

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense Regarding
Snowflake–Electronic Health Record

COORDINATIONS

MHS CIO	Concurred. 8/26/04
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA <i>JCC/TMA</i>	Concurred, 8/26/04 <i>forwarded for review 9-3-04</i>
Chief of Staff, TMA	<i>DHLA 9/3</i>
Deputy Dir, TMA	_____
Chief of Staff (HA)	_____
APDASD (HA)	_____

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Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE · ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		DATE
MHS CIO	see below	Aug. 26, 2004
DASD (FHP&R)	<u>Ed Bremer*</u>	<u>8/30/2004</u>
DASD (C&PP)	_____	_____
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	_____	_____
Chief of Staff, TMA	_____	_____
Deputy Dir, TMA	_____	_____
Chief of Staff (HA)	_____	_____
APDASD (HA)	_____	_____

*The paper from Newt is much broader than electronic health records and speaks to "drivers of health transformation" and "9 strategies for transforming health" which are much more relevant to what we are doing to transform the MHS (but included are the info technologies we have discussed)

The current response deals w/ IT only - okay but I think we are missing opportunity to talk about subjects "in quotes" above. - Ellen

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE - ELECTRONIC *HEALTH* RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		DATE
MHS CIO	<u>JOB</u>	<u>8/25/04</u>
Chief of Staff (HA)	_____	_____
APDASD (HA)	_____	_____
DASD (FHP&R)	_____	_____
DASD (C&PP)	<u>JWS For Dr. Taraberg</u>	<u>1 Sep 04</u> <u>24 Aug 04</u>

Response to Honorable Newt Gingrich Memo to the Secretary of Defense
Regarding SNOWFLAKE - ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD

COORDINATIONS

		<u>DATE</u>
MHS CIO	see below	Aug. 26, 2004
DASD (FHP&R)		
DASD (C&PP)		
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	SEEN	8/26
Chief of Staff, TMA		
Deputy Dir, TMA		
Chief of Staff (HA)		
APDASD (HA)		

September 17, 2004

TO: Paul McHale
Gen Ed Eberhart
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Issues in Homeland Defense

384

I'd like to see an interim report or brief that outlines how we are doing on addressing maritime issues with regard to homeland defense and DoD responsibilities. I know there is considerable work and thought ongoing, but my sense is that we need to have a plan in place now to respond to maritime terrorist threats in a layered fashion - essentially a Maritime NORAD concept.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-6

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

175epoy

OSD 14123-04

~~FOUO~~

September 17, 2004.

TO: Paul McHale
Gen Ed Eberhart
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Issues in Homeland Defense

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DHR:ss
091704-6

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Please respond by 10/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14126-04


11-L-0559/OSD/26622

September 17, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart
LTG Steven Blum, National Guard

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricane Response

Thanks for all the hard work preparing for and responding to Hurricanes Frances, Charlie, and Ivan. Both of your organizations made major contributions to ensuring the safety and well being of hundreds of thousands of Americans – well done. I know there is more hard work in the days ahead, as the Southeast recovers from these storms, and I thank you for it.

DHR:ss
091704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

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17 Sep 04


~~FOUO~~

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DHR:ss
091704-4

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Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14127-04


11-L-0559/OSD/26624

September 17, 2004

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart
LTG Steven *Blum*, National Guard

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld



SUBJECT: Hurricane Response

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DHR:ss
091704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

SEP 20 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Tom O'Connell
GEN John Abizaid
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Drug Labs in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

We need to get our hands around the drug labs in Afghanistan and what our approach is going to be. There are many questions:

- What exactly constitutes a drug lab?
- How big are they?
- How many people work there?
- Do we have reliable intelligence as to their locations?
- What are the ROE for hitting them?

Before we undertake a mission like that, we would need to coordinate within the interagency and get everyone on board.

Please get back to me with some thoughts on all this soon.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-5

.....
Please respond by 10/10/04

rosepy

September 17, 2004

TO: VADM Keith Lippert, DLA

cc: GEN Dick Myers
GEN Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: DLA SLRG Brief

After receiving your briefing at yesterday's SLRG, I was impressed with the excellent progress you have achieved at DLA over the past three years. I am delighted you will be around to keep at it - experience helps. So does energy and enthusiasm.

334

Thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
091704-2



Please respond by _____

OSD 14197-04

17 Sept 04

TAB A

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

AFRICA

Please tell me what this memo from EUCOM is about.

Thanks.

Attach.
09/03/04 EUCOM Memo to SecDef re: Africa Clearing House Initiative

DHR:ss
090704-46

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

11-L-0559/OSD/26628

TAB A

Tab A

100504

11-L-0559/OSD/26628

OSD 14274-04

OH 9/7



COMMANDER
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

ECCC

3 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, 1000
Defense Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House initiative

1. Purpose. US European Commands Africa Clearing House (ACH) initiative is a **major** part of the command's overall **strategy** of security cooperation in **Africa**. This memorandum **outlines** the 'way ahead' of the program.
2. Discussion. The ACH is a forum for **security assistance** coordination, **collaboration**, and **de-confliction** among donor nations and an information exchange forum between NATO, the EU, and key partner countries. The inaugural ACH conference was hosted and co-chaired by the Luxembourg Army and EUCOM in May 2004. **Representatives** from thirteen countries, the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade, European Union Military Staff, the African Center for Strategic Studies, and **OSD participated**. The **regional focus** of this first conference was West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The next ACH conference is scheduled for 22-23 November 2004 and will focus on the North Africa and Pan-Sahel regions.
3. Way Ahead. The ACH Initiative was implemented to maximize the impact of EUCOM's theater security cooperation program in Africa. It provides a forum that focuses on the **mutual strategic interests** of the United States and its allies, an environment that promotes coordination of **strategy** and investments to further those interests. The overall objective is to provide a **common strategy** for security providers, share objectives, and create a **mechanism to match objectives** with resources. To more fully realize the initiative's potential, the command will amplify the **scope** of ACH and further deepen cooperation with major partners.
 - a. EUCOM is looking to **broaden the scope** of ACH by further **identifying** shared objectives throughout Africa. **Our goal is to raise** the shared awareness within the community of security providers—**coordinate** all national efforts by bringing visibility to each nation's investments, identify **overlaps** and disconnects, **close** gaps, and eventually influence national engagement strategies. The annual **Africa Exercise Coordination Meeting** will be included in the next ACH conference to **more effectively** link **current exercise plans** and develop **future exercise contributions** focused on ACH objectives.

Tab A


ECCC

SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House Initiative

b. EUCOM will expand cooperation by forming regional working groups aligned with current African regional organizations and the African Union's (AU) Response Force concept to coordinate efforts on broader trans-regional issues such as military education, sovereign control, and border and maritime security. Several partners have already shown strong interest in chairing those regional working groups. Additionally, we will assess whether or not we should increase the frequency of the conference.

c. Capitalizing on the momentum generated by the May 2004 conference, where the major ACH partners and participants agreed to support the development of an "engagement database" to link ACH-generated objectives with the engagement activities of contributing nations, we plan to invite representatives from both the AU and Africa regional security organizations to participate in the next conference. The database will be organized by region and support the AU Regional Response Force (ARRF) development.

4. Conclusion. The May 2004 baseline ACH conference was an excellent beginning. Cooperation between EUCOM and major sponsor partners is growing. EUCOM's multinational effort in support of ECOWAS is an example of what can be accomplished within the context of such cooperation. Our work with the ACW will help export that success to other regions on the African continent.


JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corp

CF:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 SEP 21 11:11:33
OH-2062-04
21 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

- **Issue.** "Please tell me what this memo from EUCOM is about." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The USEUCOM memorandum provides an update on its efforts to coordinate security cooperation efforts in Africa with US allies who have mutual strategic interests.
- **Discussion.** USEUCOM is attempting to maximize the effectiveness of limited US security assistance by establishing a forum where NATO, European Union and other allies can coordinate activities and/or funding to achieve shared regional security objectives.
 - Africa Clearing House (ACH) *erves* as a multinational clearinghouse for interested countries to share information on their security cooperation and/or engagement programs in order to deconflict events and determine areas on which to cooperate.
 - ACH is a step forward in meeting one of the USG's G-8 commitments approved in June 2004 to develop a clearinghouse mechanism for Africa.
 - Additionally, the African Exercise Coordination Meeting (a CJCS-sponsored event which has met annually since May 1998) will be incorporated into the ACH. This will support improving both allied engagement and the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations capabilities of African militaries.
 - The initial ACH conference was hosted and co-chaired by the Luxembourg Army and USEUCOM in Senningen, Luxembourg (May 2004). Representatives from more than 15 countries and/or organizations (including OSD/International Security Affairs-Africa) participated.
 - USEUCOM will host the next ACH Conference, 13-14 December 2004, in Stuttgart, Germany.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 14274-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26631

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

September 7, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: EUCOM Memo

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Thanks.

Attach.

09/03/04 EUCOM ~~Memo~~ to SecDef re: Africa Clearing House Initiative

DHR:ss
090704-46

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

11
03
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~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/26632

OSD 14274-04

06/09/04

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ECCC

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
Tab A

ECCC
SUBJECT: Africa Clearing House Initiative

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JAMES L. JONES
General, U.S. Marine Corps

CF:

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Col Wheeler	USEUCOM	15 September 2004
Mr. Whelan	DASD (ISA/AF)	15 September 2004

September 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Paper on Terrorism

Attached is an interesting paper on the problem of terrorism and the global struggle our country is engaged in.

Respectfully,

Attach.
"A View from the Eye of the Storm" by Haim Harari

DIIR:ss
092004-20

000.5

21 SEP 04

OSD 14285-04

A View from the Eye of the Storm

Talk delivered by Haim Harari at a meeting of the International Advisory Board of a large multi-national corporation, April, 2004. Haim Harari is one of Israel's foremost physicists and Ex-president of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

"As you know, I usually provide the scientific and technological "entertainment" in our meetings, but, on this occasion, our Chairman suggested that I present my own personal view on events in the part of the world from which I come. I have never been and I will never be a Government official and I have no privileged information. My perspective is entirely based on what I see, on what I read and on the fact that my family has lived in this region for almost 200 years. You may regard my views as those of the proverbial taxi driver, which you are supposed to question, when you visit a country.

I could have shared with you some fascinating facts and some personal thoughts about the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, I will touch upon it only in passing. I prefer to devote most of my remarks to the broader picture of the region and its place in world events. I refer to the entire area between Pakistan and Morocco, which is predominantly Arab, predominantly Moslem, but includes many non-Arab and also significant non-Moslem minorities. Why do I put aside Israel and its own immediate neighborhood? Because Israel and any problems related to it, in spite of what you might read or hear in the world media, is not the central issue, and has never been the central issue in the upheaval in the region. Yes, there is a 100 year-old Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is not where the main show is. The millions who died in the Iran-Iraq war had nothing to do with Israel. The mass murder happening right now in Sudan, where the Arab Moslem regime is massacring its black Christian citizens, has nothing to do with Israel. The frequent reports from Algeria about the murders of hundreds of civilian in one village or another by other Algerians have nothing to do with Israel. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait, endangered Saudi Arabia and butchered his own people because of Israel. Egypt did not use poison gas against Yemen in the 60's because of Israel. Assad the Father did not kill tens of thousands of his own citizens in one week in El Hamma in Syria because of Israel. The Taliban control of Afghanistan and the civil war there had nothing to do with Israel. The Libyan blowing up of the Pan-Am flight had nothing to do with Israel, and I could go on and on and on.

The root of the trouble is that this entire Moslem region is totally dysfunctional, by any standard of the word, and would have been so even if Israel would have joined the Arab League and an independent Palestine would have existed for 100 years. The 22 member countries of the Arab league, from Mauritania to the Gulf States, have a total population of 300 millions, larger than the US and almost as large as the EU before its expansion. They have a land area larger than either

the US or all of Europe. These 22 countries, with all their oil and natural resources, have a combined GDP smaller than that of Netherlands plus Belgium and equal to half of the GDP of California alone. Within this meager GDP, the gaps between rich and poor are beyond belief and too many of the rich made their money not by succeeding in business, but by being corrupt rulers.

The social status of women is far below what it was in the Western World 150 years ago. Human rights are below any reasonable standard, in spite of the grotesque fact that Libya was elected Chair of the UN Human Rights commission. According to a report prepared by a committee of Arab intellectuals and published under the auspices of the U.N., the number of books translated by the entire Arab world is much smaller than what little Greece alone translates. The total number of scientific publications of 300 million Arabs is less than that of 6 million Israelis. Birth rates in the region are very high, increasing the poverty, the social gaps and the cultural decline.

And all of this is happening in a region, which only 30 years ago, was believed to be the next wealthy part of the world, and in a Moslem area, which developed, at some point in history, one of the most advanced cultures in the world. It is fair to say that this creates an unprecedented breeding ground for cruel dictators, terror networks, fanaticism, incitement, suicide murders and general decline. It is also a fact that almost everybody in the region blames this situation on the United States, on Israel, on Western Civilization, on Judaism and Christianity, on anyone and anything, except themselves. Do I say all of this with the satisfaction of someone discussing the failings of his enemies? On the contrary, I firmly believe that the world would have been a much better place and my own neighborhood would have been much more pleasant and peaceful, if things were different. I should also say a word about the millions of decent, honest, good people who are either devout Moslems or are not very religious but grew up in Moslem families. They are double victims of an outside world, which now develops Islam phobia and of their own environment, which breaks their heart by being totally dysfunctional. The problem is that the vast silent majority of these Moslems are not part of the terror and of the incitement but they also do not stand up against it. They become accomplices, by omission, and this applies to political leaders, intellectuals, business people and many others. Many of them can certainly tell right from wrong, but are afraid to express their views.

The events of the last few years have amplified four issues, which have always existed, but have never been as rampant as in the present upheaval in the region. These are the four main pillars of the current World Conflict, or perhaps we should already refer to it as "the undeclared World War III." I have no better name for the present situation. A few more years may pass before everybody acknowledges that it is a World War, but we are already well into it.

The first element is the suicide murder. Suicide murders are not a new invention but they have been made popular, if I may use this

expression, only lately. Even after September 11, it seems that most of the Western World does not yet understand this weapon. It is a very potent psychological weapon. Its real direct impact is relatively minor. The total number of casualties from hundreds of suicide murders within Israel in the last three years is much smaller than those due to car accidents. September 11 was quantitatively much less lethal than many earthquakes. More people die from AIDS in one day in Africa than all the Russians who died in the hands of Chechnya-based Moslem suicide murderers since that conflict started. Saddam killed every month more people than all those who died from suicide murders since the Coalition occupation of Iraq. So what is all the fuss about suicide killings? It creates headlines. It is spectacular. It is frightening. It is a very cruel death with bodies dismembered and horrible severe lifelong injuries to many of the wounded. It is always shown on television in great detail. One such murder, with the help of hysterical media coverage, can destroy the tourism industry of a country for quite a while, as it did in Bali and in Turkey. But the real fear comes from the undisputed fact that no defense and no preventive measures can succeed against a determined suicide murderer. This has not yet penetrated the thinking of the Western World. The U.S. and Europe are constantly improving their defense against the last murder, not the next one. We may arrange for the best airport security in the world. But if you want to murder by suicide, you do not have to board a plane in order to explode yourself and kill many people. Who could stop a suicide murder in the midst of the crowded line waiting to be checked by the airport metal detector? How about the lines to the check-in counters in a busy travel period? Put a metal detector in front of every train station in Spain and the terrorists will get the buses. Protect the buses and they will explode in movie theaters, concert halls, supermarkets, shopping malls, schools and hospitals. Put guards in front of every concert hall and there will always be a line of people to be checked by the guards and this line will be the target, not to speak of killing the guards themselves. You can somewhat reduce your vulnerability by preventive and defensive measures and by strict border controls but not eliminate it and definitely not win the war in a defensive way. And it is a war. What is behind the suicide murders? Money, power and cold-blooded murderous incitement, nothing else. It has nothing to do with true fanatic religious beliefs. No Moslem preacher has ever blown himself up. No son of an Arab politician or religious leader has ever blown himself. No relative of anyone influential has done it. Wouldn't you expect some of the religious leaders to do it themselves, or to talk their sons into doing it, if this is truly a supreme act of religious fervor? Aren't they interested in the benefits of going to Heaven? Instead, they send outcast women, naive children, retarded people and young incited hotheads. They promise them the delights, mostly sexual, of the next world, and pay their families handsomely after the supreme act is performed and enough innocent people are dead. Suicide murders also have nothing to do with poverty and despair. The poorest region in the world, by far, is Africa. It never happens there. There are numerous desperate people in the world, in different cultures, countries and continents. Desperation does not provide anyone with explosives, reconnaissance and transportation. There was certainly more despair in

Saddam's Iraq then in Paul Bremmer's Iraq, and no one exploded ?
himself. A suicide murder is simply a horrible, vicious weapon of
cruel, inhuman, cynical, well-funded terrorists, with no regard to
human life, including the life of their fellow countrymen, but with
very high regard to their own affluent well-being and their hunger for
power. The only way to fight this new "popular" weapon is identical to
the only way in which you fight organized crime or pirates on the high
seas: the offensive way. Like in the case of organized crime, it is
crucial that the forces on the offensive be united and it is crucial to
reach the top of the crime pyramid. You cannot eliminate organized
crime by arresting the little drug dealer in the street corner. You
must go after the head of the "Family". If part of the public supports
it, others tolerate it, many are afraid of it and some try to explain
it away by poverty or by a miserable childhood, organized crime will
thrive and so will terrorism. The United States understands this now,
after September 11. Russia is beginning to understand it. Turkey
understands it well. I am very much afraid that most of Europe still
does not understand it. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe will
understand it only after suicide murders will arrive in Europe in a big
way. In my humble opinion, this will definitely happen. The Spanish
trains and the Istanbul bombings are only the beginning. The unity of
the Civilized World in fighting this horror is absolutely
indispensable. Until Europe wakes up, this unity will not be
achieved.

The second ingredient is words, more precisely lies. Words can be
lethal. They kill people. It is often said that politicians,
diplomats and perhaps also lawyers and business people must sometimes
lie, as part of their professional life. But the norms of politics and
diplomacy are childish, in comparison with the level of incitement and
total absolute deliberate fabrications, which have reached new heights
in the region we are talking about. An incredible number of people in
the Arab world believe that September 11 never happened, or was an
American provocation or, ever, better, a Jewish plot. You all remember
the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mr. Mouhamad Said al-Sahaf and his
press conferences when the US forces were already inside Baghdad.
Disinformation at time of war is an accepted tactic. But to stand, day
after day, and to make such preposterous statements, known to everybody
to be lies, without even being ridiculed in your own milieu, can only
happen in this region. Mr. Sahaf eventually became a popular icon as
a court jester, but this did not stop some allegedly respectable
newspapers from giving him equal time. It also does not prevent the
Western press from giving credence, every day, even now, to similar
liars. After all, if you want to be an anti-Semite, there are subtle
ways of doing it. You do not have to claim that the holocaust never
happened and that the Jewish temple in Jerusalem never existed. But
millions of Moslems are told by their leaders that this is the case.
When these same leaders make other statements, the Western media report
them as if they could be true. It is a daily occurrence that the same
people, who finance, arm and dispatch suicide murderers, condemn the
act in English in front of western TV cameras, talking to a world
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The third aspect is money. Huge amounts of money, which could have solved many social problems in this dysfunctional part of the world, are channeled into three concentric spheres supporting death and murder. In the inner circle are the terrorists themselves. The money funds their travel, explosives, hideouts and permanent search for soft vulnerable targets. They are surrounded by a second wider circle of direct supporters, planners, commanders, preachers, all of whom make a living, usually a very comfortable living, by serving as terror infrastructure. Finally, we find the third circle of so-called religious, educational and welfare organizations, which actually do some good, feed the hungry and provide some schooling, but brainwash a new generation with hatred, lies and ignorance. This circle operates mostly through mosques, madras's and other religious establishments but also through inciting electronic and printed media. It is this circle that makes sure that women remain inferior, that democracy is unthinkable and that exposure to the outside world is minimal. It is also that circle that leads the way in blaming everybody outside the Moslem world, for the miseries of the region. Figuratively speaking, this outer circle is the guardian, which makes sure that the people look and listen inwards to the inner circle of terror and incitement, rather than to the world outside. Some parts of this same outer circle actually operate as a result of fear from, or

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terrorist headquarters, hidden in a mental hospital? Do you shoot an arch-murderer who deliberately moves from one location to another, always surrounded by children? All of these happen daily in Iraq and in the Palestinian areas.

What do you do? Well, you do not want to face the dilemma. But it cannot be avoided. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that someone would openly stay in a well-known address in Teheran, hosted by the Iranian Government and financed by it, executing one atrocity after another in Spain or in France, killing hundreds of innocent people, accepting responsibility for the crimes, promising in public TV interviews to do more of the same, while the Government of Iran issues public condemnations of his acts but continues to host him, invite him to official functions and treat him as a great dignitary. I leave it to you as homework to figure out what Spain or France would have done in such a situation. The problem is that the civilized world is still having illusions about the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. It is trying to play ice hockey by sending a ballerina ice-skater into the rink or to knock out a heavyweight boxer by a chess player. In the same way that no country has a law against cannibals eating its prime minister, because such an act is unthinkable, international law does not address killers shooting from hospitals, mosques and ambulances, while being protected by their Government or society. International law does not know how to handle someone who sends children to throw stones, stands behind them and shoots with immunity and cannot be arrested because he is sheltered by a Government. International law does not know how to deal with a leader of murderers who is royally and comfortably hosted by a country, which pretends to condemn his acts or just claims to be too weak to arrest him. The amazing thing is that all of these crooks demand protection under international law and define all those who attack them as war criminals, with some Western media repeating the allegations. The good news is that all of this is temporary, because the evolution of international law has always adapted itself to reality. The punishment for suicide murder should be death or arrest before the murder, not during and not after. After every world war, the rules of international law have changed and the same will happen after the present one. But during the twilight zone, a lot of harm can be done. The picture I described here is not pretty. What can we do about it? In the short run, only fight and win. In the long run - only educate the next generation and open it to the world. The inner circles can and must be destroyed by force. The outer circle cannot be eliminated by force. Here we need financial starvation of the organizing elite, more power to women, more education, counter propaganda, boycott whenever feasible and access to Western media, internet and the international scene. Above all, we need a total absolute unity and determination of the civilized world against all three circles of evil. Allow me, for a moment, to depart from my alleged role as a taxi driver and return to science.

When you have a malignant tumor, you may remove the tumor itself surgically. You may also starve it by preventing new blood from reaching it from other parts of the body, thereby preventing new

"supplies" from expanding the tumor. If you want to be sure, it is best to do both. But before you fight and win, by force or otherwise, you have to realize that you are in a war, and this may take Europe a few more years. In order to win, it is necessary to first eliminate the terrorist regimes, so that no Government in the world will serve as a safe haven for these people. I do not want to comment here on whether the American-led attack on Iraq was justified from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction or any other pre-war argument, but I can look at the post-war map of Western Asia. Now that Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are out, two and a half terrorist states remain: Iran, Syria and Lebanon, the latter being a Syrian colony. Perhaps Sudan should be added to the list. As a result of the conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq, both Iran and Syria are now totally surrounded by territories unfriendly to them. Iran is encircled by Afghanistan, by the Gulf States, Iraq and the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Syria is surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. This is a significant strategic change and it applies strong pressure on the terrorist countries. It is not surprising that Iran is so active in trying to incite a Shiite uprising in Iraq. I do not know if the American plan was actually to encircle both Iran and Syria, but that is the resulting situation. In my humble opinion, the number one danger to the world today is Iran and its regime. It definitely has ambitions to rule vast areas and to expand in all directions. It has an ideology, which claims supremacy over Western culture. It is ruthless. It has proven that it can execute elaborate terrorist acts without leaving too many traces, using Iranian Embassies. It is clearly trying to develop Nuclear Weapons. Its so-called moderates and conservatives play their own virtuous version of the "good-cop versus bad-cop" game. Iran sponsors Syrian terrorism, it is certainly behind much of the action in Iraq, it is fully funding the Hizbulla and, through it, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it performed acts of terror at least in Europe and in South America and probably also in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia and it truly leads a multi-national terror consortium, which includes, as minor players, Syria, Lebanon and certain Shiite elements in Iraq. Nevertheless, most European countries still trade with Iran, try to appease it and refuse to read the clear signals. In order to win the war it is also necessary to dry the financial resources of the terror conglomerate. It is pointless to try to understand the subtle differences between the Sunni terror of Al Qaida and Hamas and the Shiite terror of Hizbulla, Sadr and other Iranian inspired enterprises. When it serves their business needs, all of them collaborate beautifully. It is crucial to stop Saudi and other financial support of the outer circle, which is the fertile breeding ground of terror. It is important to monitor all donations from the Western world to Islamic organizations, to monitor the finances of international relief organizations and to react with forceful economic measures to any small sign of financial aid to any of the three circles of terrorism. It is also important to act decisively against the campaign of lies and fabrications and to monitor those Western media who collaborate with it out of naivety, financial interests or ignorance. Above all, never surrender to terror. No one will ever know whether the recent elections in Spain would have yielded a different result, if not for the train bombings a few days earlier.

But it really does not matter. What matters is that the terrorists believe that they caused the result and that they won by driving Spain out of Iraq. The Spanish story will surely end up being extremely costly to other European countries, including France, who is now expelling inciting preachers and forbidding veils and including others who sent troops to Iraq. In the long run, Spain itself will pay even more. Is the solution a democratic Arab world? If by democracy we mean free elections but also free press, free speech, a functioning judicial system, civil liberties, equality to women, free international travel, exposure to international media and ideas, laws against racial incitement and against defamation, and avoidance of lawless behavior regarding hospitals, places of worship and children, then yes, democracy is the solution. If democracy is just free elections, it is likely that the most fanatic regime will be elected, the one whose incitement and fabrications are the most inflammatory.

We have seen it already in Algeria and, to a certain extent, in Turkey. It will happen again, if the ground is not prepared very carefully. On the other hand, a certain transition democracy, as in Jordan, may be a better temporary solution, paving the way for the real thing, perhaps in the same way that an immediate sudden democracy did not work in Russia and would not have worked in China. I have no doubt that the civilized world will prevail. But the longer it takes us to understand the new landscape of this war, the more costly and painful the victory will be. Europe, more than any other region, is the key. Its understandable recoil from wars, following the horrors of World War II, may cost thousands of additional innocent lives, before the tide will turn."

September 20, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jordan as Regional Center of Excellence in Counter-Terrorism Operations

Your idea about Jordan focusing on Counter-Terrorism makes sense. Please work with the Joint Staff and Policy.

Let's get some specifics on what that would mean and how we would energize the concept.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-18

.....

Please respond by 10/22/04

OSD 14500-04

Jordan

20 Sep 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Mark Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper on Terrorism

Attached is an interesting paper you might want to read.

Thanks.

Attach.
"A View from the Eye of the Storm" by Haim Harari

DHR:ss
092004-19

.....
Please respond by _____

000, 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 14304-04

DR 5/20/04

A View from the Eye of the Storm

Talk delivered by Haim Harari at a meeting of the International Advisory Board of a large multi-national corporation, April, 2004. Haim Harari is one of Israel's foremost physicists and Ex-president of the Weizmann Institute of Science.

"As you know, I usually provide the scientific and technological "entertainment" in our meetings, but, on this occasion, our Chairman suggested that I present my own personal view on events in the part of the world from which I come. I have never been and I will never be a Government official and I have no privileged information. My perspective is entirely based on what I see, on what I read and on the fact that my family has lived in this region for almost 200 years. You may regard my views as those of the proverbial taxi driver, which you are supposed to question, when you visit a country,

I could have shared with you some fascinating facts and some personal thoughts about the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, I will touch upon it only in passing. I prefer to devote most of my remarks to the broader picture of the region and its place in world events. I refer to the entire area between Pakistan and Morocco, which is predominantly Arab, predominantly Moslem, but includes many non-Arab and also significant non-Moslem minorities. Why do I put aside Israel and its own immediate neighborhood? Because Israel and any problems related to it, in spite of what you might read or hear in the world media, is not the central issue, and has never been the central issue in the upheaval in the region. Yes, there is a 100 year-old Israeli-Arab conflict, but it is not where the main show is. The millions who died in the Iran-Iraq war had nothing to do with Israel. The mass murder happening right now in Sudan, where the Arab Moslem regime is massacring its black Christian citizens, has nothing to do with Israel. The frequent reports from Algeria about the murders of hundreds of civilian in one village or another by other Algerians have nothing to do with Israel. Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait, endangered Saudi Arabia and butchered his own people because of Israel. Egypt did not use poison gas against Yemen in the 60's because of Israel. Assad the Father did not kill tens of thousands of his own citizens in one week in El Hamma in Syria because of Israel. The Taliban control of Afghanistan and the civil war there had nothing to do with Israel. The Libyan blowing up of the Pan-Am flight had nothing to do with Israel, and I could go on and on and on.

The root of the trouble is that this entire Moslem region is totally dysfunctional, by any standard of the word, and would have been so even if Israel would have joined the Arab League and an independent Palestine would have existed for 100 years. The 22 member countries of the Arab League, from Mauritania to the Gulf States, have a total population of 300 millions, larger than the US and almost as large as the EU before its expansion. They have a land area larger than either

the US or all of Europe. These 22 countries, with all their oil and natural resources, have a combined GDP smaller than that of Netherlands plus Belgium and equal to half of the GDP of California alone. Within this meager GDP, the gaps between rich and poor are beyond belief and too many of the rich made their money not by succeeding in business, but by being corrupt rulers.

The social status of women is far below what it was in the Western World 150 years ago. Human rights are below any reasonable standard, in spite of the grotesque fact that Libya was elected Chair of the UN Human Rights commission. According to a report prepared by a committee of Arab intellectuals and published under the auspices of the U.N., the number of books translated by the entire Arab world is much smaller than what little Greece alone translates. The total number of scientific publications of 300 million Arabs is less than that of 6 million Israelis. Birth rates in the region are very high, increasing the poverty, the social gaps and the cultural decline.

And all of this is happening in a region, which only 30 years ago, was believed to be the next wealthy part of the world, and in a Moslem area, which developed, at some point in history, one of the most advanced cultures in the world. It is fair to say that this creates an unprecedented breeding ground for cruel dictators, terror networks, fanaticism, incitement, suicide murders and general decline. It is also a fact that almost everybody in the region blames this situation on the United States, on Israel, on Western Civilization, on Judaism and Christianity, on anyone and anything, except themselves. Do I say all of this with the satisfaction of someone discussing the failings of his enemies? On the contrary, I firmly believe that the world would have been a much better place and my own neighborhood would have been much more pleasant and peaceful, if things were different. I should also say a word about the millions of decent, honest, good people who are either devout Moslems or are not very religious but grew up in Moslem families. They are double victims of an outside world, which now develops Islam phobia and of their own environment, which breaks their heart by being totally dysfunctional. The problem is that the vast silent majority of these Moslems are not part of the terror and of the incitement but they also do not stand up against it. They become accomplices, by omission, and this applies to political leaders, intellectuals, business people and many others. Many of them can certainly tell right from wrong, but are afraid to express their views.

The events of the last few years have amplified four issues, which have always existed, but have never been as rampant as in the present upheaval in the region. These are the four main pillars of the current World Conflict, or perhaps we should already refer to it as "the undeclared World War III." I have no better name for the present situation. A few more years may pass before everybody acknowledges that it is a World War, but we are already well into it.

The first element is the suicide murder. Suicide murders are not a new invention but they have been made popular, if I may use this

expression, only lately. Even after September 11, it seems that most of the Western World does not yet understand this weapon. It is a very potent psychological weapon. Its real direct impact is relatively minor. The total number of casualties from hundreds of suicide murders within Israel in the last three years is much smaller than those due to car accidents. September 11 was quantitatively much less lethal than many earthquakes. More people die from AIDS in one day in Africa than all the Russians who died in the hands of Chechnya-based Moslem suicide murderers since that conflict started. Saddam killed every month more people than all those who died from suicide murders since the Coalition occupation of Iraq. So what is all the fuss about suicide killings? It creates headlines. It is spectacular. It is frightening. It is a very cruel death with bodies dismembered and horrible severe lifelong injuries to many of the wounded. It is always shown on television in great detail. One such murder, with the help of hysterical media coverage, can destroy the tourism industry of a country for quite a while, as it did in Bali and in Turkey. But the real fear comes from the undisputed fact that no defense and no preventive measures can succeed against a determined suicide murderer. This has not yet penetrated the thinking of the Western World. The U.S. and Europe are constantly improving their defense against the last murder, not the next one. We may arrange for the best airport security in the world. But if you want to murder by suicide, you do not have to board a plane in order to explode yourself and kill many people. Who could stop a suicide murder in the midst of the crowded line waiting to be checked by the airport metal detector? How about the lines to the check-in counters in a busy travel period? Put a metal detector in front of every train station in Spain and the terrorists will get the buses. Protect the buses and they will explode in movie theaters, concert halls, supermarkets, shopping malls, schools and hospitals. Put guards in front of every concert hall and there will always be a line of people to be checked by the guards and this line will be the target, not to speak of killing the guards themselves. You can somewhat reduce your vulnerability by preventive and defensive measures and **by** strict border controls but not eliminate it and definitely not win the war in a defensive way. And it is a war. What is behind the suicide murders? Money, power and cold-blooded murderous incitement, nothing else. It has nothing to do with true fanatic religious beliefs. No Moslem preacher has ever blown himself up. No son of an Arab politician or religious leader has ever blown himself. No relative of anyone influential has done it. Wouldn't you expect some of the religious leaders to do it themselves, or to talk their sons into doing it, if this is truly a supreme act of religious fervor? Aren't they interested in the benefits of going to Heaven? Instead, they send outcast women, naive children, retarded people and young incited hotheads. They promise them the delights, mostly sexual, of the next world, and pay their families handsomely after the supreme act is performed and enough innocent people are dead. Suicide murders also have nothing to do with poverty and despair. The poorest region in the world, by far, is Africa. It never happens there. There are numerous desperate people in the world, in different cultures, countries and continents. Desperation does not provide anyone with explosives, reconnaissance and transportation. There was certainly more despair in

Saddam's Iraq then in Paul Bremmer's Iraq, and no one exploded himself. A suicide murder is simply a horrible, vicious weapon of cruel, inhuman, cynical, well-funded terrorists, with no regard to human life, including the life of their fellow countrymen, but with very high regard to their own affluent well-being and their hunger for power. The only way to fight this new "popular" weapon is identical to the only way in which you fight organized crime or pirates on the high seas: the offensive way. Like in the case of organized crime, it is crucial that the forces on the offensive be united and it is crucial to reach the top of the crime pyramid. You cannot eliminate organized crime by arresting the little drug dealer in the street corner. You must go after the head of the "Family". If part of the public supports it, others tolerate it, many are afraid of it and some try to explain it away by poverty or by a miserable childhood, organized crime will thrive and so will terrorism. The United States understands this now, after September 11. Russia is beginning to understand it. Turkey understands it well. I am very much afraid that most of Europe still does not understand it. Unfortunately, it seems that Europe will understand it only after suicide murders will arrive in Europe in a big way. In my humble opinion, this will definitely happen. The Spanish trains and the Istanbul bombings are only the beginning. The unity of the Civilized World in fighting this horror is absolutely indispensable. Until Europe wakes up, this unity will not be achieved.

The second ingredient is words, more precisely lies. Words can be lethal. They kill people. It is often said that politicians, diplomats and perhaps also lawyers and business people must sometimes lie, as part of their professional life. But the norms of politics and diplomacy are childish, in comparison with the level of incitement and total absolute deliberate fabrications, which have reached new heights in the region we are talking about. An incredible number of people in the Arab world believe that September 11 never happened, or was an American provocation or, even better, a Jewish plot. You all remember the Iraqi Minister of Information, Mr. Mouhamad Said al-Sahaf and his press conferences when the US forces were already inside Baghdad. Disinformation at time of war is an accepted tactic. But to stand, day after day, and to make such preposterous statements, known to everybody to be lies, without even being ridiculed in your own milieu, can only happen in this region. Mr. Sahaf eventually became a popular icon as a court jester, but this did not stop some allegedly respectable newspapers from giving him equal time. It also does not prevent the Western press from giving credence, every day, even now, to similar liars. After all, if you want to be an anti-Semite, there are subtle ways of doing it. You do not have to claim that the holocaust never happened and that the Jewish temple in Jerusalem never existed. But millions of Moslems are told by their leaders that this is the case. When these same leaders make other statements, the Western media report them as if they could be true. It is a daily occurrence that the same people, who finance, arm and dispatch suicide murderers, condemn the act in English in front of western TV cameras, talking to a world audience, which even partly believes them. It is a daily routine to hear the same leader making opposite statements in Arabic to his people

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Every student of political science debates how you prevent an anti-democratic force from winning a democratic election and abolishing democracy. Other aspects of a civilized society must also have limitations. Can a policeman open fire on someone trying to kill him? Can a government listen to phone conversations of terrorists and drug dealers? Does free speech protect you when you shout "fire" in a crowded theater? Should there be death penalty, for deliberate multiple murders? These are the old-fashioned dilemmas. But now we have an entire new set. Do you raid a mosque, which serves as a terrorist ammunition storage? Do you return fire, if you are attacked from a hospital? Do you storm a church taken over by terrorists who took the priests hostages? Do you search every ambulance after a few suicide murderers use ambulances to reach their targets? Do you strip every woman because one pretended to be pregnant and carried a suicide bomb on her belly? Do you shoot back at someone trying to kill you, standing deliberately behind a group of children? Do you raid

terrorist headquarters, hidden in a mental hospital? Do you shoot an arch-murderer who deliberately moves from one location to another, always surrounded by children? All of these happen daily in Iraq and in the Palestinian areas.

What do you do? Well, you do not want to face the dilemma. But it cannot be avoided. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that someone would openly stay in a well-known address in Teheran, hosted by the Iranian Government and financed by it, executing one atrocity after another in Spain or in France, killing hundreds of innocent people, accepting responsibility for the crimes, promising in public TV interviews to do more of the same, while the Government of Iran issues public condemnations of his acts but continues to host him, invite him to official functions and treat him as a great dignitary. I leave it to you as homework to figure out what Spain or France would have done in such a situation. The problem is that the civilized world is still having illusions about the rule of law in a totally lawless environment. It is trying to play ice hockey by sending a ballerina ice-skater into the rink or to knock out a heavyweight boxer by a chess player. In the same way that no country has a law against cannibals eating its prime minister, because such an act is unthinkable, international law does not address killers shooting from hospitals, mosques and ambulances, while being protected by their Government or society. International law does not know how to handle someone who sends children to throw stones, stands behind them and shoots with immunity and cannot be arrested because he is sheltered by a Government. International law does not know how to deal with a leader of murderers who is royally and comfortably hosted by a country, which pretends to condemn his acts or just claims to be too weak to arrest him. The amazing thing is that all of these crooks demand protection under international law and define all those who attack them as war criminals, with some Western media repeating the allegations. The good news is that all of this is temporary, because the evolution of international law has always adapted itself to reality. The punishment for suicide murder should be death or arrest before the murder, not during and not after. After every world war, the rules of international law have changed and the same will happen after the present one. But during the twilight zone, a lot of harm can be done. The picture I described here is not pretty. What can we do about it? In the short run, only fight and win. In the long run - only educate the next generation and open it to the world. The inner circles can and must be destroyed by force. The outer circle cannot be eliminated by force. Here we need financial starvation of the organizing elite, more power to women, more education, counter propaganda, boycott whenever feasible and access to Western media, internet and the international scene. Above all, we need a total absolute unity and determination of the civilized world against all three circles of evil. Allow me, for a moment, to depart from my alleged role as a taxi driver and return to science.

When you have a malignant tumor, you may remove the tumor itself surgically. You may also starve it by preventing new blood from reaching it from other parts of the body, thereby preventing new

"supplies" from expanding the tumor. If you want to be sure, it is best to do both. But before you fight and win, by force or otherwise, you have to realize that you are in a war, and this may take Europe a few more years. In order to win, it is necessary to first eliminate the terrorist regimes, so that no Government in the world will serve as a safe haven for these people. I do not want to comment here on whether the American-led attack on Iraq was justified from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction or any other pre-war argument, but I can look at the post-war map of Western Asia. Now that Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya are out, two and a half terrorist states remain: Iran, Syria and Lebanon, the latter being a Syrian colony. Perhaps Sudan should be added to the list. As a result of the conquest of Afghanistan and Iraq, both Iran and Syria are now totally surrounded by territories unfriendly to them. Iran is encircled by Afghanistan, by the Gulf States, Iraq and the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Syria is surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Israel. This is a significant strategic change and it applies strong pressure on the terrorist countries. It is not surprising that Iran is so active in trying to incite a Shiite uprising in Iraq. I do not know if the American plan was actually to encircle both Iran and Syria, but that is the resulting situation. In my humble opinion, the number one danger to the world today is Iran and its regime. It definitely has ambitions to rule vast areas and to expand in all directions. It has an ideology, which claims supremacy over Western culture. It is ruthless. It has proven that it can execute elaborate terrorist acts without leaving too many traces, using Iranian Embassies. It is clearly trying to develop Nuclear Weapons. Its so-called moderates and conservatives play their own virtuoso version of the "good-cop versus bad-cop" game. Iran sponsors Syrian terrorism, it is certainly behind much of the action in Iraq, it is fully funding the Hizbulla and, through it, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it performed acts of terror at least in Europe and in South America and probably also in Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia and it truly leads a multi-national terror consortium, which includes, as minor players, Syria, Lebanon and certain Shiite elements in Iraq. Nevertheless, most European countries still trade with Iran, try to appease it and refuse to read the clear signals. In order to win the war it is also necessary to dry the financial resources of the terror conglomerate. It is pointless to try to understand the subtle differences between the Sunni terror of Al Qaida and Hamas and the Shiite terror of Hizbulla, Sadr and other Iranian inspired enterprises. When it serves their business needs, all of them collaborate beautifully. It is crucial to stop Saudi and other financial support of the outer circle, which is the fertile breeding ground of terror. It is important to monitor all donations from the Western World to Islamic organizations, to monitor the finances of international relief organizations and to react with forceful economic measures to any small sign of financial aid to any of the three circles of terrorism. It is also important to act decisively against the campaign of lies and fabrications and to monitor those Western media who collaborate with it out of naivety, financial interests or ignorance. Above all, never surrender to terror. No one will ever know whether the recent elections in Spain would have yielded a different result, if not for the train bombings a few days earlier.


11-L-0559/OSD/26655

But it really does not matter. What matters is that the terrorists believe that they caused the result and that they won by driving Spain out of Iraq. The Spanish story will surely end up being extremely costly to other European countries, including France, who is now expelling inciting preachers and forbidding veils and including others who sent troops to Iraq. In the long run, Spain itself will pay even more. Is the solution a democratic Arab world? If by democracy we mean free elections but also free press, free speech, a functioning judicial system, civil liberties, equality to women, free international travel, exposure to international media and ideas, laws against racial incitement and against defamation, and avoidance of lawless behavior regarding hospitals, places of worship and children, then yes, democracy is the solution. If democracy is just free elections, it is likely that the most fanatic regime will be elected, the one whose incitement and fabrications are the most inflammatory.

We have seen it already in Algeria and, to a certain extent, in Turkey. It will happen again, if the ground is not prepared very carefully. On the other hand, a certain transition democracy, as in Jordan, may be a better temporary solution, paving the way for the real thing, perhaps in the same way that an immediate sudden democracy did not work in Russia and would not have worked in China. I have no doubt that the civilized world will prevail. But the longer it takes us to understand the new landscape of this war, the more costly and painful the victory will be. Europe, more than any other region, is the key. Its understandable recoil from wars, following the horrors of World War II, may cost thousands of additional innocent lives, before the tide will turn."

September 21, 2004

313

TO: Newt Gingrich
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: TRICARE

I asked for an update on your E-mail on transforming TRICARE. Here is a response – it appears they're hard at it.

Thanks for your help.

Regards,

DHR:ss
092104-2

.....

Please respond by _____

215eP04

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

Paul Butler

9/20

Here's some material on health transformation that Gingrich is working on. Is there anybody that can be helpful here at DoD? Do you have your head into those issues?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email 3.20.04 Re: Tricare

Please respond by:

~~6/23~~ 8/19/04

*Sir
Response attached
at Tab A.*

*v/r
Lt Col Lengyel 7/21*

OSD 14122-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26658

9/20
1100



HEALTH AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 17 PM 5:00

INFO MEMO

SEP 16 2004

Bill Butler
9/20
PWB

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*, MD, ASD (Health Affairs)
SUBJECT: Electronic Health Records

- You requested information regarding electronic health records.
- To answer your question, our heads are very much into the issues raised by Gingrich. I meet periodically with him and his staff to exchange ideas on electronic health records and health information technology. We have provided him demonstrations on the military electronic health record, as well as a number of other advanced technologies in use today within the Department of Defense.
- I admit to some bias, but based on my experience in the private sector, the Military Health System is pursuing information technology and its application to all phases of our business far more aggressively than the vast majority of private sector health organizations and companies. (See TAB A)

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	9/20
BRMA SD	
MA SD	2 9/20
EXP. SD	M 9/20

Prepared by: Connie Gladding, IMT&R/IPI&EL, (b)(6) PCDOCS 69124, 69345,69892

OSD 14122-04

INFORMATION PAPER

DoD Health Transformation through Information Technology

The DoD is a leader in the use of health information technologies to improve health care access, quality, population health management and force health protection.

I have met with Mr. Gingrich on a periodic basis to exchange ideas on the electronic health record and health information technologies in general. My staff has shown Mr. Gingrich and his staff the military electronic health record and a number of advanced technologies in use today within DoD. Health information technologies are being used to facilitate DoD's health and business transformation include:

- **Composite Health Care System** – Provides an electronic health record at all military treatment facilities that includes laboratory, pharmacy and radiology computerized physician order entry and results retrieval, registration, appointing and scheduling, and documentation of the patient encounter capabilities.
- **TRICARE Online** – Provides health care benefits information, health and wellness information, a secure personal health journal and online appointing capabilities at over 300 military treatment facilities.
- **Telehealth** - Provides interactive consultations in radiology, mental health, dermatology, pathology and dental care between remote locations and medical referral centers.
- **Military Health System Data Repository** – A centralized data warehouse containing patient encounter information from military treatment facilities and private sector providers, financial data, demographics and other data. It is used in our strategic planning, performance monitoring, population health management and business management.
- **Pharmacy Data Transaction System** – A centralized data repository of all prescriptions processed for DoD beneficiaries, whether obtained in military treatment facilities, 50,000 retail pharmacies across the U.S., or through our mail order system. The system processes over 411,000 prescription transactions per day. It gives DoD amazing capability to know what is happening with all pharmaceutical services (over \$5B per year), and helps prevent tens of thousands of adverse drug reactions every year for our beneficiaries.
- **Joint Medical Asset Repository** – A web-based system that provides comprehensive information on the location, movement, status and quantity of medical equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals and units of blood in the Military Health System.

- Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support – This system combines business process re-engineering with leading edge technologies to provide state-of-the-art capabilities supporting DoD medical logistics, electronic commerce and commercial best practices.
- Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program – Provides assistive technology and accommodations for DoD and other Federal employees with disabilities. It is available to employees, patients and family members, Pentagon survivors and wounded soldiers with visual, hearing, dexterity and cognitive disabilities.

Key to transforming health care is an enterprise architecture; data, security, communication and interoperable standards; and implementation of a robust computing and communication infrastructure. The Military Health System enterprise architecture is aligned with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture and Federal Health Architecture. DoD is a leader in the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative to develop and adopt common health standards for all Federal agencies.

I fully support the President's Management Agenda on health care reform. DoD assisted the Department of Health and Human Services (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) in developing national strategies for transforming health care through the use of technologies such as the electronic health record. DoD, in response to a Presidential Executive Order, recommended approaches for providing affordable health information technologies to rural and medically underserved communities. DoD will continue to collaborate and share technology products, outcomes, benefits and lessons learned with HHS, other Federal agencies, and the private sector.

Electronic Health Record Snowflake

COORDINATION

MHS CIO	Concurred, 8/25/04
DASD (FHP&R)	Concurred, 8/30/04
DASD (C&PP)	Concurred, 9/1/04
Dir, Program Integration, TMA	Concurred, 8/26/04
Chief of Staff, TMA	Concurred, 9/8/04
Deputy Dir, TMA	Concurred, 9/9/04
Chief of Staff (HA)	<u>Concurred, 9/13/04</u>
APDASD (HA)	<u>N/A</u>

Electronic Health Record **Snowflake**

COORDINATION

USD (P&R)

DR. CHU

David S. L. Chu / F. S. Chu

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 10:34 AM

To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil,
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil;
david.chu@osd.mil; william.winkenwerder@ha.osd.mil

Cc: john.jumper@pentagon.af.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: electronic health records and tricare-the aarp example-newt

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 3/ 20/04

transforming tricare for greater member satisfaction and better health and lower cost (the trifecta of health transformation)

everything being described for an electronic health record below could apply even more to the military and military retirees and we could have an electronic health record up and running for the members to use as well as their doctors and hospitals by September one of this year

aarp is very excited about rolling out an electronic health record by January for the 2.2 million 65 year olds who will be getting the new Medicare benchmark physical exams in 2005.

building further on friday's lunch conversation

so we can explain why an electronic health record would be truly empowering for the new medicare benchmark physical:

it would be really helpful if aarp might have or develop the following data:

the new 65 year olds are different from their parents (remember your magazine cover with the model--60 is 30, a little much, I think it is 45 and I am 60)

1. how many more years will the average 65 in 2005 probably live and how long will the longest probably live
2. how many of the 2.2 million will probably reach 80 and how many will probably reach 90 and the same for 100 (this lets us know that in 2020, 2030, and 2040 we will have this many people still using their electronic health records compared to the

3/20 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26664

frequency of paper records being lost, copied, fedexed etc.)

3. **how** often will this generation of 65 year olds travel each year, how many will go out of **state**, how many will go *out* of country

this **explains** why accessing your records from anywhere on **the net is** so important

how many will actually move out of state to live somewhere else than where they are now

how many have children or grandchildren who live out *of* state

this kind of data would enable us to build an overwhelming case for starting in January with an electronic health record as a matter of convenience and safety for the health of "the new 65 year olds"

if you put all this together it might make a great article for the magazine along with a story about what England is actually doing (I met last night with the people from IDX who are partnering in two of the five English electronic health record regions **and** they were very very encouraging). you could also tie it into explaining your website development at aarp

thanks for helping with this
newt

3/20/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26665

72001
~~FOUO~~

September 22, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Presentation Additions

DR

ITrag

Doug Feith and I were talking about your briefing at the Combatant Commander's Conference. The point you make about the fact that we are doing well and the enemy has not won any tactical engagements might be more persuasive if it were linked to some metrics. For example:

The enemy's goals are:

- To frighten away police recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers for security forces are up.
- To frighten away Army recruits; but the fact is recruitment numbers are up.
- To scare folks to impede commerce; but the fact is commercial activity is up.
- To stop the political process; but the facts are:
 - The National Conference took place successfully this summer.
 - Work on an Afghan constitution continues.
 - Work on January elections continues.

22Sep04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14415-04

In addition, it is important to address some of those points that are getting raised in the press, such as the arguments that:

- The enemies in Iraq seem to be growing in numbers.
- The enemies seem to be able to launch more attacks per day than in past months.
- The enemies seem to be increasing the casualties per week on the part of both Iraqi and Coalition forces.

Comments that address each of those arguments would be persuasive. When you get it pulled together, please send me a copy.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-24

.....
Please respond by _____

September 22, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Training Iraqi Security Forces

IRAQ

Mr. President,

Here is the biweekly update to the Iraqi Security Forces plan. Progress is being made. The key high level points are:

- We are "on track" with nearly 100,000 trained and equipped Iraqi Security forces on the ground performing their duties today.
- All are equipped with weapons and have completed a serious and well-run training regimen.

I know there is a great deal of data in the attached briefing. The pages I find useful are # 2, # 14, # 27, and # 33, which are summaries of progress and current status. For convenience, I have placed tabs on those charts.

I will continue to forward this information every two weeks or as things change significantly.

Respectfully,

Attach.
9/20/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
092204-6

OSD 14427-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26668

~~FOUO~~

2ASEPO4

For Official Use Only

Iraqi Security Forces Update


20 September 2004

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/26669

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

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- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service



Ministry of Interior Forces

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection – New Plan

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Objective		20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
	Original Plan	Revised Plan					
Regular Iraqi Police*	90K	135K	41%	43%	46%	50%	85%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	16K	32K	44%	45%	45%	46%	62%
Emergency Response Unit	270	270	55%	55%	77%	77%	100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 (2 Reg)	1,200 (2 Reg)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 (9 Bn)	3,600 (9 Bn)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/26672

Ministry of Interior Forces Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

	End state	20 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Regular Iraqi Police*	135K police					56%
Dept of Border Enforcement**	32K	44%	45%	45%	46%	62%
Emergency Response Unit	270 police			55%	77%	100%
Special Police Regiments***	1,200 police (2 Regiments)					100%
Public Order Battalions***	3,600 police (9 Battalions)					100%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police are considered trained based on training by coalition forces, but capabilities are uneven across the force
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipping schedules are still being determined, and recruiting has just begun

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT


As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Iraqi Regular Police Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	38,921 (+3,626)
Training	3,065 (-414)
Untrained	42,964

 **Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date**
 **On Track to achieve projected goal by target date**
 **Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date**



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/26674


Iraqi Police Service Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	94,120 (↔ +1,027)
Vehicles	5,985 (↔ +62)
Radios	13,586 (↔ +341)
Body Armor	43,766 (↔ +1,275)
Police Trained and In Training	41,986 (↔ +3,212)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date




As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT




Civil Intervention Force* Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	0
Training	0
Untrained	0

- 
Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
- 
On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
- 
Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date







* **Mission: Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and counterinsurgency.**

Civil Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	0
Vehicles	0
Radios	0
Body Armor	0
Civil Intervention Force Trained and In Training	0

	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/26677


Emergency Response Unit* Training

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
↔	76 (-7)
↔	0**
↔	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date

** Next basic training course begins on 25 September with 75 recruits




*** Mission: Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.**

Emergency Response Unit Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 500
Vehicles	↔ 0
Radios	↔ 300
Body Armor	↔ 270
ERU Forces Trained and In Training	76 (-7)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date







As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


Border Enforcement Training


For Official Use Only



Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained 	14,313
Training 	463* (-22)
Untrained 	1,375


 **Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date**

 **On Track to achieve projected goal by target date**

 **Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date**

* Current trainees were previously trained at unit level and are now retraining under the new program of instruction at the Jordan Academy

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT




*** Recruiting Projection: 2,000 per month until 32K force achieved end of May '05**
Training Throughput: 2,000 (800 recruits and 1,200 previously trained at unit level)
End State: Legacy and new border personnel trained to one established standard
(recycle of previously trained personnel to new standards by end of Oct '05)

Border Enforcement Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 16,442
Vehicles	↔ 1,870 (+72)
Radios	↔ 1,627
Body Armor	↔ 4,000
Border Guards Trained and In Training	14,776 (-22)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Ministry of Interior Forces: Man, Train, and Equip

For Official Use Only

FORCE COMPONENT		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
							WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
		AUTH	ON DUTY	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAINING	TRAINED	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
Iraqi Police	IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	135K	84,950	42,964	3,065		213,185	94,120	22,395		67,565		135,000	
	CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920		0	0		11,490		1,002		10,240		4,800	
	EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270		0	0		1,020	500	58		352		270	
Dept of Border Enforcement		32,000	16,151	1,375	463*	14,313	42,601		8,271		8,271		28,626	
TOTAL		172,190	101,177	44,339	3,528*		268,296	111,062	31,726		86,428		168,696	

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40 - 69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

* DBE trainees have been previously trained, and are retraining under a new POI

** Some Radios on hand, but they are an interim capability only

(Does not include 73,992 personnel in Facilities Protection Service)



Ministry of Defense Forces

Iraqi Armed Forces Projection



Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> Original Plan Revised Plan </div> Objective	1 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)			50% 50%	50% 50%	100% 100%
9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)				88% 88%	100% 100%
45 Bn 32K Soldiers 65 Bn 62K Soldiers				60% 42%	100% 100%
1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50% 50%	50% 50%	55% 55%	60% 60%	95% 95%
1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)	25% 25%	25% 25%	25% 25%	40% 40%	70% 70%

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Iraqi Armed Forces Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

	End state	13 Sep 04	1 Oct 04	1 Nov 04	1 Dec 04	1 Jul 05
Iraqi Regular Army	18 Battalions (27,000 soldiers)				50%	50%
Iraqi Intervention Force	9 Battalions (6584 soldiers)					88%
Iraqi National Guard	65 Battalions (62,000 soldiers)					42%
Commando Battalion	1 Battalion (828 soldiers)	50%	50%	55%	60%	95%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	1 Special Mission Unit (451 soldiers)					40%

Legend

70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/26685

Regular Army* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	6
Initial Capability	3
Independent Operations	0

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**

- Defend Iraq against external threats.
- When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.

One Battalion=757 Soldiers

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/26686

Regular Army Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	15,432
Vehicles	1,768
Radios	1,034 (+13)
Body Armor	6,137
Trained and In Training Battalions	9

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date








As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/26687

Iraqi Intervention Force* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training 	6
Initial Capability 	3
Independent Operations	0

	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*** Mission:**

- To conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas
- To assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can establish and maintain law and order

One Battalion= 648 Soldiers

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/26688

Iraqi Intervention Force Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 3,300
Vehicles	↔ 152
Radios	↔ 1,593
Body Armor	↔ 2,741
Trained and In Training Bns	↔ 9

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date






As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT


11-L-0559/OSD/26689

Commando* Battalion

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	↔ 467 (+33)
In training	↔ 0
Untrained	0

 Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
 Below Track to Achieve projected goal by target date



* Mission: Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion


• One Battalion=828 Soldiers

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force* (ICTF)

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number
Trained	↔ 114 (-27)
In training	↔ 75
Untrained	0

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



***Mission:** Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorism function


The Task Force is organized with 451 soldiers

Special Operations Forces* Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 1049 (-225)
Vehicles	↔ 122(+55)
Radios	↔ 115
Body Armor	↔ 780 (+175)
Special Operations Force Trained and In Training	↔ 656(+5)

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



*Special Operations Forces procurement is a combination of Commando Battalion and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force


As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

Iraqi National Guard* Battalions

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Status	Number of Battalions
Initial Training	↔ 0
Initial Capability	↔ 8
Recruiting / awaiting equipment	↔ 57

↑	Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↔	On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
↓	Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date




- *Mission:**
- One Battalion=896 Soldiers
 - Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to the Ministry of Interior.
 - Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security

Iraqi National Guard Procurement Status

For Official Use Only

Current Status	
Category	Number
Weapons	↔ 37,635
Vehicles	↔ 758 (+31)
Radios	↓ 427*
Body Armor	↓ 23,320**
Trained and In Training Bns	↔ 8

- ↑ Above Track to achieve projected goal by target date
- ↔ On Track to achieve projected goal by target date
- ↓ Below Track to achieve projected goal by target date



* Radio delivery to units delayed by diversion of assets to recent contingency operations. More than 4,000 on hand and will be distributed starting this week.

**Body armor delivery delayed due to a contractor default; working with contracting office to speed delivery.

Ministry of Defense Forces: Man, Train, Equip

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National Guard numbers reflect increased authorization for six division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions

		MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING							
							WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR	
FORCE	COMPONENT	REQ'D	O/H	UN-TRAINED	IN TRAINING	TRAINED	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
ARMY	IRAQI ARMY	27,000	12,899	0	7,910		23,806	15,432	2,298		3,596		20,949	
	IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,405	0	2,744	38,661	68,760	37,635	2,142		11,208		62,032	
	IRAQI INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584		0	5,489		8,850		583		1,798		6,584	2,741
	IRAQI SPECIAL OPS FORCE	1,967		0	75		2,473	1,049	408		1,388		1,967	
AIR FORCE		502	206	0	39		383	0	34		21		502	
COASTAL DEFENCE FORCE		409		0	130	282	486	12	15		156		409	
TOTAL		98,366	62,795	0	16,387	46,408	104,558	57,428	5,480	2,819	18,147		71,152	32,988

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Note: Iraqi National Guard equipment "on hand" numbers are being reverified following the August Mahdi Militia uprising.

NATO Training in Iraq



Training Implementation Mission assessment was submitted to Atlantic Council on 15 September

Atlantic Council decision delayed when France and Belgium announced on 17 September

Atlantic Council proposal includes:

Coordination between NATO and MNF-I would best be achieved through a "hat" arrangement of the MNSTC-I Commander

Linking NATO's engagement to a NATO supported Iraqi training, operations and doctrine center

Continued provision of NATO advice and mentoring to Iraqi operational and strategic level HQ staffs

Continued assistance in the coordination of training and equipment offers


Continued provision of complementary out-of-country training

Coalition Contributors – MNF-I

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MNF-I = 33 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	New Zealand	5	Tonga	51
Australia	388	Estonia	47	Latvia	133	Norway	9	Ukraine	1,610
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	114	Poland	2,493	United Kingdom	7,918
Azerbaijan	300	Hungary	288	Macedonia	31	Portugal	129	US	137,216
Bulgaria	475	Italy	3,352	Moldova	10	Romania	744		
Czech Rep.	92	Japan	800	Mongolia	132	Singapore	33		
Denmark	533	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,471	Slovakia	103		
							Total	161,959	

Iraqi Forces On Hand - 163,822	
Police Service	64,950
Civil Intery Force	0
Emer. Response Unit	78
Dept. of Border Enf.	15,131
Army	12,699
National Guard	41,405
Intervention Force	7,417
Special Ops Force	656
Air Force	208
Coastal Defense Force	412



Facilities Protection Service 73,992

Significant Events Since Last Report

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Man:

- 7,541 available and qualified recruits now awaiting shipment to training.
- ING Conference held in Baghdad to discuss manning and the authorization of 6 division HQs, 20 brigade HQs, and 65 battalions
- Baghdad IPS district-level meetings held at New Baghdad, Salhiyah, Karadah, and Mansour HQs
- Counterterrorism Unit, Emergency Response Unit, and Dignitary Protection demonstrations held for Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister and Minister of State
- Facilitated an Iraqi Police Service – Iraqi National Guard Coordination Conference focused on Baghdad law enforcement
- CPATT continued work to coordinate a contracted Provincial SWAT team training plan

Train:

- 927 Highway Patrol members trained and on-duty
- 112 law enforcement students started specialized policing classes on 11 September:
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Post-Blast Investigation, Kidnap Negotiation, Mid-Level Leadership, and Internal Controls at Adnon
- 1,101 law enforcement students graduated on 16 September:
 - Iraqi Police Service Basic Training at the Jordan International Police Training Center (976 grads)
 - Basic Criminal Investigation, Counter-Drug Investigation, Organized Crime, and Internal Controls at Adnon Palace (125 total grads)
- Next Basic Courses: 18 September at both Baghdad and Jordan Academies (max 2,500 students)
- New regional police academy opened in Sulaymaniyah for 250 students

Equip:

- Equipped 3rd Brigade (Regular Army) with for operations in 1 Infantry Division Area of Operations
- Issued the following equipment this week:
 - Iraqi Police Service: 1,027 Weapons, 62 Vehicles, 341 Radios, and 1,275 Body-Armor Vests
 - Department of Border Enforcement: 72 Vehicles

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- 45 border forts are under construction or renovation, and 210 additional forts are under contract
- Began construction of three regional police academies
- \$3.1 million was obligated to reconstruct 24 police stations in Anbar Province
- Completed Baghdad Iraqi Police Service Main HQ Operations Room; Training is in progress (Ops Room IOC 30 September)

Mentor/Employ:

- CPATT CG and Iraqi Police Service Chief chaired a 15 September Civil Intervention Force Command Selection Board
- Mol Salary Team (CPATT and Mol staff) visited Basrah to help with an MND-SE Department of Border Enforcement Operations & Maintenance budget
- Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee data collection continued (2,500 complete and estimated completion date for Baghdad Region remains 30 September)
- Iraqi Air Force Seeker squadron conducted its first unsupervised operational flight on 15 Sept from Basrah
- 1st Brigade (-) redeployed from operations in An Najaf to Baghdad on 14 Sept 04 in order to begin reconstitution for follow on operations
- 3rd Brigade (-) (Brigade Tactical Assault Command Post and 7th Battalion) began deploying to forward operating bases vicinity Samarra for operations with 1st Infantry Division

Funding:

- Hearings conducted on IRRF realignment of \$1.8B into the Security Sector
- Congressional notification forwarded on 7 September for realignment of funds within the Security Sector for additional Iraqi National Guard equipment, the First Responder Network, and the Sulaymaniyah Academy
- Justification for Funding (\$210M) from the FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill forwarded to MNF-I on 16 Sept.

As of: 201100 Sep 04 EDT

11-L-0559/OSD/26699

Security and Law Enforcement Funding

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Development Fund for Iraq*

\$1.0B Funds Allocated

\$998.7M (95%) Obligated

\$1.0B (100%) Committed

\$1.3M Committed awaiting on J7 resolution

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund**

\$2.417B Apportioned

\$1.374B (57%) Obligated

\$2.176B (90%) Committed

\$241.1M (10%) Uncommitted Balance--but "earmarked"
for known requirements

- **\$1.8B IRRF Realignment at Congress for decision**
- **\$210M FY05 Defense Appropriation Bill justification to MNF-I**

FORCE	COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER TRAINED
IRAQI POLICE	Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training (Phased Out) 8 Week Academy	30,102 (TIP) 8,819 (Academy)
	Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Academy	0
	Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Academy	76
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT		4 Week Academy	14,313
ARMY	Iraq Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	4,789
	Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: Put into operations (over watched) at initial operations capability, generally 8 weeks; full operations capability follows (In progress)	38,661
	Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks MOUT Training: 6 Weeks	1,928
	Iraqi Special Ops Force	Field Training Provided by USJSOTF (Ranger/SFOD Type Training)	581
AIR FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks 4 Months Pilot Training (IP)	167
COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE		Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In progress)	282

September 22, 2004

NorthCOM

TO: Gen Ed Eberhart

cc: Paul McHale
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime NORAD

We need to have a post-911 arrangement that makes sense – like the one we have in the air. Essentially, we need a Maritime version of NORAD to deal with homeland security on the seas.

Top priority is fixing the air-to-ship capability right now.

I would like to see the interim report fast – by 10 October, please – then a fully considered plan shortly thereafter.

The ROE will be particularly important, as well as the relationship between Navy and Coast Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-4

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

Casey

September 23, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings

335 SD

You did nice work up on the Hill yesterday. Your comments incorporated just the right balance of quiet confidence in the long term outcome, with strong cautions about the tough fight ahead.

We all appreciate the difficult challenges you shoulder in CENTCOM. You're doing an excellent job.

DHR:ss
092304-7



Please respond by _____

OSD 14476-04

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9/27
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SEP 28 2004

9/28
E 936



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

For Official Use Only - Pre-decisional 2004 SEP 27 PM 12:03

ACTION MEMO

September 22, 2004, 4:55 PM



Paul Butler

9/27

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting US

SUBJECT: SECDEF Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

dispatch

- I request your approval to ~~send~~ the attached letter (TAB A) in response to Senator McCain's concerns regarding the C-130J cost and capability, which he mentioned in recent 9-11 hearings. My letter seeks to assure Senator McCain that the Department will review the C-130J program to ensure we acquire a safe and mission-capable weapon system.
- Mr. Patterson prepared an info memo (TAB B) for you to send to the Secretary if you desire. It is an accurate assessment of the situation.

RECOMMENDATION: That Deputy Secretary of Defense sign and forward the info memo to SECDEF, and approve the response to Senator McCain, by initialing:

Approve [Signature] Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: ARA, GC, LA, Compt, and AF (TAB C)

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared By: Col Jim Edge, (b)(6) 200 1-2757-174

452c

22 SEP 04

TSA SD	[Signature]
SA DSD	[Signature]
SRMA DSD	[Signature]
EXEC SEC	E 9/27

JCL 9/28



OSD 14693-04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

SEP 29 2004


The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 205 10-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman,

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you raised concerns with Secretary Rumsfeld about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department has the C-130J program under review, including its ability to conduct its intended mission, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I have identified the C-130J as a special interest acquisition program and I will continue my active engagement with organizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and customer representatives, such as the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The Department stands ready to brief you or your staff on our progress to date, as well as the plan to achieve full C-130J operational capability.

Sincerely,


Michael W. Wynne
[Acting]



11-L-0559/OSD/26705



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

~~For Official Use Only~~ - Pre-decisional
INFO MEMO

September 21, 2004, 9:42 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense

PW SEP 29 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Tasking Regarding: C-130J Program History and a Letter to
Senator McCain Addressing C-130J Safety

Don,

Senator McCain's reference to the problems with the C-130J during your hearing before the SASC originates in a DoD IG July 23, 2004 report critical of the Air Force C-130J acquisition program. The report was prompted by allegations to the Defense Hotline concerning the Defense Contract Management Agency's oversight of Lockheed Martin's performance on the C-130J aircraft as well as F-22 and C-5 aircraft.

The IG report states that with regard to the C-1305, the Air Force "conditionally accepted 50 C-130J aircraft at a cost of \$2.6 billion even though none of the aircraft met commercial contract specifications or operational requirements." The report goes on to say that the Air Force paid Lockheed Martin "more than 99 percent of the C-130J aircraft's contracted price" for an aircraft that cannot perform its intended mission. The IG also concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J as a commercial item, without the benefit of certified cost or pricing data, was unjustified, and that the Air Force and OSD failed to manage and oversee the program effectively.

My initial look at the C-130J program reveals the following:

1. Lockheed Martin developed the C-130J with approximately \$1 billion of its own money for sale in the commercial market. The U.K. bought the aircraft before the U.S.
2. The C-130J program started with a contract in 1995 for two C-130J aircraft as a modification to an existing C-130H-model contract.
3. First delivery of two aircraft planned for 1997, did not deliver until 1999. But, in 1996 the government, with encouragement from Congress, signed a 5-year option contract which authorized us to purchase 35 C-130Js from FY 1997-FY 2000.



11-L-0559/OSD/26706

4. The initial 35 aircraft could not meet the commercial contract specification, and Lockheed established a 3-phase block upgrade to bring the aircraft up to specification, at its own cost. The Air Force agreed.
5. In December 2000, the Air Force agreed to another 5-year option to purchase 20 additional aircraft from FY2001-FY2003.
6. You and the Secretary of the Air Force inherited a problem aircraft program.
7. The Air Force, again with Congressional support, in 2003 awarded Lockheed a 6-year multi-year contract for 60 more C-130Js.
8. The Air Force has made a great effort to correct deficiencies. The aircraft however, still has not been released to perform key missions such as: low level formation flight, formation flight in instrument meteorological conditions, heavy equipment airdrop, and weather penetration reconnaissance (“hurricane hunting”).
9. Bottom line: Senator McCain’s comments and the IG report raise valid concerns.

I have directed Mike Wynne to work with the Air Force to provide me a deficiency mitigation plan that includes:

- a) a history of the program, including what went wrong, how it’s going to be fixed, and
- b) execution milestones for fixing problems.

Additionally, I’ve asked Mike to provide a letter (**attached**) back to Senator McCain outlining what we are going to do to get the C-130J capable of meeting its operational mission requirements. I will provide you monthly progress reports.

COORDINATION: Acting USD(AT&L)

Attachment:
As Stated



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC 205 10-0303

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In the recent 9-11 Commission hearings and in other correspondence, you have raised concerns about the cost and capability of the C-130J aircraft. The Department recognizes that we should review the C-130J program, including its ability to conduct its intended missions, the aspects of commercial procurement, and the associated recommendations of the Inspector General.

In coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will review the program and will engage organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Transportation Command, and representatives from the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. I will share my findings with you.

Sincerely,

Michael W. Wynne
Acting



11-L-0559/OSD/26708

UNCLASSIFIED

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

30 August 2004 - 0930 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: **USD AT&L**


SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake on the "C-130 Issue"

Sir,

The DSD has asked that you please take the attached snowflake for action by providing a complete history on the C-130J program to include all the contract, performance and capability problems. Additionally, please provide:

1. A list of each deficiency that exists; a detailed plan for fixing the deficiency with milestones, and expected date for achieving operational capability.
2. What compensation is due the government for deficiencies and waivers'?
3. What is the breakout of investment by the government and investment by the contractor?
4. What did the government do differently to comply with the "commercial" approach to contracting for the C-130J?
5. A letter to Senator McCain that explains what the Air Force and Department of Defense are doing to ensure the Department is acquiring a safe and mission capable weapon system.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 3 September 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/26709

Re-coordination on Letter

LA	Mr. Stanley for Mr. Moore	September 16,2004	Concur
GC	Mr. Larsen	September 16,2004	Concur
AF	Dr. Sambur	September 20,2004	Concur
Compt	Mr. Henke	September 16,2004	Concur
ARA	Dr. Spruill	September 16,2004	Concur

SNOWFLAKE

~~FOUO~~

1800 / 19 Aug 04 -
JDP HC'd TO ATWL
FOR ACTION

17 Aug - 1165
Scoutnet

August 18, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 Issue

Senator McCain raised the question of a \$2-3 billion problem with a C-130 aircraft that cannot be used in combat. Please figure out what is going on with that, take care of it and tell me what you are doing.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
081804-6

.....
Please respond by

9/10/04

452
C

18 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 14695-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26711



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



2004 SEP 27 14 2 54

ACTION MEMO

September 20, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Captain William P. Marriott, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake #081504-5, "Thanks for Support to Troops"

- You stated, "I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our troops at the hospitals or do USO work, if they are doing any significant amount" (TAB A).
- A list of 25 individuals and 25 organizations, representing those who have significantly supported our troops and/or their families, are provided at TAB B. Details of their support are provided at TAB B1 and TAB B2.
- An example letter has been prepared for your review/signature to one of the individuals (TAB C1) and one of the groups/organizations (TAB C2).
- If approved, I will prepare similar letters for all individuals and groups for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the list of supporters and enclosed letters for your signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Fixed

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments: As stated

9/26
Please Get a GP coord. (see SOCO)
Larry Di Pina
9/27
D. R. H.

TSA SD	<i>9/22</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	<i>M 9/21</i>

Prepared by CPT Thomas Burke, OSD/EXEC SEC (b)(6)

OSD 14715-04

INDIVIDUALS

Dennis Farina
Drew Carey
Gary Sinise
Henry Rollins
Joan Jett
Neal McCoy
Robin Williams
Toby Keith
Wayne Newton
World Wrestling Enterprise
David Bellamy
Howard Bellamy
Joe Diffie
David Lee Murphy
Lee Roy Parnell
David Clayton-Thomas
Mel Tillis
Deborah Allen
Heather Kinley-Mendenhall
Jennifer Kinley-Hughes
Michelle Wright
Patty Loveless
Charlie Daniels
Billy Ray Cyrus
Diamond Rio

ORGANIZATIONS

The Oak Ridge Boys
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
United Services Organizations, Inc
National Military Family Association, Inc.
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.
The Spirit of America Tour
Angels of Mercy
Camp Flashhh
Lindsay Project
Operation Interdependence
Handy Man Hotline Materials
USA Cares
Camp Wonderland
Operation Gratitude
Glory Boots
Pay it Forward
United Through Reading
Adoptaplatoon
Operation Hero
Family Support Center • School Supplies
Missoula Children's Theater
Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club
Andrews Home Educators

Groups and individuals who have performed for *Celebrities on Tour*:

DENNIS FARINA

c/o Kami Putnam
Gersh Agency
130 W. 42d St., Ste 2400 (23d & 24th Floors)
New York, NY 10036

Pacific Handshake – Japan, Okinawa – 21-30 Dec 03
Operation Starlight – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain – 22-30 Dec 01
Christmas Handshake – Europe, Norway – 21-30 Dec 02

DREW CAREY

c/o Messina Baker Entertainment
955 Carillo Drive Str 100
Los Angeles, CA 90048

Qatar, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Singapore, Diego Garcia – 19-23 Dec 02
Europe, Norway – 23 Nov-01 Dec 02
Kuwait, Iraq – 24-30 Sep 03
Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE – 20-27 Jan 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02

GARY SINISE

c/o Patrick Whitesell
Endeavor
9701 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Hills, CA 90212

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Singapore, Diego Garcia, Korea – 16-27 Feb 04
Italy – 02-09 Jul 03
Italy, Germany – 02-05 Sep 03

HENRY ROLLINS

7615 Hollywood Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90046

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar – 01-08 Dec 03
Kuwait, Iraq – 22-28 May 04
Honduras – 10-13 Aug 04

JOAN JETT

c/o Kenny Laguna
Blackheart Records Group
155 E. 55th St., Ste 6H
New York, NY 10022

Okinawa, Japan – 10-16 Oct 03
Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay – 22-26 Oct 01
Bahrain, Turkey – 28 Dec 01-06 Jan 02
Oman, Pakistan, Afghanistan – 22 Sep-02 Oct 02

NEAL McCOY

Neal McCoy Fan Club
c/o Patsy Williams
610 Standard Street
Longview, TX 75604

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 2-19 Nov 01

ROBIN WILLIAMS

MBST Entertainment
c/o Tanner Gibson
345 North Maple Drive, Suite 200
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Turkey, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan – 13-20 Oct 03
Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Kuwait – 14-19 Dec 03

TOBEY KEITH

T.K.O Artist Management
1107 17th Ave S. Wall Center
Nashville, TN 37212

Germany, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia – 23 May-05 Jun 02
Germany, Kuwait, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan – 27 May – 06 Jun 04

WAYNE NEWTON

c/o Erin Miel, Inc.
6730 South Pecos Road
Las Vegas, NV 89120

UAE, Iraq, Kuwait – 17-23 Nov 03
Korea – 30 Jun-06 Jul 04
Bahrain, Kuwait – 25-29 Nov 02
Oman, Bahrain – 19-24 Dec 01
Korea – 30 Jun-07 Jul 02
Korea – 30 Jun-03 Jul 03
Germany, Hungary, Bosnia, Italy – 12-19 Nov 01

WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT(WWE)

c/o Vincent K. McMahon
1241 East Main Street
Stamford, CT 06902

Iraq – 12-17 Dec 03
Korea – 29-30 Oct 02
Kuwait, Iraq – 15-20 Jul 03

Groups and Individuals who have performed, free of charge, for *Spirit of America*:

THE BELLAMY BROTHERS:

DAVID BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

HOWARD BELLAMY

Bellamy Brothers Partners
13917 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

US Coast Guard Training Center - March 14

MR. JOE DIFFIE

9435 Weatherly Drive
Brentwood, TN 37027

Keesler AFB - June 6

DAVID LEE MURPHY

PO Box 121682
Nashville, TN 37212

LEE ROY PARNELL

317 Jocelyn Hollow Circle
Nashville, TN 37205

Fort Polk - June 6

DAVID CLAYTON-THOMAS

Antoinette Music Prod. Ltd.

715 Route 304
Bardonia, NY 10954

Fort Lewis - June 9

MEL TILLIS

Mel Tillis Enterprises
PO Box 305
Silver Springs, FL 34489

Charleston AFB - June 19

Robins AFB - June 20

DEBORAH ALLEN

104 Broadley Court
Franklin, TN 37069

HEATHER KINLEY-MENDENHALL

5560 Quail Covey Trail
Pegram, TN 37143

JENNIFER KINLEY-HUGHES

6809 Bridgewater Drive
Nashville, TN 37221

MICHELLE WRIGHT

214 Lancelot Lane
Franklin, TN 37064

Submarine base New London - August 13

Langley AFB - August 14

MCAS New River - August 15

PATTY LOVELESS

c/o Mike Robertson Management
1227 17th Avenue South

Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB - July 16

CHARLIE DANIELS CDB, Inc.

17060 Central Pike
Lebanon TN 37090

Dyess AFB - June 20

Mountain Home AFB - July 27

Fort Irwin - October 22

DIAMOND RIO:

MARTY ROE
GENE JOHNSON
BRIAN PROUT
DANA WILLIAMS
JIMMY OLANDER
DAN TRUMAN

c/o Modern Management, Inc.
1625 Broadway, Suite 600
Nashville, TN 37203

Fort Sill - September 12

THE OAK RIDGE BOYS:

DUANE ALLEN
JOE BONSALE
WILLIAM LEE GOLDEN
RICHARD STERBAN

The *Oak Ridge Boys*, Inc.
88 New Shackle Island Road

Henderson, TN 37075

Fort Leonard Wood – September 12
Fort Knox – October 7

BILLY RAY CYRUS

c/o Terry Elam
Fitzgerald-Hartley Company
1908 Wedgewood Avenue
Nashville, TN 37212

Wright-Patterson AFB – October 8

Non-profit Organizations Providing “Significant” Support during OEF/OIF

Mr. Ken Gladish,
National Executive Director,
YMCA of the USA, Inc.
101 N. Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606

Provides support to Reserves and National Guard and their family who don't have access to support structures typically available on military installations. Support varies by the needs of the community and include free or reduced membership for using their facilities; counseling and mentoring programs; respite child care; summer camps; and generally reaching out to these military families across the country.

Frank Gallo, RADM, USN (Ret)
National Executive Director,
Armed Services YMCA of the USA, Inc.
6359 Walker Lane Suite 200
Alexandria, VA 22310

150 program centers throughout the world providing programs that complement those on military installations. Programs are targeted to junior enlisted personnel (who are single or married with families) and the Guard and Reserves. Programs are either free or at little cost and include childcare and school age care, counseling, youth and teen mentoring programs, and many national programs that focus on “building strong kids, strong families, and strong communities.” Nearly 250,000 people were provided services in 2003 that would have otherwise not been available or affordable.

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600,
Rockville, MD 20852

There are 26 Fisher Houses adjacent to military medical centers and six houses near Veteran Affairs medical facilities. Annually, more than 7000 families of wounded and injured service member's stay in furnished Fisher House-provided living quarters while they are visiting.

In response to OIF/OEF...while the government funds one trip for two family members to visit their wounded loved one, the Fisher House recognized that the presence of family members, including spouses, children, and parents, are a key factor in the healing

process, and would require multiple airline trips. Since January, the Fisher House has distributed about \$300,000 in free airline tickets, donated by five airlines.

Mr. Edward Powell
President
United Services Organizations, Inc
211 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 22201
Arlington, VA 22201

At 125 locations, worldwide, the USO continues to provide touch of home services such as free Internet and e-mail access, recreation services, travel assistance, and family events. Celebrity entertainment continues to be hugely popular with troops and highly valued by commanders because it provides that needed morale boost. Recent entertainers volunteering their time and talent in Southwest Asia included Wayne Newton, Robin Williams, Ruth Pointer, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gary Sinise, Drew Carey, Jessica Simpson, and Jay Leno.

USO has distributed more than 300,000 Operation USO Care Packages since the program began in September 2002 as a way for the American people to show their support. The packages include items such as prepaid international calling cards, disposable cameras, toiletries, snacks, and playing cards. The USO opened a center in Kuwait last December and recently opened centers in Qatar and Vicenza, Italy.

Ms. Candace A. Wheeler
President
National Military Family Association, Inc.
2500 North Van Dom Street, Suite 102
Alexandria, VA 22303-1601

NMFA serves the seven uniformed services. In addition to their advocacy for military families through testimony, newsletters and legislative updates, NMFA had two significant projects during OEF/OIF. One is published research -*Sewing the Home Front: An Analysis of Military Family Support from September 11, 2001 through March 31, 2004*. A second major contribution was the initiation of "Operation Purple" in the summer of 2004. Operation Purple served more than 1000 youth at camps throughout the US and Guam. The residential camps were for military youth whose parent was deployed

Ms. Roxanne Spillet
President
Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Inc.

1230 W. Peachtree Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30309

Continuing strong partnership with DoD with every military youth center belonging to B&GCA and participating in their exception staff training programs and other national contests and events. During OEF/OIF they provided two special programs. One is "Opening our Doors" in which they opened their hearts and their doors at Boys and Girls Clubs worldwide, for children and families impacted by deployment, including the Guard and Reserves. The second, "A Time for Smiles" was a large donation of toys and games to programs for military children. Additionally, DoD youth programs have received over \$2.5 million in B&GCA grants this past year.

Robert M. Rosenthal
The Spirit of America Tour
4444 Riverside Drive, Suite 303
Burbank, CA 91505

Mr. Rosenthal is a former entertainment industry attorney who founded a charitable foundation, called the Robert and Nina Rosenthal Foundation, dedicated to providing free celebrity entertainment to military installations in the Continental United States. This foundation provided free celebrity concerts at 18 US military installations in calendar year 2003 and will provide a total of 20 free celebrity concerts at US military installations during 2004.



FISHER HOUSE FOUNDATION, INC.

