

Restaurant food/equipment - Outback/Gough Restaurants (70 short tons)
Magazines - Senator Saxton request (20 short tons)
Air conditioners - Senator Biden request (15.6 short tons)
USO care packages (12.5 short tons)
NASCAR promotional cars and drivers for MWR visit (7.5 short tons)
WWE equipment and wrestlers for MWR visit (5 short tons)
Telephone calling cards (2.5 short tons)
Cookies for shipboard Sailors (2.5 short tons)
Clothing for wounded troops in German hospital (0.5 short tons)
Snacks - Slim-Jim (0.5 short tons)
Clothing for wounded troops in Landstuhl, Germany (0.4 short tons)
Baseball equipment - Congressman Tiahrt (0.4 short tons)
Chapel supplies (0.02 short tons)

b. Pending:

Air conditioners for troops in Iraq (22.5 short tons)
25-inch televisions (4.5 short tons)
Miscellaneous goods for deployed troops (2.5 Short tons)

c. Denied:

Restaurant food/equipment for Operation Feed the Troops (35 short tons)
BBQ restaurant food, grills, and cooks for deployed troops (35 short tons)
Magazines for deployed troops (19 short tons)
Freezer pops for deployed troops (2.5 short tons)
Snow Cone machine for deployed troops (0.05 short tons)

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
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The Black Vault



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Discover the Truth at: <http://www.theblackvault.com>

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Dear Cap,

They tell me you are under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR:dh
040204-4

335 SD

2 APR 04

OSD 04095-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30536

* * * COMMUNICATION RESULT REPORT (APR. 2. 2004 10:50AM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

TRANSMITTED/STORED : APR. 2. 2004 10:49AM
FILE MODE OPTION

ADDRESS

RESULT

PAGE

247 MEMORY TX

(b)(6)

OK
OK

1/1
1/1

REASON FOR ERROR
L-1) HANG UP OR LINE FAIL
E-3) NO ANSWER

E-2) BUSY
E-4) NO FACSIMILE CONNECTION

April 2, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

TO: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Dear Cap,

They tell me you *are* under the weather in the hospital. I sure hope that by the time this note reaches you, you are well on your way to recovery. Stay healthy, my friend - we need you!

Warm regards,

DHR:dh
040204-4

91
1330

720

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

4/2

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

15 Mar 04

Sir,
Sec Army Response attached.
v/v/CDR Nosenzo

4/2

4/1
OSD 04918-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

INFO MEMO

March 31, 2004, 8:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army *Brownlee*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for the Guard and Reserve

- In response to your query of March 15, 2003, I fully agree that we need to ensure our Soldiers receive the best possible support, especially with respect to their pay. We have been working to resolve the systemic causes of the problems even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. We have since intensified our efforts.
- In the near term, the Forward Compatible Pay System (FCPS) will provide a commercial, off the shelf, interim solution, beginning in March 2005. Current development cost estimates for FCPS total \$17.3 million. The ultimate solution is the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), which is being developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The deployment of the system will not begin until January 2006. The Army Budget Office is working with the Joint Requirements Integration Office to validate the full DIHMRS development costs.
- Until FCPS is fielded, the Army is providing training teams to finance battalions, mobilization/demobilization sites, and units in Kuwait, as well as establishing workarounds for current pay systems to correct specific, problematic input. Additionally, an information campaign to inform Soldiers and family members of the Guard and Reserve Pay Task Force (telephonic and e-mail hot line) is already proving beneficial in resolving pay issues.
- We continue to monitor progress in resolving this issue as outlined in the attached Pay Improvement Plan (Tab A).

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTC Susan Beausoleil, (b)(6)

0 SD 04918-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30539

326

31 Mar 04

15 Mar 04



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Completed Actions</u>						
2	Training team to Kuwait	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	10	1a(2)
3	35 specific training events for finance battalions and mobilization/demobilization site personnel	USARC		completed	10	1a(3)
7	US Army Reserve help lines for individuals and finance units	USARC		completed	N/A	1a(7)
8	Deploy integrated Active Component/Reserve Component input system (DMO) to all Army	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(1)
9	Retroactive entitlement input	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(2)
10	Leave Accrual	DFAS		completed	N/A	1b(3)
11	Revise Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) Military pay message from 19 Dec 02	DFAS	Nov-03	completed	1, 3, 18	1c(1)
12	Publish matrix of responsibilities by action	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	1, 3	1c(2)
13	Publish standardized entitlement explanation flyer for distribution at mobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	completed	13	1c(3)
15	Add warning screens on input system (DMO and JUSTIS) for tour cancellations	DFAS, ARNG		completed	4, 21	1e
18	Published guidance on processing orders for medical extensions	Army GI		completed	4	1g
20	Review grades of US Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO) military pay technicians	ARNG		completed	9	1i
25	Produce exportable DJMS-RC training package	Finance School	Mar-04	completed	10	2c
43	Joint Uniform Standard Terminal Input System (JUSTIS - ARNG input system) change to require remark on miscellaneous credit input	ARNG	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
44	DMO change to require remark on misc. credit input	DFAS	Apr-04	completed	20	N/A
50	Establish policy for supervisory control/review of tour cancellations	DFAS/ARNG	Apr-04	completed	N/A	N/A
<u>Ongoing Actions</u>						
1	Training at US Army Reserve Pay Operations Center	USARC		ongoing	10	1a(1)
4	National Guard mobilization finance classes	ARNG		ongoing	10	1a(4)
5	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of pending mobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(5)
6	Notification to US Property & Fiscal Offices of recent demobilizations	ARNG		ongoing	N/A	1a(6)
14	Initiate compliance reviews of mobilization/demobilization sites	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	1	1d
16	Defense Joint Military Pay System - Reserve Component (DJMS-RC) automated reconciliation to in-theater database for monitoring stops/starts of theater entitlements	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(1)
17	DJMS-RC automated reconciliation to demobilization site records for stopping all pay/curtailing tours	DFAS		ongoing	3	1f(2)
19	Publish memorandum to reserve commands on importance of using pay management report	USAFINCOM	Dec-03	ongoing	5	1h
21	Ensure pay issues for units identified by General Accounting Office are all resolved	ARNG	Oct-03	ongoing	15	1j
40	Continue to add functionality to myPay for discretionary actions	DFAS		ongoing	14	N/A
42	Add JUSTIS table of mobilized soldiers' accounts with recurring input required	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	19	N/A
45	Provide Defense Military Pay Offices (DMPO) and Finance Battalions (FB) with NG newsletter	DFAS		ongoing	20	N/A
51	Establish ombudsmen program for National Guard Soldiers	ARNG	Apr-04	ongoing	N/A	N/A



Summary Action/Task List for Improving Pay Support for Mobilized Soldiers

<u>Control Number</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Primary Organization</u>	<u>Suspense</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>GAO Response</u>	<u>Memo to Congress</u>
<u>Near Term Actions (3 to 6 months)</u>						
22	Automate Hardship Duty Pay - Location (HDP-L)	DFAS	Apr-04	open	17	2a(1)
23	Develop/publish revised comprehensive procedures	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	1	2b(1)
24	Clarify who does what how & develop metrics/standards tailored to mobilization/demobilization	USAFINCOM	Mar-04	open	2	2b(2)
38	Evaluate support for surge staffing of USPFOs	ARNG	Apr-04	open	7, 8	N/A
41	Evaluate Standard Installation/Division Personnel System - National Guard (SIDPERS-NG) - JUSTIS interface for mobilization	ARNG	Mar-04	open	16	NIA
46	Evaluate potential DJMS-RC systems change for debt threshold	DFAS	Apr-04	open	21	N/A
<u>Mid-Term Actions (6 to 36 months)</u>						
26	Internet soldiers' pay account access (myPay) for dependents (view-only)	DFAS	Aug-04	open	14	3a
27	Forward Compatible Pay system (FCP) approval from DoD/ Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)	DFAS	Sep-04	open	17,18,20	3b(3)
28	Complete FCP Development-Dec 04	DFAS	Dec-04	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(a)
29	Start FCP deployment to the Army RC- Mar-05	DFAS	Mar-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(b)
30	Start FCP deployment to the Army AC-Jul 05	DFAS	Jul-05	open	17,18,20	3b(4)(c)
31	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes- DoDFMR	DFAS	Sep-04	open	6	3c
32	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - AR 37-104-4	USAFINCOM	Sep-04	open	6	3c
33	Update regulations to eliminate outdated entitlements and processes - NGR 130-6	ARNG	Sep-04	open	6	3c
34	Evaluate placement and monitoring mechanisms for FCP/reserve pay training	Finance School	Sep-04	open	10,12	3d
39	Add pay support doc review & monthly reconciliations to precommand course	ARNG	Sep-04	open	11	N/A
49	Automate Continental US Cost of Living Allowance (CONUS COLA)	DFAS	Mar-05	open	NIA	N/A
52	Procedures for reviewing high dollar payments	DFAS	Sep-04	open	24	N/A
<u>Long Term Actions (36+ months)</u>						
35	Initial Army operational capability DIMHRS-Sep05	OSD	Sep-05	open	22, 23	4a(4)(a)
36	Start deployment of DIMHRS to the Army-Jan 06	OSD	Jan-06	open	22, 23	4a(4)(b)
37	Complete DIMHRS implementation-Sep 07	OSD	Sep-07	open	22, 23	4a(4)(c)
47	Incorporate Army Guard pay problems in Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) development	OSD	Sep-05	open	22	N/A
48	Include full reengineering in DIMHRS	OSD	Sep-05	open	23	N/A



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer *4/6/04*

SUBJECT: Iranian Charge

We will remove the Iranian Charge. The Iraqi Foreign Minister agrees with our moving against him. However, he insisted that the MFA be given a chance to ask the Iranians to remove the charge on their own decision. He put this question to the Iranians. In fact, the Iranian Charge is out of the country at this time but it is not yet clear whether that is a quiet removal or only for consultations.

With the business in the south, thousands of Iranian pilgrims coming in the next few days for the Shia festival of Arba'een, and the British pressing to hold back until the end of the festival, we delayed implementing the order until the festival is over. I have directed my staff to have the Foreign Ministry implement the formal order to expel the Charge on April 12, the day after Arba'een.

OSD 04927-04

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UNIT	CAD	DDO	CA/OPS	DDI	

12/11

6 APR 04

5 APR 04

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO

Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 12:45 PM

To: Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail); Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)

Subject: Iranian Charge Snowflake

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Please pass to Amb Bremer and confirm receipt.

V/R

Capt Lavoie

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GC	<input type="checkbox"/>
RE	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
CABLE CH	<input type="checkbox"/>
FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>

Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD

From: Lavoie, Lynn L, Capt, OSD
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 12:42 PM
To: Norwood, Scott, Col; ExecSec; McCormack, Brian; Mike Adler
Cc: SecDef Cables ESO
Subject: Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR

You have an Iranian Charge Snowflake in SIPR.

V/R
Capt Lavoie

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: Administrator [Administrator@orha.centcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 12:39 PM
To: RSS - SecDef CablesESO
Subject: Delivery Status Notification (Success)



ATT228386.TXT



Iranian Charge
Snowflake

Your message

To: Brian McCormack (E-mail); Executive Secretariat CPA (E-mail);
Mike Adler (E-mail); Scott Norwood (E-mail)
Subject: Iranian Charge Snowflake
Sent: Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:44:33 +0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>
CPA Executive Secretary on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>
Adler, Michael J. (FS-02) on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>
Norwood, Scott on Mon, 5 Apr 2004 20:38:51 +0400
<exchgs1.orha.centcom.smil.mil.#2.0.0>

RSS - SecDef CablesESO

From: CPA Executive Secretary [execsec@orha.centcom.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 12:46 PM
To: RSS - SecDef CablesESO
Subject: RE: Iranian Charge Snowflake
Importance: High

Confirming Receipt – many thanks.

Sincerely,
S. Sita Sonty
Exec Sec

-----Original Message-----

From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 8:45 PM
To: McCormack, Brian V. (GS-13); CPA Executive Secretary; Adler, Michael J. (FS-02); Norwood, Scott
Subject: Iranian Charge Snowflake

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Please pass to Amb Bremer and confirm receipt.
V/R
Capt Lavoie

4/5/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30546

3/16/04

72

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
 Dov Zakheim
 Les Brownlee
 Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

326

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

Please respond by

~~4/2/04~~
 31 MAR

15 Mar 04

OSD 04986-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30547



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 06 1:00 PM
April 6, 2004, 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu to General
SUBJECT: Personnel Systems for Guard and Reserve -- SNOWFLAKE

- Pay for active, reserve, and Guard personnel is one of the many problems caused by our ineffective legacy military personnel systems.
- The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing an interim pay system (Forward Compatible Pay) that will address some of the pay problems. The Services are also putting in place manual workarounds. However, many of the pay problems are caused by the personnel systems and the lack of integration between personnel and pay.
- My office, working with the Services and other DoD offices, designed the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) that will address the problems with our current legacy military personnel and pay systems. It is a fully integrated, all-Service, all-Component personnel and pay system built on a commercial off-the-shelf base (PeopleSoft) and designed to streamline business processes and incorporate best practices. We recently developed an accelerated schedule for implementation that will bring the Army **up** beginning in September 2005 with full implementation in all Services by October of 2006.
- The accelerated program requires some additional near-term funding, which I will work with the Comptroller to secure.

RECOMMENDATION: INFORMATION ONLY

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Norma St. Claire, Director, Joint Requirements and Integration Office,

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/30548

OSD 04986-04

3/16/04

March 15, 2004

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Pay Systems for Guard and Reserve

I am concerned about the pay systems for Guard and Reserve that seem to be broken and causing a great deal of unhappiness and difficulty. If we are going to ask people to serve, we need to treat them right.

Please tell me what is being done to fix this problem, how much it is going to cost and when it will be finished.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-24

.....
Please respond by

~~4/2/04~~
31 MAR

OSD 049

11-L-0559/OSD/30549



720
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO
ACTION

MAR 29 2004

USDP for (b)(6)
DSD
I-04/002780
EF-8646

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs JWR 25 MAR 2004
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Metrics

- You asked us to incorporate Andrew Krepinevich's suggestions about metrics into our process of measuring progress in the war in Iraq.
- We have forwarded these suggestions to the appropriate offices within OSD Policy, and will use them as part of our reevaluation of the metrics process.
- **Recommend you sign attached letter to Dr. Krepinevich thanking him for his suggestions.**

Attachments: As stated

DUSD (NESA) UJ

PDASD/ISA aw

MAR 25 2004

Iraq

25 Mar 04

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04



EF-8646

March 1, 2004

I-04/002780

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Suggestions from Krepinevich

Attached is a letter from Andrew Krepinevich, which has some useful suggestions.
You might want to feed that into the process on metrics.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/17/04 Krepinevich memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
030104-47

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04.

(Handwritten signature) Letter attached

Larry Di Rita
4/1

I

9

1 Mar 04

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04

02-03-04 08:09 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/30551

MEMO

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Andrew Krepinevich
DATE: February 17, 2004
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq

cc: D. Rita
LTG Craddock

Iraq

Thank you for inviting me to meet with you last week. During our session, I asked you what metrics you were employing to gauge progress in Iraq. You said my question was "mean" and did not offer any metrics, even though you are a strong believer in their importance, as am I.

Let me suggest two metrics that might be of use to you:

1. *The Percentage of Incidents Initiated by Coalition Forces.* This ~~war~~ is dominated by intelligence. If we **know** who the enemy is, and where he is, we will win, as the enemy cannot hope to match our military capabilities. **Thus** it is not the overall number of incidents between enemy and coalition forces that matters, but rather our *ability* to *initiate such engagements*.
2. *The Number of Enemy Defectors that Offer Useful Intelligence.* Again, **this** pertains to winning the intelligence war, but it also speaks to an erosion in the enemy's ability **to win** the "hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people. People defect when they believe their side will not win, **or** when they lose faith in the cause for which they are fighting.

17 Feb 04


As you know, in this kind of war it is important to establish metrics at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, **and** across its military, political, social and economic dimensions. There are lots of metrics. Which ones do we put our stock in? Which take priority? The choice ought to be informed by our goals and our strategy. On the other hand, if we don't have a coherent strategy, **any** metrics will do.

In a protracted competition such as this, the public will want to know that we are making progress in Iraq (and Afghanistan, and in **GWOT**) . Persuasive metrics are needed for this purpose **as well**.

Hope **this** is useful. It was good to see you. I am personally grateful for your efforts on behalf of our nation, and wish you every success.

OSD 05027-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30552



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 7 2004

Mr. Andrew Krepinevich
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Suite 912
Washington, DC 20036

IM
a9

Dear Andy:

Thank you for your insightful memo. I forwarded it to Doug Feith for inclusion in our review of the metrics process. Please feel free to pass along any other suggestions you may have regarding the measurement of progress in Iraq.

7 Apr 04

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

17 Feb 04

OSD 05027-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30553

2/24/04

72

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: DAVID CHU
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

OFFICE OF THE
SECURITY ASSISTANT

254 120 -0 0111: 22

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and get me the precise details?

701

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.09

2/27

Please respond by: _____

18 Feb 04

OSD 05034-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30554



UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

SECRET
2004 APR 06 11:21

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

April 6, 2004 - 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Representative TIART - SNOWFLAKE

- e You asked for the precise details on a constituent of Representative Tiart who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare (attached).
- e Representative Tiart's Office was contacted and provided the name of the constituent, Mr. Ryan York, but was unable to provide additional details.
- e We have made numerous attempts to contact Mr. or Mrs. York and have been unsuccessful to date. We will continue our efforts to contact the Yorks, and will provide additional information after we have discussed the situation with them.
- e Our policies are structured to try to preclude any such loss for a reservist called to active duty, so we are eager to learn more to understand if there is a situation we need to correct.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment

Prepared By: Colonel Kathleen Woody, OASD/RA(M&P)



11-L-0559/OSD/30555

OSD 05034-04

2/20/04

7:35 PM

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
DAVID CHU
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
20040218-0 11:22

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Tiart

- Congressman Tiart talked about a fellow who lost \$4,000 because of a gap in his healthcare. Would you please check that out and **get me the precise details?**

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.09

a/27

Please respond by: _____

OSD 05034-04

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We **need** to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have **a** sense of **how** closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32(ts computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

1/31/04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

April 7, 2004; 10:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

David S. C. Chu
8 Apr 04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Recruiting that Accurately Reflects Deployment

- You recently asked (Tab A) for a sense of how well the Services' recruiting efforts reflect the likelihood of deployments. This responds.
- The topic of deployments is a standard part of training and information provided to recruits during discussions with the recruiter and through Delayed Entry Program activities.
- The Air Force is the most explicit. All Air Force recruits are required to review the Air Force Expeditionary Force Policy prior to accession. Each applicant must indicate with initials or signature that he or she received information on the policy, which clearly states that, although most Air Force personnel are away from their home stations less than 120 days per year, some may be required to exceed this level. Air Force advertising and marketing also depict Airmen in deployed environments.
- Similarly, Navy advertising and marketing prominently feature sailors on sea duty or in a warrior context.
- Army recently shifted its communications strategy away from a focus on tangible benefits, such as money for college and bonuses, to a more balanced approach. Army advertising and marketing reflect all aspects of Army training, including the combat arms, and portray the full rigor of Army service, including mobilizations and deployments.
- We will use our next survey of active personnel to ensure recruits understand these messages accurately.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Capt Angela Giddings, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)
Maj Heidi Schwenn, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)

11-L-0555/OSD/30558

OSD 05055-04

TAB

A

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the **kinds** of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are **with** respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (ts computer)



Please respond by 1/31/04

EF-8783
04/003223

March 5, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

334

Here is a draft memorandum on the Defense Policy Board.

I wonder if we ought to do an update on it and then work it with Tillie Fowler.
Once we have a good piece of paper, we can circulate to people who might focus
it better.

Thanks.

Attach.
March 2001 Draft Memorandum Concerning the Defense Policy Board

DHR:dh
030504-29

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04 4/9

SM on 04

Ryan - It maybe
better if you could
pull it all together
for SecDef with a single
piece of paper and action
recommendations as appropriate.

OSD 05109 04
11-L-0559/OSD/30561

Di. h

INFO MEMO

MAR 29 2004

EF-8783

DepSecDef
USD(P) *[Signature]* APR 7 2004

I-04/ 003223

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Proposed Revisions to Defense Policy Board Charter

- You asked us to consider updating the March 2001 Draft Defense Policy Board memorandum (Tab A).
- Besides the memo you provided us, the DPB is also governed by a charter which is updated every two years and signed by the USD(P). The latest charter, filed August 3, 2003, is attached (Tab B).
- Since both the memorandum and charter are similar in nature, I recommend doing away with the memorandum as a document.
- I have provided three additional ideas to utilize the DPB in other ways (Tab C).
- I have also spoken with Tillie Fowler and Walt Slocombe and have attached their inputs (Tab D). Tillie recommends merging the ideas in the attached memorandum and those in Tab C into the DPB charter when it is updated next summer.

COORDINATION: Defense Policy Board (Tillie Fowler)

Attachments: As stated.

334
29 Mar 04
5 Mar 04

Prepared by: Mark Ellis, Special Assistant, OUSD(P) (b)(6)

OSD 05109-04

(b)(6)

DRAFT MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

The Defense Policy Board **was** founded during the Reagan administration: (1) to bring new thinking to the Department of Defense; (2) to **analyze** and assess policies and programs with the detachment **that** distance from day-to-operations allows; (3) to provide the Secretary with early warning of potential problems **and** early advice concerning emerging opportunities; and (4) to **help** develop support for **the** Secretary **and** his program among members of Congress, other executive branch officials, the press **and** intellectual communities.

The Board's products are ideas, assessments **and** advice. These can only be produced by a group of intelligent, experienced and innovative individuals brought together with a sense of purpose **and** a close relationship to the Secretary of Defense. **If** the Secretary takes the Board seriously, so will the officials who come before it to discuss their policies **and** **programs**. **If** it is known that the Secretary counts on the Board to keep him informed, to develop ideas, to evaluate current programs **and** propose **new** ones, the Board will be able to recruit talented members **and** enlist the help of a wider community.

To **make** the Board effective, I believe that: (1) you should be available to meet with *the* Board at least quarterly for 1-2 hours; **and** (2) the Board should be described as reporting to you (even **though**, for administrative purposes, it should continue to be managed by the Under Secretary for Policy.)

I would **like** to reinvigorate the Board by a combination of new members, the establishment of working groups **assembled as necessary** to look at **and** report on specific matters of interest to you, **and** by allocating a small budget for outside consulting/research services. (Board members serve without compensation).

The priorities of the Board will, of course, be your **priorities**. I would imagine that you would want us to work on missile defense, on a strategy for **Iraq**, on the transformation of our current force posture to one less oriented to cold war contingencies, on the realignment of NATO/EU "arrangements," and the like. We should be broad and deep enough to take on any assignment you choose to give us **and** you may well have others in mind.

As I see the **Board** it is not a substitute for the **staff work** that will be coming to you from a vast department. **But** as you **know** it is often difficult

(b)(6)

to look much beyond the next inter-agency meeting, the next Presidential speech, the next NATO ministerial meeting, the next budget decision. The Board can make its most important contribution, not by looking into the distant future or at today's immediate concerns, but at new policies that can be initiated during your tenure as Secretary.

In a separate memo I have indicated the current membership **and some** preliminary ideas about new members. If we were to go forward **I** would propose to conduct an immediate review of the current membership with a view to recommending a reconstituted Board.

Aug 3, 2002
DoD Charter

CHARTER
DEFENSE POLICY BOARD ADVISORY COMMITTEE

A. Official Designation: This committee will be officially designated the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (referred to as the Defense Policy Board, abbreviated DPB).

B. Objectives and Scope of Activities:

1. The Defense Policy Board will provide the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy. It will focus on issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense and will be responsible for research and analysis of topics raised by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. Individual Defense Policy Board members will be selected by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Members will be appointed to serve for a term of two years. Membership will consist primarily of private sector individuals with distinguished backgrounds in national security affairs, but may include no more than four (4) government officials. Board membership will be approximately twenty-six (26).

3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy may appoint consultants to support the Board and Board task forces.

4. The Defense Policy Board's sole function will be advisory and it will operate under the provisions of Public Law 92-463.

C. Period of Time Necessary for the Committee to Carry Out Its Purpose: Indefinite.

D. Official to Whom the Committee Reports: The Defense Policy Board reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

E. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support: The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will provide personnel, facilities and other administrative support necessary for the performance of the Defense Policy Board's functions. Information and assistance as required may be obtained from the Military Departments and other agencies of the Department of Defense.

F. Duties: The Defense Policy Board will perform the following functions:

1. Review the long-term policy implications of (a) U.S. force structure and force modernization and transformation on the ability of the Department of Defense to execute the U.S. defense strategy; (b) U.S. regional defense policies; and (c) any other issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. When required, the Chairman may establish task forces comprising members of the Board to analyze specific short-term policy issues identified by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

3. Serve as individual advisors to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as required.

G. Annual Operating Costs and Man-Years: Members will serve without compensation but will be reimbursed for travel and other necessary expenses of Defense Policy Board business as approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Defense Policy Board's annual support costs are estimated to be \$710,000 to include salaries for 2 full-time professional staff, 1 full-time administrative assistant, consultants as required, travel expenses, and miscellaneous fees and administrative costs.

H. Number and Frequency of Committee Meetings: The Defense Policy Board will meet quarterly or as required by the Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Task forces established by the Chairman may meet at other times as determined by the Chairman. Necessary notices will be filed at least 15 days prior to each meeting with the Federal Register and all procedures required for closed meetings will be followed.

I. Termination Date: The Defense Policy Board will terminate two years from the chartering date, unless, before that period's expiration, its charter is renewed.

J. Filing Date: August 3, 2003

Tab C: Other ways to utilize the DPB

1. Integrated Policy Teams (IPT): To help advise the Secretary on multi-disciplinary queries, joint-board task forces could be assembled drawing on membership from the DPB, DSB, DBB, Highlands Forum, and other equivalent and relevant DoD-related boards.

2. War Games: DPB members could inform NDU and other relevant entities about the nature of senior government advisory positions based on their own experiences so as to help make war game exercises more realistic. Specific members may also participate in war game exercises if need be.

3. Team B view-point: The Secretary can direct DPB task forces to develop contrarian positions on policies under review within DoD to provide the Secretary with further option(s) in addition to OUSD(P)'s policy guidance.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

March 26, 2004

FOR RYAN HENRY

FROM: Tillie Fowler, Chairman *Tillie K. Fowler*

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

This is in response to the Secretary's note regarding the Defense Policy Board. I understand that in the previous administration the Board was little utilized and, therefore, Richard's memo in March 2001 was appropriate at the time. During his tenure, he brought the Defense Policy Board into the forefront.

What the Secretary may not be aware of is that our charter is required to be reviewed every two years. The Defense Policy Board charter was last updated in August 2003 (Tab A). This was shortly after I took over as chair (May 2003) and provided the perfect opportunity to modify and focus the Board's future. I was thoroughly engaged in the effort and the charter was rewritten after consultations with Doug Feith. In rewriting the Charter, we made several positive changes to the Board:

- We reduced the number of Members. 26, vice 30, is a more manageable number and has allowed our discussions to be more thorough.
- We modified the composition of the Board. We removed non-participators and have added expertise where we needed it.
- We established Task Forces. The first involving the Proliferation Security Initiative, as you know, recently concluded, and we have begun the Irregular Warfare/USSOCOM task force. Additionally, I will be speaking with the Secretary on April 26th to determine the next one.
- I meet regularly with the Secretary regarding the Board's meetings and seek his input as to the topics to be discussed at each meeting.

We continue to look for ways to be more responsive to the Secretary and welcome ideas on how to do that. As to your suggestions regarding IPTs, or Joint Task Forces between the DPB, DSB, DBB, RFPB etc., I welcome this if there is a topic that crosses our boundaries. Additionally, cross flow communication between these boards is useful. Denis Bovin and Bill Schneider, both of the DSB, regularly attend our quarterly meetings, Kiron Skinner, now attends the DBB quarterly meetings and several of our

members (i.e. Fred Ikle, Chris Williams, Barry Blechman) have participated in DSB task forces and summer studies.

Regarding participation of our members in war games with NDU and other relevant entities, I am sure the members would be interested in participating depending upon their schedules.

Finally, with the balance of opinions on the board today, the Secretary already receives both pro and contrarian views regarding the subjects that are before us at our quarterly meetings. Developing contrarian viewpoints regarding policy guidance could certainly be a subset of our task forces for a certain policy issue.

The priority of the Defense Policy Board is to be responsive to the Secretary by providing him with independent, outside advice, assessments and ideas.

Attachments:

As stated

Anne:

Here are my quick comments on how to respond to SecDef's request for suggestions on how to make the DPB serve him and DOD better. They are not particularly geared to the 3/01 paper attached, which is more in the nature of telling him what the DPB does and how to restructure its membership. (The list of topics to address, for example, is clearly the product of 2001 not 2004.)

Based on my still relatively brief service - and 8 years of working with the DPB as a DOD official - I have these suggestions:

- The Board cannot practically meet as a corporate body more than about quarterly, especially if the Secretary is to meet with them for a serious discussion. However, it would be useful if there was more opportunity for members both to learn about what is going on in DOD and to work on specific projects between meetings. The task forces are a *good* initial step in that direction, but I should think more could be done to ask members to contribute in between meetings. It would be a mistake to over-organize, but it might make sense to have several sub groups working most of the time, on topics the Board had earlier identified. (I realize this process has already started.)
- The agenda should reflect first of all the Secretary's preferences/concerns, and those should take absolute priority. However, it would also be useful if there were a more systematic way for members to suggest items which the Board should address. Would it, for example, be possible to canvass the board a month or so before each meeting for suggestions for topics?
- It is useful for Board members to know what are the Secretary's and the Department's, long-term policy concerns even if they are not (at least initially) on the DPB's agenda for any meeting. It might, for example, be useful for USDP to appear briefly at alternate meetings to give an overview of "strategic business," not yesterday's cable clearing crisis, but long-term projects on his agenda - both to sensitize the board to what's on his (and, by hypothesis, SecDef's) mind, but also to get suggestions at a relatively early stage from the board both as to considerations for what he is working on and also what is conspicuous by absence.
- The Board should focus on long-term issues, not current affairs. The focus at the last meeting on China is an example of doing just this. It would be useful to bring in experts from both inside government and outside to address - sometimes with a different perspective - these longer term issues. (An example is the presentation by Lord Guthrie on Pakistan - and, in fact, the controversial briefing on Saudi Arabia.)
- The main utility of the Board, as I see it, is to give the Secretary outside advice. He has a couple of a million direct employees to tell him how to manage details and implement the policies that he has established (or that they think he should) and to congratulate him and his staff on how well they are doing. The Board should not be a debating society and it may not need to include bitter partisan enemies (though Richard

Perle served usefully and with integrity throughout the Clinton years, and it did us no harm to be informed as to our manifest failings on a regular basis) but it should include some but who don't, in general, agree with the Administration of the day

- In order to fulfill its potential, the Board should be understood as strictly advisory and deliberately somewhat contrarian — for the sake both of the Secretary and for the integrity of its advice. Its members are not government officials, they are not even, at least not by reason of their membership, confidants of the DOD leadership who for one reason or another don't want to work in the government, but whom the Secretary wants to be able to call on for counsel. They are independent sources of comment and suggestions, without authority or official status. In today's Washington, that may be hard to convince anyone of, but it should still be the message.

Wall Street

215070/27 Mar 04



MAR 7 2004
[Handwritten signature]

ACTION MEMO

I-04/003253-ES
DepSecDef
USDPCopy provided
[Handwritten signature]

Haiti

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

[Handwritten signature of Peter W. Rodman]

11 MAR 2004

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters to the Chilean and Canadian Ministers of Defense.

- You asked us to prepare letters from you to your Chilean and Canadian counterparts thanking them for their prompt deployment of troops to Haiti (Tab B).

RECOMMENDATION: That Secretary of Defense sign the attached letters and release the transmittal cables at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: Luis Sanchez, ISA/WHA (b)(6)

11 MAR 04

60 7076

OSD 05114-04

2/15 0800

4/1030

EF-8801

04/003253-ES

March 9, 2004

11/17/1

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Chile and Canada in Haiti

Please draft a letter for me to send to the MoD of Chile and the MoD of Canada thanking them for sending troops to Haiti so promptly - I appreciate it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-98

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

Handwritten notes:
LARRY D. FEITH
fy Sam 4/6
LARRY D. FEITH

Handwritten note:
→ (152P)

Handwritten note:
He said Chile
we got France?

Handwritten note:
Exec Sec - 3/29
This is UNSAT. Please pay attention I did not ask for a letter to France - D. Wolfowitz

???????

EX-103-04 10:24

FILE-0559/03D/00570

Handwritten note:
4/14/04
D. Wolfowitz



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

Haiti

Her Excellency
Michelle Bachelet
Minister of National Defense
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,

Santiago



OSD 05114-04

9 April 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30574



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

Her Excellency
Michelle Bachelet
Minister of National Defense
Santiago, Chile

Dear Madame Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Chilean troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to ~~democracy~~ *democracy, stability and security*.

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/30575



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 8 2004

His Excellency
David Platt
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the Multi-national Interim Force to Haiti in such an expeditious manner. Their presence is making an important contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to stability and security.

Sincerely,



OSD 05114-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30576

HAITI

8-11-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

His Excellency
David Platt
Minister of National Defense 14 rue St. Dominique
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Minister:

Please accept my appreciation for sending Canadian troops as part of the
Multi-national Interim Forces to Haiti. Their presence is making an important
contribution toward setting Haiti back on the road to

stability and security

Sincerely,



11-L-0559/OSD/30577

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh
040504-10

335 SD

7 Apr 04

OSD 05131-04

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

204 162 -2 MI 12: 04

APR 07 2004

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani


c c : Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Visit

Thanks so much for your hospitality. It was a good visit, and I am delighted you are enjoying what you are doing so much. Stay in touch.

Regards,



DHR:dh
040604-10

.....

Please respond by _____

33350

7 APR 04

OSD 05135-04



April 8, 2004

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Jan Boyer

Here is the background sheet of someone who wants to work on the Millennium Challenge Account. He is bright and capable.

Thanks.

Attach.
Jan Boyer's background sheet

DHR:dh
040804-15

230 02

8 Apr 04

OSD 05147-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30580

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I trust you are well. I moved from Argentina to come to DC about a year ago to take up a post as Senior Advisor to Peter Watson, the President of OPIC.

I remain appreciative for your time and counsel after the Dole campaign and up to the time you moved back to Washington. I haven't wanted to burden you since my arrival since I can only imagine how busy you must be. Frank Carlucci suggested I ask for your counsel and support in my next step in public service.

I have an interest in serving on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the President's new foreign aid initiative. This new organization will be headed by Paul Applegarth, whose name has been submitted to the Senate for confirmation. I have been told that the WH is making personnel decisions regarding the next tier of leadership of the organization and that my name is "in the mix". The decisions are being made in the next few days and, not surprisingly, it is a very competitive process.

I would very much appreciate your help in the form of a call to share your opinion on my qualifications. I would understand if, for whatever reason, you were unable or unwilling to do so.

In the event you decide to support my interest, I thought you might find useful some relevant background :

1. Position sought: "VP Country Relations", reporting to the CEO. As I understand it, this position has operational responsibility for negotiating the agreements with foreign aid recipient governments.
2. The key challenge for MCA is implementation. I have a proven track record of negotiating agreements and deploying capital in the developing world. In addition, my time at OPIC has taught me about launching initiatives inside the USG.
3. Of the 18 countries initially eligible for MCA aid, I speak fluently one of the official languages of 14 of these countries and have traveled or done business in several.

I am attaching my CV. I am available to talk to you and would welcome your counsel. Many thanks and sorry for the bother.

Best regards,

Jan Boyer

JAN BOYER

(b)(6)

EXPERIENCE

2003-present

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC), Washington, D.C.

Senior Advisor to the President.

- Involved in strategic projects for the private equity, structured finance and insurance activities.

1994-2002

VENTURE CAPITAL/PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTOR (in US and Emerging Markets)

Have launched and led three successful private investment initiatives in emerging markets. Responsible for strategy, implementation, budget, oversight, personnel and media relations. Reviewed more than 1,200 investment proposals from over 30 countries. Negotiated agreements with more than 150 companies, organizations and NGOs.

Positions:

Managing General Partner and Founder, Softbank Latin America Ventures, L.P. (2000-2002)

- Chief executive of investment activities of **Softbank Corp.** (a Tokyo Stock Exchange listed company) in Latin America and the US Hispanic market.
- Responsible for investment funds of \$155 million; annual budget of \$7 million; oversight of companies with over 400 employees, more than \$100 million of invested capital and offices in 7 countries.
- Served on Board of Directors of Connectmed, Spring Wireless, Dineronet, BitTime, Tiixa, LearningSoft, iCaramba and others.

President, BancBoston Capital Southern Cone; Partner and Director, BancBoston Capital, Inc. (1997-2000)

- Private equity business of **FleetBoston Financial Corporation** (a NYSE listed company) with investments of \$1.4 billion in over 350 companies.
- Established franchise in region and partnerships in four countries. Responsible for all operations and deal flow.

Director, Member of the Board, MBA Holdings, S.A. (1994-1996)

- Private equity business of Merchant Bankers Asociados, Argentine affiliate of **Salomon Smith Barney**.
- Managed investments of \$60 million fund.

1984-1993

INVESTMENT BANKER (in US, Europe and Emerging Markets)

Positions:

Lehman Brothers Inc.

Director, based in London (1989-1993)

Vice President, Associate, Analyst, based in New York (1984-1989)

Mergers, Acquisitions, Principal Investments and Corporate Finance.

- Completed international and domestic strategic transactions for US, European and South American companies.
- Negotiated acquisitions, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, strategic alliances, cross-border joint ventures and recapitalizations.
- Raised financing (debt and equity) in the public and private markets.

Government Financial Advisory.

- Provided economic policy advice to the Governments of Nigeria, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and others. Negotiations with multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank).
- Undertook financial restructuring, privatization and recapitalization work for state-owned entities.
- Negotiated debt-rescheduling agreements with commercial bank and government creditors.

EDUCATION

1993-1994

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Master in Public Administration Degree (MPA). Course work at Harvard Business School and Law School. Co-taught graduate level course: "Financial Aspects of Privatization".

1980-1984

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

B.A. Degree in Economics and International Relations (Honors). Awarded competitive scholarships to conduct thesis research in Tanzania (summer 1983). Rowed Varsity Crew; Captain (1981).

11-L-0559/OSD/30582

LANGUAGES English and Spanish mother-tongues. Fluency in Italian, French and Portuguese.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

- Full-time staff member, Dole Presidential Campaign, Washington, D.C. (1996).
- Financial advisor to Cabinet Ministers and Heads of Central Bank in Latin America and Africa.
- Legislative intern, Senator Hayakawa (R-CA), US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (summer 1982).
- Elected representative, Kennedy School Student Government at Harvard. Only Republican member (1993-1994).

PUBLIC SERVICE

- **Endeavor.** US non-profit organization pioneering economic development in emerging markets through entrepreneurship. Member of the Global Advisory Board (1999-present).
- **World Economic Forum.** Served on the Global Digital Divide Initiative Task Force and the Steering Committee on Entrepreneurship (2001).
- **Hispanic-Net.** Non-profit organization dedicated to fostering Hispanic entrepreneurship in the high technology sector. Member of the Advisory Board (2001-present).
- **Catholic Big Brothers,** New York City (1987-1989). Served as mentor to Hispanic youth. Chosen Big Brother of the Year Speaker.
- **Heritage Fund,** Chairman. Selected to direct fund-raising organization with 50 volunteers at Stanford University (1981-1984).

MEDIA/PUBLIC SPEAKING

Interviewed in several languages by **CNN**, The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Time, ABC, CBS, NBC, Institutional Investor, Latin Finance, Latin CEO and by more than a hundred other US and international television, radio, print and on-line media.

- Featured speaker and participant at over **fifty** conferences and seminars organized by the World Economic Forum, the Aspen Institute, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Harvard and other similar institutions. Topics include: international finance and investments, entrepreneurship, foreign policy, minority investing, private equity and technology.
- Editorial columnist: Diario El Financiero, Chile (1997-1999); Stanford Daily (1982-1983).

PERSONAL

- Born in (b)(6) 1961. Married to (b)(6)
- Multicultural upbringing, education, and professional experience having lived outside the US for more than 20 years. Traveled and worked extensively in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe and the Americas.
- Enjoy high altitude mountain climbing, parachuting, motorcycling and flying.

120

~~FOUO~~

RECEIVED BY THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 11 17 PM 3:07

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

11-11-04 6:43:07

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/30584

0 SD 05203 -05

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30585

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile: unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and - to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, CFOA would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on CFOA data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign **public** opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the **U.S.** government's foreign public opinion **programs together** with the Under **Secretary** of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, **representatives of USAID**, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an **ad hoc basis**.

A dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world must be seen **as** a long-term commitment central to **America's** vital national interest. **The** creation of a private institution, **performing** government contract work, charged **with constantly measuring** foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the **impact of American** policy on foreign public **opinion** would **give** the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the **rest** of the world. Further, **bringing** public **diplomacy** to the highest level of **NSC** deliberation will ensure that we communicate **our** message more **effectively** in **the** future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams **was** asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had **opposed** it; and about a third was **waiting to see** who won. In many ways, this is the **situation America** is faced with today in **the** court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in *the War on Terror*, **however**, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can **win** over to their side. **As** such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics **is** a vital and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, “The small percentage of Muslims who **are** fully committed to Osama Bin Laden’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion.” To win **the War** on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are “impervious to persuasion,” and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have **sat** on the sidelines **due** to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark **on** a long-term project to improve **her** standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the **world**.

There **have** been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government’s public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many **aspects** of American foreign policy, it **similarly** justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or **reshuffling** bureaucratic **boxes**. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and **how** they can **be** properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,”* pg. 375.

² *Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 Mandate for Leadership), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.*

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the **press**.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come **up with** a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5 million** annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does **fails** to address important **questions**. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a **draft** report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of **Radio Sawa**, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The **draft** report said that while **Radio Sawa** has been **promoted** as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether **Radio Sawa** was influencing its audience. **Despite** the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain **Radio Sawa's** impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the **Arab world**," the **draft** report said.⁵

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel **about** America, specific American policies, **and** how the United States can best change **attitudes** and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant **increase** to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes most to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print.

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. **This** investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the "takeoff" as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered - if not always agreed with - in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal - from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth - information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allow for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we have **at** our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how **and** when **these tools** should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law for, at the **very least**, oppose **extremist** visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world **that we** are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort **is** less **likely** to be successful **than** one that **recognizes that** the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might **be different** from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, **we** might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country **than** we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message **than** their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should **be** delivering contradictory **messages** to different **groups**. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America **should** simply recognize that our **message** should be delivered **differently** to different **groups**.

To spread our message, the **U.S.** government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. **This** would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, **and** other Cabinet officers and senior **government** officials as well as **Americans** in the **private** sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as **advertisements**, **speeches**, **interviews**, **lectures**, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences **and** their reactions to the United States. **As** an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the **War on Terrorism** will require **unprecedented use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the **teamwork** of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. **To** this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S. government** to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully** engage in a long-term market **research effort** aimed at **better** understanding foreign public opinion. **It would** be tasked **with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, **ask** question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner **that** is **simply** not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to **issues** of anti-American sentiment **and** this institution would be **tasked** with reviewing all existing data plus contracting for any original research **needed** to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this **corporation**. First, the corporation's **independence** avoids creating bureaucratic fights **over** what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who **controls the focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across **many areas** of government - from the Broadcasting **Board** of Governors to the National **Security Advisor** - **and** keeping it **independent** would **allow** its resources to be used by a wide-array of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with **the** rest of the world while **still** maintaining crucial separation between various entities. **That** is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, **creating** an independent corporation would **allow** each to continue to work completely **in** its own sphere while **still** having access to research when **necessary**.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., **before** the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging **Threats**, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an **excellent** analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the **communication** aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFO.4 will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While** a few structures link federal **officials**, coordination often **does** not extend to embassy practitioners.¹³

In order to keep all pans of the government bureaucracy moving towards the **same** goal, a senior interagency **group** (SIG) should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the **U.S.** government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, **all** other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation **among** the **various** parties involved. **Acting** on the information **provided** by CFOA, this SIG would allow the **relevant** Under Secretaries to implement **the** government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member **would also** be responsible for ensuring that **all** U.S. government **messengers** are given the information required to effectively communicate **with** their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced **by** the White **House** Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public **diplomacy** officer in the Republic of **Korea** should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, and so forth. Once **again**, it is **vital** that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the **style** and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. **Importantly**, this fine-tuning **must** be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the **U.S.** public diplomacy apparatus is, **however**, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 20M Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just **as** the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United **States military**, he must similarly view himself **as** the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign **governmental** leaders. This **commitment** must be made not only through public statements and private **consultation** and analysis **within** the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with **Department** of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be **a** priority **commitment** that is followed through on **a** day-to-day **basis** and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion **is** no less important to American national security than American public opinion **is** to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of **a** proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs **and** behavior **a** short pause to **hammer** out a comprehensive **strategy is called** for. *The temptation of **many** in Washington - including **many** who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try **and** rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War.* While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen **as** vital components of the **War on Terrorism** - **it is far more** important **for** the **U.S. government** to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in **this** paper does just that. It **starts** with an intense **stage** of information gathering **where** **American government officials** - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate **all** of the information currently available **and** **procures** whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America **gains** and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of **a** newly created NSC staff **member** chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, **and** flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the **rest** of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen **as** a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would **give** the **U.S. government** the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, “**The** Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.” For a **small, extremist segment of** the world *population values like* freedom and prosperity **are** meaningless. Yet **the** vast majority of people around **the** globe **is** more interested in security for themselves and their families than **war** and destruction. America **has** a peaceful message and **strives** to be a force for freedom and prosperity around **the world**. **Yet we** are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. **As** the 9/11 commission stated “If the United States does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will **gladly** do the job for us.”¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, “**How** can a *man in a cave* out communicate the world’s **leading** communications society?”¹⁶

American national security **requires** that **we** harness the wealth of **resources we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the **world**. We must speak and listen to the **rest** of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If **we** do **so**, **we** will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pp. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

INFO MEMO

MAR 16 2005

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:24

POUSDF
I-04/015791-ES
ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

WRC 02 MAR 2005

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
 - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved
 - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
 - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
 - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
 - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

Bottom Line: The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

OSD 05203-05

~~FOUO~~

Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)_____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/30602

11-L-0559/OSD/30603

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:10

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

11-11-04 1:03:00

11-11-04 05203-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/30604

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30605

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States **must** capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our **extremist allies** can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that **we** convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. **As** such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central **component** of the **War** on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does **not** seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we **present** two substantial **and** vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full **Force of the greatest** communications **society** in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping **hearts** and minds and changing **viewpoints** in the **War** on Terror.

It **is** important to note from the start, however, **that any** attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics **towards the** United States **is** futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just **as** the President **serves** as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must **similarly view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States **to the** citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. **This** role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is **an** integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior **towards** America, the **United States** government should

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, **ask questions**, and **analyze foreign public opinion** as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages.

It **is** startling how little the U.S. government (**USG**) currently engages in public opinion polling and how **irrelevant** much of the research it does do **is**. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor **how** the opinions of **various** demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups **and** tailoring our message **and** to an

appropriate 'degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the **War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use** of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications **resources**. To **this** end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with **gathering** the information required by the **USG** to advance America's position in the communications **aspect** of the **War on Terror**.

The mission of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (**CFOA**) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be **tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done **today**, as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG messages**. **Crucially**, **CFOA would** only **provide** the research product - **coordination of message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the **National Security Council**, the **Departments of State** and **Defense**, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE : Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the **same** sheet is especially important. **CFO.4** will provide the **data** that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and **constantly** reevaluate and refine the **U.S. government's** message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it can **utilize this** information effectively.

As **such**, a new staff position on the **National Security Council** should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S. government's overall** communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA data** so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy **action**

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC & liberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the **American** Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it: about a third had **opposed it**; and about a third was waiting to **see who won**. In many ways, this is the **situation America is** faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War on Terror**, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. **The** simple (in theory) challenge of the **War on Terror** is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists **than** our extremist adversaries can **win over** to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a viral and central component of the **war**.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are **impervious to persuasion**."¹ To win the **War on Terror**, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the **ranks of** our supporters, decreasing the **small** percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion" and impacting those who, **while** not actively **supportive of** extremists, have sat on the sidelines **due to resentment of** America. Put bluntly, **America needs** to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations **around the world**.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the **problem** of public diplomacy. All **have** acknowledged a problem **exists** and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the **War on Terror** has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a **strategic** reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic **boxes**. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and **new** - and how they can be properly **targeted** at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on "Terrorist Attacks on the United States," "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the **American** media or **because** of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies **at the** very core of **America's** own vital national interest.

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat – and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States – than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family?" and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question — some of which might even prove accurate — the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis.⁵ Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, The Washington Post has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the Jay” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs." America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

* U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are **trying** to persuade and **what** tools we **have** at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences **as well as** how and **when these** tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), **we** must begin by **identifying** the different segments that exist around the world that **we** are trying to persuade. That is, **a one-size-fits-all public** diplomacy effort **is** less likely to be successful than one **that recognizes that the** arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we **would** another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older **Koreans** who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history **books** accounts.

Crucially, **this** does not mean America **should** be delivering **contradictory** messages to **different groups**. Not only does delivering false messages or **propaganda** go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but **also** it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to **different groups**.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ **all** available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials **as well as** Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, **business** people, and so forth. **These** "public diplomacy ambassadors" **can** speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, **speeches**, **interviews**, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the **research** necessary to effectively **pair** a message with a messenger and a medium.

The **U.S.** government should **also** not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States; **As an** Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public **diplomacy**: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications." Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools **will** remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector

IV. *Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy*

A vital part of this new framework for **engaging the public opinion aspect** of the War on **Terror** is making **sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most** accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them **at all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration **that will allow** the U.S. government to **bring the best work of the** American public and private sectors to **bear in the right to shape** the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, **Hap Arnold**, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that **we have not yet established** the balance necessary to **insure** the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, **industry**, and the universities. Scientific planning must **be years** in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare **and security of the United States of America.**"

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's *technology*, broadcast, market research, and *communications* resources. In order to best utilize those resources *it is* vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other *government* agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should *push* for the creation of a private sector institution *similar* to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the *U.S. government* to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The *mission* of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion *Analysis*" (CFOA) would be to *use* the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to *fully engage* in a long-term market research effort aimed at *better* understanding foreign *public* opinion. It would be *tasked* with contracting with specialist firms around the world to *listen, ask* question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a *manner* that *is simply* not done *Today*. There are *knowledge* gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment *and this* institution would be tasked with *reviewing* all existing data *plus* contracting for any original *research* needed to fill remaining knowledge gaps."

There *are* a number of significant advantages to creating *this* corporation. First, the corporation's *independence* avoids creating bureaucratic *fight* over *what* budget the money for foreign *public* opinion *research* comes from, *who* controls the *focus* of the *research*, and so forth. Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption *across many* areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow *its* *resources* to be used by a *wide-array* of *interests*. Finally, it would *provide* a method for coordinating different aspects of *government* engagement *with* the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital *it is* that public diplomacy *be* differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in *its own* sphere while still having access to *research* *when* necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, coordinating authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. **While** a few structures **link** federal officials, coordination **often** does not extend to embassy practitioners.¹³

In order to keep **all parts** of the government bureaucracy **moving towards** the same goal, **a senior** interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together **with the** Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, **all** other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on **an** ad hoc **basis**. This **formal** consulting mechanism would **encourage** closer cooperation **among** the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would **allow** the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would **also be** responsible for ensuring **that all U.S. government messengers** are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications **should be** disseminated to all U.S. government messengers **as well as** information that **is** specific to particular audiences. **Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given** instructions **as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for** him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Korea, businessman, opinion makers, **and so forth**. **Once again, it is vital** that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message **must be** fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. **Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based** on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, **however**, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

Finally, **this** dialogue between America and the rest of the **world** – and the **responsive framework** established that incorporates **government and the private sector** – is seen **as a** long-term commitment. **The creation of a private** institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's** message, **and** the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion **would** give the **U.S.** government **the** real-time information necessary for effective communication with **the** rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, **"The Revolution** was in the **minds and hearts** of **the** people." **For a** small, extremist **segment** of the world population values like **freedom** and prosperity are meaningless. Yet **the vast** majority of people around the **globe** **is** more interested in **security** for themselves and their families than **war** and **destruction**. America has **a peaceful message** and strives to **be a** force for **freedom** and **prosperity** around **the** world. **Yet we are** doing incredible **harm** to **ourselves** by not advocating for ourselves effectively. **As the 9/11 commission stated:** "If **the United States** does not act aggressively to **define** itself in the Islamic world, the **extremists** will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard **Holbrooke** put it best, "How can a **man** in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications **society**?"¹⁶

American national security requires **that** we **harness** **the** wealth of resources **we** have available to **communicate with** the rest of the world. We must speak and listen **to** the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If **we** do so, **we** will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

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INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MAR 16 2005

POUSDP 16M005

2005 MAR 17 PM 3:24 241-04/015791-ES

ES-1478

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

02 MAR 2005

099

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper (SD Snowflake)

- You asked for Policy's thoughts on the Strategic Communications Paper submitted by Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner, and Lew Manilow.
- The general premise is that the more we know our audience, the more effective we will be in communicating with it.
- The paper recommends increasing funds for foreign opinion research and polling, and establishing a government-funded private sector institution to conduct this research.
- The paper points out that no one in the USG is "empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy."
 - The paper recommends a new staff position on the National Security Council to do this.
- The paper points to real problems. But this cannot be solved until we have answered the larger question of how to conduct public diplomacy. Until that larger question is resolved:
 - It is not clear that we need a new government-funded corporation to do an increased amount of foreign opinion research.
 - It might be just as effective to increase the funding (currently around \$6 million) of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
 - The paper's emphasis seems to be on reacting, not on setting the agenda.
 - It is not clear that the new NSC position would have the executive authority to do the job.

Bottom Line: The findings and recommendations of this paper are very similar to the Defense Science Board's recommendations on strategic communications.

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Attachments: As stated

Peter Flory (PDASD/ISA)_____

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 MAR 17 PM 3:09

November 22, 2004

I-04/015791

ES-1478

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:as
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

23-11-04 10:33 OUT

~~FOUO~~
11-L-0559/OSD/30622

0 SD 05203 -05

*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow.

November 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30623

Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have already been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. Rather, we present two substantial and vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to the challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the War on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the U.S. government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does do is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. By listening to the opinions of various groups and tailoring our message and ~ to an

appropriate degree - our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on **Terrorism** will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and **communications resources**. To this end, the **Administration** should establish a private sector institution similar to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the **USG** to advance **America's** position in the communications aspect of the **War on Terror**.

The mission of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (**CFOA**) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully engage in a **long-term market** research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various **USG** messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product - coordination of message and broad strategic decisions must be made through the **National Security Council**, the **Departments of State** and **Defense**, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the **USG** has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows **America** to both formulate a comprehensive **communications** strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the **U.S.** government's message into the future. The **USG** must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the **National Security Council** should be created and charged with coordinating the **U.S.** government's overall **communications strategy**. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will have on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams was asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. In many ways, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion - and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the War on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist adversaries can win over to their side. As such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion."¹ To win the War on Terror, America needs a strong policy aimed at increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines due to resentment of America. Put bluntly, America needs to embark on a long-term project to improve her standing in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have been a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the U.S. government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of allocating more resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider all available tools of public diplomacy - old and new - and how they can be properly targeted at various audiences in order to reach them effectively.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

- This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in *the American media* or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest.

I. How America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view *America* unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among Arabs for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and freedom of the press.' The question these statistics beg is: "Why, given the amount we have in common, is the United States seen in such a negative light in the rest of the world?" While each of us could come up with a number of answers to this question – some of which might even prove accurate – the best way to reverse this troubling trend of anti-Americanism is to comprehensively study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends \$5 million annually on this type of analysis? Further, much of the research the U.S. government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has been promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its audience. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to ascertain Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the Arab world," the draft report said.⁶

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the 'takeoff' as well as the "crash landing" of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America's vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will "play" in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audiences. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and "issue of the day" polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."⁶ America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation **must** be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an *exchange* process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences **must** believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences **we are trying** to persuade and **what tools we have** at our disposal to attempt to influence **these audiences as well as** how and **when these tools should be utilized**.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support **America's** vision of **freedom** and prosperity under the **rule** of law (or, **at the very least**, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must **begin by** identifying the **different** segments that **exist around** the world that **we** are trying to persuade. That is, **a one-size-fits-all** public diplomacy effort **is less likely to be successful** than one that recognizes **that the** arguments that **are** successful in the **Muslim** world might be **different** from **the** persuasive arguments **we** should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group **within** a country **than we** would another **group**. The **same** could be true for different **age groups** - older **Koreans who remember the Korean War**, for example, **will be** persuaded by a different message **than their** younger countrymen **who only know** of the war **from** distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this **does not mean** America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only **does** delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the **basic** principles our country **stands for**, but **also** it would be **unwise** from a practical standpoint, **as** audiences worldwide would quickly **catch on to any** contradictions. Rather, **America** should **simply recognize** that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the **U.S. government** should employ all available tools of **public diplomacy**. This would include utilizing **the President, the Secretary of State**, and other Cabinet officers **and senior government officials** as well as **Americans** in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. **These** "public diplomacy **ambassadors**" can speak to foreign audiences **using a variety of** promotional **tools** such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, **lectures**, and educational exchanges. The **key is** for the **U.S.** government to invest in the **research** necessary to effectively pair a message with **a messenger and a medium**.

The **U.S.** government should also **not** be hesitant to **use the private sector** in doing research into foreign audiences **and** their reactions to **the United States**. As an **Independent Taskforce** sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the key strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American private sector

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates have the most accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at all times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will allow the U.S. government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy have made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and private industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes- all for the public welfare and security of the United States of America."

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.

¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, **winning the War on Terrorism** will require unprecedented **use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources.** In order to **best utilize those resources it is vital** to insure the teamwork of the **State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector.** To this end, the Administration **should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to RAND** charged **with gathering the information** required by the **U.S. government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.**

The mission of this "Corporation for **Foreign Opinion Analysis**" (CFOA) would be to **use** the resources and capabilities of the United States of **America** to fully **engage** in a long-term **market research** effort **aimed at better understanding foreign** public opinion. It would **be tasked with** contracting with specialist firms around **the world to listen, ask question, and analyze** foreign public opinion in a manner **that is** simply not done **Today.** **There are** knowledge gaps with regard to **issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be** tasked with **reviewing** all existing **data** plus contracting for any original research needed to fill **remaining knowledge gaps."**

There are **a number of significant advantages** to creating **this corporation.** First, **the corporation's independence** avoids creating bureaucratic fights **over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research comes from, who controls the focus of the research, and so forth.** **Second, CFOA would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - from the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent** would allow its **resources to be used by a wide-array** of interests. Finally, it would **provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with the rest of the world while still maintaining crucial separation between various entities. That is, given how vital it is that public diplomacy be differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.**

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, **President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc.,** before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how **America's communications expertise** can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror.

Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because the U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government must create a mechanism by which it can utilize this information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹² The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message," but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.”

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards the same goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings the NSC staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc basis. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation among the various parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CIOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to implement the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. government messengers are given the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily “Talking Points from the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs” or “The Global Messenger” produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be disseminated to all U.S. government messengers as well as information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be given instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessmen, opinion makers, and so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be given accurate information from the U.S. government, but the style and tone of America's message must be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. Importantly, this fine-tuning must be based on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled as a

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. E.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security priority by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he ~~must~~ similarly view himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not ~~only~~ through public statements and private consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic Chiefs of Mission. It must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the President's decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "further study" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of many in Washington - including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy - is to try and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important - and should be seen as vital components of the War on Terrorism - it is far more important for the U.S. government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. America needs to do more than broadcast our message to foreign audiences; we need to listen to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework laid out in this paper does just that. It starts with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials - with the help of the private-sector - evaluate all of the information currently available and procure whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand foreign public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy makers, so prior policy can be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits America gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is given to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials - under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a SIG - who use this information to craft an effective, informed, and flexible communication effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the world – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the U.S. government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John Adams famously observed, "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people." For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than war and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by not advocating for ourselves effectively. As the 9/11 commission stated: "If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us."¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, "How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?"¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate with the rest of the world. We must speak and listen to the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 FEB 12 AM 8:18

EF-8772

March 8, 2004

I-04/003198

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Liberia and Haiti *DN*

Let's get the Department of State to put pressure on Taylor to start behaving and stop making trouble in Liberia, and pressure on Aristide to start behaving and stop making trouble in Haiti.

092

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-21

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

3/11/04

→ SD

At the March 10 DC meeting on Haiti, Hadley and I asked State to develop and implement a "Plan Aristide" to do what you suggest.

8 Mar 04

Part of plan is to gather what we know of his corruption and human rights abuses and get US and foreign spokesmen to publicize this to counter Aristide's possible efforts to return as President.

09-03-04 12:13 IN

We had a similar discussion about Taylor at a Liberia DC meeting some time ago. I'll push on implementation.

Doug Feith

OSD 05207-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30639

SECRET
2001 APR 12 AM 8:55

February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Trip Coordinators
Arlene
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: April Function

*ASD(ISP) —
Need to sort out
quickly (per our
conversation yesterday)*

ROMANIA

C 3/4

Nick Burns says there is some sort of function in early April. I don't know what it is. I think it is maybe near Romania. Please see what that is and tell me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020704-1 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

— FOREIGN MINISTERIAL IN BRUSSELS 2 APR
7 INVITEES BECOME FORMAL MEMBERS (FRIDAY)
FOR JUNE SUMMIT. *Accessions Ceremony held to the Foreign Ministers*

— ROMANIA IS 12-13 OCT (MAYBE)
Scheffer may want Def Minister a day only

9 FEB 04

OSD 05216-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30640

April 8, 2004

TO: Steve Hadley

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Requests of Joint Staff

If you have requests of the Joint Staff or the Vice Chairman, you should run them through John Craddock's office. Then we will know what is going on and be able to make sure that appropriate information required by the National Security Council staff gets to you.

I have asked the folks in the Joint Staff to refer such requests to my office.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040804-4

OSD 05217-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30641

APR 07 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Senator Bond

Thanks for the call on Kit Bond. I talked to him, and we will work it.

DHR:dh
040504-10

335 SD

7 Apr 04

OSD 05234-04

March 29, 2004

Afghanistan

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DA**
SUBJECT: *The Hunt for Bin Laden*

Would you please do me a favor and read the book, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* by Robin Moore, and tell me what you think of it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032704-15

24 March

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

Ad 4/14

Sir,
Response attached.
w/ CDR Nosenzo
4/12

12 APR 04

04 MAR 29 PM 1:59

OSD 05246-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

APR 12 2004 11:23

CM-1684-04
12 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CJCS *RBMY 4/12*

SUBJECT: Robin Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden*, 2003

ISSUE: Your request for an assessment of Moore's book (TAB A)

CONCLUSION: Moore's book is well written, duly appreciative of Special Forces, but riddled with inaccuracies that undermine his account.

DISCUSSION:

- *The Hunt for Bin Laden* is an engaging account of Task Force Dagger in Afghanistan. Moore is understandably impressed with, and sympathetic to, the Special Forces community. He does a solid job of depicting the unique warfighting synergies that emerge when special operations are used in conjunction with the latest technologies.
- Moore's account, however, lacks analysis of the overall strategic and operational picture for the Afghanistan operation. Moreover, when Moore describes non-SF personnel or organizations his comments can be gratuitously insulting assertions (e.g., "while generals fretted about body bags and downed aircraft, bin Laden was escaping," p244; "the CIA was still as inept as ever," p298)
- Finally, several members of the 5SFG expressed concern with various aspects of Moore's account (TAB B). These comments make a compelling case that *The Hunt for Bin Laden* is more of a historical novel than a purely factual account.

RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.

Attachments

As stated

Prepared by: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS, (b)(6)

OSD 05246-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30644

March 2~~5~~, 2004

CJCS HAS SEEN

MAR 27 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: *The Hunt for Bin Laden*

Would you please do me a favor and read the book, *The Hunt for Bin Laden* by Robin Moore, and tell me what you think of it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032404-15

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

'04 MAR 29 PM 1:59

11-L-0559/OSD/30645

Comments from 5SFG Personnel Involved in Task Force Dagger

Comment 1:

The best description that I have heard given about the book is that it is "based on a true story". What I mean by this is that most of the story lines about the various elements are relatively accurate, but the comments attributed to many of the individuals are fictional. Additionally, there were comments made about CW3 Way, as the Rear Detachment CDR for 3rd BN, about how he tried to avoid going down range, etc., etc. [158-59] This irritated many within the FRG, to include my wife (which I still hear about now), as they felt he did a great job, especially with many of the casualties coming from 3rd BN. He held everything together. The thought line being if CDRs truly feel that the Rear D and FRG are important and we want to take care of families, you have to leave back competent people. The book trashed him. The families loved him.

Comment 2:

I read the first 50 pages or so of the book before my stomach began to hurt too much from laughing so hard. I was sitting in Baghdad, escorting COL Mulholland around to talk to all of the big wigs and brought the book along to while away the hours. I was with Todd and some other guys and we started passing it around reading out loud. We were in stitches from laughing so hard. It was the equivalent of reading a "Sergeant Rock" comic book when I was younger--everything and everybody was a caricature. The whole thing read like some Mack Bolan book. Frankly, we were all kind of embarrassed to be associated with the generally fictitious account, however, we couldn't help but try and figure out which actors would play which role in the movie version (Costner for Mark Mitchell?).

Honestly, I didn't read anything that would withstand true historical scrutiny--all of the people I talked to about their interaction with Moore is that he twisted their words and thoughts and misrepresented them and are pretty pissed at him. Were you aware of all of the "back channel" dealings that went on with that book (e.g., the pressure by MG Lambert to accept the project and USASFC having to disapprove the first draft of the book because it was so factually flawed)?

Comment 3:

WRT to Mr. Moore's book, I have only read portions of the book...and scanned through others. I will tell you that his accounts are far from accurate and in some cases embarrassingly inaccurate. The book, like his new book on Iraq, strike me as nothing more than transparent attempts to capitalize on his relationship with the Special Forces community by being the first on the market - without regard to truth or accuracy. He never interviewed me for the portion of the book about Qala-I Jangi and I can't recall talking to a single person who was there that has spoken with him. Again, this is a small portion of the book but it appears to be indicative of the overall quality of scholarship/journalism that went into writing the book. I have also spoken with some of my peers here at the SOC who had firsthand knowledge of events described in the book and they have had the same reaction.

The other part of the book that was particularly galling was his characterization of CW2 Rob Way and Rob's actions following the friendly fire incident with ODA 574 on 05 Dec 01. LTC Bowers had gone to great pains to ensure that casualty notification was done properly, out of respect for the soldiers and their families, and was explicit in his

instructions to the rear detachment. CW2 Way, following established Army procedure, would not confirm or deny whether specific individuals had suffered casualties until the official notification of the NOK. Mr. Moore finds fault with **this** and even goes so far as to claim that Mr. Way was failing to uphold the SF tradition of taking care of our own. However, the logical consequences of telling spouses that their husbands are OK while not commenting to other spouses is a process of elimination that precedes the official notification, with potentially dire consequences for the NOK. This is precisely why Mr. Way would not comment and Mr. Moore, who claims a long association with the military, should know better.

Finally, Mr. Moore's association with a man named Keith Edema (the man shown on the front cover) leads me to call into question his judgment. Mr. Edema is a charlatan and provocateur who somehow made his way into Afghanistan. We had standing orders to detain him because he was falsely claiming to be an ex-SF soldier now working for the CIA and was making mischief by representing himself as a USG official. I believe that Mr. Edema is the basis for a character in the book that claims that COL Beckwith made him a Green Beret after witnessing him do the swim test - underwater. Any basic fact checking would likely reveal Mr. Edema's claims as the specious BS that they are.

Bottom line is that there are probably some portions of the book that are substantially accurate but there are more than a few whoppers thrown in. The book is probably a great recruiting tool but not something that we, the SF community...should associate ourselves with. Whenever somebody asks me to sign a copy of it for them, I always write "Based on a true story" on the top of the title page before signing it.

For full disclosure, I am compelled to reveal that I have spoken with Mr. Doug Stanton who is writing a book about SF in AFG. Mr. Stanton is the author of "In Harm's Way," a critically acclaimed recounting of the tragedy of the USS Indianapolis and, in my personal opinion, a serious author more concerned with getting it right than getting there first.

Comment 4:

Jeff Stein wrote a great review of Moore's new book ("Hunting Saddam"?) for the Washington Post (it was in the "Early Bird"). He pretty well captures all of my heartburn with Moore.

More specific comments:

Chapter 2, subsection: "Miller's Finest Hour". This is total creative writing. I was at SOCCENT for the OEF planning when it started in earnest on 16 Sep 01 and the guy who pushed the UW campaign plan through SOCCENT and then to GEN Franks was LTC Bob Kelley (now 1/5 battalion commander). The noted LTC Miller is a very decent man, but he was totally ineffective as a planner at SOCCENT. He had been working on some SOCCENT UW plans for quite awhile, but they were very methodical, based on the sequential phases of insurgency. The younger guys (Kelley, CW3 Bett Brown) developed a simultaneous plan that was based on the current environment, as opposed to the Vietnam-era work that Miller did. Miller was out on point pushing the UW campaign plan for Afghanistan for a couple of days before he was moved to a vault to conduct interagency coordinations. The aforementioned section is essentially fiction.

Chapter 19, subsection: "Blue-on-Blue Snafu". I was in the JOC with COL Mulholland--that's not how I remember it (i.e., "screams in the background"). Moore's general scheme of maneuver is correct although he misidentifies units and helicopters

(i.e., "160th **SOAR** MH-53J Special Operations helicopters"). The MH-53's were out of AFSOC and 160th wasn't involved in this operation (nor do they have MH-53s).

Chapter 22; subsection: "Take-Down of Mir Wais Hospital". I was the ground tactical commander for this operation (ref. page 265 in the hardcover). I would describe Moore's depiction as "inspired by a true story" like they caveat made-for-TV movies. Most of the events (although the language is b.s.) occurred, but his sequence is all wrong as well as his supposition that the operation was designed to let U.S. forces conduct it under the "cover" of the Afghans. The whole plan was predicated on the Afghans conducting the operation. Only when they had failed twice and sustained significant casualties, was the decision made to have U.S. forces lull the A.Q. in the hospital.

Finally, I'm sure everyone is aware that the center guy in the photo on the hard cover is Keith Idema who claims to be some "old school" Green Beret. He was actually in Afghanistan (don't ask me how) purportedly claiming to be an agent of the U.S. government. To the best of my understanding, it was determined that in fact he was in Afghanistan on his own accord (perhaps as a mercenary for the Northern Alliance). Mr. Idema is one of the prominent figures in the book. Additionally, it has been purported that Mr. Idema's wife was one of Mr. Moore's project managers for the book. I don't know the veracity of any of the above, but it is definitely one of the more firmly planted rumors (urban myths?) in the 5th SFG.

Comment 5:

Before I begin, please understand that I can speak accurately only about what I personally know from my own experience...

I estimate that -- AT BEST -- 60% of Moore's work about my team is truth, fact, or accurate. Worst case, I estimate that some sections approach 33% accuracy, and in many cases, his writing is pure fiction, reckless embellishment, and gross exaggerations. There are entire paragraphs in the chapter devoted to my team that are completely false. Well over 50% of the paragraphs in that same chapter have something wrong or completely blown out of proportion. Worse still, a significant amount of material that he presents as fact in reality is just plain wrong.

To ice the cake, please know neither Moore nor his surrogate author ever interviewed a single person on my team -- not one, not ever. He and his surrogate author had approached our compound in Mazari Shariff requesting interviews, but for a variety of understandable reasons (including ongoing ops), we had to refuse. He never asked again, and we didn't exactly run him down.

Despite not speaking to us, his surrogate author and he put together an entire chapter. Probably 80-90% of the hard data he has about us comes from the Jan 2002 Newsweek article by Donatella Lorch. Ms. Lorch had lived with us in the team house for 3 days as one of the first four experimental embeds in the WOT. Moore's chapter pretty much takes her article and retells it with a dramatic flair that would make Dick Marcienko jealous. He completely fabricates scenes and events that never happened in order to fill in gaps between Ms. Lorch's work. In the remaining 10-20% of the chapter's data, he just completely fabricates things. Where it isn't pure fiction, he dilutes his work with speculation, hearsay, and 'bullogna.' Whatever the example, his embellishment far exceeds any author's dramatic license, and honestly, it makes me sick.

My experience in Afghanistan was limited only to my UWOA, but notwithstanding, I feel pretty confident that I have a decent understanding of the region's culture. Working in Central Asia for several months before 9/11, I also think I know a

little bit about the region and its history. I feel reasonably confident in challenging a lot of his facts and analysis in his presentation of either Afghanistan's history or its culture.

Lastly, I know from conversations with one of my best friends...that both he and Pelton have each published many team photos that 595 gave those authors strictly for their personal collections. For that matter, Moore's book remains the absolute single source anywhere that has published my last name: at the time in direct breach of USASOC's PAO guidance and more importantly, my consent... Although this is probably no big deal to most people, it is to us, and was especially more so at the time. Hell, the guy never even asked.

In short, I have concluded that he will never allow facts, research, or command guidance to get in the way of his storyline. I wouldn't trust this guy or his surrogate to write my nephew's 1st grade homework assignment, and to this day, I have still not purchased the book in protest. My wife wants a souvenir copy for kicks, and though I recognize that I am just the XO in this relationship, I have delayed her efforts successfully thus far.

Comment 6:

I only reviewed one chapter of the book, and that was the one...that dealt with the seizure of Mazar-e-Sharif, the defense of that city, and the prison uprising at Qala-i-Jangi. What I remember is that the information recited in that chapter was not factually correct, full of conjecture, and the research did not appear to be thorough. I say that because at that time I was the Battalion XO for 3/5th SFG(A) and our unit was heavily involved in everything related to the liberation of Northern Afghanistan.

Comment 7:

In general, my response is that anything that overpraises the capture-kill portion is drawn to the shiny object of movie action. The true impact of special operations is on the achievements through or with indigenous troops. This is operational value added to the national defense scheme, vice capture-kill which turns into tactical value added. We don't need higher paid rifle squads. We need captains, warrants, and great NCOs who can merge with tribal chiefs and warlords to shape and direct them. US Air Power is the element that gives these small, independent teams their ability to work in a very risky environment. It turns us (and our indig) into a force to be reckoned with. And it harnesses indig eyes on situational awareness and intelligence that American eyes cannot see.

SECRET
2004 APR 13 11 02 17



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer *u. al. r. y.*
SUBJECT: Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq

I agree with your memorandum of April 7, 2004 regarding OSC, the importance of unity of command within OSC, and its subordination to MNF-I for the foreseeable future. That arrangement is in place and is working well.

The issue which I believe may have occasioned this exchange was a discussion with Secretary Powell in which we agreed that the OSC Commander should be "double hatted" in the sense that, as in most missions, he would continue to seek policy guidance from the Chief of Mission just as he does from me today. That is, I believe, in accordance with the coordinated policy among OSD, JCS and CPA.

I do want to clarify one point, which is the operational control of law-enforcement organizations. As part of OSC, the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) will monitor, advise, and certify law enforcement personnel and organizations. However, under normal circumstances law enforcement organizations will not be operationally employed by OSC or MNF-I. Command and control of law enforcement organizations will exist within standard civilian authority structures. Certainly there will be close coordination between military and law enforcement in many situations, but operational ownership falls within the purview of the civilian authorities.

Finally, you mention the issue of a three-star flag officer to advise the Chief of Mission. I completely agree -- the current template for MNF-I provides sufficient expertise and lines of communication for dialogue between MNF-I and the Chief of Mission.

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USDI	OSD	OSD	CABLE/CH	PLS

OSD 05285-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30650

Bakalorz, Marion P, MAJ, OSD

From: Executive Secretary [execsec@orha.centcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, April 12, 2004 2:24 PM
To: MLA dd - SecDef Cables
Cc: Executive Secretary
Subject: Memo from LPB to SecDef - Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Iraq
Importance: High

This is in response to the Snowflake SecDef sent to Ambassador Bremer on 7 April regarding same subject.

Please confirm receipt.

4/12/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30651

April 5, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
LTG John Craddock

335 SA

~~Larry Di Rita~~
4/2

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Larry Congleton

I want to make sure I send a note to the awards dinner for May 6 and also a personal congratulatory letter to Larry Congleton.

Thanks.

Attach.
4/3/04 Craddock memo

DHR:dh
040504-14

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

at 10
~~Gracie~~ / ~~Carrie~~ / ~~John~~ / ~~draft~~ / ~~two~~
~~letters~~ / ~~TRF~~
DHR

5 APR 04

OSD 05314-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 13 2004

335 SD

Special Agent
Protective Services Unit
701st MP Group
6010 6th Street
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Dear Special Agent :

Congratulations on your selection as the **Army** Criminal Investigation Division's Noncommissioned Officer Special Agent of the Year.

What a fine achievement! Keep up the good work.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

You are a STAR!

13 APR 04

5 APR 04

OSD 05314-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

APR 13 2004

Special Agent (b)(6)
c/o Colonel Don Salo
Commander, 701st MP Group
6010 6th Street
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Dear Special Agent (b)(6):

Congratulations on your selection as the Army Criminal Investigation Division's Noncommissioned Officer Special Agent of the Year!

I understand this is the first time that an Army Reserve NCO has been honored in this way. It is a testament to your dedication, and recognizes your superior performance and the high expectations for your future service.

On this important occasion, I am delighted to join your colleagues, family, and friends in saluting your outstanding service to our country.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 05314-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30654



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ADMINISTRATIVE AND

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE AND
MANAGEMENT

Ray Dubois 4/14/04

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

- In an October 27, 2003, snowflake (Tab A) you expressed concern about the currency of DoD Directives. Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) were asked to review the Directives under their purview (TAB B). Of the 653 Directives in effect in November 2003, they identified 384 for revision or cancellation.
- Your February 13, 2004 memorandum (Tab C) told the PSAs they had prepared very few revisions or cancellations and to complete those actions by April 1, 2004. The weekly rate of submissions increased by more than 60 percent afterward, so we are making progress.
- As shown in the table at Tab D, to date 120 Directives have been submitted for revision or cancellation.
- We are monitoring this closely and will keep you advised of our progress.
- Additionally, my office has worked closely with USD(P) to address your concerns regarding an OSD review of JCS Directives. That issue is addressed in the memo from Ryan Henry at Tab E.

300.8

14 Apr 04

COORDINATION: None

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD, (b)(6)

OSD 05379-04

October 27, 2003

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Old Directives

I don't know if **you** were in the room when we found out that the SOLIC directive is dated 1995. It seems to me that you ought to set up a system where **we** review every directive that exists, listed by date and name, and let me look at it. I can select the ones I want to **start** having people review, so that we can get them up to date.

September 11 changed the world, and if we keep using the same directives that existed before, we are making a bad mistake. We owe it to ourselves. It **may** require getting some outside outfit like IDA to assist with a systematic review. I **am sure** there are a lot of directives.

Please let me know, and let's put some structure into this problem.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
102403-17

.....
Please respond by _____

U180260/03

11-L-0559/OSD/30656



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

OCT 29 2003

Administration
& Management

**MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

SUBJECT Mandatory Review of DoD Directives

Reference: DA&M Memorandum, "Mandatory Review of DoD Issuances for Currency," dated December 30, 2002.

In the referenced memorandum, addressees were requested to certify the currency of all DoD issuances under their cognizance that were over five years old. Since that effort was initiated, the Secretary of Defense has noted out-of-date DoD Directives and has directed that they be reviewed and recertified for currency. He is concerned that the DoD Directives should reflect recent actions taken within the Department to respond to world events and the realignment of functions.


Because the Secretary has asked for a current listing of all directives, a timely review and certification of each directive (see attached list) is required by the responsible Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Your response is requested by November 21, 2003, and shall indicate whether the listed directives are current, need revision or should be cancelled. Upon receipt and compilation of your input, this information will be provided to the Secretary.

For directives no longer current, proposed revisions should be processed through the DoD Directives System for signature by the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 90 days. Requests to cancel a directive should be processed within 45 days. The support and cooperation of coordinating officials are requested to ensure that these suspenses are met.

In order to facilitate implementation of a systematic review process for maintaining the currency of DoD Directives, the mandatory review period for directives in DoD Directive 5025.1, "DoD Directives System," Will be reduced from five years to two years. This change is effective immediately and will be reflected in a forthcoming revision to that Directive.

11-L-0559/OSD/30657

Your certification of the listed directives should be provided to the Directives and Records Division, C&D, 1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 501, Arlington, VA 22202. My action officer is Mr. H.D. Neeley, Chief, Directives and Records Division, who may be contacted at telephone (b)(6) or by e-mail at hdneeley@cd.whs.mil.


Raymond F. DuBois
Director

Attachment:
As stated



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30659

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
4/16/04**

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES</u>	<u>REVISIONS</u>		<u>CANCELLATIONS</u>		<u>SIGNED</u>	
		Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	49	17	25	20	1	0
USD(P)	64	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	79	32	9	3	2	1
USD(C)	15	6	1	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	45	5	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	12	4	9	8	0	0
ASD(PA)	14	2	2	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	16	9	1	0	0	0
DA&M	85	46	4	9	1	1	0
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
WHS/C&D	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
WHS/P&S							
TOTALS:	652	324	89	60	35	6	3

* Number identified by each Component in responseto Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818

EF-8656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to *your* question about *the* desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives. .
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by: Pam Mirelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)
Steven Netisben, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Template

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

DATE February 24,2004

SUBJECT Directives

Attached is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.
If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
0202404.01ta

Attach: Info Memo from Gen Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: _____ 3/5 _____

01-03-04 15:11 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-5000

INFO MEMO

CH-1546-04

23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

DSD Finner

SUBJECT: Dives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect when we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

684 2/24

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

cc: Ray Dibos

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 31, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Where do we stand on getting all of the joint staff and chairmen of the joint chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?

Thank you.

DFIA/om
103104.12

Respond by:

2/12/04

300.8 1

Handwritten notes:
S...
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31 Jan 04 5 Feb 04

OSD 01776-04

APR 14 2004

TO: David Gompert

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: New MoD

Iraq

Thanks so much for your note on the new MoD. I appreciate your keeping me posted.

Regards,

Attach.

4/13/04 Gompert e-mail to SMA re: Iraq's Defense Minister

DHR:dh
041304-01

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Apr 04

OSD 05407-04

04/13

Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD

From: Gompert, David Mr. (CIV) [gompertd@orha.centcom.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 2:27 PM
To: Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD
Cc: L. Paul Bremer; Abizaid, GEN John P.; Jones, Richard (AMB)
Subject: Iraq's Defense Minister

John,

I thought SecDef might be interested in my personal assessment of Iraq's Defense Minister after two weeks on the job.

Ali Allawi is a good organizer and builder. He's set clear and sound priorities in forming and mobilizing his team at MoD. His excellent eye for talent is proving valuable as we select the generals to lead the army. Allawi has grasped quickly the limitations of the IAF and ICDC. He is willing to take responsibility and initiative – he was the first to propose an Iraqi Task Force, drawn from capable extant and former units. He speaks his mind in private, e.g., in the give-and-take of the new Ministerial Committee on National Security. He is circumspect in public; actually, we'd prefer a higher media profile. He is receptive to advice and not afraid to take decisions.

Early on, the Minister displayed an aversion to the use of force, especially against Muqtada Sadr, whom he assessed – wrongly, in our view – as having the ability to mobilize a mass movement. After discussion and reflection, he came to accept the need for operations other than in holy sites. Also, he was quite prepared to admit that his initial estimation of Sadr's potential was wrong. It is hard to say whether his inhibitions about operations against Sadr in Najaf were based on his analysis of the consequences or some generic distaste for force.

I would like to reiterate my suggestion that Ali Allawi be invited to visit Washington in the first half of May, perhaps sooner. He is needed here now to build the MoD, help manage crises, and give confidence to both the public and the troops. Let's hope conditions will permit a visit in three or four weeks.

David

Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD

From: Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, April 14, 2004 3:06 PM
To: 'gompertd@orha.centcom.mil'
Cc: Lowery, Michael, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: New MoD, OSD 05407-04

The attached Secretary of Defense Snowflake, dated April 14, 2004, Subject: New MoD, OSD 05407-04, is forwarded in PDF format.



OSD 05407-04.pdf

APR 14 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Honorable George Tenet
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Barham Salih April 9, 2004 *Washington Post* Op-ed

Iraq

This piece is worth reading.

Attach.

Salih, Barham. "A Year After Liberation," *Washington Post*, April 9, 2004, p. A19.

DHR:dh
041204-14

14 Apr 04

OSD 05409-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30668

washingtonpost.com

A Year After Liberation

By Barham Salih

Friday, April 9, 2004; Page A19

SULAIMANI, Iraq -- The toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad a year ago today was a symbol of the victory of freedom over despotism in Iraq and the Middle East. But liberation from tyranny is only the first step. Building a democracy that protects freedom requires a long-term and sustained effort.

A year after liberation, we need to acknowledge both the achievements behind us and the difficulties ahead. The upsurge in violence over the past 10 days underscores the truth that democracy will not be implanted throughout Iraq easily or quickly. But the progress of the past year shows that it can be done.

For those of us who have spent a lifetime battling to free the Iraqi people from the grip of the merciless Baathist tyranny, the past 12 months have been a vindication. That Hussein and many of his cronies are now behind bars and awaiting trial is just.

For the representatives of Iraq's various communities, whom Hussein had played against each other, to have engaged in a peaceful political process to draft an interim constitution was remarkable. The document drawn up by Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians, men and women, Christians and Muslims, is the most liberal in the Islamic Middle East and is an achievement we can all take pride in.

It is worth remembering that historically Iraqi political disputes have generally been settled through violence. Iraq is a failed state in which there have been more coups than free elections. Yet, during the constitutional negotiations, the only weapons that were deployed were ideas, the only exchanges were of words.

While there is a grave and continuing terrorist threat, Iraq is not the violent disaster that naysayers depict. Rather, for Iraqis, most of whom have known nothing but the murder and mayhem of Hussein's rule, the past year has provided a taste of the benefits of peace. More than a million Iraqi refugees have come back to their homeland, despite being told by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees that it was unsafe to do so.

The refugees have returned to a thriving economy characterized by improving services. A year into the new Iraq public health care funding is more than 25 times as much than under Hussein, and child immunization rates have risen 25 percent. The supply of drinking water has doubled. The historical marshlands of southern Iraq, an environment devastated by Hussein, are being restored. Iraqi Kurdistan, protected from Hussein for 12 years by Britain, the United States and Turkey, is experiencing a cultural and economic boom.

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For the first time in living memory, Iraqis feel optimistic. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, 56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. Only 18.6 percent said they were much or somewhat worse. And 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now.

It is in response to this political and economic progress that the terrorists' onslaught is being stepped up. The terrorists know there is no room for them and their sterile ideas in our nascent democracy. These attacks are not, as some imagine, "resistance" to foreign presence. Rather, the terrorists are fighting against the right of Iraqis to choose for themselves. What they are trying to do is drive out all those who would extend a helping hand to Iraqis.

The terrorists will stop at nothing in their quest to drive out the friends of Iraq. The contemptible minority that murdered those brave Americans in Fallujah and desecrated their bodies in no way represents Iraq. By contrast, the Americans who were lost in such terrible circumstances represent all that so many Iraqis admire about the United States.

The thugs of Fallujah are the Iraqi past: men who committed similar atrocities against their fellow Iraqis with utter impunity for decades. Iraqis are most well placed to find the murderers, to develop, collect and exploit the intelligence that will defeat the remnants of the Baathist regime and their al Qaeda allies.

There are more Iraqis under arms today than there are coalition soldiers in Iraq. The contrast between the forced conscription that characterized Baathist rule and the willing engagement of so many Iraqis in the defense of democracy is striking and heartening.

The year ahead will be critical. On June 30 the awful label of "occupation" ends, and Iraq sovereignty is to be restored. After no more than seven months, there should be free and direct elections for a legislature that would be the first directly elected government in the country's history. These will not be easy benchmarks to attain. While we need sustained international support, the onus of responsibility will be on Iraqis themselves to build national institutions. Priorities for Iraqi democrats will be to promote civil society and protect a nascent political process against corruption and organized extremists.

The terrorists, the fundamentalist extremists -- and their sponsors -- know that Iraq is the decisive battle in their war against freedom. They are determined and resourceful. The violence of the past 10 days is a testament to the grave challenge they pose to Iraq's new political process. We have to respond to the present threat but also anticipate that this challenge may escalate as June 30 and then the U.S. presidential election approach. While a robust military response from the coalition is unavoidably the immediate requirement, Iraqis must be empowered to assume a more active role in protecting their country and taking responsibility for their own fate. Iraqi political leaders must be unequivocal in facing their responsibilities. There is no margin for political opportunism in confronting terrorism and extremism in our midst. If the terrorists and extremists are seen to win in any way, seen in any manner to inflict setbacks upon Iraq's burgeoning democracy, then the whole of the Middle East could be set ablaze. If the terrorists lose, then there is hope not just for the stability of the Middle East but for the rest of the world and our common battle against terrorism.

The writer is prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Sulaymaniyah. He will answer questions about this article at 11 a.m. today at www.washingtonpost.com.

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TAB A

March 22, 2004

IRAQ

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Ammo Dumps

Apparently the UK is complaining about unguarded ammo dumps in Iraq. Someone ought to find out what they are complaining about, and either get them to fix it or get somebody else to fix it. It is not the first time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032204-9

.....
 Please respond by 4/2/04

22 March

OSD 05416-04
Tab A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 19 PM 1: 22 APR 19 2004

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Peter Kunkel

Peter Kunkel has been doing terrific work in the DOD Legislative Affairs shop. He is a real team player and an enthusiastic supporter of President Bush. I would like to appoint him as a Schedule C. Please help that process along.

Thanks.

Attach.
Kunkel fact sheet

DHR:dh
041504-2

23002

19 Apr 04

OSD 05631-04

Peter E. Kunkel, Esq.

(b)(6)

experience

- 2003- **ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, *Special Assistant*** WASHINGTON, D.C.
Legislative Action Officer, International Security Policy and International Security Affairs.
Developing and/or implementing strategies to communicate Bush administration defense policy to the respective U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives committees of jurisdiction over the Defense Department and State Department
- 2000-2002 **UBS WARBURG, LLC, *Associate Director, Investment Banking*** NEW YORK, NY
2001-2002 Aerospace and Defense Corporate Finance
Advised on means to exploit strategic markets in the commercial aerospace and defense industries
General Electric Aircraft Engines: Penetration into additional defense markets for value-added systems
The Boeing Company: Space-based air traffic management, electronic flight bag, and real time scheduling opportunities
Originated and executed merger and acquisition, equity and debt financing transactions
Raytheon Company: \$1 billion secondary equity offering
Lockheed Martin: Investment grade revolving line of credit
TRW: Tax free spin-off and strategic acquisition talks
- 2000-2001 Leveraged Finance: Originated and executed high yield bond, senior bank debt, and bridge financing transactions
Industries served: health care providers, telecommunications providers, paper mills and petrochemical producers
- 1992-1996 **UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, *Infantry Company Commander*** TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA
1996 Commanding Officer, Company G, Second Battalion, Seventh Marines
Commanded 214 Marines, solely responsible for their combat preparedness, professional character and welfare
Coordinated with US Embassy in Argentina, Air Force transportation authorities, and local California USMC units for USMC to mount an expedition up Cerro Aconcagua, the Western Hemisphere's Tallest Mountain.
- 1995-1996 Executive Officer, Company G
In both 1995 and 1996, operational segment of the Company Ranked Number 1 of 24 in USMC Combat Preparedness Competition
- 1996 Personal Honors: Ranked #1 of 35, Summer Mountain Leaders Course. Also, top 5%, Winter Mountain Leaders Course, Bridgeport, CA
- 1992-1995 Platoon Commander, Company G
Commanded 41 Marines. Mentored 2 junior Marines to become the #1 and #3 small unit leaders in a field of 100

student internships

- 1999 **J.F. LEHMAN & CO., *Summer Associate*** NEW YORK, NY
Quantitative debt service analysis of potential leveraged buyout opportunities and other related transaction execution duties.
Identified 2nd and 3rd tier aerospace / defense manufacturing businesses and OEM segments for potential purchase
- 1998 **MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS, *Summer Clerk, Judge William C. Whitbeck*** LANSING, MI
- 1997 **THE HON. PETER HOEKSTRA, U.S. House of Representatives, *District Intern*** HOLLAND, MI

education

- 1997-2000 **UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW** SAN FRANCISCO, CA
J.D., Best Brief, First Year Moot Court Competition, 1998. CALI Award for excellence, Maritime Law, 1999. Recipient, Moot Court Case Counsel Scholarship, 1998. Participant, Judge John R. Brown Admiralty National Moot Court Competition, 1999. Participant, Advocate of the Year Competition, 1998
- 1988-1992 **NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY** EVANSTON, IL
B.A., *Economics; Naval Science Curriculum*, 1992. Honor Graduate, Marine Corps Association Midshipman Award, 1992. Recipient, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Scholarship, 1989-1992. President, Semper Fidelis Association, 1992

affiliations

- 2001 Student Sponsor Partnership of New York City, mentor
2001 New York Bar Association, member in Good Standing
2001 University Club of New York, social club member

personal

- 1997 **HIGH ALTITUDE MOUNTAINEERING:** Successful Ascent of Cerro Aconcagua, Argentina (Elev. 22,856')

11-L-0559/OSD/30673

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3
March 3, 2004

2004 APR 12 PM 1:35

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Study Teams

Please take a look at these PA&E Defense Resource Management Study Teams.

Why aren't they in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030101-77

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

092

3 Mar 04

16 Apr 04

OSD 05633-04



PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1800 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1800

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7001 APR 19 PM 1:33



FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ken Krigg, Director, PA&E

APR 16 2004

SUBJECT: Future DRMS Studies

- You asked me to take a look at the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) program and see if it could be applied in Iraq and Afghanistan (Tab A).
- The DRMS program is co-sponsored by Policy and PA&E. It is focused on reforming the defense resource management process of allied countries.
 - To do this, DRMS provides participating countries a methodology and computer tools for producing resource-constrained, multi-year defense programs.
 - The DRMS methodology is more sophisticated than either country is ready for now.
- We are resourced to conduct two DRMS studies per year. Policy selects the countries and secures their agreement to participate; PA&E conducts the studies.
 - For 2004, Policy has made DRMS commitments to the Philippines and Kuwait.
 - For 2005, Policy will give priority to Iraq and Afghanistan.
- To prepare the Iraqis for DRMS, DoD is conducting programs such as the Defense Planners Workshop at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.

COORDINATIONS: None

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: Ryan Henry
Andy Hoehn

Prepared By: Gary Morgan

(b)(6)

OSD 05633-04

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3
March 1, 2004

2004 APR 19 PM 1:35

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Study Teams

Please take a look at these PA&E Defense Resource Management Study Teams.

Why aren't they in **Iraq** and Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030101-77

.....
Please respond by 3/12/04

OSD 05633-04

(b)(6)

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

c c : Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: April 16, 2004

SUBJECT:

Do you know a Kurdish leader on the Talibani Peshmerga group named Kosrat?
Apparently he's quite a good military officer and quite popular.

Thanks.

000.5

DHR/azn
041604.10

Please respond by: _____ *4/27/04* _____

16 APR 04

OSD 05571-04

No Classification in Message Body

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From: System Administrator [postmaster@centcom.smil.mil]
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To: CablesESO@osd.smil.mil
Subject: Delivered: Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD



Urgent - Time sensitive respon...

<<Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD>> Your message

To: CENTCOM Command Center (E-mail); CENTCOM NCOIC (E-mail); COL
Reynes (E-mail); Abizaid John P Gen CENTCOM/CCCC
cc: 'thompsh@centcom.smil.mil'; Swope, Mark , LTC, OSD
Subject: Urgent - Time sensitive response from GEN Abizaid from SD
Sent: Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:02:47 -0400

was delivered to the following recipient(s) :

Reynes Col Joseph Jr (USAF) on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:27 -0400
MSEXCH:MSEXchangeMTA:CENTCOMHQ:MAGNOLIA
Thompson, LTCol H.Earle on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:27 -0400
MSEXCH:MSEXchangeMTA:CENTCOMHQ:MAGNOLIA

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MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:CENTCOMHQ:VOYAGER
Cmd Ctr NCOIC on Mon, 19 Apr 2004 19:03:08 -0400
MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:CENTCOMHQ:VOYAGER

APR 19 2004

1830
4/19

Advance
copy

TO: Gen. John Abizaid
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Petition

Here is a petition about something that happened a year ago.

What is the status?

I will probably get asked about this during some public press events this week, so the 80 percent answer today will be better than the 90 percent answer on Friday.

Thanks.

Attach.
E-mail about petition

DHR:dh
040504-15

.....
Please respond by 4/21/04

OSD 05673-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30681

Larry,

FYI -- there is a petition originated by the Newspaper Guild an, CWA and the International Federation of Journalist that is circulating online.

<http://cwa-union.org/IFJpetition/>

Tell Donald Rumsfeld That Journalists' Lives Matter

It has been nearly a year since journalists at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad came under fire from U.S. forces on April 8, 2003. Two journalists were killed and three others wounded. In all, seven journalists have perished in four separate incidents of so-called "friendly fire" by U.S. troops in Iraq since hostilities began in March 2003.

To date, the Pentagon's internal "investigation" of the Palestine Hotel tragedy, as well as other catastrophes involving media workers in Iraq, has remained classified. No details of these incidents have been released to their families, news organizations, or the American public. The Pentagon, meanwhile, has ignored repeated calls by journalists and other organizations in the U.S. and around the world for a detailed, independent inquiry into these tragic events as well as the development of protocols to assure the safety of war correspondents.

Reporters, camera operators and others who cover war zones must be reasonably secure that the U.S. military is doing everything possible to ensure their safety. Independent and accurate news coverage of military conflicts depends on the ability of journalists, no matter what news agency they work for, to stay out of harm's way and be free from fear that they are being targeted.

Add your name to the petition below which will be presented to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and members of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees on the anniversary of the Palestine Hotel bombing.

We, the undersigned, have not forgotten the sacrifice of those who gave their lives to report on the Iraq war and its aftermath.

We call upon the Pentagon to make public the results of its own investigations.

We again call for an independent investigation of so-called "friendly fire" incidents involving journalists and U.S. troops.

We demand to know what steps, if any, have been taken by the U.S. government to reduce the likelihood that tragedies such as the Palestine Hotel will not occur in other conflicts.

These actions are necessary to provide closure for the families and colleagues of those who died trying to tell the story in Iraq and to minimize the risk to media workers in the future.

First Name Last Name E-mail Address Media Organization
(if applicable)

Only your name will appear on the petition when it is submitted.

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MSEXCH:MSExchangeMTA:CENTCOMHQ:VOYAGER

SECRET
2001 APR 20 AM 9:35

EF-9145
I-04/004593-ES
APR 5 2004

Eritrea

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Feb

FROM: SECDEF
SUBJECT: Eritrea

4/19

Please get somebody to draft a memo from me to the NSC people on Eritrea, saying that we have to balance these two State Department local nationals who are in jail against the fact that we are suddenly getting cut out.

Abizaid needs to get in. He needs to work with them. It is important. The question is what is the cost-benefit ratio here? It sounds to me like we are on the wrong side of it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040104-19

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

4/19

Sec Def: Draft
Memo Attached

SAPRO4

OSD 05701-04
05-04-04 12:03 IN
TEN
4/19

June 9, 2004

TEW
6/15

CentCOM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Press in CENTCOM

sub

You will recall our discussion at Round Table this morning about lowering the profile of CENTCOM's press activities in Iraq and how that might be done.

What we did not talk about is when it should start. My instinct is that it ought to start fast and not wait until June 30.

Let's discuss this.

Thanks.

DHR dh
060904-12

.....
Please respond by _____

6/15 DLR 6/16

Please see my note attached
Dikeb

OSD 15961-04

hournb

June 15,2004

MEMO TO SECDEF from Di Rita (cc: CJCS)

We will brief you soon on this issue in broader detail ——— For your information now, though, we have already scaled back the CentCom profile significantly.

Senor and Kimmitt already have reduced their briefing schedule to not more than twice per week; they had been briefing daily.

At the same time, Prime Minister Allawi is briefing daily.

We will continue on those trend lines and further reduce our own profile as we further increase the Iraqi profile.

The tenor of the media coverage is beginning to shift as the face of Iraq begins to shift. See the attached article, which ~~was~~ on the front page of the New York Times on Sunday.

Other Iraqi ministers and officials are conducting extensive press activities for local and regional Arab media.

The national security advisor, Mowaffek al Rubaei, holds briefings several times a week for regional and local press, in Arabic.

Our own perception of who is briefing may be skewed because U.S. stations won't carry Iraqi briefers speaking in Arabic.

Allawi is also being booked for a lot of U.S. press interviews. This morning, for example, he was on CNN and Fox.

There is unanimous sentiment that the public face of Iraq must be Iraqi. There are other considerations, though, and we will brief you, soon.

72
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:41

15
March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*
SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

Please get the briefing from John Hamre, if you have not already received it, and then help me figure out ways we can implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

Thanks.

DFR:dh
031204-15

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30690

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 4/21/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: FRONT OFFICE DOC

OSD CONTROL **OSD 05774-04**

DOC **3/15/2004**

DOR **4/21/2004**

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SECDEF

TO SN

SUBJECT **HAMRE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS**

KEYWORDS

COMMENTS **CAF**

FN **020500**

SEC **U**

OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE

DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY

ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE

ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1

ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:

FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: **barnwell**

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ADC R

11-L-0559/OSD/30691

April 26, 2004

To: Larry DiRita

Fr: Gordon England

Subj: Hamre Report Recommendations

Larry
Larry

Although we concur with the problem set identified by CSIS, it does not appear evident that we would want to implement the recommendations. My suggestion would be to convene a small group with representatives from each of the services and OSD to discuss a more wholesome way ahead. The exception is the recommendations dealing with personnel. I am inputting those recommendations into NSPS.

If you would like, I will organize some review groups from within DoD to provide more comprehensive recommendations than those provided by CSIS. In essence, we will expand the CSIS recommendations into approaches that hopefully will be better accepted by DoD.

Let me know and I will proceed.

Gordon



020 000

26 APR 04

OSD 05774-04

15 MAY 04

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

B4-27 04

Print Date: 4/26/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: NOTE REPLY

OSD CONTROL OSD 05774-04

DOC 4/26/2004

DOR 4/26/2004

SIGNATURE CASE:

FROM SN ENGLAND

TO TSADIRITA

SUBJECT HAMRE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

KEYWORDS

COMMENTS

FN 020 D00

SEC U OCN

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

STATUS CODE DECISION

DECISION DATE

PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:

AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED

SUSPENSE

DOC SUSPENSE:

SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD

COORDINATION

PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 0

SUSPENSE STATUS

PACKAGE VIEW:
FRONT OFFICE DOC
RESPONSE
QUESTION/NOTE
NOTE REPLY

CREATED BY: orr

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ADC R
TSA O

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:41

March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

Please get the briefing from John Hamre, if you have not already received it, and then help me figure out ways we can implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

Thanks.

DHR:as
031204-15

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

4/21

→ Sec Nav -

I know you're not looking for any more work, but I think SecDef was interested in your thoughts on a way ahead for those recommendations that made sense.

OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30694

Dr. H. A.

Larry Di Rita

4/22

April 20, 2004 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:51

To: SECDEF
Fr: SECNAV
Subj: CSIS (HAMRE) REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS



Mr. Secretary,

By your note of March 15, 2004, you asked that I review the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, CSIS Report recommendations and provide input on ways to implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

With enclosure (1) you will find my thoughts on the recommendations provided by the CSIS Report. In general, I believe many of the underlying problems identified in the report are accurately identified and feed well into facilitating discussion on many of DoD's transformation initiatives. However, most of the specific recommendations put forward by CSIS are not appropriate and are integrated "point" solutions that lack analytical bases and do not reflect principles I think important in achieving a more efficient and effective organization in DoD.

I believe that the CSIS Report expresses many of the concerns of senior leadership and that the report is a good starting point for more substantive discussion about strategic managerial objectives within the Department of Defense. A lot more discussion is needed before we can implement any reorganization of staffs and processes. I look forward to contributing in a forum that will address these issues.

Attachment:
(1) DoN input on CSIS Recommendations

0 SD 05774-04

Department of the Navy

Report on CSIS Recommendations

20 April 2004



11-L-0559/OSD/30696

Strengthening Civilian Professionals

CSIS Objectives

1. Increase quality of DoD's civilian workforce by recruiting and retaining the best and brightest.
 - Create a more flexible "in/out" personnel system.
2. Strengthen civilian career professionals in DoD in policy and oversight.
 - Create training and professional development alternatives.
3. Create greater "jointness" at the interagency level.

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Establish a Defense Professional Corps	1,2	-All four Hamre recommendation will be reviewed as part of the NSPS design and development that has just begun.
Increase opportunity for professional development and training by adding 1000 career civilian billets over the next 5 years	1,2	-But probably no need to create a Defense Professional Corps and 1000 additional career civilian billets. Manageable within a civilian career force that numbers 743,000.
Require a 2-3 year interagency rotation prior to SES appointment	3	-DoD needs an overarching SES strategy to help manage professional development and career rotations. Development of such a strategy should be integrated with the NSPS process (SES process is currently not part of NSPS however).
Open more senior positions in DoD to career professionals	1,2	- Pursuing a strategy that creates a more flexible "in/out" and rotates personnel at the interagency level for greater jointness has merit. NSPS will provide flexibility to accomplish this objective.



Organizational Structure

CSIS Objectives

1. Build an integrated civ/mil staff by consolidating or eliminating duplicative staffs that create excessive wasteful coordination processes. Need to preserve diversity of ideas and perspectives.
2. Staffs should focus on their essential functions.
 - OSD should focus on policy formulation and oversight not program management.
 - Joint Staff should focus on roles in support of CJCS.
3. Create oversight to improve effectiveness in policy formation and strategic thinking.
4. Strengthen joint advocacy to solve joint capability needs.
 - Resolve lack of C2/C3 jointness by strengthening oversight.
5. Strengthen advocacy for joint programs and requirements.
 - Removes processes that are resistive to change.
6. Tie resource allocation decisions to DoD strategy and planning processes.
7. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning.
 - Forces the tough trade-off decisions at a higher level.



Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Merge each Service and Secretariat staff into an integrated staff.	1	-Growing OSD staff is not the answer. We need to clarify staff roles and processes in order to provide better advice to senior leaders.
Create an integrated civ/mil J1 and OSD (P&R) staff.	1	-Staff alignment is required given process overlap and redundant, ill-defined "lanes." a. JCIDs, EPP, Analytic Agenda and JROC exemplify that nobody has the authority to rationalize competing staff efforts that overlap. b. OSD Staff is not organized to resolve conflicts or set priorities among OSD staff elements or across DoD entities.
Create an integrated civ/mil J4 and OSD (AT&L) staff.	1	-Organizations and processes must enable the presentation of divergent ideas and independent analysis to senior decision-makers. - Collapsing the Joint Staff or other agencies into OSD may impact the ability to provide disparate advice to appropriate senior decision-makers.
Consolidate J6 and elements of DISA and create a joint C2 task force with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authority.	1,4,5	Consolidating into OSD will greatly complicate decision-making, roles/responsibilities, and fragment budget and acquisition authority. Does not address the organizational processes to assess and integrate competing priorities for senior leadership decisions. The alignment of requirements/budget and acquisition in this area is rich for discussion.



Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
Expand the Under Secretary of Intelligence to include C3.	1,2,4	Dilutes intelligence operational support, budgetary and policy authority; creates budget and mission misalignment and inserts two acquisition offices – USD (C3I) and (AT&L).
Disband J7 and transfer responsibilities to the J5 and the Joint Forces Command.	1,2,4	JFCOM has conceptual/training focus and should not own Joint Doctrine. Joint Doctrine better coordinated by current process between the Services and CJCS staff. J7 adds value, expertise with specific orientation on OPLANs and independent review process.
Build a strong PA&E capable of providing broad strategic choices for DoD.	6,7	-A more vital PA&E could solidify and institutionalize the OSD decision integration process for internal OSD issues and support the ability to assess and better present Service and COCOM positions.
Create an Office of Implementation and Execution Review that is tied directly to SECDEF.	6,7	-Shift PA&E to a strategic and capability-based process that is able to evaluate policy, operational and cost effectiveness for senior leadership. Proposal requires a cultural shift from long-standing major program focus. Better long-term solution would be to stand up a USD for Force Analysis over an organization that would implement a more capability-based process to evaluate policy, operational and cost effectiveness for senior leadership. -Implementation and execution review is already inherent in USD roles. Potentially, requirement could be tied into a USD for Force Analysis organization.



Organizational Structure

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
OSD consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary for Administration.	1,3	OSD needs an entity that would set staff priorities, run an executive decision-making agenda and ensure appropriate preparation of materials for senior leadership. Empowering Executive Secretary could potentially fix problem by setting priorities and resolving conflict through an executive decision making agenda.
Build capabilities in the COCOM for a stronger role in the resource allocation process.	5,7	<p>-COCOMs require mechanism to play a more effective role in the DoD decision-making process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Geographic COCOMs address near-term theater requirements and are not equipped to provide inputs into the resourcing process. b. COCOM priorities diverge across theaters and generally exceed available resources. Requires a decision-making construct to vet and integrate COCOM inputs with longer-term, overarching perspective of Services. <p>-A "J-8" like organization in the COCOM's would provide an input mechanism, but alone, does not address the organizational process to assess and integrate competing priorities for senior leadership decision.</p> <p>- A "J-8" organization would create duplicative requirements generation, increase friction, and will not effectively balance COCOM's resource risks (long term v.s. short-term outlook). Would incur Service manpower bills and grow COCOM headquarters.</p>




Interagency Planning

CSIS Objectives

1. Integrate political, military, economic, humanitarian and other agencies into complex contingency planning.
2. Achieve greater unity of effort in interagency planning for post conflict operations.
 - Establish procedures for developing integrated strategies and coherent plans.
3. Develop expertise by incorporating dedicated planning staffs and professional training.
4. Achieve a level of jointness at the interagency levels
5. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	DoN Comments
President should establish a new NSC office with the mandate to integrate agency plans.	1,2,4	Strongly support active and robust interagency functions and processes.
Establish SOP for the planning of complex interagency operations.	2,3	
All agencies establish planning offices to lead the development of plans in the interagency process.	1,2,3,4	



Interagency Planning

CSIS Recommendations	Effect	Recommendation
Designate one senior official in charge of interagency operations.	1,2,4	Strongly support active and robust interagency functions and processes.
Congress establish a new Agency for Stability Operations with a civilian stability operations corps.	1,2,3,4	
Congress create a new Training Center for Interagency Operations and fund international training and exercise programs.	2,3	
Congress increase funding for programs that support building operational capabilities of allies in complex operations.	2,3	
Enhance opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with counterparts.	2,3	
Congress seek a bipartisan "BRAC" like" process in overseeing DoD.	5	DoN supports efforts to increase Congressional expertise on defense issues.



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 APR 21 AM 9:41

15
March 12, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Hamre Report Recommendations

Please get the briefing from John Hamre, if you have not already received it, and then help me figure out ways we can implement those recommendations that are appropriate and can be readily implemented.

Thanks.

DHR:cb
031204-15

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

OSD 05774-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30704

DJS

OCT 18 2004

882

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Options

Qatar

I believe you are going to get back to me with options on Qatar headquarters.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
101504-20

.....
Please respond by 11/1/04

18 Oct 04

EF-9230
I-04/004944
APR 9 2004

RUSSIA

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Liability Language

Let's make sure we get this liability language surfaced that came up with Ivanov.
I want to see what the problem is.

Please get it teed up for me, and maybe I can help get it solved.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040604-14

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

9 APR 04

OSD 05935-04

720
APR 23 2004

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Haiti

D.R.

We have 2,000+ folks in Haiti who, needless to say, I would like to get out.

My hope is that you are pressing hard on the UN, so that there won't be any slippage in their replacing our forces there at the end of the 90 day period.

Thanks.

Haiti

DHR:dh
042004-7

23 APR 04

OSD 05955-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30707

72
TAB A

February 20, 2004

704

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

AFGHANISTAN

I assume that your two organizations will get to work on a longer-range plan for Afghanistan that looks at the total number of Afghan security forces, a program of their use and their phasing out or their integration with other elements, funding levels, the ultimate disposition of these forces, what other countries might be available to assist, and the like—in short, all the questions I raised at the meeting today.

