment) or potentially \$21,300 in savings which could also allow the insurance to rise with a floating deductible equal to the size of the savings account.

given the size of tricare this might enable you to save \$1 billion a year or more.

**TAB**

**B**

Response to Opportunity to Cut Health Care Costs from Newt Gingrich – SNOWFLAKE

COORDINATION

DASD (HB&FP)

Concurred, 6/24/04


CoS (HA)

Concurred, 6/25/04

(A)PDASD (HA)

Concurred, 6/28/04

USD (P&R)

  
1 July 04

TO: David Chu  
David Winkenwerder

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gingrich**

Attached is another memo from Newt Gingrich on health care costs. Please take a look and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060604D.05s

*Attach: Gingrich email 11.23.03 – Opportunity to Cut Health Costs*

Please respond by: 6 | 21

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

---

**From:** Thirdwave2@aol.com

**Sent:** Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:45 PM

**To:** (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6); jack.patterson@osd.mil;  
william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil

**Subject:** cutting the cost of dod health

for secdef,depsecdef  
from newt 11/23/03

opportunity to cut health costs while making people happy

the new Medicare bill includes a provision for a health savings account effective 1/1/04.

this provision allows you to offer up to \$2500 per individual or \$5000 per family tax free in a health savings account which also is tax free in the interest buildup and tax free if you spend it on health, preventive health, long term care or long term care insurance.

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you could offer everyone in tricare under 65 an option. those who choose it and are healthy would rapidly begin to buildup a health savings account and would be spending first dollar on themselves and their family.

this would dramatically change the incentives for use and would lead to much more informed people because they would be in charge.

a family that had four years without a major illness would have \$20,000 plus the tax free interest or investment return (say 4% in this environment) or potentially \$21,300 in savings which could also allow the insurance to rise with a floating deductible equal to the size of the savings account.

given the size of tricare this might enable you to save \$1 billion a year or more.

11-L-0559/OSD/25256

11/24/2003

JUN 21 2004  
I-04/00325  
EF-9224

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Mira Ricardel

SUBJECT: Meeting in Rome

Geoff Hoon called. He wants to go ahead with the MoD meeting in Rome, probably Sunday morning, the morning before the NATO MoD meeting in Istanbul starts. I told him that if he wanted, I would co-host it, but that he would have to do the work, because I just had too many things going on.

I raised a series of questions. Issues he should consider: who to invite, what to present, etc. You might want to help them think through how to do it, if he decides to go forward. I told them the White House had no particular interest and that I didn't. He said that Downing Street had a lot of interest and that is why he has had to agree to do it.

Thanks.-

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

DHR:dh  
061904-5

June 30, 2004

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Captain Marriott,

Respectfully request that this snowflake action be closed - it is OBE.

Agree  
Paul Butler  
7/2

Jane Bartlett  
Jane Bartlett  
Deputy Director  
Policy Executive Secretariat

TAB A

June 29, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Aircraft Security for Ukraine

Let's make sure we provide the security for the Ukraine aircraft when they land at Al Kut, the way we indicated to Minister Marchuk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062904-5 (is computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*7/2/04*

OSD 10040-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25258



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, O.C. 20318-9999

2004 JUL -7 AM 9 05

INFO MEMO

CM-1897-04  
6 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, <sup>For</sup> CJCS *VA/R 6306*

SUBJECT: Aircraft Security for Ukraine

- **Issue.** "Let's make sure we provide the security for the Ukraine aircraft when they land at Al Kut, the way we indicated to Minister Marchuk." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** USCENTCOM Joint Operations Center confirmed that security for the Ukraine aircraft landing at Al Kut, Iraq, on 30 June was provided.
- **Discussion.** Multi-National Corps-Iraq provided attack aviation sweeps of the area prior to the aircraft's arrival, as well as ground security while the aircraft was at Al Kut. Aircraft departed the same day with no incidents reported. Ukraine General Officer feedback to Multi-National Force-Iraq indicated that they were pleased with the security arrangements.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N.A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25259

OSD 10040704

TAB A

June 29, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick ~~Myers~~  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Aircraft Security for Ukraine

Let's make sure we provide the security for the Ukraine aircraft when they land at Al Kut, the way we indicated to Minister Marchuk.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062904-5 (to computer).doc

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*7/2/04*

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25260

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**TAB B**

**COORDINATION PAGE**

USCENTCOM

COL Swedburg

01 July 2004

TAB

June 8, 2004

713

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hanson Article

Attached is an article by Victor Davis Hanson. Please read it, and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hanson, Victor Davis. "Kill the Insurgents. Stop Talking." *The New Republic*, June 7 & 14, 2004, p. 13-14.

DHR:dh  
660804-10

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

Tab

OSD 10113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25262

Kill the insurgents.

# Stop Talking

BY VICTOR DAVIS HANSON

**M**OST OF THE time in war, diplomatic machinations don't create enduring realities—events on the battlefield do. After World War I, the defeated, but not humiliated, German army that surrendered in France and Belgium provided the origins for the “stab in the back” mythology that fueled Hitler's rise to power. After World War II, by contrast, the shattered and shamed Wehrmacht in Berlin was unable to energize a Fourth Reich. George S. Patton, snarling to head for Berlin and beyond in 1945, grasped the importance of “the unforgiving minute,” when military audacity can establish a fait accompli on the ground that diplomats quibble over for decades. His unfulfilled wish to take Prague meant a blank check for a late-arriving Red Army that would help ensure a half-century of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe.

The labyrinth of failed plans and bad-faith deals in the Balkans led nowhere until the U.S. Air Force secured in 79 days in 1999 the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic—the chief foreign policy achievement of the Clinton administration. Suicide bombing failed to bring Yasir Arafat what he could not obtain at Camp David only because of the skill and ingenuity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which—through a multifaceted strategy of border fortification, proactive attacks, targeted air assassinations, and increased intelligence and vigilance—drastically curtailed the efficacy of the tactic. Arafat today is a marginalized figure not because of a belated European perception that he is corrupt and murderous, but because he was first reduced to a humiliated lord of a rubble pile—thanks to the IDF.

In our current postmodern world, we tend to deprecate the efficacy of arms, trusting instead that wise and reasonable people can adjudicate the situation on the ground according to Enlightenment principles of diplomacy and reason. But thugs like Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Saddam Hussein's remnant killers beg to differ. They may eventually submit to a fair and honest brokered peace—but only when the alternative is an Abrams tank or Cobra gunship, rather than a stern rebuke from L. Paul Bremer. More important, neutrals and well-meaning moderates in Iraq often put their ideological preferences on hold as they wait to see who will, in fact, win. The promise of consensual government, gender equality, and the rule of law may indeed save the Iraqi people and improve our own security—but only

*Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

7/1  
1105  
Paul Butler  
From: Sec Def

From: Peter Rodman

pub

1/2

FYI.

See especially p. 14.

When those who wish none of it learn that trying to stop it will get them killed.

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows. But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt—and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

The misplaced restraint of the past year is not true morality, but a sort of weird immorality that seeks to avoid ethical censure in the short term—the ever-present, 24-hour pulpit of global television that inflates a half-dozen inadvertent civilian casualties into Dresden and Hiroshima. But, in the long term, such complacency has left more moderate Iraqis to be targeted by ever more emboldened murderers. For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.

This is the context for the current insistence on more troops. America's failure to promptly retake Falluja or rid Najaf of militiamen demands more soldiers to garrison the ever more Fallujas and Najafs that will now surely arise. In contrast, audacity is a force multiplier. A Sadr in chains or in paradise is worth more, in terms of deterrence, than an entire infantry division.

There are other advantages to a force of some 138,000 rapidly responding soldiers, rather than 200,000 or so garrison troops. The more American troops, the less likely it is Iraqis will feel any obligation to step up to the responsibilities of their own defense. The more troops, the more psychological reliance on numbers than on performance of individual units. And, the more troops, the higher the profile of culturally bothersome Americans who disturb by their mere omnipresence, rather than win respect for their proven skill in arms.

**O**N MONDAY EVENING, the president outlined a sober, workable, step-by-step transition plan from the appointment of constitutional framers to representative delegates and on to direct democracy, which, like it or not, will at long last put a much-needed Iraqi face on both political and military operations. The long-term trends offer hope—whether we look at heightened petroleum revenue from increased pumping and prices to the influx of U.S. aid and the resurrection of the Iraqi infrastructure. But these trends won't endure unless our youth bring to bear the full force of U.S. military might that credits the Iraqis for their success in putting down the opponents of their own newly created society.

This formula does not require more American soldiers. It requires the increasing use of admittedly unreliable Iraqi

troops made more reliable by the massive use of U.S. tanks, airpower, and artillery. The former will grow in confidence, as did the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, when they grasp that real force is on their side and that their enemies have no commensurate recourse to air strikes, armor, and heavy artillery—much less billions of dollars in aid. In other words, we can accomplish two seemingly mutually exclusive goals—more security and less of an American profile—but only by using the force we have to punish the enemy on every single occasion it attacks, starting immediately.

Practically, a new aggressiveness means greater use of Special Forces, Rangers, elite airborne units, and Marines to spearhead retaliatory raids in conjunction with Iraqi forces. Conventional and purely American units should form strategic reserves out of sight that can arrive in overwhelming force to surround recalcitrant cities should our Iraqi-American forces face problems—and they will, at first. Clear success in Falluja—defined not just by apparent tranquility, but the absence of arms caches, nocturnal assassins, and organized gangs of Baathists using homes and businesses to foment insurrection—will undermine Sadr's militias, embolden democracy-minded moderates, and frighten Iran and Syria into curbing their mischief. Iran will talk to us soon enough about behavior that promotes stability rather than terrorism—but only when they have real reason to fear U.S. success in Iraq. A consensual Iraq, then, even in the broadest sense, is a de facto revolutionary force in the region, whose daily televised parliamentary proceedings, free and open presses, economic transparency, and vibrant popular culture offer an alternative paradigm to the same old tired Middle East dichotomy between the Islamic fundamentalism of the masses and the fascist autocracy of the elite.

By contrast, hesitation and uncertainty would propel the sequence of events into reverse. If the humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 helped create the landscape for the boat-people, reeducation camps, the Cambodian holocaust, the takeover of the Tehran Embassy, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Russian-sponsored insurrection in Central America, and a decade-long demoralization at home, so, in the same way, our momentum thus far has curtailed the Libyan weapons program, brought revelations of nuclear mischief from Dr. A.Q. Khan, and put Iran and Syria under scrutiny—a volcanic, not a static, situation that can as easily deteriorate as improve. The hard truth is that grand diplomacy and geopolitical calculus depend on the lethality of a few thousand American fighters in the streets of Karbala, Kufa, and Najaf. The more lethal they are today, the safer Iraqis and Americans will be in the years to come. ■

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1900-04  
7 July 2804

27 Jul 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard **3** Myers, CJCS *OSM 7/7*

SUBJECT: Hanson Article

- **Question.** "Attached is an article by Victor David Hanson. Please read it, and let's discuss." (TAB)
- **Answer.** Hanson makes a sophisticated argument and raises several interesting points that merit discussion.
- **Analysis.** Hanson's basic thesis is that the United States should employ lethality **rather** than diplomacy/restraint against Iraqi extremists. This is best achieved by employing existing troops in a more audacious manner rather than increasing force structure.
- While his thesis is appealing, it also raises several critical questions **to** consider:
  - How would this approach impact the use of other instruments of power?
  - Why would this approach decrease rather than increase number of extremists?
  - How would this approach impact the legitimacy of the interim Iraqi government?
  - How would the UN and our allies respond to this approach?
  - Is he guilty of mirror imaging?
  - Does this approach **make** the US military a de facto arm of the Iraqi army'?
  - Finally, since Hanson was educated as a classicist, with particular expertise in the Peloponnesian War, why is he relying so heavily on the military instrument of power? One of the principal reasons Athens fell is that it overly relied on its navy (i.e. military instrument of power) to the exclusion of other instruments--is this a lesson worth bearing in mind'?

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Waiter L. Sharp, USA; DJ-5; (b)(6)

OSD 10113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25265

TAB

June 8, 2004

713

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hanson Article

Attached is an article by Victor Davis Hanson. Please read it, and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Hanson, Victor Davis. "Kill the Insurgents. Stop Talking." *The New Republic*, June 7 & 14, 2004, p. 13-14.

DHR:ab  
11-0804-10

.....  
Please respond by 6/18/04

Tab

OSD 10113-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25266

Kill the insurgents.

# Stop Talking

BY VICTOR DAVIS HANSON

**M**OST OF THE time in war, diplomatic machinations don't create enduring realities—events on the battlefield do. After World War I, the defeated, but not humiliated, German army that surrendered in France and Belgium provided the origins for the “stab in the back” mythology that fueled Hitler's rise to power. After World War II, by contrast, the shattered and shamed Wehrmacht in Berlin was unable to energize a Fourth Reich. George S. Patton, snarling to head for Berlin and beyond in 1945, grasped the importance of “the unforgiving minute,” when military audacity can establish a fait accompli on the ground that diplomats quibble over for decades. His unfulfilled wish to take Prague meant a blank check for a late-arriving Red Army that would help ensure a half-century of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe.

The labyrinth of failed plans and bad-faith deals in the Balkans led nowhere until the U.S. Air Force secured in 79 days in 1999 the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic—the chief foreign policy achievement of the Clinton administration. Suicide bombing failed to bring Yasir Arafat what he could not obtain at Camp David only because of the skill and ingenuity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which—through a multifaceted strategy of border fortification, proactive attacks, targeted air assassinations, and increased intelligence and vigilance—drastically curtailed the efficacy of the tactic. Arafat today is a marginalized figure not because of a belated European perception that he is corrupt and murderous, but because he was first reduced to a humiliated lord of a rubble pile—thanks to the IDF.

In our current postmodern world, we tend to deprecate the efficacy of arms, trusting instead that wise and reasonable people can adjudicate the situation on the ground according to Enlightenment principles of diplomacy and reason. But thugs like Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Saddam Hussein's remnant killers beg to differ. They may eventually submit to a fair and honest brokered peace—but only when the alternative is an Abrams tank or Cobra gunship, rather than a stern rebuke from L. Paul Bremer. More important, neutrals and well-meaning moderates in Iraq often put their ideological preferences on bold as they wait to see who will, in fact, win. The promise of consensual government, gender equality, and the rule of law may indeed save the Iraqi people and improve our own security—but only

*Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

2/1  
100  
Paul Butler  
Firm: Peter Rodman  
pub  
4/2

FYI.

See especially p. 14.

When those who wish none of it learn that trying to stop it will get them killed.

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows. But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt — and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

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ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

25A JUL -2 11 7 '04

July 8, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Handling Reports from the Intl. Committee of the Red Cross [Final]

- In the attached snowflake you asked that we establish a system for receiving, memorializing, and elevating oral and written reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
- The memo at TAB A establishes a process for receiving and promptly elevating oral or written ICRC reports. To ensure expedited action, we propose that all ICRC reports received by a ~~military~~ or civilian official of the Department of Defense at any level shall, within 24 hours, be transmitted to the USD(P) with information copies to the Director, Joint Staff; the ASD(PA); the General Counsel of DoD; and the DoD Executive Secretary. Reports received by officials within a combatant command area of operation shall also be transmitted simultaneously to the combatant commander.
- The USD(P) will determine the significance of reports and immediately forward to you those ICRC reports of significance. For all reports, the USD(P) will develop and coordinate a course of action. Actions of significance will be forwarded to you for decision.
- Oral reports from the ICRC will be summarized in writing. Guidance on the essential information to be included is provided in the memo at TAB A.
- The temporary procedures established in the memo at TAB A are effective immediately and shall be reviewed in six months with a view to incorporating these changes into pertinent DoD issuances.
- To ensure that DoD responses to ICRC reports are appropriately coordinated with other US Government agencies, the USD(P) shall establish an ICRC Interagency Group, consisting of representatives of Defense, State, the NSC Staff, and other appropriate agencies, that will meet, initially monthly, to review ICRC matters, coordinate responses, and share information.

7/12

080

850104

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memo at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments  
As stated

TBA SD	
SA DRD	
SRMA DRD	21 7/12
EXEC SEC	M 7/12

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 14 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
 COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
 INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 DEFENSE  
 ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
 DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
 DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT  
 DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION  
 DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES  
 DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

080

SUBJECT: Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross

Prompt evaluation and transmission of reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to senior DoD leaders is of the utmost importance. Recognizing that information may be reported at various command levels and in oral or written form, I direct the following actions:

- All ICRC reports received by a military or civilian official of the Department of Defense at any level shall, within 24 hours, be transmitted to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) with information copies to the Director, Joint Staff; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; the General Counsel of DoD; and the DoD Executive Secretary. ICRC reports received by officials within a combatant command area of operation shall also be transmitted simultaneously to the commander of the combatant command.
- The USD(P) shall be responsible for determining the significance of ICRC reports and immediately forwarding those actions of significance to the Secretary of Defense.
- For all ICRC reports, the USD(P) shall, within 72 hours of receipt, develop a course of action, coordinate such actions with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the pertinent Combatant Commander, the General Counsel of DoD, and, as appropriate,

14 July 04

8 July 04



OSD 10190-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25270

the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and other DoD officials. Actions of significance shall be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

- Combatant Commanders shall provide their assessment of the ICRC reports they receive to the USD(P) through the Director, Joint Staff within **24** hours of receipt.
- To ensure essential information is reported, oral reports shall be summarized in writing. The following information shall be included:
  - Description of the ICRC visit or meeting: Location? When? Has corrective action been initiated if warranted?
  - Identification of specific detainee or enemy prisoner of war reported upon (if applicable).
  - Name of ICRC Representative.
  - Identification of U.S. official who received the report. Also, identify the U.S. official submitting the report.
- All ICRC communications shall be marked with the following statement: "ICRC communications are provided to DoD as confidential, restricted-use documents. As such, they will be safeguarded the same as ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ information using classified information channels. Dissemination of ICRC communications outside of DoD is not authorized without the approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense."

These temporary procedures are effective immediately and shall be reviewed in six months with a view to incorporating these changes into pertinent DoD issuances.

At the same time, the USD(P) shall establish an ICRC Interagency Group, consisting of representatives of the Defense and State Departments and the National Security Council Staff, and other appropriate agencies, that will meet, initially monthly, to review ICRC matters, coordinate responses, and ensure that all ICRC matters are appropriately addressed.

Your compliance with the procedures in this memorandum is a matter of DoD policy and is essential to enabling the Department to continue to meet its responsibilities and obligations for the humane care and full accountability for all persons captured or detained during military operations.

i ^  


May 20, 2004

To: Ray DuBois  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Pete Geren  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: ICRC and Human Rights Reporting

J  
7/12

Please fashion a system throughout the Department of Defense whereby any oral input from the International Committee of the Red Cross is memorialized in a memorandum, and any written communication from the ICRC or any human rights group is elevated to at least the next two levels of authority above where the reports are submitted.

We need to get a Department-wide fix on this fast. Please do this in the next four days and make an 80 percent proposal to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
052004-26

.....  
Please respond by 5/26/04

c r d  
SIGNED BY SD

7/14

11-L-0559/OSD/25272

SIR  
Response attached  
vr / CDR Nosumzo  
7/1  
OSD 07805-04  
DSD 07805-04

### ICRC Coordination

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Official</b>	<b>Date Coordinated</b>
CJCS	MG Michael Maples, VDJS	June 30,2004
USD(P)	Douglas J. Feith	June 23, 2004
General Counsel	W. J. Haynes	July 7,2004
Special Assistant (Mr. Geren)	Peter Geren	July 8,2004

cc:  
Secretary of the **Army**  
USD(I)  
ASD(PA)

TAB

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 JUN 12 June 9, 2004  
806

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Foreign Forces

We do need a plan to go out and get foreign forces to protect the UN in Iraq, to protect the elections and to replace some of our forces. Let's design a program to do that.

We also need to get a briefing on CENTCOM's ideas as to how they are going to arrange foreign forces relative to our forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060904-28

.....  
Please respond by 6/25/04

Tab

Iraq  
9 Jun 04

2004 JUL 12 PM 5:36

**ACTION MEMO**

EF-0029  
I-04/008975-ES  
DepSecDef  
USDP *RE (POM) 7/1c*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Ricard *John Hand for JUL 8 2004*, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP)

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Dr. Edmund Stoiber, Bavarian Minister President.

- Letter at Tab B from Dr. Edmund Stoiber, the Minister President for Bavaria, comments on the 28 May 2004 global posture consultations between Doug Feith and members of the German federal government.
  - Stoiber thanks you for involving Bavaria in the consultations.
  - He expresses his appreciation for the possibility of a **Stryker** brigade being stationed in Grafenwoehr.
  - Stoiber discusses the withdrawal of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, the impact it will have on the Franconian region, and points out the advantages of the Nuernberg International Airport and Rhine-Main-Danube canal.
- Letter at Tab A for your signature:
  - Thanks Dr. Stoiber for his letter.
  - States Germany will remain a center-piece for U.S. forces stationed in Europe.
  - Emphasizes that no final decisions have been made.
  - Promises to continue the close consultations between our two governments.

32002 Strategic

**RECOMMENDATION:** You sign Tab A letter.

Attachments:  
As stated

8 JUL 04

OSD 10269-04


11-L-0559/OSD/25275

08-07-04 14:42 IN

**COORDINATION**

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
European and NATO Policy

Ian J. Brzezinski



Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Strategy

Mike Brown (for)

electronically

Director, European Policy North

Jess Kelso



11-L-0559/OSD/25276

Prepared by: CDR Chaffee, ISP/EUR, 697-9258, 07 Jul 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ES-0029  
04/008975

2004 JUL 12 PM 5:36 July 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Bavarian Minister President

I would like to see the response we draft to this letter from the Bavarian Minister President.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/28/04 Bavarian Minister President ltr to SD

DHR:dh  
070104-30

.....  
Please respond by

7/7/04

GERMANY

1 JUL 04

8 JUL 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 10269-04

02-07-04 11:20 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/25277

SECRET:

Booted copy of a memo you should  
be getting shortly.

C6/28  
DS 71

Courtesy Translation by USFLO Bayern/28Jun04

The Bavarian Minister President

Tel. (b)(6)

File # BII3.2-971-282

Secretary of Defense  
Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-455  
USA

Dear Secretary:

Allow me to make some comments about the consultations at the end of May of this year between representatives of your government and the German Federal government regarding the US military installations in Germany. I would like to thank you that your government acknowledges the value of Bavaria as an essential stationing location and involves us in these negotiations. In this fashion we also always obtain factual information.

I already had the opportunity this year, in early February, during the Munich Conference for Security Policy to state our position and to reassure you that the US military installations in Bavaria are of high strategic importance for Europe and that the stationing of the US military in Bavaria provides many strategic advantages with regards to rapid deployment into crisis areas, and that the US Army and their family members are appreciated guests and a unique part of Bavaria.

Although the plans of the military have not been politically finalized, I appreciate that the importance of training areas in Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels were taken into account and that will possibly be upgraded with a Stryker brigade thereby retaining the high strategic importance of the area.

11-L-0559/OSD/25278

The intent to **withdraw the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division due to a restructuring of the US Forces** has a direct impact on **Bavaria** Especially in **the Franconian region** where the future use of the **soon to be vacated installations** has not been determined. Despite **the military** organization structure i believe that these **WS installations** are primarily suitable **for** rapid deployment of units. I request you reconsider **utilizing** these excellent installations **for** possible future **use**.

In **this** respect I **would like** to point out **the** advantages of **the** Nuernberg international **airport**. For a **long** time now your soldiers **stationed** in Bavaria have deployed to **the Balkans** from **this** airport. **Additionally**, last February the soldiers of the **1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division** deployed from **this** airport to Iraq. Your Generals and Officers **highly** appreciate the **short travel distance from their installations** in Bavaria to the deployment airfield.

In **coordination** with HQs, **USAREUR** Nuernberg **airport** established a separate deployment processing **area** for the US Army thereby **guaranteeing a smooth** operation. The Nuernberg **airport also guarantees air routes into the areas of** operation in the Middle **East**, especially since **the NATO expansion includes** the new members of **Bulgaria, Rumania** and Slovakia and **their commitment to** the alliance. Subsequently, a potential **Austrian** denial of over flight rights **is of no consequence any more**.

Should the requirement remain for the **further** deployment of **heavy** equipment **into** the areas of operation the **use of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal is obvious** since the military installations **of Wuerzburg, Schweinfurt, Bamberg and Kitzingen are** located directly on the **canal**. **Also** other **US Army** units stationed in Ansbach, Illesheim and Giebelstadt **are** in close proximity **of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal**. During the Iraq **mission** the deployment of **heavy** equipment **utilizing** inland waterways to the oversea ports **was** successfully performed.

---

**Because of the special importance associated with the stationing of US Forces in Germany I would like to reiterate *the* strategic advantages of Bavaria's military installations which offer you the capability to rapidly deploy of your troops into the areas of operation.**

**Sincerely,**

**Dr. Edmund Stoiber**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 16 2004

320.2 Strategic

Dr. Edmund Stoiber  
The Bavarian Minister President  
Postfach 22 00 11  
80535 Munich  
Germany

Dear Minister-President Stoiber,

Thank you for your letter regarding our ongoing Global Posture review.

I appreciate your remarks about the possible return of the 1st Infantry Division to the U.S. and the impact it will have on the Franconian region of Bavaria. The United States' long friendship with Germany will continue even as we change our force posture to meet the threats of the twenty-first century. Germany will remain a centerpiece of our forces stationed in Europe.

16 JUL 04

As our review proceeds, we will continue the close consultations begun last year.

With best wishes,



OSD 10269-04

8 JUL 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25281



PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000  
INFO MEMO



2004 JUL 12 10:30 AM  
DepSecDef

POLICY

JUL 12 2004

1-04/006163  
EF-9499

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Iraq

SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq Weekly Update

- You asked about the extent to which Senator Lamar Alexander's fifteen suggested metrics have been incorporated into the Iraq Weekly Update and suggested that we consider incorporating those that are not currently in use.
- Also attached is a list of the Senator's suggested metrics and an explanation of which metrics are, or are not, being used and why. We have highlighted in bold text those metrics that we are using.
  - CPA uses 13 of Senator Alexander's suggested metrics in whole or in part.
  - Only two of his suggested metrics, the Number of Prisons and the Number of TV/Radio Stations Broadcasting, are not used.

1250104



Senator Alexander's Metrics and the Iraq Weekly Status Report

OSD Policy  
7/2/04

Suggested Metrics	Iraq Weekly Status Report
Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/power)	We report megawatt hours produced, peak generation capacity (megawatts), as well as average hours of electricity by governorate. No Iraqis receive electrical power around-the-clock, therefore, the hours of power received per day is a better indicator of how well Iraq's electrical demand is being met.
Schools (# of schools open, % of boys and girls attending)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)	We report that all 240 hospitals are operating. We also report on clinics, pharmaceutical supplies, and other related data. The percentage of Iraqis receiving services does not reflect improvements in the quality of services received.
Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Police (# in training, # training)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Militia (# in training, # training)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis with freshwater access)	We report on water projects underway and the estimated number of Iraqis benefiting from them.
Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)	We could report the number of prisons open, prison beds available, and/ or the number of prisoners and detainees held. CPA believes it would be more advisable to measure the number of prisons brought up to international standards. CPA also believes that reporting weekly on this long-term effort would not be worthwhile. <i>WE WILL WORK WITH DCS TO RE-EVALUATE.</i>
Iraqi Troops (# in training, # serving)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)	We report the percentage of the projected quarterly food requirements that are on-hand.
Unemployment (# and/or %)	Included in Iraq Weekly Status Report
TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)	We could track the number of TV/radio stations broadcasting in Iraq and how Iraqis obtain information. CPA believes it would not be worthwhile to report this information weekly.

*WE WILL WORK WITH DCS TO RE-EVALUATE, TO INCLUDE BROADCAST AND PRINT MEDIA. AS THE INTERNET DEVELOPS WE WILL ALSO DETERMINE IF THERE IS A VIABLE METHOD TO TRACK.*

UNCLASSIFIED

06 0635 EDT Jul 04



# **WORKING PAPERS**

# *Iraq Status*

This briefing is classified  
**UNCLASSIFIED**  
Derived from: Multiple Sources

11-L-0559/OSD/25284

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**Highlights**

<b>Objectives:</b> <b>Finance</b> <b>Stability</b> <b>Political</b> <b>Security</b> <b>Recovery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Support the Interim Iraqi Government</b></li> <li>• <b>Build Justice</b></li> <li>• <b>Reconstruct Communications &amp; Postal Systems</b></li> <li>• <b>Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure</b></li> </ul>
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**Highlights:**

**Formal transfer of sovereignty was announced at a ceremony in Baghdad, two days ahead of schedule**

**Opinion polling shows a high level of support (68%) for the Interim Government**

**Saddam Hussein appeared in an Iraqi court to hear preliminary charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity read out against him**

**Number of telephone subscribers in Iraq is now over 1 million (inc. 461,000 cell phone subscribers) - 50.3 % above pre-2003 levels**

**Estimated crude oil export revenue is around \$8 billion for 2004**



## Governance

- **The formal transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government took place at a ceremony on 28 Jun, two days ahead of schedule**
  - **Ambassador Bremer announced the formal dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)**
- **Recent poll shows a high level of support (68%) for the Interim Iraqi Government and new leadership**
- **The same poll also indicate that a large proportion of Iraqis expect that the upcoming elections for the National Assembly will be free and fair**
- **The Government of Iraq is preparing for the selection of a National Council to oversee the government and cabinet council of Ministers**
  - **Assistance is being provided by an NGO funded by USAID**
- **Kuwait announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Iraq, severed since Saddam Hussein's forces invaded the emirate in 1990**

### Objectives: Governance

**Support Transition to Sovereignty; Develop Civic Participation in Governance; Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections; Promote Respect for Human Rights; Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**



# Governance (Cont.) - National Transition

2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

01 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) Announced and Governing Council dissolved

Phase I  
(Interim Government)

04 Jun

Election Commission established

28 Jun

Transfer sovereignty from CPA to IIG

Jul

National Conference convenes and selects Interim National Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II  
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office

N/P



## Essential Services - Water and Sanitation

- **A strategic approach for repairing and maintaining the Sweet Water Canal and for providing potable water to Basrah is being developed**
  - **PCO, USAID, the Ministry of Water Resources, and the Ministry of Public Works are working together**
- **A substantial increase in access to potable water should result as work on a number of treatment plants and systems is completed in the second half of 2004, including:**
  - **Baghdad's Shark Dijlah plant will benefit 750,000**
  - **Ad Diwaniyah plant will benefit more than 80,000**
  - **An Najaf plant will benefit 560,000**
  - **Ninawa' Governorate plants will benefit 50,000**
  - **Fallujah plant will benefit more than 200,000 people**


**Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal Services**

**Create viable organization to deliver water/sewerage/municipal services (WSMS); Expand WSMS to meet national needs; Develop full range of municipal services & inclusive delivery mechanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource system; Facilities improvements & capacity building within Ministry**



## Essential Services - Telecommunications

- Total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq is now over 1,252,000 (inc. 461,000 cell phone subscribers) - 50.3 % above pre-war levels



- Over 3,300 radios have been installed as part of the Baghdad Digital Network, representing 100% of those under contract
  - Provides emergency communications capability for police, fire and emergency medical technicians

### Objectives: Reconstruct Communications & Postal Systems


Build Iraq's first responder network • Establish independent regulatory agency • Upgrade Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) network • Build transmission component data network for Iraq, inc. international gateways • Restructure ITPC and its business operations • Upgrade and modernize postal systems • Upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use



## Essential Services - Transportation

- USAID's program for the management of the Port of Umm Qasr was completed on 30 Jun
- Since the port re-opened to commercial traffic in Jun 03, achievements include:
  - Over \$18 million in operating revenues were generated
  - Over 280 vessels, 1.2 million metric tons of cargo, and 8,000 people have moved through the facility

- Chart shows # of full containers (Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEU)) processed through Port Umm Qasr from Oct 03 through May 04




### Objectives: Restore Economically Strategic Transportation Infrastructure

Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service • Enable Iraqi Port Authority to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution • Enable Iraqi Republic Railways to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities • Reform civil service at Ministry of Transportation



# Essential Services - Food Security

- Chart below shows % of estimated requirements for Public Distribution System (PDS) goods from Apr-01 Jul
- Requirement includes stocks sufficient for the period and a three month buffer for 01 Jul
- While substantial additional shipments of most goods have been procured, they are not shown as these shipments will arrive after 01 Jul



**Objective: Provide Food Security for all Iraqis**

Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture • Assure supply of inputs • Strengthen research system • Ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS) • Monitor food security • Environmental Initiatives



## Essential Services - Food Security (cont)

- **Food availability throughout Iraq has improved through the combined efforts of the Coalition and the Interim Iraqi Government:**
  - **Tenders for procurement of all commodities needed through the end of the year, including the three-month buffer, are complete and will be issued by Ministry of Trade (MOT) in the coming weeks**
  - **Both wheat and rice stock levels are above 30 days, excluding the national wheat harvest**
  - **The MOT has concluded contracts with two Iraqi firms and a Turkish firm to supply 200,000 metric tons of flour in Jul and Aug**
  - **Harvest of national wheat through the end of Jul will ensure that there is an additional two months supply of wheat**
  - **Three berths are now operational at Umm Qasr with a combined off-load capacity for wheat in excess of 15,000 metric tons per day**
  - **Security on the highways has been enhanced and the ability of trucks to transport wheat and rice is being closely monitored**
  - **Financial incentives for truck drivers have been implemented**



## Essential Services - Health Care

- **Estimated that 85% of Iraqi children have now been immunized**
- **240 Iraqi hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are operating**
  - **Iraqi non-governmental organizations are using USAID assistance to rehabilitate health facilities throughout the country**
- **Supplemental funds are targeting construction of primary health care clinics in every governorate and rehabilitation of 16 pediatric/maternal hospitals**
- **The Minister of Health approved a \$11.5 million emergency drug purchase**
  - **This is the second phase of a program to reduce the occurrence of shortages of critical pharmaceuticals across the country**
- **Training for medical professionals and support for primary health care centers is improving the awareness and treatment of malnutrition**

**Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care**

**Develop health care organizations, management, & infrastructure; Train health care professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support; Public health**



## Essential Services - Education

- **Primary, intermediate, and secondary students have completed their final examinations for the school year with minimal disruption**
- **With support from USAID, Iraqi government agencies are conducting a various vocational training programs to help alleviate unemployment and supply appropriately skilled workers, including:**
  - **A 90-day agricultural training course for youth in southern Iraq**
  - **An Information Technology training program will train 1,000 young Iraqis in southern Iraq**
- **To date, over 32,000 secondary school teachers and 3,000 supervisors have been trained as part of effort to upgrade the quality of education**
- **Nearly 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated to date and an additional 1,200 are expected to be complete by the end of the year**

### Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education

**Reorganize and staff the Ministry of Education; Rehabilitate school buildings and build new schools; Advance national dialog on curriculum reform; Continue and expand teacher training**



## PCO Developments

- **The former Program Management office is now the Project and Contracting Office**
- **The Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) continues to gain momentum nationwide to meet urgent local needs**
- **Projects and requirements were developed as a joint effort between various US and Iraqi agencies, and local community leadership**
- **Projects cover: water and sanitation, health, education, building, roads, power, telecommunications, and various other**
- **Achievements of the AIRP include:**
  - **Over 11,000 Iraqis have been directly employed on projects to date**
  - **Over \$303 million was under contract at 30 Jun, which surpasses the AIRP goal of \$250 million by this date**
  - **Jump starts community essential services construction and improves Iraqi's quality of life**
  - **Stimulates local economy**
  - **Provides opportunities for local businesses**



## **Project and Contracting Office Developments**

- **The former Program Management Office (PMO) has been renamed the Project and Contracting Office (PCO)**
- **Major construction accomplishments to date include:**
  - **Tadji Military Base, Phase III**
  - **Kirkush Military Training Base - Base Utilities**
  - **Public Safety Academy, Baghdad**
  - **Civil Defense Headquarters, Baghdad**
  - **Counter Terrorism Training Facility, Baghdad**
  - **Ministry of Environment, Baghdad**
  - **Nasiriyah Power Generation Water Intake**
  - **Khor Al Zubayr Generation Rehabilitation**
- **The Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) continues to gain momentum nationwide to meet urgent local needs**
  - **Over 11,000 Iraqis have been directly employed on AIRP projects**
  - **Over \$303 million was under contract at 30 Jun, which surpasses the AIRP goal of \$250 million by this date**



# Project and Contracting Office (PCO)

Sector	2207 Report	Apportioned \$M	Committed \$M	Obligated \$M	Expenditure \$M
Security and Law Enforcement	3,243	2,976	2,264	1,431	213
Electricity Sector	5,539	2,538	2,405	1,707	111
Oil Infrastructure	1,701	1,701	1,648	916	16
Justice, Public Safety, and Civil Society (less Democracy)	1,038	825	542	269	14
Democracy	451	451	415	270	8
Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance	259	259	229	48	8
Roads, Bridges, and Construction	370	270	246	123	0
Health Care	793	512	474	283	0
Transportation and Telecommunications	500	467	363	71	4
Water Resources and Sanitation	4,148	816	799	450	0
Private Sector Development	184	136	100	42	16
Admin Expense (USAID, CPA Successor)	213	29	29	29	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18,439</b>	<b>10,980</b>	<b>9,514</b>	<b>5,639</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>CONSTRUCTION</b>					
<b>NON-CONSTRUCTION</b>	<b>5,582</b>	<b>4,789</b>	<b>3,580</b>	<b>1,649</b>	
<b>DEMOCRACY</b>					
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,439</b>	<b>10,980</b>	<b>9,514</b>	<b>5,639</b>	<b>400</b>

N/P


Data as of 30 Jun

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
# Project and Contracting Office (PCO) (Cont.)



PMO Web-site Portal:  
[www.rebuilding-iraq.net](http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net)

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# ject and Contracting Office (PCO) (Cont.)





## Economy

- On 27 Jun, estimated crude oil export revenue was around \$8 Billion for 2004
  - Revenues in June affected by attacks on northern and southern pipelines
- In Jan 04, the Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28 % and an underemployment rate of 21.6%
- According to a recent poll of Iraqis, 59% said that Iraq's economic situation is better than it was before the war
- In the same poll, nearly 59% of respondents expect the economic situation to improve over the next 6 months
- The Consumer Price Index for May in Iraq declined by 1.2 percent relative to its level in April
- The New Iraqi Dinar was at 1,460 dinars per dollar on 27 Jun, and has been stable for over four months

### Economic Objectives:

Build Financial Market Structures; Develop Transparent Budgeting And Accounting Arrangements; Private Sector Initiatives; Lay Foundations For An Open Economy; Pursue National Strategy For Human Resources Development



## **Economy (Cont.)**

**The Iraq Stock Exchange opened on 24 Jun for the first time since the fall of the Ba'athist regime**

- **The mid-market loan program has been launched with the creation of Iraq Mid-Market Development Foundation, a separate legal entity that will channel \$140 million of medium term loans to Iraqi companies and banks**
- **The Kurdistan Trade Forum was held in London during the last week of June to promote investment opportunities in the northern governorates of Iraq**
- **The Japanese government approved \$290 million in emergency grants for rebuilding infrastructure**
  - **These grants are part of the \$1.5 billion aid pledged by Japan last October**
- **The Ministry of Finance is implementing a 10 percent hotel and restaurant tax that will apply to deluxe hotels or first class restaurants.**
  - **USAID assistance has included the development of educational materials for businesses and training for tax administrators**


# Iraqi Budgeted Spending for 2004

The following chart shows budgeted Iraqi spending for 2004, from all sources:

Country funding in millions of US\$	Revised Iraqi Budget, March 2004					New OIF Deposits		Budgeted Total
	Salaries (inc. FPS)	Other Operating Expenses	Capital Projects	Other	Total	Total		
with selected major payments)*	17	12,938	184	814	<b>13,953</b>	1,580	<b>15,533</b>	
Distribution System		2,400			2,400	200	2,600	
Imports		2,100			2,100	0	2,100	
Payments		1,671			1,671	0	1,671	
Obligations (e.g., reparations)		1,432			1,432	0	1,432	
Regional Grants		831			831	0	831	
and Retirement Awards		797			797	0	797	
Structuring and Salary Support		761			761	50	811	
Development		600			600	277	877	
Building projects		571			571	0	571	
Internal Security Projects		500			500	500	1,000	
Regional Response Program		225			225	0	225	
		70			70	123	193	
		981			981	430	1,411	
	8	210	900	-	1,118	315	1,433	
	230	750	50	-	1,030	0	1,030	
	682	103	170	-	<b>955</b>	0	<b>955</b>	
	7	82	212	-	<b>301</b>	0	<b>301</b>	
	37	17	233	-	<b>287</b>	0	<b>287</b>	
	5	56	200	-	<b>261</b>	460	<b>721</b>	
Imports	15	21	166	-	<b>202</b>	0	<b>202</b>	
Other sources	19	7	128	-	<b>155</b>	0	<b>155</b>	
	367	108	10	-	<b>485</b>	0	<b>485</b>	
	42	67	42	-	<b>151</b>	0	<b>151</b>	
	77	24	0	-	<b>101</b>	0	<b>101</b>	
Other agencies	265	425	237	-	<b>927</b>	130	<b>1,057</b>	
	<b>1,773</b>	<b>14,809</b>	<b>2,532</b>	<b>814</b>	<b>19,926</b>	<b>2,485</b>	<b>22,411</b>	



# Electricity Overview



- Due to unforeseen problems, achievement of the Jun goal has slipped until at least Jul
- Spring maintenance program continues resulting in about 620 MW of generation capacity currently offline for scheduled and 640 MW for unscheduled maintenance


N/P

Data as of 01 Jul




# Power Production

## Mega Watt Hour Production




## Generation By Region



N/P Data as of 01 Jul



# Crude Oil Production




**Weekly Average of 1.815 MBPD Is Below Target of 2.5 MBPD**

- Long Term Target (Dec 04): 2.8 - 3.0 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5 MBPD in Mar 03
- Post-war Peak: 2.595 MBPD on 16 Apr 04




# Crude Oil Exports

Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports



• Current Monthly Average: Jun data up to 27 Jun. No data for Jul


# Jet Fuel Supply



**Week's average production and imports are 105% of goal**




# Kerosene Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 98% of goal




# Gasoline / Benzene Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 90% of goal



# Liquefied Petroleum Gas Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 78% of goal



## Security - Build Justice

- On 30 Jun, Saddam Hussein was formally transferred from US to Iraqi custody
- On 01 Jul, Saddam Hussein was brought before the Investigative Court of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) to hear seven preliminary charges against him for the following crimes:
  - Anfal campaign against Kurds, late 1980s
  - Gassing Kurds in Halabja, 1988
  - Invasion of Kuwait, 1990
  - Brutality against Iraq's Kurdish and Shia communities in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War
  - Killing political activists over 30 years
  - Massacring members of Kurdish Barzani tribe in 1980s
  - Killing religious leaders, 1974
- Eleven senior members of Saddam Hussein's former regime also heard the charges against them on 01 Jul

### Objective: Build Justice

**Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property Rights**



## Security - Developments

- **Coalition advisors are working with Iraqi security forces to increase surveillance and protection of the oil pipelines after recent attacks**
- **The initial battalion of the Iraq Intervention Force (IIF), which was formerly known as the Iraq National Task Force, deploy into Baghdad at the end of Jun**
  - **The IIF is being established, trained and equipped for urban counterinsurgency operations**
  - **All three battalions of the first IIF brigade will be ready by end of Jul**
- **The Iraqi National Guard (formerly the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp) are conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with Coalition and Iraqi Police forces**
  - **Focus is on equipping, training, and reconstituting the force**

### Objectives: Security

**Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment; Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order ; Develop Iraqi Defense Capabilities and Oversight Mechanism**

WORKING PAPERS

06 0635 EDT Jul 04


## **Security - Developments (Cont.)**

are underway to recruit six additional 400-man public order battalions as part of the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force. In these additions, the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force will include three public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions. 5,085 new IPS recruits have completed the eight week training classes, or over 3,411 students, have graduated from the Jordan Army Safety Academy. 1,674 students, have graduated from the Baghdad Safety Academy. Approximately 25,000 IPS personnel who served as police under the Saddam regime have completed a three-week Transitional and Integration course taught by Coalition advisors. These personnel are also being taught basic criminal investigation, criminal justice, and dignitary protection by Coalition advisors.

# Security - Developments (Cont.)

The following shows significant insurgent activities in Iraq to 26 Jun, which include attacks using:

Improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets





# Stability Contributors - OIF

## Countries with forces in Iraq

31

- Albania
- Australia
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- El Salvador
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Hungary
- Italy
- Japan
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia

TOTAL ~22K

- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

## Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq

5

TOTAL TBD

**36 Countries**

Potentially Supporting Iraqi Stability and Humanitarian Relief

Data as of 02 Jul

P

EF-9499  
04/006163

May 3, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq Weekly Update

Here are some good metrics that Lamar Alexander sent along.

Why don't you see the extent to which they have been incorporated into our Iraq Weekly Update, and, if they have not, consider incorporating them.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/22/03 Senator Alexander ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
050304-25

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/04

United States Senate  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 OCT 23 11 10: 01

✓  
10/23

October 22, 2003

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1300 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Don,


Thank you very much for your letter of the 16<sup>th</sup> and the copy of the one pager you are working on to explain the administration's plan to win the peace.

The one-pager is moving in the right direction. Fully developed, it should persuade Americans of our goal, our plans and our progress toward the goal.

Since you asked, here are my suggestions:

1. Set a clear overall goal: Operation Iraqi Democracy.
2. Set a timetable for accomplishing the goal and withdrawing most American forces: for example, January 1, 2005 or 2006.
3. Establish a set of measurable objectives which, taken together, add up to a plan to meet the goal. These should specify pre-war levels, post-war levels, today's levels, today's goal, and the goal for January 1, 2005 (or 2006). I've appended a list of suggested measurable objectives that are easy to understand.
4. Report publicly on the objectives once a week.
5. In every speech you, the President, Vice-President, Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice and other key officials make, refer briefly to that week's progress report: "As our weekly progress report on our plan to build democracy in Iraq showed, electricity before the war was at 3300 megawatts, our goal for January 1, 2005(or 2006) is 6000 megawatts, we are at 4217 megawatts today which is 1217 more than before the war, and right on schedule for our goal; on crude oil production, etc.

Sincerely,



U17594 / 03

11-L-0559/OSD/25317

**Suggested objectives (should be measurable and simply presented):**

- ✓ Electricity (megawatts produced, % of Iraqis w/ power)
- ✓ Schools (# of schools open, % of boys & girls attending)
- ✓ Health care (# of hospitals operating, % receiving services)
- ✓ Governance (timetable to a constitutional democracy)
- ✓ Crude oil production (barrels produced, shipped)
- ✓ Police (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Militia (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Water (gallons of water available, # of Iraqis w/ fresh water access)
- ✓ Prisons (# of prisons, # of beds for prisoners, # of prisoners)
- ✓ Iraq Troops (# in training, # serving)
- ✓ Troops from other countries (# of troops, # of countries)
- ✓ US Troops (overall #, reserve, and active duty)
- ✓ Food (# of malnourished Iraqis, amount of food available)
- ✓ Unemployment (# and/or %)
- ✓ TV/Radio (# of stations, # of Iraqis receiving)
- ✓ Etc.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 21, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

*8*  
*7/15*

*2004 JUN 21 10 00 AM*  
*10318-04*

Thanks for your memo on the status of DoD Directives. Are there units that are lagging on getting this work done?

Do you think we ought to establish a directive that requires that these directives be reviewed every two or three years?

Thanks.

**Attach.**

6/14/04 DuBois memo to SD re: Review of DoD Directives Status Report [OSD 08556-04]

DHR:dh  
062104-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

*Sir,*  
*Response is*  
*Attached.*

*V/R, COLIB*  
*7/15*

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 10318-04



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUL 01 2 2004 PM 4:15

**INFO MEMO**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Periodic Review of DoD Directives

- In the attached June 21 snowflake you asked if there are units lagging on completing the Directives review, and whether we should establish a system to review DoD Directives for currency every two or three years.
- The table at Tab A shows the current progress made by each Component.
- We are institutionalizing a 2-year review cycle for all DoD Directives (Tab B), and my staff is visiting Components that appear to lag in their progress.
- You also inquired about the relationship between DoD Directives and DoD Instructions. Directives establish policy for the Department and Instructions implement policy. Instructions that are not specifically authorized by Directives (approximately 40%) provide directions for operating programs or prescribe plans of action.
- Presently, 654 DoD Directives and 373 DoD Instructions are in effect.
- We are reviewing DoD Instructions on a 5-year cycle.

3008

1250104

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ESCD, (b)(6)

**OSD 10318-04**

June 21, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Thanks for your memo on the status of DoD Directives. Are there units that are lagging on getting this work done?

Do you think we ought to establish a directive that requires that these directives be reviewed every **two** or three years?

**Thanks.**

**Attach.**

6/14/04 DuBois memo to SD re: Review of DoD Directives **Status** Report [OSD08556-04]

DHR:dh  
062104-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES  
PROGRESS REPORT  
FOR WEEK ENDING  
7/9/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CERTIFIED CURRENT</u>	<u>TO BE REVISED OR CANCELED</u>	<u>SUBMITTED FOR COORDINATION*</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL SUBMITTED</u>	<u>SIGNED</u>
USD(AT&L)	108	37	71	50	( 70%)	15
USD(P)	66	11	55	6	( 11%)	0
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	( 83%)	0
USD(P&R)	192	103	89	49	( 55%)	18
USD(I)	58	8	50	11	( 22%)	2
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	( 0%)	0
ASD(NIE)	40	17	23	16	( 70%)	6
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	(100%)	0
GC, DoD	36	19	17	9	( 56%)	4
DOT&E	3	2	1	1	(100%)	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	( 86%)	3
DA&M	87	31	56	14	( 25%)**	3
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	(100%)	0
DNA	1	0	1	0	( 0%)	0
WHS	15	8	7	7	(100%)	1
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>( 46%)</b>	<b>54</b>

\* Of the 178 submitted for coordination, 49 have been recommended for cancellation.