*"Dedicated to our greatest national treasure ...
our military service men and women and their loved ones"*

FOR RELEASE
On or After August 24, 2004

Contact: Jim Welskopf
jwelskopf@fisherhouse.org

RECIPIENTS SELECTED FOR 2004 "NEWMAN'S OWN" AWARDS

PRESENTATION HELD IN PENTAGON ON AUGUST 24, 2004

The Honorable Charles S. Abell, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), assisted in the presentation of \$50,000 in grants to 16 volunteer organizations for their innovative programs to improve military quality of life.

Mr. Abell joined Kenneth Fisher, Chairman, Fisher House Foundation; Tom Indoe, Chief Operating Officer of Newman's Own; and Dave Smith, Vice Resident, Military Times Media Group, in a August 24, 2004 ceremony at the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes where recipients of "The Newman's Own Awards" were announced.

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families, and hosting special events. It was judged as the best entry and will receive a \$10,000 grant. Fifteen other organizations shared \$40,000 in grants.

This is the fifth year that Newman's Own, Fisher House Foundation, and Military Times Media Group have jointly sponsored the program which seeks to reward ingenuity and innovation for volunteer organizations working to improve military quality of life. The challenge was straightforward: "Present an innovative plan to improve the quality of life for your military community and receive funding to carry out the plans."

A total of 64 entries were received. Six judges, two from each of the sponsoring organizations, evaluated each entry based on the organization's impact to the respective communities, creativity and innovation. To be eligible, each organization was required to certify that it was a private or non-profit organization operating with authority of a military installation commander. Every organization submitting an entry will receive a certificate of recognition from Paul Newman.

OVERALL WINNING ENTRY (\$10,000 GRANT)

"Angels of Mercy," sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary Unit 270 of McLean, Virginia, is a program to support wounded and injured Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) service members and their families. Auxiliary members visit patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Center at least once a week, bringing them clothing and comfort items, providing home cooked meals to OIF/OEF families, and hosting special events. For further information, contact Marian T. Chirichella at (b)(6)

\$5,000 GRANTS

"Camp Flashhh," is a free program for children with special needs and their families at Camp Pendleton, CA, sponsored by the Camp Pendleton Armed Services YMCA. "Flashh" stands for "Families Laughing and Sharing Hugs, Hopes and Happiness," and it permits special needs families to experience new adventures, to escape from the daily routine, and provide a unique bonding experience. For further information, contact George Brown at (b)(6)

The **"Lindsay Project,"** sponsored by the Washington PAVE (Parents Advocating for Vocational Education) at Fort Lewis, WA, is a volunteer project named after a young child with Special needs who could not participate in community events. The program uses liaisons in each troop unit to reach out to families with children with special needs, with an emphasis on deploying units. The results have been decreased returns of deployed service members for family problems. For further information, contact Heather Hebdonar (b)(6)

\$4,000 GRANTS

"Operation Interdependence," a civilian-to-military delivery system administered by a Fallbrook, CA nonprofit organization streamlines the delivery of packages to deployed service members. Care packages were overwhelming the military distribution system, so by repackaging individual care packages into platoon sized boxes with 50 civilian rations (c-rats) and sending them in bulk, it has simplified the delivery process to individuals in deployed units. For further information, contact Albert R. Renteria at (b)(6)

"Handy Man Hotline Materials," a program of the Connecticut National Guard Family Program, reduces stressors on families of deployed Guardsmen by having everyday household problems diagnosed and repaired, or referred to competent businesses at no cost for the labor. The Hotline is manned by volunteers, but funds are needed to purchase materials for the repair, or needed tools and equipment. For further information, contact Louis P. Preziosi at (b)(6)

"USA Cares," a Radcliff, KY nonprofit, works to compliment an overburdened network of both information and financial support to service men and women and their families, while protecting the privacy and dignity of the individual. Rather than giving money to individuals, USA Cares pays utility companies or repair shops, or donates gift cards for food. The focus is on Reserve and National Guardsmen without a military installation or support network. For further information, contact Roger Stradley at (b)(6)

"Camp Wonderland," sponsored by the Missouri National Guard Wonderland Foundation is a single one-week camp session for 95 special needs campers. Operated by volunteers, the organizers work in joint partnership with the Missouri Department of Mental Health's Division of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities, focusing on mentally challenged family members of Missouri National Guardspersons. For further information, contact Wade Johnson at (b)(6)

\$3,000 GRANTS

"Operation Gratitude" is a California National Guard sponsored nonprofit, all-volunteer organization that has sent 21,150 care packages plus letters of support to service members deployed overseas. The organization obtains the names of service members through inquiries on its website, then sends packages as requests are received. For further information, contact Carolyn Blashek at (b)(6)

\$2,000 GRANTS

"Glory Boots" and "Pay It Forward," are both programs of the Mothers of Military Support (MOMS) of the 81st Armor Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA. The group became a distributor of desert boots with sewn soles and ankle support that are sent to deployed unit members; and they became a conduit for the public to purchase gift cards that given anonymously to families of deployed service members. For further information, contact Elizabeth Johnston at (b)(6)

"United Through Reading," a program sponsored by the Family Literacy Foundation of San Diego, CA facilitates supportive relationships for children through families and friends reading aloud to them. Its focus is more than 150 deploying ships and Navy/Marine Corps units, Permitting military parents and other family members to stay connected with their children by reading aloud on videotapes that are mailed home. For further information, contact Britta Justesen at (b)(6)

"Adopt a platoon" a Kingston, NH nonprofit promotes morale lifting mail, care packages and other support measures to deployed service men and women through "platoon moms," and thousands of volunteers. The platoon mom ensures that each participating service member in a unit receives mail any special needs or requests. For further information contact Fran Dobson at (b)(6)

\$1,000 GRANTS

"Operation Hero" a program of the San Diego Armed Services YMCA is a free ten-week after school enrichment program for children of armed services personnel to help them succeed in school and to help them develop self-esteem through counseling from trained social workers and individualized homework assistance. The program targets dependents of deployment service members who are identified by school personnel as having difficulties. For further information, contact Blaine McCafferty at

(b)(6)

"Family Support Center - School Supplies" a program of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Mt. Hood, OR Chapter, works with the children of the activated members of the 939th Air Refueling Wing and 304th Rescue Squadron based at the Portland, OR Air Base. The goal is to ease stress and tension experienced by military families who may lack some of the material items as other children. For further information, contact Robin Hammond at (b)(6)

"Missoula Children's Theater" is the nation's largest children's theater program, and the sponsoring organization, the William T. Sampson Elementary School Parent Teachers Organization from the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has requested a grant to help pay for a team of actors/directors and their equipment to travel to Guantanamo to develop and produce a full-scale musical with 40-50 military children in the cast. For further information, contact Kathy Arlinghaus at (b)(6)

"Cannon Enlisted Spouses Club" is a group of enlisted spouses who share common Air Force bonds like deployments and family separation and adjusting to new places to live, promote fellowship and serve as a resource for others at Cannon Air Force Base. The group's projects include scholarships, childcare and meals, and welcome packets for newly arriving families. For further information, contact Kris Keick at (b)(6)

"Andrews Home Educators" is a nonprofit support group made up of home school families who are affiliated with Andrews Air Force Base (80 families with 192 children). The group coordinates the use of an base facilities for home school families and offers a full range of activities to improve the educational experience of the children. For further information, contact Debbie Sanzone at (b)(6)

David Bellamy
Bellamy Brothers Partners
1349 17 Restless Lane
Dade City, FL 33525

Dear Mr. Bellamy,

Thank you so much for all you have done to support our troops, both at home and overseas. Your ~~personal interest in bringing~~ *committed to bringing* entertainment and comfort to ~~our men~~ *the* and women in uniform will not soon be forgotten.



All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate ~~everything you do, David, for our fine armed forces. It is great work you are doing.~~ *what you*


My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

Mr. David Coker
Executive Director
Fisher House Foundation, Inc.
1401 Rockville Pike Suite 600
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear Mr. Coker,

 
Thank you so much for all you and the Fisher House Foundation do on a daily basis to help ~~our~~ armed forces and their families. Your contributions bring comfort and much needed support to ~~our~~ proud men and women in uniform, and for that I am truly grateful.


All of us at the Department of Defense appreciate everything the Fisher House Foundation is doing for our fine armed forces. It is great work you are doing.

My best wishes and thanks for your inspiring work.

All the best,

11-L-0559/OSD/26728

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 SEP 07 04 2:54
August 15, 2004 2:54

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thanks for Support to Troops

335 SD

I think I ought to get thank you notes off to all the people who visit our **troops** at the hospitals or do USO **work**, if they are doing any significant amount.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
081504-5 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

15 Aug 04

OSD 14715-04

September 27, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Views by Bill Schneider

Attached are the additional views Bill Schneider attached to the Scowcroft Report.
They are worth reading.

350.109

Attach.
12/31/01 Additional Views to the Scowcroft Report by William Schneider, Jr.

DHR:ss
092704-12

27-Sep-04

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (Task 4, *Organizing for Success*). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

The need to transform the IC to meet 21st century international security requirements

The international security environment of the 21st century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. **As** a result, the **US military** posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, **as** was the case during the Cold **War**. For **this** reason (among others), public policy aims to **transform US** military capabilities to those that are far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold **War**. To meet **this** requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if our intelligence agencies continue with business **as** usual."

To permit the US national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of US adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats pose overwhelming problems for **US** security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the military applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century warfare requires **US** military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into an actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. This processed intelligence information will often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit US forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required as well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21st century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the US government.

Notable IC difficulties during the 1990s in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for US security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. This failure to predict these developments remind us that the IC must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the “national” or “strategic” intelligence requirements of the US government with the demanding “tactical” or “operational” DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the IC. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet 21st century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. Its interaction with elements of the IC most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for tasking and resource allocation with the DCI. This “creative tension” between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.¹

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

¹ The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*,” (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that “the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD.”

Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold War performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.²

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under the DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around the *means* by which intelligence is collected rather than *ends* served **by** national intelligence.³ It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence – not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the “distance” of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the *Predator* unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is employed in support of **US** military operations in Afghanistan offers an informative example of the constructive interplay between **users** and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of **users**. This model is more appropriate to the support of 21st century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations **are** subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD to improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user as the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the warfighter is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to assure responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the **armed** forces.

² The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects “seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21st century.”

³ The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly 40 years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem – the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement “of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements.” The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

Draft 02

31 December 2001

120

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 20 11 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

320.2

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
090704-41

.....
Please respond by 9/14

7 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/26735

OSD 14746-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 23 AM 9:55

INFO MEMO

CM-2086-04
27 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/27*

SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

- **Question.** "Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Yes. OSD(P&R) has the Department of Defense lead using the process developed by OSD(Policy) last year. The Joint Staff uses the Joint Staff Action Processing system to manage actions for which it has the lead.
- **Analysis**
 - The Joint Staff will assist OSD(P&R) in developing its briefing and revising the action agenda. The current action agenda is attached (TAB B).
 - The OSD(PA&E) DOD Balanced Scorecard **risk** metrics and the Joint Staff/OSD(P&R) co-chaired Force Management Functional Capabilities Board also track force level initiatives.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

copy to:
DUSD(P&R)

Prepared By: VADM Robert F. Willard, USN; Director, J-8; (b)(6)

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26736

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

09070441

2004 SEP 28 AM 8:55

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Tina Jonas
David Chu
Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Force Level Memo

Do we have a process in place to track each of the items in this Force Level Memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
9/29/04 Force Level Memo

DHR:ss
09070441

.....
Please respond by 9/14

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14746-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26737

WORKING PAPER

Version #6

September 7, 2004

SUBJECT: “Force Levels,” “End Strength” and “Stress on the Force” —Are current U.S. military forces sufficient in size and properly organized and managed to meet the challenges facing our country? What are ways DoD can reduce the stress *on* the force, maintain recruiting and retention targets, and make the Department more efficient and cost effective?

Summary: The **U.S.** can afford whatever military force level is determined to be necessary and appropriate for our nation’s security. The men and women in uniform are the Department’s most valuable asset. It is our people who distinguish the U.S. military from other forces. For the present, analysis by the Joint Chiefs indicates that the U.S. military currently has sufficient active and reserve forces to execute its assigned missions. If at any time that is not the case, it would be DoD’s responsibility to recommend to the President appropriate adjustments. Absent analysis that indicates that U.S. forces are not able to meet their assigned missions, it would be a mistake to increase the size of our forces. To the extent we increase our investment in force levels, we increase risk in other key areas, such as readiness, procurement and research and development.

Background: The operational tempo of U.S. forces during the two years after September 11, 2001 has been significant. In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some have called for an increase in the statutory “end strength” *of the* U.S. military, *but* have not explained how to pay for it. Although this may appear to be a straightforward solution, it is not cheap, easy or quick.

- The cost is substantial over the lifetime of a service member. A number of the most costly add-ons to military pay and benefits have been for retired, not active duty personnel.
- Increased end strength has second and third order effects. The more forces, the more force protection that is required; the more forces, the more infrastructure that is required; the more forces, the more pensions and healthcare for life that are required.
- It takes time to recruit, train and integrate new personnel into the Armed Forces. As a result, there is a lag between when the additional personnel are recruited and the costs begin, and when the added capability is available.

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Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/26738

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- At present, the Services' recruiting and retention goals are being met or exceeded. Whether these favorable results will continue as we move through the coming months and years remains to be seen. These key indicators must be closely watched.

The current stress on the force is very likely a "spike," and we hope it will not be permanent. The Department is taking immediate actions to relieve this stress on the force in Iraq. There is a three-pronged strategy underway that is working to:

- Develop Iraqi capacity to conduct police and other security tasks;
- Increase international military participation in Iraq; and
- Increase actionable intelligence to disrupt attacks on coalition forces and other threats to stability.

In any event, the current stress, as well as respect for the taxpayers' dollars, requires DoD to make every effort to achieve the most efficient use of the forces. That same respect for the taxpayers' dollars mandates that we aggressively address the alternative contractor and civilian employee cost impacts as well.

Following is, I am sure, an incomplete but illustrative list of activities DoD is currently executing and/or examining for implementation in addition to those immediate actions listed above. As appropriate, we must exploit each of these areas to reduce stress on the force, both active and reserve. Though it may appear that some of these areas do not directly benefit end strength, nor assist in reducing stress on the force, in a variety of ways we believe they can have positive, indirect impact. To the extent we are successful in improving performance in these areas, it should relieve pressure on the force and likely reduce the current calls for end strength increases, or, at the minimum, reduce the size of any end strength increase that analysis might later indicate is necessary in the future.

1. Lessons Being Learned (JTL eod with J1/J3/J8/J5)

- Contingency Plans. DoD is currently reviewing and revising all contingency plans to take account of the lessons learned thus far in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror. Among the lessons is the need to take advantage of the tradeoffs between numbers of people and things—"mass"—versus the increased lethality from speed, agility, precision munitions and the leverage available in the information age. "Overmatching power" is replacing "overwhelming force."
- Jointness. DoD is achieving greater jointness worldwide, so combatant commanders should be able to tailor forces creatively among the

Tab A

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11-L-0559/OSD/26739

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Services to gain added synergy and lethality, as in the Iraq war. Coherently joint forces create power that exceeds the sum of individual military — US, and international—elements.

- Training and Exercises. Training matters; joint training matters more. It creates an asymmetric advantage for U.S. forces. Training and exercises need to take account of recent real world experience.
- Global Force Management. DoD is exploring methods of replacing the concept of “forces for a specific combatant commander” with a “Global Force Management Availability System,” which should lead to more efficient management of the forces and the process by which they are provided to Combatant Commanders in support of their essential missions.
- Reserve/Active Force Balance. DoD is rebalancing the reserve components with the active components to achieve the appropriate mix for the 21st century. The task is to avoid having to call up certain specialties repeatedly for tasks we know DoD is and will continue to be called upon to execute regularly (civil affairs, etc.). The new active-Reserve mix must also be designed to enable more immediate action, as appropriate.
- Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets. DoD will review active and reserve components to determine how the Department can best allocate manpower levels and specific skill sets, within existing end strength limits, to best satisfy the demands of the 21st century.
- Time on Operational Duty. For Reserve Components, DoD will seek ways to increase the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation/mobilization a unit is actually performing the mission for which it was called up. We can improve on those instances where it is as low as 6 months out of a 12-month call-up.
- Precision Weapons. Our use of precision weapons, with greater accuracy, can maintain lethality while reducing both the operational footprint and the logistics tail, thereby reducing force requirements.
- Deployments. The old Industrial Age process is broken. An approach that permits only peace or war, with little or no nuance, is out of date. The process is currently being streamlined to take less time and permit more nuanced management of mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and recovery operations.

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- Relief-in-Place. The Services need to establish a common definition of “relief-in-place” and then implement measures to shorten the relief in place system from 45 – 60 days to a shorter period, as appropriate.
- Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The world is moving so fast that Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are necessary. If it takes one to three months to staff up a headquarters, the wars of the future may be over before the staff is in place. Where appropriate, we must invest in and sustain surge capability.

2. People (J1 lead with JS/J3/J6)

- Military Out of Non-Military Jobs. DoD requires Congressional cooperation to pass the personnel reform legislation so it can get closure on the studies that suggest there are some 300,000 to 380,000 positions that military personnel are currently serving in that might be performed by civilians. Managers have to be freed up so they can make greater use of the civil service, rather than being forced to use military personnel or contractors because they cannot efficiently manage the DoD civilian workforce. If only one-sixth of those 300,000 positions were freed up for military duty, it would increase usable “end strength” by 50,000. We won’t know what can be achieved until the current analysis is completed.
- Core Competencies. OSD is aggressively working to move the military out of activities that are not core competencies or inherently governmental. For example, housing privatization has allowed DoD to get better value and speed modernization for the same expenditure of funds.
- Contract Employees. For shorter duration missions and missions that are not military core competencies, DoD will have to make more judicious use of contract employees. This will require that we organize so we have Congressional authority and the ability to properly engage contract assistance.
- Education. The Department is working to improve joint education to create a culture that empowers younger leaders to think beyond their parent Services for creative solutions to the challenges our nation faces.
- Coalition Forces. The U.S. must organize its alliances and relationships to increase the availability and readiness of coalition forces—the speed of their availability and the readiness of their equipment. This will require a diplomatic effort to substantially reduce the current restrictions

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and cautions many countries have that reduce the availability of their forces and also a long-term commitment from other countries to help finance less wealthy nations' ability to recruit, train, deploy and sustain their forces.

- Allies. We must assist treaty partners, where appropriate, to assume greater responsibility for their defense more rapidly.
- Backfill. During a crisis, we need to arrange for other countries to backfill for U.S. troops in some of our long-term commitments, such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, **Kosovo**, etc. Additionally, the U.S. will have to tackle the tough political challenge of ending some commitments.
- Indigenous Forces. The U.S. must organize and fund to be able to use more host nation security personnel in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo to ease the burden on coalition forces. This will require Congress approving DoD's proposed "train and equip" legislation.
- Reserve Forces. DoD has established a policy whereby it will, to the extent possible, first use Reserve forces that have not recently been mobilized.
- Volunteers. DoD **will** continue to use volunteers from the Reserve force, to the extent available.
- Holidays. To the extent possible, DoD force mobilizations will be respectful of major holidays.
- Call-ups. DoD is revising the process so as to protect the goal of 30 days' notice for mobilization of reserve units, if at all possible, and will consider a tiered arrangement whereby some reserve units might be compensated and trained to maintain a readiness level to be available and ready for prompt deployment with a shorter call-up.
- Incentives. DoD will consider offering incentives for extended deployments.
- Peace Operations. The USG is considering a "Peace Operations Initiative" with the goal of increasing the worldwide availability of peacekeepers, peacemakers, military police, constabulary, etc. for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations.

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- Intelligence. DoD is working to strengthen actionable intelligence, and improve humint in key areas of interest, by prioritization of effort and by assuring seamless exchange of information among U.S. agencies.

3. Technology (J8 lead with J4/J5/J6)

- Information Age. DoD will accelerate use of new information technologies to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel and thereby reduce the rotation rate the Services require to support a deployed person.
- Logistics. DoD will continue to emphasize systems with smaller logistics requirements and footprint, simplified designs with fewer and more interchangeable parts.
- New Technologies. DoD will invest in technology to substitute for human force protection — sensors, intelligence, etc. Additionally, the Services will be encouraged to consider the approach the Navy is using to reduce personnel needed for ship manning (by as much as 50 percent in some cases) and invest in less manpower-intensive platforms (UAVs), and technologies and processes, in and out of the defense industry.
- Lethality. Services are working to lighten their footprint, while increasing lethality, to the extent possible.
- U.S. and Coalition Transformation. DoD will work to improve its interoperability with coalition partners through the Joint Forces Command.

4. Efficiency (J8 lead with J1/J2/J3/J4)

- Organization of Forces. In the 21st century one size doesn't fit all. DoD will modernize the Services' force organizations to achieve improved modularity, so combatant commanders can more readily organize units to task. This should allow commanders to build capability by adding modules and right-sizing the force to their missions. The goal is to achieve greater interchangeable and combined arms effects to increase flexibility. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are ideally suited to integrate and operate this approach. Interchangeable divisions could provide improvements in force allocation, force rotation, and employment flexibility.

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- Global reach back. DoD will organize to conduct more non-spear point activities for deployed forces back in the U.S., thereby reducing both the number of forces deployed as well as the rotation base multiple needed to maintain that number of troops forward-deployed. Organizing the Reserve Components to optimize reach back opportunities may yield significant personnel tempo savings.
- Force Allocation. OSD and the Joint Forces Command will work to be able to provide combatant commanders the joint force capabilities they need to achieve desired “effects” and “outcomes,” rather than simply responding to requests for numbers of things — troops or platforms.
- Procurement. DoD will continue to invest to achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure.
- Strategic Lift. DoD will continue investing in strategic lift to assure timely mobility, e.g., high speed transport. Leveraging new technologies in this area should also reduce the associated logistic footprint. Additionally, the Department must continue to support participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Act as a supplement to our national mobility capability.
- Rotation Ratio. The Services will work to find ways to reduce the rotation ratio and consider opportunities to transport crews to their equipment.
- Headquarters Layering. DoD components’ reduction in the number of headquarters will free up some of the manpower currently staffing those organizations. The flattening of headquarters hierarchies is desirable and viable given existing and planned communications technology.
- Best Practices. DoD will work to move best practices from inside and outside DoD throughout the Department.
- Planning Tools. DoD is developing tools to enable it to plan more rapidly to produce more refined force requirements, both in terms of numbers and timing of their movement and arrival.
- Operational Availability. DoD will implement the appropriate JROC “operational availability” studies’ recommendations.
- Strategic Warning. Intelligence capabilities will be tasked to see if it is possible and cost effective to increase strategic warning, thereby reducing the portion of the force that must be forward-deployed.

Tab A ⁷

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- The Right Skills. DoD will develop the ability to more rapidly adjust forces in the field, so as to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time and to be able to make rapid adjustments as circumstances change.
- Safety. DoD will move aggressively to reduce the number of mishaps as a means to protect our most valuable resources, our people.

5. Policy (JS lead with JS3)

- U.S. Foreign Commitments. DoD will continue to work to **pare** down long-term U.S. commitments such as the Sinai, Iceland, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc. We will advise nations at the outset that deployments are not forever and that the **U.S.** requires the ability to redeploy for other contingencies and ease of transit. DoD will also use care in adding new commitments of forces.
- U.S. Non-Military Skills. The USG needs to strengthen the international capability to help countries establish and execute civil implementation tasks; only if we are successful will the U.S. and coalition forces be relieved of peace operations earlier than tends to be the case, such as in Bosnia.
- U.S. Worldwide Footprint. DoD will work to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. forces by adjusting U.S. forward-deployed forces in Europe and **Asia**, by repositioning and making greater use of pre-positioned equipment to improve our capabilities for rapid deployment from the U.S. and elsewhere, and by investing in necessary infrastructure where required. DoD will consolidate locations worldwide to reduce the number of troops required for support, including force protection and, in addition, will use host nation forces, where available, to **provide** protection for deployed U.S. forces.

Conclusion.

In a war—in this case, the Global War on Terrorism—it cannot be “business as usual.” During a crisis, when there is an understandable spike demand on U.S. forces, DoD cannot behave as though it is “business as usual.” It isn’t. DoD needs to act promptly to reduce or stop activities such as exercises and other “business as usual” activities, as appropriate.

The task of DoD is to manage the force within acceptable levels of stress. Key measurements are recruiting and retention metrics. We must monitor all activities to see that we achieve solid progress on each of the above tasks, before taking the

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easy and more expensive course of increasing force levels. We owe *the* American people no less.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/ End Strength

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Tab A ?

11-L-0559/OSD/26746

TAB B
Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

ACTION AGENDA – REDUCING STRESS ON THE FORCE
(without increasing military end strength)

1. Lessons Being Learned

Action Item	Near-Term Action	Mid-term Action
a. Contingency plans	<p>USD(P) - Update Contingency Planning Guida to include action items from 18 Aug SECDEF “Operational Availability Action Items” memo (Sept 03).</p> <p>CJCS – Within 6 months of Contingency Planning Guidance publication, update Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Direct Combatant CC’s to delineate forces required to seize the initiative, additional forces required to achieve SDTE objectives, and follow-on forces required to achieve objectives of win decisive.</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process that encompasses the full spectrum of military operations. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement a new Defense Readiness Reporting System that uses adaptive planning constructs for force readiness assessment (IOC in FY04)</p>
b. Jointness	<p>CDR/JCOM – Publish & oversee implementation of DoD’s Integrated Interoperability Plan as tasked in the Transformation Planning Guidance. (Nov 03)</p>	<p>CJCS - Develop DPG language supporting initiatives that improve jointness and add synergy to joint force operations. (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Implement Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System to capture joint experience and training of military personnel. Ensure personnel systems uniformly define and track joint training qualifications and experiences for the selection of qualified personnel for joint assignments. (Oct 04).</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
<p>2. Training and Exercises</p>	<p>USD P&R – Update the Training Transformation Implementation Plan as appropriate to include lessons from recent real world experience (Jan 04).</p> <p>CDRJFCOM– Implement an initial Joint National Training Capability training event in FY04.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Evaluate progress on implementing the three enabling Training Transformation capabilities (Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, Joint National Training Capability, Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability), and recommend adjustments, if required, for POM 06. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM - Create a Joint National Training Capability to routinely incorporate joint context into major Service training events (FY 04)</p>
<p>1. Global Force Management</p>	<p>CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p>	<p>USD(P) – Oversee implementation of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study. (ongoing)</p> <p>CDR JFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).</p> <p>USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to implement capabilities-based force allocation into defense readiness assessment and planning (June 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
<p>1. Reserve/Active Force Balance</p>	<p>Service Secretaries – Develop plans and propose program or budget changes (if appropriate) to implement the SECDEF “Rebalancing the Force” memo and the 18 Aug SECDEF Operational Availability memo (Oct 03).</p> <p>USD(P&R) and Secretary of Army – work with PA&E to develop Army program changes that decrease reliance on the Reserve Component for “swiftly defeat” & high demand units. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation. (Dec 03)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM: In conjunction with Service Component Commands (SCCs), identify and implement plans and procedures in support of JFCOM’s roles as the single Force Provider for the supported Combatant Commanders.</p>
<p>2. Realignment of Manpower Levels and Skill Sets</p>	<p>Service Secretaries – Brief SECDEF on actions taken to better align manpower skills with assigned missions and develop Budget Change Proposals, if appropriate, to initiate support of rebalancing the Force efforts. (Oct 03)</p>	<p>USD(P) – Work with USD(P&R), Service Secretaries and CJCS to develop manpower realignment DPG language to guide POM 06 development and QDR preparation (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P&R)- with USD(I) and CJCS, conduct a study of DoD’s organic language, regional, and cultural expertise skill requirements. Recommend options to realign skill sets to meet foreign language requirements. (Aug 04)</p> <p>CJCS: With Services, identify each Services need to provide support for other Service, allied, and coalition units in support of full spectrum operations. Determine if there is a need to realign manpower to support this mission area. (Jun 04)</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
g. Time on Operational Duty	Service Secretaries – Assess options to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD (P&R), CJCS, Service Secretaries – Develop action plan to improve the ratio of the number of months out of the total period of activation that RC forces are actually performing the mission (Aug 04). CDR JFCOM: Identify actions, plans, methods and capabilities to track rotations of forces within the overall mobilization process. (Aug 04)
h. Precision Weapons		USD(AT&L) – with D, PA&E, CJCS and USD(P), develop plan for long-lead analysis needed to inform-QDR as to impact of current and projected precision weapons programs on logistics and manpower requirements. (Dec 03)
i. Deployments	CDR JFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03.	USD(P&R) – with CJCS and Service Secretaries define interactions between manpower, personnel management, and training systems to ensure these systems and supporting deployment processes are integrated. (Oct 06)
j. Relief in Place	CJCS – work with Services and USD (P&R) to develop a common definition of “relief-in-place.” (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries - Develop and implement procedures to better execute relief-in-place operations, to include conducting the operations in less time and doing so using best practices learned across all Services (Dec '03)
k. SJFHQ		USD(P) – Identify next steps for SJFHQ implementation in DPG for POM 06 action. (Dec 03)

2. People

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Military Out of Ton-Military Jobs	USD(P&R) – Work through the Defense Human Resource Board to identify opportunities for civilian-military conversions. As appropriate, work with PA&E or Comptroller to develop a Program Review Issue or Budget Change Proposal on civilian-military conversions (Oct 03).	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
b. Core Competencies	Service Secretaries – Continue progress toward achieving the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) competitive sourcing initiative via the A76 process or divesture using a core competency approach (on going)	<p>USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)</p> <p>Service Secretaries – develop options for divesting non-core competency missions in POM 06-11, including plans for completing the required PMA review by FY09. (Aug 04)</p>
c. Contract Employees	USD(C) – Consider whether a legislative proposal is needed to allow DoD to more judiciously use contractors in an expeditionary role for short duration missions and for other missions that are not military core competencies. (Jan 04)	USD(P) – With USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L), develop Defense Planning Guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move the military out of non-core mission areas, and out of activities that are not “military essential.” (Dec 03)
d. Education	CJCS – Complete/ implement Joint Professional Military Education initiatives	Dir, OFT – With USD P&R, develop options for a transformational education program for consideration in QDR. (Jan 05)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Coalition Forces		<p>USD(P) – Ensure increased availability and readiness of coalitions forces is a key issue for the next Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
E Allies	<p>USD(P) – Develop options for expanding the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(P) – integrate appropriate direction in the Security Cooperation Guidance on sharing transformation with allies and accelerating their ability to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P&R) – Develop a plan to implement common training and readiness assessment with Allies. (Oct 04)</p>
g. Backfill		<p>USD(P) – Develop appropriate direction to Regional Component Commanders in the Security Cooperation Guidance. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
h. Indigenous Forces	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan to expand the Train and Equip program (assuming legislation approved) (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(P) - Update the Security Cooperation Guidance (Jan 04) to direct Regional Component Commanders to increase the availability and capability of host nation security personnel.</p>

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
Reserve Forces	<p>Service Secretaries – Review current policies and practices to ensure judicious and prudent use of reserve forces. Inform USD(P&R) of the results of this review. (Dec 03)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM: Develop plan for a consolidated Joint Mobilization Process focused on engineering existing systems and plans for JFCOM's role as the single mobilization command,</p>
Volunteers	<p>Service Secretaries – Develop and implement initiatives that enhance unit and individual volunteerism per the 9 July SecDef “Rebalancing the Force” memo. Brief DepSecDef NLT Oct 03.</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p> <p>CDRJFCOM: Develop plans, systems and procedures to standardize coordination and command and control for Service Component Commands in the management and tracking of volunteers. (Aug 04)</p>
Holidays		<p>USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Component mobilization policy documents. (April 04)</p>
Call Ups	<p>CDRJFCOM – Identify changes in Joint doctrine, policy, and law required for new deployment and mobilization process reform and recommend to SECDEF improvements to RC mobilization considering NE/OEF/OIF lessons learned. (Jan 04)</p> <p>USD(P&R) - In coordination with CDRJFCOM develop “Quick Wins” initiatives from OIF lessons learned for SECDEF consideration. Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (Sep 03)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Review and update appropriate Reserve Force Mobilization policy documents. (April 04). Develop appropriate legislative proposals to implement deployment and mobilization process reforms. (Jan 04)</p>

Final DRAFT Version 10(as of 11 Oct)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
m. Incentives	USD(C) and USD(P&R) - assess options to offer incentives for extended deployments and develop a Budget Change Proposal or Management Initiative Decision as appropriate for DepSecDef consideration (Oct 03).	
n. Peace Operations Initiative		USD(P) – Revise Security Cooperation Guidance as appropriate to better focus security cooperation efforts on increasing the ability of allies and partners to participate in peace operations. (Jan 04) USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).
o. Intelligence	USD(I) – Identify desired capabilities and shortfalls in <i>our</i> ability to generate actionable intelligence, including a concrete interagency plan for improving horizontal integration of intelligence. (Dec 03)	USD(I) - Develop action plan to strengthen actionable intelligence (Aug 04)

3. Technology

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Information Age	ASD(NID) – Develop options to accelerate the implementation of the GIG and use of new information technologies and concepts to reduce the need for forward deployed personnel. (Nov 04)	ASD(NII) – with CJCS, conduct long-lead analysis for QDR of potential effects of C4 systems on reducing US.-based and deployed personnel. (Jan 05). See associated action in section 4.b.
b. Logistics	USD(AT&L) - Review all Major Defense Acquisition Programs to ensure they emphasize smaller logistics requirements and footprints. (Nov 03)	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to reduce logistics and support requirements. (Jan 04) CJCS – Consider the impact of improved systems on logistics, mobility and personnel requirements in <u>Operational Availability 01 Study</u> . (Mar 04)
c. New Technologies		USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries - Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to substitute for human force protection. (Jan 04)
d. Lethality	Secretary of the Army - Complete fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat teams IAW PDM I, FY04-09. (1 st Stryker deploying to OIF in Oct 03, 2 nd Stryker BCT ready in mid-FY04).	USD(AT&L) and Service Secretaries – Develop S&T priorities and metrics for new technologies to lighten the deployed footprint while retaining lethality. (Jan 04)
e. U.S. and Coalition Transformation	CDRJFCOM – Develop a coalition experimentation plan to examine key interoperability needs of coalition partners. (Dec 03)	USD(P) - Update Security Cooperation Guidance to identify regional coalition transformation priorities. (Jan 04)

4. Efficiency

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
a. Organization of Forces	Service Secretaries – Describe the capabilities required within each Service to drive modular design at appropriate levels and brief options for implementation by Dec 03.	CDRJFCOM – with CJCS and D, OFT, conduct long-lead QDR analysis of options for modular force organizations. (Jan 05)
b. Global Reach Back	Service Secretaries and Combatant Commanders – Identify capabilities that lend themselves to reachback. Propose near-term joint options to increase reliance on reachback to help reduce the forward footprint. (Dec 03)	USD(P) – With ASD (NI) and CJCS, develop “Global Reach Back” DPG direction for POM 06 development and QDR preparation, with emphasis on organizing the Reserve Component to optimize reachback opportunities. (Dec 03). See associated action in section 3.b.
c. Force Allocation	CJCS – Develop an integrated apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodology to include integrating the Joint Presence Policy into “Forces For” (Oct 03) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef OA Action Items Memo).	CDRJFCOM – Develop capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of operational availability capability packages (immediate response forces, rapid response forces, and win decisive forces) (Jun '04) (IAW 18 Aug SecDef “Operational Availability Action Items” Memo). USD (P&R) – work with CJCS to capture capabilities-based assessments in defense readiness assessment and adaptive planning tools. (July 04)
d. Procurement	Services – establish preferred munitions requirements prior to Service FY 06 POM development. (Jan 04)	USD(AT&L) - Develop S&T priorities and metric! for new technologies that achieve greater lethality per unit of force structure. (Jan 04) USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance direction for munitions funding priorities. (Dec 03)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
e. Strategic Lift	CJCS – Assess strategic lift requirements for warfighting scenarios specified in the Operational Availability '04 Study. (Mar '04).	Service Secretaries – Implement recommendations 2a and 2e from Secretary's 18 August "Operational Availability Action Items" memo in POM 06. (Aug 04) Service Secretaries. Initiate action on DepSecDef approved recommendations of the Advanced Mobility Concept Study (AMCS) for development of future strategic mobility capabilities (Aug 04).
f. Rotation Ratio	CJCS – develop an action agenda to implement SECDEF approved Elaborate Crossbow III initiatives. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving near-term stress on the force. (Oct 03) USD(P&R) – work with D,PJA&E and Services to develop options to reduce rotation ratio by transporting crews to their platforms. (Nov 03)	Service Secretaries - assess options for reducing rotation ratios and make necessary programmatic adjustments by POM 06 (Aug 04)
g. Headquarters Layering	CJCS, USD(P&R), USD(P) – Leveraging previous work, assess near-term ways to further reduce the number of headquarters and combine headquarters activities. Brief SLRG in Oct 03. USD(C), Service Secretaries, and CJCS – Implement near-term budget and program changes as directed in 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Dec 03)	USD(P) –with USD(P&R) and CJCS, develop Defense Planning Guidance that examines ways to further reduce DoD's headquarters staff structure. (Dec 03). CJCS – Conduct study of Combatant Command manpower utilization as directed in the 14 Jul '03 SecDef Action Memo on "Manpower to Support Implementation of Unified Command Plan '02" (Oct 04)
h. Best Practices		USD(P&R) – Propose options to establish a process to identify and move best Human Resource Management practices among DoD Components. (Jan 04)

Final DRAFT Version 10 (as of 11 Oct)

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
i. Planning Tools	<p>USD(P&R) – Report to Deputy Secretary on progress in implementing new Defense Readiness Reporting System assessment tools (Nov 03).</p> <p>CDR,JFCOM - Develop a new deployment process (Joint Deployment Process Owner) incorporating lessons learned from OIF and identify the capabilities need in planning tools to execute this new process. Report progress to DepSecDef by Dec 03</p>	<p>USD(P) – Develop a plan for institutionalizing an Adaptive Planning process. Brief recommendations to the SECDEF by 1 Feb 04.</p>
j. Operational Availability	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. Continue to monitor and report progress achieved on relieving stress on the force. (Sept 03)</p>	
k. Strategic Warning	<p>USD(I) – Identify Intelligence shortfalls impacting the ability to generate increased strategic warning. (Jan 04)</p>	<p>USD(I) – In preparation for QDR 05, assess options to mitigate strategic warning shortfalls (Jan 05).</p>
l. The Right Skills	<p>CJCS - develop a mechanism to track implementation of Operational Availability recommendations. (Sept 03)</p>	<p>USD (P&R) – with the Services, extend provisional unit concepts to capitalize on the skills of the Individual Ready Reserve and recent retirees.</p>
m. Safety	<p>USD(P&R) – Form a Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC) to govern the Department’s mishap reduction efforts (Sept 03)</p> <p>USD (P&R) – Develop an enterprise mishap reduction system to provide actionable data to DoD leadership (July 04)</p>	<p>USD(P&R) – Work with USD(AT&L) to develop DPG language guidance to direct the Department’s efforts to aggressively move on the 50% mishap reduction effort (Dec 03)</p>

5. Policy

Action Item	Near-Term Actions	Mid-term Actions
1. US Foreign Commitments	USD(P) - Develop prioritized list of long-term foreign commitments where US could reduce or discontinue its	USD(P) - Develop plan to pare down long-term US commitments (Apr 04).
1. U.S. Non-Military Skills		<p>USD(P) – Develop Defense Planning Guidance language on stability operations to guide POM 06 development. (Dec 03)</p> <p>USD(P) – Develop an implementation plan for the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) with near term options focused on Africa. (Dec 03).</p>
2. U.S. Worldwide Footprint		USD(P) - Oversee implementation of Global Posture (IGPBS) initiatives (ongoing)

TAB C


COORDINATION PAGE

OSD(Policy)	Col Kelly	10 September 2004
OSD(Personnel & Readiness)	Mr. Gallant	16 September 2004

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEP 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleeza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ADM Blair's Testimony to Senate Appropriations Committee

Attached is the statement by ADM Dennis Blair before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Intel Reform. It is well worth reading. The first sentence says it all.

Attach.
9/21/04 ADM Blair's Statement before the SAC

DHR:ss
092704-29

350.09

28 Sep 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 14794-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26761

Senate Appropriations Committee Testimony

21 September 20, 2004

Senator Stevens, members of the Committee.

(((When planning or conducting a military operation, intelligence is one of the absolute key supporting functions – like ammunition, transportation and communications.)))

Perhaps in the past intelligence capabilities funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program – NFIP – primarily supported national-level policy makers. No more. NFIP programs provide intelligence support that is integral to military planning and operations at the tactical level. The National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Information Agency are combat support agencies. They are involved with military plans and operations from the early stages – intelligence preparation of the battlefield – through all stages of conflict. I recommend that their operations, funding, personnel policies and effectiveness continue to be determined primarily by the Secretary of Defense, then integrated with other intelligence programs by the National Intelligence Director.

To me it makes no sense for an official outside the Department of Defense to determine DoD requirements, then to provide funds to DoD , then to monitor programs. That would be like the Department of Transportation deciding what kind of and how many trucks DoD needs, then providing funding to the Department and monitoring truck usage.

I strongly favor a powerful National Intelligence Director who is not the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. That Director should have a large and competent requirements, programming and budgeting staff, comparable to the Joint Staff, PA&E and the Office of the Comptroller in the Defense Department. However the Department of Defense should originate the programs of DoD combat support agencies as a part of building the Defense capabilities this country needs. The NID, assisted by a competent staff, should then integrate the requirements of all government customers and providers of intelligence. In many cases DoD combat support agencies will be collecting intelligence of use to others besides the

350.09

285ep04

armed forces. The NID needs to ensure that these capabilities are included and integrated.

In case of strong differences between the NID and the Secretary of Defense, the issue should be taken to the White House for solution. With a strong and capable staff providing data-based recommendations, the NID should have no fear about seeking these decisions.

But what about the current war on terrorism – can't we do better? Isn't good, shared intelligence the key to success?

Yes, if we put someone besides an intelligence official in charge of planning and conducting that war.

Intelligence works when it is driven by commanders and operators or by officials with line responsibility. It does not work when it is generating its own objectives and requirements. To assign a National Counter Terrorism Center reporting to the NID the responsibility for planning the war on terrorism is like making a football team's scouts the head coach. A head coach wants tremendous scouts – he wants to know everything possible about the opposing team – on game day he wants the scouts up in the spotter's booth predicting what the opposing team's next play will be – but it is the coach who must call the plays. He knows what his players can and cannot do, not the scouts – he knows what other games he must play – not the scouts.

The fastest way to fix intelligence in the war on terrorism is to designate the head coach. Right now we have a committee conducting the war - the CIA is conducting part of the war, DoD is conducting part of the war, FBI is conducting part of the war, DHS is conducting part of the war, the Departments of State and Treasury are conducting other parts. The results are predictable. Our adversary is moving faster than we are, we are missing opportunities in internal friction, and the intelligence services are doing their best, particularly the TTIC, but they are doing it in a vacuum, rather than as part of operations to defend against and destroy terrorism. It may be that we need several teams to win this war – one for the United States headed by DHS, several joint interagency task forces overseas headed by either DoD or CIA officials. But right now we have none.

There are many other aspects of current intelligence reform proposals that are good – improving sharing, upgrading networks, increasing professional standards. However I strongly recommend against two proposals in various bills:

- To give the NID overall responsibility for the NFIP budget activities in the Department of Defense;

- To place the NID in charge of developing the strategy for the war on terrorism.

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer questions.

September 27, 2004

TO: Lt Gen Mike Hayden
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Materials to Steve Cambone

I notice I am receiving some materials out of your organization on a regular basis that Steve Cambone is not receiving. How is that decision made and who can we talk to to assure Steve Cambone receives the same materials which are sent to me?

312

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-27

.....
Please respond by 10/4/04

27 Sep 04

OSD 14796-04

720

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

COLLECTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 2 11:21 AM
September 2, 2004 11:21 AM

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

848

CC: Gen. Pete Pace
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Preparation of the Battlespace"

I am concerned that the old phrase "preparation of the battlespace" may no longer be appropriate terminology for a variety of reasons, including potential inaccuracy and misimpressions that it can convey.

Please think through what terms may be more appropriate in today's world. In the GWOT, the entire world is the "battlespace" in the old sense, and it can be harmful to telegraph U.S. "preparation."

Thanks.

DHR:dh
190204-1

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 14817-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26766



September 27, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet the Press

Nice job on Sunday doing "Meet the Press." You told the story honestly and accurately, and came across well. Thanks for taking the time to do it.

DHR:ss
092704-30

.....
Please respond by _____

000.17

27 Sep 04

OSD 14844-04

July 26, 2004

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: ICRC Visit

3836

Here is another ICRC cable you should **look** into.

Thanks.

Attach.
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD Cable **O 2410562JUL 04**

DJR:dh
072604-24

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

26 Jul 04

OTTUZYUW RUEHGBA0239 2061056-UUUU--RUEKNMA
ZNR UUUUJ ZZH
O 241056Z JUL 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0350
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0008
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

T. Beren

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000239

~~SENSITIVE~~

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ICRC, PTER, IZ

SUBJECT: USEB 142: DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC BAGHDAD REGARDING VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF

REF: A) SECSTATE 140713, B) GENEVA 001861, C) USEB 79/BAGHDAD 128, D) GENEVA 2033, E) SECSTATE 155080

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY. IN A JULY 20, 2004 FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION CHRISTOPHE BENEY CLARIFIED THAT THE TWO REMAINING BARRIERS TO AN INITIAL ICRC VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF TO ASSESS CONDITIONS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH RESIDENT MEMBERS OF MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ (MEK) WERE ICRC'S SECURITY CONCERNS AND ICRC'S PREFERENCE FOR NOTIFYING A SENIOR MEMBER OR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT (IIG) PRIOR TO TRAVEL. BENEY DID NOT, HOWEVER, SEE AN INITIAL VISIT TAKING PLACE BEFORE AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(S)~~ EMBASSY POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNSELOR NEUMANN, MNF-I DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS MAJOR GENERAL MILLER, AN EMBASSY NOTE TAKER, AND LAWYERS AND OFFICERS FROM THE EMBASSY AND MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ (MNF-I) MET ON JULY 20, 2004 WITH ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF OPERATIONS CHRISTOPHE BENEY IN A FOLLOW-UP TO THEIR JULY 12, 2004 MEETING, AS REQUESTED BY THE DEPARTMENT. (REF E)

3. ~~(S)~~ MG MILLER OPENED THE MEETING BY NOTIFYING THE ASSEMBLED THAT 3,840 OF 3,843 MEK MEMBERS RESIDENT AT CAMP ASHRAF HAD

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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*NAGELMAN /
WAXMAN /
HENRY /*

DIR, JS /

ICRC communications are provided to DoD as confidential, restricted-use documents. As such, they will be safeguarded the same as ~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ information using classified information channels. Dissemination of ICRC communications outside of DoD is not authorized without the approval of the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

SIGNED AN AGREEMENT REJECTING VIOLENCE AND PARTICIPATION IN TERRORISM. MG MILLER SAID HE BELIEVED ICRC HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING THE FINAL DISPOSITION OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE MEK AND IN PASSING THIS DISPOSITION ALONG TO THE USG AND TO OTHER HUMANITARIAN NGOS.

4. ~~(S)~~ ICRC BAGHDAD HEAD OF DELEGATION BENEY REMARKED THAT THIS WAS GOOD NEWS AND THAT, WHILE HE HAD SUGGESTED AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING THAT A BETTER DEFINITION OF THE STATUS OF THE MEK HAD BEEN A PREREQUISITE FOR ICRC INVOLVEMENT, THE INFORMATION OFFERED BY MG MILLER WOULD HELP IN PERMITTING THE PLANNING OF AN INITIAL VISIT BY A SMALL ICRC TEAM TO CAMP ASHRAF.

5. ~~(S)~~ ICRC BAGHDAD HOD BENEY CONTINUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ICRC HAVE CONTACT WITH THE IIG BEFORE EMBARKING UPON ANY INTERVIEWS AT CAMP ASHRAF, AND SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO MEET WITH IIG PRIME MINISTER ALLAWI ON THE MATTER. WHEN AMBASSADOR NEUMANN POINTED OUT THAT PM ALLAWI'S TRAVEL PLANS CURRENTLY RENDERED HIM UNAVAILABLE, HOD BENEY AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR NEUMANN THAT DEPUTY PM SALIH WOULD ALSO BE A SUITABLE INTERLOCUTOR.

6. ~~(S)~~ MG MILLER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ICRC HAD EXPRESSED SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE PAST WHEN CONSIDERING TRAVEL TO CAMP ASHRAF. HE NOTED THAT HIS CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF ROAD CONDITIONS ALONG THE MAIN COALITION SUPPLY ROUTE TO CAMP ASHRAF PUT THE RISK AT LOW-TO-MODERATE AND SAID THAT SECURITY CONDITIONS HAD IMPROVED IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS A LOW PROBABILITY OF DANGER TO ANY ICRC TEAM INSIDE CAMP ASHRAF. HOD BENEY CONCURRED THAT HE WAS MORE AND MORE COMFORTABLE, AS TIME PASSED, ABOUT SECURITY ON THE ROAD IN QUESTION.

7. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY SAID THAT A VISIT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE PLACE AFTER THE END OF THE MONTH [JULY]. MG MILLER ASKED WHETHER THE VISIT MIGHT NOT TAKE PLACE EARLIER, EXPLAINING THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE EARLIER THE VISIT, THE MORE EFFECTIVE IT WOULD BE. HE REMARKED THAT THREE THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE CURRENTLY AWAITING A SENSE OF THEIR FUTURE DISPOSITION AT THE CAMP.

8. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY REPLIED THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE RESIDENTS OF CAMP ASHRAF. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY DETERMINATIONS THE ICRC WAS ABLE TO MAKE WERE WHETHER PEOPLE AT THE CAMP WERE FREE AND WILLING TO LEAVE THE CAMP AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD THE OPTION OF TRAVELING TO A THIRD COUNTRY [OUTSIDE IRAQ AND IRAN]. THE ICRC WAS NOT, HOD BENEY SAID, ABLE TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER MEK MEMBERS WERE ELIGIBLE FOR REFUGEE STATUS.

9. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY SAID THAT THE ICRC DID HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY, HOWEVER, IN OFFERING A PRAGMATIC EXPLANATION OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO MEK MEMBERS RESIDENT AT CAMP ASHRAF. HE NOTED THAT THE PRIVACY OF ICRC INTERVIEWS WAS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE

PROCESS, AND THE ICRC WOULD NEED TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF MEK LEADERSHIP DURING VISITS TO CAMP ASHRAF.

10. ~~(S)~~ MG MILLER SAID THAT MNF-I COULD SUPPORT AN ICRC TEAM OF UP TO TWENTY MEMBERS AT CAMP ASHRAF, INCLUDING ACCOMMODATION, BOARD, AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED. HE ALSO OFFERED MNF-I ASSISTANCE IN ENSURING THAT MEK MEMBERS PROVIDED SUITABLE PRIVATE INTERVIEW SPACES FOR A SECOND, POST-ASSESSMENT ICRC VISIT.

COMMENT

11. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY DID NOT REPEAT HIS EARLIER CONTENTION THAT THE USG WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE A CLARIFICATION OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE MEK RESIDENTS AT CAMP ASHRAF BEFORE THE ICRC COULD CONSIDER VISITING THE CAMP. NOR DID HE EXPRESS THE OPINION THAT SECURITY CONCERNS PRECLUDED THE ICRC'S TRAVEL TO CAMP ASHRAF AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, COMMIT TO AN INITIAL ICRC ASSESSMENT VISIT TO CAMP ASHRAF, NOR TO EVENTUAL COMPREHENSIVE ICRC INTERVIEWS WITH MEK MEMBERS.

12. ~~(S)~~ HOD BENEY'S INTRODUCTION OF A NEW CRITERION FOR ICRC ENGAGEMENT (HIS PERSONAL NOTIFICATION OF THE IIG) AND HIS SILENCE IN RESPONSE TO MG MILLER'S REQUEST FOR AN ACCELERATED ICRC VISIT SCHEDULE BOTH INDICATE THAT IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT HOD BENEY SEES THE COMMENCEMENT OF ICRC VISITS TO OR INTERVIEWS AT CAMP ASHRAF AS LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

13. ~~(S)~~ DEPUTY PM SALIH TOLD DCM ON JULY 20 THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE ICRC AND ENCOURAGED THEM TO VISIT THE CAMP (NOTE: HE DID ASK THAT THEY PUT THE REQUEST IN WRITING.). SALIH QUERIED US AT LENGTH ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE CAMP RESIDENTS, ESPECIALLY WHETHER THEY HAD HEAVY WEAPONS (NOT ANY MORE) OR WERE TRAVELING TO BAGHDAD TO "AGITATE."

NEGROFONTE

SECDEF V2
ACTION (U, 6, 8) 1
INFO CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1)
SECDEF-C(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PAE-RAM(*)
ESC-SMTP(*) ESC AGENT ALL TRF(*) SECDEF WASH DC(*)
OSDOMNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*)
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//
+USDP :ESC

CJCS V6
ACTION (U, 8) 2
INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(*) SJS-C(*)
SJS-C(1) NMCC:WFO(*) CMAS(*) J3(*) CMAS(1) J5(*)
J4:LRC(*) JSAMS(*)
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

July 16, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Pete Geren
Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainee Statement

383.6

Where is the latest draft of the overall detainee statement? We need to start pulling the threads together.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071604-4

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Please respond by ~~9/21/04~~

165010V

July 16,2004 MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita

Attached is the draft statement on Detainee operations that we are attempting to validate by everyone who is in a position to validate it.

The first sentence is solid.

The second sentence is solid for Iraq, and we are confirming that it is solid for Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

This statement will leave some people wanting more, but when it is bulletproof we will be able to use it.

**DRAFT STATEMENT ON DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND THE
ICRC**

**The International Committee of the Red Cross has access to all
Defense Department detention operations.**

**All detainees in (Iraq, Afghanistan and GTMO) have been
assigned Internment Security Numbers and are registered with
the ICRC.**

DRAFT

July 28, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response on Torture

383.6

When people write expressing concern about torture and abuse, we ought to have a packet of unclassified materials that we can send them that show what has been authorized, why what was authorized was not torture, that it was humane, and that it was within the law.

We also need to point out that any activities that occurred that were not authorized have been or are being investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.

The materials need to be bullet-proof.

I would like it within a week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072804-5

.....
Please respond by 8/5/04

28 July 04

July 28, 2004

SUBJECT: Policy v. Legal

We have to decide if we want to address the Department of State on a policy basis as opposed to a legal basis on some of these issues.

DHR:dh
072804-14

040 STATE

28 JUL 04

September 29, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve Call Ups

At the present time the Army has been authorized to call up roughly 6500 Individual Ready Reservists (IRR). My understanding is that the Army currently has called up nearly 4000, thus far. Of those already scheduled to report, roughly three-fifths have shown up for duty.

Background:

- Each of the services has Individual Ready Reserves.
- Everyone who serves in the military today is a volunteer.
- Each volunteer incurs an eight-year obligation, either on active duty, in the Selected Reserve, or in the Individual Ready Reserve; or a combination thereof.
- If on active duty or in the Selected Reserve – training every month – the Army knows their addresses, phone numbers, medical condition and skill proficiency.
- If in the Individual Ready Reserve, the Army may not know their current addresses and phone numbers, skill proficiency, physical condition, or personal circumstances.

326

29 Sep 04

Therefore, when Individual Ready Reservists are called up, it is expected that only about two-thirds will show up ready to serve and that there will be special situations with respect to the remainder.

By "situations," I refer to the fact that a few may be dead, a few in jail, some in the hospital or physically incapacitated; some may have moved and we may have incorrect addresses. Some may have personal circumstances that make it impossible for them to come on active duty. For example, the Department has exempted several IRR members because they hold civilian positions considered more critical to national security.

In any event, there are a lot of good reasons why the Army will not get 100% when they call up the Individual Ready Reserves, and they know that. It is no surprise. A number of exemptions have already been issued.

I am told there are eight individuals whom we know received their notices and have not responded. These eight cases are currently being reviewed. The Army reports that an IRR member ordered to active duty over a year ago was declared AWOL last June.

AWOL determinations will be reviewed by senior Army officials before they are made.

DHR:ss
092904-7

77
~~FOUO~~

SEP 30 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Michael Bayer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SEC

070

Please think through how we can connect the Service Secretaries again and get something like the SEC, or a redesigned SEC, functioning.

We need to link them, and we need *to* include them more. And I need to get better connected to them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-12

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 14965-04

30000000

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26779

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 SEP 3 11:11 AM '04

O: Ray DuBois
C: Gen. Dick Myers
ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
UBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

In Yuma a question was raised about illegal immigrants coming into the firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting our training.

Please look into that.

Thanks.

HR.dh
12704-9 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

684

27 Aug 04

OSD 15010-04



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:41

INFO MEMO

ACQUISITION
 TECHNOLOGY
 AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma *Ray DuBois 9/30/04*

In the attached snowflake, dated August 27, 2004, you requested information about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training. Discussions with the Marine Corps, the Department of Interior and Department of Homeland Security yielded the following information.

- Tab A is an Info Memo from the Commandant of the Marine Corps describing impact on training on the Goldwater Range from undocumented aliens in the Yuma region entering the range. The problem has been exacerbated by increased enforcement along the border east and west of the Goldwater Range. The range has been closed 208 times from May through July 2004 with 733 training hours lost.
- Inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination is currently worked at the regional level through the Borderland Management Task Force. The Commandant calls for the establishment of inter-departmental (with Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Interior) strategic coordination task force under the DoD Range Sustainment Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT). The OIPT is co-chaired by the DUSD (I&E), DUSD(Readiness), and the Principal Deputy Director Office of Test & Evaluation.
- ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working IPT process, with the Marine Corps leading the staff working group.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated


Prepared by: Jan Larkin, (b)(6)

OSD 15010-04

August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 20 AM 11:41

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

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Please look into that

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-9 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/17/04

OSD 15010-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26782



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Hagee 9/15

SUBJECT Undocumented Aliens Aboard Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma Training Ranges

- MCAS Yuma is responsible for 1.2M acres of land that encompasses the **Barry M. Goldwater Range**. The Goldwater Range shares a 37-mile border with Mexico. The Border Patrol, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and DoD all have statutory and regulatory interests in activities occurring aboard the Goldwater Range. An area map is contained in Tab A.
- Heightened Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement activity (both under Department of Homeland Security) in Tucson, San Diego, and El Centro has resulted in increased smuggling of aliens in the less resourced Border Patrol's Yuma sector (Goldwater Range inclusive).
- Snapshot of Border Patrol Yuma sector (as of Jun 04): Over 86,000 alien apprehensions; 1,183 of those aliens from 47 countries (other than Mexico); 25 alien heat related deaths (11 were aboard the Goldwater Range); 2nd quarter alien apprehensions up 81%; MCAS Yuma detains approximately 260 aliens per month.
- During the last 12 months, aliens and other trespassers have significantly interrupted training by causing closure of the Goldwater Range 208 times, ranging from 20 minutes to 10 hours per closure. These range closures averaged one per day from May through July 04 and totaled 733 DoD training hours lost to date.
- The DoD Overarching Implementation Process Team (OIPT) on Range Sustainment should formally establish a coordination task force with senior officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Interior in order to strategically coordinate decisions that affect the missions of each Department near international borders.

COORDINATION: NONE.


Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Major John M. Manson (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26783

MCAS Yuma & Goldwater Range



August 27, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:50

O: Ray DuBois

ROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

UBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with **BLM** and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a **good** idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get more information from him.

Thanks.

HR:db
12704-11 (in computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

601

27 Aug 04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26785



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11:49

INFO MEMO

ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

Raymond F. DuBois 9/30/04

SUBJECT: BLM and DoD Land Exchanges in Arizona

In the attached snowflake dated August 27, 2004, you outlined your conversation with Arizona Governor Napolitano on land exchanges around several military bases involving the Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Department. An update on our effort follows.

- In July 2004, the Department of the Interior was briefed by the Olympia Group, a private development group based in Scottsdale and Las Vegas. Olympia officials plan to acquire land from multiple landowners under the flight path immediately outside Luke Air Force Base and exchange these consolidated private tracts with developable land managed by Interior's BLM. Olympia currently has under contract approximately 6,000 acres owned by 17 landowners.
- A land exchange of this nature would require Federal legislation. Senator John McCain and Senator Jon Kyl, along with Congressman Trent Franks, have been approached by the Olympia Group to introduce such legislation.
- Interior's initial response was that there is no direct benefit for the BLM to pursue these types of exchanges, but they are willing to work such projects in pursuit of the appropriate broader National interest.
- DUSD(I&E) staff contacted and discussed the proposal with Governor Napolitano's staff. Additional information was requested and will be forwarded by the Governor's staff.
- DUSD(I&E) will continue to work with the Air Force, Department of Interior, and Governor Napolitano's office to determine the current status of the proposal, track any new Federal land exchange legislative proposals, and explore ways to take advantage of this opportunity, if appropriate.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Bruce Beard (b)(6)

* R- ARIZONA , LUKE AFB is his District,



11-L-0559/OSD/26786

OSD 15011-04

August 27, 2004

STATE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 SEP 30 AM 11: 50

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Land Exchanges in Arizona

I talked to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano when I was in Phoenix this past week. She indicated she had talked to Secretary of Interior Gayle Norton about working with BLM and DoD to do land exchanges around several military bases in Arizona. It sounded like a good idea to me.

Please look into it and get back to Dennis Burke, her chief of staff, to get more information from him.

Thanks.

1R dh
2704-11 (in computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

9/24/04

OSD 15011-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26787

77
~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte
Gen John Handy

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

580

Leon, it was a good idea to take that young Korean boy home on your aircraft; and John, nice job working out the complexities of the transport.

Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss
092904-3

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15081-04

29 Sep 04


~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

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Gen John Handy

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Medical Transport of Korean Boy

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Those kind of humanitarian gestures mean a great deal. Thanks for thinking of it.

DHR:ss
092904-3

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15081-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26789

September 29, 2004

TO: RADM Adam Robinson
CC: Gordon England
ADM Vern Clark
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Visit to Bethesda

The visit I made to Bethesda Naval Hospital was extremely well run. You and the team out there made excellent use of our time, and I was particularly impressed with the evident care provided to our wounded Marines.

You are clearly running a first-class hospital – thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
092904-9

.....
Please respond by _____

33550

27 Sep 04

OSD 15082-04

~~FOUO~~

file

September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SOUTHCOM's Haiti Request

Please get back to me on what SOUTHCOM'S request is for an assessment team in Haiti and let's look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092904-5

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

Sir,
Response attached.

DR
LtCol Lengyel
9/30

Haiti

30 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15136-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26791

20
~~FOUO~~
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 OCT -1 PM 2:37

September 21, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HUMINT Effort in QDR.

We ought to think about a major HUMINT effort in the QDR.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-30

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15174-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26792

SEP 22 2004

SECRET
TOP SECRET - FROTH

TO: Ryan Henry
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA

SUBJECT: Item for the QDR

One of the QDR items should be:

- How do we leverage the National Guard?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092104-5

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15175-04

~~FOUO~~

file

KK's
copy

October 25, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: QDR Item

Here's a memo from me to Dick Myers and his response. I agree, this has got to be part of the QDR. I assume you agree.

Thanks.

Attach:
9/27/04 SecDef Memo to Gen Myers re: Idea for QDR
10/22/04 *Gen* Myers Memo to SecDef re: Capability to build Security Forces in Other Countries

DHR:ss
102504-9

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~SECDEF~~
YES,

RYAN HAS THAT ON

DR 10/24

LIST.

KJK

10/26/04

cc RYAN HENRY

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26794

U 15176-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference ~~was~~ the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

DR 10/25

*Sir,
Response attached.*

*v/r
Lt Col Lengyel*

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 15176-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26795

DA 10/25



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2133-04
22 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/21*

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

- **Question.** "One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries. Should we push that issue into the QDR?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes. Given the challenges facing the United States now and in the future, the Department of Defense will require some capability to build security forces in other countries. The QDR should consider this issue within the broader force sizing and interagency context.
- **Analysis**
 - Training foreign security forces is tied directly to increasing the capability of US allies and other potential coalition partners, improving our ability to conduct multinational operations and to prevail against adversaries.
 - Currently, training of foreign security and police forces includes programs executed by at least seven different departments, agencies and coalition partners. The President's Global Peace Operations Initiative begins to address the problem and we should continue to support it.
 - **Our** analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

copy to:
USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5 (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26796

OSD 15175-04

~~FOUO~~

INFORMATION RETENTION

September 27, 2004

277 127 - 1 22 2 04

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Ryan Henry

cc: Jim Thomas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the things that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other-countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

INFORMATION RETENTION

11-L-0559/OSD/26797

28-09-04 15:10 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-PI-33-04

22 October 2004

2004 OCT 22 09:05

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

TEAM 10/21

SUBJECT: Capability to Build Security Forces in Other Countries

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 - **Our** analysis during the QDR should address DOD's role as part of the overall US government effort and how we can most efficiently and effectively train security forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USDP

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26798

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ OSD 15176-04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

September 27, 2004

868

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Idea for QDR

One of the **things** that came up in the Combatant Commanders Conference was the need for DoD to have people capable of building security forces in other countries.

Should we push that issue into the QDR?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-20

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

INFORMATION RETENTION

September 27, 2004

SECRET
27 09 27 15 2:05

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Ryan Henry *cc: Jim Thomas*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SalafistFactor

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, then the **USG** needs to have plans to deal with them.

First, do you folks agree that is the case?

If so, what do you propose by way of a plan to deal with it?

Shouldn't the U.S. have a major program to **fund** moderate schools? Should that be part of the QDR effort?

Thanks.

DHR:as
092704-19

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

0 SD 15177-04

INFORMATION RETENTION

11-L-0559/OSD/26800

28-09-04 15:10 IN

In reply refer to ES-0898 & 04/013054-ES



~~FOUO~~

SEP 28 2004

September 28, 2004

227 137-1 13 9 07

TO: Ryan Henry
CC: Steve Cambone
Ken Krieg

SUBJECT: Draft of QDR

Please **give** me a draft (in bullet points) of what you think the QDR should include; what we hope to get out of it; and what it should and should not be.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-5

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15178-04

~~FOUO~~

29-09-04 17:17 0255

11-L-0559/OSD/26801

September 30, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
VADM Tim Keating
ADM Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: System for Managing Force Rotation

3202

It would be helpful to have a briefing showing me the system for managing force rotation that was in place in 2001 when we arrived, as well as the current system we are using. It seems to me we are still using an industrial-age approach and are not fully single-sourcing through JFCOM.

My suspicion is that there is still considerable room for growth, and it would be interesting to see your plans for further consolidation and improvement.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-14

.....
Please respond by 10/21/04

3052904

OSD 15186-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

IRAD

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/30/04 Memo to SecDef from Mike De Long

DHR:ss
100104-8

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 15187-04

10 OCT 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26803

30 September 2004

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Sir,

Lt Gen (Ret) Mike De Long called at 2:30 pm. He returned from Iraq yesterday and offered the below listed points for your consideration. If you would like more elaboration, or have any questions, he is available, and we can arrange a call.

He had numerous meetings with important tribal leaders, and heads of several Iraqi corporations. They gave him several insights. Generally, their view of the importance of the coming elections is the same as PM Allawi's. There are a few additional views.

They feel that between 13 – 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq are ready for the elections, want them, and will hold them relatively successfully. The others are problematic. The leaders feel that if elections are held, and any of the provinces are left out, it will cause such a feeling out alienation that it could lead to a civil war. They were adamant that all provinces need to participate.

Next, they urged the U.S. and the Coalition to at strongly to crush the insurgents. The use of force in the right cause is respected, and any backing off, or moderation will only be cause for problems later.

Lastly, given a choice, the leaders do not want any expatriates in the government. They respect Allawi, but really want someone like themselves, that stuck it out under Saddam. They resent the outsiders, even the good ones.

Very Respectfully,



COL B

11-L-0559/OSD/26804

October 1, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Note from Mike De Long

Attached is a note from Mike De Long that might be of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/30/04 Memo to SecDef from Mike De Long

DHR:ss
100104-8

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15187-04

30 September 2004

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Very Respectfully,



COL B

11-L-0559/OSD/26806

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEP 21 2004
11 11 01

September 21, 2004
ES-0825
I-04/012624

0005

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM:

SUBJECT: Department of Treasury and Department of Justice Participation and Progress in GWOT

Please get back to me with a sense of how Treasury and Justice are doing with their tasks in the GWOT. At the Combatant Commander's Conference, it was clear that we don't have an accurate sense of how they are doing in stopping funding streams and working other interagency pieces that belong to those two departments.

If we can understand what they are doing and how much progress they are making, perhaps we could encourage them to do even more.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-17

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

2152004

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 15196-04

SECRET
2004 09 14 14 27


500 S

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

October 1, 2004

Captain Marriott,

On September 23, USDP Feith sent the attached memo to Steve Hadley. (tab 1) He will organize the briefings.


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

1 OCT 04

OSD 15196-04

21 SEP 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR STEVE HADLEY

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *8/13/04*

SUBJECT: Justice and Treasury GWOT Efforts

At our recent Combatant Commander's conference, some of the Combatant Commanders asked how Justice and Treasury are doing with their efforts in the Global War on Terrorism.

It might be a good if they briefed their efforts at an upcoming Deputies Committee meeting.

Thanks.

— and then briefed the PC.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26809

~~FOUO~~

SEP 24 11 23 AM '04

September 24, 2004
ES-0875
I-04/012866

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Tom O'Connell

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Process for Handling High Value Detainee Release Requests

We will shortly begin to receive recommendations from GEN Casey and the Iraqis to release a number of the high value detainees.

Please set up a process in the building that evaluates each situation and provides recommendations to me in a measured way.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-7

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

OSD 15197-04

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
10/1/04 11:03:30


Policy Executive Secretariat Note

October 1, 2004

Captain Marriott,

USDP met with Policy, JS, OGC and USDI staff on Sept 30 as follow up to the Sept 29 roundtable. Policy staff is working on an action plan to transfer responsibility of Iraqi detainees (both HVDs and other Iraqi detainees).

We are scheduled to brief the Deputy on Monday, Oct 4.

UP


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

0 SD 15 97 -04

11-L-0559/OSD/26811

720
~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 14, 2004

EF-9872

I-04/008049

TO: Bill Luti
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

What do we do about accelerating the Afghan security forces and making sure the budget is right?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-29

OSD 15261-04


.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

August 4, 2004

Captain Marriott:

Mr. Feith handed a copy of the attached brief to the SecDef yesterday afternoon, 3 August.

JR.

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

11-L-0559/OSD/26812

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

AFGHANISTAN

14 June 04

August 25, 2004

082504-1 08:17

TO: Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

Please check with the White House Counsel on paragraph six of this memo concerning the Kissinger transcripts and get back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/17/04 William Rogers e-mail to Kissinger

DHR db
082504-1 (ta computer).doc

.....
Please respond by

9/3/04

OSD 15347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26813




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

October 4, 2004 9:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Transcripts

- You asked me to check on the release of transcripts of Dr. Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you. (Tab A)
- The transcripts were made when Dr. Kissinger served in the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
- Nixon-era transcripts.
 - Most of these transcripts were released by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) on May 26, 2004.
 - Only those conversations mentioning national security information that is still classified were withheld. No privileges were asserted.
 - The released transcripts included a few telephone conversations with you and several more conversations about you. NARA reported that no telephone conversations with or about you were withheld.
- Ford-era transcripts.
 - Although a final decision has not been made on whether to release these transcripts, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and White House Counsel (WHC) have concluded that Dr. Kissinger's telephone conversations with or about you (and other members of the President's Cabinet) should be withheld as privileged under the Freedom of Information Act.
 - The Department of State is currently cross-referencing the portions of transcripts released in Dr. Kissinger's memoirs with a list of transcripts DOJ and WHC have recommended be withheld to ensure a privilege is not claimed for transcripts already released publicly.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared By: Christine S. Ricci, Associate Deputy General Counsel (LC) (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26814



0 SD 1 53 47 - 04

A

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Don -

After our lunch and long conversation with Joyce I have asked Bill Rogers to run up the status of the Clemons one diamond. I am enclosing his report based on his memory together with a trusted ex-Foreign Service Officer of the material.

I expect no media interest but should there be you can be sure that I will respond in a manner of simplicity and very light regard for you as a public servant and my affection for you as a person and a friend.

Warm regards



(b)(6)

AUG 17 2004

Jesse Incao

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 1:49 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Subject: Draft Revised Note Re phone notes Rumsfeld

Dear Henry:

You asked that I sum up the situation with respect to your telcons.

1. The collection now being made public includes both your White House conversations as Security Adviser and your State Department conversations as Secretary. In other words, everything -- with sizable gaps -- from January 1969 to January 1977.

2. National Archives has already released the Nixon material, after culling out personal and security matters. Archives put the telcons in its public reading rooms several months ago. The release was required by, and followed carefully, the special Nixon records legislation. There has been a good deal of interest in the papers, but precious little media notice.

3. The State Department will make the telcons for your tour as Secretary available for FOIA release within the next few days. Like the National Archives, State has also culled out personal and classified material.

4. References to Rumsfeld in this second instalment of papers are of two types: First, your conversations directly with him. These are a small fraction of the 8,000 pages. I would characterize them as businesslike and professional -- not suggesting a particularly intimate friendship, but certainly not personal or confrontational. Second are occasional comments to others touching on Rumsfeld's policy positions, for example his role in blocking the extension of SALT.

5. More broadly, I doubt that this second instalment covering your term as Secretary of State will cause any greater public sensation than the first.

6. In any event, I am now advised by the State Department -- I have had no direct link to the White House on this -- that it is unlikely that the conversations with or related to Rumsfeld will be made public. The White House has told State to withhold "for review by the WH/DOJ any transcripts containing any mention of the White House or the NSC, including discussions with or about persons who were either at the WH/NSC at the time the transcripts were made or with or about persons who are now senior officials of the current administration." State did not ask for my views as to this request.

I would, of course, be pleased to respond to any further questions.

Regards,

Bill

 This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

William Rogers

(b)(6)

1

11-L-0559/OSD/26817

A-129-3

TOTAL P.03



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

ACTION MEMO



October 6, 2004 - 10:00 AM

DEPSEC Action

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS - SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- You asked about the progress on MG Odierno's nomination and confirmation during this session of Congress
- The background is as follows:
 - The Certification and Nomination arrived at the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 23 September.
 - We replied to the questions posed by the SASC on 30 September.
 - MG Odierno met with the SASC on 5 October.
 - Secretary Brownlee talked to both Majority and Minority Staff Directors in reference to this issue yesterday.
- The sense is that the meeting with MG Odierno and the SASC went well. In fact, barring any disagreement from the Minority, they are expecting the nomination to move this week.

Sec Def called Sen W on Wed PM. Indications were good. v/r Jim S. VADM

RECOMMENDATION: If there is no action by Wednesday evening, I recommend that you call the Chairman.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Major Jered Helwig, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>Laf</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 10/6</i>



11-L-0559/OSD/26818

OSD 15445-04


0 1006

~~FOUO~~

October 4, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Charlie Abell

cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Les Brownlee
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Nomination of MG Odierno for ACJCS

We need *to* find out what must happen to ensure Ray Odierno is confirmed during this session of Congress. If I need to make calls, go to the Hill, or do anything else, please let me know.

This is an important nomination: and we need to get it through the process without creating an unhelpful precedent. Please let me know what I need to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100-04-11

.....
Please respond by

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26819


OSD 15445-04

~~FOUO~~

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This is an important nomination, and we need *to* get it through the process without creating an unhelpful precedent. Please let me know what I need to do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100-04-11

.....
Please respond by 10/6/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26820

OSD 15445-04

October 6, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Greenville Herald Banner Request

000.71SD

Let's set up a phone call with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner*.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/5/04 Memo from Powell Moore to SecDef re: Interview Request
~~SECDEF LETTER TO CONG. HALL~~
DHR:ss
100604-4

.....
Please respond by _____

6 OCT 04

6 OCT 04

OSD 15504-04

600704

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 2/1/2005

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL OSD 15504-04 DOC 10/6/2004 DOR 2/1/2005 SIGNATURE CASE:
FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO TSADIRITA
SUBJECT GREENVILLE HERALD BANNER REQUEST
KEYWORDS DI RITA, L SNOW FLAKE
COMMENTS CAF - NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.
FN 000.7150 SEC U OCN 100604-4
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS OSD 15561-04 OSD 15538-04
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0
SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC
ACTION MEMO
FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: reynolds

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES

11-L-0559/OSD/26822



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

R+R

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION MEMO

October 5, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SECDEF Interview Request

- SECDEF comment on childhood near-drowning incident.
- Rep. Ralph Hall contacted my office to ask that you speak to a reporter for his local paper. It seems that his constituent, Bill Salamon, claims that his father, Bud Salamon, saved your life in 1937.
- Melva Geyer writes for Rep Hall's district paper, the *Greenville Herald Banner*. She would like you to acknowledge the incident and "any other comments he might like to make or reaction to the resurrection of this memory." An article from the time is attached.

RECOMMENDATION: SecDef agree to the interview.

COORDINATION: NONE

SECDEF DECISION:

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Comment: _____

Attachment:
As stated

OSD 15504-04

Prepared By: Claude Chafin, Special Assistant for Communications, ASD Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26823

000.7150

SECRET

SECRET

Daily News-Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 1937

Publ...

Year No. 376 Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

BUD' SALAMON

SAVES 3 CHILDREN

Rescues 3 From Lake in as Many Minutes

Edgar ("Bud") Salamon, who during the Fall, plays halfback with the Blue Ridge "perp" school down in North Carolina and in Summer does life-guarding at the Lee st. beach in Evanston, became a hero three times today in as many minutes.

Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in his lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 5, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in, brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breathing and handed him over to

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, of 1302 Judson av., Evanston.

Scarcely had he relinquished one youngster than another near-drowning required his attention. He swam furiously out to where sand cavity had caused a nine-foot depth and rescued Nancy Belcher, 8, of 1213 Michigan av., Evanston.

Salamon's third rescue followed immediately. Joan Rumsfeld, Donald's 7-year-old sister and the Belcher girl's playmate, had slipped into the same sand cavity death trap and was almost drowned when Salamon reached her.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the father of your constituent.

It's all true! I remember it - it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. R. ...". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,

Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bud Salamon, the father of your constituent.

It's all true! I remember it – it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

335SD

6 OCT 04

OSD 15504-04

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 6 2004

The Honorable Ralph Hall
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Congressman,


Thanks so much for calling Powell Moore about
the article from 1937 that features Mr. Bill Salamon, the
father of your constituent.

WRONG
NAME

It's all true! I remember it – it did in fact happen.

We would be happy to touch base with Melva
Geyer of the *Greenville Herald Banner* and will do so.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ralph Hall". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "R" and "H".

11-L-0559/OSD/26828

Daily News - Index

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1937

PAGE

The Official Newspaper of the State of Illinois

BUD' SALAMON SAVES 3 CHILDREN

FOR
FILES

11-L-0559/OSD/26829

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Young Salamon, who lives at 927 Madison st., Evanston, was on duty in his lookout pinnacle when he saw Donald Rumsfeld, 5, sinking in the water a hundred feet off shore.

The life guard plunged in, brought Donald to shore, emptied the water out of him, restored his breath and handed him over to

his frantic mother, Mrs. George Rumsfeld, 411 1/2 W. Jackson av., Evanston.

Scarcely had he disembarked one youngster than a second drowning required his attention. He swam furiously out to where a sand cavity had caused a child to depth and rescued Harry Belcher, 8, of 1213 Michigan st., Evanston.

Salamon's third rescue followed immediately. Jack, 10, of Donald's Fearless, a Belcher girl's playmate, fell into the water and was in a death trap. Salamon dived, drowned with him and



Bud Salamon of Evanston Ill. Saves three children from drowning in Lake Michigan in July of 1937. The children are L-R Joan Rumsfeld 7, Donald Rumsfeld 5, and Nancy Belcher 8. Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense)

~~FOUO~~

SEP 22 2004

863

Northcom

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ed Eberhart

I think Ed Eberhart is right -- he should go from 96 to 48 hours. Is that going to happen?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092104-10

.....
Please respond by 9/27/04

~~FOUO~~


22SEP04

OSD 15507-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 7, 2004

TO: Ashley Kavanaugh
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Card for POTUS



33523

Ashley,

Attached is a card from the Chinese-American woman who cuts my hair -- she is a big fan of the President.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/13/04 Note from (b)(6) to POTUS

DHR:ss
100704-2

10 OCT 04


~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 15540-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26833

MR. PRESIDENT & FIRST LADY

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/26836

SEP 13-04

President & First Lady,
it is election year,
you've been distre-
l busy, so do all your
es, including me.
ith all my heart for
reelected. And, I
me to be lucky enough
or hair for the
on. I like you and
y very much. I
onored if you
d me an autographed
- of yourself.

You're a star!

I will very much appre-
ciate your consideration

Respectfully

(b)(6)

October 7, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: The Debate

0001

Mr. Vice President,

Joyce talked to our son Nick after your debate Tuesday evening. He said, "You know, next to dad, Vice President Cheney is the one for me!"

He's right! Good job.

Regards,

DHR:ss
100704-3

10 OCT 04

September 29, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Directives from Bill Schneider

300.8

I asked Bill Schneider and his group to draft up some directives that I could send out -- implementing some of the things he said should be implemented.

What has happened with this?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-21

.....
Please respond by 10/6/04

9/29

29 Sep 04

DR

SIR _____
DRAFT
• Directive is next below, ready to go out for coord.

• Please sign memo to launch.

v/r Ji

~~FOUO~~

8 OCT 04

OSD 15584-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

I have reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study and am impressed with their efforts. This study provides some useful suggestions for reshaping our capabilities to exploit prewar opportunities and address postwar responsibilities. As highlighted by the DSB, the Department of Defense is part of a government-wide approach to the development of interagency capabilities critical to achieving U.S. objectives in the transition to and from hostilities.

The Under Secretary for Policy will be the focal point for implementation of DSB recommendations as captured in the attached draft directive. Please review and coordinate on the directive by October 30, 2004. You should begin identifying documents under your cognizance that need to be revised based on the new directive. In addition, identify those high priority actions that proceed from your responsibilities in the directive, but which should be undertaken separately.

Attachment
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/26840





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT 8 2004

300.8

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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Attachment:
As stated

SECRETARY

OSD 15504-04



DOD DIRECTIVES SYSTEM COORDINATION RECORD

1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (X one)		2. TYPE OF DOD ISSUANCE (X one)		3. TYPE OF ACTION (X one)	
<input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOD DIRECTIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> DOD PUBLICATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NEW	<input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE
<input type="checkbox"/> SECRET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/> DOD INSTRUCTION	<input type="checkbox"/> ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION	<input type="checkbox"/> REISSUANCE	<input type="checkbox"/> CANCELLATION

3. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance)
 Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

(For DoD Directives, insert a maximum of 20 working days from the date this form is signed by the Originating Authorizing Official. For all other DoD issuances, no more than 45 working days should be required.)

3. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED (X one)
 YES NO

7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS (Continue on back if necessary)

This Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities to the Heads of the DoD Components for activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

3. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (X all that apply)
 OMB RCS IRCN

9. FORMS PRESCRIBED (X one) **11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS (X one)**
 YES NO YES NO

12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (X one)
 A - Unlimited B - Limited C - Classified

13.a. ACTION OFFICER NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) (Print or type)
 Dr. McGinn, Jerry

1. OFFICE DESIGNATION
 PDUSD(P)

1. COMPLETE MAILING ADDRESS
 2000 Defense Pentagon, Room 4E830
 Washington, DC 20301-2000

14.a. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name)
 Mr. Ryan Henry

1. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) **e. FAX NUMBER (Include Area Code)**
 (b)(6)

b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type) **c. DATE FORM SIGNED**
 Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October 7, 2004

1. E-MAIL ADDRESS
 jerry.mcginn@osd.mil

15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS (X all that apply)
Only those officials authorized in writing may coordinate on DoD issuances. For guidance on appropriate signature levels, see instructions for Item 16 and Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.7-M. The preprinted "X" indicates the MANDATORY COORDINATORS.