Thanks.

DFR:dh
022004-24

.....
Please respond by 3/2/04

20 Feb 04

Tab A

OSD 05984-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

JAN - 6 2004



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

2004 JAN - 7 PM 4: 52

EF-8019

I-04/000165

USDP

Handwritten notes:
1/6/04
1/11/04

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
Peter Rodman (b)(6) *PR* 06 JAN 2004

SUBJECT: US Advisors to Afghan Government Ministries

- On January 5 you asked about the status of US advisors to Afghan government ministries and whether we want them in the ministries.
- The Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) is comprised of 15 senior advisors and 8 support personnel.
 - Six senior advisors and four staff (including an ARG Chief of Staff) have been hired and are at work in Kabul.
 - None of the senior advisors work in Afghan government offices.
 - They are based at the Embassy and provide advice to Zal Khalilzad.
 - They also work closely with Afghan ministry officials.
- Separately, USAID has approximately 800 technical experts and contractor hires working in Afghan ministries on health, education, economic reform, and agricultural programs.
- The Department of State requested and received \$25 million in the FY-04 supplemental to hire approximately 200 technical experts to work in Afghan ministries.
 - These experts, in accordance with the June 18, 2003, Action Plan to Accelerate Progress, will be "imbedded" in the ministries and will offer specific, needed skills.


OSD 00258-04


11-L-0559/OSD/30709

01/06/04 11:29 AM

- The ARG is to design a program to hire and place these technical experts.
 - A contractor (e.g., Dyncorp) would run the program.
 - To date the ARG has not designed such a program.
 - The program will likely include technical experts to be imbedded in the Ministry of Interior to monitor the police training program.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA) 

PDISA 

5:02 PM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 11, 2004
SUBJECT: **Duncan Hunter**

700

I talked to Duncan Hunter today. Here is a memo that Pete Geren gave me. He said he is going to send in a **paper**. What we need to do is *see* that your folks work it with John Abizaid and get it down the chain.

333

Then **30** days from now, let's get a report back **and** find out what Gen. Abizaid has done off of **the** recommendations that Hunter made.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021104.04

Attach: Hunter Phone Call to SD 2/11/04

Please respond by: _____ 3/11/04

11 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30711

OSD 05985-04

Tab A

①

UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF

MEMO

February 11, 2003, 11:00 a.m.

FOR: LTGEN CRADDOCK
FROM: MR. PETE GEREN

SUBJECT: HUNTER PHONE CALL TO SECDEF

- Duncan Hunter has a call into the SECDEF to discuss his recent CODEL to Iraq, specifically force protection issues. I accompanied Hunter on the CODEL. He pressed everyone he met with about force protection against IEDs and returned unsatisfied with the situation.

The issues he raised were:

- 1) HMMWV:
 - i. He questioned why we have HMMWVs carrying troops in threat areas at all. Why not armored vehicles, trucks, Bradleys, or Strykers?
 - ii. Slow rate of installation of armored kits on HMMWVs;
 - iii. Concerned that Commanders were forced to resort to "homemade" armored kits, generated in local machine shops rather than being supplied with standardized kits for installation. Why not deliver standardized armor plating to Commanders to install in theater to supplement the rate of kit installation in Kuwait?
 - iv. Lack of reinforced glass in vehicles; and
 - v. Vulnerability of gunner atop vehicles.
- 2) IED Detection: In general, he believes that we are not doing all we can do to detect IEDs, that the effort lacks intensity. He offered suggestions about increasing surveillance on high threat highways and gathering intel on IEDs. Specific suggestions:
 - i. Install cameras along highways.
 - ii. Hire Iraqis to walk/drive high threat stretches of road throughout the night (he compares them to NVA "trail walkers" in Vietnam)
 - iii. Raise the priority for IED detection with CIA.
 - iv. He believes we are relying too heavily on "walk in" tips on IEDs. Hire "every Iraqi we can buy" to gather intel in IEDs.
- 3) He also raised questions about the value of HMMWV patrols in hostile areas. Is the return worth the risk?

Need U A U.S.
B Prodan 19 Sept 1990
11-L-0559/OSD/30712

Tab A

TAB B



OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB 17 PM 3:36

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

DUNCAN HUNTER
CHAIRMAN

February 13, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I appreciated our discussion regarding my Codet to Iraq. As promised, I am sending along our trip report and a memo detailing our findings. I hope these materials are useful.

Sincerely,

Duncan Hunter

P.S. Should your staff need additional details, Bob Simmons on the HASC staff is available.

OSD 02262-04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/30713



Memo

February 13, 2004

To: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Cc: Secretary of the Navy Gordon England
Secretary of the Air Force James Roche
Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon Clark
Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael Hagee
Chief of Staff of the Air Force General John Jumper
Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker

From: Duncan Hunter, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
RE: CODEL Hunter & Force protection

The purpose of this memo is to highlight the force protection observations obtained during CODEL Hunter. Further, this memo suggests a number of opportunities to correct the seeming inability of the military acquisition system to properly meet the needs of our troops in theater.

From February 5 through 9, 2004, a bipartisan delegation of four House members visited major operational units in Iraq to assess ongoing military operations with a particular emphasis on self protection techniques and equipment. The CODEL reached three conclusions that highlight the urgent need for the acquisition system to more fully address the force protection issue:

- Force protection continues to be a severe challenge and priority for operational units. The delegation found numerous examples where units, through the innovative application of simple equipment modifications and changed tactics, have started to improve the safety of U.S. troops. However, additional resources and priority must be applied to this problem to ensure that all possible technical and material solutions are made available to our troops in the field.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/30714

Memo: Force Protection

- The **continued and** varied use of **Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)** by opposition forces **stands as** the most pressing force protection challenge **facing** coalition forces **and** must accordingly **receive** the highest priority attention of the military acquisition system.
- Operational commanders identified a **number of equipment and** capability shortfalls that will require the **urgent attention of** the Department of Defense **and** the Congress. Among others, the **critical need for organic tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), increased up-armored/add-on-armor High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and Rapid Fielding Initiative infantry equipment** were of particular concern.

For further background, please find attached a copy of the CODEL trip report.

Given these conclusions, I have begun a review of the performance of the military acquisition system in meeting the material needs of our soldiers in theater. **Based on** my preliminary review of two critical **war fighting** systems, I am very concerned that our acquisition system is operating in a **manner** that lacks urgently needed innovation **and** an ability to "think outside the box" resulting **in** the traditional, **lengthy, and** ponderous deployment of urgently needed capabilities.

Up-Armor & Add-on Armor Vehicles

- M1114 Up Armor **HMMWV** production at **O'Gara Hess** (OGH) is not at maximum capacity. Further, the **Army has** not placed requirements on this manufacturer to produce at maximum **rate**. Current Army contract **requirements are** for 220 **units** per month but **are** not fully contracted for the **entire** year (see Table 1). Considering the lead time for materials **and** subcontractors, the **Army's** leisurely acquisition **strategy is** inadequate to support the urgent need to field this critical force protection system in significant numbers **as rapidly as** possible. Further, there are **only 818 M1114 units** in the **FY05** budget request. The contractor reports that without any additional capital **investment**, production could be increased to 360 **units** per month by July and by November reach 500 **units** per **month**. The 4th ID, 1st AD **and** the 82nd ABN each have about 250 M1114's. These units report they need at least 800 vehicles each. The **Marines** report the 1st MEF needs 270 M1114 above the Army requirement.

CY04	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
M1114	150	166	202	205	220	220	220	220	205	188	167	140	2303

Table 1 - O'Gara Hess Conti-act Schedule
(source: Armor Holdings, Inc)

- The O'Gara Hess Facility which manufactures HMMWV **A2** Chassis Add-on Armor **Kit is** also **not running** at maximum capacity. The **Army** position is that there is no requirement for a **higher** rate.

Tab B

- Production for the **Army** Research Lab Add-on Armor kit for the A0 HMMWV Chassis is scheduled to fulfill the objective for 8,400 **kits in Iraq** by December. The U.S. and Canadian mills producing the Rolled **Homogenous** Armor (**RHA**) Steel are not producing at **maximum** capacity nor are there any **Army** requirements to **ramp up**. As a result of the less than **maximum** RHA production, the five **Army** Arsenals producing the Add-on Armor kits are not producing at maximum rate. **Kits are** delivered to Kuwait for installation at the Oshkosh facility. **Rotating** 8,400 HMMWV's to Kuwait leads to unnecessary delay in delivery to the area of operation. **Kits** should be delivered directly to the divisions for installation at their motor pool compounds, an effort that can be effectively carried out by military or contractor personnel in the field
- There is still **an** opportunity to transfer some of the additional M1114 Up Armor HMMWV's currently outside Iraq to the theater and then **backfill** these vehicle transfers. Of the 3,272 M1114 in the inventory, 18 are in **CONUS**, 24 in **Alaska**, 246 in Korea, and 43 afloat in **APS**.
- The 4th ID reported to the CODEL that transporting **troops** in support of missions has proven to be extremely **dangerous** for two reasons. 1) The **lack** of ballistic protection and 2) the troops face inward, not allowing **them** to employ their **weapons** and exposing their **backs to attack**. Innovative soldiers are **using** plywood to make benches in the center of the cargo bed and sand bags with Kevlar blankets to provide minimal protection. Further, they **would** like to mount **.50 caliber** machine guns in the beds of **these** trucks to provide additional firepower. In response to **this pressing** need, Lawrence Livermore Lab is just completing an armor protection kit for the cargo/troop **area** of the Army's 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) and the Marine's 7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). This development project, an effort independent of the Army acquisition system, is scheduled to be completed in less than 60 total days on February 18th.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

The CODEL consistently heard **from** unit operations and intelligence staffs of **the** urgent **need** for more UAVs for two different applications. **First**, the most effective tactic to defeat **the** IED threat is to catch the perpetrators installing these devices. Thermal/Visual surveillance or Change Terrain Detection capability from UAVs would allow **the more than** 1,600 daily patrols and convoys to perform more securely. **During** the CODEL, it **was learned** that these assets are so important and in such short supply that commanders **are** constantly competing at all levels **for** these **resources**. Second, **the** extensive border **areas** of concern must have better surveillance. The 82nd ABN must have more positive control of the 825 km of border with Syria and Saudi Arabia. High persistence UAV's are essential to successfully accomplishing this mission.

Memo : Force Protection

- The Army has 32 Hunter UAVs. Six are in Iraq and 12 are being returned to the U.S. for "reset." Availability of these assets in theater must be maximized. The reset effort has two components: 1) overhauling the UAVs and 2) rotating Army operators and support staff. As a more operationally effective alternative, the Hunter contractor could provide support personnel and overhaul materials and perform the reset in theater. Further, the lack of operations personnel could be overcome in the short term through the use of contractor operators to support missions and the deployment of additional Army personnel to be trained in place.
- The Army has 32 Shadow UAVs of which 16 are in Iraq and 8 of these are being returned to the U.S. for reset. Again, the same approach could be used for the Shadow UAV — overhaul in theater and then use contractor operators to support missions while training additional Army personnel.
- There are 13 Predator high persistence UAVs in storage in the U.S. The contractor, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems can provide operators, support personnel and training. Further, General Atomics reports the Lynx Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) system which includes 4 inch resolution and Coherent and Amplitude Change Detection capability is available and can be deployed on the Predator UAVs within two months. This SAR system could also be deployed on Blackhawk helicopters. Change Detection SAR can detect disturbance along roadways or pipelines which suggest the planting of IEDs. General Atomics has at least 6 system available for immediate deployment. The Predator with the Lynx SAR would be effective for both IED missions and border surveillance.
- There are several variants of UAVs in or starting production such as Shadow, Silver Fox, etc. that could be ramped up over a very short period.

Summary

The pressing operational demands of the military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan require that we, as a nation, look beyond the conventional approach to acquiring critical military systems and capabilities. Nowhere is this more the case than in systems that significantly increase the force protection of our troops in the field. While it must be recognized that no technological solution will ever eliminate the inherent risks of combat operations, we owe it to our troops and their families to be doing everything humanly possible to knock down all bureaucratic barriers and pursue all innovative solutions to field enhanced force protection systems as rapidly as possible. I urge you to press the military services in their Title 10 role to pursue their responsibility with this in mind and I stand ready to do anything I can from the legislative end to facilitate this objective. I will continue to make this effort a priority issue for myself and the House Armed Services Committee in the months ahead and look forward to continuing to work with you on this common goal.

Attachment

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/30717



CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (CODEL) HUNTER VISIT TO IRAQ

February 5 - 9, 2004

From February 5 through 9, 2004, a **bipartisan** congressional delegation (**CODEL**) of **four** House **members** visited **major** operational units in **Iraq** to assess **ongoing** military operations with a particular emphasis on **self** protection techniques and **equipment**.

The delegation was led by **Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)**, Chairman of the House **Armed** Services Committee, **Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)**, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on **Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities**, **Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)** a member of the House **Armed Services and Intelligence** committees, and **Rep. Ron Lewis (R-KY)**, **member** of the House Government Reform Committee.

During the first day, the delegation visited the Combined Forces Land Component Commander headquarters in **Kuwait**. On the second day, the delegation traveled to **Baghdad** and visited the Combined Joint Task Force - 7 headquarters, the **Iraqi** Survey Group headquarters, the First Armored Division headquarters and with the **2/2 Armored Cavalry**. **The next day**, the delegation **visited** the **4th** Infantry Division in Tikrit and the **3rd Brigade** of the **82^d** Airborne Division in **Ar Ramadi**. **On the final** day, the delegation visited the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany.

CONCLUSIONS -

Following its review, the delegation reached the following conclusions:

- Operational commanders and individual **units** all report continued **progress** in stabilizing the **security** environment within their respective area of operations. While attacks against coalition and Iraqi security forces continue to **pose** a serious challenge, the rate of frequency of these attacks is trending in the **right** direction.

-
- a The Iraqi Survey Group estimates it is **only** halfway **through** with its **mission** to identify **and** quantify all evidence of Iraqi efforts to develop a **Weapons of Mass** Destruction capability.
 - Force protection continues to **be** a severe challenge and priority for **operational** units. **The** delegation **found numerous** examples **where** units, **through** the innovative application of **simple** equipment **modifications** and changed tactics, have **started** to improve the **safety of U.S. troops**. However, additional resources **and** priority **must** be applied to **this** problem to **ensure** that **all possible technical and material solutions are made** available to **our** troops in the field.
 - a The continued **and** varied use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) by opposition forces **stands as the most** pressing force protection challenge facing coalition **forces and** must accordingly receive the **highest** priority attention of the military acquisition **system**.
 - a Operational commanders identified a number of equipment **and** capability shortfalls that will **require** the urgent attention of the Department of Defense **and** the Congress. **Among** others, the critical need for organic tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), increased up-armored High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (**HMMWV**) and **Rapid** Fielding Initiative infantry equipment were of particular concern.
 - The plan **for the** large scale rotation of **U.S.** forces in *Iraq* **appears** to be proceeding **apace** with **virtually every** unit beginning **some** phase of rotation in **the weeks** ahead.
 - a **The** effort to identify, **secure** and destroy the extensive inventory of **Iraqi** ammunition **and** explosives appeared to **lack focus** and priority at the higher levels of command. **At** the unit level, **this** effort **was** recognized **as an** important component of stabilizing the security situation **and** denying bomb **making materials** to insurgents. **Accordingly**, the rate of progress in eliminating **and securing this** material within the individual **area** of **operations** of the units visited by the delegation **was** uniformly positive.
 - Proper and expeditious equipping of the **Iraq** security elements remains a priority **as** the June 30th **handoff** approaches **and** coalition forces increasingly **look** to these elements to shoulder responsibility for internal security in **Iraq**.

ITINERARY -

Kuwait- Friday, February 6,2004

The delegation **arrived in** Kuwait and met with the command element of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) in **Camp Doha**.

The delegation received a briefing on current **CFLCC** operations with a particular emphasis on the OIF 1/2 force rotation that **has** begun. **CFLCC** is presently generating sustainment convoys involving 600-800 trucks per day to support coalition forces within Iraq. The majority of these convoys consist of commercial vehicles. However, CJTF-7 is responsible for providing force protection support for this sustainment effort through the use of military assets. The force protection challenge facing the sustainment and force rotation activities is concentrated in the urban areas of Iraq with attacks rarely occurring in the open transit areas.

One force protection initiative discussed with **CFLCC** officials is the modification of baseline HMMWVs with armor kits produced in the **US**. These kits improve the protection of the ubiquitous HMMWV by adding steel and Kevlar components to better shield troops from the dangers posed by Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and small arms fire employed by the Iraqi insurgency. These modifications are being conducted in Kuwait. **CFLCC** staff confirmed that they could perform a higher number of these modifications per month if more kits were provided from the US. The delegation was also told that a critical capability that they require is enhanced tactical surveillance that would allow the extension of visibility of convoys to threats they might face. The ~~Harrier~~ UAV system was mentioned as one option to achieve such an enhanced capability.

Iraq - February 7,2004

Combined Joint Task Force - 7 (CJTF-7)

The delegation met with the commander of the **3rd Corps**, Lieutenant General Metz and his staff. LTG Metz is responsible for tactical operations within the country.

Major General Miller, **G3** (operations) provided an overview of operations with a focus on the current force rotation. This force rotation also includes international coalition troops. Force protection equipment such as Up-Armor HMMWV, and Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) will remain in theater for the use of forces rotating into Iraq. MG Miller discussed the change in area of responsibility (AOR) for the **3rd** Brigade **2nd** Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Originally, the **3/2 SBCT** was deployed to the Sunni Triangle. CJTF-7 decided to redeploy the **3/2 SBCT** to the 101st Airborne Division AOR in Northern Iraq around Mosul. The rationale for this move is the advanced capability and mobility of the SBCT allows this brigade to replace the whole 101st Division. The delegation questioned the use of the highly survivable and

lethal Stryker **Brigade** in Northern Iraq **where** the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) is lower. The **Stryker** vehicle **has** already successfully survived two IED and two rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. The delegation suggests **an** evaluation of deploying the **SBCT** in **the** Sunni Triangle **and** utilizing units of motorized **infantry** based on thin-skinned HMMWV's in Northern Iraq. Mr. Saxton requested a geographical map showing the location and frequency of attacks on coalition forces, **infrastructure** **and** civilians.

Chairman Hunter inquired **about** the **security** status of **former** regime ammunition dumps and caches. MG Miller **reported** that **progress** had been **made** in securing and destroying **ammunition** from these sites. Considering the amount of **ammunition** stored by the former regime, destruction of these stockpiles **will** take several years. **The** delegation was told that over 600,000 tons of former-regime ammunition **has** been found at 200-300 separate sites **and** that more continues to be found. Private **sector** contractors **have** been retained to carry out a significant portion of this destruction **effort**. **A** definitive accounting for how many sites **are** the under **actual** security control of coalition forces and **how** many sites remain un-guarded was not available at the brief from **CJTF-7**. **Chairman** Hunter **requested** that **this** **information** be provided to the delegation. **The** Captured **Enemy** Ammunition (CEA) **program** will require \$800 million **in** funding which is presently pending consideration and review by the Department of Defense. Chairman Hunter inquired **as** to the availability of serviceable **AK-47** rifles **from** discovered caches **and** **was** told that not very many **were** being found and those that of **those** that were, most were unserviceable.

Brigadier General **Fast**, C2 (intelligence) provided a comprehensive overview of the **situation** in Iraq. **Human** intelligence (**HUMINT**) gathering is steadily improving **as** Iraqi's gain **confidence** in the coalition forces. **HUMINT** **as** monitored through Iraqi's walking in to military **and** police facilities with information is **up** **300%** since the capture of Saddam Hussein. The coalition forces continue to make progress in the killing **or** capture of former regime **elements**. **Gaining** **security** control of the lengthy Iraqi borders is essential to combating the small but potent **threat** **posed** by foreign fighters. BG Fast highlighted that **along** with standing **up** the Iraqi Border **Guards**, essential tools in controlling the **borders** were not available in sufficient **quantity** **at** **this** time. These tools include long **and** medium endurance **unmanned** aerial vehicles and sensors.

Iraqi Survey Group, (ISG)

The delegation met with Major General Keith **Dayton**, Director of **the** Iraqi **Survey** **Group** (ISG) **and** his staff. **MG** **Dayton** **briefed** on the **current** **status** of **the** ISG effort **and** the recent controversy over **remarks** by the **former** special advisor, Mr. David Kay.

Mr. Kay began working with the **ISG** on June 22, 2003. Originally, the mission of the **ISG** **was** very broad involving several tasks **beyond** the hunt **for** Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (**WMD**) capabilities (**war** crimes, Iraqi intelligence service, counter

terrorism). Mr. Kay was assigned to the effort to bring focus and emphasis to the WMD hunt. He saw his mission as a "sprint to December." Accordingly, the ISG shifted its focus to principally conduct the WMD hunt and kept as its only other mission to continue the search for leads as to the status of the Desert Storm Navy pilot Spicher. All other remaining missions were to be conducted only on a "non-interference" basis with the WMD mission.

By October, CENTCOM was increasingly concerned with the growing threat against US and coalition military personnel in Iraq and began to advocate that the ISG focus more attention on the counter terrorism mission. This resulted in a reshuffling of priorities that added counter terrorism to the mission list but only on a "as capacity is available" basis. On November 13, 2003, additional personnel were added to the ISG to carry out the additional counter terrorism duties. This arrangement resulted in no assets being diverted or reduced from the pre-existing WMD effort:

The delegation explored the organizational arrangement of the ISG and how Mr. Kay fit into the structure. Mr. Kay was designated as the "strategic advisor" to the ISG, however, he clearly had the mandate to focus and direct ISG assets in the search for WMD. Given that the ISG was and remains a military organization, this arrangement was used to graft a civilian into a military chain of command. MG Dayton stated there was no question in his mind that Mr. Kay came to the theater with the authority to change the mission to WMD.

MG Dayton stated that with regard to Mr. Kay's statement to Congress that the WMD search effort is 85 percent done, he "doesn't know where he got that." He and his team believe that a more accurate ballpark estimate is that they are 50 percent done. All his teams believed they were operating on a timeline to complete activities by June-July, 2004 and not the December, 2003 target used by Mr. Kay. MG Dayton stated that his technical teams have compiled a single-spaced, one and a half page long list of items that they believe require further work before completing their work. 24 million pages of documents thought to be related to the Iraqi WMD effort have yet to be translated and analyzed for useful information.

1st Armored Division

The delegation met with Brigadier General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) and staff from the 1st Armored Division. General Scaparrotti briefed members on the status of transitioning forces, which includes greater participation of the reserves (14% National Guard, 7% Reserve), an overview of the current security situation, and equipment requirements. The Division staff stated that the efforts to stand up Iraqi Civil Defense (ICDC) units was going well. The Division has been successfully conducting joint missions with ICDC personnel. All but 2 Iraqis from the ICDC units returned to their post following a recent leave period. Recruiting for the Iraqi National Police Force continues to be strong despite the continued targeted attacks.

The challenge is **training capacity**, not Iraqi interest-injoining. Presently have 9,000 police personnel and need 19,000.

The delegation discussed the **force protection** challenge **facing the** Division and **was** told that early casualties to personnel **were** largely due to **small arms fire**. However, **this** trend **changed to IEDs** leading to both fatalities and **many traumatic** injuries to soldiers. **The** Killed in Action (KIA) profile is **now mostly from IEDs and less from** direct **fire** engagements. The Division experience is that Iraqis in **their** area of **operations** do not **support** the E D activity **and don't want them to occur in their** neighborhoods. **This has led to an increase in walk-in and other tips as to the** location of **IEDs** resulting in the discovery of **55%** of IEDs before they detonate.

The 1st AD **staff** identified the Division's most critical **material needs as more** M114 up-armored HMWVs, **More** E D counter electronic measure systems, **more** tactical UAV system, explosive vapor sniffers **and** more bomb dogs.

The delegation also met with Colonel Brockman, Field Artillery Commander, **and soldiers from the Division Artillery Headquarters. The command touched** on the need to **maintain and fund** the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). Members also had the opportunity to speak **with the soldiers and discuss training and operational** tactics, **techniques and** procedures, **inspect** equipment **and** vehicles, **and tour a** recently constructed barracks.

Tab B


11-L-0559/OSD/30723

Iraq - February 8, 2004

4th Infantry Division - Task Force Ironhorse

The delegation met with Major General Odierno, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division/Task Force Ironhorse and his staff.

MG Odierno provided the delegation with an operations and intelligence update and discussed the success and challenges faced within the 4th's area of operations (AO). MG Odierno informed the delegation that all ammunition storage areas in his AO are now secure. As the slide below details, a total of 3,103 ammunition sites were found in the TF Ironhorse AO.



MG Odierno stressed the value and need to continue allowing Division and Brigade level organizations to provide funding for civic projects within their AO. The Commander Enhanced Response Program (CERP) has been very successful and should be continued. The following slide summarizes the status of CERP activity:

Division and Brigade CERP			
	Total Projects	Projects Completed	\$ Funds Expended
Education	727	482	16,401,390
Security	307	193	15,838,258
Public Works	174	105	5,266,865
Government	267	189	1,985,843
Public Health	135	85	690,863
Communications	63	37	134,025

STEADFAST AND LOYAL

As of 2 Feb 04

The delegation also discussed equipment and material **needs** of the Division. Tactical UAVs was highlighted as an area of critical need. The Division currently **only has 2** Shadow tactical UAVs and **needs 4** platoons to equip all of its **brigades**. In addition, division and battalion-level UAV capability is also **urgently** needed.

Other issues identified for the delegation were:

- **Need** to increase police training **throughput**. Jordan facility is **good**, but need to **stand up** more capability within **Iraq**.
- Equipping of Iraqi **security** forces **remains a problem**. Not being **able to properly** outfit forces is a **further** impediment in being able to **hand of day to day** security responsibilities.
- Additional Non-Governmental Organizations (**NGO**) are needed **in** Iraq to assist with the reconstruction **efforts**.
- “Debaathification” policy **can** create unintended effects if not implemented wisely **and** with flexibility. Blanket exclusion of mid-level or **Baath** party **members** that joined **solely** for economic or employment **reasons** leads to yet another contingent of **Iraqis with** no **incentive** to **support** coalition effort or **turn** to insurgent activity. **Only** the Coalition Provisional Authority (**CPA**) now **has** the authority to **issue** waivers or exemptions to the Debaathification rule and this is **leading** to a significant backlog. **Example was** given of the University of Tikrit **faculty**, all of **which** were required to **join the Baath party** as a condition of employment. When the **CPA** policy **went** into effect on October 1, all had to be fired creating a dangerous **degree** of **unrest** among the **student and faculty population**. Discretion to issue waivers **should** be extended to the **Task Force** commanders.

The delegation also **witnessed** several equipment and force protection measures demonstrations and discussed their effectiveness and shortfalls **with operational** units. The delegation **was told** that a number of soldiers **used** their own personal funds to acquire certain enhanced equipment (rifle scopes, **tac lights**, **knee pads**, **etc.**) since they

were not being readily provided **through** the Army acquisition system. **Chairman** Hunter requested a list of the Division's Rapid Fielding **Initiatives** requirements.

3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division

The delegation met with Major **General Swannack**, Commander of the 82nd Airborne **Division** and his staff.

Major **Bredenkamp**, deputy G2 (intelligence) provided a **situation** overview for the 82nd's area of responsibility (AOR). The AOR includes the major population centers along the **Euphrates** River including **Ar Ramadi** and **Fallajah**, 825 km of border with Syria and Saudi Arabia, **and** the western desert **region**. Consistent With the other AOR visited by the delegation, the 82nd has experienced a continued increase in **Iraqi walk-ins** providing information on **former** regime elements and foreign **extremists**. **This** human intelligence is essential in defeating the IED and terrorist threat, **The** G2 reported on the challenges in securing the 825 km of border. The 82nd **has** secured the **major** border crossings and conducts patrols over the balance of the border area. Providing the necessary security against foreign extremist crossing the expansive border requires addition **assets to improve** surveillance. **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles** and **sensors** are not available in sufficient supply.

Lieutenant Colonel **Farris**, G3 (operations) reviewed the **rotation** plan for the 82nd. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force will take over the AOR **LTC** **Farris** **discussed** the **securing** of the former regime ammunition dumps and **caches**. The 82nd **has** secured or cleared of all known caches in their AOR.

Shortages of basic infantry **equipment** are a concern for the commander. Essential pieces of equipment **necessary** for conducting **security** patrols and operations are not available for **the** soldiers. **Many** of these items are a **part** Army's Rapid Fielding **Initiative** and yet are not made available to **the** deployed units. **Additional** IED counter-measures equipment **is** also required.

Many patrols and missions **are now** conducted in concert with the **Iraqi** Civil Defense **Corps (ICDC)**. Such cooperative missions provide **valuable** training for the **ICDC** and help put **an Iraqi** face on security missions. The 82nd continues to recruit trainees to further **build this security** force. **Equipping** the ICDC and the **Iraqi** Police is a source of **frustration** because of the delays in purchasing vehicles, weapons **and** ballistic vests.

Civilian Affairs Operations were presented for the 82nd AOR. Economic stability is established by creating jobs. **Using** the **Commanders** Emergency Relief Program (**CERP**) funds, 12,000 **Iraqi** **will** be employed in reconstruction projects by June. Local self-governance continues to mature **as** 35 of 41 elected positions have been filled in the creation of the provincial governing council.

Germany - February 9, 2004

HIR I I I Center

The delegation visited with injured military and civilian personnel evacuated from Afghanistan and Iraq at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. The delegation heard from medical providers that the interceptor body armor vest is very effective in protecting the soldiers from blast and small arms fire. However, the protection is limited to the chest and back of soldiers, and as a result, trauma is now concentrated to the face and extremities. Col. Rhonda Cornum, Commander of the hospital *also* briefed the delegation on the status of efforts to modernize the facilities at Landstuhl. The delegation learned that, although this facility serves as the principal medical treatment and evacuation point for all US military forces in the EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs, the wards and other areas of the facility are in dire need of modernization and reconfiguration. In fact, the wards where injured soldiers are kept to recuperate have yet to be air conditioned.

DELEGATION -

Members of Congress

Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)

Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)

Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)

Rep. Ron Lewis (R-KY)

Department of Defense Officials

Mr. Pete Geren, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Committee Staff

Robert Rangel, Staff Director

Bob Simmons, Professional Staff

Debra Wada, Professional Staff

U.S. Marine Corps Escorts

Col. Mike Shupp

LTC Rich Simcock

Gunnery Sergeant Lorenzo Chance

5/17
11/20

72

March 2, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Operational Industrial Centers

Please dig up some information on "Operational Industrial Centers." They were started by Leon Sullivan, and he has them around the world. I believe Philadelphia is the headquarters.

If we call in, they will send us some material and information on it. I would like to see if they might be appropriate for Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030204-2

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

3/28

TO:
Mr. DuBois

Ray Dubois -
Are you doing
this?
Scott B. White

Mar-04
10-04

Larry Di Rita

3/29

Larry Di Rita
3/29

RFD to respond to
SF + just to *MEM*
11-L-0559/OSD/30729

06000-04
A-04-753

080

4/27
1030

573



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

2004 APR 23 12:42

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration & Management

4/22/04

080

SUBJECT: Opportunities Industrialization Centers

In the attached snowflake, dated March 2, 2004, you requested information on Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC), with regard to their suitability for Afghanistan. Initial internet research and subsequent correspondence with the President/CEO of OIC International yielded the following information.

- OIC International is an international aid organization providing general International Development programs, ranging from vocational training to food security to microfinance. The organization's objective is "to improve lives in developing countries through training and sustainable organizational development." Specifically, they focus on vocational and technical-skills training; agriculture and rural development; and business and entrepreneurial development. A more detailed information summary of their global program operations is provided at Tab A.
- Regarding your question about their appropriateness for Afghanistan: in addition to their general vocational training and business development programs, they provide Post-war Rehabilitation Services (Liberia, Sierra Leone), Health and Nutrition Education, and they emphasize *Empowerment of Women*—all of which indicates some suitability toward Afghanistan. However, from a cultural-regional perspective, they seem oriented primarily around Africa (although they have centers in the Philippines, Poland and the Caribbean). They have no current plans for establishing centers in Afghanistan.

22 APR 04

Ron Howard, President/CEO of OIC International has sent an information packet with a capability statement, program reports, a study summary and additional organizational information (Tab B). He is willing to discuss potential opportunities with the Department. Accordingly, I will work with Marty Hoffmann to arrange a meeting with Ron Howard.

4/30
Ray
Ok - Permits
- forwarded into
to SecDef
LARRY
573

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Kimball Brown (b)(6)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/22/04
SR MA CRADDOCK	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	4/26

Pattern 5/4
Back to AGM

OSD 06000-04

2 MAR 04

Information Summary
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International

- **History.** As noted in your snowflake, Leon H. Sullivan created Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) to empower African American youth through training and job placement. Patterned after these stateside centers, the first overseas centers were established in Africa in the 1970s. As a thriving Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), *OIC International* now has over **40** affiliate programs in 18 countries, and they remain one of several organizations supported by the Leon H. Sullivan Foundation.
- **Local Institution Building.** The goal of Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) International is not simply to accomplish “projects,” but to build local *institutions* that will continue after they are established. They do this by establishing affiliated centers as individual legal NGOs within the host country. The centers are staffed, managed and controlled by host-country nationals, and function at the request of their communities. They continue to receive support and guidance from the OIC International parent organization, but by being localized, they are better able to focus their efforts on the specific needs of their communities. The local NGO status also facilitates their ability to interact better with their local and national governments than an imported NGO might.
- **Business Development Emphasis.** At their beginnings in Africa in the 1970s, the organization emphasized vocational/skills training and job placement. Because of the decline of viable private sectors within many developing countries over the years, however, the emphasis has shifted to vocational/skills training coupled with entrepreneurial and business skills development. This model seeks to achieve truly sustainable development.
- **Funding/Partnerships.** OIC International-at-large was initially funded primarily by a grant from USAID, but due to grant policy changes, they no longer receive this umbrella support. Now, their individual centers receive USAID grants on a country-by-country or program-by-program basis. Individual Centers also engage in income-generating activities and solicit funding through local channels, as well as internationally. Additionally, OIC International has collaborated with other international aid organizations and charities to share costs and accomplish common development goals. Such organizations include the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, Catholic Relief Services, Africare and Latter Day Saints Charities.



**INFORMATION
PACKET**

11-L-0559/OSD/30732

**OPPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS INTERNATIONAL
CAPABILITY STATEMENT**

OIC INTERNATIONAL
240 WEST TULPEHOCKEN STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19144
(215) 842 0860 Telephone
(b)(6)
website: www.oicinternational.org
email: oici@oicinternational.org

11-L-0559/OSD/30733



CAMEROON OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

IMPROVING THE LIVES AND LIVELIHOOD OF YOUNG CAMEROONIANS
THROUGH SKILLS TRAINING AND JOB PLACEMENT **OF** JOB CREATION

Program Director:
Bernard Mwanbo

P.O. Box 57, Buea,
Southwest Province
Republic of Cameroon

Tel.: (237)32-25-86

Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail:
coic@cyberkokk.net

Courses Offered:

Carpentry

Masonry

Motor Mechanics

Hotel Catering

Management/
business development

Program Description

Cameroon OIC (COIC) was established in the town of Buea in the south-west Province of Cameroon as a vocational **and** entrepreneurship training center. Today, **COIC** is a well run organization that is doing an excellent job of training young men and women with a combination of entry level technical **skills** and the **positive** personal character attributes necessary to be employed by businesses or be self-employed. **COIC** also runs a **strong** Management and Business Development unit that **has** distinguished itself by providing short-term workshops in various



cities and towns for local established business persons **and** others considering opening businesses. These practical seminars have been well attended and well received.



Accomplishments

Since its start in October 1986, Cameroon OIC has graduated more than 1,764 technical skills trainees of which 1268 were males and 496 were females. Despite severe economic pressures, job placement rates for program graduates have ranged between 51% and 75%. In

addition, an estimated minimum of 10% of program graduates have created their own jobs through self-employment. Even further, more than 2,230 small business persons have been trained through Cameroon OIC small business outreach workshops **and** programs.

Future Goals

- Construction of additional classrooms
- Development of a computer training course
- Development of an electronic appliance maintenance course
- Construction of an extension onto the COIC owned Pavilion Hotel

Training Centers

- Buea



History

OIC International's first thrust into Central Africa occurred in FY 1986 with the birth of the Cameroon **OIC** project. Buea, a city in Cameroon's Southwest Province, is the site of *this* vocational skills/management/business development training institution which was initially funded **through** a grant from the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) **and** the Government of the Republic of Cameroon.

The center is designed to provide technical skills training in the areas of carpentry, masonry, motor mechanics, hotel catering, and management/business development. Training offered at the center is geared to **both** the **basic** and advanced skill levels. The **beneficiaries** of the Cameroon OIC program has been focused on young unemployed school drop-outs, and artisans in need of upgraded skills training. The selection of these target groups reflect the national desire to address the problems of youth unemployment and the emerging skilled labor needs of the region.

Pavilion Hotel

Cameroon OIC currently operates the Pavilion Hotel in Buea. The hotel was built specifically for COIC in September of 1992 in order to provide hands-on training for the hotel catering students. The Pavilion hotel currently has 10 rooms; however, an upcoming expansion project (funded by Bread for the World) will raise the capacity of the hotel to over 20 rooms.



O P P O R T U N I T I E S I N D U S T R I A L I Z A T I O N C E N T E R S C E N T R A L A F R I C A N R E P U B L I C

CONTRIBUTING TOWARD IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF RURAL YOUTH OF BOTH SEXES, AGES 17 TO 28, WHO ARE OUT OF SCHOOL AND UNEMPLOYED, WITHOUT REGARD TO RACE, RELIGION, OR NATIONALITY, AND ALSO CONTRIBUTING TOWARD CURBING THE EXODUS FROM RURAL AREAS, THROUGH A TRAINING PROGRAM IN PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR SMA AND MEDIUM AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES.

Board Chair:
Jean du Dieu Dessardé

Executive Director:
Victor Bissekoin

OIC Centre Afrique
B.P. 134
Lakouanga, Bangui
Central African
Republic

Tel. 236-61-29-32
Fax (b)(6)

Courses Offered:

- Agro-forestry
- Animal Husbandry
- Cereal production
- Market gardening
- Farm management
- Fish farming
- Rural construction
- Product marketing
- Masonry
- Carpentry
- Metal-working
- Information technology
- Small business devt

Future Goals :

To introduce:

- Nutritional monitoring of children ages 0 to 5
- Catering
- Environmental protection
- Coffee and rice production
- Household economy and savings
- AIDS Prevention

Program Description

OIC-Centrafricque consists of the national executive office in Bangui and satellite training centers in Mbaïki, Berengo, and Sibut. Current objectives of OIC-CA at the national level are:

- ◆ To assist the Government in its plans for training administrators;
- ◆ To stimulate cooperation between OIC-CA and local industries and businesses as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies; and
- ◆ To contribute to transporting to rural milieux appropriate technologies aimed at protecting the environment and reducing poverty.



Accomplishments

- OIC-Mbaïki has trained more than 500 youths, with 415 now employed in agriculture, animal husbandry, artisanal crafts, commerce, and fashion design and the others employed in private companies.
- OIC-CA extension units have trained 285 farmers, offered farm extension services to 420 men and women in neighboring villages, and organized seminars including 180 participants from Village Development Associations, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
- The training provided at the Bérengo Center so impressed the Government of the CAR that three Ministers participated in the graduation ceremonies of the first class to graduate: the Ministers of Agriculture and Animal-Raising, of Youth, and of the Promotion of Women.
- OIC-CA has received funding support from a wide variety of government agencies and international donor organizations, including among others the UN Development Program, IFESH, the USAID, the Government of the Central African Republic, and the African Development Bank.

History

The first OIC local program in the CAR was established in Sibut in 1987 through an agreement between OIC International and the Government of the Central African Republic (RCA). In 1990 OIC-CA and OICI signed an affiliation agreement, with the national office located in Bangui, and in December 1991 the local OIC training center in Mbaïki was established with financial support from the African Development Fund (FAD) and the Government of the RCA for a Center of Training and Placement for Rural Youth. In 1992 work was begun to convert the Bérengo Complex into a training center, and in 1993 the Bérengo Center conducted its first training activities under the direction of Mr. Henry Taylor-Cline.

The communities of Bouar and Bambari hoped to see OIC centers constructed in their large cities, but politico-military turmoil in the RCA in 1996 and 1997 prevented establishing centers in these locations. These two cities may well serve as future sites of OIC training centers, with encouragement and support from OIC-Mbaïki and the Bérengo Center.

OIC Centre Afrique



Training Sites

- Bangui
- Mbaïki
- Sibut
- Berengo



OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS COTE D'IVOIRE

INSTITUTIONALIZING A NON-FORMAL SKILLS TRAINING AND RESETTLEMENT/
JOB CREATION PROGRAM FOR UNEMPLOYED YOUTH, MICROENTREPRENEURS,
AND MARGINAL FARMERS

Board Chair:
Armand Yao

Executive Director:
N'Doua Affket

OIC Cote d'Ivoire
20 B.P. 1523
11 Rue des Pecheurs
Abidjan 20
Cote d'Ivoire
West Africa

Tel. 225-21-26-74-87
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oic-ci@africainline.co.ci

Courses Offered:

- Crop production
- Animal husbandry
- Business training
- Computer training
- Credit services
- Health education
- Literacy training

**TRAINING
SITES**

- Abidjan
- Bouake



Program Description

Both agriculture and business training programs are offered, and a new computer program is thriving. OIC-CI offers training for youth, particularly school drop-outs between the ages of 17 to 35 and low-income adults. The Agro-Pastoral training component provides young men and women with skills to engage in farming, therefore reducing urban migration. The Outreach Programs for adult farmers are short term training programs to reach hundreds of people in their



village through agriculture extension and health education services. The Small Enterprise Development component is aimed at providing men and women with entrepreneurship and business development skills to improve their business practices and provide them with access to credit that would enable them to start businesses.

Accomplishments

- Since 1986, OIC-CI has trained roughly 5,000 clients
- 80% of clients have either been resettled or now have jobs

In anticipation of the USAID grant ending, OIC-CI initiated a series of income generating activities aimed at reducing down or dependency and improving their prospects for achieving sustainability. Two of the most successful activities at the centers were fee-for-service training seminars and production of goods for sale. Both the private sector and the government were targets of OIC-CI's business development initiatives. One of the successful contracts completed by OIC-CI was a government contract. OIC-CI also provided literacy training services to government workers for a fee.



History

Based on requests for assistance from members of the community in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, OICI initiated an indigenous NGO that was awarded legal recognition in 1986 by the government. The OIC Cote d'Ivoire program began operation in Bouake and Angouayakro. It is managed by a local Board of Directors and staff. A grant from USAID enabled OICI to provide technical assistance services in organizational development and in technical training.

Technology

In 1996, OIC-CI initiated a computer training center in Abidjan with four computers with funding from the International Foundation of Self-Help. Today, it has 9 computers and is managed by nine full-time staff members. The centers services are marketed towards clients who own medium and large scale businesses and people interested in upgrading their skills, such as secretaries, unemployed youth who are hoping to break into the job market and other. The two month intensive program provides an overview of computers and specific training in the use of Windows and DOS applications. Training fees of 75,000 CFA franc or an equivalent of US \$136 is charged per client.

Future Goals

OIC-CI is exploring ways to achieve financial sustainability while continuing to fulfill its mission of helping the poor and the disadvantaged. It plans to increase the number of clients served to approximately 1,500 a year, while diversifying its funding sources. To date, OIC-CI has mobilized over a billion CFA franc from sources such as BNDA, BIAO, BICICI, COOPEC, CREP, the government of Cote d'Ivoire, foundations, and income generation activities. Future financing strategies include increasing local income generation while reducing resources from the government and donors.



OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS **ETHIOPIA**

PROVIDING HIGH QUALITY JOB TRAINING SERVICES TO THE
UNEMPLOYED YOUTH OF ETHIOPIA

Board Chair:
Fitawrari Amede
Lemma

Executive Director:
Ato Melesse Yalew

OIC Ethiopia
P.O. Box 2486
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia

Tel. 251-1-50-78-47
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
S_makonnen@hotmail.

Courses Offered:

Carpentry

Electrical wiring

Building masonry

Plumbing

Computer training

Tailoring

Agricultural skills

Carpentry skills

Program Description

OIC Ethiopia is a nationally recognized local NGO registered by the Ministry of Justice and under the umbrella of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of Ethiopia. Its Board of Directors consists of community leaders, private sector representatives (including the Chamber of Commerce of Addis Ababa) and representatives from line Ministries such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, and the Addis Ababa City Administration. OIC Ethiopia is an indigenous community based informal skills training and employment organization, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. OIC Ethiopia operates two centers, one in Addis Ababa for unemployed ur-



ban youth and the second one in the town of Dimma, the Gambella Region of Ethiopia for Sudanese Refugees in collaboration with the UNHCR and the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs office. OIC Ethiopia receives sponsorship from organizations such as the Oromia Regional Government of Ethiopia, various international NGOs such as CONCERN, Red Barna, Plan International, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and others.

History


OIC Ethiopia was established in 1973 with the initiative of concerned Ethiopian community leaders who now administer it in their capacity as Board of Directors of the Program. OIC Ethiopia is thus an indigenous Ethiopian NGO, which has been serving the unemployed youth of the Addis Ababa community for almost 30 years. OIC Ethiopia was started with funding solicited from USAID and with direct technical assistance from OIC International. Despite some early funding hardships, OIC Ethiopia has continued to offer its services and has grown through the years attracting support from local and other European development assistance organizations. Since its inception, OIC Ethiopia has been training an average of 150 unemployed youth yearly.

Future Goals

OIC Ethiopia plans to offer high quality, affordable training in new courses such as auto-mechanics, metal work, electronics, catering and business skills development.

Accomplishments

Since its establishment, OIC Ethiopia has trained over 4000 youth (25% young women) in building trades at its center in Addis Ababa and over 700 Sudanese refugees (51% of them women and young women). In addition, OIC Ethiopia has trained over 500 youth (7% of them young women) in short-term training programs. Because of its track record, flexibility and cost effectiveness, OIC Ethiopia has been selected by the Prime Minister's office of Ethiopia to organize and conduct informal skills training programs for four peripheral regional states of the country, namely Affar, Somalia, Gambella and Beni Shangul-Gumuz. One cycle of training has been successfully conducted for three of the four peripheral regions. Preparations are underway for the fourth region and second round of training has been requested by the other three regional states.





OPPORTUNITIES
INDUSTRIALIZATION
CENTERS
GHANA

PROVIDING JOB TRAINING AND PLACEMENT ASSISTANCE TO
YOUNG UNDEREMPLOYED YOUTH

Board Chair:
J.E.K. Moses

Executive Director:
KA. Keelson

OIG Accra Training
Center
P.O. Box AN 6241
Accra-North, Ghana
West Africa

Tel. 224-40-49-89

Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oig-ho@africaonline.gh

Courses Offered:

- Computer training
- Agricultural production
- Agricultural marketing
- Food processing
- Motor mechanics
- Carpentry
- Office skills
- Electronics
- Ceramics
- Textile design
- Auto-body repair
- Masonry
- Business-skills
- Plumbing
- Catering
- Graphic arts

Program Description

Established in 1971, OIG Ghana (OICG) provides training in vocational skills, creates employment opportunities, and offers counseling job-placement, and follow-up services to disadvantaged, unskilled, and un-employed Ghanaian youth. Over the past 30 years, OICG has grown into a solid organization with a strong and dedicated Board of Directors, a capable staff, and well-institutionalized structures. Now operating at four program sites



throughout Ghana, OICG has actively demonstrated its commitment to sustainability by seeking greater involvement from individuals and communities in decisions that affect their well-being.



Accomplishments

- Since its inception, OICG has trained over 9,400 disadvantaged men and women.
- Each year, OIG Ghana trains over 1,500 youths.
- Computer training is now offered at three of the OICG Centers

History

Established in 1971, OICG provides young men and women with personalized training in eleven skill areas at four training centers around the country. Since its inception, the organization has trained over 10,000 disadvantaged youth.

OICG fosters democratic participation at the grassroots level, and its beneficiaries are exposed to and trained in democratic governance. It is a community-based program imbued in the principle of "self-help" which empowers poor people to solve their own problems rather than depend upon government. In 1996 the Government of Ghana granted OICG the National Good Corporate Citizen Award, to recognize the organization's "immense contributions to the country's socio-economic development."

The first OICG center opened its doors in Accra in 1971 to offer skills training and job-placement services to disadvantaged Ghanaian youth. The OICG Head Office was created in 1977 to co-ordinate the activities of the three local OICG programs then existing in Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi/Takoradi. The newest OICG center opened in 1999 in Tamale and features agricultural, micro-enterprise, and water and sanitation programming to advance food security in the region.

Future Goals

- To assist the trainees in acquiring entrepreneurship skills
- To enable the trainees to establish their own businesses

Special Project

The Poverty Alleviation Initiative Program targets groups in Kumasi, Tamale, and Sekondi-Takoradi and seeks to reduce rural poverty in Ghana by increasing household incomes within rural communities. The program seeks to:

- Improve farm productivity and marketing,
- Improve farm income and rural employment,
- Improve access to microcredit resources
- Strengthen Ghana OIG staff capacity and organizational sustainability.

Training Sites

- Accra
- Tamale
- Kumasi
- Sekondi-Takoradi





OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS GUINEA

SUPPORTING THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED BY INCLUDING THEM IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF THEIR COUNTRY THROUGH STRATEGIES OF **NON-FORMAL** TRAINING AND SELF-HELP

Chairman:
Sekou M. Sylla

Executive Director:
Lamine Barry

OIC Guinea
Dixson Port
BP 719 Conakry
Republic of Guinea

Tel. 224-40-49-89
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
oic@gui@mirinet.net.gn

Courses Offered:

- Traditional fishing
- Reforestation/nursery
- Seed banks
- Grain silos
- Vegetable gardening
- Natural Resource Mngmt
- Secretarial skills
- Carpentry skills
- Masonry
- Metal forging
- Tile-setting
- Industrial painting
- Restaurant management
- Textile weaving & dyeing
- Soap-making
- Health education
- Business/financial debt
- Micro-/community credit

Program Description

OIC Guinea has operated since 1986 as an independent non-governmental organization in Guinea, created under the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization. Whereas many development projects come and go, OIC Guinea has maintained sufficient local and international partnerships to continue to serve the impoverished sectors of the population today. OIC Guinea maintains a steering committee in Mamou and a board of directors in Conakry to oversee and provide leadership to the diverse array of development activities within OIC Guinea. These volunteer members, who receive



no monetary support from OIC Guinea or OIC International, serve and guide the project managers, providing a basis for the long-term sustainability of OIC Guinea. Programs offered at OIC Guinea include a Professional Training School in Conakry, an Agriculture Development and Natural Resource Management project, the Garafiri Resettlement Project, and "Project Equity" which aims to construct and furnish 5 primary schools in Fria and Gaoual.

History

OIC Guinea was created in 1986 to provide skills training in carpentry, masonry, and secretarial sciences. OIC Guinea has received financial support from OIC International, the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, the United Nations, the Canadian Development Office, and the Canadian Government. OIC Guinea's Small Business Enterprise program, established in 1990 with financing from USAID, has organized seminars throughout Guinea in business management, cooperative organization, textiles weaving and dyeing, soapmaking, and restaurant management. Throughout the country, OIC Guinea has taught literacy courses — usually translated into local languages — and courses on organizing women's collectives, credit and time management, industrial painting, and tile setting.

Accomplishments

- 837 trainees graduated from OIC Guinea and Professional Training Center in Conakry since 1986, with 85% obtaining gainful employment after graduation.
- 500 women entrepreneurs initially trained through Small Business Enterprise program, extended to an additional 2,000 beneficiaries through supplemental project funding.
- 749 women recipients received loans totaling \$40,000 in FY 1999 through Credit with Education program activities, benefiting 33 women's associations in 5 project zones. Credit repayment rates averaged 97%.

Training Sites

- Conakry: National Office & OIC Guinea Training Center
- Mamou & Tolo: Agriculture Training Project
- Mamou: Credit with Education
- Garafiri: Resettlement Project
- Fria & Gaoual: Project Equity school construction projects

PAVE Project

The PAVE (Profitable Agriculture Village Extension) project began in 1996. Since its inception the PAVE program has achieved many accomplishments, including the following:

- Creation of a local community structure composed of local education, health, business, and agriculture leaders, plus recruitment of 70 full-time staff
- Construction of a livestock production farm with a 14,000-chicken capacity
- Creation of an agriculture credit section for distributing tools and improving seed varieties
- Promoting environmentally sound practices through the specific efforts of project extension agents



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E-mail: oicinternational@oici.org

Website: www.oicinternational.org

11-L-0559/OSD/30739



THE GAMBIA

OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

PROVIDING GAMBIANS WITH THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS
AND TOOLS TO INCREASE FOOD PRODUCTION AND INCOME

Board Chair:
Adeidiade Sosséh-Gaye

Executive Director:
Kalifa A.M. Kambi

Ministry of Agriculture
Banjul
The Gambia, W. Africa

Tel. 220-464-558

Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Ruralfin1@gamtel.gm

Courses Offered:

Sewing

Crop production

Animal husbandry

Resettlement services

Handicraft skills

Agricultural marketing

NGO capacity building

Future Goals

The Gambia OIC plans to create two new centers in the Central River Region and the Lower River Region. Both of these programs will imitate the training already offered at the Farafenni center so that more Gambians will attain food security.



Program Description

The GOIC program offers a variety of courses ranging from vegetable gardening to cash crops and from animal husbandry to rural development.

Most of the clients are rural youth who have left the formal track of education. Graduates tend to be self-employed as farmers.

In order to increase food security, GOIC is maintaining the following objectives:

- Increase agricultural production by training young adult farmers modern, appropriate



and environmentally-sound agricultural techniques

- Provide training in agro-processing and value adding to farmers and provide credit for purchase of necessary equipment
- Strengthen and expand OIC Gambia's training and production units in order to reach more farmers and generate more income for sustainability



Accomplishments

Since its reactivation in 1987, up until 2000, the on-campus young farmer training program, at the Chamen Self Development and Training Center, has trained over 200 men and 100 women. Of those, 115 men and 45 women have settled.

From 1991-99, the Outreach Women Training project trained a total of 400 women in 10 different villages. [in the following villages: Maka-Farafenni (40), 1991-99; Tankento (40); Chamen (20); Jerekaw-wolof (70); Jerekaw-fulla (30); India (60); Jarjarr (30); Kubandarr (60); Dutabullu (30); Wallaland (20) -- 400 total]

History

Established in 1977, The Gambia OIC seeks to provide Gambians with the necessary knowledge to attain food security. GOIC is the only center in the country that provides agricultural training and resettlement, and handicraft skills training for women and youth. GOIC operates with support from the Gambia Government through the Department of State for Agriculture (DOSA), and therefore works very closely with all the departments under DOSA's authority. The Department of Agriculture recognizes the center's important role in farmer training and collaborates closely with GOIC. The National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) also works extensively with GOIC and is currently conducting trials at the Farafenni center.



TRAINING SITES

- Farafenni

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11-L-0559/OSD/30740



LESOTHO OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

CONTRIBUTING IMMENSELY TO THE HUMAN RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF LESOTHO THROUGH SKILLS TRAINING FOR YOUTH

Board Chair:
Ms. S.M. Seelso

Executive Director:
Petrose Lesela

Lesotho OIC
P.O. Box 2542
Maseru, 102
Kingdom of Lesotho
Southern Africa

Tel. 266-31-31-19

Fa (b)(6)

E-mail:
Cook@lesoff.co.za

Courses Offered:

Bricklaying

Feeder

Carpentry

Plumbing

Metal work

Foreman training

Management

Business development

Microenterprise
development


TRAINING SITES

- Maseru



Program Description

Lesotho Opportunities Industrialization Centers (LOIC) is a significant contributor to human resource development for the small, Southern African mountain kingdom of Lesotho. Since its inception as an active skill development center in 1978, LOIC has developed the technical, vocational, and business management skills of well over 4,000 young Basotho. In an age where the southern African regions and economies suffer from slow economic growth and high unemploy-



ment, LOIC graduates still enjoy a job placement rate of at least 85%. LOIC graduates place particularly well in the Ministry of Works of the Lesotho Government and with private sector construction contractors. Some 20 graduates have started and continue to sustain viable small businesses.



Accomplishments

LOIC counts among its accomplishments the following:

- Fundraising and program support from a diverse set of donors.
- Over 4,000 young trainees to date,
- 85% job-placement rate for trainees soon after graduation.
- Over 20 trainees who started and continue to operate viable small businesses.
- Expansion of LOIC to double its capacity for the intake of trainees; currently with 150 trainees enrolled in courses of brick laying, plumbing, carpentry, sheet metal work, and welding. 117 of the 150 are enrolled in ETMD courses.
- 24 total staff, including 7 technical instructors, 3 feeder instructors, 3 ETMD instructors, 1 counselor, and 1 job developer.

- Increase networking with such organizations as the Lesotho Council of NGOs, Africa Skillshare, and the Technical and Vocational Division of the Ministry of Education.

History

In 1975, a group of concerned individuals from the Kingdom of Lesotho requested OICI assistance in establishing a vocational training institution in Maseru to serve the needs of disadvantaged school dropouts. In 1977, the Lesotho OIC was established with assistance from OICI and USAID. Lesotho OIC is still operational and serves a vital need of the community. Lesotho OIC offers training in carpentry, masonry, metal work, plumbing, small business development and foreman's skills. Individuals who graduate are assisted in finding jobs or in creating new jobs. OICI's direct assistance to Lesotho OIC ended in 1985. Lesotho OIC exists today as an independent affiliate of OICI but continues to participate in OICI conferences and seminars. The Lesotho Program is run and managed by a local board of directors and receives support from the Lesotho government, the UN and from contracts.

Future Goals

- Construction and use of a training center in Semonkong. This center, whose construction is being funded by the government, will accommodate 60 skills trainees at any one time in such low-cost areas as brick-laying and welding. It is planned that during the parts of the years the center is not being used for training, it will accommodate up to 20 residents such as tourists.
- Create income generation programs to create revenue for LOIC. Areas under consideration include poultry raising, swine, dairy cows and fruit trees.



LIBERIA

OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

ASSISTING WITH LIBERIA'S POST-WAR RECOVERY, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HUMAN CAPACITY BUILDING, SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY AND REHABILITATION OF WAR-AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS.

Rev. Walter D. Richards,
Chairman, LOIC Board
of Directors

Edmund C. Dillon
National Executive Dir.

Liberia OIC
P.O. Box 3596
Monrovia,
Liberia
West Africa

Tel. (231)-226337

Courses Offered:

Agriculture

Animal Husbandry

Metalwork

Functional Crafts

Plumbing

Tailoring

Electricity

Masonry

Carpentry

Small Enterprise Devt

Elaking

Shoemaking/Repair

Building Construction

Life Skills

Counseling Services

Program Description

The goals of the LOIC Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program are to resettle war-affected individuals and to rebuild rural societies and economies. Liberia OIC serves four war-affected groups: returning refugees, former combatants, internally displaced and severely affected local citizens. Due to the horrific events experienced by the Liberian people during prolonged civil conflict, LOIC offers trauma



counseling in addition to vocational of 17 to 35. Vocational skills training focuses on agriculture, building trades such as masonry and carpentry, and other skills needed to rebuild Liberia's war-torn infrastructure and to create productive rural communities.

Accomplishments

- 3 Enabled 7,000 LOIC graduates to become employed or self-employed
- ◇ Assisted 3,000 families with resettlement in rural areas.
- ◇ Built 12 centers throughout Liberia providing practical skills training and job development services to unskilled and disadvantaged Liberians.
- ◇ Provided counseling and training services throughout the entire Liberia Civil Conflict.
- ◇ Pioneered war trauma counseling in Liberia.




History

LOIC began training high school dropouts in marketable skills in 1977. During a 1990 civil conflict; program facilities in Monrovia and Foya were looted and destroyed, forcing these programs to close. In Foya, LOIC staff were displaced and the center lay dormant for several years. But LOIC's commitment to its communities, coupled with assistance from donors, enabled the center to successfully recover, even during sporadic fighting. In 1995, LOIC rebuilt and reopened its centers as the LOIC Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program, a transitional assistance service focusing on rehabilitation and resettlement of victims of war. Between 1994 and 1999 LOIC established six satellite-training programs.

Goals for 2003

- 0 Become a leader in addressing the psychological and emotional problems of war-affected youths through appropriate counseling, healing and stress reduction activities.
- 0 Train 10,000 Liberians in agricultural and rural development skills.
- 0 Cultivate 25,000 acres of rice on farms established by LOIC graduates.
- 0 Generate 50% of operating costs through social enterprises and cost recovery initiatives designed to ensure program sustainability.

Liberia OIG



Training Locations

- Monrovia
- Buchanan
- Gbarnga
- Ganta
- Foya
- Sinje
- Harbel
- Voinjama
- Zwedru
- Cape Palmas

Program Services

- Trauma counseling for clients
- Trauma counseling seminars for teachers and social workers
- Training in basic skills useful in rural communities
- Resettlement materials (tools and farm inputs) for graduates
- Guidance counseling and farm planning assistance

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11-L-0559/OSD/30742



OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS PHILIPPINES

PROVIDING TRAINING TO THOSE WHO NEED IT, WANT IT, AND CAN PROFIT BY IT
THROUGH LEADERSHIP, LIVELIHOOD SKILLS, MICRO-ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT,
AND CONTINUING EDUCATION.

Board Chair:

Dr. Melquiades F. Pugno

Executive Director:

Mr. Nemesio C. Daitao

OIC Philippines, Inc.
12-U.S. Lopez, Jeana St.
Lapaz, Iloilo City
Philippines 5000

Tel. 63-320-65-62

Fax (b)(6)

Email:

Oicphils@iloilo.net

Courses Offered:

Small-scale, income
generating activities

Community projects
management

Micro-enterprise devt.

Future Goals :

To replicate the experience of OIC Philippines in neighboring provinces so that many more low income Filipinos will benefit from the same self-help philosophy and similar human resource development services.

Training Locations:

- Cabatuan

OIC Philippines



P Description

OIC Philippines is a self-help initiative established in the U.S. and African countries. OIC Philippines evolved from a small interest group to a highly visible and successful local NGO with wide acceptance and support from the community. The leadership and day-to-day operations of this program have been totally in the hands of local Filipino community leaders since inception. Program highlights include:

- **OIC Philippines-People's Empowerment in Action for Community Enhancement.** This is a community-based training program focused on institutional development for local empowerment, leadership, and job development.



- **OIC Philippines-Credit/Loan with Education Development.** This is a small business funding assistance program to further community and economic development in the country. It assists microenterprises by providing working capital to existing small businesses and entrepreneurs.
- **OICP-Training Skills and Micro-Enterprise Development Center;** This center provides training in development projects leadership, management and livelihood skills initiatives to selected officers/representatives from OIC Philippines, the Government, and private agencies.

Accomplishments

- Established Consumers' Cooperative that operates with both paid and voluntary services, with assets now worth several times the initial amount.
- Microloan program has already served over 300 clients and is gaining in popularity, financing a variety of economic activities such as stuffed-toymaking, bamboo craft, garment-making, bakery, vegetable gardening, and swine fattening.
- OIC Philippines has succeeded in helping people to improve their economic conditions. It provides training opportunities for them to learn or strengthen their livelihood skills, credit access to improve business performance, and leadership training to enhance the capacity of community leaders.



History

OIC Philippines formally came into being in 1991 through its registration as a Philippine NGO with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippine Government. It was the first and currently the only OIC in Asia and the Pacific region.

The program's history dates back to 1989 when a group of Filipino-Americans (Partners for Philippine Progress or PPP) in South Jersey, USA, wanted to establish an OIC-type skills training program in Iloilo. Several PPP members were natives of Iloilo. They contacted OICI and discussed how to import the OIC model into their country. The collaboration between PPP and OICI resulted in the development of an OIC Philippines Interest Group in Iloilo, supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Philippines, and the Provincial Government of Iloilo and the Municipal Government of Cabatuan for a local OIC program initiative.

Since 1989, PPP occasionally raised funds in the U.S. in support of OIC Philippines. Some members of PPP also visited OIC Philippines during their home visits. OICI conducted a feasibility study in addition to a follow-up visit. Through OICI intervention, the Chase Manhattan Foundation has contributed a cumulative total of over US \$25,000 to assist the program, the latest donation consisted of US \$12,000 earlier this year (1999). About 1,500 women and men from hundreds of families in Cabatuan and neighborhood have already benefited from the services of OICP.

OIC International Headquarters • 240 West Tnlpehocken Street • Philadelphia, PA 19144 • Tel. (215) 842-0220

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11-L-0559/OSD/30743



OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS NIGER

PROVIDING FOOD SECURITY THROUGH TRAINING AND CREDIT
ACCESS

Board Chair:
M. Djibo Garba

Program Director:
Mr. Assoumane
Karanta

OIC Niger
B.P. 12671
Niamey, Niger

Tel. 227-73-39-56
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
magha@intnet.net

Courses Offered:

Small-scale, income
generating activities

Business Training

Micro-enterprise devt.

Program Description

OIC-Niger has put a high performance economy in motion and promoted plurality at the heart of Niger's society. OIC-Niger also has encouraged regional participation in developing countries. OIC-Niger attacks the causes of poverty, reinforces the ability of people to help themselves, and fights poverty with new strategies that build the capacity of the poor.



History

In March 1997 OIC International conducted a feasibility study to determine the viability of an OIC affiliate in Niger. The study showed a high demand for training and for credit among low-income women. Partnerships were formed with Africare and CARE. OICI obtained a grant from the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) on October 1, 1998 to improve food security for low-income Niger women through job creation and improved income, business training, and credit access. Programming began in March 1999.

Success Story

The micro-credit loan funds Madame Zara Hamidou received have met her needs and expectations. The funds have led to some significant developments for her business. Mme Zara now has three modern sewing machines, including one very advanced model used for embroidery. Before encountering OIC-Niger, she was unable to approach commercial banks for a loan. Now, her association has its own bank account. Her workshop is now prospering as she continues to see her clientele grow. With her steady income, she is now able to pay her children's school enrollment and medical fees.

Future Goals

- As a priority, we hope to improve our performance in the office and in the field. We need to develop resources to acquire some capital equipment – a small computer, a safe, motorcycles, etc. – to help ensure our future expansion.
- We also hope to make credit funds consistently enough available to cover the needs of the groups affiliated with OIC-Niger and to begin making commercial transactions.
- OIC-Niger has provisional plans to commercialize agricultural products and to begin offering services in management, building partnerships, governance, audits and project evaluation, and conference organizing.

Accomplishments

- With help from IFESH, OIC-Niger ran a credit-lending agricultural program in Beylandé for 26 women entrepreneurs in agri-business.
- An additional IFESH grant allowed OIC-Niger to track 360 women entrepreneurs and their use of credit for 14 months. This project also permitted the development and expansion of the businesses belonging to this group of beneficiaries. The grant from IFESH also strengthened OIC-Niger's capacity and visibility.
- The Women's Entrepreneurship and Income Generation Development Project is in full swing! In its first year, the project enabled 253 women to benefit from training.
- OIC-Niger has developed positive relations with other NGOs: Lutheran World Relief, ONDPH, Catholic Relief Services, and Africare.



Training Sites
• Niamey

OIC International Headquarters • 240 West Tulpehocken Street • Philadelphia, PA 19144 • Tel. (215) 842-0220
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11-L-0559/OSD/30744



NIGERIA OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

IMPROVING LIVES BY TEACHING APPROPRIATE AND MARKETABLE SKILLS THAT ENABLE
DISADVANTAGED YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN TO BECOME SELF-RELIANT, ECONOMICALLY
PRODUCTIVE, AND CAPABLE OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR
FAMILIES

Board Chair:
Mrs. Odia

National Director:
Okadipo Alia

**Plot A14 Gbagada
Industrial Estate
Owonsoki-Oshodi
Expressway
Gbagada, ED Box 4251
Shomolu, Lagos
Nigeria, West Africa**

**Tel. 224-40-49-89
Fax (b)(6)**

E-mail:
Dipoalia@yahoo.com

Courses Offered:

- Refrigeration
- Air conditioning
- Metal fabrication
- Electronics
- Carpentry
- Auto mechanics
- Fashion design
- Hotel catering
- Secretarial studies
- Computer studies
- Snail farming
- Fish farming
- Agricultural development
- Animal husbandry
- Microcredit lending
- Entrepreneurship

Program Description

Nigeria OIC offers vocational, technical, and agricultural skills training and small-enterprise development support to over a thousand economically disadvantaged youth each year. With program fees much lower than at similar institutions, NOIC's training programs are highly sought, after and waiting lists are often long. Financial support for the programs comes from student fees, corporate donors, and national, intergovernmental, and international humanitarian assistance offices and agencies such as



the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), the Royal Netherlands government, the US Agency for International Development, and UN agencies.

NOIC courses are typically 12 to 18 months long but are presently being streamlined into a more-efficient 12-month model to enable the more-efficient training of greater numbers of youth.



Accomplishments

- Set up a pilot catfish farm and a snail farm in Lagos as well as a catering economic venture in the Lagos and Delta programs with funding from the Chase Manhattan Foundation
- Set up a gari-processing plant for women in Ilupeju, Ekiti State with funds from the Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Implemented a technical skills acquisition project (TSAP) in Warri, jointly funded by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Chevron, to train disadvantaged youth in computers, metal fabrication and welding skills, and implemented a Youth Technical Skills training program in Port Harcourt, Rivers State
- Started a one-year vocational training project in Bori, Rivers State with funds from Shell
- Trained youth in Warri through a grant from Texaco

History

Nigeria OIC, celebrating its 30th anniversary this year, was the first OIC program to be developed outside of the United States. Visiting Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1968 for medical treatment, Dr. Folorunsho Salawu, the Nigerian founder of NOIC, learned of the success Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC America was having in providing job-skills training to disadvantaged American youth. Dr. Salawu invited Rev. Sullivan and other OIC executives to visit Nigeria, and NOIC was established in Lagos in 1970.

Although initial funding support from the US Agency for International Development dried up in 1976, NOIC has succeeded in providing training with support through other channels, including support from the NOIC parent-teacher association. Additional IFESH funding in the 1990s helped NOIC grow, and in 1997 NOIC agricultural skills-training started in Ekiti State. In the mid-1990s an NOIC interest group formed in Kano in Nigeria's northern region, and by early 2000 two site visits by OIC International staff and NOIC National Secretariat members had been made, leading to the formal establishment of the Kano Interest Group at the NOIC National Board of Directors Meeting in Lagos in February 2000. An NOIC program in Edo State was also recently begun.

Future

- Peace building and conflict resolution courses to be added to Lagos, Delta, and Kano Programs.
- Community peace building workshops to be held 2-3 times yearly in Warri and in Kano.
- Community Peace Centers to be set up at Lagos, Delta, and Kano Program sites.
- New cooperatives specialists in Delta and Kano Programs to train small cooperative groups and offer microcredit support.

Training Sites

- Warri (2)
- Ekiti State
- Edo State
- Kano





OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS POLAND

PREVENTING **UNEMPLOYMENT** AND PROMOTING **ECONOMIC**
DEVELOPMENT BY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATIONAL
AND **ADVISORY** PROGRAMS

Board Chair:
Stanislaw Weglarz

Executive Director:
Teresa Bogacka

Poland OIC
Ul. Szewska 4,
20-086
Lublin, Poland

Tel. 48-81-532-6368
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oicpl@platon.man.lublin.

Courses Offered:

Planning and marketing

Human resource
management

Health care units
management

Controlling

Quality management

Entrepreneurship for
teachers

Real estate market
services

In-company training

Finance

Law

Planning

Technology transfer

Program Description

The main activities of the **Polish Foundation of the Centers of Economic Development Support**, or **OIC Poland**, are programs and ventures of an educational character. OIC Poland provides the highest



quality educational and professional services through the most modern and up-to-date programs. The programs are custom designed by OIC Poland, or in collaboration with other organizations. Competent trainers deliver the services in well equipped training facilities.

The programs of OICP are aimed at: school graduates, unemployed people, NGO activists and managers, private business people as well as managers and professionals interested in furthering their own education and increasing their skills.

The service delivery activities of OICP have different organizational forms but fall into two main

groups:

- a Program Activities – targeting youth and youth education, the labor market and workforce preparation, the physically challenged, and the entrepreneur and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
- Professional Educational Services—offer full commercial training services for individuals interested in getting new qualifications, and for commercial businesses, interested in the further development of their employees through management training and information technology.



History

Polish Foundation of the Centers of Economic Development Support, OIC Poland, based in Lublin was founded in 1991 in

cooperation with OIC International. OIC Poland Foundation is an independent, private, not-for-profit Polish NGO. The initiators of the OIC Poland were representatives of the local community who were interested in starting activities to stimulate economic and social development of the Lublin Region. This

local interest OIC Poland group modeled the initiative's development on the American NGO, OIC International, Inc. headquartered in Philadelphia, PA, USA. Affiliating and replicating a successful 30-year model has enabled OIC Poland to create an efficient operating model that enjoys a close cooperation with the state, the private business sector and other non-governmental partners. OIC Poland's training and advisory programs are aimed at school graduates, unemployed people, NGO Activists and managers and the business community. More than 50% of OIC Poland's clients are women who have chosen to pursue a career as an alternative to staying at home. Programs and educational services receive some funding from various sponsors and thus are fully or partially free of charge to participants.

Training Sites

- Lublin



Accomplishments

- OIC Poland has created a modern, fully professional educational institution.
- OIC Poland is recognized, not only in Poland, but abroad for its quality of services
- Since OIC Poland's inception, over 40,000 people have directly participated in its programs.

Future Goals

OIC Poland plans to create an International Center of Education and Development (ICED), in Lublin. This challenging project will be a complex of modern, multifunctional and effectively managed facilities for the present and future educational, social and economic development program run and delivered by the Foundation OIC Poland.



SIERRA LEONE OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

CONTRIBUTING TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SIERRA LEONE THROUGH VOCATIONAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT, AND BUSINESS TRAINING. AND ASSISTING DISADVANTAGED YOUTH AND MEMBERS OF WAR-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES DEVELOP THEIR POTENTIAL AND FIND ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE WAYS OF ENHANCING THEIR LIVES

Board Chair:
Gabriel AS. Balon

Executive Director:
Samuel J.M. Maligil II

**SLOIC National Office
Nat. Workshop
Compound
PMB 388, Freetown
Sierra Leone**

**Tel. 232-22-22-6884
Fax (b)(6)**

**E-mail:
Samligil@hotmail.com**

Courses Offered:

Building construction

Automechanics

Electricity

Blacksmithery

Metalworking

Business management

Secretarial science

Tailoring

Agriculture

Rural development

Cottage industries

Training Sites

- Bo (2)
- Freetown (2)
- Makeni (2)
- Matru-Jong



Program Description

Since its inception 23 years ago and through nearly a decade of civil conflict, SLOIC has maintained its proactive and dominant role in technical and vocational skills education in Sierra Leone. With seven major training sites and several outreach programs, SLOIC has achieved many successes:

- Pioneered institutionalized, private vocational skills training and job development for underprivileged, unemployed, and underemployed youth.
- Pioneered small-enterprise development training and credit assistance to small business entrepreneurs.



Since 1989, trained over 2,000 individuals in basic business management skills and provided over 500 persons (mainly women) with credit assistance from SLOIC's revolving loan fund.

In 1994 became the first national NGO to develop a project proposal to fund a rehabilitation, training, and resettlement program for former combatants - including child soldiers and local militias - and internally displaced persons and widows of military personnel killed or missing in action.

Accomplishments

- Personal development and career-counseling workshops for former combatants were organized and run by SLOIC in Lungi and Freetown.
- SLOIC staff are assisting UN peacekeepers and Sierra Leone's National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in demobilizing former combatants at Rot Loko and Lungi.
- SLOIC outreach programs in agricultural development and cottage industries began in January 2000 in Moyamba, Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba. These programs emphasize rural development, reintegration of former combatants, and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees.
- Training of lay trauma counselors have been offered through SLOIC workshops in Bo, to provide better psychosocial counseling support for persons severely affected by war.

History

In 1977, Bo became the first SLOIC training site when the Bo Vocational Training Center was established. One year later, SLOIC began offering training in business development in Freetown, with the relocation of the SLOIC national office soon following. Additional SLOIC programs began operating in Makeni in the north and Matru-Jong in the south in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though SLOIC operated programs throughout the civil conflict that started in 1991, all programs were significantly reduced in scope after the May 1997 military coup and the January 6, 1999 invasion of Freetown. Currently, over 10,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living in the SLOIC National Workshop Compound in Freetown, where the national office and training programs are housed. Some of these IDPs will be trained by SLOIC in new skills useful for resettling the communities, towns, and villages throughout Sierra Leone from which these people came.

SLOIC has over 178 staff and has received support from numerous organizations over the years, including USAID, various European organizations and agencies such as EZE, GIZ, and DFID, and Plan International. The Government of Sierra Leone provides some support to the programmes in the form of salaries for staff members and also through cost subvention. Parent organization OIC International provides technical assistance as needed.



SOUTH AFRICA

OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

PROVIDING SKILLS TRAINING THAT BUILDS SELF-WORTH IN PEOPLE
AND EMPOWERS DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES

Board Chair:
Mayu Sisibo

Program Director:
Vasco Seleona

SA-OIC
P.O. Box 11251
Dorpspruit, 3206
Kwazulu Natal
South Africa

Tel. 228-42-00-04
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oic@futurenet.co.za

Courses Offered:

- Carpentry
- Electrical wiring
- Plumbing
- Brick laying
- Automotive maintenance
- Welding
- NGO capacity building
- Computer studies
- Small business devt

Future Goals:

- To build contacts with private-sector companies
- To expand SA-OIC programming beyond the Kwazulu Natal Midlands Region
- To locate financing to set up a production facility whose outputs can be sold to different companies

Program Description

South Africa OIC is one of the newest OIC programs in Africa, having been established in 1996. Under the dynamic leadership of Board Chair Mrs. Mayu Sisibo and Program Director Vasco Seleone, South Africa OIC has quickly become a leader among the OIC affiliates in Southern Africa. SA-OIC training is conducted in modern facilities located in the center of Pietermaritzburg, and attracts black youth from Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding communities. Outreach programs target community development committees and focus on



capacity building and the development of social infrastructure.

SA-OIC features practical skills training in vocational areas such as the building trades, provides new educational opportunities using computers and customized software packages for developing basic educational skills as well as technical expertise, and provides specialized courses in small-business development for entrepreneurs.

Accomplishments

SA-OIC has succeeded in training people who are now self-employed as sub-contractors in plumbing, welding, and automotive mechanics workshops. Its technical skills trainees in the building trades all sit for the national certification exams in their training areas. Because of SA-OIC's innovative training programs:

- 30% of its graduates are employed by companies on a full-time basis;
- 50% of its graduates are employed part time
- 15% of its graduates have started their own businesses



Training Sites

- Pietermaritzburg



South Africa OIC

History

South Africa Opportunities Industrialization Centres was founded in June 1996 with the assistance of the Government of National Unity. It operates from 19 Prince Edward Street in Pietermaritzburg. SA-OIC also offers outreach training programs, especially in the areas of business development and NGO/CBO (non-governmental and community-based organization) capacity building.

Initial funding for SA-OIC came in May 1996 from a two-year sub-grant agreement between OIC International and the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH). Under the terms of the agreement, SA-OIC was to establish and institutionalize a community-based training program in Kwazulu Natal, South Africa. This grant ended in September 1998. The same year, SA-OIC received a three-year grant from the USAID/South Africa Mission Office.

In late 1999 SA-OIC received a grant from Johnson & Johnson to help establish a computer-based learning center, utilizing software developed by EDL ("Educate Develop and Learn for Life") Foundation. EDL has assisted with the acquisition of computers for SA-OIC to begin its computer-based training model, which may soon be expanded to other training centers in South Africa and other sub-Saharan African countries. Other funds for SA-OIC have come from the British Council and the Chase Manhattan Foundation. The South African Ministries of Labor and Education have provided additional funding through contracted projects with SA-OIC.



OPPORTUNITIES
INDUSTRIALIZATION
CENTERS
TANZANIA

IMPROVING THE INCOME-GENERATING SKILLS OF TANZANIAN
WOMEN, MEN AND YOUTHS THROUGH HIGH QUALITY TRAINING AND
OTHER BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT SERVICES

Board Chair:
Bernadetta Ndunguru

Executive Director:
Christine Mwanukuzi-
Kwayu

OIC Tanzania
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PO. Box 12474
Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania

Tel. 255-51-152-991
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oic@raha.com

Courses Offered

Business training

Food processing

Tie dye/Batik

Poultry farming

Furniture making

Professional video

NGO capacity building

Consulting services

Future Goals:

OIC Tanzania - In collaboration with OICI - plans to upscale its services and adopt a high performance program model to effectively serve thousands more Tanzanian business women and men beginning in the year 2000. It intends to further develop into a sustainable NGO that will help people to achieve a better life through income creation and successful businesses.

Program Description

OIC Tanzania's program are highly individualized to meet the needs of each client. Whether the client is an individual, a small business, an NGO or a government organization, OIC Tanzania provides high quality services to improve business and income.

Program services include:

- Business Initiation— targets youth that are scheduled to graduate from training institutions and are on the threshold of entering the job market. The training modules focus on self-employment orientation, how to start a business and business planning.
- Business Improvement— training modules for existing micro-entrepreneurs, many being served by credit-improving NGOs that are tailored to individual



client needs. Some topics that have been covered are business expansion strategies, record keeping, costing and pricing, and production and quality control. Some contracts with local NGO's provides for training with an emphasis on credit access and loan management.

- Training of Trainers
- Technical Training— is provided to apprenticeship trainers through technology improvement. The technical targets improvement of skill in business lines such as poultry raising, furniture making, and tie-dye.




Accomplishments

- Over 6,000 clients have been served since the program's inception in 1996. Of the total, 57% were women.
- A 1997 OIC Tanzania Study, following a business development training session for female clients that:
 - 100% believed their business performance had improved
 - 100% believed that their sales had increased
 - 27% of the respondents generated employment
 - Capital assets of respondents increased by 87%
- A tracer study in 1998 showed that:
 - 82% of clients claimed to have an increase in customers
 - 83% noticed increased daily sales

History

Established in 1996, OIC Tanzania is the result of a collaborative effort between OICI, the National Income Generation Programme (NIGP) of Tanzania, and a local OIC interest group whose members volunteered their services for the creation and management of OIC Tanzania as a local NGO. The UNDP initially provided US\$1.2 million for a three-year program effort implemented with the technical assistance of OICI. An end-of-project evaluation in 1998 indicated OIC Tanzania as an effective contribution to local income generation effort through business skills development. In December 1998, the NIGP board of directors approved a Phase II through assistance funds from the Belgian government and other revenues additionally raised by OIC Tanzania.



Tanzania OIC

TRAINING SITES

- Dar es Salaam
- Zanzibar

OIC International Headquarters 240 West Tulpehocken Street Philadelphia, PA 19144 Tel. (215) 842-0220

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11-L-0559/OSD/30749



OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

Togo

FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE RURAL POPULATION THROUGH
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Board Chair:
Arouna Sema

Program Director:
Tchayiza Donja

OIC Togo
B.P. 3685
Lome, Togo
West Africa

Tel. 228-42-00-04
Fax (b)(6)

E-mail:
Oicitogo@cafe.tg

Courses Offered:

- Crop production
- Livestock and poultry production
- Farm management
- Nutrition
- Animal traction
- Feeder courses

Program Description

OIC Togo is located in the Plateau region of Togo, in Todome-Notse, and serves youth from the Plateau and Maritime regions. The OIC Togo center reaches out to subsistence farmers, women and unemployed rural youth in the villages within a one hundred kilometer radius of the center. The activities of OIC Togo are focused on agropastoral training, resettlement and extension.



multiplication, and soybean cultivation and processing.

- **Training** - students are trained in agropastoral techniques, animal husbandry, vegetable gardening, yam, etc.

- **Resettlement** - students are resettled into their own villages after training with credit assistance and food for work programs from OIC Togo. Graduate trainees who can not find land are resettled on land obtained by the OIC center in Notse.

History

OIC Togo was created in 1976 as the first OIC agricultural training program. OIC Togo has provided training and settlement assistance in improved crop production and animal husbandry skills to youth and subsistence farmers in the plateau region of Togo.

OIC Togo has created the most important resettlement site for young farmers in the country. It is a 1900 hectare plot of land located at Agoto in the HAHO Prefecture. The center has settled 84% of its graduate trainees since 1985. These young farmers have formed a farmer's cooperative name "Union des Groupements des Producteurs Agricoles d'Agoto" (UGPA). They have created their own school and have paid teachers that they recruit. The UGPA have also created a Saving and Credit Union. Due to their success, they have shared among themselves a credit of 51 million francs (CFA) which they have reimbursed 100%.

Future Goals:

- Increase crop production with a special emphasis on soybean production.
- Encourage people to consume more soybean in order to fight malnutrition
- Increase livestock and poultry production in the farming community by improving upon tradition techniques.
- Support agricultural production and provide agricultural credit
- Continue agropastoral training for school dropouts and the unemployed

Accomplishments

- 78% of trainees have been resettled into farming and animal husbandry activities.
- The UGPA (a group of farmers trained and resettled by OIC Togo) have created a Saving and Credit Union establishment.
- In 1996, the UGPA were named the best association for young farmers in the Plateau region.
- In 1997, the Saving and Credit Union was named the best rural Saving and Credit Union in Togo.

Training Sites

- Todome-Notse



Current Project

The Togo Farm Income Improvement Project seeks to improve agricultural practices of small and subsistence farmers by providing them training in modern agricultural practices. The program also aims to increase farmer's access to agricultural credits to upgrade the skills of agricultural technicians, monitors, and young farmers who will be organized into cooperatives for the procurement of inputs and marketing of produce. This project involves:

- Training of village level extension agents
- Upgrading farmers' cooperatives into procurement and marketing cooperatives.
- Development of saving and credit federations
- Seminars for the training of trainers

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11-L-0559/OSD/30750



ZIMBABYYE OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS

ERADICATING POVERTY THROUGH EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND TRAINING OF ENTREPRENEURS

Board Chair:
Pamldzai Nyatsambo

Executive Director:
Phillip Bohwasi

Zimbabwe OIC
P.O. Box A1626
Avondale
Harare, Zimbabwe

Tel. 263-4-708-909
Fax (b)(6)

IE-mail:
Zolc@mweb.co.zw

Courses Offered:

- Business Initiation (pre-start)
- Business Initiation (startup)
- Business Development
- Training of Trainers
- Tailor made courses
- Microenterprise
- Officeskills

Future Goals:

Program Development:

- Construction of computer and business telecenters

Resource Development:

- Local resource development

Program Description

ZOIC provides a service to the informal sector operators and microenterprises. ZOIC was initiated in response to employment creation demands. The main objectives of ZOIC are:

- To develop ZOIC's micro-entrepreneurship training program.
- To improve business management skills of the informal sector.
- To develop training material, curricula and methodology for entrepreneurship training and business development support in collaboration with OICI



- and selected local microfinance partners.
- To strengthen the capacity of microfinance NGO's and institutions dedicated to the promotion and support of entrepreneurship development.
- To network for institutional support and resource mobilization.



Accomplishments

- Training manuals were developed with particular sensitivity and relevance to the target group
- ZOIC has become a member of the Micro Finance Association of Zimbabwe (ZAMFI)
- ZOIC has become a member of the steering committee for Zimbabwe National Network Advocacy group (ZMNNAG) for Jobs for Africa—Poverty Reduction Employment Strategies for Sub-Sahara Africa (JFA-PRESSA).
- With only US \$30,000 ZOIC was able to institutionalize and fund raise for more resources to continue to offer training to the informal sector in 1999.
- ZOIC is now receiving training requests from organizations and associations of informal sector operators.

Service Delivery:

- Care and post conflict counseling
- Micro-credit/



History

ZOIC opened its offices in 1998, following an agreement for a grant from UNDP for US \$30,000, and OICI's involvement in the institutionalization process. The organization works in collaboration with community based organizations, local communities, host governments, donors and the informal sector association in Zimbabwe. ZOIC is supported by UNDP and the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa and receives technical support from OIC International. Zimbabwe OIC continues to work towards its vision of uplifting the living standards of economically disadvantaged Zimbabweans by equipping them with skills to start and run their businesses.



Training Sites

- Harare

The Institutionalization and Sustainable Development of Indigenous Affiliated OICs

Lessons Learned from 25 Years of
OIC International's Institution-Building
Activity in the Developing World

Prepared by
Stanley A. Barnett and Associates
Westport, Connecticut

Under contract to
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International, Inc.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

June 1994

**The Institutionalization and Sustainable Development
of Indigenous Affiliated OICs
Lessons Learned from 25 Years of OIC International's
Institution-Building Activity in the Developing World**

June 1994

Prepared by Stanley A. Barnett and Associates, Westport, CT

Under contract to
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International
Philadelphia, PA

Pre USAID Cooperative Agreement OTR-0244-A-00-0102-00

11-L-0559/OSD/30753

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the past quarter-century, OIC International (**OICI**) an American PVO, **has** dedicated itself to the creation, institutionalization and sustainability of indigenous, community-based NGOs **that** provide non-formal training, primarily to the **poor** and unemployed, in **the Third** World, and more recently, Second World. OICI is one of the earliest--perhaps **the** earliest --and **one** of **the** most successful USAID **grantees** to have focused **on** that aspect **of** humanitarian **assistance**.

OICI believes that the development of democratic, indigenous NGOs to teach appropriate marketable skills for employment and self-employment enables beneficiaries **to** become self-reliant, economically productive, capable of improving the quality of their lives, and **reinforces** the **spread** of democratic processes to the community **at** large.

The strength of OICI's program lies in its emphasis on "graduating" its affiliate **OICs, i.e.,** making them self-governing and financially independent of OICI and the U.S. Government. Towards this end--and with program support via USAID/FVA/PVC cooperative agreement **grants**--OICI provides **OICs** technical assistance in all **areas** of institutional development, including training of their indigenous boards of directors and staff, management and financial systems, and resource mobilization. The program support **grants** have helped make OICI and its affiliate **OICs** increasingly effective and efficient in serving an increasingly numerous and diversified clientele with ever greater numbers of relevant **services**.

OICI was founded in 1969 in response to requests by Africans that the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan replicate in their countries **the** entry-level OIC vocational skills **centers** training **dis-**advantaged youth in the United States. **OICI's** first vocational skills training affiliate **was** opened in Nigeria in 1970, its first agricultural training OIC was established in **Togo** in 1976, and its small enterprise development centers **began** in Lesotho and Sierra Leone in 1978.

OICI's strategy focuses on a motivational philosophy, a long-term sustainable development objective, and **an** integrated **approach** to program growth and support that empowers OIC affiliates with the skills and tools for effective local program leadership, management and **operations**. Over the years, the **OIC** model, originally designed to meet conditions in the **U.S., has** been adapted to the distinctly different economic, social and political realities and **needs** of African, East European, Asian and Caribbean nations.

During the past decade, the number of countries in which **OICs** operate has almost **doubled** from from nine to 17, and the number of separate OIC non-formal training centers **has** jumped from 12 to 30. **By** mid-1994, 10 of the OIC centers focused exclusively **on** vocational/technical skills training, eight **on** agricultural and rural development training, and six

on small enterprise development. Two OICs featured vocational **and** agricultural training. Three concentrated on vocational **and** small business training; and a fourth (OIC Poland), in addition, conducted workshops to strengthen indigenous NGOs as agents of democratic change.

OIC vocational and agricultural **skills** training centers concentrate on transforming unskilled youth into productive members of society. The target beneficiaries tend to come from the poorer families in generally poor societies, lack marketable job skills and generally **are** undereducated. Without OIC training, most would have been doomed to a lifetime of part-time casual labor. Business management and development training at the OICs runs a gamut from short seminars for (mostly female) microentrepreneurs, to part-time skills-upgrading courses for middle management of indigenous private firms and government agencies.

Through FY 93, affiliate OICs had graduated almost 35,000 trainees: 51% of them by vocational skills centers, 26% by agricultural training centers and 23% by small business development units. In FY 93, 13 (of the 17) OICs for which data are available graduated 4,634 trainees, an increase of 1,728, or 59.5% over the FY 92 total. Thirty-nine percent of the graduates were female.

To ensure maximum impact on beneficiaries, the OIC training model is almost "cradle-to-the grave" in scope: enrollees generally are provided with: individual counseling throughout their training; three-months of intensive pre-skills-training motivational courses; and an average of 9-12 months of practical "hands-on" skills instruction and on-the-job training. Vocational trainees are provided with job-placement and/or self-employment assistance, and agricultural trainees with settlements services. Affiliate OICs accept qualified applicants on a first-come first-accepted basis and training generally is tuition-free.

Although the OICs' aims, aspirations and operations are philosophically and methodologically similar, reflecting a common OICI heritage, each indigenous OIC develops a distinctive format and personality that reflects its original program design as well as modifications made during implementation in response to its unique set of national and community concerns, interests and cultural traits; variations in donor support; and changing external conditions.

Surveys conducted over the years by external evaluators among employers of hundreds of OIC vocational skills graduates have shown strikingly similar results. Between 94% and 96% of OIC graduates' direct supervisors judge them above-average or average in work-attitude, technical knowledge and practical skills; and prefer the graduates to counterparts not OIC-trained. Evaluators have considered the survey results proof that the OICs have largely succeeded in transforming their "unpromising" targets beneficiaries into viable participants in the world of work. Evaluations of several affiliate vocational programs in 1987 and 1992 indicate that graduates earn several times more after OIC training than they would have, had they entered the job market as part-time, unskilled laborers.

A comprehensive cost-effectiveness study of the OICs in 1987 revealed that their cost-per-beneficiary (enrollee) was generally lower than corresponding costs at similar institutions serving similar clienteles, and that the OICs' annual cost-per-trainee tended to decline over successive years. The analysis also concluded that OICI has been cost-effective in the use of its limited resources, particularly the initial cooperative grant agreement funds. OICI performance through the third year of its current cooperative agreement appears similarly effective.

Testimony to the validity of USAID's focus on institution-building as a **cost**-effective **target** for Agency financing is the OIC's ability to continue churning out skilled graduates, year after year, subsequent to the cessation of **USAID** direct funding of the affiliate's **program**

The intermediate outputs of OICI's current support grants are couched in terms of OICI support services, through which affiliates are transformed into sustainable institutions. Enumerated **OICI** services comprise: (a) new program development (i.e., forming and assisting interest **groups**, conducting **appraisals** and feasibility **studies** and preparing funding proposals); (b) providing continuing **technical** support during project implementation (i.e., through **OICI** specialists **stationed at** the **OICs**, TDY **technical** support visits by field-based and headquarters-based specialists, regional training conferences and exchanges of experience, a **battery** of **critical** programmatic and financial planning and control systems and manuals, and periodic external evaluations and **annual** independent audits); and (c) a variety of backstopping services provided by OICI headquarterm).

Analysis reveals that **OICI** generally meets and surpassing designated levels of **support** services outputs. And external **consultant** surveys among **OIC** board chairmen and program directors in 1986 and in 1994 reveal a generally **high** degree of satisfaction with OICI support **services** among recipient **OICs**.

The final outputs of the program support grants are mature and self-sustaining grassroots-based OICs, i.e., affiliates that **possess**: relevant training criteria and effective training methods, an effective board of **directors**, capable staff in place and functioning, sound **program** management structure and operating systems, a resource development strategy, host-government and community acceptance and support, adequate appropriate facilities, and program replication potential. These outputs are detailed in the text and summarized below.

Institutionalization of indigenous **NGOs** takes years. To some degree, the slowness **reflects** the generally chronic instability of the external environments in which **OICs** **operate**. Yet the record of survival of individual **OICs** and the **OIC** network--indeed the demonstrated ability of the **OICs** to continue growing under the most difficult and protracted of adverse conditions--is a hallmark that appears to verify the **essential** correctness of **OICI** institution-building methodology.

Over the years, **OICs** have become leaner and increasingly cost-effective--results of OICI's and the affiliates' increasing professionalism, and of changing economic and donor environments. Emphasis on self-employment **has** increased, **as** job placement has grown more difficult. Geographic dispersion of **OICs** has accelerated. Affiliate budgets have **shrunk**. Support from host-governments (always strong) continues to grow. Inter-OIC networking and **OIC** joint activities **are** rising. And **strong resource** developments have increased funding from international donors.

Recurring evaluations report that the autonomous **OIC** policy-making boards of directors, reflecting their democratic **nature**, vary in effectiveness from **affiliate** to affiliate. Generally, however, they are composed of busy, dedicated man and women who donate **scarce** time and much energy to the cause of their **OIC** and the young people it **serves**. Board members represent a wide **spectrum** of community leaders from the public sector (national or **regional** local government), private sector (professionals, educators, bankers, businessmen), the

* Five years ago, vocational OICs job-placed an average of 75% of trainees; incomplete anecdotal evidence suggests that the current average may be in the 651-7096 range.

clergy and civic organizations. The vast majority of evaluations agree on the high quality and commitment of the locally-based personnel who staff the affiliates. **Because** of tight budgets, almost all **OICs use** (and find quite helpful) **technical** volunteers and interns, provided by **donor** agencies to augment limited affiliate staff and/or add needed expertise.

Overall, the U.S. Government (overwhelmingly via USAID) has been the largest funding **source** for **OICI** and the affiliates--having provided \$39,974,700 between FY 84 and FY 93. During the decade, non-U.S. Government donors contributed the equivalent of dramatic-\$25,194,200.

The ratio of non-U.S. Government to **U.S.** Government funding **rose** dramatically from the first to the last year of that decade. In FY 84, the ratio was one-to-two: **32.7%** came from non-U.S. Government **sources**, while 67.3% **came** from the **U.S.** Government. By FY 93, the **ratio** had declined almost to one-to-one--48.9% to 51.1%--slightly bettering OICI's projected FY 95 **goal of 48.0%** as the non-U.S. Government share under the current program **support grant**.

Host-government contributions equalled \$11,825,000 (three-fourths in cash), or **47%** of the non-U.S. funding from FY 84-FY 93.* Other donors (nine bilateral agencies; 10 multi-lateral agencies; and 27 foundations, NGOs and PVOs; and U.S. businesses and individuals) contributed the equivalent of additional \$13,369,200.

To supplement donor funds, the **OICs** conduct community-based self-help **resource** mobilization efforts that include: community drives and economic ventures (**e.g.**, sale of farm by-products, vocational-trainee work contracts and fee-for-services contracts, and for-profit enterprises--some of which have produced modest profits, but which **are** most valuable for their public relations impact).

Seven of the 13 larger **OICs** have replicated and by mid-1994 were operating a **total** of 20 training centers.** Affiliates also **are** adding new training components to mature programs. **External** evaluations of OICI and/or individual **OICs** during the past dozen years overwhelmingly agree that the affiliate institutionalization process **has** been accelerating. The overall ability demonstrated by **OICs** to continue benefitting ever-larger target **groups**; their progressive growth in institutional and professional capability; and their continually increasing financial and in-kind support from donor agencies--all in the face of severe economic and political dislocations--indicate that their sustainable development is well under way.

#####

The final portion (Part Three) of this study is a compendium of 50 lessons learned (and overwhelmingly implemented) over the course of a quarter century of **OICI's** institution building of indigenous NGOs in the developing world. The lessons **are** documented with pertinent quotations extracted programmatic evaluations of **OICI** and of its affiliates, and from OICI's annual reports to USAID. They will be of interest (and hopefully of value) to other NGOs, to the donor community, to the OICs--and **as** a reminder--to OICI itself.

* Although most of OICI's mature programs now receive government subventions, the affiliates without exception maintain their integrity as independent private NGOs, because host-governments are well aware of their contributions to the nation and know that they cannot duplicate OIC training on their own.

** The four other OICs are either small, underfinanced "bootstrap" options or brand-new.



Opportunities Industrialization Centers International

Rev. Leon Sullivan
Founder

Rev. Gus Roman
Chairman

C.L. Mannings, Ph.D
President & CEO

Mission:
To improve the lives of people in developing countries through training and sustainable development services.



Our Founder and History:

Reverend Leon Sullivan, our founder, started the first OIC training center in an abandoned jail house in 1964. His goal was to help African Americans in Philadelphia acquire the skills necessary for employment and economic self sufficiency. What began as a national movement out of Philadelphia expanded internationally in 1970.

Who we are:
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International (OICI) is a United States based non-profit, non-governmental organization. OICI operates in partnership with local communities, host governments and donors. Its primary role is to provide technical assistance for the institutionalization of affiliate OICs into sustainable social enterprises and human resource development centers. Each affiliate OIC operates with its own Board of Directors and Local staff. OICI currently operates over 40 affiliate programs in 18 countries.

The first OICs in Africa were established in Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia as vocational/technical skills training and job placement centers. In 1976, an agricultural skills training center was developed in Togo, and small enterprise development programs were developed in Lesotho and Sierra Leone. Our center in Sierra Leone has since become a refugee, war rehabilitation, and trauma counseling center, as have other programs in war torn countries, further broadening the scope of OICI's work in our affiliate programs.

Where we are in the world:

- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- The Gambia
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- The Philippines
- Poland
- South Africa
- Sierra Leone
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Zimbabwe




How to contact us:

OIC International Headquarters
240 West Tulpehocken Street
Philadelphia, PA 19144

Phone: (215) 842-0220
Fax: (215) 842-0220
Email: oiic@oicinternational.org
Web: www.oicinternational.org

New programs are developing income generating and job creation activities as an integral part of program design in order to maintain program relevancy and enhance sustainability.

OIC International Affiliates



A global citizen passes away

James Butty, Washington

The Reverend Leon Sullivan, one of the outstanding African Americans who fought against apartheid in South Africa, and originator of the African-African American summits, has died at the age of 78. A press release from the family headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, said he died from leukemia. His wife of 57 years, Grace Banks, and three children - Howard, Julie and Hope - and seven grandchildren survive him.

"It is my father's wish that we continue our efforts in his mission and keep his fight for Africa, particularly the Sixth African-African American Summit on course," said daughter Hope Sullivan-Rose. Ms Sullivan-Rose is Deputy Summit Manager and will spearhead the Summit efforts on her father's behalf. As West Africa has reported (April 23, 2001), the Sixth African-African American Summit, scheduled to be held in Abuja from May 21 to 25 has been postponed.

"Reverend Sullivan was a good man," said Melvin Foote, president of the Washington-based Constituency for Africa. "A lot of us are good men and good women, but he was a great one. In terms of what I do, he was one of the people I looked forward to as my mentor. I think the challenge now is for us to pick up the mantle and move forward. He did us a favour in getting us to this late. It is up to all of us to do our part to ensure that his legacy lives on," Foote said.

This reporter was one of the few journalists who interviewed the Reverend Sullivan in March this year. He described how he would like to be remembered: "I'm not the type of person that goes around looking for stories. I don't need someone to take my picture. I have thousands of pictures. The thing I'm trying to do as a minister of God is to help little people. Nobody is paying me for what I do except the Lord. But I want people to realise that there was a man by the name of Leon Sullivan who worked and died in order to help little people help themselves in America and the world and in Africa. That's my mission. That's

what I'm setting out to do, as far as I can do it"

The Rev. Sullivan left behind a huge legacy. For more than five decades, he was the champion of the people. Sullivan was the first African-American to serve on the board of directors of the General Motors Corporation. In 1977, he formulated the Sullivan Principles, a set of ethical directives that called for equitable treatment for Black workers in apartheid South Africa. These principles were instrumental in the abolition of apartheid. At the Fifth African-African American Summit in Accra, the Rev. Sullivan announced the expansion of the original Sullivan Principles to the Global Sullivan Principles for corporate social responsibility. Today, these guidelines enforce fair employment practices around the world.

In 1969, the Rev. Sullivan founded Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) International, a training programme that he said had provided skills training to over three million people. To date, the OIC has more than 75 training facilities in the United States and 17 countries in Africa.

In 1983, Sullivan founded the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), a non-profit organisation that trains farmers and workers. IFESH operates programmes such as Teachers for Africa, SOS (Schools Supplies for the Children of Africa), the International Fellows Program, Debt for Development, Schools for Africa, the African-African American Summit, the Liberia Reconstruction Program and the Angola Training Center.

"The Teachers for Africa Program is perhaps the most successful teaching programme ever attempted in Africa," Leon Sullivan said. "It is really led by my daughter, Julie. We have sent 750 master teachers from America who have already trained 40,000 African teachers. We are training every teacher in Benin. We're teaching people not only literacy but also how to use the electronics. I will not be satisfied until I send at least 2,500 master teachers teaching at least 100,000 African teachers to improve their skills because if you can't read you can't lead. We've got



Leon Sullivan: remembered for the Sullivan Principles in South Africa

to find the way - African-Americans and friends of Africa - to help Africans help themselves."

The Rev. Sullivan created the bi-annual African-African American Summit in 1991 to bring American corporations, business leaders, and African heads of state together to discuss political, economic, educational and social development of the African continent.


In 1992 Sullivan was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President George Bush Sr for his "voice of reason for over forty years" and a lifetime of work in helping the economically and socially disadvantaged people of the world. In December 1999 he received the Eleanor Roosevelt Award from President Clinton for his humanitarian efforts around the world.

Leon Sullivan was a champion of the people, particularly the people of Africa. The question is, what happens now? "Well, I think we are better off in terms of US policy toward Africa today than we were 10 years ago, and Sullivan certainly gets a great deal of credit in that regard," said Melvin Foote. "We've got to see who now will step in to do their part, and I don't think it's going to be one person. I think the days of the charismatic giant, the Martin Luther King, the Malcolm X, the Leon Sullivan, those days may well be on their wane. So I just think the debate's being broad, and a lot of this got its origin from Sullivan, but Sullivan will be the last one to tell you that he's looking for another messiah to step forward. It's going to be determined by people like you, me and everybody who's been working on Africa."

April 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. John Abizaid
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Observations for the Future

My feeling is that in several areas decisions on Iraq apparently were made that, in retrospect, might have been different. For example:

1. We may have had several changes in military leadership very fast in some places in Iraq. I am told we have had at least four different military leaderships in Fallujah, with the result being we may have lost situational awareness and given an uncertain signal to the people in the area. We may be paying a penalty now.
2. At the end of major combat operations the in-place military picked up and left.
3. We have just realized that there are different rules of engagement for Coalition countries. We need to get them all to be the same. And, where that is not possible or they are not sufficiently robust, we should put them in locations where it would matter less.
4. The 17-nation multi-national division went in a calm area, but conditions changed.

Iraq

27 Apr 04

OSD 06042-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30761

5. Finally, most important, in retrospect, may have been creating a multi-national division and keeping together all of the 17 nations. There are good reasons for not putting all of them in one sector. Specifically:

- It is good to have US forces work with foreign forces, in that it creates more combined capability for the alliance for the future.
- When we mix foreign forces in with US forces, they learn working with our military and become better.
- Further, rather than putting all 17 Coalition countries in one division, if Spain or Honduras and the others had been embedded in US forces spread around the country, and then some nations pulled out, it would have made less difference, since we are now having to rearrange forces to fill the gaps. The task would have been easier if we had had small numbers of the 17 Coalition forces with our units.

Please look at these issues and any others you can think of, if you think I am right, then let's continue to address conditions, discuss our options and make sure we are flexible.

Let's discuss.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-10

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

APR 27 2004

PACOM

TO: ADM Tom Fargo
 CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

Thanks so much for sending along your memo, "Updating Systems and Procedures." We'll work it from here - you keep pushing from there.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
 042604-29

.....

Please respond by _____

amaproy

OSD 06115-04

April 27, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Book Review on *Anti-Americanism*

Attached is a review on a book written by Jean-François Revel, *Anti-Americanism*.
I think you will find it both interesting and enjoyable.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Book review

DHR:dh
042704-9

092

27 Apr 04

OSD 06192-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30764

130 Research, Inc. 4/22/04

Much has been made of how America is detested in the rest of the world. Critics particularly point to the almost complete reversal of positive opinion about the U.S. immediately after 9/11.

As we have written, even before Iraq, the U.S. has two cultures: land of economic opportunity, *habeas corpus*, the rule of law, transparency, immigration and assimilation of diverse peoples, human rights, democracy and the First Amendment, etc.

But most of the world doesn't see this—what they see is Hollywood, MTV and McDonald's and these are considered economic and cultural imperialism. No developed country hates America more than France, which is why we follow French intellectual and public opinion very closely.

Jean-Francois Revel, a well-known French journalist, recently weighed in with a new book, *Anti-Americanism*. While Revel is known to be pro-American, he lives in one of the centers of anti-Americanism, and therefore, has a unique insight into why America is so disliked. We have asked our French correspondent to review the book.

Revel argues that what he calls the “anti-American obsession” is mostly based on a faulty analysis of the most obvious facts about American political and social life, its economic freedom and democratic traditions.

According to Revel, the mixed and often contradictory sense of envy and contempt that the United States inspires abroad was long established, and the aftermath of 9/11 only encouraged the resurgence of negative attitudes towards America.

Of course, the question of cultural superiority is more debatable, depending on whether “culture” is narrowly or broadly defined, but it is obvious that America's popular culture and tastes in dress, music, recreation and fast food have attracted young people everywhere and will continue to do so.

America's role as a “superpower” is undeniable. But, Revel makes the following interesting observation:

“American ascendancy is indebted only in part to the creativity and determination of the American people; it also sprang by default from the cumulative failures of the rest of the world: the fall of Communism, the

ruin of Africa, the divisions within Europe, the Asian and Latin American slowness to evolve towards democracy.”

For Revel, what is lacking in European thinking about America’s “ascendancy” is “an inquiry into its primary causes.”

“Europeans in particular should force themselves to examine how they have contributed to that preponderance. It was they, after all, who made the twentieth century the darkest in history; it was they who brought about the two unprecedented cataclysms of the World Wars; and it was they who invented and put into place the two most criminal regimes ever inflicted on the human race.”

What Revel emphasizes is that the current American “hyperpower” status *is* the direct consequence of European powerlessness, both past and present.

What America truly does is “fill the void” caused by the world’s inadequacy to think and act for itself.

And for the author, this unwillingness to act is not dictated by incompetence or laziness, but by a blind “attachment to *idée fixe*” and an intentional “turning away from facts.”

Revel presents many of France’s self-contradictory criticisms of the United States as a way of demonstrating the absurdity of the French and European condemnation of the U.S.

The American society is criticized for being both too free-market oriented and too protectionist; too lawless and too controlled by the judiciary; having too little culture and being too influential of a culture; being too isolationist and too interventionist.

In the chapter “*The Worst Society That Ever Was*,” Revel points out the misrepresentations by the French of life in the United States and the deliberate distortions and contradictions. He compares healthcare in the U.S. and Europe, studies crime statistics and looks at the American melting pot versus the large non-integrated Muslim minorities in France.

One of the “*idée fixe*” about the U.S. is its “pandemic violence”. Everywhere you go, according to the conventional wisdom in France, violence reigns, with uniquely high levels of delinquency and criminality and a feverish state of near-open revolt in the ghettos.

But, Revel deftly puts the shoe on the other foot. He points out that for a long time, the French closed their eyes to their own rapidly-rising crime levels. The result is that during the last fifteen years of the twentieth century, crime steadily diminished in the United States, whereas in Europe it took off.

The “New York Miracle,” when Rudolph Giuliani, who was elected mayor in 1993, succeeded over a period of five years in cutting by half the previously very high levels of crime in that city, was first mocked in French newspapers.

This “Giussolini,” as he was frequently called, was too repressive and brutal and the French government had “no desire to copy the American model.” But, as their own violence escalated, the French made a sharp U-turn in 2001 with a new policy that is best expressed as follows: “The Left no longer favors social explanation of delinquency. Zero tolerance—the new watchword on crime control.”

Overwhelmed by their failure to combat this delinquency curse, and unable to keep hiding from the obvious, in 2001, the French authorities were forced to acknowledge that their analysis of crime’s causes was flawed and that their remedies, based upon supposed prevention, didn’t work. Giuliani was now held up as an example of success by a number of elected officials.

For Revel, “this pout of disdain for American solutions, in law enforcement and many other social and economic areas, on the part of numerous countries that do much less well than the U.S.A. verges on ineptitude and even absurdity.”

Revel believes that anti-Americanism is really a struggle against liberalism.

Much anti-Americanism is simply anti-capitalism in disguise supported by people in Europe and the rest of the world who are still committed to doctrines that are illiberal or even totalitarian.

Turning his attention to anti-globalism, Revel reveals the left’s hypocrisy.

It is not that the left has anything against globalism, they just don’t like the fact that people worldwide will be able to freely trade with one another without government interference.

“Dirigisme” (state control of economic and social affairs) and state-controlled economies want a globalization imposed and sanctioned by concerted governments.

