

information ownership, we are working to streamline the flow of combat information to assure broader and faster dissemination of actionable intelligence. At the individual level, finally, there is no substitute for experiential learning. Some of the best lessons learned are associated with honest, even tragic mistakes. We can not allow a zero defects mentality to write off such learners too early, and we should review our leader evaluation systems to ensure they are leader development tools and not mere management sorting tools.

The Army **has** always prized leader development, and in an era dominated by peace would take risk to facilitate it. An emphasis on career-broadening experiences, however, makes less sense in an environment where most commanders will employ their units in combat. The Army does not exist to broaden careers, and units are not training aides for a commander. Effective collective training requires the participation of the entire team. Especially in an environment requiring more multi-functional junior leaders, we must avoid too rapid a turnover of those leaders in the name of career development.

The problem is somewhat less acute for middle- and senior-grade officers, among whom some degree of specialization is unavoidable. Even in their case, however, the increasing complexity, uncertainty, and political sensitivity associated with joint and expeditionary operations urges some measure of stabilization in assignments that inherently involve interpreting complex requirements and implementing sophisticated solutions. This completes a trend already begun in recent changes to officer management.

At the individual level, Army leader development will be subordinate to mission requirements; so too at the institutional level it will be subordinate to joint requirements. If we are to create a culture that

"I'd just like to tell you right up front and declare I am a joint officer, who happens to be in the Army, who happens to be the Chief of Staff of the Army right now."

**Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker**

empowers our leaders to think beyond their own service for creative solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must be fully joint, incorporating joint education and experience. We must build a bench of leaders able think creatively at all levels of war, leaders able to operate comfortably in joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environments. And if achieving that requires submitting our internal educational institutions to joint oversight, we should not shrink from it.

## **Doctrine and Materiel**

**Doctrine.** The Army rightfully views itself as "doctrine-based." In the 1970s and 1980s, doctrine was the engine that transformed the post-Vietnam Army into the victor of our post-Cold War engagements. That doctrine, however, reflected the strategic environment of its time, particularly a singular, mirror-image adversary. Although the challenges of

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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developing doctrine for an expeditionary Army with a joint mindset and campaign qualities are very different, they are no less essential.

In any era, doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It encapsulates a much larger body of knowledge and experience, providing an authoritative statement about how military forces do business and a common lexicon with which to describe it. As it has evolved since the end of Cold War, Army doctrine portrays military operations as a seamless and dynamic combination of offense, defense, stability and support. Our challenge now is to extend it to address asymmetric opponents.

To deal with such opponents, doctrine must reflect an operational philosophy that takes the uncertainties associated with asymmetry fully into account. Uncertainty is in some measure inseparable from the nature of warfare. Asymmetry merely increases it. Doctrine can't predict the precise nature and form of asymmetric engagements, but it can forecast the kinds of knowledge and organizational qualities necessary to cope with an asymmetric operational environment.

|  |
|--|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Asymmetry and Adaptation</b></p> <p><b>Strategic:</b><br/>"This is a game of wits and will. You've got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive."<br/>Army Chief of Staff<br/>General Peter J. Schoomaker</p> <p><b>Operational:</b><br/>"The enemy is evolving. He's getting a bit more lethal, a little more complex ..."<br/>Joint Task Force 7, Iraq<br/>LTG Ricardo Sanchez</p> <p><b>Tactical:</b><br/>"This is the way you take down Samarra - at night. You can either lockstep and not change with the enemy, or you can evolve to keep him off balance."<br/>Commander, 5-20 In, after night raid<br/>LTC Karl Reed</p> |
|--|

A doctrine geared to uncertainty cannot prescribe solutions. Instead, it must furnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose unexpected requirements, and a menu of practical options founded in experience from which leaders can create their own solutions quickly and effectively. Its underlying philosophy must be initiative and creative thinking. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap. The U.S. military has an immense array of capabilities that are worthless unless both their prerequisites and limitations are understood. Doctrine can help frame those prerequisites and limitations in context. It cannot prescribe how they should be accommodated in any given case. Instead, the purpose of doctrine in a contest with asymmetry is to underwrite flexible thought and action and thereby assure the most creative exploitation of our own asymmetric advantages.

Most important in today's environment, doctrine must acknowledge the adaptive nature of a thinking, willful opponent and avoid both prediction and prescription. It isn't the part of doctrine to predict how an adversary will behave. Rather, its function is to enable us recognize that behavior, understand its vulnerabilities and our own, and suggest ways of exploiting the former and diminishing the latter. It will be useful only to the extent that experience confirms it, and its continuous review and amendment therefore is essential.

Such review would be necessary in any case to assure Army doctrine remains consistent with and imbedded in joint doctrine and that our operations thus remain coherently joint.

**Materiel.** Materiel development is a special challenge for an Army at War, because we must not only meet pressing current needs, but also anticipate and address future ones. Both share one common first priority: Equipping the individual Soldier. Since war began, the Army has shifted more than a billion dollars to improved body armor, up-armored vehicles, and other essential equipment for the Soldiers who are kicking down doors every day. In the past,

the best individual equipment was reserved for units most likely to engage first. In an expeditionary environment, it is

“Every soldier in theater will have it (Interceptor Body Armor). That wasn't the requirement when we went there. It was intended only for the front-line soldiers that we thought would be in the closest contact with the enemy. But with attacks rampant on convoys and checkpoints, the decision was made to equip all soldiers.”  
Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee

impossible to forecast which those will be. Every deployed Soldier needs the best individual equipment available.

In an expeditionary environment, we can no longer continue to treat equipment as permanently owned by the units to which it is assigned. In a rotation-based force, equipment ownership will be the exception. We will increasingly divorce Soldiers from their carriers and equipment, tailoring the materiel mix for the mission at hand. We currently are reorganizing Army Prepositioned Stocks to reflect an Army Regional Flotilla concept that will expedite our ability to deploy and fight on arrival. As brigade combat teams modernize and transform, they will take advantage of their position in the unit rotation cycle to re-equip through unit set fielding.

With respect to weapon systems, the challenge of reconciling current with future needs is tougher. An Army at War exhausts its current set of equipment ever faster, while future development needs are unabated. Many systems are promising -- we have barely tapped the potential of UAVs. Aviation systems will need particular attention if they are to remain a key tool of maneuver, with better C2 connectivity, extended operational reach, and all-weather capability. Being most amenable to adaptability, speed, and flexibility, aviation assets will be key to an expeditionary force.

Still more vital is the continued development of more rapidly deployable fighting platforms. The Future Combat System remains the material centerpiece of the Army's commitment to become more expeditionary, and it is well on its way to addressing the challenge of reconciling deployability with sustainable combat power. But even if FCS meets all expectations, we will remain a hybrid force for the foreseeable future, and we must seek ways to improve the deployability of the platforms we already own.

Moreover, although we are confident of the general direction of the FCS program, we are not as confident of its priorities. Originally conceived as an 18+1 “system of systems” (18 systems plus the connecting network), we increasingly appreciate that it is actually

*Working Draft: An Army at War -- A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset*  
2/9/2004 6:48 AM

“1+18”, for if the network fails, FCS will not reach its potential. Limitations in communications bandwidth at corps level and below, particularly in an expeditionary environment, remain our single most serious deficiency. To repair it, the Army together with the Joint community must relentlessly address the architectures, protocols, and systems of a redundant, non-terrestrial network capable of providing the focused bandwidth necessary to support mobile Battle Command and joint Blue Force tracking.

Until now, the Army has pursued a dual approach to networking, one business-oriented (Army Knowledge Management) and the other operational (LandWarNet). We now need to bring these approaches together, because for an Army at War, still more a rotational Army, units in the field are inseparable from the installations that train, mobilize, deploy and support them.

Installations are part of the sustaining base once units deploy – power projection platforms from which they mobilize, deploy, fight and sustain. Routine use as reach-back platforms will profoundly alter the way we manage installations, and unit rotation and home basing will change them even more. In an expeditionary environment the metrics for effective installation will increasingly be measured in access to the internet as much as access to railheads, airheads and seaports. Their potential to facilitate habitual joint training will be another important criterion. Facilities will be increasingly modular and reconfigurable to accommodate the one certainty of future installation requirements: change.

## **Constant Conflict—Constant Change**

The Army always has changed and always will. But as the default condition shifts from peace to conflict, we must change the way we change.

**Current and Future.** In peacetime, armies tend to change deliberately and gradually -- and for good reason. Land warfare is immensely complex. The vast array of capabilities, skills, techniques and organizations on which it depends is a recipe for chaos without careful analysis to assure interoperability, synchronization, and synergy. The second and third order effects of a change in any part of this mechanism are difficult to forecast, and the consequences of misjudgment can be immense.

Peacetime also tends to sacrifice effectiveness to economy and interdependence to the inevitable institutional competition for budgets and programs. Institutional energies tend to focus on preserving force structure and budget “programs of record.” Resource risk is allocated evenly across all budget years and all programs – including forces in the field.

But we are an Army at War. Our current force is totally engaged, and in a way not perfectly forecast. Our near term demands are urgent, and the need to accelerate capabilities that can feasibly be made available in the near term necessarily outweighs protection of the “program of record.” Resource risk must be redirected to where it will do the least damage to our fighting soldiers.


To be sure, this urgency does not excuse us from the obligation to prepare for the future, for the continuation of this conflict as well as others we can only hypothesize. But it does significantly blur the usual dichotomy between the current and future force. We must be willing to risk the integrity of a future force program if necessary to ensure we win the fight today. And we must assure the lessons learned from today's fight are applied to future force programs, even if that means altering their direction and timing. The integrating mechanism of the simultaneous consideration of the current and the future must pervade our change processes.

It must also pervade our institution. Change will not be restricted to our operating forces. The institutional Army confronts equally dramatic change in organizations and processes. The same soldiers and leaders who adapt, learn, and innovate on our battlefields also serve in our institutional Army. Success on the battlefield must be matched by successful change in our internal institutions. Such change already is apparent in the expansion and retailoring of our combat training centers, establishment of the Future Center in Training and Doctrine Command, reformulation of the Army Campaign Plan, and a wide range of consolidation and reorganization initiatives in Army Materiel Command.

**Interdependencies.** Earlier we noted that our future is irrevocably joint. Interdependence is central to both the expeditionary mindset and campaign quality we seek. Achieving it is first a *conceptual* challenge, for all capabilities — not only in materiel but also doctrine, organization, and so on — spring from operational concepts. Joint operational concepts are emerging, and the Army has participated actively with its

sister services in their creation, articulation, wargaming, and experimentation. The collaborative development of joint concepts allows Army concept development to be nested in a coherently joint context. That context embodies five key joint and expeditionary interdependencies:

**- Joint Battle Command.** The flexible supported-to-supporting relationships first attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom will demand interdependent command and control driven by top-down, comprehensive architectures and redundant, interoperable networks. Joint protocols and standards will enable effective joint fires, blue force tracking, and logistic support for effective anticipation and reaction in an expeditionary context. Army contributions to Joint Forces Command's Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) Transformation Roadmap will be essential to integrate the Army's LandWarNet, the Air Force's C2 Constellation, and the Navy's ForceNet.



**- Joint Fires.** Interdependence of joint fires will be vital to mitigating risk and reducing reliance on organic fires in a joint expeditionary environment. Linked through an effective joint command and control system, the American Soldier has the entire target acquisition and engagement resources of the theater at his fingertips. All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as "universal observers" or "joint effects control teams." To facilitate more effective employment of close air support in a non-contiguous battlespace, we need universal standards for observation, designation and target acquisition. The Air Force has demonstrated increasing flexibility in recent operations and has committed to a general officer-led Joint Force Air Component Command element at every Army corps exercise. Both the Army and the Air Force still have concerns, the Army for responsiveness and reliability, the Air Force for control and training demands. Their resolution will require cooperative adjustments by both services.

| Air Force Sorties Redirected After Launch |
|---|
| Operation Desert Storm : 20%              |
| Operation Enduring Freedom: 43%           |
| Operation Iraqi Freedom: 80%              |

**- Joint Lift.** The Army's dependence on its sister services is nowhere more obvious than in the area of mobility, both strategic and operational. We cannot wish away the laws of physics, but neither must we surrender to them. The solution of the Army's mobility challenges will require action by both the Army and its partners. For its part, the Army must continue to improve its inherent deployability. This remains the focus of major development programs such as Stryker, the Future Combat System, and numerous

complementary systems, all of which are being designed to satisfy the space and weight limitations of the C-130. It also is a major objective of our tactical unit redesign. For their part, our sister services must recognize strategic and operational lift as critical service competencies. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in a future conflict in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. To overcome that challenge, we will need the ability through vertical envelopment to bypass those defended areas with forces of operational significance, forces with the mobility, lethality, and survivability to maneuver to and defeat these integrated point defenses. Current intra-theater lift assets have neither the range nor the payload to support that. Future lift assets will require both. We also share the Marine Corps' interest in the feasibility of deploying from a Sea Base. The Army supports the Sea Base Joint Requirements Office and looks forward to a cooperative effort to address the intra-theater lift challenge.

- **Joint Air and Missile Defense.** The increasing range and speed of air and missile threats, and their potential ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, place a high premium on the interdependence of service air and missile defenses, regardless of their domain of origin. This interdependence has driven considerable integration of programs and requirements, most recently the merger of Army and Marine Corps programs to defend against cruise missiles. All services need to pursue complementary air defense kill mechanisms able to defeat mixed threats of varying complexity through the right amount and combination of effects at the right time and place. Collaboration already underway addresses key issues: Joint Airspace Control Procedures, Joint Identification Procedures, Joint Engagement Authority Procedures, resolving voice and data communication issues, incorporating into school and unit training a common grid reference system, improving situational awareness for all participants, and emission deconfliction / control. All services also are collaborating on a Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Course, to be conducted for the first time at Ft Bliss in June, 2004.

- **Joint Logistics.** All the services have key interdependencies in the logistics arena and will experience even more in an expeditionary environment. There is a pressing demand for a joint end-to-end logistics structure that permits reliable sustainment of distributed operations in which deployment, employment, and sustainment are simultaneous. At the national level, the Army is prepared to make resources available to a global logistics command. At the theater level, where the Army is the predominant service component, we are willing to redirect the resources of our current Theater Support Commands to regional joint logistics commands under the supervision of the regional combatant commander. If another service is the predominant component, that service's logistics organization similarly could be used as the basis for a *regional joint* support command, with the Army contributing in its normal Title X/WEAR (Wartime Executive Agency Requirement) role. At the tactical level, to bridge the gap from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams, we already plan to convert current COSCOMs and DISCOMs into joint-capable Army Expeditionary Support Commands that are more rapidly deployable, employable, modular and sustainable.

## Moving Out

The changes ahead are significant. But they are neither reckless nor revolutionary. On the contrary, they reflect years of Army study, experimentation, and experience. We have delayed this transformation repeatedly, believing that we could not afford such change in a time of turbulence and reduced resources. Now we realize that what we cannot afford is further delay. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division is reorganizing today to a prototype redesign that converts its combat structure from 3 brigades to 4 brigade combat teams. Other divisions will follow.

Throughout, Soldiers will remain the centerpiece of our formations. The effects of changes in organizations, material, doctrine and facilities are additive. Those of training are multiplicative. Those of leadership are exponential. Simultaneous consideration of current and future requirements will be the integrating mechanism in all our change processes. And all will be viewed through the lens of a joint and expeditionary mindset.

The best way to anticipate the future is to create it. The Army is moving out, and this is merely the beginning. As drastic as some may consider these changes, the incentive for pursuing them is not radicalism. The incentive is effectiveness, and if additional change becomes necessary to defeat our adaptive adversaries, those described here will be only a down payment on what follows.

"We're going to have to [change] some of the things that made us the best Army in the world. Our values are sacrosanct ... everything else is on the table."

Army Chief of Staff  
General Peter J. Schoomaker

The Army has never failed the nation. It has just prevailed in two successive campaigns, and has earned the nation's respect and gratitude for its resolute determination to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the dangers confronting us, most of our citizens can continue to pursue their lives in relative peace and safety – a significant measure of our success.

But our challenge is to measure ourselves not against others, but against our own potential. It is not enough that we are changing. The real question is, are we changing enough? Our brave Soldiers and adaptive leaders constitute the best Army in the world, but we can be far better. It is inside of us and it is what the nation expects. The future of the world as we know it – our lives, the lives of our families, this country, everything we love and cherish – all depend on our success in meeting this challenge. *Are you wearing your dog tags?*

060104.24



12:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
DATE: June 1, 2004  
SUBJECT: Q&A

Somewhere in the press briefing you might want to begin doing the Q&A.

Here's the question that has been raised, here's the answers.

It's been \_\_\_\_ weeks since the Taguba report was made public.

We've completed \_\_\_\_ number of investigations, we have \_\_\_\_ number still underway, and there will be more initiated.

There have been a great many charges leveled during this period, and a great many of conclusions jumped to.

What I can say at this point, and it may be subject to amplification, elaboration, or even correction later as more information is known.

- Knowing we do not yet have the full information, several things seem to be coming clear.
- We have learned a great deal, but there is more we need to learn. That means that very likely there will be new revelations.
- At least thusfar it appears that the services have been open and forthcoming and moving with dispatch as problems have been discovered.
- While certainly regrettable, the abuses do not appear at least thusfar to be widespread.

383.6

1 Jun 04

OSD 16129-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037562

12:12 PM

- The suggestion that the abuses were the result of a senior official's encouraging such actions as part of a softening up process for interrogation have not been demonstrated thusfar.

Then use the Q&A approach.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
060104.24

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

I want to send Joe Castle, Dick Stevens, Somers Steelman, James MacWilliam at Princeton, the unclassified version of the Iraq weekly summary with a bump slip from me.

DHR/azn  
060104.37

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

**OSD 16130-04**

01 0500 EDT May 04

**WORKING PAPERS**

# *Iraq Status*

This briefing is classified

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources

11-L-0559/OSD/037565



## Highlights

### CPA Priorities:

- Governance
- Essential Services
- Economy
- Security
- Strategic Communications

### CPA Intermediate Objectives:

- Support transition to sovereignty
- Develop framework and capacity for elections
- Build Financial Market Structure
- Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure

### Weekly Highlights:

- Mr. Iyad Allawi nominated unanimously by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government
- UN panel interviewed candidates for key Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions
- Iraq's annualized inflation rate for Apr 04 was 19.6%, down from a peak of 47.7% in Oct 03
- Estimated crude oil export revenue is over \$6.2 billion for 2004 to date



## Governance

- Former exile Mr. Iyad Alawi's nomination for prime minister of the Interim Iraqi Government unanimously endorsed by Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)
  - UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi "respects" the decision and will work with Alawi to pick remainder of government
- Brahimi continues consultations with a broad spectrum of Iraqi people and their leadership
- UN completed processing the 1,878 nominations for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) positions
  - UN panel interviewing 25 short-listed candidates
  - 18 nominations will then be submitted to IGC for review
- Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) Offices accepted 2,582 claims as of 21 May, providing Iraqis a means to resolve property ownership disputes
- Ministries of Transportation and Environment transitioned to full Iraqi control last week (15 Ministries have transitioned to date)

### CPA Objective: Governance

Support Transition to Sovereignty; Develop Civic Participation in Governance;  
Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections; Promote Respect for Human Rights;  
Promote Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)



# Governance (Cont) – National Transition

2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End-May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End-May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I  
(Interim Government)

July/Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05  
(31 Dec 04 if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II  
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office



## Strategic Communication

- **USAID's Democracy Development Activities (DDA) program organized over 9,000 sessions in Iraq, with 280,000 participants**
  - **Stimulated civic participation and increased Iraqis' understanding of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and basic democratic principles**
- **Other activities continue in support of political transition and the TAL including:**
  - **Distribution of booklets and leaflets on the TAL**
  - **Numerous focus groups, seminars, public forums, and town hall meetings across Iraq**
- **CPA and USAID continue to undertake extensive activities providing assistance to Iraqi women, including:**
  - **Establishment of women's centers**
  - **Vocational training and education programs**
  - **Civic education and participation**

## **Municipal Services - Water and Sanitation**

**Continuing on the expansion of Shark Dijlah water treatment plant in Baghdad**

**Investments to the plant will increase potable water flow by 45 percent to the underdeveloped area of east Baghdad**

**Dijlah is one of two main water treatment plants that serve 4.7 million Baghdad residents**

**Mechanical and electrical work is more than 50 percent complete at Adhnan wastewater treatment plant**

**Plant will benefit more than 80,000 when completed in Aug 04**

**Rehabilitating damaged water and sewage stations and networks in Fallujah to meet urgent needs after the recent conflicts**

**Work to be completed by end of Jun and benefit more than 200,000**

### **Water Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal Services; Improve Water Resource Management**


**Strengthen organization to deliver water/sewerage/municipal services (WSMS); Develop WSMS to meet national needs; Develop full range of municipal services & delivery mechanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource management; Facilities improvements & capacity building within Ministry**



# Essential Services – Telecommunications and Postal

- Total number of telephone subscribers in Iraq is now over 1,192,000 (inc. 415,000 cell phone subscribers) – over 43 % above pre-war levels

- Chart shows trend in number of telephone subscribers



- Completed the Baghdad Digital Network, which provides emergency communications capability for police, fire and emergency medical technicians
- Iraq Post's International Service Center opened at Baghdad International Airport and introduction of Iraq's new Postal Code system announced

## CPA Objectives: Reconstruct Communications & Postal Systems

Build Iraq's first responder network • Establish independent regulatory agency • Upgrade Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) network • Build transmission component data network for Iraq, including international gateways • Restructure ITPC and its business operations • Upgrade and modernize postal systems • Upgrade ITPC outside plant for increased subscriber capacity and use



## Essential Services – Transportation

- **Reconstruction of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and other activities continue in preparation for commercial operations and increased traffic**
  - More than 30 cargo handlers unload up to 45 tons of cargo each day
  - BIAP transition timeline due to commence on 01 Jun with Iraqi Air Traffic Control (ATC) taking over the civilian side of airport operations
  - Work is expected to be complete by Aug 04
- **Port Umm Qasr received 50 ships in Apr and over 40 in May, dredging of the port continues**
- **Work initiated on a \$7M project for salvage and dredging at the port of Khor Az Zubayr to enable oil tankers to use dock facilities**
  - Contract awarded to an Iraqi company based in Baghdad

### CPA Objectives: Restore Economically Strategic Transportation Infrastructure


Enable Iraqi civil aviation to prepare for international commercial aviation and cargo service • Enable Iraqi Port Authority to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution • Enable Iraqi Republic Railways to provide domestic and international passenger and freight capabilities • Reform civil service at Ministry of Transportation



# Essential Services - Food Security

- Chart below shows % of estimated requirements for Public Distribution System (PDS) goods from Apr - 01 Jul
- Requirement includes stocks sufficient for the period and a three month buffer by 01 Jul
- While substantial additional shipments of most goods have been procured, they are not shown as these shipments will arrive after 01 Jul

Progress Toward Three-Month Buffer Stock by July 1st



**CPA Food Security Objective: Provide Food Security for all Iraqis**

Enhance capacity of Ministry of Agriculture • Assure supply of inputs • Strengthen research system • Ensure adequate stocks for Public Distribution System (PDS) • Monitor food security • Hand over administration of system in the North • Initiate reform of rations basket • Environmental Initiatives



## Essential Services – Food Security (cont)

- **Buffer stock build-up is slower than anticipated, due to delays in finalizing the first round of Ministry of Trade (MoT) contracts**
- **Transporting commodities from Um Qasr to warehouses and silos has been affected by truck drivers concerned about hijackings and robberies**
- **Concerns over wheat requirements for June addressed by additional procurement by CPA / MoT of 100,000 metric tons of flour and scheduled arrivals of wheat supplied by World Food Program**
- **A schedule for the second phase of MoT commodity procurements was due to be finalized by 30 May**

## **Health Services - Health Care**

**and that 85% of children have now been immunized and rates will  
with ongoing programs**

**hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are**

**medical supply shortages continue to be reported, especially  
with, however:**

**shipment of Ministry of Health (MoH) emergency drug purchase  
and two more shipments were due to arrive last week**

**and emergency drug purchase was finalized last week**

**four MoH employees attended a World Bank sponsored training  
in Amman covering the establishment of National Health**

**help the MoH make cost-based decisions as they establish a  
viable National Health Care finance system**

**and, distribution of over 30,000 medical books and reference  
to 46 medical hospitals, clinics and universities throughout**

**Health Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care**

**health care organizations, management, & infrastructure; Train health  
professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support; Public health**



## Essential Services - Education


- Nearly 2,500 schools have been rehabilitated
- Primary, intermediate, and secondary students have been completing their final examinations for the school year
  - Ministry of Education reports that the examination process has been uneventful
  - Apart from a few schools in Najaf and Karbala, all schools have been open for exams including Fallujah
- To date, over 32,000 secondary school teachers and 3,000 supervisors have been trained as part of effort to upgrade the quality of education
  - Includes modern teaching methods, curriculum development, and promoting change in teaching philosophies
- Six Iraqi high school students attended the second United World Youth Council at Radley College in Oxford, England

### CPA Education Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education

- Reorganize and staff the Ministry of Education
- Rehabilitate school buildings and build new schools
- Advance national dialog on curriculum reform
- Continue and expand teacher training




# Program Management Office (PMO)



PMO Web-site Portal:  
[www.rebuilding-iraq.net](http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net)

Program Management Office (PMO) (cont)



**Non-Construction Procurement**  
(Target figures are for 01 Jul)



## Economy

- On 21 May, estimated crude oil export revenue was over \$6.2B for 2004
- In Jan 04, the Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28% and an underemployment rate of 21.6%
- Iraq's annualized inflation rate for Apr 04 was 19.6%, down from its peak of 47.7% in Oct 03
  - Over past six months the CPI has risen by 3.5%, or 7.0% at an annual rate
  - The April CPI declined by 3.7% relative to its level in March, partially reversing the 9.2% increase in Mar
- The Trade Bank of Iraq has issued 206 letters of credit, totaling \$789.1M, covering imports from 33 countries
- The New Iraqi Dinar was at 1,465 dinars per dollar on 20 May, and has been relatively stable for nearly three months

### CPA Economic Objectives

Build Financial Market Structures; Develop Transparent Budgeting And Accounting Arrangements; Private Sector Initiatives; Design Oil Trust Fund; Lay Foundations For An Open Economy; Pursue National Strategy For Human Resources Development



## Economy (cont)

- **Micro-credit loans now total almost \$5M, with 2,500 clients**
  - Provide credit to financially viable micro and small businesses
  - First loan in Fallujah as micro-lending presence is established in Al Anbar Province
- **As of 20 May, the balance in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was \$10.2B (\$3.1B is already committed, and \$7.1B is slated for projected 04 budget items)**
- **Recent economic sector surveys were completed by the Iraqi Central Statistics Organization (CSO)**
  - Will assist in economic and planning and in meeting data requirements for an IMF stabilization program
  - CPA and USAID providing technical support and training to build CSO's capacity to use modern statistical data and forecasting techniques
- **A Ministry of Trade delegation attended the World Trade Organization (WTO) General Council meeting in Geneva, Switzerland**
  - This was the first formal participation in the WTO by Iraq



## Accelerated Iraqi Reconstruction Program (AIRP)

- **New Accelerated Iraq Reconstruction Program (AIRP) announced to meet urgent local needs in eighteen Iraqi cities**
- **Projects and requirements were developed as a joint effort between CPA, PMO, various US and Iraqi agencies, and local community leadership**
- **Projects cover: water and sanitation, health, education, building, roads, power, and telecommunications**
- **Benefits of the AIRP:**
  - **Will employ thousand of Iraqis in high unemployment areas**
  - **Jump starts community essential services construction**
  - **100% contract awards by 15 Jun**
  - **Rapid execution and impact**
  - **Over 160 urgent, high profile projects**
  - **Stimulates local economy**
  - **Provides opportunities for local businesses**
  - **Improves Iraqi's quality of life**



# Iraqi Budgeted Spending for 2004


- The following chart shows Iraqi budgeted spending for 2004, from all revenue sources:

| Ministry funding in millions of US\$           | Revised Iraqi Budget, March 2004 |                          |                  |            | New OFF Deposits |              | Budgeted Total |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|
|  | Salaries (inc. FPS)              | Other Operating Expenses | Capital Projects | Other      | Total            | Total        |                |
| Finance (with selected major payments)*        | 17                               | 12,938                   | 184              | 814        | 13,953           | 1,580        | 15,533         |
| <i>Public Distribution System</i>              |                                  | 2,400                    |                  |            | 2,400            | 200          | 2,600          |
| <i>Fuel Imports</i>                            |                                  | 2,100                    |                  |            | 2,100            | 0            | 2,100          |
| <i>Transfer Payments</i>                       |                                  | 1,671                    |                  |            | 1,671            | 0            | 1,671          |
| <i>Foreign Obligations (e.g., reparations)</i> |                                  | 1,432                    |                  |            | 1,432            | 0            | 1,432          |
| <i>Local/Regional Grants</i>                   |                                  | 831                      |                  |            | 831              | 0            | 831            |
| <i>Salaries and Retirement Awards</i>          |                                  | 797                      |                  |            | 797              | 0            | 797            |
| <i>SOE Restructuring and Salary Support</i>    |                                  | 761                      |                  |            | 761              | 50           | 811            |
| <i>Regional Development</i>                    |                                  | 600                      |                  |            | 600              | 277          | 877            |
| <i>Nation Building projects</i>                |                                  | 571                      |                  |            | 571              | 0            | 571            |
| <i>Additional Security Projects</i>            |                                  | 500                      |                  |            | 500              | 500          | 1,000          |
| <i>Rapid Regional Response Program</i>         |                                  | 225                      |                  |            | 225              | 0            | 225            |
| <i>CERP</i>                                    |                                  | 70                       |                  |            | 70               | 123          | 193            |
| <i>All other</i>                               |                                  | 981                      |                  |            | 981              | 430          | 1,411          |
| Electricity                                    | 8                                | 210                      | 900              | -          | 1,118            | 315          | 1,433          |
| Health   | 230                              | 750                      | 50               | -          | 1,030            | 0            | 1,030          |
| Education                                      | 682                              | 103                      | 170              | -          | 955              | 0            | 955            |
| Transport                                      | 7                                | 82                       | 212              | -          | 301              | 0            | 301            |
| Housing  | 37                               | 17                       | 233              | -          | 287              | 0            | 287            |
| Oil  | 5                                | 56                       | 200              | -          | 261              | 460          | 721            |
| Public Works                                   | 15                               | 21                       | 166              | -          | 202              | 0            | 202            |
| Water Resources                                | 19                               | 7                        | 128              | -          | 155              | 0            | 155            |
| Interior                                       | 367                              | 108                      | 10               | -          | 485              | 0            | 485            |
| Justice  | 42                               | 67                       | 42               | -          | 151              | 0            | 151            |
| Defense  | 77                               | 24                       | 0                | -          | 101              | 0            | 101            |
| Other Agencies                                 | 265                              | 425                      | 237              | -          | 927              | 130          | 1,057          |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>1,773</b>                     | <b>14,809</b>            | <b>2,532</b>     | <b>814</b> | <b>19,926</b>    | <b>2,485</b> | <b>22,411</b>  |



# Electricity Overview

Goal 01 June 04: 6,000 MW Peak Deliverable Generation Capacity





- Ambassador Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan to reach 6,000 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 120,000 MWH of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to unforeseen problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun
- CPA spring maintenance program continues resulting in about 1,323 MW of generation capacity currently offline for scheduled and 529 MW for unscheduled maintenance



# Power Production


## Mega Watt Hour Production



N/P Data as of 27 May



# Hours of Power – Week of 20 May



**Average Hours of Electricity Available to Governorate Per Day Over a 7 Day Period**


- ≤ 8 Hrs = Red ●
- 9 to 15 Hrs = Amber ○
- ≥ 16 Hrs = Green ●

**Percent Change (7 Day)**

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Baghdad      | 2.7%  |
| Duhok        | 0.0%  |
| Naynawa      | 12.4% |
| Tamim        | 10.2% |
| Salah Ad Din | 6.7%  |
| Anbar        | 8.0%  |
| Dyala        | 24.8% |
| Babil        | 7.3%  |
| Karbala      | 8.2%  |
| Najaf        | 10.9% |
| Qadisiyah    | 7.9%  |
| Wasit        | 9.4%  |
| Muthanna     | 13.3% |
| Dhi Qar      | -1.4% |
| Misan        | 7.9%  |
| Basrah       | -0.2% |



# Crude Oil Production




**Weekly Average of 2.236 MBPD Is Below Target of 2.5 MBPD**

- Long Term Target (Dec 04): 2.8 - 3.0 MBPD (Pre-War Capacity)
- Pre-War Peak: 2.5 MBPD in Mar 03
- Post-war Peak: 2.595 MBPD on 16 Apr 04



# Crude Oil Exports


Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports



• **Current Monthly Average: 1.198 MBPD**




# Diesel Supply



- This week's average production and imports are 85% of goal


# Gasoline Supply



**U.S. average production and imports are 97% of goal**




# Gasoline / Benzene Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 83% of goal



# Liquefied Petroleum Gas Supply



• This week's average production and imports are 51% of goal



# Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary

|                                     | Required | On Duty   |            |                  | Total On Duty | In Support Units | In OP Units | Total On Duty & Training |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|--------------------------|
|                                     |          | Untrained | IP Trained | Advanced Trained |               |                  |             |                          |
| Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 1        | 89,369   | 65,084    | 21,018     | 4,701            | 90,803        | 1,174            | 250         | 92,227                   |
| Dept. of Border Enforcement (DBE) 2 | 20,420   | 0         | 0          | 0                | 17,472        | 101              | 0           | 17,573                   |

|                                    | Required | On Duty | In OP Units | TOTAL  |
|------------------------------------|----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) 3         | 35,000   | 3,939   | 2,763       | 6,702  |
| Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 4 | 40,556   | 24,874  | 100         | 24,974 |



## Iraqi Security Forces Personnel & Training Summary (cont)

|   | Required                           | On Duty | In Training | TOTAL   |
|---|------------------------------------|---------|-------------|---|
| Facilities Protection Service (Ministries & MSCs) (FPS) 5 | 73,992                             | 73,992  | 156         | 74,148  |
|   | <b>Total Required:<br/>259,337</b> |         |             | <b>Total on Duty and in Training:<br/>215,624</b> |

- 1 New requirement from MNF-I 22 Apr based on better census data. IPS implementing new reporting procedures
- 2 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. DBE includes Border Police, Customs, Immigration, Nationality. There is no TIP training for DBE but Border Police received basic sentry training
- 3 MNF-I C3 Effects NISF Roll-up
- 4 OSC SITREP 29 Apr. ICDC includes the 36<sup>th</sup> ICDC BN
- 5 FPS requirements changed by Ministries. Numbers are estimated. Source OSC SITREP

**Number required and total on duty reflects best available data in the wake of recent combat operations.  
Re-assessments and updates are continuing**



## Security - Build Justice

- **Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of the Special Task Force on Compensation for Victims of the Former Regime**
  - Initial endowment of \$25 million from the Development Fund for Iraq
- **President Bush announced that Abu Ghraib prison will be demolished, as a symbol of Iraq's new beginning**
- **The fourth of six judicial training courses has been completed, each course trains approximately 30 judges**
  - Covers due process, rule of law, human rights, judicial independence, ethics, developments in international law, and CPA Orders
- **Weekly programs to train about 600 court-appointed defense counselors for indigent defendants began last week**
- **Iraqi Corrections Service has improved the prisoner transport system, which has reduced disruptions to scheduled court appearances**

### CPA Objective: Build Justice

**Establish Independent Judiciary; Reform Judicial System; Improve the Penal System; Establish Commission on Public Integrity; Solidify Real Property Rights**



## Security - Developments

- The Coalition military headquarters, Combined Joint Task Force - 7 stood down and transitioned into the Multi-National Force – Iraq
- Fallujah has remained relatively quiet since the creation of the Fallujah Brigade and there have been no violations of the cease-fire since 03 May
- All militias have now agreed to a transition and reintegration plan
  - Almost 90 percent of the roughly 100,000 militia members will have passed into new occupations prior to the elections
- The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Personnel Redirection program continues to make progress with the hiring of 25 high-level former weapons scientists and engineers
  - Will work as scientific and technical consultants with Iraqi Ministries and the private sector in support of reconstruction efforts

### CPA Objectives: Security

Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment; Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order; Develop Iraqi Defense Capabilities and Oversight Mechanism





## Security – Developments (Cont)

- **Key leadership of the Ministry of Defense has been appointed, including the Inspector General and all five Directors General**
- **Status of the Iraqi Army:**
  - **Three battalions conducting operations with Coalition forces**
  - **Three new battalions are training new recruits and leadership staff**
  - **One battalion is learning techniques for military operations in urban terrain through a “train-the-trainer” program**
- **19 Iraqi helicopter pilots graduated from flight training conducted at the Royal Jordanian Air Force in Jordan**
  - **All 19 airman were pilots under the former regime**
- **Thirty police managers are enrolled in the first Mid-Level Management course for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)**
- **More than 21,000 police of the former regime are on duty after completing Training and Integration of Police program**



## Security – Developments (Cont)

- Chart shows significant insurgent activities in Iraq, includes attacks using:
  - Improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and improvised rockets
- Chart opposite shows murders reported to the Baghdad Police Department since May 03





# Stability Contributors – OIF

## Countries with forces in Iraq

34

- Albania
- Australia
- Azerbaijan
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dom Rep
- El Salvador
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Japan
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia

TOTAL ~24K

- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Moldova
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
- Singapore
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Thailand
- Ukraine
- UK

## Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq

5

TOTAL TBD

**39 Countries**

Potentially Supporting  
Iraqi Stability and  
Humanitarian Relief

# IRAQ Governance - Transition

fact sheet



2004

08 Mar

Transitional Administrative Law signed

End - May

Establishment of Election Commission (approximate date)

End - May

Selection of Interim Government (approximate date)

30 Jun

Iraqi Interim Government takes power

Phase I  
(Interim Government)

July / Aug

National Conference selects Consultative Council

2005

31 Jan

Elections for the National Assembly complete: NLT 31 Jan 05  
(31 Dec if possible)

Early '05

Iraqi Transitional Government takes power

Phase II  
(Elected Government)

15 Aug

National Assembly completes draft of permanent constitution

15 Oct

Referendum for permanent constitution

15 Dec

Elections for government completed

31 Dec

Elected government assumes office



# IRAQ

fact sheet

## Economics

---

- On May 21, estimated crude oil export revenue was over \$6.2 billion for 2004
- In Jan, the Iraq Ministry of Planning reported a national unemployment rate of 28 percent and underemployment rate of 21.6 percent
- The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Iraq, compiled by the Ministry of Planning, increased by 27.9 percent over the year to Feb 04
  - Over past six months the CPI has risen by 3.5 %, or 7.0 % at an annual rate
- To date, more than 2,500 loans totaling \$5 million have been disbursed to micro and small enterprises throughout Iraq
- The New Iraq Dinar (NID) has been relatively stable for the past three months at around 1,425 - 1,460 NID to the US Dollar
- The Trade Bank of Iraq has issued 200 letters of credit, totaling \$767.5 million, covering imports from 32 countries

## **Water and Sanitation**

**Implementing water and sanitation projects across Iraq that will benefit millions of people**

**Over 40 percent of the marshlands deliberately drained by Saddam have been reflooded since liberation**

**Major program in 2003 that cleared over 17,000 kilometers of waterways to improve water flow and irrigation**

**Major program in 2004 will clear 20,000 kilometers of Iraq's waterways and employ around 100,000 Iraqis**

**Objective: Provide Water Supply, Sewerage & Municipal Services; Improve Water Resource Management Create viable organization for water / sewerage / municipal services (WSMS); Expand WSMS to meet local needs; Develop full range of municipal services & inclusive financing mechanism; Infrastructure improvements to water resource system; Capacity improvements & capacity building within Ministry**

That 85% of children have now been immunized and rates  
are rising with ongoing programs

Over 10 million children (6 - 12 years) have been immunized for  
Measles, Mumps, and Rubella

Over 10 million children under 5 years have been vaccinated since

Over 10 hospitals and over 1,200 preventive health clinics are

Operating 52 primary healthcare clinics and re-equipping 600 more to  
provide essential primary healthcare services

Continues primary health care training of trainers program  
to reach 2,500 primary health care providers throughout Iraq

US military has helped 700 doctors to provide better primary and  
preventive care, especially for women and children

**Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Health Care**  
through health care organizations, management, and infrastructure;  
training of health care professionals; Pharmaceuticals logistic support;  
Medical equipment; Public health


ed nearly 2,500 schools across Iraq  
ew schools required and 11,939 schools need repairs  
plemental funds will rehabilitate at least 1,047 schools  
Bank may commit to rehabilitate another 1,000 schools  
,000 secondary school teachers and administrative staff  
d distributed over 8.7 million textbooks throughout Iraq  
d large numbers of school equipment including student  
cher desks, chairs, cabinets, chalkboards, and teachers kits  
g an accelerated learning program for 600 students to  
e them into the school system  
n will be expanded to 50,000 in 2004

ation Objective: Improve Quality and Access to Education,  
e and staff the Ministry of Education; Rehabilitate school  
and build new schools; Advance national dialog on  
reform; Continue and expand teacher training

# RAQ

fact sheet


# Power



## Generation


- 4,400 Megawatts (MW) Peak Capacity
- 4,417 MW (Met initial goal of 4,400 MW)
- 4,000 MW Peak Generation Capacity
- 20,000 MWH Production

Bremer approved an increase plan in Jan 04 for 4,000 MW of peak deliverable capacity and 20,000 MWH of daily production by 01 Jun. Due to operational problems, these goals will slip until 30 Jun 04. A maintenance program continues resulting in 1,300 MW of generation capacity currently scheduled and 529 MW for unscheduled



## Production


Peak: 2.595M BPD (16 Apr)  
Average: 2.236M BPD  
1.038M BPD  
Target (Dec): 2.8 - 3.0M BPD



- 2003 Revenue: \$5,076.6M
  - 2004 Revenue:
    - Cash Received: \$3,966.0M
    - Receivable: \$1,979.3M
- \$5,945.3M**

ate which includes unspecified re-injection rates, smuggling, and storage

## Monthly Average of Crude Oil Exports



**Current Monthly Export: 1.198 MBPD**

# RAQ

fact sheet

## Security

| <u>Security Forces</u>     | <u>Operating</u> | <u>Required</u> |
|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| ce                         | 92.2K            | 89.4K           |
| of Border Enforcement      | 17.6K            | 20.4K           |
| i Armed Forces             | 6.7K             | 35.0K           |
| l Defense Corps            | 25.0K            | 40.5K           |
| ilities Protection Service | 74.1K            | 74.0K           |
| al                         | *215.6K          | 259.3K          |

Required and total on duty reflects best available data in the recent combat operations. Re-assessment and updates are

4.5K in training

June 16, 2004

350.09

TO: Steve Cambone  
cc: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Intel Bill

I am told Porter Goss has an intel bill that he has going through, and he got Duke Cunningham to sign **up** for it. Duke said, "I wonder if Rumsfeld is going to be mad at me for this."

You have not briefed me at all on any of the legislation coming through. I need to know what is going on. Please let me know, so we can get Cunningham off of it if we should be off of it.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
061604-10

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

16 JUN 04

OSD 16133-04

June 16, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Support from the Hill

032

You heard me talk to Duncan Hunter about the items we are worried about.

I also saw Congressman Lewis and talked to him about the \$500 million for train and equip. He said he would work on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061604-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 16134-04

16 Jun 04

June 21, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Air Defense

384

Let's talk about how we could stop another airplane from hitting an important target in the US. Either we can or we cannot, or it is somewhere in the middle.

I think it is important that the President know which it is, and that we let the Congress and the world know in some way, so expectations are not unrealistic.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062104-13

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

2134104

OSD 16136-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 21, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Funding Strategy

110.01

We have to make a major effort using the Chiefs and everyone else to get the train and equip money and the CERP money.

Please give me a battle plan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062104-5

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

hounclie

OSD 16138-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JUN 21 2004

0005

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Document Production

George Tenet and I agreed that we would each **try** to pull together data on the reams of material that we have been required to send to different organizations – the House, the Senate Committees, individual Congressman and Senators, the 9/11 Commission, subpoenas on other things, etc. and the man-years of work that it is taking.

The purpose would be to show that what is happening has gone past the point of “oversight.” A question is: How can we manage this, and is it possible to conduct a war given the accelerating kinds of demands.

I cannot remember to what extent I started getting this project organized in the Department. I think I asked Feith to pull it together. Please look into it. The key people would be Doug Feith, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Powell Moore. You could check with others.

Please see me to discuss.  
  
Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061904-4

.....  
*Please respond by* 7/16/04

OSD 6140-04

214504

7201

June 16, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Including Coalition

IRAQ

You should figure out a way we can include the coalition in all the fast-moving decisions that are taking place with respect to security issues in Iraq.

Thanks.

DIR:dh  
061604-20

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 16142-04

16 JUN 04

June 23, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Waivers

*DR*

I notice I am signing more and more waivers – for adverse information, for the number of years so they can retire in a higher rank, for joint service, etc.

It strikes me that it is not a good procedure to keep signing waivers. If the rules are wrong, we should change the rules. If the rules are right, we ought to adhere to them and not sign so many waivers. I am not a purist, but the volume seems to be too high.

Please check, and come back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062304-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/23/04

210

23 JUN 04

OSD 16143-04

June 23, 2004

TO: David Chu  
Ray DuBois  
  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
  
SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh  
062304-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

O20 Navy

OSD 16144-04

23 June 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: POTUS Outreach to Veterans' Groups

*292*

When we met with John McCain, one of the things he recommended is for the President to meet with heads of the veterans' organizations and figure out ways we can work with them, so we stay in good touch with them.

Please come up with a proposal, and tell me how you are going to propose it to the White House.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
063004-6

.....  
Please respond by 7/19/04

*30 JUN 04*

**OSD 16146-04**

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~~FOUO~~

JUN 23 2004 I-04/008326  
EF-9225  
JUN 21 2004

J 6/29

Electrons can  
be sent if needed.

(b)(6)  
602-7051

IRAQ

TO: Peter Rodman  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Edits to "Thoughts on Iraq" Paper

Thanks for the edits on the GWOT paper. I am currently incorporating them.

Please also edit the "Thoughts on Iraq" paper, along the lines of the memo you sent on June 10. I have attached another copy of the paper.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/10/04 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq  
6/7/04 "Thoughts on Iraq"

This is quite good.  
Works either  
as a speech or  
a longish  
OPED.  
J

DHR:dh  
061804-3

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

SIR,  
Response attached.

OSD 16147-04

ATTN: J

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~



INTERNATIONAL  
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 10 JUN 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *JMA*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.,:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that it and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037618

~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves -- really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037619

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/008677

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *PMR* 28 JUN 2004

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

I have redrafted your memo of June 7 (Tab D) on "some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it," as you requested. My redraft is at Tab A. I have cast it as a speech.

However, criticizing the media can be a kamikaze exercise, as DepSec has discovered. Therefore, whether to deliver such a speech at all is a separate question. You may wish to consult with other Principals.