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS
 DUSD (ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY)
 DUSD (LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS)
 DIR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
 ATSD NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
 DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY
 DIR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
 DIR DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
 DIR DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
 DIR DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
 DIR OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION
 DIR DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 DIR AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE

GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
 PDUSD (POLICY)
 ASD (HOME AND DEFENSE)
 ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
 ASD (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)
 ASD (SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT)
 DUSD (POLICY SUPPORT)
 DIR DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
 DIR DEFENSE POW/MP OFFICE
 DIR DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, OSD (2 copies)
 DIR PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY
 DIR WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES

DIRECTOR FORCE TRANSFORMATION

DIRECTOR NET ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
 PDUSD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
 ASD (HEALTH AFFAIRS)
 ASD (RESERVE AFFAIRS)
 DUSD (READINESS)
 DUSD (PROGRAM INTEGRATION)
 DIR DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY
 DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY
 DIR TRICARE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY
 DIR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY


SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTHER (Identify)
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

OTHER (Identify)

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 DIR DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
 DIR DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

16.a. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy) (Sign and print or type name)


b. POSITION TITLE (Print or type)
 Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy

c. DATE FORM SIGNED
 October 7, 2004

7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS (Continued)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SD FORM 106

ITEM 1. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the security classification of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 2. TYPE OF ISSUANCE

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of DoD issuance.

ITEM 3. TYPE OF ACTION

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate the type of action prescribed for the DoD issuance.

ITEM 4. DOD ISSUANCE NUMBER

For a new DoD issuance, leave this item blank for completion by the Directives and Records Division, WHS. For a revision, change, or cancellation of a DoD issuance, enter the existing number of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 5. COORDINATION SUSPENSE DATE

Enter the date that the coordination must be received by the originating OSD Component. For DoD Directives, the date must be no more than 20 working days (45 working days for all other DoD issuances) from the date this form is signed by the Originating Authorizing Official in Item 14. c.

ITEM 6. SUBJECT (Title of Issuance)

Enter the subject of the DoD issuance. It shall be no more than three lines in length.

ITEM 7. PURPOSE AND REMARKS

Enter the reason for the action and provide any supplementary or background information to support the action.

If the DoD issuance should be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in this block.

ITEM 8. FEDERAL REGISTER PUBLICATION REQUIRED

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance must be published in the Federal Register. See Administrative Instruction No. 102.

ITEM 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Place an "X" in all boxes that apply. See DoD 8910.1-M.

ITEM 10. FORMS PRESCRIBED

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance prescribes or references forms.

ITEM 11. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS

Place an "X" in the appropriate box to indicate whether the DoD issuance addresses matters relating to the collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal information regarding U.S. citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence.

ITEM 12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Assign an appropriate distribution statement:

- A - Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
- B - Approved for release to U.S. Government employees and their contractors; distribution is limited.
- C - Classified; distribution approved by Office of Primary Responsibility only.

ITEM 13. ACTION OFFICER

Enter the action officer's name, office designation, complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address.

ITEM 14. ORIGINATING AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. This official authorizes the coordination of the DoD issuance.

ITEM 15. COORDINATING OFFICIALS

Place an "X" in the appropriate boxes to indicate which DoD Components should coordinate on the DoD issuance. If the DoD issuance shall be reviewed by DoD officials who are under the cognizance of an Under Secretary of Defense, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, or a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, make recommendations in Item 7. The preprinted "X" identifies the mandatory coordinators (General Counsel, DoD; the Inspector General, DoD; and the Director of Administration and Management, OSD.).

ITEM 16. COORDINATING OFFICIAL (Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy)

Obtain the signature of the Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy. For additional guidance on the appropriate signature levels, see Chapter 7 of DoD 5025.1-M.

DoD Directives: Because Directives establish DoD-wide policy and are signed only by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, they are coordinated at the highest level. Coordinating officials shall be the Under Secretaries of Defense or their Principal Deputies, the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Principal Staff Assistants or their Principal Deputies who report directly to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries or Under Secretaries of the Military Departments or a Principal Staff Secretary.

DoD Instructions, Publications, and Administrative Instructions: Coordinating officials on these issuances may include any of the officials authorized to coordinate on a DoD Directive or any other official who is designated in writing to coordinate on such issuances by a Principal Staff Assistant or Principal Deputy cited above.



Department of Defense **DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 3000.cc
September 17, 2004

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities

References: (a) Section 113 of title 10, United States Code
(b) Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011, March 2004¹
(c) DoD Directive 5000.59, "DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Management,"
January 4, 1994

1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a), and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b), this Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for planning, training, and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive:

2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Combatant Commands; the Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense; the Defense Agencies; the DoD Field Activities; and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter collectively referred to as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

2.2. Provides guidance on how DoD personnel and forces plan and operate, in concert with the Department of State, other Federal Agencies, coalition forces, and international and nongovernmental organizations, during the transition to and from hostilities to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.

2.3. This Directive supersedes any conflicting portions of other DoD issuances. Such instances shall be identified to the office of primary responsibility for this directive as listed at web site <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

¹ The SPG is classified SECRET/NOFORN. For access to the document contact the Director, Executive Services & Communications, refer to document control number OSD 75774-04.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Transition to and from Hostilities. As used in this directive, this phrase means the activities over periods of time, which may be measured in years, before and after conflict, or during the turbulent periods after a state fails, conducted to assist in the restoration of stability, promotion of a productive economy, and establishment of representative governments in which minority rights are respected and protected. Achieving these ends could be made less challenging by shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities. These activities include, but are not limited to, stability operations, intelligence activities, and other activities such as strategic communication. These activities and capabilities may well enhance combat capabilities but are not designed for combat operations. Many of these capabilities and responsibilities may reside outside the Department of Defense. Accordingly, effective interfaces shall be established to bring these capabilities to bear on the problem at hand.

3.2. Strategic Communication. The employment of all elements of national information activities in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence foreign or key audiences on the policies and interests of the U.S. Government. Strategic communication includes the activities of public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations.

3.3. Stability Operations. Stability operations are military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. These consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain and refine relations with other nations. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the US and its allies to a global economy. These operations may include a wide array of tasks from combat operations, in order to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to peace enforcement, or security cooperation activities.

3.4. Stabilization. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter.

3.5. Reconstruction. Efforts by the U.S. Government in coordination with coalition partners and other nations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people.

4. POLICY

4.1. Well developed capabilities to plan, coordinate, and conduct operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities are central and essential to implementing the Defense Strategy and achieving national security objectives. Accordingly, operations during

the transition to and from hostilities shall be explicitly addressed in DoD doctrine, education, training, exercises, and operational planning, and accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations. These DoD efforts are part of a government-wide approach to the development of capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. The U.S. Government is institutionalizing long-term, rigorous, and sustained pan-government contingency planning and integration task forces to orchestrate the planning and execution of extended campaigns using multiple instruments of national power.

4.2. The capabilities of DoD Components, including active and reserve forces, special operations forces, and intelligence capabilities, to provide Service capabilities for joint and interagency operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities shall be measured by relevant metrics and reported and addressed in readiness reporting systems in the same manner as the readiness of DoD capabilities to conduct combat operations.

4.3. Intelligence activities, covert operations, and activities of special operations forces supporting the transition to and from hostilities shall be jointly planned, exercised, and overseen to assure that the capabilities of intelligence assets and special operations forces are harmonized, and are adequate in quantity, quality, geographic distribution and kind to ensure achieving national security objectives.

4.4. The development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities shall be managed under a separate program with an operational focus sufficient to introduce these systems to the user community in the near term. This program shall field intrusive, close in, networked systems, such as tagging, tracking and locating (TTL) systems.

4.5. DoD intelligence efforts shall make maximum use of open sources. Data and communications architectures shall be designed to support and exploit information provided through open sources.

4.6. Foreign language skill and regional and cultural expertise are essential enabling capabilities for DoD activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities. DoD programs for assessing, training, and promoting officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel shall be strengthened to ensure that DoD requirements in these skill areas are met the same as skills for combat operations.

4.7. Support shall be provided to the Department of State and other Federal departments and agencies to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Support shall include, but is not limited to, personnel, training, exercises, and analysis.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall:

5.1.1. Lead and coordinate DoD participation in, and support to, interagency deliberate planning processes and the development of interagency plans for activities and operations in the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.1.1. Lead interagency effort to establish cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces focused on critical countries. This effort shall develop criteria for identifying countries or regions for which task forces are necessary and establish standard operating procedures for standing task forces.

5.1.1.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Regional Combatant Commanders, engage the Department of State and other federal agencies, coalition partners, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations at early and appropriate stages in the preparation of contingency plans.

5.1.1.3. Support the establishment and operation of the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (OSRO) at the Department of State and participation of OSRO in the planning and exercising of contingency plans.

5.1.2. Develop and oversee DoD policy for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities, including peacetime activities and activities conducted during stabilization and reconstruction. DoD policy shall include planning and operations conducted with interagency and coalition organizations.

5.1.2.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for operations and other activities during the transition to and from hostilities and represent the Department of Defense on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, other Federal agencies, State and local entities, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.

5.1.2.2. Lead interagency effort with the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and other federal agencies to define functional responsibilities and capabilities (both current and planned) and develop procedures for execution during the different stages of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.1.2.3. Include guidance in the Defense Security Cooperation Guidance on the pre-conflict requirements for those countries and areas with the potential for U.S. military operations.

5.1.3. Advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the adequacy of DoD capabilities to perform activities during the transition to and from hostilities, particularly in the critical areas of security, strategic communication, humanitarian affairs, and regional expertise including languages.

5.1.4. Develop and oversee policy for the implementation of DoD elements of strategic communication in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)).

5.1.4.1. Serve as the DoD focal point for strategic communication efforts, including defense support for public diplomacy, and represent the DoD on such matters with the National Security Council, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies.

5.1.4.2. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the military plans of the Combatant Commanders incorporate strategic communication components, including public affairs and defense support for public diplomacy.

5.1.5. Coordinate with the USD(I), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to harmonize activities of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. In coordination with the USD(I), provide joint oversight of these activities.

5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall:

5.2.1. Develop and oversee DoD intelligence policy and initiatives to support the transition to and from hostilities. Reform collection and analysis processes to incorporate open source information; transform all-source analysis including recruitment, training, and equipping; change intelligence procedures to include senior analytic personnel in both collection and classification decision making; and ensure that analysis is aligned with intelligence questions or problems.

5.2.1.1. Intelligence policy shall provide for nongovernmental and international organizations to have access, to the extent possible, to information that can facilitate their work, while still providing adequate protection to sensitive classified information and intelligence sources and methods.

5.2.1.2. Through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency establish and sustain an enhanced capability to plan and execute open source analysis in support of all DoD Components. Separately identify funding for open source analysis activities in the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution process.

5.2.2. In coordination with the USD(P), provide joint oversight of Special Operations Forces and forces conducting covert operations or intelligence activities. Harmonize these activities in coordination with the USD(P), as stated in subparagraph 5.1.5.

5.2.3. Accelerate the transformation of Defense human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities to provide sustained coverage and deep penetration of sufficient countries and regions to anticipate requirements and reduce the reliance on surging intelligence assets.

5.2.4. Establish and institutionalize a major program, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), for the development and fielding of technical collection systems to obtain the intelligence information required in the transition to and from hostilities. Among other capabilities, this program shall create a discipline of TTL, and to lead and manage DoD-wide efforts to develop and implement state-of-the-art TTL capabilities. The program shall include, but not be limited to, systems and collection analysis; prototyping, production, and deployment; counter-measures and counter-

intelligence; tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination and horizontal integration; and, research and development as needed. Identify DoD requirements for TTL targets of interest, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others as appropriate.

5.2.5. Support the development, exercising, and red-teaming of intelligence campaign plans by the Combatant Commanders; and ensure that the intelligence campaign plans are properly resourced and directed to provide the information required to inform the Regional Combatant Commanders' portfolio of contingency operational plans. Direct the DoD elements of the Intelligence Community to prepare and maintain a portfolio of contingency intelligence campaign plans to support operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.2.6. In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, ensure that intelligence career paths are adjusted to attract and keep in productive service the increasing quantity and quality of intelligence personnel that today's modern warfare demands not only during phases of intense combat, but especially in the transitions to and from combat, and in support of stability and reconstruction objectives. Intelligence career paths shall provide incentives for skilled personnel to develop and maintain deep and current expertise in specialized areas of importance for achieving national security objectives.

5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) shall:

5.3.1. Identify and monitor, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), the USD(I), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders, DoD-wide requirements for foreign language speakers and personnel with regional and cultural expertise, including requirements for foreign area officer and enlisted specialists. Develop metrics to evaluate and report individual and unit capabilities and readiness in these skills. Ensure that the portfolio of skills available to the Combatant Commanders conform to the needs of the portfolio of contingency operational plans and intelligence campaign plans.

5.3.2. Reform curricula at senior service schools, service academies, ROTC programs, advanced officer and enlisted education programs to include foreign language education and regional area expertise, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Expand opportunities for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel to participate in regional and cultural education programs, including resident or on-line studies and exchange programs. Establish programs to maintain proficiency in regional and cultural affairs and language skills.

5.3.4. Expand opportunities, in coordination with the USD(P), the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for personnel from other Federal agencies to attend DoD schools to receive training in the deliberate decision-making and planning process and the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

5.3.5. Reform curricula at senior service schools and advanced officer and enlisted education programs, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to include preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the transition to and from hostilities. Curricula shall include operations in the interagency and coalition environments.

5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall:

5.4.1. Establish research, development, and acquisition programs to support DoD-wide capabilities to transition to and from hostilities. Give priority to technologies that enhance capabilities for tagging, tracking, and locating targets of interest; and force-multiplying technologies such as language translation devices and programs that facilitate operating in foreign cultures.

5.4.2. Revise acquisition processes to enable science and technology capabilities to be exploited rapidly and coherently in current operations.

5.4.3. Address modeling and simulation requirements for activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities identified by the Commander, Joint Forces Command, in accordance with reference (c).

5.4.4. Through the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, address requirements related to the activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Defense Science and Technology planning process. Incorporate appropriate needs in the Defense Technology Area Plan and the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan and other planning documents. Support related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).

5.4.5. Strengthen capabilities for contracting support for activities needed during the transition to and from hostilities. Capabilities shall include immediate response and diligent oversight.

5.5. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall:

5.5.1. Separately identify funds and resources required to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process.

5.5.2. Streamline and institutionalize procedures to enable the prompt disbursement and accountability of currency by local commanders in foreign countries in support of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on implementing public affairs elements of strategic communication programs and initiatives. Assist the USD(P) and the Regional Combatant Commanders in maximizing the effect of these critical communication capabilities.

5.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Information and Integration shall acquire sufficient communications capabilities to support all aspects of the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

5.8.1. Reshape forces to provide stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. These forces shall achieve the following standards:

5.8.1.1. Actively train, practice, exercise, and rehearse.

5.8.1.2. Regularly evaluate readiness and validate plans.

5.8.1.3. Available on short notice.

5.8.1.4. Establish continuity in theater.

5.8.1.5. Capable of supporting multiple concurrent cumulative operations.

5.8.1.6. Capable of operating in a range of cultures and languages.

5.8.1.7. Capable of responding to an adaptive enemy.

5.8.1.8. Participate in an active experimentation program.

5.8.2. Strengthen and maintain programs for Foreign Area Officers and Enlisted Regional Specialists to support activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.8.3. Expand foreign language training programs to meet DoD-wide requirements for Active and Reserve Component personnel proficient in foreign languages, including personnel who would deploy with units.

5.8.4. Revise curricula in individual and unit training programs and senior service schools to meet requirements for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities, in coordination with the USD(P&R), the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.8.5. In coordination with USD(P), support approved interagency requirements for personnel or assistance, as directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, to develop and enhance deliberate interagency planning skills and capabilities for the preparation and conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations.

5.8.6. Appoint a senior officer from each Military Service to lead and advocate stabilization and reconstruction initiatives.

5.9. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy shall organize, train, and equip Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components forces to conduct operations during the transition to and from hostilities. In consultation with the Commander, Joint Forces Command, explore and exercise innovative organizational constructs, e.g., modular units that combine personnel with a range of skills that support operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Stabilization and reconstruction operations will require support from combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.

5.10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.10.1. In coordination with the USD(P), determine the type and number of forces and other force requirements necessary for pre-hostilities, stabilization, and reconstruction.

5.10.2. Develop metrics, in coordination with the USD(P), to report the readiness of forces to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations in coordination with the Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of the Military Services.

5.10.3. Establish a program at the National Defense University to teach deliberate planning skills in the interagency environment. The program shall enlist personnel from DoD and other federal departments and agencies and shall teach planning for the range of activities and operations during the transition to and from hostilities.

5.10.4. Implement the policies and responsibilities as specified herein and facilitate the Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commands in the implementation their responsibilities.

5.11. The Commanders of the Regional _____ t t Commands shall:

5.11.1. Develop and maintain contingency operational campaign plans spanning the transition to and from hostilities, including activities and operation during peacetime, stabilization, and reconstruction, for their respective areas of operation. These operational campaign plans shall be supported by intelligence campaign plans that include realistic collection and exploitation plans for the timely delivery of actionable information, and metrics that enable the intelligence plans to be exercised and their readiness evaluated. Campaign plans shall also include appropriate of strategic communication elements and shall be coordinated with the respective Chiefs of Mission.

5.11.2. Designate the Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander as the Joint Commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations. This commander shall be responsible for detailed planning, exercises, and execution of stabilization operations.

5.11.3. Establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations. These offices shall work closely with Country Teams, Directors of the Regional Centers for Security Studies, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks and other centers of expertise, and involve experts in ongoing activities, as appropriate.

5.12. The Commander, Joint Forces Command shall:

5.12.1. Develop and publish joint doctrine for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities. Use simulation techniques where appropriate to meet training objectives.

5.12.2. Identify required modeling and simulation capabilities and issues to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.59 (reference (c)).

5.12.3. Participate, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure requirements for stabilization and reconstruction operations during the transition to and from hostilities are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate.

Davis. Rose CIV WHS/ESD

From: Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:49 PM
To: Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD
CC: Meiners, Regina, CIV, OSD-ODA&M; Wooten, Broderick, SSG, OSD-ODA&M
Subject: Action Package 15666-04 on ElevatingDoD Executive Issues

Importance: High

Ms. Davis:

You can close that action out. Mr. DuBois was **directly and personally involved** in that action and it was active from May 2004 into early January 2005. However, **O&MP** as the lead office for the initiative working it on behalf of the **DA&M** was never able to reach closure. In discussions with us in January, Mr. DuBois indicated that it was dead. Sorry we didn't think to engage ESD pro-actively to close it out. Since we had worked hard on the effort and thought it had a lot of merit, perhaps we hoped it would begin breathing again. In any case, close it out.

Thank you.

Mark Munson
O&MP/ODA&M Staff

(b)(6)

310.1

-----Original Message-----

From: Davis, Rose CIV WHS/ESD
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2005 3:43 PM
To: Munson, Mark, CIV, OSD-ODA&M
Subject: Action Package 15666-04

Mr. Munson,
Can you tell me if the package you prepared, "ElevatingDoD Executive Issues, dated 10/07/04 still open? I am reviewing open signature packages.

Thank You
Rosemary Davis
WHS/ESD

(b)(6)

OSD 15666-04

7 Oct 05

ACTION MEMO


SECRET
2004 OCT 17 17

October 7, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management



SUBJECT: Elevating DoD Executive Issues

- In the attached snowflake, you directed us to: "... find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues. Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department." After significant vetting and some modifications to my original proposal, I have reached agreement with your closest advisors.
- Accordingly, I recommend the establishment of a DoD Executive Issues Management Team as a standing organization led by a political appointee (e.g., Dick McGraw) as the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management (SA-EIM). The team shall have an O-6 who serves as the SA-EIM's deputy and as a special assistant to the Chairman for joint issues. Three O-5s will form the main body of the team, along with one administrative assistant. The SA-EIM will have a seat at The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. For day-to-day matters, he will report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense; however, when the urgency of an issue dictates, he has the authority to report it directly to you and the Deputy. This process does not replace current arrangements, including sensitive-information exchanges within the senior political team.
- When an issue is raised by the SA-EIM that requires attention, it will be addressed in The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting. When Joint issues are involved, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee will be invited to participate. If a special Crisis Action Team is required, it will be stood-up as appropriate.
- Six months after stand-up, we will formally review the structure and process, evaluate its effectiveness, and determine whether or not any modifications need to be made—to include disestablishment of the team. A charter for the team and process is provided at TAB A.

COORDINATION: Coordination with William Haynes, Powell Moore, Larry Di Rita, Paul Butler, Pete Geren, Dave Patterson, Mike Maples, and Dick McGraw is reflected at TAB B.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve this proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments: As stated

OSD 15666-04

Prepared by: Mark A. Munson, Sr. (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/26855

A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE ISSUES MANAGEMENT TEAM

1. PURPOSE

This Charter establishes the mission, organization, membership, and functions of the Department of Defense Executive Issues Management Team (DoD EIMT).

2. APPLICABILITY

This Charter applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). This Charter shall also apply to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense unless the Inspector General of the Department of Defense has decided that an executive issue raises a conflict of interest with Inspector General activities.

3. MISSION

The mission of the DoD EIMT is to bring a more focused, reliable, and disciplined approach in elevating executive issues to the attention of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

4. DEFINITION

An executive issue includes, but is not limited to, an incident, event, or problem at any level within the Department that could have a negative impact on the Department because of its sensitivity or egregious nature. For purposes herein, an executive issue is reported without solutions or options accompanying the report of the issue.

5. ORGANIZATION, MEMBERSHIP, AND STAFF

5.1. The DoD EIMT shall be composed of 6 members:

5.1.1. Led by a full-time Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, who shall be a senior non-career appointee, responsible for the ongoing collection, continuing review, comprehensive evaluation, and timely disposition of information on emerging, highly visible, and consequential executive issues of interest to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

5.1.2. A senior officer in the grade of O-6 shall serve in a dual capacity as the Deputy to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management and as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Executive Issues Management.

5.1.3. A permanent, full-time team, which consists of three military officers at the grade of O-5, one each from the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force shall conduct the information gathering, analysis, and reporting. At least one team member shall be an expert on Information Technology and shall be responsible for maximizing the use of data-mining software as an aid in identifying emerging issues. Administrative assistance shall be provided by an appropriate out-sourced contractor.

5.2. The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting will be the forum for the elevation of relevant executive issues identified by the DoD EIMT and shall oversee the executive issues process.

5.3. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene a Crisis Action Team when an issue of great magnitude has emerged that requires close attention and prompt action by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. The Crisis Action Team, composed of appropriately assigned members from across the Department, shall meet until the situation has been resolved.

6. FUNCTIONS

6.1. The DoD EIMT, under the day-to-day management and oversight of the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, shall:

6.1.1. Scan all sources, including domestic and foreign media and DoD channels, with a 360-degree method of operation using a variety of tools, techniques, and processes.

6.1.2. Assemble and organize information that is accurate, factual, timely, and compelling.

6.1.3. Identify leading indicators for early warning.

6.1.4. Submit issues and reports, as required, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense through The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, when the urgency of an issue dictates, the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management has the authority to immediately report it directly the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.5. Have access to all meetings, as appropriate, to further inform the process.

6.1.6. Provide follow-up assessments, in coordination with The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, as needed, on previously reported items.

6.1.7. The DoD EIMT shall NOT replace or supplant existing reporting arrangements and relationships between the:

6.1.7.1. Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.1. OSD Principal Staff Assistants and the Heads of DoD Components who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.1.7.2. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6.2. The OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) who report directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit a copy of their Weekly Activity Reports on Thursday of each week to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management.

6.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

6.3.1. Provide information to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management, when appropriate, or promptly upon request.

6.3.2. Take action to encourage commanders or executives in the field to identify and report emerging or potential problems.

6.3.3. Promptly elevate issues to the Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management to serve as an early warning to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense that a problem has been identified with real or potential DoD-wide ramifications.

6.4. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy secretary of Defense shall invite the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or his designee, as appropriate, to The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting when executive issues are on the agenda.

7. ADMINISTRATION

7.1. A weekly summary report of executive issues shall be submitted to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense via The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

7.2. The Special Assistant for Executive Issues Management shall:

7.2.1. Be nominated by the DA&M and selected by the Secretary of Defense.

7.2.2. Report to The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for day-to-day matters.

7.2.3. Assemble and prepare reports/issues for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and shall keep the members of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting apprised of activities appropriately.

7.2.4. Monitor the progress of follow-on actions and issues.

7.2.5. Maintain and safeguard records and ensure their appropriate disposition when they are no longer required in active files.

7.2.6. Be a member of The Special Assistant's Daily Staff Meeting.

7.2.7. Meet with the Vice Director of the Joint Staff or the Vice Director's designee, when necessary, to ensure that Joint and Combatant Command issues are being identified and addressed.

7.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall nominate three candidates for their respective officer positions at the 0-5 level to serve on the Executive Issues Management Team. (The Secretary of the Navy may nominate a mix of Naval and Marine Corps officers for the Navy billet.)

7.4. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services, shall provide personnel resources and such other technical, administrative, and logistical support to the DoD EIMT, which shall be located in the Pentagon.

7.5. Six months after Secretary of Defense approval to stand up the DoD EIMT and the associated executive issues process, the DA&M shall lead a formal review of the structure and process and determine its effectiveness providing recommendations for modifications or continuance.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Charter is effective immediately.

B

LIST OF COORDINATING OFFICIALS
Department of Defense Executive Issues Team

October 7, 2004


Official & Position	Coordinating Date	Status
LARRY DI RITA	September 24, 2004	Substantive comments on linkage with the Joint Staff regarding Joint/Combatant Command executive issues; met w/ Mr. DuBois on 9/27; comments accepted and accommodated
POWELL MOORE	September 17, 2004	Concur
WILLIAM HAYNES	September 17, 2004	Concur w/ comments; accepted and incorporated
MG MIKE MAPLES	September 8, 2004	Concur
PAUL BUTLER		Awaiting resolution of issues identified by Di Rita and Geren.
DAVE PATTERSON	September 22, 2004	Concur
PETE GEREN	September 21, 2004	Concur w/ comments (concerned about using the Geren-Maples Group in an oversight role, since the Geren-Maples Group is not a permanently established entity and was convened to address detainee issues only); met w/ Mr. DuBois 9/21 to discuss; comments accepted and accommodated
DICK McGRAW	September 14, 2004	Concur

file

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues

Please talk to Jim Roche and find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues.

Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department. I would like a first cut at it done within the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-24

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

SIR,
Response attached.

v/r
LT Col Lengyel
9/13

11-L-0559/OSD/26863

OSD 15666-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26863

2 May 04 4:00 PM
a

October 8, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

3/10

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time. We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

OSD 15680-04

SO 10/08



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 23, 2004, 4:14 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 2 Dec 04
SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives — SNOWFLAKE(attached)

- We are working General Brown's incentive proposals for Special Operations Forces (SOF) with the Services.
- All Services agree on increasing targeted retention bonuses for SOF war fighters.
 - These will be set to achieve optimal retention levels.
 - We will seek to minimize unintended effects on other specialties and personnel.
- We are exploring all flexibilities for Service members, including special operations personnel, to leave active duty for a period of time and return.
 - A recent law change aids the seamless transition for members to and from the Reserves and active duty.
- After a review of the special operations retention analysis and incentives next week, I expect to issue instructions to the Services to initiate a robust incentives program for special operations personnel beginning on January 1, 2005.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: C. Witschonke (b)(6)

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=FEB-23 01:29

END=FEB-23 01:30

FILE NO.=480

STN NO.	COMM.	RBBR NO.	STATION NAME/TEL NO.	PAGES	DURATION
001	OK	*	(b)(6)	001/001	00:00:18

***** - - - *****

October 8, 2004 ✓

TO: GEN Doug Brown
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Retention Initiatives

We had an interesting discussion yesterday about the need for innovative approaches in dealing with the retention of our special operations personnel.

Please develop new ideas along the lines we discussed, including an assessment of whether it makes sense to give our folks flexibility to go off active duty for a period to time, We need to knock down any bureaucratic barriers that stand in the way of what makes sense and provides the best overall retention rates.

Thanks.

DHR:m
100804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

(Signature)

CDR's PFor SECDEF SOF Retention

1. Sir, thank you for your support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) retention initiatives. I believe the quickest and most effective retention action we can take is to get approval for our current proposal offering targeted retention bonuses to our SOF operators. We are near the finish line with this proposal, and I am requesting you approve it. We will continue to work with the OSD staff to secure funding.

2. Additionally, we are offering our troops and their families educational incentives. We inaugurated our Enlightened Warrior program which will provide "SOF-friendly" degree programs available on-line through four nationally accredited universities. We have also partnered with the University of South Florida to enable SOF personnel who are within a year of completing their undergraduate degrees the opportunity to transfer as full-time students.

3. We will also pursue additional authorities, not currently legislated under USC Title 10, to enable our headquarters to actively engage in personnel force management. The current language allows us to monitor our force, but we need authorities to actively manage our force.

4. Regarding short-term breaks in service, I am interested in the idea of sabbaticals for our troops. Our staff is researching alternatives and developing options.

5. I appreciate your active engagement in SOF retention issues. We will do what makes sense to provide the best overall retention rates.

6. Respectfully, Doug

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *RIA*
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:12

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

010

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please look into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-12

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

NO Seroy

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26868



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

2011 OCT 12 PM 1:12

INFORMATION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: DoD Claims Process After Shooting Down an Aircraft

- This replies to your request, "If we shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all this?" We do know what our legal authorities are.
- The United States is not compelled to pay compensation unless Congress and the President have waived sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is a traditional legal principle that states that a government is immune from suit unless the government consents. In the United States, we consent by statute.
- The United States has not waived sovereign immunity for combat activities. The shooting down of an airliner by the military in defense of the United States is a combat activity. Therefore, there is no statutory authority to pay compensation after shooting down an aircraft in defense of the United States.
- In such cases, two principal options are available if the President determines that compensation should be paid. One is to use emergency and extraordinary expense funds to pay compensation. We used this option when we mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo. The other is to obtain specific statutory authority to pay compensation. We used this option after 9/11.
- When statutes authorize the United States to pay Compensation for combat activities, the Military Departments investigate, adjudicate and settle claims worldwide. We have a very large, efficient and effective claims system. In some cases if a claim is not settled to the satisfaction of the claimant, the claimant may sue the United States.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC/(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/26869

OSD 15800-04

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Shooting Down of Aircraft

2004 OCT 12 PM 1:14
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

If we did shoot down an aircraft and it crashed in a populated area, killing people and damaging property, do we know what our legal authorities are, how people would be compensated, and what we would do about all that?

Please **look** into it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-12

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15800-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26870



June 8, 2004

TO: General Mike Hagee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Rotation Plan

300.2

I note we are going to be meeting on Thursday.

I also understand you are going to come up and defend the 7-month rotation, as opposed to a 12-month rotation.

I would like you to be prepared to make a presentation as to how you would do a 12-month rotation if, in fact, we decide that it is necessary to get the Marines into the same rhythm as the Army. Currently, a disconnect occurs when you cannot replace each Marine with another Marine, and we end up having to bring in Army units to replace Marines. It causes a disjointed effect in the rotations.

Therefore, I would like to see your best approach as to how you would do it and what other adjustments you would make, if we asked the Marines to start using 12 months.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-23

.....
Please respond by

6/10/04 _____

8 JUN 04

OSD 15850-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26871

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.04ts

Please respond by: _____

6/8

UZBEKISTAN

270004

OSD 15851-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26872



TO: Larry Lanzilotta
 Ken Krieg

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **DoD Budget**

110.01

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. I think it is an idea worth exploring.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060604A.01ls

Attach: Gingrich email 11/23/03

Please respond by: _____ *6/21*

27604

OSD 15852-04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:33 PM

To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil

Subject: longterm help for the dod budget

for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 11/23/03


longterm room for the dod budget

you should take the non military functions of retirement and medical care and see if the President would be willing to move them to Veterans Affairs.

In the long run if these numbers are going to grow in an uncontrollable way you should look at getting them out of your line and into another line.

the current system makes the defense budget look bigger than it really is in defense terms.

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

Take a look at this paper that you got a copy of originally and let's discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604F.01ts

Attach: Thoughts and Ideas 12/1/03

Please respond by: _____ 6/20

33350

6 Jun 04

OSD 15854-04

12/1/03

~~Sent from~~
~~Don't let Cheney to see it~~

For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

cc: L. DiRita

Bingo— On the Thanksgiving visit,

There were some interesting articles this week in the WSJournal suggesting the Bush WH is committed to 'going over the heads' of the news media to get their message directly to the people. One or two compared it to Nixon and Reagan efforts in a similar vein. Of course, we agree completely—but would urge them to figure out ways to & it rather than set off a media reaction by saying they are going to do it. The preannouncement of PR activity is always a mistake,

Spoke

To break the news concentration in Baghdad, they might consider rotating briefings among several cities. After all, the reporters are sort of captive to the US Gov't for information. If such information is offered in cities outside the Sunni triangle, they will have to follow (and may see interesting stories along the way).

The single most effective manner of communication is to provide the public with access, on something of a regular basis, to the handful of Bush Administration spokesmen with a high degree of credibility (certainly including Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz--but there could well be others),

The most popular and effective broadcasts during the war were the daily DOD briefings by Rumsfeld and Meyers. [The Tuesday --- November 25, 2003 Pentagon briefing underlined it again.] They were carried live and rebroadcast in the evenings. No one really cared to hear Dan Rather's interpretation of what Rumsfeld had said if they could get the information directly from the source. We need to duplicate this opportunity, perhaps on a weekly basis, in a predictable time slot accessible to the public (without appearing to dictate it!). Essentially, the Administration would be bypassing the middleman in one avenue of news delivery.

DWII

Have a joint briefing every other week with Bremer from Iraq and DR / General Meyer live from the Pentagon. Bremer needs visuals (for pictures). Do it at 8 PM and capture the cable networks live.

For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

At the White House Fellows annual meeting, the **most** popular panel by far **was** a wide ranging conversation between Justices Scalia and Beyer, lightly moderated by a 10th Circuit **judge** who was a former **Fellow**. Apparently this **also** had been done at a 10th Circuit **judicial** retreat and was **equally** popular. *It was the interplay between the two justices that was so informative.*

It is true that something like this happens each Sunday on the morning talk shows (detailed time with a top Administration spokesman without too much moderation), but it's an awkward time slot for **most** of the viewing public,

Consider instead making *two* of our **list** [Rumsfeld, Powell, Cheney, Rice and Wolfowitz-- but there could well be other] available on a **regular** weekly **basis**, perhaps for C-span, **so** that viewers would have a predictable evening **time slot** to tune in. Rather than a press conference or some other format, it **would** be the conversational interplay between them that would be the attraction--and **give** the Administration the opportunity to present its case directly to the viewing public in a low **key** manner. It would even help **disarm** gossip about feuds, **personalize** our heroes, and accomplish **all sorts** of good works.

3

Gimmicks **like** the Deck of Iraqi **Cards** **are** tough and can be dangerous, but there must be some way to quantify (**chart**) peaceful progress in reopening **schools**, restoring electrical power, etc. Remember the Misery **Index**? **We** should coming up with a Freedom Index or a Normalcy Index.

7

The **most** promising Iraqi improvement **is** the flow of their oil. Remember, it **was** supposed to **pay** for much of their recovery. Perhaps **we** could chart that and show how that money **is** flowing back into security and **social** improvements.

401.

Rummy and **his boss** are both branded **as** gunslingers that have **no** concern for the families of the **soldiers** who have given their life. I know this **is** not true but the reputation **is** widespread. Even my hard-line wife **has** doubts.

Isuggest an event where **both** the President and Don **can show** genuine concern might help a lot, even if the opponents and **pundits** of the east greet it cynically. Then it must be followed up in some meaningful way---- over **and** over again.

401

11-L-0559/OSD/26877

For: DR
CC: DiRita
12/1/2003
Thoughts and Ideas

Bush should do a David Frost like interview in the US before Christmas or between Christmas and New Year's. He can either do a major network or all the cable anchors (Hume, Williams, Browne and maybe CNBC). **Bush's** core character and empathy will emerge. He can talk about the success of Iraq—the sacrifice—and restate his determination.

A joint Bush, Rumsfeld, Powell press conference or prime time conversation would be dramatic. Critics would argue the President should not share the stage with others—that it somehow demeans the office of President. But, wouldn't this be "Bush like"? He has the confidence to have the others with him—he runs the show, takes the lead.

One suggestion was mooted somewhat by the President's trip to the families of fallen soldiers in Colorado three days ago. [*And the Thanksgiving trip.*] The idea was for **DR** and the President (and their wives?) to make a much more concerted effort to visit with and express gratitude to the families of those who have lost sons and daughters in Iraq and to those soldiers who have been wounded. **RN** was always very conscious of the troops, their sacrifices, and did all he could to support them and express appreciation to them. **RN's** trip to visit the troops in Vietnam and the homecoming event at The White House for the American POWs remain in my mind as two of the great events in **RN's** presidency. President Bush and **DR** need a sustained effort to show their fatherly sides, not just their warrior sides. Gratitude is a powerful force to inspire continued sacrifice.

7

11-L-0559/OSD/26878

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 6, 2004
SUBJECT: Ivy Football Assn. Dinner NYC

001.15D

Can you check the calendar to determine when the State of the union might be and whether there is any reason to believe that Jan. 27, 2005 is a problem.

Then get this back to me so I can make a final decision in the next month.

What are your thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604B.02ts

Attach: Invitation/Hoover 1/27/05Ivy Dinner @ NYC

Please respond by: 6/20

6/20/04

OSD 15855-04

✓ 5/11



HOOPER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

May 10, 2004

The Honorable **Donald H. Rumsfeld**
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense **Pentagon**, Room 3E380
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear **Don**,

It is my pleasure to **inform** you that you have been selected as **Princeton University's** honoree for the Ivy Football Association dinner at The Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on **January 27, 2005**. It **was** my honor to represent Princeton at the 2003 event, and on behalf of the Princeton Football Association, I **invite** you to accept **this honor**.

The Ivy Football **Association** promotes and celebrates **Ivy League** football. It is composed of the Ivy League football alumni associations, and it **has** a **strong** Princeton connection. Stanislaw Maliszewski, '66, founded the **organization**, and its current president is **Cosmo Iacavazzi**, '65.

The purpose of the **January 27** dinner is to recognize **one distinguished alumnus** from each of the eight Ivy League **universities** who **has** played football, but more importantly, has distinguished himself in his chosen career. The **dinner** is held bi-annually, and the 2001 and 2003 dinners were huge successes. In fact, in 2003 the event had to be **moved to the Waldorf Astoria from The Pierre Hotel** in order to accommodate the greatly expanded guest list. At least 1100 **guests are** expected for the 2005 dinner.

For the first time, a portion of **the proceeds** of the 2005 event will help to fund the National Football **Foundation and Hall of Fame's** "Play it **Smart Program**." This program assists **inner city kids** by encouraging them to learn from football **experiences**.

The master of ceremonies will be **Jack Ford**, Yale, '72 (**a fine defensive back**), who did **an outstanding** job of emceeing the dinners in 2001 and 2003. Jack formerly reported for **ABC News' Good Morning America**, anchored his **own ESPN show**, Sports Reporter **II**, hosted NBC's Today Show, and currently co-hosts a syndicated morning talk **show**, Jack will introduce the honorees, and each will address the audience for about five **minutes**.

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
May 10, 2004
Page Two

If Joyce **would** like to accompany you, the Ivy Football Association **would** be pleased to include her **as** their guest. Charlotte joined me and **had** a thoroughly enjoyable **time**.

The audience will consist primarily of **individuals** who have played football at the eight **Ivy League** schools **and their** spouses. Of course, you **may** talk about **anything** you like, but **I'm** sure the **audience** would be interested in hearing **how playing** football for Princeton influenced your development and how it may have contributed to **your success**.

All of the Ivy League **athletic** directors **and head** football coaches will attend the dinner, **and the Ivy Football Association** plans to invite **the** university presidents **as well**. The evening **is** a wonderful way to celebrate **and promote** Ivy League football, **as well as** to encourage cooperation **and cohesion among the eight institutions**.

You will be joined at **this** event by a distinguished group. **At this point**, William V. Campbell, **Chairman** of Intuit, Inc., will be Columbia's honoree; Jeffrey R. Immelt, **Chairman and CEO** of General Electric, will be Dartmouth's choice; and Charles B. Johnson, **Chairman and CEO** of Franklin Templeton Investments, will **represent** Yale. You will be **notified** of the other **four** honorees as they become **known**. I have attached lists of those **who** were honored at the first two dinners.

I encourage **you to** accept **this honor and** enjoy a memorable evening with many of your **friends**.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

Attachments

The Ivy Football Association Dinner

Thursday, January 25, 2001

*The Pierre Hotel
New York City*

*Honorary Chairman, Governor George E. Pataki,
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ABC News*

Honoring:

JOE PATERNO
Head Football Coach
Penn State University
(Brown '50)

RUSSELL F. WARREN, M.D.
Surgeon and Chief, New York Hospital for Special Surgery
(Columbia '62)

RICHARD B. LOYND
Chairman of the Executive Committee
Furniture Brands International
(Cornell '50)

WILLIAM H. KING, Jr.
Partner, McGuireWoods
(Dartmouth '63)

DANNY M. JIGGETTS
Sportscaster, Fox Network
(Harvard '76)

JAMES S. RIEPE
Vice Chairman, T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.
(Pennsylvania '65)

JOHN F. MCGILICUDDY
Former Chairman and CEO, Chemical Banking Corporation
(Princeton '52)

KURT L. SCHMOKE
Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
(former Mayor of Baltimore, Maryland)
(Yale '71)

The Ivy Football Association Dinner

*Wednesday, January 22, 2003
The Waldorf-Astoria Grand Ballroom
New York City*

*Governor George E. Pataki, Honorary Chairperson
Master of Ceremonies, Jack Ford of ESPN, Yale '72*

HONORING

PAUL J. CHOQUETTE, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Gibbane Building Company
BROWN '60

ALLISON F. BUTTS
Chief Executive Officer
Next Wave, LLC
COLUMBIA '64

CHARLES F. KNIGHT
Chairman
Emerson
CORNELL '57

HENRY M. PAULSON, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
DARTMOUTH '68


TOMMY LEE JONES
Academy Award Winning Actor
HARVARD '69

DAVID S. POTTRUCK
President and Co-Chief Executive Officer
Charles Schwab Corporation
PENNSYLVANIA '70

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Former Secretary of State
Reagan Administration
PRINCETON '42

KENNETH L. WOLFE
Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Hershey Foods Corporation
YALE '61

TO: Hon. Melvin Laird

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:

I just once again reread your February 11th memo and found it helpful. If you have other thoughts and suggestions as we go along, please do let me have them.

Thanks, my friend.

DHR/azn
060604F.02ts

326

OSD 15856-04

6 Jun 04

Melvin R. Laird

(b)(6)

February 11, 2004

Personal and Confidential

Dear Rummy:

You **asked** me to be frank on how things are going - thought I would cover **several** items off the top of my head **and** send **them** to you on the private **fax** number you provided me.

All-Volunteer Total Force Planning

Thanks for putting me in touch with General Schoomaker. I believe my suggestions on the Reserve and Guard were as helpful to him **as** his suggestions were to me. Evidently, the General's recent study shows the preferred length of service for Guard **and** Reserves to be one full year for emergencies in a four-year period. When Dave Packard and I looked at it in connection with the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Concept, eight months **was** the call-up period in emergencies in every two-year period as needed. Things have changed, but it is still within a few months. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves **are** somewhat different in several respects, which we discussed in detail. The Guard, Army Reserves, **and** Marine Reserves, to some extent, have not done **as** well **as** planned in restructuring. When I took over **as** Postmaster General **during** the Postal strike, we had a few non-regular units ready to be helpful. Thankfully, the strike did not last long. Not only were we short of Postal and Communications Reserve units, but also we were dreadfully short of police, fire, government infrastructure units, etc. These types of units do not have a great deal of appeal to the **Army** Reserves or Guard for regular or summer training exercises, but are the type of duty which can be supplied best in times of crisis. Anyway, we had a good visit and I **am** glad you are getting the message across to our **friends** on Capitol Hill through your briefing at lunch a week ago Monday.

Air National Guard

The President's record of volunteering for the Air National Guard is available to **you**. This was a question discussed in a Public Affairs briefing when I was in the Pentagon. **Bush's** service in **Texas**, transfer to Alabama, and subsequent request to attend graduate school were all reviewed after receiving **an** inquiry. His record, which ended in **an** Honorable Discharge, should be officially disclosed. Public disclosure and transparency are the best policy. As I remember the record, **Bush** certainly did not desert; he did not go to Canada; but rather, he volunteered, served, and **then** requested **an** early out to attend graduate school. **Many** young people, in and out of military service, requested **an** early out or deferment for higher education up until the time we ended college deferments in the Nixon Administration, went to the lottery system **and** established

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February 11, 2004
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the All-Volunteer Force. Do not let anyone make this an issue to divide the military and veteran votes in November. You have the record, dates, etc.

Iraq Briefing

You were somewhat upset with me for walking out of the briefing last year on the Middle East situation. I hope you have gotten over it. The briefing was so formalized there was no opportunity to raise questions or make suggestions, only listen. No one is required to follow **anything** we old timers say, but sometimes it does not hurt to listen. Some of us have listened to Defense Department briefings for years on the Defense Appropriations Committee – we learned a great deal of the pitfalls, all the way from Engine Charlie to seven years of the light at the end of the tunnel with McNamara.

Having spent some time in the Middle East, all the way **from** Turkey to Afghanistan; **Pakistan** to Iraq, and everywhere else, the briefers and your Deputy seemed to have no idea of the politics of the area. Even when I visited **Iraq** for the first time in **1953**, as one of the youngest members of the House Appropriations Committee, the political and economic situation was quite clear. After our successful mission to save Kuwait and our failure to guarantee our friends in the North and the Shiites **any** degree of safety before we pulled out, the inevitable of our present problem should have been obvious. By giving the idea that it would be a cakewalk this time after we failed them the last **time**, was disturbing. My comments to you were honest **as** I thought the briefing was not based on any degree of realism or **firm** intelligence. The Defense Department should always present a guarded picture of all its proposed combat operations. As I told you in your first week in office, you can believe the third assessment report on any operation if they concur with the first two – and even then you can be disappointed.

Intelligence Failures

Rummy, you will remember my admonition in your office in February 2001 as you just took office – appoint your own men and women to top intelligence posts. You can change most of these jobs yourself – I listened to these agencies for many years. I got a great deal of grief for changing DoD top positions, but you cannot believe the difference it made. The big three in intelligence usually spend most of their time confirming past reports. The Community would not even confirm the fact that Russians were conducting MIRV tests in **1968** when we had electronic test verification, which had not been presented first **by them**. The President will not win politically by defending his choice of a holdover CIA Director even if he is a good friend. The Director is in the past and the President could “die **on his sword**” in **the** future. **You** will recall that Kennedy fired Dulles very quickly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Dulles read about his departure in the newspaper. I served on the Intelligence Committee in Congress when it was truly “secret” and appointed by the Speaker with only five members of the House. It does not

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hurt a President to fire people for a failure he should not bare. Ike always said, "politics is sometimes tough, especially on your friends."

Cheney and Full Disclosure

Cheney's unwillingness to divulge the names of individuals meeting with him on energy policy continues to be a mistake. Because of his background after leaving government, transparency and full disclosure should have been his number one concern. Now as this issue is taken all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, he will be further brought into the public spotlight even to the point of embarrassing one of our friends on the Supreme Court. Dick did nothing wrong - he talked to the right people, but it is the *perception* of a cover up that counts. This was all unnecessary as I told Dick, Lynne and Libby from the start - they thought I was nuts!

The Election

We do not want a one-term presidency like the one we had with George, Sr. or Jerry. When talking with you last week, it seemed not to register. This is the track the Administration is on, and if we do not change course, we could be headed for defeat. You are the only one in the Cabinet that understands national policies and the facts of life about national elections.

Ike won big on the Korean War issues - "I will go there myself immediately after the election." George W. did not win the last election - Clinton and Gore lost it. Jerry and George, Sr. lost their re-election bids - Carter and Clinton won these elections by default. Nixon won his first election on our country's discontent with the Vietnam War (Johnson and McNamara). Nixon won his second term because of Vietnam - the fact we had removed all combat troops by Election Day from Vietnam, ended the draft, and established the All-Volunteer Force. McGovern had no place to go with his anti-defense and anti-Vietnam war message. Even then, we took McGovern seriously - we beefed up government purchase orders from toilet paper, cars, airplanes, trucks, tanks, etc. in the last weeks of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1973 and the first quarter of fiscal 1974. We may have done too much of this, but you can never take a national election for granted. These were all purchases approved by Congress for the fiscal year in question. We just moved them up a little earlier. I can go on and on about why I think an incumbent should never be defeated. The President has all the tools at his disposal. He must exercise them wisely and remember that the presidency is much more important than supporting friends. Nixon finally realized that after the second election - there would have been no Watergate exposé in his second term if he would of cleaned house (Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and others months earlier). The Presidency is too important for the President to take blame or perhaps the fall for the incompetent advice he received from the intelligence community or any others. All Presidential elections are about how the President is perceived as a true leader.

I

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Another View of Perception

I will never forget the weekend Jerry pardoned Nixon. We were partners in a two-day golf tournament at Burning Tree. (By the way, we were just one stroke behind the tournament leaders with the extrastrokes our golf handicaps gave us). I left Jerry Saturday night firmly convinced he would not pardon Nixon until some of us organized a group of Senators and House Members to call upon Ford at the White House, to show for the first time public **support** to put the Nixon matter behind us. John Stennis had suggested this pardon approach to Bryce Harlow and me. He felt we could get a group of **thirty** or so to publicly call on **Nixon** after such a meeting. Instead, Phil Buchanan, Haig, and others were pressing for a dramatic pardon move to wipe the slate clean. That Sunday morning shock had a great deal to do with Jerry losing the election. Imagine my disappointment when we teed off at 12:30 p.m. that Sunday in our golf tournament. Jerry asked me what I thought of what he had done earlier that morning on the pardon. **My** response on the first tee **was**, "Jerry, I'll tell you what **I think** of it **after we finish** this round - we have a chance to **win** the tournament this afternoon, and we can discuss this after our round." The pardon was right, but the public **was** not properly prepared for the Sunday morning shock. **Thus** another case of *perception* playing a big part in a national Presidential election.

Anyway, Rummy, I have rambled around in dictating **this** note - you asked for it. Tear it up after you have read it, but remember I do **love** you and Joyce. **Your** plate is full, but by putting on an extra fill-court press, we may be saved and win in November.

Regards,



Mei Laird

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

VIA FACSIMILE

11-L-0559/OSD/26888

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT:


I ran across this paper that Newt Gingrich sent to a number of people back in January '03. It struck me you might want to read it. I am sure you are aware of the kinds of comments he makes and I know you've made enormous progress, but nonetheless I thought it might be of interest to you.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D03ts

Attach: Gingrich email 1.04.03 Re: Why the data you get may be wrong

Please respond by: _____



322

6 JUN 04

OSD 15857-04

From Newt Gingrich
cc Di Rita
Wolfe, T2

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, January 05, 2003 12:08 AM
To: (b)(6); Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil
Cc: stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; Torie.Clarke@OSD.Mil; jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: why the data you get may be wrong
 for secdef,depsecdef
 from Newt 1/04/03
 why the data you get may be wrong

Every senior person in the Bush Administration I have talked with about the budget problems has been struck by the gap between their information and the facts I am asserting. This memo will help explain how misleading are the reports you are getting

the following memo is long but it explains better than anything I have seen why you are getting such poor quality of information and such dishonest answers about what we need and what has to change. I urge you to read it. This is a successful mid-level Army officer:

note the terrible comment

"Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders."

FYI, a remarkably prescient letter by an Army officer responding to a CSIS study.
 Dave

13 December 2002

Center for Strategic and International Studies
 1800 K Street N. W Washington DC, 20006

Dear CSIS,

I read with great interest your report entitled "American Military Culture in the 21st Century." I thought you might be interested in my thoughts as I read the report.

For your information, I am a single white male Army battalion operations officer, thirty-nine years old, no dependents. I have seventeen years of service in Korea, Europe, the Balkans and the US, to include time in the 2nd Infantry, 101st Air Assault, and 1st Armored Divisions. I also served as an observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and have instructed at West Point and the Aviation Officer Basic Course.

1. In my opinion, Army basic training is no longer a rite of passage. I cannot write with any authority on what occurs there, but weekly I receive the graduates. New soldiers are increasingly undisciplined, rebellious, and more concerned with their rights than their responsibilities. They often have little sense of teamwork or duty. My suspicion is that the "Army of One" mentality (in place long before the phrase was coined) is teaching them to ask not what they can do for their country, but what their country can do for them. Army recruiting strategy with its offers of money and more money is where this pathology begins.

Since there is apparently little quality control in basic training, active units receive, relatively unmodified, the raw product of American Society. I would prefer to see

(A) Recruiting based on the Marine model, because one gets what one asks for. The USMC asks for young men who wish to serve their nation and challenge themselves, while the Army asks for people who want money.

(B) Even if it means a smaller Army, I would prefer to see some quality control in basic training. In short, if recruits do not meet rigid standards of ethics, behavior, and performance, they should not be allowed into the service, period.

(C) Basic training that is a tradition based and challenging rite of passage. Bottom line: Recruits must join the Army, not the other way around.

2. I do not agree that soldiers identify with the Army as the report contends. Junior officers and soldiers identify with their small units, and senior officers and NCOs with their staffs (commanders and command sergeants major excepted). I believe that the importance of service identity is overstated, and that now is the time to transition to one service.

The payoff in procurement and standardization would be immense, without damaging unit cohesion. The other side of the coin, however, is that morale is so poor and unit cohesion at the lower levels so weak due to years of over commitment, under resourcing, micromanagement, and social engineering, that morale needs some intensive shoring up. I believe there are some ways to do this:

(A) Give us back our officer and NCO clubs. They may not be efficient, but they are effective in building esprit de corps and strengthening the ever-weakening line between the ranks.

(B) Power down. Our company commanders are no longer that, but instead

"company managers." Let's get brigade commanders and division commanding generals out of company physical training programs, and instead focused on directing their staffs to do more than crank out endless taskings which do not support battalion essential combat tasks.

(C) Allow units to develop and propagate unit specific symbols and insignia at the battalion level.

(D) Recruit regionally and field units on the now defunct COHORT model.

(E) Organize in multifunctional regiments on the USMC model.

3. I do not believe as the report contends that we have demonstrated military prowess in Desert Storm, Bosnia, or Kosovo. The report did not mention Somalia in this vein, a conflict that demonstrates how bad things can get when we face a resolute enemy. Therefore, the "lessons of success" learned in the Balkans and Desert Storm need some perspective.

What we have demonstrated is that because we have a lot of money, we can overcome an enemy that does not fight, or is more concerned with criminal activities than military engagements. I believe that, should we face a resolute enemy in open combat, the results would be catastrophic (Bunker Hill, Bull Run, Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, Vietnam, Somalia).

America, between its major wars, has a long history of demanding efficiency rather than effectiveness from its Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces are not IBM or Microsoft, nor are they the Department of Interior or Bureau of Weight and Measures.

Efficiency rather than effectiveness in peacetime translates to heavy casualties in the opening weeks of the next real conflict.

4. I was interested in the comment of the report that "military culture by definition must differ significantly from civil culture in a democratic society." I could not agree more, which is why I am perplexed at the Herculean efforts in the last ten years to civilianize the military.

5. Beware the fidelity of survey data. The atmosphere of fear in the Army is impossible to overstate. Years of conditioning to zero-defects and fear of offending have resulted in answers to survey questions that will be generally lukewarm at worst. More importantly, survey data is manipulated by the chain of command. While I was in Kosovo, yet another of a seemingly endless line of "Blue Ribbon Panels" traveled there to sound a group of captains reference retention. Prior to the arrival of the panel, the senior officers dictated that no maintenance or headquarters company commanders would participate, knowing that these are the most thankless command positions. Additionally, the senior officers further weeded by name the remaining line commanders.

The best survey or interview is the one in which the interviewee does not realize he

is being interviewed. If you want to know what the Army is thinking, just listen to soldiers converse in bars. Pay particular attention to junior NCOs and officers.

6. Because captain retention is so poor, Department of the Army has chosen to make captains from lieutenants at three years of service. Additionally, the selection rate for captain was this year 99%. This decision is typical of the kind of shortsighted decision making common at senior levels. The long-term result is incompetent captains, whose poor leadership creates disgruntled soldiers and NCOs who resign or do not reenlist. The captains themselves, frustrated that they cannot perform as expected, will also resign as soon as they can.

Recommend fewer officers of higher quality. If this means a smaller Army, so be it.

7. Casualty and risk aversion, euphemized in the Army as "force protection," have expanded beyond all logical proportion. In Kosovo, I actually heard a brigade commander say "The worst thing we can do here is discharge a weapon." I tend to take the more traditional view that the worst thing a military force can do is fail in its mission.

8. Commanders and other leaders within the Army are daily faced with the following conundrum: Follow the regulations, or accomplish the mission. Our penchant for risk aversion and micromanagement has done away with judgment, while regulations reproduce themselves at an alarming rate. The cynicism and stress on integrity the above conundrum creates is a huge burden.

One of the reasons junior officers join the Army is for the opportunity to exercise their judgment. If platoon leaders are not allowed to do this, why have them? Put a pile of regulations in their chairs. Soldiers requiring management can consult the regulations, judgment no longer required.

9. "Proper" race and gender relations, currently propagated in the Army by the much despised and canned "Consideration of Others" program, has guaranteed the poorest possible social climate. We have taught a generation of soldiers to see themselves not primarily as soldiers, but as African-Americans who happen to be soldiers, or females who happen to be soldiers. Worse yet, we have taught them not to be polite and respectful, but instead to carry chips on their shoulders, searching for someone to offend them. The result in the loss of unit cohesion has been devastating as soldiers are isolated in social fear. Additionally, the never-ending stream of "African-American Months" and "Asian-Pacific American Months" has done nothing more but accentuate differences. Recommend we have "American Soldier Year" and be done with it. The self-fulfilling prophecies created by racial and gender hypersensitivity are assisting in the destruction of morale.

10. Technology, as useful as it is, has helped to create slaves to perfection and intense micromanagers. The man-hours wasted on just the right color for PowerPoint presentations number in the millions, while subordinate commands

await the "perfect" operations order. Junior officers watch senior officers slave away on presentations for generals and ask themselves "Do I want to be doing that in three years?" Perhaps if the generals would refuse to accept this kind of waste, the colonels would follow suit. Additionally, nobody wants a corps commander in their tank or cockpit with them. Recommend we stop the search for real time terrestrial omniscience at the higher levels, and start trusting our subordinates again.

Human nature dictates that what can be known will be known. The question is, just who needs to know it? Does the theater commander really need a monthly report on venereal disease cases in platoon X? I think not, but he gets one by name and social security number.

11. We have entered an interesting and twisted period in military sociology when abuse is not defined by the institution or the senior, but rather by the subordinate. The ramifications of this environment are self-evident. Schofield's venerated definition of discipline is often quoted to justify this position: "The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment." Nowhere in this statement does Schofield indicate that the private soldier should define "harsh and tyrannical."

12. The Army has long been wedded to what I have come to think of as the "Chase your tail" method of training. As we move from execution to execution, the training of subordinates suffers. We do so much so rapidly that little is done correctly. We "check the block" and move on to the next task. I recently saw a corps G-3's annual training calendar, of which he was exceedingly proud. Not a block of empty space on it. When then, do the division, brigade, battalion, and company commanders, not to mention platoon leaders and NCOs, have time to train as they wish? Either the Corps G-3 knows every platoon's training needs better than platoon leaders, or there is something very wrong. Here in USAREUR my battalion requires 397 days to meet the annual training requirements placed on us by higher headquarters.

Simultaneously, my battalion services endless garrison support taskings and those of higher headquarters to resource someone else's training. Meanwhile, company commanders are chided by general officers for not giving their soldiers predictability. One does not know whether to laugh or cry.

The solution for this problem is simple...slow down. We can do a few things very well or we can do a great many things poorly. There is no middle ground. Long ago the military developed the concept of main and supporting efforts, as well as mission essential tasks. If we would employ these concepts, everything would not be a priority, and unit focus would not shift from day to day. Movement is not necessarily progress, nor is constant reorganization.

13. The study made much of married soldiers and soldiers with dependents,

asserting that these are stabilizing influences. Apparently no one interviewed any company commander known to me, some of whom spend upwards of half their time dealing with family abuse, teens in trouble, dependent related alcohol and drug problems, unwed pregnant soldiers, single soldiers who have no plans to care for their children in the event they deploy, etc., etc. I remember several years ago a USMC general suggesting that junior Marines should not be married. He was pilloried in the press, but I think he was correct. Recommend that the services accept no first term married soldiers, and that all unwed pregnancies be immediately discharged.

14. Soldiers generally are not opposed to deployments. The problem lies in the perceived value of the deployment. If I am to ask my soldiers to separate from their dependents for six months once every two years, I must give them a good reason to do so. Police work in Kosovo is not what I consider worthy of that kind of sacrifice. We do more, but it is meaningless. I cannot overstate the cynicism that this situation creates.

15. I similarly cannot stress enough the importance of swift, bold decisions to solve these problems, or at least to acknowledge them. I am aware that the Army is a large organization averse to change. I am similarly aware, however, that many of these problems were apparent ten years ago. Executive summary after executive summary, panel after panel, committee after committee, task force after task force, with no tangible results other than new headgear (make no mistake, even the lowliest private sees that pitiful measure for what it is).

Soldiers have lost patience. Having taught at West Point, I maintain an active correspondence with dozens of junior officers I met there. I do not know one who is planning on staying in the army past his initial commitment. Company commanders are refusing second commands, and captains are refusing first commands in favor of resignation. Lieutenant colonels and colonels are also refusing commands. These actions were very rare...almost unthinkable ten years ago, yet they are all around us today. We have a problem that requires serious effort.

Our greatest threat is not criminals in Kosovo, weapons of mass destruction, or Osama Bin Laden. Our enemy is domestic: rock bottom morale. We wonder which of two unpalatable situations we face...either the senior leadership does not recognize the low morale, or they do recognize it and do not care. In my opinion, anything we do which distracts or keeps us from solving the morale problem is tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

16. The report repeatedly suggests that military service is not fun anymore. There is no truer statement. Most everything we had that made the service fun has been taken away from us. The net result of the loss of fun or job satisfaction is a "workaday" attitude. I see in myself and in more and more officers a view of my service as just a job, rather than a way of life. I never thought I would see it that

way, and was surprised and saddened when I did. The Army I joined is not the Army I am in, and I believe I am betrayed. Idealism has met reality, and those two concepts are too far removed from one another.

I am aware that as I have written, my comments have become increasingly emotional and urgent. I have allowed this to happen, and you receive this letter without edit. Those of us who live in this environment day in and day out are extremely frustrated, and I wanted you to read that frustration, unvarnished.

Finally, one of the "things" that frustrates me most is the lack of survey feedback. Armies of lab coated technicians and sociologists sally forth from Washington annually to poke us, prod us, and test us. As they snap closed their briefcases, they always promise us feedback. In seventeen years, I have seen feedback twice, once when Prof. C. Moskos provided me some directly at my request, and once when I saw your report a few days ago, purely by accident. The average soldier does not demand immediate solutions. He does, however, harbor the hope that his senior leadership recognizes problems and takes positive, effective action to solve them.

Thank you for your time, patience, and study.

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Gingrich**

352

Here is an old Gingrich item on Peacekeeping as a Doctrine. Do you know what has happened in the intermittent period?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604D04s

Attach: *Gingrich email 4.16.03 - Peacekeeping as Doctrine*

Please respond by:

6/21

SecDef -

JAA 6/8

- The Army's Peacekeeping Center did not close*
- It stayed open, not under the Army War College, but under the U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC)*
- TRADOC is working closely w/ JFCOM concerning stability operations doctrine — and Next is involved/advising.*

6 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/2689 **OSD 15870-04**

6/8

From Newt Gingrich
cc Duran
Craddock
Wolfowitz

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Thursday, April 17, 2003 1:22 PM

To: (b)(6); Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil

Cc: jaymie.durnan@osd.pentagon.mil; damicorj@js.pentagon.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil;
glambastiani@jfc.com.mil

Subject: peace keeping as a doctrine
for secdef,depsecdef
from newt 4/16/03



peacekeeping as a doctrine

the following article about closing the Army's center for peacekeeping doctrine does raise the question who should be studying this and who should be developing the doctrine for peacekeeping.

It is obvious that we are going to continue to do peacekeeping. Some agency should own the doctrine development for this activity.

newt
Chicago Tribune
April 15, 2003

Army Institute To Be Shut Down

Critics hit loss of training center for peacekeeping

By Douglas Holt, Tribune staff reporter

WASHINGTON -- Even as the U.S. military grapples with the largest peacekeeping effort in a generation, the Army is shutting down its only institute devoted to such operations, prompting protests from inside and outside the Pentagon.

Since its creation in 1993 at the Army War College, the Peacekeeping Institute has struggled against a military culture that sees itself as a war-fighting machine that should leave peacekeeping to others.

But in a sign that peacekeeping skills are useful in modern conflicts, the institute's former director, Col. George Oliver, has been deployed overseas to work with the Pentagon-led reconstruction effort of Iraq.

In a March 14 memo obtained by the Tribune, Oliver pleaded with Army Secretary Thomas White to keep the center open, telling him he "made a mistake" by ordering its closing along with other staff cutbacks.

The Peacekeeping Institute, in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., will close Oct. 1. A Jan. 30

Army news release said its functions and mission will be absorbed at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Ft. Monroe, Va.

A spokesman for the training command, however, said Monday that it has no plans to accept the institute's charge.

"I can tell you that no functions from the Peacekeeping Institute are being transferred to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, nor are they being transferred to TRADOC," said spokesman Harvey Perritt.

Rumsfeld supports closing

Lt. Col. Gary Keck, a Pentagon spokesman, said that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld supports closing the institute. He added, however, that the decision to close the institute was the Army's.

Oliver, in his letter written five days before the war in Iraq began, said: "When the announcement came that the Institute would close, no one thought it was a good idea.

"Most felt that such an institute was needed more now than when it was formed in 1993. With the war on terrorism going on in Afghanistan and the threat of war looming in Iraq, the goal of winning the war could be overshadowed by losing the peace. PKI personnel are currently involved in efforts to 'win the peace' in both Afghanistan and Iraq," Oliver wrote.

An Army spokesman denied that the shutdown signals any reduction in the importance placed on peacekeeping but said it is emblematic of the "hard choices we have to make" in operating in as efficient a manner as possible.

Out of a \$81 billion annual Army budget, the Peacekeeping Institute ran on \$200,000 a year.

Experts said that it sends the wrong signal at a critical time in Iraq but that the move fits with the Bush administration's dislike of peacekeeping missions.

'It does not make sense'

"It does not make sense," said David Segal, director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland.

But Segal said the Army has performed peacekeeping missions grudgingly, whether in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or after Hurricane Andrew.

As a candidate, Bush voiced disagreement with then-Vice President Al Gore on the

use of troops for peacekeeping. "He believes in nation building," Bush said. "I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place."

After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, administration officials built a case for a pre-emptive war in Iraq to remove a threatening regime and pave the way for democracy. The administration also said the war could be managed with such precision that the Iraqi people would inherit a relatively intact country.

So far, the military has fared better at fighting than civil order. While troops immediately secured oil fields to protect them from sabotage, they were unable to protect civilian assets such as hospitals, banks and the national museum from looting.

Some experts speculate the current difficulties might reinforce the military's reluctance to take on the task of dealing with the aftermath of war.

"This may be a convenient way to carry out an agenda that I think was clear from the campaign rhetoric of this administration, which was: 'We don't do peacekeeping. We don't do nation building. We don't escort kids to school,'" said William Durch, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a research institute in Washington.

In the letter to Army officials, Oliver said Iraq likely will need military peacekeepers.

"The nature of security in the world today [and tomorrow] demands a large pool of well-trained professional peacekeepers," he wrote. "Today over 80 nations have peacekeeping centers, institutes and organizations dedicated to this emerging field. With PKI's closure, the United States military will be devoid of any such organizations."

72

file

801

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 6, 2004
 SUBJECT:

Why don't you and Pete take a look at this list of general officers that we've got over in Iraq. It is hard for me to believe that this makes sense.

Why don't we see if we can't manage it better?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060604D.06ts

Attach: GO List for Multi-National Force

Please respond by: 6/25

6 JUN 04

OSD 15871-04

	OST	LTG David H. Petraeus	Commanding General (Inbound)	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
	OST	BG Andrew MacKay (CAN)	CPATT	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
	CPA	LTG(Ret) Jeffrey Oster	CPA Exec		CPA Building, APO AE 09315
	CPA	COL(P) Joseph Schroedel	Deputy Commander, Gulf Region Division, CPA	USA	
14	CPA	BG Stephen M. Seay	US Dep to Director CPA IRAQ	USA	
15	ISG	MG Keith Dayton	ISG	USA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
16	CPA	BG Usher	CPA	USA	
	Other General Officers				
17	GRD	MG Ronald Johnson	CG, USACE (Med-Evac'd)	USA	CPA Building, APO AE 09315
	C3, MNF-I	BG Janos Isaszegi (Departed; Italy Fill inbound)	Dep C3	COA	Multi-National Force Iraq APO AE 09342
18	Cmd Grp, MNC-I	BG Richard Formica	C3 (Effects)	USA	Multi-National Corps Iraq APO AE 09342
	Division MSCs				
19	1st Infantry Division	MG John R. Batiste	Commanding General	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
20		BG Steve Mundt	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
21		BG John Morgan	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Infantry Division APO AE 09392
22	1st Armored Division	MG Martin Dempsey	Commanding General	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
23		BG Mark Hertling	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
24		BG Curtis Scaparrotti	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	1st Armored Division, Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3054
25	1st Cavalry Division	MG Peter W. Chiarelli	Commanding General	USA	1st Cavalry Division APO AE 09344
26		BG Jeffery W. Hammond	Assistant Division Commander (S)	USA	1st Cavalry Division APO AE 09344
		COL(P) Mike Jones	Assistant Division Commander (M)	USA	

	13th COSCOM	COL(P) James Chambers	Commander	USA	13 COSCOM APO AE 09391
27	Cmd Grp, MNF-I	BG Carter Ham	MND-North CDR	USA	TF Olympia APO AE 09342
28		BG Timothy J. Wright	CG, Multinational Task Force North, 88th Infantry Division (Forward)	USA	
29	I MEF	LTGen James T. Conway	Commanding General	USMC	I Marine Expeditionary Force
30		MajGen Keith Stalder	Deputy Commanding General	USMC	I Marine Expeditionary Force
31	1st MARDIV	MajGen James Mattis	Commanding General	USMC	1st Marine Division
32		BrigGen John F. Kelly	Deputy Commanding General	USMC	1st Marine Division
33	1st FSSG	BrigGen Richard Kramlich	Commanding General	USMC	1st Force Service Support Group
34	3d MAW	MajGen James Amos	Commanding General	USMC	3d Marine Aircraft Wing
	Separates				
35	2d Med Bde	BG James F. Reynolds	Commander	USA	2d Med Bde APO AE 09342
36	ACCE	BG Robert P. Steel	ACCE	USAF	
37	Data Masked	BG Marke E. Gibson	DATA MASKED	USAF	

SJS No: 04-03939	Date/Time: 06/08/2004 17:08	SJS Date Changed: 06/14/2004 17:03	CJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
To Chief AD: <input type="text"/>	Editor: <input type="text"/>	Red Tag: <input type="checkbox"/>	Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
VCJCS Has Seen: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
Subject: SF-801/ GENERAL OFFICERS IN IRAQ			
Summary: MEMO FROM THE SECDEF TO CJCS, CC TO DEPSECDEF. "WHY DON'T YOU AND PETE TAKE A LOOK AT THIS LIST OF GENERAL OFFICERS THAT WE'VE GOT OVER IN IRAQ. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT THIS MAKES SENSE. WHY....."			
Addressee: <input type="text"/>		Keyword: RUMSFELD	
How Referred: CJCS REPLY			
Distribution: GFO, OCJCS/LC		Assignment:	
Directorate: GFO		J Division: GFO	
Action Officer: GNELZI, THOMAS D, LTCOL		AO Phone: (b)(6)	
Originator Data			
Originator: OSD/SD		Origination Date: 06/06/2004	
Originator No.: SF 060604D.06TS		Originator Phone: <input type="text"/>	
Originator Name: RUMSFELD			
Suspense Data			
Current SJS Suspense: <input type="text"/>	Originally: 06/24/2004	Completion Date	
Current J Suspense: <input type="text"/>	Originally: 06/24/2004	Time: <input type="text"/>	Chgs: <input type="checkbox"/>
Current Orig. Suspense: <input type="text"/>	Originally: 06/25/2004	Date Completed: 06/14/2004	Signed: <input type="checkbox"/>
Changes: <input type="checkbox"/>		Who: SHEL/DNA	
		How Completed: BEING ANSWERED UNDER 04-03864	
Special Instructions: <input type="text"/>			

04-03864



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1844-04
15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

15/6/15

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

TAB A

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Richard Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: Locations

CJCS HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2004

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.07

Please respond by: _____

6/10

04 JUN 05 PM 1:34

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/26906

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Multi-National Force - Iraq

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-AirCmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	MajGen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	MajGen(S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostick arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	

CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North, 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wright	Mosul, Iraq	

DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	

Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
-----------------------	---	-----	-----------	---------------	-------------------------------------

Multi-National Corps - Iraq

Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	
C3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
C7	7	USA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, I MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, I MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Tagaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

OSAMOD

Position Title	Grade	Service	Incumbent Name	Location	Remarks
Spl Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodel	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovic	8 April 2004

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/26909

6/22
1257

720

In reply refer to EF-9822 & 04/007757-ES

EF-9822

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

p.s.
The Ambassador to Singapore says there is a serious disconnect between the Policy shop and the S&T DSCC folks. He thinks we ought to be able to do better by Singapore than we are doing.

Do you know anything about it? Please look into it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604B.07ts

Please respond by: _____ *6/25*

TO See Def

Paul Butler

6/23

6/24

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nasenzo
6/24

OSD 15872-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26910

08-06-04 15:24 IN

Singapore

627404



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

DDG/24

DepSecDef
USD(P) *[Signature]* (P) 4/21
I# 04/007757-ES

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs *[Signature]* 18 JUN 2004
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Comments by U.S. Ambassador to Singapore

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on comments that Ambassador Lavin made regarding "S&T DSCC". Amb Lavin meant to refer to ISA/DSCA, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees security cooperation and foreign military sales.
- I spoke with Amb Lavin, who clarified that:
 - He did not mean to imply there was a serious disconnect between Policy and DSCA (which, as I reminded him, is part of Policy); and
 - He advocated giving "Singapore a piece of candy each year" to be symbolic of and to incentivize our close bilateral relationship, citing the early release of the Longbow as an example of a case coordinated through and timed by Policy.
 - He cited the AIM-9X as something we should offer Singapore to enhance the F-15 package in an upcoming fighter competition with Eurofighter and Rafale.
- My response and recommended position on this issue are:
 - The system governing the transfer of arms for Singapore is cumbersome, but the cases of AMRAAM and Longbow showed that we could make the system work for a priority country like Singapore.
 - We should do our best to expedite the process in the future, starting with the AIM-9X/F-15 case.

Attachments:

Tab 1: SecDef question

Tab 2: Coordination

Prepared by: Elizabeth Phu, ISA/AP, (b)(6)



COORDINATION

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA
(Peter C.W. Flory)

TDY

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, ISA/AP
(Richard Lawless)

APL RPL 10 Jan

Principal Director, ISA/AP
(John Allen)

A 10 Jan

Director, Middle East, Asia, North Africa/DSCA
(Ed Ross)

Copy provided



June 9, 2004

TO: The Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Document and E-mail Request

USAT

I know you are aware of the request by the Senate Armed Services Committee and by Senator McCain for a series of documents and e-mails relating to the Boeing tanker-lease proposal.

The Department sent the attached letter to Senator Warner, which he has shown to Senator McCain. It is my understanding that Senator McCain was dissatisfied with our proposal and is considering asking for the Senate Armed Services Committee or the Senate Commerce Committee to subpoena the Department of Defense to produce the documents and e-mails Senator McCain requested in his letter, which I have also attached.

My plan is to be as cooperative as we can be. Senator McCain is holding up a number of the President's DoD nominations. It is increasingly difficult to run the Department with so many key open positions, and particularly during a war.

The only reason I would not be fully cooperative is if the President decided it was a matter of privilege. I am at the point where I believe the interests of the Department and, absent advice to the contrary, the interests of the Administration are that we provide these materials to the Committee. Please let me know if you agree; and, if not, which documents the President wishes to withhold.

Please let me know if it is appropriate for me to proceed in a manner that is consistent with what I see as the interest of the Department of Defense and, I believe, the interest of the Administration.

Sincerely,

Attachments a/s

DHR:dh
060704-7

hounob
9 Jun 04

OSD 15873-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26913

C6/10

June 8, 2004

I-04/007774

EF-9832

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: More Coalition Forces

Are we going to get the new Iraqi government to ask for more Coalition forces?

I think we ought to do it, and we ought to do it formally. We ought to get the State Department to ask them to do it, and we ought to ask them to do it when our team goes out there.

We ought to want more Coalition forces, so we can relieve the pressure on our forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-18

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

→SD 6/9/04 [Signature] 6/11/04

We are working this matter in three ways:

1. I'll reinforce this message with CPA (Bremer).
2. We'll push in the Coalition Working Group, an interagency group that meets daily and gets diplomatic cables and other efforts done.
3. DSD will raise with Iraqis on his trip.

OSD 15874-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26914

TEN 6/10

Doug Feith

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT: **SecDef Correspondence**

312

Find out if I am sending a letter to the family of every person who was killed since I have been Secretary of Defense and if I am sending a letter to everyone who retires after 20 or 25 years.

I would like to see the letters if they are being sent and if not, I would like to start doing it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.34

Please respond by: 6/14

15 Jun 04

OSD 15875-04

4:29 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT: **Economic Points**

Why don't you circulate this economic information around to the inter-agency.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.43

Attach: Economic Points/Jeffery email 5/27/04

Please respond by: _____ *6/12*

JRM

OSD 15882-04

19 Jun 04

11-L-0559/OSD/26916

1. 15/27

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: Jeffery, Reuben CPA [Reuben.Jeffery@osd.mil]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Helmick, Frank BG OSD; Ganyard, Stephen COL OSD
Cc: Craddock, John J Lt Gen OSD; Butler, Paul CIV OSD
Subject: FW: Economic Points

U

fyi-some good news. rj

-----Original Message-----

From: Fleischer, Michael Mr. (CIV) [mailto:fleischerm@orha.centcom.mil]
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2004 1:00 PM
To: Jeffery, Reuben CPA
Subject: Economic Points

Although you'd never know it, the Iraqi economy has been improving steadily for months.

- Unemployment, put at over 60% in the aftermath of the war, had dropped by early 2004 to about 28%. A recent survey in some of the big cities indicates that fewer than 10% of households have no one working. Some of the employment gain is related to government spending but much stems from private enterprise, largely Iraqi or Iraqi expatriates. It is not clear how the events of recent weeks have affected the economy's generation of jobs, but there is reason to think that job creation has fundamental strength and will continue
- A consumer led expansion has been driving the economy almost since war's end. At first, consumers snapped up goods like satellite dishes. Then came consumer appliances and cars. Now, the range of goods has expanded to include toys, bicycles, motor scooters, home and office furniture, and, increasingly, luxury items. On one block in Karradah there is a store selling elegant clocks and lamps of all kinds. There is no sign that consumer demand is flagging.
- Businesses too are spending. Factory managers are hiring. Shop owners are renovating their stores and new commercial buildings are rising from the ground up. This business investment is being fueled by an entrepreneurial community, including many wealthy exiles, who see opportunity on Iraq's near horizon. The return of the exiles, with their money, is especially encouraging. Their confidence, borne of a more intuitively accurate sense of ground truth in Iraq than we can have, is a solid indicator of hope for the future.
- The macro-economic forces in Iraq are favorable. The bulk of the reconstruction spending has not yet rolled into the economy. Its effect will be enormous and positive. Six months from now we will be talking about shortages of skilled Iraqi labor and in 18 months most every Iraqi who wants a job will have one. As reconstruction efforts tail off over time, foreign investment will pick up the slack. Even in the face of uncertain security, seminars and presentations to international firms with an interest in Iraq continue to be full.
- The coalition continues to work with a large number of Iraqis with ambitious business ideas. These people almost never mention the issues in Najaf, Karbala, and Kufa, and they never mention Abu Ghraib. Rather, they speak of expanding markets and Iraq's future role in the world or regional economy. They truly demonstrate that in most parts of the country, the doors are open for business.
- The CPA itself continues to work every day with Iraqi counterparts dedicated to all aspects of Iraq's new civil society: rebuilding its power and water systems, performances by the Iraqi Symphony, launching housing construction projects, making micro-loans (including the first in the Fallujah area). Events have the past two months have been distressing but they have not stopped the Iraq's advance toward a better future.

Reuben – let me know if this isn't what you were looking for and I will go back at it.

Regards,

5/27/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/26917



7:05 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: **9/11 Commission**

F

Keep me posted on how we are going to get the 9/11 Commission thing turned around. Should we start meeting with some of those Commissioners again individually? We can't let it go forward like that.

Thanks.

0005

DHR/azn
060204.01

Please respond by: 6/12

29 June 04

OSD 15884-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26918

9:34 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: **Istanbul Summit**

For the Istanbul Summit, has the United States been asked to provide any security with respect to the air cover? I am surprised if we haven't, given the fact that the effort we made in Prague was so necessary. I am surprised it is not necessary for Istanbul. What's the story?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.13

NATO 337

6/10

Please respond by: _____

2 June 04

OSD 15886-04



72
 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



13 11 05

ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

October 8, 2004; 4:15 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 8 Oct 04

 (Signature and Date)

210(3+4)

SUBJECT: Longer Tours—and Longer Tenure—SNOWFLAKE

- You asked for a proposal initiating action on your desire that senior officers serve longer tours (Tab B).
- I believe three steps will accomplish your objective:
 1. Announce that you expect most four-star officers to serve at least four years in their posts (Tab C lists four-star posts, and average tenure over the past decade).
 2. Confer with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the three-star posts that should likewise carry a tenure of three or four years, with the balance assumed to be two-year tours (Tab D lists three-star posts, nominating as four year candidates those that are normally "capstone" posts—i.e., last post of career).
 3. Invite the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to provide you with a similar list for one and two-star officers, for your review and approval.
- This is a simple approach, to begin changing our culture. Actual tours may vary somewhat from the new norms—and you may want some to be of intermediate length. As such a system is implemented, it will be critical to encourage prompt retirement of those not advancing, and to assure those staying longer will be properly compensated. (The latter requires statutory change and will require your personal backing. We have already failed twice to persuade Congress.)
- Memoranda to initiate this action are attached for your consideration.

8 Oct 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum to the Service Secretaries and CJCS at Tab A.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Hebert, (b)(6)

20 SEP 04



TAB

A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEFS OF SERVICES**

SUBJECT: Expectations for the Tenure of Senior Officers

Senior officers must enjoy sufficient tenure in their posts to be effective. They must have sufficient time to size up what is to be accomplished, to develop the appropriate plans to put those plans into effect, and to see them through to success.

Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest that the average time in post for our flag officers is frequently less than two years. This is too short.

As we plan for the future, we should assume that those confirmed for a four-star post will typically serve at least four years in that position. This should likewise be the expectation for several of our three-star posts, and I will be meeting with you to discuss the posts where longer tenure could be meritorious. A list of three-star billets with recent tour averages is provided to aid in this review.

I invite you to provide me, in advance of our meeting, but no later than November 1, 2004, your recommendations on tenure length for the one and two-star posts in your domain. I will ask the Chairman and Combatant Commanders for their recommendations on joint positions.

cc: CJCS



11-L-0559/OSD/26922



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Tenure of Senior Officers in Joint Assignments

We must give senior officers assigned to joint posts sufficient tenure to be effective. Regrettably, the data I've seen suggest the average is often less than two years. For some operational posts this may be acceptable. But in other cases this will not be enough time to size up the situation, decide what must be accomplished, and see the plans through to success.

In consultation with the Combatant Commanders, I would like your recommendations on the tenure we should expect for those officers occupying joint assignments in the grades of O7 through O9. I look forward to discussing these recommendations with you at your earliest convenience.

cc: Combatant Commanders



11-L-0559/OSD/26923

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
(Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency)	Joint/External			3
(Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center (Cdr, Land North)	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command				3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	24	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	47		3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
(Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force)				

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions		Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Title	Service			
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Amy/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	22	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	20	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific: commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistic, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH				

11-L-0559/OSD/26926

*Statutory Tour Length

TAB

B

9/21/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

OFFICE OF
SECURITY
SEP 19 11:00:05

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss
091304-25

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Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

TAB

C

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant, Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

*Statutory Tour Length

TAB

D

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center [Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe [Dep Cdr, Land North]	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

11-L-0559/OSD/26933

*Statutory Tour Length

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps				4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			2

11-L-0559/OSD/26934

*Statutory Tour Length

9/21/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 20 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Two Major Initiatives

SEP 21 10 00 AM '04
SEP 21 10 00 AM '04

I plan to put forth a major initiative with respect to longer tours for people and, for those that are successful, somewhat longer service.