The drawback of the “dirigiste” ambition and the paradox of “its resurgence nowadays,” says Revel, “is that putting it into practice has never in the past resulted in anything but disastrous economic decline, poverty or even destitution of the people and pronounced technological backwardness, accompanied more often than not by political tyranny.”

This assessment is as valid for communist-socialist states as for Hitlerian National Socialism.

What the developing countries are asking for is greater access to the world’s best markets for their products, especially agricultural products. **Developing countries want more globalization, not less.** India and China are now following Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea because they understand economic growth is the only true escape from poverty.

Revel also sees globalization as an engine of enrichment for cultural diversity and believes that state protection of local culture only leads to stagnation.

“Isolation breeds sterility.” He warns that anti-American phobias and anti-globalism will prevent progress in Europe and contrary to what Jacques Chirac maintains, he clearly believes that globalization is not a “cultural steamroller.”

In response to the ideas that Europe should abandon nuclear energy, genetic engineering and research using embryonic cells, Revel cites the work of Claude Allegre: “Should the pressure groups that agitate against progress win the day, in 20 years, the European states will regress to the level of the underdeveloped countries, in a world that will be dominated by the United States and China.”¹²

In the chapter “*Being Simplistic*”, Revel goes after another “*idée fixe*”, the argument that poverty is the root cause of terrorism.

Quoting Francis Fukuyama, **Revel agrees that the conflict is not one of clashing civilizations, but rather a reaction by people who feel themselves threatened by modernization and by its moral component: respect for human rights.**

For the jihadists, the ultimate enemy is “the secular character of the Western conception of rights, a conception that lies at the heart of the liberal tradition.” Al-Qaeda terrorists do not mention economic inequalities, but reproach the West for opposing the teachings or (more specifically the fundamentalist interpretations) of their religion.

“The path to equality is through modernization: this truth is precisely what the Islamists most despise, for to modernize effectively means deviating from the Sharia.”

As for negotiation and the search for a “political solution” that most European states support, Revel asks: “I’d like the clever minds who advocate this brilliantly original idea to explain how effective it would be with the likes of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.”

The fundamentalists blame our civilization not for what it does, but for what it is; not for having failed, but for having succeeded. “The endless talk about the need to find a ‘political solution’ to the problem of Islamist terrorism is founded on the illusion that rational policy could have any bearing on a mental universe so divorced from reality.”

To the anti-American humanitarians who accused the U.S. of wanting to kill civilians by dropping food packages along with the bombs, he responds, let’s not forget that “the United States from 1980 to 2001 was the principal supplier of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and that 80% of the aid distributed by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) within the framework of the World Food Program was paid for by Americans.”

In his last chapter, entitled “*Scapegoating*”, Revel concludes that anti-Americanism and the notion that America is the source of all evil—imperialistic, greedy and ruthlessly competitive—is not a position, but a disease and his prognosis is quite pessimistic. “The disinformation in question is not the result of pardonable, correctable mistakes, but rather of profound psychological need.”

The most important lesson from this book is that “anti-American obsession, in effect, aggravates the evil it aims to extirpate, namely the unilateralism famously ascribed to the United States. By criticizing the Americans whatever they do, and on every occasion—even when they are in the right—we Europeans (and we are not alone in this, although we lead the dance) compel them to disregard our objections—even when we are in the right.”

The irrational criticism, the deliberate disregard of the facts, the opinionated ill will in much of the European media will only lead to Americans rejecting the idea of consultation. The biases currently reigning will only weaken Europe and the rest of the world and encourage American unilateralism.

In short, America is no different from Standard Oil in the 19th century and Microsoft now—hated for its success and power—and nothing short of America's loss of power will change it.

April 29, 2004

Afghanistan

TO: Ambassador Evan Galbraith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Thanks so much for your note on the Allies and Afghanistan. I will work it with Doug Feith. I appreciate it.

Regards,

P.S. If we ever do anything like that, we sure better put a time limit on it, because you can be darn sure they will have time limits on their PRTs!

DHR:dh
042904-9

OSD 06344-04

29 APR 04

April 29, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

TO: Honorable George Shultz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail

335 SD

George—

They issue the doctor raised has been run to ground. The people were sincere, and we appreciated the heads up, but it looks like there is nothing there.

Regards,

DHR:dh
042904-13

29 APR 04

OSD 06369-04

April 30, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid
LTG Rick Sanchez

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Spokesman

Attached is a message I received from a friend.

I think there is a lot of truth to it.

Thanks.

Attach.
Iraq Spokesman

DHR:dh
043004-14

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 06370-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30773

Subject: Iraqi spokesman in Baghdad is worth two divisions-

having an Iraqi face replace the American face in Baghdad would be worth two divisions

Nagl's Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam makes clear the importance of the political over the military in defeating an insurgency

every time an American spokesman appears in Baghdad we remind Iraqi nationalists they are against us

every time an Iraqi briefs the press and an Iraqi announces new developments we move a step into the background and Iraqi nationalism subsides

can't the white house simply issue an edict that as of tomorrow all briefings will be given in arabic by an Iraqi and translated into English

getting the Americans off television (remember that al jazeera and al arabyia cover American presence with an intensity which has to arouse Iraqi nationalism) would be more helpful than sending two additional divisions

EF-8102

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-04/000473

January 12, 2004

NATO 322

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Flag to Post

We are going to have to make sure that the interagency knows that the flag to post thing has to be solved by January 23, when the NAC meets. That means we ought to get it done this coming week and solve it. We need the memo first, however.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01 1204-27

.....
Please respond by 1/14/04

Policy ExecSec's Note
January 15, 2004
CDR Nosenzo,
SUBJ: Flag to Post

- The attached memo **was** delivered to you on the evening of January 13.

C. L. O'Connor
Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC

FILE
TEN
1/15

OSD 06385-04

12 JAN 04

EF-8218
I-04/000924
January 21, 2004

2/2

IRAN

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
FROM:
SUBJECT: Chargé

I notice that a QODs Force general from Iran has been assigned as chargé in Iraq.
As the sovereign, we don't have to accept him, do we?
Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012104-8

.....
Please respond by

1/26/04

1/26/04

1/31

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/
CDR Nosenro
430

cc: ES
done 1/22

21JAN04

OSD 06386-04

728

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

March 8, 2004

728

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: NATO Military Committee

Please get back to me with the lay down of the military committee at NATO and the relationship with SACEUR, the relationship with you, the relationship with me and an analysis as to whether or not you think we ought to propose some changes, given the fact that we are in the 21st century. My guess is that we should.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-8

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

NATO
M34

8 Mar 04

OSD 06395-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30777

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 30, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Criteria

I would be curious to know what criteria you folks are using for the selection of the people the US would recommend to Brahimi for the key posts. I have not heard any discussion of that, and I am interested.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-17

Iraq

30 Apr 04

17 Apr 04

OSD 06400-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30778

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

205 100 -5 01 0:55

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

QSD 06405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/30779



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

April 7 2005 APR -5 AM 8:52
~~March 31, 2005, 4:20 PM~~

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Post-Major ~~Combat Operations Stabilization~~ Efforts

- In the attached snowflake you asked if we need to organize the civilian side of the Department to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts.
- After many weeks of deliberations in OSD, we are coordinating a draft directive to define and assign DoD responsibilities for stability operations. After the Defense Science Board briefed you on its stabilization study last Fall, you asked that a directive be prepared.
- The directive creates a policy framework for stability operations and reconstruction, and catalyzes the Department to develop a range of stability operations capabilities such as language and cultural expertise, planning, intelligence, and training exercises.
- The directive also calls for the production of metrics to determine progress and inform decisions on how resources should be allocated. It also seeks to integrate DoD efforts with the interagency, NGOs and the private sector in the post-major combat period.
- In the directive, the Secretary of the Army is designated as the Executive Agent for Stability Operations and will lead implementation. He and the USD(P) will co-chair an Executive Committee to oversee implementation and develop a Roadmap of necessary actions. The Secretary of the Army will report to you on progress.
- Marty Hoffmann believes that the directive will be only part of the solution to improving DoD and USG performance in stabilization efforts. DoD needs to develop better operational doctrines for stabilization and reconstruction missions. Key issues include: how to engage in economic reconstruction under combat conditions and how to jumpstart bottom-up, citizen driven economic activity.
- With respect to specific organizational arrangements necessary to enable the Department to execute its responsibilities in stabilization, the Stability Operations Executive Committee will work with the stakeholders and develop recommendations for your approval.

COORDINATION: None

CC: FEITH, HENDRY, O'CONNELL, HARVEY, HOFFMANN

Prepared By: Bob Menig, (b)(6)

OSD 06405-05

11-L-0559/OSD/30780

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Stabilization

Do we need to organize the civilian side of the Department of Defense to include post-war, post-major combat operations stabilization efforts?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-26

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 06405:05

11-L-0559/OSD/30781

8:58 AM

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: January 9, 2004
SUBJECT:

Handwritten initials: MR and a large X

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

IRAQ

I need to be given what's going on with the ISG. I need to know precisely how many people we reduced out of his operation and what it amounted to in total numbers and as a percentage.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010904.16

Please respond by: 1/15/04

Handwritten: OB 1/26

OSD 06409-04

97Jan04

Binoler-FILE COPY

EF-8185

In reply refer to EF-8185 and
04/000819

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes

SUBJECT: Drug Trafficking Aircraft

I have read the reason we don't shoot down drug **trafficking** aircraft. There are ways we can do it. Let's go ahead and think about making those recommendations.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012004-45

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

COMPLETED

FEB 10 2004

OSD 06413-04
21-01-04 11:52 AM

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

11-L-0559/OSD/30783

000.5
20 Jan 04

~~SECRET~~ In reply refer to: EF-8187
04/000836
January 20, 2004 C 1/30

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Spain

I want to find ways to strengthen Spain—to include them, give them information, make them knowledgeable, and improve their position in the EU.

Spain

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012004-42

.....
Please respond by 2/12/04

Siri C 1/30 ✓ 1/30
Response attached
w/CDR Nosenzo
1/30
20 Jan 04

OSD 06414-04

~~SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/30784

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

May 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Article

Attached is an article of interest.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Jonas, George. *National Post*, April 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
042004-6

3
1

3 May 04

OSD 06430-04

canada.com **News**



America must find its national purpose to beat the terrorists
It will need to reconsider decades of ultra-liberalism

George Jonas
National Post

April 17, 2004

There's a demand for Pax Americana and, judging by President George Bush's press conference this week, the United States is ready to supply it. The Bush administration seems anything but wobbly. Even so, one wonders if the President and his advisors fully realize what the task entails. To put the genie of anti-civilizational ruthlessness back into its bottle, to defeat terrorist despotism from the nuclear labs of North Korea to the alleys of Falluja and the caves of al-Qaeda in the Hindu Kush, America will need to reconsider decades of ultra-liberalism and political correctness, and revert to earlier models of national purpose.

SPECIFICALLY, THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO:

1. Regard any hostile power that attempts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction, or refuses to sign and abide by a non-proliferation agreement, as a belligerent state. Such countries must be exposed to the traditional consequences of belligerency, from blockades to possible invasion.
2. Acknowledge that, while Islam is a great religion, it contains a strain hostile to Western civilization, and recognize that a state of war exists between that particular strain of Islam and the West. This includes all Arab and/or Muslim countries whose governments nurture or tolerate such a hostile strain.

4/19/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30786

3. Face the fact that terrorism is the chosen tactic of Islamist militants who can't penetrate the defensive perimeters of Western powers from the outside. Face the fact that terrorism depends for its success on fifth columnists; face the fact that Western residents of Arab/Muslim background, along with Arab/Muslim visitors or students, are susceptible to Islamist recruitment as fifth columnists; and face the fact that the loyalty of such residents and visitors cannot be taken for granted. Consequently, much as it may offend liberal and multicultural sensibilities, face the fact that residents, visitors, and, when warranted, even citizens of such background may have to be subjected to profiling, restrictions, surveillance, isolation and, in some cases, expulsion.

4. Remember that up to, and including, the Second World War, military operations weren't conducted with the view that the enemy was merely "the regime" and not the population. The Allies acted on the assumption that the foe was the Germans and the Japanese, even though far from all Germans or Japanese supported the Nazis or the warmongers of Japan. When the Allies bombed Dresden, they didn't try to separate those who voted for Hitler in 1933 from those who voted against him. The imperiums of Wilhelm II or Franz Joseph before the First World War, though more liberal than modern dictatorships, were hardly Western-style democracies. They were absolute monarchies whose populations might not have endorsed their own rulers in a referendum. Yet it never occurred to the Entente to say that it was only fighting the Kaiser and not his subjects. During the Cold War, even though it was evident that most people inside the Soviet camp hated the regime -- they brought it down in the end -- the West prepared and relied on a nuclear deterrent that by its nature couldn't distinguish between the supporters and opponents of communism.

5. Americans will have to consider that making the avoidance of civilian casualties a rigid priority in war has two predictable consequences. First, there's reduced military effectiveness and increased exposure of one's own troops to danger. Second, a campaign may not be evaluated primarily in terms of its military/strategic achievement, but in how successful it was in avoiding collateral damage. This exposes a victorious campaign to the risk of being judged a political debacle if it falls short of some self-imposed goal of minimizing civilian casualties. In short, it increases the likelihood of winning the war and losing the peace. It's ironic when self-imposed Western standards carry such political burden against a terrorist enemy that, far from trying to avoid collateral damage, deliberately targets non-belligerents. Arab/Islamist military efforts specifically express themselves in the bombings (or suicide bombings) of civilian buses, planes, discos, or office buildings, along with ruses de guerre such as using civilian shields, dressing military units in civilian clothes, placing military targets in civilian quarters, etc. The indignation of Arab and Islamist belligerents -- who, after deliberately targeting civilians, protest when Western or Israeli action results in some collateral civilian damage -- ought not to persuade Americans that they have some moral duty to impose extra conditions on themselves in addition to standard conventions of war.

6. A year ago, I wrote that asking whether Iraqis will look at the coalition as liberators is asking the wrong question. It assumes a unanimity in Iraq we would never expect to find in our own countries. In America, most people share the same liberal-democratic heritage, yet even Americans are divided on the question of whether they're liberators or occupiers. In Iraq, there's at least a six-way division. First, there are those Iraqis for whom individual freedom, political democracy, and economic prosperity are important criteria. These people have predictably greeted the coalition forces as liberators. Next are those who define themselves mainly by their various sectarian or ethnic identities. Shiite or Kurdish Iraqis

may, initially, have considered the forces that removed their Baathist-Sunni oppressors as liberators, but can hardly be relied on to do so forever, given that the coalition stands in the way of, say, Kurdish dreams of an independent Kurdistan or Shiite dreams of a Tehran-style theocracy. A third group identifies itself as Arab nationalists. Some may have hated Saddam, but like Westerners even less. Ditto for the fourth group, who defines itself primarily as Muslims. They're unlikely to cherish being liberated by the infidels, whatever they may have thought of Saddam. The fifth group is the "die-hards" currently burning and mutilating Americans in the streets of Falluja. They actually supported Saddam and benefited from his corrupt and despotic regime. These Iraqis naturally hate the coalition. Finally, there's a sixth group of Iraqis who care about little beyond their daily existence and their families. They understand next to nothing about democracy; they accepted Saddam and his predecessors without either affection or hostility, as one accepts the weather. These Iraqis may not be fanatical nationalists or Muslims, but they certainly regard Westerners as aliens. For them, the coalition appears as neither liberators nor oppressors, but as a force of nature, to be outwitted if possible and endured if necessary. Any estimate about the relative size of these groups would only be a guess, but the first group -- the supporters of democracy and Western values -- is probably the smallest, while the sixth group -- the apolitical Iraqis -- is probably the largest. It's their souls for which Islamists and pan-Arabists are contending with the West.

7. Relying on the possibility, or even probability, that most people within Islam -- or specifically within Iraq -- would prefer to live in a democracy, and that only a minority support despotism and enmity with the West, is a grievous error. It's not an error because it may not be true, but because it's immaterial. Majorities do not necessarily carry the day even in free countries, let alone in theocracies or tyrannies. Militant minorities are far more likely to set the tone in a given country, period, or civilization. Communism was rarely supported by more than 20% of the population in which it held sway. Even a relatively popular totalitarian system, Nazism, was supported only by one out of three voters in Germany's last free election before Hitler assumed power. Western policy-makers cannot take comfort in democracy's enemies having only a minority support among their own people. A minority support is all they need. It was all they needed even before the age of terror and weapons of mass destruction, and can do with even smaller numbers in the age of suicide bombers, anthrax and nuclear devices. It took just 19 Middle East infiltrators to create the havoc of 9/11 in Manhattan, and about the same for the recent mayhem of 3/11 in Madrid.

8. Terrorist despotism, theocratic or secular, must be confronted; it cannot be accommodated or appeased. Defeating the enemy is the best way to change his mind. Anti-civilizational ruthlessness, Marxist or Muslim, is to Western democracy what Hannibal's Carthage was to Rome. Some 2,000 years ago, Marcus Porcius Cato ended his speeches in the Senate with the words *Carthaginem esse delendam* -- Carthage must be destroyed. At his press conference this week, even if somewhat more diffidently, President Bush conveyed the same message.

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7:43 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: January 7, 2004
SUBJECT: **POTUS Briefing**

I do need *to* brief the President on the submarine issue with Vern Clarke and Dick Myers there. Let's get it set.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.IO

Please respond by: _____

337 WH

7 Jan 04

2/19
1400

720

EF-8295
04/001185

January 28, 2004

Durnan → *TO SD*
2/18 *cc: LTG Craddock*

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
LTG John Craddock

SUBJECT: Poland

The Polish **MoD** wants me to go to Poland for the Ukraine-Poland meeting. He will set the date to fit with me, either in late May or early June, possibly tie it to the Normandy D-day meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012804-3

.....
Please respond by _____

NATO 337

28 Jan 04

29-01-04 11:35

11-L-0559/OSD/30790

OSD 06449-04

January 13, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: William Winkenwerder
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA
SUBJECT: Wagee Barzani

You are in charge of dealing with this medical problem that Jay Garner wrote about concerning Wagee Barzani.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/9/04 Garner ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
011304-11

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

OB
1/20

Irag

13 Jan 04

✓
1/13

January 9, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

Last night I visited Wagee Barzani, the youngest brother of Masoud Barzani, leader of the KDP, (the largest Kurdish Political Party). As you will remember, Wagee was severely wounded and maimed by friendly fire shortly after the war began. Today, Wagee is missing his left eye, he cannot talk, he cannot walk, and he continually sustains serious internal organ problems. By all rights he should be dead; however, he is a tough soldier from a tough family...and I might add, a family that has, over the decades, been extremely pro-American at great personal expense.

After his wounds from friendly fire, we (DOD) committed to oversee and manage his recovery. He received excellent treatment as an in-patient at Walter Reed for several months. However, since that time the oversight by DOD to assist and manage his recovery has been shoddy, unsupportive and embarrassing. If you were to hear the entire story, you would be shocked, enraged and personally embarrassed.

This is the reason for sending this report: After all, the Kurds and especially the Barzanis were our only Iraqi allies during the war. I know you are extremely limited with your time, but I also know you would not condone this lack of performance and support from DOD. I would ask you to call or visit Wagee and Avan (she speaks excellent English) and to also assign a DOD POC which has appropriate authority to assist this family. Wagee is a symbol to all of Kurdistan, and they represent over 20% of the Iraqi population...and again, they were and are our allies. Their address and phone number are: 1410 N Scott, Apt 565, Arlington, VA 22209 ph: 703-969-0875.

I have been so disturbed by this, as I know you will be. Thank you for allowing me to vent.

Jay

(Garner)

cc: LTG Craddock

11-L-0559/OSD/30792

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

January 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Spanish Detainee

*Advance
copy sent*

383.6

I want to put a full court press on that Spanish detainee. Aznar is coming.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011404-5

.....
Please respond by NLT 1700, 14 JAN 04

✓ 1/15

1/14

14 Jan 04

OSD 06452-04

14-01-04 11:14 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/30793

EF-8372

FEB 2

January 30, 2004

I-04/001269

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: HARM-III

Why did we give the Harm-III to Egypt?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
013004-8

.....

Please respond by 2/12/04
2/03/04

Egypt

2 Feb 04

120

~~Resonance (UK)~~

EF FILE

Hadley

FILE COPY

27
January 28, 2004

EF-8259
I-04/001054

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM:
SUBJECT: UK Paper

Here is the UK think piece on the Iraq security agreement. Please take a look at it and see how closely we have conformed.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/7/04 UK Paper

DHR:dh
012304-19

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

1/28/04

→ SD

Policy ExecSec's Note
January 28, 2004

CDR Nosenzo,

- Mr. Feith gave the attached response to SecDef at this morning's Roundtable.

C. L. O'Connor
Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

There's a reasonable degree of overlap in UK and DOD thinking.

I spoke to Hadley on this on Jan 27 and he said that Cond. agrees strongly with your approach, but has some suggestions about revising our tactics, which sounded reasonable to me.

Hadley suggested that we finish getting all USG principals lined up and then engage the UK.

I'll try to get this done today or tomorrow.

Doug Feith

COMPLETED

~~Resonance (UK)~~

27-01-04 12:58 IN

Iraq

27 JAN 04

~~RESTRICTED (UK)~~

27
January 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK Paper

Here is the UK think piece on the Iraq security agreement. Please take a look at it and see how closely we have conformed.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/7/04 UK Paper

DHR:dh
012304-19

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

~~(S)~~ 30796

OSD 06463-04

Rec'd from
Simon Webb
1/7/04

UK FOOD FOR THOUGHT PAPER: IRAQ SECURITY AGREEMENT

Limited scope

- the Agreement should focus on the key principles of the security relationship ie the functions and responsibilities of the multinational presence during the transition period. Details of rights, immunities etc can come in a later SOFA, based on the NATO standard.

Consent

- multinational forces after transition must be in Iraq at the invitation of the government. This demonstrates a clean break with the "occupying power" period. Principle of consent will also be essential for widening international participation.

Negotiation on behalf of all MNF contributors.

- US should negotiate as commander of the MNF, consulting main contributors. Each contributor should subsequently agree an MOU with US, as is usual procedure.

MNF form

- familiar model may be most easily understood. A UN-authorized MNF, under US unified command, is the simplest option. Bringing host country in as a troop contributor new, but potentially workable. But we should avoid over-elaborate structures that could arouse suspicions that sovereignty was not being respected and complicate UNSC endorsement. Adding in elements of a regional security structure would add further complexities.

Command of Iraqi forces, freedom of action and right to detain

- key red lines. But they will need to be **expressed** clearly in terms of delineation of MNF/Iraqi responsibilities (eg not all Iraqi forces under Iraqi control; purposes for which MNF will need freedom of action and right to detain should be spelt out.) Agreement may need to include provision for what ultimately happens to those the MNF forces detain.

Principle of transition

- principle of a progressive migration of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capacity builds must run through the security agreement. This could be facilitated by focus on tasking, with capability being the key determinant of who does what.

Iraqi responsibility for elements of security

agreement should provide that initially Iraqis take on responsibility for certain security tasks, eg local law enforcement, and take on more as they gain capacity. Shared tasks could include counter-insurgency, with detailed arrangements worked out for joint command structures. The MNF should take on responsibility for external threats. Flexibility to amend arrangements that were not working should be built in.

Iraqi membership of the MNF

- Iraq could assign elements (not all) of its security forces to the MNF. It remains *to be* seen how saleable such an approach would be to the Iraqis or the UNSC, although it should be noted (1) that those security forces which would be most visible to the population on a day-to-day basis – ie, the police – would not be so assigned, and would be visibly under Iraqi leadership; and (2) that the MNF and Iraqi leaders would exercise strategic control through a National Security Council (see below).
- The arguments for assigning other Iraqi security force elements to the MNF are essentially (1) that indigenous command and control mechanisms will not be sufficiently developed in this timeframe for independent Iraqi operations to be a realistic option for the more demanding security tasks; (2) that where tasks (eg counter-insurgency operations) are shared between the Iraqis and the MNF the two sets of forces must have a single command chain to minimise the risk of confusion (and, eg, fratricide).
- Iraqi security forces assigned in this way would need to include the ICDC (which is not intended to have a long-term independent existence, but which the Iraqi army will not be able to absorb until its command structure is more developed), probably-- national/high-end police capabilities, and elements of the armed forces as they are stood up. Those forces not so assigned (such as the police) would be subject only to Iraqi command. As Iraqi capacity develops, and subject to the situation on the ground at the time, the number of Iraqi force elements assigned to the MNF could be progressively reduced.

Iraqi strategic and political input

- Iraqi high level involvement and co-ordination could be delivered through an Iraqi National Security Council of Iraqi government Ministers and military, with a seat for the MNF commander and say, two major contributors. It would provide a forum for discussion of strategic goals, consultation on implementation of the Agreement and clarity over who was responsible for specific tasks - but not operational control. Will need to be squared with Fundamental Law and arrangements for transitional government.

International legitimacy

- the Agreement needs to attract continued involvement of multinational forces. UNSCR 1511 already endorses the multinational force in place in Iraq. Re-authorisation of the force by the UNSC, on the basis of the already negotiated new agreement, would be the simplest way to do this. But UNSC will need to see an explicit invitation from the sovereign Iraqi government for continued presence after 1 July as well as IGC agreement, and a further SCR after this may thus be necessary.
- one possible model could be an ISAF/Korean hybrid. UN and US double-hatting would not work without a real blue hatted command structure. Expect UN only to come into the picture to authorise MNF; it would have no operational decision-making power, and the UNSC's role should be limited to receiving regular reports from Commander MNF. But

the element in the Korean model of consultative arrangements at the strategic/political level between the host country and US MNF command (see above) would help gain Iraqi buy-in.

Cooperation element

- the Agreement needs to demonstrate a balance in what is provided to and by the multinational presence. The agreement should commit MNF partners to delivering a continued package of assistance for build up **the** capacity of Iraqi security forces to a point where they can take over **full** responsibility for Iraq's security.

Provision for withdrawal

- an explicit provision for review on transition should not be included. But genuine sovereignty requires that the Iraqis are able to withdraw. Six months notice is a reasonable period; any longer suggests being "tied in". Continuation of the arrangements should be subject to review after the period of transition is up.

- the Fundamental Law should refer to how Iraq's security will be assured in the transition period, as well as commitments to international obligations including on WMD.

May 3, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Comparison to Vietnam

Mr. President—

Attached for your possible interest is a paper that one of the staff over here did on the comparison between Vietnam and Iraq.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Undated: "Vietnam? No Comparison"

DHR:dh
050304-27

Iraq

3 May 04

OSD 06474-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30800

Vietnam? No Comparison.

- It's difficult to recall of an instance in which guerillas alone have ever won a war. They can:
 - Harass.
 - Ambush.
 - Mine roads.
 - Occasionally shoot down a helicopter.
 - Occasionally mass for an attack (like in Ramadi last week).

- But these things don't win wars, *unless they break the will of the stronger power*. Guerillas stand a better chance of winning when they:
 - Have a coherent political strategy;
 - Can serve as an auxiliary to a conventional force;
 - Enjoy the benefit of an external sanctuary;
 - Have the support of a sympathetic population;
 - Supplied by a major client state.

- Has Iraq become, as some have claimed, "George Bush's Vietnam?" Hardly. Iraq is not like Vietnam:
 - There is no conventional North Vietnamese Army to distract us from organizing to fight a guerilla war.
 - There is no coherent anti-coalition strategy like Hanoi's "armed struggle" and "political struggle."
 - There is no external sanctuary of the scope enjoyed by Hanoi.

- There is no overwhelming sympathy from the population.
- There is no major client state supplying the guerillas.
- With time and perseverance, an army can always defeat guerillas acting alone especially if that army:
 - Organizes for counter-guerilla operations;
 - Develops good intelligence and acts on it quickly;
 - Isolates the guerilla strongholds (prevent them from entering or leaving);
 - Systematically identifies, captures, or kills trapped guerillas;
 - Gains and keeps the support of the local population;
 - Secures the borders.

We are doing these things in Iraq today and we will win. Iraq is not like Vietnam.

720
TAB A

March 15, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SLRG on Updating Systems and Processes

Attached is a memo I am sending out on broken systems and processes.

Please put this on an agenda for a SLRG meeting ~~some~~ time.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/15/04 SecDef memo re: Updating Systems and Processes (#031504-23)

DHR:dh
031504-25

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30803

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three **years**, where only **after** a period of serious problems with a **DoD** system or process have we realized that **we** **were** still in the industrial age, rather **than** the **21st** century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, **and** the process for preparing **them was** antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the **21st** century. **Now** we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict **was** broken. **Now we** are fixing it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component **was** clearly **out** of whack. **Now** we are rebalancing the **AC/RC**.
- Our **SRO** procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the **Guard** and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend **per month** and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate **when** we are mobilizing to the extent **we** have had to during the Iraq conflict.

11-L-0559/OSD/30804

TAB A

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that is broken. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need ~~them~~ and before we discover they are not suited to the 21st century, I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION:

CJCS

VCJCS

DJS

DSD

USD(P)

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USD(P&R)

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ASD(NII)

SecArmy

SecNav

SecAF

CoS Army

CoS Air Force

CNO

CMC

COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

TAB B



**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND**



APR 16 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington DC 20301-1000**

**FROM: Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite BO16
Peterson AF8 CO 80914-3801**

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures (SecDef Memo, 17 March 2004)

1. In response to the SecDefs request for feedback on updating systems and procedures, we have coordinated with OSD (PA&E) and provide the following comments.

a. Several current policies, and in some cases statutes, present significant obstacles to the approval, funding and execution of civil support missions. Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, these precautions provided the appropriate level of oversight for the prudent use of DoD resources. However, now they constitute unnecessary impediments to conducting civil support missions that augment the interagency effort in the Global War on Terrorism. We believe this is the right time to undertake a comprehensive review regarding how DoD will conduct homeland defense and civil support in the future.

b. We are reviewing the roles and responsibilities of NORAD and anticipate recommending the expansion of the bi-national command's mission beyond air sovereignty, including areas such as maritime domain awareness. NORAD must transform to augment its ability to accomplish its legacy strategic mission with the new requirements of the Global War on Terrorism.

c. We propose modification of the Enhanced Planning Process by allowing combatant commands to submit their POMs directly to OSD/PA&E, instead of commands competing within executive agent (Service) POMs. Each command submitting a POM directly to OSD would then be evaluated and resourced on a level playing field with the Services and fellow combatant commands.

2. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on systems and procedures. We believe these proposed adjustments will improve our mission effectiveness. Please pass these to the Secretary per his request.

**RALPH E. EBERHART
General, USAF**

**cc:
OJS
DIRECTOR, OSD (PA&E)**

11-L-0559/OSD/30806

Tab B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRET

MAY 11 2004

INFO MEMO

CM-1745-04
11 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/5/11*

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

- In response to your request (TAB A), the Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM), reply is attached (TAB B). The memorandum proposes that combatant commanders make direct submissions to the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), as part of the program objective memorandum process.
- CDRUSNORTHCOM proposal has been forwarded to Director, (PA&E), for consolidation with other issues under consideration by the Senior Level Review Group.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30807

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 15, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: SLRG on Updating Systems and Processes

Attached is a memo I am sending out on broken systems and processes.

Please put this on an agenda for a SLRG meeting sometime.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/15/04 SecDef memo re: Updating Systems and Processes (#031504-23)

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30808

OSD 06893-04

TAB A

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only after a period of serious problems **with** a DoD system or process have **we realized** that **we** were still in the industrial age, rather than **the 21st** century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for **preparing** them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21st century. Now we are fixing **them**.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict **was** broken. Now *we are* **fixing** it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component **was** clearly **out of whack**. Now we are rebalancing the AC/RC.
- Our **SRO** procedures were sluggish and out of date. **Now** they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the **pay** systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are **doing** one weekend **per month** and a **two-week** active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

11-L-0559/OSD/30809

TAB A

I am concerned about **what we'll** discover next that is broken. We've made lots of progress **on the operational side, but please review** the systems, procedures and business practices that you **use** and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe **we** need to **fix now**, before we need **them and** before we discover **they** are not suited to the 21st century. I'd **like** to try to get ahead of the *curve*.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg **in PA&E**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by

4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION:

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VCJCS

DJS

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USD(C)

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USD(AT&L)

USD(I)

GC

ASD(LA)

ASD(PA)

ASD(NII)

SecArmy

SecNav

SecAF

CoS Army

CoS Air Force

CNO

CMC

COCOM: EUCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM,
SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

11-L-0559/OSD/30810

Tab A

TAB B



NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND



APR 16 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington DC 20301-1000

FROM: **Commander**, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016
Peterson AFB CO 80914-3801

SUBJECT: Updating Systems and Procedures (SecDef Memo, 17 March 2004)

1. In response to the SecDef's request for **feedback** on updating systems and procedures, **we** have coordinated with OSD (PA&E) and provide the following comments.

a. Several current policies, and in some **cases** statutes, **present** significant **obstacles** to the **approval**, funding and execution of civil support missions. Prior to the events of 11 September **2001**, these precautions provided the appropriate level of oversight for the prudent use of DoD resources. However, now they constitute unnecessary impediments to conducting civil support missions that augment the interagency effort in the **Global War on Terrorism**. **We** believe this is the right time to undertake a comprehensive **review** regarding how DoD will conduct homeland defense and civil support in the future.

b. We are reviewing the roles and responsibilities of NORAD and anticipate **recommending** the expansion of the **bi-national** command's mission **beyond** air sovereignty, **including** areas such as maritime domain awareness. NORAD must transform to augment **its** ability to accomplish its legacy strategic **mission** with the new requirements of the Global War on Terrorism.

c. **We** propose modification of the **Enhanced** Planning Process by allowing combatant **commands** to **submit** their POMs directly to OSD/PA&E, instead of commands competing within executive agent (Service) POMs. **Each** command submitting a POM directly to OSD would then be **evaluated** and resourced on a **level playing field** with the Services and fellow combatant commands.

2. **We** appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on systems and procedures. **We** believe these proposed adjustments will improve our mission effectiveness. **Please** pass these to the Secretary per his request.

RALPH E. EBERHART
General, USAF

cc:
OJS
DIRECTOR, OSD (PA&E)

11-L-0559/OSD/30811

Tab B



TAB

April 27, 2004

762

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
 CC: Paul Wolfowitz
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Battle Damage Assessment Integration

381

In the SLRG on April 26, it **was** suggested that possibly the Chairman do a battle damage assessment integration process. Do you have plans to do that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042704.3



Please respond by 5/7/04

27 Apr 04
12 May 04

Tab



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1749-04
12 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RB/MS/11

SUBJECT: Battle Damage Assessment Integration

- **Question.** "In the SLRG on April 26, it was suggested that possibly the Chairman do a battle damage assessment integration process. Do you have plans to do that?" (TAB)
- **Answer.** A battle damage assessment (BDA) integration process is set in joint doctrine, but its implementation is inadequate.
- **Analysis.** The military targeting community is working three initiatives to improve the process: standardizing federation, leveraging information technology (IT) and creating a combat assessment working group (CAWG).
 - **Standardizing Federation:** The intent is to designate specific intelligence organizations as permanent federated partners with specific functional target sets. These organizations will then be able to develop functional expertise and train regularly to support targeting and BDA requirements. Under the current federated BDA process, combatant commands work with the Joint Staff/J-2 to establish a unique federated architecture for each crisis. This is neither efficient nor conducive to effective training because organizations and responsibilities can change for each crisis.
 - **Leveraging IT:** The joint targeting cycle, including BDA integration, is improving through the creation of the Joint Targeting Toolbox (JTT) and a targeting portal. JTT will improve support to all phases of the joint targeting cycle, including BDA deficiencies identified in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Creating a single targeting portal will streamline and integrate combat assessment efforts by linking combatant commands and Intelligence Community target analyses.
 - **Creating a CAWG:** The CAWG was formed in December 2003 to resolve OIF combat assessment (and BDA) shortfalls. The CAWG includes combatant commands, Service, national agencies and Allied representatives.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Major General Ronald L. Burgess Jr., USA; Director, J-2;

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30813

OSD 06946-04

May 3, 2004

TO: Gordon England
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Please take a look at this paper by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and tell me if you think there is anything I ought to be doing with respect to this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.

Undated, Mahnken and FitzSimonds: "Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation"

DHR:dh
050304-30

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

11-L-0559/OSD/30814

OSD 06978-04

37 MAY 12 PM 2:24

May 12, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Mr. Secretary,

In your note of May 3, you asked me to take a look at the survey by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and let you know if there is anything you ought to be doing with respect to this issue. The answer is no.

This survey does highlight a few items the other Service Secretaries and Chiefs may find interesting so therefore I will make sure that the CNO and CMC, as well as the other Service Secretaries and Chiefs, receive a copy with the areas of interest highlighted.

May 3, 2004

TO: Gordon England
c c : Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation

Please take a look at this paper by Mahnken and FitzSimonds and tell me if you think there is anything I ought to be doing with respect to this issue.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated, Mahnken and FitzSimonds: "Officer Attitudes Toward Innovation"

DHR:dh
050304-30

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04



October 18, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Addition to Awards List and Thank You Note

Please add to the to my awards list the following:

The Precision Strike Association gave me the Special Recognition Award on October 12, 2004 for "Critical Insight, Vision and Commitment to Our Nation in Advancing and Improving Precision Strike Systems in Defense of the United States."

The organization gave me this award via Paul Wolfowitz, as I was out of the country. He has a letter we should get a copy of – so that I can write a note of thanks.

DHR:ss
101804-11



Please respond by _____

001,15D

18 Oct 04

1 Apr 04



OSD 07021-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30817

October 18, 2004

P.B.
Draft letter
to me to
sign




Sir -

You asked where a letter from SecDef should be addressed regarding his recent award from the Precision Strike Association. The letter should be addressed to:

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

with a courtesy copy to Ms. Virginia Sniegon, the PSA Programs Chair, at the same address. Ginny is apparently the person who nominated the Secretary for the award, which was voted on by the Executive Board of the Association.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 2004

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

Dear Mr. Savage,

I thank you so much for the Special Recognition Award for "critical insight, vision and commitment to our nation in advancing and improving precision strike systems in defense of the United States."

It was very kind of the Precision Strike Association to select me for this unique honor. I do appreciate it.

With my best wishes for the continued success of your organization,

Sincerely,

OSD 07021-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30819

0011510

29 OCT 04

1 APR 04

Pres for SecDef

Larry Di Rita
1/29

Mr. Wayne F. Savage
Chairman of the Board
Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

Dear Mr. Savage,

I thank you so much for the Special Recognition Award for "Critical Insight, Vision and Commitment to Our Nation in Advancing and Improving Precision Strike Systems in Defense of the United States."

It was very kind of the Precision Strike Association to select me for this unique honor. I do appreciate it.

With my best wishes for the continued success of your organization,

Sincerely,

Sam



From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

10/19

Don -

These are the folks who
gave you the Precision
Strike award.

Paul W.

OSD 07021-04

001,150

19 OCT 04

1 APR 04

HERE IS WHAT I COULD
FIND
CSC - DSD OFFICE

MIGHT HAVE MORE
CHECK W/ CAPT O'CONNOR
IF YOU USED INFO IN

11-L-0559/OSD/30821



1 April 2004

SECRET
APR 13 11 03 AM '04
Affiliate, National Defense Industrial Association

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

Members of the Precision Strike Association (PSA) wholeheartedly respect your vision and commitment to the goals/objectives of transforming the Defense Department – especially as you use the urgency of the present global war on terrorism to continue transforming our military.

PSA, founded during the mid-1980s by a small core of Defense experts in support of precision strike systems, is sponsoring its 14th annual Precision Strike Technology Symposium on 12-14 October 2004. This three-day event will be held at the Kossiakoff Conference Center of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD. It would be our distinct honor to have you open the symposium by delivering the keynote address to the precision strike community on Tuesday, 12 October (unclassified day) at 1300 – or whenever convenient that afternoon to accommodate your demanding schedule. *“Accelerating Joint & Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike”* is the theme for this symposium.

At that time, PSA also wishes to present you with a special award in recognition of your keen insight into the need for and the use of precision strike weapons during the past 30 years. This award will recognize your leadership in making precision strike systems a reality – from the time you made the decision to establish the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office in 1977 until the present time of accelerating the Services’ transformation – to allow critical precision strike systems to become fully interoperable within the joint environment.

PSA is a non-profit organization dedicated to advancing precision strike systems by promoting new concepts, facilitating communication between leaders in government and the commercial sector, and influencing technology investment and infusion. Over 300 representatives from industry, government, and the international arena are expected to participate. Embassy officials and the Press will attend the unclassified sessions on 12 October and the morning of 13 October. Presentations scheduled for the afternoon of 13 October and all day on 14 October will be conducted at the SECRET–Releasable to NATO level.

Secretary Rumsfeld, we hope that you will be available to accept our invitation to address this year’s symposium on 12 October and to receive our special recognition. Thank you for your consideration. I will remain in contact with your staff and can be reached at 703-845-6719.

Sincerely,

Ginny Sniegon

Executive Board & Programs Chair

2111 Wilson Boulevard • Suite 400 • Arlington, VA 22201
Telephone: (703) 247-2590 • Fax: (b)(6) • <http://www.precisionstrike.org>

11-L-0559/OSD/30822

OSD 07021:04

PRECISION STRIKE ASSOCIATION
PRECISION STRIKE TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM

OCTOBER 12-14, 2004

KOSSIAKOFF CONFERENCE CENTER * THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY * LAUREL, MD

Accelerating Joint & Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike

PSA Programs Chair: Ginny Sniegon * PSA Programs Vice-Chair: CAPT Jim Hart, USN
PSTS-04 Tri-Chairs: Dr. John Walter, Harvey Dahljelm, George McVeigh
PSTS-04 Technical Chairs: CAPT Jim Hart USN, Tim Beard, Manny Garrido, Dean Larson
PSTS-04 Classified Chairs: George McVeigh & Dick Rumpf
Warfighter Representatives: CAPT Deke Philman USN, Col Lance Moore USA, Maj Chad Stevenson USAF

Tuesday, 12 October 2004

—ALL AFTERNOON UNCLASSIFIED—

- 1130 CHECK-IN & LIGHT REFRESHMENTS
- 1230 SYMPOSIUM WELCOME:
Wayne Savage—Chairman of the Board
- 1235 JHU / APL WELCOME:
- 1240 OPENING REMARKS:
- 1300 KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld—Secretary of Defense (*Ginny invited*)
- 1340 SPECIAL AWARD RECOGNITION TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD
- 1345 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—MY OBSERVATIONS:
Lt Gen William S. (Scott) Wallace, USA—Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth (Ginny confirmed w/Gen Wallace & his Staff)

1430 AFTERNOON REFRESHMENT BREAK

1450 ACCELERATING PRECISION STRIKE TECHNOLOGIES — WHERE ARE WE SPENDING S&T FUNDS?

Moderator: Harvey *Dahljelm*—Director, Air Force & Space Programs, ITT Industries

- What is happening now: Charles *Holland* —DUSD (Science & Technology) (*Harvey invited 3/17*)
- What is happening mid-term: Industry Representative (*Harvey invite*)
- What is happening long-term: Dr. Spiro *Lekondis* —Director, Weapons Systems, DUSD (S&T) (*Harvey invited 3/17*)

1545 COALITION TECHNOLOGIES

Chair: Paul Hitchcock—MBDA Missiles Systems

- United Kingdom
- France
- Germany

1700 EVENING RECEPTION

Wednesday, 13 October 2004

—MORNING UNCLASSIFIED— AFTERNOON CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET Rf to NATO~~—

0730 CHECK-IN

0800 KEYNOTE ADDRESS—DARPA'S ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES

Dr. Anthony J. Tether—Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(*Harvey/Ginny invited 3/18*)

0845 TARGETING SESSION

Chair: Manny *Garrido*—Battlespace, Inc.

- Invite DARPA speaker to open session to present overview on IDENTIFYING AND TRACKING TARGETS (DAKYA is placing a lot of money into this area). Further, address Investments Today for Future Capabilities — Detection, Precision ID, Tracking & Destruction of Elusive Surface Targets
- Unclassified Targeting Paper
- Unclassified Targeting Paper

1000 MORNING REFRESHMENT BREAK

1015 WEAPONS SESSION

Chair: *Captain Jim Hart, USN*—OUSD(AT&L)/Defense Systems, Air Warfare

- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper
- Unclassified Weapons Paper

1145 LUNCHEON—Kossiakoff Center Dining Room

1230 LUNCHEON ADDRESS:

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN (Ret)—President, ATK Missile Systems Co.

* * *

~~ALL AFTERNOON CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO NATO~~

1315 C4ISR SESSION

Chair: *Tim Beard*—BAE Systems

- Unclassified or Classified C4ISR Paper

1430 AFTERNOON REFRESHMENT BREAK

1445 EFFECTS SESSION

Chair: *Dr. Dean Larson*—The CNA Corporation

- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper
- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper
- Unclassified or Classified Effects Paper

1545 WARFIGHTERS' FLAG PANEL

Moderators: *Captain Deke Philman, USN*—Headquarters, U.S. Navy

Major Chad Stevenson, USAF—Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

- Joint Staff Perspective: *(Jim invite)*
- Army Perspective: *(Lance invite)*
- Navy Perspective: *(Deke invite)*
- Marine Corps Perspective: *(Deke invite)*
- Air Force Perspective: *(Chad invite)*

1700 ADJOURN

Thursday, 14 October

~~ALL DAY CLASSIFIED SECRET REL TO NATO~~

0700 CHECK-IN

0745 KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

MG Michael D. Maples, USA—Deputy Director, The Joint Staff (George invited 3/17)

0830 THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Christopher Yates: Defense Intelligence Agency (George invite)

0900 CLASSIFIED TARGETING/WEAPONS SESSION

Chair: George McVeigh—SAIC

- Targeting Paper
- Targeting Paper
- Weapons Paper
- Weapons Paper

1015 MORNING REFRESHMENT BREAK

1030 GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FUTURE JOINT& COALITION ADVANCES FOR PRECISION STRIKE

Moderator: Dick Rumpf—President, Rumpf Associates International

Major General James M. Dubik, USA—Director, Joint Experimentation Directorate (J-9), U.S. Joint Forces Command (Ginny/Lance invite)

Brig Gen Kevin Kennedy, USAF—Director, Strike Warfare, U.S. Strategic Command (Brig Gen Kennedy accepted Ginny's invitation 4/1)

1130 NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES:

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Representative (Ginny working—discussed with Suzanne Incoe of NGA 2/4)

1215 OPEN—DICK RUMPF SCHEDULE CLASSIFIED TOPIC & INVITE SPEAKER

1300 CLOSING REMARKS:

Wayne Savage

1305 DEPARTURE SNACKS

CALL FOR PAPERS

Precision Strike Technology Symposium 2004

*The Precision Strike Association will sponsor the
Fourteenth Annual Precision Strike Technology Symposium
12-14 October 2004 – Kossiakoff Conference Center
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel MD.*

Overview & Purpose

Transformation demands innovative thinking and a process that can identify, examine, and turn technology or concepts into reality. The purpose of PSTS-04 is to continue to provide a forum for exchanging insights, experiences, and ideas regarding the Acceleration of Joint and Coalition Technology Advances for Precision Strike, as well as to introduce new or improved technologies, capabilities, concepts, and processes into Precision Strike planning and operations. PSTS-04 papers should focus on innovations that span near to far time horizons.

Desired Topics

- + Weapons
- + Effects
- + C4ISR
- + Targeting

Abstracts for proposed papers are to be sent to the Precision Strike Association by:

E-mail to: info@precisionstrike.org (preferred)

Fax to: (b)(6) Attn Dawn Campbell-PSA)

Mail to: Precision Strike Association
2111 Wilson Blvd. -Suite 400
Arlington, VA 22201-3061

Requirements & Schedule

Individuals desiring to present a paper for consideration should ensure that the abstract is pertinent to the symposium theme and/or session topics and that it is no longer than 500 words. Abstracts are due no later than Friday, 11 June 2004. **Presentations may be to the SECRET level, but all abstracts must be UNCLASSIFIED.** Innovative concepts and ideas are particularly welcomed, and multimedia presentations are strongly encouraged.

Papers should be suitable for a no-minute presentation. Abstracts should include the intended classification of the paper and must include the point of contact, complete address, e-mail, telephone and fax number. Specific format requirements will be provided to those individuals whose abstracts are selected.

The Following Schedule Applies:

- ✦ Deadline for Abstracts: 11 JUNE 2004
- ✦ Acceptance Notification sent by
E-mail: Week of 19 JULY 2004
- ✦ Symposium: 12-14 OCTOBER 2004

PSTS-04

Virginia (Cinny) A. Sniegon

Adjunct
Cost Analysis and Research Division



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

4850 Mark Center Drive / Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

(b)(6)

fax

vsniegon@ida.org

11-L-0559/OSD/30828

72

10:05 AM
10:05 AM
2004 MAR 14 10:04 AM

TAB A

March 8, 2004

721

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-20

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

0 SD 07131-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30829



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2004 MAY 14 11:13:05

INFO MEMO

CM-1758-04
14 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

MM 5/13

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Personnel

- **Question.** "Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve. Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** The Services and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) have reviewed this concept and do not intend to recall retired or IRR personnel with civil affairs (CA) experience for possible use in Afghanistan or Iraq at this time. As of 19 April, no action has been taken regarding the retired International Executive Service Corps.
- **Analysis.** In February, the Director, Joint Staff (DJS) provided a list of more than 3,000 military retiree volunteers to the CPA; 47 had CA-related military skills. In March, the DJS asked the Services to screen their IRR population for personnel with CA experience and they identified 437. Age, availability, and security clearance issues are primary concerns of the Services. Additionally, CPA has reviewed the possibility of utilizing the IRR population and has decided against such a policy.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Brig Gen Maria C. Owens, USAF; Director, J-1;

(b)(6)

OSD 07131-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30830

11-L-0559/OSD/30831
030804-20
030804-20

TAB A

March 8, 2004

721

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Calling Back Retired Personnel

Have we made any attempt to get retired civil affairs personnel back on active duty to help out in Afghanistan or Iraq? They may be in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Have we made any effort to get the retired executive international corps going?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-20

.....
Please respond by 3/26/04

OSD 0713 L-04

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION

AGENCY	NAME	DATE
USA	COL Wright	16 March 2004
USN	CAPT Thompson	29 March 2004
USAF	COL Ball	16 March 2004
USMC	COL VanDyke	16 March 2004

TAB A

RECEIVED
DEFENSE ATTACHMENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 FEB 2004 11:12

8:30 AM

709

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 25, 2004
SUBJECT: UCP

It seems to me that the linkage between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is an important one. If I am not mistaken, at the present time, all those countries except Kazakhstan are in EUROM. It may be that we want to move Kazakhstan into EUROM.

The only other country in that area that is a prospect for EUROM it seems to me is Uzbekistan because of their clear orientation toward NATO and the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Let's think this through and discuss it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.11

Please respond by: _____ 3/5

Tab A

OSD 07134-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30833

May 25, 2004

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
 Paul Wolfowitz
 Gen. Pete Pace
 Doug Feith
 LTG John Craddock
 Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CSIS Recommendations

020505

Your approach on how to organize for the Hamre/CSIS recommendations sounds fine. Press on!

Thanks.

Attach.
5/14/04 SecNav letter

DHR:dh
052504-2

.....
Please respond by _____

25 MAY 2004

09 JUN 04

07135 04


5/14
1800

SECRET

May 14, 2004 2004 MAY 14 PM 1:33

AWB
[Handwritten signature]

To:  SECDEF

Fr: Gordon England 

Subj: CSIS/Hamre Recommendation Follow On



Mr. Secretary,

You asked me to think about how we could organize ourselves to properly evaluate the CSIS/Hamre recommendations and to develop a plan for implementation. The attachments outline the approach.

I am asking Doug Feith, Pete Pace and some of the members of your immediate staff to accept taskings in their area of responsibility, including schedules to completion. When responses are received, the output of these separate efforts will be integrated into an overall implementation recommendation for SLRG presentation/decision.

Let me know if you disagree with this approach.

Attachments

TSA SD	5/20
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	5/14

OSD 07135-04

April 29, 2004

TO: Gordon England

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hamre's Recommendations

John Hamre came in with a lot of interesting recommendations for the organization of DoD.

Why don't you think about how we could organize ourselves to properly evaluate his recommendations and develop a plan to implement the one we agree with?

You don't seem busy enough!

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042904-2

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 07135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30836

***USD (Policy) lead on following CSIS interagency recommendations
with assistance from Joint Staff***

CSIS Interagency Recommendations
President should establish a new NSC office with the mandate to integrate agency plans.
Establish SOP for the planning of complex interagency operations.
All agencies establish planning offices to lead the development of plans in the interagency process.
Designate one senior official in charge of interagency operations.
Congress establish a new Agency for Stability Operations with a civilian stability operations corps.
Congress create a new Training Center for Interagency Operations and fund international training / exercise programs.
Congress increase funding for programs that support building operational capabilities of allies in complex operations.
Enhance opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with counterparts.
Congress seek a bipartisan "BRAC" like" process in overseeing DoD.

CSIS Interagency Objectives
1. Integrate political, military, economic, humanitarian and other agencies into complex contingency planning.
2. Achieve greater unity of effort in interagency planning for post conflict operations. -Establish procedures for developing integrated strategies and coherent plans.
3. Develop expertise by incorporating dedicated planning staffs and professional training.
4. Achieve a level of jointness at the interagency levels
5. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning

**VCJCS lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations
Members: USD (P&R)/(AT&L), and Service Vice Chiefs**

CSIS Organizational Recommendations

Create an integrated civ/mil J1 and OSD (P&R) staff.

Create an integrated civ/mil J4 and OSD (AT&L) staff.

Consolidate J6 and elements of DISA, create a joint C2 task force with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authority.

Disband J7 and transfer responsibilities to the J5 and the Joint Forces Command.

CSIS Organizational Objectives

1. Build an integrated civ/mil staff by consolidating or eliminating duplicative staffs that create excessive wasteful coordination processes. Need to preserve diversity of ideas and perspectives.
2. Staffs should focus on their essential functions.
 - OSD should focus on policy formulation and oversight not program management.
 - Joint Staff should focus on roles in support of CJCS.
3. Create oversight to improve effectiveness in policy formation and strategic thinking.
4. Strengthen joint advocacy to solve joint capability needs.
 - Resolve lack of C2/C3 jointness by strengthening oversight.
5. Strengthen advocacy for joint programs and requirements.
 - Removes processes that are resistive to change.
6. Tie resource allocation decisions to DoD strategy and planning processes.
7. Create stronger roles for key players that have a stake in strategy and planning.
 - Forces the tough trade-off decisions at a higher level.

VCJCS lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations Members: COCOMs and Service Vice Chiefs

CSIS Organizational Recommendation

Build capabilities in the COCOM for a stronger role in the resource allocation process.

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DEPSECDEF lead on following CSIS organizational recommendations

Members: USD (Policy)/Comptroller, PA&E, ASD (Public Affairs)

CSIS Organizational Recommendations

OSD consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary for Administration.

Expand the Under Secretary of Intelligence to include C3.

Build a strong PA&E capable of providing broad strategic choices for DoD.

Create an Office of Implementation and Execution Review that is tied directly to SECDEF.

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April 29, 2004

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Doug Feith
LTG John Craddock
Paul Butler

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DHR:dh
042904.2

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 07135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30841

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with assistance from Joint Staff**

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Members: USD (P&R)/(AT&L), and Service Vice Chiefs**

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Members: USD (Policy)/Comptroller, PA&E, ASD (Public Affairs)

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
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800
2004 MAY 14 PM 1:20
May 14, 2004

To: SECDEF
Fr: Gordon England 
Subj: CSIS/Hamre Recommendation Follow On

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Let me know if you disagree with this approach.

Attachments

OSD 07135-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30846

TAB A

SECURITY INFORMATION
APR 10 11 14 AM '04

April 8, 2004

743

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CJCS HAS SEEN

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Powell Moore

APR 09 2004

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*

SUBJECT: Private Security Forces

Please come back with an answer for the folks who asked about the disconnect between private security forces and US, Coalition and Iraqi security forces.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
040804-12

.....
Please respond by 4/23/04

Tab A

OSD 07140-04

May 17, 2004

TO: Dave Gompert
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note on Fallujah

IRAQ

Thanks so much for your note to John Craddock on Fallujah. I appreciate it.
You're doing a fine job, and we all thank you for it.

DHR:dh
051704-29

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 07311-04

19MAY04

May 17, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

IRAQ

Attached is a most interesting letter from Art Laffer on the subject of Iraq. I think you will find it interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.

2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-30

17MAY04

OSD 07312-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30849

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

Because of my experience with the domestic economy of Vietnam in the 1970-1974 period under George Schultz and my work on a post-Castro transition plan for Cuba with the Cuban American National Foundation, when it was ably led by Jorge Mas Canosa (who passed away five years ago), I thought you might be interested in my two-cents worth (which has been discounted even below two cents). Rather than criticizing what I may not have fully understood of the Bremer and CPA plans, I've limited myself to what I consider essential do's and don'ts for creating an economically viable society out of a war-ravaged former totalitarian state.

- A. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to reestablishing markets is the absence of a viable *stable-valued means of payment and store of value (currency)*. To foster economic interchange, merchants, workers, savers and investors need a currency they can count on both over time and across space. This currency has to be stable in value over time to satisfy the needs of small savers, and to provide a basis for contracts and it has to be *readily acceptable everywhere both inside and outside the region to facilitate trade and investment flows*.

I can't begin to tell you how depressing it was to the local economy of Mexico in 1976 when the peso started to collapse after having been stable for years and years. Likewise, Argentina's recent abandonment of the currency peg (under de la Rúa) and the subsequent financial collapse is a tragedy of immense proportions. Our own return to dollar credulity in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan was the *sine qua non* of America's renaissance. Time and again countries are forced to relearn the powerful dictum of a sound money.

Iraq does not have the ability nor does it have powerful enough political institutions to pursue, maintain and monitor its own currency *de novo*. Iraq, if it is to have its own currency at all, must have that currency immutably linked to the dollar or euro. My personal suggestion would be to use either euros or dollars as the domestic currency of

11-L-0559/OSD/30850

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.

Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.

- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full cloth of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for your continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Bucci
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121
858-458-0811
Fax (b)(6)



May 17, 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Economic Issues in Iraq

IRAQ

Attached is a most interesting letter from Art Laffer on the subject of Iraq. I think you will find it interesting.

Regards,

Attach.
2/18/04 Laffer ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
051704-32

19MAY04

OSD 07314-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30854

February 18, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Don,

Last week I was invited by a group of your finest (Marine officers) to a seminar at Camp Pendleton, which is only a few miles north of where I live. These guys are great and have been assigned to a variety of tasks involved in the transition of Iraq from an occupied, economically dependent territory to a self-governing economically independent country. They have their work cut out for them under the best of circumstances. Why I'm writing to you, however, is because I was led to believe both from written material and during the course of our conversations that these tasks are facing additional potentially insurmountable obstacles placed in their way by the Coalition Provisional Authority and other directives coming from the U.S.

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11-L-0559/OSD/30855

Iraq and don't even pretend to introduce a new Iraqi currency. Panama is dollarized literally, and lots of other countries are dollarized *de facto*, and the system works extremely well.

Attempting to set up a new currency puts at risk the entire Iraqi rehabilitation effort and could, if bad enough, force the lower echelons of the Iraqi economy into barter. Barter is inefficient, inconvenient and costly, and will materially impede the type of economic progress we all hope for. The upper levels will always be able to take advantage of foreign currencies.

- B. Also of exceptional importance for a new Iraqi government is the structure of fiscal policy (taxation, spending and the issuance of debt) at the national and provincial levels.

In countries like Iraq where financial markets are years and years away from sophistication, there is a virtual certainty that budget deficits will lead to overuse of the printing press and hyperinflation. Budget deficits also can lead to excessively high tax rates and widespread disregard and flouting of the laws. Therefore, clear and concise tax policy explicitly segregated between federal and provincial prerogatives is of the essence.

Iraq is extraordinarily fortunate to be blessed with oil. As such severance taxes on oil should be a mainstay for government revenues – severance taxes are about as efficient as taxes get. If set up correctly, a good system of oil severance taxes is effectively a tax on foreigners and should do the least damage to the domestic economy of any tax system I know. We have two states that use them extensively, Alaska and Wyoming. It also makes lots of sense to collect revenues on a comprehensive flat rate basis on imports. Any type of sin tax is also a good option because the economic damage the tax does is on the disfavored products. Also property taxes should be used at the provincial level – property and real estate are about the only items that can't escape local taxes by leaving. Any additional revenue supplements should be on a flat rate, broad-based, value added like tax.

Taxes that should be avoided are income taxes (especially progressive) and small taxes where the costs of collection approach or exceed the revenue actually collected. The keys to good tax policy are:

- i.) Tax those items most that can escape the least, and conversely tax those least that can easily escape. It makes no sense to tax something that then flees the jurisdiction, goes underground or stops working. You not only don't get the revenue, but you also lose the benefits of the productive services.
- ii.) Tax those things most that you least like (sin taxes). An additional benefit of sin taxes is that they do reduce the activity being taxed.
- iii.) Tax those things least where the collection costs are highest
- iv.) Broad based low rate taxes provide people with the least incentives to evade, avoid and otherwise not report taxable income and the least number of places where they can escape taxation.
- v.) Tax people fairly. People in like circumstances should have similar tax burdens. The perception of fairness is key to voluntary compliance.
- vi.) Make sure that taxation is not arbitrary or easily subject to discretionary changes. The power to tax in the wrong hands is an ugly weapon for exploitation.

- vii.) Lastly, collect only as much as you really need. Wasteful spending will always rise to the level of revenues.

These rules should help your efforts, if meticulously adhered to. Next to a bad money I know of nothing that will bring an economy to its knees faster than an unjust, inefficient, anti-growth, excessive system of taxation. This principal is universal.

On the spending side, priorities need to be set really quickly. In my view infrastructure is the first among equals such as: security (police), judiciary, water, electricity, telecommunications, roads, airports, hospitals and government itself. In the near term at least, school programs, women's issues, social redistribution and humanitarian projects are further down on the list. Once the economy is back on its feet there will be plenty of time to redress these wrongs. At the outset, government spending should be focused almost exclusively on getting the economy back on its feet as quickly as possible. Without production there's nothing to redistribute. Feigning a big heart is often the quickest path to disaster. Iraq needs endemic production and government can be instrumental in achieving its goal.

- C. Forgiveness of debt owed by Iraq to foreign creditors can be enormously beneficial to Iraq if and only if Iraq has the infrastructure to take advantage of the additional resources financed by additional debt. If Iraq's incentive structure and system of self governance isn't well ranged, new debt to replace old debt is money down a rat hole. You really don't want to replace old bad loans with new bad loans. No one wins. Allowing Iraq to incur additional foreign debt obligations should only occur after Iraq's economy and government have been established. You're going to make lots of mistakes and will learn a lot from those mistakes. The smaller the scale of the initial operations, the less Iraq will have to pay for lessons learned. The less costly the mistakes from which you learn, the better off Iraq will be.
- D. Regulatory policy should be simple, small and fair. Laws should be basic and enforceable with quick and decisive action for violation. Having laws on the books that are not observed or actively disobeyed undermines the moral authority of all government. Keep regulations to a minimum, keep them simple and enforce them.
- E. Trade policy should be as open and as free as possible, restricting only those products which really cause harm (drugs, weapons, etc.). For revenue purposes you may want a low rate, broad-based tax on imports. It's interesting to note that for most of our country's history, tariffs provided the lion's share of our tax revenues. Tariffs plus an oil severance tax could well be the lion's share of future Iraqi tax revenues.

Trade is often an area where privilege and corruption take root. Here more than anywhere is where Iraq needs transparency, simplicity and fairness.

- F. A lot of attention is being placed on the need to provide an adequate number of jobs for Iraq. And while jobs per se clearly are important, increasing employment and creating jobs is often a catch phrase standing in for increasing output. In truth Iraq needs additional output far more than it needs more jobs. Now in some cases these two phrases are synonymous, but they may not be interchangeable in Iraq. Make work projects and avoiding reform for fear of losing jobs are sure fire losers. At no time and nowhere is it more important to recognize the primacy of efficiency, output and productivity than it is now in Iraq.
- G. Special industries like banking, glass factories, construction companies, etc. should be left to the marketplace. I know they are important, but so does every business person in Iraq. Those businesses will grow on their own if they are profitable.

- H. Dismantling the former government and former military can be carried too far. Under Saddam Hussein there were no alternatives and therefore there are no substitutes waiting in the wings to take over the general functions of government and security. You do need an Iraqi presence to deal with, to support, and to nurture, in order for us to get out.
- I. Be very careful of U.S. quasi-governmental lobbying groups who see visions of sugarplums with each new contract with Iraq. These people rarely focus on what's good for the Iraqi people (or Americans for that matter) and yet they can wrap their desires in the full clothe of altruistic public interest.
- J. Don't expect Iraq or Iraqis to love us right away. Even though we have done an enormous amount for them, they still feel the intense pain of Saddam's vicious dictatorship and the ensuing war and will lash out at anyone near them. In due course, if we continue to behave honorably, they will come to appreciate all that we have done for them and they will respect us for all that we have sacrificed on their behalf.
- K. Our purpose for being in Iraq has absolutely nothing to do with our desire to develop a free-enterprise, pro-growth, democratic, capitalist nation. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a threat to our way of life and as such we terminated that threat. Anything additional we do for the Iraqi people is truly out of the goodness of our hearts, not out of guilt. No matter what anyone may say, you were 100% correct in the actions you took. You make me very proud to be an American.

Hope these points are of some value. You have done and are doing the best job ever. I dream and hope for you continued success.

Your Buddy,

Arthur B. Laffer

cc: Steven Buccì
Catherine Mainardi
Paul D. Wofowitz

Dr. Arthur B. Laffer
Laffer Associates
5405 Morehouse Drive, Suite 340
San Diego, California 92121
858-458-0811
Fax (b)(6)

* * * TRANSMISSION RESULT REPORT (IMMEDIATE TX) (MAY. 18. 2004 3:22PM) * * *

FAX HEADER:

DATE	TIME	ADDRESS	MODE	TIME	PAGE	RESULT	PERSONAL NAME	FILE
MAY. 18.	3:21PM	(b)(6)	GSES	0:58"	P.	6 OK		981

: BATCH
M : MEMORY TX
S : STANDARD
* : PC
2--: ASYNC MODE

C : CONFIDENTIAL
L : SEND LATER
D : DETAIL
+ : ROUTING
1--: MIL_STD MODE

S : TRANSFER
@ : FORWARDING
F : FINE
O : RECEIPT. NOTICE REQ.
3--: RICOH-MG3/COMPATIBLE MODE

P : POLLING
E : ECM
> : REDUCTION
A : RECEIPT. NOTICE

*Rec'd verbal confirmation from
Ms. BARBARA Johnson (his secretary)*

OSD Policy
22 Apr 04
4:00 PM



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

ACTION MEMO

EF-9061
I.04/004209-ES

DepSecDef _____

Paul Butler
Tab
A7

FOR: Deputy SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Douglas J. Feith 4/28/04
SUBJECT: LTG (Ret) Garner Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

- Based on his concern that the U.S. maintain long-term logistical control over the Iraqi Army, General Garner sent you a letter (Tab B) to recommend that
 - contracts for Iraqi Army equipment specify U.S.-built equipment only.
 - excess U.S. equipment be used to equip the Iraqi Army.
 - the equipment be refurbished in U.S. Army depots, thereby creating domestic economic benefits.
- The 2004 Supplemental emphasizes use of full and open competition. This means foreign firms are welcome to bid.
 - An effort to restrict competition likely would further delay the equipping process, thereby delaying the assumption of security responsibilities by the Iraqis, and would cause concern to our Coalition partners.
- It is likely that the Iraqi Armed Forces will be tied to the U.S. by our training program and by a close security relationship between the two countries.

RECOMMENDATION: that you sign the response to General Garner at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachment(s):
As Stated

DUSD (NESA) WJ

TSA SD	5/7/04
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	4/28

1240

28 APR 04

29 APR 04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner
L3 Communications
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Square 4, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear General Garner:

The Secretary appreciated getting your suggestions on equipping Iraqi security forces and asked me to respond to you.

We agree with you that a strong U.S. influence on the Iraqi Armed Forces is in our interest. Building that influence began with your work, continues in our training effort, and will grow stronger through all the programs that characterize a close security relationship.

Also important is the speed of equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces, and all Iraqi security forces, so they can assume their responsibilities.

A requirement to use exclusively U.S. equipment is likely to slow the process, given the emphasis that Congress has placed on awarding contracts competitively. We believe we will achieve the goals that you expressed without taking formal action to limit competition.

Sincerely,

COORDINATION

LTG (Ret) Gamer Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

Request Coordination **NLT 12** April 2004

Office of the General Counsel

as revised (back with Memo) and Tab A
4/20/04
Principal Deputy GC

Director of the Joint Staff _____

Coalition Provisional Authority _____

Please call Chris Straub OUSD(P) NESANG (b)(6) for pick-up

COORDINATION

LTG (Ret) Garner Suggestion on Equipping Iraqi Armed Forces

Request Coordination NLT 12 April 2004

Office of the General Counsel _____

Director of the Joint Staff Frank Hull J-5 (phone, 14 Apr 04)

Coalition Provisional Authority P. V. G. 18 Apr 04.

Please call Chris Straub OUSD(P) NES/NG (b)(6) for pick-up

In reply refer to EF-9061 & 041004209

29
March 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Foreign-made Equipment

Please take a look at this note from Jay Gamer . I am inclined to agree with him.

What do you folks think?

If you agree, let's get it done.

Thanks.

Attach.

3/25/04Gamer memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
032504-18

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

IRAQ

29 MAR 04

07347-04

29-03-04 10:01 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/30864

4/12
all

March 25, 2004

Mr. Secretary,

I know you are incredibly busy and you haven't *time* to focus on the following, but I think it is important.

The Army's past request to industry to 'bid on equipping *the* Iraqi Army was cancelled. The Army through Army Material Command is re-initiating this proposal. In the initial proposal, bidders were allowed to bid foreign-made equipment. I recommend that DOD constrain industry to bidding only U.S. built equipment for the following reasons:

- It would logistically tie the Iraqi Army to the United States for the next several decades.
- It also means that we could logistically shut down the Iraqi Army at anytime of our choosing.
- We have excess equipment that can be used for equipping the new Iraqi Army.
- The upside to *this* is that we would need to refurbish new equipment through the Army Depot system (4-6 depots). This would be an economic advantage to the states concerned; which is a plus to the Administration in an election year.

Bottom line: I feel it is very important to have a logistical hold over the Iraqi Army.

thanx

429
000

In reply refer to:
IEF-9061
04/004209

- APR 20 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Bids Using US Equipment

Here is a note someone sent concerning the Iraqi **Army**. What do you folks think?

Thanks.

Attach.
3/25/04 Memoto SecDef

DHR:dh
041204-9

.....
Please respond by 4/30/04

ALSO RESPONDS TO SNOWFLAKES
032504-18 from (b)(6) (NEXT UNDER)

TSA SD	SLJ
SRMA SD	
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	4/28

20-04-04 12:07 IK

07347-04

IRAQ

20 APR 04

29 APR 04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

IRAQ

Lieutenant General Jay Garner, USA (Ret.)
L3 Communications
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Square 4, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear ~~General~~ ^{Jay} Garner:

The Secretary appreciated getting your suggestions on equipping Iraqi security forces and asked me to respond to you.

We agree with you that a strong U.S. influence on the Iraqi Armed Forces is in our interest. Building that influence began with your work, continues in our training effort, and will grow stronger through all the programs that characterize a close security relationship.

Also important is the speed of equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces, and all Iraqi security forces, so they can assume their responsibilities

A requirement to use exclusively U.S. equipment is likely to slow the process, given the emphasis that Congress has placed on awarding contracts competitively. We believe we will achieve the goals that you expressed without taking formal action to limit competition.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

150304

29 MAR 04



11-L-0559/OSD/30867

OSD 07347-04
OSD 07347-04

Bump original w/ B6 Helmick for DS1

*BACK
1710
28 May 04*

**OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT**

May 27, 2004

*Paul,
Answers to your
questions are next
under. - JK*

FOR: LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FROM: DAVE PATTERSON

*DAVE
1710
28 May 04*

Sir,

Jay Garner wrote to the Secretary. Policy answered it with a letter back. Could you get me an answer back to the two questions from the Deputy (TAB A). See Garner letter and Policy cover memo (TAB B). Need quickly. Responses can come directly back to me.

Thanks and VR

Dave

J. David Patterson

*Believe Tina Ballard has
worked this - thank you.*

2 Attachment
As stated
Suspense
RED TAG - ASAP



26 MAY 2004

Dave

From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

26 May 04

- ① Why can't the equipment requirements specify U.S. equipment -- Then there can be open competition among suppliers?
- ② How are we specifying equipment requirements for Iraqi forces?

1710
5/28

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

May 28, 2004, 3:00 p.m.

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Answers to Secretary Wolfowitz' Questions Pertaining to Equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces

Question 1: Why can't the equipment requirements specify U.S. Equipment?

Answer: The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) requires full and open competition. While the Buy American Act does restrict some procurements to U.S. sources, it does not apply to procurements in Iraq. Furthermore, since our requirements are performance based, full and open competition means that all responsible sources, both U.S. and non-U.S., can compete and offer their products. (Armies in the Middle East commonly use non-U.S. equipment anyway.) The only known applicable exception to full and open competition that would allow restriction to U.S. equipment would be Exception 7, Public Interest. Use of this exception would require the Secretary of Defense to sign a Determination and Findings stating that restriction is in the public interest. Also, to the extent these procurements are funded with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), approval by Ambassador Bremer and seven days prior notification to Congress are also required. In some cases, it would be too late to go through these steps, as some procurements have already gone beyond the stage where potential sources are identified.

A determination to procure "U.S. Equipment Only" would require a definition of "U.S. Equipment" because many items manufactured in the U.S. have significant foreign parts.

Also, in some cases a determination to use U.S. Equipment Only would have operational and cost impacts. For example, AK-47s are required because everyone in the Iraqi Armed Forces is already trained on use of the weapon. If we changed the weapon we would have to train the force to use the new weapon. A collateral consequence would be longer training periods and the time-table for deployment of fully trained forces would be extended. Additionally, there would be a cost impact for training and ammo packages.

Question 2: How are we specifying equipment requirements for Iraqi Forces?

Answer: Our requirements are performance based. We do not specify the make/model of a vehicle. For example: A portion from the requirement for Medium Wheeled Vehicle reads:

"The vehicle shall have all wheel drive, be capable of operation on a variety of surfaces and terrains ranging from desert environment to hard surface streets, have a minimum range of 450km on internally carried fuel, shall be equipped with service brakes, be capable of carrying six soldiers - including the driver."

COORDINATION: On HQDA Form 5

Prepared By: LTC Kel Wood, (b)(6)

Approved By: Ms. Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Policy and Procurement)

UNCLASSIFIED
TAB A

January ²⁶ 25, 2004

I
R
A
Q

TO: Gen. Pete Pace
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Let's make sure we have a joint CIA-CENTCOM Konar Valley lessons learned effort.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012304-15

.....
Please respond by 2/6/04

OSD 07371-04

26 Jan 04

May 18, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Advance Copies of Presidential Remarks

I sometimes receive Presidential remarks for my suggestions after the President has already taped them.

If it is worth my spending time looking at the remarks, it seems to me it ought to be before it is too late to make the changes.

Help!

DHR:dh
051704-41

350.001WH

18MAY04

OSD 07394-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1774-04
20 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

ASAS/19

SUBJECT: KATUSA Model

- **Question.** "I would like you to talk to John Abizaid and see if he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq or Afghanistan." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** Commander, USCENTCOM, has considered the Korean Augmentees to US Army (KATUSA) model for employment in Iraq and Afghanistan and determined that the exact replication of the KATUSA program is impractical for these areas of operations; however, partnership initiatives similar in concept have evolved and continue to be cultivated as part of USCENTCOM's pursuit of long-term strategic objectives (TAB B).
- **Analysis.** Two primary reasons make the exact duplication of the KATUSA model not viable for implementation in these countries.
 - First, the Iraqi and Afghan Armies are relatively small, all-volunteer forces dependent on volunteers to establish and maintain minimum operational capabilities. The KATUSA force on the other hand depends upon a conscript base from which to recruit.
 - Second, the KATUSA program has thrived under the long-term force presence of US Forces Korea. Over time, selection as a JSATUSA has become desirable among English-speaking Korean Army conscripts. Current US strategy does not envision a similar long-term commitment of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Partnership initiatives exist in both countries to enhance interoperability, communications, mentorship and cultural awareness. These encompass the embed of US trainers in Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Afghan National Army units, the development of the Afghan National Army provisional force concept, combined operations with Iraqi and Afghan forces, and assignment of Iraqi liaison officers to US forces down to platoon level.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30874

USD 07515-04

TAB A

APR 27 2004

761

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Katusa Model

I would like you to **talk** to John **Abizaid** and see if he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq **or** Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:db
042304-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30875

TAB B



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTHBOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJ5-P

1 May 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC 20318-1000

SUBJECT: SECDEF Inquiry, Using KATUSA Model in Iraq and Afghanistan

REF: JS Tasker #04-0371, 29 Apr 04, Subject: SF-761/KATUSA Model

1. Purpose. To provide the US Central Command position on the use of the Korean Augmentation to United States Army (KATUSA) model for Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

2. Background. KATUSAs are conscripted Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers assigned to and under the control of United States units for the full duration of their enlistment. The purpose of the KATUSA program is to strengthen ROK combat capabilities and to enhance interoperability with U.S. forces. KATUSAs enhance US force effectiveness by mitigating communication barriers and by providing a source of cultural awareness. KATUSAs are volunteers selected while attending basic training and incur the same 30-month obligation as active duty ROK soldiers. There are approximately 5000 individuals serving as KATUSAs. Selection is competitive and based on the ability to read, write, and comprehend English. Koreans consider KATUSA service as a mark of distinction.

3. Discussion

a. Commander, USCENTCOM has considered the KATUSA model for employment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The exact mirroring of the KATUSA program in Iraq and Afghanistan may be impractical for two reasons. First, the Iraqi and Afghan armies are relatively small, all-volunteer forces and depend on all current volunteers to establish and maintain minimum operational capabilities. Second, the KATUSA program has thrived under the long-term force presence of US Forces Korea. Current US strategy does not envision a similar long-term commitment of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.

11-L-0559/OSD/30876

Tab B

b. The establishment of KATUSA-like programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, has enormous potential. Enhanced interoperability, communications, mentorship opportunities, and cultural awareness are critical military objectives in these theaters of operation. Current KATUSA-like initiatives include embedded US trainers in Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Afghan National Army (ANA) units, combined operations with Iraqi and Afghan forces, and assignment of Iraqi liaison officers to US forces down to platoon level. USCENTCOM continues to explore new KATUSA-like partnerships with Iraqi and Afghan forces.

4. Recommendation. Continue current KATUSA-like initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pursue additional KATUSA-like programs consistent with long-term strategic objectives.

5. Point of Contact is LtCol Brown, **CCJ5-Plans**, DSN: (b)(6)
(b)(6)



Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Director, Plans and Policy

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM

RADM J. A. Robb

3 May 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/30878

Tab C

TAB A

APR 27 2004

761

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Katusa **Model**

I would like you to **talk** to John **Abizaid** and see **if** he has given any thought to using the Katusa Korean model for Iraq **or** Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-9

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/30879 *OSD 07515-04*

May 19, 2004

TO: Tillie Fowler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

Thanks so much for giving me the piece by John Hamre. I appreciate it.

Regards,

DHR:dh
051904-7

335 SD

19 May 04

OSD 07532-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30880

J Secretary -
I committed this
article for your reading.
Pages 3 & 4 have some
interesting suggestions.
J. H.

ass 07552-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30881

Law Offices
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP

Tillie K. Fowler

Member of Congress 1993-2001

2099 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 100
Washington, D.C. 20006-6801
202-419-2482 • Fax (b)(6)
tfowler@hklaw.com

11-L-0559/OSD/30882

OSW 07532-04



May 19, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Hamre Piece

IRAQ

Attached is an interesting memorandum by John Hamre, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense under Bill Cohen.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Hamre, John. "Should America Just Walk Away from Iraq?" CSIS Memorandum, May 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
051904-9

19 MAY 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30883

07533-04

CSIS MEMORANDUM

To: CSIS Board of Trustees, Supporters, and Friends

From: John J. Hamre



Date: May 17, 2004 (Number 137. Three Pages)

Re: **Should America just walk away from Iraq?**

All over Washington I am now hearing this question asked: Is Iraq a lost cause? Should we just find a way to pull out as soon as possible? I honestly believe the answer to both is no. It is clear, however, that we are less in control of the situation every day – which may indeed be our exit strategy.

Washington is still reeling from the terrible pictures from the prisons. They have become a metaphor for all that has plagued us this past year. It seems that Washington (and our Baghdad headquarters, I fear) has been cut off from what is really happening on the ground in Iraq. We have managed Iraq policy through our hopes and aspirations, not through a realistic assessment of the conditions on the ground.

It appears, though, that the Administration is now embracing a new strategic direction that is more realistically grounded on conditions in the field. After the uprising in April, senior leaders in the Administration finally realized the path they were on was not working. They correspondingly made three critical decisions:

First, they abandoned the sweeping “de-Baathification” policy that excluded past managers from participating in the building of a new Iraq.

Second, they decided to reinforce our troop levels in the region, committing to a major deployment for at least the next 18 months. There is no question that the political folks in the White House would have preferred to pull the troops out rather than to move more in, that would have been a far more popular move domestically. Instead, the President decided that his entire presidency now rests on success in Iraq.

Third, they chose to stay with the concept of “indigenization” of Iraqi security, but with a surprising twist. They agreed to let a former Saddam general take charge of the security of Fallujah. It seemed completely incongruous when it first came up. I believe it was more than just a pragmatic solution to avoid a bloody battle, which would have only served to strengthen the uprising elsewhere in Iraq. In fact, it represents a new power-sharing strategy in Iraq. We can see this even more starkly in Najaf, where the radical Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, has holed up with his small army. Instead of launching an all out assault on them, we have sealed off the region in order to allow the most pragmatic Shia religious and political leadership the time to finally decide that they want to remove al-Sadr and his forces.

Both of these instances—turning Fallujah over to a former Saddam general and letting Shi’ite leaders disarm al-Sadr—are indeed defacto power-sharing decisions. We have

decided to let local political leaders have direct authority on the street, so long as it stays within the boundaries we find acceptable - which is why we are keeping 135,000 troops in the country indefinitely. In effect we are saying "you run things at the local level, and so long as it doesn't threaten national unity, we will leave you alone."

This still begs the question of how we create a viable national government. Here is where the tragedy of the prisoner abuse scandal will haunt us. Some 80% of Iraqi citizens now want America to leave as soon as possible. That, in combination with the fact that Ambassador Paul Bremer has publicly stated that U.S. and coalition forces would withdraw if asked to do so by a future Iraqi government, now presents a significant dilemma. No new Iraqi government will have legitimacy with its citizens unless it confronts America. If America selects the new government, it won't be legitimate. If the Iraqi people pick the government, it is likely to be anti-American. The challenge now is to create a new process to produce a legitimate government, without it being seen as America's product.

Last weekend CSIS sponsored a very high level private conference in a quiet setting outside of London. It was a productive few days that invited very frank and open discussions. The participants agreed that the primary problem we face in Iraq is to prevent it from sliding into factional strife - effectively breaking it up into three constituent parts. Based off of that premise, they outlined a path which I think makes good sense.

1. Immediately seek a new United Nations resolution.
2. Recruit a "national unity" council to replace the Iraqi Governing Council. This national unity council should explicitly include opponents of America's involvement, not just the segment of Iraqi leadership that embraces America's role.
3. Accelerate the use of former Baathists to assume administrative functions within the government. These Baathists should be required, however, to first pledge their support to the Iraqi national unity council.
4. Appoint a U.S. Presidential envoy of unquestioned influence and integrity (Jim Baker was considered a representative candidate) who could undertake a new outreach to Middle East capitals. The purpose of the outreach would be to listen to each of their perspectives, and enlist their support for the remainder of this agenda.
5. Under the umbrella of a UN resolution, establish a Reconstruction Implementation Council patterned after the mechanism developed for Kosovo. This takes the international legitimization effort out of the day-to-day politics of the UN and into the hands of a group that is committed to solving the problems in Iraq. Notionally the Council would include each of Iraq's regional neighbors (including Iran), along with 8-10 other countries willing to

commit a legitimate effort to helping the new government of Iraq get on its feet. This formula allows us to incorporate the regional countries, but in a forum where they can't dominate the deliberations.

6. Seek to involve the Arab League in concrete steps. Let supportive Arab capitals take the lead in developing an agenda that the Arab League could embrace for the reconstruction of Iraq.
7. Re-engage on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Dr. Condoleezza Rice has been given the lead in this area, and she should *visibly* make it a priority during the next 3 months.

This seems to me a very pragmatic path to answer the opening question of this memo: Is the situation in Iraq lost? No, it is not lost - but the path to success now largely rests in the hands of others.

Sorry, this memo is a bit longer than usual, but I felt the topic merited a more in depth discussion. I am always grateful to hear your thoughts and comments. Please feel free to contact me with your reactions at JHamre@csis.org.

END

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
cc: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: NATO-EUCOM Report

EUCO

Thanks so much for your report on NATO-EUCOM. I will be discussing all these pieces with the folks here.

You sure have a lot going on, my friend!

Regards,

DHR:dh
052004-19

.....
Please respond by _____

20 May 04

OSD 07545-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: F-15 Basing

Thanks so much for your note on the F-15s. I appreciate it and have asked Dick Myers to see that it gets into the tank, so we can have a good discussion on it, possibly when you are back.

DHR:dh
052004-18

.....
Please respond by _____

452 F

20 May 04

OSD 07546-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Visible Change

Iraq

Please let me know when you develop some plans as to how you are going to show a visible change when sovereignty is passed over.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-13

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

20 May 04

OSD 07547-04

May 19, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Positioning International Forces

Iraq

We are seeing growing pressure for various countries to pull their forces out of Iraq – Italy, Poland, Hungary and others, as I recall.

It makes me wonder if, before it is too late, we could get the Coalition forces that are under pressure re-positioned to protect UN missions and/or international sites and to begin working to provide security for the elections later this year. That way, we could help to relieve the political pressure on them. Further, it would give us the opportunity to fill in at their locations with US forces, which are more reliable and have more robust ROEs.

The alternative, if the above fails, is to get them to replace us in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

19 in any way

DHR:dh
051904-20

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

OSD 07548-04

May 20, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Remarks to Heritage Foundation

350.00150

Mr. President—

I spoke to the Heritage Foundation on Monday. I have marked some sections of my remarks on pages 3 and 4 of the attached transcript that I thought might be of interest to you.

Respectfully,

Attach.
5/17/04 Secretary of Defense Remarks to the Heritage Foundation

DHR:dh
052004-36

OSD 07549-04

30MAY04



United States Department of Defense.

News Transcript

On the web: <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040517-secdef0782.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact: <http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html> or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Monday, May 17, 2004 2:03 p.m. EDT

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Heritage Foundation

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Applause.) Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. (Cheers, applause.) Thank you.

Well, that's amazing. (Applause continuing.) Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I appreciate that more than I can say.

Midge, your many contributions to the cause are legendary. You're a friend. You're important to all that's good about this country, and we thank you so much for that.

Ed, you're right, I did tell you not to get a building. (Laughter.) But you didn't take my advice. (Laughter.) I hope the real estate values have gone up. (Laughter.)

You know, it's amazing. I had my family together in February. And I have six grandchildren, and I gave them that poem, "If." And I, this is last February; this is the middle of May, if you can think about it. And I said, "We're going to probably be together over July 4th, and it would be a good idea if y'all memorized it. (Laughter.) I'm prescient, or lucky.

But I then remembered reading that the terrorist organization put a -- I guess it's \$15 million on my head. And then I woke up one morning to CNN about a week ago where they said, about the Senate, "They're after his head!" (Laughter.) And then I remembered "If," and "If you can keep your head -- (laughter) -- when all about you."

And last weekend, before this last, the one before, I got a call from my wife, Joyce. She was in -- at the University of Colorado. And she was there for her 50th college reunion, and she just called up to tell me that it really wasn't necessary for me to give her all this publicity -- (laughter) -- on her return, after 50 years, to Boulder. And she went to the graduation, and the poem they read was "If." So

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Aw!

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Oh!

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, there is a great deal happening in our world and in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Some is bad. Some's good. Some is truly wonderful. And some of it's uncertain as to what it will mean.

I saw a bit of it last week, as I flew into Iraq. First, the bad news: You've all seen some of the pictures and reports about what took place at Abu Ghraib prison. That some of the guards abused those Iraqis who were in our custody and were our responsibility was truly a body blow. As we saw some of those pictures in the Pentagon and looked at each other's faces, you could feel the, the shock that we felt and disappointment that some in our country's uniform could sully it by that behavior.

There are now, I guess, six or seven different investigations going on. Two or three have been completed. We'll know soon how all this came about. And needless to say, those involved will be held accountable.

Last week I saw some of the finest young American men and women working around the clock to provide security for the Iraqi people, to be sure; recognizing that the transition to the Iraqis taking over their country is coming upon us in six or so weeks. The troops are doing their job well. They're doing their jobs with compassion and skill and courage, and we're so fortunate to have them doing what they're doing for our country and defending our freedom. (Applause.) They are truly remarkable and in, in their dedication, their conviction, their recognition that what they're doing is truly noble work.

We've also seen many brave Iraqis risk their lives to protect their country. We saw some reports that some of them did not engage the enemy and left their posts. That's true. There's over -- something like 200,000 of them now. They're getting better equipped every day, but they're not as well equipped as some of the enemies they've faced. And I worry about the impression that was left, because over 300 of these Iraqi security forces have already lost their lives. So it's not like they're not willing to engage; they are, and they're on a path to being able to take over the security responsibilities in that country.

There's a lot of intimidation going on. The former regime elements, the Ba'athists, and the terrorists are trying to intimidate the Iraqi people and to discourage them from cooperating, whether it's on a Governing Council or a judge -- as a judge, or a provincial council, city council, member of the security force, police, the civil defense group. Just hours ago, the head of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine Salim, was assassinated by enemies of freedom. The Governing Council, however, has not been intimidated, it has not been defeated. And we must not allow terrorists or regime remnants to determine the fate of 25 million Iraqis.

In Iraq, the man on the street knows that he has been under a vicious regime for the past 35 years and he's free of that. He knows that Saddam Hussein is in prison, where he belongs, and that he'll be tried by a new Iraqi government in the weeks and months ahead for the crimes he committed against his people and his neighbors. Those crimes, too numerous to list, include the use of chemical weapons on ethnic groups resulting in mass deaths; the use of murder, filling many mass graves, as a tool of state; the torture and abuse of children to instill fear in parents. In Houston right now are seven Iraqi businessmen that are being fitted with prosthesis devices to replace the arms that Saddam Hussein's personal military forces chopped off.

The fact that these actions defined the political culture in Iraq for 35 long years I think goes some way towards explaining why the transition to self-government is so difficult. Over the past year, since the military liberation, Iraqis are slowly settling into a new understanding of what their lives and their futures might be like. They know that among the 138,000 American troops in this country -- their

country -- are people who have been not just providing security, but also building roads, fixing schools, fixing hospitals. There today are many times the medical care in terms of delivery of medicine, availability of doctors and clinics than was the case under Saddam Hussein. The oil fields are producing, except when terrorists try to damage them to disrupt them.

Since September 11th, we have known that we have a mission to complete. The global war on terror, like the Cold War before it, will be the work of a generation. Terrorists will strike at will. To defeat them, we not only have to eliminate their leaders, but we also have to wage a war of ideas to win the allegiance of a new generation that needs to see that freedom is a vastly better choice than terrorism and hatred.

We do not know precisely what will happen over the coming weeks because politics and power have too many human variables, but we do have plans and a good sense of what the possibilities are. On or before June 30th, this transition to the Iraqi will occur. It's not a magical date. Our forces don't suddenly head home on June 30th, and a mature state will most certainly not spring forth to be admired and praised by the world. Still, something truly significant should begin.

An interim government of men and women appointed in consultation between the Iraqi Governing Council; the Iraqi people; Mr. Brahimi, the United Nations envoy; will take power on an interim basis. There will likely be a president, a prime minister and a couple of dozen Cabinet ministries. The personalities involved will probably be a mixture of political people, leaders and technocrats. This new interim government will hold power for some -- power for some six months plus, until elections are held for a transitional national assembly. The assembly will be the legislature for a transitioning government that will serve for probably around a year. Its main task will be to write a permanent constitution, an Iraqi constitution, an Iraqi solution to their governing, and that then would be voted on by the Iraqi people.

All of this should be thought of as the infancy of a nation. In our lifetimes, we have watched Germany -- I shouldn't say "our" lifetimes; my lifetime. (Laughter.) It's a little longer than most of the folks here. We've seen Germany and Japan go through a process. We've seen India and Israel. We've seen Eastern European states that emerged from Soviet control. And most recently, we've been able to watch and assist as Afghanistan navigates along that difficult path.

It's always a difficult process. It is not easy. The men and women who undertake to lead Iraq will face a very sharp learning curve, and there will be some real bumps in the road.

Thomas Jefferson said, when our own nation underwent this process, he said, quote, "We are not to expect to be translated from despotism to liberty in a featherbed." Meanwhile, the Iraqis must build the institutions that are the heart of democracy. Coalition countries can consult, they can advise, but the Iraqis will choose what they'll listen to. And that's the way it is.

Is it possible that the country will revert to mayhem? Perhaps. But it's more likely that a set of serious, capable and educated men and women will find ways to make things work. Not our way, not necessarily the way of other coalition countries. Maybe slowly; indeed, very likely slowly.

There will be both successes and failures, and the failures will force people to in some cases give up, I'm sure, and step aside, and in other cases they'll get up off the mat and try again to find a better way of moving forward along that difficult path.

Before turning to questions, let me make a, a brief comment on Abu Ghraib. In the past two weeks, the United States has offered the world a seminar on what happens when things go wrong in a democracy. The world has seen those shameful pictures, but the same world has watched the United States government take responsibility and apologize to those individuals who were wronged. It's watched senior civilian and military leadership come to Congress to testify under oath about what was known and what has been done. It's watched a free media publish stories of all types, from the accurate to the grossly distorted. Iraq and the watching world have seen that in our country, no one is above the law, that we are a nation governed by laws.

They've seen that abuse by a few in the military was revealed and investigated by the military; not by the media, by the military. They're the ones who announced it. They're the ones who went public in early January, within a day or two of a soldier turning in material that raised that alarm, and they went public and told the world that there are abuses, that they are filing charges because of alleged abuses in that prison. The media have piled on, to be sure, but the public announcement was by the U.S. Central Command in Baghdad.

The world will see that Americans will not accept dishonorable behavior. These are important lessons, though we certainly would not have chosen to teach them this way. Terrorists are working to break the will of the United States government and the American people, and to break the growing confidence of Iraqis in their right and their ability to live in freedom. We will be able to claim success in Iraq when we can bring our troops home, leaving behind Iraqi security forces that can provide for the security of those people, leaving behind a nation of free people that is not a threat to its neighbors, leaving behind a nation that's respectful of the various religious and ethnic and minority groups in that country. And the existence of such a country can set a powerful example in that region.

And when the day comes, all who have been a part of such a great stride forward for human freedom will have the right to be proud of what they've done -- and most of all, the remarkable men and women in uniform who remained so steadfast during this testing of our nation's will.

And with your help and the good center of gravity of the American people, we'll see that day in the months and years ahead, but only if we are steadfast and only if we stay the course.

Thank you, and God bless you all. (Extended applause.) Thank you very much. (Applause continues.) I'm told that there are microphones here, and I'd be delighted to respond to some questions. I'll even answer some. (Laughter.)

You know, Midge's introduction was biased. She's -- she left out a chapter. When I was asked to go run the Office of Economic Opportunity, the War on Poverty, and -- Ed Meese remembers this -- I followed -- it's the first war that had ever been run by a Seargent. It was Seargent Shriver. (Laughter.) And the president wanted to try to get it fixed and get it on the right track and stop doing the things that didn't work and get some of the things working.

And I got home one night, and my wife has kind of an unusual sense of humor: there on the refrigerator was a little sign that said, "He tackled a job that couldn't be done." (Laughter.) "With a smile, he went right to it. He tackled a job that couldn't be done and couldn't do it." (Laughter.) You got to be tough to be married for 50 years to someone with that sense of humor. (Laughter.)

All right. We have microphones. Why doesn't somebody who wants a question go near a microphone? Then we can do more of them. Here's one right over here if someone has a question. Good, you can pass -- oh, good.

Q Oh. Mr. Secretary, it's the observation of myself and many of my friends that the issue of a free Iraq and the administration of Hussein is a powerful issue. However, I think the more important issue has been sublimated by that issue, and that is the war on terror. We're more concerned about the issue that it's being fought on their grounds by our terms, and the bodies are falling in Iraq and not on New York City streets. So I wonder why we can't heighten that awareness in most of what's issued by the various departments and the press secretaries. I think it's the most important issue, and so do many of my friends, and I don't think it's getting the attention paid to it that it should be. And I'd like to know what you think on that. Thanks.

SEC. RUMSFELD: I agree. I agree completely with what you're saying. There's no question but that the global war on terror is the challenge. If you think of where there have been attacks besides the United States, in Spain, in Madrid, that changed an election undoubtedly; consciously, as a result of terrorist intent, changed the outcome of an election. I just had lunch with President Aznar, who now is out of office, and he is convinced that that's the case. But also in Saudi Arabia, in Indonesia, and country after country we've seen these terrorist attacks, and as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.

It is -- as I mentioned in my remarks, it's a task not for a battle, but for a generation as the Cold War was a generation. We have a whole host of people who are being trained in these schools to hate the West, to hate progress, to believe that it's in their interest to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. And they have an enormous advantage; they can attack anywhere, anytime, using any technique; and you can't defend everywhere at every moment of the day or night against every conceivable technique. Defense simply doesn't work alone.

You have to defend, to be sure, but the only way to deal with it is to take the battle to the terrorists where they are, and find those networks. And they don't have countries, for the most part. (Applause.)

They have the advantage of using our technology, e-mails and computers and pagers and wire transfers and all kinds of technologies that they never could develop themselves, and use them against us. They have the ability of going to school on us, watching how free societies behave. Practically everything we do is public. And they see that. They, they test it. They watch behavior and then adjust their techniques to accommodate to that behavior.

So it's a tough job. It's going to be a while. It's going to take a while. And its going to take determination. Its going to take determination by this generation and, very likely, the next generation.

Question. Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm a little perplexed about Syria. I don't necessarily believe that embargoing will resolve the problem there, particularly when a lot of other countries that we would like to hope would be on our side are against us there. And I don't understand why we are just permitting all of this continuing problem to be handled in such a rather subtle or diplomatic fashion. Is there anything that

we can see coming in the future that can deal with the Syrian problem as it's affecting our presence in Iraq better than what we've been hearing in the press and otherwise?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The fact is that Syria and Iran have both been unhelpful to what it is we're trying to do in Iraq. Neither government in any way approximates the kind of a system that we're looking forward to in Iraq, a free system. The dictatorship that exists in Syria is notably different than the model that we're hopeful Iraq will seize. The handful of clerics in Iran that lead that country, to the dismay of, I'm sure, a large fraction of their population, they're not interested in seeing a free Iraq, a system that is representative of the people and that is at peace with its other neighbors.

It's tough, it's tough to answer your question because what the president and the United States has been attempting to do is to go about our business in Iraq and try to get the Iraqis set on a logical, sensible path, and to dissuade, through a variety of different ways, the Syrians from making the kind of mischief that they can make.

I mean, they have -- that border has been porous and people, terrorists, have come across that border. Syria has been recalcitrant with respect to freeing up Iraqi assets that were frozen in their country, and large portions of it have been disappearing.

You say you're not sure the sanctions will work. I don't think anyone is confident that the sanctions alone will change the Syrian government from the direction it's on to some much more acceptable behavior pattern. On the other hand, the Congress has passed sanctions, and they -- it is, in my view, appropriate that Syria not be rewarded. The hope is that through discussion, and debate, and consideration, diplomacy, that Syria will recalibrate its direction. Whether that will happen, I don't know. I wish I did know. But in the meantime, we've got to make sure that they do as little damage to what we're trying to accomplish in Iraq as possible.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, first of all, thank you very much for your service. If there ever was a -- (interrupted by applause).

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you. Thank you very much.

Q If there ever was a right person in the right job at the right time, this is it.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

(Applause.)

Q I didn't know I was going to get so much applause! (Laughter.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q The second question is a little more difficult. (Laughter.) After you complete the second term with George W. Bush as president in the White House and you finish that four years -- (applause) -- would you consider -- would you consider staying on with a new administration in your present position for the following term? (Laughter.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Laughs.) Oh, my! (Laughter.) I'll have to talk to my wife about that. (Laughter.)

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, I also want to express my deep appreciation for the job you're doing as secretary of Defense.

And secondly, you spoke to Mr. Aznar, Senor Aznar. And I would be -- I would like to hear if he expressed any thoughts on his defeat, and what his thoughts are about the Spanish people in effect capitulating to the terrorists by electing his successor.

SEC. RUMSFELD: He is a, he's a very interesting man. He served, I think, two terms. He has a great deal of courage personally. He is, as he has said publicly, disappointed in the decision that was made by his successors.

He believes very strongly that what's being done in Iraq is the right thing to do. He plans to write and speak out and, and encourage the countries of Europe and the world to recognize that we simply cannot allow terrorists to determine the outcome of elections. And he believes deeply that that is exactly what happened in Spain and he believes that that is what the terrorists will attempt to do in other countries in the months ahead.

Yes?

Q I'd like to thank you as well, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you.

Q Thank God for you right now.

My question has to do with weapons of mass destruction. There's a question as to whether they existed, and of course we knew they did because he used them. The real question was where the heck are they? And in the news this morning --

SEC. RUMSFELD: Kind of like my wife. (Laughter.) Well, the answer is that the intelligence information in our country and in other countries that have excellent intelligence gathering capabilities was that they existed, that the government of Iraq was systematically deceiving the world about what it was doing. There was a great deal of evidence to that effect. We don't now know what actually happened.

We've got 1,200 people in the Iraqi Survey Group that are there in the country following up on leads, attempting to understand what was done, what took place. As you say, we know they existed because he used them on his own people and his neighbors. And everyone in the United Nations that I know of agreed that his declaration, that was supposed to be accurate, was fraudulent, that it was inaccurate. That was widely accepted.

The debate wasn't about whether or not he had weapons of mass destruction. The debate in the U.N. wasn't about whether or not the declaration was fraudulent. The debate up there was how much longer did one think that inspections should be allowed to continue the way we were going. And

finally, after 17 or 18 resolutions, a decision was made that that was enough.

My -- I can't guess how much longer it will take to get what we will finally look and say was ground truth -- certainly months, maybe a year-plus. I just don't know how long it will take. We certainly won't just discover anything. I mean, we did not just discover Saddam Hussein, and he was hiding in a hole that was big enough to put chemical weapons in it that would kill tens of thousands of people.

And how was he found? He was found because intelligence people talked to one person who talked to another person and said this person might know something, and then tracked it down one after another after another, and finally somebody took them out there and said maybe around here. They didn't find him. Finally, they allowed as how that person ought to look harder, and he walked over and said try there. And sure enough, they pull up this thing and he's there in the ground. Our forces had gone back and forth past that farm dozens of times. The only way you'll find it is not by discovery in a country the size of California. The only way you're going to find out what actually happened is if finally people are no longer intimidated, no longer frightened, and come -- are willing to come forward, and the terrorists know that. The former regime elements know that. That's why they systematically killed yesterday the president of the Governing Council, the Iraqi Governing Council, is, is to instill fear and intimidation.

Think of what terrorism is. Terrorism does not mean you blow up a building. Terrorism means you terrorize. The purpose of it is to terrorize. It's to change your behavior. It's to affect what you do. And the fear that exists in that country that that crowd might come back in, that we might leave prematurely and that these -- this vicious regime could take back over is real, it's palpable and it works. And the only thing that will dissuade people from that is time and success.

Q On the news this morning, apparently a mortar shell was found that had sarin gas in it. So we have found some of this material. And then a week or so ago apparently a large quantity was discovered in Jordan. So clearly the terrorists do have access to it. How does that change -- I would hope the media would maybe say some things about -- (chuckles) -- this in a proper way, but how does that change -- (laughter) -- how does that change how we approach things in Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, let me say this about that. The -- I've seen the intelligence on the matter you've raised. My personal view is the way we ought to handle it -- although it's not for me to decide -- is to recognize that what you cited, I believe, was a field test, which is not perfect, and what we ought to do is to get the samples someplace where they can be tested very carefully before coming to a conclusion as to precisely what it was.

Then we have to be careful. We can't say something that's inaccurate. So what we have to then do is to try to track down and figure out how it might be there; what caused that to be there in this improvised explosive device, and what might it mean in terms of the risks to our forces, the risks to other people, and any other implication that one might draw. And that's going to take some time. So. . . Question?

Q Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Do you think that the United Nations should have a vital role in the rebuilding of Iraq? If so, why? If not, why not?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The president said so. (Laughter, applause.) Those were his precise words,

and I agree with him. The more countries that are invested in the success in Iraq, the better it is for the Iraqi people. And the better it is for the Iraqi people, the more rapidly that country will recover and be a positive and constructive force in the neighborhood, which helps Jordan, it helps Turkey, it helps the neighboring countries.

So I do think it's a good thing we attempt to engage the rest of the world, whether it's the United Nations or NATO or other countries individually. We now have something like 32-or-so countries with forces in Iraq, and that's a good thing. And if we can get another U.N. resolution, my guess is they'll be still additional countries that will be doing -- be willing to put forces in there. And that relieves the stress on our force and on our coalition partners, and that, in my view, is a help.

Yes?

Q Mr. Secretary, when the Ba'ath party took over Iraq in 1959, I believe, they murdered the king very brutally, and the prime minister, and many, many other people. Has there been any thought of returning the monarchy to Iraq?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I've seen speculation about that. I've seen people propose that. You may recall that in Afghanistan that was also suggested, and there was a big loyal jirga and a conclave to discuss those types of things. And I'm sure that there will be people who will propose that during the period between now and the time there's a constitution, and it will get sorted out and the Iraqi people will make a judgment about that. Yes?

Q I have a statement or an inquiry. It seems as though much of the world perceives us as being not evenhanded in our treatment of the Israelis vis-a-vis the Palestinians. And I can't help but wonder if that is an encumbrance to our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere.

SEC. RUMSFELD: That's been the case for most of my adult life. And the Palestinian people have not had a good deal over that time. There have been a lot of words spoken, a lot of bullets fired, a lot of people killed, but with the exception of President Sadat and Menachem Begin when the Sinai was returned and various decisions were made, there hasn't been much progress on the Palestinian front.

And the effect of that, of course, is to create a politically volatile situation in the countries of that region. And many of them have Palestinian refugees living there that are not their own nationals, that worry them, and they're concerned. They would like to see the Palestinian problem solved, and solved in the way that there is a Palestinian state and the Palestinians in their countries move back out of their countries and into a Palestinian state.

And that issue about what it might look like has been what's been going on for close to 50 years, 40-some-odd years. And, and it's, it is a complicated one. It's one where there is a great deal of emotion attached to it. There are times when both sides have felt they were quite close, but in the last analysis, the interlocutor on the -- particularly on the Palestinian side, Mr. Arafat, stepped away.

Where it will be in the period ahead, I just don't know. Certainly I think most rational people hope that they can find a way to solve it. Some people look at it from a distance and say, "Well, why doesn't the United States just grab them both by the scruff of the neck and shove them together?" And wouldn't it be nice. And we get that kind of hope expressed from countries in the region.

So there have been occasions when we've heard that hope from Israel.

But it doesn't work that way. You can't just shove people together and think that they're going to stay together. They've got to work this out. They've got to figure out a way that they can live together in peace.

And there's been a great deal of progress made; it just hasn't reached a solution. If you think about it, it wasn't too long ago there wasn't a country that had any relationship with Israel. Today any number of them have a variety of relationships, both formal and informal.

And so I think we have to keep trying. It's the kind of thing that if you're not working on it, it gets worse; and if you are working on it, it may or may not get better. (Scattered laughter.) But God bless all the wonderful people in the world who have worked on it over the years and tried to make it better and tried to see if we can't find ways that -- but if you think about it, there are very few countries today in that region whose position, formal governmental position, is that they want Israel eradicated and shoved into the sea. That was -- I mean, it wasn't too many decades ago that that was the mantra. But you don't hear that today. It's not considered really acceptable, except by terrorists, but not by the countries.

Question?

Q Mr. Secretary, I have a -- wonder if I can get your input on a military policy that's been evolving over the years and has become, I think, very evident in Iraq today. And that's the inclusion of servicewomen in the combat zone, where, even though they aren't in combat MOSs, they are engaged in close combat, being killed and horribly wounded.

I'm wondering if you view that as a contradiction to current social mores against violence in (sic) women. Is the notion of chivalry, the conduct of a gentleman, becoming an anachronism?

And also, are we opening up a Pandora's box of gender-neutral litigation, to include everything from Selective Service, the draft, and military uniform and physical fitness standards? Thank you. (Scattered applause.)

SEC. RUMSFELD: (Sighs.) (Laughter.)

Look, we've got terrific men and women doing a great job for this country. They don't do exactly the same jobs, as you well know. They do somewhat different jobs. There are a lot of things they do as well or better than the other sex. And my impression is that this is not something that needs to be adjusted at the present time.

I think that I'm so darn proud of what they do. And I go out there and I watch them, and I see the determination and the courage that these young men and women show. And to suggest that that isn't right, that they shouldn't be allowed to do that -- everyone's a volunteer.

It's not like you have conscription and we said you have to go do this, and you have to go do this this way. Every one of the people there stuck up their hand and said, "Send me. I want to do this." And that's a wonderful thing.

So I'm -- and I would add, just on the other subject you mentioned, I can't imagine our country going back to a draft. We don't need it. We're able to attract and retain wonderful people the way we're doing it as long as we provide the appropriate incentives. And certainly this is a country that's wealthy enough to do that. (Applause.)

We'll make this the last question, so make it a good one. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, going to go back to your first statement. You referred to people -- young people, particularly, being educated to hate us. And I think we know the schools we're talking about. I'm curious, what are we doing domestically and/or internationally to shut down the funding for those kinds of schools, or another way to interdict them?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, the president and the team have put together something like an 80- or 85-nation coalition that are trying to use all elements of national power to put pressure on terrorists, financing of terrorism, teaching of terrorism, and to try to share intelligence and to make life difficult for people who would do that.

There is a battle of ideas. There's a struggle within that religion where some people are trying to hijack it -- a relatively small minority of the people in that religion are trying to hijack it. And they are feeding money into these schools that teach people that it's in their interest, religious interest, if you will, to go out and kill people.

We're not -- where we stand in the world on that is not satisfactory, from my standpoint. I'm just one observer, and each of you can make your own assessment. But I have a feeling that it's a tough job. I have a feeling that a great deal of that work is ultimately going to have to be done by people in that religion. They are going to simply -- millions and millions and millions -- hundreds of millions of moderate Muslims are going to have to take back their religion. And we have to try to find ways to help them. (Applause.)

It's amazing, when you think of it. We have such a wonderful country and we're so good at so many things.

We're good at communication. We're good at advertising. We're good at marketing. We are good at inventing things and creating value. And in this area, we're not competing. We're not really -- as a nation focused in a way that would help us engage in this battle of ideas and help those people, those right-thinking people all across the globe, and there are a lot of wonderful right-thinking people all across the globe who recognize -- I mean, think of what we have. Everything we have in this country is based on trust. That is why we are so productive. That is why this country is so creative. Because people are free, and they're free to do what they want and think things that are unorthodox and unusual and to create just an amazing system.

When one compares this system, rooted in trust -- the fact that we can engage in a contract and for the most part expect that it stands up; the fact you can walk out of your door in the morning and not have to look around the corner and see if you're going to be shot; that you can send your kids off to school and you can trust that they're going to come back, that is a special thing and we are, because of the uniqueness of our society, we are the most vulnerable society on earth to terrorism. It strikes right at that trust. It attempts to alter our behavior and for us to be something other than what we are, a free

people. And that is really dangerous.

It is something that takes -- is going to take a lot of thought by the best minds in this country, because we cannot afford as a people to find that incrementally we are giving up that which makes this country so special and so distinctive. (Applause.)

Finally, if you see someone in uniform, say "thank you."