What I have tried to do is "embed" this criticism deeper in a discussion of your broader points, e.g., what are the right metrics, what are the lessons of history, etc. It might work.

Attachments

TAB A: Redraft

TAB C: My memo of June 10

TAB D: Your memo of June 7

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037620

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Iraq and How to Think about It

A central question that I wrestle with everyday is: How do we assess properly what is going on in Iraq? What is the right measure of success? Or of failure?

The fact is, there are contradictory trends. There is the daily turbulence that makes the news – the bombings, the casualties. The extremists are showing themselves somewhat more capable of organizing their attacks, and it is clear that the job of suppressing them will not be easy.

At the same time, our soldiers see a different ground-truth: of schools and hospitals and institutions of local government being rebuilt; of brave Iraqis coming forward to defend their future against the extremist minority trying to hijack it. And we see the extraordinary political progress that the June 28 turnover of sovereignty represents.

Which is the right perspective?

All of us should approach this question with some humility. There is ample historical precedent for governments misjudging reality very badly and the critics being

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11-L-0559/OSD/037621

right. However, there is also historical precedent – I think of Tet 1968 – when the government was correct in its analysis of the strategic outcome and the media got it wrong. (I refer you to Peter Braestrup’s classic study, **Big Story**, of how the media covered Tet 1968.)

*This is a superb example of a fine book.*  
J.

Our soldiers, as I said, see a certain reality on the ground, face-to-face. These dedicated men and women – all volunteers – know that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people not only welcome their liberation from Saddam Hussein but continue to yearn for a decent, democratic future. Opinion polls show this too. Of course, Iraqis wanted to see the occupation over; so would you and I. But our soldiers see every day how hard the Iraqi people are striving to rebuild their lives, and that they reject what the extremists stand for.

Our armed forces also know that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed or wounded. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it sometimes works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave Americans on the front lines of this struggle see it for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

In 1946, there were some who complained that we had "botched" the occupation of Germany, that it was a hopeless mess, that we didn't know what we were doing, that the Europeans didn't love us as liberators any more, and so on. We have a file of such reports back in the Pentagon. Maybe that's how it looked in 1946. But they lacked the perspective we have now.

The process of building new institutions to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of a totalitarian regime is a complicated one. It takes time. Even today in the former Soviet bloc, where the transition was peaceful, we see the dislocations that come from building different **kinds** of institutions to replace the flawed institutions of the past. It takes time.

So, when we look at Iraq today, what do we compare it to? What standards and expectations do we apply?

Some among us seem to measure Iraq's many difficulties and challenges not against history or realistic expectations but against a false standard of perfection, that of countries that enjoy relative tranquility, of countries that have succeeded in their struggles for freedom.

Events in Iraq are not tranquil, and in many cases are ugly. The media are doing their job when they report that. But, without **perspective** being brought to bear, our publics risk falling prey to despair – to the conclusion that all is lost, that the terrorists are

sure to win, and that what is being done is hopelessly flawed, or misguided, or even malevolent.

**That is wrong – totally wrong, very dangerously wrong.**

History tells us that the path to freedom has always been arduous, dangerous, and sometimes marked by ugliness. Democracy in Iraq is being fought tooth-and-nail by extremists who fear its success because of what it will mean for the entire Middle East. So, to measure its condition by the standard of countries that have already achieved their freedom misses the point.

The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite obstacles and opposition, it can be done. It has been done. Our own republic went through tough periods – surviving rebellions, riots, and civil war – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair. As Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy: “One ought not expect to be transported on a featherbed.”

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully advance from fascism to democracy. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. It should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. **One thing is certain: US and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.**

Thus, the question of how to measure success or failure – of what perspective or standard or expectation to apply – is not simply an analytical challenge to us in the Department of Defense. It should be a core question in our national debate.

I am convinced there is a solid bipartisan consensus in both houses of Congress, and among most leaders of both parties, that we must succeed in Iraq. The cause could not be more just; the enemy could not be more vicious or more hostile to our most basic values; the strategic stakes in a vital region of the world could not be higher.

Senator Kerry, to his credit, has strongly affirmed this. So have other key Democratic leaders such as [President Clinton], Senator Biden, Senator Lieberman, Congressmen Skelton and Lantos, [William Cohen], Sandy Berger, and many others.

The task we all face is: How do we bring **this** national consensus and national steadfastness to the fore in our national discussion? How do we get **this** story to be front and center? The American people deserve this, so that the daily events in Iraq can be better seen in their context – so that the progress being made will be properly perceived, so that the courage that our men and women are showing on the ground in Iraq will be reinforced by a confident and determined nation back home.

The Iraqi people need to hear this message, as well: They, who are truly on the front line – and who are bravely taking on more and more of the security responsibility – need reassurance that the Coalition will back them and help them. This is our national commitment, and they need to know we will fulfill it.

And the enemy needs to hear that message too. We are in a test of wills with a fierce enemy. The enemy has many faces – die-hard remnants of the old totalitarian regime, or fanatical Islamists – but we have seen that it is the face of evil. Much more is at stake than the future of Iraq. In that test of wills with the forces of evil, the forces of freedom must prevail. ~~Does anyone disagree with that?~~

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? Those who reject this enterprise, or who oppose doing what it takes to win, can be asked: What is your proposal? Some say: Leave. What if the Coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- a failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack other moderate friends in the Middle East, or in Europe, or to attack this country; ✓
- a civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites; ✓
- falling under the sway of a neighboring country and radical clerics, spreading a virulent Islamist ideology; ✓
- a split-up of Iraq into several parts; or ✓
- a new Saddam Hussein taking control and reimposing a brutal dictatorship. ✓

Which of those options would anyone argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists, and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups with its borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

**I repeat: There is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. There is no reason for such a conclusion, since our strategy in Iraq – the empowerment of moderate Iraqis to take charge of their own future – is on track.**

But, for us and the Iraqis to prevail, we in this country will need to conduct our political debate this year in a manner that does justice to the huge stakes involved. The imperative to win in Iraq should not be a partisan issue; the Administration will not treat it as one. Nor is this a debate about media coverage; the media should report the truth as they see it. But our country's leaders, as they discuss Iraq, owe the American people perspective, and balance, and a clear affirmation of what is at stake and of why we must be united in the will to win.

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I trust the American people. They usually get it right. Their common sense, and courage, and patriotism, will prevail. Caving in to terrorist blackmail is the worst possible course – and the most dangerous. That is not in the cards. This is the United States of America.

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~~FOUO~~



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 10 JUN 2004  
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6) *PWR*)

SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

Your memo on Iraq (I have the 7 June draft) could be the basis of an important speech. However, it would have to be recrafted with care. Seeming to "blame the media" is an explosive matter, and you would need to prepare the ground well, with a bill of particulars and appropriately humble admissions of USG fallibility. E.g.,:

- There are many examples in history of governments deluding themselves and misjudging reality. But there are also precedents – I would cite Tet '68 – where the USG was correct and the media got it wrong.
- A bill of particulars could start with the contrast between coverage in April and in May. In April we faced two real challenges (Fallujah; Sadr), which led to screaming headlines about a national uprising. By May these challenges were overcome but the headlines never caught up.
- In addition, there is the host of cheap-shot negative articles interviewing grumbling Iraqis. This is too easy and just tendentious.
- I would give credit to leading Democrats – Senators Kerry, Biden, Lieberman; Sandy Berger – who have made good statements that we have to win this. But they too probably feel the heat from the media reporting. The trick is to find a way to bring this strong consensus of our political class forward, so that **it** and not the negativism dominates the national discourse.
- We need to admit fallibility. The superficial media notwithstanding, there are also serious – and friendly – voices like Eliot Cohen who see a deteriorating security situation (measured by the ability to move around easily and safely). This could be the context for your discussion of what the right metrics are.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037630

~~FOUO~~

The reason this is worth a speech is that your central point – that we can't be defeated unless we defeat ourselves – really needs to be said.

I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/037631

~~FOUO~~



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2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



I-04/007908

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

INFO MEMO

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SUBJECT: Your Memo "Some Thoughts on Iraq..."

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11-L-0559/OSD/037632

~~FOUO~~

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I would be glad to try my hand at it. I have two Congressional appearances next week that I have to write statements for, but I will do my best to do it if you would like.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman, ASD/ISA, (b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037633

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week -- for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21<sup>st</sup> century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

June 18, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Intel Reform

W5009

Please give me a copy of Bill Schneider's dissent on the Scowcroft Commission. Isn't that something we could be using?

It seems to me we need to mount a major campaign on this intel reform. The 9/11 Commission is going to recommend it. Goss is now recommending it. Scowcroft recommended it.

We need to hit it head on. No one is doing it intellectually. Why don't we get a team of folks together and get after it? It is a bad thing for the country.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061804-4

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

JUN 19 2004 *attached*

OSD 16148-04

18JUN04

## ADDITIONAL VIEWS

William Schneider, Jr.

While I share the views and recommendations of the Commission concerning the challenges and opportunities facing the Intelligence Community (IC) and our current and planned capabilities, I disagree with its recommendations concerning the reorganization of the IC (**Task 4, Organizing for Success**). If the Commission's reorganization recommendations were implemented, I believe that the ability of the IC to respond to the President's aspirations to transform the nation's national security posture could be sharply diminished.

### *The need to transform the IC to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century international security requirements*

The international security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century no longer permits the United States to predict the nature of threats posed to its interests. As a result, the **US military** posture cannot be optimized against well-understood threats, **as** was the case during the Cold **War**. For **this** reason (among others), public policy aims to transform US military capabilities to those that **are** far more agile, flexible, and adaptable than the legacy force structure of the Cold **War**. **To** meet this requirement, intelligence must not simply be "good" or "better"; it must be exquisite. In the words chosen by the Commission to characterize the requirement, "US intelligence will not meet the demands of the future if **our** intelligence agencies continue with business **as** usual."

To permit the **US** national defense posture to adapt to new threats, the IC will need to provide deep insights into the nature of **US** adversaries, their capabilities, vulnerabilities, resources, infrastructure, personnel, and most closely held secrets. At the highest level of national policy, the transformation of the IC is needed to strengthen the hand of American diplomacy, and permit the national leadership to anticipate and act before future threats **pose** overwhelming problems for **US** security.

It is the tactical or operational requirements of the armed forces that pose the most compelling challenge for the transformation of the intelligence community. The impact of the **military** applications of information technology and the intelligence that supports that capability will be fundamental; Twenty-first century **warfare** requires **US** military forces to conduct operations within the decision cycle of its adversaries if it is to prevail in future conflict. Intelligence information to support military operations will need to be collected from multiple sources, processed and fused into **an** actionable form, and delivered to military users in a timely manner. **This** processed intelligence information **will** often need to be transmitted directly to the seeker in a weapon system to permit **US** forces to bring a fleeting target under attack in a matter of seconds, not minutes or hours or days as is now the case. Moreover, extraordinary precision in the location of targets will be required **as** well to permit discriminate targeting, and a reduction in the risk of unintended casualties from friendly fire and collateral damage to non-combatants. These demanding intelligence requirements for 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare are affirmed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Vision 2020.

**Role of shared DCI-DoD responsibility for the management of IC**

The responsibility for the management of IC is shared between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. This unique managerial arrangement reflects the special circumstances surrounding the uses of intelligence information within the government. The DoD is both the collector and user of an overwhelming fraction of intelligence information – more than three fourths of all intelligence collected by the US government. Moreover, the DoD's need for timeliness and precision are unique and on a scale without parallel within the **US** government.

Notable IC difficulties during the **1990s** in predicting crucial international developments have had powerful implications for **US** security. These difficulties included a failure to predict developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in India, Iraq, Iran, Libya, **North** Korea, and Pakistan. **This** failure to predict these developments remind us that **the IC** must jointly serve both DoD and non-DoD interests as well.

The need to jointly serve the “national” or “strategic” intelligence requirements of the **US** government with the demanding “tactical” or “operational” DoD applications for the conduct of military operations establishes a need for shared management of the **IC**. The Department of Defense cannot transform its military capabilities to meet **21<sup>st</sup>** century requirements without access to intelligence that meets its needs for timeliness and precision. **Its** interaction with elements of the **IC** most directly associated with producing such intelligence is intimate and routine, and led by personnel directly managed by the Secretary of Defense, but with shared responsibility for **tasking** and **resource** allocation with the DCI. **This** “creative tension” between intelligence collectors and users is a constructive managerial model for which there is strong empirical support.<sup>1</sup>

The new administration has undertaken constructive measures that have mitigated some of the most damaging failures of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to coordinate. The failure of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to meet regularly during the late 1990s when some of the most egregious and damaging lapses in coordination took place has been replaced since January 2001 by frequent meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The exigencies imposed by wartime intelligence demands have further strengthened this collaborative relationship.

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<sup>1</sup> The tri-cornered relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the NRO for the management of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has been affirmed in the report of a recent statutory body, The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office. See *The Report of National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office*,” (Washington: Government Printing Office, November 2000), p 44. In the report, the Commissioners unanimously concluded that “the tri-cornered arrangement among the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and NRO Director has at times provided great strength to the NRO because it has allowed the NRO Director to draw on the resources and benefit from the advocacy of two major forces in the Intelligence Community and the DoD.”

**Limitations of the Commission's reorganization recommendations**

The Commission has recommended that the authority to manage and appoint the leadership of the major DoD agencies in the IC (the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency **and** other special programs) be shifted from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI.

Doing so would, in my view, perpetuate the IC's institutional weaknesses that have adversely affected its post-Cold ~~War~~ performance. Further, the proposed reorganization is likely to produce a result that is orthogonal to the modernization aspirations the Commission.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Commission's recommendation to centralize management of the IC agencies under **the** DCI would perpetuate the obsolete organizing principle of the IC around **the means** by which intelligence is collected rather than **ends** served by national intelligence? It is the flawed underlying organizational concept of the IC that focuses on collection disciplines that produces the performance problems for the IC from the perspective of the user of intelligence – not whether the DCI or the Secretary of Defense leads the collection management function. Moreover, centralizing the management of these important intelligence collection disciplines will greatly increase the “distance” of these organizations from the user. Such an outcome is precisely opposite to the underlying need for the modernization of the intelligence function. The example of the manner in which the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (**UAV**) is employed in support of **US** military operations in Afghanistan offers **an** informative example of the constructive interplay between **users** and producers of intelligence. In this case, intelligence collectors operating under the control of users collaboratively participate in meeting the needs of **users**. **This** model is more appropriate to the support of 21<sup>st</sup> century military operations than the supplier-user model that would be created if the major defense-related intelligence organizations **are** subordinate to the DCI.
2. The intense needs of the DoD **to** improve the timeliness and precision of intelligence information make the responsiveness of the IC crucial. By moving away from the constructive tension of shared responsibility for the IC between collector and user **as** the Commission proposes, the responsiveness of the IC to the **warfighter** is at risk. In practice, diminished responsiveness by the IC is likely to produce undesirable bureaucratic pathologies. It is likely that the DoD will be forced to create parallel capabilities to those controlled by the DCI within elements of the DoD that **are** not included in the National Foreign Intelligence **Program** to **assure** responsiveness to the immediate tactical requirements of the armed forces.

---

<sup>2</sup> The Commission seeks to create national intelligence that reflects “seamless integration across intelligence disciplines, operational agility, and analytic prowess that are necessary to support the President and the NSC in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”

<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of Defense has directed that the Defense Science Board establish a Task Force to study the concept of managing foreign intelligence by focusing on ends vice means to study the organizational and operational implications of such an organizing principle.

3. Institutionalizing the existing informal DoD-DCI collection management function (called the Collection Management Center in the report) would burden the IC by adding yet another coordinating bureaucracy to the excessively baroque existing structures with little value-added to the user of intelligence. The Commission's view of the coordination difficulties between the DoD and the DCI were influenced by an exceptional period in the late 1990s when the Secretary of Defense and the DCI never met. This practice has been reversed by the new administration. Similarly on a smaller scale, the informal coordination process between the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Director of the NRO has been successfully maintained for nearly 40 years (apart from exceptional 1997-2001 period) when the DoD function was delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In this respect, it would be constructive for the DCI to participate more directly in the intelligence dimension of the Defense Planning Guidance process to better assess the intelligence implications of DoD modernization initiatives.
4. Appropriating funding to the DCI rather than to the Secretary of Defense jeopardizes the ability of the government to maintain the secrecy of patterns of resource allocation within the IC. Moreover, such a change does not address the most important problem – the allocation of resources within the IC to adjust to changes in priorities. The IC budget is assembled two years in advance of execution. The fast-breaking international security environment will not permit the IC to be effective unless its resources can be reallocated in a timely manner to respond to contingencies that could not have been anticipated when the budget was created. The DCI's authority should be strengthened by the repeal of the 1997 statutory provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act. The statutory provision prevents the DCI from reallocating funding within the IC without the agreement “of the Secretary or the head of the department which contains the affected element or elements.” The provisions of the 1997 legislation were insufficiently mitigated in Section 105 of the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act.

*Draft 02*

*31 December 2001*

October 15, 2004

TO: The Right Honourable Geoffrey Hoon  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Update on Iraqi Security Force Training

IRAQ

- 1. Here is the latest information on our training program for Iraqi forces. I'll continue to send these along every couple of weeks, and would ask you to pass them along to the Prime Minister.
- 2. Our discussions in Romania were pleasant and productive as always - I look forward to our next meeting.

**Attach.**  
10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
101504-8

ISOCFOY

OSD 16101-04

ISOCFOY

*Iraqi Security Forces Update  
Executive Summary*

*13 October 2004*

# Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces


For Official Use Only

|                                      |                                |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped*</u> |
| – Police                             |                                |
| – Civil Intervention                 |                                |
| – Emergency Response                 | <b>57,726</b>                  |
| – Border Enforcement                 |                                |
| – Highway Patrol                     |                                |
| – Dignitary Protection               |                                |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u>  |
| – Army                               |                                |
| – National Guard                     |                                |
| – Intervention Force                 | <b>48,540</b>                  |
| – Special Operations                 |                                |
| – Air Force                          |                                |
| – Coastal Defense Force              |                                |
|                                      | <hr/>                          |
|                                      | <b>106,266</b>                 |


\*Note: 74,000 Facilities Protection Service forces are not included

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003 = 0 Iraqi Security Forces



Note: Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037647

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time**

| Security Force Element            | Current Targeted End State | 11 OCT 04 | 1 NOVO4 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Regular Iraqi Police *            | 135,000                    |           |         |          | 47%      | 58%      | 68%      |
| Dept of Border Enforcement **     | 32,000                     | 44%       | 45%     | 50%      | 60%      | 66%      | 84%      |
| Emergency Response Unit           | 270                        |           | 55%     | 70%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Special Police Regiments ***      | 1,200                      |           |         | 50%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Public Order Battalions ***       | 3,600                      |           |         | 67%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection **** | 500                        |           | 90%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol              | 1,500                      |           |         | 47%      | 58%      | 71%      | 92%      |

**Notes**

- \* Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- \*\* Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- \*\*\* Special Police Regiments and Public Order Battalions equipment schedules still TBD; training of initial 3 Public Order Battalions will commence this week.
- \*\*\*\* Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

**Legend**

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037648

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\***

| Security Force Element        | End state       | 11 OCT 04 | 1 NOV04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army            | 27,000 soldiers |           | 44%     | 81%      | 93%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Intervention Force      | 6,584 soldiers  |           | 67%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi National Guard          | 61,904 soldiers |           | 57%     | 74%      | 91%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Commando Battalion            | 1,516 soldiers  | 58%       | 58%     | 67%      | 76%      | 85%      | 100%     |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451 soldiers    |           |         | 40%      | 58%      | 76%      | 100%     |

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037649

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

**For Official Use Only**

| MNF-I = 32 Countries |          |                |            |             |       |                 |          |                |                |
|----------------------|----------|----------------|------------|-------------|-------|-----------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| Albania              | 73       | El Salvador    | 380        | Korea       | 2,837 | Norway          | 9        | Tonga          | 53             |
| Australia            | 148      | Estonia        | 48         | Latvia      | 133   | Poland          | 2,470    | Ukraine        | 1,565          |
| <b>Armenia</b>       | <b>0</b> | <b>Georgia</b> | <b>162</b> | Lithuania   | 88    | Portugal        | 129      | United Kingdom | 7,657          |
| Azerbaijan           | 150      | Hungary        | 282        | Macedonia   | 31    | Romania         | 745      | US             | 131,699        |
| Bulgaria             | 449      | Italy          | 3,088      | Moldova     | 11    | Singapore       | 33       |                |                |
| Czech Rep.           | 92       | Japan          | 800        | Mongolia    | 132   | Slovakia        | 103      |                |                |
| Denmark              | 535      | Kazakhstan     | 30         | Netherlands | 1,470 | <b>Thailand</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>Total</b>   | <b>155,402</b> |

| Iraqi Forces On Hand- 167,757   |               |
|---------------------------------|---------------|
| Police Service                  | 85,532        |
| Civil Interv. Force             | 1,336         |
| Emer. Response Unit             | 107           |
| Dept. of Border Enf.            | 16,233        |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection. | 446           |
| Highway Patrol                  | 927           |
| <b>Army</b>                     | <b>11,776</b> |
| <b>National Guard</b>           | <b>43,062</b> |
| <b>Intervention Force</b>       | <b>7,033</b>  |
| <b>Special Ops Force</b>        | <b>690</b>    |
| <b>Air Force</b>                | <b>206</b>    |
| <b>Coastal Defense Force</b>    | <b>409</b>    |



Iraqi Forces On Hand  MNF-I

| Trained/In-Training Iraqi Forces<br>Total- 127,621 |               |
|--|---------------|
| Police Service                                     | 47,109        |
| Civil Interv. Force                                | 1,336         |
| Emer. Response Unit                                | 107           |
| Dept. of Border Enf.                               | 14,858        |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection.                    | 446           |
| Highway Patrol                                     | 589           |
| <b>Army</b>  | <b>11,776</b> |
| <b>National Guard</b>                              | <b>43,062</b> |
| <b>Intervention Force</b>                          | <b>7,033</b>  |
| <b>Special Ops Force</b>                           | <b>690</b>    |
| <b>Air Force</b>                                   | <b>206</b>    |
| <b>Coastal Defense Force</b>                       | <b>409</b>    |



Trained Iraqi Forces  MNF-I

## Notes

•Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security

•Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

## Other Forces

**Facilities Protection Service**  
**73,992**

**NATO Training Team = 15**

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037650

## *NATO Training in Iraq*

**For Official Use Only**

- North Atlantic Council decision, 8 October includes:
  - Approval of concept of operations for NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I).
  - Dual-hatting the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq Commander.
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine, and Education Center.
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command.
  - Focusing on training, equipping, and technical assistance.
  - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway in Iraq.
  - Providing out-of-country training.
- NATO Military Authorities will now develop the Operations Plan within the next four weeks and submit it to the NAC for approval.

**For Official Use Only**

# *Back Up*

*Data as of: 13 Oct 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/037652

# Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT                | AUTHORIZED     | ON DUTY                | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|--------------------------|----------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| POLICE                   | 135,000        | 84,950                 | 42,302             | 52,800                           | JUL '06                 |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE | 4,920          | 1,336<br>(In Training) | 0                  | 1,800                            | JUL '05                 |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT  | 270            | 107                    | 76                 | 188                              | MAY '05                 |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT       | 32,000         | 15,688                 | 14,313             | 15,900                           | MAR '06                 |
| HIGHWAY PATROL           | 1,500          | 927                    | 589                | 750                              | SEP '05                 |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION     | 500            | 446                    | 446                | 500                              | DEC '04                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b>             | <b>174,190</b> | <b>103,454</b>         | <b>57,726</b>      | <b>71,938</b>                    | <b>OCT '06</b>          |

# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT          | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY            | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY   |
|--------------------|---------------|---|--|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| ARMY               | 27,000        | 4,507   | 0  | 0 121,831                            | JUL '05                            |
| NATIONAL GUARD     | 61,904        | 41,097  | 0  | 46,000 10                            | SEP '05                            |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584         | 1,743   | 0  | 732 / 5,852                          | MAY '05                            |
| SPECIAL OPS        | 1,967         | 617   | 0  | 725 / 0                              | SEP '05                            |
| AIR FORCE          | 502           | 167   | 0  | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    | TBDBASEDON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    |
| COASTAL DEFENSE    | 582           | 409   | 0  | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT | TBDBASEDON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>98,539</b> | <b>48,540</b>                                 | <b>0</b>                                   | <b>47,457 127,683</b>                | <b>MAR '06</b>                     |

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037654

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT   | TRAINING  | NUMBER IN TRAINING |
|---|---|--------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training   | 4,888              |
| Civil Intervention Force  | 6 Week Specialized Training   | 1,336              |
| Emergency Response Unit   | 8 Week Specialized Training   | 31                 |
| Dept of Border Enforcement  | 4 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training  | 545                |
| Highway Patrol  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy Training  | 0                  |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection                                    | 3 Week Initial Training<br>2-3 Week Advanced Training<br>Mentoring by US Special Forces   | 138                |
| Iraq Regular Army   | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic Training: 4 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks   | 7,269              |
| Iraqi National Guard  | Basic Training: 3 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks   | 1,965              |
| Iraqi Intervention Force  | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks<br>Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks  | 5,290              |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force<br>- Commando<br>- Counter Terrorist Task | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training).<br>12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat | 72                 |
| Air Force   | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months   | 39                 |
| Coastal Defense Force   | Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)  | 0                  |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |   | <b>21,573</b>      |

Data as of: 13 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037655

# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| Unit                             | Mission   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security.</li> </ul>   |
| Civil Intervention Force         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>  |
| Emergency Response Unit          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>  |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>  |
| Highway Patrol                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>   |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>   |
| Regular Army                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>   |
| National Guard                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security.</li> </ul>   |
| Intervention Force               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order.</li> </ul>  |
| Commando Battalion               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>   |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>  |
| Air Force                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>  |
| Coastal Defense Force            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles.</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities.</li> </ul> |

# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

## Manning:

- **9,065** available and qualified Army recruits ready for movement to initial training.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Iraqi Transportation Battalion started its first driver class.
- Two additional Special Police Commando Battalions recruited.

## Training:

- **1,500** Public Order Battalion recruits began initial training at Numaniyah Training Area
- **804** Iraqi Police students graduated from Police Basic Course at the Baghdad Academy.
- **545** DBE students started courses in Border Policing, Immigration, and Civil Customs at Jordan Academy

## Equipping:

- Issued **16,000** weapons, **64** vehicles, and over **2.6** million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior forces
- Issued **1,958** radios and **4,560** kevlar helmets to Iraqi National Guard.

## Building:

- Approximately \$1B of construction ongoing; 75% of construction of Iraqi military bases complete.
- Awarded **16** Department of Border Enforcement border fort construction contracts.
- Began construction of **8** Iraqi Police Stations in Baghdad.

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### **Mentor/Employ:**

- **5<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade conducted cordon and search operations with 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division in Baghdad; assisted with the recovery of a large weapons and ammunition cache.**
- **41 of 45 Iraqi National Guard battalions continue effective operations throughout Iraq.**

October 15, 2004

IRAQ

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
 Secretary Colin Powell  
 Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
 Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Update of Iraqi Security Force Training

Mr. President,

1. Here is the latest update concerning the training efforts in Iraq. We remain on track. I had a chance to visit with various elements of the Iraqi Security Forces in the Kirkuk region earlier this week, and they appear determined and confident.
2. As always, I'll ensure a copy of this is forwarded to Tony Blair via his Minister of Defense.

Attach.  
 10/13/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
 101504-7

1505704



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 15 2004

Mr. Walter E. Massey  
Morehouse College  
830 Westview Drive, S.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30314-3773

Dear Walter,

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to Shirley. We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

OSD 16194-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037660

293

15 OCT 04

19 SEP 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Carrie

(b)(6)

Please draft a letter for SD to Mr. Massey for review.

Thanks,  
Wife

Note (F41) - the Department gave him an award in May 2004 (the award was a distinguished public service award). - I believe in honor of his retirement.

Mr. Walter E. Massey  
Morehouse College  
830 Westview Drive, S.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30314-3773

Dear Walter,

Thank you so much for your recent letter. It was good hearing from you.

I do also appreciate the information about John Hopps. I am sorry to hear he passed away. It's clear that the Department of Defense lost a dedicated member of its community.

Send my best wishes to Shirley. We hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

 Prepare for  
See Det signature  
PAUL BUBER  
10/12

020PRE

24SEP04


19SEP04

9/24  
1700

~~FOUO~~

September 24, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Information on John Hopps



Please see if you can figure out who John Hopps is that is mentioned in Walter Massey's letter.

I'd like to answer Walter's letter - he is a good friend.

Thanks.

ATTACHED

Attach.  
9/19/04 Note from Walter Massey

DHR:ss  
092404-5

.....  
Please respond by 9/28/04

293

24 Sep 04

19 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16194-04



Walt

WALTER E. MASSEY

(b)(6)

9/10/04

Dear Dan,

293

The Department of Defense lost a very valuable member when John Hays passed a few months ago. John was my college roommate at Morehouse, and one of my closest friends (and a fellow physicist.)

John and I talked about his going to D.O.D.. At first he really did not want to, having just retired from Morehouse. However, after 9/11 he felt he had to do what was necessary to serve his country. Today reminded me of his decision.

19 SEP 04

He really loved working at D.O.D. and felt he was making important contributions.

OSD 16104-04

I know you are overwhelmed,  
but I thought that might be  
of interest to you.

Shirley sends regards to  
you and Joyce, and says  
to tell Joyce she still  
uses (quite often) the great  
dictionary Joyce gave her in  
Chicago.

Hang in there!

Walter



Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

20008+1621 2a

bbbbb

Walter E. Massey  
Morehouse College  
830 Westview Drive, S.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30314-3773

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

WDB 9/28

To Secret  
From Paul Butler Paul Butler  
9/27

Subject: Walter Massey Letter on John Higgs.

Attached is a bio on Dr. John Higgs  
who worked for Mike Wynne in AT&L.  
He passed away ~~over~~<sup>in</sup> the late spring.  
Please let me know if you would like us  
to do an initial draft reply to Mr. Massey

Yes

**DR. JOHN H. HOPPS, JR.**

**Deputy Director, Defense Research & Engineering  
and**

**Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
(Laboratories and Basic Sciences)  
3030 Defense Pentagon, Rm. 3E114  
Washington, D.C. 20301-3030**



**Phone: (703) 692-4592**

**Fax: (b)(6)**

**Email: john.hopps@osd.mil**



Dr. John H. Hopps, Jr. serves in dual capacities within the Office of Defense Research and Engineering. He serves as Principal Deputy to the Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). Dr. Hopps also serves as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences (LABS). In this capacity he has responsibility for the oversight of the Defense Laboratories, for the improvement of the Defense Laboratory science and engineering workforce, and for DDR&E university-based basic research, instrumentation, graduate fellowship and education programs in the science and engineering disciplines. He has additional responsibility for international programs of technical cooperation between the U.S. and its allies.

Dr. Hopps comes to the Department of Defense from Northwestern University where he served as Institute Professor in the Materials Research Center. His activities included an initiative for the integration of materials science into the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum. His research interests involved the application of bio-inspired perspectives in the study of strategies for self-healing in non-biological materials.

Prior to returning to scientific activities at Northwestern, Dr. Hopps served as Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, and as Professor of Physics, at Morehouse College from 1995-1999. He was responsible for all matters related to the academic program, student affairs, information technology and resources, institutional research, and athletics. Significant accomplishments included establishing the Andrew Young Center for International Affairs and the International Power Institute, and establishing interdisciplinary programs in neuroscience and telecommunications, all within the framework of a 4-year liberal arts institutional structure.

Prior to joining Morehouse, he served as Director of the Division of Materials Research at the National Science Foundation (1991-1995). Dr. Hopps' tenure at NSF was through an **IPA** arrangement with the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. At Draper, Dr. Hopps was a Principal Member of the Technical Staff and served as Chief of Photonics Technology. His responsibilities included overseeing research and development activities, as well as fabrication and test facilities in the areas of high performance fiber optic components, integrated optic components, laser devices, semiconductor photonic devices, photonics fabrication automation and packaging, and optical signal processing. He also had direct technical and management responsibility for the Laser Development and Test Facility. Dr. Hopps supervised the research of graduate students in the areas of quantum optics and in the microscopic theory of high-frequency dynamical behavior of complex semiconductor laser structures.

Also, during his tenure at Draper, which began in 1977, he served as Manager of Energy Program Development, Manager of Fault-Tolerant Systems Research, and as Education Director. From 1977 to 1991 he was concurrently a Research Affiliate in the Departments of Nuclear and/or Electrical Engineering at MIT. His primary research areas were the non-equilibrium statistical mechanics of dense fluids and their study via light and neutron scattering; and plasma kinetic theory and neutron transport theory, and their application to the control of fusion, fission and hybrid reactors. He supervised dissertations in the area of reactor control using fault-tolerant systems concepts and strategies, and in the application of real-time stochastic decision models to nuclear plant operational safety.

Dr. Hopps is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, Beta Kappa Chi, and Golden Key Honor Societies. He has been a member, and in some cases held national office, in several scientific organizations including American Association of the Advancement of Science, American Chemical Society, American Physical Society, American Nuclear Society and the Material Research Society. He has served on task forces and evaluation teams for government agencies, educational institutions and foundations, as well as public service organizations. Board appointments have included the National Research Council's National Materials Advisory and Space Studies Boards; U.S. Department of Energy National Reliable Energy Laboratory, National Advisory Board; the Negro Educational Review Editorial Board; and the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) Board of Directors.

**Education:**

Ph.D., Physics, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA (1971)  
M.S., Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA (1961)  
B.S., Math and Chemistry, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA (1958)  
Certificate, Institute for Educational Management, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

**Other Honors and Awards:**

Ford Foundation Early Admissions Scholar, Morehouse College  
Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Sanders Associates Corporate Doctoral Fellow, Brandeis University  
U.S. Presidential Citation for "Outstanding Accomplishments in the Technology Reinvestment Project"  
Morehouse College Presidential Citation, awarded by Morehouse College Board of Trustees

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

2004 OCT 19 10:00 AM

October 19, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

*David S. C. Chu 19 Oct 04*

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options--SNOWFLAKE

- This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (citizens and resident aliens) (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although we must confer with the Director of Selective Service, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
  1. Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS.
  2. Administration propose repeal of the Military Selective Service Act, eliminating the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above.
- Once you have indicated the course of action you prefer, I would be glad to organize the necessary consultative process.

RECOMMENDATION: Select #1 \_\_\_\_\_ Select #2 \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: General Counsel (Tab B) + JCS (TAB B)

Attachments:  
As stated

*10/29 Ask CJCS for views*  
*Dr. Chu*  
*D. Chu*

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr,

(b)(6)  
(b)(6)

|          |         |
|----------|---------|
| TSA SD   |         |
| SRMA SD  |         |
| MA SD    |         |
| EXEC SEC | M 10/20 |

*Larry Di Rita*

*10/29*

OSD 16220-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037670

327

19 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

**TAB**

**A**

11/5/04

November 5, 2004

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Selective Service for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective Service, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they are doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-19

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

**TAB**

**B**



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 14, 2004, 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (P&R)

DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

- o This responds to your question (Tab A) about reducing or eliminating draft registration requirements. National investments in the present Selective Service System (SSS) generally, and draft registration specifically, are of increasingly questionable value.
- o After 30 years of success with the All Volunteer Force, and with the Cold War behind us, we find mandatory draft registration increasingly questionable. Today's weapon systems and tactics do not lend themselves to a rapid infusion of draftees.
- The SSS today registers men aged 18-25 (90% compliance). One who fails to register is disqualified for certain Federal employment or education programs, and in most states would be ineligible for a driver's license.
- The SSS has about 200 full-time employees, including 16 military officers. Its annual budget is roughly \$26 million. The registrant database is used by DoD to identify recruitment leads, but is not essential. We can and do purchase excellent and well targeted "lead lists" from the private sector.
- Although I must confer with General Meyers, it presently appears we could pursue the following changes, with little or no risk to national security:
  1. Administration take action to <sup>REDUCE</sup> ~~terminate~~ registration and downsize SSS. ✓
  2. Administration propose <sup>to</sup> ~~repeal~~ the anachronistic Military Selective Service Act, and do away with the SSS. This could be done directly or as follow-on to "1" above. ✓

COORDINATION: General Counsel:

*[Handwritten signature]*  
PSGC  
10/18/04

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr, (b)(6)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2179-04

12 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR **THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PERSONNEL AND READINESS**

Subject: Selective Service System (SSS) Registration Options

1. I have reviewed the SSS options outlined in your recent note.<sup>1</sup> Recommend that we pursue Option 1: "Administration take action to reduce registration and downsize SSS."
2. The SSS database provides the Nation a valuable strategic manpower pool that should be retained. However, it is essential to transform the agency into a more modern, agile and efficient operation. Accordingly, the administration should pursue the following initiatives.
  - a. Retain the legislation supporting the SSS as a response to a national security crisis or emergency.
  - b. Realign the organization and infrastructure to a bare-bones operation and change the scope of the mission to a more limited, quick-response capability for the Nation.
  - c. Mandate that SSS's leadership exploit modern information technology applications, lessening the **staff** and administrative burdens to further reduce unnecessary costs.

  
RICHARD B. MYERS  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reference:

- 1 USD(P&R) Note, 29 October 2004

OCT 08 2004

3  
M  
9

TO: David Chu  
 Jim Haynes

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
 Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Selective Service Registration Options

Please get back to me with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.

You mentioned that current requirements cost the taxpayers a considerable amount of money. We should look at whether it is worth it. We should take a thorough look - rapidly - and decide what to propose.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-13

.....

Please respond by 10/15/04

800-04

1500504

OSD 16220-04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

327

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Options Regarding Selective Service

- You asked Dr. Chu and me to provide you with options for reducing or eliminating the requirements associated with Selective Service registration.
- The Selective Service System is a separate agency in the Executive Branch. It is not part of DoD.
- I have asked a member of my staff to work with Dr. Chu's staff in preparing a reply to you. I will coordinate on Dr. Chu's reply, and ensure it incorporates my advice.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoD OGC/

(b)(6)

cc: USD(P&R)

15 OCT 04



OCT 15 2604

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte  
ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissenger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissenger on China that is of interest.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

7/30/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss  
101404-23

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

China

15 OCT 04

OSD 16230-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

DATE: July 30, 2003

SUBJECT: Chinese Views on Korea

Two recent conversations with senior PRC officials underlined the skepticism with which China now views North Korea. Minister Chen Yunlin, who is dual-hatted as the Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of both the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, called on me July 24 accompanied by his deputy, Zhou Mingwei. A significant portion of the conversation concerned Korea. Subsequently, the departing PRC Consul General in New York, Ambassador Zhang Hongxi, hosted a dinner for me on July 28, during which we again touched on the problem posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Although Chen holds no responsibilities relating to North Korea, he himself broached the subject by asking for my views on how good or bad outcomes on the DPRK nuclear weapons issue might affect the Taiwan Strait. He seemed comfortable with my view that the emergence of a nuclear power on China's Yalu River border would not be in China's interest and would make the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia inevitable, possibly including Taiwan. I noted the issue was whether we could create a political framework for resolving the issue that would also be able to address broader concerns on the Korean peninsula, much as the CSCE process had done in Europe. I urged that we not get bogged down over tactical issues. For a viable solution, we needed to involve the five or six (including Russia) key countries involved. This would also be the most effective way to commit Japan to nuclear restraint. I emphasized the central role that China and the United States needed to play, since neither of us could tolerate having a new nuclear power on the Korean peninsula. I recalled that I had seen a major shift in China's position on North Korea as US-China relations had evolved and touched on the enormous expansion of China's trade and other relations with South Korea.

Chen did not take issue with any of these observations and responded positively to the further point that good cooperation between China and the United States in dealing with North Korea would also deny an opportunity to elements on Taiwan who wanted to drive a wedge between Beijing and Washington, whereas poor cooperation would have the opposite effect. He appreciated my remark that China's interests on the Korean peninsula were broader than simply the question of nuclear weapons, and that these interests needed to be respected. I also noted the beneficial impact on elites in both countries if we were seen as cooperating closely on an issue as important as Korea. Chen called these observations very important and useful for China to consider.

( During my dinner with Ambassador Zhang, he readily acknowledged North Korea's appalling weakness as a result of its own policies. He doubted that the regime there could survive for more than a month if war were to break out.

In contrast to the pollyannaish views of some Chinese officials in the past when discussing North Korea, I was struck by the realism about the North displayed by both Chen and Zhang in these conversations. Neither tried to make rhetorical points.

Overall, my impression is that the implications of North Korea's current policies are so grave for Beijing, and pose such high risks of international complications that impact directly on fundamental Chinese security interests, that there are divided counsels in the PRC government over the best approach. At the same time, top leaders clearly recognize that if China is perceived as disengaged, or unwilling to press resolutely for a **non-nuclear** Korean peninsula, it will compromise its ability to sustain Japanese restraint on acquiring nuclear weapons. For that reason, China is more resolute than South Korea in its determination to reverse North Korea's nuclear program, even at severe cost to its relations with North Korea, or to the survivability of the regime there.

However, for China it is vitally important, in part because of its internal divided counsels, that regime-threatening actions not be taken except after every alternative possibility of resolving the matter through dialogue and negotiations has been exhausted. This underlines the need for a patient but resolute tightening of the screws on North Korea, rather than premature resort to a regime-threatening approach that will maximize Beijing's internal difficulties and increase the risks that China will seek more starkly to differentiate its approach from that of the United States.

October 18, 2004

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte  
ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Kissinger Memo

Attached is a dated memo by Henry Kissinger on China that is of interest.

Attach.  
7/3/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss  
101404-23



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

China

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Overall, my impression is that the implications of North Korea's current policies are so grave for Beijing, and pose such high risks of international complications that impact directly on fundamental Chinese security interests, that there are divided counsels in the PRC government over the best approach. At the same time, top leaders clearly recognize that if China is perceived as disengaged, or unwilling to press resolutely for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, it will compromise its ability to sustain Japanese restraint on acquiring nuclear weapons. For that reason, China is more resolute than South Korea in its determination to reverse North Korea's nuclear program, even at severe cost to its relations with North Korea, or to the survivability of the regime there.

However, for China it is vitally important, in part because of its internal divided counsels, that regime-threatening actions not be taken except after every alternative possibility of resolving the matter through dialogue and negotiations has been exhausted. This underlines the need for a patient but resolute tightening of the screws on North Korea, rather than premature resort to a regime-threatening approach that will maximize Beijing's internal difficulties and increase the risks that China will seek more starkly to differentiate its approach from that of the United States.

**Washington Headquarters Services  
Executive Services & Communications Directorate**

1155 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Phone: 703-695-3133 -- Fax: (b)(6)

|                          |   |  |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| FROM :                   |   | TO: Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK (GEN LaPorte)        |
| Subject: Kissinger Memo  |   | Organization: Office of the Secretary of Defense |
|                          |   | Phone: DSN (b)(6)                                |
| Pages (Including Cover): | 4 | Date: 10/18/2004 Fax: (b)(6)                     |

Urgent     For Review     Please Comment     Please Reply     Information

Comments: Item of interest from SECDEF

October 18, 2004

TO: Gen Leon LaPorte  
ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Kissinger Memo

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Attach.

7/3/03 Memo by Dr. Henry Kissinger re: Chinese Views on Korea

DHR:ss  
101404-23

.....

*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE: July 30, 2003  
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October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. R.*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to be coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

She is a very bright, capable person and it would be a help if she had a good trip.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

18 Oct 04

October 15, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

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101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

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LTG David Barno

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Thanks.

DIR:ss  
101504-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

7201

HOLD



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

~~SENSITIVE~~

10 OCT 2004 11:55

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

ACTION MEMO

October 14, 2004 - 11:00 AM  
DepSecDef Action \_\_\_\_\_

210 (3+4)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (P&R)  
*David S. C. Chu 18 Oct 04*  
SUBJECT: Female General and Flag Officers — SNOWFLAKE

- You asked two questions regarding female general and flag officers (Tab A).
  - Have we ever had a four-star woman? **Answer:** No
  - Are there any four-star candidate females in any of the Services right now? **Answer:** We currently have no three-star female officers. The Services do intend to nominate several three-star slates this year. The Service game plan meetings with you later this month should provide a clear assessment of the potential of each of these two-stars.
- Among recently retired female three-stars, perhaps the strongest possibility is LTG Kenne, who could be a candidate for Air Force Materiel Command at a future date (bio at Tab B).
- Reflecting the period when they entered military service, all one and two-star women officers chose careers in "support" specialties. This will make it difficult to compete successfully as combatant commander candidates, and likewise for chief of service. But some may be strong candidates for the four-star training commands in the Air Force and the Army, the acquisition commands, and possibly for vice chief of a military service.

14 Oct 04

**RECOMMENDATION:** That you discuss with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs how they are developing women with operational backgrounds for the next cohort of junior flag officers.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

**SECDEF DECISION:**  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

20 Oct 04



October 7, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Four-Star Question

*Vertical handwritten notes on the right margin, partially illegible.*

*210(344)*

Have **we ever had** a four-star woman? **And** are there any four-star candidate **females** in **any** of the services right **now**?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100704-14

*10/8*



*Vertical handwritten text on the right margin: 700CT04*



# BIOGRAPHY

## UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

### LIEUTENANT GENERAL LESLIE F. KENNE

**Retired Sep. 1, 2003.**

Lt. Gen. Leslie F. Kenne is Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. She is responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for forming and executing policy and strategy to integrate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to enable more effective employment of air and space power in support of national objectives. General Kenne also provides guidance and direction to four field operating agencies: the Air Force Command and Control & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center; the Air Force Communications Agency; the Air Force Frequency Management Agency; and the Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation.



General Kenne entered the Air Force in 1971 as a distinguished graduate of Auburn University's ROTC program. She has served as a flight line maintenance officer in operations, and attended the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School in 1974. After school, she served as a test and evaluation project manager, and in test and evaluation supervisory positions.

General Kenne has served in two other Pentagon staff positions, first as a division chief, and during a second tour, as a deputy director in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. She has directed three major programs-- the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night, the F-16 and the Joint Strike Fighter. She also has served as Vice Commander of Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif. Prior to assuming her current position, General Kenne commanded the Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.