\*\* Of the 56 DA&M Directives identified for revision or cancellation, 49 are charter Directives. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

**5.2.** The Director, Washington Headquarters Services, under the DA&M shall:

**5.2.1.** Administer and operate the DoD Directives System.

**5.2.2.** Administer periodic mandatory reviews of DoD issuances as follows:

**5.2.2.1** Every 2 years, provide the PSAs with lists of DoD Directives under their cognizance for their review.

**5.2.2.2** Every 5 years, provide the PSAs with lists of DoD Instructions and Publications under their cognizance for their review.

**5.2.3.** Place approved unclassified DoD issuances on the Internet.

**5.2.4.** Approve Administrative Instructions.

**5.3.** The positions identified in subparagraphs **4.4.2** through **4.4.3.**, above shall:

**5.3.1.** Prepare DoD issuances that are relevant and necessary to accomplish their assigned responsibilities, in accordance with reference (b).

**5.3.2.** Prepare, coordinate, and approve DoD Instructions within their areas of responsibility and, if authorized by their organizational charters, sign the Instructions.

**5.3.3.** Prepare, coordinate, and approve DoD Publications and sign the foreword.

**5.3.4.** Coordinate proposed DoD issuances with the DoD Components, as prescribed in paragraph **4.4.**, above, and coordinate on proposed DoD issuances originated by PSAs.

**5.3.5.** Conduct periodic reviews for currency of all DoD issuances under their cognizance according to the following schedule:

**5.3.5.1.** Beginning in January **2006** and every 2 years thereafter, review all DoD Directives under their cognizance.

**5.3.5.2.** Beginning in January **2008** and every 5 years thereafter, review all DoD Instructions and Publications under their cognizance.

**5.3.6.** Provide written certification to the DA&M whether each issuance reviewed according to subparagraph **5.3.5.** above, is current or shall be revised or canceled.

**5.3.7.** Issue directive-type memoranda forwarding a signed copy of each to the Director, Executive Services and Communications, Washington Headquarters Services. Cancel or convert such memoranda into DoD issuance as appropriate.

TAB A

May 25, 2004 7:00 PM

787

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incident Conferences

I think we ought to have an analysis of the incident conference that could happen if an aircraft is hijacked, and decide who we want on it, who is allowed to talk and what the proper procedures would be.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
052504-11

.....  
Please respond by 6/4/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25324

OSD 10396-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 13, 2004

TO: Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF  
President, National Defense University

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

*D.R.*

SUBJECT: NDU Accomplishments

Thanks so much for your memo on accomplishments over the last year. It sounds like a lot of good work is being done there.

Congratulations.

DHR:dh  
071304-6

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

352 NDU

13 Jul 04

9 Jul 04

OSD 10413-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11/12  
8  
9 Jul 04

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense (CY FOR)  
Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff

FROM: President, National Defense University *Mike D.*

Subject: Accomplishments Over the Last Year

Sirs, I wanted to give you some thoughts on the changes we have made during my first year at NDU.

**Transformation** – we have thoroughly infused the curricula in all our colleges with transformation – from transformational leadership, transformational organizations, to transformational thinking. However, we are still not satisfied. Art Cebrowski is in the process of funding us to develop curriculum for a certificate program in Transformational Leadership – which could be used in all war colleges (Army, Navy, Air, etc.).

**GWOT** -- Adjusted curricula to reflect the long-term nature of the conflict. Have focused on differences of views between US/allies and others. Have brought our international students forcefully into the debate. And have brought many senior policy makers to speak – in order to ensure we present the USG point of view. Have conducted workshops/roundtables for CPA, Amb Negroponte, and for Generals Casey and Sharp. Have conducted exercises for EUCOM and Government of Greece to enhance security for the 2004 Olympics and a major bioterrorism exercise for Secs Ridge, Minetta, Thompson, and other cabinet officials.

**Capstone** -- many changes – most significantly -- to expose our new GOs/FOs to senior leaders – including both of you, USDP, Dir CIA, and Art Cebrowski. One class even heard from VP Cheney. Secondly, have shifted overseas travel to visit our JTFs – to include GTMO, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Korea, and Horn-of-Africa. Have also visited Israeli Northern Command (watched live Hizballah infiltrations in broad daylight) – great lessons learned. Speaker Gingrich continues to support us with his time and thoughts.

**Research** -- have refocused our efforts to support our customers in OSD/JS – policy, AT&L, and NII. Have added OSD chairs to the university from policy and AT&L. Have met with DASDs/Directors on products/round tables frequently. Have provided numerous studies and papers: on transformation; stabilization and reconstruction ops; IT in the military; analyzed difficult Homeland security challenges, including bio-terrorism, dirty bombs, and MANPADs threat to civil aviation; studies on implementation of US CT strategy; de-Ba`thification; building new Iraqi defense forces; changing civil-mil relations in the greater Middle East; enhancing stability in Afghanistan; papers on NE Asia and Korea/PRC roles, and others. This year, Joint Force Quarterly celebrated its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary and INSS completed its 20<sup>th</sup> year of operations. We have provided library support to both OSD/JS.

MS2 NDU

9 Jul 04

OSD 10413-04

**Counter Terrorism Fellow (CTF) Program** – A singular success. Is supported by SOLIC – brings international officers from those countries without enough IMET or those which have significant IMET restrictions (e.g. Indonesia), and focuses them on a CT curriculum. About 70 officers per year for 8 month program. A new class enters every 4 months. We expect our first Afghani and Iraqi students this year.

**Regional Centers (Africa Center, NESAC Center, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies)** – All have new directors. Thru Ryan Henry's leadership, are in process of using them in the "battle of ideas." We have new courses on GWOT, created alumni associations – and providing them with high quality information, provided virtual access to our library, shared best practices among the centers, and a myriad of other programs.

**Congress** – have continued simulated war games and attracted over 80 members and many senior officials – have added scenarios on anthrax, plague, port security and transportation system. Have also run a Korean scenario and have one on China/Taiwan planned for later this month. We have conducted Hill staffer courses – both in terrorism and in "Defense 101," and run brown-bag lunches for Hill staffers. With Ike Skelton's help, we have held Congressional breakfasts – which expose our National War College and ICAF students to members of Congress (and vice versa).

**Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)** – we have broadened JPME: created a course for Capt/USN Lts, created a Joint Advanced Warfighting Course for joint planners, in process of creating a course (named Pinnacle) for prospective JTF Commanders. Are reviewing ideas for joint courses for NCOs, have created Advanced JPME course for Reserve Component (RC) Officers – combination in-residence/DL format, and increased the number of RC two-week courses by 50%.

**Sr Leaders** – we have made a concerted effort to bring the most senior policy makers to the University to address our students. DSD has visited about a dozen times, Dep Sec State, USDP, USS Political Affairs, DHS, and almost every Combatant Commander and Service Chief have addressed our students. We have gone after many notables – many of which are scheduled to talk – including former Sec Schultz. Pres Bush addressed our classes in February.

**International Focus** – have expanded our International Fellow (IFs) program with NWC and ICAF by 25% -- seeking to increase the number of countries represented from the arc of instability and from Africa. We are delivering more courses to more people with our regional centers – both here and abroad. We have reinvigorated our international Hall of Fame – where we recognize those IFs who succeed in their country. Working with embassies in Washington and country teams abroad, we have sought out our grads, catalogued their present positions, and sent notes to every Ambassador, DASD/ASD/DASS/ASS informing them that they had people in the AORs which have studied in the US and are likely to have a favorable impression of the US. We urged they be nurtured and included in events when key US officials visited the country. In the near future, we see NDU linked with counterpart

institutions and alumni in almost every country in the world – interacting virtually, by VTC, and in person – seeking to build consensus in support of US objectives. [Presently I correspond with the Commandants from over 50 countries on a routine basis.] We continue to volunteer to host distinguished foreign visitors here – to conduct roundtables with them and to press US views on them. Our experience is that we can say some things in an “academic setting” that can’t be said in formal meetings.

**Homeland Security** – Have formed a new Institute for Homeland Security Studies (IHSS) – led by Hon Steve Duncan, former ASD (RA) and DOD drug czar under SD Cheney. Purpose of IHSS is to pull together various aspects of HLS in other NDU components and to interface with DHS. We have created a Homeland Security Planner’s Course in support of NORTHCOM. We have developed a range of training and simulation programs designed to enhance interagency planning and cooperation of complex contingencies.

**Information Resources Management College** – continues to adjust its focus – we have new intensive courses focused on network-centric organizations, DOD enterprise architecture, and building the business case for IT. Curriculum changes were made to update CIO competencies and CIO leadership skills such as collaboration, communication, critical thinking, and leading change. Enrollment in distance learning courses grew to 25 percent of total enrollment, and the College continues to be an innovator in instructional design.

**Facilities and Infrastructure.** Planning is well under way for a new 240,000SF Academic and Conference Center – we expect ground breaking Nov 04. We plan to bring numerous NDU elements housed in leased space off campus into what we are tentatively calling “Lincoln Hall.” However, we have an opportunity to build a Homeland Security College – one which serves DOD, DHS, other parts of the government, and state/local authorities. We want DHS to fund the college and help us build the curriculum. Will let you both know of any roadblocks we might face.

**Board of Visitors** – have reinvigorated the BOV – provided it with more expansive view of NDU activities; have included its members in almost every facet of NDU operations, including overseas travel, key conferences, and workshops. I am very happy with the independent, thoughtful advice I get from the Board.

**Funding** – we have adequate funding ...but, in priority order, need additional funding for: (1) NESAC center – courses for Afghanistanis and Iraqis, and for playing an increasingly important role in the battle of ideas in the Presidents’ Greater Middle East Initiative. (2) NCO JPME – this is long overdue, needs resources.

Bottomline: Great things are underway here. We are improving in all we do.

Very Respectfully,

CF: DSD, USDP, DJS

72  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TAB A

June 14, 2004

808

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan security situation.

One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ~~turn~~ in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the **Afghan** military.

Here is a report on Afghan capabilities.

Thanks.

*Less*  
Atarah

NIC Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 2004-04HC, June 2004

*(Distributed separately)*

DHR:uh  
051304-12

.....  
Please respond by

7/9/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED  
Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25329

OSD 10492-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999  
INFO MEMO

CM-1933-04  
15 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 7/14*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

- **Issue.** "I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan Security Situation. One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ~~buy~~ <sup>buy</sup> in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military. ..." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion**
  - My staff is working closely with General Abizaid to develop a framework for Afghanistan security forces, similar to the one now being developed for Iraq. This framework will address concerns regarding the security situation and provide a way ahead for Afghanistan forces.
  - As the Iraq framework piece nears completion, work is beginning in earnest on a similar framework for Afghanistan.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TAB A

June 14, 2004

808

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

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One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ~~turn~~ in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military.

Here is a report on Afghan capabilities.

Thanks.

*Less*  
Attach.

NIC Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 2004-04HC, June 2004

*(Distributed separately)*

DHR:dh  
051404-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25331

OSD 10492-04

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

COL **Doxey**

18 June 2004

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/25332



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

204 850 -2 AM 9:20

ACTION MEMO

December 1, 2004, 4:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration & Management

SUBJECT: *Ray DuBois* Protection from the International Criminal Court (ICC)

- The directive at TAB A clarifies and updates policy guidance to the DoD Components on the assignment of personnel to UN Missions. The directive responds to your snowflake on this subject and subsequent guidance from VADM Stavridis (next under).
- Key points of the Directive:
  - All initial assignments of personnel to any UN Missions are approved by the SecDef.
  - Personnel will only be assigned to UN Missions in countries where sufficient protections exist to ensure U.S. personnel will not be exposed to the risk of assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC consistent with U.S. policy and the American Servicemembers' Protection Act.
  - The ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for the receipt and coordination of requests for personnel to serve in UN Missions and for submitting a recommendation for your consideration.
  - The Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions. The US Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W), a unit operating under the Secretary of the Army, provides administrative and logistical support for personnel assigned to UN Missions and ensures they receive anti-terrorism training prior to deployment.
- The directive was coordinated among the DoD Components and the OSD Staff. Comments received during coordination have been accommodated where appropriate.

O/S

1 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the directive at TAB A.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :

As stated

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

AM 02444-04

30 Jan 04



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 08 24 09:05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

SUBJECT: Protection from the ICC

Looks good!  
Send out,  
get coord,  
Dend,  
to SD  
For signature  
Jim

In response to your note (attached) on the Secretary's snowflake on the ICC, we drafted the DoD Directive at **TAB A**.

It is clear that a directive is needed to update guidance to JCS and the Military Departments. Memoranda providing guidance on these personnel assignments date back as far as 1973.

Key points of the Directive:

- ▶ The SecDef approves all initial assignments of personnel to UN Missions.
- ▶ Personnel are assigned only to UN Missions in countries where personnel are protected from the ICC.
- ▶ In cases where personnel rotations are needed for already approved assignments, rotations are managed by the Commander of the US Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W), a unit operating under the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions.
- ▶ USMOG-W handles training and support of personnel being assigned to UN Missions.
- ▶ Personnel assigned are considered individual augmentees, not units - when units are deployed, the JCS deployment order process is used.

The draft directive was prepared with input from the Joint Staff, OUSD(P), and the Army Staff, but formal staffing is needed before approval and publication.

With your concurrence, we will send the draft directive out for formal coordination.

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

Ray  
Raymond F. DuBois  
Director

8.20.04

Attachments  
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/25334

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	SL 8-24-04

OSD 10497-04



# Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 2065.1E

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DA&M

**SUBJECT:** Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions

- References:
- (a) Title 10, United States Code
  - (b) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Department of Defense Personnel Assignments to the United Nations for Headquarters Support," January 14, 1994 (hereby canceled)
  - (c) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Memorandum, "US Military Support to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)," October 31, 2000 (hereby canceled)
  - (d) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)," July 20, 1973 (hereby canceled)
  - (e) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," May 9, 2003
  - (f) Section 7421 et seq. of title 22, United States Code

## 1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive:

1.1. Establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the receipt, analysis, coordination and approval of assignments of DoD military or civilian personnel to serve with United Nations (UN) Missions.

1.2. Cancels references (b) through (d).

1.3. Pursuant to reference (e), designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions. This designation replaces and subsumes the executive agent designations made in references (c) and (d).

## 2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as



# Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 2065.1E

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DA&M

SUBJECT: Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions

- References:
- (a) Title 10, United States Code
  - (b) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Department of Defense Personnel Assignments to the United Nations for Headquarters Support," January 14, 1994 (hereby canceled)
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Missions, including but not limited to equipment, training, and transportation. Provide an officer to serve as the Commander of the USMOG-W.

**4.4.3.** Coordinate the assignment of personnel approved to serve in UN Missions and the replacement of such personnel with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments or their designated representatives.

**4.5.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall, after approval of the request for personnel, request the Secretaries of the Military Departments and, when appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command and the other Combatant Commanders, to provide appropriate military and civilian personnel as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Personnel shall be directed to report to the USMOG-W for anti-terrorism training and for administrative and logistics support.

5. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. A. [unclear]".



Department of Defense  
**DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 2065.1E

DA&M

SUBJECT **Assignment** of Personnel to United Nations Missions

- References: (a) Title 10, United States Code  
(b) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Department of Defense Personnel Assignments to the United Nations for Headquarters Support," January 14, 1994 (hereby canceled)  
(c) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Memorandum, "US Military Support to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)," October 31, 2000 (hereby canceled)  
(d) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)," July 20, 1973 (hereby canceled)  
(e) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," May 9, 2003  
(f) American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, Section 7421 et seq. of title 22, United States Code

**1. PURPOSE**

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive:

1.1. Establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for the receipt, analysis, coordination and approval of assignments of DoD military or civilian personnel to serve with United Nations (UN) Missions.

1.2. Cancels references (b) through (d).

1.3. Pursuant to reference (e), designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions. This designation replaces and subsumes the executive agent designations made in references (c) and (d).

**2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE**

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all

other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services" as used herein applies to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard (when not a part of the Navy).

2.2. Applies to all assignments (whether permanent or temporary duty) of DoD military and civilian personnel in support of UN Missions, but does not apply to the deployment of units in support of UN operations. When the deployment of units is required, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare the appropriate orders for approval by the Secretary of Defense.

2.3. Applies to authorized personnel support to a UN Mission in place on the effective date of this directive and to such support to a UN Mission in the future.

2.4. Takes precedence over DoD memoranda or other issuances that contain conflicting guidance on the assignment of personnel to UN Missions or Executive Agent responsibilities for such assignments.

### 3. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

3.1. All initial assignments of DoD military and civilian personnel to any UN Mission shall be approved by the Secretary of Defense. Follow-on assignments to a UN Mission, including assignments resulting from the extension of a UN mandate shall be managed by the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions.

3.2. DoD military and civilian personnel shall be assigned only to UN Missions in countries where sufficient protections exist to ensure U.S. personnel will not be exposed to the risk of assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC) consistent with U.S. policy and the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (reference (f)). Such protections may be provided, as applicable, by a Status of Forces Agreement in effect in the country where the UN Mission takes place, a bilateral agreement between the United States and that country consistent with Article 98 of the ICC Treaty, a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or other legally binding provisions or agreements.

3.3. DoD military and civilian personnel serving in UN Missions shall be under the management oversight of an Executive Agent and supported by a single focal point official who shall be responsible for providing command, oversight, training, and administrative and logistics support for all DoD personnel serving in UN Missions.

### 4. RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall oversee the process for the receipt, analysis, coordination, and approval (or other disposition) of requests for personnel to serve with UN Missions received from the UN and forwarded by the Department of State to the Department of Defense, and shall:

4.1.1. Upon receipt of a request for DoD personnel to serve with a UN Mission, ~~determine~~, in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DoD GC), and other officials responsible for policy regarding the ICC, whether the assignment of personnel meets the provisions of reference (f), thereby ~~protecting~~ DoD personnel from the jurisdiction of the ICC.

4.1.2. Forward to the Secretary of Defense for decision an Action Memorandum coordinated with the ~~Chairman~~ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD GC, and others as appropriate. The Action Memorandum shall ~~contain~~ all pertinent information concerning the request for personnel, including the determination required by subparagraph 4.1.1.

4.1.3. Coordinate with the Department of ~~State~~ to determine force protection responsibilities for DoD personnel serving on UN Missions.

4.2. The OSD Principal ~~Staff Assistants~~ shall, within their functional areas, exercise their designated authorities and responsibilities as established by law or DoD guidance to facilitate the mission of the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions.

4.3. The ~~Secretaries of the Military Departments~~ shall:

4.3.1. Provide the military and civilian personnel to support UN Missions, as requested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of ~~Staff~~. Personnel shall be directed to report to the U.S. Military Observer Group, ~~Washington~~ (USMOG-W) (a jointly staffed organization), for anti-terrorism training and for administrative and logistics support before executing their assignments. Active or Reserve component personnel ~~who~~ are required for UN Missions for a period that exceeds 180 ~~days~~ may be assigned pursuant to permanent change of station orders as an authorized overstrength in the appropriate component. Retirees supporting UN Missions shall be ordered to active duty pursuant to ~~Section 688~~ of reference (a).

4.3.2. Provide personnel as requested by the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions, to ~~staff~~ the USMOG-W.

4.3.3. Cooperate with and support the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions to ensure the effective and efficient use of resources and facilitates the mission of the Executive Agent.

4.4. The ~~Secretary of the Army~~ is hereby designated as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to UN Missions in accordance with reference (e). In this role, and in addition to the responsibilities prescribed in paragraph 4.3, the ~~Secretary~~ of the Army shall:

4.4.1. Command and oversee all DoD personnel serving in UN Missions ~~through~~ the Commander of the USMOG-W to ensure that mission requirements and the administrative and logistics needs of the personnel are met.


Missions, including but not limited to equipment, ~~training~~, and ~~transportation~~. Provide an ~~officer~~ to serve as the Commander of the USMOG-W.

4.4.3. Coordinate the assignment of personnel approved to serve in UN Missions and the replacement of such personnel with the **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** and the Secretaries of the Military Departments or their designated representatives.

4.5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall, after approval of the request for personnel, request the Secretaries of the Military Departments and, when appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command and the other Combatant Commanders, to provide appropriate military and civilian personnel as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Personnel shall be directed to report to the USMOG-W for anti-terrorism ~~training~~ and for administrative and logistics support.

5. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. M. ...", is written over the text of section 5.

June 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Protection from ICC

I think in the future I should approve anyone, who is going to go serve on a UN mission who is a military or civilian person. We need to have precise clarity as to where they are going and whether or not those places would have protection from the JCC - Article 98 or SOFAs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-3

*✓ Ray Dubois -  
Instruction -  
SD approves  
via Deporal*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 10497-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25342

OSD 10497-04



Department of Defense  
**DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER xxxx.xx

DA&amp;M

SUBJECT: Assignment of Personnel to United Nations Missions

- References:
- (a) Section 113 of title 10, United States Code
  - (b) Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Department of Defense Personnel Assignments to the United Nations for Headquarters Support," January 14, 1994 (hereby canceled)
  - (c) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy memorandum, "US Military Support to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)," October 31, 2000 (hereby canceled)
  - (d) Secretary of Defense memorandum, "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)," July 20, 1973 (hereby canceled)
  - (e) Title 11, Public Law 107-206, "American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002"
  - (f) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002

1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a), this Directive:

1.1. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the receipt, analysis, coordination and approval of assignments for DoD military or civilian personnel to serve with United Nations (UN) Missions.

1.2. Cancels references (b) through (d).

1.3. Designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions. This designation replaces and subsumes the executive agent designations made in references (c) and (d).

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

DRAFT

**2.1.** Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). The term Military Services as used herein applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

**2.2.** Applies to the initial assignment of DoD military and civilian personnel to serve with UN Missions; it does not apply to the deployment of units in support of UN operations. When the deployment of units is required, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare the appropriate orders for approval by the Secretary of Defense.

**2.3.** Applies to the extant personnel and other support arrangements provided to: UN Mission Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Mission Liberia (UNMIL), UN Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), UN Mission Georgia (UNOMIG), UN Truce Supervision Organization (USSTO); and to such support provided to UN Missions in the future.

### **3. POLICY**

It is DoD policy that:

**3.1.** All initial assignments of DoD military and civilian personnel to UN Missions shall be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

**3.2.** DoD military and civilian personnel shall only be assigned to UN Missions in countries that enable their protection consistent with the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), reference (e).

**3.3.** DoD military and civilian personnel serving in UN Missions shall be under the management oversight of a DoD Executive Agent and supported by a single focal point organization that will be responsible for providing command and control, administrative and logistics support, and training for all DoD personnel serving in UN Missions.

### **4. RESPONSIBILITIES**

**4.1.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)) under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall oversee the process for the receipt, analysis, coordination, and approval, or other disposition, of requests for personnel to serve with UN Missions received from the United Nations and forwarded by the Department of State to DoD, and shall:

**4.1.1.** Upon receipt of a request for DoD personnel to serve with a UN Mission, determine whether or not the assignment of personnel meets the provisions of the ASPA, reference (f), thereby protecting DoD personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

**4.1.2.** Forward to the Secretary of Defense for decision, an Action Memorandum coordinated with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the General Counsel of the DoD, and others as appropriate. The memorandum shall contain all pertinent information concerning the request for personnel, including the determination addressed in subparagraph 4.1.1 above.

**4.1.3.** Oversee the implementation of the responsibilities of the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions pursuant to DoD Directive 5101.1, reference (f).

**4.2.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall, when tasked by the Secretary of Defense following approval of the request for military personnel, task the Chiefs of the Military Services to provide the military personnel as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Personnel shall be directed to report to the US Military Observer Group, Washington (USMOG-W) for administrative and logistics support.

**4.3.** The Secretary of the Army is hereby designated as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions in accordance with DoD Directive 5101.1, reference (f) and in this role shall:

**4.3.1.** Provide command and control of all DoD personnel serving in UN Missions through the USMOG-W. Oversee personnel during their service with UN Missions to ensure mission requirements and administrative and logistics needs of the personnel are met.

**4.3.2.** Program and budget to fund the operational and support requirements of USMOG-W and provide administrative and logistics support for personnel serving in UN Missions, including but not limited to equipment, training, and transportation. Provide the Commander of the USMOG-W.

**4.3.3.** Coordinate the assignment of personnel approved to serve in UN Missions and the replacement of such personnel with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Unless mission requirements dictate otherwise, personnel assignments shall rotate among the Military Departments.

**4.4.** The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

4.4.1. When tasked by the Secretary of Defense following approval of the request for DoD civilian personnel, provide the civilian personnel as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Personnel shall be directed to report to the USMOG-W for administrative and logistics support.

4.4.2. Provide personnel as requested by the DoD Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions to staff the USMOG-W, a jointly manned organization.

4.4.3. Cooperate and support the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions in a manner that ensures the effective and efficient use of resources and facilitates the mission of the Executive Agent.

4.5. The OSD Principal Staff Assistants shall, within their functional areas, exercise their designated authorities and responsibilities as established by law or DoD guidance to facilitate the mission of the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions.

## 5. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

TAB A

June 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Protection from ICC

I **think** in the future I should approve anyone who is going to go serve on a UN mission who is a military or civilian person. We need to have precise clarity as to where they are going and whether or not those places would have protection from the ICC – **Article 98** or SOFAs,

Thanks.

DIR dh  
063004-5

.....  
*Please respond by*           —          

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CH-1931-04

15 July 2004

2004 JUL 15 AM 10:50

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Protection From the International Criminal Court (ICC)

- **Issue.** "I think in the future I should approve anyone who is going to go serve on a UN mission who is a military or civilian person. We need to have precise clarity as to where they are going and whether or not those places would have protection from the ICC - Article 98 or SOFAs." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for assignment of DOD personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.
- **Discussion**
  - The Department of State forwards UN requests for personnel to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (OASD(SO/LIC)) for action. The requests are subsequently routed through OASD(SO/LIC) to the Deputy ASD (Stability Operations) (DASD(SO)). After coordination with Joint Staff/J-5 and OSD (Negotiations Policy), DASD(SO) makes a recommendation through OASD(SO/LIC) to the Secretary of Defense whether to grant each request. If approved, the OSD Executive Secretary informs the Joint Staff of the requirement to be filled. Joint Staff/J-1 then tasks the Services in accordance with CJCSI 1301.01C, "Individual Augmentation Procedures." Protection from the ICC is determined during coordination between DASD(SO) and Joint Staff/J-5 and annotated on the OASD(SO/LIC) memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.
  - There are currently no DOD civilian personnel assigned to UN missions. However, such assignment would follow essentially the same procedure less the J-1 actions.

015

15 01 04

30 31 04

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25348

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY** OSD 10497-04

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

OASD(SO/LIC)	COL Brown	9 July 2004
DASD(NP)	Guy Roberts	8 July 2004
USMOG-W	Col de la Pena	8 July 2004



ADMINISTRATION AND  
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET

2004 10 20 10 05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT

SUBJECT: Protection from the ICC

In response to your note (attached) on the Secretary's snowflake on the ICC, we drafted the DoD Directive at TAB A.

It is clear that a directive is needed to update guidance to JCS and the Military Departments. Memoranda providing guidance on these personnel assignments date back as far as 1973.

Key points of the Directive:

- ▶ The SecDef approves all initial assignments of personnel to UN Missions.
- ▶ Personnel are assigned only to UN Missions in countries where personnel are protected from the ICC.
- ▶ In cases where personnel rotations are needed for already approved assignments, rotations are managed by the Commander of the US Military Observer Group-Washington(USMOG-W), a unit operating under the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for DoD Support to United Nations Missions.
- ▶ USMOG-W handles training and support of personnel being assigned to UN Missions.
- ▶ Personnel assigned are considered individual augmentees, not units – when units are deployed, the JCS deployment order process is used.

The draft directive was prepared with input from the Joint Staff, OUSD(P), and the Army Staff, but formal staffing is needed before approval and publication.

With your concurrence, we will send the draft directive out for formal coordination.

*Ray*  
Raymond F. DuBois  
Director

8.20.04

Attachments  
As stated

0 SD 10497-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25350

June 30, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Protection ~~from~~ ICC

I think in the future I should approve anyone, who is going to go serve on a JN mission who is a military or civilian person. We need to have precise clarity as to where they are going and whether or not those places would have protection from the ICC - Article 98 or SOFAs.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-3

*Ray Dubois -  
Instruction -  
SD approves  
via Deporo*

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

120

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB

July 2, 2004  
821

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Afghanistan

I am told we are spending something like \$11 billion a year on the military in Afghanistan, and that the '05 budget for the entire USG for non-military support for Afghanistan is about \$1 billion.

Given the disparity, and the fact that our goal is to not have our military in Afghanistan forever, we need to fashion a way to present this obvious disparity in a way that is persuasive and that enables the USG to get things right.

The first thing we need to do is to prepare a security force plan addressing the same elements we are addressing in Iraq. We have been in Afghanistan for two and half years. We have made some progress, but we need to have a detailed plan and timetable. Then we need to find a way to fund it so we can shift the funding away from our military over to theirs.

Thank you.

250104

DIR jh  
070204-R

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/25352

OSD 10516-04

TAB 

June 29, 2004

314

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Olympics

What is the status on moving those booms from England down to the Olympics?

What other issues do we have? I want to make sure we do what we need to do to help the Olympics, but nothing that leaves us short.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062904-4 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by 7/2/04

353.8

29 Jun 04

OSD 10552-04

tab

11-L-0559/OSD/25353

**SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL**

Print Date: 7/16/2004

*AC 07/16/04*

DOCUMENT TYPE: **FRONT OFFICE DOC** ATTACHMENT:  
OSD CONTROL **OSD 10552-04** DOC **6/29/2004** DOR **7/16/2004** SIGNATURE CASE:  
FROM **SECDEF RUMSFELD** TO **JCS**  
SUBJECT **OLYMPICS**  
KEYWORDS **SNOWFLAKE**  
COMMENTS **NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT ES APPROVAL**

FN **353.2** SEC U OCN062904-4

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS  
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:  
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:  
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION  
PAGES **1** ENCLOSURES **0** PACKAGE VIEW:  
SUSPENSE STATUS **FRONT OFFICE DOC**

CREATED BY: **orr**

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ADC **R**  
ADD **0**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1936-04  
15 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/15*

SUBJECT: Dunlop Barrier Support for the Greek Olympics

- **Question.** "What is the status on moving those booms from England down to the Olympics? What other issues do we have? I want to make sure we do what we need to do to help the Olympics, but nothing that leaves us short." (TAB)
- **Answer.** In anticipation of funding, USEUCOM provided maritime transportation of Dunlop Barriers from England to Athens; all barriers (32) have arrived in Greece and installation has begun.
- **Analysis**
  - Greece was unable to support the project (\$800K). US State Department was also unable to provide resources for the Dunlop Barriers. On 1 July, DepSecDef approved use of Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) funds. Use of over \$500K required notice to House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Funds have been obligated for emplacement of the barriers.
  - USEUCOM anticipates a 30-day installation period. Cruise ships arrive the week of 8 August. Estimated completion is during first week in August. I will notify you when complete.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General N.A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 10552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25355

353.8

15 JUL 04

29 JUN 04

JUN 14 2004

TO: Lcs Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: History

I would like to visit with you about when the last time was that the US fired from the ground at aircraft attacking US forces. My guess is that it was probably Korea. I don't think it happened in Vietnam, and likely not since. All we have seen lately have been Scuds.

What personnel and investment do we have in the Army air defense forces? Do you have any proposals with respect to the future?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-22

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

#066-035 14 Jun 04 JAF

11-L-0559/OSD/25356

OSD 10554-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFO MEMO

2004 JUL 16 11:20:21

July 9, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army  
~~Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff, United States Army~~

*Brownlee*  
*July 15, 2004*  
*8*  
*15.07.04*

SUBJECT: Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Transformation

- Reference your memo dated 14 June 2004 at Tab A.
- The last time the Army fired at an attacking manned aircraft was in 1950 during the Korean War. Currently, our Air Forces have attained a level of deterrence that dissuades potential and current adversaries from pursuing large manned air forces. As a result, the Army began reorganization and modernization efforts within AMD. The Joint Force identified capability gaps that include the need for improved defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, rockets, artillery, mortars, combat identification, and a Single Integrated Air Picture. Of particular concern are cruise missiles and the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles.
- This concern resulted in the shift of personnel and investments as indicated in the attached chart at Tab B. Specifically, the Army terminated Stinger Based Systems, received transfer of Patriot and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) programs from the Missile Defense Agency, and stood up a National Guard Brigade and Battalion for Ground Based Midcourse Defense. These efforts support National Security Presidential Directive - 23.
- The centerpiece of the Army's AMD transformation is the conversion to composite battalions. These battalions are capable of operating from tactical to strategic levels, interdependent with other services, as well as providing for Homeland Security. The Army has realigned 29 AMD battalions to other missions. The remaining organizations are transforming into a minimum of 14 Active Component AMD Task Forces and eight Homeland Defense battalions.
- A recent review of Army Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capability resulted in increased funding for this mission by \$1.1 billion in President's Budget 05. The Army will deploy a CMD capability by fiscal year 2008. The Army will field an aerostat-based elevated sensor and an integrated fire control capability while executing an acquisition effort with the United States Marine Corps on a Surface Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) System.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared By: COL Ralph M. McGee, (b)(6)

# Tab A

JUN 14 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



**SUBJECT:** History

I would like to visit with you about when the last time was that the US fired from the ground at aircraft attacking US forces. My guess is that it was probably Korea. I don't think it happened in Vietnam, and likely not since. All we have seen lately have been Scuds.

What personnel and investment do we have in the Army air defense forces? Do you have any proposals with respect to the future?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061004-22

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

#06-035 14 Jun 04 JJA

11-L-0559/OSD/25359


OSD 10554-04

# Tab B




# Army AMD Transformation Since 1999

**PB99**




**PB05**




## Investment

**1999**



**2005**



## Personnel

**\*Reflects Total Army Analysis-11 (TAA-11) Decisions, Modularity and AMD Task Forces**

**Legend:**

ABT - Air Breathing Threat  
BMC2 - Battle Management Command and Control  
GMD - Ground Based Midcourse Defense  
MAMD - Maneuver Air and Missile Defense

AMD TF - Air and Missile Defense Task Force  
CMD - Cruise Missile Defense  
HLS - Homeland Security  
TBMD - Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense

TAB A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF  
SECURITY

June 24, 2004

2700 JUL 15

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Decision Recommendations

Someone is going to have to get their arms around the decision recommendations from the General Barno brief - on money, trainers, who needs to do what, etc

Thanks.

DHR:eh  
062404-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/1/04

Afghanistan

24 Jun 04

04 JUN 25 AM 10:22

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/25362

OSD 10557-04

1800

72

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ES-0033  
04/008980

July 1, 2004

Paul Butler  
7/14

TO Sec Def

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Memo on Haiti

Please don't forget to give me a memo on Haiti, so we can caution them that the UN is not living up to its assignment.

Thanks.

DHR-da  
070104-10

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

C&D  
CONTROL TAGN  
BACK TO MB  
FM 7/16

Sir,  
Response is  
attached  
VJR, CCB

Haiti

July 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 10560-04

02-07-04 4762721/M/N

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Received 0815/ MAR 10 2004

#1

Deputy EA W EA R

2004 MAR 16 21 20

CJCS Decision:

Memo for my Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Will answer at Roundtable:

Give me verbal response W 3/10

Give me e-mail response \_\_\_\_\_

Give me 5x8 / slide / etc. \_\_\_\_\_

Send to Staff for info \_\_\_\_\_

No Reply Required \_\_\_\_\_

Copy to: JS; DJS

383.6

March 8, 2004

730

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Felth  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld D

SUBJECT: Detainees

I need to have the name this week of the person who is going to be in charge of Iraqi detainees, like General Mueller is in charge of GTMO detainees.

What is happening has got to stop.

Thanks.

DIR.06  
030804-73

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

8 Mar 04

CJS-33  
10P1

B22  
4/1

11-L-0559/OSD/25364

OSD 10578-04

*09-01806*  
**CHAIRMAN@ACTION ASSIGNMENT**

Reviewed by *RW* Date Mar 12 2004

**THE JOINT STAFF**

**MEMORANDUM**

DATE: 3/15/04

SJS 04-01806  
SF 930

TO: ACB

SUBJECT: SJS 04-01806

Per Col Leonard does not require written CJS response. Self def selected MG Geoffrey Miller to be Spec Asst for Detainee Operations, JTF-7, Iraq. Reports NLT 1 Apr. His replacement for Col. JTF-6TMO will be interviewed by VJCS/DepSecDef on 18 Mar.

*Col Semmelrod*

SJS/CPCB	SJS/ACB	Protocol								
LA	LC	Speechwriter								
Aides	JHO	NG/RA								
PA	Other <u>DJS/VJCS-cy</u>									
<table style="margin: auto; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">1</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">2</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">3</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">4</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">5</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">6</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">7</td> <td style="border: 1px solid black; width: 15px; height: 15px;">a</td> </tr> </table>			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	a
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	a			
CJCS Reply <u>VERBAL</u>	See CJCS Note	Info Only								
Scan & File/Note & File	Direct Reply	Appropriate Action								
Condolence	BSA/GSA	Translation								
Secommendations:										
Forward to:		Purple note:								
Amplifying Information										
Personal friend/salutation is:										
Comments:										
Enclose w/letter										
Photo	Bio	CJCS Book								
Autographed Card	CJCS Functions Sheet									
Other										
Gifts(s) Received										
DISPENSE:		CONTROL #								

7/15  
12:00

72

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 14, 2004  
ES-0155  
I-04/009504

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Your people told me there was a Presidential waiver for Uzbekistan. Colin Powell and Condi say there is not. Please advise.

Thanks.

DHR dh  
071404-15

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

7/20

7/15/04 Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a memo that answers your question. It also includes a draft memo to PCTC's (regarding the authority under the Foreign Assistance Act).

Mira Ricardé

↙ NB I spoke with Doug Feith and he has some reservations on this. Thanks it's a loser.

Paul

15-07-04 11:05 IN

11- L-0559/OSD/25366

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

1/0589-04

UZB EK

4/2004

quest

1600

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ES-0031  
04/008977

July 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan Waiver

Please dig into this question of whether the President has a waiver on Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070104-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/7/04

Uzbekistan

*Exe Sel*  
*OBI. More recent*  
*SMAN like response went*  
*in. Can close files at.*

*Paul*  
Paul Butler  
7/6

150104

OSD 10589-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25367

INFO MEMO

USDP *W. Powell* 7/13  
DEPSECDEF  
ES-0031  
041008977

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: MIRA RICARDEL, *John Head Sr* ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Acting) JUL 12 2004

SUBJECT: Presidential Waiver Authority for Uzbekistan Certification ~~(FOUO)~~

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked that we dig into the question of whether the President may waive prohibitions on assistance to Uzbekistan. (Tab A)
- (U) Under section 568(a) (Tab B) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, funds are only available for Uzbekistan if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to Congress that Uzbekistan is making substantial and continuing progress on protection of human rights and on other matters.
  - o Unlike similar provisions, e.g., related to Kazakhstan, the Uzbekistan provision does not include a "national security interest" waiver.
- (U) There is an extraordinary authority in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (section 614, Tab C) that would permit the President to provide assistance to Uzbekistan notwithstanding the prohibition, provided he determines, and so notifies Congress in writing, that to do so is "important to the security of the United States."
  - o FAA section 614 authority is sensitive and rarely used. We are unaware of its use during this Administration.
- (U) It appears that Secretary of State will make a decision whether to certify Uzbekistan under section 568(a) within the next week.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ If the decision is not to certify, you may want to discuss with Secretary Powell the possibility of recommending that the President use his extraordinary authority under section 614 of the FAA.

UZBEKISTAN

12 Jul 04

OGC *ALLEN 9*

A/DASD Eurasia *BA 07/12/04*

OSD 10589-04

Prepared by: LTC Kurt Meppen, (b)(6)  
Classified by: Principal Director, Eurasia  
Reasons: 1.4(d), Declassify on 02/09/14

13-07-04 08:10 IN

EXTRACT FROM THE 2004 CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT

Sec. 568. (a) Funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for assistance for the central Government of Uzbekistan only if the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Uzbekistan is making substantial and continuing progress in meeting its commitments under the "Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States of America", including respect for human rights, establishing a genuine multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the independence of the media.

(b) Funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for assistance for the Government of Kazakhstan only if the Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Kazakhstan has made significant improvements in the protection of human rights during the preceding 6-month period.

(c) The Secretary of State may waive the requirements under subsection (b) if he determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

Search USC, [About Database](#), [Download USC](#), Classification Tables, Codification



Go to 1st query term(s)

-CITE-

22 USC Sec. 2364

01/22/02

-EXPCITE-

TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE

CHAPTER 32 - FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

SUBCHAPTER III - GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Part I - General Provisions

-HEAD-

Sec. 2364. Special authorities

-STATUTE- *Foreign Assistance Act, Section 614*

(a) Furnishing of assistance and arms export sales, credits, and guaranties upon determination and notification of Congress of importance and vitality of such action to security interests and national security interests of United States; policy justification; fiscal year limitations; transfers between accounts

(1) The President may authorize the furnishing of assistance under this chapter without regard to any provision of this Chapter, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this chapter, in furtherance of any of the purposes of this chapter, when the President determines, and so notifies in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States.

(2) The President may make sales, extend credit, and issue



11-L-0559/OSD/25370

guaranties under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), without regard to any provision of this chapter, the Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under the Arms Export Control Act, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Act, when the President determines, and so notifies in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that to do so is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

(3) Before exercising the authority granted in this subsection, the President shall consult with, and shall provide a written policy justification to, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(4)(A) The authority of this subsection may not be used in any fiscal year to authorize -

(i) more than \$750,000,000 in sales to be made under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);

(ii) the use of more than \$250,000,000 of funds made available for use under this chapter or the Arms Export Control Act; and

(iii) the use of more than \$100,000,000 of foreign currencies accruing under this chapter or any other law.

(B) If the authority of this subsection is used both to authorize a sale under the Arms Export Control Act and to authorize funds to be used under the Arms Export Control Act or under this chapter with respect to the financing of that sale, then the use of the funds shall be counted against the limitation in subparagraph

(A) (ii) and the portion, if any, of the sale which is not so financed shall be counted against the limitation in subparagraph (A) (i) .

(C) Not more than \$50,000,000 of the \$250,000,000 limitation provided in subparagraph (A) (ii) may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year unless that country is a victim of active aggression, and not more than \$500,000,000 of the aggregate limitation of \$1,000,000,000 provided in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (A) (ii) may be allocated to any one country in any fiscal year.

(5) The authority of this section may not be used to waive the limitations on transfers contained in section 2360(a) of this title.

(b) United States obligations in West Germany

Whenever the President determines it to be important to the national interest, he may use funds available for the purposes of part IV of subchapter I of this chapter in order to meet the responsibilities or objectives of the United States in Germany, including West Berlin, and without regard to such provisions of law as he determines should be disregarded to achieve this purpose

(c) Certification by President of inadvisability to specify nature of use of funds; reports to Congress

The President is authorized to use amounts not to exceed \$50,000,000 of the funds made available under this chapter pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of the use of such funds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts. The President shall fully inform the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each use of funds under this subsection prior to

the use of such funds.

-SOURCE-

(Pub. L. 87-195, pt. 111, Sec. 614, Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 444;  
 Pub. L. 89-583, pt. 111, Sec. 301(f), (g), Sept. 19, 1966, 80  
 Stat. 805; Pub. L. 90-137, pt. 111, Sec. 301(e), Nov. 14, 1967, 81  
 Stat. 459; Pub. L. 93-559, Sec. 19(b), Dec. 30, 1974, 88 Stat.  
 1800; Pub. L. 96-533, title I, Sec. 117(a), Dec. 16, 1980, 94 Stat.  
 3140; Pub. L. 99-83, title I, Sec. 128, Aug. 8, 1985, 99 Stat. 206;  
 Pub. L. 101-222, Sec. 8, Dec. 12, 1989, 103 Stat. 1899; Pub. L.  
 103-199, title VII, Sec. 705(2), Dec. 17, 1993, 107 Stat. 2328.)

-REFTEXT-

REFERENCES IN TEXT

This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (c), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 87-195, Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 424, as amended, known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2151 of this title and Tables.

The Arms Export Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), (2), (4)(A), (B), is Pub. L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1320, as amended, which is classified principally to chapter 39 (Sec. 2751 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2751 of this title and Tables.

REFERENCES TO PART IV OF SUBCHAPTER I DEEMED REFERENCES TO PART IV  
 OF SUBCHAPTER II

Part IV of subchapter I (Sec. 2241 et seq.) of this chapter has been repealed. References to part IV of subchapter I, or any sections thereof, are deemed references to part IV of subchapter II (Sec. 2346 et seq.) of this chapter, or to appropriate sections thereof. See section 202(b) of Pub. L. 92-226, set out as a note

under section 2346 of this title.

-MISC2-

#### AMENDMENTS

1993 - Subsec. (a)(4)(C). Pub. L. 103-199 struck out "'Communist or Communist-supported'" after "victim of active".

1989 - Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-222 amended second sentence generally. Prior to amendment, second sentence read as follows:  
"The President shall promptly and fully inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each use of funds under this subsection."

1985 - Subsec. (a)(4). Pub. L. 99-83 designated existing provisions as subpar. (A), added cl. (i) and designations "'(ii)'" and "'(iii)'", struck out fiscal year limitation for any one country, and added subpars. (B) and (C).

1980 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 96-533, in revising subsec. (a), incorporated part of existing first sentence in provisions designated par. (1), inserted reference to Arms Export Control Act, struck out reference to Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, required notification of the Speaker of the House and chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and substituted "'security interests'" for "security"; inserted pars. (2) and (3); incorporated part of existing first sentence, second sentence, and substance of third sentence in provisions designated par. (4) and inserted reference to the Arms Export Control Act; and designated fourth sentence as par. (5) and substituted therein "may not" for "shall not".

1974 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 93-559 provided that the authority of the section shall not be used to waive the limitations on transfers contained in section 2360(a) of this title.

1967 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 90-137 substituted ''506'' for ''510'', classified to the Code as section 2318 of this title.

1966 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89-583, Sec. 301(f), provided that the \$50,000,000 limitation on allocation of funds to any country in any one fiscal year shall not apply to any country which is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 89-583, Sec. 301(g), inserted provision for reports to Congress of use of funds under this subsec.

-CHANGE-

#### CHANGE OF NAME

Committee on Foreign Affairs of House of Representatives treated as referring to Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives by section 1(a) of Pub. L. 104-14, set out as a note preceding section 21 of Title 2, The Congress.

-MISC4-

#### EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1985 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 99-83 effective Oct. 1, 1985, see section 1301 of Pub. L. 99-83, set out as a note under section 2151-1 of this title.

-TRANS-

#### DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS

For delegation of functions of President under this section, see Ex. Ord. No. 12163, Sept. 29, 1979, 44 F.R. 56673, as amended, set out as a note under section 2381 of this title.

-SECREP-

#### SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 2151g, 2161, 2222, 2314, 2360, 2394, 2413, 2780, 3281 of this title.



11-L-0559/OSD/25375

7/14 10:00



July 13, 2004

Paul Butler  
RWB  
7/14

To: Secretary of Defense  
From: Ken Krieg  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Ryan Henry

334

Subject: Snowflake on polling SLRG Members for topics

After a note to principals, memo to staffs and several reminders at staff meetings, I received two inputs:

- Air Force had no suggestions at this point, but will pass along as they have them, and
- Dr. Chu suggested doing a future presentation on entitlements growth.

I agree with David's recommendation and suggest that we do that in the context of the FY '06 program and budget review and FY '06 legislative submission sometime this fall.

13 JUL 04

This is in addition to the topics that Ryan and I have been developing amended by you in a conversation a month or so ago:

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction – this week

Next Round Global Basing (next week) – integrate developing costs with plans and debate priorities, opportunity costs, etc.

Strategic Capabilities – Led by Ryan -- Next round of discussing strategy and tying to future capabilities.

Joint Forcible Entry – first of joint integrating concepts – how do we want to fight in the future jointly and what does our current portfolio of investment and effort do to prepare us.

Under Sea Superiority – second target of above technique.

Horizontal Integration

Broader Portfolio Topics

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols ideas and other Jointness issues (CSIS related work)

27 APR 04

April 27, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SLRG

I think you ought to send a note to all the participants in the SLRG, and ask them if they have suggestions for future SLRG meetings.

Please tell me who suggests what.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
042704-2

.....  
Please respond by 5/14/04

MR. SECRETARY,  
ONLY RECEIVED ONE RESPONSE.

OSD 10603-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25377

**Look for Classification Marking in Message Body**

***Classification: UNCLASSIFIED***

Good afternoon all,

Mr. Krieg would like all participants to the SLRG to please provide suggestions for future SLRG meetings. Please have appropriate staff forward those suggestions to me via e-mail by next Friday.

Thank you

V/r

Carlos

**Commander Carlos Del Toro  
Military Assistant  
to the Director and Deputy Director  
Programs Analysis & Evaluation  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3D841  
1800 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC 20301-1800**

(b)(6)

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PAE**

---

**From:** Seipel Bradley Lt Col AF/XPXS  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 06, 2004 4:16 PM  
**To:** Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E  
**cc:** Olinto Louis Col AF/XPXS  
**Subject:** RE: Special Request for SLRG Inputs

Carlos,  
The USAF has no suggested topics for SLRGs at this time, but we certainly may in the future and will pass along to you.