(Applause.)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040517-secdef0782.html>

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Jim Jones

cc: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Response to Periodic NATO-EUCOM Report

EUCO

1. **ISAF Expansion**. I continue to think we need to push the other countries to step up. The US should not make it a pattern of filling every vacuum. I am reluctant, but I am willing to talk about it.
2. **Bosnia**. Good.
3. **Kosovo**. Sounds right to me. We have to get NATO to work hard on national caveats. You're right - they are killing us everywhere.
4. **NATO Response Force**. What do you propose we do? This should be elevated, and pushed. It is critically important.
5. **Olympics**. We need to keep pushing NATO as a response for Greek Olympic security. We should not fill every vacuum. I agree with you that NATO ought to be able to do it.
6. **NATO Strategic Intelligence**. Good.
7. **Pre-Istanbul Comments**. I agree. What do we do about it?
8. **OIF**. I agree completely that 1st ID and you folks are doing great work to communicate and solve the problems for the families.

20 May 04

OSD 07570-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30904

9. **EUCOM name**. I will talk to General Myers and think about the renaming, but at the moment I am reluctant until we think through some other things. But thanks for the thought.

10. **Summit**. Thanks.

I look forward to seeing you next week.

Regards,

Attach.

5/18/04 EUCOM memo to SecDef: "Periodic Report from NATO-EUCOM"

DHR:dh
052004-20

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

rec'd 5/18/04

5/18/04

5/20/04

To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Cc: CJCS, VCJCS
Subject: PERIODIC REPORT FROM NATO/EUCOM
MR. SECRETARY,

BELOW PLEASE FIND A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT MAIN ISSUES CURRENTLY ONGOING IN NATO AND EUCOM:

1. NATO:

✓ (A) -ISAF EXPANSION: "DEAD IN THE WATER. FOR NOW, UNLESS NATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO REMAINDER OF FORCE GENERATION. (NEED 5 C-130S, 1 ROLE TWO MEDICAL STAGING UNIT, SOME INTELL ASSETS, 4 UTILITY HELOS FOR KABUL, AND 36 PEOPLE WITH VARYING SKILLS NECESSARY TO KEEP KABUL AIRPORT OPEN 24/7, BEYOND 1 JUNE). CJCS HAS ALL AMPLIFYING DATA. I KNOW THIS IS A TOUGH TIME FOR US, BUT U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO OPS IS NOW AT 0.2% OF OUR TOTAL CAPABILITY. ONE C-130 FOR NATO, FOR 3 MONTHS WOULD HELP GREATLY..... THEN AGAIN, ANYTHING WOULD HELP GREATLY!

✓ -BOSNIA: ON TRACK FOR HANDOFF TO E-U IN DECEMBER. U.S. DRAWDOWN OF BASES IS UNDERWAY, WILL KEEP SMALL PORTION OF EAGLE BASE FOR U.S. FOLLOW-ON MISSION AS AGREED.

✓ -KOSOVO: RETRAINING THE FORCE, TRYING TO MAKE IT MORE USABLE, NEED MORE SUCCESS ON POLITICAL FRONT. U.N. NOT BEING SUCCESSFUL AT PRESENT. AM RESISTING CALL FOR MORE TROOPS IN FAVOR OF MAKING THE TROOPS WE HAVE MORE USABLE (NATIONAL CAVEATS CONTINUE TO KILL US).

0 -ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR: LIKE ALL OTHER NATO OPS, NOT PROPERLY RESOURCED, BUT DOING WELL NONETHELESS. LIKELY TO CONTINUE IN 05, NATO'S ONLY REAL GWOT MISSION AT PRESENT.....WELL RUN, BUT CRITICALLY SHORT OF MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (75% SHORT OF REQUIREMENT).

✓ -NATO REPOSE FORCE: HITTING SOME SNAGS AFTER GREAT TAKEOFF. NATIONS WANT AN NRF.....BUT THEY DON'T WANT TO USE IT! THIS WILL BE A MAJOR PROBLEM IF NOT FIXED. SOME OF THIS IS CULTURE, SOME OF IT IS WHO PAYS FOR IT WHEN IT IS USED? NONE OF THE ARGUEMENTS ARE VALID.

✓ -OLYMPICS: NATO IS RESPONDING TO GREEK REQUEST FOR SUPPORT. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT U.S. USE NATO TO ANSWER GREEK BILATERAL REQUESTS FOR ANY HELP. NATO SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO THIS. IF THERE IS A U.S. ONLY CAPABILITY NEEDED (AS YET NOT IDENTIFIED) WILL ADVISE. OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IS ADMIRAL GREG JOHNSON, AND TACTICAL NATO COMMANDER IS VADM HARRY ULRICH. HAVE SENT MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR MILLER AS TO THIS COA.

-NATO STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE: WILL PROPOSE A PLAN FOR DEVELOPING NATO STRATEGIC INTELL CENTER. PROPOSAL CENTERS ON A "NATO ANALYSIS CENTER VICINITY OF JAC MOLESWORTH. CRITICAL SHORTFALL IN NATO (KOSOVO WAS A TOTAL SURPRISE.....NO INTELL !)

-PRE- ISTANBUL COMMENTS: NATO'S "CANCERS ARE IN FULL BLOOM.....GAP BETWEEN POLITICAL WILL AND WILL TO RESOURCE IS AS WIDE AS EVER. NO NATO OPERATIONAL MISSION IS FULLY RESOURCED, MULTI-NATIONAL LOGISTICS IS A FUTURE MUST. NATIONAL CAVEATS, COMMON FUNDING LIMITATIONS, NATIONAL BUDGETS FOR SECURITY ARE DECLINING (11 NATIONS NOW UNDER 2%), ARE CONTINUING TO LIMIT PROGRESS. PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT CONTINUING ABILITY

11-L-0559/OSD/30906

✓ OF ANY ONE NATION TO ALTER NATO COA IS A MAJOR LIMITING FACTOR TO NATO'S POTENTIAL TRANSFORMATION.

2. EUCOM.

✓ -OIF: IMPACT OF 2 DIVISIONS IN IRAQ IS FELT, PARTICULARLY IN FAMILIES OF 1ST AD (RECENTLY EXTENDED). USAREUR DOING GREAT WORK TO COMMUNICATE AND SOLVE PROBLEMS FOR FAMILIES.

✓ -FOOTPRINT: REGULAR GERMAN INTEREST/CONCERN ABOUT THIS ISSUE. GENERALLY "BUY" THE TRANSFORMATION THEME WE HAVE TOUTED. THEY ARE NOT IN A STRONG POSITION TO OBJECT.....% OF GDP FOR SECURITY GOING TO 1.3% ACCOMPANIED BY FORCE REDUCTION (ARMY CHIEF RESIGNED IN PROTEST)

✓ -NEW "EUCOM" NAME: IN AN EFFORT TO BETTER TITLE THE REGIONS WE OPERATE IN, SUGGEST WE CONSIDER RENAMING PACOM AND EUCOM TO NEW DESIGNATION AS WESTCOM AND EASTCOM, RESPECTIVELY. HENCE WE WOULD HAVE.....NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, EASTCOM, AND WESTCOM..... ALL "GEOCOMS"..... PASSING THOUGHT!

-AFRICA: CONTINUING EXCELLENT WORK IN STIMULATING INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION THROUGH EUCOM SPONSORED "AFRICA CLEARING HOUSE" SYMPOSIUM 25-26 MAY. IDEA IS TO GET CONCEPT OF HELPING AFRICANS HELP THEMSELVES EMBRACED BY COALITION OF NATIONS.

-GTEP LIKE MISSIONS: WILL SUBMIT LIST OF POTENTIAL NATIONS WHICH COULD BENEFIT FROM GTEP LIKE PROGRAMS

-D-DAY PREP: PROGRESS WITH D-DAY EVENTS IS GOOD. WORKING WITH NAVY TO ENSURE PRESENCE OF U.S. CARRIER OFF COAST. FRENCH INTEND TO HAVE CHARLES DE GAULLE CVN PRESENT ON BACKDROP. MY VIEW IS PRESIDENT BUSH OUGHT TO HAVE HIS THERE AS WELL.

-SUMMIT: WILL FORWARD A PAPER TO ADDRESS BOTH NATO AND EUCOM ISSUE FOR YOUR USE AT ISTANBUL. IT WILL BE A MILESTONE REPORT OF HOW FAR WE HAVE COME SINCE PRAGUE..... THE GOOD AND THE BAD..... AND THE WAY AHEAD.

3. SUMMARY:

-STILL AN ACTIVE TIME WITH TWO TRANSFORMATIONS (EUCOM AND NATO). STRONGLY **RECOMMEND** U.S. SIGNAL INTENT TO SUPPORT ALLIANCE AT **SOME** LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTION, TO INCLUDE THE NRF. ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE UNDERSCORE EUCOM TRANSFORMATION AS BEING AN EFFORT TO MAKE OUR FORCES MORE STRATEGICALLY EFFECTIVE AND USABLE. EMPHASIZE VALUE OF ROTATIONAL FORCES.... WILL NEED SOME ASSURANCES THAT THIS IS A REGULAR PART OF THE PLAN TO AUGMENT THEATER PRESENCE.

-FUTURE IN AOR IS PROMISING DESPITE MAJOR OBSTACLES. YOU HAVE ASSEMBLED A MOST WILLING TEAM, AND WE WILL DO THE JOB!

VERY **RESPECTFULLY**,



11-L-0559/OSD/30907

UNCLASSIFIED

TAB A

APR 14 2004

7A8

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Steve Cambone

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Threats

On this Jacoby threat report, I would like to know what we are doing on all the relevant potential targets.

Thanks.

Attach.

4/10/04 DIA info memo to SecDef re: Threats

DHR:dh
041304-8

.....
Please respond by

4/30/04

OSD 07592-04

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/30908

Tab A

TAB

APR 27 2004

754

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: PRTs

Please have the Joint Staff start working with John Abizaid to respond to this memo from March 8, so I know what the answer is.

Thanks.

Attach.
3/8/04 SD memo to CENTCOM [#030804-14]

DHR:dh
042304-8

.....
Please respond by 5/7/04

OSD 07594-04

Tab

11-L-0559/OSD/30909

May 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Briefing on Global War on Terror



337 WH

Mr. President—

You will recall that you asked us to meet with you to discuss the global war on terror. We were scheduled for an hour and a half, in your upstairs quarters, so it would be less formal.

As you know, we had to cancel the meeting because it was scheduled for the time I had to be on Capitol Hill dealing with the prison problems.

After the discussion we had yesterday with General Abizaid, it strikes me that our briefing on the Global War on Terror might be timely now. We are prepared to come over at any time you feel would be appropriate to make the presentation that we had planned for two weeks ago.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh
052104-7


OSD 07595-04

21 May 04

May 20, 2004

000.5

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Gingrich Note

Mr. President—

Here is an e-mail from Newt Gingrich. As you will note, he asked me if I would share it with you, and I am happy to do so. It certainly fits with our discussion on Thursday.

Respectfully,

Attach.

5/20/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: We are Not Winning the War on Terror

DHR:dh
052004-40

OSD 07598-04

20 May 04

cc: Craddock
Butter

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2004 7:57 AM
To: (b)(6); Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6); jack.patterson@osd.mil
Subject: we are not winning the war on terror-newt

for secdef, despsecdef
 I cannot be at the dpb today but I wanted to share this with you

I wish you would share this with the President

it will not make him happy but I think it is profoundly accurate.
 as you know I spent a lot of time outside the official system talking with military and intelligence folks. The following is my deepest worries about where we are.

at the Crossroads

someone told me that the President in Georgia was emphatic that we are winning the war on terror and that he was explaining that we were killing terrorists and they were declining in numbers

it is dangerous for him to say this and even more dangerous if he believes it

we are not winning the war on terror and in the absence of profound changes in our strategies and systems of implementation we will not win the war on terror

the Irreconcilable Wing of Islam is larger and more popular than ever

the funding from Saudi Arabia is continuing

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are far more dangerous than Iraq and Afghanistan

there is a real risk of a catastrophic attack somewhere (a successful version of their effort in Jordan that was stopped) including the United States

there are four groups in American foreign policy today

1. the Howard Dean withdrawal faction
2. the John Kerry stay engaged but only with the UN, the French and The Russians

support faction

3. The partisan loyalists who salute without question

4. those who believe the President is morally right in his positions but the strategies and implementation systems are profoundly too weak

with each passing week people are moving from three to four

the more the Administration protects and defends current accomplishments and the less it demands bold, decisive change the harder it is to keep from speaking out

this transcends politics and is about national security and a lot of American lives

5/14
1730

04-124

APR 23 2004

TO: Les Brownlee

CC: Mike Wynne
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

471

I have some questions regarding your response to my memo:

1. If there has been under-funding **of** ammunition procurement since **1988**, as you say, one would have thought that it should **have** been corrected well before **9/11**, and that it would have been the responsibility of the Army to make the case for appropriate funding under its organize, train and q u i p responsibilities. **Has that** account been used as a "billpayer"?
2. You **say** there were increases directed in small arms training strategy "immediately after **9/11**." What were they, and when?
3. Why wouldn't the Defense Logistics Agency procure common ammunition (like **small arms**)? Mike Wynne, please look into that issue.

Les, seeing your response **makes** me wonder what other situations may exist like this one that the Department may not have been sufficiently attentive to. Please **look into** that question and let me **know**. Thanks.

Attach.

4/8/04 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Shortage of Ammunition

DHR:db
042104-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

23 APR 04



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
 1 155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



INFO MEMO

May 14, 2004, 8:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
 Technology & Logistics)
 R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

[Handwritten signatures]

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

- This responds to your April 23, 2004, query concerning ammunition shortages. (TAB A)
- We have prepared a joint response to your questions on the Army ammunition shortage. Both before and after September 11th, the Army took prudent and balanced steps to resource capabilities to best meet strategic challenges to win our Nation's wars. Ammunition has historically not been fully funded to the total Army requirement. This is true for other Army programs as well given the numerous demands and constrained resources over time. It does not imply that the Army has been neglectful of providing ammunition resources or used ammunition accounts as a "billpayer." Funding for Army ammunition has increased steadily over the past 10 years. Since 9/11 the Army has further adjusted priorities to support the Global War on Terrorism, to include increases in small arms training requirements and warfighting expenditures. Operational expenditures have exceeded initial projections; we have and plan to use supplemental funding to support replenishing that ammunition.
- On September 28, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an immediate increase in small arms weapons training in preparation for combat operations. He specifically directed that all active duty soldiers qualify on their weapons twice yearly versus once, and that they conduct a collective live-fire exercise annually. He also directed a complete review of all training strategies, which resulted in additional training requirements that go into effect starting in FY05.
- Your question regarding the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) raises a good point. Managing the life-cycle of conventional munitions, from research and development to production, storage and demilitarization would require a major

471

19 MAY 04

23 APR 04

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

expansion of DLA's current capabilities. Ammunition acquisition and management more closely resembles the process used for weapon systems than commodities. Ammunition is unique in the complexity of the types and calibers of rounds, and the variety of suppliers and facilities that support ammunition production in the industrial base. Specialized management skills are required due to the constant change in operational demands, weapons platforms, force structure, and training requirements. Due to this complexity and recent actions by the Army to improve ammunition management, we recommend the Army maintain this responsibility.

- The Army has addressed the near term shortage of small caliber ammunition by increasing the annual production rate at the government-owned small caliber facility from 400 million rounds in FY00 to 1.2 billion rounds in FY04; the Army will continue to increase capacity to reach a 1.5 billion round rate in FY05. Additionally, we have initiated procurements from private industry that will provide 350 million rounds annually starting in FY05. This capacity of 1.85 billion rounds a year provides 300 million for other Service requirements, and 1.55 billion rounds a year to meet Army training, operations, and war reserve requirements. These actions give the Army flexibility to more effectively manage production and inventory against requirements and provide surge capacity in times of war (TAB B). To ensure continued improvement, the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense, (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) will begin a study in June that will closely examine all of our metrics, as well as DLA processes and metrics to improve how we manage ammunition.
- We agree with your concerns about other areas that may need attention. The Army, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, is conducting capability assessments to identify critical gaps that must be closed to retain our warfighting edge. Prior to 9/11, the Army had a different set of priorities. There were areas where we applied fewer resources, and accepted some additional risk. We have identified several areas where the risk has increased based on the global situation, and have taken actions to reduce that risk. Examples of these areas include Rapid Fielding Initiatives, Interceptor Body Armor, Aircraft Survivability Equipment, increased procurements for Up Armored Wheeled Vehicles, and Blue Force Tracking. We are addressing these and similar areas with a combination of program changes in the FY06-11 POM, supplemental funding, and reprogramming funds in the current budget.


Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Don Chrans, (b)(6)



Small Arms Production History

ROUND: \$X 1 0



11-L-0559/OSD/30917

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004, 4:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)
R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

- This responds to your April 23, 2004, query concerning ammunition shortages (TAB A).
- Historically, ammunition has not been funded to the total Army requirement. This is not unique to ammunition; we balance numerous demands with constrained resources based upon a changing environment, but we have not used ammunition as a "billpayer." Since 9/11, ammunition expenditures have increased, and we have adjusted priorities to fund the surge capacity needed in time of war (TAB B).
- On September 28, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an immediate increase in small arms weapons training in preparation for combat operations. He also directed a review of Army weapons training strategies. Approved changes take effect Army-wide in October 2004, but we have resourced deploying units at the new levels since 2003.
- Managing the life-cycle of conventional munitions closely resembles the process used for weapons systems; the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) core capabilities reside in commodity management and are not readily postured to provide munitions life-cycle management. However, we have initiated a joint study to improve how we manage ammunition and we will look to DLA to advise us on their processes and metrics for commodity management. We recommend the Army, as the DoD Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, maintain this executive responsibility.
- We agree with your concern about other areas that may need attention. We are taking actions to reduce other areas of risk based on the current global situation. Some examples include: Rapid Fielding Initiatives, Interceptor Body Armor, Aircraft Survivability Equipment, Up Armored Wheeled Vehicles, and Blue Force Tracking. These are being addressed through reprogramming in the current budget, supplemental funding, and the FY06-11 POM.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments: As Stated

Prepared By: Don Chrans,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30918

OSD 07658-04

4/21

14 JUN 04

23 APR 04

TAB

A

5/14
1:1730

04-124

APR 23 2004

Les Brownlee

Mike Wynne
Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Schoormaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Ammunition Shortage

I have **some** questions regarding your response to **my memo**

1. If there has been under-funding of ammunition procurement since **1988**, as you say, one would have thought that it should have been corrected well before 9/11, and that it would have been the responsibility of the **Army** to make the case for appropriate funding under its organize, **train** and equip responsibilities. Has that account been used as a "billpayer"?
2. You **say there were** increases directed in small **arms** training strategy "immediately after 9/11." What were they, and when?
3. **Why** wouldn't the Defense Logistics Agency procure common ammunition (like small **arms**)? Mike Wynne, please **look** into that issue.

Les, seeing your response **makes** me wonder what other situations may **exist** like this one that the Department **may** not have been sufficiently attentive **to**. Please look **into** that question and let me **know**. **Thanks**.

Attach.

4/8/04 *SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Shortage of Ammunition*

DHR:dh
042104-3

.....
Please respond by 5/14/04

OSD 07658-04


11-L-0559/OSD/30920

TAB

B



Lake City Army Ammunition Plant Production History



Years

11-L-0559/OSD/30922

TAB

C

COORDINATION

CONCUR	AGENCY	NAME	PHONE	DATE
Y	OSD, (AT&L)	SES, Melita	(b)(6)	13/06/04
Y	DLA	MG, Mongeon		13/06/04
Y	Army G8	LTG Griffin		14/06/04
Y	Army G4	SES, Plummer		13/06/04
Y	Army G3	BG, Weber		13/06/04
Y	Army, ASA(ALT)	COL, Aultman		13/06/04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 25 2004

Ms. Martha Raddatz
Pentagon Correspondent
ABC News
1717 DeSales Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Martha and (b)(6)

Thanks so much for your hospitality at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. It was a nice evening, and I enjoyed being with you and your associates.

Sincerely,

335SD

25 May 04

OSD 07708-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30925

Ser/
4 May 0630

May 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank-You for Dinner

Please let me know who I thank off this list of people I had dinner with Saturday night.

Thanks.

Attach.
WHC dinner info sheet

DHR:dh
050304-1

.....
Please respond by 5/4/04

Sir,
Response & thank you
note attached.
vr
/CDR Nosenzo

OSD 07708-04 TEN 5/24

11-L-0559/OSD/30926

DINNER TONIGHT

Host:

Martha Raddatz and her husband, (b)(6) National Public Radio correspondent. He has had lots of time in the Balkans and elsewhere (during Kosovo and Bosnian War)

Others at the table:

- Mr. and Mrs. Karl Rove
- Claire Shipman, ABC correspondent on *Good Morning America* and other programs
- Terry Moran, ABC White House Correspondent
- Tom Brady, quarterback, New England Patriots (was in Mrs. Bush's box w/Joyce at 2004 State of the Union)
- David Westin, ABC President

Note:

1. Larry recommends you go to the ABC reception first and meet Martha Raddatz and (b)(6) before going to any other receptions. They will be flexible; they will be there beginning at 6:00 p.m. and will look for you.
2. Colin Powell will be at another table, also hosted by ABC, but not at your table.

May 24, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Qaddafi

Attached is an interesting report quoting Qaddafi as urging Arab governments to retaliate against America's allies in Iraq. Worrisome.

Respectfully,

Attach.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Qaddafi, Scorning Agenda, Walks Out of Arab Summit," *The New York Times*, May 23, 2004.

DHR:dh
052404-34

Libya

24 May 04

OSD 077 11-04

The New York Times
nytimes.com

*Qaddafi calling for retaliation
against OIF contributors.*

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May 23, 2004

Qaddafi, Scorning Agenda, Walks Out of Arab Summit

By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

TUNIS, May 22 - The annual summit meeting of Arab leaders opened here Saturday with a few fleeting moments of drama, including the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, stalking out and Yasir Arafat, under Israeli blockade in Ramallah, addressing the gathering with a prerecorded plea for support.

The crucial issues to be addressed by the meeting include a joint Arab position toward ending the American occupation of Iraq, renewing a peace overture toward Israel while condemning recent violence against the Palestinians and, finally, support for reform of both the Arab political system and the Arab League itself.

Colonel Qaddafi, who has repeatedly called for dismantling the 22-member Arab League and had to be coaxed by other leaders to attend, announced he was withdrawing because he believed the entire agenda was flawed.

"There is one agenda laid out by the Arab people and another by the Arab governments," he said at a news conference after he had changed from the brown robe he was wearing when he marched out of the opening session into a white blazer festooned with military ribbons.

Colonel Qaddafi's outbursts, while erratic, often reflect popular sentiment, and those on Saturday mirrored some of the feeling on the street toward the current state of chaos in the Arab world, especially what many see as a lack of greater government support for the Iraqi people who are battling occupation.

While conceding that there was little the Arab governments could do about the American and British occupation forces in Iraq, he said they could collectively threaten smaller countries like Italy, Australia and Bulgaria that have sent troops.

"The Arabs are not doing anything to retaliate against these countries," the Libyan leader said. "The Arab summit should have warned these countries to withdraw their forces from Iraq or else they should consider themselves at a state of war with the Arab countries."

At the same time, he attacked the way the United States-lead coalition is dealing with Iraq. "If Saddam lived for another 10 years, would he be able to kill as many Iraqis and destroy as much of Iraq as the Americans have done in one year?" he asked, although he compared the American revolution favorably with that he carried out in Libya.

He appeared particularly upset because the Arab League has largely ignored a suggestion he made three years ago that the Arabs push for Israel and the Palestinians to form one state called Israteen, to which all Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return. Instead, a 2002 proposal advanced by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who is not attending this year and with whom Colonel Qaddafi sparred last

11-L-0559/OSD/30929

year, is being resurrected. It offered Israel comprehensive peace with all Arab states in exchange for comprehensive withdrawal, but foundered under continuing violence.

Colonel Qaddafi waved a white book he had published outlining his proposal - which Israel has belittled in the past - and said he hoped the Libyan people would decide to withdraw from the Arab League because it failed to carry out its decisions. He walked out of the meeting as Amr Mousa of Egypt, the secretary general, voiced criticism of those trying to dismantle the organization.

The Libyan leader also called it scandalous that the Arab League was saying nothing about the isolation of the Palestinian leader by the Israelis and the imprisonment of Saddam Hussein by the Americans.

"How could they ignore such a serious problem?" he said, rebuking reporters who tried to address him as "Mr. President," saying he was merely the leader of the Libyan revolution. "This means that any member of this summit cannot depend on his brothers to save him when he gets in trouble."

Mr. Arafat addressed the opening session in a statement recorded at his compound in Ramallah. The Palestinian leader, increasingly isolated by Israel with United States backing, referred to the mounting violence in the Gaza Strip as "unprecedented aggression."

He said the Arabs needed to pressure the world to ensure that the proposed Israeli withdrawal from Gaza not be used as a pretext for limiting any withdrawal from the West Bank.

The Palestinians want a state that is a single political and geographic entity, he said, adding, "What applies to the Gaza Strip must apply to the West Bank."

The opening session started with the Tunisian president, Zine el-Abidine ben Ali, asking everyone to stand in a moment of silence for Palestinian victims. But Arab officials conceded that their leaders - only about two-thirds of the kings, princes and presidents attended - could offer little other than criticism of violence in Iraq and the occupied territories. The meeting was delayed two months because of tension over the reform proposals and other issues.

"The reality is that nobody could ask the coalition to withdraw from Iraq immediately," said Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Sudanese foreign minister, who was leading his country's delegation. "But at least the Iraqi people want to know that the coalition forces will withdraw within three years, four years."

The leaders are expected to call for a greater United Nations role in running Iraq and for expanded international efforts to rein in violence in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Bush administration had hoped the meeting would provide an emphasis on reform that would bolster its arguments that overthrowing Mr. Hussein was promoting change throughout the region.

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0830

720

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1784-04
25 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 5/24*

SUBJECT: Communicate with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

- **Issue.** "Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated. ...I would like to see a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The Services, with their respective Reserve Components, should expand the current communication program targeting Reserve Component (RC) family members to include the proposed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) communication initiative (TAB B). New ideas such as internet Webcasts and cable broadcast of the Pentagon Channel, town hall meetings by senior Defense and RC leaders, the DOD Web sites and links to national and local RC, and Active Component community resources should be considered.
- **Discussion.** Since 9-11, there have been substantial increases in the spectrum of tools used to communicate with RC family members. Web sites, armory and Internet-based support groups, E-mails, toll-free numbers, financial advisors and counselors are but a few of the new tools (TABs C and D). More than 1,000 volunteer, full-time or part-time paid family readiness/support coordinators actively reach out to the families. Ideas from the ASD(PA) initiative can be used to expand communications with families.
 - The Services have implemented a program called "One Source" that provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, information and referral services to family members. (TAB E)
 - While keeping families informed is a Service responsibility, the Office of Family Policy in DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) provide policy and a forum supporting these efforts. DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) host a quarterly Joint Family Readiness Group; the next is scheduled for spring 2005.

326

25 May 04

RECOMMENDATION: Sign proposed memo at TAB F requesting the Services incorporate the ASD(PA) initiative of innovative communication methods into current communication programs.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____
JUN 1 2004

TSA SD	<i>[Signature]</i>
SRMA SD	<i>CS/26</i>
MA SD	<i>5/25 TN</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>5/25</i>

COORDINATION: TAB G

Attachments:
As stated

OSD 07718-04

Prepared by: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACICS (NG); (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30931

TAB B

Pentagon Channel Communication to the Men and Women In the Military

Overview:

The DoD will expand the Pentagon Channel in May to every military camp, base and station in the U.S. DoD will also webcast the Channel and offer the programming to cable providers (C-Span Model).

Purpose for Expansion:

Through our transformation studies, we've learned that the military wants more information and news from their leadership. For instance, Congress passed an updated Soldier, Sailor Relief Act that will provide needed benefits to the military. DoD has the capability to communicate this information overseas via American Forces Radio and Television Service, but no capability to broadcast the information stateside --- where many of the benefits apply. The expanded reach to camps, bases and stations provides the necessary communication vehicle.

1.2 Million members of the military are in the Guard and the Reserves so it is imperative for them to have timely access to military news and information.

Channel Content :

- DoD Briefings
- Military Briefings, speeches from the field
- DoD Interviews
- Military Service Broadcasts
- DoD News and Information pieces (i.e., new military benefits, health requirements..)

Timeline of Events

- In May (Military Appreciation Month), DoD will offer the channel via satellite to every military camp, base and station.
- In June, DoD will begin webcasting the Channel.
- In August, DoD will offer the Pentagon Channel to all cable and satellite providers (C-Span Model).

Reasons for Expansion

- Congress funded this expansion in FY04 Budget

Source: OASD/PA(CI), 3/11/04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/30932

TAB C

GUARD AND RESERVE UNIT FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS

1. There is a substantial infrastructure facilitating effective communication with RC families. ASD Public Affairs is developing a program to provide the Pentagon Channel via satellite, cable TV providers and Internet Webcast. It has the potential to be a valuable element to add to the substantial outreach infrastructure already in place. Examples of existing infrastructure include the following.

a. There are nearly 400 Family Assistance Centers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) that provide support to the Active Army, Army Reserve and ARNG families in addition to the unit family readiness coordinators. Approximately 80 percent of all deployed ARNG units have family readiness groups with full-time staff. So far in FY04, more than 608,000 family members from all components were provided assistance by the Army National Guard Family Support Centers.

b. The Naval Reserve uses a system of volunteer ombudsmen in addition to the 57 unit family support centers to maintain contact with family members. Additionally, the Naval Reserve publishes a monthly magazine, "The Navy Reservist," which provides resources, current news and features, and is directly mailed to all drilling Reservist's homes.


c. The Marine Corp Reserve uses the Key Volunteer Network with unit family coordinators as the primary link between units and families, providing unit spouses with official communication, information and referrals. Additionally, the Lifestyle Insights, Networking, Knowledge and Skills (L.I.N.K.S.) Program is a spouse-to-spouse orientation service offered to new Marine spouses to acquaint them with the military lifestyle and the Marine Corps, including the challenges brought about by deployments. Online and CD-ROM versions of L.I.N.K.S makes this valuable tool more readily accessible to working spouses of Reserve Marines not located near Marine Corps installations.

2. Families are kept informed through a variety of ways. Each Reserve Component headquarters has family readiness offices to oversee and implement command programs.

a. Toll-free family support hotlines, Web sites, newsletters, direct mailings and family support meetings are designed to inform family members about military benefits and entitlements, including medical/dental benefits, commissary and exchange privileges, military pay and allowances, financial assistance, counseling services, parenting and child care, legal issues, reemployment rights, and everyday issues.

b. The implementation of the One Source program provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, providing information and referral services to family members at the closest DOD facility.

3. The ASD Reserve Affairs "The National Guard and Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan, 2000-2005" calls for a strong, proactive approach to preparing family members for periods of separation due to military service. "The Family Readiness Toolkit" has been developed as a guide for commanders, service members, family readiness group leaders and volunteers to enhance family readiness. "The HELP Guide to Guard and Reserve Family Readiness" promotes a joint approach and includes unit contact information and Internet access to specific programs.



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- Deployment Preparation
- Deployment Locations
- National Guard & Reserves
- Commanders' Health Briefing
- Employment Regulations
- Health Care
- Health Surveillance
- Family Support Programs

- Family Support
- Post-Deployment
- Health Care Providers

Family Support Programs

The following National Guard and Reserves family support programs, servi organizations are available to help families cope **with** the strains associated deployments.

National Guard

Army National Guard Family Readiness Program. The mission of this **prog** help bond **Guard** families together and promote a sense of comradeship; rel information **from** the Director and the Family Readiness Program in order to feeling of isolation and convey the Director's concerns for the well being of families; aid Guard families in better understanding the mission of the ARN Guard families informed about activities sponsored by the Director and /or t Readiness Program; and provide an avenue for Guard families to share som common rewards, or tensions and frustrations of military life.

National Guard Bureau Family Support. In **the** aftermath of the Cold War, n the Guard **and** Reserve are being called to active duty to an unprecedented e recent years we have repeatedly called reservists to duty involuntarily for m Bosnia, **Kosovo** and Southwest Asia. Contingency **operations** like these hav enormous strains on our servicemembers and their families. This site provid information on the steps the **NGB** is taking to enhance family support and r

National Guard Bureau Year of the Family. In **2000** the NGB celebrated the family. **During** this time the National Guard **took steps** to address issues imp Air National Guard **and Army National** Guard Family Readiness Program.

Reserves

Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits. This guide provides an overview military benefits and **how** to access **them.** It identifies eligibility requiremen associated with some entitlements **and** provides **guidance** for obtaining assis specific questions and problems.

Army Reserve Family Promam. This site provides information on family pr **support offices,** reserve family member benefits, family readiness handbook reserve family **news.**

Navy Reserve Ombudsman Online. The Reserve Ombudsman provide a vol force who is able to offer support and guidance to families.

National Guard & Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan. Prepared by th the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Office of **Far** (within the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, F Education) this plan seeks to **ensure** that reservists and their families are pre cope with the strains associated with long or repeated deployments and are served by military family care systems, networks and organizations.

Air Force Reserve Family Readiness. Families of deployed reservists will b and supported by the Family Readiness office. The types of deployment ass services the family can expect include: family support groups, reunion infor volunteer opportunities.

Marine Corps Reserve Community Services, Marine **Corps** Community Ser (MCCS) is the byproduct of merging the Corps old Morale, Welfare, and R and Human Resources programs and tailoring them to better meet today's n personal and family readiness. **MCCS** is designed around five essential, req capabilities: Marine Corps Family Team Building, Personal Services, Semp Business Operations, and General Support. Marine Forces Reserve, due to t unique challenges, will focus on the first three.

Coast Guard Reserve Member, Family, and Employer Support. This page h designed to aid the Coast Guard Reservist, their families, and employers to l understand the benefits and nature of reserve service.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This site is to today's Reserve force. It provides information about the policies, program initiatives that OSD/Reserve Affairs manages for the National Guard and R Components of the United States Armed Forces. This includes family supp issues.

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
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Relocation-- a huge part of the **military lifestyle...**

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In addition to having access to an Army One Source (AOS) consultant over the phone 24 hours a day, seven days a week, you can also have six PRIVATE in-person counseling sessions* with a counselor for each problem or life issue that you need help with. These sessions are with Masters-prepared counselors in your local community and provided at NO COST TO YOU. This service is available to every Soldier, dependent relative, or guardian of a Soldier's minor child in the US and Puerto Rico. This service is not limited to one set of six sessions. You are encouraged to access these services for as many problems or life issues that you may face now and in the future. Simply call 1-800-464-8107 access these services.

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Have you tried one of the popular low-carb diets?

- Yes. I have, and I have had success
- Yes, I have, but I did not have success
- No, but I am interested in trying one
- No, and I am not interested in trying one

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Today's Tip

Has your eyeglass prescription changed? Instead of throwing your old glasses in a drawer, donate them. Many vision professionals accept old frames and glasses and then donate them to those who are less fortunate.

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
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TAB G

COORDINATION PAGE

ASD (PA)	Ms. Allison Barber	19 Apr 04
DUSD (MC&FP)	Ms Meg Falk	20 Apr 04
ASD (RA)	COL James Scott	20 Apr 04
Army	COL John Chappel	8 Apr 04
Navy	CAPT M.S. Simon	8 Apr 04
USMC	Col van Dyke	7 Apr 04
Air Force	Col Ball	13 Apr 04

27
6/6

March 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Communicate w/Activated Guard and Reserve Families

Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated.

The active forces seem to have a much better arrangement, since they are generally located together on a base, unlike the Guard and Reserve.

I think some arrangements have to be made. I would like to see a proposal.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
030804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

DR 6/14

SecDef -

A comprehensive response was sent in to you about 2 weeks ago highlighting communications links to both National Guard & Reserve personnel

11 6/11

OSD 07718-04

07/01

07/01

March 8, 2004

727

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Communicate w/Activated **Guard** and Reserve Families

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Thanks.

Done
6/1

DHR:dh
030804-4

.....
Please respond by 4/2/04

SIR,
CTCS Response attached.
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5/26

file
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC 20318-9999



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-1784-04
25 May 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS / *RBMY 5/24*

SUBJECT: Communicate with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

- **Issue.** "Please come up with a proposal for the Services to develop a better way to stay in touch with the families of Guard and Reserve who are activated. ...I would like to see a proposal."
- **Conclusion.** The Services, with their respective Reserve Components, should expand the current communication program targeting Reserve Component (RC) family members to include the proposed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) communication initiative (TAB B). New ideas such as internet Webcasts and cable broadcast of the Pentagon Channel, town hall meetings by senior Defense and RC leaders, the DOD Web sites and links to national and local RC, and Active Component community resources should be considered.
- **Discussion.** Since 9-11, there have been substantial increases in the spectrum of tools used to communicate with RC family members. Web sites, armory and Internet-based support groups, E-mails, toll-free numbers, financial advisors and counselors are but a few of the new tools (TABs C and D). More than 1,000 volunteer, full-time or part-time paid family readiness/support coordinators actively reach out to the families. Ideas from the ASD(PA) initiative can be used to expand communications with families.
 - The Services have implemented a program called "One Source" that provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, information and referral services to family members. (TAB E)
 - While keeping families informed is a Service responsibility, the Office of Family Policy in DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) provide policy and a forum supporting these efforts. DUSD(MC&FP) and ASD(RA) host a quarterly Joint Family Readiness Group; the next is scheduled for spring 2005.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign proposed memo at TAB F requesting the Services incorporate the ASD(PA) initiative of innovative communication methods into current communication programs.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB G

Attachments:
As stated

TSA SD	<i>NR</i>
SRMASD	<i>65126</i>
MA SD	<i>5/25 IN</i>
EXEC SEC	<i>5/25</i>

OSD 07718-04

Prepared by: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACICS (NG); (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/30943

TAB B

Pentagon Channel Communication to the Men and Women In the Military

Overview:

The DoD will expand the Pentagon Channel in May to every military camp, base and station in the U.S. DoD will also webcast the Channel and offer the programming to cable providers (C-Span Model).

Purpose for Expansion:

Through our transformation studies, we've learned that the military wants more information and news from their leadership. For instance, Congress passed an updated Soldier, Sailor Relief Act that will provide needed benefits to the military. DoD has the capability to communicate this information overseas via American Forces Radio and Television Service, but no capability to broadcast the information stateside --- where many of the benefits apply. The expanded reach to camps, bases and stations provides the necessary communication vehicle.

1.2 Million members of the military are in the Guard and the Reserves so it is imperative for them to have timely access to military news and information.

Channel Content:

- DoD Briefings
- Military Briefings, speeches from the field
- DoD Interviews
- Military Service Broadcasts
- DoD News and Information pieces (i.e., new military benefits, health requirements..)

Timeline of Expansion:

- In May (Military Appreciation Month), DoD will offer the channel via satellite to every military camp, base and station.
- In June, DoD will begin webcasting the Channel.
- In August, DoD will offer the Pentagon Channel to all cable and satellite providers (C-Span Model).

Funding for Expansion:

- Congress funded this expansion in FY04 Budget

Source: OASD/PA(CI), 3/11/04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/30944

TAB C

GUARD AND RESERVE UNIT FAMILY READINESS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS

1. There is a substantial infrastructure facilitating effective communication with RC families. ASD Public Affairs is developing a program to provide the Pentagon Channel via satellite, cable TV providers and Internet Webcast. It has the potential to be a valuable element to add to the substantial outreach infrastructure already in place. Examples of existing infrastructure include the following.

a. There are nearly 400 Family Assistance Centers in the Army National Guard (ARNG) that provide support to the Active Army, Army Reserve and ARNG families in addition to the unit family readiness coordinators. Approximately 80 percent of all deployed ARNG units have family readiness groups with full-time staff. So far in FY04, more than 608,000 family members from all components were provided assistance by the Army National Guard Family Support Centers.

b. The Naval Reserve uses a system of volunteer ombudsmen in addition to the 57 unit family support centers to maintain contact with family members. Additionally, the Naval Reserve publishes a monthly magazine, "The Navy Reservist," which provides resources, current news and features, and is directly mailed to all drilling Reservist's homes.


c. The Marine Corp Reserve uses the Key Volunteer Network with unit family coordinators as the primary link between units and families, providing unit spouses with official communication, information and referrals. Additionally, the Lifestyle Insights, Networking, Knowledge and Skills (L.I.N.K.S.) Program is a spouse-to-spouse orientation service offered to new Marine spouses to acquaint them with the military lifestyle and the Marine Corps, including the challenges brought about by deployments. Online and CD-ROM versions of L.I.N.K.S makes this valuable tool more readily accessible to working spouses of Reserve Marines not located near Marine Corps installations.

2. Families are kept informed through a variety of ways. Each Reserve Component headquarters has family readiness offices to oversee and implement command programs.

a. Toll-free family support hotlines, Web sites, newsletters, direct mailings and family support meetings are designed to inform family members about military benefits and entitlements, including medical/dental benefits, commissary and exchange privileges, military pay and allowances, financial assistance, counseling services, parenting and child care, legal issues, reemployment rights, and everyday issues.

b. The implementation of the One Source program provides 24/7 toll-free personal assistance, providing information and referral services to family members at the closest DOD facility.

3. The ASD Reserve Affairs "The National Guard and Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan, 2000-2005" calls for a strong, proactive approach to preparing family members for periods of separation due to military service. "The Family Readiness Toolkit" has been developed as a guide for commanders, service members, family readiness group leaders and volunteers to enhance family readiness. "The HELP Guide to Guard and Reserve Family Readiness" promotes a joint approach and includes unit contact information and Internet access to specific programs.



[Printer Frier](#)

- Deployment Preparation
- Deployment Locations
- National Guard & Reserves
- Commanders' Health Briefing
- Employment Regulations
- Health Care
- Health Surveillance
- Family Support Programs

- Family Support
- Post-Deployment
- Health Care Providers

Family Support Programs

The following National Guard and Reserves family support programs, servi organizations are available to help families cope with the strains associated deployments.

National Guard

Army National Guard Family Readiness Program. The mission of this progr help bond Guard families together and promote a sense of comradeship; rel information from the Director and the Family Readiness Program in order to **feeling of** isolation and convey the Director's concerns for the well being of families; aid Guard families in better understanding the mission of the ARN Guard families informed about activities sponsored by the Director and /or t Readiness Program; and provide **an** avenue for Guard families to share som common rewards, or tensions and frustrations of military life.

National Guard Bureau Family Support. In the aftermath of the Cold War, n the Guard and Reserve are being called to active duty to **an** unprecedented c recent years we have repeatedly called reservists to duty involuntarily for m Bosnia, Kosovo and Southwest Asia. Contingency operations like these hav enormous strains on **our** servicemembers and their families. This site provid information on the steps **the** NGB is taking to enhance family support **and** r

National Guard Bureau Year of the Family. In 2000 the NGB celebrated the family. **During** this time the National Guard **took steps** to address issues imp Air National Guard and Army National Guard Family Readiness Program.

Reserves

Guide to Reserve Family Member Benefits. **This** guide provides **an** overview military benefits and how to access **them**. It identifies eligibility requiremen associated **with** some entitlements **and** provides guidance for obtaining assis specific questions and problems.

Army Reserve Family Program. **This** site provides information on family pr support offices, reserve family member benefits, family readiness handbook reserve family news.

Navy Reserve Ombudsman Online. The Reserve Ombudsman provide a vol force who is able to offer support and guidance to families.

National Guard & Reserve Family Readiness Strategic Plan. Prepared by th the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Office of Far (within the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, F Education) this plan seeks to ensure that reservists and their families are pre cope with the strains associated with long or repeated deployments and are served by military family care systems, networks and organizations.

Air Force Reserve Family Readiness. Families of deployed reservists will b and supported by the Family Readiness office. **The** types of deployment ass services the family can expect include: family **support** groups, reunion infor volunteer opportunities.

Marine Corps Reserve Community Services. Marine Corps Community Ser (MCCS) is the byproduct of merging the Corps old Morale, Welfare, and R and Human Resources programs **and** tailoring them to better meet today's n personal **and** family readiness. **MCCS** is designed around five essential, **req** capabilities: Marine Corps Family Team Building, Personal Services, Semp Business Operations, and General Support. **Marine** Forces Reserve, due to t unique challenges, will focus on the first three.

Coast Guard Reserve Member, Family, and Employer Support. This page h designed to aid **the** Coast Guard Reservist, their families, and employers to l understand the benefits and nature of reserve **service**.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This site is to today's Reserve force. It provides information about **the** policies, program initiatives that OSD/Reserve Affairs manages for the National Guard and R Components of the United States Armed Forces. This includes family supp issues.

Tab D

ARMY One Source

Search

- Home
- Materials Request
- Contact Us
- Site Map
- Site Help

Help

- ▶ Parenting & Child Care
- ▶ Military Life
- ▶ Education
- ▶ Midlife & Retirement
- ▶ Older Adults
- ▶ Disability
- ▶ Financial
- ▶ Legal
- ▶ Everyday Issues
- ▶ work
- ▶ International
- ▶ Managing People
- ▶ Health
- ▶ Emotional Well-Being
- ▶ Addiction & Recovery

¿Habla Español?

- ▶ ¿Necesita informacion en español?

Your Organization

Disclaimer

- ▶ Information on sending packages to Soldiers
- ▶ Army Emergency Relief
- ▶ Army National Guard Homepage
- ▶ Army Reserve Homepage
- ▶ Army Homepage

▶ Show all

My Army One Source

▶ Sign Up



welcomes you to
Army One Source Online
 the comprehensive source to help you face
 life's everyday challenges.

▶▶ This Month's Feature

Relocation -- a huge part of the military lifestyle...

more ▶

In addition to having access to an Army One Source (AOS) consultant over the phone 24 hours a day, seven days a week, you can also have six PRIVATE in-person counseling sessions* with a counselor for each problem or life issue that you need help with. These sessions are with Masters-prepared counselors in your local community and provided at NO COST TO YOU. This service is available to every Soldier, dependent relative, or guardian of a Soldier's minor child in the US and Puerto Rico. This service is not limited to one set of six sessions. You are encouraged to access these services for as many problems or life issues that you may face now and in the future. Simply call 1-800-464-8107 access these services.

more ▶

Weekly Poll

Have you tried one of the popular low-carb diets?

- Yes, I have, and I have had success
- Yes, I have, but I did not have success
- No, but I am interested in trying one
- No, and I am not interested in trying one

View Results: 1631 votes

Today's Tip

Has your eyeglass prescription changed? Instead of throwing your old glasses in a drawer, donate them. Many vision professionals accept old frames and glasses and then donate them to those who are less fortunate.

Life Articles

Ideas for Living Within Your Means

Managing Employees Who Work Flexible Schedules

more ▶

About this Service

Army One Source Frequently Asked Questions & Answers

more ▶

Events

▶ Moderator Helping You Talk your Elder Relative 02:00 EDT 05/2

▶ LifeWork

▶ View

Feature

- ▶ Financial Calc
- ▶ Child Care Locator
- ▶ Elder Care Finder
- ▶ Summer Camp

Self-

- ▶ Quick Quiz: What Help Do Your Relatives Need?
- ▶ Are You Changing Your Life?
- ▶ Are You Depressed?

Bulletin

- ▶ Midlife and Retirement
- ▶ Older Adults
- ▶ Parenting and Family
- ▶ Financial Issues

AIR FORCE One Source

Search

- Home
- Materials Request
- Contact Us
- Site Map
- Site Help

How May We Help You?

- ▶ Parenting & Child Care
- ▶ Military Life
- ▶ Education
- ▶ Midlife & Retirement
- ▶ Older Adults
- ▶ Disability
- ▶ Financial
- ▶ Legal
- ▶ Everyday issues
- ▶ Work
- ▶ International
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- ▶ Emotional Well-Being
- ▶ Addiction & Recovery

Habla Español

¿Necesita información en español?

Your Documentation

Disclaimer

- ▶ Air force & Special Needs
- ▶ Air Force Aid Society
- ▶ Reserve Family Benefits Guide
- ▶ Air National Guard
- ▶ Tricare for Reservists

Show all

My Air Force One Source

Sign Up



welcomes you to
Air Force One Source Online
the comprehensive source to help you face
life's everyday challenges.

This Month's Feature

Relocation - a huge part of the military lifestyle...

more

US Air Force Family Support Centers offer you access to Air Force One Source Online, where you can find help to cope with life's **little -- and not so little --** issues. Click on a topic of interest on the left, under the **How May We Help You?** heading, or use the key word search in the top **right** corner. You can access informative **articles**, helpful **tools**, audio tips on hundreds of specific **topics**, and much more.

more

Weekly Poll

Have you tried one of the popular low-carb diets?

- Yes, I have, and I have had success
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Submit

View Results: 1645 votes

Life Articles

Supporting Military Personnel When They Return to Work

Your Middle School Child's Social Life

more

Today's Tip

Has your eyeglass prescription changed? Instead of throwing your old glasses in a drawer, donate them. Many vision professionals accept old frames and glasses and then donate them to those who are less fortunate.

About this Service

Air Force One Source Frequently Asked Questions & Answers

more

Email Newsletters

Air Force One Source Online offers monthly email

Events

Moderator
Helping You Tailor your Elder Relations
02:00 EDT 05/2

LifeWork

View

Feature

- ▶ Financial Calc
- ▶ Child Care Loans
- ▶ Elder Care Financing
- ▶ Summer Camp

Self-

- ▶ Quick Quizzer
- ▶ What Help Do Relative Need?
- ▶ Are Life Changes Causing You Stress?
- ▶ Are You Depressed?

Bulletin

- ▶ Midlife and Retirement
- ▶ Older Adults
- ▶ Parenting and Family
- ▶ Financial Issues

NAVY One Source

Search

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help

- Parenting & Child Care
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- Navy Knowledge Online
- Spouse Employment Assistance Program
- Familylines
- Navy Ombudsman

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View Results: 1644 votes

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Has your eyeglass prescription changed? Instead of throwing your old glasses in a drawer, donate them. Many vision professionals accept old frames and glasses and then donate them to those who are less fortunate.

Email Newsletters

Navy One Source Online offers monthly email newsletters on a variety of topics.



Mail Order Buying Tips

Co-Dependency in Families with Chemical Dependency



Navy One Source Frequently Asked Questions & Answers

Events

Moderate Helping You Tailor your Elder Relat
 02:00 下午 EDT
 05/20/04

Life Work

View

Feature

- Financial Calc
- Child Care Lo
- Elder Care Fir
- Summer Cam

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- Quick Quizzes
- What Help Do Relative Need?
- Are Life Chan You Stress?
- Are You Depr

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- Midlife and Re
- Older Adults
- Parentinganc
- FinancialIssu



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000


MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Communication with Activated Guard and Reserve Families

Since September 2001, you have done much to improve family support programs for Active and Reserve Components. In the area of communication, we can never do enough for Guard and Reserve members, employers, and families. More information and news are necessary from DOD leadership. As the Department of Defense relies more on the contributions from the National Guard and Reserve, it is increasingly important to improve communication with these members and their families.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) expanded the Pentagon Channel to reach every military camp and station in the United States via satellite starting May 2004. The Pentagon Channel will also be made available on Internet Webcast in June and to all cable and satellite providers in August.

Please work with your Reserve Components, Family Support, and Public Affairs offices to incorporate this new initiative into your strategic communication plans.



cc:
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)



11-L-0559/OSD/30951

TAB G

COORDINATION PAGE

ASD (PA)	Ms. Allison Barber	19 Apr 04
DUSD (MC&FP)	Ms Meg Falk	20 Apr 04
ASD (RA)	COL James Scott	20 Apr 04
Army	COL John Chappel	8 Apr 04
Navy	CAPT M.S. Simon	8 Apr 04
USMC	Col Van Dyke	7 Apr 04
Air Force	Col Ball	13 Apr 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUN 1 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

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cc:
Assistant secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)

326


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J S M...
oy



OSD 07718-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30953

May 29, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Brahimi's List

Condi —

I cannot understand why Bremer, Blackwill and you are unwilling to allow Abizaid and Sanchez to see the names of the people who are being considered by Brahimi.

ITAG

It seems to me that they may have knowledge of those people, and it would be a shame not to take advantage of it.

I would be curious to know why that decision has been made.

Thank you.

DHR:dh
052504-17

25 May 04

*am
stop*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 26, 2004

IPAA

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM : CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT : BRAHIMI'S LIST

Don,

To my knowledge, there has been no decision made. In any case, Jerry will share the full slate with Abizaid and Sanchez tomorrow morning. He has already briefed Sanchez on the power ministries and has arranged for him to meet some of the key people on the list.

Condi

Don De

23 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30955

07771 04

02
5/28

May 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Brahim's List

Condi —

I cannot understand why Bremer, Blackwill and you are unwilling to allow Abizaïd and Sanchez to see the names of the people who are being considered by Brahim.

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I would be curious to know why that decision has been made.

Thank you.

DHR:dh
052504-17

Done
5/28


11-L-0559/OSD/30956

07771.04

May 25, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Fact Checking

Andy—

In fact checking several numbers for the President's speech on Iraq, the White House speechwriters called three different points of contact here in the Pentagon — predictably with slightly varying answers.

For similar situations, the best course of action for the speechwriters is to call my office, specifically my Senior Military Assistant, Lieutenant General John Craddock. We want to ensure they get one correct answer with one phone call.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-1

350.001 WH

25 May 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

0848
4/30
S/E
2/73

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *JW* 10 MAY 2004

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 4/29/04

SUBJECT: Information on DoD Advisory Boards for Senator McCain

- In the attached snowflake, you requested that we prepare a letter to Senator McCain transmitting information on DoD Federal Advisory Committees.
- The requested letter is attached for your signature (Tab A).

334

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at Tab A

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments:
As Stated

10/11/04

Prepared by: Jennifer Spaeth, (b)(6)

OSD 07775-04

10 Feb 04

5/11
1800

CS/11

1:00PM

Paul Butler
5/24

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld %σ
DATE: February 10, 2004
SUBJECT:

Please get back to me with that attachment that I will send to McCain explaining what all of our advisory boards are, what the rules are, and defending the rules and defending the people who serve, and that we value and need their advice and counsel. We may end up wanting to put it on the website as well.

334

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021004.21

Please respond by: _____ 2/20

Sim
Response attached.
v/r.
LTC Swope
5/24 TEN

CS/24

see 5/25

Let's relook
Some.

OSD 07775-04

10 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30959



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond B. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Information on DoD Advisory Boards for Senator McCain

- In the attached snowflake, dated February 10, 2004, you requested information on DoD Advisory Boards that would be forwarded to Senator McCain regarding his inquiry.
- Currently, DoD utilizes 60 advisory boards: 34 were established at your discretion or that of your predecessors, 25 were established in statute, and one was established by Executive Order.
- All DoD advisory boards with non-Governmental members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. Consistent with longstanding DoD policy, non-Government members are appointed as Special Government Employees. Members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated for their work. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant for White House Liaison and the various OSD Principal Staff Assistants who utilize a board or receive advisory assistance from them. Members are required to execute financial disclosure reports. Advisory board charters, meeting records, reports, and membership listings are open to the public. Meetings are also open to the public unless certain legal exemptions apply.
- The merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the Government are well recognized. They have been very valuable in many areas, including current transformation efforts. They are an important pipeline for informing the DoD leadership of the latest business practices and state-of-the-art science and technology developments. Membership creates professional networks that provide access to information that cannot exclusively be found from internal government sources. In addition, advisory boards provide a timely and cost-effective means of receiving highly expert advice and assistance. The costs would be significant if the Department were to use other contractual arrangements for the same services.
- An information paper is at Tab A and a detailed summary of all DoD Advisory Boards is at Tab B. Both of these may be provided to Senator McCain.

COORDINATION: Tab C

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jenny Spaeth, (b)(6)

11-L-055 OSD/30960

A-011-370

COORDINATION

DA&M Response to SecDef Snowflake on McCain Snowflake

Senior Official

Signature

Date

ASD(LA)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dan Starly", written over a horizontal line.

4/29/04

COORDINATION
DA&M Response to SecDef Snowflake on DoD Advisory Boards

Senior Official

Signature

Date

2/20/04

DoD GC


Principal Deputy

as revised, include the
additions of bullet (items)
to the information paper

ASD(LA)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 26 2004

Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

Per our earlier discussion on this matter, attached is an information paper on the Department of Defense Federal Advisory Committees. The first attachment briefly explains the guidelines under which they operate, our policies and procedures on the appointment of members, and their value to me and other senior leaders in the Department. The second attachment is a listing of all DoD advisory committees and describes the purpose of each.

Respectfully,

334

26 May 04



OSD 07775-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30963

10-1604

Information Paper on DoD Advisory Boards

- The Department currently utilizes 60 advisory boards, 34 of which were established at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Twenty-five were created in statute by the legislative branch, and one was established by Executive Order. A listing of these boards and their missions is at Tab 1. This listing is also found at the DoD Federal Advisory Committees website: <http://faca.disa.mil> under the Advisory Committees tab.
- DoD advisory boards which have private citizens as members are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I. This statute not only recognizes the merits of seeking advice and assistance from experts outside the government, but it allows the executive branch to receive advice that is relevant, objective, and open to the public.
- Department advisory boards can be established on a long-term basis to address continuing issues, or they can be established on a short-term basis to address a specific issue. Long-term boards can be established for two-year periods and can be renewed for additional two-year periods thereafter.
- Under the law, advisory board meetings must be announced in advance and must be open to the public. All or part of an advisory board meeting may be closed, however, based on one or more of the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c).
 - As an example, advisory board meetings may be closed to the public when the board will discuss classified information.
- The law also requires advisory boards to keep and make available to the public minutes of open and closed meetings, including an accurate description of and the resolution of each matter discussed by the board.
- Department advisory boards are independent entities. While they report their findings to the Department leadership, their recommendations are not subject to direction and control by the Department.
- It has been the Department of Defense's policy for the past 15 years to appoint all private sector board members as Consultants, also known as Special Government Employees. After agreeing to serve, potential members are vetted through the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (White House Liaison) and various Principal Staff Assistants who utilize the board

and/or receive their advice. Nominees are also required to fill out financial disclosure reports if the board they serve on makes recommendations that could affect the expenditure of government funds in the future. Board members may accept travel and per diem, but are rarely compensated directly for their work.

- The General Counsel of the Department of Defense notifies advisory committee members by letter to contact the Standards of Conduct Office (SOCO) for advice concerning ethics issues relating to their appointment. SOCO assures that the members' confidential financial disclosure reports are completed before their first meeting. Committee members also complete a Foreign Activities Questionnaire and execute a disqualification from participation in any particular matters involving financial interests listed on the confidential financial disclosure report. SOCO attorneys provide an ethics briefing to the Committee members. A guide for current committee members is distributed at a committee meeting and can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defenseethics> under "ethics resource library" and under "DoD guidance."
- Advice provided to the Department has been critical to current transformation efforts, keeping the Department informed on cutting edge issues from the latest best business practices to state-of-the-art science and technology developments. This advice cannot be drawn exclusively from internal government sources. We simply do not have the expertise or those with professional networks with access to the kind of information needed. This advice often has a direct impact on future military operations and the welfare of the war fighter.
- If the Department were to use survey instruments and contractual arrangements to gather the advice provided by advisory boards, the costs would be significantly higher. Most support provided to these committees is done by federal employees who manage these committees as a collateral duty to their principal duties.



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES**

As of 04/29/2004

Type of Committee: Statutory (Total - 25)

Presidential (Total - 1)

Discretionary/Established by Secretary of Defense (Total - 34)

Committee Name	Type	Description
<u>Advisory Council on Dependents' Education (ACDE)</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS), on improvements to achieve and maintain a high quality public educational program through secondary school for minor dependents in overseas areas as defined in section 1411, Public Law 95-561, as amended.
<u>Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction</u>	Statutory	Assesses the capabilities for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving weapons of mass destruction. Examines response capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels.
<u>Air University Board of Visitors</u>	Discretionary	Assists the Air University in sustaining effective programs pertaining to the educational, doctrinal, and research policies and activities of the Air University, and advises the Secretary of the Air Force, through the Commander, AU.
<u>Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Executive Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Studies the ARMS Initiative and reviews the Army's plan for its implementation; makes specific findings and recommendations concerning the concept, executability, and overall soundness of the plan; assesses government and industry expectations for the ARMS Initiative; evaluates the incentives being proposed under the ARMS Initiative Implementation Plan (AIIP); reviews and makes specific recommendations on the applicability and adequacy of the loan guaranty program and planning grants; reviews and determines which existing public laws, regulations, and policies are currently available to fulfill the ARMS Initiative; and, reviews and comments on the Army's plans for Plant Reutilization, Emergency Planning, and the Disposal of Excess Plant Equipment.

<u>Armed Forces Epidemiological Board</u>	Discretionary	Serves as a continuing scientific advisory body to the Surgeons General of the military departments and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) providing them with timely scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development and research needs for the prevention of disease and injury and promotion of health.
<u>Army Education Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and the Army's senior leadership with expert and continuous advice on Army educational programs. Advice provided relates to educational policies, school curriculums, educational philosophy and objectives, program effectiveness, facilities, staff and faculty, instructional methods, and other aspects of organization and management.
<u>Army Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and major Army Commanders on scientific, technological, and acquisition matters of interest to the Department of the Army.
<u>Board of Advisors to the President, Naval War College</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the President, Naval War College in educational and support areas. Reports or opinions, suggestions and recommendations of the Board will be made to the President, Naval War College. The President, Naval War College shall advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations of opinions and recommendations made by the members of the Board which should receive consideration by a higher authority.
<u>Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Superintendent and the Secretary of the Navy on naval graduate education programs, assessing the effectiveness of the school in accomplishing its mission and inquires into the curricula, instruction, physical equipment, administration, state of the student body, fiscal affairs, and other matters relating to the operation of school programs.
<u>Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</u>	Statutory	Provides advice and guidance to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the operation of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences; to assure that said operation is in the best tradition of academia and in compliance with the appropriate accreditation authorities.

<u>Board of Visitors, Joint Military Intelligence College</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Commandant, Joint Military Intelligence College with independent, informed advice and recommendations on matters related to policy, mission, accreditation, faculty, students, facilities, curricula, educational methods, research, and administration, in connection with the College.
<u>Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University</u>	Statutory	Reviews develops, and provides recommendations on all aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; examines all aspects of the University's Professional Military Education operations; and provides such oversight and advice as is necessary to facilitate high educational standards and cost effective operations.
<u>Board of Visitors, National Defense University</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice on matters related to mission, policy, faculty, students, curricula, educational methods, research, facilities, and administration of the National Defense University (NDU). Principal components of NDU are: Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, national War College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute of Higher Defense Studies, and Department of Defense Computer Institute.
<u>Board of Visitors, Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)</u>	Statutory	Provides to DoD expert advice on the operations and management of the Institute. Inquires into the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs and academic methods of the Institution and any other matters that it or the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate. Reviews WHINSEC curriculum and determines whether it complies with applicable U.S. laws and regulations consistent with U.S. policy goals toward the Western Hemispheres and adheres to U.S. doctrine appropriately emphasizing human rights, the rule of law, due process, civilian control of the military and the role of the military in a democratic society.

<p><u>Chief of Engineers Environmental Advisory Board</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Serves as advisor to the Chief for developing policy and procedures for Corps Programs; ascertains and advises upon natural, social and cultural resource management issues associated with Corps plans, projects and programs; provides advice aimed at both identifying and resolving existing environmental issues with new or expanded Corps missions; advises on the development of workable methods for quantifying natural, social and cultural resource management costs and benefits of Corps programs and in expressing these in terms of both their tangible and intangible consequences; and, explores and advises on new directions where the Corps, acting as the national engineering agency, can continue to solve not only the engineering and economic aspects of new challenges, problems, and opportunities, but also those environmental features for which it has responsibility.</p>
<p><u>Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Advisory Committee</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides an avenue of communications by which a distinguished group representing scientific, academic, engineering, and political communities may advise the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on questions related to national seapower. In pursuing its objectives, the CEP may operate in committees composed of selected Panel members to conduct detailed examinations of matters related to national seapower.</p>
<p><u>Defense Acquisition University Board of Visitors</u></p>	<p>Statutory</p>	<p>Advise the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and the President of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) on "organization management, curricula, methods of instruction, facilities and other matters of interest" to the DAU, as directed by 10U.S.C. 1746.</p>
<p><u>Defense Advisory Board for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense about issues concerning Reservists and their civilian employers, to include recommending policies and priorities for employer support actions and programs.</p>
<p><u>Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing</u></p>	<p>Discretionary</p>	<p>Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters pertaining to military personnel testing; reviews the calibration of personnel selection and classification tests to ensure the accuracy of resulting scores; reviews relevant validation studies to ensure that the tests have utility in predicting success in technical training and on the job; reviews ongoing testing research and development in support of the enlistment program; and, makes recommendations for improvements to make the testing process more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and the Military Services.</p>

<u>Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), with assistance and advice on matters and policies relating to women in the Armed Forces .
<u>Defense Business Board</u>	Discretionary	Makes recommendations to the Senior Executive Council (SEC) on effective strategies for implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Environmental Response Task Force II</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Studies and provides an annual report to Congress on the findings and recommendations concerning environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned.
<u>Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Board of Advisors</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director, DFAS, with respect to providing world class finance and accounting services to the Department of Defense.
<u>Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with scientific and technical expertise and advice on current and long-term operational and intelligence matters covering the total range of the mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency; provides a link between the scientific/technical and military operations communities of the United States and the Defense Intelligence Agency; and, in the military operations area, addresses issues including intelligence support to combat units, joint intelligence doctrine, net assessments, arms control, and integration of intelligence and operational planning.
<u>Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Provides the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of defense policy; focus upon long-term, enduring issues central to strategic planning for the Department of Defense; and, responsible for research and analysis of topics, long or short range, addressed to it by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Policy.
<u>Defense Science Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on scientific and technical matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

<u>DoD Advisory Group on Electron Devices</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Military Departments with advice and recommendations on the conduct of economical and effective research and development programs in the field of electron devices.
<u>DoD Domestic Advisory Panel on Early Intervention and Education for Infants, Toddlers, and Preschool Children, and Children with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	Advises the Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and Director, Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS) unmet needs within the DDESS for the education of children with disabilities, comments publicly on any proposed DDESS rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists DDESS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDEA and Director, DDESS.
<u>DoD Education Benefits Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of Defense on the actuarial status of the DoD Education Benefits Fund; furnishes advice and opinion on matters referred to it by the Secretary; reviews valuations of the Fund; and, provides periodic reports to the Secretary and President and Congress on the status of the fund as required.
<u>DoD-Government-Industry Advisory Committee on the Operation and Modernization of the National Defense Stockpile</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Established pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)), and Section 3306 of Public Law 102,484 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, advises the Secretary of Defense concerning significant issues relating to the operations of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and recommends ways to effect a modernization of the NDS consistent with NDS material requirements and sound business management practices.
<u>DoD Historical Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of such other Components as may choose to participate, regarding the professional standards, historical methodology, program priorities, liaison with professional groups and institutions, and adequacy of resources connected with the various historical programs and associated activities of the DoD. These include: historical, archival, museum, library, art , curatorial, and related programs
<u>DoD Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the DoD Medicare-Eligible retiree Health Care Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the DoD under DoD retiree health care programs for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries.

<u>DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries</u>	Statutory	Makes all actuarial determinations necessary to sustain the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund for the accumulation of funds in order to finance, on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefit programs.
<u>DoD Wage Committee</u>	Discretionary (Auth by Law)	Makes recommendations regarding wage surveys and wage schedules for blue-collar employees to the Department of Defense Wage Fixing Authority.
<u>Inland Waterways Users Board</u>	Statutory	Advises the Secretary of the Army on matters relating to construction and rehabilitation priorities on the commercial inland waterways and harbors of the United States.
<u>Joint Advisory Committee on Nuclear Weapons Surety</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council on nuclear weapons systems surety matters that relate to protecting against inadvertent nuclear detonation or plutonium dispersal.
<u>Missouri River -- North Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of North Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>Missouri River -- South Dakota -- Task Force</u>	Statutory	Advise the Secretary of the Army on a plan and projects to reduce siltation of the Missouri River in the State of South Dakota and to meet the objectives of the Pick-Sloan program in accordance with the Missouri River Protection and Improvement Act of 2000.
<u>National Security Agency Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, on matters involving Signals Intelligence production, Information Security, science, technology, business procedures and management related to the mission of the NSA/CSS.
<u>National Security Education Board</u>	statutory	Develop criteria under the National Security Education Act of 1991 for awarding scholarships, fellowships, and grants to U.S. citizens and institutions; provide for wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under the Act; establish qualifications for persons desiring scholarships or fellowships, and for institutions of higher education desiring grants under the Act. The Board will report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy & Resources), who is the designated representative of the Secretary of Defense.

<u>Naval Research Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	<p>Maintains an understanding of the technological needs confronting the Navy and Marine Corps, keeping abreast of the research and development which is being carried on to address them, and offering a judgment to the Navy and Marine Corps as to whether these efforts are adequate; senior scientific advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Naval Research</p>
<u>Ocean Research Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	<p>Provides senior scientific advice to the National Oceanographic Research Leadership Council. Advises the Council on policies, procedures, selection of projects and allocations of funds regarding the National Oceanographic Partnership Program and on matters relating to national oceanographic data requirements as well as other responsibilities that the Council considers appropriate.</p>
<u>Overseas Dependents Schools National Advisory Panel on the Education of Dependents with Disabilities</u>	Statutory	<p>Advises the Director, DoDDS, of unmet needs within the system for the education of children with disabilities; comments publicly on any Office of Dependents Schools rules or standards regarding the education of children with disabilities; and assists ODS in matters that have been identified as areas of concern by the Director, DoDDS.</p>
<u>Planning and Steering Committee (Navy)</u>	Discretionary	<p>Provides to the Advanced Technology Panel of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Board in-depth technical assessments to U.S. and Soviet ASW developments and related technologies, critically review programs which potentially impact SSBN survivability, and evaluate intelligence efforts to identify and define ASW and SSBN survivability threats.</p>
<u>President's Information Technology Advisory Committee</u>	Presidential	<p>Provides the National Science and Technology Council, through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with advice and information on high-performance computing and communications, information technology, and the Next Generation Internet.</p>
<u>Scientific Advisory Board of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology</u>	Discretionary	<p>Serves in the public interest as a scientific advisory body to the Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, to provide scientific and professional advice and guidance in matters pertaining to operational programs, policies and procedures of the AFIP central laboratory of pathology for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with responsibilities for consultation, education and research in pathology.</p>

<u>Semiconductor Technology Council</u>	Statutory (Lapsed/Inactive)	Advises the Secretary of Defense on appropriate technology goals and appropriate level of effort for the research and development activities of Sematech; to link assessment by the semiconductor industry of future market and national security needs to opportunities for technology development through cooperative public and private investment; and, to seek ways to respond to the technology challenges for semiconductors by fostering precompetitive cooperation among industry, the Federal Government, and institutions of higher education.
<u>United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides technical and scientific advice of qualified scientists and representative views of the scientific community to the Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) during the development of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Convening upon request, the SAG will provide scientific and technical advice and representative views to the DSTP in order to enhance JSTPS planning.
<u>strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Statutory	Provides recommendations to the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Council on environmental research and development activities as prescribed in statute and assume additional advisory responsibilities as directed by the Council.
<u>Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee</u>	Discretionary	Advises the Secretary of Defense concerning the legal and policy considerations implicated by: a) the application of pattern queries/data correlation technology to counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence missions, and b) other DoD activities related to the war on terrorism.
<u>Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) Charter</u>	Discretionary	Advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on reduction of the threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional and special weapons, sustainment of the nuclear weapons deterrent, chemical and biological defense, counterproliferation, technology security, weapons effects, and other matters related to the DTRA mission.
<u>Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel</u>	Statutory	Reviews and comments on the development of the uniform formulary by the DoD Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee.
<u>USAF Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.

<u>USAF Scientific Advisory Board</u>	Discretionary	Provides a link between the Air Force and the Nation's scientific community by serving as a means of communicating the most recent scientific information as it applies to the Air Force; reviews and evaluates long-range plans for research and development and provides advice on the adequacy of the Air Force program; recommends usually promising scientific developments for selective Air Force emphasis and new scientific discoveries of techniques for practical application to weapon or support systems; makes a variety of studies designed to improve the Air Force Research and Development Program; and, serves as a pool of expert advisers to various Air Force activities.
<u>U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Board</u>	Statutory	Provides broad policy guidance and review of plans and fund requirements for the conduct of research and development in the field of coastal engineering and recommends priorities of accomplishment of research projects in consonance with the needs of the coastal engineering field and the objectives of the Chief of Engineers.
<u>U.S. European Command Senior Advisory Group (SAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides the Commander, U.S. European Command with advice, guidance, and assistance toward fulfilling its mission.
<u>U.S. Joint Forces Command Transformation Advisory Group (TAG)</u>	Discretionary	Provides timely advice on scientific, technical, intelligence, and policy-related issues to the Commander, USJFCOM, during the development of the nation's joint warfighting concepts to provide joint forces and capabilities, improve joint warfighting capabilities, transform the joint force, and improve internal command processes.
<u>US Military Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy that the Board decides to consider.
<u>U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors</u>	Statutory	Inquires into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Naval Academy that the Board decides to consider, and, within 60 days of its annual meeting, submits its findings and recommendation to the President of the United States.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 26 2004

333

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN
Commander, USSTRATCOM
901 SAC Boulevard, Suite 2A1
Offutt AFB, NE 68113-6000

Dear Jim,

Let me know the dates you are thinking of Santa Fe and Taos, and I will block them out. As you can see, both places have two bedrooms, so it is all available.

Regards,

26 May 04

OSD 07776-04

May 25, 2004



333

TO: Valerie
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Mexico

Valerie—

Admiral Ellis and his wife and another couple, his wife's brother and his wife, would like to use the house in Santa Fe sometime in the third or fourth week of July, I think, and possibly go up and stay in Taos at Valdez for a day or too as well. I will give you a heads up as soon as I know the dates they are thinking of.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052504-4

25 MAY 04

OSD 07776-04

FAXED
AM 5/25

26 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30977

720

PB
MAY 10 2004
DHS
SPS

ACTION MEMO

I-04/004202-ES
USDP *copy prior*
EF-9059 *14 5/14 04*

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PRM* 10 MAY 2004

SUBJECT: Tunisian Offer to Assist in Iraq

- You asked about exploring Tunisia's offer to help in Iraq.
- ISA-NESA investigated CENTCOM's current requirements and explored the matter more fully with the Country Team. The Country Team met with the Tunisians who said they had several requirements before participating in Iraq:
 - Another UN resolution.
 - An invitation from the UN to send troops.
 - Other Arab nations' involvement.
- They also said Tunisian forces for Iraq would come from their existing mission in the Congo.
- Possible Tunisian contributions would include an MP guard company or medical logistics company.

TUNISIA

10 May 04

RECOMMENDATION: That we explore other Arab contributions and then approach the Tunisians again in the context of a new UNSCR and UN mandate.

SECDEF DECISION:

Agree *PRM* Disagree _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: Joint Staff (J-5), OSD-Coalition Support, AMEMBASSY Tunisia.

Prepared by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN, ISA-NESA (b)(6)

DUSD (NES) *Y. Abuly 5/10* PDASD (ISA) *H/S*

29 May 04

2705

In reply refer to EF-9059 and 04/004202

29
March 24, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

5/24
SECRET

SUBJECT: Tunisia

The Tunisian MoD said that Tunisia wants to help in the reconstruction of Iraq.
Let's **get** them engaged.

Let's ask **them** to help with his neighbors. He is a good man.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
032404-29

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

RAV

5/24
Response attached.
vr/cdr Nosenko
5/24

TUNISIA

29 March

OSD 07785-04

SECRET

MAY 26 11:37

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Elevating Issues

Please talk to Jim Roche and find out what the Air Force system is to elevate issues.

Then come up with a proposal as to how we can implement that throughout the entire Department. I would like a first cut at it done within the next four days.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-24

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

OSD 07803-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30980

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OSD 07805-04

This is
being
reworked
pursuant to
Secret guidance
at Aven/MaPles
meeting

Paul Butler
4/14

080

2 Jun 04

20 May 04

213
1730



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

2004 JUN 14 10:06 AM

June 2, 2004, 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. Dubois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: **Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross**

- In the attached snowflake you asked that we establish a system for receiving, memorializing, and elevating oral and written reports from the **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**. (snowflake next under)
- The memo at TAB A establishes a process for receiving and promptly elevating oral or written ICRC reports. To ensure expedited action, we propose the subordinate command immediately notify the appropriate Combatant Commander, who shall be responsible for rendering a preliminary evaluation of the issue and forwarding the report to the USD(P) with an information copy to the Director, Joint Staff.
- ICRC reports received from the interagency, or received directly from the ICRC by OSD or Military Department officials will be promptly delivered to the USD(P) for action. The USD(P) will develop and coordinate a course of action unless a particular issue requires others to lead the action, for example, the DoD General Counsel for a legal matter. *Those* ICRC actions with special significance **will be forwarded to you.**
- Policy on the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program is published in a DoD directive under the oversight of the USD(P). Guidance on the reporting of communications from the ICRC exists in a multi-service regulation published by the Secretary of the Army, who is the designated DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program. These documents should reflect the new procedures amplifying and expediting, to your attention, reports of communications from the ICRC. Accordingly, we believe that the USD(P) should update DoD Directive 23 10.1 and the Secretary of the Army should update AR 190-8 to incorporate the reporting requirements addressed in the memo at TAB A.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE OTHER _____

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memo at TAB A. JUN 14 2004

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments
As stated

Prepared By: Bob Menig (b)(6)

TSA SD	6/8
SA DSD	
SRMA DSD	
EXEC SEC	6/3/04

USD 07805-04

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: ICRC and Human Rights Reporting

Please fashion a system throughout the Department of Defense whereby any oral input from the International Committee of the Red Cross is memorialized in a memorandum, and any written communication from the ICRC or any human rights group is elevated to at least the next two levels of authority above where the reports are submitted.

We need to get a Department-wide fix on this fast. Please do this in the next four days and make an 80 percent proposal to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-26

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

OSD 07805-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30983

DSD 07805-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL
AUTHORITY
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Handling of Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross

Prompt evaluation and transmission of reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to senior DoD leaders is of the utmost importance. Recognizing that information may be reported at various command levels and in oral or written form, Combatant Commanders, OSD Principal Staff Assistants and the Heads of the other DoD Components shall take the following actions:

- Field commanders shall be instructed to forward all reports received at their level to the Combatant Commander without delay. Oral reports shall be transcribed in an appropriate written format.
- Combatant commanders shall conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine (1) the accuracy of the concerns raised, (2) actions and schedule proposed to resolve the concerns, and (3) the potential effects on DoD operations and broader U.S. security objectives. Timeframe: Within five days of receipt.
- Combatant Commanders shall forward this assessment, along with the ICRC report or communications summary, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) with an information copy to the Director, Joint Staff. The subject of such actions shall be identified as "ICRC Communication."



11-L-0559/OSD/30984

- The USD(P) in coordination with the DoD Executive Secretary shall ensure ICRC Communication reports are distributed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the DoD General Counsel, and as appropriate, the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Timeframe: Within 24 hours of receipt.
- The USD(P) shall be the DoD lead for such actions unless, upon review by the Deputy Secretary, special circumstances require the DoD lead to be assigned elsewhere. The USD(P) shall develop a course of action and coordinate it with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD General Counsel, and as appropriate, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs and Legislative Affairs, and other OSD officials. The USD(P) shall forward those actions with special significance to the Secretary of Defense. Timeframe: Within five days of receipt.
- ICRC communications received by OSD or Military Department officials from the interagency, or directly from the ICRC shall be immediately forwarded to the DoD Executive Secretary who shall provide the report to the USD(P) for action and shall make distribution as specified above.

All ICRC communications shall be marked with the following statement: "ICRC communications are provided to DoD as confidential restricted use documents. As such, they will be safeguarded the same as CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN information using NODIS channels. Dissemination of ICRC communications outside of DoD is not authorized without the approval of the Secretary of Defense."

These procedures are effective immediately. Pertinent DoD issuances and Army Regulation (AR) **190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees***, the multi-service regulation issued by the Secretary of the Army, who serves as the DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Enemy POW Detainee Program, shall be revised to incorporate these procedures for the reporting of ICRC communications.

Your compliance with the procedures in this memorandum and in regulation is a matter of DoD policy and is essential to enabling the Department to meet its responsibilities and obligations for the humane care and full accountability for all persons captured or detained throughout the range of military operations.

Organization	Official	Date Coordinated
Secretary of the Army	R. L. Brownlee	May 28,2004
CJCS	MG Michael Maples	June 2,2004
USD(P)	Ryan Henry	May 28,2004
USD(I)	Stephen A. Cambone	June 1,2004
General Counsel	William J. Haynes	June 1,2004
ASD(PA)	No response	
ASD(LA)	Powell Moore	May 28,2004
Exec Sec	William P. Marriott	May 28,2004



**Office of the Secretary of Defense
Directorate for
Administration & Management**

2 June 2004

TO: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Acting Secretary of the *Army*
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of *Staff*
USD (Policy)
USD (Intelligence)
ASD (Legislative Affairs)
ASD (Public Affairs)
General Counsel, DoD
Special Assistant to the SecDef (Pete Geren)
Vice Director, Joint Staff
Executive Secretary of the DoD

FROM: Director, Administration & Management

RE: Handling of Reports from the International Committee
of the Red Cross

Gentlemen:

I handed this memo to the Secretary after this morning's

"Detainee" meeting. **He said he would read and let me know.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ray D. Smith".

cc: Director, ES&CD, WHS

11-L-0559/OSD/30987

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL DIVISION

MEMORANDUM FOR _____

Your proposed signature item is returned for the following reason(s) indicated below. Please correct and return to the Correspondence Control Division, 3A-948 for processing.

_____ Coordination by: _____

(Note: Coordination must be at the Principal Deputy level or higher.)


_____ Copy requirements. Please furnish the original and one copy, complete with all enclosures, attachments, and tabs.

_____ Envelope(s). Envelopes are required for all addressees outside of the Pentagon.

_____ An original message version is required. See Administrative Instruction No. 7, paragraph 5.21. Message will be transmitted by the OSD Cables Division upon signature by the SD/DSD.

Other: See example attached for correct order of addressees. Coordination sheet is blank.

ESCD - Pat,


Patrick Gordon
CCD, (b)(6)

See the attached example, I followed!

Bob Menig





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

Administration & Management

JAN 28 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
 GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
 INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
 DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
 DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
 DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
 DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
 DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

312

SUBJECT: Listing of Addressees and Addressing DoD Memorandums

The addressee section of *this* memorandum shows the correct format for organizational titles and the complete order of listing for multiple-addressee memorandums. Normally, a complete listing will not be necessary, but the titles should be used in the order shown for any memorandum directed to two or more addressees.

28 Jan 04

For multiple-addressee and distribution purposes, the following officials are included within the title indicated above:

(1) Under Secretaries of Defense include: Under **Secretary** of Defense for Acquisition, **Technology** and Logistics; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

(2) Assistant Secretaries of Defense include: Health **Affairs**; Homeland Defense; International Security Affairs; International Security Policy; Legislative Affairs; Networks and Information Integration/DoD CIO; Public Affairs; Reserve **Affairs**; and Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.

(3) Assistants to the Secretary of Defense include: the **Assistant** to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; Special Assistants to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; the **Executive** Secretary of the Department of Defense; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight); Representative and Executive Director for the Coalition Provisional Authority; the Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO; and other assistants as may be designated from time to time by the **Secretary** or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

28 Jan 04

OSD 01278-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30989

SECRET
2004 MAY 26 09:39

May 20, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Pete Geren

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: ICRC and Human Rights Reporting

Please fashion a system throughout the Department of Defense whereby any oral input from the International Committee of the Red Cross is memorialized in a memorandum, and any written communication from the ICRC or any human rights group is elevated to at least the next two levels of authority above where the reports are submitted.

We need to get a Department-wide **fix** on this fast. Please do this in the next four days and make **an** 80 percent proposal to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052004-26

.....
Please respond by 5/26/04

0 SD 07805-04

11-L-0559/OSD/30990

28
May 26, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: France

FRANCE

Please see if you can fix this issue that Colin Powell sent me. If you cannot, please let me know today.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/26/04 SecState memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
052604-16

.....
Please respond by _____

Completed
by
Doug Feith

See Attached!

28 MAY 04

26 MAY 04



cc: Craddock
Butler

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

26/5

To Don Rumsfeld

On the eve of
President Bush's visit
to Normandy and as
I try to get French
support for UN
resolutions, this
seems petty and
counterproductive.

CF

Kelly, Craig

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2004 8:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

5

[REDACTED]

Amb. Leach asked that we let the Secretary know of the latest incident involving OSD and the French. We learned today that Gen. Nyland, Assistant Marine Commandant, who is coming to France to preside at a Memorial Day event at one of our cemeteries, has been limited by Doug Feith to a 15 minute, non-substantive meeting with the French Army/Marine Chief of Staff.

refused Nyland perm

es: no more

(Nyland's staff is actually clocking the meeting) and the only authorized topic of discussion is pleasantries about the Normandy commemoration.

26/5/26

MAY 26 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DF 5/26/04*

SUBJECT: General Nyland's Visit in France

The email that Colin forwarded to you on General Nyland's visit to France reminds me of the famous comment: "every word was wrong, including 'and' and 'the.'" No one imposed "ground rules" or "instructions" on General Nyland's visit. I never suggested (let alone mandated) a time or topic limitation.

France

I have now straightened this out with Colin by telephone. He knows that the email is thoroughly false.

What actually happened:

- General Nyland asked to talk with me about his trip.
- We met on April 21, 2004. I described your views on allied cooperation and US-French relations.
- I noted that you like to extend special privilege (e.g., access to restricted policy discussions) to especially cooperative allies, but DOD wants to have polite and proper relations with the French.
- As his trip is for a commemorative ceremony and General Nyland described his meeting with the French Army Chief as a courtesy call, I told him I saw no problems at all with his visit.

26 May 04

The email transmitted by Colin is full of misunderstandings that must have arisen after General Nyland and I ended our harmonious and relaxed meeting together.

26 May 04

Today, I confirmed with General Nyland that the foregoing is accurate.

Tom - I don't believe US C had an opportunity to check this. Thanks 5/27

11-L-0559/OSD/30994



May 26, 2004

350.001

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Paper by George Shultz

Mr. President—

Attached is a very good paper by George Shultz, which he delivered in San Francisco on May 17. He has some excellent thoughts here, which I think might be interesting to you as you prepare for your future leadership speeches.

George Shultz is a good one to talk to from time to time, when you have a moment.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Shultz, George. "The Road Ahead," May 17, 2004.

DHR:dh
052604-7

OSD 07856-04

26 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/30995

THE ROAD AHEAD
The Marines' Memorial Club, The Commonwealth Club,
and The World Affairs Council

San Francisco
May 17, 2004

George P. Shultz

The Marines, The Commonwealth Club, and The World Affairs Council. The Marines: a fighting outfit with a clear approach – “No better friend, no worse enemy” – now fighting our country’s battles in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Commonwealth Club and The World Affairs Council: among the great forums in our country, with over 100 years of experience in helping citizens sort through central issues of our times. I am honored to be a member of all three.

I am proud to be a Marine. I am proud of our Marines: their fighting capacity, their will to win, their readiness to be genuinely helpful friends to all those people in Iraq and Afghanistan who seek a peaceful and constructive future. The Marines provide just the kind of strength linked to a helpful attitude that is needed. So, hats off to the Marines.

Now, in the spirit of The Commonwealth Club and The World Affairs Council, and against the background of Marine strength, let me turn to the road ahead. What is going on in the world? Where do we go from here? The answer to the first question is the key to the second, to the formation and carrying out of a comprehensive and effective American strategy.

We Are at War

We have struggled with what we have called terrorism for a long time, without quite realizing the nature of the threat. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)

In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement alone, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress.

The movement is not centrally controlled, but is an effectively coordinated loose global network. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

The intellectual and political leaders of this movement have made their objectives perfectly clear in volumes of materials produced over recent decades. The movement's objectives are in four layers or phases:

- (1) to drive the international community's people and influences out of the Middle East (the core of the Muslim world);
- (2) to overthrow all Arab regimes that are in a working relationship with the international community;
- (3) to gain a more entrenched and threatening foothold on the edges of the Muslim world (Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia) and inside the Western world (Europe); and
- (4) eventually to eliminate all vestiges of the international state system from a unified Islamic theocratic rule.

So we see how deadly opposed the Islamic terrorists are to the international state system. Our commitment to that system may account in part for the apparent lack of comprehension within the international community about the nature or even the existence of this war and a reluctance to acknowledge or discuss the religious dimension of what is now going on in the world.

The basic assumption of the international state system is that all peoples, organized as states, will be in or want to be in, the system. Conflict and war, it is also assumed, will take place between states in the system (e.g., France versus Germany) and not against the system itself. So the foundational attitude of our side is not in accord with the current reality.

So, from a security standpoint, what is going on in the world? The international state system is under determined attack by a religiously motivated movement using terrorist attacks of dramatic lethality as its weapon of choice. The war is against this movement, not just the weapon of terror.

What Should We Do?

First and foremost, shore up the state system.

The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other – bilaterally or multilaterally – to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the UN as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" is un-Islamic. They talk about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They are fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.

The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals, gangsters, or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong-Il of North Korea is another.

They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule, and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its

privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant, and why the war against Saddam's Iraq was necessary. Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations – including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale – behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

North Korea is such a case. The circumstances do not parallel those of Iraq, so our approach is adjusted accordingly. China, Japan, Russia and South Korea must man laboring oars. One way or another, that regime will undergo radical change or will come to an end.

Iran is another very different case, being at one and the same time an outlaw state, an Islamist enemy of the international state system, a destabilizing presence in the Gulf region, and a supporter of terrorism to stop a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. In some sense, the future of Iran is tied to the issue of our success in Iraq. The Iraqi Shia

inclination to keep its religious hierarchy unsullied by direct involvement in politics and government could be used to draw Iran's theocracy in the same direction. Through deft policy management, the U.S. should stand unambiguously on the side of the Iranian people who want to be rid of their mullah rulers, while pressuring the theocrats to abandon their efforts to dictate every aspect of Iranian society.

But make no mistake. The crucial battle is now joined in Iraq. Were we to falter or fail in Iraq, the entire Middle East would be severely threatened and war on a world scale would have only begun.

The Middle East

The Middle East is an area where governance has failed. In many countries, oil has produced wealth without the effort that connects people to reality, a problem reinforced in some of them by the fact that the hard physical work is often done by imported labor. The submissive role forced on women has led to a huge population explosion. Generations of young people have grown up in these societies with a surplus of time on their hands and a deficit of productive and honorable occupations. Since they are disconnected from reality, they can live in a world of fantasy. Denied opportunity, many have turned to a destructive, terror-using ideology. Islamism is the name most specialists have settled on. Yet these young people can see on their TV screens that a better life is possible in a great many places in the world. Whether or not they like what they see, their frustration is immense. As a result, the Middle East has produced all too many religious radicals who for years have been waging war against the international state system.

Many Muslim regimes in the Middle East have finally realized that the radical variant of Islam is violently opposed to the modern age, to globalization, to secular governance and to those Muslim regimes themselves, their primary target. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan top the target list. Years ago these regimes, and others, began a frantic search for ways to deflect the threat. Some tried to co-opt the Islamists into their governments. Some paid extortion money. Some pushed the Islamists into other countries and then subsidized them. Some of them pumped out huge volumes of propaganda to incite the Islamists to turn their attention from the "near enemy," such as Saudi Arabia, to the "far enemy," Israel and the United States. Some of these targeted regimes tried all these defensive tactics in an attempt to buy time.

Since September 11, 2001, some of these Muslim regimes have begun to realize that this approach is a loser; it only strengthens their Islamist enemies, who, in recent months, have begun to turn against them directly.

So increasingly, those regimes in the Arab-Islamic world, however much they may have appeased, bought out, or propagandized the terrorists, have nonetheless now had a reality check. They have recognized that they are members of the international system of states and must find a way to reconcile their Islamic beliefs and practices to it. Saudi Arabia and others in the world of Islam must, in their own interests, recognize their own responsibility to stop the preaching of hate and to reform their societies. Young people must have access to the world of opportunity. Women must be free to play substantial roles in their societies.

Use Less Oil

Our strength and our security are vitally affected by our dependence on oil coming from other countries and by the dependence of the world economy on oil from the most unstable part of the world: the Middle East. Presidents from Eisenhower on have called for energy independence. Ike, no stranger to issues of national security, thought that if foreign oil were more than 20 percent of our consumption, we were headed for trouble. The number is now pushing 60 percent and rising. What would be the impact of terrorist sabotage of key elements of the Saudi pipeline infrastructure? Or of a takeover by Islamic extremists?

I remember proposals for alternatives to oil from the time of the first big oil crisis in 1973. Pie in the sky, I thought. But now the situation is different.

Hybrid technology is on the road and increases gas mileage by at least 50 percent. Increased attention to weight and drag can enhance performance even more. The technology is scaleable. Sequestration of effluent from use of coal may be possible. Maybe coal could be a benign source of hydrogen. Maybe hydrogen could be economically split out of water by electrolysis, perhaps using renewables such as wind power. An economy with a major hydrogen component would do wonders for both our security and our environment. With evident improvements in fuel cells, that combination could amount to a very big deal. Applications include stationary as well as mobile possibilities. And major advances are evident in the effort to turn sunlight into electricity. So all this may take time, but work now on the possibilities. Other ideas are in the air. Scientists, technologists, and commercial organizations in other countries are hard at work on these issues. The administration is coordinating potentially significant

developments. We should not be put off by experts who are forever saying that the possible is improbable. Scientific advance in recent decades is a tribute to and validation of creative possibilities. Bet on them all. Sometimes long odds win.

Now is the time to push hard on research and development with augmented funds directed at identified targets such as sequestration, electrolysis, and fuel cells, and other money going to competent scientists with ideas about energy. You never know what bright people will come up with when resources and enthusiasm combine. We can enhance America's security and simultaneously improve our environment.

Israel and the Palestinians

We must take our long-standing role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a new and deeper level, also because of a renewed recognition of the importance of the state.

In 1979 Egypt and Israel recognized each other as legitimate states and signed a treaty of peace. At that time Egypt took on the role of state negotiator with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians, who did not have a state. This was in recognition that states can make peace only with other states within the context of the international state system.

But after Islamists murdered President Sadat, Egypt dropped its role as state negotiator. Jordan took up that role, but dropped it in 1988. Since that time the negotiations have not made serious progress, despite some apparent high points, because there has been no state partner to sit across the table from the State of Israel.

But now the picture has some new possibilities. Yes, optimists should stand aside, but fatalists should, too. You do not work on probabilities in this area, just possibilities. But work we must – and with energy and timing – since the issues involved are vital in this dangerous world.

What are the possibilities? There are far more in evidence than is commonly assumed.

Security for the state of Israel is clearly an essential for fruitful negotiations. So far, nothing has worked. Those who seek to eliminate Israel have regarded efforts at Oslo or Camp David II and elsewhere as proof that terrorism works, and that every Israeli step toward peace is really a sign of weakness.

Now a security barrier is under construction. Israel has stated that its path can be changed in the event of a negotiation. Israel, with all the related turmoil, seems ready to pull back some settlements beyond the new barrier, as in Gaza. If Israel, through these measures, gains security in its land, that will be a major step toward peace. Once again, Israel will have demonstrated that it cannot be beaten militarily, this time by terrorist violence. The confirmation of this fact is essential. And, when Palestinians face the fact that terrorism has become both ineffective and self-destructive, that realization may enable them to take a major step toward peace.

Don't forget that for the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, important Arab states have stated a willingness to promote peace between Israel and Palestine. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are the keystones of this structure. And remember the important initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Under his initiative, in the event that a peace agreement is reached between the state of Israel and a state of Palestine, the Arab League states would recognize Israel as a permanent, legitimate state in the Middle East and in the international state system.

And there is a "road map" to work from. This document spells out the general directions for progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace. No document since the

founding text of the peace process – the 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 – has had such wide, even if tentative, international support. Israelis and Palestinians, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the “quartet” – the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations – all have indicated willingness to take this road map as a working paper of the parties to the conflict, and of the leading nations and organizations of the international state system itself. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza should be seen as a major step along the road map.

This approach incorporates a way to fix the negotiating problems of the past twenty years. It provides for the establishment of a Palestinian State, not at the end of the negotiations, but in the midst of the effort. Of course, there is much more to making a state than an announcement. But a structure of governance can be established and, if the states of Egypt and Jordan will help, violence can be suppressed and the emerging state can control the use of force. Then there would be a Palestinian state partner for the State of Israel to negotiate with. The Palestinians charged with governance will have more leverage, and the Israelis will have more confidence that their negotiating partner can deliver on the deal that is made – because it will be a state-to-state deal. Put some projects in the mix, about water, for example, to energize those Palestinians who yearn for peace and a chance for a better life. Help them take the play from extremists so that their state has a chance for decent governance. Who knows, just maybe, possibility could become probability and then a new reality.

Additional Steps

I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.

All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, be a helpful partner in economic and political development, and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.

International organizations are mechanisms created by the member states – historically with the United States in the lead – to serve the interests of the states as directed by them. Most notable among these institutions is the United Nations. At present, the U.N. has not grasped the fact that it, too, is a target of those making war on the international state system. The U.N. came into Iraq in the summer of 2003 in the belief that its role was to be a neutral facilitator of postwar arrangements to be worked out between the occupying power (the United States) and the defeated Iraqi state. U.N. leaders had not understood the meaning of the revelation at the time of the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, in 1993, that the U.N. Secretariat was the terrorists' secondary target. In August 2003, the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, basically unguarded at the insistence of the U.N., was destroyed. In May 2004, Osama bin Laden offered a reward for the assassination of Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The United States should undertake an intensive effort to bring the U.N. toward a recognition of the new reality and to work with the U.N. in Iraq to bolster its efforts to

create through elections a re-legitimized Iraq that can qualify for full participation in the international state system.

International law is another pillar of the international system and, once again, a product of American leadership through most of the twentieth century. But international law was damaged during the cold war by the Soviet Union's ideological rejection of it, and by its disparagement by American commentators who felt that U.S. adherence to international law only played into Soviet attempts to manipulate it to our disadvantage.

The post-cold war decade of the 1990s did further harm to international law by permitting the production of deeply flawed, politicized negotiated texts such as the Kyoto Accord on climate change and the International Criminal Court. The United States was correct in turning away from these documents as the twenty-first century opened. Now, however, with the international system in jeopardy, the United States should initiate a comprehensive review of the status of international law and begin work to shore up its foundations, curb its excesses, and advance it in responsible, well-grounded ways.

Norms are an essential feature of the international state system and, as enshrined in documents open for signature by states – such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention – they make up a kind of “standard of civilization” to which members of the system can expect to be held. As with other features of the system, there is the assumption of universal applicability; that everybody either is in, or wants to be in, the international system. The current case of prisoner abuse in Iraq is, in microcosm, an example of the conundrum now facing those responsible for upholding and protecting the international system. The Geneva Conventions are based on the assumption that wars will be waged between two member states of the system, and by

professional armed forces. Prisoners taken in battle may be held until the end of the conflict and then returned to the formerly belligerent state parties. During detention the professional soldier prisoners are required only to give "name, rank, and serial number." But those waging war on the international system today are not professional soldiers of a legitimate sovereign state and, if the system is to have integrity, its privileges and immunities should not be given to those who would destroy it. While the ban on prisoner interrogation under the Geneva Conventions should not automatically be provided to "unlawful combatants" who conduct terrorist attacks against civilians as a matter of policy, they nevertheless are clearly covered by conventions involving torture. The situation, however, cannot be left as it is. The United States should inaugurate a review and study of how to handle fundamental incompatibilities that arise when a system designed to regulate itself encounters an enemy dedicated to its destruction.

Just as membership in the international state system entails professional armed services, so also does it require a professional diplomatic and foreign service. Recent decades have revealed a growing imbalance between the two in the role of the United States in the world. The Foreign Service has been allowed to deteriorate. The terms of service have worsened. The structure of the career has been truncated and distorted. The best young people have been told to put off seeking entrance even as the best veterans have been hurried out of the corps. Political appointees – a necessary and welcome part of the service – have encroached too far into the most professional sectors. Secretary of State Colin Powell has turned these trends around, but there is much more work to do. In the terrorist war being waged today, diplomacy – as is always the case – should be our first line of defense, the forward presence where national interest and security and justice

for, and within, the international system may be advanced without a wider war. So a professional, well-managed American diplomacy must be a top priority. We need more representation around the globe. Just as there is no substitute for boots on the ground, there is no substitute for eyes and ears to help us understand and deal with global developments.

We need to remind ourselves and our partners of an ancient message: the Great Seal of our Republic carries that message, as clear and relevant to these times as to our early days. The central figure is an eagle holding in one talon an olive branch and in the other, thirteen arrows. As President Harry Truman insisted at the end of World War II, the eagle will always face the olive branch to show that the United States will always seek peace. But the eagle will forever hold onto the arrows to show that, to be effective in seeking peace, you must have strength and the willingness to use it.

Strength and diplomacy: they go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. Both must be developed at the highest professional level and used in a coordinated fashion.

In 1917, a few months after the United States declared that it would enter the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson organized a group of generalists and specialists knowledgeable across the range of international affairs to prepare an approach for the United States to take when peace was restored. This effort became known as "The Inquiry." Now, in the midst of war, something similar may be needed, suitable for the present situation in which a long war must be fought to preserve the international state system, even as that system must shore itself up from within and build or rebuild institutions for peace even as the conflict continues.

A World of Danger and A World of Opportunity

I cannot emphasize too strongly the danger and extent of the challenge we are facing. We are engaged in a war, a long and bitter war. Our enemies will not simply sit back and watch as we make progress toward prosperity and peace in the world.

The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the enemy. We now call this what it is: a war. In war, you act on both offense and defense. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence, and prevention, are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful preemption. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. This means fighting the war on the ground in Iraq. It means diplomacy around the world and at international organizations. And it means, no less, taking serious steps toward energy independence here at home.

September 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network. If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

We and our partners throughout the world can then work and live in a time of immense promise. Scientific and technological advances are breathtaking virtually across the board. The impact on the human condition and human possibilities is profound. New technologies are changing the way we live and work, globalizing access

to an extraordinary range of information. People everywhere can see that economic advance has taken place in countries of every size, with great varieties of ethnic, religious, and cultural histories. So we should not be surprised -- as Freedom House, the Heritage Foundation, and *The Wall Street Journal* carefully document -- that open economic and political systems are becoming more common.

So an unprecedented age of opportunity is ahead, especially for low-income countries long in poverty. The United States and our allies can rally people all over the world. Don't let the terrorists take away our opportunities. We have the winning hand. We must play that hand with skill and confidence.

December 31, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Positions Important to DoD

If you could give me a hand, I would appreciate it. The following positions are of enormous importance to the Department of Defense.

- Ambassador to NATO
- Ambassador to Afghanistan
- Ambassador to Iraq
- NID
- Deputy NID
- NCTC
- Deputy NCTC
- Deputy CIA

230.02

It would be a big help to me if, when people are being discussed and/or announced for these positions, that I be given an opportunity to talk with you or the President about them before final decisions are made.

Thanks so much.

DHR:as
123004-6 (ts)

31 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Q&As

333

I think we ought to have a daily session in preparation for Q&As because they come up fast, and we only have a short time to prepare. I think we ought to have two or three people who ask very tough questions and who help me develop excellent answers. We don't have a big margin for error. I also think we ought to work toward shorter answers. Please see me about this.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
123004-7 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/4/04

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

OSD 07921-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31015

~~FOUO~~

Advance copy sent 12/30 am

DEC 30 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Seminar on Iraq Intelligence

IRAQ

I looked at your paper on Seminar on Iraq Intelligence and I don't think the principals ought to be involved. I think it would change it completely. I think it ought to be below that level, and possibly even below the deputy level.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122904-16 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

30 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

.December30,2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Assessment Team Charter

334

The assessment team charter has got to get people's eyes off their shoe laces, and up at the horizon. It's got to deal with big issues. Therefore we have to have big people on the assessment team. We don't need to have them come back and say they need a six week training program, instead of a seven week training program. We need a macro look.

Thanks.

DHR:as
122904-10 (2)

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 24, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Mel Laird

You should add Mel Laird to the list of people who want to be helpful. See the attached note.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef note to Mel Laird

DHR:ms
122704-9 (rs)

.....
Please respond by 1/10/04

335 SD

~~FOUO~~

29 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Senior Counselor for National and International Affairs
The Reader's Digest Association, Incorporated
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 212
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mel,

Thanks so much for your call. You can certainly be of help. We'll suggest television and talk radio give you a call. And if you want to do an op-ed piece, it would sure ~~make~~ sense. I'll have Larry Di Rita get some materials to you.

With my appreciation and very best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: **VADM Jim Stavridis**
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo from Josh Bolten

I suppose you can send copies of the memo from Bolten to whomever you want, but the first thing we've got to do is to find out what he's **talking** about on the bottom of page one where it says, "We agreed that our supplemental requests will include **\$5 billion annually** for those purposes." I don't remember **any** agreement on what the supplemental would include.

You should get with Paul Wolfowitz and have him **sort** it out, and see if he made **an** agreement like that.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/21/04 OMB Dir Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
122704-18

.....
Please respond by 1/3/05

110.01

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07926-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31020

28 Dec 04



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

08/12/07

THE DIRECTOR

December 21, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: JOSHUA BOLTEN *JB*
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FY 2006 BUDGET AND SUPPLEMENTALS

Thank you for your letter of December 15 and memorandum of December 20 regarding the Defense Department's 2006 budget and pending and future supplementals. I thought our discussion yesterday was constructive. After follow-on consultations between our teams, I believe we have arrived at good resolutions that are fully consistent with the President's guidance. I am writing to confirm those understandings:

We are agreed that the 2006 Budget will reflect the cancellations and reductions in significant procurement programs on which you briefed the President yesterday. While I know these were tough choices to make, and will be challenging to implement, I believe they will advance the transformational goals you have pursued, while remaining within topline FY 2006 passback guidance of \$419.3 billion (including an increase for classified programs).

With respect to the five specific issues enumerated in your memorandum:

1. We agreed that, to address requirements for Army modularity and recapitalization of equipment, we will increase topline FY 2007-11 passback guidance by \$5 billion each year. Attached is a table reflecting our understanding of the full FY 2006-11 funding path.
2. You sought relief on funding for certain programs, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and activities in Iceland. Providing the requested relief in the FY 2006 Budget does not appear to be consistent with the President's current guidance.
3. We agreed that, prior to funding in the regular FY 2007 Budget, addressing the short-term and urgent needs for acceleration of the Army's modularity and associated equipment recapitalization programs, arising from current wartime intensity, will be handled through supplemental funding requests. We agreed that our supplemental requests will include \$5 billion annually for those purposes.

7

4. You requested consideration of supplemental increases in FY 2005 to accelerate the training and equipping of Afghan security forces and provide support to other Coalition partners. I understand that our staffs will make a recommendation on an approach that ensures these priorities are met, and they are now finalizing details to match requirements and resources.

5. You requested consideration of supplemental increases in FY 2005 for Improvised Explosive Device (ED) countermeasures. I understand that, while details of the request are still forthcoming, our staffs will work together to ensure that we include absolutely all necessary funding to protect our troops.

Please let me know if your understanding differs in any way from the above.

Thank you for the skillful and cooperative manner in which you and your Department are addressing our shared budget challenges.

Enclosure

FY06 051

(\$ in billions)

	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11
FY05 President's Guidance	422.7	443.9	465.7	487.7	496.3	509.6
FY06 DOD Passback Guidance	417.6	436.4	455.5	475.1	485.1	495.3
SAP Adjustment	-0.053	-0.053	-0.053	-0.053		
OMB Adjustment	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.1
Total FY06 Passback Guidance	419.3	438.1	457.5	476.9	487.1	497.4
Modularity Adjustment		±5	±5	±5	±5	±5
SETTLEMENT	419.3	443.1	462.5	481.9	492.1	502.4

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
cc: *Paul Butcher*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

D&D FTD

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:ss
122704-11

.....
Please respond by 1/7/04

~~FOUO~~

28 Dec 04



FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OK 12/27

December 22, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the war colleges and service academies


11-L-0559/OSD/31025

- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with an overall strategic transformation appraisal soon.

My interest in advancing national security policy and the President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope to be able to continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:

Deputy Secretary of Defense

DEC 21 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Harold Burson

Here's a memo from Dick McGraw. What do you think about you putting together a group of people, maybe including Tone, to talk with Harold Burson? And if you think I ought to be there, I will, though my schedule is very full. I think it would be a smart thing to do. Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/15/04 McGraw Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-50

.....
Please respond by 1/20/05

000.71 SD

21 Dec 04

Wednesday, 15 December 2004

MEMO TO: SECDEF

FROM: Dick McGraw



SUBJECT: Public Image

Generally speaking, "image" is a reflection of reality. The image one has of the Department of Defense is a result of the perception of the decisions made and actions taken by the Department. Therein lies the rub—perception. To the extent we do or do not adequately inform and educate the American people of our decisions and actions, we color their perceptions. Their perceptions also are colored by whether they agree with our decisions and actions and how others portray those decisions and actions.

I don't know whether we're doing an adequate job of informing and educating the American public. A good friend of mine who might have some insight into that question is Harold Burson, retired founder and Chairman of Burson-Marsteller, one of the world's largest public relations firms and a brilliant thinker. I stay in touch with Harold and he frequently offers to be a sounding board for my ideas or to otherwise help where he can.

You should have lunch with Harold and whomever else you think appropriate in the Department. I would be happy to set it up.

_____ Set it up

_____ Don't set it up



11-L-0559/OSD/31028

DEC 21 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phone Call with Tillie Fowler

Please arrange a phone call for me with Tillie Fowler in connection with this note.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/04 T. Fowler note to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-45

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

000.71 SD

21 Dec 04



DEFENSE POLICY
BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2100



December 17, 2004

To: Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

From: Tillie K. Fowler

Thank you for agreeing to continue to serve as the Secretary of Defense. I hope you are ignoring the McCain diatribes and the Lott comments. There is no one who could take your place at this critical time for our military.

I would like to talk with you at some time about some personnel changes that I think would better serve you. I will be in Florida until January 3.

I hope you and Joyce can get away for the holidays.

2476593_v1

11-L-0559/OSD/31030

December 17, 2004

TO: Fran Harvey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paul Ignatius

451

I ran into Paul Ignatius last night. He is a former Secretary of the Army and also held some other positions here in the Pentagon. We got talking about the armor problem. He told me about things they had done during the Vietnam War. There was a special organization that they stood up to deal with scarce items. They also had a special method to get things moved to the battlefield rapidly -- they called it the "Red Ball Express."

Ignatius mentioned the reality that when the Army does things differently than they had done in the past, they learn that, for example, things wear out differently. He pointed out the reality that the more armor we put on these vehicles, the more the breaks and shock absorbers are going to go, and the vehicles wore out at a rate that was notably different than what was planned for.

Ignatius is a very fine person -- sharp as a tack. I would think you might want to have him in for lunch and hear his ideas, probably sooner rather than later (he lives here in Washington). Let me know after you've had him in.

On a related thought -- inviting in former secretaries of the Army is a good idea. I do it with former secretaries of defense and find it very helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Paul Ignatius bio

DHR:ss
121704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

17 Dec 04

Paul R. Ignatius

February 1964- December 1964

Paul R. Ignatius was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1920; received a B.A. degree with honors from the University of Southern California, 1942; commissioned lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1943, serving until 1946 principally as an aviation ordnance officer aboard the aircraft carrier Manila Bay in the Pacific, and in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Washington, D.C.; received an M.B.A. degree from Harvard University, 1947; served as research assistant and instructor in business administration at Harvard, 1947-1950; founded a management consulting and research firm, Harbridge House, Inc., in Boston, 1950, and served as company vice president and director, 1950-1961; was Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics), 22 May 1961-27 February 1964; was Under Secretary of the Army, 28 February 1964-11 December 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), 23 December 1964-31 August 1967; was Secretary of the Navy, 1 September 1967-24 January 1969; was president, The Washington Post Newspaper, and executive vice president, The Washington Post Company, 1 March 1969-31 December 1971; chairman, president, and CEO, Air Transport Association, 1972-1986; chairman, board of trustees, Logistics Management Institute, 1986-1993; is trustee of the George C. Marshall Foundation and member of the Federal City Council and the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs.