I am also going to put forth a major initiative for Standing Joint Headquarters, so that when we have to fight a next war, we will have the headquarters set up, and won't end up with the headquarters half-filled when the war is over. I have been pushing this for three years, but the resistance is powerful.

210 (344)

We need to get both of them done. Please get back to me with proposals.

Thanks.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Joint Manning Timeline (2 pages)

DHR:ss
091304-25

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

doj sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-10 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Commander, US Central Command	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	37	3.1	4
Commander, US European Command	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Commander, US Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	29	2.4	4
Commander, US Northern Command	Joint/External			4
Commander, US Pacific Command	Joint/External	33	2.8	4
Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Commander, US Southern Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	4
Commander, US Special Operations Command	Joint/External	34	2.8	4
Commander, US Strategic Command	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Commander, US Transportation Command	Joint/External	33	2.7	4
Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	48	4.0	2*
Vice Chairman of the JCS	Joint/External	35	2.9	2*
Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	36	3.0	4*
Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	25	2.1	4
Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	27	2.2	4
Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	34	2.8	4
Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	26	2.2	4
Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	24	2.0	4
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	Air Force	25	2.1	3
Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command	Army	30	2.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Forces Command	Army	18	1.5	4
Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	36	3.0	4
Chief of Staff, USA	Army	49	4.1	4
Commanding General, USA Europe and Seventh Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Vice Chief of Staff, USA	Army	20	1.7	3
Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	48	4.0	4
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps	Marine Corps	25	2.0	3
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (SEA-08)	Navy	72	6.0	8*
Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	42	3.5	4*
Commander, US Atlantic Fleet	Navy	25	2.1	4
Commander, US Naval Forces, Europe	Navy	30	2.5	4
Commander, US Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	4
Vice Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	22	1.8	3

*Statutory Tour Length

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Chief, National Guard Bureau	Army/AF			4
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve	Marine Corps	21	1.7	4
Deputy Commandant, for Programs and Resources, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.2	4
Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	24	2.0	4
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific; and Commander, Marine Corps Bases Pacific	Marine Corps	21	1.7	3
Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Bases-Atlantic; Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe; and Commander, United States Marine Corps Forces, Southern Command	Marine Corps	26	2.1	3
Deputy Commandant, for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	32	2.7	3
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Marine Corps	21	1.8	3
Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Marine Corps	27	2.3	2
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force	Marine Corps	21	1.7	2
Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Striking Force Atlantic	Marine Corps	19	1.6	2
Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Commander, Marine Corps Bases, Japan; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan	Marine Corps	18	1.5	2
Superintendent, United States Naval Academy	Navy	39	3.3	5
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command	Navy	40	3.3	4
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command	Navy			4
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command	Navy	41	3.4	4
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General	Navy			4
Chief of Naval Reserve	Navy	43	3.5	4*
Commander, Military Sealift Command	Navy	25	2.1	3
Commander, Naval Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	29	2.4	3
Commander Naval Air Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Education and Training Command	Navy			3
Inspector General, Department of the Navy	Navy	32	2.7	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Atlantic Fleet	Navy	38	3.2	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	30	2.5	3
President, Naval War College	Navy	43	3.6	3
Director for Material Readiness and Logistics, N4, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	32	2.7	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, N1, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, Naval Personnel	Navy	32	2.7	3
Director of Naval Intelligence, N2	Navy			3
Commander Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic	Navy	31	2.6	3
Commander, Naval Surface Force, United States Pacific Fleet	Navy	28	2.3	3
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	17	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, N8, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	23	1.9	2
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, N6/N7, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (pending)	Navy	23	1.9	2
Director, Navy Staff, N09B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Navy	19	1.6	2
Commander, SECOND Fleet	Navy	22	1.8	2
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	Navy	23	1.9	2
Commander, SIXTH Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe	Navy	20	1.6	2
Commander, THIRD Fleet	Navy	28	2.4	2
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, United States Atlantic Fleet/Fleet Forces Command	Navy	15	1.3	2
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command and Commander, FIFTH Fleet	Navy			

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff	Joint/External	21	1.8	4
DUSD for Military Personnel Policy	Joint/External	22	1.8	3
Principal Deputy Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			4
Director, Missile Defense Agency	Joint/External	14	1.2	4
Director, Defense Information System Agency and Manager, National Communications Systems	Joint/External	31	2.6	4
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	Joint/External	32	2.7	4
Director, Defense Logistics Agency	Joint/External	36	3.0	4
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	Joint/External	40	3.3	4
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency	Joint/External	28	2.4	4
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service	Joint/External	42	3.5	4
Chief of Staff, United States European Command	Joint/External	29	2.5	4
Director for Logistics, J-4, Joint Staff	Joint/External	29	2.4	3
Director of Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems, J-6, Joint Staff	Joint/External	23	1.9	3
United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee	Joint/External	33	2.8	3
President, National Defense University	Joint/External	34	2.8	3
Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency	Joint/External			3
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Director, Joint Staff	Joint/External	16	1.3	2
Director for Operations, J-3, Joint Staff	Joint/External	22	1.8	2
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Joint Staff	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff, United States Central Command	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, United States Joint Forces Command	Joint/External	20	1.7	2
Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command/Vice Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	Joint/External			2
Deputy Commander, United States Pacific Command	Joint/External	14	1.2	2
Deputy Commander, United States Special Operations Command	Joint/External	15	1.3	2
Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command	Joint/External	19	1.6	2
Deputy Commander, United States Transportation Command	Joint/External	27	2.2	2
Cdr, JSRC Center (Cdr, Land North)	Joint/External	18	1.5	2
Deputy Commander, Joint Sub Regional Command Center, Allied Command Europe (Dep Cdr, Land North)	Joint/External	37	3.1	2
Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense	Joint/External			2
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Deputy National Security Advisor	Joint/External			2
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Intelligence and Warfighting Support	Joint/External			2
Superintendent, United States Air Force Academy	Air Force	40	3.3	5
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	31	2.6	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	21	1.8	4
Surgeon General of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command	Air Force			4
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force	Air Force			4
Director, Air National Guard	Air Force	63	5.3	4
Commander, Air University	Air Force	33	2.8	4
The Inspector General of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Vice Commander, Air Education and Training Command	Air Force	36	3.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	20	1.7	3
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	26	2.2	3
Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	48	4.0	3
Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command	Air Force	24	2.0	3
Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Materiel Command	Air Force	47	3.9	3
Commander, Eighteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command	Air Force			3
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command	Air Force	30	2.5	3
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force	Air Force			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Warfighting Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force			2

Proposed Tour Lengths--O-9 Positions

Title	Service	Avg Time in Position (Mos)	Avg Time in Position (Yrs)	Tenure Proposed (Yrs)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	16	1.4	2
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Headquarters United States Air Force	Air Force	15	1.3	2
Vice Commander, Air Combat Command	Air Force	16	1.3	2
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Air Combat Command	Air Force	29	2.4	2
Commander, Ninth Air Force, Air Combat Command and Commander, United States Southern Command Air Forces	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command	Air Force	18	1.5	2
Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	21	1.8	2
Commander, United States Forces Japan and Commander, Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	28	2.3	2
Deputy Commander In Chief, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces	Air Force	27	2.3	2
Commander, Alaskan Command, United States Pacific Command; Commander Eleventh Air Force, Pacific Air Forces; and Commander, Alaskan North American Defense Region	Air Force	24	2.0	2
Vice Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	25	2.1	2
Commander, Allied Air Forces South and Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, United States Air Forces in Europe	Air Force	23	1.9	2
Superintendent, United States Military Academy	Army	60	5.0	5
Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers	Army			4
Commanding General, Third United States Army/Commander, United States Army Forces Central Command	Army	34	2.8	4
Commanding General, First United States Army	Army	27	2.2	4
Commanding General, Fifth United States Army	Army	26	2.2	4
Commanding General, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command	Army	47	3.9	4
Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center	Army	27	2.3	4
Deputy Commanding General, for Initial Entry Training/Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Medical Command/The Surgeon General, United States Army	Army			4
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific	Army	28	2.4	4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army	Army	25	2.1	4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army	Army			4
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy/Director, Army Acquisition Corps, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)	Army			4
Chief Information Officer/Deputy Chief of Staff, G6, United States Army	Army			4
Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	Army	24	2.0	4
Chief, Army Reserve	Army			4*
Director, Army National Guard	Army			4
Commanding General, Eighth United States Army and Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea	Army			3
Commanding General, I Corps and Fort Lewis	Army	30	2.5	3
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army	Army			3
Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of the Army	Army	31	2.6	3
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command	Army	9	0.8	2
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg	Army	28	2.4	3
Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood	Army	31	2.6	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Forces Command	Army			2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army	22	1.8	2
Commanding General, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	24	2.0	2
Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army	Army	23	1.9	2
Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command	Army	27	2.3	2
Director of the Army Staff	Army			2
Director, Futures Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command	Army			2
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army	Army	18	1.5	2

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AUSMIN

Done - 6/23

Australia

Please tell me what time the Australian Ministerial meetings are on July 7.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062204-4

.....
Please respond by _____

To SecDef

Attached is a draft itinerary I received from. I'm told Australians appreciated opportunity to host a dinner but declined and are happy with ending the Ministerial quickly.

Paul

Paul Butler
6/22

aaJuno4

OSD 15890-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26940

TW 6/23

6/22
1430

**DRAFT Agenda
AUSTRALIA-U.S. MINISTERIAL MEETING
JULY 7, 2004
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Wednesday, July 7, 2004

Session I: War on Terrorism (0900-1045)

- Welcoming Remarks (Secretary Powell) 0900-0905
- Iraq (U.S. lead) 0905-0940
- CT Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Australia lead) 0940-1005
- Nonproliferation 1005-1045
 - Proliferation Security Initiative (Australia lead)
 - President's NP initiatives (Global Partnership) (U.S. lead)
 - Iran/IAEA (U.S. lead)

Break (1045-1055)

Session II: North Asia (1100-1145)

- China-Taiwan (Australia lead) 1100-1120
- Korean Peninsula (U.S. lead) 1120-1145

Working Lunch (1145-1315)

- Indonesia (Australia lead) 1215-1230
- Southeast Asia Security
 - Regional Maritime Security Initiative (U.S. lead) 1230-1245
 - Five Power Defense Arrangement (Australia lead) 1245-1300
- Other topic(s), as desired 1300-1315

Session III: Bilateral/Alliance Issues (1320-1500)

- Global Posture Review (U.S. lead) 1320-1340
 - Joint Combined Training Center
 - Special Forces
 - Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)/C4

- Interoperability Study, Phase II (Australia lead) 1340-1400
 - Combined Review and Implementation
 - Releasability and Disclosure Issues

- Defense Materiel Issues (Australia lead) 1400-1440
 - Joint Strike Fighter update
 - Aegis system
 - ITAR Exemption
 - Trade and Buy America

- Missile Defense (U.S. lead) 1440-1500

Signing Ceremony (1515-1525)

- Missile Defense Framework MOU signing ceremony
- Statement of Interoperability signing

Joint press availability (1530-1600)

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
721 OCT 13 AM 10:24

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end up with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach.
USD(P&E) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04
DHR:ss
100504-9

.....

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15894-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

10 OCT 24

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 13, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS) *David S. C. Chu*
10 Oct 04

SUBJECT: Uneven Guard Recruiting—SNOWFLAKES

- You asked how we might deal with uneven state recruiting performance for the National Guard, to preclude adverse effects on our overall national capability (Tab A).
- The overall objective, of course, is to meet strength goals. A state with weak recruiting could still meet its goal through improved retention.
- For that reason, we will focus on jurisdictions with persistent shortfalls in end strength. Preliminary analysis produces nine candidates: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Virgin Islands.
- I have asked that a plan be developed by Thanksgiving that would give us a “way ahead” on reductions in states with both weak recruiting and persistent end-strength shortfalls. Our goal would be to start making adjustments early in the new year. We will work with Ray DuBois on any BRAC implications (Tab B).
- This is also an opportunity to rebalance, by taking reductions in areas where we have generous capacity, and adding units in skills that are in short supply.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

cc: Mr. DuBois

OSD 15894-04

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

SECURITY
2004 OCT 13 AM 10:24

OCT 06 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

How are you going to **fix** this problem where you have uneven performance by different states that shows we end **up** with weak recruiting?

Thanks.

Attach:
USD(P+R) Memo to SecDef 9/20/04
DHR:ss
100504-9

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15894-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26946



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRET

2004 SEP 28 PM 5:14

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

September 28, 2004 - 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

9/29 fws

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

Handwritten signature/initials

SUBJECT: Current Recruiting and Retention Results

- Active recruiting continues to meet quality and quantity goals (Tab A). But the Army FY 2005 Delayed Entry Program ("reservations") is about half the preferred size. The Army is deploying additional recruiters and using existing bonus authority more aggressively. We will know in about two months if these steps are sufficient to sustain needed results. In the meantime we are looking at expanding other programs (e.g., Blue to Green).
- Reserve recruiting is satisfactory except for the Army National Guard (Tab B). Indeed, the Air National Guard had a banner month in August (130% of goal) and may therefore make its number for the full year. The Army National Guard will fall short about 5,000. We will be focusing on state by state results, and accelerating restructuring from states with weak recruiting to those with stronger recruiting, among other actions.
- Active retention: Navy and Air Force retention rates reflect force shaping initiatives aimed at balancing manpower skills and assisting with force reduction. All active components continued to experience retention success through August of FY04 (Tab C).
- Reserve attrition continues to be favorable (Tab D). Survey results predict worse attrition in the future, but it has not yet occurred. New bonus authority in the House version of the authorization bill would help significantly.

+

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

Attachments :
As stated

TSA SD	9/29
SRMA SD	
MA SD	9/29
EXEC SEC	9/29

Prepared by: CAPT Wellock, (b)(6)

OSD 14845 - 04



TAB

B

~~FOUO~~

10/6/04 16A
NDP

OCT 06 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
David Chu
CC: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Adjusting of Guard and Reserve Units

Please be sure to talk to Ray DuBois about how you plan to adjust the Guard and Reserve Units to fit recruiting and how that might link to BRAC.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100504-19

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26949

29
June 24, 2004

020NAVY

TO: Gordon England
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: H.T. Johnson

OK

Thanks for your note about H.T. Johnson. I understand Mike Wynne is talking with him about how we might keep him engaged.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/23/04 SecNav memo to SecDef
6/22/04 ASecNav(I&E) ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
062404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15897-04

020NAVY

1/25
16.5

June 23, 2004

To: SECDEF
Fr: Gordon England
Re: HT Johnson


Mr. Secretary,

Attached is a letter of resignation for Mr. HT Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for I&E. HT has been planning to resign for some time, but he is more than willing to forego other opportunities and serve in a non-PAS but leadership position to manage the DoD BRAC process. As you may be aware, HT Johnson is a retired **four-star** Air Force general and served on the 1993 BRAC Commission. He is quite likely the most capable person in the DoD to run the BRAC.

In my judgment, BRAC is somewhat like the National Security Personnel System, meaning it is at least as complex as designing an aircraft carrier, but with much greater implications for the Department. I strongly urge your personal consideration to have HT Johnson perform this responsibility for you. Timing is important as HT will be leaving on July 16 unless a BRAC leadership role is available.

Thanks.

Gordon



Eric.

11-L-0559/OSD/26951



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

June 22, 2004

Memorandum Thru the Secretary of the Navy, 1000 Navy Pentagon,
Washington DC 20350

For the Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington DC
20310

Subject: ~~Letter~~ of Resignation

I have thoroughly enjoyed working for you and Secretary England but it is time for me to move on to other endeavors. Consequently, I am forwarding this copy of my resignation to the President. It has been a distinct pleasure and an honor to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment). The experience has had a profound and lasting effect on me.

I have the utmost respect and admiration for the noble men and women who serve this great Nation. It has been a privilege to serve you, the Administration, and the Nation.

Hansford T. Johnson
Hansford T. Johnson

11-L-0559/OSD/26952

7/1330

72

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Questionnaire

Let's make sure with Senator Warner that if we do send up Fran Harvey for Army, and switch him out of the communications job, that they won't require a new questionnaire that he will have to fill out. Please see if that is the case, on a confidential basis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062404-11

.....
Please respond by 6/30/04

ExecSec

R & N
close out snowflake.

230.02

24 Jun 04

OSD 15898-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/26953



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 2, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Powell A. Moore", written over a horizontal line.

Subject: Response to Snowflake regarding Questionnaire

- Fran Harvey will be allowed to submit the questionnaire that he submitted last November, unless there have been changes and these changes should be included in the resubmitted questionnaire. Moreover, there undoubtedly is a new tax return for calendar year 2003 for which the Committee will ask.
- Concerning the advance policy questions, the advance policy questions for the position of Secretary of the Army will be different than ones for the Assistant Secretary of Information and Network Integration. New responses will be requested.

Attachment:
SECDEF Snowflake 062404-11

11-L-0559/OSD/26954

6/29

June 26, 2004

334NSC

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: PCs and NSCs on Iraq

We regularly have PCs and NSCs on Iraq, where the Pentagon always briefs. There is a great deal more going on in Iraq beyond security, including governance, essential services, the economy, the diplomatic side of keeping our coalition partners in the game, getting additional partners, solving the MEK issue, progress in developing the ministries, plans for the elections, solving the Kurd displacement issues, etc.

We ought to suggest to the NSC when they try to schedule Iraq briefings with DoD briefing that other departments should put together briefings on other subjects of interest. We need to make it clear that Iraq is not simply a security issue.

Thanks.

DHR:db
062504-1 (tr computer).doc

Please respond by _____

6/29/04 *Del 7/1*

→ SD

~~FOUO~~

I've had better luck pushing for such non-DoD briefings at DC meetings than at PC or NSC meetings. I'll continue to work this with Hadley.

Doug Feith
OSD 15899-04

26JUN04

no

file

June 29, 2004

I-04/008817
ES-0006

09
W

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT ASEAN

The intel suggests we ought to strengthen our relationships with the ASEAN countries.

Please give me a list of them, and tell me what we are doing with them and what we might do in addition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062904-1 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 7/12/04

J 8/30
DA 8/30

Sir,
Response attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Lensyel 8/30

29
Jun
04

OSD 15900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26956

AUG 24 2004 8/27

DepSecDef
USD(P) *fa* *Q* *ROUS/le*
I# 04/008817-ES 8/27
ES-0006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *AW* 26 AUG 2004

SUBJECT: Snowflake Regarding Strengthening Relations with ASEAN (U)

- (U) You asked what are we doing with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and what more we might do.

Background:

- ASEAN was established in 1967.
- Its founding members: Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia.
- Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995.
- Laos and Burma joined in 1997. Cambodia became a member in 1999.

US Relations with ASEAN Core Countries:

- (U) **Thailand:** Thailand, a treaty ally, has deployed troops to OEF and OIF. Thailand is considering leaving a "remnant" of its troops behind when their second deployment to OIF ends in September. State and DoD are looking for ways to support this through the use of FMF to underwrite the upgrading of Thai peacekeeping training facilities.
- (U) **The Philippines:** We are re-assessing defense relations with the Philippines in the wake of Manila's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq. *YOU'VE BEEN FORWARDED A SEPARATE MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT.*
- (U) **Singapore:** A crucial friend that has provided critical facility access. We are developing a bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement.
- (U) **Malaysia:** Under PM Abdullah Badawi, who succeeded Mahatir in late 2003, bilateral relations have improved. We should keep defense relations professional and low key ~~is~~ and support Malaysian efforts to promote moderate Islam.
- (U) **Indonesia:** Recent cooperation with the FBI investigations of the Timika murders opens the possibility of expanding mil-mil ties with Indonesia.

US Relations with "New" ASEAN Members:

- (U) **New Members** - Burma, Laos, and Cambodia joined ASEAN largely as the result of Malaysia's desire to include all the Southeast Asian countries (including Burma) in the Association in time for the 50th founding anniversary.
- (U) **Vietnam:** Bilateral defense relations are improving. A second USN ship visit was conducted in July/August 2004.
- (U) **Cambodia:** After consulting select lawmakers and Hill staffers, we are prepared to recommend restoring low-level military-to-military activity focused on counterterrorism assistance.
- (U) **Laos:** U.S.-Lao relations have improved. Laos signed an Article 98 Agreement in December 2003, continues to cooperate in POW/MIA operations, poppy eradication and controlling amphetamine production, and has assisted with regional CT efforts and acceded to some CT conventions.
- (U) **Burma:** U.S. relations with Burma remain tense in the wake of Burma's refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi and recognize the 1990 election results. Burma is slated to take the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006, a potential embarrassment for ASEAN. The U.S. should continue to work with ASEAN to bring pressure on Burma.

What More Can Be Done:

- (U) With the "core" countries, we are seeking expanded training opportunities, consolidating access arrangements, and sustaining and expanding commitments to supporting OIF.
 - In the case of the Philippines, we are reevaluating our military relationship in the wake of the Philippines withdrawal from Iraq. We will have a "way ahead" paper to you shortly. *(Sent August 27, 2004)*
- (U) With "new" members, the potential for expanding defense relations is limited either by the nature of the regime (e.g., Burma) or by the limited potential for meaningful defense relations (e.g., Laos).
- (U) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a security forum established under ASEAN in 1996, has also recently established an annual Security Policy Conference for Vice Minister-level defense officials.
 - The U.S. is a full member of the ARF. OSD should plan to play an active and ongoing role in this new conference, including sending a senior OSD official to the inaugural Security Policy Conference in Beijing in October.

REVIEWED BY:

PD, ISA/AP A 16 Det

DUSD/AP A 16 RPL 16 Det

PDASD/ISA [Signature]

COPY TO:

Joint Staff J-5 APAC

7/2
1730

June 30, 2004

Paul Butler → "See Det"

PWB

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Hunter's Legislation

Please make sure we get a copy of Duncan Hunter's legislation on being able to acquire materials fast. Apparently it passed the House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-7

.....

Please respond by 7/2/04

7/8

*Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Wosenzo
7/7*

400.13

30 JUN 04

72
1430

add 7/8



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 2, 2004 11:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Subject: Response to SECDEF Snowflake regarding Congressman Hunter's Legislation,
063004-7

- Attached is H.R. 4323, an Act to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.
- The House passed it on June 14, 2004.

400, 3

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake
H.R. 4323

2004 3000001

108th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 4323

AN ACT

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

HR 4323 EH

108th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 4323

AN ACT

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense to respond to combat emergencies.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY TO RESPOND TO COMBAT EMERGENCIES.

(a) IN GENERAL- Chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Sec. 2410p. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies

(a) **RAPID ACQUISITION AUTHORITY-** The Secretary of Defense may rapidly acquire, in accordance with this section, equipment needed by a combatant commander to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.

(b) **PROCESS FOR RAPID ACQUISITION-** Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a process for the rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) and submit to Congress a detailed explanation of the process, including procedures to be followed in carrying out the process. The process shall provide for the following:

(1) A requirement that the process may be used only to acquire the minimum amount of equipment needed until the needs of the combatant commander can be fulfilled under

11-L-0559/OSD/26962

existing acquisition statutes, policies, directives, and regulations.

'(2) A goal of awarding a contract for the equipment within 15 days after receipt of a request from a commander.

'(3) In a case in which the equipment cannot be acquired without an extensive delay, a requirement for an interim solution to minimize the combat capability deficiency and combat fatalities until the equipment can be acquired.

'(4) Waiver of the applicability of all policies, directives, and regulations related to--

'(A) the establishment of the requirement for the equipment;

'(B) the research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment; and

'(C) the solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(5) Such other procedures or requirements as the Secretary considers appropriate.

'(c) WAIVER OF CERTAIN STATUTES- For purposes of exercising the authority provided by subsection (a) with respect to equipment, laws relating to the following shall not apply:

'(A) The establishment of the requirement for the equipment.

'(B) The research, development, test, and evaluation of the equipment.

'(C) The solicitation and selection of sources, and the award of the contract, for procurement of the equipment.

'(d) LIMITATIONS- The rapid acquisition authority provided by subsection (a) may be used only--

'(1) after the Secretary of Defense, without delegation, determines in writing that there exists a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities; and

'(2) to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating not more than \$100,000,000 during a fiscal year.

'(e) SOURCE OF FUNDS- For acquisitions under this section to be made during any fiscal year, the Secretary may use any funds made available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

'(f) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS AFTER EACH USE OF AUTHORITY- The Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees within 15 days after each use of the authority provided by subsection (a). Each such notice shall identify the equipment to be acquired, the amount to be expended for such acquisition, and the source of funds for such acquisition.

'(g) COMBATANT COMMANDER- In this section, the term 'combatant commander' means the commander of a unified combatant command with authority for the conduct of operations in a specific area of responsibility or who otherwise has authority to conduct operations at the

11-L-0559/OSD/26963

direction of the President or Secretary of Defense.'.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

'241 Op. Rapid acquisition authority to respond to combat emergencies.'.

Passed the House of Representatives June 14, 2004.

Attest:

Clerk.

END

11-L-0559/OSD/26964

file

June 30, 2004

TO: Eric Ruff

cc: Larry Di Rita
Matt Latimer

Larry Di Rita FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

7/20 SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

7/20
good

done

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Please give me a copy of the transcript of my interview with the San Diego talk show host Roger Hedgecock on June 30, and also give it to Matt Latimer.

Matt – please take a look at the transcript of this interview, and see if you can polish it up so we can use some of that material. It felt pretty good.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-8

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Please respond by 7/4/04


7/22

Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r
LT Col Lengyel
7/20

00000000

OSD 15905-04

Recd 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita 
TO: SecDef
DATE: July 13, 2004
SUBJECT: Roger Hedgecock Interview

You asked for a copy of the Hedgecock transcript. I am attaching one for your review. We also provided one for Mrs. Rumsfeld earlier.

We have provided the transcript to the writing team and Matt is using the the material as he develops future products for your use.



United States Department of Defense.

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?><http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

Media contact: (b)(6)

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> (b)(6)**Presenter:** Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Roger Hedgecock, Newsradio 600 KOGO

Q: [In Progress]... he has been prominent in a number of private-sector firms and in a number of cabinet and congressional positions throughout his lengthy career, which began back in 1957. Secretary Rumsfeld, welcome to KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thank you very much. Actually, my career began before 1957. I was a Navy pilot back in 1954. And even before that, I lived in Coronado, California, as a young man during World War II when my father was stationed out on an aircraft carrier.

Q: Well, there you go.

SEC. RUMSFELD: [Laughter]

Q: And you know, we love to hear that because there are obviously a lot of military people in San Diego and we have been through this station doing something called "Operation Homefront" mobilizing our listeners to help military families with, what, the broken transmission, the repair of the fence, whatever it is they need, during this time when their loved ones are deployed. So I want you to know that, that we're standing behind our military families.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I read that you were doing that and I do congratulate you and thank you for it. It's a wonderful thing that you do. And goodness knows, the families serve and sacrifice just as the men and women in uniform do and we're grateful to all of them.

Q: You bet. Secretary Rumsfeld with us. Let me get down to business here. You just got back from this NATO meeting in Turkey and I guess it's unclear to me how much, if at all, can we depend on our NATO partners with respect to any aspect of the burden we're carrying in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we've got I think it's 32 countries currently helping us in Iraq and I think that of those, probably 16 or 17 are NATO countries. And any numbers of others are NATO Partnership for Peace countries -- countries that are loosely affiliated with NATO. So we're really getting a good deal of support from the NATO countries individually. NATO as an institution's role in Iraq, thus far, has been restricted to helping the Polish Ukraine division in force generation and support.

But at the conference in Istanbul that I just returned from last evening, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to take an additional step with respect to Iraq and that is to provide training and equipment assistance for the Iraqi security forces, which is a good thing. It's going to be a centralized activity supported by NATO countries to assist in training and equipping the Iraqis, so that they can take over responsibility for the security of their country.

Q: And those forces, we're reading a lot today, The Los Angeles times has a couple of articles about the people

in Iraq willing to sign up, even though they know it's a very dangerous duty to be policemen and in the new army to take this step toward freedom. Are they really up to the task? We found in Fallujah, unfortunately, what, a couple of months ago that some of those people were not ready and, in fact, joined the insurgents when push came to shove.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, what you have is as we went from zero to 226,000 Iraqis serving in various security forces today -- some in the army, some in the site protection force, some in the border patrol, still others working with the police and others in what's called the new Iraqi National Guard. It used to be called the Civil Defense Corps. When you go from zero to 226,000 in a year, obviously, you're going to have to do some vetting that requires you to make some changes. On the other hand, we've seen an uneven situation, but I would say overwhelmingly positive.

The police and the national guard and the site protection people received varying degrees of training. The army gets the most training and the best equipment, the other security forces get somewhat less training and less equipment. So if they're up against some well-armed terrorist that have rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s and they have small weapons and side arms and pistols, obviously, they're going to get into a difficult dust-up. And you're correct, some of them have decided that the better part of valor is to move away and try it again another day. On the other hand, the idea that has been left by some that these forces just run and hide in their barracks is just flat untrue. More than 400 of them have been killed already, so they're not sitting around with their fingers in their ear, they're out there on the front line helping to provide security for the people of Iraq and God bless them for it.

And you're quite right, not only is it a dangerous business, but these folks are standing in line to be recruited to go in all of those security services and that's a wonderful thing because they're betting on the future of their country.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld with us. Let's talk about the size of the armed forces -- big issue here in San Diego, as I mentioned with the big military contingent in our community. We've got a situation where some of these folks have been held beyond their enlistment terms. The Reserves, of course, have been called up sometimes repeatedly. Private security people and other support contracts replacing what used to be duty done by armed forces personnel and now we've got headlines today on the recall of the Ready Reserves. You were once in the Ready Reserves; you know what that's about. Have the armed forces of the United States got enough people to do the tasks required?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We have in the active force about 1.4 million people. And in the Guard and the Reserve and if you include the Individual Ready Reserve, the people who are not training in ready units, we go up to somewhere over 2.3 million people. At the present time, we have about 200,000 in the Central Command's area of responsibility.

Now think of that. The force is stressed and we're only sustaining 200,000-plus in the Central Command region out of a total of 2 million. So the question is, well, why is that. Why is it stressful if you're sustaining a relatively small force percentage-wise and yet you find it's difficult? Well, one of the folks here, General Schoomaker, puts it this way. He says, think of rain barrel. And you've got a rain barrel filled with water. And you turn the spigot on and you can only access 10 percent of it because the spigot's up at the top of the rain barrel. See, you're only accessing a very small portion of that water.

Now the choice you have is to get a bigger barrel -- increase the size of the armed forces in this case -- or move the spigot down and figure out ways that you can have access to more of those people. And that's what we're doing. We're in the process of doing just that. We've got probably 300,000 military people who are engaged in tasks that could every bit as easily be conducted by civilians. We don't use contractors as skillfully and successfully as we probably could. We have a number of Reserve and Guard people who have either never been called up or have been called up very rarely over their entire careers. While at the same time, we have guard people that have been called up too frequently because they happen to be in a skill set that the United States, for whatever reason, didn't have on active duty.

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So what we need to do is to manage the force smarter. We need to rebalance the reserve components – the guard and reserves -- with the active force, so that we have the right people on active duty and the right skill sets there. We need to make better use of civilians – both contractors and civilian employees – and stop over-using uniform personnel in things they need not do. And my estimate is that if we do that skillfully, we'll find that we're probably sized about right, although we do need to increase the force, when we have a crisis like we have with respect to a war in Afghanistan after September 11th or a conflict in Iraq. But we can do that. We have emergency powers and we've increased the – for example -- the army by something like 25[000] or 30,000 people over the last 2.5 years.

Q: Under any circumstances, Mr. Secretary, would a draft be necessary in the future, as you contemplate it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, I can't imagine it. I just can't imagine it. There are people who can argue that a draft is a good thing because it gives everyone a chance to serve and understand the military and national service. Although it really never did, it never drafted women, only men, and it exempted people who were in school and people who were married and people who were teaching and a whole lot of exemptions they had. But in terms of the need of the services, goodness no, we're perfectly capable of increasing the incentives and the inducements to attract people into the armed services.

As a matter of fact, despite all the talk about the stress on the force, today we still are having very good results with respect to recruiting and retention. And we do not have a problem of attracting and retaining the people we need in the military. And if we ever did get to that point we should, in my view, do exactly what you do in the private sector and that's increase the pay and increase the incentives and the inducements, so that you can have the kind of skills and the numbers of people you need to help defend our country. We're very fortunate to have so many people raise their hand and say, "I want to volunteer to go in the United States Armed Forces," and they say, "send me" and God bless them for it.

Q: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In a related issue, and it's a big issue here in San Diego particularly in terms of supplying the military, Congress appropriates this money and then the Pentagon through all these mysterious ways, finally gets around to buying the stuff that soldiers need. And there's been a lot of controversy about whether the soldiers out there – Marines and the soldiers – are getting the body armor, the armored Humvees, all that. And Duncan Hunter, a congressman from this area, that's a chair of the Armed Services Committee in the House, has legislation that he calls "the rapid acquisition authority" because he's so frustrated with the time it takes, the lag time between the money getting appropriated and the stuff actually getting out to the soldiers and Marines. Do you support that kind of legislation, that approach?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I have not had a chance to read that precise proposal, but Duncan Hunter, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, of course, is a very strong supporter, a stalwart supporter of the men and women in uniform and he's a former service man himself. And he has paid a great deal of attention on the subject of shortages in areas that needed to be adjusted, for example, like body armor and up-armored Humvees.

There's been a little bit of misunderstanding about the body armor. There always has been ample amounts of body armor. But from time to time, people developed new techniques and new materials that can, in fact, provide additional capabilities. And so what they developed were some inserts that would go into the body armor that the service people had. And the manufacturer of that had to ramp up and produce it. But of course, it was new. It was brand-new stuff. And as a result, there were some people out there who did not have it in the early period and they ended up having to use people who were out in the spear point of the war getting the early portions -- the early deliveries -- of these inserts for their body armor. And people who were in the rear areas did not have it. Then what happened was during the course of the war, it turned out that the rear areas were vulnerable to attacks. Convoys and combat support people were vulnerable to attacks as well. And so it's been a task of seeing that it can get out there as fast as it possibly can.

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The Humvees, of course, also were designed to have a certain ability to resist various types of attacks. When you then decide that you want to increase that capability by adding armor to an existing Humvee's protection capability, then you have to manufacture it and you have to attach it and see that it's there. The reality is that even a tank can be destroyed, and you've seen pictures of tanks and they're fully armored, not just up-armored Humvees, but they're fully armored.

Q: Well, this issue was taken up in the opinion journal in The Wall Street Journal opinion page by Brendan Miniter on Tuesday on this issue of the Hunter legislation. It passed the House. And the interesting thing was that Mrs. Pelosi abstained after criticizing this very thing, the administration not getting necessary equipment to the troops. She abstained on this bill. But it did pass 285-97 and goes over to the Senate. So I think on behalf of Mr. Hunter, although I haven't talked to him, but this rapid acquisition authority addresses an issue of bureaucratic lag time that simply is not up to -- in the minds of many people -- the need. Do you agree with that?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Oh, I do. I think basically what we have is we've had over our history since World War II basically an idea that we were either in war or we were in peace and that we were in peacetime constraints. And of course, since we don't have a declaration of war and we're not in World War III, all of those peacetime constraints and procedures and auditors and contract rules and competitive bidding, all of that pertains. And the effect of it is that you end up in a war on terror, like we're in, losing lives and yet you are still required to adhere to the rules of peacetime, because we don't have gradations of between war and peace and therefore we need to find a way to live in this 21st century where threats can come at you from the shadows and from ungoverned areas in ways that are not predictable, as they were, for example, during World War II or during the Cold War, for that matter.

Q: Secretary Don Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense. A couple of other issues I want to get to were weapons of mass destruction and the Supreme Court rulings. And so quickly, on the weapons of mass destruction, obviously, the opposition to the administration says we should never have invaded. The Bush administration lied about the WMD, never found any, never were any, etcetera, etcetera. Now, I'm reading recent reports in fairly easily accessible published accounts that Syria is holding the weapons of mass destruction or some of them, that others were destroyed, that others might still be hidden in Iraq, etcetera. What is the status on WMD? And if Syria is holding any of them and you guys know about it, how come we haven't heard about it?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me respond this way. The decision to go to war was a concern on the part of, first, the president, then the Congress of the United States and ultimately the United Nations that Saddam Hussein had had weapons of mass destruction, had used them on his neighbors in Iran and had used them on his own people in Iraq -- chemical weapons -- that he was known to have various other WMD programs and that he was required by the United Nations over a period of some 17 resolutions to file a declaration declaring what he had. And everyone agreed he had filed a fraudulent declaration as to what weapons of mass destruction he had. The debate as to whether to go to war was not whether or not he'd filed a fraudulent declaration. Everyone agreed to that. The only question was should you give him another chance, should you wait and go 18 resolutions or 19 resolutions, another five years or however many.

Now what's actually happened? Right now you have the Iraqi Survey Group, which is a multinational group that's out there reviewing documentation and looking at suspect WMD sites. I was with the Polish minister of defense this weekend in Istanbul, Turkey at the NATO Summit. And in the course of that, he pointed out that his troops in Iraq had recently come across -- I've forgotten the number, but something like 16 or 17 -- warheads that contained sarin and mustard gas.

Now these are weapons that we always knew Saddam Hussein had that he had not declared and they have tested them and I have not seen them and I have not tested them, but they believe that they are correct that these, in fact, were undeclared chemical weapons -- sarin and mustard gas -- quite lethal and that is a discovery that just occurred within the last period of days. If you think about -- most people remember the image of where Saddam Hussein was captured in that hole -- that pit that he was living in. That pit, that hole in the ground was probably big enough to hold chemical and

11-L-0559/OSD/26970

biological weapons sufficient to kill tens of thousands of people. And therefore, it is not hard to hide things in a country the size of California. It's quite easy to hide things. In fact, we finally found a bunch of jet aircraft that they've buried underground.

In answer to your question on Syria, there have been a lot of intelligence speculation and rumors and chatter about the fact that Saddam Hussein may have placed some of his weapons of mass destruction in Syria prior to the start of the war. Until that can be validated and proved, you'll find people in the administration not talking about it.

Q: All right. Let's talk about the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a somewhat surprising ruling on the rights of enemy combatants has kind of put the administration in a tough spot -- because I suspect I can almost smell lines of lawyers lining up -- to file lawsuits in federal courts on behalf of these enemy combatants at GTMO and maybe otherwise, what's going to be the administration response, at least as far as Department of Defense?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, thus far, it's been silence and consideration. I was in Turkey and so I was not back here. I just came in last night and really have not had time to talk to people who have studied several decisions -- three or four. My guess is what they'll do is they will fashion a plan that will enable us to move forward in as reasonable a way as makes sense, given the fact that we are in a new -- we have new set of facts in the world. We have a large number -- small percentage wise, but a large numbers -- of tens of thousands of extremists radicals who are determined to kill innocent men, women and children using terror as their weapon of choice to terrorize the world into making it fit an image that they would want. That is to say a world that has a small handful of clerics running it, an end of nation states and bringing down moderate regimes of that religion and preventing the cultures of other nations in other parts of the world to influence what they prefer to see as the way they want life lived.

This is a very dangerous threat to the world. It's a dangerous threat because they are the kinds of people who go around cutting off people's heads and cutting off their hands and as we saw Saddam Hussein putting pliers in their mouth, pulling their tongues out and cutting them off, shoving people off the tops of buildings, filling up mass graves with tens of thousands of bodies. These are people who have little or no respect for human life and they are determined and we need to be equally determined.

The problem we've got is they know precisely what they want. They have a strategy, they have a plan. They are determined to prevent democracy from prevailing in Afghanistan. They're determined to prevent it from prevailing in Iraq. And the rest of the world is still trying to figure out what's happening. The rest of the world, we see terrorist attacks in Bali, we see it in Madrid, we see it in Turkey and in the United States and in Indonesia. But the world is still trying to sort through all this and what it really means, while the enemy knows what they're doing and they're determined to prevent the kinds of progress that is occurring in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

We need to have -- as they say in the military, a more common threat assessment in the world of the moderates, the people who were not running around trying to tell everyone else how they must live their lives. And we're in a long struggle, a serious struggle, where human life is at risk. And we need to be resolute. We need to be steadfast. We need to recognize the nexus between extremists and weapons of mass destruction means not simply 300 people can be killed or 3,000 people as on September 11th, but it means 300,000 or potentially millions of people can be killed to the extent extremists, as we've seen recently on television cutting people's heads off, to the extent those people gain access to still more powerful weapons, biological weapons, for example, or radiation weapons.

So we're in a critical time in the history of the world. We need to allow free people to come to free decisions about what it really means, but we don't have the luxury of being careless or inattentive.

Q: So with regard to these enemy combatants then, do you think these military tribunals which have been announced will begin processing these people in terms of trials? Do you think the folks at GTMO are going to be moved somewhere else? What's the response?

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SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, as I say, I'm sorry I'm just not in the position to respond. I'm not a lawyer. The lawyers are poring over these decisions trying to find out what the implications are. And at some point, there'll be policy meetings that will take the best legal judgments and come to some conclusions about what the appropriate steps might be. We have to constantly recognize that what we are are a free people and that is our essence. And we cannot give up our rights and the things we value so much, simply because we're terrorized by terrorists. We have to learn how to live in this 21st century. And that means we have to, with respect to the peacetime constraints on contracting but so, too, with laws and interpretations and procedures. We have to find a way to live in this world that protects the men and women and the children in our country. And by golly, we're determined to do that and at the same time, protect them in a way that's consistent with the values that we have and the freedom we respect so much and the thing that makes it the single most productive and free society on the face of the earth.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld. I know you have to go. I want to ask you if you can give us an update or any information at all of a Camp Pendleton Marine who was held captive, Cpl. Wassef Ali Hassoun. What's the update on him?

SEC. RUMSFELD: As I say, I've been overseas and traveling until late last night and I would be reluctant to try to pretend that I could give you a precise update. We have people who can do that, but I'm not in that position.

Q: Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, we appreciate your time. Thank you for your service. I have an opportunity to say that on behalf of all of us here in San Diego. And please be aware that at least in this part of the media, we are concerned about those military families in supporting them during this tough time for them, too.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, we appreciate that a great deal. And as someone who was selling newspapers at the Coronado Ferry on VJ Day in 1945, I want to say hello to all those folks out in that part of the world. It's a wonderful part of the world.

Q: Indeed, it is. Thank you very much for being with us here at KOGO.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040630-secdef0949.html>

June 15, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joint Session

Colin Powell went to the Joint Session for Karzai and I didn't, and it looked bad.
We were told he wasn't going to go.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061504-13

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15906-04

15 JUN 04

6/15

FYI

9:40 a.m.

Memorandum To: SecDef

From: Mary Claire Murphy *Mary Claire*

Re: Karzai Joint Session of Congress

Just FYI,

I just got a call from Sec. Colin Powell's scheduler that late last night, Secretary Powell **DID** in fact decide to back out of the King Abdullah meeting at the WH, and re-arranged his schedule so that he could be at the Joint Session of Congress this morning with President Karzai.

June 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan Detainees

38310

I was confused as to what Karzai was talking about in terms of detainees. He apparently was referring to the fact that it takes too long to get them processed in Afghanistan, not the GTMO folks.

Please set up a process, and tell me what you propose to do.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-30



Please respond by 7/16/04

14

OSD 15907-04

June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Seating Charts

Please have your folks put down who these people are when they prepare a seating chart, so it is on the seating chart.

For example, it should show on the chart that Qasimi of Afghanistan is the Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs and what Salih's title is. It doesn't show it on the seating chart. It is really unhelpful. If I am looking at the seating chart, I need to know what their jobs are.

Thanks.

Attach.

Protocol read-ahead for 6/14 Karzai visit

DHR:dh
061404-27

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15908-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26976

Afghanistan

14 Jun 04

**READ AHEAD: HONOR CORDON, MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KARZAI OF AFGHANISTAN**

FROM: Ms. Mary Claire Murphy, Director of Protocol, (b)(6)



Monday, June 14, 2004

3:00 p.m.

River Entrance/SecDef Dining Room

You have agreed to host an Honor Cordon and a meeting with His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan. (See Tab 1 for read ahead from Policy.) You last met here with President Karzai February 2003.

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. (9) vs. Afghanistan (9), (List of participants at Tab 2.)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

3:00 p.m. You greet President Karzai curbside, for the Honor Cordon.

You and President Karzai are escorted to the Dining Room. He will sign the guest book followed by a photo. (See Tab 3 for seating.)

3:25 p.m. Meeting Concludes. You and President Karzai will be escorted to the 911 Memorial for a brief tour.

3:35 p.m. You and the President arrive at the Memorial.

3:40 p.m. You and the President step outside of the building for a press avail near the cornerstone.

3:45 p.m. Press avail concludes. You bid President Karzai farewell and return to your office escorted by Mary Claire Murphy and Security.

Attachments

- Tab 1 Read Ahead (from Policy)
- Tab 2 List of participants (from Policy)
- Tab 3 Seating (from Protocol)

**List of participants for SecDef meeting with the President of Afghanistan
June 14, 2004**

Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Honorable Zal Khalilzad, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan
The Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Lieutenant General Tome Walters, Director of DSCA
Dr. Bill Luti, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Special Plans, Near Eastern and
Southern Asia
Lieutenant General John Craddock, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Kurt Amend, Note taker


Afghanistan Delegation

His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan
His Excellency Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Minister
His Excellency Ali Ahmad Jalali, Minister of Interior
His Excellency (Dr.) Zalmay Rassoul, National Security Advisor
His Excellency SaidTayeb Jawad, Ambassador of Afghanistan (Tentative)
Mr. Enayatullah Qasimi, Minister Advisor for Legal & International Affairs
Mr. Amrullah Salih, National Directorate of Security
Mr. Mohammad Umar Daudzai, Chief of Staff, Office of the President
Mr. Jawed Ludin, Spokesperson

SECDEF meeting with President Karzai of Afghanistan

Monday, June 14, 2004 3 p.m.

SecDef Dining Room

Mr. Amend, notetaker		Mr. Ludin Spokesperson
Dr. Luti		Mr. Qasimi
Mr. Rodman		Dr. Zalmay Rassoul National Security Advisor
Mr. Feith		HE Abdullah Abdullah MOFA
SecDef		President Karzai
Gen Myers		HE Ali Ahmad Jalali Minister of Interior
Amb Khalilzad		HE SaidTayeb Jawad Afghan Ambassador
LTG Walters		Mr. Salih
LTG Craddock		Mr. Daudzai Chief of Staff

June 14, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
VADM Staser Holcomb, USN (Ret.)
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

210

Andy Card claims that the military nominations will go out of the White House today, including Casey.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-26

.....
Please respond by _____

DR 6/19

SECDEF

A bunch of noms did clear the WH on 6/14 ... 9 out of 17 ... including Casey/Cody.

There are still some critical noms there.

- Broadwater (to go to COS, EUCOM) is the most time-critical
- John Craddock, since we need to get him confirmed in July
- DJS, J-3, J-4

OSD 15935-04

The CNO (Clark) reappointment, package having been in the SASC for months, now is critical. He must be confirmed by 7/19.

11-L-0559/OSD/26980

Staser 6/15

14 JUN 04

10/21
2922
Paul Butler
PWB
6/23

TO SecDef

EF-9913
04/008302
June 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Previous Foreign Meetings

0205D

When I am meeting with somebody I have met with previously, and in the previous meeting they had asked me for certain things, my briefing for the current meeting ought to explain what was asked the last time and what has happened in the intervening period.

They seem not to do that. Each one seems to start fresh.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-18

.....
Please respond by _____

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

TEN
6/23


SIR,
Response attached.
v/cor Nosenzo
6/23

June 21, 2003

C 6/23
DH 6/24

Captain Marriott,

Please see attached memo from Mr. Feith to Policy offices concerning "Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries."


June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

14 Jun 04

OSD 15936-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26981



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



*Dkt
6/24*

JUN 18 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND
DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DJF 6/18/04*

SUBJECT: Read Aheads for Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries

Reminder regarding read aheads:

Show the meeting start and end times, how to address the guest (e.g., Your Royal Highness, Mr. Minister or Mr. Smith) and pronunciations.

Using the templates as a checklist will help.

Read aheads should refer back to the previous meetings with the Foreign Dignitary. What was discussed? What is status of the action items from the previous meeting? Put background information and recommended talking points within the same set of bullets.

To do quality control properly, we need the read aheads, if possible, two days before the meeting.

Thanks.

June 14, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Report on Investigative Oversight

Attached is a report on detainee abuse you should be aware of and have the appropriate people look into.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/10/04 Deputy IG ltr to SecDef re: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

DHR:dh
061404-16

.....
Please respond by _____

14JUN04

OSD 15938-04



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

INFO MEMO

*SecDef -
For your Information*

*1611
DLH 6/14*

June 10, 2004

FOR: SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: L. Jerry Hansen, Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: Status of Detainee Abuse Investigative Oversight

- For the week ending June 4, 2004, the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) reported an increase of 18 new detainee abuse investigations bringing the total to 127 investigations. Of the 127 investigations, 69 were in a facility and 58 others. Twenty-four cases were unit investigations conducted by commanders. Of the 127 investigations, 39 involved the death of a detainee - 35 in a facility and 4 others.
- For the week ending June 4, 2004, three new death investigations were reported: two involved deaths due to natural or undetermined causes, and a third occurred after an engagement between soldiers and civilians in An-Najaf. Subsequent to the engagement, two wounded Iraqis were captured. One of the injured was deemed terminal by a medic. When the medic departed, a US Army captain allegedly shot the detainee in the head, killing him. The investigation is continuing.
- Other CID misconduct investigations included 14 new assault cases and one sexual assault case (bringing the number of sexual assault cases to four). In the latter, a detainee at Abu Ghraib reported that a translator sodomized another detainee while a female soldier took photos. Investigation continues.
- The 14 new assaults cases were largely initiated based on reports by detainees in Iraq. In two cases, robbery was also alleged. One case involved a Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan who was alleged to have assaulted several citizens believed to be affiliated with the Taliban. One of the 14 cases was determined to be unfounded. No new investigations were reported this week from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
- ~~The attached chart depicts current weekly reporting to the Office of Inspector General of all investigations, inquiries, reviews, etc., concerning detainee abuse in the Department.~~

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: Special Assistant to SecDef (Mr. Pete Geren)

Prepared By: Jim Pavlik, Dir., Investigative Policy & Oversight, (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11-L-0559/OSD/26984

June 14, 2004

TO: ExecSec
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Charles Wick

M 355D

Recently Charles Wick sent me a letter. I would like to get it and see if I answered it. If not, I want to answer it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
06/14/04-5

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 15939-04

14 JUN 04



June 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Col. Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Saleh

Yemen

When I have this Saleh man in for lunch or a meeting, I want Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Bill Luti and probably Bill Winkenwerder. If someone wants to suggest someone else to be added, we could do that.

His competence is generally in Afghanistan and Iran.

Thanks.

DHR:JR
061404-1

.....
Please respond by _____

14 JUN 04

OSD 15940-04

11-L-0559/OSD/26986

June 14, 2004

TO: Mary Claire

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: OSD Support for Reagan Events

You and your team really stepped up for the Reagan ceremonies this past week. It was terrific that you did it, and did it so well by all reports.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
061104-10

.....
Respond by _____ ✓

335 SD

14 JUN 04

OSD 15941-04

file

June 14, 2004

7/20
J

330 11

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

LARRY DI RITA
7/20

I am told that Schwarzenegger's wife, Maria Shriver, does an awful lot for the military wives at Camp Pendleton and other places in California. Would you please check into that?

We should know what she is doing and whether or not we should thank her. Should other people be doing similar things?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061104-8



Please respond by _____

7/22

Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r,
Lt Col Lengyel
7/20

14 JUN 04

OSD 15942-04

OSD 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita
TO: SecDef
DATE: July 13, 2004
SUBJECT: Maria Shriver

We are considering events for Maria Shriver to participate in.

The attachment highlights what she has done and areas in which she is interested. We will continue to develop opportunities where she might be appropriate and helpful

She may be in Washington soon and apparently has expressed an interest in meeting with you.

OK Write her & say I'd like to see her when she is in

Discuss

D. C

11/15/04

Outreach to U.S. Troops
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and California's First Lady Maria Shriver

Past:

- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with U.S. and coalition service members throughout the Persian Gulf. Schwarzenegger also showcases newest movie Terminator 3 (July 2-3,2003).
- Mrs. Shriver speaks at Specialist Pat Tillman's memorial service, HP Pavilion, San Jose, California (May 3,2004).
- Governor Schwarzenegger meets with 500+ service members (including the injured), and escaped hostage Thomas Hamill at Ramstein Air Base, Germany (May 4,2004).

Future:

- Mrs. Shriver intends to make issues surrounding military families, where a spouse is deployed overseas, a high priority. Two issue examples provided were:
 - (1) availability of adequate grief counseling for surviving spouses; and
 - (2) requirement that surviving spouses vacate base housing within six months.

Upcoming USO Events Designed to Support the Troops:

- NFL players assisting with opening of USO Center in Qatar
Date: June 28 (T)
- Morale tour with actor Vince Vaughn
Locations: Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq
Dates: June 28-July 5
- Fourth of July tour with Wayne Newton, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Lewis Dix and Miss USA
Location: Korea
Dates: July 2-5
- USO/Walter Reed visit to Manhattan (troops to receive tickets to David Letterman Show, Broadway, sporting events)
Date: July 14
- USO musical show with the band Sugar Ray at the return of the USSS Ronald Reagan
Location: San Diego, California
Dates: July 22-23
- USO Gala honoring our troops with Wayne Newton
Dates: October 14

JUN 14 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Rotations

320.2

I just got briefed by the Marines. I asked them to tell me why they should not do 12-month rotations and why they should do the 7 months they are doing.

I would be interested to hear from you as to why you think you should keep doing 12-month rotations, and, if you were to change to 6, 7, 8 or 9 months, how you would do it and what would be the pros and cons.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-23

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

1432004

OSD 15943-04



~~FOUO~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310
26 JUL 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your June 14, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However,

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom 3 and Enduring Freedom 6 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operation Iraqi Freedom 4 and Enduring Freedom 7.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

3202

26 July 04

14 Jun 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 15943-04

June 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ray Reynolds

IRAQ

Let's get a letter off to Ray Reynolds from the Iowa Army National Guard. That is a nice e-mail he sent out.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/8/04 E-mail

DHR:dh
061004-17

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

10JUN04

OSD 15944-04

Joyce Rumsfeld**From:**
To:

(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:06 AM
Subject: well said**Subject:** Fw: The Real Story

This is a letter from Ray Reynolds,
a medic in the Iowa Army National Guard, serving in Iraq:

As I head off to Baghdad for the final weeks to say thanks to all of you who did not believe the media. They have done a very poor job of covering everything that has happened. I am sorry that I have not been able to visit all of you during my two week leave back home.

And just so you can rest at night knowing something is happening in Iraq that is noteworthy, I thought I would pass this on to you. This is the list of things that has happened in Iraq recently: (Please share it with your friends and compare it to the version that your paper is producing.)

- * **Over 400,000 kids have up-to-date immunizations.**
- * School attendance is up 80% from levels before the war.
- * Over 1,500 schools have been renovated and rid of the weapons stored there so education can occur.
- * The port of Uhm Qasar was renovated so grain can be off-loaded from ships faster.
- * **The country had its first 2 billion barrel export of oil in August.**
- * Over 4.5 million people have clean drinking water for the first time ever in Iraq.
- * The country now receives 2 times the electrical power it did before the war.
- * 100% of the hospitals are open and fully staffed, compared to 35% before the war.
- * Elections are taking place in every major city, and city councils are in place.
- * Sewer and water lines are installed in every major city.

11-L-0559/OSD/26994

6/8/2004

- * Over 60,000 police are patrolling the streets.
- * Over 100,000 Iraqi civil defense police are securing the country.
- * **Over 80,000 Iraqi soldiers are patrolling the streets side by side with US soldiers.**
- * Over 400,000 people have telephones for the first time ever
- * Students are taught field sanitation and hand washing techniques to prevent the spread of germs.
- * An interim constitution has been signed.
- * Girls are allowed to attend school.
- * Textbooks that don't mention Saddam are in the schools for the first time in 30 years.

Don't believe for one second that these people do not want us there. I have met many, many people from Iraq that want us there, and in a bad way. They say they will never see the freedoms we talk about but they hope their children will. We are doing a good job in Iraq and I challenge anyone, anywhere to dispute me on these facts. So If you happen to run into John Kerry, be sure to give him my email address and send him to Denison, Iowa. This soldier will set him straight. If you are like me and very disgusted with how this period of rebuilding has been portrayed, email this to a friend and let them know there are good things happening.

Ray Reynolds, SFC
Iowa Army National Guard
234th Signal Battalion



June 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: E-mails

413.51

We are moving ahead on the e-mails. They are sorting them now. Before they go up, we are going to have to make sure that Roche knows they are going to go up, and that the people who are mentioned in the e-mails know about it.

We do not want to simply do it. We want to make sure it is done right.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-16

.....

Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15945-04

10 Jun 04

file

6/14/04

3 M0.64

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Bill Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Nuc-Chem-Bio

DR

JUNE 9

I got briefed by the Defense Science Board ~~yesterday~~ on dealing with nuclear weapons. It is kind of a single shot, just like yours was a single shot on chemical.

In any event, it was a pretty good briefing. Bill Schneider set it up. I told him I would get him a hearing with Tom Ridge and Spence Abraham. I have talked each of them, and they both have agreed.

Would you please coordinate that, so that it happens? I would like you to see and see what their reaction is. You can call their offices, and remind them that is what I talked to them about and that they agreed they would like to see the briefing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-14

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Sil,

add 7/24

Response attached.

OSD 15946-04


VR COLB

7/22

14 JUN 04

DA 7/22

July 22, 2004

To: Secretary of Defense
From: Ken Krieg 
cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Bill Schneider
Subject: Snowflake on Nuc-Chem-Bio (attached)

Stan Szemborski and I met yesterday with Rich Wagner, chair of the DSB task force, who briefed you June 9.

We had a very good conversation on his work and agreed on exchanging data and ideas for inclusion in the follow-up work that we are doing coming out of last week's SLRG on combating weapons of mass destruction.

In particular, we had a very good discussion on thinking through how to characterize the cost-benefit and capabilities evaluation of the broader portfolio of investments on active defenses. It was an extremely worthwhile conversation.

Rich Wagner has a meeting scheduled with Secretary Ridge for next week and a meeting with Secretary Abraham in the next couple of weeks (it was originally schedule for this week, but the Secretary had to move his schedule around). I will work with Rich to make sure you get their reactions.

11-L-0559/OSD/26998



June 9, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
c c : Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Hunter-Rogers Petition

032

If we have not gotten a thank you to Duncan Hunter and Rogers and all the people on that list by now, there is something wrong with our system.

My impression is that it takes way too long to get responses to Congressional mail. Please show me what tracking system you have, how it works and what the average time for responses is.

In addition, please get to me fast with notes with respect to the Hunter-Rogers petition.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-10



Please respond by _____

9 Jun 04

OSD 15947-04

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Warner Matter

032

Please have someone contact Ray DuBois, and tell him that I need him to get back to me and tell me how we handled the matter with John Warner and the Eisenhower Corridor date.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
061004-6

.....
Please respond by _____

hounsb

OSD 15948-04

June 10, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Non-lethal Riot Agents

370.61

I need someone in your shop to craft a memo from me to the President about the non-lethal riot agents problem.

We are not able to do the things we ought to be able to do. Apparently the treaty is so restrictive that we are able to use lethal force, but not non-lethal force, which is of course an unfortunate outcome. I am sure it was not the intent of the treaty.

Let's see what we can fashion for me to begin to work on this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061004-2

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

10-7-04

OSD 15949-04

June 9, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Warner

1383.6

What is the status on this May 13 letter from John Warner?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Sen. Warner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
060904-23

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

Closed (courtesy) 6/16/04

*SD provided with
answer EDW meeting
w/ Mr. Geren + Mr. Moore
in June 16, 2004.*

hounCb

OSD 15952-04

DU 49

JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
 PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS
 PAVAN SILLARD, IDAHO
 JEFF SESSIONS, ALABAMA
 ROSS M. COLLINS, MAINE
 JOHN ENIGHN, NEVADA
 JAMES M. TALENT, MISSOURI
 GARRY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
 ELIZABETH DOLE, NORTH CAROLINA
 JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS

VIL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
 ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
 JOSEPH L. LIBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
 JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
 DANIEL T. AKAKA, HAWAII
 BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, NEBRASKA
 MARK DAYTON, MINNESOTA
 EVAN BAYH, INDIANA
 HILARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK
 MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS

JUDITH A. ANGELEY, STAFF DIRECTOR
 RICHARD D. DEBORES, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8060

May 13, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20310-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your participation and assistance in facilitating the recent hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by certain members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Committee has held two important hearings, to date, but the complexity of this issue requires that more hearings be held to establish a body of fact needed for oversight by the Senate. The Committee fully understands that the availability of some witnesses and material is affected by the conduct and completion of ongoing investigations, as well as operational requirements in Iraq.

On behalf of the Committee, I request that the following officials be made available to testify, in open session, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, at an early date: Ambassador Paul Bremer, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority; General John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, U. S. Central Command; Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Honorable William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, USA, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), as well as the senior Judge Advocate General Officer who was responsible for the legal review of authorized interrogation techniques; Major General George R. Fay, USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army; Major General Barbara G. Fast, Director for Intelligence, J-2, CJTF-7; Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA, Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations, CJTF-7; Major General Donald J. Ryder, USA, Provost Marshall General, U.S. Army; Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, USAR, Chief, Army Reserve; and Lieutenant General Stephen H. Blum, USANG, Chief, National Guard.

To date, in scheduling, the Committee has tried to meet your requirements, and we hope to continue such cooperation in arranging the earliest possible date for appearances of these witnesses. Given that some witnesses may need to remain in Iraq for operational reasons, we are open to exploring the option of video teleconferences for some hearings.

11-L-0559/OSD/27003

The objective of these hearings will be to document all aspects of detainee operations in Iraq, including: the policy for the treatment of detainees in Iraq; the chain of command at Abu Ghraib prison; military doctrine and procedures for the conduct of interrogations; the readiness of military units in Iraq to conduct detainee operations; the evolution of interrogation policy and procedures in Iraq, as it related to the overall security situation; and, the status of completed and on-going investigations into detainee and interrogation operations in Iraq. As the body of fact concerning the mistreatment of prisoners is assembled, the Committee may determine the need for additional military and civilian witnesses from the Department.

During the hearing conducted by the Committee on May 11, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army, discussed the interrogation techniques authorized for use in Iraq. He testified that all interrogation techniques, including those requiring specific approval from higher authority before being employed, were deemed to be lawful and acceptable under the Geneva Convention. Subsequent inquiries by the Committee have determined that the evaluation of so-called "harsh approaches" has been the subject of significant discussion and legal review within the Department of Defense. The Committee requests that all legal reviews and related documentation concerning approval of interrogation techniques for use in Department of Defense intelligence gathering operations, including in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, be provided to the Committee.

The Department has been cooperative in providing documents and materials regarding allegations of prisoner abuse in Iraq. The Committee's standing request for all relevant documentation, including International Committee of the Red Cross reports to the Department on abuse of prisoners in U.S. military custody, is important in carrying out our oversight responsibilities.

As you determine the availability of witnesses and requested materials, please have your staff coordinate with Mr. Charles W. Alsop (b)(6) of the Committee staff, to determine specific hearing dates and administrative arrangements.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter,

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



John Warner
Chairman

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

June 9, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to MG Miller

How have we handled this letter from Jane Harman to Geoff Miller? Did we do what was suggested to just refer it to Porter Goss? How did we answer it?

Thanks.

Attach.
5/21/04 Cong. Harman Ltr to MG Miller

DHR:dh
060904-22

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

Closed 6/16/04
(verbally)

SID briefed on status
on June 16, 2004 IOW
meeting w/ Mr. Geren &
MG Miller.

OSD 15953-04

920004

Oct 6/9

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CO-SPEAKER
J. DENNIS HASTERT, SPEAKER
NANCY PELOSI, DEMOCRATIC LEADER

FROM H-REL, U.S. CONGRESS
INFO 204-5131

FRANCE S. MURRAY, STAFF DIRECTOR
L. CHRISTINE HEALEY, DEMOCRATIC COUNSEL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6416

May 21, 2004

*SecDef -
Have heard this
will be in the
press shortly*

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, USA
Deputy Commander for Detainee Operations
for Multi-National Force Iraq
Commander Joint Task Force 7
Headquarters Command Group
CPA-APO AE 09335

Dear General Miller:

Less than 24 hours ago, you met with the Committee to discuss detainee and interrogation policies and practices. While I appreciate your willingness to appear, I am dismayed that information emerging immediately after your briefing raises questions about the candor and accuracy of your statements.

A Pentagon briefing for reporters yesterday provided new details about the development of interrogation policy for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the briefing, as reported in today's *Washington Post*, the original policy approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in late 2002 was almost immediately challenged by military lawyers, triggering an intense, three-month debate among legal experts, intelligence officials, and others. In particular, Defense Department officials reportedly confirmed yesterday that a group of senior military attorneys sent a memo on February 5, 2003. This debate led to the issuance of new guidelines in April 2003.

In addition, press reports about the contents of the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy issued by General Sanchez, a copy of which has not been provided to us, seems to indicate a role for Military Police that goes well beyond the passive intelligence collection role that you have described.

Finally, there were also press reports yesterday evening regarding an alleged Delta Force detention facility near the Baghdad International Airport that engages in coercive interrogations.

While the substance of your briefing to the Committee cannot be publicly discussed, we depend upon your complete candor and full


?

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller
May 21, 2004
Page Two

disclosure. If information is *only* provided in response to a question that is phrased in precisely the right way, it is virtually impossible for Congress to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibility.

I am disappointed and request a prompt explanation of the gaps and discrepancies in your presentation.

Sincerely,



Jane Harman
Ranking Democrat

June 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gingrich Memos

383.6

Please make sure all of these Newt Gingrich memos get to Geren, Maples and Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach:
Gingrich memos

DHR:dh
060904-21

Please respond by _____

9 Jun 04

OSD 15954-04

cc: Butler
Craddock

2/18/04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 12:59 PM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: for secdef-close abu ghraib immediately-newt

RS

from Newt
5/08/04

close Abu Ghraig immediately

this prison is a symbol of everything wrong in saddam's dictatorship and now a symbol of american violations of the rule of law

closing it would be a significant symbolic step towards 'cleaning things up'

it should be announced immediately and done within 30 days

the closing should be a public event when the last door is closed

newt

cc: LTG Craddock
Butler
Di Rita

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2004 8:03 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) ;om; jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: we are on a slippery slope in apologizing-newt

From Newt
5/5/04

I am very worried about the tone that is building. We are on the edge of slipping from Reaganism into Jimmy Carterism

I am submitting the following op ed today

A SUICIDAL DOOUBLE STANDARD
by Newt Gingrich

The coverage of the violations of American law against Iraqi prisoners is in grave danger of setting a suicidal double standard for America and the Arab world. Americans must be very careful in explaining how we feel and what we will do. Otherwise our enemies will use our own words as an excuse to establish a suicidal double standard for behavior.

Some Americans did a terrible thing. They will be investigated and where guilty punished. We do this because we protect our own constitution and we live under the rule of law.

The incident is something to be condemned.

The process of exposing the wrongdoing, investigating the charges, having a fair and honest trial of the accused with a presumption of their innocence until proven guilty, and punishing the guilty is something we should be proud of and clear about.

Explaining our anger at these misdeeds and our determination to punish the wrong doers is appropriate. Appearing overly contrite or overly apologetic will be a big mistake.

The anti-American left is already on radio and television exploiting this as an opportunity to exploit and opportunity to condemn America.

The primary Arab media said nothing when the Syrian dictator destroyed Homma and killed 30,000 plus innocent people.

11-L-0559/OSD/27010

The primary Arab media said nothing when Saddam used poison gas on his own people and created 300,000 anonymous graves.

One CNN official wrote an article admitting that they had deliberately covered up and ignored Saddam's atrocities to retain access to Baghdad. A policy of caution which of course is not reflected in their coverage of charges against America.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when Americans were mutilated and drug through the streets of Fallujah.

The primary Arab media said nothing negative when two gunmen ambushed a woman last Sunday in her station wagon and at point blank range methodically killed her four daughters age two to eleven, killed the eight month old baby she was carrying, and then killed her.

One American newspaper, with a half page dedicated to the allegations of brutality in Iraq, referred to the Sunday killing of a mother and five children as "violence marred the Sunday Likud election". No outrage, no shock, no horror, just another day of viciousness and brutality by our enemies.

There is a suicidal double standard building where Arab viciousness, terrorism, mutilation, and barbarism are normal behavior not to be commented on but any American error, including those we will uncover and punish ourselves, are proof of our guilt.

This is the road to Jimmy Carterism.

We should firmly state our commitment to our values, our condemnation of any American acts which violate those values and our explicit commitment to punish the guilty within a process of fairness and the rule of law.

With equal firmness we should demand of the Arab governments and the Arab media their condemnation of barbarism, brutality and terrorism in their own communities.

Finally, we should angrily reject anyone who would smear the 200,000 plus courageous decent men and women who have risked their lives for a free Iraq and a safe America. Any effort by the anti-American left of the Arab world to generalize this into a smear on America or on America's armed forces should be totally, directly, repudiated and condemned.

cc Craddock
Butter

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 8:19 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: urgent Tilly Fowler on Monday

from Newt 5/10/04

(C)

Urgent

you do not have time for Tilly Fowler to do an investigation and then report

you need to move Tilly front and center today so the country starts to focus on the investigation rather than the scandal

if Tilly Fowler is going to be your lead on the outside review of the prisoner scandal you should try to get her to the meeting with the President at the Pentagon today.

Time is not on our side.

The House and Senate members need to see something to get them to calm down and hold off as the bad news keeps coming.

Tilly would have real credibiltiy on the hill. The investigatons she conducted in the Clinton administration while she was still on the House Armed Services Committee and the investigations she conducted for you at the DPB can all be laid out for the press as proof of why she is the right person.

She should be:

1. built up in the press today and tomorrow
2. sent to the Hill for the week to meet with members and find out what questions they want answered
3. be given unlimited access to people and information
4. add three non-DPB prosecutors to her panel to increase credibility (the DPB is too insider for our critics to take its report as totally reliable)

5. have a consistent press operation both in the **US** and in Baghdad

the news is going to get worst and the Republican members on the Hill will start breaking ranks this week unless they have something to cling to

Tilly can be the person who lets them have an answer back home and to the media and in the floor debates when the Democrats are attacking

This must happen early this week or the whole situation could unravel with stunning speed

you want Tilly rather than secdef to be the person answering questions on next sundays shows

then she can go do the investigation with a lot of publicity from Baghdad

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

Copy provided to LTG
Craddock only!
per Newt's request.

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 2:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: secdef from newt

C

FTR

for secdef
from newt 5/08/04

the urgent need for a strategic plan to redefine the prison scandal

Trent Lott never understood how dangerous his situation was until it was too late.

As Speaker I never understood the corrosive power of constant hammering until I had been deeply weakened. Even when the charges were totally phony the weight of their being charged had impact and the repetition was debilitating and distanced my allies who got tired of defending me,

Dan Quayle never understood how he was being defined until the definition became unshakable.

The current moment is much more dangerous than people realize and it cannot be solved by tactical steps taken in response to events.

You have to assume that this scandal has just began.

There are active opponents of President Bush who would love to use this scandal as a method of weakening and defeating the President.

There are active opponents of American policy in Europe, the Middle East and the American news media who are delighted and invigorated by a chance to keep us on defense and to potentially define us as hypocrites and incompetents at best and willing doers of evil at worst.

There are supporters of the President who will see dumping the Secretary of Defense as an inexpensive way of saving the President.

There are Republicans in the House and Senate who have had thier feelings hurt over the last three and a half years by you and your team who will see this as an easy way of getting even.

All of these forces come together to create efforts to undermine, exaggerate, and exploit which will go on until one of four things happen:

11-L-0559/OSD/27014

5/8/2004

1. you leave and a new face is given a honeymoon;
2. the corner is turned and your visible action steps and clear explanations give you dominance over your critics;
3. the issue burns out and other issues replace it in the media's attention span;
4. the election occurs and the issue is made moot.

I assume 1 is not going to occur. I would deeply, passionately oppose your leaving because it would cripple the President with his base (it would be an act of Jimmy Carterite weakness) and it would be an historic injustice to you and a significant weakening of our national security capability at a key point in this war on terror.

The the best option is to turn the corner by taking such visible actions and explanations that your critics leave the field because they are losing.

It is very dangerous to assume that you can simply outlast the issue because it will take on a life of its own and new problems will erupt to keep you on defense.

Turning the corner requires three immediate steps in parallel:

1. create a very small strategic advisory group to think beyond each day and to develop action plans that enable you to regain the offense. This kind of group cannot have daily responsibilities and have to be tasked with redefining the entire set of issues onto terms favorable to you and the President. Three possible members of such an informal advisory group would be Randy Evans (my attorney and Hastert's attorney and a world class litigator who instinctively thinks strategically and works at regaining the offense by redefining the fight), Paul Johnson (the Washington head of Fleishmann-Hillard the most respected public relations firm in the world and the largest public relations contractor with the federal government--both Powell and Ridge recently praised their work-- and a good former House Republican administrative assistant from Michigan); and Bob Walker--now the head of Walker-Wexler and a board member of Hill and Knowlton. A small kitchen cabinet of these kind of outside strategic thinkers would give you far more options and would enrich dramatically what Dirita is trying to get done. They would also give you a lot of connectivity with realities that may not be obvious inside the Pentagon.

2. Establish a series of action items that can start rolling out Sunday night or Monday on a daily basis so you are back being in charge and getting things done. Time in the short run is not on your side and you have to reestablish a sense of command and clarity. Two examples would be closing the prison and appointing an outside civilian group of three prosecutors to review everything outside the military chain of command and ensure that the American rule of law is reestablished both for this problem and as doctrine and regulations for future occupations (prosecutors who had served in the military or graduated from the academies would be ideal).

11-L-0559/OSD/27015

3. You need to establish a mantra of determination to uncover what happened, punish the guilty, reestablish faith and trust with the Iraqi people by proving that a democracy protects the innocent and punishes the guilty and ensuring that safeguards are built to prevent this from happening in the future. Clinton developed a mantra in december 1995 of saving medicare, medicaid, education and the environment which they knew polled well and which they repeated maniacally. You need a similar mantra of guidelines you can use with the media, the congressm the public and the military and then use to communicate with Iraqis and the Middle East

These three steps would optimize your ability to start getting things under control and get back on offense

Let me know how I can help.

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Jhirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:02 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: for secdef-urgent from newt ON PACE AND RESILIENCE

for secdef
from newt 5/11/04



URGENT-PACE AND RESILIENCE

This is a difficult period.

you remain the most expensive and most valuable national security asset this country has.

Because the problems are going to be very complex and involve great conflict (there is an election going on at home , we have active enemies overseas, and we have a world media that loves to bash Americans so conflict is unavoidable), your health, energu, optimism and resilience are vital.

George Marshall had three heart attacks before World War Two and his doctor told him he could either learn to work a limited day and delegate like crazy or he could train his successor because after the fourth heart attack someone new would be Chief of Staff. Marshall later said this was the advice which enabled him to run a global war.

You should follow Marshall's regimen:

1. Take one full day a week off and a weekend every three weeks;
- 2, set priorities of which managing Iraq, handling the principals level national security council and dealing with the media and Congress should belong to you (you are the closer, no one else can do these three); everything else should be explicitly delegated with Wolfowitz and Myers coordinating the delegated zones;
3. outside Iraq, nes media and Congress you should only be asked to decide things which myers and wolfowitz can't decide.

you MUST pace yourself to retain energy and resilience

11-L-0559/OSD/27017

cc Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 11:20 PM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: immediate publicity for Fowler and the investigative mission-newt

It is vital to get Fowler in the media as soon as possible. This will move the spotlight from the pictures and problems of the past to the investigations and reforms of the future.

She should do media through the Sunday shows and then we will have imprinted that we are in a new stage with a new set of leaders who are looking at everything from a fresh viewpoint.

This will embolden our allies to argue our case and it will calm down and satisfy the independents who are undecided. Because of Tilly's reputation and personality it will also calm a lot of the liberal Democrats and force them to slow down and wait for the report.

This only occurs if she is in the media enough to force through the message that we are in a new period with a new personality.

Simply appointing the DPB group and then having them disappear into an investigative mode accomplishes nothing in the near future and it is the near future that is critical.

Furthermore Tilly is a new face and a new personality and this will give the media an opportunity to be positive and interested in someone new. She will almost automatically lower the rhetoric and the intensity of the coverage.

Tilly has a very clear set of messages she can stick to. They will be very reassuring to the American people and yet will not prejudice the investigation in any way.

Her primary talking points ought to be:

1. she has done a number of investigations and there is a systematic pattern of finding the facts, exposing and prosecuting the guilty, and learning what we need to change to improve the future:
2. as a former member of Congress she will work very hard to meet the concerns of her former colleagues in the House and Senate and to ensure that when the investigation is done they will be satisfied with the report as they have been

11-L-0559/OSD/27018

5/11/2004

satisfied with other reports she has made in the past.

3. as someone who has sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution she knows full well how precious our commitment to the rule of law and our belief that every person is endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights is. She believes fully that those principles extend to anyone under American custody and she will approach these investigations with those principles in mind.

4. Schlesinger and she have been reassured that they are leading an independent investigation with full access to the facts and with full ability to learn and explore wherever it leads to. She is convince the President and the Secretary of Defense are serious about getting at the truth and she intends to be very tough in ensuring that they get the truth.

5. She fully expects to brief her former colleagues and to satisfy their interest in every aspect of this difficult problem. She is taking the time to ask their adviser and to ascertain their concerns so that when the report is done it will have more than met congressional expectations.

6. as a former elected official she realizes fully the obligation federal officials owe the American people and she will do everything she can to ensure that people look back on this period as a sad moment of failure in a great system and that they will be convinced problems have been fixed, systems have been improved, the guilty have been punished, and America is upholding its obligations to its own citizens and to people around the world. That is why she is willing to take time off from her job at the law firm to undertake this assignment for the Secretary and the President.

June 9, 2004

383.9

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Results of Interrogations

We ought to have something that shows the kinds of information that interrogations have produced by way of intelligence to save people's lives.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-19

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04
Closed - 6/16/04
DR

*SD provided with
Results of interrogation
briefing back on June 16, 2004
ICW meeting w/ Mr. Geren
& Mr. Maple*

97unfb

OSD 15955-04

TO THE GOVERNOR
MAY 24, 2004
8:30 AM

May 21, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Examples

We should try to get unclassified examples of the intelligence value that has been achieved by interrogations. Information has enabled us to capture other terrorists and to save people's lives. Let's try to do this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-37

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/27021

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Theater Interrogation Operations Highlights

(July 03 - May 04)

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Intelligence Enabled

- **Operational Battle:** Foreign Fighters, Suicide Bombers, Terrorist Groups
- **Survival Technology:** Former Regime U.S.D. WMD Capabilities, NBCD, IED, Research, etc.; MOPAD Application, proliferation
- **Counterintelligence:** Former Iraqi Intelligence Service, Force Protection
- **Political/Military:** Iraqi Tribal Groups, Religious fundamentalist politics, Former Regime Elements
- **Other:** New Iraqi Alliances, Financing, Third country ties, weapons, foreign fighters, financial support, and Anticollusion emergent leadership

Intelligence Produced

- Interrogation led to capture of Saddam Hussein
- Issuance of C2 structures, weapons caches, financial support and operating bases
- Over 4,000 interrogations under combat conditions resulting in 1,000+ reports since July 03.

Key Operational Support

- Top 50 of Former Regime, Baku, U.S. management, Central Operations, Jalalab, Ramadh, An-Najaf, Amara, Al-Furqan, Mosul, AMIA, Force Protection, Former Regime, 30 June 04 transfer, sovereignty

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 03	Detainee gave information that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein. Arrested for his support of Saddam Hussein since the fall of Baghdad. Detainee provided information on other Saddam enablers. Interrogations included information on some of Saddam's wealth being brought into a third country.	Facilitated capture of Saddam Hussein and capture of Ba'ath Party officials. Interrogation of distributor of Saddam Hussein's wealth.
	Over 70 Intelligence Reports produced.	
Winter 03	Interrogations provided the names of associates of Saddam Hussein. Also detainee stated that he related to the locations of hidden weapons caches due to his position and influence.	Used information to locate and destroy weapons caches.
	Over 200 Intelligence Reports produced.	

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Spring 04	Detainee was captured in association with a major known terrorist organization. Detainee provided critical information on the group's command structure. Detainee provided key operational information about other terrorist agents. Detainee has also provided information concerning the organization's financial methods and details on its structure, tactics, and messaging.	Currently exploiting networks, capabilities, leads on agents. Building a comprehensive understanding of the organization's role and agenda in Iraq.
	Over 20 Intelligence Reports produced.	
Summer 04	Detainee provided general information on other previous detainees of Saddam Hussein. Reported on Ba'ath Party cells inside of Iraq. Gave insight into former regime intelligence groups. He believed that only two people in Iraq would know of WMD existence. Names were passed to Iraq Survey Group.	Briefing and location information since capture of 3 of top 55 mass weapons. Report regime elements involved in pipeline sabotage.
	Over 200 Intelligence Reports produced.	

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Key leader in global terrorist organization. Provided information on media venues for various terrorist propaganda operations. Interrogations highlighted high level foreign fighter support before the coalition invaded Iraq.	Provided current and past terrorist network structure. Information used to target and attack the terrorist network.
	Nearly 30 Intelligence Reports produced.	
Spring 04	Provided information on the activities of Maghda al-Sadr and his organization to include the breakdown of the Office of Maghda Al Sadr (OMS) throughout Iraq, Sadr's security procedures, OMS financing, and Sadr's key lieutenants.	Aided in the capture of other members of Sadr's network including key lieutenants.
	Nearly 10 Intelligence Reports produced.	

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Winter 04	Detainee was an intelligence officer from the former Iraqi Intelligence Service. He served as an agent and trainer. Detainee reported reliable on the location of Sadr's family in a third country, as well as his movement patterns and hiding places in Najaf.	Identified leader of operating in Fallujah. Positively identified other Front region intelligence officers.
	10 Intelligence Reports published.	
Winter/Spring 04	Detainee is suspected of being associated with the Zarqawi network. A Foreign fighter that entered Iraq to join the jihad against coalition forces. Detainee provided information on a safe house location associated with the marshalling of foreign fighters from a neighboring country into Baghdad. Detainee claims to have met with Zarqawi on three separate occasions.	Provided actionable intelligence in support of current operations.
	8 Intelligence Reports published.	

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Summer 03	Detainee identified a "front" travel agency providing transportation for weapons smuggling between Baghdad and neighboring countries. The favorite vehicles used for this group's smuggling operations are a brand of western SUV. The vehicles have been used to transport weapons and IEDs into Iraq. The detainee claims that the SUVs in question were used to transport weapons and IEDs into Iraq. The detainee claims that the SUVs in question were used to transport weapons and IEDs into Iraq. The detainee claims that the SUVs in question were used to transport weapons and IEDs into Iraq.	Information used in profile of weapons smuggling.
Summer/Summer	Provided information regarding Sadr's militia, its structure, and its operations. Detainee provided information regarding Sadr's militia, its structure, and its operations. Detainee provided information regarding Sadr's militia, its structure, and its operations. Detainee provided information regarding Sadr's militia, its structure, and its operations.	Provided background from which to conduct further intelligence.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Spring 04	Detainee claimed to have been in the process of performing his duties (PE Internal Affairs). Subject was involved in attacks on Coalition and IF forces. Subject transported weapons and ammunition for Maghadi's Militia between locations. Detainee was in the possession of a battery-powered weapon, and an unknown amount of Iraqi currencies. Detainee provided extensive information regarding structure and organization of Maghadi's Militia. Detainee provided information on how and where to find both forged and real passports from other countries including national couriers.	Used detainee to positively identify captured members of insurgent group.

10 Intelligence Reports published.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Spring 04	Detainee is a confirmed foreign fighter from a neighboring country. Detainee was detained during a raid to apprehend another High Value Target. He was captured with two other foreign nationals and their weapons. Detainee admitted to training into the role of a fighter against Coalition forces. He stated that he has become disillusioned with the idea and desires to return to his country. Detainee admitted to being involved in intelligence gathering and being involved in Iraq. He stated that he has become disillusioned with the idea and desires to return to his country. Detainee admitted to being involved in intelligence gathering and being involved in Iraq.	Confirmed foreign fighter executing. Identified other countermeasures involved with tactical fighting.