#### EDUCATION

1970 Bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering, Auburn University, Auburn, Ala.  
 1975 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.  
 1979 Master's degree in procurement management, Webster College, St. Louis, Mo.  
 1981 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 1986 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.  
 1988 Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.  
 1993 Advanced Management Program, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire

11-L-0559/OSD/037693

1995 National and International Security Management Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

#### **ASSIGNMENTS**

1. April 1971 - December 1971, space systems analyst, Headquarters Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
2. December 1971 - April 1972, student, aircraft maintenance officer course, Chanute Air Force Base, Ill.
3. April 1972 - June 1973, flight line maintenance officer, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
4. June 1973 - June 1974, maintenance supervisor, 474th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
5. July 1974 - October 1975, student, flight test engineering course, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, Calif.
6. October 1975 - June 1978, project manager for air combat measuring instrumentation, later, Deputy Test Director, Range Measurement System Joint Testing, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
7. June 1978 - August 1981, program manager for Secretary of Defense Office-directed joint tests, Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.
8. August 1981 - January 1982, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
9. January 1982 - June 1985, Chief, Airborne Systems Test Branch, later, Chief, Electronics Systems Test Division, 3246th Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.
10. June 1985 - June 1986, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. June 1986 - April 1988, Director of Operations and Support, Airborne Warning and Control Systems Program Office, later, Program Manager, Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Class II, Headquarters Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
12. April 1988 - September 1988, student, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va.
13. December 1988 - August 1990, Chief, Special Projects Division, Directorate of Special Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
14. August 1990 - July 1992, Director, LANTIRN Systems Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
15. July 1992 - October 1993, Deputy Director, Fighters, Command and Control and Weapons Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
16. October 1993 - September 1994, Director, F-16 System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
17. September 1994 - July 1995, Vice Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
18. July 1995 - September 1996, Vice Commander, Sacramento Air Logistics Center, McClellan Air Force Base, Calif.
19. September 1996 - July 1997, Deputy Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
20. August 1997 - June 1999, Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Arlington, Va.
21. June 1999 - April 2002, Commander, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass.
22. May 2002 - August 2003, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

#### **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Distinguished Service Medal  
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster  
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster  
Bronze Star Medal  
Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters  
Joint Service Commendation Medal  
Air Force Commendation Medal

#### **PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATIONS**

Level III Program Management  
Level III Test and Evaluation

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant Apr 1, 1971  
First Lieutenant Apr 1, 1973  
Captain Apr 1, 1975  
Major Oct 24, 1980  
Lieutenant Colonel Mar 1, 1985  
Colonel Oct 1, 1989  
Brigadier General Oct 1, 1994  
Major General Mar 20, 1998  
Lieutenant General Jul 1, 1999

(Current as of July 2002)

October 18, 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad  
LTG David Barno  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Kristin Devold, the Norwegian MOD, is going to be coming to Afghanistan.

We suggested she see both of you. Possibly see a U.S. PRT -- maybe Kandahar, Gardez or Jalalabad. We also suggested she might think about seeing Wardock or the Minister of Finance.

She is a very bright, capable person and it would be a help if she had a good trip.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101504-12



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*Norway*

*101504-12*

OSD 16364-04

10/18/2004 4:26:39 PM

**OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION**

**FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

**To:** Ambassador Khalilzad

**Subject:** Conversation with Norway's MOD

**Facsimile #:** 011-93-20-230-1364

**From:** Secretary Rumsfeld

**Office/Desk:** OSD Cables Division

**Number of Pages Incl. Cover:** 2

**Telephone:** Comm: (b)(6)  
DSN: (b)(6)

**Facsimile:** (b)(6)

**Remarks:**

COMPLETED

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|                             |     |      |        |       |

**Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD**

---

**From:** McInturff, Sandra L [McInturffSL@state.gov]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 5:44 AM  
**To:** 'Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD'  
**Subject:** RE: Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

I got it. I will take a copy to General Barno's people.  
Sandy McInturff

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Steinfadt, Kyle D, Capt, OSD [mailto:Kyle.Steinfadt@osd.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 2:09 PM  
**To:** 'mcinturffsl@state.gov'  
**Subject:** Memo for Khalizad from SecDef Rumsfeld

Please receipt email for the attached 2-pg doc.

Thank You,  
Capt Steinfadt <<Khalizad.snowflake.19Oct04.pdf>>

10/18/2004 4:28:24 PM

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

COMPLETED

To: LTG Barno

Subject: Conversation with Norway's MOD

Facsimile #: ~~DSN 312-224-3723~~  
CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL

From: Secretary Rumsfeld

Office/Desk: OSD Cables Division

Number of Pages Incl. Cover: 2

Telephone: Comm: (b)(6)  
DSN: (b)(6)

Facsimile: (b)(6)

Remarks:

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**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** System Administrator [postmaster@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:28 AM  
**To:** CablesESO@osd.smil.mil  
**Subject:** Delivered: RE:



RE:

<<RE: >> Your message

To: 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'  
Subject: RE:  
Sent: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:30:26 -0000

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO on Tue, 19 Oct 2004 07:28:03 -0000

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

---

**From:** CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO [CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 4:35 AM  
**To:** 'RSS - SecDef CablesESO'  
**Subject:** RE:

Got it sir. Thanks

**MICHAEL K. ANDERSON**  
**SFC, USA**  
**Embassy Liaison NCO**  
**DSN:** (b)(6)



-----Original Message-----

**From:** RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:CablesESO@osd.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 12:00 PM  
**To:** 'CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO'  
**Subject:** RE:

**Classification: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

I see all CAPS in the address, that was not told to me....

Please confirm receipt of 2-pg doc from SecDef to GEN Barno.

Thank You,  
Capt Steinfadt  
SecDef ESO

-----Original Message-----

**From:** CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO [mailto:CFC-EMB-ADMIN-NCO@CFC-A.CENTCOM.SMIL.MIL]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 19, 2004 3:25 AM  
**To:** 'cableseso@osd.smil.mil'  
**Subject:**

Test.

**MICHAEL K. ANDERSON**  
**SFC, USA**  
**Embassy Liaison NCO**

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Over Classification

Please look into this article on over classification.

I have always felt that there has been a "~~bet~~safer than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.  
Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DHR:dk  
082504-12 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/30/04

OSD 16378-04

Members of the commission have said that the recommendations for overhaul of Congressional intelligence oversight, which the panel described as "dysfunctional," were among the panel's most important - and would be among the most difficult for Congress to endorse. The commission called for Congress to consider creation of a single joint committee on intelligence or, alternatively, for a single committee in each house of Congress that would have the power to appropriate budget money.

Either proposal would almost certainly face strong opposition from lawmakers on the many Congressional committees that now review intelligence affairs and would have to cede power under a new oversight structure.

The membership of the working group includes Mr. Roberts, as well as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia, the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee's ranking Democrat. Senators Warner and Levin have already expressed wariness about any change that might strip the Defense Department - and the Armed Services Committee as well - of control over intelligence matters related to the military.

Among the other members of the working group are the two Senate authors of the legislation that created the Sept. 11 commission: John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut.

"Ensuring that the Senate is as effective as possible when dealing with the threat of terrorism is a principal concern," Mr. Frist said, "and I welcome the working group's recommendations."

Washington Times  
August 25, 2004  
Pg. 6

## Overclassification Overdone?

*Pentagon testifies it errs 'on the side of caution'*

By Shaun Waterman, United Press International

The official in charge of information security at the Pentagon told lawmakers yesterday that at least half of the information the U.S. government classifies every year should not be kept secret.

"How about if I say 50-50?" Carol Haave told the House Government Reform national security, emerging threats and international relations subcommittee, when asked to quantify the problem of overclassification.

Ms. Haave, the deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, said classification generally was not done maliciously, but because "people have a tendency to err on the side of caution."

The hearing was one in an unprecedented summer-recess series held to consider the recommendations of the September 11 commission, which found "current security requirements nurture overclassification" and create a barrier to the information-sharing needed to fight terrorism.

[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825a/index\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20040825a/index_concat.html)

8/25/2004

Rep. Christopher Shays, Connecticut Republican, the panel's chairman, called the system for safeguarding the nation's secrets "incomprehensibly complex" and "so bloated it often does not distinguish between the critically important and the comically irrelevant."

Mr. Shays said there was broad agreement that many of the 14 million pieces of information the government classified last year did not need to be secret, but that estimates varied wildly on how bad the problem is.

"Some estimate 10 percent of current secrets should never have been classified. Others put the extent of overclassification as high as 90 percent," he said.

The administration's secrecy watchdog, Bill Leonard, head of the Information Security Oversight Office, told legislators that too much information is being classified in violation of President Bush's executive order governing secrecy.

That order, introduced in March, says information can lawfully be classified only if its "unauthorized disclosure ... reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security ..."

The problem, said Bill Crowell, a former deputy director of the National Security Agency who has served on a number of commissions inquiring into classification and secrecy, is that the system dated from the Cold War.

"The current system assumes that it is possible to determine in advance who needs to know particular information, and that the risks associated with disclosure are greater than the potential benefits of wider information-sharing," he said.

As a result, there are significant incentives to protect information, but none to share it.

---

Christian Science Monitor  
August 25, 2004

## Debate Reignites Over US Aid To Indonesia

*A court ruling earlier this month exonerated four officials charged in the 1999 massacre in East Timor.*

By Eric Unmacht, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

JAKARTA, INDONESIA - Two competing perspectives have long dominated Washington when it comes to military aid for Indonesia. On one side there are those in Congress who call the country's military brutal abusers of human rights. They want US aid to remain suspended until Indonesia's military is reformed.

On the other side is the Pentagon and some White House officials who say the US, once Indonesia's largest source of military aid, should resume funding because of the country's importance to the war on terrorism.

[http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/cbfiles/e20040825aaindex\\_concat.html](http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/cbfiles/e20040825aaindex_concat.html)

8/25/2004



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000  
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1111 L. ... 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

OCT 12 2004

SUBJECT: SecDef Snowflake Regarding Overclassification

- Your snowflake of 25 August 2004 (attached) expressed concern about over classification within the Department. This is predominately a training issue. People overclassify because they are in a hurry or cautious, the classification guidance is unclear or the derivative source was over classified.
- We have recently established the DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and Defense Agencies that is meeting quarterly to oversee implementation of security policies to include this one. Recommend this be "the team" you suggest establishing in your comments to help reduce excessive classification.
- Regarding your comment about review of documents, there are systematic and mandatory declassification review processes as well as reviews done in response to Freedom of Information requests. For example, USD(P) is conducting a declassification review of prewar Iraq policy material. Also, there is a package on its way to you designating USD(I) as the final declassification arbiter for GTMO related issues.
- Attached are some actions underway to help remedy the situation, but the key is command emphasis on security as part of the operational mission, training and oversight. These actions and venues provide the opportunity and ability to strengthen the DoD information security program and reduce over classification.

Attachment:

List of additional actions

COORDINATION:

DA&M: Concur

GC: Concur

Prepared by: C. Bromwell, OUSD(I), (b)(6)

OSD 16378-04



### Revised Guidance

- As required by the SecDef All Hands message (attached), we are issuing a memorandum to all DoD agencies to rejustify their list of original classification authorities to ensure only those positions requiring this authority have it.
- In a revision to DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program," we will be proposing that derivative classification authorities be identified on classified documents. This will reinforce accountability of decisions.
- We are coordinating recommended changes to detainee guidance with a number of DoD agencies and once agreed, we will provide them to the Commanding General, Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo (GTMO) for updating his security classification guide.
- You will be receiving, if you haven't already, a memo for your signature designating me as the declassification authority for collateral classified information related to JTF GTMO detainee issues.

### Training Initiatives

- The Defense Security Service Academy is updating and reinforcing the training requirements that will be articulated in a memorandum from me to all DoD Components. We are also investigating novel ways to disseminate the information across the Department such as websites, and assist visits. We are also sending a survey to deploying commands to determine security training needs.
- The Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency conducts a security awareness week in the Pentagon every year, and one of my staff will be participating in October to emphasize your message.
- We continue efforts to enhance the training and professionalization of security managers.
- Considering assigning DSS representatives to Combatant Commanders to educate and answer security-related questions.

### Oversight

- The DoD Security Directors Group comprised of senior security officials from the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands and defense agencies that is meeting on 5 October and quarterly thereafter to help oversee implementation of revised security policies.
- OUSDI-led coordination of JTF GTMO detainee-related documents.
- Command self-inspections.
- Considering a proposal to DoD Inspector General — make classification a special interest item.
- Information Security Oversight Office oversight visits to DoD Components.

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ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUEKJCS9815 2602142  
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To ALDODACT  
ZEN/ALDODACT @ AL ALDODACT(UC)  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC  
ZEN/PTC OTC SPT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: SUBJ: DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

ALDODACT 13/04

ADDRESSEES PASS TO ALL SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
REF: (A) EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, AS AMENDED, CLASSIFIED NATIONAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION (B) DOD 5200.1-R, INFORMATION SECURITY  
PROGRAM

1. THE PRESIDENT ESTABLISHED A STRONG INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 (REFERENCE A), IMPLEMENTED WITHIN DEPARTMENT BY REFERENCE (B). ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION (OCA), DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO REFERENCE (A), AND CLASSIFIERS, ARE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR DECISIONS. OFFICIALS WITH COMMAND SIGNATURE AUTHORITY SHALL ENSURE THAT CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS ARE
2. IT IS IMPORTANT TO STATE THAT CLASSIFIERS SHALL NOT: A) CLASSIFICATION TO CONCEAL VIOLATIONS OF LAW, INEFFICIENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR; B) CLASSIFY INFORMATION TO EMBARRASSMENT TO A PERSON, ORGANIZATION, OR AGENCY; C) INFORMATION TO PREVENT OR DELAY THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE PROTECTION IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY. INFORMATION MAY ONLY BE CLASSIFIED IF IT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT IN REFERENCE (A) AND REITERATED IN REFERENCE (B).
3. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)) ISSUE MINIMUM TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OCAS AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITIES WITHIN 45 DAYS. USD(I) ALSO SHALL THAT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE IS UPDATED, CORRECTIVE IS TAKEN, AS APPROPRIATE, AT DOD COMPONENTS THAT GENERATE RELATED TO DETAINEES AND PRISONER ABUSE, AND THAT ALL DOD CONDUCT ACTIVE OVERSIGHT OF ALL OCA POSITIONS FOR JUSTIFICATION MAINTAIN THIS
4. ALL CLASSIFIED DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED

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SUCH AND CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS APPLIED AS REQUIRED BY REFERENCE  
(B) . DRAFTS AND WORKING PAPERS MAY NOT BE USED AS SOURCES FOR  
DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES .

5. ANY QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SENT VIA THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO ONE OF THE  
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIAL, THE DIRECTOR OF  
MANAGEMENT, JOINT STAFF OR THE DIRECTOR, SECURITY, (ODUSD/CI&S) .

PJBD...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
USRMCLD... INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
JSSC...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
SHAPE LNO...INFO \*\*\*\*\*  
USSOCOMWO...INFO \*\*\*\*\*

JOINT STAFF V1 3  
ACTION (U,7)  
INFO SJS-C(\*) SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*)  
CMAS(1) JS COMPT(\*) PJBD(\*) JSSC(\*) USSOCOMWO(\*)  
JMUSDC(\*) USTRANSCOMWO(\*) JSAMS(\*) SECDEF-C(1)  
SECDEF-C(\*) JCSOINNIPRDA(\*) JCSONSIPRDA(\*)

SECDEF V2 0  
ACTION SECDEF WASH DC(\*) (U,6,7,8)  
INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS2(\*) DOTE :OSD(\*)  
DOD:IG(\*) ATSD:IO(\*) NCCS SUPPORT(\*) MDA(\*)  
C3I-DASD-DCIO(\*) USDAT :STS(\*) ASD :PA-SMTP(\*)  
DIR :PAE-RAM(\*) DIR :PAE-SSACP(\*) DIR:PAE-DCL(\*)  
USDCOMP(\*) MILPERDIV(\*) USDP:ESC(\*) ESC-SMTP(\*)  
IG-DCIS KWS(\*) OSDONNIPRDA(\*) OSDONSIPRDA(\*)  
+SAFE

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#9815

NNNN

August 25, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Over Classification

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I have always felt that there has been a "better safe than sorry" approach. Everyone tends to classify things that didn't need to be classified, and there is really no process for reviewing it in a timely fashion and declassifying it.

Maybe we ought to put together a team inside the Department to see if we can avoid having excessive classification. Let's get some folks to look at how we might do a better job on that—possibly a training program.

Thanks very much.

Attach.

Waterman, Shaun. "Overclassification Overdone?" *Washington Times*, August 25, 2004, p. 6.

DHR:gh  
082504-12 (to computer).doc

.....  
Please respond by

9/20/04

OSD 16378-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037709

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Washington Times  
August 25, 2004  
Pg. 6

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8/25/2004

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Christian Science Monitor  
August 25, 2004

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8/25/2004

TAB  
~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2004

869

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-13

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

322

28 Sep 04

092804-13

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037712



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2129-04  
19 October 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY 10/18*

SUBJECT: CINCs

- **Question.** "Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINCs I don't deal with regularly?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** Yes, we should strive for enhanced connectivity with combatant commanders with whom we are not engaged on a regular basis.
- **Analysis.** The following procedures provide the necessary links:
  - Encourage all combatant commanders to request an office call with SecDef whenever they visit Washington.
  - Host periodic video-telecommunications or teleconferences with one command at a time.
  - Visit (accompanied by Joyce) one combatant command per month for a day.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

**As** stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037713

TAB

~~FOUO~~

September 28, 2004

869

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CMCs

Should we try to figure out a way to get better connected to those CINC's I don't deal with regularly?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-13

.....  
Please *respond-by*:

10/8/04

092804-13

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 16393-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037714

October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages.

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a set of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102504-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

*091.4*

*25 OCT 04*

*4 OCT 04*

~~FOUO~~

10/4/04

~~FOUO~~

cc - 10/4/04  
NDP

10/4/04 10:07

OCT 04 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/14/04

~~FOUO~~



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

SECRET

INFO MEMO

2004 DEC -2 PM 2:49

November 29, 2004, 5:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)  
*David S. C. Chu & Dec 04*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The current language pool is driven by an outdated manpower “requirements” process.
- We need to establish a number of people to be trained in languages over and above the needs defined in this traditional manner, “capabilities based.” This is one of the objectives of our Language Transformation Roadmap.
- We can begin by:
  - o Identifying a goal for the percent of the force that should possess capability in investment languages (regardless of job), and tasking the Defense Language Institute to set up courses to train these service members over and above their existing capacity. I propose setting the goal at **5%** active, 2 1/2% selected reserve (= 70,300 active, 21,522 reserves)
  - o Establishing a Joint Service Language Corps that could be used to support all services and operations. We are currently developing the concept for such a Corps.
  - o Expediting the full implementation of an **Army** pilot program to recruit Arabic speaking service members, by expanding the languages we target for recruitment and starting similar programs in other services.
  - o Providing incentive for service members to maintain their language proficiency with enhanced Foreign Language Proficiency Pay. **An** increase was included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act.
- Subject to your guidance, I will pursue all of the above options and report back to you on our progress.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD(PLANS),

(b)(6)



OSD 16491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037717

October 25, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

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It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

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Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102504-19

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

OCT 04 2004

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.


I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by

10/14/04



Sir,  
Response Attached  
V/R  
COLB  
10/20



1455

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



DA 104

2004 OCT 19 PM 6:20

October 13, 2004, 3 PM

PERSONNEL AND READINESS

Gail Butler

Aug 10/20

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Macro Layout of Languages (Snowflake)

- Active Service members with a minimum of Level 1 reading and listening ability:

|                          | 2000  | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  | 2004  |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Arabic (Modern Standard) | 2,391 | 1,979 | 2,586 | 2,606 | 2,556 |
| Chinese (Mandarin)       | 1,168 | 918   | 1,455 | 1,578 | 1,623 |
| Persian Farsi            | 657   | 446   | 739   | 802   | 796   |
| Persian Afghan           | 5     | 4     | 15    | 13    | 16    |
| Korean                   | 2,646 | 2,243 | 3,199 | 3,322 | 3,354 |

see expanded charts at rear of packet

|                          | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Arabic (Modern Standard) | 418  | 417  | 398  | 376  | 543  |
| Chinese (Mandarin)       | 150  | 205  | 188  | 237  | 189  |
| Persian Farsi            | 124  | 95   | 103  | 138  | 166  |
| Persian Afghan           | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 18   |
| Korean                   | 264  | 322  | 274  | 253  | 379  |

- More dramatic improvement has been hampered by the Services' lengthy processes for developing manpower requirements, which are largely based upon past operational experience instead of being driven by a capabilities-based assessment. We have initiated a pilot program to recruit heritage Arabic speakers into the Individual Ready Reserve with an eye to creating a surge capability for operational units in the future. The Army is having success with this program, which should serve as a model for future efforts.
- We are also addressing systemic language issues to fix the requirements process to allow for "top down" driven changes, a doctrinal change to incorporate foreign language and regional expertise as combat capabilities for planning purposes, and a readiness index to measure our progress. We are currently coordinating a Transformation Roadmap that embodies these changes and the need for greater language proficiency among our language specialists. In accordance with the Strategic Planning Guidance, the Roadmap will be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.

Attachment:  
Data on Service Academies language requirements

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (PLANS), (b)(6)

|          |                  |
|----------|------------------|
| TSA SD   | <i>10/20</i>     |
| SRMA SD  |                  |
| MA SD    | <i>SPD 10/20</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M 10/20</i>   |



OSD 16491-04

## SERVICE ACADEMIES

**United States Military Academy** (two semester mandatory requirement) Following are the numbers for cadets in the Classes of 2004-2008 for the seven languages taught at West Point.

| Academic Year (AY) | AY 2000 (graduates 2004) | AY 2001 (graduates 2005) | AY 2002 (graduates 2006) | AY 2003 (graduates 2007) | AY 2004 (graduates 2008) |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Arabic             | 91                       | 89                       | 208                      | 209                      | 244                      |
| Chinese            | 84                       | 112                      | 58                       | 55                       | 78                       |
| French             | 130                      | 149                      | 148                      | 178                      | 97                       |
| German             | 263                      | 232                      | 234                      | 265                      | 216                      |
| Portuguese         | 118                      | 100                      | 58                       | 127                      | 178                      |
| Russian            | 70                       | 112                      | 141                      | 56                       | 52                       |
| Spanish            | 374                      | 361                      | 279                      | 366                      | 420                      |

**United States Air Force Academy** (four semester requirement for non-technical majors; two semester requirement for mathematics, space operations, meteorology, and biology; no requirement for engineering majors) Students enrolled in language courses, by year.

| Academic Year | Fall 2000 | Fall 2001 | Fall 2002 (voluntary) | Fall 2003 (mandatory again) | Fall 2004 |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Arabic        | 104       | 111       | 47                    | 84                          | 135       |
| Chinese       | 108       | 105       | 42                    | 46                          | 75        |
| French        | 312       | 253       | 98                    | 151                         | 164       |
| German        | 285       | 226       | 79                    | 156                         | 197       |
| Japanese      | 109       | 130       | 37                    | 65                          | 97        |
| Russian       | 171       | 181       | 92                    | 112                         | 128       |
| Spanish       | 465       | 630       | 261                   | 286                         | 346       |

**United States Naval Academy** (four semester requirement for humanities and social science majors; no requirement for engineering, mathematics or science majors) **Number** of midshipmen taking languages by the academic year.

| Academic Year | 2001 (Spring & Fall) | 2002 (Spring & Fall) | 2003 (Spring & Fall) | 2004 (Spring & Fall) | 2005 (Fall) |
|---------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Arabic        |                      |                      |                      |                      | *34         |
| Chinese       |                      | *56                  | 103                  | 111                  | 51          |
| French        | 294                  | 297                  | 325                  | 319                  | 172         |
| German        | 177                  | 174                  | 207                  | 230                  | 120         |
| Japanese      | 109                  | 112                  | 92                   | 123                  | 82          |
| Russian       | 89                   | 97                   | 122                  | 134                  | 64          |
| Spanish       | 1122                 | 963                  | 951                  | 1078                 | 456         |

Attachment



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000**  
**INFO MEMO**



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

October 13, 2004, 3 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

*David S. C. Chu*  
 1946604

SUBJECT: Macro Layout of Languages (Snowflake)

|                          | <b>2000</b> | <b>2001</b> | <b>2002</b> | <b>2003</b> | <b>2004</b> |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
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| Chinese (Mandarin)       | 1,168       | 918         | 1,455       | 1,578       | 1,623       |
| Persian Farsi            | 657         | 446         | 739         | 802         | 796         |
| Persian Afghan           | 5           | 4           | 15          | 13          | 16          |
| Korean                   | 2,646       | 2,243       | 3,199       | 3,322       | 3,354       |

- Students graduating with these languages at the Defense Language Institute:

|                          | <b>2000</b> | <b>2001</b> | <b>2002</b> | <b>2003</b> | <b>2004</b> |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Arabic (Modern Standard) | 418         | 417         | 398         | 376         | 543         |
| Chinese (Mandarin)       | 150         | 205         | 188         | 237         | 189         |
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Attachment:

Data on Service Academies language requirements

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD (PLANS),

(b)(6)



OSD 16491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037722

## SERVICE ACADEMIES

**United States Military Academy** (two semester mandatory requirement) Following are the numbers for cadets in the Classes of 2004-2008 for the seven languages taught at West Point.

| Academic Year (AY) | AY 2000 (graduates 2004) | AY 2001 (graduates 2005) | AY 2002 (graduates 2006) | AY 2003 (graduates 2007) | AY 2004 (graduates 2008) |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Arabic             | 91                       | 89                       | 208                      | 209                      | 244                      |
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| Russian            | 70                       | 112                      | 141                      | 56                       | 52                       |
| Spanish            | 374                      | 361                      | 279                      | 366                      | 420                      |

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| Academic Year | Fall 2000 | Fall 2001 | Fall 2002 (voluntary) | Fall 2003 (mandatory again) | Fall 2004 |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Arabic        | 104       | 111       | 47                    | 84                          | 135       |
| Chinese       | 108       | 105       | 42                    | 46                          | 75        |
| French        | 312       | 253       | 98                    | 151                         | 164       |
| German        | 285       | 226       | 79                    | 156                         | 197       |
| Japanese      | 109       | 130       | 37                    | 65                          | 97        |
| Russian       | 171       | 181       | 92                    | 112                         | 128       |
| Spanish       | 465       | 630       | 261                   | 286                         | 346       |

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| Academic Year | 2001 (Spring & Fall) | 2002 (Spring & Fall) | 2003 (Spring & Fall) | 2004 (Spring & Fall) | 2005 (Fall) |
|---------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Arabic        |                      |                      |                      |                      | *34         |
| Chinese       |                      | *56                  | 103                  | 111                  | 51          |
| French        | 294                  | 297                  | 325                  | 319                  | 172         |
| German        | 177                  | 174                  | 207                  | 230                  | 120         |
| Japanese      | 109                  | 112                  | 92                   | 123                  | 82          |
| Russian       | 89                   | 97                   | 122                  | 134                  | 64          |
| Spanish       | 1122                 | 963                  | 951                  | 1078                 | 456         |

\*Denotes inception year of program.

Attachment

11-L-0559/OSD/037723

10/4/04

~~FOUO~~

CC: 10/4/04  
WDP

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OCT 04 2004

OCT 04 11 PM 06:27

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Macro Layout

Please get back to me with a macro layout on languages in the Department of Defense, including what it was each year beginning in 2000 to the present.

I'm from Missouri on this one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100104-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/14/04

~~FOUO~~

720  
~~TOUG~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
VADM Jim Stavridis  
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues Proposal

*Copy of  
PKC to  
GEN Helmick*

Please take a look at this proposal from Ray Dubois and tell me what you think of it.

~~Have Paul Wolfowitz look at it, and then come back to me with a recommendation.~~

Thanks.

Attach  
5/20/04 Memo to SecDef re: Elevating Issues

DHR:es  
101404-33

.....  
Please respond by 10/18

*SJR* —

*→ Larry, Paul, and I think it worth setting up & trying for 6 months.  
→ Will send to Deputy for his cut / recommendation.*

*v/r jr*

~~TOUG~~  
11-L-0559/OSD/037725


OSD 16606-04

**A**




# Executive Issues Flow

## Chain of Command Reporting



## Expedited Early-Warning



October 19, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Letter from Governor Ehrlich

Attached is a letter from Governor Bob Ehrlich, and a copy of my response to him.

It is in your hands.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/15/04 Gov Ehrlich Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
101904-21


.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

3233 Navy

19 OCT 04

15 OCT 04

OSD 16610-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor of Maryland  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

4

Dear Governor,

Thanks so much for your note and your holiday greetings. Mary Beth dropped it off.

I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large loop and a long horizontal stroke.



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.,  
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC, 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, Maryland is home to nearly 100,000 military personnel and some of the nation's most important military installations. While many of these installations have become an integral part of America's tradition and history, I would like to draw your attention to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head, a facility that is vital to the way we conduct warfare.

Recently, the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Indian Head developed, tested, and fielded the thermobaric bomb in 68 days. It was a remarkable success story in our fight against Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts in the mountainous Gardez region of eastern Afghanistan. Although this facility has remained relatively anonymous, its unique combination of energetics capability and problem solving are essential to overcome the asymmetrical tactics of our enemies.

While industry has abandoned the energetics business, it can no longer meet this quick-response requirement. As a result, the Navy consolidated its energetics activities into the Naval Warfare Center at Indian Head, which provides a full life-cycle energetics activity, capable of pursuing science and technology, design, development, in-service engineering, process development, scale-up and limited production. This enormous capability is supported by 800 energetics scientists and technicians and efficiently housed in one facility in Indian Head. In fact, 70% of all U.S. explosives and propellants, including the thermobaric bomb, developed since 1985 originated at Indian Head.

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 is designed to save money while injecting efficiencies into the way we station and deploy our forces. In 1995, BRAC analysts focused keenly on energetics and devised multiple scenarios to close Indian Head. It became clear that it was too expensive to close Indian Head then, and it will likely remain too expensive to close today. In the wake of BRAC, however, the Navy took the opportunity to consolidate even more energetics missions at Indian Head. Today, it remains the hub of the Department of Defense (DoD) energetics, it is the only research and development center for underwater weapons, the only facility for high-risk chemicals (including being the sole producer of torpedo fuel), and it is DoD's center of excellence for all aircraft ejection seat propellants and other cartridge actuated and propellant actuated (CAD/PAD) devices.


OSD/6610-04

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
October 15, 2004  
Page 2

Others have followed the Navy to Indian Head, taking advantage of its proximity to the Beltway and the affordable living conditions in Charles County. Today, the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), which tests the majority of new command and control systems for service-wide compatibility, has re-located to Indian Head. The Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Center (EODTC) provides the capability to locate, gain access to, identify, and neutralize hazards presented by military and improvised surface and underwater conventional and nuclear devices. Today, the EODTC operates a 24-7 command cell linked via satellite to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify unexploded ordnance, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Additionally, the U.S. Marines selected Indian Head to position its Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), enabling a rapid response to Washington, D.C. while maintaining a safe distance in the event of a catastrophic event. As you know, it was the Indian Head-based CBIRF that responded to the Senate Hart Office Building following the post 9-11 anthrax attack.

In addition, the analyses of BRAC 95 repeatedly demonstrate the financial and military **risk** inherent in closing this facility or moving its capability elsewhere. While Indian Head offers a continuum of energetics capability, from development and testing to neutralization and disposal for our military, it is also vital to Maryland. If I may be of any assistance on this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact my Deputy Chief of Staff, Mary Beth Carozza at (b)(6) or via email at (b)(6)

Very truly yours,

  
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor

cc: The Honorable Aris Melissaratos  
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/037731



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.,  
GOVERNOR

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington DC, 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

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3233 Navy

15 Oct 04


OSD 16610-04

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
October 15, 2004  
Page 2

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Very truly yours,

  
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor

cc: The Honorable *Aris* Melissaratos  
Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff

11-L-0559/OSD/037733

43 231013  
Mr. Secretary -  
Greetings  
from  
Maryland!  
The Governor  
asked me to say  
"Hello!"  
Mary Beth




MARY BETH CAROZZA  
Deputy Chief of Staff

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
STATE HOUSE  
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401

(b)(6)

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

Ms. Mary Beth Carozza  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Office of the Governor  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mary Beth,

Thanks so much for your note and the letter from the Governor.

I hope things are going well for you. We miss you here.

Warm regards,

323.3 Navy

20 OCT 2004

15 OCT 2004

OSD 16601-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 20 2004

The Honorable Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.  
Governor of Maryland  
State House  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Governor,

Thanks so much for your note and your holiday greetings. Mary Beth dropped it off.

I have passed your letter along to Ray DuBois, who is working the BRAC issue for us, and I know he will give it the most careful attention.

I look forward to seeing you the weekend after the election, if you are able to make it.

Warm regards,

323.3 Navy

20 Oct 04

OSD 16600-04

hapa

11-L-0559/OSD/037736

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

At the right time, in the right way, why don't you think about the possibility of using Peshmerga military forces for one or more of the following possibilities:

- Protection of a UN presence
- Protection of the NATO Mission for training and equipping
- Protection in the Green Zone
- Protection for election activities in selected parts of the country
- Convoy protection – since they would be moving across the country, rather than permanently located
- Selected site protection
- Protection along the Syrian border and/or the Iranian border

One possibility might be to make them an element of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

Iraq

200404

OSD 16612-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037737

October 20, 2004

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Peshmerga Possibilities

At the right time, in the right way, why don't you think about the possibility of using Peshmerga military forces for one or more of the following possibilities:

- Protection of a UN presence
- Protection of the NATO Mission for training and equipping
- Protection in the Green Zone
- Protection for election activities in selected parts of the country
- Convoy protection – since they would be moving across the country, rather than permanently located
- Selected site protection
- Protection along the Syrian border and/or the Iranian border

One possibility might be to make them an element of the Iraqi Army or the Iraqi National Guard.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-20

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

**OSD 16612-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/037738

OCT 15 2004

**ACTION MEMO**

USD(P)  
15 Oct 2004  
OSD/ISA/NESA  
I-04/013743-ES  
ES-1027

*Handwritten notes:*  
10/15/04  
10/14/04  
10/14/04

*Handwritten:* Korea

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

*Handwritten signature:* [Signature]  
18 OCT 2004

SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

- You asked us to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula.
- We have already sent him a thank you note (attached).
- Next under is another note with photos attached.

Recommendation:

- Sign note to Crown Prince of Bahrain.

*Handwritten:* 1806704

**OSD 16625-04**

DU/SD/ISA

*Handwritten signature:* [Signature]

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by: CDR Peter McVety, OSD/ISA/NESA,

(b)(6)

*Handwritten:* 1300304

late  
1700

~~FOUO~~

October 13, 2004  
ES-1027  
I-04/013743

Korea

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Thank You Note to Crown Prince of Bahrain

I want to draft a note to the Crown Prince of Bahrain thanking him for dinner and for his hospitality, enclosing a satellite photo of the Korean peninsula, as promised.

Please give me a draft of the note to review.

DHR:ss  
101304-11

.....

Please respond by 10/19/04

→ TO Sec Net *OK 10/21*  
Paul Butler  
*10/20*

13 OCT 04

OSD 16625-04

~~FOUO~~

His Highness

Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa  
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief  
Bahrain Defense Force  
Kingdom of Bahrain  
Manama, Bahrain

Your Highness,

It was a pleasure to see you during my visit to Bahrain. I want to again express my special appreciation for your gracious hospitality and the elegant dinner that you hosted for all the visiting Ministers of Defense.

Thank you for your continued cooperation. I look forward to returning to Bahrain in the future.

Sincerely,

*Mailed out on 13 October, 2004.*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



OCT 21 2004

His Highness  
Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa  
Crown Prince and Commander-in-Chief  
Bahrain Defense Force  
Kingdom of Bahrain  
Manama, Bahrain

*Korea*

Your Highness:

Enclosed is the satellite photo of the Korean Peninsula that I promised you during dinner.

Again, thank you for the wonderful day in your country.

Sincerely,


*21 OCT 04*

*13 OCT 04*

OSD 16625-04



Nighttime Lights, Korean Peninsula  
21 September 2003, 1201z



OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**October 1, 2004**  
2004 OCT 21 PM 12:43

TO: Doug Feith  
Mike Wynne  
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, **the** Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss  
093004-17

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/29/04



COMPTROLLER

**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 OCT 21 PM 12:42

October 20, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

- At your direction, I have spoken with Larry DiRita on the management of the Defense Business Board (DBB) (snowflake at TAB A).
- I understand your concern about the Board's work products becoming public before they are in a final, releasable form.
- The DBB Executive Director will continue to work proactively with Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and will ensure they are involved early and are aware of the Board's activities, deliberations and draft reports.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Thomas Modly, DBB Executive Director

(b)(6)

**OSD 16657-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/037745

**TAB**

**A**

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**October 1, 2004**  
2004 OCT 21 PM 10:43

TO: Doug Feith  
Mike Wynne  
Tina Jonas

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Managing Boards

Please talk to Larry Di Rita soon, and get clear in your minds the responsibilities for the Defense Policy Board, the Defense Business Board and the Defense Science Board, and how you should manage them.

Thanks.

DHRss  
093004-17

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

**OSD 16657-04**

11-L-0559/OSD/037747

720  
~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 OCT 22 11 09:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026  
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please give me the ~~manning~~ tables for all the headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
101304-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037748

14-10-04 17:10 11



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

SECRET  
2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14  
I-04/013742  
I-04/013838  
DepSecDef \_\_\_\_\_  
USD(P) \_\_\_\_\_  
*copy provided Oct 21/04*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Mira Ricardel, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP)

FROM: Ian Brzezinski, DASD (European and NATO Policy)

SUBJECT: NATO Manning Tables

*Jan M*  
*Jan B*  
OCT 21 2004

- You asked to see the manning tables for NATO headquarters/activities. Attached is a by-nation summary of military manning in the NATO Command Structure (NCS) as of January 2004 (Tab **A**).
- Because the full manpower structure for the new NCS has not yet been finalized, NATO is still working under its pre-existing manpower authorizations.
  - o This means the attached table does not reflect the 7 new NATO members, the handful of new French positions in ACO and ACT, or the manpower savings that will result from command structure reform.
- (U) As soon as complete manning data for the new NCS is available, we will provide an updated list.
  - o We anticipate the NAC will approve the full manpower structure for the new NCS by the end of November 2004.

Prepared by Lt Col John Harris, ISP/NATO, (b)(6)



**A**

**NATO Command Structure — Military Positions (as of Jan 2004)**

|                | <b>ACLANT*</b><br>(becomes ACT)* | <b>ACE*</b><br>(becomes ACO)* | <b>Totals</b> |
|----------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Belgium        | 15                               | 492                           | <b>507</b>    |
| Canada         | 60                               | 256                           | <b>316</b>    |
| Czech Republic | 7                                | 103                           | <b>110</b>    |
| Denmark        | 18                               | 388                           | <b>406</b>    |
| France         | 2                                | 0                             | <b>2</b>      |
| Germany        | 68                               | 2381                          | <b>2449</b>   |
| Greece         | 10                               | 583                           | <b>593</b>    |
| Hungary        | 5                                | 78                            | <b>83</b>     |
| Italy          | 24                               | 1505                          | <b>1529</b>   |
| Luxembourg     | 1                                | 0                             | <b>1</b>      |
| Netherlands    | 50                               | 657                           | <b>707</b>    |
| Norway         | 29                               | 263                           | <b>292</b>    |
| Poland         | 14                               | 258                           | <b>272</b>    |
| Portugal       | 169                              | 44                            | <b>213</b>    |
| Spain          | 51                               | 422                           | <b>473</b>    |
| Turkey         | 7                                | 686                           | <b>693</b>    |
| UK             | 220                              | 1216                          | <b>1436</b>   |
| U.S.           | 432                              | 2797                          | <b>3229</b>   |
| Other*         | 103                              | 337                           | <b>440</b>    |
| <b>Totals</b>  | <b>1285</b>                      | <b>12466</b>                  | <b>13751</b>  |

\*  
 ACTLANT = Allied Command Atlantic  
 ACT = Allied Command Transformation  
 ACE = Allied Command Europe  
 ACO = Allied Command Operations

**B**

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ES-1062  
04/013838-ES

2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14  
OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *JB*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101404-22

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

11-10-04 16:54 11

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037753

OSD 16785-04

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 OCT 22 AM 9:14

October 13, 2004

ES-1026  
I-04/013742

TO: Ian Brzezinski  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Manning Tables

Please *give* me the manning tables for all *the* headquarters by country -- I want to take a look at it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101304-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16784-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037754

14-10-04 17:10 11

72  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF  
SECRETARY

ES-1062  
04/013838-ES

2004 OCT 22 14:01:14 OCT 15 2004

TO: Ian Brzezinski

SUBJECT: Manning Tables *MB*

Please be sure to get me the Manning Tables by country for all those various NATO activities.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101404-22

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

13-10-04 16:56 111

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16785-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037755

October 21, 2004

TO: Tom Hall  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transforming the Guard and Reserve

Tom, I know your team has put in a great deal of effort over the past year working with the Hill on the important task of transforming the Guard and Reserve; and I see that the 2005 Authorization Bill supports most of our initiatives. We have a way to go, but this is an excellent start. Thanks for all your hard and effective work.

326

DHR:ss  
102104-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

OSD 16815-04

210 Jay

October 8, 2004

10/08/04 10:50 AM  
10/08/04 10:50 AM

TO: Ken Krieg  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: DonaldRumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: C-130 issue

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like you to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100804-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 OCT 22 AM 4:50

INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004, 3:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel 

SUBJECT: C-130 Program

- Recent reports in the press concerning the Air Force's C-130 program relate to two distinct issues: 1) the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG's) audit of the Air Force's commercial procurement of C-130J aircraft; and 2) recent protests by Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, challenging the Air Force's conduct of certain competitive procurements in which Darleen Druyun was involved as an employee of the Air Force.
- In its report of July 23, 2004, the OIG concluded that the acquisition of the C-130J aircraft as a commercial item was improper, and that the aircraft does not meet contractual requirements and cannot perform its mission.
- Senator McCain cited the OIG's report in a hearing before the SASC regarding the 9/11 Commission, and in a letter to you concerning the analysis of alternatives for the recapitalization of the tanker aircraft fleet.
- On August 18, 2004, you requested that the Deputy Secretary look into Senator McCain's concerns. In response to your request and the OIG's report, the Acting USD(AT&L) has undertaken a review of the C-130J program. That review is ongoing, and may result in a plan to address the concerns. The Acting USD(AT&L) informed Senator McCain of the review in a letter dated September 29, 2004.
- Following reports of Ms. Druyun's plea agreement, Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems addressed their protests to officials in the Air Force. The protests challenge the award of contracts to Boeing under the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and in other competitive procurements in which Ms. Druyun participated. My staff is reviewing the protests in coordination with attorneys in the Air Force Office of General Counsel.

OSD 16862-04

OSD 16863-04

  
11-L-0559/OSD/037758

COORDINATION: TAB A

Prepared By: Charles Bidwell, (b)(6)

October 8, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
Jim Haynes  
FROM: DonaldRumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: C-130 issue

2004 OCT 22 PM 4:50  
D:\Rumsfeld\Inbox\100804-12

There are allegations in the press concerning a C-130 contract or situation. It came up recently in a Congressional hearing also.

I would like **you** to look into and tell me what you recommend the Department do about it.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100804-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

**A**

TAB A -- COORDINATION: INFO MEMO RE C-130 PROGRAM

Mr. Krieg, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 21, 2004

Mr. Patterson, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, October 21, 2004.

October 22, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Possible Talking Points

Attached are some thoughts on how the White House might want to talk about the Myers letter.

Again, Andy, my apologies that I did not give you a heads up this morning.

Attach.  
Draft statement on NID

DHR:dh.  
102204-10.

350.09

22 Oct 04

OSD 16866-04

DRAFT  
CLOSE HOLD

October 22, 2004

General Myers has consistently provided advice to the President along the lines of his recent letter to Congressman Duncan Hunter, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. General Myers was asked by Chairman Hunter to provide his opinion on intelligence reform in writing. It has consistently been the position of the President's administration that when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is asked his opinion by Congress, that he should provide his honest advice. The President respects that.

General Myers is right in his view that nothing should intrude on the integrity of the chain of command. The President has emphasized that that is his view and that principle was reflected in the legislation sent up by the President on September 16, 2004 on page 14, section 4(k)(b)(2), which says, in part:

“The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the National Intelligence Director, shall--(1) ensure that the agencies and organizations of the Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense adequately satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such agencies and organizations are performing Government wide functions, the needs of other departments and agencies;”

DRAFT  
CLOSE HOLD

11-L-0559/OSD/037764

DRAFT  
CLOSE HOLD

The President believes that the intelligence reform legislation now being worked on in Conference can address this issue in a constructive way. As the President has indicated, he is seeking a bill that adheres to the important principle of respecting the chain of command and also gives full budget authority to the NID. These principles touch on a variety of aspects of the relationships, including personnel, budget authority, and management accountability. The details on such matters could probably best be left to be worked out by the Executive Branch in consultation with Congress, given their importance and their complexity. The President expects that any bill that comes forward for his signature will provide the NID full budget authority, while respecting the chain of command.

General Myers supports intelligence reform, including the NID and the NCTC, and the President would not want a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who did not have views on such important matters and a willingness to express them.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/NID

DRAFT  
CLOSE HOLD

SEP 28 2004

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 28 2004  
3  
10

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~TOP SECRET~~



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

OCT 22 05 21 0:13

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 22, 2004 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

*David S. C. Chu*

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—  
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- We have already achieved substantial “jointness” in MP training
- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of “places.” Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock,

(b)(6)



OSD 16867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037767

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

SEP 28 2004  
13

Should we have a program to get all Military Police joint and trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-25

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16867-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037768

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

0300  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

September 15, 2004 21 4 45

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Tina Jonas  
Ken Krieg

857

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few idcas might include:

- Cost per soldier **per** month / year
- Total Cost **per** month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it **would** be helpful to have these in our heads as **we look** at trade-offs **with** regard to **U.S.** and local forces as well as **our** longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091501-5

.....  
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037769

OSD 16953-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-2136-04  
25 October 2004  
CLASSIFIED BY: 70103705  
EXEMPT FROM: 45

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 10/34*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

- **Issue.** "We need some basic 'rules of thumb' reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include: Cost per soldier per month/year, Total Cost per montldyear...it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to US and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is \$30.5K; annual per Service member cost is \$365.9K. Total US cost per month for OIF is \$4.2B; annual total cost is \$50.5B. Monthly per US Service member cost for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is \$53.7K, annually \$644.6K. Monthly total US costs for OEF is \$752M, annually \$9.0B. Only operational and recurring costs (TAB B) are included in these figures. Differing force packages, operational concepts, logistics networks and other cost elements for OIF and OEF result in higher costs in Afghanistan.
- **Discussion.** You must be careful when using these figures to estimate savings from future force reductions. The cost avoidance will be less than the per Service member cost. A drawdown plan is required to compute cost avoidance. The drawdown strategy would describe how much of the support structure remains in place as ground combat elements redeploy. Since the more costly support will likely drawdown more slowly than the ground combat elements, costs will not go down at the per Service member rate described above. In addition, the per Service member cost avoidance must be offset by the costs of a prolonged US sustainment of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Another rule of thumb for the security costs is the FY 2005 US costs to build the Iraqi security force and the ANA. The US cost per Iraqi security force member is \$16.7K and per ANA soldier is \$44.5K. The US costs for Iraq are lower because the Iraqi government offsets costs for Iraqi security.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral R. F. Willard, USN; Director J-8;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/037770

OSD 16953-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

0309  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SECURITY INFORMATION

September 15, 2004 PM 4:15

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

857

c c : Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Tina Jonas  
Ken Krieg

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: "Rules of Thumb" for Security Costs in Afghanistan and Iraq

We need some basic "rules of thumb" reflecting our costs for security in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few ideas might include:

- Cost per soldier per month / year
- Total Cost per month / year

I'm sure there are other good metrics. I think it would be helpful to have these in our heads as we look at trade-offs with regard to U.S. and local forces as well as our longer range planning in both countries.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
091504-5

.....  
Please respond by 23 sep 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037771

OSD 16953-04

## TAB B

### Operational and Recurring Costs

- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are calculated by using the burn rate; that is, the average of the monthly costs per contingency operation. The burn rate costs are the recurring, operational (incremental) costs that Services and agencies report through the Defense Finance and Accounting System to Congress.
- These costs include both direct and indirect costs for OEF.
  - Direct Service costs include full pay and allowances for Guard and Reserve, incremental pay for active duty personnel (allowances such as imminent danger pay and family separation pay), personnel support, operations support, transportation and military construction.
  - Other direct costs include depot maintenance, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency operations, Defense Intelligence Agency operations, other intelligence and the Defense Health Program.
  - Indirect costs in support of OEF include costs for USCENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar, military overstrength, military construction in Southwest Asia external to Iraq and Afghanistan, the military tribunal **and** defense health care costs for military personnel in Southwest Asia, external to Iraq and Afghanistan. Since these costs are contingency related and must be reported as a contingency cost, they are shown as a cost against the first contingency in the Global War on Terrorism, OEF.
- The costs per US Service member in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM reflect only direct costs incurred for Iraq.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USDC.