BACK TO FORMER USA PAGE

December 16, 2004

325

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Guard

The response on Guard realignment doesn't sound right to me. What about rebalancing the way we are?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/30/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Changing Force Structure in Guard

DHR:ss
121604-5

.....
Please respond by _____

16 Dec 04

1743
1600

~~FOUO~~

November 30, 2004

NOV 30 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Changing Force Structure in Guard

Paul Butler

→
12/14

Please report back to me after you have had that December 3 meeting with Blum on how to change force structure in the National Guard.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/17/04 SecDef memo #1 11704-10, USD (P&R) memo to SecDef #OSD 18887-04

DHR:dh
113004-11

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

TO Sec Def
Paul Butler

Sir,
Response attached.
v/r
Lt Col Kengyel

DEC 15 2004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19971-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31034



12/10/04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 10, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)
SUBJECT: Guard Realignment — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Initial meeting with LTG Blum on December 1st; more work is needed before we can provide you with a plan.
- General Blum has already alerted the state adjutants general (in writing) that future force structure will flow to states with sustained recruiting and retention success, at the expense of states that fall short.
- This is an opportunity to rebalance the Guard, building units of the type we now need, shedding those less necessary.
- We will lay out a plan that plots by state how strength should move, and the numbers and types of new units that should be established. I anticipate forwarding this to you by the end of next week.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:
As stated

cc: General Myers

MA SD	SMA DSD	12/13	
TSA SD	SA DSD	12/14	
EXEC SEC		12/13	
ESR MA		12/13	

OSD 19971-04



11-L-0559/OSD/31035

11/18/04

November 17, 2004

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 NOV 23 PM 6:31

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard

I understand that the Virginia National Guard is not good. Everywhere I turn, someone tells me they are resigning or that they are not recruiting and so forth.

What do we do about fixing it? Should someone talk with the Governor? Does it need new leadership? What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:sh
111704-10

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

DR 11/20

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P. 01



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

NOV 23 PM 6:31



INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

Paul Bunker
11/29

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia Army National Guard is one of nine that have missed their ARNG recruiting missions for the past four years.
 - o They are: CT, DE, HI, IL, LA, MA, MD, VA and VI.
 - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
 - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

TBA SD	11/29
SRMA SD	
MA SD	2 11/29
EXEC SEC	M 11/24
ESR	ES 11/24



11-L-0559/OSD/31037

OSD 18887-04

December 14, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Terry Robbins
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Instrument of Gift

Thanks for the draft Instrument of Gift.

I have the following questions and thoughts.

- 1) It says "residing in Washington, D.C." I think my legal residence is still in Illinois. I ought to talk to Terry to see if I want to use Illinois or Maryland, but I'm pretty sure I won't want to use Washington, D.C.
- 2) On line 5, it refers to the type of papers, but it does not mention "business," unless that's what professional means.
- 3) On the next to the last line, on page 1, it says that I may retain any of the originals of my personal papers and furnish a copy. Does that permit me to do it after digitization, when I have had a chance to look at everything and see what I might like the original of? Or do I need to decide before digitization?
- 4) Page 2, paragraph 1: I would like to discuss what "intellectual property" means, and how you solve that.
- 5) Page 3: I'd like to discuss the fact that it does not transfer title to classified information and how that gets handled.
- 6) Page 3, paragraph 2, line 5: I wonder if we ought to make it ten years.
- 7) Page 3, paragraph 2, Line 7 (under Access): I'd like to discuss those policies.
- 8) Page 3, next to last paragraph: When it mentions those that should be restricted from public access, for what length of time is that, and who makes the judgment?

314.7

14 Dec 04

- 9) Page 3, last line: I'd like to discuss that.
- 10) Page 4, item E: It talks about adversely affecting the security. I also think the reputation of the United States, or there may be something other than security. Let's discuss it.
- 11) Page 5, paragraph 1, line 2: Let's discuss this triple X series.
- 12) Page 5, paragraph 1: Let's discuss the five years.
- 13) Page 5: I wonder about case work and possible embarrassment for the constituents when I was a Member of Congress.
- 14) Page 5: I'd like to talk about press access.
- 15) Page 6, last three lines: Let's discuss.
- 16) Page 7, paragraph 5: I think that I should agree to pay for some or all of the digitization. Let's discuss that.
- 17) Page 7, paragraph 5: We may want to add "except as designated by the donor" and under the add, we may want to include "for all or most."
- 18) Page 8: We should include the George W. Bush Library, if/when it ever exists.
- 19) Page 8, Item 7: Let's discuss.
- 20) Page 9, middle of the first paragraph: Let's discuss a timeframe.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/30/04 Draft Instrument of Gift

DHR:ss
121304-25

.....
Please respond by _____

DRAFT
11/30/04

INSTRUMENT OF GIFT

D.H. Rumsfeld

Borell? I, Donald H. Rumsfeld, residing in Washington, D.C. (hereinafter referred to as Donor), hereby give, grant, and set over to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library of Congress (hereinafter Library) and for administration therein by the authorities thereof a collection of my personal and professional papers and associated material documenting my life and career in public service and government (hereinafter referred to as Collection), more particularly described by the attached schedule. Donor warrants that he owns the physical property in the Collection free and clear of any liens. Donor does not represent that the papers and materials donated constitute the entirety of the personal and professional papers and associated material in his possession.

This is a gift of only the physical property contained in the materials constituting the Collection, and Donor reserves to himself all rights, title, and interest he may have in and to all of the intellectual property associated with the Collection including, but not limited to copyright. Further, Donor, in his complete discretion, may retain the original of any of his personal papers and furnish a copy of that original to the Library.

*After the gift of
of digitization?*

By accepting this gift, however, the Library does so to improve the national collections, and such acceptance of the physical property shall not be construed as a conclusive determination by the Library that the Donor does, in fact, have or possess with regard to these materials such intellectual property as above identified or described.

How blue?

The Collection shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. Classified Materials. All materials in the Collection that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and are, in fact, properly classified pursuant to such statute or executive order, shall be safeguarded and administered by the Library in accordance with such statutes or executive orders. Access to these materials shall be allowed only in accordance with procedures established by the United States Government to govern the availability of such information. All classified materials shall be reviewed from time to time by the Library (and, at the Library's request, by appropriate security classification authorities), and materials which, because of the passage of time or other

by R

DRAFT

circumstances, no longer require classification restrictions shall, upon declassification, be opened to public access, subject to the access requirements of provision #2 below. This gift does not transfer title to classified information, in whatever form in the collection; and, in accepting the gift, the Library agrees to receive classified information only as a deposit for administration under the terms of this document.

2. Access. With the exception that the entire Collection shall at all times be available to the staff of the Library for administration purposes, access to the Collection is reserved to Donor and to others only with Donor's written permission, or, in the event of the death of Donor, with the permission of Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years ¹⁰ from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld; thereafter the Collection shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

Donor recognizes that the Collection may contain some or all of the following classes of material that should be restricted from public access:

(a) Papers and other historical materials the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a living

person or persons.

(b) Papers and other historical materials that are specifically authorized under criteria established by statute or executive order to be restricted from public disclosure in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

(c) Materials relating to the personal, family, and confidential business affairs of Donor or other persons referenced in the Collection.

(d) Materials containing statements made by or to Donor in confidence.

(e) Materials containing statements or information the divulgence of which might prejudice the conduct of foreign relations of the United States or which could affect adversely the security of the United States.

(f) Materials relating to law enforcement investigations of individuals or organizations, to proposed appointments to office, or to other personnel matters directly affecting individual privacy.

[Add: Except for papers that contain national security information as described in (2)(b), all the papers in the Collection shall be made available to researchers after the restriction period described above.]

Those requesting access to the Collection shall provide Donor with their subject of interest and purpose of their research. Those granted access also must

DRAFT

agree in writing to obtain written permission of Donor or his designee prior to quoting for publication any unpublished material in the Collection.

Additionally, access to that section of the collection designated on the attached schedule as the xxx series will be reserved to the Donor and to others only with the Donor's written permission during the Donor's lifetime and the lifetime of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever comes later. In the event of the death of Donor, access to the xxx series will be restricted to those with the permission of the Donor's literary executor for a period of 5 years from the date thereof or during the life of President Gerald R. Ford, whichever is later. Thereafter, the xxx series shall be available to researchers according to the policies of the division of the Library responsible for the administration and service of materials of this nature.

7

2

The Donor will appoint his literary executor. Upon Donor's death, Joyce P. Rumsfeld may appoint a new literary executor, including herself. Upon the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld, their surviving children may jointly appoint a new literary executor, who may not be any of the surviving children.

The Library will notify the Donor or, upon his death, his literary executor, promptly of any requests, claims, or legal actions relating to the papers or materials of the Collection.

Corr. 6.2

Prell ?

3. Reproduction. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned reservation of rights and interest in and to the intellectual property as above identified, persons granted access to the Collection may obtain single-copy reproductions of the materials contained therein for research purposes, and, consistent with Library practices and procedures, such additional copies as may be allowed by copyright law (e.g., by the fair use doctrine or expiration of the copyright term). The Library may make preservation copies of the materials in the Collection in any format as determined by the Library.

4. Use. Use of the materials constituting the Collection shall be governed by the Library's policies for the administration and service of materials of this nature. The Library is also permitted to exhibit any or all of the material in the Collection on- and off-site and may display any or all of the materials in the Collection on its website or in any other electronic form or successor technology, provided, however, that the Library first obtains the permission of the Donor or the Donor's literary executor *{Delete: during the period of Donor's life and for 10 years thereafter}* ¹² *[Add: for a period of 5 years from the later of the date of death of the Donor or the death of Joyce P. Rumsfeld]* and subject to the other

DRAFT

conditions expressed in provision 2 of this Instrument. Donor reserves the right to make selected unclassified materials available to the public at any time upon written notification to the Library.

5. Digitization of Material Currently on Deposit. (Delete: Donor agrees to pay ~~for~~ the cost ~~of~~ digitization ~~of~~ the papers either currently on deposit or to be deposited with the Library, which under this Instrument become the Library's physical property. Upon a mutually agreed-upon schedule, the Library agrees to make these papers available to Donor or his designee ~~for~~ the purpose ~~of~~ their digitization. Donor or his designee agrees to ensure that the original papers are returned to the Library in good order and condition upon completion ~~of~~ their digitization. Donor also will provide the Library a digital copy ~~of~~ these papers).

except
Ag. deposit
by Donor

[Add: Donor agrees to donate to the Library funds to be used to pay for the cost of digitization ~~of~~ the papers currently on deposit at the Library and those papers to be placed on deposit at the Library. The Library agrees to use [name of company] to perform the digitization. The Library agrees to provide the Donor or Donor's literary executor, upon either's request, digital copies of all papers the Donor gives to the Library.] Donor reserves the right to provide digitized copies of the collection to other institutions, including but not limited to

for all or most

FW Books

the Ronald Reagan Library, Gerald R. Ford Library, George H. W. Bush Library, Richard M. Nixon Library, Herbert Hoover Institute [?], and Princeton University, subject to the same conditions as provided for in this instrument.

6. Additions. Such other and related materials as the Donor may from time to time donate to the United States of America for inclusion in the collections of the Library shall be governed by the terms of this Instrument of Gift or such written amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon between the Donor and the Library. At the discretion of the Donor, future additions to the Collection may be transferred to the Library under a separately negotiated Instrument of Gift.

7. *{Delete: Removal. Donor or a representative acting on Donor's behalf pursuant to his written authorization may remove any or all of the Collection at Donor's complete discretion during Donor's lifetime.}* [Add: **Original Items**.

7
The Donor may borrow original items from the Library for such periods of time as will be mutually agreed to by the Donor and the Library at the time of the loan of the original items.]

8. Disposal. Should any part of the Collection be found by the Library to

DRAFT

include materials which the Library deems inappropriate for retention with the Collection or for transfer to other collections in the Library, the Library shall offer to return the materials to the Donor and allow the Donor ninety (90) days from the date of such offer to reply. If the Donor does not wish to receive said materials or designate another repository to receive them, or has not responded to the Library's offer by the end of the aforesaid ninety (90) days, the Library may dispose of such materials in accordance with its procedures for disposition of materials not needed for the Library's collections. Should the Library determine, subsequent to acceptance and transfer of the Collection that any part of the Collection includes classified information which the Library deems inappropriate for permanent retention with the Collection, it shall notify the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense shall then notify the Library in writing of the appropriate disposition of these classified materials.

Time frame?

9. Communications. The Donor will provide the Library with a current address and other contact information in order that the Library can meet its responsibilities as herein described. The Library will send notices and requests to addresses of record as provided and updated by the Donor.

In witness whereof, I have set my hand and seal this _____ day of

_____, 2004 in the City of _____

Donald H. Rumsfeld

Accepted for the United States of America

The Librarian of Congress (seal)

Date

December 8, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/Chu on Languages

091.4

I need a meeting with David Chu to go over this language memo. I am unhappy about it. Please set it up.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/29/04USD(P&R) memo to SDre: Macro Layout of Languages [OSD 16491-04

DIR:dh
120804-2

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

8 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

October 25, 2004

2004 OCT -2 PM 2:49

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages

I just looked over your October 13 memo on the Macro Layout of Languages. It is extremely disappointing. Please come back to me with a set of proposals as to how we can get some intelligent balance into this.

It's clear things in motion remain in motion, and in the past period since September 11, people are not making the kinds of logical corrections that thoughtful people would make.

Please get back to me promptly with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
102504-19

.....
Please respond by 11/19/04

DR 12/8

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31051

OSD 16491-04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE --
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

12/8

INFO MEMO

2004 DEC -2 PM 2:47

November 29, 2004, 5:00 PM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)

pub
Paul Buttes
12/3

SUBJECT: Memo on Macro Layout of Languages—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The current language pool is driven by an outdated manpower “requirements” process.
- We need to establish a number of people to be trained in languages over and above the needs defined in this traditional manner, “capabilities based.” This is one of the objectives of our Language Transformation Roadmap.
- We can begin by:
 - o Identifying a goal for the percent of the force that should possess capability in investment languages (regardless of job), and tasking the Defense Language Institute to set up courses to train these service members over and above their existing capacity. I propose setting the goal at 5% active, 2 1/2% selected reserve (= 70,300 active, 21,522 reserves)
 - o Establishing a Joint Service Language Corps that could be used to support all services and operations. We are currently developing the concept for such a Corps.
 - o Expediting the full implementation of an Army pilot program to recruit Arabic speaking service members, by expanding the languages we target for recruitment and starting similar programs in other services.
 - o Providing incentive for service members to maintain their language proficiency with enhanced Foreign Language Proficiency Pay. An increase was included in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act.

- Subject to your guidance, I will pursue all of the above options and report back to you on our progress.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by Mrs. Gail McGinn, DUSD(PLANS),

(b)(6)

MA SD	SMA DSD		
7SA SD	SA DSD	12/3	
EXEC SEC	11/2/3		
ESR MA		7/2/2	7



December 8, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld %σ

SUBJECT: E-mail to Gingrich

400

Please send the following e-mail to **Newt** Gingrich in response to his attached e-mail:

Newt—

Thanksfor the copy σ your e-mail to Berkson. I am delighted you are pressing forward on it.

You're right. It may very well end up requiring some legislative changes, but for some reason, it's harder than the dickens to get the Department to propose legislative changes, even though they know they are needed. Once they are proposed, it's very hard to get the Department to actually get them accomplished. Let's push it.

Attach.
12/2/04 Gingrich e-mail to SD

DHR:dh
120804-1

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Dec 04

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2004 11:18 AM
To: brad@berkson.org
Cc: WSanders@aei.org; ken.krieg@osd.pentagon.mil
Subject: more on logistics--newt

thanks for the briefing over dinner last night

the progress you are making in moving toward a single theater level logistics commander is really a big step forward

the work you are doing in bringing lean to bear on analyzing and modernizing logistics inside the **US** is also going to bear some pretty profitable fruit for the department

I would like to get with you and ken krieg to pursue an even bolder and more comprehensive set of reforms in a manner that would both give the secretary of defense an opportunity to move the system even more dramatically into a modern logistics supply chain model (with a goal of at least \$15 billion a year in savings by year five) and also give us the support to go to Congress for any changes that are needed to the law (and to block the depot caucus from blocking reform)

I am working with Bob Luby and Tom Williams at IBM to get a sense of the state of the art in total logistics supply chain management (a combination of Womack's Lean Thinking and Deming's total system approach to quality--the former builds incrementally from the bottom up while the latter starts with a system wide perspective and then works down). I am going to ask them to develop a list of the ten best logistics supply chain practitioners in the country to see if we could get them both to advise you and the secretary and to have them as resources for Congress.

I am also working with General Chuck Boyd at BENS (Business Executives for National Security). As you know Chuck was executive director of the Hart Rudman Commission and we had a long series of proposals in that commission for acquisition and logistics reform. In addition Chuck has members like Fred Smith of Fedex who he believes would be happy to work with you and the Secretary (Smith had the President as a pledge at Yale and therefore combines technical knowledge and political strength in getting this done).

I also hope you will both get Womack directly involved as an adviser and maybe as a teacher in the system.

12/2/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31054

I hope you and Chuck will get together in the very near future and work through how BENS can be systematically helpful. If you could keep Bill Sanders and me in the loop as that develops it would help. You and Chuck should get the head of Delphi involved, when they spun off from General Motors he was very proud of his role in using lean to really reduce costs and increase productivity at Delphi.

After last night I want to further digest how much you have already accomplished and I do not want to slow down the process of getting service approval of the theater level logistics process.

I would like to focus on three large questions in the next thirty days:

1. can we put together a middleware solution to the system wide legacy computer challenge and the fact that the system does not talk to itself and therefore has not been certified for the Congress. If we could develop a cost comparison of a middleware system versus a replacement of the 1000 plus legacy systems I think Congress would approve a legacy system approach.
2. Can we define a tops down deming style systems analysis that would bring together the various lean initiatives, make sure we are not suboptimizing and enable us to look at large order changes from parts acquisition through lifetime maintenance to immediate logistics. I am told this system wide view is vital to maximizing the scale of change.
3. Can we develop a set of strong proposals for the secretary to consider by mid January so he can see what a complete logistics supply chain approach would look like and what it might save.

thanks
newt

December 6, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail Response

Please send an e-mail response for me to the attached e-mail:

Dear Patt—

Thank you so much for your e-mail about Marty Hoffmann. He is a star and goes about his work on behalf of the people of Afghanistan with no thought of himself. Our country is so fortunate to have people of such dedication and skill.

Thanks so much for the nice thought.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Attach.
12/4/04 Mancy e-mail to JR

DHR:dh
120504-20

.....
Please respond by _____

335 SD

6 Dec 04

Joyce Rumsfeld

From: "Maney, Patt" <ManeyP@state.gov>
To: (b)(6)
Sent: Saturday, December 04, 2004 6:51 AM
Subject: Marty Hoffmann

I met and briefed you at the Embassy Kabul. I **am** a deployed reserve officer and serve as part of the **ARG**. I write to seek your advice and assistance regarding recognizing the continuing and superlative efforts of Marty Hoffmann. Do you know how one might bring Marty's name to the attention of those who consider folk for the Medal of Freedom? I can't think of anyone who more deserves recognition from the President. His efforts in Afghanistan have been and continue to be in the finest tradition of selfless service in encouraging freedom and prosperity for others. Kaivon Saleh and I will be happy to do anything required to forward this well deserved recognition, if you think it appropriate.

Respectfully,

Patt Maney

Ally - Top DOD.

12/6
1630

720

~~FOUO~~

FILE COPY

December 6, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Vehicles and Security

Let's talk about who gets a car and driver, who gets security, and who doesn't. I think we need to reestablish it for the new team.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120504-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

530
6 DEC 04

TO SecDef
From Paul Butler

12/15/04

Ray
1/10

Attached is a memo from Ray Abous outlining who gets Personal Security Details and cars. Ray, Admiral Stavridis and I will meet next week and give you some suggestions on how to cut this back.

OSD 07978-05

~~FOUO~~

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*Call
2/28/05*

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB 13 11 7: 41

FROM: Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/14/04

SUBJECT: Personal Security Details (PSDs)

In response to your **snowflake** of 6 December, Subject: "Vehicles and Security," I submit the following:

- **Attached listing** of all DoD officials, civilian and military, was forwarded to Peter Sobich, Special Assistant to the President and ~~Deputy Cabinet~~ Secretary, on 17 November 2004. Sobich had requested that each Department provide the White House a list of all officials who are assigned a PSD.
- Six DoD Civilian officials and 21 Military officials are assigned 24/7 PSD here and abroad.
- The following civilian officials, (five ~~Under Secretaries~~ of Defense) have dedicated cars and drivers and are eligible for home to office transportation, but do not have a PSD assigned: Mike Wynne, Doug Feith, Tina Jonas, David Chu and Steve Cambone.

?



RECOMMENDATION: None

Attachments:

DoD Inventory of Personal Security Details, November 2004

T 6/1

OSD 07978-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31059

December 6, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Travel

I notice you and General Hagee are scheduled to be in CENTCOM at the same time. I hope you don't overstress the place.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120504-11



Please respond by 12/9/04

333

6 Dec 04

OSD 07980-05
05

May 28, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: **Thoughts on Iraq**

D.R.

Iraq

The attached is for your information and review.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.05

Attach: SD Thoughts on Iraq

28 May 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31061

07982-04

December 6, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Pens from the Healthcare Chaplaincy

There has been a mistake. Not a **big** mistake, but a mistake. This hospital chaplaincy is run by a high school classmate of mine. We have been giving him money for **30** years. If you recall, they sent those bookmark pens. We don't have to pay for them.

005

Thanks.

Attach.
Thanksgiving 2004 ltr to SecDef from The Healthcare Chaplaincy

DHR:dh
120504-9

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

6 Dec 04



Administrative Center

315 East 62nd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10021-7767
Phone 212-644-1111 Ext.101 Fax 212-758-9959
www.healthcarechaplaincy.org

The Rev. Dr. Walter J. Smith, S.J.
President & CEO

Thanksgiving 2004

Mr. and Mrs. Donald Rumsfeld

(b)(6)

Dear Joyce and Don,

Winston Churchill once commented that "plans are useless, but planning is invaluable." This makes me muse whether we may also at times confuse life with living, dreams with dreaming, work with working, love with loving? Churchill commented further that many of us live like hungry fishermen: sewing and casting our nets, though we never know for sure what they will yield until the net is hauled onboard. Our Buddhist friends might further counsel us to remain detached from the dream of a specific fish. Whatever is caught or found may be experienced as unexpected treasure.

During the past year, our staff and trustees tried to apply this wisdom as we went about the arduous but exhilarating task of strategic planning. We remained open to much imagining and dreaming. The process required a lot of listening, understanding, and discerning. What has emerged from this planning activity is a wonderfully rich and challenging vision for the future of The Healthcare Chaplaincy, consistent with its 43-year history, but boldly committed to dynamic growth with many new services and programs. However astute the plan may be judged by the passage of time, the planning process itself has been an edifying exercise of multifaith and multicultural dialogue. With Churchill, we would all affirm his conclusion that "planning is invaluable."

At Thanksgiving, we have many reasons for giving thanks. More than ever, our community has embraced the inestimable treasure that we steward in the rich diversity of our faiths and traditions, along with a willingness to speak and work with each other out of those belief systems. In gratitude for your association with us in our mission, we offer this small gift. This unique set of pens—designed to function both as bookmarks and writing instruments—is imprinted with thoughtful words garnered from some of the world's great spiritual traditions, and selected by our staff. They may provide you or a loved one with a needed inspiration, or you may choose to give one or other of these bookmark pens to another person in need of its hopeful message.

In this joyful season which invites us to be mindful of our riches and responsibilities, we want to express to you—out of the very spiritual diversity from which our multifaith identity has been forged—a prayer of gratitude and blessing. None of our achievements or future aspirations would be possible without the loyal support and stewardship of our colleagues, friends, and benefactors like you. May the words inscribed on these gifts remind you of renewed opportunities for living, dreaming, working and loving.

With abundant thanks,

The Healthcare Chaplaincy is a multifaith community of professionals
committed to the advancement of pastoral care, education, and research.
We are dedicated to the spiritual care of all persons who are suffering in body, mind, and spirit.

11-L-0559/OSD/31063

~~FOUO~~



December 9, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes

CC: David Chu
Jim O'Beirne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Walter Huffman

231.2

Pete Schoomaker sent along the name of Walter Huffman as a good man to serve on an independent panel of *experts* on DoD legal reforms. His background sheet is attached.

Please tell me the status of that concept and what you think of this individual.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/23/04 CSA note w/ Huffman background sheet

DHR:dt
120904-32



Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07983-05

9 Dec 04

**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERALS**

3. Stephen W. Preston

Recommended by:

Partner, Wilmer, Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (2000-present)
General Counsel of the Department of the Navy (1998-2000)
Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1993-1995)
Deputy Assistant Attorney General (1995-1998)

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Brings perspective of a Military Department General Counsel*
- *Brings expertise regarding Navy legal elements*



4. Walter Burl Huffman, Major General, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Recommended by:

Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law (2001-present)
The Judge Advocate General of the Army (1997-2001)
25 year Army career

- *Brings perspective of a judge advocate*
- *Brings perspective of being The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)*
- *Brings expertise regarding Army legal elements*



5. Peter M. Murphy

Recommended by:

Partner, Holland and Knight LLP
Counsel to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (1984-2004)
Various assignments in Office of Navy General Counsel (1976-1984)
Infantry Officer, U.S. Army (1966-1969)

- *Brings expertise regarding USMC legal elements*
- *Many years of experience in GC-like position; has seen it all; good and bad*



**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

6. John O. Marsh, Jr.

Recommended by:
Distinguished Professor, George Mason University School of Law
Secretary of the Army (1981-1989)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (1973-1974)
Counsellor to the President (1974-1977)
Member of Congress (1962-1970)
Retired LTC, Virginia National Guard

- *Lengthy experience as Military Department Secretary*
- *Continued involvement with national security issues during past 20 years*



7. Paula Boggs

Recommended by:
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Starbucks Coffee Co. (2002-present)
Vice President, Legal, Dell Corp. (1997-2002)
Partner, Seattle law firm (1995-1997)
Previously: Assistant U.S. Attorney, Army Officer

- *Brings current corporate law office organizational perspective*
- *Brings junior/mid-level judge advocate perspective*



8. Samuel P. Huntington

Recommended by:
Professor and Chairman of the Harvard University Academy of International and Area Studies (1978-present)
Coordinator of Security Planning, National Security Council (1977-1978)
Author of many defense-related books and articles

- *Brings informed, academic, non-lawyer perspective*
- *Limited practical expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning*



**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

9. Larry D. Thompson

Recommended by:

Senior Vice President and General Counsel, PepsiCo. (2004-present)

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute (2003-2004)

Deputy Attorney General (2001-2003)

Partner, King and Spalding (1986-2001)

U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Georgia (1982-1986)

e Brings extensive background of legal organization, public and private

e Limited expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning



10. Edward C. Schmults

Recommended by:

Senior Vice President and General Counsel, GTE Corp. (1984-1994)

Deputy Attorney General (1981-1984)

Partner, White and Case (1977-1981)

Deputy Counsel to the President ((1975-1977)

Under Secretary and General Counsel of Treasury Department (1973-1975)

e Brings broad background of legal organization, public and private

• Limited expertise in military law/military department organization and functioning

~~PERSONNEL SENSITIVE - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION~~

**RANKED LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR
INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL
TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MILITARY DEPARTMENT GENERAL
COUNSELS AND JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL**

1. F. Whitten Peters

Recommended by:

Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP (2001-present)
Secretary of the Air Force (1999-2001)
Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Air Force (1997-1999)
Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1995-1997)
Line Officer, U.S. Naval Reserve (1969-1972)
Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on the Future of the
Aircraft Carrier (2001-present)
Vice Chair, Federal Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace
Industry (2001-present)

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Earned the respect of both uniformed and civilian members of DoD*
- *Brings detailed expertise regarding USAF legal elements*



2. Martin Richard Hoffmann

Recommended by:

Secretary of the Army (1975-1977)
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1973-1974)
General Counsel of the Department of Defense (1974-1975)
Served as Assistant U.S. Attorney, Congressional staffer, law firm partner and
as vice president and general counsel of a major corporation

- *Understands issues from both DoD and Military Department perspectives*
- *Experience from the past may help inform panel members*



~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Agreement w/India

India

In India one of the military people talked about some sort of an arrangement where it has taken two years, they need an agreement, and they paid \$160,000 advance.

I don't know what it is about, but you were in the meeting. Let's sort it out.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-29

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

Greg

This is Navy submarine rescue vehicle - India wants to "rent" it.
Task ^{Navy/} ATIL to give us status. ~~FOUO~~ ASAP.

TR
J

OSD 07984-05

9 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31069

December 9, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Memo on Diane Bodman

I received your note about Diane Bodman. Of course, I know her and know what she's been doing. I was there at the luncheon that your memo describes. She walked me all around.

201.22

I am surprised at your memo. Was it meant for someone other than me?

Thanks.

Attach.
12/8/04 MCM memo

DJR:dh
120904-28

.....
Please respond by 12/15/04

OSD 07985-05

9 Dec 04

For Sec Def

12/8

SPB
AD 12/19

I want to bring to your attention the extraordinary volunteer work that Diane Bodman, wife of **Deputy** Treasury Secretary Sam Bodman, is doing at Walter Reed Medical Center.

Last week, I attended a luncheon for wounded soldiers at the Pentagon. Diane organized it, arranging for transportation of some 40 soldiers and their family members to the gathering. She **knew** each soldier's name, family, details of their injuries, **status** of their recovery, **and** their general well being.

Apparently, Diane spends several days a week at Walter Reed, helping to coordinate and facilitate patient recreation activities, including tours of the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, the Supreme **Court**, etc.

In order to comply with hospital guidelines, Diane joined the Red Cross and completed official **training** and certification. She coordinates with the physicians, nurses, and therapists on appropriate activities for each patient, arranges handicap accessible vans and buses for group outings, and helps keep the families apprised of each patient's care and activities.

I thought you would like to know about **Diane's** wonderful commitment to these fine soldiers.

M/C Murphy

Who is this?

Mary Claire Murphy

150
2

December 9, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Newt and Negroponte

Did you set **up** Negroponte to see Newt before Negroponte went back?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-22

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

0000.71

OSD 07986-05

9 DEC 04

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Editorial about Torture

This Washington Post piece (item 41) is just inexcusable. Please tell me what you propose to do about it. I suggest the possibility of Geren and Maples and some others sitting down and spending two hours with them.

385.6

Thanks.

Attach.
"The System Endures," *WashingtonPost*, December 5, 2004

DHR:dh
120804-6

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 07988-05

8 Dec 04

Many of the colleges and law schools that support a ban on military recruiters teach some of the best and brightest students in the country. Their mission is to mold these students into more tolerant, well-rounded citizens who will not discriminate when given the opportunity to influence policy. What purpose, then, does it serve to deprive the military of such candidates?

This year's class of newly commissioned officers and military lawyers will produce the next generation of admirals, generals and military judges. Today's students will later advise the president, Congress and the Pentagon on what is best for the military ranks. What better place to give more tolerant, well-rounded citizens the opportunity to influence policy?

Joshua S. Eisenberg, New York, Nov. 30, 2004

The writer is a lawyer and a captain in the New York Army National Guard.

Editor's Note: The article referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, November 30, 2004.

Washington Post
December 5, 2004
Pg. B6

41, The System Endures

SEVEN MONTHS AGO the leak of shocking photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison alerted the country to the fact that U.S. soldiers and interrogators were criminally abusing Iraqi detainees. In the weeks that followed, a still more disturbing story emerged. The torture portrayed in the photographs, while extreme and mostly unauthorized, grew out of a system of abusive treatment of prisoners established by the Bush administration after Sept. 11, 2001. Official investigations have documented the mistreatment of more than 100 detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere and the deaths

of more than 20. In many cases these acts were committed by CIA or Army personnel who were following procedures authorized by such senior officials as Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Iraq commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales. This news prompted some noisy congressional hearings; some angry lawmakers, including a few Republicans, called for reforms.

Yet the worst aspect of the Abu Ghraib scandal is this: The system survived its public exposure. The Bush administration is vigorously prosecuting the lowly reservists depicted in the Abu Ghraib photos, while brazenly defending the larger process it established for extracting intelligence from prisoners. No senior officers have acknowledged fault for authorizing harsh interrogation techniques or been held accountable by prosecutors or Congress. An official investigation into how the interrogation policies were drawn up and used, which was completed months ago, has never been released. No alteration has been made in the policies governing the system, including an extremely permissive definition of torture prepared under the direction of Mr. Gonzales, or a set of harsh techniques for interrogating prisoners approved by Mr. Rumsfeld.

Consequently it is no surprise that the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is monitoring the Guantanamo Bay prison and other U.S. detention facilities, continues to find that detainees in American custody suffer "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment that is "tantamount to torture." It is no surprise that the Pentagon would reject those judgments without disputing the substance behind them. According to the New York Times, which obtained a Red Cross report

from July, monitors found that prisoners were subjected to "solitary confinement, temperature extremes, use of forced positions." The Times said that some were forced to strip and then were shackled in uncomfortable positions while being exposed to loud noise or music and prolonged cold.

Such abuses are not isolated or the result of rogue behavior by guards. They are part of the standing procedure for interrogating Guantanamo prisoners, approved by Mr. Rumsfeld in April 2003. That is why the administration rejects the Red Cross charges: not because they aren't true but because President Bush and his political appointees -- as opposed to many of the professional lawyers in the military -- don't regard such tactics as improper. To back up their position, they have Mr. Gonzales, who oversaw a 2002 review that concluded that the infliction of pain short of death or organ failure, or psychological stress that did not cause permanent derangement, did not constitute torture under the treaties and federal laws that bind the U.S. government. According to the administration's reasoning, the same methods documented by the Red Cross could be properly used on Americans arrested by foreign governments, or on detainees in federal prisons.

By now it should be clear that Mr. Bush will perpetuate this systematic violation of human rights, and fundamental American values, unless checked by one of the other branches of government. The federal courts have begun to explore the handling of prisoners at Guantanamo; last week a federal judge in Washington elicited from a Pentagon official the admission that information obtained through torture could be used by the tribunals the administration has established in Guantanamo to judge whether detainees are "enemy combatants." Yet Congress has

shirked its responsibility. No hearings have been held on the prisoner abuse scandal in three months; no legislation has corrected the administration's twisted interpretation of torture or the Geneva Conventions. Mr. Rumsfeld, Gen. Sanchez and Mr. Gonzales have never been required to answer for their policy decisions. As long as such passivity continues, you can expect more disturbing reviews from the Red Cross.



28
May 26, 2004

In-ag

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Snail Mail

I just got a memorandum from you on an authorization for granting of immunity dated May 6 that came in on May 26, because it was sent through the mail.

Please don't send things through the mail. This is time sensitive. We won't be able to do this once sovereignty is passed.

We'll try to get our folks working on it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
052604-24

.....
Please respond by _____

28 May 04

OSD 07989-04

~~FOUO~~

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joe Klein Piece

This piece by Joe Klein is irresponsible. Have a go at it.

Thanks.

Attach.

Klein, Joe. "Is Bush Serious About a New Spy System?" *Time*, December 6, 2004, p. 29.

DIHR:dh
120804-3

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

350.09

8 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 07989-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31076

Joe Klein



Is Bush Serious About a New Spy System?

HERE IS AN INDISPUTABLE FACT: THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A single, unified computer network that contains—at the very least—all the available information on the world's bad guys. This was the primary recommendation of the 9/11 commission. The FBI needs to know what the CIA knows about, say, the mythical terrorist Mahmoud Shimon O'Hara, and vice versa—and both agencies need to be alerted immediately if O'Hara tries to enter the country or has a phone conversation overheard by the

National Security Agency (NSA). Everyone from the President to the customs cops stamping passports at LAX agrees this is a necessity.

We are probably not going to build that system anytime soon. Congress has tried to do it twice in the past two years, and failed both times. First, it created the Department of Homeland Security, which included a whole new bureaucracy—the office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—to build the system. But IAIP was almost immediately mugged by the CIA, which backed a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center to do much the same thing.

The Pentagon and the FBI ignored both efforts, in the classic passive-aggressive manner of turf-obsessed bureaucrats.

The second attempt, now comatose, was the National Intelligence Reform Act—the brisk congressional response to last summer's findings of the 9/11 commission. The bill would have created a National Intelligence director to ride herd over the CLASSA, parts of the FBI and assorted other intel agencies. The czar would have had budgetary authority and also the power to “design” and “implement” the unified computer network. But two House Republican committee chairmen decided to croak the bill on the weekend before Thanksgiving—in large part because the reform was opposed by the Pentagon, which controls 80% of the intelligence budget. An effort is being made to revive it, but don't hold your breath.

And perhaps be grateful: even though the goals of the reform bill were the right ones, I'm not convinced that it would have gotten the job done. It could easily have become a familiar legislative charade—a “re-



Bush says he wants intel reform; Rumsfeld had early doubts

form” is passed, there's a nice bill-signing ceremony in the Rose Garden, various pols (including the President) get to take credit, but nothing really changes ... except for the accretion of another sedimentary layer of semi-powerless bureaucracy. In truth, it is impossible for Congress to reorganize the inner workings of the Executive Branch without the full support of the President, and I'm not so sure George Bush really favored either one of the attempted reforms.

Neither of the two bills emanated from the White House. Homeland Security came from congressional Democrats; Intelligence Reform from the 9/11 commission. Both ideas sprouted during election seasons; both were popular. Bush opposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security before he favored it—and he has been unwilling to do the head cracking necessary to ensure that his friend, Secretary Tom Ridge, has the authority to do his job. Bush was dragged into supporting intelligence reform by John Kerry's imprudent campaign demand that the 9/11 commission recommendations be enacted

immediately—without any input from, or negotiation with, the entrenched panjandrums of the intelligence community. “You can't do intelligence reform without a clear vision and direct marching orders from the President,” 9/11 commission member Bob Kerrey told me last week. “If you create an Intelligence czar, but the President doesn't want to back him fully and give him real authority to build the network, then you might as well deep-six the bill.”

it happens, the President does have a clear vision about intelligence reform, and it may not include the bureaucratic reshuffling suggested by the 9/11 commission. Bush, as always, is more interested in action than information. He wants a more aggressive spy service—a good thing. But he also wants a more compliant spy service—not such a good thing. He has hired Porter Goss to achieve both goals at the CIA. He has also issued a series of memos that begin to lay out his vision: one supports a 50% increase in the number of covert operatives—an excellent idea. Another seems to support the transfer of operational control over the use of covert force from the CIA to the

Pentagon. That may not be a bad idea, either, but it feeds a fear among some intelligence professionals that with the CIA in tatters, power may shift, subtly, toward the Secretary of Defense. “The militarization of intelligence is a real worry,” an intelligence expert told me—and Donald Rumsfeld's intense and, according to several sources, continuing covert opposition to the 9/11 intel recommendations only reinforces those fears.

The Secretary of Defense has a dreadful track record when it comes to intelligence. In Bush's first term, Rumsfeld set up an Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon to challenge the CIA's cautious analysis of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction by touting the incendiary garbage provided by Iraqi exiles. That is, I suppose, a version of intelligence reform: a system in which fantasies are produced to support the President's policy preferences. But it is not the version proposed by the 9/11 commission—and it is time for Bush to make clear whether he supports the commission or his Defense Secretary. He cannot support both. ■

BOOKS, ART, COMICS, TV, FILM

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rob McGuinness

451

Someone named Rob McGuinness was on television, I think on FOX. He was terrific in answering this armor question. You ought to get a thank you note off to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-28

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

OSD 07990-05

14 Dec 04

28
May 26, 2004

Iraq

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Gen. John Abizaid
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: UK and Command and Control

You should be aware of this note from Geoff Hoon.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/26/04 PM's comments in UK

DHR:dh
052604-22

.....
Please respond by _____

28 May 04

OSD 07991-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31079

Handwritten: 5726
C5726



SECRETARY OF STATE

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2EU

Telephone: 020 721 8211/2/3

Fax: (b)(6)

E-mail: defencesecretary@defence.mod.uk

MO 6/17/15C
MST 4/5/2

26 May 2004

Dear General,

IRAQ

You may be aware that there has been intense media speculation in the UK over the past 24 hours about command and control of forces in Iraq after 30 June. The UK media are perceiving a difference in view between the United States and the United Kingdom based on remarks by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State Powell yesterday.

I attach a summary of what the Prime Minister said in Parliament at lunchtime today on this issue. I should be grateful if you could draw his remarks to the attention of Secretary Rumsfeld.

Yours sincerely

Chris Baker

J C S BAKER
Private Secretary

Lieutenant General John Craddock
Senior Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

11-L-0559/OSD/31080



Recycled Paper

PRIME MINISTER'S LINE ON IRAQ – 26 MAY 2004

New Interim Government has to have full sovereignty: ultimate strategic and political decision-making passes to Interim Government.

Our forces will be there with consent of Interim Government.

Once strategic decision made, of course as now, the running of an operation in the hands of the Commander of the Multinational Force.

No question of US or UK troops not being able to protect themselves or US or UK troops being under anything other than US/UK command.

December 13, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Plan for Abizaid and Casey

Centcom

What is the plan to get Abizaid and Casey with the President when they are in town?

What is the plan to use them with the media or the Congress?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-23

.....
Please respond by _____

13 Dec 04

OSD 07991-05

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

CC: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Awards for Afghanistan Personnel

I think we ought to give an award to Zal Khalilzad when he comes in this week.

We also might find that sometime we could give an award to Marty Hoffmann and the Afghanistan team that have been backing up Zal. I don't know if we want to do it at the same time, but we ought to think about it.

The fact that they had the inauguration is a good time to mark it for the Afghanistan group, it seems to me.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-18

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 07992-05

Afghanistan

14 Dec 04

DEC 14 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: Larry Di Rita
Matt Latimer

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Article

Please see me about who the person is who we ought to assign the task of taking the initiatives and accomplishments paper and turning it into an article of some kind, where we do a paragraph on each of the initiatives or accomplishments.

It would be pretty long, but we need to begin to compile a record of four years. That staccato, bullet-point paper is useful for me to talk off of, but it is not useful to hand out to people, or to think about a presentation to the Congress or a message to each Member of Congress.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-14

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

020 D05

14 Dec 04

December 13, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Col. Harvey Brief

Please get Scooter Libby to invite Colonel Harvey over to brief him on the intel situation in Iraq.

Iraq

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121304-10

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

13 Dec 04

DEC 13 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Quotes

Please give me a copy of whatever it is they claim to be quoting me from in this editorial on Boeing.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Go Boeing" *Washington Post*

DHR:dh
121004-24

.....
Please *respond* by 12/16/04

0007 SD

OSD 07996-05

13 Dec 04

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...ity. Least
Warner (D) and Attorney
y W. Kilgore (R) could make a wor
ference. Both should be embarrassed to p
side over a public-defense system that fails its
clients so often

'Go Boeing!'

THE MORE the Boeing tanker deal is scrutinized, the worse it looks. The tanker leasing arrangement, now thankfully dead, was questionable on its face, the result of a back-door legislative maneuver; if it had gone through, the Air Force would have paid too much for planes that it might not need, or that at least might not be the best solution to its aging tanker fleet. Then it turned out that negotiations were rigged in Boeing's favor by an Air Force procurement official as a "parting gift" just before she took a \$250,000-a-year job at the company. The official, Darleen A. Druyun, has pleaded guilty to ethics charges, along with Boeing's former chief financial officer. But as much as the Air Force would like to suggest otherwise, the Boeing mess doesn't stop there. The pile of internal e-mails tenaciously extracted by Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) show an Air Force leadership more bent on stifling dissenting views from within the military than on determining the best deal for taxpayers, inappropriately cozy with its contractors and personally biased against others, and resolutely uninterested, even now, in determining what went wrong. E-mails to and from Air Force Secretary James G. Roche, who resigned last week, are particularly disturbing. In May 2003, Boeing lobbyist Paul Weaver told Mr. Roche that Marvin R. Sambur, the Air Force's acquisition chief, "was getting beat up" by Michael W. Wynne, a senior Pentagon procurement official, over the tankers' cost. "It's time for the big guns to quash Wynne!" replied Mr. Roche—who then repeatedly denied to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he asked Boeing to put pressure on Mr. Wynne. As chummy as the Air Force was with Boeing, officials were hostile to a possible competitor for the tanker deal, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. (EADS) and its Airbus division. E-mailing a Raytheon Co. executive, Mr. Roche wrote, "Privately between us: Go Boeing! The fools in Paris and Berlin never did their homework." When Mr. Wynne told Mr. Roche that he had invited the

EADS officials to lunch, noting the potential "benefits of competition," he was angrily slapped down. "Mike, you must be out of your mind!!!" Mr. Roche wrote. "We won't be happy with your doing this!" Mr. Roche is not the only one whose conduct is troubling. Even as she was negotiating with the Air Force about whether the tanker lease was a good deal, Office of Management and Budget Associate Director Robin Cleveland asked Mr. Roche to intercede with former colleagues at Northrop Grumman to help Ms. Cleveland's brother get a job there. Within half an hour, Mr. Roche had passed the material on to the company, noting Ms. Cleveland's key position and endorsing her brother. Then he wrote back to Ms. Cleveland, "Be well. Smile. Give tankers now (Oops, did I say that? . . .)." Ms. Cleveland ended up supporting the leasing deal, but even if she hadn't, her conduct, now under review by the Justice Department, represented an unethical use of her public position. Mr. Roche's actions weren't much better. Incredibly, the Air Force withheld this exchange from Mr. McCain on the grounds that the e-mails were simply joking. Indeed, one of the most distressing aspects of this entire episode has been the military's stonewalling response to what Mr. Roche, in an e-mail, termed "the enemies of the lease on the Hill." At a meeting last November, following the Druyun firing, according to one e-mail, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "asked if in light of that should we take a second look at her involvement in any tanker lease related matters in order to deflect possible criticism from the [Senate Armed Services Committee] and unfavorable publicity." You would have hoped Mr. Rumsfeld would want to take a "second look" to figure out what went wrong in his operation, not to deflect criticism or avoid bad press. Mr. McCain put it well in a Senate floor speech. "This appears to be a case of either a system failure in procurement oversight, willful blindness or rank corruption. Either way, full accountability among Air Force leadership is in order."

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DEC 13 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: JWACC and Iraq

The attached is self-explanatory. Please dig into it and see what you can do.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef

Iraq

DHR:dh
121004-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

OSD 07997-05

13 Dec 04

12/10

(b)(6)

From Newt Gingrich

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 12:34 PM
To: giambastiani@jfc.com.mil
Cc: james.stavridis@osd.mil; peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)
paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: JWACC and Iraq

there are two major areas where JWACC can play a big role in understanding what we need to accomplish in Iraq

1. we need a clear sense of the metrics of a relatively healthy Iraq

the current metrics don't necessarily cover the requirements of a sustainable Iraq but instead reflect the CPA's highly inadequate goals on electricity there was an estimate we needed 9000 megawatts to be economically and socially healthy

CPA arbitrarily reduced that to 6200 megawatts

last month we made 3500 megawatts

there is no plan currently to get to 9000 by the time summer's heat irritates people who have now bought air conditioners

getting a fresh look at the key systems analysis of a sustainable Iraq and the metrics associated with that would be helpful

2. JWACC did a good job a few years ago putting together a financial and economic interest network analysis around the Serbian leadership and identifying ways to bring pressure to bear on Milosevich

we need a similar analysis of the current pro-dictatorship sunni factions. We know they have money in Syria, Jordan Saudi Arabia and probably Switzerland. Col Harvey now has a briefing identifying almost all the key factional leaders.

If JWACC could start with Harvey's list and begin to analyze that would be great.

if you need forensic help from Treasury let me know and I will call Snow

thanks
newt

12/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31089

May 28, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: **Thoughts on Iraq**

D.R.

IF aq

Please review the attached and get back to me at your earliest convenience with your comments and thoughts.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.06

Attach: SD Thoughts on Iraq

28 May 04

OSD 07998-04

May 28, 2004

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq

When I meet with U.S. military commanders in Iraq and the senior military leadership here in Washington, DC, as I do so often, I invariably hear their confidence and conviction about the progress being made in Iraq and the solid prospect of success. But when one turns on the television or reads the press here, in the United States and in much of the world, the reports are mostly of problems, difficulties, pessimism and despair.

It is fair to ask, which of these perspectives is correct, or more correct, and therefore which should be shaping U.S. policy and conditioning world thinking on this critically important matter?

One reason for the glaring disparity - and it is an enormous difference - may be the standard or expectation that one measures progress against. Those wonderful volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against terrorists, who are participating on the front lines of the global war against extremism, who see first hand the relatively small number of radicals trying to hijack a religion from the large majority of moderate Muslims and who are fighting this global terrorist

Iraq

28 May 04

28 May 04

OSD 07998-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31091

insurgency, they have the first hand experience and the perspective to understand not to expect war to be tidy, orderly or predictable.

Quite the contrary, they recognize that conflict, these types of struggles have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded, that those who step forward with courage can become the targets of assassins and that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to cause people to alter their behavior. And terrorism can work. There are those who when frightened, change course, acquiesce, or try to appease the terrorists, the extremists. So those people on the front line of the struggle see the insurgency for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. The perspective is rooted in history and in personal experience.

Conversely, other observers, removed from the battle, and receiving information only through the media see it differently and their perspective is shaded by those who compare what is taking place, with all the difficulties not against history or personal experience, but against the false standard of those countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom and now enjoy tranquility. Not surprisingly, they see that events in Iraq are not tranquil, are not peaceful, and indeed, in many cases, are dangerous and ugly. So they can be vulnerable to the

argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is wrong or imperfect or misguided or, in more extreme cases, even malevolent.

The more correct perspective is to look at history, to look at the struggles that have taken place over the decades, to look at the countries that have navigated the difficult and bumpy path from dictatorships and theocracies to representative civil societies. Only by reflection on those histories, those struggles, then can one appreciate the truth that that path to freedom has always been difficult, always dangerous, and always filled with ugliness. So to test the Coalition's progress against the picture of those that have prevailed is wrong. What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual, let alone wrong. What is taking place should be understandable from history for those who wish to understand. This is a hard road, a tough road, a road filled with potholes and lethal dangers. That is the road we are on – and it is the right road.

It is a road that has been traveled by a number of countries over the decades and successfully so, despite the faint-hearted and those who persuaded themselves it couldn't be done. Even our own country navigated through tough periods, seeing

demonstrations, riots, battles, and we survived it all because the American people were steadfast, courageous and listened to the wiser councils.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to a civil society. And while it was not easy to be sure, they did it. It was hard in each case. It took time. And people were killed. And there were difficulties and ugliness. But they succeeded, to the great benefit of the civilized world.

For a country to be great, for a country to be purposeful, for a country to be steadfast, it has to have a concentration span of something greater than a 30 second sound bite, it must be rooted in history and have an understanding that, as Thomas Jefferson of the path to democracy said, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard and it is not perfect. But it should not be expected to be perfect. It never has been. Is it failing? No. Is there a very good chance it can succeed? You bet. Is it certain? No. But one thing is certain. Our forces cannot be defeated in this struggle on the battlefields of Iraq, They can be

pinpricked to death. They can suffer heartbreaking casualties as they are, but they cannot be defeated on the battlefield. The only way the vital cause can be lost is if the American people are falsely persuaded that it is lost, that it cannot be won, or is not worth the pain.

I can say with absolute conviction that all is not lost. And those who seek the truth should sharply challenge those who are trying to hold this process up against unrealistic expectations. Ask the pundits and the critics where in history it has ever been done smoothly. Ask where in history has a country gone from a repressive, vicious dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties and challenges or loss of life. And if there are not good answers – and there are not – then ask why should Iraq be tested against that unrealistic template? It should not be. It must not be, or we fail our convictions.

What is taking place is tough. It is hard. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It's ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of many wonderful young men and young women - who are all volunteers, and may God bless them all. But the least they deserve is an honest assessment of what it is they are doing. The very least they deserve is an accurate, truthful understanding of the progress that is being achieved both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The least they deserve is some recognition for the progress

they have made - the hospitals that have been built, the clinics that have been opened, the schools that have been staffed and provided new textbooks, the economic progress that has been achieved. The least they deserve is a recognition of the courage demonstrated by the Iraqi security forces they have trained, and the courage of the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

This Memorial Day season is a time for reflection to be sure, for thoughtfulness, but also for fairness, balance, and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from those who would lead, as well as those who do lead. And they deserve it from the media that has the full constitutional freedom to be fair, to be honest, to be thorough and constructive.

It is important to ask what are the alternatives for that troubled region and for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqi people, and for the United States, and for our 33 allies in the multinational Coalition?

The Iraqi people know what they want. More than 60 percent of the Iraqi people say they want a single Iraq, with power centralized in Baghdad. Another 20 percent want a single state with power shared between Baghdad and the provincial governments. So more than 80 percent are opposed to breaking up that country. We also know that no nation wants to be occupied. We know that and understand.

We know that the Iraqi people, despite the terrorist attacks, despite the improvised explosive devices, despite the assassinations, despite the disruptions to essential services, despite the fact that the terrorists continue to kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week - innocent Iraqi men, women and children - and have already killed close to 400 of the Iraqi security forces, despite all of that, among all Iraqis 70 percent say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardship they face today. Among Iraqi Kurds it is over 90 percent. Among Iraqi Shia, it is 80 percent. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, those who prospered the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people do understand that life is better, despite the critics constant drumbeat to the contrary.

So what then might be the alternatives to the path we are on as disturbing as this path may be? What alternatives do those who criticize and emphasize everything that is dangerous and tumultuous, as opposed to the progress being achieved and the opportunity ahead. What do they suggest? Some say leave. Some say to internationalize the occupation despite the fact that not a week goes by that efforts are not made to decrease the 33 nation coalition and increase the involvement by NATO and the UN.

What if the coalition were to shift direction and leave prematurely? Thoughtful observers speculate that the possibilities would include the following:

- There could be civil war.
- There could be ethnic cleansing of the likes Iraq has seen previously, filling up still more mass graves.
- It could become a failed state and anarchy prevail, with terrorists eventually taking it over and achieving a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.
- One of the neighboring countries would take over and impose their rule – possibly a neighbor would try to put in place still another handful of radical clerics.

- The country could split up into parts with the result being that Iraq would no longer be a nation and their neighbor's aspirations for their land and wealth would be encouraged.
- Or a new Saddam Hussein could take control and reimpose another vicious, theocracy dictatorship.

Which of those options or others equally undesirable might critics argue would be better than the President's goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

I am convinced that we are on the right course, that the difficulties we face are understandable, given the historical record of many countries that navigated through the difficult seas and faced similar problems. I know of no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, or for the world.

And I repeat, there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be defeated by those who insist on not recalling history, and on rushing to conclude it can't be done.

We are waging this struggle during a period of 24 hour news, seven days a week for the first time in our nation's history. And we are doing it during a Presidential election year where incredibly there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So we are in for a rough six months. But when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st Century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction, and paralysis from perserverance.

DHR:dh
052704-8

72
May ²⁸26, 2004

Iraq

TO: Steve Herbits
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Your Report

Steve—

Thanks for your report. Ugh!

Keep them coming.

Regards,

DHR:dh
052604-9

28 May 04

OSD 08002_04

cc: Craddock
Butler

(b)(6)

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com

Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 7:33 PM

To: (b)(6); Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6); jack.patterson@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: Fwd: Chalabi - Important

this is in its own way similar to abu ghraib

there was no excuse for this level of action and no excuse for cpa lying about it
newt

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2004 5:27 PM
 To: Thirdwave2@aol.com
 Subject: Chalabi - Important

From an American Friend Who Witnessed the Humiliating Raid Against Chalabi
 (With thanks to Harold Rhode)
 Sent: Friday, May 21, 2004 10:26 AM
 Subject: Baghdad update

Hi folks,

I wanted to let everyone know that I am safe in Iraq after what was a very eventful day yesterday. As most of you know, I work closely with Dr. Chalabi in Iraq, assisting the INC as a financial advisor. Yesterday, as I was sitting in my nightshirt and shorts, getting ready to face the day, my guard came in and told me that Dr. Chalabi's guards were being arrested. Yelling to my friend and housemate Francis, I raced over to Dr. Chalabi's house to find a confrontation between the Iraqi Police (IP), guarded by the US military and advised by plain clothed "advisors" to the IP. Two Americans demanding to know who was in charge of this operation, startled them. Suddenly some of the American "advisors" disappeared into their cars. The US military were fine—just obeying orders. After a back and forth with the IP and the US military, one unarmed IP was allowed inside to search for the persons for whom they had warrants.

It is helpful to understand that these "warrants" are coming from a special court established by Paul Bremer and reporting directly to him. The judge used to be a translator at the CPA Ministry of Justice and was imposed on the court by the CPA. His first charge was against Aras Kareem, the head of INC intelligence. According to the arrest warrant, he was charged with stealing 11 vehicles that belonged to the Ministry of Finance. Those 11 vehicles had been parked on INC property for protection and the MOF had taken the keys with them. The temporary offices of the MOF (its permanent building was damaged in the war) had no room for the vehicles. The MOF sent a letter to the judge saying there was no basis for the charges. The judge threatened the MOF lawyer with imprisonment if the MOF did not withdraw the letter. He also refused to take the letter from Aras's lawyer. Even yesterday, when they came to arrest several people (none of course were at Dr. Chalabi's house), their investigation was so poor that they did not even know the last names of the people they were trying to arrest. They tried to arrest one of Dr. Chalabi's drivers just because his first name was Kamaran—a common Kurdish name. It would be like going to an office with a warrant to arrest Mike and arresting anyone with that first name.

After the police left (with nothing) I went over to China House—the INC office—where this time there was no pretense of arresting anyone. The plain-clothed American advisor without ID said they were seizing the building. I asked to see the warrant but none was available and no one would admit to being in charge. Under the watchful eye of these advisors, the IP ransacked the office, shooting Dr. Chalabi's picture, overturning furniture, looting what they could carry off and spewing garbage everywhere. Dr. Chalabi had a group picture of his father—about 50 persons in total. The police had smashed the glass and punched a hole through the face of Dr. Chalabi's father. We forget that Iraqis have long histories and long memories. That this police officer would recognize the face of Dr. Chalabi's father in a sea of faces is illustrative of the roots of the invasion of his office.

5/24/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31103

Paul Bremer's imperious manner has resulted in a tremendous loss of American and Iraqi lives. His subversion of Iraq's nascent judicial system to silence a political opponent not only undermines Iraqi democracy but ours as well. I am okay in Baghdad, but angry.

Peg

Stephen E. Herbits

(b)(6)



December 13, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Background Sheet on Harry Kraemer, Jr.

A friend of mine, Joe Jannotta, sent me this background sheet. It is self-explanatory. Please feed it into the process. I don't know the individual, but I know Joe Jannotta very well and he's an outstanding person and a Korean War Naval aviator.

Thanks.

Attach.
Background Sheet on Harry Kraemer, Jr.

DHR:ss
121004-20

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

230.02

13 Dec 04

(b)(6)

ShieldsMeneley PARTNERS

311 South Wacker Drive
Suite 1825
Chicago, IL 60606
312.994.9500

(b)(6)

www.ShieldsMeneley.com

To: Donald Rumsfeld Fax: (b)(6)

From: Joe Jarnotta (b)(6) Date: 12/9/2004

Re: Harry Kraemer's Resume ^{+ letter} Pages: 85

CC:

Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Please Recycle

Comments: Don: This is a very talented health care exec. In the attached letter to me indicates Harry would like to work for HHS. could I have 2 minutes to talk about him?

Best,
Joe
(b)(6)

Please feel free to contact Harry directly on his cell phone (b)(6)

(b)(6)

1-1-0559/OSD/34106

Subj: Candidate for HHS position
Date: 12/7/2004 4:37:44 PM Eastern Standard Time
From: HKraemerJr
To: Jejannotta
File: harrybio8-04.doc

Dear Joe,

It was great speaking with you. As I mentioned, I spoke with Secretary Tommy Thompson today. He stated that they already have a leading candidate to replace him at HHS. However, he also stated that given my extensive healthcare and management experience, that I would be an excellent candidate.

Given my background of 22 years of global healthcare experience at Baxter Int'l, including the last five as Chairman and CEO, I believe I could make an important contribution. As you know, Baxter is a \$10 billion global healthcare company with more than fifty thousand employees.

Joe, although I am currently looking at other CEO positions within healthcare and lecturing at Northwestern's Kellogg School of Management, I would be honored to have the opportunity to make a true difference in healthcare around the world.

Let me know if this makes sense to you and we can discuss it further at your convenience. I have attached a short bio sketch as well as my contact information.

--

Regards,

Harry

Harry M. Jansen Kraemer, Jr.

office phone: (b)(6)

office fax:

cell phone:

home phone:

home fax:

HARRY M. JANSEN KRAEMER, JR

(b)(6)

Home (b)(6)

Office (b)(6)

(b)(6)

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY

BAXTER INTERNATIONAL

1982 to 2004

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER / PRESIDENT

1997 to 2004

Traversed rapid growth, transformation and crisis management during eight-year tenure as President, CEO and Chairman of the Board of a world-leading healthcare business. Outlined and led the execution of progressive strategies to drive market valuation and stock price to all time highs, showcase the company's ability to become a major player in biosciences, and demonstrate a social consciousness that resonated with employees, customers and shareholders.

- Positioned Baxter as one of the healthcare industry's best, most consistent growth companies with revenue and operating profit at double-digit rates over 8 years.
 - Drove a ten-fold increase in market capitalization from \$4 billion in 1993 to \$35 billion by 2002
 - Sustained a 14% average year-over-year increase in stock value to an all time high of \$60/share in 2002 through programs initiated as CFO and continued as President & CEO.
 - Focused the business on profitable growth culminating in revenue growth from \$6.1 billion in 1997 to \$8.9 billion in 2003. Over the same period, net income increased from \$300 million to \$881 million, and net profit margins moved from 4.9% to 9.9%.
 - Led Baxter to a solid financial footing, paying down 30% or longer-term debt to less than \$2.2 billion in 2002.
 - Instituted aggressive growth through acquisition, completing more than ten transactions valued at more than \$3 billion in ten years to deliver an after-tax return of +20%.
- Led a 2003 corporate restructuring initiative to deliver \$300 million in savings and 25% increases in operating margins over 3-4 years.
 - Reduced global workforce 6%, with 50% of headcount reductions in G&A.
 - Divested slow growth businesses, freeing up more than \$1 billion in capital.
 - Drove manufacturing supply chain improvements, closed ten facilities, and improved overall economies of scale.
- Reinforced a values-based, shared objectives business philosophy initiated as CFO. Demonstrated that corporate investments in people were value-added and the key to success.
 - Hand-picked a talented management team, cultivating self-confidence and holistic decision-making.
 - Named the first Chief Scientific Officer and helped advance careers of many executives who later became CEO/President of other companies.
 - Increased headcount 20% while increasing revenue and profit 30-50% in six years.
 - Maintained simple, open and personal communications with all employees at facilities around the world.
 - Pioneered emerging global standards for environmental and social reporting. Named to Business Ethics Magazine's list of 100 Best Corporate Citizens; achieved Top 10% ranking in Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index.
- Diversified the portfolio to create a balanced revenue base. Increased investments in BioScience to 37% of revenue; Medication Delivery to 43% of revenue, offsetting slower growth in Renal Therapy, 20% of revenue, 2003.
- Unveiled an aggressive strategy to build the BioScience business to \$10 billion by 2010. Delivered 20%+ year over year growth in the \$2.5 billion enterprise that is now on par with global biotech firms such as Amgen and Genentech.
 - Drove \$1 billion+ in strategic investments in blood plasma, recombinants and biosurgery products.
 - Positioned Baxter as the "manufacturer of choice" and collaborative partner for small biotech companies.

HARRY KRAEMER

PAGE 2

- Entered the vaccine market with plans to grow a \$100 million business to \$1 billion in ten years. Achieved technology breakthroughs with 10+ vaccines in development. Partnered with Acambis PLC to win a \$428 million sole source contract with the federal government for smallpox vaccine.
 - Directed \$1 billion in capital investments in global manufacturing facilities to create high quality, low-cost capacity to produce genetically engineered vaccines and Factor 8 products.
 - Navigated through major market upheaval and 40% price erosion when competitors re-entered the plasma protein market in 2002. Attained market leadership position in blood disorder therapies.
 - Boosted European presence and share of open-heart surgery devices through strategic acquisitions in 1997.
 - Led the rapid growth of a cardiovascular unit spun-off in 2000 as Edwards Lifesciences. Delivered 200% shareholder value and created a new publicly traded company with strong global presence.
- Led strategic repositioning to accelerate the growth of Baxter's flagship \$3+ billion Medication Delivery business. Structured and closed a series of acquisitions to create a robust portfolio of products for physicians and hospitals.
 - Entered the drug delivery business and grew it to \$1 billion in revenue by structuring partnering contracts with major pharmaceutical companies.
 - Expanded anesthesia business lines into a highly profitable market segment.
 - Hunched a five-year strategy to grow a \$200 million oncology business into a \$1 billion enterprise. Acquired oncology business from a major German chemical company that doubled the portfolio of cancer treatments.
 - Positioned the Renal therapy business to capitalize on opportunities in parental and hemo dialysis markets.
 - Partnered with Microsoft and Cisco in 2000 to develop applications for web-enabled kidney dialysis machines to connect the scientific, doctor and patient communities.
- Demonstrated Baxter's social conscientiousness as a 'life saving' company that "did the right thing" regardless of the financial or legal impact.
 - Testified before Congress in 2002 as the Chairman of the Healthcare Leadership Council's Executive Task Force on the Uninsured to advocate a combination of solutions to solve a national crisis.
 - Set aside \$150 million in 2001 to compensate victim's families who died using dialysis machines in Europe. Immediately closed plants in acquired company and pulled products from the market. Volunteered a 40% pay cut and 20% reduction in executive bonuses to the Board Compensation Committee.
 - Settled thousands of claims with women suffering side-effects from silicone breast implants in 1997, and hemophiliacs infected with HIV from blood products in 1998.
 - Responded proactively to shareholder concerns of PVC-based hospital supply products, which resulted in a withdrawal of a shareholder resolution and favorable relations with activist groups.
- Championed work-life balance philosophy across the business, attracting and retaining top-notch employees and receiving immeasurable paybacks in employee productivity.
 - Earned recognition as a Fortune "Best Company to Work" in 2001.
 - Introduced back-up elder care, adoption assistance, and alternative work arrangements, e.g., flextime and job sharing.
 - Increased annual giving through the Baxter Foundation to care for uninsured and the elderly, prevent child abuse, promote health education and help local communities.
 - Donated money to charitable causes in which employees participated through "Dollars for Doers" program.

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT & CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

1993 to 1997

Promoted to top financial job to introduce discipline and strategic focus in revenue, profit and earnings. Given full latitude to effect a corporate-wide cultural transformation to shared values and objectives. Created and instituted programs that had a widespread impact on the perception of investors, customers, management, employees and the community. Appointed to the Baxter Board of Directors in 1995.

- Transformed Baxter's image as a laggard financial performer by encouraging the spin-off of slow-growth companies to create financial flexibility, and enhance competitive position and shareholder value.
 - Spearheaded financial and operational disciplines that resulted in consistent, solid returns. Grew net income 11% and net profit margins 6.3% from 1993 to 1996.

- Self-appointed "Cash Wow Officer" to partner with operating executives in driving profitable business growth despite margin pressures.
 - Led Baxter's spin-off as two separate companies: a \$5 billion biotechnology, renal therapy, and cardiovascular medicine enterprise, and a \$3.8 billion U.S. hospital distribution business.
 - Substantiated the need to divest home care and cardiac device businesses where growth was impeded by Medicare and Medicaid price caps.
 - Designed an exit strategy of the U.S. hospital supply business achieving 650% shareholder return when business was ultimately sold to Cardinal Health in 1998.
- Drove an unprecedented restructuring of the business to capitalize on a 60-year history in blood related health businesses.
 - Targeted international growth to increase Baxter's offshore sales from 25% to 50% of total revenue
 - Extended reach into US cardiovascular perfusion market through the 1995 acquisition of PSICOR and SETA-
 - Led the 1996 \$750 million acquisition of Immuno International to boost European sales.
 - Created a new corporate shared values statement -- *Respect, Responsiveness & Results* -- to promote a clear understanding of corporate objectives and build a values-based corporate culture for 55,000 employees.
 - Broke down "silos" across functional disciplines, business lines and worldwide geographies to improve collaboration and optimize the entire portfolio.
 - Ramped-up communication to employees including a fully integrated telecommunications system with weekly voicemails to keep them abreast of progress in every global business unit.
 - Converted an informal "CFO Update" for senior management into a monthly newsletter sent to all employees
 - Created a "Ask Harry" program where employee could communicate directly with the CFO -- a program emulated by all 80 senior managers across the company.
 - Developed a new performance management system that incorporated shared values principles into performance appraisals.
 - Complemented new shared values with the development of four key objectives: *Best Team, Best Partner, Best Results & Best Citizen*.
 - Introduced work/life balance programs that reduced turnover and improved employee satisfaction.
 - Developed new sales/marketing initiatives to position Baxter as a business partner to physicians and hospitals.
 - Implemented focus, discipline, consistency and credibility into all financial planning, budgeting and forecasting processes.
 - Set the example for being responsive to the needs of people, encouraging volunteerism, philanthropy and community outreach.
 - Adopted an annual environmental P&L statement, demonstrating that investments in environmental, health and safety benefited the company and the community.
 - Gained significant media coverage for a unique five-year shared investment program for the top 80 senior managers that focused on creating shareholder value.
 - Introduced voluntary stock purchase plan through personal loans that made senior management vested shareholders in the business.
 - Collaborated with WR to change management objectives and to weight incentive compensation toward profitable growth, cash generation, ROI and overall business results.
 - Led "road show" presentations to share Baxter's vision of delivering a four-fold increase in cash generation that resulted in a 300% increase in stock price over the life of the program.
 - Led the repurchase of more than \$1 billion in Baxter common stock and leveraged strong cash flow performance and divestitures to complete the programs ahead of schedule.

VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE & OPERATIONS

1990 to 1993

Responsible for finance and operations in the \$3 billion international business. Developed and implemented a new structure to align core business functions and operations into a global operating environment.

HARRY KRAEMER

PAGE 4

- *Designed and implemented a shared services organization for finance, human resources and IT to optimize resources and reduce G&A expense.*
- *Transformed offshore operations and country management structures into a global environment. Appointed six global heads to translate corporate growth initiatives into regional sales and marketing strategies.*
- *Created centers of excellence across manufacturing facilities in 27 countries to leverage high-quality, low cost production and achieve operating efficiencies and economies of scale.*

DIVISION PRESIDENT, HOSPITEX

1989 TO 1990

Promoted into first P&L responsibility for a \$200 million division with 200 employees responsible for specialty hospital products with responsibility for sales, marketing and operations.

- *Drove double-digit growth through new products, market expansion and client relationship management.*
- *Positioned Hospitex as the lead business in the Baxter portfolio, delivering one of the highest ROT's in the company.*
- *Capitalized on emerging technology to expand offerings in higher value, higher margin patient care systems and hospital equipment to offset declining profit margins in commodity-based products and supplies.*

VICE PRESIDENT, FINANCE & OPERATIONS, HOSPITAL GROUP

1988 to 1989

CONTROLLER, HOSPITAL SUPPLY DIVISION

1987 to 1988

CONTROLLER, CARDIOLOGY BUSINESS

1986 to 1987

Transitioned from corporate finance into line management, earning progressive promotions as the top financial executive of business units/divisions ranging in size from \$800 million to \$4 billion.

VICE PRESIDENT, FINANCIAL PLANNING & ANALYSIS

1985 TO 1986

DIRECTOR, CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT

1982 TO 1985

Brought expertise in business development to a \$1.5 billion company under the leadership of a new CEO with a vision to drive ambitious organic and acquisition-based growth. Earned CPA certification.

PLANNING & BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ANALYST - NORTHWEST INDUSTRIES

1979 to 1982

Formerly a \$6B diversified holding company with interests in consumer and industrial products

DIRECTOR, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

1981 TO 1982

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ANALYST

1979 TO 1981

EDUCATION

MBA, Finance & Accounting - Kellogg School of Management/Northwestern University, 1979

BS Summa cum Laude, Mathematics & Economics - Lawrence University, 1977

Certified Public Accountant

BOARD & COMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS

Science Application International Corporation (SAIC), Board of Directors

Northwestern University, Board of Trustees

Kellogg School of Management, Dean's Advisory Board

Schaffner Award for Outstanding Leadership & Service - Kellogg School of Management, 1996

Lawrence University, Board of Trustees

Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Deans Advisory Board

Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, Board of Trustees

Business Counsel, Commercial Club of Chicago

Economics Club of Chicago

Past Member, Business Round Table - Healthcare Leadership Counsel

DEC 13 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail to Gingrich re: JWACC

Iraq

Please send the following e-mail to Newt Gingrich:

Newt—

Thanks for your e-mail on JWACC and Iraq. I have asked Paul Wolfowitz to dig into it fast.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121004-19

.....
Please respond by _____

EMAILED 12/13 0700

13 Dec 04

OSD 08040-05

December 10, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tom Christie

020 07E

We need to start trying to find a replacement for Tom Christie. He plans to leave in January.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121004-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

10 Dec 04

OSD 08041-05

December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Status of Letter

452 T

Please find out the status of this letter dated November 19; what has been done, who is doing it, who has the action on it, and when it will be completed.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/04 Letter from Levin, Warner and McCain to SecDef

DHR:ss
121004-13

.....
Please *respond* by 12/16/04

10 Dec 04

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8050

November 19, 2004

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On December 2, 2003, Chairman Warner wrote to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to request that the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) conduct a thorough investigation of the KC-767A tanker aircraft program. According to Chairman Warner's letter "this inquiry should examine the actions of all members of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Air Force, both military and civilian, top to bottom, who participated in structuring and negotiating the proposed tanker lease contract which was submitted to the Congress in July 2003." A copy of that letter is attached.

It was our understanding that the requested DOD IG review would assess not only individual responsibility for any allegations of criminal violations of law; but, equally important, individual accountability for management decisions and executive oversight. In essence, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in order to conduct its necessary legislative oversight of the Department of Defense, needs to know what happened, who was accountable and what actions must be taken to prevent this situation from happening again.

It is astonishing to us that one individual could have so freely perpetrated, for such an extended period, this unprecedented series of fraudulent decisions and other actions that were not in the best interest of the Department of Defense.

We recently found out that no such managerial accountability review has been undertaken by the DOD IG. Rather, the DOD IG limited his review to determining whether there was evidence to press criminal charges. We are deeply concerned by this development, Given the Chairman's letter, why was a decision made not to do this work?

Congressional oversight of the proposed contract to lease 100 KC-767A tanker aircraft, a contract which is now prohibited by section 133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, uncovered the most significant defense procurement scandal since the El Wind bribery and fraud cases of the 1980s. It is imperative that the Department take actions to hold those responsible accountable. Otherwise, the fallout from this Air Force procurement scandal will have disastrous effects on the integrity of the acquisition system.

18663-04


In our view, an assessment of accountability should include a review of all members of the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Air Force, both military and civilian, who participated in structuring and negotiating the proposed tanker lease contract. Most importantly, this should include Secretary of the Air Force Jim Roche, and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Marvin Sambur. We reiterate the Committee's request that the DOD IG immediately initiate such an accountability review.

Again, we do not understand how one individual could have amassed so much power that she was able to perpetuate such fraud against the federal government and other actions that were not in the best interest of the Department of Defense. Where was the oversight? Where were the checks and balances? At a minimum, the acquisition chain of the Air Force, and perhaps DOD, was woefully inadequate. The fact that no Departmental review of these questions has been conducted raises significant accountability and oversight questions that go far beyond this one case. We trust you will endeavor to rectify the situation and hold those who are responsible accountable.

Sincerely,



Carl Levin
Ranking Member



John Warner
Chairman



John McCain
U.S. Senator

Attachment

cc: Department of Defense Inspector General

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United States Senate
 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6060
 December 2, 2003

The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
 Deputy Secretary of Defense
 1000 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Wolfowitz:


I commend the Secretary of Defense and yourself for the prompt actions you have taken regarding the Air Force's tanker aircraft program, in light of recent extraordinary personnel actions taken by the Boeing Company. Your decision to require a "pause" in the execution of any contracts to lease and purchase tanker aircraft is a prudent management step.

Further, I concur in your judgment to task the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD-IG) to conduct an independent assessment. However, I believe that the DOD-IG assessment should go further than the review described in your letter of December 1, 2003. The DOD-IG inquiry should pursue the trail of evidence wherever it leads, in accordance with standard IG procedures. This inquiry should examine the actions of all members of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force, both military and civilian, top to bottom, who participated in structuring and negotiating the proposed tanker lease contract which was submitted to the Congress in July 2003.

Your recent actions clearly indicate that there are many outstanding questions that must be answered before proceeding with this program. I expect that you will consult further with the Congress as you receive the report of the DOD-IG and that no actions will be taken with respect to the lease and purchase of KC-767 tanker aircraft until the Congress has had an opportunity to review the DOD-IG report. Ultimately, this program, as restructured, must be executed in a manner that is fully consistent with Section 135 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136).

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,



John Warner
 Chairman

cc: Department of Defense Inspector General

U19766-03

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **Attached**

DRO CPA

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive back in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

28 May 04

OSD 08043-04



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

June 2, 2004

FOR: The Honorable Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director of Administration and Management, Office of the
Secretary of Defense *Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Personal Security for Ambassador Jerry Bremer

Dr. Rice's staff told me that she forwarded to you the attached note Secretary Rumsfeld sent us on the subject of Ambassador Bremer's security upon his return to the U.S. at the end of this month.

As a first step, I think we need a Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment (PSVA) to quickly and expertly determine the nature and severity of threats to Ambassador Bremer and his family.

Given Ambassador Bremer's status as Presidential Envoy, I think it would make most sense if your office directed the U.S. Secret Service to analyze the threat situation and to propose an appropriate protection plan.

A concurrent step is the need to address the open issue of who in the Executive branch would have the actual authority and responsibility to provide or contract for any protection measures based on the threat to Ambassador Bremer once he leaves office.

Please let me know what I should do to assist.

cc: Secretary Rumsfeld
Dr. Rice

OSD 08043-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31119

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive **back** in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31120

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois

CC: Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

I do not know what his circumstance is in terms of the government. He is a presidential envoy, he reports to Condi Rice, he is a career ambassador, and the Pentagon has been his back office. The responsibility for his security, I suppose, could come from the secret service, the State Department, the Pentagon or a private contractor to be paid by one of the agencies of the government.

I don't know a lot about this, but I know we better get started right now making sure that the minute he arrives back the security is in place.

I have spoken to Mrs. Bremer and she understandably is aware that there is a price on his head.

Please screw your head into this and let me know what you think. I am sending a copy of this to Condi Rice so she will be aware of the need, and the fact that she and her staff ought to sort through what is the best way to handle this matter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

11-L-0559/OSD/31121

~~FOUO~~

December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^R
SUBJECT: Jason Read

000.71 SD

Please get back to me with a report on whoever Jason Read saw, what they think and what might happen.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121004-11

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

10 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08043-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31122

December 10, 2004

TO: Jim MacDougall

CC: Gen Dick Myers
Mira Ricardel
Ryan Henry
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Good Job in Georgia with the Vice Chairman

335 515

Jim,

I've heard from General Pace what a nice job you did in discussions with the Georgian MOD and President. Your high quality work throughout a complex AOR is notable, and is only the latest example.

Thanks for all you are doing.

DHR:ss
121004-7

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 04

OSD 08044-05

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: **Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.**

O20 CPA

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

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Please screw your head into this and let me know what you think. I am sending a copy of this to Condi Rice so she will be aware of the need, and the fact that she and her staff ought to sort through what is the best way to handle this matter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

28 May 04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31124

10301

June 8, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Bremer Security

File

380.01

Please keep your head into the Bremer security situation. It is **possible** he could be coming home somewhat earlier. We want to make sure the security preparations are in **place** and that they know the drill.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-4

.....
Please respond by 6/15/04

RdW
Sketch created orally.
Paul Butler
6/18

8 JUN 04

28 MAY 04

OSD 08046-04

May 28, 2004

TO: Ray Du Bois
CC: Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: **Security for Jerry Bremer Upon His Return to the U.S.**

A threat assessment should be made as to Bremer's security. Undoubtedly, it will show he needs government paid security after he arrives back in the U.S. for a period.

I do not know what his circumstance is in terms of the government. He is a presidential envoy, he reports to Condi Rice, he is a career ambassador, and the Pentagon has been his back office. The responsibility for his security, **I suppose**, could come from the secret service, the State Department, the Pentagon or a private contractor to be **paid** by one of the agencies of the government.

I don't know a lot about this, but I know we better get started right now **making** sure that the minute he arrives back the security is in place.

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Please screw your head into this and let me know what you think. I am sending a copy of this to Condi Rice so she will be aware of the need, and the fact that she and her staff ought to sort through what is the best way to handle this matter.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
052804.02

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31126

HUM

May 28, 2004

TO: Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is a memorandum that is time sensitive. We cannot allow him to arrive back in the country without protection.

Ray Du Bois will get back to you some time next week to see what your thinking is.

Thank you.

DHR/azn
052804.03

Attach: Du Bois Snowflake 5/28/04

OSD 08046-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31127

9/17
1030



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

INFO MEMO

June 16, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Security for Ambassador Bremer

- In the attached snowflakes you engaged me on the question of Jerry Bremer's security when he returns home.
- Today, I was informed by Mr. Card's office that the Secret Service will be providing personal security protection for Ambassador Bremer for 90 days after his return. After the first 90 days, continuing protection will be based on updated vulnerability assessments by Secret Service.

Attachments

COORDINATION: none

Prepared by: Brett Armstrong, (b)(6)
Bill Brazis, (b)(6)

380,01

16 Jun 04

28 May 04

OSD 08046-04

December 9, 2004

TO: Tom Wedige
CC: Paul Butler
Joe Wassel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Computer and Blackberry

413.51

I would like to get my own computer going. If it cannot be on my credenza, I would like to put it in my small office. Let's talk through how we would do that and what I would want on it.

I also wonder if I ought to get a Blackberry and start using it. Having the cell phone, the computer and the Blackberry may give me a chance to do more things interactively with people faster, without a lot of paper.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-34

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 08046-05

09 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Possible DoD Candidates

Let's put down Asa Hutchinson, who is at Homeland Security, as a person who is a possibility for something here in the Department. For example, he could be General Counsel, Another person is Betty Goldman (I think that is her name), she is Hutchison's chief of staff. I heard she is excellent. I don't know what she would be able to do, but those are a couple thoughts.

230.02

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121004-6

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 08047-05

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: IG Paper

000.5

The Inspector General was in today and handed me the attached paper.

My understanding, and it is imperfect, is that the IG has the view that something in this packet should be issued. He indicates that David Chu and Jim Roche don't believe it should be issued. I know nothing other than that.

Please dig into it and decide what you think ought to be done and do it, and then let me h o w what you've decided.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/8/04 IG Memos

DHR:ss
121004-3

.....
Pleaserespondby 1/6/05

10 Dec 04



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

04-12/10

NOV 08 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL
AND READINESS

SUBJECT: Addressing the Sexual Assault Challenges in the Department of Defense

As a follow-on to the DoD Leadership Consultation Summit on Sexual Assault, I want to provide constructive recommendations and pledge the continued support of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in assisting your efforts to meet the challenges.

As you know, we have significant recent experience in this area. In February 2003, my office received a request from Senator John Warner asking that we "review the work being done by the Air Force and others" relating to a number of former and current cadets [who] may have allegedly been sexually assaulted and possibly raped while serving at the United States Air Force Academy." During a subsequent meeting with Senator Warner he remarked that the leadership challenges at the Air Force Academy associated with these allegations (and any related challenges at the other services academies) "go to the very heart and soul of our Armed Forces." I could not agree more with Senator Warner's comments and since that time my office has been actively engaged in many of the Department's efforts to ensure an adequate and effective response.

In accordance with my statutory duty under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix), we have provided oversight of the Air Force General Counsel's Working Group and the work conducted by the Air Force Inspector General, reviewed criminal investigations, initiated several investigations based on information we independently developed from current and former cadets, and referred other complaints to the military services. Additionally, we provided assistance to the Fowler Panel, the Embrey Panel (Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault), the leadership summit on the Department of Defense Care for the Victims of Sexual Assault, and the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies. We also have exchanged ideas with the Air Force on its draft confidentiality policy (Tab A).


A major undertaking for my office was to develop and administer a sexual assault and leadership climate survey at the Air Force Academy in May 2003 and another sexual assault and leadership climate survey at the Military, Naval and Air Force Academies in the spring of 2004. As part of our overall assessment of sexual assault-related leadership challenges at the service academies we focused on, among other things, the aspirational standards of leadership established by Congress for officers of all three Services (Tab B).

11-L-0559/OSD/31132

As a proactive measure to curb sexual misconduct within the Services, I urged the Service secretaries in an October 31, 2003, memorandum, Subject: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies (Tab C), to consider using these statutory tools both to develop officer character traits and to suppress sexual misconduct. In November 2003, I clarified my expectations for the personnel employed or assigned to the OIG to honor those standards (Tab D). The point being missed by some of our leaders is that our leadership standards must be higher than the society we are pledged to protect, and we cannot be content to simply ensure that criminal misconduct is appropriately punished.

As we continue to analyze the data we collected from both sexual assault and leadership surveys, we recognize that one of the contributing factors to current problems is a failure by leaders to "set the bar" high enough, with aspirational, exemplary leadership standards. Currently, although the Army appears to be proactively engaged in infusing these standards into its ongoing revision of AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, none of the Services has formally implemented the Title 10 standards, in some cases they say, because they were awaiting specific guidance from you. Therefore, I encourage you to issue such guidance expeditiously in a manner consistent with the service-by-service structure in Title 10, which could be as simple as the draft memorandum at Tab E.

We remain committed to assisting the Department improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all DoD programs and operations. To that end, we will assist you in any way we can to improve the safety and security of our military communities and the confidence our service people, civilian employees and their families have in our military institutions.



Joseph E. Schmitz

Attachments:
As stated



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

FEB 4 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT :Draft Directive for the USAFA Sexual Assault Response Program

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment upon the draft Memorandum for USAFA/CC, Subject: **USAFA** Sexual Assault Response Program Directive, dated January 26, 2004.

We feel the directive should challenge cadets and staff to set and attain exemplary leadership standards. As is, the directive appears to focus on superficial remedies in the reporting process while missing an opportunity to address more serious issues. We feel that standards at the Air Force Academy should be at least as high, preferably higher, than the corresponding service standards. Statutory provisions in Title 10 USC §8583 require commanders and others in authority "to be vigilant inspecting the conduct of persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct... all persons who are guilty of them."¹ As pointed out by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz in a recent memo to the Service Secretaries*, efforts to combat immoral practices, to include sexual misconduct, "begin with the recognition that all commanding officers and other DoD officers and employees in positions of authority are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with statutory requirements for exemplary conduct."

In our opinion, a directive in this critical area ought to go beyond superficial changes in the processes governing sexual assault reporting, investigations, and follow-up. The directive and program ought to ensure visibility of violations to senior leadership; address necessary changes to the Academy culture; and motivate cadets and staff to achieve the requisite exemplary leadership standards of Title 10. The directive should make a strong statement clarifying that criminal misconduct will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law and that lesser forms of misconduct, such as consensual sex between cadets,

¹ c f, Colorado Criminal Code Title 18 Article 6, which proscribes immoral activity, including "offenses involving the family relationships" (Article 6), "promoting sexual immorality" (§18-7-208), and "adultery" (§18-6-501).

² DepSecDef memo dated January 30, 2004, subject: Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Department of Defense.

fraternization, and other violations of rules or regulations, are also prohibited and will be addressed appropriately.

Existing deviations from law and regulations and the failure of leadership to change the academy's culture disguised the depth and extent of chronic problems. Improving that culture or climate could improve the effectiveness of normal reporting processes.

The directive **speaks** to three separate program goals but does not address how the program in the draft directive will accomplish those goals; e.g., the policy does not address how the goal of "eliminating sexual assaults and the climate that fosters it" (Goal A) will be achieved. Since "eliminating" sexual assaults is unlikely, we recommend the achievable goal of "suppressing" sexual assaults, which corresponds to the title 10 charge of "suppressing" immoral conduct. Similarly, the policy does not address how the Academy will "restore victim's health and well-being" (Goal B).

Overall, the document is difficult to understand **and**, therefore, could reduce confidence in the process. We **think** neither cadets nor **staff** will easily and effectively comprehend the policy. For example, in the second subparagraph under 5.A., "The Academy Response Team," the sentence is long and convoluted, with **57** words. The phrases "when feasible" and "before initiation" introduce additional confusion. The same is true for the clarity of the first sentence of paragraph 3, with over 90 words. When revising, consider that cadets are the primary audience.

We continue **to be** concerned about official exclusion of the independent investigative authority, **AFOSI**, from the first responders, the Academy Response Team (ART). **A** multidisciplinary response to crime is not new -- child abuse and domestic violence are two topical examples. However, the exclusion of the independent investigative authority **from** multidisciplinary teams responding to allegations of violent crime is not common **and**, therefore, should be challenged. In part, sexual assaults at the **Air** Force Academy stayed hidden because the local command controlled the information. The proposed Tier **1** structure continues that systemic problem. We feel that Tier **1** of the ART should include a representative of the independent investigative authority, with that **person's** performance evaluation written by the independent investigative authority's commander at USAFA. **On** a related topic, excluding the independent investigative authority could condition these future Air Force leaders to **think** that **AFOSI** services are suspect and do not support Air **Force** commanders.

Paragraph **4.C.** is entitled "**Anonymous Report.**" This should probably be entitled "**Confidential Report**"; it is not anonymous. The counselor knows the complainant, and the Superintendent can order the identity released.

Paragraph 4.J. "Academy Response Team". **The** definition does not set forth the roles of the participants or how they will function **as** a team. While procedures may be well understood by the individuals that currently occupy those positions, it is not clearly stated in the **draft** directive for those who will follow them, or those who will later judge their **effectiveness**. Similarly, paragraph **9.E.** "Academy Response Team" is also vague on how the team will function **and** interact with victim.

In paragraph **5**, the meaning of the expression in the fourth sentence "**this** directive establishes the duty" is not clear, and much **of this** sentence is very similar to the first sentence in the same paragraph.

In the second paragraph under **5.A.** "The Academy Response Team," the following statement appears overly broad "no victim will be compelled to be interviewed or undergo a rape protocol." While **AFOSI does** not have the authority **to** compel **a** victim to interview, others do, **as** evidenced by the "Command Override" at paragraph 7. Additionally, the structure of the sentence appears to single out **AFOSI**, the independent investigative authority. If that is the intent, we think it is incomplete because the same is true of the **ART**. If you think the quoted statement is necessary, which we don't, the statement should be adjusted to read "neither the ART nor AFOSI have the authority to compel **a** sexual assault victim to be interviewed or undergo a **rape** protocol examination."

In the same paragraph, we **think** it should be made clear that **ART** members and **AFOSI** investigators should coordinate with each other **their** actions **with** respect to victims.

Continuing in the same paragraph, we're not **sure** what is meant by the reference to the Victim **and** Witness Protection Act and "...consideration is given to the victims' views prior to initiation of **an** investigation..." **We find no** reference **to** that statement in the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance.

Three additional items that caught **our** attention in paragraph **5** are:

- At paragraph 5.A., in the fourth sentence, "agency" should be defined or explained.

- At the second paragraph in 5.A., the “ample time” standard **is** too open ended.
- It wasn’t clear who had responsibility for providing the victim with the DD **Form** 2701, Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime, or recording that action and reporting it. (DoDI 1030.2, Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures)

From our reading of the draft directive, only a “Designated Counselor” can write the Anonymous Report **(AR)**. That appears to be the renaming of an old idea that failed. **Also**, we assume psychotherapist-patient confidentiality, as described in AFI **44-109**, Mental Health, Confidentiality, and Military Law, does not cover those counselors. What isn’t clear, is why you don’t point out the psychotherapist-patient confidentiality at the mental health clinic as an option available to cadets. Other Air Force members have access to the psychotherapist-patient confidentiality at a mental health clinic. **Our** view is that the **ART**, confidential psychotherapists at the **mental** health clinic, and chaplains **are** sufficient options. [If the Air Force decides to continue with the **AR**, the Academy should consider existing report formats, such as **Form** 11 used by the Office of Special Counsel] The challenge for the academy leadership is to recapture **the** confidence of cadets in both the investigative process and in protections afforded to complainants/victims. If they can’t do that, this program’s likelihood of success will be limited, regardless of the reporting options added.

The detailed Sexual Assault Reporting options fail to recognize the existence or availability of Inspectors General in the process; the plan should include the Academy IG, the Air Force IG, and DoDIG. Special consideration should be given to the Inspectors’ General role in the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, **and** reprisals addressed in section **7** of the Inspector General Act.

Regarding paragraph **7**, Command Override, reference to DoDI **5503.3** (last line) should read 5505.3.

Direction to “all personnel assigned to the Academy” (paragraph I, page **7**) should incorporate the exemplary conduct guidance **from** Title **10 §** 8583 as well as the **other** guidance listed.

We also noted the draft directive claims nothing in the directive alters the authority to investigate provided to **AFOSI** by law or regulation (**bottom** of page **7**). That is not accurate. DoD guidance specifically prohibits the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIO), the independent investigative

authorities of the Military Departments, ~~from~~ seeking permission to investigate crime, to wit:

MCIO Commanders are not required to solicit, nor shall they solicit ~~from~~ the commanders outside the MCIO, requests or authorizations to initiate investigations. **This** does not prevent MCIOs from discussing with commanders the initiation of a criminal investigation. In each case, the decision to initiate a criminal investigation remains with the **MCIO**. (Para **6.1, DoDI 5505.3**, initiation of Investigations by Military Criminal Investigative Organizations, June **21,2002**.)

The “Designated Counselor” option, like the presently structured **ART**, channels reports of violent crime away from the independent investigative authority. That also appears contrary Air Force Policy Directive 71-1, which at paragraph 7.5.1, directs Air Force Commanders to refer to AFOSI all criminal matters **and** offenses for which AFOSI is responsible. Additionally, **as** indicated above, the first sentence in paragraph 7, is inaccurate, the Superintendent may request **an** investigation, but the decision to initiate a criminal investigation remains with the **MCIO**.

We assume every AR will result in the AFOSI Detachment Commander requesting an override by the Superintendent; there is no other way for the AFOSI commander to protect the equity **of** the independent investigative authority. **On** a related topic, it was not clear when the AR must be provided to the ART, though it is clear that when received **the** ART must immediately distribute the AR to **AFOSI** and others.

The necessity **of** CASIE or SAE Guides is not obvious. **A** more direct **and**, therefore, confidential process would allow the complainant to contact directly the **ART** duty person or duty Designated Counselor (if you decide to continue with that option), or psychotherapist ~~from~~ the mental health clinic. Such direct contact could be facilitated using well-publicized procedures, perhaps a combination Blackberry/cell phone.

Amnesty discussions should address instances in which any cadet provides false testimony **as** well **as** the other situations listed.

Holding other cadets accountable for acting responsibly in a given situation should not be limited to the “senior **ranking** cadet in attendance”. As stated, the policy seems to imply that other **ranking** cadets are not accountable for failing to act responsibly.

If we can be of further assistance with this material, please ask. If you have questions concerning our response, please contact me at (b)(6) or Mr. John Perryman, Director of Oversight, (b)(6)


L. Jerry Hansen
Deputy Inspector General
Inspections and Policy

cc: Air Force Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

09 FEB 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FROM SAF/MR

SUBJECT: Draft Air Force Confidentiality Policy (Deputy Inspector General, Inspections and Policy Letter, February 4, 2004)

Thank you for your office's comments regarding the draft Air Force confidentiality policy (Deputy Inspector General, Inspections and Policy letter of February 4, 2004). While we share enthusiastically many of the concerns expressed in those comments, our draft represents a sincere effort to implement the Fowler Panel's recommendation that confidential reporting be available to Academy cadets alleging sexual assault. The Senate Armed Services Committee commented favorably on those recommendations, and we believe the Senate expects us to implement them.

The proposed policy you reviewed was an attempt to address a concern raised by many as being absent from the Agenda for Change. It was undertaken in the absence of any direction on this issue from OSD. However, in light of your views, we feel that we are unable to move forward. We need to be of one mind with you on this important matter. Please keep in mind that we did not provide for confidentiality originally, because of our belief in the preeminent responsibility of command for the welfare of assigned personnel, and because we agree with the concerns expressed by AFOSI.

There are, however, several matters that I would like to clarify to assist in our collective efforts to think through this dilemma. Some of these matters are addressed below.

The draft policy your office reviewed represents only one small aspect (confidential reporting) of a much larger set of programs being implemented at the Air Force Academy and the Headquarters in response to our review of the sexual assault deterrence and response process. Our comprehensive approach addresses, at fundamental levels, the culture of the Academy, academics, military training, and the cadet disciplinary system. Our Agenda for Change programs will require detailed implementation through Academy directives and will be integrated with other guidance already in place, and to come. We would be delighted to share with you the extensive materials we are using to direct actions towards the exemplary leadership standards referred to in your memorandum.

While we considered both the possibility of using the existing Air Force psychotherapist privilege as your comments suggest, and the potential application of Military Rule of Evidence 513, as suggested by the Fowler Panel, we concluded that neither avenue could accomplish the task. We would be happy to share our analysis with you. Essentially, we believe that these provisions could not provide a practical measure of confidentiality. Thus, we might raise false expectations among our cadets. In addition, we concluded that attempting to use the existing

11-L-0559/OSD/31140

psychotherapist privilege would considerably aggravate the concerns expressed in your letter about limiting information to the AFOSI and command. It is also significant that, **as** designed, our proposed policy would **be** a careful experiment, limited to the Academy reservation, and would not **require** modifications to existing Air Force-wide programs (**as** would be necessary were we to employ either the psychotherapist privilege or the Military Rule of Evidence **513**). We will not contemplate changes to Air Force-wide regulations **and** policies until and unless this prototype process has been tested and judged suitable for wider application.

Finally, we **do** not believe that the draft policy would alter the AFOSI's authority to investigate, contravene DoD Instruction **5505.3**, or have the necessary result that **AFOSI** would need to **request** override of confidentiality in every **case**. **AFOSI** would retain the **discretion** to initiate **an** investigation into any matter without seeking **permission** of any commander. Even in the hopefully **rare** circumstances of a limited confidentiality **report**, **AFOSI** would receive detailed information and its agents could exercise their discretion to investigate. Command **override** provides **AFOSI** the means of obtaining information withheld in the confidential **report**, notably the names of the victim and alleged **perpetrator(s)**. Consistent with the Instruction, the Secretary would ensure that **AFOSI** understands that its commander could, at any time, turn directly to him **on any** matter believed to be an infringement on AFOSI's independence. Further, we **believe** that the **AFOSI** liaison on Tier 1 would **be** very helpful to **both** the victim and **AFOSI** to ensure that justice is done while not re-victimizing the victim. However, we do agree that such a confidential reporting process could have the effect of limiting information available to investigators.

In light of your comments and our belief that we **are** in **an** untenable position (obligated to proceed, but unable to do **so** without your endorsement), I request a meeting to **discuss** our **mutual** concerns in detail and to **dispel** the perception that **our** efforts **are** mere "superficial remedies."


MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

cc:
USD (P&R)
DoD GC
SAF/GC
SAF/IG
AF/JA
USAFA/CC

**EXEMPLARY CONDUCT STANDARDS
FOR COMMANDERS AND "OTHERS IN AUTHORITY" IN THE MILITARY SERVICES**

10 USC § Section 3583. Requirement of exemplary conduct [ARMY]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required -

- (1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- (2) to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- (3) to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them; and
- (4) to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Army, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

10 USC § 5947. Requirement of exemplary conduct [NAVY]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

10 USC § 8583. Requirement of exemplary conduct [AIR FORCE]

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Air Force are required -

- (1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
- (2) to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
- (3) to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Air Force, all persons who are guilty of them; and
- (4) to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Air Force, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704**

October 31, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct at Service Academies

The survey my staff administered at the Air Force Academy in May 2003 was designed in part to provide a baseline for a more refined survey at all three Academies, which we are tentatively planning to administer early next year. During the next weeks and months, I hope to work closely with each of you, and with your respective Inspectors General and Academy leaders, to maximize the value of the upcoming three-Academy survey.

In developing the three-Academy survey, as part of our overall assessment of sexual assault-related leadership challenges at the Service Academies, we will be focusing not only on the minimum standards of conduct for cadets and midshipmen, which criminal activities obviously violate, but also on the other end of the spectrum -- the aspirational standards of leadership established by Congress for officers of all three Services, including legislation enacted over the past decade in response to sexual misconduct and related disciplinary challenges in the Armed Forces. This memorandum: (a) encourages your consideration of these recent statutory tools that might be utilized, directly or indirectly, both to develop officer character traits and to suppress sexual misconduct; and (b) explains how these statutory tools might be worked into our forthcoming survey to address "root causes" and, hopefully, to derive useful recommendations for suppressing sexual misconduct at the three Academies.

A. STATUTORY TOOLS

1. "Exemplary Conduct" Leadership Standard

Statutory Leadership Standard: In 1997, Congress legislated the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard for "commanding officers and others in authority" in each of the Services:

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices; and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge. [10 U.S.C. §5947; 10 U.S.C. §3583 (Army) and §8583 (Air Force)]

Background: The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the above legislation "note[d] that these standards have applied to the Naval and Marine Corps officers since they were first drafted by John Adams and approved by the Continental Congress in 1775." (see <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/liberty.pdf>, p. ii) The Report explained the purpose behind the 1997 legislation: "This provision will not prevent an officer from shunning responsibility or accountability for an action or event. It does, however, establish a very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services. The committee

11-L-0559/OSD/31143

TAB C

holds military officers to a higher standard than other members of society. The nation entrusts its greatest resource, our young men and women, to our military officers. In return, the nation deserves complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct." (*Id.*)

Even before our upcoming three-academy survey, you might consider discussing with your Service and Academy leadership: (a) how the following "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard has been promulgated and/or implemented within your Service and at your Service Academy (*see, e.g.*, <http://www.dodig.osd.mil/IGInformation/IGPolicy/OIGLeadershipStd.pdf>, implementing this Exemplary Conduct standard within the Office of Inspector General); and (b) whether this standard is being as fully utilized as it could be, e.g., as required reading (or even memorization) for all cadets and midshipmen, to inspire within those officer candidates the character traits identified in the Senate Committee Report accompanying the 1997 legislation: "complete integrity, moral courage, and the highest moral and ethical conduct."

2. Physically Separated Housing & Privacy For Basic Training

Recitation of the following statutory standard is not intended to suggest that Congress has already explicitly required you to provide "Physically Separate Housing" and "Privacy" for "male and female" cadets and midshipmen at your Service Academies and respective Prep Schools. Rather, my intent here is to suggest that you might wish to reconsider these statutory standards -- considering their remedial nature and purpose¹ -- as tools for suppressing sexual misconduct.

Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: separate housing for male and female recruits":

- (a) Physically Separate Housing. - (1) The Secretary of the Air Force shall provide for housing male recruits and female recruits separately and securely from each other during basic training. (2) To meet the requirements of paragraph (1), the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for male recruits shall be physically separated from the sleeping areas and latrine areas provided for female recruits by permanent walls, and the areas for male recruits and the areas for female recruits shall have separate entrances. (3) The Secretary shall ensure that, when a recruit is in an area referred to in paragraph (2), the area is supervised by one or more persons who are authorized and trained to supervise the area. . . .
- (d) Basic Training Defined. - In this section, the term "basic training" means the initial entry-training program of the Air Force that constitutes the basic training of new recruits.¹
- [10 U.S.C. §9319; similar provisions at 10 U.S.C. §4319 (Army) and §6931 (Navy)]

Statutory Standard for "Recruit basic training: privacy":

The Secretary of the Air Force shall require that access by military training instructors and other training personnel to a living area in which recruits are housed during basic training shall be limited after the end of the training day, other than in the case of an emergency or other exigent circumstance, to military training instructors and other training personnel who are of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area or to superiors in the chain of command of those recruits

¹ See *Sutherland on Statutory Construction* at §60:1 ("The policy that a remedial statute should be liberally constructed is well established"), citing, *inter alia*, *Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo*, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977).

² Neither the statute nor any DoD implementing regulation/directive restricts the definition of "basic training of new recruits" to enlisted recruits; considering the remedial nature of the statute, an argument could be made that the term "basic training of new recruits" should encompass at least "Cadet Basic Training," aka "Plebe Summer." See discussion of the rule of construction for remedial statutes in the previous footnote.

who, if not of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area, are accompanied by a member (other than a recruit) who is of the same sex as the recruits housed in that living area. [10 U.S.C. §9320; 10 U.S.C. §4320 (Army) and §6932 (Navy)]

Background: The 1997 Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues to the Secretary of Defense recommended “that female and male recruits be housed in separate barracks. This would decrease disciplinary problems and reduce distractions from training. The committee has reviewed the layout and surge numbers at the training installations, and believes this change can be accomplished at marginal cost, if any.” (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html>); see GAO/NSIAD 99-75, “Military Housing: Costs of Separate Housing for Male and Female Recruits in Basic Training,” March 1999 (which “determined that the services would not incur additional construction costs if they housed male and female recruits in separate barracks.”) (<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99075.pdf>).

B. HOW THESE STATUTORY TOOLS MIGHT FIT INTO OUR FORTHCOMING SURVEY

I have asked my staff to consider each of the above statutory tools as we develop our more refined sexual assault survey instrument for administration at each of your Service Academies early next year. For instance, we will likely endeavor to measure:

- how well cadets and midshipmen relate to the core values of their Service and with the statutory “exemplary conduct” standard, which the Senate Armed Services Committee Report described as the “very clear standard by which Congress and the nation can measure officers of our military services”;
- how well cadets and midshipmen understand the potential constructive role of inspectors general, whose statutory duties focus on “discipline, efficiency, and economy.” See 10 U.S.C. §§3020 (Army), 5020 (Navy) & 8020 (Air Force); and
- whether cadets and midshipmen consider the Academy chaplains required by law (see 10 U.S.C. §§ 4337, 6031 & 9337) to be part of the solution vis-à-vis guarding against and suppressing sexual misconduct, which is antithetical to the character development missions of each Academy. See generally www.usafa.af.mil/hc/ (“The Cadet Chapel is the architectural and spiritual centerpiece of our academy. As such, it plays a vital role in developing and nurturing the character of our cadets. It is a reminder that we are a nation under God dedicated to the promotion of peace and goodwill among all nations of the world. The young women and men who come to study here do so in order to prepare themselves to protect freedom - freedom which is God’s gift to all people.”).

I look forward to continuing dialogue on these issues of vital importance to our Armed Services and to our Nation.

Joseph E. Schmitz

11-L-0559/OSD/31145



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

November 7, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Office of Inspector General Leadership Standards (Revision 1)


As civilian and military personnel employed by and assigned to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, we have been entrusted with important and special obligations. These include the obligation to understand and adhere to standards established for all those who serve in federal offices of inspector general. The basic premise for these standards, as articulated by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, is that:

"Public office carries with it a responsibility to apply public resources economically, efficiently, and effectively. The offices of Inspector General carry an additional public responsibility. The nature of their activities creates a special need for high standards of professionalism and integrity." [Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General (2003)]

Because we have a special responsibility for oversight of statutes, directives and policies critical to the national defense and to the welfare of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilian employees of the Department of Defense as we carry out the national defense, we are further obligated to adhere to high standards in our personal conduct. These standards are best articulated in the standards of exemplary conduct Congress has prescribed for the Armed Forces:

"All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge." [10 United States Code § 5947 -- similar provisions at 10 U.S.C. § 3583 (Army) and 10 U.S.C. § 8583 (Air Force)]

My intent in issuing this memorandum is not to establish new standards for our conduct but rather to clarify existing standards -- leadership standards I expect every individual employed by or assigned to the Office of the Inspector General to make a concerted effort to honor. Meeting these standards is essential to the credibility of our investigations into allegations of misconduct within the Department of Defense, as well as our advisory reports to the Services, the Defense Agencies, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. Failing to meet them will disserve both our institutional commitment and our personal obligation to the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, the Constitution, and our fellow Americans.

h

Joseph E. Schmitz

11-L-0559/OSD/31146

TAB D

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Statutory Tools for Suppressing Sexual Misconduct

Even as various task forces address issues relating to sexual assault in the Armed Forces, I want to offer my view on this important matter to augment the Inspector General's October 31, 2003, Memorandum to the Service Secretaries on the subject.

Secretary Rumsfeld clarified earlier this year that, "Sexual assault will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense. Commanders at every level have a duty to take appropriate steps to prevent sexual assaults, protect victims, and hold those who commit offenses accountable. . . ."

The statutory "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard identified by the Inspector General in his Memorandum to the Service Secretaries is codified service-by-service: Title 10, §3583 (Army); §5947 (Navy); and §8583 (Air Force). This leadership standard, although first enacted for the Naval Services in 1775, was re-enacted by Congress in 1997 for all three military departments in response to military sexual scandals of the 1990's. Military Departments need not wait for any guidance from the Department of Defense to implement each department's respective statutory standard.

Commanders throughout the Department of Defense, including the Military Departments, should make full use of all tools available, including the statutory "Exemplary Conduct" leadership standard, DoD and military department Inspectors General, and defense criminal investigative organizations, to suppress sexual assaults, protect victims, and hold those who commit sexual offenses accountable.

In accordance with Secretary Rumsfeld's repeated admonition that "you get what you inspect, not what you expect, or put differently what you measure improves," we will be measuring.

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
cc: COL Steve Bucci
Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phone Call with Brenda Brockett

328

Let's figure out who I can get on the phone with me when I speak to Brenda Brockett, it should be someone who can take notes and know what to do about it.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/8/04 E-Mail from Bill Brockett to SecDef

DHR:ss
121004-1

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08049-05

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2004 9:09 AM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Bill Brockett [mailto:bbrockett@foto-grafics.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 11:36 AM
To: Donald Rumsfeld
Subject: Follow up on Kuwait meeting...

Mr. Secretary,

I hope this finds you well and enjoying the holiday season! As someone I know has an interest in the Ford Foundation and Library/Museum I wanted to make you aware that I am beginning a project to re-work the library and museum website with a fresh, new and up-to-date look. I will forward you an address in the near future where you can watch the progress if you like.

Also, I just read the following on the Fox News website from a meeting you had with soldiers in Kuwait:

During the question-and-answer session, another soldier complained that active-duty Army units sometimes get priority over the National Guard and Reserve units for the best equipment in Iraq.

"There's no way I can prove it, but I am told the Army is breaking its neck to see that there is not" discrimination against the National Guard and Reserve in terms of providing equipment, Rumsfeld said.

My wife, Army Captain Brenda Brockett, returned in June from an 18-month deployment in her role as combat support nurse with the 396th CSH. She, and I, are very proud of her contribution to the War on Terror, something we totally support. To be honest with you, her main and really only complaint was the way National Guard and Reservist troops are treated, housed, and equipped when compared to the regular Army. In fact, she detests the terms "One Army" and "Army of One" because of this experience and stories she has heard from other "citizen soldiers" she has spoken with while doing medical case management in Ft. Knox, Kentucky.

I know she would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you and I hope you would take a few minutes to do this. You can reach her at (b)(6) at our home in (b)(6) most days. I know you would find a conversation with her rewarding in dealing with this very serious issue.

Best wishes for a wonderful Christmas season!

Bill Brockett
foto-grafics.com
<http://www.foto-grafics.com/>
(b)(6)

12/10/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31149

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: New Metrics

Please follow up on this memo to Giambastiani and let me know the status.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/19/04 SD memo to CDR, JFCOM re: New Metrics

DHR:dh
120904-55

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

NATO 092

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Metrics for Iraq

Iraq

Please get the Joint Staff working on these metrics and others, and get back to me

Thanks.

Attach.
11/23/04 List of Metrics

DHR:dh
120904-53

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

OSD 08051-05

~~FOUO~~

Holder

November 23, 2004

SUBJECT: Metrics Needed on Iraq

We need metrics to track:

- the number of trials
- the number of punishments of Iraqis who attack the Coalition; who kill Iraqis
- the number of jobs created
- the number of ^{1^e} awards given
- the number of people dealt with under reconciliation

We need an assessment.

DHR:ss
112304-10

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31152

December 10, 2004

TO: Peter Rodman

CC: Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Asia

Asia

That paper on relationships in Asia was excellent.

Thanks so much.

DHR:dh
120904-52

.....
Please respond by _____

10 Dec 04

December 10,2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Memo for POTUS

At some point, I ought to try to think of a memo I could fashion for the President, telling him what his national security agenda legacy will be. We haven't figured out any way so he has any sense of the magnitude of it

381

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-51

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

December 10, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Briefing on SOF

Please take a look at this report on SOCOM. Should we do some sort of a statement or briefing sometime on this? This is an amazing amount we've done.

322

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 ASD(SO/LIC) memo to SD re: Special Operations Forces

DHR:dh
120904-50

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

06/12/9

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) copy provided
I-04/014546 2 Nov 04

NOV - 2 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

~~SECRET~~
2-NOV-04

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces

You asked for a summary reflecting SOF advances over the past four years addressing capabilities, command relationships, service roles, reduction of nonessential missions, and improved posture for GWOT. The attached paper is the second attempt.