4 Intelligence Reports published.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Summer 03	Detainee reaffirmed biographical data given during previous interrogations. He provided details and lists of department discussions at the Iraqi National Agency and reformed and current activities of the agency. Detainee was willing to provide Baghdad's proposed locations of people named by Coalition Forces.	Used information to identify and coordinate intelligence efforts. Provided information to provide the best information.
Fall 03	Detainee claimed the man who attempted to recruit him was being held in the Fall was a member of the Baghdad-based group. The name of the man was not given. The man was a member of the Baghdad-based group. The name of the man was not given. The man was a member of the Baghdad-based group. The name of the man was not given.	Continue to detain for suspect determine against humanity.

4 Intelligence Reports.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
July 03	Discussed Saddam's security parties to his doubts. Discussed Saddam's whereabouts, most access detainee had to Saddam Hussein. Detainee had witnessed Saddam Hussein's response millions of dollars from Bin Laden and had knowledge of the disposition. Bin Laden's last around the beginning of April.	Confidence Forces were able to recover the funds from Saddam's distribution.
July 03	Captured in the possession of the following: New York bank account statement for user's foreign passport day planner riding non-loyalty member. (HAWAIIAN) (HAWAIIAN)	Passed by the FBI.

Multiple Intelligence Reports.

Theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

Date Detained	INFORMATION OBTAINED	Results - what did we do with this?
Fall 03	General Officer claiming to have relinquished his Kuwaiti membership in 1992 so that his pavilion is used by humanitarian committees would be viewed as more helpful than political. Detainee claims that the Republican League had knowledge of Captain Michael Speicher's fate. Detainee reported that Iraqi POWs who refused to come home after the Iraq-Iraq war were working with Iranian supporting groups and performing attacks on coalition forces.	Information on Speicher passed to ING. Provided information on training influence in post-Saddam Iraq.

Multiple Intelligence Reports published.

10 Intelligence Reports published.

theater Interrogation Highlights From July 03

IIS Sponsored IED and VBIED Project

The Explosives sections of the Iraqi Intelligence Service's (IIS), were created to supply the IIS, Saddam Fedayeen, and the Iraqi military with explosives, detonators, and the vessels used to conceal the explosives. Due to the projects specializing mainly in the creation of IEDs and VBIEDs.

Through Interrogations of the detained IIS project members, the Coalition learned of bomb making techniques that were proliferated to various anti-coalition groups in Iraq that continue to improve upon and develop these IEDs and VBIEDs.

The intelligence from the project allowed Coalition Forces to conduct raids against several bomb producing cells and to develop several countermeasures to IED employment.

June 9, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Briefings on Detainees

I hope you folks are keeping a master list of all the briefings before Congress, to everybody, where we talked about detainees, including the breakfasts here.

It seems to me we are going to want to have that list and maybe get it out there soon to blunt the attack that we are not talking to Congress, we are not briefing them, and they don't know what is going on, because they do, and we should have that list. We should think about getting it into the hands of our friends up there.

Let me see what it looks like.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-17

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

9 Jun 04

OSD 15957-04



June 9, 2004

326

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Roles and Missions

Let's think through who we want to be at a meeting with Brownlee, Schoomaker, Myers, Pace, and maybe Jim Haynes to talk about roles and missions and the fact that it ought to go up from McKiernan through the Army chain.

We ought to figure out who is supposed to do what, and whether or not we need some clarification in administrative orders or the law.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060904-15



Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 15960-04

4 Jun 04

June 9, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thoughts for the Remarks on Abuse Issue

383.6

The first thing that has to be said is that we know there is still more information to come, investigations are underway, and new information will develop as the investigations are completed. That having been said, there are some things that can be asserted now:

1. At least thus far, we have not seen anything that suggests that a senior official of the US Government, military or civilian, authorized or encouraged guidance or authorization to those managing custody of detainees that permitted them to use torture or to treat any detainee in anything other than a humane manner as directed by the President.
2. Further, thus far, we are not aware of any detainee who was, despite the President's instructions, tortured or treated in an inhumane manner for the purpose of interrogation.
3. The photos from Abu Ghraib depict mistreatment of detainees, but thus far our information shows that any such mistreatment would be contrary to the guidance, instructions, procedures and techniques that have been in place at various times since September 11, 2001.

DHR:dh
060904-8

Please respond by _____

970004

OSD 15967-04

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meet w/Gingrich

Let's get Newt Gingrich in for lunch, so I can talk to him about his discussion on the size of the Army. Maybe have Pete Schoomaker there.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/4/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

DHR:dh
060904-6

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

000.71SD

9 Jun 04

OSD 15969-04

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM
To: (b)(6) Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army

finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap--the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

11-L-0559/OSD/27029

6/7/2004

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the adminstration is wrong on both

June 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Airline Tickets

U.S.H.C.

Please have somebody look into the facts behind this article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Margasak, Larry. "Pentagon Wasted Millions on Airline Tickets, GAO Says." *Washington Post*, June 9, 2004, p. 8.

DHR:dh
060904-3

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

hounfb

OSD 15972-04

Washington Post
June 9, 2004
Pg. 8

Pentagon Wasted Millions On Airline Tickets, GAO Says

By Larry Margasak, Associated Press

The Defense Department spent an estimated \$100 million for airline tickets that were not used over six years and failed to seek refunds even though the tickets were reimbursable, congressional investigators say.

The department compounded the problem by reimbursing employee claims for tickets the Pentagon bought, the investigators said.

To demonstrate how easy it was to have the Pentagon pay for airline travel, the investigators posed as defense employees, had the department generate a ticket and showed up at the ticket counter to pick up a boarding pass.

The General Accounting Office of Congress issued the findings in two reports on the Pentagon's lack of control over airline travel, copies of which the Associated Press obtained yesterday. A prior report, issued last November, found that the Pentagon bought 68,000 first-class or business-class airline seats for employees who should have flown coach.

"At a time when our soldiers are patrolling the streets of Iraq in unarmored Humvees, and when the Bush administration is asking for record defense spending, Secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld is letting hundreds of millions of dollars that could be used to protect our troops and our country go to waste," said Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky (D-Ill.), one of three lawmakers -- along with Republican Sens. Charles E. Grassley (Iowa) and Susan Collins (Maine) -- who ordered the studies.

The GAO estimated that between 1997 and 2003, the Defense Department bought at least \$100 million in tickets that were not used or used only partially by a passenger who did not complete all legs of a flight. The waste went undetected because the department relied on individuals to report the unused tickets. They did not.

The Pentagon said in a written statement that it is working to ensure it receives credit in the future for each unused ticket.

"We take this deficiency in our procedures very seriously and are moving swiftly to establish proper management controls. The long-term answer will be the automated Defense Travel System [DTS] that controls the travel order and payment process from beginning to end," the statement said. "DOD is researching the data presented in the GAO report and will continue to pursue the amounts we determine are recoupable."

The reimbursable tickets had no advanced purchase requirements, minimum or maximum stays or penalties for changes or cancellations under department agreements with the airlines.

While one GAO report focused on the unused tickets, the second investigation found potential fraud. It said the department paid travelers for tickets the department bought and reimbursed employees for tickets that had not been authorized.

11-L-0559/OSD/27032

- A limited review of records for 2001 and 2002 identified 27,000 transactions totaling more than \$8 million in reimbursements to employees for tickets bought by the government. These figures represent only a small portion of the potential fraud, the GAO said.

It is a crime for a government employee knowingly to request reimbursement for goods and services he or she did not buy.

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEP 21 2004

204 OCT 13 PM 3:1

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Manning of **Standing** Joint ~~Task~~ Forces

We **simply** have to address the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. That is **not** acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a **first** cut at a **proposal** soon – no later than Oct. 1. This is something we have been wrestling with in the **building** for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21st century.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline


DHR:as
091304-17

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

OSD 15980-04

Tab A


CJTF-7 Manning Timeline



- activated
 - 1 J1 receives Phase IV JMD from CJTF-7
 - Instruction published
 - CENTCOM forwards multiple JMD changes to JFCOM
 - 1 informs CENTCOM that the JMD is frozen for P&SR
- 6 23 Jan 04: JFCOM, JS J1 P&SR: Services agree to source 598 of 640 (93%) IAs in CJTF-7 Phase IV IA requirements
 - 7 11 Feb 04: JFCOM releases message tasking Services to fill CJTF-7 IA requirements.
 - 8 15 Apr 04: P&SR for MNF-I/MNC-I. End of CJTF-7 JMD
 - 9 15 May 04: MNF-I/MNC-I stand-up. CJTF-7 stands down
 - 10 15 Jun 04: MNF-I/MNC-I FOC



CJTF-7 Manning Timeline





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

10 OCT 2004
CM-2119-04
13 October 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers 10/10*

SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

- **Issue.** "We simply have to address the problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal. Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. ...Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon--no later than Oct. 1." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** USJFCOM is developing a concept on forming, training and sustaining Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ). To address immediate manning concerns, a short-term solution will be provided to you by the end of October.
- **Discussion**
 - Regional combatant commands are on track establishing Standing Joint Force Headquarters in fiscal year 2005, as directed by the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance.
 - USJFCOM is developing a process for forming and sustaining future JTF HQs. It is taking a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with the Services, combatant commands and other agencies, which includes organizing, equipping and training future JTF HQs.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

OSD 15900-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27037

SEP 21 2004 20:00:13 FRI 3:30

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Manning of Standing Joint Task Forces

We simply have to address *the* problem of not having Standing Joint Task Forces capable of fighting wars. Please come back to me with a proposal.

Those timelines showing how undermanned headquarters are, long past after the wars are over. That is not acceptable in this day and age. Please come back with a first cut at a proposal soon – no later than Oct. 1. This is something we have been wrestling with in the building for 3 and a half years. We have to adapt to the imperatives of the 21st century.

Attach.
CJTF-7 Manning Timeline

DHR:sa
091304-17

.....
Please respond by 9/29/04

OSD 15980-04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Larry Di Rita
 Doug Feith
 VADM Jim Stavridis
 Paul Butler
AMB J.D. COACH

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Romania

ROMANIA

I should not have gone to see the base in Romania. It leaves the impression that I might select it, and, if I don't, it turns out to be a negative for our friends in Romania.

Let's avoid this in the future.

Thanks.

DHR:as
 101304-1

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 16018-04

~~FOUO~~

13 OCT 04



TO: Larry Di Rita
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 6, 2004
 SUBJECT: **William Mayer Article**

900

Let's make sure we get that William Mayer "D-Day" article out to as many people as you possibly can, as fast as you can. Send it out internally, and let's get it into the *Early Bird*.

Get a copy sent to Andy Card as well.

Possibly you might want to get it to the press people on the traveling team back at the Pentagon.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060604F.06ts

Attach: If D-Day Had Been Reported

Please respond by: _____

65 Jun 04

OSD 16112-04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: (b)(6)

To:

Sent from the Internet ([Details](#))

If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry. The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.

were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three-year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours.

"Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."

June 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: News Coverage

006

Duncan Hunter says his staff is doing a summary. They found out that the *Washington Post* did something like 50 or 60 articles on D-day and the Normandy invasion, and they did something like 107 on Abu Ghraib already.

You might want to talk to his staff about it. That is kind of an interesting fact. Don't use the numbers, because they are still working them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-9

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

OSD 16113-04

8 Jun 04

EF-9825
04/007758
C 6/9

June 8, 2004

W
W
W

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Trip to Taiwan

DR

I don't think it is a good idea for Brigadier General Allen to go to Taiwan right now. What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-14

.....
Please respond by 6/11/04

DR 6/9

NOTE FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy DTF by LIA 6/9/04

Per today's roundtable, BG Allen will not go.

8 Jun 04

OSD 16114-04

✓ ✓

TO: Jim Haynes
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 6, 2004
 SUBJECT: Witness

IRAQ

I notice that people are talking about me being a witness in Saddam Hussein's trial and also at an Abu Gahrib soldier's trial.

Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060604.07ts

Please respond by: _____

6/5

WA 7/8
C 7/6

Sir,
 Response attached.

v/cdr Nosenz
 7/6

654404

OSD 16116-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

04 7/8

INFO MEMO

June 29, 2004, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJH*

SUBJECT: Potential Testimony at Trial of Saddam Hussein or Courts-Martial of Soldiers Accused of Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison

- You asked about the potential of being called as a witness at either the trial of Saddam Hussein or at the courts-martial of soldiers charged with offenses at the Abu Ghraib Prison.

Saddam's Trial

- The Iraqis intend to try Saddam before the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for crimes against humanity and other crimes against the Iraqi people. The IST is not yet up and running – its procedures, including those related to witness requests, have yet to be promulgated.
- Media reporting suggests that Saddam's defense counsel may request you as a witness, citing your service as President Reagan's Special Middle East Envoy in the 1980s.
- The defense team could try to call high-profile witnesses as in the Milosevic case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Milosevic has listed President Clinton, Secretary Albright, Secretary Christopher, and General Clark as witnesses he would like to call. Due to delays in the case, including the replacement of the senior judge due to serious illness, this list has not yet been litigated.
- Such requests for senior U.S. officials or former officials, if approved by the court, present issues for the USG since the purpose would be to provide testimony about governmental rather than private actions. Testimony related to one's actions in a diplomatic capacity, such as your service as Special Middle East Envoy, present a significant additional factor that the USG would need to consider before deciding whether or not to provide the testimony.



- Since the IST process has not yet taken shape, it is too early to make an accurate assessment. My preliminary view, however, is that it is unlikely that the IST would order your testimony based on either your current or previous capacity. //

Court-Martial Cases

- Civilian defense attorneys for soldiers charged in Abu Ghraib cases have stated that they intend to call you and other senior civilian and military officials as defense witnesses.
- At recent pretrial hearings for two soldiers, however, counsel sought testimony from other senior officials but did not seek to compel your testimony. The military judge ordered that defense counsel be given the opportunity to interview GEN Abizaid, LTG Sanchez, and their subordinates. These interviews could lead to requests for certain senior officials to appear as witnesses at trial.
- Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the defense counsel must demonstrate the relevance and materiality of expected testimony; this requirement helps guard against frivolous requests for senior officials as witnesses.
- Even if defense counsel can meet the threshold of relevance and materiality, the trial counsel (prosecutor) could first seek other means to obtain the evidence deemed relevant. Normally, the trial judge would work with the attorneys to obtain the evidence deemed relevant by means other than the witness's attendance in court. The parties could agree to stipulate to facts or to the statement that the witness would be expected to offer were he or she to appear in court.
- My assessment is that it is unlikely in these cases that a court-martial would require your testimony. //

10:10 AM

TO: Ron Sega

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

Attached is a letter from a friend from college who is talking about a composite that has been developed. Are you aware of it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.04

Attach: Ltr from Mac Williams to SD

Please respond by: 6/10

451

OSD 16117-04

17JUN04

May 19, 2004

(1)

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Don,

Time will be precious at our 50" so I wanted to write some thoughts to share with you.

You know how I value our friendship. From the mats and Cap & Gown to Pensacola, to the nasty phone calls as you checked out in a new aircraft, to your meeting with Grant and the thoughts that we have shared by mail, you know how I feel about you and the jobs you have done.

Enough of that- Several questions- Why are we court marshaling a young (misguided) soldier so quickly yet- Saddam is no where near a trial which should result in his death? (2)

Some people have really let you down in Iraq. My friend Alex said we aren't getting the information that we should. There is a fine line as to what can be done to help catch the other bad guys but I know that somehow you will squeeze out the information that you need to save other servicemen.

One thing for the future- A Princetonian from Houston has developed a composite material with which he can make a vehicle that will stop an RPG and/or a 50 caliber bullet!! It would weigh 20% of the armored Humvee and provide the needed protection for the occupants. When you get back to D.C. would you please advise me to whom we might speak to explore a demonstration of the material? I have seen the material and it is truly amazing, 1/5 the weight of steel yet stronger!!

Dick Respass got a physics degree from Princeton, is an E.R.M.D. and has developed several cars in the past for auto racing. I recruited him years ago (as a single wing center) and have stayed in touch with him over the years. He is Class of '70 and a real character. We would love to talk to the proper procurement people, as the material could be a real breakthrough for your vehicles. Is Roy Du Boise still working for you? (3)

If you have time to talk with my Granddaughter it will be great. She would be a great catch for Princeton!! My best always to you and Joyce.


Best Regards, *always*

Jim
Jim MacWilliam

11-L-0559/OSD/27049



11:01 AM

TO: Les Brownlee
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
 DATE: June 1, 2004
 SUBJECT: **Media**

006

Would you please give me a one-pager on that point you made about WWII and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.12

Please respond by: 6/7

15 JUN 04

OSD 16119-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

June 7, 2004, 2:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Media, D-Day, and 24/7 news coverage

*Brownlee -
Mr. Secretary -
Shorely is in
what you had in
mind - Lee*

- Secretary of Defense's note of June 1, 2004, 11:01 A.M., requested a one-page response on World War II and D-Day, and how the press would be carrying it if they had 24/7 news back then.
- One-page information paper attached. Conclusion is that media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy - and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTC John Shaw, (b)(6)

Information Paper: Thoughts on D-Day and Current Media Practices

1. Current media practices might have led to some of the headlines below and put the campaign at risk in several ways: shaking the confidence of the American public and the troops, inviting premature Congressional or Administration involvement, and compromising the operational plan itself or the deception plan upon which operational success depended.
2. TOP SECRET OVERLORD PLAN CALLS FOR MASSIVE AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULTS IN NORMANDY!! With today's 24/7 news cycle it might be impossible to keep news of such a massive operation a closely guarded secret. The tendency of news "leaks" and news organizations putting the public's "right to know" above all other considerations would likely lead to premature compromise.
3. GERMANS DUPED; NORMANDY THE MAIN ATTACK!!! Allied deception plans depended upon Germans believing the main attack would be the Pas de Calais, even after landings at Normandy had already occurred. A complex charade portrayed an entire dummy army commanded by Patton scattered across the southeastern English countryside. Given the intrusiveness of international reporting today and the rapidity of media distribution, could this secret have been kept? Would the media have revealed what they could find of the war plan, perhaps indirectly by the virtue of retired senior officers who know our organizational habits so well they can inevitably connect the dots while on international broadcasts?
4. LANDINGS BOTCHED; HUNDREDS DEAD ON THE BEACHES!!! War is usually untidy. A lot can look wrong even when things are going well overall. A media tendency to focus negatively on the sensational or tragic distorts the overall picture. While D-Day was a striking success, with the bulk of nine divisions ashore on the first day and casualties far more modest than anticipated by operational planners, nevertheless a lot went wrong. The 116th regiment in the very first wave took extremely heavy casualties before making their way onto shore, amphibious tanks sank in rough seas, Rangers attacked positions already emptied of their guns at Pont du Hoc, paratroopers were widely scattered, some landing craft hit the wrong beaches, the Air Corps missed key designated targets, and French civilians were killed in preparatory bombardments. The larger success of getting tens of thousands ashore with thousands of tons of equipment in the face of stiff opposition might be lost in media reports that focused on these negative events. How would the public and the troops have reacted to a real time fixation on those things that went wrong?
5. EISENHOWER MAY BE CALLED BACK FOR HEARINGS; MANY CALL FOR MARSHALL AND STINSON TO RESIGN; FDR REELECTION IN DOUBT! Congress and the Administration understandably want to contribute to mission success. Alarming news or apparent controversy can trigger their intervention – often unnecessarily or prematurely. Eisenhower launched in uncertain weather, significant tensions lurked beneath the apparent amity of the uniformed allies, and much went wrong on the first day. Allied military leaders worked through all of this successfully. How dysfunctional would the distraction have been if they had had to respond in real time to their political leadership to every rumor or whiff of controversy?
6. Tensions among operational security, the delegation of command authority and the freedom of the press present an enormous challenge to the conduct of modern warfare. Media technology and practices developed over the past sixty years might have proven disastrous at Normandy – and perhaps are dysfunctional now.

file

11:35 AM

793

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Round Table**

IRAP

Do you have any thoughts on this paper from Steve Cambone? Do you think it is OBE or is there something we ought to be doing. Let's talk at Round Table.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.15

Attach: Thoughts on Next Steps in Iraq 5/28/04 - Cambone

Please respond by: _____ 6/8

OSD 16121-04

1 Jun 04

28 May 2004, 10:10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN IRAQ

The handover of sovereignty is a ready-made opportunity to reset DOD relationships with State and CIA to ensure closer cooperation and greater effectiveness in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Iraq.

Following are thoughts on steps you might consider taking to reset those relationships:

- Host a meeting with the Secretary of State, the DCI, Ambassador Negroonte, and General George Casey.
 - Agenda:
 - Settling the question of, "Who's in charge?"
 - Establishing a communications plan so that each of you is kept informed of the activities of the other and coordination is done expeditiously on important issues;
 - Clarification on "lanes in the road in Iraq."
 - Creation of a State-DOD-CIA support group in Washington, D.C., to back-stop Baghdad. It could be State-chaired and held accountable for resolving issues or, if they cannot resolve them quickly, for referring them to you, the Secretary of State, and the DCI.
- DOD team. This could be an opportunity to put a new face on DOD's lead for Iraqi affairs. It would have the advantage of freeing the OSD Policy shop from detailed day-to-day support while, at the same time, allowing for the creation of a more operationally and technically oriented mission support staff.

SC

11-L-0559/OSD/27054

- It should be dedicated to the “back-office work” that would be needed to support Negroponte and Casey.
- This mission support staff should be a combined staff drawn from across OSD, the services, and the Joint Staff.
- It could be led by a senior DOD career civilian (e.g., Pete Verga, Lisa Bronson, etc.).
- It should have a military deputy drawn from either the services or the Joint Staff.
- It might occupy the spaces to be vacated by the CPA.
- Extending your influence over the DOD portion of the mission in Iraq. I have spoken with General Casey about the organization of his headquarters. I urged him to create a “strategy cell” whose sole purpose would be to give strategic direction to the military campaign in Iraq. The essence of that direction would be to craft military operations explicitly and specifically to support the broader political objectives we are pursuing and to identify those political, economic, reconstruction, and communications, etc., tasks to be directed by the U.S. Mission or the Iraqi government in support of military operations.
 - This might very well be the conduit through which you, the CJCS, General Abizaid, and General Casey might communicate and plan. As such, it would also serve as your channel for communication through Casey to Negroponte.

Whether you would embrace any or all of the above is, in my view, less important than your consideration of how we might make use of the transition of sovereignty to make a “new start” in our approach to affairs in Iraq. I believe that this can and should be done without any suggestion of dissatisfaction with the current arrangement. Instead, it should be presented as the recognition of the fact that circumstances on the ground are changing and that we are adjusting, in an appropriate manner, how we are going to deal with those circumstances.

11:39 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Time Line**

This Time Line is getting better. Let's bring it up to date to June 1st, let's add the Abu Ghraib photos, and I think maybe the suspension of the tanker is a pretty big thing, and maybe a few points where we show what percentage of our 48 Presidential Appointees are filled, and update this on a quarterly basis. I think that is important to show. Then ask some other people what else might be added.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.16

Please respond by: 6/10

383.6

17 Jun 04

OSD 16122-04

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Draft

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28 Dec
Announcement
of SecDef
nomination


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


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


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
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2004



11:56 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker

c c : Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: **Working Draft 2/9/04 - A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint And Expeditionary Mindset**

0005

This working draft Army White Paper of an Army at War is excellent! I saw the February 9th draft. I assume you have a later one. When you get it finished, I would like a copy to send over to the President.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.19

Please respond by: _____

OSD 16125-04

17404

Serving a Nation at War

A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset

(Draft Army White Paper)



Strategic Context

Our Army is serving a Nation at war. To win this war the Nation must meld all elements of our national power in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign to defeat those who challenge our very way of life. This is not a 'contingency,' nor is it a 'crisis.' It is a new reality that Soldiers understand all too well: since 9/11, more than a battalion's worth killed in action, more than a brigade's worth severely wounded. Their sacrifice has liberated more than 46 million souls from oppression. As these words are written, the Army is undertaking the largest rotation of forces in its history, and 9 of its 10 active divisions—all but the 2 ID already committed to Korea—will have seen action in Afghanistan or Iraq. More than 128,000 reservists have been activated in the last 2 years, and more than 300,000 Soldiers are forward deployed. We are an Army at War.

For any war, as Clausewitz pointed out, it is essential to understand "the kind of war on which (we) are embarking." Although the fundamental nature of war is constant, its methods and techniques change, chameleon-like, to match the strategic context and operational capabilities at hand. The United States is driving a rapid evolution in the methods and techniques of war. Our

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that it is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

Clausewitz, *On War*

A cursory examination of the ideas in competition may forecast the depth and duration of this conflict. The United States, its economy dependent on overseas resources and trade, has launched a wave of globalization in both markets and ideas. Regions and countries prepared to participate in this phenomenon have benefited. For others, it has precipitated failure, resentment, and rejection. Especially in the Muslim world, while some have embraced modernity, others remain content with the traditional patterns of Islam, and a few are irreconcilably opposed to the modernizing influences of the West. Committed to preserving the secular authority of religion, and intolerant of any faith other than Islam, their ideas directly conflict with western ideas of religious freedom and secular pluralism. Even reduced to a one or two percentage of the Islamic world, this pool of irreconcilables poses a threat of several *million* potential combatants.

And this is but one of the challenges we currently face. In the Far East, North Korea's threatened nuclearization risks intensifying more than 50 years of unremitting hostility, and North Korea is not the only potential enemy actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. Today, moreover, we confront a growing risk that such weapons will find their way into the hands of non-state groups or individuals anxious to apply them to our homeland, and with no homelands of their own to protect. Meanwhile, the technologies — particularly information technologies — that underwrite our current conventional military advantages are highly fungible, and it is not unrealistic to foresee a time when regional competitors may achieve parity or perhaps even superiority in “niche” military technologies tailored to their political ambitions. Concurrently, we see emerging operational concepts and capabilities that will enable us to pursue ways of war that are increasingly rapid, simultaneous, and non-contiguous. These future operational requirements loom even as we must pursue our current conflict.

Some might equate our current challenge to the Cold War but there are critical distinctions :

- Our non-state adversaries are not satisfied with a “cold” standoff, but instead seek at every turn to make it “hot.”
- Our own forces can't focus solely on future overseas contingencies, but also must defend bases and facilities both at home and abroad today.
- Because some of our adversaries are not easily deterred, our national strategy is not “defensive” but “preventive.”
- Above all, because at least some current adversaries consider “peaceful coexistence” with the United States unacceptable, we must either alter the convictions prompting their hostility or destroy them outright by war.

That is neither the context nor the strategy for which we designed today's United States Army. Therefore the Army must meet the supreme test of all armies: *to rapidly adapt to circumstances which it could not foresee*. Fundamental to that adaptation will be our rapid evolution to *a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset*.

Expeditionary

The Army is no stranger to expeditionary operations. WWI saw deployment of the American Expeditionary Forces, WWII the Allied Expeditionary Force, and since WWII the Army has executed a wide array of operations involving the temporary deployment of ground forces to distant places. But by some today, the United States Army is no longer perceived to be “expeditionary.” That perception is largely an artifact of the prolonged forward stationing of Army forces during the Cold War, when the Army focused on known rather than hypothetical threats, on developed rather than austere theaters, and on rapid reinforcement rather than contingency deployment. Historically, such conditions have been the exception rather than the rule, and so they are today.

Some might argue that the primary distinction of an expeditionary operation is its short duration. Neither history nor strategic guidance – which calls for expeditionary forces capable of sustained operations – confirm such a definition. Others view expeditionary

as speed of responsiveness, but this perception, too, is not complete. In the Cold War the United States was prepared to reinforce Europe with 10 divisions within 10 days, but this responsiveness was not perceived as "expeditionary." The reason for this is significant: in the Cold War we knew exactly where we would fight and we met this requirement through prepositioning of units or unit sets in a very developed theater. The uncertainty as to where we must deploy, the probability of a very austere operational environment, and the requirement to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace, pose an entirely different challenge – and the fundamental distinction of expeditionary operations.

This challenge is above all one of mindset, because American soldiers are predisposed with good reason to seek certainty, planning, preparation and synchronization in the application of force. We have engaged repeatedly in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity, to be sure, but always viewing such operations as the exception rather than the rule. That must no longer be the case. In this globalized world, our enemies shift resources and activities to those areas least accessible to us. As an elusive and asymmetric enemy seeks refuge in the far corners of the earth, the "norm" will be short notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, incomplete information – indeed, the requirement to fight *for* information, rather than fight *with* information. This is the essence of the expeditionary mindset we seek.

Joint

The touchstone of our style of warfare is combinations, a style in which no nation on earth can match us. Each of our armed services excels in combining a wide array of technologies and tools in each dimension—land, air, sea and space—to generate a synergy that overwhelms our opponents. Today, that same emphasis on combinations extends beyond single service to joint operations. No longer satisfied merely to deconflict the activities of the several services, we now seek joint *interdependence*.

Interdependence is more than just interoperability, the assurance that service capabilities can work together smoothly. It is even more than integration to improve their collective efficiency and tempo. Instead, joint interdependence combines service capabilities to maximize their complementary rather than merely reinforcing effects, concurrently using each to offset the vulnerabilities of the others. There are several compelling reasons for doing so:

- First, modern technology has extended the reach of weapons far beyond their "dimensions of origin." For example, land-based cruise missiles threaten ships at sea, and land-based air defenses pose challenges to air, sea and even space-based capabilities. Defeating the mirror-image threat within a service's primary dimension of interest will no longer suffice.
- Second, in addition to achieving daunting supremacy within the air, maritime, and space dimensions, our sister services are developing increasingly powerful capabilities that can influence land combat directly.

- Third, the very nature of expeditionary operations argues for leveraging every potential tool of speed, operational reach, and precision, the very strengths offered by our sister services.

The central prerequisites of a commitment to interdependence are broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each service's capabilities, clear agreement about how those capabilities will be committed in any given operational setting, and absolute mutual trust that, once committed, they will be employed as agreed.

At the strategic level, interdependence has pervaded the Army's thinking for over a century. Bereft of organic strategic lift, we can neither deploy nor sustain ourselves without the support of the other services. But our commitment to interdependence has not always extended to the tactical level. Constrained by the tyranny of terrain, ground forces operate in an environment in which movement and observation are restricted, command and control are fragile, and the risk of surprise is omnipresent. That inherent friction encourages a preference for organizational autonomy and redundancy, and tends to prejudice soldiers against relying on others for essential ingredients of tactical survival and success. In the past, moreover, that prejudice too often has both prompted and been reinforced by inter-service rivalries reflecting concerns far removed from the practical imperatives of the battlefield.

An Army at War can't afford that indulgence. War has a bad habit of exposing theories built upon prejudice rather than proof, and Iraq and Afghanistan have been no different. The "air or sea or land"-power debates are over. Our collective future is irrefutably joint. To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services right down to the tactical level. In turn, that will require us to develop operational concepts and capabilities that are joint from the outset, not merely as an afterthought.

Campaign Quality

While our two magnificently successful campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a tantalizing glimpse of the nascent power of jointness and of the unarguable need for expeditionary capabilities,

" ... even within Iraq itself, there are different challenges based on where you are. MG Dave Petraeus (101st Division in Mosul, northern Iraq) is doing a great job in the north, with the demographics he has up there. But that differs from what MG Ray Odierno (4th Infantry Division, Tikrit area) is doing. MG Chuck Swannack (82nd Airborne) has a different challenge in the west. And BG Marty Dempsey in the 1st Armor Division has Baghdad and he deals with entirely different conditions. And we are working with Coalition Forces, the British in particular, and with the Poles I think we are learning a lot, but at the same time we are learning that we can't forget there are other challenges out there that the Army has to be prepared to face. So right up front I will tell you that we are very mindful that you can't apply all of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to the responsibilities that the Army has to defend the nation and be part of the joint team."

GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff

those same experiences also demonstrate that neither the duration nor the character of even the most brilliantly conducted campaign is readily predictable. Especially in wars intended to liberate rather than subjugate, decisive victory implies winning a competition of ideas, and thereby fundamentally changing the conditions that prompted the conflict. Long after the defeat of Taliban and Iraqi military forces, we continue to wage just such campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The campaigning qualities of an Army thus entail not only its ability to conduct sustained combat operations throughout a battlespace of shifting scope, but also its ability to adapt its operations to unpredictable but often profound changes in the context and character of the conflict. The Army's preeminent challenge, then, within the joint framework, is to reconcile the agility and responsiveness to conduct rapid expeditionary deployments with the power, durability and adaptability to carry a conflict to a victorious conclusion no matter what form it eventually takes.

"Are You Wearing Your Dogtags?"

"Are you wearing your dogtags?" Does the question surprise you? It might if you view peace as the norm, and war the exception. But our new reality is simple:

- a conflict of irreconcilable ideas
- a desperate pool of potential combatants numbering in the millions
- adaptive adversaries seeking our destruction by any means possible
- an evolving asymmetric threat that will relentlessly seek shelter in those environments and methods for which we are least prepared.
- a foreseeable future of extended conflict in which we can expect to fight every day, and in which real peace will be the anomaly.

This new reality drives the transformation underway in the United States Army. Be it "mindset," "culture," or "attitude," it is the lens that shapes our perception and interpretation of the future, and governs our responses to its challenges. It is the logic for a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. Are you wearing your dog tags?

"On September 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country ... With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false ... These terrorists target the innocent and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. ... The evil is in plain sight ... We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them."

President Bush in London, Nov 19, 2003

Changing for Conflict

The Center of Our Formations

In a time of profound change, the United States Army can rely on only one certainty: The American Soldier will remain the center of our formations. In today's conflict, indeed, the Soldier is the weapon of choice. Able to fight even when deprived of nearly every tool but his or her skill, courage, and determination, the Soldier remains the irreplaceable foundation of the dynamic array of combinations that America will generate to defeat our enemies in any expeditionary environment. As the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter, the American Soldier is irrefutable proof that people are more important than hardware and quality more important than quantity.

Making Soldiers more effective and survivable is the first requirement of adaptation to a joint and expeditionary environment. However much the tools of war may improve, only

“Every Soldier is a Soldier first, regardless of whether they're a truck driver or a typist, a maintainer or infantryman. While technology has helped the Army become more lethal and effective, individual Soldiers still do the fighting ... technology has to enhance the human dimension. ... Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It's a test of wills. It's a test of things deep within US.”

Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Soldiers with the capacity to endure the hardships of war can exploit them. Their very identity will evolve as the specialization that contributed so effectively to industrial age warfare gives way to greater flexibility, multifunctionality, and a warrior ethos. That ethos reflects the spirit of the pioneers who built our homeland, of whom it rightly

was said: “*The cowards never came. The brave arrived. The tough remained.*” It is a subtle, aggressive but controlled spirit based on quiet competence. It is recognition that closing with an enemy is not simply a matter of killing, but rather imposing one's will on that enemy to achieve the nation's purpose. It is the ultimate responsibility reserved only for the professional whose responsibility and discipline can moderate war's inevitable brutality.

Just as the Nation's expectations are evolving to reflect the realities of our current conflict, so too will expectations of Soldiers and their families. They will expect field duty before garrison duty. They will expect tactical movements and combat drills before drill and ceremony. They will expect deployment before reassignment. They will expect surprise before certainty. They will measure quality of life in terms of meaningful deployments and service to the Nation.

As brave and tough Americans join the United States Army, our values and training will transform them into warriors of character. Bound to each other by integrity and trust, they will learn that in the United States Army, every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to *initiative*: creating situations

for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army reflects an ethos of selfless service to the nation—a warrior culture, not a corporate one. And they will learn that it is not important who gets the credit, either within the Army or within the joint community; what's important is that the Nation is served.

Organizing for Conflict

Confronting an adaptive adversary, no singular solution will succeed, no matter how elegant, synchronized, or advanced. Its very 'perfection' will ensure its irrelevance, for an adaptive enemy will relentlessly eliminate the vulnerabilities it seeks to exploit and avoid the conditions necessary for its success. Instead, the touchstones of Army Transformation are diversity and adaptability. The Army must retain a wide range of capabilities while significantly improving their flexibility and versatility. Building an expeditionary Army with campaign qualities will require versatile forces that can mount smaller and shorter duration operations routinely without penalty to the Army's ability to transition to larger and more prolonged campaigns.

Modular Units. A key prerequisite to achieving that capability is developing more modular tactical organizations. The Army's force design has incorporated tailoring and task organization for decades, but primarily in the context of a large conventional war in which all echelons from platoon to Army Service Component Command were deployed. This presumption of infrequent, large-scale deployment allowed the Army to centralize certain functions at higher echelons of command, and implicitly assumed that deployment would largely be complete before employment began. Moreover, presuming peace to be the default condition, the Army garrisoned the bulk of its tactical units with a view to economic efficiency and management convenience rather than combined arms training and rapid deployment. Above all, the Army designed its capabilities to satisfy every tactical requirement independently, treating sister service capabilities as supplementary.

These presumptions no longer apply. Simultaneous employment and deployment increasingly characterize Army operations, and those operations are increasingly diverse in both purpose and scope. Tailoring and task organizing our current force structure for such operations renders an ad hoc deployed force and a residue of partially dissembled, non-deployed structure. The premium now is on effectiveness at lower levels vice efficiency at macro levels. Peace will be the exception, and both tactical organizations and garrison configurations must be designed for expeditionary deployment, not simply improvise it. Force design must catch up with strategic reality.

Our strategic reality is the need for smaller, more agile units ... and more of them. Increasingly, ownership of capabilities by echelons and even by services matters less than how those capabilities are allocated to missions. If the Army can leverage its sister service's mobility, speed, and flexibility to meet its mission requirements, all the better. Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than it is about operational and tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond organic capabilities for the required effects. We must expand our view of Army force design to encompass the entire range of

available joint capabilities. At the end of the day, squads and platoons will continue to win our battles, but no one can reliably predict which squads or platoons will come into contact with the enemy or when. In an expeditionary environment, they must be so well networked with other joint capabilities that whichever are in contact can win.

Nor is such joint interdependence unidirectional. The more modular the Army's capabilities, the better we will be able to support our sister services, whether by the air defense protection of an advanced sea base, compelling an enemy ground force to mass and thereby furnish targets for air attack, or exploiting the transitory effects of precision fires with the more permanent effects of maneuver.

Although divisions have long been the nominal measure of the Army's fighting strength, recent operations increasingly have witnessed deployment and employment of multi-functional brigade combat teams of various types in varying combinations. In the future, by shifting to brigade combat teams as our basic units of maneuver, endowing them routinely with adequate combat, combat support, and sustainment capabilities, and assuring them connectivity to higher and joint assets, we can significantly improve the tailorability and scaleability of the Army's contribution to the overall joint fight. At the same time, the inherent robustness and self-sufficiency of brigade combat teams will enhance their ability to deploy rapidly and fight on arrival.

Modular Headquarters. The transformation of our headquarters will be even more dramatic than that of our units, for we will sever the routine association between headquarters and the units they control. At division level and higher, headquarters will be stripped of organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of commanding and controlling any combination of capabilities, Army or Joint. For that purpose, the headquarters themselves will be more robust, staffed to minimize the requirement for augmentation from subordinate organizations. They will have separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry; home station operations center to minimize forward footprints, and network-enabled organizations, capable of commanding of supporting joint and multinational forces.

Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Every division-level headquarters will need to be capable of managing Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Similarly, every corps-level headquarters must be designed from the outset with enough permanent sister service staff positions to permit it to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling it to serve with equal effectiveness as a Joint Task Force or JFLCC headquarters, command Army tactical units directly, or act as the Army Service Component Command.

Stabilizing the Force. Paradoxically, an Army that seeks maximum flexibility through modular units and headquarters must simultaneously maximize unit cohesion where it counts, within our companies, battalions and brigades. Once again, our altered strategic context is the driver. In the past, our approach to unit manning reflected the industrial age in which our forces were developed. People were treated as interchangeable parts, and

their administrative availability was valued more highly than their individual and team proficiency. At the unit level, manning and equipping reflected a 'first-to-last' strategic deployment system. Peace was the paradigm, and late deploying units could be filled out at leisure, typically by individual replacements, during the expected prolonged transition from peace to war.

At a time when continuous conflict has become the default condition, in which major portions of our Army will repeatedly be deployed and employed, such an approach to manning won't work. We must make two significant changes:

- First, we will shift the logic of our force structure from a scenario basis to a rotation basis, for we will need an adequate level of capability not only for employment, but also for training, refitting, and rest. An adequate rotation base is needed to allow units to cycle through these operational phases.
- Second, the tiering of readiness by 'early' and 'late' deployers will disappear – because there will be no 'late deployers', merely 'future deployers' who are at different stages of their rotation cycle.

To satisfy the recurring commitments anticipated in an Army at War, units must sustain a level of readiness that far exceeds the ability of an individual manning system. The effects we seek are broad: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit readiness and combat effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their families. To achieve them we will need to undertake the most significant revision in manning policy in our Army's history.

Our first task is to redesign the Army's force structure to support unit rotation. The next is to establish unit manning by synchronizing Soldier's tours with those units' operational cycles. While accidents and casualties will preclude eliminating individual replacement altogether, routine attrition of deployed units must be minimized. Our final task is to establish home basing, stabilizing the assignment of Soldiers and their families at home stations and communities across recurring rotations.

Why Force Stabilization: An Individual Replacement on the Road to Badghad

"... I graduated from Ranger School March 14th and reported to Fort Bragg a week later. By April 2nd I was on a plane headed to Kuwait. I figured I'd get to recover and spend time learning my battalion with some time as a staff assistant. My Battalion Commander says I lived every infantry officer's dream because I was given a platoon immediately. My platoon and company were engaged in combat the night I met them. The next morning I led my platoon as the company main effort in a raid across the bridge in the battle of As Sawana. In the morning light I did not recognize my PSG or RTO as I had not seen their faces in light. They looked very different from how I had pictured them in my mind." (United States Military Academy Graduate, Class of 2002)

As any personnel manager would tell you ... "this changes everything." And so it will. Today's individual soldier and leader development programs, for example, were not designed to accommodate force stabilization. They must change. Current command tour policies do not accommodate force stabilization. They must change. There have been many previous attempts to experiment with force stabilization, but those attempts always focused narrowly on only a few portions of the Army and invariably failed as a result. Stabilizing the force can be achieved only through a comprehensive redesign.

Adjusting the Total Force Mix

Changes required in our Reserve Component (RC) organizations will match—indeed, may exceed—those in the Active Component (AC). RC forces will remain a vital part of the Army's deployable combat power, but their allocation among functional requirements must change both to accommodate the demands of an expeditionary environment and in recognition of the RC's expanded role in homeland security. In any case, an industrial age approach to mobilization no longer will suffice. To accommodate the uncertainties of today's conflict environment, RC mobilization must take less time and allow more granular management of individual and unit readiness, mobilization and demobilization, deployment and redeployment, and post-deployment recovery.

The near term requirement is to adjust the AC/RC mix so that AC forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment without regard for the nature of the commitment, and thus with whatever functional capabilities are required. For that purpose, some high demand, low density capabilities currently found only in the RC must be reincorporated in the active force. At the same time, while RC units will not be expected to deploy in the first 30 days, they will require responsiveness measured in *hours* for security operations within our homeland. That, and the need to build predictability into RC deployments so that RC forces can expect routinely to deploy no more than one year in six, will require increasing the proportion of high demand, low density units in the RC as well.

Finally, the arguments for shifting to rotation-based unit manning rather than individual replacement apply as much to the RC as to the AC. As with the AC, therefore, a way must be found to reconcile unit mobilization, training and deployment with the personnel overhead account (Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students -- TTHS).

Training and Education

To change the mindset of an Army, few tools are as important as its programs of training and education. The United States Army has long set the standard among the services and across the world in its commitment to soldier and leader development. This strong legacy is our fulcrum from which to leverage change. We train for certainty while educating for uncertainty. This conflict poses both.

Individual Training. The certainty confronting today's Soldiers is overseas deployment and probable combat. Many will enter combat within weeks or months of their basic and

advanced individual training. Thrust into a conflict in which potential adversaries number in the millions, our soldiers must believe and demonstrate that quality is more important than quantity, people are more important than hardware. On the battlefields we face, there are no front lines and rear areas. The rear is often the front, and there are no "secure" garrisons or convoys. Soldiers are warriors first, specialists only second.

"We don't have the luxury of time right now. We graduate soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying ... When soldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and into Humvees, they are immediately thrust into combat operations. ... They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."

SFC Gallagher, IET Trainer

The warrior experience will be tough; Soldier training must be stressful, beyond the comfort zone. We must move beyond the 72-hour field

conflict of daunting ambiguity and complexity, Soldiers will need a fundamental attitude of *multifunctionality* rather than *specialization*, *curiosity* rather than *complacency*, and *initiative* rather than *compliance*.

Collective Training. Our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the linchpin of our extraordinary battlefield success over the past several

"Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two major requirements - skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well-disciplined troops. Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations."

Field Marshal William Slim, WW II

That reluctance, however, violated the "task-condition-standard" requirements of Army training doctrine, since a joint context has become an inevitable condition of every Army employment. Recognizing that, we have begun introducing joint, interagency, and multinational components into our key training experiences at both the "dirt" CTCs and our Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) for division and corps headquarters. We also are proactively supporting establishment of the Joint National Training Center (JNTC) and routinely introducing consideration of joint effects in our home station

training. All these efforts will make Soldiers expert in the application of joint capabilities at every organizational level.

Additional change is underway at the CTCs. In very short order, the threat environment has been transformed to reflect the complexity and ambiguity experienced by our deployed forces, not only at the Joint Readiness Training Center, but also at the National Training Center. Transforming the training mindset will not be as easy, for we must shake a legacy of planning-centric rather than execution-centric collective training. We need battle drills rather than rock drills, and units conditioned to fight for information, not wait passively to *receive* it. Integrated with force stabilization cycles, CTCs will be the capstone experience for forces preparing to rotate to their deployment phase.

Education. Just as training must reflect the hard certainties of the conflict before us, individual Soldier and leader education must address the uncertainties of those we may confront in the future. George C. Marshall once said that an Army at peace must go to school. Our challenge is to go to school while at war. The need to teach Soldiers and leaders *how to think* rather than *what to think* has never been more clear. To defeat adaptive enemies, we must out-think them as well as out-fight them.

Adaptive leaders must instinctively eschew mirror-imaging, for an asymmetric enemy will relentlessly seek areas of vulnerability and surprise. We also must exploit our own asymmetric advantages, particularly information, but be cautious in relying on them. We can have perfect knowledge without understanding. Appreciation of context transforms knowledge to understanding, and only education can make that context accessible to us. Technology can enhance human capabilities, but at the end of the day, war remains more art than science, and its successful prosecution will require battle command more than battle management. Only education informed by experience will encourage soldiers and leaders to meet the irreducible uncertainties of war with confidence, and to act decisively even when events fail to conform to planning assumptions and expectations.

Greater emphasis on adaptive execution will require us to rethink a military decision-making process (MDMP) that hasn't changed in its essentials for nearly half a century, and that was devised originally to assure systematic planning of set-piece operations by relatively inexperienced and untrained leaders. As we improve leaders' skill and knowledge, that rote style of decision-making can be replaced with a more artful application of leader knowledge and intuition that encourages greater adaptation and initiative within the commander's intent. Planning will become iterative rather than linear, more a framework for learning and adjusting than a rigid template for action. Adjusting the MDMP thus will allow us to capitalize on the American soldier's inherent versatility, our growing ability to acquire and process information, and the increased rapidity with which planning adjustments can be disseminated, coordinated, and transformed into effective action.

To that end, the Army already has begun to refocus institutional learning, shifting Center for Army Lessons Learned collection assets from the CTCs to forward employed units. Similarly, recognizing that a learning-driven organization has no room for a culture of

information ownership, we are working to streamline the flow of combat information to assure broader and faster dissemination of actionable intelligence. At the individual level, finally, there is no substitute for experiential learning. Some of the best lessons learned are associated with honest, even tragic mistakes. We can not allow a zero defects mentality to write off such learners too early, and we should review our leader evaluation systems to ensure they are leader development tools and not mere management sorting tools.

The Army **has** always prized leader development, and in an era dominated by peace would take risk to facilitate it. An emphasis on career-broadening experiences, however, makes less sense in an environment where most commanders will employ their units in combat. The Army does not exist to broaden careers, and units are not training aides for a commander. Effective collective training requires the participation of the entire team. Especially in an environment requiring more multi-functional junior leaders, we must avoid too rapid a turnover of those leaders in the name of career development.

The problem is somewhat less acute for middle- and senior-grade officers, among whom some degree of specialization is unavoidable. Even in their case, however, the increasing complexity, uncertainty, and political sensitivity associated with joint and expeditionary operations urges some measure of stabilization in assignments that inherently involve interpreting complex requirements and implementing sophisticated solutions. This completes a trend already begun in recent changes to officer management.

At the individual level, Army leader development will be subordinate to mission requirements; so too at the institutional level it will be subordinate to joint requirements. If we are to create a culture that

"I'd just like to tell you right up front and declare I am a joint officer, who happens to be in the Army, who happens to be the Chief of Staff of the Army right now."

**Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker**

empowers our leaders to think beyond their own service for creative solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must be fully joint, incorporating joint education and experience. We must build a bench of leaders able think creatively at all levels of war, leaders able to operate comfortably in joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environments. And if achieving that requires submitting our internal educational institutions to joint oversight, we should not shrink from it.

Doctrine and Materiel

Doctrine. The Army rightfully views itself as "doctrine-based." In the 1970s and 1980s, doctrine was the engine that transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the victor of our post-Cold War engagements. That doctrine, however, reflected the strategic environment of its time, particularly a singular, mirror-image adversary. Although the challenges of

developing doctrine for an expeditionary Army with a joint mindset and campaign qualities are very different, they are no less essential.

In any era, doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It encapsulates a much larger body of knowledge and experience, providing an authoritative statement about how military forces do business and a common lexicon with which to describe it. As it has evolved since the end of Cold War, Army doctrine portrays military operations as a seamless and dynamic combination of offense, defense, stability and support. Our challenge now is to extend it to address asymmetric opponents.

To deal with such opponents, doctrine must reflect an operational philosophy that takes the uncertainties associated with asymmetry fully into account. Uncertainty is in some measure inseparable from the nature of warfare. Asymmetry merely increases it. Doctrine can't predict the precise nature and form of asymmetric engagements, but it can forecast the kinds of knowledge and organizational qualities necessary to cope with an asymmetric operational environment.

Asymmetry and Adaptation

Strategic:

"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive."

Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Operational:

"The enemy is evolving. He's getting a bit more lethal, a little more complex ..."

Joint Task Force 7, Iraq
LTG Ricardo Sanchez

Tactical:

"This is the way you take down Samarra - at night. You can either lockstep and not change with the enemy, or you can evolve to keep him off balance."

Commander, 5-20 In, after night raid
LTC Karl Reed

A doctrine geared to uncertainty cannot prescribe solutions. Instead, it must furnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose unexpected requirements, and a menu of practical options founded in experience from which leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively. Its underlying philosophy must be initiative and creative thinking. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap. The U.S. military has an immense array of capabilities that are worthless unless both their prerequisites and limitations are understood. Doctrine can help frame those prerequisites and limitations in context. It cannot prescribe how they should be accommodated in any given case. Instead, the purpose of doctrine in a contest with asymmetry is to underwrite flexible thought and action and thereby assure the most creative exploitation of our own asymmetric advantages.

Most important in today's environment, doctrine must acknowledge the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and avoid both prediction and prescription. It isn't the part of doctrine to predict how an adversary will behave. Rather, its function is to enable us recognize that behavior, understand its vulnerabilities and our own, and suggest ways of exploiting the former and diminishing the latter. It will be useful only to the extent that experience confirms it, and its continuous review and amendment therefore is essential.

Such review would be necessary in any case to assure Army doctrine remains consistent with and imbedded in joint doctrine and that our operations thus remain coherently joint.

Material. Materiel development is a special challenge for an Army at War, because we must not only meet pressing current needs, but also anticipate and address future ones. Both share one common first priority: Equipping the individual Soldier. Since war began, the Army has shifted more than a billion dollars to improved body armor, up-armed vehicles, and other essential equipment for the Soldiers who are kicking down doors

every day. In the past, the best individual equipment was reserved for units most likely to engage first. In an expeditionary environment, it is

“Every soldier in theater will have it (Interceptor Body Armor). That wasn’t the requirement when we went there. It was intended only for the front-line soldiers that we thought would be in the closest contact with the enemy. But with attacks rampant on convoys and checkpoints, the decision was made to equip all soldiers.”
Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee

impossible to forecast which those will be. Every deployed Soldier needs the best individual equipment available.

In an expeditionary environment, we can no longer continue to treat equipment as permanently owned by the units to which it is assigned. In a rotation-based force, equipment ownership will be the exception. We will increasingly divorce Soldiers from their carriers and equipment, tailoring the materiel mix for the mission at hand. We currently are reorganizing Army Prepositioned Stocks to reflect an Army Regional Flotilla concept that will expedite our ability to deploy and fight on arrival. As brigade combat teams modernize and transform, they will take advantage of their position in the unit rotation cycle to re-equip through unit set fielding.

With respect to weapon systems, the challenge of reconciling current with future needs is tougher. An Army at War exhausts its current set of equipment ever faster, while future development needs are unabated. Many systems are promising -- we have barely tapped the potential of UAVs. Aviation systems will need particular attention if they are to remain a key tool of maneuver, with better C2 connectivity, extended operational reach, and all-weather capability. Being most amenable to adaptability, speed, and flexibility, aviation assets will be key to an expeditionary force.

Still more vital is the continued development of more rapidly deployable fighting platforms. The Future Combat System remains the material centerpiece of the Army’s commitment to become more expeditionary, and it is well on its way to addressing the challenge of reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. But even if FCS meets all expectations, we will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we must seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own.

Moreover, although we are confident of the general direction of the FCS program, we are not as confident of its priorities. Originally conceived as an 18+1 “system of systems” (18 systems plus the connecting network), we increasingly appreciate that it is actually

“1+18”, for if the network fails, FCS will not reach its potential. Limitations in communications bandwidth at corps level and below, particularly in an expeditionary environment, remain our single most serious deficiency. To repair it, the Army together with the Joint community must relentlessly address the architectures, protocols, and systems of a redundant, non-terrestrial network capable of providing the focused bandwidth necessary to support mobile Battle Command and joint Blue Force tracking.

Until now, the Army has pursued a dual approach to networking, one business-oriented (Army Knowledge Management) and the other operational (LandWarNet). We now need to bring these approaches together, because for an Army at War, still more a rotational Army, units in the field are inseparable from the installations that train, mobilize, deploy and support them.

Installations are part of the sustaining base once units deploy – power projection platforms from which they mobilize, deploy, fight and sustain. Routine use as reach-back platforms will profoundly alter the way we manage installations, and unit rotation and home basing will change them even more. In an expeditionary environment the metrics for effective installation will increasingly be measured in access to the internet as much as access to railheads, airheads and seaports. Their potential to facilitate habitual joint training will be another important criterion. Facilities will be increasingly modular and reconfigurable to accommodate the one certainty of future installation requirements: change.

Constant Conflict—Constant Change

The Army always has changed and always will. But as the default condition shifts from peace to conflict, we must change the way we change.

Current and Future. In peacetime, armies tend to change deliberately and gradually -- and for good reason. Land warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, skills, techniques and organizations on which it depends is a recipe for chaos without careful analysis to assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. The second and third order effects of a change in any part of this mechanism are difficult to forecast, and the consequences of misjudgment can be immense.

Peacetime also tends to sacrifice effectiveness to economy and interdependence to the inevitable institutional competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on preserving force structure and budget "programs of record." Resource risk is allocated evenly across all budget years and all programs -- including forces in the field.

But we are an Army at War. Our current force is totally engaged, and in a way not perfectly forecast. Our near term demands are urgent, and the need to accelerate capabilities that can feasibly be made available in the near term necessarily outweighs protection of the "program of record." Resource risk must be redirected to where it will do the least damage to our fighting soldiers.


To be sure, this urgency does not excuse us from the obligation to prepare for the future, for the continuation of this conflict as well as others we can only hypothesize. But it does significantly blur the usual dichotomy between the current and future force. We must be willing to risk the integrity of a future force program if necessary to ensure we win the fight today. And we must assure the lessons learned from today's fight are applied to future force programs, even if that means altering their direction and timing. The integrating mechanism of the simultaneous consideration of the current and the future must pervade our change processes.

It must also pervade our institution. Change will not be restricted to our operating forces. The institutional Army confronts equally dramatic change in organizations and processes. The same soldiers and leaders who adapt, learn, and innovate on our battlefields also serve in our institutional Army. Success on the battlefield must be matched by successful change in our internal institutions. Such change already is apparent in the expansion and retailoring of our combat training centers, establishment of the Future Center in Training and Doctrine Command, reformulation of the Army Campaign Plan, and a wide range of consolidation and reorganization initiatives in Army Materiel Command.

Interdependencies. Earlier we noted that our future is irrevocably joint. Interdependence is central to both the expeditionary mindset and campaign quality we seek. Achieving it is first a *conceptual* challenge, for all capabilities -- not only in materiel but also doctrine, organization, and so on -- spring from operational concepts. Joint operational concepts are emerging, and the Army has participated actively with its

sister services in their creation, articulation, wargaming, and experimentation. The collaborative development of joint concepts allows Army concept development to be nested in a coherently joint context. That context embodies five key joint and expeditionary interdependencies:

- Joint Battle Command. The flexible supported-to-supporting relationships first attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom will demand interdependent command and control driven by top-down, comprehensive architectures and redundant, interoperable networks. Joint protocols and standards will enable effective joint fires, blue force tracking, and logistic support for effective anticipation and reaction in an expeditionary context. Army contributions to Joint Forces Command's Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Transformation Roadmap will be essential to integrate the Army's LandWarNet, the Air Force's C2 Constellation, and the Navy's ForceNet.



- Joint Fires. Interdependence of joint fires will be vital to mitigating risk and reducing reliance on organic fires in a joint expeditionary environment. Linked through an effective joint command and control system, the American Soldier has the entire target acquisition and engagement resources of the theater at his fingertips. All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as "universal observers" or "joint effects control teams." To facilitate more effective employment of close air support in a non-contiguous battlespace, we need universal standards for observation, designation and target acquisition. The Air Force has demonstrated increasing flexibility in recent operations and has committed to a general officer-led Joint Force Air Component Command element at every Army corps exercise. Both the Army and the Air Force still have concerns, the Army for responsiveness and reliability, the Air Force for control and training demands. Their resolution will require cooperative adjustments by both services.

Air Force Sorties Redirected After Launch	
Operation Desert Storm :	20%
Operation Enduring Freedom:	43%
Operation Iraqi Freedom:	80%

- Joint Lift. The Army's dependence on its sister services is nowhere more obvious than in the area of mobility, both strategic and operational. We cannot wish away the laws of physics, but neither must we surrender to them. The solution of the Army's mobility challenges will require action by both the Army and its partners. For its part, the Army must continue to improve its inherent deployability. This remains the focus of major development programs such as Stryker, the Future Combat System, and numerous

complementary systems, all of which are being designed to satisfy the space and weight limitations of the C-130. It also is a major objective of our tactical unit redesign. For their part, our sister services must recognize strategic and operational lift as critical service competencies. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in a future conflict in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. To overcome that challenge, we will need the ability through vertical envelopment to bypass those defended areas with forces of operational significance, forces with the mobility, lethality, and survivability to maneuver to and defeat these integrated point defenses. Current intra-theater lift assets have neither the range nor the payload to support that. Future lift assets will require both. We also share the Marine Corps' interest in the feasibility of deploying from a Sea Base. The Army supports the Sea Base Joint Requirements Office and looks forward to a cooperative effort to address the intra-theater lift challenge.

- **Joint Air and Missile Defense.** The increasing range and speed of air and missile threats, and their potential ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, place a high premium on the interdependence of service air and missile defenses, regardless of their domain of origin. This interdependence has driven considerable integration of programs and requirements, most recently the merger of Army and Marine Corps programs to defend against cruise missiles. All services need to pursue complementary air defense kill mechanisms able to defeat mixed threats of varying complexity through the right amount and combination of effects at the right time and place. Collaboration already underway addresses key issues: Joint Airspace Control Procedures, Joint Identification Procedures, Joint Engagement Authority Procedures, resolving voice and data communication issues, incorporating into school and unit training a common grid reference system, improving situational awareness for all participants, and emission deconfliction / control. All services also are collaborating on a Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Course, to be conducted for the first time at Ft Bliss in June, 2004.

- **Joint Logistics.** All the services have key interdependencies in the logistics arena and will experience even more in an expeditionary environment. There is a pressing demand for a joint end-to-end logistics structure that permits reliable sustainment of distributed operations in which deployment, employment, and sustainment are simultaneous. At the national level, the Army is prepared to make resources available to a global logistics command. At the theater level, where the Army is the predominant service component, we are willing to redirect the resources of our current Theater Support Commands to regional joint logistics commands under the supervision of the regional combatant commander. If another service is the predominant component, that service's logistics organization similarly could be used as the basis for a *regional joint* support command, with the Army contributing in its normal Title X/WEAR (Wartime Executive Agency Requirement) role. At the tactical level, to bridge the gap from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams, we already plan to convert current COSCOMs and DISCOMs into joint-capable Army Expeditionary Support Commands that are more rapidly deployable, employable, modular and sustainable.

Moving Out

The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, believing that we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is further delay. The 3rd Infantry Division is reorganizing today to a prototype redesign that converts its combat structure from 3 brigades to 4 brigade combat teams. Other divisions will follow.

Throughout, Soldiers will remain the centerpiece of our formations. The effects of changes in organizations, material, doctrine and facilities are additive. Those of training are multiplicative. Those of leadership are exponential. Simultaneous consideration of current and future requirements will be the integrating mechanism in all our change processes. And all will be viewed through the lens of a joint and expeditionary mindset.

The best way to anticipate the future is to create it. The Army is moving out, and this is merely the beginning. As drastic as some may consider these changes, the incentive for pursuing them is not radicalism. The incentive is effectiveness, and if additional change becomes necessary to defeat our adaptive adversaries, those described here will be only a down payment on what follows.

"We're going to have to [change] some of the things that made us the best Army in the world. Our values are sacrosanct ... everything else is on the table."

Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker


The Army has never failed the nation. It has just prevailed in two successive campaigns, and has earned the nation's respect and gratitude for its resolute determination to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the dangers confronting us, most of our citizens can continue to pursue their lives in relative peace and safety – a significant measure of our success.

But our challenge is to measure ourselves not against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are changing. The real question is, are we changing enough? Our brave Soldiers and adaptive leaders constitute the best Army in the world, but we can be far better. It is inside of us and it is what the nation expects. The future of the world as we know it – our lives, the lives of our families, this country, everything we love and cherish – all depend on our success in meeting this challenge. *Are you wearing your dog tags?*

060104.24

120

12:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT: Q&A

Somewhere in the press briefing you might want to begin doing the Q&A.

Here's the question that has been raised, here's the answers.

It's been ____ weeks since the Taguba report was made public.

We've completed ____ number of investigations, we have ____ number still underway, and there will be more initiated.

There have been a great many charges leveled during this period, and a great many of conclusions jumped to.

What I can say at this point, and it may be subject to amplification, elaboration, or even correction later as more information is known.

- Knowing we do not yet have the full information, several things seem to be coming clear.
- We have learned a great deal, but there is more we need to learn. That means that very likely there will be new revelations.
- At least thusfar it appears that the services have been open and forthcoming and moving with dispatch as problems have been discovered.
- While certainly regrettable, the abuses do not appear at least thusfar to be widespread.

OSD 16129-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27084

383.6

1 JUN 04

12:12 PM

- The suggestion that the abuses were the result of a senior official's encouraging such actions as part of a softening up process for interrogation have not been demonstrated thusfar.

Then use the Q&A approach.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.24

Please respond by: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/27085

3:56 PM

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT:

I want to send Joe Castle, Dick Stevens, Somers Steelman, James MacWilliam at Princeton, the unclassified version of the Iraq weekly summary with a bump slip from me.

DHR/azn
060104.37

Please respond by: _____

OSD 15130-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27086

01 0500 EDT May 04

WORKING PAPERS

Iraq Status

This briefing is classified
UNCLASSIFIED

Derived from: Multiple Sources

11-L-0559/OSD/27087



Highlights

CPA Priorities:

- Governance
- Essential Services
- Economy
- Security
- Strategic Communications

CPA Intermediate Objectives:

- Support transition to sovereignty
- Develop framework and capacity for elections
- Build Financial Market Structure
- Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure

Weekly Highlights:

- Mr. Iyad Allawi nominated unanimously by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government
- UN panel interviewed candidates for key Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions
- Iraq's annualized inflation rate for Apr 04 was 19.6%, down from a peak of 47.7% in Oct 03
- Estimated crude oil export revenue is over \$6.2 billion for 2004 to date

WP



Governance

- **Former exile Mr. Iyad Alawi's nomination for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government unanimously endorsed by Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)**
 - **UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi "respects" the decision and will work with Alawi to pick remainder of government**
- **Brahimi continues consultations with a broad spectrum of Iraqi people and their leadership**
- **UN completed processing the 1,878 nominations for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions**
 - **UN panel interviewing 25 short-listed candidates**
 - **18 nominations will then be submitted to IGC for review**
- **Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) Offices accepted 2,582 claims as of 21 May, providing Iraqis a means to resolve property ownership disputes**
- **Ministries of Transportation and Environment transitioned to full Iraqi control last week (15 Ministries have transitioned to date)**

CPA Objective: Governance

Support Transition to Sovereignty; Develop Civic Participation in Governance; Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections; Promote Respect for Human Rights; Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)



Governance (Cont) – National Transition

2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End-May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End-May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I
(Interim Government)

July/Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05
(31 Dec 04 if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office



Strategic Communication

- **USAID's Democracy Development Activities (DDA) program organized over 9,000 sessions in Iraq, with 280,000 participants**
 - **Stimulated civic participation and increased Iraqis' understanding of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and basic democratic principles**
- **Other activities continue in support of political transition and the TAL including:**
 - **Distribution of booklets and leaflets on the TAL**
 - **Numerous focus groups, seminars, public forums, and town hall meetings across Iraq**
- **CPA and USAID continue to undertake extensive activities providing assistance to Iraqi women, including:**
 - **Establishment of women's centers**
 - **Vocational training and education programs**
 - **Civic education and participation**

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

01 0500 EDT May 04

Municipal Services - Water and Sanitation

Continuing on the expansion of Shark Dijlah water treatment plant in Baghdad

Investments to the plant will increase potable water flow by 45 percent to the underdeveloped area of east Baghdad

Shark Dijlah is one of two main water treatment plants that serve 4.7 million Baghdad residents

Structural and electrical work is more than 50 percent complete at Adhamiyah wastewater treatment plant

Plant will benefit more than 80,000 when completed in Aug 04

Rehabilitating damaged water and sewage stations and networks in Fallujah to meet urgent needs after the recent conflicts

Work to be completed by end of Jun and benefit more than 200,000

Water Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal Services; Improve Water Resource Management


Strengthen the organization to deliver water/sewerage/municipal services (WSMS); Develop WSMS to meet national needs; Develop full range of municipal services & delivery mechanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource management; Municipalities improvements & capacity building within Ministry



Essential Services – Telecommunications and Postal

- Total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq is now over 1,192,000 (inc. 415,000 cell phone subscribers) – over 43 % above pre-war levels

- Chart shows trend in number of telephone subscribers



- Completed the Baghdad Digital Network, which provides emergency communications capability for police, fire and emergency medical technicians
- Iraq Post's International Service Center opened at Baghdad International Airport and introduction of Iraq's new Postal Code system announced

CPA Objectives: Reconstruct Communications & Postal Systems

Build Iraq's first responder network • Establish independent regulatory agency • Upgrade Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) network • Build transmission component data network for Iraq, including international gateways • Restructure ITPC and its business operations • Upgrade and modernize postal systems • Upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use



Essential Services – Transportation

- **Reconstruction of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and other activities continue in preparation for commercial operations and increased traffic**
 - More than 30 cargo handlers unload up to 45 tons of cargo each day
 - BIAP transition timeline due to commence on 01 Jun with Iraqi Air Traffic Control (ATC) taking over the civilian side of airport operations
 - Work is expected to be complete by Aug 04
- **Port Umm Qasr received 50 ships in Apr and over 40 in May, dredging of the port continues**
- **Work initiated on a \$7M project for salvage and dredging at the port of Khor Az Zubayr to enable oil tankers to use dock facilities**
 - Contract awarded to an Iraqi company based in Baghdad


CPA Objectives: Restore Economically Strategic Transportation Infrastructure

Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service • Enable Iraqi Port Authority to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution • Enable Iraqi Republic Railways to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities • Reform civil service at Ministry of Transportation



Essential Services - Food Security

- Chart below shows % of estimated requirements for Public Distribution System (PDS) goods from Apr - 01 Jul
- Requirement includes stocks sufficient for the period and a three month buffer by 01 Jul
- While substantial additional shipments of most goods have been procured, they are not shown as these shipments will arrive after 01 Jul



CPA Food Security Objective: Provide Food Security for all Iraqis

Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture • Assure supply of inputs • Strengthen research system • Ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS) • Monitor food security • Hand over administration of system in the North • Initiate reform of rations basket • Environmental Initiatives



Essential Services – Food Security (cont)

- **Buffer stock build-up is slower than anticipated, due to delays in finalizing the first round of Ministry of Trade (MoT) contracts**
- **Transporting commodities from Um Qasr to warehouses and silos has been affected by truck drivers concerned about hijackings and robberies**
- **Concerns over wheat requirements for June addressed by additional procurement by CPA / MoT of 100,000 metric tons of flour and scheduled arrivals of wheat supplied by World Food Program**
- **A schedule for the second phase of MoT commodity procurements was due to be finalized by 30 May**

Health Services - Health Care

and that 85% of children have now been immunized and rates will continue to rise with ongoing programs

There are 12 hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are

operating. However, medical supply shortages continue to be reported, especially for antibiotics, however:

One shipment of Ministry of Health (MoH) emergency drug purchase was received and two more shipments were due to arrive last week

and emergency drug purchase was finalized last week

Four MoH employees attended a World Bank sponsored training session in Amman covering the establishment of National Health

to help the MoH make cost-based decisions as they establish a sustainable National Health Care finance system

and the distribution of over 30,000 medical books and reference materials to 46 medical hospitals, clinics and universities throughout

Health Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care
strengthen health care organizations, management, & infrastructure; Train health professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support; Public health



Essential Services - Education

- Nearly 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated
- Primary, intermediate, and secondary students have been completing their final examinations for the school year
 - Ministry of Education reports that the examination process has been uneventful
 - Apart from a few schools in Najaf and Karbala, all schools have been open for exams including Fallujah
- To date, over 32,000 secondary school teachers and 3,000 supervisors have been trained as part of effort to upgrade the quality of education
 - Includes modern teaching methods, curriculum development, and promoting change in teaching philosophies
- Six Iraqi high school students attended the second United World Youth Council at Radley College in Oxford, England


CPA Education Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education

- Reorganize and staff the Ministry of Education
- Rehabilitate school buildings and build new schools
- Advance national dialog on curriculum reform
- Continue and expand teacher training



Program Management Office (PMO)

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


Construction Tasks Committed
(Target figures are for 01 Jul)

PMO Web-site Portal:
www.rebuilding-iraq.net

NP Data as of 27 May

Program Management Office (PMO) (cont)



Non-Construction Procurement
(Target figures are for 01 Jul)



Economy

- On 21 May, estimated crude oil export revenue was over \$6.2B for 2004
- In Jan 04, the Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28% and an underemployment rate of 21.6%
- Iraq's annualized inflation rate for Apr 04 was 19.6%, down from its peak of 47.7% in Oct 03
 - Over past six months the CPI has risen by 3.5%, or 7.0% at an annual rate
 - The April CPI declined by 3.7% relative to its level in March, partially reversing the 9.2% increase in Mar
- The Trade Bank of Iraq has issued 206 letters of credit, totaling \$789.1M, covering imports from 33 countries
- The New Iraqi Dinar was at 1,465 dinars per dollar on 20 May, and has been relatively stable for nearly three months

CPA Economic Objectives

Build Financial Market Structures; Develop Transparent Budgeting And Accounting Arrangements; Private Sector Initiatives; Design Oil Trust Fund; Lay Foundations For An Open Economy; Pursue National Strategy For Human Resources Development

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N/P



Economy (cont)

- **Micro-credit loans now total almost \$5M, with 2,500 clients**
 - Provide credit to financially viable micro and small businesses
 - First loan in Fallujah as micro-lending presence is established in Al Anbar Province
- **As of 20 May, the balance in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was \$10.2B (\$3.1B is already committed, and \$7.1B is slated for projected 04 budget items)**
- **Recent economic sector surveys were completed by the Iraqi Central Statistics Organization (CSO)**
 - Will assist in economic and planning and in meeting data requirements for an IMF stabilization program
 - CPA and USAID providing technical support and training to build CSO's capacity to use modern statistical data and forecasting techniques
- **A Ministry of Trade delegation attended the World Trade Organization (WTO) General Council meeting in Geneva, Switzerland**
 - This was the first formal participation in the WTO by Iraq



Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program (AIRP)

- **New Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) announced to meet urgent local needs in eighteen Iraqi cities**
- **Projects and requirements were developed as a joint effort between CPA, PMO, various US and Iraqi agencies, and local community leadership**
- **Projects cover: water and sanitation, health, education, building, roads, power, and telecommunications**
- **Benefits of the AIRP:**
 - **Will employ thousand of Iraqis in high unemployment areas**
 - **Jump starts community essential services construction**
 - **100% contract awards by 15 Jun**
 - **Rapid execution and impact**
 - **Over 160 urgent, high profile projects**
 - **Stimulates local economy**
 - **Provides opportunities for local businesses**
 - **Improves Iraqi's quality of life**



Iraqi Budgeted Spending for 2004


- The following chart shows Iraqi budgeted spending for 2004, from all revenue sources:

Ministry funding in millions of US\$	Revised Iraqi Budget, March 2004					New OFF Deposits		Budgeted Total
	Salaries (inc. FPS)	Other Operating Expenses	Capital Projects	Other	Total	Total		
Finance (with selected major payments)*	17	12,938	184	814	13,953	1,580	15,533	
<i>Public Distribution System</i>		2,400			2,400	200	2,600	
<i>Fuel Imports</i>		2,100			2,100	0	2,100	
<i>Transfer Payments</i>		1,671			1,671	0	1,671	
<i>Foreign Obligations (e.g., reparations)</i>		1,432			1,432	0	1,432	
<i>Local/Regional Grants</i>		831			831	0	831	
<i>Salaries and Retirement Awards</i>		797			797	0	797	
<i>SOE Restructuring and Salary Support</i>		761			761	50	811	
<i>Regional Development</i>		600			600	277	877	
<i>Nation Building projects</i>		571			571	0	571	
<i>Additional Security Projects</i>		500			500	500	1,000	
<i>Rapid Regional Response Program</i>		225			225	0	225	
<i>CERP</i>		70			70	123	193	
<i>All other</i>		981			981	430	1,411	
Electricity	8	210	900	-	1,118	315	1,433	
Health	230	750	50	-	1,030	0	1,030	
Education	682	103	170	-	955	0	955	
Transport	7	82	212	-	301	0	301	
Housing	37	17	233	-	287	0	287	
Oil	5	56	200	-	261	460	721	
Public Works	15	21	166	-	202	0	202	
Water Resources	19	7	128	-	155	0	155	
Interior	367	108	10	-	485	0	485	
Justice	42	67	42	-	151	0	151	
Defense	77	24	0	-	101	0	101	
Other Agencies	265	425	237	-	927	130	1,057	
TOTAL	1,773	14,809	2,532	814	19,926	2,485	22,411	



Electricity Overview

Goal 01 June 04: 6,000 MW Peak Deliverable Generation Capacity





- Ambassador Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan to reach 6,000 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 120,000 MWH of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to unforeseen problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun
- CPA spring maintenance program continues resulting in about 1,323 MW of generation capacity currently offline for scheduled and 529 MW for unscheduled maintenance



Power Production


Mega Watt Hour Production



N/P Data as of 27 May



Hours of Power – Week of 20 May



Average Hours of Electricity Available to Governorate Per Day Over a 7 Day Period


- ≤ 8 Hrs = Red ●
- 9 to 15 Hrs = Amber ○
- ≥ 16 Hrs = Green ●

Percent Change (7 Day)

Baghdad	2.7%
Duhok	0.0%
Naynawa	12.4%
Tamim	10.2%
Salah Ad Din	6.7%
Anbar	8.0%
Dyala	24.8%
Babil	7.3%
Karbala	8.2%
Najaf	10.9%
Qadisiyah	7.9%
Wasit	9.4%
Muthanna	13.3%
Dhi Qar	-1.4%
Misan	7.9%
Basrah	-0.2%



Crude Oil Production




Weekly Average of 2.236 MBPD Is Below Target of 2.5 MBPD

- Long Term Target (Dec 04): 2.8 - 3.0 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5 MBPD in Mar 03
- Post-war Peak: 2.595 MBPD on 16 Apr 04



Crude Oil Exports

Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports




• **Current Monthly Average: 1.198 MBPD**

11-L-0559/OSD/27109

C/P



Diesel Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 85% of goal


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DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

01 0500 EDT May 04

ene Supply




■ Production ■ Import — Target

k's average production and imports are 97% of goal



Gasoline / Benzene Supply




• This week's average production and imports are 83% of goal

NP



Liquefied Petroleum Gas Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 51% of goal



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary

	Required	Status			On Duty	Available	Off Duty	Total On Duty & Available
		Untrained	IPF Trained	Aspirant Trained				
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 1	89,369	65,084	21,018	4,701	90,803	1,174	250	92,227
Dept of Border Enforcement (DBE) 2	20,420	0	0	0	17,472	101	0	17,573

	Required	On Duty	Available	TOTAL
Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 3	35,000	3,939	2,763	6,702
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 4	40,556	24,874	100	24,974

11-L-0559/OSD/27114
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 DRAFT WORKING PAPERS
 01 0500 EDT May 04

W/P



Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary (cont)

	Required			
Facilities Protection Service (Ministries & MSCs) (FPS) 5	73,992	73,992	156	74,148
	Total Required: 259,337			Total on Duty and in Training: 215,624

- 1 New requirement from MNF-I 22 Apr based on better census data. IPS implementing new reporting procedures
- 2 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. DBE includes Border Police, Customs, Immigration, Nationality. There is no TIP training for DBE but Border Police received basic sentry training
- 3 MNF-I C3 Effects NISF Roll-up
- 4 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. ICDC includes the 36th ICDC BN
- 5 FPS requirements changed by Ministries. Numbers are estimated. Source OSC SITREP

**Number required and total on duty reflects best available data in the wake of recent combat operations.
Re-assessments and updates are continuing**



Security - Build Justice

- **Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of the Special Task Force on Compensation for Victims of the Former Regime**
 - Initial endowment of \$25 million from the Development Fund for Iraq
- **President Bush announced that Abu Ghraib prison will be demolished, as a symbol of Iraq's new beginning**
- **The fourth of six judicial training courses has been completed, each course trains approximately 30 judges**
 - Covers due process, rule of law, human rights, judicial independence, ethics, developments in international law, and CPA Orders
- **Weekly programs to train about 600 court-appointed defense counselors for indigent defendants began last week**
- **Iraqi Corrections Service has improved the prisoner transport system, which has reduced disruptions to scheduled court appearances**

CPA Objective: Build Justice

Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property Rights



Security - Developments

- **The Coalition military headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force - 7 stood down and transitioned into the Multi-National Force – Iraq**
- **Fallujah has remained relatively quiet since the creation of the Fallujah Brigade and there have been no violations of the cease-fire since 03 May**
- **All militias have now agreed to a transition and reintegration plan**
 - **Almost 90 percent of the roughly 100,000 militia members will have passed into new occupations prior to the elections**
- **The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Personnel Redirection program continues to make progress with the hiring of 25 high-level former weapons scientists and engineers**
 - **Will work as scientific and technical consultants with Iraqi Ministries and the private sector in support of reconstruction efforts**

CPA Objectives: Security

Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment; Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order; Develop Iraqi Defense Capabilities and Oversight Mechanism





Security – Developments (Cont)

- **Key leadership of the Ministry of Defense has been appointed, including the Inspector General and all five Directors General**
- **Status of the Iraqi Army:**
 - **Three battalions conducting operations with Coalition forces**
 - **Three new battalions are training new recruits and leadership staff**
 - **One battalion is learning techniques for military operations in urban terrain through a “train-the-trainer” program**
- **19 Iraqi helicopter pilots graduated from flight training conducted at the Royal Jordanian Air Force in Jordan**
 - **All 19 airman were pilots under the former regime**
- **Thirty police managers are enrolled in the first Mid-Level Management course for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)**
- **More than 21,000 police of the former regime are on duty after completing Training and Integration of Police program**



Security – Developments (Cont)

- Chart shows significant insurgent activities in Iraq, includes attacks using:
 - Improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets
- Chart opposite shows murders reported to the Baghdad Police Department since May 03



N/P



Stability Contributors – OIF

Countries with forces in Iraq

34

- Albania
- Australia
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dom Rep
- El Salvador
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Japan
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia

TOTAL ~24K

- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq


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TOTAL TBD

39 Countries
 Potentially Supporting
 Iraqi Stability and
 Humanitarian Relief

IRAQ Governance - Transition

fact sheet



2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End - May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End - May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I
(Interim Government)

July / Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05
(31 Dec if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office



- On May 21, estimated crude oil export revenue was over \$6.2 billion for 2004
- In Jan, the Iraq Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28 percent and underemployment rate of 21.6 percent
- The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Iraq, compiled by the Ministry of Planning, increased by 27.9 percent over the year to Feb 04
 - Over past six months the CPI has risen by 3.5 %, or 7.0 % at an annual rate
- To date, more than 2,500 loans totaling \$5 million have been disbursed to micro and small enterprises throughout Iraq
- The New Iraq Dinar (NID) has been relatively stable for the past three months at around 1,425 - 1,460 NID to the US Dollar
- The Trade Bank of Iraq has issued 200 letters of credit, totaling \$767.5 million, covering imports from 32 countries

IRAQ
fact sheet

Water and Sanitation

g water and sanitation projects across Iraq that will benefit
n people

40 percent of the marshlands deliberately drained by
ave been reflooded since liberation

l program in 2003 that cleared over 17,000 kilometers of
erways to improve water flow and irrigation

am in 2004 will clear 20,000 kilometers of Iraq's waterways
y around 100,000 Iraqis

**Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal
nprove Water Resource Management Create viable organization
ater / sewerage / municipal services (WSMS); Expand WSMS to
ial needs; Develop full range of municipal services & inclusive
chanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource system;
mprovements & capacity building within Ministry**

That 85% of children have now been immunized and rates
are with ongoing programs

Million children (6 - 12 years) have been immunized for
Mumps, and Rubella

Million children under 5 years have been vaccinated since

hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are

52 primary healthcare clinics and re-equipping 600 more to
essential primary healthcare services

initiates primary health care training of trainers program
reach 2,500 primary health care providers throughout Iraq
has helped 700 doctors to provide better primary and
secondary care, especially for women and children

Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care
health care organizations, management, and infrastructure;
primary care professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support;
Program; Public health

IRAQ

fact sheet

Education


ed nearly 2,500 schools across Iraq
aw schools required and 11,939 schools need repairs
plemental funds will rehabilitate at least 1,047 schools
bank may commit to rehabilitate another 1,000 schools
,000 secondary school teachers and administrative staff
d distributed over 8.7 million textbooks throughout Iraq
l large numbers of school equipment including student
cher desks, chairs, cabinets, chalkboards, and teachers kits
g an accelerated learning program for 600 students to
them into the school system
will be expanded to 50,000 in 2004

Education Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education
and staff the Ministry of Education; Rehabilitate school
and build new schools; Advance national dialog on
reform; Continue and expand teacher training

RAQ

fact sheet

Power



Generation

- 4,400 Megawatts (MW) Peak Capacity
- 4,417 MW (Met initial goal of 4,400 MW)
- 4,000 MW Peak Generation Capacity
- 20,000 MWH Production

Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan 04 for 1,000 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 10,000 MWH of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to operational problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun. A maintenance program continues resulting in 300 MW of generation capacity currently out of service and 529 MW for unscheduled




RAQ

fact sheet

Oil

Production


Peak: 2.595M BPD (16 Apr)
Average: 2.236M BPD
1.038M BPD
Target (Dec): 2.8 - 3.0M BPD



- 2003 Revenue: \$5,076.6M
 - 2004 Revenue:
 - Cash Received: \$3,966.0M
 - Receivable: \$1,979.3M
- \$5,945.3M**

ite which includes unspecified re-injection rates, smuggling, and storage

Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports



Current Monthly Export: 1.198 MBPD

RAQ

fact sheet

Security

<u>Security Forces</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Required</u>
ce	92.2K	89.4K
of Border Enforcement	17.6K	20.4K
i Armed Forces	6.7K	35.0K
l Defense Corps	25.0K	40.5K
ilities Protection Service	74.1K	74.0K
al	*215.6K	259.3K

quired and total on duty reflects best available data in the cent combat operations. Re-assessment and updates are

4.5K in training

June 16,2004

350.09

TO: Steve Cambone
cc: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Intel Bill

I am told Porter Goss has an intel bill that he has going through, and he got Duke Cunningham to sign up for it. Duke said, "I wonder if Rumsfeld is going to be mad at me for this."