MS. TINA JONAS

9/28/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/037773

Tab C

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~FOUO~~

ES-1066  
04/013846-ES  
OCT 15 2004

CONFIDENTIAL  
OCT 15 2004 11:13

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: NATO Question on Darfur

We have to answer the Secretary General of NATO's question on Darfur.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101404-30



*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~FOUO~~

OSD 16996-04  
10-10-04 16:53 IN

FOUO  
FOUO

ES-1054  
04/013809 (12P)

~~SECRET~~  
~~ATTACHMENT~~

October 15, 2004

TO: Ian Brzenzinski  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Surveillance System

10/15/04 11:24  
10/15/04 11:24

It sounds strange that the test and analysis of the VERA-E passive surveillance system should take that long. Why don't we send some people there to test it instead of shipping it back?

Please tell the folks working on it that that doesn't sound right, and ask whether they could accelerate the effort.

I would like a report back as to what their timetable could be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
101404/DH-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

11-L-0559/OSD/037775

~~SECRET~~ ~~Attachment~~

~~FOUO~~

10:56 11  
OSD 16998-04



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000  
INFO MEMO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2004 OCT 26 PM 3:43

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

SUBJECT: Firing Range in Yuma

In my Info Memo to you, dated September 30, 2004, responding to your snowflake about illegal immigrants coming into the Yuma firing range, putting themselves at risk and inhibiting training, I reported that ODUSD(I&E) staff have initiated contact with Department of the Interior and Department of Homeland Security headquarters staff to identify the appropriate points of contact for further coordination as required to support the Commandant. Formal coordination of this issue will occur through the existing Range Sustainment Working Integrated Product Team (WIPT) process, with the Marine Corps leading a staff working group. I wanted to update you on this process.

- The Range Sustainment WIPT met Tuesday, October 12 and the Marine Corps briefed the Undocumented Alien (UDA) issue to the other WIPT members. The Marine Corps agreed to lead a staff work group, coordinated through the IPT process, and initiate staff level coordination between DoD, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security.
- Consistent with the Commandant's recommendation to you, the Range Sustainment IPT will coordinate collaboration, both internal and external, on this subject. Initial staff contacts were begun the week of October 18 including Department of the Interior, Department of Homeland Security, and NORTHCOM. The Marine Corps will present an update at the next WIPT meeting. An interagency staff-level meeting is scheduled for Tuesday, November 23.
- As the Range Sustainment IPT continues its efforts at a staff level, **it would be advantageous for you and General Hagee to meet with Secretary Ridge at a mutually convenient time to discuss this issue.**

OSD 17019-04



11-L-0559/OSD/037776

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

The Iraqi elections in January could produce a variety of outcomes. Candidates could win who are right on the mark, somewhere in the middle, or notably unhelpful.

*IRI*

The NSC needs to think through appropriate strategies and objectives now to:

- Do what we can so the outcome is favorable to the President's goals.
- Strategies to deal with all of the various possible outcomes.

Let me know what we can do to help.

DHR:ss  
102504-18

*26 Oct 04*

October 26, 2004

TO: Richard Lawless  
CC: ADM Tom Fargo  
Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone  
Mira Ricardel  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense and Japan

My impression is that the missile defense people are dealing with the Japanese on a separate track from the overall base realignment and force posture adjustments. They seem to feel that is the right thing.

*JAPAN*

My personal view is that it is probably not the right thing, and that the people doing it don't know much about what you and Tom Fargo are doing with respect to force posture. It seems to me that all of these pieces fit together to a certain extent, and I am a little worried about their going off on their own.

Please think it through, talk to Tom Fargo and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102504-24

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

*26 Oct 04*

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*  
SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has the lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102604-6

*334 NSC*

*26 OCT 04*

OSD 17030-04

October 26, 2004

TO: GEN Doug Brown

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
Tom O'Connell  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

The time we spent at Fort Belvoir was excellent. The operatives are extraordinary, and we'll work on the issues that surfaced in the briefing and see what can be done about their concerns.

Thanks for suggesting and organizing the trip - it was most helpful.

DHR:ss  
102604-11

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

33350

260404

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: COL Conrad Trautman

c c : GEN Doug Brown  
Gen Dick Myers  
Tom O'Connell  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Visit to Fort Belvoir

Thank you for a useful and impressive visit with your unit at Fort Belvoir. Your team is extraordinary and inspirational, and I learned a good deal during our time together.

You can be proud of the fine work you are doing for our country.

DHR:ss  
102604-12

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

333SD

26 Oct 04

OSD 17032-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037781

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest Afghan Security Forces Update, for your information.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
10/25/04 Afghan Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
102604-10

*AT OF HANUSMAN*

*De O'Jof*

**For Official Use Only**



# *Afghan Security Forces Update*

## *Executive Summary*

*25 October 2004*

Data as of 25 Oct 04

Version M3

11-L-0559/OSD/037783


# Afghan Security Forces

For Official Use Only

|                                      |                               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| – National Police                    | <b>28,406</b>                 |
| – Highway Police                     |                               |
| – Border Police                      |                               |
| – Customs Police                     |                               |
| – Counternarcotics Police            |                               |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| – Afghan National Army               | <b>14,225</b>                 |
| – Afghan Air Corps                   |                               |
|                                      | <hr/>                         |
|                                      | <b>42,631</b>                 |

# Trained and Equipped Afghanistan Security Forces

For Official Use Only



Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037785

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

| Security Force Element   | Endstate | 25-Oct-04 | 1-Nov-04 | 1-Feb-05 | 1-May-05 | 1-Aug-05 | 1-Jan-06 | 1-Jul-08 <sup>1</sup> |
|--------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------------------|
| National Police          | 47,500   | 55%       | 58%      | 63%      |          |          |          |                       |
| Highway Police           | 2,500    |           |          |          |          | 50%      |          |                       |
| Border Police            | 25,000   |           |          |          |          |          | 50%      |                       |
| Customs Police           | 800      |           |          |          |          |          | 50%      |                       |
| Counter-Narcotics Police | 1,570    |           |          |          |          |          |          |                       |

<sup>1</sup>Projected 100% Date is 1 Jan 07 for all forces except CN Police which is a pilot program currently under review.

| Legend |                             |
|--------|-----------------------------|
| ■      | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
| □      | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
| ■      | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037786

# Afghan Armed Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, Equipped) Policing Units on hand over time

| Afghanistan Security Forces Elements | Endstate | 25-Oct-04 | 1-Nov-04 | 1-Feb-05 | 1-May-05 | 1-Aug-05 | 1-Jan-06 | 1-Apr-07 |
|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Ministry of Defense General Staff    | 3,000    |           |          | 48%      |          |          |          |          |
| Corps                                | 43,000   |           |          |          | 41%      | 47%      | 51%      |          |
| Air Corps                            | 3,000    |           |          |          |          | 40%      | 63%      |          |
| Sustaining Institutions              | 21,000   |           |          |          |          |          |          |          |

| Legend |                             |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|        | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|        | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|        | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037787

# Coalition Contributors



**For Official Use Only**

## OEF & ISAF = 42 Countries

|            |     |         |       |            |      |             |     |              |               |
|------------|-----|---------|-------|------------|------|-------------|-----|--------------|---------------|
| Albania    | 22  | Denmark | 61    | Iceland    | 15   | Mongolia    | 16  | Spain        | 1,044         |
| Australia  | 5   | Egypt   | 65    | Ireland    | 7    | Netherlands | 512 | Sweden       | 102           |
| Austria    | 3   | Estonia | 15    | Italy      | 1006 | New Zealand | 9   | Switzerland  | 4             |
| Azerbaijan | 22  | Finland | 75    | Jordan     | 174  | Norway      | 282 | Turkey       | 252           |
| Belgium    | 653 | France  | 1,296 | Korea      | 205  | Poland      | 121 | UK           | 611           |
| Bulgaria   | 42  | Georgia | 50    | Latvia     | 9    | Portugal    | 27  | USA          | 15,903        |
| Canada     | 993 | Germany | 2,255 | Lithuania  | 53   | Romania     | 570 |              |               |
| Croatia    | 51  | Greece  | 121   | Luxembourg | 11   | Slovakia    | 55  |              |               |
| Czech Rep  | 22  | Hungary | 156   | Macedonia  | 20   | Slovenia    | 22  | <b>Total</b> | <b>28,233</b> |

|  |               |
|--|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces On Hand</b>           | <b>67,020</b> |
| National Police                        | 48,450        |
| Highway                                | 891           |
| Border Police                          | 3,417         |
| Customs Police                         | 0             |
| Counter Narcotics Police               | 37            |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>                | <b>52,795</b> |
| Ministry of Defense<br>(General Staff) | 590           |
| Corps                                  | 12,860        |
| Air Corps                              | 0             |
| Intermediate Commands                  | 775           |
| <b>Subtotal On Hand</b>                | <b>14,225</b> |

|  |               |
|--|---------------|
| <b>Afghan Forces Trained</b>           | <b>42,631</b> |
| National Police                        | 27,431        |
| Highway Police                         | 200           |
| Border Police                          | 750           |
| Customs Police                         | 0             |
| Counter Narcotics Police               | 25            |
| <b>Subtotal Trained</b>                | <b>28,406</b> |
| Ministry of Defense<br>(General Staff) | 590           |
| Corps                                  | 12,860        |
| Air Corps                              | 0             |
| Intermediate Commands                  | 775           |
| <b>Subtotal Trained</b>                | <b>14,225</b> |



Data as of 25 Oct 04

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

■ Coalition Forces ■ US Forces ■ Afghan Forces

**For Official Use Only**

# *Back Up*

**Data as of 25 Oct 04**

11-L-0559/OSD/037789

# Afghan Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

| POLICE                   | PROPOSED      | ON DUTY       | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN 05 | 100% TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|
| National Police          | 47,500        | 48,450        | 27,431             | 28,073                          | Jan 06                  |
| Highway Police           | 2,500         | 891           | 200                | 515                             | Jul '06                 |
| Border Police            | 25,000        | 3,417         | 750                | 2,200                           | Dec '06                 |
| Customs Police           | 800           | 0             | 0                  | 0                               | Dec '06                 |
| Counter Narcotics Police | 1570          | 37            | 25                 | 62                              | Dec '07                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b>             | <b>77,370</b> | <b>52,795</b> | <b>28,406</b>      | <b>30,850</b>                   | <b>Dec '07</b>          |

# Afghan Security Forces MoD Update

**For Official Use Only**

| ARMY                                 | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN 05 L/F CAPABILITY | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---|--|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Ministry of Defense General Staff    | 3,000         | 590   | 0  | 590/0                    | Sep 09 <sup>(3)</sup>            |
| Corps                                | 43,000        | 12,860  | 0  | 12,860/0                 | Sep 09                           |
| Air Corps                            | 3,000         | 0   | 0  | 0/0                      | Sep 09                           |
| Intermediate Commands <sup>(4)</sup> | 21,000        | 775   | 0  | 775/0                    | Sep 09                           |
| <b>Totals</b>                        | <b>70,000</b> | <b>14,225</b>                                 | <b>0</b>                                   | <b>14,225/0</b>          | <b>Sep 09</b>                    |

**Notes:**

- (1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment
- (2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations
- (3) Full Operational Capability planned for Sep 09 utilizing the 5 battalion training model
- (4) Intermediate Commands are: Recruiting, Logistics and Acquisition, Training and Education, Communications, and Intelligence

# Afghan Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

| POLICE  | TRAINING   | IN TRAINING  |
|---|--|--------------|
| National Police   | Basic Course is 8 weeks for literate;<br>4 weeks for illiterate<br>2 weeks for existing officers<br>Instructor Development Course is 4 weeks | 1759         |
| Highway Police  | Basic Course is 8 weeks<br>1 week specialized training (Change from 2 weeks in last report.)   | 189          |
| Border Police   | Basic Course is 8 weeks<br>2 weeks specialized training  | 844          |
| Customs Police  | Program not developed  | 0            |
| Counter Narcotics Police                                  | Special Course sponsored by the DEA  | 25           |
| <b>Total</b>  |  | <b>2817</b>  |
| ARMY  | TRAINING   | IN TRAINING  |
| Enlisted Basic Training                                   | Basic Training is 10 Weeks<br>Advance Individual Training is 6 to 8 weeks<br>Collective Training is 6 Weeks                                  | 2384         |
| National Military Academy –<br>Afghanistan (Begin Feb 05) | 4 Year Course  | 0            |
| Command and General Staff College                         | 12 weeks   | 0            |
| Combat Leaders Course                                     | 5 weeks  | 36           |
| NCO Course  | 6 Weeks  | 420          |
| Officers' Candidate School                                | 8 weeks  | 176          |
| <b>Total</b>  |  | <b>3,016</b> |

Data as of 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037792

# Afghan Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| <b>POLICE</b>                          | <b>Mission</b>   |
|--|--|
| National Police                        | Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are responsible for security and maintaining law and order. ANP enhances security in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.  |
| Highway Police                         | Afghan Highway Police (AHP) enhance the security of Afghan highway network and increase government presence outside Kabul. Enforce criminal and traffic code violations.   |
| Border Police                          | Afghan Border Police (ABP) responsible for border protection and control. Responsible for movement of persons and goods. Control cross border traffic and counteract threats posed by organized crime and other border conflicts, including armed conflicts. |
| Customs Police                         | To assess and collect customs duties on imposed merchandise, prevent fraud and smuggling. Control carriers, persons, and articles entering and departing the country.  |
| Counter Narcotics Police               | Lead Agency for CN efforts in AF. Focuses on narcotic interdiction, interrogation, and investigations primarily in urban areas.  |
| <b>ARMY</b>                            |  |
| Ministry of Defense<br>(General Staff) | Defend the Nation's independent, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and establishment of law.  |
| Corps                                  |  |
| Air Corps                              |  |
| Institutional Commands                 |  |

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### **Manning:**

- ANA: Command and General Staff Course #4 graduated 59 students 20 Oct 04

### **Training:**

- ANA: Battalions #26, #27 and #28 are in training
- ANA: Battalion #29 starts training 30 Oct 04

### **Equipping:**

- ANA: Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating subsidizes the ammunition shortage
- ANA: Czech Republic ammunition donation has been approved by Czech Parliament

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### **Build:**

- ANP: Construct/refurbish projects underway on 17 provincial/highway police stations
- ABP: 2 Border Police headquarters and 1 crossing site under construction

### **Mentoring/Employing:**

- ANA: J3 recommended delaying additional Embedded Training Teams until Feb 04
- ANA: Delaying embedded trainers reduces battalion team manning from 16-12
- ANP: Police Technical Advisory Team continues sustainment training.

### **Funding:**

- ANA: \$65m short for accelerating to 5 battalion model

October 26, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
10/25/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update  
DHR:ss  
102604-8

*IMAG*

*260004*

***Iraqi Security Forces Update  
Executive Summary***

***25 October 2004***


# *Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces*

**For Official Use Only**


|                                      |                               |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| - Police                             |                               |
| - Civil Intervention                 |                               |
| - Emergency Response                 |                               |
| - Border Enforcement                 | <b>63,776</b>                 |
| - Highway Patrol                     |                               |
| - Dignitary Protection               |                               |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u>  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u> |
| - Army                               |                               |
| - National Guard                     | <b>48,742</b>                 |
| - Intervention Force                 |                               |
| - Special Operations                 |                               |
| - Air Force                          |                               |
| - Coastal Defense Force              |                               |
|                                      | <hr/>                         |
|                                      | <b>112,518</b>                |

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003= 0 Iraqi Security Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

| Security Force Element             | Current Targeted End State | 25 OCT 04 | 1 NOV 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Regular Iraqi Police *             | 135,000                    |           |          |          | 47%      | 59%      | 70%      |
| Special Police Regiments ***       | 1,200                      |           |          | 50%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Public Order Battalions ***        | 3,600                      |           |          | 67%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Emergency Response Unit            | 270                        |           | 59%      | 84%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol               | 1,500                      |           |          | 50%      | 61%      | 72%      | 92%      |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection ****  | 500                        | 89%       | 90%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Special Police Commando Battalions | 2,019                      | 45%       | 45%      | 75%      | 85%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Dept of Border Enforcement **      | 32,000                     | 55%       | 60%      | 62%      | 60%      | 71%      | 84%      |

### Notes

- \* Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
- \*\* Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven
- \*\*\* These units make up the Civil Intervention Force
- \*\*\*\* Bureau of Dignitary Protection personnel have completed initial training and began specialized training on 2 October.

### Legend

-  70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT
-  39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037800

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\***

| Security Force Element        | Current Targeted End State | 25 OCT 04 | 1 NOV 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army            | 27,000                     |           | 69%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Intervention Force      | 6,584                      |           | 67%      | 73%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi National Guard          | 61,904                     | 65%       | 66%      | 76%      | 91%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Commando Battalion            | 1,516                      | 58%       | 64%      | 67%      | 76%      | 95%      | 100%     |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451                        |           | 40%      | 40%      | 58%      | 76%      | 100%     |

| Legend |                             |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|        | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|        | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|        | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037801

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

**For Official Use Only**



| MNF-I = 32 Countries |          |                |            |             |       |                 |          |                |                |
|----------------------|----------|----------------|------------|-------------|-------|-----------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| Albania              | 73       | El Salvador    | 380        | Korea       | 2,837 | Norway          | 9        | Tonga          | 53             |
| Australia            | 417      | Estonia        | 48         | Latvia      | 133   | Poland          | 2,461    | Ukraine        | 1,617          |
| <b>Armenia</b>       | <b>0</b> | <b>Georgia</b> | <b>162</b> | Lithuania   | 76    | Portugal        | 129      | United Kingdom | 9,095          |
| Azerbaijan           | 150      | Hungary        | 278        | Macedonia   | 32    | Romania         | 745      | US             | 130,646        |
| Bulgaria             | 449      | Italy          | 3,139      | Moldova     | 10    | Singapore       | 33       |                |                |
| Czech Rep            | 98       | Japan          | 812        | Mongolia    | 132   | Slovakia        | 103      |                |                |
| Denmark              | 427      | Kazakhstan     | 30         | Netherlands | 1,497 | <b>Thailand</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>Total</b>   | <b>156,038</b> |

| IRAQI FORCES ON HAND               | 175,679 |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE               | 67,554  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE           | 1,196   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT            | 197     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION     | 484     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                     | 555     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 1,650   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT         | 18,693  |
| ARMY                               | 11,776  |
| NAT'L GUARD                        | 43,063  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                 | 6,907   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                 | 676     |
| AIR FORCE                          | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                    | 538     |

| IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING | 128,202 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE                 | 49,212  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE             | 1,196   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT              | 197     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION       | 484     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                       | 555     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS   | 1,650   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT           | 18,693  |
| ARMY                                 | 11,776  |
| NAT'L GUARD                          | 43,063  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                   | 6,907   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                   | 676     |
| AIR FORCE                            | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                      | 538     |


## Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

## Other Forces

**Facilities Protection Service**  
73,992

**NATO Training Team = 15**



Data as of: 25 Oct 04

## *NATO Training in Iraq*

**For Official Use Only**

- North Atlantic Council approved proposal for NATO Training on 22 September.
- Concept of Operations approved on 7 October.
- North Atlantic Council decision includes:
  - Dual-hatting LTG Petraeus, MNSTC-I Commander
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training, Doctrine and Education Center
  - Help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command
  - Focusing on training, equipping and technical assistance—not combat
  - Adding value to training and equipping efforts already underway
  - Providing out-of-country training
- NATO Survey Team currently in-theater to assess Training, Education, and Doctrine Command infrastructure requirements at Ar Rustimayah.
- SHAPE developing OPLAN.

**For Official Use Only**

# *Back Up*

*Data as of: 25 Oct 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/037804

# *Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update*

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT                    | AUTHORIZED     | ON DUTY        | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|------------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POLICE                       | 135,000        | 87,554         | 43,627             | 52,800                           | JUL '06                               |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE     | 4,920          | 1,196          | 0                  | 3,120                            | JUL '05                               |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT      | 270            | 197            | 100                | 270                              | FEB '05                               |
| HIGHWAY PATROL               | 1,500          | 925            | 555                | 750                              | TBD                                   |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION         | 500            | 484            | 446                | 500                              | DEC '04                               |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS* | 2019           | 2,019          | 900                | 2,019                            | JAN '05                               |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT           | 32,000         | 20,039         | 18,148             | 15,900                           | MAR '06                               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                 | <b>176,209</b> | <b>112,414</b> | <b>63,776</b>      | <b>75,359</b>                    | <b>JUL '06</b>                        |

\* New elements recently authorized, recruited, and trained by the Ministry of Interior

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037805

# *Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update*

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT          | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS) | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY     |
|--------------------|---------------|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| ARMY               | 27,000        | 3,887   | 620  | 10,915 / 10,915                        | JUL '05                              |
| NATIONAL GUARD     | 61,904        | 41,261  | 0  | 45,000 / 0                             | SEP '05                              |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584         | 0   | 1,794                                      | 1,794 / 4,790                          | MAY '05                              |
| SPECIAL OPS        | 1,967         | 0   | 604  | 0 / 725                                | SEP '05                              |
| AIR FORCE          | 502           | 167   | 0  | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT      | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    |
| COASTAL DEFENSE    | 582           | 409   | 0  | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT   | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>98,539</b> | <b>45,724</b>                                 | <b>3,018</b>                               | <b>57,709 / 16,430</b>                 | <b>MAR '06</b>                       |

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is fully manned, trained, and equipped and is capable of conducting independent operations

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037806

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT   | TRAINING   | NUMBER IN TRAINING |
|---|--|--------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training  | 5,585              |
| Civil Intervention Force  | 6 Week Specialized Training  | 1,196              |
| Emergency Response Unit   | 8 Week Specialized Training  | 97                 |
| Dept of Border Enforcement  | 4 Week Academy<br>Specialized Training   | 545                |
| Highway Patrol  | 3 Week TIP Training<br>8 Week Academy Training   | 0                  |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection  | 3 Week Initial Training<br>2-3 Week Advanced Training<br>Mentoring by US Special Forces  | 38                 |
| Special Police Commando Battalions  | 4 Weeks Basic Training<br>1-3 Weeks Advanced Training  | 750                |
| Iraq Regular Army   | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic Training: 4 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 7,269              |
| Iraqi National Guard  | Basic Training: 3 Weeks<br>Collective Training: 4 Weeks  | 1,802              |
| Iraqi Intervention Force  | Cadre: 4 Weeks<br>Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks<br>Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks                                       | 5,113              |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force<br>- Commando Battalion<br>- Counter Terrorist Task Force | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training)<br>12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat | 72                 |
| Air Force   | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months  | 39                 |
| Coastal Defense Force   | Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)   | 127                |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |  | <b>22,633</b>      |

Data as of

11-L-0559/OSD/037807

# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| Unit                             | Mission   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Civil Intervention Force         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>  |
| Special Police Commando Bns      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.</li> </ul>  |
| Emergency Response Unit          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>  |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>  |
| Highway Patrol                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>   |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>   |
| Regular Army                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>   |
| National Guard                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Intervention Force               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order</li> </ul>   |
| Commando Battalion               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>   |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>  |
| Air Force                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>  |
| Coastal Defense Force            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities</li> </ul> |

Data as of: 25 Oct 04

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### Man:

- Enrolled 2,526 new Iraqi Police Service recruits into the force for basic training course that started this week at Baghdad and Jordan Academies.
- Enrolled 956 newly-hired Department of Border Enforcement personnel into the force for eventual train-up.
- Recruited 96 new students to begin training for Emergency Response Unit.

### Train:

- 5,585 Police Cadets training in basic eight-week courses in Amman, Baghdad and regional academies.
- Graduated 90 and began training of 98 new law enforcement students in three specialized policing classes at the Adnon Training Facility (Basic Criminal Investigation and two courses in Election Security).
- Graduated 27 Emergency Response Unit officers from their basic training course.
- 17th Battalion, Regular Army, completed basic training 23 October.

### Equip:

- Issued 3,860 weapons, 153 vehicles, 2,612 armor vests, 500 radios, and over 3 million rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Interior Forces.
- Issued 2890 weapons and 3.2 Million Rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Defense forces.

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### **Build:**

- Began construction on a Major Crimes Unit force protection enhancement project in Baghdad.
- Committed over \$363.7 million of the \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. Projects are out for bidding with awards expected in late October and early November, putting MNSTC-I ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter after reallocation of IRRF.
- Work productivity at construction sites is running at 80% of normal capacity rather than the 67% anticipated during Ramadan. Working with contractors to mitigate using double shifts and labor attendance incentives.

### **Mentor/Employ:**

- Ministry of Interior's Iraqi Police Service Qualifying Committee has screened over 7,000 data records to date.
- Police Commando units executing operations with coalition forces in Samarra and Mosul.
- Three Intervention Force Battalions, two Regular Army battalions, the Army Commando Battalion, the Counter-Terrorist Force, a Police Commando Battalion, and Emergency Response Unit preparing for possible future offensive operations.

~~FOUO~~

ES-1087  
04/013935-ES

October 18, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Iraqi Army

Who disbanded the Iraqi Army - Bremer or Garner, and what date did it happen?

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101804-2

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

2004 OCT 20 11 7:27

04/013935-ES

Iraq

18 OCT 04

TO SecDef  
9

Paul Butler  
10/21

|          |              |
|----------|--------------|
| TSA SD   |              |
| BRMA SD  |              |
| MA SD    |              |
| EXEC SEC | RSJ/10-27-04 |

~~FOUO~~

10-19-04 P01:20 OSD 17118-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037811

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OCTOBER 27, 2004

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM : CONDOLEEZZA RICE *Randi*

SUBJECT: Need for a briefing on  
Salafist financial and  
spiritual networks

Don,

The lead on terrorist financing is an interagency effort that Fran Townsend has led. I will arrange a briefing. The "spiritual network" has largely been treated as a disruption effort through the Agency. Elliott Abrams at the NSC has also helped to coordinate a Muslim World Outreach strategy that might be of interest. I will ask them to brief as well.

OSD 17131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037812

~~FOUO~~

October 26, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*

SUBJECT: Need for Briefing

The center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is very likely the Salafist financial network and *the* Salafist spiritual network.

I think it would be helpful to get a briefing for the PC meeting and eventually an NSC meeting, where we receive a report as to what is being done.

The lead agencies for those two taskers could brief the PC and the NSC, so the rest of us are aware of what is going on and are able to assist and cooperate. I assume Treasury has the lead on the financial networks and that State has *the* lead on the spiritual networks.

Thanks.

DHR:cm  
102604-6

OSD 17030-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037813

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

14 October 2004

326

Dear Secretary:

With respect to the attached, I DON'T BELIEVE IT! With all the PR in other areas re: what is being done for families of "serving" members, this smacks of politicization.

It is quite true this area is one of heavily Democrat population. Most of the time, I find fairness a part of BEAVER County character. However, the 911th Airlift Wing at Pittsburgh International Airport has been used regularly since the first Gulf War, as have other Reservist and Guard units subject to mobilization - locally.

This attitude has been building gradually, BUT without contrary and factual info from the Services.

You may wish to give this subject a "hard go" factually to clear-the-air here.

14 OCT 04

Sincerely and Very respectfully,

*H. E. Gerhard*

OSD 17135-04

October 26, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Response to RADM Gerhard

Please get someone to fashion the right answer to this letter from RADM Gerhard.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/14/04 Gerhard ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh  
102504-21

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*CRD*  
CONTROL, LAUNGA  
*IM 10/27*

*Oct 10/27*  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
✓/R  
L+G/Lengyel  
10/27

326

26 OCT 04

14 OCT 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 28 2004

Rear Admiral H.E. Gerhard

(b)(6)

Dear Admiral Gerhard,

Thank you for your letter and attached article from the *Beaver County Times*.

Since 9/11, Guard and Reserve units have shouldered a large burden in the Global War on Terror. Approximately 35 percent of the 911<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing (AW) has been mobilized at one time or another since September 11, 2001. One of the 911 AW's C-130 squadrons was called up in December 2003 for 1 year, and in July 2004 they were extended to 2 years. The basic rotation schedule for the mobilized squadron is 90 days deployed, followed by 90 days home, with unit members averaging 150 days deployed this year.

I appreciate your sending along the article; we'll keep working to ensure the facts are clear to the public.

Sincerely,

OSD 17135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037816

326

28 OCT 04

14 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF  
SECURITY

October 7, 2004

2004 OCT 20 PM 12:27

873

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Arabian Gulf

We recently discussed the MIO work by NAVCENT in the Arabian Gulf. I'd be interested in an update, showing the numbers of boardings conducted, where we are focusing our efforts, what we are finding, and a general assessment of the value of the operations.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
100604-8

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

801.2

7 N T A U

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17161-04



~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CM-2148-04  
28 October 2004

2004 OCT 28 11:12:42

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RAM 10/27*

SUBJECT: Non-Payment of Police Recruits in Najaf

- **Question.** "Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Najaf police recruits were not being paid due to the lag time between hiring recruits and their completing vetting and police academy training requirements. Iraqi Ministry of Interior representatives are committed to meeting the back-pay obligation.
- **Analysis.** Attached information paper (TAB B) provides additional background and actions to ensure the Najaf police recruits get paid.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 17166-04

~~FOUO~~

SECRET // NOFORN  
Attachment

TAB A

October 13, 2004

CLASSIFIED BY  
SECRET 10/13/04  
2004 OCT 20 PM 12:42

875

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Recruits in Najaf

Please have someone run down this question about why recruits are not being paid. I've heard this from three sources now, and I cannot figure out what's going wrong.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/13/04 SECRET Memo re: 1,000 Police Recruits Hired in An Najaf  
DHR:as  
101304-3

.....  
Please respond by 10/22/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 171 66-04

TAB B

14 October 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Non-payment of Najaf Police

1. Purpose. To provide an update on non-payment of Najaf Police

2. Key Points

- **Background.** During the fighting in Najaf, the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior authorized the Najaf police chief to fire officers who laid down arms or ran from the fight. They also authorized him to hire able and willing replacements, and told him they would be added to police rolls once Ministry of Interior approved the "by-name" list. Hundreds were fired and replacements hired.

Vetting and attending a police-training course qualifies a police candidate for pay. Many Najaf replacements, perhaps as many as a thousand, have since met these requirements and are now on the rolls.

Though they have continued to serve in various unofficial capacities, some replacements had not been identified to the Ministry of Interior by local authorities; no action had been taken to get them on the police rolls.

- **Action Taken.** We have discussed the issue with the staff of the Deputy Minister of Interior for Finance. The Ministry of Finance has committed to meeting the back-pay obligation if personnel are identified by name. If they pass the vetting process (literacy and criminal background check), these personnel can be accessed to the police rolls, though most will require training, as they have no prior military or police background.

- **Way Ahead.** Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has oversight on recruiting and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and will take the following actions: 1) Confirm with the Iraq Ministry of Interior, who controls the Iraqi Police Service, his intention to provide back pay and to submit names to Ministry of Interior for Finance. 2) Confirm the Minister's plans to accept applications from the unofficial police to join the police force and vet applications for permanent police status. 3) Accept a Ministry of Finance Pay LNO and establish a joint Finance Coordination Group to deal with future pay issues. 4) Assess if the problem is more widespread and initiate corrective action as appropriate.

~~FOUO~~

October 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Luxembourg's MOD

*FWB*

Luxembourg has a new MOD who is first rate and interested in the transatlantic relationship. I sense he is pulling away from France, Germany and Belgium.

We need to find ways we can encourage that.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
101404-11

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*R&W*  
Paul Butler  
10/28

10/15/04  
→ SD  
Noted.  
We'll keep this in mind and look for opportunities  
Doug Feith

Luxembourg

14 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17251-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037821

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2004 OCT 29 AM 11:08  
September 28, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
David Chu  
**Powell Moore**  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, who selects the commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there any role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in BRAC?

It seems to me it is time to get a briefing. Who should I be briefed by -- you or Michael Wynne?

How are we going to think about combining training activities, so they get more joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- o Truck Drivers
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:m  
092804-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037822



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY,  
AND LOGISTICS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

SECRET

2004 OCT 29 11:11:03

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, DUSD(I&E)

*Ray DuBois* 10/29/04

SUBJECT: Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commissioners

This memorandum answers part of your 28 September snowflake on BRAC commissioners. I will address homeland security and joint training separately.

- The President must nominate the nine BRAC commissioners for Senate confirmation no later than March 15, 2005. Two commissioners each are nominated in consultation with the Speaker and Senate majority leader and one each in consultation with the minority leaders of the House and Senate. The President nominates the remaining three, including the Chair, without consultation.
- Because the Commission reviews the *Secretary's* recommendations, your participation in the selection process is critical to support the White House selection of nominees not requiring consultation. You might also provide input for those nominations requiring consultation with the Congress.
  - Prior commissioners have been Bo Callaway, Jim Courter, Alan Dixon, Tom Eagleton, Marty Hoffmann, Graham Claytor, Gen H. T. Johnson, Gen Duane Cassidy, Bob ~~Stuart~~, Harry McPherson, Arthur Levitt, and Russ Train.
- Commissioners must be able to make this a full time effort between the time they organize and then receive your recommendations to their Sep 8<sup>th</sup> statutory deadline for reporting to the President, approximately five months. (This is no more time than provided previous commissions yet we expect a more robust recommendations set.) The statute authorizes commissioners to be paid \$137K per annum,
  - Congress appropriated \$10 million in the FY05 Washington Headquarters Services budget for the Commission's salaries and operating expenses.
- We will propose candidates to you around 22 November to support nominations in late January and confirmation in March. The Commission Chair (and the **staff** director and general counsel the Chair selects) should receive priority focus.

**ATTACHMENT** : As stated

cc: ✓ Dr. Wolfowitz, DepSecDef

Mr. Wynne, Acting USD(AT&L)

Jim O'Beirne, WHLO

OSD 17232-04

11-L-055970SD/037823

~~FOUO~~

SECRET  
2004 OCT 29 11:11:08  
September 28, 2004

TO: **Ray** DuBois  
CC: **Gen Dick Myers**  
David Chu  
**Powell Moore**  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: BRAC

On BRAC, **who** selects the commissioners, and when do I see a proposed list? Is there **any** role for the Department of Homeland Security's needs in BRAC?

It **seems** to me it is time to get a briefing. **Who** should I be briefed by -- **you** or Michael Wynne?

**How** are we going to think about combining training activities, **so** they get **more** joint training for:

- Pilots
- Drill Instructors
- Truck Drivers
- Medics

Thanks.

DHR:ee  
092804-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037824

OCT 18 2004

?

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Letter to Maupin Family

Please check and see if I've ever written the Maupin family. If not, I should.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/6/04 Info Memo from Acting SecArmy to SecDef re: Meeting with Maupin Family

DHR:dh  
101504-22

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_ 10/18

SIR \_\_\_\_\_

you have not  
previously  
written

v/R  
Jim

See  
attached  
draft

784  
18 OCT 04  
6 OCT 04

OSD 17241-04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 10/29/2004

*JK 110104*

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC ATTACHMENT  
OSD CONTROL OSD 17241-04 DOC 10/18/2004 DOR 10/29/2004 SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD TO SD MA ADM STAVRIDIS, J

SUBJECT LETTER TO MAUPIN FAMILY

KEYWORDS SNOW FLAKE

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL.

FN *704* SEC U OCN 101504-22

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:  
INFO MEMO  
FRONT OFFICE DOC  
FRONT OFFICE DOC

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DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES  
ADC 0

Office of the Secretary of Defense

*VADM S,*

*Sir,*

*Mr. Butler asked for  
your comments on the  
two letters.*

*Should the Boss do it at  
all? Or it differently?*

*1928 1130  
HOT! Mr Butler  
NOTE TO Mr/Ms. MAUPIN  
RE THEIR SON.*

*vr,  
m 10/28*

*Yes*

*go smooth V/R,  
on the version 0613  
"OK" 10/28  
J*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Ms. Carolyn Maupin

(b)(6)

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will keep you informed throughout this process.

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. Keith Maupin

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037827

704  
29 OCT 04  
6 OCT 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Mr. Keith Maupin

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time.

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Ms. Carolyn Maupin

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037828

Mr. And Mrs. Keith Maupin

Address

Dear Mr. And Mrs. Maupin

I know you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army and the General Pete Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. We all want to assure you that the Department of Defense is very focused on Matt's situation and we will do everything we can to find him. <sup>The Army</sup> We will also provide frequent and immediate updates to you.

Our thoughts and prayers are with you and the Maupin family during this difficult time. ~~Please let me know personally if there is anything else we can do for you.~~

Sen Nelson  
Mrs Spiker...

Mr. Keith Maupin

(b)(6)



Dear Mr. Maupin,

The circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be so difficult for you. You are in my thoughts and prayers during this hard time, ~~and I assure you that returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~

Please know that our people are focused on resolving Matt's situation. To that end, I understand that you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I have also confirmed that the Army will regularly update you throughout this process.

You remain in my thoughts and prayers.


Sincerely,

cc: Ms. Carolyn Maupin

OK

Ms. Carolyn Maupin

(b)(6)



OK

Dear Ms. Maupin,

I realize that the circumstances regarding your son, Matt, must be difficult for you. Please know that I am keeping you in my thoughts and prayers.

~~Returning your son is a priority for the Department of Defense.~~ I understand you recently met with Mr. Les Brownlee, the Secretary of the Army, and General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff here in the Pentagon. I assure you that our people are focused on Matt's situation. I have also confirmed that the Army will ~~provide updates to you~~ throughout this process.

*Keep you informed*

Again, you remain in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

cc: Mr. Keith Maupin



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

OCT 6 2004

DA 10/15

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

*Brownlee*

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Family of SPC Maupin

*Exp/10/15*

- On 30 Sep 04, General Schoomaker and I, along with other senior Army leaders, met with the Maupin family in the Pentagon. As you may recall, SPC Keith "Matt" Maupin is our only Soldier missing in action from Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with Mrs. Carolyn Maupin, Matt's Mother; Mr. Keith Maupin, Matt's Father; Ms. LeeAnn Spenser, Matt's stepsister, Mr. Carl Cottrell, Ms. Spenser's fiancée and Representative Rob Portman, Member of Congress (R-OH). The family received a detailed briefing from LTG Campbell, the Director of the Army Staff, and then met privately with General Schoomaker and myself.
- The intent of this meeting was to reinforce to the family the importance that the Department of Defense and the Army leadership places on resolving their son's situation. We explained what information we had and what actions we are taking to find their son. We stated that Matt is one of our Soldiers and that we will do everything possible to find him and that this is one of our warrior ethos - "never leave a fallen comrade." We also stressed that the family will receive immediate updates from the Army on any significant developments.
- We just received the completed AR 15-6 investigation report covering the event leading to Matt's capture. We assured the family that we would send someone knowledgeable from the unit's chain of command to brief them and provide them a redacted copy of the report.
- Overall, the Maupins and Representative Portman were both satisfied with and appreciative of our commitment to finding Matt. If desired, we are prepared to come brief you on the specifics of Specialist Maupin's case.

704

609

40

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: LTG James L. Campbell (b)(6)

OSD 17241-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037832

SEP 10 2004

September 9, 2004

2004 SEP 23 PM 1:23

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting

As we discussed at roundtable this morning, I would be interested in an update of how we are doing in revising our readiness reporting system so that it provides sensible and accurate indications to senior decision makers. I know you've been doing some work in this area and I would like an update.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
090904-7

.....  
Please respond by 9/24/04

OSD 17247-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037833



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO 2004 OCT 29 PM 1:33

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

October 29, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (Personnel and Readiness)  
SUBJECT: Readiness Reporting—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) bridges the gap between readiness status, plans, and alternate courses of action. In short, it answers “ready for what.”
- Current reporting is essentially independent of mission needs. DRRS, on the other hand, allows force managers to determine quickly:
  - What missions forces are currently prepared for, based on “output” measures for the mission essential tasks. Every tasked organization, from the ship/battalion/squadron up to the Combatant Commands, will regularly assess whether it currently can perform its assigned missions. This is essentially a “yes” or “no” question that is supported by performance measures, resource information, and commanders’ comments.
  - Which forces are currently deployed and where, and which are available to deploy.
  - What the limiting factors are (e.g., do they have enough people which individuals are not “medically prepared,” do they have their equipment and does it work). Data come automatically from authoritative sources (versus today’s manual feed).
  - What alternative courses of action could meet mission needs.
- We are partnering with the Combatant Commanders in developing and implementing DRRS.
- Initial software is in place on the SIPRNet; functionality and usability will improve over the next two years. We would be happy to provide you a demonstration at your convenience.

322  
29 OCT 04  
95 ep 04

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Joseph J. Angello, Jr., Dir. Readiness Prog & Assessment,

October 29, 2004

TO: Senior Officials of the Department of Defense  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Dating Documents

Please put dates on all papers you are sending.

We need to find a way to get this Department to move paper faster. If documents are not dated, there is no way for us to track the delays.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102904-12



Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

312

29 OCT 04

OSD 17268-04

720  
~~FOUO~~

OCT 29 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: My Remarks to AUSA

Attached is a copy of the remarks I made to the Army Association yesterday. You might find something in there that's useful.

Thanks.

Attach.  
SecDef Remarks to AUSA delivered 10/27/04

DHR:ss  
102804-16

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*350.001 SD*

*29 OCT 04*

OSD 17274-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037836



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>  
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>  
or +1 (703) 428-0711

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### Association of the U.S. Army Annual Meeting

*Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, October 27, 2004.*

---

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. It is good to be with you for this 50th annual meeting of the Association, with so many Army leaders, soldiers and supporters -- patriots all.

General Sullivan, thank you so much for your kind words and for your leadership of this important organization. It's good to see you, and I thank you for your service.

I just left the table here with Secretary Les Brownlee and Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker.

You two and your team are doing an absolutely superb job of leading the Army as it meets the tough challenges of the 21st century. We appreciate your experience, your wisdom, your energy, your toughness as you tackle your vitally important posts.

General Sullivan mentioned my meeting here some 20 years ago. I remember it well, meeting with this Association. I also remember that the following year, the organization wisely presented the George Catlett Marshall Medal to my friend, Paul Nitze.

As many of you may know, Paul Nitze died last week.

As one of the key architects of the strategy that defended America through the long struggle against the Soviet empire, his keen intellect helped to give the hope of freedom to literally millions of people trapped behind the Iron Curtain. And through his long and distinguished public career and his dedicated service to the country, he remained a model of honor and integrity. We will certainly miss him.

General Sullivan mentioned who the recipient of the George Catlett Marshall Medal is this year -- the American soldier. That is an inspired choice. There could be no better, and I congratulate you for it. To the soldiers.

I never cease to be amazed at these young men and women -- active, Guard and Reserve alike. They're a very special group of truly selfless volunteers. Our country is so fortunate that they have stepped forward and said, "Send me." And certainly to all of the soldiers here and across the world, please know that we are deeply in your debt.

When I spoke to this organization in 1984, I did mention the growing threat of terrorism. I was concerned even two decades ago about what I had seen when I was serving as President Reagan's Middle East envoy. You'll recall 241 of our service people were killed in Beirut, Lebanon. I was afraid that the threat was underestimated, and I worried that the effect of a single attack could have a

11-L-0559/OSD/037837

serious effect on even the behavior of great nations.

Seven weeks ago, we observed the third anniversary of September 11th, the day that awakened our country to a new world. Three years into the global war on terror, some still ask, "Is our country safer today?" And it's a fair question. And the answer is yes -- we are safer today, without question.

It's been said that the global struggle against extremism will be a task for a generation, that it could go on for years, as did the Cold War; and I'm afraid that's true.

The Cold War was a great victory, a victory for freedom, but that 50-year struggle between the free world and the Soviet empire was marked by setbacks and failures all along the way, as well as some successes.

There were times when the Soviets seemed to have the upper hand. I remember when "euro-communism" was in vogue, when the West was considering withdrawing from the Cold War. I was Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970s, and I recall having to fly back to Washington in a hurry to testify before the United States Senate against an amendment that would have begun pulling U.S. forces out of Europe at the height of the Cold War. Many Americans and many of our allies were exhausted, and they favored withdrawing from the struggle.

The West's strategies varied. They varied from coexistence to containment to détente to confrontation. Our alliances wavered. In NATO, there were frequent disputes over diplomatic policy, serious disputes over weapon deployments, and arguments over military strategies.

In the 1960s, France pulled out of the military command in NATO, and they tossed NATO out of France. In America, columnists questioned U.S. policies. There were vocal showings of support for communist Soviet Union, marches against the U.S. military buildup, even instances where American citizens saw their own government unfairly challenged as warmongers.

Clearly, many did not fully comprehend the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's appetite for empire. But our nation, over a long period and with our allies, demonstrated impressive perseverance and resolve. We dared to confront what many thought might be an unbeatable foe, and eventually the Soviet regime collapsed.

It seems that that's a lesson that needs to be relearned from generation to generation -- the lesson that weakness can be provocative, that it can entice others into adventures they otherwise would have avoided, that a refusal to confront gathering dangers can increase rather than reduce future peril. And that while there are risks to acting to be sure -- and there are risks to acting -- there are also risks to failing to act, and that ultimately victory comes from those who are steadfast.

It's with those lessons in mind that the President and a truly historic coalition of more than 90 nations have sought to confront a new and perhaps even more dangerous enemy -- an enemy without a country, an enemy without a conscience -- one that seeks no armistice, no truce with us or with the civilized world. From the outset of the conflict, it was clear that our coalition had to go on the offense against the terrorists: the need to pursue terrorists and regimes that provide them comfort and aid, to establish relationships with new allies and bolster international coalitions to prosecute the war, and the need to work with moderate Muslim leadership to undermine the terrorists' ideological foundation.

Al Qaeda was a growing danger long before September 11th, 2001. Osama bin Laden was safe and sheltered in Afghanistan. His network was dispersed all across the world.