V/r  
Bradley A. Seipel, Lt Col, USAF  
Exec Sec QDR Integration Group  
HQ USAF/XPXS  
Phone: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E

**Sent:** Friday, April 30, 2004 3:58 PM

**To:** Butler, Trish, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Steve LtCol John C [HQMC]; McCollum, Douglas F MAJ Army G3; Montalvo, Gary G LT; Barrett, Darren E; Rudder Col Philip C [HQMC]; Brown, Rosemary J, CIV, JCS ODJS; Miott, Ron, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Valente, Claudia, OSD-COMPT; Burchfield, Jeffrey B, Maj, JCS J8; Gunzinger Mark Civ AF/XPX; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Burke, Richard, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Champoux, Bernard S, COL, JCS VCJCS; Coulter, Eric, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Daly, Peter H, RDML, JCS J8; Gallant, Al, CIV, OSD-P&R; Gay, Robert, COL, OSD - P&R; Ioffredo, Michael, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Johnson, James, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Lamartin, Glenn, Dr, OSD-ATL; Mikolaski, Stephen, COL, OSD-COMPT; Roby, Cheryl, CIV, OSD-NII; Roth, John, OSD-COMPT; Spruill, Nancy, Dr, OSD-ATL; Stenbit, John, Mr, OSD-NII; Altomare, Michael J, COL, JCS J8; Farmer, Paul, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Collins, Christine, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Nappier, Milt, Mr, OSD-ATL; Rodgers, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; Gorenflo, Mark L CDR J004; Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY; Krieg, Ken, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Szemborski, Stanley R., VADM, OSD-PA&E; Lester, Suzi, CIV, OSD; Duncan LtCol James C [HQMC]; Collins, Barbara A, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Honecker, Brian A CWO2; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQMC]; Alston, Mack A YNCS (PTGN); Brasher Edward C. Col; Musca Col Joseph I [HQMC]; Bucco, Steven, COL, OSD; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Buechler, Nicholas J COL DAS; VanCamp, Eric J, Col, Force Transformation; Daugirda, John J, LTC, NORAD/USNORTHCOM WASHINGTON OFFICE; Snead, Lawrence R., LTC, JCS J7; Fair John Ctr AF/XOA; Greenwood, Charles R, Col, JCS SJS; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Earhart, Douglas B COL Army G8-QDR; Angello, Joseph J, CIV, OSD-P&R; Rudder Col Philip C [HQMC]; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQMC]; Brilakis Col Mark A [HQMC]; Bultemeier Col Mark A [HQMC]; Rawson Col Steven W [HQMC]; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQMC]; Holland, Gary, COL, OSD-POLICY; Davis, Stephen, CDR, OSD-POLICY; Provost John CIV SOCOM-WO; Tucker, Christopher, COL, JCS J8; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSD-USDI; Shafford Troy Maj AF/REXP; Flowers Alfred Col USSOCOM/COMPTR; Ross, Kevin, LTCOL, OSD-POLICY; McGinn, Jerry, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Robinson, Scott, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Luther, Brian E; Snead, Richard L, CAPT, JCS J8; Comes, Scott, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Barrow, Brent, CAPT, OSD-P&R; robert.bellitto@jcom.mil; Walker, Belinda MSG Army G8; Ledford, John H YNCS; Johnson, Clarence, Maj, JCS J8; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQMC]; Sims Col Terron D [HQMC]; Plata, Nancy D., CIV, OSD-P&R; Bryant, Richard R. LCDR (CNO); Olinto Louis Col AF/XPXS; Buzzard, Curtis A MAJ Army G-3; Kaufman Timothy Contr AF/XPXS; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQMC]; Berkson, Brad, Mr, OSD-ATL; robert.bellitto@jcom.mil; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQMC]; Kott Marilyn Lt. Col AF/XP; Philbrick, Christopher R LTC Army G8; Seward, Pamela, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Simkins-Mullins, Caroline A, LtCol, JCS J8; Brown, Rosemary J, CIV, JCS ODJS; Crawford, Paul M COL Army-G8-PAE; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQMC]; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSD-USDI; Hagerott, Mark R, CDR, OSD; Malone, David, CTR, OSD-PA&E; Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD; Schotzko, John E MAJ Army G8-QDR; Hannes, Kevin L CDR; Char,

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

11-L-0559/OSD/25379

## Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PAE**

**From:** Ioffredo, Michael, CIV, OSD-PA&E  
**Sent:** Friday, April 30, 2004 4:49 PM  
**To:** Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E  
**Subject:** RE: Special Request for SLRG Inputs

**Classification: UNCLASSIFIED**

As I mentioned at this morning's staff meeting, funding shortfall for combined Patriot/MEADS.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E  
**Sent:** Friday, April 30, 2004 3:58 PM  
**To:** Butler, Trish, CIV, OSDPOUCY; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Steve LtCol John C [HQM]; McCollum, Douglas F MAJ OCLL; Montalvo, Gary G LT; Barrett, Darren E, Rudder Col Philip C [HQM]; Brown, Rosemary J, CIV, JCS ODUS; Miott, Ron, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Valente, Claudia, OSD-COMPT, Burchfield, Jeffrey B, Maj, JCS J8; Gunzinger Mark Civ AF/XPX; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Burke, Richard, CIV, OSD-PA&E; 'Champoux, Bernard S, OOL JCS VCIOS'; Coulter, Eric, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Daly, Peter H, FDML, JCS J8; Gallant, Al, CIV, OSD-P&R; Gay, Robert, OOL OSD - P&R; Ioffredo, Michael, CN, OSD-PA&E; Johnson, James, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Lamartin, Glenn, Dr, OSD-ATL; Mikolaski, Stephen, OOL, OSD-COMPT; Roby, Cheryl, CN, OSDNII; Roth, John, OSD-COMPT; Spruill, Nancy, Dr, OSD-ATL; Stenbit, John, Mr, OSDNII; Altomare, Michael J, OOL, JCS J8; Farmer, Paul, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Collins, Christine, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Nappier, Milt, Mr, OSDATL; Rodgers, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; 'Gorenflo, Mark L CDR J004'; Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY; Kreg, Ken, CN, OSD-PA&E; Szemborski, Stanley R, VADM, OSD-PA&E; Lester, Suzi, CIV, OSD; Duncan LtCol James C [HQM]; Collins, Barbara A, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Honecker, Brian A LTJG; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQM]; Alston, Mack A YNCS (PTGN); Brasher Edward C, Col; Musca Col Joseph I [HQM]; Buod, Steven, OOL, OSD; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Buechler, Nicholas J OOL OCSA; VanCamp, Eric J, Col, Force Transformation; Daugirda, John J, LTC, NORAD/USNORTHCOM WASHINGTON OFFICE; Sneed, Lawrence R, LTC, JCS J7; Fair John Ctr AF/XDA; Greenwood, Charles R, Col, JCS SJS; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Earhart, Douglas B COL Army G8-QDR; Angello, Joseph J., CIV, OSD-P&R; Rudder Col Philip C [HQM]; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQM]; Brilakis Col Mark A [HQM]; Buitemeier Col Mark A [HQM]; Rawson Col Steven W [HQM]; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQM]; Holland, Gary, COL, OSD-POLICY; Davis, Stephen, CDR, OSDPOUCY; Provost John CIV S000M-WO; Tucker, Christopher, OOL, JCS J8; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSDUSD; Shalford Troy Maj AF/REXP; Flowers Alfred Col USSOCOM/COMPTR; Ross, Kevin, LT COL, OSD-POLICY; McGinn, Jerry, CIV, OSDPOUCY; Robinson, Scott, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Luther, Brian E, Sneed, Richard L, CAPT, JCS J8; Comes, Scott, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Barow, Brent, CAPT, OSD-P&R; 'robert.bellitto@jcom.mil'; Walker, Belinda MSG Army G8; Ledford, John H YNCS; Johnson, Clarence, Maj, JCS J8; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Sims Col Terron D [HQM]; Plata, Nancy D, CIV, OSD-P&R; 'Bryant, Richard R, LCDR (CNO); Olinto Louis Col AF/XPXS; Buzzard, Curtis A MAJ Army G-3; Kaufman Timothy Contr AF/XPXS; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Berkson, Brad, Mr, OSD-ATL; 'robert.bellitto@jcom.mil'; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQM]; Kott Marilyn Lt Col AF/XP; Philbrick, Christopher R LTC Army G8; Seward, Pamela, CN, OSD-POLICY; Simkins-Mullins, Caroline A, LtCol, JCS J8; Brown, Rosemary J, CIV, JCS ODUS; Crawford, Paul M OOL Army-G8-PAE; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSDUSD; Hagerott, Mark R, CDR, OSD, Malone, David, CTR, OSD-PA&E; Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD; Schotzko, John E MAJ Army G8-QDR; Hannes, Kevin USNCDR CNO N815E/N00X5E; Char, Chester, LTC, OSD-PA&E; Donnelly, Edward P COL Army G8-QDR; Barday, Jim O OOL VCSA; Fattahi Omid Ctr AF/XPXS; Sample Todd Contr AF/XPXS; Lindenbaum, Eric; Duma, David, Mr, OSD-DOT&E; Wells, Mary, Ms, OSD-DOT&E; Lilli Charles, ICapt, USN; Miller, Nancy L CIV (N8P); Austin, Stephen D, OOL, OSD-PA&E; Davis, Lisa, TSGT, OSD-POUCY; Loy, David, OOL, OSD-POUCY; Jones, Raymond, LTC(P), OSD-ATL; Key, Todd E MAJ Army G3; Hannes, Kevin USNCDR CNO N815E/N00X5E; Ford Kathleen MSGT AF/XO; Valente, Claudia, OSD-COMPT; Romero, Gregory R LCDR; Kustra Maj Mark C [HQM]; Koch Jeffrey Lt Col AF/XPPE; Anselm, Clete D, CDR, JCS J8; Lilli, Charlie, CAPT (N8A); Shea, Patrick D, CDR (N8A2); Schebler, Daniel CDR CNO N815C/N00X5C; McGrath, T. J., Maj, DoD OGC; Hendrickson, Randall, CAPT, OSDPOUCY; Sulmeyer, Michael, CIV, OSD-POUCY; Wilson, Charles, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Samuels, Celeste, CN, OSD-COMPT; Wilkenson, Wade F, USNCDR OPNAV (N81A/N00XA); Mann, Thomas, MR, OSDUSD; Smith, Elizabeth A, CTR, OSD-USD (ISR Systems); Troyano, Thomas, Mr, OSD-ATL; Hargis LtCol Darren L [HQM]; Cave, Francine H, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Collins, Christine, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Burke-Angel, Fran, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Strickland, Melodie, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Adams Maj Mark A [HQM]; Smith, Winton CDR (N3N5); Girrier, Robert P. (N3N5); Samuels, Celeste, CN, OSD-COMPT; Odom, Anita, Mrs, OSD-ATL; Davison, Rich, CIV, OSD-POUCY; Euresit, Kara, CTR, OSD-ATL; Steptoe Philip P Civ AF/XPPE; Bowen, Desney V, LCDR, OSD-ATL; Seipel Bradley Lt Col AF/XPXS; McCloud Maj Trane [HQM]; West, Scott D, Col, JCS J8; Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Pasquarette, James F, LTC, JCS J8; Crino, John R MAJ Army G8-PAE; Rogers, Jeffrey V, CTR, JCS J8; Kolesar, Krystyna, CN, OSD-PA&E; Armstrong, Brett, OOL, OSD-ATL; Altomare, Michael J, OOL, JCS J8; Gingrich, Karl H, MAJ, JCS J8; Bowen, Desney V, LCDR, OSD-ATL; Rogers, Jeffrey V, CTR, JCS J8; Quinlan, Robin, Ms, OSD-ATL; Beasley, William, CTR, OSD-ATL; Mitnaul, Henry, Col, O S D LA; Scott, William, Mr, OSD-ATL; Hesterman, Jeffrey A, CAPT, JCS J5; Marsh, Steve, CN, OSD-POLICY; Wilson, Tom, Mr, OSD-USD; Wilson, Kirk, CDR, OSD-ATL; Gordon, Vance, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Poirier, Michel T, CDR, JCS J8; Stenger, Gail E, CN, OSD-P&R; Diggs, Donald, Mr, OSDNII; Nielsen Andrew Maj AF/XPPE; Casey, Thomas F, Capt, JCS J8; Tyson, Dustin, Col (S), OSDPOLICY; Anderson, Christier R, CTR, OSD-PA&E; Sweatt, Susan, OOL, OSD-USD; Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E; Hegstrom, Robert R, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Taylor, Brenda, , OSD-USD; Thompson, Cathar, CIV, OSD-USD; Hicks, Kristine, CTR, OSD-ATL; Ott, Alan, LTC, DoD OGC; Clark, Harley W LTC Army G8-FD; Tyson, Dustin, Col (S), OSDPOUCY; Cordray, Elisabeth, CN, OSDPOUCY; Wilson, Tom, Mr, OSD USD; Jones, Cecilia, OR, OSD-NII; Benzal Christopher J, CDR; Sauer Edward K, LTC; McGee Michael L, Lt Col; Paustin, Kyler, Brent J, LCDR, JCS J8; 'McLeese, Christine'

**Subject:** Special Request for SLRG Inputs

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body  
11-L-0559/OSD/25380

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body

**Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PAE**

**From:** Gallant, Al, CIV, OSD-P&R  
**Sent:** Friday, April 30, 2004 4:03 PM  
**To:** Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E  
**Subject:** RE: Special Request for SLRG Inputs

Carlos: It probably goes without saying, but I think Dr Chu is amenable to presenting the "Entitlements Growth" briefing-- he just couldn't do it on May 7 because of out-of-town commitments. Al

-----Original Message-----

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**Sent:** Friday, April 30, 2004 3:58 PM  
**To:** Butler, Trish, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Steve LtCol John C [HQM]; McCallum, Douglas F MAJ OCLL; Montalvo, Gary G LT; Barrett, Darren E, Rudder Col Philip C [HQM]; Brown, Rosemary J, CN, JCS ODUS; Miott, Ron, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Valente, Claudia, OSD-COMPT; Burchfield, Jeffrey B, Maj, JCS J8; Gunzinger Mark Civ AF/XPX; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Burke, Richard, CN, OSD-PA&E; Champoux, Bernard S, OOL, JCS VCJCS; Coulter, Eric, CN, OSD-PA&E; Daly, Peter H, RDM, JCS J8; Gallant, Al, CIV, OSD-P&R; Gay, Robert, OOL, OSD-P&R; Ioffredo, Michael, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Johnson, James, CN, OSD-PA&E; Lamartin, Glenn, Dr, OSD-ATL; Mikolaski, Stephen, OOL, OSD-COMPT; Roby, Cheryl, CIV, OSD-NII; Roth, John, OSD-COMPT; Spruill, Nancy, Dr, OSD-ATL; Stenbit, John, Mr, OSD-NII; Altomare, Michael J, OOL, JCS J8; Farmer, Paul, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Rotach Karen Civ AF/XP; Collins, Christine, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Nappier, Milt, Mr, OSD-ATL; Rodgers, Philip, Mr, OSD-ATL; Gorenflo, Mark L, ODR J004; Henry, Ryan, HON, OSD-POLICY; Krieg, Ken, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Szemborski, Stanley R, VADM, OSD-PA&E; Lester, Suzi, CIV, OSD; Duncan LtCol James C [HQM]; Collins, Barbara A, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Honecker, Brian A, LTJG; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQM]; Alston, Mack A, YNCS (PTGN); Brasher Edward C, Col; Musca Col Joseph I [HQM]; Bucco, Steven, OOL, OSD; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Buechler, Nicholas J, COL, OCSA; VanCamp, Eric J, Col, Force Transformation; Daugirda, John J, LTC, NORAD/USNORTHCOM WASHINGTON OFFICE; Sneed, Lawrence R, LTC, JCS J7; Fair John Ctr AF/XOA; Greenwood, Charles R, Col, JCS SJS; Cunningham Stickman LtCol AF/XPXS; Pond, Paul A, LtCol, JCS SJS; Earhart, Douglas B, COL, Army G8-ODR; Angelo, Joseph J, CIV, OSD-P&R; Rudder Col Philip C [HQM]; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQM]; Briakis Col Mark A [HQM]; Bultemeier Col Mark A [HQM]; Rawson Col Steven W [HQM]; Van Dyke Col Anthony E [HQM]; Holland, Gary, OOL, OSD-POLICY; Davis, Stephen, CDR, OSD-POLICY; Provost John C, N SOCOMWO; Tucker, Christopher, OOL, JCS J8; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSDUSDI; Shafford Troy Maj AF/REXP; Flowers Alfred Col USSOCOM/COMPT; Ross, Kevin, LTCOL, OSD-POLICY; McGinn, Jerry, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Robinson, Scott, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Luther, Brian E, Sneed, Richard L, CAPT, JCS J8; Comes, Scott, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Barow, Brent, CAPT, OSD-P&R; robert.bellitto@jcom.mil; Walker, Belinda, MSG, Army G8; Ledford, John H, YNCS; Johnson, Clarence, Maj, JCS J8; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Sims Col Terron D [HQM]; Plata, Nancy D, CIV, OSD-P&R; Bryant, Richard R, LCDR (CNO); Olinto Louis Col AF/XPXS; Buzzard, Curtis A, MAJ, Army G-3; Kaufman Timothy Contr AF/XPXS; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Berkson, Brad, Mr, OSD-An; robert.bellitto@jcom.mil; Caspers Col Jeffrey L [HQM]; Kott Marilyn Lt Col AF/XP; Philbrick, Christopher R, LTC, Army G8; Seward, Pamela, CN, OSD-POLICY; Simkins-Mullins, Caroline A, LtCol, JCS J8; Brown, Rosemary J, CIV, JCS ODUS; Crawford, Paul M, COL, Army-G8-PAE; Bayard GS15 Richard C [HQM]; Long, Letitia, DISES, OSDUSDI; Hagerott, Mark R, CDR, OSD; Malone, David, CTR, OSD-PA&E; Nosenzo, Thomas, E, CDR, OSD; Schotzko, John E, MAJ, Army G8-ODR; Hannes, Kevin, USNCDR, CNO N815E/N00X5E; Char, Chester, LTC, OSD-PA&E; Donnelly, Edward P, COL, Army G8-ODR; Barday, Jim O, COL, VCSA; Fattahi, Ormid, Ctr AF/XPXS; Sample, Todd, Contr AF/XPXS; Lindenbaum, Eric, Duma, David, Mr, OSD-DOT&E; Wells, Mary, Ms, OSD-DOT&E; Lilli, Charles I, Capt, USN; Miller, Nancy L, CN (N8P); Austin, Stephen D, COL, OSD-PA&E; Davis, Lisa, TSGT, OSD-POUCY; Loy, David, COL, OSD-POLICY; Jones, Raymond, LTC(P), OSD-ATL; Key, Todd E, MAJ, Army G3; Hannes, Kevin, USNCDR, CNO N815E/N00X5E; Ford, Kathleen, MSG AF/XO; Valente, Claudia, OSD-COMPT; Romero, Gregory R, LCDR; Kustra, Maj Mark C [HQM]; Koch, Jeffrey, Lt. Col AF/XPPE; Anselm, Clete D, CDR, JCS J8; Lilli, Charlie, CAPT (N8A); Shea, Patrick O, CDR (N8A2); Schebler, Daniel, CDR, CNO N815C/N00X5C; McGrath, T. J., Maj, DoD OGC; Hendrickson, Randall, CAPT, OSD-POLICY; Sulmeyer, Michael, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Wilson, Charles, CAPT, OSD-ATL; Samuels, Celeste, CN, OSD-COMPT; Wilkenson, Wade F, USNCDR, OPNAV (N81A/N00XA); Mann, Thomas, MR, OSD-USDI; Smith, Elizabeth A, CTR, OSD-USDI (ISR Systems); Troyano, Thomas, Mr, OSD-ATL; Hargis, LtCol Darren L [HQM]; Cave, Francine H, CN, OSD-PA&E; Collins, Christine, CN, OSD-PA&E; Burke-Angel, Fran, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Strickland, Melodie, CN, OSD-PA&E; Adams, Maj Mark A [HQM]; Smith, Winton, CDR (N3N5); Giermer, Robert P. (N3N5); Samuels, Celeste, CN, OSD-COMPT; Odom, Anita, Ms, OSD-ATL; Davison, Rich, CN, OSD-POUCY; Euressti, Kara, CTR, OSD-ATL; Steptoe, Philip P, Civ AF/XPPE; Bowen, Desney V, LCDR, OSD-ATL; Seipel, Bradley, LtCol AF/XPXS; McCloud, Maj Trane [HQM]; West, Scott D, Col, JCS J8; Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Pasquarette, James F, LTC, JCS J8; Crino, John R, MAJ, Army G8-PAE; Rogers, Jeffrey V, CTR, JCS J8; Kolesar, Krystyna, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL; Altomare, Michael J, COL, JCS J8; Gingrich, Karl H, MAJ, JCS J8; Bowen, Desney V, LCDR, OSD-ATL; Rogers, Jeffrey V, CTR, JCS J8; Quinlan, Robin, Ms, OSD-ATL; Beasley, William, OR, OSD-ATL; Mitrnau, Henry, Col, OSD-LA; Scott, William, Mr, OSD-ATL; Merman, Jeffrey A, CAPT, JCS J5; Marsh, Steve, CN, OSD-POUCY; Wilson, Tom, Mr, OSD-USDI; Wilson, Kirk, CDR, OSD-ATL; Gordon, Vance, CN, OSD-PA&E; Poirier, Michel T, CDR, JCS J8; Stenger, Gail E, CIV, OSD-P&R; Diggs, Donald, Mr, OSD-NII; Nielsen, Andrew, Maj AF/XPPE; Carney, Thomas F, Capt, JCS J8; Tyson, Dustin, Col (S), OSD-POUCY; Anderson, Christfer R, OR, OSD-PA&E; Sweatt, Susan, OOL, OSD-USDI; Del Toro, Carlos, CDR, OSD-PA&E; Hegstrom, Robert R, CIV, OSD-PA&E; Taylor, Brenda, OSD-USDI; Thompson, Cather, CIV, OSD-USDI; Hicks, Kristine, CTR, OSD-ATL; Ott, Alan, LTC, DoD OGC; Clark, Harley W, LTC, Army G8-FD; Tyson, Dustin, Col (S), OSD-POLICY; Cordray, Elisabeth, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Wilson, Tom, Mr, OSD-USDI; Jones, Cecilia, CTR, OSD-NII; Benzal, Christopher J, ODR; Sauer, Edward K, LTC; McGee, Michael L, LtCol; Paustin, Kyler, Brent J, LCDR, JCS J8; McLeese, Christine

**Subject:** Special Request for SLRG Inputs

Look for Classification Marking in Message Body  
11-L-0559/OSD/25381

6/23  
08 00 1.0



Paul Butler

EF-8718  
04/003014

March 3, 2004

6/23 TO: Sec Def

**TO:** Doug Feith  
**CC:** Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

**SUBJECT:** Syria and Iran

I think the US Government needs a fresh policy on Syria and Iran.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030304-6

.....  
Please respond by 3/11

UCB please control

Response is:

OSD 77344-04

092

DD 6/25  
C 6/24  
3 Mar 04

05-03-04 11:33 IN

TEW  
6/24

11-L-0559/OSD/25382

OSD 10693-04

EF-8776  
March 8, 2004  
I-04/003201

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

3/29 → Sec Chief  
SUBJECT PKK

Where do we stand on the PKK?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-42

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

✓ 4/5

UCB - please control

Sir,  
Response attached  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
3/30

Reply is:

OSD 77345-04

000.5

8 Mar 04

APR 5 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to Cong. Knollenberg

This looks funny to me. What should I think about it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/30/04 Service Chiefs ltr to Cong. Knollenberg

DHR:dh  
033104-7

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

320.2 Strategic

5 APR 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC

30 MAR 2004

The Honorable Joseph Knollenberg  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Construction  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Knollenberg:


We regret that our request to have our respective service experts on installations and facilities testify before **your** Subcommittee has disappointed you. We assure you that we understand the importance of the annual appropriations for military construction, and we appreciate your long-standing commitment to the superb men and women of our Armed Forces.


However, we are concerned about possible conflicts of interest regarding our **role** in pending decisions for **the** Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study and the Fiscal Year 2005 Base Closure and Realignment process. Service chiefs must maintain a certain distance from deliberations on these matters until they are ready for our joint assessment and a final decision. Your Subcommittee rightfully would expect a level of familiarity and detail that is inconsistent with our duties regarding these issues at this time.

Our intent always has been to provide the Subcommittee with the most accurate information possible on our military construction priorities. Therefore, we believe our respective subject matter experts are the right witnesses to answer the Subcommittee's questions. Additionally, their appearance would preserve our ability to offer the Secretary of Defense and the President, at the proper time, our impartial judgments regarding what is best for the Nation.


Once again, we greatly appreciate your continued advocacy on behalf of our outstanding men and women in uniform, our Department of Defense civilians, and the thousands of family members, retirees and others associated with our military. Now, more than ever, your steadfast support is tangible proof of America's commitment to those making very real sacrifices for our country.

Sincerely,

  
Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations

  
John P. Jumper  
General, U.S. Air Force  
Chief of Staff

  
Peter J. Schoomaker  
General, U.S. Army  
Chief of Staff

  
Michael W. Hagee  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/25385

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To Dr Chy

From Paul Butler

0011WH

10 Aug 04

1 APR 04

SecDef snowflake inviting  
POTUS to Freedom Awards Dinner.  
Wrote request from att ~~the~~  
Cabinet affairs for PA Statement for  
POTUS video. May want to  
coordinate this with PA.



Paul Butler

8/10

**TO:** Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
**SUBJECT:** POTUS Recognition of Employers

On September 21, 2004, we will hold the *Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award* ceremonial dinner to recognize certain U.S. employers who have provided exceptional support to their Guard and Reserve employees.

This event would be an opportunity for the President to say "thank you" to America's employers for their patriotic commitment to the global war on terror.

I am told there will be about 500 guests. Some additional information on the award is attached.

Thanks.

Attach.

Information Paper: *Secretary of Defense Employee Support Freedom Award*

DHR:dh  
032604-2

## INFORMATION PAPER

*Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award*

The *Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award* was instituted in 1996 under the auspices of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR). The award recognizes employers who provide the most outstanding support for their National Guard and Reserve employees and is presented annually by the Secretary of Defense. The *Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award* is the highest in a series of awards for employees, which also include the *Patriot Award*, *The Above and Beyond Award*, and the *Pro Patria*.

Secretary of Defense William Perry authorized the first award in 1996 and presented it to Schneider National, a Green Bay, Wisconsin trucking company. In the years since, many companies have received this prestigious award. In 2003, recipients were Central Atlantic Toyota Distribution Center; D.H. Griffin Wrecking Company; Millet Brewing Company; PG&E Corp.; and Tyson Foods, Inc.

Traditionally, each of the 55 volunteer ESGR Committees (one in each state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Europe) submitted one nomination. These employer nominations were chosen from a pool of applications submitted by Guardsmen and Reservists.

In today's environment of continuous mobilization of Guardsmen and Reservists, America's employers are becoming inextricably linked to the nation's defense. ESGR recognizes that more employers are being impacted by the War on Terrorism and the on-going military operations in Iraq. In 2004, the nomination process was opened up to the general public and applications are submitted on-line to ESGR.

The nominations provide a detailed description of employer's outstanding efforts in support of their Guard and Reserve employees. On April 20, 2004, a National Selection Board will judge employer nominations based on criteria that assesses their company policies, practices, and programs that support their employees who serve in the Guard and Reserve. Special focus is given to what employers do "above and beyond" the support required by law.

For more information about the *Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award*, or other ESGR programs and services designed to help Guard and Reserve members and their employers, contact ESGR at (b)(6) or [www.esgr.com](http://www.esgr.com).

APR 1 2004

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
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Information Paper: *Secretary of Defense Employee Support Freedom Award*

DHR:dh  
032604-2

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11-L-0559/OSD/25389

OSD 10719-1

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Traditionally, each of the 55 volunteer ESGR Committees (one in each state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Europe) submitted one nomination. These employer nominations were chosen from a pool of applications submitted by Guardsmen and Reservists.

In today's environment of continuous mobilization of Guardsmen and Reservists, America's employers are becoming inextricably linked to the nation's defense. ESGR recognizes that more employers are being impacted by the War on Terrorism and the on-going military operations in Iraq. In **2004**, the nomination process was opened up to the general public and applications are submitted on-line to ESGR.

The nominations provide a detailed description of employer's outstanding efforts in support of their Guard and Reserve employees. On April **20,2004**, a National Selection Board will judge employer nominations based on criteria that assesses their company policies, practices, and programs that support their employees who serve in the Guard and Reserve. Special focus is given to what employers do "above and beyond" the support required by law.

For more information about the *Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award*, or other ESGR programs and services designed to help Guard and Reserve members and their employers, contact ESGR at (b)(6) or [www.esgr.com](http://www.esgr.com).

March 31, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Day of 9/11

Please take a look at this article from the *New York Observer*.

We need to start now to prepare the testimony for the hearing they will have when they look at the day of 9/11.

Please get with Marc Thiessen, and let's sketch out the testimony. We can use those portions of the original testimony that related to 9/11. In addition, we ought to do a complete timeline, minute-by-minute. We ought to have a section that raises every question raised by this article, by others, and by Zelikow - and just walk through precisely what happened.

In addition, in this testimony we should lay out what each Department in the USG's responsibility is, so it is clear what our responsibility is.

Let's set a timetable to do this.

Thanks.

Attach.

Sheehy, Gail. "Four 9/11 Moms Watch Rumsfeld and Grumble," *New York Observer*, March 29, 2004, p. 1.

DHR:dh  
033104-1

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 10720

11-L-0559/OSD/25391

*S*  
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# Four 9/11 Moms Watch Rumsfeld And Grumble

*Widows Drive from New Jersey to See Secretary, Ask Tough Questions As He, Powell Testify; Shocked That Zelikow Named in Clarke Book*

BY GAIL SHEEHY

In the predawn hours of Tuesday, March 23, Kristen Breitweiser, Lone Van Auken, Mindy Kleinberg and Patty Casazza dropped off their collective seven fatherless children with grand-

around the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that now has top officials from both the Clinton and Bush administrations duking it out in conflicting testimonies at this week's high-drama hearings in the Hart Office Building before the 9/11 commission



DONALD RUMSFELD

one was different. On March 23, testimony was to be heard by the commission investigating intelligence failures leading up to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, among others.

These four moms from New Jersey are the World Trade Center widows whose tireless advocacy produced the broad investigation into the failures

al for them, their hearts were heavy.

The Four Moms had submitted dozens of questions they have been burning to ask at these hearings. Mr. Rumsfeld is a particular thorn in their sides.

"He needs to answer to his actions on Sept. 11," said Ms. Kleinberg. "When was he aware that we were under attack? What did he do about it?"

When the widows had a conference call last week with the commission staff, they asked that Secretary Rumsfeld be questioned about his response on the day of Sept. 11. They were told that this was not a line of questioning the staff planned to pursue.

They were not especially impressed with his testimony. In Mr. Rumsfeld's opening statement, he said he knew of no intelligence in the months leading up to Sept. 11 indicating that terrorists intended to hijack commercial airplanes and fly them into the Pentagon or the World Trade Center.

It was his worst moment at the mike. Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste ran through a list of at least a dozen cases of foiled plots using com-



21st-Century Cruise: How often does a giant movie star ha

## Tom's Risky

Superstar Cruise Bolts P.R. Superpower  
It's Hard to Be Mega-Brand Over Dec  
Cruise Has Survived Better Than AT

BY FRANK DI GIACOMO

For an actor whose best performances have come from playing vulnerable men—think *Jerry Maguire*, *Magnolia*'s Frank T.J. Mackey, the dick-swinging motivational speaker with father issues, or *Vanilla Sky*'s dis-

Cruise has consistently pre- self on the stage of public per- a pretty impregnable guy. W was flashing his halogen smile peccable manners on some re laughing too hard on the late- shows, vigorously litigating; some tabloid report that **quest** sexuality, or beating bac

**BASRA HOTEL BLAST  
SOUNDED LIKE GOD'S  
BEDROOM SET FELL**

New Boraq Hotel Bombed—  
Targeted for British,  
But Made Iraqi Victims

TH-SS MY HOME! RELAX!

# 9/11 Widows Quiz Rumsfeld

**CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1**  
 mercial airlines to attack key targets in the U.S. and elsewhere. Mr. Ben-Yeniste cited the "Bajinka" plot in 1995, which envisioned blowing up Western commercial planes in Asia. That plot was foiled by the government and must have been on the mind of U.I.A. director George Tenet, who was having weekly lunches with Mr. Rumsfeld through 2001. In 1998, an Al Qaeda-connected group talked about flying commercial planes into the World Trade Center.

"So when we had this threatened strike that something huge was going to happen, why didn't D.C.D. alert people on the ground of a potential jihadist hijacking? Why didn't it ever get to an actionable level?" the commissioner asked.

Mr. Rumsfeld said he only remembered hearing threats of a private aircraft being used. "The decision to fly a commercial aircraft was not known to me."

Mr. Ben-Yeniste came back at him. "We knew from the Millennium plot [to blow up Los Angeles International Airport] that Al Qaeda was trying to banish an American airport," he said. The Clinton administration foiled that plot and thought every day about foiling terrorism, he said. "But as we get into 2001, it was like, everyone was looking at the white truck from the sniper attacks and not looking in the right direction. Nobody did a thing about it."

Mr. Rumsfeld huffed off with the same excuse. "I should say I don't know."

He said that on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, he was "hosting a meeting for some of the members of Congress."

"Inmatically, in the course of the conversation, I said how important it was for our country to be adequately prepared for the unexpected," he said.

It is still incredible to the moms that their Secretary of Defense continued to sit in his private dining room at the Pentagon while their husbands were being incinerated in the towers of the World Trade Center. They know this from an account posted on Sept. 11 on the Web site of Christopher Cox, a Republican Congressman from Orange County who is chairman of the House Policy Committee.

"Ironically," Mr. Cox wrote, "just moments before the Department of Defense was hit by a suicide hijacker, Secretary Rumsfeld was describing to me why... Congress has got to give the President the tools he needs to move forward with a defense of America against ballistic missiles."

At that point, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the Secret Service, the F.A.A., NORAD (our North American air-defense system), American Airlines and United Airlines, among others, knew that at least three planes had been violently hijacked, their transponders turned off, and that thousands of American citizens had been annihilated in the World Trade Center by Middle Eastern terrorists, some of whom had been under surveillance by the F.B.I. Yet the nation's defense chief didn't think it significant enough to interrupt his political pitch to a key Republican in Congress to reinvigorate the Star Wars initiative of the Bush's years.

"I've been around the block a few times," Mr. Rumsfeld told the Congressman, according to his own account. "There will be another event." Mr. Rumsfeld repeated it for emphasis. Mr. Cox wrote: "There will be another event."

"Within minutes of that utterance, Rumsfeld's words proved tragically prophetic," Mr. Cox wrote.

"Someone handed me a note that a plane had hit one of the W.T.C. towers," Mr. Rumsfeld recalled on March 23. "Later, I was in my office with a C.I.A. briefcase when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower."

The note didn't seem to prompt any action on his part.

"Shortly thereafter at 9:58 a.m., the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then unknown origin," he said. He had to go to the window of his office to see that the Pentagon had been attacked? Now the moms were getting agitated.

"I went outside to determine what had happened," he testified. "It was not there long, apparently, because I was told to go back to the Pentagon with the crisis action team, by shortly before or after 10 a.m."

"Upon my return from the crash site, and before going to the Executive Support Center," he continued, "I had one or more calls in my office, one of which I believe was the President."

Then commissioner member James Gorelick, who served as deputy attorney general and general counsel for the Department of Defense in the Clinton administration, had her turn with Mr. Rumsfeld.

"Where were you and your aircraft when a missile was heading to the Pentagon? Surely that is your responsibility, to protect our facilities, our headquarters—the Pentagon is everything we do to protect it!"

Mr. Rumsfeld said was a law-enforcement issue.

"When I arrived at the command center, an order had been given—the command had been given instructions that their pilots could shoot down any commercial airlines filled with our people if the plane seemed to be acting in a threatening manner," he said.

Ms. Gorelick tried to get Mr. Rumsfeld to say whether the NORAD pilots themselves knew they had authority to shoot down a plane.

"I don't know what they thought," he answered. "I was immediately concerned that they knew what they could do and that we changed the rules of engagement."

One of the hardest things for the families to hear was how every witness testified how he had done everything possible to combat the threat of terrorism. No one said, "We fell short."

Secretary of State Colin Powell complained that the Bush administration was given no military plan by the Clinton administration for ousting Al Qaeda. He then described how Condoleezza Rice undertook a complete reorganization of the failed responses of the Clinton years—not too much more than a series of meetings that took up the next eight months.

"Then 9/11 hit, and we had to put together another plan together," said Mr. Powell.

He also claimed that "we did not know the perpetrators were already in our country and getting ready to commit the crimes we saw on 9/11."

Some of the widows groaned. In fact, the moms had learned, the F.B.I. had 14 open investigations on supporters of the 9/11 hijackers who were in the U.S. before 9/11.

And after the Clinton administration foiled the Millennium plot to blow up LAX, the C.I.A. knew that two Al Qaeda operatives had a sleeper cell in San Diego. F.B.I. field officers tried to move the information up the line, with no success.

What's more, most of the 9/11 hijackers re-entered the U.S. between April and June of 2001 with blatantly suspicious visa applications, which the Four Moms had already obtained and shown to the commission. The State Department had 166,000 people on its returns watch list in 2001, but only 12 names had been passed along to the F.A.A. for inclusion on its "no-fly list." Mr. Powell had to admit as much, though he said that State Department consular officers had been given information to help them identify terrorist suspects among the visa

applicants.

One of the key questions that the Moms expected to be put to Mr. Powell was why over 100 members of the Saudi royal family and many members of the bin Laden clan were annihilated out of the U.S. in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks—without being interviewed by law enforcement—while no other Americans, including members of the victims' families, could take a plane anywhere in the U.S. The State Department had obviously given its approval. But no commissioner apparently dared to touch the sacrosanct Saudi friends of the Bush family.

When Republican commissioner James Thompson asked Mr. Powell:



Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the 9/11 Commission Mar. 23, but many who lost family members in the attacks still have questions.

"Prior to Sept. 11, would it have been possible to say to the Pakistanis and Saudis, 'You're either with us or against us?'" Mr. Powell simply ignored the issue of the Saudi exemption and pointed on Pakistanis.

### FOX IN THE CHICKEN HOUSE

To the Moms, the problems with the 9/11 commission were always apparent. But the disappointing testimony from Mr. Rumsfeld was especially difficult to bear. The Moms had tried to get their most pressing questions in the commission reasked of Mr. Rumsfeld, but their efforts had foundered at the hands of Philip Zelinkow, the commission's staff director.

Indeed, it was only with the recent publication of Richard Clarke's memoir of his commencement on days in the White House, *Against All Enemies*, that the Moms found out that Mr. Zelinkow—who was supposed to present their questions to Mr. Rumsfeld—was actually one of the select few in the new Bush administration who had been warned, some months before 9/11, that Osama bin Laden was the No. 1 security threat to the country. They are now calling for Mr. Zelinkow's resignation.

Ms. Gorelick sees this point. "This is a legitimate concern," Ms. Gorelick said in an interview, "and I am not convinced we knew everything we needed to know when we made the decision to hire him."

But despite her obvious discomfort at the conflicts of interest apparently not fully disclosed by Mr. Zelinkow in his deposition by the commission's attorney, Ms. Gorelick believes that the time is too short to replace the staff director.

"We're just going to have to be very cognizant of the role that he played and address it in the writing of our report," she said.

That doesn't satisfy the Four Moms. They point out that it is Mr. Zelinkow who decides which among the many people offering information will be interviewed. Efforts by the families to get the commission to hear from a raft of administration and intelligence agency whistleblowers have been largely ignored at his behest. And it is Mr. Zelinkow who oversees what investigative material the commission will be briefed on, and who decides the topics for the hearings. Mr. Zelinkow's

sounded to the Moms like a whitewash waiting to happen.

"This was everybody's fault and nobody's fault."

The Moms don't buy it.

"Why did it take Condoleezza Rice nine months to develop a counterterrorism policy for Al Qaeda, while it took only two weeks to develop a policy for regime change in Iraq?" Ms. Kleinberg asked rhetorically.

Dr. Rice has given one closed-door interview and has been asked to return for another, but the commissioners have declined to use their subpoena power to compel her public testimony. And now, they say, it is probably too late.

"That strategy may not turn out well for the Bush administration," Ms. Gorelick said.

Bob Kerrey, the commissioner who replaced Max Cleland, expressed the same view in a separate interview:

"The risk they run in not telling what they were doing during that period of time is that other narratives will prevail."

The Four Moms have enjoyed some victories along the way. The first was when the White House finally gave up trying to block an independent investigation; the commission was created in December 2002. The Moms shut down in Washington—stopping in traffic to change out of their Capri pants and into proper pantsuits—to meet with the new commissioners, who thanked them for providing the wealth of information they'd been gathering since losing their husbands on Sept. 11.

Ms. Gorelick expressed amazement at the research the women had done, and vowed it would be their "road map."

"We were their biggest advocates," said the husky-voiced Ms. Kleinberg.

"They asked us to get them more funding, and we did. It could have been a great relationship, but it hasn't been."

Mr. Zelinkow's idea of how to conduct the investigation, the Moms said, is to hold everything close to the vest.

"They don't tell us or the public anything, and they won't until they publish their final report," said Ms. Casazza. "At which point, they'll be out of business."

Ms. Kleinberg chimed in: "Why not publish interim reports, instead of letting us sit around for two years bleeding for attorneys' fees?"

"We have lower and lower expectations," said Ms. Van Auker, whose teenage daughter often accompanies her to hearings; her son still can't talk about seeing his father's building incinerated.

The irony is that two of the Four Moms voted for George Bush in 2000, while another is a registered independent, only one is a Democrat. But until they felt the teeth of the Bush attack dogs, they were either apolitical or determinedly nonpartisan. Now their tone is different.

"The Bush people keep saying that Clinton was not doing enough [to combat the Al Qaeda threat]," said Ms. Kleinberg. "But 'nothing' is less than 'not enough,' and nothing is what the Bush administration did."

An unnamed spokesman for the Bush campaign was quoted as saying of Sept. 11, "We own it." That comment particularly disturbed the Four Moms.

"They can have it," said Ms. Van Auker. "Can I have my husband back now?"

"If they want to own 9/11, they also have to own 9/10 and 9/12," said Ms. Kleinberg. "Their argument is that this was a defining moment in our history. It's not the moment of tragedy that defines you, but what you do afterwards."

If the final report of this 9/11 commission does indeed turn out to be a whitewash, the Four Moms from New Jersey have a backup plan. Provided there is a change of leadership, they will petition the new President to create an independent 9/11 commission before

31  
March 29, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee  
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Shortage of Ammunition

471

I need to know why we are running out of small-caliber ammunition. It suggests that some unfortunate decisions were made, and, further, that there may be some systemic problem.

It concerns me that risk issues like that seem not to get elevated when they are being balanced off.

Please look into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032904-20

.....  
Please respond by 4/23/04

31 Mar 04

*OB*  
*5/26*

31  
March 29, 2004

TO: Adm. Ellis  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: British Officers

Mira Ricardel advises me we are making progress on assigning British officers to Strategic Command.

*UK*

I hope it is helpful.

*Done 6/1*

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/18/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef [OSD 04268-04]

DHR:dh  
032904-24

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*31 Mar 04*

OSD 10723-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25395

093



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900


OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

03/18/04 08:57

EF 8919

IO-04/002809-OMDP  
MAR 23 2004 USDP (K. POUKSONG)  
DSD

INFO MEMO

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
From: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting)  MAR 18 2004  
Subject: Assignment of UK Military Personnel to USSTRATCOM

- In response to your memo of February 5 (Tab 1) regarding the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) desire to assign UK officers to key billets without providing U.S. officers in exchange, my staff has been working with the General Counsel, Comptroller, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM to find an appropriate solution.
- We have developed a draft arrangement under which UK military personnel would perform tasks assigned by the USSTRATCOM chain of command, and would be permitted to share relevant information with the UK Ministry of Defence.
  - Under this arrangement, the U.S. would not be required to provide officers to the UK in exchange.
- The General Counsel has advised that we are authorized to enter into such an arrangement under Title 10 U.S.C. 2608, which states:
  - *"The Secretary of Defense may accept from...any foreign government or international organization...any contribution of services made by such foreign government or international organization for use by the Department of Defense."*
- Acceptance authority under this provision has been delegated to the Comptroller.
- My staff is working with the Comptroller's office on such an arrangement, with the objective of having this mechanism in place by late March.
- We believe that this type of arrangement could be used not only for this USSTRATCOM assignment, but also to provide for similar assignments to other combatant commands.
  - Specific approval would be required from USD(P) consistent with DoD Directive 5230.20, "Visits, Assignments, and Exchanges of Foreign Nationals," each time this authority is requested.

Coordination: Tab 2

11-L-0559/OSD/25396

Prepared By: Frank Rose, ISP/FP/MDP (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	03/24
MA BUCCI <i>Naz...</i>	3/29
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	3/24

19050004268-04





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



FEB 5 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
 DEFENSE

SUBJECT: UK Officers on USSTRATCOM Staff

Commander, USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM), wants to assign UK officers to key USSTRATCOM staff billets without having to provide US officers to the UK in exchange. Current DOD policy allows exchange officers or foreign liaison officers, but not officers who function in both capacities and on a non-reciprocal basis.

Please review the officer exchange/liaison policy to determine if the policy supports this closer cooperation across all combatant commands. If it does not, please advise me as to what courses of action may be taken to meet this goal.

Please report back to me by February 20, 2004.

2	<del>GENERAL COUNSEL</del>
1	<del>DEPT GENERAL COUNSEL</del>
3	EA

OSD 75194-04



11-L-0559/OSD/25397

March 30, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
Paul Butler  
Jaymie Durnan

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Procedures for Appointments with Members of the House and Senate

032

With respect to meetings on the Hill and invitations to people on the Hill to come to the Department of Defense, I want to set some new procedures.

Invitations to Members of Congress to come to DoD to meet with me will need to be approved by me before the invitation is extended.

The same will be true for any proposals for me to go to the Hill to meet with the House, the Senate or anyone on the Hill.

I am concerned that appointments are being set that I cannot make, and it is awkward to have to keep canceling the meetings. It is best to get them set right the first time.

Thanks.

30 Mar 04

DHR:dh  
033004-4

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

March 30, 2004

TO: Eric Ruff  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Vail Resorts

DR

200.10

4/12

You ought to be aware of the wonderful things that Vail Resorts are doing. Here is a press release.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/23/04 Vail Resorts Press Release

DHR:dh  
033004-2

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

4/10  
4/13  
Info attached

Larry Di Rita  
4/12

FROM: Eric Ruff  
THRU: Larry Di Rita  
TO: SecDef  
CC: DepSecDef  
DATE: April 8, 2004  
SUBJECT: Vail Resorts

We have put the generous contributions of the Vail Resorts company on the DefendAmerica website, and it is being picked up by base newspapers and the Service news organizations. Additionally, Stars & Stripes has indicated their intention to cover this story in future issues.

11-L-0559/OSD/25400

# DEFEND AMERICA

U.S. Department of Defense News About the War on Terrorism

Mar 30, 2004

Search

HOME AND ABROAD  
APRIL 2004  
**CAVATAS**

Our Troops  
How you can help

Mar. 23, 2003  
Prepared America

CoD video Broadcast  
Today's Webcast  
Schedule


A Year in Iraq  
Operation Enduring Freedom  
2003-2004

- Government**
- [FirstGov](#)
  - [EPA](#)
  - [FAA](#)
  - [FBI](#)
  - [FEMA](#)
  - [Homeland Security](#)
  - [Justice Department](#)
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  - [Naw Reserve](#)
  - [Air Force Reserve](#)
  - [Marine Reserve](#)



**VEHICLE UNLOADING** — A U.S. Marine Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck and other Marine vehicles are unloaded from the Military Sealift Command fast sealift ship USNS Bellatrix at the port of Mina Ash-Shu'abih, Kuwait, in support of the recent troop rotations in Iraq. Military Sealift Command is the transportation provider for the Department of Defense with the responsibility of providing strategic sealift and ocean transportation for all military forces overseas. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Eric L. Beauregard



## OPERATION TRIBUTE TO FREEDOM

### Operation Freedom Lodging Offers Free Stays

**PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Colo.,** March 29, 2004 (NNS) — Vail Resorts in Colorado is offering 1,000 free nights to service members who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, as part of "Operation Freedom Lodging." Members from any branch of service who served for 30 or more days in these countries are eligible for up to three consecutive nights of lodging at Vail Resorts-owned and -operated hotels in Breckenridge and Keystone. [More](#)

★ [Sign an On-line Thank You Note](#)

### Future Iraqi Defense Leaders Train in Washington

**WASHINGTON,** March 30, 2004 — Iraqi training for leadership positions within the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense told reporters here today they look forward to building a military that transcends ethnic and political differences to protect Iraq's people and its constitution. [More](#)

### Iraq Survey Group Continues WMD Search

**WASHINGTON,** March 30, 2004 — A U.S. official working with an international group of specialists searching post-Saddam Iraq for weapons of mass destruction said today that more work needs to be performed before arriving at any conclusions. [More](#)

### Defense Leaders Speak President George W. Bush

"NATO's core mission remains the same: the defense of its members against any aggression. Today, our alliance faces a new enemy, which has brought death to innocent people from New York to Madrid. Terrorists hate everything this alliance stands for. They despise our freedom, they fear our unity, they seek to divide us. They will fail. We will not be

## President Bush Lauds First Responders, Military Members

By Kathleen T. Rhem / American Forces Press Service

**WASHINGTON,** March 30, 2004 - The United States is at war and needs to be "ready on all fronts," President Bush told first responders in Appleton, Wis., today.

"The first-responder effort and the strategy with the local, state and federal government is really an important part of making sure that we do everything we can to do our solemn duty, which is to protect our fellow citizens from harm," Bush said during a brief stop in the Wisconsin city of about 70,000 people.