You have not briefed me at all on any of the legislation coming through. I need to know what is going on. Please let me know, so we can get Cunningham off of it if we should be off of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061604-10

.....
Please respond by _____

16 Jun 04

OSD 16133-04

June 16, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Support from the Hill

032

You heard me talk to Duncan Hunter about the items we are worried about.

I also saw Congressman Lewis and talked to him about the \$500 million for train and equip. He said he would work on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061604-11

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 16134-04

16 Jun 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27131

June 21, 2004

384

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Air Defense

Let's talk about how we could stop another airplane from hitting an important target in the US. Either we can or we cannot, or it is somewhere in the middle.

I think it is important that the President know which it is, and that we let the Congress and the world know in some way, so expectations are not unrealistic.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062104-13

.....
Please respond by _____

215004

OSD 16136-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Funding Strategy

110.01

We have to make a major effort using the Chiefs and everyone else to get the train and equip money and the CERP money.

Please give me a battle plan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062104-5

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

11001

OSD 16138-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27133

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JUN 21 2004

5000

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Document Production

George Tenet and I agreed that we would each **try** to pull together data on the reams of material that we have been required to send to different organizations – the House, the Senate Committees, individual Congressman and Senators, the 9/11 Commission, subpoenas on other things, etc. and the man-years of work that it is taking.

The purpose would be to show that what is happening has gone past the point of “oversight.” A question is: How can we manage this, and is it possible to conduct a war given the accelerating kinds of demands.

I cannot remember to what extent I started getting this project organized in the Department. I think I asked Feith to pull it together. Please look into it. The key people would be Doug Feith, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Powell Moore. You could check with others.

Please see me to discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061904-4

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

4060412

OSD 16140-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 16, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Including Coalition

IRAQ

You should figure out a way we can include the coalition in all the fast-moving decisions that are taking place with respect to security issues in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061604-20

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 16142-04

16JUN04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 23, 2004

210

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Waivers

I notice I am signing more and more waivers – for adverse information, for the number of years so they can retire in a higher rank, for joint service, etc.

It strikes me that it is not a good procedure to keep signing waivers. If the rules are wrong, we should change the rules. If the rules are right, we ought to adhere to them and not sign so many waivers. I am not a purist, but the volume seems to be too high.

Please check, and come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062304-7

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

23 Jun 04

OSD 16143-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27136

June 23, 2004

TO: David Chu
Ray DuBois

cc: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh
062304-13

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD Navy

OSD 16144-04

23 June 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: POTUS Outreach to Veterans' Groups

292

When we met with John McCain, one of the things he recommended is for the President to meet with heads of the veterans' organizations and figure out ways we can work with them, so we stay in good touch with them.

Please come up with a proposal, and tell me how you are going to propose it to the White House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
063004-6

.....
Please respond by 7/19/04

30 Jun 04

OSD 16146-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOUO~~

JUN 23 2004 I-04/008526
EF-9225
JUN 21 2004

J 6/29

Electrons can be sent if needed.

-DebraRE
672 7051

IRAO

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Edits to "Thoughts on Iraq" Paper

Thanks for the edits on the GWOT paper. I am currently incorporating them.

Please also edit the "Thoughts on Iraq" paper, along the lines of the memo you sent on June 10. I have attached another copy of the paper.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/10/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq
6/7/04 "Thoughts on Iraq"

This is quite good. Works either as a speech or a longish OPED.

DHR:dh
061804-3

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,
Response attached.

OSD 16147-04

21JUN04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27139



INTERNATIONAL
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/007908

USDP _____

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 10 JUN 2004
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JMA*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.,:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that it and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.

~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27141

~~FOUO~~

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26/28



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/008677

USDP _____

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (b)(6) 28 JUN 2004
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

I have redrafted your memo of June 7 (Tab D) on "some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it," as you requested. My redraft is at Tab A. I have cast it as a speech.

However, criticizing the media can be a kamikaze exercise, as DepSec has discovered. Therefore, whether to deliver such a speech at all is a separate question. You may wish to consult with other Principals.

What I have tried to do is "embed" this criticism deeper in a discussion of your broader points, e.g., what are the right metrics, what are the lessons of history, etc. It might work.

Attachments

TAB A: Redraft

TAB C: My memo of June 10

TAB D: Your memo of June 7

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27142

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Iraq and How to Think about It

A central question that I wrestle with everyday is: How do we assess properly what is going on in Iraq? What is the right measure of success? Or of failure?

The fact is, there are contradictory trends. There is the daily turbulence that makes the news – the bombings, the casualties. The extremists are showing themselves somewhat more capable of organizing their attacks, and it is clear that the job of suppressing them will not be easy.

At the same time, our soldiers see a different ground-truth: of schools and hospitals and institutions of local government being rebuilt; of brave Iraqis coming forward to defend their future against the extremist minority trying to hijack it. And we see the extraordinary political progress that the June 28 turnover of sovereignty represents.

Which is the right perspective?

All of us should approach this question with some humility. There is ample historical precedent for governments misjudging reality very badly and the critics being

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11-L-0559/OSD/27143

right. However, there is also historical precedent – I think of Tet 1968 – when the government was correct in its analysis of the strategic outcome and the media got it wrong. (I refer you to Peter Braestrup’s classic study, *Big Story*, of how the media covered Tet 1968.)

This is a superb example: a fine book.
A.

Our soldiers, as I said, see a certain reality on the ground, face-to-face. These dedicated men and women – all volunteers – know that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people not only welcome their liberation from Saddam Hussein but continue to yearn for a decent, democratic future. Opinion polls show this too. Of course, Iraqis wanted to see the occupation over, so would you and I. But our soldiers see every day how hard the Iraqi people are striving to rebuild their lives, and that they reject what the extremists stand for.

Our armed forces also know that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed or wounded. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it sometimes works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave Americans on the front lines of this struggle see it for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

In 1946, there were some who complained that we had "botched" the occupation of Germany, that it was a hopeless mess, that we didn't know what we were doing, that the Europeans didn't love us as liberators any more, and so on. We have a file of such reports back in the Pentagon. Maybe that's how it looked in 1946. But they lacked the perspective we have now.

The process of building new institutions to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of a totalitarian regime is a complicated one. It takes time. Even today in the former Soviet bloc, where the transition was peaceful, we see the dislocations that come from building different kinds of institutions to replace the flawed institutions of the past. It takes time.

So, when we look at Iraq today, what do we compare it to? What standards and expectations do we apply?

Some among us seem to measure Iraq's many difficulties and challenges not against history or realistic expectations but against a false standard of perfection, that of countries that enjoy relative tranquility, of countries that have succeeded in their struggles for freedom.

Events in Iraq are not tranquil, and in many cases are ugly. The media are doing their job when they report that. But, without perspective being brought to bear, our publics risk falling prey to despair – to the conclusion that all is lost, that the terrorists are

sure to win, and that what is being done is hopelessly flawed, or misguided, or even malevolent.

That is wrong – totally wrong, very dangerously wrong.

History tells us that the path to freedom has always been arduous, dangerous, and sometimes marked by ugliness. Democracy in Iraq is being fought tooth-and-nail by extremists who fear its success because of what it will mean for the entire Middle East. So, to measure its condition by the standard of countries that have already achieved their freedom misses the point.

The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite obstacles and opposition, it can be done. It has been done. Our own republic went through tough periods – surviving rebellions, riots, and civil war – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair. As Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy: “One ought not expect to be transported on a featherbed.”

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully advance from fascism to democracy. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. It should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. **One thing is certain: US and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.**

Thus, the question of how to measure success or failure – of what perspective or standard or expectation to apply – is not simply an analytical challenge to us in the Department of Defense. It should be a core question in our national debate.

I am convinced there is a solid bipartisan consensus in both houses of Congress, and among most leaders of both parties, that we must succeed in Iraq. The cause could not be more just; the enemy could not be more vicious or more hostile to our most basic values; the strategic stakes in a vital region of the world could not be higher.

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Senator Kerry, to his credit, has strongly affirmed this. So have other key Democratic leaders such as [President Clinton], Senator Biden, Senator Lieberman, Congressmen Skelton and Lantos, [William Cohen], Sandy Berger, and many others.

The task we all face is: How do we bring **this** national consensus and national steadfastness to the fore in our national discussion? How do we get **this** story to be front and center? The American people deserve this, so that the daily events in Iraq can be better seen in their context -- so that the progress being made will be properly perceived, so that the courage that our men and women are showing on the ground in Iraq will be reinforced by a confident and determined nation back home.

The Iraqi people need to hear this message, as well: They, who are truly on the front line -- and who are bravely taking on more and more of the security responsibility -- need reassurance that the Coalition will back them and help them. This is our national commitment, and they need to know we will fulfill it.

And the enemy needs to hear that message too. We are in a test of wills with a fierce enemy. The enemy has many faces -- die-hard remnants of the old totalitarian regime, or fanatical Islamists -- but we have seen that it is the face of evil. Much more is at stake than the future of Iraq. In that test of wills with the forces of evil, the forces of freedom must prevail. ~~Does anyone disagree with that?~~

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? Those who reject this enterprise, or who oppose doing what it takes to win, can be asked: What is your proposal? Some say: Leave. What if the Coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- a failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack other moderate friends in the Middle East, or in Europe, or to attack this country; ✓
- a civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites; ✓
- falling under the sway of a neighboring country and radical clerics, spreading a virulent Islamist ideology; ✓
- a split-up of Iraq into several parts; or
- a new Saddam Hussein taking control and reimposing a brutal dictatorship. ✓

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7

11-L-0559/OSD/27149

Which of those options would anyone argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists, and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups with its borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: There is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. There is no reason for such a conclusion, since our strategy in Iraq – the empowerment of moderate Iraqis to take charge of their own future – is on track.

But, for us and the Iraqis to prevail, we in this country will need to conduct our political debate this year in a manner that does justice to the huge stakes involved. The imperative to win in Iraq should not be a partisan issue; the Administration will not treat it as one. Nor is this a debate about media coverage; the media should report the truth as they see it. But our country's leaders, as they discuss Iraq, owe the American people perspective, and balance, and a clear affirmation of what is at stake and of why we must be united in the will to win.

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I trust the American people. They usually get it right. Their common sense, and courage, and patriotism, will prevail. Caving in to terrorist blackmail is the worst possible course – and the most dangerous. That is not in the cards. This is the United States of America.

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INTERNATIONAL
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2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/007908

USDP _____

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 10 JUN 2004
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *PWR*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that **it** and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.

11-L-0559/OSD/27152



~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W Rodman, ASD/ISA (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27153

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS



I-04/007908

USDP _____

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 10 JUN 2004
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JMA*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

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- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that it and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.



11-L-0559/OSD/27154

~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27155

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

June 18, 2004

W5009

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel Reform

Please give me a copy of Bill Schneider's dissent on the Scowcroft Commission. Isn't that something we could be using?

It seems to me we need to mount a major campaign on this intel reform. The 9/11 Commission is going to recommend it. Goss is now recommending it. Scowcroft recommended it.

We need to hit it head on. No one is doing it intellectually. Why don't we get a team of folks together and get after it? It is a bad thing for the country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061804-4



Please respond by 7/16/04

JUN 19 2004 *attached*

OSD 16148-04

18JUN04

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (**Task 4, Organizing for Success**). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

The need to transform the IC to meet 21st century international security requirements

The international security environment of the 21st century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. As a result, the **US military** posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, as was the case during the Cold **War**. For this reason (among others), public policy aims to transform US military capabilities to those that **are** far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold **War**. To meet this requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if **our** intelligence agencies continue with business as usual."

To permit the **US** national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of **US** adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats **pose** overwhelming problems for **US** security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the **military** applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century **warfare** requires **US** military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into **an** actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. **This** processed intelligence information **will** often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit **US** forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required **as** well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21st century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the US government.

Notable IC difficulties during the 1990s in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for US security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. This failure to predict these developments remind us that the IC must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the "national" or "strategic" intelligence requirements of the US government with the demanding "tactical" or "operational" DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the IC. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet 21st century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. Its interaction with elements of the IC most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for tasking and resource allocation with the DCI. This "creative tension" between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.¹

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

¹ The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that "the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD."

Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold War performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.²

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under the DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around the means by which intelligence is collected rather than ends served by national intelligence? It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence – not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the “distance” of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is employed in support of US military operations in Afghanistan offers an informative example of the constructive interplay between users and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of users. This model is more appropriate to the support of 21st century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations are subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD to improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user as the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the warfighter is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program to assure responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the armed forces.

² The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects “seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21st century.”

³ The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly 40 years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem - the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement "of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements." The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

Draft 02

31 December 2001

October 15, 2004

TO: The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi Security Force Training

1. Here is the latest information on our training program for Iraqi forces. I'll continue to send these along every couple of weeks, and would ask you to pass them along to the Prime Minister.
2. Our discussions in Romania were pleasant and productive as always - I look forward to our next meeting.

Attach.
10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
101504-8

IRAQ

ISOFOR

ISOFOR

OSD 16101-04

*Iraqi Security Forces Update
Executive Summary*

13 October 2004

Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped*</u>
– Police	
– Civil Intervention	
– Emergency Response	
– Border Enforcement	
– Highway Patrol	
– Dignitary Protection	
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– Army	
– National Guard	
– Intervention Force	
– Special Operations	
– Air Force	
– Coastal Defense Force	
	<hr/>
	106,266


*Note: 74,000 Facilities Protection Service forces are not included

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27168

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003 = 0 Iraqi Security Forces

- Iraqi Regular Army
- ▨ Iraqi National Guard
- Border Enforcement
- Army Special Ops Bde
- ▩ Iraqi Intervention Force
- Iraqi Regular Police Service
- Civil Intervention Force
- ▩ Coastal Defense & Air Force

Note: Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27169

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	11 OCT 04	1 NOVO4	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police *	135,000				47%	58%	68%
Dept of Border Enforcement **	32,000	44%	45%	50%	60%	66%	84%
Emergency Response Unit	270		55%	70%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Regiments ***	1,200			50%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions ***	3,600			67%	100%	100%	100%
Bur. of Dignitary Protection ****	500		90%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol	1,500			47%	58%	71%	92%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- *** Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipment schedules still TBD; training of initial 3 Public Order Battalions will commence this week.
- **** Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27170

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	End state	11 OCT 04	1 NOVO4	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000 soldiers		44%	81%	93%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584 soldiers		67%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904 soldiers		57%	74%	91%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516 soldiers	58%	58%	67%	76%	85%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451 soldiers			40%	58%	76%	100%

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27171

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	Norway	9	Tonga	53
Australia	148	Estonia	48	Latvia	133	Poland	2,470	Ukraine	1,565
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	88	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	7,657
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	282	Macedonia	31	Romania	745	US	131,699
Bulgaria	449	Italy	3,088	Moldova	11	Singapore	33		
Czech Rep	92	Japan	800	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	535	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,470	Thailand	0	Total	155,402

Iraqi Forces On Hand- 167,757	
Police Service	85,532
Civil Interv. Force	1,336
Emer. Response Unit	107
Dept. of Border Enf.	16,233
Bureau of Dignitary Protection.	446
Highway Patrol	927
Army	11,776
National Guard	43,062
Intervention Force	7,033
Special Ops Force	690
Air Force	206
Coastal Defense Force	409



Iraqi Forces On Hand
 MNF-I

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

Trained/In-Training Iraqi Forces Total- 127,621	
Police Service	47,109
Civil Interv. Force	1,336
Emer. Response Unit	107
Dept. of Border Enf.	14,858
Bureau of Dignitary Protection.	446
Highway Patrol	589
Army	11,776
National Guard	43,062
Intervention Force	7,033
Special Ops Force	690
Air Force	206
Coastal Defense Force	409



Trained Iraqi Forces
 MNF-I

Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service
73,992

NATO Training Team = 15

11-L-0559/OSD/27172

NATO Training in Iraq

For Official Use Only

- North Atlantic Council decision, 8 October includes:
 - Approval of concept of operations for NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I).
 - Dual-hatting the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq Commander
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine, and Education Center.
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command.
 - Focusing on training, equipping, and technical assistance.
 - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway in Iraq.
 - Providing out-of-country training.
- NATO Military Authorities will now develop the Operations Plan within the next four weeks and submit it to the NAC for approval.

Back Up

Date as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27174

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	84,950	42,302	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,336 (In Training)	0	1,800	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	107	76	188	MAY '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	15,688	14,313	15,900	MAR '06
HIGHWAY PATROL	1,500	927	589	750	SEP '05
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	446	446	500	DEC '04
TOTAL	174,190	103,454	57,726	71,938	OCT '06

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27175

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	4,507	0	0 121,831	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,097	0	46,000 10	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	1,743	0	732 / 5,852	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	617	0	725 / 0	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBDBASEDON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBDBASEDON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	48,540	0	47,457 127,683	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27176

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training	4,888
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,336
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	31
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	545
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	0
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Special Forces	138
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	7,269
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	1,965
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,290
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	0
TOTAL		21,573

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27177

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27178

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- **9,065** available and qualified Army recruits ready for movement to initial training.
- **1st** Iraqi Transportation Battalion started its first driver class.
- Two additional Special Police Commando Battalions recruited.

Training:

- **1,500** Public Order Battalion recruits began initial training at Numaniyah Training Area
- **804** Iraqi Police students graduated from Police Basic Course at the Baghdad Academy.
- **545** DBE students started courses in Border Policing, Immigration, and Civil Customs at Jordan Academy

Equipping:

- Issued **16,000** weapons, **64** vehicles, and over **2.6** million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior forces
- Issued **1,958** radios and **4,560** kevlar helmets to Iraqi National Guard.

Building:

- Approximately **\$1B** of construction ongoing; **75%** of construction of Iraqi military bases complete.
- Awarded **16** Department of Border Enforcement border fort construction contracts.
- Began construction of **8** Iraqi Police Stations in Baghdad.

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Mentor/Employ:

- **5th Battalion, 3rd Brigade conducted cordon and search operations with 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad; assisted with the recovery of a large weapons and ammunition cache.**
- **41 of 45 Iraqi National Guard battalions continue effective operations throughout Iraq.**


October 15, 2004

IRAQ

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
 Secretary Colin Powell
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Update of Iraqi Security Force Training

Mr. President,

1. Here is the latest update concerning the training efforts in Iraq. We remain on track. I had a chance to visit with various elements of the Iraqi Security Forces in the Kirkuk region earlier this week, and they appear determined and confident.
2. As always, I'll ensure a copy of this is forwarded to Tony Blair via his Minister of Defense.


Attach.
 10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
 101504-7

15OCT04

OSD 16181-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27181



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 15 2004

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to Shirley. We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

OSD 16194-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27182

293

15 OCT 04

19 SEP 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Carrie Sue,

Please draft a letter for
SD to Mr. Massey for review.

Thanks,
Wife

Note (F41) - the Department gave
him an award in May 2004
(the award was a distinguished
public service award). - I
believe in honor of his retirement.

11-L-0559/OSD/27183

(b)(6)



Dear (b)(6)

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to Shirley. We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

Prepare for Sec Def signature
PPH/PEB/BJR
10/12

0200DRE

24SEP04

19SEP04

9/24
1700

~~FOUO~~

September 24, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Information on John Hopps



Please see if you can figure out who John Hopps is that is mentioned in (b)(6) (b)(6) letter.

I'd like to answer (b)(6) letter - he is a good friend.

ATTACHED

Thanks.

Attach.
9/19/04 Note from (b)(6)

DIIR:ss
092404-5

.....
Please respond by 9/28/04

293

24 Sep 04

19 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 161001-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27185



R. J. H.

(b)(6)

9/11/04

293

Dear Dan,

The Department of Defense lost a very valuable member when

→ John Hays passed a few months ago. John was my college roommate at Morehouse, and one of my closest friends (and a fellow physicist.)

John and I talked about his going to D.O.D.. At first he really did not want to, having just retired from Morehouse. However, after 9/11 he felt he had to do what was necessary to serve his country. Today he reminded me of his decision.

He really loved working at D.O.D. and felt he was making important contributions.

OSD 16104-04

I know you are overwhelmed,
but I thought that might be
of interest to you.

Shirley sends regards to
you and Jayce, and says
to tell Jayce she still
uses (quite often) the great
dictionary Jayce gave her in
Chicago.

Hang in there!

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

WDA 9/28

To SecDef
From Paul Butler Paul Butler
9/27

Subject: (b)(6) Letter on John Happs.

Attached is a bio on Dr. John Happs who worked for Mike Wynne in AT&L. He passed away ~~over~~ⁱⁿ the late spring. Please let me know if you would like us to do an initial draft reply to Mr. (b)(6)

Yes

DR. JOHN H. HOPPS, JR.

**Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering
and**

**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Laboratories and Basic Sciences)
3030 Defense Pentagon, Rm. 3E114
Washington, D.C. 20301-3030**



Phone: (b)(6)
Fax:
Email: john.hopps@osd.mil



Dr. John H. Hopps, Jr. serves in dual capacities within the Office of Defense Research and Engineering. He serves as Principal Deputy to the Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). Dr. Hopps also serves as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences (LABS). In this capacity he has responsibility for the oversight of the Defense Laboratories, for the improvement of the Defense Laboratory science and engineering workforce, and for DDR&E university-based basic research, instrumentation, graduate fellowship and education programs in the science and engineering disciplines. He has additional responsibility for international programs of technical cooperation between the U.S. and its allies.

Dr. Hopps comes to the Department of Defense from Northwestern University where he served as Institute Professor in the Materials Research Center. His activities included an initiative for the integration of materials science into the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum. His research interests involved the application of bio-inspired perspectives in the study of strategies for self-healing in non-biological materials.

Prior to returning to scientific activities at Northwestern, Dr. Hopps served as Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, and as Professor of Physics, at Morehouse College from 1995-1999. He was responsible for all matters related to the academic program, student affairs, information technology and resources, institutional research, and athletics. Significant accomplishments included establishing the Andrew Young Center for International Affairs and the International Power Institute, and establishing interdisciplinary programs in neuroscience and telecommunications, all within the framework of a 4-year liberal arts institutional structure.

Prior to joining Morehouse, he served as Director of the Division of Materials Research at the National Science Foundation (1991-1995). Dr. Hopps' tenure at NSF was through an IPA arrangement with the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. At Draper, Dr. Hopps was a Principal Member of the Technical Staff and served as Chief of Photonics Technology. His responsibilities included overseeing research and development activities, as well as fabrication and test facilities in the areas of high performance fiber optic components, integrated optic components, laser devices, semiconductor photonic devices, photonics fabrication automation and packaging, and optical signal processing. He also had direct technical and management responsibility for the Laser Development and Test Facility. Dr. Hopps supervised the research of graduate students in the areas of quantum optics and in the microscopic theory of high-frequency dynamical behavior of complex semiconductor laser structures.

Also, during his tenure at Draper, which began in 1977, he served as Manager of Energy Program Development, Manager of Fault-Tolerant Systems Research, and as Education Director. From 1977 to 1991 he was concurrently a Research Affiliate in the Departments of Nuclear and/or Electrical Engineering at MIT. His primary research areas were the non-equilibrium statistical mechanics of dense fluids and their study via light and neutron scattering; and plasma kinetic theory and neutron transport theory, and their application to the control of fusion, fission and hybrid reactors. He supervised dissertations in the area of reactor control using fault-tolerant systems concepts and strategies, and in the application of real-time stochastic decision models to nuclear plant operational safety.

Dr. Hopps is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, Beta Kappa Chi, and Golden Key Honor Societies. He has been a member, and in some cases held national office, in several scientific organizations including, American Association of the Advancement of Science, American Chemical Society, American Physical Society, American Nuclear Society and the Material Research Society. He has served on task forces and evaluation teams for government agencies, educational institutions and foundations, as well as public service organizations. Board appointments have included the National Research Council's National Materials Advisory and Space Studies Boards; U.S. Department of Energy National Reliable Energy Laboratory, National Advisory Board; the Negro Educational Review Editorial Board; and the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) Board of Directors.

Education:

Ph.D., Physics, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA (1971)
M.S., Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (1961)
B.S., Math and Chemistry, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA (1958)
Certificate, Institute for Educational Management, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Other Honors and Awards:

Ford Foundation Early Admissions Scholar, Morehouse College
Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sanders Associates Corporate Doctoral Fellow, Brandeis University
U.S. Presidential Citation for "Outstanding Accomplishments in the Technology Reinvestment Project"
Morehouse College Presidential Citation, awarded by Morehouse College Board of Trustees

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

2004 OCT 19 10:00 AM

October 19, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef _____

David S. C. Chu 19 Oct 04

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options--SNOWFLAKE

- This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (citizens and resident aliens) (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although we must confer with the Director of Selective Service, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
 1. Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS.
 2. Administration propose repeal of the Military Selective Service Act, eliminating the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above.
- Once you have indicated the course of action you prefer, I would be glad to organize the necessary consultative process.

RECOMMENDATION: Select #1 _____ Select #2 _____

COORDINATION: General Counsel (Tab B) + JCS (TAB B)

Attachments:
As stated

10/29 Ask JCS for views

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr

(b)(6)

D. Carr

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	M 10/20

Larry Di Mito

10/29

OSD 16220-04

327

19 Oct 04

15 Oct 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB

A

11/5/04

November 5, 2004

TO: David Chu
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Selective Service for the 21st Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective Service, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they are doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-19

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

TAB

B



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 14, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef _____

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

- o This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- o After 30 years of success with the All Volunteer Force, and with the Cold War behind us, we find mandatory draft registration increasingly questionable. Today's weapon systems and tactics do not lend themselves to a rapid infusion of draftees.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although I must confer with General Meyers, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
 1. Administration take action to ^(REMOVE) ~~terminate~~ registration and downsize SSS. ✓
 2. Administration propose repeat ^(X) the anachronistic Military Selective Service Act, and do away with the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above. ✓

COORDINATION: General Counsel: _____

[Handwritten signature]
PSGC
10/18/04

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr, (b)(6)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2179-04

12 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Subject: Selective Service System (SSS) Registration Options


1. I have reviewed the SSS options outlined in your recent note.¹ Recommend that we pursue Option 1: "Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS."

2. The SSS database provides the Nation a valuable strategic manpower pool that should be retained. However, it is essential to transform the agency into a more modern, agile and efficient operation. Accordingly, the administration should pursue the following initiatives.

a. Retain the legislation supporting the SSS as a response to a national security crisis or emergency.

b. Realign the organization and infrastructure to a bare-bones operation and change the scope of the mission to a more limited, quick-response capability for the Nation.

c. Mandate that SSS's leadership exploit modern information technology applications, lessening the **staff** and administrative burdens to further reduce unnecessary costs.


RICHARD B. MYERS
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

1 USD(P&R) Note, 29 October 2004

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/27197

~~FOUO~~

OCT 08 2004

337

TO: David Chu
 Jim Haynes

CC: Gen Dick Myers
 Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

Please get back to me with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.

You mentioned that current requirements cost the taxpayers a considerable amount of money. We should look at whether it is worth it. We should take a thorough look – rapidly – and decide what to propose.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 100704-13

.....
 Please respond by 10/15/04

800204

1500704

OSD 16220-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27198



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

327

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Options Regarding Selective Service

- You asked Dr. Chu and me to provide you with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.
- The Selective Service System is a separate agency in the Executive Branch. It is not part of DoD.
- I have asked a member of my staff to work with Dr. Chu's staff in preparing a reply to you. I will coordinate on Dr. Chu's reply, and ensure it incorporates my advice.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC/697-93


cc: USD(P&R)

15 Oct 04



OCT 15 2604

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte
ADM Tom Fargo
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissenger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissenger on China that is of interest.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/30/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss
101404-23

.....
Please respond by _____

China

15 OCT 04

OSD 16230-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

DATE: July 30, 2003

SUBJECT: Chinese Views on Korea

Two recent conversations with senior PRC officials underlined the skepticism with which China now views North Korea. Minister Chen Yunlin, who is dual-hatted as the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of both the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, called on me July 24 accompanied by his deputy, Zhou Mingwei. A significant portion of the conversation concerned Korea. Subsequently, the departing PRC Consul General in New York, Ambassador Zhang Hongxi, hosted a dinner for me on July 28, during which we again touched on the problem posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Although Chen holds no responsibilities relating to North Korea, he himself broached the subject by asking for my views on how good or bad outcomes on the DPRK nuclear weapons issue might affect the Taiwan Strait. He seemed comfortable with my view that the emergence of a nuclear power on China's Yalu River border would not be in China's interest and would make the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia inevitable, possibly including Taiwan. I noted the issue was whether we could create a political framework for resolving the issue that would also be able to address broader concerns on the Korean peninsula, much as the CSCE process had done in Europe. I urged that we not get bogged down over tactical issues. For a viable solution, we needed to involve the five or six (including Russia) key countries involved. This would also be the most effective way to commit Japan to nuclear restraint. I emphasized the central role that China and the United States needed to play, since neither of us could tolerate having a new nuclear power on the Korean peninsula. I recalled that I had seen a major shift in China's position on North Korea as US-China relations had evolved and touched on the enormous expansion of China's trade and other relations with South Korea.

Chen did not take issue with any of these observations and responded positively to the further point that good cooperation between China and the United States in dealing with North Korea would also deny an opportunity to elements on Taiwan who wanted to drive a wedge between Beijing and Washington, whereas poor cooperation would have the opposite effect. He appreciated my remark that China's interests on the Korean peninsula were broader than simply the question of nuclear weapons, and that these interests needed to be respected. I also noted the beneficial impact on elites in both countries if we were seen as cooperating closely on an issue as important as Korea. Chen called these observations very important and useful for China to consider.

(| During my dinner with Ambassador Zhang, he readily acknowledged North Korea's appalling weakness as a result of its own policies. He doubted that the regime there could survive for more than a month if war were to break out.

In contrast to the Pollyannaish views of some Chinese officials in the past when discussing North Korea, I was struck by the realism about the North displayed by both Chen and Zhang in these conversations. Neither tried to make rhetorical points.

Overall, my impression is that the implications of North Korea's current policies are so grave for Beijing, and pose such high risks of international complications that impact directly on fundamental Chinese security interests, that there are divided counsels in the PRC government over the best approach. At the same time, top leaders clearly recognize that if China is perceived as disengaged, or unwilling to press resolutely for a **non-nuclear** Korean peninsula, it will compromise its ability to sustain Japanese restraint on acquiring nuclear weapons. For that reason, China is more resolute than South Korea in its determination to reverse North Korea's nuclear program, even at severe cost to its relations with North Korea, or to the survivability of the regime there.

However, for China it is vitally important, in part because of its internal divided counsels, that regime-threatening actions not be taken except after every alternative possibility of resolving the matter through dialogue and negotiations has been exhausted. This underlines the need for a patient but resolute tightening of the screws on North Korea, rather than premature resort to a regime-threatening approach that will maximize Beijing's internal difficulties and increase the risks that China will seek more starkly to differentiate its approach from that of the United States.

October 18, 2004

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte
ADM Tom Fargo
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissinger on China that is of interest.

Attach.
7/3/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss
101404-23

.....
Please respond by _____

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Overall, my impression is that the implications of North Korea's current policies are so grave for Beijing, and pose such high risks of international complications that impact directly on fundamental Chinese security interests, that there are divided counsels in the PRC government over the best approach. At the same time, top leaders clearly recognize that if China is perceived as disengaged, or unwilling to press resolutely for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, it will compromise its ability to sustain Japanese restraint on acquiring nuclear weapons. For that reason, China is more resolute than South Korea in its determination to reverse North Korea's nuclear program, even at severe cost to its relations with North Korea, or to the survivability of the regime there.

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Washington Headquarters Services
Executive Services & Communications Directorate

1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Phone: (b)(6) -- Fax: (b)(6)

FROM :		TO: Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK (GEN LaPorte)
Subject: Kissinger Memo		Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense
		Phone: DSN (b)(6)
Pages (Including Cover):	4	Date: 10/18/2004 Fax: (b)(6)

Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Information

Comments: Item of interest from SECDEF

~~FOUO~~

October 18, 2004

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte
ADM Tom Fargo
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissinger on China that is of interest.

Attach.
7/3/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss
101404-23

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16248-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27207

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
DATE: July 30, 2003
SUBJECT: Chinese Views on Korea

Two recent conversations with senior PRC officials underlined the skepticism with which China now views North Korea. Minister Chen Yunlin, who is dual-hatted as the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of both the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, called on me July 24 accompanied by his deputy, Zhou Mingwei. A significant portion of the conversation concerned Korea. Subsequently, the departing PRC Consul General in New York, Ambassador Zhang Hongxi, hosted a dinner for me on July 28, during which we again touched on the problem posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

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October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
LTG David Barno
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to be coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

She is a very bright, capable person and it would be a help if she had a good trip.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101504-12



Please respond by _____

18 Oct 04

October 15, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
LTG David Barno

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to ^{be} coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

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DHR:ss
101504-12

.....

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

October 15, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
LTG David Barno

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

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Thanks.

DHR:ss
101504-12

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27212



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

72
HOLD
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

~~SENSITIVE~~

ACTION MEMO

October 14, 2004 - 11:00 AM
DepSecDef Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)
David S. C. Chu 18 Oct 2004
SUBJECT: Female General and Flag Officers — SNOWFLAKE

- You asked two questions regarding female general and flag officers (Tab A).
 - Have we ever had a four-star woman? **Answer:** No
 - Are there any four-star candidate females in any of the Services right now? **Answer:** We currently have no three-star female officers. The Services do intend to nominate several three-star slates this year. The Service game plan meetings with you later this month should provide a clear assessment of the potential of each of these two-stars.
- Among recently retired female three-stars, perhaps the strongest possibility is LTG Kenne, who could be a candidate for Air Force Materiel Command at a future date (bio at Tab B).
- Reflecting the period when they entered military service, all one and two-star women officers chose careers in "support" specialties. This will make it difficult to compete successfully as combatant commander candidates, and likewise for chief of service. But some may be strong candidates for the four-star training commands in the Air Force and the Army, the acquisition commands, and possibly for vice chief of a military service.

RECOMMENDATION: That you discuss with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs how they are developing women with operational backgrounds for the next cohort of junior flag officers.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

210 (3+4)

14 Oct 04

20 Oct 04



October 7, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Four-Star Question

*Gen. Myers
10/7/04
2106344*

Have **we ever had** a four-star woman? **And** are there any four-star candidate **females** in **any** of the services **right now**?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-14

.....

10/8

100704



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESLIE F. KENNE

Retired Sep. 1, 2003.

Lt. Gen. Leslie F. Kenne is Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. She is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for forming and executing policy and strategy to integrate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to enable more effective employment of air and space power in support of national objectives. General Kenne also provides guidance and direction to four field operating agencies: the Air Force Command and Control & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center; the Air Force Communications Agency; the Air Force Frequency Management Agency; and the Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation.



General Kenne entered the Air Force in 1971 as a distinguished graduate of Auburn University's ROTC program. She has served as a flight line maintenance officer in operations, and attended the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School in 1974. After school, she served as a test and evaluation project manager, and in test and evaluation supervisory positions.

General Kenne has served in two other Pentagon staff positions, first as a division chief, and during a second tour, as a deputy director in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She has directed three major programs-- the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night, the F-16 and the Joint Strike Fighter. She also has served as Vice Commander of Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif. Prior to assuming her current position, General Kenne commanded the Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.

EDUCATION

1970 Bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.
 1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1979 Master's degree in procurement management, Webster College, St. Louis, Mo.
 1981 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
 1986 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 1988 Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.
 1993 Advanced Management Program, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire

11-L-0559/OSD/27215

1995 National and International Security Management Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. April 1971 - December 1971, space systems analyst, Headquarters Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
2. December 1971 - April 1972, student, aircraft maintenance officer course, Chanute Air Force Base, Ill.
3. April 1972 - June 1973, flight line maintenance officer, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
4. June 1973 - June 1974, maintenance supervisor, 474th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
5. July 1974 - October 1975, student, flight test engineering course, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.
6. October 1975 - June 1978, project manager for air combat measuring instrumentation, later, Deputy Test Director, Range Measurement System Joint Testing, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
7. June 1978 - August 1981, program manager for Secretary of Defense Office-directed joint tests, Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.
8. August 1981 - January 1982, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
9. January 1982 - June 1985, Chief, Airborne Systems Test Branch, later, Chief, Electronics Systems Test Division, 3246th Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.
10. June 1985 - June 1986, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. June 1986 - April 1988, Director of Operations and Support, Airborne Warning and Control Systems Program Office, later, Program Manager, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Class II, Headquarters Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
12. April 1988 - September 1988, student, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.
13. December 1988 - August 1990, Chief, Special Projects Division, Directorate of Special Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
14. August 1990 - July 1992, Director, LANTIRN Systems Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
15. July 1992 - October 1993, Deputy Director, Fighters, Command and Control and Weapons Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
16. October 1993 - September 1994, Director, F-16 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
17. September 1994 - July 1995, Vice Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
18. July 1995 - September 1996, Vice Commander, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif.
19. September 1996 - July 1997, Deputy Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
20. August 1997 - June 1999, Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
21. June 1999 - April 2002, Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
22. May 2002 - August 2003, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal

PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS

Level III Program Management
Level III Test and Evaluation

11-L-0559/OSD/27216

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Apr 1, 1971
First Lieutenant Apr 1, 1973
Captain Apr 1, 1975
Major Oct 24, 1980
Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 1985
Colonel Oct 1, 1989
Brigadier General Oct 1, 1994
Major General Mar 20, 1998
Lieutenant General Jul 1, 1999

(Current as of July 2002)

11-L-0559/OSD/27217

October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
LTG David Barno
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to be coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

She is a very bright, capable person and it would be a help if she had a good trip.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101504-12

.....
Please respond by _____

Norway

12 OCT 04

OSD 16364-04

10/18/2004 4:26:39 PM

**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION**

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

To: Ambassador Khalilzad

Subject: Conversation with Norway's MOD

COMPLETED

Facsimile #: (b)(6)

From: Secretary Rumsfeld


Office/Desk: OSD Cables Division

Number of Pages Incl. Cover: 2

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

Facsimile: (b)(6)

Remarks:



Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD

From: McInturff, Sandra L [McInturffSL@state.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 5:44 AM
To: 'Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD'
Subject: RE: Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

I got it. I will take a copy to General Barno's people.
Sandy McInturff

-----Original Message-----

From: Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD [mailto:Kyle.Steinfadt@osd.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 2:09 PM
To: 'mcinturffsl@state.gov'
Subject: Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

Please receipt email for the attached 2-pg doc.

Thank You,
Capt Steinfadt <<Khalizad.snowflake.19Oct04.pdf>>

10/18/2004 4:28:24 PM

**OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES DIVISION**

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

COMPLETED

To: LTG Barno

Subject: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Facsimile #: (b)(6)

CFC-FMB-ADMIN-NC0@CFC-A, centcom.smil.mil

From: Secretary Rumsfeld

Office/Desk: OSD Cables Division

Number of Pages Incl. Cover: 2

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6)

DSN: (b)(6)

Facsimile: (b)(6)

Remarks:

SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION				
SECDEF	SECSTATE	SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: System Administrator [postmaster@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:28 AM
To: CablesESO@osd.smil.mil
Subject: Delivered: RE:



RE:

<<RE: >> Your message

To: 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'
Subject: RE:
Sent: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:30:26 -0000

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO on Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:28:03 -0000

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO [CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 4:35 AM
To: 'RSS - SecDef CablesESO'
Subject: RE:

Got it sir. Thanks

MICHAEL K. ANDERSON
SFC, USA
Embassy Liaison NCO
DSN (b)(6)



-----Original Message-----

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:CablesESO@osd.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 12:00 PM
To: 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'
Subject: RE:

Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

I see all CAPS in the address, that was not told to me....

Please confirm receipt of 2-pg doc from SecDef to GEN Barno.

Thank You,
Capt Steinfadt
SecDef ESO

-----Original Message-----

From: CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO [mailto:CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:25 AM
To: 'cableseso@osd.smil.mil'
Subject:

Test.

MICHAEL K. ANDERSON
SFC, USA
Embassy Liaison NCO

10/19/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/27223

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Over Classification

Please look into this article on over classification.

I have always felt that there has been a "better safe than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.
Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DNR:dh
M2504-11 (to computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/20/04

OSD 16378-04

Members of the commission have said that the recommendations for an overhaul of Congressional intelligence oversight, which the panel described as "dysfunctional," were among the panel's most important - and would be among the most difficult for Congress to endorse. The commission called for Congress to consider creation of a single joint committee on intelligence or, alternatively, for a single committee in each house of Congress that would have the power to appropriate budget money.

Either proposal would almost certainly face strong opposition from lawmakers on the many Congressional committees that now review intelligence affairs and would have to cede power under a new oversight structure.

The membership of the working group includes Mr. Roberts, as well as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat. Senators Warner and Levin have already expressed wariness about any change that might strip the Defense Department - and the Armed Services Committee - of control over intelligence matters related to the military.

Among the other members of the working group are the two Senate authors of the legislation that created the Sept. 11 commission: John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut.

"Ensuring that the Senate is as effective as possible when dealing with the threat of terrorism is a principal concern," Mr. Frist said, "and I welcome the working group's recommendations."

Washington Times
August 25, 2004
Pg. 6

Overclassification Overdone?

Pentagon testifies it errs 'on the side of caution'

By Shaun Waterman, United Press International

The official in charge of information security at the Pentagon told lawmakers yesterday that at least half of the information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept secret.

"How about if I say 50-50?" Carol Haave told the House Government Reform national security, emerging threats and international relations subcommittee, when asked to quantify the problem of overclassification.

Ms. Haave, the deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, said classification generally was not done maliciously, but because "people have a tendency to err on the side of caution."

The hearing was one in an unprecedented summer-recess series held to consider the recommendations of the September 11 commission, which found "current security requirements nurture overclassification" and create a barrier to the information-sharing needed to fight terrorism.

http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825/wa/index_concat.html

8/25/2004

Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Republican, the panel's chairman, called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets "incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

Mr. Shays said there was broad agreement that many of the 14 million pieces of information the government classified last year did not need to be secret, but that estimates varied wildly on how bad the problem is.

"Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as high as 90 percent," he said.

The administration's secrecy watchdog, Bill Leonard, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, told legislators that too much information is being classified in violation of President Bush's executive order governing secrecy.

That order, introduced in March, says information can lawfully be classified only if its "unauthorized disclosure ... reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security"

The problem, said Bill Crowell, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency who has served on a number of commissions inquiring into classification and secrecy, is that the system dated from the Cold War.

"The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in advance who needs to know particular information, and that the risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information-sharing," he said.

As a result, there are significant incentives to protect information, but none to share it.

Christian Science Monitor
August 25, 2004

Debate Reignites Over US Aid To Indonesia

A court ruling earlier this month exonerated four officials charged in the 1999 massacre in East Timor.

By Eric Unmacht, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

JAKARTA, INDONESIA - Two competing perspectives have long dominated Washington when talk turns to military aid for Indonesia. On one side there are those in Congress who call the country's military brutal abusers of human rights. They want US aid to remain suspended until Indonesia's military is reformed.

On the other side is the Pentagon and some White House officials who say the US, once Indonesia's largest source of military aid, should resume funding because of the country's importance to the war on terrorism.

http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825a/index_concat.html

8/25/2004



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

777 777 777 777

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  OCT 12 2004

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake Regarding Overclassification

- Your snowflake of 25 August 2004 (attached) expressed concern about over classification within the Department. This is predominately a training issue. People overclassify because they are in a hurry or cautious, the classification guidance is unclear or the derivative source was over classified.
- We have recently established the DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies that is meeting quarterly to oversee implementation of security policies to include this one. Recommend this be "the team" you suggest establishing in your comments to help reduce excessive classification.
- Regarding your comment about review of documents, there are systematic and mandatory declassification review processes as well as reviews done in response to Freedom of Information requests. For example, USD(P) is conducting a declassification review of prewar Iraq policy material. Also, there is a package on its way to you designating USD(I) as the final declassification arbiter for GTMO related issues.
- Attached are some actions underway to help remedy the situation, but the key is command emphasis on security as part of the operational mission, training and oversight. These actions and venues provide the opportunity and ability to strengthen the DoD information security program and reduce over classification.

Attachment:

List of additional actions

COORDINATION:

DA&M: Concur

GC: Concur

Prepared by: C. Bromwell, OUSD(I), (b)(6)

OSD 16378-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27227



Revised Guidance

- As required by the SecDef All Hands message (attached), we are issuing a memorandum to all DoD agencies to rejustify their list of original classification authorities to ensure only those positions requiring this authority have it.
- In a revision to DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program," we will be proposing that derivative classification authorities be identified on classified documents. This will reinforce accountability of decisions.
- We are coordinating recommended changes to detainee guidance with a number of DoD agencies and once agreed, we will provide them to the Commanding General, Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo (GTMO) for updating his security classification guide.
- You will be receiving, if you haven't already, a memo for your signature designating me as the declassification authority for collateral classified information related to JTF GTMO detainee issues.

Training Initiatives

- The Defense Security Service Academy is updating and reinforcing the training requirements that will be articulated in a memorandum from me to all DoD Components. We are also investigating novel ways to disseminate the information across the Department such as websites, and assist visits. We are also sending a survey to deploying commands to determine security training needs.
- The Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency conducts a security awareness week in the Pentagon every year, and one of my staff will be participating in October to emphasize your message.
- We continue efforts to enhance the training and professionalization of security managers.
- Considering assigning DSS representatives to Combatant Commanders to educate and answer security-related questions.

Oversight

- The DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and defense agencies that is meeting on 5 October and quarterly thereafter to help oversee implementation of revised security policies.
- OUSDI-led coordination of JTF GTMO detainee-related documents.
- Command self-inspections.
- Considering a proposal to DoD Inspector General — make classification a special interest item.
- Information Security Oversight Office oversight visits to DoD Components.

RAAUZYUW RUEWMFU9815 2602142-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS9815 2602142
R 1621412 SEP 04
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
TO ALDODACT
ZEN/ALDODACT @ AL ALDODACT(UC)
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SUBJ: DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

ALDODACT 13/04

ADDRESSEES PASS TO ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDS
REF: (A) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, AS AMENDED, CLASSIFIED NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION (B) DOD 5200.1-R, INFORMATION SECURITY
PROGRAM

1. THE PRESIDENT ESTABLISHED A STRONG INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 (REFERENCE A), IMPLEMENTED WITHIN DEPARTMENT BY REFERENCE (B). ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION (OCA), DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO REFERENCE (A), AND CLASSIFIERS, ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR DECISIONS. OFFICIALS WITH COMMAND SIGNATURE AUTHORITY SHALL ENSURE THAT CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS ARE
2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO STATE THAT CLASSIFIERS SHALL NOT: A) CLASSIFICATION TO CONCEAL VIOLATIONS OF LAW, INEFFICIENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR; B) CLASSIFY INFORMATION TO EMBARRASSMENT TO A PERSON, ORGANIZATION, OR AGENCY; C) INFORMATION TO PREVENT OR DELAY THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE PROTECTION IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY. INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE CLASSIFIED IF IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT IN REFERENCE (A) AND REITERATED IN REFERENCE (B).
3. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) ISSUE MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OCAS AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES WITHIN 45 DAYS. USD(I) ALSO SHALL THAT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE IS UPDATED, CORRECTIVE IS TAKEN, AS APPROPRIATE, AT DOD COMPONENTS THAT GENERATE RELATED TO DETAINEES AND PRISONER ABUSE, AND THAT ALL DOD CONDUCT ACTIVE OVERSIGHT OF ALL OCA POSITIONS FOR JUSTIFICATION MAINTAIN THIS
4. ALL CLASSIFIED DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: / DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: /
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: / FILE: XCEB
USDP: / DIA: OTHER: ESR / MILPER / CIVPER /
USDI: / PER SEC: COMM: PROTOCOL

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 2

SUCH AND CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS APPLIED AS REQUIRED BY REFERENCE (B). DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS MAY NOT BE USED AS SOURCES FOR DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES.

5. ANY QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SENT VIA THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO ONE OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT, JOINT STAFF OR THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY, (ODUSD/CI&S),

PJBD...INFO	****
USRMCLO... INFO	****
JSSC...INFO	****
SHAPE LNO...INFO	****
USSOCOMWO...INFO	****

JOINT STAFF V1		3
ACTION	(U,7)	
INFO	SJS-C(*) SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(*) CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JS COMPT(*) PJBD(*) JSSC(*) USSOCOMWO(*) JMUSDC(*) USTRANSCOMWO(*) JSAMS(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*) JCSONNIPRDA(*) JCSONSIPRDA(*)	

SECDEF V2		0
ACTION	SECDEF WASH DC(*) (U,6,7,8)	
INFO	CHAIRS(*) CHAIRS TESTBED(*) CHAIRS2(*) DOTE :OSD(*) DOD:IG(*) ATSD:IO(*) NCCS SUPPORT(*) MDA(*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(*) USDAT :STS(*) ASD :PA-SMTP(*) DIR :PAE-RAM(*) DIR :PAE-SSACP(*) DIR:PAE-DCL(*) USDCOMP(*) MILPERDIV(*) USDP:ESC(*) ESC-SMTP(*) IG-DCIS KWS(*) OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*) +SAFE	

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#9815

NNNN

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/27230

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Runsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Over Classification

Please look into this article on over classification.

I have always felt that there has been a "better safe than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.

Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DNR:dk
M2504-12 (to scmpaper).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

9/20/04

OSD 16378-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27231

Members of the commission have said that the recommendations for an overhaul of Congressional intelligence oversight, which the panel described as "dysfunctional," were among the panel's most important - and would be among the most difficult for Congress to endorse. The commission called for Congress to consider creation of a single joint committee on intelligence or, alternatively, for a single committee in each house of Congress that would have the power to appropriate budget money.

Either proposal would almost certainly eliminate the 18 separate Congressional committees that now review intelligence matters and would have to adapt to a new oversight structure.

The membership of the working group includes Mr. Roberts, as well as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat. Senators Warner and Levin have already expressed wariness about any change that might strip the Defense Department - and the Armed Services Committee, as well - of control over intelligence matters related to the military.

Among the other members of the working group are the two Senate authors of the legislation that created the Sept. 11 commission: John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut.

"Ensuring that the Senate is as effective as possible when dealing with the threat of terrorism is a principal concern," Mr. Frist said, "and I welcome the working group's recommendations."

Washington Times
August 25, 2004
Pg. 6

Overclassification Overdone?

Pentagon testifies, it errs 'on the side of caution'

By Shaun Waterman, United Press International

The official in charge of information security at the Pentagon told lawmakers yesterday that at least half of the information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept secret.

"How about if I say 30-30?" Carol Heave told the House Government Reform national security, emerging threats and international relations subcommittee, when asked to quantify the problem of overclassification.

Ms. Heave, the deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, said classification generally was not done maliciously, but because "people have a tendency to err on the side of caution."

The hearing was one in an unprecedented summer-recess series held to consider the recommendations of the September 11 commission, which found "current security requirements nurture overclassification" and create a barrier to the information-sharing needed to fight terrorism.

http://pbird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825a/index_concat.html

8/25/2004

Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Republican. L epanel's chairman, called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets "incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

Mr. Shays said there was broad agreement that many of the 14 million pieces of information the government classified last year did not need to be secret, but that estimates varied wildly on how bad L e problem is.

"Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as high as 90 percent," he said.

The administration's secrecy watchdog, Bill Leonard, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, told legislators that too much information is being classified in violation of President Bush's executive order governing secrecy.

That order, introduced in March, says information can lawfully be classified only if its "unauthorized disclosure ... reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security"

The problem, said Bill Crowell, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency who has served on a number of commissions inquiring into classification and secrecy, is that the system dated from the Cold War.

"The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in advance who needs to know particular information, and that the risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information-sharing," he said.

As a result, there are significant incentives to protect information, but none to share it.

Christian Science Monitor
August 25, 2004

Debate Reignites Over US Aid To Indonesia

A court ruling earlier this month exonerated four officials charged in the 1999 massacre in East Timor.

By Eric Unmacht, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

JAKARTA, INDONESIA - Two competing perspectives have long dominated Washington when talk turns to military aid for Indonesia. On one side there are those in Congress who call the country's military brutal abusers of human rights. They want US aid to remain suspended until Indonesia's military is reformed.

On the other side is the Pentagon and some White House officials who say the US, once Indonesia's largest source of military aid, should resume funding because of the country's importance to the war on terrorism.

http://pbird.afis.osd.mil/cbfiles/e20040825aaindex_concat.html

8/25/2004

TAB
~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2004

869

322

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINC's I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:ms
092804-13

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

092804-13

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27234

2852904



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2129-04
19 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 10/18

SUBJECT: CINCs

- **Question.** "Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes, we should strive for enhanced connectivity with combatant commanders with whom we are not engaged on a regular basis.
- **Analysis.** The following procedures provide the necessary links:
 - Encourage all combatant commanders to request an office call with SecDef whenever they visit Washington.
 - Host periodic video-telecommunications or teleconferences with one command at a time.
 - Visit (accompanied by Joyce) one combatant command per month for a day.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27235

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 16393-04

TAB

~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2004

869

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:as
092804-13

.....
Please *respond-by* 10/8/04

092804-13

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27236

~~FOUO~~
October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a set of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
102504-19

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

091.4

25 OCT 04

4 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

10/4/04

~~FOUO~~

CC: 10/4/04
NDP

OCT 04 2004

10/4/04 10:14:37

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100104-11

.....
Please respond by 10/14/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27238

OSD 16491-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

SECRET

2004 DEC -2 PM 2:49

November 29, 2004, 5:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)
David S. C. Chu & Doc. of

SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The current language pool is driven by an outdated manpower “requirements” process.
- We need to establish a number of people to be trained in languages over and above the needs defined in this traditional manner, “capabilities based.” This is one of the objectives of our Language Transformation Roadmap.
- We can begin by:
 - Identifying a goal for the percent of the force that should possess capability in investment languages (regardless of job), and tasking the Defense Language Institute to set up courses to train these service members over and above their existing capacity. I propose setting the goal at 5% active, 2 1/2% selected reserve (= 70,300 active, 21,522 reserves)
 - Establishing a Joint Service Language Corps that could be used to support all services and operations. We are currently developing the concept for such a Corps.
 - Expediting the full implementation of an **Army** pilot program to recruit Arabic speaking service members, by expanding the languages we target for recruitment and starting similar programs in other services.
 - Providing incentive for service members to maintain their language proficiency with enhanced Foreign Language Proficiency Pay. **An** increase was included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act.
- Subject to your guidance, I will pursue all of the above options and report back to you on our progress.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD(PLANS), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/27239

OSD 16491-04

October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a **set** of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:as
102504-19

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

TOUO

OCT 04 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100104-11

.....
Please respond by

10/14/04

DR
↓
in St. Check Status.

*Sir,
response Attached
V/R
COLB
10/20*

TOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/27241

OSD 16491-04



1435

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

2004 OCT 19 PM 6:20
October 13, 2004, 3 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

SUBJECT: Macro Layout of Languages (Snowflake)

- Active Service members with a minimum of Level 1 reading and listening ability:

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	2,391	1,979	2,586	2,606	2,556
Chinese (Mandarin)	1,168	918	1,455	1,578	1,623
Persian Farsi	657	446	739	802	796
Persian Afghan	5	4	15	13	16
Korean	2,646	2,243	3,199	3,322	3,354

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	418	417	398	376	543
Chinese (Mandarin)	150	205	188	237	189
Persian Farsi	124	95	103	138	166
Persian Afghan	0	0	0	0	18
Korean	264	322	274	253	379

see expanded charts at rear of packet

- More dramatic improvement has been hampered by the Services' lengthy processes for developing manpower requirements, which are largely based upon past operational experience instead of being driven by a capabilities-based assessment. We have initiated a pilot program to recruit heritage Arabic speakers into the Individual Ready Reserve with an eye to creating a surge capability for operational units in the future. The Army is having success with this program, which should serve as a model for future efforts.
- We are also addressing systemic language issues to fix the requirements process to allow for "top down" driven changes, a doctrinal change to incorporate foreign language and regional expertise as combat capabilities for planning purposes, and a readiness index to measure our progress. We are currently coordinating a Transformation Roadmap that embodies these changes and the need for greater language proficiency among our language specialists. In accordance with the Strategic Planning Guidance, the Roadmap will be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.

Attachment:

Data on Service Academies language requirements

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (PLANS),

(b)(6)

TSA SD	10/20
SRMA SD	
MA SD	SPD 10/20
EXEC SEC	M 10/20



OSD 16491-04

SERVICE ACADEMIES

United States Military Academy (two semester mandatory requirement) Following are the numbers for cadets in the Classes of 2004-2008 for the seven languages taught at West Point.

Academic Year (AY)	AY 2000 (graduates 2004)	AY 2001 (graduates 2005)	AY 2002 (graduates 2006)	AY 2003 (graduates 2007)	AY 2004 (graduates 2008)
Arabic	91	89	208	209	244
Chinese	84	112	58	55	78
French	130	149	148	178	97
German	263	232	234	265	216
Portuguese	118	100	58	127	178
Russian	70	112	141	56	52
Spanish	374	361	279	366	420

United States Air Force Academy (four semester requirement for non-technical majors; two semester requirement for mathematics, space operations, meteorology, and biology; no requirement for engineering majors) Students enrolled in language courses, by year.

Academic Year	Fall 2000	Fall 2001	Fall 2002 (voluntary)	Fall 2003 (mandatory again)	Fall 2004
Arabic	104	111	47	84	135
Chinese	108	105	42	46	75
French	312	253	98	151	164
German	285	226	79	156	197
Japanese	109	130	37	65	97
Russian	171	181	92	112	128
Spanish	465	630	261	286	346

United States Naval Academy (four semester requirement for humanities and social science majors; no requirement for engineering, mathematics or science majors) **Number** of midshipmen taking languages by the academic year.

Academic Year	2001 (Spring & Fall)	2002 (Spring & Fall)	2003 (Spring & Fall)	2004 (Spring & Fall)	2005 (Fall)
Arabic					*34
Chinese		*56	103	111	51
French	294	297	325	319	172
German	177	174	207	230	120
Japanese	109	112	92	123	82
Russian	89	97	122	134	64
Spanish	1122	963	951	1078	456

Attachment



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

October 13, 2004, 3 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Macro Layout of Languages (Snowflake) *1964604*

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	2,391	1,979	2,586	2,606	2,556
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Persian Farsi	657	446	739	802	796
Persian Afghan	5	4	15	13	16
Korean	2,646	2,243	3,199	3,322	3,354

- Students graduating with these languages at the Defense Language Institute:

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Arabic (Modern Standard)	418	417	398	376	543
Chinese (Mandarin)	150	205	188	237	189
Persian Farsi	124	95	103	138	166
Persian Afghan	0	0	0	0	18
Korean	264	322	274	253	379

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Attachment:

Data on Service Academies language requirements

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (PLANS), (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/27244

OSD 16491-04

SERVICE ACADEMIES

United States Military Academy (two semester mandatory requirement) Following are the numbers for cadets in the Classes of 2004-2008 for the seven languages taught at West Point.

Academic Year (AY)	AY 2000 (graduates 2004)	AY 2001 (graduates 2005)	AY 2002 (graduates 2006)	AY 2003 (graduates 2007)	AY 2004 (graduates 2008)
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Academic Year	2001 (Spring & Fall)	2002 (Spring & Fall)	2003 (Spring & Fall)	2004 (Spring & Fall)	2005 (Fall)
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French	294	297	325	319	172
German	177	174	207	230	120
Japanese	109	112	92	123	82
Russian	89	97	122	134	64
Spanish	1122	963	951	1078	456

*Denotes inception year of program.

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/27245

10/4/04

~~FOUO~~

CL 10/4/04
NDP

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OCT 04 2004

OCT 04 11 4: 27

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100104-11

.....
Please respond by 10/14/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27246

OSD 16491-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

OCT 15 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
 VADM Jim Stavridis
 Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues Proposal

*Copy of
 PKC to
 GEN Helmick*

Please take a look at this proposal from Ray Dubois and tell me what you think of it.

~~Have Paul Wolfowitz look at it, and then come back to me with a recommendation.~~

Thanks.

Attach
 5/20/04 Memo to SecDef re: Elevating Issues

DHR:sp
 101404-33

.....
 Please respond by 10/18

SIR _____

*→ Larry, Paul, and I think it worth setting up, trying for 6 months.
 → Will send to Deputy for his cut / recommendation.*

v/r [Signature]


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


Executive Issues Flow

Chain of Command Reporting



Expedited Early-Warning



October 19, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Letter from Governor Ehrlich

Attached is a letter from Governor Bob Ehrlich, and a copy of my response to him.

It is in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/15/04 Gov Ehrlich Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
101904-21

.....
Please respond by _____

3233 Navy

19 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 16610-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Governor of Maryland
State House
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Governor,

Thanks so much for your note and your holiday greetings. Mary Beth dropped it off.

I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the name of the Secretary of Defense, is written over the text "Warm regards,".

11-L-0559/OSD/27251



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC, 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, Maryland is home to nearly 100,000 military personnel and some of the nation's most important military installations. While many of these installations have become an integral part of America's tradition and history, I would like to draw your attention to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head, a facility that is vital to the way we conduct warfare.

Recently, the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head developed, tested, and fielded the thermobaric bomb in 68 days. It was a remarkable success story in our fight against Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts in the mountainous Gardez region of eastern Afghanistan. Although this facility has remained relatively anonymous, its unique combination of energetics capability and problem solving are essential to overcome the asymmetrical tactics of our enemies.

While industry has abandoned the energetics business, it can no longer meet this quick-response requirement. As a result, the Navy consolidated its energetics activities into the Naval Warfare Center at Indian Head, which provides a full life-cycle energetics activity, capable of pursuing science and technology, design, development, in-service engineering, process development, scale-up and limited production. This enormous capability is supported by 800 energetics scientists and technicians and efficiently housed in one facility in Indian Head. In fact, 70% of all U.S. explosives and propellants, including the thermobaric bomb, developed since 1985 originated at Indian Head.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 is designed to save money while injecting efficiencies into the way we station and deploy our forces. In 1995, BRAC analysts focused keenly on energetics and devised multiple scenarios to close Indian Head. It became clear that it was too expensive to close Indian Head then, and it will likely remain too expensive to close today. In the wake of BRAC, however, the Navy took the opportunity to consolidate even more energetics missions at Indian Head. Today, it remains the hub of the Department of Defense (DoD) energetics, it is the only research and development center for underwater weapons, the only facility for high-risk chemicals (including being the sole producer of torpedo fuel), and it is DoD's center of excellence for all aircraft ejection seat propellants and other cartridge actuated and propellant actuated (CAD/PAD) devices.

11-L-0559/OSD/27252

STATE HOUSE, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401

(b)(6)

TTY USERS CALL VIA MD RELAY


OSD/6610-04

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
October 15, 2004
Page 2

Others have followed the Navy to Indian Head, taking advantage of its proximity to the Beltway and the affordable living conditions in Charles County. Today, the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), which tests the majority of new command and control systems for service-wide compatibility, has re-located to Indian Head. The Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (EODTC) provides the capability to locate, gain access to, identify, and neutralize hazards presented by military and improvised surface and underwater conventional and nuclear devices. Today, the EODTC operates a 24-7 command cell linked via satellite to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify unexploded ordnance, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Additionally, the U.S. Marines selected Indian Head to position its Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), enabling a rapid response to Waslungton, D.C. while maintaining a safe distance in the event of a catastrophic event. As you know, it was the Indian Head-based CBIRF that responded to the Senate Hart Office Building following the post 9-11 anthrax attack.


In addition, the analyses of BRAC 95 repeatedly demonstrate the financial and military **risk** inherent in closing this facility or moving its capability elsewhere. While Indian Head offers a continuum of energetics capability, from development and testing to neutralization and disposal for our military, it is also vital to Maryland. If I may be of any assistance on this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact my Deputy Chief of Staff, Mary Beth Carozza at (b)(6) or via email at mbcarozza@gov.state.md.us.

Very truly yours,



Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Governor

cc: The Honorable Aris Melissaratos
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington DC, 20301-1000

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3233 Navy

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DSD 16610-04

(b)(6)

MD


21401

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
October 15, 2004
Page 2

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Very truly yours,


Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Governor

cc: The Honorable *Aris* Melissaratos
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/27255

Mr. Secretary -

(b)(6)




*Greetings
from
Maryland!*

MARY BETH CAROZZA
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE HOUSE
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401

*The Governor
asked me to say
"Hello!"*



mbcarozza@gov.state.md.us

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

Mary Beth

11-L-0559/OSD/27256

OSD 167 -04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

Ms. Mary Beth Carozza
Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of the Governor
State House
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mary Beth,

Thanks so much for your note and the letter from the Governor.

I hope things are going well for you. We miss you here.

Warm regards,


323.3 Navy

20 Oct 04

15 Oct 04

OSD 16601-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27257



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Governor of Maryland
State House
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Governor,

Thanks so much for your note and your holiday greetings. Mary Beth dropped it off.

I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,


323.3 Navy

20 Oct 04

OSD 16600-04

copy

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen John Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

At the right time, in the right way, why don't you think about the possibility of using Peshmerga military forces for one or more of the following possibilities:

- Protection of a UN presence
- Protection of the NATO Mission for training and equipping
- Protection in the Green Zone
- Protection for election activities in selected parts of the country
- Convoy protection – since they would be moving across the country, rather than permanently located
- Selected site protection
- Protection along the Syrian border and/or the Iranian border

Iraq

200404

One possibility might be to make them an element of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-20

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 16612-04

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

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- Selected site protection
- Protection along the Syrian border and/or the Iranian border

One possibility might be to make them an element of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-20

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 16612-04



OCT 15 2004

Handwritten notes:
10/15/04
10/15/04
10/15/04
10/15/04

ACTION MEMO

USD(P)
15 Oct 2004
OSD/ISA/NESA
I-04/013743-ES
ES-1027

Handwritten: Korea

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

Handwritten: 18 OCT 2004

SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

- You asked us to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula.
- We have already sent him a thank you note (attached).
- Next under is another note with photos attached.

Recommendation:

- Sign note to Crown Prince of Bahrain.

Handwritten: 18 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04

Handwritten signature: Peter McVety

PDASD/ISA _____

Prepared by: CDR Peter McVety, OSD/ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

Handwritten: 13 OCT 04

10/13/04
1700

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2004
ES-1027
I-04/013743

Korea

TO: Bill Luti
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

I want to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula, as promised.

Please give me a draft of the note to review.

DHR:sm
101304-11

.....
Please respond by 10/19/04

→ To Sec Def 10/21
Paul Butler
10/10

13 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04

~~FOUO~~

His Highness
Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief
Bahrain Defense Force
Kingdom of Bahrain
Manama, Bahrain

Your Highness,

It was a pleasure to see you during my visit to Bahrain. I want to again express my special appreciation for your gracious hospitality and the elegant dinner that you hosted for all the visiting Ministers of Defense.

Thank you for your continued cooperation. I look forward to returning to Bahrain in the future.

Sincerely,

Mailed out on 13 October, 2004.

11-L-0559/OSD/27263



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



OCT 21 2004

His Highness
Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief
Bahrain Defense Force
Kingdom of Bahrain
Manama, Bahrain

Korea

Your Highness:

Enclosed is the satellite photo of the Korean Peninsula that I promised you during dinner.

Again, thank you for the wonderful day in your country.

Sincerely,


21 OCTOY

13 OCTOY

11-L-0559/OSD/27264

OSD 16625-04





Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula
21 September 2003, 1201z

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
October 1, 2004

2004 OCT 31 PM 12:42

TO: Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, **the** Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss
093004-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 21 PM 12:42

October 20, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

- At your direction, I have spoken with Larry DiRita on the management of the Defense Business Board (DBB) (snowflake at TAB A).
- I understand your concern about the Board's work products becoming public before they are in a final, releasable form.
- The DBB Executive Director will continue to work proactively with Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and will ensure they are involved early and are aware of the Board's activities, deliberations and draft reports.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Thomas Modly, DBB Executive Director (b)(6)

OSD 16657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27267

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
October 1, 2004
2004 OCT 21 PM 12:43

TO: Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, the Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss
093004-17

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27269

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please give me the ~~manning~~ tables for all the headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:m
101304-5

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27270

14-10-04 17:10 IN



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14

I-04/013742

I-04/013838

DepSecDef _____

USD(P) _____

copy provided Lt Col 21/04

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mira Ricardel, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP)

John M. For OCT 21 2004
John Harris

FROM: Ian Brzezinski, DASD (European and NATO Policy)

SUBJECT: NATO Manning Tables

- You asked to see the manning tables for NATO headquarters/activities. Attached is a by-nation summary of military manning in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) as of January 2004 (Tab *A*).
- Because the full manpower structure for the new NCS has not yet been finalized, NATO is still working under its pre-existing manpower authorizations.
 - o This means the attached table does not reflect the 7 new NATO members, the handful of new French positions in ACO and ACT, or the manpower savings that will result from command structure reform.
- (U) As soon as complete manning data for the new NCS is available, we will provide an updated list.
 - o We anticipate the NAC will approve the full manpower structure for the new NCS by the end of November 2004.

Prepared by Lt Col John Harris, ISP/NATO (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27271



OSD 16784-04

A

1/04

NATO Command Structure — Military Positions (as of Jan 2004)

	ACLANT* (becomes ACT)	ACE* (becomes ACO)	Totals
Belgium	15	492	507
Canada	60	256	316
Czech Republic	7	103	110
Denmark	18	388	406
France	2	0	2
Germany	68	2381	2449
Greece	10	583	593
Hungary	5	78	83
Italy	24	1505	1529
Luxembourg	1	0	1
Netherlands	50	657	707
Norway	29	263	292
Poland	14	258	272
Portugal	169	44	213
Spain	51	422	473
Turkey	7	686	693
UK	220	1216	1436
U.S.	432	2797	3229
Other*	103	337	440
Totals	1285	12466	13751

*
 ACTLANT = Allied Command Atlantic.
 ACT = Allied Command Transformation 11-L-0559/OSD/27273
 ACE = Allied Command Europe.
 ACO = Allied Command Operations

B

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ES-1062
04/013838-ES

2004 OCT 22 10:09 AM OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *IL*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
IOI404-22

.....

Please respond by _____

13-10-20 14:54 18

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD 16785-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27275

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 OCT 22 09:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please give me the manning tables for all the headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
101304-5

.....

Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27276

14-10-04 17:10 IN

7201

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

ES-1062
04/013838-ES

OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *IR*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:es
101404-22

.....
Please respond by _____

15-10-04 16:56 IR

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27277

OSD 16785-04



October 21, 2004

TO: Tom Hall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Transforming the Guard and Reserve

Tom, I know your team has put in a great deal of effort over the past year working with the Hill on the important task of transforming the Guard and Reserve; and I see that the 2005 Authorization Bill supports most of our initiatives. We have a way to go, but this is an excellent start. Thanks for all your hard and effective work.

326

DHR:ss
102104-6

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 16815-04

210519



11-L-0559/OSD/27278



~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 issue

05 41 12 76 100 100
09 OCT 02 PM 45 50
09 OCT 02 PM 45 50

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like you to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27279

OSD 16863-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: C-130 Program

- Recent reports in the press concerning the Air Force's C-130 program relate to two distinct issues: 1) the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG's) audit of the Air Force's commercial procurement of C-130J aircraft; and 2) recent protests by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, challenging the Air Force's conduct of certain competitive procurements in which Darleen Druyun was involved as an employee of the Air Force.
- In its report of July 23, 2004, the OIG concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item was improper, and that the aircraft does not meet contractual requirements and cannot perform its mission.
- Senator McCain cited the OIG's report in a hearing before the SASC regarding the 9/11 Commission, and in a letter to you concerning the analysis of alternatives for the recapitalization of the tanker aircraft fleet.
- On August 18, 2004, you requested that the Deputy Secretary look into Senator McCain's concerns. In response to your request and the OIG's report, the Acting USD(AT&L) has undertaken a review of the C-130J program. That review is ongoing, and may result in a plan to address the concerns. The Acting USD(AT&L) informed Senator McCain of the review in a letter dated September 29, 2004.
- Following reports of Ms. Druyun's plea agreement, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems addressed their protests to officials in the Air Force. The protests challenge the award of contracts to Boeing under the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and in other competitive procurements in which Ms. Druyun participated. My staff is reviewing the protests in coordination with attorneys in the Air Force Office of General Counsel.

11-L-0559/OSD/27280



OSD 16863-04

OSD 16863-04

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared By: Charles Bidwell (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27281

~~FOUO~~

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: C-130 issue

2004 OCT 09 PM 10:50
100804-12

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like **you** to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100804-12

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27282

OSD 16863-04

A

TAB A -- COORDINATION: INFO MEMO RE C-130 PROGRAM

Mr. Krieg, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 21, 2004

Mr. Patterson, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 21, 2004

October 22, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Possible Talking Points

Attached are some thoughts on how the White House might want to talk about the Myers letter.

Again, Andy, my apologies that I did not give you a heads up this morning.

Attach.
Draft statement on NID

DHRdh
102204-10.

330.09

22 Oct 04

OSD 16866-04

DRAFT

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

October 22, 2004

General Myers has consistently provided advice to the President along the lines of his recent letter to Congressman Duncan Hunter, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. General Myers was asked by Chairman Hunter to provide his opinion on intelligence reform in writing. It has consistently been the position of the President's administration that when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is asked his opinion by Congress, that he should provide his honest advice. The President respects that.

General Myers is right in his view that nothing should intrude on the integrity of the chain of command. The President has emphasized that that is his view and that principle was reflected in the legislation sent up by the President on September 16, 2004 on page 14, section 4(k)(b)(2), which says, in part:

“The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, shall--(1) ensure that the agencies and organizations of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense adequately satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such agencies and organizations are performing Government wide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies;”

DRAFT

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27286

DRAFT

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

The President believes that the intelligence reform legislation now being worked on in Conference can address this issue in a constructive way. As the President has indicated, he is seeking a bill that adheres to the important principle of respecting the chain of command and also gives full budget authority to the NID. These principles touch on a variety of aspects of the relationships, including personnel, budget authority, and management accountability. The details on such matters could probably best be left to be worked out by the Executive Branch in consultation with Congress, given their importance and their complexity. The President expects that any bill that comes forward for his signature will provide the NID full budget authority, while respecting the chain of command.

General Myers supports intelligence reform, including the NID and the NCTC, and the President would not want a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who did not have views on such important matters and a willingness to express them.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/NID

2

DRAFT

~~CLOSE HOLD~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27287

SEP 28 2004

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld)
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 28 2004

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

OCT 22 15 11 8:13

October 22, 2004 – 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- We have already achieved substantial “jointness” in MP training
- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of “places.” Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/27289

OSD 16867-04

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 28 2004
13

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27290

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

1300
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 15, 2004 11:45

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

857

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier **per** month / year
- Total Cost **per** month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it **would** be helpful to have these in our heads as **we look** at trade-offs **with** regard to U.S. and local forces as well as **our** longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091501-5

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27291

OSD 16953-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

SECRET
CM-2136-04
25 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 10/24*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

- **Issue.** "We need some basic 'rules of thumb' reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include: Cost per soldier per month/year, Total Cost per month/year...it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to US and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is \$30.5K; annual per Service member cost is \$365.9K. Total US cost per month for OIF is \$4.2B; annual total cost is \$50.5B. Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is \$53.7K, annually \$644.6K. Monthly total US costs for OEF is \$752M, annually \$9.0B. Only operational and recurring costs (TAB B) are included in these figures. Differing force packages, operational concepts, logistics networks and other cost elements for OIF and OEF result in higher costs in Afghanistan.
- **Discussion.** You must be careful when using these figures to estimate savings from future force reductions. The cost avoidance will be less than the per Service member cost. A drawdown plan is required to compute cost avoidance. The drawdown strategy would describe how much of the support structure remains in place as ground combat elements redeploy. Since the more costly support will likely drawdown more slowly than the ground combat elements, costs will not go down at the per Service member rate described above. In addition, the per Service member cost avoidance must be offset by the costs of a prolonged US sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Another rule of thumb for the security costs is the FY 2005 US costs to build the Iraqi security force and the ANA. The US cost per Iraqi security force member is \$16.7K and per ANA soldier is \$44.5K. The US costs for Iraq are lower because the Iraqi government offsets costs for Iraqi security.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director J-8; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27292

OSD 16953-04

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

1325
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 15, 2003 PM 4:15

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Ken Krieg

857

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier per month / year
- Total Cost per month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to U.S. and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-5

.....
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27293

OSD 16953-04

TAB B

Operational and Recurring Costs

- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are calculated by using the burn rate; that is, the average of the monthly costs per contingency operation. The burn rate costs are the recurring, operational (incremental) costs that Services and agencies report through the Defense Finance and Accounting System to Congress.
- These costs include both direct and indirect costs for OEF.
 - Direct Service costs include full pay and allowances for Guard and Reserve, incremental pay for active duty personnel (allowances such as imminent danger pay and family separation pay), personnel support, operations support, transportation and military construction.
 - Other direct costs include depot maintenance, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency operations, Defense Intelligence Agency operations, other intelligence and the Defense Health Program.
 - Indirect costs in support of OEF include costs for USCENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar, military overstrength, military construction in Southwest Asia external to Iraq and Afghanistan, the military tribunal and defense health care costs for military personnel in Southwest Asia, external to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since these costs are contingency related and must be reported as a contingency cost, they are shown as a cost against the first contingency in the Global War on Terrorism, OEF.
- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM reflect only direct costs incurred for Iraq.

11-L-0559/OSD/27294

Tab B

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USDC

MS. TINA JONAS

9/28/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/27295

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOUC~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SECURITY INFORMATION

OCT 26 PM 1:13

ES-1066
04/013846-ES
OCT 15 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: NATO Question on Darfur

We have to answer the Secretary General of NATO's question on Darfur.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-30

.....
Please respond by _____

~~TOUC~~

OSD 16996-04

10-10-04 16:53 1N

11-L-0559/OSD/27296

10/26 0800

~~FOUO~~
FOUO

ES-1054
04/013809

(13P)

~~SECRET~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

October 15, 2004

TO: Ian Brzenzinski
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Surveillance System

2004 OCT 26 PM 1:34
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

It sounds strange that the test and analysis of the VERA-E passive surveillance system should take that long. Why don't we send some people there to test it instead of shipping it back?

Please tell the folks working on it that that doesn't sound right, and ask whether they could accelerate the effort.

I would like a report back as to what their timetable could be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
101404/DH-2

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

11-L-0559/OSD/27297

~~SECRET~~ Attachment
~~FOUO~~

3:56 18
OSD 16998-04



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000
INFO MEMO

SECRET
2007 OCT 26 PM 3:43

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

In my Info Memo to you, dated September 30, 2004, responding to your snowflake about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training, I reported that ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination of this issue will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) process, with the Marine Corps leading a staff working group. I wanted to update you on this process.

- The Range Sustainment WIPT met Tuesday, October 12 and the Marine Corps briefed the Undocumented Alien (UDA) issue to the other WIPT members. The Marine Corps agreed to lead a staff work group, coordinated through the IPT process, and initiate staff level coordination between DoD, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security.
- Consistent with the Commandant's recommendation to you, the Range Sustainment IPT will coordinate collaboration, both internal and external, on this subject. Initial staff contacts were begun the week of October 18 including Department of the Interior, Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM. The Marine Corps will present an update at the next WIPT meeting. An interagency staff-level meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, November 23.
- As the Range Sustainment IPT continues its efforts at a staff level, it would be advantageous for you and General Hagee to meet with Secretary Ridge at a mutually convenient time to discuss this issue.

11-L-0559/OSD/27298

OSD 17019-04



~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The Iraqi elections in January could produce a variety of outcomes. Candidates could win who are right on the mark, somewhere in the middle, or notably unhelpful.

IRW

The NSC needs to think through appropriate strategies and objectives now to:

- Do what we can so the outcome is favorable to the President's goals.
- Strategies to deal with all of the various possible outcomes.

Let me know what we can do to help.

DHR:ss
102504-18

26 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17028-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27299

720
~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: Richard Lawless
CC: ADM Tom Fargo
Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense and Japan

My impression is that the missile defense people are dealing with the Japanese on a separate track from the overall base realignment and force posture adjustments. They seem to feel that is the right thing.

My personal view is that it is probably not the right thing, and that the people doing it don't know much about what you and Tom Fargo are doing with respect to force posture. It seems to me that all of these pieces fit together to a certain extent, and I am a little worried about their going off on their own.

Please think it through, talk to Tom Fargo and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102504-24

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

gfh

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17029-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27300

for OIC

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has the lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102604-6

334 NSC

26 OCT 04

OSD 17030-04

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Tom O'Connell
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

The time we spent at Fort Belvoir was excellent. The operatives are extraordinary, and we'll work on the issues that surfaced in the briefing and see what can be done about their concerns.

33350

Thanks for suggesting and organizing the trip - it was most helpful.

DHR:ss
102604-11

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17031-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27302

26 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: COL Conrad Trautman

c c : GEN Doug Brown
Gen Dick Myers
Tom O'Connell
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

Thank you for a useful and impressive visit with your unit at Fort Belvoir. Your team is extraordinary and inspirational, and I learned a good deal during our time together.

You can be proud of the fine work you are doing for our country.

DHR:ss
102604-12

.....
Please respond by _____

333 SD

OSD 17032-04

26 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27303

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/25/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
102604-10

AT HANUSKIS

De OJW


For Official Use Only



Afghan Security Forces Update

Executive Summary

25 October 2004



Data as of 25 Oct 04

Version M3

11-L-0559/OSD/27305


Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– National Police	28,406
– Highway Police	
– Border Police	
– Customs Police	
– Counternarcotics Police	
• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>	<u>Trained & Equipped</u>
– Afghan National Army	14,225
– Afghan Air Corps	
	<hr/>
	42,631

Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27307

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Endstate	25-Oct-04	1-Nov-04	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Jul-08 ¹
National Police	47,500	55%	58%	63%				
Highway Police	2,500					50%		
Border Police	25,000						50%	
Customs Police	800						50%	
Counter-Narcotics Police	1,570							

¹Projected 100% Date is 1 Jan 07 for all forces except CN Police which is a pilot program currently under review.