Today, a bit more than three years later, a large fraction of al Qaeda's key leaders have been detained or killed; and I suspect that Osama bin Laden spends a major portion of each of his days just avoiding being caught.

Once controlled by extremists, Afghanistan today is led by President Hamid Karzai, who's helping to lead the world in support of moderates against the extremists. Soccer stadiums in Kabul, once used for public executions under the Taliban only a few years ago, today are used for soccer.

Three years ago in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his sons brutally ruled an important nation in the heart of the Middle East. Saddam was attempting to regularly kill American and British air crews that were enforcing the southern and northern no-fly zones. He ignored more than a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions. He was paying \$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers.

And last December, Saddam Hussein was captured by U.S. Special Operations Forces and by the 4th Infantry Division. He's no longer killing tens of thousands of innocent people. He's in a cell -- a prisoner awaiting trial by the Iraqis. His sons are dead after refusing to surrender to the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Airborne.

Some 112,000 trained and equipped Iraqis today now provide security for their fellow citizens. Under the new Iraqi leadership, Iraq is determined to fight the terrorists and to build over time a peaceful society.

Interestingly, NATO is now leading ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, in Afghanistan. It's also helping to train Iraqi security forces near Baghdad. For NATO to be operating outside of the NATO treaty area, outside of Europe, for the first time in the history of that alliance, is a truly historic move.

Here at home, the demands of the global war on terror have given an even greater impetus to the need to transform our armed forces. The armed forces, as you know, are faced with an increasingly complex array of missions. With the leadership of Les Brownlee and Pete Schoomaker, and using the President's emergency powers, the size of the active duty Army has increased by about 30,000 troops, and is being reorganized into more agile, more lethal, and more readily deployable brigades -- brigades with the protection, firepower and logistics assets necessary to sustain them. And we're currently increasing the number of these new, more capable Army brigades from 33 to 43 or possibly 48, over the coming two-and-a-half to three or three-and-a-half years.

In addition, the Army is restructuring and retraining the active component and the reserve components to achieve a more appropriate 21st century balance to get a distribution of skill sets between the active force and the reserve components to fit this new century -- to improve total force responsiveness -- and so that Reservists and Guardsmen will be called somewhat less often, possibly for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability.

The ability of the armed services -- the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard -- to work together is increasing. It has to increase. Jointness has to become the rule and not an occasional luxury. Communications and intelligence activities have been improved, and we have significantly expanded the capabilities and the missions of the Special Operation Forces. And they are doing a truly outstanding job for our country, let there be no doubt.

Since the global war on terror began, our coalition has worked to undercut the extremists' efforts. Our world is, I suppose it's fair to say, divided between regions where freedom and democracy have been nurtured, and areas of the world where people are subjected to tyranny.

And if one were to look down from Mars on the globe, we would see that it is those countries with political and economic freedom that are providing the most for their people; and those countries that have repressive systems, centralized systems, tyrannical systems that are denying their people the opportunities available elsewhere in the world.

In Afghanistan, over 8 million people voted in this month's election. They were hoping to get 6 million people registered; 8 million voted. People dressed in their best clothes. They got up at 3:00 in the morning and they walked miles in the cold to go vote. A long line of women stayed in line, even after some explosives went off about a hundred yards from their polling place.

Iraq now has an interim constitution that includes a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. There are municipal councils in almost every major city in Iraq, most towns and most villages, and provincial councils for all of the 18 provinces. The Iraqis are now among those in the world who are allowed to say and write and watch and listen to whatever they want and whenever they want, and it's clear that governments and the people in the Middle East are taking note.

I flew over much of Iraq a week and a half ago, I guess, coming in from the south, went to the west, went in towards Baghdad, went north, and it's a different country than one sees. It is different in different parts of the country, to be sure, but it is a very different one from what the people here in the United States see. The schools are open with new books. The clinics are open. There's a stock market. The economy's strong. The oil listings are back up where they were. The electricity is at or better than where it was. It is not burning and smoking in a way that one believes it to be by watching television. I don't talk to anybody who comes out of there who isn't struck by the contrast between what they experienced on the ground and the good things being done by the young men and women in the Army and in the Air Force and in the Navy and in the Marine Corps for the people of that country.

It's also clear that the people in the Middle East are taking note of what's happening in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Now, there have been setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, to be sure. And on a bad day, Iraq is not a pretty picture. But the road from tyranny to freedom has never been peaceful, it's never been tranquil, it's never been without bumps. It's always been difficult and dangerous everywhere. It was tough for the United States. It was tough for Germany and Japan and Italy. And the idea that the path from a repressive system to a free democratic system is or could be easy is fanciful. It isn't easy. It's hard. It's tough.

But these enemies cannot defeat the coalition in a conventional battle, let alone in a war. But of course they don't seek conventional war. Their weapons are terror and chaos. They want the world to believe that the coalition cannot win; that the free Iraqi and the free Afghan governments cannot win; and that the fight is not worth it; that the effort will be too hard, that the losses will be too great, and that it's simply too ugly for an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week. They attack any sort of hope or progress in an effort to try to undermine morale -- the morale of the Afghans, the morale of the Iraqis, the morale of the coalition countries, and -- let there be no doubt -- the morale of the American people. They're convinced that if they can win the battle of perceptions -- and they are superb at managing perceptions, much better than free societies are, that's for sure. But they're convinced that if they can win that battle of perceptions, managing the media and affecting people's thinking -- that we will lose our will and toss in the towel.

Well, they're wrong. Failure in Afghanistan or in Iraq would exact a perfectly terrible toll in this world. It would embolden the extremists. It would make the world a vastly more dangerous place. It would turn it all over to those who would lead the world into a dark, dark place.

Our 26th president, the Commander-in-Chief, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote in his autobiography that, "The worst of all fears is the fear of living." He was correct, and we cannot allow the terrorists, the extremists, to win this struggle and destroy the way of life of free people.

From Baghdad to Kabul, Madrid, Bali, the Philippines, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the call has been sounded, and the outcome of this struggle will determine the nature of our world for some decades to come. These enemies will not be wished away.

*Those who behead innocent people on television, those who seek to enslave others, have shown that they were perfectly willing to do literally anything to achieve their goals. The deaths of the innocent people that they kill are not incidental in this war. Indeed, innocent men, women and children are in fact the target in this war, and the extremists will willingly kill hundreds and thousands more.*

The world has gasped, if you will, at the brutality of the extremists: the hundreds of children in Russia who were killed or wounded on their very first day of school; the commuters blown up in the trains in Madrid on their way to work; innocents murdered in the nightclub in Bali; the cutting off of heads on television. Should these terrorists acquire the world's most lethal weapons -- and they are seeking them, to be sure -- the lives of tens of thousands could be at stake.

There have been losses, and they have been borne heavily by the United States Army -- active, Reserve, and Guard alike.

Every loss is deeply felt.

Today, as before, the hard work of history falls to our country, to the U.S. armed forces, and certainly to the United States Army. Our people have been entrusted with the gift of freedom, and it is for each generation to safeguard and to defend that freedom. And as the brave men and women in uniform face these new challenges, they can know that the great sweep of human history is for freedom, and that that is on our side.

The Afghans are making it, thanks to the U.S. military, thanks to the coalition forces, and most of all, thanks to the Afghan people, who are reaching out for freedom courageously.

And the Iraqi people have a good crack at making it as well. And I believe they will make it, and I believe it will be because I have so much confidence in the American people winning that test of wills which we face.

So I thank you all. May God bless the men and women of the United States Army and our great country. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041027-secdef0864.html>

~~FOUO~~

SECRET  
2004 NOV - 01 1: 54

July 28, 2004

000.5

TO: Paul Butler  
Larry Di Rita  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Caleb Carr

Next week I would like to have Caleb Carr come in for lunch with Doug Feith, me and possibly Pete Pace to talk about the attached article.

Thanks.

Attach.

Carr, Caleb. "Wrong Definition for a War." *WashingtonPost*, July 28, 2004, p. 19.

DHR:dh  
072804-11

.....  
Please respond by 8/5/04

28Jul04

~~FOUO~~

Washington Post  
July 28, 2004  
Pg. 19

## Wrong Definition For A War

By Caleb Carr

Toward the end of its widely praised report, the Sept. 11 commission offers a prescriptive chapter titled "What to Do?" There, it makes an assertion that is genuinely shocking. It says that in our current conflict, "the enemy is not just 'terrorism,' some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism [the report's emphasis] -- especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology."

At a stroke, in other words, the members of the commission have tried to rewrite the terms of the global war on terrorism and turn it into a global war on Islamist terrorism alone.

It seems almost incredible that we could have been at war this long without defining precisely who or what we are at war with. But such is the case, and it has never seemed an urgent matter to lawmakers. When I appeared before a congressional subcommittee studying strategies for the war on terrorism in 2002 and suggested that the first step should be the promulgation of just such a uniform definition, the members were momentarily dumbstruck. To their credit, they soon recovered and we began to discuss the issue, but a comprehensive definition of terrorism for the use of the American government and the education of the American people never emerged. Now, however, the president and his supporters are apparently ready to instantly approve the radical definition set forward by the commission.

Terrorism, as defined by military historians, has been a constant, ugly feature of warfare, an aberrant tactic akin to slavery, piracy and genocide. One of the reasons that some of us argued throughout the 1990s for undertaking of genuine war on terrorism (involving the military in addition to intelligence and law enforcement) was the notion that we might finally declare the tactic -- like those other aberrant belligerent methods -- to be out of bounds, for the armed forces of civilized nations and non-state organizations alike.

It's true that both slavery and piracy are still practiced, but only in remote corners of the world; certainly genocide is still with us, but its employment is now cause for immediate sanction and forceful reaction (theoretically, at any rate) by the United Nations. Banning such tactics and actively stamping out their practice has been the work of some of the great political and military minds and leaders of the past two centuries. Now it is time -- past time, really -- for terrorism to take its place as a similarly proscribed and anachronistic practice.

But first we must agree on an internationally acceptable definition. Certainly terrorism must include the deliberate victimization of civilians for political purposes as a principal feature -- anything else would be a logical absurdity. And yet there are powerful voices, in this country and elsewhere, that argue against such a definition. They don't want to lose the weapon of terror -- and they don't want to admit to having used it in the past. Should the United States assent to such a specific definition of terrorism, for example, it would have to admit that its fire-bombings of German and Japanese cities during World War II represented effective terrorism. On the other hand, few Muslim nations want to go up against the power of organized terrorist groups by declaring them *de jure* as well as *de facto* outlaws.

In the intellectual arena, meanwhile, the fatuous logic that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom

fighter" keeps left-leaning intellectuals away from the cause of definition. And so its promulgation continues to elude the world, even as we have embarked on a war against the phenomenon itself.

The Sept. 11 commission evidently also came to feel, during its months of sitting, that defining terrorism was too thorny a problem to be undertaken in anything but a partial and temporary manner. Fighting wars against tactics, they announced -- fighting wars over the nature of war itself -- is simply too complicated. We need to fight specific wars about people, not general wars about ideas (the American Revolution, the Civil War and two world wars notwithstanding).

By this token, any and all intellectual or moral meaning is removed from our military undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as from the global war on terrorism generally. What began as a war between modernism and medievalism, between progressive ideas of how to reform war and regressive notions of cataclysmic conflicts, will, if the commission's recommendations are fully implemented, become instead a "clash of civilizations" between extremist Western and extremist Muslim values: a simplistic, devastating confrontation. In a terribly ironic but real sense, the final hijacking of Sept. 11 will be the commandeering of the global war on terrorism itself.

What the commission fails to see is that the word "extremist" (or "Islamist") is not what will be heard on the "Arab street," or indeed much of anywhere else in the world, when the new enemy is proclaimed. George Bush initially reacted to the Sept. 11 attacks by calling for a "crusade" against terrorism, but many Muslims heard only one word, "crusade," and they heard it in its historical rather than its rhetorical sense. The West, that word implied, is coming again to take control of Muslim nations and holy places, just as it did after the turn of the last millennium. The president later apologized for his thoughtlessness, but the damage had been done.

And now, when the Sept. 11 commission says that terrorism is no longer the enemy, that Islamist extremism has assumed that role, most Muslims are going to hear the same sort of threatening, generalized message, one constantly repeated by Osama bin Laden: The Americans are not really concerned with terrorism -- in fact, they've practiced it throughout their history; what they are embarked on is a war against Islam itself.

The commission should immediately amend its report, and reassert, rather than deny, that we are indeed engaged in a global war against terrorism, whoever practices it. (They might also think to recommend that, at some point soon, the United States formally repudiate the deliberate victimization of civilians, something it has never done.) Then President Bush, Sen. John Kerry and all national leaders should support the change in message. The war on terrorism began not as a crusade about ideology but as a pragmatic war about war. It must remain such.

*The writer is professor of military history at Bard College and the author, most recently, of "The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians."*

~~FOUO~~

SECRET  
2004 NOV -1 PM 1:54

July 26, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
CC: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Vigilante

Please take a look at this cable. I have never heard of this fellow. How do we deal with this?

Thanks.

Attach.  
Reuters file

DHR:dh  
072604-27

.....  
Please respond by 7/30/04

~~FOUO~~

DOCUMENT\_ID: OW44634135  
 DOCST: ACTIVE  
 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH  
 VENDOR: REUTERS  
 PUBNAME: REUTERS LIBRARY SERVICE  
 ORIGDATE: 200407210518  
 PUBLISHR: REUTERS  
 PUBNO: a1903  
 DOR: 20040721  
 TOR: 051829  
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED  
 TITLE: Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.

## TOPLINES:

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was

## TEXT:

^BC-AFGHAN-VIGILANTES (PICTURE)@

^Vigilante in Afghanistan says he worked for U.S.@

KABUL, July 21 (Reuters) - The leader of three Americans arrested in Afghanistan for illegally detaining people he suspected of being Islamic militants said on Wednesday he was working for the U.S. government.

Jonathan "Jack" Idema said he had been in frequent contact with the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies in the course of his work tracking Islamic militants in Afghanistan, including al Qaeda members.

"We were working for the U.S. counter-terrorist group and working with the Pentagon and some other federal agencies," Idema told reporters before the opening of his trial.

"We were in contact directly by fax and email and phone with Donald Rumsfeld's office," he said, referring to the U.S. Secretary of Defence.

The U.S. military and NATO peacekeepers have said the group was not acting on behalf of, or in conjunction with, their forces.

Idema and his two American colleagues were arrested on July 5 after a brief shootout in Kabul. They and some Afghan accomplices had illegally detained and interrogated eight people they believed to be terrorists, Afghan officials said.

The three face up to 15 years in prison if found guilty of illegally detaining and torturing people.

The arrests have been a headache for foreign forces in Afghanistan, where the U.S. military has been under scrutiny for its treatment of suspected militant prisoners.

The U.S. military has been accused by U.S.-based Human Rights Watch of "systematic" abuse of detainees.

The court sat for about two hours on Wednesday with a prosecutor giving details of the charges against Idema and his two colleagues, identified as Edward Caraballo and Brent Bennett. Idema said Caraballo was a journalist.

Idema, wearing dark glasses, combat boots, khaki trousers and a shirt with a U.S. flag on the shoulder was brought into court in handcuffs. The handcuffs were removed when the trial began.

UNCLASSIFIED

Idema told reporters he had broken up an assassination plot against Afghan government ministers and captured a Taliban intelligence chief in May and passed him to U.S. military authorities.

The trial was adjourned for 15 days.  
Reut05:18 07-21-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037847  
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2

720  
~~FOUO~~

Mr. Di Rita

FYI

July 20, 2004

No action  
required

b.p.

file

1:54

032

TO: Paul Butler  
RADM Jim Stavridis  
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Mary Bono

When are we having Congresswoman Bono down here?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072004-5

.....

Please respond by 7/30/04

7/30

DU 8/31

~~-----~~ *Secret*

Powell Moore  
discussed this with  
her and she said she  
would enjoy coming but  
simply wanted you to know  
how much she supports what  
you are doing. We'll  
get her in sometime.

20074101

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD 05-04

*D. R.*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
July 12, 2004  
2004 07 - 1 PM 1:54

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Second Three-Star Billet for SOCOM

210 (324)

I have reviewed your memo to me on this subject and understand your suggested strategy to pay for this billet.

I am concerned that continued use of emergency powers authority may well cause us problems in the future. There are a few scenarios I can think of which might suddenly withdraw the authority from us. I am aware of three or four generals we have already appointed to positions based on this authority. More will only make the potential problem worse. Furthermore, it doesn't feel right to use this authority in the "semi-permanent" fashion that we seem to be heading toward.

At this time, I do not want to authorize the second three-star billet at SOCOM using this authority. Instead, I believe we can identify an existing three-star billet as a billpayer. It seems to me that within 60 days we should be able to identify the billpayer. If that position is encumbered and cannot be vacated in the short term, at that time I will consider using emergency powers as the authority for the SOCOM billet until the billpayer billet is unencumbered.

Thanks.

Attach.

Memos from CJCS re second three-star billet for USSOCOM: 5/27/04, 3/30/04, nom package

DHR:dh  
070604-1

.....  
Please respond by 7/23/04

1274104

# UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

## ACTION MEMO

FOR : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMS/27*

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Second Three-Star Billet for USSOCOM

- Recommend establishing a second three-star position in USSOCOM to perform all the operational functions under the Commander. USSOCOM is unique in having both Unified Combatant Commander/Geographical Combatant Commander in addition to service responsibilities. The current Deputy Commander would perform the duties similar to a Service Vice-Chief.
- Suggest a two-part strategy in order to quickly establish this new three-star position.
  - Initially establish the position using your authority under 10 USC § 527 to exceed active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling.
  - Establishing a temporary three-star position in USSOCOM will provide sufficient time to identify, staff, and vacate a current three-star position to downgrade or civilianize.
  - Preliminary guidance is to identify a joint three star position in either the European theater, head of DoD Agency, or President of NDU to downgrade or civilianize as appropriate. I will provide a recommendation within six months with the objective to implement by end of FY06.
- At TAB A is General Brown's detailed explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the two USSOCOM key leadership positions requiring the grade of three-star.
- For your consideration, I have also enclosed the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, US Special Operations Command and appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense exercise his authority to exceed the active duty general and flag officer strength and grade ceiling under 10 USC § 527 and forward Major General Dailey's nomination to the President for approval.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Vice Admiral T. J. Keating, DJS, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/037850



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

27 May 2004  
GFO 159/11-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense


Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, and DoD Instruction 1320.4, the Acting Secretary of the Army has recommended Major General Dell L. Dailey for assignment as Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, and appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. The Acting Secretary also asks that this position be designated a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general.

2. This nomination requires you to exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceiling to fill this temporary position under the provision of Title 10, United States Code, section 527 and executive order 13223.

3. I have reviewed Major General Dailey's performance in three joint assignments. While serving as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, he specially organized, trained, and equipped assigned forces to conduct time sensitive, surgical special operations across the spectrum of conflict. Major General Dailey tirelessly improved inter-operability with all subordinate commands and other joint units as well as leveraged scarce resources to improve training facilities and initiate world-class information operations. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.

4. I concur with the Acting Secretary's nomination of Major General Dailey for this assignment, appointment to the grade of lieutenant general, and that this position be designated as a position of importance and responsibility. I recommend you forward it to the President for approval.

  
RICHARD B. MYERS  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

11-L-0559/OSD/037851



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON DC 20310

MAR 30 2004



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

We recommend the President designate the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as a position of importance and responsibility, authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C. Section 601, and that the President nominate Major General Dell L. Dailey, age 54, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment to this position. Major General Dailey has served as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, since September 2003. His mandatory retirement date is July 1, 2009, based on time in service.

In accordance with the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., and DoD Instruction 1320.4, a proposed memorandum for the President is enclosed. Major General Dailey is a graduate of the United States Army War College. He has served in three joint duty assignments, but is not a joint specialty officer.

The Director, Center for Operations, Plans and Policy, United States Special Operations Command is currently a two-star billet. The upgrade of this position to a three-star billet is temporary. We request that you exercise your authority to exceed the active duty general officer strength and grade ceilings to fill the position under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., section 527; accordingly, this position will not count against the Army's general officer strength ceilings.

All systems of records, to include Equal Employment Opportunity files and the Standard Form 278 (Public Financial Disclosure Report), maintained in the Department of Defense that pertain to this officer have been examined. The files contain no adverse information about this officer since his last Senate confirmation. Further, to the best of our knowledge, there is no planned or ongoing investigation or inquiry into matters that constitute alleged adverse information on the part of this officer.

If selected for this position of importance and responsibility, we request approval to frock Major General Dailey to the grade of lieutenant general upon his confirmation by the Senate, but no earlier than 60 days prior to assuming his new duties. If the exemption is approved, this action will not cause the Department of the Army to exceed the number of officers authorized to serve in the grade of lieutenant general.

SUBJECT: General Officer Nomination

Major General Dailey's career resume is enclosed.



Peter J. Schoomaker  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff



R. L. Brownlee  
Acting Secretary of the Army

Enclosures



# United States Army

**Major General DELL L. DAILEY**

**Deputy Commanding General  
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310  
since September 2003**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE USMA

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy – BS – No Major  
Shippensburg University – MPA – Public Administration

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) Spanish

PROMOTIONS

DATE OF APPOINTMENT

|     |          |
|-----|----------|
| 2LT | 9 Jun 71 |
| 1LT | 9 Oct 72 |
| CPT | 9 Jun 75 |
| MAJ | 1 Feb 83 |
| LTC | 1 Mar 89 |
| COL | 1 Apr 94 |
| BG  | 1 Nov 97 |
| MG  | 1 Jan 01 |

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FROM

TO

ASSIGNMENT

|        |        |  |
|--------|--------|--|
| Jan 72 | Feb 73 | Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 6 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado |
| Mar 73 | Dec 73 | Student, Officer Rotary Wing Aviator Course, United States Army Primary Helicopter School, Fort Wolters, Texas                               |
| Dec 73 | Sep 74 | Executive Officer, 2d Aviation Battalion, later Aviation Officer, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea       |
| Oct 74 | Jul 75 | Aviation Operations Officer, B Company, 2d Aviation Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, United States Forces Korea, Korea                       |

**Major General DELL L. DAILEY**

|        |        |   |
|--------|--------|---|
| Jul 75 | Mar 76 | Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia   |
| Mar 76 | Jun 76 | Assistant S-3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia   |
| Jun 76 | Feb 78 | Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, later Commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 2 1st Infantry Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia   |
| Feb 78 | Apr 78 | Assistant G-3 (Operations), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia  |
| Apr 78 | Apr 79 | S-5 (Civil Affairs), later S-4 (Logistics), 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia  |
| Apr 79 | Aug 81 | Platoon Commander, later Executive Officer, Air Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany   |
| Aug 81 | Nov 81 | Operations Officer S-3, Command and Control Squadron, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany  |
| Nov 81 | Apr 83 | Commander, Combat Aviation Troop, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany  |
| Apr 83 | Jun 84 | Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas   |
| Jun 84 | May 85 | Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Fort Benning, Georgia  |
| Jun 85 | Aug 87 | Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 10 1st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky |
| Aug 87 | Apr 89 | Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC   |
| Apr 89 | Jul 91 | Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia  |
| Jul 91 | Jun 93 | Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky  |
| Jun 93 | Jul 94 | Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  |
| Oct 94 | Oct 96 | Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), Fort Campbell, Kentucky   |
| Oct 96 | Aug 98 | Assistant Division Commander, 10 1st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky   |
| Aug 98 | Jul 00 | Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida   |
| Jul 00 | Sep 03 | Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina  |

**SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

|  | <u>Dates</u>    | <u>Grade</u>       |
|--|-----------------|--------------------|
| Commander, 160th Aviation Battalion, 3d Special Operations Command, OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia | Sep 90 – Apr 91 | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida                        | Aug 98 – Jul 00 | Brigadier General  |

**Major General DELL L. DAILEY**

Commanding General, Joint Special Operations  
Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Jul 00 - Sep 03

Brigadier General/  
Major General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal  
Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)  
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Bronze Star Medal  
Meritorious Service Medal (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Air Medal  
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)  
Expert Infantryman Badge  
Master Parachutist Badge  
Master Army Aviator Badge  
Air Assault Badge  
Ranger Tab  
Army Staff Identification Badge

As of 17 March 2004



## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the position of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, be designated as a position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade of lieutenant general under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 601(a). I also recommend the nomination of Major General Dell L. Dailey, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and his assignment as the Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Major General Dailey, age 54, is currently serving as the Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This is a new, temporary position, established to augment United States Special Operations Command's mission to defeat the Global War on Terrorism.

To carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions, both in his own Service and in the joint arena. The general officer must be capable of planning and synchronizing the Department of Defense effort in the Global War on Terrorism. He must be thoroughly knowledgeable of the overall management of a unified command, extensively trained and experienced in the development and execution of global command and control of Special Operations Forces missions and for providing tailored Special Operations Forces capabilities to the designated Combatant Command. Major General Dailey meets these requirements. Major General Dailey possesses the qualifications and broad leadership experience necessary to carry out effectively the duties and responsibilities of Director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command.

I have exercised my authority to exceed general officer grade and strength ceilings under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 527. Accordingly, this position will not count against the number of general/flag officers authorized under law. This action is based upon the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Army and the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, section 164(e), the Commander, United States Special Operations Command concurs with this recommendation.

As required by Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on Major General Dailey's performance in his joint duty assignments.

Enclosure

APPROVED \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
President of the United States

Printed on  Recycled Paper

11-L-0559/OSD/037857

# The White House

*Washington*

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Lieutenant General  
Major General Dell L. Dailey, 3747

## **GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT**

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced today that the President has nominated Maj. Gen. Dell L. Dailey, U.S. Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and assignment as director, Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Dailey is currently serving as the deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, N.C.

-END-

Major General Dell L. Dailey  
Major Permanent Duty Stations/Positions

| <u>Duty Station/Duty Assignments</u>   | <u>From</u> | <u>To</u> | <u>Total<br/>Months in<br/>Position</u> |
|--|-------------|-----------|---|
| Fort Benning, Georgia<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senior Liaison Officer S-3 (Operations), later S-5 (Civil Affairs), 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger)</li> </ul>   | Jun 84      | May 85    | 11                                      |
| Fort Campbell, Kentucky<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander, D Company, Task Force 160, 160th Air Group (Airborne), 158th Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, later D Company, Special Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne)</li> </ul> | Jun 85      | Aug 87    | 26                                      |
| Washington, DC<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Special Operations Aviation Staff Officer, United States Army Special Operations Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans</li> </ul>  | Aug 87      | Apr 89    | 20                                      |
| Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander, 3d Aviation Battalion, 160th Special Operations Command, and OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia</li> </ul>   | Apr 89      | Jul 91    | 27                                      |
| Fort Campbell, Kentucky<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)</li> </ul>   | Jul 91      | Jun 93    | 23                                      |
| Fort Campbell, Kentucky<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)</li> <li>• Assistant Division Commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)</li> </ul>   | Oct 94      | Aug 98    | 24                                      |
| MacDill Air Force Base, Florida<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command</li> </ul>  | Aug 98      | Jul 00    | 22                                      |

|   |  |               |                |
|---|--|---------------|----------------|
| ▪ |  |               |                |
| • | <b>Fort Bragg, North Carolina</b>                                | <b>Jul 00</b> | <b>Present</b> |
|   | • Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command           |               | <b>38</b>      |
|   | • Deputy Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg |               | <b>6</b>       |

As of 30 March 2004

Cathy +  
Col B  
for action

July 22, 2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: AG Meeting

Jim Haynes is going to set up a meeting with the Attorney General and whoever else the AG wants to bring. We will go over there. The meeting should be set for Monday or Tuesday of next week if we can. I would like Haynes, Steve Cambone and probably Geren and Maples to be there.

By Friday morning Haynes is going to give Cambone, Dick Myers and me a packet of material to read. Before we have the meeting next week, we ought to have a meeting of Haynes and Myers to discuss how we are going to handle the AG meeting.

After the AG meeting we are going to think about having a meeting with Will Taft of the State Department.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072204-4

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

337

22 Jul 04

July 21, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Report

000.5

A couple of thoughts:

1. The issue of reform – set aside the Commission’s recommendations or anyone else’s recommendations for a minute – is an important one, and it is important that it be discussed thoughtfully.
2. The most important thing to do first is to identify the problems one thinks need to be corrected, before coming up with solutions to unidentified problems. To those who would tear down what is falls the responsibility for specifying why it should be changed, and then recommending something better that actually will fix the real problem as first identified.
3. One consideration has to be the new reality that a user of intelligence, whether anyone from the President down to a platoon leader, really doesn’t care where the intelligence comes from. The distinction between national intelligence and tactical military intelligence is somewhat of an anachronism in the sense that information today is coming from a variety of sources – satellites, human intelligence, etc. What is really important is how that information gets to where it is needed. So, in a sense, artificial separations between national and tactical intelligence really are a thing of the last century.

2154104

4. Next, there are certain activities – I would include research and development and intelligence gathering – that have historically been shown to benefit from an absence of centralization and regimentation. That is to say, competition and differing views in those areas have historically led to greater innovation and creativity in the case of research and development, and, in the case of intelligence, avoiding the kind of “group think” that can lead to intelligence disasters.
  
5. When there are problems, and goodness knows there have been problems with respect to intelligence, there is a tendency to rush to make corrections. We don’t want to see damage done in the name of reform. It strikes me it is important to think any reform through carefully, but first identify the problem, have an elevated discussion, and only then consider solutions.


Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072104-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

July 20, 2004

320.2

TO: Jim Roche  
CC: Gen. John Jumper  
    GEN. DICK MYERS  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Air Force End Strength

We have talked about the fact that the Air Force is 20,000+ over authorized end strength. Some weeks ago, when it was 19,000, I asked you to start working that number down. Instead of going down, it has gone up. Why has it ballooned?

I would like to see a plan by Thursday, July 22, that explains how you plan to get it down – with a timeline – and with what adverse effects to the Service.

I also would like to know where you are getting the money out of your program to pay for it, and what it costs to have 20,000 people in the Air Force a year longer than budgeted.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/13/04 Active & Reserve Strengths Snapshot

DHR:dh  
072004-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/22/04

2074104

**Active & Reserve**

**Active Component**

| Service      | FY04 Authorized End Strength(PB05) | FY04 Waiver Authority * |           | Current End Strength |            | % Difference and Authorized End Strengths |
|--------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|----------------------|------------|---|
|              |                                    | 2%                      | 3%        | As of May 31, 2004   | Difference |   |
| Army         | 482,400                            | 492,048                 | 496,872   | 495,763              | 13,363     | 2.8%                                      |
| Navy         | 373,800                            | 381,276                 | 385,014   | 376,204              | 2,404      | .6%                                       |
| Marine Corps | 175,000                            | 178,500                 | 180,250   | 175,048              | 48         | 0   |
| Air Force    | 359,300                            | 366,486                 | 370,079   | 379,534              | 20,234     | 5.6%                                      |
| Total        | 1,390,500                          | 1,418,310               | 1,432,215 | 1,426,549            | 36,049     | 2.6%                                      |

**Reserve Component**

| Service      | Currently Mobilized |
|--------------|---------------------|
| Army         | 133,200             |
| Navy         | 2,772               |
| Marine Corps | 10,304              |
| Air Force    | 8,068               |
| Total        | 154,344             |

\* Section 115 of Title 10 allows Service Secretaries to increase end strength by 2%.

\* Section 115 of Title 10 allows SECDEF to increase end strength by an additional 1% for a total of 3%.

\* Section 123 of Title 10 removes all end strength limitations during time of war or national emergency.

To See Def

July 20, 2004

~~Paul Butler~~

7/20

IRAQ

7/20

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Stock Exchange

SIR —  
Current stuff here.  
v/r  
joi

Please find out today about the Iraqi stock exchange – if one opened, what happened to the market, how many stocks, and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072004-6

.....  
Please respond by 7/20/04

*DR* 7/21

SIR,  
Response attached.  
v/r  
HGI Longyel  
7/20

2007104

OSD 17322-04

To: SecDef

July 20, 2004

From: Paul Butler

Cc: Larry Di Rita

Re: Iraqi Stock Exchange

Here is some data on the Iraqi Stock Exchange:

- Opened on June 24, 2004. Open for business only on Wednesdays and Sundays for two hours per day.
- Presently 27 companies are listed but Iraqis expect to list more than 100 by the end of July.
- Trading has been vigorous. An article last Sunday (attached) describes the activity: over 1.43 billion shares worth over \$10 million traded in the Sunday July 18 session (the first session open to the media).
- There is no data on the Iraqi exchange in the Wall Street Journal stock tables. I will check the Financial Times and get back to you.

Also noteworthy is the fact that on July 19 the Iraqis did their first post-Saddam bond issue raising \$103 million for 91 day government bonds at 6.8% interest. The Iraqi government hopes to raise \$1.2 billion this year in twice weekly bond auctions (second article attached).



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Business News - July 20, 2004

## Volume Jumps on New Iraq Stock Exchange



July 18, 2004 04:18 PM EDT

Iraqi stock traders bid during a trading session at the well guarded stock exchange building in the center of Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 18, 2004. At present, the Iraq stock exchange is open only on Wednesdays and Sundays from 10 am until midday, but plans are under way to create a six-day trading week. It only has 27 listed companies with about 100 more due to go public in the coming months. (AP Photo/Saeed Khan, Pool)

BAGHDAD, Iraq - The miniature Liberty Bell clanged. Elbows flew. Sweat poured down foreheads. Sales tickets were passed and, with a flick of the wrist, 10,000 shares of the Middle East Bank had more than doubled in value. The frantic pace Sunday of those first 10 minutes of trading typified the enthusiasm behind the Iraq

Stock Exchange - a new institution seen as a critical step in building a new Iraqi economy.

In just five sessions, trading volume has nearly quadrupled and the value of some stocks has surged more than 600 percent, gains traders say reflects the pent up frustration of 15 months of closure.

"How can I not be excited by this?" Taha Ahmed Abdul-Salam, the exchange's chief executive officer, said as he eyed the activity on the trading floor.

The ISX is temporarily housed in a converted restaurant. Looters had gutted the old exchange, so traders now jostle for position in a long room overlooking an old dining room. Where bartenders once chatted with patrons sidling up for drinks, a bank of secretaries log orders.

With space limited, investors are not allowed in the exchange, let alone the "floor." Instead, from a makeshift courtyard, they can look in through the same windows that once offered diners a garden view. Joining them are the posse of men armed with assault rifles who provide security for the exchange.

Such scenes are standard in the tumultuous Iraqi capital. But the

Travel  
Plan a  
vacation

Prob  
Repe  
Mess  
ID  
Prob  
Desc  
Poss  
Prob  
Caus  
Poss



- FREE 14-day Trial
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- Phone, E-mail or Wireless

## Sports Scores

EDFP

## Today's Games

## MLB

NY Yankees at 0  
Tampa Bay 0

## Yesterday's Games

## MLB

NY Yankees at 7  
Tampa Bay 9 FINAL

## Market Update

Stock Lookup

| DJIA    | NASDAQ    | S&P   |
|---------|-----------|-------|
| 9:57 AM |           |       |
|         | 10,110    |       |
|         | 10,100    |       |
|         | 10,090    |       |
|         | 10,080    |       |
| 11      | 1         | 3     |
| DJIA    | 10,095.11 | +1.05 |
| S&P     | 1,101.49  | +0.59 |
| NASDAQ  | 1,891.34  | +7.51 |

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## ET - NEW YORK (CBS MW) -

Insurer Safeco said Tuesday that its careful underwriting practices and low catastrophe payouts helped it double second quarter earnings versus year-ago levels.

More

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presence of security does little to dampen enthusiasm at the exchange.

The unofficial figures of the day's trade tell the story. Over \$10 million in stocks changed hands, reflecting the movement of about 1.43 billion shares - though only 27 companies are listed on the exchange.

"Iraqis have always been business savvy," said Abdul-Salam, the former research head at the old exchange. "But that we have this much activity with so few companies listed shows just how much pent up frustration there was among investors under the previous regime."

For Iraqis, these days have been a long time coming. The ISX replaces the now-defunct Baghdad Stock Exchange, which was riddled with corruption. Saddam's extended family often muscled in at will by simply issuing new shares for companies they found attractive.

The new exchange has built in safeguards against manipulation. It took about a year to set up, with 12 brokerage houses and banks that own it working alongside former occupation authorities to lay the legal and regulatory framework.

"This is much better than before," said Emad Shakir al-Baghdadi, a broker with the Okaz Co. firm. The removal of a 5 percent cap on price swings has added tremendous credibility and liquidity to the market, he added.

"Look at these prices," he said, glancing at the board showing offers for one industrial company at about 25 dinars, almost two-tenths of a cent. "These shares are ridiculously undervalued. That's why prices are surging as much as 600 percent from day-to-day."

The exchange was inaugurated last month and is open two days a week for two hours a day. Sunday's session was the first open to the media.

Officials say they hope that in a month they will have all 120 companies previously listed on the old exchange on the new ISX's "big board" - actually 27 small white boards, where workers record trades with markers.

Thirty minutes after the ringing of the Liberty Bell replica - a donation from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange - Talib al-Tabatabaie, the ISX's board chairman, hollered into the phone, struggling to be heard over the din from the unairconditioned trading floor.

"Sell? Do you want me to sell them now?" he screamed at a client over the phone, his shirt coming untucked as he waved his arms. "It's up again! We should sell!"

Economists say the key to success is a strong regulatory framework, transparency and accountability. A shift to an electronic trading system is coming, officials say.

So are more regulations. Oversight here comes from the Iraq Securities Commission, headed by Luay al-Okali.

"Right now, we're all working together to build up the exchange. Later, when things are running smoother, then we'll give them a hard time," al-Okali said with a wink.

The added bonus will be opening the door for foreign investment. The legal framework is in place, but the details have yet to be completed.

"My hope would be that they would quickly encourage foreign investment," Nobel Laureate and University of Chicago economist Gary Becker told The Associated Press by telephone. "Foreign investors often want to make sure they have majority ownership."

Brokers and ISX officials predict that the tourism and hospitality sector will be the market's new blue chips.

On Sunday, Baghdad Hotel's shares did not disappoint. In a market when many shares were trading at values equal to a fraction of a penny, the 25-cent offer for the hotel's stock was snapped up.

"Don't forget that Iraq is a tourist country. There's plenty to see here," said Mohammed Ismael, a broker with Qidwa Securities.

As the sound of automatic gunfire reverberated in the distance, he shrugged.

"I guess it will take a little more time for them to come."

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# BUSINESS REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL

## Iraq raises \$103m in post-Saddam bond sale

July 19, 2004

London - Iraq sold its first bonds since the ouster of Saddam Hussein more than a year ago, raising R607.6 million from domestic banks.

The central bank in Baghdad will today announce the yield on the 91-day 6.8 percent-interest note.

Iraq's three-week-old government is selling debt to help pay local banks \$3 billion of debt that accrued during Saddam's rule and to reduce its reliance on international loans and revenue from oil. The government will hold twice-monthly auctions to raise as much as \$1.2 billion by year-end.

"It shows the sophistication of the Iraqi banking system," said Richard Segal, research director at London brokerage for emerging market securities, including Iraqi debt.

Iraq, the world's number three holder of oil reserves, this month made its first payment on domestic bonds since 1981, paying 507 billion dinars (R2.13 billion) for three-month 6 percent-interest bills to domestic banks during the days of Saddam's leadership.

Today's sale will help it repay another 600 billion dinars of debt that comes due on October 1, said finance minister Aziz Jaafar Hassan said in a weekend interview.

The government will have to overcome investor scepticism about its ability to pay debt. The nation is subjected to frequent attacks by insurgents, about 140 000 US troops are stationed in the country and the nation still has to reach an agreement on \$120 billion of foreign debt.

Meanwhile stockbrokers have reported roaring trade, making three times their monthly salaries on shares bought just one week ago on the revamped Iraq stock exchange.

"It's simply fantastic. I sold shares worth 5 million dinars and made a profit of more than 2 million in one session. What a great day," exclaimed trader Abdul al Jabbar.

The bourse, which opened on June 24, enjoyed record trading volumes on its sixth session to close with more than 2 billion shares swapping hands.

"The volumes seen Sunday are simply historic," said Taha Ahmed Abdulsalam, the chief executive of the exchange.

"This is despite the primitive system we have. Imagine what it would be once the electronic trading system comes," he said, referring to a plan to shift from the old-fashioned paper system to a fully automated one.

Iraq's stock exchange is a product of more than a year's work by 12 brokerage firms and banks. It has 27 listed companies, with about 100 more due to go public in the next six weeks.

The bourse is open only on Sundays and Wednesdays for two hours at a time. - Bloomberg and

July 26, 2004

322

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis  
cc: Mary Claire Murphy  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Event for Combatant Commanders

For the combatant commanders' dinner, we will have:

- Service Chiefs – no substitutes, not the Vice Chief if a Service Chief cannot be there
- combatant commanders
- Craddock and Keating, who are confirmed
- Martin, if he is confirmed
- Chairman and the Vice Chairman
- Admiral Stavridis
- Probably Duncan Hunter and Congressman Skelton.

I think that is the group. Let's pull that together, check it out with Dick Myers, and then we will decide it for sure.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072304-16

.....  
Please respond by 8/30/04

2674184

July 22, 2004

||

Sir,

I checked with CJCS protocol, and Sunday night, September 19<sup>th</sup> works well on their schedule, for you to host an event at your residence for the Combatant Commanders. They will all be flying in that day, so it would be the welcoming event.

The President does NOT host a dinner during this Fall conference, but the Combatant Commanders spouses WILL be accompanying their husbands to Washington.

We will also host the Commanders on Wednesday at the Pentagon, for the Strategic Planning Council and a working lunch, etc.

cc: Admiral Stavridis  
Paul Butler  
Larry Di Rita  
Cathy Mainardi (b)(6)

*Ale  
Stavri  
- Criddle  
- Keating  
- Martin  
if confirmed*

*- Sav. dir.  
- Hunt  
- Skelton  
- Chi  
- Vice  
- [unclear] Comr. 9.*

July 26, 2004

383.6

TO: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressman Bartlett

Please get back to Roscoe Bartlett and Murtha and tell them what happened – that SGT Davis was interviewed and so forth.

Thanks.

**Attach.**  
7/20/04 CJCS memo to SecDef, CM-1946-04 [OSD 10977-04]

DHR:dh  
072604-2

.....  
Please respond by 8/9/04

26 Jul 04

OSD 17324-04

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Pace  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Information

*J*  
*7/23*

What should we do about getting that person who said **he knew** information about the abuses? He is in Roscoe Bartlett's Congressional district **and briefed** Murtha and someone else.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
051904-14

.....  
Please respond by *5/28/04*

*Det 7/24*

Sir,  
Response attached.

*V/R*  
*Lt Col Lengyel*  
*7/23*

Tab

OSD 10977-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1946-04  
20 July 2004

*04-7/26*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard D. Myers, CJCS *RDMyers 7/20*

SUBJECT: Information

- **Question.** "What should we do about getting that person who said he knew information about abuses? He is in Roscoe Barlett's Congressional district and briefed Murtha and someone else."
- **Answer.** The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed SGT Davis and there is no action required.
- **Analysis**
  - SGT Davis is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, Virginia. While assigned in Iraq with 372nd MP Company, his duties included escorting detainees in and out of Abu Ghraib (Oct 2003-Nov 2003).
  - SGT Davis provided a statement to Army CID dated 27 May 04 in which he claims to have witnessed certain treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib to include: 1) Naked detainees handcuffed together and to the bars of the cell being yelled at by interrogators; 2) Naked detainees being ordered to low-crawl on the floor, and; 3) PFC England taking photos of detainees.
  - SGT Davis reported what he saw to his chain of command while in Iraq. His platoon commander gave a written reprimand to a CPL involved in the events witnessed by SGT Davis. In addition, when it was brought to the attention of the Commanding Officer of Fort Lee that SGT Davis had information about possible detainee abuse, the Commanding Officer reported this to CID, resulting in CID interviewing SGT Davis. The information provided by SGT Davis is still part of a current investigation. This information was provided by CID Agent **Worth** of the Detainee Task Force and the agent that interviewed SGT Davis.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:  
As stated.

Prepared By: LtCol Richard E. Grant; USMC; OCJCS/LC;

(b)(6)

|          |               |
|----------|---------------|
| TSA SD   | <i>X</i>      |
| SRMA SD  |               |
| MA SD    | <i>mm</i>     |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M 7/23</i> |

OSD 10977-04

file

July 26, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo

IRAQ

Do you think we ought to get this memo you gave me to Casey?

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/29/03 MFR: Impressions - Iraq - 19-23 October 2003

DHR:dh  
072604-6

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

*DR 7/27*

*SecDef -*

- Yes - though some of the issues raised in the memo may be addressed by now, cannot be sure
- I will forward to Gen Casey to insure he has seen

*7/26*

26 Jul 04

SecDef -

10/30

- author is a retired Army Colonel
- he has assisted in preparing every Army unit that has served in the Balkans
- his specialty is negotiations training
- he went to Iraq to gain situational awareness in the 4 ID area (Tikrit)
- he will assist in training the Division that replaces the 4 ID.

C

29 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Impressions – IRAQ – 19-23 October 2003

This memo contains my impressions developed during a 19-23 October 2003 visit to Iraq. I am indebted to the commanders who opened their thoughts and units to me. This is not meant to be a critical piece, as I have not walked in their moccasins. I have not written letters to families as have these great leaders. This is intended to be a forward looking, not a rearward pointing, think piece.

1. An infantry battalion commander told me, "You can't assume kindness will win their hearts. You've got to get in sync with the Arab male mentality – then they will respect you – tough but fair.
2. From point 1 comes the need to balance "Dignity and Respect" with operating within the cultural norms. Do we compromise our values to operate within their value set as did Laurence of Arabia? At what point on the toughness scale does the new unit enter the fray? This is a really tough decision for the leadership of the new unit -- and I do not think it should be left to subordinate leaders to make this determination.
3. Units have got to have their game face on before they leave the operating base. Standards have got to be impeccable. This means looking correct enough that no one who wants to live would dare attack you. Units that do not demonstrate this degree of professionalism will invite attacks. I went on an early morning raid with a mechanized unit. We looked as tough as tough could be. The operation went off without incident – every soldier looked ready for action all the time. As we returned, after daylight, we passed a logistics convoy. Soldiers were not postured with the same alertness as ours; some were out of uniform. Later on, we observed a lone vehicle drive by – the policy is three, two of which must have crew served weapons. Both the convoy and the lone vehicle were inviting attacks. In the train up for this mission, I would inflict kills every time on ill disciplined convoys and lone vehicles to make the "Game Face" point.
4. Before Units enter theater, everyone must understand the capabilities of CA, PSYOPS, CI, THT. I also hear this point consistently from rotations in the Balkans.
5. Units training for this mission need to practice drills from vehicles in all environments for ambushes, raids, and manning Ops.
6. Translators should be treated as a pacing item. The battalion that I joined for the raid only had three translators – one was a CAT II, the other two were hired locally by the battalion. I am told not every battalion has a CAT II. We have forgotten what we learned in the Balkans. How do we manage perceptions, win hearts and minds, or just

*Civil Affairs*

*Counterintelligence*

*Tactical  
Hammer Teams*

operate safely if we cannot communicate with the population? Soldiers detain people, search homes, and order people around without being able to explain to them what is happening. This is a recipe for disaster.