The size of the United States makes it particularly tough to stop terrorists on U.S. soil, Bush said. That's why it's vital to take the fight to the enemy. [More](#)

## Spike in Iraq Violence Leaves Two Coalition Soldiers Dead

By U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Doug Sample / American Forces Press Service

**WASHINGTON,** March 30, 2004 — A recent spike in attacks against coalition forces in Iraq has left two more coalition soldiers dead, a coalition military spokesman said today in Baghdad.

A coalition soldier was killed and one was wounded today in an improvised explosive device attack on their patrol near Ramadi, said Army Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Combined Joint Task Force 7 deputy operations director. [More](#)

## Bush Welcomes NATO Nations, Pledges Unity in War on Terror

By Gerry J. Gilmore / American Forces Press Service

**WASHINGTON,** March 30, 2004 — President Bush welcomed seven new NATO members at a March 29 White House ceremony, noting the alliance "is made stronger by their

11-L-0559/OSD/25401



March 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Briefing on Account

I need to get a briefing on the transfer account that Tom O'Connell manages. I have forgotten the correct name of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
033004-8

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

*W37*

*30 MAR 04*

OSD 10727-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25402

March 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Now that we have these speechwriters, we ought to be writing thank you notes to: the people from the USO who support the troops, press people, corporations that support the troops, the wrestling people who are going to visit them at the hospitals, and the NASCAR people who go in, for example.

I think we ought to get a system to get that information, get some very good letters written, drafted and sent, and show me how it works.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032904-7

*OB/A/23*

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

33550

20 11-4-04

OSD 10728-04

March 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Public Thank You

*335 SD*

We ought to start announcing people who are helping the troops, like the USO, the wrestlers, the NASCAR and other entertainers who go out to Walter Reed, and thank them at a press briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
032904-8

.....  
*Please respond by* 4/9/04

*OB*  
*4/23*

*29 MAR 04*

OSD 10729-04



March 29, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Condolence Letters

I do want to write a letter to all the families of the people who have died and those who were wounded. I would like to see a new go at it. I don't feel like we are doing it as well as we could.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032904-10

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

*OB*  
*4/23*

*6*

*11-L-0559-04*

March 25, 2004

OB  
3/31

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

c c : Marc Thiessen

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Letters

I think we could be doing a better job on letters. Now that we have some speechwriters, we might want to try to do that.

Specifically, some thoughts are:

- Letters to combatant commanders periodically – when they take over, depart, or do something important, for example.
- Letters to families of people who have been killed.
- Letters to people who are retiring.

We ought to try to do a better job on these. Let's try to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-9

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

6  
6  
6  
6

6  
6  
6  
6

March <sup>29</sup> 25, 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Romanian MoD

*Advance copy sent 3/25 0915*

*ROMANIA*

Please get back to me and tell me whether or not we can do something special for the Romanian MoD on the day he is in town – whether we can get him in the POTUS meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-3

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

*29 Mar 04*

29  
March 26, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Active and Reserve/Guard

326

I want to get a speech working now on the material on the Active and Guard/Reserve balance.

I have Chu and Abell working on it in terms of cost. It is an important subject and is going to take some time and some substantive help.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/26/04 P&R Brief "Active and Reserve Component Pay & Benefits Cost Analysis"

DHR:db  
032604-15

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

29 MAR 04

OSD 10733 :04

11-L-0559/OSD/25408



✓ 3/26

# Active and Reserve Component Pay & Benefits Cost Analysis

USD for Personnel and Readiness

March 26, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25409

## SECDEF Questions:

1. As we gather data, we ought to know how much more expensive the Guard and Reserve are relative to the Active Force, because of Congressional add-ons...
2. Please develop a way to look at this that compares the usage of Active forces vs. Reserve and Guard forces per dollars spent.

**Personnel & Readiness**

**Per Capita Cost of Entitlement Changes**

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>RC %</u>
<u>FY 02 Average Cost Per Capita</u>	<u>\$54,642</u>	<u>\$6,970</u>	<u>12.7%</u>
TRICARE for Life Accrual	\$5,279	\$1,759	
Repeal of 1986 "Redux" Retirement	\$929		
Family Separation Allowance	\$73	\$73	
RC Healthcare		\$534	
<u>FY 04 Average Cost Per Capita</u>	<u>\$63,765</u>	<u>\$9,814</u>	
(Also includes pay raises & force mix changes)			<u>15.4%</u>
<u>"Worst Case" Benefit Increases:</u>			
Full Concurrent Receipt	\$1,065	\$40	
Additional RC Healthcare		\$2,804	
Reserve <b>MGIB</b> Increase		\$256	
Survivor Benefit (Social Security) Offset	\$111	\$48	
Age 55 Retirement		\$893	
<u>Potential Average Cost Per Capita</u>	<u>\$64,941</u>	<u>\$13,855</u>	<u>21.3%</u>


## Facts

- Average annual (non-mobilized) compensation: RC is 15.4% of the cost of AC (FY 04 Appropriations; composite average)
  - AC:
  - RC:
- Average lifespan is 83 years (DHRA)
- Percentage of force reaching retirement (DHRA)
  - AC:
  - RC:
- Average length of career for retirees
  - AC: 22
  - RC: 25

## Assumptions – Calculating Lifetime Costs

- “Usage” is defined as number of deployments in a career:
  - AC: 7 (1 per 3)
  - RC: 4 (1 per 6)
- \*Until we complete mil/civ conversions and rebalancing, portions of the Active and Reserve forces never deploy
- Non-pay incremental costs for RC deployments are about two times higher than deployment costs for AC service members. Including added “full-pay”, RC deployment costs are ten times higher than AC members
- Commissary and exchange service costs net zero between Active and Reserve forces
- \*Active component personnel receive DoD schools support of \$1,274 per member per year, and \$2,550 per member in medical treatment facilities

# RC and AC Individual Member Cost Comparison




11-L-0559/OSD/25414

## Key Points

- Lifetime RC personnel costs are one third of AC personnel in “busy” careers
- Incremental costs and additional pay associated with mobilization make short-term expenses very high for RC forces
- Fixed costs for active personnel far exceed those of non-mobilized reserve personnel and relate directly to the overall higher lifetime cost
- The “gray-area” between the end of RC service and the beginning of retirement benefit reception constitutes a significant cost savings over AC forces (AC member receives ~\$327,000 during RC member’s non-paid “gray area”) [Age 55 RC retirement would change to \$210,000]

## Comparison of Lifetime Costs per Deployment Usage



MAC Relative Cost

RC Relative Cost

11-L-0559/OSD/25416

## Conclusions

- Entitlement changes are increasing the costs of both AC and RC members, but RC growth is greater.
- Reserve component personnel cost about one third the costs of Active forces over a lifetime (pay and retirement).
- In all scenarios of reasonable expectations, RC forces are more cost effective than AC forces in terms of total lifetime costs, and lifetime costs amortized over a number of deployments.
- The Reserve components are cost-effective force providers to augment the Active force, despite higher short-term mobilization costs and lower “usage” opportunities.

In reply refer to EF-9062 & 041004211

March 29, 2004

C4/7

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Larry DiPietro

4/7

SUBJECT: Ash Carter

I think someone ought to brief Ash Carter broadly on what we are doing with respect to the posture. He cracked it in the press, without knowing what we're doing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-16

Agree

Please respond by 4/16/04

**Policy ExecSec's Note** April 5, 2004

April 5, 2004

CAPT Marriott,

- USDP spoke with Ash Carter on 4/1.
- USDP gave SecDef a readout of the conversation at the 4/2 Roundtable.
- Please close this action.

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC  
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 10735-04

337

29 MAR 04

29  
March 25 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cost of Reserve v. Active

326

I need some data that shows me what the taxpayers are getting for a Reservist or Guard person, versus active duty, given the number of man-days or years we get out of each of them based on some assumption.

Please do it soon.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032504-19

.....  
Please respond by 4/16/04

29 MAR 04

OSD 10736-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25419

March 24, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: *WSJ* Article

Please see if you can get me a copy of an article from Monday's *Wall Street Journal* on the Moors in Spain and Islam, and taking it back.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-8

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

000.7

24 MAR 04

OSD 10737-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25420

March 24, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

cc: Ryan Henry  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SLRG Prep

337

In the future, I would like all SLRG preps to be held two or three days before a SLRG meeting, so I can have an effect on what takes place.

The SLRG prep papers did not arrive to me until the morning of March 24, which means I will not have time to read them prior to the prep session scheduled for today.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

24 MAR 04

March 24, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pentagon Memorial Fund

000.4

I would like some brochures and information about how people can give to the Pentagon Memorial fund.

I want to get them up and out and get a little more aggressive in promoting it. I need some in my office so I can give them to people, and maybe I will send them to some people. Maybe we ought to have stacks of them in the waiting room.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
032404-23

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

24 MAR 04

23  
March 18, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*  
SUBJECT: Barone Article

Please take a look at this article by Michael Barone - it is good.

Thanks.

Attach.

Barone, Michael. "Heartening Progress in Iraq," *U.S. News & World Report*, March 22/March 29, 2004, p. 48.

DHR:dh  
031904-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

IRAQ

23 Mar 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25423

OSD 10740-04

M. J.

# Heartening progress in Iraq

**I**T HELPS SOMETIMES TO PUT THINGS in historic and metric perspective. The Iraqi Governing Council adopted a constitution on March 8, 11 months after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The German Western Parliamentary Council adopted a constitution—in May 1949, 48 months after the fall of Adolf Hitler. George W. Bush's critics complain of his "rush to war" and unpreparedness for its aftermath, but the

11 months it took to get a constitution was less than the 14 months between his speech naming Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" and the beginning of military action in Iraq.

What is remarkable about our occupation of Iraq is not that it has gone badly but that it has gone so well. Last week, crude oil production was above target level, the central bank signed up for the payment system used by central banks internationally, and 140,000 Iraqi police and law enforcement officers were on duty. A new Iraqi currency is circulating, and schools are open. Wages are rising, interest rates are falling, businesses are opening and hiring. Millions of Iraqis are buying cellphones, TVs, and satellite dishes. Attacks on Americans have greatly diminished, and attacks on Iraqis are likely to turn them against terrorists rather than against us.

The interim constitution adopted March 8 is worth serious attention. It provides for an elected national assembly, a strong prime minister, a largely ceremonial three-member presidency, and an independent judiciary. It has a bill of rights, with freedoms of expression and religion. It promises full equality for women. It bridges one of the thornier issues by saying that Islam shall be "a source"—not the sole source—of law, and that no law can run contrary to democratic principles. It provides for a large measure of autonomy for the Kurds, who have already developed their own democratic institutions despite a history of feuding. Both Kurdish and Arabic will be official languages.

No constitution is self-executing. Benjamin Franklin, on being asked what America's Constitutional Convention had produced, famously said, "A

republic... if you can keep it." What is encouraging here is the language used by Governing Council members. Sunnis and Kurds, Adnan Pachachi (said to be the State Department's man) and Ahmed Chalabi (said to be the Pentagon's man), they all get it—democracy, human rights, minority rights—to a degree not many expected a year ago.

This may have something to do with the extraordinary worldwide spread of democracy in the past 25 years. When Gen. Lucius Clay was prodding the Germans to produce a constitution in 1949, there were precious few democracies operating throughout the world. Now there are dozens and dozens. Starting in the 1970s with Spain, where the king played a key role, and Portugal, then in Greece and Turkey, South Korea and Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia, in Latin America and eastern Europe and Russia, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have been replaced by working democracies; not always perfect, in some cases backsliding, but democracies. The trend is positive, and examples are there to see.

**Advancing democracy.** Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all made contributions to this. Now George W. Bush is working to advance democracy in the Middle East. Iranians have been demonstrating against the mullahs; Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah has been talking about reforms; Persian Gulf states are moving toward democracy; some brave Syrians even demonstrated in Damascus. The developments in Iraq cannot help but change the focus of Arabs and Iranians, who have long been encouraged

by their tyrants to blame their plight on Israel and the United States. Now their attention is being redirected to the question of how to build a decent democratic society.

One more thing for the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council to consider: the creation of something like Alaska's Permanent Fund to flow some percentage of state oil revenues through to each citizen. Huge oil revenues have produced wasteful, tyrannical states. Flowing through some of the money to citizens would provide a safety net and encourage the growth of a vibrant and independent private sector. Democracy requires not only a good constitution but a self-reliant people jealous of their rights. An Iraqi Permanent Fund would be a step in that direction. ●

What is remarkable about our occupation ... is not that it has gone badly but that it has gone so well.



**WEIGHING IN.** Paul Bremer (right), the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, talks with members of the Iraqi Governing Council.

March 19, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intrepid Foundation Invitation for POTUS

Here is a letter from the Intrepid Foundation in New York. They want to honor the President in May.

It is an organization that does a good deal for the military, including providing scholarships to dependents. The Fisher family also funds the Fisher Houses, which are rooms military families can use while visiting loved ones undergoing treatment at military health facilities, including Walter Reed and Bethesda Naval Hospital.

It is worth your consideration.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/22/03 Intrepid Foundation invitation to POTUS

DHR:dh  
031904-7

001104

19 MAR 04

OSD 10741-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25425



ARNOLD FISHER  
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

December 22, 2003

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Intrepid Museum Foundation, it is my honor to invite you to receive the 2004 Intrepid Freedom Award, a special honor presented to selected world leaders for their leadership in the advancement of peace, freedom and democracy.

The Intrepid Freedom Award was created by the Board of Trustees in 1992 to recognize outstanding leaders who have stood tall in defense of the principles prized by people throughout the world. Past recipients have included Presidents Reagan and Yeltsin, and Prime Ministers Rabin and Thatcher, as well as then-Secretary Cheney and General Powell. Our board has recommended you for this Award in recognition of your pursuit of world freedom and democracy.

The Award will be presented at the Fleet Week Gala, hosted aboard the historic World War II aircraft carrier *Intrepid* in New York City on the evening of May 27, 2004. The dinner will be part of the 17<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Fleet Week. Fleet Week, often referred to as "America's Premiere thank-you to the men and women of the Armed Forces," is hosted annually by the Intrepid Museum Foundation and the City of New York. Vessels from the United States Navy and Coast Guard, as well as from Allied nations from around the world, visit New York to join in the week's celebrations.

Since the inception of Fleet Week in New York in 1987, 300,000 American military personnel, from all five branches of the Armed Forces, have joined in the event. The Museum arranges a series of activities for them, including free crew parties aboard *Intrepid*, athletic competitions, and other special events. Other New York organizations join in as well: The New York Yankees and Mets each donate 5,000 tickets for the uoops for baseball games; theatres offer Broadway show tickets, and many restaurants and stores offer discounts for servicemen and women in town. Fleet Week has become a true opportunity for American citizens to offer their thanks to those who serve in our nation's defense. This year 10,000 U.S. troops will be joined by sailors from other allied nations for our celebration.

The black-tie Gala is hosted on the hangar deck of the World War II - era carrier *Intrepid*, which serves as the centerpiece of the Intrepid Sea Air Space Museum. The Gala, which also honors the members of the Armed Forces of the United States and allied nations, is a military-themed event featuring patriotic entertainment. The event is scheduled to begin at six o'clock with a reception, followed by dinner in the carrier's hangar deck area. Senior Federal, State and City officials will be in attendance. Our nation's top corporate CEO's and national figures will be present as well.

08/03/1995 09:59

(b)(6)

PAGE 03

Received: 1/ 9/04 10:00;

-> INTREPID MUSEUM BVP; Page 5

01/09/04 FRI 17:24 TEL

005

I hop that you will join in what I promise will be an outstanding event. My office will provide all details required by your staff, and we are standing by to assist in any special arrangements that may be required. We hope that you will accept our invitation and that we will see you and the First Lady at the Gala.

Sincerely,



The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

11-L-0559/OSD/25427

BCC:  
GEN DICK MYERS  
PAUL WOLFOVITZ  
DONS FEITH

March 19, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Non-NATO Ally Status

I just heard that Colin has announced that Pakistan is now a non-NATO ally.

I don't recall knowing about this.

We ought to decide who should have non-NATO ally status, and on what basis we will decide it.

It ought not be like passing out eggs at Easter.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031904-4

✓  
3/25

Pakistan

19 MAR 04

OSD 10742-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25428

March 18, 2004  
EF-8941  
I-04/003783

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: *Seidler*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

~~Adm~~  
~~Wolfe~~  
3/19 1645

TRSD

*ON FILE*

3/29

Please come forward with a plan soon for the US Government on this UN issue, so we can be helpful to the CPA and get it sorted out. I would like a plan we can propose to the interagency.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/18/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re Oil for Scandal

DHR:dh  
031804-12

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

✓ 3/30

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/ CDR Nosenzo  
3/30

18 MAR 04

OSD 10743-04

6501' 3/25/04

INFO MEMO

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira R. Ricardel, ASD for International Security Policy (Acting)

*Handwritten:* 24 MAR 04

SUBJECT: Oil for Food (OFF) Program Allegations of Abuse Update

- You requested we prepare a draft USG plan to address the unfolding OFF program abuses (Tab A). Earlier you had also asked about getting the Inspector General involved (Tab B).
- Several events occurred since you raised this issue at the 11 March PC meeting:
  - o The Iraqi Governing Council has hired an independent accounting firm, KPMG, and legal counsel to investigate past and current OFF Program abuses.
  - o Senior Officials from State briefed the HIRC Subcommittee on National Security on OFF Program abuses.
  - o A sub-PCC has developed options on how best to proceed.
- On 19 March UN Secretary General Annan announced his intention to create an independent high-level commission to fully investigate the OFF Program abuses.
  - o An internal UN investigation of UN officials and UN contractors is ongoing.
  - o SYG Annan intends to seek the full and active cooperation of the UN Security Council and all member states.
- Over the weekend, both Secretary Powell and NSA Rice gave their support for Annan's proposal, and promised whatever assistance may be needed.
  - o Jerry Bremer has frozen all records that exist in Iraq and has promised the full support and cooperation of the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council.

I R A Q

**Next Steps.** In conjunction with these ongoing investigations we will continue to press for full disclosure and accountability, and ~~we will~~ make available to investigators any information we have on the OFF Program.

*D. Fall has been in touch with Steve Cambour about this. Faith is also pushing the issue with Jerry Bremer and with State.*

*Handwritten:* The USG, including the Iraq Survey Group, should

24 MAR 04 18 MAR 04

Prepared by: Guy B. Roberts PD/NP

Reviewed by: Mark T. Esper, DASD/NP

March 18, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS and Basing in Spain

*✓ OLB  
3/22*

*Spain*

The next time I meet with the President, I am going to have to be able to tell him what we currently have in Spain in force posture, what we were planning to do and how we have adjusted what we were planning to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031804-8

.....  
Please respond by 3/23/04

*18 MAR 04*

3/18 1300

120

C 229

March 17, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Audit

What am I supposed to do with this memo from Dov Zakheim on audit?

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/16/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Audit

DHR:dh  
031704-5

.....  
Please respond by 3/23/04

✓  
3/29

SecDef 3/28  
Nothing. The Poles have raised  
some questions and we're looking into it  
D. Rita

130

17 MARCH 04

03/16



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

March 16, 2004, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Audit

- Attached is the type of audit I have asked the DCAA staff to perform.
- Highlighted are the key points.
- Today I talked with the Polish Deputy Defense Minister, Janusz Zamke. He told me that since my recent visit, conditions have improved at the Multinational Division.

Attachments:  
As Stated

COORDINATION: NONE



Dr. Zakheim wanted to know the status of the living accommodations and camp conditions for the coalition forces (Multinational division) with specific emphasis on the Polish sector. He was concerned that all personnel in theater be treated on an equal footing as regards the camp accommodations. He also wanted a comparison to contractor living conditions.

We have been performing some floorchecks and perambulations in the Polish sector and making observations over the past weeks. I personally visited one of the Camps, Camp Lima. There was about a 60:40 split of Thai versus Polish troops at that location, so the Thai commander was the camp commander. I spoke to the Thai commander as well as the Polish commander on site and made some observations of my own. I also spoke to some Thai, Polish, and American troops. There were a few American troops at the camp and some Slovak troops were due to arrive in a couple days.

My observation was that the living accommodations of all the troops appeared to be similar, whether Thai, Polish or American. Higher ranking officers did have better quarters than the regular troops, as would be expected. At the time of my visit, all but about 150 of the Polish troops were in mobile containers, which is considered a desirable living accommodation at a camp like this. All the Thai troops were already in containers. I am not sure why the Thai's got priority over the Poles. It could be that they were there first or may have had something to do with the fact that the commander was Thai. But once they get into a container, the accommodations are similar.

There was a very clear difference in the living accommodations for the troops versus the contractor (KBR) personnel. There were 25 containers for KBR personnel, each a one person container with plumbing. By contrast, the troops are three to a container with no plumbing.

Another observation is that the KBR containers seemed to have better protective measures than some of the troop containers. A blast wall had been erected between the KBR containers and the camp perimeter. There was no such wall for much of the troop housing. There may have been good reasons for this disparity. It may be that the KBR side of the camp was considered more dangerous or vulnerable; they may have been closer to the perimeter etc. I am not qualified to make these assessments. The Thai commander said some of his troops had commented on this disparity. He was not complaining, but did say he had heard some comments.

I asked the Thai commander about the KBR housing. He said that some of the Thai troops had brought up this subject. He said he had explained to them that it was not a problem because KBR itself was paying for those containers. I did not attempt to explain to him that it was really the contract that was paying for the containers. As for the LOGCAP support, he did not have major complaints but was not entirely satisfied. He said it took a long time to get things done. He said they sometimes just use their own money when they want to get something done quickly. On this subject, I am sure there is a certain amount of confusion and misconception about what can and can't be done under LOGCAP. His expectations could be different than what the contract actually provides for.

The Polish commander had no major complaints. He did not seem to have a problem with the disparity in living conditions. One of the Polish officers explained that soldiers expected to be living in field conditions and that they expected that civilian contractors would be treated differently.

We made additional observations at Babil, with a large concentration of Polish troops and a Polish commander. We spoke with the commander there. He was very satisfied with the conditions and treatment his troops were receiving. The food was good and the camp conditions positive. The conditions at Babil were better than Camp Lima and the feedback from the commander sounded more positive. The commander did not seem to have any problem with contractor living conditions there. He said the troops expected to be living in field conditions.

The IBO auditors performed three additional field visits at camps for the Polish and the Ukrainians. Our observations disclosed no significant problems with the quantity and quality of the life support being provided to the Multi-National Forces under the LOGCAP Contract. We have coordinated with the local DCMA offices on this review.

KBR's living conditions are significantly better than the troops, but there may be valid reasons for this. We are considering an operations audit to determine if cost savings can be achieved by placing KBR personnel in housing more similar to that provided to the troops. We asked KBR for its in-theater housing policy for its personnel nearly a month ago. We have still not received it.

Best regards,

Dan Altemus  
Branch Manager  
Defense Contract Audit Agency  
Iraq Branch Office

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For Official Use Only

11-L-0559/OSD/25435

March 17, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Poll Results

Here is an interesting poll you might want to reference in some remarks sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Poll

DHR:dh  
031704-7

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

000.7

17 MAR 09

## Poll: Iraqis say life better now

LONDON, England-- A majority of Iraqis believe life is better now than it was under Saddam Hussein, according to a poll by broadcasting organizations released to coincide with the first anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion.

And almost half -- 49 percent-- of those questioned believe the invasion of their country by U.S. and British troops was right, compared with 39 percent who said it was wrong.

The poll -- the first nationwide poll in Iraq since the war -- was commissioned by ABC of the U.S., Britain's BBC, Germany's ARD and Japan's NHK.

Some 57 percent of respondents said life was better now than under Saddam, against 19 percent who said it was worse and 23 percent who said it was about the same.

Iraqi people appeared optimistic about the future, with 71 percent saying they expected things to be better in a years time, six percent predicting it will be worse and nine percent the same.

But Iraqis are concerned about conditions in their country, the poll shows.

They have considerable worries about joblessness, security and basic services like electricity.

"The positive attitudes and the high expectations and optimism are quite striking, with majorities telling us their lives are going well," ABC polling director Gary Langer told The Associated Press.

"Expectations carry risks, however. If these are unmet, there could be political consequences."

Seven in 10 say the availability of jobs is poor and nearly that many said the same about electricity. Almost three-fourths gave a positive rating to local schools, however.

The biggest overall concern nationally was regaining public security -- named as the top concern by almost two-thirds in the poll, 64 percent. That was far higher than any other priority.

About half said they oppose the presence of coalition forces, but few want those troops to leave now -- wanting soldiers to stay until the Iraqi government is in place or until security is restored.

Only 25 percent said they had confidence in coalition forces to deliver their needs. There were far higher levels of confidence in Iraqi religious leaders, 70 percent; local police, 68 percent; and the new Iraqi army, 56 percent.

Four of five said they want a unified country with a central government in Baghdad. Kurds, an ethnic minority in northern Iraq who make up about one-third of the total population in Iraq, were less likely to feel that way. By a 2-1 margin, Kurds favored the formation of regional states with a federal government. Kurds have been seeking autonomy in Iraq.

The number who think Iraq needs "a single strong Iraqi leader" in the next year increased from 27 percent in November, when the polling firm Oxford Research International last asked the question, to 47 percent now.

When asked what Iraq needs in five years, people were more likely to say an Iraqi democracy, 42 percent, followed by "a single strong leader," 35 percent.

The poll was conducted by the Oxford Research International of Oxford, England, for ABC News, the British Broadcasting Corp., the German broadcasting network ARD and the Japanese network NHK.

The poll of 2,737 face-to-face interviews was conducted in Iraq from Feb. 9-28 and has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 2 percentage points.

ABC's Langer told **AP** the interviewers faced difficulties conducting the poll because of the security situation in Iraq.

The polling firm "reported a car wreck, interviewers detained by coalition forces, interviewers detained and questioned by Iraqi police, and some who had to detour around a bombing site," he said.

**ABC, BBC, ARD (GER) AND NHK (JAPAN) NATIONWIDE POLL,  
9-28 FEB 04: LIFE IN IRAQ**

Based on 2737 face-to-face interviews; 2% margin of error. Oxford Research International did polling for the news organizations. Some difficulties encountered during polling due to security situation.

Issue	Data
Life now versus under Saddam Hussein	<b>57%</b> life is better than under Saddam 19% life is worse <b>23%</b> about the same
On the future	<b>71%</b> said things will be better in one years time 5% things will be worse 24% things the same
Rated poor	<b>70%</b> poor availability of jobs - 70% poor availability of electricity
Rated positive	<b>75%</b> positive about local schools
Biggest concern	<b>64%</b> regaining public security
Coalition Forces	<b>50%</b> oppose presence; but most want soldiers to stay until Iraq gov't in place or security restored 25% believe coalition forces can deliver needs
Iraqi Leadership	70% confidence Iraqi religious leadership <b>68%</b> confidence local Iraqi police 56% confidence new Iraqi army
Unified country with central gov't in Baghdad	<b>50%</b> favor (Kurds favor regional states with federal gov't by <b>2 to 1</b> )
Strong, single Iraq leader	<b>47%</b> of Iraqis see need for (up from 27% in Nov)
Iraq's needs in 5 yrs	42% democracy 35% single, strong leader

March 17, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
Marc Thiessen  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: Questions and Answers

*Advance  
copy sent  
3/17 1245*

000.5

Here is an article from this week's *Time* that I think raises some questions we may want to raise and answer ourselves.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Klein, Joe, "Bush and 9/11: What We Need to Know," *Time*

DHR:dh  
031704-8

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

17 MAR 2004

OSD 10773-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25440



★ VIEWPOINT

Bush and 9/11: What We Need to Know

The investigative panel is getting ready to grill the President. Here's what they

should ask

By JOE KLEIN

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Saturday, Mar. 13, 2004

George W. Bush's most memorable day as President was Sept. 14, 2001, when he stood in the rubble of the World Trade Center, holding a bullhorn in one hand, his other arm slung over the shoulder of a veteran fire fighter from central casting. Bush was pitch perfect that day—the common-man President, engaged and resolute. This is the image the Bush campaign is probably saving for the last, emotional moments of the election next fall. It is the memory the Republicans want you to carry into the voting booth. It is why the Republican Convention will be held in New York City this year. And it may also be why the White House has been so reluctant to cooperate with the independent commission investigating the events of Sept. 11, 2001.

The commission, which will finish its work in midsummer, on the eve of the conventions, will soon question the President about his response to the terrorist threat in the months before 9/11. I asked a dozen people last week—some intimate with the commission's thinking, some members of the intelligence community, some members of Congress who have investigated 9/11—what they would ask the President if they could. Their questions fell into three broad categories.

Why didn't you respond to the al-Qaeda attack on the U.S.S. *Cole*? The attack occurred on Oct. 12, 2000; 17 American sailors were killed. The Clinton Administration wanted to declare war on al-Qaeda. An aggressive military response was prepared, including special-forces attacks on al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. But Clinton decided that it was inappropriate to take such dramatic action during the transition to the Bush presidency. As first reported in this magazine in 2002, Clinton National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and counterterrorism deputy Richard Clarke presented their plan to Condoleezza Rice and her staff in the first week of January 2001.

Berger believed al-Qaeda was the greatest threat facing the U.S. as Clinton left office. Rice thought China was. What were President Bush's priorities? Was he aware of the Berger briefing? Did he consider an aggressive response to the bombing of the *Cole* or to the al-Qaeda millennium plot directed at Los Angeles International Airport—which was foiled on Dec. 14, 1999? Did he have any al-Qaeda strategy at all? Rice, who has not yet testified under oath, decided to review counterterrorism policy; the review wasn't completed until Sept. 4. A related question along the same lines: Why didn't you deploy the armed Predator drones in Afghanistan? The technology, which might have provided the clearest shot at Osama bin Laden before 9/11, was available early in 2001. But the

CIA and the Pentagon squabbled about which agency would be in charge of pulling the trigger. The dispute wasn't resolved until after 9/11. Were you aware of this dispute, Mr. President? Why weren't you able to resolve it?

Indeed, the second category of questions revolves around the President's interest in and awareness of the al-Qaeda threat. As late as Sept. 10, after the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, Bush was asking in his national-security briefing about the possibility of negotiating with the Taliban for the head of bin Laden. "If he had studied the problem at all," an intelligence expert told me, "he would have known that was preposterous." As early as Aug. 6, Bush had been told that al-Qaeda was planning to strike the U.S., perhaps using airplanes. What was his response to that? How closely was he following the intelligence reports about al-Qaeda activity, which had taken an extremely urgent tone by late spring? Another intelligence expert proposed this question: "Did he ever ask about the quality of the relationship between the CIA and the FBI?"

Obviously, the President couldn't be responsible for knowing that the FBI was tracking suspicious flight training in Arizona or that the CIA had an informant close to two of the hijackers, but was he aware of the friction between the two agencies? Was he aware that John Ashcroft had opposed increasing counterterrorism funding for the FBI?

Finally, there are the questions about the President's actions immediately after 9/11. Specifically, why did he allow plane loads of Saudi nationals, including members of the bin Laden family, out of the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks? Who asked him to give the Saudis special treatment? Was he aware that the Saudi Arabian government and members of the royal family gave money to charities that funded al-Qaeda?

It is easy to cast blame in hindsight. Even if Bush had been obsessed with the terrorist threat, 9/11 might not have been prevented. But the President's apparent lack of rigor—his incuriosity about an enemy that had attacked American targets overseas and had attempted an attack at home—raises a basic question about the nature and competence of this Administration. And that is not a question the Republicans want you to take to the polls in November

!!!

March 17, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: RC Members Serving in the Balkans

326

My recollection is that when Blunt was here, we talked about what the percentage was of the Reserves actually utilized for the Balkans, and I guessed it was 0.12.

In any event, here are the numbers. I wonder if you ought to get them to Blunt. Did we ever do that?

Please check with David Chu and see if he did.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/8/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDEF re: Number of Reserve Component Members Serving in the Balkans (OSD 03585-04)

DHR:dh  
031704-14

.....

Please respond by 3/26/04

17 MAR 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

March 8, 2004, 1200

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu 10 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Number of Reserve Component Members Serving in the Balkans

- Based on an inquiry from Congressman Roy D. Blunt, you asked for the number and percentage of Reserve component members who served in the Balkans.

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	Total
Bosnia	8,114	7,776	1,378	1,754	1,965	4,614	2,808	3,041	31,450
Kosovo	0	0	0	5,576	1,527	960	842	2,529	11,434
<b>Total- Balkans</b>	<b>8,114</b>	<b>7,776</b>	<b>1,378</b>	<b>7,330</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>5,574</b>	<b>3,650</b>	<b>5,570</b>	<b>42,884</b>
<b>% of Selected Reserve*</b>	0.87%	0.85%	0.15%	0.83%	0.40%	0.64%	0.41%	0.63%	
<b>% of Ready Reserve**</b>	0.53%	0.54%	0.10%	0.57%	0.28%	0.46%	0.30%	0.48%	

- Reserve component call-ups for Bosnia operations began December 8, 1995 (Presidential Executive Order 12982) and for Kosovo operations April 27, 1999 (Presidential Executive Order 13120).
- The annual totals represent less than 1% of the Selected Reserve force for each year, and, at the highest, slightly more than 1/2 of 1% of the Ready Reserve.
- COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P),

(b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECUTED MARRIOTT	3/10



11-L-0559/OSD/25444

OSD 03585-04

### Mobilized Reserve Members in Support of Balkan Contingencies

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02*	FY03*
Bosnia	8,114	7,776	1,378	1,754	1,965	4,614	2,808	3,041
Kosovo	0	0	0	5,576	1,527	960	842	2,529
<b>Balkans - Total</b>	<b>8,114</b>	<b>7,776</b>	<b>1,378</b>	<b>7,330</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>5,574</b>	<b>3,650</b>	<b>5,570</b>

SelRes Pop	928,033	909,740	889,078	879,027	873,207	875,398	882,142	882,792
Mob'd for Balkans - % of SelRes	0.87%	0.85%	0.15%	0.83%	0.40%	0.64%	0.41%	0.63%

IRR Pop	608,607	541,234	464,350	409,817	378,245	348,723	317,179	284,309
---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------	---------


Ready Reserve Pop (SelRes + IRR/ING)	1,536,640	1,450,974	1,353,428	1,288,844	1,251,452	1,224,121	1,199,321	1,167,101
Mob'd for Balkans - % of Ready Reserve	0.53%	0.54%	0.10%	0.57%	0.28%	0.46%	0.30%	0.48%

Bosnia	PRC via EO 12982 - 8 Dec 95
Kosovo	PRC via EO 13120 - 27 Apr 99

Cumulative RC Members:	Invol
Bosnia	31,450
Kosovo	11,434

\* Includes Reserve members in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE in Balkan countries as well as Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/GUARD/FORGE (Bosnia) and JOINT GUARDIAN (Kosovo)

Does not include volunteers.




-  - RC members mobilized for Balkans - % of SelRes force.
-  - RC members mobilized for Balkans - % of Ready Reserve force.

3/11/230  
3/5/04

3/12  
3/17

March 4, 2004

TO: David Chu



FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Number

Letty Di Rita  
3/12

Please get back to me with that number I asked you for, the percentage—the one I guessed was something like .012.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-30

.....  
Please respond by 3/12

March 17, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

Here is the material Newt gave me on the UN oil-for-food "scandal." What do you think about getting the Inspector General working on it?

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/10/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef w/attachments (45 documents)

DHR:dh  
031704-15

.....  
Please respond by

3/26/04

OSD 10775-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25447

Craddock  
DiRita

10, 2004 8:09 AM

(b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;  
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil

**Cc:** peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil

**Subject:** corruption in iraq and the threat to the BUsh administration

for secdef,depsecdef  
from Newt  
3/10/04

Hankes-Drielsma (the man who uncovered the Nobel scandal in Sweden and negotiated the South African debt crisis) is convinced the UN oil for food program was the largest financial scandal in history

he is also convinced it reaches into France, the UN, Jordan, and a host of other countries

finally he is convinced it will inevitably show up as corruption in our efforts to modernize Iraq because the depth and habit of corruption are so deep

it is vital that we get ahead of this corruption scandal by appointing a special investigative task force both to help uncover past corruption and to root out current corruption.

Given the scale of corruption KPMG is uncovering it is almost certain a lot of very clever experts in bribery and false accounting are doing business with CPA.

former **Deputy Attorney General Ed Scmults** is in Iraq now as Advisor to the Justice Ministry. He could be reassigned immediately to head an anti-corruption task force with a counterpart from Iraq.

Either we will be the people rooting out corruption or we will be the people presiding over corruption

This could explode this summer and fall and be very much to our disadvantage unless we get ahead of the curve and very loudly meet it head on

I am forwarding a number of already published articles which make clear how big this is and Hankes-Drielsma is back in town next week and I am certain this will get bigger. Someone fairly senior should be assigned to work with him.

3/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/25448

March 17, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Cost-Cutting

Here is a memo I sent you January 31. Please take the lead on this and make sure we get a good list.

Thanks.

Attach.  
1/31/04 SecDef Memo (103104.16)

DHR:dh  
031704-17

.....  
Please respond by

4/16/04

020700

17 MAR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25449

OSD 10776-04

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock  
Jaymie Durnan  
Steve Cambone  
Paul Wolfowitz  
*Kew Kares*

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached

Attached is a list of some major cost-cutting efforts. Why don't you add some others to this list and let's refine it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
103104.16

*Attach: List of Cost Cutting Activities*

*Respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

*2/7/04*

11-L-0559/OSD/25450

09068-04

MEMORANDUM  
January 31, 2004

Important cost-cutting activities that will change the face of how this department functions.

1. Complete revamping of the DAT system worldwide.
2. New security cooperation.
3. Massive review of regular international and bilateral meetings to increase the ones that should be increased and decrease the ones that should be decreased.
4. Force posture.
5. Complete review of DoD directives.
6. Complete revamping of contingency plans.
7. Other.

DHR/azn  
013104.15

11-L-0559/OSD/25451

March 17, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
Tony Dolan  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Questions for Press

000.7

We ought to think about questions I can ask the press that the answer to which will inform them of something that is useful.

On a recent trip, I asked the press how many people they thought had been killed in action in Afghanistan. As I recall, the estimates were 200 to 500. I think the truth is that it was in the 60s or 70s. It was helpful for them to learn the answer. It was also helpful for them to know that they thought they knew the answer but didn't, and that they were wrong because of impression.

We ought to think about questions we can ask.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031704-18

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

17 MAR 04

OSD 10777-04

3/18  
1320



March 17, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
LTG John Craddock  
Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: China

*ask June -  
China*

*China*

I have not been to China in the three-plus years I have been here. I am wondering if we ought to finish four years without my doing that. I have been asked to visit 15 times.

I am going to be going over to Australia and Singapore. Why don't you noodle that and give me your advice?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031704-20

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

*OB  
5/18*

*Col*

*So Col -  
Agree. When all the  
Taiwan election items  
settle down, should  
consider doing. After  
Singapore may be good!  
(early ~~May~~ <sup>JUNE</sup>)  
D. R. H.*

*17 March 04*

OSD 10779-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25453

*3/29*

March 17, 2004

✓ 3/17

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Story on Stop-Loss

After we get a report back from the Army Association of America, or whatever outfit it was that came out with the story about stop-loss being like a draft, I would like to know who contacted them and whether or not we were able to disabuse them.

320.2

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-35

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

3/15

SecDef-

Les Brownlee told me he would make a point of getting to the group in question (Military Officers Association). I suggested he and Schoomaker or he and Casey do it. Also, we are providing the correct info to other like associations and to the Military "talking heads". Also, going back to Schiesser/Friedman. *DR*

INFO MEMO

March 15, 2004, 4:45 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GEN Casey, Vice Chief of Staff, Army

SUBJECT: Army Stop Loss Update

1. Purpose. To respond to a question of the Secretary of Defense on "Face the Nation" concerning an allegation by the Military Officer's Association of America (MOAA) that the Army policy of Stop Loss (SL) is being used as a means to generate the authorized 30K end strength increase.

2. Discussion.

- Stop Loss is the temporary holding of soldiers past the completion of their contracted term of service for operational purposes.
- The Army has judiciously employed SL over the last two years, being effective stewards who used SL to increase unit readiness. The requirement for SL is reviewed monthly and was completely eliminated for an extended period for the active forces; however, operational requirements caused it to be reinstated.
- The focus of Army deployments is on trained and ready units, not individuals. SL is a management tool that sustains effectively a force, which has trained together, to remain a cohesive element throughout its deployment.
- As of February 2004, SL affects a total of 44,535 soldiers of all components; with the transition between OIF1/OIF2 and OEF4/OEF5, current projections reflect an average of 30,889 Soldiers affected by Stop Loss (all components for the remainder of this calendar year).
- Without SL, selected low density skilled units would be required to remain in theater longer than the current *12 months Boots on the Ground*.
- The Army's Force Stabilization Initiative will minimize the necessity for SL as we source OIF3 and OEF6.
- SL is a temporary measure that does not permanently affect the Army's End strength; moreover, it has not been a key planning element in increasing the end strength.
- The 30K temporary growth will be met through a 20K increase in recruiting and a 10K increase in retention over the next four years. Actions have already been initiated to increase accessions by 5K this FY.
- The SL program was initiated well before the approval of the 30K temporary growth and affects only the deployed or deploying forces.
- This temporary growth allows the Army to reorganize internally through the Army's initiatives of Modularity, Restructuring and Rebalancing our AC/RC force structure mix, and Force Stabilization.

Prepared By: LTG Lovelace, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/25455

**Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD**

**From:** Lovelace, James J LTG DAS [james.lovelace@us.army.mil]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2004 6:18 PM  
**To:** Craddock, John J Lt Gen OSD; Caldwell, Bill MG OSD  
**Subject:** Stop Loss Update..SITREP 15 March 04

John/Bill,

- Today met with several on the staff to wargame/AAR circumstances that led to Stop Loss being an issue on this past weekend's "Face the Nation" program.

**PURPOSE:** To respond to a question of the Secretary of Defense on "Face the Nation" concerning an allegation by the Military Officer's Association of America (MOAA) that the Army policy of Stop Loss is being used as a means to generate the authorized 30K end strength increase.

- **MOAA appears to believe that the Army's Stop Loss policy is keeping Soldiers in the Army until 2005, not understanding the actual facts of the program. An inaccurate article was posted on MOAA's legislative update web site on 13 February, 2004 (item #3).**
- I spoke with GEN (Ret) Sullivan, President of Association of the United States Army earlier today .... he was also caught by surprise on MOAA's perspective on Stop Loss.
- BG Gaylord (OCPA) has made contact with MOAA ....I also have attempted to call (ADM(Ret) Ryan has not yet returned my call) in order to offer to provide them factual information that they then can use to set the record straight on their web site. Secretary Brownlee intends to talk with the President of MOAA ...already being coordinated between the offices.
- We are currently developing TTP, so that in the future the Army can keep Army-related lobbying organizations accurately informed, staying within legal bounds... similar to what we already do with AUSA. Will not let this happen again!!
- We have been monitoring both the media and the Hill for any follow up requests for information....none to this point.
- Below is an **updated** information paper to show your bosses .



Army Stop Loss  
Update.doc (25 ...

*Changes highlighted.*

Hooah, Jim

March 17, 2004

TO: Larry Lanzilotta  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Departure

I am very sorry you're leaving.

I sure hope you'll stick around until Tina is confirmed and in the saddle, and has a week or two with you, so you can pass the baton.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031704-16

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

02005C

17MAR04

March 17, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kennedy Story on Internet

413.51

I think you better let Kennedy's office know that I have never said anything like that e-mail being sent out on the internet, so they are aware that it is just factually not true.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031704-1

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

*OB*  
*3/24*

17 Mar 04

March 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Binder for "Radio Day"

The notebook for today's "Radio Day" activities arrived in my office sometime after I left last night. It is 40 or 50 pages long, and there is no way in the world I have any time to even look at it.

It is just a waste of everyone's time to do it if they are not going to get it to me the day before. I should also add that it is unintelligible.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031604-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3/15

✓  
3/17

I agree. Totally unhelpful and sloppy.

Di Rita

000.1750

16 MAR 04

OSD 10783-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25459

March 15, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Location of Iraqi Chemical Suits

Please find out in what town in Iraq did we find the chemical suits the Iraqis had to protect them against a chemical attack, how many suits there were and where they were located.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-34

.....  
Please respond by

3/19/04

IRAQ

15 Mar 04

March 15, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Brief for POTUS

Let's make sure we get Ed Giambastiani scheduled to brief the President on lessons learned from the Iraqi viewpoint.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-29

.....  
Please respond by 4/9/04

*OB*  
*3/16*

*IRAQ*

*15 MAR 04*

March 15, 2004

OB  
3/16

Larry Di Rita  
3/15

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Press Avail

Please get me the transcript of my press briefing the night of September 11, 2001 in the press briefing room in the Pentagon. I think it was around 6 p.m. I need to read it.

Also, please give me a videotape of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-27

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3/15

Tape coming

Larry Di Rita  
3/15

OSD

OSD



United States Department of Defense.

On the web: [http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09112001\\_t091tsd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09112001_t091tsd.html)  
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131  
Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> (b)(6)

**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001 - 6:42 p.m. EDT

## DoD News Briefing on Pentagon Attack

(Also participating were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), and Senator John Warner (R-Va.))

Rumsfeld: This is a -- first of all, good evening. This is a tragic day for our country. Our hearts and prayers go to the injured, their families and friends.

We have taken a series of measures to prevent further attacks and to determine who is responsible. We're making every effort to take care of the injured and the casualties in the building. I'm deeply grateful for the many volunteers from the defense establishment and from the excellent units from all throughout this region. They have our deep appreciation.

We have been working closely throughout the day with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dick Myers, who is currently participating in a meeting elsewhere in the building, and a great many other officials from throughout the government.

I should say we've received calls from across the world offering their sympathy and indeed their assistance in various ways.

I'm very pleased to be joined here by Chairman Carl Levin and Senator John Warner. Senator Warner called earlier today and offered his support and was kind enough to come down and has been with us. We've very recently had a discussion with the president of the United States. Chairman Hugh Shelton has just landed from Europe. Secretary of the Army Tom White, who has a responsibility for incidents like this as executive agent for the Department of Defense, is also joining me.

It's an indication that the United States government is functioning in the face of this terrible act against our country. I should add that the briefing here is taking place in the Pentagon. The Pentagon's functioning. It will be in business tomorrow.

I know the interest in casualty figures, and all I can say is it's not possible to have solid casualty figures at this time. And the various components are doing roster checks, and we'll have information at some point in the future. And as quickly as it's possible to have it, it will certainly be made available to each of you.

I'll be happy to take a few questions after asking first General Shelton if he would like to say anything, and then we will allow the others to make a remark or two.

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Shelton: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Ladies and gentlemen, as the secretary just said, today, we have watched the tragedy of an outrageous act of barbaric terrorism carried out by fanatics against both civilians and military people, acts that have killed and maimed many innocent and decent citizens of our country.

I extend my condolences to the entire Department of Defense families, military and civilian, and to the families of all those throughout our nation who lost loved ones.

I think this is indeed a reminder of the tragedy and the tragic dangers that we face day in and day out both here at that home as well as abroad.

I will tell you up front, I have no intentions of discussing today what comes next, but make no mistake about it, your armed forces are ready.

Warner: The chairman.

Rumsfeld: The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin.

Levin: Our intense focus on recovery and helping the injured and the families of those who were killed is matched only by our determination to prevent more attacks and matched only by our unity to track down, root out and relentlessly pursue terrorists, states that support them and harbor them.

They are the common enemy of the civilized world. Our institutions are strong, and our unity is palpable.

Senator John Warner.

Warner: Thank you.

As a past chairman, preceding Carl Levin, I can assure you that the Congress stands behind our president, and the president speaks with one voice for this entire nation. This is indeed the most tragic hour in America's history, and yet I think it can be its finest hour, as our president and those with him, most notably our secretary of Defense, our chairman, and the men and women of the armed forces all over this world stand ready not only to defend this nation and our allies against further attack, but to take such actions as are directed in the future in retaliation for this terrorist act -- a series of terrorist acts, unprecedented in world history.

We call upon the entire world to step up and help, because terrorism is a common enemy to all, and we're in this together. The United States has borne the brunt, but who can be next? Step forward and let us hold accountable and punish those that have perpetrated this attack.

Again, I commend the secretary, the chairman, and how proud we are. We spoke with our President here moments ago. He's got a firm grip on this situation, and the Secretary and the General have a firm grip on our armed forces and in communication the world over.

Rumsfeld: Thank you very much.

We'll take a few questions and then we'll adjourn.

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Charlie.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you have any inkling at all, in any way, that something of this nature and something of this scope might be planned?

Rumsfeld: Charlie, we don't discuss intelligence matters.

Q: I see. And how -- how would you respond if you find out who did this?

Rumsfeld: Obviously, the president of the United States has spoken on that subject, and those are issues that he will address in good time.

Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, we are getting reports from CNN and others that there are bombs exploding in Kabul, Afghanistan. Are we, at the moment, striking back? And if so, is the target Osama bin Laden and his organization?

Rumsfeld: I've seen those reports. They -- in no way is the United States government connected to those explosions.

Q: What about Osama bin Laden, do you suspect him as the prime suspect in this?

Rumsfeld: It's not the time for discussions like that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said you could not be specific about casualties. Can you give us some characterization, whether it's dozens, hundreds in the building?

Rumsfeld: Well, we know there were large numbers, many dozens, in the aircraft that flew at full power, steering directly into the -- between, I think, the first and second floor of the -- opposite the helipad. You've seen it. There cannot be any survivors; it just would be beyond comprehension.

There are a number of people that they've not identified by name, but identified as being dead, and there are a number of casualties. But the FBI has secured the site. And the -- information takes time to come. People have been lifted out and taken away in ambulances. And the numbers will be calculated, and it will not be a few.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what you saw?

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yeah?

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you consider what happened today, both in New York and here, an act of war?

Rumsfeld: There is no question but that the attack against the United States of America today was a vicious, well-coordinated, massive attack against the United States of America. What words the lawyers will use to characterize it is for them.

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Q: Does that mean that the U.S. is at war then?