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of 25 Oct 04




11-L-0559/OSD/27308

Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

Afghanistan Security Forces Elements	Endstate	25-Oct-04	1-Nov-04	1-Feb-05	1-May-05	1-Aug-05	1-Jan-06	1-Apr-07
Ministry of Defense General Staff	3,000			48%				
Corps	43,000				41%	47%	51%	
Air Corps	3,000					40%	63%	
Sustaining Institutions	21,000							

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27309

Coalition Contributors



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OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

Albania	22	Denmark	61	Iceland	15	Mongolia	16	Spain	1,044
Australia	5	Egypt	65	Ireland	7	Netherlands	512	Sweden	102
Austria	3	Estonia	15	Italy	1006	New Zealand	9	Switzerland	4
Azerbaijan	22	Finland	75	Jordan	174	Norway	282	Turkey	252
Belgium	653	France	1,296	Korea	205	Poland	121	UK	611
Bulgaria	42	Georgia	50	Latvia	9	Portugal	27	USA	15,903
Canada	993	Germany	2,255	Lithuania	53	Romania	570		
Croatia	51	Greece	121	Luxembourg	11	Slovakia	55		
Czech Rep	22	Hungary	156	Macedonia	20	Slovenia	22	Total	28,233

Afghan Forces On Hand	67,020
National Police	48,450
Highway	891
Border Police	3,417
Customs Police	0
Counter Narcotics Police	37
Subtotal On Hand	52,795
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	590
Corps	12,860
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	775
Subtotal On Hand	14,225

Afghan Forces Trained	42,631
National Police	27,431
Highway Police	200
Border Police	750
Customs Police	0
Counter Narcotics Police	25
Subtotal Trained	28,406
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	590
Corps	12,860
Air Corps	0
Intermediate Commands	775
Subtotal Trained	14,225



Data as of 25 Oct 04

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

11-L-0559/OSD/27310

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27311

Afghan Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

POLICE	PROPOSED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN 05	100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED
National Police	47,500	48,450	27,431	28,073	Jan '06
Highway Police	2,500	891	200	515	Jul '06
Border Police	25,000	3,417	750	2,200	Dec '06
Customs Police	800	0	0	0	Dec '06
Counter Narcotics Police	1570	37	25	62	Dec '07
TOTAL	77,370	52,795	28,406	30,850	Dec '07

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27312

Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

ARMY	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	BY JAN 05 E/F CAPABILITY	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
Ministry of Defense General Staff	3,000	590	0	590/0	Sep 09 ⁽³⁾
Corps	43,000	12,860	0	12,860/0	Sep 09
Air Corps	3,000	0	0	0/0	Sep 09
Intermediate Commands ⁽⁴⁾	21,000	775	0	775/0	Sep 09
Totals	70,000	14,225	0	14,225/0	Sep 09

Notes:

- (1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
- (2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
- (3) Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model
- (4) Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27313

Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

POLICE	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
National Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks for literate; 4 weeks for illiterate 2 weeks for existing officers Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks	1759
Highway Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)	189
Border Police	Basic Course is 8 weeks 2 weeks specialized training	844
Customs Police	Program not developed	0
Counter Narcotics Police	Special Course sponsored by the DEA	25
Total		2817
ARMY	TRAINING	IN TRAINING
Enlisted Basic Training	Basic Training is 10 Weeks Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks Collective Training is 6 Weeks	2384
National Military Academy – Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05)	4 Year Course	0
Command and General Staff College	12 weeks	0
Combat Leaders Course	5 weeks	36
NCO Course	6 Weeks	420
Officers' Candidate School	8 weeks	176
Total		3,016

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27314

Afghan Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

POLICE	Mission
National Police	Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
Highway Police	Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.
Border Police	Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts.
Customs Police	To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country.
Counter Narcotics Police	Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.
ARMY	
Ministry of Defense (General Staff)	Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.
Corps	
Air Corps	
Institutional Commands	

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- ANA: Command and General Staff Course #4 graduated 59 students 20 Oct 04

Training:

- ANA: Battalions #26, #27 and #28 are in training
- ANA: Battalion #29 starts training 30 Oct 04

Equipping:

- ANA: Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating subsidizes the ammunition shortage
- ANA: Czech Republic ammunition donation has been approved by Czech Parliament

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- ANP: Construct/refurbish projects underway on 17 provincial/highway police stations
- ABP: 2 Border Police headquarters and 1 crossing site under construction

Mentoring/Employing:

- ANA: J3 recommended delaying additional Embedded Training Teams until Feb 04
- ANA: Delaying embedded trainers reduces battalion team manning from 16-12
- ANP: Police Technical Advisory Team continues sustainment training.

Funding:

- ANA: \$65m short for accelerating to 5 battalion model

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

TRM

Respectfully,

Attach.
10/25/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update
DHR:as
102604-8

26 Oct 04

***Iraqi Security Forces Update
Executive Summary***

25 October 2004

Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only


<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">- Police- Civil Intervention- Emergency Response- Border Enforcement- Highway Patrol- Dignitary Protection	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 63,776
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">- Army- National Guard- Intervention Force- Special Operations- Air Force- Coastal Defense Force	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 48,742 <hr/> 112,518

Data as of: 25 Oct 04


11-L-0559/OSD/27320

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003 = 0 Iraqi Security Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27321

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	25 OCT 04	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police *	135,000				47%	59%	70%
Special Police Regiments ***	1,200			50%	100%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions ***	3,600			67%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	270		59%	84%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol	1,500			50%	61%	72%	92%
Bur. of Dignitary Protection ****	500	39%	90%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando Battalions	2,019	45%	45%	75%	85%	100%	100%
Dept of Border Enforcement **	32,000	55%	60%	62%	60%	71%	84%

Notes

- * Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- ** Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- *** These units make up the Civil Intervention Force
- **** Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

Legend

- 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
- 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27322

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	25 OCT 04	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000		69%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584		67%	72%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904	65%	66%	77%	94%	100%	100%
Commando Battalion	1,516	58%	64%	67%	76%	95%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451		40%	40%	58%	76%	100%

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

11-L-0559/OSD/27323

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	73	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,837	Norway	9	Tonga	53
Australia	417	Estonia	48	Latvia	133	Poland	2,461	Ukraine	1,617
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	76	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	9,095
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	278	Macedonia	32	Romania	745	US	130,646
Bulgaria	449	Italy	3,139	Moldova	10	Singapore	33		
Czech Rep	98	Japan	812	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	427	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,497	Thailand	0	Total	156,038

IRAQI FORCES ON HAND	178,678
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	87,954
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	197
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	925
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	20,039
ARMY	11,776
NAT'L GUARD	43,063
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,907
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	676
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING	128,202
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	49,212
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	197
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	555
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	1,650
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	18,693
ARMY	11,776
NAT'L GUARD	43,063
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,907
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	676
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

Notes


•Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security

•Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service
73,992

NATO Training Team = 15



Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27324

NATO Training in Iraq

For Official Use Only

- North Atlantic Council approved proposal for NATO Training on 22 September.
- Concept of Operations approved on 7 October.
- North Atlantic Council decision includes:
 - Dual-hatting LTG Petraeus, MNSTC-I Commander
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine and Education Center
 - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command
 - Focusing on training, equipping and technical assistance—not combat
 - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway
 - Providing out-of-country training
- NATO Survey Team currently in-theater to assess Training, Education, and Doctrine Command infrastructure requirements at Ar Rustimayah.
- SHAPE developing OPLAN.

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27326

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	87,554	43,627	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,196	0	3,120	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	197	100	270	FEB '05
HIGHWAY PATROL	1,500	925	555	750	TBD
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	484	446	500	DEC '04
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS*	2019	2,019	900	2,019	JAN '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	20,039	18,148	15,900	MAR '06
TOTAL	176,209	112,414	63,776	75,359	JUL '06

* New elements recently authorized, recruited, and trained by the Ministry of Interior

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27327

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS)	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	3,887	620	10,915 / 10,915	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	41,261	0	45,000 / 0	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	0	1,794	1,794 / 4,790	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	0	604	0 / 725	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	45,724	3,018	57,709 / 16,430	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27328

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training	5,585
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,196
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	97
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	545
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	0
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Special Forces	38
Special Police Commando Battalions	4 Weeks Basic Training 1-3 Weeks Advanced Training	750
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	7,269
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	1,802
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,113
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	127
TOTAL		22,633

Data as of

11-L-0559/OSD/27329

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Special Police Commando Bns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27330

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- Enrolled 2,526 new Iraqi Police Service recruits into the force for basic training course that started this week at Baghdad and Jordan Academies.
- Enrolled 956 newly-hired Department of Border Enforcement personnel into the force for eventual train-up.
- Recruited 96 new students to begin training for Emergency Response Unit.

Train:

- 5,585 Police Cadets training in basic eight-week courses in Amman, Baghdad and regional academies.
- Graduated 90 and began training of 98 new law enforcement students in three specialized policing classes at the Adnon Training Facility (Basic Criminal Investigation and two courses in Election Security).
- Graduated 27 Emergency Response Unit officers from their basic training course.
- 17th Battalion, Regular Army, completed basic training 23 October.

Equip:

- Issued 3,860 weapons, 153 vehicles, 2,612 armor vests, 500 radios, and over 3 million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior Forces.
- Issued 2890 weapons and 3.2 Million Rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Defense forces.

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Build:

- **Began construction on a Major Crimes Unit force protection enhancement project in Baghdad.**
- **Committed over \$363.7 million of the \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. Projects are out for bidding with awards expected in late October and early November, putting MNSTC-I ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter after reallocation of IRRF.**
- **Work productivity at construction sites is running at 80% of normal capacity rather than the 67% anticipated during Ramadan. Working with contractors to mitigate using double shifts and labor attendance incentives.**

Mentor/Employ:

- **Ministry of Interior's Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee has screened over 7,000 data records to date.**
- **Police Commando units executing operations with coalition forces in Samarra and Mosul.**
- **Three Intervention Force Battalions, two Regular Army battalions, the Army Commando Battalion, the Counter-Terrorist Force, a Police Commando Battalion, and Emergency Response Unit preparing for possible future offensive operations.**

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27332

2811

720

~~TOP SECRET~~

ES-1087
04/013935-ES

October 18, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Iraqi Army

Who disbanded the Iraqi Army - Bremer or Garner, and what date did it happen?

Thanks.

DHR:16
101804-2

2004 OCT 20 PM 7:27

SECRET

Iraq

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

TO SecDef
↗

Paul Butler
10/21

18 OCT 04

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	RSV/10-27-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27333

10-19-04 P01:20 OSD 17118-04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 27, 2004

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM : CONDOLEEZZA RICE *Condi*

SUBJECT: Need for a briefing on
Salafist financial and
spiritual networks

Don,

The lead on terrorist financing is an interagency effort that Fran Townsend has led. I will arrange a briefing. The "spiritual network" has largely been treated as a disruption effort through the Agency. Elliott Abrams at the NSC has also helped to coordinate a Muslim World Outreach strategy that might be of interest. I will ask them to brief as well.

OSD 17131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27334

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and *the* Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has *the* lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:m
102604-6

OSD 17030-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27335

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

14 October 2004

Dear Secretary:

With respect to the attached, I DON'T BELIEVE IT! With all the PR in other areas re: what is being done for families of "serving" members, this smacks of politicization.

It is quite true this area is one of heavily Democrat population. Most of the time, I find fairness a part of BEAVER County character. However, the 911th Airlift Wing at Pittsburgh International Airport has been used regularly since the first Gulf War, as have other Reservist and Guard units subject to mobilization - locally.

This attitude has been building gradually, BUT without contrary and factual info from the Services.

You may wish to give this subject a "hard go" factually to clear-the-air here.

Sincerely and Very respectfully,



OSD 17135-04

326

14 OCT 04

October 26, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to RADM Gerhard

Please get someone to fashion the right answer to this letter from RADM Gerhard.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/14/04 Gerhard ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
102504-21

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

CRD
CONTROL, LAUNGA
IM 10/27

10/27
Sir,
Response attached.
v/R
L+G/Lengyel
10/27

326
26 OCT 04
14 OCT 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 28 2004

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

Dear Admiral Gerhard,

Thank you for your letter and attached article from the *Beaver County Times*.

Since 9/11, Guard and Reserve units have shouldered a large burden in the Global War on Terror. Approximately 35 percent of the 911th Airlift Wing (AW) has been mobilized at one time or another since September 11, 2001. One of the 911 AW's C-130 squadrons was called up in December 2003 for 1 year, and in July 2004 they were extended to 2 years. The basic rotation schedule for the mobilized squadron is 90 days deployed, followed by 90 days home, with unit members averaging 150 days deployed this year.

I appreciate your sending along the article; we'll keep working to ensure the facts are clear to the public.

Sincerely,

OSD 17135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27338

326

28 OCT 04

14 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF
SECURITY

October 7, 2004

2004 OCT 20 01:27

873

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Arabian Gulf

We recently discussed the MIO work by NAVCENT in the Arabian Gulf. I'd be interested in an update, showing the numbers of boardings conducted, where we are focusing our efforts, what we are finding, and a general assessment of the value of the operations.

801.2

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100604-8

.....
Please respond by 10/16/04

7 ART 44

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17161-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

INFO MEMO

CH-2148-04

28 October 2004

2004 OCT 28 PM 12:12

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMM 10/27*

SUBJECT: Non-Payment of Police Recruits in Najaf

- **Question.** "Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Najaf police recruits were not being paid due to the lag time between hiring recruits and their completing vetting and police academy training requirements. Iraqi Ministry of Interior representatives are committed to meeting the back-pay obligation.
- **Analysis.** Attached information paper (TAB B) provides additional background and actions to ensure the Najaf police recruits get paid.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27340

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17166-04

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachment

TAB A

October 13, 2004

SECRET
2004 OCT 20 PM 12:42

875

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruits in Najaf

Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/13/04 SECRET Memo re: 1,000 Police Recruits Hired in An Najaf

DHR:ms
101304-3

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17166-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27341

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TAB B

14 October 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Non-payment of Najaf Police

1. Purpose. To provide an update on non-payment of Najaf Police

2. Key Points

- **Background.** During the fighting in Najaf, the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior authorized the Najaf police chief to fire officers who laid down arms or ran from the fight. They also authorized him to hire able and willing replacements, and told him they would be added to police rolls once Ministry of Interior approved the "by-name" list. Hundreds were fired and replacements hired.

Vetting and attending a police-training course qualifies a police candidate for pay. Many Najaf replacements, perhaps as many as a thousand, have since met these requirements and are now on the rolls.

Though they have continued to serve in various unofficial capacities, some replacements had not been identified to the Ministry of Interior by local authorities; no action had been taken to get them on the police rolls.

- **Action Taken.** We have discussed the issue with the staff of the Deputy Minister of Interior for Finance. The Ministry of Finance has committed to meeting the back-pay obligation if personnel are identified by name. If they pass the vetting process (literacy and criminal background check), these personnel can be accessed to the police rolls, though most will require training, as they have no prior military or police background.

- **Way Ahead.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has oversight on recruiting and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and will take the following actions: 1) Confirm with the Iraq Ministry of Interior, who controls the Iraqi Police Service, his intention to provide back pay and to submit names to Ministry of Interior for Finance. 2) Confirm the Minister's plans to accept applications from the unofficial police to join the police force and vet applications for permanent police status. 3) Accept a Ministry of Finance Pay LNO and establish a joint Finance Coordination Group to deal with future pay issues. 4) Assess if the problem is more widespread and initiate corrective action as appropriate.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27342

Tab B

1015
0830

720

~~FOUO~~

October 14, 2004

FB

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Luxembourg's MOD

2004 OCT 22 AM 10:55
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Luxembourg

Luxembourg has a new MOD who is first rate and interested in the transatlantic relationship. I sense he is pulling away from France, Germany and Belgium.

We need to find ways we can encourage that.

Thanks.

DHR:as
101404-11

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

R & W
Paul Butler
10/28

10/15/04
→ SD
Noted.
We'll keep
this in mind
and look for
opportunities

Doug Feith
14 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17231-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27343

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF
SECURITY

2004 OCT 27 AM 11:03
September 28, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, who selects **the** commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there any role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in **BRAC**?

It seems to me it is time to get a briefing. **Who** should I be briefed by -- you or Michael Wynne?

How are we going to think about combining training activities, **so** they get more joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- **Truck Drivers**
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:ms
092804-14

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27344



ACQUISITION
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

SECRET

2004 OCT 27 AM 11:08

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

Ray DuBois 10/29/04

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commissioners

This memorandum answers part of your 28 September snowflake on BRAC commissioners. I will address homeland security and joint training separately.

- The President must nominate the nine BRAC commissioners for Senate confirmation no later than March 15, 2005. Two commissioners each are nominated in consultation with the Speaker and Senate majority leader and one each in consultation with the minority leaders of the House and Senate. The President nominates the remaining three, including the Chair, without consultation.
- Because the Commission reviews the *Secretary's* recommendations, your participation in the selection process is critical to support the White House selection of nominees not requiring consultation. You might also provide input for those nominations requiring consultation with the Congress.
 - Prior commissioners have been Bo Callaway, Jim Courter, Alan Dixon, Tom Eagleton, Marty Hoffmann, Graham Claytor, Gen H. T. Johnson, Gen Duane Cassidy, Bob ~~Stuart~~, Harry McPherson, Arthur Levitt, and Russ Train.
- Commissioners must be able to make this a full time effort between the time they organize and then receive your recommendations to their Sep 8th statutory deadline for reporting to the President, approximately five months. (This is no more time than provided previous commissions yet we expect a more robust recommendations set.) The statute authorizes commissioners to be paid \$137K per annum.
 - Congress appropriated \$10 million in the FY05 Washington Headquarters Services budget for the Commission's salaries and operating expenses.
- We will propose candidates to you around 22 November to support nominations in late January and confirmation in March. The Commission Chair (and the **staff** director and general counsel the Chair selects) should receive priority focus.

ATTACHMENT : As stated

cc: ✓ Dr. Wolfowitz, DepSecDef

Mr. Wynne, Acting USD(AT&L)
Jim O'Beirne, WHLO

11-L-0559/OSD/27345

OSD 17232-04



~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 27 11:11:03
September 28, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, **who** selects the commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there **any** role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in BRAC?

It **seems** to me it is time to get a briefing. **Who** should I be briefed by -- you or Michael Wynne?

How are we going to think about combining training activities, **so** they get **more** joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- Truck Drivers
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:ee
092804-14

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27346

OCT. 18 2004

?

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Maupin Family

Please check and see if I've ever written the Maupin family. If not, I should.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/6/04 Info Memo from Acting SecArmy to SecDef re: Meeting with Maupin Family

DHR:dh
101504-22

.....

Please respond by _____ 10/18

SIR —

you have not
previously
written

v/r *Jm*

see
attached
draft

704

18 OCT 04
6 OCT 04

OSD 17241-04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 10/29/2004

JK 110104

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT
OSD CONTROL OSD 17241-04 DOC 10/18/2004 DOR 10/29/2004 SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO SD MA ADM STAVRIDIS, J

SUBJECT LETTER TO MAUPIN FAMILY

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN *704* SEC U OCN 101504-22

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

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INFO MEMO
FRONT OFFICE DOC
FRONT OFFICE DOC

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ADC 0

Office of the Secretary of Defense

VADM S,

Sir,

*Mr. Butler asked for
your comments on the
two letters*

*should the Boss do it at
all? Or differently?*

*1928 11/28
HOT! Mr Butler
NOTE TO Mr/Ms. MAUPIN
RE THEIR SON.*

*vr,
m 10/28*

Yes
*go smooth V/R,
on the version 10/28
I "OK" 10/28*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will keep you informed throughout this process.

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. (b)(6)

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27349

704

89 OCT 04

6 OCT 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time.

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Ms. (b)(6)

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27350

Mr. And Mrs. (b)(6) Maupin

Address

Dear Mr. And Mrs. Maupin

I know you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army and the General Pete Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. We all want to assure you that the Department of Defense is very focused on Matt's situation and we will do everything we can to find him. ^{The Army} We will also provide frequent and immediate updates to you.

Our thoughts and prayers are with you and the (b)(6) family during this difficult time. ~~Please let me know personally if there is anything else we can do for you.~~

Sen Nelson
Mrs Spiker...

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time. ~~and I assure you that returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Ms (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27352

(b)(6)

OK

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

~~Returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~ I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will provide updates to you throughout this process.

Keep you informed

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27353



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

OCT 6 2004

DB 10/15

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Family of SPC Maupin

On 30 Sep 04, General Schoomaker and I, along with other senior Army leaders, met with the Maupin family in the Pentagon. As you may recall, SPC Keith "Matt" Maupin is our only Soldier missing in action from Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with Mrs. (b)(6) Maupin, Matt's Mother; Mr. (b)(6) Maupin, Matt's Father; Ms. (b)(6) Matt's stepsister, Mr. (b)(6), Ms. Spenser's fiancée and Representative Rob Portman, Member of Congress (R-OH). The family received a detailed briefing from LTG Campbell, the Director of the Army Staff, and then met privately with General Schoomaker and myself.

[Handwritten signature]

- The intent of this meeting was to reinforce to the family the importance that the Department of Defense and the Army leadership places on resolving their son's situation. We explained what information we had and what actions we are taking to find their son. We stated that Matt is one of our Soldiers and that we will do everything possible to find him and that this is one of our warrior ethos - "never leave a fallen comrade." We also stressed that the family will receive immediate updates from the Army on any significant developments.
- We just received the completed AR 15-6 investigation report covering the event leading to Matt's capture. We assured the family that we would send someone knowledgeable from the unit's chain of command to brief them and provide them a redacted copy of the report.
- Overall, the Maupins and Representative Portman were both satisfied with and appreciative of our commitment to finding Matt. If desired, we are prepared to come brief you on the specifics of Specialist Maupin's case.

704

6004

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: LTG James L. Campbell (b)(6)

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27354

SEP 10 2004

September 9, 2004

2004 SEP 9 11 13 33

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting

As we discussed at roundtable this morning, I would be interested in an update of how we are doing in revising our readiness reporting system so that it provides sensible and accurate indications to senior decision makers. I know you've been doing some work in this area and I would like an update.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090904-7

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

OSD 17247-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27355



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 10/29/04 OCT 29 PM 1:33

PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

October 29, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (Personnel and Readiness)
 SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) bridges the gap between readiness status, plans, and alternate courses of action. In short, it answers “ready for what.”
- Current reporting is essentially independent of mission needs. DRRS, on the other hand, allows force managers to determine quickly:
 - What missions forces are currently prepared for, based on “output” measures for the mission essential tasks. Every tasked organization, from the ship/battalion/squadron up to the Combatant Commands, will regularly assess whether it currently can perform its assigned missions. This is essentially a “yes” or “no” question that is supported by performance measures, resource information, and commanders’ comments.
 - Which forces are currently deployed and where, and which are available to deploy.
 - What the limiting factors are (e.g., do they have enough people which individuals are not “medically prepared,” do they have their equipment and does it work). Data come automatically from authoritative sources (versus today’s manual feed).
 - What alternative courses of action could meet mission needs.
- We are partnering with the Combatant Commanders in developing and implementing DRRS.
- Initial software is in place on the SIPRNet; functionality and usability will improve over the next two years. We would be happy to provide you a demonstration at your convenience.

322

29 Oct 04

95 ep 04

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., Dir. Readiness Prog & Assessment (b)(6)

October 29, 2004

TO: Senior Officials of the Department of Defense
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dating Documents

Please put dates on all papers you are sending.

We need to find a way to get this Department to move paper faster. If documents are not dated, there is no way for us to track the delays.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-12



Please respond by _____

312

29 OCT 04

OSD 17268-04

720
~~FOUO~~

OCT 29 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: My Remarks to AUSA

Attached is a copy of the remarks I made to the Army Association yesterday. You might find something in there that's useful.

Thanks,

Attach.
SecDef Remarks to AUSA delivered 10/27/04

DHR:ss
102804-16

.....
Please respond by _____

350.001 SD

29 OCT 04

OSD 17274-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27358



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Speech

On the Web:

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[http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html)

[secdef0864.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html)

Media contact: +1 (b)(6)

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/fag/comment.html>

or + (b)(6)

Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, October 27, 2004.

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. It is good to be with you for this 50th annual meeting of the Association, with so many Army leaders, soldiers and supporters -- patriots all.

General Sullivan, thank you so much for your kind words and for your leadership of this important organization. It's good to see you, and I thank you for your service.

I just left the table here with Secretary Les Brownlee and Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker. You two and your team are doing an absolutely superb job of leading the Army as it meets the tough challenges of the 21st century. We appreciate your experience, your wisdom, your energy, your toughness as you tackle your vitally important posts.

General Sullivan mentioned my meeting here some 20 years ago. I remember it well, meeting with this Association. I also remember that the following year, the organization wisely presented the George Catlett Marshall Medal to my friend, Paul Nitze.

As many of you may know, Paul Nitze died last week.

As one of the key architects of the strategy that defended America through the long struggle against the Soviet empire, his keen intellect helped to give the hope of freedom to literally millions of people trapped behind the Iron Curtain. And through his long and distinguished public career and his dedicated service to the country, he remained a model of honor and integrity. We will certainly miss him.

General Sullivan mentioned who the recipient of the George Catlett Marshall Medal is this year -- the American soldier. That is an inspired choice. There could be no better, and I congratulate you for it. To the soldiers.

I never cease to be amazed at these young men and women -- active, Guard and Reserve alike. They're a very special group of truly selfless volunteers. Our country is so fortunate that they have stepped forward and said, "Send me." And certainly to all of the soldiers here and across the world, please know that we are deeply in your debt.

When I spoke to this organization in 1984, I did mention the growing threat of terrorism. I was concerned even two decades ago about what I had seen when I was serving as President Reagan's Middle East envoy. You'll recall 241 of our service people were killed in Beirut, Lebanon. I was afraid that the threat was underestimated, and I worried that the effect of a single attack could have a

11-L-0559/OSD/27359

serious effect on even the behavior of great nations.

Seven weeks ago, we observed the third anniversary of September 11th, the day that awakened our country to a new world. Three years into the global war on terror, some still ask, "Is our country safer today?" And it's a fair question. And the answer is yes -- we are safer today, without question.

It's been said that the global struggle against extremism will be a task for a generation, that it could go on for years, as did the Cold War; and I'm afraid that's true.

The Cold War was a great victory, a victory for freedom, but that 50-year struggle between the free world and the Soviet empire was marked by setbacks and failures all along the way, as well as some successes.

There were times when the Soviets seemed to have the upper hand. I remember when "euro-communism" was in vogue, when the West was considering withdrawing from the Cold War. I was Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970s, and I recall having to fly back to Washington in a hurry to testify before the United States Senate against an amendment that would have begun pulling U.S. forces out of Europe at the height of the Cold War. Many Americans and many of our allies were exhausted, and they favored withdrawing from the struggle.

The West's strategies varied. They varied from coexistence to containment to détente to confrontation. Our alliances wavered. In NATO, there were frequent disputes over diplomatic policy, serious disputes over weapon deployments, and arguments over military strategies.

In the 1960s, France pulled out of the military command in NATO, and they tossed NATO out of France. In America, columnists questioned U.S. policies. There were vocal showings of support for communist Soviet Union, marches against the U.S. military buildup, even instances where American citizens saw their own government unfairly challenged as warmongers.

Clearly, many did not fully comprehend the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's appetite for empire. But our nation, over a long period and with our allies, demonstrated impressive perseverance and resolve. We dared to confront what many thought might be an unbeatable foe, and eventually the Soviet regime collapsed.

It seems that that's a lesson that needs to be relearned from generation to generation -- the lesson that weakness can be provocative, that it can entice others into adventures they otherwise would have avoided, that a refusal to confront gathering dangers can increase rather than reduce future peril. And that while there are risks to acting to be sure -- and there are risks to acting -- there are also risks to failing to act, and that ultimately victory comes from those who are steadfast.

It's with those lessons in mind that the President and a truly historic coalition of more than 90 nations have sought to confront a new and perhaps even more dangerous enemy -- an enemy without a country, an enemy without a conscience -- one that seeks no armistice, no truce with us or with the civilized world. From the outset of the conflict, it was clear that our coalition had to go on the offense against the terrorists: the need to pursue terrorists and regimes that provide them comfort and aid, to establish relationships with new allies and bolster international coalitions to prosecute the war, and the need to work with moderate Muslim leadership to undermine the terrorists' ideological foundation.

Al Qaeda was a growing danger long before September 11th, 2001. Osama bin Laden was safe and sheltered in Afghanistan. His network was dispersed all across the world.

Today, a bit more than three years later, a large fraction of al Qaeda's key leaders have been detained or killed; and I suspect that Osama bin Laden spends a major portion of each of his days just avoiding being caught.

Once controlled by extremists, Afghanistan today is led by President Hamid Karzai, who's helping to lead the world in support of moderates against the extremists. Soccer stadiums in Kabul, once used for public executions under the Taliban only a few years ago, today are used for soccer.

Three years ago in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his sons brutally ruled an important nation in the heart of the Middle East. Saddam was attempting to regularly kill American and British air crews that were enforcing the southern and northern no-fly zones. He ignored more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions. He was paying \$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers.

And last December, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. Special Operations Forces and by the 4th Infantry Division. He's no longer killing tens of thousands of innocent people. He's in a cell -- a prisoner awaiting trial by the Iraqis. His sons are dead after refusing to surrender to the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne.

Some 112,000 trained and equipped Iraqis today now provide security for their fellow citizens. Under the new Iraqi leadership, Iraq is determined to fight the terrorists and to build over time a peaceful society.

Interestingly, NATO is now leading ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan. It's also helping to train Iraqi security forces near Baghdad. For NATO to be operating outside of the NATO treaty area, outside of Europe, for the first time in the history of that alliance, is a truly historic move.

Here at home, the demands of the global war on terror have given an even greater impetus to the need to transform our armed forces. The armed forces, as you know, are faced with an increasingly complex array of missions. With the leadership of Les Brownlee and Pete Schoomaker, and using the President's emergency powers, the size of the active duty Army has increased by about 30,000 troops, and is being reorganized into more agile, more lethal, and more readily deployable brigades -- brigades with the protection, firepower and logistics assets necessary to sustain them. And we're currently increasing the number of these new, more capable Army brigades from 33 to 43 or possibly 48, over the coming two-and-a-half to three or three-and-a-half years.

In addition, the Army is restructuring and retraining the active component and the reserve components to achieve a more appropriate 21st century balance to get a distribution of skill sets between the active force and the reserve components to fit this new century -- to improve total force responsiveness -- and so that Reservists and Guardsmen will be called somewhat less often, possibly for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability.

The ability of the armed services -- the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard -- to work together is increasing. It has to increase. Jointness has to become the rule and not an occasional luxury. Communications and intelligence activities have been improved, and we have significantly expanded the capabilities and the missions of the Special Operation Forces. And they are doing a truly outstanding job for our country, let there be no doubt.

Since the global war on terror began, our coalition has worked to undercut the extremists' efforts. Our world is, I suppose it's fair to say, divided between regions where freedom and democracy have been nurtured, and areas of the world where people are subjected to tyranny.

11-L-0559/OSD/27361

And if one were to look down from Mars on the globe, we would see that it is those countries with political and economic freedom that are providing the most for their people; and those countries that have repressive systems, centralized systems, tyrannical systems that are denying their people the opportunities available elsewhere in the world.

In Afghanistan, over 8 million people voted in this month's election. They were hoping to get 6 million people registered; 8 million voted. People dressed in their best clothes. They got up at 3:00 in the morning and they walked miles in the cold to go vote. A long line of women stayed in line, even after some explosives went off about a hundred yards from their polling place.

Iraq now has an interim constitution that includes a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. There are municipal councils in almost every major city in Iraq, most towns and most villages, and provincial councils for all of the 18 provinces. The Iraqis are now among those in the world who are allowed to say and write and watch and listen to whatever they want and whenever they want, and it's clear that governments and the people in the Middle East are taking note.

I flew over much of Iraq a week and a half ago, I guess, coming in from the south, went to the west, went in towards Baghdad, went north, and it's a different country than one sees. It is different in different parts of the country, to be sure, but it is a very different one from what the people here in the United States see. The schools are open with new books. The clinics are open. There's a stock market. The economy's strong. The oil listings are back up where they were. The electricity is at or better than where it was. It is not burning and smoking in a way that one believes it to be by watching television. I don't talk to anybody who comes out of there who isn't struck by the contrast between what they experienced on the ground and the good things being done by the young men and women in the Army and in the Air Force and in the Navy and in the Marine Corps for the people of that country.

It's also clear that the people in the Middle East are taking note of what's happening in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Now, there have been setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, to be sure. And on a bad day, Iraq is not a pretty picture. But the road from tyranny to freedom has never been peaceful, it's never been tranquil, it's never been without bumps. It's always been difficult and dangerous everywhere. It was tough for the United States. It was tough for Germany and Japan and Italy. And the idea that the path from a repressive system to a free democratic system is or could be easy is fanciful. It isn't easy. It's hard. It's tough.

But these enemies cannot defeat the coalition in a conventional battle, let alone in a war. But of course they don't seek conventional war. Their weapons are terror and chaos. They want the world to believe that the coalition cannot win; that the free Iraqi and the free Afghan governments cannot win; and that the fight is not worth it; that the effort will be too hard, that the losses will be too great, and that it's simply too ugly for an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week. They attack any sort of hope or progress in an effort to try to undermine morale -- the morale of the Afghans, the morale of the Iraqis, the morale of the coalition countries, and -- let there be no doubt -- the morale of the American people. They're convinced that if they can win the battle of perceptions -- and they are superb at managing perceptions, much better than free societies are, that's for sure. But they're convinced that if they can win that battle of perceptions, managing the media and affecting people's thinking -- that we will lose our will and toss in the towel.

Well, they're wrong. Failure in Afghanistan or in Iraq would exact a perfectly terrible toll in this world. It would embolden the extremists. It would make the world a vastly more dangerous place. It would turn it all over to those who would lead the world into a dark, dark place.

11-L-0559/OSD/27362

Our 26th president, the Commander-in-Chief, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote in his autobiography that, "The worst of all fears is the fear of living." He was correct, and we cannot allow the terrorists, the extremists, to win this struggle and destroy the way of life of free people.

From Baghdad to Kabul, Madrid, Bali, the Philippines, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the call has been sounded, and the outcome of this struggle will determine the nature of our world for some decades to come. These enemies will not be wished away.

Those who behead innocent people on television, those who seek to enslave others, have shown that they were perfectly willing to do literally anything to achieve their goals. The deaths of the innocent people that they kill are not incidental in this war. Indeed, innocent men, women and children are in fact the target in this war, and the extremists will willingly kill hundreds and thousands more.

The world has gasped, if you will, at the brutality of the extremists: the hundreds of children in Russia who were killed or wounded on their very first day of school; the commuters blown up in the trains in Madrid on their way to work; innocents murdered in the nightclub in Bali; the cutting off of heads on television. Should these terrorists acquire the world's most lethal weapons -- and they are seeking them, to be sure -- the lives of tens of thousands could be at stake.

There have been losses, and they have been borne heavily by the United States Army -- active, Reserve, and Guard alike.

Every loss is deeply felt.

Today, as before, the hard work of history falls to our country, to the U.S. armed forces, and certainly to the United States Army. Our people have been entrusted with the gift of freedom, and it is for each generation to safeguard and to defend that freedom. And as the brave men and women in uniform face these new challenges, they can know that the great sweep of human history is for freedom, and that that is on our side.

The Afghans are making it, thanks to the U.S. military, thanks to the coalition forces, and most of all, thanks to the Afghan people, who are reaching out for freedom courageously.

And the Iraqi people have a good crack at making it as well. And I believe they will make it, and I believe it will be because I have so much confidence in the American people winning that test of wills which we face.

So I thank you all. May God bless the men and women of the United States Army and our great country. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html>

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

July 28, 2004

2004 NOV - PM 1:54

000.5

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Caleb Carr

Next week I would like to have Caleb Carr come in for lunch with Doug Feith, me and possibly Pete Pace to talk about the attached article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Carr, Caleb. "Wrong Definition for a War," *WashingtonPost*, July 28, 2004, p. 19.

DHR:dh
072804-11

.....

Please respond by 8/5/04

285104

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27364

OSD 17300-04

Washington Post
July 28, 2004
Pg. 19

Wrong Definition For A War

By Caleb Carr

Toward the end of its widely praised report, the Sept. 11 commission offers a prescriptive chapter titled "What to Do?" There, it makes an assertion that is genuinely shocking. It says that in our current conflict, "the enemy is not just 'terrorism,' some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism [the report's emphasis] -- especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology."

At a stroke, in other words, the members of the commission have tried to rewrite the terms of the global war on terrorism and turn it into a global war on Islamist terrorism alone.

It seems almost incredible that we could have been at war this long without defining precisely who or what we are at war with. But such is the case, and it has never seemed an urgent matter to lawmakers. When I appeared before a congressional subcommittee studying strategies for the war on terrorism in 2002 and suggested that the first step should be the promulgation of just such a uniform definition, the members were momentarily dumbstruck. To their credit, they soon recovered and we began to discuss the issue, but a comprehensive definition of terrorism for the use of the American government and the education of the American people never emerged. Now, however, the president and his supporters are apparently ready to instantly approve the radical definition set forward by the commission.

Terrorism, as defined by military historians, has been a constant, ugly feature of warfare, an aberrant tactic akin to slavery, piracy and genocide. One of the reasons that some of us argued throughout the 1990s for undertaking of genuine war on terrorism (involving the military in addition to intelligence and law enforcement) was the notion that we might finally declare the tactic -- like those other aberrant belligerent methods -- to be out of bounds, for the armed forces of civilized nations and non-state organizations alike.

It's true that both slavery and piracy are still practiced, but only in remote corners of the world; certainly genocide is still with us, but its employment is now cause for immediate sanction and forceful reaction (theoretically, at any rate) by the United Nations. Banning such tactics and actively stamping out their practice has been the work of some of the great political and military minds and leaders of the past two centuries. Now it is time -- past time, really -- for terrorism to take its place as a similarly proscribed and anachronistic practice.

But first we must agree on an internationally acceptable definition. Certainly terrorism must include the deliberate victimization of civilians for political purposes as a principal feature -- anything else would be a logical absurdity. And yet there are powerful voices, in this country and elsewhere, that argue against such a definition. They don't want to lose the weapon of terror -- and they don't want to admit to having used it in the past. Should the United States assent to such a specific definition of terrorism, for example, it would have to admit that its fire-bombings of German and Japanese cities during World War II represented effective terrorism. On the other hand, few Muslim nations want to go up against the power of organized terrorist groups by declaring them *de jure* as well as *de facto* outlaws.

In the intellectual arena, meanwhile, the fatuous logic that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom

11-L-0559/OSD/27365

fighter" keeps left-leaning intellectuals away from the cause of definition. And so its promulgation continues to elude the world, even as we have embarked on a war against the phenomenon itself.

The Sept. 11 commission evidently also came to feel, during its months of sitting, that defining terrorism was too thorny a problem to be undertaken in anything but a partial and temporary manner. Fighting wars against tactics, they announced -- fighting wars over the nature of war itself -- is simply too complicated. We need to fight specific wars about people, not general wars about ideas (the American Revolution, the Civil War and two world wars notwithstanding).

By this token, any and all intellectual or moral meaning is removed from our military undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as from the global war on terrorism generally. What began as a war between modernism and medievalism, between progressive ideas of how to reform war and regressive notions of cataclysmic conflicts, will, if the commission's recommendations are fully implemented, become instead a "clash of civilizations" between extremist Western and extremist Muslim values: a simplistic, devastating confrontation. In a terribly ironic but real sense, the final hijacking of Sept. 11 will be the commandeering of the global war on terrorism itself.

What the commission fails to see is that the word "extremist" (or "Islamist") is not what will be heard on the "Arab street," or indeed much of anywhere else in the world, when the new enemy is proclaimed. George Bush initially reacted to the Sept. 11 attacks by calling for a "crusade" against terrorism, but many Muslims heard only one word, "crusade," and they heard it in its historical rather than its rhetorical sense. The West, that word implied, is coming again to take control of Muslim nations and holy places, just as it did after the turn of the last millennium. The president later apologized for his thoughtlessness, but the damage had been done.

And now, when the Sept. 11 commission says that terrorism is no longer the enemy, that Islamist extremism has assumed that role, most Muslims are going to hear the same sort of threatening, generalized message, one constantly repeated by Osama bin Laden: The Americans are not really concerned with terrorism -- in fact, they've practiced it throughout their history; what they are embarked on is a war against Islam itself.

The commission should immediately amend its report, and reassert, rather than deny, that we are indeed engaged in a global war against terrorism, whoever practices it. (They might also think to recommend that, at some point soon, the United States formally repudiate the deliberate victimization of civilians, something it has never done.) Then President Bush, Sen. John Kerry and all national leaders should support the change in message. The war on terrorism began not as a crusade about ideology but as a pragmatic war about war. It must remain such.

The writer is professor of military history at Bard College and the author, most recently, of "The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians."

11-L-0559/OSD/27366

720

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET
2004 NOV -1 PM 1:54

July 26, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vigilante

Please take a look at this cable. I have never heard of this fellow. How do we deal with this?

Thanks.

Attach.
Reuters file

DHR:dh
072604-27

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOCUMENT_ID: OW44634135
 DOCST: ACTIVE
 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
 VENDOR: REUTERS
 PUBNAME: REUTERS LIBRARY SERVICE
 ORIGDATE: 200407210518
 PUBLISHR: REUTERS
 PUBNO: a1903
 DOR: 20040721
 TOR: 051829
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 TITLE: Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.

TOPLINES:

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was

TEXT:

^BC-AFGHAN-VIGILANTES (PICTURE)@

^Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.@

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was working for the U.S. government.

(b)(6) said he had been in frequent contact with the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies in the course of his work tracking Islamic militants in Afghanistan, including al Qaeda members.

"We were working for the U.S. counter-terrorist group and working with the Pentagon and some other federal agencies,"

(b)(6) told reporters before the opening of his trial.

"We were in contact directly by fax and email and phone with Donald Rumsfeld's office," he said, referring to the U.S. Secretary of Defence.

The U.S. military and NATO peacekeepers have said the group was not acting on behalf of, or in conjunction with, their forces.

(b)(6) and his two American colleagues were arrested on July 5 after a brief shootout in Kabul. They and some Afghan accomplices had illegally detained and interrogated eight people they believed to be terrorists, Afghan officials said.

The three face up to 15 years in prison if found guilty of illegally detaining and torturing people.

The arrests have been a headache for foreign forces in Afghanistan, where the U.S. military has been under scrutiny for its treatment of suspected militant prisoners.

The U.S. military has been accused by U.S.-based Human Rights Watch of "systematic" abuse of detainees.

The court sat for about two hours on Wednesday with a prosecutor giving details of the charges against (b)(6) and his two colleagues, identified as (b)(6) and (b)(6).

(b)(6) (b)(6) said Caraballo was a journalist.

(b)(6) wearing dark glasses, combat boots, khaki trousers and a shirt with a U.S. flag on the shoulder was brought into court in handcuffs. The handcuffs were removed when the trial began.

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6) told reporters he had broken up an assassination plot against Afghan government ministers and captured a Taliban intelligence chief in May and passed him to U.S. military authorities.

The trial was adjourned for 15 days.
Reut05:18 07-21-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27369
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2

7200
~~FOUO~~

Mr. Di Rita

FYI

July 20, 2004 No action
required.

file
11:54

b.p.

032

TO: Paul Butler
RADM Jim Stavridis
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mary Bono

When are we having Congresswoman Bono down here?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072004-5

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

7/30
DR 8/31

Seaf

Powell Moore
discussed this with
her and she said she
would enjoy coming but
simply wanted you to know
how much she supports what
you are doing. We'll
get her in sometime.

2074109

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27370

OSD/17305-04

O. L. L.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 12, 2004
2004 07 12 PM 1:54

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Second Three-Star Billet for SOCOM

210 (324)

I have reviewed your memo to me on this subject and understand your suggested strategy to pay for this billet.

I am concerned that continued use of emergency powers authority may well cause us problems in the future. There are a few scenarios I can think of which might suddenly withdraw the authority from us. I am aware of three or four generals we have already appointed to positions based on this authority. More will only make the potential problem worse. Furthermore, it doesn't feel right to use this authority in the "semi-permanent" fashion that we seem to be heading toward.

At this time, I do not want to authorize the second three-star billet at SOCOM using this authority. Instead, I believe we can identify an existing three-star billet as a billpayer. It seems to me that within 60 days we should be able to identify the billpayer. If that position is encumbered and cannot be vacated in the short term, at that time I will consider using emergency powers as the authority for the SOCOM billet until the billpayer billet is unencumbered.

Thanks.

Attach.

Memos from CJCS re second three-star billet for USSOCOM: 5/27/04, 3/30/04, nom package

DHR:dh
070604-1

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

1274104

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UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RMUS/27*

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Second Three-Star Billet for USSOCOM

- Recommend establishing a second three-star position in USSOCOM to perform all the operational functions under the Commander. USSOCOM is unique in having both Unified Combatant Commander/Geographical Combatant Commander in addition to service responsibilities. The current Deputy Commander would perform the duties similar to a Service Vice-Chief.
- Suggest a two-part strategy in order to quickly establish this new three-star position.
 - Initially establish the position using your authority under 10 USC § 527 to exceed active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling.
 - Establishing a temporary three-star position in USSOCOM will provide sufficient time to identify, staff, and vacate a current three-star position to downgrade or civilianize.
 - Preliminary guidance is to identify a joint three star position in either the European theater, head of DoD Agency, or President of NDU to downgrade or civilianize as appropriate. I will provide a recommendation within six months with the objective to implement by end of FY06.
- At TAB A is General Brown's detailed explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the two USSOCOM key leadership positions requiring the grade of three-star.
- For your consideration, I have also enclosed the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, US Special Operations Command and appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense exercise his authority to exceed the active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling under 10 USC § 527 and forward Major General Dailey's nomination to the President for approval.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral T. J. Keating, DJS, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/27372



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

27 May 2004
GFO 159/11-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, and DoD Instruction 1320.4, the Acting Secretary of the Army has recommended Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, and appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. The Acting Secretary also asks that this position be designated a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general.

2. This nomination requires you to exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceiling to fill this temporary position under the provision of Title 10, United States Code, section 527 and executive order 13223.

3. I have reviewed Major General Dailey's performance in three joint assignments. While serving as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, he specially organized, trained, and equipped assigned forces to conduct time sensitive, surgical special operations across the spectrum of conflict. Major General Dailey tirelessly improved inter-operability with all subordinate commands and other joint units as well as leveraged scarce resources to improve training facilities and initiate world-class information operations. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.

4. I concur with the Acting Secretary's nomination of Major General Dailey for this assignment, appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, and that this position be designated as a position of importance and responsibility. I recommend you forward it to the President for approval.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard B. Myers".

RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/27373



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

MAR 3 0 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

We recommend the President designate the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C. Section 601, and that the President nominate Major General Dell L. Dailey, age 54, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment to this position. Major General Dailey has served as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, since September 2003. His mandatory retirement date is July 1, 2009, based on time in service.

In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., and DoD Instruction 1320.4, a proposed memorandum for the President is enclosed. Major General Dailey is a graduate of the United States Army War College. He has served in three joint duty assignments, but is not a joint specialty officer.

The Director, Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, United States Special Operations Command is currently a two-star billet. The upgrade of this position to a three-star billet is temporary. We request that you exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceilings to fill the position under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., section 527; accordingly, this position will not count against the Army's general officer strength ceilings.

All systems of records, to include Equal Employment Opportunity files and the Standard Form 278 (Public Financial Disclosure Report), maintained in the Department of Defense that pertain to this officer have been examined. The files contain no adverse information about this officer since his last Senate confirmation. Further, to the best of our knowledge, there is no planned or ongoing investigation or inquiry into matters that constitute alleged adverse information on the part of this officer.

If selected for this position of importance and responsibility, we request approval to frock Major General Dailey to the grade of lieutenant general upon his confirmation by the Senate, but no earlier than 60 days prior to assuming his new duties. If the exemption is approved, this action will not cause the Department of the Army to exceed the number of officers authorized to serve in the grade of lieutenant general.

11-L-0559/OSD/27374

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

Major General Dailey's career resume is enclosed.



Peter J. Schoomaker
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff



R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

Enclosures



United States Army

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

**Deputy Commanding General
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310
since September 2003**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy – BS – No Major
Shippensburg University – MPA – Public Administration

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) Spanish

PROMOTIONS

DATE OF APPOINTMENT

2LT	9 Jun 71
1LT	9 Oct 72
CPT	9 Jun 75
MAJ	1 Feb 83
LTC	1 Mar 89
COL	1 Apr 94
BG	1 Nov 97
MG	1 Jan 01

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FROM

TO

ASSIGNMENT

Jan 72	Feb 73	Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 6th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado
Mar 73	Dec 73	Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, United States Army Primary Helicopter School, Fort Wolters, Texas
Dec 73	Sep 74	Executive Officer, 2d Aviation Battalion, later Aviation Officer, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea
Oct 74	Jul 75	Aviation Operations Officer, B Company, 2d Aviation Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

Jul 75	Mar 76	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Mar 76	Jun 76	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Jun 76	Feb 78	Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, later Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Feb 78	Apr 78	Assistant G-3 (Operations), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia
Apr 78	Apr 79	S-5 (Civil Affairs), later S-4 (Logistics), 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia
Apr 79	Aug 81	Platoon Commander, later Executive Officer, Air Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 81	Nov 81	Operations Officer S-3, Command and Control Squadron, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Nov 81	Apr 83	Commander, Combat Aviation Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Apr 83	Jun 84	Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jun 84	May 85	Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Fort Benning, Georgia
Jun 85	Aug 87	Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Aug 87	Apr 89	Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC
Apr 89	Jul 91	Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia
Jul 91	Jun 93	Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Jun 93	Jul 94	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Oct 94	Oct 96	Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Oct 96	Aug 98	Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky
Aug 98	Jul 00	Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
Jul 00	Sep 03	Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Commander, 160th Aviation Battalion, 3d Special Operations Command, OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia	Sep 90 – Apr 91	Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida	Aug 98 – Jul 00	Brigadier General

Major General DELL L. DAILEY

Commanding General, Joint Special Operations
Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Jul 00 – Sep 03

Brigadier General/
Major General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Master Army Aviator Badge
Air Assault Badge
Ranger Tab
Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 17 March 2004



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, be designated as a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 601(a). I also recommend the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and his assignment as the Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Major General Dailey, age 54, is currently serving as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This is a new, temporary position, established to augment United States Special Operations Command's mission to defeat the Global War on Terrorism.

To carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions, both in his own Service and in the joint arena. The general officer must be capable of planning and synchronizing the Department of Defense effort in the Global War on Terrorism. He must be thoroughly knowledgeable of the overall management of a unified command, extensively trained and experienced in the development and execution of global command and control of Special Operations Forces missions and for providing tailored Special Operations Forces capabilities to the designated Combatant Command. Major General Dailey meets these requirements. Major General Dailey possesses the qualifications and broad leadership experience necessary to carry out effectively the duties and responsibilities of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command.

I have exercised my authority to exceed general officer grade and strength ceilings under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 527. Accordingly, this position will not count against the number of general/flag officers authorized under law. This action is based upon the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Army and the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 164(e), the Commander, United States Special Operations Command concurs with this recommendation.

As required by Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on Major General Dailey's performance in his joint duty assignments.

Enclosure

APPROVED _____ DATE _____
President of the United States

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Lieutenant General
Major General Dell L. Dailey, 3747

GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced today that the President has nominated Maj. Gen. Dell L. Dailey, U.S. Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment as director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Dailey is currently serving as the deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, N.C.

~~-END-~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27381

Major General Dell L. Dailey
Major Permanent Duty Stations/Positions

<u>Duty Station/Duty Assignments</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Total Months in Position</u>
Fort Benning, Georgia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (Operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) 	Jun 84	May 85	11
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) 	Jun 85	Aug 87	26
Washington, DC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 	Aug 87	Apr 89	20
Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia 	Apr 89	Jul 91	27
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) 	Jul 91	Jun 93	23
Fort Campbell, Kentucky <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) • Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 	Oct 94	Aug 98	24
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command 	Aug 98	Jul 00	23

•	Fort Bragg, North Carolina	Jul 00	Present	
•	• Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command			38
	• Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg			6

As of 30 March 2004

Cathy +
Col B
for action

July 22, 2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: AG Meeting

Jim Haynes is going to set up a meeting with the Attorney General and whoever else the **AG** wants to bring. We will go over there. The meeting should be set for Monday or Tuesday of next week if we can. I would like Haynes, Steve Cambone and probably Geren and Maples to be there.

By Friday morning Haynes is going to give Cambone, Dick Myers and me a packet of material to read. Before we have the meeting next week, we ought to have a meeting of Haynes and Myers to discuss how we are going to handle the AG meeting.

After the AG meeting we are going to think about having a meeting with Will Taft of the State Department.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072204-4

.....
Please respond by _____

337

22 Jul 04

July 21, 2004

000.5

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report

A couple of thoughts:

1. The issue of reform – set aside the Commission’s recommendations or anyone else’s recommendations for a minute – is an important one, and it is important that it be discussed thoughtfully.
2. The most important thing to do first is to identify the problems one thinks need to be corrected, before coming up with solutions to unidentified problems. To those who would tear down what is falls the responsibility for specifying why it should be changed, and then recommending something better that actually will fix the real problem as first identified.
3. One consideration has to be the new reality that a user of intelligence, whether anyone from the President down to a platoon leader, really doesn’t care where the intelligence comes from. The distinction between national intelligence and tactical military intelligence is somewhat of an anachronism in the sense that information today is coming from a variety of sources – satellites, human intelligence, etc. What is really important is how that information gets to where it is needed. So, in a sense, artificial separations between national and tactical intelligence really are a thing of the last century.

2/4/04


4. Next, there are certain activities – I would include research and development and intelligence gathering – that have historically been shown to benefit from an absence of centralization and regimentation. That is to say, competition and differing views in those areas have historically led to greater innovation and creativity in the case of research and development, and, in the case of intelligence, avoiding the kind of “group think” that can lead to intelligence disasters.

5. When there are problems, and goodness knows there have been problems with respect to intelligence, there is a tendency to rush to make corrections. We don’t want to see damage done in the name of reform. It strikes me it is important to think any reform through carefully, but first identify the problem, have an elevated discussion, and only then consider solutions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072104-13

.....
Please respond by _____




July 20, 2004

320.2

TO: Jim Roche

CC: Gen. John Jumper
 GEN. DICK MYERS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

We have talked about the fact that the Air Force is 20,000+ over authorized end strength. Some weeks ago, when it was 19,000, I asked you to start working that number down. Instead of going down, it has gone up. Why has it ballooned?

I would like to see a plan by Thursday, July 22, that explains how you plan to get it down – with a timeline – and with what adverse effects to the Service.

I also would like to know where you are getting the money out of your program to pay for it, and what it costs to have 20,000 people in the Air Force a year longer than budgeted.

Thanks.

Attach.
 7/13/04 Active & Reserve Strengths Snapshot

DHR:dh
 072004-12

.....
 Please respond by 7/22/04

2004/04



OSD 17321-04

Active & Reserve

Active Component

Service	FY04 Authorized End Strength(PB05)	FY04 Waiver Authority *		Current End Strength		% Difference and Authorized End Strengths
		2%	3%	As of May 31, 2004	Difference	
Army	482,400	492,048	496,872	495,763	13,363	2.8%
Navy	373,800	381,276	385,014	376,204	2,404	.6%
Marine Corps	175,000	178,500	180,250	175,048	48	0
Air Force	359,300	366,486	370,079	379,534	20,234	5.6%
Total	1,390,500	1,418,310	1,432,215	1,426,549	36,049	2.6%

Reserve Component

Service	Currently Mobilized
Army	133,200
Navy	2,772
Marine Corps	10,304
Air Force	8,068
Total	154,344

* Section 115 of Title 10 allows Service Secretaries to increase end strength by 2%.

* Section 115 of Title 10 allows SECDEF to increase end strength by an additional 1% for a total of 3%.

* Section 123 of Title 10 removes all end strength limitations during time of war or national emergency.

To See Def

July 20, 2004

Paul Butler

7/20

IRAQ

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iraqi Stock Exchange

SIR
Grant stuff here.
v/r
for

Please find out today about the Iraqi stock exchange - if one opened, what happened to the market, how many stocks, and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR dh
072004-6

.....
Please respond by 7/20/04

7/21

SIR,
Response attached.

v/r
LGI Longyel
7/20

2007104

OSD 17322-04

To: SecDef

July 20, 2004

From: Paul Butler

Cc: Larry Di Rita

Re: Iraqi Stock Exchange

Here is some data on the Iraqi Stock Exchange:

- Opened on June 24, 2004. Open for business only on Wednesdays and Sundays for two hours per day.
- Presently 27 companies are listed but Iraqis expect to list more than 100 by the end of July.
- Trading has been vigorous. An article last Sunday (attached) describes the activity: over 1.43 billion shares worth over \$10 million traded in the Sunday July 18 session (the first session open to the media).
- There is no data on the Iraqi exchange in the Wall Street Journal stock tables. I will check the Financial Times and get back to you.

Also noteworthy is the fact that on July 19 the Iraqis did their first post-Saddam bond issue raising \$103 million for 91 day government bonds at 6.8% interest. The Iraqi government hopes to raise \$1.2 billion this year in twice weekly bond auctions (second article attached).



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Business News - July 20, 2004

Volume Jumps on New Iraq Stock Exchange



July 18, 2004 04:18 PM EDT

Iraqi stock traders bid during a trading session at the well guarded stock exchange building in the center of Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 18, 2004. At present, the Iraq stock exchange is open only on Wednesdays and Sundays from 10 am until midday, but plans are under way to create a six-day trading week. It only has 27 listed companies with about 100 more due to go public in the coming months. (AP Photo/Saeed Khan, Pool)

BAGHDAD, Iraq - The miniature Liberty Bell clanged. Elbows flew. Sweat poured down foreheads. Sales tickets were passed and, with a flick of the wrist, 10,000 shares of the Middle East Bank had more than doubled in value. The frantic pace Sunday of those first 10 minutes of trading typified the enthusiasm behind the Iraq

Stock Exchange - a new institution seen as a critical step in building a new Iraqi economy.

In just five sessions, trading volume has nearly quadrupled and the value of some stocks has surged more than 600 percent, gains traders say reflects the pent up frustration of 15 months of closure.

"How can I not be excited by this?" Taha Ahmed Abdul-Salam, the exchange's chief executive officer, said as he eyed the activity on the trading floor.

The ISX is temporarily housed in a converted restaurant. Looters had gutted the old exchange, so traders now jostle for position in a long room overlooking an old dining room. Where bartenders once chatted with patrons sidling up for drinks, a bank of secretaries log orders.

With space limited, investors are not allowed in the exchange, let alone the "floor." Instead, from a makeshift courtyard, they can look in through the same windows that once offered diners a garden view. Joining them are the posse of men armed with assault rifles who provide security for the exchange.

Such scenes are standard in the tumultuous Iraqi capital. But the

11-L-0559/OSD/27391

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Possi



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NY Yankees at 0
Tampa Bay 0


Yesterday's Games

MLB

NY Yankees at 7
Tampa Bay 9 FINAL

Market Update

Stock Lookup



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ET - NEW YORK (CBS.MW) -

Insurer Safeco said Tuesday that its careful underwriting practices and low catastrophe payouts helped it double second quarter earnings versus year-ago levels.

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presence of security does little to dampen enthusiasm at the exchange.

The unofficial figures of the day's trade tell the story. Over \$10 million in stocks changed hands, reflecting the movement of about 1.43 billion shares - though only 27 companies are listed on the exchange.

"Iraqis have always been business savvy," said Abdul-Salam, the former research head at the old exchange. "But that we have this much activity with so few companies listed shows just how much pent up frustration there was among investors under the previous regime."

For Iraqis, these days have been a long time coming. The ISX replaces the now-defunct Baghdad Stock Exchange, which was riddled with corruption. Saddam's extended family often muscled in at will by simply issuing new shares for companies they found attractive.

The new exchange has built in safeguards against manipulation. It took about a year to set up, with 12 brokerage houses and banks that own it working alongside former occupation authorities to lay the legal and regulatory framework.

"This is much better than before," said Emad Shakir al-Baghdadi, a broker with the Okaz Co. firm. The removal of a 5 percent cap on price swings has added tremendous credibility and liquidity to the market, he added.

"Look at these prices," he said, glancing at the board showing offers for one industrial company at about 25 dinars, almost two-tenths of a cent. "These shares are ridiculously undervalued. That's why prices are surging as much as 600 percent from day-to-day."

The exchange was inaugurated last month and is open two days a week for two hours a day. Sunday's session was the first open to the media.

Officials say they hope that in a month they will have all 120 companies previously listed on the old exchange on the new ISX's "big board" - actually 27 small white boards, where workers record trades with markers.

Thirty minutes after the ringing of the Liberty Bell replica - a donation from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange - Talib al-Tabatabaie, the ISX's board chairman, hollered into the phone, struggling to be heard over the din from the unairconditioned trading floor.

"Sell? Do you want me to sell them now?" he screamed at a client over the phone, his shirt coming untucked as he waved his arms. "It's up again! We should sell!"

Economists say the key to success is a strong regulatory framework, transparency and accountability. A shift to an electronic trading system is coming, officials say.

11-L-0559/OSD/27392

So are more regulations. Oversight here comes from the Iraq Securities Commission, headed by Luay al-Okali.

"Right now, we're all working together to build up the exchange. Later, when things are running smoother, then we'll give them a hard time," al-Okali said with a wink.

The added bonus will be opening the door for foreign investment. The legal framework is in place, but the details have yet to be completed.

"My hope would be that they would quickly encourage foreign investment," Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist Gary Becker told The Associated Press by telephone. "Foreign investors often want to make sure they have majority ownership."

Brokers and ISX officials predict that the tourism and hospitality sector will be the market's new blue chips.

On Sunday, Baghdad Hotel's shares did not disappoint. In a market when many shares were trading at values equal to a fraction of a penny, the 25-cent offer for the hotel's stock was snapped up.

"Don't forget that Iraq is a tourist country. There's plenty to see here," said Mohammed Ismael, a broker with Qidwa Securities.

As the sound of automatic gunfire reverberated in the distance, he shrugged.

"I guess it will take a little more time for them to come."

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11-L-0559/OSD/27393



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INTERNATIONAL

Iraq raises \$103m in post-Saddam bond sale

July 19, 2004

London - Iraq sold its first bonds since the ouster of Saddam Hussein more than a year ago, raising \$103 million (R607.6 million) from domestic banks.

The central bank in Baghdad will today announce the yield on the 91-day 6.8 percent-interest note.

Iraq's three-week-old government is selling debt to help pay local banks \$3 billion of debt that Saddam's rule had accumulated and to reduce its reliance on international loans and revenue from oil. The government will hold twice-monthly auctions to raise as much as \$1.2 billion by year-end.

"It shows the sophistication of the Iraqi banking system," said Richard Segal, research director at London brokerage for emerging market securities, including Iraqi debt.

Iraq, the world's number three holder of oil reserves, this month made its first payment on domestic bonds since 1981, paying 507 billion dinars (R2.13 billion) for three-month 6 percent-interest bills during the days of Saddam's leadership.

Today's sale will help it repay another 600 billion dinars of debt that comes due on October 1, said finance minister Aziz Jaafar Hassan said in a weekend interview.

The government will have to overcome investor scepticism about its ability to pay debt. The nation is subjected to frequent attacks by insurgents, about 140 000 US troops are stationed in the country and the nation still has to reach an agreement on \$120 billion of foreign debt.

Meanwhile stockbrokers have reported roaring trade, making three times their monthly salaries on shares bought just one week ago on the revamped Iraq stock exchange.

"It's simply fantastic. I sold shares worth 5 million dinars and made a profit of more than 2 million in one session. What a great day," exclaimed trader Abdul al Jabbar.

The bourse, which opened on June 24, enjoyed record trading volumes on its sixth session to close with more than 2 billion shares swapping hands.

"The volumes seen Sunday are simply historic," said Taha Ahmed Abdulsalam, the chief executive of the exchange.

"This is despite the primitive system we have. Imagine what it would be once the electronic trading system comes," he said, referring to a plan to shift from the old-fashioned paper system to a fully automated one.

Iraq's stock exchange is a product of more than a year's work by 12 brokerage firms and banks to set up the market. It has 27 listed companies, with about 100 more due to go public in the next six weeks.

The bourse is open only on Sundays and Wednesdays for two hours at a time. - Bloomberg analyst

11-L-0559/OSD/27394

July 26,2004

322

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis
cc: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Event for Combatant Commanders

For the combatant commanders' dinner, we will have:

- Service Chiefs – no substitutes, not the Vice Chief if a Service Chief cannot be there
- combatant commanders
- Craddock and Keating, who are confirmed
- Martin, if he is confirmed
- Chairman and the Vice Chairman
- Admiral Stavridis
- Probably Duncan Hunter and Congressman Skelton.

I think that is the group. Let's pull that together, check it out with Dick Myers, and then we will decide it for sure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072304-16

.....
Please respond by 8/30/04

2674104

July 22, 2004

||

Sir,

I checked with CJCS protocol, and Sunday night, September 19th works well on their schedule, for you to host an event at your residence for the Combatant Commanders. They will all be flying in that day, so it would be the welcoming event.

The President does NOT host a dinner during this Fall conference, but the Combatant Commanders spouses WILL be accompanying their husbands to Washington.

We will also host the Commanders on Wednesday at the Pentagon, for the Strategic Planning Council and a working lunch, etc.

cc: Admiral Stavridis
Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
Cathy Mainardi/Arlene Nestel

*Ale
Stavri*

*- Grubel
Kestring*

Martin of Confirmed

*- Sandlin
Hunt
Skelton*

*Chi
Vice
Gmr. 9.*

July 26, 2004

383.6

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Bartlett

Please get back to Roscoe Bartlett and Murtha and tell them what happened – that SGT Davis was interviewed and so forth.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/20/04 CJCS memo to SecDef, CM-1946-04 [OSD 10977-04]

DHR:dh
072604-2

.....
Please respond by 8/9/04

OSD 17324 04

26Jul04

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Information

J
7/23

What should we do about getting that person who said **he knew** information about the abuses? He is in Roscoe Bartlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
05/19/04-14

.....
Please respond by *5/28/04*

Det 7/24

Sir,
Response attached.

v/r
Lt Col Lengyel
7/23

Tab

OSD 10977-04

Det 7/26



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1946-04
20 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard D. Myers, CJCS *RDM 7/20*

SUBJECT: Information

- **Question.** "What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about abuses? He is in Roscoe Barlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else." ✓
- **Answer.** The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed SGT Davis and there is no action required.
- **Analysis**
 - SGT Davis is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, Virginia. While assigned in Iraq with 372nd MP Company, his duties included escorting detainees in and out of Abu Ghraib (Oct 2003-Nov 2003).
 - SGT Davis provided a statement to Army CID dated 27 May 04 in which he claims to have witnessed certain treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib to include: 1) Naked detainees handcuffed together and to the bars of the cell being yelled at by interrogators; 2) Naked detainees being ordered to low-crawl on the floor, and; 3) PFC England taking photos of detainees.
 - SGT Davis reported what he saw to his chain of command while in Iraq. His platoon commander gave a written reprimand to a CPL involved in the events witnessed by SGT Davis. In addition, when it was brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of Fort Lee that SGT Davis had information about possible detainee abuse, the Commanding Officer reported this to CID, resulting in CID interviewing SGT Davis. The information provided by SGT Davis is still part of a current investigation. This information was provided by CID Agent **Worth** of the Detainee Task Force and the agent that interviewed SGT Davis.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated.

Prepared By: LtCol Richard E. Grant; USMC; OCJCS/LC; (b)(6)

TSA SD	<i>X</i>
SRMA SD	
MA SD	<i>mm</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>M 7/23</i>

OSD 10977-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27399

72
~~FOUO~~

file

July 26, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo

IRAQ

Do you think we ought to get this memo you gave me to Casey?

Thanks.

Attach.
10/29/03 MFR: Impressions - Iraq - 19-23 October 2003

DHR:dh
072604-6

.....
Please respond by _____



DR 7/27

SecDef -

- Yes - though some of the issues raised in the memo may be addressed by now, cannot be sure*
- I will forward to Gen Casey to ensure he has seen*

DR 7/26

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27400

OSD 17325-04

26 Jul 04

SecDef -

10/30

- author is a retired Army Colonel
- he has assisted in preparing every Army unit that has served in the Balkans
- his specialty is negotiations training
- he went to Iraq to gain situational awareness in the 4 ID area (Tiberit)
- he will assist in training the Division that replaces the 4 ID.

①

29 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Impressions – IRAQ – 19-23 October 2003

This memo contains my impressions developed during a 19-23 October 2003 visit to Iraq. I am indebted to the commanders who opened their thoughts and units to me. This is not meant to be a critical piece, as I have not walked in their moccasins. I have not written letters to families as have these great leaders. This is intended to be a forward looking, not a rearward pointing, think piece.

1. An infantry battalion commander told me, "You can't assume kindness will win their hearts. You've got to get in sync with the Arab male mentality – then they will respect you – tough but fair.
2. From point 1 comes the need to balance "Dignity and Respect" with operating within the cultural norms. Do we compromise our values to operate within their value set as did Laurence of Arabia? At what point on the toughness scale does the new unit enter the fray? This is a really tough decision for the leadership of the new unit – and I do not think it should be left to subordinate leaders to make this determination.
3. Units have got to have their game face on before they leave the operating base. Standards have got to be impeccable. This means looking correct enough that no one who wants to live would dare attack you. Units that do not demonstrate this degree of professionalism will invite attacks. I went on an early morning raid with a mechanized unit. We looked as tough as tough could be. The operation went off without incident – every soldier looked ready for action all the time. As we returned, after daylight, we passed a logistics convoy. Soldiers were not postured with the same alertness as ours; some were out of uniform. Later on, we observed a lone vehicle drive by – the policy is three, two of which must have crew served weapons. Both the convoy and the lone vehicle were inviting attacks. In the train up for this mission, I would inflict kills every time on ill disciplined convoys and lone vehicles to make the "Game Face" point.
4. Before Units enter theater, everyone must understand the capabilities of CA, PSYOPS, CI, THT. I also hear this point consistently from rotations in the Balkans.
5. Units training for this mission need to practice drills from vehicles in all environments for ambushes, raids, and manning Ops.
6. Translators should be treated as a pacing item. The battalion that I joined for the raid only had three translators – one was a CAT II, the other two were hired locally by the battalion. I am told not every battalion has a CAT II. We have forgotten what we learned in the Balkans. How do we manage perceptions, win hearts and minds, or just

Counterintelligence

*Tactical
Humint Teams*

Civil Affairs

operate safely if we cannot communicate with the population? Soldiers detain people, search homes, and order people around without being able to explain to them what is happening. This is a recipe for disaster.

7. I spoke to a CPA representative who routinely speaks with a local Imam. In a recent conversation the Imam stated that three months ago, he used to get one request a week for a Fatwa (sp) to kill an American soldier. These requests have increased to three a day. The two main reasons for the requests are:

- a. The way we treat their woman
- b. The detention of their men

Now think back to the shortage of translators – This could be a second or third order effect of poor communications – we can't reach the people.

8. There is always the feeling that “platoon headquarters” does not know what is going on. Most useful intelligence seems to be self generated by units. Scott St-Cyr has the key. Some days ago he expressed his philosophy to me. He said, “I work for the king. The king can be the squad leader who needs the information.” That is really healthy – but tough.

9. Relationships are more important here than they are for units operating in the Balkans - build them fast; but watch who you build them with. A commander can give stature to a thug just by paying attention to him in a group.

10. All operations should be preceded with a risk assessment. The next step is to rigorously seek ways to mitigate risk. Absent this, force protection can be a crap shoot.

11. Each time units mount an operation, we will, by nature, upset a portion of the population. We should use Information Ops to mitigate this much the same as we identify actions to mitigate risk after doing a risk assessment. Actions might be as simple as the production of a flyer explaining what we are doing and why; a phone number for an IRAQI OFFICE that family can contact to get information on detained family members; could be a MEDCAP etc.

12. Instincts are important. Leaders and troops must know what right looks like. Then, instinctively, they must know something is out of the ordinary.

13. We've got to get out front of the enemy's IO. I heard over and over again, “Sheiks are the internet of IRAQ” – figure out how to leverage them!

14. Don't write checks you can't cash. Don't write checks your boss can't cash. Don't promise anything till you've checked and double checked, and have the resources under your control. The first time you promise something and don't deliver, you have no credibility with an Arab.

15. As the National Governing Council and field offices mature, operations and cooperation in the field will become more difficult. The Council in Baghdad is driving to

centralization. The CPA and the Coalition is driving, bottom up, to decentralization. They are on a collision course. One of the implications is provincial governments, put in place by the Coalition, are not being paid -- by the government in Baghdad. They seem to be on a collision course.

16. Right seat left seat rides are significantly more important here than they are in the Balkans. Incoming commanders must gain a complete understanding of players and history of previous unit's operations in the AO. The implications can be tremendous.

17. Troops I interviewed from previous rotations commented about conditions changing so much that ROE change or supplemental instructions were required, but not forthcoming. It might be prudent to review ROE regularly against METT-T-C. It might also be prudent to regularly review how ROE are being operationalized by subordinate units. In the extreme, frustration can be one heck of an enemy; it got my generation My Lai.

Ed McCarthy
29 OCTOBER 2003

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

file

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 2, 2004

2004 NOV - 820
PT 2: 10

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Militias

IRHQ

I left one thing out when we had that meeting on the Iraqi Security Forces, and that is how we handle the militias. That has to be a part of the security situation in the country, and it should have a separate section in the approach.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070204-5

.....
Please respond by 7/

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17326-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27405

11-L-0559/OSD/27405

SJS 04-04431

Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS

From: Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 1:30 PM
To: Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD
Cc: Leonard, Kevin A, COL, JCS SJS; Koles, Robert E, Lt Col, JCS SJS
Subject: Request for closure of SF-820 Militias

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CDR Nosenzo,

At a 2 July CJCS/MNF-I/CENTCOM SVTC, Gen Casey (MNF-I) stated militias should be woven into the plan for Iraqi Security Forces and CJCS agreed. MNF-I is taking appropriate action on SecDef's memo (SF-820).

Recommend Joint Staff action be closed out.

v/r
Fran Dillard

(b)(6)



tasker_04-04431.p
df

July 26, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Good News Story

383.6

You might want to take a look at this story and see if you can move it around.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/23/04 Fax from SecState on Major Garrity

DHR:dh
072604-10

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

OSD 17327-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27407

26074104



S/ES 200417620
United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Washington, D.C. 20520-5824

July 22, 2004

DIST
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NOTE TO THE SECRETARY ✎

✓
W

Attached is a *summary* of a good news story about an Army Reservist who got it right in her treatment of detainees in Southern Iraq. Maj. Garrity is from Athens, PA - not far from where our farm is located in the far north of *the* state. Since all we hear from ICRC and *the* press is bad news about U.S. treatment, this is a story that ought to reach beyond Northern Pennsylvania.

I am copying this to Richard Boucher.


Gale Dewey

A GOLDEN HEART: ATHENS SOLDIER BELOVED BY IMPRISONED IRAQIS
(summarized from *The Sunday Review*, July 4, 2004)

Pictures from Camp Bucca, a U.S.-run detention center near Umm Qasr in southern Iraq, show a very different picture of prison life than the images of Abu Ghraib that have saturated the media. Notably, the pictures show American soldiers and Iraqi prisoners smiling together. Most of the pictures include Major Stacy Garrity, an Army Reservist from Athens, Pennsylvania.

As Major Garrity used to walk through Camp Bucca, children would chant: "good, good major!" They would give her a small, braided "friendship bracelets." At least one detainee wrote to her that "when we see you, we feel hope." Iraqi generals at the camp called her "GoldenHeart." To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

Garrity served at Camp Bucca for one year, keeping life flowing for the masses of Iraqi detainees. Garrity handled processing at the prison, interacting with everyone who came in and out. She was also responsible for family visitations and interpreters, and she served as a Red Cross liaison.

Garrity took her mission to watch and care for the Iraqis very seriously. Often, she told detainees: "You will never be mistreated while you are here." It was her conviction that anybody who came through the gates at Camp Bucca would be treated with dignity as a human being. She followed the Geneva Conventions, looked out for the detainees and treated everyone with respect and dignity. Iraqis under her care lived in large tents, got water from water buffaloes, and received ice two times a day from the U.S. soldiers. The Iraqis showered twice a day, received extra clothes and blankets, and got cigarettes twice a day.

Garrity also took on projects that were not in her job description. She procured soccer balls, volleyballs, chess, checker and domino sets, and newspapers. She set up a post office system where families could leave letters for detainees. She helped a Christian orphanage nearby get money, toys, clothes and food. She helped design a family visiting system, arranging schedules and organizing bus drivers.

Her attention to prisoners' well-being earned her affection, as evidenced by the gifts and thank-you cards given to her by Iraqi prisoners. One detainee in particular didn't want to leave Camp Bucca. A young Iraqi who speaks three languages kept committing minor crimes so he could keep coming back to Camp Bucca. Each time he would be released he would say "Major Garrity, I'll see you in two days!" And in two days he would return.

When Garrity received word this spring that she was going home, the detainees were very upset by the news. Many of the detainees invited her to visit their families -- they think of her as a sister. It was because she cared. And she helped. Helping was her job, Garrity insists. Most of all, it makes sense. One of the most important things, she believes, "isto win hearts and minds." If Iraqis like Americans, they won't hurt Americans.

Garrity has also served in Haiti six times for short-term missions and in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War as an administrative officer. Garrity graduated from Bloomsburg University, where she joined the ROTC, with a business administration degree.

TWELVE - A - THE SUNDAY REVIEW, JULY 4, 2004

Heroes

A golden heart

Athens soldier beloved by imprisoned Iraqis

BY NANCY GOLDMAN
(870) 266-1633
The Daily/Sunday Review

Stacy Garrity used to walk through camp, under the stinging sunlight. Her boots crunched the sand.

Dark-haired kids would see her. "Good, good major!" they'd chant. Perhaps one would run up with a small, green, braided object like a rope. He'd give it to her.

It was called a "friendship bracelet."

And she was their friend.

This was Camp Bucca, a southern Iraq detainee center. Stacy, from Athens, a U.S. Army Reserve officer, served there a year, keeping life flowing for its masses of Iraqi prisoners.

"Golden Heart." That's what some Iraqi generals there called her. To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

"When we see you, we feel hope," at least one person wrote to her.

It was because she cared. And she helped.

Why?

Well, there's the Geneva Convention. And issues of dignity and respect. And good common sense.

But for this young woman with blue eyes and golden curls ... who travels the world ... who's gone to Haiti six times on short-term missions ... who wears a small cross ring ... who likes to smile ... there's some-



Submitted photo

Maj. Stacy Garrity of Athens stands with some young friends during her recent year in Iraq. Garrity, a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, served at Camp Bucca, detainee center in southern Iraq.

thing more. "Something that has to be inside you," she says.

"I genuinely like people," she states simply.

"It's easy for me ... it's not a burden."

Stacy graduated from Sayre High in 1982. At first interested in political science, she finally earned a business administra-

tion degree from Bloomsburg University. Today, she's product marketing manager at Osrans-Sylvania in North Towanda. Her father and his wife, Howard and Tammy Lynn Garrity, live in Waverly, and her mom, Beverly Arbia, and her husband, John, in Scranton. And — Stacy doesn't want to

miss anyone — she has three sisters, Maureen, Paige and Jennifer; one living grandmother, June Garrity of Sayre, and a fiancé, Dan Ghazi of Elmira.

Years ago, her parents joined the Navy Reserve. Try it!

See HEART, Page 13A



THE OREGON JOURNAL, JULY 4, 2004 - EDITION A

Heroes

HEART

Continued from page 2A

found right away. So to realize the goal of the program, we have to find people who can do the job. The most difficult part was finding the right people.

Just the fact that we had a goal was a big step. We had to find people who could do the job. We had to find people who could do the job. We had to find people who could do the job.

They were 2003. That January she and her 2003 husband, David, had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

The fact was that she had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son.

Several other people, the ones who were the most important. They were the most important. They were the most important.

At that point, the fact was that she had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son.

And ... And ... And ... And ... And ... And ... And ... And ... And ... And ...

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

"I guess I don't want to say people. The fact was that she had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son.

Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ... Davidson ...

At that point, the fact was that she had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son.

"I think to yourself, you supposed to do that. You supposed to do that. You supposed to do that. You supposed to do that.

The fact was that she had a son. She had a son. She had a son. She had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

On average, they had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

The American ... The American ... The American ... The American ... The American ...

And they had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

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They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son. They had a son.

11-L-0559/OSD/27411

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Turkish MoD

3335D

Have I sent a thank you to the Turkish MoD? If not, I should. Please draft it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070804-3

.....
Please respond by 7/12/04

10/12/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17328-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27412



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUL 2 2004

His Excellency Mehmet Vecdi Gonul
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Turkey

Dear Minister Gonul:

Thank you so much for your warm hospitality. **Joyce** and I thoroughly enjoyed our visit to Istanbul. We found the dinner at the Officers Club delightful and the Gala evening at the Topkapi Palace spectacular. We wish we had been able to stay longer.

Please do express my appreciation to **Mrs. Gonul**. It was a pleasure to be with her.

Turkey organized and hosted a truly memorable Summit.

With best wishes and appreciation,

Sincerely,

OSD 09956-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27413

July 13,2004

TO: Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF
President, National Defense University

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NDU Accomplishments

Thanks so much for your memo on accomplishments over the last year. It sounds like a lot of good work is being done there.

Congratulations.

DHR:dh
071304-6

.....
Please respond by _____

9 Jul 04

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense (CY FOR)
Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff

11/2
J

FROM: President, National Defense University

Mike D.

Subject: Accomplishments Over the Last Year

Sirs, I wanted to give you some thoughts on the changes we have made during my first year at NDU.

Transformation – we have thoroughly infused the curricula in all our colleges with transformation – from transformational leadership, transformational organizations, to transformational thinking. However, we are still not satisfied. Art Cebrowski is in the process of funding us to develop curriculum for a certificate program in Transformational Leadership – which could be used in all war colleges (Army, Navy, Air, etc.),

GWOT -- Adjusted curricula to reflect the long-term nature of the conflict. Have focused on differences of views between US/allies and others. Have brought our international students forcefully into the debate. And have brought many senior policy makers to speak – in order to ensure we present the USG point of view. Have conducted workshops/roundtables for CPA, Amb Negroponte, and for Generals Casey and Sharp. Have conducted exercises for EUCOM and Government of Greece to enhance security for the 2004 Olympics and a major bioterrorism exercise for Secs Ridge, Minetta, Thompson, and other cabinet officials.

Capstone -- many changes – most significantly -- to expose our new GOs/FOs to senior leaders – including both of you, USDP, Dir CIA, and Art Cebrowski. One class even heard from VP Cheney. Secondly, have shifted overseas travel to visit our JTFs – to include GTMO, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Korea, and Horn-of-Africa. Have also visited Israeli Northern Command (watched live Hizballah infiltrations in broad daylight) – great lessons learned. Speaker Gingrich continues to support us with his time and thoughts.

Research -- have refocused our efforts to support our customers in OSD/JS – policy, AT&L, and NII. Have added OSD chairs to the university from policy and AT&L. Have met with DASDs/Directors on products/round tables frequently. Have provided numerous studies and papers: on transformation; stabilization and reconstruction ops; IT in the military; analyzed difficult Homeland security challenges, including bio-terrorism, dirty bombs, and MANPAD threat to civil aviation; studies on implementation of US CT strategy; de-Ba'thification; building new Iraqi defense forces; changing civil-mil relations in the greater Middle East; enhancing stability in Afghanistan; papers on NE Asia and Korea/PRC roles, and others. This year, Joint Force Quarterly celebrated its 10th anniversary and INSS completed its 20th year of operations. We have provided library support to both OSD/JS.

Counter Terrorism Fellow (CTF) Program – A singular success. Is supported by SOLIC – brings international officers from those countries without enough IMET or those which have significant IMET restrictions (e.g. Indonesia), and focuses them on a CT curriculum. About 70 officers per year for 8 month program. A new class enters every 4 months. We expect our first Afghani and Iraqi students this year.

Regional Centers (Africa Center, NESACenter, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies) – All have new directors. Thru Ryan Henry's leadership, are in process of using them in the "battle of ideas." We have new courses on GWOT, created alumni associations – and providing them with high quality information, provided virtual access to our library, shared best practices among the centers, and a myriad of other programs.

Congress – have continued simulated war games and attracted over 80 members and many senior officials – have added scenarios on anthrax, plague, port security and transportation system. Have also run a Korean scenario and have one on China/Taiwan planned for later this month. We have conducted Hill staffer courses – both in terrorism and in "Defense 101," and run brown-bag lunches for Hill staffers. With Ike Skelton's help, we have held Congressional breakfasts – which expose our National War College and ICAF students to members of Congress (and vice versa).

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) – we have broadened JPME: created a course for Capt/USN Lts, created a Joint Advanced Warfighting Course for joint planners, in process of creating a course (named Pinnacle) for prospective JTF Commanders. Are reviewing ideas for joint courses for NCOs, have created Advanced JPME course for Reserve Component (RC) Officers – combination in-residence/DL format, and increased the number of RC two-week courses by 50%.

Sr Leaders – we have made a concerted effort to bring the most senior policy makers to the University to address our students. DSD has visited about a dozen times, Dep Sec State, USDP, USS Political Affairs, DHS, and almost every Combatant Commander and Service Chief have addressed our students. We have gone after many notables – many of which are scheduled to talk – including former Sec Schultz. Pres Bush addressed our classes in February.

International Focus – have expanded our International Fellow (IFs) program with NWC and ICAF by 25% -- seeking to increase the number of countries represented from the arc of instability and from Africa. We are delivering more courses to more people with our regional centers – both here and abroad. We have reinvigorated our international Hall of Fame – where we recognize those IFs who succeed in their country. Working with embassies in Washington and country teams abroad, we have sought out our grads, catalogued their present positions, and sent notes to every Ambassador, DASD/ASD/DASS/ASS informing them that they had people in the AORs which have studied in the US and are likely to have a favorable impression of the US. We urged they be nurtured and included in events when key US officials visited the country. In the near future, we see NDU linked with counterpart

institutions and alumni in almost every country in the world – interacting virtually, by VTC, and in person – seeking to build consensus in support of US objectives. [Presently I correspond with the Commandants from over 50 countries on a routine basis.] We continue to volunteer to host distinguished foreign visitors here – to conduct roundtables with them and to press US views on them. Our experience is that we can say some things in an “academic setting” that can’t be said in formal meetings.