7. I spoke to a CPA representative who routinely speaks with a local Imam. In a recent conversation the Imam stated that three months ago, he used to get one request a week for a Fatwa (sp) to kill an American soldier. These requests have increased to three a day. The two main reasons for the requests are:

- a. The way we treat their woman
- b. The detention of their men

Now think back to the shortage of translators – This could be a second or third order effect of poor communications – we can't reach the people.

8. There is always the feeling that “platoon headquarters” does not know what is going on. Most useful intelligence seems to be self generated by units. Scott St-Cyr has the key. Some days ago he expressed his philosophy to me. He said, “I work for the king. The king can be the squad leader who needs the information.” That is really healthy – but tough.

9. Relationships are more important here than they are for units operating in the Balkans - - build them fast; but watch who you build them with. A commander can give stature to a thug just by paying attention to him in a group.

10. All operations should be preceded with a risk assessment. The next step is to rigorously seek ways to mitigate risk. Absent this, force protection can be a crap shoot.

11. Each time units mount an operation, we will, by nature, upset a portion of the population. We should use Information Ops to mitigate this much the same as we identify actions to mitigate risk after doing a risk assessment. Actions might be as simple as the production of a flyer explaining what we are doing and why; a phone number for an IRAQI OFFICE that family can contact to get information on detained family members; could be a MEDCAP etc.

12. Instincts are important. Leaders and troops must know what right looks like. Then, instinctively, they must know something is out of the ordinary.

13. We've got to get out front of the enemy's IO. I heard over and over again, “Sheiks are the internet of IRAQ” – figure out how to leverage them!

14. Don't write checks you can't cash. Don't write checks your boss can't cash. Don't promise anything till you've checked and double checked, and have the resources under your control. The first time you promise something and don't deliver, you have no credibility with an Arab.

15. As the National Governing Council and field offices mature, operations and cooperation in the field will become more difficult. The Council in Baghdad is driving to

centralization. The CPA and the Coalition is driving, bottom up, to decentralization. They are on a collision course. One of the implications is provincial governments, put in place by the Coalition, are not being paid -- by the government in Baghdad. They seem to be on a collision course.

16. Right seat left seat rides are significantly more important here than they are in the Balkans. Incoming commanders must gain a complete understanding of players and history of previous unit's operations in the AO. The implications can be tremendous.

17. Troops I interviewed from previous rotations commented about conditions changing so much that ROE change or supplemental instructions were required, but not forthcoming. It might be prudent to review ROE regularly against METT-T-C. It might also be prudent to regularly review how ROE are being operationalized by subordinate units. In the extreme, frustration can be one heck of an enemy; it got my generation My Lai.

Ed McCarthy  
29 OCTOBER 2003

(b)(6)

file

SECRET  
July 2, 2004  
7374 NOV - 820 11 2: 10

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
CC: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Militias

IMM

I left one thing out when we had that meeting on the Iraqi Security Forces, and that is how we handle the militias. That has to be a part of the security situation in the country, and it should have a separate section in the approach.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070204-5

.....  
Please respond by 7/

SJS 04-04431

-Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS

---

**From:** Dillard, Frances W, CIV, JCS SJS  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 07, 2004 1:30 PM  
**To:** Nosenzo, Thomas E, CDR, OSD  
**Cc:** Leonard, Kevin A, COL, JCS SJS; Koles, Robert E, Lt Col, JCS SJS  
**Subject:** Request for closure of SF-820 Militias

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

**CDR Nosenzo,**

**At a 2 July CJCS/MNF-I/CENTCOM SVTC, Gen Casey (MNF-I) stated militias should be woven into the plan for Iraqi Security Forces and CJCS agreed. MNF-I is taking appropriate action on SecDef's memo (SF-820).**

**Recommend Joint Staff action be closed out.**

**v/r**

**Fran Dillard**

(b)(6)



tasker\_04-04431.p  
df

July 26, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Good News Story

383.6

You might want to take a look at this story and see if you can move it around.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/23/04 Fax from SecState on Major Garrity

DHR:dh  
072604-10



Please respond by 8/6/04

26074104

(b)(6)



S/ES 200417620  
United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary  
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration

Washington, D.C. 20520-5824

July 22, 2004

✓  
W

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7/22  
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PA/RB  
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NOTE TO THE SECRETARY ✕

Attached is a *summary* of a good news story about an Army Reservist who got it right in her treatment of detainees in Southern Iraq. Maj. Garrity is from Athens, PA - not far from where our farm is located in the far north of the state. Since all we hear from ICRC and the press is bad news about U.S. treatment, this is a story that ought to reach beyond Northern Pennsylvania.

I am copying this to Richard Boucher.

*Gene Dewey*  
Gene Dewey

**A GOLDEN HEART: ATHENS SOLDIER BELOVED BY IMPRISONED IRAQIS**  
(summarized from *The Sunday Review*, July 4, 2004)

Pictures from Camp Bucca, a U.S.-run detention center near Umm Qasr in southern Iraq, show a very different picture of prison life than the images of Abu Ghraib that have saturated the media. Notably, the pictures show American soldiers and Iraqi prisoners smiling together. Most of the pictures include Major Stacy Garrity, an Army Reservist from Athens, Pennsylvania.

As Major Garrity used to walk through Camp Bucca, children would chant: "good, good major!" They would give her a small, braided "friendship bracelets." At least one detainee wrote to her that "when we see you, we feel hope." Iraqi generals at the camp called her "GoldenHeart." To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

Garrity served at Camp Bucca for one year, keeping life flowing for the masses of Iraqi detainees. Garrity handled processing at the prison, interacting with everyone who came in and out. She was also responsible for family visitations and interpreters, and she served as a Red Cross liaison.

Garrity took her mission to watch and care for the Iraqis very seriously. Often, she told detainees: "You will never be mistreated while you are here." It was her conviction that anybody who came through the gates at Camp Bucca would be treated with dignity as a human being. She followed the Geneva Conventions, looked out for the detainees and treated everyone with respect and dignity. Iraqis under her care lived in large tents, got water from water buffaloes, and received ice two times a day from the U.S. soldiers. The Iraqis showered twice a day, received extra clothes and blankets, and got cigarettes twice a day.

Garrity also took on projects that were not in her job description. She procured soccer balls, volleyballs, chess, checker and domino sets, and newspapers. She set up a post office system where families could leave letters for detainees. She helped a Christian orphanage nearby get money, toys, clothes and food. She helped design a family visiting system, arranging schedules and organizing bus drivers.

Her attention to prisoners' well-being earned her affection, as evidenced by the gifts and thank-you cards given to her by Iraqi prisoners. One detainee in particular didn't want to leave Camp Bucca. A young Iraqi who speaks three languages kept committing minor crimes so he could keep coming back to Camp Bucca. Each time he would be released he would say "Major Garrity, I'll see you in two days!" And in two days he would return.

When Garrity received word this spring that she was going home, the detainees were very upset by the news. Many of the detainees invited her to visit their families - they think of her as a sister. It was because she cared. And she helped. Helping was her job, Garrity insists. Most of all, it makes sense. One of the most important things, she believes, "is to win hearts and minds." If Iraqis like Americans, they won't hurt Americans.

Garrity has also served in Haiti six times for short-term missions and in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War as an administrative officer. Garrity graduated from Bloomsburg University, where she joined the ROTC, with a business administration degree.

TWELVE - A — THE SUNDAY REVIEW, JULY 4, 2004

## Heroes

## A golden heart

## Athens soldier beloved by imprisoned Iraqis

BY NANCY COLEMAN

(570) 265-1632

The Daily/Sunday Review

Stacy Garrity used to walk through camp, under the stinging sunlight. Her boots crunched the sand.

Dark-haired kids would see her. "Good, good major!" they'd chant. Perhaps one would run up with a small, green, braided object like a rope. He'd give it to her.

It was called a "friendship bracelet."

And she was their friend.

This was Camp Bucca, a southern Iraq detainee center. Stacy, from Athens, a U.S. Army Reserve officer, served there a year, keeping life flowing for its masses of Iraqi prisoners.

"Golden Heart." That's what some Iraqi generals there called her. To others, she was "The Angel of the Desert."

"When we see you, we feel hope," at least one person wrote to her.

It was because she cared. And she helped.

Why?

Well, there's the Geneva Convention. And issues of dignity and respect. And good common sense.

But for this young woman with blue eyes and golden curls ... who travels the world ... who's gone to Haiti six times on short-term missions ... who wears a small cross ring ... who likes to smile — there's some-



Submitted photo

**Maj. Stacy Garrity of Athens stands with some young friends during her recent year in Iraq. Garrity, a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, served at Camp Bucca detainee center in southern Iraq.**

thing more. "Something that has to be inside you," she says.

"I genuinely like people," she states simply.

"It's easy for me ... it's not a burden."

Stacy graduated from Sayre High in 1982. At first interested in political science, she finally earned a business-administra-

tion degree from Bloomsburg University. Today, she's product marketing manager at Oram-Sylvania in North Towanda. Her father and his wife, Howard and Tammy Lynn Garrity, live in Waverly, and her mom, Beverly Arbia, and her husband, John, in Scranton. And — Stacy doesn't want to

miss anyone — she has three sisters, Maureen, Paige and Jennifer; one living grandmother, June Garrity of Sayre, and a fiancé, Dan Gizzi of Elmira.

Years ago, her parents joined the Navy Reserve. Try it!

See HEART, Page 13A





July 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter to Turkish MoD

3335D

Have I sent a thank you to the Turkish MoD? If not, I should. Please draft it.

Thanks.

DIIR:dh  
070804-3

.....  
Please respond by 7/12/04

h01n08



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

JUL 2 2004

His Excellency Mehmet Vecdi Gonul  
Minister of National Defense  
Republic of Turkey

Dear Minister Gonul:

Thank you so much for your warm hospitality. **Joyce** and I thoroughly enjoyed our visit to Istanbul. We found the dinner at the Officers Club delightful and the Gala evening at the Topkapi Palace spectacular. We wish we had been able to stay longer.

Please do express my appreciation to **Mrs. Gonul**. It was a pleasure to be with her.

Turkey organized and hosted a truly memorable Summit.

With best wishes and appreciation,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.

OSD 09956-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037891

July 13, 2004

TO: Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF  
President, National Defense University

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: NDU Accomplishments

Thanks so much for your memo on accomplishments over the last year. It sounds like a lot of good work is being done there.

Congratulations.

DHR:dh  
07.1304-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

11/2  
8  
9 Jul 04

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense (CY FOR)  
Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff

FROM: President, National Defense University

Mike D.

Subject: Accomplishments Over the Last Year

Sirs, I wanted to give you some thoughts on the changes we have made during my first year at NDU.

**Transformation** – we have thoroughly infused the curricula in all our colleges with transformation – from transformational leadership, transformational organizations, to transformational thinking. However, we are still not satisfied. Art Cebrowski is in the process of funding us to develop curriculum for a certificate program in Transformational Leadership – which could be used in all war colleges (Army, Navy, Air, etc.),

**GWOT** -- Adjusted curricula to reflect the long-term nature of the conflict. Have focused on differences of views between US/allies and others. Have brought our international students forcefully into the debate. And have brought many senior policy makers to speak – in order to ensure we present the USG point of view. Have conducted workshops/roundtables for CPA, Amb Negroponte, and for Generals Casey and Sharp. Have conducted exercises for EUCOM and Government of Greece to enhance security for the 2004 Olympics and a major bioterrorism exercise for Secs Ridge, Minetta, Thompson, and other cabinet officials.

**Capstone** -- many changes – most significantly -- to expose our new GOs/FOs to senior leaders – including both of you, USDP, Dir CIA, and Art Cebrowski. One class even heard from VP Cheney. Secondly, have shifted overseas travel to visit our JTFs – to include GTMO, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Korea, and Horn-of-Africa. Have also visited Israeli Northern Command (watched live Hizballah infiltrations in broad daylight) – great lessons learned. Speaker Gingrich continues to support us with his time and thoughts.

**Research** -- have refocused our efforts to support our customers in OSD/JS – policy, AT&L, and NII. Have added OSD chairs to the university from policy and AT&L. Have met with DASDs/Directors on products/round tables frequently. Have provided numerous studies and papers: on transformation; stabilization and reconstruction ops; IT in the military; analyzed difficult Homeland security challenges, including bio-terrorism, dirty bombs, and MANPAD threat to civil aviation; studies on implementation of US CT strategy; de-Ba'thification; building new Iraqi defense forces; changing civil-mil relations in the greater Middle East; enhancing stability in Afghanistan; papers on NE Asia and Korea/PRC roles, and others. This year, Joint Force Quarterly celebrated its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary and INSS completed its 20<sup>th</sup> year of operations. We have provided library support to both OSD/JS.

**Counter Terrorism Fellow (CTF) Program** – A singular success. Is supported by SOLIC – brings international officers from those countries without enough IMET or those which have significant IMET restrictions (e.g. Indonesia), and focuses them on a CT curriculum. About 70 officers per year for 8 month program. A new class enters every 4 months. We expect our first Afghani and Iraqi students this year.

**Regional Centers (Africa Center, NESACenter, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies)** – All have new directors. Thru Ryan Henry's leadership, are in process of using them in the "battle of ideas." We have new courses on GWOT, created alumni associations – and providing them with high quality information, provided virtual access to our library, shared best practices among the centers, and a myriad of other programs.

**Congress** – have continued simulated war games and attracted over 80 members and many senior officials – have added scenarios on anthrax, plague, port security and transportation system. Have also run a Korean scenario and have one on China/Taiwan planned for later this month. We have conducted Hill staffer courses – both in terrorism and in "Defense 101," and run brown-bag lunches for Hill staffers. With Ike Skelton's help, we have held Congressional breakfasts – which expose our National War College and ICAF students to members of Congress (and vice versa).

**Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)** – we have broadened JPME: created a course for Capt/USN Lts, created a Joint Advanced Warfighting Course for joint planners, in process of creating a course (named Pinnacle) for prospective JTF Commanders. Are reviewing ideas for joint courses for NCOs, have created Advanced JPME course for Reserve Component (RC) Officers – combination in-residence/DL format, and increased the number of RC two-week courses by 50%.

**Sr Leaders** – we have made a concerted effort to bring the most senior policy makers to the University to address our students. DSD has visited about a dozen times, Dep Sec State, USDP, USS Political Affairs, DHS, and almost every Combatant Commander and Service Chief have addressed our students. We have gone after many notables – many of which are scheduled to talk – including former Sec Schultz. Pres Bush addressed our classes in February.

**International Focus** – have expanded our International Fellow (IFs) program with NWC and ICAF by 25% -- seeking to increase the number of countries represented from the arc of instability and from Africa. We are delivering more courses to more people with our regional centers – both here and abroad. We have reinvigorated our international Hall of Fame – where we recognize those IFs who succeed in their country. Working with embassies in Washington and country teams abroad, we have sought out our grads, catalogued their present positions, and sent notes to every Ambassador, DASD/ASD/DASS/ASS informing them that they had people in the AORs which have studied in the US and are likely to have a favorable impression of the US. We urged they be nurtured and included in events when key US officials visited the country. In the near future, we see NDU linked with counterpart

institutions and alumni in almost every country in the world – interacting virtually, by VTC, and in person – seeking to build consensus in support of US objectives. [Presently I correspond with the Commandants from over 50 countries on a routine basis.] We continue to volunteer to host distinguished foreign visitors here – to conduct roundtables with them and to press US views on them. Our experience is that we can say some things in an “academic setting” that can’t be said in formal meetings.

**Homeland Security** – Have formed a new Institute for Homeland Security Studies (IHSS) – led by Hon Steve Duncan, former ASD (RA) and DOD drug czar under SD Cheney. Purpose of IHSS is to pull together various aspects of HLS in other NDU components and to interface with DHS. We have created a Homeland Security Planner’s Course in support of NORTHCOM. We have developed a range of training and simulation programs designed to enhance interagency planning and cooperation of complex contingencies.

**Information Resources Management College** – continues to adjust its focus – we have new intensive courses focused on network-centric organizations, DOD enterprise architecture, and building the business case for IT. Curriculum changes were made to update CIO competencies and CIO leadership skills such as collaboration, communication, critical thinking, and leading change. Enrollment in distance learning courses grew to 25 percent of total enrollment, and the College continues to be an innovator in instructional design.

**Facilities and Infrastructure.** Planning is well under way for a new 240,000 SF Academic and Conference Center – we expect ground breaking Nov 04. We plan to bring numerous NDU elements housed in leased space off campus into what we are tentatively calling “Lincoln Hall.” However, we have an opportunity to build a Homeland Security College – one which serves DOD, DHS, other parts of the government, and state/local authorities. We want DHS to fund the college and help us build the curriculum. Will let you both know of any roadblocks we might face.

**Board of Visitors** – have reinvigorated the BOV – provided it with more expansive view of NDU activities; have included its members in almost every facet of NDU operations, including overseas travel, key conferences, and workshops. I am very happy with the independent, thoughtful advice I get from the Board.

**Funding** – we have adequate funding ...but, in priority order, need additional funding for: (1) NESAC center – courses for Afghanis and Iraqis, and for playing an increasingly important role in the battle of ideas in the Presidents’ Greater Middle East Initiative. (2) NCO JPME – this is long overdue, needs resources.

Bottomline: Great things are underway here. We are improving in all we do.

Very Respectfully,

CF: DSD, USDP, DJS

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July 19, 2004

TO: RADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: IRR Numbers

Please have someone get me the Individual Ready Reserve numbers to add to this "Active and Selected Reserve Forces" chart, so I know the total.

Also have them put on the same page the civilian headcount.

Thanks.

**Attach.**

5/04 "Active and Selected Reserve Forces".

DHR:dh  
071904-20

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

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OSD 17330-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037896

## Active and Selected Reserve Forces

| Service      | Active    | Guard & Reserve |
|--------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Army         | 495,763   | 555,266         |
| Navy         | 376,204   | 83,234          |
| Marine Corps | 175,048   | 39,756          |
| Air Force    | 379,534   | 180,950         |
| Total        | 1,426,549 | 859,206         |

*FRR*

Active Duty as of May 30, 2004  
Guard & Reserves as of May 30, 2004

720

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July 14, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
CC: RYAN HENRY  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Allegation

383.6

You ought to have someone look into this allegation by the former detainee from Jordan.

Thanks.

Attach.  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN Cable P. 1402252JUL 04 ZDK, "Jordanian Released from GITMO Interviewed by Islamic Weekly Al-Sabil, Cites Abuse"

DHR:dh  
071404-8

.....  
Please respond by 8/6/04

1430104

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OSD 17331-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037898

*7/14*

PTIUZDKW FUEHAMA5893 1960225-UUUU--RUEKNMA.  
ZNR UUUU ZZH  
P 140225Z JUL 04 ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3973  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0046

*7/14*  
*J*

UNCLAS AMMAN: 005893

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IZ, JO

S T: JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM GITMO INTERVIEWED BY  
ISLAMIC WEEKLY AL-SABIL, CITES ABUSE

REF: FBIS GNP20040707000102

1. JORDAN ISLAMIST WEEKLY AL-SABIL PUBLISHED JULY 6 A LENGTHY INTERVIEW WITH, THEY REPORT, THE FIRST JORDANIAN RELEASED FROM THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA. THE FORMER PRISONER DESCRIBED HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AT DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2004 AS BEING WORSE THAN THE REPORTED ABUSE AT ABU GHREIB. THE FULL TEXT OF THE ARTICLE CAN BE FOUND IN FBIS REFTEL. WE REPORT THIS IN THE INTEREST OF ANY ONGOING INVESTIGATION.

-----  
**HANDED OVER IN TEHRAN TO US FORCES**  
-----

2. WISAM ABD-AL-RAHMAN, KNOWN AS ABU-UBAYDAH, DESCRIBED TO AL-SABIL HIS ALLEGED EXPERIENCES AS A PRISONER IN DETENTION CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO. HE SAID IRANIAN POLICE ARRESTED HIM IN ZAHEDAN ON HIS RETURN FROM A TRIP TO PAKISTAN. HE SAID THAT AFTER HIS INTERROGATION BY IRANIAN POLICE HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE RELEASED. HOWEVER, HE WAS INSTEAD TAKEN TO THE AIRPORT IN TEHRAN AND ALLEGEDLY HANDED OVER TO A U.S. PLANE WITH AFGHAN MEN ON BOARD.

-----  
**DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, CUBA; RETURN TO JORDAN**  
-----

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF:   X   DEPSEC:   /   EXECSEC:   /    
C&D :   /   CCD :   /   CABLE CH:   /   FILE:             
USDP:   /   DIA:            OTHER:             
USDI:   /   PER SEC:            COMM:

3. ABD-AL-RAHMAN DESCRIBED HIS REPORTED PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN FROM JANUARY 2002 UNTIL APRIL 2003 AS MOVING FROM "ONE AMERICAN PRISON TO ANOTHER", STAYING IN COLD, DARK, AND CROWDED ROOMS. HE SAID HE STAYED, WITHOUT CHARGES OR INTERROGATION, WITH NINE OTHER PERSONS IN A 25 SQUARE FOOT ROOM WITHOUT SUNLIGHT AND FED ONLY BREAD AND RICE FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT 77 DAYS. HE SAID THAT SANITARY AND HYGIENE CONDITIONS WERE TERRIBLE, AND THAT HE DID NOT RECEIVE MEDICAL CARE NOR SEE THE SUN DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ALSO REPORTED SLEEP DEPRIVATION, UNDRRESSING IN FRONT OF FEMALE SOLDIERS, DESECRATION OF THE KORAN BY A DOG, BEATINGS, AND THREATS OF HARM FROM BARKING DOGS WHILE BLINDFOLDED.

4. ABD-AL-RAHMAN SAID THAT AFTER BEING TOLD OF HIS INNOCENCE BY AN INTERROGATOR, HE WAS FLOWN TO THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CAMP IN CUBA AT THE END OF APRIL 2003. MORE ALLEGED ABUSE, POOR CONDITIONS, AND SCARCE FOOD FOLLOWED. UPON HIS RELEASE IN 2004, HE WAS FLOWN BY A U.S. MILITARY PLANE INTO AMMAN AND HELD BY JORDANIAN SECURITY OFFICIALS FOR 56 DAYS, FOLLOWED BY RELEASE UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

-----  
**RED CROSS FAILED TO DELIVER LETTERS**  
-----

5. ACCORDING TO ABD-AL-RAHMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC) DID NOT DELIVER ANY OF THE LETTERS THAT HE WROTE TO HIS FAMILY WHILE DETAINED. HE SAID THAT AN ICRC REP CAME TO HIS HOUSE AFTER HIS RELEASE, HANDED HIM THE LETTERS, AND APOLOGIZED FOR NOT DELIVERING THEM TO HIS FAMILY.

-----  
**COMMENT**  
-----

6. GIVEN THE REVELATIONS OF ABUSES OF PRISONERS IN ABU GHREIB PRISON, ABD-AL-RAHMAN'S ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE IN U.S. CUSTODY IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO WILL BE WIDELY BELIEVED HERE.

7. BACHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

VISIT EMBASSY AMMAN'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT

[HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/NEA/AMMAN/](http://www.state.gov/p/nea/AMMAN/)

OR ACCESS THE SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S SIPRNET HOME PAGE.

HALE

POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03291  
POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03175  
POSSIBLE DUPLICATE OF MCN=04196/03186

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\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 3 of 3

\*\*\*\* RETRANSMITTED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*

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| SECDEF V2                             |                       | 1 |
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11-L-0559/OSD/037901

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July 14, 2004

TO: RDML Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Declassify Testimony

31314

Is there a way we can declassify Steve Cambone's testimony today to the Intel Committee and get a declassified version for broader use?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071404-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*File copy  
attachment provided  
to SD Sepur*

14 Jul 04

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OSD 17332-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037902

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY

DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE  
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

THE CRITICAL NEED FOR INTERROGATION  
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

**UNCLASSIFIED**

11-L-0559/OSD/037903

# UNCLASSIFIED

## STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY  
DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE  
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

JULY 14, 2004

### INTRODUCTION

(U) Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for inviting me here today. I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the interrogation guidelines, training, and resources the Department of Defense provides its military forces. My remarks will focus on Department-level intelligence guidelines and policies, since that is the area over which I have cognizance. Mr. Feith and I are accompanied by Service and Command experts who can address your more specific questions.

### VITAL IMPORTANCE OF INTERKOGATIONS

(U) Interrogation is a HUMINT collection technique employed to obtain reliable, timely information to support combat operations, military campaign plans,

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and national strategy. Interrogations have provided highly valuable information on individual terrorists, terrorist groups or networks, and terrorist plans. They have also been essential to the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. It is a fact that interrogations can yield information on terrorists that is unavailable from any other collection discipline.

(U) Detainee debriefs have had a major impact on our understanding of the terrorist threat since 9/11. In the case of al-Qaida, interrogations have provided highly valuable insights into its structure, target selection process, operational planning cycle, degree of cooperation between various groups, and the identities of key operational and logistical personnel. For example, interrogations at Guantanamo have yielded information on :

- Individuals connected to al-Qaida's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
- Front companies and accounts supporting al-Qaida and other terrorist operations;
- Surface-to-air missiles, improvised explosive devices, and tactics and training used by these terrorist groups;
- Explosives training, assembly, and distribution networks used by al-Qaida throughout Afghanistan;

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- Training of young adults for suicide bombing missions;
  - Potential travel routes to be used by terrorists to reach the United States;
  - Transnational funding operations;
  - Individuals suspected of money laundering for terrorist organizations;
- and
- Non-governmental organizations providing financial and material support to terrorist organizations.

(U) The intelligence we have obtained from detainee interrogations at Guantanamo Bay has expanded our understanding of jihadist selection, motivation, and training processes. This information has helped the US Government to disrupt active threat planning through the capture of operatives and the implementation of additional security measures.

(U) In Iraq interrogation has been employed to locate and capture Saddam Hussein, roll up his support and communications network, locate and then capture or kill insurgent leaders, pinpoint munitions stockpiles, and disrupt attacks. The loss of this source of information would have a significantly negative impact on our counterterrorism efforts, including our ability to warn of impending threats.

(U) LTG Boykin, VADM Jacoby, and LTG Alexander will provide specific examples of valuable information we have obtained from the interrogation of

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detainees when they testify later today.

## INTERROGATION POLICY AND GUIDELINES

(U) Interrogations take place, broadly speaking, in two venues – on or near the battlefield or at detention facilities.

(U) On or near the battlefield or at transfer facilities, the primary goal is to obtain time-sensitive information which is immediately useable in helping to accomplish the supported unit's mission. There is a premium on gaining this information from a detainee as rapidly as possible after capture. If the information is not gained within the first 96 hours after capture, it is usually of limited value to an ongoing operation.

(U) Interrogations at detention centers (e.g., Guantanamo, Bagram, and Baghdad International Airport) can be conducted over longer periods of time. Detainees at these centers have either been sent to the rear from the battlefield or point of capture for continued interrogation, or assigned to a center from the time of capture. The primary goal is to extract information that might affect the broader military campaign or national strategy, although information of immediate use on the battlefield might be acquired. Interrogation plans at the centers are often more elaborate than those prepared for use at the front lines because the information is

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harder to extract. The disorienting effect of capture wears off; the detainee is more comfortable with his setting; he may have the support and assistance of other detainees in resisting interrogations; and, he has time and opportunity to hone the resistance techniques he may have learned in his training.

(U) Before providing a reprise of interrogation guidelines developed for Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq, I would like to make the following points:

- In each case the interrogation guidelines received a legal review by a command Staff Judge Advocate.
  - In the case of Guantanamo, the interrogation guidelines received two additional reviews at the DoD level.
- In each case, external reviews of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for interrogators were conducted with the aim of refining those TTPs and establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs) to improve the effectiveness of interrogations.
- In each case, the baseline for interrogation guidelines and practices was the Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52. It is important to understand that FM 34-52 does not describe the full universe of permitted TTPs. The FM states, the “approaches and techniques [listed] are not new nor [are they] all the possible or acceptable techniques.” Therefore, judgment is

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required in every case to determine whether proposed TTPs comply with applicable rules, regulations, standards, policies, and domestic and international law. That is why, as one reviews the guidelines for Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, one finds a range of opinion among interrogators, SJAs, and commanders about what is permitted, and a variation in the TTPs proposed and employed in each of the three cases.

(U) Guantanamo. With respect to the Geneva Convention and detained al-Qaida and Taliban supporters, the President directed on February 7, 2002 that:

[a]s a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

(U) From Guantanamo's establishment in early 2002, interrogators employed the standard techniques found in the FM 34-52.

(U) During the summer and fall of 2002, the United States was in a high-threat environment, and intelligence continued to indicate planning by al-Qaida for attacks in the United States and elsewhere. Among the detainees at Guantanamo were individuals thought to have close connections to al-Qaida planning figures.

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These detainees of high interest also demonstrated training in al-Qaida tactics to resist interrogation.

(U) On June 17, 2002, the acting SOUTHCOM Commander, Major General Speer, requested that the Joint Staff conduct an “external review of intelligence collection operations” at Guantanamo. The resulting report was delivered in September. It called for the adoption of a “rule of thumb” or “Rules of Engagement” for interrogation.

(U) Subsequently, the new SOUTHCOM Commander, General James T. Hill, received from Joint Task Force- 170 (charged with interrogations at Guantanamo) a proposed set of interrogation techniques, divided into three categories. GEN Hill was of the view, based on a review by the SJA for JTF- 170, that the Category I and II techniques were “legal and humane.” He requested, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a review and approval of the Category III techniques. This set of techniques had been proposed by JTF-170 for use on some detainees who had, according to Hill, “tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods.” What GEN Hill sought were “counter-resistant [*sic*] techniques that we can lawfully employ.”

(U) On November 27, 2002, the DoD General Counsel, after discussing the request with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for

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Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the Secretary of Defense “authorize the Commander of USSOUTHCOM to employ, in *[sic]* his discretion, only Categories I and II and the fourth technique listed in Category III (‘Use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.’).”

(U) On December 2, 2002 the Secretary of Defense concurred in this recommendation. He did not approve for use from Category III the use of:

- Scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family;
- Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring);
- Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation.

(U) These guidelines remained in effect until January 12, 2003, when the Secretary verbally suspended his December 2 decision, and then formally rescinded, on January 15, 2003, all Category II techniques and the one Category III technique he had approved.

(U) On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department’s General Counsel to establish a Working Group to assess the legal,

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policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogation of detainees held by the US military in the war on terrorism.

(U) The Working Group consisted of representatives of the Military Departments, Service general counsels, the Judge Advocates General of the armed forces, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Department of Justice advised the Working Group in its deliberations.

(U) Based on the Working Group's report, which was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of 24 techniques for use at Guantanamo on April 16, 2003. Eighteen of these 24 techniques came from FM 34-52. Four of the 24 techniques required notification to the Secretary before they could be used. Two of these were in the FM 34-52: "incentive and removal" and "pride and ego down." Two additional techniques requiring notification were recommended: "Mutt and Jeff" and "isolation." The four other techniques not in FM-34-52 were "diet manipulation," "environment manipulation," "sleep adjustment," and "false flag." Any additional techniques GEN Hill might wish to employ other than those approved by the Secretary of Defense would require the Secretary's approval.

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(U) Of the six techniques approved, but not included in FM 34-52, five were on General Hill's original list – all from Category 11.

(U) Prior to the execution of US military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, USCENTCOM issued guidance directing the humane treatment of detainees. While detainees could be categorized as Enemy Prisoners of War or unlawful combatants, the requirement for humane treatment was a constant.

(U) Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, from the war's inception through the end of 2002, all forces employed FM 34-52. On January 21, 2003, the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS), on behalf of the Working Group referenced above, requested that CENTCOM provide information on the interrogation techniques it was using and had used, highlighting those it had found to be effective and those it desired to implement, with rationale included.

(U) On January 24, 2003, CJTF-180 prepared for forwarding to the Working Group, through the CENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate, its response to the DJS tasking. CJTF-180 listed all techniques currently being used, including some not explicitly listed in FM 34-52. CJTF-180 was aware that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded the techniques he had authorized for use at Guantanamo from

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December 2, 2002 to January 15, 2003.

(U) With respect to Special Operations in Afghanistan, SOF conducted interrogations in accordance with FM 34-52 in the beginning of 2003. Convinced that its interrogations were not yielding useful results, some SOF units conducted an external review of its interrogation TTPs in the fall of 2003. As part of its review, these elements were aware of the Secretary's December 2, 2002 memo, and discussed with personnel at Guantanamo when and where information most useful to SOF might be collected. Psychologists were also consulted as part of this SOF review.

(U) The SOP it published in February 2003 focused on battlefield interrogation. It closely paralleled FM 34-52.

(U) The SJA for one of the SOCOM major subordinate commands, at the time a subordinate command for CENTCOM in Afghanistan, reviewed and recommended approval of these techniques. The Task Force Commander approved the techniques.

(U) Iraq. During July and August 2003, elements of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, which had previously served in Afghanistan, were sent to the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility to run interrogation operations. The warrant officer-in-charge prepared a draft interrogation guidelines based in part on a

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February 2003 SOF SOP. It is a near copy of the SOP created by SOF in Afghanistan. The SOF SOP in Iraq was used because members of the 519th knew of its existence and were looking for a point of departure in building an SOP for Abu Ghraib. On August 25, two SJAs from CJTF-7, an American and an Australian, reviewed the draft guidelines and recommended CJTF-7 approval.

(U) On August 31, 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller arrived in Iraq from Guantanamo. MG Miller had been tasked by the Joint Staff to send a team to Iraq to conduct an external review of interrogation policies and procedures, to include detention operations. MG Miller chose to lead the team, and he discovered that there were no official interrogation guidelines yet in place, he recommended that CJTF-7 formalize the draft interrogation counter-resistance guidelines that had been reviewed on August 25. CJTF-7 prepared such draft guidelines on September 10. It was put in a format similar to the April 16, 2003 guidance relative to Guantanamo. The draft underwent a second legal review by CJTF-7 and, with some modification, was signed on September 14, 2003 by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander. When LTG Sanchez promulgated the guidelines in theater, he stipulated that the use of certain techniques would require his personal approval. He emphasized that the Geneva Conventions on humane treatment continued to be applicable.

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(U) On September 14, 2003, LTG Sanchez also sent the new CJTF-7 interrogation policy to CENTCOM for review. At CENTCOM, the Staff Judge Advocate reviewed the policy and recommended the removal of some techniques.

(U) October 12, 2003, LTG Sanchez published revised counter-resistance guidelines. He granted authority to employ only techniques outlined in FM 34-52 with the exception of two techniques. He also required that any new techniques proposed, beyond those identified in the October 12 guidelines, would require approval. This policy remained in effect until it was modified on May 13, 2004.

(U) With respect to the SOF in Iraq, the Director of the Joint Staff inquired in June 2003 whether interrogation techniques in use in Afghanistan and Iraq by SOF were compliant with FM 34-52. A SOF SJA replied through the CENTCOM SJA that "the military interrogations at both BIAP [Baghdad International Airport] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in IAW FM 34-52 and SecDef direction."

### LOOKING FORWARD

(U) As I stated before this committee on May 11th, there clearly was a breakdown in discipline by some at Abu Ghraib. However, nothing I have seen or heard thus far indicates that the source of that breakdown was the guidance on

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interrogation provided to SOUTHCOM or by CENTCOM.

(U) This is not to assert that individual interrogators may not have exceeded their authority. We await MG Fay's findings on this point. It is to say that in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, appropriate measures were taken to ensure that proper guidance, to include legal reviews, was provided to and within the chain of command. And, it is to say that nothing we have seen in the pictures from Abu Ghraib were in any way associated with a lawful interrogation.

(U) With respect to the abuses, the Department has initiated a number of efforts to determine what happened and why, and to hold those responsible accountable. These efforts include investigations concerning accountability of those within the chain of command, such as the Taguba report and the Fay, Formica, Jacoby, and Helmley investigations; investigations by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division and Inspector General; and, various unit-level investigations within the Commands to improve accountability, unit discipline, and standard operating procedures.

(U) In addition, the Secretary of Defense has:

- Appointed VADM Albert Church to conduct a comprehensive Detainee Operations and Interrogation Review.
- Set up a review panel under Secretary of the Navy Gordon England to

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## UNCLASSIFIED

accelerate the release of detainees at Guantanamo.

- Is taking steps to appoint an ombudsman for detainee matters within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
- Is taking steps to establish a new office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to oversee detainee affairs.
- Named former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger as envoy to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Established the Schlesinger Panel to oversee all the Department's corrective actions.

(U) The Department has taken the following measures to improve its capacity to conduct interrogations and the interrogation process:

- As the Army transforms to a modular force structure, the number of enlisted interrogators and warrant officers will nearly triple in size, increasing from over 555 currently on hand to over 1500 by 2009.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plans to hire fluent linguists to serve as interrogator supervisors and to create deployable HUMINT assistance teams that will consist of interrogator supervisors, strategic debriefers, reports officers, and other HUMINT collectors. These teams

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will help reduce the impact of heightened OPTEMPO.

- As you know, we are engaged in remodeling Defense intelligence that encompasses a wide range of efforts to change the way we prepare for and conduct intelligence activities in the Department. As part of that effort, we intend to increase the foreign language proficiency of our HUMINT collectors, including interrogators. We have begun to do this by raising the standards of graduates from the Defense Foreign Language Institute from Level 2 proficiency to Level 3 (professional proficiency). These new standards will improve the performance of the language specialist corps throughout the force, including interrogators.
- DIA is currently coordinating its Interrogation Policy for DHS.
- Furthermore, I have engaged the Department's intelligence community on the question of a DoD-level set of guidelines for interrogation drawing on DIA's work.
- The Army proposed a joint review of doctrine regarding interrogations, prisoners of war, and security detainee operations. This will include a review of operations and oversight of confinement facilities. The goal is to clearly identify responsibilities among Military Intelligence, Military Police, and other agencies that conduct interrogations in a military theater

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of operations. The review is underway, under the lead of Major General Ronald Burgess, the Director, J-2, Joint Staff, with assistance from Joint Forces Command. The Department will act expeditiously on the recommendations that come out of this review.

- CENTCOM has taken a number of steps to streamline the chain of command at Abu Ghraib, unifying responsibility for detention operations, law enforcement, investigations, and disposition of criminal cases under MG Geoffrey Miller. It has also taken action to expedite detainee processing and upgrade detention facilities.
- CENTCOM has taken the following corrective steps in the area of intelligence and interrogation. It has:
  - Placed a General Officer on the Multi-National Force—Iraq staff to serve as Deputy Commander General—Detainee Operations. Made this officer responsible for all detention and interrogation operations;
  - Issued interrogation policies reinforcing the requirement to abide by the Geneva Conventions and required that all interrogations be conducted with command oversight;

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11-L-0559/OSD/037920

## UNCLASSIFIED

- o Assigned a behavioral psychologist to provide support to interrogators;
  - o Transferred responsibility for all HUMINT collection and analysis to the Multi-National Force—Iraq and increased that organization's manning level.
  - o Established a weekly Inter-Service/Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts;
  - o Established an intelligence fusion system that decreases the amount of time needed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information; and
  - o Assigned **DIA** personnel to primary theater interrogation facilities to facilitate intelligence sharing between agencies.
- In Iraq, MG Geoffrey Miller is working to accelerate the release of those detainees who no longer pose a security threat, who do not possess valuable intelligence, and who will not be subject to criminal prosecution. Based on a review of each detainee's case, we have already been able to reduce the detainee population at Abu Ghraib by 50 percent – from approximately 5,000 on April 14, 2004, to 2,500 on June 7, 2004. By mid-July, the goal is to have the total detainee population in Iraq

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11-L-0559/OSD/037921

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

reduced to between 1,500 and 2,000. A similar process is underway at Guantanamo, where Secretary of the Navy England is leading an effort to review each detainee's case annually. We have released detainees when we concluded they did not pose a significant threat, but we must continue to detain those we think would launch new attacks if released.

### **CONCLUSION**

(U) In conclusion, I would like to underscore the absolute necessity of maintaining an inherently robust interrogation capability within the Department of Defense: it is critical to protection of our forces and critical to fighting a meaningful war against terrorism. Too much is at stake to abandon an intelligence collection technique that often gives us the only useful intelligence we have on terrorist capabilities and intentions at both the tactical and strategic level. Nothing that took place at Abu Ghraib was in the context of lawful interrogation. Nor do I ascribe to the premise that a climate was created that condoned such behavior.

(U) The Department recognizes that grievous mistakes were made in the treatment of some detainees in Iraq. The abuses are being investigated, and the Department will take appropriate action. Meanwhile, the Services, DIA, and the

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

Combatant Commands are reviewing detainee and interrogation policies and procedures; these will be updated and corrected where necessary. Service training curriculum is also being carefully examined. Our intent is to learn from mistakes that were made, ensure that they are not made again, and continue forward with a strengthened interrogation capability.

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11-L-0559/OSD/037923

7201  
~~FOUO~~

file

August 2, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Meet w/Army

OSD ARMY

I need a meeting with the Army. Don't tell them, but I want to talk about:

- Incentives for folks.
- The possibility of having some come home just marginally earlier than they expected.
- Morale.
- Managing the force well.
- The importance of leadership on the part of commanders.

I will need this note for the meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
073004-9

.....  
Please respond by 8/20/04

*Sir,  
meeting is  
set for  
4 Aug at 1100.  
I've included Dr.  
Chu. v/r Jim*

~~FOUO~~

**OSD 17333-04**

OSD ARMY

2 August 2004

TO: SECDEF

FROM: VADM JIM STAVRIDIS

SUBJ: MEETING WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

1. Sir, we've set up a meeting on Wednesday with SecArmy, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, and Dr. Chu.
2. As per your snowflake, I have not given them advance notice of topics. Director Army Staff called and said he thought the topics were force rotation and detainees. I was non-committal.
3. In your snowflake you mentioned a few topics. Here are my thoughts on each:
  - a. **Incentives.** Should push this hard. Army needs to be creative and leaning forward. This would solve much of the non-volunteer issue, I believe.
  - b. **Bringing units home marginally early.** Huge winner. Recommend pushing hard. If they can go down from 148 K to 120 K for weeks, why not use some of that time to bring folks home early, especially with holidays coming up?
  - c. **Morale.** They need to provide you with a sense of how the troops are doing on a regular basis, drawing on a wide variety of inputs. Senior enlisted advisor could be very helpful here.

- d. **Managing the force well.** Need to get “out of the shoebox.” Too many times you get the answer, “system doesn’t give us enough granularity.”
  - e. **Importance of leadership on part of commanders.** The basis of coming through this challenging period lies in this point. Insist on a sense of how the 0-5 / 0-6 level leadership is working through the issues – that’s where the officer impact “rubber meets the road.”
4. I recommend you also discuss “the rules” for deployments with them (attached), keying on their need to manage their way through challenges and not create surprises.
  5. This may be the first of several meetings. We’ll schedule appropriately after you go through these topics with them.

v/r Jim

~~FOUO~~



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



ACTION MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

July 30, 2004, 1300

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Force Deployment Rules for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING  
FREEDOM

The following summarizes for the deployment rules used to source active duty and reserve forces.

Active Component Forces

- Dwell Time: a minimum 1:1 ratio of deployed time (in support of any contingency operation) to home station time. Whenever possible, forces are chosen based upon longest dwell time.
- Forces assigned to other Combatant Commanders may be used if risk is acceptable.
- Units will deploy at required readiness levels.
  - Units with less than required readiness ratings may be used if required training can be accomplished, or the unit can be cross-leveled with appropriate personnel and equipment.
- Time in theater guidelines differ for each Service.
  - Army: Units (not soldiers) will serve one-year boots on the ground (BOG). BOG is defined as when the main body of the unit (not individuals) arrives in the OIF/OEF AOR (e.g., arrival in Kuwait). The Joint Staff has defined BOG as *"the window of time a unit (main body) physically arrives in theater until the window of time the unit physically departs the theater."*
  - Marine Corps: Marine units below Regimental/Group level deploy for seven months. Regimental/Group Headquarters and above deploy for twelve months. The Marines volunteer their OIF/OEF forces as a "surge" capability if the on-ground situation requires more forces.



11-L-0559/OSD/037927

~~FOUO~~

- Air Force: The Air Force rotates personnel in accordance with its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) cycle. Beginning September 2004, the baseline deployment will be 120 days in a 20-month cycle. Each Airman deploys only once during a cycle, although some stressed specialties will deploy longer, and in greater frequency. Some deployment rules have been modified at the unit level to increase volunteerism or provide stability in key missions, (e.g. senior personnel rotations in the Combined Air Operations Center are for 1 year).
- Navy: The Fleet Response Plan (FRP), calls for surge capability to meet global requirements while moving away from traditional scheduled/longer deployments. Currently, CNO deployment goals are 6 months portal to portal with 12 months in a non-deployed status.
- Alternative sourcing is considered before re-deploying active forces in violation of above criteria or service guidelines. Options include:
  - Can COCOM handle the task with forces already in country, with a gap?
  - Can the in-country force be extended without violating “boots on ground” criteria?
  - Can host nation (Iraqi/Afghani) and coalition support be used?
  - Can the duty be outsourced and supported by a contractor?
  - Can similar specialties from other Services support the requirement?
  - Can other geographic Commanders’ forces be used without undue risk?
- Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets are closely managed under the Global Military Force Policy to preserve their capability to respond to emerging crises. Before an asset is tasked above levels sustainable without significant adverse effects, Joint Staff asks:
  - Can another asset be substituted or lower-priority/exercises joint experiments be cancelled?
  - Can a Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO) minimize excessive deployments, while maintaining home-station training?
  - Can the asset support one AOR, but be quickly re-rolled into another AOR during a crisis?

### Reserve Component Forces

- Activate Reserve component forces only after determining that it is both prudent and judicious to do so.
  - Voluntary duty – no restrictions on tour duration.
  - Involuntary duty – maximum of 24 cumulative months.
- Involuntarily recalling the Individual Ready Reserve only after considering Selected Reserve members & volunteers.

- Second or subsequent involuntary recalls – previous service (length & nature) is considered and the maximum break between tours is provided (1 in 6 planning factor considered).
- Maximize Predictability – mobilization orders to be provided in a timely manner (minimum of 30 days prior to active duty report date).
- Training when mobilized – members may not be mobilized solely for the purpose of training, but training related to the mobilization mission is permitted. (Legislative relief being requested).
- Members retained on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.
- Members taking leave prior to release from active duty are voluntarily retained to use accrued leave.

General Observations

- These rules evolved in response to changing needs since September 11, 2001. They are therefore likely to evolve further. The rules recognize that this is an all-volunteer force; equitable sharing of our burden is essential to retaining today's volunteers and attracting their future replacements.
- Upon your confirmation of these rules, we will publish the associated implementing guidance.