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that the Pentagon would be open for business tomorrow. What kind of assurances can you give the people who work here at the building that the building will be safe?

Rumsfeld: A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using any technique. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in every place against every technique. It is not possible to give guarantees. The people who work in this building do so voluntarily. They're brave people, and they do their jobs well.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you give a sense of what happened -- what did you see when you left your office, ran down to the site and apparently helped people on stretchers and then returned to the command center?

Rumsfeld: The -- I felt the shock of the airplane hitting the building, went through the building and then out into the area, and they were bringing bodies out that had been injured, most of which were alive and moving, but seriously injured. And a lot of volunteers were doing a terrific job helping to bring them out of the buildings and get them into stretchers and into ambulances and into airlifts.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how many of the dead were soldiers and how many were civilians? Have you been able to determine that?

Rumsfeld: Absolutely not.

Yeah.

Q: Mr. Secretary, today we saw military planes both in New York and in Washington. How much more of a military presence will we see, now that this incident has occurred, for the next week?

Rumsfeld: Those kinds of decisions are made day to day. It is correct that we had aircraft flying protective missions at various places in the United States today. And they will do that as appropriate.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Q: -- what do you say to the American people who may have questions on how something so coordinated has been carried out against this nation? What do you say to them who might not have confidence that our intelligence and security are what they should have been?

Rumsfeld: I say to them that the president of the United States will be making some remarks to them this evening that will address those subjects.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've declared -- the Pentagon has declared Threatcon Delta for forces around the world. Could you tell me why? Have you received any threats? Or has anyone claimed credit for this?

Rumsfeld: We have in fact declared Force Protection Condition Delta and a condition of high alert -- indeed, the highest alert. We did so almost immediately upon the attacks, and it is still in force.

Q: Mr. Secretary, were there threats issued against other U.S. facilities elsewhere in the world today?

Rumsfeld: The -- I don't know that there's a day that's gone by since I've been in this job that there haven't been threats somewhere in the world to some facility somewhere. It's a -- it's one of the complexities of the intelligence business that you have to sort through those kinds of things. But we don't get into the specifics.

Yes? You had your hand up? Yes?

Q: Mr. Secretary, there were rumors earlier in the day that the plane which crashed in Pennsylvania had been brought down by the United States, either shot down or in some other manner.

Rumsfeld: We have absolutely no information that any U.S. aircraft shot down any other aircraft today.

Q: I wonder if we could just ask Senator Levin one thing, Senator, if that's all right.

Levin: You bet.

Q: Senator Levin, you and other Democrats in Congress have voiced fear that you simply don't have enough money for the large increase in defense that the Pentagon is seeking, especially for missile defense, and you fear that you'll have to dip into the Social Security funds to pay for it. Does this sort of thing convince you that an emergency exists in this country to increase defense spending, to dip into Social Security, if necessary, to pay for defense spending -- increase defense spending?

Levin: One thing where the committee was unanimous on, among many, many other things, was that the -- we authorized the full request of the President, including the \$18 billion. So I would say that Democrats and Republicans have seen the need for the request.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you describe what steps are being taken -- defensive measures -- beyond force protection, and whether there's been any operational planning for homeland defense and as to --

Rumsfeld: Those aren't the kinds of things that one discusses.

Q: Sir, the perpetrators of the Khobar Towers bombing were never found -- the Cole bombing as well. What assurances or what confidence do you have that the perpetrators of this act will be found?

Rumsfeld: All one can offer by way of assurance is a seriousness of purpose. We're still taking bodies out of this building, so I would say that that's a little premature.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: You've talked about -- and others at the podium have talked about being ready, the military is ready, General Shelton said. And we understand the Navy has dispatched two carriers and some guided-missile cruisers and destroyers and a couple of Marine Corps helicopter amphibious ships, such as the Bataan -- it's not the Bataan -- here and to New York. Can you tell us if that's true? And also any other things you can share with us about how the United States military is preparing to take on whatever in

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the next few days?

Rumsfeld: We don't make announcements about ship deployments.

Q: Mr. Secretary?

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Can you describe the fire-fighting efforts that are going on right now in that corridor and the search-and-rescue efforts that are beginning?

Rumsfeld: Can I describe them?

Q: Yeah.

Rumsfeld: Why don't we let the Secretary of the Army, who was out there with me a few minutes ago and has been talking to the incident commander on the site.

White: I think it's fair to say at this point that the fire is contained, and will shortly, if not already, be sufficiently controlled to allow entry into the building. That entry will be supervised by the FBI, who are in charge of the site, assisted by the fire departments that are present. We, on the Army side, will support them as they go in the building and search for casualties and bring them out, then we will support them in dealing with that. That's what's going on on the ground.

Rumsfeld: We'll take one last question.

Q: Is the government operating under the assumption that this attack is done, or is it poised or bracing for more action?

Rumsfeld: The government is certainly aware that it's difficult to know when attacks are concluded.

And I want to thank Senator -- Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, and certainly Secretary of the Army White and General Shelton for being here with me. And we'll excuse ourselves. Thank you.

Q: Thank you.

[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09112001\\_t0911sd.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t09112001_t0911sd.html)

March 15, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Human Rights Watch Report

Here is a report by Human Rights Watch. I have not read it. How should we respond? Should we respond?

Please give me a way to think about this.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/04 Human Rights Watch, "Enduring Freedom' Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan"

DHR:dh  
031504-40

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

Afghanistan

DH 4/14

Sir,  
Response attached.  
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
GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
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INFO MEMO

March 29, 2004, 7:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report on ENDURING FREEDOM

- You asked whether DoD should respond to a report by HRW (Tab A) published in March 2004 covering operations in Afghanistan in 2003 and early 2004. The report alleges human rights/law of war violations during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. For the reasons explained below, a response is neither required nor recommended.
- This is the most recent of several HRW public criticisms of U.S. military operations in the Global War on Terrorism and the war in Iraq. Other reports have focused on combat operations in Iraq (December 2003) and post-conflict civilian casualties in Iraq (October 2003). HRW also has been publicly critical of the use of military commissions.
- This report alleges that U.S. forces have employed excessive force in the continuing military operations against al Qaeda and Taliban; denounces capture (versus arrest) and detention of al Qaeda/Taliban suspects; and criticizes HRW's lack of access to detainees.
- The HRW report contains major flaws of fact, law and theory. For example:
- HRW endeavors to apply peacetime law enforcement/human rights standards to an on-going armed conflict with regard to (a) use of force, and (b) capture vis-à-vis arrest.
  - o The argument disregards threat conditions and assumes, wrongly, that the rules for engaging the enemy during wartime do not apply. For example, it recommends that firearms not be used except in "self defense against the threat of death or serious injury," and states that "intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life."



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- o These are incomplete statements of domestic law enforcement rules for use of deadly force that would limit use of supporting arms and aircraft and would placing U.S. forces in Afghanistan hunting heavily armed al Qaeda and Taliban at undue risk.
- The complaint about HRW's lack of access to detainees assumes a privilege that HRW does not have.
  - o The U.S. abides by the law of war and, in the case of detainees, ensures that they are treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. We do this even though detainees are not entitled to prisoner of war (PW) status.
  - o Consistent with this policy, the U.S. has provided International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detainees in view of the ICRC's recognized role under the Geneva Conventions. As is the case in armed conflicts across the spectrum, there is no requirement to provide access to other international and nongovernmental organizations.
- HRW argues that if detainees are not entitled to PW status, they are entitled to protection under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC). This argument is not consistent with the diplomatic history of the Geneva Conventions, which afford no protection for unprivileged belligerents.
- The HRW report applies standards contained in the 1977 Additional Protocol II, a treaty to which U.S. is not a party, incorrectly arguing that its provisions are customary law binding on the U.S.
- The HRW report is based on media reports rather than first-hand accounts.
- The HRW report expresses HRW's objections to U.S. policy and operations, framing its criticism in legal terms. A response is neither required nor recommended.

Attachment: As stated.

CC: CJCS  
 USDP  
 VCJCS

**“Enduring Freedom”  
Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan**

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## I. Summary

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States went to war in Afghanistan in the name of national security and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and with a stated secondary **aim** of liberating the people of Afghanistan from the cruel and capricious rule of the Taliban.

Yet today, on Afghan soil, the United States is maintaining a system of arrests and detention as part of its ongoing **military** and intelligence operations that violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law (the laws of war). In doing so, the United States is endangering the lives of Afghan civilians, undermining efforts to restore the rule of law in Afghanistan, and calling into question its commitment to upholding basic rights.

This report, based on research conducted in southeast and eastern Afghanistan in 2003 and early 2004, focuses on how U.S. forces arrest and detain persons in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> It details numerous abuses by U.S. personnel, including cases of excessive force during arrests; arbitrary and indefinite detention; and mistreatment of detainees. The report also details the overall legal deficiencies **of** the U.S.-administered detention system in Afghanistan, which, as shown here, operates almost entirely outside of the **rule of** law.

In Afghanistan, United States and coalition forces, allied with local Afghan forces, are fighting armed groups comprised of members of the Taliban, the mujahidin group Hezb-e Islami, and a relatively small number of non-Afghan fighters, some of whom are associated with al-Qaeda. For their part, these groups have shown little willingness to abide by international humanitarian law **or** human rights standards: they have carried out abductions and attacks against civilians and humanitarian aid workers and detonated bombs in bazaars and other civilian areas. Those responsible for these violations, including the leaders of these groups, should, if captured, be investigated and prosecuted for violations of Afghan law and the laws of war.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this report, the term "U.S. forces" refers to U.S. personnel in the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and all other military personnel under the overall command of the President of the United States. The U.S.-led coalition force in Afghanistan is made up predominately of U.S. personnel, although there are approximately two thousand troops from other nations in the force. Approximately 6,000 troops from various nations are also stationed in Kabul and Kunduz city as part of the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

But the activities of these groups are no excuse for U.S. violations. The Geneva Conventions do not require reciprocity to be applicable. Abuses by one party to a conflict, no matter how egregious, do not justify violations by the other side. This is a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law.

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From 2002 to the present, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least one thousand Afghans and other nationals have been arrested and detained by U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. Some of those apprehended have been picked up during military operations while taking direct part in hostilities, but others taken into custody have been civilians with no apparent connection to ongoing hostilities. (This latter category may include persons wanted for criminal offenses, but such arrests are not carried out in compliance with Afghan or international legal standards.)

There are numerous reports that U.S. forces have used excessive or indiscriminate force when conducting arrests in residential areas in Afghanistan. As shown in this report, U.S. military forces have repeatedly used deadly force from helicopter gunships and *small* and heavy arms fire, including undirected suppressing fire, during what are essentially law-enforcement operations to arrest persons in uncontested locales. The use of these tactics has resulted in avoidable civilian deaths and injuries, and in individual cases may amount to violations of international humanitarian law.

Human Rights Watch has also documented that Afghan soldiers deployed alongside U.S. forces have beaten and otherwise mistreated people during arrest operations and looted homes or seized the land of those being detained. These violations should be a matter of concern to the United States. The Afghan government remains responsible for violations by Afghan forces that are under their control, and individual Afghan military commanders are culpable for abuses by their troops. But where Afghan forces have been put under the de facto control or command of U.S. forces during operations, U.S. personnel have a responsibility to prevent ongoing abuses by Afghan troops, and may be criminally culpable if they fail to do so.

Many of those arrested by U.S. forces are detained for indefinite periods at U.S. military bases or outposts. While held, these detainees have no contact with relatives or others, although some detainees receive visits from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Detainees have no opportunity to challenge the basis for their detention, and are sometimes subjected to mistreatment or torture. Some detainees have been sent to the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, while others have

been kept in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> Many have ultimately been released; but some detainees in Afghanistan have been held for over **two** years.

The U.S. military maintains its main detention facility in Afghanistan at the Bagram airbase, north of the capital Kabul. There are an unknown number of additional U.S. detention facilities in the country, including at bases in Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Asadabad. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is also holding an unknown number of detainees, both at Bagram airbase and at other locations in Afghanistan, including in Kabul. Furthermore, the United States has encouraged **local** Afghan authorities to detain hundreds of persons taken into custody during joint U.S.-Afghan operations. These persons are held without charge and in poor conditions, and some have been subjected to torture and other mistreatment. In the northern city of Shiberghan, approximately one thousand detainees—alleged Taliban combatants and foreign fighters allied and captured with them—are being held at a facility under the control of Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a member of the Karzai government and the commander of a predominately Uzbek militia, Junbish-e Melli. CIA and U.S. military interrogators are believed to have access to these detainees and others held by Afghan forces. The United States has opposed efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments to screen such detainees for release.

Human Rights Watch is also concerned about mistreatment of detainees **in** custody. Human Rights Watch has had access only to detainees *released* from U.S. custody.<sup>3</sup> Human Rights Watch researchers therefore have only been able to interview detainees **whom** U.S. authorities did not consider to be a security **risk** or indictable ~~for~~ criminal offenses. From these detainees, however, Human Rights Watch has received credible allegations of mistreatment in U.S. custody. These allegations are consistent with other allegations received by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and numerous international journalists.

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<sup>2</sup> The Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, where the United States is holding approximately 660 detainees, most of whom were taken into custody **in** Afghanistan, is not the subject of this report.

<sup>3</sup> Human Rights Watch sent written requests in **2003** to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and General John Abizaid, the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), for permission to visit U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan and discuss our concerns about alleged abuses by U.S. forces **with** officials in the Department of Defense. To date we have not received any response. Officials in the public affairs offices of the Pentagon and CENTCOM told Human Rights Watch in October 2003 and again in January 2004 that such requests would not be granted. Human Rights Watch has also made written requests to George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, regarding concerns about CIA operations in Afghanistan; a response from the General Counsel of the CIA indicated that CIA officials **would** not be available to discuss operations **in** Afghanistan.

Afghans detained at Bagram airbase in 2002 have described being held in detention for weeks, continuously shackled, intentionally kept awake for extended periods of time, and forced to kneel or stand in painful positions for extended periods. Some say they were kicked and beaten when arrested, or later as part of efforts to keep them awake. Some say they were doused with freezing water in the winter. Similar allegations have been made about treatment in 2002 and 2003 at U.S. military bases in Kandahar and in U.S. detention facilities in the eastern cities of Jalalabad and Asadabad.

In December 2002 two Afghan detainees died at Bagram. Both of their deaths were ruled homicides by U.S. military doctors who performed autopsies. Department of Defense officials claim to have launched an investigation into the deaths in March 2003. In June 2003, another Afghan died at a detention site near Asadabad, in Kunar province. The Department of Defense has yet to explain adequately the circumstances of any of these deaths. Human Rights Watch is concerned that the results of any investigations may never be publicized, and that appropriate criminal and disciplinary action may never take place.

Concerns about conditions at Bagram persist. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has collected complaints alleging torture and mistreatment made by recently released detainees and families of persons still detained.

Human Rights Watch is also deeply concerned about the lack of legal process for detainees. The United States has set up a system in Afghanistan that does not provide detainees a process whereby they can contest their detention and obtain their release. Ordinary civilians caught up in military operations and arrested are left in a hopeless situation. Once in custody, they have no way of challenging the legal basis for their detention or obtaining a hearing before an adjudicative body. They have no access to legal counsel. Their release is wholly dependent on decisions of the U.S. military command, with little apparent regard for the requirements of international law—whether the treatment of civilians under international humanitarian law or the due process requirements of human rights law.

Not a single person detained in Afghanistan since the start of U.S. operations in 2001 has been afforded prisoner-of-war status or other legal status under the 1949 Geneva Conventions.<sup>4</sup> No one held by the United States since the start of hostilities to the

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<sup>4</sup> Belligerents captured during the international armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban should have been afforded the status of prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention unless and until a “competent tribunal” under article 5 determined otherwise. The U.S. did not

present has been charged or tried for any crime (with the single exception of John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen) nor has the United States or the present Afghan government set up any tribunals or other legal mechanisms to process detainees captured in connection with military operations. The United States continues to treat *all* detainees it has captured in Afghanistan as “unlawful combatants” it considers not entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions or of human rights law.

The Afghan government also has obligations to protect the rights of persons within its borders. President Hamid Karzai has complained to U.S. authorities on occasion about abuses by U.S. troops. The Afghan government and the Afghan Ministry of Defense have limited influence over U.S. military strategies and policies, but they can do more to insist that U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan uphold international humanitarian law and human rights law.

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The violations of detainees’ rights documented in this report are exacerbated by the almost complete opacity maintained by U.S. officials about the Bagram facility and other detention facilities in Afghanistan. The United States refuses to **allow** access to detainees’ *families*, lawyers, or advocates, or to journalists or representatives of non-governmental organizations (other than the ICRC). **And** it is not evident that the detention system maintained by the United States in Afghanistan is conducive to the security of U.S. forces. The routine arrests and indefinite detention of persons who have no genuine connection to armed opposition groups has angered many Afghan communities and lessened their willingness to cooperate with U.S. forces.

Almost nothing is known about U.S. investigations or prosecutions of U.S. military personnel for **alleged** violations of international humanitarian law. (**This** is in sharp contrast with **Iraq**, where a number of cases involving U.S. soldiers have been publicly reported.) Simply put, the United States operates its detention facilities in Afghanistan in a **climate** of almost total impunity. As noted, the Department of Defense has not even released the results of its investigations into the deaths of Afghan detainees at Bagram and Asadabad and has yet to **explain** adequately the circumstances of these deaths. Nor have U.S. officials adequately responded to inquiries about alleged

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convene a single article 5 tribunal in Afghanistan, though it has held hundreds during **the** 2003 Iraq war and in previous conflicts. Afghan nationals found not to be prisoners of war would be entitled to “protected person” status under **the** Fourth Geneva Convention.

mistreatment and torture by U.S. forces in Afghanistan made by human rights groups and members of the U.S. Congress.<sup>5</sup>

There is little doubt that U.S. policies on the detention of terrorism suspects—both in Afghanistan and elsewhere—have harmed public opinion of the United States around the world, and have damaged some of its efforts in building a coalition to combat international terrorism.

These policies are also making it more difficult for the United States to criticize other governments for violating international human rights and humanitarian law standards in maintaining detention facilities. Every year, the U.S. State Department publishes “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” which contain criticisms of abuses similar to those documented in this report, such as beatings, use of sleep deprivation, continuous shackling, and long-term isolation.<sup>6</sup> The United States is undermining the effectiveness of these reports by committing the same abuses it has rightly criticized elsewhere.

The U.S. detention policy in Afghanistan serves as a poor example for other nations around the world, and for Afghanistan itself. Afghan warlords whose troops are deployed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan have done little to improve their horrific records with regard to the treatment of detained persons. Instead of setting a positive example for them, the behavior of the United States sends the message that the U.S. operates on a set of double standards. And worldwide, it is now all too easy for governments to justify their failures to uphold human rights by pointing to U.S. violations in Afghanistan.

It doesn’t have to be this way. Human Rights Watch believes that the protections provided under international humanitarian and human rights law do not conflict with the security of states. The U.S. and Afghan governments have both a duty and a responsibility to provide for the security of their populations and to take appropriate actions against those who threaten state security or violate the law. But in Afghanistan, the United States appears to have allowed its single-minded pursuit of security to obscure the obligation to protect individual rights, rights deeply ingrained in U.S.

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, June 2, 2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-rice.pdf>; Response to Senator Leahy from Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes, June 25, 2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix.

constitutional law and reflected in international law (as well as in the former and current Afghan constitutions). This course of action is shortsighted and damaging to the rule of law, not **only in Afghanistan** but across the world.

A list of recommendations to the United States, the Afghan government, and other countries involved in Afghanistan begins on **page 51**.

## II. Background “Operation Enduring Freedom”

The ongoing U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan discussed in this report fall under a larger campaign referred to by the United States and its coalition partners in Afghanistan as “Operation Enduring Freedom.”

Operation Enduring Freedom as originally planned was a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. It was, in its first manifestation, a military operation against the Taliban government of Afghanistan and the network of foreign groups, including al-Qaeda, believed responsible for the September 11 attacks.<sup>7</sup>

The U.S.-led coalition’s initial military operations in Afghanistan, from September through December 2001, were directed at the Taliban forces and their foreign allies. In late September, CIA forces entered Afghanistan to organize existing Afghan anti-Taliban forces (primarily the loose coalition of groups called the Northern Alliance) and assist covert U.S. Army and Air Force units to transport equipment into the country. Throughout the first phase of the conflict, millions of dollars in cash and significant amounts of weapons, communications equipment, and other military supplies were ferried into Afghanistan and given to anti-Taliban forces. As the war progressed, the U.S. advance teams were joined by Army Special Forces and Special Forces units from the Navy and Air Force, and ultimately, regular army ground troops and units from coalition partners such as the United Kingdom and Australia. Over the next two months, the U.S.-led coalition carried out an extensive air campaign against the Taliban and its allies. Anti-Taliban forces on the ground initially assisted in identifying targets for the air campaign and later advanced and seized areas held by Taliban and al-Qaeda forces.

Since December 2001, the U.S.-led coalition’s primary military focus has been on locating remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda which did not surrender and fled into remote areas of the country.

However, there was and is more to Operation Enduring Freedom than military operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants. Coalition operations have included

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<sup>7</sup> For more information on the diverse characteristics and composition of non-Afghan armed groups operating in Afghanistan before and after the U.S.-led attack in 2001, including al-Qaeda, see Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*, (B. Taubis : September 2003). See also Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

investigative and intelligence-gathering components aimed at locating or uncovering threats to the United States and other coalition members, and disrupting or eliminating those threats. Operations have also included efforts to capture terrorist suspects and gather intelligence in Afghanistan as part of the global campaign to disrupt the worldwide operations of al-Qaeda.

U.S. and Coalition forces have also increasingly broadened the scope of their activities in Afghanistan to include peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, delivery of humanitarian aid, counter-narcotics work, and general intelligence gathering. As in other post-conflict situations where the United States has taken the leadership role, it has deployed significant numbers of personnel from the CIA and other intelligence services: the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, in addition to the armed forces.

Since the fall of the Taliban government in late 2001, U.S. and coalition military operations under Operation Enduring Freedom have largely consisted of small- and medium-scale operations whose overall aim is to destroy or disrupt the remaining Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other hostile forces in the country. Some of these operations have focused on fixed Taliban or al-Qaeda military positions, such as caves, bunkers, and other fortified positions, usually in remote rural areas. Others have been directed at residential compounds, usually in small villages, in which anti-coalition suspects are thought to be hiding. These operations can be divided into those where the primary intent appears to be to destroy the target, such as through bombing raids and other direct attacks, and those where the intention is to take into custody particular individuals and collect intelligence information, either from local residents or seized materials.

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<sup>8</sup> The office of the Director of Central Intelligence officially oversees not only the CIA but also the "U.S. Intelligence Community," which consists of at least fourteen different government agencies, including Department of Defense intelligence offices and several non-military agencies.

### III. Violations by U.S. Forces

This chapter is divided into three sections addressing, respectively, use of excessive force by U.S. forces during arrests; arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention; and mistreatment in detention.

As the cases in the first section show, U.S. forces repeatedly have used military means and methods during arrest operations in residential areas where law enforcement tactics were more appropriate. This has resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties and in some cases may have involved indiscriminate or disproportionate force in violation of international humanitarian law.

Cases in the second section of this chapter raise serious questions about the intelligence gathering and processing that leads to coalition arrests. Members of the U.S. armed forces have arrested many civilians not directly participating in hostilities and persons whom U.S. authorities have no legal basis for taking into custody. The cases in the second section also make clear that persons detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan are held without regard to the requirements of international humanitarian or human rights law and are not provided reasons for their arrest or detention. Detainees are held **virtually** incommunicado without any legal basis for challenging their detention or seeking their release.

The final set of cases presented here raise serious concerns regarding the treatment of detainees at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, particularly in light of the **failure** of the United States to investigate and publicly report on several unexplained deaths in detention. There is credible evidence of beatings and other physical assaults on detainees, as well as evidence that the United States has used shackling, exposure to cold, and sleep deprivation amounting to torture or other mistreatment in violation of international law. To date neither the Department of Defense nor the CIA has adequately responded to allegations of mistreatment.

### ***Indiscriminate and Excessive Force Used During Arrests***

As this section shows, U.S. forces routinely use military force when carrying out arrests in Afghanistan, sometimes with insufficient regard to the requirements of applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. U.S. military Rules of Engagement designed for combat situations seem to be applied where law enforcement protocols are required.<sup>9</sup> In addition, it appears that faulty and inadequate intelligence has resulted in targeting of civilians who were not taking a part in the hostilities, unnecessary civilian deaths and injuries during arrest operations, and needless destruction of civilian homes and property.<sup>10</sup> There are also credible reports that U.S. forces have beaten and abused persons during arrest operations, and that Afghan troops accompanying U.S. forces have abused local residents and looted the homes of those detained.

According to U.N. officials in Kabul, numerous complaints have been made to their offices about U.S.-led operations in southern, southeastern, and eastern areas of Afghanistan alleging excessive use of force by coalition troops.<sup>11</sup> Complaints often state that U.S. forces have been manipulated by local Afghan forces, including local Afghan “fixers” and interpreters; that U.S. military forces have unwittingly been used as proxies in local rivalries; and that the presence of U.S. forces has been the backdrop for Afghans to extort money from local residents or intimidate opponents.

Government officials in the Karzai government, along with local government officials, have also repeatedly raised concerns with U.S. officials about excessive military force being used during operations.<sup>12</sup>

One U.N. official who collected complaints about U.S. operations in 2002 said many of the complaints concerned the “use of cowboy-like excessive force” against residents

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<sup>9</sup> The Department of Defense was unwilling to provide Human Rights Watch with copies of current Rules of Engagement (ROE) Cards for their personnel in Afghanistan, or a copy of Afghanistan-specific ROE.

<sup>10</sup> The consequences of mistaken attacks on Afghan civilians and civilian objects during air strikes is a large issue of concern but is not discussed in this report. Human Rights Watch has raised this issue elsewhere. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: U.S. Military Should Investigate Civilian Deaths,” press release, December 13, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights Watch interviews with U.N. officials, Kabul, December 16, 2003. Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with a former senior U.N. official, December 5, 2003 and February 6, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Paul Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003; Patrick Quinn, “U.S. raids, cultural problems lead to rising resentment in southern Afghanistan,” Associated Press, June 24, 2002.

“who generally turn out to be law abiding citizens.” The official noted cases of U.S. forces “blowing doors open with grenades, rather than knocking,” and roughly treating women and children.<sup>13</sup>

Human Rights Watch is particularly concerned about the use of suppressing fire during arrest operations—that is, the indiscriminate firing of weapons to immobilize possible enemy forces. As noted below, Human Rights Watch believes that the use of suppressing fire in the first resort (not in response to enemy fire) is inappropriate during arrest operations in residential areas where no combat is taking place or underway.

*The case of Ahmed Khan and his sons*

On a night in late July 2002, U.S. forces raided the home of Ahmed Khan, a resident of Zurmat district in Paktia province. Zurmat district, while not completely stable, is firmly under the control of Afghan forces allied with the United States and was under such control in July 2002. During the raid, Ahmed Khan was arrested along with his two sons, aged 17 and 18 years.<sup>14</sup> A local farmer died from gunfire during the arrest operation, and a woman in a neighboring house was wounded. Human Rights Watch spoke with several neighbors and other witnesses to the raid. Ahmed Khan described the attack:

It was around harvest time. The farmers were sleeping by the harvests. . . . It was about nine at night. We were lying in bed, but we were not yet asleep. . . . Suddenly, there was a lot of noise. Some helicopters were flying over. Then there were large explosions. The house shook; the

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<sup>13</sup> Human Rights Watch e-mail exchange with former U.N. official in Afghanistan, February 2004.

<sup>14</sup> There were conflicting reports by reporters who visited the site of the attack about what the target of the raid was and whether other men in the area were taken into custody during the raid. One news report about the incident suggested that five other persons were arrested on the same night. “US troops kill Afghan, take away six in raid: False report misled soldiers: governor,” Agence France Presse, August 1, 2002. Another report suggests that the arrest was aimed at a man called Haji Uddin, who was alleged to have given shelter to anti-U.S. forces in the area. Liz Sly, “U.S. grabs at shadows in hunt for Al-Qaeda,” *Chicago Tribune*, September 3, 2002. The same report stated that five persons were arrested during the raid two relatives of Haji Uddin, including a 14-year-old boy, and three farm workers. But Human Rights Watch interviews with residents and local officials in Zurmat shed no light on the reason for the U.S. forces raid on Ahmed Khan’s home. The governor of Paktia, Raz hiohammad Dalili, who was familiar with the incident, could not explain why the attack took place. Human Rights Watch interview with Raz Mohammad Dalili, governor of Paktia, March 9, 2003. See also Pamela Constable, *Frustrated hunt for Bin Laden: al-Qaeda leader elusive, but U.S. sees success in Afghan raids*, Washington Post, September 11, 2002.

towers [corners of the house] had been hit. . . . The operations started. Some helicopters came, we could hear them circling and firing machine guns. It was a lot of noise. There were also explosions. They rocketed one of the towers, and they rocketed a hole through the wall.<sup>15</sup>

During the shooting, Ahmed Khan said he and his family hid on the floor in their bedroom on the second floor of the house. Gunfire shattered their windows and doors.<sup>16</sup> Neighbors said they saw helicopters shooting at the house and at areas around it.<sup>17</sup> Ahmed Khan described how U.S. forces entered his house, firing their weapons:

I looked out the broken windows here, and saw that there were many soldiers in the compound. They shot at the door [front door of the house], and opened it, and came up these stairs. They came through the windows. . . . They entered the house, through the windows, which had been broken by the shooting and the explosions. They came **up** to our room, and they kicked the door open and entered with torches and machine guns. They signaled for us to put up **our** hands, there were no Afghans with them, no Pashto speakers, although later [we saw] interpreters in the yard. . . . Then they fastened the men's hands and told the women to go into the yard. And they took us into the yard too.<sup>18</sup>

Troops, including Afghan soldiers, then searched the house, occasionally using **gunfire** to open locks.

They [U.S. soldiers] made the women go to the other house [across the yard]. Then they searched the house. They broke **all** the windows, and

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<sup>15</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003. A neighbor of Ahmed Khan's described the attack in similar terms: "I heard a lot of noise, which came from helicopters. So I got up, and I crept up to my **roof**. I looked around. There were helicopters circling his [Ahmed Khan's] house. There was a lot of shooting and it was difficult to look thoroughly at what was happening. There were many, many helicopters. We did not dare to **go** near that house." Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> "There were a lot of bullets. The glass broke **in** all the windows . . ." Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003, Human Rights Watch interview with brother of Niaz hiohammad, Zurmat, Pakda, March 10, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

tore the doors off cupboards, and shot open the boxes, and turned them over. . . . [Later,] they put hoods over ~~our~~ heads, and walked us out. We were lifted up, into a helicopter. I could hear the rotors. We were in the helicopter for a long time. . . . I don't know how long. Later I learned I was in Bagram.<sup>19</sup>

The body of a local laborer and farmer, Niaz Mohammad, was found after the raid. A neighbor told Human Rights Watch:

[Later, we] found the corpse of the man who was killed. It was Niaz Mohammad. He had a bullet in his foot, and a bullet in his back. It had entered in his back, and come out right where his heart is. He was found near to the mill.<sup>20</sup>

Ahmed Khan and his neighbors told Human Rights Watch that Niaz Mohammad had been sleeping outside, near piles of harvested wheat, in order to keep watch so that no one would steal the grain.<sup>21</sup>

According to neighbors, a local woman was also wounded in the attack. She received a bullet wound that was ~~not~~ considered to be serious. The homes in the vicinity of Ahmed Khan's house received considerable damage from bullets and other weapons, indicating that the U.S. forces used considerable firepower even though there was no evidence of any armed opposition. A U.N. local staff person visited the site the day after the attack: "There were bullet shells all around the house, everywhere, many shells. There was a big hole in the wall and bullet holes in the windows; the glass was all broken and had fallen into the yard. Household items were scattered all about—all around the compound."<sup>22</sup> Human Rights Watch visited Ahmed Khan's compound in March 2003

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<sup>19</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003. Human Rights Watch interview with G.A.U., local U.N. staff, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003. One of the neighbors described the house after the attack: "After all the noise ended and the helicopters left, I went to the house to see what happened. I went with some neighbors. We went inside. The first thing is that the women were very scared. Boxes from the house were thrown around the yard, and there were possessions scattered about. . . . About ten minutes later, we walked outside. We were walking around to ask people what happened." Human Rights Watch interview with H.M., Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

and observed scores of bullet holes in the window frames and doors of the house, bullet slugs, and destroyed farm equipment.<sup>23</sup>

Ahmed Khan's family said they lost many of their most valuable possessions on the night of the raid. U.S. forces confiscated some books and four automatic weapons, which they later returned to Ahmed Khan, when he and his teenage sons were released. But the family said that other possessions were missing. Said Ahmed Khan:

They stole all my possessions. . . . I don't know who it was. The Americans returned some things to us, but a lot of jewelry disappeared. The women were in the other room. They didn't see anything. . . . The Americans may have taken the jewelry, or the Afghans. I don't know. I lost a lot of property. I don't know what was lost that night. A lot of jewelry was taken.<sup>24</sup>

Ahmed Khan's frustration was manifest months later:

They killed a farmer, Niaz Mohammed. He was just guarding his harvest and was killed. He had four children, two boys and two girls. What will I do for these children? I take care of them now. We will forgive America when they pay for his life, at least to help me with these children.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Human Rights Watch researchers also saw that newly laid mud and brick had been used to fill in a large hole in the compound's wall, approximately three meters in diameter, where a rocket was said to have hit. Scores of bullet holes in the house's walls and window frames indicated that gunfire had come from two directions: the hole in the wall, and the door of the compound. Bullets in the window frames were embedded in two trajectories: some were clearly driven in perpendicularly (at 90 degrees), coming from the direction of the hole in the wall; others were driven in much more obliquely (less than 10 degrees off the surfaces flush with the house) starting from the direction of the house's door.

<sup>24</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

*Other cases*

Human Rights Watch documented a case in February 2003 in the southern province of Uruzgon in which U.S. troops assaulted **two** children during a raid **on** a civilian house.<sup>26</sup> The owner of the house, a low-level military commander in Uruzgon province, cooperated with U.S. forces during coalition attacks on Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. But one night in February **2003**, U.S. forces raided the man's home, entering by force and tying up him and one of his older sons. Through local interpreters and Afghan soldiers accompanying them, the U.S. troops accused the man of holding weapons and cooperating with the Taliban. A Farsi-speaker, the man was baffled why the soldiers believed he was cooperating with the Pashtun-speaking Taliban.

According to the man, the soldiers pushed him and his older son against a wall, and seized the man's young son and nephew:

In front of my eyes, **two** Americans laid down both the boys on the ground and pressed their boots into the children's backs. And they were yelling: 'Where is the ammunition? Where is the ammunition?'

These boys were aged **only** eleven and thirteen. The children were shrieking and shouting. I was saying, "**Look** over all my house - I have nothing!" But they kept asking this, as the children screamed.<sup>27</sup>

The soldiers subsequently searched the house, but **only** found **two** weapons, both of them registered with the authorities. Still, the man was arrested by the local Afghan forces and taken to a neighboring province. He was released a few days later.

On December 5, 2003, U.S. forces conducted an operation in the village of Kosween, in Sayed **Karam** district of Paktia, near Gardez in southeast Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup> According to U.S. military officials, the **aim** of the operation was to arrest a man named Mullah Jalani, alleged to be a Hezb-e Islami leader involved in anti-U.S. military operations. As a result of the operation, a couple and their **six** children were killed: Ikhtari Gul, **35** (a farmer),

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<sup>26</sup> Information about this incident is taken from a Human Rights Watch interview with man from Uruzgon, Kabul, March 2003.

<sup>27</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with man from Uruzgon, Kabul, March 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Information about this case is based on interviews in December 2003 and January 2004 with several journalists who visited the site of the raid in the weeks after it occurred.

and his wife, Khela; their four daughters, Khela, Daulat Zai, Anara and Kadran; and **two** sons, Asif and Nematullah.<sup>29</sup> The use of military methods and tactics during the operation may have violated international legal obligations to minimize harm to civilians and prohibitions against disproportionate attacks.

The U.S. military gave inconsistent accounts of the operation after it occurred. On December 6, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty told several reporters at Bagram airbase that U.S. forces the previous night had raided the home of Mdah Jalani in Sayed Karam.<sup>30</sup> He said that U.S. forces had detained “several persons” during the raid, but had not captured Jalani.<sup>31</sup> The village was sealed off in the week after the raid several journalists who attempted to visit the site of the operation during the week of December 7 - 12 were turned back by Afghan forces cooperating with a Special Forces unit in the village.<sup>32</sup>

On December 10, Hilferty admitted that the Sayed Karam raid had involved close **air** support and bombing, and said that on December 7 U.S. forces found eight civilians who had died during the operations.<sup>33</sup> Hilferty indicated that the dead civilians were in another compound than the one attacked and were buried by a **wall** that collapsed because of “secondary and tertiary explosions” from stored ammunition in Jalani’s compound.<sup>34</sup> He suggested that U.S. forces were not “completely responsible” for the deaths because the civilians (presumably including the children) had “surrounded

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<sup>29</sup> Ikhtari’s brother, Naser, told a reporter that the children’s ages ranged from one to twelve. Pamela Constable, “Deadly U.S. Raid Leaves Some Afghans Bewildered; Villagers Say Target Was **Not** a Terrorist,” Washington Post, December 12, 2003.

<sup>30</sup> “Troops In Afghanistan **Raid** Insurgent Base, Destroy Weapons,” Associated Press, December 6, 2003.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. The next day, December 7, the military announced that nine children had been killed in a separate incident—an **air** attack on a building in Ghazni, Afghanistan. Aijaz Rahi, “Afghan Village Angry After Gunship Attack,” Associated Press, December 8, 2003. For more information about these **two** attacks, see also Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: **U.S.** Military Should Investigate Civilian Deaths,” press release, December 13, 2003. There was **no** indication that the Ghazni incident was **an** arrest operation.

<sup>32</sup> Human Rights Watch telephone interview with an international journalist who attempted **to** visit Sayed Karam, February 6, 2004.

<sup>33</sup> Paul Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 2003. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave **a** press briefing in Washington on December 9 but did not reveal the civilian deaths in Gardez. Why this information was withheld by the military for three days was not explained.

<sup>34</sup> Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.”

themselves” with weapons and ordinance—a puzzling claim, since the dead civilians were not in Jalani’s compound.<sup>35</sup> A foreign correspondent visiting the village the same week found a large concave crater at the compound where the civilians were killed, suggesting that an errant bomb had hit the compound.<sup>36</sup>

Hilferty said that the aim of the operation had been to arrest M d a h Jalani, whom he described as a suspected associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Islami: “We try very hard not to kill anyone. We would prefer to capture the terrorists rather than kill them.”<sup>37</sup> But he gave no adequate explanation as to why U.S. forces on the ground ultimately used bombs in an operation in a residential area.

There are conflicting reports from different sources as to how many people were arrested in the operation, varying from five to fourteen.<sup>38</sup> A reporter from the *Washington Post* visited the village a week after the attack and was told by villagers that Jalani was a local military leader who had cooperated with Taliban forces during the Taliban era, but who had changed sides and cooperated with U.S. forces at times and sat on a local governmental council.<sup>39</sup> Villagers said that Jalani had been involved in several tribal disputes in the area and was living openly in the village before the attack, but had left before it took place.

Human Rights Watch received a complaint from government officials in Paktia about an operation in Zurmat district in February 2003 in which Abdul Gehafouz Akhundzada, a cleric, was arrested in his home after a firefight. (Akhundzada’s detention is discussed in more detail in the section on arbitrary arrests and detention below). Among other

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with a journalist who wished to remain anonymous, Kabul, December 12, 2003.

<sup>37</sup> Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.”

<sup>38</sup> Officials in the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission told Human Rights Watch that eleven persons were arrested during the operation, and had not been released. Human Rights Watch interview with AIHRC official, Kabul, December 16, 2003. A local Afghan governmental official in Paktia, Faiz Mohammed Zalan, told a reporter: “There were five people arrested during the whole operation, but they were innocent, so they were released the next day.” See Watson, “Civilian Toll Not U.S. Fault, Afghans Say.” The Washington Post reporter who visited the village was told by residents that possibly as many as fourteen people had been arrested during the raid.

<sup>39</sup> Pamela Constable, “Deadly U.S. Raid Leaves Some Afghans Bewildered; Villagers Say Target Was Not a Terrorist,” *Washington Post*, December 12, 2003. U.S. Special Forces in the village refused to talk to the reporter.

things, officials complained of U.S. forces coming for Akhundzada in the middle of the night, a course of action which they believe set off a dangerous firefight.

According to Akhundzada's family and neighbors, the arrest took place on or around February 20, 2003. Afghan and U.S. soldiers gathered outside his home late at night and knocked on his door.<sup>40</sup> Akhundzada reportedly thought they were Afghan troops who had come to rob him—a common occurrence in Zurmat district.<sup>41</sup> He fired a weapon from his rooftop, either in the air or directed at the troops. The troops outside returned fire, and soon thereafter, U.S. helicopters flew toward the house, reportedly firing weapons. According to his family and neighbors, Akhundzada then realized that the Afghan troops were working with U.S. forces, and surrendered. Before this happened, however, U.S. and Afghan forces fired hundreds of rounds of ammunition into Akhundzada's home, where there were two women—Akhundzada's mother and wife—and his two children. The women and children told Human Rights Watch that they lay on the floor of the home during the attack, and were not wounded.

After Akhundzada was arrested, U.S. troops entered the home and searched it, shooting open steel trunks with their weapons and breaking doors and windows.<sup>42</sup> Human Rights Watch researchers inspected the house in March and saw hundreds of bullet holes in the compound's external and internal walls. Two bullet slugs dug out of the compound's internal walls appeared to be from an M-60 machine gun, a more powerful weapon than the standard assault rifles carried by U.S. and Afghan troops (M-16s and Russian AK-47s).

Local officials maintained that Akhundzada was a civilian, living openly in Zurmat, who could have been peacefully approached and taken into custody during the day.

Kandahar officials also complained to U.S. forces in 2002 about a raid involving U.S. Army and Special Forces troops that took place on May 24, 2002, in the village of Band

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<sup>40</sup> Information about this case is based on interviews in Zurmat with family members of Abdul Gehafouz Akhundzada, March 10, 2003; interviews with villagers in Zurmat district on March 10, 2003; and interviews with governmental officials in Gardez on March 9, 2003.

<sup>41</sup> Human Rights Watch documented in 2003 that home robberies by Afghan soldiers and police were common in southeastern Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, including in Paktia province and Zurmat district in particular. See Human Rights Watch, "Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing For Us: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 15, no. 5(c), July 2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/>.

<sup>42</sup> Sometime during the operation, the family's copy of the Koran was shot through with a bullet, a fact which later and understandably caused anger in the local community.

Taimore, in Kandahar province. Accounts of the operation are not clear, but according to journalists who interviewed villagers, a tribal leader in his 80s was shot dead in a mosque and a 3-year-old girl drowned after she fell into a well trying to run away from U.S. forces.<sup>43</sup>

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Through 2003, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission office in Gardez city has received numerous complaints from the Gardez area, including allegations that U.S. forces or Afghan forces working with them used excessive force and destroyed property during operations. According to the complaints:

- November 9, 2003, Central Gardez: G.K.<sup>44</sup> claims he “was arrested without cause and his house was damaged by coalition forces. Women and children were kept in the yard in the cold weather and the locks of the women’s boxes were broken, money and jewels were taken.”
- November 8, 2003, Gardez, Shekar Kheil village: H.M.K. complains that “house was damaged by the coalition forces and the named person was taken along with property deeds and other things.”
- August 22, 2003, Central Gardez, Khajeh village: Dr. B, Dr. J, Engineer T.B claim that “In the middle of the night, their house was damaged and coalition forces entered the women’s rooms without permission. Due to fear and terror one woman lost her fetus [spontaneously aborted]. [Dr. B] was taken, along with some money and jewelry.”
- July 28, 2003, Central Gardez: N.G. claims he “was arrested by coalition forces without cause in the middle of the night from his house, and money and jewels were taken.”
- July 13, 2003, Central Gardez, Shaykhan village: J.M.M. complains that: “Coalition forces arrested, beat, harassed and insulted him.”

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<sup>43</sup> See Michael Ware, “We Were Better Off Under the Russians,” *Time Magazine*, June 10, 2002; Patrick Quinn, “U.S. raids, cultural problems lead to rising resentment in southern Afghanistan,” *Associated Press*, June 24, 2002.

<sup>44</sup> Names have been replaced with initials to protect the confidentiality of the complainants.

- May 2003, Khost province, Lelamy Koli district: H.I.K. complains that “compound bombed by coalition forces: **two** killed, four injured, four others were taken [arrested] by coalition forces.”

UNAMA local offices and UNAMA headquarters in Kabul have also received numerous complaints over 2002 and 2003 about U.S. forces using excessive or “culturally insensitive” force during operations in the south and southeast of the country.<sup>45</sup> (Complaints about culturally insensitive force usually refer to allegations of male troops touching or looking at women during searches, which in some areas violate local norms even if there is no sexual intent. Local leaders have requested, among other things, that the U.S. military use more women soldiers during search operations.)

#### *Abuses by Afghan forces*

Afghan forces deployed alongside U.S. forces have been implicated in abuses during military operations. As noted elsewhere in this report, persons arrested by U.S. forces routinely complain about local Afghan forces looting their homes in the wake of U.S. military operations.

An Afghan journalist in Kandahar city told Human Rights Watch in November 2003 that he received several complaints in 2003 from residents in Zabul and Helmand about local forces operating with U.S. troops extorting money from villagers by threatening to tell U.S. forces that local residents are “with the Taliban,” claiming that the villagers will be targeted for arrest by the United States if they fail to pay certain sums of money—typically around 10,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately U.S.\$175).<sup>46</sup>

In October 2003, a reporter from the *Los Angeles Times* documented that local troops from Kandahar, working as guides for U.S. forces, looted homes and beat and tortured civilians during a week-long military operation in Zabul province, which lies directly to the east of Kandahar.<sup>47</sup> Residents showed the journalist **two** young men who had been

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<sup>45</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with U.N. officials, Kabul, December 13 and 16, 2003. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with former U.N. official, February 6, 2004.

<sup>46</sup> Human Rights Watch interviews with A.G.S., Afghan journalist, October 5 and 9, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> Paul Watson, “Afghans Tell of Torture During Security Sweep,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 30, 2003; Paul Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003. See also transcript of interview with Paul Watson by *Los Angeles Times* Online editor, on documenting abuses and interviewing witnesses, available at: <http://www.latimes.com/>

beaten by the troops; one described being severely beaten and blacking out, the other was still unconscious days after the attack. According to other residents, U.S. forces did not witness the abuses, but the Afghan troops allegedly stole “cash, jewelry, watches, radios, three motorcycles—even the mud-brick school’s windows and doors” before leaving when U.S. and Afghan troops moved on to other areas. Said one elder: “These people are robbing us, torturing us and beating us . . . . They are also taking innocent people to jail.”

In late October 2003, a spokesman for President Hamid Karzai said publicly that Karzai’s office had been receiving information about similar abuses by local troops for more than a year; that Karzai had told U.S. military commanders in Kabul that Afghan militias accompanying U.S. troops were committing abuses; that Karzai had suggested to U.S. commanders they not use Afghan militias in non-combat situations; and that the U.S. actions with local militias were undermining the overall effort to combat terrorism in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup>

*Legal standard applicable to use of force during arrest operations*

International humanitarian law seeks to protect civilians from unnecessary harm during armed conflict. Central to this protection is the imperative that military forces differentiate between combatants and civilians during military operations and when they take persons into custody.

Rules applicable to the current conflict in Afghanistan<sup>49</sup> require a military force to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”<sup>50</sup> Attackers must refrain from an attack that may be expected to cause disproportionate civilian casualties and damage.<sup>51</sup> Also prohibited are indiscriminate attacks, which include those not directed at a specific military objective

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<sup>48</sup> Watson, “Afghan Leader Told U.S. About Abuses, Aide Says,” October 31, 2003.

<sup>49</sup> See section on “International Legal Context,” below.

<sup>50</sup> Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”), art. 57(2)(a)(ii). Many of the provisions of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, including those applying to methods and means of attack, are accepted as customary international law applicable to international and non-international armed conflict. See section on “International Legal Context,” below.

<sup>51</sup> Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).

and consequently of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.<sup>52</sup>

In situations where forces are conducting essentially law enforcement operations—for instance, arrests of civilians wanted for questioning—basic rules of international human rights law also apply, including standards applicable to the use of force by law enforcement personnel. Applicable law enforcement standards are typically more stringent than those under international humanitarian law, and narrowly prescribe the contexts in which deadly force and firearms may be used.

Human Rights Watch believes that the use of military tactics and military rules of engagement in operations that otherwise bear the characteristics of civilian law enforcement, particularly the arrest of suspects in residential areas, raises legal concerns and in Afghanistan likely has led to avoidable casualties and destruction of civilian property. The United States has an obligation to investigate such incidents, take disciplinary or other legal action as appropriate, scrutinize its arrest methods and rules of engagement, and adopt necessary policy changes to prevent further unnecessary loss of life and property.

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<sup>52</sup> Protocol I, art. 51(4). Among indiscriminate attacks are those expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life and property that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Id. art. 51(5).

### ***Arbitrary or Mistaken Arrests and Indefinite Detention***

U.S. forces in Afghanistan regularly capture combatants and civilians who have taken up arms against U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces, during both combat and search and arrest operations. However, as shown here, U.S. forces also routinely arrest civilians taking no direct part in hostilities, sometimes in contexts in which the arrests seem arbitrary or based on poor or faulty intelligence.