Homeland Security –Have formed a new Institute for Homeland Security Studies (IHSS) – led by Hon Steve Duncan, former ASD (RA) and DOD drug czar under SD Cheney. Purpose of IHSS is to pull together various aspects of HLS in other NDU components and to interface with DHS. We have created a Homeland Security Planner’s Course in support of NORTHCOM. We have developed a range of training and simulation programs designed to enhance interagency planning and cooperation of complex contingencies.

Information Resources Management College – continues to adjust its focus – we have new intensive courses focused on network-centric organizations, DOD enterprise architecture, and building the business case for IT. Curriculum changes were made to update CIO competencies and CIO leadership skills such as collaboration, communication, critical thinking, and leading change. Enrollment in distance learning courses grew to 25 percent of total enrollment, and the College continues to be an innovator in instructional design.

Facilities and Infrastructure. Planning is well under way for a new 240,000 SF Academic and Conference Center – we expect ground breaking Nov 04. We plan to bring numerous NDU elements housed in leased space off campus into what we are tentatively calling “Lincoln Hall.” However, we have an opportunity to build a Homeland Security College – one which serves DOD, DHS, other parts of the government, and state/local authorities. We want DHS to fund the college and help us build the curriculum. Will let you both know of any roadblocks we might face.

Board of Visitors – have reinvigorated the BOV – provided it with more expansive view of NDU activities; have included its members in almost every facet of NDU operations, including overseas travel, key conferences, and workshops. I am very happy with the independent, thoughtful advice I get from the Board.

Funding – we have adequate funding ...but, in priority order, need additional funding for: (1) NESAC center – courses for Afghanis and Iraqis, and for playing an increasingly important role in the battle of ideas in the Presidents’ Greater Middle East Initiative. (2) NCO JPME – this is long overdue, needs resources.

Bottomline: Great things are underway here. We are improving in all we do.

Very Respectfully,

CF: DSD, USDP, DJS

11-L-0559/OSD/27417

July 19, 2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: IRR Numbers

Please have someone get me the Individual Ready Reserve numbers to add to this "Active and Selected Reserve Forces" chart, so I know the total.

Also have them put on the same page the civilian headcount.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/04 "Active and Selected Reserve Forces"

DHR.dh
071904-20

.....
Please respond by _____

Active and Selected Reserve Forces

Service	Active	Guard & Reserve
Army	495,763	555,266
Navy	376,204	83,234
Marine Corps	175,048	39,756
Air Force	379,534	180,950
Total	1,426,549	859,206

F R R

Active Duty as of May 30, 2004

Guard & Reserves as of May 30, 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/27419

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
CC: RYAN HENRY
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Allegation

383.6

You ought to have someone look into this allegation by the former detainee from Jordan.

Thanks.

Attach.

AEMBASSY AMMAN Cable P 1402252JUL 04 ZDK, "Jordanian Released from GITMO Interviewed by Islamic Weekly Al-Sabil, Cites Abuse"

DHR:dh
071404-8

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

1430104

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17331-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27420

Handwritten: 7/14

PTTUZDKW RUEHAMA5893 1960225-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUU ZZH
R 140225Z JUL 04 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0046

*Handwritten: 7/14
J*

UNCLAS AMMAN 005893

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IZ, JO

S-----T: JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM GITMO INTERVIEWED BY ISLAMIC WEEKLY AL-SABIL, CITES ABUSE

REF: FBIS QNP20040707000202

1. JORDAN ISLANIST WEEKLY AL-SABIL PUBLISHED JULY 6 A LENGTHY INTERVIEW WITH, THEY REPORT, THE FIRST JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA. THE FORMER PRISONER DESCRIBED HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AT DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2004 AS BEING WORSE THAN THE REPORTED ABUSE AT ABU GHREIB. THE FULL TEXT OF THE ARTICLE CAN BE FOUND IN FBIS REFTEL. WE REPORT THIS IN THE INTEREST OF ANY ONGOING INVESTIGATION.

HANDED OVER IN TEHRAN TO US FORCES

2. WISAM ABD-AL-RAHMAN, KNOWN AS ABU-UBAYDAH, DESCRIBED TO AL-SABIL HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AS A PRISONER IN DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO. HE SAID IRANIAN POLICE ARRESTED HIM IN ZAHEDAN ON HIS RETURN FROM A TRIP TO PAKISTAN. HE SAID THAT AFTER HIS INTERROGATION BY IRANIAN POLICE HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED. HOWEVER, HE WAS INSTEAD TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT IN TEHRAN AND ALLEGEDLY HANDED OVER TO A U.S. PLANE WITH AFGHAN MEN ON BOARD.

DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, CUBA; RETURN TO JORDAN

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: /
C&D: CCD: / CABLE CH: FILE:
USDP: / DIA: OTHER:
USDI: / PER SEC: COMM:

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 3

3. ABD-AL-RAHMAN DESCRIBED HIS REPORTED PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2003 AS MOVING FROM "ONE AMERICAN PRISON TO ANOTHER", STAYING IN COLD, DARK, AND CROWDED ROOMS. HE SAID HE STAYED, WITHOUT CHARGES OR INTERROGATION, WITH NINE OTHER PERSONS IN A 25 SQUARE FOOT ROOM WITHOUT SUNLIGHT AND FED ONLY BREAD AND RICE FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 77 DAYS. HE SAID THAT SANITARY AND HYGIENE CONDITIONS WERE TERRIBLE, AND THAT HE DID NOT RECEIVE MEDICAL CARE NOR SEE THE SUN DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ALSO REPORTED SLEEP DEPRIVATION, UNDRESSING IN FRONT OF FEMALE SOLDIERS, DESECRATION OF THE KORAN BY A DOG, BEATINGS, AND THREATS OF HARM FROM BARKING DOGS WHILE BLINDFOLDED.

4. ABD-AL-RAHMAN SAID THAT AFTER BEING TOLD OF HIS INNOCENCE BY AN INTERROGATOR, HE WAS FLOWN TO THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA AT THE END OF APRIL 2003. MORE ALLEGED ABUSE, POOR CONDITIONS, AND SCARCE FOOD FOLLOWED. UPON HIS RELEASE IN 2004, HE WAS FLOWN BY A U.S. MILITARY PLANE INTO AMMAN AND HELD BY JORDANIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS FOR 56 DAYS, FOLLOWED BY RELEASE UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

RED CROSS FAILED TO DELIVER LETTERS

5. ACCORDING TO ABD-AL-RAHMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC) DID NOT DELIVER ANY OF THE LETTERS THAT HE WROTE TO HIS FAMILY WHILE DETAINED. HE SAID THAT AN ICRC REP CAME TO HIS HOUSE AFTER HIS RELEASE, HANDED HIM THE LETTERS, AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT DELIVERING THEM TO HIS FAMILY.

COMMENT

6. GIVEN THE REVELATIONS OF ABUSES OF PRISONERS IN ABU GHREIB PRISON, ABD-AL-RAHMAN'S ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE IN U.S. CUSTODY IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO WILL BE WIDELY BELIEVED HERE.

7. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

VISIT EMBASSY AMMAN'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT

[HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/NEA/AMMAN/](http://www.state.gov/p/nea/AMMAN/)

OR ACCESS THE SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S SIPRNET HOME PAGE.

HALE

POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03291

POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03175

POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03186

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/27422

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 3 of 3

**** RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE ****

SECDEF V2		1
ACTION	(M)	
INFO JSAMS(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*)		
	TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED	1

#5893

NNNN

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/27423

July 14, 2004

TO: RDML Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Declassify Testimony

3134

Is there a way we can declassify Steve Cambone's testimony today to the Intel Committee and get a declassified version for broader use?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071404-13

.....
Please *respond* by _____

*File copy
attachment provided
to SD Sepur*

14 Jul 04

UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY

DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

THE CRITICAL NEED FOR INTERROGATION
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

UNCLASSIFIED
11-L-0559/OSD/27425

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY
DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

INTRODUCTION

(U) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for inviting me here today. I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the interrogation guidelines, training, and resources the Department of Defense provides its military forces. My remarks will focus on Department-level intelligence guidelines and policies, since that is the area over which I have cognizance. Mr. Feith and I are accompanied by Service and Command experts who can address your more specific questions.

VITAL IMPORTANCE OF INTERKOGATIONS

(U) Interrogation is a HUMINT collection technique employed to obtain reliable, timely information to support combat operations, military campaign plans,

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and national strategy. Interrogations have provided highly valuable information on individual terrorists, terrorist groups or networks, and terrorist plans. They have also been essential to the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. It is a fact that interrogations can yield information on terrorists that is unavailable from any other collection discipline.

(U) Detainee debriefs have had a major impact on our understanding of the terrorist threat since 9/11. In the case of al-Qaida, interrogations have provided highly valuable insights into its structure, target selection process, operational planning cycle, degree of cooperation between various groups, and the identities of key operational and logistical personnel. For example, interrogations at Guantanamo have yielded information on :

- Individuals connected to al-Qaida's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
- Front companies and accounts supporting al-Qaida and other terrorist operations;
- Surface-to-air missiles, improvised explosive devices, and tactics and training used by these terrorist groups;
- Explosives training, assembly, and distribution networks used by al-Qaida throughout Afghanistan;

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- Training of young adults for suicide bombing missions;
 - Potential travel routes to be used by terrorists to reach the United States;
 - Transnational funding operations;
 - Individuals suspected of money laundering for terrorist organizations;
- and
- Non-governmental organizations providing financial and material support to terrorist organizations.

(U) The intelligence we have obtained from detainee interrogations at Guantanamo Bay has expanded our understanding of jihadist selection, motivation, and training processes. This information has helped the US Government to disrupt active threat planning through the capture of operatives and the implementation of additional security measures.

(U) In Iraq interrogation has been employed to locate and capture Saddam Hussein, roll up his support and communications network, locate and then capture or kill insurgent leaders, pinpoint munitions stockpiles, and disrupt attacks. The loss of this source of information would have a significantly negative impact on our counterterrorism efforts, including our ability to warn of impending threats.

(U) LTG Boykin, VADM Jacoby, and LTG Alexander will provide specific examples of valuable information we have obtained from the interrogation of

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detainees when they testify later today.

INTERROGATION POLICY AND GUIDELINES

(U) Interrogations take place, broadly speaking, in two venues – on or near the battlefield or at detention facilities.

(U) On or near the battlefield or at transfer facilities, the primary goal is to obtain time-sensitive information which is immediately useable in helping to accomplish the supported unit's mission. There is a premium on gaining this information from a detainee as rapidly as possible after capture. If the information is not gained within the first 96 hours after capture, it is usually of limited value to an ongoing operation.

(U) Interrogations at detention centers (e.g., Guantanamo, Bagram, and Baghdad International Airport) can be conducted over longer periods of time. Detainees at these centers have either been sent to the rear from the battlefield or point of capture for continued interrogation, or assigned to a center from the time of capture. The primary goal is to extract information that might affect the broader military campaign or national strategy, although information of immediate use on the battlefield might be acquired. Interrogation plans at the centers are often more elaborate than those prepared for use at the front lines because the information is

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harder to extract. The disorienting effect of capture wears off; the detainee is more comfortable with his setting; he may have the support and assistance of other detainees in resisting interrogations; and, he has time and opportunity to hone the resistance techniques he may have learned in his training.

(U) Before providing a reprise of interrogation guidelines developed for Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq, I would like to make the following points:

- In each case the interrogation guidelines received a legal review by a command Staff Judge Advocate.
 - In the case of Guantanamo, the interrogation guidelines received two additional reviews at the DoD level.
- In each case, external reviews of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for interrogators were conducted with the aim of refining those TTPs and establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs) to improve the effectiveness of interrogations.
- In each case, the baseline for interrogation guidelines and practices was the Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52. It is important to understand that FM 34-52 does not describe the full universe of permitted TTPs. The FM states, the “approaches and techniques [listed] are not new nor [are they] all the possible or acceptable techniques.” Therefore, judgment is

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required in every case to determine whether proposed TTPs comply with applicable rules, regulations, standards, policies, and domestic and international law. That is why, as one reviews the guidelines for Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, one finds a range of opinion among interrogators, SJAs, and commanders about what is permitted, and a variation in the TTPs proposed and employed in each of the three cases.

(U) Guantanamo. With respect to the Geneva Convention and detained al-Qaida and Taliban supporters, the President directed on February 7, 2002 that:

[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

(U) From Guantanamo's establishment in early 2002, interrogators employed the standard techniques found in the FM 34-52.

(U) During the summer and fall of 2002, the United States was in a high-threat environment, and intelligence continued to indicate planning by al-Qaida for attacks in the United States and elsewhere. Among the detainees at Guantanamo were individuals thought to have close connections to al-Qaida planning figures.

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These detainees of high interest also demonstrated training in al-Qaida tactics to resist interrogation.

(U) On June 17, 2002, the acting SOUTHCOM Commander, Major General Speer, requested that the Joint Staff conduct an “external review of intelligence collection operations” at Guantanamo. The resulting report was delivered in September. It called for the adoption of a “rule of thumb” or “Rules of Engagement” for interrogation.

(U) Subsequently, the new SOUTHCOM Commander, General James T. Hill, received from Joint Task Force- 170 (charged with interrogations at Guantanamo) a proposed set of interrogation techniques, divided into three categories. GEN Hill was of the view, based on a review by the SJA for JTF- 170, that the Category I and II techniques were “legal and humane.” He requested, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a review and approval of the Category III techniques. This set of techniques had been proposed by JTF-170 for use on some detainees who had, according to Hill, “tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods.” What GEN Hill sought were “counter-resistant [*sic*] techniques that we can lawfully employ.”

(U) On November 27, 2002, the DoD General Counsel, after discussing the request with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for

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Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the Secretary of Defense “authorize the Commander of USSOUTHCOM to employ, in *[sic]* his discretion, only Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III (‘Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.’).”

(U) On December 2, 2002 the Secretary of Defense concurred in this recommendation. He did not approve for use from Category III the use of:

- Scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family;
- Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring);
- Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.

(U) These guidelines remained in effect until January 12, 2003, when the Secretary verbally suspended his December 2 decision, and then formally rescinded, on January 15, 2003, all Category II techniques and the one Category III technique he had approved.

(U) On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department’s General Counsel to establish a Working Group to assess the legal,

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policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogation of detainees held by the US military in the war on terrorism.

(U) The Working Group consisted of representatives of the Military Departments, Service general counsels, the Judge Advocates General of the armed forces, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of Justice advised the Working Group in its deliberations.

(U) Based on the Working Group's report, which was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 24 techniques for use at Guantanamo on April 16, 2003. Eighteen of these 24 techniques came from FM 34-52. Four of the 24 techniques required notification to the Secretary before they could be used. Two of these were in the FM 34-52: "incentive and removal" and "pride and ego down." Two additional techniques requiring notification were recommended: "Mutt and Jeff" and "isolation." The four other techniques not in FM-34-52 were "diet manipulation," "environment manipulation," "sleep adjustment," and "false flag." Any additional techniques GEN Hill might wish to employ other than those approved by the Secretary of Defense would require the Secretary's approval.

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(U) Of the six techniques approved, but not included in FM 34-52, five were on General Hill's original list – all from Category 11.

(U) Prior to the execution of US military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, USCENTCOM issued guidance directing the humane treatment of detainees. While detainees could be categorized as Enemy Prisoners of War or unlawful combatants, the requirement for humane treatment was a constant.

(U) Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, from the war's inception through the end of 2002, all forces employed FM 34-52. On January 21, 2003, the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS), on behalf of the Working Group referenced above, requested that CENTCOM provide information on the interrogation techniques it was using and had used, highlighting those it had found to be effective and those it desired to implement, with rationale included.

(U) On January 24, 2003, CJTF-180 prepared for forwarding to the Working Group, through the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate, its response to the DJS tasking. CJTF-180 listed all techniques currently being used, including some not explicitly listed in FM 34-52. CJTF-180 was aware that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded the techniques he had authorized for use at Guantanamo from

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December 2,2002 to January 15,2003.

(U) With respect to Special Operations in Afghanistan, SOF conducted interrogations in accordance with FM 34-52 in the beginning of 2003. Convinced that its interrogations were not yielding useful results, some SOF units conducted an external review of its interrogation TTPs in the fall of 2003. As part of its review, these elements were aware of the Secretary's December 2,2002 memo, and discussed with personnel at Guantanamo when and where information most useful to SOF might be collected. Psychologists were also consulted as part of this SOF review.

(U) The SOP it published in February 2003 focused on battlefield interrogation. It closely paralleled FM 34-52.

(U) The SJA for one of the SOCOM major subordinate commands, at the time a subordinate command for CENTCOM in Afghanistan, reviewed and recommended approval of these techniques. The Task Force Commander approved the techniques.

(U) Iraq. During July and August 2003, elements of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, which had previously served in Afghanistan, were sent to the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility to run interrogation operations. The warrant officer-in-charge prepared a draft interrogation guidelines based in part on a

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February 2003 SOF SOP. It is a near copy of the SOP created by SOF in Afghanistan. The SOF SOP in Iraq was used because members of the 519th knew of its existence and were looking for a point of departure in building an SOP for Abu Ghraib. On August 25, two SJAs from CJTF-7, an American and an Australian, reviewed the draft guidelines and recommended CJTF-7 approval.

(U) On August 31, 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller arrived in Iraq from Guantanamo. MG Miller had been tasked by the Joint Staff to send a team to Iraq to conduct an external review of interrogation policies and procedures, to include detention operations. MG Miller chose to lead the team, and he discovered that there were no official interrogation guidelines yet in place, he recommended that CJTF-7 formalize the draft interrogation counter-resistance guidelines that had been reviewed on August 25. CJTF-7 prepared such draft guidelines on September 10. It was put in a format similar to the April 16, 2003 guidance relative to Guantanamo. The draft underwent a second legal review by CJTF-7 and, with some modification, was signed on September 14, 2003 by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander. When LTG Sanchez promulgated the guidelines in theater, he stipulated that the use of certain techniques would require his personal approval. He emphasized that the Geneva Conventions on humane treatment continued to be applicable.

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(U) On September 14, 2003, LTG Sanchez also sent the new CJTF-7 interrogation policy to CENTCOM for review. At CENTCOM, the Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the policy and recommended the removal of some techniques.

(U) October 12, 2003, LTG Sanchez published revised counter-resistance guidelines. He granted authority to employ only techniques outlined in FM 34-52 with the exception of two techniques. He also required that any new techniques proposed, beyond those identified in the October 12 guidelines, would require approval. This policy remained in effect until it was modified on May 13, 2004.

(U) With respect to the SOF in Iraq, the Director of the Joint Staff inquired in June 2003 whether interrogation techniques in use in Afghanistan and Iraq by SOF were compliant with FM 34-52. A SOF SJA replied through the CENTCOM SJA that "the military interrogations at both BIAP [Baghdad International Airport] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in IAW FM 34-52 and SecDef direction."

LOOKING FORWARD

(U) As I stated before this committee on May 11th, there clearly was a breakdown in discipline by some at Abu Ghraib. However, nothing I have seen or heard thus far indicates that the source of that breakdown was the guidance on

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interrogation provided to SOUTHCOM or by CENTCOM.

(U) This is not to assert that individual interrogators may not have exceeded their authority. We await MG Fay's findings on this point. It is to say that in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, appropriate measures were taken to ensure that proper guidance, to include legal reviews, was provided to and within the chain of command. And, it is to say that nothing we have seen in the pictures from Abu Ghraib were in any way associated with a lawful interrogation.

(U) With respect to the abuses, the Department has initiated a number of efforts to determine what happened and why, and to hold those responsible accountable. These efforts include investigations concerning accountability of those within the chain of command, such as the Taguba report and the Fay, Formica, Jacoby, and Helmley investigations; investigations by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division and Inspector General; and, various unit-level investigations within the Commands to improve accountability, unit discipline, and standard operating procedures.

(U) In addition, the Secretary of Defense has:

- Appointed VADM Albert Church to conduct a comprehensive Detainee Operations and Interrogation Review.
- Set up a review panel under Secretary of the Navy Gordon England to

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accelerate the release of detainees at Guantanamo.

- Is taking steps to appoint an ombudsman for detainee matters within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- Is taking steps to establish a new office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to oversee detainee affairs.
- Named former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger as envoy to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Established the Schlesinger Panel to oversee all the Department's corrective actions.

(U) The Department has taken the following measures to improve its capacity to conduct interrogations and the interrogation process:

- As the Army transforms to a modular force structure, the number of enlisted interrogators and warrant officers will nearly triple in size, increasing from over 555 currently on hand to over 1500 by 2009.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plans to hire fluent linguists to serve as interrogator supervisors and to create deployable HUMINT assistance teams that will consist of interrogator supervisors, strategic debriefers, reports officers, and other HUMINT collectors. These teams

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will help reduce the impact of heightened OPTEMPO.

- As you know, we are engaged in remodeling Defense intelligence that encompasses a wide range of efforts to change the way we prepare for and conduct intelligence activities in the Department. As part of that effort, we intend to increase the foreign language proficiency of our HUMINT collectors, including interrogators. We have begun to do this by raising the standards of graduates from the Defense Foreign Language Institute from Level 2 proficiency to Level 3 (professional proficiency). These new standards will improve the performance of the language specialist corps throughout the force, including interrogators.
- DIA is currently coordinating its Interrogation Policy for DHS.
- Furthermore, I have engaged the Department's intelligence community on the question of a DoD-level set of guidelines for interrogation drawing on DIA's work.
- The Army proposed a joint review of doctrine regarding interrogations, prisoners of war, and security detainee operations. This will include a review of operations and oversight of confinement facilities. The goal is to clearly identify responsibilities among Military Intelligence, Military Police, and other agencies that conduct interrogations in a military theater

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of operations. The review is underway, under the lead of Major General Ronald Burgess, the Director, J-2, Joint Staff, with assistance from Joint Forces Command. The Department will act expeditiously on the recommendations that come out of this review.

- CENTCOM has taken a number of steps to streamline the chain of command at Abu Ghraib, unifying responsibility for detention operations, law enforcement, investigations, and disposition of criminal cases under MG Geoffrey Miller. It has also taken action to expedite detainee processing and upgrade detention facilities.
- CENTCOM has taken the following corrective steps in the area of intelligence and interrogation. It has:
 - Placed a General Officer on the Multi-National Force—Iraq staff to serve as Deputy Commander General—Detainee Operations. Made this officer responsible for all detention and interrogation operations;
 - Issued interrogation policies reinforcing the requirement to abide by the Geneva Conventions and required that all interrogations be conducted with command oversight;

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- Assigned a behavioral psychologist to provide support to interrogators;
 - Transferred responsibility for all HUMINT collection and analysis to the Multi-National Force—Iraq and increased that organization's manning level.
 - Established a weekly Inter-Service/Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts;
 - Established an intelligence fusion system that decreases the amount of time needed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information; and
 - Assigned **DIA** personnel to primary theater interrogation facilities to facilitate intelligence sharing between agencies.
- In Iraq, MG Geoffrey Miller is working to accelerate the release of those detainees who no longer pose a security threat, who do not possess valuable intelligence, and who will not be subject to criminal prosecution. Based on a review of each detainee's case, we have already been able to reduce the detainee population at Abu Ghraib by 50 percent – from approximately 5,000 on April 14, 2004, to 2,500 on June 7, 2004. By mid-July, the goal is to have the total detainee population in Iraq

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reduced to between 1,500 and 2,000. A similar process is underway at Guantanamo, where Secretary of the Navy England is leading an effort to review each detainee's case annually. We have released detainees when we concluded they did not pose a significant threat, but we must continue to detain those we think would launch new attacks if released.

CONCLUSION

(U) In conclusion, I would like to underscore the absolute necessity of maintaining an inherently robust interrogation capability within the Department of Defense: it is critical to protection of our forces and critical to fighting a meaningful war against terrorism. Too much is at stake to abandon an intelligence collection technique that often gives us the only useful intelligence we have on terrorist capabilities and intentions at both the tactical and strategic level. Nothing that took place at Abu Ghraib was in the context of lawful interrogation. Nor do I ascribe to the premise that a climate was created that condoned such behavior.

(U) The Department recognizes that grievous mistakes were made in the treatment of some detainees in Iraq. The abuses are being investigated, and the Department will take appropriate action. Meanwhile, the Services, DIA, and the

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Combatant Commands are reviewing detainee and interrogation policies and procedures; these will be updated and corrected where necessary. Service training curriculum is also being carefully examined. Our intent is to learn from mistakes that were made, ensure that they are not made again, and continue forward with a strengthened interrogation capability.

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~~FOUO~~

file

August 2, 2004

DAARMY

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet w/Army

I need a meeting with the Army. Don't tell them, but I want to talk about:

- Incentives for folks.
- The possibility of having some come home just marginally earlier than they expected.
- Morale.
- Managing the force well.
- The importance of leadership on the part of commanders.

I will need this note for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
073004-9

Please respond by 8/20/04

~~FOUO~~

*Sir,
meeting is
set for
4 Aug at 1100.
I've included Dr.
Chu. V/R Jim*

2 AUG 04

OSD 17333-04

2 August 2004

TO: SECDEF

FROM: VADM JIM STAVRIDIS

SUBJ: MEETING WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

1. Sir, we've set up a meeting on Wednesday with SecArmy, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and Dr. Chu.
2. As per your snowflake, I have not given them advance notice of topics. Director Army Staff called and said he thought the topics were force rotation and detainees. I was non-committal.
3. In your snowflake you mentioned a few topics. Here are my thoughts on each:
 - a. **Incentives.** Should push this hard. Army needs to be creative and leaning forward. This would solve much of the non-volunteer issue, I believe.
 - b. **Bringing units home marginally early.** Huge winner. Recommend pushing hard. If they can go down from 148 K to 120 K for weeks, why not use some of that time to bring folks home early, especially with holidays coming up?
 - c. **Morale.** They need to provide you with a sense of how the troops are doing on a regular basis, drawing on a wide variety of inputs. Senior enlisted advisor could be very helpful here.

- d. **Managing the force well.** Need to get “out of the shoebox.” Too many times you get the answer, “system doesn’t give us enough granularity.”
 - e. **Importance of leadership on part of commanders.** The basis of coming through this challenging period lies in this point. Insist on a sense of how the 0-5 / 0-6 level leadership is working through the issues – that’s where the officer impact “rubber meets the road.”
4. I recommend you also discuss “the rules” for deployments with them (attached), keying on their need to manage their way through challenges and not create surprises.
 5. This may be the first of several meetings. We’ll schedule appropriately after you go through these topics with them.

v/r
Jim



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

July 30, 2004, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Handwritten signature: D. C. Chen 37 July 04

SUBJECT: Force Deployment Rules for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM

The following summarizes for the deployment rules used to source active duty and reserve forces.

Active Component Forces

- Dwell Time: a minimum 1:1 ratio of deployed time (in support of any contingency operation) to home station time. Whenever possible, forces are chosen based upon longest dwell time.
- Forces assigned to other Combatant Commanders may be used if risk is acceptable.
- Units will deploy at required readiness levels.
 - Units with less than required readiness ratings may be used if required training can be accomplished, or the unit can be cross-leveled with appropriate personnel and equipment.
- Time in theater guidelines differ for each Service.
 - Army: Units (not soldiers) will serve one-year boots on the ground (BOG). BOG is defined as when the main body of the unit (not individuals) arrives in the OIF/OEF AOR (e.g., arrival in Kuwait). The Joint Staff has defined BOG as *"the window of time a unit (main body) physically arrives in theater until the window of time the unit physically departs the theater."*
 - Marine Corps: Marine units below Regimental/Group level deploy for seven months. Regimental/Group Headquarters and above deploy for twelve months. The Marines volunteer their OIF/OEF forces as a "surge" capability if the on-ground situation requires more forces.



- Air Force: The Air Force rotates personnel in accordance with its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle. Beginning September 2004, the baseline deployment will be 120 days in a 20-month cycle. Each Airman deploys only once during a cycle, although some stressed specialties will deploy longer, and in greater frequency. Some deployment rules have been modified at the unit level to increase volunteerism or provide stability in key missions, (e.g. senior personnel rotations in the Combined Air Operations Center are for 1 year).
- Navy: The Fleet Response Plan (FRP), calls for surge capability to meet global requirements while moving away from traditional scheduled/longer deployments. Currently, CNO deployment goals are 6 months portal to portal with 12 months in a non-deployed status.'
- Alternative sourcing is considered before re-deploying active forces in violation of above criteria or service guidelines. Options include:
 - Can COCOM handle the task with forces already in country, with a gap?
 - Can the in-country force be extended without violating "boots on ground" criteria?
 - Can host nation (Iraqi/Afghani) and coalition support be used?
 - Can the duty be outsourced and supported by a contractor?
 - Can similar specialties from other Services support the requirement?
 - Can other geographic Commanders' forces be used without undue risk?
- Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets are closely managed under the Global Military Force Policy to preserve their capability to respond to emerging crises. Before an asset is tasked above levels sustainable without significant adverse effects, Joint Staff asks:
 - Can another asset be substituted or lower-priority/exercises joint experiments be cancelled?
 - Can a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) minimize excessive deployments, while maintaining home-station training?
 - Can the asset support one AOR, but be quickly re-rolled into another AOR during a crisis?

Reserve Component Forces

- Activate Reserve component forces only after determining that it is both prudent and judicious to do so.
 - Voluntary duty - no restrictions on tour duration.
 - Involuntary duty - ,maximum of 24 cumulative months.
- Involuntarily recalling the Individual Ready Reserve only after considering Selected Reserve members & volunteers.

- Second or subsequent involuntary recalls – previous service (length & nature) is considered and the maximum break between tours is provided (1 in 6 planning factor considered).
- Maximize Predictability – mobilization orders to be provided in a timely manner (minimum of 30 days prior to active duty report date).
- Training when mobilized – members may not be mobilized solely for the purpose of training, but training related to the mobilization mission is permitted. (Legislative relief being requested).
- Members retained on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.
- Members taking leave prior to release from active duty are voluntarily retained to use accrued leave.

General Observations

- These rules evolved in response to changing needs since September 11, 2001. They are therefore likely to evolve further. The rules recognize that this is an all-volunteer force; equitable sharing of our burden is essential to retaining today's volunteers and attracting their future replacements.
- Upon your confirmation of these rules, we will publish the associated implementing guidance.

Decision

Schedule meeting to discuss _____ Proceed without further discussion _____

Prepared By: Paul Mayberry, (b)(6)

7/20

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file

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 1, 2004

2004 JUL -1 PM 3:02

7/20

J

SIR,
Options
below

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Captain Hopper

~~Larry Di Rita~~

7/20

Lynne Cheney tells me that this Captain Hopper is a star. If she is going to be around here sometime, we probably ought to meet her. You might want to think of whether there is anything you could do to acknowledge her.

Thanks.

Attach.
Mrs. Cheney photograph

DIIR dh
070104-31

— Do a letter
to her

— work to
bring her
in for
meeting.

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

7/22

I'd like to
meet her -
DR

7/14 -

SecDef -

Agree. FYI, attached
is an article we did
about her on the
DoD "Defend America"
Website. We will look
for other possibilities
to highlight/acknowledge her.
DR

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Captain Hopper
Good Housekeeping Women
in Good Award
First ~~female~~ African-American
woman to fly a fighter jet



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U.S. Air Force Capt. Christina Hopper

Pilot Wins Good Housekeeping Award

By Keith Pannell / 27th Fighter Wing Public Affairs

CANNON AIR FORCE BASE, N.M., June 30, 2004 — An unwavering faith, a good clean life and a sparkling career — not necessarily a clean house — earned a 524th Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon pilot here a Good Housekeeping award.

Capt. Christina Hopper was presented Good Housekeeping magazine's Woman in Government Award for 2003 recently and will be featured in the magazine's July edition.

The award is given to a woman who "has made a significant contribution toward the advancement of women in government."

Hopper was nominated by base officials here.

"I got a call from the editor at Good Housekeeping telling me I won the grand prize," the captain said. "I couldn't believe I had been selected. I literally trembled for about a half hour after I hung up. Then, I called my family and my squadron commander to let them know."

Hopper's husband, Capt. Aaron Hopper an F-15 pilot in the 522nd Fighter Squadron, said he is happy for his wife.

"I am extremely happy for her," he said. "It's a tremendous honor for her to have been selected out of such a qualified pool of nominees. I think the attention she has received will prove to be very beneficial for the Air Force by encouraging women and ethnic minorities to pursue their dreams in the military, especially if that includes flying fighters."

Attention is something he said his wife has not asked for, but has certainly gotten.

In the last year, she has been interviewed by reporters on international news channels and from international magazines. Hopper said she has spoken with Oprah Winfrey and has done countless local interviews.

"Christina never set out to gain recognition or special attention, but many people have been encouraged by the opportunities she has been given by both God and the Air Force," said her husband.



Air Force Capt. Christina Hopper poses for a photo at Cannon Air Force Base. Good Housekeeping magazine's Woman in Government award will be featured in the magazine's July edition. Hopper is a pilot and a member of the 524th Fighter Squadron. Photo by Keith Pannell.

She said the biggest stressor is the constant her husband because of demands by their different squadrons.

"We are often separated by temporary duty on opposite flying schedules," he said. "But our faith is a blessing and gives both of us strength to focus on our work."

The fighter pilot duo is to be separated again for an instructor pilot assignment at Luke Air Force Base.

The Good Housekeeping grand prize also came with \$10,000.

"We plan to give a portion of the money to the squadron," she said. "I know about the rest yet."

Hopper was deployed with her squadron in Iraq during the war in Iraq started. She and the other squadron members bombed targets the second day of the war.

"The desert experience was unforgettable," she said. "I look back on that experience with a deep sense of gratitude. I'm grateful to God, who gave me the opportunity to serve my country and such a life-changing and world-changing experience."

She said she also credits the men in the squadron for what she needed to know to stay alive in Iraq. "I have enough faith in her to do the job well."

"Christina Hopper is an all-around great character," Col. Jeffrey Slambaugh, the 27th Fighter Wing commander, said. "She performed magnificently in and firm in her faith, and she's a fitness role model. She's simply a wonderfully talented and hard-working great character."

[More Profiles](#)

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11-L-0559/OSD/27454

Hopper said she does not see her faith as a part of her life, rather as the central point in her life. Her call sign, "Thumper," is not a play on her last name, but a shortened form of "Bible Thumper."

 [Email A Copy](#)

"I believe every blessing, including this Good Housekeeping award, is a gift from (God)," she said. "My faith gives me the consistent ability to cope with all kinds of stressors."

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11-L-0559/OSD/27455

August 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

461

I am thinking of sending the Thomas Schelling foreword to the following people:

Fran Townsend, Tom Ridge, John Ashcroft, Condi Rice, Rich Armitage, Bodman,
the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Mueller, and Bellinger.

Please let me know if you think there is anyone else who should get it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Cover memo, Schelling foreword

DHR.dh
073004-5



Please respond by _____

2 Aug 04

August 2, 2004

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

This is a worthwhile read on the subject we have been discussing.

Thanks.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book, *Pearl Harbor***

DHR:dh
073004-11

11-L-0559/OSD/27457

FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were ~~so~~ busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it **was** an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States; assuming the decision on **war**, the attack hardly appears reckless. There **is** a tendency in **our** planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what **is** improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible ~~mistake—one~~ we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

Mrs. Wohlstetter's book is a unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is at pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found us, it can only remind us how likely it is that we are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on a few vivid and oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, as Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" who count are also responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is a genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

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Leland Stanford Junior University

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98 97 96 95 94 93 92

Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/27460

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
July 15, 2004

2004 JUL -15 PM 3:09

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO Response Force in Afghanistan

We need to keep pushing in NATO on this issue of getting the NATO Response Force (NRF) to go into Afghanistan for the election. In doing so, we have to make sure we don't allow the French to paint the NRF into a corner so that the NRF could only be used in a crisis. That was never the intention.

Please get from NATO the resolution that passed NATO to create the NRF. I want to see if the word "crisis" was used.

If we cannot get the NRF into Afghanistan, then I think we ought to have a force generation in NATO. If that doesn't work, we ought to get a coalition of the willing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
070104-17

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

Handwritten vertical text on right margin

Handwritten vertical text on right margin

SECRET
July 1, 2004
2004 1007 -1 FM 3: 07

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

Attached is a memo I sent to Condi Rice. Why don't you screw your head into it and get the Deputies going.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/25/04 SD memo to Rice: "Kurds and Sunnis" [062504-2 (ts computer)]

DHR:dh
070104-16

.....
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOUO~~

June 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

I think we need to have a briefing to the PC that tees up a proposal as to how the Iraqis are going to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Sunnis in terms of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from the Kurds, and the Kurds now want back.

It is a serious point of friction, and there are those who think it could lead to a major conflict as early as August. It merits our attention. The flash points could come soon, so I would think we would want to get a briefing in the next two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062504-2 (ts computer).doc

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/27463

4

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR.dh
071904-7

.....

Please respond by 7/30/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17341-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27464

file

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

825

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR:dh
071904-7

.....
Please respond by 7/30/04

*2x LTG Benno SUTC
on 9/5 Aug*

CHAIRMAN'S ACTION ASSIGNMENT

Reviewed by B. [Signature] Date

Assigned Action to								
SJS/CPCB	<u>SJS/ACB</u>				Protocol			
LA	LC				Speechwriter			
Aides	JHO				NG/RA			
PA	Other <u>105</u>							
Action								
J	1	2	3	4	<u>5</u>	6	7	8
CJCS Reply			<u>See CJCS Note</u>			Info Only		
Scan & File/Note & File			Direct Reply			Appropriate Action		
Condolence			BSA/GSA			Translation		
Recommendations:								
Forward to:					Purple note:			
Amplifying information <i>This is OBE Work #171A</i> Personal friend/salutation is: <i>to get off snowflake</i> Comments: <i>Det. S/D is well aware of the way ahead on Afghan Security</i>								
Enclose w/letter								
Photo			Bio			CJCS Book		
Autographed Card			CJCS Functions Sheet					
Other								
Gifts(s) Received								
SUSPENSE:						CONTROL #		

JS Form 12, Feb 01 (EG)

11-L-0559/OSD/27466

ROUTING COVER SHEET

CASEY

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	DATE RECEIVED 08/02/2004	ACTION NUMBER 04-04044/01
---------------------------------------	------------------------------------	-------------------------------------

SUBJECT
/SF-825/ AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

CJCS REPLY

CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BRANCH FOR DISPATCH OR FILING. **THIS FORM SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM ATTACHED DOCUMENT.**

TO	NAME	INITIAL	COMMENTS
	CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS		<p>AUG 4</p> <p>CJCS HAS SEEN</p> <p>AUG 04 2004</p> <p><i>This GORE works w/ m & # got off snowflake list. SDG well aware of the way ahead on Afghan security.</i></p>
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	ASSISTANT TO THE CJCS		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
	ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR NG		
	ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR RM		
	SPECIAL ASSISTANTS		
	LEGAL COUNSEL		
	LEGISLATIVE ASST		
	PROTOCOL		
	JOINT HISTORY OFFICE		
	PUBLIC AFFAIRS		
3	DIRECTOR, JT STAFF		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
2	VICE DIRECTOR, JT STAFF		
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT		
1	SECRETARY, JT STAFF		
	CHIEF, ACTIONS DIVISION		
	RETURN TO ADM SUPPORT BR		

CLASSIFICATION **UNCLASSIFIED**

June 14, 2004

808

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. John Abizaid
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

7/15
J

I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan security situation.

One option should include using our clout to get the militias to turn in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military.

Here is a report on Afghan capabilities.

Thanks.

Les
Atsadh.

NIC Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 2004-04HC, June 2004

(Distributed separately)

DHR:uh
061404-12

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

Sir,
Response attached.
vr / CDR Nosenro
7/15

T-8/1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/27468

OSD 10492-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1933-04

JUL 15 AM 10:41 15 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/14*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

- **Issue.** "I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan Security Situation. One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ^{take} their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military. ..."
- **Conclusion**
 - My staff is working closely with General Abizaid to develop a framework for Afghanistan security forces, similar to the one now being developed for Iraq. This framework will address concerns regarding the security situation and provide a way ahead for Afghanistan forces.
 - As the Iraq framework piece nears completion, work is beginning in earnest on a similar framework for Afghanistan.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

Sir - This is the Metrics Work / Exit Strategy briefs from Gen Casey. Gen Borno will be in shortly with the Afghan version. vlr jim

TSA SD	
SRMA SD	
MA SD	N 7/15
EXEC SEC	SL 7.15.04

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

COL Doxey

18 June 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/27470

Tab B

77
~~FOUO~~

July 29, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Analysis of Alternatives

Please take a look at this letter from Senator McCain and come up with three or four alternatives as to what we might do about the fact that he is challenging RAND's ability to do this.

Please try to do it fast and get it to me by tomorrow.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/28/04 McCain Letter

DHR:dh
072904-3

.....

Please respond by 7/30/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17342-04

JUL. 28. 2004

7/29

0066 7/29

JOHN MCCAIN
ARIZONA
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

SIR,

- Latest from Sen McCain
- Concerned about AOA
- Wants independent group, not RAND/Project AF, to do it. DSD for action.

P. 2/6

SELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0303
(b)(6)

50 SOUTH RURAL ROAD
SUITE B-130
TEMPE, AZ 85282
(b)(6)

2400 EAST ANTONIA
BILTMORE CIRCLE
SUITE 1150
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(b)(6)

3 WEST PAVED REDONDO
TUCSON, AZ 85701
(b)(6)

PHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED
(b)(6)

VIA FAC

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary
Department of Defense
The Pentagon 3E880
Washington, DC 20301-3010

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am concerned about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the Tanker Lease Proposal will be conducted. In particular, I am concerned about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA, and the involvement of the Air Force's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)—RAND, which I understand is spearheading this effort.

The conduct of Air Force leadership regarding the Tanker Lease Proposal has been unacceptable. Frankly, its credibility on the recapitalization of the tanker fleet has been fundamentally called into question. Notably, many of the problems that the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD-OIG) found in the Tanker Lease Proposal are similar to those it recently found in the multibillion dollar C-130J procurement program. Bases for my concern about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA include, but are not limited to, the following.

First, the Air Force has provided Congress inaccurate information in an attempt to justify its original proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767As. For example, Air Force Secretary Jim Roche has repeatedly advised Congress that, in the existing KC-135 fleet, "corrosion is significant, pervasive, and represents an unacceptable risk." Secretary Roche has also emphasized to Congress increased operating costs in the current fleet as a basis for entering into the tanker lease. Air Force leadership has indicated that these elements create an "urgent" need to recapitalize the fleet. However, as you of course know, the DSB task force concluded that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. As such, the task force also concluded that "[t]here is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a replacement program prior to the completion of the AoA and the MCS." Thus, the task

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11-L-0559/OSD/27472

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
July 28, 2004
Page 2 of 5

forcejettisoned the “dominant reason” Secretary Roche first cited in his July 10, 2003, report to Congress as the basis for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing tankers than they would for buying them. The Air Force’s representations on this issue remains a matter of continuing investigative concern.¹

In another example, to comply with the original authorizing statute, the Air Force misrepresented to Congress that its proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767 tankers was merely an operating lease. This would have obviated the requirement that the White House obtain advance budgeted authority for the whole lease proposal. But, the DoD-OIG and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), as well as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the procurement of these tankers is, in fact, a lease-purchase. In addition, facts surrounding the Original lease proposal made it clear that the transaction was a lease-purchase: under the original proposal, the Air Force conceded that the DoD is “committed to earmark[ing] an additional \$2B in FY08 and FY09 for the purchase of aircraft covered by the multi-year program under the terms of the proposed contract” to head off a funding spike over the Future-Years Defense Program

Second, the DoD-OIG and the NDU concluded that the Air Force’s commercial item procurement strategy “prevented any visibility into Boeing’s costs and required the Air Force to use a fixed-price type contract ... The strategy also exempted [Boeing] from the requirement to submit cost or pricing data. The strategy places the Department at high risk for paying excessive prices and precludes good fiduciary responsibility for DoD funds.” The NDU similarly concluded that “[i]n a sole source, monopoly commercial environment, the government is not served well with limited price data” and suggested that the Air Force neglected its fiduciary/stewardship responsibilities.

Notably, the DoD-OIG arrived at similar conclusions regarding the Air Force’s mismanagement of the C-130J procurement program. In particular, the DoD-OIG found that, because the C-130J was improperly acquired as a commercial item, the Air Force did not have contractor-certified information on contract prices, costs, or profits, and therefore was “limited” in its ability to protect the Government against possible overpricing.

¹My concerns about whether the stated reason for the lease was pretext is in part based on an e-mail among senior Boeing executives, dated September 18, 2001. This e-mail describes a meeting between Boeing and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Marvin Sambur, during which “[Sambur] indicated that the USAF is desperately looking for the rationale for why the USAF should pursue the 767 Tanker NOW. The briefing his staff had put together on the Economic Service Life Study did not meet his needs ... Sambur is looking for the compelling reason the administration should do this now rather than push off to a future administration.” E-mails of this sort underscore the Committee’s need for the documents it requested from the DoD and the Air Force on July 2, and September 11, 2003.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

July 28, 2004

Page 3 of 5

Third, the DoD-OIG and the NDU also concluded that the operational requirements document (ORD) for tankers was not tailored, as it should have been, to the requirements of the warfighter, but rather to closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A. The DoD-OIG found that senior Air Force staff directed that the ORD closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A that was being developed for a foreign government, in anticipation of the authorizing legislation. This is particularly troubling where, according to an internal Boeing document regarding the ORD, Boeing planned to "[e]stablish clearly defined requirements in ORD for the USAF Tanker configuration that results in an affordable solution that meets the USAF mission needs and will prevent an AOA from being conducted." Under the current proposal, the first 100 tankers produced will not be capable of, among other things, interoperability with Navy, Marine, or coalition assets, or simultaneously refueling more than one receiver aircraft. Rear Adm. Mark P. Fitzgerald, USN, recently suggested that in theater, such a limitation restricts the Navy's long-range striking capability and fosters a needlessly risky aerial refueling environment.

Notably, with respect to the C-130J procurement program, the DoD-OIG similarly found that, while the Air Force conditionally paid Lockheed Martin about \$2.6 billion, the C-130J is not operationally suitable or effective and cannot perform its intended mission. Furthermore, to date, 36 deficiency reports that "could cause death, severe injury or illness, major loss of equipment or systems, or that could directly restrict combat or operational readiness" have been received.

Finally, Boeing documents suggest that the Air Force allowed Boeing to modify the requirements in the ORD while it was being developed. These documents also reflect that the Air Force induced the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) into approving and validating the corrupted ORD by falsely representing that it was not tailored to a specific aircraft. This is of continuing investigative interest to the Committee.

Interestingly, as a result of the commercial specifications of the C-130J not meeting user needs, the Air Force (and Marine Corp) decided to "revise its requirements document" to reduce the initial capabilities required and to satisfy operational requirement deficiencies through block upgrade programs at the Government expense. I am very concerned about this.

I understand that RAND (the Air Force's FFRDC), and Project Air Force in particular, is spearheading the AoA. Generally, the Air Force, specifically Dr. Sambur, is "the overall sponsor" for Project Air Force activities. However, having argued against the need for an AoA as early as November 2002, according to a recently produced internal DoD e-mail, Dr. Sambur has apparently prejudged its outcome:

A formal AoA will cost money, delay the program two years, and still come up with the same answer we have today. There are only a few aircraft that can serve as tankers, they are already in production, and so analyzing their respective capabilities and costs won't take long—in fact, it's already been done and the results passed to OSD. What's left to study?

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 July 28, 2004
 Page 4 of 5

As I originally indicated in my letter of March 12, 2004, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley similarly touted the Air Force's proposal to lease and 'buy' Boeing 767s during recent budget hearings. In particular, General Moseley provided "opinion" testimony suggesting that the KC-767 tanker is the Air Force's only viable option. For example, in testimony before the Projection Force Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, General Moseley specifically rejected re-engining remaining KC-135Es (as the DSB task force recommended); modifying used aircraft (for example, DC-10s, also as the DSB task force suggested); using contractor support services (as the GAO recently opined), and other options that your office's AoA guidance specifically required the Air Force to examine. While General Moseley attempted to explain away his testimony as "personal opinion," at no time was he asked to provide his personal opinion and at no time during his testimony did General Moseley indicate that he was conveying a personal opinion. Considering General Moseley's role as the chairman of the Air Force Steering Group for Project Air Force and, respectfully, despite your assurances in your March 17, 2004, Letter, I remain concerned that the Air Force and RAND have effectively prejudged the outcome of the AoA regarding the Tanker Lease Proposal.

Several recently produced internal DoD e-mails call into question whether the ongoing AoA will be conducted objectively. For example, in an e-mail, dated August 15, 2003, from Secretary Roche to Dr. Sambur and Acting Undersecretary Wynne, Secretary Roche dissuaded the OSD and Air Force staff from initiating an AoA. In this e-mail, Secretary Roche said the following:

Agggggg, stop the nonsense! Don't even begin to start an unnecessary AoA at this point. All this would do is give the enemies of the lease an excuse from DoD to delay the lease, and really honk off the Appropriators. Let's see what comes out of conference, damn it! If the lease is approved then we can talk about how to decide on the recapitalization of the other 400 airplanes, but there is no rush here.

Soon thereafter, Acting Secretary Wynne responded, "I agree with Jim, [sic] What started this flurry of activity? I'd hate for our story to change." The foregoing does not inspire confidence that the current AoA will be conducted properly.

My concern that RAND, in particular, may have prejudged the outcome of the AoA is underscored by its conclusion regarding tanker recapitalization in a recent report. In a December 2003 report entitled "Investigating Optimal Replacement of Aging Air Force Systems," RAND, in particular Project Air Force, found—without the benefit of an AoA—that "it appears to be optimal to replace the KC-135 by the end of the decade." Apparently relying on Air Force data and analysis that was ultimately rejected by the DSB task force, this conclusion comes unacceptably close to prejudging the outcome of the AoA and is inconsistent with the conclusions of the Air Force's own Economic Service Life Study; the GAO; and, most recently, the DSB task force, all of which found that the current fleet is viable through 2040. In light of the relationship between the RAND and the Air Force, as described above, there can be no assurance that RAND will conduct the AoA here with the desired independence.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
July 28, 2004
Page 5 of 5

My concerns appear to be reflected in a recently released internal DoD e-mail from Eric Coulter, Deputy Director for Theater Assessments and Planning at Program, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to Nancy Spruill, co-chairperson of the Leasing Review Panel Working Group, dated August 7, 2003:


I do not support RAND as the sole source or lead to conduct the Congressionally-directed independent tanker AoA. First, its [sic] said that it takes Congress to direct the Department to do something it should do on its own. We've been trying to get the AF to conduct an AoA for several years, but could never get AT&L's support to direct one. The AF clearly wanted to postpone it for as long as possible to delay the issue of recapitalizing the fleet. Now the Department is playing catch up. That said, [the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)] has more experience to conduct this type of effort. In fact, [Air Mobility Command] relies on IDA to do a lot of its mobility analyses both for airlift and tankers. I believe the Department will get a better, more objective product than we would from RAND. I hope we're not letting IDA's cost review of the tanker lease color our opinion. Please convince me otherwise.

I am also concerned about the fact that Project Air Force may have received as much as \$50 million for FY03 and FY04 and is expected to get at least another \$25 million for FY05. This financial relationship between the Air Force and RAND renders RAND unsuitable for conducting the AoA on this multibillion dollar procurement proposal.

Given the foregoing, I respectfully suggest that the Air Force not enter into an agreement to procure aerial refueling aircraft until an entity independent of the Air Force—on the basis of a study not funded directly or indirectly by the Air Force—completes the AoA.

As always, I appreciate your consideration.

Sincerely,



John McCain
Chairman

file

SECRET
July 1, 2004
2004 0701 -1 01 3:07

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Op-ed

7/20
J

Larry Di Rita
7/20

OC...

I got a note from John Howard asking if he should submit his articles, such as the attached one, to *Stars and Stripes*. If you think so, you should tell him. If not, just forget it.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/26/04 Howard letter and op-ed piece

DHR:dh
070104-14



Please respond by *7/9/04*

DR 7/22

Sir,
Reply attached.
v/r,
LtCol Lengyel
7/20

DB 7/22

FROM: Larry Di Rita
TO: SecDef
cc: Allison Barber
DATE: July 13, 2004
SUBJECT: Op-Ed

Stars & Stripes is always looking for thoughtful and thought-provoking pieces like this. I will have Allison Barber make contact with him so that he knows how to submit his articles. We'll encourage him to do so.

July 15,2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

c c : Larry Di Rita, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Op-Ed Submission to *Stars and Stripes*

- Dr. John Howard will be submitting his articles to *Stars and Stripes*.

11-L-0559/OSD/27479

THE HOWARD CENTER
FOR FAMILY, RELIGION & SOCIETY



934 North Main Street
Rockford, Illinois 61103

phone: (b)(6)

fax: (b)(6)

email: hwdctr@profam.org

DR. JOHN A. HOWARD

Senior Fellow

26 June 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Don:

"Democracy in Arabia" is something you will want to read if you haven't seen it.

Owen Roberts' Position Paper is a privately subscribed circulation piece, but I have his permission to send it to you. The marked Churchill quote on page 2 is powerfully apropos.

I also ~~enclose~~ enclose the just finished text of the next in our series of op/ed pieces. Is this something I should submit to Stars and Stripes? If so, how?

The warmest good wishes

John

DRAFT

Date

Editor
Address
City, State Zip

Dear Editor:

In his biography of John F. Kennedy, Ralph Martin notes that when James Reston asked the new President what vision he had for the future, Kennedy replied that he hadn't had time to think about it. The intensity of modern presidential campaigns is so great that the news media like the candidates tend to be engrossed in today's issues, seldom finding time to consider larger matters such as what personal qualities make for wise and capable leadership.

Here is an essay about presidential leadership you are welcome to publish or distribute.

Sincerely,

Lawrence D. Jacobs
Vice President

LDJ/cg

LEADERSHIP RECONSIDERED

by Dr. John A. Howard
Senior Fellow, The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society
Rockford, Illinois

Following the death of Ronald Reagan there was a spontaneous truce in the continuous media barrage of angry criticism hurled at President Bush and his Administration. For a week the news was dominated by fond memories and praise of another president. Although it was a time of mourning, the relief from the rancor of the political campaign, combined with the numerous stories of Ronald Reagan's courage, optimism, kindness and good humor made it a welcome period of national amity, and, for many, of renewed pride in their country.

There is an eternal human hunger for leaders who proclaim and champion ideals, who embody the principles undergirding those ideals, and who provide hope and inspiration to the people. During the two decades prior to the Reagan election, the sour cynicism about, and criticism of, America that prevailed in the media, academia and the entertainment industry cast a pall over patriotism and other idealistic sentiments. It became a modern **Dark** Age which James Reston in 1969, perceived as "a new pessimism," Arthur Burns as "a loss of faith in our institutions," and Archibald MacLeish, as "an anesthesia of the soul."

Suddenly America had a leader who reversed the engines. As Margaret Thatcher said: "Others prophesied the decline of the West; he inspired America and its allies with renewed faith in its mission of freedom. Others saw only limits to growth; he transformed a stagnant economy into an engine of opportunity. His politics had a

freshness and optimism that won converts from every class and nation – and ultimately from the very heart of the evil empire.”

One startling aspect of that freshness was the fact that he did not seek the presidency for fame or power or personal advancement. As he said in his speech to the nation when leaving office, “I never meant to go into politics . . . but I was raised to believe you had to pay your way for the blessings bestowed on you. I was happy with my career in the entertainment world, but I ultimately went into politics because I wanted to protect something precious.” Serving his country was a natural and genuine motive and gave him the freedom to follow whatever course he judged best for the nation. Self-seeking moneyed pressure groups had no claim on him.

The something precious he wanted to protect was, naturally, the first point he made in his Farewell Speech. He spoke of an incident involving the Midway aircraft carrier in the China Sea: They spotted a small craft filled with “Boat People,” trying to escape from Communist tyranny. As the launch from the Midway brought them back to the Carrier, a refugee shouted to a seaman way up on the deck, “Hello, American sailor. Hello, Freedom Man.” What more poignant illustration could there be to illustrate the preciousness of freedom to all human beings?

The religious up-bringing which instilled in him the duty to be of service to the community also taught him to serve and love other people. Vice President Cheney in his eulogy stated, “If Ronald Reagan ever uttered a cynical, or cruel, or selfish word, the moment went unrecorded.” President Bush said, “Ronald Reagan carried himself, even in the most powerful office, with a decency and attention to small kindnesses that

define a good life. He was a courtly, gentle and considerate man, never known to slight or embarrass others.”

Ronald Reagan reawakened in our nation an appreciation of the depth and beneficent power of the basic ideals of our free society and labored to help other nations adopt and benefit from them.

A politician he was not. A gifted and admirable leader he was.



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OWEN J. ROBERTS
CHAIRMAN AND CEO

AREA CODE (b)(6)

John - 3 May 2004
Thank you for all the good
you do in this world and for
sharing your magnificent
writings with us. Uweh and Susan

John A. Howard

CFC® Position Paper

THE LONDON BLITZ, 1940
and
WORLD TERRORISM, 2004

Owen J. Roberts

3 May 2004

July 28, 2004

383.6

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Use of Helicopters w/Detainees

Someone raised a question as to whether or not anyone who was at GTMO or anywhere else was taken up in a helicopter and threatened to be thrown out as a way to scare them.

I had never heard that before. I had heard it about Vietnam, but I had never heard it about the global war on terror. Please have someone check into that and see if anyone knows anything about it. If so, we better do whatever is appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
072804-13

.....
Please respond by _____

28 Jul 04



720

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488

IN REPLY REFER TO:

J00
4 Oct 04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Improvements to Jointness – Response to Singapore Snowflake

1. I have reviewed Lin Wells' summary of Singapore's military transformational efforts and appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on improving "jointness" within this context. I will specifically address the areas of Joint command and control, where I can speak from experience.
2. Singapore's emphasis on integrated command and control and warfighting experimentation are key enablers to jointness. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is working closely with the Services and Defense Agencies to develop fully integrated command and control capabilities. Further, we continue to reach out to our multinational partners to draw them into our exercise and experimentation programs. In fact, I personally extended an offer to Singapore's CNO to assign a liaison officer to JFCOM.
3. Singapore's decision to designate a "Future Systems Architect" and "fence" a portion of their budget for experimentation and future systems architecture development is noteworthy. In a similar vein, JFCOM's oversight of Joint Battle Management Command and Control is crucial to ensuring the relevance of this system-of-systems approach to our joint operational commanders. As we look to the future of Joint command and control, the key to success will depend on effective joint oversight and adequate resources. The use of the Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap, signed by myself and Mike Wynne on 26 May 2004, as a directive document to guide Service and Agency acquisition efforts is a key element of JFCOM oversight per Management Initiative Decision (MID 912), signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 7 January 2003. This roadmap is my "proposal" for Joint command and control in DoD.

V/R

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

OSD 17354-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27487

OCT 19 2004

72

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu
 CC: Gem Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
 SUBJECT: **Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers**

I'd like some hard data - within the next week - telling me precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve that have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 102004-5

326

.....
 Please respond by 10/29/04

USD	PDUSD
NA	HA
FI	Readiness
MPP	CPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 17356-04

20 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27488



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND
 READINESS

November 1, 2004 - 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

David S. C. Chu IN 2004

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers

2004 NOV - 1 11 41 AM
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- You asked for hard data telling you precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve who have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.
- Our official database for the Reserve components reflects that 1,796,347 individuals were members of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) from FY99 through FY04. Average annual SelRes strength over that 6 year time frame has been about 875,000.
- Of these almost 1.8 million individuals shown to have served in the SelRes since FY99, the following is a breakdown of those who have served once or more in support of contingency operations over the last six years. This includes operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and current operations - ONE/OEF/OIF.

326

One Time	Two Times	Three Times (or more)	Total
334,078	53,478	8,822	396,378
18.60%	2.98%	0.49%	22.07%

1 Nov 04

- The percent of members who have been called-up multiple times is about 3.5% of the members who were reflected to be in the SelRes Population from FY99 - FY04.
- Looking at just the current SelRes population of 860,764, about 327,900 - or -38% - have been called-up for operations ONE/OEF/OIF over the past 3 years.

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P) (b)(6)

20 Oct 04



OSD 17356-04

OCT 19 2004

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu
 CC: Gen Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
 SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve Call-Up Numbers

I'd like some hard data - within the *next* week - telling me precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve that have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
 102004-5

.....
 Please respond by 10/29/04

USD	PDUSD
NA	HA
PI	Readiness
MPP	GPP
PLANS	MC&FP
CCO	

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 17356-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27490

November 1, 2004

TO: Jay Garner

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads **up** on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

DIR:dh
110104-7

373 24

1 Nov 04

OSD 17361-04



72
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 1, 2004-11:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

David S. C. Chu
(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: Guideposts For Boards — SNOWFLAKE (Attached)

- The Secretaries of the Military Departments issue guideposts to the promotion boards in the form of written instructions:
 - Army- "Give special attention to officers who can conceptualize, chart strategies, and formulate policies as opposed to merely organizing solutions to problems."
 - Navy- "The Navy needs bold officers who are willing to think creatively, take well-calculated risks, develop new ideas, and maximize capabilities through sound management practices."
 - Marine Corps- "A critical goal of the Marine Corps is to encourage -- to demand -- innovation and efficiency to ensure that we retain an adaptive, flexible, and effective naval force able to anticipate events and win across the spectrum of conflict."
 - Air Force- "To support this effort, the Air Force needs leaders who can be the intellectual compass for the institution -- leaders who don't just do, but who can conceptualize what needs to be done."
- But we can also encourage innovation and boldness through other avenues, on which I will report shortly.
- Ultimately, the issue is whether those mechanisms actually produce the results you want--a subject for further thought.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Herbert,

(b)(6)

OSD 17374-04



11-L-0559/OSD/27492

28

SEP 29 2004

September 28,2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

Should there be certain precepts or guideposts for boards that select flag officers?
Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-10

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

OSD 17374-04

SEP 29 2004

September 28, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

Should there be certain precepts or guideposts for boards that select flag officers?
Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-10

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

2.0 (5-2004)

28 Sep 04

1/2
D930

72
~~1000~~

October 29, 2004
2004 NOV -2 11:11:11

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Dutch Issue

Colin Powell called. He said the Dutch are locking themselves into pulling their troops out in March. He said the Defense Minister Kamp apparently has the lead role in their Coalition politics on this subject.

Apparently they have 1450 people there and he has said publicly that they will not be extended past mid-March, 2005. The White House and State are trying to walk the Dutch back.

What should we be doing? Should I be calling Kamp and finding out? I had not heard this. Please get your folks to find out what's going on. We should get ahead of the curve on this stuff, as I've been asking.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102904-28

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 17431-04

11-L-~~0559~~/OSD/27495

120

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

CJCS HAS SEEN

OCT 19 2004

OCT 15 2004

2004 10 19 - 3 01 59 20
SECRET

ITALY

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Italy's Offer

We ought to make sure we follow up with Italy on their offer to train and equip in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-37

.....
Please respond by 10/24/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

150CT04

OSD 17555-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27496



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3045 PENTAGON

CH-2161-04
3 November 2004

JAN

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

- **Issue.** "Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** One C-130 load of plastic sheeting and one C-130 load of Government of Japan (GOJ)-provided relief supplies were delivered on 28 October.
- Four additional C-130 loads of GOJ-provided supplies were planned; however, the second sortie satisfied the relief requirement.
- **Discussion.** Department of State requested DOD humanitarian support to the victims of the 23 October earthquakes in the Niigata Prefecture (130 nm NNW of Tokyo). Assistance is being provided on a non-reimbursable basis.
- Japanese Foreign Ministry conveyed a request for the US Government (USG) to provide and airlift one C-130 load of plastic sheeting for use as temporary shelter for approximately 100,000 displaced citizens and support five C-130 loads of GOJ-furnished relief supplies.
- The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved this action via OSD Executive Secretary memorandum on 27 October.
- The US Embassy has worked closely with the GOJ to provide additional assistance. No other requests for assistance remain. Relief supplies available to US Forces Japan include:
 - Blankets, tents, bedding, generators, potable water and Meals Ready to Eat.
 - A standard tent camp for 1500 persons.

3 NOV 04

27 OCT 04

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DSD 17581-04

- A SEABEE Detachment, a Marine Engineer Battalion (on Okinawa) and Air Force Prime Beef Engineer Units.
- These additional assets can be available on short notice.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize a positive response to future GOJ requests for assistance related to the current Niigata earthquake situation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :
As stated

Reference:

- 1 OSD Executive Secretary memorandum, OSD 17017-04, 27 October 2004, "Approval of State Request for DoD Assistance to Japan Earthquake Victims"

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3 (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27498

2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/27499

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

10/27

2004 OCT -3 PM 5: October 27, 2004

Hor!

J-3

N28

TO: Gen Dick Myers
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
 10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:sr
 102704-1



Please respond by 10/28/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27500

OSD 17581-04

OK 10/26

From: Baker, Howard H (Tokyo)
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY** RUMSFELD
FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD **BAKER**

Importance: High

Dear Don:

I am sure that you are well aware of the earthquake that shook the Niigata area of Japan last Saturday and of the devastation that it caused. Several dozen people were killed, over 100,000 are out of their homes, roads and other infrastructure have been badly damaged. There has been a very strong aftershock just this morning, adding to the existing damage and further complicating efforts to return the affected area to normal.

We have been working here with the Japanese Government on ways in which the USG might respond to this disaster. I have turned over a check for \$50,000 as a start. State and DoD are now working out details of a plan to authorize providing badly needed materials such as plastic sheeting. U.S. Forces Japan is ready and willing to support this effort.

I hope that you will give this issue your personal attention. It goes without saying that this humanitarian mission must be accomplished swiftly in order to be effective and beneficial to the affected people in Niigata Prefecture. I greatly appreciate your support.

Sincerely,
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27501

~~FOUO~~
TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY

10/27

2004 NOV -3 FILE # 25
October 27, 2004

Hor!

3-3

N 28

Japan

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

Let's see what **we** can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from **Howard** Baker and get back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:as
102704-1

.....
Please respond by 10/28/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 17581-04

2006107

11-L-0559/OSD/27502

04/14

From: Baker, Howard H(Tokyo)
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY RUMSFELD**
FROM **AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER**

Importance: High

Dear Don:

I am sure that you are well aware of the earthquake that shook the Niigata area of Japan last Saturday and of the devastation that it caused. Several dozen people were killed, over 100,000 are out of their homes, roads and other infrastructure have been badly damaged. There has been a very strong aftershock just this morning, adding to the existing damage and further complicating efforts to return the affected area to normal.

We have been working here with the Japanese Government on ways in which the USG might respond to this disaster. I have turned over a check for \$50,000 as a start. State and DoD are now working out details of a plan to authorize providing badly needed materials such as plastic sheeting. U.S. Forces Japan is ready and willing to support this effort.

I hope that you will give this issue your personal attention. It *goes* without saying that this humanitarian mission **must** be accomplished swiftly in order to be effective and beneficial to the affected people in Niigata Prefecture. I greatly appreciate your support.

Sincerely,
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/27503

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/27504

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
 CC: Doug Feith
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: **Jim Jones Organization**

2004 FOM - 3 FRI 9 27
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

EUCOM

Should the **Jim Jones organization** be reorganized? **My** impression is it should be.
 The **world has** changed, **NATO** has changed.

Please have some **folks look** at it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR ss
 092804-17

.....
 Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

29Sep04

~~FOUO~~

November 4, 2004

TO: Dina Powell

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Air Force Appointees

020

I've been informed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche, and Under Secretary Pete Teets that they, as well as the other PAS appointees in the Air Force, with the exception of Michael Dominguez, are planning to step aside sometime after the election.

DHR:ss
110104-36

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17606-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27506

4 NOV 04

NOV 04 2004

TO: Dina Powell
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable H. Card, Jr.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Turbulence in Key Positions

020

Attached is a memo on the subject of turbulence in key Presidential Appointment positions. As you know, DoD has had a vacancy rate of about 20-25% throughout the past four years.

- The FBI clearance process has been sluggish
- The ethics clearance process has been sluggish
- The Senate confirmation process has been damaging, with some Presidential nominees being held up without a vote for as long as a year and a half.

The attached paper addresses the facts surrounding the corruption to which Darlene Druyun has now confessed.

Quite beyond the Air Force is the fact that the Secretary of the Army position has been vacant 18 months, because of the refusal of the Senate to confirm a nominee. And, it is the Secretary of the Army that is the Executive Agent for detainees and, I should add, therefore for Abu Ghraib.

Something has to be done to fix this process. There is only a modest veneer of civilian control in the Department of Defense. With an average 20-25% vacancy rate in the 48 Presidential-appointed Senate-confirmed positions, a President's grip on the Executive Branch is even thinner. DoD is responsible for more than three million people, including the active force, the reserve components, civilians and contractors, and a budget of more than \$400 billion.

Operating at a 20-25% vacancy rate during a war is unacceptable. This process needs be fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/1/04 Druyun memo

DHR:dh
110104-30

OSD 17607-04

honey

2 November 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process. The question is: "How could such major corruption happen, over such a long period, without those serving above and around her seeing her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- Druyun served as the "civilian" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air Force for Acquisition for ten years.
- During the ten years of Druyun's service, the position of her immediate superior, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, was vacant for four of those ten years. As a result, for those four years Druyun was the senior civilian in the Air Force acquisition system and in charge of the day-to-day activities of all Air Force acquisition. In the six years that there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary, daily oversight of Druyun's activities was spotty, since there were four Assistant Secretaries who moved in and out of the post as her superior, for an average tenure of roughly 18 months.
- In addition to Druyun's post, there is also a "military" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-year tenure, there were four "military" Deputies moving in and out of office. But, these three-star general officers were not involved in contracting. It is notable that, under Title 10 U.S.C., even today only a senior civilian can make major acquisition decisions. Military officers, no matter how senior, cannot do so. Therefore, by virtue of her position as the senior Air Force acquisition civilian, all procurement information passed through and was controlled by her.
- To further add to the turbulence in Air Force acquisition, during her ten-year tenure, there were five Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of the U.S. Air Force. And, there were four different Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide oversight of Air Force acquisition organization and processes. The rapid turnover reduced continuity of adult supervision.
- However, within twelve months of the current Air Force Secretary being confirmed, and within seven months of having an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition confirmed, the Air Force acquisition organization

and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of the organizational power Druyun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel

Tele: (b)(6)

Fax:

October 26, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 33880
1300 Defense Highway
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. ~~Secretary~~ Secretary:

For openers, permit me again to reiterate the pleasure and uplifting that your fine (if brief) visit to Annapolis several months ago provided the Governor and all the rest of us. Even from a great wrestler (now more than a half-century ago), it was special. All the members of my office join me in our gratitude, prominently displaying our photo with you.

Your distinguished career of honor and persistence in devoted service to our beloved country will retain all of its outstanding character, whatever the future holds.

On an item of governmental as well as personal privilege, Clarence Watson "Watty" Wheelwright was a close, also under-age carousing friend of mine, who joined the Air Force to defend our country when the Korean War began. As gunner on a B-26 bomber, AIC Wheelwright went down with his aircraft on a bombing run over North Korea on May 31, 1952. There were no survivors. Since then his sister Martha and brother-in-law have tirelessly worked with U.S. officials to recover his remains. The exact site has been pinpointed.

Most recently, Martha Wheelwright Galleher was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04


11-L-0559/OSD/27510

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and Martha Wheelwright Galleher's personal appreciation to them.

My file reflects that Watty Wheelwright's identifier is Tasker Number **2003015143** (AIC Clarence W. Wheelwright). As you know far better than I, the USG has been negotiating with North Korea for nine years, with North Korea approving only three areas for search. It is my impression that Watty's remains are in or within walking distance of one of those sites. It is not clear to me whether a specific request as to the precise site, or a further general request, is now appropriate. Whatever, your departmental colleagues have been processing my inquiry, and anything you can do personally to assist would also be greatly welcomed. Governor Ehrlich, Mary Beth Carozza, Tom Hance, and all the other members of this office join me in forwarding our genuine appreciation.

Finally, please give my very best to Joyce, with congratulations on all her efforts, most particularly in trying to keep you, Nedgar, Debbie, and the other New Triers in line.

As ever,



JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office (for forwarding)
Ms. Martha Wheelwright Galleher
Mr. Redmond C.S. Finney

11-L-0559/OSD/27511

630

~~1000~~

file

November 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter from Jervis Finney

Paul Butler
12/13

Korea (North)

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Jerve Finney. He works with Governor Bob Ehrlich. You will see Finney's name at the top, on the letterhead. He is a very close friend - please see what you can do about this and update me.

Thanks.

Attach.
 10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
 110804-5

.....
 Please respond by 12/5/04

To SecDef
From Paul Butler

12/13/04

DR 12/14

Attached is a letter from Jerry Jennings -
 OASD/POW-MIA to Mr. Finney responding to his
 letter about locating the remains of his friend
 Watty Wheelwright (there is a team scheduled to investigate
 the relevant crash site in N. Korea in July 2005)

8 Nov 04

I also spoke with Mr. Finney to make sure the
 letter answered his questions. He said it did and
 passed on his support and regards. I gave him my
 phone number if he needed ~~any~~ follow-up.

11-L-0559/OSD/27512

SP:
176084374

11/8
1630

~~FOUO~~

November 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Jervis Finney

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Thanks.

Attach.
10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
110804-5



Please respond by 12/5/04

Done
Paul Butler
1/11

~~FOUO~~



STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

2004 OCT 26 10:31 AM

DU 11/8

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel

Tele: (b)(6)
Fax: [Redacted]

October 26, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 33880
1300 Defense Highway
Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

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Most recently, Martha Wheelwright Galleher was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27514

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and Martha Wheelwright Galleher's personal appreciation to them.

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Finally, please give my very best to Joyce, with congratulations on all her efforts, most particularly in trying to keep you, Nedgar, Debbie, and the other New Triers in line.

As ever,

J. Hance

JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office
Ms. Martha Wheelwright Galleher
Mr. Redmond C.S. Finney

*Sir -
This has been
tasked to Policy.* 11/4

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/27515



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
 SECURITY AFFAIRS

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

KOJ EA (NORTH)

Mr. Jervis S. Finney
 Chief Legal Counsel
 Office of the Governor
 Shaw House, Room 201
 21 State Circle
 Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mr. Finney:

This is in response to **your** inquiry to Secretary Rumsfeld concerning your friend Airman First Class Clarence Wheelwright who was lost during the Korean War. As the Department of Defense office responsible for accounting for Americans missing from **our** Nation's wars, we are pleased to provide the following information.

We are not certain that we have pinpointed the exact location of Airman Wheelwright's crash site or burial location. The Russian document that provides us with our most detailed information on the shoot down states: "A search group established that on 31 May 1952 at 2300 hours a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region on a southwesterly course and crashed near the village An-Khari 20 meters **from** the railway bed. The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day."

We believe that "An-Khari" is probably the Russian transliteration of the present village Anha-ri by general area and presence of the **main** rail line. A possible complication is that even if the village name is correct, it is possible that the village may have moved. North Koreans often relocate villages due to construction or reclamation. Secondly, there is no mention of the crew's burial location. So while we are fortunate to have this documentation, we are far from having an exact location to excavate.

Unfortunately, the North Korean government imposes significant restrictions on **our** access to their country. Therefore, **our** ability to investigate this crash site depends on the North Korean government allowing our teams access to the area. In any case, we do wish to investigate this site, as well as other aircraft crash sites in the vicinity. The arrangement we concluded last month with the North Koreans provides for a Korean People's Army (KPA) pre-investigative period in March and a joint investigation period in July 2005. Prior to starting joint field activities in North Korea in 2005, we intend to propose that our teams investigate this crash site and others during the joint investigative period in July.

(26 007 04)



R 17608-04

11-L-0559/OSD/27516

We appreciate **your** concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey **to Mrs. Gallaher** that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation **and** making every effort possible to account for her brother **and** his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jerry D. Jennings". The signature is stylized with large, flowing letters and a prominent flourish at the end.

Jerry D. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

KOREA (MIA/27H)

Mr. Jervis S. Finney
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of the Governor
Shaw House, Room 201
21 State Circle
Annapolis, MD 21401

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(26 DEC 04)



11-L-0559/OSD/27518

R 17608.04

We appreciate your concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey to Mrs. Gallaher that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation and making every effort possible to account for her brother and his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. D. Jennings". The signature is stylized with large, sweeping letters and a long horizontal flourish extending to the left.

Jerry D. Jennings
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs

November 4, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

IRAQ

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.
11/1/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
110404-7

4 NOV 04

OSD 17639-04

Iraqi Security Forces Update

1 November 2004


Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only


<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">–Police–Civil Intervention Force–Emergency Response–Border Enforcement–Highway Patrol–Dignitary Protection	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 63,844
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none">–Army–National Guard–Intervention Force–Special Operations–Air Force–Coastal Defense Force	<u>Trained & Equipped</u> 50,941 <hr/> 114,785

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003=
0 Iraqi Security
Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27523

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only




Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Regular Iraqi Police (1)	135,000	22%	46%	59%	71%	71%
Special Police Regiments	1,200	0%	50%	75%	100%	100%
Public Order Battalions	3,600	0%	67%	100%	100%	100%
Emergency Response Unit	270	0%	85%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Highway Patrol (2)	6,300	0%	To Be Determined	To Be Determined	To Be Determined	To Be Determined
Bur. of Dignitary Protection	500	96%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Special Police Commando Battalions	2,019	45%	75%	85%	100%	100%
Dept of Border Enforcement (3)	32,000	57%	62%	60%	71%	87%

Notes

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27524

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection




For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

Security Force Element	Current Targeted End State	1 NOV 04	1 FEB 05	1 MAY 05	1 AUG 05	1 JAN 06
Iraqi Regular Army	27,000	44%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Intervention Force	6,584	67%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi National Guard	61,904	66%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Commando Battallon	1,516	58%	67%	100%	100%	100%
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force	451		40%	58%	76%	100%

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

Legend	
	70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
	40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
	39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

11-L-0559/OSD/27525

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

MNF-I = 32 Countries									
Albania	74	El Salvador	380	Korea	2,803	Norway	9	Tonga	63
Australia	375	Estonia	48	Latvia	133	Poland	2,452	Ukraine	1,595
Armenia	0	Georgia	162	Lithuania	87	Portugal	129	United Kingdom	7,862
Azerbaijan	150	Hungary	276	Macedonia	33	Romania	745	US	131,376
Bulgaria	444	Italy	3,131	Moldova	11	Singapore	0		
Czech Rep	98	Japan	792	Mongolia	132	Slovakia	103		
Denmark	426	Kazakhstan	30	Netherlands	1,473	Thailand	0	Total	155,392

IRAQI FORCES ON HAND	177,931
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	87,248
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	166
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	484
HIGHWAY PATROL	925
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	20,039
ARMY	12,654
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,916
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	669
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING	137,459
IRAQI POLICE SERVICE	48,906
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	1,196
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	166
BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION	388
HIGHWAY PATROL	555
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS	2,019
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	18,375
ARMY	12,654
NAT'L GUARD	44,873
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,916
SPECIAL OPS FORCES	669
AIR FORCE	206
COASTAL DEFENSE	536

Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia, Singapore & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service
73,992

NATO Training Team = 41



Iraqi Forces On Hand MNF-I



Trained Iraqi Forces MNF-I

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27526

- NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq (NTIM-I) became NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) when the Activation Order was published.
- Prime Minister Allawi will address the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 5 November.
- NATO Force Generation Conference scheduled 8-9 November in Mons, Belgium to seek fulfillment of NTM-I force requirements.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27527

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Back Up

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27528

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	ON DUTY	TRAINED & EQUIPPED	TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05	100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	135,000	87,248	43,439	52,800	JUL '06
CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,920	1,196	0	3,120	JUL '05
EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	166	91	270	MAY '05
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	32,000	20,039	18,375	19,889	AUG '06
HIGHWAY PATROL*	6,300	925	555	TBD	TBD
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500	484	484	500	DEC '04
SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS	2,019	2,019	900	2,019	JAN '05
TOTAL	176,209	112,077	63,844	79,153	AUG '06

* On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol Authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27529

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	AUTHORIZED	LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽¹⁾	FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ⁽²⁾	31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS)	100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
ARMY	27,000	3,887	620	10,915 / 10,915	JUL '05
NATIONAL GUARD	61,904	43,445	0	45,000 / 0	SEP '05
INTERVENTION FORCE	6,584	0	1,816	1794 / 4,790	MAY '05
SPECIAL OPS	1,967	597	0	0 / 725	SEP '05
AIR FORCE	502	167	0	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
COASTAL DEFENSE	582	409	0	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT	TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT
TOTAL	98,539	48,505	2,436	57,709 / 16,430	MAR '06

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is manned, trained, and equipped to prescribed standards and has capability to plan and conduct independent operations at company level. Battalion headquarters capable of commanding and controlling battalion operations.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27530

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

COMPONENT	TRAINING	NUMBER IN TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	3 Week TIP Training	400
	8 Week Academy	5,476
	Specialized Training	170
Civil Intervention Force	6 Week Specialized Training	1,196
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training	75
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy Specialized Training	0
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training	0 NA (Prior Service IPS)
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Special Forces	96
Special Police Commando Battalions	4 Weeks Basic Training 1-3 Weeks Advanced Training	750
Iraq Regular Army	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 4 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	7,367
Iraqi National Guard	Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks	2,013
Iraqi Intervention Force	Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks	5,287
Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force	Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat	72
Air Force	Varies by specialty: 1-6 months	39
Coastal Defense Force	Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)	0
TOTAL		22,941

Data as of

11-L-0559/OSD/27531

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

Unit	Mission
Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security
Civil Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.
Special Police Commando Bns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.
Emergency Response Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.
Department of Border Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods
Highway Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.
Regular Army	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.
National Guard	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security
Intervention Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order
Commando Battalion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion
Counter-Terrorist Task Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function
Air Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities
Coastal Defense Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/27532

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Man:

- Intimidation attacks are impacting Iraqi Security Forces' effectiveness and retention in Anbar Province and several other locations in the Sunni areas, though there remain no shortage of recruits for the military or police.

Train:

- Began training for 96 Bureau of Dignitary Protection students in VIP Personal Security and Motor Escort Operations, and graduated 38 students from a VIP Site Security course.
- Graduated 545 Department of Border Enforcement students on 28 October from four-week courses in Customs, Immigration, and Border Police Operations at the Jordan Academy.
- Graduated 282 law enforcement students from five specialized policing courses at Adnan Training Facility on 28 October (Basic Criminal Investigation, Organized Crime Investigation, Iraqi Police Service Training Staff Development, and two courses in Election Security Management).
- Began the Provincial SWAT training program at the Baghdad International Airport Training Facility with 22 students from the Baghdad Region.
- 1st Battalion and the Basic Training battalion completed basic training courses; MNC-I units provided security escort for soldiers to reduce chances of ambush as the soldiers embarked on leave.

Equip:

- Issued 100 weapons, 100 vehicles to Iraqi Police Service.
- Issued 550 AK 47s, 2445 Body Armor sets, 100k rounds of 7.62 X 39 ammunition, 10,000 desert boots, and 3,095 kevlar helmets to Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Issued 645 9mm Pistols to Iraqi National Guard.
- Received inbound air shipment of 2,529 AK47s, 50 PKMs and 264 RPKs for Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Airlifted 1,371 sets of body armor to Mosul for delivery to Iraqi Regular Army units at Al Kasik.

Significant Events Since Last Report

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Build:

- Intimidation has caused delays in construction at Al Kasik Military Base in Ninewa Province that may delay generation of the 3rd Division's final brigade; workarounds being pursued.
- Awarded contracts for Basrah Military Airfield Project and Iraqi Air Force C-130 Base at Baghdad International Airport on 29 Oct 04.
- MNSTC-I has committed over \$412 million of \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. MNSTC-I is ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter.

Mentor/Employ:

- 1st Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force; 3rd Brigade (-), Regular Army; 36th Commando Battalion; Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force; 3rd Police Commando Battalion; and the Police Emergency Response Unit are preparing for operations.
- 1st Police Commando Battalion commenced successful operation in Mosul; companies from 2nd Police Commando Battalion continue good operations in North Babil and Samarra.
- Ministry of Interior conducted a communications exercise on 25 October with the National Joint Ops Center using all available systems in rehearsal for Iraqi voter registration security requirements.
- CG CPATT met with the Ministry of Interior Deputy Minister for Iraqi Police Service on 26 October to discuss plans to expand the Special Police Commando force structure by at least three more battalions (to six) and, possibly, substantially more.