Lamy

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**INFORMATION PAPER
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

OASD(SO/LIC)
2 Nov 04

- The Secretary requested and received Congressional authority to provide SOF support to foreign forces (including groups and individuals) that can assist with GWOT missions. (Greatly increases SOF options and flexibility). (Twenty years overdue).
- SOCOM was designated as the lead (supported) command for GWOT missions with a sweeping change to the UCP. Triggered development of a series of OPLANs orchestrating interagency, combatant command, and allied participation.
- SOCOM established a Center for Special Operations with joint/interagency collaboration capability. Can respond quickly to the SECDEF's guidance on OPLAN development and adjustment. Monthly reviews with SECDEF. (MG Dell Dailey)
- SOCOM strengthened Theater Special Operations Commands to better support Geographic Combatant Commanders. More robust and responsive planning and execution capability for SOF missions.
- The Secretary directed increased USMC participation with SOCOM.
- SOCOM/USMC signed a Memorandum to improve communications and logistics, established an annual SOCOM/USMC wargame focused on interoperability, and established a 100 man USMC SOCOM Detachment for a six month combat deployment to Iraq with SEAL Team One. This team recently returned and is reviewing lessons learned.
- Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) now provide Liaison Officers to the Theater Special Operations Commands, upon arrival in theater, establishing a much tighter link for all the Geographic Combatant Commander's interoperability issues. USMC participation on the SOCOM staff has increased, with Marines in key leadership positions.
- At the Secretary's direction, worldwide SOF units have been redeployed and reconfigured to support OIF and OEF. Task organization changes provide CENTCOM with a more flexible, responsive and successful force for missions such as HVT operations.

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11-L-0559/OSD/31157

- Worldwide SOF missions have been carefully monitored and adjusted by the SECDEF:
 - All SOF deployments for counternarcoterrorist missions, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs), and allied exercises have been reviewed and realigned to put more SOF into GWOT missions. An example is Georgia train and equip. Another is the 7th and 10th Special Forces Group missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. (The 7th Group traditionally focuses on Latin America, the 10th on Eastern Europe and portions of Africa.).
 - SECDEF guidance has refocused SOF deployments from a 30% rate in GWOT priority countries three years ago to a 90% rate for 2005.
- The Secretary expanded both SOF personnel (12%) and budget lines (77%) providing significant increases in SOF aviation (transport, tanker, and gunship capabilities). This upward ramp for personnel continues through 2009.
 - One benefit to the conventional forces has been increased AC-130 gunship support, (four aircraft) providing precision fires for combat in urban areas and sustained surveillance capability during OIF and OEF.
 - Development of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System merges naval submarine stealth and range with SEAL stealth and lethality for special reconnaissance and direct action missions.
- Because of the rapid development and acquisition process employed by SOCOM, important developments in sensors, communications, night vision systems, and soldier systems have been quickly transferred to conventional forces.
- USSOCOM PSYOP capabilities are now integrated with STRATCOM's IO mission. Theater PSYOP operations executed under the SECDEF's DEPORD process now contribute to the GWOT strategy.
 - PSYOP broadcast capability has been improved with the modification of airborne broadcast platforms. (EC-130s).
- SOF Special Mission Units have been strengthened under the Secretary's direction including transfer of command to SOCOM. They have repeatedly provided actionable intelligence for both SOF and conventional forces, and have been at the center of the most important successes in the GWOT, OEF, and OIF.
- SECDEF's Global Force Posture initiative offers SOF new basing initiatives, allowing more effective task organization and rotation options. This initiative will reduce strain on SOF – from families to mobility platforms.

TAB A

May ²⁸ 26, 2004

384

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Paul McHale

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Homeland Security

I feel disconnected from information on Homeland Security. When I came into my office this afternoon, every station on TV had Ashcroft and Mueller announcing a big threat. I had not heard anything about it.

Is there someone on the Joint Staff or in Paul McHale's office who goes to the meetings who knows that I and the folks in OSD need to be told what is going on there?

Eberhart's office is connected to it. McHale's office is connected. The Joint Staff is connected. **But I feel blind.** We should **rewire** this **place**.

DHR:dh
052604-23

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

*Sir,
CJCS response
attached.
vr/
CDR Nosenzo
6/15*

DR 6/16

28 May 04

OSD 08068-04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

ACTION MEMO

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

June 25, 2004 1250

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. BILL SCHNEIDER, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

THRU: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS), JUN 25 2004

SUBJECT: Defense Science Board response to Global Artillery

- In response to your snowflake, I have discussed the project with Andy Marshal, Lowell Wood (Livermore Lab, one of the developers of the concept), and Johnnie Foster (DSB). It is a very promising concept with revolutionary implications if it can be successfully developed.
- I have discussed some potentially actionable concepts for promoting the early development of this technology. The aim of this effort will be to:

- (1) Identify the transformational basis for promoting the early development of this technology; and
- (2) Provide you with actionable alternatives for introducing the program and budget for the effort in the FY 06-11 defense program.

RECOMMENDATION That SecDef approve further development of the concept in the form of a more detailed memorandum followed by a meeting at his convenience to discuss the concept.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SEP 8 2004

COORDINATION: NONE

TSA SD	6/30
SRMA SD	6/30
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	11/9/28

Prepared By: Brian Hughes/DSB/(b)(6)

OSD 08073-04

BU 7/11
✓

↑
PWB

for Sec 10/5

AS/MS

470

25 grant

1 grant

4
1600



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

27 April 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Andy*

SUBJECT: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

Several weeks ago Johnny and Lowell came to see me. They want to see you to urge development of a global gun, which they believe is quite feasible. Johnny tells me that, while the idea of a cannon with global reach has been around for some years, the people at Livermore Labs have, in the last couple of years, thought through solutions to most of the technical and engineering problems it presents. Attached are:

- A short memo by Lowell expanding on the proposed project, plus three related graphics.
- A paper by Jonathan Perle that includes a discussion of the geopolitical implications of a global gun (I sent you a copy when it was written during the summer of 2002). See pages 13 to 19, which are marked.

If you decide to go ahead with the first phase of the technical program, I suggest that you also have two studies done. One on the costs of such a program, including the ownership costs of a long-term, fully ready-to-shoot capability. The other to explore likely reactions of other countries to a U.S. program.

11-L-0559  D/31161

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

**Re: Transformation of Geopoliticomilitary Affairs:
Global-Range, High-Rate, Low-Cost Sourcing of All Types of Fires**

Motivation. In order to defend itself and its allies, the US has developed an exemplary world-wide force projection capability. The Nation's combination of logistical capacity and efficiency, superbly trained and proficient personnel, and technically superior weapons and equipment enable it to fight and win conflicts against adversaries throughout the world. Rapid, decisive, world-wide force projection is, however, an exceedingly difficult task. As highly effective as our current force projection capabilities have become, they remain imperfect and expensive.

Many of the costs and limitations of our current system stem from the need to apply force quickly, at the onset and early stages of a rapidly developing conflict. This, of course, is where force is most politically and militarily effective, but also where it is most difficult to apply. Providing really rapid response requires extensive forward-basing of personnel and supplies (with large financial and geopolitical costs), while too-slow response allows adversaries to seize and consolidate gains, driving-up eventual costs to resolve MRCs satisfactorily. Such considerations underlie the SecDef-stated desire to transform U.S. force-projection capabilities.

In addition to fundamentally enhancing American capabilities for really rapid response to MRCs, such transformation should also leverage America's great other-than-human military strengths – creation, production and use of high-potency weaponry – while minimizing the policy impacts of our well-known 'weaknesses': aversion to U.S. casualties, disinclination to harm enemy civilians, properties or territories, and reluctance to engage in prolonged conflicts.

A basic transformation in geopoliticomilitary affairs – not 'merely' a revolution in military affairs – thus may result, and certainly is called for by present circumstances. The key enabling technological means is a revolutionary concept: Global Artillery. Some development is required before this extensively-reviewed concept can be operationally demonstrated, but the required cost, time and risk are comparatively very modest. The basic question today is: *What's possible? or What do you have in mind?*"

Key Requirements. The force levels required to either stall the aggressive advance of a regional superpower in a MRC or to impose outright defeat on it have been extensively studied. Such analyses indicate that about 100 B-2 sorties (~2,000 tons of military payload) per day of high-tech weaponry-delivery capability are required to decisively defeat a North Korean-scale adversary when applied steadily over a 10-day interval (followed by ~20 days of ~40 sorties/day to neutralize national war-making potential), with perhaps 3-6 times that being required to effectively paralyze such an attack in its very earliest phase. [See Figures.]

Since the U.S. doesn't have (and doesn't choose to procure-&-maintain) the forward-based strategic bomber capability corresponding to such force-application levels, we utilize a variety of other, shorter-range ordinance-delivery means to deal with adversaries distant from our shores. The logistical penalties implicit in delivering such forces (involving ~100:1 equipment-to-delivered-ordnance overheads, and multi-month intervals for delivery-to-theater and combat set-up) are responsible for most of the costs and limitations of our current force-projection system.

However, there appears to be realistic technical prospects for the near-term creation of an advanced, near-instantaneous, CONUS-based, weapon/sensor/comm delivery capability, thereby eliminating force projection delays and forward-basing penalties. This new capability would be used at the onset of a MRC, applying sufficient force to impede (if not deter outright) adversarial actions long enough for existing U.S. forces to arrive and definitively deal with the situation. Perhaps most strikingly of all, it appears possible to attain IOC of this capability within the present decade, with the cost to create an operational prototype perhaps being \$10 B.

Global Artillery. This novel weaponry delivery capability is provided by long-range, CONUS-based "artillery": military payloads are launched from high-performance, 21st century guns at sufficiently great speeds that they fly as much as half-way around the Earth before they come down – precisely to where they were programmed. These payloads *each* contain of the order of 1,000 pounds of weaponry – *ad hoc* mixes of munitions, sensors, communications systems, etc. – and are launched at rates of the order of 10,000 every day, so that roughly 10 million pounds – 5,000 tons – of materiel are launched theater-ward (or alternatively, into Earth orbit) each day.

A fundamental purpose of "Global Artillery" is to bring all potential adversaries of the U.S. "under the American gun" – and to do so within the same hour that the President/SecDef gives the order to do so. A secondary objective is to "secure the high ground" for the U.S. in a lasting manner, by conferring a completely unmatchable degree of access to the space environment.

First-Level Technology Details. The proposed means for implementing this capability is an electrically-energized launcher – in essence, a mile-length high-tech 'artillery tube' – that's capable of taking electricity from a power transmission line, conditioning it appropriately, and applying it several times each minute so as to 'fire' a payload-packet of the order of 1 ton at a speed of the order of 6 miles per second straight up into the air.

The projectile so 'fired' is an RV-shaped object – a maneuvering transatmospheric vehicle (ManTAV) – that aerodynamically turns towards its target as it climbs through the air. It thereafter flies through space for 20-40 minutes and reenters the atmosphere over its target-area. By means of a combination of its own inertial guidance, GPS signals and target-homing sensors, it 'flies' into the immediate vicinity of its target and – depending on its specified mission – either dives at hypersonic speeds into its target as a unitary weapon (carrying ~10X its own weight of TNT in kinetic-energy form), slows (possibly at high altitude) and distributes sub-munitions, comm gear or sensors – or whatever else may be required of it.

The 10,000 'packets' of mixed fires that each such facility can source daily represent a total of ~200-400 B-2 strike-sorties – even more if sourcing hypersonic blast-engendering munitions – a level sufficient to stall, and quite possibly swiftly defeat, attacks by major regional adversaries.

Programmatic Sketch. Realization of such a revolutionary force-projection capability on transformational time-scales clearly involves some significant acceptance of schedule risk.

The overall-preferred programmatic approach is a three-phase one. The First Phase builds on previous (e.g., the attached) scoping studies, specifies the major risk items and generates a corresponding fast-paced risk-mitigation plan, and also provides skeletal engineering analyses and the outline of a prototype implementation program. Properly executed by a small team of top-quality people, this First Phase would involve somewhat less than a year's effort, so that, if begun promptly, results could be available within a year at a total cost of a few M\$.

The Second Phase would be quadpartite, involving execution of the risk-mitigation program, the corresponding fleshing-out of a more-detailed but still highly-opportunistic program plan, the development and demonstration of key components, and the concurrent commencing of procurement of long-lead-time items and performing the basics of facility preparation. It probably could be completed by end-CY'05 and likely would involve obligation of ~\$50 M (of which ~\$25 M would be costed in FY'05).

The Third Phase would involve high-concurrency execution of the detailed program plan, and could lead to Horizontal Prototype facility IOC at end-'07 and Vertical Prototype facility IOC at end-CY'08, at a total cost of the order of \$5 B. [See Figures.] This program phase would also leverage results from the old ABRES program for support of LRIP of the required maneuvering transatmospheric vehicles (ManTAVs). [In order to minimize cost and overall covert-program risks, the IOC would not involve major electrical transmission-line creation, and thus would sustain the full-scale 10,000ton/day launch-rate for only a fractional-hour with the energy storage capacity of its Power-Conditioning System; an option for very swiftly-executed energizing of the facility to sustain full-launch-rate immediately following IOC would be fully developed during the Third Phase. Plans would also be fully developed for swift post-IOC execution of ever more robust hardening of the National capability embodied by the Vertical Prototype facility.]

Additional Considerations. It's presumably clear that the 'Global Artillery' system represents much more than an ultra-long-range cannon or a super-rate space-launcher. Instead, it's a truly revolutionary capability for long-distance, high-rate transportation of mid-scale payloads to virtually everywhere that's of present or future military interest. It'll likely represent a technological advance of historic scale, one – like powered air-flight – that'll still be 'looking' for leverage-exploiting national security applications a half-century after it's first realized.

Two additional considerations merit explicit attention in this context.


Collateral Space Supremacy. The contemplated capability enables placement of payloads virtually anywhere in near-Earth space at far higher *daily* totals than are currently attained by the entire human race during an entire *year*. These capabilities inevitably confer enduring, utterly-compelling U.S. supremacy-in-space: America would own a veritable railroad-into-space, while all others would still be accessing space via figurative oxcarts.

Asymmetry Maintenance. It's likewise obvious that the most careful attention be given, from the very outset, to maintaining profound asymmetry between the U.S. and all future adversaries with respect to effective ownership of the capabilities conferred by this system.

Recommendations. The historic opportunity proffered by this prospect considered, it is strongly recommended that immediate commitment be made to execution of the First Phase – involving detailed planning and design-for-risk-reduction – of this program, with a commitment-in-principle being made at the outset to seamlessly follow-on into Second Phase, if First Phase results basically bear out results of analyses made to date. This pair of start-up decisions will support a mid-CY'05 review concerned with provisional commitment to commencement of Third Phase work – the 3-year drive to IOC – at start-CY'06.


It's recommended that at least the first two Phases of this 5-year program be DARPA-sponsored, with special top-level management attention being mandated in order to move it along at a technology-limited pace and to maintain its covert characteristics to the greatest extent compatible with a very fast pace and top-quality people being enlisted in adequate quantities for its execution.


Because of its implications for enduring American supremacy both on the Earth's surface and in all of near-Earth space, it's recommended that this entire program be protected comprehensively, managed optimally and funded appropriately – and that top-level *ad hoc* OSD reviews be convened regularly to ensure all of this.



*From Figure 1 of "Analyses of U.S. Requirements for Conventionally Armed Bombers," by Gen. Jasper Welch (USAF, ret.), July 1994.

MRC Requirements - High Intensity Case





Horizontal Prototype Facility

UNCLASSIFIED

Political Policy Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs

By: Jonathan Perle

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INTRODUCTION

The following paper is intended to examine and illuminate the political consequences of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The debate over the RMA, while heated within the professional military and those civilian agencies which are responsible for equipping it, has gone unnoticed by many of the civilian leaders who will be most affected by its outcome. The revolution in military affairs has the potential not just to alter the way in which wars are fought, but the nature of the use of force.

It will be the civilians—the President, NSC, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense—whose actions will most be transformed by the RMA. New capabilities and weapons systems will alter the realities of warfare: when, where, and how the United States chooses to use force. While the military may become more efficient as a result of the RMA, it will not fundamentally change the nature of their jobs. If ordered to invade Iraq, they might carry out their mission with different methods of operation, but their overall objectives will not be altered. It will be the civilian leadership who will benefit most from the RMA, by gaining new options that will aid in deciding when and how to go to war.

This report examines two aspects of the revolution in military affairs and its effects on policy leaders. One deals with the different overall technologies that make up the RMA, such as stealth and precision. The other examines a specific RMA weapons systems and its individual capabilities that could potentially affect the policy making process. In both cases, the paper will look at the military and policy goals of RMA concepts, and will show where the military and civilian leadership have converging and diverging interests. The objective will be to flesh out exactly which policies, strategies, and technologies will be most useful to policy makers in a post-RMA world.

POLICIES OF THE RMA

The revolution in military affairs promises to change the nature and methods of engaging threats at the tactical level through the emergence of new technologies. Without a corresponding change in strategic thinking at the civilian policy level, however, the true benefits of the RMA will never be realized. The RMA offers the ability to leverage new technologies and operational concepts. While this has repercussions for a tank commander or a fighter pilot, these technologies and concepts have even greater consequences for the President and his national security advisors.

Uncertainty and lack of information have characterized war for all of human history. In the ancient world, policy makers had little to do with war on a daily basis, once it began. Messages took a long time to reach their recipients, and even finding the intended target of the message was an ordeal. As a result, commanders on the battlefield were left to make almost all decisions. But even their measure of control was limited. The best intelligence a commander in the field could get at the time of the Peloponnesian War was to stand on a hill and look out over the battlefield. And even when he was able to see the shape of a battle unfold and make a decision accordingly, he had to rely on a runner to get down to his lieutenants in the field and direct them as to what his wishes were.

Thousands of years later, the situation was little improved. During the Civil War, civilian leaders were still far removed from the day-to-day course of the conflict. Messengers had to be sent using horseback (or telegraph when available), and the armies, for the most part, were completely blind as to what lay just a few miles away. The concept of cavalry reconnaissance extended the range by which a commander could gather intelligence, but even these units were in danger of being captured or getting lost in the unfamiliar terrain and being unable to locate their units. Even assuming the cavalry assets worked as they were supposed to, they were only tactical units, able to provide a commander on-scene with information. The President and others making decisions about the course of the war would have to wait days or weeks to receive intelligence that would often be too old to use.

By the Second World War communications systems had improved significantly, but the "fog of war," both at the tactical and strategic levels, was still prevalent. Today, a mere fifty-five years after the end of World War II, the change in information availability for civilian leaders has been profound. The United States is on the verge of dramatically reducing, for the first time in history, the "fog of war" from the battlefield. Advances in communications, satellites, and radar have combined to completely revolutionize the types and amount of information that is available at both the tactical and strategic levels. The revolutionary capabilities new methods of intelligence gathering and communications will profoundly affect the decision-making capabilities and decisions of those individuals who must exercise the "when" as much as those who decide the "how" to go to war.

U.S. involvement in local, regional, and world conflicts in the coming decades is highly likely, even if the exact nature of future conflicts remains uncertain. The United States has economic, political, and security interests in every region of the globe, as such, it will be forced to deal with a multitude of threats from a host of different countries. Due to our unique and predominant position in world affairs, many countries seek to undermine our regional and global power. The increasing sophistication of guided weapons, even by second-rate powers, forces military commanders to develop counter measures. In the modern age, with advanced mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, "double-digit" surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and other "smart" weapons of the information age, the United States must come up with new, innovative technologies to protect our military personnel.

Civilian policy leaders will also need new tools. In the past, when war was far away and the moral climate less strict, it may have been enough to order the military into the field and await the results. Instant communications, however, have politicized war in the modern era, especially for democracies, to a new level.

At the same time, civilian leaders must overcome the dangers of technology in order to sustain a war effort that may come under fire from civilians who do not understand the ramifications of inaction, and who base their views on an incomplete understanding of the conflict. While for a time the United States' singular advantage in advanced technologies may allow it sharply to reduce the "casualty hypothesis,"¹ potential rivals are developing weapons systems, such as advanced surface-to-air

¹ The casualty hypothesis is the belief that in the modern age of warfare, information about a conflict is near-instantaneously disseminated to the public through television, the Internet, and other forms of communication, either through independent news channels, or by governments themselves. The net effect is to make war more difficult because the public directly sees its visual horrors.

missiles, that promise to reintroduce a large measure of jeopardy for U.S. soldiers. Often times, the weapons used to counter the U.S. technological advantage will be cheaper and easier to manufacture than the weapons the United States must use to counter the increasing threat.

It is the responsibility of the policy makers today to make sure that the weapons systems being built for tomorrow are adequate not just for the military task of war, but for the political task of diplomacy. Furthermore, it will be the civilian policy-makers that bear the ultimate responsibility of the United States' success or failure in adapting to the changing international environment.

It is with that principle in mind—civilian leaders bear the ultimate responsibility in deciding upon the best courses of action to secure U.S. interests abroad—that this paper is written. Many of the technologies that comprise the revolution in military affairs are already in use by our armed forces and provide capabilities that have implications not merely for the war fighters at the tactical level, but also for the policy makers at the strategic level. Future technologies that will be developed over the next two decades will further alter the capabilities that policy makers have at their disposal, and in doing so, will fundamentally alter the nature of the cost-benefits analysis for our leaders. This paper will examine the impact that the RMA will have on policy makers at a macro level, as well as delving into specific weapons, both created and envisioned, and to explain how new weapons systems and classes of weapons will change the nature of warfare.

THE SEPARATION OF POLICY AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

For civilian policy makers, the revolution in military affairs is not simply about fighting more efficiently; it is about achieving desired *political* effects. Through much of history there was a close relationship between military and political effects: big political effects required big military actions. But today a single car bomb, of no military significance, can give a wildly disproportionate political effect when detonated against a carefully selected target.

The bomb that killed 241 marines in Beirut in 1983 achieved a political effect—the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon—out of all proportion to the force employed.

Like a terrorist weapon, RMA technologies can have a grossly disproportional political effect. The ability unerringly to strike a building in the middle of a city while leaving its neighbors untouched is as political effects even more important than its military ones. Other RMA technologies can produce similar results, enabling a small but highly sophisticated force to save time, money, and lives by destroying politically and militarily important targets, thus degrading the enemies will to fight. This concept of "Effects-Based Operations" (EBO) is at the heart of the synergy between the increased military capabilities offered by the revolution in military affairs and the political benefits derived from the same.

There are multitudes of reasons for a state to use or threaten to use force to achieve its desired goals. Regardless of the exact circumstances, the decision to go to war is always a political one. It is therefore important to understand whether the RMA will enhance or detract from civilian leaders' political ability to wage war. Will war (or conflict in general) be easier and more frequent as a result of the RMA, or will it be harder? For most of the history of democracies, it has been quite difficult to fuse together political and military objectives. When power is not unified in one individual or like-

minded body, political and military objectives often come into conflict. Such was the case in World War II, when Churchill proposed invading Italy in order to achieve the political objective of cutting off the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The plan was rejected by military planners in the United States, who felt that an invasion of Normandy was safer and more able to meet the immediate objective of military victory, and who saw political victory as a secondary goal.

It is the conclusion of this report that the RMA will enhance the ability of civilian policy makers to use force to achieve their objectives. At the same, the RMA will allow military leaders to carry out operations more effectively. Thus, there is currently the potential for a convergence between political and military objectives. The RMA will allow new military capabilities, which in turn will allow new political capabilities. RMA-enabled forces will conduct operations faster, safer, and more "cleanly" than ever before. Civilian policy makers will in turn be able to threaten the use of force more often, and be able to back up that threat with action.

At the same time, the potential consequences of RMA technologies in enemies' hands must also be acknowledged. Military action becomes politically easier as a result of the RMA for the United States, but becomes significantly harder when opposing forces possess RMA technologies. Even a few "smart" weapons in enemy hands may be used in such a way that their political effects are disproportionate to their military capabilities. Just as a terrorist bomb may have larger implications than its explosive power, so too can highly accurate weapons applied against U.S. troops in the field, or against U.S. citizens in the United States.

Current U.S. doctrine relies on a U.S. presence abroad, through bases on the ground or carrier battle groups at sea. The purpose of a forward presence is two fold. First, it is a political tool that shows America's commitment to its allies overseas. Second, it allows the United States to react more quickly in a crisis, drawing on pre-allocated assets. Forward presence, however, may be nearing the end of its virtual impunity from attack. New and sophisticated weapons can target U.S. assets overseas with increasingly accurate and longer-range weapons. Policy planners will be forced to determine which of the missions (diplomatic reassurance or military pre-planning) is more important. If it is the latter, then it will become increasingly harder to maintain the case for forward presence, given the new vulnerabilities U.S. assets will face. If the diplomatic importance of forward presence is deemed to be the greater of the two benefits, U.S. leaders will still be forced to determine whether forward basing is really the best option for the United States, especially in areas where small conflicts, and not full-scale war are likely to be the situations in which the United States finds itself.²

If adversaries acquire advanced capabilities and even first generation RMA technologies, they will be able to strike at vulnerable American personnel in a way not previously possible. While there may be significant diplomatic benefits to reassuring our allies that we are committed, will they truly be greater than when the first guided set of explosives strikes an airbase killing Americans and destroying aircraft? A risk-averse United States completely shifted its methods of operation in the Middle East after the attack on a single ship, the *USS Cole*.

² U.S. citizens maybe willing to settle for losses in areas perceived as key to U.S. security (i.e. Western Europe and the Gulf region), but will not condone the loss of U.S. lives in regions of the world where no immediately discernable U.S. interest is. While policy planners may recognize the exigency of bases in far-flung regions in order to ensure stability, the majority of the American people are not so prescient.

5

There is a chance for the United States, for a time, to exercise its political will when, and how, it sees fit. The advances that the RMA offers will allow U.S. leaders to overcome the political obstacles that they face, as well as the military obstacles that the armed forces must confront. Both perception and reality can be altered with the RMA. The United States will gain the ability to strike targets with incredible precision from far distances so that it may protect itself. Simultaneously, by acquiring a capability that makes it politically and militarily easier to go to war, the United States may not have to.

PRECISION STRIKE

If one of the primary aspects of the RMA for civilian policy leaders is to make choices about warfare easier, then the question becomes “what are the technologies civilian policy makers will want to achieve this goal?” The answer begins with one of the earliest RMA technologies, which is just now beginning to enter the mature phase—precision strike. The old axiom “if you can see it, you can hit it; if you can hit it you can kill it,” has never been more true. With advanced information technologies and platforms, such as space-based radar and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) the United States can mitigate the “fog of war” and create a more transparent battlefield. When such a capability is combined with advanced precision weapons that can re-target up to the last second before impact, a powerful capability to destroy virtually any tactical or strategic target is realized.

Thus far, there have been three major problems with precision strike, from a political perspective. The United States’ favored method of long-range precision strike, the cruise missile, is expensive at \$1.1 million a piece³, and delivers a relatively small payload. The intelligence needed successfully to use a precision weapon is sometimes wrong or unreliable.⁴ And, there is difficulty correlating the blast size of a weapon to a specific target, so that the intended target, and nothing else, is destroyed. Each of these problems is in some sense a military one, but these problems also have important political consequences. Military commanders must operate within their budgets, but they are not responsible for explaining the use of their funds to all but a handful of theoretically knowledgeable Congressmen. Likewise, the military would prefer to limit collateral damage, but they face relatively little chance of losing career or reputation over collateral damage issues. It is civilian policy makers who attach greatest importance to the avoidance of collateral damage; and it is therefore necessary for *civilian* leadership to press for the development of better precision weapons. Ultimately, while the military generally favors precision munitions, limited budgets may cause military commanders to

³ \$1.1 million reflects the cost of the current Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM)

⁴ Improper intelligence in the Kosovo bombing led to a serious international incident after the Chinese embassy was accidentally targeted, but accurately struck. On a more mundane, but perhaps no less problematic level, targeting error can ruin an otherwise perfect operation. An aircraft can be armed with precision bombs and launch them precisely on target, but if the target’s position is improperly identified by even a few meters, the ability to hit is severely degraded. If the uses of smaller weapons with smaller blast radii are used in order to minimize collateral damage, then a target must be hit dead on. If forced to use larger weapons in order to compensate for Target Location Error (TLE), then collateral damage will increase.

under invest in precision strike since they tend to view the political consequences of imprecision as less important.

The Tomahawk cruise missile has a CEP of somewhere below 8 meters,⁵ making it a fairly accurate weapon. However, its price and relatively small payload make it a non-ideal choice in many circumstances. While the Tomahawk's accuracy will undoubtedly improve, its small payload is not likely to change significantly and its cost will remain high. Coupled with its slow speed of approximately 550 miles per hour⁶, and its high cost per target destroyed, the Tomahawk cannot be the primary weapon in future conflicts.

The ability of a Tomahawk to be fired from beyond the lethal range of the enemy, thus protecting American personnel in the theater, has made it a weapon of choice in many recent conflicts, especially where the prospect of American losses was most troubling. But the effectiveness against hard targets by the Tomahawk is minimal; its slow speed means that it is unable to destroy hardened targets. Furthermore, the small payload means that damage is minimal, which can be a good thing when dealing with small targets, but a real hindrance when striking larger structures. When multiple missiles are needed to destroy a target, the potential for collateral damage is increased, as are the costs.

During the Kosovo campaign, the United States nearly ran out of cruise missiles. In fact, the military had to begin converting nuclear cruise missiles to conventional cruise missiles at an additional cost of about \$500,000 each.⁷ When one considers that a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) has a CEP of approximately 45 feet (19 feet when used with a B-2), can be manufactured quickly, and has a cost of about \$20,000,⁸ the cruise missile becomes a very expensive option (and the JDAM a remarkably cheap one).

Smart bombs, as of now, are much more effective, both politically and militarily than cruise missiles and are able to achieve a CEP of 19 feet or less.⁹ And, unlike a cruise missile, a JDAM can carry a much larger explosive and conduct "bunker busting" operations. Of course, the cruise missile does not require a pilot to come into range of enemy fire, but this problem can be overcome with stealth. A single B-2, which has a minimal chance of being targeted, especially when combined with radar jamming, can drop sixteen 2000-pound JDAMs at 16 different targets at a cost of approximately \$400,000.¹⁰ The same job with cruise missiles¹¹ would cost of \$17.6 million.

As a political tool, the cruise missile has been very effective thus far and will continue to be. However, its cost is a drawback that must either be cut significantly, or eventually face public scrutiny when a combat scenario arises that makes the cruise missile an unusable weapon.

⁵ Jane's Online

⁶ Jane's Online

⁷ *Congressional Record*, KOSOVO POLICY (Senate - April 19, 1999)

⁸ http://www.safac.hq.af.mil/acq_ref/stories/jdam_1.html

⁹ If a JDAM were equipped with a laser designator as well as a GPS kit, the accuracy of the system would increase dramatically, enabling in fair weather conditions an almost perfect strike capability. Such a kit would probably double the cost of a JDAM from between \$40,000 to \$50,000, still less than 5% of the cost of a current Tomahawk.

¹⁰ Cost does not include maintenance and flying costs of the B-2

¹¹ Assuming non-hardened targets

There may be ways to lower the cost per target destroyed using new cruise missiles or other precision strike weapons. The re-design of cruise missiles and the employment of new manufacturing techniques may reduce the cost of cruise missiles substantially. While this option should be pursued, as cruise missiles are certain to be a mainstay U.S. weapon for fixed soft targets (and perhaps in the future mobile targets as well), the cost of a cruise missile can only be reduced so much.¹² Another option is to improve stealth, and the accuracy of precision-guided bombs. Bombs are far cheaper than missiles, and can do far more damage. Research into equipping JDAMs and the new small smart bombs (SSB) with both GPS (which itself should be upgraded) and laser designation packages would go a long way towards meeting the needs of cheap, reliable, and effective weapons that can be used to realize the maximum political effect.

Once the United States possesses a cheap and accurate bomb (on the order of one-meter CEP), the weapon adds a new dimension to the political realm. As of now, aircraft flying very low can achieve great accuracy, but by doing so they expose themselves to anti-aircraft fire and Surface-to-Air missiles (SAM).¹³ Politically, U.S. pilots being killed in combat is perhaps the only situation worse than civilian casualties, in a limited conflict. As a result, aircraft are forced to fly at high altitudes, and therefore their accuracy is diminished considerably.¹⁴

¹² The newest Tomahawk, which has yet to be manufactured will cost in the neighborhood of \$500,000.

¹³ *Air Power Studies Centre, APSC Paper Number S3, "Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare," Richard P. Hullion, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base, Fairbairn*

¹⁴ Even if a pilot does everything perfectly and a weapon works exactly as it is supposed to, the CEP of a MK 84 general purpose bomb at a slant range of 20,00 feet had a worst-case miss of 160 feet. *Ibid.*

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRECISION

Historically, warfare has been characterized by a lack of accuracy; munitions — bombs or bullets — have generally missed their mark. During the battle of Gettysburg, the Union expended roughly 240 rounds of ammunition for each Confederate soldier killed.¹⁵ In World War II, it took 648 bombs to achieve a 96% chance of hitting a 400 x 500 foot German power-generation plant.¹⁶

In 1943 the entire U.S. 8th Air Force attacked only 50 targets for the year.¹⁷ In Desert Storm, the allied forces attacked 150 targets in the first day. Now, for the first time in history, a country will be able to field weapons that are effective in a nearly one-to-one ratio. During the Gulf conflict, the F-117A fighter-bomber flew only 2 percent of the U.S. sorties, but damaged over 40% of the strategic targets. While not every bomb hit its target, the F-117s did hit over 80% of their targets — an unprecedented accuracy rate.¹⁸ When compared with conventional aircraft using conventional bombs, the numbers are even more impressive. It took twelve sorties of F-111Es using 168 Mk-82 bombs to destroy two targets during the Gulf War. Twelve sorties of F-117As destroyed twenty-six targets with only twenty-eight precision guided weapons.¹⁹ During Operation Allied Force, more improvements were implemented. In the first eight weeks of the war, six B-2 bombers, all operating from CONUS, combined stealth and precision guided munitions to successfully strike 600 aim points, while 336 other strike aircraft combined to hit 860 aim points.²⁰ The B-2s accuracy was rated somewhere above 90%.²¹

A key strategic doctrine of U.S. military action is destroying command and control (C2) nodes as quickly as possible at the beginning of a conflict. Precision obviously makes it militarily easier for U.S. air power to take out C2 nodes, but it also makes it politically easier. Adversaries witnessed the dominance of U.S. precision weapons against exposed targets in the Gulf War and in Operation Allied Force. In the opening phases of Allied Force, known C2 nodes and lines of communication that were fixed and exposed were easily destroyed. The United States can expect that its adversaries have learned from such mistakes, and will choose one or a combination of three options to combat this vulnerability.

Enemies may seek to make their command and control nodes mobile, forcing intelligence assets to try to locate and track them, a task that can be extremely difficult. In this case, the challenge is military and not civilian. The other two options that opposing forces have are to move their C2 facilities underground and into highly populated civilian centers. Both methods have been tried against the United States, and have met with some success. During the Gulf War, underground bunkers were of particular concern, prompting the United States to develop the GBU-28 "bunker busting" bomb, before which there was no capability to destroy deeply buried targets. Once again,

¹⁵ Conversation with Gettysburg library

¹⁶ *Air Power Studies Centre, APSC Paper Number 53, "Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare," Richard P. Hallion, Air Power Studies Centre, RAAF Base, Fairbairn*

¹⁷ *"The Revolution in Military Affairs," Jeffery McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Krause, Richard Blanchfield, and Dale Hill, Strategic Assessment Center-Science Applications International Corporation*

¹⁸ *"The utility of force in a world of scarcity," John Orme, International Security, Winter 1997/v22 n3*

¹⁹ *Gulf War Air Power Survey, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993*

²⁰ *"Sonic Weapons Save Money and Lives," Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., Lexington Institute, August 8, 2000*

²¹ Using a combination of the on board B-2 targeting system and JDAMs.

the problem of buried bunkers is a military one more than a political one. In this case, it is the military that should want advanced precision munitions in order to have the greatest chance of destroying buried targets. The problem becomes a civilian one, however, as soon as enemies seek to put C2 modules underground *and* in highly populated civilian areas.

Making C2 nodes mobile may be the best option for making them survivable, both in terms of making them hard to effectively target and in mobility's ability to make intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) difficult. Mobile units, however, will not be adequate on their own. Adversaries will still undoubtedly need facilities that are larger and better equipped (especially for their civilian leadership and top staff officers), than can be provided for by a mobile platform. C2 centers will be placed further underground, and their construction will be kept more secret in order to avoid detection. Politically moving C2 centers into the middle of cities, underneath residential and civilian areas, will force the United States to recalculate whether and how to strike them.

Even a modest bunker in or underneath a building in a residential section of a crowded city can mean a political nightmare for civilian policy makers. Destroying an underground facility required extremely powerful weapons, which are sure to cause external damage. A weapon that has a CEP of 10 meters, under such circumstances, could mean the end to a limited strike. With a 10-meter CEP a bomb will land somewhere beyond 25 feet of the target half the time. If a command and control center is placed below an apartment building in a crowded area, this could mean the destruction of hundreds of civilian lives. If the C2 facility is of such vital importance to the effort that it *must* be destroyed, regardless of the civilian casualties, a large warhead will have to be used, which means even if the weapon is accurate, it is likely to destroy other buildings in the area. Alternatively, smaller warheads could be employed, but more weapons would have to be used. This is not a viable solution, as each time a weapon is dropped that has a CEP of 25 feet there will be a 50% probability that the weapon falls outside the perimeter.

While there may be no way to eliminate collateral damage in instances where bunkers are placed beneath residential areas, as a matter of moral principle and political understanding, the limiting of collateral damage should be of utmost concern to policy leaders. Improved accuracy not only means that the proper target is selected, but also means that a smaller payload can be used, which in turn will limit the collateral damage caused by the explosion. One can easily imagine a situation where Saddam Hussein places a command center next to a mosque and a school, and then waits for U.S. air strikes to miss their target and kill worshippers or children. Alternatively, the weapon might work perfectly well, but the secondary effects of the blast blow the building outward.

In a world where air power is the primary weapon of choice, precision or payload are the only two options for increasing effectiveness. For the military, increasing payload may work, but for political leaders the negative effects of a large bomb in certain situations will prohibit its use. The perceived lack of morality in using more powerful explosives will offset the benefits of destroying the target in all but the most extreme cases.

Ultimately, the political benefits of precision will manifest themselves in two types of situations: pre-warfare calculations by the enemy and during actual combat. When foreign adversaries calculate their chances of success against the United States,

they are necessarily going to look at the U.S. ability to wage warfare in their region of the globe. If they believe that the United States has the ability to strike any target that they present without suffering negative political effects as a result, then their decision on whether to begin an engagement will be altered. Thus the deterrent factor presented by precision weapons will have strong political influence in policy circles, as diplomatic efforts will partly rest on the knowledge that the United States will be able to destroy any target at any time.

If an adversary is not deterred by the United States' overwhelming military superiority and concludes that there are military or political objectives to be gained by military action, then highly accurate precision weapons will, as discussed above, allow the United States political leaders to more freely engage the enemy. Or, alternatively, the United States may be able to preempt action by an adversary and coerce him by using highly accurate limited strikes to demonstrate U.S. willpower and resolve before hostilities break out in full force.

THE EFFECTS OF PRECISION

Careful examination of precision weapons in the hands of the United States leads towards one conclusion for foreign policy makers. War, or conflict, becomes easier. The question is does it become more frequent? The newfound power the United States policy leaders will acquire with extremely accurate precision weapons will give them an unprecedented ability to use military force anytime, anywhere. Serious political and moral implications arise from this situation.

Politically, making military action an easier option for policy makers may not be a complete benefit all the time. U.S. allies and pseudo-allies are constantly and consistently focused on U.S. power and hegemony, even when used in humanitarian and beneficial ways. While the United States may be willing to engage in military action more frequently due to our enormous precision strike advantage, our allies, both for military reasons (lack of the same capability) and political reasons, may not be willing to support the United States in our endeavors. A second problem, also dealing with allies, is that a clearly superior U.S. capability may cause them to oppose U.S. action, simply by virtue of U.S. power. Countries have a tendency to envy power, and even close friends will oppose U.S. actions some of the time.

A further political consequence will arise from the newfound ability to hit any target that we can find. If weapons with 1 meter CEPs that can be dropped unaided become a reality, then it seems likely that the proclivity to use force in a situation will increase. This can be both a positive and negative situation. On the negative side, civilian leaders may gradually relegate diplomatic and economic coercion to the background if they believe that their military capabilities are such that public support for their actions can be maintained. If this is the case, then it will be likely that military means will supersede diplomatic and other non-lethal methods of implementing policy.

The positive aspect of such a capability is the same as the negative side: politicians may resort to the military option before exhausting diplomatic and economic options. There is a reasonable argument to be made that United States foreign policy has suffered from a cookie cutter formula for the last decade, in which a pattern of diplomatic, economic, and finally military measures are used to achieve political goals, in that order. The reasons for this are twofold: first, a natural reluctance to use force. Second, military action can be politically very costly, as mentioned above. This pattern

has played out time and time again, however, it has not necessarily always been beneficial for U.S. foreign policy. Foreign adversaries, knowing America's proclivity to avoid confrontation for moral and political reasons have been able to take advantage of America's foreign policy formula, and plan accordingly.

Kosovo, which many consider to be a military victory, turned out to be a political failure, for this reason. The United States eventually succeeded in coercing Milosevic by using air power alone. However, by the time that Milosevic surrendered, the ostensible reason for U.S. intervention — stopping the slaughter and displacement of the Kosovars — had failed. Milosevic had already succeeded in displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Thus, America's political objective, which is what prompted the air campaign in the first place, was unsuccessful. Had the United States actually presented the credible threat of force when Milosevic first tried to displace the Kosovars, rather than engage in diplomatic condemnation of the action, perhaps Milosevic would not have sustained his campaign.

STEALTH AND ANTI-ACCESS

Precision represents a revolutionary capability because it transforms the battlefield from one where mass is the dominant factor (i.e. how many bullets you have and how fast you can concentrate them on a single target), to one where accuracy and mobility reign supreme. Similarly, the battlefield will shift away from the primary form of protection for the last half century — armor — to stealth and the ability to hide. In a world where weapons can kill virtually anything that can be seen, the key to survival is to deny weapons the ability to "see" in the first place, or deceive weapons into believing the target is somewhere else.

Stealth, like precision, has the ability to transform the way in which operations are conducted at the military level, as well as the capability to alter how civilian policy leaders make decisions about warfare. Stealth and precision share a dichotomy: precision protects innocent civilians, while stealth protects American servicemen. The ability to protect U.S. personnel is one of the most politically important aspects of the revolution in military affairs. Nothing has a greater potential to hamper a necessary U.S. operation than U.S. casualties. It was U.S. casualties that helped start the anti-Viet Nam War movement, caused the United States to pull out of Lebanon, and leave Mogadishu. While it is possible that the "casualty hypothesis" has been over exaggerated, the potential impact of even a few U.S. casualties on the course of war cannot be pushed aside. In the end, it may turn out that Americans are willing to accept losses in operations, but this cannot be taken for granted, and planning cannot proceed along this assumption without eventually coming to a point where operations, in reality, are no longer feasible.

Stealth is one area of the RMA where the United States' focus should be particularly heavy, given the current environment and planned theater of operations for the next two decades. Stealth is one RMA technology that the United States possesses a lead of perhaps 20 years over any potential adversary.

When examining problems of "anti-access" (A2), stealth becomes all the more important. The proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced mines, and advanced surface-to-air missiles is causing the A2 problem to increase dramatically, especially in situations involving the U.S. and Asian powers. In such scenarios, it will be U.S. naval

and air power that shoulders the primary burden in a conflict due to a lack of a significant U.S. presence in mainland Asia.

As of today, U.S. ships are unarmored and rely on their advanced weaponry to destroy the enemy before it can get into range; thus the logic behind the aircraft carrier's use of combat air patrols (CAP). Such a concept works when the enemy is fielding symmetric forces of a lesser quality than the United States, an F-18 E/F vs. a SU 27, for instance. But when the enemy is fielding supersonic, stealthy cruise missiles from great distances that can fly undetected, and even if spotted, give only seconds warning time to ships, then destroying the enemy before he can fire is no longer an option.

Currently, the United States lacks a strong infrastructure and presence in the Far East. With the exception of bases in Japan and Korea, the United States has no major bases in Asia. Without such an infrastructure, the United States will be forced to transport any materiel it needs for combat. Given the aquatic nature of the environment in which the United States will have to operate, stealth will be the key to survival for air and naval forces. Without heavily armored vehicles as the main weapons of U.S. power, it will fall upon sea and air-based forces to provide much of the striking power, especially early on in a conflict while land forces are assembled.

Paramount to conducting a military operation is the protection of troop lives, both for political and moral reasons. Since the United States made the decision not to equip its ships with armor, instead opting for speed and weapons' range as forms of protection, a way must be found to protect troops and assets. As noted above, those two factors are no longer the security blanket that they once were; the United States needs to look at new forms of protection. Stealth, both for ships and aircraft is the only viable solution at this point. Large ships that can be targeted can be killed. Those ships that avoid detection will also avoid destruction, and will have the ability to penetrate enemy defenses more easily. While the navy may have a great love of carriers, being the capital ships that have lead their forces for the past 50 years, the future calls for a different path. The navy was fiercely loyal to battleships 50 years ago, and their inability to protect themselves from the dangers of the air caused their demise in the same manner that the carrier's inability to protect itself from missiles might lead to its own demise.

Given the circumstances and ingrained culture of the Navy, it will be the civilian policy leaders who must take the lead in transforming the naval structure. The political consequences of losing a destroyer or cruiser are horrific, and only the word catastrophe can adequately describe what the loss of a carrier in a non-major regional conflict would be. The Navy, understandably, has a great attachment to the ships, which have been the backbone of their force for half a century. However, when it comes to warfare, sentimental attachment cannot override strategic judgment. Although many in the upper ranks of the Navy will admit that anti-access is a problem, few will acknowledge the carrier's significant vulnerability, due to its large radar signature, that makes it a prime target for the newer generations of anti-ship missiles. Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, earlier this year stated that carriers may be vulnerable in the future, but that is not true today.²² Such thinking has two fundamental flaws. First, there is growing

²²Remarks by Admiral Vern Clark, *Sea, Air, Space Expo, Hosted by the Navy League of the United States, Washington, D.C. April 12, 2001*: "Take aircraft carriers, for example. It has been reported in the press that aircraft carriers may be vulnerable, that their survivability might be in question. Some day that may be true. But it's not true today. Maybe in the future we won't have to worry about all that we have to worry about today. But for now and the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable platform, anywhere in the world, than America's large deck aircraft carrier. I wanted to get that on the record."

evidence that ships with large radar signatures, starting with the Falklands War, are vulnerable to anti-ship cruise missiles or mines. Second, such rationalization causes the Navy to be focused upon the successes of today rather than the problems of tomorrow.

Naval power operating in littoral waters faces a host of threats; many of those threats are as much political problems as they are military problems. Access denial, when planned for, is a purely military problem—how to get into the theater and remain safe. However, when, as so often is the case, a conflict rapidly emerges, plans created in the abstract of the purely military world become subject to the restraints of the political world.

Both Air Force and Navy aircraft have been denied access to targets because of diplomatic concerns. In Operation Earnest Will, the United Arab Emirates and Oman denied overflight permission to Navy jets aboard the carrier.²³ The denial of overflight permission directly lead to a decrease in operational tempo in Operation Earnest Will, and thus paralleled many of the military anti-access threats that our nation's carriers are likely to face in the future.

So what policies can be enacted to counter the anti-access problem? Civilian leaders must strive to create as tight diplomatic alliances as possible with our allies in order to assure effective operations can take place. However, this is only part of the solution. No matter how tight our peacetime diplomatic relations, when war comes, bonds have the ability to weaken suddenly. When bonds do weaken because countries fear repercussions, the United States will need to have back-up plans in place.

Ultimately, the only way that the United States can avoid the political problems of anti-access are to create targets that are unseen and minimally supported. Long-range stealthy aircraft accomplish the goal, as do submarines. The B-2 bomber, the stealthiest of currently operational aircraft, has never been brought down due to enemy fire. Similarly, no modern submarine has been lost due to enemy action. The best systems that policy leaders can use are ones that have the same sorts of stealthy, long-range characteristics.

Global Artillery

Truly revolutionary technologies are rare. While a number of new technologies and novel methods of operation have comprised different revolutions in military affairs over the years (the use of the tank and the aircraft carrier in World War II being prime examples), relatively few military technologies have been nearly an entire revolution in themselves. In the 20th century, nuclear weapons managed to change not just the nature of warfare, but also the entire dynamic of international strategy and politics. Today, the United States has the capability to create a weapon which can destroy a wide range of targets that in the past could only be confidently destroyed by nuclear weapons. The effects of such a weapon have the potential to change not just the way in which warfare is conducted, but also how policy makers decide to implement U.S. grand strategy.

Global artillery combines many of the technologies being developed for the RMA into one weapon, capable of striking anytime and anywhere on the globe, within an hour. The concepts of long-range guns and global artillery are not new, but now the United

²³ Siegel, Adam, *Basing and Other Constraints on Land-Based Aviation Contributions to U.S. Contingency Operations*, Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995

States now has both the technological capabilities to build such a weapon, as well as the capital for its construction.

Global artillery, as it is presented in this paper, offers a number of unique or highly upgraded capabilities that the United States would be hard-pressed to find in any other system. In addition to its tremendous globe-spanning range, a global gun is a cost-effective piece of equipment, with multiple roles, that make it a tool with politico-military uses ranging from coercion to bunker busting. Its potential benefits far exceed merely its military effectiveness, and give policy makers a genuinely revolutionary capability that will be unmatched by any country for decades to come.

Long-range operations are one of the hallmarks of modern warfare. The ability to destroy one's enemy before he even has the ability to fire has been a priority across all U.S. weapons platforms. Air Force tactical doctrine, for instance, concentrates on long-range missiles for air-to-air combat, and the ideal situation is to fire the primary weapon at extended ranges, long before the enemy even has a chance to activate his own weapon. Similarly, the Navy's ability to project power relies on its ability to send aircraft over the horizon without putting the carrier battle group in danger. The Army's focus on multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), tactical missiles (ATACM), and armor equipped with weapons that have the maximum range possible also reflects this thinking.

Global artillery leverages the United States' unique technical and engineering superiority to provide a weapon that operates under the same concept that all U.S. military units currently subscribe to. A long-range artillery piece operating from somewhere in the middle of CONUS takes the natural protection that long-range tactical weapons use and extends them to a new level. Instead of tactical weapons providing stand-off capabilities of 100 miles, global artillery will provide a stand-off capability of 5,000 miles or more; the United States will be able to hit targets without the enemy ever coming within range of U.S. forces. The only options a non-ICBM adversary will have are to run, hide, bury, or surrender. Even those countries that possess an ICBM capability will pose little threat to the United States for one or both of the two reasons that prevents the United States from currently maintaining a fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles for use as global artillery. For Russia, treaty restrictions prevent it from using its ICBM fleet as global artillery. For the rest of the world, including Russia, the cost of using an ICBM as a conventional weapon is simply too high to be feasible.²⁴

A ballistic missile costs about \$7 million to build.²⁵ Even assuming that the United States was to withdraw from the START treaties and field conventional ballistic missiles, the costs would be enormous. A typical Minuteman III missile is armed with three Mk-12 warheads, which weigh 253 lbs. each. Replacing these warheads with conventional munitions would produce a missile capable of delivering three small, high-speed kinetic energy weapons at a minimum cost of \$2.33 million each. Compared with a cost of less than \$30,000 for a JDAM or even an updated \$500,000 Tomahawk, the ballistic missile option is unrealistic (even when the delivery-system costs for the latter are factored).

Furthermore, the START I and START II treaties prevent policy makers from using a ballistic missile as a conventional weapon. With a cap of 3,500 warheads, and no multiple warheads allowed, the maximum number of weapons the United States could have at its disposal would be 3,500, assuming we no longer were to maintain a nuclear

²⁴ For additional information on the concept of ICBMs as conventional long-range artillery, see *The Ultimate Standoff Weapon*, Lt. Col. John R. London III, USAF, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/london.html>

²⁵ Cost for a Minuteman III. Of course the total system cost is many times the manufacturing cost of the missile itself.

missile fleet. Although reductions in the U.S. nuclear force structure are likely to occur, it is highly improbable that the United States will reduce its ballistic missile fleet to fewer than 1,500 warheads. Thus, the maximum number of weapons the United States would have in a conventional ICBM fleet would be around 1,500. At an acquisition cost of \$7,000,000, the use of the entire conventional ICBM fleet would run \$1,050,000,000. Each of these weapons, assuming advanced guidance were installed to give them the same capabilities as GPS guided bombs, could theoretically be used on one target. Thus, 1500 targets could be destroyed, assuming a perfectly accurate weapon, with the entire arsenal. In contrast, during the Gulf War, the United States used a total of 17,201 guided weapons at a cost of \$2,272,000,000. Ignoring munitions which did not possess stand-off capabilities, the United States used a total of 332 Tomahawk and air launched cruise missiles at a price of \$913,800,000.²⁶

Even were cost not an issue for policy makers, and number of weapons not a concern for the military—which they both assuredly are—a conventional ballistic fleet poses an immense political challenge to civilian military leaders. A conventional ballistic missile is indistinguishable from a nuclear one, and countries—such as Russia—will be concerned that each launch carries a nuclear warhead. The association of ICBM's with nuclear weapons is such that the complications of using them for the delivery of conventional weapons, even if cost were not a factor, would rule it out.

If rockets are an unacceptable method the intercontinental delivery of conventional munitions, then very long-range guns remain as an important option to consider. A global gun, capable of hitting any spot in the world within an hour is the solution. Global artillery solves virtually all of the problems that an ICBM fleet cannot overcome, and it can be built now. Once developed, a global gun will be cheaper, faster, and better than any other method of long-range attack against fixed targets in the hands of the United States.

The first question that must naturally be asked when looking at a concept as large as global artillery is: "can it be done?" While at first the challenges of global artillery may seem daunting, in fact, much of the research has already been done. The challenge of a global artillery lies not in the technology, but in the construction. Much of the technological research that would be needed to create a global artillery piece exists, especially for a first generation system. The global gun that would first be built would use existing technologies, simply scaled up. Although the engineering will be new and challenging, the concepts are well understood.

The first global artillery piece will be a scaled-up gun, placed somewhere in CONUS. It will require a (vertically-oriented) barrel measuring approximately a kilometer in length, which is most naturally emplaced underground. The projectile, which will weigh up to 300 kg in the initial reference system, will travel at 9 km/sec. The system will be able to shoot 10,000 projectiles per day continuously for a month, and will do so in a cost-efficient manner. It will also be extremely accurate with respect to (usually, terminally-guided) payload-delivery, as is required for it to be a politically potent tool, rather than simply a militarily effective one.

The global gun will provide a number of unique military capabilities. It will be able to reach any spot on the globe in a matter of a few dozen minutes; its projectiles will be capable, by virtue of their very great kinetic energy, of destroying large armored columns single-handedly; it will be the most capable (non-nuclear) weapon yet invented

²⁶ *Operation Desert Storm. Evaluation of the Air Campaign*, GAO, June, 1997, GAO NSIAD-97-134

to destroy hardened targets and deeply buried bunkers. Finally, it will be a logistically superior weapon, with the entire infrastructure needed to supply it remaining in CONUS.

As important, and perhaps more so, than the military implications of a global gun are the political possibilities it creates. A global gun, once constructed, will be enormously efficient and cost very little to operate, relative to the capabilities it delivers. All military units needed to support the weapon will be based in CONUS, and only a handful of forward observers, if any at all, will be needed to spot and designate targets for the weapon. The weapon's near-instantaneous capabilities will automatically give credibility to U.S. threats of force. No treaties, nor need for cooperative allies, will restrict the weapon's use, and the ability to use it as a coercive tool make it perhaps the one of the greatest such weapons in the history of warfare, comparable to nuclear weaponry.

Global artillery is a single system that combines nearly all of the technologies that comprise the current RMA. Near-instantaneous response, stealth, precision, and long-range are all encompassed by global artillery. Indeed, global artillery may be considered the "aircraft carrier" of the land, able to project power far beyond its platform, emplace its own sensors and reconnaissance assets over targeted areas, remain protected by layers of defenses, respond quickly to a crisis, and reach anywhere on the globe. An aircraft carrier is vulnerable to different weapons systems, is not capable of reaching certain targets, carries limited ordinance, and can take many days to reach its target. A global artillery system has an unlimited ammunition supply, is virtually un-targetable, and can respond within minutes to reach any point in the world.

Just as civilian leaders turn to the aircraft carrier to solve a myriad of political problems, from actual war to merely a show of resolve, so too will political leaders in the future be able to turn to a global gun in the same manner. In fact, global artillery will be far more useful than carriers, for all of the reasons mentioned above.

An examination of the ICBM fleet, as demonstrated above, reveals that an enormous monetary requirement, not to mention treaty restrictions, prohibit the United States from fielding a conventional ICBM force. Similarly, though cruise missiles are less expensive than ICBMs, they have shortcomings in the performance, latency, and cost areas as well. When civilian leaders consider the range of projects to be developed, cost is always crucial. The current administration has made it clear that it does not wish to invest in systems that will not deliver the maximum capability for the minimum dollar amount. Clearly, ICBMs do not deliver such a capability, nor do cruise missiles when used extensively.

Global artillery, on the other hand, is a cost-effective weapon, though at first its price tag may seem high. When it comes to demonstrating U.S. resolve and U.S. capabilities, no system will better be able to form precision strikes, while at the same time maintaining a low operational cost. This makes it an ideal weapon from a policy standpoint, as it is the day-to-day cost of operations, from logistics to maintenance, that usually prove to have the most extensive costs during a conflict.

The projected capital costs²⁷ of a global artillery system are somewhere around the \$4 billion mark. This is a substantial sum, but when compared with a carrier battle group cost of \$10-15 billion; this is not an unreasonable amount. Furthermore, six B-2C

²⁷ All projected cost figures for global artillery are based on briefings and discussions with Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, who has done the initial research into global artillery.

bombers are projected to cost approximately the same amount, and the global gun will offer a far more potent capability, exercised at far lower asset-risk, than they do.

Where ordinance is concerned, the cost of a 300 kg projectile is comparable to a JDAM, but there is one fundamental distinction which makes it a very attractive alternative to JDAMs: the global gun rounds can be assembled onsite, thereby drastically reducing logistics costs, and the deployment and operational costs of the associated delivery system are near-zero. The reduction in logistics costs will not only allow money to be spent more efficiently, as this administration has committed itself to doing, but will also free up overseas transport for other vital pieces of equipment.

While the cost issue certainly has an enormous impact on civilian policy makers, as they are the individuals charged with creating and taking responsibility for the budget, it is not the cost-cutting implications of global artillery, but rather the performance implications that make it such a powerful concept.

Politically, the performance that will make global artillery a militarily super-weapon will also revolutionize the way in which diplomacy is conducted. In addition to its unique properties that cannot be mimicked by any other (non-nuclear) system (such as destroying hardened bunkers), global artillery can replace many of the functions of other major platforms, thereby reducing the overall power-projection risk to men and materiel.

The short latency time of global artillery's projectiles and their ability to be re-directed by operators based in CONUS up until a few dozen seconds before impact mimics the capability of carrier battle groups, but allows more and higher lethality ordinance to be placed on a target. With such a capability, U.S. policy makers gain two distinct advantages. First, they need not worry about the political fallout from the damaging or sinking of a carrier. Second, in order for a carrier to respond to a crisis, it must either be pre-positioned, making it vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, or steam to the location of the conflict, a process which can take many days. Global artillery's ability to strike immediately, within the span of an hour, is its greatest political asset.

United States policy makers will be able to threaten the use of force and actually be able to carry out such threats nearly instantaneously. While the B-2 bomber serves to accomplish this role to a certain degree today, its latency is more than 12 hours, and its invulnerability to enemy countermeasures is far from perfect. Furthermore, while the payload it carries is substantial for an aircraft, it is still limited to what a single global gun could source in less than 15 minutes.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT GLOBAL ARTILLERY

Global artillery's impact on United States policymaking, as described above, is clearly beneficial. Operations will be conducted more quickly, cleanly, efficiently, with less risk to U.S. soldiers, and at less cost. In short, global artillery is a system that falls clearly on the side of making war easier for the United States. Unlike precision-guided weapons, which may find their way into the possession of a multitude of actors who will be able to utilize them to prevent the United States from achieving its policy goals, the United States will have a global monopoly on global artillery for several decades.

While the benefits of global artillery far exceed any negative aspects of the weapon, there is at least one identifiable problem that the weapon may bring about; global artillery may cause a radical shift in the priorities and operations of potential enemies of the United States. If the weapon works as advertised, the only two factors limiting U.S. action against an enemy are political will and intelligence capabilities.

Since global artillery by its very nature eliminates many of the potential political ramifications of military action, then one can assume that U.S. policy makers will be more willing to employ force, using global artillery as the medium. In such an instance, limited intelligence capacity becomes the only obstacle to U.S. action.

Given such an overwhelming set of capabilities, opposing forces will seek asymmetric methods of attack. Were the United States to have an overwhelming conventional force, the asymmetric means would be achieved through anti-access weaponry, utilizing much of the previously described precision-guided munitions. With global artillery, however, there is no such chance for an opposing force to use conventional munitions in an asymmetric manner.

What then are the alternatives for enemy countries? Two answers immediately come to mind. Nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles are one obvious choice, but very few countries have them and a combination of deterrence and potential future defenses should provide an adequate defense. A more likely approach by an enemy force would be to bring the fight to the continental United States using terrorist tactics.

Proceeding from the assumption that the United States will be able to destroy any weapons system that is not constantly mobile or so deeply buried as to be worthless, states may decide that terrorism is the only effective weapon against the United States. Small, highly mobile forces that can evade U.S. intelligence will be the only guaranteed weapons that cannot be targeted by a global gun.

The threat of terrorism in response to global artillery cannot be taken lightly. However, one can safely assume that any nation that deems it permissible to strike U.S. civilian targets through a campaign of terror in response to the threat of global artillery will probably do so in the absence of global artillery as well. While policy leaders must acknowledge an increase in the possibility that a country may use terrorism during a conflict, ultimately the advantages of global artillery are compelling. Additionally, for the United States to be held hostage to the threat of terrorism and forgo a major weapon of military and political consequence would not serve U.S. interests; sooner or later an attack will be attempted on the U.S. homeland, regardless of what types of weapons the U.S. builds.

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

One area that must be covered in any political analysis of a specific large-scale weapon is its political survivability. Nowhere is this truer than with global artillery. The weapons systems that the revolution in military affairs requires are already coming into conflict with the established military. As Machiavelli noted, "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order."²⁸ Weapons such as submerged arsenal ships, long-range bombers, and small surface vessels require the armed forces to rethink their methods of operations. In a hierarchical structure such as the military, with deeply embedded tradition, radically new systems are not always readily accepted.²⁹

²⁸ *The Prince*, Niccolò Machiavelli

²⁹ See: *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Rosen. © 1991, Cornell University Press

More conventional weapons have faced fierce challenges from the services, but such challenges may be small in comparison to the potential battle that global artillery will face. A global gun may be seen to threaten the missions of the Navy, Air Force, and Army simultaneously. Global artillery can do the job of an aircraft carrier faster and for much less cost. It can do part of the Air Force's job by being capable of reaching anywhere on the globe. And it can do the job of conventional Army artillery with greater firepower sourced over far greater distances. Consequently, the battle for global artillery must be lead by the civilian policy makers who recognize its great potentialities. Though some visionaries within the Services may recognize the weapon's potential, most will be prone to dismiss it, and will actively work against its creation.

Ironically, the Air Force, who would be the most likely candidate to operate a global artillery system, has officers in it who may be particularly threatened by its creation. One of the applications for a global gun is launching supplies and satellites into space. In fact, a full-scale global artillery system could launch into orbit in a single day 10 times the total tonnage of payload that NASA puts in space every year. As such, it is an ideal platform for both the initial launch and then re-supply of satellites, both military and civilian. However, some senior officers in the Air Force may have a vested interest in not re-supplying satellites, or inexpensively launching them, for two reasons. First, the satellite and space launch industrial sector is often a source of jobs for flag officers once they retire. Second, some Air Force officers fear damage to the satellite-creation and space launch industrial base if satellites become cheaply or re-suppliable. Their preference would be to keep launching new satellites at very high costs in order to make sure enough work is provided to maintain the presently structured industry.

In order to gain the support of the Services, it would first seem necessary to enlist the support of the Air Force by emphasizing global artillery's role as being complimentary with current Air Force doctrine. To minimize effective opposition to its development, funding should be provided directly from the Department of Defense, in a program akin to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, rather than come from the Air Force's (or Army's) budget. Furthermore, studies will need to be conducted that will demonstrate the global gun's usefulness to all the Services, to try and minimize their opposition.

CONCLUSION

This paper provides the groundwork for thinking about the revolution in military affairs from a civilian policy making perspective. In general, the ideas contained within this document are aimed at the broad sweep of the RMA and its consequences. Thus, the examples provided, with the exception of global artillery, are intended to demonstrate how general principles and ideas of the RMA can alter civilian policy makers' thinking about warfare, rather than being directed at calling for or eliminating certain programs.

It is clear that the RMA has the potential to have a major impact on the way in which civilian policy makers prepare for and execute war. At the fiscal level, more efficient weapons will reduce the numbers of weapons needed to execute a war, and thus costs associated with their construction, maintenance, storage, and transportation will correspondingly be reduced. At the policy level, the new technologies that are emerging will give civilian policy makers more leeway in determining when to go to war. And,

once a war has begun, will grant policy makers the ability to go after targets that would have once been politically difficult to destroy.

Though this paper is largely focused on the broad implications of the **RMA**, as opposed to more specific determinations about which weapons and projects should be pursued, global artillery is included because it is perhaps the quintessential weapon system that could revolutionize military operations in the modern era, yet at the same time is of perhaps even more benefit to civilian policy makers.

The time to invest in global artillery or other **RMA** systems is now. **As** the United States continues to have a major influence throughout the globe, the chance that we will engage in conflict increases. In order to realize the types of systems that will best enhance policy makers' choices in coming conflicts, research and development must begin sooner rather than later. Precision guided weapons have been in existence since Viet Nam, yet the United States is still a long way from achieving a cheap, reliable, and extremely accurate all-weather munition. Those weapons that have the highest accuracy need clear skies, and those that are all-weather sacrifice some accuracy.

In some cases, both military and civilian policy makers will recognize the importance of an **RMA** technology and that technology will be developed. However, in other cases **RMA** technologies that will be most useful to civilian policy makers may be actively opposed by military leaders, due to entrenched opinions and a genuine preference for different systems. In such cases, civilian policy makers must push for the development of those **RMA** technologies.

The ultimate recommendation of this paper is to call for an investment in RMA technologies as soon as possible, in light of their potential importance to civilian policy makers. Already, numerous papers have been published regarding the significance of RMA technologies for military planners. Given that there is, at least in some areas, a convergence between the technologies that will aid our military and civilian policy makers, now is the time to go forward and explore the possibilities that the RMA offers.

June
May 4, 2004

TO: Bill Schneider
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Global Artillery

Here is an interesting note from Andy Marshall. Is this proposal something the Defense Science Board should look at?

Why don't you get in touch with Andy to discuss it?

Thanks.

Attach.
4/27/04 Director, Net Assessment ltr to SecDef re: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

DHR:dh
050404-1

.....
Please respond by 6/25/04

To SecDef
Paul Butler
6/30

Sir,
Response attached. Original attachment included behind.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
6/30
6/7/1

OSD 08073-04

June
~~May 4, 2004~~

TO: Bill Schneider
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
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050404-1

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Please *respond* by 6/25/04

OSD 08073-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31192



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

27 April 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Marshall *Andy*

SUBJECT: Johnny Foster and Lowell Wood request for a session with you

Several weeks ago Johnny and Lowell came to see me. They want to see you to urge development of a global gun, which they believe is quite feasible. Johnny tells me that, while the idea of a cannon with global reach has been around for some years, the people at Livermore Labs have, in the last couple of years, thought through solutions to most of the technical and engineering problems it presents. Attached are:

- A short memo by Lowell expanding on the proposed project, plus three related graphics.
- A paper by Jonathan Perle that includes a discussion of the geopolitical implications of a global gun (I sent you a copy when it was written during the summer of 2002). See pages 13 to 19, which are marked.

If you decide to go ahead with the first phase of the technical program, I suggest that you also have two studies done. One on the costs of such a program, including the ownership costs of a long-term, fully ready-to-shoot capability. The other to explore likely reactions of other countries to a U.S. program.

MEMORANDUM

To:

From:

**Re: Transformation of Geopoliticomilitary Affairs:
Global-Range, High-Rate, Low-Cost Sourcing of All Types of Fires**

Motivation. In order to defend itself and its allies, the US has developed an exemplary world-wide force projection capability. The Nation's combination of logistical capacity and efficiency, superbly trained and proficient personnel, and technically superior weapons and equipment enable it to fight and win conflicts against adversaries throughout the world. Rapid, decisive, world-wide force projection is, however, an exceedingly difficult task. As highly effective as our current force projection capabilities have become, they remain imperfect and expensive.

Many of the costs and limitations of our current system stem from the need to apply force quickly, at the onset and early stages of a rapidly developing conflict. This, of course, is where force is most politically and militarily effective, but also where it is most difficult to apply. Providing really rapid response requires extensive forward-basing of personnel and supplies (with large financial and geopolitical costs), while too-slow response allows adversaries to seize and consolidate gains, driving-up eventual costs to resolve MRCs satisfactorily. Such considerations underlie the SecDef-stated desire to transform U.S. force-projection capabilities.

In addition to fundamentally enhancing American capabilities for really rapid response to MRCs, such transformation should also leverage America's great other-than-human military strengths – creation, production and use of high-potency weaponry – while minimizing the policy impacts of our well-known 'weaknesses': aversion to U.S. casualties, disinclination to harm enemy civilians, properties or territories, and reluctance to engage in prolonged conflicts.

A basic transformation in geopoliticomilitary affairs – not 'merely' a revolution in military affairs – thus may result, and certainly is called for by present circumstances. The key enabling technological means is a revolutionary concept: Global Artillery. Some development is required before this extensively-reviewed concept can be operationally demonstrated, but the required cost, time and risk are comparatively very modest. The basic question today is: *What's possible? or What do you have in mind?*"

Key Requirements. The force levels required to either stall the aggressive advance of a regional superpower in a MRC or to impose outright defeat on it have been extensively studied. Such analyses indicate that about 100B-2 sorties (~2,000 tons of military payload) per day of high-tech weaponry-delivery capability are required to decisively defeat a North Korean-scale adversary when applied steadily over a 10-day interval (followed by ~20 days of ~40 sorties/day to neutralize national war-making potential), with perhaps 3-6 times that being required to effectively paralyze such an attack in its very earliest phase. [See Figures.]

Since the U.S. doesn't have (and doesn't choose to procure-&-maintain) the forward-based strategic bomber capability corresponding to such force-application levels, we utilize a variety of other, shorter-range ordinance-delivery means to deal with adversaries distant from our shores. The logistical penalties implicit in delivering such forces (involving -100:1 equipment-to-delivered-ordnance overheads, and multi-month intervals for delivery-to-theater and combat set-up) are responsible for most of the costs and limitations of our current force-projection system.

However, there appears to be realistic technical prospects for the near-term creation of an advanced, near-instantaneous, CONUS-based, weapon/sensor/comm delivery capability, thereby eliminating force projection delays and forward-basing penalties. This new capability would be used at the onset of a MRC, applying sufficient force to impede (if not deter outright) adversarial actions long enough for existing U.S. forces to arrive and definitively deal with the situation. Perhaps most strikingly of all, it appears possible to attain IOC of this capability within the present decade, with the cost to create an operational prototype perhaps being \$10 B.

Global Artillery. This novel weaponry delivery capability is provided by long-range, CONUS-based "artillery": military payloads are launched from high-performance, 21st century guns at sufficiently great speeds that they fly as much as half-way around the Earth before they come down - precisely to where they were programmed. These payloads *each* contain of the order of 1,000 pounds of weaponry - *ad hoc* mixes of munitions, sensors, communications systems, etc. - and are launched at rates of the order of 10,000 every day, so that roughly 10 million pounds - 5,000 tons - of materiel are launched theater-ward (or alternatively, into Earth orbit) each day.

A fundamental purpose of "Global Artillery" is to bring all potential adversaries of the U.S. "under the American gun" - and to do so within the same hour that the President/SecDef gives the order to do so. A secondary objective is to "secure the high ground" for the U.S. in a lasting manner, by conferring a completely unmatched degree of access to the space environment.

First-Level Technology Details. The proposed means for implementing this capability is an electrically-energized launcher - in essence, a mile-length high-tech 'artillery tube' - that's capable of taking electricity from a power transmission line, conditioning it appropriately, and applying it several times each minute so as to 'fire' a payload-packet of the order of 1 ton at a speed of the order of 6 miles per second straight up into the air.

The projectile so 'fired' is an RV-shaped object - a maneuvering transatmospheric vehicle (ManTAV) - that aerodynamically turns towards its target as it climbs through the air. It thereafter flies through space for 20-40 minutes and reenters the atmosphere over its target-area. By means of a combination of its own inertial guidance, GPS signals and target-homing sensors, it 'flies' into the immediate vicinity of its target and - depending on its specified mission - either dives at hypersonic speeds into its target as a unitary weapon (carrying -10X its own weight of TNT in kinetic-energy form), slows (possibly at high altitude) and distributes sub-munitions, comm gear or sensors - or whatever else may be required of it.

The 10,000 'packets' of mixed fires that each such facility can source daily represent a total of -200-400 B-2 strike-sorties - even more if sourcing hypersonic blast-engendering munitions - a level sufficient to stall, and quite possibly swiftly defeat, attacks by major regional adversaries.

Programmatic Sketch. Realization of such a revolutionary force-projection capability on transformational time-scales clearly involves some significant acceptance of schedule risk.

The overall-preferred programmatic approach is a three-phase one. The First Phase builds on previous (e.g., the attached) scoping studies, specifies the major risk items and generates a corresponding fast-paced risk-mitigation plan, and also provides skeletal engineering analyses and the outline of a prototype implementation program. Properly executed by a small team of top-quality people, this First Phase would involve somewhat less than a year's effort, so that, if begun promptly, results could be available within a year at a total cost of a few M\$.

The Second Phase would be quadpartite, involving execution of the risk-mitigation program, the corresponding fleshing-out of a more-detailed but still highly-opportunistic program plan, the development and demonstration of key components, and the concurrent commencing of procurement of long-lead-time items and performing the basics of facility preparation. It probably could be completed by end-CY'05 and likely would involve obligation of ~\$50 M (of which ~\$25 M would be costed in FY'05).

The Third Phase would involve high-concurrency execution of the detailed program plan, and could lead to Horizontal Prototype facility IOC at end-'07 and Vertical Prototype facility IOC at end-CY'08, at a total cost of the order of \$5 B. [See Figures.] This program phase would also leverage results from the old ABRES program for support of LRIP of the required maneuvering transatmospheric vehicles (ManTAVs). [In order to minimize cost and overall covert-program risks, the IOC would not involve major electrical transmission-line creation, and thus would sustain the full-scale 10,000ton/day launch-rate for only a fractional-hour with the energy storage capacity of its Power-Conditioning System; an option for very swiftly-executed energizing of the facility to sustain full-launch-rate immediately following IOC would be fully developed during the Third Phase. Plans would also be fully developed for swift post-IOC execution of ever more robust hardening of the National capability embodied by the Vertical Prototype facility.]

Additional Considerations. It's presumably clear that the 'Global Artillery' system represents much more than an ultra-long-range cannon or a super-rate space-launcher. Instead, it's a truly revolutionary capability for long-distance, high-rate transportation of mid-scale payloads to virtually everywhere that's of present or future military interest. It'll likely represent a technological advance of historic scale, one – like powered air-flight – that'll still be 'looking' for leverage-exploiting national security applications a half-century after it's first realized.

Two additional considerations merit explicit attention in this context.


Collateral Space Supremacy. The contemplated capability enables placement of payloads virtually anywhere in near-Earth space at far higher *daily* totals than are currently attained by the entire human race during an entire *year*. These capabilities inevitably confer enduring, utterly-compelling U.S. supremacy-in-space: America would own a veritable railroad-into-space, while all others would still be accessing space via figurative ox carts.

Asymmetry Maintenance. It's likewise obvious that the most careful attention be given, from the very outset, to maintaining profound asymmetry between the U.S. and all future adversaries with respect to effective ownership of the capabilities conferred by this system.

Recommendations. The historic opportunity proffered by this prospect considered, it is strongly recommended that immediate commitment be made to execution of the First Phase – involving detailed planning and design-for-risk-reduction – of this program, with a commitment-in-principle being made at the outset to seamlessly follow-on into Second Phase, if First Phase results basically bear out results of analyses made to date. This pair of start-up decisions will support a mid-CY'05 review concerned with provisional commitment to commencement of Third Phase work – the 3-year drive to IOC – at start-CY'06.


It's recommended that at least the first two Phases of this 5-year program be DARPA-sponsored, with special top-level management attention being mandated in order to move it along at a technology-limited pace and to maintain its covert characteristics to the greatest extent compatible with a very fast pace and top-quality people being enlisted in adequate quantities for its execution.


Because of its implications for enduring American supremacy both on the Earth's surface and in all of near-Earth space, it's recommended that this entire program be protected comprehensively, managed optimally and funded appropriately – and that top-level *ad hoc* OSD reviews be convened regularly to ensure all of this.



*From Figure 1 of "Analyses of U.S. Requirements for Conventionally Armed Bombers," by Gen. Jasper Welch (USAF, ret.), July 1994.


MRC Requirements - High Intensity Case





Horizontal Prototype Facility

11-L-0559/OSD/31200



Vertical Prototype Facility

UNCLASSIFIED

Political Policy Implications of the Revolution in Military Affairs

By: Jonathan Perle

Sponsored by:
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
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment
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Washington, DC 20301-2950
(703) 697-1312

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IATAC

**Providing IA Support to the
Warfighter**



UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31202

December 10, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN George Casey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Militia Theory

Iraq

Attached is an e-mail I received on militias. What do you think of it?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-49

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Ronn S. Pickard [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM
To: Donald Rumsfeld
Subject: MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwark of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31204

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 10, 2004

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: E-mail Response to Ronn Pickard

Iraq

Please send the following e-mail response to Ronn Pickard:

Dear Mr. Pickard—

I received your e-mail, I thank you and I will see that it is put in the hands of a number of people.

Thank you so much.

Attach.
11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-48

.....
Please respond by _____

OK

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

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Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31208

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)

December 9, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Future Travel

In terms of travel, I think when I go over to Asia, I ought to go to Thailand, Malaysia, probably Indonesia, Cambodia and Mongolia.

Let's talk about that trip.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-43

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

333 SD

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
Larry Di Rita
VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: COL Steve Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD

020 DD

Attached is a memo we ought to start thinking about fast.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/9/04 SecDef memo re: Plans for DoD - 2005

DHR:dh
120904-39

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

9 Dec 04

December 9, 2004

SUBJECT: Plans for DoD – 2005

We need to set our plans for DoD for the coming year:

- Outreach – Get a schedule that is more creative. For DR plus other DoD folks.
- Members of Congress – Get a schedule and master plan for DR, plus others.
- Ministers of Defense – schedule regular calls to key MoDs and key coalition partners.
- Travel – Lay out 2005 now. Must be creative – domestic and international.
- Press plan – do's and don'ts, off the record sessions, social, ways to help key press people who cover us thoughtfully and carefully (Mikelczewski, Raddatz, key folks from *Defense News*), contact with some of the key press people from DoS and WH, etc.
- Consider a new rhythm for staff meetings.
- Set plans to keep Service Secretaries in tight.
- Plan creative events by DoD for those who help – USO, entertainers, heroes, etc.

DHR:dh
120904-31

~~FOUO~~

December 3, 2004

TO: Mary Claire Murphy

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Letter to POTUS

Please draft a letter from me to the President, telling him how much Diane Bodman is doing for the troops.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-22

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

201.22

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08078-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31214

December 3, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: National Security Personnel System

230

Whenever we talk about transformation, we ought to mention the National Security Personnel System.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

3 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thank You Note for Bill Timmons

If we have not prepared a thank you to Bill Timmons for his heads up on the calling cards for the military, please draft one.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120304-10

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

311.3

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

file

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 9
SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss
120304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

12/15 ~~at~~ 12/16

TO SecDef
From Paul Butler

These have been Dave

335 SD

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08082-05

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

"HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

Ceiba
Citronelle
Equinox
Fat Punk's
Kinkead's

Marcel's
Melrose
Poste Brasserie
Rocklands BBQ
Tosca

Will be cooking a very special dinner on
MONDAY DECEMBER 13TH
6:00-9:00 PM

Mologne House Dining Room
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at



of Metropolitan Washington



Fax

To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest

Fax Number: (b)(6)

From: Elaine Rogers President, USO & Metropolitan Washington

Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2

Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!

HAPPY HOLIDAYS

11-L-0559/OSD/31219

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, (b)(6) raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from (b)(6)

DHR:ss
120304-3

311.3

3 Dec 04

1 Dec 04

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone Calling Cards for Military

311.3

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards." On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.

1 Dec 04

OSD 08084-05

720
~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Fundraising

005

Please call Lynda Webster and tell her I cannot write a letter like this, according to the General Counsel.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/15/04 Webster fax re: Request from Ambassador Michael Thawley

DHR:dh
120104-4

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31222

OSD 08102-05

Pentagon Memorial Fund**Fax**

To: **Sec. and Joyce Rumsfeld** From: **Lynda Webster**

Fax: (b)(6)

Fax: (b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Phone: (b)(6)

Date: 11/15/2004

Pages: 2

Subject: **Request from Ambassador Michael Thawley**

Hello~!

I received a call from Ambassador Michael Thawley of Australia. As you may recall, he was seated at your table, Secretary Rumsfeld, the day we held the Pentagon Memorial 'friendraiser' a few weeks ago. He was seated there because we have been talking with him at length about an Australian gift to the Memorial. Australia lost a citizen in the attack.

In order to secure the largest commitment possible, the ambassador is confident a letter from you to their Minister of Defense would be helpful. He took the liberty of drafting one he thought would be effective ;it's attached for your review and consideration. Naturally it can certainly be re-worded to satisfy your legal team.

I told Ambassador Thawley that while you have both been extremely supportive of our Memorial effort, you are being very careful not to engage in anything that might be perceived as "fundraising." Whether or not this proposed letter falls into that category will be something I'll leave for you to determine.

Should you or an aide wish to contact Ambassador Thawley directly, his number is (b)(6) his fax is (b)(6) Or, you may simply give me direction on how to respond to his request.

We have just passed the \$4.5 million mark today...! We continue to be grateful to you both for your continued interest and support.

Warmly, Lynda

11-L-0559/OSD/31223

DRAFT

→ Lynda Webster

Senator ~~the~~ Hon. Robert Hill
Minister for Defence
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

The profound loss of September 11, 2001 has moved a great many people to support the building of a permanent memorial at the site of the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. All those affected by the attack hope for a fitting place to remember the events of that day.

We remember that Australia grieved with us then. An Australian, Yvonne E. Kennedy, was aboard the flight that hit the Pentagon. And we will always be grateful for the fellowship expressed by your Prime Minister, John Howard, during his visit to Washington at the time of the attacks – and for Australia’s support in the war on terror.

A Pentagon Memorial Fund has been established by a group of leading private citizens and corporations which aim to raise \$17.5 million to build and maintain the memorial.

The Fund would like to include Australia in its endeavour and has invited Australia to participate in the building of the memorial. I would like to endorse their approach to you and encourage you to contribute. I understand that the Fund has had some discussion with your Ambassador about an appropriate contribution.

I enclose some additional information about the memorial and the fund. We would be privileged to have one of our principal allies involved in an enduring memorial to an event so close to our hearts.

Lynda Webster
→ could send information under separate cover.

DRAFT

December 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Admiral Ellis

Let's put Admiral Ellis on the Defense Science Board.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-6

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

334 DSB

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Commandant, Marine Corps

I would like a meeting with General Hagee sometime to talk to him about transformation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-7

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

000.91 SD

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
CC: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meet with Service Secretaries

I need to see the three Service Secretaries and David Chu to talk to them about precepts for selection boards and the importance of diversity and innovation.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-8

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

00071 SD

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Projects

I would like to see a list of the projects you're working on.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-12

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

020 DSD

1 Dec 04

Adv. copy sent

December 1, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Meeting w/VP

The President suggested that I have a meeting with Vice President Cheney.

Please see if you can work with Cheney's office and get it set up for shortly after I get back from India - the first day or the next day.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-14

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

000/1 SD

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
cc: Larry Di Rita
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Early Report of Abuse

38346

What is this *Early Bird* article about from the *Washington Post*? I have never heard of it.

Thanks.

Attach.

White, Josh. "U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds," *Washington Post*, December 1, 2004, p. 1.

DHR:dh
120104-16

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

Washington Post
December 1, 2004
Pg. 1

U.S. Generals In Iraq Were Told Of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds

By Josh White, Washington Post Staff Writer

A confidential report to Army generals in Iraq in December 2003 warned that members of an elite military and CIA task force were abusing detainees, a finding delivered more than a month before Army investigators received the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison that touched off investigations into prisoner mistreatment.

The report, which was not released publicly and was recently obtained by The Washington Post, concluded that some U.S. arrest and detention practices at the time could "technically" be illegal. It also said coalition fighters could be feeding the Iraqi insurgency by "making gratuitous enemies" as they conducted sweeps netting hundreds of detainees who probably did not belong in prison and holding them for months at a time.

The investigation, by retired Col. Stuart A. Herrington, also found that members of Task Force 121 -- a joint Special Operations and CIA mission searching for weapons of mass destruction and high-value targets including Saddam Hussein -- had been abusing detainees throughout Iraq and had been using a secret interrogation facility to hide their activities.

Herrington's findings are the latest in a series of confidential reports to come to light about detainee abuse in Iraq. Until now, U.S. military officials have characterized the problem as one largely confined to the military prison at Abu Ghraib -- a situation they first learned about in January 2004. But Herrington's report shows that U.S. military leaders in Iraq were told of such allegations even before then, and that problems were not restricted to Abu Ghraib. Herrington, a veteran of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, warned that such harsh tactics could imperil U.S. efforts to quell the Iraqi insurgency -- a prediction echoed months later by a military report and other reviews of the war effort.

U.S. treatment of detainees remains under challenge. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross recently told U.S. military officials that the treatment of inmates held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was "cruel, inhumane and degrading" (story, Page A10). Herrington's report, which was commissioned by Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, the top intelligence officer in Iraq, said some detainees dropped off at central U.S. detention facilities other than Abu Ghraib had clearly been beaten by their captors.

"Detainees captured by TF 121 have shown injuries that caused examining medical personnel to note that 'detainee shows signs of having been beaten,'" according to the report, which later concluded: "It seems clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees."

A group of Navy SEALs who worked as part of the task force has been charged with abuse in connection with the deaths of two detainees they arrested in the field. One died in a shower room at Abu Ghraib on Nov. 4, 2003, a month before Herrington arrived for his review.

A military source who participated in Task Force 20, the predecessor to TF 121, said the task forces comprised several 12-man units that had targeted missions, such as searching for Hussein loyalists and

terrorists. TF 20, which had about 1,000 soldiers, incorporated Army Rangers, members of Delta Force and Special Forces units working with CIA agents. They planned their missions nearly autonomously and answered either directly to the theater commander or to officials in Washington, the source said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the missions were classified.

Task Force 121 added Navy SEAL units but was slightly smaller overall. Herrington wrote that an officer in charge of interrogations at a high-value target detention facility in Baghdad told him that prisoners taken by TF 121 showed signs of having been beaten.

Herrington asked the officer whether he had alerted his superiors to the problem, and the officer replied: "Everyone knows about it."

While several investigations have been completed into the Abu Ghraib scandal and U.S. interrogation practices in Iraq, an official military inquiry into the detention activities of Special Operations forces has not been released. That probe, headed by Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, was expected to be presented to Congress earlier this year, but a Pentagon spokesman said it is ongoing.

Of the Herrington report, a Pentagon official said top generals in Iraq, including Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who at the time directed U.S. forces there, reported the alleged abuses to officials at U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activities in the Middle East. The official said TF 121 was investigated, but he could not provide results.

"The Herrington report was taken very seriously," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the report has not been released.

The report also provided an early account of the practice of holding some detainees -- sometimes called "ghost detainees" -- in secret and keeping them from international humanitarian organizations. Herrington also wrote that agents from other government agencies, which commonly refers to the CIA, regularly kept ghost detainees by not logging their arrests.

Nearly six months later, Defense Department officials were forced to acknowledge the practice because of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Soldiers who worked at the prison said several detainees were hidden, and a prison logbook showed a consistent stream of them from October 2003 to January 2004.

Herrington, who is considered an expert in human intelligence operations, ran programs during Operation Desert Storm and in Panama and was part of the controversial Phoenix Program, which targeted the roots of the Viet Cong insurgency in Vietnam. He compiled his report after a week-long trip to Iraq beginning Dec. 2, 2003, joined by a military intelligence officer and an Army intelligence official from the Pentagon.

His ultimate conclusion was that much needed to be done to increase intelligence capabilities, which he called below average, though he praised Fast's determination.

"Given the fact that the United States and its coalition partners paid and continue to pay a steep price in losses and national treasure to lay our hands on these detainees, it is disappointing that the opportunity to thoroughly and professionally exploit this source pool has not been maximized, in spite of your best efforts and those of several hundred MI [military intelligence] soldiers," Herrington wrote to Fast in the Dec. 12 report. "Even one year ago, we would have salivated at the prospect of being able to talk to people like the hundreds who are now in our custody. Now that we have them, we have failed to devote the planning and resources to optimize this mission."

Herrington, contacted by telephone, declined to discuss the report. A Pentagon official said Fast personally requested Herrington's visit, and the report indicates Fast was interested in improving U.S. intelligence and detention operations, saying that "in spite of efforts to upgrade this effort, [she] remained concerned about its state of health."

In the 13-page report, Herrington wrote that overcrowding and a lack of resources caused the Army to use "primitive prison accommodations" for even the most important targets. He said that led to the loss of considerable significant intelligence and might have fueled the Iraqi insurgency.

He added that some detainees were arrested because targets were not at home when homes were raided. A family member was instead captured and then released when the target turned himself in -- a practice that, Herrington wrote, "has a 'hostage' feel to it."

A separate report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, issued this past May and intended for internal use, gave the sense that some Army tactics served to "alienate common Iraqis who initially supported the coalition."

The 134-page CALL report singled out the practice of detaining female family members to force wanted Iraqi males to turn themselves in, similar to Herrington's findings.

"It is a practice in some U.S. units to detain family members of anti-coalition suspects in an effort to induce the suspects to turn themselves in, in exchange for the release of their family members," the report stated. The CALL report also was critical of the delays in notifying family members about the status of detainees held in U.S. custody, reminding family members of Hussein's tactics.

Herrington's report also noted that sweeps pulled in hundreds and even thousands of detainees who had no connection to the war. Abu Ghraib, for example, swelled to several thousand more detainees than it could handle. Herrington wrote that aggressive and indiscriminate tactics by the 4th Infantry Division, rounding up random scores of detainees and "dumping them at the door," was a glaring example.

As the United States recently has picked up its counterinsurgency efforts, the number of new detainees has again surged.

"Between the losers and dead end elements from the former regime and foreign fighters, there are enough people in Iraq who already don't like us," Herrington wrote. "Adding to these numbers by conducting sweep operations . . . is counterproductive to the Coalition's efforts to win the cooperation of the Iraqi citizenry. Similarly, mistreatment of captives as has been reported to me and our team is unacceptable, and bound to be known by the population."

Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks contributed to this report.

~~FOUO~~

December 1, 2004

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GAO Report

120-1

What is this item about in today's *Early Bird* referencing a GAO report that says DoD is not providing proper oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses?

Thanks.

Attach.
McGlinchey, David. "Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says," *GovExec.com*, November 30, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-17

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

1 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

GovExec.com
November 30, 2004

Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says

By David McGlinchey

The Defense Department is not providing sufficient oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations actually are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

As a result of the report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has ordered a study on the cost and time needed to modify the relevant financial systems to comply with regulations.

GAO released similar findings to lawmakers in 2003, and the fiscal 2004 conference report on defense appropriations called on the Pentagon to "strengthen the annual review process" and "provide transparency of disbursements at the same level as the budget submission."

In the report released this week, however, GAO announced that the Pentagon is not following congressional direction on oversight.

"The military services are not matching obligations to disbursements at the individual disbursement transaction level in all the years that disbursements can occur as required by the Financial Management Regulation," the report (GAO-05-87R) said. "Additionally, the services are not reporting the obligation balances at the budget submission level as directed by congressional conferees."

In their report, GAO noted that military personnel appropriations, also known as MILPERS, make up a significant amount of the Defense Department's budget. In fiscal 2003, MILPERS accounted for more than \$109 billion. That figure also includes allowances, housing, travel and reserve training. GAO investigators said the insufficient budget review is stopping lawmakers from making informed decisions on funding.

"This has made it difficult, if not impossible, for decision-makers to oversee how the services actually use MILPERS funds," the GAO report said.

The investigators took the Office of the Secretary of Defense to task for failing to implement the reforms from the top.

"OSD has not provided the services with explicit instructions in the Financial Management Regulation requiring them to review MILPERS obligations," the report said. "Moreover, OSD has not effectively monitored the services' compliance with the Financial Management Regulation's requirement to review obligation balances. Unless the services strengthen their year-end reviews and certification processes, the actual use of MILPERS funds will continue to be masked, and the baseline for future budget requests may be inaccurate."

GAO did note that the Army has made some progress in developing prior year financial reports with great detail. In a Nov. 23 directive, top Defense officials ordered the Air Force, Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to complete a feasibility study on recording and reporting detailed

- disbursements for prior years' spending. That study is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31, 2005.

~~FOUO~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
cc: Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Breakfast with POTUS

I think the President wants to have breakfast in the residence on Thursday morning at 7:00 am with Casey, Abizaid and probably Myers or Pace (but not both) and me. Let's confirm that with the White House.

337 WH

Thanks.

DIIR:ss
121404-22

.....
Please respond by _____

12/14

SIR,

It is confirmed and on the schedule:

Thursday 16 December 7:00am-8:00 w/POTUS, SecDef, Abizaid, Casey, VCJCS, VP, Card, Rice @ Small Dining Room next to Oval Office.

Cathy.

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31237

OSD 08112-05

December 14, 2004

TO: (b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Cabinet Acknowledgements

I need to know who I have called and who I have written to in connection with Cabinet people coming and going.

Please give me a list.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-20

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

230,02

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

file

December 14, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tony Dolan

*He is on tomorrow's
schedule for 8:40am.*

000.71 STD

I would like to see Tony Dolan for about 10 or 15 minutes sometime this week.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-16

.....

Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

14 Dec 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31239

OSD 08114-05

December 14, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Travel Schedules

I would like to see the travel schedules between now and March 1 for General Myers, General Pace, Paul Wolfowitz, Jim Haynes, Steve Cambone, and Larry Di Rita.

333

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-15

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Calendar
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Location of Events

In the future, it would be helpful if it is listed on the calendar where in the White House a meeting is going to be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121404-14

***** - ***** - ***** 1

Please respond by _____

337 WH

14 Dec 04

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Debrief Doug Feith

334 NSC

Please debrief Doug Feith on the NSC meeting and make sure he comes up with a list we can use with the NSC of possible things we can do with respect to Syria.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

14 Dec 04

12/11
1600

20

~~FOUO~~

ES-1692
04/016917-ES

December 14, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Wehrkunde Conference

I've forgotten the name of the guy who runs the Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich. But given the lawsuit that has been filed against so many people in Germany, I think he ought to be aware that there may be a reluctance to attend Wehrkunde on the part of people who are subject to those frivolous lawsuits.

092.3

Thanks.

Attach.
12/14/04 Washington Times Article

Paul Butler

DHR:ess
121404-5

12/20

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

12/17/04

MR. SECRETARY:

DD 12/21

- I CALLED MR. (b)(6) TODAY AND PASSED ON THAT THE LAWSUIT IS PROBLEMATIC AND THERE MAY BE A RELUCTANCE TO ATTEND ON THE PART OF THOSE NAMED, BUT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE.

- (b)(6) SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CALL, UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS, AND WOULD LET US KNOW IF HE LEARNED ANYTHING RELATED TO THE LAWSUIT. HE ~~ADDED~~ IT WOULD BE A PITY IF YOU DID NOT ATTEND.

11 Dec 04

15-12-04 110156 IN

YR Mila

OSD 08118-05

Washington Post
December 14, 2004
Pg. 2

1. Corrections

Two Dec. 13 articles incorrectly identified Gen. Paul J. Kern as the commander of the Army Materiel Command. Kern relinquished that post in November.

Editor's Note: The articles referred to appeared in the Current News Early Bird, December 13, 2004.

Washington Times
December 14, 2004
Pg. 1

2. 'Frivolous Lawsuit' Irks Pentagon

Leftists target Rumsfeld
By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Pentagon expressed concern yesterday about a "frivolous" complaint filed against Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld by a leftist group that is using a new German law that claims the right to investigate war crimes anywhere in the world.

The reaction was in response to a Nov. 30 lawsuit filed in Berlin by the Center for Constitutional Rights, whose founders include liberal activist William Kunstler.

The New York-based center filed the German complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials on behalf of four Iraqis who, the complaint says, were abused by U.S. guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

"Generally speaking, these cases are of concern, these frivolous lawsuits filed by activist groups on behalf of people making very unsubstantiated charges and probably not able to be substantiated charge," Larry Di Rita, chief Pentagon spokesman, said in an interview yesterday. "These kind of frivolous lawsuits are troubling."

Mr. Di Rita said the Pentagon has raised the issue with the State Department.

Tell Weekly
"State is engaged in this," he said. "Obviously, it's something that we're focused on and very concerned with and are going to pursue with purpose to make sure this does not become part of a pattern."

German-U.S. relations have been strained over the Iraq war, which the Berlin government adamantly opposed.

The Pentagon's concerns resemble a dispute last year between Mr. Rumsfeld and another NATO country, Belgium. Mr. Rumsfeld traveled to Brussels for a NATO meeting and used the visit to bluntly chastise Belgium for a law that has made the nation a favored venue for accusations of war crimes against American leaders.

Lawyers cited Belgium's law to file a number of lawsuits, including one against retired Gen. Tommy Franks, who commanded the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein. Previously, a complaint was filed against former President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

Activists also filed cases against former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.

Mr. Rumsfeld said the law could force U.S. officials to shut NATO headquarters in Brussels. He also threatened to block funding for a new NATO building.

"We will have to seriously consider whether we can allow our civilian and military officials to come to Belgium," Mr. Rumsfeld said at a news conference last year.

As the lawsuits and complaints piled up, Belgium gutted the law.

Republicans in Washington take a dim view of U.S. service members being subjected to international courts, fearing that anti-U.S. groups will use such courts as a

vehicle to carry out a vendetta against American forces throughout the world.

On a global scale, President Bush has refused to submit a treaty to the Senate that would make Washington a party to a new International Criminal Court.

There are parallels to the situation in Germany, where the United States stations about 70,000 troops. In 2002, Germany enacted the Code of Crimes Against International Law. It grants German courts "universal jurisdiction," or the power to hear war-crimes complaints regardless of where the war crimes are supposed to have taken place.

This law is the basis for the Center for Constitutional Rights' picking Germany to file its complaint against Mr. Rumsfeld. Also named in the complaint are former CIA Director George J. Tenet; Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the former top commander in Iraq when abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred; and Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who ran the prison.

Under the German code, the country's general prosecutor, who is akin to the U.S. attorney general, now must decide whether the case has merit and should be forwarded to the courts for a criminal investigation.

Asked to respond to Pentagon complaints, a spokeswoman at the German Embassy said, "German courts are independent of the government and this is an important part of a democratic system."

"Secondly, the international code of crimes deals with crimes against humanity and crimes punishable following international conventions," she said on the condition of anonymity.

The spokeswoman also said that after the law took effect in 2002, a "handful" of complaints were filed and the

general prosecutor rejected them all.

Center for Constitutional Rights President Michael Ramer personally filed the Rumsfeld complaint in Berlin.

"From Donald Rumsfeld on down, the political and military leaders in charge of Iraq policy must be investigated and held accountable," Mr. Ramer said. "It is shameful that the United States of America, a nation that purports to set moral and legal standards for the world, refuses to seriously investigate the role of those at the top of the chain of command in these horrible crimes."

The Pentagon has started a number of administrative and criminal investigations that have resulted in criminal charges against personnel who abused Iraqi detainees.

The center's mission statement reads, "CCR uses litigation proactively to advance the law in a positive direction, to empower poor communities and communities of color, to guarantee the rights of those with the fewest protections and least access to legal resources, to train the next generation of constitutional and human rights attorneys, and to strengthen the broader movement for constitutional and human rights."

Wall Street Journal
December 14, 2004

Pg. 4

3. Pentagon To Seek \$80 Billion More

Request to Help Finance Iraq, Afghanistan Presence Is Bigger Than Expected

By Greg Jaffe and Jackie Calmes, Staff Reporters Of The Wall Street Journal
WASHINGTON

Pentagon officials said they will ask the Bush administration for an additional \$80 billion in emergency funding to help pay costs of the military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, slightly higher than the \$70 billion to \$75

DEC 14 2004

385.6

TO: Pete Geren
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brits and Detainees

Colin Powell tells me the Brits are going to come back and try to get four more detainees. We better be ready.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121304-38

.....
Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 14 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Article by Douglas MacKinnon

000.7

Here's an interesting article by Douglas MacKinnon. You might want to thank him.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/11/04 New York Post article by Douglas MacKinnon

DHR:ss
121304-34

.....

Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31246

OSD 08120-05

insurgency.

On the other hand, the United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of mostly Shiite parties organized under the auspices of Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, is expected to win a large majority in the 275-seat assembly, enabling it to write up Iraq's constitution. A Shiite domination of Iraqi politics will further polarize the ethnic divide already aggravated by the war and push the door wide open toward a civil war.

Although Shiite and Sunni affiliations have been an integral part of Iraq's history, two U.S.-led wars and occupation have galvanized these far-from-homogenous communities into tribe-like ethnicities with hardening sectarian loyalties. During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Iraqi Shiites were seen as great patriots who fought bravely against the (Shiite) Iranian Army. With the exception of the 1990 uprising incited by the Americans and the Iranians, contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi Shiites were no more oppressed than the Sunnis whom Saddam considered more threatening to his regime.

Today, the Bush administration is peddling the ethnic factor as a precondition for Iraq's (numeric) democracy. It argues that since the Shiites make up a majority 60 percent of the population, their vote will guarantee the legitimacy of the elections and pave the way toward democracy, with Sistani's indispensable encouragement. Wrong.

Referred to as a "moderate" for not advocating resistance against the American occupation, the fundamentalist cleric is also seen as a "democrat" for being adamant on holding elections when parts of the country burn. Beyond that, little is known about how he thinks or what he is planning.

What is certain, however, is that the ayatollah is a spiritual leader with no

political experience or interest, whose only connection to the rest of Iraq, indeed the world, is a network of politically minded functionaries and clergies with sectarian agendas and ambiguous liaisons within and outside Iraq. They feed him information and implement his general directives as they see fit. Today, they are dividing the assembly seats among their close allies in the Shiite parties. That is hardly a cause for optimism.

In fact, members of Sistani's entourage are thought to be concealing their true intentions in accordance with the Shiite religious code of Taqiya, or concealment in the face of danger, which was adopted through centuries of discrimination against them as a small minority within the Muslim world. Sistani's men are exploiting America's need for elections (when all other justifications for the war have been discredited), to prepare for Iranian-style clerical control over a predominantly secular Iraq. In recent days Arab leaders, including Yasser, have warned against blatant Iranian interference in Iraq and a "dramatic geopolitical shift" in the region resulting from the elections.

Why then does Washington insist on a policy that strengthens the fundamentalists and inflames ethnic strife, instead of empowering secular or Arab majorities in a federal democratic Iraq? Simply put, the Bush administration is trapped between two alternatives and no real choice.

If it alienates Shiite leaders, they would organize their own insurgency parallel to the one in the Sunni Triangle, leading to an immediate Vietnamization of Iraq's war. Otherwise, it must appease them and risk the consequences of their takeover. The latter scenario will probably not last long as the conflict escalates into an open ethnic war inflamed by

extremists on both sides.

In light of an aggravating strategic impasse, the Bush administration is opting for **appeasement in the imperial tradition: Divide and rule. Better split the Iraqis through elections than having them unite through resistance to the occupation.**

Such a shortsighted and morally bankrupt policy will backfire with cataclysmic domestic and regional consequences. Only in the context of a healing process of national reconciliation, reconstruction and the promise of full American withdrawal do elections play a pluralistic rather than a divisive role. Otherwise, Iraq would have suffered a costly war only to replace an oppressive regime with fundamentalist sectarian rule.

Marwan Bishara is a visiting lecturer at the American University of Paris and the author of "Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid."

New York Post
December 11, 2004

42. Press Pile-On

By Douglas MacKinnon

WITH each passing day, the role of the media in Iraq becomes more confusing and much more controversial.

The latest example: the "question" asked of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his "town hall" meeting this week with U.S. soldiers in Kuwait.

One soldier asked, "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal ... to up-armor our vehicles, and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?"

That question and the video of that question led almost every newscast or front page in this country. What does the question have to do with the media and its ever growing controversial role in Iraq? A reporter for the Chattanooga Times Free Press fed the

question to the soldier so he could set up Donald Rumsfeld.

While there is no doubt our soldiers need more armor and protection, the question remains: Is it right or ethical for a member of the media to spoon-feed a question to a soldier and manufacture a news story that he and others would then cover?

Which begs a larger question: At what point does irresponsible and sensationalist reporting become dangerous, or even acts of betrayal? All involved in prosecuting and covering this war need to ask themselves that.

Political correctness dictates that we do not speak about this, but I have yet to talk with a member of our military who does not strongly believe that the Abu Ghraib prison scandal wasn't blown out of all proportion. Worse, they feel that the ensuing media feeding frenzy had a direct result in fueling the insurgents attacking our troops and innocent civilians in Iraq.

Do they feel the mistreatment of the Iraqi and insurgent prisoners was wrong and disgusting? To a person.

Do they think some in the media have used the inappropriate behavior of seven ignorant soldiers to tar and feather the other 140,000 on the ground? To a person. Just as they feel that many in the press are purposely twisting the definition of "torture" to play "gotcha" journalism with a military they not so secretly look down upon.

As recently as this week, in a lead editorial, The Washington Post referred to the Abu Ghraib situation as "torture" and "extreme." If the Post thinks that the reprehensible, but juvenile humiliation we saw in the Abu Ghraib photos rises to the level of "torture," then I would ask them to define what innocent Iraqi police endured before being shot in the head, or the brutal beatings endured by U.S. military POWs during the first Gulf War.

December 14, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ballot for Marty Hoffmann

014,35

Please **put** this ballot with the materials for Marty Hoffmann that we are going to give him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Ballot

DHR:dh
121404-25



Please respond by _____

14 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

000,115D

TO: Paul Butler
CC: Jim O'Beirne
COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Tony Principi

I ought to try to have lunch with Tony Principi sometime to talk about the VA-DoD relationship.

Jim O'Beirne, please get me a copy of his background sheet.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-12

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: MoD Letter

Afghanistan

I should get a letter off to the new Minister of Defense of Afghanistan, if in fact it has been decided.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-10

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Kurt Schilling

335

I saw Kurt Schilling last night, and he volunteered to help and do anything. I talked to him a bit about the possibility of going to Walter Reed or Bethesda. He said (b)(6) so he is not able to do much right now, but at some point in the future.

He also said he would be willing to go overseas, if that would be helpful.

Why don't we check in two months and see how his health is.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-8

.....
Please respond by 2/10/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

311.3

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards

Please look into this memo I sent Andy Card.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 SD memo to Card

DHR:dh
121504-6

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

15 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, (b)(6) raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from (b)(6)

DHR:ss
120304-3



OK 12/3

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: (b)(6)

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone **Calling Cards** for Military

Request **your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families**. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to **issue an order concerning prepaid calling cards that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%**.

Ten years **ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (called enhanced cards) was placed in service**. Telephone **calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees**. After all these years the FCC intends to **make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less**.

Consistent with the **goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users**. The USO provides **free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program"**. Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, **drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards**. **Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country**. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation **Congress directed the FCC 'not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards.'** **On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented**. The FCC chairman put off official action **until after the election but now intends to go forward**.

Dan, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call **Andy Card** and **ask him to help?**

Thanks a bunch.

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Progress

Korea

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh
121504-2

.....
Please respond by _____

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004



TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Operation Hometown

1
292

Someone with the Vice President's party last night talked to me about "Operation Hometown." Do you know anything about it?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
121504-1

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

~~1/21/05~~ 1/11

SecDef -

OK

See the attached

Note. It may be what

The individual was referring to. It is a good and very interesting program at the National Endowment for the Arts. Could not

15 Dec 04

find "Operation Hometown" per se. ~~TOP SECRET~~
11-L-0559/OSD/31256 Di Rita

OSD 08127-05

MEMORANDUM

To: (b)(6)

From: [Redacted]

Date: December 17, 2004

Re: Operation Hometown/ Operation Homecoming

I have reviewed our *America Supports You* database and researched online, but I was unable to locate a program entitled *Operation Hometown*. There is a program entitled *Operation Homecoming* that may be the one to which he is referring.

- *Operation Homecoming: Writing the Wartime Experience*, is a program for U.S. military personnel and their families aimed at preserving the stories and reflections of American troops who have served our nation in Afghanistan and Iraq—and stateside defending the homeland.
- In coordination with all four branches of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, the National Endowment for the Arts is sponsoring writing workshops for returning troops and their families at military installations across the country and overseas.
- The workshops will be taught by some of America's most distinguished novelists, poets, historians, and journalists, these workshops will provide service men and women with the opportunity to write about their wartime experiences in a variety of forms—from fiction, verse, and letters to essay, memoir, and personal journal. The visiting writers, many of whom are war veterans themselves, will help the troops share their stories with current and future generations.
- The *Arts* Endowment has produced an accompanying audio CD for this program. Moving from a heart-rending letter from the Civil War to poems and memoirs about World War II to Vietnam War fiction, the CD explores the variety of literary responses by those who have come through similar experiences.
- In addition to these multi-day workshops and CD, the Arts Endowment will provide an online writing tutorial at www.operationhomecoming.org to help the troops develop their writing skills and access writing resources. The Web site also will be used to collect submissions of writing by active personnel and their families.
- The best writing that emerges from this program will be published in a nationally promoted anthology of wartime writing that will be sold in bookstores and will be distributed free by the *Arts* Endowment to military installations, schools, and libraries.

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

451.6

Please get back to me with the answer on the Ike Skelton story on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Story

MR

Please get back to me with the answer on the Ike Skelton story on the armored personnel carriers, and why we are not using them until we get enough up-armored humvees. It sounds reasonable to me.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-21

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

YS 1 6

*1/12/05 -
SecDef -*

12 Jan 05

General Myers will be responding to Ike Skelton, but there seems to be a divergence of views in the matter between the Army and CentCom in the matter. There is an indecipherable Joint Staff info memo attached, but Myers will apparently respond.

15 Dec 04

OSD 08128-051-L-0559/QSD/31259

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NUMBER SJS 04-08131

TO CJCS

THRU DJS

ORIG SUSPENSE 6 Jan 2005

SUBJECT /5C/ LETTER TO CJCS FROM REPRESENTATIVE IKE SKELTON REGARDING RECENT MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THE LACK OF ARMOR IN IRAQ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To clarify Army and CENTCOM positions regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles prior to the CJCS's response to Congressman Skelton.¹

2. Discussion.

a. Recently Army² and CENTCOM³ provided responses to JSAP 04-08131 for the Joint Staff to prepare a coordinated response to Congressman Skelton's request for information on the feasibility of using the M 113 in Iraq to augment armored HMMWVs. CENTCOM and Army indicated in their responses that the M 113 was neither practical, nor readily available to augment armored HMMWVS for operations in Iraq.

b. In a 4 Jan 2005 Miami Herald article, written by Joe Galloway, the paper cites an anonymous Army source who states that the Army is preparing M 113s with add on armor for deployment to Iraq at the request of LTG Metz and approved by GEN Casey.⁴

3. Recommendation. HQDA and USCENTCOM provide feedback reference the validity of the Galloway article prior to the CJCS response to Congressman Skelton.