As shown in this section, U.S. forces sometimes take into custody all men of military age found within the vicinity of an operation. Other times, it seems persons are targeted for arrest because U.S. officials have determined they are a security risk or are useful for intelligence purposes—for instance, clerics or local tribal leaders who might be politically involved with the Taliban, or civilians spotted near the site of a recent attack. Human Rights Watch has interviewed many Afghans who were arrested for simply being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

For many of these men, arrest is the start of an ordeal in which they may be beaten or otherwise mistreated during arrest or detention, repeatedly and seemingly randomly interrogated, held for weeks or months without family visits, and eventually released only to find that their homes were looted by Afghan troops. (Negations of beatings and mistreatment are not discussed here but in the “Mistreatment in Detention” section below.)

In late May 2002, U.S. forces raided two homes in the village of Kirmati, near Gardez city, and arrested five Afghan men, all of whom were later released and returned to Gardez. During the raid, U.S. forces reportedly used helicopters and airplanes to patrol the area and lay down suppressing fire. The raid took place in an entirely residential area, and there is no evidence that U.S. forces met any resistance. Kirmati is firmly under the control of Afghan forces allied with the United States and was so at the time of this attack.

U.S. forces took five people into custody: Mohammad Naim and his brother Sherbat, Ahmaddullah and his brother Amanullah, and Khoja Mohammad. Mohammad Naim described the raid as follows:

It was late at night. It was after midnight. Suddenly, there were a lot of noises, very loud, confusing . . . I went into the yard. Suddenly, there was someone in my house with a gun on me. So I surrendered.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with hohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

Mohammad Naim's brother told a similar story.<sup>54</sup> Ahmaddullah and Amanullah, who are brothers, were arrested in a house nearby. Another villager, Khoja Mohammad, was arrested when he came out of his house to investigate what was happening in the other houses.<sup>55</sup> Amanullah described the arrests as follows:

I awoke, there were helicopters **all** around the house. And I looked out and there were people in my house [in the compound]. There was a man I could see, I thought he was a thief. He had a gun. But he spoke English, and I realized he was **an American**. I don't speak much English, but I said, "How are you?" But then he said, "shut up" in Pashto - "Chopsha."

My brother was there too, and he was arrested. They tied his hands, and they were pointing their guns at me **all** the time. Then they arrested me too, and tied my hands.<sup>56</sup>

The five men were taken to Bagram. Mohammad Naim described what happened after they landed:

They threw us in a room, face down. We were there for a while. Then they stood me up and led me somewhere, and then they took off my blindfold. I saw that I was alone. I saw that there were some other people in the room, but I was the **only** prisoner.

I was on the ground, and a man stood over me, and he had a foot on my back. **An** interpreter was there **at** this point. He asked me, "**What** is your name?" and I told them.

They made me take off my clothes, so that I was naked. They took pictures of us, naked. And then they gave us new clothes, which were dark blue.

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<sup>54</sup> **Human** Rights Watch interview with Sherbat, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>55</sup> **Human** Rights Watch interview with Khoja Mohammad, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>56</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Amanullah, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

A man came, and he had some plastic bag, and he ran his hands through my hair, shaking my hair. And then he pulled out some of my hair, some hair from my beard, and he put it in a bag. . . . The most awful thing about the whole experience was how they were taking ~~our~~ pictures, and we were completely naked. Completely naked. It was completely humiliating.<sup>57</sup>

According to Mohammad Naim and Sherbat, the questioning at Bagram over the next few days was exceedingly general, and indicated that the U.S. investigators had **no** idea who the brothers were:

In the interrogations they asked us, “Who are you? What do you do?” I told them, “I am butcher. I am just a butcher with a shop in the village.” They showed me Khoja Mohammad’s picture [one of the other villagers arrested] and asked me if I knew him. “Obviously I know him—he is my neighbor,” I said.<sup>58</sup>

U.S. forces also asked very general questions of Ahmaddullah, Amanullah, and Khoja Mohammad, suggesting the **U.S. knew** very little about them as **well**. Amanullah described his interrogation at Bagram as follows:

During the interrogations, they were asking me, “Do you know Jalaludid? [A suspected Taliban commander.] Do **you** know Mullah Omar?” And they were asking about some other Taliban ministers. But I was telling them, “I am only a laborer.” But then they would ask me [again]: “Do you know Ali Jan, Jalaludin’s deputy?”

There was one Afghan translator, one American, and **two** others [nationalities unknown].<sup>59</sup>

Khoja Mohammad, meanwhile, was asked about Sherbat, one of the brothers arrested in another house. “During the interrogations, they showed me Sherbat’s picture, and they asked me if I knew him. I said, laughing, ‘Of course I know him: he is a butcher in my village. I buy my meat from him.’”

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<sup>57</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>58</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Sherbat (last name withheld), Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

After sixteen days of detention, including *six* days of interrogations, the U.S. released ‘the five men. Said Sherbat:

When they released us, an American came and said, through the translator, ‘We apologize to you. We apologize on behalf of America and even on behalf of President Bush. We apologize.’ They said that they would help us by giving us compensation for what they did. They said we would receive assistance. But we never did.

They covered our heads again, and put us in the helicopter, and took us to Gardez. We landed in Gardez, and they took us in truck. We told them to stop before we got to *our* village, and that we would *walk*. The interpreter gave us about thirty-thousand [old] Afghanis each [approximately 70 cents U.S.], so that at least we could get some tea.<sup>60</sup>

The five men returned home to find that their houses had been looted and most of their possessions of value gone. Said Mohammad Naim: “I think that night [of the raid] my house was looted. . . . After that, *no* one helped *us*, *no* government, no NGO, no *one*.”<sup>61</sup> The brothers *said* that they were told later that the Afghan forces working with the Americans had searched and looted their houses.

Ahmaddullah says he suffered mental health difficulties after the arrest:

When we were there [to Bagram], I was so afraid they were going to kill me. Even now, having come back, I worry they will come and kill me. We are innocent people, we have nothing. We were punished by the Taliban: we were Persian speakers [i.e., not native Pashtuns like the Taliban.] We thought they [the U.S. forces at Bagram] would *kill* us for sure. I have to take medication now just to sleep. . . . Afghanistan has had so many governments in the last *thirty* years, and under *all* of these governments I have suffered. Under *all* of them I have been mistreated. They *all* ask for forgiveness. What’s the good of forgiveness if they don’t give you anything?<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Sherbat, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>61</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Naim, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>62</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmaddullah, Gardez, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

Human Rights Watch received information about various other persons detained for extended periods by U.S. forces after being taken into custody.

Human Rights Watch interviewed **two** civilian men who were arrested in Paktia in early 2002 and held at Bagram for over a month before being flown to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba.<sup>63</sup> Both were released in May 2003. The fact that the two were released from Guantanamo and were not held by Afghan authorities after their release makes it clear that insufficient evidence existed that they committed any crime. Neither of them had any idea why they were arrested. One of the detainees said that a close friend of his was still in custody, either in Bagram or Guantanamo. The detainee's family and residents of his village told the detainee that his friend was arrested when he (the friend) approached a U.S. military base near Khost asking for information about him.

Human Rights Watch received a report about two persons in Khost city, Paktia, arrested by U.S. forces in August 2003.<sup>64</sup> The **two** men were arrested after their brother was killed in an explosion that local authorities believed was the result of a premature detonation of a car bomb. According to the **two** men, who spoke with local journalists in Khost, they were taken to Bagram airbase and interrogated by U.S. forces there. They said they were released after two months, when U.S. forces determined that they were not involved in the explosion or affiliated with anti-Coalition forces. During this whole time, their family was unable to receive news of them. The two said they received compensation from the United States and were flown back to Khost.

In Jalalabad in May 2003, four persons were taken into custody by U.S. forces operating out of Jalalabad airport.<sup>65</sup> After interrogation, the men were then turned over to Afghan authorities. The detainees, who according to some residents were merely civilians, had no criminal charges pending against them, and were being held seemingly at the request

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<sup>63</sup> The information here is gathered from interviews by Human Rights Watch with the **two** detainees in July 2003 and several interviews with a journalist who interviewed these detainees earlier. For security reasons, the names of the detainees are withheld. The **two** detainees were severely mistreated by U.S. forces while at Bagram; their case is discussed in more detail in the *Mistreatment in Detention* section, below.

<sup>64</sup> Information about this case is based on a Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a local journalist, Paktia province, November 4, 2003.

<sup>65</sup> The information about this case is based on a Human Rights Watch interview with AIHRC official, Jalalabad, May 7, 2003.

of the U.S. forces. They were released a few weeks later after AIHRC officials pressured the local authorities.

One case discussed above involved the February 2003 arrest of Abdul Gehafouz Akhundzada, a cleric from Zurmat district. After the arrest, described earlier, Akhundzada was taken away in a helicopter, presumably to Bagram airbase, but his family was not informed of the location or reason for his arrest over the following months. As of late 2003, there was no response to appeals made through local government officials to both the U.S. and the Afghan authorities for an explanation as to his whereabouts. According to local residents, the U.S. government released no information as to the reasons for Akhundzada's arrest to his family or made such information public. Local U.N. staff in Paktia suggested that coalition forces focused operations in Zurmat district in 2003 in part because several senior Taliban Officials were born there.<sup>66</sup> It is possible U.S. forces arrested Akhundzada in order to question him, believing that since he is a cleric he might have information about the location of Taliban officials. U.N. staff, however (as well as local officials), do not believe that Akhundzada had any meaningful or high-level connections with the Taliban.<sup>67</sup>

Ahmed Khan and his two sons (discussed above) also told Human Rights Watch that they were arrested in Zurmat and taken to Bagram airbase after their arrest. They said they were questioned about their identities, and whether they knew certain people—various names were given, people whom they did not know.<sup>68</sup> They were held for over two weeks, and then flown back to Zurmat. Ahmed Khan told Human Rights Watch that U.S. officials at Bagram Air Base apologized to him before releasing him, and asked him “for forgiveness.”

Naim Kuchi, an elder and tribal leader of nomads from Paktika province, was arrested in late December 2002, while traveling on a road outside of Kabul.<sup>69</sup> U.S. personnel in civilian vehicles, accompanied by Afghan forces, reportedly took him into custody.

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<sup>66</sup> Human Rights Watch interviews with local U.N. staff, Gardez, March 11, 2003.

<sup>67</sup> Human Rights Watch interviews with local U.N. staff, Gardez, March 11, 2003. Human Rights Watch interview with Raz Mohammad Dalili, governor of Paktia, and other government officials, Gardez, March 9, 2003.

<sup>68</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan and his sons, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>69</sup> Information about this case is based on Human Rights Watch interviews with Naim Kuchi's brother, Kabul, March 8 and 29, 2003. See also Marc Kaufman, “Afghans Protest Clan Leader's Detention,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003; Marc Kaufman, “Afghan Figure Sent to U.S. Facility in Cuba,” Washington Post, March 29, 2003.

Kuchi's family told Human Rights Watch that Kuchi had no involvement with anti-Coalition activities and said they had received no information about the basis for his arrest, nor were they able to meet with him after his arrest. In March 2003, Kuchi was transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, where he remains. A former U.N. official told Human Rights Watch that Kuchi was allied with the Taliban and with the former mujahidin government in Kabul from 1992-1996, and that he had represented the Ahmadzai nomad tribe in meetings with the Karzai government and the United Nations in 2002.<sup>70</sup> In April 2003, U.S. Department of Defense officials told Human Rights Watch that Kuchi was a former Taliban official and a "scumbag" involved in smuggling arms over the Pakistani border." Whatever the case, Kuchi remains detained without charge or trial.

Rohullah Wakil, a local leader from Kunar province who was elected to the 2002 loya jirga in Kabul, was arrested in a raid in Kunar in August 2002 and remains in custody—possibly at Bagram. Local representatives from Kunar have made repeated pleas to the United States and U.N. in Kabul, complaining that Wakil should either be tried for a crime or released. No charges have been filed against him.

Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 1,000 persons have been detained in the course of coalition operations in Afghanistan from early 2002 to the present, most of whom have been released within days or weeks of their capture. This estimate is based on the average number of weekly new detainees who arrive at Bagram—approximately ten—according to journalists and human rights monitors who have been following the Bagram process. The number of new detainees obviously fluctuates: In December 2003, according to a U.S. military spokesman in Kabul, U.S. forces detained over 100 people.<sup>72</sup>

#### *CIA Detention Facilities*

As noted above, CIA agents have operated throughout Afghanistan since soon after September 11, 2001, conducting military and intelligence operations. The CIA maintains a large heavily guarded compound in Kabul, in the Ariana Chowk neighborhood, surrounded by forty foot walls, razor wire, and guard towers. The CIA also controls a separate detention and interrogation facility at Bagram airbase, though this has never

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<sup>70</sup> E-mail correspondence with former U.N. official, February 2004.

<sup>71</sup> Human Rights Watch meeting with U.S. Department of Defense officials, Washington D.C., April 24, 2003.

<sup>72</sup> Stephen Graham, "U.S. Kills 10, Arrests 100 in Afghanistan," Associated Press, December 30, 2003.

been officially acknowledged by the United States. Little is known about who is detained there, for how long, conditions of detention, or grounds for release or transfer to other U.S.-controlled facilities.

Human Rights Watch interviewed one former detainee, a former high-level Taliban official, who was held in an unknown facility near Kabul for eight months, guarded by Afghan troops but interrogated by U.S. personnel in plainclothes.<sup>73</sup> Since all U.S. military personnel are under orders to wear uniforms in Afghanistan, it is possible that the government personnel in question were from the CIA. The former official said that there were other detainees held in the same facility: he heard their voices and heard guards discussing other prisoners in the hallway outside his cell. He said he cooperated with the U.S. personnel and was not mistreated. He believes he was held in an Afghan detention center in the Shashdarak area of Kabul or at the Ariana Chowk CIA facility.

There is also some evidence that the United States detains people in Afghanistan who have been captured outside of the country. Pakistani officials told a reporter with *Time* that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, an alleged al-Qaeda leader, was taken to Bagram air base after his arrest in Pakistan in March 2003.<sup>74</sup> Saifullah Paracha, a Pakistani man who was alleged to have connections to Shaikh Mohammed, was also taken to Afghanistan after he was arrested in Pakistan in July 2003, according to his wife, who received a letter from him delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross.<sup>75</sup> (His son was also arrested by authorities in the United States.<sup>76</sup>) Part of the letter from Saifullah read:

I am in Kabul with U.S. authorities. My health is OK. My blood pressure and sugar is controlled. Tell relatives about my welfare. . . . The Red Cross people do visit me [every] seven to 10 days. Reply me soon. You can send me fax. Get the number from Internet or ICRC.<sup>77</sup>

Saifullah reportedly remains in custody without charge.

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<sup>73</sup> The information presented here is based on a Human Rights Watch interview with a former detainee on July 18, 2003, in Kabul. For security reasons, the person's name is withheld here.

<sup>74</sup> See "The Biggest Fish of Them All," *Time* Magazine, March 17, 2003.

<sup>75</sup> Zarar Khan, "Missing businessman in U.S. custody, wife says," Associated Press, September 4, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

*Legal standard applicable to detention of civilians and combatants in Afghanistan*

International humanitarian law and human rights law provide protections to all persons taken into custody during situations of armed conflict. As discussed in the section “International Legal Context” below, since the establishment of the Karzai government, the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan is considered to be a non-international (internal) armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions. Persons arrested and detained during internal armed conflicts must be treated in accordance with Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, customary international humanitarian law, and the due process requirements of human rights law.

During an internal conflict, persons apprehended for taking part in armed conflict may be prosecuted for taking up arms against the government. This is different from the situation of an international armed conflict, where soldiers are normally entitled to the “combatant’s privilege,” which protects them from being prosecuted for taking part in the hostilities. This means that the Afghan government may prosecute persons apprehended during the current fighting for violations of Afghan law. But such prosecutions must be carried out by tribunals that meet international due process standards.<sup>78</sup>

Persons taken into custody who have not taken a direct part in the hostilities must be charged with a criminal offense or released. The protections of human rights law, in particular the rights to be charged with a criminal offense, have access to legal counsel, and be tried before an impartial and independent court, apply.<sup>79</sup> In a declared state of emergency, some due process requirements may be derogated, but such derogations must be “limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”<sup>80</sup> The

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<sup>78</sup> Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions provides that criminal sentences may not be imposed except by regularly constituted courts that afford “all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.” Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 3. Customary international humanitarian law incorporates many of the fair trial protections found in human rights law. Persons must be presumed innocent, be prosecuted by an independent and impartial court, be informed without delay of the charges against them, and they shall have the right and means of defense. See Protocol I, art. 75. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), opened for signature December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976, and acceded to by Afghanistan January 24, 1983 and ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992), art. 14.

<sup>79</sup> ICCPR, arts. 9 and 14.

<sup>80</sup> The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the body that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states in its commentary to article 4 on states of emergency, that limitations to derogation “relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the state of emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to because of the emergency. . . . [T]he

right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court, for instance, may never be violated.<sup>81</sup>

Even if the United States maintains that an international armed conflict persists in Afghanistan (see International Legal Context section below), U.S. actions with regard to its detainees would remain contrary to international law. During international armed conflict, civilians may be detained for “imperative reasons of security,” but they may not be held indefinitely without review. The Fourth Geneva Convention permits detention “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”<sup>82</sup> Even then, the internee is entitled to have his internment reconsidered “as soon as possible” before an appropriate court or administrative board set up by the Detaining Power for that purpose. Thus, most of the standards applicable to non-international conflict are applicable even to international conflicts. By flaunting these standards, the United States is violating international law.

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obligation to limit any derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation reflects the principle of proportionality which is common to derogation and limitation powers. Moreover, the mere fact that a permissible derogation from a specific provision may, of itself, be justified by the exigencies of the situation does not obviate the requirement that specific measures taken pursuant to the derogation must also be shown to be required by the exigencies of the situation.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (art. 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), para. 4.

<sup>81</sup> Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, para. 11.

<sup>82</sup> Fourth Geneva, art. 42.

## *Mistreatment in Detention*

### *Bagram airbase*

Human Rights Watch has received credible and consistent information about mistreatment of detainees at the Bagram detention facility. It also appears that during the first months after the United States set up the Bagram facility in late 2001, the treatment of detainees there was especially harsh.

Two detainees held in Bagram in March 2002 (who were later sent to the Guantanamo facility and ultimately released and repatriated) described to Human Rights Watch being held in a cell for several weeks, in a group, stripped to their undershirts and underwear.<sup>83</sup> According to the two men, bright lights were set up outside their cells, shining in, and U.S. military personnel took shifts, keeping the detainees awake by banging on the metal walls of their cells with batons. The detainees said they were terrified and disoriented by sleep deprivation, which they said lasted for several weeks. During interrogations, they said, they were made to stand upright for lengthy periods of time with a bright spotlight shining directly into their eyes. They were told that they would not be questioned until they remained motionless for one hour, and that they were not entitled even to turn their heads. If they did move, the interrogators said the “clock was reset.” U.S. personnel, through interpreters, yelled at the detainees from behind the light, asking questions.<sup>84</sup>

Two more detainees held at Bagram in late 2002 told a *New York Times* reporter of being painfully shackled in standing positions, naked, for weeks at a time, forcibly deprived of sleep and occasionally beaten.<sup>85</sup>

A reporter with the *Associated Press* interviewed two detainees who were held in Bagram in late 2002 and early 2003: Saif-ur Rahman and Abdul Qayyum.<sup>86</sup> Qayyum was

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<sup>83</sup> The information here is gathered from interviews by Human Rights Watch with the two detainees in July 2003 and several interviews with a journalist who interviewed these detainees earlier. For security reasons, the names of the detainees are withheld.

<sup>84</sup> A journalist with a British Broadcasting Corporation Panorama program interviewed these two detainees in July 2003 about their experiences at Bagram and Guantanamo. See “Inside Guantanamo,” BBC-One program broadcast on October 5, 2003, transcript available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1/shared/sp1/hi/programmes/panorama/transcripts/insideguantanamo.txt>

<sup>85</sup> See Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody,” *New York Times*, March 4, 2003.

<sup>86</sup> Information about these cases is based on an article by an Associated Press journalist who interviewed the two in March 2003. See Kathy Gannon, “Prisoners released from Bagram forced to

arrested in August 2002; Rahman in December 2002. Both were held for more than **two** months. Interviewed separately, they described similar experiences in detention: sleep deprivation, being forced to stand for long periods of time, and humiliating taunts from women soldiers. Rahman said that on his first night of detention he was kept in a freezing cell for part of his detention, stripped naked, and doused with cold water. He believes he was at a military base in Jalalabad at this point. Later, at Bagram, he said U.S. troops made him lie on the ground at one point, naked, and pinned him down with a chair. He also said he was shackled continuously, even when sleeping, and forbidden from talking with other detainees. Qayyum and Rahman were linked with a local commander in Kunar province, Rohullah Wakil, a local and national leader who was elected to the 2002 loya jirga in Kabul, and who was arrested in August 2002 and remains in custody.

According to detainees who have been released, U.S. personnel punish detainees at Bagram when they break rules—for instance, talking to another prisoner or yelling at guards. Detainees are taken, in shackles, and made to hold their arms over their heads; their shackles are then draped over the top of a door, so that they can not lower their arms. They are ordered to stand with their hands up, in this manner, for two-hour intervals. According to one detainee interviewed who was punished in this manner, the punishment caused pain in the arms.<sup>87</sup>

In March 2003, Roger King, a **U.S.** military spokesman at Bagram, denied that mistreatment had occurred, but admitted the following:

We do force people to stand for an extended period of time. . . . Disruption of sleep has been reported as an effective way of reducing people's inhibition about talking or their resistance to questioning. . . . They are not allowed to speak to each other. If they do, they can plan together or rely on the comfort of one another. If they're caught speaking out of turn, they can be forced to do things, like stand for a period of time—as payment for speaking out.<sup>88</sup>

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strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to stand for hours," Associated Press, March 14, 2003. Human Rights Watch interviewed Gannon to confirm the accounts given here.

<sup>87</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Khan, Zurmat, Paktia, March 10, 2003.

<sup>88</sup> Gannon, "Prisoners released from Bagram forced to strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to stand for hours," March 14, 2003.

King also said that a “common technique” for disrupting sleep was to keep the lights on constantly or to wake detainees every fifteen minutes to disorient them.<sup>89</sup>

Several U.S. officials, speaking anonymously to the media, have admitted that U.S. military and CIA interrogators use sleep deprivation as a technique, and that detainees are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, and held in awkward, painful positions.<sup>90</sup>

In March 2003, a U.S. official told a *New York Times* reporter that Omar Faruq, a detainee at Bagram who was allegedly close to Osama bin Laden, was subjected to interrogations at Bagram that were “not quite torture, but about as close as you can get.” The official said that Faruq was fed very little and subjected to sleep and light deprivation and prolonged isolation and room temperatures ranging from 100 degrees to 10 degrees Fahrenheit (38 to -12 centigrade).<sup>91</sup> The same month, U.S. officials told another *New York Times* reporter about interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, allegedly a senior al-Qaeda leader who was arrested in March 2003 and possibly held at Bagram. Abu Zubaydah was shot in the chest, groin, and thigh when he was captured in Pakistan in March, and, according to one official, interrogators later manipulated levels of pain medication for Abu Zubaydah while they were interrogating him.<sup>92</sup> Military interrogators told the *Wall Street Journal*:

“Interrogators can also play on their prisoners’ phobias, such as fear of rats or dogs, or disguise themselves as interrogators from a country known to use torture or threaten to send the prisoners to such a place. Prisoners can be stripped, forcibly shaved and deprived of **religious items and toiletries.**”<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> See, e.g., Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, “U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,” *Washington Post*, December 26, 2002.; Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, “Questioning to Be **Legal**, Humane and Aggressive the White House Says,” *New York Times*, March 4, 2003.

<sup>91</sup> Don Van Natta Jr. “Adark jail for Qaeda suspects; captives are deprived of sleep and sometimes chilled.” *The New York Times*, March 10, 2003.

<sup>92</sup> Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, “Questioning of Accused Expected to Be Humane, Legal and Aggressive,” *New York Times*, March 4, 2003.

<sup>93</sup> Jess Bravin and Gary Fields, “How do Interrogators Make A Captured Terrorist Talk?,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 4, 2003.

*Mistreatment in other facilities*

Human Rights Watch interviewed a Pakistani fighter with the Taliban who was held at the Kandahar airport in early 2002 and later taken to Guantanamo. He said he was beaten and kicked by U.S. troops in transport to Kandahar and while there.<sup>94</sup> He was released from Guantanamo in July 2003.

[On the plane to Kandahar:] We were shackled and our eyes were covered so that we could not see anything. . . . [A]ll the handcuffed prisoners were forced to sit with their legs stretched and hands behind them and the whole body bent onto the legs all the way. [Demonstrates: kneeling but essentially sitting on top of his calves and feet, with torso bent down over the knees.]

It was very difficult to remain in that position and if we fell to the side or moved, the armed men standing over our heads would beat us mercilessly with their army boots, kicking us in our back and kidneys. We were all beaten, without exception.

The man also said that he and other prisoners were beaten when they arrived in Kandahar:

Our eyes were closed [blindfolded] while we were getting out of the helicopter at the Kandahar airbase. One man pulled me up by my arm and threw me down the stairs, and then made me to lie down on the ground with my face upward.

We did not have the right to move, and if we did we were beaten. Other people were beaten. . . .

When we were in Kandahar, we were not allowed to talk with each other and if we did, we were beaten and we were not allowed to sleep. For instance, if we were sleeping we were waken up or if we were covering our head with our bed cover we were beaten strongly.

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<sup>94</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with M.S.M. (name withheld), Malakand district, Pakistan, January 3, 2004.

They would kick and punch us. To tell you precisely they were behaving rudely with us.

The man also said that he and other prisoners were occasionally taken outside and forced to lie on the frozen ground until they were numb with cold.<sup>95</sup>

Another Pakistani man, who was arrested in Pakistan by U.S. forces and taken to Kandahar in early 2002 (he was later sent to Guantanamo and was released in 2003), said he was beaten during an interrogation at Kandahar:

My hands were handcuffed in my back. There I was beaten for the first time by the Americans. They made me lie down on a table with my face down, while two persons held me, one at my neck and the second at my feet. Both pressed me down hard on the table, and two others beat me on my back, my thighs and my arms with punches and their elbows. The beating lasted five or six minutes. Then the interrogations started and lasted for half an hour. I was standing the whole time.<sup>96</sup>

The man said he was beaten again at Kandahar in a holding cell, along with other prisoners, before being taken to Guantanamo.

Persons taken into custody after a raid in January 2002 provided other details of mistreatment at the Kandahar airbase. On the night of January 24, 2002, U.S. forces attacked two government buildings in Khas Uruzgon, a small village in eastern Uruzgon province, and mistakenly killed several anti-Taliban fighters who were assisting U.S. forces.<sup>97</sup> U.S. forces destroyed a school in the attack, killing 19 soldiers and Afghan

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<sup>95</sup> James Meek, a reporter with the Guardian (U.K.), interviewed this detainee and others held in Kandahar at the same time. Their stories were consistent, including being beaten and forced to lie on the frozen earth. See James Meek, "People The Law Forgot," The Guardian, December 3, 2003. See also Gannon, "Prisoners released from Bagram forced to strip naked, deprived of sleep, ordered to stand for hours," March 14, 2003 (including allegations by a detainee at Jalalabad who was forced to lie outside in a puddle of frozen water).

<sup>96</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with A.Z. (name withheld), North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, February 6, 2004.

<sup>97</sup> The information about this account is based on the following interviews: Human Rights Watch interview with A.M.S., resident of Khas Uruzgon, Kabul, February 23, 2003. Human Rights Watch interview with R.H.M., resident of Khas Uruzgon; Kabul, February 23, 2003; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with an international journalist who visited Uruzgon village on January 27, 2002, February 20, 2003; Human Rights Watch interview with international journalist who visited Uruzgon

government employees who were with them. U.S. forces took into custody twenty-seven anti-Taliban fighters and government workers and transferred them to Kandahar airbase, where they were held for several days.

Several of these detainees said that they were kicked and punched repeatedly by U.S. forces after they arrived, and suffered broken bones that went untreated. Several were beaten until they were unconscious. Among those beaten was an elderly man, who had his hand broken. Others reported being kicked in their ribs and heads.<sup>98</sup>

At the scene of the attack, local residents found **two** dead Afghan soldiers with their hands bound with plastic ties similar to those commonly used by U.S. troops. They had apparently died from gunshot wounds to the torso. Residents were unable to determine whether they had been bound before they were killed or whether they were wounded, bound, and then subsequently died. The deaths raise serious issues that the U.S. military should **fully** investigate. If the men were intentionally killed after their capture, the killing would amount to an extrajudicial execution and violation of the laws of war. If the men received their injuries before being captured, then it may have been unlawful for the U.S. forces to leave them bound without providing them proper medical attention.<sup>99</sup> That the U.S. forces were able to take some **two** dozen persons into custody suggests that they would have been fully capable of taking the other two for medical treatment.

After the Khas Uruzgon detainees were released, U.S. officials visited Uruzgon and apologized to elders there, and gave out \$1,000 to the families of persons who had been killed in the raid. Those who were mistreated by U.S. forces received nothing.<sup>100</sup>

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village in early February 2002, February 5, 2004. See also Craig Smith, "U.S. Account Of a Battle with Taliban is Disputed," *New York Times*, January 27, 2002; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Releasing 27 Captured in Raid," *New York Times*, February 7, 2002.

<sup>98</sup> See preceding note. See also Carlotta Gall, "Released Afghans Tell of Beatings," *New York Times*, February 11, 2002; Ellen Knickmeyer, "Survivors of raid by U.S. forces say victims were among America's best friends," *Associated Press*, February 6, 2002; Molly Moore, "Villagers Released by American Troops Say They Were Beaten, Kept in 'Cage,'" *Washington Post*, February 11, 2002; Eric Slater, "U.S. Forces Beat Afghans After Deadly Assault, Ex-Prisoners Say," *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 2002.

<sup>99</sup> See Second Geneva Convention, art. 3 ("The wounded . . . shall be collected and cared for"); art. 12 (Wounded belligerents who fall into enemy hands "shall be treated humanely and cared for. . . . Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered").

<sup>100</sup> A CIA spokesman acknowledged to CNN that the agency sent its personnel to Uruzgon to provide payment. See "CIA pays victims of commando raid," February 6, 2002, available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/06/ret.detainees.released/>

On March 17, 2002, U.S. forces raided a compound in Sangesar, a village near Kandahar, and arrested more than thirty anti-Taliban fighters, apparently by mistake.<sup>101</sup> The detainees were taken to the Kandahar airport.<sup>102</sup> According to the detainees, hoods were placed over their heads and they were “thrown down,” face first, onto rocky ground. Many said they were kicked in the back by U.S. forces. One witness, with a bruised arm, said he was held by the feet and head and kicked repeatedly in the back. Another man, who still had a black eye when he was interviewed three days after being released, said, “They picked me up and threw me down on the rocks. It was painful. I couldn’t rest on my chest. When I moved they kicked me.”<sup>103</sup> The detainees also said they were punished for talking to each other, by being made to kneel with their hands behind their heads for extended periods, and were kicked when they moved.

A photojournalist who accompanied Special Forces and soldiers from the U.S. 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne during operations in eastern Afghanistan in July 2002 told Human Rights Watch that Special Forces referred to the Kandahar airbase as “Camp Slappy,” and that U.S. forces would threaten uncooperative persons encountered during raids, suggesting that they might be sent there: “We tell them they can either cooperate or go to Camp Slappy,” a Special Forces soldier told the journalist.”

Recent complaints received by the Gardez office of the AIHRC about U.S. forces in the Gardez area include the following, from Zurmat district in Paktia province, alleging that

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<sup>101</sup> Information about this case is based on a telephone interview with a journalist who interviewed the detained men, February 4, 2004, and the news story that journalist filed. See Charles J. Hanley, “Finally freed, Afghans say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” Associated Press, March 23, 2002.

<sup>102</sup> This case was discussed in a Department of Defense briefing on March 20, 2002 in Washington D.C. At that briefing, a military spokesman, Brig. Gen. John W. Rosa Jr., said “We went to the compound—no shots were fired—found out who these folks were, temporarily detained them. We never processed them and they never became detainees. But no shots were fired, and those folks were released.” This statement was false. Several journalists were told by officials in Afghanistan that the men were still in custody, and were not released until March 21. See Hanley, “Finally freed, Afghans say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” March 23, 2002.

<sup>103</sup> See Hanley, “Finally freed, Afghans say they were kicked and abused in U.S. hands,” March 23, 2002.

<sup>104</sup> Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tomas van Houtryve, February 3, 2004. See also Tomas van Houtryve, “Prisoners of America,” *International Relations Journal*, San Francisco State University, Spring 2003.

five residents there were arrested and tortured by U.S. forces (this case is currently being investigated by the AIHRC):

November 29, 2003, Ezzat Kheil village: “The compound was bombarded by coalition forces from Bagram at 2 a.m., damaging the compound and terrifying and frightening women and children in the middle of the night. . . . Five residents of the village were arrested and released after *six* days; they had been subjected to torture and *two* of them were injured.”

Human Rights Watch has learned that U.S. forces routinely hold Afghans at the local airport in the eastern city of Jalalabad. However, former detainees there refused to speak in detail with Human Rights Watch about their experiences in U.S. detention. One told Human Rights Watch:

We were treated absolutely terribly there. They did terrible things to us, things we'll never forget. It was absolutely awful what they did. . . . We absolutely cannot talk about it. We don't want to talk about it with you. We have made our agreements not to talk, and we won't talk about it.<sup>105</sup>

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The treatment of detainees at Bagram seems to have become more standardized and professional since 2002, though the absence of access to detainees makes it difficult to determine whether conditions have significantly improved. Human Rights Watch interviewed several persons detained at the military facility at Bagram in 2003. According to these accounts, persons arrested are usually blindfolded, hooded, and shackled during the **trip** to Bagram, which is normally by helicopter.<sup>106</sup> Once at Bagram, detainees are taken to a room, separated from other persons who were detained with them, and then stripped and photographed. Samples of hair and skin flakes are taken, presumably to collect for a DNA database. Detainees are then instructed, through interpreters, about the rules of Bagram, which include restrictions on talking with other detainees. They are then shackled and taken to cells, where they are held during the

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<sup>105</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with *two* Afghan men (names withheld), Jalalabad, May 8, 2003.

<sup>106</sup> International law permits security forces to use measures during transportation of arrested persons, such as blindfolds and shackling, that would **not** normally be permitted once a detainee is at a detention facility. However, these measures can amount to cruel, inhumane **or** degrading treatment—especially if they are used intentionally to cause **pain or** suffering.

periods they are not being interrogated. They are given bottles of water and fed in the cells. Except during interrogations, the detainees are shackled, even while sleeping.

Human Rights Watch has not been able to locate or interview anyone who has been held at the Bagram CIA facility. Human Rights Watch researchers spoke with one detainee held in Kabul city who was interrogated by U.S. officials who were likely CIA personnel (as mentioned in the Arbitrary Detention section above).

*Detainees held by Afghan forces*

Human Rights Watch is extremely concerned about the treatment of the hundreds of Afghans alleged to be from Taliban, Hezb-e Islami, or other anti-Coalition forces held under the auspices of the Afghan military and intelligence authorities. In past reports Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of torture, beatings, and other mistreatment of persons in the custody of local Afghan military officials.<sup>107</sup> Recently, for instance, there have been credible reports from human rights monitors in Kandahar that “Taliban prisoners” are repeatedly and severely beaten by the Afghan soldiers holding them. A monitor who met with some prisoners there said: “We have come across this repeatedly. It is an ordinary thing. We know about this. We visit the prisons.”<sup>108</sup>

In the northern city of Shiberghan, approximately one thousand detainees—alleged Taliban combatants and foreign fighters captured with them—are being held at a facility under the control of Afghan General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a member of the Karzai government and the commander of a predominately Uzbek militia, Junbish-e Milli. According to human rights monitors in Kabul, CIA and U.S. military interrogators have access to these detainees and others held by Afghan forces across the country.<sup>109</sup> According to officials in the Pakistan government, the United States has resisted efforts by the Afghan and Pakistani governments to screen the detainees for release.

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<sup>107</sup> Human Rights Watch, “All Our Hopes are Crushed: Violence and Repression in Western Afghanistan,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 14, no. 7(C), October 2002, available at [http://hrw.org/reports/2002/afghan3/herat1002-06.htm#P997\\_155129](http://hrw.org/reports/2002/afghan3/herat1002-06.htm#P997_155129), section IV entitled “Torture and Arbitrary Arrests”; Human Rights Watch, “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing For Us: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan,” *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 15, no. 5(c), July 2003, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/afghanistan0703/>.

<sup>108</sup> Human Rights Watch telephone interview with human rights monitor in Kandahar, October 15, 2003.

<sup>109</sup> Human Rights Watch interview with a human rights monitor, Kabul, December 17, 2003.

Officials with **UNAMA** and the Afghan Human Rights Commission have visited Afghan military detention facilities in several provinces and expressed concerns to Human Rights Watch about the treatment of prisoners, including their belief that prisoners have, in some cases, been subjected to torture.<sup>110</sup> U.S. military and **CIA** in Afghanistan are aware of these facilities' existence: U.S. forces regularly **work** with local forces during military operations that result in the arrests of persons who are put in Afghan military custody.

#### *Death in U.S. custody*

Two Afghans died while in detention at Bagram airbase in December 2002.<sup>111</sup> Both deaths were ruled homicides by U.S. military doctors who performed autopsies.

One of the prisoners, **Dilawar**, aged 22 and from near **Khost city** in southeastern Afghanistan, died on December 10, 2002 from "blunt force injuries to lower extremities complicating coronary artery disease," according to his death certificate prepared by a military pathologist, which was obtained by the *New York Times*.<sup>112</sup> The other detainee, **Mullah Habibullah**, aged approximately 30 years and from the southern province of **Oruzgan**, died earlier, on December 3, 2002. A military spokesman at Bagram confirmed to reporters from the *New York Times* that **Mullah Habibullah's** death was ruled a homicide by a **military** pathologist, the cause being "pulmonary embolism [blood clot in the lungs] due to blunt force injury to the legs."<sup>113</sup> Both *military* pathologists, when contacted by Human Rights Watch in November and December 2003, turned down requests to be interviewed.

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<sup>110</sup> These concerns have been cited in correspondence and telephone conversations between Human Rights Watch and staff from the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. For a more detailed description of military detention sites and ordinary criminal **jails** and prisons in Afghanistan see Human Rights Watch, "Killing **You** Is a Very Easy Thing For Us," n. 9 and accompanying text.

<sup>111</sup> See **Carlotta Gall**, "U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody," *New York Times*, March 4, 2003. Information about these cases is also based on extensive conversations with journalists who have researched the cases and requested information from U.S. military spokespeople in Kabul during 2003.

<sup>112</sup> The death certificate was signed by a military pathologist named Dr. Elizabeth A. Rouse. **Dilawar's** family have insisted to reporters from the BBC and the *New York Times* that **Dilawar** was a civilian—a taxi driver and farmer. See **Gall**, "U.S. Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody," March 4, 2003; and "Inside Guantanamo," BBC-One program, October 5, 2003.

<sup>113</sup> The spokesman told reporters that the military pathologist who performed the autopsy was named Dr. Kathleen Ingwersen.

Military officials at Bagram said in March 2003 that the military had launched an investigation into the deaths. But as of this Writing in February 2004, they have not announced any results.

In June 2003, another Afghan died at a detention site near Asadabad, in Kunar province.<sup>114</sup> U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and in the United States have refused to provide any details about this death.

Human Rights Watch has written repeatedly in 2003 and 2004 to officials in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (which CENTCOM officials have said is responsible for the Bagram investigation) asking for information about all three of the detainee deaths. Officials from both offices have replied and stated that the investigation into the Bagram deaths is ongoing and that no information is available. As for the Asadabad death, both offices have refused to release any information at all—not even a statement that an investigation is ongoing.

*Legal standard applicable to physical treatment of detainees*

The prohibition against the ill treatment and torture of detainees is fundamental to both international humanitarian and human rights law. Common article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits torture, cruel treatment, and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” The “Fundamental Guarantees” under Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, generally accepted as customary international law in non-international as well as international armed conflicts, likewise prohibit “at any time and in any place whatsoever . . . torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental.”<sup>115</sup> Human rights law similarly prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.<sup>116</sup> The prohibition against torture and other mistreatment is in effect at all times, and cannot be derogated from during a state of emergency.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> April Witt, “U.S. Probes Death of Prisoner in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 24, 2003.

<sup>115</sup> Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”), art. 75.

<sup>116</sup> See generally the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention against Torture”), G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (entered into force June 26, 1987; ratified by Afghanistan April 1, 1987 and by the United States on October 21, 1994). See also ICCPR, art. 7.

<sup>117</sup> ICCPR, art. 4(2).

While international law permits the discipline and punishment of prisoners who break reasonable rules, such punishment must be determined by law or imposed by a competent administrative authority, and may not amount to torture or other mistreatment.<sup>118</sup>

There is no clear line separating some types of permissible interrogation techniques from unlawful mistreatment.<sup>119</sup> Each case must be assessed on its own merits. To conform to the letter and spirit of international law, detaining forces should err on the side of caution and constantly evaluate their methods. A practice that is acceptable in one context can be abusive in other circumstances; for instance, allowable day-long questioning of a detainee, when continued overnight and into the following day, can become impermissible sleep deprivation.

Prolonged shackling of detainees violates international law prohibitions against mistreatment, and can amount to torture. The Special Rapporteur on Torture has repeatedly and in various contexts identified shackling for lengthy periods as an example of a torture practice.<sup>120</sup> The U.N. Secretary General has also referred to shackling as an example of a prohibited method of torture.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> ICCPR, art. 10 (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted August 30, 1955, by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), paragraphs 28-32

<sup>119</sup> See Nigel Rodley, *The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law* (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999), p. 105 (“[T]he borderline between ‘other ill-treatment’ and treatment falling outside the prohibition altogether cannot be precisely drawn.”).

<sup>120</sup> Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, “Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/38, submitted 24 December 1997 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38, (Yemen, para. 200) (“The methods of torture reported included...shackling for lengthy periods...”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, “Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.1, submitted 16 January 1996 pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37, (China, para. 104) (“The methods of... torture reportedly include handcuffing or shackling for long periods...”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, “Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34, submitted 12 January 1995 pursuant to Commission on

Prolonged sleep deprivation and exposure to cold may also violate international law prohibitions against mistreatment, and can amount to torture. The U.S. State Department, in its “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” has repeatedly listed prolonged sleep deprivation and exposure to cold as examples of practices amounting to mistreatment and torture. (See Appendix.)

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Human Rights Resolution 1992/32, (China, para. 91) (“Among the most common methods of torture reported were . . . shackling with handcuffs or leg-irons, often tightly and with the victim’s body in a painful position.”).

<sup>121</sup> See, e.g., United Nations Secretary-General, “Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, Situation of human rights in Myanmar; Note by the Secretary-General,” (1994), A/49/594, para. 13 (“Numerous allegations . . . have been received from various sources alleging that forces of the Myanmar military, intelligence and security services and police continue to torture persons in detention or otherwise subject them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments and punishments. . . . Allegations include subjection to . . . shackling. . .”).

#### IV. International Legal Context

International humanitarian law binds **all** of the parties to the **military** conflict in Afghanistan, including non-state armed groups, Afghan government forces, and the United States and coalition forces. Fundamentally, it imposes upon these warring parties legal obligations to reduce unnecessary suffering and protect civilians and other non-combatants. However, the specific legal context of conflict in Afghanistan and the specific applicable rules of international humanitarian law have changed over time.

The war between the United States and Afghanistan started at least by October 6, 2001, when **U.S. air** attacks on Afghanistan began. This war was an *international* armed conflict—a conflict between opposing states. The law applicable to international conflicts includes the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Afghanistan and the United States are party,<sup>122</sup> and the Hague Regulations of 1907, which are **commonly** accepted as customary international law.<sup>123</sup>

On December 22, 2001, power was transferred to an Interim Authority as the sovereign power of Afghanistan, chaired by Hamid **Karzai** and established by the December 5, 2001 Bonn Agreement, endorsed by U.N. Resolution 1383 (2001).<sup>124</sup> **Six months** later, Hamid **Kamari** was elected by an Afghan loya jirga to the presidency **of** the transitional administration of Afghanistan; he was inaugurated on June 19, 2002.

As of June 19, 2002, and possibly as early as December 22, 2001, the international armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan concluded. Since the end of the international conflict, hostilities have been part of a *non-international* (also referred to as an

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<sup>122</sup> Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick **in** Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (**Third** Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.

<sup>123</sup> Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War **on** Land of 1907 (Hague Regulations), 3 *Martens Nouveau Recueil* (ser. 3) 461, 187 *Consol. T.S.* 227, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910.

<sup>124</sup> According to the Bonn Agreement, art. 1: "An Interim Authority shall be established upon the official transfer of power on 22 December 2001. . . ." Art. 3: "Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect." See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, Germany, signed December 5, 2001.

*internal*) armed conflict. U.S. forces in Afghanistan are now operating in the country with the acquiescence of the Karzai government, and hostilities fall under provisions of the Geneva Conventions applicable to non-international armed conflict. The primary law applicable to non-international armed conflicts is article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, applicable to non-international conflicts, has not been ratified by Afghanistan or the United States, but most if not *all* of its provisions are recognized as customary international law and are therefore also applicable.<sup>125</sup> In addition, certain provisions of Protocol I, including many of those concerned with the protection of the civilian population, are also recognized as reflective of customary international law and are also applicable.<sup>126</sup>

During a non-international armed conflict, international humanitarian law as the *lex specialis* (specialized law) takes precedence, but does not replace, human rights law. Persons under the control of a party to an internal armed conflict must be treated in accordance with international humanitarian law. But where that law is absent, vague, or inapplicable, human rights law standards still apply. Human rights law includes, among other things, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<sup>127</sup> and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,<sup>128</sup> both of which have been ratified by the United States and Afghanistan.

Human rights standards applicable to military and police forces who are carrying out law enforcement or investigative operations—including arrests and searches—include the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.<sup>129</sup> These standards apply to military forces when they are operating in a law enforcement context.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Protocol II (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol II”).

<sup>126</sup> Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“Protocol I”).

<sup>127</sup> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), opened for signature December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976, and acceded to by Afghanistan January 24, 1983 and ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992).

<sup>128</sup> Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (entered into force June 26, 1987; ratified by Afghanistan April 1, 1987 and by the United States on October 21, 1994).

<sup>129</sup> U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. res. 34/169, annex, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1979.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.* In accordance with the commentary to article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, in countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether

## V. Conclusions

This report raises serious concerns regarding the actions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, specifically with regard to the use of excessive force during arrests; arbitrary or mistaken arrests and indefinite detention; and mistreatment in detention:

- U.S. forces regularly use military means and methods during arrest operations in residential areas where law enforcement techniques would be more appropriate. This has resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties and may in some cases have involved indiscriminate or disproportionate force in violation of international humanitarian law.
- Members of the U.S. armed forces have arrested numerous civilians not directly participating in the hostilities and numerous persons whom U.S. authorities have no legal basis for taking into custody. These cases raise serious questions about the intelligence gathering and processing that leads to arrests and call into question the practice of arresting any and sometimes all Afghan men found in the vicinity of U.S. military operations.
- Persons detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan are held without regard to the requirements of international humanitarian law or human rights law. They are not provided reasons for their arrest or detention. They are held virtually incommunicado without any legal basis for challenging their detention or seeking their release. They are held at the apparent whim of U.S. authorities, in some cases for more than a year.
- The general lack of due process within the U.S. detention system violates both international humanitarian law and basic standards of human rights law. The United States, as a detaining power in Afghanistan, is essentially applying no legal principles to the persons whom they detain in Afghanistan. Simply put, the United States is acting outside the rule of law. There are no judicial processes restraining their actions in arresting persons in Afghanistan. The only real legal limits on their activities are self-imposed, and there is little evidence that the Department of Defense has seriously investigated allegations of abuses or mistreatment at Bagram, and the department has most certainly not sought on its own to correct the legal deficiencies of its detention regime.

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uniformed or not, or by state security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services.

- There are serious concerns regarding the treatment of detainees at Bagram airbase, particularly in light of the failure of the United States to investigate and publicly report on several unexplained deaths in detention. There is credible evidence of beatings and other physical assaults of detainees, as well as evidence that the United States has used prolonged shackling, exposure to cold, and sleep deprivation amounting to torture or other mistreatment in violation of international law. Neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor the CIA has adequately responded to allegations of mistreatment at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan.

## VI. Recommendations

### To the United States Government:

#### *Detention*

- Publicly identify all places in Afghanistan where the United States, including the CIA, is holding persons in detention. The CIA should transfer **all** detainees under its control to U.S. military or Afghan detention facilities or release them. In the event that the International Committee of the Red Cross does not have access to **all** detainees under U.S. control, permit **full** access immediately.
- Ensure that **all** detainees are treated in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts. As the sovereign authority, the Afghan government is ultimately responsible for protecting the legal rights of those detained by the United States. The United States must take **immediate** measures in conjunction with the Afghan **Ministry** of the Interior to ensure that detainees at Bagram airbase and other U.S. detention sites are charged and prosecuted, or released, in accordance with international due process standards. **This** includes access to counsel, and the right to a fair and public trial before a competent, impartial, and independent court.
- Permit families of detainees, and those providing legal assistance, to visit detainees.
- Abide fully with U.S. obligations as a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Prohibit **all** interrogation techniques that cause physical or mental suffering. Cease practices, such as shackling and sleep deprivation, if they rise to the level of mistreatment. End incommunicado detention practices that facilitate mistreatment.
- Fully and impartially investigate allegations of mistreatment of detainees in detention at all U.S. facilities in Afghanistan and make public the results of those investigations.
- In particular, release the results of investigations into detainee deaths at Bagram and Asadabad military bases. Take disciplinary or criminal action as appropriate against all personnel responsible for mistreating or otherwise violating the rights of detainees.