Decision

Schedule meeting to discuss \_\_\_\_\_ Proceed without further discussion \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared By: Paul Mayberry,

(b)(6)

720

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file

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
July 1, 2004

2004 JUL 1 - 1 08:38:07

7/20

J

SIR,  
Options  
below

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR  
SUBJECT: Captain Hopper

Lynne Cheney tells me that this Captain Hopper is a star. If she is going to be around here sometime, we probably ought to meet her. You might want to think of whether there is anything you could do to acknowledge her.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Mrs. Cheney photograph

DIIR:dh  
070104-31

Please respond by 7/16/04

— Do a letter to her  
— work to bring her in for meeting.

7/22  
I'd like to meet her - DR

7/14 -  
SecDef -  
Agree. FYI, attached is an article we did about her on the DoD "Defend America" website. We will look for other possibilities to highlight/acknowledge her.  
DiRita

11-L-0559/OSD/037930

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OSD 17334-04

Captain Hopper  
Good Housekeeping Women  
in Govt Award  
Just ~~for~~ American-American  
woman to fly a fighter in





Hopper said she does not see her faith as a part of her life, rather as the central point in her life. Her call sign, "Thumper," is not a play on her last name, but a shortened form of "Bible Thumper."

 [Email A Copy](#)

"I believe every blessing, including this Good Housekeeping award, is a gift from (God)," she said. "My faith gives me the consistent ability to cope with all kinds of stressors."

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August 2, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

I am thinking of sending the Thomas Schelling foreword to the following people:

Fran Townsend, Tom Ridge, John Ashcroft, Condi Rice, Rich Armitage, Bodman,  
the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Mueller, and Bellinger.

Please let me know if you think there is anyone else who should get it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Cover memo, Schelling foreword

DHR:dh  
073004-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

461

2 AUG 2004

August 2, 2004

TO:

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Schelling Foreword

This is a worthwhile read on the subject we have been discussing.

Thanks.

Attach.

Schelling foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's **book, *Pearl Harbor***

DHR:dh  
073004-11

11-L-0559/OSD/037935

## FOREWORD

It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely *ordinary* blunder. In fact, "blunder" is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was neither a Sunday-morning, nor a Hawaiian, phenomenon. It was just a dramatic failure of a remarkably well-informed government to call the next enemy move in a cold-war crisis.

If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were *so* busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made.

And it *was* an "improbable" choice; had we escaped surprise, we might still have been mildly astonished. (Had we not provided the target, though, the attack would have been called off.) But it was not all *that* improbable. If Pearl Harbor was a long shot for the Japanese, so was war with the United States: assuming the decision on *war*, the attack hardly appears reckless. There *is* a tendency in *our* planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what *is* improbable need not be considered seriously.

Furthermore, we made the terrible *mistake*—one we may have come

close to repeating in the 1950's—of forgetting that a fine deterrent can make a superb target.

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to **work**, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who **knows** he'll be chewed **out** by his superior *if* he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability **of** individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it *is* the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip **us** off to the climax.) Finally, **as** at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure **to** anticipate effectively.

**Mrs.** Wohlstetter's book is **a** unique physiology of a great national failure to anticipate. If she is **at** pains to show how easy it was to slip into the rut in which the Japanese found **us**, it can only remind us how likely it *is* that **we** are in the same kind of rut right now. The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in **a** poverty of expectations—a routine obsession **with** a few dangers that may be *familiar* rather than *likely*. Alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion all seem to need to focus on **a** few vivid **and** oversimplified dangers. The planner should think in subtler and more variegated terms and allow for

a wider range of contingencies. But, **as** Mrs. Wohlstetter shows, the "planners" **who** count are **also** responsible for alliance diplomacy, inter-service bargaining, appropriations hearings, and public discussion; they are also very busy. This is **a** genuine dilemma of government. Some of its consequences are mercilessly displayed in this superb book.

*Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University*

THOMAS C. SCHELLING



# Pearl Harbor

Warning and Decision

Roberta Wohlstetter

"The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor." — Samuel Eliot Morison

Stanford University Press  
Stanford, California  
© 1962 by the Board of Trustees of the  
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Stanford University Press

11-L-0559/OSD/037938

SECRET **July 17, 2004**

2004 NOV -1 PM 3:02

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: NATO Response Force in Afghanistan

We need to keep pushing in NATO on this issue of getting the NATO Response Force (NRF) to go into Afghanistan for the election. In doing so, we have to make sure we don't allow the French to paint the NRF into a corner so that the NRF could only be used in a crisis. That was never the intention.

Please get from NATO the resolution that passed NATO to create the NRF. I want to see if the word "crisis" was used.

If we cannot get the NRF into Afghanistan, then I think we ought to have a force generation in NATO. If that doesn't work, we ought to get a coalition of the willing.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
070104-17

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

*Afghanistan*

*17*

SECRET  
July 1, 2004  
2004 P07 -1 511 3: 07

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

Attached is a memo I sent to Condi Rice. Why don't you screw your head into it and get the Deputies going.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/25/04 SD memo to Rice: "Kurds and Sunnis" [062504-2 (ts computer)]

DHR:dh  
070104-16

.....  
Please respond by 7/16/04

~~FOUO~~

June 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*  
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

I think we need to have a briefing to the PC that tees up a proposal as to how the Iraqis are going to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Sunnis in terms of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from the Kurds, and the Kurds now want back.

It is a serious point of friction, and there are those who think it could lead to a major conflict as early as August. It merits our attention. The flash points could come soon, so I would think we would want to get a briefing in the next two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
062504-2 (ts computer).doc

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037941

4

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR:dh  
071904-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/30/04

file

July 19, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

**825**

When will I have the first cut on the Afghan security force situation mentioned in my memo of June 14?

In the future, please do have folks put down dates that you expect to provide me what I have requested.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/15/04 CJCS memo to SecDef CM-1933-04 [OSD 10492-04], response to SD 061404-12

DHR:dh  
071904-7

.....  
Please respond by 7/30/04

*2x LTG Benno SUTC  
on 9 5 Aug*

## CHAIRMAN'S ACTION ASSIGNMENT

Reviewed by B. [Signature] Date \_\_\_\_\_

|  |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
|--|---|---|--------------------------|---|------------------|--------------------|---|---|
| Assigned Action to   |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| SJS/CPCB   |   |   | SJS/ACB                  |   |                  | Protocol           |   |   |
| LA   |   |   | LC                       |   |                  | Speechwriter       |   |   |
| Aides  |   |   | JHO                      |   |                  | NG/RA              |   |   |
| PA   |   |   | Other <u>[Signature]</u> |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| Action   |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| J  | 1 | 2 | 3                        | 4 | 5                | 6                  | 7 | 8 |
| CJCS Reply   |   |   | See CJCS Note            |   |                  | Info Only          |   |   |
| Scan. & File/Note & File   |   |   | Direct Reply             |   |                  | Appropriate Action |   |   |
| Condolence   |   |   | BSA/GSA                  |   |                  | Translation        |   |   |
| Recommendations:   |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| Forward to:  |   |   |                          |   | Purple note:     |                    |   |   |
| <b>Amplifying information</b> <i>This is OBE. Work w/MA</i><br><b>Personal friend/salutation is:</b> <i>to get off snowflake</i><br><b>Comments:</b> <i>Let. S/D is well aware of the way ahead on Afghan security</i> |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| <b>Enclose w/letter</b>  |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| Photo  |   |   | Bio                      |   |                  | CJCS Book          |   |   |
| Autographed Card   |   |   | CJCS Functions Sheet     |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| Other  |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| <b>Gifts(s) Received</b>   |   |   |                          |   |                  |                    |   |   |
| <b>SUSPENSE:</b>   |   |   |                          |   | <b>CONTROL #</b> |                    |   |   |

JS Form 12, Feb 01 (EG)

# ROUTING COVER SHEET

CASEY

|                                       |                             |                              |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| CLASSIFICATION<br><b>UNCLASSIFIED</b> | DATE RECEIVED<br>08/02/2004 | ACTION NUMBER<br>04-04044/01 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|

SUBJECT: /SF-825/ AFGHANISTAN SECURITY

CJCS REPLY

CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BRANCH FOR DISPATCH OR FILING. THIS FORM SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

| TO | NAME                            | INITIAL | COMMENTS   |
|----|---------------------------------|---------|--|
|    | <b>CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS</b>      |         | <p>AUG 4</p> <p>CJCS HAS SEEN</p> <p>AUG 04 2004</p> <p><i>This is OBE<br/>work w/ m &amp;<br/>got off snowflake<br/>list. SD is well<br/>aware of the way<br/>ahead on Afghan<br/>security.</i></p> |
|    | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT             |         |  |
|    | DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT      |         |  |
|    | <b>VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS</b> |         |  |
|    | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT             |         |  |
|    | <b>ASSISTANT TO THE CJCS</b>    |         |  |
|    | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT             |         |  |
|    | <b>ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR NG</b> |         |  |
|    | <b>ASSISTANT TO CJCS FOR RM</b> |         |  |
|    | <b>SPECIAL ASSISTANTS</b>       |         |  |
|    | LEGAL COUNSEL                   |         |  |
|    | LEGISLATIVE ASST                |         |  |
|    | PROTOCOL                        |         |  |
|    | JOINT HISTORY OFFICE            |         |  |
|    | PUBLIC AFFAIRS                  |         |  |
| 3  | <b>DIRECTOR, JT STAFF</b>       |         | <p>DJS HAS SEEN</p>  |
|    | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT             |         |  |
| 2  | <b>VICE DIRECTOR, JT STAFF</b>  |         |  |
|    | EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT             |         |  |
| 1  | <b>SECRETARY, JT STAFF</b>      |         |  |
|    | <b>CHIEF, ACTIONS DIVISION</b>  |         |  |
|    | <b>RETURN TO ADM SUPPORT BR</b> |         |  |

CLASSIFICATION: ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

June 14, 2004

808

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. John Abizaid  
Doug Feith

7/15  
J

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan security situation.

One option should include using our clout to get the militias to turn in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military.

Here is a report on Afghan capabilities.

Thanks.

*Liss*  
Attach.

NIC Intelligence Community Assessment, ICA 2004-04HC, June 2004

*(Distributed separately)*

DHR:uh  
061404-12

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

*SIR,  
Response attached.  
vr / CDR Nosenro  
7/15*

*T-8/1*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-1933-04

JUL 15 AM 10:41 ID: 415 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 7/14*


SUBJECT: Afghanistan Security

- **Issue.** "I think we ought to develop two or three options as to different ways we might deal with the Afghanistan Security Situation. One option should include using our clout to get the militias to ~~turn~~ <sup>turn</sup> in their weapons and cooperate with the government. A second option might include an accelerated Afghan security force. Another might include a way to incorporate the Afghan militias into the Afghan military. ..."
- **Conclusion**
  - My staff is working closely with General Abizaid to develop a framework for Afghanistan security forces, similar to the one now being developed for Iraq. This framework will address concerns regarding the security situation and provide a way ahead for Afghanistan forces.
  - As the Iraq framework piece nears completion, work is beginning in earnest on a similar framework for Afghanistan.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)



*Sir - This is the Metrics Work / Exit Strategy briefs from Gen Casey. Gen Borno will be in shortly with the Afghan version. vlr jim*

|          |            |
|----------|------------|
| TSA SD   |            |
| SRMA SD  |            |
| MA SD    | N 7/15     |
| EXEC SEC | SL 7.15.04 |

TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

COL Doxey

18 June 2004

July 29, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Analysis of Alternatives

Please take a look at this letter from Senator McCain and come up with three or four alternatives as to what we might do about the fact that he is challenging RAND's ability to do this.

Please try to do it fast and get it to me by tomorrow.

Thanks.

Attach.  
7/28/04 McCain Letter

DHR:dh  
072904-3

.....  
Please respond by 7/30/04

OSD 17342-04

JUL 28 2004

JOHN MCCAIN  
ARIZONA

CHAIRMAN  
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,  
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

SIR,

7/29

7/29

- Latest From Sen McCain
- Concerned about AOA
- Wants independent group, not RAND/Project AF, to do it. DSD For action?

P. 2/6

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3 WEST PASEO REDONDO  
TUCSON, AZ 85701

(520) 870-6934

PHONE FOR HEARING IMPAIRED  
(202) 224-7132  
(800) 952-0170

VIA FAC

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
Department of Defense  
The Pentagon 3E880  
Washington, DC 20301-3010

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am concerned about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the Tanker Lease Proposal will be conducted. In particular, I am concerned about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA, and the involvement of the Air Force's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC)—RAND, which I understand is spearheading this effort.

The conduct of Air Force leadership regarding the Tanker Lease Proposal has been unacceptable. Frankly, its credibility on the recapitalization of the tanker fleet has been fundamentally called into question. Notably, many of the problems that the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DoD-OIG) found in the Tanker Lease Proposal are similar to those it recently found in the multibillion dollar C-130J procurement program. Bases for my concern about the participation of Air Force leadership in the AoA include, but are not limited to, the following.

First, the Air Force has provided Congress inaccurate information in an attempt to justify its original proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767As. For example, Air Force Secretary Jim Roche has repeatedly advised Congress that, in the existing KC-135 fleet, "corrosion is significant, pervasive, and represents an unacceptable risk." Secretary Roche has also emphasized to Congress increased operating costs in the current fleet as a basis for entering into the tanker lease. Air Force leadership has indicated that these elements create an "urgent" need to recapitalize the fleet. However, as you of course know, the DSB task force concluded that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. As such, the task force also concluded that "[t]here is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a replacement program prior to the completion of the AoA and the MCS." Thus, the task

**The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
**July 28, 2004**  
**Page 2 of 5**

forcejettisoned the "dominant reason" Secretary Roche first cited in his July 10, 2003, report to Congress as the basis for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing tankers than they would for buying them. The Air Force's representations on this issue remains a matter of continuing investigative concern.<sup>1</sup>

In another example, to comply with the original authorizing statute, the Air Force misrepresented to Congress that its proposal to lease 100 Boeing KC-767 tankers was merely an operating lease. This would have obviated the requirement that the White House obtain advance budgeted authority for the whole lease proposal. But, the DoD-OIG and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), as well as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the procurement of these tankers is, in fact, a lease-purchase. In addition, facts surrounding the Original lease proposal made it clear that the transaction was a lease-purchase: under the original proposal, the Air Force conceded that the DoD is "committed to earmark[ing] an additional \$2B in FY08 and FY09 for the purchase of aircraft covered by the multi-year program under the terms of the proposed contract" to head off a funding spike over the Future-Years Defense Program

Second, the DoD-OIG and the NDU concluded that the Air Force's commercial item procurement strategy "prevented any visibility into Boeing's costs and required the Air Force to use a fixed-price type contract. ... The strategy also exempted [Boeing] from the requirement to submit cost or pricing data. The strategy places the Department at high risk for paying excessive prices and precludes good fiduciary responsibility for DoD funds." The NDU similarly concluded that "[i]n a sole source, monopoly commercial environment, the government is not served well with limited price data" and suggested that the Air Force neglected its fiduciary/stewardship responsibilities.

Notably, the DoD-OIG arrived at similar conclusions regarding the Air Force's mismanagement of the C-130J procurement program. In particular, the DoD-OIG found that, because the C-130J was improperly acquired as a commercial item, the Air Force did not have contractor-certified information on contract prices, costs, or profits, and therefore was "limited" in its ability to protect the Government against possible overpricing.

---

<sup>1</sup>My concerns about whether the stated reason for the lease was pretext is in part based on an e-mail among senior Boeing executives, dated September 18, 2001. This e-mail describes a meeting between Boeing and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Marvin Sambur, during which "[Sambur] indicated that the USAF is desperately looking for the rationale for why the USAF should pursue the 767 Tanker NOW. The briefing his staff had put together on the Economic Service Life Study did not meet his needs ... Sambur is looking for the compelling reason the administration should do this now rather than push off to a future administration." E-mails of this sort underscore the Committee's need for the documents it requested from the DoD and the Air Force on July 2, and September 11, 2003.

**The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld**

July 28, 2004

Page 3 of 5

Third, the DoD-OIG and the NDU also concluded that the operational requirements document (ORD) for tankers was not tailored, as it should have been, to the requirements of the warfighter, but rather to closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A. The DoD-OIG found that senior Air Force staff directed that the ORD closely correlate to the Boeing KC-767A that was being developed for a foreign government, in anticipation of the authorizing legislation. This is particularly troubling where, according to an internal Boeing document regarding the ORD, Boeing planned to "[e]stablish clearly defined requirements in ORD for the USAF Tanker configuration that results in an affordable solution that meets the USAF mission needs and will prevent an AOA from being conducted." Under the current proposal, the first 100 tankers produced will not be capable of, among other things, interoperability with Navy, Marine, or coalition, assets, or simultaneously refueling more than one receiver aircraft. Rear Adm. Mark P. Fitzgerald, USN, recently suggested that in theater, such a limitation restricts the Navy's long-range striking capability and fosters a needlessly risky aerial refueling environment.

Notably, with respect to the C-130J procurement program, the DoD-OIG similarly found that, while the Air Force conditionally paid Lockheed Martin about \$2.6 billion, the C-130J is not operationally suitable or effective and cannot perform its intended mission. Furthermore, to date, 36 deficiency reports that "could cause death, severe injury or illness, major loss of equipment or systems, or that could directly restrict combat or operational readiness" have been received.

Finally, Boeing documents suggest that the Air Force allowed Boeing to modify the requirements in the ORD while it was being developed. These documents also reflect that the Air Force induced the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) into approving and validating the corrupted ORD by falsely representing that it was not tailored to a specific aircraft. This is of continuing investigative interest to the Committee.

Interestingly, as a result of the commercial specifications of the C-130J not meeting user needs, the Air Force (and Marine Corp) decided to "revise its requirements document" to reduce the initial capabilities required and to satisfy operational requirement deficiencies through block upgrade programs at the Government expense. I am very concerned about this.

I understand that RAND (the Air Force's FFRDC), and Project Air Force in particular, is spearheading the AOA. Generally, the Air Force, specifically Dr. Sambur, is "the overall sponsor" for Project Air Force activities. However, having argued against the need for an AOA as early as November 2002, according to a recently produced internal DoD e-mail, Dr. Sambur has apparently prejudged its outcome:

A formal AOA will cost money, delay the program two years, and still come up with the same answer we have today. There are only a few aircraft that can serve as tankers, they are already in production, and so analyzing their respective capabilities and costs won't take long—in fact, it's already been done and the results passed to OSD. What's left to study?

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
 July 28, 2004  
 Page 4 of 5

**As** I originally indicated in my letter of March 12, 2004, Air Force Vice **Chief** of Staff General T. Michael Moseley **similarly** touted the Air Force's proposal **to lease and 'buy** Boeing 767s **during** recent budget hearings. **In** particular, **General** Moseley provided "opinion" **testimony suggesting** that the **KC-767** tanker is the Air Force's **only** viable option. For example, in testimony before the **Projection Force** Subcommittee of the **House Armed Services** Committee, **General** Moseley specifically rejected re-engining remaining **KC-135Es** (as the **DSB** task force recommended); **modifying** used aircraft (for example, DC-10s, also as the **DSB** task force suggested); **using** contractor support services (as the **GAO** recently opined), and other options that **your office's AoA guidance** specifically required the **Air Force** to examine. While **General** Moseley attempted **to explain away** his testimony as "personal opinion," at no time was he asked to provide his personal opinion and at no **time** during his testimony did **General** Moseley indicate that he was conveying a **personal** opinion. Considering **General** Moseley's role as the chairman of the **Air Force Steering Group** for Project **Air Force** and, respectfully, despite your **assurances** in your March 17, 2004, Letter, I remain concerned that the **Air Force** and **RAND** **have** effectively prejudged the outcome of the AoA regarding the **Tanker Lease Proposal**.

**Several** recently produced internal DoD e-mails call into **question** whether the ongoing AoA will be conducted **objectively**. For example, in an e-mail, dated August 15, 2003, **from** Secretary Roche to Dr. **Sambur** and **Acting Undersecretary Wynne**, **Secretary Roche** dissuaded the **OSD** and Air Force staff **from initiating** an AoA. In this e-mail, Secretary Roche said the following:

**Agggggg, stop the nonsense!** Don't even **begin** to start an unnecessary AoA at this point. **All this would do is give ?he** enemies of the lease an **excuse from** DoD to delay the lease, and really **honk off** the **Appropriators**. **Let's see** what comes out of conference, damn it! **If the lease is approved then we** can talk about **how** to decide on the recapitalization of the **other** 400 airplanes, but **there** is no rush here.

Soon thereafter, **Acting** Secretary Wynne responded, "**I agree with** Jim, [sic] What started this **flurry of activity?** **I'd hate for our story to change.**" The **foregoing** does not inspire confidence that the current AoA **will** be conducted properly.

**My** concern that **RAND**, in particular, may **have prejudged** the outcome of the AoA is underscored by its conclusion regarding **tanker** recapitalization in a recent report. In a **December 2003** report entitled "**Investigating Optimal Replacement of Aging Air Force Systems**," **RAND**, in particular Project **Air Force**, found—without the benefit of an AoA—that "it appears to be **optimal** to replace the **KC-135** by the end of the decade." Apparently **relying** on **Air Force data** and analysis that **was ultimately** rejected by the **DSB** task force, this conclusion comes unacceptably close to prejudging the outcome of the AoA and is **inconsistent** with the conclusions of the **Air Force's own Economic Service Life Study**; the **GAO**; and, most recently, the **DSB** task force, all of which found that the current **fleet is viable through 2040**. In **light** of the relationship between the **RAND** and the **Air Force**, as described above, there can be no **assurance** that **RAND** will conduct the AoA here with the **desired independence**.

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
July 28, 2004  
Page 5 of 5

**My concerns appear to be reflected in a recently released internal DoD e-mail from Eric Coulter, Deputy Director for Theater Assessments and Planning at Program, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to Nancy Spruill, co-chairperson of the Leasing Review Panel Working Group, dated August 7, 2003:**


**I do not support RAND as the sole source or lead to conduct the Congressionally-directed independent tanker AoA. First, its [sic] said that it takes Congress to direct the Department to do something it should do on its own. We've been trying to get the AF to conduct an AoA for several years, but could never get AT&L's support to direct one. The AF clearly wanted to postpone it for as long as possible to delay the issue of recapitalizing the fleet. Now the Department is playing catch up. That said, [the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)] has more experience to conduct this type of effort. In fact, [Air Mobility Command] relies on IDA to do a lot of its mobility analyses both for airlift and tankers. I believe the Department will get a better, more objective product than we would from RAND. I hope we're not letting IDA's cost review of the tanker lease color our opinion. Please convince me otherwise.**

**I am also concerned about the fact that Project Air Force may have received as much as \$50 million for FY03 and FY04 and is expected to get at least another \$25 million for FY05. This financial relationship between the Air Force and RAND renders RAND unsuitable for conducting the AoA on this multibillion dollar procurement proposal.**

**Given the foregoing, I respectfully suggest that the Air Force not enter into an agreement to procure aerial refueling aircraft until an entity independent of the Air Force—on the basis of a study not funded directly or indirectly by the Air Force—completes the AoA.**

**As always, I appreciate your consideration.**

Sincerely,

  
John McCain  
Chairman

file

SECRET  
July 1, 2004  
2004 NOV -1 PM 3: 02

TO: Larry Di Rita  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Op-ed

*7/20*  
*J*

*Larry Di Rita*  
*7/20*

I got a note from John Howard asking if he should submit his articles, such as the attached one, to *Stars and Stripes*. If you think so, you should tell him. If not, just forget it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/26/04 Howard letter and op-ed piece.

DIR:dh  
070104-14

.....  
Please respond by 7/9/04

*DR 7/22*

Sir,  
Reply attached.  
v/r,  
LtCol Lengyel  
*7/20*

08/12/2

FROM: Larry Di Rita  
TO: SecDef  
cc: Allison Barber  
DATE: July 13, 2004  
SUBJECT: Op-Ed

*Stars & Stripes* is always looking for thoughtful and thought-provoking pieces like this. I will have Allison Barber make contact with him so that he knows how to submit his articles. We'll encourage him to do so.

July 15, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Allison Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

c c : Larry Di Rita, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Op-Ed Submission to *Stars and Stripes*

- Dr. John Howard will be submitting his articles to *Stars and Stripes*.

11-L-0559/OSD/037957

THE HOWARD CENTER  
FOR FAMILY, RELIGION & SOCIETY

934 North Main Street  
Rockford, Illinois 61103  
phone: 815/964-5819  
fax: 815/965-1826  
email: hwdctr@profam.org



DR. JOHN A. HOWARD  
Senior Fellow

26 June 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
2206 Kalorama Rd  
Washington D.C 20008-1621

Dear Don:

"Democracy in Arabia" is something you  
will want to read if you haven't seen it.

Owen Roberts' Position Paper is a  
privately subscribed circulation piece, but  
I have his permission to send it to you.  
The marked Churchill quote on page 2 is  
powerfully à propos.

I also ~~enclose~~ enclose the just finished text  
of the next in our series of op/ed pieces.  
Is this something I should submit to  
Stars and Stripes? If so, how?

The warmest good wishes

John

**DRAFT**

Date

Editor  
Address  
City, State Zip

Dear Editor:

In his biography of John F. Kennedy, Ralph Martin notes that when James Reston asked the new President what vision he had for the future, Kennedy replied that he hadn't had time to think about it. The intensity of modern presidential campaigns is so great that the news media like the candidates tend to be engrossed in today's issues, seldom finding time to consider larger matters such as what personal qualities make for wise and capable leadership.

Here is an essay about presidential leadership you are welcome to publish or distribute.

Sincerely,

Lawrence D. Jacobs  
Vice President

LDJ/cg

11-L-0559/OSD/037959

# LEADERSHIP RECONSIDERED

by **Dr. John A. Howard**  
**Senior Fellow, The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society**  
**Rockford, Illinois**

Following the death of Ronald Reagan there was a spontaneous truce in the continuous media barrage of angry criticism hurled at President Bush and his Administration. For a week the news was dominated by fond memories and praise of another president. Although it was a time of mourning, the relief from the rancor of the political campaign, combined with the numerous stories of Ronald Reagan's courage, optimism, kindness and good humor made it a welcome period of national amity, and, for many, of renewed pride in their country.

There is an eternal human hunger for leaders who proclaim and champion ideals, who embody the principles undergirding those ideals, and who provide hope and inspiration to the people. During the two decades prior to the Reagan election, the sour cynicism about, and criticism of, America that prevailed in the media, academia and the entertainment industry cast a pall over patriotism and other idealistic sentiments. It became a modern **Dark** Age which James Reston in 1969, perceived as "a new pessimism," Arthur Bums as "a loss of faith in our institutions," and Archibald MacLeish, as "an anesthesia of the soul."

Suddenly America had a leader who reversed the engines. As Margaret Thatcher said: "Others prophesied the decline of the West; he inspired America and its allies with renewed faith in its mission of freedom. Others saw only limits to growth; he transformed a stagnant economy into an engine of opportunity. His politics had a

freshness and optimism that won converts from every class and nation – and ultimately from the very heart of the evil empire.”

One startling aspect of that freshness was the fact that he did not seek the presidency for fame or power or personal advancement. As he said in his speech to the nation when leaving office, “I never meant to go into politics . . . but I was raised to believe you had to pay your way for the blessings bestowed on you. I was happy with my career in the entertainment world, but I ultimately went into politics because I wanted to protect something precious.” Serving his country was a natural and genuine motive and gave him the freedom to follow whatever course he judged best for the nation. Self-seeking moneyed pressure groups had no claim on him.

The something precious he wanted to protect was, naturally, the first point he made in his Farewell Speech. He spoke of an incident involving the Midway aircraft carrier in the China Sea: They spotted a small craft filled with “Boat People,” trying to escape from Communist tyranny. As the launch from the Midway brought them back to the Carrier, a refugee shouted to a seaman way up on the deck, “Hello, American sailor. Hello, Freedom Man.” What more poignant illustration could there be to illustrate the preciousness of freedom to all human beings?

The religious up-bringing which instilled in him the duty to be of service to the community also taught him to serve and love other people. Vice President Cheney in his eulogy stated, “If Ronald Reagan ever uttered a cynical, or cruel, or selfish word, the moment went unrecorded.” President Bush said, “Ronald Reagan carried himself, even in the most powerful office, with a decency and attention to small kindnesses that

define a good life. He was a courtly, gentle and considerate man, never known to slight or embarrass others.”

Ronald Reagan reawakened in our nation an appreciation of the depth and beneficent power of the basic ideals of our free society and labored to help other nations adopt and benefit from them.

A politician he was not. A gifted and admirable leader he was.



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OWEN J. ROBERTS  
CHAIRMAN AND CEO

AREA CODE (b)(6)

John — 3 May 2004  
Thank you for all the good  
you do in this world and for  
sharing your magnificent  
writings with us. Owen and Susan

## John A. Howard

CFC® Position Paper

THE LONDON BLITZ, 1940  
and  
WORLD TERRORISM, 2004

Owen J. Roberts

3 May 2004

July 28, 2004

TO: Pete Geren  
c c : Ryan Henry  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Use of Helicopters w/Detainees

383.6

Someone raised a question as to whether or not anyone who was at GTMO or anywhere else was taken up in a helicopter and threatened to be thrown out as a way to scare them.

I had never heard that before. I had heard it about Vietnam, but I had never heard it about the global war on terror. Please have someone check into that and see if anyone knows anything about it. If so, we better do whatever is appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
072804-13

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

28 Jul 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDER  
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200  
NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488



IN REPLY REFER TO:

J00  
4 Oct 04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Improvements to Jointness – Response to Singapore Snowflake

1. I have reviewed Lin Wells' summary of Singapore's military transformational efforts and appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on improving "jointness" within this context. I will specifically address the areas of Joint command and control, where I can speak from experience.
2. Singapore's emphasis on integrated command and control and warfighting experimentation are key enablers to jointness. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is working closely with the Services and Defense Agencies to develop fully integrated command and control capabilities. Further, we continue to reach out to our multinational partners to draw them into our exercise and experimentation programs. In fact, I personally extended an offer to Singapore's CNO to assign a liaison officer to JFCOM.
3. Singapore's decision to designate a "Future Systems Architect" and "fence" a portion of their budget for experimentation and future systems architecture development is noteworthy. In a similar vein, JFCOM's oversight of Joint Battle Management Command and Control is crucial to ensuring the relevance of this system-of-systems approach to our joint operational commanders. As we look to the future of Joint command and control, the key to success will depend on effective joint oversight and adequate resources. The use of the Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap, signed by myself and Mike Wynne on 26 May 2004, as a directive document to guide Service and Agency acquisition efforts is a key element of JFCOM oversight per Management Initiative Decision (MID 912), signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 7 January 2003. This roadmap is my "proposal" for Joint command and control in DoD.

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

OSD 17354-04

OCT 19 2004

7209

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu  
 CC: Gem Dick Myers  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA  
 SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers

I'd like some hard data - within the next week - telling me precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve that have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
 102004-5

.....  
 Please respond by 10/29/04

326

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| USD   | PDUSD     |
| RA    | HA        |
| PI    | Readiness |
| MPP   | CPP       |
| PLANS | MC&FP     |
| CCO   |           |

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

OSD 17356-04

to Oct 04

11-L-0559/OSD/037966



**UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000  
INFO MEMO**



PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

November 1, 2004 – 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

*David S. C. Chu INV04*

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE – Guard and Reserve Call-up Numbers

2004 NOV - 1 11 11 AM  
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- You asked for hard data telling you precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve who have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.
- Our official database for the Reserve components reflects that 1,796,347 individuals were members of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) from FY99 through FY04. Average annual SelRes strength over that 6 year time frame has been about 875,000.
- Of these almost 1.8 million individuals shown to have served in the SelRes since FY99, the following is a breakdown of those who have served once or more in support of contingency operations over the last six years. This includes operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and current operations - ONE/OEF/OIF.

*326*

| One Time | Two Times | Three Times (or more) | Total   |
|----------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|
| 334,078  | 53,478    | 8,822                 | 396,378 |
| 18.60%   | 2.98%     | 0.49%                 | 22.07%  |

*1 Nov 04*

- The percent of members who have been called-up multiple times is about 3.5% of the members who were reflected to be in the SelRes Population from FY99 – FY04.
- Looking at just the current SelRes population of 860,764, about 327,900 – or –38% - have been called-up for operations ONE/OEF/OIF over the past 3 years.

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Kohner, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

*20 Oct 04*



**OSD 17356-04**

OCT 19 2004

October 20, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Guard and Reserve Call-Up Numbers

I'd like some hard data - within the *next* week - telling me precisely the percentage of Guard and Reserve that have been called up once, twice or thrice in the last six years.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102004-5

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

|       |           |
|-------|-----------|
| USD   | PDUSD     |
| RA    | HA        |
| PI    | Readiness |
| MPP   | GPP       |
| PLANS | MC&FP     |
| CCO   |           |
|       |           |

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01.

OSD 17356-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037968

November 1, 2004

TO: Jay Garner  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

Thanks for the heads **up** on missile defense. We are working with General Cartwright and Steve Cambone on it, and I think we are making headway.

Regards,

D11R:dh  
110104-7

*373 24*

*1 12/11/04*

OSD 17361-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

November 1, 2004 - 11:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. David S. C. Chu, USD P&R

*David S. C. Chu*  
(Signature and Date)

SUBJECT: Guideposts For Boards — SNOWFLAKE (Attached)

- The Secretaries of the Military Departments issue guideposts to the promotion boards in the form of written instructions:
  - Army- "Give special attention to officers who can conceptualize, chart strategies, and formulate policies as opposed to merely organizing solutions to problems."
  - Navy- "The Navy needs bold officers who are willing to think creatively, take well-calculated risks, develop new ideas, and maximize capabilities through sound management practices."
  - Marine Corps- "A critical goal of the Marine Corps is to encourage -- to demand -- innovation and efficiency to ensure that we retain an adaptive, flexible, and effective naval force able to anticipate events and win across the spectrum of conflict."
  - Air Force- "To support this effort, the Air Force needs leaders who can be the intellectual compass for the institution -- leaders who don't just do, but who can conceptualize what needs to be done."
- But we can also encourage innovation and boldness through other avenues, on which I will report shortly.
- Ultimately, the issue is whether those mechanisms actually produce the results you want--a subject for further thought.

Attachment:  
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Lernes Herbert, (b)(6)

OSD 17374-04



Vertical text on the right margin, possibly a file number or date stamp.

SEP 29 2004

September 28, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

Should there be certain precepts or guideposts for boards that select flag officers?  
Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

**Thanks.**

DHR:ss  
092804-10

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/22/04

~~FOUO~~

SEP 29 2004

September 28, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Guideposts for Boards

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Things that come to my mind are: Innovativeness and boldness.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-10

.....  
*Please respond by* 10/22/04

210 (3-10)

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17374-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037972

28 SEP 04

112  
D930

720  
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM:  
SUBJECT: Dutch Issue

Colin Powell called. He said the Dutch are locking themselves into pulling their troops out in March. He said the Defense Minister Kamp apparently has the lead role in their Coalition politics on this subject.

Apparently they have 1450 people there and he has said publicly that they will not be extended past mid-March, 2005. The White House and State are trying to walk the Dutch back.

What should we be doing? Should I be calling Kamp and finding out? I had not heard this. Please get your folks to find out what's going on. We should get ahead of the curve on this stuff, as I've been asking.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102904-28

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 17431-04

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

CJCS HAS SEEN

OCT 19 2004

OCT 15 2004

2004 10/19 - 3 PM 5:30

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ITALY

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Follow Up on Italy's Offer

We ought to make sure we follow up with Italy on their offer to train and equip in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101404-37

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/04

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17555-04

1506104



720  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-5000

CM-2161-04  
3 November 2004

JAHM

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

- **Issue.** "Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** One C-130 load of plastic sheeting and one C-130 load of Government of Japan (GOJ)-provided relief supplies were delivered on 28 October.
- Four additional C-130 loads of GOJ-provided supplies were planned; however, the second sortie satisfied the relief requirement.
- **Discussion.** Department of State requested DOD humanitarian support to the victims of the 23 October earthquakes in the Niigata Prefecture (130 nm NNW of Tokyo). Assistance is being provided on a non-reimbursable basis.
- Japanese Foreign Ministry conveyed a request for the US Government (USG) to provide and airlift one C-130 load of plastic sheeting for use as temporary shelter for approximately 100,000 displaced citizens and support five C-130 loads of GOJ-furnished relief supplies.
- The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved this action via OSD Executive Secretary memorandum on 27 October.
- The US Embassy has worked closely with the GOJ to provide additional assistance. No other requests for assistance remain. Relief supplies available to US Forces Japan include:
  - Blankets, tents, bedding, generators, potable water and Meals Ready to Eat.
  - A standard tent camp for 1500 persons.

3 NOV 04

27 OCT 04

- A SEABEE Detachment, a Marine Engineer Battalion (on Okinawa) and Air Force Prime Beef Engineer Units.
- These additional assets can be available on short notice.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorize a positive response to future GOJ requests for assistance related to the current Niigata earthquake situation.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :  
As stated

Reference:

- 1 OSD Executive Secretary memorandum, OSD 17017-04, 27 October 2004, "Approval of State Request for DoD Assistance to Japan Earthquake Victims"

Prepared By: Lieutenant General J. T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/037976

2

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## TAB B COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT. Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
11-L-0559/OSD/037977

~~FOUO~~

TAB A

2004 NOV -3 PM 5: October 27, 2004

10/27

Hot!

J-3

N 28

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
 Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

Let's see what we can do about the earthquake in Japan. Please see the attached memo from Howard Baker and get back to me with a recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.  
 10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:ss  
 102704-1

.....

Please respond by 10/28/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OK 10/26

From: Baker, Howard H (Tokyo)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY** RUMSFELD  
FROM AMBASSADOR HOWARD **BAKER**

Importance: High

Dear Don:

I am sure that you are well aware of the earthquake that shook the Niigata area of Japan **last** Saturday and of the devastation that it caused. Several dozen **people** were killed, over 100,000 are out of their homes, roads and other infrastructure have been badly damaged. There has been a very strong aftershock just this morning, adding to the existing damage and further complicating efforts to return the affected area to normal.

We have been working here with the Japanese Government on ways in which the USG might respond to this disaster. I have turned over a check for \$50,000 as a start. State **and** DoD are now working out details of a plan to authorize providing badly needed materials such as plastic sheeting. U.S. Forces Japan is ready and willing to support this effort.

I hope that you will give this issue your personal attention. It goes without saying that this humanitarian mission must be accomplished swiftly in order to be effective and beneficial to the affected people in Niigata Prefecture. I greatly appreciate your support.

Sincerely,  
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037979

~~FOUO~~  
TAB A

CHANGE TO 11-1  
SECRETION 11-1

10/27

2004 NOV -3 05:25  
October 27, 2004

Hor!

3-3 —

N 28

Japan

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Niigata Earthquake Assistance

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Thanks.

Attach.  
10/26/04 Memo to SecDef from Amb Baker re: Earthquake

DHR:ss  
102704-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/28/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 17581-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037980

2506107

PA 10/

From: Baker, Howard H(Tokyo)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 26, 2004 11:26 PM

Subject: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO **SECRETARY RUMSFELD**  
FROM **AMBASSADOR HOWARD BAKER**

Importance: High

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Sincerely,  
Howard

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/037981

**UNCLASSIFIED**

TAB B

COORDINATION

USPACOM

CAPT. Smith

28 October 2004

Tab B.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
11-L-0559/OSD/037982

7201  
TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **Jim** Jones Organization

2004 SEP -3 11 51 27  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*EUCCOM*

Should the **Jim Jones** organization be reorganized? **My** impression is it should be.  
The **world has** changed, **NATO** has changed.

Please have some **folks look** at it and get back to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092804-17

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

*29Sep04*

~~FOUO~~

November 4, 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Air Force Appointees

*020*

I've been informed by the Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche, and Under Secretary Pete Teets that they, as well as the other PAS appointees in the Air Force, with the exception of Michael Dominguez, are planning to step aside sometime after the election.

DHR:ss  
110104-36

*4 NOV 04*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17606-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037984

NOV 04 2004

TO: Dina Powell  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Turbulence in Key Positions

020

Attached is a memo on the subject of turbulence in key Presidential Appointment positions. As you know, DoD has had a vacancy rate of about 20-25% throughout the past four years.

- The FBI clearance process has been sluggish
- The ethics clearance process has been sluggish
- The Senate confirmation process has been damaging, with some Presidential nominees being held up without a vote for as long as a year and a half.

The attached paper addresses the facts surrounding the corruption to which Darlene Druyun has now confessed.

Quite beyond the Air Force is the fact that the Secretary of the Army position has been vacant 18 months, because of the refusal of the Senate to confirm a nominee. And, it is the Secretary of the Army that is the Executive Agent for detainees and, I should add, therefore for Abu Ghraib.

Something has to be done to fix this process. There is only a modest veneer of civilian control in the Department of Defense. With an average 20-25% vacancy rate in the 48 Presidential-appointed Senate-confirmed positions, a President's grip on the Executive Branch is even thinner. DoD is responsible for more than three million people, including the active force, the reserve components, civilians and contractors, and a budget of more than \$400 billion. Operating at a 20-25% vacancy rate during a war is unacceptable. This process needs be fixed.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/1/04 Druyun memo

DHR:dh  
110104-30

OSD 17607-04

honey

2 November 2004

SUBJECT: Darlene Druyun and corruption in the Air Force acquisition process. The question is: "How could such major corruption happen, over such a long period, without those serving above and around her seeing her corruption and reporting it to the proper authorities?"

The following history offers a clue as to how this might have happened:

- Druyun served as the "civilian" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Air Force for Acquisition for ten years.
- During the ten years of Druyun's service, the position of her immediate superior, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, was vacant for four of those ten years. As a result, for those four years Druyun was the senior civilian in the Air Force acquisition system and in charge of the day-to-day activities of all Air Force acquisition. In the six years that there was a confirmed Assistant Secretary, daily oversight of Druyun's activities was spotty, since there were four Assistant Secretaries who moved in and out of the post as her superior, for an average tenure of roughly 18 months.
- In addition to Druyun's post, there is also a "military" Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. During Druyun's ten-year tenure, there were four "military" Deputies moving in and out of office. But, these three-star general officers were not involved in contracting. It is notable that, under Title 10 U.S.C., even today only a senior civilian can make major acquisition decisions. Military officers, no matter how senior, cannot do so. Therefore, by virtue of her position as the senior Air Force acquisition civilian, all procurement information passed through and was controlled by her.
- To further add to the turbulence in Air Force acquisition, during her ten-year tenure, there were five Secretaries or Acting Secretaries of the U.S. Air Force. And, there were four different Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide oversight of Air Force acquisition organization and processes. The rapid turnover reduced continuity of adult supervision.
- However, within twelve months of the current Air Force Secretary being confirmed, and within seven months of having an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition confirmed, the Air Force acquisition organization

~~FOUO~~

and processes were altered to ensure that no one person could acquire too much independent acquisition-authority. This had the effect of removing much of the organizational power Druyun had accumulated over time. She chose to retire shortly thereafter.

The turbulence in the civilian political appointees, both the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for Acquisition, plus the turbulence in the "military" acquisition officials, is a formula for problems. The combination of that turbulence, coupled with the statutory requirements, and the serious delays in getting political appointees through the FBI clearances, the ethics clearances and the Senate confirmation process, all conspire to create an environment that is hospitable to corruption. And corruption is what we got.

To what extent this set of circumstances caused corruption of such magnitude will never be known with certainty. But facts are facts, and I am persuaded these facts were a nontrivial part of the problem. They need to be fixed.

~~FOUO~~



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel  
Shaw House, Room 201  
21 State Circle  
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel  
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel  
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel  
Tele: (410) 974-3005  
Fax: (b)(6)

October 26, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 33880  
1300 Defense Highway  
Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. *Rumsfeld* Secretary:

For openers, permit me again to reiterate the pleasure and uplifting that your fine (if brief) visit to Annapolis several months ago provided the Governor and all the rest of us. Even from a great wrestler (now more than a half-century ago), it was special. All the members of my office join me in our gratitude, prominently displaying our photo with you.

Your distinguished career of honor and persistence in devoted service to our beloved country will retain all of its outstanding character, whatever the future holds.

On an item of governmental as well as personal privilege, Clarence Watson "Watty" Wheelwright was a close, also under-age carousing friend of mine, who joined the Air Force to defend our country when the Korean War began. As gunner on a B-26 bomber, AIC Wheelwright went down with his aircraft on a bombing run over North Korea on May 31, 1952. There were no survivors. Since then his sister Martha and brother-in-law have tirelessly worked with U.S. officials to recover his remains. The exact site has been pinpointed.

Most recently, Martha Wheelwright Galleher was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04

11-L-0559/OSD/037988

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and Martha Wheelwright Galleher's personal appreciation to them.

My file reflects that Watty Wheelwright's identifier is Tasker Number **2003015143** (AIC Clarence W. Wheelwright). As you know far better than I, the USG has been negotiating with North Korea for nine years, with North Korea approving only three areas for search. It is my impression that Watty's remains are in or within walking distance of one of those sites. It is not clear to me whether a specific request as to the precise site, or a further general request, is now appropriate. Whatever, your departmental colleagues have been processing my inquiry, and anything you can do personally to assist would also be greatly welcomed. Governor Ehrlich, Mary Beth Carozza, Tom Hance, and all the other members of this office join me in forwarding our genuine appreciation.

Finally, please give my very best to Joyce, with congratulations on all her efforts, most particularly in trying to keep you, Nedgar, Debbie, and the other New Triers in line.

As ever,



JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff  
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office (for forwarding)  
Ms. Martha Wheelwright Galleher  
Mr. Redmond C.S. Finney

11-L-0559/OSD/037989

8  
630

~~FOUO~~

file

3

November 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Jervis Finney

*Paul Butler*

*12/13*

*Korea (North)*

Please take a look at this letter from my friend, Jerve Finney. He works with Governor Bob Ehrlich. You will see Finney's name at the top, on the letterhead. He is a very close friend - please see what you can do about this and update me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
110804-5

.....  
Please respond by 12/5/04

*To SecDef  
From Paul Butler*

*12/13/04*

*DR 12/14*

Attached is a letter from Jerry Jennings -  
DASD/POW-MIA to Mr. Finney responding to his  
letter about locating the remains of his friend  
Watty Wheelright (there is a team scheduled to investigate  
the relevant crash site in N. Korea in July 2005)

*8 Nov 04*

I also spoke with Mr. Finney to make sure the  
letter answered his questions. He said it did and  
passed on his support and regards. I gave him my  
phone number if he needed ~~any~~ follow-up.

11-L-0559/OSD/037990

*SP  
176084304*

11/8  
1630-

~~FOUO~~

November 8, 2004

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10/26/04 J. Finney letter to SecDef

DHR:ss  
110804-5

.....  
*Please respond by* 12/5/04

*Dave*  
Paul Butler  
1/11

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/037991



STATE OF MARYLAND  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

2004 OCT 26 10 15 AM  
DU 11/8

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.  
GOVERNOR

Office of Legal Counsel  
Shaw House, Room 201  
21 State Circle  
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Jervis S. Finney, Chief Counsel  
J.P. Scholtes, Deputy Counsel  
Arielle Fougy Hinton, Deputy Counsel  
Tele: (410) 974-3005  
Fax: (b)(6)

October 26, 2004

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Secretary of Defense  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 33880  
1300 Defense Highway  
Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

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Your distinguished career of honor and persistence in devoted service to our beloved country will retain all of its outstanding character, whatever the future holds.