COORDINATION

NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
	Army				
	CENTCOM				

CLASSIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS
UNCLASSIFIED	

DUNCAN HUNTER, CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN
 CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA
 JOEL WELBY, COLORADO
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 JOHN M. COSTART, INDIANA
 WALTER S. JONES, NORTH CAROLINA
 JIM RYUN, KANSAS
 JIM DEBBARD, NEVADA
 ROBERT HAYES, NORTH CAROLINA
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 ROE SIMMONS, CONNECTICUT
 JO ANN TAYLOR, UTAH
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 FRANK A. LOBREGO, NEW JERSEY
 TOM COLE, OKLAHOMA
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 PAUL G. NICHOLS, GEORGIA
 MRS. ROBERTS, ALABAMA
 TRENT FRANKS, ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

December 13, 2004

KE SKELTON, MISSISSIPPI
 JOHN SPRATT, SOUTH CAROLINA
 ROSS W. GATE, TEXAS
 LAMAR BRYAN, FLORIDA
 DEAN TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI
 NEIL ABRAHAMSON, HAWAII
 SHARVY MENON, MASSACHUSETTS
 BRYAN RYAN, TEXAS
 VICTOR B. RYAN, ARIZONA
 JIM TURNER, TEXAS
 ADAM SMITH, WASHINGTON
 LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
 MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA
 DINO D. ROSOLUZZI, TEXAS
 ELLEND TALSICH, CALIFORNIA
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 WARDEN P. HILL, MISSISSIPPI
 JOHN B. LARSON, CONNECTICUT
 SUSAN A. DAVIS, CALIFORNIA
 JAMES R. LANGRISH, RHODE ISLAND
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 ROCK LAMSON, WASHINGTON
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 JIM INGRAM, GEORGIA
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 HENRY ALEXANDER, LOUISIANA
 TOM RYAN, OHIO

ROBERT S. MASON, STAFF DIRECTOR

General Richard B. Myers
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Pentagon
 Washington DC 20310


Dear General Myers:

I am concerned that the recent discussions in the press regarding the lack of armor in Iraq are a symptom of a larger problem with U.S. forces in Iraq. This problem has links to the Vietnam War. As I am sure you are aware, in the early days of that war the Army sent only infantry forces based on a mistaken belief that armor forces were inappropriate. It was only after several years that the Army leadership recognized that armor forces could make a significant contribution. One of the most successful units in Vietnam was the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was equipped with M-113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles (ACAVs) and M-48 tanks. Armed with multiple machine guns behind gun shields, the M-113 proved itself an especially effective vehicle for close combat in jungles against enemy forces armed with RPGs and AK-47 rifles.

I understand that the M-113 may not provide the same level of protection as some other armored vehicles currently in use, but they certainly provide better protection than soft-skinned vehicles. Moreover, I believe that the M-113 chassis is robust enough to easily accommodate the additional weight of supplemental armor kits, whereas the HMMWV struggles under the burden, and it is causing significant maintenance issues. As you know, broken-down up-armored HMMWVs provide no protection at all.

I have read reports where earlier this year, the deputy director of Army Material Command said he had seven hundred M-113 series vehicles prepositioned in Kuwait. Are they still there? I know you share my concern that we provide our fighting men and women with the very best equipment available. While we await delivery of additional up-armored HMMWVs, I would like you to revisit the possibility of using the M-113s the Army already has on hand as a means to provide them additional mobile protection. Could they point toward a solution to the Army's challenge in supplying armored transportation to protect our soldiers?

Sincerely,



Ike Skelton
 Ranking Member

11-L-0559/OSD/31261

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT DEPUTY TO THE ARMY OPERATIONS DEPUTY
(JOINT AFFAIRS)
OFFICE OF JOINT AND DEFENSE AFFAIRS

20 DEC 2004

ARMY PLANNER DACS-ZD-JDA
Memorandum Number: 788-04

MEMORANDUM FOR J4/SAIL, ATTN: LTC Ware, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Representative Ike Skelton's letter regarding recent media reports about the lack of armor in Iraq,

1. (U) Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. (U) Discussion.

a. The Multinational Force-Iraq Commander identifies requirements in theater and has determined that the Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAV) and Add-on Armor kit program best fit the need for daily operations in theater instead of the M113A3. Nonetheless, there are still over 800 M113A3s in use in the theater of operations.

b. Tracked vehicles, such as the armored personnel carrier, are not well suited for operations in an urban environment. The heavy tracked vehicle tends to be more difficult to maneuver on the paved streets than wheeled vehicles. The tracks of the heavy vehicles are also known to inflict heavy damage to the infrastructure. Operational commanders prefer the Up-Armored HMMWV to the armored personnel carrier.

c. The chart below depicts the availability of M113s in or near the area of operation. Of the 62 M113A3s on hand, 48 require some level of maintenance before they could be issued to units. Of the 332 M113A2s on hand, 242 require some level of maintenance.

MODEL	Kuwait	Qatar	DRMO SWA	APS 2	TOTAL
M113A3	2 (1)	45 (45)	0 (0)	15 (2)	62 (48)
M113A2	3 (3)	0 (0)	149 (149)	180 (90)	332 (242)

* Total Vehicles on hand (vehicles requiring maintenance) - AMC G3 data

d. Additionally, the M113A2 is not well suited for add on armor kits. The added weight puts a severe strain on the engine and transmission and causes the vehicle to move much slower. This is important to note since speed has become a critical survivability measure in the Iraqi area of operations.

3. (U) POC for this action is MAJ Steven J. Adams, DAMO-SSW (b)(6)

Abbott
ROY L. MCWILLIAMS
Colonel, GS
Army Planner

11-L-0559/OSD/31262

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3 Information Paper

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton
Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

1. Purpose. To provide feedback to Representative Skelton regarding the feasibility of using M113s to augment HMMWV armored vehicles.

2. Background. Senator Skelton would like to revisit the possibility of using M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) that the US Army already has on hand as a means to provide soldiers in Iraq with more armor protection. The following information in response to Representative Skelton's query was provided by LTC Clark LeMasters, CCJ4-O-LRC DSN 651-6636/6435.

- (U) Question: *Senator Skelton specifically asked about the status of several hundred M-113s that Army Material Command previously reported were in Kuwait.*

- (U) Based on a phone call from BG Leonard, CFLCC C-4/AMC SWA Commander, there are 45 M113s in Kuwait. All are Non-Mission Capable.

- (U) Based on a review of reports from MNC-I, there are 609 M113, APCs with MNC-I in Iraq. The table below shows the break out by unit. I MEF does not have M113s.

Table Extracted from 4th CMMC Maintenance Report.

M113	Required	O/H	FMC	NMC	FMC
1 CD	238	238	223	15	
2/2 ID	87	85	71	14	84%
1 ID	209	209	197	12	
MNB-N			0		N/A
III CARTY	8	8	5	3	63%
1ST COSCOM			0		N/A
44 MED			0		N/A
185 AVN			0		N/A
420 EN BDE	28	32	28	4	88%
16 MP BDE			0		N/A
42 MP BDE	0	0	0	0	N/A
504 MI BDE			0		N/A
81 ESB	37	37	35	2	
HQ, III CORPS			0		N/A
3 SIG BDE			0		N/A
CORPS TOTAL	607	609	559	50	

O/H - On Hand; FMC - Fully Mission Capable; NMC - Not Mission Capable

UNCLASSIFIED

CCJ3

Subject: Letter to CJCS from Representative IKE Skelton
Regarding Recent Media Reports About the Lack of Armor in Iraq

- (U) From the Army G-4, LOC Brief from 15 DEC 04, the Depot Maintenance Workload slide shows there are 750 M113s scheduled for repair at Anniston, AL, Army Depot (ANAD). 303 are currently on hand at ANAD.

SYSTEM	SOURCE OF REPAIR	FY05 REQUIREMENT	FY05 FUNDED WORKLOAD*	ON-HAND		FY05 PROG (EOM)	FY05 COMP (TO DATE)
				UNSERV WAITING INDUCTION	WORK IN PROGRESS		
M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	ANAD	763	750	243	60	41	28

- (U) From the same Army G-4 LOC brief, Retrograde Processing Status slide for APS Rolling Stock shows that there are 626 M113 APCs that have been shipped from APS stocks in Kuwait to source of repair. 445 are in transit and 181 are at the source of repair.

SYSTEM	BALANCE (AS OF 24NOV04)	SHIPPED TO DATE		REMAINING TO BE SHIPPED	IN TRANSIT	REC'D AT SOURCE OF REPAIR	REMARKS
		NUMBER SHIPPED	PERCENT SHIPPED				
M113 ARMORED— PERSONNEL CARRIER FOV	626	626	100%	0	445	181	363 ON CHARLTON

3. Recommendation: None. Provided for information only.

APPROVED BY: //PJK//21 Dec 04// PREPARED BY://EAA//20 Dec 04
 PATRICK J. KANEWSKE EDUARDO A. ABISELLAN
 Colonel, USMC Major, USMC
 Chief, Current Ops Division Ground Operations

Miami Herald
January 4, 2005

U.S. Army Adding Armor To 'War Horse' Troop Carriers

To answer complaints about inadequately armored vehicles, the Army confirmed that it will armor two types of veteran war horse carriers and send them to Iraq.

By Joseph L. Galloway

WASHINGTON - The Army, beset with complaints that its troops are going into combat in inadequately armored Humvees, will send an older and less used class of armored personnel carriers to Iraq after spending \$84 million to add armor to them.

These vehicles, both veteran war horses, are the M-113/A3 armored personnel carrier and the M-577 command post carrier. Both will be tougher and safer than newly armored Humvees.

Army officials who pushed hard over the past two years for getting the M-113 into duty in Iraq said it was more useful, cheaper and easier to transport than the Army's new wheeled Stryker armored vehicle, also in use in Iraq.

The Army and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld found themselves at the center of a firestorm last month over the pace of adding armor to the Humvee, a small transport vehicle that's been pressed into service in Iraq as a combat vehicle. Critics have charged that even with armor the Humvee is too easily destroyed by rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices.

An Army representative, who requested anonymity, said Monday that \$84 million was being spent to add armor to 734 M-113/A3s and M-577s.

For the M-113s, that includes hardened steel side armor, a "slat armor" cage that bolts to the side armor and protects against rocket-propelled grenades, anti-mine armor on the bottom and a new transparent, bulletproof gun shield on the top that improves gunners' vision.

SLAT ARMOR

The M-577, nicknamed the "high-top shoe" for its tall, ungainly silhouette, will get only slat armor and anti-mine armor. Its high sides can't take the steel armor without making the vehicle unstable and even more liable to roll over.

The slat-type armor essentially is a metal cage designed to detonate RPGs before they breach the steel armor and the light aluminum wall. Similar slat armor has been added to the Stryker vehicle.

The armor kits will be produced in the United States, the Army representative said, and installed in Kuwait.

The representative said the M-113 upgrade was requested by Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, the ground commander in Iraq, and approved by Gen. George Casey, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq.

The **M-113** typically carries a driver, a commander and 11 infantry soldiers. It can be fitted with a .50-caliber machine gun or a **MK-19 40mm** grenade launcher.

NEWER, IMPROVED

The **M-113/A3** version, introduced in **1987**, has a bigger turbo-charged diesel engine, an improved transmission, steering and braking package, and inside liners to suppress spall, the superheated molten metal produced by **RPG** and tank-round hits. It has a range of 300 miles and a road speed of more than 40 mph. It also is amphibious.

More than **80,000M-113s** in **28** configurations have been manufactured since **1960**.

At 13 tons, the M-113 is much easier to transport than the behemoth **M1A2 Abrams** tank or **Bradley Fighting Vehicle**.

December 15, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Taiwan

Do take over the Taiwan weapon issue, and keep me posted on what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-20

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

China(Chats)

15 Dec 04

December 15, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Turkey

TURKEY

Do get back to me after you have talked to the Intel community about the situation with Turkey, and why the drift.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-19

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

IS BARRY

~~FOUO~~

DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: "Rumsfeld Plan"

0205D

What in the world is this group talking about – the "Rumsfeld Plan"?

It seems to me that this is this fellow out in Hawaii who we had questions about. I don't know what is going on, but I have never heard of the "Rumsfeld Plan."

Thanks.

Attach.
Halloran, Richard. "Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed," *Honolulu Advertiser*, December 12, 2004.

DHR:dh
121504-14

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

16Dec04

~~FOUO~~

Honolulu Advertiser
December 12, 2004

The Rising East

Rumsfeld Plan Called Ambitious, Flawed

By Richard Halloran

The plans of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to transform the nation's armed forces ran into a spirited dose of skepticism at a recent gathering in Hawai'i of strategic thinkers from America, Asia and the Pacific.

An Australian strategist on land warfare, Michael Evans, set the tone by pointing to both the strengths and weaknesses of the Rumsfeld plan, which seeks to propel American military power so far ahead of that of any other nation that none would dare challenge it.

"American strengths in transformation are seen as being in the realm of ideas, innovation and technology," Evans told his colleagues. Weaknesses included "a tendency toward faddism," a love of technology for the sake of technology, and "a perceived inability to transform the vast organization of the Pentagon, whose mindset was formed in the crucible of the Cold War."

The conference on transforming U.S. armed forces was organized by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, where military officers, defense officials, diplomats and law-enforcement officers from America, Asia and the Pacific meet to examine security issues.

To encourage candor, speakers usually cannot be identified. Evans, however, agreed to be quoted.

The main cause of the Asian doubts, which were as much cultural as military, was their difficulty in discerning what "transform" means. American defenders of the plan acknowledged that it was an "elusive concept," but asserted that the objective was to assemble a force that could dominate the spectrum of conflict from nuclear war to terrorism.

This transformed force, which would include political, economic, diplomatic and cultural elements, would provide depth in homeland defense and would rely on a revitalized intelligence corps, innovative uses of space, streamlined logistics, and new weapons.

The deadline was set as 2012.

In Asia and the Pacific, the United States has already begun to redraw the map of its bases and to realign forces so that expeditions could be launched to points elsewhere in the region. War plans are being updated and speed of command will be emphasized.

Alliances with Japan, and to a lesser extent with South Korea, will become even more vital than they are today.

Even so, Japanese misgivings included concern that the plan relied too much on advanced technology that Japan's Self-Defense Forces could not match. There was concern that efforts to win hearts and minds through public affairs, psychological operations, and the Internet would be neglected.

For South Korea, the Rumsfeld plan is seen as ambitious but ambiguous and has been greeted with ambivalence. President Roh Moo-hyun has asserted that his nation should be "self-reliant" in defense against North Korea, but some South Koreans have deplored U.S. plans to reduce troop levels in South Korea and to assign those forces missions elsewhere.

A participant from Southeast Asia drew affirmative nods when he asserted that too often, U.S. leaders insist that "you must do it my way" rather than to seek Asian points of view.

Another participant said Singapore found the plan had little relevance for small powers.

A South Asian contended that most strategists in his part of the world saw the Rumsfeld plan as "too expensive and too expansive." It was "technologically exotic" and not suited to low-level threats, such as terrorism, that plague that region.

The Australian strategist, Michael Evans, did not go into detail about the Pentagon's flaws. Others have pointed to bloated bureaucracies, contorted chains of command, and unending disputes over roles and missions. They have cited warring rivals in the feudal domains within the Pentagon and the anomaly of commanding U.S. forces by a committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, Congress adds billions of dollars to defense spending every year with projects that bring money to members' districts but hamper military readiness. Allied with Congress is a defense industry that permits incompetent management, produces shoddy workmanship and is too often guilty of waste or fraud.

Moreover, Rumsfeld and his colleagues have made little effort to explain their plan to Congress or the American voters and taxpayers, whose sons and daughters serve in the armed forces. Nor apparently, have Pentagon officials or American diplomats been successful in persuading friends and allies in Asia of the need to transform and realign the U.S. armed forces in their neighborhood.

In his summary, Evans did not spare his own country from criticism but concluded: "The process of defense transformation in both Australia and the United States is an unfinished symphony whose final form remains unclear since neither country has yet seriously tackled the key issue of organizational culture."

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia. He wrote this article for The Advertiser.

DEC 16 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Armstrong Williams

000.17750

Armstrong Williams wants me on his television program, and I have promised to do it. He is a friend of a friend of mine.

It is an hour program. I think I might like to do it for half an hour, and then maybe have someone else do another half hour, like Dick Myers.

Thanks.

Attach.
Business card

DHR:dh
121504-15

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

Television and Radio Syndication

Armstrong Williams
President & Executive Producer

The Right Side Production
201 Massachusetts Ave., NE, #C-3
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-5400 Tel
(202) 546-1218 Fax
www.armstrongwilliams.com
email: arightside@aol.com



16 ready

OSD 08132-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31272

December 16, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Intel Item

350.09

Please talk to the Intel community to try and figure out why the threats never materialize, after the USG has spun up. Is it because of the deterrent effect? Are the terrorists jerking us around? Is the intelligence weak? We ought to be able to begin to get some visibility into this issue, in that it has happened so many times.

What it is costing us? It has to be billions of dollars. Please talk to Tina and see what she can estimate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121504-18

.....
Please *respond* by 1/13/05

16 Dec 04

720

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

FILE
COPY

12/02

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

CC: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

322

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the **JTF HQ**. Clearly a lot of good work by his staff and the Joint Staff as well went into it.

I do want to see you carefully think through whether it ought to be **an** active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to **use** reserves. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can sign in the next two weeks. We need to move out on this.

Thanks.

DHR:sf
120204-10

.....
Please respond by 17 Dec 04

Thanks.

*Sir,
Response attached.
4/r
Lt Col Lengyel
FEB 04 2005*

Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 08135-05

11-L-0559/OSD/31274

December 2, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ~~-\$~~
SUBJECT: Tilghman Island

800

An acquaintance of mine gave me this material about Tilghman Island. It sounds reasonable to me. Why don't you have someone look into it. I don't know what the arguments, and I don't have a view.

Thanks.

Attach.
Information on Tilghman Island, MD

DHR:ss
120204-8

.....
Please respond by 11/13/05

Thanks.

2 Dec 04

Objective: To restore Devils Island in Tilghman, Maryland to its former size which could then be used as a wildlife habitat. **Action Required:** The Corps of Engineers periodically dredges the Knapps Narrows channel in Tilghman for navigation purposes. The dredge materials are presently barged to far away Poplar Island. Instead of depositing the dredge at Poplar Island, the Corps may want to consider depositing it at Devils Island...a far closer location with the resultant beneficial results of less costs for transportation and the creation of a wildlife habitat. (The present owner of Devils Island is offering the location for dumping of the dredge at no cost to the government.)

8

Point which it holds to this day. It is at the end of Poplar Grove Street, and is the location of many modern homes. Sailing past Chicken Point comes in our view a small man-made island which is the birthplace of many of the East coast's work and racing canoes, built on Tilghman's Island. Here Capt. John B. Harrison had a boat yard and also a fish packing and oyster house. Mr. Harrison packed his fish in a different method than is done today. They were put in barrels with much salt and packed very hard. The island is reached either by boat or the long board walk that connects it to the main land. This at present has been nearly torn down by storms and high tides. Just who named Devil's Island is not known. However, it no doubt was named by the one who built it. This landmark is not in use at the present writing.

Just a short distance from here is another man made island, much larger in size. It is that of Avalon. This is where the only post office in the United States, to be on such an island, is located. Just how it received its name is plain to see. The word avalanche meaning a mass of rock, stone, or shells, no doubt is how it came about. There was also a steamboat running there by the name of Avalon, and some to this day feel that it was named after the boat.

As we sail around the shores of Tilghman's Island, some distance from Avalon is another well known name, Pig Pen, where during the War of 1812 stood a very large dwelling. This story may be well considered, as the party telling it made it clear, that it was only handed down to her and may not be at all correct.

The story goes, that an old slave who was freed by his owner, did not want to leave so built himself a little place here. It being so small and all that he could afford, he called it his Pig Pen. Since that time it still holds that name. Just a few more minutes of sailing and we arrive at the village of Barneck, so named because of a long sandy bar that extended from one of its points. Homes at Barneck are somewhat scattered, but it is an ideal place for the man making a livelihood from the water.

Around the shore from this village is another which is some-


(circa 1950)



DEVIL'S ISLAND



AVALON



Payson Island

BAY

KNAPP NARROWS

Devils Island

HARRIS

21671

CHESAPEAKE

Payson Island

Upper Bar Neck Point

Lower Bar Neck Point

11-L-0559/OSD/31278

PTANK

KE BAY

1:50,000

December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
CC: Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Visits to Bethesda and Walter Reed

333 SD

I want to go to both Bethesda and Walter Reed sometime before Christmas to see the wounded troops. If I'm not here on a weekend, or traveling too much, I'll have to do it during the week.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-6

.....
Please respond by _____

2 Dec 04

December 2, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
cc: Cathy Mainardi
(b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Boy Scout Jamboree

080

I ought to think about going to the Boy Scout Jamboree on July 24, 2005 at Fort AP Hill, near Richmond.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-4



Please *respond* by _____

OSD 08140-05

2 Dec 04

December 2, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's the material from Powell Moore. I asked him to please try to stay on longer, to be sure we get someone confirmed in time.

You should get hot on this - let's get that list and put it on the top of the priorities.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/1/04 Powell Moore Memo to SecDef
12/1/04 Powell Moore letter to POTUS

DHR:ss
120204-2

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

020 LA

2 Dec 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

Personal and Confidential

December 1, 2004

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Powell A. Moore".

SUBJECT: Retirement Plans

- I would like to advise you that I have accepted an offer from the law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge to join them on February 1, 2005 to assist them in advising and representing their clients on public policy issues. Before entering discussions with them on October 13, 2004, I consulted with the Office of General Counsel and I disqualified myself from taking any action that might have an impact on the firm, their subsidiaries, affiliates or joint ventures. I share your commitment to strict observance of all ethical standards including post Federal employment restrictions on representational activities.
- In addition, I have asked the Department's benefits personnel to begin processing my retirement from Federal service to be effective on February 1, 2005.
- I have also attached a formal letter of resignation and request that you forward it to the President's staff. In this letter, I restate my interest in an assignment abroad, preferably in Europe.
- Needless to say, I am eager to support in any way possible the urgent task of identifying and recruiting a highly qualified successor. I have a couple of names to add to the list I gave you on July 31 and have given them to Jim O'Beirne.

Attachment:
As stated

11-L-0559/OSD/31283



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

December 1, 2004

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

With deep appreciation for the opportunity to serve in your Administration, I hereby offer my resignation from the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to be effective on January 31st, 2005.

No honor has ever come to me that exceeds the privilege of serving under the leadership of you and Secretary Rumsfeld for the past four years. Generations of Americans will benefit from the visionary, heroic approach that both of you have brought to the national security challenges of the first four years of the 21st Century. The two of you have proven to be the right leaders for this important crossroads in the history of our Nation. My gratitude for the experience of being a member of your team and Secretary Rumsfeld's team is beyond my ability to express.

I would like to restate my interest in another opportunity to serve our Nation abroad. The private sector currently has many attractions for me, but I would willingly forego them for an appointment from you for an overseas assignment.

Congratulations on your historic re-election and best wishes for a successful second term.

Respectfully,


Powell A. Moore

11-L-0559/OSD/31284

December 2, 2004

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Powell Moore

Here's a background sheet on Powell Moore, and also some points that I have developed with respect to the job he could do as a U.S. Ambassador for this Administration. He is first rate. He is leaving. He would very much like to serve the country. I hope you will see that his name is carefully considered. You never know what might happen, but this is a person who has been carrying the mail, as has his wife, (b)(6) for many, many decades.

Thanks.

Attach.
Powell Moore Bio
Talking Points on Powell Moore

DHR:ss
120204-1

020 LA

OSD 08143-05

2 Dec 04

POWELL A. MOORE

Powell A. Moore is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. He was nominated by President Bush for this position on April 23, 2001 and confirmed by the Senate on May 1, 2001.

Mr. Moore formerly served as the Chief of Staff for Senator Fred D. Thompson, Republican of Tennessee, and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Mr. Moore held this position from September 1998 until assuming his current duties.

Active in public policy affairs in Washington for more than 37 years, Mr. Moore is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs under President Reagan and served on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan.

Mr. Moore began his Washington career in 1966 as Press Secretary to Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and served in this capacity until Senator Russell's death in January of 1971. He then joined the Nixon Administration, first serving as Deputy Director of Public Information for the Department of Justice and later as a member of the White House Legislative Affairs staff.

He left the White House in 1975, and for the subsequent six years, engaged in government relations and legislative affairs consulting, representing a variety of corporations and associations.

Mr. Moore returned to the White House in January 1981 on the day following Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the 40th President of the United States. As Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs during 1981, he managed the Senate component of the legislative affairs office at the White House.

In January of 1982, President Reagan nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, and he was confirmed by the Senate on February 4, 1982.

After leaving government in late 1983 and before returning in 1998, Mr. Moore advised and represented business interests as a consultant and as Vice President for Legislative Affairs of the Lockheed Corporation.

Mr. Moore was born in Milledgeville, Georgia, on January 5, 1938. He graduated from the University of Georgia in Athens in 1959 after attending preparatory school at Georgia Military College in Milledgeville. After graduation, he was commissioned as an Infantry officer in the United States Army where he served for three and one-half years with tours in Baumholder, Germany, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

Mr. Moore lives in (b)(6) with his wife (b)(6). He has a daughter (b)(6) and a son, (b)(6). Mr. and Mrs. Moore together have (b)(6).

Talking Points to Support a Recommendation Of Powell Moore to be an Ambassador

- Powell Moore's career has prepared him to serve as an Ambassador and lead an embassy team to advance the interests of the United States overseas.
- He has a longstanding history of achieving measurable results in developing and implementing strategies to deliver public policy messages.
- As a member of the President's legislative affairs and national security team for the past four years, he has a deep understanding of the President's national security and foreign policy goals
- His career in legislative affairs has provided him with solid preparation for a diplomatic post where accurate reporting and insightful analysis are essential.
- Powell Moore has an in-depth knowledge of the United States government. He has worked for Senators Richard Russell of Georgia and Fred Thompson of Tennessee, on the White House staff under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan and in the Departments of Justice, State and Defense. He also understands the interests and issues of the Nation having worked closely with scores of Senators and Representatives from every region on a variety of issues including trade, manufacturing, agriculture and finance.
- As Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of Defense, he has accompanied Members of Congress to more than forty nations where he has participated in meetings with numerous international leaders.
- His introduction to U.S. ties to Europe came early in his career when he served for two years as an Infantry officer in Germany at the time of the Berlin crisis.
- His wife (b)(6) would be an exceptional representative of our nation.
 - (b)(6) came to Washington from Atlanta in 1989 as a key member of the staff of President G.H.W. Bush's Peace Corp Director, Paul Coverdell. Her association with the late Senator Coverdell spanned more than 20 years in Republican fundraising and political activities in Georgia and in Washington.
 - As Director of the Office of Private Sector Relations for the U.S. Peace Corps, she raised more than \$12 million in private sector donations to support the Peace Corps' initiative into former Warsaw Pact countries.
 - She currently directs the National Blood Foundation, which provides support for transfusion medicine research with an endowment of more than \$4 million.
 - Pamla was an alternate delegate from the District of Columbia to the Republican National conventions in Philadelphia in 2000 and in New York in 2004.
 - On November 2, 2004, she won a non-partisan election with more than 70 percent of the vote to represent the eastern section of Georgetown on a District of Columbia Advisory Neighborhood Commission.
- Powell Moore has loyally served in the Administration of President Bush during his first term and is eager to serve the President and the Nation in a challenging assignment abroad in the second term.

December 1, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: For Next Ivanov Meeting

Please tickle a note for the next time I see Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the statements we have made out of the Department concerning Russia moving WMD out of Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-25

.....
Please respond by _____

Russia

1 Dec 04

December 1, 2004

TO: Jim O'Beirne
CC: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{7A}
SUBJECT: Candidates

230.02

Please take a look at the following as possibilities for civilian appointments:

1. Seth Cropsey.
2. Pat Harrison. I believe she is currently acting in the public diplomacy spot over at State.
3. Steve Friedman. He just left as the White House economic person.
4. Terry O'Donnell.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120104-24

.....
Please respond by _____

1 Dec 04

May 19, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

011
1000



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - 03 27
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

May 28, 2004 5:00 PM

Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 051904-5

- You asked to see a copy of the letter sent to Rep Skelton (Tab 2) in response to his questions (Tab 3) concerning private security personnel in Iraq.
- Response was prepared by Reuben Jeffery's office.

Attachments:

1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. SECDEF's Response
3. Rep Skelton's Letter

ATCH 1

May 19,2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Skelton Letter

Will someone please get me a copy of the letter that I or somebody in the Pentagon sent Ike Skelton about contractors. I was asked about it yesterday in the meeting, and I don't remember anything about it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051904-5

.....
Please respond by 5/28/04

11-L-0559/OSD/31292

OSD 08159704

CPA ATCH 2



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 4 2004

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

Thank you for your letter of April 2 regarding private security personnel in Iraq. A discussion paper provided by the Coalition Provisional Authority responding to the points that you raised is attached.

Some Private Security Companies (PSCs) under contract in Iraq provide personal security services for senior civilian officials as well as some visiting delegations. They also provide physical security for non-military facilities inside the Green Zone and convoy protection for non-military goods. In addition, they provide protection for Governorate Support Teams consisting of CPA personnel and government contractors who team **with** local Iraqi officials to develop local government structures and functions.

It is my understanding that most PSCs doing business in Iraq do not work directly for the U.S. Government. They work under subcontracts to prime contractors to provide for the protection of their employees. Many PSCs are hired by other entities such as Iraqi companies or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities in Iraq. The CPA has established a PSC Working Group to provide a forum in which PSCs exchange information, and approximately 50 PSCs are actively involved in this group. The Attachment includes a current listing of known PSCs operating in Iraq today.

A draft CPA order on regulating PSCs, which will require certain data from each firm, has been prepared with input from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). The Iraqi MOI and Ministry of Trade will be largely responsible for the administration of this and any revisions that may be promulgated by the Iraqi Interim Government after June 30.



OSD 04942-04

CPA 01302-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31293

Finally, the Department of Defense (DoD) is drafting uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contract using U.S. appropriations.

I hope this is useful. We can provide additional information or a briefing if you would like.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Z. R. [unclear]". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "Z" and "R".

Attachments:
As stated

cc:
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer

ATTACHMENT
DISCUSSION PAPER
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ

SUMMARY

Private Security Companies (PSCs) operating in Iraq provide **only** defensive services. In the execution of these services, PSCs divide into two broad categories. *The first* category includes PSCs with which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) contracts directly. The second category includes PSCs to which companies doing work for the CPA have awarded subcontracts. The overwhelming majority of PSCs are subcontractors. Because such information is proprietary and may have privacy implications, subcontracted PSCs and their parent companies generally do not make available details concerning the prices of their contracts, salaries, or number of employees.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is drafting regulations for the registration and vetting of PSCs. The regulations will comply with and complement existing and proposed Iraqi law and CPA orders, such as Iraq's new business law (CPA Order 64, which replaced the Iraqi New Company Law 21 of 1997). We anticipate completion of the PSC regulations sometime in May.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is coordinating with affected agencies to issue uniform guidance regarding PSCs employed in Iraq under contracts using U.S. appropriations.

DISCUSSION

CPA's Program Management Office (PMO), CPA Contracting, and the CPA-MOI have records of 60 PSCs in Iraq (Enclosure). Of those 60, the CPA has direct contracts with only 8, for obligations currently totaling about \$147 million: **81.4** million appropriated dollars and 65.5 million dollars in funds from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). It is important to note that more subcontracted PSCs will arrive in Iraq in support of the post-transition PMO reconstruction effort.

Approximately 20,000 personnel are employed by PSCs in Iraq. These employees are U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and Iraqis.

PSCs provide three distinct security services: personal security details for senior civilian officials, non-military site security (buildings and infrastructure), and non-military convoy security. These services **are** defensive in nature.

PSCs work *for* the agency that contracts for their services. **A** PSC works for CPA if it has a contract with the CPA. If a PSC has a subcontract with a prime contractor to the CPA, then the PSC reports to the prime contractor.

Disciplining contractor personnel is the contractor's responsibility, not the CPA's. Normally, an individual who requires discipline is immediately removed from the country by the contractor. In the event that criminal accusations are made against contractor personnel, such accusations would be handled through a complaint made to the local Iraqi Police. In such a case, if the PSC employee was acting within the scope of his or her official employment under the terms and conditions of a contract with the Coalition Forces or CPA, and if the employee was not an Iraqi, then he or she would be immune from Iraqi legal process under the terms of CPA Order Number 17. The parent country of the contractor maintains a right

to waive the immunity. **If**, however, the PSC employee acted outside the scope of his or her official employment, the employee would be subject to Iraqi law. At this time, the approval of the CPA Administrator would still be required in order to proceed with legal action against a PSC employee.

Enclosure

LIST OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES OPERATING IN IRAQ

1. AD Consultancy
2. AKE Limited
3. AJ Hamza
4. Armor Group
5. Babylon
6. Bechtel
7. BH Defense
8. BHD
9. Blackheart International LLC
10. Blackwater
11. BritAm Defense
12. Castleforce Consultancy
13. Control Risks Group
14. CTU ASIA
15. Custer Battles
16. D.S. Vance
17. Diligence Middle East
18. DTS Security
19. Dyncorp Intl
20. EODT
21. Erinyes
22. Excalibre
23. GE International Inc.
24. Genric
25. Global
26. Group 4 Falck A/S
27. Hart Group
28. Henderson Risk Ltd
29. Hill & Associates
30. ICP Group Ltd
31. IRC
32. ISI
33. KBR
34. Kroll Associates
35. Meteoric Tactical Solutions
36. Meyer & Associates
37. MVM
38. NAF Security
39. Neareast Security
40. Olive
41. Omega Risk Solutions
42. Optimal Solution Services
43. Orion Management
44. Overseas Security & Strategic Information, Inc/Safenet - Iraq
45. Parsons
46. RamOPS Risk Management Group
47. Reed
48. RONCO
49. Rubicon
50. SAS/SASI
51. Sentinel
52. SGS
53. Smith Brandon Int
54. SOC-SMG
55. Sumer International Security
56. Tarik
57. Triple Canopy
58. Unity Resources
59. USA Environmental
60. Wade-Boyd and Associates LLC

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 TAYNT FRANKS ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

April 2, 2004

KE SKELTON MESSOURI
 JOHN SPRATT SOUTH CAROLINA
 SOLOMON P. ORTU TEXAS
 LAMAR WARE MISSISSIPPI
 GENE TAYLOR MISSISSIPPI
 NEIL AULICHUMENI ILLINOIS
 MARTY MULLIAN MASSACHUSETTS
 SILVESTRE HUYG TEXAS
 VIC SNYDER ARKANSAS
 JIM TURNER TEXAS
 ADAM SMITH WASHINGTON
 LORBITA SANCHEZ CALIFORNIA
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 TAYRYAN OHIO

ROBERT S. RANGEL STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
 Secretary of Defense
 The Pentagon
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to first extend my **sympathy and dismay** over the recent brutal killings in Fallujah. All of the killings in Iraq—both of **our** troops and of contractors and civilians—have been unacceptable and tragic, but the murder and desecration of the four Americans working for Blackwater USA was particularly barbaric. I would hope that plans are being prepared for a measured **but** powerful response.

One of the issues raised by this tragedy is the role being played by private military **firms** such as Blackwater. Media reports indicate that at the time of the **ambush**, the personnel in **question** were providing security for a food delivery convoy. I also understand that Blackwater **provides** the personal security for Ambassador Paul Bremer.

I would like to request that you provide my office with a breakdown of information regarding private military and **security** personnel in Iraq. Specifically I would like to **know** which **firms** are operating in Iraq, how many personnel each **firm** has there, which specific **functions** they are performing, how much they **are** being paid, and **from** which appropriations accounts. Additionally, I would like to understand what the chain of command is for these personnel, **what** rules of engagement govern them, **and** how disciplinary or criminal accusations **are** handled if **any** such claims are levied against them.

Firms like Blackwater are clearly serving important functions in Iraq and putting themselves at **risk**. It is important that Congress **have** a clearer sense of the roles they are playing so that **we** can conduct effective oversight. I appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Ike Skelton
 Ranking Democrat

TO: Gen. Richardo Sanchez

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT:

We are pleased with the progress that is being made on the Governance front in Iraq. At least for the first day, it appears to be off to a fine start.

I know that you and your team have played an important part in getting us to this point and I want you to know that we are grateful to you and respectful of the important contribution you have all made.

JRM

Regards.

DHR/azn
060104.47

1 June 04

OSD 08186-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31299



8:48 AM

TO: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached**

Attached is an email I received from a Princeton classmate of mine concerning fusion energy. I assume you are up to speed on this. I am not, but I thought you might want to be aware of how enthusiastic he is about it.

Thanks.

463

DHR/azn
060204.11

Attach: 'Email to SD from (b)(6) 6/1/04

2 Jun 04

OSD 08193-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31300

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 2004 5:43 PM

To: (b)(6)

Subject: Meeting at Princeton

(b)(6) and I were pleased at the opportunity to shake your hand at our 50th Princeton Reunion. We could only say a couple of words then, and we both wanted to send this note to tell you how very much we appreciate what you are doing for us and for our wonderful country. We know the job isn't easy, but I can't think of anyone who could take your place and do as well; so thank you again.

One of us (b)(6) has one comment to add. I worked at the Matterhorn Project from 1955 to 1959. At reunions I had a chance to see the progress since then. It appears to me they have developed a capability to actually achieve fusion energy. I thought you might like to know since such a development is the only way to solve the world's energy problem. Such an achievement would dwarf all that have been made to date, and be a truly historic accomplishment for the Bush Administration.

Yours sincerely,

(b)(6)

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Adm. Ed Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Singapore

Attached is a summary on some of the things Singapore is doing with respect to transformation and jointness. I found it interesting. Maybe we ought to think through some steps we should take with respect to jointness that are yet to be done.

Ed, please come back to me with a proposal for consideration.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
060204.05bts

Attach: Singapore & Transformation, Lin Wells 6.2.04

Please respond by: 6/17

SMY/MORE

2 June 04

OSD 08200-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31302

Singapore and Transformation

- Singapore is living jointness. Flag and general officers for all three services are chosen by a joint selection board chaired by the DepSecDef-equivalent. Command and control (C2) programs are "born" joint, and have been since the late 1970s.
- Singapore recently has designated an active duty general officer (BG Jimmy Khoo) as the "Future Systems Architect" for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). One percent of Singapore's defense budget is "fenced" for experimentation and future architecture.
- The Singapore Armed Forces are putting special emphasis on Integrated, Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2), trying to think through C2 in a network-centric environment. In November 2003 the "SAF Centre for Military Experimentation" was opened, incorporating a C4I Lab, a Command Post of the Future, and a Battlelab, along with a 12-experiment program scheduled for 2004. They want to cooperate more with the US in experimentation, and have expressed an interest in putting a liaison officer at JFCOM.
- In January 2004 Singapore's Ministry of Defence hosted a meeting entitled Island Forum II, focused on "Information in Conflict." Based on DoD's "Highlands Forum," the session was attended by all the senior civilian and military leadership of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and about 20 foreign invitees from the US, UK, Australia, Sweden, India and Israel.
- One of the most interesting insights from the Forum was into Singapore's response to the 2003 SARS crisis. Their actions represented a classic use of the full spectrum of information operations (IO) tools against an asymmetric and unexpected national security threat. Singapore's leadership assembled quickly a national-level team and supporting groups to counter both the Corona Virus itself and the panic, fear and hype surrounding it. The command, control and coordination of information, combined with an approach of being upfront and honest with the public from the first, was a key part of a global battle to enlist community backing, maintain morale, allay fears, and develop international support. High technology, internet services, and even rap groups, plus tough calls like the "culling" of popular animals, were formed into an integrated, multi-lingual, global campaign that ultimately succeeded. US public affairs and IO personnel could use Singapore's actions as a case study for a wide variety of unconventional national security responses.
- A two-page summary of the Forum is available, if desired.

Lin Wells

1



TO: Secretary Gordon England
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT:

Thanks for your note in response to my memo of March 17 concerning updating systems and procedures. It is helpful, except it does not address my memo.

I would appreciate your going back and addressing the issues in my memo. In the meantime, I will think about your memo of May 28th.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
 060204.066ts

Attach: 3/17/04 memo re: Updating Systems/Procedures & SecNav Response

Please respond by: _____ 6/5 _____

381

25 Jun 04

C6/2

March 17, 2004

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: updating systems and Procedures

D.A.

*S14,
SecNav Response
is last under.
CDE Nosenzo
6/2*

10 C

We have had a series of difficulties over the past three years, where only after a period of serious problems with a DoD system or process have we realized that we were still in the industrial age, rather than the 21st century.

For example:

- DoD Contingency Plans were out of date, and the process for preparing them was antiquated, excessively long and not suitable for the 21st century. Now we are fixing them.
- The deployment process for the Iraq conflict was broken. Now we are fixing it.
- The balance between the Active component and the Reserve component was clearly out of whack. Now we are rebalancing the ACRC.
- Our SRO procedures were sluggish and out of date. Now they have been revamped.
- Today we read that the pay systems for the Guard and Reserve are okay if the Guard and Reserve are doing one weekend per month and a two-week active duty period per year, but seriously inadequate when we are mobilizing to the extent we have had to during the Iraq conflict.

11/11/04/07

OSD 03937-04

3

I am concerned about what we'll discover next that **is broken**. We've made lots of progress on the operational side, but please review the systems, procedures and business practices that you use and/or are responsible for, and advise me of those that you believe we need to fix now, before we need them and before we discover they are not suited to the 21st century. I'd like to try to get ahead of the curve.

Please coordinate your responses with Ken Krieg in PA&E.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
031504-23

.....
Please respond by 4/16/04

DISTRIBUTION

CJCS

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SOUTHCOM, JFCOM, CENTCOM

USFK

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 28, 2004

2004 MAY 29 PM 3:08

Paul Butler

PWB

4/2

To: SECDEF
Fr: SECNAV
Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures Response

Mr. Secretary,

You asked that the CNO, the *Commandant* and I review systems, procedures and business practices and let you know what I think **needs fixing**. In our judgment, concentrating on one specific initiative will provide many other benefits for the DOD. Specifically, responsibility and accountability between *OSD staff* and the Services need to be aligned.

Discussion:

The ~~Goldwater-Nichols~~ Act clarified the chain of command from the President to the SECDEF to the Combatant Commanders; however, it left the relationship between OSD staff and the Service Secretaries vague.

Title 10 specifies that Service Secretaries have the responsibility and authority to carry out their obligations. Title 10 also specifies that all authority and responsibility flow from the SECDEF. Conflicts arise when it is not clear what authorities and responsibilities have been passed to the OSD staff. This is a fundamental management issue; that is, we need to align and document authorities and responsibilities. Today, confusion and frustration exist.

Recommendation:

We need to systemically address the problem starting with a SLRG level discussion. I would be happy to lead that discussion and offer approaches to move toward resolution. If, after the SLRG, you agree that this is an important issue, I would be pleased to lead or serve on a team to bring back options to clarify responsibility between the OSD Staff and the Services. The objective should be to align and publish authorities, responsibilities and accountability for all operating departments in the Pentagon and especially between Service Secretaries and OSD staff.

TSA SD	6/1
SRMA SD	6/1
MA SD	6/1
EXEC SEC	6/1

OSD-DB024-04

2

SECRET
201 JUN 11 11 19 23

June 9, 2004

To: SECDEF

Fr: SECNAV

Subj: Updating Systems and Procedures

Mr. Secretary,

Sorry we missed the mark on answering your memo – although I still strongly urge we align responsibility and accountability between OSD staff and the Services. That said, a more responsive list is attached.

Attachment:

As stated

OSD 08201-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31308

Defense Health Care

-For FY 05 through FY 11, Defense Health Care is estimated to increase from 30B to **42B** per year, but the Department of the Navy is unaware of any cost containment strategies.

-There is a need for a mechanism to derive and execute a strategy that explicitly links effective management of resources to an enterprise-wide system of providing for all medical activities within DoD.

Total Workforce Master Plan (TWFMP)

-DoD is in the process of rebalancing the active and reserve components, but is doing so without the benefit of a Total Workforce Master Plan.

-The civil service and contractor components of the workforce are not being addressed. There is not a system for reporting past or current inventory and costs of contractor support personnel that is department-wide in coverage, accurate, widely accepted, and timely.

-Creating a TWFMP that provides new organizational strategies for planning and accomplishing workloads, inventories, skills/education/training, and costs is a crucial step in addressing manpower issues that pose challenges to the Department.

Technical Competence

-We need a strategy for managing DoD technical expertise vice solely relying on contracting for the expertise. We are creating managers, with little technical and engineering know-how. Education is emphasized in the Services, but only with a management, or joint warfighting focus (e.g., EMBNJPME). Organic technical competency needs to be revitalized. During the Cold War, technical skill and analysis leading to a technical edge was important and were proficient at it. Today, we have lost our vision with respect to technology as a result of losing a peer competitor to measure our progress against.

BMMP/ERP

-Performance measurements and budget performance integration is impossible without a real-time, responsive financial management system.

-Uniformity of systems across DoD is desirable but not essential and probably not achievable at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time frame. Private sector organizations with different systems-achieve effectiveness and efficiency by focusing on the right interfaces and so can DoD. BMMP, in its current form, is likely to both eliminate Service systems with great potential and fail to develop into the uniform, overarching system that has been projected.

-Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on four Enterprise Resource program pilots. This effort will dramatically improve the Navy's supply chain, reduce costs and improve combat capability. It can also be modified to feed into any financial system eventually developed at the OSD level for the entire department. It is important to incentivize military departments to initiate bottom-up programs of this type while OSD is developing a longer-term top-level approach. If BMMP is overly prescriptive, the probability of failure significantly increases.

Working Capital Fund

-The Working Capital Fund concept is an attempt to instill commercial business practices into the Department to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Neither of these goals is being met, primarily because the stove-piped underlying business processes have not been reengineered to adopt best practices of the commercial market.

Long Term Maintenance

-The ongoing wear and tear on combat equipment in the current GWOT will have long-term negative implications if a strategy for coping with it is not established immediately.

-The deterioration of equipment exceeds that anticipated in life-cycle planning when the equipment was programmed and purchased.

If current OPTEMPO levels continue past **FY 2006**, this will be problematic. It will require serious strategy and budgetary decisions. Supplementals are not the answer if this truly becomes a long-term issue.

-As operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps will lose more vehicles to battle damage and drastically increased wear and tear than it can replace or repair within current budgetary resources.

-Requires a long-term strategy to compensate for the potential of increased OPTEMPO across the FYDP and beyond.

TO: George Tenet
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 2, 2004
SUBJECT: Memo of Agreement

I just received your memo on the Memorandum of Agreement for TTIC. I can't believe we haven't answered you in over a year. I don't know that you have ever raised this issue in our lunches. I'll get somebody on it trying to figure out what the problem is, but it is all news to me.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060204.06bts

350.09

25 Jun 04

OSD 08202-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31311

2/12
4900

720

In reply refer to EF-8435 and 04/001760

February 8, 2004

2/18

Sec Def
TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Sudan Peace Agreements

I take it you are up to speed with what is going on with respect to the Sudan peace agreements.

Thanks.

DHR:di
020804-87

.....
Please respond by 2/11/04

2/16 ✓ 2/20
C 2/19
Rodman is. See attached memo.

2/18

TEN 2/15

OSD 08254-04

11-L-0550/OSD/04042

In reply refer to EF-8407 & 001639-ES

SECRET

201 JUN -11 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Repair of Libyan Ship

How do we deal with the issue that the President of Croatia raised about being able to repair that Libyan ship?

I think we ought to pursue it. First we have to get the facts. So far as I understand it, at the present time it seems to me that it may be reasonable to let them do it, since it is \$210 million for Croatia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020604-29 (16 computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

*Close snowflake
C 2/4*
Sin C 2/11
Snowflake response attached
LTC Swope

OSD 08323-04

19-02-01 10:31:14

720

In reply refer to EF-8439 & 04/001779-ES

SECRET

FEB 8 2004

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Terrorist Financing

I think it is time for DoD to get involved in how the interagency is handling shutting down fundraising and financing for terrorists. I think we ought to start seeing a weekly report. We ought to know who is doing what, who has the responsibility.

I think it is critical to our success in the global war on terrorism, and I have no visibility into it at all.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-57

.....
Please respond by 2/18/04

11-02-04 12:29 PM

0 SD 08324-04

2/18 1800

120

✓
2/26

In reply refer to EF-8405 & 04/001634-ES

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2004 FEB -4 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

→ SecDef

SUBJECT: Coalition Forces for Afghanistan

Should we be trying to get more coalition forces for Afghanistan?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-34 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

2/18/04
C 2/26

S.C.
Response attached.
✓R
MSG JUD

OSD 08325-04

09-02-04 11:31 IN

11-I-0559/OSD/31315



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JAN - 6 2004

2004 JAN - 7 PM 4 57

EF-8019

I-04/000165

USDP

Handwritten notes:
1/6/04
1/7/04
1/11/04

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
Peter Rodman (b)(6) *Handwritten:* 06 JAN 2004

SUBJECT: US Advisors to Afghan Government Ministries

- On January 5 you asked about the status of US advisors to Afghan government ministries and whether we want them in the ministries.
- The Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) is comprised of 15 senior advisors and 8 support personnel.
 - Six senior advisors and four staff (including an ARG Chief of Staff) have been hired and are at work in Kabul.
 - None of the senior advisors work in Afghan government offices.
 - They are based at the Embassy and provide advice to Zal Khalilzad.
 - They also work closely with Afghan ministry officials.
- Separately, USAID has approximately 800 technical experts and contractor hires working in Afghan ministries on health, education, economic reform, and agricultural programs.
- The Department of State requested and received \$25 million in the FY-04 supplemental to hire approximately 200 technical experts to work in Afghan ministries.
 - These experts, in accordance with the June 18, 2003, Action Plan to Accelerate Progress, will be "imbedded" in the ministries and will offer specific, needed skills.


OSD 00258-04


11-L-0559/OSD/31316

01/06/04 11:29 AM

- The ARG is to design a program to hire and place these technical experts.
 - A contractor (e.g., Dyncorp) would run the program.
 - To date the ARG has not designed such a program.
 - The program will likely include technical experts to be imbedded in the Ministry of Interior to monitor the police training program.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

DUSD (NESA) 

PDISA 

2/19
0800

720

In reply refer to EF-8401 & 04/001626

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB -4 PM 3:07

February 8, 2004

TO: Sec Def

Purnan
2/19

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz
Andy Hoehn

SUBJECT: Base at Zader, Croatia

How do we sort through the issue on the Zader base? Please talk to Andy Hoehn.
The following facts sound attractive – there is an air base and a port at the same location; it was used during the Balkan war; it has 350 days per year of sunshine; and Croatia has a history of cooperating in exercises.

Let's get it added to our list of things to think about with Andy Hoehn.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-40 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

✓
2/20

C
2/20
2/19/04

Sic,

Response attached
V/R
MSG Judd

09-02-04 11:31 IN

OSD 08327-04

DEPARTMENT OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 FEB -4 PM 3: 09

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

LARRY DI RITA
3/1
Seckel

SUBJECT: Elements of National Power

We have to get the Department organized to **push** the National Security Council on all elements of national power that are outside of DoD - their authorities, their metrics, their funding, the leadership, their success/failure rates.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-60

.....
Please respond by 2/18/04

2/29
Seckel-
Two related snowflakes
plus Feith response,
attached.
D, R

OSD 08329-04

11-02-04 12:25 111

3/19/04

720

In reply refer to
EF-8385
04/001505-ES

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
201 JUN -5 08:13:33

February 5, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Global Force Posture

*ATTN: DI Files
3/29*

On the global force posture, it seems to me we ought to have a pretty good idea in each country where we are going to keep or put forces not only what the sitting government thinks about it, but what the opposition political parties think about it. For stability over time, we cannot rely on the governments that just happen to be in office when we are making these decisions.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020504-9 (ta computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

*Sir,
Response Attached.
vr/CDR Nozenzo
3/30*

*DR 4/19
C 3/30*

OSD 08358-04

720

FOUO

27 Sep-1630
Scanned

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Graybeard Group

334

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Memo "Possible Graybeard Group"

DHR:ss
092804-18

.....
Please respond by 10/16/04

reply'd

I think this is a very good idea.

NOV 29 2004
1148

29 Sep 04

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/31321

OSD 08366-05

~~FOUO~~

September 13,2004

SUBJECT: Possible Graybeard Group

I want to think about whether the President should appoint a graybeard group right after the election to sort through the issues of how the U.S. Government can bring all elements of national power to bear and sort the inter-agency issues.

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31322

3/12
1730

120

In reply refer to EF-8542 & 04/002313-ES

SECRET

February 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

ATTN: Di [unclear]

3/29

Se [unclear]

SUBJECT: Latvia

The President of Latvia is ready to help with respect to Russia.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020704-7 (is computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

✓
3/30

Sir,
Response attached. 3/30
vr/CDR Nosunzo
3/30

OSD 08371-04

20-02-04 15:28 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/31323

2/13/04

720

SECRET
2004 FEB 04 10:24

EF-8366
I-04/001438
February 4, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM:
SUBJECT: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Doug—

You have the action on this Moscow cable.

Thanks.

Attach.
USDAO MOSCOW RS Cable R 0214392FEB 04

DHR:dh
020404-5

.....
Please respond by 2/20/04

Need your
inputs?
Thanks.

J
Durnan
2/17

OSD 08372-04

04-02-04 17:39 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/31324

C2/2

RTTUZYUW RUEHMOA6973 0331439-UUUU--RUEKNMA.
ZNR UUUUU

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:RUE//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OUSD-P/ISP/TSPCP/CTR//
INFO RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/RAR/NMJIC-J2//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/RUE//
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EUR/RUS/INR//
RUEAADN/DTRA DULLES WASHDC//CT//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFNGOA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUFNGOA/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2/J5//

DF-
Action

UNCLAS MOSCOW RS

U-0056-04

SUBJECT: LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD
FROM SERGEI ((IVANOV)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE, RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, RE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

1. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM
MINISTER OF DEFENSE SERGEY IVANOV TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD RUMSFELD RECEIVED AT USDAO MOSCOW BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE
NO. 239 ON 2 FEBRUARY 2004.

//BEGIN UNOFFICIAL DAO TRANSLATION//

MOSCOW, 24 JANUARY 2004

DEARMR. RUMSFELD,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP RESPECT AND GRATITUDE FOR
YOUR GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREVENTION OF THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MATERIALS
FOR THEIR PRODUCTION. IT GIVES US PLEASURE TO NOTE THAT OUR
COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM IS
MOVING FORWARD ON A POSITIVE COURSE. AND TODAY WE CAN SAY
WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED
STATES IS HELPING RUSSIA IN THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO THE ELIMINATION
AND PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION STOCKPILES, ACCUMULATED DURING THE YEARS OF THE
"COLD WAR."

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: X DEPSEC: / EXECSEC: /
C&D: / CCD: / CABLE CH: FILE:
USDP: / DIA: OTHER:
USDI: / PER SEC: COMM:

+ UNCLASSIFIED *

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 2 of 2

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THE POSITIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR MINISTRIES IN THE AREA OF TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATED IN RUSSIA.

UNDERSTANDING FULLY THE NEED TO ENDOW OUR COOPERATION UNDER THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM WITH THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL STATUS, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED FEDERAL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ARE WORKING TO PREPARE THE DOCUMENTS NECESSARY FOR RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE SAFE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

RESPECTFULLY,

//SIGNED//

S. IVANOV
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MINISTER OF DEFENSE

//END UNOFFICIAL DAO MOSCOW TRANSLATION//

2. POC RDML M.B. WACHENDORF, DEFENSE ATTACHE, TEL
7-095-726-5317 OR 7-095-726-5000 EMB EXT 5317. FAX

(b)(6)

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 1
INFO CMAS(*) CMAS(1) JS(*) SHAPE LNO(*)
JSAMS(*) JCONNIPRDA(*) JCSONSIPRDA(*)

SECDEF V2

ACTION (U,6,8,F) 2
INFO SJS-C(*) SJS-C(1) CHAIRS(*)
CHAIRS TESTBED(*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(*)
DASD I/O&IS(*) C3I DASDI(*) C3I-DASD-DCIO(*)
USDAT:STS(*) ASD:PA-SMTP(*) DIR:PAE-RAM(*)
USDAT:NTP(*) USDCOMP(*) C2DIR(*) USDP SCCTR(*)
ESC-SMTP(*) OSDONNIPRDA(*) OSDONSIPRDA(*)
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//
+USDP BSC

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3

#6973

NNNN

*** UNCLASSIFIED ***

11-L-0559/OSD/31326

INFO MEMO

2004 02 12 - 5 08:27

USD(P) *[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *MR* FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: Cooperative\Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message

- On December 30, 2003 you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.

↑
REF X04575-03

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 ended.

- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in **USG** is that ratification will happen when Putin says so - at a minimum not before Russian elections in March 2004.
- We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson *LB*
 Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir., (b)(6)

OSD 08372-04

INFO MEMO

2004 FEB -5 PM 12: 27

USD(P) *[Signature]*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel *[Signature]* FEB 12 2004

SUBJECT: **Cooperative Threat Reduction: Sergey Ivanov Reply to Your Message**

- On December **30,2003** you wrote to Ivanov asking him to help ratify the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) "Umbrella Agreement" between the U.S. and Russia.
- The Umbrella Agreement protects DoD when it provides CTR assistance.
- John Bolton has been pressing Moscow to ratify the Umbrella Agreement – Secretaries Powell and Abraham sent identical letters to their counterparts.
- Bolton is trying to use CTR Umbrella ratification to protect legal standards covering other U.S. non-proliferation assistance programs in Russia.
- The agreement has been applied provisionally since Moscow has refused to ratify.
- DoD has been able to make the agreement work even without ratification, but we are strongly supporting Bolton's efforts. Ratification now will strengthen our hand for negotiations in **2006** when the agreement needs to be extended.
- Ivanov's reply states that Russian agencies are "preparing documents necessary for ratification." Consensus in USG is that ratification will happen when Putin says so – at a minimum not before Russian elections in March **2004**.
- We will continue supporting Bolton's efforts.

COORDINATION: ISP-Eurasia (Jim MacDougal)

Approved: Lisa Bronson *[Signature]*
Prepared by: Ken Handelman, Princip. Dir.,

(b)(6)

OSD 08372-04

2/23
1400

SECRET
2004 FEB 12 12:33

EF-839E
04/00160
C 3/2

February 7, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

Larry Di Rita
3/1

SECRET

SUBJECT: Kosovo

Please give me a sense of where we are in Kosovo, and what it would take to get someone to take our place there and get us out.

Thanks.

DHR:db
020704-14 (ts computer) doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

✓
3/3

OSD 08373-04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31329

09-02-04 10:19 IN

2/13 1300

120

In reply refer to EF-8399 & 04/001611

SECRET

February 8, 2004

2004 FEB -5 PM 12:33

TO SID

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Durman
2/17

SUBJECT: For Next Meeting w/Ivanov

Please tickle a note the next time I see Sergei Ivanov that I want to talk to him about the foldout page 29 from his Defense Ministry report on priority tasks.

It is just totally inaccurate and misrepresents the situation. It must have been written by Bolyevski. Save it for me and tickle it.

Thanks.

Attach.

"The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"

DHR.db
020804-8 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

✓
2/19


Sir, 2/19
Response attached.
v/cdr Nossup
2/19

OSD 08374-04

SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY SITUATION IN ZONES OF RUSSIA'S INTEREST

The possibility of the deployment of considerable groups of foreign troops and the creation of strike groups in the territory of new NATO members and countries that aspire to join the bloc.

A zone of peace and stability created within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with large-scale confidence-building measures and border co-operation, and the need to resist extremism and international terrorism.



The possibility of a military operation with the use of the infrastructure located in the territory of some former Soviet countries.


A region of potential military tensions where some countries are working to implement nuclear weapons programmes.

ITEM
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TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Media

Mr. President –

If you have not seen this, you should. I think you will find it pretty close to the mark.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060604F.05ts

Attach: If D-Day Had Been Reported on Today

000,7

6 Jun 04

Date: 6/4/2004 10:25:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From: "Schmautz, Kurt" <Kurt.Schmautz@mail.house.gov>
To: "Dayton, Soren" <Soren.Dayton@mail.house.gov>, "Latimer, Matt" (b)(6)
Sent from the Internet ([Details](#))

If D-Day Had Been Reported On Today

by William A. Mayer

Tragic French Offensive Stalled on Beaches (Normandy, France - June 6, 1944) - Pandemonium, shock and sheer terror predominate today's events in Europe.

In an as yet unfolding apparent fiasco, Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower's troops got a rude awakening this morning at Omaha Beach here in Normandy.

Due to insufficient planning and lack of a workable entrance strategy, soldiers of the 1st and 29th Infantry as well as Army Rangers are now bogged down and sustaining heavy casualties inflicted on them by dug-in insurgent positions located 170 feet above them on cliffs overlooking the beaches which now resemble blood soaked killing fields at the time of this mid-morning filing.

Bodies, parts of bodies, and blood are the order of the day here, the screams of the dying and the stillness of the dead mingle in testament to this terrible event.

Morale can only be described as extremely poor--in some companies all the officers have been either killed or incapacitated, leaving only poorly trained privates to fend for themselves.

Things appear to be going so poorly that Lt. General Omar Bradley has been rumored to be considering breaking off the attack entirely. As we go to press embattled U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's spokesman has not made himself available for comment at all, fueling fires that something has gone disastrously awry.

The government at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is in a distinct lock-down mode and the Vice President's location is presently and officially undisclosed.

Whether the second in command should have gone into hiding during such a crisis will have to be answered at some future time, but many agree it does not send a good signal.

Miles behind the beaches and adding to the chaos, U.S. Naval gunships have inflicted many friendly fire casualties, as huge high explosive projectiles rain death and destruction on unsuspecting Allied positions.

The lack of training of Naval gunners has been called into question numerous times before and today's demonstration seems to underlie those concerns.

At Utah Beach the situation is also grim, elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne seemed to be in disarray as they missed their primary drop zones behind the area believed to comprise the militant's front lines. Errant paratroopers have been hung up in trees, breaking arms and legs, rendering themselves easy targets for those defending this territory.

On the beach front itself the landing area was missed, catapulting U.S. forces nearly 2,000 yards South of the intended coordinates, thus placing them that much farther away from the German insurgents and unable to direct covering fire or materially add to the operation.

f1-L-0559/OSD/31333

were wounded in the haphazardly coordinated attack, which seems to have no unifying purpose or intent. Of this number at least 3,000 have been estimated as having been killed, making June 6th by far, the worst single day of the war which has dragged on now--with no exit strategy in sight--as the American economy still struggles to recover from Herbert Hoover's depression and its 25% unemployment.

Military spending has skyrocketed the national debt into uncharted regions, lending another cause for concern. When and if the current hostilities finally end it may take generations for the huge debt to be repaid.

On the planning end of things, experts wonder privately if enough troops were committed to the initial offensive and whether at least another 100,000 troops should have been added to the force structure before such an audacious undertaking. Communication problems also have made their presence felt making that an area for further investigation by the appropriate governmental committees.

On the home front, questions and concern have been voiced. A telephone poll has shown dwindling support for the wheel-chair bound Commander In Chief, which might indicate a further erosion of support for his now three year-old global war.

Of course, the President's precarious health has always been a question. He has just recently recovered from pneumonia and speculation persists whether or not he has sufficient stamina to properly sustain the war effort. This remains a topic of furious discussion among those questioning his competency.

Today's costly and chaotic landing compounds the President's already large credibility problem. More darkly, this phase of the war, commencing less than six months before the next general election, gives some the impression that Roosevelt may be using this offensive simply as a means to secure re-election in the fall.

Underlining the less than effective Allied attack, German casualties--most of them innocent and hapless conscripts--seem not to be as severe as would be imagined. A German minister who requested anonymity stated categorically that "the aggressors were being driven back into the sea amidst heavy casualties, the German people seek no wider war."

"The news couldn't be better," Adolph Hitler said when he was first informed of the D-Day assault earlier this afternoon.

"As long as they were in Britain we couldn't get at them. Now we have them where we can destroy them."

German minister Goebbels had been told of the Allied airborne landings at 0400 hours.

"Thank God, at last," he said. "This is the final round."



TO: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Speech**

Attached is a speech that was made by Steve Cambone back in January that I found interesting. There might be some material there that you would find useful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.05ts

Attach: Security Affairs Support Assoc. 1/22/04 by Cambone

350.001

6 JAN 04

Security Affairs Support Association

22 January 2004

Speech by S. Cambone

We are a nation at war.

We do not know how long it will last, but it is unlikely to be short.

We cannot know where or against whom all of its battles will be fought.

There are multiple fronts in this war, and

There is no single theater of operations.

We do know that we are all at risk,

at home and abroad,

civilians and military alike.

We do know that battles and campaigns will be both conventional and unconventional in their conduct.

Some of those battles and campaigns will be fought in the open, and

Others will be fought in secret, where our victories will be known to

only a few.

Success in every battle, in each campaign, will depend in some way on the contributions of the men and women of the intelligence community. If they are to provide the support demanded by their colleagues in uniform, we will need to transform that community even as we transform the Department of Defense.

Before laying out the goals of that effort, allow me to underscore the urgent need for the transformation of our intelligence capabilities.

We are facing a turbulent and volatile world populated by a number of highly adaptive state and non-state actors. Some of these are weighing whether, to what extent, or how, they might oppose the interests of the United States and its friends. Others, such as the terrorist organizations responsible for attacks in the United States, Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kenya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other places have committed themselves to war.

In such a world, where largely ungoverned areas can serve as sanctuary for terrorists, and where political-military affairs in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America continue to evolve, it is impossible to predict with confidence what nation

or entity will pose a threat, in five, 10, or 20 years, to the United States or to our friends and allies.

In such a world, where our vulnerabilities are all too well understood by potential adversaries, we should expect to be surprised.

But not everything that unfolds in the coming years should be a surprise. We can expect that an adversary will continuously search for effective means to attack

- our people;
- our economic, military, and political power; and
- the people and power of our friends and allies.

We can also expect that an adversary will have access to a range of modern technologies and will be prepared to use them to magnify the destructiveness of their attacks, using

- truck bombs and improvised explosives,
- cyber intrusions to attack the computer systems upon which we rely,
- radio transmitters to jam our space assets,
- small laboratories to develop new biological or genetically altered agents,

- and chemical and nuclear technology and materials delivered by missile, plane, boat or backpack to poison our environment and destroy human lives.

In this era of surprise, lack of preparation is the harbinger of catastrophe.

Being prepared—by which I mean taking measures to avoid surprise, if possible; to mitigate its effect when it occurs; and to bring appropriate force to bear to defeat those who would surprise us—is essential.

Such preparation may dissuade those who might otherwise choose to make an enemy of the United States. It could deter those who wish to make war on us. And it certainly promises those who choose war that we can—and will—defeat them even as we protect and preserve that which our enemies hate most, our way of life.

The United States brings to the challenges of preparing for surprise a unique set of political, economic, technological, and military advantages.

We have a way of life—moral, political social—to which our citizens are deeply, passionately attached. We have:

- strong allies, developed through patient diplomacy and steadfast commitment displayed for nearly 60 years by succeeding U.S. administrations,
- a powerful economic and technology base,
- a military capable of projecting power on a global basis, and
- the power to dominate combat in any environment: on land, across the seas, in the air, and in space and cyber-space.

In addition to these, the nation possesses another preeminent advantage: intelligence organizations comprised of the very best people, employing some of the finest technology available.

The nation's intelligence capability provides to our political leadership information essential to its decisions on how to keep the peace—and whether and when to wage war.

It enables the application of the nation's power in peace and war.

Intelligence figures prominently in the judgments made by the nation's leaders in

- assuring allies and friends of our purpose and resolve,
- dissuading adversaries from threatening ambitions,
- deterring aggression and coercion, and, when necessary,
- decisively defeating an adversary
- while creating the conditions so that those who would free themselves from tyranny might succeed and prosper.

The close coupling of military capability with intelligence results in a powerful combination. But our intelligence capability must be remodeled—transformed—to function successfully in an environment of ever-increasing complexity.

- Knowledgeable adversaries know far too much about the nation's sources and methods for collecting and analyzing intelligence.
- Espionage, unauthorized leaks, the inexorable progress of commercial science and technology, all advantage our adversaries.
- The extent of ungoverned spaces around the world give potential adversaries places to train and prepare for war.
- The ability to identify, track, and disrupt the manufacture and transport of materials of use in assembling weapons of mass

destruction is frustrated by contemporary business practices and the existence of dual-use technologies.

- The speed, volume, and diversity of financial transactions that take place on a global scale permit financiers of terror and horror to hide, for all practical purposes, in the open.

To overcome these challenges, the nation will need to set goals for the transformation of its intelligence community. Those goals include:

- First, knowing something of intelligence value about everything of interest to us all the time. This “universal situational awareness,” pursued to the limits of what physics will permit and the law will allow, must be coupled with a capacity to dive deeply into the fine-grained details of specific issues to support timely political and military decisions. This is a daunting challenge, but meeting it is absolutely necessary if intelligence is to support our national security needs in the future.
- Second, having reliable strategic warning, not only of potential threats, but across the full spectrum of reporting. For the DOD, such

warning is essential to permit us to refashion our forces and their posture in a timely way. For other agencies, warning is equally precious to shape diplomatic, economic, commercial, and associated legal and regulatory responses. Averting crises is nearly always preferable to managing them.

- Third, we will need an agile and adaptable intelligence collection and analysis capability far less dependent for its operations than today's systems are on linear and hierarchical processes. Such a level of flexibility could give rise to a culture
 - that always expects the unexpected;
 - that has prepared for surprise; and
 - that has developed the capability to deal rapidly and with assurance in response to unforeseen developments.

- Fourth, we will need an intelligence capability that supports a national strategy of forward deterrence. Deterring future adversaries will require a detailed understanding of their goals, motivations, history, networks, relationships—all the dimensions of human political

behavior—on a scale that is broader, and to a level of granularity that is far deeper, than what we enjoy today.

- At the very least, this requires a regeneration of our human intelligence capabilities and an overhaul of our analytic processes and culture.
- It implies, as well, a commitment by those who rely on intelligence to invest greater time and effort into understanding its strengths and weaknesses. Such an investment by the political leadership could reduce the burden borne by the intelligence community for warning while increasing the capacity of decision-makers to anticipate surprise.
- Fifth, with specific reference to military operations, we will need, when our forces are employed, intelligence that enables the swift defeat of the enemy. We need intelligence that enables us to act quickly, secretly, and effectively—intelligence that enables us to anticipate war fighters' needs and provide predictive intelligence that stays ahead of the battle. That intelligence support will need to extend to the post-conflict, stabilization phase of a campaign.

- Sixth, ensuring that knowledgeable adversaries do not compromise our secrets. This will require obtaining robust capabilities to acquire an adversary's secrets in ways he cannot comprehend even as we ensure that our own capabilities are not vulnerable. My former colleague USD/AT&L Pete Aldridge described this as "exquisite intelligence."

An effort to transform intelligence to achieve these goals will take time, effort, and money. That effort will range across the technologies we use to collect, process, and disseminate information. It will require changes to our organizations and cause us to take greater interest in our people – their recruitment, training, retention and promotion. Let me begin with technology.

Technology

With respect to technology, we have made the necessary investment in our remote sensing capabilities to bridge the period of service between our extant systems and those capabilities that we might bring on line in the next decade.

These near-term capabilities will provide improved performance over extant systems. They have the benefit of having been designed in the aftermath of the last war, the Persian Gulf War. They respond well to the “lessons learned” from that war.

By definition, however, they will not satisfy the emergent needs we have identified as critical to our preparation in an era of surprise.

Nor will existing communications structures and protocols support the transport of the large volume of data needed to perform collection and analysis tasks we now know we will need to accomplish.

Nor will these near-term systems liberate us from the collector-based processes for classifying and, hence, regulating the distribution and use of intelligence.

For these reasons, the defense and intelligence communities have moved—more in concert than not—to invest in a new generation of technology. This effort is guided by the work Don Kerr completed before moving to be Director, S&T, at

the CIA. Follow-on efforts sponsored by the DCI's Community Management staff and especially Charlie Allen, ADCI/Collection, have helped us frame our investment preferences.

Space-Based Radar

Most prominent among the new investments is the space-based radar. It was conceived with the aim of increasing the persistence of surveillance and contributing to a variety of defense and intelligence missions. If the technology involved proves affordable, it has the potential to free us from building our imagery intelligence as we do today—as if it were a jigsaw puzzle for which we earnestly hunt for the pieces while uncertain of the picture we are seeking to construct.

The unique contribution of SBR comes into focus if we think of space-based radar as an “illuminator,” throwing into relief both geographic features and activity on the earth's surface. By creating a reference baseline and then permitting us to constantly refresh our picture of those features and activities, it can allow us to detect change and alert us to matters of interest or concern.

Then, either by shifting the radar from an “illuminator” to a “spotlight,” if you will, or by “tipping” or “cueing” other systems, space-based radar can provide the means for diving deeply into specific matters.

The persistent surveillance provided by a space-based radar, in combination with other complementary space and airborne systems, could allow us to approach a number of the goals I outlined. Most obviously it could form the basis for “knowing something about everything”, “strategic warning”, and an “agile intelligence enterprise.”

The promise of space-based radar will go unrealized, however, if we think of it in the terms most comfortable to today’s collectors and users. Constrained in its development by the extant paradigm, space-based radar will not be able to make a meaningful contribution to either military or intelligence missions. USecAF Pete Teets, under whose direction the system is being developed, is working to loose those constraints. Industry is ready to have them removed. I can assure you I will continue to push for concepts and a system that delivers on the promise of SBR.

I noted that space-based radar alone cannot meet the goals of persistence. Other systems, operating in all media and venues, will need to contribute. And, indeed, investments are being made in such technology.

Processes and Networks

Improvements to collection, alone, will not provide bring us very close to achieving the six operational goals. Collection needs to be coupled to a process that allows the data collected to be accessed by the user—the analyst or the military operator. That process, moreover, must allow for more than collaborative activity. It must allow the user to drive collection even as it allows the collector to provide the user with a tailored product.

Toward this end, substantial investment is being made in laser satellite communications, the expansion of the global information grid, creation of a distributed common ground system, and joint command and control systems.

This includes both space and airborne platforms along with ground and sea-based sensors. Once we can organize our collection assets more along the lines of a combined arms team, than say a football team, the better off we will be.

That is, instead of one team for imagery, another for signals and special teams made up of core officers, MASINT operators and technical experts, we might have a single team capable of bringing the right combination of capabilities to bear to address the problem at hand.

Under such a combined arms approach the limits of one system – say SBR versus cruise missiles – could be compensated for by other elements – say airborne radars, dispersed ground sites. But these capabilities could be combined and recombined in packages adapted to the problem we face.

These, in turn, are being fashioned into a networked operating environment that both the defense and intelligence community can share. As this capability comes on line, the need for “direct downlinks” will dissipate as “reach-back” both on and through the military and intelligence networks takes hold.

Organization

Let me turn now to organization and doctrine.

The defense and intelligence communities have embraced a vision for horizontal integration, or HI. Without suggesting that translating the vision into

system concepts, hardware, and practice will be easy, I do think the benefit is an intuitive one to grasp.

Imagine that the processes by which collection and analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence information were similar to those that govern contemporary web sites. Refresh rates at those sites are driven by the interaction between customer demand and what the purveyor (collector) of information can supply.

Demand for that information and its supply are regulated by a rules-based set of protocols. Neither the customer nor the supplier is independent of each other, yet each has separate responsibilities.

The customer defines his preferences by his selection. He has access to all information that he needs to know—

- rather than access based on security limitations imposed by considerations of “sources and methods”
- or by distribution constraints dictated by the originating agency.

The supplier, in turn, attracts the customer by satisfying the customer's range of choice or by offering new products or services of interest to the user.

Information is not owned by either party, and the system is run not by a particular discipline, but by an administrator.

That kind of networked environment and process, with which we are so comfortable in every other facet of our lives, is at the heart of HI.

Its incorporation into the world of intelligence will change that world's organization and doctrine in ways we cannot now imagine. But if our experience in the DOD is any guide, it means that hierarchical tasking, reporting, and decision-making, stretched over long periods of time, resulting in least-common-denominator solutions, will be a thing of the past.

At the same time, this emerging environment will require the advent of new methods for validating and verifying information, and providing senior leaders with finished recommendations and products, and assessing the utility of the products created. Most important, it will change the role of analysts and probably the distribution of analysts. That is, in so far as machine-to-machine interfaces and

processes do the hard work of shipping the “noise away from the signal,” the analyst can concentrate on what the signal means. Analysts operating at the front lines should be able to isolate the data of interest for tactical operations without having to wait on analysts at higher headquarters. UAV operations today illustrate this point. The future is here.

People

Which brings us to people.

Those who are entering the intelligence ranks today will be the leaders and conductors of the organizations we are now setting out to build, and they will be the operators of any technology we design and deploy, and they will be the full beneficiaries of the world of HI that I have described.

They will encounter a world very different from our own. The regions and cultures of the world they will be concerned with, the entities they will need to penetrate, the secrets they will be asked to acquire and safeguard, will demand skills possessed today by a small, though ever-growing, cadre.

The talent certainly exists that is needed to

- lead the nation's intelligence organizations,
- design its systems,
- operate in the midst of our adversaries—potential and actual—and
- to provide the strategic warning and current intelligence needed to safeguard the nation in a complicated and dangerous world.

It is our task to motivate this rising generation to take on the challenge that lies before us.

We must recruit, train, compensate, and mentor those willing to accept the challenge,

- and we must be able to do so in creative, flexible ways that will make government service attractive to those with rare talent.

But the transformation of our intelligence capabilities will need to be matched by a transformation in how we think about the affairs unfolding around us. Policies, strategies, plans, and activities predicated on years of warning are no longer adequate to our purposes.

Coming to grips with the reality that we live in an era of surprise is imperative.

Achieving the goals I have outlined will improve our access to information. But our analysis of that information needs improvement, as well.

Thomas Schelling, in his forward to Roberta Wohlstetter's book, Pearl Harbor, reminds us that information alone is not sufficient.

"If we think of the entire U.S. government and its far-flung military and diplomatic establishment, it is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made."

Schelling accounts for this faulty strategic analysis as follows:

“There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”

This is not a mistake we can afford to make again. The acts of 9/11 have put us on notice. They inform with a painful impact—in an age of surprise, we have only ourselves to blame if we do not prepare. There is little we should consider “improbable” when contemplating the possible acts of terrorists and those who would harbor or support them. In this age of surprise, we cannot afford to suffer what Schelling describes as “a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.”

Let me conclude by returning to where I began. Pursuit of the six goals I have outlined will contribute to the transformation of the nation’s intelligence capability. As we achieve those goals, our level of preparation will increase. Whether that increase will be sufficient to substantially decrease the likelihood of surprise will only be known in the future.

But a failure to prepare is to invite surprise, and, with it, catastrophe. Responsible members of the government, within the executive and legislative branches, have a singular obligation to those they represent to prepare them for surprise.

Those same officials owe the American people plain talk about what they think they know, what they know they don't know, and the reality that there are, at this moment, unknown means and methods being devised and developed by our enemies to do us harm.

In assessing our progress both toward preparing for future surprises and victory in the present war, it is imperative that the contribution of intelligence—to our successes or any failures—not be misestimated.

I spoke earlier of "exquisite intelligence." A profound secret gleaned by U.S. intelligence, without the knowledge of the adversary, is no small accomplishment.

Its relevance to our security, its contribution to our preparation, however, is directly proportionate to the conversion of that secret into action by the agencies of the U.S. government.

Sense of Urgency

There should be no doubt, about the urgency to transform intelligence. Defining and achieving operational goals of the sort I postulated earlier is essential. We must not permit ourselves to remain wedded to past practices, policies, technologies, and products. We do so at our peril.

Conclusion

So, let me conclude by recalling then-candidate Bush's 1999 Citadel speech.

As a way of underscoring his determination to bring about the transformation of the military forces of the United States, the President reminded his audience of an earlier time when a free people confronted what he called "rapid change and momentous choices."

That time was the 1930s. Nazi Germany was rearming, and the British government was reluctant to take forceful steps to stave off war.

To give voice to his own concerns, candidate Bush quoted Winston Churchill, who repeatedly called upon his countrymen to respond to the gathering storm:

“The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing and baffling expedience, of delays, is coming to a close,” Churchill said. “In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.”

That period of consequences arrived not only for the military, but for those who practice intelligence, just two years after the President’s Citadel speech, on September 11, 2001.

Like our colleagues in the military forces, we will be judged by our successors on our response to this period of consequences.

We face few substantial impediments to transforming intelligence.

SecDef and DCI are committed to strengthening intelligence for the 21st century.

We are led by individuals in the DoD and agencies who embrace the need for and who likewise are committed to this effort.

The Congress has provided resources.

Industry has it well within its grasp to supply the technology and systems to enable transformation.

Our colleges, universities, laboratories, and think tanks are replete with talent.

What remains, then, is to embrace the urgency of the President and to summon the energy of Churchill, who, when presented with a memo containing a compelling idea, would note in the margin, "Action this day!"



TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Attached Media Release**

Mr. President –

Attached is the speech that was presented by Prime Minister Goh of Singapore at the Third International Institute of Strategic Studies session last week. I found it most interesting and thought you would as well, given the series of speeches you have been giving.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060604B.051s

Attach: Singapore Government Media Release 6.5.04.

Singapore

6 Jun 04

Singapore Government MEDIA RELEASE

Media Relations Division, Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, 140 Hill Street, #02-02, MITA Building, Singapore 179369.
Tel: 6837 9666 Fax: (65) 6837 9666 Singapore Press Release on the Internet (SPRInter) URL: <http://www.gov.sg/sprinter>

EMBARGOED TILL FULL DELIVERY
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER GOH CHOK TONG AT THE
THIRD INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ASIA
SECURITY CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE AT THE SHANGRI-LA
HOTEL, ISLAND BALLROOM, ON FRIDAY, 4 JUNE 2004, AT 8.00 PM

POST-COLD WAR GEOPOLITICS

1 This is the third meeting of the Shangri-La Dialogue. It is a tribute to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that the Shangri-La Dialogue has so quickly become entrenched as a 'must attend' event on the regional calendar. It clearly fulfils an important need. I thank the IISS for the opportunity to share my views with such a distinguished audience.

2 Last month, I gave two speeches on themes relevant to this conference. The first was to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. I dwelt on the ideological aspects of the war against terrorism. We must have no illusions about our enemy. This enemy, terrorism, is most dangerous as it is fuelled by an extremist religious belief that brooks no compromise with non-believers whom they label *infidels*. Even fellow Muslims who oppose their strain of Islam are their enemies.

3 Unless all of us in the civilised world - Muslims and non-Muslims alike - unite and fight them ideologically, we will be tormented for a long time. There will be no dearth of terrorist foot soldiers willing to martyr themselves. The Al-Qaeda *jihadist* ideology which uses violence to bring the world back to the 7th Century Arabian way of religious life must be debunked and defeated. But this ideological battle on how Islam should be practised in today's world, and indeed the battle for Islam's future, must be fought primarily by Muslims. In Washington, I pointed out that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constrained mainstream Muslims from speaking out against extremists for fear of being labelled pro-American. I also emphasised the crucial role of education, especially of women, and economic development to create the necessary conditions for democracy to be transplanted to the Middle East.

4 My second speech was at an event in Singapore celebrating the enlargement of the European Union. I stressed the imperative of Europe and America working together to meet the challenge of terrorism. A Transatlantic rift only serves the terrorists' agenda. I also highlighted the importance of Europe and Asia working together, not in opposition to America, but with America to advance our common interests.

5 This evening, I would like to draw together the threads of these arguments. I have entitled my talk "Post-Cold War Geopolitics". Let me elaborate.

The New Geopolitics of Terrorism

6 The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the end of the Cold War. But I believe that the real post-Cold War era did not begin until September 11, 2001. Of course, few people really thought history ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. History proved far more resilient. Crises did not abate. But there was no widespread sense of a serious global security threat such as had infused the Cold War period and galvanised the free world to hold together. Even the 1991 Iraq invasion of Kuwait was dealt with in a relatively straightforward way by a broad American-led coalition, giving rise to the hope that a peaceful New World Order could be achieved.

7 That hope proved illusory as did the expectation that 'democratic enlargement' was an irresistible trend that would stabilise international relations. Still, as the threat of superpower nuclear conflict receded, there was a sense that the world had reached a geopolitical equilibrium. None of the conflicts in Africa, the Balkans or the Middle East were thought to really threaten the global equilibrium.

8 9/11 swept away these comfortable assumptions. It shook America's sense of security and changed America's definition of its role in the world. Suddenly, America felt vulnerable. To protect itself, America was determined to take the battle to its enemies wherever they might be. Because of its global supremacy, America could and would go it alone, if necessary. Post-Cold War geopolitics is the geopolitics of the war against terrorism.

9 I believe the fight against terrorism will last as many decades as the Cold War. However, I do not think that everyone sees or understands the challenge in such stark terms. And this is one of the principal dangers of post-Cold War geopolitics. There is no overarching strategic consensus on the threat of terrorism and the means to combat it. I hope to persuade you

that while there are differences with the Cold War period, the fight against terrorism is no less a mortal struggle and certainly far more complex.

10 Like the Cold War, the fight against terrorism is both an ideological and a geopolitical struggle. But there are crucial differences. Since the 1930s, the Soviet Union gave priority to state interests over ideology. Therefore, whatever the differences with its adversaries, the Soviet Union calculated the costs and benefits, foremost among which was the primacy of survival. The West could use the time-tested tools of diplomacy, deterrence and containment to hold the line against Communism, until internal and inherent contradictions led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

11 But how do you conduct diplomacy with a religious ideology that sees the struggle as a zero sum game with no room for compromise except as a tactical expedient? How do you contain an adversary that occupies no fixed territory but resides in the minds and hearts of men? How do you deter an enemy that is not afraid, indeed eager, to die for its ideology?

12 These complexities define the new geopolitics of terrorism. But they do not make diplomacy, deterrence and containment irrelevant. The geopolitics of terrorism has not displaced the old geopolitics of conflict and collaboration between states. The new forms an overlay over the old. It is the interaction between the old and new that will shape post-Cold War geopolitics for many years to come.

How to Defeat the Terrorists

13 The terrorists are driven by an ideological desire to force their strain of Islam on others but their goals and methods are geopolitical. The war against terrorism must therefore be simultaneously fought on both fronts: the ideological as well as the geopolitical. While the US cannot lead the ideological struggle, only it has the capacity to lead the geopolitical fight. In this contradiction lie the complexities.

14 The terrorists want to overthrow secular governments: initially in the Middle East to secure control of oil that will give them the wherewithal to achieve their ultimate goal of a Caliphate of the entire *ummah* or global Islamic community. It will be a mistake to dismiss them as mere fanatics. The terrorists have strategic thinkers amongst them and their reach is global. Indeed they seem to be able to think more strategically and globally than do some governments.

15 The terrorists have accurately identified the principal threat to their goal as the geopolitical trend of the Americas, Europe and Asia coalescing into regional blocs. They see the spread of development, democracy and

the modern way of life as corrupting their vision of an ideal society based on their interpretation of the Koran. America is their main enemy because America is the vanguard of this modern civilisation and the main obstacle to their designs. They know that a combination of America, Europe and Asia will be formidable. Hence I believe they would give priority to splitting the US from its European and Asian allies.

16 The terrorists are a deviant minority in the Muslim world. According to Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia, "*Many Muslims refuse to acknowledge that there can be bad Muslims, and that Islamic teachings have been corrupted by some groups to serve their militant cause.*" Prime Minister Abdullah was schooled in Islamic studies and has just won the General Elections convincingly with his vision of "Progressive Islam" or *Islam Hadari* against the opposition party's vision of an austere Islamic state based on *Shariah* law.

17 The terrorists are definitely bad Muslims as they are ready to commit mass murders and take innocent lives to achieve their ends. Hence the civilised world must do everything in its power to prevent them laying their hands on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). But even if we succeed, they will still pose a serious threat. The terrorists do not need large armies or sophisticated weaponry to fight their battle. They need only self-assembled bombs, unconventional home-made weapons of destruction and suicide bombers. Their chief tactic is to create fear and a perpetual sense of vulnerability to disrupt our way of life. They will exploit the discomfort that even close US friends and allies feel at America's global primacy and some of its policies. The Madrid bombing in March is a classic example.

18 Anti-Americanism is high around the world. A principal cause is the sheer scale of American power and the indispensability of the US to the post-Cold War international system. This leaves other major powers uncertain of their own roles and insecure about their own status. In certain intellectual circles, it is fashionable to be anti-American. But wishing for a more balanced world will not make it so. All the more necessary, therefore, to state what ought to be obvious but is unfashionable: America is not the enemy; the terrorists are the enemy.

19 The central battleground is the Middle East. The difficulties America currently faces in Iraq offer the greatest opportunities for the terrorists. The terrorists know that America cannot be defeated militarily. Their target is psychological: America's resolve and the resolve of America's coalition allies. If they succeed, first in breaking the coalition allies' resolve, and later, America's resolve, extremists everywhere will rejoice and be emboldened. They will know that they can defeat even the world's mightiest

nation. They will go on the offensive with renewed vigour. This is why it is so vital that, whatever the difficulties, the US and its allies do not waver in Iraq but persevere to bring about a good outcome.

20 Whatever the differences of views over America's actions in Iraq, Europe and the US must set aside pre-war recriminations, go beyond saying "I told you so", and work together with the UN to stabilise Iraq. The US has paid a price for going into Iraq. The price is worth it if out of the ashes of war emerges a stable, peaceful and new Iraq which Iraqis are proud of and their neighbours can live with, and an Iraq which contributes to Middle East peace and stability. Europe will pay a higher strategic price if the chaos in Iraq leads to turmoil in the Middle East. And the civilised world will pay the full price if the US loses, or is seen by the terrorists, to have lost in Iraq.

21 The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was a hideous crime. It must be dealt with transparently and decisively. The guilty must be punished. But Abu Ghraib must not be allowed to cloud the central strategic issue that is at stake.

22 The Middle East is also where US friends and allies are most disquieted by America's seemingly unconditional support for Israel. I know this is a delicate issue. I know that whatever the criticisms of its policies, the US plays an irreplaceable role in stabilising the Middle East. But this is too important an issue to dress in diplomatic niceties. The US is essential to the solution but is also part of the problem. A more balanced and nuanced approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - an approach that recognises that there are equities and inequities on both sides - must become a central pillar of the global war against terrorism. Given the post-Cold War geopolitical battle against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer just a regional problem. The Islamic terrorists know this. They have exploited this conflict to win sympathy and recruits for their own cause.

23 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a rallying cause of terrorism. We know that a solution to it will not end terrorism, given the ideologically-driven motivations of the Al-Qaeda terrorists. But the discomfort that mainstream Muslims around the world feel with America's Middle East policies limits their ability to fight the ideological battle. Even the Europeans and other friends of the US will be constrained to support the US in the fight against the terrorists. This weakens the US-led geopolitical struggle against terrorism.

Unity of US, Europe and Asia is Critical

24 Strategically, the terrorists will want to break the transatlantic partnership, and thereby isolate the US. The so-called "truce" that Osama

bin Laden offered to Europe in April was so crudely put as to blatantly expose his intentions. But the terrorists will refine this strategy. Europe is internally preoccupied with enlargement. Several European governments face strong domestic pressures over support for the US on Iraq. Many Europeans want to believe that some tacit accommodation with the terrorists is possible. They fail to see the threat as a long-term problem and that any accommodation by the terrorists will be out of expediency. This threat is not the same as what Europe faces from, say, the Basque terrorists whose goals are limited. So long as the terrorists think that the European public can be used to pressure their governments, they will try to manipulate it. They will dangle the sword of another Madrid.

25 Asia will not be spared. The terrorists have similar goals in Asia. The secular governments of India and Pakistan have been on the frontlines of the struggle against Islamic extremism for many years. Whatever their differences over Kashmir, they have no illusions about the nature of the enemy. Southeast Asia is waking up to this. Post 9/11 and the Bali bombing, it has emerged as a major front in the war against terrorism. The secular governments of Southeast Asia know the stakes.

26 Northeast Asia, however, is less aware. China has its own problems with Muslim separatists but may be less worried about terrorism. In Japan and Korea, ethnic and religious homogeneity has, until relatively recently, shielded their public from the dimensions of the problem and the extent to which they too are in the sights of the *jihadist* terrorists.

27 Japan was recently shaken by the discovery that Al-Qaeda was operating in its territory. I believe that Northeast Asian governments will sooner or later have to confront the threat of a terrorist attack on international waterways in Southeast Asia. Should an attack take place, it would have catastrophic consequences, and not just for Southeast Asia. The vital lifelines of Japan, Korea and China pass through Southeast Asia. Such an attack would seriously disrupt the international trade and energy supplies on which all the economies of Northeast Asia are critically dependent. It would be designed for maximum economic disruption and to turn the public against governments which support the US.

28 In Asia, as in Europe, unease with America's overwhelming global dominance is high. But Asia is more keenly aware than Europe of the vital role that the US plays in maintaining global stability. No matter what their misgivings, only a few Asian countries, and certainly no major US ally, opposed the US on Iraq. There is a clearer appreciation in Asia than in Europe that the fundamental issue in Iraq now is the credibility and resolve of the US.

29 This is because Asia still faces many serious security challenges. Kashmir, North Korea and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are potential flashpoints. If things go terribly wrong, the conflicts could even turn nuclear. The US is central to the management of all three potential flashpoints. All three conflicts also have a direct impact on the global struggle against terrorism. Let me conclude therefore with a few words on each.

Potential Flashpoints in Asia

30 The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is a longstanding one, difficult to resolve because of religion and history. If a conflict breaks out, it is not difficult to imagine Kashmir becoming a new theatre for *jihad* and a fertile ground for breeding terrorists. But India and Pakistan know that a conflict over Kashmir will have devastating consequences for each other and the entire South Asian region. The US holds the ring. The desire of both Islamabad and New Delhi to maintain good relations with the US gives Washington leverage that it exercised in 2001 to avert a possible nuclear war.

31 North Korea is another potential trouble spot. The terrorists could try to exploit the situation to acquire materials for WMD. Fortunately, the six-party talks have lowered tensions and the issue is being managed. Whatever their differences, the key actors share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the issue. I have been told by several leaders who have met Kim Jong Il that he is a rational, well-informed man who calculates his moves. He must know that an outbreak of conflict with the US will lead to the very outcome that he fears most: regime change or even the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. He may go to the brink but not step over the edge. The credibility of the US military option is vital to maintaining peace.

32 The dangers of miscalculation are highest over Taiwan. The issue is extremely complex because it involves the domestic politics of China, the US and Taiwan and relations between the three parties. Economic forces are integrating Taiwan with the Mainland but this trend conflicts with Taiwan's desire for a separate identity. Chen Shui-bian's inauguration speech took a conciliatory tone. He must have taken into account US concerns about maintaining stability in cross-strait relations. But he did not renounce independence. Yet independence for Taiwan is a non-starter. No Asian, and I believe, no European government, would recognise Taiwan's independence. To do so would earn China's permanent enmity. And China is the economic story of this century. No Chinese leadership can lose Taiwan and still survive. If Taiwan pushes beyond a certain red line, the

Chinese leaders must respond or be rejected by their people. The result will be war and a permanent rise in Chinese nationalism and hostility.

33 The consequences of such a war will make Iraq seem a small problem. The US has no reasons to open another front with China over Taiwan, given its strategic priorities in Iraq, the Middle East and the global fight against terrorism. Indeed, President Bush has stated explicitly that he does not support Taiwan's independence. He has also publicly stated that the US opposes any unilateral action by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. Still, the likelihood of the US being drawn into a cross-strait conflict is there if wrong signals are emitted by the US. Should such a conflict arise, China might not prevail; at least not in the first round. China's physical infrastructure would be damaged and economic development set back many decades. But the Chinese leaders have said that they would be prepared to pay this price and more. Taiwan, however, would be physically and economically devastated. Investor confidence in Taiwan would be shattered. The economy will go downhill, and not recover for a long time. If the Taiwanese know that this will be the outcome, they may pause to ask whether this price is worth paying for a bid for independence.

34 Stable US-China relations are the foundation of East Asian stability. If the long-term stability of US-China relations can be assured, East Asia will grow and benefit the US as well. If there is permanent enmity between China and the US, not only will East Asian growth be set back but the entire region will be dragged down. Only the terrorists will benefit. And terrorism is the key issue of post-Cold War geopolitics.

Thank you.

June 7, 2004

TO: Honorable Tillie Fowler

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Look at Intelligence

Please consider having a session at the next Defense Policy Board meeting on the subject of intelligence reform.

You might want to have Chris Williams get with Steve Cambone and figure out how to structure a portion of the day on that subject. It looks like there are a lot of proposals floating around from the Scowcroft Commission, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 9/11 Commission, and the House Intelligence people.

A thoughtful meeting, hearing some good ideas, discussion and information from the members of the Policy Board, would be a big help to us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060704-4

.....
Please respond by _____

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OSD 08510-04

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Dick Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Dick Cheney

DATE: June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Framing the War**

Mr. President -

Attached is an interesting paper Steve Cambone prepared after our DoD discussions about how best to describe the struggle we are in.

0005

His paper came out of discussions we had at the Pentagon in preparation for the briefings we presented you on the same subject.

Respectfully,

DHR/azn
060704.01

Attach: Framing the War., S. Cambone, 5/24/04

7 Jun 04

C5/25

25 May 2004, 09:21

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *sc*

SUBJECT: FRAMING THE WAR

The discussion yesterday morning on how to frame the war was important. I would like to offer my own thoughts.

The phrase “global war on terror” suffers, in my estimation, from a number of shortcomings.

1. Global. The prominence of the word, “global,” connotes to those abroad who read or hear it an American notion that the conflict is everywhere, or “universal,” and that the response and solution to it is the “singular” approach pursued by the United States. Some who might otherwise be partners—willing or grudging—find the war and its conduct and solution conceived and defined in American terms. For a variety of reasons, most are unwilling to accept such a definition even as they recognize their vulnerability.
2. War. The United States is at war, certainly with Al Qaeda and possibly with other terrorist networks. But here, again, state actors who might partner with us find joining in a “war” unappealing for domestic reasons.
 - Yet, we know that a large number of nations are fighting, some quite intensely, against the objectives and operations of terrorists within their own countries.
 - Most of these countries are aligned and cooperating with us through law enforcement or intelligence channels. However, in many cases, they do not wish to be publicly associated with us in a “war” as they battle their domestic problems. Some are even willing to be accounted as “against us,” even as they fight domestic terrorism.
3. Terrorism. I am of the view that terrorism is a method or tactic that has been chosen by our adversaries. I believe our adversaries seek, as you said

yesterday, to advance radical Islam as the basis for civil society for the better part of 2 billion people on the face of the earth.

- This effort has gained force and coherence over the last 10 to 15 years. It is a response to earlier defeats, for example: in Egypt in the 1990s and their continuing failure to destabilize the Saudi regime, among others.
- The 9/11 attack on the United States had the strategic effect of “enlarging the war.” The fact that the United States is fighting against “jihad” is being used to motivate, and perhaps radicalize, a large sector of the Islamic population in support of the objective of overthrowing western-leaning and/or corrupt regimes.

An alternative formulation to the phrase “global war on terror” might be that the political objective of radical or extremist Islam is to destroy international civil society through a combination of methods to include: terrorism, political manipulation, blackmail of ruling elites, corruption of Muslim educational institutions, and the radicalization of the Muslim faith. That is, our adversaries have brought to bear, on behalf of their objectives, a wide variety of elements of power against which we are, for the most part, employing military power. That is not a winning strategy.

Who are the adversaries? That is a more difficult question to answer. However, I believe they are to be found in the elite society of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia and Thailand—as well as within western countries—those who, for a variety of reasons, are disaffected from the government and societies in which they live and are inclined to support radical Islam. They also possess, in addition to their elite standing, the financial means and the ruthlessness needed to pursue their objectives. The names of these individuals pass by us every day in the lists of financiers, industrialists, educators, scientists, and the like, associated with the terrorists, terrorist activities, and state sponsors.

For now, the United States has no choice but to continue the tactical engagement against Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks. But it is time for us to realize that we have a larger problem than Al Qaeda, and that its solution will require a multi-variant approach. That approach ought to allow for the creation of “alliances of convenience” between the United States and other states such that

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

those states can address their domestic problems in ways conducive to their own political realities while, at the same time, and without attribution, contribute to the overall objectives of the United States.

The objective of the United States, in short, is to ensure for itself and to assist others in the pursuit of the defense of international civil society in the modern world.

copy to:
DepSecDef
CJCS
USDP

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 8, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE

(b)(6)

Captain M -
This should prob be
FAXED b/c it's
Urgent. CSC w/s

TO: Amine Gemayel (c/o Michael Dravis)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

Dear Amine,

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch with you to let you know whether or not we have been successful.

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

DIIR:dh
060804-19

DK

OSD 08577-04

Jun 08 2004 7: 11pm

Last Transaction

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	7:10pm	Fax Sent	(b)(6)	0:48	2	OK

hp officejet 7140xi
printer/fax/scanner/copier

Fax-History Report for

Jun 08 2004 6:55pm

Last Transaction

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Identification</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Result</u>
Jun 8	6:54pm	Fax Sent	(b)(6)	0:00	0	No answer

Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:20 AM
To: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: Done - FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

CAPT Marriott, Jimmy,

Receipt confirmed & acknowledged to Mr. Dravis. Done deal.

V/r,

John

(JS - stopped by on my morning run - vr, JL)

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Wednesday, June 09, 2004 5:15 AM
To: 'Michael Dravis'
Subject: RE: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

* Mr. Dravis,

Good morning,

Thank you for the word back confirming receipt - it is much appreciated.

Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Michael Dravis [mailto:MDRAVIS@cidcm.umd.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 9:24 PM
To: john.larson@whs.mil
Subject: Re: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Dear Mr. Larson,

This is to confirm my receipt of the advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel.

I apologize for the trouble you had faxing the letter to me, and thank you for your persistence.

I will pass the substance of Secretary Rumsfeld's letter to Mr. Gemayel tonight.

Sincerely,

Mike Dravis
Assistant to Amine Gemayel

>>> "Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD" <john.larson@whs.mil> 06/08/04 7:47 PM
>>>

Mr. Dravis,

Handwritten circled note: * Done deal. ✓

Handwritten notes: 6/9 Jimmy, Done JL

Handwritten note: need to let VCB know

Handwritten circled note: it was successful JL

Good evening.

Attached, please find an advance copy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel. The original letter will follow via postal channels.

(Fax transmittal to (b)(6) appears successful, while attempts to (b)(6) were met with a busy signal).

Secretary Rumsfeld's staff, as indicated in his response, will be in touch regarding President Gemayel's request for the service this Friday.

Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications

(b)(6)

<<08577-04.pdf>>

Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 8:22 PM
To: Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
cc: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: FW: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Jimmy,

Good morning,

Mr. Michael Dravis, of the University of Maryland, is an assistant to His Excellency Amine Gemayel, former President of Lebanon (during the Reagan years).

The former President requested (via his June 6th letter faxed by Mr. Dravis on June 7th) to be present for President Reagan's service in Washington this Friday, if possible. He would also like to meet briefly with the SecDef as well.

Due to the short turn, advance copy of SecDef's reply was to be faxed, but we were repeatedly met with a busy signal.

A fax to an alternate number appears to have been successful (copies of transmittal sheets on your desk).

I left a voice message (b)(6) for Mr. Dravis, indicating that we had attempted to forward an advance copy of Secretary Rumsfeld's acknowledgement, but were not certain it went through.

If you would, please call him in the a.m. to confirm receipt (fax or electronic) (he may very well call back also). Voice: (b)(6)

John

(I don't know that the attached bio for Gemayel is "official" - it was one of the first that came up when I searched on his name when looking for background info)



Dravis & Gemayel 08577-04 Incoming
Info.pdf



& Draft.pdf

-----Original Message-----

From: Larson, John CIV WHS/ESCD
Sent: Tuesday, June 08, 2004 7:47 PM
To: 'mdravis@cidcm.umd.edu'
CC: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD; Sherrod, Jimmy, CIV, WHS/ESCD
Subject: Secretary Rumsfeld Letter to His Excellency Amine Gemayel

Mr. Dravis,

Good evening.

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(Fax transmittal to (b)(6) appears successful, while attempts to (b)(6) were met with a busy signal).

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Respectfully,

John Larson
Executive Services & Communications

(b)(6)



OB577-04.pdf



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Contact

Michael W. Dravis

Faculty Research Assistant
e-mail: mdravis@cidcm.umd.edu
phone: (301) 405-3356
fax: (b)(6)

Projects:

- Kahlil Gibran Research and Studies



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University of Maryland . 0145 Tydings Hall . College Park, MD 20742 . 301.314.7703

Last Modified: December 01, 2003

AMINE GEMAYEL



Former President of Lebanon

Sheikh Amine Gemayel, the eighth President of the Lebanese republic was born in the village of Bikfaya - Lebanon in 1942, to a family which has played a major political role in modern Lebanon. His father, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, founded in 1936 the democratic and social party: The Lebanese Kataeb. His brother Sheikh Bashir was elected President in August 1982, (Bashir was assassinated three weeks later). Sheikh Amine Gemayel graduated from Saint-Joseph University with a law degree; He started practicing as attorney at law in 1965. In 1970 at the age of 28, Sheikh Amine Gemayel was elected to the Lebanese parliament, and became thus the youngest member. On September 21st 1982, he was elected President of the Lebanese Republic by 77 votes out of 80. His term of office ended in September 1988, (Six years as per the Lebanese Constitution). He then joined the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University as fellow and lecturer (1988-1989).

He is affiliated with the University of Maryland as a distinguished visiting professor. From 1990 to July 2000, he resided in Paris as an exiled leader of the opposition, and lectured extensively on Lebanon and the Middle East in various countries worldwide. Since July 2000, he lives and pursues his political agenda in Lebanon.



Career history

When he became President, the new head of state set himself three main objectives which form the basis of his political activity today:

- Re-establishing the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.
- Maintaining an effective dialogue between Lebanon's different communities.
- Restoring and modernizing the institutions of the state.

Concerning Syria, in 1982, presided by Amine Gemayel, the Lebanese government dissolved the Arab Deterrence Force which legitimized Syrian military presence in Lebanon and in September 1983, he addressed a letter to the Syrian President Hafez El Assad requesting the withdrawal of his forces from the country.

As for the PLO in 1987 he annulled the Treaty of Cairo signed with the PLO in 1969, which authorized them to use Lebanon as a base for military operations against Israel. His position on the Israeli issue, is the implementation of the SC/UN resolution 425 - 426, and that he is opposed to any measures which would work against restoring Lebanon's sovereignty.

On the domestic front, Amine Gemayel's activities are aimed at establishing strong foundations for intercommunal dialogue. He is also working towards restoring the state's role by making its institutions credible, efficient and unified.

Paradoxically, although the major criticisms of Amine Gemayel during his presidency were his desire to appear as the President of all Lebanon and the pre-eminence of the state, today, these are the factors which give him credibility in the eyes of the Lebanese people.

Currently, he is continuing his battle to restore Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, and endow it with democratic institutions.

Apart from his political activities, in 1976, Amine Gemayel created the INMA Foundation, a non-profit organization, which brings together a number of institutions dealing with social, political, and economic issues concerning Lebanon and the Middle East. One of these is Beit-al-Mustakbal, (the house of the future), which is a combination of think-tank and research center, publishing a quarterly journal in three languages called: Haliyyat (Panorama of Events).

Publications:

1986: Peace and Unity (Colin and Smythe).

1988: L'Offence et le Pardon (Gallimard), reflections on the events in Lebanon.

1990: Mediation d'espoir (JC. Lattes), a collection of lectures delivered in the United States in 1989.

1992: Rebuilding Lebanon's Future, published by Harvard University (C.F.I.A.).

AMINE GEMAYEL

Stated

293

June 6, 2004

The Honorable Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
The Pentagon
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Secretary,

It was with profound sadness that I learned of the passing of President Ronald Reagan yesterday. On behalf of my wife Joyce and myself, I should like to express our heartfelt condolences to you, your family, and your colleagues from the Reagan Administration.

I recall my years of working alongside President Reagan and your good self on Middle East issues with a fondness tinged with sadness. The fondness springs from the warm personal relations we all maintained throughout, even during the most difficult of times. Indeed, I will never forget the generous time and attention that both you and President Reagan devoted to the cause of peace, freedom and democracy in the region and to helping my country achieve its national aspirations.

Similarly, despite ongoing turbulence in Iraq, I am certain that history will credit President Bush, your good self, and your colleagues in the Administration with bold leadership for your efforts to transform a troubled region.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, if at all possible I would very much treasure the opportunity to pay my last respects to President Reagan during the state funeral that will take place in Washington on Friday. If that can be arranged, please let me know as soon as possible so that I can schedule my travel. A visit to Washington might also permit us to hold a brief meeting to review the latest developments in Lebanon and the Middle East.

As on previous occasions, I can be reached via my assistant, Mr. Michael Dravis, whose contact information is as follows:

0145 Tydings Hall
Center for International Development
and Conflict Management
University of Maryland
College Park, MD , 20742
Telephone: 301 405-3356

copy to MCM to handle - an

Sincerely, OSD 08577-04

Amine Gemayel

6 JUN 04

FAX COVER SHEET**Date:** 7 June 2004**To:** Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld**Recipient's Fax Number:** (b)(6)**Recipient's Telephone Number:****Number of Pages:** 2 (including this cover sheet)-----
From: Amine Gemayel (through Michael Dravis)**Sender's Telephone Number:** (b)(6)**Message:****Original will follow via mail.**



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 2004

203

His Excellency Amine Gemayel
c/o Mr. Michael Dravis
0145 Tydings Hall
Center for International Development
and Conflict Management
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742

Dear Amine:

Thanks so much for your note concerning the passing of
President Ronald Reagan.

I have asked my staff to try to find a way to have you
included in the service on Friday. We will be back in touch
with you to let you know whether or not we have been
successful.

8 JUN 04

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely,

OS5 08577-04

6 JUN 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31387



June 8, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Military Confirmations

We have a serious problem with military confirmations.

I am told that we have some 20 military nominations pending in the White House and the Senate. We have to get them to the President for signature and up to the Senate, so we can get hearings. We are going to end up having senior officers revert to lower ranks, and having to put three-stars into four-star jobs. We have a problem with General Casey, who we need to get to Iraq in close proximity to Ambassador Negroponte. Vern Clark may not get confirmed by the date his current term expires.

I would appreciate it if you could figure out what the delays are and help get the nominations in to the President. If there are any questions, please call me and I will try to be helpful.

I am going to work the Hill at the same way to see if we can talk Senator Warner into scheduling hearings and getting on with it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060804-22

210 (384)

25 m 04

OSD 08591-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31388



June 8, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq

Attached are some remarks on the subject of Iraq that I dictated the other day. I don't know whether or how I might use them, but I felt better after dictating them.

Respectfully,

Attach.

6/7/04 "Some Thoughts on Iraq"

DHR:dh
060804-16

Iraq

8 Jun 04

OSD 08593-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31389

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

11-L-0559/OSD/31390

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:


- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 9 2004

The Honorable Alan Greenspan
Chairman, Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20551

Iraq

Dear Alan,

Enclosed are some remarks I dictated on Iraq.

If you have any thoughts, please let me know. I don't know what I will do with them, but I am thinking of doing something.

Best regards,

Enclosure

9 Jun 04

OSD 08600-04

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

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11-L-0559/OSD/31396

struggle see the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

6/12
1300

120

File

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 24, 2004

I-04/00865-3
EF-9989

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ray DuBois

J 8/17

383.6

SUBJECT: Policy on Images

Attached is a problem. It looks as though we do not have a uniform, Department-wide policy on photographing, filming and videotaping in prisons.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.

DHR:dh
062304-12

.....
Please respond by _____

24 JUN 04

TO SecDef

Paul Butler
8/17
→
WR

SR
Response attached
WR
COE
8/17
10/8/18

24 MAY 04

OSD 08603-04

11 ~~28-95-94 07:54 IN~~

28-95-94 07:54 IN



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

May 24, 2004/4 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes 6/07/04*

SUBJECT: Photographs in DoD Detention and Confinement Facilities

- In all DoD detention facilities, photographing/filming/video taping of individual detainees for other than internal facility administration or intelligence purposes is strictly prohibited by a joint service regulation (Tab A). The rule is specific, clear and applicable to all persons including guards.

- As a general rule, the taking of unofficial photographs of confinees at DoD confinement facilities is not authorized (Tab B). DoD confinement facilities primarily house military personnel who have been convicted at courts-martial and sentenced to confinement.

- This general rule regarding confinement facilities is written in the context of photographs by civilian visitors, including the media. No rule expressly addresses unofficial photographs by guards. I understand, however, that the "no unofficial photographs" rule is applied to guards in practice.

- The two primary reasons for the rule at both facilities are the same: security of the facility and protection of the detainees/confinees from humiliation and public curiosity.