*Military Operations and Law Enforcement*

- In all circumstances comply with international humanitarian law standards to protect civilians against the dangers arising from military operations. These include prohibitions on attacks against civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate attacks, and attacks that cause harm to civilians or civilian objects that are excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.
- Take all precautionary measures during military operations, including: taking all feasible steps to verify that objectives to be attacked are not civilian but military; taking all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects; and canceling or postponing an attack where it becomes apparent the objective or target is not a military one or where civilian loss would be disproportionate. The United States must give particular attention to these standards during operations carried out in residential areas that have not been the scene of military action.
- Revise as necessary standing Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan to ensure that in law enforcement situations, the U.S. armed forces and CIA forces abide by international standards on the use of force by law enforcement officials. For instance, indiscriminate suppressing fire should not be used in law-enforcement type operations.
- In law enforcement situations, military forces should abide by the standards set forth in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. U.S. forces deployed in such situations must be provided with the equipment and training necessary for this purpose. It is also necessary to have sufficient and appropriate interpreters to communicate with the local population. Applicable standards provide in part:
  - In law enforcement operations, non-violent means shall be applied, as far as possible, before resorting to the use of force and firearms. Force and firearms may only be used if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.
  - Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, restraint must be exercised in their use and in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved. Force used

must minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life. Injured persons must receive medical aid and have their family notified at the earliest possible moment.

- Firearms shall not be used against persons except: in self-defense or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.
  - It must be ensured that firearms are used **only** in appropriate circumstances and in a manner likely to decrease the risk of unnecessary harm. Prohibited are the use of those firearms and ammunition that cause unwarranted injury or present an unwarranted risk.
- US. forces should, in all instances, take all appropriate steps to prevent or stop Afghan forces deployed with or under the command of U.S. forces from committing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Those who do should be turned over to the proper Afghan authorities for disciplinary action or criminal prosecution.

**TO President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan Government:**

- Ensure, through the Ministry of the Interior, that the Afghan justice system applies to all persons detained in the country, including those held by U.S. forces at Bagram airbase and other detention facilities. Work with the United States to ensure that the fundamental rights of all detainees are respected.
- Thoroughly and impartially investigate all allegations of criminal offenses and violations of the laws of war by Afghan military forces and militias, and take appropriate disciplinary and criminal action against those responsible.
- Pressure the United States government to ensure that all forces operating in Afghanistan uphold international humanitarian law and human rights law.

## Appendix: U.S. Criticisms of Mistreatment and Torture Practices

The U.S. State Department has condemned as torture or other inhuman treatment many of the treatments and techniques described in this report and used by U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. Listed below are reports from 2000, 2001, and 2002 in the U.S. State Department's annual "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices."

Country	Methods Used:
<b>Burma</b>	According to a State Department country report, the Burmese military "routinely subjected detainees to harsh interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient." <sup>131</sup> Techniques listed include being forced to squat or remain in uncomfortable periods for long periods of time, sleep and food deprivation, confinement in leg clamps, and prolonged questioning under bright lights. <sup>132</sup>
<b>Cambodia</b>	The State Department reported that "torture, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continued to be a serious problem throughout the country." <sup>133</sup> In particular, the State Department noted that "there were credible reports that both military police and police officials used physical and psychological torture and severely beat criminal detainees, particularly during interrogation." <sup>134</sup> It also noted reports of shackling of prisoners.
<b>Cameroon</b>	The State Department reported that "security forces continued to subject prisoners and detainees to degrading treatment," which included stripping of inmates. <sup>135</sup>
<b>China</b>	The State Department reported that "police and other elements of the security apparatus employed torture and degrading treatment in dealing with some detainees and prisoners" including prolonged periods of solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, beatings, and shackling. <sup>136</sup> Reports noted that the practice of shackling hands and feet constituted torture. <sup>137</sup>

<sup>131</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Burma), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Cambodia), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> U.S. State Department, *2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Cameroon), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>136</sup> U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (China (including Tibet, Macau and Hong Kong), Sect. 1(c).

Country	Methods Used:
Egypt	The State Department noted that “there were numerous, credible reports that security forces tortured and mistreated citizens.” <sup>138</sup> The country reports cite the stripping, handcuffing, being doused with cold water, and blindfolding of prisoners among the principal methods of torture used by Egyptian authorities. <sup>139</sup>
Greece	In a 2002 report, the State Department described kicks, blows the hands, fists, batons or other objects and excessive force at the time of arrest as “ill treatment.” <sup>140</sup>
Iran	According to the State Department “there were numerous credible reports that security forces and prison personnel continued to torture detainees and prisoners.” <sup>141</sup> Common methods of torture include sleep deprivation and “suspension for long periods in contorted positions.” <sup>142</sup> The State Department further noted that systematic abuses included “prolonged and incommunicado detention.” <sup>143</sup>
Iraq	Iraqi security services used extended solitary confinement in small dark compartments as a form of torture, according to 2001 and 2002 reports.” Reports from 2000,2001, and 2002 also cite the use of prolonged and incommunicado detention and the continual denial of citizens’ “basic right to due process.” <sup>145</sup>

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Egypt), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>139</sup> U.S. State Department, *2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Egypt), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Egypt), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Egypt), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>140</sup> U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Greece), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>141</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>142</sup> U.S. State Department, *2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>143</sup> U.S. State Department, *2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(d). The practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(d); *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iran), Sect. 1(d).

<sup>144</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iraq), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iraq), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>145</sup> U.S. State Department, *2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iraq), Sect. 1(d). The practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iraq), Sect. 1(d); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Iraq), Sect. 1(d).

Country	Methods Used:
Jordan	The State Department reports that Jordanian police and security forces were alleged to engage in acts of torture, including the use of sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and prolonged suspension with ropes in contorted positions. <sup>146</sup>
North Korea	The State Department stated that methods of torture “routinely” employed in North Korea include “severe beatings . . . prolonged periods of exposure, humiliations such as public nakedness, and confinement to small ‘punishment cells’, in which prisoners were unable to stand upright or lie down, where they could be held for several weeks.” <sup>147</sup> The State Department characterized the use of leg irons, metal collars, and shackles as “harsh”. <sup>148</sup>
Kuwait	According to the State Department reports, “there continued to be credible reports that some police and members of the security forces abused detainees during interrogation.” <sup>149</sup> Abusive treatment included blindfolding and verbal threats. <sup>150</sup>
	The State Department reported that prisoners were subjected to “torture and other abuses” including “beatings, long-term solitary confinement in completely darkened rooms . . . . In some cases detainees were held in leg chains or wooden stocks”. <sup>151</sup>
Libya	According to the State Department, Libyan authorities commonly chain detainees to a wall or hang them by their wrists for hours and deprive them of food and water. <sup>152</sup> The State Department stated that “[t]he Government’s human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses,” examples of which included holding prisoners incommunicado. <sup>153</sup>

<sup>146</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Jordan)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Jordan)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>147</sup> U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2001 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait)*, Sect. 1(c);

<sup>150</sup> U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2001 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Kuwait)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>151</sup> U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Laos)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>152</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2001 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>153</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(d). The practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2001 and 2002. U.S. State Department, 2001

<b>country</b>	<b>Methods Used</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>	The State Department reports that prolonged isolation, being chained to a cell wall, and denial of food or sleep are common torture methods. <sup>154</sup>
<b>Philippines</b>	The State Department reported that “members of the security forces and police continued to use torture and to abuse suspects and detainees.” The State Department cited reports by a non-governmental organization stating that “torture remained an ingrained part of the arrest and detention process.” The State Department noted that common forms of torture and abuse reported during the arrest and detention process included striking detainees and threatening them with guns. The State Department also cited reports of detainees being tied up, blindfolded and punched during interrogations as cases of torture. <sup>155</sup>
<b>Russia</b>	The State Department described forms of “torture” by police officers including beating with fists, batons or other objects. <sup>156</sup>
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	The State Department noted that Ministry of Interior officials use sleep deprivation and suspension from bars with handcuffs as interrogation tactics. <sup>157</sup>
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	According to State Department reports, “torture continues with relative impunity.” <sup>158</sup> Reported methods of torture include suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted positions and being forced to remain in unnatural positions for extended periods. <sup>159</sup>

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*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(d); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Libya)*, Sect. 1(d).

<sup>154</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2007 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan)* Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Pakistan)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>155</sup> U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Philippines)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>156</sup> U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Russia)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>157</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2001 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Saudi Arabia)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>158</sup> U.S. State Department, 2000 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2001 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka)*, Sect. 1(c).

<sup>159</sup> U.S. State Department, 2007 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2007 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka)*, Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, 2002 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Sri Lanka)*, Sect. 1(c).

Country	Methods Used:
<b>Tunisia</b>	Tactics such as food and sleep deprivation or confinement to a tiny, unlit cell are commonly used in Tunisia. <sup>160</sup> In addition, the State Department notes that despite the shortening by Tunisian government of the maximum allowable period of pre-arraignment incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days, “credible sources claimed that the Government rarely enforces the new provisions and that appeals to the court for enforcement are routinely <b>denied</b> .” <sup>161</sup>
<b>Turkey</b>	According to the 2001 and 2002 country reports, some of the many methods of torture employed by Turkish security forces and recognized by the State Department included repeated beatings; forced prolonged standing, isolation; exposure to loud music; stripping and blindfolding; food and sleep deprivation; and psychological torture including verbal threats and deception of a detainee, for example, instilling a false belief that the detainee is to be <b>killed</b> . <sup>162</sup>
<b>Yemen</b>	According to the State Department, detainees in Yemen have been confined in leg irons and shackles despite a <b>1998</b> law banning the practice. <sup>163</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>161</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c), (d). The practice of incommunicado detentions was continued in 2002. U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Tunisia), Sect. 1(c), (d).

<sup>162</sup> U.S. State Department, *2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Turkey), Sect. 1(c); U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Turkey), Sect. 1(c).

<sup>163</sup> U.S. State Department, *2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (Yemen), Sect. 1(c).

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*Asia Division*

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.

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We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.

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We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for **all**.

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March 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Brit GTMO Detainee Allegations

383.6

My understanding on this detainee beating allegation is that it is flat untrue, that we have had many people check it, that they are lying and that they are trained to lie and say these things.

It seems to me we ought to knock it down hard and expose them for following their training.

Thanks.

Attach,  
3/13/04 AFP (FBIS OW43484535)

DHR:dh  
031504-21

.....  
Please respond by 3/9/04

✓  
3/15  
3/16

*So def-*

*We have knocked down quite hard. Surprisingly, the allegations have not gotten a lot of play over here, because the allegation(s) are so fantastic and not believable. D. Rita*

383.6

OSD 10788-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25533

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT-ID: OW43484534  
DOCST: ACTIVE  
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH  
VENDOR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
PUBNAME: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
ORIGDATE: 200403132340  
PUBLISHR: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE  
PUBNO: e0562  
DOR: 20040313  
TOR: 184115  
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED  
TITLE: More Guantanamo Bay Britons allege beatings and abuse  
ATTENTION - ADDS quotes, details, background ///

TOPLINES:

LONDON, March 13 (AFP) - Three British friends released this week from the United States' Guantanamo Bay centre for terrorism suspects have said they were regularly beaten while in US custody, TEXT:

More Guantanamo Bay Britons allege beatings and abuse  
ATTENTION - ADDS quotes, details, background ///

LONDON, March 13 (AFP) - Three British friends released this week from the United States' Guantanamo Bay centre for terrorism suspects have said they were regularly beaten while in US custody, backing similar allegations by two other British detainees.

Asif Iqbal, Ruhai Ahmed and Shafiq Rasul, all from the town of Tipton in central England, said they were regularly mistreated from the moment they were handed over to US forces in Afghanistan in late 2001.

After being taken to a US detention centre in the Afghan city of Kandahar, they were forced to kneel bent forwards for hours with their foreheads touching the ground, Rasul told The Observer, a British Sunday newspaper.

"I lifted my head up slightly because I was really in pain. The sergeant came up behind me, kicked my legs from underneath me, then knelt on my back," he said.

"They took me outside and searched me while one man was sitting on me, kicking and punching."

The three childhood friends, aged between 22 and 26, said they had gone to Pakistan for Iqbal's planned wedding, arranged by his family, before going into Afghanistan to help arrange humanitarian aid.

There they were captured by the US-backed Northern Alliance, and almost died after hundreds of prisoners were forced into lorry containers, the majority of whom suffocated.

The trio's allegations of US mistreatment follow similar claims made earlier this week by two other British returnees.

Tarek Dergoul, a 26-year-old former care worker from east London, said in a statement issued through his lawyer on Friday that he had endured "botched medical treatment, interrogation at gunpoint, beatings and inhuman conditions".

Earlier that day another released Briton, 37-year-old website designer Jamal al-Harith, said in a newspaper interview that he had experienced beatings and degrading treatment during his two years at the jail.

11-L-0559/OSD/25534

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1

UNCLASSIFIED

US Secretary of State Colin Powell told a British television programme which also interviewed Harith that the charges were "unlikely".

The five British men flew home on Tuesday from Camp Delta, the high-security camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where the United States is holding about 650 suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

Despite their lengthy detention and although four of the men were briefly held by British police when they returned, none has been charged with any crimes.

The three friends recounted being repeatedly interrogated by both US and British intelligence officials who falsely claimed to have incontrovertible evidence linking them to the Al-Qaeda terrorist group.

The trio said that last year they were moved to an isolation block at the Cuban camp after interrogators said they had been seen on a video tape made in August 2000 standing behind Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Rasul told the newspaper that he had pointed out that at the time he was allegedly with bin Laden, he had been enrolled at a British university and working at a local electrical goods shop -- both facts that could be easily checked.

On being told he could have falsified these, Rasul made a false confession along with his friends.

"I got to the point where I just couldn't take it any more. Do what you have to do, I told them.

"I'd been sitting there for three months in isolation so I said yes, it's me. Go ahead and put me on trial," Rasul said.

Although Britain has been the United States' closest ally in its "war on terrorism", there has been considerable disquiet in the country over the treatment of the Britons detained at Guantanamo Bay.

Washington says that those held at the base are "illegal combatants", and thus not subject to rules governing either civilian or military prisoners.

pw/gk

Britain-US-attacks-Guantanamo  
AFP 132340 GMT 03 04

March 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: TV Programs on Anniversary

*Advanced copy sent 3/15 103*

Please have someone pull up what are going to be the best programs on the one-year anniversary of Iraq.

Let's make sure we get them put on my calendar and taped. If I can, I will watch them; if not, I can watch them later on tape.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-15

.....  
Please respond by 3/16/04

*DB  
3/16*

*031504-15*

*031504-15*

March 15, 2004

TO: MIRA RICARDEL  
~~Peter Rodman~~  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Condolence Letter to Spain

*Advance  
copy sent  
3/15 1015*

*15  
15  
15*

Please draft a note to Aznar about the terrorist act in Spain, and get it to me to sign by tomorrow.

Joyce had dinner with him at the White House recently. You might include her and say that we are both thinking of him, the people of his country and the loved ones of those who were killed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031504-7

.....  
Please respond by 3/16/04

*15*

*15*

OSD 10790-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25537

March 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Oil-for-Food

*IRAQ*

Here is the material from Newt Gingrich on the Oil-for-Food program. Let's push ahead.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/10/04 Gingrich memo to SecState

DHR:dh  
031504-4

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

*15 MAR 04*

OSD 10791-04 *g*

(b)(6)



✓  
3/15

3 (D)

**Fax**

<b>To:</b> Secretary Colin Powell	<b>From:</b> Newt Gingrich
<b>Fax:</b> (b)(6)	<b>Pages:</b> TEN (including this one)
<b>Phone:</b>	<b>Date:</b> 3/10/2004

from newt  
3/10/04

Claude Hanks-Drielsma (the man who uncovered the Nobel scandal in Sweden and negotiated the South African debt crisis) is convinced the UN oil for food program was the largest financial scandal in history.

he is also convinced it reaches into France, the UN, Jordan, and a host of other countries.

finally he is convinced it will inevitably show up as corruption in our efforts to modernize Iraq because the depth and habit of corruption are so deep.

it is vital that we get ahead of this corruption scandal by appointing a special investigative task force both to help uncover past corruption and to root out current corruption.

Given the scale of corruption KPMG is uncovering it is almost certain a lot of very clever experts in bribery and false accounting are doing business with CPA.

former Deputy Attorney General Ed Schmults (sp?) is in Iraq now as Advisor to the Justice Ministry. He could be reassigned immediately to head an anti-corruption task force with a counterpart from Iraq.

Either we will be the people rooting out corruption or we will be the people presiding over corruption.

This could explode this summer and fall and be very much to our disadvantage unless we get ahead of the curve and very loudly meet it head on.

I am forwarding a few of the number of already published articles which make clear how big this is. Hanks-Drielsma is back in town next week and I am certain this will get bigger. Someone fairly senior should be assigned to work with him. Please have him or her contact Bill Sanders at the American Enterprise Institute (WSanders@aei.org, ph. (b)(6)) for Hanks-Drielsma's contact and scheduling information.

your friend, newt

Copyright 2004 The Financial Times Limited  
Financial Times (London, England)  
February 21, 2004 Saturday

## Two firms named to probe Iraq graft claim

By THOMAS CATAN

Iraq's Governing Council has appointed KPMG accountants and Freshfields, the international law firm, to investigate allegations of corruption under the United Nations' oil-for-food programme - set up to alleviate the impact on ordinary Iraqis of sanctions against Saddam Hussein.

The IGC opened the investigation last month after compiling a list of some 270 people from 45 countries who allegedly received crude oil contracts from Mr Hussein's regime under the UN programme.

The Iraqi oil minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, said last week that his ministry would sue anyone found to have taken bribes from Mr Hussein's regime.

The UN has strongly denied accusations of corruption within its operations and said it was requesting documentary evidence.

Claude Hanks-Drielsma, a British adviser to the IGC, said yesterday: "The concerns and questions put to the UN are serious and warrant an independent investigation by the UN ... I think what will shock everybody is the extent of it (the corruption) . . .

"The amounts involved and the blatancy of it is beyond anything that certainly I've seen," he added.

Some former weapons inspectors in Iraq have made similar allegations.

David Kay, former head of the US Iraq Survey Group, told the AP news agency last week that his team had found widespread corruption in the oil-for-food programme.

"There are going to be red faces among a lot of our allies and friends as to this," he said.

The US Treasury and the customs service are also investigating whether international sanctions against Iraq were violated.

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The Washington Times  
February 20, 2004

## **Saddam's fan club**

By Ariel Cohen  
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The latest revelations that the deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used oil sales under the U.N. oil-for-food program to buy friends and influence policy around the world should turn on an alarm in Washington, New York, Paris and other capitals. Saddam's influence buying is only a part of a broader phenomenon. Other oil-producing countries are engaged in similar activities on an even larger scale.

Several important lessons arise from discovery of Saddam's buddy list. First, this is just the beginning: There are thousands of documents in Baghdad that American and Iraqi intelligence officers need to catalog, translate, analyze and investigate. The precedent - the Eastern German intelligence service STASI archives, which exposed hundreds of spies in Europe and America.

Second, the U.N. may have done more damage than good in Iraq - and may do so again. The U.N. oil-for-food officials knew about the global bribery effort and did nothing to stop it. Moreover, it is possible the officials in that august body facilitated and benefited from at least some of the transactions.

A key question is whether a "Mr. Sevan" who allegedly received oil export vouchers in Panama is the same person as the U.N. Assistant Secretary General Benon V. Sevan, who ran the oil-for-food program. So far, U.N. Secretary General Koffi Annan has refused an internal investigation, and the U.N. bureaucracy has stonewalled and resisted an external investigation of the oil-for-food program.

This is not the first time the U.N. has bungled major policy undertakings: The U.N. aid effort in the West Bank and Gaza called United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA] only perpetuated the refugee problem and has been thoroughly penetrated by Hamas and other terrorist organizations.

Third, persistent rumors are worth checking. Stories about Saddam's global payola have been in circulation for years, with nobody investigating. Similar stories are in circulation about Saudi and Chinese influence-buying. It is high time the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe cooperated in investigating.

The documents uncovered in Baghdad by the Iraqi Oil Ministry and published in Al Mada, an independent Iraqi newspaper, are a jackpot of embarrassing information. Their veracity is confirmed by Naseer al-Chaderji, a senior member of the Iraqi Governing Counsel [IGC], and by Claude Hankes-Drielsma, the British chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and an adviser to the IGC.

The documents list dozens of organizations and individuals in more than 50 countries who were instrumental in orchestrating pro-Saddam policies, and point to a spider web of allies, from the pro-Saddam British back-bencher Member of Parliament George Gallaway to President Jaques Chirac's friend Patrick Maugein, an oil trader, and to highly influential former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, who has denied any connection to Iraq. While Bernarde Merimee - France's ambassador to the United Nations - who is on Saddam's buddy list, denied accusations, can banking details available in Baghdad exculpate the French diplomat?

The list includes Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the highly influential Russian Orthodox Church, Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization and Jordanian Islamic radical leader Layth Shbeilat. Some of those fingered have denied the accusations. Others, like Mr. Maugein, have announced they "did nothing wrong."

There are a few surprises on the list. The extent to which Russia benefited from doing business with Saddam is mind-boggling. While others received several millions of barrels, Russia got the lion's share of 1.3 billion barrels.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky's "Liberal Democratic Party" is listed as receiving a whopping 80 million barrels. A senior official in that extremist party complained to the author in a 2002 meeting at the Duma that Washington's military action against Saddam would "destroy the most lucrative business" they ever had.

President Putin's United Russia party was equally well-oiled. Russian politically influential oil companies received close to a billion barrels with market value of more than \$20 billion. "Our Foreign Ministry is for sale as far as the Russian oil companies are concerned. A department chief receives about \$200 a month - you do the math," a Moscow-based Russian Middle Eastern expert told me.

Many names and positions on the list require further investigation and clarification: Who is the anonymous "director" of the Russian Presidential Administration? The recently retired Alexander Voloshin, Mr. Putin's chief of staff, or a lower-level official, possibly still in place? Undeniably, Moscow's resistance to the war against Saddam was as implacable as it was shrill.

Did the millions of barrels earmarked for the "Ukrainian Social Democrat Party" benefit President Leonid Kuchma's Chief of Staff Alexander Medvedchuk, the leader of that party or go directly to the president who allegedly sold arms to Baghdad?

Just as Saddam's oily revenues corrupted presidential chancelleries and newsrooms, funds from other major Middle Eastern oil suppliers with ambitious religious and political agendas may wreak even more havoc.

At stake is the integrity of the foreign policy process, which is supposed to, but often does not, reflect national interests - not the size of bribes in ministers' bank accounts. However, an ugly reality is emerging, one that should be investigated by U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.

Consumer countries have to strive to turn oil suppliers into what they should be: commodity providers, not power peddlers corrupting global political systems, media and academia. National agendas should be set at the ballot box and in legislatures, not in desert tents. Global bribery may be as dangerous to the West as global terrorism. Saddam's buddy list is just the tip of the iceberg.

*Ariel Cohen is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. His expertise is in international energy security.*

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Financial Times (London, England)  
February 6, 2004

## Saddam oil bribe claims probed in US

By THOMAS CATAN, CAROLA HOYOS and MARK TURNER

US authorities are investigating claims that hundreds of people received oil contracts from Saddam Hussein when US sanctions were in force in return for supporting his regime.

The US Treasury's office of foreign assets control and immigrations and customs enforcement are examining whether any oil contracts violated international sanctions. Iraq's Governing Council (IGC) has also launched an investigation since a local newspaper listed 270 people from more than 40 countries alleged to have received oil contracts, including foreign politicians, officials, companies and activists.

Senior United Nations officials will shortly discuss a response to related charges of corruption in connection with the oil-for-food programme, which the UN administered for Iraq during Mr Hussein's rule.

The UN meeting will also study a series of allegations made by members of the Governing Council, a UN official said.

In a letter this week to the UN, obtained by the FT, IGC adviser **Claude Hanks-Drielsma** detailed "serious transgressions" in the oil-for-food programme. He said the original list of oil contracts "demonstrates beyond any doubt that Saddam Hussein bought political and other support under the aegis of the UN". Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, has said the programme was satisfactorily audited many times.

According to Mr Hanks-Drielsma, the UK chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants and a former chairman of the management committee at Price Waterhouse and Partners, at least 10 per cent was added to the value of all invoices under the UN-run programme.

He calculated that the scheme would have provided Mr Hussein's regime with more than Dollars 4bn (Pounds 2.2bn).

UN officials said they were aware that Mr Hussein's regime had found ways to circumvent the sanctions and raise cash through kickbacks.

"Everybody knew this was going on but it was not going on under our noses because it was not part of the procedures we were involved in," said a UN official. "Certainly a lot of people and companies got involved in illicit transactions but these were not part of the oil-for-food programme."

Mr Hankes-Drielsma said he was "absolutely certain" the document was legitimate. "I know how it was compiled and I'm totally satisfied that it's genuine." He said the list was compiled on IGC orders mainly from existing oil ministry records.

Mr Hankes-Drielsma has long known Mr Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and chairman of the IGC finance committee, which is investigating the allegations. Mr Chalabi began pursuing the charges against the UN at least eight months ago, according to a person who spoke to him last summer.

"There are many indications there's a huge amount of corruption as regards this programme," said a spokesman for Mr Chalabi.

*Additional reporting by Mark Turner and Carola Hoyos*

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Financial Times (London, England)  
February 5, 2004

## Monitoring panel for Iraq spending yet to start work

By THOMAS CATAN

An independent watchdog set up by the United Nations nine months ago to monitor spending of Iraqi revenues by occupying powers has yet to begin work, plagued by long disagreements over its scope.

In the meantime, the occupying powers continue to spend billions of dollars in Iraqi funds without the independent oversight ordered by the UN Security Council last year.

"There's been all of this time, all these revenues, without any independent verification - which is in breach of UN resolutions," said John Davison of UK charity Christian Aid.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is due to be dissolved in around five months' time, when it is scheduled to hand over power to an Iraqi government. It is unclear what will happen to both the fund and the international panel supposed to monitor it after that time.

The situation has fuelled suspicions that the CPA is deliberately dragging out the process to avoid independent scrutiny of its spending in its final months of existence - something it strongly denies.

"One is never quite sure what the actual hold-up is," said Claude Hankes-Drielsma, a British adviser to Iraq's Governing Council. "The lack of transparency and adequate consultation has at times contributed to that perception. It's quite disgraceful and unnecessary that it hasn't started work yet."

The UN Security Council set up the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) last May to oversee spending from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) - a newly created account containing Iraqi oil revenues, frozen assets and funds left over from the UN's oil-for-food programme.

Under the terms of the UN resolution, the watchdog is made up by representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. They spent much of last year engaged in disagreements over the watchdog's remit.

"One of the issues that held it up is that the US didn't want it to have any real teeth," said an official from one of the watchdog's member organisations. "(The members) said wait a second, we are not in the business of rubber-stamping things here."

After months of wrangling, the IAMB was finally set up in October, and has held two procedural meetings since then. But it is still waiting for the CPA to nominate accountants, which the IAMB is meant to then approve or reject.

"The institutions presented a work programme to the CPA in December and are still waiting for a final commitment by CPA," said the official from an IAMB member organisation.

A CPA official, however, said they were waiting for the "statement of work" to be finalised before any accountants could be selected. According to CPA figures, Dollars 10.5bn has flowed into the DFI account in New York, of which just over Dollars 3bn has been spent. The CPA says it has used funds from the account to, among other things, buy wheat, pay Iraqi salaries, rebuild essential services and print the new currency.

As time goes by, there is a growing sense among critics that they will simply have to take occupying forces at their word.

"Five months from now, the CPA is supposed to dissolve," said Nathaniel Hurd, who is preparing a report on spending by the occupying powers for Iraq Revenue Watch, a watchdog funded by financier George Soros. "So this whole thing may have been some giant window-dressing exercise and all of this money may be spent with minimal external oversight," said Mr Hurd.

###

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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH(LONDON)  
October 16, 2003

## **Taylor Nelson creates new role for Lowden**

ROLAND Berger Strategy Consultants have appointed **Claude Hankes-Drielsma** as chairman. He is chairman of the Windsor Leadership Trust.

###

Copyright 2003 The Financial Times Limited  
Financial Times (London,England)  
October 15, 2003

## **And finally... Claude Hankes-Drielsma**

By RUTH SULLIVANBODY:

\* Roland Berger Strategy Consultants has appointed **Claude Hankes-Drielsma**, former chairman of Price Waterhouse's management committee, as chairman.

###

Copyright 2003 Times Newspapers Limited  
The Times (London)  
October 7, 2003

## **The College of St George Windsor Castle**

Mr **Claude Hankes-Drielsma** was elected *Honorary Fellow and Special Adviser*, The College of St George, at the meeting of the General Chapter on September 29, 2003.

###



# OpinionJournal

from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Editorial Page



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AG EDWARDS

## WEASEL ALERT

### Saddam's Global Payroll

It's time to take a serious look at the U.N.'s oil-for-food program.

**BY THERSE RAPHAEL**

Monday, February 9, 2004 8:00 a.m. EST



On Dec. 5, during a trip to Baghdad, Claude Hankes-Drielsma faxed an urgent letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Mr. Drielsma, the U.K. Chairman of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, had recently been appointed to advise Iraqi Governing Council. What he saw in Baghdad left him shocked. "As a result of my findings here, combined with earlier information," he wrote, "I most strongly urge the U.N. to consider appointing an independent commission to review and investigate the 'Oil for Food Programme.' Failure to do so might bring into question the U.N.'s credibility and the public's perception of it. . . My belief is that serious transgressions have taken place and may still be taking place."

Just how serious these transgressions were became clear late last month, when the Iraqi daily Al Mada published a partial list of names, compiled by Iraq's ministry, of those whom Saddam Hussein rewarded with allocations of Iraqi oil. Mr. Hankes-Drielsma, who says he was among the first to see the list in early December, says it is based on numerous contracts and other detailed documents and was compiled at the request of the Iraqi Governing Council.

The list, a copy of which has been seen by the Journal's editorial page, is in spreadsheet format and details (in Arabic) individuals, companies and organizations, grouped by country, who oil ministry and Governing Council officials believe received vouchers from the Iraqi regime for the purchase of oil under the oil-for-food program. Mr. Hankes-Drielsma said the recipients would have been given allocations at below-market prices and then been able to pocket the difference when a middleman sold the oil on to a refinery; 13 time periods are designated and with indications of how much crude, in millions of barrels, each recipient allegedly received.

The list reads like an official registry of Friends of Saddam across some 50 countries. It's clear where his best, best friends were. There are 11 entries under France (totaling 150.8 million barrels of crude), 14 names under Syria

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(totaling 116.9 million barrels) and four pages detailing Russian recipients, voucher allocations of over one billion barrels. Many of the names, transliterated phonetically from Arabic, are not well-known or are difficult to identify from the information given. Others stand out. There's George Gallo the Saddam-supporting British MP recently expelled from the Labour Party, has always denied receiving any form of payment from Saddam. Other notable include Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (also listed separately the "daughter of President Sukarno"), the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Russian Orthodox Church, the "director of the Russian President's office" and former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. Some--including Mr. Pasqua, the Russian Church and Ms. Megawati--have denied receiving anything from Saddam. Patrick Maugein, a close friend of Jacques Chirac and head of Soco International oil company, says his dealings were all within "the framework of the oil-for-food program and there was nothing illegal about it."

The list's breadth, and the difficulty in reading and interpreting it, has slowed its exposure. There's also the question of authentication. Mr. Hanks-Driels (who is not an Arabic speaker) is convinced it is authentic and will be followed by more detailed evidence as the Iraqi oil ministry and Governing Council conduct further investigations. "I've seen the documents that have satisfied beyond any doubt that we're dealing with a genuine situation," he told me.

One of the most eye-catching names on the list is easy to miss as it's the only entry under a country one would not normally associate with Iraq--Panama. The entry says: "Mr. Sevan." That's the same name as that of the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Benon V. Sevan, a Cyprus-born, New York-educated career U.N. officer who was tapped by Kofi Annan in October 1997 to run the oil-for-food program.

When I tried Mr. Sevan for comment, a U.N. spokesman wouldn't put me through to him directly but offered to pass on e-mailed questions. In an e-reply to questions about Mr. Sevan's apparent inclusion on the list and interest in the Panama-based business that allegedly received the discounted oil, the spokesman quoted Kofi Annan's statement Friday: "As far as I know, nobody at the Secretariat has committed any wrongdoing. If there is evidence, we will investigate it very seriously, and I want those who are making the charges to give the material they have to me so that we can follow up to determine if there has been any wrongdoing and I would take necessary action. So far, no statements are being made but we need to get facts." The pro forma U.N. response certainly seems inadequate. Mr. Sevan should take the opportunity to defend himself against the inference that the presence of his name on this list could help explain how Saddam was able to get by with so much influence-buying around the world with little apparent objection from the U.N.

In the seven years that Oil-for-Food was operational, (it was shut down in November and its obligations are being wound up) Saddam was able to skim funds for his personal use, while at the same time doing favors for those who supported the lifting of sanctions, supplied him with his vast arsenal of weapons, and opposed military action in Iraq. Indeed, it was clear from the outset that Saddam would be able to use the program to benefit his friends. The 1995 U.N. resolution setting out the program--Resolution 986--bends backwards to reassure Iraq that Oil-for-Food would not "infringe the

11-L-0559/OSD/25550

sovereignty or territorial integrity" of Iraq. And to that end it gave Saddam power to decide on trading partners. "A contract for the purchase of petrole and petroleum products will only be considered for approval if it has been endorsed by the Government of Iraq," states the program's procedures. Predictably, Saddam exploited the program for influence-buying and kickba and filled his coffers by smuggling oil through Syria and elsewhere. With Oil for-Food and smuggling, he was able to sustain his domestic power base ar maintain a lavish lifestyle for his inner circle.

The system was ripe for abuse, in part because a divided Security Council g Saddam far too much flexibility within the program. Oil-for-Food not only gi Iraq the power to decide with whom to deal, but also freedom to determine official price of Iraqi oil, revenues from which went legally into the U.N.'s Oi for-Food account. U.N. rules did not allow it to order Iraq to deal directly wi end-users and bypass all those lucky middlemen who got deals from Sadda Nor was the U.N. allowed to view contracts other than those between the oi ministry and the first purchaser, so it had no way of verifying that surcharg were being imposed by the middlemen on end-users. That enabled him to a surcharges to finance his own schemes while still making the final price competitive.

U.N. rules were ostensibly devised to prevent pricing abuses, but in one of many indications of administrative failure, those safeguards appear not to h been enforced. In response, the U.S. and Britain tried often from 2001 to impose stricter financial standards, but Russia blocked changes. Then the U and Britain instituted a system of retroactive pricing--delaying approval of t Iraqi selling price so that they could take account of the market price when giving their approval. This too met with grumbling from Friends of Saddam while it reduced oil exports, it didn't end the corruption.

Throughout most of the program's life, Mr. Sevan's office seemed to see no evil. When overwhelming evidence finally surfaced that Oil-for-Food had become a gravy-train for the Iraqi regime, U.N. officials acknowledged som the abuses but refused any of the blame. Criticism is routinely portrayed as politically motivated. "The [program] has existed in a highly politicized environment from day one," explains the U.N. Web site. "The scale of these operations has also made it a rather large target." Its last line of defense w to punt to the Security Council, whose sanctions committee (authorized by 1990 sanctions resolution and composed of Council members) was meant to oversee the program, receive reports and review audits.

The record of systemic abuse of the program lends credence to claims that oil-ministry list is genuine and should be investigated. The Iraqi Governing Council says it's considering legal action against anyone found to have profi illegally from Oil-for-Food. The U.S. Treasury's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is investigating possible violations of U.S. law. But th U.N. has resisted calls for an independent investigation into abuses. Says M Hanks-Drielsma: "I would urge the U.N. to take the high moral ground and instigate a truly independent investigation."

To this end, he wrote a second letter to the U.N. secretariat on Feb. 1, this addressed to Hans Correll, Under Secretary for Legal Affairs and Legal Cour of the U.N., with a copy to British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. He catalog:

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questions on areas "which need urgent investigation," e.g. "Why did the U.I approve oil contracts to non-end users?" His letter alleges that "not less than 10% was added to the value of all invoices to provide cash to Saddam . . . was this not identified and prevented?" The letter also asks "What controls in place to monitor BNP [the French bank] who handled the bulk of the LCs, total value of which may have [been] in the region of \$47 billion?"

In a June 2000 statement on Oil-for-Food, Mr. Sevan said, "As [Mr. Annan] it recently, we, as international civil servants, take our marching orders from the Security Council." It might have been more accurate to acknowledge that the U.N. took its marching orders from Saddam.

*Ms. Raphael is editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe.*

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720

March 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
 Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Transitional Arrangements for Coalition Forces

*Advance  
 copy sent  
 3/15 0915*

*IRAQ*

Please take a look at this note to Secretary Powell on the situation in Iraq legally.  
 Please get back to me with a proposal – fast.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 3/10/04 Jack Straw memo to SecState

DHR:dh  
 031504-3

.....  
 Please respond by 3/17/04

*12 APR 2004*

OSD 10792-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25553

FROM SITE 4A STATE

(FRI) MAR 12 2004 9:58/ST. 9:57/NO.

(b)(6)



British Embassy  
Washington

2/3/02  
3/15

From the Ambassador  
Sir David Manning KCMG

10 March 2004

4

3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

Telephone (b)(6)  
Facsimile (b)(6)

www.BritainUSA.com

LETTER TASKED

The Honorable Colin Powell, KCB  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Room 7226  
2201 C Street NW  
Washington DC 20520

(D)

By fax: (b)(6)

cc to NSC  
1 Pentagon

Dear Mr Secretary

I have been asked by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, to forward to you the attached paper on transitional arrangements in Iraq.

Best wishes,

Yours faithfully  
David Manning

David Manning

2004 PNR 1.1 P1 3 01

arrangements and thus address many of the issues highlighted above. If we can get the IGC to issue an invitation to the MNF to remain beyond 30 June, a new UNSCR should then

- note this as representing Iraqi consent until such time as the new sovereign Transitional government addresses the matter;
- re-authorises the MNF on that basis; and
- give UNSC recognition/endorsement to other arrangements set out in an IGC invitation, including eg the type of operations the MNF would conduct, and the relationship between the MNF and Iraqis as set out in the IGC invitation.

#### Status of forces provisions

7. With the disappearance of the CPA on 30 June, the privileges and immunities set out for coalition forces under CPA Order 17 will cease to exist, notwithstanding Article 26(C) of the TAL. UNSCR 1511 does not confer P&I on the MNF, and it would be unusual and awkward to write them into a new UNSCR. These issues need to be provided for in some other form. This is important to the UK military, who have a duty of care requiring them to ensure that their personnel are legally protected for the activities they are likely to be involved in. Coalition partners also feel strongly about this, and will find it difficult to secure continuing approval from their parliaments in the absence of clarity on such issues. The continuation of CPA Order 17 would fill part of this gap, although there would be a need to find some legally watertight way of effecting this - such as amending Order 17 so that it does not cease to apply with the demise of the CPA. But CPA Order 17 anyway covers only some of the issues relevant to the status of forces - namely jurisdiction, immunities and claims. It does not cover issues such as:

- freedom of entry into, exit from and movement within Iraqi territory, airspace and waters
- the right to use such bases and facilities as the MNF deems appropriate, including the retention of property currently being used.
- the right to use utilities and other services, etc

8. It is widely accepted now that a formal SOFA could probably not be negotiated with the IGC nor would it be likely to be seen as a legitimate bilateral agreement. But the IGC could express a view which would establish a working interim basis for MNF forces pending any negotiation of a formal SOFA agreement with the Transitional Government. This could be in the form of an annex to the letter of invitation from the IGC. An possible alternative option would be for the IGC letter simply to state that until a sovereign Iraqi Government concludes a binding international agreement on the status of forces, as provided for in the TAL, the provisions of the UN's generic model SOFA should apply, *mutatis mutandis* (though this options needs further analysis and might not provide all the protections we need). This would save the IGC having to negotiate on some politically very sensitive issues. Subsequent UNSCR recognition of this arrangement would also go a long way to solving the IGC legitimacy problem.

March 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
 David Chu

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Mandatory Retirement

210 Navy

Please get together and tell me how I am supposed to speak out on this mandatory retirement problem. Please get me some anecdotes and some examples, and let's get some action going on it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/8/04 USD(P&R) memo to SecDef re: Mandatory Retirement (OSD 03360-04)

DHR:dh  
031504-2

.....

Please respond by 4/2/04

15000000



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SEC 1  
2004 MAR -0 11:56  
3/15

INFO MEMO

(D)

March 8, 2004 - 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) David S. C. Chu & Assoc  
Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Mandatory Retirement--SNOWFLAKE(Tab A)

- There are several remedies applicable to Captain Jenkins and others like him:
  - He can be recalled to active duty. The Secretary of a Military Department may order most retired officers to active duty (10 U.S.C. 9688). No more than 25 officers can serve concurrently and they cannot serve more than 12 months in a 24-month period. (During periods of national emergency these restrictions are lifted, which is the current situation.)
  - If selected by a selection board, an officer who would otherwise be required to retire following completion of 30 years service may have retirement deferred and be continued on active duty for up to 5 years or until age 62, whichever is sooner (10 U.S.C. §637).
- The real problem is that officers like Captain Jenkins may not wish to be retained, because there is little financial incentive to stay. Indeed, it could be argued the current incentive is negative, since delayed retirement may damage second career earnings.
- We are pursuing a set of legislative remedies to this dilemma for flag officers (raising maximum age to 68, and providing for an increased pension if they serve beyond 30 years). Your speaking out in support will help us, since we failed to win their acceptance last year.
- RAND is helping us evaluate alternatives for officers below flag rank. To enable us to try these out without having to justify each in advance, we are seeking military personnel demonstration authority. OMB has not yet cleared this, but I am hopeful they will soon do so. (I will let you know if by the end of next week we have not yet succeeded.)

+

COORDINATION: TAB B.

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Francine Blackmon, ODUSD(MPP/OEPM) (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DIR ADA	3/10
SR MA GRADUOC	3/17
MA BUCC	
EXECUTIVE MARR	033 610 04 3/9



11-L-0559/OSD/25557

12/12/03

December 11, 2003

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Incentives

*Larry Di Rita*  
3/11

Yesterday I met the Executive Assistant to Reuben Jeffery. He is a Navy Captain with 30 years of service. He is 51 years old, and he is retiring. He is first-rate.

All the incentives in our system are wrong. Why don't we get them fixed?

Please come back to me with a proposal by January 5.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
121103-18

*DR*

Please respond by 1/5/04

*✓*  
*3/11*

*"Jan 5 -"*  
*Response attached.*  
*D. R.*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*3/11*

3/16 1730

12

15  
March 12, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
CC: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Voting Record

IRAG

LARRY DI RITA  
3/25

I would like to know how Ted Kennedy, John Kerry and Carl Levin voted on the regime change legislation in 1998.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031204-4

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

✓  
3/26

Response attached  
C 3/25

15 MAR 04

OSD 10794 04

11-L-0559/OSD/25559



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓  
3/24

March 16, 2004 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Voting Record

- You wanted to know how Senators Ted Kennedy, John Kerry and Carl Levin voted on the regime change legislation in 1998.
- On October 7, 1998, the Senate passed H.R. 4655 by unanimous consent. There was no recorded vote. ||

Attachments:

SECDEF Snowflake # 031204-4

H.R. 4655 Bill Summary and Status

11-L-0559/OSD/25560

*Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress***Item 1 of 1**

**PREVIOUS:ALL | NEXT:ALL**  
**NEW SEARCH | HOME | HELP**

**H.R.4655**

**Title:** To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.

**Sponsor:** Rep Gilman, Benjamin A. [NY-20] (introduced 9/29/1998)    **Cosponsors:** 1

**Related Bills:** [H.R.4664](#), [S.2525](#)

**Latest Major Action:** 10/31/1998 Became Public Law No: 105-338.

Jump to: [Titles](#), [Status](#), [Committees](#), [Related Bill Details](#), [Amendments](#), [Cosponsors](#), [Summary](#)

**TITLE(S):** (*italics indicate a title for a portion of a bill*)

- **SHORT TITLE(S) AS INTRODUCED:**  
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
- **SHORT TITLE(S) AS PASSED HOUSE:**  
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
- **SHORT TITLE(S) AS ENACTED:**  
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
- **OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:**  
To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq.

**STATUS:** (*color indicates Senate actions*) ([Floor Actions](#)/[Congressional Record Page References](#))

See also: [Related House Committee Documents](#)

**9/29/1998:**

Referred to the House Committee on International Relations.

**10/2/1998:**

Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.

**10/2/1998:**

Committee Agreed to Seek Consideration Under Suspension of the Rules, (Amended) by Voice Vote.

**10/5/1998 6:12pm:**

Mr. Gilman moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.

**10/5/1998 6:12pm:**

Considered under suspension of the rules.

**10/5/1998 6:54pm:**

At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5, rule I, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.

**10/5/1998 7:26pm:**

11-L-0559/OSD/25561

Considered as unfinished business.

**10/5/1998 7:33pm:**

On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by the Yeas and Nays:  
(2/3 required): 360 - 38 (Roll No. 482).

**10/5/1998 7:33pm:**

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

**10/6/1998:**

Received in the Senate, read twice.

**10/7/1998:**

Passed Senate without amendment by Unanimous Consent.

**10/7/1998:**

Cleared for White House.

**10/8/1998:**

Message on Senate action sent to the House.

**10/20/1998:**

Presented to President.

**10/31/1998:**

Signed by President.

**10/31/1998:**

Became Public Law No: 105-338.

#### COMMITTEE(S):

Committee/Subcommittee:	Activity:
<u>House International Relations</u>	Referral, Markup

#### RELATED BILL DETAILS: (additional related bills may be identified in Status)

Bill:	Relationship:
<u>H.R.4664</u>	Identical bill identified by CRS
<u>S.2525</u>	Identical bill identified by CRS

#### AMENDMENT(S):

\*\*\*NONE\*\*\*

#### COSPONSORS(1), ALPHABETICAL [followed by Cosponsors withdrawn]: (Sort: by date)

Rep Cox, Christopher - 9/29/1998 [CA-47]

#### SUMMARY AS OF:

10/5/1998--Passed House, amended. (There is 1 other summary)

Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 - Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.

11-L-0559/OSD/25562

Authorizes the President, after notifying specified congressional committees, to provide to the Iraqi democratic opposition organizations: (1) grant assistance for radio and television broadcasting to Iraq; (2) Department of Defense (DOD) defense articles and services and military education and training (IMET); and (3) humanitarian assistance, with emphasis on addressing the needs of individuals who have fled from areas under the control of the Hussein regime. Prohibits assistance to any group or organization that is engaged in military cooperation with the Hussein regime. Authorizes appropriations.

Directs the President to designate: (1) one or more Iraqi democratic opposition organizations that meet specified criteria as eligible to receive assistance under this Act; and (2) additional such organizations which satisfy the President's criteria.

Urges the President to call upon the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people and democracy transition assistance to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, including convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to the foreign debt incurred by the Hussein regime.

11-L-0559/OSD/25563



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

July 20, 2004 11:00 AM

**FOR:** SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**FROM:** David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R) *David S. C. Chu* July 20, 2004

**SUBJECT:** Update on the Federal Voting Assistance Program--SNOWFLAKE

- You signed memos on March 17, 2004, to the Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders directing that they give the voting program command attention and emphasizing quality officers as their Unit Voting Officers. We wrote all Governors on March 10, 2004, requesting voting assistance for Guard and Reserve units.
- We have worked with the Postal Service to implement special expedited handling procedures for election materials sent to and from Service members outside the U.S. during the 45 day period preceding the November election. Separate expedited postal handling procedures have been implemented for members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- The Department and the Department of Justice have written state chief election officials urging election officials to use every available means to help ensure Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters may receive and return absentee ballots by fax or electronic mail methods.
- We have been visiting mobilization sites and major installations to inform commanders on voting program requirements and to train Voting Assistance Officers. As of July 15, 2004, 113 Voting Assistance Officer Training workshops have been completed at military sites and 30 workshops have been presented to overseas citizen audiences at U.S. Embassies and Consulates. A total of 157 workshops are scheduled through August 2004. In addition, Voting Assistance Officer Training is offered On-Line.
- We have an aggressive public affairs campaign, which includes television, radio, billboards, posters, pre-recorded messages from leaders, slogan contests, and emphasis through the Overseas Citizen Voters Week (July 4-10, 2004), Armed Forces Voters Week (September 3-11, 2004), and Absentee Voting Week (October 11-15, 2004).
- We are monitoring voting during the Primaries to detect problems and implement necessary corrective actions before the General Election.
- We look forward to briefing you at your convenience to review these and other steps being taken.

Prepared By: J. Scott Wiedmann, (b)(6)



OSD 10801-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25564

March 15, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: "Bumper Sticker"

You are going to get back to me with a "bumper sticker" on accomplishments.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-11

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

*DR 4/19*

*SecDef —*

- From the list provided by Gen Handy, propose 4 "bumper sticker" accomplishments be added to DoD Accomplishments
- These "adds" are high-lighted on the attached draft list.