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Most recently, Martha Wheelwright Galleher was extensively briefed in May at the Korean and Cold War Annual Government Accounting Initiative Meeting by Doug

OSD 17608-04


11-L-0559/OSD/037992

Blasser, an expert on POW/MIA issues, particularly with respect to the Soviet involvement in the Korean War. Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Ehrlich, and Tom Hance, Director of Maryland's Washington Office, became involved at my request. Claude Chafin of your office and Babs Chase, Intergovernmental Relations for DOD, have been involved and most cooperative. Please convey my and Martha Wheelwright Galleher's personal appreciation to them.

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As ever,



JSF/svh

cc: Mary Beth Carozza, Deputy Chief of  
Mr. Tom Hance, Director, D.C. Office  
Ms. Martha Wheelwright Galleher  
Mr. Redmond C.S. Finney

*SIR -  
This has been  
tasked to Policy.* 11/4

(b)(6)



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

KOI EA (North)

Mr. Jervis S. Finney  
Chief Legal Counsel  
Office of the Governor  
Shaw House, Room 201  
21 State Circle  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mr. Finney:

This is in response to **your** inquiry to Secretary Rumsfeld concerning your friend Airman First Class Clarence Wheelwright who was lost during the Korean War. As the Department of Defense office responsible for accounting for Americans missing from **our** Nation's wars, we are pleased to provide the following information.

We are not certain that we have pinpointed the exact location of Airman Wheelwright's crash site or burial location. The Russian document that provides us with our most detailed information on the shoot down states: "A search group established that on 31 May 1952 at 2300 hours a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region on a southwesterly course and crashed near the village An-Khari 20 meters **from** the railway bed. The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following **day**."

We believe that "**An-Khari**" is probably the Russian transliteration of the present village Anha-ri by general area and presence of the **main** rail line. A possible complication is that even if the village name is correct, it is possible that the village may have moved. North Koreans often relocate villages due to construction or reclamation. Secondly, there is no mention of the crew's burial location. So while we are fortunate to have this documentation, we are far from having an exact location to excavate.

Unfortunately, the North Korean government imposes significant restrictions on **our** access to their country. Therefore, **our** ability to investigate this crash site depends on the North Korean government allowing our teams access to the area. In any case, we do wish to investigate this site, as well as other aircraft crash sites in the vicinity. The arrangement we concluded last month with the North Koreans provides for a Korean People's Army (KPA) pre-investigative period in March and a joint investigation period in July 2005. Prior to starting joint field activities in North Korea in 2005, we intend to propose that our teams investigate this crash site and others during the joint investigative period in July.

(26 007 04)



R 17608-04

We appreciate **your** concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey **to** Mrs. Gallaher that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation **and** making every effort possible to account for her brother **and** his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jerry D. Jennings". The signature is stylized with large, flowing letters and a prominent flourish at the end.

Jerry D. Jennings  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

DEC 08 09:55  
2004

08 DEC 2004

2004/014850

KOREA (KIA) (KIA)

Mr. Jervis S. Finney  
Chief Legal Counsel  
Office of the Governor  
Shaw House, Room 201  
21 State Circle  
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Mr. Finney:

This is in response to your inquiry to Secretary Rumsfeld concerning your friend Airman First Class Clarence Wheelwright who was lost during the Korean War. As the Department of Defense office responsible for accounting for Americans missing from our Nation's wars, we are pleased to provide the following information.

We are not certain that we have pinpointed the exact location of Airman Wheelwright's crash site or burial location. The Russian document that provides us with our most detailed information on the shoot down states: "A search group established that on 31 May 1952 at 2300 hours a burning B-26 type aircraft passed at low altitude through the Sonchen region on a southwesterly course and crashed near the village An-Khari 20 meters from the railway bed. The aircraft broke into pieces upon impact; the three-man crew perished and was buried by Korean citizens on the following day."

We believe that "An-Khari" is probably the Russian transliteration of the present village Anha-ri by general area and presence of the main rail line. A possible complication is that even if the village name is correct, it is possible that the village may have moved. North Koreans often relocate villages due to construction or reclamation. Secondly, there is no mention of the crew's burial location. So while we are fortunate to have this documentation, we are far from having an exact location to excavate.

Unfortunately, the North Korean government imposes significant restrictions on our access to their country. Therefore, our ability to investigate this crash site depends on the North Korean government allowing our teams access to the area. In any case, we do wish to investigate this site, as well as other aircraft crash sites in the vicinity. The arrangement we concluded last month with the North Koreans provides for a Korean People's Army (KPA) pre-investigative period in March and a joint investigation period in July 2005. Prior to starting joint field activities in North Korea in 2005, we intend to propose that our teams investigate this crash site and others during the joint investigative period in July.

(26 DEC 04)



We appreciate your concern and support for this important humanitarian issue. Please convey to Mrs. Gallaher that we are pursuing every avenue of investigation and making every effort possible to account for her brother and his fellow service members missing from the Korean War. If we may be of further assistance, please contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jerry D. Jennings". The signature is stylized with large, flowing letters and a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

Jerry D. Jennings  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
POW/Missing Personnel Affairs

November 4, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

IRAQ

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
11/1/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss  
110404-7

4 NOV 04

OSD 17639-04

# *Iraqi Security Forces Update*

*1 November 2004*


# *Grand Total all Iraqi Security Forces*

**For Official Use Only**


|   |  |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>–Police</li><li>–Civil Intervention Force</li><li>–Emergency Response</li><li>–Border Enforcement</li><li>–Highway Patrol</li><li>–Dignitary Protection</li></ul></li></ul> | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u><br><br><b>63,844</b>                         |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>–Army</li><li>–National Guard</li><li>–Intervention Force</li><li>–Special Operations</li><li>–Air Force</li><li>–Coastal Defense Force</li></ul></li></ul>                  | <u>Trained &amp; Equipped</u><br><br><b>50,941</b><br><hr/> <b>114,785</b> |

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

**For Official Use Only**



May 2003=  
0 Iraqi Security  
Forces



- Does not include 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

# Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

**Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time**

| Security Force Element                    | Current Targeted End State | 1 NOV 04 | 1 FEB 05         | 1 MAY 05         | 1 AUG 05         | 1 JAN 06         |
|---|----------------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Regular Iraqi Police <sup>(1)</sup>       | 135,000                    | 37%      | 46%              | 46%              | 59%              | 70%              |
| Special Police Regiments                  | 1,200                      | 0%       | 50%              | 86%              | 100%             | 100%             |
| Public Order Battalions                   | 3,600                      | 0%       | 67%              | 100%             | 100%             | 100%             |
| Emergency Response Unit                   | 270                        | 33%      | 85%              | 100%             | 100%             | 100%             |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol <sup>(2)</sup>       | 6,300                      | 0%       | To Be Determined | To Be Determined | To Be Determined | To Be Determined |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection              | 500                        | 96%      | 100%             | 100%             | 100%             | 100%             |
| Special Police Commando Battalions        | 2,019                      | 45%      | 75%              | 85%              | 100%             | 100%             |
| Dept of Border Enforcement <sup>(3)</sup> | 32,000                     | 57%      | 62%              | 60%              | 71%              | 84%              |

**Notes**

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

**Legend**

|  |                             |
|--|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038002

# Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection

**For Official Use Only**

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time\*

| Security Force Element        | Current Targeted End State | 1 NOV 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army            | 27,000                     | 44%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Intervention Force      | 6,584                      | 67%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi National Guard          | 61,904                     | 66%      | 74%      | 100%     | 100%     | 100%     |
| Commando Battalion            | 1,516                      | 58%      | 67%      | 82%      | 100%     | 100%     |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451                        |          | 40%      | 58%      | 76%      | 100%     |

\*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

| Legend  |                             |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT     |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT      |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038003

# MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

**For Official Use Only**

| MNF-I = 32 Countries |          |                |            |             |       |                  |          |                |         |
|----------------------|----------|----------------|------------|-------------|-------|------------------|----------|----------------|---------|
| Albania              | 74       | El Salvador    | 380        | Korea       | 2,803 | Norway           | 9        | Tonga          | 63      |
| Australia            | 375      | Estonia        | 48         | Latvia      | 133   | Poland           | 2,452    | Ukraine        | 1,595   |
| <b>Armenia</b>       | <b>0</b> | <b>Georgia</b> | <b>162</b> | Lithuania   | 87    | Portugal         | 129      | United Kingdom | 7,862   |
| Azerbaijan           | 150      | Hungary        | 276        | Macedonia   | 33    | Romania          | 745      | US             | 131,376 |
| Bulgaria             | 444      | Italy          | 3,131      | Moldova     | 11    | <b>Singapore</b> | <b>0</b> |                |         |
| Czech Rep            | 98       | Japan          | 792        | Mongolia    | 132   | Slovakia         | 103      |                |         |
| Denmark              | 426      | Kazakhstan     | 30         | Netherlands | 1,473 | <b>Thailand</b>  | <b>0</b> | Total          | 155,392 |

| IRAQI FORCES ON HAND               | 177,931 |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE               | 87,248  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE           | 1,196   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT            | 166     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION     | 484     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                     | 925     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 2,019   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT         | 20,039  |
| ARMY                               | 12,654  |
| NAT'L GUARD                        | 44,873  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                 | 6,916   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                 | 669     |
| AIR FORCE                          | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                    | 536     |

| IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING | 137,459 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE                 | 48,906  |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE             | 1,196   |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT              | 166     |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION       | 388     |
| HIGHWAY PATROL                       | 555     |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS   | 2,019   |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT           | 18,375  |
| ARMY                                 | 12,654  |
| NAT'L GUARD                          | 44,873  |
| INTERVENTION FORCE                   | 6,916   |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES                   | 669     |
| AIR FORCE                            | 206     |
| COASTAL DEFENSE                      | 536     |


## Notes

- Georgia expected to increase forces from 162 to 300 and add a 500 man battalion for UN Security
- Armenia, Singapore & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

## Other Forces

**Facilities Protection Service**  
73,992

**NATO Training Team = 41**



□ Iraqi Forces On Hand    □ MNF-I



□ Trained Iraqi Forces    □ MNF-I

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038004

- NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq (NTIM-I) became NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) when the Activation Order was published.
- Prime Minister Allawi will address the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 5 November.
- NATO Force Generation Conference scheduled 8-9 November in Mons, Belgium to seek fulfillment of NTM-I force requirements.

**For Official Use Only**

# *Back Up*

*Data as of: 1 Nov 04*

11-L-0559/OSD/038006

# *Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update*

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT                   | AUTHORIZED     | ON DUTY        | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POLICE                      | 135,000        | 87,248         | 43,439             | 52,800                           | JUL '06                               |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE    | 4,920          | 1,196          | 0                  | 3,120                            | JUL '05                               |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT     | 270            | 166            | 91                 | 270                              | MAY '05                               |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT          | 32,000         | 20,039         | 18,375             | 19,889                           | AUG '06                               |
| HIGHWAY PATROL*             | 6,300          | 925            | 555                | TBD                              | TBD                                   |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION        | 500            | 484            | 484                | 500                              | DEC '04                               |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS | 2,019          | 2,019          | 900                | 2,019                            | JAN '05                               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                | <b>176,209</b> | <b>112,077</b> | <b>63,844</b>      | <b>79,153</b>                    | <b>AUG '06</b>                        |

\* On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol Authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038007

# Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT          | AUTHORIZED    | LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(1)</sup> | FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY <sup>(2)</sup> | 31 JAN '05 L/F CAPABILITY (BATTALIONS) | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY     |
|--------------------|---------------|---|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| ARMY               | 27,000        | 3,887   | 620  | 10,915 / 10,915                        | JUL '05                              |
| NATIONAL GUARD     | 61,904        | 43,445  | 0  | 45,000 / 0                             | SEP '05                              |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584         | 0   | 1,816                                      | 1794 / 4,790                           | MAY '05                              |
| SPECIAL OPS        | 1,967         | 597   | 0  | 0 / 725                                | SEP '05                              |
| AIR FORCE          | 502           | 167   | 0  | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT      | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT    |
| COASTAL DEFENSE    | 582           | 409   | 0  | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT   | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| <b>TOTAL</b>       | <b>98,539</b> | <b>48,505</b>                                 | <b>2,436</b>                               | <b>57,709 / 16,430</b>                 | <b>MAR '06</b>                       |

(1) Limited Operational Capability = unit is conducting combat operations, but continues to receive advanced unit training and may still require some equipment

(2) Full Operational Capability = unit is manned, trained, and equipped to prescribed standards and has capability to plan and conduct independent operations at company level. Battalion headquarters capable of commanding and controlling battalion operations.

Data as of: 1 Nov 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038008

# Iraqi Security Forces Training

**For Official Use Only**

| COMPONENT   | TRAINING   | NUMBER IN TRAINING     |
|---|--|------------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service  | 3 Week TIP Training  | 400                    |
|   | 8 Week Academy   | 5,476                  |
|   | Specialized Training   | 170                    |
| Civil Intervention Force  | 6 Week Specialized Training  | 1,196                  |
| Emergency Response Unit   | 8 Week Specialized Training  | 75                     |
| Dept of Border Enforcement  | 4 Week Academy   | 0                      |
|   | Specialized Training   |                        |
| Highway Patrol  | 3 Week TIP Training  | 0                      |
|   | 8 Week Academy Training  | NA (Prior Service IPS) |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection  | 3 Week Initial Training  |                        |
|   | 2-3 Week Advanced Training   | 96                     |
|   | Mentoring by US Special Forces   |                        |
| Special Police Commando Battalions  | 4 Weeks Basic Training   | 750                    |
|   | 1-3 Weeks Advanced Training  |                        |
| Iraq Regular Army   | Cadre: 4 Weeks   | 7,367                  |
|   | Basic Training: 4 Weeks  |                        |
|   | Collective Training: 4 Weeks   |                        |
| Iraqi National Guard  | Basic Training: 3 Weeks  | 2,013                  |
|   | Collective Training: 4 Weeks   |                        |
| Iraqi Intervention Force  | Cadre: 4 Weeks   |                        |
|   | Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks   | 5,287                  |
|   | Urban Operations Training: 6 Weeks   |                        |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force<br>- Commando Battalion<br>- Counter Terrorist Task Force | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) |                        |
|   | 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat   | 72                     |
| Air Force   | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months  | 39                     |
| Coastal Defense Force   | Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress)     | 0                      |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |  | <b>22,941</b>          |

Data a

# Iraqi Security Forces Missions

**For Official Use Only**

| Unit                             | Mission   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Civil Intervention Force         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents.</li> </ul>  |
| Special Police Commando Bns      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.</li> </ul>  |
| Emergency Response Unit          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.</li> </ul>  |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods</li> </ul>  |
| Highway Patrol                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways.</li> </ul>   |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.</li> </ul>   |
| Regular Army                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defend Iraq against external threats.</li> <li>• When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security.</li> </ul>   |
| National Guard                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements.</li> <li>• Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security</li> </ul>  |
| Intervention Force               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas</li> <li>• Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order</li> </ul>   |
| Commando Battalion               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion</li> </ul>   |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function</li> </ul>  |
| Air Force                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities</li> </ul>  |
| Coastal Defense Force            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles</li> <li>• In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities</li> </ul> |

Data as of: 1 Nov. 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038010

# *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

## Man:

- Intimidation attacks are impacting Iraqi Security Forces' effectiveness and retention in Anbar Province and several other locations in the Sunni areas, though there remain no shortage of recruits for the military or police.

## Train:

- Began training for 96 Bureau of Dignitary Protection students in VIP Personal Security and Motor Escort Operations, and graduated 38 students from a VIP Site Security course.
- Graduated 545 Department of Border Enforcement students on 28 October from four-week courses in Customs, Immigration, and Border Police Operations at the Jordan Academy.
- Graduated 282 law enforcement students from five specialized policing courses at Adnan Training Facility on 28 October (Basic Criminal Investigation, Organized Crime Investigation, Iraqi Police Service Training Staff Development, and two courses in Election Security Management).
- Began the Provincial SWAT training program at the Baghdad International Airport Training Facility with 22 students from the Baghdad Region.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion and the Basic Training battalion completed basic training courses; MNC-I units provided security escort for soldiers to reduce chances of ambush as the soldiers embarked on leave.

## Equip:

- Issued 100 weapons, 100 vehicles to Iraqi Police Service.
- Issued 550 AK 47s, 2445 Body Armor sets, 100k rounds of 7.62 X 39 ammunition, 10,000 desert boots, and 3,095 kevlar helmets to Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Issued 645 9mm Pistols to Iraqi National Guard.
- Received inbound air shipment of 2,529 AK47s, 50 PKMs and 264 RPKs for Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Airlifted 1,371 sets of body armor to Mosul for delivery to Iraqi Regular Army units at Al Kasik.

## *Significant Events Since Last Report*

**For Official Use Only**

### Build:

- Intimidation has caused delays in construction at Al Kasik Military Base in Ninewa Province that may delay generation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division's final brigade; workarounds being pursued.
- Awarded contracts for Basrah Military Airfield Project and Iraqi Air Force C-130 Base at Baghdad International Airport on 29 Oct 04.
- MNSTC-I has committed over \$412 million of \$859 million received for construction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer in early October. MNSTC-I is ahead of schedule in meeting its spending plan goal of \$589 million in obligations in the first quarter.

### Mentor/Employ:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, Iraqi Intervention Force; 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade (-), Regular Army; 36<sup>th</sup> Commando Battalion; Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force; 3<sup>rd</sup> Police Commando Battalion; and the Police Emergency Response Unit are preparing for operations.
- 1<sup>st</sup> Police Commando Battalion commenced successful operation in Mosul; companies from 2<sup>nd</sup> Police Commando Battalion continue good operations in North Babil and Samarra.
- Ministry of Interior conducted a communications exercise on 25 October with the National Joint Ops Center using all available systems in rehearsal for Iraqi voter registration security requirements.
- CG CPATT met with the Ministry of Interior Deputy Minister for Iraqi Police Service on 26 October to discuss plans to expand the Special Police Commando force structure by at least three more battalions (to six) and, possibly, substantially more.

November 4, 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
CC: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Karzai Inauguration

Afghanistan

I think you ought to think about leading the U.S. delegation to Kabul for the December 7 Inauguration of Karzai. It is an enormous success for the region and the world. It's important for the Global War on Terror. It would really show the right level of interest.

I'd like to go and I think the President ought to think about including Tom Franks in the delegation, given all he has done with respect to Afghanistan.

DHR:ss  
110404-15

OSD 17680-04

420004

7201

~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

Please get the Department working on the task of changing this law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job and the same thing in other superintendent positions.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss  
100604-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

*357 Academies*

*6 Oct 04*

~~FOUO~~



SECRET

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 NOV -5 AM 9:37



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND  
READINESS

November 4, 2004 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. CHU, USD(P&R)

*A. R. Chu 4 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Forced Retirement of Superintendents--SNOWFLAKE

- You asked that the Department get "working on the task of changing the law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job."
- Mission Accomplished. With the signing of the F'Y-05 Authorization Bill, the law has been changed. The Bill provides for a waiver to allow continued service beyond an officer's tenure as Superintendent at any of the Service Academies.
- If the Superintendent is reassigned or retires before having completed three years in that position, the Service Secretary must report to Congress.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock,

(b)(6)

*352 Henderson 4 Nov 04 6:00 PM*



~~FOUO~~

October 6, 2004

TO: Powell Moore  
David Chu

CC: Gen Dick Myers  
VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Law Regarding Forced Retirement of Superintendents

Please get the Department working on the task of changing this law so that a superintendent at the Naval Academy can go on to another job and the same thing in other superintendent positions.

Thanks.

Attach.

Title 10 Law Chapter 603 - U.S. Naval Academy

DHR:ss  
100604-1

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038016

OSD 17700-04

NOV 05 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

We've been thinking about adding Joe Califano, a former Democrat office holder, to the Defense Policy Board. Given the President's comments this morning and his desire to reach out, I wonder if it might be better to consider Tom Daschle for the position. He'd probably be a good member of the Defense Policy Board. I would be happy to make the offer, and we could do it soon if we thought it would be helpful to the effort. Probably the sooner we do it, the better. Please let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
110404-12

334

5 Nov 04

November 11, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
CC: Powell Moore  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Congressional Letters

I just looked at Powell Moore's paper on what is changing in the Congress. It seems to me that I should write to some of the people who are retiring or were defeated, people like Daschle, Nethercutt, Hollings, Schrock, etc. - people I have known and maybe some others that I didn't.

Please get a list of all of the people who are retiring or were defeated, and draft up appropriate letters where it seems likely that I should do so.

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/5/04 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef re: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees [OSD 17729-04]

DHR:dh  
111104-17



Please respond by 11/19/04

032  
11 Nov 04  
5 Nov 04



LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*OSD 11/11*

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 NOV -5 PM 2:37

INFO MEMO

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

*Paul Butler*  
*11/8*  
*PMB*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

- The gain of four seats in the Senate and three seats in the House for the Republican majority is expected to slightly change the ratios of majority and minority members of DoD committees of jurisdiction. The Republican term limit in both houses will have a greater impact.

**1. Senate Armed Services Committee:** None of the 25 members retired or were defeated, but the increase in the Republican majority will probably lead to a two vote margin rather than a one vote margin. No decisions have been made in this regard, but it is likely that a couple of Armed Services committee members may leave to fill vacancies on the Senate Appropriations Committee or the Senate Finance Committee. It is our understanding, for example, that Senator Evan Bayh has had a long-standing interest in the Senate Finance Committee where Democrat vacancies are likely as a result of the departure of Senators Daschle, Graham and Breaux.

**2. SASC Subcommittee Chairmen:** There will be a reshuffling of subcommittee chairmen. Senator McCain will be eligible to become a subcommittee chairman. He was previously ineligible as a result of his chairmanship of the Commerce Committee because of a Republican rule that prohibits Republicans from simultaneously serving as a full committee chairman and a subcommittee chairman. He will relinquish Commerce because of a term limit rule. McCain supposedly favors the Airland Subcommittee underscoring his interest in Air Force procurement issues. The Republican rule prohibiting a Senator from simultaneously chairing a full committee and a subcommittee may require Pat Roberts to give up the SASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. This would add to the subcommittee reshuffle.

|          |             |
|----------|-------------|
| TSA SD   | <i>11/8</i> |
| SRMA SD  |             |
| MA SD    | <i>11/9</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>11/8</i> |

OSD 17729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038019

**3. House Armed Services Committee:** Two members, Congressmen Schrock of Virginia and Turner of Texas, have retired and Democrats, Baron Hill of Indiana, Charlie Stenholm of Texas and Ciro Rodriguez of Texas, were defeated. None of the subcommittee chairmen and ranking members are leaving the House.

**4. Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee:** Senator Hollings' departure, through retirement, will be the only change on this Subcommittee. He may not be replaced as a result of the change in ratios from the addition to the Republican majority.

Senator Stevens will continue to serve as Chairman of the Subcommittee thanks to an exemption from the term limit rule for appropriations subcommittee chairmen. Stevens is starting his 25th year as either Chairman or Ranking on the Defense Subcommittee. Stevens will, however, have to move from full Appropriations Committee chairmanship to Commerce Chairman, as a result of the term limit rule. Thad Cochran will replace him as full committee chairman.

**5. Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee:** Chairman Jerry Lewis is required to give up his Chairmanship as a result of term limits and he is expected to be replaced by Chairman Bill Young who must relinquish the Chair of the full committee as a result of term limits. Lewis is a candidate for full committee chairman along with Ralph Regula of Ohio and Hal Rogers of Kentucky. Congressman George Nethercutt of Washington is leaving the House of Representatives having given up his seat to run unsuccessfully for the Senate.

**6. In the Senate Leadership,** the major change will come as a result of the departure of the Majority Leader, Tom Daschle. Harry Reid of Nevada is currently the front runner to replace him. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota and Dick Durbin of Illinois are reported to be interested in the leadership and may face each other to replace Reid as Minority Whip.

(7)



LEGISLATIVE  
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNCLASSIFIED

2004 NOV -5 PM 2:37

INFO MEMO

November 5, 2004 11:15 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Impact of Elections on Defense Oversight Committees

- The gain of four seats in the Senate and three seats in the House for the Republican majority is expected to slightly change the ratios of majority and minority members of DoD committees of jurisdiction. The Republican term limit in both houses will have a greater impact.

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032

5 NOV 04

OSD 17729-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038021

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SEP 28 2004

September 27, 2004 ✓

SEP 27 11 30 AM '04

TO: David Chu  
cc: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

*DR*



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 17 PM 5:10

CM-2190-04

17 November 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS <sup>FOR</sup> *VA R. B. Myers 16 Nov 04*

SUBJECT: Joint Credit

- **Question.** "How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it. I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for." (TAB)
- **Answer.** In response to SecDef snowflake to USD (P&R), Joint Staff/J-1, in coordination with OSD, developed initiatives to obtain credit for deserving warfighters. The previous legal issues regarding proposed joint credit were resolved as follows: SecDef, in appropriate cases, could exercise his authority under 10 U.S.C. 664 (b) and waive the statutory 24- and 36-month tour lengths for full joint duty credit if the positions are on the Joint Duty Assignment List (**JDAL**). For US officers to be eligible for this waiver, Joint Staff/J-1 will hold a review board of those positions that warrant joint duty credit, recommend these positions be added to the **JDAL** and work with OSD to expedite a **JDAL** board. Individuals obtaining 365 days cumulative credit in an approved **JDAL** position will be recommended to SecDef for full joint duty credit.
- **Analysis.** The actions listed below are planned for completion within the next 90 days.
  - CENTCOM 61: Award cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service specific positions "below" the JTF Headquarters in the USCENTCOM AOR.
  - Full Joint Duty Credit: Award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in the USCENTCOM AOR. Following USCENTCOM's development of its key position listings, my staff will recommend their inclusion on the Joint Duty Assignment List (**JDAL**).
  - A follow-on call for positions that warrant joint duty credit, as well as a list of the officers recommended for joint duty credit, will be reviewed by a G/FO board in January 2005. The approved positions will be recommended for inclusion in the **JDAL**. Officers with 365 days of cumulative credit in those positions will be recommended for consideration for full joint duty credit.
  - In the spring of 2005, the **JDAL** will be analyzed, and positions with a modest level of jointness will be recommended for deletion. The Joint Staff will host a G/FO and SES-level board to develop recommendations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

copy to:

USD(P&R)

11-L-0559/OSD/038024

Prepared By: RDML Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1; (b)(6)

OSD 1773 2-04

~~TAB~~  
~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to **have** to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

**Thanks.**

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/038025

OSD 17732-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000  
 INFO MEMO



PERSONNEL AND  
 READINESS

November 5, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

*David S.C. Chu*  
 Signature & Date

SUBJECT: Joint Credit -- SNOWFLAKE

- Together with the Joint Staff, we are executing the following action plan:
- Immediate (December 2004): Ensure deserving joint warfighters get appropriate credit now (-1000)
  - o Allow cumulative joint duty credit for 61 nominated Service-specific positions "below" the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters in CENTCOM which would not otherwise qualify (solution is to dual-hat the incumbents in a qualifying position),
  - o Ask you to exercise your waiver authority to award full joint duty credit for deserving JTF-level positions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Horn of Africa, if the period of service does not meet the statutory minimum. General Casey and CENTCOM are completing nominations. Positions elsewhere may also deserve credit and we will pursue.
- Near-term (Summer 2005): Broaden Joint Duty Listing
  - o Add/delete positions based on actual joint content (RAND assisting Department), as confirmed by a Validation Board.
  - o Complete strategic review of joint officer management by due date (January 2006) (FY05 Authorization Act). Results of RAND's analysis and Validation Board's conclusions should be ready for your review by summer 2005.
- Long-term (January 2007): Strategic review of total work force (FY05 Authorization Act directs follow-on strategic review of senior civilians, senior noncommissioned officers, and senior Reserve leadership).

Prepared By: Captain Stephen M. Wellock,

(b)(6)



OSD 17732-04

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED BY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ZELSON -5 ON 3-19

September 27, 2004 ✓

TO: David Chu  
c c : Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Joint Credit

How much longer are we going to have to wait to straighten out which billets get credit for being joint billets? We don't have joint credit for billets that deserve it, but we are currently giving joint credit for billets that don't deserve it.

I want folks to get joint credit for billets they ought to have joint credit for.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
092704-26

.....  
Please respond by 10/15/04

*MR*

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17732-04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

September 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace

858

CC: Doug Feith  
Lt. Gen Sharp  
Tina Jonas  
VADM Willard

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Funding

Please take a close look at the costs of funding ongoing and future security operations in Afghanistan. Clearly, there will be increasing pressure to reduce overall costs and to control such funding through the normal budget process.

We need to be sure that:

- Any security projects we put in place (ANA, Police, infrastructure) can be sustained by the Afghans in the long run.
- We create a force, both in size and infrastructure, which is appropriate to Afghanistan, reflecting its economy and circumstances, as opposed to creating something along American lines and standards.
- The interagency must be supportive of this process, to include fully and correctly staffing the Embassy, cooperating with us on funding, and agreeing with our approach.

Please come back to me with some thoughts on this as part of a larger Afghan Security Strategy soon.

Thanks.

DHR:as  
091504-6

.....  
Please respond by 30 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 17919-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/038028

AFGHANISTAN  
15 Sep 04

7201  
~~FOUO~~

TAB

OCT 21 2004

884

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections. If the UN pulls out, I think the elections should still go forward.

I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
101904-14

.....  
Please respond by 10/29/04

11-L-0559/OSD/038029

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 17924-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038029

IRAQ

21 Oct 04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2172-04  
9 November 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/7*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Elections

- **Issue.** "I'm concerned that Prime Minister Allawi may be counting too heavily on UN participation in the upcoming elections... I wonder what we should do about GEN Casey and Amb Negroponte beginning the process of working them on that, so it doesn't just stop if the UN gets skittish." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** General Casey, Commander, Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), and Ambassador Negroponte should reinforce to Prime Minister Allawi the US commitment to sustain support for the Iraqi elections and stress that while the UN presence is important, it is not a requirement. Mr. Allawi and other key leaders of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) have been consistent and public about the importance of executing the national elections in January 2005. In coordination with the US Embassy and the IIG, MNF-I has developed detailed plans for support.
- **Discussion.** MNF-I's plans include security for distribution of materials, key officials and polling places. The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM and MNF-I are also working with the UN leadership on the ground in Baghdad and in New York to demonstrate US commitment to the elections and the security of UN personnel and facilities. The United Nations has a small number of election officials in Iraq, with plans to expand over the next several months. While important, their presence would not be the deciding factor in the success of the elections; in the end, it is Iraqi participation that will decide that outcome.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/038030

OSD 17924-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

10/22  
15.30

7201  
~~FOUO~~

October 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: November 14 Invitation

I can't attend this Boy Scout event on November 14. Please have someone write a letter of congratulations.

Thanks.

Attach.  
Boy Scout Invitation for Nov 14

DHR:ss  
102204-1

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

3555 D

2000004

15 Oct 04

OSD 17965-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038031

Boy Scouts of America Community Troop 613  
1121 University Blvd. W. #103  
Silver Spring, Maryland, 20902

October 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-3400

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

The Scouts, Leaders and Members of the Committee Boy Scout Troop 613 take great pleasure in announcing that:

Having completed the requirements for, and having been examined by an  
Eagle Scout Board of Review

**Nathaniel Shalom**

Was found worthy of the rank of Eagle Scout.

In honor of this achievement, we have scheduled an Eagle Scout Court of Honor to be held at 6 o'clock PM on November **14, 2004** at:

**The Kemp Mill Synagogue  
11910 Kemp Mill Road  
Silver Spring, Maryland.**

In the event that you are unable to attend, we would greatly appreciate a letter or certificate acknowledging his achievement. We will compile it with other acknowledgments and placed in a scrapbook commemorating this special occasion.

Thank you for taking time from your extremely busy schedule to help this community recognize the achievements and service of Eagle Scout Nathaniel E. Shalom.

Sincerely,

The Members of Troop 613

National Capital Area Council, Rock Creek District

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038032

33550

15200104

As the Boy Scouts of America approaches its centennial, it seems appropriate that the distinction of the Eagle Scout award has been bestowed. Local Scout Nathaniel Shalom earned the Eagle Rank in June of 2004; the medal will be formally presented to him in November. Open to all boys of ages eleven to eighteen, Scouting stands for and upholds the ideals of leadership, citizenship, service, and collective skill. Boys have the opportunity to earn numerous awards and achieve specific ranks within the Scouts, of which Eagle is the highest. Nathaniel joined the organization in 2000, and since then has worked toward Eagle with unwavering dedication.

Internationally recognized for nearly one hundred years, the Eagle rank is the epitome of achievement in Scouting. Requiring excellence in Scouting's entire repertoire of skills, less than three percent of all Boy Scouts reach the rank. Because of its demanding requirements, maturity, focus, and dedication are crucial. While time added a certain challenge, Nathaniel considers that aspect of the journey a definite factor contributing to his motivation. He also is grateful for his expedience in the Cub Scouts, open to boys not yet old enough to become Boy Scouts. While a Cub Scout, he earned the Arrow of Light Award, its highest recognition.

Going beyond fulfilling basic requirements, Nathaniel made sure to exemplify excellence. At each level of advancement, he earned recognition for achievement far beyond that required for the Eagle rank.


He was the first in his area to receive the prestigious Etz Chaim award for religious accomplishment, and has been recently elected to Scouting's national honor society. He has also

pushed himself to earn additional awards. Knowing that setting an example helps to inspire his troop's future success, Nathaniel sets high goals. He endeavors to pass on the ideals of Scouting to all youth.

Recently graduated, Nathaniel has pursued excellence beyond Scouting. His accomplishments include becoming Valedictorian of his class as well as earning schoolwide Math and Science awards. He served as school yearbook editor, and also become a Maryland Distinguished Scholar. He has studied classical piano for ten years, and is largely involved in martial arts.

Fully believing in dedication, Nathaniel looks forward to applying himself in the years to come. Interested in attending MIT and the University of Maryland, his study plans include computer science, mathematics, engineering, and music. As far as continued involvement with the Boy Scouts of America, he hopes to continue as an adult leader within a local troop, considering the Scouting experience to be an essential part of life.





BSA TROOP 613  
AND THE FAMILY OF  
NATHANIEL, ERE%SHALOM  
TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN INVITING YOU  
TO THE EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR.  
TO BE HELD AT 6 O'CLOCK ON NOVEMBER 14, 2004  
AT THE KEMP MILL SYNAGOGUE  
11910 KEMP MILL ROAD  
SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND.

UNIFORM OR SEMI-FORMAL ATTIRE REQUESTED.  
RECEPTION AETERWARDS.

(b)(6)

Mr. Nathaniel Shalom  
c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor  
Event Coordinator

(b)(6)

Dear Nathaniel,

Congratulations on achieving the rank of Eagle Scout! Unfortunately, I will not be able to make it to your upcoming Court of Honor, but I do want to join your family, friends, and fellow troop members in extending best wishes on this special occasion.

This significant milestone is a result of hard work and commitment. The leadership skills you have gained will not only serve you well in the future, but also set a fine example for those who follow in your footsteps.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,


SOM  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PUB

Paul Butler

11/8

EAGLE SCOUT COURT OF HONOR  
EVENT COORDINATOR

(b)(6)



*The Hon. & Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld*

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/038036

(b)(6)





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 9 2004

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c/o Eagle Scout Court of Honor  
Event Coordinator

(b)(6)

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With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 17965-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038037

335513

9 NOV 04

1520104

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV - OCT 29 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: State and CIA Deployment Policy

Please find out if the Department of State and CIA can order their employees to go to foreign posts, or if they can only ask them to do so.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102804-15

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/5/04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600  
INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
2004 NOV - 9 PM 5:44

November 9, 2004, 5:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: Authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the  
Department of State (State) to Assign Employees to Overseas Work  
Sites

- You asked whether State and CIA have the authority to “order their employees to go to foreign posts, or if they can only ask them to do so.”
- In short, both State and CIA have the authority to “order” employees to perform work overseas for an extended period of time.
- Under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, members of the State Foreign Service are “obligated to serve abroad” and are required to be “available to serve in assignments throughout the world.”
- Foreign Service members who refuse to serve at foreign assignments may be subject to adverse employment action, including termination of their employment with State.
  - It should be noted, however, that generally State civil service employees, other than Foreign Service members, may not be assigned involuntarily to serve at overseas posts.
- CIA employees, like Foreign Service members, may be directed to serve at duty stations outside the United States for an unlimited period of time.
- Under Section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has extremely broad authority and discretion to terminate CIA employees who refuse to serve on assignments overseas.

Prepared by: Hilary Hageman, ODGC(P&HP), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/038039



OSD 18013-04

~~FOUO~~

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]  
DATE: [illegible]

2004 OCT - OCT 29 2004

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: State and CIA Deployment Policy

Please find out if the Department of State and CIA can order their employees to go to foreign posts, or if they can only ask them to do so.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
102804-15

.....  
*Please respond by* 11/5/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Paul, let's get thank you letters to *these two* people, **Andrew** Athens and *Andrew* Manatos, thanking them for their letter.

Larry, please do a letter to **John Curtis** thanking him for the editorial he wrote. You might want to get it in the *Early Bird* or posted someplace, move it around.

Thanks.

Attach:  
11/9/04 National Coordinated Efforts of Hellenes letter to SecDef  
11/9/04 Curtis letter to SecDef

DHR:ds  
111104-33

.....  
Please respond by 11/19/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038041

18018-04

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11 NOV 04

9 NOV 04

1100



204 10/11

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED  
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)**

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld


FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1  
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM,  
PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER AT (b)(6)

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(b)(6)



THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT  
OF HELLENES (CEH)

(b)(6)

Andrew A. Athans  
Chairman  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
National Chairman  
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC)  
World President  
World Council of Hellenes Abroad (WCHA)

Philip Christopher  
Vice Chairman  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
President  
International Coordination Committee  
Justice for Cyprus (IFCYC)  
President  
Panorgano Association of America

Andrew E. Menatos  
President  
National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (NCEH)  
Executive Board Member  
UHAC and NCEH

Paulinos Papadimitriou  
Executive President  
Cyprus Federation of America

Nikolaos Moustakas  
Executive Vice President  
Panorgano Association of America

Charles M. Manganopoulos  
President  
UHAC New York  
Executive Board Member  
NCEH

November 9, 2004

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000  
VIA FACSIMILE: (b)(6)


Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make the best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,

  
Andrew A. Athans

  
Andrew E. Menatos

*Congratulations. Not  
bad for a "lightweight" (K. Menatos)*

2011/11



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# FAX TRANSMITTAL

DATE: 11-09-07      ORIGIN:      RECIPIENT:      PHONE:      FAX:      FAX#

TO: DONALD H. RUMSFELD      FAX# (b)(6)

FROM: JOHN CURTIS      FAX#

RE: FYI

PAGES: 3/W COVER

MESSAGE: THOUGHT YOU'D LIKE THIS COLUMN!

BEST, WALTER,



JOHN CURTIS  
EDITOR, ONLINECOMMUNIST.COM

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RUMSFELD ON TARGET O2004 J.M Curtis

1

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JOHN M. CURTIS

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Realizing that the war in Iraq will not only be won in the streets, Secretary of State Donald H. Rumsfeld launched his own propaganda offensive hoping to convert skeptics in Iraq and elsewhere. Marching on Fallouja sends a loud message to doubters questioning U.S. resolve to root out insurgents. Election year politics stalled the Pentagon's efforts to capture key battlegrounds, including Sunni-controlled strongholds of Fallouja and Ramadi. Shortly after Sen. John F. Kerry conceded, U.S. forces were given the green light to retake insurgent-infested Fallouja, the presumed base of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, though U.S. officials now believe the Jordanian-born terrorist has long-since moved on. But whether al-Zarqawi is killed or captured, U.S. control of Fallouja sends a loud message to insurgents hoping to derail plans for holding free elections in January.

Taking Fallouja has huge symbolic value to skeptics believing that insurgents had the upper hand. Watching terrorists scatter gives Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi renewed credibility that his U.S.-backed government is here to stay. Playing cat-and-mouse with insurgents sent the wrong signal that Iraq was losing its war with terrorists. "Success in Fallouja will deal a blow to terrorists in the country, and should move Iraq further away from a future of violence to one of freedom and opportunity for the Iraqi people," said Rumsfeld at a Pentagon briefing. Rumsfeld reassured not only Iraqis but also growing skepticism inside the U.S. Winning reelection gives the White House some breathing room for delivering President George W. Bush's promise of democracy. Gaining the upper hand in Fallouja gives new hope to administration plans for scheduled elections.

Since Baghdad fell in April 9, 2003, the U.S. has been locked in tit-for-tat battles with insurgents, with little measurable progress. Iraqis have grown increasingly skeptical of U.S. efforts to reinforce Allawi's new government. With U.S. troops routing insurgents in Fallouja, Iraq's interim government gains a distinct propaganda advantage. Without putting up resistance, terrorists, like in Afghanistan, find themselves on the run, forced to hide in remote locations. Driving terrorists out of symbolic strongholds like Fallouja and Ramadi tells the Iraqi public Allawi's new Iraqi government is beginning to take charge. Dislodging terrorists from recognized strongholds doesn't solve the dilemma of preventing jihadists from streaming across Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Bilateral agreements and special efforts must be made to seal off Iraq's porous borders.

A-30-3

Credit Iraq's interim leader Allawi with recognizing that there can be no compromise with terrorists. Like Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Allawi finds himself one bullet away from anarchy. He knows that his only hope of survival is to use U.S. forces to push insurgents further from Baghdad, while, simultaneously, building up his own military. So far, Allawi's new military and security forces have proved disappointing, especially the recent massacre of 50 Iraqi troops suggesting infiltration. It's hard to know whether rank-and-file Iraqis support Allawi's new government or insurgents fighting to expel U.S. occupation. As Rumsfeld knows, any long-range strategy must include winning the hearts-and-minds of Iraqi civilians. Only through an all-out media blitz can the U.S. hope to turn Iraqis against terrorists currently supported by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV.

Driving tanks into the heart of Fallouja deals a blow to insurgents telling the Iraqi people that they're winning the battle against U.S. occupation. Iraqis won't support U.S. efforts until they believe insurgents are losing power. No one wants to see Fallouja go the way of Samarra, where U.S. forces liberated the city but now falls prey to ongoing terrorist attacks. Putting off the assault on Fallouja in April only made matters worse. Terrorists were permitted to amass and dig in, causing bigger headaches for U.S. forces retaking key cities inside the Sunni Triangle. "It's like pulling your fist out of a bucket of water, and everyone soaps back in," said Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, concerned that Fallouja won't be Rumsfeld's "tipping point." If Fallouja joins Samarra, it won't reassure too many Iraqis that the insurgency is under control.

Rumsfeld put his finger on the pulse realizing that the U.S. must do a better job of winning the hearts-and-minds of ordinary Iraqis. Rooting out insurgents and retaking Iraqi strongholds won't work unless the U.S. confronts insurgents' formidable propaganda machine, supported in large part by Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya TV and radio. Iraqis must be convinced that there's no going back. They must repeatedly hear that insurgents are losing ground to Iraq's new government. Despite skeptics, Allawi must keep up the war-of-words against pernicious propaganda. "It may not take long to capture the city, but nothing will have been resolved. It will be a symbolic victory," said French military strategist Jean Louis Dufour, proving, if nothing else, that propaganda doesn't only come from the Middle East. Iraq must follow Rumsfeld's lead and confront the profits of doom-and-gloom.

#### About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He's editor of *OnlineColumnist.com* and author of *Debating The Bullet* and *Operation Charisma*.

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED EFFORT  
OF HELLENES (CEH)**

SECRET  
NOV 15 09:00

(b)(6)

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National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH)  
National Chairman  
United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC)  
World President  
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PSEKA

November 9, 2004.

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense

(b)(6)

Dew Secretary Rumsfeld;

Congratulations on your very successful efforts to help re-elect President George W. Bush.

Hellenes realized long ago that the people's ability to select their country's leaders far surpassed any other means of selection ever tried. All Americans must do what they can to help our President move our country in the right direction.

We look forward to working with you in an effort to help this Administration make ~~the~~ best decisions possible for America with respect to issues about which we have some special knowledge.

Sincerely,

  
Andrew A. Athens

  
Andrew E. Manatos

*Congratulations. Not  
bad for a "high foreign exchange".  
(Amthor)*

OSD 18018-04

**THE NATIONAL COORDINATED  
EFFORT OF HELLENES (CEH)**

TELECOPIER TRANSMISSION

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO: the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

FROM: Andrew Athens & Andrew Manatos

TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF THIS COVER PAGE AND 1  
ADDITIONAL PAGES TO FOLLOW.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, OR IF THERE IS ANY PROBLEM,  
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

NOV 24 2004

060.1

Mr. Andrew A. Athens  
Mr. Andrew E. Manatos  
The National Coordinated Effort  
of Hellenes (CEH)

(b)(6)

Dear Mssrs. Athens and Manatos,

Thank you for your letter of congratulations. I do appreciate your support.

The President is indeed a superb leader, and will continue to do a wonderful job for the country.

Sincerely,

29 NOV 04

OSD 18018-04

9 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038049

**MEMO TO: Doug Feith  
Pete Pace**

**October 28, 2004** - HC 14/29

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz** PW

**SUBJECT: Post-Election Strategy for Iraq**

Iraq

Doug/Pete,

I agree with John Abizaid and Steve Cambone that we should get some contingency thinking going on how we would deal with the possible outcomes of an Iraqi election.

Could the two of you get back to me and the Secretary quickly with a plan of action? I would start with a very small cell that just lays out four or five possible election outcomes and then tries to enumerate the three or four major issues that we might face in each of those possible outcomes. If you prefer to start with a smaller number of outcomes and/or issues, that would be fine.

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

1820  
101

October 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Strategy

Attached is a memo from Steve Cambone. If you agree with them, as I do, would you please act on both of these recommendations? Otherwise, please see me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/25/04 USD (I) Memo to SecDef re: 10/23 Conversation with Gen Abizaid

DHR:ss  
102704-11

.....  
Please respond by 11/5/04

→ SD -  
I agree with Steve.  
I've asked  
- Ken Krieg and Jim Roche  
- Faith Pace  
to recommend a way - a lead or each  
*FW*

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038051

OSD 18024-04  
Tab A

MEMO TO: VCJCS

Secretary of the Air Force  
Director, PA&E

October 28, 2004 -11C10/29

1330

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

SUBJECT: Operations Analysis of UAV Employment in Iraq

Could you please come back to me quickly with some recommendations on how we might pursue Steve Cambone's suggestion here about analyzing the use of UAVs in Iraq?

I had exactly the same reaction when we were briefed by the Air Force last week on the UAV issue. The subject needs a systems approach.

Could you get back to me quickly with some suggestions about who we might task to do this and how? Thanks.

452 R

28 Oct 04

25 Oct 04