COORDINATION: None.

ATTACHMENTS:
as stated

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk/DoDOGC (b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/31402

OSD 08603-04

Army Regulation 190-8
OPNAVINST 3461.6
AFJI 31-304
MCO 3461.1

Military Police

**Enemy
Prisoners of
War, Retained
Personnel,
Civilian
Internees and
Other Detainees**

Headquarters
Departments of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps
Washington, DC
1 October 1997

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31403


Headquarters
Departments of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps
Washington, DC
1 October 1997

*Army Regulation 190-8
*OPNAVINST 3461.6
*AFJI 31-304
*MCO 3461.1
Effective 1 November 1997

Military Police


Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

By Order of the Secretary of
the Navy:



TOGO D. WEST, JR.
Secretary of the Army

J. L. JOHNSON
Admiral, United States Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Acting




J.S. Mobley
Rear Admiral, United States Navy
Director, Navy Staff

By Order of the Secretary of
the Air Force

RICHARDA COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Security Police

By Order of the Secretary of
the Navy:



GENERAL L. JONES USMC
Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff
for Plans, Policies and Operations

History. This printing publishes a revision of this publication. Because the publication has been extensively revised the changed portions have not been highlighted.

Summary. This regulation implements Department Of Defense Directive 2310.1 and establishes policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Persons, and Other Detainees. This regulation is a consolidation of Army Regulation 190-8 and Army Regulation 190-57 and incorporates SECNAV Instruction 3461.3 and Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304. Policy and procedures established herein apply to the services and their capabilities to the extent that they are resourced and organized for enemy prisoner of war operations.

Applicability. This is a multi-service regulation. It applies to the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to their Reserve components when lawfully ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10 United States Code.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The proponent has the authority to approve

exceptions to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulation. Proponents may delegate the approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent.

Army management control process. The Regulation contains management control provisions in accordance with AR 11-2, but does not contain checklists for conducting management control. Reviews are used to accomplish assessment of management controls.

Supplementation. Army supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command or local forms is prohibited without prior approval from HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force supplementation of this regulation is authorized, but is not required. If supplements are issued, major or second echelon commands will furnish one copy of each supplement to their headquarters, as follows: Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations (N511), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington DC 20350-2000, Marine Corps, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQ USMC (POS-10) 2 Navy Annex, Washington DC, 20380-1775 11), and Air Force, to HQ USAF/SPO,

1340 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1340.

Suggested Improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements through channels as follows: HQDA (DAMO-ODL), WASH DC 20310-0440.

Distribution. Army: Distribution of this regulation is made in accordance with initial distribution number (IDN) 092120, intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for Active Army, Army National Guard, U. S. Army Reserve.

Navy: SNDL A (Navy Department); B5 (Coast Guard); (COMDTTCOGARD, only) 21A (Fleet Commanders in Chief); 22A (Fleet Commanders); 23 (Force Commanders); 24 (Type Commanders); 26A (Amphibious Groups); 28 (Squadron, Division, and Group Commanders—Ships); 41A (COM-SC); SECNAV/OPNAV Directives Control Office, Washington Navy Yard Bldg 200, 901 M Street SE, Washington DC 20374-5074

Air Force: F

Marine Corps: PCN 10203324000

*This regulation supersedes AR 190-8, 1 June 1982, and rescinds AR 190-57, 4 March 1987. This regulation also rescinds DA Form 5451-R, August 1985; DA Form 5452-R, August 1985; and DA Form 5976, January 1991.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31404

medical annex of OPLANs, OPORDs and contingency plans includes procedures for treatment of EPW, CI, RP, and ODS. Medical support will specifically include:

(a) First aid and all sanitary aspects of food service including provisions for potable water, pest management, and entomological support.

(b) Preventive medicine.

(c) Professional medical services and medical supply.

(d) Reviewing, recommending, and coordinating the use and assignment of medically trained EPW, CI, RP and OD personnel and medical material.

(e) Establishing policy for medical repatriation of EPW, CI and RP and monitoring the actions of the Mixed Medical Commission.

h. U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). USACIDC will provide criminal investigative support to EPW, CI and RP Camp Commanders per AR 195-2.

1-5. General protection policy

a. U.S. policy, relative to the treatment of EPW, CI and RP in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces, is as follows:

(1) All persons captured, detained, interned, or otherwise held in U.S. Armed Forces custody during the course of conflict will be given humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they fall into the hands of U.S. forces until final release or repatriation.

(2) All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the GPW until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.

(3) The punishment of EPW, CI and RP known to have, or suspected of having, committed serious offenses will be administered IAW due process of law and under legally constituted authority per the GPW, GC, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts Martial.

(4) The inhumane treatment of EPW, CI, RP is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or with deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

b. All prisoners will receive humane treatment without regard to race, nationality, religion, political opinion, sex, or other criteria. The following acts are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory deprivation, collective punishments, execution without trial by proper authority, and all cruel and degrading treatment.

c. All persons will be respected as human beings. They will be protected against all acts of violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. They will not be subjected to medical or scientific experiments. This list is not exclusive. EPW/RP are to be protected from all threats or acts of violence.

d. Photographing, filming, and video taping of individual EPW, CI and RP for other than internal Internment Facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited. No group, wide area or aerial photographs of EPW, CI and RP or facilities will be taken unless approved by the senior Military Police officer in the Internment Facility commander's chain of command.

e. A neutral state or an international humanitarian organization, such as the ICRC, may be designated by the U.S. Government as a Protecting Power (PP) to monitor whether protected persons are receiving humane treatment as required by the Geneva Conventions. The text of the Geneva Convention, its annexes, and any special agreements, will be posted in each camp in the language of the EPW, CI and RP.

f. Medical Personnel. Retained medical personnel shall receive as a minimum the benefits and protection given to EPW and shall also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of EPW. They shall continue to exercise their medical functions for the benefit of EPW, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope of the military laws and regulations of the United States Armed Forces. They shall be provided with necessary transport and allowed to periodically visit EPW situated in working detachments or in hospitals outside the

EPW camp. Although subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are retained such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that concerned with their medical duties. The senior medical officer shall be responsible to the camp military authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel.

g. Religion.

(1) EPW, and RP will enjoy latitude in the exercise of their religious practices, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate space will be provided where religious services may be held.

(2) Military chaplains who fall into the hands of the U.S. and who remain or are retained to assist EPW, and RP, will be allowed to minister to EPW, RP, of the same religion. Chaplains will be allocated among various camps and labor detachments containing EPW, RP, belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language, or practicing the same religion. They will enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport provided in the Geneva Convention, for visiting the EPW, RP, outside their camp. They will be free to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious organizations. Chaplains shall not be compelled to carry out any work other than their religious duties.

(3) Enemy Prisoners of War, who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their own forces, will be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of their faith in U.S. custody. For this purpose, they will receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the United States. They are not to be obligated to do any additional work.

(4) If EPW, RP, do not have the assistance of a chaplain or a minister of their faith. A minister belonging to the prisoner's denomination, or in a minister's absence, a qualified layman, will be appointed, at the request of the prisoners, to fill this office. This appointment, subject to approval of the camp commander, will take place with agreement from the religious community of prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with approval of the local religious authorities of the same faith. The appointed person will comply with all regulations established by the United States.

1-6. Tribunals

a. In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

b. A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.

c. A competent tribunal shall be composed of three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of a field grade. The senior officer shall serve as President of the Tribunal. Another non-voting officer, preferably an officer in the Judge Advocate General Corps, shall serve as the recorder.

d. The convening authority shall be a commander exercising general courts-martial convening authority.

e. Procedures.

(1) Members of the Tribunal and the recorder shall be sworn. The recorder shall be sworn first by the President of the Tribunal. The recorder will then administer the oath to all voting members of the Tribunal to include the President.

(2) A written record shall be made of proceedings.

(3) Proceedings shall be open except for deliberation and voting by the members and testimony or other matters which would compromise security if held in the open.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 08:06
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, April 5, 2004

Jim:

Here is what the Army corrections reg has to say about photographing prisoners and facilities. The paragraph heading pertains to public access, but the wording of subparagraphs 10-12a and b is not limited to the public, and their rationale would apply to correctional staff as well.

Steve

10-12. Public access to facilities

Access by the public to ACS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism on grounds of defamation, embarrassment, and mental anguish to prisoners confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

a. Photographing prisoners. Prisoners will not be photographed, except in support of medical documentation and for official identification purposes. Photography that does not reveal the identity of individual prisoners when undertaken for official purposes and that will not reflect adversely upon the Army may be authorized per paragraph 10-12b(1)(b), (c) and (d) below.

b. Photographing facilities. Photographing ACS facilities is not permitted unless authorized by the facility commander as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include—

- (1) Areas where detailing fences, restraining walls, bar, locks, and other restraining devices are located.
- (2) Scenes including prisoners who are identifiable.
- (3) Scenes depicting prisoners under custodial control.
- (4) Use of irons or similar restraining devices.

c. Prisoner communications with the news media. Face-to-face and telephonic communications between military prisoners and members of the news media (print and broadcast) are not authorized. Written communications including those prepared by prisoners for publication on the internet, are permitted subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10-10 and 10-13d of this regulation.

d. Release of material prepared by prisoners for publication.

- (1) Written material prepared by prisoners for publication, in whole or in part, in print or through the broadcast media, other than clearly identified expressions of personal opinion, must be submitted for review prior to release under the criteria contained in paragraph 10-11b of this regulation.
- (2) In addition, such material may, as appropriate, be subject to national security and policy review under the provision of AR 360-1.

e. Institutional publications. MACOMs may approve establishment of institutional publications containing prisoner prepared articles when such publications are for use within a facility *only*.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 09:09
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: SECNAVINST 1640.9B, Department of the Navy Corrections Manual, December 1996

Chapter 8, section 8301, paragraph 16

16. Official, Press and Civilian Visits

a. Requests ,for general visiting of the brig by groups or individuals shall be coordinated with the local PAO and in accordance with-"Chapter 18 of OPNAVINST 5510.1H, Navy Information Security Program (NOTAL) and SECNAVINST 5720.44A, Department of the Navy Public Affairs (pAO) policY and Regulations= Each request shall include a specific reason for the visit. The brig officer will g-ant or deny such requests based upon the brig's ability to maintain good order and discipline and availability of staff to supervise the visit. Official, press, and civilian visits shall normally be conducted within the brig's regular visitation schedule and shall strictly prohibit photographing or recording of names of prisoners.

b. Current DoD policy is that personal interviews and telephonic communications between prisoners and the media are not authorized.

Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC

From: Strong, Steven, T., COL, OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2004 08:51
To: Schwenk, James, Mr, DoD OGC
Subject: AFI31-205 7 APRIL 2004, The Air Force Corrections System

Jim:

This is all there was in the Air Force reg.

Steve

5.11. Public Affairs. Access by the public to AFCS facilities should be limited to authorized tours and visits. Care should be taken to avoid criticism, grounds of defamation, embarrassment and mental anguish to detainees/inmates confined within the facility resulting from visit and tour policies.

5.11.1. Videotaping and photographing detainees/inmates will not be permitted except in support of medical documentation, for official identification purposes, (i.e., criminal activities) or IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures*. If the inmate consents to a photograph, the inmate must sign a consent statement.

5.11.2. Photographing an AFCS facility is not permitted unless authorized by the confinement officer or as an exception to policy when the stated purpose justifies such action. When photography is authorized, it will not include:

5.11.2.1. Areas where detaining fences, restraining walls, bars, locks and other restraining devices are located.

5.11.2.2. Scenes including inmates who are identifiable.

5.11.2.3. Scenes depicting detainees/inmates under custodial control.

5.11.2.4. Use of restraining devices.

5.11.3. All requests for media interviews (face-to-face, on camera or telephonic) with military detainees/inmates should be coordinated with public affairs and security forces personnel. Media interviews must be conducted without compromising security procedures established by the confinement/corrections facility. Authorize written communication subject to the provisions of paragraph **6.3.2**.

5.11.4. Written material prepared by detainees/inmates for publication must be submitted to the confinement officer or delegated representative for review prior to release. In addition, such material is subject to national security and policy review by Public Affairs under the provisions of AFI 35-101.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

AUG 10 2004

DEPSECDEF

USD(P)

I-04/008653

EF 9989

QA 8/11/04
copy provided
8/11/04

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Policy on Images (U)

- (U) You requested a proposal regarding the use of photographic imagery in DoD prison facilities.
- (U) The Department has a clear and comprehensive policy regarding imagery taken by US soldiers or others at USG detention facilities so as to ensure compliance with our obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Department regulations or directives. (Tab B)
- (U) According to a current Joint Service Regulation, "Photographing, filming, and video taping of individuals for other than internment facility administration or intelligence/counterintelligence purposes is strictly prohibited." (Tab C).
- (FOUO) The General Counsel for the Department of Defense advised you on January 24, 2002, as to the legal requirements of executing our regulations with respect to detention and photography. (Tab D).
- (FOUO) The policies outlined in Mr. Haynes' memorandum have become our operating procedures at our detention facilities per your directive of March 29, 2003. (Tab E)
- (U) I do not believe that additional policy guidance is required, but, I have asked the DASD/Detainee Affairs to inquire through the Department Joint Detainee Coordinating Committee whether any gaps remain to be filled.

383.6

10 Aug 04

24 May 04

COORDINATION: Copies provided to the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and discussed with OGC (Ms. Diane Beaver) on August 5, 2004.

Attachment: As stated.

Prepared by: Bryan C. Del Monte, Detainee Affairs,

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 08603-04

December 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Editorial Pieces

383.6

Take a look at these two editorials (item 43 and 44), and please do something about them.

Thanks.

Attach.
"Tortured Principles," Boston Globe, December 6, 2004
"Tantamount to Distortion?" Washington *Times*, December 6, 2004

DHR:dh
120804-5

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

OSD 08652-05

8 Dec 04

the military's employment practices are generally admirable -- with minorities, for example -- its "Don't ask, don't tell" policy, bars openly gay men and women from service.

Several groups -- including the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights -- are challenging a 1995 law, called the Solomon Amendment, on behalf of university law schools. The law allows the federal government to stop funding to colleges and universities that deny or obstruct campus recruiting by the military. Billions of dollars are at stake because all federal funding to colleges and universities, not just law school funding, can be blocked. The court sided with the schools, saying the government can't stop funding because the military is booted out. The appeals court used the same rationale that the U.S. Supreme Court used in its 2000 decision allowing the Boy Scouts of America to exclude a gay scoutmaster. Just as the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct and lifestyles are inconsistent with Scout values, so too, are U.S. military anti-gay policies inconsistent with the law schools' values, the FAIR lawyers argued. Thus, requiring schools to support discrimination by permitting military recruiters on campus is the same as requiring the Boy Scouts to accept a gay scoutmaster, they said.

What makes the universities' position difficult is that the use of federal funds in a carrot-and-stick approach to enforce good government policies -- usually those supportive of civil rights, inclusion of women and other worthwhile objectives -- has been a practical method of achieving beneficial societal goals. But the carrot-and-stick approach is just a tactic toward an end. It mustn't be confused with something as intrinsic to human decency as fair and equal treatment of all persons.

The former is a means to an end; the latter is the destination itself.

The Pentagon now must decide if it wants to accept the appeals court's decision, ask for a review by the full appellate court or ask the Supreme Court to hear the case. Whichever route the military chooses, our hope is that the ultimate outcome reinforces the basic principles of fairness and equality.

Boston Globe
December 6, 2004

43. Tortured Principles

Years from now, the mistreatment of Afghan war detainees at Guantanamo and Iraqi war detainees at Abu Ghraib will likely rank with the internment of Japanese-American civilians in World War II as a violation of the nation's principles. But the Bush administration continues to stonewall criticism of its actions, whether it comes from US courts or the International Red Cross. Congress must act to steer the nation back toward compliance with the Geneva Conventions and US law.

In a confidential report to the administration based on visits to Guantanamo in June, the International Red Cross found that detainees had been subjected to psychological and physical forms of coercion that were severe enough to be "tantamount to torture." The report, parts of which were leaked to The New York Times last week, also charged US doctors and other medical personnel with providing interrogators with information about prisoners' health and vulnerabilities. Because of this, the report said, prisoners were reluctant to seek medical assistance.

Physicians for Human Rights, which has been calling on the Defense Department to set and enforce ethical guidelines for medical personnel at prison camps for months, said that "any involvement of health

professionals in the practices of torture and/or ill treatment, in any way, violates the international principles of medical ethics." The executive director of the group, Leonard Rubinstein, said the United Nations Principles of Medical Ethics rule out the activities alleged in the Red Cross report.

A court proceeding last week also demonstrated how the United States is turning its back on its own due process standards in its treatment of detainees. For decades, evidence obtained from defendants after torture has not been admissible in US courts. But on Thursday, a deputy associate attorney general told a federal judge that there was nothing to stop military officials at Guantanamo from using torture-induced statements in deciding whether a detainee should be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant.

In another case last month, a federal judge found that the procedures at Guantanamo for determining enemy combatant status do not comply with the Geneva Conventions and US law, which state that any battlefield detainee is presumed to be a prisoner of war until a "competent tribunal" puts him in the less protected status of enemy combatant.

Far from correcting policies that violate medical and legal standards, President Bush has nominated for attorney general his chief counsel, Alberto Gonzales, who in 2002 wrote a memo calling parts of the Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete." Congress should thoroughly investigate conditions at the detainee camps and, if necessary, pass laws to keep the administration's human rights violators in check.

Washington Times
December 6, 2004
Pg. 20

44. Tantamount To

Distortion?

This page does not condone the use of torture for extracting information. A new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross alleging that detainees in Guantanamo Bay have been abused has a number of flaws. The Pentagon has refuted the report's claims of abuse.

According to a detailed memorandum on the ICRC report obtained by the New York Times, apparently from a U.S. government source, the ICRC has alleged that psychological and sometimes physical coercion used at Guantanamo was "tantamount to torture." That report was made after a Red Cross inspection team spent most of last June at the facility. The report said that coercion consisted of "humiliating acts, solitary confinements, temperature extremes, use of forced positions."

For starters, just what does tantamount to torture mean? While those practices do sound like they could elicit both physical and mental discomfort and duress, they do not appear to rise to the level of torture, or something tantamount to it.

Also, the ICRC's bases for its allegations of abuse are the reports of the detainees themselves, not any first-hand observation of the alleged abuse, said a Pentagon official. That fact calls into question the findings, for obvious reasons. The official maintains that claims of ongoing conflict between the Pentagon and ICRC are also false. "It actually is a pretty good relationship we have with the ICRC," he said. "They continue to make valuable comments and suggestions."

The ICRC, which is based in Geneva and is separate from the American Red Cross, defines itself as "an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them

with assistance." Also, it endeavors "to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles." Given that mission, the ICRC's credibility in alleging acts of torture, or anything related to torture, is critical. It must be careful to ensure the practices it complains about rise to that level.

It is difficult to believe, though, that some stress on detainees doesn't need to be exerted in order to produce intelligence.

The White House has repeatedly said it is upholding international law in its treatment of Guantanamo detainees. Without more concrete and substantiated evidence to the contrary, there seems little reason to pay the ICRC report much heed.

APR 20 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control

You might ask Ray DuBois if he wants to think about talking to the air traffic controllers about the closeness of these airplanes to our front here.

It seems to me they are getting closer and closer. I don't know why. I thought they were supposed to fly out over the river. They are flying right over the top of our building.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
041904-8

.....
Please respond by 4/20/04

OSD 08773-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31413

April 30, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Proximity of Aircraft

An airplane went by my window here at about 1444 on April 30. It was very close. You might want to check into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
043004-15

.....
Please respond by

5/7/04

11-L-0559/OSD/31414



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

SECRET
2004 JUN 10 PM 2:47

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 6.9.04

SUBJECT: Proximity of Air Traffic to the Pentagon

- In the attached snowflakes, you expressed concern regarding the proximity of air traffic to the Pentagon and requested that I look into the matter.
- I have been in contact with officials from the Federal Aviation Administration and the Washington Metropolitan Airports Authority, and they have disseminated a request throughout the Reagan National Airport (DCA) aviation community that includes the following:
 - "...all air crews arriving DCA for 'Landing Rwy 15' are encouraged to operate their aircraft at optimum decent profiles and whenever practicable avoid directly over flying the Pentagon (PNT) building. All Departures from 'Rwy 33' are also encouraged to avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself whenever practicable."
 - "Over flights of the Pentagon are not prohibited and not in violation of any FAA airspace course rules for operating at DCA according to the FAA. However, the Department of Defense has requested all air carriers and their flight crews avoid over flying the Pentagon building itself to the maximum extent possible."
- An aerial photograph of the Pentagon's proximity to the flight path of DCA Rwy 15/33 is attached at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Jennifer S. Cole, (b)(6)

DCA Rwy 15/33 Extended Centerline and PNT



11-L-0559/OSD/31417

June 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressional Letter of Support

Please give me a piece of paper with the names of each of these Congressmen – I cannot read their handwriting.

Then draft a letter to each one of them from me, thanking each of them for that. Please give the draft letter to me so I can edit it.

Thanks.

Attach.
5/13/04 Congressionaltr to POTUS

DHR:dh
060804-27

.....

Please respond by 6/18/04

335 SD

8 Sunday

The Honorable _____
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 205 15

Dear Representative _____

Thank you for the statement of support in the letter to the President signed by you and 42 of your colleagues. I appreciate your friendship and will redouble my effort to merit your confidence.

Sincerely,

Mike Rogers (AL)
Duncan Hunter
Jim Saxton
Joe Wilson
Eric Cantor
Randy "Duke" Cunningham
John Sullivan
Sam **Johnson**
Terry Everett
Roy Blunt
Edward Whitfield
Tom Cole
Devin Nunes
Cass Ballenger
Candace Miller
Bob Beauprez
Spencer Bachus
Mario Diaz-Balart
Joe Pitts
Trent Franks
Chris Chocola
Peter King
Tom Feeney
Charles "Chip" Pickering, Jr.
Jim Gibbons
Steve King
Mark Kennedy
Jennifer Dunn
Wally Herger
Roscoe Bartlett
William "Mac" Thornberry
Scott McInnis
J. Gresham Barrett
Melissa Hart
Jack Kingston
Todd Tiahrt
John Carter
Tim Murphy
John Doolittle
Sam Graves
Jim Ryan
Clay Shaw

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

May 13, 2004

The Honorable George W. Bush
President
United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing today to express our strong and unwavering support for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He is serving with honor and distinction.

Since September 11, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld has demonstrated exceptional leadership in service to you and our nation. He has led our nation's military through two wars, the continuing global war of terror, and a revolutionary period of transformation. He is doing a tremendous job at a tremendous task.

Mr. President, we strongly support your comments made on May 10, 2004 when you told Secretary Rumsfeld, "You're doing a superb job. You are a strong Secretary of Defense, and our nation owes you a debt of gratitude."


True leaders perform their best during the most difficult times. Secretary Rumsfeld is leading from the front with strength, honor, and candor. We continue to support him as he continues his job as our Secretary of Defense.

Thank you for your leadership and for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Mike D. Rogers
Member of Congress



Duncan Hunter
Member of Congress

11-L-0559/OSD/31421

Jim Patton

Jose Wilson

Pic Cento

"Dub" Langford

John Smith

Sam Johnson

Tony Ernst

Roy Hunt

Ed Whis.

Sam Cole

Domin Nemes

Case Ballenger

Carroll Miller

Bob Bump

John King

Spencer Balcer

Tom Flynn

John King

John King

John King

John King

Paul Smith

Steve King

Mark Kennedy - MLA

Jim Dun

Melvin Hart

Wally Henger

Jack Kingston

Butler

Todd Tiahart

Mac W. By

John R. Carter

Sam

Tim Murphy

John T. Drotelle

Jim Ryan

[Signature]

Allyson

Melissa Hart



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:04

June 10, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake #060804-27

- You asked for a draft thank you letter (Tab 2) to send to each Member who signed the 13 May 04 letter to the President (Tab 4)
- You also asked to see the printed names of the Members (Tab 3)

335 SD

Attachments :

1. SECDEF Snowflake
2. Proposed Thank You Letter
3. List of Names
4. 13 May 04 Letter to the President

10 Jun 04 8 Jun 04

OSD 08785-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31426

TAB A

SECRET
2004 JUN 11 11 09 35

May 20, 2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SLJBJECT: **Joint** Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue **arising** on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to **have** a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come **up** with a **proposal** in the next seven days.

Thanks.

DHR:Jh
052004-27

.....
Please respond by 6/1/04

0 SD 08793-04

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 11 AM 9:39

CM-1835-04
10 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *TBSM 6/10*

SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

- **Issue.** "There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees. Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint Doctrine Development Community is aggressively working to establish doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations. Joint Publication 2-01.1, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," introduces interrogation operations and should be approved this August. A first draft of a "stand alone" detainee operations joint publication will be developed immediately thereafter.
- **Discussion.** The attached (TAB B) provides information on development of joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Brig Gen Jack Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

OSD 08793-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31428

TAB A

May 20,2004

777

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Jim Haynes
Pete Geren
Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Joint Doctrine on Detainees

There is an issue arising on doctrine on detainees. It seems to me that, given the fact of the nature of the war we are in, we need to have a Joint Doctrine on detainees.

Please come up with a proposal in the next seven days.

Thanks

DHR:jh
052004-27

.....
Please respond by 6/1/04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31429

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: /SF-777/ Joint Doctrine on Detainees

1. Purpose. To provide information on doctrine for joint detainee and interrogation operations.

2. Key Points. The Joint Doctrine Development Community is currently establishing joint doctrine for detainee and interrogation operations.

- Detainee Operations


- The Air-Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center completed a manual on "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (MTTP) on Detainee Operations in a Joint Theater." This manual, which is ready for signature, is on hold per an April 2004 request by the OSD General Counsel (pending Supreme Court decision on detainees).
- The Joint Staff intent is to convert the above MTTP publication into a "stand alone" unclassified joint publication. Notwithstanding the OSD GC hold, the existence of a mature MTTP draft suggests that the joint doctrine development timeline can be shortened; a first draft for Service and combatant command staffing could be developed by fall 2004. A final draft for CJCS signature would be ready by fall 2005.

- Interrogation Operations

- The revision of Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations" will introduce joint interrogation operations and should be approved in August 2004.
- The revision of JP 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations" is in the assessment stage. This classified revision will address human intelligence, counterintelligence and interrogation operations based on lessons learned from ongoing operations. The first draft should be out by August 2005, and the approved doctrine published by fall 2006.

JUN 14 2004

TO: RADM Michel Miller, WHMO

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Military Nominations

I have just reviewed the status of senior military nominations needing Senate confirmation. I am concerned by the number of nominations awaiting action at the White House, as well as in the Senate.

We have several key nominations in that queue at the White House that must get to the Senate for confirmation action this month. I would appreciate your personal efforts to get the nominations currently in the White House to the President for action.

I have attached a memo I sent to Andy Card on this subject, and a listing of nominations currently at the White House awaiting signature.

Thank you.

Attach.

6/9/04 SecDef memo to Andy Card

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh
061004-1

210 (344)

14 Jun 04

OSD 08850-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31431

Copy

June 9, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Military Nominations

Andy—

We talked on the phone about our need to get the White House to sign off on our three- and four-star military nominations. Attached is the list of the nominations that are at the White House. I am told that the papers for some or all of them are physically with the President's party at Sea Island. It would be a big help if you could get them signed.

We need help! We have a war going on. The peacetime pace of 10 working days for White House processing gets multiplied when they go to the Senate. They are still operating on a peacetime schedule. The combination of the two means that we are consistently without a large number of senior military officers. Also, throughout the three-and-a-half-year period we have had 20 to 25 percent of the 48 Presidential appointees that require Senate confirmation vacant. It makes it tough to run this Department.

Thanks.

Attach.

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations as of Tuesday, June 8, 2004

DHR:dh
060904-11

OSD 08728 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31432

Pending 3 & 4 Star Nominations

as of

Tuesday, June 08, 2004

NOMINATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE FOR POTUS SIGNATURE

Service	Name	Type of Nomination:	Arrival at White House
USMC	Cartwright	Cdr, US STRATCOM	5/21/2004
AF	Hester	Cdr, PACAF	5/21/2004
Navy	Keating	Cdr, NORTHCOM	5/21/2004
Navy	Morgan	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Navy	Munns	Cdr Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet and Cdr. Submarine Allied Cmd.	5/21/2004
Navy	Nathnian	Vice Chief of Naval Operations	5/21/2004
Army	Odierno	Assistant to the CICS	5/21/2004
USMC	Sattler	Cdr, I MEF	5/24/2004
Navy	Route	Inspector General, Department of the Navy	5/25/2004
AF	McNabb	0-9 to 0-9 Dir, Log, J-4, JS	5/27/2004
Army	Broadwater	Chief of Staff, US European Cmd	5/28/2004
Navy	LaFleur	Cdr, US Pacific Fleet	5/28/2004
Army	Casey	Cdr, Multi-National Forces-Iraq	6/2/2004
Army	Cody	Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army	6/2/2004
USMC	Conway	0-9 to 0-9 Dir of Ops, J-3, JS	6/2/2004
Army	Honore	CG, First US Army	6/3/2004
Army	Inge	Deputy Commander, U. S. Northern Command/Vice Commander, U. S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command	6/3/2004
AF	Schwartz	Director, Joint Staff	6/3/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/31433



HEALTH AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

 RECEIVED
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 JUN 14 2004 11:35

INFO MEMO

JUN 1 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

 FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
 William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Letter from Secretary Thompson on Afghanistan

- You asked me to respond to a recent letter you received from Health and Human Services Secretary Thompson regarding his experiences and observations about health issues in Afghanistan, and the on-going joint effort between Health and Human Services and Department of Defense to improve child and maternity health services (TAB A).
- Secretary Thompson referenced the Rabia Balkhi Hospital and a request from the Afghan Ministry of Health to have Health and Human Services take management of the hospital.
- As you recall, I have been facilitating regular meetings addressing maternal and child health issues in Afghanistan. These meetings bring together the relevant people on this issue from Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, Veterans Health Administration, and U.S. Agency for International Development. It also includes Dr. Peter Saleh, the senior advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Health, who works on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group for Ambassador Khalilzad, and Marty Hoffman.
- The group met last week and addressed the issues raised by Secretary Thompson. Although preliminary, an innovative proposal emerged which may eventually involve an international foundation in responsibility for administration of the hospital.
- Progress is being made in facility refurbishment and clinical care, but all representatives agreed that effective management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital is a critical need. Dr. Saleh announced that the French have agreed to construct a new women's hospital in Kabul, which may eventually serve as a referral facility for Rabia Balkhi, Malalai, and Indira Gandhi Hospitals. Management of such a network of facilities will present even greater challenges.
- Representatives from Health and Human Services and the Veteran's Health Administration are putting together a proposal to address the need for effective hospital management. It will include cost estimates for a management program for

11-L-0559/OSD/31434

OSD 08841-04

0114741

Rabia Balkhi Hospital, and will be scalable to permit inclusion of Malalai and Indira Ghandi Hospitals in management improvements. Once completed and vetted with stakeholder agencies, Dr. Saleh will engage and brief the Minister of Health.

- Our inter-agency healthcare coordination group will meet again in six weeks to discuss the management improvement proposal and other progress in the Afghanistan healthcare sector reconstruction effort.
- It would be useful for you and Secretary Thompson to meet again in order to have you jointly place your support behind this solution. I would suggest the optimal time for your meeting to be after the proposal is completed, in six to eight weeks.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: CAPT Jack Smith, C&PP, (b)(6), PCDOCS 65790,661 12,66124

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: June 1, 2004
SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a note from Secretary Thompson. *Do you have any thoughts?*

Thanks.

DHR/azn
06/01/04.29

Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD

Please respond by: _____

6 | 10 | 04

11-L-0559/OSD/31436

6/5/24

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Last January, I provided you an update of the efforts and accomplishments of my Department of Health and Human Services in Afghanistan throughout last year. While in the past year we have made tremendous progress in improving the lives of Afghans, much still needs to be done. As you might know, I visited Afghanistan for the third time, and I would like to share with you some of my impressions from my trip.

Before that, I would like once again to express my appreciation to the Department of Defense for making my trip a possibility. Difficulties of air travel in the region made it impossible for me to fly by commercial air, and thus I relied on military transport provided by U.S. Central Command, for which I am very grateful. Throughout my travels, the pilots and ground personnel were of the highest caliber and true ambassadors of the American people.

The primary purpose of my visit was to follow up on letters from President George W. Bush to the heads of state of the six remaining countries that have endemic poliovirus transmission. We are nearing the end of a fifteen-year-long campaign to eradicate polio from the world, supported in large part by the U.S. Government, and I hope these last six countries can overcome the remaining obstacles and stamp out this disease that cripples and kills children primarily. In each of the countries I visited, I saw great enthusiasm and resolve to complete this task, from the highest levels of government on down. I also saw the power of the private sector, particularly Rotary International, with its hundreds of chapters around the world, in making this dream of global polio eradication a reality.

In Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to tour three different hospitals in Kabul, including Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital, which has had the support of the Departments of Defense and Health and Human Services. In addition, I visited a maternity hospital supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development and a children's hospital supported by the Indian Government. While there are certainly limitations at these facilities in terms of infrastructure, staffing and supplies, they all are clearly providing a vital service to the people of Kabul.

As a result of my recent discussions with you, I am pleased to say we now have a new commitment from the Department of Defense to support some of the needed repairs at Rabia

Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.

Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health has asked my Department to consider taking on the management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital. If the Afghan health care sector is to achieve self-sufficiency, the country will need high-quality managerial talent. We are currently considering this request and have not yet responded formally to the Ministry, but my staff had fruitful discussions with the leadership of the Ministry during the World Health Assembly in Geneva this past week. Managing Rabia Balkhi would represent a substantial increase in our commitment to the facility and is outside the bounds of our limited resources. Nonetheless, we view this as an opportunity to cement some of the gains we have made by instituting a sustainable management at the hospital, indeed at all three maternity hospitals in Kabul, which can be replicated across the country. As you may know, we have had significant success in this particular area through our Indian Health Service, which has been able over the years to train Native American communities, many of whom live in very difficult conditions, to manage their own health care resources in a self-sufficient manner. We are fortunate in that the Native American community has expressed interest in contributing to our efforts in Afghanistan by assisting the Afghan people in this particular area. I am hoping to identify additional resources to make this initiative a reality.


We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,



Tommy G. Thompson



Response to Health and Human Services Secretary Regarding Trip to Afghanistan

COORDINATION


DASD, C&PP

USD (P&R)

Dr. David Tornberg

Dr. David S.C. Chu

Concurred 6/6/04


David S.C. Chu
11 Jun 04

2:31 PM

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

Paul Butler

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

6/15

DATE: June 1, 2004

SUBJECT: Attached,

Here is a note from Secretary Thompson. Do you have any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060104.39

Attach: 5/27/04 - Secy. Thompson ltr. to SD

Please respond by: 6/10/04

DR 6/16

Sir,
Response attached.
W/CDR Nosenzo
6/15

AFghanistan

15 Jun 04

10 Jun 04

05/28

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

MAY 27 2004

Bill W

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

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Page 2- The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld


Balkhi Hospital. This is in addition to the several millions of dollars my Department will put into upgrading the training of the staff in modern women's health care.


Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health has asked my Department to consider taking on the management of Rabia Balkhi Hospital. If the Afghan health care sector is to achieve self-sufficiency, the country will need high quality managerial talent. We are currently considering this request and have not yet responded formally to the Ministry, but my staff had fruitful discussions with the leadership of the Ministry during the World Health Assembly in Geneva this past week. Managing Rabia Balkhi would represent a substantial increase in our commitment to the facility and is outside the bounds of our limited resources. Nonetheless, we view this as an opportunity to cement some of the gains we have made by instituting a sustainable management at the hospital, indeed at all three maternity hospitals in Kabul, which can be replicated across the country. As you may know, we have had significant success in this particular area through our Indian Health Service, which has been able over the years to train Native American communities, many of whom live in very difficult conditions, to manage their own health care resources in a self-sufficient manner. We are fortunate in that the Native American community has expressed interest in contributing to our efforts in Afghanistan by assisting the Afghan people in this particular area. I am hoping to identify additional resources to make this initiative a reality.

We are making substantial progress in many needed areas of life in Afghanistan, but the ability of the Afghan people to perpetuate these improvements will depend on their ability to actively manage their scarce resources, whether financial or human, and to pass on and use knowledge and skills. This, in itself, will be a true test of our legacy in Afghanistan.

I look forward to a chance to discuss these developments further with you.

Sincerely,


Tommy G. Thompson


P.S. Thanks Don for
all your help + support!




OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

June 14, 2004 12:42 PM

Administration
& Management

INFO MEMO

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT *Ray DuBois*

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

- Of a total of 653 DoD Directives, **388** were identified for revision or cancellation. Tab A shows their current status.
- Of the 388 Directives, 43% either have been approved or are in formal staffing.
 - 167 have been submitted for cancellation or revision (123 for revision, 44 for cancellation).
 - Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has approved 48 of the 167 directives submitted.
- The above numbers reflect *only* the Directives either complete or informal coordination.
 - For example, the attached status chart at Tab A indicates that USD(Policy) has *only* submitted two of its 51 Directives identified for revision. However, 19 additional Directives are drafted and in internal Policy coordination (Tab B). USD(AT&L) has submitted 29 of its 50 Directives for revision, with 16 of the remaining 21 currently in draft or internal coordination (Tab C). Progress also is evident in other components.
 - The same chart shows that DA&M has identified 45 Directives for revision, but 39 of these are Charter Directives, which require full and timely participation from Principal Staff Assistants and Components.
- Following the SecDef's February 13, 2004 memo expressing disappointment at the pace of this effort (Tab D), the weekly submission rate increased by over 60%.
- With regard to the OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives, a copy of Ryan Henry's April 8, 2004 memorandum to the Secretary is at Tab E.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD, (b)(6)

OSD 08856-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31443

TAB

A

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
6/4/04**

COMPONENT	NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES	CERTIFIED CURRENT	REVISIONS		CANCELLATIONS		SIGNED	
			Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	38	50	29	25	22	10	5
USD(P)	64	11	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	103	79	41	11	5	13	3
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	8	45	8	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	19	12	5	9	8	1	3
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	19	16	9	1	0	4	0
DA&M	86	31	45**	7	10**	6	2	1
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/C&D	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/P&S	5	4	1	1	0	0	0	0
TOTALS:	653	265	325	123	63	44	34	14

* Number identified by each Component in response to Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29,2003.

** Of the 45 DA&M Directives identified for revision, 39 are charter Directives; 9 of the 10 cancellations are also charters. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

TAB

B

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
SOLIC										
U 2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		SOLIC/H&A/PL Policy estimated completion 6 8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 80% completed, estimate 3 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 for final coordination. POC: Todd Harvey 697-3151	11/21/2003			
4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		SOLIC/IAT Draft is 10% completed, working w/J34, estimated draft completion 15 Aug 04. Antiterrorism Standards (2000.16) must be completed before this directive can be updated. POC: COL Tennessee 697-0742	11/21/2003			
U 5100.46	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12-4-1975		X		SOLIC/H&A/PL Policy estimated completion 6 8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 40% completed, estimate 4.5 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 wks for final coordination.	11/21/2003			

POUSO(P)

U 2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	11/17/1997		X		POUSO/P/D&S/M&S&F (Ed Rader). Contacted Gwen Simpson @ State	11/21/2003			
----------	---	------------	--	---	--	--	------------	--	--	--

U 2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7-5-1995		X		ISPT/SP&CP/DTSA per Chester under revision				
U 2060.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	8/8-1972		X		ISPT/SP&CP under revision	11-21-2003			
U 3100.1	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		ISPIFP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U 3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1988		X		ISPIFP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
U 5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	11/19/1983		X		ISPT/SP&CP - Pete Batten 602-5269 under revision	11/21/2003			
U 6205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE			X		ISPT/SP&CP under revision	11/21/2003			

U 3020.36	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	1/15/1993		X		HD- under revision. POC: Donna Reuss/Chuck Adams (703) 681-3528/8815	11/21/2003			
-----------	--	-----------	--	---	--	--	------------	--	--	--

Proponent Responsibility: USDP(P)

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U 3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	2/4/1994	X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be incorporated into the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U 3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)	2/18/1997	X		Per Walter Washabaugh directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U 3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	7/9/1999	X		Per Walter Washabaugh directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U 5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	4/13/1972	X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities combatting crime directive	11/21/2003			
U 5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	12/4/1975	X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities support of US Postal Services.	11/21/2003			
[REDACTED SECTION]									
U 2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993	X		ISA/DSCA under revision 3d OIR. FOC: Friedb Lodge 804-6842	11/21/2003			
2310.1	DDO PROGRAMS FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE: DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/18/1994	X		ISA/DPMO POC: LTC Dan Shea (703) 698-1198 under revision				
U 5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	11/26/1993	X		ISA/DSCA - Forwarded to LTC Walters to sign coordination sheet. Should be completed 3d OIR. 04 POC: Dawn Burke 801-3864	11/21/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

TAB

C

Proponent Responsibility:USD(AT&L)

CL NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D8RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U 1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/28/1978		X		FORMALLY COORDINATED	12/1/2003			
U 2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	8/24/1992 8/24/1992		X		REDRAFTED	11-24-2003			
U 3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981 3/9/1981		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U 3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U 3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		REDRAFTED	11-24-2003			
U 3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE): ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1989		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U 4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U 4120.11	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/5/2003			
U 4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	3/2/1983		X		REDRAFTED	12-8-2003			
U 4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3-2-1982 10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U 4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/21/2003			
U 4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	11/21/2003			
U 4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION DOD LANDS	9/28/1988		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/8/2003			
U 4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			

Proponent Responsibility:USD(AT&L)
11-L-0539/OSD/31450

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DERD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U 5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U 5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

TAB

D



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEB 13 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified 384 Directives that you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by April 1, 2004. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect our approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked for revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Z. R. [unclear]".



OSD 01776-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31453

TAB

E

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1-04/002818

EF-2656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

APR 8 2004

SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives.
- The Chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
- CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Pam Mircelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)
Steven Netishen, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Template

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

DATE February 24, 2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Attached is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.

If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/mzn
0202404.01ts

Attach: Info Memo from Gen. Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: _____ 3/5 _____

01-03-04 15:11 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-0000

INFO MEMO

CH-1546-04

23 February 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/ML*

DSD Review

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

4/7
1600

20

Paul Butler →
6/9

TO: Sec Def

TO: Mira Ricardet

I-04/007531
EF-9782

2004 JUN 15 AM 8:36

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Are you positive that the State Dept. is not going to certify Uzbekistan? If that is so, we've got to get to work on it. Get Paul Wolfowitz to talk to Hadley, and draft a memo from me to Secretary Powell and a memo to me for my POTUS file that I want to talk to the President about Uzbekistan.

Thanks.

DJR/asm
060204.D4a

Please respond by: 6/8

Sir,
Response attached.
w/CDR Nosenzo
6/9

OSD 08876-04

03-05-04 12:02 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/31459

June 14, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Moving Military Base at Babylon

IRA 9

Please get back to me and tell me what you are going to do in response to the CPA's request that the military base at Babylon be moved to avoid disturbing and damaging archeological sites.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
061404-17

.....

Please respond by 6/25/04

14 Jun 04

OSD 08878-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 15 AM 9:29

CM-1842-04
14 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/14*

SUBJECT: Standing Orders

- **Issue.** "I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions. Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal." (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** All pre-September 11 orders were reviewed previously with negative results (TAB B). USTRANSCOM was additionally tasked with the further examination of Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) to ensure their applicability during the War On Terrorism (WOT) and their adherence to the standard DOD orders process. USTRANSCOM completed the review and stated that all MOAs are both applicable during the WOT and in compliance with the standard orders process.
- **Discussion.** USTRANSCOM is the only command supporting active MOAs with other agencies. Operation DEEP FREEZE was the only MOA supported by an Execute Order dated prior to 11 September 2001 and is currently in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) for rewrite.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 08883-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31461

TAB A

March 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Standing Orders

I just read this Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how many things like this exist that need to be reviewed in light of September 11. This was in July 2001, before September 11. Four hundred missions is a pile of missions.

Let's get some review of things that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like that. Please give me a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/12/04 J-3 response to SecDef snowflake
1/27/04 SecDef memo to CJCS re: Antarctica (012704-17)

DHR:dh
030204-14

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

11-L-0559/OSD/31462

OSD 03398-04
Tab A

ANTARCTIC OPERATION DEEP FREEZE

Purpose. To provide a response to SecDef Snow Flake - 674.

Issue. SF-674 stated, "In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there had been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that."

Bottom Line

- DOD support to Operation DEEP FREEZE is provided on a reimbursable basis from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under a DOD-NSF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) at no cost to the Department of Defense.
- Operations are conducted under a standing SecDef EXORD that was issued 032310ZJul01.

Background

- Department of Defense has supported Polar Programs since 1957.
- Operation DEEP FREEZE mission is designed to move people and cargo to, from and within Antarctica in support of the NSF.
- MOA of 1 Apr 99 outlines NSF and DOD responsibilities for Operation DEEP FREEZE.
 - The implementing party for NSF is the Office of Polar Programs.
 - The implementing parties for the Department of Defense are the US Air Force/Air National Guard and the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
 - As the DOD Executive Agent for the MOA, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is required to perform a biennial review of the MOA.

01270A11

- USTRANSCOM has operational control of all DOD common user transportation assets and personnel when they are supporting the Polar Programs.

- Operation DEEP FREEZE missions include:


- Flying support missions between McMurdo (base camp in Antarctica) and Christchurch, New Zealand, by C-141 and C-17.
- Intercontinental missions by LC-130 (ski equipped).
- On-continent missions by LC-130.
- US Coast Guard (USCG) and Military Sealift Command vessel operations (USCG icebreakers, one cargo vessel and one fuel tanker).

Current Year/Season Support (As of 12 Feb 04)

- 46 of 56 C-141 and C-17 missions completed (only C-141 missions remain)
- 51 of 66 LC-130 intercontinental missions complete
- 401 LC-130 on-continent missions complete
 - LC-130 providing additional airlifting for cargo offloaded from AMERICAN TERN
- McMurdo Station to close on 24 Feb
- DEEP FREEZE closes o/a 27 Feb; all units return home

Recommendation. None. Provided for information only.

Prepared by: CDR Warren, USN, J-3 JOD-PAG (b)(6)



Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31463

January 27, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*
SUBJECT: Antarctica

In the meeting with the President, John Handy mentioned that there **had** been 400 missions to Antarctica. I don't remember signing any deployment orders for that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012704-17

.....
Please respond by 2/4/04

Sir,
The attached *Call* 5X8 previously
routed, answers this snowflake.
vr/cdr Nosmy
3/1

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31464

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO **CM-1668-04**
5 April 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 4/3*

SUBJECT: **Standing Orders**

- **Issue.** "I just read **this** Operation Deep Freeze memo. I wonder how **many things** like this exist **that** need to be reviewed in light of September 11. **This** was in July 2001, before September 11. **Four hundred** missions is a **pile** of missions. Let's get some review of **things** that preceded September 11 that need to be reviewed like Operation Deep Freeze. Please **give me a proposal.**" (TAB A)
- **Conclusion.** The Joint **Staff**, combatant command and Service staffs have examined all **standing execution** orders (EXORDs). Operation DEEP **FREEZE** (ODF) is the **only** EXORD **that** had not been cancelled, reviewed or modified since 11 September 2001. I anticipate that **a further** evaluation of **outstanding** memorandums of agreement (MOAs) and **understanding** with other agencies **may** highlight areas that do not have a direct bearing on the **War** on Terrorism. A review of these memorandums **will be forwarded by 30 April.**
- Discussion. **EXORDs** dating back to 1992 **were analyzed to determine if they had** undergone periodic review and approval since 11 September.
 - Before July 2001, **ODF was** executed under **an MOA** with the National Science Foundation. USTRANSCOM supports several such MOAs pre-dating September 2001 that are now **under** evaluation.
 - Combatant **commander** and Service **staffs** were encouraged to **continue their** review **of** all EXORDs that require **use** of DOD **assets** in light of their applicability to current operations.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments :
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

OSD 03398-04
11-L-0559/OSD/31465
etc 04-00529/07

Tab B

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

USTRANSCOM

Gen Handy

26 April 2004

file

June 21, 2004

TO: **LTG** John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: General Officers in Iraq

Please take these lists of generals and tell me how many are Army, how many are Marine Corps, and how many are Coalition (non-US). **Also**, how many generals do we have per 5,000 Army troops and how many Marine generals do we have per 5,000 Marines?

DR

Thanks.

Attach.
6/15/04 CJS memo to SD re: Locations [OSD 08923-041]

DHR:dh
062104-8

DR 9/1

.....
Please respond by 7/2/04

C 7/2

(21 Jun 04)

Sir,
There are 33 Army general, 8 Marine Corps General,
and 10 Coalition Generals. There are also 2 AF general.

The Ratios are : 0.727 Army GOs/5000 soldiers
0.625 Marine Corps GOs/5000 Marines.

COL TB

2 Jun 04

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pete Pace

2004 JUN 15 PM 5: 54

CC: Gen. Richard Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

CJCS HAS SEEN

JUN 03 2004

DATE: June 2, 2004

SUBJECT: Locations

Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq.

Thanks.

DHR/azm
060204.07

Please respond by: 6/10

04 JUN 03 PM 1:34

0 SD 08932-04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/31468



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUN 15 PM 5:50

CM-1844-04

15 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/15*

SUBJECT: Locations

- **Question.** "Please do get me the information on where all the generals and admirals are in Iraq." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** TAB B shows where the general and flag officers in Iraq are located.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: VADM T. J. Keating, USN; Director, Joint Staff; (b)(6)

OSD 08932-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31469

USCENTCOM G/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Multi-National Force - Iraq

Commander	9/10	USA	LTG Sanchez	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement to arrive 30 Jun
DCG	9	Coalition	Coalition-LTG McColl	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG (Embassy based position)	8	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	MG Stratman, USA arrives 30 Jun
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition-Air Cmdr Jones (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG Detainee Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, G	Baghdad, Iraq	
Chief of Staff	8	USMC	Maj Gen Weber	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCS Intel	8	USA	MG Fast	Baghdad, Iraq	BG DeFritas, USA arrives Aug
Deputy Intel	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	UK Fills
DCS Ops	8	USA	MG Miller, T.	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement BG Fil arrival TBD
DCS Ops	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Molan (Aus)	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy C3	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	Italian fill (BG Isaszegi departed)
Dep Dir, Ops/CICB	7	USA	BG Kimmit	Baghdad, Iraq	Brig Gen Lessel, USAF arrives 1 Jul
DCS Strategy, Policy & Plans	8	USAF	Maj Gen (S) Sargeant	Baghdad, Iraq	
Deputy Pol/Mil	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
Coalition Ops	7	Coalition	Coalition	Baghdad, Iraq	
C4I	7	USAR	MG Detamore	Baghdad, Iraq	Replacement requested for 1 Aug
DCS Log	8	USA	BG West	Baghdad, Iraq	MG Minetti, ARG arrives 15 Jul
C7/DCG Eng	8	USA	MG Johnson	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Bostock arrives July
C9	7	USAR	BG Davidson	Baghdad, Iraq	

CDR, Air Cbt Contingency Element	7	USAF	Brig Gen Steel	Baghdad, Iraq	
MND-North Cdr	7	USA	BG Ham	Mosul, Iraq	TF Olympia
CG MNTF North, 88th Inf Div (Fwd)	7	USARG	BG Wriath	Mosul, Iraq	

DCG/OST-I	9	USA	LTG Patraeus	Baghdad, Iraq	
CMATT	8	USA	MG Eaton	Baghdad, Iraq	BG Schwitters arrives 20 Jun
CPATT	8	Coalition	Coalition - BG MacKay	Baghdad, Iraq	

Ch, Iraq Survey Group	8	USA	MG Dayton	Baghdad, Iraq	BGen McMenamin, USMC arrives 15 Jun
-----------------------	---	-----	-----------	---------------	-------------------------------------

Cdr, MNC-I	9	USA	LTG Metz	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Coalition	Coalition - MG Graham (UK)	Baghdad, Iraq	
DCG	8	Canada	MG Natynczyk (Can)	Baghdad, Iraq	

USCENTCOM/FO LOCATION IN IRAQ

Chief of Staff	7	USA	BG Troy	Baghdad, Iraq	Requirement TBD
c3	7	USA		Baghdad, Iraq	
C3 (Effects)	7	USA	BG Formica	Baghdad, Iraq	
c7	7	IUSA	BG Pollman	Baghdad, Iraq	

CG, 1st Armored Div	8	USA	MG Dempsey	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Hertling	Al Hillah, Iraq	
ADC, 1AD	7	USA	BG Scaparrotti	Al Hillah, Iraq	
CG, 1st Infantry Div	8	USA	MG Batiste	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID -	7	USA	BG Mundt	Tikrit, Iraq	
ADC, 1ID	7	USA	BG Morgan	Tikrit, Iraq	
CG, 1st Cavalry Div	8	USA	MG Chiarelli	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Hammond	Baghdad, Iraq	
ADC, 1st Cav	7	USA	BG Jones	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 13th COSCOM	7	USA	BG Chambers	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	
CG, 2d Med Bde	7	USAR	BG Reynolds	Baghdad, Iraq	
CG, 1 MEF	9	USMC	LtGen Conway	Al Asad, Iraq	
DCG I MEF	8	USMC	MGen Stadler	Al Asad, Iraq	
CG, 1 MarDiv	8	USMC	MGen Mattis	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
ADC, 1stMarDiv	7	USMC	BGen Kelly	Ar Ramadi, Iraq	
CG, 1st FSSG	7	USMC	BGen Kramlich	Al Taqaddum, Iraq	
CG, 3d MAW	8	USMC	MGen Amos	Al Fallujah, Iraq	

Sp1 Asst to LTG(Ret) Oster	7	USMC	BGen Usher	Baghdad, Iraq	Backfill not required
DCdr, Gulf Region Engr Div	7	USA	COL(P) Schrodel	Baghdad, Iraq	
US Dep to Dir, CPA Iraq	7	USA	BG Seay	Baghdad, Iraq	

TAB C

COORDINATION

USA	COL Bruno	8 June 2004
USAF	Capt McKaskill	4 June 2004
USMC	Maj Sylvester	4 June 2004
USCENTCOM	LtCol Moscovic	8 April 2004



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JN 21 2004

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence
Ministry of Defence
303 Gombak Drive
Singapore 669645

333 SD

Dear Minister Teo:

It was a pleasure to be with you at the **IISS** Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

21 Jun 04 14 Jun 04

OSD 08950-04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Rear Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean
Minister for Defence
Ministry of Defence
303 Gombak Drive
Singapore 669645

Dear Minister Teo:

He [unclear]

It was a pleasure to meet with you at the IISS Asia Security Conference. The Conference provided an excellent opportunity to discuss issues of regional and global concern with our colleagues in a candid, open atmosphere.

I do also thank you for hosting such a delightful, informative luncheon.

I look forward to working with you to further strengthen our defense relationship.

Sincerely,

CSC

FIX PLEASE

12/6/18

June 16, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Singapore MoD

If I have not written to the Defense Minister of Singapore since my trip, someone should draft up a nice note for me to send to him.

Thanks.

Attach.
Incoming 6/14/04 ltrs from MoD Singapore

DHR:dh
061604-5

.....
Please respond by _____

To Sec Def

There is a letter that is in coordination. We'll drag it out and get it to you (Policy drafted it and its with our writing staff)

Paul
Paul Butler
6/16

33350

*1650004
1450004*

OSD 08950-04

TN 6/18

11-L-0559/OSD/31475

Received Event (Event Succeeded)

Date: 6/15/2004
Pages: 3
Sender: 2025370354
Fax Number:
Tyj JUN-15-2004 16:09

Time: 4:12 PM
Duration: 1 min 17 sec
Company:
Subject:

SINGAPORE EMB IN WRS DC

(b)(6)

P.02/03



MINISTER FOR DEFENCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SINGAPORE

14 June 2004

The Honourable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

It was a pleasure to welcome you to Singapore earlier this month. I am glad that you were able to see for yourself the close cooperation between the Singapore Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces. I trust that you found your visit to Changi Naval Base useful. There are ongoing discussions between our respective staffs and armed forces on how the cooperation may be extended to include US access to the new facilities coming up in the vicinity of Changi Naval Base - Changi Runway 3 and the Command and Control Centre - as well as other SAF facilities. We look forward to these new areas of cooperation when the Defence Cooperation Agreement is concluded.

I also hope that you found the Shangri-La Dialogue to be a useful forum to gather perspectives from this region on the pressing security issues of the day. Your participation and your keynote address were valuable contributions to the Dialogue.

Thank you once again for your presence at the Dialogue and at the lunch for the Ministers.

Yours sincerely;

Read-Admiral(NS) Teo Chee Hean

OSD 08950-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31476

January 15, 2004

381

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Headquarters' Layering

That was a good meeting we had yesterday on end strength. While I gave you some guidance on further questions to come back to me on, I am not sure my request that you look at how you might eliminate some headquarters' layering was clear.

My perception is that the Army has an excessive number of headquarters from the lowest tactical to the highest operational level. We are in the 21st century – how long has the current Army organizational construct been in place? With the technological advances in communications and shared situational awareness, I wonder if the Army is organized to leverage the gains.

Some things I want you to look at and get back to me are:

- Is the division the least common denominator for deployment? Can you deploy multiple units subordinate to a division – to possibly different locations – quickly – like the Marine Corps?
- What is the value-added at each level of headquarters? At what level is the least value added?

15 Jan 04

OSD 08968-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31477

- What is a theater army? What is its relevance today? Who else can do that mission?
- Can brigades work directly for corps? If they can, why aren't they? If they cannot, why not? I believe NATO has had plans for brigades working for corps-level headquarters, so I would like to know what you think about that.

Please get your heads into this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
011504-14

.....
Please respond by 7/23/04

10
November 7, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Ken Krieg
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Personnel Legislation

If we get this personnel legislation through, which it looks like we have, I need to see the plan as to how we are going to implement it in the Department.

Clearly, it is going to take some money to implement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110703-20

.....
Please respond by 12/12/03



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 JAN 12 11 09:13

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 12, 2003, 1:30PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC Action _____

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL & READINESS)

David S. C. Chu

SUBJECT: Governor of Connecticut and Family Day Care Licensing - Snowflake

- Following field hearings at Groton, CT, a concern surfaced that spouses who want to provide family day care are waiting an excessive amount of time to be licensed.
- Initial letter was sent in September 2003 to Governor Rowland requesting his assistance in facilitating discussion between the family day care staff at New London Naval Base and the licensing office for Connecticut.
- Connecticut licensing personnel, Director of OSD Office of Children and Youth, and Navy staff met on October 22, 2003. Since that time initiatives have been taken to reduce the length of time for processing background checks and to provide required training earlier in the process.
- Because this process appears to be improving at this time, we have not accepted your offer to help.
- Navy will provide regular updates to OSD reporting on the goal of reducing time for licensing providers from 9 months to 3 months.


RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only.

ATTACHMENTS:
None

COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: Jan Witte, Director, Office of Children and Youth, ODUSD(MC&FP),

(b)(6)



JW 12/22



Snowflake

7:55 AM

10/23/03

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
DATE: October 22, 2003
SUBJECT: Letter to Governor Rowland

I just read your letter to Governor Rowland of September 9th and his response of September 17th. If you want me to weigh in with him, draft a letter from me to send on top of yours.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
102203.08

Please respond by: _____ *10/28*

11-L-0559/OSD/31481

SNOWFLAKE

DR. CHU FOR ACTION _____

ASSIGN ACTION TO MEFP _____

SUSPENSE DATE BACK TO DR. CHU 29 Oct _____

SUBJECT: Letter to Governor Rowland

12/24/03 Snowflake



December 27, 2003

330.11

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Writing to the Military

Here is a letter from a woman asking us to reinstate the program of writing to the military. Why don't you have someone look at that, now that the anthrax scare has calmed down—if it has.

Thanks.

Attach.
Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:dh
122703-14 (to computer)



Please respond by 1/16/04

*TO Charlie Abell:
Please respond.*

*V/R
Jaymie
Durrnan
2/3*

27 Dec 03

OSD 01664-04

Thank you for doing all you do
for our Military. I am very
proud of them and the actions
they do. I started writing to the
"Any Military Member" program in
1990. It was discontinued after
anthrax. I'm still writing some of
the friends I made before the
program was stopped. I hope you
will be able to reinstate the program
in 2004. Have a happy holiday
season.



Best wishes
for a happy holiday season.

(b)(6)



12/24/03 Snowflake

330.11

December 27, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Writing to the Military

Here is a letter from a woman asking us to reinstate the program of writing to the military. Why don't you have someone look at that, now that the anthrax scare has calmed down—if it has.

Thanks.

Attach.
Christmas card from (b)(6)

DHR:dh
122703-14 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

*TO Charlie Abell
Please respond.
V/R
Jaymie
Durnan
43*

3 Feb 04
27 Dec 03

11-L-0559/OSD/31485

OSD 01664-04

~~INFORMATION RETENTION~~

December 16, 2003

Japan

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita PAUL WOLFOWITZ
~~Don Fort~~

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

I would like to have the two co-chairmen of the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, Jim Sensenbrenner and Jim McDermott, in for breakfast, lunch or a meeting sometime. I would like to see their background sheets, and then I would like to have that meeting set up.

Thanks.

Attach.
 12/4/03 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef
 11/24/03 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) [112403.03]

FILE

DHR:dh
 121603-2

.....
 Please respond by 1/30/04

OSD 01687-04

~~INFORMATION RETEN~~

11-L-0559/OSD/31486

→RS 12/18/03
 Call Craddock.
 Isn't McDermott the guy who said the President could have caught Saddam earlier but chose to wait? If he is, shd SD meet w/him? DJF

16 Dec 03

Seattle Times
December 16, 2003

McDermott Questions Timing Of Arrest

By Alex Fryer, Seattle Times Washington bureau

WASHINGTON — On Seattle radio yesterday, Rep. Jim McDermott questioned the timing of Saddam Hussein's capture, saying, "I'm sure they could have found him a long time ago if they wanted to."

His comments came during an interview on "The Dave Ross Show" on KIRO-FM.

"I've been surprised they waited, but then I thought, well, politically, it probably doesn't make much sense to find him just yet," he said.

"There's too much by happenstance for it to be just a coincidental thing that it happened on this particular day," he continued.

Later yesterday, the Seattle Democrat said he did not know whether the Pentagon had manufactured the arrest of the Iraqi leader. "I think the fact is that the administration has been desperate to find something (positive), and this came up.

"I don't have any knowledge if they knew about it (Saddam's hideout). I think they (Bush administration) got a Christmas present early."

State Republican Party Chairman Chris Vance quickly launched a statement condemning McDermott's earlier statements. "Once again McDermott has embarrassed this state with his irresponsible ranting."

Despite the capture of the Iraqi leader, McDermott said Americans should remain concerned about the welfare of U.S. troops.

"My worry is that problems will be just as bad tomorrow," said McDermott, who has represented the 7th District since 1988.

"... It is not the end of the problem. The fact that he is in captivity does not change things."

McDermott's comment stands in contrast to other members of the state's delegation, who lauded Saddam's capture.

In September 2002, McDermott made news when he traveled to Iraq and told television interviewers that President Bush would mislead the public to justify an invasion.

It's an incident that continues to reverberate on Capitol Hill.

Two months ago, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-Texas, wrote McDermott a personal letter after McDermott denounced a comment by a member of DeLay's office. The staffer said McDermott had attacked the U.S. while he visited Iraq.

Instead of an apology, DeLay wrote: "Your words, had they been spoken in the United States, would:

have amounted to mean-spirited but predictable mediocre hackery. That they were uttered in Saddam's Iraq, however, perhaps within shouting distance of a torture chamber or mass grave, elevated (or lowered) those remarks to the sickening embarrassment they were."

Seattle Times staff reporter J. Patrick Coolican contributed to this report.



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300
UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

December 11, 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Snowflake -U.S. - Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

As a follow-up to your snowflake dated November 24, attached is the list of participants attending this Exchange Program last week.

Attachments:

1. List of U.S.- Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program Participants.
2. Original response to Snowflake.

Prepared By: COL Noreen Holthaus, Director House Affairs, OSD(LA), (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31490

The 30th US-Japan Legislative Exchange Program
Tokyo Meeting
December 2nd-4th, 2003

in alphabetical order of countries

Korean Member

Jay Kun Yoo
Member of National Assembly
Millennium Democrat Party

Japanese Members

Otohiko Endo
The House of Representatives
New Komei Party
Proportional Representative
North Kanto Block

Yoshimasa Hayashi
The House of Councillors
Liberal Democratic Party
Yamaguchi District

Wakako Hironaka
The House of Councillors
Democratic Party
Chiba District

Banri Kaieda
The House of Representatives
Democratic Party
Tokyo 1st District

Yoshitake Kimata
The House of Councillors
Democratic Party
Aichi District

Yutaka Kobayashi
The House of Councillors
Liberal Democratic Party
Kanagawa District

Yuriko Koike
The House of Representatives
Liberal Democratic Party
Proportional Representative
Kinki Block

Kenji Kosaka
The House of Representatives
Liberal Democratic Party
Nagano 1st District

Co-chair	Iwao Matsuda	The House of Councillors Liberal Democratic Party Gifu District
	Asahiko Mihara	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Proportional Representative Kyushu Block
Co-chair	Jin Shinobu Murai	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Proportional Representative Hokuriku-shinetsu Block
Co-chair	Yoshinori Ohno	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Kagawa 3rd District
	Kazuya Shinba	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Shizuoka District
	Yasuhisa Shiozaki	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Ehime 1st District
	Seiken Sugiura	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Aichi 12th District
	Naokazu Takemoto	The House of Representatives Liberal Democratic Party Osaka 15th District
	Isamu Ueda	The House of Representatives New Komei Party Kanagawa 6th District
	Hideki Wakabayashi	The House of Councillors Democratic Party Proportional Representative

US Members

Eni Faleomavaega	The House of Representatives Democrat American Samoa
Mike Honda	The House of Representatives Democrat California 18th

Co-chair	Jim McDermott	The House of Representatives Democrat Washington 7th
	Tom Petri	The House of Representatives Republican Wisconsin 6th
Co-chair	F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.	The House of Representatives Republican Wisconsin 5th
	Harald Malmgren	President The Malmgren Group
	Henry R. Nau	Professor The George Washington University
	Sandy Snider-Pugh	Administrative Assistant The George Washington University



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

4 OCT 2003

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (697-6210)

SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

- Pursuant to your snowflake request of 24 November, I am attaching information on the U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program. House Members participate in the Exchange Program, which is organized by Professor Henry Nau at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The Senate has chosen not to participate.
- The congressional co-chairmen of the Exchange Program are Jim Sensenbrenner (WI) and Jim McDermott (WA). The American congressional delegation is in Tokyo today for the winter meeting of the Legislative Exchange Program. For the second time, South Korean Parliamentarians were also invited to attend. The spring meeting, which will be held in Washington, has not been scheduled.
- The Exchange Program is congressionally endowed. Meetings are held twice a year.
- As all of the George Washington University (GWU) coordinators are in Tokyo for the winter meeting, I have been unable to get a list of Diet Members. Upon the return of the GWU administrators, I will forward the list to you.

Attachments:

1. Snowflake
2. Agenda for U.S.-Japan-Korea Tri-Lateral Meeting
3. General Information on U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange

Prepared by: Jeanine Esperne, DASD, House Affairs

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31494

9:09 AM

+ 2

TO: Powell Moore

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 24, 2003

SUBJECT:

See if the US-Japan Parliamentary exchange still exists. If so, who the members are, how often they meet, who funds it and how it works. I would like to know who is on the US side and who is on the Japan side.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
11/24/03 1:13

Please respond by: _____

U223488/03

11-L-0559/OSD/31495

- 2

**The 30th U.S.-Japan Legislative Exchange Program
and
The First US-Japan-Korea Tri-Lateral Meeting
December 2-4, 2003**

**Sponsored by the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, under a grant from the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission*

December 2nd, Tuesday

U.S. Members arrive at New Tokyo International Airport, Narita and proceed to ANA Hotel, Tokyo

Accommodations at ANA Hotel, Tokyo

ANA Hotel, Tokyo

12-33, Akasaka 1-chome

Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052

Tel: 81-3-3505-1111

Fax: 81-3-3505-1155

18:00-20:00 Dinner hosted by Japanese Co-Chair at ANA Hotel, Tokyo.

December 3rd, Wednesday

8:00-9:00 Breakfast meeting at ANA Hotel

- 09:15 Leave the hotel and proceed to The Parliamentary Museum by coach.
The Parliamentary Museum
1-1, Nagata-cho 1-chome
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0014
Tel: 03-3581-1651
- 09:45-12:30 Session 1 - **Political Issue**
- 12:45-14:00 Luncheon Meeting at the Parliamentary Museum
- 14:15-16:15 Session 2 - **Security Issue**

December 3rd (continued)

- 16:15-18:15 Session 3 - **Economic Issue**
- 18:15 Leave for ANA Hotel by coach
- 19:00-19:30 Welcoming Cocktails with Korean Parliament Members at ANA Hotel.
- 19:30-21:00 Tri-Lateral Dinner hosted by Japanese Co-Chair at ANA Hotel.

Accommodations at ANA Hotel

December 4th, Thursday

- 8:00-9:00 Tri-Lateral Breakfast meeting at ANA Hotel.
- 9:15 Leave for The Parliamentary Museum by coach.


- 09:45-12:30 The 1st Tri Lateral Session
**Economic and Political Issues of South Korea and
North Korean Issue**
- 12:45-14:00 Tri-Lateral Luncheon Meeting at the Parliamentary Museum.
- 14:00 Transfer to ANA Hotel by coach.

December 5th, Friday

- 08:00-09:30 Breakfast with Young Japanese Leaders (optional)
Room in ANA Hotel to be announced

*** * * * End of the 30th Meeting * * * * ***

Accommodations at ANA Hotel



U.S. JAPAN

JCIE Political Exchange Program (PEP)

The Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), based in Tokyo, was established in 1970 as an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization dedicated to strengthening Japan's role in international affairs. JCIE plays an important role in broadening debate on Japan's international responsibilities by engaging Japanese from different sectors in privately sponsored programs of exchange, research, and dialogue with their foreign counterparts.

One of the central elements of JCIE's efforts over the past three decades has been the Political Exchange Program. This program began in the late 1960s, even prior to the formal creation of JCIE, when its precursor, the Japan Council for International Understanding, cosponsored the first full-fledged, nongovernmental policy dialogue between Japan and the United States, the Shimoda Conference. What emerged from that meeting was a growing consciousness that the U.S.-Japan relationship cannot be handled solely by the governments. There is a need for the involvement of leaders from diverse sectors, and particularly from the world of politics. JCIE's subsequent activities—including the continuation of the Shimoda Conference series—have sought to address precisely that need.

As one of very few independent, nonprofit organizations in Japan, JCIE is in a unique position to promote substantive, nonpartisan political exchange between Japan and other countries. JCIE's programs are also enhanced by the presence of its American affiliate, the Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA), which was established in 1975 in New York as a tax-exempt organization. Among its most important functions, JCIE/USA plays a networking role among members of Congress, foundations, and think tanks in the United States and their counterparts abroad. In addition, JCIE/USA serves as an informal information center to JCIE/Japan and other friends by compiling resources and tracking current developments in politics and civil society in North America. This presence in the United States has enabled JCIE to play a critical role in promoting exchange between political, intellectual, and grass-roots leaders from the United States and Japan.

The closing decades of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes throughout the global community that have changed the way nations are able to govern themselves. Globalization and greater interdependence are making it ever more critical that policymakers have a thorough grasp of international affairs, even when considering domestic policy choices. In Japan, another significant shift in the mode of governance has been a decline in the role of bureaucrats and a simultaneous and conspicuous rise in the role of politicians in the policymaking process. This has further reinforced the need for substantive exchanges between Japanese policymakers and their counterparts abroad. In comparison to the traditional model of political exchange that primarily stressed network-building, JCIE has worked to create more issue-oriented exchanges, fostering dialogues between political leaders on topics relevant to them.

Exchanges of Political Leaders

In light of the new requirements of the globalized age, JCIE's exchanges of political leaders seek to promote greater breadth and depth of knowledge on the part of policymakers through the promotion of interaction and dialogue with their counterparts in other countries. These programs also seek to engage a broad range of individuals—the staff of politicians, members of local and state governments, and leaders in the community—all of whom are playing an increasingly important role in relations between countries.

By taking a flexible and responsive approach in its political exchange program, JCIE has enjoyed an exceptional degree of continuity and longevity in its programs. The U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, founded in 1968, is the oldest bilateral exchange of national legislators. In all, JCIE's various exchanges have involved well over one thousand political leaders over the past thirty years, offering them programs that reflect their changing needs and providing substantive learning opportunities as well as opportunities for networking with other policymakers.

U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

Over the past three decades, a total of 24 Congressional delegations and 21 Diet delegations—comprised on aggregate of roughly 200 members of Congress and 160 Diet members—have traveled across the Pacific to meet with their counterparts in the legislature, key government officials, and other experts. As economic and political interdependence has deepened over the past decades, and as the scope and scale of issues requiring policy coordination between the two countries have steadily increased, the program has sought to provide a better and more nuanced grasp of the domestic dynamics in each country. In 1997, the program was expanded to include a Joint Parliamentary Study and Dialogue Project on U.S.-Japan Security Relations in Asia Pacific, conducted in cooperation with the Brookings Institution, and a Study Group for Young Members of the Diet.

U.S. Congressional Delegations to Japan (1968–2000)

Senate

Howard Baker (R-TX)
Max Baucus (D-MT)
Bernie Beutler (R-MD)
Henry Bellmon (R-OK)
Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)
Bill Bradley (D-NJ)
William V. Roth (R-NJ)
Dick Clark (D-IA)
John Danner (D-NH)
Paul Fannin (R-GA)
Tom Harkin (D-IA)

Vance Hartke (D-IN)
James McClure (R-ID)
Lee Metcalf (D-MT)
Ronald Moran (D-NC)
Frank Mours (D-UT)
Frank Murkowski (R-AK)
Edmund Muskie (D-ME)
Sam Nunn (D-GA)
James Pearson (R-KS)
Charles Percy (R-IL)
Jay Rockefeller (D-WV)
William Roth (R-DE)

Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)
Jim Sasser (D-TN)
Hugh Scott (R-PA)
Robert Stafford (R-CT)
Richard Schweiker (R-PA)

House

Thomas Aiken (D-ME)
Bill Archer (R-TO)
Les AuCoin (D-OR)
Herbert Bauman (R-VA)
Doug Bereuter (R-NE)

Howard Berman (D-CA)
 Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY)
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 William Clay (D-MO)
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 Jeffrey Cochran (D-CA)
 Thomas Coleman (R-MO)
 Ronald Coleman (D-TX)
 Michael Collins (R-GA)
 James Conman (D-CA)
 John Culver (D-IA)
 Peter DeFazio (D-OR)
 Diane DeGette (D-CO)
 Butler Derrick (D-SC)
 Lawrence DeNardis (R-CT)
 Norman Dicks (D-WA)
 Thomas Downey (D-NY)
 Robert Duncan (D-OR)
 Dennis Eckart (D-OH)
 John Erlenborn (R-IL)
 Alan Enel (D-PA)
 Frank Evans (D-CO)
 Eni Faleomavaega (D-Delegate,
 American Samoa)
 Bob Filner (D-CA)
 Bill Frenzel (R-MN)
 Thomas Foley (D-WA)
 Wyche Fowler (D-GA)
 Albert Gore (D-TN)
 Barney Frank (D-MA)
 Donald Fraser (D-MN)
 Martin Frost (D-TX)

Sam Gejdenson (D-CT)
 Richard Gephardt (D-MO)
 Sara Gibbons (D-FL)
 Dan Glickman (D-KS)
 Sam Gordon (D-TN)
 Bill Gradson (R-OR)
 Judd Gregg (R-NH)
 Tony Hall (D-OH)
 Lee Hamilton (D-IN)
 James Hayes (D-LA)
 Earl Hilliard (D-AL)
 James Howard (D-NY)
 William Hungate (D-MO)
 Henry Hyde (R-IL)
 Nancy Johnson (R-CT)
 Robert Leggett (D-CA)
 Sander Levin (D-MI)
 William Millard (R-CA)
 Robert Minkas (R-CA)
 Robert Matsui (D-CA)
 Spark Matsunaga (D-OR)
 Joseph McDade (R-PA)
 Patsy Mink (D-HI)
 Jini McDermott (D-WA)
 Robert McEwen (R-NY)
 Matthew McHugh (D-NY)
 Thomas McMillen (D-MD)
 Robert Michel (R-IL)
 Barbara Mikulski (D-MD)
 John Miller (R-WA)
 Norman Mineta (D-CA)
 Howard Nielson (R-UT)
 James O'Hara (D-MI)
 Leon Panetta (D-CA)
 Thomas Petri (R-WI)

John Porter (R-WV)
 Joel Pritchard (R-WA)
 David Pryor (D-AR)
 Dan Quayle (R-IN)
 Albert Quie (R-MN)
 Thomas Rainsbeck (R-IL)
 Bill Richardson (D-NM)
 Charlie Rose (D-NC)
 Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL)
 Hamid Sawyer (R-MD)
 Herman Schneebeli (R-PA)
 James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
 James Shannon (D-MA)
 Phillip Sharp (D-IN)
 Norman Shumway (R-CA)
 David Skaggs (D-CO)
 Denny Smith (R-OR)
 John Spratt (D-SC)
 William Steiger (R-WI)
 Louis Stokes (D-OH)
 Samuel Stratton (D-NY)
 Bennie Thompson (D-MS)
 Morris Udall (D-AZ)
 Jolene Unkewild (D-WA)
 Pat Williams (D-MT)
 Timothy Wirth (D-CO)
 Robert Wise (D-WV)
 Lynn Woolsey (D-CA)
 Wendell Wyatt (R-OR)
 Andrew Young (D-GA)

(Affiliations given are those at time of participation.)

Japanese Diet Delegations to the United States (1974-2000)

Members of the House of Councilors are marked (*). All others are members of the House of Representatives.

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

Kazuo Aichi
 Kenro Aizawa
 Kyoji Chuma
 Seisuke Eto
 Takao Fujii
 Ken Fujieda
 Takuro Hamada
 Yoshitaka Hara
 Ryutoma Hori
 Yo Shunzo Inayama
 Yoshiro Inayama

Yukihiko Ikeda
 Chiken Kakazu
 Koji Kakizawa
 Genryo Kaneko
 Kazuyoshi Kaneko
 Naohiro Kato
 Mono Kimura
 Takashi Kosugi
 Hiroshi Kumagai
 Nobuyuki Machimura
 Hiromichi Miyama
 Kiyomi Mizuno
 Hajime Morita
 Tetsuzo Nakamura
 Yoshio Nagano
 Ken Nakatani
 Tetsuro Niimi

Takeshi Nozaki
 Tetsu Nozaki
 Fukuhiro Nukaga
 Keizo Obuchi
 Naomasa Ogawa
 Senjirou Okaji
 Tadamasa Osamura
 Shinun Oshiro
 Kenichiro Otsubo
 Toshiro Saito
 Akiho Saito
 Tetsu Shinoda
 Akira Shirogane
 Hiroshi Sonoda
 Junzo Suzuki
 Shunichi Suzuki
 Daisuke Takatori

BRIEFING

Elion School Home & ...

Senator
Lieberman Keynotes
Homeland Security
Seminar



Japan-U.S. Legislative Exchange Program Still Going Strong

Joseph Stiglitz's Brings
Discontent Talk to GWU

Money to Move
Discussion Into Space

Students, Iraq, and a
TV Camera

CISTP Shakes Hands
with South Korea

Developments in the
Works

ESIA Launches New U.S.
Foreign Policy Institute

For Liberty or Security?

The Sigur Center Shines

A Very Public Staff

Japan-U.S. Legislative
Exchange Program Still
Going Strong


Hail to the Chief?

Students on Tour

New Student Policy
Group Tackles Security
Issues

Could Link to a Career

Bartering Over Human
Rights with the Embassy



WHY THE U.S.?

[Meeting with China](#)

[Paying Attention to Culture in the World](#)

[NATO's Kurt Volker Visits with Students](#)

[Speaking Out for Children](#)

[Fuerth Continues to Think Ahead](#)

[David Rockefeller Chats with Dean Harding](#)

[Nau and Mearsheimer Debate Policy](#)

[Access Transcripts Online](#)

[Want to Find Out What's Happening?](#)

[Graduate Students Take Office](#)

[Bringing International Education to K-12](#)

[Public Diplomacy or Propaganda?](#)

[Belosky Series Hosts Thomas Homer-Dixon](#)

[The New Leonard Nadler Scorn Honored](#)

[Speaking Out for Zimbabwe](#)

[Equity Notes](#)

[Faculty Profiles: Click Larsen](#)

[Brown Bag Series Starts with Afghanistan](#)

[Remembering Ambassador Koba Ebani: A Tribute](#)

Twice a year members of the U.S. Congress meet with members of the Japanese Diet to talk, chat, debate, and yes, even raise their voices. In the spring they congregate in Washington DC and in the fall they meet in Tokyo for informal conversations on the state of world affairs. By working outside official channels they can develop a more personal relationship and better understanding between the two nations and their policies, says Professor Henry Nau, Director of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, the program that hosts this Legislative Exchange Program.

The Legislative Exchange Program began nearly 14 years ago as an offshoot of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda, which was implemented in 1985. "In the late 80s it was apparent that there was little real dialogue on the issues," says Nau. Gaston Sigur approached Henry Nau with the idea of the U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda in order to nurture a better, less business focused relationship with Japan.

Today, the Legislative Exchange Program continues offering further development toward Japan's understanding of U.S. democracy and U.S. understanding of Japan's policies. In its 28th session, Nau remarks that its regular participants have established candid and friendly relations that allow for real talk. In many cases, American senators will spend time with their counterpart's family or a Japanese politician will join an American senator on the campaign trail in the United States.

During their most recent meeting this past October, the Japanese and American officials discussed security issues like U.S. bases in Okinawa, the potential threat of Korean nuclear power, environmental issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, and a number of other pressing issues. The next scheduled meeting will take place in Washington DC in late April. 

HISTORY OF THE U.S.-JAPAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Introduction

The U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda began in 1985 as a research and public policy activity jointly sponsored by the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. and the Carnegie Council on Ethnic and International Affairs in New York. In 1990, the Agenda became an independent program at the George Washington University, and in 1991, it became associated with the newly created Gaston Sigur Center for Asian Studies, now known as the Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Over the past seventeen years, the Agenda has conducted a variety of activities. These include public policy seminars and conferences, research projects with various counterpart institutions in Japan (covering a range of topics from energy to agriculture to high technology policy-making), and various publications to include a newsletter, monograph series, two edited books published by New York and Columbia University Presses, and various conference papers and proceedings.

For the first nine years, the GWU Agenda was co-directed by Henry R. Nau, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, and Gaston Sigur, Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Counselor at the Sigur Center in the Elliott School. Professor Sigur, a former Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs in the U.S. Department of State and long-time scholar and commentator on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Asian affairs, died in Spring 1995. Professor Nau continues as the Agenda Director. He is a former staff member of the National Security Council and author of numerous publications in areas of technology, political economy and U.S. foreign policy. His most recent book, to be published by Cornell University Press in March 2002, is At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy. Other books include The Myth of America's Decline, published in 1990 by Oxford University Press, and Trade and Security, published in 1995 by The American Enterprise Institute Press. Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, is the director of the Sigur Center. He is the holder of the chair in U.S.-Japan relations established in honor of Gaston Sigur.

The Agenda's principal ongoing program is the Legislative Exchange Program (LEP), carried out in cooperation with the Japan Economic Foundation in Tokyo.¹ In

¹ The LEP was referred to in a survey conducted in 1993 by the Japan Center for International Exchange as one of only two "models for bilateral parliamentary exchanges between Japan and the United States" (the other being the Bradley-Shinya U.S.-Japan Legislators' Committee — discontinued in 1996). These models are characterized by academic administration, ongoing dialogue among legislators to develop personal ties (rather than one-shot conferences), and candid, informal discussions on substantive topics of the moment. See ICIE, A Survey and Study Report on Inter-Parliamentary and Political Leaders Exchanges between the United States and Japan, March 11, 1994, p. 2.

2000, the LEP completed its thirteenth year. The LEP brings together on a semi-annual basis the same core group of U.S. Congressional Members and Japanese Diet Members for in-depth and informal discussions of the broad range of political, economic and security issues affecting U.S.-Japan relations. Conducted initially in English, the exchanges have created strong personal and social ties among the members, enabling them to debate controversial political issues without rancor. This type of exchange did not, and still does not, exist elsewhere in U.S.-Japan parliamentary relations. For this reason, in a survey in fall 1997, Congress identified the LEP as the preferred forum for expanding U.S.-Japan parliamentary exchanges, both to include non-English speaking Diet Members and more of the leadership of both parliaments. Accordingly, the LEP's program expanded significantly in 1999. The meetings now include simultaneous translation and higher level parliamentary representation. The new Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, has been a regular member of the LEP since 1995. After becoming speaker, he hosted breakfast meetings for the LEP and has been directly involved in ongoing discussions to include the leadership of Japan's parliament. In December 1999, Taku Yamasaki, then one of the leaders of the LDP and now Secretary General of the LDP under the new Koizumi government, participated in an LEP discussion with simultaneous translation. In 2000, the Speaker of the Japanese Diet attended an LEP dinner. Thus, the current LEP builds on the solid personal and social relationships, which the English-speaking group developed between 1989 and 1998, and now includes expanded meetings with non-English speaking Japanese Members and leaders of both parliaments.

As before, the LEP plans two meetings during Calendar Year 2002. The first meeting takes place in Washington, D.C. in April/May 2002. The second meeting takes place in Tokyo in November/December 2002. At the second meeting, the LEP is exploring a low cost means of linking a parliamentary exchange among U.S., Japanese and South Korean legislators with the bilateral U.S.-Japan LEP meeting. Japanese colleagues would invite friends in the South Korean parliament to attend the last day of the LEP session (usually a morning session and lunch). The topic for discussion would be trilateral security and economic issues. Initially, the South Korean members might cover their own travel costs, and the Japanese the meeting costs. Eventually, the Japanese might work these costs into their regular budget. (The LEP also maintains contact with Congressman Ed Royce (R-CA), who chairs the U.S.-South Korea parliamentary exchange. The possibility of a joint meeting of the two bilateral exchange programs has been suggested.)

Background of the Agenda

In its early years, the GWU U.S.-Japan Economic Agenda conducted a variety of research projects with Japanese counterparts. Initially funded entirely by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, the Agenda received subsequent support from other sources.

The *Pew Charitable Trusts* funded the Agenda's high technology policy-making project, carried out in cooperation with the Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI). The

project featured two conferences on U.S. and Japanese high technology policy-making in the controversial sectors of high-definition television (HDTV) and the FSX fighter aircraft. The conferences developed and published case studies of U.S. and Japanese policy-making processes in these two controversies.

The United States Agency for International Development funded an Agenda project on U.S.-Japan energy and environmental cooperation in third world countries. This project was conducted jointly with the MIT-related institute, Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI). It featured a workshop of 25 participants (10 from Japan) and culminated in the joint preparation of twelve working papers on various aspects of U.S. and Japanese energy and environmental priorities, policy-making and possible cooperation in third countries.

In recent years, the Agenda has confined its activities to the Legislative Exchange Program.

Background of the Legislative Exchange Program (LEP)

The LEP was headed at its inception by Congressman Norman Shumway (R-California) on the American side and Diet Member Iwao Matsuda (LDP-Gifu Prefecture) on the Japanese side. Congress Shumway retired from the U.S. Congress in January 1991, and Congressman Donald Pease (D-Ohio), a key member of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, became chair. Congressman Pease retired from Congress in January 1993, and Congressmen Arno Houghton (R-NY) and Tom Sawyer (D-OH) served as co-chairs from 1993 to 1998. In 1999, Congressmen James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and David Minge (D-MN) took over leadership of the LEP. In 2000, David Minge left the Congress, and James McDermott (D-WA) became the Democratic Co-Chair. On the Japanese side, Matsuda (originally LDP, then New Frontier Party and independent, now LDP again) was chair until 1996, when he was defeated in lower House elections. Thereafter, Jin Murai (LDP) and Yoshinori Ohno (LDP) assumed the leadership. Mr. Matsuda became the third co-chair when he was reelected to the upper house of the Diet in 1998. Today, the Japanese delegation is led by three co-chairs.

Over the years, participation by U.S. Members in the LEP meetings has steadily increased. At the first meetings, fewer than ten Members participated. At the meeting in May 2001, twenty-one Members participated (i.e. physically showed up, not just indicated they would come). In total, over the past ten years, some eighty-five Members of Congress have attended one or more of the LEP sessions. On the Japanese side, anywhere from six to seventeen Diet members have participated in individual sessions. In May 1999, the Japanese sent their largest delegation to Washington — fifteen Diet Members. In May 2001, seven Japanese Members participated. Altogether, more than thirty-five Diet Members have attended one or more of the meetings. With recent changes in Japanese politics, the participants now represent the range of political parties in Japan.

The participants over the years have expressed frequent and enthusiastic support for the exchanges. The original English format developed a direct and spirited form of exchange, which helped to overcome cultural formalities and build personal ties. Shumway and Pease, when they retired, went out of their way to find successors and ensure that the program continued. A number of the American and Japanese legislators (Sawyer, Houghton, Sensenbrenner, McDermott, Hastert, Murai, Ohno, Matsuda, Yamamoto, Miyamoto) attend the sessions regularly and make up a core group that enjoys personal rapport and attracts a wider circle of participants. In one communication in 1994, Mr. Matsuda suggested how frank and valuable the LEP discussions are. He wrote: "I count the number of times that voices are raised as positive indicators of the intensity and ultimately the value of our exchange programs."

THE CONGRESSIONAL STUDY GROUP ON JAPAN

233 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, S.E., SUITE 200

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-1107

(202) 543-8676

(b)(6)

March 12, 2001

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Dear Colleague:


We would like to invite you and/or a member of your staff to attend a luncheon meeting on Tuesday, March 20, 2001 with a group of seven young policy-oriented Japanese Diet Members who are participating in the 23rd U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program run by the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). The Diet Members will discuss the current political situation and future outlook in Japan, and are interested in hearing Members' and staff views on the new Congress and future directions for U.S. foreign policy. Please note that staff are particularly welcome to attend this program. The luncheon meeting will be held in Room S-115 (Senate Family Dining Room) in the Capitol, beginning at 12:30 p.m.

The Diet delegation (all members of the House of Representatives) will be led by Mr. Ichiro Aisawa of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Other participants are: Mr. Yukio Edano, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ); Mr. Kazuhiro Haraguchi (DPJ); Mr. Hakubun Shimomura (LDP); Mr. Takuya Tasso (Liberal Party); Mr. Kazuyoshi Akaba (New Komeito Party), and Mr. Tatsuya Ito (LDP). The delegation will be accompanied by Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE, and Mr. Hiroshi Peter Kamura, Executive Director, JCIE/USA.

We hope that you and/or a member of your staff will join us for a stimulating discussion meeting, which is funded by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission. Please have your office either return the enclosed form to the Congressional Study Group on Japan (b)(6) or call 543-8676 to let us know if you will be able to attend.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,



Dianne Feinstein



Steve Horn

Enclosure

The Congressional Study Group on Japan is a project of the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress in cooperation with the East-West Center and is funded by the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and other interested donors.

11-L-0559/OSD/31509

12/17
0900

December 16, 2003

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
Doug Feath
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program

I would like to have the two co-chairmen of the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, Jim Sensenbrenner and Jim McDermott, in for breakfast, lunch or a meeting sometime. I would like to see their background sheets, and then I would like to have that meeting set up.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/4/03 ASD(LA) memo to SecDef
11/24/03 SecDef memo to ASD(LA) [112403.03]

DHR:dh
121603-2

.....
Please respond by 1/30/04

*Larry -
He wants to meet
w/ McDermott - the guy
who just said we "staged"
the capture of SH for
political effect ????*

*Powell Moore:
Where are we
on this?*

*Thanks,
Jaymie
Dernau
2/3*

(b)(6)

OSD 01687-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31510



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 MAR -3 PM 5:38

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

- Based upon your positive impressions during a visit to Secretary Thompson's Command Center, I visited the facility to determine the potential use of their capability in your new Unified Command Center.
- While the HHS Command Center is limited in scope and size, they have done an impressive job constructing it in 59 days at a cost of \$3.7M. Essentially, they use two large video walls with one wall having four large screen monitors tuned to live news TV stations (domestic and international), and the other wall having ten projector screens in a two-down and five-across matrix as a "knowledge wall."
- On the knowledge wall, each projector can display a single image or multiple images, such as video teleconferencing images, multiple health crises, multiple hospital statuses during an event, etc. This would be similar to you concurrently tracking information and talking to multiple Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, other Department Secretaries, the President, etc.
- I have directed my IT team, responsible for developing and implementing your Unified Command Center, to meet with Secretary Thompson's IT staff to better understand how we can utilize the HHS Command Center's capability and their expertise in integrating a "knowledge wall" into the new Unified Command Center, your new office on the Mall Terrace in 2005, and other areas occupied by you.
- If desired, I am available to discuss further at your convenience.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Michael R. Sullivan, (b)(6)

OSD 03192-04



December 19, 2003
~~18~~

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at the HHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121803-11

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

December 18¹⁹, 2003

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: HHS Command Center

Please go over and take a look at the HHS command center. I am told it was done in 59 days and only cost \$3.5 million. It is amazing.

Please go over, get a full briefing on it and see if you think we ought to do something like that.

Thanks.

DHR:db
121803-11

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

311ccc

19 Dec 03

1 Mandy

OSD 03192-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1632-04
19 March 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS 19 March 2004

SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

- **Question.** "Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth. Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say?" (TAB A)
- **Answer.** General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, and I are meeting with Congressman Jim Marshall regarding this matter on 23 March.
- **Analysis.** After the meeting, we will report on insights from Congressman Marshall at your earliest opportunity.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Copy to:
CSA

Prepared By: MG Clyde A. Vaughn, USA; ACJCS/NG; (b)(6)

OSD 04082-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31514

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoemaker talk to him and see what he has to say. He is an interesting man, very bright. He is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-27 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by

1/31/04

11-L-0559/OSD/31515

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

Office of the Chief of Staff, COL Campbell 16 March 2004
US Army

326

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Congressman Marshall

Congressman Marshall has some interesting ideas about using the Guard and Reserve to fight three-week wars and not for much else. He says they like to do it and do it well. He says they have the skills for civil affairs and so forth.

Why don't we arrange to have Pete Schoomaker talk to him and see what he has to say. He is an interesting man, very bright. He is the one who wrote such a good op-ed piece after he came back from the Middle East.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-27 (to computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

27 Dec 03

OSD 04082-04

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 4, 2003

2003 DEC -2 PM 2:50

IRELAND

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Collins Film on Irish Insurrection

Attached is a note from Newt. I am going to get the film he refers to.

After I have looked at it, I will let you see it, and we will decide whether we think it is worth Abizaid seeing it.

Thanks.

Attach
12/2/03 Gingrich e-mail to SecDef re: Irish Insurrection of 1916

DHR:dh
120403-30 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 04811-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31518

4 Dec 03

(12)4

(b)(6)

OSD

[Handwritten signature]

cc Di Rita
LTG Craddock

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
 Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2003 7:23 AM
 To: arlene.nestel@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
 Cc: damicoj@j.s.pentagon.mil
 Subject: first copy had editing errors-new

[Handwritten signature]

for secdef depsecdef
 from newt
 12/02/03
 visiting Dublin on the way home from Brussels

you should stop in Dublin on the way home from Brussels and look at the lessons of the Irish war against the British Empire 1916-22.

After six days in Dublin I highly recommend you visit its historic sites and study the lessons of its 1916-1922 war against the British Empire..

The Irish were the first successful insurrection of the 20th century. They forced the British Empire to accept their independence after a six year struggle (1916-1922), The British could not defeat a local insurgency as long as it had local support and was willing to die.

In effect the Irish nationalists were saying "we are willing to die longer than you are willing to kill us and even a few of us can kill enough of you to make your system agree to our independence."

Mao Tse Tung, Tito, Ho Chi Minh and others were all aware of the Irish experience. (Peter Hart, The I.R.A. at War 1916-23 Oxford University Press 2003).

Michael Collins is a pretty good film on this topic and worth the two hours of viewing (an alternative to visiting Dublin).

The key to defeating an insurgency is building up our allies in the local population. Killing the insurgents is necessary but not sufficient. The headline below from the New York Times illustrates how far we are from understanding this war and getting it right.

Using heavy firepower and killing a lot of people is going to end up alienating the local population not intimidating them. We are currently rejecting a century of lessons learned in fighting societal wars (what some would call guerrilla or terrorist

12/3/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/31519

3

campaigns but in essence are societies at war with professional military and professional police from another culture).

Dublin Castle in 1921 resembles the CPA fortress in 2003.

It is going to take a profound change of doctrine and strategy to win this war.

Let me repeat because this will be hard for the existing system to accept: it is going to take a profound change of doctrine and strategy to win this war,

NY Times article:

U.S. Sees Lesson for Insurgents in an Iraq Battle

By DEXTER FILKINS and IAN FISHER

Americans vowed that the killing of as many as 54 insurgents would serve as a lesson, but Iraqis disputed the death toll.

4



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

INFO MEMO

April 7, 2004; 10:00 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD (Personnel & Readiness)

David S. C. Chu
8 Apr 04

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Recruiting that Accurately Reflects Deployment

- You recently asked (Tab A) for a sense of how well the Services' recruiting efforts reflect the likelihood of deployments. This responds.
- The topic of deployments is a standard part of training and information provided to recruits during discussions with the recruiter and through Delayed Entry Program activities.
- The Air Force is the most explicit. All Air Force recruits are required to review the Air Force Expeditionary Force Policy prior to accession. Each applicant must indicate with initials or signature that he or she received information on the policy, which clearly states that, although most Air Force personnel are away from their home stations less than 120 days per year, some may be required to exceed this level. Air Force advertising and marketing also depict Airmen in deployed environments.
- Similarly, Navy advertising and marketing prominently feature sailors on sea duty or in a warrior context.
- Army recently shifted its communications strategy away from a focus on tangible benefits, such as money for college and bonuses, to a more balanced approach. Army advertising and marketing reflect all aspects of Army training, including the combat arms, and portray the full rigor of Army service, including mobilizations and deployments.
- We will use our next survey of active personnel to ensure recruits understand these messages accurately.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Capt Angela Giddings, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)
Maj Heidi Schwenn, ODUSD(MPP)AP; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/31521



OSD 05055-04

TAB

A

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are with respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

MPD

December 27, 2003

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Recruiting

We need to make sure our recruiting accurately reflects the kinds of deployments we expect.

Do you have a sense of how closely the Services are with respect to the accuracy and likelihood of deployments?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
122703-32 (ts computer)

.....

Please respond by 1/31/04

6:33 PM

C 11/10

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: December 20, 2003
SUBJECT: Cables

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 DEC 20 AM 9:53

Please look at the attached two cables on the French dealing with the Taliban and let me know what you find out the facts are.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
122003 01tscomp

Attach: Unclass 190839Z Dec 03
Unclass 190816Z Dec 03

Sir,
Response attached,
Original attachments
included behind.

vr/
CDE
Nasmyt
1/9

France

Please respond by: 1/10/04 TO SECDEF

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE

✓
1/13

Jake -
Help, please -
8K
12/23/03

20 DEC 03

03-2672

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: **FBIS**
 DOCNO: SAP20031219000011
 CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 DTG: 190839Z DEC 03
 FROM: FM FBIS RESTON VA
 CONTROLS
 UNCLAS

*S.C.
 look into this
 DR*

WARNING: TOPIC: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL,
 LEADER, MEDIA, TERRORISM, URGENT

TEXT
 SERIAL: SAP20031219000011
 PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN, FRANCE, PAKISTAN

SUBJ: PAKISTAN: FRENCH JOURNALISTS REPORTEDLY FAKE FILM ON
 MULLAH OMAR, TALIBAN

REF: 1. PAKISTAN ARRESTS FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR INTERVIEWING
 MULLAH OMAR SAP20031218000098 KARACHI UMMAT URDU 18 DEC 03

SOURCE: ISLAMABAD KHABRAIN IN URDU 18 DEC 03 PP 1, 8

TEXT:

(REPORT BY AZEEM NAZIR: "CONSPIRACY TO DEFAME PAKISTAN; FRENCH
 JOURNALISTS PRODUCE FAKE FILM OF TALIBAN'S TRAINING")
 (FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT)

LAHORE -- SOME JOURNALISTS FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE ON THE
 PAYROLL OF ANTI-PAKISTAN FORCES INCLUDING INDIA AND ISRAEL AND WANT
 TO PROVE THAT PAKISTAN IS HELPING THE TALIBAN. ACCORDING TO A
 HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL SOURCE, ANTI-PAKISTAN FORCES ARE ALSO
 ENCOURAGING SOME PAKISTANI ELEMENTS WHO ARE PROVIDING SHELTER TO
 PERSONA NON GRATA ELEMENTS IN TRIBAL AREAS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
 TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS WERE ARRESTED IN KARACHI ON 17 DECEMBER.
 BOTH OF THEM ARE ON THE PAYROLL OF ENEMIES OF PAKISTAN WHO HAD
 PROVIDED A HUGE AMOUNT TO A MAN IN QUETTA TO GATHER PEOPLE IN A
 MOUNTAINOUS AREA ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. THEY DRESSED THESE
 PEOPLE LIKE TALIBAN AND PREPARED A FAKE FILM. IN THIS WAY THEY
 WANTED TO PROVE THAT TALIBAN ARE BEING GIVEN TRAINING IN DIFFERENT
 AREAS OF BALOCHISTAN. THEY INTENDED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT
 TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS EXIST IN PAKISTAN.

ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT, IN VIEW OF ITS
 RELATIONS WITH THE FRIENDLY COUNTRY OF FRANCE, HAS ADOPTED A
 LENIENT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE JOURNALISTS, AND BY IGNORING THEIR
 DESIGNS HAS REGISTERED A CASE OF VIOLATION OF THE FOREIGN ACT.
 HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT WILL FORMALLY LODGE A PROTEST
 WITH FRANCE OVER THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE IT WAS A CONSPIRACY TO
 DEFAME PAKISTAN. ACCORDING TO SOURCES, AN IMPRESSION IS BEING
 INTENTIONALLY GIVEN THAT THESE JOURNALISTS INTERVIEWED MULLAH OMAR.

11-L-0559/OSD/31526

UNCLASSIFIED

WHICH IS A WHITE LIE. IN THIS WAY, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONCEAL THE REAL DESIGNS.

(DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: ISLAMABAD KHABRAIN IN URDU -- SENSATIONALIST DAILY, GENERALLY OPPOSES PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY. CIRCULATION OF 30,000.)

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(ENDALL)

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31527

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: **FBIS**
DOCNO: SAP20031218000098
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
DTG: 190816Z DEC 03
FROM: FM FBIS RESTON VA
CONTROLS
UNCLAS

WARNING: TOPIC: DOMESTIC POLITICAL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL, MEDIA,
TERRORISM, **URGENT**

TEXT
SERIAL: SAP20031218000098
PASS: ATTN WIRE SELECT

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN, FRANCE, PAKISTAN

SUBJ: PAKISTAN ARRESTS FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR INTERVIEWING
MULLAH OMAR

SOURCE: KARACHI UMMAT IN URDU 18 DEC 03 PP 1, 7

TEXT:

(UMMAT CORRESPONDENT REPORT: "TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS ARRESTED
FOR INTERVIEWING MULLAH OMAR")
(FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT)

PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES HAVE ARRESTED TWO FRENCH JOURNALISTS WHO
INTERVIEWED TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR. THEY ARE ACCUSED
OF VIOLATING PAKISTANI IMMIGRATION LAWS. THE FIA (FEDERAL
INVESTIGATION AGENCY) HAS REGISTERED A CASE AGAINST THEM FOR
COMMITTING VISA IRREGULARITIES.

ACCORDING TO DETAILS, FIA PASSPORT CELL PERSONNEL RAIDED THE
AVARI TOWER HOTEL ON LATE TUESDAY (16 DECEMBER) NIGHT AND ARRESTED
MARK EPSTEIN AND JEAN PAUL GUILLOTEAU, WHO ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE
FORTNIGHTLY "L EXPRESS." TALKING TO NEWSMEN IN HIS OFFICE,
MOHAMMAD MALIK, FIA PASSPORT CELL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SAID THE FRENCH
JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FOR VIOLATING THE INSTRUCTION
PRINTED ON THEIR VISAS. HE SAID THE ACCUSED OBTAINED A VISA FROM
THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY IN PARIS IN SEPTEMBER, WHICH WAS VALID UP TO
28 MARCH 2004. THE ACCUSED ARRIVED IN KARACHI ON 7 DECEMBER.
ACCORDING TO VISAS ISSUED TO THE FRENCH JOURNALISTS, THEY COULD
ONLY VISIT KARACHI, LAHORE, AND ISLAMABAD. BUT THE ACCUSED WENT
TO QUETTA ILLEGALLY AND AGAIN STAYED AT AVARI TOWER HOTEL ON THEIR
RETURN TO KARACHI. UPON RECEIVING INFORMATION OF THE BREACH OF
LAW, THEY WERE ARRESTED AND CASE NO. 270/2003 WAS REGISTERED
AGAINST THEM. A LOCAL COURT HAS REMANDED THEM TO FIA CUSTODY
UNTIL 24 DECEMBER.

HOWEVER, IMPORTANT SOURCES SAY THE ACCUSED STAYED IN QUETTA FOR
ONE DAY AND THEN CROSSED THE BORDER INTO AFGHANISTAN, WHERE THEY
RECORDED AN AUDIO AND VIDEO INTERVIEW OF MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR.

11-L-0559/OSD/31528

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTER CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW, THEY AGAIN REACHED QUETTA. UPON RECEIVING THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN, AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT AGENCY STARTED SEARCHING FOR THE JOURNALISTS. THEY RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE JOURNALISTS HAD LEFT FOR KARACHI BY ROAD, UPON WHICH SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED AT OTHAL CHECK POINT WERE DIRECTED TO SEIZE THE LOGGAGE AND CAMERAS ETC. FROM THE ACCUSED. THEREFORE, BORDER GUARDS SEIZED THEIR LUGGAGE AND EQUIPMENT. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCES, THE FRENCH CONSULATE GENERAL WROTE LETTER NO. 162/APK TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CAMP OFFICE KARACHI, WHICH SAID THAT THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM THE JOURNALISTS INCLUDED ONE LAPTOP COMPUTER; ONE RED NOTEBOOK; ONE FLOPPY DISC; ONE VIDEOCASSETTE; SIX DIGITAL CAMERAS; IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS; HOTEL RECEIPTS; TICKETS FOR KARACHI, ISLAMABAD, AND QUETTA; AND THE NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD OF ONE KHAWAR MEHDI.

ACCORDING TO SOURCES, THE IMPORTANT AGENCY CHECKED THE ARTICLES CAPTURED FROM THE JOURNALISTS BUT THEY CONTAINED NOTHING ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. LATER, THE AGENCY DIRECTED FIA PASSPORT CELL DEPUTY DIRECTOR MOHAMMAD MALIK TO ARREST THE FRENCH JOURNALISTS FOR VIOLATING THE DIRECTIVES PRINTED ON THEIR VISAS. AFTER THEIR ARREST, A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICIAL REACHED THE PASSPORT CELL, BUT THE FIA HAD REGISTERED THE CASE BY THEN. OFFICIALS FROM IMPORTANT AGENCIES ARE INVESTIGATING THE MATTER.

MEANWHILE, FIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR MOHAMMAD MALIK HAS DENIED THAT THE ACCUSED WENT TO AFGHANISTAN.

(DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: KARACHI UMMAT IN URDU -- SENSATIONALIST, PRO-USAMA BIN LADEN URDU DAILY. HARSHLY CRITICAL OF THE US AND OF INDIA. CIRCULATION OF 20,000.)

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(ENDALL)

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/31529

Snowflake

SECRET
2001 DEC 12 AM 9:03

✓
1/12

December 30, 2003

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense

373.24

Please read this J.D. Crouch memo on missile defense and see me.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/03 Crouch memo to SecDef re: "Missile Defense Way Ahead"

DHR:dn
123003-3 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/16/04

TEN
1/9

30 Dec 03

OSD 05211-04

11-L-0559/OSD/31530

3

11/1/04

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

DATE 1/9/2004 4:20 PM

MEMO FOR SecDef

I have read J.D.'s memo.

I agree with his approach. We agreed to add \$500M in new money for FY05 and \$1B in FY06 to support the next phase of deploying ground-based missile.

Gen Kadish has found an additional \$336M (FY05 \$177M & FY06 \$159M) within his program to ensure sufficient funds for this next deployment phase.

The challenge before us, if we want to deploy abroad, is to work out agreements with allies.


I agree with J.D. on the need for a fresh look at the missile defense progress. I've discussed such an effort with Gen Kadish, and he agrees one is needed. We should do it before he leaves in June.

Key to continued success with missile defense is the knowledge of and commitment to it by the next ASD/ISP.

As always, I stand ready to help.

11-L-0559/OSD/31531

A19



✓
R/S

December 10, 2003

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
From: J. D. Crouch II
Subject: ~~Missile~~ Defense Way Ahead

DepSec _____

I have heard that an effort is underway in the department to "pause" the evolutionary approach to missile defense briefed to the President the last two years in Crawford. I am aware of the arguments in favor of such a pause, but I think it would be a mistake.

The evolutionary approach was deliberately designed not to commit us to a large, costly deployment but slowly to begin fielding modest capability. Its benefits are that for a relatively small investment we can:

- Begin to assure allies and dissuade opponents.
- Gain valuable experience in the organization and operation of global defenses.
- Provide a forcing function to organize, train, and equip for missile defense.
- Demonstrate real capability out of an \$8+ billion dollar budget while continuing an aggressive R&D effort.
- Keep our deployment options open for the future.

The dollars we are talking about for Crawford II are not huge (3-8% of the MDA budget), but sustaining this new approach to fielding systems has broad implications for missile defense, and how the department fields systems more generally.

Pausing now would:

- Be used by opponents of the program as evidence that the President's decision last year was premature and politically motivated.
- Delay the fielding of any new capabilities beyond Crawford I until after the end of the President's second term, thus:
 - Undermining the dissuasive impact of our MD program on key states of interest at a time of critical negotiations.
 - Make it difficult to sustain congressional interest in an \$8+ billion dollar budget in the out-years.
- Instill doubt in allies and friends who have recently come on board or are thinking about doing so, with implications beyond missile defense.
- Be seen inside the military as stepping away from the MD mission at a time when we are just now getting traction with the Combatant Commanders and the uniformed military.
- Cost significant amounts of money to restart production lines.

cc: LD
LTG Craddock

11-L-0559/OSD/31532

✓

Continuing the program as briefed at Crawford would:

- Demonstrate continued confidence in the cautious, evolutionary approach we briefed to Congress.
 - We need not make a new public announcement of our intention to deploy specific capabilities in FY 06. Internally, budget and schedule planning will need to occur, yet our public rhetoric can simply emphasize our intention to continue to move forward to field additional capabilities, while preserving some flexibility concerning dates and numbers.
- Lock in allied support for the program as it becomes increasingly "real" to them.
 - A European site that provides limited protection for both the U.S. and Europe from longer-range missiles would further demonstrate the President's commitment to the alliance and differentiate the U.S. as an ally of choice in the NATO-EU debate.
 - It would also make it much more difficult to reverse the track toward greater MD capabilities because of the foreign policy and alliance management implications.
- Help force needed trade-offs and belt tightening within the MD program. A pause will be interpreted as a breathing space between hard decisions.
 - There is money to be found in the MDA budget, and Steve Cambone and Dov Zakheim originally reserved an additional funding wedge outside the MDA budget in the FY06-09 timeframe for fielding new capabilities.
 - Three years in, a look at what programs deserve continuing is in order.
 - The tooth to tail ratio also needs examination. There is almost one billion dollars in SETA contract support in the budget!

ACTION: If you agree, I suggest you direct Dov Zakheim to work with Ron Kadish to parse this year's MDA budget and present you with options to sustain the evolutionary approach to missile defense.



SECRET
ZDN 128 12 11 9: 03

646
December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PACOM and CENTCOM

333

Here is a Vern Clark e-mail on the lines between PACOM and CENTCOM that we ought to think through. Please see me on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/24/03 CNO e-mail re: India/Pakistan Trip Thoughts

DHR.dh
122703-79 (is computer)



Please respond by 1/23/04

OK C2/10
Sir,
CJCS met w/ SecDef
on 22 Jan 04 @ 0835.
LTC Swope

27 Dec 03

OSD 05214-04