*C 3/18*

OSD 10869-04

151104-11

# **The First 3 Years—1/01-3/04—Highlights**

## **DoD Accomplishments**

- **Global War on Terrorism—**
  - Developed global offensive strategy
  - Removed Taliban and Al Qaeda power base
  - Removed Iraqi regime from power—Saddam Hussein and top Ba’athist leaders in custody
  - Executed the largest troop movement since WW II
  - Degrading/damaging worldwide terrorist networks
  - Innovative approaches—to high value, time-sensitive targets; maritime interdiction
  - Transforming mindset—more flexible and agile
  - Delegated authorities to capture/kill high value targets
  - Sense of urgency
- **Improved Military Readiness**
  - Funding increases to support tempo
  - Joint combat capability strengthened
  - Targeted pay raises
  - Budget supplementals to sustain readiness
  - Implemented single focal point for air mobility operations
- **Nuclear Posture Review**
  - New triad
  - Nuclear weapons reductions underway
- **Developed Proliferation Security Initiative**
- **Restructured Missile Defense Program**
  - Withdrawal ABM Treaty
  - Refocused and broadened R&D for MD
  - Aggressive test program
  - Began fielding an initial capability
- **Implemented Space Commission Recommendations**

3/4/04

1

# The First 3 Years—1/01-3/04—Highlights

## Accomplishments (cont.)

- **Defense Status**
  - New defense strategy
  - New force sizing construct
  - New risk balancing focus
- **Modernized Unified Command Plan**
  - Northern Command—fully operational Sep 03
  - JFCOM— Focus on Transformation— NATO Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation
  - Strategic Command—combined w/Space Command; new missions
  - NATO command structure modernized
- **New Working Relationships**
  - OSD & Joint Staff
  - DoD & CIA
  - DoD and DHS
- **Improved Strategic Reconnaissance Operations**
- **New Strategic Direction**
  - DoD role in new political military strategy
  - Liberia crisis—initial US lead to stabilize, then hand-off to follow-on UN force
  - Strategic Planning Guidance, Enhanced Planning Process, Joint Programming Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance improving speed/relevance/value of plans
- **New Strategic Relationships**
  - Central Asia/Caucasus and South Asia
  - Eastern Europe and NATO
  - Missions determining Coalitions
  - Security Cooperation Guidance implemented
  - NATO Expansion
  - NATO Response Force

3/4/04

2

# **The First 3 Years—1/01-3/04—Highlights**

## **Accomplishments (cont.)**

- **Implemented Top-Down, Capabilities-Based Requirements & Acquisition Process**
- **Adopted Realistic Budgeting/ Cost Estimates**
- **Illustrative Program Decisions**
  - Crusader to FCS/Precision
  - Acceleration of UAVs/UCAVs
  - DD-21 to DD-X
  - Stryker Brigade combat capability
  - SSBN to SSGN
  - “Ship Swaps”
  - Laser Comms and C4ISR funding
  - Consolidated Navy/Marine aircraft programs
  - Army Aviation Task Force/Comanche
- **Supply chain management reforms**
  - Established single entity responsible for the Defense Logistics supply chain
  - Established USTRANSCOM as the distribution process owner
  - Flattened planning cycle – 50% faster
  - Improved in-transit visibility – reduced costs, improved performance
- **Stand-up of:**
  - USD(I)
  - ASD (Homeland Defense)
  - Coalition Provisional Authority (Rear Office)
- **Defense Transformation Legislation**
  - National Security Personnel System
  - Range and Training Area Readiness
  - BRAC authority
- **Established Senior Level Review Group Process**

3/4/04

3

11-L-0559/OSD/25568



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
508 SCOTT DR  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-5357

10 March 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: TCCC**

**SUBJECT: USTRANSCOM 30-Month Snapshot**

1. The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has transformed dramatically over the past 30-months, greatly benefiting the Department of Defense (DOD) and the warfighter. The attached listing highlights some of the key events and initiatives.
2. Rest assured that we are committed to continuous process advancements that will significantly improve DOD distribution, and provide premier support to global warfighters. I am truly proud of the USTRANSCOM team, and you can count on us to deliver excellence!
3. I look forward to any feedback you may offer.

  
JOHN W. HANDY  
General, USAF  
Commander

**Attachment:**  
**USTRANSCOM 30-Month Snapshot**

**cc:**  
**Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**  
**Deputy Secretary of Defense**  
**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)**

11-L-0559/OSD/25569

USTRANSCOM 30-Month Look  
(Oct 01-Mar 04)

Organization:

- Flattened and streamlined the HQ based on industry model—identified 86 positions
- Created J-3 Directorate dedicated to warfighter operations
- Consolidated two Numbered Air Forces into one - single focal point for air mobility ops
- Established Joint Interagency Coordination Group
- Transferred the Joint Deployment Training Center to USJFCOM and Defense Courier Service to HQ USTRANSCOM
- SDDC/MSC reorganization - consolidated contracting into one component

Process:

- Implemented DOD Distribution Process Owner
- Cost avoidance using sealift over airlift
- Established DDOC Forward - created template for joint theater logistics
- Deployed/embarked force protection for common user sealift - Operation Guardian Mariner
- Drove reauthorization of Maritime Security Program - expanded warfighter capability
- Union/Labor Support

Warfighting:

- Optimized Sealift - 101<sup>st</sup> deployment closed in 12 days
- C-17 Performance—ie., 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade Airdrop
- CRAF / RRF Activation
- Delivered combat capability - force packaged and sequenced troop/equipment arrivals
- Containerized ammo vs. break bulk
- ITV to identify MRE's in theater
- Reduced footprint
- Aeromedical Evacuation
- Safety

Technology:

- DOD certified command architecture model as template
- Designed expandable IT system - GTN 21 ready for global distribution mission
- Published RFID CONOPS - driving global visibility for warfighter
- Established global ITV of patient movement

Bottom Line: Supported combat operations in two austere environments - executed the largest troop movement since WWII, while simultaneously supporting other combatant commands

# Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) “The First 45 Days”

## Organization

- Formed from DOD's Logistics Partners
- Led by Distribution Process Owner
- Lean Organization: 63 Logistics Experts
- Deployed into Theater; Tactically Controlled by the CENTCOM Commander
- Reach back Capability – leverages the power of DOD's National Logistics network

## Improved Theater Execution

- Improved customer confidence – collaborative theater environment
  - Connected logisticians in Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the US
  - Most robust collaborative logistics network in DOD
  - Flattened the planning cycle for intra-theater distribution (50% faster)
- Improved performance and reduced costs by gaining visibility of key forces and materiel
  - Located and redirected 19 containers of armored vehicle track in Kuwait
  - Diverted over 100 Repair Parts containers back to origin in CONUS
  - Prevented shipment of over 1700 containers from CONUS
- Synchronized strategic & intra-theater Deployment and Distribution:
  - Generated CRAF-level performance in a NON-CRAF environment
  - Achieved record single day performance - approx. 8,000 pax moved globally
  - Discharged and loaded 5 LMSR-size vessels simultaneously in record time
- Accelerated 101<sup>st</sup> AA Div Redeployment by 3 weeks
- Improved strategic delivery of critical materiel directly to forward units
  - Streamlined packaging process for frontline units
  - No longer requires multiple handling and repackaging in theater
  - Pallets constructed in CONUS for direct delivery to combat units in Iraq
  - Improved velocity –significantly reduced customer wait times
- Introduced leading edge, national systems into theater
  - Vessel berth throughput to synchronized deployment/retrograde operations
  - First ever web-based tool to track intransit visibility in Iraq
  - Created repair parts to provide accurate visibility of inbound cargo
- Demonstrated new technology
  - Tested Iridium satellite tags to track container and unit convoys
  - First ever employment of commercial satellite tags to manage containers

Bottom Line: We moved out and demonstrated the power of DOD's logistics partnership while achieving a truly “end to end” distribution process

March 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: TRANSCOM Dual-Hat

We need to address the question of the fact that the TRANSCOM CINC is dual-hatted as an Air Force four-star in charge of Mobility Command. That is inhibiting in terms of who is going to be TRANSCOM someday.

I need some visibility into that and why that is a good idea. Do we need that task? Could it be merged with something other than a combatant command or a specified command?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031104-10

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

OSD 10870-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25572

March 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response by Joe Collins to *Atlantic Monthly*

I saw this letter to the editor of Joe Collins wrote to the *Atlantic Monthly*. It is excellent. Please tell him: "Good job!"

Thanks.

Attach.

Collins, Joe. "Blind Into Baghdad" letter to the editor, *Atlantic Monthly*, April 2004.

DHR:dh  
031504-5

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 10871-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25573

11-09

11-09



Atlantic  
Monthly  
April 2004

### Blind Into Baghdad

As one of the Department of Defense officials involved in the initial planning for relief and reconstruction in Iraq, I would like to comment on James Fallows's article "Blind Into Baghdad" (January/February *Atlantic*). At every turn in his description of planning for Iraq, the author overemphasized bureaucratic conflict in the executive branch and distorted the nature of contingency planning.

As the Pentagon's "point man" (his term) for postwar plans, I worked continuously and harmoniously with my colleagues at State, USAID, the CIA, and the NSC. I also participated in numerous interagency meetings and conferences, including the January 2003 National Intelligence Council exercise that Fallows says Pentagon personnel were "forbidden by OSD to attend."

The author states that rather than holding a meeting with the Secretary of Defense or the deputy secretary, the nongovernmental organizations were given an audience only with me. In fact I had been meeting with the NGOs frequently on many topics since the start of operations in Afghanistan. I was not a consolation prize for the NGOs but a frequent interlocutor, and I remain so to this day. Our conversations are substantive and have often resulted in policy changes, even though we forgo the photo ops and the press releases that often encumber one-time meetings with the most senior officials.

Missing from Fallows's narrative was any mention of the official interagency planning effort that went on from early fall of 2002 to March of 2003. The planning group met weekly in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House. Chaired by NSC and OMB officials, this group included senior representatives from State,

USAID, the CIA, Treasury, and many other agencies. Tom Warrick, the head of State's Future of Iraq Project, was a back-bencher at some of the sessions. The senior interagency planners were all familiar with the interesting work of his eclectic group.

The interagency group formulated first a strategy and then a detailed plan for relief and reconstruction. Representatives from the group coordinated these plans with international organizations and with General Tommy Franks, the combat commander. Secretaries Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld were briefed on the final plan, as was the President. The group even briefed the press on its work on February 24.

Although none of this planning was as juicy as the bureaucratic infighting that Fallows dwells on, it is an essential part of the story. Jay Garner—appointed in late January of 2003 to lead the field effort in Iraq—did face a daunting task, but not a blank sheet of paper. Indeed, the basic reconstruction plans discussed at the two-day conference that Garner held in February at the National Defense University were in the main developed—and harmoniously so—by the very interagency group that Fallows overlooked.

Finally, Fallows's judgment that when the past eighteen months are assessed "the Administration will be found wanting for its carelessness" does not pass muster. The four conflicts that I have helped to plan in the Pentagon suggest clearly that war, as Clausewitz told us, remains the province of chance. Military campaigns and their aftermath defy prediction. Intelligence accepted for a decade can be wrong. The same experts who incorrectly predict huge refugee flows may accurately predict civil disturbances. Staffs will fixate on things that do not come to pass and assume away the importance of things

that do. No plan—political or military—survives contact with reality. Planners will always make more mistakes than journalists who have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.

We have not "squandered American prestige, fortune, and lives" in Iraq. Despite high costs and many casualties, the United States and its thirty-four coalition partners have destroyed one of the most heinous and dangerous regimes in the world, captured 80 percent of its criminal senior leadership, liberated the Iraqi people, and started the political and economic reconstruction of a nation that may well bring democracy to that part of the Middle East. Mr. Fallows should resist the temptation to call the game in the third inning.

Joseph J. Collins

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Alexandria, Va.

James Fallows's lengthy list of expert warnings on Iraq that were ignored by the Bush Administration would have benefited from some reference to the strikingly parallel "splendid little war" that provided the other bookend to the twentieth century. (And both of those conflicts boasted a British troubadour, although Tony Blair's flack Alistair Campbell never quite matched the eloquence that Rudyard Kipling showed in his paean to American benevolence, "The White Man's Burden.") In the Philippines a century ago a walkover victory in the capital was followed by prolonged hostilities in the countryside. A foray by General Frederick Funston and his special forces into hostile territory led to the capture of the enemy leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo. (The two Napoleonic figures—both about five feet four—actually got along quite well after that episode.) Mark Twain suggested a redesign of Old Glory, with "the white stripes painted



March 16, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Thoughts on WMD

0119

Here are some thoughts on the WMD issue that we might want to use from time to time.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/15/04 MFR on WMD (#031504-33)

DHR:dh  
031604-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

0119

OSD 10872-04

March 15,2004

SUBJECT: WMD

How many times did the President ask what General Franks was going to do when WMD was used on US forces during the invasion of Iraq? Many times!

General Franks believed the likelihood of Saddam Hussein using WMD was the greatest at that point where our forces got closer to Baghdad, from any direction.

How many times did US forces put on their chemical protective gear, despite the discomfort? The reason is because they expected a chemical attack.

The heads of state of most countries in the CENTCOM AOR believed Saddam Hussein had WMD. Mubarak cautioned General Franks that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and will use them – “be careful.”

The likelihood is that we did surprise Saddam Hussein. He likely had precursors that he could have put together fast, but because he was surprised, he didn't have time to do so.

We will find out at some point in the future what the situation actually was.

DHR:dh  
031504-33

11-L-0559/OSD/25576

March 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Internet Story

*JR*

I just read this thing on the internet that my son sent me. It is just factually not true. I never said anything like that. How do we get something like that corrected? Is that legal for people to do that?

Maybe one thing to do would be to put the exact testimony on to counter it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/15/04 Nick R. e-mail to JR

DHR:db  
031604-1

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

*3/15*

*✓ 3/18*

*See Def -*

*About as quickly as it showed up on the internet, a bunch of stories started appearing saying it was untrue and urban legend. It has not been reported, to our knowledge, by mainstream outlets. The exact testimony is posted for internet access.*

*OSD 10873-04-50 04 MAR*

11-L-0559/OSD/25577

*Di Rita*

**Joyce Rumsfeld**

---

**From:** "Nick" <nick@rainsnet.org>  
**To:** "Joyce Rumsfeld" (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 15, 2004 1:32 PM

Is this accurate? I would guess not. If it is not, it just shows what kind of stuff can circulate.

Nick

**Rumsfeld: Kennedy 'All Wet' About Bush Lies**

(2004-02-05) -- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Sen. Edward M. Kennedy yesterday that he was "all wet" when the Senator alleged that the Bush administration lied about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to justify going to war.

The verbal clash came during Mr. Rumsfeld's testimony at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing probing the state of pre-war intelligence.

Sen. Kennedy began his questioning of the Defense Secretary by saying, "Don't you think some members of the Bush administration should be held legally accountable for the lies they told about Iraqi weapons, and the subsequent cover-up?"

"First, with all due respect Senator Kennedy, you're all wet," said Mr. Rumsfeld. "The administration has not lied or covered up. However, in general, I do believe that when a man commits a crime he should face the bar of justice. He should not be allowed to serve in positions of power in our government, and be hailed as a leader, when the question of his guilt remains unresolved, if you know what I mean."

"I'm sure I do not know what you mean," Mr. Kennedy said. "But the American people deserve to know why you can't find Saddam's weapons of mass destruction."

"Sometimes things are hard to find, even when you know where they are," said Mr. Rumsfeld. "For example, I've heard of a man who missed a bridge and drove his car into the water, even though he knew where the bridge was. And then sometimes you just keep diving into a problem and despite repeated efforts, you come up empty handed. That doesn't mean that nothing's there. As you know, eventually, the truth comes to light."

Having no further questions, Mr. Kennedy yielded the remainder of his time.

March 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Jerry Lindauer

Please put Jerry Lindauer on the Defense Business Board. He is a smart guy. You might want to connect with him somehow.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031004-7

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

3/11 ✓ 3/12

- Will do.
  - I asked Allison Barber, who runs Armed forces Radio/TV, to get with him, too.
- D. Rita*

384

10 MAR 04

OSD 10875-04

March 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Serving as Acting Secretary

I talked to Les Brownlee last night. He tells me that since he is the Under Secretary, he can serve as Acting Secretary as long as is needed, and he is not limited.

Please check the law.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031004-4

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

OSD 10876-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25580

March 10, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Same Sex Marriage in the Military

250

I was asked a question in the press avail about what DoD would do about same sex marriages by military personnel, given the "Don't ask, don't tell" policy.

Please get back to me personally to discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
031004-2

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

11 MAR 2004

OSD 10877-04

March 10, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: March 8 Gompert Memo

*Advance  
copy sent  
3/11 0830*

Please get on top of this Gompert memo. Talk to Paul Wolfowitz, and then tell me what you recommend.

We better get back to him fast. Time is short.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/8/04 Gompert Memo: Iraq Issues

DHR:dh  
031004-17

.....  
Please respond by 3/15/04

OSD 10878-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25582



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD

SECDEF

03/10

df

March

8, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR LTG John Craddock, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Iraq Issues

Several items for attention:

7

a. Egypt: I intend to visit Cairo to promote Egyptian cooperation with the coalition. In the near term, this will involve unit training of the Iraqi Army units at high-quality (US-spec) Egyptian sites. It could also include Egyptian participation in the MNF post-7/1 - an option we'd like to create while making no commitment from our side. (Amb Bremer, State and CJTF7 concur.)

bx

b. Iraqi defense budget: We've stabilized the 2005 MoD budget at \$1.7B (which includes ICDC but not police) and are sending it to OSD and J5 for review. Unless otherwise directed, I will advise the Iraqis that they should assume the fiscal responsibility. (Amb Bremer concurs.)

7

c. Creation of Iraqi MoD: The order will be signed and announcement made on March 20, assuming consultations go smoothly. CPA order has been worked thoroughly between CPA and DoD. Input to SECDEF on choice of Iraqi Defense Minister and post-7/1 senior advisors will follow separately and shortly.

d. Threat and Iraqi capabilities: Per inter-agency guidance, we will begin using our consultations with Iraqis to build factual awareness and political consensus concerning threats in and to Iraq, Iraqi capabilities and responsibilities to deal with those threats, and gaps. CJTF7 is involved; DoD links are Policy and J-5.

//SIGNED BY//  
DAVID C. GOMPERT  
Senior Advisor  
Office of National Security Affairs  
Baghdad, Iraq

CC:  
Amb L. Paul Bremer  
GEN John Abizaid

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/25583

March 9, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Chu's Charts

*Advance copy sent*

If you have David Chu's charts, please get them in to me fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-95

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 10879-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25584



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

INFO MEMO

March 3, 2004 - 10:00 A.M

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*copy to [unclear]  
3/18*

*David S.C. Chu  
3 Mar 04*

SUBJECT: Revised Entitlement Charts

- Attached at Tab A is a revised set of entitlement charts and assumptions used to build the charts, responding to your direction (Tab B). As you requested, each chart parses the recent growth of entitlements among retirees (the bulk of the change), actives (very modest change), and the reserves (most near-term potential growth).
- The first chart in the series tabulates the burden on the defense budget from legislation currently in force; the next, if that legislation is extended (e.g., reserve health care expires this year); and the last summarizes the effect of further changes being discussed on the Hill.
- You will note that most of the changes occurred in the last five years or so (the effects are delayed, and do not show up until FY03). We are researching the record of the prior five years, but believe only modest changes were made in that period.

INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATION: *Sanfilippo 512*  
USD (Comptroller)


Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)



**Personnel & Readiness**

**Growth of Entitlements FY02-FY09  
Current Law**




**Reserve** – Includes cost for enhanced Reserve healthcare authorized by the FY03 Supplemental, and the reserve portion of Family Separation Allowance (FSA) from the FY03 Supplemental.

**Active duty** – Includes enhanced healthcare benefits from FY01/02 NDAA and the active portion of FSA from the FY03 Supplemental.

**Retirees** - Includes TFL accrual pmts for benefits in FY01 NDAA, costs for enhanced benefits from FY01/02 NDAA, cost of new Tricare claimants, cost of **2004 NDAA** concurrent receipt- change in accruals, and DoD cost for the repeal of the 1986 Military Retirement Reform Act contained in the FY00 NDAA.

**Personnel & Readiness**

# Growth of Entitlements FY02-FY09 If Current Law is Extended




**Reserve** – Includes cost to extend enhanced Reserve healthcare authorized by FY03 Supplemental, and the Reserve portion of Family Separation Allowance (FSA) from the FY03 Supplemental..

**Active duty** – Includes enhanced healthcare benefits from **FY01/02** NDAA's and cost to extend the active portion of FSA from the FY03 Supplemental assuming current legislation is extended.

**Retirees** - Includes TFL accrual pmts for benefits in **FY01** NDAA, costs for enhanced benefits from **FY01/02** NDAA's, cost of new Tricare claimants, and DoD cost of repeal of the 1986 Military Retirement Reform Act contained in the **FY00** NDAA.

# Growth of Entitlements FY02-FY09 for Past and Potential Legislation

## Personnel & Readiness



**Reserve** - Includes cost to expand Reserve healthcare originally authorized by FY03 Sup, and the reserve portion of Family Separation Allowance (FSA) from the FY03 Sup. Also includes cost of potential legislation for age **55** Reserve retirement.

**Active duty** - Includes enhanced healthcare benefits from **FY01/02** NDAA and the active portion of FSA from the FY03 Supplemental assuming current legislation is extended.

**Retirees** - Includes TFL accrual pmts for benefits in **FY01** NDAA, costs for enhanced benefits from **FY01/02** NDAA, cost of new Tricare claimants, and DoD cost of repeal of the 1986 Military Retirement Reform Act contained in the **FY00** NDAA. Also includes cost of potential legislation to provide for full concurrent receipt, and Survivor Benefit Program offset.

March 9, 2004

TO: Jim Roche  
Gen. John Jumper

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Active/Reserve

I would like to have a look at your proposal for rebalancing the Active component and the Reserve component. It certainly took a lot of Reserves to activate the air bridge, much more than I ever expected. It suggests to me that we need to do a lot more rebalancing than you are currently proposing to do.

Please explain.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-88

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

Sec Def - 3/25

I sent a copy of  
Sec Roche's response  
to Dr Chu for review  
of comment.

Sir,  
Response attached.  
vr/CDR Nosenzo  
3129

✓  
3/25

C

11-L-0559/OSD/25589

OSD 378-2



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
3/25

MAR 24 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Rebalancing Active/Reserve

In response to your questions about rebalancing Air Force Active and Reserve components, I offer the following. Over the past year, we have undertaken the largest airlift effort since World War II. Initial deployments for OIF delivered over 325,000 personnel and 120,000 tons of cargo while concurrently transporting another 80,000 troops and 40,000 tons of cargo for operations in Afghanistan. We are now in the process of a 200,000 personnel swap out. All totaled, these figures exceed passenger and tonnage requirements for two Major Combat Operations. Commercial airlift support is reduced because of combat threats in Iraq.

The Air Bridge to support these operations is a "surge" effort to support contingency operations and not a normal peacetime operation. The air bridge is scalable--the active duty forces are sized to handle numerous small-scale conflicts (e.g. Somalia) or very brief, intense operations (e.g., ALLIED FORCE). For more prolonged, large-scale mobility movements as part of major combat operations, use of the Air Reserve Component is in the plan. A shift of mobility forces toward active duty would mean a surplus of mobility personnel during peacetime.

The Air Force leverages the Reserve Component to be fiscally responsible and cost effective. We use that capability only at the right time and in the right amount. Prior to 9/11, mobility operations did not require the extensive reserve call-ups that were characteristic of Operations OIF/OEF/ONE. OIF/OEF air bridge efforts are not a new steady state as evidenced by our gradual reduction in optempo over the last two years. During OIF, we selectively mobilized the Reserve Component to fulfill Combatant Commander requirements that could not be met by a combination of active forces, reserve full-time personnel and volunteers. We deactivated many of these forces as soon as the requirements were met. Since last August, we have demobilized over 15,000 personnel. These are smart, cost effective business practices that work well for the Air Force and our Nation.

The Air Force continues to aggressively pursue rebalancing initiatives as discussed in the SLRG. We call this the Future Total Force. I have created a Future Total Force office within our headquarters to explore new organizational constructs that integrate Active, Guard, and Reserve units. By integrating some units, we increase available manpower and take advantage of Reserve component experience during surge operations but keep overhead lean during peacetime. As we divest legacy weapon systems, we will increase investments in unmanned aerial vehicles; space capabilities; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.

11-L-0559/OSD/25590

These investments translate into roles and missions that are ideally suited for the Guard and Reserve. Our developing concepts of operations put many Guard and Reserve units into front-line combat roles while reducing the need to mobilize.

The Air Force is reshaping its total force mix and is on target to meet peacetime and contingency requirements. We do not need to extensively rebalance to solve a spike in requirements due to major contingency operations. We will continue to review our force balance against the backdrop of current and future contingency and peacetime operations as we go through our program review for the Program Objective Memorandum '06.

*W.A. Jiri*

Robert G. B. Air Force  
Secretary of the

P.S. - Boss, I don't believe we should seek a "permanent solution" to a "temporary problem." Because our Guard is so well trained, we enjoy a "virtual endline" far larger than our active core. Further, all indications so far point to healthy recruiting and retention in the Guard & Reserve. These Airmen know they are doing something important and noble, and they know they are appreciated.

*W.A. Jiri*

March 9, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Veterans

Here is a letter from someone who is obviously a little frustrated. Why don't you call him and see what he has to say.

Let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/7/04 Weeks ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
030904-13

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 10882-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25592

318  
1420

**George J. Weeks**

USN Retired  
(b)(6)

March 7, 2004

Mr Donald Rumsfeld  
The **Secretary** of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Don

There are over **350 retired** military vets who feel they should receive **some respect and** recognition for their **dedication to their country.**

**We** understand **who** was president **and** secretary of **defense** in 1990 when public law 101-150-N0015, 1990 **was** enacted. **We** also understand the amendments added in 1998.


**What we have a** problem with is **how** the Pentagon **can** hire a COO who **has** never been in the military and has **absolutely** no concept of our way of life, to take our **Trust Fund** and do with what he likes.

I have tried for several months to contact **David Chu** to no **avail**. I have spoken to **Col Pachuto**, **John Moleno**, **Capt Walleck** on several occasions, but without satisfaction.

**We** feel that someone **from** your **office** should meet with us to **answer** several **problems** that we **have**, such as spending 1.9million dollars for a **46** room **expansion** project and **many of the** problems we have.

**We know you will** do the **right thing** by us.

Respectfully,

  
George J. Weeks

USN retired

(b)(6)



March 9, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Quotes

Please use some of these quotes. I think they are worth repeating and certainly send an important message.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Quotes from 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division Calendar

DHR:dh  
030904.3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

350.001:SD

9/11/04

OSD 10883-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25594

SUBJECT: Quotes *(taken from 2004 Calendar of 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division)*

Once we have a war there is only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in war.

*Ernest Miller Hemingway*

Few men are born brave. Many become so through training and force of discipline.

*Flavius Vegetius Renatus*

We've got the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on the run. One by one the terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.

*President George W. Bush*

To foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power.

*Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart*

People sleep peaceably in their beds at night because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.

*George Orwell*

When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen.

*George Washington*

No man is worth his salt who is not ready at all times to risk his body, to risk his well being, to risk his life, in a great cause.

*Theodore Roosevelt*

We make war that we may live in peace.

*Aristotle*

Victory is reserved for those who are willing to pay its price.

*Sun Zi*

I am a soldier, I fight where I am told, and I win where I fight.

*General George Patton, Jr.*

Only our individual faith in freedom can keep us free.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

A better world shall emerge based on faith and understanding.

*General Douglas MacArthur*

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty.

*John F. Kennedy*

DHR:dh  
Current MFRS/Quotes

March 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
cc: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Review NSC Notes

334 NSC

Steve Hadley apparently is going to have you go over the notes as to what the Administration did between January 20, 2001 and September 11, 2001.

You probably should do that soon, and then get back to me, so I can have some sense of it. Apparently he is going to have you and Armitage go over it. That's what Condi told me.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-3

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

3/19/04

OSD 10885-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Croatia

I talked to Condi and Colin about Croatia.

1. Colin is going to delay inviting the Prime Minister. They say they are going to work on Croatia to do some other things. I said the PM just came into office, so it is hard to hold him accountable. Colin said they want to see more progress before they give him an Oval Office meeting.
2. With respect to the shipyard deal, Colin and Condi both said they were for it and the problem is there are some sanction laws. Colin has to go through certain legal steps to lift the sanctions. He says his people are working on it.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
030404-14

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 10886-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25598

3/11  
12:30

72

3/15

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

March 8, 2004

TO: Dov Zakheim

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paying for Secondary Roads

*Lerty Di Piter*  
*3/15*

H  
3  
6

Zal claims you said we could pay for secondary roads from a defense standpoint.  
What is that about?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-15

.....  
Please respond by 3/12/04

3/11/04

*✓*  
*3/15*

→ SD

I spoke to Zakheim about this and conveyed your thoughts

Doug Feith

cc ISH  
SOLIC

3/15/04

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

OSD 10887-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25599

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Estonia

Please let me know if, when and where we put nuclear submarines near Estonia and how often.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-23

.....  
Please respond by

3/19/04

OSD 10888-04

11-L-0559/OSD/25600

TO: Larry Di Rita  
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Lunch Meeting w/HHS

Let's set up a lunch with Secretary Thompson regarding the hospital in Kabul.

The correspondence includes material from Joe Collins. What does SOLIC have to do with this subject?

For the meeting, please have Lanzilotta, Collins (if he is the guy), Winkenwerder and anyone else you think should be there,

Thanks.

Attach.

3/5/04 Sec HHS letter to SecDef re: Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital

DHR:dh  
030804-68

.....  
Please respond by 4/2/04

*Cathy M*  
Larry Di Rita  
3/8

Done  
March 8, 2004  
3/26

00000000

S. H. ...

030804-68





THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAR -5 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your note of February 27 regarding our joint activities at Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital (RBH) in Kabul, Afghanistan. I appreciate the time you took to write. In response, I thought I would provide you with an assessment of the actions our two Departments have taken to date to address the physical infrastructure of the hospital and the training we have initiated for the benefit of the hospital staff.

As you know, emblematic of the problems found throughout Afghanistan, the hospital suffers from a multitude of problems after years of neglect and willful destruction during twenty years of civil war. As a result, when our two Departments jointly agreed to work at RBH, it operated as a hospital in name only, and was missing many of the components found in even the most basic hospitals in many developing countries. Since the time we teamed together in late 2002, we have jointly been able to implement a number of critical improvements at the facility, and have upgraded not only the physical infrastructure but also the skills of the staff to handle the current patient caseload.

Specific health-related improvements at RBH in the last 18 months include the following:

- Maternal and Child Health Teaching Clinics began in April 2003 with continuous physician and nurse-midwife consultant rotations;
- 9 Dramatic drop in hospital-based maternal and infant mortality rates from 10 per week in the first quarter of 2003 to less than one per week during the last quarter of 2003;
- 9 Drop in post-operative infection rate from over 50 percent prior to October 2003; to 16 percent in October; 2.3 percent in January 2004; and 0 percent during the first two weeks of February;
- 9 Establishment of RBH's first emergency room, which has already saved lives;
- Expansion and renovation of a newborn nursery and opening of a newborn discharge room;
- 9 Start of rudimentary medical records program (no records system existed before at all);
- 9 Start of quality-assurance workshow;
- Opening of computer lab with Internet links;
- Start of environmental rounds for review of sanitation and infection-control measures;
- 9 Initiation of significant events-reporting system for tracking unnecessary deaths and other adverse events; and
- 9 Improved education and training of cleaning and maintenance staff.

Page 2 - The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Specific facility improvements at RBH in the last 18 months include the following:

- RBH is now on an independent line connection to the city power supply (previously shared with a dental clinic);
- Emergency power generator is operational;
- Second, smaller emergency power generator is operational (donated by Japan);
- Medical-waste incinerator is operational;
- Hospital is on a separate, clean water well (previously shared with a dental clinic);
- Emergency diesel fuel is now available;
- HHS has provided \$15,000 for emergency plumbing and electrical repairs;
- The Department of Defense (DoD) will initiate a janitorial and maintenance contract;
- Approval of Special Commander's Emergency Response Program funds for cleaning of floors is pending action; and
- Numerous safety and humanitarian external improvements are underway.

In association with the janitorial and maintenance contract, HHS and DoD have pledged to work with RBH and the Afghan Ministry of Health (MOH) to develop a model program of a Voluntary Nominal Fee System, the first-ever fee-for-service program for the MOH.

Additionally, since Congress has now appropriated Fiscal Year 2004 funds to HHS for the support of this activity, we will soon initiate a request for proposals from non-governmental groups to operate this program on a long-term, performance-based contract. This will ensure we can maintain and build upon the results we have seen so far. Furthermore, we will issue a second request for proposals that will initiate our long-term residency program in obstetrics and gynecology. This program will likely be awarded to a U.S. university or medical school that has significant experience with working in developing countries. Through a combination of these two programs, we will lay the base for significant improvement of the staff and operations at RBH, and in turn, the hospital will serve as a model for the rest of the nation.

While funding for these two programs is assured, what has not yet been resolved is the extent to which we will be able to improve the physical infrastructure of the hospital. As you must have heard on your trip to Afghanistan, we need to improve the working environment of the hospital to more effectively operate our training programs. We are currently waiting for the results of an assessment of the hospital undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Kabul. Preliminary findings indicate a strong imperative to address the plumbing, sewer, and electrical systems at the hospital, in addition to the maintenance and emergency repairs we are currently supporting. Estimates of the needs have run as high as \$2 million, which we understand exceed the current guidelines for this sort of humanitarian work set by your Department. I would welcome further discussions with you to identify sources of funding for renovation. Additionally, we might wish to consider outside sources of funding from private groups. For your reference, I have enclosed copies of recent correspondence between my staff and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins, Ph.D., on this topic.


I understand that you might have heard on your trip that another maternity hospital in Kabul, Malalai, is doing better **than RBH**. There is a growing competition of sorts (healthy for the most part) between RBH and Malalai, that might have been in play. It is true that, on the surface, Malalai looks better than RBH, without doubt, because of a better paint job, better lighting, and regular maintenance and cleaning. However, Afghan and American physicians (not **only those** involved in our project) tend to say that the staff at RBH **are** better trained and have skills that **surpass those** of doctors at Malalai. Additionally, Malalai is referring its more **difficult** cases to RBH, and patients are often found to be transferring themselves from Malalai to RBH for **better care**. So, while superficially Malalai looks to the untrained eye to be a better facility, patients seem to be voting with their feet for **RBH**.

The bottom line is that conditions at RBH **are** improving, and the care being provided to mothers and their infants there is better now than it **has** been in many years—perhaps **since** the **mid-1980s** or before. We still have much work to do, of course, but we can be proud of the energy and commitment our two Departments have demonstrated in the course of **the last year and a half**. Our next step is to expand our joint program from Kabul to other sites within Afghanistan, as we agreed. We are working with DoD and **the** Afghan Ministry of Public Health to identify potential sites for **additional** maternal and child health teaching clinics for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005.

Thank you again for the support you and your team provided to make **my visit** to Iraq possible. You have much to be proud of in the Coalition Provisional Authority's accomplishments in **the country** so far, and my Department and I are pleased to be able to contribute in **some small way**. I **am** also contemplating mother stopover to **Afghanistan** in association with a visit to the Middle **East** and **South Asia** next month, and I would appreciate **any** assistance you can **render** in **this** regard to make **this** visit a **success**.

I **look** forward to continuing our dialogue on both Iraq and Afghanistan. As always, **thank** you for your friendship and **your** great leadership in these **trying** times.

Sincerely,

  
Tommy G. Thompson

*P.S. Lets have lunch at your convenience and discuss how we can better serve the women & children in Afghanistan! Tommy*



## DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &amp; HUMAN SERVICES

Office of the Secretary

Office of International Affairs  
Washington, D.C. 20201

JAN 2 2004

Joseph Collins, Ph.D.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability Operations  
U.S. Department of Defense  
2000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000

Dear Dr. Collins:

Please accept my best wishes to you and your family for a healthy and blessed New Year. Thank you for taking the time to meet with me on December 8. We had a productive discussion that day that reaffirmed the partnership between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the commitment by our respective Secretaries to improve the health and welfare of the Afghan people and to ensure the stability and security of that country.

To follow up regarding Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital (RBH) in Kabul, we would like to reiterate the need to complete the necessary renovations at RBH for us to maintain and expand our existing training program there. As we discussed, problems at RBH are in three main areas: training, administration, and physical infrastructure. HHS is addressing the first two needs of training and administration through our on-the-ground staff of physicians, nurses, midwives, and administrators, who are providing needed expertise to the staff at RBH. In addition to didactic training and improving the clinical skills of physicians, nurses, and midwives, we are also providing medical English classes to the staff, and implementing numerous initiatives to improve the overall administration of the hospital, including such basic systems as infection control, inventory control, personnel, record-keeping, and pharmacy management. Senior hospital administrators from HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs have been providing needed expert advice on a continuous basis.

While carrying out these activities, our instructors and RBH staff have encountered severe problems with the physical infrastructure of the hospital that negatively affect the quality of teaching by our faculty and ultimately the quality of care by the Afghan doctors and nurses. The poor physical condition and layout of the hospital complex, the lack of maintenance and repair services at the hospital, and the substandard utilities infrastructure that serves the facility are all challenges that impede our ability to meet our shared goals. Major deficiencies exist in the electrical system, the water supply including plumbing, and waste management systems at RBH. Furthermore, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health is currently not capable of providing the necessary maintenance required to sustain the primary functions of a major hospital. RBH regularly suffers from extensive power outages, sewerage system failures, including backed-up sewers, and waste collection system failures that result in the uncontrolled accumulation of biohazardous wastes.

Page 2 - Joseph Collins, Ph.D.

As a result of these problems, our HHS trainers are not able to work effectively in the substandard environment, and, because of utility deficiencies, the hospital cannot install essential equipment donated by DoD and others. A number of visitors to RBH from the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) based in Kabul have taken note of these circumstances and are developing various proposals to address the problems at RBH. CAPT Jose Cuzme, one of our senior hospital engineers at HHS, whom you met, made an assessment of the situation. I am enclosing an abbreviated trip report by CAPT Cuzme with his major findings and recommendations, as well as the latest weekly report on our work at RBH that we delivered to Secretary Thompson. We would be glad to discuss these findings in more detail, if you wish.

We are eager to continue cooperative efforts with DoD to address these problems and establish an effective, sustainable health care facility at RBH. Thus, I encourage your efforts to negotiate and fund a contract through JCMOTF with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health to provide some regular maintenance at RBH. In doing so, I would hope that JCMOTF would keep the requirements made of the Ministry commensurate with the level of investment DoD is planning to make.

Furthermore, we here at HHS would appreciate the opportunity to expand our partnership with DoD, particularly the Army Corps of Engineers and JCMOTF, in drafting and implementing plans for the renovation of the facility's electrical and water/sewage systems. We hope that DoD would be willing to make the capital investments necessary to bring RBH up to acceptable standards of hygiene and safety. At a minimum, we at HHS believe DoD should underwrite the costs of implementing CAPT Cuzme's first set of recommendations, although we consider his second option outlined in the attached trip report a better, long-term solution. We at HHS will be pleased to work with you on this important renovation. Our goal is to have a sustainable environment in which we can effectively operate our training program in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, your office and JCMOTF, for the betterment of Afghan mothers and children.

Our joint DoD-HHS activities at RBH have helped us understand the challenges we will face as we expand our program of maternal and child teaching clinics into other areas of Afghanistan. As we discussed last week, Jalalabad is under serious consideration as the next site for our training program. HHS and DoD staff visited this location in October and noted that the major requirements seem to be in place. Our next step is to ask for an assessment by our non-governmental organization (NGO) partner, International Medical Corps, to ensure it feels confident that its staff can operate in that environment. On the assumption that the answer will be positive, we are going ahead with plans to allocate funding for this location.

Page 3 - Joseph Collins, Ph.D.

You might be interested to know that one of our staff in Kabul was invited to participate in the opening of the headquarters for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar. In addition to observing the opening ceremonies, he was able to meet with some provincial health officials who welcomed our efforts. As you noted during our meeting, however, our staff member did not think the security situation was appropriate for our program just yet. He also had an opportunity to make a visit himself to Jalalabad and had good discussions with local health officials.

Finally, I would like to thank you for keeping HHS in mind when staffing the PRTs. We consider the PRTs a major component of the U. S. Government's commitment to assisting Afghanistan, and I would like to propose that HHS assign personnel to the Jalalabad PRT as a potential first step. To that end, we have already begun to identify staff who would be interested in contributing to the efforts of the PRT in Jalalabad. Some of the proposed staff have had significant military experience and would work well in the PRT environment in lending public health and clinical expertise to the team.

Thank you again for meeting with my staff and me. I look forward to continuing our conversations and to accomplishing our objectives in Afghanistan. Please accept my best wishes for a happy and healthy holiday season.

Sincerely,



William R. Steiger, Ph.D.  
Special Assistant to the Secretary  
for International Affairs

Enclosures

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/  
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTOFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

JAN 27 2004

William R. Steiger, Ph.D.  
Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Affairs  
Office of the Secretary  
Department of Health and Human Services  
Washington DC 20201

Dear Dr. Steiger:

Thank you for meeting with us on December 8, 2003 and for your letter of January 2, 2004 regarding Rabi Balkhi Women's Hospital (RBH) in Kabul Afghanistan. I appreciate the work Health and Human Services (HHS) has done to improve the hospital. DoD will continue to support HHS staff in Afghanistan with meals, lodging and other logistical support.

In addition to the challenges for RBH that you identified - training, administration and physical infrastructure, the lack of an adequate hospital operating budget and overall hospital administration and management are issues that the Afghanistan government needs to address.

Below are specific comments, from information we obtained from TF-180 and Central Command, and updates on physical infrastructure issues:

Joint task Force 180 (JTF-180) staff has been working with the U.S. Corps of Engineers through support of USAID to complete an extensive assessment and technical design plan for reconstruction of the hospital's electrical wiring/power systems and plumbing, wastewater and waste disposal systems, which are the issues noted in Option 1 of CAPT Curms's report. It is best to await the results and estimates of this very extensive effort before committing any additional resources to reconstruction at RBH. These detailed plans are expected to be completed by the end of January. The construction required for HHS Option 2, with its estimated cost of \$1 -2 million, exceeds the rudimentary level of work that the Department of Defense (DOD) seeks to adhere to in its humanitarian work.

DOD is drafting a project to provide one year of maintenance coverage at RBH. We are working with the Afghanistan Ministry of Health to ensure that this maintenance responsibility will be assumed by the Afghans in successive years. Additionally, we have identified a number of critical administrative, management and training requirements that will improve the ministry's chances to sustain the expected investments. We ask HHS assistance to insure progress on these actions, in particular, the development of plans for an effective management of

the janitorial and maintenance program, and the essential staff and patient training programs.

ITF-180 staff has informed us that the German Medical Service, a German nongovernmental organization, has worked with them and RBH staff to connect the hospital to an existing deep well at the front side of the dental clinic to provide a safe source of drinking water. If you have additional information on the water system we would appreciate it and will investigate further.

In the HHS weekly report of January 2, 2004, it states that International Medical Corps (IMC) is investigating the possibility of renting tanker trucks to provide regular pumping of the septic tanks. This is an excellent idea and, with the plumbing maintenance, should reduce clogged sinks and sewage backups. Past "sewage system failures" have been linked to the disposal by RBH staff of bandages, medical waste etc., in sinks and toilets. Training of staff to prevent pipe blockages is needed. Construction of a sewer system to divert effluent to the Kabul River exceeds the rudimentary Level of work required of Department of Defense (DOD) humanitarian projects.

We are informed by TF-180 staff that the medical incinerator had been operational but its motors broke due to overheating attributed to incorrect installation. Repairs have been completed and the incinerator is operational as of 12 January. Hospital maintenance staff has already been trained in the proper use of the incinerator. We encourage HHS to influence the hospital administration to establish an effective medical waste disposal policy, protocol and implement medical staff training to insure that the advantage of having a medical incinerator is beneficial to the long-term infection control needs of the hospital.


As you know, backup power is an issue we have been working on and will continue to pursue until the electrical system is fully functional. We are informed that both generators have been operational for over a month. US JID provided the initial allocation of fuel for the 400 KW generator and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is committed to providing fuel for a number of months for the smaller generator which they installed. Hospital staff has received appropriate training and we are regularly monitoring the proper use of the generator and the extent of fuel usage of the main generator especially.

Extensive alterations to walls may lead to a project that is not appropriate for a DOD humanitarian project. If you can identify which walls you would like evaluated for structural design, DOD could assist you. If HHS could provide more specific recommendations for floor and wall finishes needed to provide a more sanitary environment, we will consider doing this work. Lighting upgrades will be included with the electrical upgrade project. TF-180 staff will provide HHS the final reports from the Corps of Engineers; HHS could indicate at that time any suggested changes or additions.

DoD welcomes HHS participation in the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). To facilitate HHS participation, I suggest we arrange a meeting with Department of State staff. Please contact COL Sam Jones at (b)(6) to talk over the mechanics of setting up such a meeting.

Again, thanks for all of HHS's efforts to improve Afghanistan maternal and child healthcare. We look to continuing our productive partnership in the future and addressing the range of challenges that we have identified here.

Sincerely,

  
Joseph J. Collins  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Stability Operations

**AFGHANISTAN TRIP REPORT**  
**José F. Cuzme, P.E.**  
**U.S. Public Health Service**  
**Indian Health Service**  
**U.S. Department of Health and Human Services**  
**November 17 - 23, 2003**

**PURPOSE:**

- **To** assess the current conditions of Rabia Balhki Hospital (RBH) in Kabul, including the water system, sewerage treatment and disposal, solid waste management, and power facilities.
- **To** identify potential conceptual infrastructure alternatives for a sustainable maternity hospital.
- To identify stabilization priority needs to stop the weakening of the existing supporting infrastructure of the hospital.
- To develop recommendations of adequate space and staffing in conjunction with health professionals assigned to the HHS initiative that is assisting RBH.

**FINDINGS:**

- **Water System:** The existing water supply is polluted and limited in quantity. The existing RBH well is not functional and has been disconnected. DoD has tested water from the RBH well in front of the emergency room for coliform counts. The tests reflect coliform counts of 1275, which are extremely high. RBH instead relies on a water supply from the Dental Hospital next door. A new well and storage facilities are necessary to provide the quantities of safe and clean water needed by RBH.
- **Sewage System:** RBH suffers from constantly clogged sinks and sewage backups in toilets. Buildings A, B, and C have each a septic tank or tanks of unknown dimensions that drain onto the grounds as they fill. It is speculated that these septic tanks are about 2 by 3 meters and 3 meters deep. They are essentially cesspools designed to be vertical in nature, which allows percolation through the tank walls. MOH has arrangements to pump these tanks twice a week with a hydro pump truck of 3700 liters. MOH indicated that the pump trucks belong to another hospital and are in poor condition from age and usage. Our recommended solution is to reconfigure the sewer system to create a new wastewater system and divert effluent to the nearby Kabul River.
- **Electrical System:** The electrical system is inadequate throughout RBH. As a result, the HHS-supported trainers and hospital staff are unable to use donated medical equipment and heaters. Our recommended solution is to externally wire the entire complex with a capacity matched to anticipated needs.

- **Medical Waste:** Inadequate disposal of medical waste is a constant source of new infections throughout RBH. Medical waste is deposited into recycled paint buckets available in the medical treatment rooms and emptied periodically into 40-gallon steel drums located in front of the generator and incinerator building. An attempt at medical waste disposal was observed, using supplemental fuel in an existing incinerator, which proved unsuccessful. Repeated attempts during my visit were equally unsuccessful.
- **Power Supply:** Power outages occur every two to four hours because of the overcapacity of the city power system. RBH does not have backup power, because the existing 400 KW generator and a 65 KW generator donated by the Japanese Government remain unconnected to the hospital. Problems continue because of a lack of fuel and batteries, poor communications, or other reasons. CMCOORD has expended major effort to work with the Ministry of Power to restore electricity.
- **Structures:** The RBH buildings are of solid stones and blocks, and are 70 years old. The unreinforced masonry structure, with walls up to two feet thick, makes partition relocation difficult. Structural design advice is needed for all load-bearing walls that could need removal or alteration. The floor tiles have a deteriorated finish that is prohibitively expensive to repair. The buildings have very poor lighting throughout, no handrails at the stairs, failed sinks, leaking pipes and faucets, poorly painted walls, and an unsanitary environment. All of these factors contribute to an environment favorable for infections and the transmission of disease.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

**Option 1:** Address the immediate priorities of access to fresh water, wastewater treatment, waste disposal, and external electrical wiring, without addressing structural issues related to physical space. This low-cost (under \$500,000) course of action can be accomplished within one year. However, this is clearly a stop-gap solution that will need re-addressing within a matter of five years.

**Option 2:** Demolish the combined administrative building and outpatient department (Building C). Use cleared space for a wastewater treatment system for RBH. Construct a new building with all administration functions on the second floor and supply and facility maintenance on the first floor.

**Shift** all inpatient services to the main building (Building A). Relocate all surgery, labor and delivery, and other inpatient services to the second floor of Building A. Put inpatient beds and dining facilities on the first floor. This option will require the installation of an elevator suitable for the Afghan environment.

Shift all outpatient services to Building B. Provide an enclosed passage from the second floor of Building B to the second floor of Building A so that gurneys can be moved between buildings. This medium-cost solution (\$1-2 million) will take approximately two years to accomplish, but is a longer-lasting approach.

Option 3: Do nothing with RBH and focus attention on working with the MOH to develop and implement a plan that will drastically reduce the number of patients referred to RBH. This plan would acknowledge the severe limitations of the RBH infrastructure and will force the MOH to reconfigure current plans that rely on RBH to serve a large population of patients. This will also affect HHS' plans to use RBH as a location for a maternal and child health teaching clinic.

(A related option is to suggest that the MOH decommission RBH entirely and sell the potentially valuable property to commercial land developers. The proceeds could be used to construct a new facility elsewhere. The cost of this option is unknown, but will likely take several years to implement and could require the infusion of new resources at other facilities in the Kabul region. Note that this is a decision that the U.S. Government cannot unilaterally implement, but instead is one the Ministry of Health would have to make.)

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DF*  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

I think we ought to get back to the President of Uzbekistan and explain what that article he was waving in my face was, and what it wasn't.

Please draft something.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
030804-46

.....  
Please respond by 3/19/04

UZBEKISTAN

8 MAR 2004

OSD 10890-04

March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
 SUBJECT: Responsibility for Relationships

I think we ought to develop a system where you tell me who is the person responsible for maintaining the relationship with all key countries.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-49

.....  
 Please respond by 3/19/04

*7.1.04*

*8.6.04*

OSD 10891-04